This paper presents a case study examination of the Commonwealth of Virginia's public higher education market and the use of asymmetrical information flows between providers and consumers by college and university institutions to intentionally create market failures to maximize brand building through increased revenue collections via profit maximization behaviors. Existing economic research in the financial services market hold that asymmetry of information generates inefficient allocation of goods and subsequent identification of market failure conditions. Market failures can lead to tipping points which may result in public values failures as threats to human subsistence (i.e. food, clothing, education) and imperfect public information. Market failures resulting in public values failures warrant government intervention to correct market inefficiency and ensure pareto efficiency in the allocation of goods. Mandatory non-educational fees increase the cost to attend a post-secondary institution which subsequently aid in increased student debt and reduced access and affordability for low income classification groups thus exacerbating societal cleavages identified as public values failures. This research identifies the application of economic and public administration theory to construct a policy recommendation to mitigate asymmetrical information and improve pareto efficiency involving transactions in the public higher education market.