

# PHILOSOPHY OF CARAKASAMHITĀ

THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE  
MAHATMA GANDHI UNIVERSITY  
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN  
SANSKRIT

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SEPTEMBER 2008

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This is to certify that this thesis, **PHILOSOPHY OF CARAKASAMHITĀ**, submitted for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sanskrit under the faculty of Language and Literature, Mahatma Gandhi University, Priyadarsini Hills, Kottayam, is the record of bonafide research carried out by **Asokan. G.**, under my guidance.

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## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

It is with immense pleasure that I express my sincere gratitude to my guide Dr. G. Gangadharan Nair who has given me instructions to complete this research project. I am very grateful to Dr. M. Gopalakrishnan Unnithan for the generous care with which he has read this thesis and improved it by corrections. I am indebted to Dr. V.N. Jha, Prof. Dr. Karin Preisendanz, University of Vienna, Austria, and Prof. K. Nirmalanandan, who have given me the benefits of long and varied experience as great scholars of Indian philosophical systems and I owe much to Dr. S.S. Vivekanandan, Dr. Manoj Sankaranarayanan and Dr. Pavana. J., for the services they have rendered to me in the completion of this work. And finally, I should like to place on record my indebtedness to the Research centre, Govt. Sanskrit College, Tripunithura, for providing me with adequate facilities for carrying out my research.

**ASOKAN. G**

## PREFACE

Āyurveda, represented by Caraka and Suśruta, stands first among the sciences of Indian intellectual tradition. No other branch of learning is subject to such an acute competition as Āyurveda is with modern medicine. Yet, it has survived the challenges of time and has attained a new impetus today. Intensive researches and studies are being carried out throughout the world with the intention to answer some of the fundamental questions which are yet to be answered in the domain of medical science. This is probably due to the novelty of the fundamental principles of Āyurveda which is based on a holistic approach. The fundamental principles are, in fact, built upon philosophical concepts. Hence it is essential to remove the ambiguities in philosophical abstractions for developing the consistency and authenticity of the fundamental principles. One of the possible ways is to make explicit the philosophical speculations in which the fundamental principles of Āyurveda are rooted. Carakasamhitā deserves special mention in this respect.

Carakasamhitā is recognized as a unique treatise on *kāyacikitsā* and fundamental principles. It is an encyclopaedia that discusses the inner and outer world without leaving anything as irrelevant and taking into consideration the prevailing knowledge systems.

Carakasamhitā, ascribed to the great celebrity Caraka, has got three strata. The first stratum is the original work composed by Agniveśa, the foremost of the six disciples of Punarvasu Ātreya. He accomplished the work by collecting and codifying the teachings of his preceptor Punarvasu Ātreya. The second and the most prominent stratum is the redacted (*pratisamskṛta*) form of Agniveśatantra and this redaction is ascribed to Caraka. The third and final layer is a reconstruction by D ḍhabala, son of Kapilabala of the Punjab. He has incorporated the seventeen chapters of the sixth section *Cikitsāsthāna* as well as the last two sections *Kalpāsthāna* and *Siddhisthāna* into the Carakasamhitā and completed it. Thus, Carakasamhitā, as it is available today, comprises 120 chapters (*adhyāyas*) prearranged in eight sections (*sthānas*): *Ślokaśthāna* or *Sūtraśthāna* (30 chapters), *Nidānaśthāna* (8 chapters), *Vimānaśthāna* (8 chapters), *Sārīraśthāna* (8 chapters), *Indriyaśthāna* (12 chapters), *Cikitsāsthāna* (30 chapters), *Kalpāsthāna* (12 chapters), and *Siddhisthāna* (12 chapters). The most significant thing to be noted in this connection is that the book is now known in the name of the redactor Caraka even though the final reconstruction was done by D ḍhabala.

The present thesis is the result of my endeavor as a research student of the Mahatma Gandhi University. The purpose of the attempt is to present a comprehensive view of the philosophy of Caraka. The work primarily tries to codify the philosophical abstractions strewn in different *sthānās* of the compendium and, through a comparison with the concepts in other philosophical systems, seeks to bring out the foundational ideas constituting the creative matrix of Āyurveda.

The thesis comprises nine chapters. The introductory chapter deals with the relevance of the study by focusing on the relationship between philosophy and the practical science of Āyurveda. The second chapter gives an explanation of the six categories enumerated by Caraka in comparison with the six categories of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The third chapter is devoted to a discussion of the important fundamental theories regarding the origin of the universe, five physical elements (*pañcabhūtas*), and the three faults (*tridoṣas*), and reveals the allegiance of Caraka to the pre-classical Sāṃkhya. The next chapter describes the Self as the foundational cause of the Universe. A detailed exposition of a human-being and his relation with the universe based on philosophical abstractions is given in the fifth chapter. In the sixth chapter the means of knowledge are analyzed by making a comparison with their concepts in Nyāya philosophy. Similarly, the seventh chapter is a comparative analysis of logic and dialectical terms. The eighth chapter discusses ethical conceptions and moral prescriptions. The concluding chapter evaluates the innovative contributions of Caraka and determines his philosophical vision.

## ABBREVIATIONS

ACJ	Advaitic Concept of Jīvanmukti by Lalit Kishore Lal Srivastava.
ADS	Aṣṭādaśasmṛiti.
AH	Aṣṭāṅghaḍaya of Vāgbhaṭa.
AHM	Aspects of Hindu Morality by Saral Jhingran.
Ai. U.	Aitareya Upaniṣad.
AK	Amarakośa.
AMS	Āyurvedīyamaulikasiddhānta, by Vinayaka Jayananda Thakkar.
ARV	The Mind in Āyurveda and Other Indian Traditions by A.R.V. Murthy.
AS	Aṣṭāṅgasaṅgraha of Vāgbhaṭa.
BCA	Buddhacarita of Aśvaghōṣa.
BFD	Beyond Freedom and Dignity by B.F. Skinner.
BG	Śrīmad Bhagavad Gītā Bhāṣya of Śankarācārya.
Bh. S	Bhelasamhitā.
BLS	Life: An Introduction to Biology.
Br. Bh	Brahmasūtra, with Śāṅkarabhāṣya.
Br. Su	Brahmasūtra
Br. U.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.



- BT Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition, Paul Williams, with Anthony Tribe.
- BWT On Being and What There Is: Classical Vaiśeṣika and the History of Indian Ontology by Wilhem Halbfass.
- CHI The Cultural Heritage of India.
- Ci Cikitsāsthāna
- CIET Classical Indian Ethical Thought: A philosophical Study of Hindu, Jaina and Bauddha Morals by Kedar Nath Tiwari.
- CIPM Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind by Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti.
- CSP The Critical Study of Praśastapādabhāṣya by S. Peerukannu.
- CS Carakasamhitā of Agniveśa, Revised by Caraka and Dḍhabala, (with the Commentary Āyurveda Dīpikā of Cakrapāṇidatta).
- CSG Carakasamhitā (with Hindi, Gujarati, and English Trans.).
- CSJ Carakasamhitā (with Āyurveda Dīpikā of Cakrapāṇi and Jalpakalpataru of Sri Gangadhar Kaviratna Kaviraja).
- CST Carakasamhitā of Agniveśa , (with Trans. and Critical Exposition by Dr. R.K. Sharma and Dr. Bhagavan Dash).
- DO Darśnodaya: Early Indian Thought by S. K. Ramachandra Rao.
- DT The Doctrine of Tantrayuktis (Methodology of Theoretico- Scientific Treatise in Sanskrit ) by Dr. W.K. Lele.
- EAIP Elements of Ancient Indian Psychology by B. Kuppuswamy.
- EFW History of Indian Philosophy by Erich Frauwallner.

- EIP M. Hiriyanna, , The Essentials of Indian Philosophy.
- EIPS Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. IV, (Sāṃkhya A Dual Tradition in Indian Philosophy.
- EIPK Encyclopedias of Indian Philosophies Vol. II (Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika upto Gaṅgeśa).
- EJ An Epitome of Jainism.
- ENVC Evolution of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoricalology by Harsh Narain.
- EWUV The East-West Understanding of Man by Narayan Karan Reddy.
- FIC Foundations of Indian Culture, Vol. I., Spiritual Vision and Symbolic Forms in Ancient India by G.C. Pande.
- FM A History of Philosophy by Fuller / McMurrin.
- FRIP Facets of Recent Indian Philosophy .
- HIL A History of Indian Logic (Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Schools) by Satis Chandra Vidyābhūṣṇa.
- HIPS A History of Indian Philosophy by Surendranath Dasgupta.
- HSPCIC History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilisation.
- IFD Inference and Fallacies Discussed in Ancient Indian Logic: With Special reference to Nyāya and Buddhism by Pradeep P. Gokhale.
- IHBT Indian Philosophy: An Introduction to the Hindu and Buddhist Thought by Richard King.
- IK Introduction to Kāyācikitsā by C. Dwarakanath.
- IM An Introduction To Metaphysics.

In	Indriyasthāna.
IP	Indian Psychology by Jadunath Sinha.
JJL	Classical Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of its History and Meaning by Jerald James Larson.
JNS	Indian Philosophy by Jadunath Sinha.
KA	The Kautilīya Arthaśāstra.
Ka	Kalpasthāna
Ka. U.	Kaṭha Upaniṣad.
KFL	Knowledge Freedom and Language: An Interwoven Fabric of Man, Time and World by D.P. Chattopadhyaya.
KHP	Presuppositions of India's Philosophies by Karl H Potter.
KL	Kiraṇāvalī of Udayanācārya.
KS	<i>Kāśyapasaṃhitā</i> of V ddhajīvaka
KV	Kāśikā: Pāṇinīyavyākaraṇasūtrav tti, of Pt. Vāmana and Jayāditya .
LC	The Legacy of Caraka by M.S Valiathan.
MB	Mahābhārata.
M.Bh	Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya of Patañjali.
MK	Methods of Knowledge: Perceptual, Non-perceptual and Transcendental According to Advaita Vedānta by Swāmī Satyaprakāśānanda.
MM	Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa.
MS	Manusm ti.

M.Su	Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini.
Mu. U.	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.
NB	Nyāya Bindu of Sri Dharmakīrti.
N. Bh	Nyāya-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.
NEC	Nyāya-sūtra evam Carakasamhitā.
Ni	Nidānasthāna.
NK	Nyāyakośa.
NKU	Nyāyakusumāñjali of Udayanācārya.
NM	Nyāyamañjarī, Jayantabhaṭṭa.
NS	Nyāyasūtra.
NSMD	Kārikāvalī of Viśwanāthapañcānana, (with the commentaries Muktaivalī, Dinakarī, and Rāmarudrī).
NSMK	Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī of Viśwanāthapañcānana, (with the commentary Kiraṇāvalī by Pt. Kriṣnavallabhācārya.
NSS	The Number Sense by Stanislas Dehaene.
NTIT	The Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought by Dale Riepe.
NV	Nyāya-Vārttika of Udyotakāra.
NVT	Nyāya-Vārttikatātparyāṭīkā of Vācaspati Miśra.
Ny.Sa	Nyāyasara of Bhāsarvajña.
ODST	Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought, Pulinbihari Chakravarti.

PBNK	Praśastapādabhāṣya.
PD	Outlines of Indian Philosophy by Paul Deussen.
PIP	Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy.
PS	Aṣṭādhyāyī - sūtrapāṭha of Pāṇini.
PSAH	The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus by Brijendranath Seal.
PTN	The Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi .
PUIP	The Problems of Universals in Indian Philosophy by Rajaram Dravid.
PVS	History of Medicine in India, (From Antiquity to 1000 A.D.)
RV	Ṛgveda-Saṃhitā
RVS	Rasavaiśeṣika-sūtra of Bhadantanāgarjuna.
Sa	Sārīrasthāna
SAS	Śārṅgadharasaṃhitā of Śārṅgadharācārya.
SDS	Ṣaḍdarśanasamucaya.
SDSM	Sarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha, Sāyaṇa-Mādhava.
SHI	Scientific Heritage of India: Āyurveda.
Si	Siddhisthāna
SIT	Studies in Indian Thought (Collected papers) by T.V.R. Murti.
SK	Sāṃkhyakārikā
SM	Scientific Materialism by Mario Bunge.
SP	Saptapadārthi of Śivāditya.

SS	Suśrutasaṃhitā of Suśruta .
SSM	Śabdastoma Mahanidhi.
S.Su	Sāṃkhya-sūtra,
SSV	Sāṃkhyadarśana (with Sākhyapravacanabhāṣya of Sri Vijñana Bhikṣu).
STK	Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī of Sri Vācaspati Miśra.
Su.	Sūtrasthāna
Sv. U.,	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
Ta. U.	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
T.Bh	Tarkabhāṣa of Śrī Keśavamiśra.
TC	Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya.
TDB	Tarkasaṃgraha (with the commentary of Dayananda Bhargava), Delhi, 1984.
TSA	Tarkasaṃgraha of Annaṃbhaṭṭa (with the authors own Dīpikā, Nyāya-bodhinī of Govardhana and Introduction and English Trans., of the text by Mahadev Rajaram Bodas). ed., with Critical Notes and Explanatory Notes by Yashwant Athalye
TV	Tantrayuktivicāra, Nīlameghabhiṣak
US	Uttarādhyayana-sūtra.
Ut	Uttaratantra
VB	Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya of Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra.
VC	Vivekacūdāmaṇi of Śrī Śankarācārya.

Vi	Vimānasthāna
VNK	Eastern and Western Philosophy (An Introduction) by V.N.K Reddy.
VP	Vedāntaparibhāṣa of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra .
VS	Vaiśeṣikadarśana.
VSA	Vedānta- Sāra of Sadānanda Yogīndra.
VSK	Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī of Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita.
VTa	Vaiśeṣikadarśan - Tulanātmāk Adhyayan by Dr. Badarinathsinh.
VU	Vaiśeṣikopaskāra of Śrī Śaṅkaramiśra.
VV	Viśayatāvāda, Hrirāma Tarkālaṅkāra.
WM	History of Indian Literature by Maurice Winternitz.
YD	Sāṃkhya Yogadarśana (Yogadarśana) of Patañjali.
Y.Su	Yogasūtra,

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# Chapter - I

## INTRODUCTION

Āyurveda is a practical science and Carakasamhitā is a treatise on it. So it is quite natural to have the question: “What is the relevance of the study of the philosophy of Caraka?” or “Is there any philosophical speculation in Carakasamhitā?”

The question presupposes the notion that science is distinct from philosophy. Philosophy does not provide us with the kind of knowledge that science provides. Science is a way of gaining knowledge by explaining observed facts and the knowledge thus obtained is useful in the day to day life of man. But philosophy is not so. It is attached to transcendental principles. It is abstract in character, and has no direct involvement in human life conditions.

So it is essential to give a reasonable or at least a satisfactory answer to the above-mentioned queries, even though such questions are the outcome of utilitarian thoughts. Such an answer would also prove the historicity of Carakasamhitā.

A retrospective introspection of the evolution of human thought reveals that “man began by dealing wholesale with the world, indulging in

speculations about the general nature and behaviour of the universe without separating scientific and philosophic fields and methods of investigation from one another”.<sup>1</sup> Gradually persuaded by increasing human needs and directed to different groups of events, the spirit of universal enquiry was subdivided into specialized investigations. Thus, in the west, special sciences like Astronomy, Medicine, and Logic slowly originated at a fairly early date and steadily became independent and self supporting.<sup>2</sup> This shows that the western sciences have their roots in the early philosophical thoughts, but got isolated from them in course of time.

### **The distinction of knowledge in Indian tradition - higher and lower knowledge (*parā vidyā* and *aparā vidyā*)**

The Indian tradition of knowledge which began with emphasis on intuition in the Vedic age flowered in the philosophies and sciences of the classical age.<sup>3</sup> In the Upaniṣads, we find an important distinction between *parā vidyā* and *aparā vidyā* or higher knowledge and lower knowledge,<sup>4</sup> and also *avidyā* and *vidyā* or false knowledge and true knowledge.<sup>5</sup> “These two types of knowledge differ from each other in their objects, their consequences as well as in methods of acquisition”.<sup>6</sup> With regard to acquisition, the higher knowledge is said to be direct and intuitive, while the lower knowledge has different accredited means like perception, and inference.<sup>7</sup> The knowledge of the immutable (*akṣara*) highest essence is called higher knowledge (*parā vidyā*).<sup>8</sup> It was valued, for it leads to liberation. The Upaniṣads and Darśanas come under the purview of

*parā vidyā*. The empirical or phenomenal knowledge is called lower knowledge (*aparā vidyā*). They are all discursive and the truth they aim at is pragmatic (*vyāvahārika*). Such pragmatic knowledge is rational and corrigible. All sciences fall under *aparā vidyā*. It enables one to know the objective world, means and ends, and virtues and vices, which can lead to prosperity and heaven. “This distinction between a spiritually liberating transcendental knowledge and practically useful intellectual knowledge has remained a permanently accepted distinction within the Indian tradition”.<sup>9</sup>

## **Darśanas**

The Darśanas are the philosophical speculations which sprang up in continuation of the Upaniṣads with the aim of accomplishing the higher knowledge of enlightenment culminating in ultimate freedom. The word darśana literally and technically means either of two things: (1) literally means sight and technically reflective knowledge<sup>10</sup> as well as (2) literally sense organs and technically that by which the real nature of things is seen.<sup>11</sup> According to the second technical meaning, it refers to the source of true knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) of the nature of reality. The name Darśana, thus, is used in the second technical sense for the knowledge systems, which present a reflective knowledge of man and the world in total. They are recognized as various philosophical systems.<sup>12</sup> Haribhadrasūri, the Jaina philosopher, who introduced the term Darśana in the sense of philosophy, mentions six philosophical systems: Bauddha, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Jaina, Vaiśeṣika, Jaiminīya and includes the non-Vedic Cārvāka.<sup>13</sup>

The usual way of explaining the word Darśana is to point out that, in the Vedas, there is a prescription for seeing the self, the threefold method of hearing (*śravaṇa*), thinking (*manana*), and meditation (*nididhyāsana*). But this explanation is not adequate, for all philosophical systems do not prescribe methods for realizing the self. The Buddhists and the Cārvākas refute the existence of the self, yet they are not deprived of the name Darśana.<sup>14</sup>

Sāyaṇa Mādhava, who speaks of sixteen Darśanas, classifies them into two groups namely Vedic (*āstika*) and Non-Vedic (*nāstika*).<sup>15</sup> The *āstika* Darśanas are those which accept the authority of the Vedas.<sup>16</sup> They prescribe methods for realizing the self and in that sense they are self-centric philosophical schools. The present list of six systems, namely Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Pūrvamīmāṃsā, and Uttaramīmāṃsā (Vedānta) form this group.

Though there are differences between these systems, the basic factors that impelled the philosophers to make such an enquiry are common. The fundamental cause of the enquiry is the realization of the fact that the sum total of everyone's life in this world is painful and that this pain is due to attachment caused by ignorance. The endeavor of the philosophers was to find out a way to root out pain eternally.<sup>17</sup> In order to achieve the end, they formulated a fourfold enquiry. The four common factors that became the subject of their investigation are (1) attachment (*bandha*), (2) cause of attachment (*bandhakāraṇa*) (3) freedom (*mokṣa*) and (4) cause of freedom

(*mokṣakāraṇa*). Thus, the Indian Darśanas which focused on the above mentioned aspects are really philosophical systems which made systematic speculations on man and universe with the aim of realising the highest truth for transforming and spiritualizing human life.

## Indian sciences

The search for mundane happiness progressed on a par with the task of realising the ultimate truth for the utmost freedom. Gradually, various progressive sciences developed. Śankarācārya, who is the author of Prapañcasāra says that the Lord constructed eighteen such *vidyas* and Darśanas. The eighteen disciplines (*vidyas*) are (1) Ṛg Veda, (2) Yajur Veda, (3) Sāma Veda, (4) Atharva Veda, (5) Śikṣā (a treatise for teaching the proper tone in which the Vedas are to be recited), (6) Kalpa (a treatise for teaching the rules of rituals), (7) Vyākaraṇa (grammar), (8) Nirukta (etymology), (9) Jyotiśāstra (astronomy and astrology), (10) Cchandaḥśāstra (metrics), (11) Purāṇa, (12) Nyāya, (13) Mīmāṃsā, (14) Dharmaśāstra, (15) Āyurveda, (16) Dhanurveda, (17) Gandharva (a treatise on music), and (18) Arthaśāstra.<sup>18</sup> It should be noted in this context that Śankarācārya includes all the four Vedas within the lower knowledge (*aparā vidyā*) while maintaining at the same time that the Upaniṣads, the last part of the Vedas, impart knowledge of the Brahman. According to his followers, the empirical knowledge (*viśayavidyā*) or the ritualistic part of the Vedas, which is not directly related to the knowledge of the Brahman, is referred to by Śankarācārya as lower knowledge.<sup>19</sup> This shows that there



developed philosophy on the one side and the sciences on the other side distinctly in India. The life science thus developed came to be called Āyurveda.

### Ill-fate of Āyurveda and other sciences

Āyurveda, being a scientific discipline distinct from the higher knowledge, was overlooked even in the past. So the neglect that Āyurveda had undergone must not be looked upon in isolation. It is a part of the disregard that the Indian sciences confronted in general.

One of the main reasons was that *parā vidyā* was considered as the most celebrated knowledge in early days. “From the view of the enlightened person, knowledge of the phenomenal world is not merely lower (*aparā*), but also linked with *avidyā* or root of ignorance”.<sup>20</sup> Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad states that *aparā vidyā* is knowledge concerned with perishable things; while *parā vidyā* is concerned with the imperishable (*akṣara*).<sup>21</sup> Jayantabhaṭṭa also refers to the very same notion. He says that, there is no need of the employment of *śāstras* in empirical matters (*dṛṣṭaviṣaya*). On the contrary, they are intended for the transcendental knowledge.<sup>22</sup> The undue importance attached to spirituality has to a certain extent, undermined the Indian sciences in the past. The condition of Āyurveda was also not different.

In the later period, during the colonial rule, the direct presence of the Europeans by and large influenced the science and technology in India as in other Asian countries. The homogenizing impact of science and technology of western origin continued in our country even when other countries like

Japan and China have escaped the negative effects of colonial subjugation, retaining their self identity. Another important reason is that English education not only strengthened the hegemonic impact of the language on all branches of learning but also pushed Sanskrit and Sanskrit education to the background. The scientific knowledge in its cultural context could not be acquired unless the classical language like Sanskrit could be studied in depth.<sup>23</sup> More over, “the writings of the English educated historians of science and of the scientists themselves show little or no notable sign of their familiarity with the rich tradition or the development of science in India”.<sup>24</sup>

Even though projects are being carried out to free ourselves from this intellectual bondage, at least some people believe that the theme of Āyurveda is not completely tenable and is not in any way considered as an authentic system of knowledge. This is because the knowledge imparted by the western sciences is considered the most prestigious, for it is honoured for its practical utility and its usefulness in our day-to-day life. This has led to the belief that the theoretical explanations of western sciences are factual, logical, and reliable while those of Indian sciences are illogical and dogmatic. But such notions are false and have no relevance.

### **Methodological inadequacy of modern sciences**

The notion that scientific knowledge is the best form of knowledge is wrong for various reasons.<sup>25</sup> The western sciences, which jerked away from philosophy with its specialized investigations, got estranged themselves

from the general nature and behaviour of the universe and from the transcendental objectives of life. In the closing decade of the last century the western scientists were persuaded to say that their theories were probable explanations. They admit that a theory is simply a hypothesis<sup>26</sup> that has been tested often enough to convince scientists that it is probably correct. They speak of the acceptance of a theory, confidence in a theory, and probability of its correctness but never the proof of its correctness. If proof means the establishment of an eternal and absolute truth, then proof has no place in natural sciences. A theory is always open to disproof.<sup>27</sup>

In fact, the mechanical view of nature often creates crisis in science. In 1910 Max Plank wrote, noting the existence of a crisis in physics:

“No physical theorem is at present beyond doubt, all and every physical truth is considered disputable. It often seems almost as if theoretical physics is about to be plunged again into chaos”.<sup>28</sup>

There is a conviction that progress of science depends upon the use of mathematics. This also is not tenable. “Mathematical models rarely agree *exactly* with physical reality.... All the ‘laws’ of physics that we arrogantly impose on the universe seem condemned to remain partial models, approximate mental representations that we ceaselessly improve”.<sup>29</sup> “Mathematicians generate an enormous amount of pure mathematics. Only a small part of it will ever be useful in physics. There is thus an overproduction of mathematical solutions from which physicists select those that seem best adapted to their discipline”.<sup>30</sup> In fact the credibility of

mathematics itself is questionable. David Herbert holds that “the existence of the mathematical objects is meaningless. Mathematics is only a game in which one manipulates symbols according to precise formal rules. Mathematical objects such as numbers have no relation to reality; they are defined merely as a set of symbols that satisfy certain axioms”.<sup>31</sup>

Another thing is that all sciences deal with different parts of Nature. Some times the same thing is studied from two different points of view. For instance, both physics and chemistry deal with matter. But the scientists make a distinction between physical properties of matter and chemical properties of matter. All these distinctions are abstract in the sense that they are not so in reality.<sup>32</sup>

The greatest distortion of sciences is their spiritual inadequacy arising from objectivism.<sup>33</sup> “Science strives to discover the laws of the objective--its goal is to state the truth about the objective nature of the universe.<sup>34</sup> What happened is that they have failed to concentrate on human subjectivity; human aspirations and hopes”.<sup>35</sup>

Subjectivity and objectivity are the two poles implicit in knowledge. They are the ontological extremities into which almost every knowledge situation is analysable.<sup>36</sup> The basic assumption of science is that objective knowledge is the only valid kind of knowledge, for it is definite, exact, and unambiguous. Science tries to know the universe objectively and keeps out of its consideration the elements that constitute subjectivity.<sup>37</sup> Science like physics, chemistry, and biology offer an objective materialistic explanation of the empirical world by observation, analysis, experimentation, and

proof.<sup>38</sup> This empirical analytical approach does not give attention to human consciousness or the mechanism of knowledge beyond trying to find out its physiological *correlates*. It is consciousness that causes happiness, pain, interests, insights, and volitions which are the very sign of one's existence. But these deeper human elements are neglected in science. That is, the question of how physical process in the brain gives rise to subjective experience remains unsolved. Science has consistently overlooked the *elan* of man.<sup>39</sup>

The extrinsic explanation of man without knowing the inner self fails to understand the real nature of man and the universe and their interrelationship. Human science identifies man with his immediate physical and physiological identity, forgetting his deeper and far reaching spiritual identity. These external institutional human sciences are methodologically inadequate.<sup>40</sup> Science deprives man of his inner being, his search for the meaning of his life out there in the world.<sup>41</sup>

Modern medicine is also not an exception to what has been stated above. Like any other science, modern medicine has the tendency to discard or reject the whole notion of life force, and this is rooted in a philosophical perspective of empiricism and analysis. Hence modern medicine seeks to reduce the art of healing to the psychochemical manipulation of the body as directly as possible.<sup>42</sup>

### **Comprehensiveness of philosophical consciousness**

All this has been stated to show the methodological inadequacy of sciences. The limitation is that science knows reality by one method that is,

by observation and experiment, neglecting the method of critical reflection. Critical reflection means understanding in depth to the level of knowledge of reality, seeing the truth, enlightenment and the like. In the Indian context, such knowledge can be called *pāramārthikajñāna* or *tattvajñāna*.<sup>43</sup> This is what philosophy or any Indian Darśanas aim at. “Philosophical consciousness is all comprehensive and concrete. Moreover, it is rational”.<sup>44</sup> Philosophy is a quest of knowledge. It concentrates on the ultimate or intrinsic process of substances so as to arrive at the most general nature of the universe as a whole. “Philosophy is something like science and something like religion, but it belongs to neither. It is, like science a critical enquiry, an impartial enquiry, an enquiry that follows the rigor of logic. It is unlike science, because its attempt is to scale the highest heights to the study of ultimate substance and its significance and value”.<sup>45</sup> “Unlike science, philosophy is satisfied with mere intellectual incorrigibility, even when verification in experience is provided for in regard to its conclusions”.<sup>46</sup> Conceptual understanding as well as manipulation, conceptual mapping and remapping are resorted to by philosophers. They make use of their own mind as the laboratory to carry out the researches and experiments with concepts.<sup>47</sup> “Philosophical knowledge is self-validated in the sense that it develops its own method of enquiry and criteria of justification. Philosophical explanations are meant only for clarifying the meaning and coherence of the philosophical truth rather than testing them in the world because of the fact that philosophical knowledge, unlike scientific knowledge, is not accountable from our experience of the world”.<sup>48</sup>

“The distinguishing features of the methods of philosophy are those of: (1) impartial and critical of beliefs (religious or otherwise), propositions and conclusions (scientific or otherwise) and speculations on all the fundamentals of enquiry (2) application of logical rigor in relating to the fundamental process of the world and the underlying assumptions of thought and knowledge in an attempt to arrive at the most indubitable universal and essential conclusions, which even though not verifiable, may be yet rationally incorrigible”.<sup>49</sup>

The philosophical illumination or wisdom thus achieved should be distinguished from the knowledge in the form of information that we imbibe from different scientific pursuits.

The task of philosophical reasoning is to decipher the essential structures underlying the phenomena. Here one thing is to be remembered as some thing important. That is, reason is not partial to the transcendental; it is equally responsible to the empirical also, for there cannot be any empirical without a corresponding trans-empirical. In essence philosophy is the enquiry of the meaning and significance of human existence, temporal, and supra-temporal. Philosophy can argue for the compatibility of both the phenomenal and the transcendental.

### **The importance of the philosophy of Carakasamhitā**

Āyurveda, in its early days, was an unrefined science consisting of etiology (*hetu*), symptomatology (*liṅga*) and therapeutics (*auśadha*).<sup>50</sup> The

all embracing categorial knowledge gained by intuition was synthesized with its corpus later on.<sup>51</sup> Thus, Āyurveda derived its theoretical sustenance from the philosophical systems particularly of the Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika for the harmonious existence of the individual within and outside. It vindicates that until the incorporation of the intuitive philosophical or *dārśanic* knowledge it was a morbid science of treatment which contained camouflaged ideas gathered from empirical observation. The intuitive knowledge had been incorporated in Āyurveda probably from the realization of the essentiality of the knowledge of the ultimate reality behind the phenomenal existence of man, the world around him, and their interrelationship in cherishing the purpose of eradication of diseases and maintenance of positive health.

The synthesis of the intuitive knowledge of the trans-empirical realities with the knowledge derived from empirical observations found in Caraka marks a paradigm shift in the history of Indian intellectual tradition, since it showed how spiritual knowledge can be applied to improve the life conditions. The historicity of Caraka lies in the fact that it is the only monumental work which contains this synthesized knowledge.

Suśrutasaṃhitā keeps a different outlook. Suśruta declares that, there is no need of knowledge other than that of the physical world, for the knowledge of the physical world is enough for therapeutics.<sup>52</sup> What is implied is that Suśruta places primacy on the external world. He sees man more as a somatic being than as a spiritual being. In other words, the objective



world is taken into consideration and the subject pole is eliminated. On the contrary Caraka discusses the inner and outer world with out leaving anything as irrelevant and taking into consideration the prevailing knowledge systems. He himself has stated that “What ever that is in the Saṃhitā is everywhere and what ever that is not in it is in nowhere else”.<sup>53</sup>

Carakasamhitā has got a dual status. On the one hand, it constitutes a corpus of logical and practical knowledge of health and longevity and on the other hand, this knowledge traces its roots to an original and unchanging vision and seeks to help the liberation of man. It deals with the physical and the metaphysical. In it we see the harmonization of both the pragmatic and transcendental knowledge.

The concept of *puruṣa*, *pañcabhūtasiddhānta*, *tridoṣasiddhānta*, and the symptomatic diagnosis principles are the fundamental aspects which make Āyurveda an autonomous system of medicine. Puruṣa is construed at the evolutionary, empirical, and spiritual levels based on the vision that subjectivity and objectivity are not independent realities, but they depend upon each other. The trans-empirical elements are analysed in detail. The theorization of the *pañcabhūtas*, the *tridoṣas* (*vāta*, *pitta*, and *kapha*) that constitute the body, and also the constituents of mind, namely *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* are based not merely on empirical generalizations but on the intuitive insight of the holistic state of psychophysically conditioned human being through its symptomatic manifestations. The *doṣas* can be known when specially manifested in specific physiological and biochemical phenomena

but cannot be identified with them. It may seem that the entities like matter, mind, physical world, life, and consciousness, are very closer to the empirical observations of the world. But, as has been pointed out by R. C. Pradhan, none of them is an empirical concept because none of them is product of our experimental encounter with the world.<sup>54</sup>

Caraka's endeavor was not limited to the inquiry of the origin of diseases, the ways of their ascertainment, cure, and engendering health and longevity, but aims at human perfection. In this great enterprise, he ensures that reality is not fragmented. He recognizes the invisible ground reality which causes and governs the world of experience. Everything concerning the phenomenal world is being interpreted in terms of the underlying unity palpable in the concept of Brahman and *dharma*. Even disease and health are conceived as being abided by the cosmic law. Hence he conceived that disease as a change of state called imbalance (*vaiṣamyā*) and health as a return to the natural state called equipoise (*sāmyā*). His theoretical formulations on health and cure were built on the basic vision that all phenomena arise from a common matrix and are governed by a common universal law and this fact of their unity and order is reflected in life. Thus, the lower level of statements of health and cure is made dependent upon the higher level of trans-empirical concepts.

Caraka presents a categorial scheme and discusses in detail the philosophical subject matters of the reality in human experience as whole ultimate being, cosmology, various sources of knowledge, underlying

assumptions of thought and knowledge, and human conduct and character from the aspects and standpoint of health and moral values.

The discussion of the methodology of thought and expression is also significant. Caraka gives a precise and elaborate description of the different ways of knowing – integrating observation, reasoning, testimony, and intuition. He himself patterns data by experience, reasoning, testimony, and intuition without giving undue importance to any one of them which may lead to distortion of the quest for knowledge or which may be reduced to empirical commonsense, abstract speculation, dogmatism or superstition. Natural phenomena reached by both experience and intuitive speculative thought are equally recognized as valid.

Thus, Carakaśaṃhitā is not a treatise on an incoherent area of unconnected discipline which deals with the morbid science of disease in the western style. On the other hand, it is a complete book which contains deliberations and insightful knowledge of the complex man and his environment for health and human perfection. Caraka construes man as a somatic being and spiritual being. Philosophical abstractions and scientific observations are found interlocked. In brief it is a synthesis of the subjective and the objective, the two cornerstones of epistemology. Hence the philosophical speculations of Carakaśaṃhitā are of prime importance.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 FM, Contents I, p.15.
- 2 Physics and Chemistry did not take firm independent root until after the Renaissance. Ibid, p.16
- 3 FIC Vol. I, p. 227.
- 4 *dve vidye veditavye iti ha sma brahmavido vadanti parā caiva aparā ca.* Mu.U., I, 4.
- 5 *dūramete viparīte viṣūcī avidyā yā ca vidyeti jñātā.....*, Ka. U., II, 5.
- 6 Amita Chatterjee, “*Parā vidyā - Aparā vidyā -- A Reconstruction Towards an Objective Phenomenology of Consciousness*”, HSPCIC, Vol. XI, Part-1, p. 78.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 *atha parā yayā tadakṣaramadhigamyate*, Mu.U., I, 5.
- 9 FIC, p. 229.
- 10 *dṛśyata iti darśanaṃ.*
- 11 *dṛśyate anene iti darśanaṃ.*
- 12 The word Philosophy or rather the word philosopher was coined by Paythagoras in the sixth century BC. Since Plato Philosophy in its widest and broadest sense has meant *a reflective and reasoned attempt to infer the character and content of the universe, taken together in its*

entirety and as a whole, from an observation and study of the data presented by all its aspects. FM, Contents I, p.1.

- 13 SDS p. 3; “Introduction”, HSPCIC, Vol. III, Part -- 3, p. 5.
- 14 *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*, Br. U., II, iv, 5; see also *ibid.*
- 15 *darśanakārāḥ dvividhāḥ nāstikāḥ āstikāśca*. “Upodghāta”, SDSM, p. 84. Based on the source of knowledge another three types of classification, namely *ādhyakṣika*, *tārkika*, and *śrauta* are also mentioned. See *ibid.*, p. 79.
- 16 *nāstiko vedanindakaḥ* MS, II. 11. “The word *nāstika* is differently interpreted. The derivative meaning from the Sūtra of Pānini is taken to be he who does not accept *paraloka* or existence after death. The second interpretation is that by *nāstika* we mean the person who does not accept the existence of *īśvara* and the third meaning is that *nāstika* indicates the man who denies the authority of the Vedas”. EJ, pp. 204-05. “.....*āstika nāstika* distinction is a fluid and interchangeable mode of classification and differs in its meaning and application according to context”. IHBT, p. 43. See NK, p. 408.
- 17 *heyam dukhamanāgataṃ*, Y. Su, II. 16; *atha trividhaduḥkhātyanta-nivṛttirapavargaḥ*. S. Su, I. 1.
- 18 “Introduction”, HSPCIC, Vol. III, Part-3, p. 4. Mu. U., speaks of only the four Vedas and six ancillary disciplines (*Vedāṅgas*) as *aparā vidyā*. Mu. U., I, 5. For more details see NK pp. 752 - 53.
- 19 Amita Chatterjee, “*Aparā vidyā -- A Reconstruction Towards an Objective Phenomenology of Consciousness*”, HSPCIC, Vol. XI, Part -- I, p. 78.

- 20 Ibid., 79.
- 21 Mu. U., I, 5. See Supra, p. 2.
- 22 See “adr̥ṣṭasya svargādeḥ śāstraikakāraṇatvaṃ”, NM, Part--I, p. 2.
- 23 D.P. Chattopadhyaya, “Science as a Form of Culture”, HSPCIC, Vol. XI, Part -- 2, p. 322.
- 24 Ibid
- 25 Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, “Some Considerations on Philosophical Consciousness and Scientific Knowledge: Conceptual Linkages and Civilizational Background”, HSPCIC, Vol. XI, Part - 1, p. 3.
- 26 “A hypothesis is a possible explanation based on a hunch and inspiration. Whatever it is, it is not a hypothesis unless it can be tested - validated or invalidated -- by an experiment or observation”. BLS, p. 27.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 The place of Modern physics in the Mechanical View of Nature, Max Plank. Quoted from “Principles of the Theory of the Historical Process in Philosophy”, Trans., Campbell Creighton (Oxon), Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p. 12.
- 29 NSS, p. 251
- 30 Ibid., 251.
- 31 Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, “Some Considerations on Philosophical Consciousness and Scientific Knowledge: Conceptual Linkages and Civilizational Background”, HSPCIC, Vol. XI, Part -- I, p. 4. There

are three types of theories regarding the nature of Mathematical objects namely, Platonism, Formalism and Intuitionism. David Herbert was the head of the Formalist Movement. Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Objectivism -- The factual sciences study the physical objects. These disciplines try to find out laws of such subjects, in particular their laws of change. The law statements of the factual scientists tell us what the really possible states of things are as well as what the really possible changes of state, of concrete objects are. For details see SM, pp. 162 - 63.

34 See Ramakant Sinari, "The World as the Ontological Project of Man", PIP, p. 198.

35 Subjectivity is the core of ones very existence in the sense that within one's inner self, he is aware of his personal identity, his unique reality, freedom to manipulate his own thoughts, feelings, volitions, attitudes. Ibid., p. 199. See also p. 204.

36 Ibid., p.199.

37 Ibid., p. 198.

38 Ibid., p. 200.

39 Ibid., p. 205.

40 KFL, p. 163.

41 Ramakant Sinari, "The World as the Ontological Project of Man", PIP, p. 205.

42 FIC, 243.

- 43 F RIP, p. 48.
- 44 Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, “Some Considerations on Philosophical Consciousness and Scientific Knowledge: Conceptual Linkages and Civilizational Background”, HSPCIC, Vol. XI, Part - I, p. 3.
- 45 Kireet Joshi, “Philosophical Consciousness and Scientific Knowledge: Problems of their Interrelationships”, Ibid., p. 87.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 FRIP pp. 48 - 49.
- 48 R.C. Pradhan, “Structure of Philosophical Knowledge: In Defence of the Metaphysics of First Principles”, HSPCIC, Vol. XI, Part-1, p. 275.
- 49 Kireet Joshi, “Philosophical Consciousness and Scientific Knowledge: Problems of Their Interrelationships”, Ibid., p. 87.
- 50 *hetulingauṣadhjñānaṃ svasthāturaparāyaṇaṃ trisūtraṃ śāśvataṃ puṇyaṃ bubudhe yaṃ pitāmahaḥ*, CS, Su, I. 24.
- 51 CS Su, I. 28.
- 52 *tasyopayogo’bhihitaścikitsāṃprati sarvadā bhūtebhyo hi paraṃ yasmānnāsti cintā cikitsite*, SS, Sa, I. 13.
- 53 *yadihāsti tadanyatra yannehāsti na tatkvacit agniveśakṛte tantre carakapratisaṃskṛte* CS, Si, XII. 54.
- 54 R.C. Pradhan, “Structure of Philosophical Knowledge: In Defence of the Metaphysics of First Principles”, HSPCIC, Vol. XI, Part -- I, p. 276.



## **Chapter - II**

### **FUNDAMENTAL CATEGORIES**

Placed in Nature and interrogated by forces of nature, man is objectively obliged to look more and more into the secrets of both man and Nature. Endowed with “insatiable curiosity”,<sup>1</sup> he tried to discover the final truth of the experienced world. In order to systematize the sporadic knowledge, he employed certain orders of inference like analogical reasoning, inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning. On this basis, all the entities that constitute the universe are classified into categories, so that all objects of pure thought shall fall into a pattern as intelligible as possible, by establishing the structural identity of the real world and the experienced world. This enabled him to derive correct knowledge and, on the basis of it, gave form and shape to human projects that would lead him to progress. Without a categorial commitment expressed or implied, no systematic study or philosophizing is possible. Thus, categories which are the outcome of rational thinking form the foundation stone of all investigative sciences and “categoriology”<sup>2</sup> its soul.

“Broadly speaking a category is a mode of being , a type or a kind of being, a manner of existing, a way of having ontological status, an ultimate demarcation of reality”.<sup>3</sup> Categories may well be taken to be the nature of

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objects of pure objective thought forming the subject matter of philosophy of the object, shorn of all empirical content.<sup>4</sup> Thus, categorial<sup>5</sup> commitment became an essentiality for any systematic study, most particularly philosophy. In philosophy, categorisation is a faultless classification which involves a deeper probe into the ways and inner strata of being. However, there are different types of categorial schemes like ontological, epistemological, and axiological in the philosophical domain.

In the West it was Aristotle who first used the word category and it meant “a mode of predication”.<sup>6</sup> He saw a grammar governing correct thinking, which the grammar of language follows and expresses.<sup>7</sup> Based on this, he puts forth ten categories. They are: “*substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, action, being acted upon or affected, and state, and position*”.<sup>8</sup> Immanuel Kant, who describes his philosophy as transcendental, classifies everything that occurs in the sensible manifold into twelve categories which constitute four trinities: quantity, quality, relations, and conditions of existence or modality.<sup>9</sup> Samuel Alexander gives a list of eight categories: (1) Identity, diversity, and existence. (2) Universal, Particular and Individual. (3) Relation (4) Order. (5) Substance, Causality, Reciprocity. (6) Quantity and Intensity. (7) Whole and Parts and Number. (8) Motion.<sup>10</sup>

It is unique that the Indian thinkers were sagacious enough to evolve or owe allegiance to one or other of categorial schemes. The nearest equivalent used in Indian philosophical systems (Darśanas) to mean category

in its general sense of mode or being is the word *padārtha* or *tattva*. The word *padārtha* is a compound formed of two terms: *pada* and *artha*. The term *pada* is defined by the grammarian Pāṇini as a word invariably associated with a suffix *sup* or *tiñ*.<sup>11</sup> The term *artha* means the object of cognition. The word *padārtha* is generally taken as a *yaugika*<sup>12</sup> type and so the meaning signification of a word or denotation of a word is taken into account by deriving the word as *padasya arthaḥ*. The word *tattva* means reality. The various systems of knowledge have prepared their own categories for explaining their tenets.

Thus, the Cārvākās, who maintain that the limit of the reality of this universe do not extent the limit of sense experience, enumerate four physical elements (*bhūta-dravyas*) as categories.<sup>13</sup> The Jainas divide the whole reality into two principles: souls (*jīva*) and “not-souls” (*ajīva*).<sup>14</sup> The Buddhists, who often starts with the four noble truths, namely life is suffering (*duḥkha*); there is a cause for suffering (*samudaya*); there is also cessation (*nirodha*), and there is a way for cessation (*mārga*),<sup>15</sup> divide all that are into five assemblages of elements under the heading *skandhas*. These *skandhas* are specific awareness (*viññānaṃ*), sensation (*vedanā*), idea (*saṃjñā*), tendencies (*saṃskāra*) and matter (*rūpa*).<sup>16</sup> The Sāṃkhyas, who accept two final entities at the ground level speaks of twenty-five categories and call them *tattvas*.<sup>17</sup> Kanada the author of Vaiśeṣika-sūtra postulates six fundamental categories of reality, namely, substance (*dravya*), attribute (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), universal (*samanya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavāya*).<sup>18</sup> Akṣapāda in his Nyāya - sūtra enumerates sixteen

categories.<sup>19</sup> Later on interpreters of Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika syncretic school made it seven by adding one more, that is, negation (*abāva*), to the above six.<sup>20</sup> The Vedāntins put forth two categories: *cit* and *acit*.<sup>21</sup> The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas five, namely substance, universal quality, action, and negation, and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas eight: substance, attribute, action, universal potency (*śakti*), similarity (*sādṛśya*), number, and inherence. Candra, a sectarian Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, accepted eleven by adding three more, sequence (*krama*), benefit (*upakāra*), and tendency (*saṃskāra*).<sup>22</sup>

Thus, based on certain matrices, the various philosophical systems of both the West and the East have classified “things that are” that constitute the universe, which forms the subject matter of philosophy into categories in order to suit their particular way of analysis of the universe.

Fundamentally, Caraka classifies reality into two namely being (*sat*) and non-being (*asat*).<sup>23</sup> In consonance with the philosophical methodology, Caraka also opens his discussion with an enumeration of six categories. These categories are (1) Universal (*sāmānya*), (2) Particularity (*viśeṣa*), (3) Attribute (*guṇa*), (4) Substance (*dravya*), (5) Action (*karma*), and (6) Inherence (*samavāya*).<sup>24</sup>

It is something unusual for a medical treatise like Carakaśaṃhitā, which is expected to be confined to health and cure, to have a start with a categorial scheme having ontological nature that usually forms the subject matter of philosophy. Hence it is necessary to know the real source and nature of the schemata of the Carakaśaṃhitā. Nothing is told in the

Carakasamhitā, with regard to its source, beyond saying that these categories are visualised by sages by their intuitive power. The Carakasamhitā neither calls them by a general term nor gives a general definition of them. In an English translation of the book it is stated that these are various categories enumerated in the Nyāya system of philosophy.<sup>25</sup> Actually there is no such categorization in Nyāya philosophy as we referred to earlier. But, to a certain extent, they resemble the categories enumerated in the Vaiśeṣika-sutras, since the noun terms used and the total number of the categories enumerated are the same. Certain scholars are also of the opinion that the categories postulated are a reiteration of the Vaiśeṣika categories. Quite different from that, one of the remarkable opinions is that of Surendranath Dasgupta. He opines that Caraka enumerates the Vaiśeṣika categories though it often differs from the Vaiśeṣika view.<sup>26</sup>

In this connection it is to be noted that the Carakasamhitā in its *Śārīrasthāna* enumerates twenty-four principles which correspond the categories of Sāṃkhya system of philosophy. Taking account of these two categorial schemes, scholars like G.C. Pande remarks that Carakasamhitā presupposed the categories of both Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya.<sup>27</sup> A probe into the Carakasamhitā reveals that it has utilised the concepts of other divergent Darśanas of which each one claims that it makes more sense than the others. Moreover ideas from almost all relevant sources including Dharmaśāstras are also absorbed into it. It is something extraordinary that Caraka categorises things at two different dimensions which mainly show resemblances to the Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya Darśanas.

Another thing to be noted is that the categorial scheme enumerated above is not found in any other Āyurvedic treaty. Hence it brings forth the doubt as to whether the categories of Caraka are the real *dārśanic* entities categorised by Kanāda. If so, it is not possible to accommodate the tenets of other Darśanas like Sāṃkhya which present different theoretical outlooks regarding the truth and behaviour of the universe. It is a fact that theoretical formulations cannot be made on the basis of contradictory views, even if it is for practical usage. The problem becomes graver in the context of medicine which aims at the preservation of life. This type of thought may bring about ambiguity with regard to the basic concepts on which the whole of therapeutic theory is built. If we want to digest the theory regarding therapeutics, if we want to update the science, we ought to have a real understanding of the true nature and position of the said categories which form the starting point.

As for as philosophy is concerned, it cannot be directly learned like manual or technical skills; it cannot be directly applied or judged by its usefulness in the manner of professional knowledge.<sup>28</sup> It deals with something uncommon to our habitual concern something alien to the reductionist approach. It deals with the most fundamental of all questions. “Philosophy always aims at the first and last ground of the ‘essent’<sup>29</sup> with particular emphasis on man himself and on the meaning and goals of human being-there”.<sup>30</sup> But, in this effort it breaks the paths and opens the perspectives of the knowledge that sets norms and hierarchies, of the knowledge which kindles all enquires.<sup>31</sup> Thus, it shows that philosophy stands in a different realm and order. It confines itself to no specialised

investigation of any kind. Its main aim is to demonstrate what is real and what is unreal.

At the same time, science of any sort is a result of the practical curiosity spearheaded by general curiosity. Though such a curiosity has allegiance to philosophy in one way or other, in course of time, it got segregated from the metaphysical conceptions of philosophy, and became independent and self supporting. The main aim of such specialised investigations was to satisfy the needs of everyday human life. Their main concern was to bring about immediate usefulness rather than trying to discover the ultimate reality. In the case of Āyurveda also things are not different. It is confined to the special fields of health and cure, or equipoise of the *dhātus* and longevity in the technical sense. So, the real nature of the categories can be discerned from the ensuing chapters.

Perhaps this may be a digression. But it is indispensable since it would be helpful to familiarise ourselves with the problem by a gradual transition from the things to which we are accustomed to. It should be on the basis of this that the ambiguity regarding the fundamental problem of the categorial scheme of Caraka is to be removed.

The purpose of the enumeration of the categories in the Carakaśaṃhitā and the Vaiśeṣika - sūtra are different. In the Vaiśeṣika - sūtra they are the outcome of the enquiry of the ultimate reality. They consider that the world is real (*vastu*) and not unreal (*avastu*). The world is real in the sense that it is the content (*viśaya*) of true knowledge (*prama*) that can be verbalised. In



other words, verbalisation is an encoded form of the cognition which has content (*viṣaya*). This content is the captured reality. The world consists of such reals. Hence, they call these reals as referents of linguistic terms or words (*padārthas*). Thus, for the Vaiśeṣikas, knowledge implies that the world exists (*jñānādhīnā vastusattā*) and it can be verbalised (*abhidheya*). Taking account of all these facts, Praśastapāda gives a comprehensive definition of *padārtha* in his commentary. Accordingly, existence (*astitva*), “namability” (*abhidheyatva*) and “knowability” (*jñeyatva*) are the common characteristics of *padārtha*.<sup>32</sup> Almost all the interpreters have reiterated the definition deleting the term *astitva*.<sup>33</sup> At the same time, a quite different definition is given in Nyāya - sūtra. There it is defined as *padrtha* signifying individuality, form, and genus.<sup>34</sup> Thus, the key point of the Vaiśeṣika school is that language maps reality. So if we analyse a word, it reveals a content which has a structure. This structure consists of contained (*dharma*), container (*dharmi*), and container-contained relation (*dharmadharmibhāva*). *Dharma* is a class forming property or distinguishing property. The entity or entities which are qualified by a *dharma* is called *dharmi*, and the relation between the two is called *dharmadharmibhāva*.<sup>35</sup>

Kaṇāda analyses the whole world on the basis of this notion and thus the above stated six categories follow as corollaries of this fundamental concept. The most important thing that is to be remembered of this classification is that it consists of both the entities of objective existence and the entities having existence at the conceptual level. Substance, quality, and action are construed as entities of objective existence. Hence, they are

said to have the universal “being-ness” (*satta*) and are called by the general term object (*artha*).<sup>36</sup> Thus, *padārtha* includes all entities in general despite of it being an entity of conceptual existence or objective existence, and refer to the ultimate realities.

Carakasamhitā is a treaty on Āyurveda and as such the entities enumerated in the Carakasamhitā reveal the idea of the fundamental categories within the context of Āyurveda. From the terminological and numerical similarity and the definition of some of the categories we can conclude that it presupposes the categories of the Vaiśeṣika - sūtras. But, at the conceptual level, the categorial scheme of Caraka has got its own identity and uniqueness. The change of order in the arrangement of the categories is the prima facie evidence for that. One of the most important things is that, instead of placing substance, attribute, and action as the first, second, and third categories Caraka places universal, particularity, and attribute as the first, second, and third in the hierarchy.<sup>37</sup> In fact, the first two categories, namely universal and particularity are most important in Āyurveda, because they are responsible for the equipoise of the *dhātus* by means of increase and decrease.<sup>38</sup> As far as Kaṇāda is concerned, these two entities are postulated on the basis of logical necessity. Similarly attribute is placed next, because in the scope of Āyurveda, attributes like taste and not substance that count most in therapeutic measures.<sup>39</sup> Second thing is that Caraka himself has asserted that the main object of the treatise is the maintenance of the equipoise of the *dhātus* and that these categories have been enumerated as the cause of *dhātsāmyakriyā*.<sup>40</sup> While in the Vaiśeṣika

- sūtra it is declared that the true knowledge of the resembling characteristics and differential characteristics will lead to the supreme good that is, liberation.<sup>41</sup> Thus, the categories of Caraka are to be understood as having direct involvement in the process of treatment and preservation of health ensuring longevity of man. In this sense, they are to be understood as entities that would serve the purpose of therapeutics.

It is true that the Carakasamhitā indiscriminately deals with the world *en masse*, its general nature and behaviour and nature of occurrences of particular events, without separating scientific and philosophical fields and methods of investigation from one another. In that sense they are ontological categories. But, the thing is that its metaphysical conceptions are based on the speculations of the early monistic Sāṃkhya and not on the pluralistic Vaiśeṣika. So the categories enumerated should not be confused with the *padārthas* of Vaiśeṣika - sūtra.<sup>42</sup> The doctrinal thesis regarding “being and becoming” are different. However, we shall have occasion to know it in detail again and again in the forthcoming chapters. The six entities enumerated by Caraka have their own signification and their scope co-exists mainly with the empirical realities.

Thus, it can be concluded that the categories, though presuppose the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, are in no way a reiteration, but they are the categories fundamental to Āyurveda.

## Substance (*dravya*)

“Since the early days of Western Indology, in particular since Colebrooke’s pioneering studies in Indian philosophy, the Sanskrit word *dravya* has usually been rendered as “substance”<sup>43</sup> In a recent critical review of the problem of substance, it is stated that “substance is the oldest topic of philosophical enquiry and it is also one of the most entangled”.<sup>44</sup> For Aristotle “substance is the fundamental category. Without it, without things to have quality or relation or to act or to be acted upon - the others (other categories) are meaningless”.<sup>45</sup> A recent dictionary of philosophy says that substance of a thing may be its essence or that which makes it what it is. This will ensure that the substance of a thing is that which remains through change in its properties.<sup>46</sup> In an encyclopaedia of philosophy, six notions of substance have been distinguished: “(1) the concrete individual, (2) a core of essential properties, (3) what is capable of independent existence, (4) a centre of change, (5) a substratum, and (6) a logical subject”.<sup>47</sup> Another encyclopedia says: “In MATAPHYSICS, substance is the unchanging underlying reality of a thing; it is contrasted with those aspects of a thing (its accidents) which change”.<sup>48</sup> Wilhelm Halbfass says:

“In the history of European thought the concept of substance covers, indeed, the entire semantic range from concrete empirical things to bear particulars and basic substrates. In applying the word ‘substance’ to the Indian philosophical tradition and in using it as a translation of *dravya*, it is important to be aware of the question and ambiguities with which it has associated”.<sup>49</sup>

The word *dravya* is derived from the root “*dru*” by adding the suffix “*yat*”. Etymologically it means a qualified one to become the substratum of quality, action and the like.<sup>50</sup>

Some of the earliest references concerning the semantic and categorial concepts are seen documented in Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and *Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali. There, in the *sūtras* of Pāṇini, the words like *sattva*<sup>51</sup> (being) and *adhikaraṇa*<sup>52</sup> (substratum) appear in the categorial sense of *dravya*. Patañjali further advances two questions: (1) “What is *dravya*?, and (2) What are qualities?” He then replies that sound, touch, colour, taste and smell are qualities and anything else different from qualities is *dravya*.<sup>53</sup> One of the most significant descriptions of *dravya* found in *Mahābhāṣya* is *guṇasāndrava*,<sup>54</sup> which means a confluence of *guṇās*. He further considers it as eternal, even if the forms which emanate from it are changing. However, this explanation is ambiguous, since it suggests a mere aggregation of qualities without any underlying substrate. At the same time it implies a correspondence to the conception of substance in infancy and also to the *Sāṃkhya*s who consider it as a confluence of the three *guṇas*. Kaiyaṭa uses the term *āśraya*<sup>55</sup> to paraphrase the idea of aggregation of qualities. *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*, a *prākṛit* work, which is considered to have been written before the dawn of the Christian era, defines *dravya* as a substrate of qualities, quality, as resident in one substance only, and mode as residence in both substance and quality.<sup>56</sup> Moreover, it gives a peculiar type of classification. It classifies substances into *merit*, *demrit*, space, time, matter and soul.<sup>57</sup>

The Sāṃkhya and the Yogins describe substance as a collective form of *guṇas*.<sup>58</sup> The term *guṇa* denotes the three intertwining “strands”<sup>59</sup>, namely (1) essence or the subtle matter of pure thought (*sattva*), (2) the kinetic matter of energy (*rajas*), and (3) the ramified matter of inertia (*tamas*) that constitute the primordial matter (*prakṛiti*) which is opposed to the (*puruṣa*). Vyāsa, in his *Yogabhāṣya*, defines substance as an aggregation of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*.<sup>60</sup> The Buddhists have denied substance as an independent entity.<sup>61</sup> The Vedāntins, though accept the reality of substance, call it indefinable (*anirvacanīya*) illusion (*māya*).<sup>62</sup> According to them Braḥman is the ultimate reality.

It was Kaṇāda who gives a comprehensive definition of substance. He defines it as having qualities and actions and as inherent cause.<sup>63</sup> He also classifies it into nine: earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*āp*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*), ether (*ākāś*), time (*kāla*), space (*dik*) self (*ātmā*), and mind (*manas*).<sup>64</sup>

Now it is evident that both the English term substance and the Sanskrit term *dravya* are problematic. Various systems of thought have explained *dravya* in different ways. Halbfass, after considering such differences, has rightly remarked that the different approaches to the elusive notion of *dravya* exemplify historically different levels of reflection as well as fundamental distinctions in conceptual and soteriological orientation.<sup>65</sup> So it should be on the basis of this that the historical and scientific genuineness of the concept of *dravya* in the *Carakasamhita* is to be assessed.

In consonance with Kaṇāda, Caraka defines substance as that in which quality and action exists and which is the inherent cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*).<sup>66</sup>

Cakrapāṇi explains the definition in the following way. Existence means existence by the relation of inherence. Then only substance can become the inherent cause of quality and action. As quality and action cannot produce an effect in their own by the relation of inherence, they are not inherent causes. “Having action” in the definition is to exclude the other five categories, namely quality, action, and the like, and not simultaneously to exclude the dissimilar categories and to pervade the similar ones, because the inherence of action does not exist in substances like *akāśa*.<sup>67</sup>

The definitions given by Caraka and Kaṇāda have got a two-fold nature. Annambhaṭṭa invokes the first part of the definition, that is, substance is the substratum of qualities, in his twofold definition.<sup>68</sup> Then he points out that it is defective. Accordingly, if we say that anything that serves as the substratum of qualities as substance, then it will not apply to all the substances. Substances at the moment of their production will be excluded because the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika system holds that substances at the time of their production are without any quality and action.<sup>69</sup> The defect is remedied by amplifying the definition thus: Substance is that in which inheres the universal (*jāti*) which is different from the universal existence (*sattā*).<sup>70</sup> Although the products are devoid of qualities at the moment of production, there resides the universal substance-ness (*dravyatva*) which co-exists with qualities after production. It is to avoid the over applicability (*ativyāpti*) of the definition in existence (*sattā*) that co-exist with qualities that

“different from the universal existence” (*sattābhinna*) is inserted in the definition. Though theoretically faulty, the definition is good for all practical purpose.<sup>71</sup>

The second part of Caraka’s definition, “substances are inherent causes”, is technically correct. The uniqueness of this definition is that it reveals a structure in which there is a substratum and super stratum. As such substance is a cosmological substrate and the others like quality and action are ontologically separable world constituents. It pinpoints to the fact that substance, as substrate has the efficacy of becoming inherent or substantial cause of qualities even though they are devoid of them at the production moment. In other words substances are capable of initiating new dependent entities. In that sense they are not featureless. Thus the definition implies a cosmological perspective of origination and change giving sufficient scope for enumerating and describing the cosmological scheme wherein the qualities and actions can be regarded as emanations of their substrates. It is based on this fundamentally additive relationship of substances with their qualities and actions that Caraka formulates his theory of *rasa*, *vīrya*, and *vipāka*.

In spite of the basic differences between Caraka and Suśruta with regard to “being” and “becoming”, Suśruta who has been conversant with the above mentioned nature of substance reiterates the same definition<sup>72</sup> and adds that substance is eternal and qualities are ephemeral.<sup>73</sup> Thus, according to him, substance is that which remains in and through all changes. Placing



primacy on *dravya*, Bhadanta Nāgārjuna enumerates six entities as the basis of disease and health, and conspicuously asserts that substance is the substratum of the five.<sup>74</sup> The other entities in the sequel are taste (*rasa*), quality (*guṇa*), potency (*vīrya*), *vipāka* and action (*karma*).<sup>75</sup>

Caraka enumerates nine substances namely, *ākāśa*, air (*vāyuḥ*), fire (*agni*), water (*ap*) earth (*pṛthivī*), self (*ātmā*), mind (*manas*), time (*kāla*), and space (*dik*).<sup>76</sup> This classification is also akin to the classification in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.<sup>77</sup> Almost all except the Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas do accept this classification.<sup>78</sup> These substances are heterogeneous in sense. Among these nine substances the first five namely, *ākāśa*, air, fire, water and earth form one group and are called physical or material or physical substances (*bhūtas*). The remaining four are non-material substances. The material substances constitute the physical world. Among the non-material substances mind and soul are differentiated from the rest and Caraka calls them spiritual substances (*adhyātmadravyas*).<sup>79</sup> Mind represents the psychological world and self represents the spiritual world. Thus, the schemata of substance reveal the physical, the psychological, and the spiritual world in the space time continuum and the space time continuum itself.

### **Attribute (*guṇa*)**

The third among the categories enumerated in Carakasamhitā is designated by the Sanskrit term *guṇa*. Its categorial sense is attribute. Even though attribute is the preferred expression, the word quality is also intermittently employed, for it is in common usage.<sup>80</sup>

The word *guṇa* is mainly used in two senses: (1) strand and (2) attribute. One of the earliest books in which the word *guṇa* appears in a clear sense is the Taittirīyasaṃhitā of Kṛṣṇa-Yajurveda. There it means a strand.<sup>81</sup> The Sāṃkhya system of philosophy has almost retained the same sense.<sup>82</sup> Yāskā is the earliest known author to use the word *guṇa* in the sense of attribute, quality, and property. He says that sound is the *guṇa* of *ākāśa*, and compared to *ākāśa*, air possesses two *guṇas* including touch and so on.<sup>83</sup> Pāṇini has also used the word *guṇa* in the sense of attribute.<sup>84</sup> Patañjali, who gives a detailed account of the various meanings of the term *guṇa*, enumerates attributes even if it is not in a systematic order.<sup>85</sup>

### Definition

In the grammatical literature, it was Patañjali to define *guṇa* first in the sense of attribute. He says that attribute is that which resides in substance, perishes, is found in different classes, is a super stratum, is not produced by action, and is distinct from substance.<sup>86</sup> At the same time, as a category, it was Kaṇāda who was the first to give a comprehensive explanation of the characteristic features of attribute. He says that it subsists in substance; it is not endowed with a further quality, and it does not become an independent cause in conjunction and disjunction.<sup>87</sup> Further, it is stated that one attribute originates another attribute.<sup>88</sup> Different commentators interpret this sūtra in different ways. Candrānanda is of opinion that the attribute like colour of the yarn produces colour of the cloth, for attributes of the yarn and the cloth are not the same. Śankaramiśra opines that the attribute of the final aggregates (*antyāvayaviguṇās*), duality (*dvitva*), the

separateness of duals (*dvipṛthaktva*), priority, and posteriority should be excluded from this characteristic of being originators.<sup>89</sup> Some others argue that this specification refers to those attributes that belong to the cause which produce attributes homogeneous to them, and it does not refer to all attributes. But, Srīdhara, who rejects this says that if a single attribute could not produce an attribute, conjunction produced by conjunction would become absurd.<sup>90</sup>

Caraka defines attribute as that which exists in substance by the relation of inherence (*samavāyi*), which is devoid of action (*niśceṣṭa*) and which becomes a cause (*kāraṇam*).<sup>91</sup> According to Cakrapāṇi, the expression (*samavāyi*) has been included in the definition to exclude the all-pervading motionless substances like *ākāśa*, for they never exist anywhere by the relation of inherence. The term *niśceṣṭa* denotes one without motion as well as the one different from motion. So it serves to exclude motion as well as the finite substances (*mūrtadravyas*) which become the substrate of motion.<sup>92</sup>

The expression “being a cause” serves to exclude universal, particularity, and inherence, since they cannot become causes. Here it may be argued that the definition is unconvincing as it does not pervade all attributes like the dimension of the ubiquitous substances, and colour of the final aggregate substances for they cannot be causes.<sup>93</sup> So “being a cause” is partly unproved.

Therefore its meaning should be to have universal which is invariable in the causes (*bhāvarūpakāraṇāvybhicāri sāmānyām*) as it is a positive entity. This type of causality pervades all attributes and also excludes universal as they cannot have any further universal.<sup>94</sup>

Another explanation given by Cakrapāṇi for being a cause (*kāraṇam*) is that all attributes other than the dimension of the ubiquitous substance and colour of the final aggregate substances are cognized. Hence the efficiency of being causes in the unseen cases is also to be admitted. Moreover the dimension of the ubiquitous substances can be the cause of the *yogic* perception, and so causality cannot be negated. Therefore, there is no chance of being partly unproved of the causality of quality. Even though such causality exists in universal, they are excluded by the expression *samavāyi*. *Samavāyi* means a substratum (*ādhāra*) in which something exists by the relation of inherence and also means the contained (*ādheya*) that resides in somewhere by the relation of inherence. So the ubiquitous substances that can only be the substrate in relation to inherence and the universal that can only be the “contained” of the same relation are excluded as attributes.<sup>95</sup>

The Mīmāṃsakās are of the opinion that one attribute can exist in another attribute.<sup>96</sup> But, both Caraka and Vaiśeṣikas reject this. It is true that on certain occasions attributes are further ascribed to attributes like taste.<sup>97</sup> But, it should be understood that attributes are free of further attributes.<sup>98</sup> The attributes like conjunction which are often assigned to taste actually belong to their substrates. The Vaiśeṣikas also express the same opinion in this matter.<sup>99</sup>

From the above description, it can be concluded that the definition of attribute given by Caraka is akin to that of Kaṇāda. Even though the term which means that, it does not become an independent cause in conjunction and disjunction is not found in the definition of Caraka, the expression *niśceṣṭa* serves the very same purpose with more perfection.<sup>100</sup>

Later on, Praśastapāda defines attribute thus: qualities like colour are those which are endowed with the universal attributeness (*guṇatva*), exists in substances, and are devoid of further attributes and motion.<sup>101</sup> For Sivāditya, attribute is that which possesses attributeness.<sup>102</sup> Again, it is said that being endowed with the universal it is devoid of motion and is not a substantial cause.<sup>103</sup> Keśavamiśra who expresses more or less the same idea, makes it clear that *guṇa* is only an efficient cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*).<sup>104</sup> Annabhambhaṭṭa defines it thus: attribute is that which possesses universal and at the same time different from substances and motion, or it is that which possesses attributeness.<sup>105</sup> From the point of view of the *Mīmāṃsakas*, attribute is that which is distinct from motion, has sub-genises and is excluded from the substantial causes (*upādānakāraṇa*).<sup>106</sup>

### **Enumeration of attributes in Vaiśeṣika system**

Kaṇāda gives a list of seventeen attributes namely, (1) colour, (2) taste, (3) smell, (4) touch, (5) number, (6) dimension, (7) separateness, (8) conjunction, (9) disjunction, (10) priority, (11) posteriority, (12) knowledge, (13) pleasure, (14) pain, (15) desire, (16) aversion, and (17) volition.<sup>107</sup> Praśastapāda elaborates the list to twenty-four by adding seven more namely, (1) weight, (2) liquidity, (3) viscosity, (4) tendency, (5) merit (6) demerit, and (7) sound.<sup>108</sup> The Bhāṭṭa - Mīmāṃsakaś also speak of twenty-four attributes. But they exclude merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*), and include manifestedness (*prākāṣya*), and potency (*śakti*).<sup>109</sup>

## Enumeration of attributes in Carakasamhitā

It is significant to note that Caraka presents his list of attribute in a peculiar way. Accordingly, attributes consist of sensible attributes (*arthas*) along with the attributes beginning with heaviness (*gurvādi*), the attribute knowledge (*buddhi*), attributes ending in volition (*praytāntā*), and attributes beginning with priority or superiority (*parādi*).<sup>110</sup>

As the articulation appears, it does not give the complete list of attributes. On the other hand, it alludes to some other articulation which enumerates them. Hence there remains some sort of ambiguity. One of the main problems that arise in this context is whether it refers to some of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras or it refers to the enumerations in the further articulations of Caraka himself.

In this connection it may be relevant to note the observations made by Dasgupta. He states that there is no such *gurvādi* list in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras. He, then, says that the list referred to as beginning with priority (*parādi*) and ending with volition (*prayatānta*) is not to be found in the Carakasamhitā. This may be a reference to the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra. If this is so, it leaves out a number of *guṇas* included in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra which were included there in the *parādi* list.<sup>111</sup>

Harsh Narain, referring to this problem, opines that, Carakasamhitā took its present form at a time when Kaṇāda's list of seventeen attributes was undergoing expansion, and heaviness (*gurutva*), liquidity (*dravatva*), viscosity (*sneha*), elasticity (*samskāra*), merit (*dharma*), and demerit (*adharmā*) have been included in the list.<sup>112</sup> He further says that though Caraka has used Vaiśeṣika terms for his attributes, he has sought to give

them therapeutic connotations with a view to assimilating them in the medical tradition.<sup>113</sup>

It is a fact that the scheme of attributes put forth by Kaṇāda should have influenced Caraka. But, all the separate groups of attributes in the above-mentioned articulation actually refer to the different tables of attribute that appear in different articulations of Caraka himself. His list is altogether too lengthy when compared to that of Kaṇāda. The reason is that Āyurveda has a vast utility to them. So the twenty four attributes which have been mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra appear in many ways inadequate from the perspective of Āyurveda.<sup>114</sup> The significant point is that the *gurvādi* list is of prime importance in therapeutics and hence they are enumerated in almost all important *Āyurvedic* treatises. This shows that Caraka has prepared his own list of attributes by making use of the Vaiśeṣika schemata as well as the qualities of physical elements mentioned in the Mahābhārata.<sup>115</sup>

Cakrapāṇi classifies whole list of attributes into specific attributes (*vaiśeṣikaguṇas*), generic attributes (*sāmānyaguṇanas*), and spiritual attributes (*ātmāguṇas*).<sup>116</sup> Of them, the generic attributes comprises of the *gurvādi-guṇas* and *parādi-guṇās*. When the *parādiguṇas* are common to all substances irrespective of whether they are spiritual or physical, the attributes in the *gurvādi* list are common to the physical substances only. So the *gurvādi guṇās* can be treated as general physical qualities.

### **Specific attributes (*vaiśeṣika-guṇas*)**

The five sensible attributes namely, sound , touch, colour, taste, and smell are specific attributes. Caraka calls them by the general term

*indriyārthas* which means objects of sense<sup>117</sup> or *artha* which means objects.<sup>118</sup> In this context it should be noted that Kaṇāda uses the epithet *artha* to designate the first three categories in the sense that they are things of objective existence.<sup>119</sup> The above-mentioned five attributes are recognized as specific qualities (*vaiśeṣikaguṇās*), for each one of them predominate in each one of the physical elements; that is sound is predominant in *ākāśa*, touch is predominant in air, colour in fire, taste in water, and smell in earth.<sup>120</sup> Moreover, these five attributes can only be cognized by their respective external sense organs with which the Vaiśeṣikas agree.<sup>121</sup> The Mīmāṃsakas also agree with this.<sup>122</sup> The Vaiśeṣikas include viscosity (*sneha*), natural liquidity (*saṃsiddhikadravata*), and the attributes of the self, namely desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, volition, knowledge, merit, demerit, and impression in the group of specific qualities.<sup>123</sup>

### **Colour (*rūpa*)**

Caraka does not give much attention to colour, smell, touch and sound since they have lesser importance in Āyurvedic system. Colour aids the sense of vision in perception. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika colour is the quality which is cognized by eye alone. It is of seven types namely white, blue, yellow, red, green, tawny, and variegated. They all belong to earth. Water has pale white and fire has bright white.<sup>124</sup>

### **Taste (*rasa*)**

Taste, the object of sense of taste, occupies an important position in Āyurveda, for it plays a vital role in identifying drugs and in diagnosing disease and prescribing curative measures. So Caraka is mainly concerned



with *rasa* when compared to other specific attributes. The description of the great conference held at *caitraratha* (CS.Su, I. 26) for the discussion of food and taste stands as material evidence for how much importance was given to taste in *Āyurveda*. In the conference, after examining the diverse opinions of the sages, Atreya Punarvasu, who presided over the conference, concluded that there were only six tastes: sweet (*madhura*), acid (*amla*), saline (*lavaṇa*), pungent (*kaṭu*), bitter (*tikta*), and astringent (*kaṣāya*).<sup>125</sup> Suśruta,<sup>126</sup> Vāgbhaṭa,<sup>127</sup> Vaiśeṣikas,<sup>128</sup> Mīmāṃsakas,<sup>129</sup> and also the Mahābhārata<sup>130</sup> agree with this.

Caraka basically admits the successive accumulation of attributes in physical substances.<sup>131</sup> So, naturally, earth and water are considered as the substrates of *rasa*. But, both are not given equal importance.<sup>132</sup> Priority is given to water. In fact water is regarded as the source of *rasa*.<sup>133</sup> Suśruta is also of the opinion that water is the source of *rasa*.<sup>134</sup> Earth acquires taste because of its uninterrupted relation with water.<sup>135</sup> Even though earth and water serve as the substrates of taste the other three physical elements are also responsible for their manifestation.<sup>136</sup> Since *rasas* reside in the objects constituted by *pañcamahābhūtās*, they are conditioned by five factors, namely (1) specific nature of the substance (*prakṛti*), (2) action of heat or other agents (*vikṛti*), (3) combination (*vicāra*), (4) location of production (*deśa*), and (5) time of production (*kāla*).<sup>137</sup> In Carakaśāmitā and Rasavaiśeṣika - sūtra there is reference to someone who recognises alkali (*kṣāra*) as the seventh *rasa*.<sup>138</sup> The alkali (*kṣāra*) is not a *rasa*, for it is made up of more than one *rasa* and affects more than one sense organ. It has

at least two important *rasas* namely pungent and saline. It is not a natural substance, but it is produced through artificial process.<sup>139</sup>

Similarly, Caraka and Nāgārjuna refer to some others who regard unmanifested taste (*avyaktarasa*) as the eighth *rasa*.<sup>140</sup>

But, Ātreya has clearly stated that, there is no independent *rasa* which can be called the unmanifested (*avyakta*). Water is the source of all *rasas*. So, all *rasas* are considered as existing in water in an unmanifested form. Moreover, the *anurasa* or their co-inherence in a substance has the nature of unmanifestation.<sup>141</sup>

According to the variation of components of the physical elements the content of the *rasas* also will vary. Thus, sweet taste is dominant in substances which have more water (*soma*) content; sour taste is predominant in substances which abound with earth and fire; saline taste in substances having more water and fire contents; pungent taste in substances which abound with fire and air; bitter taste in substances having more content of air and *ākāśa*, and astringent taste in substances with more air and earth.<sup>142</sup> The predominanting physical element of a given medicine (*dravya*) can be inferred on the basis of the predominance of *rasas*.

From the therapeutic point of view, the various kinds of *rasas* are being construed as the cause of increase or decrease of the three *doṣas*. This subject is outside the scope of the present study, and hence it is not discussed here.

The Vaiśeṣikas consider that quality of water can be sensed by the sense of taste and they ascribe all the six tastes to earth and sweet taste to water.<sup>143</sup>

## Smell (*gandha*), Touch (*sparṣa*), and Sound (*śabda*)

Smell, touch, and sound are the qualities which are apprehended by their respective senses. In Vaiśeṣika, smell is of two types: fragrant (*surabhi*) and noxious (*asurabhi*).<sup>144</sup> Both of them belong to earth. The Mīmāṃsakas add one more called ordinary (*sādhāraṇa*).<sup>145</sup> Similarly, for the Vaiśeṣika, touch is of three kinds: cold (*śīta*), hot (*uṣṇa*) and tepid (*anuṣṇaśīta*).<sup>146</sup> Cold touch belongs to water, hot touch to fire, and tepid which is neither cold nor hot to earth and air.<sup>147</sup> Mīmāṃsakas also accept these three divisions.<sup>148</sup>

One of the most important things to be noted in this connection is that Caraka makes use of the theory of *paka*<sup>149</sup> but he does not postulate a theory on it. It is in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that we meet with such a theory. Accordingly, the specific qualities, namely, colour, taste, smell, and touch inhering in earth are ephemeral and can sometimes be changed by the application of heat. There is a sharp difference of view in this matter between the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas. The Vaiśeṣikas, who hold the theory of *pīlupāka*, believe that the change of qualities are affected in the *paramāṇus* which form the parts of the whole like a jar, in accordance with the application of external heat. Naiyāyikas, who hold the theory of *piṭharapāka*, argue that the change takes place in the whole, that is, in the jar itself.<sup>150</sup>

## General physical attributes

Caraka gives a separate list of twenty general physical attributes. They are: (1) heavy (*guru*), (2) light (*laghu*), (3) cold (*śīta*), (4) hot (*uṣṇa*),

(5) viscous or unctuous (*snigdha*), (6) dry or non- unctuous (*rūkṣa*), (7) inert or dull (*manda*), (8) sharp or penetrative (*tīkṣṇa*), (9) stable (*sthira*), (10) fluid (*sara*), (11) soft (*mṛdu*), (12) hard (*kaṭhiṇa*), (13) non-slimy or clear (*viśada*), (14) slimy (*picchila* ) (15) smooth (*ślakṣṇa*), (16) rough (*khara*), (17) subtle (*sūkṣma*), (18) coarse (*sthūla*), (19) dense (*sāndra*), and (20) liquid (*drava*).<sup>151</sup> Vāgbhaṭa also enumerates the same,<sup>152</sup> while Nāgārjuna enumerates only ten, namely *śīta*, *uṣṇa*, *snigdha*, *rūkṣa*, *viśada*, *picchila*, *guru*, *laghu*, *mṛdu*, and *tīkṣṇa*.<sup>153</sup>

Dasgupta has suggested that Caraka has not enumerated these *guṇas* as belonging to substances, but only to food and drink that we take.<sup>154</sup> This is not credible because Caraka has clearly classified these twenty attributes into five groups and each group is shared by a particular physical element.<sup>155</sup> Moreover, he again gives a sub classification in accordance with their distribution among the three *doṣas*. In Rasavaiśeṣikasūtra, it is stated that *śīta*, *uṣṇa*, *guru*, *laghu*, *mṛdu*, *kaṭhiṇa*, *karkaśa*, and *ślakṣṇa* are tactile.<sup>156</sup>

Among the twenty attributes *guru*, *śīta*, *uṣṇa*, *snigdha*, and *drava* are the only attributes found included in the Vaiśeṣika's table. Accordingly, *gurutva* is used in the sense of weight. It is explained as the cause of motion for falling down of earthly and watery objects.<sup>157</sup> *Gurutva* is neutralised by conjunction, volition, and faculty (*saṃskāra*). For instance, a person does not fall from a swing because of his conjunction with it. The body of a person does not fall because the weight is counteracted by his volition. Similarly, the arrow shot does not drop, since its weight is neutralized by velocity.<sup>158</sup> *Śīta* and *uṣṇa* are included in the specific quality of touch. *Sneha* is the

specific quality of water which causes the thickening of powder<sup>159</sup> in such a way that its particles are held together.<sup>160</sup>

*Dravatva* is the attribute which causes the motion of flowing.<sup>161</sup> It is of two types: natural (*sāṃsiddhika*) and artificial (*naimittika*) Natural is the specific quality of water and artificial is the general quality of earth.<sup>162</sup>

Annaṃbhaṭṭa refers to *laghutva* and argues that it is nothing but negation of *gurutva*. Similarly, *mṛdutva* and *kaṭhinatva* are said as determining the relative compactness associated with conjunction of the component parts of the effect.<sup>163</sup>

### General attributes (*sāmānyaguṇas*)

(1) Superiority (*paratva*), (2) inferiority (*aparatve*), (3) propriety (*yukti*), (4) number (*saṃkhyā*), (5) conjunction (*saṃyoga*), (6) disjunction (*vibhāga*), (7) separateness (*pṛthakatva*), (8) measure (*parimāṇa*), (9) tendency (*saṃskāra*), and (10) exercise (*abhyāsa*).<sup>164</sup> With the exception of *yukti* and *abhyāsa* all other attributes are found defined in both Vaiśeṣika and Caraka with subtle differences. Caraka construes them taking into consideration their applicability in curative purpose.

### Superiority (*paratva*) and Inferiority (*aparatva*)

The two attributes, *paratva* and *aparatva*, are dealt with together because they are mutually dependent, and serve the purpose of brevity. In Caraka, *paratva* and *aparatva* denote superiority or importance and inferiority or unimportance respectively with regard to place, time, age, measure, *pāka*, potency (*vīrya*), and taste (*rasa*).<sup>165</sup> For instance, a dry place is called *para*

and a marshy place is called *apara* with regard to place. The rainy season (*visarga*) of early autumn (*śarat* and *hemanta*) is *para* and draught season (*ādāna*) is called *apara* with regard to time. In the case of age, *taruṇa* is *para* whereas others are called *apara*. In the case of *pāka*, *vīrya* and *rasa*, *para* and *apara* mean suitability and unsuitability, that is, the thing suitable for a person is called *para* and the unsuitable is called *apara*.<sup>166</sup> Actually *paratva* and *apatva* regarding age come under time. It is separately mentioned because it has specific importance in Āyurveda.

In Vaiśeṣika system, *paratva* and *apatva* are conceived as posteriority and priority. Praśastapāda defines them as the basis of the notions of posterior and prior.<sup>167</sup> The later thinkers also do not materially differ from this view.<sup>168</sup> Both the attributes reside in earth, water, fire, air, and mind.<sup>169</sup> They are present only in finite objects.<sup>170</sup> They have a two fold division, caused by space (*dikkṛta*) and caused by time (*kālakṛta*). Of them, posteriority and priority, which are due to space, afford notions of a particular direction, and those which are due to time afford notions of age. For instance, when two things exist in the same direction, due to the varied conjunctions, there arises the cognition in the seer regarding one in the form of “it is distant”, when compared to the nearer. Thus, there arises the idea of posteriority. Similarly, there arises the cognition in the form of “it is near” when a thing is compared to a distant object. Thus, there occurs the notion of priority. Similarly, in the elder there arises the apprehension of posteriority and in the younger there occurs the apprehension of priority

due to comparison in time.<sup>171</sup> If *paratva* and *aparatva* connote posteriority and priority due to time and space in Vaiśeṣika, they refer to superiority and inferiority in Caraka.

### **Reason (*yukti*)**

*Yukti* means reasonable selection of medicines with reference to certain diseases.<sup>172</sup>

### **Number (*saṃkhyā*)**

*Saṃkhyā* means number (*gaṇitaṃ*).<sup>173</sup> In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it is conceived as the basis of expressions such as of one, two.<sup>174</sup> Number is cognized by the sense of vision or sense of touch, and it resides in all substances.<sup>175</sup> The number one inhering in one eternal substance is eternal and is ephemeral in ephemeral substances.<sup>176</sup> The plural numbers which begin with two and end with *parārtha* (100,000,000,000,000,000) are products of our enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*) which operates in the form of this is one, this is one.<sup>177</sup>

### **Conjunction (*saṃyoga*)**

In Caraka, *saṃyoga* means conjunction. It is an ephemeral relation arising from the action of one, two or more substances to be united.<sup>178</sup>

The Vaiśeṣikas also express more or less the same view.<sup>179</sup> For them, it is conjunction which is instrumental for the notion of two or more things being united.<sup>180</sup> A more simple definition given is that it is a contact of two things which remained separate.<sup>181</sup> It is regarded as a cause in relation to substance, attribute, and actions,<sup>182</sup> and is divided into three kinds:

(1) conjunction caused by the action of one of the two objects to be united (*anyatarakarmaja*), (2) conjunction due to the action of both the things to be united (*ubhayakarmaja*), and (3) conjunction arising from another conjunction. (*saṃyogajasam̐yoga*).<sup>183</sup> Mutual conjunction of all-pervading substances (*vibhudravyās*) is not accepted, because they have no separate existence.<sup>184</sup> It is also told that conjunction is destroyed by disjunction and also by the destruction of the substance.<sup>185</sup>

### **Disjunction (*vibhāga*)**

Caraka describes *vibhāga* as division, separation or disjunction.<sup>186</sup> In Vaiśeṣika it is defined as that which is instrumental for the notion of two things being disunited.<sup>187</sup> It is also divided into three as in the case of conjunction.<sup>188</sup>

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### **Severalty (*p ṛ thaktva*)**

*P thaktva* is described by the synonyms non-conjunction (*asaṃyoga*), distinction (*vailakṣaṇyam*), and severalty (*anekatā*).<sup>189</sup> Cakrapāṇi says that this explanation connotes three types of separateness; They are (1) special difference (2) difference of character, and (3) difference of identity due to numerical distinction.<sup>190</sup> In Vaiśeṣika, *pṛthaktva* is described as the basis of dealing with the separateness of objects.<sup>191</sup> It resides in all substances.<sup>192</sup>

### **Quantity (*parimāṇa*)**

*Parimāṇa* means measure.<sup>193</sup> In Carakasam̐hitā it includes not only magnitude but also weight. Vaiśeṣikas also define it as the basis of all



measurements.<sup>194</sup> It resides in all substances. It is divided into four: minute (*aṇu*), large (*mahat*), long (*dīrgha*) and short (*hrasva*).<sup>195</sup> However, this kind of division given by the Vaiśeṣikas shows that *parimāṇa* is limited to magnitude and hence it makes a difference to Caraka because there it includes weight also.

### ***Samskāra***

*Samskāra* refers to the processing for the transformation of attributes by applying water or heat, by cleaning, beating, nurturing and the like.<sup>196</sup> In Vaiśeṣika philosophy *saṃskāra* means faculty or impulse and it is of three kinds: velocity (*vega*), mental impression (*bhāvanā*), and elasticity (*sthitisthāpaka*).<sup>197</sup> Velocity resides in all the five finite substances. It causes a series of motions in a particular direction.<sup>198</sup>

Mental impression is a specific attribute of the self that causes memory and recognition. It is generated in the self by a forcible knowledge (*paṭupratyaya*), repeated knowledge (*abhyāsapratyaya*), and impressive knowledge (*ādarapratyaya*). It is counteracted by contrary cognitions, intoxication, and the like.<sup>199</sup> *Sthitisthāpaka* is the characteristic of a substance to regain the natural shape when the force applied to them ceases.<sup>200</sup> The Mīmāṃsakas divide *saṃskāra* into two: worldly (*laukika*) and scriptural (*vaidika*). The worldly consist of the above-mentioned. Scriptural are those produced by shaping (*takṣṇa*), purifying (*utpavana*), sprinkling (*prokṣaṇa*), beating (*avahanana*), and the like.<sup>201</sup> Probably it might be the notion of *saṃskāra* in the Mīmāṃsā that had influenced Caraka in framing his concept of *saṃskāra*.

## ***Abhyāsa***

*Abhyāsa* means habit due to constant practice.<sup>202</sup> *Samskāra* and *abhyāsa* are mutually related and they have high pharmacological value.

## **Spiritual attributes (*ātmaguṇas*)**

A separate group of ten attributes namely, desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*dukha*), volition (*prayatna*), consciousness (*cetanā*), fortitude (*dhṛti*), knowledge (*buddhi*), memory (*smṛti*) and “I consciousness” (*ahaṃkāra*), are described as the absolute marks for inferring the existence of the self.<sup>203</sup> These attributes are again described (in a different order) as being produced in the foetus by the self.<sup>204</sup> If *prayatna* appears in the middle of the first articulation, it appears only at the end of all attributes in the second. So, it leads to confusion as to which group Caraka refer to as “the attributes ending with volition”. Cakrapāṇi takes into consideration the first articulation and recognizes the first five, namely desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, and volition as the intended attributes in the group ending with volition (*prayatnāntas*). He states that the last five attributes told in the articulation are the varieties of *buddhi* itself.<sup>205</sup> Accordingly, the spiritual attributes which belong to the self are only five and they are desire,<sup>206</sup> aversion,<sup>207</sup> pleasure,<sup>208</sup> pain,<sup>209</sup> volition,<sup>210</sup> and knowledge. In addition to these, merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*), and impression (*bhāvana*) are regarded as the attributes of the self by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.<sup>211</sup> Even though Caraka speaks of merit and demerit, he does not categorically say that they are attributes. More over, he does not make any mention of mental impression.

Thus, Caraka's list of attributes is a large one which contains forty-one attributes. From the above description it is clear that though the majority of terms used are those used by Kaṇāda, they are mostly different in sense. In fact, Caraka has given his own schemata in order to suit the purpose of Āyurveda.

The knowledge of the attributes, particularly the general physical attributes and *rasa* have a vital role in determining the physical, chemico-physical and pharmacological properties of substances and in ascertaining etiology, symptomatology and treatment of diseases. The essential knowledge in this respect is that *vīrya*, *vipāka*, and *prabhāva*. The theory of *rasa* has deeper reaches in Āyurveda and it is not possible to describe them in detail here since it is beyond the scope of the present study.

### **Action (*karma*)**

The word *karma* is used to denote both motion and action. Caraka primarily defines it in the sense of bodily actions.<sup>212</sup> Accordingly, *karma* is defined as action prompted by volition.<sup>213</sup> Comprehending both the above-mentioned meanings, he also defines it as that which causes conjunction and disjunction by inhering in substances and as action for something that is to be accomplished and it depends on no other entity.<sup>214</sup>

Even though *karma* is defined in the sense of motion, he does not go further into the details giving its general divisions or the laws governing it. On the contrary, his further explanation is mainly centered on actions of the five physical elements which are relevant in the therapeutic context. The five peculiar types of actions are: (1) emesis (*vamana*), (2) purgation

(*virecana*), (3) corrective enemata (*āsthāpana/nirūhabasti*), (4) unctuous enema (*anuvāsana-basti*), and (5) head-purging (*śīṣa-virecana*).<sup>215</sup> This is nothing but a classification of the therapeutic actions done by physicians with drugs. He also classifies human actions into two: (i) positive actions (*pravṛtti*) and negative actions (*nivṛtti*).<sup>216</sup>

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the category *karma* refers to motion rather than action.<sup>217</sup> The earliest definition of *karma* is found in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra. There, it is defined as residing in one substance only, not possessing quality, being an independent cause of conjunction and disjunction.<sup>218</sup> He classifies *karma* into five: (1) upward motion (*utkṣepaṇa*), (2) downward motion (*apakṣepaṇa*), (3) contraction (*ākuñcana*), (4) expansion (*prasāraṇa*), and (5) motion in general (*gamana*). Here the last one called *gamana* is meant to include any motion not designated by the other four.<sup>219</sup> This classification has been admitted by all the later thinkers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.<sup>220</sup>

Praśastapāda comprehending all the five divisions gives a generic definition: All the five kinds of action beginning with *utkṣepaṇa* belong to a class of *karmatva* (the universal of *karma*). He elaborates it in the following way: action belongs to a single substance, is momentary, inheres in corporeal substances, is devoid of qualities, is caused by weight, volition, and conjunction or disjunction and is destroyed by its effect. It is an independent cause of conjunction and disjunction and is conceived as an intimate cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*). It produces effects in its substratum and other substrates. It does not bring forth actions of the same class and does

not create substance.<sup>221</sup> One significant thing to be noted in this connection is that he differentiates volitional acts from other kinds of motion. He calls all the five types of actions related to the body and the things connected with the body as conscious (*satpratyaya*) and all other motions as unconscious (*asatpratyaya*).<sup>222</sup>

Now it is very clear that the motif of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is motion and that of Caraka is action. Probably Caraka has sought to give therapeutic connotation for the category *karma*, presumably with a view to assimilating them in the medical tradition.

### **Universal (*sāmānya*) and Particularity (*viśeṣa*)**

Even though the Carakaśaṃhitā presupposes the categorial schema of Kaṇāda it has got its own purpose, consistency, and uniqueness. Naturally, the two categories namely, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* included in the schemata have got their own differences. The prima facie evidence that reveals their importance in Āyurveda is that Caraka places *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* instead of substance and qualities as the first and second categories.

The terms *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* appear in a wide variety of translations in English in both the Western and the Eastern presentations of Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy. The various terms used by different writers to denote *sāmānya* are community, genus, commonness, commonality, generality, similar constituents, similar characteristics, invariable concomitance, and universal. Particular, particularity, difference, differential, dissimilar constituents, dissimilar characteristics, and variant factor are the terms used

to signify *viśeṣa*.<sup>223</sup> However, the terms universal and particularity are used in this paper to denote *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* respectively, for they are the most commonly used terms in modern times.

The experienced world of ours consists in name and form,<sup>224</sup> and so naturally there arises the problem of the relationship between sense objects, thought and language.<sup>225</sup> Thought and language work closely together in building up sense perceptions. Though they present themselves fragmentarily they are grouped together and structured according to a form which makes them intelligible. It is this form which makes us possible the recognition or identification of an object with something previously known or thought. This fact being admitted, our general cognitions like “this is a cow”, “this is a pot” imply the existence of a generic property “cow-ness” and “pot-ness”. These cognitions of unity being distinct from the individuals, their objects must also be distinct from the individuals. The individuals as such cannot explain unity or identity. Thus there evolved the class concept of unity or identity. In Sanskrit it is called *sāmānya*.

The concept of the universal and the problems arising from it forms one of the most fundamental and crucial topics of discussion. It is a common subtle and difficult topic which has been debated for a long time in both the West and the East. But still it remains a matter of philosophical controversy. There is not much space to explain them in detail with all its implications and differences. However, it would be relevant to cite some of the basic differences in theory in this regard. There are mainly three major positions.

They are:

1. Nominalistic
2. Conceptualistic
3. Realistic.

According to nominalism, individual things in nature and individual ideas in mind alone are real. They have nothing in common but the name or sign given to them for the sake of reference. The generality of the name or sign consists in the representative function of the word. That is, universal is neither conceptual nor real but nominal.<sup>226</sup> It is fictitious. “According to conceptualism, individual things are the only reals in nature. But there are also ideas and concepts which are based on reality and not on mere fiction”.<sup>227</sup> This shows that universal is absolutely conceptual. It is neither fictitious nor real. According to realism, there are not only general names and general ideas or concepts expressed by them but also universals in nature to which general names and concepts correspond and which, existing outside time and space, pervade in and inform the things in time and space.<sup>228</sup> To be precise, universal exists both in mind and nature for the realists.

In the Indian intellectual tradition all these various positions are being discussed with nuances. In the philosophical domain, the Buddhists represent the nominalists. They refuse to accept the reality of the universal.<sup>229</sup> The universe, according to them, is in a flux of momentary particulars. There is nothing identical or similar in the momentary particulars. Identity and similarity are nothing but fancies of our imagination.<sup>230</sup> There is no

recurrence in reality, for the momentary particulars (*svalakṣaṇas*) constituting it are non-repetitive.<sup>231</sup> The Jaina thinkers accept *sāmānya*. But, according to them, nothing is known as purely universal or pure particularity. In their conception the object of valid knowledge is of the nature of both universal and particular.<sup>232</sup> They are also of the opinion that it is multiform, non-eternal, and limited.<sup>233</sup> The Mīmāṃsakas, both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhakaras, opine that universal is eternal. It subsists in individuals by the relation of “identity in difference” (*bhedābheda*).<sup>234</sup> The Advaita - Vedāntins hold that universals are categories of existence generated by primordial nescience lending unity to our-knowledge of particulars. They are not mere concepts or fabrications of our mind. They are forms of existence apprehended in empirical experience. Thus, for the Advaitins, universals are, empirically real though ultimately illusory.<sup>235</sup>

The Sāṃkhyās also admit the existence of universals. But, for them, universals are not eternal even though they have a certain consistency. A universal, in the Sāṃkhyā’s view, is a positive apprehension of inclusion, and is not an apprehension of exclusion.<sup>236</sup> Recognition is based on universals. Even though the individuals are ephemeral there arises a consistency in the recognition of the individual. The entity that forms the basis of the consistency in recognition is the universal.<sup>237</sup> They also hold that the notion of similarity (*sādṛśya*) is a kind of universal and is not a separate principle as the Mīmāṃsakas and some Buddhists assert. One understands similarity by perceiving sameness in a greater number of parts of two things. In other words, similarity is the cognition of an innate characteristic, which is the same in two things.<sup>238</sup>



In the present context, we are mainly concerned with the concept of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* in the Carakasamhitā which shows close affinity with Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy and which is in sharp contradistinction with the Buddhists. A critical reading does not ask “What does the statement mean?” but, “Where is it being made from?” “What does it presuppose?” “Are its presuppositions compatible with, independent of or anterior to it?” So it is a primary need to have an idea of the concept of universal and particularity in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra from which the Samhitā is supposed to have received its idea of the six fundamental categories.

The initial doctrine of philosophical controversy about universal and particularity was provided by Kaṇāda. The term *sāmānya* is derived from the word *samāna* (meaning / similar / equal) by adding the suffix *ṣyañ* and it occurs in various *sūtras* of Kaṇāda with different shades of meaning. Primarily the word is used in the sense of similarity or resemblance (*sādharmya*).<sup>239</sup> The word appears in its categorial sense in the *sūtra*-“*sāmānyam viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam*”,<sup>240</sup> which means *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* depend on cognition. However, it cannot be treated as the definition of universal and particularity. In fact, Kaṇāda does not introduce universal with a definition.<sup>241</sup> We shall come to the *sūtra* later on.

He further states that, that which brings about the notion of “is” (*sat*) in substance, quality, and action is “being” (*sattā*)<sup>242</sup> and it is different from them.<sup>243</sup> Substance-ness (*dravyatva*), quality-ness (*guṇatva*) and motion-ness (*karmatava*) are universals as well as particularities.<sup>244</sup> He also makes the following observations: the cognition of substance, quality, and

action occurs through and in relation to universal,<sup>245</sup> while universal and particularity are known independent of their further relation since both are devoid of further universal and particularity.<sup>246</sup> Existence or being (*bhāva/satta*) is absolute universal, because it causes the notion of inclusiveness only.<sup>247</sup> Though these observations are elusive and problematic, the entire section suggests a hierarchy of more or less inclusive universals with being as the most inclusive one and hence the highest of all universals. Of these observations the last one deserves special attention because it opens a way to understand Kaṇāda's position.

Accordingly, the first universal to be deduced is "being" (*sat*). The sign by which the cognition of "being" is inferred is the cognition of "is" (*sat*).<sup>248</sup> That is, along with the cognition of substance, quality, and motion, we have the cognition that they do exist. The entity that leads to this cognition of existence cannot be a substance, quality or motion because it is different from them.<sup>249</sup> Substances, as a matter of fact, are of two types. Of them the first are those things having two or more substances as substrates (*anekadravyavat*). A jar, for example, is a product of many atoms. The second are those which do not have any other substance as substrates (*adravyavat*). For instance, the atoms of physical elements, time or space. But "existence" which we apprehend is an uninterrupted whole in each single substance (*ekadravyavat*.) So "being" cannot be a substance. In the same way, "being" can neither be a quality nor motion because it exists in both quality and motion. But, by definition a quality cannot inhere in another quality and a motion cannot exist in another motion.

Since the cognition of “is” is not fragmented by any differential sign, Kaṇāda arrives at the conclusion that “being” is one and the same everywhere. It is the “absolute universal”, for “being” causes only the notion of inclusiveness.<sup>250</sup> It is on the ground that the cognition of “is” (*asti*) is apprehended in substance, quality, and action without fragmenting. So they are called by the common term *artha*.<sup>251</sup>

In the same way Kaṇāda deduces the existence of substanceness (*dravyatva*), quality-ness (*guṇatva*), and motion-ness (*kāramatva*). Naturally such entities like substance-ness thus deduced can be counted as lower or inferior universals. Taking account of this fact, his commentator Praśastapāda calls the absolute universal *parā* which means the superior and all others *aparā*, inferior. It is in relation to the inferior universals that Kaṇāda makes the statement: *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* depend on cognition. Here the term *viśeṣa* is not used in the categorial sense of *viśeṣa*. On the contrary, it is used to denote the universal itself. What is intended is that the inferior universals like substanceness can be treated as either universal or particularity depending on our cognition.<sup>252</sup> For instance, in the case of substanceness, if we take into consideration inclusive function leading to the apprehension of a substance, then it can be called a universal. And if the same substanceness does the exclusive function giving raise to the differentiating knowledge that substance is not quality then it can be called particularity. Since the inferior universals function as both universal and particularity, Kaṇāda calls them “universal particularities”.<sup>253</sup> Thus Kaṇāda construes universal on the basis of cognition. Accordingly, Kaṇāda’s position can be concluded as conceptualistic. This is further

accepted by his followers like Praśastapāda<sup>254</sup> and Srīdharācārya.<sup>255</sup> Taking account of this fact, modern scholars like Harsh Narain opines that the notions of the universal and the particularity are relative notions and represent notional or logical categories rather than ontological ones.<sup>256</sup>

In the Kaṇāda-sūtra, the category *viśeṣa*<sup>257</sup> denotes “ultimate particularity” (*antya-viśeṣa*). They are the ultimate factors of individual identity. In comparison with “being”, substance-ness” is particularity. At the same time, it is a universal when compared to earth-ness. Similarly, in comparison with substance-ness, the universal earth-ness is a particularity. In comparison with jar-ness, it is universal. In this way Kaṇāda finally arrives at the lowest strata of the hierarchy and calls it ultimate particularity (*antya-viśeṣa*) which gives rise to the cognition of distinction or exclusion only. Praśastapāda says that the ultimate particularities are entities residing in ultimate eternal substances, namely the atoms of the first four elements (earth, water, fire, and air), *ākāśa*, time, space, self (*ātmā*), and mind giving raise to the cognition of differentiation of each one.<sup>258</sup> Thus the ultimate particularity forms the contrasting borderline cases which occur in eternal individual substances differentiating each one of them. They reside exclusively in the eternal, non-composite substances and account for the irreducible identity of each one of them.

### **Universal and particularity in Carakasamhitā**

Now let us come to Carakasamhitā. It is true that Caraka indiscriminately deals with the world *en masse*, its general nature and

behaviour, and the nature of occurrences of particular events without separating scientific and philosophical fields and methods of investigation from one another. Its main purpose is not to fulfill the purpose of philosophy, to unveil the first and last ground of 'existents', but to kindle the practical business of maintaining humane health. So it is essential to discern how universals and particularities are being construed in such a treatise on a practical science.

The most important articulations that explain the universal and particularity are two in number.<sup>259</sup> Some scholars like P.V. Sharma opines that *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, in Āyurveda, differs from Vaiśeṣika in the sense that the latter uses the terms of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* for class (*jāti*) and individual (*vyakti*) respectively, but in the former they denote similarity (*tulyārthata*) and dissimilarity (*viparyaya*).<sup>260</sup> This creates some confusion. So, in order to know the real concept we must primarily know whether the terms, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, are used in the literal sense of similarity and difference or in their technical sense of universal and ultimate particularity.

There is a difference between similarity and universal. Similarity can exist in objects belonging to different categories such as substance, quality, and action. Universals, on the other hand, reside only in objects of the same class or category. They are class essences as told earlier.<sup>261</sup> Caraka describes *sāmānya* as an entity which brings about unification or oneness (*ekatvakaraṃ sāmānyaṃ*) and as that which recurs in similar things (*tulyārthata hi sāmānyaṃ*). Commenting on the first exposition Cakrapāṇidatta says that universal is that which brings about the notion of

oneness (*ekatvabuddhikaraṃ*). Referring to the second articulation he says that *tulyārthata* means a single entity that subsists in many individuals by a single relation, and there by brings about the cognition of identity though the individuals are different.<sup>262</sup> Thus, for him universal is an entity which is instrumental in cognition. Actually speaking, Caraka does not say that the unification is only at the conceptual level. On the contrary, what he intends is the unification at the conceptual level as well as at the objective level.<sup>263</sup> Thus universal is a recurring generic property inherent in numerically different individuals and brings about the unification of individuals at the cognitive level and objective level. So it is very clear that the term *sāmānya* is used not in a mere literal sense of similarity. It is in the sense of universal.

Similarly, in the case of *viśeṣa* also if it is in the sense of difference it can exist in any individual object. If it is in the sense of ultimate particularity, as told in Vaiśeṣika, it can exist only in eternal substances. Caraka defines particularity as that which generates differentiation (*viśeṣastu pṛthaktvakṛt*) and as such it is antagonistic (*viśeṣastu viparyayaḥ*). So particularity is the cause of differentiating knowledge (*vyāvṛttabuddhikṛt*). According to Cakrapāṇi, *viśeṣa* of Caraka does not refer to the ultimate particularities but refers to the “universal particularity” when they generate relative sense of distinction. For instance, when the universal cow-ness causes distinction of cow with other objects like horses it can be called particularity depending upon the cognition. Thus, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* of Caraka refer to one and the same entity which brings about the sense of identity with the objects of the same class and which is also responsible for the sense of difference from the objects belonging to

other classes. So the entity construed here recalls the “universal particularity” of the Vaiśeṣikas which keeps conformity with the genus (*jāti*) of the Nyāya-sūtra.<sup>264</sup> On the basis this, it can be concluded that ultimate particularity (*antyaviśeṣa*) of Vaiśeṣika has no place in the Carakasamhitā.

Though Caraka presupposes the categorial schema of Kaṇāda, he makes a shift from the Vaiśeṣika theory of the universals and particularities. The most important improvement is the alteration from the conceptualistic position to the realistic position. Moreover he is neither concerned with the superior universal “being” (*parasāmānya/satta*) nor the ultimate particularity (*antya-viśeṣa*), but the “universal particularity” (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*).

It is on the basis of this paradigm shift that Caraka gives a pragmatic orientation to the philosophical concept of the universal construed by Kaṇāda. Dasgupta has remarked:

“In the Vaiśeṣika system the word *sāmānya* means a class concept; but here it means the concrete things which have similar constituents or characteristics; and *viśeṣa* which means in Vaiśeṣika, ultimate specific properties differentiating one atom from another, means in Caraka concrete things dissimilar and opposite constituents or characteristics”.<sup>265</sup>

Though the statement is confusing, the point that *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are not conceptual is quiet evident. Vinayaka Jayananda Thakkar also expresses the very same idea. He says that *ekatvakara* means not only the

unification at the conceptual level but also at the practical level in such a way that, universals brings about the equipoise of the *dhātus* from the point of view of treatment.<sup>266</sup> Unless they have an ontological existence, they would not have a practical relevance.

The crux of the paradigm shift is that Caraka assumes a dichotomic function of the said property at the objective level which in turn gives a more logical and scientific orientation to *Āyurveda*. It is on the basis of this dichotomic function of the “universal particularities” that he evolves the theory of increase (*vṛddhi*) and decrease (*hrāsa*) of the entities of the physical world. In other words, it is the final determinant of the equilibrium of man and nature. In *Āyurvedic* context it is applied as the cardinal principle of treatment.

We know that if the delicate balance between *śleṣma*, *pitta*, and *vāta* is disturbed, the body is visited by some or other disease; therefore freedom from illness is contingent upon by two types of balance internal and external. This equipoise can be made possible by increasing *dhātus* which have fallen and by decreasing *dhātus* that exceeds the normal state.

Caraka construes universal and particularity as the cause of increase and decrease respectively. He says that *sāmānya* always is the cause of increase and *viśeṣa* is the cause of decrease of everything provided the two are in conjoined action.<sup>267</sup> The classical example is that meat-ness’ (*maṃstva*) while functioning as a universal will be the cause of increase of the flesh, and it will be a cause of decrease of *vāta* while functioning as a particularity. One of the most important things that



Cakrapāṇi points out in this connection is that an entity will cause decrease only if the universal particularity of the thing that “nourishes” and the “nourished” are extremely antagonistic. If it is not so, it will not cause decrease. For example, meat-ness, the universal of meat, is a particularity when compared to blood-ness of blood. But it is not an extremely antagonistic particularity. So meat will not cause the decrease of blood. On the other hand, because of the presence of the identical nature of the universal in their qualities, it will lead to augmentation of blood. This explanation is aimed at making the point clear in the Āyurvedic context *viśeṣa* means an “antagonistic particular” (*viruddhaviśeṣa*).

The articulation is somewhat difficult to discern and so has given rise to controversial interpretations. However the main points to be noted in this articulation is that increase and decrease take place when the two are in action. A. Comba, by citing the interpretation of the Cakrapāṇi, suggests that it can be interpreted in two ways. Of them the first is that *pravṛtti* of the universal and particularity is their connection (*abhisambandha*). Such *pravṛtti* of the universals and particularities with the body constituents is the cause of increase and of decrease. In the second, *pravṛtti* means the balance of the bodily constituents (*dhātusāmānya*); this balance is an effect both of the universals and of the particularities.<sup>268</sup>

Now, the question is what is the real sense it of the part “but the action of the both (*pravṛttirubhayasya tu*)” in the articulation. The doubt is whether they refer to the action of the universal and particularity or to some other entities. As a matter of fact, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* have no independent action

of their own. It is substance that has action. So what is implied is that when two substances are in conjoined action, increase and decrease in the substances, their inhering qualities, and also actions will take place due to the presence of “universal and particularity”. Thus, it is clear that the action referred to as the cause of increase and decrease is the action of substances and not of universal and particularity. This has been well clarified by Cakrapāṇi. He quotes Praśastapāda-bhāṣya and point out that universal is neither a cause (substantial cause) nor a non-substantial cause of increase. If so eternally present fleshness in the flesh of the body would increase the body flesh itself even of the vegetarians. So he concludes that universal serves only as an indicator of the actual cause of increase, which is a substance-ness, quality-ness or action-ness.<sup>269</sup> Thus, what is implied is that universal and particularity only refer to a property or characteristic which functions as the causal determinant (*prayojaka*) of increase and decrease.<sup>270</sup> That is though the substance quality and action are the real causes of increase and decrease of their corresponding entities, there resides in them a property which functions as a “causal determinant”.

It is to be remembered in this connection that, universal and particularity are not different entities, but to the “universal particularity”. *Sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are not independent and equal entities. On the other hand they are two terms given to signify one and the same property based on the function it does. The term *viśeṣa* refer to a negative version of the universal at the functional level. If an entity functions as “causal determinant” of increase it is called universal and if the very same entity

functions as “causal determinant” of decrease it is called particularity. That is, according to Caraka, the properties that reside in substances, qualities and actions have a dicotomical function of determining both increase and decrease. Dasgupta, while dealing with growth and disease brings out this idea. He remarks that, what ever that leads to increase of a particular *dhātu* automatically leads the decrease of other *dhātus*.<sup>271</sup> In fact, Caraka himself has emphatically explained this double edged function as simultaneous. He says that a thing that increases a particular *dhātu* is also responsible for the simultaneous decrease of other *dhātus* which are extremely antagonistic in nature.<sup>272</sup>

Now the question arises as to how the simultaneity of augmentation and diminution can be justified. Cakrapāṇi says that this simultaneity is just like simultaneous production of many sounds from a single sound or like the simultaneous production of light and heat by fire.<sup>273</sup> In fact, Caraka has made it explicit when he says that proper administration of drugs will simultaneously cause increase of the reduced *dhātus* and decrease of the increased *dhātus* and thereby maintain the equipoise.<sup>274</sup> It is relevant to note that he applies the very same principle in psychic therapy also. Caraka when declares that emotions like desire (*kāma*), anger (*krodha*), fear (*bhaya*), and the like can be conveniently directed at one another to counter the ill-effects on the individual, he was actually applying the principle that *viśeṣa* diminishes the antagonistic in psychic therapy also.<sup>275</sup>

Thus, it is evident that Caraka’s metaphysical doctrine does not consist of bare particulars or simple entities as causes. On the contrary, it must

have a definite characteristic feature which is uniform in all things. Such things will fall into a class and behave in the same way. This characteristic content is the “causal determinant” of increase and decrease. As such, the characteristic which is of the widest or smallest extension cannot be a causal determinant. That is, “absolute universal” (*sattā/bhāva*) and ‘ultimate particularity’ (*antya-viśeṣa*) are neither causal determinants of increase nor a causal determinant of decrease. Hence it is the universal particularities which reside in substances, qualities, and actions that serve as the causal determinants of increase and decrease. Probably it was Caraka who was the first to construe “universal particularities” as causal determinants.

### **Various interpretations of the universal and particularity of Caraka**

Universal and particularity construed by Caraka are interpreted variously. Some of them are quoted and refuted by Cakrapāṇi. One such interpretation is that there are three types of universals and particularities namely, *dravyagocara*, *guṇagocara* and *karmagocara*.<sup>276</sup> Accordingly, the first, that is, *dravyagocara* is referred to by the 44<sup>th</sup> verse of *Sūtrasthāna*.<sup>277</sup> The first part of the 45<sup>th</sup> verse of *sūtrasthāna* refers to the second, and the second part of the same verse refers to the third. Bhaṭṭarahariścandra rejects this classification because, according to him, all the three were implied by the 44<sup>th</sup> verse.<sup>278</sup> Cakrapāṇi points out that this has been already refuted by Bhaṭṭarahariścandra. If it is accepted that all the three are mentioned by the first verse then, the verse forty-five would become futile.<sup>279</sup> Actually speaking, universals inhere only in substance, quality, and action. The

categories, namely universal, particularity, and inherence have no universal and particularity. So there is no need of such a classification because it would be misleading. But, in order to avoid this anomaly some others give another three types of classification, namely (1) the absolute universal (*atyanta-sāmānya*) referred to by the verse 44, (2) middle universal (*madhyama-sāmānya*) denoted by the first half of the verse 45 and partial universal (*ekadeśa-sāmānya*) denoted by the second half of the verse 45. But this classification is also rejected by Cakrapāṇi on the basis that such a classification is not consistent and is of no use.<sup>280</sup>

But still, there is given two other types of divisions. Of them the first one is universal existing in both objects (*ubhayavṛtti-sāmānya*) for example, meatness (*māṃsatva*). Meatness exists in both meat and flesh of the body, and thereby its consumption increases the flesh of the body. The second one is the universal existing in single object (*ekavṛtti-sāmānya*) for example, gheeness (*ghṛtatva*). Though gheeness is only in ghee, it augments the dissimilar organic fire of the body. Here, gheeness is counted as the cause of increase and so it is called partial universal. Cakrapāṇi, however, rejects this theory because it is against the concept of universal that it is a class essence. If so, the instances like the above-mentioned will remain as exceptions to the general rule that universal is the cause of increase. According to Cakrapāṇi, augmentation has no invariable relation with universal. On the other hand, universal is invariably related to augmentation.<sup>281</sup> In other words, universal is not the only cause of increase. Other entities can also become the causal determinant of increase.

He attributes a new cause called “specific power” (*prabhāva*) for increase in places where increase is caused by a different thing. Accordingly, one thing can increase another thing even when they are not identical, because of the presence of specific power. So there is nothing wrong in maintaining that dissimilar things can also cause increase.<sup>282</sup> Thus, it is clear that the general rule that universal is the cause of increase is not without exceptions. But this anomaly is solved by attributing *prabhāva* to the cause.

Similarly, it is an established fact that bodily exercises will increase *vāta*. For example running increases the *vāta* but they have nothing in common. So there arises the difficulty to explain how action increases bodily elements. Even though Caraka illustrates universals inherent in substance and quality, he has consciously refrained from illustrating the casualty of physical activity. Cakrapāṇi says that, in the case of physical activity it is the “specific power” that causes increase. This does not mean that Caraka does not admit the universal of motion. Caraka says that *vāta* which is naturally qualified by motion will be augmented by actions like physical exercise and will be decreased by inaction.<sup>283</sup> Dream is not a direct cause of the augmentation of *kapha*. But it causes increase of *kapha* through decreasing the motion. What is implied is that whenever there occurs a lapse in the invariable relation between universal and increase *prabhāva* should be inferred as the cause of increase.<sup>284</sup>

If the above-mentioned cases are instances of the lapse of “negative invariable relation” (*vyatireka-sahacāra*) of universal and increase, there are also instances of the lapse of the affirmative “invariable relation”

(*anvaya-sahacāra*). In certain cases even if the universal is found to exist in both “the thing that nourishes” and “the nourished”, augmentation is not seen to be caused. For example, even if an old man who is wearing out gets nourished by food which has the same quality as his body, that nourishment will not make him fatter. Similarly, even if sweet things are consumed in *grīṣma* it would not augment *kapha*. Cakrapāṇi settles this anomaly by saying that it is due to the presence of the obstructions, old age and the heat of *grīṣma*.<sup>285</sup> The same is the case with particularity also. It also will cause decrease only in the absence of an obstruction. For example, substances like the *mandaka*<sup>286</sup> the *nikuca*<sup>287</sup> which are unctuous even though they are antagonistic of *vāta* and of other pathogenic elements do not alleviate them, because of the presence of noxious *prabhāva* of these substances. Thus it is concluded that, universal is capable of causing increase in the absence of an obstruction<sup>288</sup>. Actually, this explanation is put forth on the basis of the theory formulated in the later period in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system and not based on the Carakasamhitā. Udayana (AD 991),<sup>289</sup> one of the greatest exponents of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in his book *Nyāyakusumāñjalī* says that “the production of an effect does not happen only by the presence of the three causes”.<sup>290</sup> But the absence of an obstruction is also essential for the production. However it is a fact that the general rule that the universal causes increase is not without exception.

Even though Caraka formulates the definition of the universals and of the particularities in a way which differs from Vaiśeṣika-sūtra by metonymy and ellipses and construes universal as the causal determinant of increase

and decrease, the other fundamental medical texts do not use them at all. Suśrutasaṃhitā mentions neither universals nor particularities. He does not speak of even similarities or differences in the first chapter of sūtrasthāna where it is expected to appear. While discussing the remedy for pathological conditions Suśruta says that, diseases due to the diminution of *doṣas* can be cured by applying drugs which have same origin of the *doṣas*.<sup>291</sup> Thus, it is clear that they are not used in the technical sense of universals and particularities as explained in the Carakasaṃhitā. Probably this may be because Suśruta being a surgeon, the fundamental were not his main concern.

When we come to Aṣṭāṅgasamgraha and Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya the subject of increase and decrease is discussed with great importance in the first chapter of *sūtrasthāna* itself. But there is a difference. Both the texts place “similar” (*samāna*) and “dissimilar” (*viparīta*) respectively for universals and particularity. Thus, the increase of all things is caused by the similar and decrease is caused by the dissimilar.<sup>292</sup> However, this innovation may be because of the reconciliation attitude adopted by these thinkers towards the predecessors or it may be an attempt for a more empirical perspective as pointed out by A. Comba.<sup>293</sup>

In this context, it would not be improper to recall the impact of the concept of universal and particularity in the Carakasaṃhitā, in the later development of the causation theory. It would help us to understand the cross currents between philosophy and science in Indian intellectual tradition in their development which have been lost at certain point of history.



A survey of the later classical Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy bears witness to the fact that its causation theory has been highly influenced by the concept of universal and particularity of Carakasamhitā. The modern exponents of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school lay emphasis on the logical necessity of accepting the existence of universals at the objective level rather than their cognitive nature in perception. They are of the opinion that the causality of a thing cannot be undermined and the determinant of causality must be a universal.<sup>294</sup> Later followers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika describe universals as indispensable conditions for the regulation of causal linkages (*karaṇatavacchedaka and kāryatavacchedaka*).<sup>295</sup>

Udayana argues for the very existence of universal on the basis of the principle of causality. His chief argument is that causal relation being necessary and uniform, it cannot be said to exist between particulars as such but between particulars having a class nature (*jāti*). A denial of this will be contrary to the nature of things as discovered by us.<sup>296</sup> “If causal relation is supposed to hold between bare particulars or then we cannot explain the notion of the potential (*svarūpa yogya*) cause. We search for the specific material which has the potentiality for the desired effect. This potentiality or causal efficiency (*karaṇatva*) is possessed by a thing by virtue of its class nature (*jāti*)”.<sup>297</sup>

Viswanatha, the author of Nyāya Siddhanta Mukṭāvalī, proves the very existence of the universal substanceness (*dravyatva*) on the basis that it is inevitable as a causal delimiter (*karaṇatavacchedaka*) of the inherent causality of an effect (*kārya*) or of conjunction (*saṃyoga*) and distinction

(*vibhāga*). Thus it is clear that the idea of causality as a consistent and essential relation between things necessarily implies the existence of universal.<sup>298</sup>

Another significant development in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is that they do not conceive all universals as ‘causal delimiters’ (*karaatavacchedaka*). Only eternal class essences like cow-ness (*gotva*), red-ness (*raktatva*) are conceived as causal delimiters. Such universals are called genus (*jāti*). Other general adventitious characteristics such as cookness (*pācakatva*) are called imposed property (*upādhis*).<sup>299</sup>

Udayana enumerates six impediments called *jātibādhakas*. They are (1) Unity of the object (*vyakterabheda*). Example: the *ākāśa* being one all-pervading thing, there is no *jāti* as *ākāśatva*. (2) Identity of objects (*tulyatva*). Example: *khaṭatva* and *kalaśatva* are not different *jātis* as both words denote the same thing. (3) Cross-division (*saṅkara*). Example: *bhūtatva* and *mūrtatva* are not *jātis* since they constitute cross division. (4) Want of finality or *regresses in infinitum* (*anavasthiti*). Example: *jātis* like manhood (*manuṣyatva*) itself cannot have further *jāti*, for in that case, there being *jāti* over *jāti ad infinitum*, there will be no finality. (5) Violation of nature (*rūpahāni*). Example: even though particularities (*viśeṣas*) are innumerable they cannot have the *jāti viśeṣatva*, because such an assumption is essentially opposed to the very conception of *jāti*, and (6) want of connection (*asambandha*). Example: *samavāyatva* cannot be accepted as the *jāti* of *samavāya* because *samyatva* cannot have any connection with its substratum inherence.<sup>300</sup>

Now, from the facts furnished above we can conclude that what Caraka has done is a *critique* of the then existing concept of the universal. It is a *critique* in the sense that it is designed to generate a better pragmatic concept, so that it can be applied for human projects of health and cure. It is an analysis which focused on the betterment of removing the imperfections and flaws of the then existed curative system which was confined to etiology (*hetu*), symptomatology (*liṅga*) and medicine (*auśadha*).

Kaṇāda provided the initial doctrine of the ultimate universal, universal particularity and ultimate particularity in a conceptualistic way. Caraka has sorted out the ‘universal particularity’ after excluding the ultimate universal “being” (*sattā*) which is of the widest extension and the ultimate particularity (*antyaviśeṣa*) which is of the smallest extension. Further, they are recognized as intrinsic, non-accidental entities inhering in substances, qualities and motions functioning as causal determinants or causal delimiters of increase and decrease. In essence, it is construed as the causal determinant of equipoise.

This was actually a shift in perspective. It was a shift which made possible the actualization of a philosophical abstraction to a pragmatic orientation which gave Āyurveda a scientific temper and made it move. But it was not without exceptions. Certain lapses are found to affect the negative and positive invariable relation between increase and universal. Cakrapāṇi, by attributing specific power (*prabhāva*) and absence of obstruction, has tried to remove such imperfections taking into consideration some of the later developments in the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy.

## Inherence (*samavāya*)

Now let us recall the peculiar function of inherence (*samavāya*), the sixth and final category. The word *samavāya* is derived from the root *ay* by prefixing “*sam*” and “*av*” and by suffixing *ghañ*. It is found to be used in Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī<sup>301</sup> and Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra<sup>302</sup> in the sense of aggregation. In Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya it is juxtaposed with *vyavaya*. There *vyavāya* signifies separateness and *samavāya*, coming together. One of the examples cited by Patañjali is that Ministers are not free as far as their relation of *samavāya* is concerned and are free as far as their *vyavāya* is concerned.<sup>303</sup> Based on similar observations, Harsh Narain states that aggregation is both external, that is, caused by external pressure and internal, that is caused by internal necessity. Their phenomenon of external aggregation gave rise to the concept of conjunction as a quality, while that of internal aggregation, to the concept of inherence.<sup>304</sup>

In the present context, as has been discerned through the doctrine of categories to know things as a conglomeration of various entities, there arises a question as to what holds the categories together and connects them to a unit. It is not possible to consider conjunction (*saṃyoga*) as the relation, for it is a quality which has been defined as a union of things not formerly united.<sup>305</sup>

“It had been recognized that conjunction originates only through movement of things which connects themselves with one another and is abrogated again through the separation of things.

But this does not hold true in the case of categories. There is, therefore, no union of earlier separated things, for they only occur together”.<sup>306</sup>

It is, therefore, assumed that there is an indwelling connection or aggregation different from conjunction which binds the categories to a unit. It is called inherence (*samavāya*).

The Vaiśeṣika-sūtra refers to *samavāya* on several occasions, while the main *sūtra* in which it appears in the categorial sense defines inherence as that which brings about the comprehension of ‘this is here’ (*iha idam iti*) - something resides in a locus with regard to cause and effect.<sup>307</sup> It implies that inherence is a relation of cause and effect which have ‘container contained’ relation. Śaṅkaramiśra clarifies that the cause and effect are devoid of conjunction and disjunction being non-separables.<sup>308</sup> Kaṇāda does not say whether inherence is eternal or not in clear terms. But we can infer that inherence as posited by him is eternal in spite of the transient nature of its related entities because, for him, that which exists and is without a cause is eternal.<sup>309</sup> This is further attested by the fact that there is no cause or source of knowledge to establish it with to its ephemerality.<sup>310</sup> On the basis of this concept of inherence, Kaṇāda recognizes two causes: (1) inherent cause (*samavāyi kāraṇa*)<sup>311</sup> and (2) non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi kāraṇa*).<sup>312</sup> However, he also speaks of the inherence of attribute and action with substance,<sup>313</sup> the inherence of many entities in the same locus (*ekārthasamavāyasaṃbandha*),<sup>314</sup> and inherence in the conjunct (*saṃyuktasamavāya*).<sup>315</sup>

In Carakasamhitā, inherence is being described as an inseparable connection of substances with their qualities. He adds that it is eternal where there is the substance not devoid of its distinctive qualities.<sup>316</sup> Accordingly, inherence is a relation different from conjunction which always presupposes the separability of its related. It pinpoints the relation of ‘identity in difference’ (*bedhābedha*). As has been pointed out by Cakrapāṇidatta, the given examples are suggestive of the container (*ādhāra*) and contained (*ādheya*); the two related entities of inherence.<sup>317</sup> Thus, according to Caraka, ‘inherence is an eternal relation of the related entities’ which are not capable of existing separately, because they involve a relation of the container and the contained. In particular he refers this association only to substances with their qualities. The significant thing to be noted in this connection is that it was Caraka who was the first to make it explicit that inherence is eternal.

Cakrapāṇidatta, taking into consideration the later innovations in the classical Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought, states that inherence is the relation of part and whole, the substrates with their qualities, motion, and universal.<sup>318</sup> But he consciously omits the relation of eternal substance with their ultimate particularities because of the fact that Caraka himself has not referred to such ultimate particularities. However, it is doubtful whether Caraka has envisaged the inherence of all these relations. His main purpose has been to reveal the binding relationship of substances with their qualities which have a high significance in the maintenance of health and the treatment of diseases. At the same time the definition is worthy enough to accommodate them all within its purview.

In this context it may be of great relevance to recall the opinion of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. A probe into the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system shows that the explanation given by Caraka has a high influence on them. The very definition given by Praśastapāda is vindictive of this fact. He defines it as a relationship between inseparable things having a “container-contained” relation.<sup>319</sup> He, further defines inherence in clearer terms removing the mist and veil of Kaṇāda’s notion of ‘this is here’.<sup>320</sup> Accordingly, Praśastapāda describes the nature of inherence as the relationship of substance, quality, action, universal, and particularity; whether it can be in the form of effect and cause or vice-versa; is one in which they are inseparably united and they exist in the form of the substrated and the substratum, by which the notion arises “this resides here” and by which there is the interdependence of the separate things of limited extension. This is called inherence.<sup>321</sup> Keśavamiśra defines it as the relationship of inseparables.<sup>322</sup> Almost all later *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* thinkers emphasizes the eternity of inherence.<sup>323</sup>

Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra defines inherence as complete combination (*saṃyogavapti*).<sup>324</sup> He recalls the definition given by Caraka<sup>325</sup> and says that inherence is the counter opposite of separateness just like disjunction is the counter opposite of conjunction.<sup>326</sup> He further states that it is a peculiar type of conjunction of the soul with *apūrva*, body, sense organs, and feelings called birth. The *puruṣa* thus constituted by inherence of the body, senseorgans, and mind experiences all kinds of sufferings and the cessation of this state of affairs constitutes the ultimate liberation from all kinds of

sufferings. This type of conjunction is particular type of quality and so it is treated as a separate entity.<sup>327</sup> But this view is not tenable because inherence is eternal for Caraka. Moreover, if it had been a quality, Caraka would have included inherence in the group of qualities along with *pr̥thaktva* and would not have given a categorial status. Above all, a relation of quality to its substrate cannot be a quality.

The Sāṃkhyas , the Bhaṭṭamīmāṃsakas, and the Vedāntins do not accept inherence as a separate category. The Prābhākaras and the modern Naiyāyikas consider inherence as eternal and varied.<sup>328</sup>

It was Caraka who was the first to construe inherence as an ontological category just as universal. As far as Kaṇāda is concerned, only substance, quality, and action have ontological existence. That is why he called them by the name *artha*. In addition to that it was Caraka who first gave a definition distinguishing it from *saṃyoga*. It is *saṃyoga* that represent individual instances of conjunction. He has clearly stated that it is eternal and will not be destroyed by the behaviour of the related tentities. So it was Caraka who was the first construe inherence as eternal.



## NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 In the Western terminology it is called disinterested curiosity or general curiosity, which has the features that are disconcerting to our human, moral, and religious interests and to our tendencies to think in accordance with them. It is this general curiosity that animates and sustains what we call the theoretical exercise of intellect in a disinterested pursuit of what we call truth. Without general curiosity there would be no dispassionate scientific and philosophic enquiry, no pure science, no pursuit of learning for its own sake, no voyage of intellectual or for that matter of geographical discovery, undertaken in the spirit and for the sake of sheer adventure. FM, Contents - I, p. 6 - 7. In Indian intellectual tradition the Sanskrit word *jijñāsā* used in the sense of insatiable curiosity is found used in the articulations. See “*athāto Brahmajijñāsā*”, Br. Su, I. i. 1; *athāto dharmaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ*, VS, I. i. 1; *athāto dīrghaṃ jīvitīyamadhyāyaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ*, CS, Su, I. 1; *athāto dharmajijñāsā*. M.Su, I.i.1. They are not to be conceived as disinterested one. On the other hand, in the pursuit of truth, it is also interested in the moral and religious bearing upon human life.
- 2 Categoriology means the theory or critic of categories. See ENVC, Vol. I, p. 22.
- 3 Donald Walhout, “On Categories”, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, XXXIV, 3, October, Amalner, 1961, p. 142.

- 4 K.C. Bhattacharyya *The concept of philosophy: Studies in philosophy*, ed., Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Calcutta, 1958, Vol. II, p. 102.
- 5 W.T. Stace claims to have used the word categorial for the first time vide his *Theory of Knowledge and Existence*, Oxford, 1932, p. 289; Harsh Narain who uses this word suggests that the alternative word categorical is rarely used now. See ENVC, Vol. I, p. 2.
- 6 ENVC, Vol. I, p. 64.
- 7 FM, Contents - I, p. 199.
- 8 Ibid, “Expressions are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action or affection”. C.D.C. Reeve, “Introduction”, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard Mckeon, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Modern Library, New York, 2001, p. 8. Harsh Narain points out that Aristotle sometimes seems to content himself with even smaller lists. See foot-notes, ENVC, Vol. I, p. 65.
- 9 FM, Contents - II, p. 222.
- 10 ENVC, Vol. I, p. 78.
- 11 *sup tiñantaṃ padaṃ*, PS, I. iv.14.
- 12 When the meaning of the component parts of the word is understood, that word is called *yaugika*: “*yatrāvayavārtha eva budhyate tadyaugikaṃ*”. NSMK, p. 315.
- 13 *tatra prṭhivyādīni bhūtāni catvāri tattvāni*, SDSM , p. 2.

- 14 *atra saṃkṣepatastvajīvājīvākhye dve tatve staḥ*, SDSM, p. 67. The English word “not- souls” is used as equivalent for the Sanskrit word by Satchidananda Murty. SDS, p. 63; K.B. Jindal calls *ajīva padārthas* as physical objects, *EJ*, p. 44.
- 15 SDS, p.5; see also VNK, p. 27.
- 16 *dukhaṃ saṃsāriṇaḥ skandhāḥ, te ca pañca prakīrtitāḥ vijñānaṃ vedanā saṃjñā saṃskāro rūpameva ca*. SDS, p. 6.
- 17 *mūlaprakṛtiravikṛtirmahadādyāḥ sapta ṣoḍaśakastu vikāro, na prakṛtirna vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ*, SK, 3.
- 18 *dharmaviśeṣaprasūtāt dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣa samavāyānāṃ sādharmaivaidharmyābhyam tattvajñānānniśreyasaṃ*. VS, I. i. 4.
- 19 *pramāṇa-prameya-saṃśaya-prayojana-dṛstānta-siddhānta-avayavataṛka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitaṇḍā-hetvābhāsa-chala-jāti-nigrahassthānānāṃ tattvajñānāt niśreyasādhigamaḥ*. NS, I. i. 1.
- 20 *dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyabāvāḥ sapta padārthāḥ*, TSA, p. 2; SP, p.5; NSMK, Kārikā, 2, p. 26.
- 21 *cidacidātmakau dvau padārthau iti māyāvādinō vedāntina āhuḥ*. NK, p. 464.
- 22 HSPCIC, Vol. II, Part -- 4, p. 183.
- 23 *dvivdhameva khalu sarvaṃ saccāsacca*, CS, Su. XI. 17.
- 24 *sāmānyam ca viśeṣam ca guṇān dravyāṇi karma ca samavāyam ca tatjñatvā tantroktam vidhimāsthitaḥ*. CS, Su. I. 28.

- 25 CST, Vol. I, p. 22.
- 26 HIPS, Vol. II, p. 369.
- 27 FIC, Vol. I, p. 234; “Further a critical survey of the entire text of Caraka reveals the fact that he was highly influenced by the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṃkhyas. The first conception of the individual proceeds from the stand point of Vaiśeṣika and the last from that of Sāṃkhya”. ODST, p. 100.
- 28 IM, p. 8.
- 29 The basic question of philosophy is “Why are there essents, why is there anything at all, rather than nothing”. Ibid, p. 1. “Essents” = “existents”, “things that are” see foot notes, ibid.
- 30 Ibid., p. 10.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 *ṣaṅṅāmapī padārthānāmastitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni*. PBNK, p. 41.
- 33 *pramitiviśayāḥ padārthāḥ*. SP, p. 4; *padasya arthaḥ padārthaḥ iti vyutpatyābhidheyatvaṃ padārtha sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ*. See Dīpikā, TSA, p. 2; “*saptānāmapi sādharmaṃ jñeyatvādikamucyate*”. NSMK, p. 67.
- 34 *vyaktyākṛtijātyastu padārthaḥ*. NS, II. ii. 65.
- 35 For details see “Introduction”, VV, pp. xiv-xv.
- 36 *artha iti dravyaguṇakarmasu*. VS, VIII. ii. 3; “*dravyādīnām trayāṅāmapi sattāsaṃbandhaḥ, .....svasamavāyārtha śabdābhidheyatvāca*”. PBNK, p. 45; *nirupapadenārthā śabdena dravyādaya evābhidhīyante*, KL, p. 246 For details see CSP, p. 37.

- 37 Substance being the substratum of all other categories, it is placed first in the Vaiśeṣika - sūtra.
- 38 “.....sāmānyajñanamūlatvāccāyurvedapravṛtyupāyasya hetvādeḥ sāmānyamagre nirdiśati”. Cakrapāni on CS, Su, I. 44.
- 39 “sāmānyamca viśeṣaṃ ca” ityādaḥ guṇānādaḥ nirdiśatā guṇānāmeva rasādīnām prāyaḥ śāstre kārmukatvamupadiśyate. Cakrapāni on Ibid., 48.
- 40 ityuktaṃ kāraṇaṃ, kāryaṃ dhātusāmyamihocyate dhātusāmyakriyā cuktā tantrasyāsya prayojanaṃ. Ibid., 53.
- 41 Loc. cit., F. Note, 18.
- 42 Caraka does not use the term *padārtha* or any such general term for the categories he has enumerated.
- 43 BWT, p. 89.
- 44 See A. Quinton, *The Nature of Things*, London, 1973, p.1. Quoted from Ibid., p. 89.
- 45 FM, Contents - I. p. 199.
- 46 “In Aristotle (Metaphysics z, vii) this essence becomes more than just the matter, but a unity of matter and form”. Simon Blackburn, *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, London, 1994, p. 366.
- 47 See also “*Substance and Attribute*”, P. Edward, ed., *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, by Vol. 8, art. “Substance and attribute”, cited in BWT, pp. 89-90.

- 48 Lexicon Universal Encyclopedia, Lexicon Publication, Inc, New York, N. Y., Delux Home edn., 1990, Vol. XVIII, p. 377 “In philosophy substance is the primary being of things, or that which underlies changes of quality”. The Encyclopedia Americana, Grolier Incorporated, Connecticut, International edn. 2001, Vol. XXV, p. 828.
- 49 BWT, p. 90.
- 50 *droḍhum guṇakarmādibhirāśritatvena prāptum योग्यमित्यर्थे “acyat”* (PS.3-1-61) *iti sūtreṇa kṛtyapratyayena niṣpanno’yam dravyaśabdaḥ pṛthivyādi dravya vācako bhavati. Pāṇinīyavyākaraṇaśāstre Vaiśeṣikatattvamīmāṃsā*, Dr. Ramsharan Sastri, Delhi, 1976, p.7.
- 51 “*cādayo’satve*” PS. I. iv.57. Patañjali interprets the word *sattva* in the sūtra as “*ayaṃ sattvaśabdḥ - astyeva dravyapadārthakaḥ. ....asti kriyā- padārthaḥ, sadbhāvaḥ sattvamiti. kasyedaṃ grahaṇaṃ? dravyapadārthakaḥ*”. M. Bh, Vol. II, I. iv. 4, p. 282; “*sattvamiti dravyamucyate*”, KV ( on PS. I. iv, 57), Vol. I, p. 77.
- 52 “*adhikaraṇavicāle ca*” PS, V. iii. 43; *dravyaṃ hi loke ‘adhikaraṇaṃ’ ityucyate*, M. Bh, Vol. II, II. i. 1, p. 344; “*adhikaraṇaṃ dravyaṃ*” KV (on PS, V. iii. 43), Vol. II, p. 83.
- 53 *kiṃ punaradravyaṃ? ke punarguṇaḥ? śabdaspārśarūparasandhā guṇaḥ, tato’ nyat dravyaṃ*. M. Bh, Vol. IV, V. i. 2, p. 297.
- 54 *anvarthaṃ khalu nirvacanaṃ - ‘guṇasandrāvo dravyaṃ’* . M. Bh, Vol. IV, V. i. 2, p. 299. see infra, F. Notes, 85, p. 94.
- 55 *sandrūyate-saṅgamyate-āśrīyate iti sandrāvaḥ. ‘samiyadruduvaḥ’ iti ghañ. guṇānāmāśrayo dravyamityarthaḥ*. Bhāṣyapradīpa, M. Bh, Vol.

- IV, V.i.2, p. 299; *evañca 'guṇasamūho dravyamiti patañjaliḥ' iti yogabhāṣyeṇa na virodha iti mañjūṣāyāṃ nirūpitaṃ*, Pradīpodyota, Ibid.
- 56 *guṇāṇamāsayo davvaṃ, egdavvasiya guṇā, laraṇaṃ pajjavāṇaṃ tu ubhau assiya bhava*. US, 28. 6, p. 713.
- 57 *dhammo, adhammo, āgāsam, kalo, puggala, jantavoes logutti pannatto jṇohi varadaṃsihi*, Ibid., 28 .7, p.714.
- 58 *sāṃkhyayogdarśanayorguṇasamūho dravyaṃ, Pāṇinīya Vyākaraṇa-sūtre Vaiśeṣikatattvamīmāṃsa*, Dr. Ramsaran Sastri, Delhi, 1976, p. 1.
- 59 Vijñānabhikṣu uses the word *guṇa* in the sense of “strand”: “*guṇaśabdaḥ puruṣopakaraṇatvāt puruṣapaśubandhakatriguṇātmakamahadādirajjunirmāṭṛtvācca prayujyate*”. SSV, p. 38. It is also designated by the Sanskrit terms ‘*māyā*’ and *prakṛti*. “*māyā abdena ca prakṛtirevocyate. māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāditi (śve. U. 2/10) śrutau, .....kiñcāvidyāyā dravyatve śabdamātrabhedo, guṇatve ca tadādhāratayā prakṛtisiddhiḥ*”. Ibid (on S. Su. I. 69), pp. 47-48.
- 60 *sāmānyaviśeṣamudāyo'tra dravyaṃ*, YD, pp. 365-66.
- 61 “In the Buddhists view, the mango is nothing but an aggregate of qualia and actions (*guṇakarmasamudāya*)”. CIPM, p. 81; Notes, TSA, 78.
- 62 Ibid.
- 63 *kriyāguṇavān samavāyikāraṇaṃiti dravyalakṣaṇaṃ*, VS, I. i. 15.

- 64 VS, I . i .5.
- 65 BWT, p. 90.
- 66 *yatrāśritāḥ karmaguṇāḥ kāraṇaṃ samavāyi yat tat dravyaṃ*. CS, Su, I. 50.
- 67 See Cakrāpaṇi on *ibid.*, p. 13.
- 68 *dravyatvajātimatvaṃ guṇavatvaṃ vā dravyalakṣaṇaṃ*, TSA, p. 4. The term *kriyāvatva* can also be added to it.
- 69 *utpannaṃ dravyaṃ kṣaṇamaguṇamakriyaṃ ca tiṣṭati* is an axiom of the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika . They hold this axiom because if the qualities are supposed to be produced simultaneously with production of the substances then all distinctions between qualities and actions with substance will disappear.
- 70 *guṇasamānādhikaraṇasattābhinnajātimatvasya vivakṣtatvāt*. TSA, p.4. *kāryasamavāyikāraṇatāvacchedakatayā, saṃyogasya, vibhāgasya, vā samavāyikāraṇatāvacchedakatayā, dravyatvajātisiddiḥ*. NSMK, p. 34. see also Cakrāpaṇi on CS, Su, I. 40.
- 71 TSA, notes, p. 77.
- 72 *dravyalakṣaṇaṃ tu ‘kriyāguṇavat samavāyikāraṇaṃ iti*. SS, Su, 40, 3.
- 73 *Ibid.*
- 74 *dravyamāśrayalākṣaṇaṃ pañcānāṃ*, RVS, I.166, p. 60.



- 75 *dravyarasaguṇavīryavipākakarmāṇyanayormūlaṃ* . Ibid., I. 4. p. 8.  
Even though *rasa* is a ramification of quality, it is because of its specific importance in therapeutics it is treated as a separate division.
- 76 *khādīnyātma manaḥ kālo diśaśca dravyasaṃgrahaḥ*, CS, Su, I. 48.  
*ākāśa* is sometimes translated as ether. But the latter was introduced by some physicists as the medium of light. The translation as ether is avoided since *ākāśa* is not a medium of light.
- 77 VS, I. i. 5.
- 78 The Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas accept darkness as an additional substance. Madhavācārya , the author of Sarvadarśanaṃgraha mentions that a section of Prābhākaramīmāṃsakas and Srīdharācārya , the author of Nyāyakandalī also accept this view, TSA, notes, p. 79.
- 79 CS, Su, VIII. 13.
- 80 Attribute, quality, characteristics, and property are synonyms, See *Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language*, New York, p. 96, 1175. The term quality narrows down the scope of *guṇa*. “A *quality* denotes what a thing really is in some one respect; an *attribute* is what we conceive a thing to be in one respect; while attribute may, quality must express something of the real nature of that to which it is ascribed”. Standard Comprehensive International Dictionary, Illinois, 1973, p. 94. See also “EIPK, Vol. II, p. 112; ENVC, pp. 132-133.
- 81 *yadhā guṇo guṇamanvasyati, evameva talloke lokamanvasyati, dhṛtyā, aśithilaṃbhāvāya*. Taittirīya- Kṛṣṇa-Yajuḥ-Saṃhitā, with Mādhava's Vedārthaprakāśa, Bibliolitheca Indica, Asiatic Society of Bengal,

Culcutta, 1899, VII, ii. 4. 2, Vol. VI, p. 247. Patañjali also refer to the meaning of strand for *guṇa*.

82. Loc, cit., F. Note, 59, p. 91.
- 83 “*ākāśaguṇaḥ śabdaḥ ākāśādvāyurdviguṇaḥ sparsena vāyorjyotistriguṇaṃ rūpeṇa jyotiṣa āpaśaturguṇā rasenādbhyaḥ pṛthivī pañcaguṇā gandhena pṛthivyāḥ bhūtagrāmasthāvarajāṅgamāḥ...*” Nirukta, “Pariśiṣṭa”, 2, p. 148.
- 84 “*voto guṇavacanāt, PS, IV. i. 44; sattvaṃ dravyaṃ samavāyikāraṇaṃ tatraiva niveśite samavaiti yaḥ sa guṇa ityanvayaḥ*”. Bālamānoraṃ on ibid., *Strīpratyayaprakaraṇa*, VSK, Vol. I, p. 559.
- 85 *guṇaśabdo’yaṃ bahvarthaḥ. Astyeva sameṣvavayaveṣu vartate. tadyatha-dviguṇā rajjuḥ, triguṇā rajjuriti..... asti saṃskāro vartate. Tadyathā - saṃskṛtamannaṃ guṇavadityucyate. M. Bh, Vol. IV, V. i. 2, p. 299; “ke punarguṇāḥ? śabdasparśarūparasagandhā guṇā”, see also Ibid., p. 297. Ibid., Vol. II, I. ii. 3, pp. 98-99.*
- 86 *satve niveśite ‘paiti pṛthagjātiṣu drśyate ādheyaścākriyaśca so’ sattvaprakṛtiguṇaḥ. M. Bh, Vol. IV, IV. i. 2, p. 62.*
- 87 *dravyāśrayyaguṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣvakāraṇamanapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇaṃ. VS, I. i. 16.*
- 88 “*.....guṇāśca guṇāntaraṃ*”, Ibid., I. i. 10.
- 89 See Śāṅkaramiśra on ibid, VU, p. 47.
- 90 *saṃyogasyaikasya saṃyogajanakatve guṇāśca guṇāntaramārabhanta iti sūtravirodhaḥ? na sūtrārthāparijñānāt guṇānāmapi....*

tadaśrutavyākhyātrṇāṃ prakṛṣṭadhīyāmeva nirvahati nāsmākaṃ,  
Nyāyakandali, PBNK, p. 352.

- 91 *samavāyī tu nśceṣṭaḥ kāraṇaṃ guṇaḥ*. CS, Su, I. 51.
- 92 See Cakrapāṇi on Ibid.
- 93 This interpretation is in consonance with the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika. Viśwanātha has pointed out that dimension of *paramāṇus* and ubiquitous substances, unperceivable universal and particularity as entities devoid of causality. (“*aṇuparimāṇaṃtu na kasyāpi kāraṇaṃ.... evaṃ paramamahatparimāṇamatīndriyasāmānyaṃ viśeśāca bodhyāḥ*”). NSMK, pp. 74 - 76. It has been pointed out by Śāṅkaramiśra that attributes of final aggregates are not causes. See VU, p. 47.
- 94 See Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, I. 51.
- 95 Ibid.
- 96 MM, p. 268.
- 97 For instance see CS, Su, XXVI. 73-79.
- 98 *guṇā guāśrayā noktāstasmādrasaguṇān bhiṣak vidyādravyaguṇān karturabhiprāyāḥ pṛthgvidhāḥ*. CS, Su, XXVI. 36.
- 99 “*bhrāntaṃ tat*”, VS, VII, ii. 4. 5. see also Śāṅkaramiśra on ibid., VU, pp. 400 - 401 *ekārthasamavāyādeva tādrśavyavahāropapattau guṇe guṇānaṅgīkārāt*. TSA, p. 4. Thus, the idea implied in Caraka’s articulation recalls the expression ‘*aguṇaṃ*’ in Kaṇādas definition.
- 100 Kaṇāda had set the condition “*saṃyogavibhāgeṣva-kāraṇamanapekṣa*” to exclude motion which becomes an independent cause to conjunction

and disjunction. For details see HSPCIC, Vol. II, 4, p.30. Similarly Carak has set the condition “one without motion” (*niśceṣṭa*) to exclude motion. see infra Cakrapāṇi on ibid.

101 *rūpādīnāṃ guṇānāṃ sarveṣāṃ guṇtvābhisambandho dravyāśritatvaṃ nitguṇatvaṃ niśkriyatvaṃ*. PBNK, p. 227.

102 *guṇatvajātiyogī guṇaḥ*, SP, p. 48.

103 *jātimatve acalanātmakatve sati samavāyikāraṇarahitaśceti*, ibid.

104 *sāmānyavān asamavāyikāraṇaṃ aspaṇḍātmā guṇaḥ*, T.Bh., p. 191.  
In the text, instead of *aspaṇḍātmā* it is printed *spaṇḍātmā*. However it is a discrepancy.

105 *dravyakarmabhinnatve sati sāmānyavān guṇaḥ guṇatvajātimān vā*. TSA, p. 5.

106 *karmaṇo vyatiriktatve satyāvāntarajātimān upādānatvanirmukto guṇo guṇavidāṃ mataḥ*. MM, p. 244.

107 *rūparasagandhasparśāḥ saṃkhā parimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukhadukhe icchādveṣau praytnāśca guṇāḥ*. VS, I. i. 6.

108 *caśabdāsamuccitaśca gurutvadravatvasnehasaṃskārādṛṣṭaśabdāḥ saptaivetyevaṃ caturviṃtiguṇāḥ*. PBNK, p. 27. The word *adṛṣṭa* in this articulation which literally means the invisible implies “merit” (*dharma*) and “demerit” (*adharmā*). Actually these attributes are found mentioned in the various Vaiśeṣika - sūtras. For instance he refers to them in the following sūtras *gurutva* - V.S, I. i. 29; V. i. 7; V. i. 18 ; V. ii. 3. *dravatva* - II. i. 6, 7; V. ii. 4. *sneha*: II. i. 2. *saṃskāra*: V. i.

- 17, 18; IX. ii. 6,10; *adṛṣṭa*: V. i. 15; V. ii. 2, 7,13, 17; VI. i. 12; VI. ii. 1,2, 14; IX. ii. 9, 13.
- 109 The Bhāṭṭa - Mīmāṃsākās also speaks of twenty- four attributes. But they exclude merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharmā*) and include manifestedness (*prākāṣya*) and potency (*śakti*), MM, p. 244.
- 110 “*sārthā gurvādayo buddhiḥ prayatnāntāḥ paradayaḥ guṇāḥ proktā*; CS, Su, I, 49.
- 111 HIPS, Vol. II, P. 369.
- 112 ENVC, p. 109.
- 113 Ibid., 110.
- 114 HSPCIC, Vol. II, Part - 4, p. 421.
- 115 Mahābhārata mentions qualities of physical elements quiet similar to that of Caraka, though there are some additional ones in Caraka which are absent in Mahābhārata or *vice versa*. The Mahābhārata mentions nine types of smells in earth: *iṣṭa*, *aniṣṭa*, *madhura kaṭu*, *nirhārin*, *saṃhata*, *snigdha*, *rūkṣa* and *viśada*. There are six tastes in water: *madhura*, *lavaṇa*, *tikta*, *kaṣāya*, *amla* and *kaṭu*. Fire has got sixteen colours: *hrasva*, *dīrgha*, *sthūla*, *caturaśra*, and *anuvṛttavat*, *śukla*, *kṛṣṇa*, *rakta*, *pīta*, *nīla*, *aruṇa*, *kaṭhina*, *cikkaṇa*, *ślakṣṇa*, *picchala*, *mṛdu*, and *dāruṇa*. Air has got twelve types of touch: *uṣṇa*, *śīta*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *snigdha*, *viśada*, *khara*, *mṛdu*, *rūkṣa*, *laghu*, *guru* and *gurutara*. M. Bh. Mokṣa, 184. 28,33. 4, 36. 7. cf. HSPCIC, Vol. II, Part--4, p. 423.
- 116 “*anena trividhā api vaiśeṣikāḥ sāmānyā ātmaviśeṣaguṇāśco-ddiṣṭāḥ*”. Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, I, 49.

- 117 Ibid, VIII. 11.
- 118 “*arthāḥ śabdādayo jñeyāḥ gocarāḥ viśayāḥ guṇāḥ*”. CS, Sa, I.
- 119 “*artha iti dravyaguṇakarmasu*”, VS, VIII. ii. 3. For details see CSP, p. 37.
- 120 *ete ca vaiśeṣikāḥ; yataḥ ākaśasyaiva śabdaḥ prādhānyena, vāyoreva sparśaḥ prādhānyena evamagnyādiṣu rūpādayḥ*, Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, I. 49.
- 121 “*śabdasparsārūparasagandhā bāhyekaikendriyagrāhyaguṇāḥ*”, PBNK, p. 231.
- 122 MM, pp. 245-46.
- 123 PBNK, p. 230; *budhyādiṣaḍakṣm..... amī vaiśeṣiko guṇāḥ*, NSMK, p. 370
- 124 TSA, p. 14; T. Bh, pp. 191-92.
- 125 *ṣaḍeva rasā ityuvāca bhagavānātreyaḥ punarvasuḥ madhrāmlavaṇa-kaṭutiktakaṣāyāḥ*, CS, SU, XXVI. 9.
- 126 SS, Su, xlii, 3.
- 127 AH, Su, I. 14.
- 128 PBNK, p. 254; SP. 26. MM, p. 245.
- 129 MM, P. 245.
- 130 *madhuro lavaṇastiktaḥ kaṣāyo'mlaḥ katutathā eṣa ṣadvidhivistāro vārimayaḥ smṛtaḥ*, MB, Mokṣa, 177, 30.

- 131 see infra p. 122. *gandhrūpasparśaśabdaguṇāḥ pṛthivyaptejovāyvākā-śānāṃ, pūrvaḥ pūrvo pakṛṣyate*, RVS, II. 40. *guṇāḥ pūrvasya pūrvasya prāpnuvantyuttarottaram*. MB, Mokṣa, 224. 39.
- 132 *rasanārtho rasastasya dravyamāpaḥ kṣitistathā*, CS, Su, I. 64.
- 133 *teṣāṃ ṣaṅṅāṃ rasānāṃ yonirudakaṃ*, CS, Su, XXVI. 9.
- 134 “.....*tasmādāpyo rasaḥ*”, SS, Su, xlii. 3.
- 135 *kṣitistvapāmeva rasena nityānuṣaktena rasvatītyucyate*, Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, I. 64.
- 136 *Loc. cit.* F. Note 54.
- 137 *pañcamahābhūtavikarastvāśrayāḥ prakṛtivilkṛtivicāradeśakālavaśāḥ*, CS, Su, XXVI. 9.
- 138 *kṣārameke saptamaṃ*, RVS, III. 3.
- 139 *kṣaraṇāt kṣāraḥ, nāsau rasaḥ*, . CS, Su, XXVI. 9.
- 140 *avyaktamaṣṭamamityeke*, RVS, III, 4.
- 141 *avyaktībhāvastu khalu rasānāṃ prakṛtau bhavatyānurase anurasasamanvaye vā dravye*, CS, Su, XXVI, 9.
- 142 CS, Su, XXVI, 40; SS, Su, xlii. 3; RVS, III. 38 - 43. “*kṣmāṃbhognikṣmāṃbutejaḥ..... bhūtairmadhurādirasodbhavaḥ*”. AH, Su, X.1.
- 143 PBNK, p. 254; TSA, p.15; Sivādityaya adds one more: *citrarasa*. SP, p. 46.
- 144 PBNK, p. 255, TSA, p. 16.

- 145 MM, p. 245.
- 146 PBNK, p. 256; SP, 27; TSA, p. 16.
- 147 TSA, p. 16.
- 148 MM, p. 246.
- 149 *Pāka* is the application of external heat which effects a change of colour, taste, smell and touch in earth. “*pāko nāma vijātīyatejasaṃyogaḥ*”, TSA, p. 17.
- 150 For details see PBNK, pp. 257-260; TSA, p. 16-18; see also the notes on it, pp.156 - 159.
- 151 “.....*viṃśatiguṇāḥ, guru - laghu - śīto - ṣṇa - snigdha - rūkṣa - manda - tīkṣṇa - sthira - sara - mṛdu - kaṭhina - viśada - picchala - ślāṣṇa - khara - sūkṣma - sthūla - sāndra - dravānugamāt*”; CS, Su, XXV. 36.
- 152 AH, Su, I. 18. See also AS, Su, I. p. 9.
- 153 *śītoṣṇasnigdharūkṣaviśadapicchalagurulaghumṛdu tīkṣṇa guṇāḥ karmaṇyāḥ*, RVS, III. 111.
- 154 HIPS, Vol. II. p. 369.
- 155 See Infra, p. 135.
- 156 RVS, II. 57.
- 157 “*gurutvaṃ jalabhūmyoḥ patanakarmakāraṇaṃ*”. PBNK, p. 640; See also VS, V. i. 7, 18; V. ii. 3.
- 158 Nyāyakandalī, PBNK, p. 642.



- 159 PBNK, p. 645.
- 160 TSA, p. 20.
- 161 “*dravatvaṃ syantanakarmakāraṇaṃ*”, PBNK, p. 641.
- 162 Ibid, p. 641 - 42.
- 163 TSA, p. 5.
- 164 *paratvāpratve, yuktiśa saṃkhyā saṃyoga eva cavibhāgaśa pṛṭhaktvaṃ ca parimāṇamthāpi ca saṃskāro bhyāsa ityete guṇā jñeyāḥ parādayaḥ*. CS, Su , XXVI. 29 - 30.
- 165 Ibid, 31.
- 166 See Cakrapāṇi on ibid.
- 167 *paratvamaparatvaṃ ca parāprābhīdhānapratyayanimittaṃ*. PBNK, p. 393.
- 168 TSA, p. 19; T.Bh, p. 203.
- 169 TSA, p. 19.
- 170 NSMK, p. 367.
- 171 *ekadikkābhyāṃ ekakālābhyāṃ sannikṛṣṭaviprakṛṣṭābhyāṃ paramaparañca*. VS, VII. Ii. 21; “*kāraṇparatvāt kāraṇāparatvācca*”. Ibid, 22; see also PBNK, pp. 393 - 398.
- 172 “.....*yuktiśca yojana yā tu yujyate*”, CS, Su , XXVI. 31. “*yuktiścetyādau yojana doṣādyapekṣayā bheṣajasya samīcīnakalpanā*”, Cakrapāṇi on ibid. *Yukti* referred to here is quite different from the source of knowledge *yukti*.

- 173 Ibid.
- 174 PBNK, p. 267; TSA. 18.
- 175 TSA, p. 18.
- 176 Ibid.
- 177 *dvitvādayaḥ parārthaparyantā apeṣābuddhijā matā*. NSMK, p. 400; SP, p. 27.
- 178 “.....yogaḥ saḥ saṃyoga ucyate dravyāṇāṃ dvantvasarvaikakarmajo-  
'nitya eva ca. CS, Su, XXVI. 32.
- 179 M.S. Valiatān says that there is a difference between Vaiśeṣika and CS for the former meant joining things which had remained apart and which could come apart again, while the latter takes it as compounding of substances. LC, p. 6.
- 180 “*saṃyogaḥ saṃuktapratyayanimittaṃ*”, PBNK, p. 335; T.Bh, 201.
- 181 “*aprāptayoḥ prāptiḥ saṃyogaḥ*”. Ibid., 347; NSMK, 413.
- 182 VS, I. i. 27-30; V. i. 1, 5, 6, 8, 11, 15; X. ii. 2, 5, 6.
- 183 VS, VII. ii. 9; PBNK, p. 347; T.Bh, 201.
- 184 “*vibhūnāṃ tu parasparataḥ saṃyogo nāsti*”, PBNK, p. 360.
- 185 CSP, p. 122.
- 186 “*vibhāgastu vibhaktiḥ syādviyogo bhāgaśo grahaḥ*”, CS, S u, XXVI. 33.
- 187 “*vibhāgastu vibhaktapratyayanimittaṃ*”. PBNK, p. 363.
- 188 “*etena vibhāgo vyākhyātaḥ*”, VS, VII. ii. 10; PBNK, p. 364.

- 189 CS, Su, XXVI. 33.
- 190 See Cakrapāṇi on ibid.
- 191 *pṛthaktvamapoddhāavyavahāarakāraṇaṃ*. PBNK, p. 332; TSA, p. 18.
- 192 TSA, p. 18.
- 193 *parimāṇaṃ punarmānaṃ*, CS, Su, XXVI. 34.
- 194 VS, IV. i. 11, 12; “*parimāṇaṃ mānavyavahāarakāraṇaṃ*”. PBNK, p. 394.
- 195 Ibid; TSA, p. 19; SP, p. 27.
- 196 CS, Vi, I. 21 (2)
- 197 PBNK, p. 646; TSA, p. 59. SP, p. 37.
- 198 PBNK, p. 647.
- 199 Ibid., p. 647.
- 200 Ibid., p. 658; *anyathā kṛtasya punastadavathāpādakaḥ sthitisthāpakaḥ kaṭādipṛthivīdravyavṛtti*, TSA, p. 51.
- 201 MM, p. 258 - 59.
- 202 *bhāvābhyasanamabhyāsaḥ śīlanaṃ satatakriyā*, CS, Su, XXVI. 34.
- 203 *icchā dveṣaḥ sukhaṃ dukhaṃ prayatnaścetnā dhṛtiḥ buddhiḥ smṛtirahaṃkāro liṅgāni paramātmanaḥ*. CS, Sa, I. 72.
- 204 “.....*sukhaṃdukhe icchādveṣau cetnā dhṛtirbuddhiḥ smṛtirahaṃkāraḥ prayatnāśa (ātmajāni)*” CS, Sa, III, 10.
- 205 see Cakrapani on CS, Sa, I.72.

- 206 Desire is yearning -- “*iccā kāmahaḥ*”, TSA, p. 58.
- 207 Aversion is irritation - “*krodhaḥ dveṣaḥ*”, *ibid.*
- 208 The experience of all with agreeable feelings is called pleasure, *Ibid.*, p. 57.
- 209 The experience of all with disagreeable feelings is called pain, *Ibid.*, p. 58.
- 210 Praśastapāda divides action into two: (1) caused by vital energy (*jīvanapūrvaka*) and (2) due to desire and aversion (*icchādveśapūrvaka*).
- 211 *buddhyādayo bhāvanāntā ātmaguṇaḥ*, Nyāyakandalī on PBNK, p. 229.
- 212 The words *pravṛtti*, *ceṣṭā*, *kriya*, *yatnaḥ*, and *kāryasamāraṃbha* are also used in the sense of bodily actions along with the word *karma*. see CS, Vi, VIII. 77.
- 213 *prayatnādi karma ceṣṭitamucyate* CS, Su, I. 49. Volition (*prayatna*) is the quality of the self. So the expression ‘*prayatnādi*’ in the dictum is to be understood as “prompted by volition” and not as “volition and the like”.
- 214 *saṃyoge, vibhāge ca karaṇaṃ dravyamāśritaṃ kartavyasya kriyā karma karma nanyadapekṣate*, CS, Su, I. 52.
- 215 CS, Su, II. 5-16; *Ibid*, XXVI. 10
- 216 see *infra*, pp. 359 - 60.
- 217 *calanātmakaṃ karma*. TSA, p. 60 ; T.Bh, p. 213.
- 218 *ekadravyamaguṇm saṃyogavbhāgeṣvanapekṣakāraṇamiti karmalakṣaṇaṃ*, VS, I. i. 17.
- 219 *Ibid.*, 7.
- 220 TSA, p. 5, 60; T.Bh, 213; SP, 8; NSMK, 41.

- 221 *utkṣepañadīṅāṃ pañcānāmapī karmatvasambandhaḥ ekadravyavatvaṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ mūrtadravyavrttitvamaguṇavatvaṃ gurutvadratvatvaprayatnasamyogavatvaṃ svakaryasamyogavirodhitvaṃ samyogavibhāganirapekṣakāraṇatvamasamavāyikaraṇatvaṃ. svaparāśrayasamavetakāryāraṃbhakatvaṃ samānajatīyānāraṃbhakatvaṃ dravyānāraṃbhakatvaṃ ca pratiniyatajātiyogitvaṃ*, PBNK, p.697 - 698.
- 222 For details see Ibid, pp. 713 - 725.
- 223 BWT, p.115; See trans., CST, Vol. I, p. 21; HIPS, Vol. II, p. 371; Antonella Comba, *Universal (sāmānya) and Particular (viśeṣa) in Vaiśeṣika and Āyurveda*, Journal of the European Āyurvedic society 1, 1990, p. 19.
- 224 “Existence, manifestation, agreeableness form, and name are the five aspects of phenomena. Of these the first three are the characteristics of the Brahman and the last two are the characteristics of the universe”, See Eng. Trans. VP, p. 157.
- 225 “.....words and language are not wrappings in which things are packed for the commerce of those who write and speak. It is in words and language that things first come into being and are”. IM, p. 13.
- 226 ENVC p. 173.
- 227 Ibid.
- 228 Ibid.
- 229 Jadunath Sinha, *Indian Realism*, Motilal Banarsidass Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, Reprint 1999, p.134; See “apoha-vāda tathā uskā nirākaraṇ”, *Vaiśeṣika Darśana: Eka Adhyayana*, Sri Nārāyaṇa Miśra, Varanasi, 1968, p. 223.

- 230 PUIP, p. 61
- 231 *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Śāntarakṣita with *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* by Kamalaśīla, Baroda: G.O.S, 1926, p. 2-3; also see Pañjikā on ibid, pp. 11.
- 232 “*sāmānyaviśeṣātmā tadartho vicayah*”, *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*, Māṅikyanandi, ed. and Trans., Mahendra Kumar Shastri, Bombay, 1941, IV. 1.
- 233 VTA, p.151; ENVC, Vol. I, p. 175.
- 234 Ibid., pp. 149-150.
- 235 PUIP, pp. 153-154.
- 236 EIPS, IV, pp. 365-66.
- 237 S. Su, V. 91-92; see also Vijñāna Bhikṣu on it, SSV, pp, 167-68.
- 238 S.Su, 94-95, see also Vijñāna Bhikṣu on it, SSV, p. 68; EIPS, p. 366.
- 239 See VS, I. i. 18, 23.
- 240 Ibid., I. ii. 3.
- 241 BWT, p. 116.
- 242 VS, I. ii. 7.
- 243 VS, I. ii. 8.
- 244 *dravyatvaṃ guṇatvaṃ karmatvaṃ ca sāmānyāni viśeṣācca*, Ibid., I. ii. 5.
- 245 *sāmānyaviśeṣāpekṣaṃ dravyaguṇakarmasu*, Ibid., VIII. i. 6.
- 246 Ibid., VIII. i. 5.

- 247 Ibid., I. ii. 4.
- 248 *tathā ca dravyādiṣu triṣu satsaditi- prakārko yataḥ pratyayaḥ sadidaṃ sadidamityākārakaḥ śabdaprayogo vā yadadhīnaḥ sā sattā*, Śāṅkaramiśra on ibid., I. ii. 7. VU, p. 90.
- 249 *dravyaguṇakarmabhyo rthāntaram*, VS, I. ii. 8; Loc. cit., I. ii. 4; *bhāvaḥ sattā anuvṛttereva hetuḥ na tu vyāvṛtteriapi hetuḥ*, Śāṅkarāmiśra on VS, I. ii. 4, VU, p. 85.
- 250 Loc. cit., I. ii. 4; *bhāvaḥ sattā anuvṛttereva hetuḥ na tu vyāvṛtteriapi hetuḥ*, Śāṅkarāmiśra on VS, I. ii. 4, VU, p. 85.
- 251 *dravyādīnāṃ trayānāmapī sattāsaṃbandhaḥ, sāmānyaviśeṣavatvaṃ, svasamayārthasabdābhidheyatvaṃ dharmādharmakartṛtvañca*, PBNK, pp. 43 - 44. *vaiśeṣikaiḥ svayaṃ vyavahārāya yaḥ saṅketaḥ kṛto'smin śāstre'arthaśabdād dravyaguṇakarmāṇi pratipattavyāni, iti*; see Nyāyakandalī on ibid., p. 45.
- 252 VS, I. ii. 5; *sāmānyāni viśeṣāścetyatrā'samāsaḥ sāmānyatve satyeva viśeṣatvaṃ yathā jñeyata tadarthaṃ*. Śāṅkarāmiśra on Ibid; VU, p. 86; *dravyatvādyaparaṃ, alpaviśayatvāt. tacca vyāvṛtteriapi hetutvāt sāmānyam sadviśeṣākhyamapi*. PBNK, p. 30. Latter thinkers like Viswanātha classifies universal into two: Higher (*para*) and Lower (*apara*) and calls the “universal particularities” by the term *parāpara*: “*dravyādīkajātistu parāparatayocyate*”, NSMK, p. 43.
- 253 Actually this is the intended sense of the VS, I. ii. 3.
- 254 *sāmānyādīnāṃ trayāṇāṃ svātmasattvaṃ buddhilakṣaṇatvaṃ*, PBNK, p. 49.

- 255 ‘*buddhireva lakṣaṇaṃ pramāṇaṃ eṣāṃ te buddhilakṣaṇāḥ, vipratipannasāmanyādisadbhāve buddhireva lakṣaṇaṃ nānyat*’, Nyāyakandalī on ibid., PBNK, p. 50.
- 256 ENVC, Vol. I, p. 211.
- 257 The word *viśeṣa* is derived from the root “*śiṣ*” by prefixing “*vi*” and adding the suffix ‘*ghañ*’. CSP, p. 195.
- 258 *vināśaraṃbharahiteṣu nityadravyeṣvākāśakāladigātmamanassu pratidravyamekaikaśo vartamānā atyantavyāvṛttibuddhihetuḥ*. PBNK, p.766; see also ibid., p. 36; NSMK, p. 50; *nityadravyavṛttayo vyāvartakāḥ viśeṣāḥ*., TSA, p.61.
- 259 *sarvadā sarvabhāvānāṃ sāmānyam vṛddhikāraṇaṃ, hrāsahetur-viśeṣaśca ca pravṛttirubhayasya tu, C S, Su, I. 44 sāmānyamekatvakaraṃ, viśeṣastu pṛthaktvakṛt, tulyārthatā hi sāmānyam, viśeṣastu viparyayaḥ*, Ibid., 45.
- 260 “Here also Āyurveda differs from Vaiśeṣika in the sense that the latter uses *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* for class (*jāti*) and individual (*vyakti*) respectively but in the former they denote similarity (*tulyārthatā*) and dis-similarity (*viparyaya*).....”, PVS, p.166; LC, p. 6. Probably this opinion might be due to the influence of the articulation regarding increase and decrease in AS and AH. *vṛddhiḥ samanaiḥ sarveṣāṃ viparītairviparyayaḥ*, AS, p. 11; AH, Su, I. 13.
- 261 “.....universal is present only in objects belonging to one and the same category....., a similarity exists also in objects belonging to different categories.....”, *Universal (sāmānya) and Particular (viśeṣa) in Vaiśeṣika and Āyurveda*, Antonella Comba, Journal of the European



Āyurvedic society<sup>1</sup>, 1990, p. 19. Viśwanātha, refuting similarity as a category, states that similarity is not a category, but it means the possession, by a thing which is different from some other thing, of many of the attributes of the latter. For instance, the similarity of a face to the moon co-exists in its being different from the moon and at the same time possessing the gladdening and other attributes of the latter. See NSMK, pp. 31 - 32.

262 Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, I. 45.

263 “*yataḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ sāmānyamekatvakaraṃ melanamekībhāvaṃ karoti, tasmāt teṣāṃ vṛddhikāraṇamiti*”. Jalpakalpataru on C S, Su, I. 45, C SJ, Vol. I, p. 40.

264 *samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ*. NS, II. ii. 70. “.....*yacca keṣāṃcitdabhedam keṣāṃcit bhedaṃ tat sāmānyaviśeṣo jātiriti*” Vatsyayana on Ibid., N.Bh, 215.

265 HIPS, Vol.II, p. 371; see ENVC, p.110.

266 *ekatvakaramityasya na ekatvabuddhikaramityevārthaḥ kintu prayogānantaraṃ sātmyībhāvena dhātunā saha ekarūpatā pādakamityarthaḥ cikitsādṛṣṭyā kartumucitaḥ iti*, AMS p. 255.

267 Loc. cit., F. Note, 260.

268 Antonella, Comba *Univresal (sāmānya) and Pariticular (viśeṣa) in Vaiśeṣika and Āyurveda*, Journal of European Āyurvedic Society 1, p. 24.

269 *etacca sāmānyam sāmānyavato māṃsadravyādeḥ vṛddhikāraṇasya lakṣaṇtvena vṛddhikāraṇamityuktaṃ. yato na sāmānyāṃ māṃsatvajātirūpaṃ vṛddhau kāraṇam bhavati, .....ata eva*

*vaiśeṣike*’pyuktaṃ: “*trayāṇāmākāryatvamakāraṇatvañca*”,  
Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, I. 44, p. 9. See supra, 32-33.

270 *sarveṣām bhāvānām dravyaguṇakarmāṇām sāmānyam  
vṛddhikāraṇam hetuḥ prayojakamityeko arthaḥ*, Jalpakapataru on  
CS,Su, I, 44; CSJ, Vol.I. p. 35.

271 HIPS, Vol. II, p.320

272 *yaugapadyena tu virodhinām dhātūnām vṛddhihrāsau bhavātaḥ.  
yaddhi yasya dhātorvṛddhikaram tattato viparītaguṇasya dhātoḥ  
pratyavāyakaram saṃpadyate*. CS, Sa, VI. 5.

273 *śabdo yugapadanekāneva śabdenekakālamārabhate, tathagniḥ  
prakaśadāhau yugapatkaroti*. Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, I. 45.

274 CS, Sa, VI. 6.

275 *kāmaśokabhayakrot dhaharṣeryālobhasaṃbhavān parasparapratidvant-  
vairebhireva śamaṃ nayet.....*, CS, Ci, IX. 86.

276 Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, I. 45.

277 Loc. cit., F. Note, 260.

278 Ibid.

279 *anye tu vyākhyānanti yat trividham sāmānyam, viśeṣaśca trividhaḥ-  
yathā drvagocaraḥ guṇacoraḥ karmagocaraśca tatra sarvadetyādinā...  
tadetadbhaṭṭāraharicandreṇaiva dūṣitaṃ, yataḥ sarvadetyādinaiva  
lakṣaṇena trividhamapi sāmānyam labhyate, tenāsmiṃ pakṣe  
sāmānyamekatvakaramityādyavācyam syāditi kṛtvā*. Cakrapāṇi on  
C.S. Su.1.45.

- 280 ‘*anye tu paśyanti- yastrividhaṃ sāmānyaṃ- atyantasāmānyaṃ, madhyamasāmānyaṃ ekadeśasāmānyaṃ ca..... ceti nātiśraddhākaraṃ*’. Carapāṇi on CS, Su, I. 45.
- 281 *asmanmate tu sāmānyaṃ vṛddhau kāraṇameva bhavatīti sāmānyaṃ vṛddhikāraṇatvena niyamyate; na tu vṛddhiḥ sāmānykāraṇikaiveti niyamyate tenāsamānādapi vṛddhirbhavati nirdoṣā.*, Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, I. 45.
- 282 Ibid.
- 283 *yattūcyate-karmasāmānyaṃ neha tantre vṛddhikāraṇamasti, yato na dhāvanena vāyuḥ samāna iti; .....atra brūmaḥ- karmaṇāṃ prāyaḥ prabhāveṇaiva vṛddhihetutvāt sāmānyānupagrahaḥ kṛtaḥ ... niṣkriyatā cāsya vātasya hrāsaḥ.* Ibid.
- 284 *yatra tu evaṃ kāraṇaṃ cintayituṃ na pāryate tatra prabhāva eva varṇanīyaḥ.* Ibid.
- 285 Ibid.
- 286 A kind of yoghurt (*dadhi*) not completely mature, obtained by a slow process of curdling. See CS, Su, XXVII. 228; Ci, XXI. 18.
- 287 *Artocarpus Lacoocha Robux.* T.B. Singh and K.C. Chuneekar, *Glossary of Vegetable Drugs in Bṛhatrayī*, Varanasi, 1972, pp. 224, 346, 351.
- 288 ‘*asati ca virodhake sāmānyaṃ vṛddhikāraṇamiti siddhāntaḥ*’; Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, I. 45.
- 289 EIPK, Vol. II, p. 523.
- 290 “*bhāvo yathā tathā*’*bhāvaḥ kāraṇaṃ kāryavanmataḥ, pratibandho visāmagrī taddhetuḥ pratibandhakaḥ*”, NKU, I. 10, p. 35.

- 291 *tatra svayonivarthanānyeva pratīkāraḥ*, SS, Su, XV. 8, 10. *svayonivardhanamapi samānena dravyeṇa samānaguṇena samānaguṇabhūyiṣṭena vā*. Dalhaṇa on Ibid., 10.
- 292 *vṛddhiḥ samānaiḥsarveṣāṃ viparītairviparyayaḥ*, AH, Su, I. 14. AS, Su, p.11
- 293 Anetonella Comba, , *Universal (sāmānya) and Particular (viśeṣa), in Vaiśeṣika and Āyurveda*, Journal of the European Āyurvedic Society 1, 1990, p. 30.
- 294 PUIP, p. 19.
- 295 BWT, p. 118.
- 296 “*tathāpi vyaktyapekṣayā niyamo’stu, na jātyapekṣayeti cenna . niyatajātīyasvabhāvavyāghātāt*”, NKU, p. 21
- 297 PUIP, pp. 19-20.
- 298 “*kāryasamavāyikāraṇatāvacchedakatayā, samyogasya, vibhāgasya, vā samavāyikāraṇatāvacchedakatayā dravyajātisiddhiriti*”, NSMK, pp. 34 - 35.
- 299 *sāmānyam jātirūpaṃ upādhirūpaṃ ca*. SP, p. 39.
- 300 KL, P. 321; See NSMK. pp. 46 - 48.
- 301 *samavāyān samavaiti*. PS, IV.iv. 43; *saṃsvāye ca*, ibid., VI. i.138.
- 302 M. Su, XII. ii. 24.
- 303 *evam tarhi pradhānena samavāye sthālī paratantrā, vyavaye svatantrā. tadyathā amātyānām rajñā saha samavāye paratantryam vyavāye svātantryam*. M.Bh, Vol. II, I. iv. 3, p. 245.
- 304 ENVC, Vol. I, p. 218.

- 305 *aprāptayoḥ prāptiḥ saṃyogaḥ*. PBNK, p. 347; ‘*aprāptayostu yo prāptiḥ saiva saṃyoga īritāḥ*. NSMK, p. 413.
- 306 EFW, Vol. II, p.106.
- 307 *ihedam iti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ*, VS. VII. ii. 26.
- 308 *yutasidhyabhavāt karyakaraṇayoḥ saṃyogavibhago na vidyate*. Ibid., 13; see also Śaṅkaramiśra on ibid., VU, p. 426.
- 309 *sadakraṇavannityaṃ*, VS; IV. i. 1.
- 310 CSP, p. 205.
- 311 *kriāyguṇavat samavāyikāraṇamiti dravyalakṣaṇaṃ*. VS, I. i.15; *kārṇamiti dravye kāryasamavāyāt*. Ibid., X. i. 1; *kāraṇe samavāyāt karmāṇi*, ibid., 3.
- 312 *karaṇaṃ tvasamavāyino guṇāḥ*. Ibid., V, ii, 24.  
*karaṇasamavāyāt saṃyogah paṭasya*. Ibid., X. ii. 5.  
*kāraṇākāraṇasamavāyācca*. Ibid., 6.
- 313 *niṣkriyāṇāṃ samavāyaḥ karmabhyo nṣidhaḥ*, VS,V. ii. 23.
- 314 *ekārthsamavāyikāraṇāntareṣu dṛṣṭatvāt*. Ibid., X. i. 6. *samanvyai-kārthsamavāyi virodhi ca*. Ibid., III. i. 9.
- 315 *saṃyuktasamavāyat agnervaiśeṣikaṃ*. Ibid., X. ii. 7.
- 316 *samavāyo’pṛthakbhāvo bhūmyādīnāṃ guṇairmataḥ sa nityo yatra hi dravyaṃ na tatrāniyato guṇaḥ*. CS, Su, I. 50.
- 317 “.....*tenādhārāṇāmādheyairyo’apṛthakbhāvaḥ sa samavāyaḥ*”, Cakrapāṇi on Ibid.

- 318 Cakrapāṇi quotes the explication given in Praśastapāda, Ibid; See also Dīpikā, TSA, p. 61.
- 319 *ayutasiddhānāmādhāryādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandhaḥ ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ*, PBNK, p. 37.
- 320 Vide supra, p. 81.
- 321 *dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣāṇām kāryākāraṇabhūtānām-akaryakāraṇabhūtānām vā yutasiddhānāmādhāryādhārabhāvenāvasthitānāmihedamiti buddhiryato bhavati, yataścāsarvagatānāmadhi-gatānytvānāmaviṣvakbhāvaḥ sa samavāyākhyāḥ sambandhaḥ*, PBNK, pp. 773-74.
- 322 *ayutasiddhayoḥ sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ*, T.Bh, p. 220.
- 323 Praśastapāda says that even though the related entities are ephemeral inherence is not so, since it exists and is with out a cause. See PBNK, p. 782. *nityasambandhaḥ samavāyah*, TSA, p. 61.
- 324 *samavāyastu samyagāvāptirekībhāvaḥ*, VB, p. 17.
- 325 *athāpyetaduktam samavāyo'apṛdhakbhāva iti*. Ibid.
- 326 *yathā khalu saṃyogapratidvanti vibhāgaḥ, pṛthaktvaṃ cāyogo nāma guṇāntaram, tathaiva vilakṣaṇyalakṣaṇasyānekatvalakṣaṇasya vā pṛthaktvasya pratidvanti guṇaḥ samavāyo nāma*. Ibid.
- 327 *yaśca apūrvaśarīrendriyavedanābhiḥ saṃyogaviśeṣo janma, tatah śarīradibhirapṛthakbhāvo ātmano bhimanyate..... so yam samavāya evamartham pṛthagucyate gunantarbhūto pi*. Ibid.
- 328 NK, pp. 961-62; CSP, p. 263.

## Chapter - III

### FUNDAMENTAL THEORIES

Cosmology, the theory of five physical elements (*pañcabhūtasiddhānta*), and the theory of “three faults”<sup>1</sup> (*tridoṣasiddhānta*) are the most important fundamental theories of Āyurveda.

A real understanding of man and the world presupposes the knowledge of the world constituents. Without ascertaining their nature, their role in world construction, and also the recurrent events of origin and destruction, it is not possible to arrive at a true or at least satisfactory conclusion regarding their role in human existence. This is most essential in Āyurveda because the conceptualisation and practice of therapeutics solely depend on theoretical concepts of world constitution. Āyurveda is scientifically established on the foundation of the theory of five physical elements,<sup>2</sup> the edifice being the theory of three faults. Āyurveda explains the physiological and psychological aspects of human existence and formulates the theories for the protection and promotion of health on their basis. It is with this view that Caraka describes how the world is constructed and by what being it is peopled. The *pañcabhūta* theory essentially explains the structure of things, on which the particular qualities and properties are based.<sup>3</sup> Āyurveda tries to understand the pharmacology, pathology, human physiology, medicine

and therapeutics on the basis of the *pañcabhūta* doctrine.<sup>4</sup> The theory of the three faults (*tridoṣasiddhānta*) is a biological interpretation of the *pañcabhūtasiddhānta*. So, it is essential to have a thorough knowledge of the fundamental theories of cosmology, the five physical elements (*pañcabhūtas*), and the three faults (*tridoṣa*). Time and space, the two substances, also share importance in therapeutics. So they are also discussed in this chapter.

## Cosmology

In the philosophical realm, it is mainly the Sāṃkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who exemplify two different models of cosmological enumerations in Indian philosophic tradition. Though Caraka enumerates and defines substance in coherence with the Vaiśeṣikas he gives an evolutionary model of origin of the world which is similar to that of the Sāṃkhya. This has brought about some sort of contradiction and hence the difficulty remains unsolved.<sup>5</sup> So, before going into the details in *Carākāsaṃhitā*, it would be better to know what is said about world construction in Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika and classical Sāṃkhya to know the real metaphysical stand of Caraka.

We hear little about world construction in the Vaiśeṣika -sūtra and in the Nyāya-sūtra. But, it is seen to be described in *Praśastapādabhāṣya* and in other later Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika books. However their view point can be summed up as follows. They consider all the nine substances as world constituents.<sup>6</sup> Primarily the nine substances are divided into two groups:



eternal and ephemeral. Atoms (*paramāṇus*) of earth water fire and air and also the remaining five, namely *ākāśa*, time, space, self, and mind are eternal substances.<sup>7</sup> These irreducible (*anāśrita*)<sup>8</sup> and imperceptible substances form the ultimate cosmic substrates. They never merge with one another nor do they emerge from one common ground. These atomic forms of earth, water, fire and air are called *bhūtas* and the effects (*kāryas*) produced by them are non-eternal substances. When the respective atoms of each one of these *bhūtas* combine together in a particular proportion the gross physical elements are produced. Motion is generated in the atoms by the will (*iccha*) of the God in such a way that two atoms unite together to form a binary atom (*dvaṇuka*). Three such binary atoms combine together to form a triune. Thus gradually the gross forms of earth, water, fire, and air are created. Since they acquire *mahatva* (perceptual dimension) they are called *mahābhūtas*. Thus the gross elements which are the products of the respective atoms of air, fire, water, and earth together with *ākāśa* constitute the physical world in the space time continuum.<sup>9</sup> One significant thing to be noted in this connection is that *ākāśa* is neither created nor destroyed. It is an eternal and ubiquitous substance.<sup>10</sup> The *mahābhūtas* further combine together to form concrete empirical objects which we cognize and interact. In fact, it is the atoms of the four elements that take part in the creation of the physical world, since the eternal *ākāśa* is also a constituent. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas call the ephemeral substances of our daily acquaintance as whole (*avayavī*) and their inherent cause as parts (*avayava*). Whole is conceived as extremely different from its parts though they are its products. This

precarious ontological status is being explained on the basis of their cause and effect theory called “*āsatkāryavāda*”.<sup>11</sup>

The classical Sāṃkhya<sup>12</sup> philosophy, on the other hand gives an extremely different model of world construction. The system posits two entities at the ground level: (1) unchanging self (*puruṣa*) and (2) changing (*pariṇāmi*) primordial material (*prakṛti*) as the ultimate ground of world occurrence, and elaborates a list of twenty-five world constituents in its schematic presentation.<sup>13</sup> Both *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are permanent entities. At the same time the self is accepted as the counter opposite of primordial material. The self is characterised as that which is the condition of neutrality or in other words the condition of being separate from all specific experiences as well as that which is the condition of non-agency.<sup>14</sup> It is determinating, subjective, specific, consciousness and non-product. On the contrary, primordial materiality is non-determinating (*aviveki*), general (*sāmānya*), non-conscious (*acetana*), and productive (*prasavadharmi*).<sup>15</sup> It is otherwise called the root principle (*mūlaprakṛti*), the rootless root (*amūlaṃ mūlaṃ*), the chief (*pradhāna*) and the unmanifest (*avyakta*).<sup>16</sup> Primordial materiality (*prakṛti*) is constituted by three intertwining strands or constituents (*guṇas*) namely (1) the light (*laghu*) and illuminating (*prākāśa*) subtle matter of pure thought (*sattva*), (2) the prop giving (*upaśṃambhak*) mobile (*cala*) kinetic matter of energy (*rajas*), and (3) the heavy (*guru*) and hindering (*varaṇakaṃ*) matter of inertia (*tamas*).<sup>17</sup> All these three are contradictory equiforms bound with one another in a state of equilibrium. It is the unlimited, unconditioned, and all-pervading ultimate cause of the manifold world.

The genesis of the world is not a creation and destruction, but it is an evolution and involution.<sup>18</sup> It is the conversion (*pariṇāma*) of the primordial materiality. The change is self-becoming and it is explained by the causation theory of *satkāryavāda*.<sup>19</sup>

The Classical Sāṃkhya theory of world occurrence is based on the notion of the conjunction (*samyoga*) of *prakṛti* with *puruṣa*. The conjunction of *prakṛti* with *puruṣa* is for contemplation (*darśana*) and *puruṣa* with *prakṛti* is for liberation (*kaivalya*). Hence the relative conjunction is effective in lending spirituality to *prakṛti* and *prakṛti* its efficiency to the self.<sup>20</sup> Consequently the equilibrium of three strands (*guṇas*) is disturbed and thus gradually evolves the world. The first evolute to emerge from *prakṛti* is intellect (*buddhi/mahat*) which is characterised by reflective reasoning (*adhyavasāya*).<sup>21</sup> When *sattva* predominates it attains basic dispositions of virtue, (*dharma*), discriminative knowledge (*jñāna*), non-attachment (*vairāgya*), and control (*aiśvarya*). Similarly when *tamas* predominates it is characterized by their opposite predispositions such as sin (*adharma*) ignorance (*ajñāna*), attachment (*rāga*), and impotence (*anaiśvarya*).<sup>22</sup> From *buddhi* which contains these predispositions and conditions which provide the frame work of man's fundamental strivings, there arises ego or "I consciousness" (*ahaṃkāra*). Often one of the three *guṇas* predominates the other two in a state of subordination. Hence the second evolute, that is, "I consciousness" appears in a three fold form. The first one predominated by *sattva* is called "the modified" (*vaikṛta*). The second one predominated by *rajas* is called "the fiery" (*taijasa*) and the third one preponderated by

*tamas* is called “the source of elements” (*bhūtādi*). This distinction is very important because it is through this distinction that the ensuing two-fold manifestation takes place. Thus, there comes forth the thinking mind (*manas*), the five sense capacities of cognition (*pañcajñānendriyas*)<sup>23</sup> and five action capacities (*pañcakarmendriyas*)<sup>24</sup> from the *vaikṛtāhaṃkāra*. Similarly the subtle elements (*pañcatanmātras*)<sup>25</sup> emanate from the *bhūtādyahaṃkāra*. Both these two aggregates are able to manifest because of the capacity for activity provided by the kinetic energy constituent *taijasa*. Finally the five gross physical elements (*mahābhūtas*) come from the five subtle elements.<sup>26</sup>

Now let us see how the unfolding of the manifold phenomenal world is described in *Carakasamhitā*. It appears in the first chapter of *Śārīrasthāna*. There, in connection with the description of the Self, he speaks of twenty-four principles consisting of two groups. Of them the first group consists of eight entities. They are the five physical elements namely, *ākāśa*, air (*vāyu*), fire (*agni*), water (*ap*), earth (*prthivi*), the “I consciousness” (*ahaṃkāra*), empirical consciousness (*buddhi*), and the unmanifest (*avyakta*). These eight entities are designated as nature of beings *bhūtaprakṛtis*.<sup>27</sup> The second group consists of sixteen evolutes (*vikāras*) namely the mind, the five cognitive sense capacities, five sense capacities of action, and five objects of senses.<sup>28</sup>

Even though the first mentioned eight entities (*aṣṭaparakṛtis*) are conceived as the basic entities of all beings in general, the unmanifest (*avyakta*) is counted as the ultimate ground which provides the

source of everything. All the other entities evolve from the unmanifest in a vertical way through successive stages. <sup>29</sup>

The unmanifest is considered as the field knower (*kṣetrajñā*) and the remaining twenty-four entities as its field (*kṣetra*).<sup>30</sup> Due to the complexity of the unmanifest<sup>31</sup> it sometimes manifests and at other times becomes latent as a real possibility.<sup>32</sup> Thus, when manifestation begins, the first evolute that arises from unmanifest is the empirical consciousness (*buddhi*).<sup>33</sup> From the empirical consciousness there emerges ego or “I consciousness” (*ahaṃkāra*). The “I consciousness” gives rise to the five gross physical elements (*pañcamahābhūtas*). Further proceeds all the other sixteen evolutes (*vikāras*) namely, the mind, the ten sense organs, and the objects of five senses.<sup>34</sup>

The peculiarity of the emanation of the gross elements is that they evolve in a vertical successive manner which has certain structure of dependence and subordination.<sup>35</sup> Accordingly, first comes *ākāśa* from “I consciousness”. From *ākāśa* there evolves air and from air fire takes place. Fire gives rise to water and from water there evolves earth. The theory of successive evolution of the gross physical elements can be traced back to the early Sāṃkhya. It also invokes the utterance in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad<sup>36</sup> and Manusmṛti.<sup>37</sup> The only difference is that, in the Taittirīya the first evolute *ākāśa* comes out directly from the Self while in Carakaśāhitā and in early Sāṃkhya it is described as springing out from the unmanifest.

Consequent to this successive emanation their possession of qualities is also explained by the accumulation theory. That is, the *ākāśa*, the first evolute, has only sound. Air, the second, possesses sound and touch. Similarly fire has sound, touch and colour; water has sound, touch, colour, and taste, and earth has all the five qualities: sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell.<sup>38</sup> The very same idea is repeated in *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya*<sup>39</sup> and *Aṣṭāṅgasaṅgraha*<sup>40</sup> and *Vedānta*.<sup>41</sup>

The process of the genesis of the world is nothing but the manifestation of the unmanifest and dissolution is its return to the previous natural state of the unmanifest.<sup>42</sup> The periodic evolution is called appearance (*udaya*) and the latter merging is called dissolution or involution (*pralya*).<sup>43</sup> Origin and dissolution are recurrent events. It is without a beginning and so it is without an end. It is a cyclical process and so there is no question of a first beginning. At the end of each cycle, the empirical world of diversity returns to the unmanifest, but re-emerges from it again. The visible world thus emerges is called the manifest (*vyakta*). Each succeeding universe is determined in its character by the preceding one by a kind of casual linkage.

Now it clear that even though Caraka keeps conformity with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in defining and classifying substance, his cosmological and metaphysical thesis is radically different. Caraka does not give a classification of substance into eternal and non-eternal substances or finite and infinite substances as we see in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. There, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the static, non evolutionary, irreducible non-derivative atoms of earth, water, fire, air and the eternal *ākāśa* are conceived as the

constituents of the physical world. But Caraka never considers such eternal atomic forms as the ultimate ground of this physical world.<sup>44</sup> For him, the physical elements are only evolutes. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas consider the world as a creation. The created objects are entirely different from its substantial cause. But Caraka never considers the world as a creation. For him it is a change and the change is self-becoming. As such all objects of our experience are only transformations of the substantial cause. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory the ultimate constituents never merge with one another nor do they emerge from a common ground as we see in the Carakasaṃhitā.

The cosmological speculation in the Carakasaṃhitā is similar to that in the classical Sāṃkhya in the sense that it enlists world constituents in successive stages in a scheme of evolution with certain structures of dependence and subordination. In spite of this similarity, there also exist some major basic differences. The differences can be summed up as follows.


1. The classical Sāṃkhya enumerates twenty five world constituents. Caraka enumerates only twenty four constituents. Instead of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, Caraka envisages the non-dual unmanifest as the ultimate cosmological substrate. So when the classical Sāṃkhya is dualistic, Caraka is monistic in approach.
2. The conception of *avyakta* as the field knower (*kṣetrajña*) and all others excepting it as field (*kṣetra*) is also a fundamental difference with the classical Sāṃkhya.

3. The classical Sāṃkhya recognizes plurality of *puruṣas*. It is against the monistic conception of Caraka.
4. In classical Sāṃkhya, the underlying reality from which the visible world emerges and to which it returns is *prakṛti* constituted by the three *guṇas*. But there is no such conception of *prakṛti* as the basic stuff of the world in the Carakaśaṃhitā. In Carakaśaṃhitā it is the unmanifest that forms the foundational source of this visible world. *Rajas* and *tamas* are conceived as its adjuncts which lead to evolution. In addition to that he recognizes all the three *guṇas* as constituents of mind.
5. The classical Sāṃkhya speaks of a three-fold division of “I consciousness”? But Caraka gives no such division.
6. Classical Sāṃkhya describes five subtle elements (*tanmātra*) from which the five gross elements (*mahabhūtas*). But there is no idea of such subtle elements in the Carakaśaṃhitā. The physical elements are construed as direct evolutes of the “I consciousness”. Caraka’s cosmological enumeration which comprises of the twenty-four entities includes objects (*arthas*) also. But they are not found included in the classical Sāṃkhya.
7. The sense organs are conceived as evolutes of modified “I consciousness” in the classical Sāṃkhya while they are considered as the evolutes of their respective gross elements (*bhautika*).



It may be useful to offer the charts of both the classical Sāṃkhya and Carakasamhitā which would give an apparent view of the materials presented to make a comparison.


## World Construction according to Classical Sāṃkhya



Five sense capacities of cognition (buddhīndriyās)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. hearing (śrotra)</li> <li>2. touch (tvak)</li> <li>3. seeing (cakṣu)</li> <li>4. tasting (rasana)</li> <li>5. smelling (ghrāṇa)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. sound (śabda)</li> <li>2. touch (sparśa)</li> <li>3. colour (rūpa)</li> <li>4. taste (rasa)</li> <li>5. smell (gandha)</li> </ol>
Five action capacities (karmendriyās)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. Mind (both sense capacity and action capacity)</li> <li>7. speaking (vāk)</li> <li>8. grasping (pāṇi)</li> <li>9. walking (pāda)</li> <li>10. excretion (pāyu)</li> <li>11. reproduction (upastha)</li> </ol>	<p>Five Gross Elements (pañcamahābhūtas)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. ākāśa</li> <li>2. air (vāyu)</li> <li>3. fire (agni)</li> <li>4. water (ap)</li> <li>5. earth (pṥthivī)</li> </ol>

(Fig. 1)

## World Construction according to Carakasamhitā



(Fig. 2)

It may not be improper to recall the cosmological speculations found in Suśrutasaṃhitā in this context. There the cosmological speculation corresponds to the classical Sāṃkhya dualism.<sup>45</sup> In coherence with the classical Sāṃkhya, Suśruta draws certain clear identical characteristics and differentiating characteristics of the self (*puruṣa*) and primordial materiality (*prakṛti*). The identical characteristics are the following. Both the self and the primordial materiality are without a beginning (*anādi*) and without an end (*ananta*). They are non-mergent (*aliṅga*), eternal (*nitya*), without another one beyond (*anapara*), and allpervadig (*sarvagata*).<sup>46</sup> The differentiating characteristics are the following. *Prakṛti* is only one (*eka*), non-conscious (*acetana*), constituted by the three *guṇas* (*triguṇī*) that has the properties of seed (*bījadharmi*), productive (*prasavadharmi*), and afflicted by pleasure and pain (*amadyastha*). On the contrary, *puruṣa* is numerous (*ananta*), conscious (*cetana*), beyond tripartite process (*triguṇātīta*), devoid of the properties of seed (*abījadharmi*), unproductive (*aprasavadharmi*), and unafflicted by pleasure and pain (*madhyastha*).<sup>47</sup> One notable difference that Suśruta makes with the classical Sāṃkhya is the conception of sense organs as physical.<sup>48</sup> However it stands as an anomaly in his theory since they are being conceived as direct evolutes of “I consciousness”.

From what has been said above, it is beyond doubt that the cosmological speculation in Carakasāṃhitā is a pre-classical one. Now the problem is whether it originally belongs to Carakasāṃhitā or it has been incorporated into it from some other pre-classical source. The problem is something crucial because pre-classical Sāṃkhya tradition itself is

extremely complicated and diverse.<sup>49</sup> It is something significant that Caraka speaks of the Sāṃkhyas in several contexts.

The first verse says that Agniveśa presented some of his doubts regarding the well-being before Punarvasu who was sitting with the Sāṃkhyas and Sāṃkhyātasāṃkhyās.<sup>50</sup> Here two terms namely, Sāṃkhyā and Sāṃkhyātasāṃkhyā are seen consecutively used and they cause some sort of confusion. If the two epithets are used in the very same literal meaning then one of them being a repetition will become meaningless. So the first epithet is to be taken to refer to the Sāṃkhyā philosophers and the second one to mean the teachers of Āyurveda who were proficient in Sāṃkhyā philosophy. The second verse says that the early Sāṃkhyas were conversant of the fact that the human-being is the constitution of six *dhātus* and that diseases are caused by the same six *dhātus*.<sup>51</sup> The third one suggests that the Sāṃkhyā system is like the all illuminating Sun.<sup>52</sup> The last two couplets further make a significant remark about liberation. Reminding us of the Bhagavat Gīta verse<sup>53</sup> it is said that the Yogins promulgate discipline (*yoga*) and the Sāṃkhyas and the Sāṃkhyatādharmins disseminate discriminative knowledge as the way of liberation<sup>54</sup> and further asserts that one has to attain perfect knowledge and practice *yoga* to attain *mokṣa*.<sup>55</sup> An intimate observation of all these verses reveals that the Carakasamhitā presupposes the existence of Sāṃkhyā thought (different from the Yoga philosophy) prior to Punarvasu Ātreya and after acquiring its perfect knowledge it was taught by Punarvasu to his disciples.

“The Marxist thinker Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya”<sup>56</sup> mentions Ātreya-tantra as an ancient text in support of his thesis that the origin of Sāṃkhyā

philosophy goes back to the pre-Vedic Tantra.<sup>57</sup> The *tāntric* origin of Sāṃkhya may be an open question. Scholars like Erich Frauwallner consider that the Sāṃkhya in Caraka has only limited value because they represent opinions of outsiders or opponents of the system.<sup>58</sup> Dale Riepe opines that the earliest fairly lengthy account of *Sāṃkhya* is to be found in Caraka's *Ātreyantra* (78B.C.) and he places Caraka before Kapila and after Patañjali.<sup>59</sup> Nonetheless the chronological position is not tenable since Kapila is considered as the real propounder of the Sāṃkhya philosophy.

Dasgupta who makes a penetrating analysis of the origin and significance of the Sāṃkhya tradition suggests that Caraka and Pañcaśika<sup>60</sup> represent the earliest available exposition. Sāṃkhya propounded by Pañcaśikha (who is said to be the direct disciple of Āsuri) is found in *Mahābhārat*. It would be enough to say that both Caraka and Pañcaśikha accept twenty-four principles. He points out that *puruṣa* is the state of *avyakta* for both of them. Both Caraka and Pañcaśikha argue for the doctrine of the foundational Self because of the need for a basis of moral responsibility. They also asserts that suffering occurs because of the mistaken identity of the conglomerations of the physical body mind and *cetana*. Both of them refer to the final state of salvation as *aliṅga*.<sup>61</sup>

Another notable aspect of the Caraka-Sāṃkhya is that it shows considerable similarity with the Sāṃkhya speculation found in the twelfth canto of the *Buddhacarita* of Aśvaghōṣa where Arāda the former teacher of the Buddha is to offer it. Suffice to say that both Caraka and Aśvaghōṣa classify all the twenty-four entities into two groups. The first group

comprises of *avyakta*, *mahat*, *ahaṃkāra* and the five gross elements under the name *prakṛti* and the second group consists of ten sense organs, the mind and the five objects of senses.<sup>62</sup> Similar to that of Caraka, the Buddhacarita also does not include the doctrine of *guṇas* in the classical sense. *Avyakta* is accepted as the ultimate ground of everything. The *tanmātras* are also not mentioned in the Buddhacarita. The plurality of *puruṣa* also is not accepted. Both of them speak of the field (*kṣetra*) and field knower (*kṣetrajña*).<sup>63</sup> With slight variations both of them enumerate and define the cause of miseries in the same way. Accordingly, delusion (*moha*), desire (*iccha*), hatred (*dveṣa*), and volition (*karma*) as the root cause of each and every action result in miseries by way of generating “I consciousness” (*ahaṃkāra*), attachment (*saṅga*), doubt (*saṃśaya*), vanity (*abhisamplava*), selfish dispositions (*abhyavapāda*), erroneous knowledge (*vipratyaya*) lack of discrimination (*aviśeṣa*) and adherence to rituals, priesthood, and begging. All these eight factors obstruct one to transcend his worldly existence.<sup>64</sup> Taking this into consideration, Larson states that all the three, that is, Caraka, Pañcaśikha and Aśvaghoṣa, are influenced by a common Sāṃkhya-yoga tradition.<sup>65</sup>

Anyway there can be no doubt that the Carakasāṃkhya represents one of the earliest available expositions of Sāṃkhya. What Caraka gives in his exposition is of natural cosmological-psychological character. Its centerpiece is the conception of the inner self as the field knower (*kṣetrajña*) and the psycho-somatic complex as the field (*kṣetra*) for the whole of therapeutics hinges on it.

## The theory of five physical substances (*pañcabhūta-siddhānta*)

According to Caraka the elements common to external physical world and human physical existence at the bottom are the five physical elements (*bhūtas*). They are *ākāśa*, air (*vāyu*) fire (*agni*), water (*ap*), and earth (*kṣiti*). Sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell are their specific qualities (*viśeṣaguṇas*) respectively.<sup>66</sup>

We know this physical world through the external cognitive senses. The sense organs of cognition are limited to five and the specific qualities (*viśeṣaguṇas*) known through these senses are also limited to the five mentioned above. Moreover it is peculiar to the sense organs that each one of them is capable of grasping a particular quality among the five. Based on this conception, it is inferred that there are five physical elements which serve as the substrate of each one of these specific qualities and they are called by the common term *bhūta*. Accordingly *bhūtas* are defined as those inherent with the specific qualities that can be known by the external sense organs.<sup>67</sup> That is, all physical substances have a specific quality that is externally perceivable and all that have an externally perceivable specific quality is physical. This definition is rather based on empirical generalization amply confirmed by innumerable observation reports and not challenged by any counter examples.<sup>68</sup> But it should not be thought as a priori, necessary truth. There are examples of physical objects which may not have externally perceivable specific qualities.<sup>69</sup> So what they claim is that a physical substance is the causal substratum (*samavāyikāraṇa*) of externally perceivable qualities like smell.<sup>70</sup> However, this would not

distract from the reliable empirical generalization which has been admitted by almost all systems of Indian thought. Thus, the causal substratum of smell is called earth or earth is that which the causal substratum of the specific quality smell. Similarly water is that of taste, fire is that of colour, air is that of touch, and *ākāśa* of sound. Thus, we have five physical elements (*bhūtas*) having five specific qualities which can be known by their corresponding sense organs. Consequently the specific quality becomes the distinguishing property of a physical substance.<sup>71</sup>

According to Caraka, each and every object of the physical world is a combination of the five physical substances<sup>72</sup> and it has been accepted by all in *Āyurveda*.<sup>73</sup> As such each and every substance is composed of all the five gross elements (*mahābhūtas*); but they differ according to the preponderance of a particular *mahābhūta* in composition. For instance, when a substance is called *pṛthivī* it implies that, though it is composed of five *mahābhūtas*, the *pṛthivī*-*bhūta* is predominant there. Similar is the case of all other gross elements. This is due to the successive emanation of the gross elements.<sup>74</sup>

In *Suśruta* the evolution of gross elements (*mahābhūtas*) is described in a quiet different way. There the gross physical elements are described as occurring through the combination of the subtle elements called *tanmātras*. The particular principle by which they combine together is called “mutual involvement” (*‘anyonyānupraveśa/bhūtanupraveśa’*).<sup>75</sup> In *Suśruta* also the gross elements are known by specific names as earth, water, fire, air and



*ākāśa* on the basis of the predominance of the subtle element in the gross element.<sup>76</sup>

The Vedāntins proposes an arithmetical formula in the process of mutual involvement of the “simple subtle physical elements” (*apancikkrtabhūta/tanmatra*).<sup>77</sup> According to them gross elements are produced by the combination of the subtle elements particularly possessed of the ingredient *tamas*. The process by which they evolve is also called *pañcīkaraṇa*.<sup>78</sup> The theory of *pañcīkaraṇa* presupposes the idea that, the preponderant *mahābhūta* gets 50% share in the composition while the remaining four 12½% each.<sup>79</sup> Referring to this, Dr. B. N. Seal says:

“Like the Vedāntists, Caraka held that each of the gross *bhūtas* (*mahābhūtas*) is a particular ultra chemical compound of five original subtle *bhūtas*. In this sense, every substance is pentabhaotic, but for purposes of chemical analysis and synthesis, that is considered with reference to the *mahābhūtas*, all substances in their chemical constitution belong to one or other of the following classes: monobhaotic, bibhaotic, tribhaotic, tetrabhaotic, and pentabatic. Further these compounds combine to form more complex substances gradually giving rise to organic substances and products.”<sup>80</sup>

Taking account of this fact, P.V. Sarma remarks that this theory brings Āyurveda very close to Vedānta.<sup>81</sup> But this is not admissible in the case of Caraka, because in *Carakasamhitā*, the gross elements are construed as direct

evolutes from the “I consciousness” and not from the subtle elements as we see in Suśruta, Classical Sāṃkhya or Vedānta.

Suśruta says that *ākāśa* is predominantly *sāttvik*, *vāyu* is primarily *rajastic*, fire is *sāttvic* and *rājasic*, water is primarily *tamasic* and *sattvic*, and earth is tamasic.<sup>82</sup> But there is no such notion in Caraka.

Keeping in mind the pharmacological point of view, Caraka asserts that all empirical substances<sup>83</sup> are constitutions of the five physical elements<sup>84</sup> and gives a classification in that direction. Thus substances are divided into two: sentient (*cetanaṃ*) and insentient (*acetanaṃ*). Things having sense organs are called sentient while those which are devoid of them are called insentient.<sup>85</sup> Actually the sentient substances are those which are constituted by the five physical elements and the self. Although consciousness belongs to the self, it gets manifested only when it is conjoined with the mind and body. So the soul, in combination with the mind and body, is said as sentient. The sentient includes even the vegetable kingdom for they also possess consciousness. For instance *sūryabhakta* (*helianthus annus* Linn) moving according to the position of the sun.<sup>86</sup> The insentient are those constituted by the physical elements only.

Caraka further gives two different types of three fold classification based on the specific action (*prabhāva*) of drugs. Of them, the first type of classification is based on its causal efficacy in the maintenance of health. Accordingly, the three types coming under the first group are drugs capable of alleviating *doṣas*, vitiating *dhātus*, and those good for the maintenance of positive health.<sup>87</sup> The three types coming under the second group are

based on their origin. Thus, there are drugs of animal origin (*jāṅgama*), vegetable origin (*audbhija*) and earthly (*pārthiva*) origin.<sup>88</sup> However these divisions have their further ramifications.

The theory of *pañcabhūtika* composition of empirical substances is found denied in the Vaiśeṣika system<sup>89</sup> as well as the Nyāya system.<sup>90</sup> It is technical of their attitude that only one *mahābhūta* may be the inherent cause of the empirical substance though other *bhūtas* may participate in its composition as efficient cause.

With regard to the classification also there is difference in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. There, the classification is given in relation to the description of earth. Accordingly, ephemeral effects produced by the atoms of earth are classified into body, sense organs and objects.<sup>91</sup> Then, the bodies are subdivided into two: embryonic (*yonja*) and non-embryonic (*ayonija*).<sup>92</sup> Embryonic is born by the union of the semen and the ovule. It is of two kinds: viviparous (*jarāyuja*) and oviparous (*aṇaḍja*). The bodies of human-beings and domestic and wild animals are examples of the former. The bodies of birds and reptiles belong to the latter. The bodies of gods and sages are born independently of the semen and so they are non-embryonic.<sup>93</sup> One thing to be noted in this context is that, Viswanātha gives a different description of non-embryonic bodies. He classifies it into two: those springing up from moisture and those shooting out of earth. The former are represented by worms, gnats; the latter by plants and shrubs. The bodies of denizens are also considered as non-embryonic.<sup>94</sup>

Another striking point to be noted in this connection is that Caraka regards the following as earthy substances: gold, the five metals (copper,

silver, lead, iron, and tin) and their “rust” (different types of bitumen), arsenic, precious stones, salts, red chalk, and collirium.<sup>95</sup> This is further attested by Susruta.<sup>96</sup> But Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy includes metals like gold in the group of minerals (*ākaraḥ*) which is a division of the fiery objects (*taijasaviṣaya*). They divide the fiery objects into four namely, earthy (*bhauma*), heavenly (*divya*), gastric (*udarya*), and minerals (*ākaraḥ*). Metals like gold is included in the division of minerals.<sup>97</sup> Not only that but they also take special strain to establish it. They argue that gold is not earthy because the fluidity of melted gold is not destroyed even by the application of extreme heat, while the fluidity of earthly things like clarified butter is generally found to vanish at certain temperature in the absence of obstruction. But the fluidity of gold remains in tact even if the obstruction is absent. Gold cannot be water like because its fluidity is occasional and not inherent by nature; nor can it be air as it has no colour. So gold is fiery. Heat and brilliancy natural to fire is concealed in gold by the obstruction of earthy colour and touch.<sup>98</sup>

Caraka, in conformity with others, recognizes sound, touch, colour, taste and smell as specific qualities of *ākāśa*, air, fire, water and earth respectively. Beyond that, from the pharmacological angle, he identifies five specific physical qualities sensible to touch and they are recognized as impeccable identifying marks or definitions of the five physical elements and their isomeric forms. The identifying physical qualities thus accepted are hardness or roughness of earth, liquidity of water, impelling or moving force of air, heat of fire and non-resistance (or penetrability) of *ākāśa* respectively.<sup>99</sup>

Further he enumerates twenty physical qualities beginning with heaviness (*gurvādi*) and five actions beginning with *vamana* which have high pharmacological value. These qualities are called ‘*sāmānyaguṇas*’ since they are common to physical substances. Such qualities of each element are as follows.

Earth: Heavy (*guru*), rough (*khara*), hard (*kamhina*), inert (*manda*), stable (*sthira*), clear or non-slimy (*viśada*) dense (*sāndra*), coarse (*sthūla*), and smell (*gandha*).

Water: Liquid (*drava*), viscous (*snigdha*), cold (*śīta*), dull (*manda*), soft (*mṛdu*), slimy (*picchala*), taste (*rasa*).

Fire: Hot (*uṣṇā*), penetrative (*tīkṣṇā*), subtle (*sūkṣma*), light (*laghu*), dry (*rūkṣā*), clear (*viśada*), and colour (*rūpa*).

Air: Light (*laghu*), cold (*śīta*), dry (*rūkṣa*), rough (*khara*), non-slimy (*viśada*) and subtle (*sūṣma*), and touch (*sparśa*).

*Ākāśa*: Imponderable (*mṛdu*), light (*laghu*), subtle (*sūkṣma*), smooth (*ślaṣṇa*), and sound.<sup>100</sup>

This enumeration is reiterated by Suśruta<sup>101</sup> and Vāgbhaṭa.<sup>102</sup>

The *pañcabhūta siddhānta* of Caraka has got its own originality and in no way it can be equated with the concepts in other systems of thought. The idea of the successive emanation of the gross elements, the enumeration of the specific qualities sensible to touch and also the general physical qualities and the conception of the minerals like gold as earthly substance instead of fiery are some of the important salient features which add to the novelty.

## The theory of three faults (*tridoṣasiddhāta*)

Ayurveda applies the theory of five physical elements to the whole living body, whether *doṣa*, *guṇa*, *dhātu*, or *mala*.<sup>103</sup> The body, similar to that of the external objects, is a conglomeration of five elements and is sustained by a three-fold function: (1) the disintegrating function, (2) the integrating function, and (3) the regulating function or the nerve function. In Āyurveda each one of these functions is ascribed mainly to three primal constituents of the body generally called *tridoṣa*. They are *vāta*, *pitta*, and *kapha*.<sup>104</sup> *Kapha* integrates, *pitta* disintegrates and *vāta* controls.<sup>105</sup> In fact the very existence of life is determined by these three functions attributed to the three *doṣas*. Suśruta is of opinion that the human body is sustained by the three basic elements; like a dwelling house is supported by the supporting stays.<sup>106</sup> These three *doṣas* have two aspects called natural (*prakṛti*) and morbid (*vaikṛti*). *Pitta* in its natural state, promotes digestion and metabolism and causes disease in the morbid state. *Kapha* props up strength in the form of *ojas* in the normal condition and in the morbid state it takes the form of excreta and causes diseases. *Vāta* is responsible for all the activities of the body in its natural state and causes disease and death in morbid condition.<sup>107</sup>

In the Atharva Veda there is a reference of three kinds of diseases, the airy, (*vātaja*), the dry (*sūkṣma*), and the wet (*abhraja*).<sup>108</sup> Similarly, in the Chandogyopanisad earth, water, and fire are told as principles world of construction. In many of the Upaniṣads *vayu* is regarded as the principle of life.<sup>109</sup> Yāska states that sleṣma oribinates from semen (*retas*) and from

śleṣma the seven *dhātus* originate in a successive manner.<sup>110</sup> Suśruta also refers to some early conception that the body is physical (*bhautika*), and the three elements that constitute body are air, water and fire.<sup>111</sup> All this show that before the systematization of Ātreyantra there had been a continuous efforts to explain the physiological functions of the body. However, what we see in Carakasamhitā is the earliest systematized form of the *tridoṣasiddhānta* and there it is construed as a biological adaptation of the *pañcabhūta-siddhānta*.

The three factors namely, *vāta*, *pitta*, and *kapha* are counted as constituents responsible for both sustaining and degenerating the body. They are called *dhātus* because their equilibrium, form the foundation of the body. They are called *doṣas* since they form the intrinsic cause of diseases.<sup>112</sup> It is to be noted, in this connection that there are other basic elements in the body called *saptadhātus*<sup>113</sup> and waste products called *malas* which makes the body foul.<sup>114</sup>

Augmentation (*vṛddhi*), normalcy (*sāmya*), and diminution (*kṣaya*) are the three characteristics of the *doṣas*.<sup>115</sup> All of them together can be called the constant internal environment in modern physiology.<sup>116</sup>

The digested food is transformed into two, namely essence (*prasāda* or *rasa*) and waste products (*kiṭṭa* or *mala*).<sup>117</sup> *Kiṭṭa* nourishes sweat, urine, stool, *vata*, *pitta*, *kapha*, and the excreta of the ear, eye, nose, mouth hair follicles, genital organs and also hair of the head, beard, small hair of the body, and nails. Similarly the essence of the food nourishes the *rasa*, *rakta*,

*maṃsa, medas majja, asthi, sukra, ojas* and the material constituents of the sense organs, that is, the five physical elements. In total it is the *doṣas*, *dhātus*, and *malas* that constitute the body and determine the integrity of the body. When the *doṣas*, *dhātus*, and *malas* continue in their proper measure they do not pollute or weaken the body or produce diseases. They all in their proper measure co-operate together in sustaining the body<sup>118</sup> and in that sense all are called *dhātus*. Still, *vāyu*, *pitta*, and *kaph* are regarded as the most important, or they are recognized as the root of all growth and decay of the body, health and disease. Suśruta attributes the same status of *vāta*, *pitta* and *śleṣma* to blood also because its impurities play a vital role in producing disturbance to wounds and so has got a special importance in surgery. Thus, he says that the three *doṣas*, together with blood (*śonita*) determine the origin, preservation, and dissolution of the living being.<sup>119</sup> Health is being conceived as the equilibrium, resulting from the coordinated normal functions of the *dhātus*. The loss of this equilibrium due to their disturbed or abnormal function is called disease.<sup>120</sup>

The special feature of the definition of health and disease given by Caraka is that it keeps harmony with the causation theory of evolution which he followed in his description of world construction. Thus disease is only a change of the *dhātus* and not a new creation. But this is in no way admissible in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought, for their causation theory suggests that each and every effect is different from the cause. Referring to this, Dasgupta cites Vivaraṇasiddhāntacintāmaṇi of Narasiṃha Kavirāja and states that the Naiyāyikas, however, hold that disease is a separate entity which is



produced by *doṣa*, but which is not itself a *doṣa*. (*dravyatve sati doṣabhinna doṣajanyatvaṃ rogatvaṃ*).<sup>121</sup>

From the time of conception itself, in certain individuals, all the three *doṣas* are in equilibrium; some are predominated by *vāta*, some by *pitta* and some by *kapha*. According to Cakrapāṇi, there are also people dominated by two *doṣas*, that is by *vātapitta*, *vātakapha* and *pittakapha*. Normally the first category, by nature, maintains normal health while those belonging to the other categories are always susceptible to bodily diseases. This is due to imbalance of the *doṣas* brought about by the domination of one or the other of the *doṣas*.<sup>122</sup>

When *vāta*, *pitta* and *kapha* become deficient or excess in quantity (*prakupita*) they become *doṣas* and they afflict the body with different types of diseases.<sup>123</sup> Based on the comparative strength of the various components of the *doṣas* and the relative strength and proportions of each *doṣa* among themselves, innumerable combinations are formed and so the diseases proceeding from them are also innumerable. Caraka points out that there are sixty-two such commonly manifested combinations.<sup>124</sup>

We know that the *doṣa* are mutually contradictory in character. Normally, when two contradictory elements combine, they generally get destroyed as in the case of fire and water. Cakrapāṇi, pointing out this example, suggests that there is the possibility for the question as to how the *doṣas* with contradictory character can combine and then he himself settles the query. He says that mutual contradiction is to be determined by

their own action and not merely by citing other illustrations. Even in the cited example itself, though water and fire are contradictory to each other they do not obstruct the combination of the five *mahābhūtas*. Similarly, the sour taste is found to be caused by the domination of the combined qualities of water and fire. This would not be possible if the mutually contradictory elements do not combine together. Finally he ascertains that it is because of the presence of the specific characteristic of *prabhāva*, the *doṣas* with contradictory nature combine together. As for as the specific characteristic of *prabhāva* is concerned, he says that it is caused by *adr̥ṣṭa*<sup>125</sup> for *adr̥ṣṭa* is capable of causing miseries.<sup>126</sup>

Another thing to be noted in this connection is that when there is a disease due to the predominance of a *doṣa* (caused by extraneous factors) corresponding to the predominant *doṣa* in one's constitution from his birth, the newly collected *doṣa* produces morbidity in accordance with the working of the predominating *doṣa* of his constitution. But his original constitutional *doṣa* (*prākṛti*) is never increased or decreased due to the predominance of a *doṣa* by any kind of disease. They always remain the same operating in their physiological functions. The constitutional *doṣa* (*prākṛti*) and the accumulated *doṣa* due to extraneous factors (*vaikṛti*) are different. The increase and decrease of *doṣas* have a separate course of action in diseases and there is no interchange between the latter collections or deficiency of *doṣas* and constitutional *doṣas*.<sup>127</sup> The actual fact regarding the relation of the constitutional *doṣa* and the accrued or deficient *doṣa* has been further pointed out by Cakrapāṇi. That is a *doṣa* will be aggravated in a system in

which the corresponding constitutional *doṣa* is predominant and a *doṣa* will lose its strength to a great extent in a system in which the corresponding constitutional *doṣa* is not predominant.<sup>128</sup>

### **The locations, qualities, and the functions of the *doṣas***

1. **Vāyu:-** Caraka differentiates the all pervasive (*viśvaṃ*) *vāyu* into two: external and internal. The external air that moves about in the world sustains the earth, kindles fire and brings about compactness and movements in the sun, moon, stars, and planets, creates clouds; causes showering of rain, flowing of rivers, maturity of flowers and fruits, and sprouting of plants and it differentiates seasons (*ṛtus*) and *mahābhūtas*; causes the manifestation of the shape and size of objects, brings about the potency for germination in seeds and growth in plants; causes dryness and hardness in grains. In brief *vāyu* functions as the cause of change.<sup>129</sup> Taking into consideration its prominent role the normal and natural functions of *vāyu* are described. *Vāyu* is metaphorically described as life (*āyu*), the strength (*balam*), the sustainer (*dhāta*), all pervasive (*viśvaṃ*) and controller (*dhātā*).<sup>130</sup>

The three *doṣas* function throughout the body.<sup>131</sup> At the same time they have got certain main sites. The locations of *vāta* are urinary bladder, rectum, waist, thighs, bones, and colon (*pakvāśaya*). Of them the most important center is colon.<sup>132</sup> Though these parts of the body are cited as locations of *vāyu* the specific locations of each one of its ramification is

given further.<sup>133</sup> It is rough (*rūkṣa*), cool, (*śīta*), light (*laghu*), subtle (*sūkṣma*), mobile (*cala*) non-slimy (*viśada*), and coarse.<sup>134</sup>

*Vāyu* is identified with life since its main function is to sustain the harmony of the body, sense, and mind and self that constitutes life. The whole body is animated by the conscious self in accordance with the function of *vāyu*. Hence it is conceived as the basis of *bala*. It co-ordinates and regulates all the functions of body, mind and sense organs. It holds together the various elements of the body and maintains its cohesion. It forms the basis of speech, hearing and touch and forms the root cause of the organs of hearing and touch. It determines joy and enthusiasm and it is the indicator of the continuity of the span of life. The corporeal *vāyu*, when gets vitiated, afflicts the body affecting the strength, complexion, happiness and the span of life. It perturbs the mind and sense organs and deforms or detains the embryo also. More over the vitiated *vāyu* cause fear, anxiety, bewilderment, and even causes death.<sup>135</sup>

Here the description of *vāyu* as the root cause of *śabda* and *spṛśa* pinpoints to the fact that the basic elements of *vāyu* are mainly *akāśa* and *vāyu*. In Vaiśeṣika philosophy, the specific quality of *vāyu* is conceived as *anuṣṇāśīta*.<sup>136</sup> *Śīta* is conceived as the specific quality of water.<sup>137</sup> But Caraka attributes *śīta* to *vāta* instead of *anuṣṇāśīta*. This is because *vāta* is seen to be augmented by *śīta* and diminished by its loss. More over when disease is caused by the mere vitiation of *vāta* then *śīta* is manifested.<sup>138</sup>

The corporal *vāyu* is divided into five namely, *prāṇa*, *udāna*, *samāna*, *vyāna*, and *apāna*. Their sites and functions are as follows. *Prāna* is located

in the chest, throat, tongue and nose. It is the principle that functions as the means to animate the living-being. *Udāna* is located in the umbilicus, chest, and throat. Its function determines the manifestation of speech, effort, enthusiasm, strength and complexion. *Samāna* pervading the channels, carries sweat, and aqueous materials and it has its location beside the seat of digestive fire (*jeṭharagni*). *Vyāna*, which pervades the whole body moves very swiftly. It is responsible for motion, extension, *vikṣepa*, winking of the eye and such similar functions. *Apāna* is located in the testicles, urinary bladder, phallus, umbilicus, thighs, groins, anus and colon. Its functions are the ejaculation of semen, voiding of urine and stool, elimination of menstrual blood and parturition of foetus. In normal state, all of them reside in their respective locations performing their proper functions which help the sustenance and maintenance of health.<sup>139</sup> Elsewhere Suśruta designates *agni*, *soma*, *vayu*, *sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*, five sense organs, and inner self (*bhūtātma*) as *prāṇa* for they nourish and sustain the body.<sup>140</sup>

**Pitta-** The main sites of *pitta* are sweat, *rasa*, lymph (*lasikā*), blood (*rakta*) and small intestine (lower part of *āmāśaya*). Among them the lower part of *āmāśaya* is the most important.<sup>141</sup> Its qualities are unctuous (*sneha*), hot (*uṣṇa*), sharp (*tikṣṇa*), liquid (*drava*), sour (*amla*), fluid (*sara*) and pungent (*kaṭu*).<sup>142</sup>

The corporeal fire distinct from the external fire is called *pitta*.<sup>143</sup> All are unanimous in their opinion that the fundamental substance of *pitta* is fire. As far as the function of *pitta* is concerned, it is balancing and transformative in nature. Digestion or indigestion, vision or loss of vision,

normalcy or otherwise of the body heat, normalcy or otherwise of luster, valour, fear, anger and joy, confusion, and lucidity are produced in accordance with the abnormal (*kupita*) or normal (*akupita*) state of its function.<sup>144</sup>

**Kapha-** The structure of *kaph* is water and earth.<sup>145</sup> It is located in chest, head, neck, joint, stomach (or upper part of *amāśaya*) and fat. The most important location is chest.<sup>146</sup> It is heavy (*guru*) cool (*sīta*), soft (*mṛdu*), unctuous (*snigdha*), sweet (*madhura*), immobile (*sthira*), and slimy (*picchala*).<sup>147</sup> *Kapha* is the determining cause of such aspects like robustness and looseness, tubbiness and leanness, enthusiasm and laziness, potency and impotency, and wisdom and ignorance.<sup>148</sup>

One of the significant things to be noted in connection with the qualities of the *doṣas* is that the imbalance of a *doṣa* does not necessarily imply that all its qualities will get vitiated. There is the possibility for one or more qualities of a *doṣa* to be vitiated when others are intact. For instance, in certain case, when *sīta* of *vāta* gets vitiated, its other qualities may remain undisturbed. So the physician must be particular in diagnosing not only the *doṣa* that has been disturbed, but also must identify the particular quality or qualities which have been increased or decreased. It is possible that a *doṣa* in its disturbed condition will remain a *doṣa*. Yet some of its qualities will be increased and others will be decreased. So, the nature of the disturbance of the *doṣa* is to be assessed by the nature of the qualities involved.<sup>149</sup>

The *doṣas* are aggravated by substances *having* three tastes (*rasas*) which are homologous and are alleviated by substances having the other three tastes (*rasas*) which are contradistinctive in the following manner.

**Aggravating tastes****Alleviating tastes**

<i>Vāta</i>	pungent, bitter and astringent.	sweet, sour and saline.
<i>Pittha</i>	pungent, sour and saline.	sweet, bitter and astringent.
<i>Kapha</i>	sweet, sour and saline.	pungent, bitter and astringent. <sup>150</sup>

S.K. Ramachandra suggests that *vāta*, *pitta*, and *kapha* are characterised by the three modes: *rajas*, *sattva*, and *tamas*.<sup>151</sup> Similarly Dwarakanath says that, at the functional level, *vāta* is primarily rajastic, *pitta* is predominantly *sāttvic* and *kapha* is mainly *tāmasic*.<sup>152</sup> All these reflect the attempts to associate the *tridoṣasiddhānta* with the *triguṇa* theory. But such a correspondence of the *tridoṣa* to the *triguṇa*, cannot be explained on the basis of the *Carakasamhitā* because Caraka does not postulate such a *triguṇa* theory as we see in *Suśrutasamhitā* or in classical *Sāṃkhya*. Probably such an attempt must have been due to the idea in *Suśrutasamhitā* that *ākāśa* is predominantly *sāttvik* *vayu* is primarily *rajastic* fire is *sāttvic* as well as *rajastic*, water is primarily both *tāmasic* and *sāttvic* and earth is *tāmasic*.<sup>153</sup> ‘Somehow, the reference of such a correspondence is seen to occur first in the Dalhaṇa’s commentary on the *Suśrutasamhitā*’.<sup>154</sup> However, it is misleading, since, on *Samkhya* terms *kapha*, *vata* and *pitta* are primarily related to the functioning of the gross, material body. Hence they are the products of gross physical elements. This would make all the three predominantly *tāmasic in nature*.<sup>155</sup> The state of affairs becomes more intricate, since, according to classical *Sāṃkhya* the divine realm is mainly *sāttvic*, the human realm is predominantly *rajastic* and plant realm or the

immobile beings is primarily *tamasic*.<sup>156</sup> So the subject matter of Āyurveda, that is health and harmony, is always working within a system that is predominantly *rajastic* in nature. “Nevertheless, as an internal system of differentiation working with the broader cosmological scheme of Samkhya school, *pitta* does not correspond to *sattva* as *vāta* to *rajas* and *kapha* to *tamas*”.<sup>157</sup>

All these have been stated only to inform that the theory of the three *doṣas* has been formulated on the concrete basis of the concept of *pañcabhūtas*. In fact, it is a biological interpretation of the *pañcabhūtasiddhānta*. However, the description of the physiological and pathological aspects of *tridoṣa* in detail is beyond the scope of this work.

## Time and space

Time and space are infinite and continuous. They have no perceivable specific quality. So they are not physical insofar as being physical is to be understood in terms of having some externally perceivable specific quality. They are nevertheless inferred as two of the common (*sādhāraṇa*) causal conditions without which nothing ephemeral can come into being.<sup>158</sup>

## Time

Sāṃkhyā conceive time and space under the elemental evolute, *akāśa*.<sup>159</sup> In Nyāya - Viśeṣika philosophy, time and space are ultimate and objective realities and they are conceived as empty containers.<sup>160</sup> Time is defined as that which is the basis of notions like priority and posteriority, simultaneity, and also of late and soon.<sup>161</sup>



Annaṃbhaṭṭa says that time is the cause of the usages like past, present and future.<sup>162</sup> It is infinite, eternal and one only.<sup>163</sup> Viśwanātha says that time is the cause of products and he considers it as the substratum of the universe.<sup>164</sup> Sivāditya divides time into three namely, the time of production, existence and destruction.<sup>165</sup> Purānic writers two aspects of time: indivisible (*akhaṇḍa*) and divisible (*khaṇḍa*) Eventhough it is infinite, eternal, and single entity in ultimate analysis, it is for practical purpose that these divisions and subdivisions are made. Its manifold conception in usage is only in a secondary sense.<sup>166</sup>

Quiet different from the Vaiśeṣikas, Caraka places time as the eighth in the schemata of substances<sup>167</sup> and describes it in terms of therapeutics. Accordingly, time is primarily classified into two: *nityaga* and *avasthitika*. *Nityaga* refers to determination of wholesomeness to different types of seasons while *avasthitika* refers to the states of the individual which is relevant to the manifestations of diseases.<sup>168</sup> *Nityaga* consists of years. Each year is sub-divided into two three, six, and twelve from different dimensions. Thus the two divisions of a year is *dakṣiṇāyana* and *uttarāyana*. The three divisions of a year are *śīta*, *uṣṇa* and *varṣa*. The six divisions refer to the seasons: *śarat*, *hemanta śīsira*, *vasanta* and *grīṣma*, *varṣa*, and the twelve divisions refers to *caitra*, *vaiśākha*, *jyeṣṭha*, *āṣāḍha*, *śrāvaṇa*, *bhādrapada*, *āśvina*, *kārtika*, *margaśīrṣa*, *pauṣa*, *māgha*, and *bhālguna*.<sup>169</sup>

In this connection, it is to be noted that Ayurveda has again postulated the concept of *ṛtu-sandhi* representing the period of transition between the

outgoing and incoming seasons- seven days on either side, and fourteen days in all required by the organisms for gradually adapting themselves to the stress of incoming season.<sup>170</sup> With regard to the stages of the evolution of diseases (*avasthikakāla*) from the time of their inception to the time of its manifestation and subsidence, Caraka gives a three broad-based consecutive steps: *caya*, *prakopa* and *praśama*. Suśruta, at the same time, gives six distinct stages namely, *sañcaya*, *prakopa praśara*, *sthānasaṃśraya*, *vyakti* and *bheda*.<sup>171</sup>

## Space

Space, in Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika, is construed as the cause of the notions such as east and west.<sup>172</sup> In Caraka, *dik* refers to *deśa* or habitate which determines the characteristics of substances due to procreation and extend of drugs or their acclimatization to the region.<sup>173</sup> For instance drugs which grow in the Himalayas are very efficacious and those in deserts are light . Such habitats are classified into three: (i) *jāṅgala*, (2) *anūpa* and (3) *sadhāraṇa*.<sup>174</sup> Carak gives a vast description for identifying these three habitates. Aśṭāṅgahṛdaya, it is stated that *jāṅgala* habitates are those which are predominated by *vāta*. *Anūpa* habitats are those predominated by *kapha*, and the *sādhāraṇa* are those which have thee equipoise of the *doṣās*.<sup>175</sup> The description of time and space thus made is purely for the treatment and maintenance of health and not from the point of view of metaphysical enquiry.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 The word “fault” is found used by Dr.K. Raghavan Thirumulpad for the term *doṣa*. See *Technical Literature in Sanskrit*, ed., S. Venkatasubramonia Iyer, p. 70. However, the word is not enough to convey the real sens of *doṣa* as used in *Āyurveda*.
- 2 “*sarvaṃ dravyaṃ pañcabhautikaṃ*”; CS, Su, XXVI. 10; *bhutebhyo hi paraṃ yasmānnasthi cintā cikitsite*, SS, Sa, I. 13; “*pañcabhautikaṃ tattū*”, AH, Su, IX. 1.
- 3 Raghavan Thirumulpad, “Baic Principles of *Āyurveda*”, SHI, p.13.
- 4 see editors note, RVS, p. 1.
- 5 “.....Caraka reveals the fact that he was highly influenced by Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya. The first conception of the individual proceeds from the stand point of Vaiśeṣika and the last from that of Sāṃkhya. But the difficulty is not still removed”. ODS, p. 100.
- 6 See the definition of substance given by Kaṇāda, see supra; p. 91 *ṛthvyādīnāṃ navānāmapī..... svātmanyāraṃbhakatvaṃ.....*, PBNK, p. 54; *samavāyikāraṇaṃ dravyasyaiva vijñeyaṃ*, NSMK, *kārikā* 23, p. 91.
- 7 “*nitydravyāṇi paramāṇvākāśadīni....*”, NSMK p. 93; *ṛthivyādica-tuṣṭayasya paramāṇavaḥ ākāśādīpañcakaṃ ca nityadravyāṇi*, *Dīpikā*, TSA, p. 6.

- 8 *anāśritatvanityatve ca anyatra avayavidravyebhyaḥ*, PBNK, p. 56.
- 9 For details see PBNK, pp.127-129; Dīpikā, TSA, p. 9.
- 10 *taccaikaṃ vibhu nityaṃ ca*, TSA, p. 11.
- 11 The *asatkāryavadins* view that the effect is not pre-existent in the cause. On the contrary It is a new creation.VS, I. i. 10, see Śaṅkaramiśra on *ibid.*, VU, pp. 46- 47; NSMK pp.114-117; KHP, pp. 111-114.
- 12 The earliest classical text on Sāṃkhya philosophy is Sāṃkhyakarikā of Īśwarakṛṣṇa. “The Classical form has found its final formulation in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, and has never been surpassed and it has remained authoritative for the entire future”. EFW, Vol. I, p. 274; FIC, Vol. I, p. 84.
- 13 SK, 3., vide supra, p. 87.
- 14 SK, 19.
- 15 SK, 11.
- 16 Sir M. Monier- Williams, *Indian Wisdom*, George Allen, London, 1875, p. 62; NTIT, p.193.
- 17 *sattvaṃ laghu prakāśakamiṣtamupaṣtaṃbhakaṃ calañca rajaḥ guru varaṇakameva tamaḥ pradīpāccārthato vṛttiḥ*, SK, 13. “It is an undifferentiated manifold, an indeterminate continuum of infinitesimal Reals. These Reals, termed *Guṇās*, may by another abstraction be classed under three heads (1) *Sattva*....., (2) *Rajas*..... and (3)*Tamas*.....,” PSAH, p. 3.
- 18 *Satkāryavāda* of the Sāṃkhya’s is just the opposite of Vaiśeṣika’s *asatkāryavāda*. The ninth *kārikā* of Īśwarakṛṣṇa constitute a locus

classicus for arguments defending *satkāryavāda*. The *kārikā* is translated by Karl H. Potter in the following way. “The effect exists [in the cause] because (1) there is no causing of what is non-existent in the cause, (2) because [when one wants a particular effect] there is grasping of [its] material cause, (3) because everything is not possible, (4) because something which has capacity causes that only of which it is capable, (5) because the cause [of the particular kind] exists.” KHP, p. 107.

- 19 The term evolution used here must not be confused with the evolution meant when one speaks of Darwinian or some other forms of biological evolution for the following reasons. “(1) *prakṛti* does not evolve like the forms of life that biological evolution speaks about, since it is unlike anything discussed in the biological theory (e.g, the amoeba etc.); (2) *prakṛti* can scarcely struggle and evolve in any environment, since it itself is the environment; (3) in comparing the evolutes of the Sāṃkhya with those in the biological theory, there appears to be no greater coherence in the later evolutes of Sāṃkhyas whereas there does appear to be in the Darwinian scheme”. T. M. P. Mahadevan, Sāṃkhya Philosophy, unpublished lectures delivered at the Graduate school of Madras University, October, 1951, cited in NTIT, p. 198.
- 20 SK, 21; The relation of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is an appearance, but not either of the two.
- 21 For details see vide infra, p.
- 22 SK, 23.
- 23 The five cognitive sense capacities are sense of seeing (*cakṣuḥ*), hearing (*śrotram*), smell (*ghrāṇam*), taste (*rasana*), and touch (*tvak*).

- 24 The five action capacities are those of speaking (*vāk*), handling (*pāṇi*), walking (*pāda*), excreting (*pāyu*), and procreation (*upastha*).
- 25 The five subtle elements are named sound (*śabda*), touch (*sparśa*), colour (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*) and smell (*gandha*). Even though they are names usually used to designate the specific qualities, they refer to the essence of the *mahābhūtas* in the evolutionary series.
26. SK, 25; see also Vācaspati Miśra on *ibid.*, STK, p. 187.
- 27 ‘*khādīni buddhiravyaktamahaṅkārastathā’ṣṭamaḥ bhūtaprakṛtiruddiṣṭā vikāraścaiva ṣoḍaśa*. CS, Sa, I. 63.
- 28 *buddhīndriyāṇi pañcaiva pañcakarmendriyāṇi ca samanaskāśca pañcārthā vikāra iti saṃjñitāḥ*. *Ibid.*, 64. Suśruta also accepts this twofold classification. But he calls the first group by the term *āṣṭaprakṛtis* and includes subtle elements (*tanmātras*) instead of the five physical elements (*bhūtas*). The second group is identical with that of Caraka. SS, Sa, I. 6.
- 29 In *Manusmṛti* *avyakta* is described as the universal “Self” which is beyond thought and sense perception and is construed as the source from which the universe evolves. See MS, I. 7, p. 6.
- 30 “.....*iti kṣetraṃ samuddiṣṭam sarvamavktavarjitaṃ. avyaktamasya kṣetrasya kṣetrajñāṃṣao viduḥ*.”, CS, Sa, I. 65.
- 31 The complexity is due to the presence of the adjuncts namely, *rajas* and *tamas* in the unmanifest. *rajastamobhyāmāviṣṭaścakravatparivartate*. *Ibid.*, 68. *avyakta* and *cetana* are one and the same entity. HIPS, Vol. I, p. 214.

- 32 vide infra, pp. 178 - 79.
- 33 In classical Sāṃkhya, *buddhi* is conceived as a purely material evolute. But in Carakasamhitā it is not so. Hence the evolute *buddhi* described in Caraka is translated as empirical consciousness while the usual translation intellect is used for *buddhi* in classical Sāṃkhya.
- 34 *jāyate buddhiravyaktādbuddhya’hamiti manyate paraṃ khādīnyahaṃ-kārādutpadyante yathākramaṃ tataḥ saṃpūrṇasarvāṅgo jāto’bhyudita ucyate.*’, CS, Sa, I. 66.
- 35 Ibid., the vertical order is implied by the word “*yathākramaṃ*” in the articulation.
- 36 “..... *tasmāt va etasmādātmanaḥ ākāśaḥ saṃbhūtaḥ. akāśadvāyuh. vāyoragniḥ. agnerāpaḥ. adbhyaḥ pṛthivī pṛthivyā oṣadhayaḥ.....*”, Ta. u., Brahmavalli, ii, 1.
- 37 MS, I. 75-78, pp. 24-25
- 38 *teṣāmekaguṇaḥ pūrvo guṇavṛddhiḥ pare pare purvaṃ pūrvaguṇaścaiva kramaśo guṇiṣu smṛtaḥ*, CS, Sa, I.28.
- 39 AH, Sa, III. 2.
- 40 AS, Sa, III, 5.
- 41 VP, pp. 157-58; VSS, p. 60.
- 42 *avyaktād vyaktatāṃ yāti vyaktādvvyaktatām punaḥ*, CS, Sa, I, 67.
- 43 Ibid., 69.

- 44 Caraka uses the word “*paramāṇu*”. But it is not in the sense of ultimate particular as we see in the Vaiśeṣika. For instance while discussing the organs of the body he says that the smallest unit of the body is *paramāṇu* which cannot be counted. They are extremely numerous and subtle, Ca, Sa, VII. 17. This is actually the smallest unit of the gross physical element.
- 45 For details see SS, Sa, I. 3- 5.
- 46 Ibid., 9.
- 47 Ibid., 13
- 48 *bhautikāni cendriyāṇyāyurvede varṇyante.....*, SS, Sa, I. 14.
- 49 The pre-classical Sāṃkhya can be seen in the middle and younger Upaniṣads, that is, Kaṭha, Śetāsvatara, Maitrāyaṇi, and the philosophical portions of the Mahābhārata like. *Bhagavat Gīta*, *Mokṣadharmā* which developed over a long period of time, JJJ p. 27.
- 50 *sāṃkhyaiḥ saṃkhyātasāṃkhyeyaiḥ sahāsīnaṃ punarvasuṃ jagaddhitārthaṃ papraccha vahniveśaḥ svasaṃśayaṃ*, CS, Su, XIII.3.
- 51 *śaḍdhātujastu puruṣo rogāḥ śaḍdhātujāstathā rāsīḥ śaḍdhātujo hyeṣaḥ sāṃkhyairādyaiḥ prakīrtitaḥ*. Ibid., XXV. 15.
- 52 *yathā ādityaḥ prākāśastathā sāṃkhyajñānaṃ prākāśakamiti*. CS, Vi, VIII. 38.
- 53 *loke’smin dvidhā niṣṭā purā proktā mayānagha jñānayogena sāṃkhyānāṃ karmayogena yoginām*, BG, III. 3.



- 54 *ayanam punarākhyātametadyogasya yogibhiḥ saṃkhyātadharmaiḥ sām̐khyaiśca muktairmokṣasya cāyanam'*, CS, Sa, I. 151.
- 55 *sarvabhāvasvabhāvajño yayā bhavati niḥspr̐haḥ. yogam yayā sādhyate sām̐khyāḥ sampadyate yayā*, Ibid, V, 17.
- 56 JLL, p. 63.
- 57 Ibid., p. 65.
- 58 Ibid., p. 48.
- 59 NTIT, p. 179; JLL, p. 139.
- 60 According to Vācaspatimiśra, Pañcaśikha is referred to in Vyāsa's Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya (I.4, I.25, I.36, II.5, II.6, II.13, III.13 and III, 41) in Sām̐khyappravacanabhāṣya (V.32, IV.68). Johnston has suggested that the *Sām̐khyayoga* suggested in Buddhacarita XII can be ascribed to Pancaśikha among others., E. H. Johnston, *Early Sām̐khya*, Price Publication Fund, Vol. XV. Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1937, p.152.
- 61 HIPS, Vol. I, pp. 216-217.
- 62 BCA, XII. 18-19.
- 63 *asya kṣetrasya vijñānāt kṣetrajña iti saṃjñi ca kṣetrajña iti cātmanaṃ kathayantyātmacintakaḥ*, ibid., 20.
- 64 (i) *ajñānaṃ karma tṛṣṇā ca jñeyaḥ śarīraṃ sārahetavaḥ*  
 .....  
*vipratyayādahaṃkārat sandehādabhisamplavāt*  
*aviśeṣanupāyābhyāṃ saṅgādabhyavapātaḥ.*  
 .....

*vijñeyo' bhyavapātaḥ sa saṃsāre yena pātyate.* Ibid., 23-32;

(ii) “*mohecchādveṣakarmamūlā pravṛttiḥ.....*  
*.....sattvaśarīradoṣamūlānām sarvaduḥkhānām bhavati*”. CS, Su,  
 V. 10. There is a slight difference in the sequence and definitions.

65 JLL, p.107.

66 *mahābhūtni kham vāyuragnirāpaḥ kṣitistathā śabdaḥ sparśaśca rūpaḥ*  
*ca raso gandhaśca tadguṇāḥ.*, CS, Sa, I. 27.

67 *pṛthivyāḍīnām pañcānāmapi bhūtatvendiyaprakṛtitvabāhyai-*  
*kekendriya grāhyaviśeṣaguṇavatvāni* PBNK, p. 51; *Bhutatva* does not  
 refer to universal *bhūtatva*. The word *bhūtatva* means to be designated  
 by the word *bhūta*: “*bhūtatvaḥ bhūtaśabdavācyaḥ*, see  
*Nyāyakandaī* on *ibid*; *bhūtatvaḥ ca ātmānyatve sati*  
*viśeṣaguṇavatvaḥ na tu jātiḥ.....*”, Vācaspatyaḥ, Vol. VI, p. 4684;  
*bhūtatvaḥ [ka] ‘bahirindriyagrāhyaviśeṣaguṇavatvaḥ’*, NK, p. 629,  
 see also NSMK, p. 96.

68 CIPM, p. 20.

69 According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, substances including the physical  
 ones do not have any quality at the moment of its production and  
 destruction., see notes, TSA, p.104, Vide, supra substance, categories.

70 It is with this idea that Athalye points out that the definition of earth  
 “as having odour” (*gandhavatī*) is to be understood as the intimate  
 cause of odour (*gandhasamavāyikāraṇam*), Notes, TSA, p. 103 ;  
*gandhaheturiti. gandhasamavāikāraṇamityarthaḥ*, NSMK, p. 106.

71 *guṇāḥ śarīre guṇinām nirdiṣṭaścihnameva* ca CS, Sa, I. 31.

- 72 *sarvam dravyam pañcabhautikaṃ.....* CS, Su, XXVI. 10.
- 73 *tatra pṛthivyāpatejovāyuvākāśānāṃ samudāyāt dravyābhiniṣṭtiḥ,*  
SS, Su, XI. 3. *iha hi dravyam pañcabhūtātmakaṃ,* AS, Su, XVII.  
p. 235.
- 74 Loc. cit, p. 121.
- 75 *anyonyānupraviśṭāni sarvāṇyetāni nirdiśet* SS, Sa, I. 21; The very  
same idea is seen expressed in an interpolated verse in *Manusmṛti:*  
*parasparānupraveśāddhārayanti parasparam guṇam*  
*pūrvasya pūrvasya dhārayantyuttarotaram.*, MS, p. 25.
- 76 “.....*utkarṣatvābhivyañjako bhavati idaṃ-pārthivamidamāpyamidam*  
*taijasamidam vāyavyamidamākāśīyamiti*”. SS, Su, Xli. 3;  
*bhūtotkarṣāpakarṣasanniveśaviśeṣāt dravyavaiṣamyam,* RVS, II. 98
- 77 *tatra ākāśādīni pañcabhūtānyapañcīkṛtāni tanmātrāpratipādyānyut-*  
*padyante.* VP, p.157. In Vedanta the subtle physical elements are  
conceived as the products of cosmic illusion (*māya*) constituted by  
*sattva, rajas,* and *tamas:* “*imāni bhūtāni triguṇamāyākāryāṇi*  
*triguṇāni*”, Ibid., 159.
- 78 *sthūlabhūtāni tu pañcīkṛtāni,* VSA, 58.
- 79 *dvidhā vidhāya caikaikaṃ caturthā pradhamaṃ punaḥ*  
*svasvetaradvitīyāṃśairyojanāt pañca pañca te.* Pñcadaśī,  
“Tattvavivekaprakaraṇam”, 27; VSA, p. 58; VP, p. 162.
- 80 PSAH, p. 57.

- 81 PVS, p. 167.
- 82 SS, Sa, I, 20.
- 83 The word *dravya* is also used in the special sense of drugs in the Āyurvedic literature. “*dravyāṇi punarośadhayaḥ*”; SS, Su, I. 28.
- 84 supra, p. 115, *tatra, pṛthivyaptejovāyvākāśānāṃ samudāyāt dravyābhinivṛttiḥ*, SS, Su, 41. 3.
- 85 *sendriyam cetanaṃ, nirīndriyamacetanaṃ*. CS, Su, I. 48.
- 86 *atra sendriyatvena vṛkṣādīnāmapi cetanatvaṃ bodhavyaṃ; tathā hi sūryabhaktāyā yathā yathā sūryo bhramati tathā tathā bhramaṇadṛganumīyate*, Cakrapāṇi on Ibid.
- 87 CS, Su, I. 67.
- 88 CS, Su, I. 68.
- 89 VS, IV, ii. 2-4; For details see VU, pp. 285-287.
- 90 NS, III, I. 28. See also Vātsyāyana on ibid., pp. 244 - 45.
- 91 PBNK, pp, 78-81.
- 92 VS, IV, ii. 5.
- 93 PBNK, p. 82.
- 94 NSMK, p. 120.
- 95 “*suvarṇaṃ samalāḥ pañca lohāḥ sasikatāḥ suddhā bhaumaṃ.....*  
*.....bhaumamauśadhāmuddiṣṭaṃ.....*”, CS, Su, I. 70.
- 96 *pārthivāḥ, suvarṇarajatamaṇimuktāmanaḥśilāmṛtkapālādayaḥ*, SS, Su, I. 32.

- 97 *viṣayascaturvidhaṃ -- bhaumadivyamudaryamakarañca....  
akarajamṃ suvarṇādih*, PBNK, P.100-101; TSA, p. 8; T.Bh,178. SP,  
p. 18
- 98 ‘*suvarṇaṃ taijasaṃ asatipratibandhake’atyantāgni saṃyoge’-  
pyapyanucchidyamāna - janyadravatvāt yannaivaṃ tannaivaṃ yathā  
pṛthivīti*’, NSMK, pp. 140-141; Dīpikā, TSA, p. 8; also  
Jinavardhanasūri’s commentary, SP, p.18; PBNK, 101-102.
- 99 *kharadravacaloṣṇatvaṃ bhūjalānilatejasāṃ  
ākāśasyapratīghāto dṛṣṭam liṅgamethākramaṃ.  
lakṣaṇaṃ sarvamevaitat sparśanendriyagocaraṃ*, CS, Sa, I. 29-30.
- 100 CS, Su, XXVI. 11.
- 101 SS, Su, xli. 4 (1 - 5).
- 102 AS, XVII. p. 238
- 103 “Introduction”, RVS, p. xii. *vāta* , *pitta* and *kapha* are usually referred  
to as wind, bile and phlegm in English. But they are not able to convey  
their intended meaning.
- 104 *vāyuh pittaṃ kaphaścoktāḥ śārīro doṣasaṃgrahaḥ*, CS, Su, I. 57; SS,  
Su, XXI. 3; AH, Su, I, 6 AS, p.7; SAS, I. V. 23.
- 105 K. Raghavan Thirumulpad, “Basic Principles of Ayurveda”, SHI, p.13
- 106 *vātapittaslēsmāṇa eva dehasaṃbhavahetavaḥ, tairevāvyāpannaira-  
dhomadhyordhvasanniviṣṭaiḥ sarīramidaṃ dhāryate’gāramiva  
sthūṇābhīstisṛbhirataśca trīsthūṇamāhureke*, SS, Su, XXI. 3

- 107 *gatiśca dvividhā dṛṣṭā prākṛtī vaikṛtī ca yā .....tenaiva rogā jāyante tena caivoparudhyate.* CS, Su, XVII. 115 - 118.
- 108 Atharvaveda, I, 12, 3.
- 109 HIPS, Vol.II, p.333.
- 110 *ślēṣmā retasaḥ saṃbhavati, ślēṣmaṇo raso rasācchoṇitaṃ ....taditaṃ yonau retaḥ sriktam puruṣaḥ saṃbhavati.,* “Pariśiṣṭa”, Nirukta, p. 148.
- 111 *prakṛtimiha narāṇāṃ bhautikīṃ kecidāhuḥ pavanadahanatoyaiḥ kīrtitāstāstu tisraḥ,* SS, Sa, IV. 70.
- 112 *śarīradhāarakavastūni. tadyathā. kaphaḥ. vātaḥ. pittaḥ. śrīradūṣaṇāddoṣāḥ malinīkaraṇānmalāḥ dhārṇāddhātavaste syurvātapittakaphāstrayaḥ,* Śabdakalpadrumaṃ, Vol. II, p. 790; *vikṛtāvikṛtā dehaṃ ghnanti te vartayanti ca,* AH, Su, I. 7; AS, p. 7.
- 113 *rasāṣṛṇmāṃsamedāstimajjāśukṛāṇi dhātavaḥ.* AH, Su, I. 13; AS, p. 10; SAS, I. V. II
- 114 *tatra malabhūtāste ye śarīrasya bādhakarāḥ.* CS, Sa, VI. 11.
- 115 *doṣāprakṛtivaiṣamaṃ niyataṃ vṛddhilakṣaṇaṃ, doṣāṇāṃ prakṛtirhānirvṛddhiścaivaṃ parīkṣyate.* CS, Su, XVIII. 53. *doṣāṇāṃ vṛddhisāmyakṣayalakṣaṇāni,* Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, XVII. 62.
- 116 LC, p. Ivi.

- 117 The qualities of the body are briefly of two types: those which make the system polluted (*malas*), and those which purify and sustain the body, (*prasāda*): “*sarīraguṇāḥ punardvividhāḥ saṅgrahaṇa-malabhūtāḥ prasādabhūtāśca*”, CS, Sa, VI. 17.
- 118 *tatrāhāraprasādākhyo rasaḥ kiṭṭaṃ ca malākhyamabhinirvartate. kittāt... samadhātordhātusāmyamanuvartayataḥ*. Ibid., Su, XXVIII. 4.
- 119 *ta eva ca vyāpnnāḥ pralayahetavaḥ. tadebhireva śoṇitacaturthaiḥ saṃbhava-sthiti-pralayeṣvapyavirahitaṃ sarīraṃ bhavati*. SS, Su, XXI, 3; See also Dalhaṇa on ibid.
- 120 *vikāro dhātuvaiṣamyam sāmīyam prakṛtirucyate sukhasaṃñjaka-mārogyam, vikāro dukhameva ca*. CS, Su, IX, 4; *rogastu doṣvaiṣamyam doṣasāmyamarogātā*, AS, p. 14; AH, Su, I. 20.
- 121 see foot-notes, HIPS, Vol. II, p. 329.
- 122 CS, Su, VII. 39-40. see also Cakrapāṇi on ibid.
- 123 *vātapitta ślēṣmaṇastu khalu sārīrā doṣāḥ. teṣāmapī ca vikārāḥ jvarātisāraśopha śoṣasvāsa mehakuṣṭādayaḥ*. CS, Vi, VI. 5.
- 124 CS, Su, XVII. 6.
- 125 *adṛṣṭa* refers to merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) see *Nyāyakandaī*, PBNK, p. 28.
- 126 See Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, XVII. 62.
- 127 *prkṛtisamānarogtpatau na prakṛtibhūtasya vṛddhiḥ, kiṃ tarhi hetvantarajanitasya vātadestatra vikarakaritvam prakṛtibhūtastu doṣastatropadarśako bhavati.....*, Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, VII, 39-40.
- 128 *samānaṃ hi prakṛtiṃ prāpya doṣaḥ pravṛddhabalo bhavati, asamānaṃ tu prāpya tathā tathā balavān na syāt*, Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, XVII, 62.

- 129 *prakṛtibhutasya khalvasya loke carataḥ karmaṇīmāni bhavanti; tadyadhā - dharmī dhāraṇam.... avaikārikavikāracēti*, CS, Su, XII. 8.
- 130 *vāyurāyurbalaṃ vāyurvayurdhātā sarīriṇām vayoḥ viśvamidaṃ sarvaṃ prabhurvāyusca kīrtitaḥ*, CS, Ci, XXVIII. 3.
- 131 *sarvaśarīracarāstu vātapittaśleṣmaṇaḥ.....*; CS, Su, XX, 9. See also Aruṇadatta on AH. Su, I. 7.
- 132 *bastiḥ puriṣadhāṇaṃ kaṭiḥ sakthīni pādāvasthīni pakvāśayaśca vātasthānāni, tatrāpi pakvāśayo viśeṣeṇa vātasthānaṃ*, CS, Su, XX. 8.
- 133 Vide infra same 36
- 134 *rūkṣaḥ śīto laghuḥ sūkṣmaśalo'tha visadaḥ kharāḥ viparītagunaiḥ dravyairmārutaḥ saṃpraśāmyati*, CS, Su, I. 59. see AH, Su, I. 11.
- 135 *vāyustantrayantradharaḥ..... ayuṣo anuvṛttipratyayabhūto bhavatyakupitaḥ. kupitastu khlu sarīre..... prāṇāṃscoparuṇaddhi*, CS, Su, XII. 8.
- 136 PBNK, pp. 111-12; TSA, p. 16,
- 137 PBNK, p. 92; TSA, p. 7. T. Bh, p.192
- 138 *'yadyapi vaiśeṣike anuṣṇāśīto vāyḥ tathāpīha śītena vṛddhidarśanāduṣṇena ca praśamanadarśanāttathā kevalavātārabdhe roge śītadarśanāca śīta eva vayoḥ'*, Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, I. 61. *nanu anuṣṇāśīto vāyḥ kāṇādaiḥ paṭhith.... "pavane yogavāhitvācchītaṃ ślēṣmayute bhavet"*, Aruṇadatta on AH, Su, I. 11.
- 139 *prāṇodāna samānākhyā vyanāpanaiḥ sā pañcadhā*



.....  
*svakarma kurvate deho dhāryate tairanāmayaḥ*, CS, Ci, XXVIII. 5-11.

140 Cf. SS, Sa, IV.3.

141 *svedo raso lasikā rudhiramāmāśayaśca pittasthanāni, tatrāpyāmāśayo viśeṣeṇa pittasthānaṃ*. CS, Su, XX. 8.

142 *sasnehamuṣṇaṃ tīkṣṇaṃ ca dravamamlaṃ saraṃ kaṭu viparītaguṇaiḥ pittaṃ dravyairāśu praśāmyati*, CS, Su, I. 60

143 “*agnireva sarīre pittāntargataḥ*”, CS,Su, XII.11.

144 *paktimapaktiṃ darśanamadarśanaṃ mātrāmātratvamūkṣmaṇaḥ prakṛtivilkṛtivarṇau śauryaṃ bhayaṃ krodhaṃ harṣaṃ moham prasādमित्येवमādīni cāparāṇi dvantvānīti*, Ibid.

145 IK, p. 25.

146 *uraḥ śiro grīvā, parvāṇyāmāśayo medaśca śleṣmasthanāni; tatrāpyuro viśeṣeṇa pittasthānaṃ*; CS,Su, XX. 8.

147 *guru sīta mṛdu snigdha madhura sthirapicchalāḥ śleṣmaguṇāḥ praśamaṃ yanti viparītaguṇairguṇāḥ*. CS, Su, I. 61.

148 *dārḍhyaṃ śaidhilyamupacayaṃ kārsyamutsāhamalāsyam vṛṣatāṃ klībatāṃ jñānamajñānaṃ buddhiṃ mohamevamādīni cāparāṇi dvatvāntānīti*, CS, Su, XII. 12.

149 *samavetanāṃ punardoṣāṇāṃ aṃśāṃśavikalpo vikalpo'sminnarthe*. CS. Ni, I, 11 (5); *tatra doṣāṇāṃ aṃśāṃśavikalpo yathā- vāte prakupite'pi kadācidvātasya sītāṃṣo balavān bhavati, kadācillaghva- mśaḥ, kadācit rūkṣāṃśaḥ kaācid lakhu-rūkṣāṃśaḥ*. Cakrapāṇi on ibid..

- 150 *svādvamlalavaṇā vayuṃ, kaṣāyasvādutiktakāḥ jayanti pittam, ślēṣmāṇam kaṣāyakaṭutiktakāḥ (kaḍvamlalavaṇāḥ pittam, svādvamlalavaṇāḥ kapham kaṭutiktakaṣāyāśca kopayanti samīraṇam)* CS, Su, I. 66; Vi, I. 6; AH, Su, I. 14-15.
- 151 DO, p.178.
- 152 IK, pp. 24-25.
- 153 *tatra sattvabahulamākāśam, rajobahulam vāyuh, sattvarajobahulamagniḥ sattvatamobahulā āpaḥ tamobahulā pṛthivī.* SS, Sa, I. 20.
- 154 IHBT, p.196.
- 155 Ibid. p.169.
- 156 *ūrdhvam sattvavīśāśca mulataḥ sargaḥ madhye rajovīśālo brahmādistambaparyantaḥ,* SK, 54.
- 157 IHBT, p.170.
- 158 CIPM, p. 3.
- 159 CSP, 87.
- 160 Ibid., p. 85.
- 161 *aparasmīn aparaṃ yugapat ciraṃ, kṣipraṃ iti kālaliṅgāni,* VS, II, ii. PBNK, p. 155; *Kālo 'pi digviparītaparatvāparatvānumeyaḥ,* T. Bh, 189.
- 162 TSA, p. 11.
- 163 Ibid; T. Bh, p. 189.8
- 164 NSMK, p. 150.
- 165 *kālastu utpattisthitivināśalkṣaṇastrividhaḥ.* SP, p. 21.

- 166 A Comparative Study of the Concepts of Space and Time in Indian Thought., Kumar Kishore Mandal , p. 21.
- 167 Time occupies the sixth place in the Vaiśeṣika table of substances.
- 168 CS, Vi, I, 21 (6); AH, Su, I, 24. Elsewhere it is stated that time is that which has change - *kālaḥ punaḥ priṇāmaḥ*, CS , Vi, VIII. 76.
- 169 *kālaḥ punaḥ saṃvatsaraścāturāvasthā ca. tatra saṃvatsaro dvidhā, tridhā, ṣoḍho, dvādaśadhā bhūyaścāpyataḥ pravibhajyate tattatkāryāmbhisamīkṣya*, CS, Vi, 8,125.
- 170 *tvorantyādisaptāhāvṛtusandhiriti smṛtaḥ*, AH, Su, III, 58.
- 171 *sañcayañca prakopañca prasaraṃ sthānasaṃśrayaṃ vyaktiṃ bhedañca yo veti doṣāṇāṃ sa bhavedbhiṣak.*, SS, Su, XXI, 36. For details see IK, pp. 84 - 108.
- 172 PBNK, p. 162; TSA, p, 12; Kaṇāḍā defines it as that which gives rise to the inference and usage that ‘this is here’. VS, Su, II. ii. 10.
- 173 *deśaḥ punaḥ sthānaṃ; sa dravyāṇāmutpattipracārau deśasātmyaṃcācaṣṭate*. CS, Vi, I. 21.
- 174 *trividhaḥ khalu deśaḥ- jāṅgalaḥ, anūpaḥ sādharmaṇaśceti*. CS, Ka, I. 8.
- 175 AH, Su, I. 23.

## Chapter - IV

### SELF (*puruṣa*)

It has been stated, “With out question, the best reason for studying *biology* is the admonition inscribed on the ancient temple of Apollo at Delphi: ‘Know thyself’. To know ourselves well, especially in the brilliant season of advance in the science of biology, we must examine all of life and life itself.”<sup>1</sup> This assertion is true not only of the biological science but also of every branch of learning which aims at the well-being of man. But the query still remains as to whether the science of biology or any other sciences of western origin, with their external methods of knowing, were able to discern the real nature of man.

The history of science shows that it has tried to identify man with his physical and physiological identity, rather ignoring his deeper and far reaching spiritual identity. Science hasn't yet succeeded in giving a “satisfactory if not true explanation”<sup>2</sup> of human-being in his totality. That is, science has failed to give an explanation taking into account not only the immediate physical and physiological aspects, but also their dialectical interactions with reference to the spiritual entity underlying it. This is an error that the scientists have committed due to their adherence to an alien objective method.<sup>3</sup> The normal method of Science is such that its dealings

with the visible world and the process of life were not wholly adapted to the physical, the artistic, the spiritual and other elements of the invisible world. Life does not consist entirely of what we see and hear and feel. The visible world which is undergoing change in time and space is continually touching an invisible world, possibly more stable or equally changeable elements which can in no way be ignored.

The basic reason is that science does not undertake the study of the complete man. Another thing is that science itself is compartmentalized into separate disciplines, and hence all the aspects of enquiry do not come within the purview of a single faculty. On the contrary, they are treated as topics of specialized investigation of special sciences. However, the biologists, who are expected to give a comprehensive definition of the life principle or the spiritual entity that animates, eventually have tried to explain the life principle in terms of “mechanism”, “vitalism”, and “finalism”<sup>4</sup> but ultimately have confessed that many a biological phenomenon is still without explanation.<sup>5</sup>

This confession discloses the inadequacy of not only biology but also of all sciences. Sciences like physics and chemistry reduce man to physical and chemical constituents to a determinable pattern of materiality and explain the inner man in terms of physical and chemical laws. The assumption of even the behavioural scientists is that human beings are complexes of behavioral process, conglomeration of definite hereditary, and environmental factors and, therefore, fully accountable by means of science of behavior adopting the strategy of physics and biology.<sup>6</sup> Like physics,

biology, and chemistry, the social sciences promise to provide a complete model of man-as-a-machine, ignoring what we call the transcendental or spiritual at its core.<sup>7</sup> They have also overlooked the *êlan* of man.

Natural sciences do not try to understand the human mechanism in terms of knowing and the laws of knowledge except by way of finding out physiological correlates. For them, to explain the 'why' and 'how' of knowledge is to determine the mechanics of the humane brain, which, according to them, is nothing more than a highly complex configuration of material constituents.<sup>8</sup>

The basic shortcoming of science is that it is extrinsic and not intrinsic. With its empirical, analytical method, it is objective anchored. It hasn't yet strived to analyse and determine human events with reference to "subjectivity",<sup>9</sup> for the reality of man is deeply rooted in subjectivity. Science has also neglected the purpose and goal of life in their investigation. So the explanation of human being given by science, referring to the physical biological, and psychological phenomena, confining to the material causes would be incomplete unless and until the dialectical interaction of these phenomena and the spiritual entity underlying it are introspected with out isolating anyone of them. But it is not possible in science, because the non-material aspects of thinking, reasoning and the like are not testable experimentally.<sup>10</sup>

Another important problem is that science explains man alienating him from nature with out exploring the inter relationship of man and nature.

D.P. Chattopadhyaya has rightly remarked that, “Man’s situation in the world is such that the scientists cannot grasp the former’s true identity, ignoring his place in the world. Nor can the scientist adequately understand the world leaving man totally out of the picture”.<sup>11</sup> Thus, it implies that the external institutional methods of western sciences are insufficient and distortive and substantively frustrative of human projects that aim at our well being. Hence it is inevitable to know the real relationship between man and nature. Beyond physical, biological and psychological interpretation, an interpretation in relation to epistemology is indispensable to know the reality of man. It necessitates a philosophical consciousness. In fact, it is a philosophical enterprise. The uniqueness of the explication of the “Self”<sup>12</sup> in Carakasamhitā lies here, for it has a philosophical genealogy. On epistemological basis, Caraka uncovers the reality of man; discusses the physical, biological, and psychological aspects and their dialectical interactions; goes beyond the limits of empirical content. He analyses the rapport between man and the world beyond his nerve endings and finally describes the foundational being of ‘everything’. The whole thing is unveiled in the context of the explication of the “Self” (*puruṣa*).

The entity that transforms matter into life has been many things for many people. In the west, it was called *psyche, life principle, the soul, anima, Hlan vital, entelechy, or mystery of life*.<sup>13</sup> In India, the Sanskrit terms Brahman, *ātmā*, and *puruṣa* dominate the whole philosophical development from the Ṛgveda to the classical systems of philosophy. The word Brahman which occurs more than two hundred times in the Ṛg Veda in the sense of

prayer,<sup>14</sup> in course of time, has become the most usual name to denote the creative principle of the world and beings. Brahman<sup>15</sup> has become the ultimate reality from which all worlds proceed, in which all worlds subsist, and into which they finally return. The term *ātmā* has also become the most regularly used name in the Upaniṣads to designate the creative principle and is often identified with Brahman.<sup>16</sup> Similarly the term *puruṣa*,<sup>17</sup> which normally means mortal man or male, is an ancient one, going back to the Ṛg Veda and the Atharva Veda. In the Ṛg Veda, the word is used as a term for mortal man as well as the cosmic man.<sup>18</sup>

“In the Upaniṣads the term *puruṣa* is often used synonymously with Brahman or *ātmā*”.<sup>19</sup> The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad says that there was only the *ātmā* in the form of *puruṣa* in the beginning.<sup>20</sup> In the Mahābhārata the word *puruṣa* is used in the sense of self along with other terms like *ātmā*, *puruṣa*, *bhūtātmā*, *aḥa*, *akṣara*, *avyaya* and *kṣetrajna*,<sup>21</sup> while in classical Sāṃkhya it became the chief designator of the individual self.

According to Caraka’s cosmology, the universe is a living organism animated through out by life- monad, and this life-monad contained within and constituting the universe, is imperishable. It is something unusual that almost all significant epithets for the “Self” in pre-classical and classical philosophical systems are seen to be collected in Caraka.<sup>22</sup> Perhaps this may lead to the assumption that his concept of Self is only a fabrication on the concepts of diverse philosophical systems. The idea as such is camouflaged, for these designators have specific signification in each philosophical system.



But the fact is not so. Caraka has got his own vision of the Self. He chooses his own way of presentation of the vision in order to satisfy his pragmatic purpose. All the terms actually and essentially unveil the various dimensions at which the soul is conceived with out contradiction. At the same time, *puruṣa* is the most perfect and perhaps the best name that Caraka has found in the language to designate the life principle or the creative principle. The term gives him enough flexibility to construe ‘being’ and “beings”.<sup>23</sup> Ultimately, for him, *puruṣa* means that which remains if we take away from our physical existence all that comes and passes away., On the one hand, it means the eternal essence of man, but on the other it signifies the “Self” of the whole world that is, the Ur-ground. So, it vindicates that he has been circumspect of the fact that every attempt to explain man and the universe must proceed from the word *puruṣa*. He has found a more clear cut expression for ‘Self’ in the word *puruṣa*.

Caraka’s philosophy distinguishes three entities: (1) the foundational being, (2) the empirical world, and (3) the empirical subject. Comprehending all these three factors, he gives a three- fold division of “Self”,<sup>24</sup> namely (1) *cetanādhātupuruṣa*, (2) *caturviṃśatikapuruṣa* and (3) *ṣaḍhātujapuruṣa*.

### **The Foundational “Self” (*cetanādhātu*)**

Caraka does not regard individual selves and the world as self supporting. On the contrary, he conceives a transcendental entity as their foundational cause. This foundational “Self” is called *cetanādhātupuruṣa* . The word *cetanādhātu*, as it signifies, is not consciousness but the conscious.<sup>25</sup> Consciousness is its inherent quality or content in the unmanifested form.

Cakrapāṇi, while commending on “śloka” I.1.48, says that consciousness does not belong to the inner self in itself. It is attained only by its contact with the senses.<sup>26</sup> He is also of the opinion that in final renunciation, there happens a total irradiation of all kinds of knowledge including the ultimate knowledge leading to liberation.<sup>27</sup> Keeping in conformity with Cakrapāṇi, Dasgupta reiterates the same opinion.<sup>28</sup> Elsewhere he states that though the self is eternal, yet the rise of consciousness is occasional.<sup>29</sup> Referring to such remarks Debiprasad Cattopadhyaya opines that in modern terminology this can only mean that the spirit is a product of matter, for *prakṛti* simply means primeval matter.<sup>30</sup> Accordingly, both the scholars agree to the point that the “Self” is not consciousness. But they differ in the second point that the “Self” is conscious. S.K. Ramachandra Rao also reiterates the same opinion.<sup>31</sup> But P. V. Sharma disagrees with Dasgupta. He makes the unique opinion that Dasgupta might have been misled by the commentary of Cakrapāṇi and expresses the view that the Self is conscious and it manifests by its contact with the sense.<sup>32</sup>

The Self construed by Caraka is not without consciousness for the following reasons:

(1) “Self” is a spiritual substance (*adhyātmadravya*)<sup>33</sup> which means that it is an inherent cause of consciousness (*cetana*), but in the unmanifested form. It is this unmanifested consciousness that gets manifested in what we call *buddhi*, the empirical consciousness. If this unmanifested consciousness is denied to exist in the ‘Self’, there won’t be any logical

explanation for the way in which the *buddhi* stems up from a basic stuff which is devoid of spirituality. Perhaps the conception *buddhi* as the first evolute of the unmanifest (*avyakta*) may make us tend to think that there is no consciousness at all in the unmanifest before the emergence of the *buddhi*. But it is not true. The evolute ‘*buddhi*’ is not to be understood as pure consciousness (*cetana*). On the contrary, it is an emanation radiant with manifested consciousness capable of giving rise to ego or “I consciousness” (*ahaṃkāra*) from which the five physical elements (*pañcamahābhūtas*) evolve. So we have to admit that there exists consciousness (*cetana*) different from empirical consciousness. That is why he distinguishes between consciousness (*cetana*) and ‘*buddhi*’ on several occasions.<sup>34</sup> As far as Caraka is concerned, *buddhi* is conceived as an instrumental cause of cognition<sup>35</sup> as well as determinate cognition of the empirical self that is the knower.<sup>36</sup> Determinate cognition is the modification of *buddhi* by which the inner self becomes aware of the objective world.<sup>37</sup>

(2) The “Self” (*ātmā*), is described as a conscious agent of every creation. The Self, in particular, is being recognized as an efficient cause or agent of the creation of the body. On the basis of this, it has been concluded that there must be a conscious agent essential for the creation, in the same way as an agent is needed for the construction of a pot or a house. Caraka calls them ignorant persons devoid of rational outlook and scriptural knowledge and who deny the existence of such a conscious agent.<sup>38</sup>

(3) Even if, for the sake of argument, the first assertion of Cakrapāṇi is admitted to have been made of the empirical self, then also it is not true.

The empirical self is not without the mind at any time and hence there is always consciousness in the empirical self.<sup>39</sup> Even the self in the subtle body that transmigrates is transcendental and is not without consciousness.<sup>40</sup> It is a fact that there disappears consciousness in the final freedom as has been pointed out by Cakrapāṇi. But it is not a total eradication. On the contrary, it is the disappearance of the transient, empirical consciousness having subjectivity (*saviṣayakajñāna*). The formless consciousness (*nirviṣayakajñāna*) inherent in the “Self” still remains there. Caraka says that in the final freedom all ephemeral experiences; determinate and differential cognitions having name gets eradicated and attain the state of Brahman.<sup>41</sup> But the important thing to be noted in this context is that the knowledge specified is the knowledge having a name (*sasaṃjñājñāna*). It connotes only the empirical knowledge or awareness having name and form (*sākārajñāna*) and not the formless and nameless consciousness (*nirākārajñāna*).

(4) If the consciousness is denied to exist in the “Self”, as has been asserted by Cakrapāṇi, then the “Self” would become a bare substance which makes it nothing different from the physical substances. Moreover the consciousness that is being told of (in 1.1.56) as emerging by the contact of the “Self” with the mind, sense capacities, and objects of senses refer only to the determinate cognition; the cognition having objectivity (*saviṣayakajñāna*) that arises in the empirical subject.

(5) Caraka himself has clearly stated that the self is *jñah* (processing consciousness) and the consciousness of the self is manifested in empirical

consciousness when the self is in contact with the instruments of knowledge. If the instruments of cognition are impeded, cognition will be generated in the same way as a mirror or water covered with impurities is unable to reflect an image.<sup>42</sup> What is implied is that there is always consciousness in the “Self” which is formless (*nirākāra*). This formless consciousness, at the empirical level, attains form and name when objects are presented to it by the contact of instruments of knowledge.

(6) The interpretation of *śloka* 1.1.6 given by Cakrapāṇi is not tenable. The intended meaning of the *śloka* is that the unchanging eternal “Self”, which is the substantial cause of consciousness, observes all actions when it is in contact with mind and sense organs characterised by the qualities of the physical elements. Accordingly, the “Self” is the soul cause of consciousness and nothing else. Matter cannot develop life or consciousness as the materialists hold, unless it has those potentialities. As far as the sense capacities are concerned, they take part as instruments in cognition. Thus, the “Self” being the substantial cause of consciousness, we have to admit that there inheres in the Self, consciousness in the unmanifested form, that is, *nirākārajñāna* which gives rise to the empirical consciousness.

(7) Caraka has specifically and purposefully used the epithet *saguṇāścetana* for the inner self, which means that the self, which is naturally conscious, is further stated as endowed with empirical qualities (like pleasure and pain).<sup>43</sup>

(8) Above all he emphatically declares that the “Self” (*ātman*) is conscious (*jñāḥ*) and the primordial cause (*prakṛti*).<sup>44</sup> That is, the “Self”

(Brahman/*ātmā*) is the agent of all creations, and so he is the one who knows because one who is devoid of knowledge cannot become an agent.

To conclude, the “Self”, being conscious, is the efficient cause- (*nimittakāraṇa*) and being *prakṛti*, is also the substantial cause- (*samavāyikāraṇa*). To be precise, “Self” is the ‘conscious foundational being’ (*sat*) and is with out a beginning. All other things are not with out a cause and so they are ephemeral.<sup>45</sup> It is the ultimate eternal ‘being’ beyond thought and cognition upon which all things are based.<sup>46</sup> It is static (*nirvikāra*) and ubiquitous (*vibhu*).

Now it is quite natural to have the question as to how the unchanging eternal “Self” can become the substantial cause of the transient world. It is to explain this with out contradiction that Caraka often calls the “Self” by the unique epithets “unmanifest” (*avyakta*) and the indistructible.<sup>47</sup> This concept of the ‘Self’ provides the key to understand the real sense of the conception of the foundational “Self”. The “unmanifest” represents the conscious “Self” enveloped by the two adjuncts, *rajas* and *tamas*.<sup>48</sup> Because of the presence of these adjuncts, the ultimate reality is simultaneously static and dynamic, It is this unmanifest that forms the ultimate ground of the whole universe. At the same time, it itself is self-existent and self revealing, for there is no other element from which it could be derived or by which it could be made known. The empirical world and the individual selves, according to this view, emerge from this unmanifest and therefore necessarily partake of its character of reality. The presence of the adjuncts,

namely ‘*rajas*’ and ‘*tamas*’ make the “Self” complex, and thus becomes the foundational cause of the universe. Due to the complexity it sometimes manifests and at other times becomes latent as a real possibility.<sup>49</sup> This periodic evolution is called appearance- *udaya* and the later dissolution is called disappearance (*pralaya*).<sup>50</sup> The process of *udaya* and *pralaya* is without a beginning and so an endless one. At the end of each cycle, the empirical world of diversity returns to the “unmanifest”, but re-emerges from it again. The world of appearance thus emerges is called the “manifest”. Each succeeding universe is determined in its character by the preceding one by a kind of casual linkage.

Thus, it is the *avyakta* that accounts for the whole world and individual selves. The unique aspect of this conviction is that the world of diversity is real and that there is a unity underlying this diversity. The unitary principle underlying the unity is the foundational being (*cetanādhātu*). It is this non-dual, all-pervading conscious “Self” (*cetanādhātu*) that is immanent in all beings as their inner ground. There is no distinction between the foundational and the inner self. That is why he consciously calls it simultaneously by the terms Brahman and *jīva* or *antarātmā*.<sup>51</sup> It is the essence of the world and our own essence. It is the foundation, the ultimate reality (*sat*). The logical idea of cause cannot be sundered from the ethical concept of purpose. The process of nature and the well-being of man can be explained only as the self-actualization of the divine will. The supreme “Self” as the *sat* is unique and wills the many. The *sat* becomes the manifold

visible world. The purpose of the cosmic process is to provide opportunity for the '*jīva*' to realize it's divine destiny.

Caraka's metaphysical conception becomes more transparent in his refutation of the atheists.

Caraka, who is not accustomed to refuting the other systems of thought, is found to have reacted strongly against the Cārvākas and the Buddhists, who go against the theory of the existence of the eternal "Self". Referring to Cārvākas he says that there are the atheist (*nāstikas*) who do not trust in verification or verifiability of objects; who do not believe in the existence of a substantial or material cause, gods, sages, spiritually perfected persons (*siddhas*), action and its results, and soul; who consider that origination is accidental. Such atheists will be caught hold of by sins worse than that of the sin resulting from violence.<sup>52</sup>

Similarly he rebuts the Buddhists who do not believe in the existence of an eternal soul. Instead of difference and diversity and instead of eternalism and annihilationism the Buddha uses depended origination in the sense of causal dependence.<sup>53</sup> According to the theory all elements of *saṃsāra* exist in some or other causal conditions. Everything is in a flux, for if the cause is permanent so will be the effect.<sup>54</sup> "Existence for the Buddhist is momentary (*kṣaṇika*), thing in itself (*svalakṣaṇa*) and unitary (*dharmamātra*)".<sup>55</sup> Consequently, the putative self occurs as a result of the coming together of causal conditions. And so it could not be unchanging. Thus, there is no immutable, inner self which is conscious or consciousness.



Consciousness is nothing but the flow of sensory experience.<sup>56</sup> Moreover, through out life there is constant change in accordance with the causal law and process. The relation between the different stages of a person's is neither identity nor difference.<sup>57</sup>

Caraka invokes this momentary theory<sup>58</sup> and repudiates it. He says that if the theory is admitted then we would be forced to accept that the fruits of action of one person will be enjoyed by some other person.<sup>59</sup>

Though Caraka endorses the self in the enumeration of substance and consider it as conscious in consonance with the Vaiśeṣika scheme of substance, his concept of "Self" is entirely different from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. Neither Kaṇāda nor Akṣapāda<sup>60</sup> recognizes a supreme Self (*paramātmā* or Brahman).<sup>61</sup> However, later thinkers construe a supreme Self. But this supreme "Self" is different from the individual selves. The first work in the Nyāya system which contains a description of a divine soul called (God) is Nyāyabhāṣya. There it is stated that God is a special "Self" in whom there is no demerit (*adharma*), no error (*mithyājñāna*) and no negligence (*pramāda*). The notable characteristic feature of God is that it possesses knowledge, concentration (*samādhi*), merit (*dharma*) and omnipotence (*aiśvariya*).<sup>62</sup> Praśastapāda clearly attributes the creation of the world to the will of God<sup>63</sup> and it has been acknowledged by almost all later thinkers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. They consider the self as the substratum of consciousness and distinguish between the supreme "Self" (*paramātmā*) and individual self (*jīvātmā*).<sup>64</sup> The Supreme

“Self” (*paramātmā*) is God who is entirely different from the individual self and is only an efficient cause or creator of the world.<sup>65</sup> The God is in no way the foundational cause of the world.

Another important thing is that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers define self as a substance comprised having the universal *ātmatva*<sup>66</sup> and consider the individual selves as many,<sup>67</sup> eternal, and all-pervading.<sup>68</sup> Even though the individual selves are told as ubiquitous, the very disparity in the circumstances characterising the lives of beings is regarded as an index to the fundamental distinction between the individual selves.<sup>69</sup>

There is no contradiction in describing selves as all-pervading and yet exclusive, since they are not physical entities. But the most striking point is that the difference of the individual selves, being intrinsic, continues even in the state of release. Though all other differences between any two selves disappear when both have released, there will be the *viśeṣa* then, as in the case of atoms, to distinguish them from each other.<sup>70</sup> This conception of innumerable individual self different from the higher Self (*paramātmā*) is also against the conception of the empirical self in Caraka.

In classical Sāṃkhya, the self is referred to by the word *puruṣa*. Unlike Caraka *puruṣa* construed here refers to the individual self only. These individual selves are innumerable in number.<sup>71</sup> Each individual self is conceived as an unrelated, featureless, eternal, ubiquitous being and is identical with consciousness. Beyond the individual selves they do not admit a divine non-dual “Self” as a substantial cause or as an efficient cause

for the manifestation of the empirical world. As stated earlier, the world is a manifestation of the primordial matter (*prakṛti*) which is extremely different from the selves (*puruṣas*). To be precise the concept of *puruṣa* in Carakasamhitā is different from that of classical Sāṃkhya . At the same time, it should be noted that the pre-classical Sāṃkhya conceived Brahman as the foundational cause of the universe. Scholars like Durgāśaṅkara Śāstrī and Jotiścandra Saraswatī are of the opinion that the nature of “Self” as expounded by Caraka identifying it with the unmanifest is undoubtedly Upanisadic in significance.<sup>72</sup> It is not other than the Vedantins and the pre-classical Sāṃkhya who strongly speak of Brahman as the foundational Self. But it does not mean that Caraka’s conception of “being” fully agrees with the teachings of the Upaniṣads or the Advaita-Vedānta. The Upaniṣads, though speak of the unity of ‘being’, sometimes distinguish Brahman from the individual self on the one hand and the physical universe on the other.<sup>73</sup> Another significant thing is that Brahman as in the Upaniṣads is pure consciousness.<sup>74</sup>

*Puruṣa* or Brahman, as construed by Caraka, is the all pervading essence, that is, the essence which permeated the object in all its form and changes. Accordingly, the omniscient and omnipotent Brahman is the source or the foundational cause from which occur the birth, continuance, growth, transformation, decay, and death. But it should not be equated with the concept of Brahman in Advaita-Vedānta, for it considers this world as illusion (*māya*).<sup>75</sup> For Caraka, the world is not an illusion (*māya*) but a reality. *Puruṣa* is the ultimate “being”. It is the prime substance (*sat*) of

everything as well as the creator who wills the world into existence. In the Vedāntic terminology *puruṣa* is simultaneously the substantial and the efficient cause or ‘*abhinnanimittopadanakaraṇa*’ of the world. The origin of the world is a result of evolution ( *pariṇāma*) and not *vivarta* as has been postulated by the Advaita-Vedāntins. The basic difference between evolution and *vivarta* is that the former is a real transition while the latter is an unreal one.<sup>76</sup> Accordingly, for Caraka the relation between the universal “Self” and the world can be ‘identity in difference’ (*bhedābheda*).<sup>77</sup>

Thus Caraka, though agrees with the Vedāntins who call it Brahman, says that the foundational principle of unity differs in his vision regarding its real nature. According to him, *cetanādhātu-puruṣa* or Brahman is the fundamental principle of unity. It is not pure consciousness nor without consciousness, but conscious. The peculiar way of the description of the conscious *puruṣa* as the foundation of the world of diversity and the origin of the world as a real manifestation of the “unmanifest” differentiates Caraka’s concept of “Self” from the conceptions of Self in other philosophical systems.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 BLS, p.3
- 2 Truth and satisfaction are not interchangeable notions. “A view or theory of the world may be satisfactory with out being true. Or it may be true with out being satisfactory”. KFL, p.2.
- 3 See Ibid. p.163
- 4 According to mechanism, life is explained in terms of physical and chemical laws. According to vitalism, living substance differ fundamentally from non-living substance. Its processes are not reducible to the mere interactions of material components as the advocates of mechanism claimed. Life is something beyond the reach of science. Finalism holds that life has a preordained pattern that was purposefully directed towards a future goal. Although vitalism and finalism differ, they both hold the view that life is intrinsically beyond explanation. See BLS, p.26
- 5 Ibid., p. 27.
- 6 Ramakant Sinari, “The World as the Ontological Project of Man”, PIP, p.203; see also Beyond Freedom and Dignity, B. F. Skinner, pp.180-81
- 7 Ibid., p. 203.
- 8 Ibid, p.201-02.
- 9 Subjectivity refers to the core of human existence or the inner self which is responsible for thoughts, happiness, pain, desire, and aversion.

- 10 “A scientific explanation must be testable experimentally, but *êlan vital* is unobservable”. BLS, p. 26.
- 11 KFL, p. 14.
- 12 Loc. city., F. Note. 23, p. 187.
- 13 Life, p. 26.
- 14 PD, p. 19.
- 15 “The root *br̥ḥ* (*br̥ḥ vṛddhau*) means growth, and the the suffix *man*, added to it, signifies an absence of limitation (in expanse). So Brahman derivatively means that which is absolutely the greatest”. Braḥma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya of Śri Śaṅkara, English Trns. by Swami Gaṃbhirananda, Advaita Ashrama, Culcutta, Fifth Impression, 1993, F. Notes, p.12; See also AK, Vol. II, Vivṛti on III. iii. 114.
- 16 PD, p. 20
- 17 Etymologically *puruṣa* means the one who dwells in the body: “*purī dehe śedati tiṣṭati iti puruṣaḥ*”, See ibid, Vivṛti on AK, I. iv, 29.
- 18 RV, 10.97, 4-5; 10.90.
- 19 15. The word *ātmā* is derived from the root “*ad bhakṣaṇe*” and it means that one who one who enjoys the auspicious and inauspicious. Another derivation is from the root “*ata sātatyagamane*” which means one who dwells in bodies: “*atati śarīreṣu saṃvasatīti va*”. See AK, Vol. I, I. iv. 29. Yāska has used it in the sense of limitless expanse: “*ātmā atatervyāptervāpi vāpta iva syādyāvad vyāptibhūta iti*”. Nirukta, III. iii, p. 28.
- 20 Br. U., I. IV. 1; II. i. 9, 12. i. 8, 9, 12. Ch. U., VIII, vii. 4.

- 21 MB, *Mokṣa*, 199. 27; 178.4; 175. 11.
- 22 *tatra pūrvam cetanādhātuḥ sattvakaraṇo guṇagrahaṇāyā pravartate; sa hi hetuḥ kāraṇaṃ nimittamakṣaraṃ kartā mantā veditā boddhā draṣṭmā dhātā brahmā viśvakarmā viśvarūpaḥ puruṣaḥ prabhavo avyayo nityo guṇī grahaṇaṃ pradhānamavyaktaṃ jīvo jñāḥ pudgalaścetanāvān vibhurbhūtātmā cāntarātmā ceti*. CS, Sa, IV. 8. It is recognized as the sixth substance and there it is called *ātmā*, CS, Su, I. 48.
- 23 In CS the word *puruṣa* is used in the senses human being, male, inner self and the foundational “Self” or ultimate reality (Brahman).
- 24 The term “Self” with the capitalized “S” refers to the foundational self and with small “s” refers to the empirical self, because the word *puruṣa* is used by Caraka stands for both the foundational Self, and the empirically bound self.
- 25 Elsewhere it is stated as “*cetanavan*”, CS, Sa, I. 76.
- 26 “*idameva cātmanaścetanatvaṃ, yadindryasaṃyoge sati jñānasālītvam, na kevalasyātmanaśetantvaṃ*”. Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, I. 48.
- 27 “*tattvajñānamapi hi mokṣaṃ janayitva nivartata eva kāraṇābhāvāt*”. Cakrapāṇi on CS, Sa, I. 154.
- 28 “The self in itself is with out consciousness. Conciseness can only come to it through its connection with the sense organs and *manas*”. HIPS, Vol. I. p. 214.
- 29 See *Ibid.*, Vol. II. p. 368.

- 30 Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, *what is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy*, People,s Publication House, (First edn.1976) New Delhi, Third edn. 1993, p. 417.
- 31 “In its transcendental aspect there is no consciousness. Consciousness is a quality that emerges incidental to the involvement of ‘Self’ in the phenomenal mass”. DO, p. 23-24.
- 32 PVS, p. 165.
- 33 “*mano mano’rtho buddhirātmā cetyāddhyātmādravyasaṅgrahaḥ*”. CS, Su, VIII. 13.
- 34 “.....*prayatnaścetanā dhṛtiḥ buddhiḥ smṛtīhetu*.....”, CS, Sa, I. 72. *cetana* and *buddhi* are referred to distinctly in this articulation.
- 35 “*karaṇāni mano buddhirbuddhikarmendriyāni ca*”. Ibid., 56;
- 36 “*jāyate tatra yā buddhirniścayātmika*”. Ibid., 23.
- 37 CS, Sa, I. 23.
- 38 Ibid., 43 - 44.
- 39 “*na cātmā satsvindriyeṣu jñāḥ, asatsu vā bhavatyjñāḥ, na hyasatvaḥ kadaācidātmā, sattvaviśeṣāccopalabhyate jñānaviśeṣa iti*”. CS, Sa, III. 18.
- 40 Ibid., II. 31, 35.
- 41 *tasmin caramasanyāse samūlāḥ sarvavedanāḥ sasaṃjñājnānavi-jñānā nivṛttiṃ yāntyāśeṣataḥ*. Ibid., I., 154. There are different versions for the word ‘*sasañjnājnāna*’. Another reading is ‘*samajñājnānavijnāna*’, CSJ, Vol. III, p.1560. Dasgupta accepts the



reading ‘*asaṃjñājñāna*’. HIPS Vol. I, p. 215, F. Notes. It may be noted that the word *sañjnāna* is used in the Aitareya Upaniṣad in the sense of determinate knowledge, See CHI, Vol. III, p. 508. However the expression “*saṃjñājñānavijñāna*” is reliable, for he has previously used it in *Nidānasthāna* while defining insanity. “*unmādaṃ punarmano buddhisamjñājñānasmṛti.....*”, CS, Ni, VII. 5.

42 CS, Sa, I. 54-55.

43 CS, Su, XXX, 4.

44 *tasmājñāḥ prakṛtiścātmā drṣṭā kāraṇameva ca*, CS, Sa, III. 25.

45 CS, Sa, I. 59.

46 *tadeva bhāvādagrāhyaṃ nityatvaṃ na kutaścana, bhāvājñeyam tadavyaktamacintyaṃ vyaktamanyathā*. Ibid., 60. According to Caraka eternity means the one with out a cause, See Ibid., 59.

47 *avyaktamātmā kṣetrajaḥ śāśvato vibhuravyayaḥ*, CS, Sa, I, 61.

48 See Ibid., 68. It invokes SAS, I; V. 55.

49 *avyaktādvaktatām yāti vyaktādvaktatām punaḥ*, CS, Ibid., 67.

50 Ibid., 69.

51 Loc. cit., F. Note, 22.

52 “*na parīkṣā na parīkṣyaṃ na kartā karaṇaṃ na ca na devā naṣayaḥ siddhāḥ karma karmaphalaṃ na ca nāstikasyāsti naivātmā yadṛcchopahatātmanaḥ pātakebhyaḥ paraṃ caitat pātaḥ nāstikagrahaḥ*”, CS, Su, XI. 14-15.

According to Cārvākas, life and consciousness are the products of the combination of the four material elements just as the power of

intoxication (*madaśakti*) generated in molasses: “*tatra pṛthivyādīni bhūtāni catvāri tattvāni. tebhyaḥ eva dehakaraṇapariṇatebhyo madasaktivaccaitanya - mupajayate*”, SDSM, p. 2. SDS, p. 108; A theory of Cārvākas as as being narrated by Jaavaala in Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhya, sarga.108, 15.

53 BT, p. 66. The usual Sanskrit word used for depended origination is: *pratītyāsamutpāda*. (*paṭiccasamutpāda* in Pāli). Caraka refers to its promulgators by the term “*pāraṃparyasamuddhitā*”.

54 Ibid, p. 64.

55 SIT, p. 1.

56 BT, p. 62.

57 SIT. p. 70.

58 *na te tadsadrśāstvanye pāraṃparyasamuddhitāḥ sārūpyādye ta eveti nirdeśyante navā navāḥ bhāvāsteṣāṃ samudayo nirīśaḥ saṃjakaḥ kartā bhoktā na sa pumāniti kecidvyavasthitāḥ*, CS, Sa, I. 46 - 47.

59 Ibid. 48.

60 “The tradition unanimously names Akṣapāda, Gotama (also called Gautama) as the founder of Nyāya-sūtras”. WM, Vol. III, p. 559. In the present work it is the name Akṣapāda is used since all scholars have unanimously accepted him as the author of the now available Nyāya-sūtras.

61 There is a casual reference of God in the Nyāya-sūtras.

62 “*guṇaviśiṣṭamātmāntaramīśvaraḥ.... adharmamithyajñāna-pramādahānyā dharmajñānasampadā.... saṅkalpānuvidhāyī cāsyā dharmāḥ*”, Vātsyāyana on NS, IV, I. 2, N.Bh, p. 154.

- 63 PBNK, p.127; see *Nyāyakandalī* on ibid.
- 64 TSA, p.12; T.Bh, p.160; TSA p. 12. SP, p. 23;
- 65 NSMK pp. 22- 32, 169, “*tatreśvaraḥ sarvajñaḥ paramātmāika eva*”, TSA, p. 12; Also see *Dīpikā* on it; SP, p. 23
- 66 “*ātmātvabhisambandhādātmā*”, PBNK, p. 167; *ātmātvamanyavān buddhiguṇāśraya ātmā*, SP, p. 51; NSMK, pp.156-57; T.Bh, p. 190.
- 67 *vyavasthāto nānā*, VS, III, ii. 20; “*nānatmano vyavasthātaḥ*” *iti vacanena pṛthaktvaṃ siddhaṃ*, *Nyāyakandalī*, PBNK, p213; NSMK; *prati śarīraṃ bhinnāḥ*, T.Bh, p. 190.
- 68 *vibhavavān mahānākāśastathā cātmā*, V5,VII. I. 22; “*jivātmā pratisariraṃ bhinno vibhurnityaśca*” TSA, p.12.
- 69 EIP, p. 91.
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 SK, 18; STK, p. 163.
- 72 CSG, Vol. I, p. 480.
- 73 The aspect of unity is declared in the great utterance “*tatvamasī*”, Ch. U, VI. viii,7; VI. ii, 1; Ai. U, I. i. 1. The following text declares the difference - Sv. U., IV. 6.
- 74 “*satyaṃ jñānāmanantaṃ Brahma*”; *Ta. u., Brahmānandavalli; 2; “prajñānaṃ Brahma*”, Ai. U., III. i. 3.
- 75 Brahman is the absolute, devoid of all determination, and the empirical world is enveloped in cosmic illusion, which claims to be true, but is not really true. The manifold world is only the making of *māya*.

*Māya* is a falsity, but yet it may appear to be fact satisfying certain practical needs. Thus the unreal world appears to be real and have pragmatic value. But the claim that the world of appearance is a truth becomes absolutely false like the flower in the sky when it refers to the self evidencing absolute'. The Philosophy of Bhedabheda, P.N. Srinivasachari, pp. 52 - 53.

76. The doctrine of causality in Advaita-Vedānta is called 'vivarta'. *tathā hi kecidāhuḥ asataḥ satajāyata iti 'ekasya sato vivartaḥ....., sataḥ sat jāyate iti vṛddhāḥ'*. STK, p. 86; "yastāttviko'nyathābhāvaḥ parinamaḥ udīritaḥ atāttviko'nyathābhāvō vivarta sa udīritaḥ", F. notes on ibid; p. 87; For details see Śri Śaṅkara on Br. Su, II, i, 14, Br. Bh, pp. 196 - 202.
- 77 Bhaskarācārya, the commentator of Br.-Su has promulgated the philosophy of identity in difference (*bhedābheda*). He says that "sa cābhinnābhinnarūpo abhinnarūpaṃ svābhāvikaṃ aupādhikaṃ tu bhinnarūpaṃ", Brahma-sūtra with the commentary of Bhāskarācārya, ed., Pt. Vindhyeśvarī Prasād Dvivedin, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, Second edn. 1991, p. 141.

## Chapter - V

### THE COMPLETE MAN

#### Composite man (*rāśi puruṣa*)

“Conceptual scrutiny and experimental findings reveal that man simultaneously belongs to at least three worlds -- Physical World, Psychological World, and Ideational or Spiritual World”.<sup>1</sup> It is significant that Caraka uncovers this idea when he says that Man is a composite form of physical, mental and spiritual factors.<sup>2</sup> It also reminds us that they are not autonomous. On the contrary, there is a causal nexus which binds them together. It is with this view point that Caraka construes a composite man (*rāśi puruṣa*) in contradistinction to the foundational “Self”. Patañjali presumes that the word *rāśi* is derived from the root “*rāś*”, though it is not found in the *dhātupāṭha*. It means a compound or that in which several things are bound together.<sup>3</sup> The term *rāśipurūṣa*, thus, literally means composite-person. Though it refers to all living-beings, it connotes the empirical subject, man. So, what we call man is a conglomeration, a gestalt, a configuration -- a pattern composed of discrete but interrelated items.<sup>4</sup> The constituents that go to make up the configuration are twenty-four in number and so it is called *caturviṃśatikapuruṣa*.<sup>5</sup> They fall into two groups comprising of eight primary entities called (*aṣṭapraṅkti*) and sixteen

secondary elements called evolutes (*vikāras*). Of them, the first group consists of the unmanifest (*avyakta*), empirical consciousness (*buddhi*), “I Consciousness” (*ahaṁkāra*), and five physical elements (*pañcamahābhūtas*).<sup>6</sup> The second group includes mind, five sense capacities of cognition, five sense organs of action, and five objects of senses.<sup>7</sup> It is the body-mind complex in which the self partaking of the nature of spirit is conceived as an inner co-ordinator and controller.<sup>8</sup> Thus the conscious inner self is the “spiritual world”. The psychological world comprises of the awareness, “I Consciousness”, and mind. The physical world is constituted by the body which is a make up of five physical elements, ten sense capacities, and the five objects of senses. Accordingly, human-being is a unique phenomenon in which all the entities are organized meaningfully and purposefully. It is this empirical subject that knows, performs actions, and feels pleasure and pain.

Pulinbihari Chakravarti opines that it is better to treat composite man (*rāśīpuruṣa*) as a dead body which is also devoid of consciousnesses.<sup>9</sup> However, it is absurd. Even though Caraka speaks of the different dimensions of *puruṣa*, the centerpiece of all his discussions is human constitution, because it is the frame of reference of all medical speculations and object of treatment.<sup>10</sup> The object of treatment, in fact, is man who is sentient and not a dead body. Even the other two divisions of *puruṣa* construed are also with the intention of bringing about a complete exposition of the living man -- his essence or the *êlan vital*, his internal and external environment, and their *interrelationship*. He was fully conscious of the fact that theories

regarding therapeutics based on biological and psychological explanations would be distortive with out referring to the permanent entity that sustains the continuity and identity of the psycho-somatic complex which is in an incessant flux. It is in this composite man that the actions, the fruits of actions, knowledge, delusion, pleasure, pain, life, death, and ownership occur.<sup>11</sup> Caraka declares that one who is conversant with the human constitution with all its implications knows treatment.<sup>12</sup> So, *rāśīpuruṣa* does not refer to a dead body, but to the living man. Truly speaking, the inner self that animates man is implicit in the unmanifest which forms the first among the twenty-four constituents. Caraka emphatically says that if we deny the inner self, then the sentient would remain with out the divine (*īśa*).<sup>13</sup>

The inner self (*antarātmā*), as has been stated earlier, is conscious. The empirical consciousness or knowledge is called *buddhi*. This consciousness becomes active when there is the contact with the instruments of knowledge.<sup>14</sup> The self renders the other constituents organised, integrated, and sentient. It is the supreme upholder or the one who bears all the entities that constitute the *rāśīpuruṣa* to form a phenomenological unity making it enlivened.<sup>15</sup> The body and the instruments of knowledge are in a fleeting flux. So there should be a permanent entity to act and enjoy the fruit of its actions. Otherwise the doer won't enjoy the fruits of their actions.<sup>16</sup> This substantial cause is nothing but the inner self. Being eternal, it is able to unite itself with its past and future experiences. If the self were not static and eternal, it could not unite itself with all its past experiences. Though

ubiquitous, apprehension of the objective world is restricted to the objects with which the sense organs can establish tactile contact.<sup>17</sup> This is due to the limitation caused by the adjuncts, namely body and sense organs. The individual self is called by a peculiar term “field knower” (*kṣetrajñā*) and the psycho-somatic complex including the objects of senses as “field” (*kṣetra*).<sup>18</sup> In fact, everything other than the self is a field wherein the body, mind, “I consciousness”, senses, and the elements operate as forces. All dimensions of experience are to be located in this field and are explained as due to the operation of the field forces.<sup>19</sup> While the continuity and uniqueness of the field which is in a ceaseless change is retained until the inner self is involved in it.

The inner self is not different in distinct individual organisms. But it is one and the same unchanging higher “Self” (*paramātmā*). The difference is due the peculiarities of the stationed adjunct (*upādhi*), that is, the psycho-somatic complex. The actions and experiences like pleasure and pain also differ according to this difference.<sup>20</sup> The experiences are owned by the inner self. Since the body- mind- sense complex is illumined by the consciousness of the inner self (*antarātmā*), they serve as sites of all experiences, desire, and the like.<sup>21</sup> Pleasure, pain and all their ramifications arise only when there occurs the self-mind - sense - object contact.<sup>22</sup> The entire body-mind complex becomes aglow with consciousness of the inner self. Thus, the phenomenal self becomes aware of the world outside and feelings within, because of the involvements of sense organs and mind.<sup>23</sup>



## Proof for the existence of the inner self

If the foundational “Self” is beyond thought and cognition, Caraka holds that the empirical self can be inferred on the basis of the following proofs. It can be inferred on the ground that there must be an entity apart from the ephemeral physical modifications responsible for “I consciousness”, action, enjoyment of fruit of action, transmigration, and memory.

Caraka, further, gives a long list of signs as proofs for the existence of self: (1) The ascending and the descending life breath (*prāṇāpānau*), (2) twinkling of the eye (*nimeṣādyāḥ*), (3) life (*jīvanam*), (4) movement of the mind (*manaso gatiḥ*), (5) shift from sense to sense in cognition and action (*indriyāntarasancārah*), (6) mobility and stability (*preraṇam dhāranam*) (7) journey to the other world in dream (*deśāntaragatiḥ svapne*), (8) anticipation of death (*pañcatvagrahaṇam*) (9) recognition of an object by the left eye that has been perceived by the right eye (*dr̥ṣṭasya dakṣiṇenākṣṇā savyenāvagama*), and (10) desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveśaḥ*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), volition (*prayatna*), consciousness (*cetana*), stability (*dhṛti*), knowledge (*buddhi*), memory (*smṛti*) as well as “I consciousness” (*ahaṃkāra*).<sup>24</sup>

The most striking point in this respect is that the indicators mentioned above are employed by both Kaṇāda in his Vaiśeṣika-sūtra<sup>25</sup> and Akṣapāda in his Nyāya-sūtra<sup>26</sup> to establish the existence of the inner self with certain minor differences. Both of them mainly avoid the indicators of the journey

to the other world and anticipation of death. However, things like the journey to the otherworld and anticipation of death cannot be taken into consideration as proofs for the existence of the self, for such things are to be established by further reasoning. Signs like desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, and pain are the commonly accepted proofs.

### **Man as a constitution of six elements (*ṣaḍdhātujapuruṣa*)**

It is something peculiar that Caraka construes a third division of *puruṣa* called *ṣaḍdhātujapuruṣa*. In no other philosophical systems or sciences, we come across such a third division. So it is quite natural to have the question, what does it actually refer to?

*Ṣaḍdhātujapuruṣa* is a constitution of six elements, namely the self and the five physical elements<sup>27</sup>. As a matter of fact, *ṣaḍdhātujapuruṣa* is the very same *rāśipuruṣa*. The constituents other than the six mentioned above as the constituents of *rāśipuruṣa* are only further emanations from the physical elements. Suśruta also describes man in a similar manner. Accordingly, human being, the object of therapeutics, is a constitution of the very same six elements. Suśruta calls it by the name *karmapuruṣa*.<sup>28</sup> Taking into account of the similarity of both *ṣaḍdhātujapuruṣa* of Caraka and *karmapuruṣa* of Suśruta S.K. Ramachandra Rao makes the following observations:

“The individual person, who is essentially dynamic and is a product of transaction, is known in Āyurveda by two expressions: *karmapuruṣa* (Suśruta) and *saṃyogipuruṣa* (Caraka). The former

word emphasizes the activity aspect, while the latter, the integrational aspect. Both words bring out the phenomenological, transactional, and dynamic characters of the individual”.<sup>29</sup>

Now the problem becomes crucial. If *rāśīpuruṣa* and *ṣaḍdharujapuruṣa* refer to one and the same entity, particularly man, then it is essential to make clear the purpose behind considering it as one among the three divisions of *puruṣa*. In this connection Cakrapāṇi, says that *ṣaḍdhātuajapuruṣa* is construed in conformity with Vaiśeṣikadarśana<sup>30</sup> and *rāśīpuruṣa* in conformity with Sāṃkhya darśana.<sup>31</sup> He arrives at this conclusion because Caraka himself has stated that *ṣaḍdhātuajapuruṣa* is the very same *rāśīpuruṣa* described by the early Sāṃkhya. But it is not true because of the following reasons.

- (1) Caraka nowhere else speaks of his concept of self or of the empirical subject as belonging to that of Vaiśeṣikadarśana.
- (2) It has been conspicuously declared by Caraka that the concept of *ṣaḍdhātuajapuruṣa* goes back to the early Sāṃkhya teachers.<sup>32</sup>
- (3) Theoretically, both Vaiśeṣika and Caraka differ in their outlook regarding “being” and “becoming”. Also the concept of inner self and body are entirely different. Hence it is not logical to think that Caraka substantiates two different systems with contradictory view points.
- (4) Caraka is philosophizing not for the sake of philosophy, but for formulating the scientific principles regarding health and

therapeutics. If he is said to incorporate two contradictory concepts so as to formulate a medical treaty which calls for a high rationale, then the treaty itself would become unscientific and absurd.

All these things lead to the conclusion that there is a particular intention behind the description of *ṣaḍdhātujapuruṣa*. Unless and until the mist and veil that envelops the concept of *puruṣa* in this regard is removed, it is not possible to arrive at a conclusion regarding the philosophy of Caraka. In other words a precise understanding of *ṣaḍdhātujapuruṣa* will provide us with the key to discern the philosophical concept of Caraka and how it has been utilized as foundation for formulating a pragmatic science. Caraka, who places primacy on *ṣaḍdhātujapuruṣa* while classifying, emphatically declares that the conglomeration of six elements in general, constitute the entire universe.<sup>33</sup> That is *ṣaḍdhātujapuruṣa*, on the one hand refers to man and on the other hand the world beyond his nerve endings. Thus, his intention is very clear. It is to unfold the secrets of the two fold micro-macro relationship of man and nature that he construes *ṣaḍdhātujapuruṣa*.<sup>34</sup>

Both man and universe are a constitution of the aforesaid six elements and as such they are microcosm and macrocosm. Man is an epitome of the universe.<sup>35</sup> Whatever that is present in the universe are also present in man, and vice versa.<sup>36</sup> The constituents, which the man and the universe share are innumerable. The three *doṣas* namely *vāta*, *pitta* and *kapha* uphold and sustain, and also destroy the body in the same way as the moon, the sun, and air uphold and sustain, and destroy the world.<sup>37</sup> The individual's form

corresponds to earth, wetness to water, heat to fire, vital breath to air, the innumerable openings to *ākāśa*, and the inner self to the universal Self or Brahman. Just as the grandeur Brahman in the universe, so is the inner self in man. Similarly, the various universal phenomena correspond to the phenomena in man. Thus, *Prajāpati* in the universe is represented by the splendid mind, *Indra* by “I consciousness”, *Āditya* by the process of *ādāna*, *Rudra* by anger, *Soma* by happiness, *Vasus* by pleasure, *Aśvins* by brilliance, *Maruts* by zest, *Viśvedevas* by sense organs and their objects, darkness by ignorance, light by knowledge, manifestation of the universe by the formation of embryo, *kṛta* age by childhood, *treta* age by youthhood, *dvāpara* age by old age, *kali* age by illness, and deluge by death. In the same way the one to one correspondence of all other phenomena can be inferred.<sup>38</sup> The epithets used here for the entities present in the universe are Vedic in nature and they are symbolic representations of various kinds of natural phenomena.

The external world has the same features of man. It also has consciousness and a psychosomatic complex in which all happiness, pain and the like appears. It is not easy for an ordinary person to know them. Only such persons who have sharpened their intellect by intuitive power can grasp them.

The repeated questions about the nature of *Puruṣa* and the answers to them have given a distinctive vision of man. What Caraka uncovers is that man is not simply an object among others. Man is not a mere material constitution but a constitution of the immortal divine and the mortal physical

elements. The never dying self that indwells in the perishing body as the principle of life is further identified as the foundation of the universe.

Man is conceived as a totality of realities. Man is the medium of all values, and a symbol of good and world sanctity. He is not an instrument in shaping the worldly realities, but an ideal medium to transform the world ensuring the well-being of all beings.

Thus, the knowledge promulgated by Caraka is capable of releasing man from his objective centered behaviourism. He is circumspect of the fact that the knowledge will not be complete without knowing what is divine in him. Human nature has the tendency of turning the self to lower and ephemeral exterior objects. So, Caraka redirects our attention from what is human to what is divine also. He advises us to know man by taking into consideration the deeply felt inner need of human nature. He analyses man taking into consideration every aspect of human nature, his intentions, and purpose of life which science does not tell us.

Above all, the concept of micro-macro relationship of man and the universe lies in the fact that it forms the basis of all tenets regarding treatment and management of health. It is on the basis of the discovered identical nature of the world and man and the laws governing them that the material things are applied to the biological field. When the extrinsic world comes into contact with man externally or internally, the equipoise of the *dhātus* are caused by their increase or decrease. Hence the therapeutic approach essentially becomes holistic and it contributes to the medical science.

## Body (*śarīraṃ*)

The three main synonyms frequently used in Carakasamhitā to designate the body are: *śarīra*, *kāya* and *deha*. The term *śarīra* is derived from the root “*sr*”. Its *meaning* is that which gets destroyed by the passage of time.<sup>39</sup> The word *kāya* is derived from the root “*ciñ*” and it means “to collect”. The term “to collect” here refers to the collection from food. The word *kāya* is also explained as a configuration of parts.<sup>40</sup> “By implication, it follows that *kāya* takes in food, digests, absorbs and metabolizes it. In other words, the term *kāya* means the building up of the body with food”.<sup>41</sup> The term *deha* is derived from the root “*diḥ*” which means to grow or to develop.<sup>42</sup> By implication, the term *deha* conveys the idea of underlying anabolic processes. It will be seen from the foregoing descriptions that all these three terms are expressive of the various aspects of the body its transient nature, the constitutional aspect, and also the destructive and constructive process of metabolism that occurs within the body.

Caraka says that the body is the site of the conscious self, which is formed by the transformation of the conglomeration of five gross physical elements.<sup>43</sup> With the exception of the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣikas, almost all are of the same opinion. Suśruta also admits this.<sup>44</sup> At the same time we see a modified definition of the body in both Suśruta and Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya. Accordingly, the body is a constitution of the basic elements such as *doṣa*, *dhātu*, and *mala*.<sup>45</sup> Actually these constituents refer to the physical elements transformed basically. The body and the mind together constitute the

substrata of pain or diseases and pleasure or health<sup>46</sup> which are in turn determined by the utilization of time, mental faculties, and objects of senses.<sup>47</sup>

Kaṇāda classify the ephemeral physical world into three, namely body, sense organs, and objects. But he does not give a comprehensive definition of the body. At the same time Akṣapāda places the body second in his enumeration of *prameyas* and defines it as the site of actions (*ceśṭa*), sense capacities, and objects.<sup>48</sup> Annaṃbhaṭṭa defines the body as the field of the soul's experience.<sup>49</sup> Srīdhara Bhaṭṭa also considers the body as the receptacle of the experiences of the self<sup>50</sup> The Mīmāṃsakas also agree with this definition.<sup>51</sup>

The conspicuous difference between Caraka and the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika is that Caraka construes the body as a composition of all the five physical elements while the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣikas do not accept it. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas not only decline to admit the *pāñcabhautika* nature of the body but also strongly refute the concept that the body is a combination of five physical elements. Kaṇāda argues that we will have to admit the fact that the body is imperceptible if the body is said to have been made up of five elements.<sup>52</sup> He also denies further the possibility of the body as a product of three perceptible elements (earth, water and fire) which may, perhaps, be posited in order to avoid the imperceptibility.<sup>53</sup> Another important thing to be noted in this connection is that Kaṇāda, even though refutes the *pāñcabhautika* nature of the body, does not make explicit the particular



element with which the human body is made of. At the same time, the Nyāya-Sūtra and its commentator Vātsyāyana unambiguously affirm that the human body is a product of the earth, because it possesses the specific quality (smell) of the earth<sup>54</sup>. Even though the penta-bhautic nature of the body is denied, they consider the earth as the substantial cause of the human body and the other four elements are regarded as instrumental causes (*nimittakāraṇa*).<sup>55</sup> In support of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's argument, there are certain Vedic utterances which hold that human body is a constitution of the earth alone.<sup>56</sup>

The salient feature of Caraka's conception of the *pāñcabhautika* nature of the body is that it follows a sequence as in the case of the manifestation of the five physical elements in the cosmic evolution. That is, the soul which is invariably associated with the mind first unites with *ākāśa*. Then it combines with air. In the same way, it further unites with fire, water, and earth one by one in that order and thus develops the embryo. All this happens in a very short time.<sup>157</sup>

The gross body comes into existence at the time of conception and goes out of existence at the time of death. The sentient body is the site and channel of the sense organs and mind.<sup>58</sup> When alive, the body, mind, and the sense organs together form the receptacle of all experiences of the self.<sup>59</sup> Though the body is spoken of as a conglomeration of the five physical elements, it implies all factors such as the seven *dhātus* that derive from it. When the *dhātus* like blood and flesh which are derived from the five physical elements

are normal, the body remains healthy and when they lose their normalcy disturbed by augmentation and diminution, it will result in the ill-health or destruction of the body.<sup>60</sup> The chief determinant of health or ill-health is the ingested food for it is also constituted by the five physical elements. The body is after all an outcome of food ingested in a fourfold manner, namely eaten, drunk, licked up, and masticated. Health and disease arise as a result of wholesome and unwholesome diet respectively.<sup>61</sup> The gross body comprises of innumerable atomic parts.<sup>62</sup> These atomic forms are not to be understood as the *paramāṇus* construed in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, for there in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy they are eternal ultimate particles of each one of the physical elements. The atomic parts mentioned in Caraka refer only to the biological units formed of the five elements. These atoms are in a flux. Every moment they are destroyed, and new ones are produced in their place. Thus, it seems that the body is stable and intact which is not real. It is constantly changing. Food is the material with which the reconstitution is done.

### **Subtle body**

Caraka speaks of a persistent detachable subtle body (*ātivāhikaśarīra*) constituted by four elements (air, fire, water and earth). The self, invariably associated with the mind and the subtle body, is capable of transmigration and rebirth. Being associated with the past actions, the self transmigrates from body to body due to the motion of the mind.<sup>63</sup> *Ākāśa* is not referred to here in this group that constitutes the transmigrating subtle body because it

is immobile.<sup>64</sup> Though the subtle body transmigrates, the physical elements of the subtle body do not contribute to the essential features of the gross body.<sup>65</sup> The factors that are responsible for the general features are (1) the mother's part-blood, (2) the father's part- semen, (3) the actions of the individual. The part played by the assimilated food juice of the mother need not be counted separately, as it is determined by the *karma* of the individual.<sup>66</sup> The mental traits are determined by the state of the mind of the individual in the previous birth.<sup>67</sup> When one dies, the self which is invariably associated with the mind and the subtle body invisibly enters into the womb due to its *karma*, and when it comes into contact with the combined semen and blood of father and mother, the foetus develops.

Even though semen and blood are the cause of the production of the body, they are able to operate only when they come into contact with the subtle body.<sup>68</sup> But in the *Suśrutasamhita* the concept of the subtle body is somewhat different and confusing. There it is stated that consciousness manifests itself when semen and blood combine with the subtle consciousness.<sup>69</sup> Elsewhere, it is stated that the self comes into contact with the combined semen and blood along with the subtle body.<sup>70</sup> In another place, it is further stated that the materials that contribute to the life of the developing foetus are *agni*, *soma*, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, the five sense organs, and the *bhūtātma*. They are also called life (*prāṇa*).<sup>71</sup> Thus, the first articulation seems to indicate that life is manifested due to the combination of semen and blood. The second articulation regards the contact of the self with its subtle body as something essential for evolving the

semen-blood into life. The third one adds the five senses *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, and holds that the place of semen-blood is taken up by the origin of agni, and *vāyu*. The reason for these three different views cannot satisfactorily be explained, except for the supposition that Suśruta's work underwent three different revisions at three different times.<sup>72</sup> However, the second statement is more reasonable and it shows close affinity with Caraka's account.

The reason for admitting that a subtle body exists is to explain the phenomenon of birth and death on the basis of the *karma* theory. We infer from the "lived life" that life is not accidental but a continuation of a previous one and so, we arrive at the conclusion that birth and death is a cyclical process. Each one of the successive life is determined by the actions of the preceding life. Each one takes new birth to enjoy the fruit of the actions of the previous birth. But this is not possible unless a subtle body is admitted to exist, for the self, though eternal, is untainted. The untainted self that presides over the subtle body is invariably associated with the mind. One undergoes rebirth in accordance with the connection of the impressions of virtue, vice, and other defects and accomplishments which the mind carries. The coupling of the mind and the self is not possible without a supporting body. Thus, in the cycle of rebirth it is essential for the mind to have a supporting subtle body in the interval between one death and subsequent birth. The subtle body accompanies the self along with the mind and undergoes the cyclical process of transmigration till the final redemption (*mokṣa*) is attained.

The Sāṃkhyas also describe two types of bodies: (1) persistent and detachable subtle body capable of transmigration (*liṅgaśarīra*) and (2) a one time only gross body (*sthūlaśarīra*). The gross body, as in the case of the Carakasamhitā, comes into existence at the time of conception and gets destroyed by death. The subtle body is made up of consciousness, “I - consciousness”, eleven sense organs, and five subtle elements (*tanmātras*).<sup>73</sup> Taking account of this, Cakrapāṇi says that this doctrine of a subtle body (*ātivāhikaśarīra*) is described in the *agama* and it implies *Sāṃkhya āgama*.<sup>74</sup> The Yoga view is that there is no need of such an intermediate subtle body. For the yogins, each self has a separate all pervading mind (*citta*). Each mind associates itself with a particular body by virtue of the fact that its manifestations (*vṛtti*) are seen in that body. So the manifestations of the all-pervading mind cease to appear in its dying body and become operative in a new body that is born. Thus, there is no need of admitting a subtle body.<sup>75</sup> The Nyāya - Vaiśeṣikas also do not accept such a subtle body. The Vedāntins also speak of a subtle body. Accordingly, the transmigrating subtle body (*liṅgaśarīra*) is constituted by the five sense capacities of action, the five sense capacities of cognition, the fine particles of the five physical elements (*apañcīkṛtabhūtas*), the five divisions of the internal air (*prāṇa, apāna, udāna, vyāna, and samāna*), intellect, ignorance (*avidā*), desire, and action.<sup>76</sup> Vijñānabhikṣu says that the subtle body is a tapering like thing no bigger than a thumb and that it pervades the whole body just like a flame that pervades the whole room.<sup>77</sup>

Though the classical Sāṃkhyas and the Vedāntins accept a subtle body as Caraka, there is a difference in their conceptions. In Carakasamhitā, consciousness, “I - consciousness”, and the ten sense capacities are not recognized as constituents of the subtle body. But in the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta philosophy they are also recognized as the constituents of the subtle body.

## Mind

Mind, the inner instrument in the empirical subject or *rāśīpuruṣa*, is responsible for deliberation.<sup>78</sup> Mind and its objects are conceived as spiritual substances.<sup>79</sup> The words employed in Carakasamhitā to denote mind are *manas*<sup>80</sup> and *sattva*<sup>81</sup>. It is something significant to note that Caraka does not use the word *citta* that is found used in other systems. It has been pointed out by Caraka that the word *cetas*<sup>82</sup> has been used by some others to denote mind, but he restricts its further usage. The Vedāntins also look upon *citta* as an additional inner instrument (*antaḥkaraṇa*).<sup>83</sup>

## Mind as a sense organ

Caraka does not distinctly say that mind is a sense organ. But it is considered as one among the twelve instruments of cognition, action, and feelings.<sup>84</sup> It presides over sense organs of both cognition and action. It motivates and coordinates various sensory and motor activities. In consonance with the main stream thought, mind is regarded as an instrument of the self in Carakasamhitā. It is devoid of consciousness. But, being illuminated by the consciousness of the self, it is activated.<sup>85</sup> Consequently,

mind becomes instrumental in all psychic functions. The Jainas also do not consider mind as a sense organ.<sup>86</sup> Suśruta<sup>87</sup> and the Sāṃkhya philosophy<sup>88</sup> recognize mind as a sense organ with dual function. In other words, for them, it is both a sense organ of cognition and a sense organ of action for it elaborates the functions of both intellectually.<sup>89</sup> In the view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas also mind is a sense organ.<sup>90</sup> They define mind as a sense organ which is instrumental in acquiring the knowledge of the specific qualities of the self like pleasure and pain.<sup>91</sup>

The Mīmāṃsākās also define mind as a sense organ instrumental in the direct cognition of pleasure and the like.<sup>92</sup> The schools of Vedānta expresses differing opinions in this regard. The proponents of the *indriya* thought cite the verse from Pañcadaśi<sup>93</sup> while others cite the verse from the Bhagavat Gīta<sup>94</sup> in defense of their versions.<sup>95</sup>

### Origin and nature of mind

There remains ambiguity in a Carakasamhitā with regard to the origin of mind. Caraka, after giving a vertical evolutionary enumeration starting with *avyakta* and ending with the physical elements (*khādīni*), states that everything is further emanated without making explicit its sequence in the cosmological discription.<sup>96</sup> So it is not possible to say strictly whether mind is a derivative of “I-consciousness” (*ahaṃkāra*) or a product of the physical elements (*bhautika*). It is significant to note that Caraka, who keeps a mysterious silence about the three *guṇas*, namely *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* in his cosmological description, consider that mind is constituted by *sattva*,

*rajas*, and *tamas*.<sup>97</sup> Again, *rajas* and *tamas* are being described as the two main pathogenic factors of mind.<sup>98</sup> This conception of mind leads to the conclusion that Caraka's conception of mind is physical. But this is quite contrary to his conception of mind as a spiritual substance. So what is to be understood is that the spirituality of mind is nothing but the acquired spirituality due to contact with the conscious self. Mind is atomic and unitary in each empirical subject.<sup>99</sup>

Caraka not only states that there is only one mind in each individual; he also denies the multiple nature of mind. Caraka affirms that mind in the same individual appears to be multiple in nature due to variation in the perception of its own objects (*svārthas*), motivation and perception of sense-objects (*indriyārthas*), intellectual elaboration (*saṃkalpa*). Similarly, it takes different forms in accordance with its constituents, namely *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. Mind is unitary and so it cannot motivate or establish contact with many senses simultaneously. So, by no means, there occurs the simultaneous function of sense capacities.<sup>100</sup>

Based on the notion of the non-simultaneity of volition and action, Kāśyapasaṃhitā also expresses the view that mind is unitary.<sup>101</sup> Another important nature of mind referred to by Caraka is its fickle nature. While advising physicians about the importance of concentration in diagnosis, he reminds them to control the fickle nature (*cañcalatva*) of mind.<sup>102</sup> In the Bhagavat Gīta also mind is described as very fickle, which is extremely difficult to control.<sup>103</sup>



In the classical Sāṃkhya, mind is regarded as a modification of “I-consciousness” and hence it is non-physical (*abautika*)<sup>104</sup> They admit neither the atomicity (*aṇutva*) nor the ubiquitous nature (*vibhutva*) of mind. Vijñānabhikṣu attributes a medium dimension (*madhyamaparimāṇa*) to mind.<sup>105</sup> Mind is ephemeral like other sense organs because all sense organs are manifestations.<sup>106</sup>

The Nyāya- Vaiśeṣikas regard mind as a substance. But, for them it is not a physical substance, for it has no externally perceivable specific quality.<sup>107</sup> It is to be remembered here that Raghunātha Śīromaṇi regards mind as *bhautika*.<sup>108</sup> But he does not make clear about the kind of physical element mind it is made of. As far as the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣikas are concerned, mind is not *āhaṃkārika*. It is also not spiritual since there is absolute absence of consciousness. It is an inner sense like the external senses. So the inner sense is not a knower or a thinker that provides the ground our personal identity.<sup>109</sup> For them mind is not a product. It is an eternal.<sup>110</sup> On the basis of the non-simultaneity of cognitions it is concluded that the mind is atomic<sup>111</sup> and unitary.<sup>112</sup> It resides in the heart.<sup>113</sup> Mīmāṃsakas say that mind is all-pervasive (*vibhu*) and motionless<sup>114</sup> They establish its all-pervasiveness based on inference.<sup>115</sup> The Nyāya - Vaiśeṣikas refute this on the ground that the self also being *vibhu* the conjunction of mind with the self should be eternal. Again, if the of self-mind conjunction is accepted as eternal, there is no possibility to account for sleep.<sup>116</sup> The Vedāntins consider that mind is not conscious (*acit*). It is like matter.<sup>117</sup> Elsewhere, Śāṅkara states that ‘it is *bhautika* on the basis of the *Upaniṣadic* words’.<sup>118</sup>

## Location of mind

The heart (*h daya*) is the vital centre of mind. It coexists *with buddhi, indriya, ātmā, ojas* and the channels of circulation.<sup>119</sup> The heart is the vital centre of all physical and mental functions and so it is called *mahadartha*.<sup>120</sup> An injury to heart will lead to fainting or even death.<sup>121</sup> Caraka further states that when the psychological *doṣas* of *sattva* and *rajas* predominate mind, permeate the heart, get aggravated by emotions like passion, anger, fear causing epilepsy (*apasmāra*).<sup>122</sup> It may be relevant to note in this context the concept of mind postulated in the *Bhelasamhitā*. Bhela considers *manas* and *citta* as two different entities. Mind is said to preside over all the sense organs and is located between the head and the palate (*śirastalvantargatām*).<sup>123</sup> For him, *citta* is a derivative of *manas*. It resides in the heart and causes cognitions, motivations and all other psychic states. Accordingly, *citta* captures that which is apprehended by *manas* and thereby gives rise to determinate cognition ascertaining virtues and faults.<sup>124</sup> Bhela keeps this distinction throughout. While discussing the pathogenesis of *unmāda*, he concedes that the *doṣas* vitiate *manas* positioned between the head and the palate first and then only they vitiate *citta*.<sup>125</sup> Suśruta also admits that mind co-exists with the self and consciousness in the heart.<sup>126</sup> Dalhaṇa,<sup>127</sup> Cakrapāṇi,<sup>128</sup> and Vāgbhaṭa<sup>129</sup> also recognize the heart as the site of mind.

The Sāṃkhya do not accept a particular location of mind.<sup>130</sup> Mind pervades the whole body and has a medium dimension. So it cannot be

accommodated in a small space, like heart. But Patañjali say that the mind is located in the heart.<sup>131</sup> The Nyāya- Vaiśeṣikas also agree to the point that mind is located in the heart.<sup>132</sup> They are also of the view that sleep occurs when the atomic mind enters into the vein called *purtaṭ*.<sup>133</sup> This is something different from the view of Caraka. According to Caraka , sleep occurs when the mind, sensory organs, and motor organs get exhausted and disassociate themselves from their objects.<sup>134</sup> But the space where the mind resides during sleep is not specified. In both cases there remains some difficulty in accounting for sleeping condition. Even if the atomicity of mind is accepted, the continuity of its contact with the self remains unobstructed. The reason is that the self being all-pervading must be present wherever the mind resides. However, the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣikas sought to remove this difficulty by the assumption that the contact of mind with the sense of touch is a general condition for all cognitions. But this is arbitrary. The phenomena of sleep and wakefulness can be sufficiently accounted for by the conjunction and severance of mind with the sense organs as has been described by Caraka.

### **Functions of Mind**

According to Caraka mind has five objects, namely thinking (*cintya*), consideration (*vicārya*), cogitation (*ūhya*), meditation (*dhyeya*), and determination (*saṃkalpa*),<sup>135</sup> and four kinds of specific functions called control or direction of senses (*indriyābhigraha*), self-restraint (*svaviṣaya nigraha*), cogitation (*ūha*), and consideration (*vicāra*).<sup>136</sup> Things apprehended by mind independent of the sense organs, even if the sensory

faculty is involved, are called *cintya*.<sup>137</sup> It is a thought process of determining whether something is obligatory or not.<sup>138</sup> Object that is subjected to reflection by reason on its fitness to be acquired or rejected is *vicārya*.<sup>139</sup> Cogitation or speculation is nothing but the indeterminate knowledge.<sup>140</sup> That is, a hypothesis is made about the things in the form of “this may happen” in a given situation.<sup>141</sup> The destination focused by abstract concentration is called *dhyeya*.<sup>142</sup> The object about which a mental resolve is made after ascertaining its merit and demerit is called *saṃkalpa*.<sup>143</sup>

In perception, the function of mind is to apprehend the object through the external senses by directing them or controlling them. When the external sense organs give immediate impressions of their objects, mind intervenes in those discrete impressions. It discriminates between the advantageous and disadvantageous through ratiocination.<sup>144</sup> Further they are presented to the “I-consciousness”. The “I-consciousness” causes an attachment in the synthesized knowledge in the form of “this is mine or so”.<sup>145</sup> Finally determinate cognition (*buddhi*) arises impelling the individual to speak or act.<sup>146</sup>

It is due to the association of the conscious self the mind conceive the external world. Mind has the capacity of being affected through the mediation of the sense object contact. Awareness of the objects occurs in the witnessing self. Thus, mind performs the synthesizing and objectifying function.

Regarding the function of mind, the Sāṃkhya system does not make much difference either. In their view, the specific function (*vṛtti*) of mind is *saṃkalpa*. The mind intervenes in the discrete sense impressions or sensations, discriminates between the qualifier and the qualified, synthesizes it through logical processes or reasoning and presents them to the “I-consciousness” and thereby to the intellect (*buddhi*).<sup>147</sup> Mind not only does the preliminary function of coordinating the various sense-data, but also makes preliminary decisions about the actions necessitated by perception. It organizes perception and the ideas generated by it and the desires and intentions of the individual.<sup>148</sup> One of the main differences of the Sāṃkhyas with Caraka is that they do not agree with the non-simultaneity of cognition. The Sāṃkhyas say that perception occurs simultaneously or gradually. It occurs simultaneously when there is a direct cognition.<sup>149</sup>

In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the inner sense is not a knower or a thinker that provides the ground of our personal identity.<sup>150</sup> It is an indispensable inner instrument (*karaṇa*) responsible for all kinds of cognition. Sense organs cannot perceive objects in the absence of mind. Knowledge of external objects arises when there is a conjunction of the mind with the self, the sense organs, and the object. Similarly mind is instrumental in the cognition of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and the like.<sup>151</sup> In the Vedāntic view mind has a three-fold function, namely decision (*adhyavasāya*), self-love (*abhimāna*), and reflection (*cintā*). It reveals to the self the inner states of

pleasure and pain and with the assistance of external instruments corresponds with the outer states.<sup>152</sup>

### **Proof for the existence of mind**

Caraka gives, as proof, the absence and presence of cognition. Even if there exists the contact of the self, sense capacities and object, cognition won't take place if the mind is not operating. Cognition is produced in accordance with the conjunction of mind.<sup>153</sup>

This stands very close to the proof put forward by Kaṇāda and Akṣapāda who posit the non-simultaneity of cognition as evidence for the existence of mind. The proof adduced by Kaṇāda is the fact that knowledge is produced or not according to the conjunction of mind with the self, sense capacities, and objects. That is, cognition won't arise in the absence of the concurrence of mind with the self and sense capacities.<sup>154</sup> Praśastapāda argues there must be an instrument to perceive pleasure and pain which are not perceived through the external senses. That instrument is mind.<sup>155</sup>

Akṣapāda says that cognitions are always successive and never simultaneous. He also favours a linear succession of internal states with the self as the abiding owner.<sup>156</sup> The proof is that the self cannot cognize more than one sensation at a time, because mind can establish only one relation between the self and the sense organ at a time.<sup>157</sup> So mind, the principal auxiliary of the self, responsible for the generation of internal states must be counted as unifunctional. Almost all others also accept the unifunctional nature of mind. Although the inner sense is unifunctional, it

can move at breakneck and appear to be multifunctional.<sup>158</sup> Though scholars like Raghunātha śiromaṇi do not favour the idea that the presence of mind is the cause of non-simultaneity of cognitions.<sup>159</sup> Almost all other thinkers of the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika school reiterate the above mentioned proofs adduced by Kaṇāda and Akṣapāda for establishing the existence and atomicity of mind.

### **Body - mind interaction**

It is a fact that every mental state influences the bodily condition, which in turn will influence the mental state. For instance, It is our experience that every act of exhaling and inhaling and every act of digestion or secretion, demand a corresponding mental state. Similarly, when the body is worn out, one may not be able to concentrate. So the serious problem to be discussed in relation to the theoretical conception of mind in Carakasamhitā is the body-mind interaction, for the whole concept of maintenance of health hinges on the psychosomatic interaction.

But, as a matter of fact, there is no difficulty in explaining the interaction between the bodily states and the internal states because the conscious self, the radiated mind, and the body are in contact with each other and together they form the body-mind self complex. Actually, in final analysis, mind is not spiritual. It is a unity of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* which are subject to change. Self is the real unchanging spiritual substance for it is the substratum of consciousness. Mind is called spiritual in the sense that it is being radiated by the self. Above all, Caraka does not consider

mind and matter as ontologically different and irreducible. On the contrary, he accepts a unity at the ontological level for both mind and body are the manifestations of the unmanifest. Both the mind and the body emerge from the unmanifest and merge into the same. So there is no problem in assuming the psycho-somatic interaction.

The account of mind given by Caraka is mainly based on the analysis in the light of his metaphysical as well as anatomical and physiological conceptions. If we look at the above description, it can be seen that his theoretical conception of mind contains some of the ideas found in other systems. For instance, he agrees with the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika with regard to the atomic and unifunctional nature of mind. But he does not accept their psychophysical dualism according to which mind and matter are ontologically different. Similarly, in consonance with the Sāṃkhya, he conceives mind as a thinker providing ground for one's personal identity. But he does not accept the medium dimension proposed by the Sāṃkhya. In addition to that Caraka do not accept the simultaneity of cognition. It is also significant to note that the assumption in no way agrees with that of the Mīmāṃsakas. The main contradiction is that Caraka considers mind as atomic and mobile or fickle, while it is static and all-pervading for the Mīmāṃsakas. However, the assumption of the Mīmāṃsakas are not reliable, for if we accept an all-pervading static mind, then we will be forced to admit the contact of the mind with all the sense organs at a time and there would be a variety of simultaneous perceptions. Also, such a contact will continue uninterrupted and there would be no sleep.



## Sense capacities

One of the outstanding features of Carakaśaṃhitā is its great concern for the sense capacities. Caraka classifies the sense capacities into two groups, namely the five cognitive sense capacities and the five action capacities. The five sense capacities of cognition are (1) the sense of vision (*cakṣu*), (2) the sense of hearing (*śrotra*), (3) the sense of smell (*ghrāṇa*), (4) the sense of taste (*rasana*), and (5) the sense of touch (*tvak*).<sup>160</sup> The five action capacities are those of (1) handling (*pāṇi*), (2) walking- (*pāda*), (3) excretion (*pāyu*), (4) reproduction (*upastha*), and (5) speech (*vāk*).<sup>161</sup> Of these five the sense capacities of action the sense capacity of speech is the noblest in so far as the articulation of truth is concerned. The articulation of truth represents light and that of untruth stands for darkness.<sup>162</sup> Caraka holds that mind, intellect (*buddhi*), five action capacities (*karmendriyas*), and five sense capacities of cognition (*budhhīndriyas*) are the instruments of the self for action, sensation, and cognition. In the absence anyone of these instruments, one cannot act or enjoy the fruit the actions.<sup>163</sup> The sense capacities of cognition receive impressions by establishing direct contact with the external objects and the action capacities act upon the objects perceived.

The Sāṃkhya<sup>164</sup> and the Vedāntins<sup>165</sup> also construe the action capacities as external sense organs. But the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika system does not recognize them as sense capacities. They recognize only the five external instruments of apprehension as sense capacities. Jayantabhaṭṭa even argues

that if the action capacities are regarded as sense capacities then many other bodily organs should be considered because the throat has the function of swallowing food, the breasts have the function of embracing, the shoulders have the function of carrying and so on. More over, if different parts of the body are treated as sense organs, there will remain no body other than the sense organs. So they must not be treated as sense-organs.<sup>166</sup>

### **Sense capacities of cognition**

The theories of the sense capacities of cognition evolved in India are completely different from those of the west, because they are based on metaphysical speculations rather than the Western scientific methods of observation and experiment.<sup>167</sup> Western philosophy, by and large, identify the cognitive sense organs with different bodily parts like the sense organs of vision, that is to say the eye is identified with the eye balls. But Indian thought, with the exception of the materialists, has never identified the sense capacities with the bodily locations. They are conceived as imperceptible capacities.<sup>168</sup> Caraka is also no exception to this. In relation to the cognitive sense capacities, he says that there are five sense capacities, five material substances that constitute the sense capacities, five seats of the senses, five sense objects and five sense perceptions.<sup>169</sup> Accordingly, eyes (*akṣīṇi*), tongue (*jihvā*), ears (*karṇau*), nostrils (*nāsike*), and skin (*tvak*) are the end organs which serve as the locations (*adhiṣṭānas*)<sup>170</sup> of the respective sense capacities of vision (*cakṣu*), hearing (*śrota*), smell (*ghrāṇa*), taste (*rasana*), and touch (*sparśana*). The objects of the five sense capacities are colour,

sound, smell, taste, and touch.<sup>171</sup> The sense perceptions are visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile perceptions. It is very clear from this description that the sense capacities of cognition are different from physiological sites or end organs. It is conceived that the sense capacities are centered in the heart along with the two upper limbs, two lower limbs, trunk and the head, consciousness, the self with all its attributes, and the mind.<sup>172</sup> But quite different to this view, elsewhere, in *Siddhīsthāna*, it is stated that the sense capacities are centered in the head along with their channels like the rays of the Sun.<sup>173</sup> This difference may be because the articulation in the *Siddhīsthāna* is that of Dṛḍhabala and not of Caraka. Caraka had a clear conception of the sensory nerves relating to the cognitive senses and motor nerves relating to the action capacities.<sup>174</sup>

Caraka does not give a formal definition to the sense capacities. Neither the Nyāya-sūtra nor the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra makes a difference in this respect. Śrīdhara-cārya gives a general definition taking into account the five cognitive sense capacities. Accordingly, sense capacities are the instrumental substances in the body which brings about direct perception.<sup>175</sup> Udyodakāra defines them as the instruments of perception of their respective objects.<sup>176</sup> According to Annaṃbhaṭṭa and Viśwanātha, sense capacities are those which unite with the mind in order that there may be perception and, at the same time, they do not possess the perceptible or developed specific qualities (*udbhūtavaiśeṣaguṇa*) with the exception of sound.<sup>177</sup>

In Carakasamhitā, the sense capacities are inferred to have been constituted by physical elements. The special feature of this constitution is

that each sense organ is particularised by a physical element. Thus, the sense of hearing is predominated by *ākāśa*, the sense of touch by air, sense of vision by fire, sense of taste by water, and the sense of smell by earth. Consequently, a sense capacity which is predominated by a particular material element is able to receive the specific quality of that particular element and, therefore, the five specific qualities of the five material elements are received by their respective sense capacities only.<sup>178</sup> The sense capacities acquire this special feature due to the peculiar nature of successive emanation of the physical elements resulting in the accumulation of their qualities in a sequence. Both the body and the sense capacities are formed of the five physical elements. So sense capacities have a relation with the gross physical body which makes possible their mutual transaction.<sup>179</sup> This concept of the sense capacities of cognition is quite different from the concepts that we find in Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, classical Śāṅkhya, Suśruta and Vedānta.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system the sense capacities are construed as material (*bhautika*) and not as *ahaṅkārika*.<sup>180</sup> In that sense Caraka is in consonance with them. But the difference in Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika is that each one of the sense faculties is formed of a particular pure physical element and is restricted to its particular object. Thus, the visual organ is formed purely by fire,<sup>181</sup> auditory capacity by *ākāśa*,<sup>182</sup> tactile by air,<sup>183</sup> gustatory by water,<sup>184</sup> and olfactory by earth.<sup>185</sup> They arrive at this conclusion on the grounds that a particular quality is known by a particular sense faculty. The olfactory capacity, for example, apprehends smell alone which is the specific

quality of earth because it is made up of earth alone. If more elements were present in the sense faculty, then it would sense the other qualities also.<sup>186</sup> The Mīmāṃsakas also share the very same view of the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣikas.<sup>187</sup> In classical Sāṃkhya philosophy, the sense faculties exist and operate as direct modifications of the “I-consciousness” (*ahaṃkāra*) and not of the physical elements.<sup>188</sup> Their main contention against the physical nature of sense capacity is that the elemental substances can pervade only those things which are of the same magnitude. On the contrary things which are not so made up are all pervading, and, as such can operate upon all things of different magnitude.<sup>189</sup> What they mean is that the sense capacities of cognition are the determinate sensory psychophysical impulses which go to the external objects and receive impressions from them, and the sense capacities of action are the determinate motor psychophysical impulses which react upon the objects perceived.<sup>190</sup> However, this conception of the sense capacities as direct evolutes of the “I consciousness” makes it difficult to prove the specificity of the senses.<sup>191</sup> The cognitive sense capacities are regarded as having the same nature of the physical elements because the specific qualities of the substances are perceived.<sup>192</sup> Suśruta, in consonance with the Sāṃkhyas, holds that all the eleven sense capacities (including mind) evolve from *vaikārikāhaṃkāra* under the influence of *rajas*.<sup>193</sup>

Similar to that of Caraka, the Vedāntins also regard the sense capacities as material. But the difference is that in the Vedānta the cognitive sense capacities are produced from the five subtle elements called *tanmātras*

particularly possessed of the ingredient of *sattva* in order.<sup>194</sup> Similarly, the five senses of action are produced from the five subtle elements (taken singly) which particularly the *rajastic* ingredients.<sup>195</sup>

According to Carak, firstly, the cognitive sense capacities are capable of producing perceptual knowledge when they are motivated by the mind which controls it.<sup>196</sup> Secondly, they can perceive a specific quality only if the specific quality that predominates the object and the sense capacity are the same. The third and the most significant feature of the sense capacities is that they are capable of producing perception through contact with the objects having identical specific qualities by their peculiar characteristic of *vibhutva*.<sup>197</sup> For instance, the sense of vision grasps the object at its place. Here, *vibhutva* should not be understood as the all pervading or ubiquitous in nature like that of the self. If so, there will be the perception of all things at all times. It only implies the ability of the sense capacities for contraction and dilation according to the object, smaller or bigger, they come into contact with, like a flame that pervades a whole room. Since the sense capacities are different from the end organs (*adhiṣṭānas*), there is no difficulty for Caraka in holding that the visual sense capacities reach out to objects, instead of stimuli from objects coming to the sensory nerves. Thus, perception is conceived as a psychophysical process in Carakaśaṃhitā. It follows that medicines applied to the end organs would make corresponding effects in those which inhere in them.<sup>198</sup>

The peculiarity of the description of sense capacities as having both the nature of the physical nature and pervasive nature (*vibhutva*) reveals

that it is a synthesis of the concepts of the Sāṃkhya who hold that the sense capacities are evolutes of “I-consciousness” and pervasive, and of the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣikas who hold that sense capacities are physical. The synthesis has enabled Caraka to account for the *prāpyakāritva* nature of the sense capacities. *Prāpyakāritva* is the characteristic of the sense capacities to apprehend the object by coming into direct contact with them,<sup>199</sup> The Nyāya- Vaiśeṣikas agree with the Sāṃkhya in holding that the sense capacities are *prāpyakāritva*. But they refuse to accept them as the evolutes of “I-consciousness” and their pervasive nature.<sup>200</sup> However, the Jainas and the Buddhists do not consider all the sense capacities as *prāpyakāri*. The Buddhists regard the sense capacities of smell, taste, and touch as *prāpyakāri* and the sense capacities of vision and hearing as *aprāpyakāri*. They apprehend their objects at a distance with out reaching them.<sup>201</sup> The Jainas regard the visual sense capacity as *aprāpyakāri* and all other capacities as *prāpyakāri*. The visual organ perceives its objects at a distance with the help of light with out getting at it.<sup>202</sup>

Caraka holds that the organ of touch pervades all the sense capacities and also the mind.<sup>203</sup> No sensation is possible with out the contact of the sense organ of touch. So perception is possible only if objects fall with in the range of touch. Thus, the sense of touch is conterminous with all the senses. The most conspicuous aspect of this theory is that the sense of touch is in perpetual relation with the mind while the mind in turn pervades and governs the sense of touch. So, even though the sense of touch pervades all the senses, there is no chance of simultaneous perception because it

occurs only where the atomic mind is active.<sup>204</sup> Skin is only the end organ of touch and consists of six layers.<sup>205</sup> Akṣapāda refers to a similar theory which considers that the sense of touch is the only sense organ and refutes it.<sup>206</sup> This is further reiterated by Jayantabhaṭṭa.<sup>207</sup> At the same time, the later Nyāya- Vaiśeṣikas believe that the sense of touch pervades the whole body.<sup>208</sup> They also consider that the contact mind with the sense of touch as a general condition for cognition.<sup>209</sup> The sense perceptions are all determinate and at the same time momentary in nature.<sup>210</sup> However, we cannot set aside the view point of Caraka that the sense capacities are physical as well as pervading because it is not a mere hypothesis but an inferential knowledge based on empirical analysis.



## NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 KFL, p.133.
- 2 *sattvātmā śarīraṃ ca trayametatrīdaṇḍavat  
lokastiṣṭati saṃyogāttatra sarvaṃ pratiṣṭitaṃ*. CS. Su. I, 46, KS, Sa,  
p. 67.
- 3 *rāśīrasmāya viśeṣeṇopadiṣṭaḥ sa, 'rāśīḥ', 'raśmiḥ', 'raśane', ityevaṃ  
viśayāḥ*; M.Bh, Vol. VI, VII.i. 96 p. 90.
- 4 DO, p. 23. “.....the body of any living being is regarded as belonging  
to a *jīva*, which may be roughly and inadequately regarded as  
corresponding to the western concept of ‘person’ ”. PIP, p. 53.
- 5 “*punaśca dhātubhedena caturviṃśatikaḥ smṛtaḥ*”, CS, Sa,  
I.17 *caturviṃśatiko hyeṣa rāśiḥ puruṣasamjñakaḥ*. Ibid, 35.
- 6 “*khādīni buddhiravyaktamahaṃkārastathā'ṣṭamḥ bhūtaprakṛti-  
ruddiṣṭā vikārāścaiva ṣoḍaśa*”. Ibid, 63.
- 7 *buddhīndriyāṇi pañcaiva pañcakarmendriyāṇi ca  
samanāskāśca pañcārthāḥ vikārā iti saṃjñitāḥ*, Ibid, 64.
- 8 “*buddhīndriyamano'rthānāṃ vidyādyogadharaṃ paraṃ*”, Ibid, 35.
- 9 “Under these circumstances the *rāśi* can be better treated as a dead  
body which is also devoid of consciousness”. ODST, p.101.
- 10 “*sa pumāṃścetanam tacca taccādhikaraṇam smṛtam*”, CS, Su, I. 47.
- 11 *atra karmaphalaṃ cātra jñānaṃ cātra pratiṣṭitaṃ  
atra mohāḥ sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ jīvitaṃ maraṇam svatā*. CS, Sa, I. 37.

- 12 *evam yo veda tattvena sa veda pralayodayau  
pāraṃparyam cikitsāṃ ca jñātavyam yacca kiñcana.* Ibid., 38.
- 13 “.....samudayo nirīśaḥ sattvasaṃjñakaḥ”; Ibid., 47.
- 14 “ātmā jñāḥ karaṇairyogāt jñānaṃtvasya pravartate” Ibid., 54.
- 15 *buddhindriyamaṇo’rthānāṃ vidyādyogadharam paraṃ.* Ibid., 35.
- 16 Ibid, 50-51; “nitytvaṃ cātmānaḥ pūrvāparāvasthānubhūtārthapra-  
tisanthānāt; nahyanitye jñātari pūrvānubhūta-marthamuttaro jñātā  
pratisandhatte”. Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, I, 56.
- 17 “dehī sarvagato’pyātmā sve sve saṃsparśanendriye  
sarvāḥ sarvāśrayasthāstu nātmā’to vetti vedanāḥ”. CS, Sa, I,79.
- 18 Ibid, I. 65; “kṣīyata iti kṣetram”, ‘kṣi nivāsagatyoh’, ‘kṣi kṣaye’ vā  
dhātuḥ. kṣetram śarīram jñātīti kṣetrajaḥ jñā avabodhane, Vivṛti  
on AK , Vol. 1. iv. 29, p.89 . kṣetrajñā is used in the sense of  
individual self. JIL, p. 150. Sivādityya uses the term kṣetrajñā for  
individual selves: “kṣetrajñā asmadādayo’nantā eva”, SP, p.23.
- 19 DO, p. 24.
- 20 *nirvikāraḥ parastvātmā sarvabhūtānāṃ nirviśeṣaḥ;  
sattvaśarīrayostu viśeṣādviśeṣopalabdhiḥ.* CS, Sa, IV.33.
- 21 “vedanānāṃ adhiṣṭānaṃ maṇo dehaśca sendriyaḥ”. Ibid., I. 136.
- 22 Ibid., 130-31.
- 23 DO, p. 24.
- 24 CS.Sa. I.70-74

- 25 *pranāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanaṃanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnāścātmāno liṅgāni*. VS, III. ii. 4. *indriyāntaravikāra* is used in the sense of *indiyāntarasañcāra* in CS.
- 26 *icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānanyātmno liṅgamiti*, NS,I. i.10; Also see Ibid., III. I. 7; III. I. 12. For details see Vātsyāyana on the *ibid*.
- 27 *ṣaḍdhātavaḥ samuditāḥ ‘puruṣa’ iti śabdaṃ labhante; pṛthivyāpaste-jovāyurākāśaṃ brahma cāvvyaktamiti, eta eva ca ṣaḍdhātavaḥ samuditāḥ ‘puruṣa’ iti śabdaṃ labhante*. CS, Sa, V. 4; *ibid.*, I. 16.
- 28 *‘pañcamahābhūtaśarīrasamavāyaḥ puruṣa’ iti. sa yeva karmapuruṣaści-kitsādhikṛtaḥ*, SS. Sa, I. 16. The self construed in Suśruta corresponds to the *puruṣa* in the Classical Sāṃkhya. *Ibid*, 9; “*ayameva pañcamahābhūtaśarīra-samavāyaḥ puruṣaḥ ityanena Suśrutenapyuktaḥ*”. Cakrapāṇi on CS, Sa, I.16.
- 29 DO, p.172.
- 30 *ayañca (ṣaḍdhātuḥpuruṣa) vaiśeṣikadarśanaparig vaiśeṣika darśanaparigṛhītāścikitasāśastraviṣyaḥ puruṣaḥ*. Cakrapāṇi on CS, Sa, I. 16.
- 31 *ṣaḍdhāturūpameva puruṣaṃ punaḥ sām̐khyadarśanabhedāc-caturviṃśatikabhedenāḥ*, Cakrapāṇi on *Ibid.*,17.
- 32 *rāśih ṣaḍdhātujo hyeṣaḥ sām̐khyairādyaiḥ prakīrtitaḥ* CS, Su.XXV. 15.
- 33 *saddhātusamudāyo hi sāmānyataḥ sarvalokāḥ*. CS ,Sa,V.7.
- 34 see LC, p. 215; cf. AMS, p.182.

- 35 *puruṣo'ayaṃ lokasaṃmitaḥ*, CS, Sa, V. 3.
- 36 *yāvanto hi loke (mūrtimanto) bhāvaviśeṣāstāvantaḥ puruṣe,*  
*yāvantaḥ puruṣe tāvanto loke*, Ibid.
- 37 *loke vāyvākāśasomānāṃ durvijñeyā yathā gatiḥ*  
.....  
*vijñeyā pavanādīnāṃ na pramuhyati karmasu*. CS, Ci, XXVIII.  
246 - 47.
- 38 CS, Sa, V. 5.
- 39 *śṛ-pratikṣaṇaṃ kṣīyamāṇe dehe*, SSM, p. 24; *śīryate kālakarameṇeti śarīraṃ*; 'śṛhiṃsāyām', Vivṛti on AK, Vol.1, 2.6.70; p. 406.
- 40 *cīryate annādibhi, ciñ ghañ ni...*, *dehe*, SSM, p. 117. *cīryate avayavairiti kāyaḥ*, 'ciñ cayane', Ibid.
- 41 IK, p.1.
- 42 *dih-san. sthūlasūkṣmakāryakāraṇarūpe śarīre*, SSM, p.223; *dihyate annaraseti dehaḥ*. 'dih upacaye' - Vivṛti on AK, Vol.1, 2. 6. 70
- 43 *tatra śarīraṃ nāma cetanādhiṣṭānabhūtaṃ pañcamahābhūtavikā rasamudāyātmakaṃ samayogavāhi*, CS, Sa, VI. 4.
- 44 Loc. cit., F. Note, 28, p. 231; KS. Sa, p. 67.
- 45 *doṣadhātumalamūlaṃ hi śarīraṃ*, SS, Su, XV. 3; *doṣadhātumalamūlo hi dehaḥ* -- AS, Su, XIX. p. 261; *doṣadhātumalāmūlam sadā dehasya; taṃ calaḥ*, AH, Su. XI. 1; see also *ibid.*, AH, Sa, III. 3-8.
- 46 *śarīraṃ sattvasaṃjñakaṃ ca vyādhīnāmāśrayo mataḥ tathā sukhānāṃ*, CS, Su, I. 55.

- 47 Ibid., 54.
- 48 *ceṣṭendriyārthāśrayaḥ śarīraṃ*. NS, I. i. 11.
- 49 *ātmano bhogāyatanam śarīraṃ*, Dīpikā, TSA, p.7. *śarīratvam .....ceṣṭāśrayatvam*, NSMK, p. 121.
- 50 *bhokṭṛbhogyāyatanam śarīraṃ*. PBNK, p.82.
- 51 *ātmanaḥ bhogāyatanam śarīraṃ*. MM, p.153.
- 52 *pratyakṣāpratyakṣāṇām saṃyogasya apratyakṣatvāt pāñcabhautikaṃ na vidyate*- VS, IV. ii. 2.; also see Śaṅkaramiśra on ibid., VU, pp. 285-86.
- 53 *guṇāntaraprādurbhāvācca na tryātmakaṃ*. VS, IV. ii. 3.
- 54 *pārthivaṃ guṇāntaropalabdheḥ*, NS, III. i. 28.
- 55 *aṇusaṃyogastvapraṭiṣiddhaḥ*, VS, IV. ii. 4; *mithaḥ pañcānām prasparamupaṣṭambhakatayā saṃyogo na niṣidhyate*, Śaṅkaramiśra, VU, p. 287; *sati ca prakṛtibhāve bhūtanām dharmopalabdhiḥ asati ca saṃyogapraṭiṣedhāt sannihitānāmiti*, Vātsyāyana on NS. III. i. 28, N.Bh, pp. 244.45; “.....tena pārthivaśarīre jalādīnām nimittatvamātraṃ bodhyaṃ”, NSMK. p. 121.
- 56 *sūryaṃ te cakṣusprṇomi .....pṛtivīm te śarīraṃ sprṇomi*. RV, X. xvi. 3.
- 57 *yathā-pralayātyaye sisṛkṣurbhūtānyakṣarabhūta ātmā satvopādānaḥ .....aṇunā kālena bhavati*, CS, Sa, IV. 8.
- 58 *tadvadindriyāṇām punaḥ sattvādīnām kevalam cetanāvaccharīramayanabhūtamadhiṣṭānabhūtam ca*, CS, Vi, V. 6.

- 59 CS, Sa, I. 136.
- 60 *yadā hyasmin śarīre dhātavo vaiṣamyamāpadyate tadā kleśaṃ vināśaṃ ca prāpnoti*, CS, Sa, VI. 4.
- 61 *hitāhāropayoga eka eva puruṣavṛddhikaro bhavati ahitāhāropayogaḥ punarvyādhinimittamiti*, CS, Su, XXV. 31.
- 62 *śarīrāvayavāstu paramaṇubhedena aparisaṃkhyeyā bhavanti*, CS, Sa, VII. 17.
- 63 *bhutaīscaturbhiḥ sahitaḥ susūkṣmairmanojavo dehamupaiti dehāt*, CS, Sa, II. 31.
- 64 *ākāśamiha akriyatvena dehāntaragamanakarmaṇi noktaṃ*, Cakrapāṇi on *ibid*.
- 65 *yāni tuvātmani sūkṣmāni bhūtāni ātivāhikarupāni tāni sarvasādhāraṇatvena aviśeṣasādṛśyakāraṇānīti naḥ bodhayanti*, Cakrapāṇi on CS, Sa, II. 23-27.
- 66 HIPS, Vol. II. p. 302.
- 67 *tena karmavaśādeva manobhedo bhavati*, Cakrapāṇi, on CS, Sa, II. 36.
- 68 *yadyapi śukrarajasī kāraṇe, tathā'pi yadaivātivāhikaṃ sūkṣmabhūtarūpaśarīraṃ prāpnutaḥ, tadaiva te śarīram janayataḥ*, *Ibid*.
- 69 *paramasūkṣmaścetanāvantaḥ śāśvataḥ lohitaretasoḥ sannipāteṣvabhivyajyante* SS, Sa, I. 16.
- 70 SS, Sa, III. 3 - 4.

- 71 *agniḥ somo vāyuḥ sattvaṃ rajastamaḥ pañcendriyāṇi bhūtātmeti prāṇāḥ*, SS, Sa, IV. 3.
- 72 HIPS, Vol. II, p. 303.
- 73 SK, 39-40. See also Vācaspatimśra on ibid., STK, p. 222-23.
- 74 *tena āgamādeva sām̐khyadarśanarūpa ātivāhikaśarīrād vyaktaṃ śarīramutpadyata*, Cakrapāṇi on CS,Sa, II. 35-36.
- 75 *svamatamāha “vṛttiḥ” iti, .....ātivāhikaṃ tasya na mṛṣyāmahe.* Vācaspati on Y.Su, IV, 10, YD, pp. 406-407.
- 76 *vāgādipañca śravaṇādi pañca prāṇādi pañcābhramukhāni pañca buddhyādyavidyāpi ca kāmakarmanī puryaṣṭakaṃ sūkṣmaśarīramāhuḥ.* VC, 96, p. 34; Sadānanda Yogīndra mentions seventeen constituents: *avayavāstu sūkṣmaśarīrāṇi saptadaṣāvayavāni liṅgaśarīrāṇi jñānedriyapañcakaṃ buddhimanasi karmendriyapañcakaṃ vāyupañcakaṃ ceti*, VSA, p.45; Dharmarāj Adhvarīndra also is of the same opinion, VP, p.163.
- 77 Vijñānabhikṣu on S. Su, V, 103.
- 78 *manasastu cintyamarthaḥ*, CS, Su, VIII. 16.
- 79 *mano manortho buddhirātmā cetyadhyātmadravyaguṇasaṅgrahaḥ.....*, ibid., VIII. 13. see vide., supra self
- 80 The word *manas* is derived from ‘*uṇādi*’ aphoristic rule by adding the suffix ‘*asun*’. *manyate’nena mana-karaṇe asun, Vācaspatyaṃ*, Vol. VI, p. 4734. It has two roots. (1) *mana bodhe* that belongs to *divādi* class *mana bodhe ḍi.ā.saka. cānaṭ. manyate*, ibid. It is applied to denote; to think, to suppose, to imagine, to concentrate, and to

- meditate. (2) ‘*mana bodhe*’ also belongs to the *tanādi* class -- *mana bodhe. ā saka. seṭ, manute*, *ibid*. It denotes knowledge, perception, teaching, informing indicating or showing. See also ARV, p. 104.
- 81 The expression *sattva* is derived from the aphoristic rule *tasya bhāvastvatalau* (PS, V. i. 119) with the addition of “*tva*”. *sataḥ bhāvaḥ sattvaṃ (bhāve)*. It refers to existence, being, reality, truth, virtuous, excellent, proper, noble, and venerable *Ibid.*, p. 105.
- 82 *atīndriyaṃ punarmanaḥ sattvasaṃjñakaṃ, ‘cetaḥ’ ityāhureke*, CS, Su, VIII, 4.
- 83 The Vedāntins regard memory (*citta*) as one among the four modifications of inner instrument (*antaḥkaraṇa*). The other modifications are cognition, mind and “I- consciousness”. *evaṃvidhavṛttibhedena evamapyantaḥkaraṇaṃ mana iti, buddhiriti, ahaṃkāra iti, cittamiti cākhyāyate*, VP, p. 32; VC, 93, p. 33. *Citta* is responsible for remembrance: *anusandhānātmikāntaḥkaraṇavṛttiḥ cittaṃ*, VSA, II, 68; VC, 94, p. 34.
- 84 *karaṇāni mano buddhirbuddhikarmendriyaṇi ca kartuḥ śamyogajaṃ karma vedanā buddireva ca*, CS, Sa, I. 56.
- 85 *acetanaṃ kriyāvacca manaścetayita paraḥ*, *Ibid.*, 75.
- 86 *anindriyaṃ manaḥ, Parīkṣāmukhalaghuvṛtti*, II, 5, quoted in IP, p.3; See also EAIP, p. 88.
- 87 ‘.....*ubhayātmakaṃ manaḥ*’, SS, Sa, I. 4.
- 88 “*ubhayātmakaṃ manaḥ*”, Sa. Su. II. 26, see also SK, 27.



- 89 “....., *buddhīndriyaṃ karmendriyaṃ ca cakṣurādīnāṃ vāgādīnāṃ ca manodhiṣṭitānāmeva svasvaviṣayeṣu pravṛtteḥ*”. Vacaspatimiśra on SK.27, STK, p. 190.
- 90 Akṣapāda does not include mind in the group of sense organs. But he mentions it separately among the objects of valid knowledge, NS, I. i. 9. Jayantabhaṭṭa points out that mind is not included in the group of sense capacities because mind is not physical like the sense capacities; NM, part- II., “Prameyaprakaraṇaṃ”, p. 67; Kaṇāda also keeps silence in this matter. All other Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika writers recognize it as a sense organ. *indriyasya vai sato manasa indriyebhyaḥ pṛthagupadeśo dharmabhedāt*, N. Bh on NS, I, i, 4; Sreedharācārya on PBNK, p. 218.
- 91 *sukhādyupalabdhisādhanamindriyam manaḥ*, TSA, p.13; T. Bh, p. 168.
- 92 *manastu sukhādyaparokṣajñānasādhanendriyatvena kalpyate*, MM, p. 12.
- 93 *manodaśendriyadhyākṣaṃ hrtpadmagolake sthitam taccāntaḥkaraṇam bāhyeṣvasvātantriyādhvinendriyaiḥ*, Pañcadaśi, II. 12.
- 94 *indriyāṇi parāṅyāhurindriyebhyaḥ paraṃ manaḥ manasastu parā buddhīryo buddheḥ partastu saḥ*, BG, III. 42.
- 95 ARV, pp.89-90.
- 96 For details vide supra, p. 121.
- 97 CS, Su, VIII. 5.
- 98 “*rajastamaśca manasau doṣau*” CS, Vi, VI. 5; Su, I. 57, XXV. 11; Sa, II. 38.
- 99 *aṅutvamatha caikatvaṃ dvau guṇau manasaḥ smṛtau*, CS, Sa, I.19.

- 100 *svārthendriyārthasaṃkalpavyabhicariṇāccānekamekasmin puruṣe sattvaṃ, rajastamasattvaguṇayogācca; na cānekatvaṃ, nahyeka-manekakāleṣu pravartate; tasmānnaikakālā sarvendriyapravṛttihi*, CS, Su, VIII. 5.
- 101 *prayatnajñānayaugapadyādekaṃ*, KS, Sa, p. 67.
- 102 CS, Sa, III. 20-21.
- 103 *cañcalaṃ hi manaḥ kṛṣṇa pramāthi balavadadr̥ḍaṃ tasyāhaṃ nigrahaṃ manye vāyoriva suduṣkaraṃ*, BG, VI, 34.
- 104 *ahaṃkārikatvaśruterna bhautikāni*, S. Su, II. 20.
- 105 S. Su, V. 69, 70, 71; *manaso na niravayavatvaṃ. anekadravyeṣvekadā yogāt. kintu ghaṭavanmadhyamaparimāṇaṃ sāvayavamityarthaḥ*, Vijñānabhikṣu on S. Su, V, 71, SSV, p. 163.
- 106 *tadutpattiśrutervināśadarśanācca*, Sa. Su, II, 22. See also Vijñānabhikṣu on ibid., SSV, p.101.
- 107 CIPM, p. 3
- 108 *mano'pi cāsamavetaṃ bhūtam*. PTN, p. 29.
- 109 CIPM, p.3.
- 110 TSA, p.13;
- 111 *tadabhāvādaṇuḥ manaḥ*, NS, III. ii. 61; VS, VII. i, 23; PBNK, p. 222; *ayaugapadyajñānānāṃ tasyāṇutvamiheṣyate*, NSMK, p. 361.
- 112 *jñānāyaugapadyādekaṃ manaḥ*, NS, III. ii. 58.
- prayatnāyaugapadyājñānāyaugapadyāccaikaiṃ*, VS, III. ii. 3. PBNK, p. 121; *pratiśarīramekaṃ ca tat*, NM, Part-II., p. 68.

- 113 T. Bh, p.168.
- 114 “.....*vibhuparimāṇamaspandaṃ ca manaḥ*”, MM, p. 217.
- 115 Ibid., pp.217-18; *mano vibhuḥ viśeṣaguṇaśūnyadravyatvāt kālavat, mano vibhuḥ jñānasamavāyikāraṇa saṃyogādhāratvāt*, TDB, p. 56.
- 116 Dīpikā, TSA, p. 13. see also NSMK, p, 361.
- 117 EAIP, p. 71.
- 118 *bhavati ca bhautikatve liṅgam karaṇānāṃ ‘annamayaṃ hi saumyo manaḥ.....’*, (Ch. U, VI. V. 4.) Br. Bh, p. 276.
- 119 Caraka regards heart as the seat of *sattva, buddhi, indriya, ātmā ojas* and the channels of circulation. CS, Ci, XXIV. 35; See sprā, p. 223.
- 120 CS, Su, XXX. 6 - 7.
- 121 Ibid., 5.
- 122 “..... *prakupitā rajastomobhyāmupahatacetasāmantarātmanaḥ....., tadā janturapasmarati.*”, CS, Ni, VIII. 4.
- 123 *śirastālvantargataṃ sarvendriyaparaṃ manaḥ*. Bh.S, Ci, VIII. 2.
- 124 Bh. S, Ci, VIII. 4 - 6.
- 125 *ūrdhvaṃ prakupitā doṣāḥ śiraḥstālvantare sthitāḥ manaḥ sā (saṃ) dūṣayanyāśu tataścittaṃ vipadyate*, Ibid., 10.
- 126 *hṛdayamiti kṛtavīryo buddhermanasaśca sthānatvāt*, SS, Sa, III. 30;
- 127 *cetanāsahacaritaṃ mano’pi viśeṣeṇa hṛdayādhiṣṭhānaṃ*, Dalhaṇa on SS, Sa, IV. 32.
- 128 *tathā mano’pi prāyeṇa hṛdyeva tiṣṭhati*, Calkrapāṇi on CS, Su, XXX. 5.

- 129 Vāgbhaṭa indirectly refers to the location of mind as heart while discussing pathogenesis of *apasmāra*: “*hate sattve hṛdi vyāpte saṃjñāvāhiṣu kheṣu ca tamo viśan mūḍhamatirbībhatsāḥ kurute kriyāḥ*”. AH, Uttarasthāna, VII. 2-3.
- 130 ARV, p. 69.
- 131 *hṛdaye cittasaṃvid*, Y. Su, III, 34.
- 132 *taccāṅuparimāṇam, hṛdayāntarvarti*, T.Bh, p. 168.
- 133 *tathā hi suṣuptyanukūlamanahkriyayā manasā ātmano vibhāgastataḥ ātmamanahsaṃyoganāśastataḥ purītatirūpottaradeśena manahsaṃyogarūpā suṣuptirutpadyate*. Dinakari, NSMD, 248; TSA, p. 13 - 14.
- 134 CS, Su, XXI. 35.
- 135 CS, Sa, I. 20
- 136 Ibid., 21.
- 137 *indriyanirapekṣam mano yatgṛhṇāti taccintyam (yadi vā indriyagrhitamevārtham yatpunarindriyanirapekṣam mano gṛhṇāti taccintyam*, Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, VIII. 16.
- 138 *cintyam kartavyatayā akartavyatayā vā yanmanasā cintyate*, Cakrapāṇi on CS, Sa, I. 21.
- 139 *vicāryam upapattyanupapattibhyām yadvimṛśyate*, ibid.
- 140 *atroho ālocanājñānam nirvikalpakaṃ*, ibid.
- 141 *ūhyam ca yat śaṃbhāvanayā ūhyate ‘etadbhaviṣyati’ iti*, ibid.

- 142 *dhyeyaṃ bhāvanājñānaviṣayaṃ*, ibid.
- 143 *saṃkalpaṃ guṇavattayā doṣavattayā vā'vadhāraṇaṃ*, ibid.
- 144 *indriyeṇendriyārtho hi samanaskena gṛhyate kalpyate manasā tadūrdhvaṃ guṇato doṣato'thavā*, CS, Sa, I, 22.
- 145 Cakrapāṇī says that, the role of “I-consciousness” is not referred to in this sequel because it is alluded by the function of consciousness: “*ahaṃkāravvyāpāraścābhimananamihānukto'pi buddhivyāpāreṇaiva sūcito jñeyaḥ*”. See Cakrapāṇī on CS, Sa, I, 21.
- 146 *jāyate viṣaye tatra yā buddhirniścayātmikā vyavasyati tayā vaktuṃ kartuṃ vā buddhipūrvakaṃ*, CS, Sa, I, 23.
- 147 “*'ālocitamevendriyeṇa vastuvidaṃ' iti sammugdhaṃ. 'idameva, naivaṃ' iti samyakkalpayati viśeṣeṇa viśeṣyabhāvena vivecayatīti yāvat*”, Vācaspatimiśra on SK, 27. SKT, p. 190.
- 148 EAIP, p. 48.
- 149 SK.30; See also Vācaspatimiśra on ibid., p. 198.
- 150 CIPM, p. 3.
- 151 *manogrāhyaṃ sukhaṃ duḥkhecchādveṣo matiḥ kṛtiḥ*, NSMK, p.194. T.Bh, pp.190 - 191.
- 152 ARV, p.91.
- 153 *lakṣaṇaṃ manaso jñānasyā bhāvo bhāva eva ca sati hyātmendriyārthānāṃ sannikarṣe na vartate. vaivṛtyānmanaso jñānaṃ sānnidhyāttacca vartate*, CS, Sa, I, 18-19; KS, Sa, p. 67.

- 154 *ātmendriyārthsannikarṣe jñānasya bhāvo abhāvaśca manaso liṅgaṃ*, VS, III. ii. 1.
- 155 *satyapyātmendriyārthasānnidhye jñānasukhādīnāmabhūtvot-pattidarśanāt karaṇāntaramanumīyate*. PBNK, p. 213.
- 156 CIPM, p.74.
- 157 *yugapajñānānutpattirmanaso liṅgaṃ*, NS, I. i. 16.
- 158 NSMK, p.362.
- 159 Raghunātha Śiromaṇi justify the non-simultaneity of cognitions on the basis of merit and demerit: “*adṛṣṭaviśeṣopagrahasya niyāmakatvāca*”, PTN, p. 30.
- 160 CS, Su, VIII, 8.
- 161 Ibid., CS, Sa, I. 25,
- 162 Ibid., 26.
- 163 Ibid., 56-57.
- 164 *vākṣāṇipādapāyūpsthāni karmendriyānyāhuḥ*, SK, 26; Vijñānabhikṣu on S.Su, II. 19, SSV, p. 100.
- 165 VP, pp. 60; VSA, p. 49.
- 166 See “*vāgādīnāmīndriyatvakhaṇḍanaṃ*”, NM, Part -- II. pp. 54.
- 167 IP, p.1.
- 168 “Phenomenology and Indian, Philosophy, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya”, PIP p. 60. The Buddhists hold that the sense capacities are nothing but the end organs, IP, p. 5.

- 169 *iha khalu pañ cendriyāṇi, pañcendriyadravyāṇi, pañcendriyādhṣṭhānāṇi, pañcendriyārthāḥ, pañcendriyabuddhayo bhavanti, ityuktamindriyadhikāre.* CS, Su, VIII. 3.
- 170 Ibid., 10.
- 171 Ibid., 11.
- 172 *ṣaḍaṅgamaṅgaṃ vijñānamindriyānyarthapañcakaṃ ātmā ca saḡuṇāścetaścintyaṃ ca hṛdi saṃśritaṃ.* CS, Su, XXX, 4.
- 173 *śirasi indriyāni indriyaprāṇavahāni ca srotāṃsi sūryamiva gabhastayaḥ saṃśritāni,* CS, Si, IX. 4.
- 174 IP. p. 1.
- 175 *śarīrāśrayaṃ jñāturaparokṣapratītisādhanaṃ dravyamindriyaṃ,* PBNK, p. 82.
- 176 *svaviṣayagrahaṇalakṣaṇatvamindriyāṅāṃ,* NV, p. 72.
- 177 *śabdetaroḍbhūtaviśeṣaḡuṇānāśrayatve sati jñānakāraṇamana-saṃyogāśrayatvaṃ,* See Dīpikā, TSA, p. 7; NSMK, p.197.
- 178 CS, Sa, I. 24.
- 179 The articulation CS, Su, V.100 is an instance which is expressive of the transaction of the sense organs and body.
- 180 VS, VIII. ii. 5, 6; *ghrāṇarasanacakṣustvakśrotrāṇi bhūtebhyaḥ,* NS, I. i. 12; III. i. 60; *asti cāyamindriyāṅāṃ bhūtaguṇaviśeṣopalabdhiniyamaḥ tena bhūtaguṇaviśeṣopalabdheryanyāmahe bhūtaprakṛtīṅindriyāṇi nāvvyaktaprakṛtīṅīti,* Vātsyāyana on NS, III, i, N. Bh. p. 60; *bhautikāṅindriyāṅīti samarthitaṃ,* NV, p. 388; *evaṃ*

- bhautikānīndriyāṇi svam svam viṣayamadhigantumutsahanta iti tallakṣaṇatvameṣāṃ siddhyatīti ato bhūtebhaḥ ityuktaṃ*, NM, Part -- II, p. 51.
- 181 *indriyaṃ sarvaprāṇīnāṃ rūpavyaṅjakamanyāvayavānabhibhīū taistejo vayavai rārabdhaṃ cakṣuḥ*, PBNK, p. 99.
- 182 *śrotram punaḥ śravaṇavivarasaṃjñako nabhodeśaḥ*, Ibid., p. 152.
- 183 *pṛthivyādyanabhibhūtairvāyyuvavayavairārabdhaṃ sarvaśarīravypī tvagindriyaṃ*, Ibid., pp. 113 - 14.
- 184 Ibid, p. 96.
- 185 Ibid., p. 87.
- 186 *kiṃ kimātmakamiti yena yatguṇābhivyaktiḥ. tatra pārthivaṃ ghrāṇaṃ gandhābhivyaktihetutvād bahyapārthivadavyavaditi. evaṃ śeṣeṣvapi*, NV, p.395; *pārthivaṃ ghrāṇaṃ dravyatve sati rūpādimadhye gandhsyaiva vyaṅjakatvā gandhayuktadravyatvāt*, NM, Part--II, p. 53; NSMK, p. 124.
- 187 MM, pp.10-11. Jadunath Sinha points out that the Mīmāṃsakas regard the auditory organ as a portion of the space - *dik* confined with in the ear-hole. IP, p.15.
- 188 *sāttvika ekādaśaḥ prvartate vaikṛtādahaṃkārāt*, SK, 25. S. Su, II.18. vide supra cosmology.
- 189 *āhaṃkārikatvaśruterna bhautikāni*. S. Su, II. 20; see also Vijñānabhikṣu on ibid; *bhautikaṃ hi yāvat tāvadeva vyāpnoti abhautikaṃ tu vibhutvāt sarvavyāpakaṃ*, Vātsyāyana on NS, III. i. 31, N. Bh, p. 247.



- 190 IP, p. 4.
- 191 PVS. p. 165.
- 192 *tena bhūtavīśeṣaguṇopalabdhermanyāmahe bhūtaprakṛtīnīndriyāṇi navyaktikānīti*, Vātsyāyana on NS, III, i. 60, N. Bh, p. 269.
- 193 *tatra vaikārikādahaṃkārāttaijasasahāyāttallakṣaṇānyevaikādaśendriyāṇyutpadyante*, SS , Sa, I. 4.
- 194 *etaiśca satvaguṇopetaiḥ pañcabhūtairyastairyathākramaṃ śrotratvakcaḥsurasanagrāṇāni pañcajñānendriyāṇi jāyante*, VP, p. 159; VSA, p. 45;
- 195 *etaireva rajoguṇopetaiḥ pañcabhūtairyathākramaṃ vākpāṇipādapāyūpsthākhyāni karmendriyāṇi jāyante*, VP, p.160.
- 196 *manaḥ puraḥsarāṇīndriyāṇyarthagrāhaṇasamarthāni bhavanti*, CS, Su, VIII. 7.
- 197 *tatra yadyadātmakamindriyaṃ viāśeṣāttattadātmkamevārthamanuḡṛhṇāti*, tatsvabhāvādvibhutvācca, Ibid., 14.
- 198 *cikitsadiprayogastu golake yaḥ pravartate so'yam adhārasaṃskāra ādheyasyopakāraḥ*, NM, Part--II, p. 51.
- 199 IP, p. 2, 27.
- 200 *bhautikendriyavāde'pi prāpyakāritvasiddhirna kāpilakathitamāhaṃkārīkatvamindriyāṇāmupapadyate*, NM, Part--II. p. 52.
- 201 IP, p. 2.
- 202 Ibid., p. 21.

- 203 *tatraikaṃ sparśanamindriyāṇāmindriyavāpakaṃ, cetaḥsamavāyi, sparśanavyāptervyāpakamapi ca cetaḥ;*, CS, Su, XI. 38.
- 204 see Cakrapāṇi on ibid.
- 205 CS, Sa, VII. 4. Suśruta describes seven layers of skin. see SS, Sa, V. 6.
- 206 See NS, III. i. 52-54.
- 207 see “ekendriyavādakhaṇḍanaṃ”, NM, part--II, pp. 53-54.
- 208 “*indriyaṃ sparśagrāhakaṃ tvak sarvaśarīravarti.*”, TSA, p. 9; *śarīravvyāpakaṃ sparśagrāhakamindriyaṃ tvak*, NSMK, p.146. Kaṇāda is silent in this matter.
- 209 *tvañmanaḥsaṃyogo jñānasāmānye kāraṇamityarthaḥ*, NSMK, p.191.
- 210 CS, Su, VIII. 12.

## Chapter - VI

### SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE (*pramāṇas* )

The Sanskrit word *pramāṇa*, as indicated by its constituents, denotes source of knowledge. It is derived from the root “*ma*”<sup>1</sup> which means to measure by prefixing “*pra*” and dissolving the instrumental infix “*lyuṭ*”. The word has three different but closely connected meanings: (1) a source of knowledge with out referring to its being either true or false, (2) a source of valid knowledge or (3) a means of scrutiny.<sup>2</sup> Thus, *pramāṇa* basically deals with the moot epistemological question “How do we know?” Probably it is one of the toughest problems that the human thought has ever confronted. It dwells on various types of knowledge from sensory experience to transcendental perception of ultimate reality. *Carakasamhitā* includes a comprehensive treatment of the various sources of knowledge from an epistemologist’s point of view.

Caraka was circumspect of the fact that a person who wants to become a successful physician must know the reality of human constitution and the world beyond his nerve endings, their relations, and the universal principle which co-ordinates and governs them. Also, he was aware of the fact that the knowledge gained must open to view what is hidden and must have the competence to lead to fruitful efforts. So a proper understanding of the sources of knowledge is essential, since the knowledge that derives from it

manifests objects by removing the mist and veil. It is with this view that Caraka, the extreme realist, incorporates the sources of knowledge in which both rational and practical aspects are found complementary. It finally gives his compendium a philosophical as well as scientific temper.

### **Classification and general definition**

A number of definitions have been given by the various system makers for *pramāṇas*. But Caraka does not give a general definition. Caraka starts the description of the sources of knowledge with the categorization of all entities as the existent and the-consequent non-existent revealing that he is an extreme realist. For him the external world is a reality and is accessible to reason. Thus, he classifies reality into two namely things that exist (*sat*) and things that do not exist (*asat*). He further classifies the sources of valid knowledge into verbal testimony (*āptavacana*), perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and heuristic (continuous) reasoning (*yukti*) and they are collectively called examination (*parīkṣa*).<sup>3</sup> On certain occasions, he speaks of three divisions of the sources of knowledge only.<sup>4</sup> Cakrapāṇi says that *yukti* is not stated separately in this context because it is implied by inference.<sup>5</sup> In addition to the above mentioned four *pramāṇas*, he also refers to other three *pramāṇas* namely analogy (*aupamya*), presumption (*arthāprāpti*) and inclusion or probability (*saṃbhava*).<sup>6</sup> Among them, *aupamya* and *arthaprāpti*, correspond to *upamāna* and *arthāpatti*. However, the sources of knowledge which Caraka recognizes as the most important are verbal testimony (*āptavacana*), perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference

(*anumāna*), and heuristic reasoning (*yukti*). They are designated by the common term *parīkṣa*. Others are not raised to such a rank.

The use of the term *parīkṣa* for the sources of knowledge, in general, is peculiar to Carakasamhitā and it primarily pinpoints to the fact that they are being conceived as a means of verification leading to right cognition or true judgment. Thus, what is real is of the nature that it submits to the scrutiny of reason and naturally the word *parīkṣa* is used in the third sense of the word *pramāṇa* cited above. This shows his rationalistic and pragmatic approach to knowledge. It was inevitable for Caraka to employ and explain the source of true judgment. Elsewhere he himself says that specific features of diseases can be determined by the three different sources of valid knowledge namely, perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and verbal testimony (*śabda*).<sup>7</sup>

The word *parīkṣa* signifies scrutiny and so it is the most accurate word for the source of reflective knowledge described by Caraka. Caraka has significantly stated that in order to arrive at infallible knowledge of diseases one should acquire verbal knowledge first and then proceed to examine by direct observation (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).<sup>8</sup> Quite similar to that, in Nyāyabhāṣya, inference is being treated as the final source of true judgment of things that are known by perception and verbal testimony. It is in this sense that inference is called *ānvīkṣa* and the Nyāya system which works by it is *ānvīkṣikī*.<sup>9</sup> If Caraka recognizes perception and inference as sources of examination for true judgment, Vātsyāyana declares that inference is the final source of judgmental knowledge<sup>10</sup>. This shows the

development in the concept of *parīkṣa* expressed by Caraka in the later period in Nyāya philosophy.

Kaṇāda does not give a general definition of *pramāṇas*. Instead of that, he defines valid knowledge as the knowledge free from all faults<sup>11</sup>. The Nyāya-sūtra also gives no general definition of the source of knowledge. But his commentators Vātsyāyana<sup>12</sup> and Udyotakāra<sup>13</sup> define it as the cause of cognition. Bhāsarvajña defines *pramāṇa* as the source of right cognition.<sup>14</sup> Jayantabhaṭṭa defines it as the collection of all the conditions of true judgment which are other than illusory or doubtful.<sup>15</sup>

Quite similar to the Naiyāyikas, the Bhāṭṭas define it as the instrument of knowledge which brings about the valid cognition of an object which is not previously comprehended.<sup>16</sup> Experience which is other than recollection is *pramāṇa* for the Prābhākaras.<sup>17</sup> The Buddhists consider the knowledge which is not contradicted by experience as valid knowledge (*avisamvādakaṃ jñānaṃ samyakjñānaṃ*).<sup>18</sup> The Buddhist logician Dinnāga defines it as that which brings about the cognition of an object which is not previously comprehended.<sup>19</sup> The Vedānta-sūtra does not pay more attention to the *pramāṇas*, the source and authority of knowledge, than the other systems<sup>20</sup>.

Even though various thinkers have given their own definitions, all of them agree to the point that *pramāṇas* are sources of valid knowledge leading to effective activity<sup>21</sup>. The *pramāṇas* accepted by the different schools of thought are as follows: The Cārvākas admit only perception as a source of valid knowledge.<sup>22</sup> The Buddhists<sup>23</sup> and Vaiśeṣikas,<sup>24</sup> admit two, perception

and inference; the Sāṃkhyas<sup>25</sup> three: perception, inference, and verbal testimony; the Naiyāyikas<sup>26</sup> four: perception, inference, analogy, and verbal testimony as sources of valid knowledge; the Prābhākaras<sup>27</sup> recognize a fifth one also, namely presumption (*arthāpatti*); the Bhāṭṭas<sup>28</sup> and the Vedāntins<sup>29</sup> admit one more, non-apprehension (*abhāva*); the Paurāṇikas<sup>30</sup> again adds two more, probability (*saṃbhava*) and historical tradition (*aitihya*).

As far as Āyurveda is concerned, it has got a high pragmatic value. It makes use of the *pramāṇas* in diagnosis of diseases and applying therapeutic measures as has been exemplified in Carakaśaṃhitā. After grasping the characteristic features of the disease from scriptural testimony, the physician examines the diseased by direct observation and inference and arrives at a conclusion regarding the disease. One who is skillful in operating this procedure seldom fails to act properly as a physician.<sup>31</sup>

### **Verbal Testimony (*śabda*)**

In the theory on the source of knowledge, perception occupies the undisputed place because it is immediate cognition. Moreover, it is the foundation on which all other *pramāṇas* operate. So perception is discussed first in all most all philosophical systems. Quite contrary to that, Caraka places primacy on verbal testimony because in Āyurveda scriptural knowledge is an essential prerequisite for a physician. It is only after attaining competency in scriptural testimony that a physician becomes proficient in making use of the other sources of knowledge for diagnosis. In Indian tradition, it is a conventional belief that truth reveals itself to a

man with pure heart and chaste mind when he engages in sincere and deep meditation, with a view to providing social welfare and without the slightest trace of selfish interest. Such is the belief in the ultimate revelatory nature of knowledge.<sup>32</sup>

Caraka defines verbal testimony as the authoritative instructions of reliable persons (*āpta*).<sup>33</sup> Trustworthy persons (*āptas*) are authoritative and enlightened persons who are freed from *rajas* and *tamas* by spiritual endeavour and knowledge. Such persons have a clear and untainted vision of things belonging to the present, the past, and the future. The teachings of such trustworthy persons are regarded as authentic.<sup>34</sup> Their words are regarded as authentic because they have an unimpaired memory and complete knowledge free from doubts, attachment, and affliction.<sup>35</sup> Further *śabda* is seen to be included in the table of logical terms. There it is said that a word (*śabda*) is a collection of letters and that it is of four kinds, namely perceived purport (*drṣṭārtha*), unperceived purport (*adrṣṭārtha*), truth (*satya*) and untruth (*anṛta*).<sup>36</sup> According to this definition and division, *śabda* refers to articulations of all types without considering whether they are authoritative or not. It brings about some ambiguity due to the inclusion of untruth as one of its divisions. It may mislead to the conclusion that statements of any person can be treated as a source of valid cognition. But according to the Carakasamhitā itself, all sentences, particularly of untruth, in no way, can be treated as the source of valid cognition. Caraka has not only explained in clear terms the specific qualities essential for a man to be recognized as a trustworthy person, but he has also cautioned that the intoxicated, mad,



the illiterate persons and persons having attachment should not be treated as bona fide<sup>37</sup>.

Caraka primarily accepts Vedas as authoritative scriptures (*āptāgama*). He includes the knowledge of moral rule, spiritual goals and practices derived *from* the Vedic scriptures in verbal testimony. At the same time, the duly verified and established doctrines by critical thinkers in other secular disciplines which do not contradict the objects of Veda and are aimed at the well-being of the universe were also treated with greater importance<sup>38</sup>. This shows his unbiased synthesizing attitude. Referring to this, P.V. Sarma points out that Caraka was a *daiṣṭika* who accepted both *āstika* and *nāstika* views as logic permitted. *Diṣṭa* is a term which Pāṇini puts in between *asti* and *nāsti*. The last two are at opposite poles while the first one (*diṣṭa*) balances the two. The *daiṣṭikas*, choose one of the two after critically examining the facts and circumstances<sup>39</sup>. However we cannot deny the fact that Caraka was an *āstika* even though he adopted a neutral approach.

Akṣapāda describes verbal testimony as the assertion of a worthy person (*āpta*) which is further followed by the later thinkers.<sup>40</sup> With regard to the question as to who an *āpta* is, Vātsyāyana says that he is one who operates through the direct and intuitive knowledge of things. Quite different from the Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas consider that the knowledge derived from the Vedas is valid, since they are the utterances of *īśvara*. He adds that *āptas* need not be sages. Even foreigners (*mlecchas*) can be *āptas*.<sup>41</sup> It is relevant to note that the Nyāya-sūtra refers to only the first two divisions,

namely *dṛṣṭārtha* and *adrṣṭārtha*.<sup>42</sup> This is certainly because he is fully aware of the fact that articulations of the truth will only come under the purview of *śabda* and as such the divisions are enough. Thus, he excludes untruth from *śabda*. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas describe verbal testimony in the following way: When the words of a sentence are heard there arises the recollection of the meaning of the words. The recollection gives rise to sense of the sentence, which is not in contact.<sup>43</sup> They give a different division of verbal testimony namely human (*pauruṣeya*) and superhuman (*apauruṣeya*). The first is the words of reliable persons and the second is the Vedic scriptures.<sup>44</sup> The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, at the same time, recognize only the Vedic scriptures as verbal cognition.<sup>45</sup> The reason is that though the words of a man lead to the inference of the intention of the speaker they do not convey themselves the meaning of the sentence because their capacity is made blunt by doubt.<sup>46</sup> Kaṇāda asserts that the cognition derived from verbal testimony is a variety of inference and it is attested by his followers. In classical Sāṃkhya, reliable authority (*āptāgama*) is verbal testimony.<sup>47</sup> The Vedāntins and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas consider only the Vedic scriptures as authority. At the same time, Caraka, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, and some other systems consider the articulations of trustworthy persons as authority.

### **Perception (*pratyakṣa*)**

Sense perception is the natural and direct way of cognizing external things. It leads to immediate cognition. In common with other living creatures, man has the capacity for sensory experience. It is the principal

means of once knowledge of the physical world.<sup>48</sup> When a thing is directly perceived, there is no desire for further cognition. For instance, when an ordinary person hears from a reliable that there is fire in a certain place, then he has the verbal knowledge of fire from his words. If he desires for further definite cognition, he proceeds to the spot. There, on seeing the smoke, he infers that there is the fire. If he again proceeds to have a determinate cognition, he apprehends it when fire is presented before his eyes. The cognition of fire attained by this direct sense-object contact is perception. It is final and there ends his desire for further cognition of that fire. So perception is placed as the first in the hierarchy of *pramāṇas* in all other systems.

The Buddhist logician Dinnāga defines perception as a kind of knowledge which is devoid of determination.<sup>49</sup> Dharmakīrti, who improves upon the definition, says that perception is a cognition that is generated by the objects not associated with names, and which is not erroneous.<sup>50</sup> Here, the absence of association of names is denoted by the expression *kalpanāpoḍha*.<sup>51</sup> According to Dharmottara the cognition which is associated with a name is determinate (*savikalpaka*).<sup>52</sup> Thus, perception is non-erroneous indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka*).<sup>53</sup>

In Nyāya philosophy, Akṣapāda defines perception as the cognition which arises from the connection between the sense organ and the object, which is devoid of the association with verbal cognition, which is not erroneous, and which is of the nature of certainty.<sup>54</sup> Accordingly, if a

perceptual judgment generated by the contact of sense with the object is to be true it must satisfy three conditions, namely (1) it must not be associated with verbal cognition (*avyapadeśyam*) (2) it must not be erroneous (*avyabhicāri*), and (3) it must be determinate (*vyavasāyātmaṅ*). Of them the first condition implies that when the perception of an object takes place, it must not be associated with a word or a name heard from a person uttering it just at the time the object is perceived. For instance, when one sees a pot and another says that “here is a pot” the knowledge derived from the articulation is not to be taken as perception but as verbal. The second condition is that it must not be erroneous. Erroneous cognition is the cognition of a thing as what it is not. Sometimes there may be erroneous cognitions from the contact of sense with the object. For example, when the flickering at a distance comes into contact with the eye, it is often recognised as water. This misapprehension is erroneous and hence it is not counted as perception.<sup>55</sup> As defined by Gangeśa Upādhyāya perceptual cognition is the knowledge in which no other knowledge is instrumental.<sup>56</sup> Kaṇāda does not give a direct and independent definition of perception. But it is implied by certain *sūtras*<sup>57</sup> which indicate that the contact of self, mind, sense, and object is the source of perceptual knowledge. Praśastapāda, who classifies valid knowledge into four (perceptive knowledge, inferential knowledge, recollection, and knowledge of sages)<sup>58</sup>, defines perception as the knowledge that which proceeds from the contacts of each sense-organ with its objects<sup>59</sup>. Further he makes it clear that the immediate cause is the sense object contact though the contact of the four namely self, mind, sense, and object is essential

for perception, the immediate cause is sense-object contact. So it is taken into consideration for the definition. The contact of the mind and self is a general condition for all cognitions. Kaṇāda says that merits and demerits of the perceiver, as well as time and space are also causal factors. Perception of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are caused by the contact between the self and the internal sense organ, mind.<sup>60</sup>

Jaimini, in his Mīmāṃsā-sūtra defines perception as cognition that is produced when there is the contact of human sense organs<sup>61</sup>. The Bhāṭṭas define it as valid knowledge generated by the contact of the senses with their objects.<sup>62</sup> The Prābhākaras say that perception is immediate cognition<sup>63</sup>. In Advaita Vedānta, mind is not an instrument of internal perception as an organ. So they do not accept the definition given by the Naiyāyikas, which does not include internal perception, unless mind (*antakaraṇa*) is considered as its instrument (*indriya*).<sup>64</sup> On the contrary, they accept the definition given by the Prābhākaras.<sup>65</sup> The Vedāntins say that the immediacy of knowledge, referred to here, does not rest on its being caused by the sense organs, but it rests on the intrinsic characteristic of immediate presence of the consciousness.<sup>66</sup>

Perception, according to classical Sāṃkhya, is the determinate cognition (*adhyavasāya*) of each individual object<sup>67</sup> by means of sense organs. Though it is conceived as the function of *buddhi*,<sup>68</sup> *ahaṅkāra*, and *manas* are also involved in it.

Caraka defines perception as the manifestation of the intellectual faculty (*buddhi*) as a result of the contact of the soul, mind, sense organ, and the object.<sup>69</sup> As far as the perception of the external world is concerned, the contact of external sense organs with the object is the immediate cause. The contact of the self with the mind is, after all, a common condition for all cognitions as has been stated in the case of the Naiyāyikās. But it is included in the definition of perception to bring the cognition of pleasure, pain, desire, and aversion with in the purview of perception.<sup>70</sup> The perception of these qualities by the contact of the self and mind is called *ātmapratyakṣā*<sup>71</sup> and by the external sense organs is called sense perception (*indriya pratyakṣā*). Cakrapāṇi speaks of five kinds of sense-object relation based on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, which are not mentioned in Carakasamhitā. The five relations thus stated are (1) *saṃyoga*, the relation of sense organ with the substances like pot, (2) *samyukta-samavāya*, the relation with the quality (*guṇa*) like colour of the pot through the thing in which they inhere, (3) *samyukta-samaveta-samavāya*, the relation with the universals of the those qualities like colourness (*rūpatva*) of the pot which inheres in the colour by *samavāya* (4) *samavāya*, the relation of the auditory sense with the sound generating sound perception, (5) *samavetasamavāya*, the relation of the auditory sense with the universal of sound (*śabdatva*) creating its perception.<sup>72</sup> Cakrapāṇi omits the sixth relation (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*) which is construed as the cause of the perception of non-existence. This explanation of perception given by Caraka is something peculiar when compared to that of the other systems particularly

Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is a fact that all of them agree to the point that sense-object proximity is the immediate cause of perceptive knowledge. Still there exists a great difference between the cognising processes among them.

The Sāṃkhyas describe the knowing process in terms of consciousness, “I consciousness”, mind, and sense organs with out the involvement of *puruṣa* which is unaffected, immutable pure consciousness. The untainted and pure *buddhi* reaches out to the object and assumes the form of the object as a pot or a cloth.<sup>73</sup> When the sense-organs come into contact with the object, the inertia (*tamas*) of the *buddhi* is overcome, and the essence (*sattva*) springs forth from it, in consequence of which a definite and determinate cognition of the object is produced.<sup>74</sup> The process of perception is further illustrated in the following way. Just like the head man of a village collects taxes from the villagers and hands them over to the governor of the province; the governor to the minister, and minister to the King, the external sense organs<sup>75</sup> communicate the immediate discrete impressions, and the mind ratiocinates them and gives them to the “I consciousness” (*ahaṃkāra*) which appropriates them by its unity of apperception and gives these self appropriated apperceived impressions to the *buddhi* for the experience of the self (*puruṣa*).<sup>76</sup> One of the important points to be noted in this connection is the following. The Sāṃkhyās consider that *puruṣa* is distinct from the *buddhi*. At the same time they argue that the manifestation of *ahaṃkāra* in the form of “I know” is due to the non-apprehension of the distinctness of *puruṣa* (pure consciousness) from

the cognition present in the *buddhi* and so it is called *abhimāna*.<sup>77</sup> The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do not admit this.<sup>78</sup> For them *buddhi* is a specific quality of the self. Contradicting the Sāṃkhya thesis, Udyotakāra says that if consciousness and soul were separate entities then the soul could not apprehend thing presented in the *buddhi*, for the reason that apprehensions of one conscious entity can never be cognized by another conscious entity.<sup>79</sup> Supporting the view, Śankaramiśra says that properties like cognition can exist only as the properties of an agent. Manifestation of *ahaṃkāra* in the form of “I know”, “I cognize” and “I intuit” takes place only in communion with the Self which is the substratum.<sup>80</sup>

Even though the Naiyāyikas overcome the constraints of dualism of *buddhi* and *puruṣa* by regarding the former as quality of the self and lay down the general condition of mind-self contact and special condition of sense-object contact, they do not explain the specific functions of the different factors involved in perception. Nor do they explain relations between the self and the object and the correspondence between knowledge forms and object forms.<sup>81</sup>

It is in this context that the Caraka’s thesis of perception reveals its uniqueness. Caraka describes the knowing process in terms of self, intellect, “I consciousness”, mind, and sense organs. The perceptual faculty or *buddhi* assumes the various forms as it enters the channels of different sense organs. Thus, seeing becomes the colour seen; hearing assumes or becomes the sound heard and so forth in accordance with the contact. Similarly, the consciousness that enters the channels of mental faculty manifests itself



into the forms of anxiety, sorrow, and so forth.<sup>82</sup> This prima-facie evidence may lead to the conclusion that the perceptual process construed by Caraka is the very same process described in classical Sāṃkhya<sup>83</sup> who consider sense faculties as egoistic (*āhaṃkārikas*) giving room for the above mentioned contradiction. But Caraka obviates this contradiction of dualism. In Caraka's thesis, *puruṣa* is the ultimate substantial cause and at the same time the agent of cognition, which is against the basic concept of classical Sāṃkhya who hold that *puruṣa* is an untainted indifferent spectator and has no involvement in cognition. As far as Caraka is concerned, *puruṣa* is not an indifferent spectator, but he is the real knower (*jñāḥ*). The manifestation of *ahaṃkāra* in the form of "I cognize" is not because of the non-apprehension of the distinctness of *puruṣa* by cognition present in the *buddhi* but because of the truth that the self becomes the owner of cognition. With out admitting such a fact, it is not possible to recognize *puruṣa* as the agent (*karta*) of all actions and enjoyer (*bhokta*) of the fruit of all his actions. Another thing is that just like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists, Caraka, on the one hand, construes sense capacities as physical and includes *buddhi* in the class of qualities. On the other side, quite similar to that of the Sāṃkhya, *buddhi* is conceived as the first evolute and determinate cognition as its modification. That is, determinate cognition is the modification of the evolute *buddhi* which is actually the material medium radiated by quality consciousness of the self. So naturally, when objects are presented to the *buddhi* it becomes the cognition of the self. So there does not arise the problem of cognising the cognitions of conscious entity by another conscious entity as in the Sāṃkhya

philosophy. Thus, by accepting the involvement of self in the process of cognition and by conceiving consciousness as the quality of the self, he has successfully solved the basic constrain that the dualistic Sāṃkhya faced with. It is something unique of Caraka that it is not by confrontation with the other systems but by accepting what is found reasonable in the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Sāṃkhya systems that he has formulated his thesis.

Caraka conceives the perceptual process as psychophysical from a realistic point of view. But he does not maintain that the object perceived is directly apprehended by one's sense capacities or mind. In cognizing an object all that is directly known by the senses is its qualities. Though the five sense-organs are constituted by all the five proto - physical elements, each sense-organ is predominated by a particular element. Thus the sense of sight is preponderated by fire, the sense of hearing by *ākāśa*, sense of smell by earth, sense of taste by water, and the sense of touch by air. The contact of the sense organs with the object is made possible by the identical nature (*tat svabhāvāt*) of the proto-physical element in the sense organ and the object, and also the pervasive nature (*vibhutva*) which is typical of the sense organs<sup>84</sup>. The conditions namely the identical nature of the predominating element of the sense-organ and the object, and the pervasive nature of the sense organ, which are described as the pre-requisites for perception are some thing peculiar to Caraka. The objects are immediately presented to the senses. They form the "sense-data". Sensations mean the awareness of sense-data.

Apprehension of truth or the fact arises when all the necessary conditions are fulfilled. Otherwise, invalid cognition in the form of an error, doubt or disbelief results.<sup>85</sup> For correct sense perception the sense organs must be free from obstructions. It may be significant to note that the Carakasamhitā, quite similar to that of the Sāṃkhyas, refers to certain obstacles to perception. They are over proximity, over distance, barrier, inadequate functioning of sense organs, lack of attention, confusion with other similar objects, overcome by stronger luminaries, and subtleness<sup>86</sup>.

### **Inference (*anumāna*)**

The word *anumāna* is constituted by adding the prefix “*anu*” (after) to the stem “*māna*” (measuring) and it literally means measuring after. Keeping in conformity with the etymological sense, Vātsyāyana defines inference thus: Inference consists in subsequent measurement of an object (*artha*) by the measuring sign.<sup>87</sup> Thus, it means the source by which knowledge is derived from knowledge. *Anumāna* is a logical process of acquiring knowledge which consists in an ordered series of cognitive episodes. The knowledge thus gained is called *anumiti* in Sanskrit which *literally* means the consequent knowledge.

Before going to Carakasamhitā, let us see the explanations of *anumāna* given in the various systems of philosophy. With the exception of the Cārvākas, all the philosophical systems admit inference as a mode of knowing the world. The classical Sāṃkhyas define inference as the cognition based on the prior knowledge of the “characteristic mark” (*liṅga*) and that

which bears the mark (*liṅgi*).<sup>88</sup> Ísvarakṛṣṇa classifies inference into three types<sup>89</sup>. But he does not further explain them. His commentators who name them widely differ in their interpretation. Paramārtha's Chinese version on Sāṃkhya Kārikā calls them as *pūrvavat*, *śeśavat* and *samanyato dṛṣṭa*<sup>90</sup> and interprets thus: (1) inference from the cause or *a-priori*, for example from rain clouds the rain; (2) inference from the effect or *a-posteriori*, for example it must have rained because the river is flowing; and (3) inference by analogy. In Gaudapāda's *Sāṃkhyakārikabhāṣya*, *pūrvavat* and *samanyatodṛṣṭa* are the same as above while *śeśavat* is interpreted in terms of inference from a part to its whole. For instance, the saltiness of the whole waters is inferred from its salty drop. Vācaspatimiśra discusses all these three inferences on the basis of a two fold division namely affirmative (*vita*) and negative (*avita*). *Vita* includes *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as affirmative. *Śeśavat* is negative (*avita*).<sup>91</sup>

Akśapāda who attaches much importance to the ways of knowing states that inference preceded from perception and that it is of three kinds: *a-priori* (*pūrvavat*), *a-posteriori* (*śeśavat*) and commonly seen (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*).<sup>92</sup> Vātsyāyana explains that the perception mentioned refers to the knowledge, the antecedents of which are the observation of the invariable relation of the middle term (*hetu*) with the major term (*sādhya*). Thus by means of recollection of the invariable relation and observation of the middle term (*hetu*), the unknown object or the major term (*sādhya*) is inferred<sup>93</sup>. He further interprets the three kinds of inference in two ways.

## 1. *Pūrvavat*

(a) When the effect is inferred from a cause it is called *pūrvavat*<sup>94</sup>. For instance, on seeing clouds we infer that there will be rain.

(b) The inference of an object from the perception of another thing based on the prior perception of their invariable connection<sup>95</sup>. For example, inferring of fire from smoke.

## 2. *Śeṣavat*

(a) It is the inference of the cause from the perception of the effect.<sup>96</sup> For example, when one sees that the river is full and the current is swifter, he infers that there has been rain.

(b) Secondly the word *śeṣavat* is interpreted as “that which remains” (*pariśeṣa*). Hence, *śeṣavat amumāna* (inference of exclusion) is that in which with regard to an object some of the likely properties being denied, we infer that remain. For example, sound is an entity and is transient, and these two properties are common to substances, qualities, and actions. Then we eliminate substancehood of sound, because sound inheres in a single substance. Then we find that sound is not an action, because it is the originator of another sound. Thus, through this elimination reasoning, we arrive at the conclusion that sound must be a quality.<sup>97</sup>

## 3. *Sāmānyatod ṛ ṣṭa*.

(a) It is an inference based on general observation. For instance, we have observed a thing in a place different from where we have seen it before,

only when it has moved. From this observed general fact we infer that the sun must be moving even though we cannot perceive it.<sup>98</sup>

(b) Even when the relation of the middle term and the major term is not perceptible, the major term is inferred from the similarity of the middle term to something else<sup>99</sup>. For instance, the soul is inferred from the qualities such as desire. Here the relation of desire and the like is not perceived. But it is inferred that desire being a quality must inhere in a substance. And the substance thus inferred is confirmed as soul.

Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda use the term *laiṅgika* for inference and define it as valid knowledge derived from the comprehension of a sign (*liṅga*).<sup>100</sup> *Liṅga* means the sign or middle term possessing pervasion or invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) with the major term (*sādhya*). A middle term (*liṅga*) proper is expected to fulfill three conditions for a correct inferential knowledge. They are: (1) It must be present in the locus or minor term (*pakṣa*) where the major term (*sādhya*) is to be inferred. (2) It must have invariable concomitance with the major term in all other known inferential loci (*sapakṣa* or positive example) (3) It must be absent in all such loci which is devoid of *sādhya* (negative example or *vipakṣa*).<sup>101</sup> Here the first condition refers to the resident of sign or middle term (*pakṣadharmata*) while the last two refer invariable concomitance. The sign which is devoid of either one or two of the characteristics mentioned is called fallacious sign (*aliṅga*).<sup>102</sup> The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas define inference as the cognition of what is not proximate resulting from the perception of what is pervaded<sup>103</sup>. Inferring for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) and inferring for others

(*parārthānumāna*) are the two types of inferences recognised by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school<sup>104</sup>. Among the two, the latter is syllogism which consists in a five step presentation (*pañcāvayava* or *nyāya*)<sup>105</sup> for the purpose of generating a veridical cognition in another person.

Caraka was fully aware of the fact that the scope of perception is very limited. Things beyond perception are unlimited. Even the things known through sense faculties are themselves not really the objects of perception. Moreover the assumption that things known through perception are the only realities and that there exists nothing beyond is absurd. So Caraka says that one has to rely on other sources of knowledge also for a complete knowledge.<sup>106</sup>

Caraka defines *anumāna* as inferential process (*tarka*) based on reasoning.<sup>107</sup> Caraka accepts *yukti* that functions as a conjecture which helps to arrive at true judgment in respect of the unknown object by the elimination of contrary suppositions. Cakrapāṇi interprets the term *yukti* in the articulation as invariable relation.<sup>108</sup> Caraka asserts three things regarding inference. They are: (1) Inference is a distinct source of knowledge based on a prior perception. (2) There are three kinds of inference. (3) Inferences have access to objects of three times<sup>109</sup>. Of them the first assertion is that perception is the cause of inference. It implies that if one is to have an inferential knowledge one must have an actual perceived knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the middle term (*liṅga*) and the the major term (*sādhya*) and must remember it at the time when one perceives that particular sign.<sup>110</sup> This knowledge of invariable concomitance is called

‘*vyāptijñāna*’<sup>111</sup> and is considered as the instrumental cause of inference in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It must be noted Caraka has not mentioned the invariable relation in its technical sense.

Though Caraka speaks of three different kinds of inferences, he neither calls them by specific names nor defines them. Instead, he only exemplifies them. The examples suggested are (1) the inference of fire from smoke, (2) the inference of sexual intercourse from pregnancy, and (3) production of fruit from the seed respectively.<sup>112</sup> Cakrapāṇi, commenting on the dictum in conformity with the divisions in the Nyāya-sūtra, says that, the first one represents the inference based on general correlation, second one the inference of the cause from the effect, and the third one the effect from the cause. They are also interpreted in relation to time as stated by Caraka himself. Thus, the example for the inference based on general correlation (inference of fire from smoke) it is also related to the present. Sexual intercourse from pregnancy, the example of inference of the cause from effect, is related to the past. The production of fruit from seed which is an example of the inference of the effect from the cause is related to the future.<sup>113</sup>

In the therapeutic context, five kinds of signs (*liṅgas*) are suggested for inferring diseases which are beyond perception. They are *hetu*, *pūrvarūpa*, *rūpa*, *upaśaya*, and *saṃprāpti*. A physician must be conversant with the concomitance of these five types of signs with the diseases prior to the diagnosis of a disease in order to arrive at right judgements.<sup>114</sup> Similarly, a long list of inferences that have greater value in determining the



psychosomatic conditions is also given. The inference of digestive fire from the power of digestion, strength from the capacity for exercise, conditions of senses from their capacity to perceive, existence of mind from the perception of specific objects in the presence of all other senses and their respective objects, and *rajoguṇa* from attachment to woman are some of them. Caraka does not conspicuously differentiate *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* as we see in the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. Yet he categorically explains *parārthānumāna* under the name *sthapana*.<sup>115</sup>

### Heuristic reasoning (*yukti*)

One of the most striking features of Carakasamhitā in the matter of the description of the source of knowledge is the introduction of *yukti*. In no other systems of knowledge *yukti* is found to be accepted as a distinct source of knowledge.<sup>116</sup> The description of *yukti* along with the other sources of knowledge is the original contribution of Caraka. It is a way of arriving at right judgment of things by an intellectual exercise which involves the right combination of manifold causes or reasons. Such right judgements are practically effective in all the three times and subserves in accomplishing the three ends of life (*trivarga- dharma, artha, and kāma*).<sup>117</sup> Caraka cites several examples to illustrate *yukti*. One of them is the ascertainment of the sprouting of the plant from the combination of the causative factors, ploughed wet land, seed, and seasons<sup>118</sup>. Cakrapāṇi says that *yukti* is not a separate *pramāṇa*. Since it subserves a *pramāṇa* in the form of *ūha* in discovering the truth, it is being treated as a *pramāṇa*. It is because of this reason, he says, that Caraka speaks of only three *pramāṇās* elsewhere. He

does not see any difference between *yukti* and *anumāna*. He points out that cases like this, where a conclusion is reached by reasoning, are properly called *ūha*. It is an inference of a future effect from the plurality of causes. So it will not generate an inference of a present thing. As such it has no access to all the three times (*trikāla*).<sup>119</sup> P.V Sarma points out that “this is an attempt to undermine its importance due to misunderstanding of its real nature. Both *anumāna* and *yukti* are *trikāla* and are quite independent of each other. Their access to *trikāla* is because of their having been established on cause and effect relationship. *Anumāna* operates with single cause while *yukti* deals with plurality of causes. More over *anumāna* itself is dependent on *yukti*”.<sup>120</sup>

Cakrapāṇi, further, cites the Buddhist logicians Śāntarakṣita (annotated by Kamalaśīla) who refute Caraka’s view of *yukti*. Referring to Caraka, Śāntarakṣita says that, *yukti* consists in the observation that, “since, ‘when this is there, that happens’, and, since, ‘when this is not there, that does not happen’. Hence “this is the cause of that”. Those who conceive *yukti* as an independent source of knowledge may argue that, this is not a case of inference. But *yukti* is a different source knowledge for in this case there is no proposition equivalent to the proposition with an example to prove it.<sup>121</sup> Interpreting this viewpoint, Kamalaśīla expresses the view that there is no other idea than cause-effect notion (*kārya-kāraṇatā*) in the conception of “that happens when this is there”, (*tadbhāva-bhāvitā*) and if any particular example is suggested, then that would demand another example, and after that another and it will end in *regressus ad infinitum*

(*anavasthā*). That is why Caraka consider it as a separate source of knowledge.<sup>122</sup> Thus, construing Caraka's conception of *yukti*, they refute it. They point out that there is no separate cognitive process which links up the relation of "this is there, that happens" with the cause and effect relation, because both these convey the same concept. The cause and effect relation is the same as "this is there, that happens" and so *yukti* is not different from *anumāna*.

Cakrapāṇi, though opines that *yukti* is *anumāna*, does not agree with śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. He points out that their criticisms are all beside the point, for *yukti* according to Caraka, is not the deriving of cause and effect from "this is there that happens". It is drawing up of a conclusion as a result of series of reasoning.<sup>123</sup> In fact Caraka's idea of *yukti* is the logic of probability. That is, when from a number of events, circumstances or observations one comes to regard a particular judgment as probable, it is called *yukti* and it is different from inference or any other accepted *pramāṇa*<sup>124</sup>.

### **Other sources of knowledge referred to in Carakasamhitā**

Analogy (*aupamya*), presumption (*arthāpatti*), and tradition (*aitihya*) are the other sources of knowledge described in the Carakasamhitā. One of the most important things to be noted in this connection is that Caraka does not consider them as means of examination.

#### **Analogy (*aupamya*)**

Analogy is that which brings about cognition by way of the similarity of one object with the other. For instance, the disease *daṇḍaka* (a disease

characterized by the rigidity of muscles) is similar to of *daṇḍa*.<sup>125</sup> The usual name used in Darśanas for *aupamya* is *upamāna*. The Naiyāyikas,<sup>126</sup> the Mīmāṃsakas,<sup>127</sup> and the Vedāntins<sup>128</sup>, who accept *upamāna* as an independent source of valid knowledge, have defined it as the knowledge of a thing through its similarity to another thing previously well-known. The Sāṃkhya do not accept *upamāna* as a distinct source of knowledge. In the view of Sāṃkhya, *upamāna* is a case of perception.<sup>129</sup> The Vaiśeṣikas include *upamāna* in inference since it comes under verbal testimony.<sup>130</sup>

### **Presumption (*arthaprāpti*)**

Presumption (*arthaprāpti*)<sup>131</sup> means to grasp a thing or a fact on the basis of another thing or fact. Caraka defines it as the knowledge of a thing or fact implied by another thing or fact expressed by an assertion.<sup>132</sup> For instance, when a person asserts that a given disease cannot be cured by nourishing therapy, it evidently implies that the disease is curable by emaciating therapy. For the Naiyāyikas, presumption is not different from inference<sup>133</sup>. The Vaiśeṣikas also include presumption in inference. For them, the presumptive cognition of a thing based on a fact of perception is a case of “inference per contraries”, and that based on verbal cognition is a case of “inference per inference”.<sup>134</sup> The Mīmāṃsakas describe it as thus: When some general valid knowledge is in conflict with a special one, the cognition of the non-conflicting element is accepted as presumption.<sup>135</sup> For instance, from the conflicting knowledge that a person is alive with the knowledge of his absence from his house, it is assumed that the person is outside.

## Tradition (*aitihya*)

Tradition stands for long standing beliefs in other Indian systems of philosophy<sup>136</sup>. At the same time tradition (*aitihya*) including the Vedas is included in verbal testimony.<sup>137</sup>

## Probability (*saṃbhava*)

Probability is being defined as the cognition of that from which something originates.<sup>138</sup> For example, the six *dhātus* constitute the originating cause of foetus in the womb. What is intended is that the thing originated is already present in the source. Thus, probability is nothing but only a manifested form. Here, in the present example the embryo is present in the six *dhātus*.<sup>139</sup>

In the philosophical systems *saṃbhava* is seen to have been given a more refined definition. There it is treated in the nature of inclusion. Thus *saṃbhava* consists in cognizing the existence of a thing from that of another thing in which it is included. For instance, the cognition of the measure of an *ādhaka* from that of *droṇa* of which it is one fourth part. Here, in a sense, the former gives rise to the cognition of the latter and so Akṣapāda includes it in inference.<sup>140</sup>

It is an accepted fact that epistemology is the main concern of philosophy and not science. Most particularly, it is not customary to a practical science like the science of medicine to deal with the methods of knowing, thinking and expressing. But, it is quite contrary to this conception that we see in Carakasamhitā a detailed account of almost all the sources

of knowledge that are being discussed in the classical *darśanic* realm. This is not the only thing. The uniqueness of Carakasamhitā, in this matter, lies in the fact that it is the earliest book which codifies almost all different sources of knowledge dealt with in various philosophical systems. *ceṣṭa* and *anupalabdhi* are the only two *pramāṇas* which are not found discussed in the Carakasamhitā. Another important thing is the recognition of *yukti* as a separate source of knowledge. Probably, it is the only book that deals with such a source of knowledge revealing the idea of logic of probability. From this, we can conclude that the Carakasamhitā is not only a compendium limited to the discussion of maintenance of positive health and cure but extends its attention to theoretical thinking. Caraka had great concern for deriving a proper methodology for theoretical formulations. Carakasamhitā has played a significant role in the formative stage of the history of epistemological and logical reflection in India.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 “*mā māne*”. Mādhaviya Dhātuvṛtti of Sayañcārya ed; Swāmi Dvārakādās Śāstri, Tara Book Agency, Varanasi, Third ed., 2000, p. 65.
- 2 Hirianna, M., Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, 1940, pp. 1-2.
- 3 *dvividhameva khalu sarvaṃ saccāsacca; tasya caturvidhā parīkṣa - āptopadeśaḥ, pratyakṣaṃ, anumānaṃ yuktiśceti*. CS. Su. XI, 17.
- 4 CS, Vi, IV. 3, 9.
- 5 *yukteranumānantarbhāvādeva na pṛthakkarāṇaṃ*, Cakrapāṇi on CS. Vi, IV. 3. But this view is not tenable. See *infra*, pp. 270 - 271.
- 6 CS, Vi, VIII. 27. See *infra*, p. 292.
- 7 CS.Vi. IV. 3, 9. 7.
- 8 “.....*trividhe tvasmin jñānasamudāye pūrvamāptopadeśajñānaṃ, tataḥ pratyakṣānumānābhyaṃ parīkṣopapadyate*”, CS, Vi, IV. 5.
- 9 “*pratyakṣāgmāsritaṃ anumānaṃ sānvīkṣā = pratyakṣāgamābhyāmīkṣitasānvīkṣāṇamānvīkṣā tayā pravartate ityānvīkṣikī nyāyavidyā = nyāyāsāstraṃ*.”, Vātsyāyana on NS, 1, i, N.Bh, p. 6. *ānvīkṣikī* was the earliest name for Nyāya -śāstra.
- 10 “*pramānairarthaparīkṣānaṃ nyāyaḥ*”, Ibid. In the present context the term Nyāya ultimately refers to syllogism. For details see TC, Vol. I, p. 540.

- 11 *aduṣṭaṃ vidyā*, VS, IX. ii. 12.
- 12 *upalabdhisādhanāni pramāṇānīti samākhyānirvacanasāmarthyād bhoddhavyaṃ-pramīyate'neneti karanārthābhidāno hi pramāṇaśabdaḥ*. N. Bh, p. 18.
- 13 *viṣayāntaraṃ prati karaṇasādhanam pramīyate'neneti pramāṇam*, NV. p. 30.
- 14 *samyaganubhavasādhanam pramāṇam*, Ny. Sa, p. 2.
- 15 *avyabhicāriṇamasandigdhamarthopalabdhiṃ vidadhatī bodhābodhasvabhāvasāmagrī pramāṇam*, NM, Part--I, p.12.
- 16 *tasmādajñātattvārthajñānasādhanameva naḥ pramāṇamiti nirnītam*, MM, p. 8.
- 17 *anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam smṛtivyatiriktā samvidanubhūtiḥ iti, prābhākaraḥ*. *ibid.*, p. 7.
- 18 Dharmottara on NB, p. 4.
- 19 *anadhigatārthajñāpakam pramāṇam; Abhedanandabhaṭṭācārya Nyāyapramāṇasamīkṣā*, Parimal Publications, Delhi, 1987, p. 19.
- 20 Max Muller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, Vol. XVI, The Chawkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 4th edn.1971, p. 143.
- 21 *pramāṇato'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyādarthavatpramāṇam*, N. Bh, p.1; *jñānam vyavasāyeneti vyavasāyaḥ pravṛtti, yathā-peyajale pānārthā pravṛttiḥ; tenāumīyate jalajñānamasya jātam*,



- kathamanyathā*, for details see CS, Vi, IV. 5-12. *jñānakāryārtha kriyāyām pravartate iti*. Cakrapāṇi on CS, Vi, IV. 8; also see Dharmottara on NB, p. 4.
- 22 *pratyakṣamekameva pramāṇaṃ yathārthajñānasādhanamiti cārvākāḥ manyante*, SDSM, “Upodghāta”, p. 29.
- 23 *pratyakṣamanumānañceti*, NB, p. 8; SDSM, “Upodghāta”, p. 30.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 SK, 4.
- 26 *pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni*, NS, l. i. 3; There is a class of Naiyāyikas (*ekadeśis*) who exclude comparison and acknowledge only three: perception, inference, and verbal testimony. *trividhaṃ pramāṇaṃ. pratyakṣamanumānamāgamaśceti*, Ny. Sa, p. 9.
- 27 *uktaṃ pramāṇacatuṣṭayamarthāpattiśceti pramāṇapañcakaṃ mīmāṃsakaviśeṣā prābhākarāḥ*, SDSM, “Upodghāta”, p. 30.
- 28 *pratyakṣamanumānaṃ ca śabdaṃ copamitistathā arthāpattirabhāvaśca ṣaḍ pramāṇāni mādrśāṃ*. MM, p. 8.
- 29 *tāni ca pramāṇāni ṣaḍ - pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamārthāp atyanupalabdhibhedāt*, VP, p.8.
- 30 *paurāṇikāstvaṣṭakamabhidadhire saṃbhavaitihayogāt*, MM, p. 9.
- 31 For details see CS, Vi, IV, 5-12.
- 32 CSG Vol. 1, p. 459.

- 33 *tatrāptopadeśo nāmāptavacanam*, CS, Vi, IV, 4.
- 34 *rajastamobhyāṃ nirmuktastapojñānabalena ye  
yeṣāṃ trikālamamalaṃ jñānamavyāhataṃ sadā.  
āptāḥ śiṣṭā vibuddhāste teṣāṃ vākyamasam-sāyam  
satyam, vakṣyati te kasmādasatyam nīrajastamāḥ.*, CS, Su, XI. 18-19.
- 35 *aptā hyavitarkasmṛtivibhāgāvidō niṣprītyupatāpadarśinaśca.  
teṣāmevaṃguṇayogādyadvacanam tat pramāṇam*, CS, Vi, IV. 4.
- 36 CS, V; VIII, 38.
- 37 *apramāṇam punarmattonmattāmurkharaktaduṣṭādusṭavacanamiti*, Ibid.
- 38 *tatrāptāgamastāvadvedaḥ, yaścānyo’pi kaścidvedārthādaviparītaḥ  
parīkṣakaiḥ praṇītaḥ śiṣṭānumato lokānugrahapravṛttaḥ śāstravādaḥ,  
sa cāptāgamah*; CS, Su, XI. 27.
- 39 PVS, p.164; *asti nasti distam matiḥ, astināstidiṣṭam matiḥ*, PS, IV. iv. 60; *pramāṇanupatinī yasya matiḥ sa daiṣṭikah*, KV, Part--I, p. 399. VS. Agarwala says that *daiṣṭika* mentioned by Pāṇini refers to the followers of the determinist philosophy preached by Makkali Gośāla who repudiated the efficacy of *karma* as means for the lot of human beings. VS. Agarwala, *India as Known to Pāṇini*, Varanasi, 1963, pp. 384-85.
- 40 *āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ*, NS, I. i. 7; NV, p.61; T. Bh, p.108, TSA, p. 50.
- 41 “*ṛṣyāryamlecchānām samānam lekṣaṇam*”, N. Bh, p.28.
- 42 *sa dvividhaḥ - drṣṭādrṣṭārthatvāt*, NS, 1. i. 8.

- 43 MM, p. 93.
- 44 *tacca śabdaṃ dvividhaṃ pauruṣeyama paoruṣeyañca. tatrāptavacaḥ pauruṣeyaṃ vedavaco apuruṣeyaṃ*, Ibid, p. 105.
- 45 *gurustvāḥ. vaidikameva śabdamasti*, Ibid.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 SK, 6.
- 48 MK, p. 36.
- 49 *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dinnaga , ed., Rangaswami Iyengar, University Publication, Govt. Oriental Library, Mysore, 1930, p. 8.
- 50 *tatra kalpanāpoḍhambhrāntaṃ pratyakṣaṃ*. NB, 1. 4. p. 8.
- 51 The term *kalpanā* is described as the association of name with the apprehension: “*abhilāpasamṣargayogyatāpratītiḥ kalpanā* Ibid”. 1. 5. p. 10.
- 52 *abhilāpasamṣṛṣṭārthaṃ vijñānaṃ savikalpakaṃ*, Dharmottara on Ibid I. 5, NB, p. 11.
- 53 *na cendriyavijñānamarthena niyamitapratibhāsatvādabhilāpasamṣargayogyatāpratibhāsaṃ bhavatīti nirvikalpakaṃ*. Ibid. “According to the Buddhists, perception is always indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*); there is no determinate (*savikalpaka*) perception; the so-called determinate perception is not perceptual in character. Indeterminate perception apprehends the specific individuality of an object (*svalakṣaṇas*) devoid of its generic character and other qualifications”. IP, pp. 31-32.

- 54 *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānamavyapadeśyaṃ avyabhicārī vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam*. NS, I. i. 4.
- 55 see N. Bh, on Ibid pp. 20-22
- 56 *jñānakaraṇakam jñānam (pratyakṣam) iti tu vyaṃ*, TC, Vol. I, p. 552.
- 57 VS, III. i. 18; III. ii. 1.
- 58 *vidyāpi caturvidhā pratyakṣalaingikasmṛtyārṣalakṣaṇā*, PBNK, p. 441.
- 59 *tatrākṣamkṣam pratītyotpadyata iti pratyakṣam*. Ibid., p. 442.
- 60 CSP, p. 140; “*sākṣātkāre sukhādīnām karaṇam mana ucyate*”. NSMK, pp. 360.
- 61 Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, I. i. 5.
- 62 *indriyārthasannikarṣajam jñānam pratyakṣam*, MM, p. 9.
- 63 *saksatpratitiḥ pratyakṣam*, Ibid., p. 24.
- 64 MK. p. 37.
- 65 Ibid, 36.
- 66 *tatra pratyakṣapramāyāḥ karaṇam pratyakṣapramāṇam. pratyakṣapramā cātra caitanyameva, ‘yat sakṣādaparokṣād brahma’ iti śruteḥ*. VP, p. 8. see also. MK, p. 36.
- 67 “*pratviṣyādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam*”, SK. 5.
- 68 *atmendriyamanorthanam sannikarṣāt pravartate. vyakta tadātve yā buddhiḥ pratyakṣam sa nirucyate*, CS, Su, XI, 20.

- 69 *pratyakṣam tu khalu tadyat svayamindriyairmanasā copalabhyate*. CS, Vi, IV, 4; *etena sukhādiviṣayamapi pratyakṣam grhītaṃ bhavati*, Cakrapāṇi on ibid, p. 71.
- 70 *pratyakṣam tu khalu tadyat svayamindriyairmanasā copalabhyate*. CS, Vi, IV, 4; *etena sukhādiviṣayamapi pratyakṣam grhītaṃ bhavati*, Cakrapāṇi on CS,Su, XI, 20, p. 71.
- 71 *pratyakṣam nāma tadyadātmanā cendriyaiśca svayamupalabhyate; tatrātma pratyakṣāḥ sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣādayaḥ, śabdādayastvindriyapratyakṣāḥ*. , Vi, VIII. 39.
- 72 See Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, XI, 20.
- 73 “*sā ca buddhirdarpaṇavannirmalā, tasyāśca bahirindriyapraṇāḍikayā viṣyākāro yaḥ pariṇatibhedo ghaṭa iti paṭa ityādyākārastajñānam vṛttiriti ca ākhyāyate.....*” Śaṅkaramiśra on VS, VIII. i. 1, VU, pp. 448- 449.
- 74 *upāttaviṣayāṇāmindriyāṇāṃ vṛttau satyāṃ, buddhestamo’bhibhāve sati yaḥ sattvasamudrekaḥ so’dhyavsāya iti vṛttiriti jñānamiti cākhyāyate*, Vācaspatimiśra on SK, 5, STK, p. 46.
- 75 The *buddhīndriyas* are not the same as their physiological sites or end organs (*adhiṣṭhānās*). For the Sāṃkhyās they mean the psychophysical impulses which go out to the external objects and receive impressions from them. IP, pp, 4-5.
- 76 Vācaspatimiśra on SK, 36. STK, pp, 214-15.

- 77 “*svacchāyāṃ buddhau vartamānena jñānena caitanyasya puruṣasya  
bhedāgrahādahaṃ jñānāmīti yo’bhimānaviśeṣaḥ saivopalbdhiḥ*”.  
Śāṅkaramiśra on VS, VIII. i. 1, VU, p. 449.
- 78 See N. Bh, p. 34
- 79 NV, p. 82.
- 80 Śāṅkaramiśra on VS, VIII, i. 1, VU, p. 449.
- 81 IP, p. 114.
- 82 *yā yadindriyamāśritya jantorbuddhiḥ pravartate .  
yāti sā tena nirdeśaṃ manasā ca manobhavā.  
bhedāt kāryendriyārthānāṃ bahvayo vai buddhayaḥ smṛtāḥ.  
ātmendriyamanorthānāmekaikā sannikaṣajā, CS, Sa, I. 32-33; See  
also Cakrapāṇi on ibid., pp. 290-91.*
- 83 *saṃbaddhaṃ bhavat saṃbadhavastvākāradhāri bhavati yadvijñānaṃ  
buddhivṛttistat pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇamityarthaḥ, Vijñānabhikṣu on  
S.Su, 1, 89, SSV. p. 57.*
- 84 *tatrānumānāgamābhyānāṃ pañcamahābhūtavikārasamudāyātmakā-  
nāmapi satāmindryāṇāṃ tejaścakṣuṣi, khaṃ srotre, ghraṇe kṣitiḥ, āpo  
rasane sparśane’nilo viśeṣeṇopapadyate. tatra yadyadātmaka-  
mindriyaṃ viśeṣāttatadātmakamevarthaṃ anugrhñāti, tatsvabhāvāt  
vibhutvācca, CS, Su, VIII. 14.*
- 85 MK, p. 115.
- 86 *satāṃ ca rūpāṇāmatisannikaṣādativiprakarṣādāvaraṇāt, karaṇadaur-  
balyānmanovasthānāt samānābhihārādatisaukṣmyācca pratyakṣā-*

*nupalabdhiḥ*. CS, Su, XI. 8; According to the Sāṃkhyas, perception is not possible if the object is too far away or too close. Inability of sense organs, lack of presence of mind, intervention of other objects between the sense organ and the object to be perceived, concealment and intermixing with similar object also obstructs perception. SK, 7.

- 87 86. *anumānaṃ- mitena lingenarthasya paścānmānamanumānaṃ*, N. Bh, pp. 17-18.
- 88 SK. 5.
- 89 Ibid.
- 90 JIL, p.158.
- 91 For details see Vācaspatimiśra on SK, 5, STK, pp.55-58.
- 92 *atha tatpūrvakaṃ trividhamanumānaṃ -- pūrvavat śeśavat sāmānyatodrṣṭaṃ ca*, NS, I. i. 5.
- 93 *tatpūrvakamityanena liṅgaliṅginoḥ....., smṛtyā liṅgadarśanena cāpratyakṣo'rtho'numīyate*. Vātsyāyana on NS, 1, i, 5, N. Bh, p.24.
- 94 *pūrvavaditi yatra kāraṇena kāryamanumīyate*. Ibid.
- 95 *adhavā -- pūrvavaditi yatra yadhāpūrvakaṃ pratyakṣabhūtayora-nyataradarśanenānyatarasyāpratyakṣasya anumānaṃ yathā dhūmenāgniriti*. Ibid., p. 25.
- 96 *śeśavat -- tad yatra kāryeṇa kāraṇamanumīyate*, Ibid, p. 24
- 97 *śeśavat nāma pariśeṣaḥ sa ca prasaktapratīṣedhe'nyatrāprasaṅgāt śīṣyamāṇe sampratyayaḥ.....*, Ibid, p. 25.

- 98 *sāmanyatodṛṣṭam -- vrajyāpūrvakamanyatra dṛṣṭasyānyatra darśanamiti tathā ca ādityasya, tasmādastyapratyākṣāpyādityasya vrajyeti.* Ibid, p. 24.
- 99 *sāmānyatodṛṣṭam nāma yatrā pratyakṣe liṅgaliṅginoh saṃbandhe kenacidartheṇa liṅgasya sāmānyād apratyakṣo liṅgī gamyate....* Ibid, p. 25.
- 100 *asyedaṃ kāryam kāraṇam samyogi virodhi samavāyi ceti laiṅgikaṃ, VS. IX. ii. 1; liṅgadarśanāt sañjāyamānaṃ laiṅgikaṃ.* PBNK, p. 476.
- 101 *yadanumeyena saṃbadham prasiddham ca tadanvite tadabhāve ca nāstyeva tatliṅgamanumāpakaṃ.* Ibid, p. 478. p. 480. see also Nyāyakandalī on Ibid.
- 102 PBNK, p. 480.
- 103 *vyāptidarśanādasannikṛṣṭārthajñānamanumānaṃ.* MM, P. 27.
- 104 *taccānumānaṃ dvividam svārtham parārtham ceti, svartham svapratipattihetuḥ..... param bodhayituṃ pañcāvayavavākyaṃ prayñkte tat parārthānumānaṃ.* T.Bh, pp. 79-80; *tadapi liṅgam dvividham svārtham parārtham ca,* SP. p. 31. See also the commentary by Jinavardhana Sūri on Ibid; TSA, p. 37.
- 105 *taccānumānaṃ parārtham nyāyasādhyamiti nyāyastadavyavāśca pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāni nirūpyante.* TC, Vol. II, p. 540. see infra syllogism.
- 106 CS, Su , XI. 7.
- 107 *anumānaṃ nāma tarko yuktyapekṣaḥ.* CS,Vi, IV. 4; Vi, VIII. 40.



- 108 *yuktiśca sambandho'vinābhāva ityārthaḥ*. Cakrapāṇi on CS, Vi, IV. 4.
- 109 *pratyakṣapūrvam trividham trikālam cānumīyate. vahnirniḡūḍho dhūmena maithunaṃ garbhadarśanāt. .CS, Su, XI. 21.*
- 110 *pratyakṣagrahaṇam vyāptigrāhakaḥ pramāṇopalakṣaṇārtham, tena pratyakṣpūrvakamiti vyāptigrāhakaḥ pramāṇapūrvakam, Cakrapāṇi on ibid., p.71. pratyakṣapūrvakamityanena khyāpitaṃ yad yasya kāraṇam yasya ca kāryasya yat kāraṇam yasya ca sāmānyam yatra tayostayoḥ sambandhayorniyatasambandhasya pratyakṣeṇa jñānam liṅga jñānam....., Jalpakalpataru on CS, , Su, XI. 21, CSJ, Vol. I, pp. 514-15.*
- 111 *yatra yatra dhūmastatrāgniriti sāhacaryaniyamo vyāptiḥ*, TSA, p. 35. *vyāparastu parāmarśaḥ karaṇam vāptidhīrbhavet anumāyām*, NSMK, p. 218.
- 112 CS, Su, XI. 22.
- 113 NEC, p. 40.
- 114 See Jalpakalpataru on CS, Su, XI, CSJ, Vol. I, p. 515.
- 115 see infra Dialectical terms
- 116 *yukteḥ pramāṇasyānyaśāstrāprasiddhatvenodāharaṇānyeva tāvaddarśayati*. Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, XI. 24.
- 117 *buddhiḥ paśyati yā bhavān bahukāraṇayogajān yuktistriḡālā sā jñeyā trivargā sadhyate yayā*, CS, Su, XI. 25.
- 118 Ibid., 23.

- 119 'sā ca paramārthato'pramāṇabhūto'pi vastuparicchede pramāṇa-  
sahāyatvena vyāpriyamāṇatvāt..... tataśca trikāleti parāhataṃ syāt.,  
Cakrapāṇi on ibid.
- 120 PVS, p.164.
- 121 See Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, XI. 25. The exact words of Śāntarakṣita are  
as follows: *tasmin sati bhavati eva na bhavaty asatīti ca tasmād ato  
bhavaty eva yuktireṣābhidīyate pramāṇantaram eveyaṃ ityāha carako  
muniḥ nānumānaṃ iyaṃ yasmād dṛṣṭānto'tra na labhyate'* Quoted in  
HIPS, Vol. II, p.376, F. Notes.
- 122 Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, XI. 25.
- 123 Ibid .
- 124 HIPS, Vol. II, p.376, F. Notes.
- 125 *atha aupamyam nāma yadanyonyasya sādṛśyamadhikṛtya prakāśanaṃ;  
yathā daṇdena daṇdakasya*, CS, Vi, VIII. 42.
- 126 *prasiddhasādharṃyāt sādhyasādhanamupamānaṃ*. NS, I. i. 6; also see  
N.Bh on ibid, p. 27;
- 127 *dṛśyamānārthasadṛśyāt smaryamāṇārthagocaram asanṅikṛṣṭa-  
sādṛśyajñānaṃ hyupamitirmatā*. MM, p. 110.
- 128 *sādṛśyapramākaraṇamupamānaṃ*, VP, p. 83.
- 129 For details see Vācaspatimiśra, on SK. 5, STK, p. 66
- 130 *āptenāprasiddhasya gavayasya gavā gavayapratipādanādupa-  
mānamāptavacanameva*, PBNK, p. 530.

- 131 Instead of *arthapraptti* the term *arthāptti* is used in all philosophical systems.
- 132 *arthaprāptirnāma yatraikenārthenoktenāparasyārthasyānuktasyāpi siddhiḥ*; CS,Vi, VIII. 48.
- 133 NS, II. ii. 2; *vakyārthasampratyayenānabhihitārthasya pratyaniḥka-bhvād grahaṇaṃ arthāpattiranumānameva*, N.Bh, p. 166.
- 134 *darśanārthādarthāpattirvirodhyeva, śravaṇādanumitānumānaṃ*. PBNK, 534.
- 135 *anyathānupapatyā yadupapādakakalpanaṃ tadarthāpattirityevaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ bhāṣyabhāṣitaṃ*. MM, P. 120.
- 136 HIPS, Vol. II, p.377.
- 137 *athaitiḥyaṃ - aitiḥyaṃ nāmāptopadeśo vedādiḥ*. CS,Vi, VIII.41.
- 138 *yo yataḥ saṃbhavati sa tasya saṃbhavaḥ*, Ibid., 48.
- 139 See Cakrapāṇi on ibid.
- 140 N.Bh, p.166.

## Chapter - VII

### LOGIC AND DIALECTICAL SPECULATIONS

It is only through critical investigation of modes and sources of knowledge that the world of experience and human destiny can be truly met. Science of reasoning is a general plan and method of analytic investigation to solve the problems in both science and philosophy. The investigators make use of logic and dialectics embedded in the science of reasoning as a method for arriving at right judgments. Science of reasoning as a methodology of critical enquiry may be called as the science of sciences.<sup>1</sup> The Indian art of debate that has been exhaustively dealt with in the Carakasamhitā and found systematically explicated in the Nyāya philosophy is a universal model of such a methodology for critical enquiry.

#### **Council of debate (*pariṣad*)**

Debating councils occupy a prominent position in the hierarchy of the educational system in Indian intellectual tradition. The councils which carry out the art of debate are called *Pariṣads*. These councils of debate are primarily classified into two: (1) assembly of the learned and (2) assembly of the ignorant. Further, each one is subdivided into three: friendly (*suhṛtpariṣad*), indifferent (*udāsīnapariṣad*), and hostile (*pratiniviṣṭa-pariṣad*).<sup>2</sup>

## Colloquy (*tadvidyāsaṃbhāṣa*)

In Carakaśaṃhitā, a colloquy (*tadvidyāsaṃbhāṣa*) is visualized as one of the most genuine methods of the acquisition of right medical knowledge colloquies. Colloquies (*saṃbhāṣas*) have got their own merits since they enables one to arrive at correct judgments by interrogating his cognitive achievements and to redeem him from socially stagnant and intellectually dogmatic state of affairs. Caraka says that medical men should engage in a discussion with other medical men because such discussions will increase the fervour for knowledge and contributes to the clarity of knowledge. They increases dialectical skill and thereby dispel doubts relating to the previously acquired knowledge and confirm the knowledge devoid of doubts. One may come to know of many new things. Sometimes there may be propitious occasions during the course of discussions on which one can hear from the opponents the most cherished secret teachings.<sup>3</sup> The Nyāya school also regards *tadvidyāsaṃbhāṣa* as the best means of perfecting one's knowledge.<sup>4</sup> Since scrutiny reveals that knowledge is incomplete, a colloquy will help us to improve our life- situations by making innovative knowledge through continuous reflection, exploration, and interpretation.

Colloquies are mainly of two types, namely friendly colloquy (*sandhāya saṃbhāṣā*) and hostile colloquy (*vigṛhya saṃbhāṣa*).<sup>5</sup> The discussion among wise and learned persons, who have the argumentative power and tolerance is called friendly debate. He must be devoid of jealousy, and should have good communicative ability. In a friendly discussion, the participants discuss problems and express their opinions frankly and

sincerely without fear of being defeated or of the fallacies of their arguments being exposed. One is not worried when he is defeated or feels proud of defeating his opponent in such a discussion. One should neither make an attempt to misinterpret the others view nor hold extreme views and should behave politely with the opponents.<sup>6</sup>

Meanwhile, a hostile colloquy always aims at victory. So Caraka gives instructions regarding the line of approach to be adopted in a hostile debate. Before entering into a hostile colloquy one must be confident of his superiority. He must also examine the method proposed to be adopted by the opponent, the difference between the abilities of himself and those of his opponents and the dispositions of the members of the assembly. He is to be judged from the intellectual and moral points. The good qualities of the participants are knowledge of the text, capacity to remember, presence of mind, and eloquence. Bad qualities are irritation, lack of skill, capacity to remember, cowardice, and carelessness.<sup>7</sup> Based on this criteria, the opponents are classified into three namely, (1) superior (*pravara*), (2) inferior (*pratyavara*), and (3) equal (*sama*).<sup>8</sup> However, factors like the family status and religion are not taken into account in assessing the opponent.

### **The strategies (*vāadopāya*) to be adopted in the debate**

It is not sensible to enter into a debate in a hostile council even if it consists of the learned or the ignorant. But one can enter into a discussion with the ignorant that is friendly or indifferent even if they neither possess blazing fame, erudition, wisdom, and eloquence nor are held in high esteem

by reputed persons. When one gets engaged in a debate with such opponents, he should use difficult sentences composed of complicated aphorisms. Assuming a cheerful countenance and ridiculing the opponent, one should engage the assembly without giving an opportunity for the opponent to speak. If the opponent says some unusual word, he should be immediately told that such a word is never used or that his proposition failed. If he further challenges, he must be stopped by ridiculing him.<sup>9</sup>

In brief, Caraka gives a conspicuous and diplomatic description of the nature and function of a debating council, taking into consideration the divergent attitudes and dispositions of the participants. The instructions about the procedures that are to be adopted by the disputant are suggestive of how they would be helpful in the successful functioning of the Parişads in engendering faultless and precise knowledge. When compared with a hostile discussion, a friendly discussion is an unbiased one. On the contrary, a hostile discussion always aims at either ones own victory or the defeat of the opponent. The most important aspect is that it reflects a secular outlook. His goalpost is true knowledge that contributes to human betterment and happiness. So he does not emphasize religion and family status of the participants. The two main things that he insists are intellectual ability and moral strength.

### **Dialectical terms**

Caraka was circumspect about the fact that it is essential for every medical man to be conversant with logic and dialectical terms. The awareness of logic and dialectical terms are needed not only for becoming an efficient

physician with ability discretion but also for engendering dialectical competency that would enable one to take active part in academic activities. In fact dialectics is the soul of Āyurveda which makes it innovative as in the case of any other discipline.

Caraka speaks of forty-four dialectical terms in connection with the discussion of the procedure of a debate. The dialectical terms discussed here are not seen in any literature other than in the Nyāya-sūtras. The dialectical terms thus enumerated are:

(1) debate (*vāda*), (2) substance (*dravya*), (3) quality (*guṇa*), (4) action (*karma*), (5) universal (*sāmānya*), (6) particularity (*viśeṣā*), (7) inherence (*samavāya*), (8) proposition (*pratijñā*), (9) demonstration (*sthāpanā*), (10) counter argument (*pratisthāpana*), (11) reason (*hetu*), (12) example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*), (13) application (*upanaya*), (14) conclusion (*nigamana*), (15) false rejoinder (*uttara*), (16) tenet (*siddhānta*), (17) word (*śabda*), (18) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (19) inference (*anumāna*), (20) historical tradition (*aitihya*), (21) analogy (*aupamya*), (22) doubt (*saṃśaya*), (23) purpose (*prayojana*), (24) inconclusive reason (*savyabhicāra*), (25) investigation (*jijñāsa*), (26) determination (*vyavasāya*), (27) presumption (*arthāpatti*), (28) probability (*saṃbhava*), (29) imperfect statement (*anuyojya*), (30) infallible statement (*ananuyojya*), (31) question (*anuyoga*), (32) counter question (*pratyanyoga*), (33) defective statement (*vākyadoṣa*), (34) excellent assertion (*vākyapraśaṃsa*), (35) quibble (*cchala*), (36) fallacy of reason (*ahetu*), (37) illogical order (*atītakāla*), (38) criticism (*upālaṃbha*), (39) resolve (*parihāra*), (40) violating the



proposition (*pratijñāhāni*), (41) criticism (*abhyanujñā*), (42) dodging with a wrong reason (*hetvāntara*), (43) offering irrelevant statement (*arthāntara*), and (44) point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*).<sup>10</sup>

These terms cover almost all the topics of logic and dialectics. But they are not arranged in a systematic way as we see in the Nyāya-sūtra. The first category *vāda*, refers to the unbiased discussion which aims at discerning how things really are and all the other categories are its related items in one way or the other. The six fundamental categories discussed in the second chapter constitute the subject of debate and hence they are included in the list. Similarly the seven sources of knowledge are also included in the list. Proposition (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*), example (*dṛṣṭānta*), application (*upanaya*), and conclusion (*nigamana*) form the integral part of an argument designed to establish a point in debate. The procedure of establishing a thesis by the subsequent members of syllogism is called *sthāpana* and the attempt to refute a *sthāpana* by a counter syllogism is called *pratiṣṭhāpana*. Doubt (*saṃśaya*) and purpose (*prayojana*) are the prerequisites for an argument. Thus the actual number of logical terms other than the fundamental categories and source of knowledge is thirty-one. The six fundamental categories and all kinds of the source of knowledge included in the enumeration were explained earlier in detail. So their description is excluded in the present context. A rearrangement is also made here for the convenience of description.

## Debate (*vāda*):

A *debate* (*vāda*) is defined as an argumentative discussion with an opponent based on scriptures (*śāstras*).<sup>11</sup> It presupposes two opposite sides called disputants and opponents. Debate is of two types: (1) wrangling (*jalpa*) and (2) cavil (*vitaṇḍā*). Wrangling is the advancement of arguments in support of establishing one's own views. For instance, if the disputant puts forth an argument in support of his proposition that there is rebirth (*punarjanma*), the opponent then advances argument in favour of his proposition that there is no rebirth, which is antagonistic to the first. The inner motive behind such counter argument is nothing but victory. A wrangler always aims at victory. A cavil is just the opposite of this. It is a destructive criticism. It is a perverse debate. The person engaged in a cavil is not bothered about his point of view. On the contrary, he confines himself to demurring against the opponent.<sup>12</sup> Akṣapāda, in his Nyāya-sūtra, does not consider wrangling and cavil as the two divisions of *vāda*. On the other hand, he considers discussion (*vāda*), wrangle (*jalpa*), and a cavil (*vitaṇḍā*) as the three fold division of a debate. They are collectively known as *katha*.<sup>13</sup> Vācaspatimiśra defines *katha* as a chain of arguments and refutations by many disputants and opponents.<sup>14</sup> The Nyāya-sūtra defines discussion (*vāda*) as the establishment of a thesis by a disputant and its refutation and the establishment of an antithesis by an opponent by means of five-member syllogism and hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*), without deviating from the established tenets.<sup>15</sup> The main characteristics of discussion is that it maintains a friendly spirit on either side. The aim of discussion is neither victory nor fame. It aims at bringing truth to light through communication.<sup>16</sup>

It is through discussion that one clarifies his old convictions and arrives at new insights. A wrangle is also a kind of discussion. But the difference is that it employs quibbles (*cchala*), futile rejoinders (*jāti*), and processes worthy of points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) which are not employed in discussion (*vāda*) with the intention of victory.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, a cavil is a kind of wrangle in which an opponent attacks the disputant's thesis, but does not establish his tenet.<sup>18</sup> A caviller also makes use of quibbles, futile rejoinders, and points of defeat to refute the disputant. But he neither enunciates his thesis nor proves it by a reason. Even though wrangling and cavil are hostile in nature, they are justified on the ground that they may ward off attacks of skeptics, and protect the right doctrine like the thorny fence to guard the seed-beds.<sup>19</sup>

From the above details it can be conceded that the *vāda* described in the Nyāya-sūtra corresponds to the friendly discussion (*sandhāya saṁbhāṣa*) of Caraka.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, *jalpa and vitaṇḍa* described in the Nyāya-sūtra are hostile in nature and hence they can be identified with the *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍa* of the Carakasamhitā. In fact, these two divisions subsumed under *vāda* are hostile discussions. So *vāda* and *saṁbhāṣa* can be considered as alternative names used in the Carakasamhitā. Thus, we can conclude that the ratiocinative procedure adopted in the Carakasamhitā and the Nyāya-sūtra are fundamentally the same.<sup>21</sup>

### **Concept of syllogistic reasoning:**

Carakasamhitā is the earliest book which gives a comprehensive knowledge of syllogistic reasoning with all five members systematically

arranged. Syllogism consists of (1) proposition (*pratijñā*), (2) reason (*hetu*), (3) example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*), (4) application (*upanaya*), and (5) conclusion (*nigamana*). The procedure of establishing a thesis in debate by the subsequent four members of the syllogism is called *sthāpana*. Refutation and establishment of the antithesis by antagonistic members of syllogism is named *pratiṣṭhāpana*.

### **Demonstration (*sthāpanā*):**

Demonstration is the establishment of the proposition in a debate by the operation of reason (*hetu*), example, application, and conclusion.<sup>22</sup> In fact, *pratijñā* together with *sthāpanā* represents the five-member syllogism. Carakasamhitā is the first available source in which the five member inferential statement is exemplified.<sup>23</sup> The following is the example given by him:

1. Proposition (*pratijñā*) -- the self is eternal
2. Reason (*hetu*) -- because it is not a product.
3. Example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) -- just like ether.
4. Application (*upanaya*) -- the self is eternal like the “non-product” *ākāśa*.
5. Conclusion (*nigamana*) -- therefore, is eternal.

This five- member syllogism is referred to by the category *avayava* in the Nyāya-sūtra.<sup>24</sup> Vātsyāyana calls it “the great *Nyāya*”.<sup>25</sup> However, Kaṇāda does not speak of the five member syllogism. But later on, almost

all the thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system accepted it, and it came to be called “inference for others” (*parārthānumāna*).<sup>26</sup> It is also called by the appellation *Nyāya*.<sup>27</sup> Vātsyāyana mentions certain schools of thought which admit a ten-member syllogism by including *jijñāsa*, *saṃśaya*, *śakyaprāpti*, *prayojana* and *samśayavyudāsa*.<sup>28</sup> The Mīmāṃsakas accept the first three members;<sup>29</sup> the Vedāntins three -- either the first or the last three,<sup>30</sup> and the Buddhists two: example (*udāharaṇa*) and application (*upanaya*).<sup>31</sup>

### **Counter syllogistic reasoning (*pratiṣṭāpana*):**

Counter syllogistic reasoning consists in the opponent’s effort to establish a counter proposition by employing the other four members of the syllogism in order to contradict the disputant.<sup>32</sup>

Thus, for the above mentioned syllogism the following is the counter syllogism.

- |                |    |  |
|----------------|----|--|
| 1. Proposition | -- | The self is non-eternal                  |
| 2. Reason      | -- | because it is perceivable                |
| 3. Example     | -- | just like a pitcher                      |
| 4. Application | -- | the self is perceivable like the pitcher |
| 5. Conclusion  | -- | therefore, is ephemeral.                 |

### **Proposition (*pratijñā*):**

Proposition is the declaration of a thing that is to be proved.<sup>33</sup> This is further attested by Akṣapāda.<sup>34</sup> Vātsyāyana says that it is the pronouncement

of an “object qualified by a property” which is to be ascertained.<sup>35</sup> Praśastapāda defines it as an assertion of what is to be proved by means of inference and should be devoid of contradiction.<sup>36</sup>

### **Reason (*hetu*):**

Caraka defines reason as the cause of valid knowledge.<sup>37</sup> In syllogism, reason is the second statement consisting of the grounds for inference. The causes thus stated for such inferential knowledge are the *pramāṇas* of perception, (2) inference, (3) tradition and (4) analogy.<sup>38</sup> Here, what Caraka implies is that a cause can be perceived, inferred, or known by analogy, or from scriptures. That is, when one says that the mountain possesses fire because it possesses smoke (*parvato vahnimān dhūmavatvāt*), the reason is smoke and it is a directly perceived one. But when one says that he is ill because of poor digestion (*ayamāturo mandāgnitvāt*), the reason is not directly perceived but inferred. Similarly, when it is said that *puruṣa* is eternal because it is “not created” (*nityaḥ puruṣo akṛtatvāt*), the reason “not created” is neither perceived nor inferred. On the other hand, it is known by tradition (*aitihya*). Again, in cases like his face is beautiful because it resembles moon (*asya mukhaṃ kāntatamaṃ candropamatvāt*), the reason resemblance of moon is an analogical one.<sup>39</sup>

Akṣapāda explains that it as the reason for proving what it is to be proved, on the basis of the homogeneity or the heterogeneity of the examples.<sup>40</sup> Vātsyāyana says that it is the means of demonstration of the attribute in question through the generic nature of the attributes shown by its existence in the examples.<sup>41</sup> He adds that reason is inference.<sup>42</sup>

Kaṇāda, who considers it as instrumental cause of inference, uses *apadeśa* (description), *liṅga* (design), *pramāṇa* (proof), and *kāraṇa* (instrumental cause) as synonymous to reason (*hetu*)<sup>43</sup> and calls the inferential knowledge *laiṅgikaṃ*. Praśastapāda calls reason by the name *apadeśa* and defines it as the statement about the inferential reason.<sup>44</sup>

According to the Buddhists, valid reason must fulfill three conditions such as, existence of “major term” (*sādhya*) in the minor term (*pakṣa*), existence in the locus where the presence of the major term has been ascertained (*sapakṣātvam*), and non-existence in the locus where the nonexistence of the major term is decidedly known (*vipakṣātvam*).<sup>45</sup> Reason helps to prove what is to be proved. In other words, inferential knowledge owes to the knowledge of reason. It has got an important place among the members of syllogism because inferential cognition mainly depends on it.

**Example: (*dr̥ṣṭānta*)**

An example is the third statement setting forth an illustration. It is being defined as an explanation of a universal truth comprehensible by both the lay man and the learned. It demonstrates the thing under investigation.<sup>46</sup> This definition actually does not make apparent its function in syllogism, but only reveals the characteristics desired for an example.

In syllogism, an example has to serve the purpose of demonstrating the presence of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) of what is to be proved -- the major term (*sādhya*) and what proves it -- the middle term (*hetu*). Taking into account of this fact, a two fold definition is given in the Nyāya-sūtras.

The first one gives the general characteristics most wanted of an example to be cited as an illustration as given by Caraka,<sup>47</sup> while the second one depicts its role as a member of syllogism. In a syllogism, an example serves the means of the demonstration of the attribute in question through the generic nature of the attribute as shown by the example, or through the dissimilarity to what is to be established.<sup>48</sup> Vātsyāyana further clarifies that an example illustrates the relation of invariable concomitance of the thing that is to be proved or the major term (*sādhya*) and the sign or the middle term (*hetu*).<sup>49</sup> To be precise, the basic difference between the Carakasamhitā and Nyāya-sūtra is that demonstration of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is not clearly expressed in the syllogism of the former while it is performed by the example in the latter.<sup>50</sup>

Praśastapāda, who presupposes the ascertainment of the invariable concomitance of the major term (*sādhya*) and the middle term (*sādhana*) in the example, divides example into two: positive example (*sādharmya nidarśana*) and negative example (*vaidharmya nidarśana*) on the basis of the similarity and dissimilarity.<sup>51</sup> He also explains fake examples (*nidarśanābhāsa*), where the example adduced is inadequate to substantiate the concomitance of the minor term and the major term.<sup>52</sup>

### **Application (*upanaya*):**

Application (*upanaya*) is the fourth member of the syllogism. Caraka does not give a definition of application beyond exemplifying it. We can conclude from the given illustration that application is a statement showing



that the minor term (*pakṣa*) of inference has the reason of inference which is invariably related to the thing that is sought to be established. It is in conformity with this that Akṣapāda defines it as wrapping up with reference to the example of what is to be proved in the form of “as being so” or “as being not so”.<sup>53</sup> This is further attested by Praśastapāda who calls it *anusandheya*.<sup>54</sup>

### **Conclusion (*nigamana*):**

In the case of conclusion also Caraka does not give any definition. From the nomenclature of the example it can be inferred that his conception does not materially differ from its concept in the Nyāya-sūtra which holds that conclusion serves the purpose of excluding contradicting suggestions against the establishment of that which is to be proved.<sup>55</sup> Akṣapāda defines it as the restatement of the proposition after stating the reason.<sup>56</sup> Praśastapāda calls it by the term *pratyāmnāya*. He also holds that it is the reiteration of the reason.<sup>57</sup> According to the most perfected definition given by Gangeśopādhyāya, conclusion is a sentence that generates the verbal cognition referring to the presence of the major term (*sādhya*) in the minor term (*pakṣa*) of inference, which fact is arrived at by the cognition of the presence of reason in the minor term of inference.<sup>58</sup> In conclusion, Caraka gives an outline of the five member syllogistic expressions that gives rise to the verbal cognition conducive to the rise of inferential cognition which was further clearly and judiciously accounted by the Naiyāyikas.

### **False rejoinder (*uttara*)**

False Rejoinder is the opposition that occurs in a counter-demonstration. It is being defined as an attempt of the opposition to upset the endeavor to establish a thesis by showing a dissimilarity of the reason where a similarity of the subject of the thesis with the example is stated or by showing the similarity of the reason where the dissimilarity of the subject of the thesis with the example is stated.<sup>59</sup> Thus, when it is said that diseases are caused by factors having identical properties, for instance cold fever is caused by factors having identical properties such as snow and chilly air, the contention is that effects are dissimilar from their causes because burning and heating sensation and inflammation of organs of the body are caused by exposure to snow and cold wind.<sup>60</sup>

The category named *jāti* of the Nyāya-sūtras serves the very same purpose of *uttara* in debate.<sup>61</sup> There, it is defined as a sophistical refutation of an argument based on similarity or dissimilarity.<sup>62</sup> Akṣapāda enumerates twenty-four kinds of futile rejoinders<sup>63</sup> which Caraka was unaware of. If this elaborate list had been known to Caraka, he would not have passed them with out referring to them.<sup>64</sup>

### **Tenet (*siddhānta*):**

Tenet is the affirmation of an idea as a truth after examination and demonstration by various methods of proper reasoning.<sup>65</sup> There are four kinds of tenets. They are:

(1) Tenet accepted unanimously by all the schools (*sarvatantrasiddhānta*).

Example: There are causes of diseases, there are diseases, and curable diseases can be cured.<sup>66</sup>

(2) Different tenets accepted by different systems of thought regarding one and the same thing (*pratītantrasiddhānta*).

Example: Some people say that there are eight *rasas*; while in *Carakasamhitā* it is said there are six *rasas*. Similarly *Carakasamhitā* accepts five sense capacities while some others say that there are six sense capacities.<sup>67</sup>

(3) Tenets implied by accepting another tenet (*adhikāraṇasiddhānta*)<sup>68</sup>

Example: If it is established that liberated self does not enjoy the fruit of *karma* since they are devoid of desires, then the doctrine of the suffering of the fruit of *karma*, liberation, and rebirth are to be accepted.<sup>69</sup>

(4) The tenet accepted for the sake of argument without proper examination or proper reason (*abhyupagama-siddhānta*).<sup>70</sup>

Example: Sometimes substance is accepted as the most important; on some other occasions quality is accepted as the chief one; and at times potency is accepted as the most important one.<sup>71</sup>

Akṣapāda, who shares almost the very same view of Caraka, defines tenet as a postulation resting on either the authority of a certain school, hypothesis, or implication.<sup>72</sup> Then he classifies it into four as the above<sup>73</sup>. Udyotakara defines tenet as a conviction with regard to the exact nature of a thing.<sup>74</sup> Keśavamiśra defines it as something which is authoritatively settled

true.<sup>75</sup> The conception of both Caraka and Akṣapāda regarding tenet is one and the same.

### **Doubt (*saṃśaya*):**

Doubt about a thing occurs when its certainty is not ascertained. It is want of judgment about things of uncertainty.<sup>76</sup> For instance, when persons endowed with the signs of long life, persons without such signs and active, and inactive persons are seen to live a long life or succumb to sudden death, there arises the doubt whether death is timely or untimely. Accordingly, doubt is an erroneous cognition which consists in attributing two recalled contradictory characteristics to a single substratum.

Akṣapāda gives second priority to doubt in his categorial scheme, because it is regarded as a prerequisite for the employment of syllogistic reasoning (*Nyāya*) for arriving at correct judgments. He defines doubt as an indefinite knowledge, which seeks to know the identifying characteristic of an object, and ascribes its occurrence to five different causes.<sup>77</sup>

Vātsyāyana says that there is no need of applying the *Nyāya* to an object which is unknown or which has been ascertained. It is only when there exists doubt regarding an object there occurs the need of examination by the instrument of knowledge called *Nyāya*.<sup>78</sup> Further he explains the five causes of doubt. Accordingly, the doubt arising from the perception of common characteristics of many objects in a single object (*samānadharmopapatti*) is the first one. The doubt occurring from the apprehension of properties of homogeneous and heterogeneous things in a substratum

(*anekadhrmopapatti*) is the second. The third originates from the knowledge of contradictory views (*vipratipatti*). Doubt taking place from the irregularity of cognition (*upalabdyavyavasthā*), and doubt cropping up from irregularity of non-cognition (*anupalabdyavyavastha*) are the fourth and fifth respectively.<sup>79</sup> Doubt, according to Kaṇāda, is an erroneous cognition that originates from the perception of the common characteristics of many objects in a thing followed by the recollection of the specific characteristics of such objects.<sup>80</sup> To Praśastapāda, doubt is an indefinite cognition in the form of “either this or that”. It arises from the recollection of the peculiarities of the two objects consequent on the perception of an object having the similarities of those objects whose distinct characteristics have formerly been cognized.<sup>81</sup> Sivāditya conceives doubt as indefinite cognition<sup>82</sup> and includes false assumption (*ūha*) and error (*anadhyavasāya*) in it.<sup>83</sup>

If we look at the whole explanations, we can see that doubt is an erroneous cognition which originates from uncertainty because of attributing contradictory characteristics to an object. Thus, in essence, all the later explanations make no difference in the explanation given in the Carakasamhitā. In fact, if Caraka explained the nature of doubt, Akṣapāda and others focused on its cause.

### **Purpose (*prayojana*):**

Every voluntary action is motivated. Every one acts to obtain the desired object or to avoid an undesirable object.<sup>84</sup> Purpose is that for which an action is begun.<sup>85</sup> It is the motivating object of an action<sup>86</sup> or it is that which goads one in to action.<sup>87</sup>

### **Inconclusive reason (*savyabhicāra*):**

A cause must be consistently concomitant with the effect. If it is inconsistent, it cannot be accepted as a cause. This “inconsistency” is called inconclusiveness.<sup>88</sup> For example, when a medicine is prescribed for a particular disease, the medicine suggested may or may not be suited to cure the disease. Hence, the medicine which is stated as the cause has no invariable concomitance with the effect. *Savyabhicāra* is treated as a division of fallacies of reason by Akṣapāda. He calls it *anaikāntika*.<sup>89</sup> When a reason or the middle term (*hetu*) stated is found to be concomitant with neither the major term (*sādhya*) only nor the negation of the major term only, but with both, then it is called is said to be tainted by indecision.<sup>90</sup> Such a reason has the tendency to prove both the major term and its negation due to its connection with both the major term and its negation. Hence it raises doubt about the major term. Taking note of this nature Kaṇāda calls it “the doubtful” (*sandigdha*).<sup>91</sup> Annaṃbhaṭṭa, Viśvanātha and others call it by the name *savyabhicāra* itself and classifies it into three, namely general (*sādhāraṇa*), peculiar (*asādhāraṇa*), and non-exclusive (*anupasaṃhāri*).<sup>92</sup>

Whatever might be the division, the lack of invariable concomitance leading to inconclusiveness is the key concept of *savyabhicāra*. Hence the knowledge of *savyabhicāra* has got a prominent role in ascertaining accurate reason.

### **Investigation (*jijñāsā*):**

Investigation (*jijñāsā*) means a deliberate examination (*parīkṣa*). For instance, a medicine is prescribed for a disease only after a proper

examination.<sup>93</sup> Akṣapāda does not refer to *jijñāsā* in his categorical discussion. But Vātsyāyana uses it in a different sense. He considers it as one of the five factors which initiate discussion.<sup>94</sup>

### **Determination (*vyavasāya*):**

*Vyavasāya* means determinate cognition in the form of “this is a disease due to predominance of *vāyu*” or “this is the particular medicine for a particular disease”.<sup>95</sup> Akṣapāda uses this term in the definition of perception in order to characterize it as determinate.<sup>96</sup>

### **Imperfect statement (*anuyojya*) and Infallible statement (*ananuyojya*):**

An imperfect statement (*anuyojya*) is a faulty assertion in the form of making only general statements leaving out essential details in such contexts where it is needed.

Example: Some one makes a statement that a given disease is curable by elimination therapy instead of saying that it is curable by emetic or purgation therapy.<sup>97</sup> An infallible statement (*ananuyojya*) is just the opposite of an imperfect statement.

Example: The given disease is incurable.<sup>98</sup> It is a perfect and reliable statement.

### **Question (*anuyoga*) and counter question (*pratyanuyoga*)**

A question (*anuyoga*) is a query advanced by a learned person to another in a debate on the basis of the thesis that he puts forward.

Example: When one scholar makes the assertion “*puruṣa* is eternal” the another scholar asks “What is the reason?”.<sup>99</sup> If a question like “why do you ask such a question?” ensues as a response from the first person, then it is called a counter question.<sup>100</sup>

### **Defective statement (*vākyadoṣa*):**

Defective statement (*vākyadoṣa*) is the imperfection of a statement due to (1) inadequacy (*nyūna*), (2) redundancy (*adhika*), (3) meaninglessness (*anarthaka*), (4) incoherence (*apārthaka*), and (5) contradiction (*viruddha*).<sup>101</sup>

1. Inadequacy means the lack of any one of the five members of the syllogism. Giving only one reason where it is necessary to give more reasons is also inadequacy. That is, when a statement has to be supported by a number of reasons, only one is offered and the others are omitted, substantially affecting the strength of support for the establishment of the thesis.<sup>102</sup> This explanation is further confirmed by Akṣapāda and Vātsyāyana, who consider it as a division of *nigrahassthāna*.<sup>103</sup>

(2) Redundancy is contradictory to inadequacy. It consists in referring to topics which are not relevant to discussion. If the opponent speaks of Bārhaspatya and Śukranīti in a context where Āyurveda is being debated, it is an instance of redundancy. It also denotes needless repetition. This type of redundancy is of two types: verbal repetition (*śabdapunarukta*) and semantic repetition (*artha-punarukta*). Verbal repetition is the repetition of words and semantic repetition is giving more than one synonym to denote one and the same meaning.<sup>104</sup> Akṣapāda makes difference in this regard. He



construes redundancy as the repetition of reason or an example cited in a syllogism.<sup>105</sup> Moreover he considers the above-mentioned two divisions as two separate divisions of another *nigrahasthāna* called repetition (*punarukta*) and suggests that they become faults in places where they have no specific sense to convey.<sup>106</sup>

3. The meaningless means a collection of letters with out any signification.<sup>107</sup> It is called *nirarthaka* by Akṣapāda.<sup>108</sup>

4. Incoherence is a combinations of words which do not convey a connected meaning.<sup>109</sup>

Example: “whey wheel thunder race morning”. Akṣapāda defines it as a statement which does not give a complete sense due to the lack of syntactical relation.<sup>110</sup>

5. A contradictory statement means making a statement which is contradictory to the example (*dṛṣṭāntavirudha*), to the conclusion, to an established tenet (*sidhāntavirudha*), or to tradition (*samayaviruddha*).

The example of the first is the statement that fever produces heat as cold water produces heat and that of the second is a physician’s statement that medicine does not cure diseases.

Contradiction of tradition (*samayaviruddha*) is the making of statements against the tenets of a particular *śāstra*. It is of three kinds: (1) contradictory statement against tenets of Āyurvedic tradition, (2) against the tenets of ritual tradition, and (3) against tenets concerning liberation in

spiritual tradition. Thus, the assertion that a therapy has four constituents is a statement against the recognized tenet of Āyurveda. Similarly, the statement that animals should not be killed in rituals is contradictory to the established tenet of the ritual tradition and the statement regarding violence towards living beings is against the spiritual tradition.<sup>111</sup>

### **Excellent assertion (*vākyaprasāṃsā*):**

An excellent assertion (*vākyaprasāṃsā*) is a brilliant statement which is free from the aforesaid defects of inadequacy, redundancy, meaninglessness, incoherence, contradiction and is well expressive of the sense.<sup>112</sup> It is to be noted here that Akṣapāda does not refer to *vākyaprasāṃsā* though he deals with the four divisions of *vākyadoṣas* under the category *nigrahasthāna*.

### **Quibble (*cchala*) :**

A quibble (*chala*) signifies a response in which the statement of the opponent is intentionally misinterpreted to defeat him. It is a speech consisting of mere words creating the sense that it is meaningful while it is actually fraught with irrelevant and improper meanings.<sup>113</sup> It has got two divisions: (1) verbal quibble (*vākchala*), and (2) generalizing quibble (*sāmānyachala*).<sup>114</sup> Akṣapāda, who recognises quibble as a category, defines it as an assail on one's speech by a deliberate misinterpretation of it,<sup>115</sup> and adds one more to the division called figurative quibble (*upacārachala*). This is further attested by Vātsyāyana<sup>116</sup> and Udyotakara.<sup>117</sup>

Though Caraka classifies quibbles, he does not define each one of them. He only illustrates them. However, the examples given for the two types of quibbles agree with the definitions given for them by Akṣapāda.

### 1. Verbal quibble (*vākchala*).

A verbal quibble (*vākchala*), according to Akṣapāda, is the assuming of a meaning by the opponent other than that intended by the speaker since he has not specified his meaning.<sup>118</sup>

Example: The word *navatantra* has got two meanings: one who has learned his new books and one who has learned nine books. Thus, when a person says about his opponent: “This is a *navatantra*” with the intention that he has learned new books, the opponent takes the second meaning and replies, “I haven’t nine books; I have only one book”. Then the former objects: “I did not say, you have nine books; I say that you have newly learned the books (*navabhyastatantra*)” and then the opponent retorts: “I have read the book many times”.<sup>119</sup> A similar example is cited by Vātsyāyana also. The word *navakaṃbala* has the meaning one who wears nine cloth and also one who wears new blanket. Thus, when one says “*navakaṃbalo’sya*” to mean the young boy bears new blanket, the opponent replies: “This boy has only one blanket; where are the nine blankets?” Here also the opponent misinterprets the word *navakaṃbala* as intended by the speaker.<sup>120</sup>

### 2. Generalizing quibble (*sāmānyachala*):

A quibble in respect of generalities (*sāmānyachala*) is giving an absurd meaning which is rendered possible by generalising the terms where

a particularised meaning is intended.<sup>121</sup> When a person says that medicine cures diseases the opponent takes the most general characteristic of the words and asks whether he intends to say that an existing entity cures another existing entity, and, if so, the disease bronchitis (*kāsa*) being an existing entity must cure the disease consumption (*kṣāya*), for it is also an existing entity.<sup>122</sup> Here also the quibbler is fully aware of the intended meaning of the speaker. But he deliberately tries to find fault with the speaker. Vātsyāyana also cites a similar example.<sup>123</sup>

### 3. Figurative quibble (*upacāracchala*):

Akṣapāda adds one more division called figurative quibble (*upacārachala*) as a third division. Accordingly, *upacārachala* consists in discarding one's statement as senseless by taking its primary sense where the secondary sense is intended.<sup>124</sup> It is notable that Akṣapāda himself raises the objection that *vākchala* is *upacārachala* itself because alteration in meaning is a common feature in both the cases.<sup>125</sup> Further, he himself clears out the objection by pointing out that there exists specific differences between the two beyond their minor similarities.<sup>126</sup> Referring to this, Dasgupta suggests that the objection raised reveals his disagreement with the classification given in Carakasamhitā.<sup>127</sup> However, Akṣapāda is found to be very weak to establish his argument. The hair splitting specific difference that he claims for them to have is not convincing.

### Fallacies of reason (*ahetu*):

The validity of inference depends upon the validity of each and every member of the syllogism. Hence it is necessary to identify a valid reason

and for that it is essential to have an accurate knowledge of fallacies of reason to ensure accuracy of reasoning. Caraka does not evolve a general definition of the fallacies of reason. Akṣapāda, who calls fallacies of reason by the term *hetvābhāsa*, treats it as one of the categories. But he also does not give a general definition of it. Vātsyāyana, at the same time, describes fallacies of reason as *ahetu* which appears as if it were a reason and which is devoid of the characteristics that is essential for a reason.<sup>128</sup> Udyotakara also calls it *ahetu* which means deficient in one or other characteristics of the valid reason.<sup>129</sup>

Annaṃbhaṭṭa defines fallacies of reason as the object of valid cognition which obstructs a judgment.<sup>130</sup> Cakrapāṇi says that *ahetu* is a reason which is incapable of generating inferential knowledge.<sup>131</sup>

Caraka classifies fallacies of reason into three: Equalizing the minor term (*prakāraṇasama*), doubtful reason (*saṃśayasama*), and equalizing the proposition (*varṇyasama*).<sup>132</sup> Akṣapāda describes five fallacies of reason. They are (1) *savyabhicāra*, (2) *viruddha*, (3) *prakaraṇasama*, (4) *sādhyasama*, and (5) (*kālātīta*).<sup>133</sup> Kaṇāda, enumerates three<sup>134</sup> and Annaṃbhaṭṭa five<sup>135</sup>. Thus, there is a divergence of opinion regarding the number of fallacies of reason. *Savyabhicāra*, which is a common division of fallacies of reason in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika classification, has been excluded by Caraka in his enumeration and is described independently. It is because *savyabhicāra* is not only an erroneous reason in inference but can also be a defective cause. Similarly, *viruddha* and *atītakāla* are also described independently since they are common defects.<sup>136</sup>

(1) Equalising the controversy (*prakaraṇasama*): If a reason (*hetu*) remains unproved and the controversy continues, it is called *prakaraṇasama*. Example: When the proponent states that the self is eternal since it is different from the body, then the opponent refutes it by pointing out the fallacy underlying the assertion. The opponent argues that if the soul is eternal just because it is different from the body which is ephemeral, then the reason different from the body will not lead to a final judgment that “the self is eternal”, because the middle term or reason (*hetu*) “different from the body” remains unascertained like the unproved major term (*sādhya*), that is the ‘eternity of the self’.<sup>137</sup> Thus, the controversy remains unsolved.

*Prakaraṇasama*, according to Akṣapāda, is a reason that does not help to ascertain the major term (*sādhya*) for which it is proposed, but only generates doubt about it.<sup>138</sup> He also speaks of another *prakaraṇasama* which is a division of false rejoinder (*jāti*). It consists in opposing an argument on the strength of similarity of the minor term (*pakṣa*) with the examples having contradictory characters.<sup>139</sup> For instance, when it is argued with equal force that sound is ephemeral because its property of eternity is not cognized in things like vessels, the opponent challenges it by saying that sound is eternal because its property of being ephemeral is not known in objects like *ākāśa*. No conclusion can be arrived at from either of the two reasons mentioned or from the two propositions due to the equal strength of contradiction. Hence it leads to the unsettlement of the contradiction.<sup>140</sup>

It is to be noted in this connection that the fallacy of reason *prakāraṇasama* conceived by Caraka is different from both the

*prakāraṇasamas* of the Nyāyasūtra. If the reason or the minor term equalises the middle term, it is called *prakāraṇasama* in the Carakasamhitā. But in the Nyāya-sūtra, the fallacy of reason *prakāraṇasama* refers to a reason which creates only doubt. Similarly the false rejoinder *prakāraṇasama* refers to the existence of two contradictory reasons in the middle term or stating of two contradictory propositions which leads to the unsettlement of the contradiction.

2. Doubtful reason (*saṃśayasama*): If the reason offered for the deduction is doubtful, it is called *saṃśayasama*.<sup>141</sup> Thus a person quotes a passage from Āyurveda: “Is he a physician or not?” This doubtful statement can even be quoted by a person who is not a physician simply after hearing from somewhere else. So quoting a passage from Āyurveda leaves behind the doubt whether the man who has quoted the passage is a physician or not. If this itself is offered as a reason for clearing doubt by saying “he is a physician because he has quoted the Āyurvedic passage”, then it becomes the fallacy of reason called *saṃśayasama*.<sup>142</sup> In Nyāyasūtra, *saṃśayasama* is regarded as a false rejoinder. There, *saṃśayasama* is confined to opposing a proposition of the proponent by urging that the existence of a major term (*sādhyā*) in the minor term (*pakṣa*) is doubtful due to its similarity with one example in which the major term is present and with another example in which the major term is absent.<sup>143</sup> Thus, the difference with regard to false rejoinder in the Carakasamhitā and Nyāyasūtra is that in the former it is used in the sense of a doubtful reason adduced for a particular conclusion while in the latter it is a case in which doubt is not removed on account of the fact that the major term possesses two opposite characteristics in two different examples.

3. Equalizing the major term (*varṇyasama*): If the example cited to confirm a major term is an unproved one and makes no difference to the major term, it is called *varṇyasama*. For instance, when it is stated that intellect is ephemeral like sound since intellect is untouchable like the latter, the non-eternity of sound remains as much in need of a proof as the intellect for its confirmation. Hence, the proposition intellect is eternal also remains unproved on the basis of the example “sound”.<sup>144</sup> This fallacy of reason is similar to the false rejoinder called *sādhyasama* of the Nyāya-sūtra. Revealing this idea, Jayantabhaṭṭa describes *sādhyasama* as the equalising nature of the example and the major term in respect of provability.<sup>145</sup>

### **Illogical order (*atītakāla*):**

**Illogical order (*atītakāla*)** is a fallacy which occurs when something which should be stated first in the order of priority is stated later or when there is an occasion for a point of defeat if one keeps silence in due time and applies it afterwards to some other point breaking the logical sequence.<sup>146</sup>

The first part of the explanation given for *atītakāla* corresponds to a division of point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) called *aprāptakāla* of the Nyāya-sūtra. There, it is being defined as the making of an alteration in the sequence of a syllogism.<sup>147</sup> The common feature in both the cases is the illogical sequence of the members of syllogism and so they cannot convey any connected meaning. Taking account of this fact, Cakrapāṇi cites an example pertaining to syllogism in which the proposition which should be said first is stated last and the conclusion which should be said last is stated first.<sup>148</sup>



But it is to be noted that the second part of the definition given by Caraka vindicates that he does not restrict the alteration to the sequence of the members of syllogism but to the point of defeat also.

### **Criticism (*upālaṃbha*):**

Criticism (*upālaṃbha*) denotes the act of pointing out the fallacies of reason in a debate.<sup>149</sup>

### **Resolve (*parihāra*):**

Resolve (*parihāra*) is the resolution given as reply to the objections raised by pointing out the fallacies of reason by the opponent.<sup>150</sup>

For instance, the following is the resolution given in reply to the objection raised against establishing that the self is eternal. “The self is eternal. It shows signs as long as it remains in the body and when it leaves the body there will be no signs in the body even if it is there. Therefore, the self is different from the body and is eternal”.<sup>151</sup>

### **Violating the proposition (*pratijñāhāni*) :**

When one is forced to forsake his proposition due to the attack of the opponent, it is called violating the proposition.<sup>152</sup> For instance, when one begins with his assertion that the self is eternal, but being contradicted by the opponent by a counter thesis that the self is ephemeral, he is forced to give up his original proposition that the self is eternal.

A quite different definition of *pratijñāhāni* is given by Akṣapāda who considers it as a division of the point of defeat. Accordingly, violating the

proposition occurs when one admits in his example that there is the character of a counter example.<sup>153</sup> A person says that sound is ephemeral because it is perceptible by a sense capacity like a jar and the opponent refutes it by saying that sound is eternal because it is perceptible by a sense organ like a genus which is eternal. Then the disputant replies that if a perceptible genus is eternal, a jar also must be eternal. Here the disputant admits that in his example jar, there is the character of eternity which is a property of genus, the counter example. Thus, he denies the ephemeral nature of a jar proposed by him and admits its eternity which is the character of a counter example and hurts the disputant's proposition.<sup>154</sup> Even though the definition given by Caraka is different from the definition given in Nyāya-sūtra, he agrees with the core point that the disputant has to forsake his original thesis. As such, it can be treated as a point of defeat.

### **Confessional retort (*abhyanujñā*):**

A confessional retort (*abhyanujñā*) consists in charging the opponent with a defect by admitting the defect in oneself.<sup>155</sup> This corresponds to the point of defeat called *matānujñā* of Nyāya-sūtra.<sup>156</sup>

### **Dodging with a wrong reason (*hetvantara*):**

If the disputant dodges a genuine reason by giving a wrong reason, it is called *hetvantara*.<sup>157</sup> The Nyāya-sūtra describes it in a different way from this. There, it consists in investing the reason with a particular character, when the reason of general character is opposed.<sup>158</sup>

### Offering irrelevant statement (*arthāntara*) :

Offering irrelevant statement (*arthāntara*) consists in setting aside the relevant topic and introducing the irrelevant one.<sup>159</sup>

Example: When the disputant is expected to give the-definition of fever, he gives the definition of diabetes (*prameha*). This is also given in the Nyāya-sūtra.<sup>160</sup>

### Points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*):

Points of defeat are the grounds of defeat. Caraka says that it occurs when an argument of the disputant is not understood by the assembly constituted by learned members. Caraka has already discussed the various types of points of defeat in the course of his discussion. The Nyāya-sūtra describes it as the inability to refute an opponent's thesis or to establish one's own thesis refuted by the opponent.<sup>161</sup> Twenty-two kinds of such *nigrahasthānas* are enumerated in the Nyāya-sūtra.<sup>162</sup>

Apart from these forty-four categories, Caraka describes another group of ten technical terms which have precise relevance within the context of Āyurveda .<sup>163</sup> It is inevitable for a physician to know them for becoming a competent person in treatment. They are the following:

1. The agent or the one who initiates an action (*kāraṇa*).
2. The instrument that helps the agent to perform his action (*kaṛaṇa*).
3. The substantial cause that is being modified into an effect by the action (*kāryayoni*).

4. The effect for which the agent performs his action (*kārya*).
5. The purpose intended of the effect by the agent (*kāryaphala*).
6. The good or bad which binds the doer as a result of the production of the particular effect (*anubandha*).
7. Location or site of the action (*deśa*).
8. Time or duration for transformation (*kāla*).
9. The effort needed for the production of the desired effect (*pravṛtti*).
10. The compliance and also the excellence in the proper setting of the agent, instrument, and the material cause to accomplish the desired effect.<sup>164</sup>

### **Similarities and dissimilarities of dialectical terms in Carakasamhitā and Nyāya-sūtra:**

The following are some of the basic similarities and differences of the dialectical terms in the Carakasamhitā and the Nyāya-sūtras. Debate, the five membered syllogism, example, false rejoinder, tenet, the source of knowledge, doubt, purpose, quibble, fallacies of reason, doubt, and point of defeat explained in Carakasamhitā are given independent categorical status in the Nyāyasūtras. *Sthāpana* of Carakasamhitā is represented by the category *avayava* of the Nyāya-sūtras. Similarly, false rejoinder (*uttara*) of Caraka corresponds to the category *jāti* of Akṣapāda. The peculiarity of the Nyāya-sūtra is that it enumerates twenty-four divisions of false rejoinders

(*jāti*) which are found lacking in Caraka. Caraka recognizes *pratijñāhāni*, *abhyanujñā*, *kālatītavacana*, *ahetu*, *nyūna*, *adhika*, *vyartha*, *anarthaka*, *punarukta*, *viruddha*, *hetvantara*, and *arthāntara* as of points of defeat.<sup>165</sup> *Ahetu* is regarded as a point of defeat in Caraka. Akṣapāda calls it by the name *hetvābhāsa*. Moreover, he treats it as an independent category and as a division of the point of defeat. Even though the points of defeat *pratijñāhāni* and *hetvantara* are described in Nyāya-sūtra and Caraka, they are different in both. Caraka speaks of twelve kinds of points of defeat. Akṣapāda increases the number to twenty-two. *Savyabhicāra*, which is treated distinctly by Caraka is conceived as a division of fallacies of reason in the Nyāya-sūtra. The fallacy of reason *prakāraṇasama* and *saṃśāyasama* given in Caraka and the Nyāya-sūtras are different. *Varṇyasama* of the Saṃhitā corresponds to the false rejoinder *sādhyasama* in the Nyāya-sūtra. *Jijñāsa*, *vavasāya*, *anuyojya*, *ananuyojya*, *anuyoga*, *pratyanyoga*, *vākyaprasaṃsā*, *upalaṃbhah*, *parihāra* discussed in Caraka are not given categorical importance in the Nyāya-sūtras.

### **The historicity of logic and dialectical speculations of Carakasamhitā**

In India, “science of demonstration or reasoning” has been struggling in vain for more than two thousand years to extricate itself from religion and to make itself independent of faith in the scriptures.<sup>166</sup> Though we can consider the earliest references of debates, dialogues, and formal legal councils in the early Upaniṣads,<sup>167</sup> Smṛtis,<sup>168</sup> Buddhistic and other secular literatures as the precursors of science of search, they do not give an idea

of the formal type of disputation or the system of dialectics. Kauṭilya (about 327 BC) recognized science of search or demonstration as a distinct branch among the four branches of study.<sup>169</sup> He calls it *anvīkṣiki* and associates it with Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokayata.<sup>170</sup> It is enjoined in a verse that it is the lamp for all sciences, means of all affairs, and basis for all that is to be done.<sup>171</sup>

Carakasamhitā and the Nyāya-sūtra are the two available early books which give us an attention-grabbing account of the science of reasoning.

It is Carakasamhitā which gives an elaborate exposition of the science of reasoning in relation to the description of the debate. Details regarding the types of councils (*pariṣats*), the different kinds of partaking opponents, the nature of debates, the procedure that is to be followed in a debating council, and a long list of dialectical terms including the fundamental categories and the source of knowledge are discussed in the Carakasamhitā. But it does not receive as much attention as the Nyāya-sūtra does. It may be because of the following reasons. Carakasamhitā is not an independent treaty on the science of reasoning. On the other hand, it is a compendium of science of life. Moreover, it is not rendered in a systematic form. As far as the Nyāya-sūtra is concerned, its main purpose has been the discussion of the science of reason. Nyāya, as a philosophical system, primarily deals with epistemology and logic, and secondarily with ontology, psychology, ethics, and theology.<sup>172</sup> Of these, epistemology and logic are considered to have been the greatest contribution of the Nyāya-sūtra to the Indian system of philosophy. It is on the basis of this that it is called *pramāṇasastra*. Placing

primacy on the science of reasoning, it gives a meticulous account of logic and dialectics. Above all, it enters into the act of refuting the epistemological as well as the metaphysical theories of the rival schools giving it the nature of a full fledged philosophical system.

Now the question arises as to whether Carakasamhitā is the precursor of Nyāya - sūtra or whether Caraka has incorporated the the Nyāya tenets into it. With regard to the origin of the science of reasoning, Mahadev Rajaram Bodas suggests that Pūrvaīmāṃsā develops sundry rules of logic in philosophical disquisitions connected with sacrifices from the exegetical necessity and called them the Nyāyas. The science of reasoning (*ānvīkṣikī*) took shape by the secularization of these exegetical rules.<sup>173</sup> Based on this hypothesis, he concludes that Gotama<sup>174</sup> developed a philosophical system from the secular art called *ānvīkṣikī*. Thus, it acquired the new appellation Nyāya and became the rival of the two Mīmāṃsas.<sup>175</sup>

However, this theory is not tenable. The main reason is that the period of development that preceded the composition of the Nyāya-sūtra has been left out by him . The important thing to be taken into consideration is that he does not speak of anything about Carakasamhitā in this regard. If it is admitted that Gotama has evolved the Nyāya philosophy from the secularized form of the Mīmāṃsā-nyāyās then the Nyāya system cannot become a rival system to the Mīmāṃsas. Moreover, he does not give due importance to what Kauṭilya says.

Satis Chandra Vidyabhushana gives a different theory. According to him, *ānvīkṣikī* was formerly a spiritual science (*atmavidyā*)<sup>176</sup> and

Carakasamhitā as well as Nyāya-sūtra of Akṣapāda embodies doctrines propounded by Medhatihī Gautama. He says that Caraka has accepted them in the crude form and Akṣapāda in the refined form.<sup>177</sup> He has also stated that the doctrines of *ānvīkṣikī* did not evidently constitute a part of the original Āyurveda of Punarvasu Ātreya. But it was incorporated into the Carakasamhitā by the redactor Caraka.<sup>178</sup>

It is some thing remarkable that there are scholars who consider that Caraka-samhitā is the forerunner of the Nyāya-sūtra. Winternitz is of the opinion that Carakasamhitā is older than the redacted Nyāya-sūtra.<sup>179</sup> Though there are many other scholars who admit this point of view, it is Dasgupta who gives a precise and authentic opinion in this regard. He vehemently opposes the theory of Vidyabhusana as baseless. He says that Methātithi Gautama is a mythical person who has not written anything and that Caraka has not borrowed from Methātithi Gautama. He argues on the ground that the evidences cited by Vidyabhusana to substantiate his theory are irrelevant.<sup>180</sup> He considers that the Nyāya-sūtras was composed by Akṣapāda in the second or the third century A.D.<sup>181</sup> The most significant part of his investigative report consists of the concluding remarks. He says: “since there is no mention of the development of art of debate in any other literature it is reasonable to suppose that the art of debate and its other accessories developed from early times in the traditional medical schools, whence they are found collected in the Carakasamhitā.”<sup>182</sup> He adds that the illustrations of the mode of dispute and the categories of the art of debate belong to the medical field and so the logical portion of Carakasamhitā was not collected from non-medical literature and grafted into it.<sup>183</sup>



The following are some of the main points that Dasgupta puts forward to substantiate his finalization. The half mythical account of the origin of *Āyurveda* given at the beginning of the first chapter of *sūtrasthāna* bears testimony to the fact that *Āyurveda* was occupied from the beginning with the investigation of the nature of causes (*hetu*) and reason (*liṅga*) for legitimate inferences in connection with the enquiry into the causes of diseases and the apprehension of signs of the same.<sup>184</sup> We find no work of an earlier date, Hindu, Buddhist or Jaina, which treats of the logical subjects found in the *Carakasamhitā*. So we have to assume that Caraka has got his materials regarding logic and dialectics from Agniveśa. More over these logical discussions seems to be inextricably connected with medical discussions of diagnosis of diseases and the ascertainment of their causes.<sup>185</sup> In addition to this, determination of cause and effects and the inference of facts or events of invariable concomitance are an indispensable necessity for *Āyurveda* physicians in the diagnosis of diseases and the ascertainment of their causes and cures.<sup>186</sup>

The definition of perception given by Caraka seems to be the earliest model, because its definition in the *Nyāya-sūtra* adds three more qualifications to make the meaning more complex and precise.<sup>187</sup> However, the findings of Dasgupta that debate and its accessories explained in the *Carakasamhitā* have developed in the early medical realm is more reasonable and tenable. It is significant to note in this connection that scholars like Pradeep P. Gokhale also say: “Caraka is perhaps the first thinker, whose discussion on the nature and possible faults of controversy is possible”.<sup>188</sup>

In addition to this, he again suggests that Caraka's account of the method of debate appeared some three centuries before Akṣapāda.<sup>189</sup> One of the difficulties is that he ascribes Nyāya-sūtra to Akṣapāda of the second century BC, which has only a partial recognition. The original authorship of Nyāya-sūtra is a controversial one. Some scholars ascribe the authorship to Gautama while some others say that it is Akṣapāda. Some of them are of the opinion that both Akṣapāda and Gautama are one and the same person. Still some others, attribute the authorship to Gotama and also to Medhātithi Gautama as shown above.<sup>190</sup> These opinions are mainly based on external evidences. It should be noted that the earliest authoritative books on Nyāya which came subsequent to the Sūtra namely, Nyāyabhasya<sup>191</sup>, Nyāyavārtika<sup>192</sup>, Nyāyavārtika- tātparyatīkā<sup>193</sup> and Nyāya Mañjarī<sup>194</sup> ascribe the authorship to Akṣapāda.

There are sufficient internal and external evidences to prove that Carakaśaṃhitā is a precursor of the Nyāya-sūtra with regard to the science of debate and reasoning provided Akṣapāda is admitted as the author of the Nyāya-sūtra. The most striking evidence is that Caraka does not give definitions of all the dialectical terms. He does it at random; some of the terms are defined and illustrated, while some others are given definitions only. Still some others are left with examples only. At the same time, it is in the Nyāya-sūtras and its subsequent books that we see a systematic and meticulous account of these technical terms. He defines them all. But he is not interested in illustrating them. This shows the premature nature of the doctrines at the time of the compilation of the Carakaśaṃhitā. Moreover,

the epistemology of the Nyāya-sūtra covers not only the sources of knowledge but also the conditions of the validity of knowledge and their sources. It is typical of the Nyāya-sūtra that it considers Sāṃkhyas as a rival school and refutes their metaphysical and epistemological doctrines. At the same time, Caraka pays much veneration to the early Sāṃkhyas. In fact, the metaphysical doctrines of the Carakasamhitā are of pre-classical origin. The most conspicuous thing is that Caraka not only outlines methodology of disputation but also applies it to his own compendium. The Carakasamhita is compiled in the very same pattern.

The most reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing facts is that Caraka gives a methodology of right thinking and the details of system of logic and dialectics practically complete and more or less consistent. Yet it has not attained the nature of a full-fledged system. Caraka addresses logic and dialectical problems not in isolation but as a second step in the hierarchy of education. In fact, his main objective was not to propound a cut and dry system of the science of reasoning and theory of knowledge but to give a complete picture of honest and value oriented medical education. Caraka expresses his views on all cognate and interdependent questions on the theory of knowledge so that it would facilitate the medical realm for clearing doubts and absurdities of what has been apprehended and thereby updating the medical knowledge. The momentous thing that is to be remembered is that there is none other than the Carakasamhitā in Āyurveda which gives such a detailed account of the science of reasoning. Perhaps there are shortcomings and imperfections. It is the one and the only earliest

book which elaborates the nature of debating council, divisions of debate, strategies to be adopted in the debate and the dialectical terms including the fundamental categories that constitute the universe. Above all, the Carakasamhitā itself stands as an icon of the methodology of thought and expression. On the contrary, the available Nyāya-sūtra does not speak about the nature of the council or the strategies that is to be taken up in a debate. Based on the similarity and differences described above, we can understand that, among the sixteen categories of the Nyāya-sūtra, all the fifteen except the category *prameya* (which deals metaphysics) are the extricated and modified forms of the dialectical terms enumerated by Caraka. Even if we accept the argument of Vidyabhusana for argument there is sufficient evidence to substantiate the fact that Caraka's account of the method of debate has happened some three centuries before Akṣapāda .

The novelty of the Nyāya-sūtra is that it has developed a well knit theory of epistemology and logic and it led to the acceleration of the dialectical interaction of the various philosophical systems. In fact, its influence has been greater in other philosophical systems and thereby assumed the status of a newly constructed philosophical system. Thus, it has eclipsed what has been explained in Carakasamhitā and henceforth became the sole standard of posterity. The Nyāya system as an independent philosophical school took the lead in applying it for metaphysical discussions. Thus, it became an inevitable part of other philosophical systems also. So, from the existing data we can concede that the available work which has pioneered to codify a methodology of rational thought is Carakasamhitā.

## Analytical devices (*tantrayukis*)

We know that people, grounded in different disciplinary matrices and affiliated to different cultures, do communicate and interact with one another. “Our language, with out which we cannot live, makes it impossible for us not to communicate and interact with one another”.<sup>195</sup> So it is essential to ensure that language doesn’t mislead.

Language maps the intention of the speaker, the reality one grasped. But the haunting question is whether we are successful in communicating our ideas perfectly. Naturally the answer is not a positive one. Expressions are context-bound and so there often happens communication breakdown. Ordinary language, written or uttered is flexible, some what indefinite, and rich in their connotations. So it creates problems in the way of right communication in philosophical, scientific discourse, and scriptural understanding.

Words may undergo the process of deformation and decay in the course of history due to many reasons. So it is essential to regain the unimpaired strength of language and words in order to discern the real sense of the treatises which document the earliest thoughts, for words and language are not wrappings in which thing are packed for the commerce of those who write and speak. It is in words and language that things first come into being and are. For this reason the misuse of words in idle talks, in and phrases destroy our authentic relation to things.<sup>196</sup> Hence thought and expression needs a well ordered scientific language to communicate.

The great thinkers of Indian intellectual tradition were fully aware of the difficulty in maintaining the transparency of the language and the barriers that stand against proper communication. So they have tried to solve the crucial problem by formulating rules regarding verbalization and its decoding. Thus, there evolved different theories on verbal testimony. The Grammarians, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāīkas were the pioneers in this field. Similarly, other system makers also have developed and employed a well-nit scientific methodology consisting of analytical devices in their compositions. Such analytical devices are called *tantrayuktis*.

“*Tantrayukti*” may be defined as the methodology and technique which enable one to compose and interpret scientific treaties correctly and intelligently”.<sup>197</sup> The knowledge and application of the *tantrayuktis* will enable one to know the relevant and intended idea of articulations coherently, precisely free of inconsistency and contradiction. Caraka, who was circumspect of this fact says that when conflicting views appear in the text it should be interpreted on the basis of the contextual, special, and temporal propriety as well as according to the intention of the speaker and the rules of interpretation.<sup>198</sup> Further in Siddhistāna it has been well expressed by Dṛḍhabala through a beautiful simile about how it can be achieved by the employment of *tantrayuktis*. The *tantrayuktis* uncover the science completely just like the sun unfolds the lotus or the lamp that illuminates the house.<sup>199</sup>

Suśrutasamhitā states that the purpose of *tantrayukti* is the proper unification of sentences and meanings.<sup>200</sup> It is also distinctly stated that a debater can establish his own points and set aside those of his opponents

who indulge in unfairness by means of *tantrayuktis*.<sup>201</sup> Referring to this, Dasgupta points out that these are maxims for the interpretation of textual topics, and are not point of dispute or logical categories.<sup>202</sup> However, it should be noted that Suśruta is of opinion that the main purpose of *tantrayuktis* is to help one to ununveil the true meaning of words which are hidden and partly explained.<sup>203</sup>

Arthaśāstra, Carakasamhitā, Suśrutasamhitā, Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya, Aṣṭāṅgasamgraha Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa, Tantrayuktivicāra of Nīlameghabhicak, and *Tantrayukti* of an anonymous author are the main books which provide us with such analytical devices analyzing and grasping the real sense of the articulations. Probably, the *tantrayuktis* might have emerged and virtually settled before Paṇini. Dr. W.K. Lele, pointing out the various devices referred to in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, has rightly remarked by that Pāṇini possessed a fair knowledge of about twenty-eight devices and that he had employed them while writing his aphoristic work.<sup>204</sup> However Pāṇini neither codifies nor defines *tantrayuktis* beyond their utilization.

Kautilya's Arthaśāstra, the greatest work on polity and statecraft, enumerates, explains and employs *tantrayuktis*. Kautilya enumerates thirty-two analytical devices called *tantrayuktis*.<sup>205</sup>

Carakasamhita, as we have seen, deals with the concepts and theories on both science and philosophy. Hence, it was essential to speak at different levels keeping the logical sequence. So he sought to use certain conventional

method and scientific language for the expression of the well ordered thought. He was not only concerned with adequacy, accuracy and economy of treaty formation, but also wanted to convey the real sense of what has been told. In order to enable this purpose of right communication of the treatise Dṛḍhabala has incorporated a list of thirty six analytical devices in *Siddhisthāna*. Even though Carakasamhitā can be treated as the first Āyurvedic treatise that deals with *tantrayuktis* they appear only in the twelfth chapter of the final book called *Siddhisthāna* which is considered as an addition made by Dṛḍhabala, who made its final recasting. Another significant thing to be noted in this connection is that these *tantrayuktis* are neither defined nor illustrated by him. So, probably, Dṛḍhabala, the final redactor of the treatise must have formed the table of thirty six *tantrayuktis* by adding four more to the thirty-two enumerated by Kautilya.<sup>206</sup>

The following are the thirty-six *tantrayuktis*:

(1) topic of discussion (*adhikaraṇa*), (2) proper arrangement of words (*yoga*), (3) extension of argument (*hetvartha*), (4) meaning of a word (*padārtha*), (5) partial description of a topic (*pradeśa*), (6) concise statement (*uddeśa*), (7) amplification of a statement (*nirdeśa*), (8) supply of ellipsis (*vākyśeṣa*), (9) purpose (*prayojana*), (10) authoritative instruction (*upadeśa*), (11) adducing a reason for establishing a proposition (*apadeśa*), (12) extension of analogous topics (*atideśa*), (13) presumption or implication (*arthāpatti*), (14) conclusion (*nirṇaya*), (15) reiteration of a statement according to the contextual propriety (*prasaṅga*), (16) a universal



statement (*ekānta*), (17) acceptance of any one of two assertions (*anaikānta*), (18) a statement regarding exception to a general rule (*apavarga*), (19) contrariety (*viparyaya*), (20) an objection raised against a proposition in debate (*pūrvapakṣa*), (21) accurate interpretation (*vidhāna*), (22) approval of other's view (*anumata*), (23) explanatory exposition (*vyakhyāna*), (24) doubt (*saṃśaya*), (25) reference to a previous statement (*atitāvekṣā*), (26) reference to an ensuing statement (*anāgatāvekṣā*), (27) technical terms coined by the author of treatise (*svasaṃjñā*), (28) deduction or an inference by reason (*ūhya*), (29) combination of entities independent of one another (*samuccaya*), (30) an example or illustration (*nidarśana*), (31) definition or etymological interpretation (*nirvacana*), (32) injunction (*saṃniyoga*), (33) option (*vikalpana*), (34) rebuttal or refutation (*pratyutsāra*), (35) extrication of ones tenet by refuting the opponent (*uddhara*), and (36) probability (*saṃbhava*).<sup>207</sup>

Cakrapāṇi has stated that Bhatārahariścandra, the author of *Carkanāyasa*, has enumerated four more *yuktis*: (1) *paripraśna*, (2) *vyākaraṇa*, (3) *vyutkrāntābhidhāna*, and (4) *hetu*.<sup>208</sup> Suśruta enumerates only thirty-two *tantrayuktis*.<sup>209</sup>

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 *S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 6th Impression, 2000, Vol. II, p. 33.
- 2 *pariṣattu khalu dvividhā -- jñānavatī, mūḍhapariṣacca. saiva dvividhā satī trividhā punaranena kāraṇavibhāgena suhṛtpariṣat, udāsīna pariṣat, pratiniviṣṭa pariṣacceti.*, CS, Vi, VIII. 20.
- 3 Ibid., 15.
- 4 NS, VI. ii. 47; *tadvidyaisca saha saṃvāda iti prajñāparipākārthaṃ*, Vātsyāyana on ibid., N. Bh, p. 415.
- 5 Ibid., 16
- 6 Ibid., 17.
- 7 Ibid., 18
- 8 Ibid., 19.
- 9 Loc. cit., F. Note, 2.
- 10 CS, V.; VIII. 27.
- 11 *tatra vādo nāma sa yat pareṇa saha śāstrapūrvakaṃ vigrhya kathayati. sa ca dvividhaḥ sūgrahaṇa -- jalpapaḥ vitaṇḍā ca.* CS, Vi, Ibid., 28.
- 12 Ibid.

- 13 *tisraḥ kathā bhavanti vado jalpo vitaṇḍā ceti*. Vātsyāyana on NS. I. ii. N. Bh p. 68; SDSM, p. 239; SDS, p. 40.
- 14 *tathā ca nānāpravakṭṛka vicāra viṣayavākya sandṛb dhiḥ katheti sāmānyalalakṣaṇaṃ.*, NVT, p. 313.
- 15 *pramānatarkasādhanopālambhaḥ siddhāntāviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣapratipakṣaprigraho vādaḥ*. NS, I. ii. 1.
- 16 *tattvanirṇyabhalāḥ kathāviśeṣo vādaḥ*, SDSM, p. 239.
- 17 *yathoktopapannaścchalajātiinigrahasthānasiddhāntopālambho jalpaḥ*. NS, I. ii. 2; *ubhayasādhanavati vijigīṣukathā jalpaḥ*, SDSM, p. 239.
- 18 *sa pratipakṣasthāpanāhīno vitaṇḍā*, NS, I. ii. 3; See also Vātsyāyana on *ibid.*, N. Bh, p. 72.
- 19 *tattvadhyavasāyārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe bījapraroḥaṇsamrakṣaṇārthaṃ kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavat*. NS, IV. ii. 50.
- 20 “The former (*sandhāyasambhāṣā*) also called *anulomasambhāṣā*, is known as *vādakathā*”. CHI, Vol. III. p. 563.
- 21 *Ibid.*
- 22 *sthāpanā nāma tasyā eva pratiñāyā hetudṛṣṭāntopanayanigama-naiḥ sthāpanā*, CS, Vi, VIII. 31.
- 23 *IFD*, p. 4.
- 24 *pratiñāhetūdāharṇopanoyanigamanānyavayavāḥ*. NS, I, i, 32.
- 25 “....so’yaṃ paramo nyāya iti”, Vātsyāyana on NS, I. i. 1, N. Bh, p. 9.

- 26 There are two types of inferences: inferring for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) and inferring for others (*parārthānumāna*). *pañcāvayavena vākyena svaniścayārthapratipādanaṃ parārthānumānaṃ*, PBNK, p. 558-565; *taccānumāinaṃ dvividham svārthaṃ parārthañca..... tāni ca vākāni... pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāni*, Sanakaramiśra on VS, IX. ii. 2, VU, p. 493-494; TSA, p. 37-38; SP, p. 31.
- 27 *taccānumānam parārthaṃ nyāyasādhyamiti nyāyastadavayavāśca pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāni nirūpyante* .TC, Vol. II, Part--i, p.540. Vedatins also accept the appellation Nyāya for syllogism, See VP, p.75.
- 28 See Vātsyāyana on NS, I. i. 32. N.Bh, p. 53.
- 29 *pratijñāhetūdāharaṇākhyā tryavayavavādinō mīmāṃsakāḥ*, SDSM, Upotghāta, pp.70-71; Notes, TSA, p.273.
- 30 *avayavāśca traya eva pratijñāhetūdāharaṇarūpāḥ, udāharaṇopanayanigamanarūpā vāna tu pañca*, VP, p.75; “Upodghata”, SDSM, p. 71; Notes, TSA, p. 273
- 31 *baudhāstūdāharaṇopanayākhyamavayavadvayaṃ manyante* SDSM, “Upotghata”, p. 70. Notes, TSA, p.273
- 32 CS, Vi, VIII. 32.
- 33 *pratijñā nāma sādhyavacanaṃ*. Ibid., 30.
- 34 *sadhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā*, NS, I. i. 33.

- 35 *prajñāpanīyena dharmeṇa dharmiṇo viśiṣṭayā parigrahavacanam  
pratijñā*, Vātsyāyana , p. 55. The words rendered in English as  
“object” refer to the minor term (*pakṣa*) and “property” to the major  
term (*sādhya*)
- 36 *tatrānumeyodeśo avirodhī pratijñā*. PBNK, p. 566.
- 37 *heturnāmopalabdhikāraṇam* CS, Vi, VIII. 33.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 CSJ, Vol. III. p.1580.
- 40 *udāharaṇasādharmāyt sādhyasādhanam hetuḥ*. NS, I. i. 34.
- 41 *udāharaṇasādharmyāt sādhyasya dharmasya sādhanam hetuḥ*  
Vātsyāyana on ibid., N. Bh, p.55.
- 42 *heturanumānam*, Vātsyāyana on NS, I. i. 1, p.9. See also NVT, p. 57
- 43 *heturapadeśo liṅgam pramāṇām karaṇamityanarthāntaram*. VS, IX.  
ii. 4.
- 44 *liṅgavacanamapadeśaḥ*, PBNK, p. 575.
- 45 *tatra svārtham trirūpalliṅgādyadanumīyate jñānam tadanumānam*,  
NB, p. 21; *trirūpalingākhyānām parārthānumānam*. Ibid, p. 46.
- 46 *dṛṣṭānto nāma yatra mūrkhaviduṣām buddhisāmyam, yo varṇyam  
varṇayati*. CS, Vi, VIII. 34.
- 47 *laukikaparīkṣakāṇām yasminnarthe buddhisāmyam sodāharaṇam*.  
NS, 1. i. 25; See also Vātsyāyana on ibid., N.Bh, p. 49.

- 48 *sādhyasādharmyāt tadharmabhavī dr̥ṣṭānta udāharaṇaṃ*, NS, I. i. 36; *tadviparyayādvā viparītaṃ*, Ibid., 37.
- 49 *udāhriyate'nena dharmayoḥ sādhyasādhnabhāva ityudāharaṇaṃ*, Vatsyāyana on NS, I,.i. 36, N.Bh, p.57.
- 50 See IFD, p. 5.
- 51 PBNK, p. 599.
- 52 PBNK, pp.600-603.
- 53 *udāharaṇāpekṣastathetyupasamharo na tatheti vā sādhyopanayaḥ*. NS, 1.i. 38.
- 54 *nidarsane'numeyasāmānyena saha dr̥ṣṭasya liṅgasāmānyamanumeye'nvayamanusandhānaṃ*. PBNK, p. 606.
- 55 See CS, Vi, VIII. 31.
- 56 *hetvapadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punarvacanaṃ nigamanaṃ*. NS, I. i. 39.
- 57 PBNK, p. 611.
- 58 *taccanumitihetuliṅgaparāmarśaprayojakaśābdajñānakāraṇavyāptipakṣatādhiprayuktasādhyadhījanakaṃ vākyaṃ*. TC, Vol. II, Part- I, p. 595.
- 59 *uttaraṃ nāma sādharmaopadiṣṭe hetau vaidharmya vacanaṃ, vaidharmyopadiṣṭe vā hetau sādharmavacanaṃ* ., CS, Vi, VIII. 35.
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 IFD, p. 3; HIPS, Vol. 1, p. 380.

- 62 *sādharmyavaidharmyābhāṃ pratyavasthānaṃ jātiḥ*, NS, I. ii. 18.
- 63 NS, V. i, 1.
- 64 HIPS, Vol. II. p. 382-83.
- 65 *siddhānto nāma sa yaḥ parīkṣakairbahuvīdhaṃ parīkṣya hetubhiḥca  
sādhayitva sthāpyate nirṇayaḥ*. CS, Vi, VIII. 37.
- 66 *sarvatantrasiddhānto nāma tasmīṃstasmin sarvasminstantre tattat  
prasiddhaṃ*, Ibid.
- 67 *pratitantrasiddhānto nāma tasmīṃstasminnekasmīṃstantre tattat  
prasiddhaṃ*, Ibid.
- 68 *adhikāraṇasiddhānto nāma sa yasminnadhikaraṇe prastūyamāne  
siddhānyanyānyapyadhikaraṇāni bhavanti*, Ibid.
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 *abhyupagamasiddhānto nāma sa yamarthamasiddhamaparīkṣitamā-  
nupadiṣṭamahetukaṃ vā vādakāle'bhyupagacchanti bhiṣajaḥ*, Ibid.
- 71 Ibid.
- 72 *tantrādhikaraṇābhyupagamasamsthitiḥ siddhāntaḥ*, NS, I. i. 26.
- 73 *sarvatantrapratitantrādhikāraṇābhyupagamasamsthiyarthāntara-  
bhāvāt*, NS, I, i, 27.
- 74 *abhyupagamavyavasthā siddhāntaḥ*, NV, p.107.
- 75 *prāmāṇikatvena abhyupagato'rthaḥ siddhāntaḥ*, T. Bh, p. 238.

- 76 *saṃśayo nāma sandehalakṣaṇānusandigdheṣvartheṣvaniścayaḥ*, CS, Vi, VIII. 43; Caraka includes doubt in the group of *tantrayukties* also. See supra, p. 333.
- 77 *samānanekadharmopalebdhervipratipaterupalebdhyanupalabdh yavyavasthātaśca viśeṣāpekṣo vimarśaḥ saṃśayaḥ*. NS, I. 1. 23.
- 78 *tatra nā'nuplabdhe no nirīte arthe nyāyaḥ pravartate. kim tarhi? samśayite arthe*, Vātsyāyana on NS, I. i. 1, N.Bh, p. 6
- 79 Vātsyāyana on NS, I. i. 23, N.Bh, pp.46-48.
- 80 *sāmānyapratyakṣād viśeṣānusmaraṇācca saṃśayaḥ*. VS, II. ii. 17.
- 81 *saṃśayastāvāt prasiddhānekaviśeṣayoḥ sādṛśyamātradarśanāt ubhayaviśeṣānusmaraṇācca kiṃsvidityubhyāvalambī vimarśaḥ saṃśayaḥ*, PBNK, pp. 411 - 412.
- 82 *anavadhāraṇaṃ jñānaṃ saṃśayaḥ*, SP, p. 68
- 83 *ūhānādhyavasāyayostu saṃśaya eva*. Ibid., p.34.
- 84 PHISPC, Vol. III, Part -- III. p. 28.
- 85 *prayojanaṃ nāma yadarthamārabhyanta āraṃbhāḥ*, CS, Vi, VIII. 44.
- 86 *yamarthamadhikṛya pravartate tat prayojanaṃ*, NS, I. i. 24.
- 87 *yena prayuktaḥ pravartate tat prayojanaṃ*, Vātsyāyana on ibid., p. 6.
- 88 *savyabhicāraṃ nāma yadvyabhicāraṇaṃ*, CS, Vi, VIII. 45.
- 89 *anaikāntikaḥ savyabhcāraḥ*, NS, I. ii. 5.



- 90 See Vātsyāyana on ibid. N.Bh, p. 73.
- 91 VS, III. i. 15,17.
- 92 *savyabhicāro'naikāntikaḥ. sa trividhaḥ sādharmaṇasādharmaṇanupasaṃhāribhedāt.*, TSA, p. 44; NSMK, pp.263-64.
- 93 CS, Vi, VIII. 46.
- 94 For details see Vātsyāyana on NS, I, i, 32, N.Bh, p. 53.
- 95 CS, Vi, VIII. 47.
- 96 NS, I. i. 4
- 97 CS, Vi, VIII. 50.
- 98 Ibid., 51.
- 99 Ibid., 52.
- 100 Ibid., 53.
- 101 *vākyadoṣo nāma yathā khalvasminnarthe nyūnaṃ, adhikaṃ, anarthakaṃ, apārthakaṃ, viruddhaṃ ceti*; Ibid., 54.
- 102 *tatra nyūnaṃ - pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanānāmanyatamenāpi nyūnaṃ nyūnaṃ bhavati; yadvā bahūpadiṣṭahetukmekena hetunā sādhyate tacca nyūnaṃ*, Ibid.
- 103 *hinamanyatamenāvayvena nyūnaṃ*. NS,V, ii, 12; see also Vātsyāyana on ibid., N. Bh, p. 454.
- 104 CS, Vi, VIII. 54.
- 105 *hetūdāharaṇamadhikamadhikaṃ*. NS, V. ii. 13.

- 106 *sabdārthayoḥ punarvacanaṃ punaruktamanytranuvādāt. Ibid., 14.*
- 107 *anarthakaṃ nāma yadvacanamakṣaragrāmamātrameva syāt pañcavargavannacārthato grhyate, CS, Vi, VIII. 54.*
- 108 *varnakramanirdeśavat nirarthakāṃ, NS, V, ii, 8. paurvapryāyogādapratisaṃbadhārthamapārthakaṃ, NS, V, ii, 10.*
- 109 *apārthakaṃ nāma yadarthavacca paraspareṇāsaṃyujyamānārthakaṃ; CS, Vi, VIII. 54.*
- 110 *paurvāparyāyogādapratisaṃbadhārthamapārthakaṃ, NS, I, ii, 10.*
- 111 *viruddhaṃ nāma yaddr̥ṣṭāntasiddhāntasamayairviruddhaṃ; CS, Vi, VIII. 54.*
- 112 *Ibid., 55.*
- 113 *chalaṃ nāma pariśaṭṭhamarthābhāsamanarthakaṃ vāgvastumātrameva. Ibid., 56.*
- 114 *Ibid.*
- 115 *vacanavighāto'rthavikalpopatyā cchalaṃ, NS, I. ii. 10.*
- 116 *Vātsyāyana on ibid., N. Bh, p. 71.*
- 117 *vacanavighato yaḥ kriyate sāmānyasya śabdasya viśeṣānekāsaṃbandhitve sati avivakṣitāropeṇa cchalaṃ tadveditavyaṃ., NV, p.178.*
- 118 *aviśeṣābhihite'arthe vakturabhiprāyādarthāntarakalpanā vākchalaṃ. NS, 1, ii, 12.*
- 119 *CS, Vi, VIII, 56.*

- 120 Vātsyāyana on NS, 1. ii. 12, N. Bh, p. 80.
- 121 *saṃbhavato'rthasyā'pratisāmānyayogādasaṃbhūtarthakalpanā  
sāmānyachalaṃ* NS, I. ii. 13.
- 122 CS, Vi, VIII, 56.
- 123 see Vātsyāyana on NS, I. ii. 13, N. Bh, p.52 .
- 124 *dharmavikalpanirdese'rthasadbhāvapratiṣedha upacāracchalaṃ*. NS,  
1, ii, 14.
- 125 *vākchalamevopacāracchalaṃ tadaviśeṣat*, NS, 1, ii, 15.
- 126 See NS, I, ii, 16, 17 and Vātsyāyana on ibid., N. Bh, p. 85.
- 127 HIPS , Vol. II. p.386.
- 128 *hetulakṣaṇabhāvādahetavo hetusāmānyād hetuvadābhāsamānāḥ*.  
Vātsyāyana on NS, I, ii, 4, N. Bh, p. 72.
- 129 *anyataraliṅgadharmānuvidhānena pravartamānā ahetavaḥ santo  
hetuvadābhāsanta iti hetvābhāsāḥ*, NV, p. 20.
- 130 *anumitipratibandhakayathārthajñānaviṣayatvaṃ hetvābhāsatvaṃ*.  
Dīpkā, TSA, p. 44.
- 131 *ahetuḥ asādhakaheturityarthaḥ*, Cakrapanni on CS,Vi,VIII. 57.
- 132 *aheturnāma prakaraṇasamaḥ, saṃśayasamaḥ varṇyasamaśceti*.  
CS,Vi, VIII, 57.
- 133 NS, I. ii. 4.

- 134 *aprasiddho'napadeśo'san sandigdhaścñānapadeśaḥ*. VS, III. i. 15.  
Praśastapāda designates *anapadeśa* as *viruddha*. See PBNK, p. 480.
- 135 *savyabhicāraviruddha satpratipakṣāsiddhabādhitaḥ pañca  
hetvābhāsāḥ*. TSA, p. 44.
- 136 *savyabhicārasya hetudoṣatvādanyatra ca doṣatvāddhetumātradoṣa-  
tvābhāvācca tadhā viruddhasya cātītakālasya ca sādharmaṇadoṣa-tvat  
pṛthagihoktaḥ*. Jalpakalpataru, CSJ, Vol. III. p.1640.
- 137 *atra prakaraṇasamo nāmāheturythā -- anyaḥ śarīrādanyaḥ ātmā  
nitya iti; “..... ya eva pakṣaḥ sa eva heturiti”*. CS, Vi, VIII , 57.
- 138 *yasmāt prakāraṇacintā sa nirṇayārthamapadiṣṭaḥ prakāraṇasamaḥ*,  
NS, I, ii, 7;
- 139 *ubhayasādharmyāt prakriyāsiddheḥ prakāraṇasamaḥ*, NS, V, i, 16.
- 140 Vātsyāyana on *ibid.*, N.Bh, pp. 429-430
- 141 *saṃśayasamo nāmāheturya eva saṃśayahetuḥ sa eva saṃśayoccheda  
hetuḥ*, CS, Vi, VIII. 57.
- 142 *Ibid.*
- 143 *samanyadrṣṭāntayoraindriyakatve samane nityānityasādharmyāt  
saṃśayasamaḥ*, NS, V. i. 14.
- 144 *varṇyasamo nāmāhetuḥ -- yo heturvarṇyāviśiṣṭaḥ; .....asparśatvāt  
buddhiranityā śabdavaditi... tadubhayavarnyāviśiṣṭatvād-  
varṇyasamo'pyahetuḥ*. CS, Vi, VIII. 57.

- 145 *ubhayorapi sādhyadr̥ṣṭāntayoḥ sadhytvāpādanena pratyavasthānaṃ sādhyasamaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ*, NM, Part -- II. p.1 77.
- 146 CS, Vi, VIII. 58.
- 147 *avayavaviparyāsavacanamaprāptakālaṃ*. NS, V. II. 11.
- 148 See Cakrapāṇi on CS,Vi, VIII. 58.
- 149 *upālam̐bho nāma hetordoṣavacanaṃ*. CS,Vi, VIII. 59.
- 150 *pariharo nama tasyaiva doṣavacanasya parihāraṇaṃ*; CS,Vi, VIII. 60.
- 151 Ibid
- 152 *pratiññāhānirnāma sā pūrvaparigṛhītāṃ pratiññāṃ paryanuyukto yathā parityajati*, CS,Vi, VIII. 61.
- 153 *pratidr̥ṣṭāntadharmābhyanujñā svadr̥ṣṭānte pratiññāhāniḥ*. NS, V. ii. 2; also
- 154 see Vātsyāyana on ibid, N.Bh p.448-49.
- 155 *abhyanujñā nāma sā ya iṣṭāniṣṭābhyupagamaḥ*, CS,Vi, VIII. 62.
- 156 *svapakṣe doṣābhyupagamāt parapakṣe doṣaprasaṅgo matānujñā*, NS, V. ii. 20.
- 157 *hetvantaraṃ nāma prakṛtahetau vācye yadvikṛtahetumāḥ*. CS,Vi, VIII. 63.
- 158 *aviśeṣoktau hetau pratiṣiddhe viśeṣamicchato hetvantaraṃ*. NS, V. 6.
- 159 *arthāntaram nāmaikasmin vaktavye'paraṃ yadāḥ*. CS,Vi, VIII. 64.

- 160 *prakṛtādarthādapratīsambandhārthamarthāntaraṃ*. NS, V, ii. 7.
- 161 *vipatipattirapatipattiśa nigrahassthānaṃ*. NS, I, ii, 19.
- 162 *pratiññāhāniḥ pratiññāntaraṃ pratiññāvirodhaḥ pratiññāsaṃnyāso  
hetvantaramarthāntaraṃ nirarthakamavijñātārthamapārtha-  
kamapraptakālaṃ nyūnamadhikaṃ punaruktamananubhāṣaṇa-  
majññānamapratibhā vikṣepo matānujñā paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇaṃ  
niranuyojyānuyogo'pasiddhānto hetvābhāsāśca nigrahassthā-  
nāni*. NS, V. ii. 1.
- 163 Many of the terms described in this group have got specific implications in other disciplines. That is why Caraka says that these terms are described in their technical sense as applied in *Āyurveda*.
- 164 CS, Vi, VIII. 68 -79.
- 165 CS, Vi, VIII. 65.
- 166 WM, Vol. III. pp. 504-5.
- 167 The dialogue between Śvetaketu and Pravahaṇa, Ch. U., V. iii. 1; 5.3;  
The dialogue between Gārgi and Yājñavalkya, Br. U., III; MS, XII.  
110, 111.
- 168 *catvāro vedadharmajñāḥ parṣatraividyaeva vā*, Yājññavalkya-  
smṛti, 1.9.
- 169 The four sciences are *trayī, vārtā, daṇḍanīti and ānvīkṣikī*.  
*anuvīkṣikī trayī vārtā daṇḍnītiśceti vidyāḥ*. KA , I. 2. p. 4. Cf.,  
p. 5.

- 170 *sāṃkhyam yogo lokāyataṃcetyānvikṣikī*, Ibid.
- 171 Ibid. Vātsyāyana affirms that Nyāya-śātra is *ānvikṣikī* and quotes the verse from KA; N. Bh, p. 5, 6, 12. In AK, *ānvikṣikī* is rendered as *tarkavidyā*, AK, Vol. I, I. vi. 5. Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, 100, 39; The Mahābharata refers to *ānvikṣikī* as *tarkaśāstra*, MB, *mokṣadharma*, 173, 45. See also MS, VII, 43; *nyāyādhigame tarko'bhyupāyaḥ*, Gautamadharmasūtra, XI. 25.
- 172 JNS, p. 479.
- 173 “Introduction”, TSA, p. XXXII.
- 174 See infra, p. 326.
- 175 Loc. cit., 173.
- 176 “*Ātma-vidyā* was called in a later stage *Ānvikṣikī*, the science of inquiry”. HIL, p. 4.
- 177 Ibid, p. 26. The date of Medhātithi Gautama assigned by Vidyabhusana is 550-500 B.C., Ibid, p. 17.
- 178 Ibid., p. 26.
- 179 WM, Vol. III . 560.
- 180 HIPS, Vol. II, p. 393.
- 181 Ibid., p. 398.
- 182 Ibid., 402.
- 183 Ibid.

- 184 Ibid., p. 395.
- 185 Ibid., p.399.
- 186 Ibid., p.398.
- 187 Ibid., p. 400-401
- 188 IFD, p. 2.
- 189 Ibid., p.9.
- 190 NEC p.5- 6; HIPS, Vol. II, p. 393-94; A Companion to Sanskrit Literature, Suresh Chandra Banerji, Motilal Banrsidass, Delhi, Second edn. 1989, p. 10; WM, Vol. III, p. 559; Introduction, TSA, p. XXX.
- 191 *yo'kṣapādapraṇītaṃ nyāyaḥ pratyabhādvadatāṃ varam*, N.Bh, p. 459.
- 192 *yadakṣapādappravaro munīnām śamāya śāstraṃ jagado jagāda*, NV, p. 1.
- 193 “*atha bhagavatā'kṣapādena niśreyasahetau śāstre praṇīte vyutpādite ca.....*”, NVT, p.1.
- 194 “*akṣapādapraṇeto hi nyāyapādapaḥ*”, NM, p.1.
- 195 KFL, p. 28
- 196 IM, pp. 13- 14
- 197 “Introduction”, TV, p. i.
- 198 *ataśca prakṛtaṃ buddhvā deśakālāntarāṇi ca tantrakartrabhiprāyā-nupāyāṃścārthamādiśet*, CS, Su, XXVI. 37.



- 199 *yathāmbujavanasyārkaḥ pradīpo veśmano yathā  
prabodhanaprakāśārthastathā, tantrasya yuktayaḥ*, CS, Si, XII, , 46.
- 200 “*ucyate vākyayojanaṃ arthayojanañca*”, SS, Ut, Ixv. 4.
- 201 *asadvādiprayuktānāṃ vākyānāṃ pratiṣedhanam,  
svavākyasiddhirapi ca kriyate tantrayuktitaḥ*, Ibid., 5.
- 202 HIPS, Vol. II, p. 389.
- 203 *vyaktā noktāstu ye hyarthā līnā ye cāpyanirmalāḥ  
leśoktā ye ca kecitsyuh teṣāñcāpi prasādhanam*, SS, Ut, Ixv. 6.
- 204 DT, p.4
- 205 KA, XV. 3.
- 206 see *Āyurvedīya Vaijñānika Itihās* (Scientific History of Ayurveda),  
Priyavrata Sharma, Jayakrshnayurvedagranthamala No.1,  
Chawkhamba Orientalia, Delhi, 1981, p. 124.
- 207 CS, Si, XII, 41-44.
- 208 *bhattārahariśchandreṇa tvānyaścatasratantrayuktayḥ paripraśna-  
vyākaraṇa-vyutkrāntābhidhāna-hetvākhyā vyahṛtāḥ*, Cakrapāṇi on  
Ibid., 41-44.
- 209 SS, Ut, IXV. 3.

# Chapter - VIII

## ETHICS

Caraka is totally predestined to be a treatise for the whole of humanity. In that sense its moral obligation is unquestionable. But the problem is to find out what sort of moral convictions Carakasamhitā upholds and how it undertakes its dissemination.

Beyond our expectations Caraka depicts its moral outlook. It is not a stereotyped description of morality or code of conduct that is to be followed in the medical domain only. But it presents a comprehensive vision of an integrated ethics for the accomplishment of the supreme good of life, taking into consideration human nature and the real nature of the world. Perhaps there may be no other medical treatise in the world which describes moral values and code of conducts in such an all embracing manner.

### **General outlook of morality**

First of all, let us have a brief description of the conception of ethics in general and in Indian tradition in particular before going into the details of the ethical conceptions of Caraka. It would be helpful to understand the relevance and importance of Caraka in this respect.

“Morality means conscious living within the frame of certain principles of conduct laid down by those regarded as authorities.

In general, therefore, the moral institution of life or moral point of view consists in the awareness of an important distinction between what is and what ought to be. For man should live not merely in the light of what is but also what ought to be. To be more specific it is the awareness of living based on a distinction between our animal demands and the demands of the higher faculties of human worthy of the distinctive nature of man”.<sup>1</sup>

Morality has mainly got two facets; one is subjective and the other is objective.<sup>2</sup> The subjective dimension refers to the individual ethics or the ethics in relation to oneself and the objective refers to the social ethics or the ethics in relation to others. The social ethics prescribes certain responsibilities and obligations and code of conduct based on which the individuals ought to behave in a group or society.<sup>3</sup> The most significant aspect of the social ethics is that it emphasizes one’s concern for others. Love, compassion, and brotherhood are some of its identifying features. On the other hand, individual morality is purely personal. “It is more a repository of prudence than morality”.<sup>4</sup> It implies the procedure of adopting ways and methods like the control of senses and the purification of mind so as to subdue one’s lower instincts and to develop the higher values through proper understanding of one’s own inner nature in such a way that the optimum of life can be attained. The domain of morality precisely consists of both the behaviour of a person to others and also his character and conduct to himself as a man. Thus, while judging a moral point of view or moral institution these two aspects deserve due attention.

In the West, generally speaking, morality is understood mainly in the sense of social reference. “Outside a society there is no question of morality. The question of morality involves a necessary reference to some others in respect of whom one has to adopt a moral point of view or has to behave either morally in a good manner or bad manner”.<sup>5</sup> Frankena, emphasizing the social reference, says that morality is a social enterprise. It is an instrument of society as a whole for the guidance of individuals and smaller groups because morality is sometimes defined as an instrument of society as a whole.<sup>6</sup> As for as the westerners are concerned, moral principles are social rules and they are not spun by an individual.

The Indian moral conceptions are referred to by the word *dharma*. *Dharma* combines in it the two distinct concepts of duty and virtue in general and is connected with a series of notions frequently called “the aims of life”.<sup>7</sup> With the exception of the Cārvākas, it is basically spiritualistic and is considered as rooted in the Vedas.<sup>8</sup> The word *dharma* is derived from the root “*dhṛ*” which means to uphold or support. So *dharma* is that which upholds the universe from within is probably the single most important concept of understanding “Indian Religion” and ethics. Even then, a critical evaluation of the moral teaching of Caraka in terms of general ethical ideas in Indian religio-culture represented by the word *dharma* has got its own limitations because Indian religio-culture is not a unified creed as we see in Semitic religions.

From the point of human morality, it is a complex whole comprising several religious philosophical beliefs, values, and practices which are often

mutually incompatible. *Dharma* when prefixed by some such proper noun as *sanātana* (Vedic) or *bauddha* (non-Vedic or *śramaṇic*), means the whole of religion and philosophy and moral code of a given people or community.<sup>9</sup> Thus, broadly speaking, the Vedic *dharma* and *śramaṇic dharma* or the *Bauddha-dharma* represent the two major streams of thought. Even though both of them uphold *dharma* as the cardinal principle of their teachings, they fundamentally differ in their outlook.

The Vedic *dharma* combines in it the two facets that we tend to keep distinct. They are the facets of “is” and “ought” -- the dimensions of “how things actually are” and “how things ought to be”. On the one hand it is righteousness and duty essentially ordained in the Vedic scriptures and the objective order of the universe. It combines in one concept the description of the ordering of things and at the same time the prescription for how one should live to attain the optimum of life.<sup>10</sup> Another aspect of morality that this single term *dharma* upholds is that it carries with it the sense of both objective or socio centric as well as subjective or self centric ethical values. Most often the latter is accentuated.

One of the most important things to be remembered in this connection is that there came in the *Smṛtis*, the *Upaniṣads*, and finally the Vedic philosophical system as continuation of the *Vedas* as sources of *dharma*. Of them, the *Smṛitis* provide us with the most important religious beliefs and practices<sup>11</sup>. The *Smṛtis* disseminate external and ritualistic socio-centric morality. The *Smṛiti* literature is generally taken to include the *Dharmasāstras*, the *Purāṇas* and the two *Epics*.<sup>12</sup> Thus, the *Vedas* and the

Smṛtis taken together have been regarded as the source of morality in the Vedic stream.<sup>13</sup> The main concern of the law givers (*smṛtikāras*) was often the stability of the social organization and the advocacy of social morality conducive to ritualism. Their chief moral concern was social stability. They seek to protect the various customs and practices of people belonging to different castes, communities, and professions.<sup>14</sup> They also advocated a scheme of life with detailed instructions of duties at every stage of life.

According to the Vedic belief, another significant thing is that *dharma* is divine. *Dharma* is not created but discovered by the Ṛṣis. It is not a subject for disagreement or debate. A person should behave in accordance with class (*āśrama*), whether he/she is a student (*brahmacārin*), a householder (*gṛhastha*), a forest-dweller (*vānaprastha*), or renouncer (*sanyasin*). Thus, one behaves as one should behave as laid down in the *Dharmaśāstras*.<sup>15</sup> *Dharma* is a cosmic principle and one has to follow it without violating or questioning it. It is one's duty (*karma*). Reasoning or logic, however, seems to be hardly given any recognizable place in the Vedic ethical tradition. There are rather clear statements of Manu denouncing those who try to assess the opinions of the Vedas and the Smṛtis on the touchstone of logic and reasoning. He says that such people are to be despised and even excommunicated.<sup>16</sup> Kumābila, while emphasizing the place of the *śāstra* in matters of morality, denounces the intrusion of logical reasoning. He says, "For the comprehension of *dharma* and *adharma* there is no other means save the fact of their being enjoined and prohibited. Hence the introduction of inferential argument is not proper"<sup>17</sup> *Śukranīti* says that theory of

religion and morality is very complicated, and hence people should practice the rules of Śṛuti, Smṛti, and Purāṇas.<sup>18</sup> “It is difficult to find out the reasons on which duties stand.<sup>19</sup>

The Upaniṣhads and the philosophic schools promulgated liberation directed self-centric morality. Accordingly, *dharma* serves the route to superior control, to the mastering of attitudes of greater and greater concern coupled with less and less attachment. The purification of mind and the control of sense organs are indispensable for the attainment of *mokṣa*. One has to subordinate lower impulses to the higher ones through the proper understanding of ones inner nature and through the observance of some practical discipline. Subjective process constitutes the moral life of man.

Buddhism and Jainism, which represent the main stream of *śramanic* ethics, also preach both subjective and objective moralities. But the points in which they differ from Hinduism are: (1) the rejection of an eternal ultimate reality as the essence of the universe, (2) the firm rejection of the Vedic ritualism, and (3) the rejection of the classification of *varṇavyavasthā*.<sup>20</sup> In the teachings of the Buddha, *karma* was ethicized. For the Buddha, *karma* was essentially volition (intention) that leads to the actions of body, mind, and speech.<sup>21</sup> If the Vedic *karma* refers to is ritualistic action which calls for external purification, it was a mental event for the Buddha and so he emphasized internal purification.

The *Sāṃkhya*s believe in three kinds of ethically significant actions: (1) *sāttvika* actions which consist in kindness, restraints of sense organs,

and freedom from hatred. (2) *rājasika* actions which consist in passion, anger, greed, violence, discontent, faultfinding, and rudeness. (3) *tāmasika* actions which consist in madness, intoxication, lassitude, drowsiness, lust, worthlessness, and impurity. Of them, virtues are the first kind of actions since they lead to liberation.<sup>22</sup>

Similarly, in the philosophy, merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) are the qualities of the self and they are not the objective act which is prompted by the self. There is no merit or demerit in the action itself. It is always the intention which causes merit and demerit.<sup>23</sup> The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas say that actions are caused by volition (*prayatna*). Śaṅkaramiśra defines *karma* as action (*pravṛtti*) and inaction (*nivṛtti*) for acquiring the beneficial and avoiding the non-beneficial and that such actions and inactions are produced by peculiar type of volitions springing from desire and aversion.<sup>24</sup> Volition in turn is caused by the mental dispositions of desire (*icchā*) and aversion (*dveṣa*). So, according to the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika, it is the intention that determines whether an action is right or wrong.

Thus, we see a transition in the concept of ethics in the philosophical systems. *Karma* was given a new interpretation. In spite of the differences in their world outlook, they were more or less unanimous in reinterpreting *karma*. If *karma* formerly stood for ritual action and social duties, the new meaning it acquired was action prompted by intention. Thus, intention became absolutely essential for constituting rightness and wrongness, and naturally the purification of mind attained prime position in ethical conceptions. In spite of the differences, all are unanimous in the basic



postulation of ultimate values. All of them accept the ethical values of exclusion of envy, hatred, covetousness, wickedness, and the practice of humility, charity, love, greatfulness, sympathy, and self sacrifice.

### **Moral outlook of Caraka**

If we analyze the moral outlook of Caraka on the basis of the above criterion, we can see that the scheme of moral life promulgated by Caraka is basically Vedic and predominantly philosophical. But this does not mean that he discards the non-Vedic moral values. On the other hand, it follows a balancing attitude, for the main focus is human happiness. It upholds all the above mentioned values which are universally acclaimed as the “right way of life”.

Caraka adopts a rational attitude. Through the words of Ātreya he declares that Veda is credible knowledge. Meanwhile the assertions of eminent persons based on their investigation and substantiation in any field of knowledge which are not in contradiction with the Veda and which are approved by virtuous persons and are conducive to human welfare should be considered authoritative<sup>25</sup>. This shows that the moral conceptions are not merely dogmatic but also rational.

If “social morality” is predominantly the morality of doing, and individual morality is the morality of “being”, we see the culmination of both in the moral conceptions of Caraka. He pays equal importance to worldly life and liberation. Mundane life is construed as a way to attain the spiritual optimum. In other words, it is a synthesis of the world- and- life-affirming moral conceptions of Vedic- tradition.

## Spiritual basis of moral conception

In consonance with the Vedic thought, Caraka believes that the ultimate reality is the very essence of the universe as well as an inner self of man and it sets for him a spiritual goal of “complete freedom ” from all forms of suffering as higher than any other goal to which his mundane inclinations lead to. The moral conception underpinned is based on the belief of the unity of everything at the transcendent level. The basic postulates of the mortality of the self, the law of action (*karma*), rebirth or transmigration, and liberation are being discussed with due importance in Caraka. In this sense, its moral conceptions are directed towards the attainment of individual liberation (*mokṣa*). But it cannot be interpreted as self-centric for the reason that it never tolerated the idea of pessimistic sentiments denouncing the world and exalting world renunciation as a way of getting liberated from transmigratory existence by following the way of mendicants.<sup>26</sup>

Caraka believes in the world of suffering. But he does not ask to reject the socio-moral obligations for the sake of liberation. His ethical outlook is not life-negating. On the other hand, he puts forth a moral outlook which is fully world-and-life affirming. Caraka was circumspect of the reality that all activities of human-beings are directed towards the achievement of happiness.<sup>27</sup> Even though Caraka speaks of the four “aims of life”, namely righteousness (*dharma*), material prosperity (*artha*), desires (*kāma*), and liberation (*mokṣa*),<sup>28</sup> he emphasizes the first three which can be construed more subtly perhaps as attitudes or orientations<sup>29</sup> than the final aim of life

-- liberation (*mokṣa*). He says that one should discard unwholesome attitudes and adopt wholesome ones in regard to righteousness (*dharma*), material prosperity (*artha*), and desire (*kāma*), for no happiness or pain can occur without these three factors.<sup>30</sup> It vindicates that his prime concern is mundane life and happiness. A happy man is one who is free from all vices such as physical violence, adultery, theft, and persecution. Such a person can only relish the fruits of *dharma*, *artha*, and *kāma*.<sup>31</sup>

### Theory of *karma*

Caraka did not simply take over a pre-existing Vedic doctrine of ritualistic *karma*. He interprets *karma* in a different sense which is more or less similar to the one in the philosophical systems. His total ethical conceptions hinges on the doctrine of *karma*. For Caraka, *karma* is essentially the action of the body, the mind, and the speech prompted by volition or intention (*prayatna*).<sup>32</sup> So, according to Caraka, every act is intentional.<sup>33</sup> It is the intention that decides whether the action is good or bad. The root of every action lies in the mind. Actions spring from erroneous knowledge (*moha*) and the mental dispositions of desire (*icchā*) and aversion (*dveṣa*).<sup>34</sup> Elsewhere he states that desire and aversion are the two kinds of craving (*trṣṇa*)<sup>35</sup> and declares that the ultimate healing of all sorts of sufferings consists in the elimination of *upadhā*<sup>36</sup> which is synonymous with *trṣṇa*.<sup>37</sup>

It may be relevant to note in this context that the basic conception of *karma* is found reflected in the various classical philosophical systems. The

Buddha regards craving (*tṛṣṇā*) as the cause of suffering.<sup>38</sup> The Nyāya-sūtra also gives the very same idea. There it is stated that defects (*doṣas*) which proceed from ignorance are the cause of actions leading to bondage.<sup>39</sup> *Doṣa* refers to more or less the same concept of *tṛṣṇā* in the Carakasamhitā because erroneous knowledge (*moha*), desire (*icchā*), and aversion (*dveṣa*) are regarded as the ramifications of *doṣa*.<sup>40</sup> Vaiśeṣika - sūtra regards *upadhā* as the cause of actions leading to *adharma* and *anupadhā* as the origin of *dharma*. By *upadhā* what he means is the impurity of all mental dispositions as well as external impurity. Similarly, *anupadhā* refers to both internal and external purity.<sup>41</sup> According to Praśatapāda, volition that impels action is of two types: (1) that which proceeds from being lively (*jīvanapūrvaka*) and (2) that which proceeds from desire and aversion (*icchādveṣapūrvaka*).<sup>42</sup>

Whatever one does or whatever one refrains from doing is an action, and unless it is an act of renunciation, it is bound to breed bondage and frustration. Wholesome or unwholesome *kārmic* intentions bring about in this life or in the future life happy or painful experiences. For instance, an action taking place from hatred or greed as response to what is unpleasant is morally wrong and is not conducive to liberation. In particular, *karma* refers to a morally relevant action rather than mere ritual action.

The diversity of the initial circumstances as well as the equipment with which men are brought into this life is accountable only in terms of the diversity of the causal actions and tendencies. Caraka calls the actions of the previous life which lead to rebirth as destiny (*daiva*) and the fresh acts initiated in the present life as *puruṣakāra*.<sup>43</sup> If *karma* is strong and

dominant, it will certainly wield its effect (death) on time (*kālaniyata*) and if it is weak, it doesn't produce its result on time (*akālaniyata*).<sup>44</sup> Transmigration is also according to one's accrued fruits of actions.<sup>45</sup> The subtle body, after death, carries with it the merit and demerit of what is done in the previous life, and it determines the mental traits and thereby the next life. One takes a new birth according to the potential of one's actions of previous life. The good and bad experiences of this life or future life are, therefore, brought about not by others but by oneself.

Actions are not accidental. But they are underpinned by certain fundamental motives or instincts. The three basic instincts from which all our actions originate are (1) desire for life preservation (*praṇaiṣaṇa*), (2) desire for material wealth (*arthaiṣaṇa*) and (3) desire for afterlife (*paralokaiṣaṇa*).<sup>46</sup> Thus, Caraka construes the three sorts of biological instincts as the fundamental motives which serve as the spring of all our actions and envisages a scheme of well balanced life by harmonizing the interplay of all the three basic instincts. The harmonization in turn is determined by knowledge because, for Caraka, action denotes action impelled by volition.<sup>47</sup> That is, even though the aforesaid three biological instincts are at the root of every action, all actions are essentially and immediately initiated by volition. Again, volition (*prayatna*) is oriented by apprehension (*dhi*), fortitude (*dhr̥ti*), and memory (*smṛti*). Thus, in accordance with the nature of these three factors the basic instincts get manifested in the form of desire or aversion which gives rise to volition. Volition finally ends in action.

Craving arises from erroneous knowledge of objects in the pursuit of happiness. So the ignorant people indulge in unwholesome gratification of the five senses and subject themselves to strain beyond their capacity and get adapted to unpleasant regimes. They subject themselves to excessive utilization (*atiyoga*), non-utilization (*ayoga*), and wrong utilization (*mithyāyoga*) of the physical, mental, and oral actions<sup>48</sup> and thus yield to all kinds of sufferings.

It is one's knowledge that determines the way of life. One is able to retain one's identity as long as one retains one's power of discrimination between right and wrong. The discriminative and judgmental capacity of a person depends on wisdom (*prajñā*) which consists in apprehension (*dhī*), fortitude (*dhṛti*), and memory (*smṛti*). If the instruments of knowledge, most particularly the inner instruments, are disciplined and integrated, there comes in wisdom, the cause of wholesome volitional acts that gives rise to happiness. So Caraka construes volitional transgression (*prajñāparādha*) due to the degeneration or derangement of intelligence (*dhī*), fortitude (*dhṛti*), and memory (*smṛti*)<sup>49</sup> as one of the root causes of all sufferings. All the mental defects such as malice, despair, fear, anger, vanity, and hatred are also considered as volitional transgression.<sup>50</sup> So, annihilation of volitional transgression, control of sense organs, precise memory and accurate knowledge of place and time, self awareness, and good conduct will promote wholesome actions.<sup>51</sup>

The conceptions of these three fundamental motives as the basic instincts of all actions and the classification of *karma* into *daiva* and *pauruṣa*

are something peculiar to Caraka and it differentiates Carakasamhitā from all other systems of Indian philosophy. Probably it is the *daiva* that determines ones basic instincts and so it can be equated with the unseen (*adr̥ṣṭa / dharma and adharma*) in the Vaiśeṣika - sūtra.

### **Moral prescriptions for healthy and happy life**

As far as Caraka is concerned, an ethically virtuous life will be a healthy and a happy one. So he gives elaborate moral prescriptions which are conducive to good health and happiness. From the point of view of one's mundane and spiritual well-being, he advocates to hold back from urges relating to evil deeds. A wise person should refrain from greed, grief, fear, anger, vanity, shamelessness, jealousy, extreme attachment, and malice. One should not use harsh and untimely words. One should not engage in violence or immoral contact with women, theft, and persecution.<sup>52</sup> Injury to living beings (*hiṃsā*) is a sin and so it will affect one's longevity. So non-injury (*ahiṃsā*) is prescribed as a way of increasing ones life (*ahimsā prāṇavardhanam*).

One should avoid such sinful persons in character, speech, and mind as well as those who are quarrelsome and those who make vicious remarks about others. The greedy, the envious, the cruel, the fickle minded as well as those who indulge in defaming others, those who associate with the enemies, those who are devoid of compassion, and those who do not follow the virtuous course of life are also to be avoided. Caraka further advises to associate with wise, learned, and matured persons as well as with men of

character, fortitude, and self concentration. So also one should make association with those who know the real nature of things and are full of equanimity, who direct us in the right path, who are good to all beings, and who are peaceful and content.<sup>53</sup> The better way is to give up the unwholesome habits and to develop wholesome habits steadily and gradually.<sup>54</sup> He must improve himself by a series of ideological and behavioural self identifications.

One has to maintain the balance of both mind and sense organs. For this one has to perform one's noble acts with utmost care. Caraka says that one should respect gods, cows, brahmins, preceptors (*gurus*), and elderly. One ought to help other persons, saints, and great teachers (*acāryas*). One should offer auspicious amulets, wear good herbs, bath twice, and clean all the pores of the body and feet, and cut hair, beard, and nail three times in a fortnight. One should wear good apparel, should be pleasant, apply scent, comb the hair, oil the head, ears, nose, and feet and smoke. One should perform sacrifices, and pay offerings to the departed ancestors. One should be self controlled and virtuous. One should be envious of another person's efficiency, but should not be jealous of the fruits of such efficiency. One should be firm in decision, fearless, susceptible to the feelings of shame, be intelligent, energetic, skilful, merciful, virtuous, and a believer (*āstika*). One should devote oneself to teachers who are modest, intelligent, learned, noble, aged, and spiritually perfect. One should acquit oneself as well as display good manners. One should avoid going to impure and untidy places. One should be compassionate to all beings and should root out attachment and antipathy.<sup>55</sup>



It may not be improper to refer to Caraka's opinion of social hierarchy. In connection with the description of practices that is to be followed for the procreation of the desired child he describes the due rites that should be performed by women belonging to each *varṇa*, namely *brāhmin*, *kṣatriya* and *vaiśya*. He also reminds us that a *śūdra* woman should offer only obeisance to the gods, fire, *brāhmins*, preceptors, and those who have attained perfection.<sup>56</sup> This shows that Caraka did not dishonour the social hierarchy. But it does not in any way harm his humanitarian conceptions. It is not because of sectarian thoughts that he refers to such customs, but because he believed in the potency of one's *karma* to ordain for him pleasure and pain according to the good or bad actions one does. So the assumption of inequality of men is sought to be justified on the basis of the law of *karma* which traces these inequalities of the present life to the actions of different selves in their past lives.

### **Medical ethics**

The most striking aspect of Caraka's ethics is that he was highly conscious of the moral obligations of medical professionals to society. He cautions them to keep the moral standards intact. He says that a physician should always be a great humanist. He must primarily possess knowledge, imagination, comprehension, memory, resourcefulness and promptness;<sup>57</sup> must be prudent, must have self-restraint, and must be endowed with presence of mind.<sup>58</sup> A physician must also have a clear knowledge of drugs and their applications. Even a deadly poison can become an excellent drug if

properly administered and, on the contrary, if it is not properly administered, it will be a deadly poison. So, if the physician is not competent in these aspects, his prescription would be nothing but poison, a weapon, fire or a thunderbolt to his patient, for it kills him.<sup>59</sup> He also warns that even a talk with a physician who is an impostor devoid of virtuous acts will be the messenger of death.<sup>60</sup>

He repeatedly insists on the quality of the head and the heart and the need to be careful about giving quarter to quacks, imposters and charlatans. It is better to die rather than to be treated by a quack physician.<sup>61</sup> Such physicians who take away the life instead of diseases are called *rogābhisāras*.<sup>62</sup> The physician should show compassion towards the ailing; should have devotion to patients who can be cured, but be detached from the dying patients.<sup>63</sup> Genuine physicians are saviours of life (*prāṇābhisāras*).<sup>64</sup>

### **Compassion as the crowning principle of morality**

The greatness of the ethical conceptions of Caraka lies in the fact that it is dedicated to the well-being of the fellow beings and the world at large. Caraka dictates to act according to what one's inner conscience says right (*manḥpūtaṃ samācāret*). Perhaps, it may be argued that, Āyurveda is ultimately a healing science which is primarily concerned with human happiness in the objective world and so naturally be socio-centric. But beyond our expectations it surpasses the limits of social responsibilities and obligations to reach the heights of universal love and compassion for all. The Ṛṣis were actually incarnates of love and compassion. Caraka, at

the opening part itself, affirms that the science is the most sacred among the Vedas because it is beneficial to mankind in this world and the world beyond. He declares that positive health stands at the very root of accomplishing the four ends of man: *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*.<sup>65</sup> Diseases are the destroyers of health. So the great loving sage, grasping everything, engaged in prescribing the *Āyurveda* to his disciples out of compassion for all beings.<sup>66</sup> Again, it is also said that the disciples, after acquiring accomplishment, understanding, patience, fame, forbearance, and pity for the good of all creatures, should dedicate themselves to the well being of all.<sup>67</sup> Finally, Caraka says that scriptures are intended to bring about happiness to the whole world (*lokānugrahapravṛttaḥ śāstravādaḥ*).<sup>68</sup> In the moral prescriptions also he repeatedly insists upon compassion and non injury.

The modern conception of ethical man in Albert Schweitzer is more or less the same. He says that man must stress not only men's relations with his own species but also must learn to establish an ever-living contact with all other creatures.<sup>69</sup> But the novelty of the humanism envisaged in Caraka is not only because it is spun by compassion and love, which may be said as quite natural to any curative science and other systems of thought and religion, but also because it has a sound spiritualistic metaphysical basis. The depth as well as significance of this metaphysical basis is an automatic offspring from the realization of the micro-macro relationship between man and the universe as was outlined formerly. He whose self is integrated and harmonized by such a vision of oneness or equality in life with all sentient

creatures on the moral plane experiences a profound joy and absolute compassion.

So, if we look at the whole picture, the ethical conceptions of Caraka have got its own brevity, elegance, serenity, reasonableness, and catholicity. The moral conceptions of Caraka are not merely a repository of prudence. Caraka harmonizes the two types of standards (both social and personal) mentioned above which, being of opposite nature, should have drifted apart.

The institution of morality has for its basic concern the regulation of man's lower inclinations and the promotion of the higher ones in realization of his aspiration as a man. It is in such a concern that the transition of "is" to "ought" is involved. Not only is the conduct to other members of the society emphasized, but his behaviour to himself is stressed with equal importance. Purification of mind and control of sense organs and subordination of lower impulses to the higher ones through a proper understanding of his inner nature and through the observance of some practical discipline which are indispensable for the attainment of higher values of life are repeatedly reminded of.

Even though Caraka gives lengthy moral prescriptions, he does not consider ethics as a mere study of morals. On the contrary, it is the acknowledgement of human responsibility to the sentient beings of the world. Caraka's ethical system conceives man as an all comprehensive concept. Man is not considered as a limited being. On the contrary, he is regarded as the universal link between all humans and non-human animals.

His ethical system is allied to the affirmation of both man and the world as natural. It combines in it both the “world view” and “life view”.

### **Liberation (*mokṣa*) as the ultimate moral end**

In the modern view, the main concern of medical science is about psycho-somatic ailments and their cure. From that perspective Caraka, is expected to look upon man as a biological entity. He is expected to deal with the worldly life of man. But he surpasses such limited assumptions. Caraka not only engaged himself in finding the means to free man from his physiological and psychological tensions but in discovering the path that delivers him from the subtle challenges that arise from the habits themselves and that cannot so easily be met by the techniques of science. He is a true philosopher and thereby a “great doctor” who diagnosed and prescribed cure for the total human sufferings. For him, a human being is not a mere biological product of the evolution controlled by biological drives, motives and instincts and reflexes. On the other hand, he is a spiritual being. He is an altruistic humanistic being and a seeker of supreme good. He diagnosed that contemplation is the highest aspiration of man. A contemplative life is rich in its import, manifestation, and realization. A life of contemplation is exalted. So, in coherence with the philosophical systems, he places liberation (*mokṣa*) as the highest ideal of life and the final end of man.<sup>70</sup>

Caraka calls death which terminates the limited life span by the epithets *svabhāva* (return to the former state), *pravṛtteruparama* (cessation of activities), *maraṇa* (death), *anitya* (*ephemeral*) and *nirodha* (obstruction to

the continuity of life).<sup>71</sup> The liberated state which ends the transmigratory existence is being designated as *vipāpa* (freed from sinful acts), *viraja* (free from attachments), *śānta* (quiescence), *parā* (absolute), *akṣara* (indistinctible), *avyaya* (immutable), *amṛta* (immortal), the Brahman (God), and *nirvāna* (the state of extinction of all sufferings).<sup>72</sup> This shows that Caraka constructs his theory of liberation in terms of the Brahman.

Change is the nature of the phenomenal world. Cause (*hetu*), origin (*utpatti*), growth (*vṛddhi*), decay (*upaplava*), and death (*viyoga*) are the five different stages of change and they constitute suffering.<sup>73</sup> This is actually the radical unremitting impermanence, the essential ontological dimension of one's unenlightened state of suffering.

The phenomenal self is never freed from ego, intellect, mind, volitions, and other defects. Since the mind is enveloped by *rajas* and *tamas*, all kinds of evils follow the individual until true knowledge occurs. The tainted mind and volitions engender powerful positive actions (*pravṛtti*)<sup>74</sup> and, thereby, transmigratory existence.<sup>75</sup> Thus, the phenomenal self in bondage undergoes all kinds of sufferings.

Experiences are in the form of happiness and pain. They are all sufferings, for they originate from cravings on the one hand and they give rise to cravings on the other hand. Craving in turn consists of ignorance, desire, and aversion.<sup>76</sup>

All kinds of positive actions are sinful.<sup>77</sup> The positive actions originate from *prjñāparādha* which springs from desire and aversion engendered by

erroneous knowledge and such a person is engulfed in egoistic feelings (*ahaṃkāra*), vocal, mental, and physical actions (*saṅga*), doubt (*saṃśaya*), vanity (*abhisamplava*), selfish dispositions (*abhyavapāta*), erroneous knowledge in the form of a beneficial thing as harmful (*vipratyaya*), lack of distinction between conscious and unconscious elements, nature and its modification, attachment and detachment (*aviśeṣa*), and performance of rituals, priesthood and begging. (*anupāya*).<sup>78</sup> Again, volitional transgression (*prjñāparādha*) is due to the derangement of apprehension (*dhī*), fortitude (*dhṛti*), and memory (*smṛit*).<sup>79</sup> The derangement of intellect (*dhībhraṃśa*) means wrong apprehension like the apprehension of an eternal entity as ephemeral, a beneficial thing as non-beneficial. The correct apprehension is the cognition of a thing as it is. The derangement of fortitude (*dhṛtibhraṃśa*) is the unrestrained mental urge to do harm to worldly objects. The control of mind is called fortitude. Similarly, the derangement of memory (*smṛtibhraṃśa*) is the erroneous apprehension due to the envelopment of *rajas* and *tamas*.<sup>80</sup>

This vindicates that if ignorance, that is, if the derangement of intellect, fortitude, and memory are totally eradicated, volitional transgression can be eliminated, and if volitional transgression is eliminated positive actions can be relinquished. Then again if positive actions cease, the vicious circle of craving and suffering in the form of experiences can be completely rooted out. So the primary thing is to eradicate ignorance. Caraka says that a person with pure mind and who practices *yoga* acquires true knowledge and eliminates ignorance. Thus, one is able to see things “the way they really

are”. This insight will help one to renounce everything, thereby all cravings and suffering can be eradicated and ultimate freedom can be attained.<sup>81</sup>

### **Nature of freedom**

Liberation is a transformation from the negative states of unpleasant experiences to a positive state. It is the state of quiescence (*praśānta*) and immutability (*akśara*). It is called the Brahman.<sup>82</sup> This optimum can be attained only by complete renouncement. In the final stage of renunciation (*caramasanyāsa*) all sense-bound experiences including all determinate and specific cognitions are completely relinquished.<sup>83</sup> One ultimately identifies oneself with the Brahman. Self awareness ceases and finally the phenomenal existence itself ceases with out leaving behind any identifying mark.<sup>84</sup> In the liberated state, all volitions get destroyed due to the absence of *rajas* and *tamas*. Thus, one is finally and irrecoverably liberated from the ties of the phenomenal world, from rebirth.<sup>85</sup>

### **Means conducive to liberation**

The realization of freedom involves both the knowing process (*jñānamārga*) and the willing process (*yogamārga*). Caraka has emphatically stated that the path of life prescribed is nothing but what has been dictated by the Yogins and the followers of Sāṃkhya.<sup>86</sup>

Unless the impurities like desire aversion and attachment are removed by right efforts, there can be no complete freedom. For this one has to raise from the level of the sense-bound cognition of worldly objects to the level of intuition ( *prajñā* or *vidyā*)<sup>87</sup> The intuitional knowledge, according to



Caraka, is one of identity or “knowledge of two in one”. That is if one realizes oneself as the universe and the universe as one it is the transcendental knowledge.<sup>88</sup>

Fundamentally speaking, the way to liberation is the acceleration of intelligence, fortitude, and memory of ultimate reality. The continuity of the psychosomatic relation will be destroyed when these three factors engender human perfection.<sup>89</sup> Among these three factors, the memory of transcendent reality occupies the prominent place.<sup>90</sup> The causal factors that lead to memory are apprehension of cause and form, similarity, difference, indulgence of mind, recurrence of cognition, repetitive hearing and recollection of all former experiences.<sup>91</sup> The main factors that catalyze one’s memory capacity are devotion to the nobles, abstinence from the wicked; observance of vows and fasts, apprehension of Dharmaśāstras and performance of duties in accordance with its rules, inclination to live in solitude, detachment from the worldly objects, right apprehension, supreme fortitude, desisting from new activities, annihilation of the past actions, extermination of egoistic dispositions, fear of attachment, serenity of mind and consciousness, and meditation.<sup>92</sup> To be precise, it is the recollection of the ultimate reality that leads one to ultimate liberation from sufferings.<sup>93</sup>

If the ultimate freedom is implicit in the transcendental knowledge, the psychosomatic spiritual endeavour that brings about the condition of quiescence is called *Yoga*.<sup>94</sup> *Yoga* is the awakening of a man into the freedom

of the self. *Yoga* is a self impelled and self initiated effort by which man ascends from the lower to the higher existence.<sup>95</sup> Meditative contemplation or the exploration of the deeper reaches of consciousness of a Yogin is marked by the purity of mind that gives rise to the eight kinds of divine strength and powers. Those powers are (1) the capacity of the self to enter the body of others, (2) the capacity for cognition of mental objects, (3) doing things at will, (4) supernatural vision, (5) supernatural audition, (6) miraculous memory, (7) extraordinary brilliance, and (8) the state of unawareness when desired.<sup>96</sup>

### **Way of life to liberation**

Living in accordance with, but not quite tied up by the laws of nature, man, through his moral disposition and continuous efforts, is capable of realizing freedom. So Caraka further dictates elaborately the systematic and disciplined life of devotion.

The seeker of liberation who has seen the futility of mundane life should approach a preceptor whose teaching he should put into practice. Thus, he should study the Dharmaśāstras, and mould his conduct and perform duties in compliance with the scriptures. He should be devotional to the noble and refrain from the wicked; should speak that which is conducive to the wellbeing of all living-beings and the speech should be gentle, reasonable, and pertinent. He should regard all living creatures as himself. He should avoid remembering, thinking about, desiring and talking with women. He should relinquish all belongings. He should wear a loin cloth and an ochre-

coloured, garment and a case of needles for mending it. He should also carry a pot of water for cleaning, a mendicant's staff as a sign of his order of life, and a bowl for collecting alms. He should take food only once a day in order to keep his life and may substitute natural food accessible in the forest for cooked food. He may take rest on a bed improvised with dry leaves and weeds without making it a usual habit. He may keep a wooden arm rest as an aid in meditation. He should live in the forest, but not in a roofed house. He should control desire and aversion and avoid drowsiness, sleep, and laziness. He should treat occasions of honouring, praise, criticism and insult as equal and should endure hunger thirst, fatigue, strain, cold, heat, wind, rain, pleasure, and pain. He should not be stimulated by grief, depression, self conceit, affliction, and arrogance. He should look on ego as the cause of suffering and view the micro-macro relationship of him to the universe. He should never hesitate to practice *yoga*. He should maintain purity of mind; he should direct all his powers of understanding, fortitude, and recollection towards final emancipation. He must restrain all sense organs, the mind, and self. He should constantly resolve that the entities that constitute different parts of the body are the *dhātus*, should realize that anything that has a cause is miserable and ephemeral and all activities tainted with evil. He should regard complete renunciation as real happiness.<sup>97</sup> Eventually, such a disciplined life enables one to weaken and destroy ignorance, desire, and aversion underlying physiological urge to do positive acts and promotes one's cognitive capacities, fortitude, and memory and thereby free oneself from the ties of the phenomenal world. The way of life as has been suggested is

nothing but the life of a monk (*sanyāsin*), which asks for complete renunciation.

### Concept of liberation in other philosophical systems

The Buddhists declare that the ultimate freedom is the cessation of all kinds of knowledge along with impressions, tendencies, and longings.<sup>98</sup> According to the Sāṃkhya, lack of discriminative knowledge is the cause of all sufferings. The discriminative knowledge, in the final stage, delivers one from all kinds of pain.<sup>99</sup> For them liberation is the disassociation of the self (*puruṣa*) from the psychical states with which it finds itself in association.<sup>100</sup> It is a state of aloofness (*kaivalya*). The Yoga school is also of the same view. They say that *avidya* is the cause of all sufferings<sup>101</sup> and the discriminative knowledge is the means to attain freedom.<sup>102</sup> They also suggest the *yoga* path which consists of eight stages.<sup>103</sup>

In the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika system the final end of transmigratory existence is called *niśreyasa* or *apavarga*. Kaṇāda says *dharma* is what accomplishes worldly happiness (*abhyudaya*) and liberation (*niśreyasa*).<sup>104</sup> He also considers that negative actions (*nivṛtti*) lead to liberation. The elimination of desires, merits, and demerits, and the absolute negation of pain are the ends of *nivṛtti* and this can be made possible by the true knowledge of the six categories (reality).<sup>105</sup> According to Srīdharaçārya, liberation is the total annihilation of all the nine qualities of the self namely, consciousness, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and impression. Thus, liberation is the existence of the self in its essential

nature marked by the destruction of all its qualities.<sup>106</sup> In Nyāya-sūtra freedom is defined as the absolute deliverance from suffering (*duḥkha*).<sup>107</sup> It can be attained through the elimination of pain, birth, activity, faults (*doṣa*), and false knowledge in the reverse order<sup>108</sup> by the acquisition of the true knowledge of the sixteen categories.<sup>109</sup> Vātsyāyana has conceived the concept of *apavarga* in terms of the Brahman and the bliss and it consists in the absence of pain.<sup>110</sup> In conformity with the Vaiśeṣikas, Jayantabhaṭṭa says that liberation is the complete extinction of the nine specific qualities of the self.<sup>111</sup> Udayana defines it as a state of aloofness (*kaivalya*) to be attained through discursive knowledge and devotional attitude. The bondage and the resulting suffering are due to false knowledge. Rebirth and sorrow disappear when the urges to act dies down.<sup>112</sup> Thus, one attains ultimate freedom. However, in spite of the slight differences, the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika thinkers unanimously hold that liberation is neither pure knowledge nor pure bliss; it is purely a painless state and the way to liberation is the elimination of negative states.

In Pūrvamīmāṃsā “Jaimini and Śavara enjoin the performance of duties as a means to attain happiness in heaven. They do not attach much importance to the conception of liberation”.<sup>113</sup> Jaimini says that happiness is the only goal of life.<sup>114</sup> Kumārila conceives liberation as a negative character, and hence eternal. It is the negation of all experiences of cognition, pleasure pain, desire aversion, impression, merit, and demerit.<sup>115</sup> Liberation is because of the absolute irradiation of merits and demerits. According to the Prabhākaras, freedom is the state of the self remaining in

its own nature consequent to the destruction of the specific qualities of the self.<sup>116</sup> Thus liberation, in Pūrvamīmāṃsā, is a state of complete extermination of pain<sup>117</sup>. The peculiarity of freedom in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā discipline is that it emphasizes *karma* rather than *jñāna*.

Advaita Vedānta recognizes that the individual self (*jīva*) is none other than the Brahman, but identical in nature (*jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ*). One is deluded in the world of *māya* due to *avidyā* which has no beginning. Right knowledge at one stroke abolishes the sense of finitude together with the sense of duality.<sup>118</sup> Ontologically, freedom is the identification of oneself with the transcendental consciousness or the Brahman which is “pure Bliss”.<sup>119</sup>

Among the non-Vedic schools, Jainism recognizes deliverance as the freedom of the self from *kārmic* matter which covers its inherent qualities.<sup>120</sup>

If we look at the various view points described above, it can be understood that Caraka agrees with all the philosophical systems on the basic issues regarding freedom. He recognizes the phenomenal life as one of suffering and freedom from suffering as the goal of spiritual endeavour. He is of the opinion that the vision or insight into the reality of things will dispel one’s illusion and ignorance and thus one can be liberated eternally and irrecoverably from all negative aspects of phenomenal existence by psycho-somatic spiritual endeavour.

Liberation has two aspects: (1) the liberating process and (2) the state of being liberated. The liberating process is a negative one which involves

the eradication of suffering, and being liberated, by contrast, is a positive state. Emphasizing the negative phase of eradication, Caraka calls it by the epithets *nirvāṇa* and *nivṛtti* which echo the Buddhists, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika . At the same time, with regard to the final state of freedom he agrees with the Vedāntins who hold that freedom is the attainment of oneness with the Brahman.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 CIET, p. 2.
- 2 Ibid., p. 6.
- 3 Ibid., p. 2.
- 4 Ibid., p. 6.
- 5 Ibid., p. 2.
- 6 W.K. Frankena, “The Concept of Morality”, *Readings in Contemporary Ethical Theory*, ed., Pahl & Schiller, Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970, p. 6.
- 7 The Sanskrit terms for the notions are *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. Among them *artha* usually refer to material prosperity; *kāma*, refers to sexual relations and incidentally to aesthetic values; *Dharma* is said to have to do with one’s duty to family, caste, or class, and *mokṣa* to complete freedom. KHP, p. 6.
- 8 “*vedo dharmamūlaṃ*”, *Gautamadharmasūtra* I. 1. “*vedo’khilo dharmamūlaṃ*”, MS, II, 6.
- 9 AHM, p. 2.
- 10 BT, p. 18.



- 11 *tadvidāṃ ca smṛtiśīle*, *Gautamadharmasūtra*, I. 1. ; *smṛtiśīle ca tadvidāṃ*, MS, II , 6
- 12 CIET, p. 51.
- 13 “*śrutismṛtyuditaṃ dharma*”, *Laghu Yama Smṛti*, 1; ADS, p. 172  
*śrutismṛtiśca viprāṇāṃ nayane dve prakīrtite*, *Atrisaṃhitā*, 349, ADS, p. 54.
- 14 AHM, pp.73-74.
- 15 BT, p.15
- 16 MS, II . 10, 11.
- 17 Ślokavārtika, Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Eng., Trans., Ganganath Jha, p.242-243. Cited in CIET, p. 20.
- 18 *dharmatattvaṃ hi gahanamataḥ satsevitam naraḥ śrutismṛtipuā-ṇānāṃ karma kuryād vicakṣaṇaḥ*. *Śukranītisāra* of Śukrācārya, with elucidative notes by Jīvānandavidyāsāgara Bhaṭṭācārya, Nārāyaṇa Press, Kalikālatārajaghanī, 1890, III. 39.
- 19 MB, Apaddharma, 132, 2.
- 20 CIET, pp. 63-64
- 21 BT, p.72.
- 22 CIET, p. 60.
- 23 Ibid., p. 27.
- 24 CS, Sa, V. 9 See infra ibid., 73. *iccādveṣajanite pravṛttinivṛtī prayatnaviśeṣau tābhyāṃ ca hitāhitaprāptiparihārāphale śarīra*

*karmani ceṣṭālakṣāṇe janyate.* Śāṅkaramiśra on VS, III. I. 19, VU, pp. 231 -232.

25 CS, Su, XI.27 ; Su, VII. 55.

26 Caraka speaks of renunciation (*sanyāsa*) only as the final stage of life.

27 *sukhārthāḥ sarvabhūtānāṃ matāḥ sarvāḥ pravṛttayaḥ*, CS, Su, XXVIII. 35.

28 CS, Su, I. 15. Loc. cit., F. Note. 65.

29 “There is no state of *artha*, of *kāma*, or of *dharma* which a man comes to realize and rest in. Rather these terms are to be construed more subtly, perhaps as attitudes or orientations”, KHP, p. 6.

30 “....*dharmārthakāmānāmahitānāmanupasevane hitānāṃ copasevane prayatitavyaṃ.....*”. CS, Su, XI. 46 .

31 Ibid, 28-30.

32 vide supra, p. 55.

33 The conception of action as being prompted by volition is akin to the concepts of *karma* in Buddhism and Nyāya.

34 *mohecchādveṣakarmamūlā pravṛthiḥ*, CS, Sa, V. 10.

35 *icchādveṣātmikā tṛṣṇā*, CS, Sa, I. 134.

36 *upadhā hi paro heturduḥkhāduḥkhāśrayapradāḥ*, Ibid., 95.

37 The word *upadhā* is being interpreted by Cakrapāṇi as *tṛṣṇa*. In Buddhist tradition *tṛṣṇa* is conceived as the origin of suffering, BT, p. 43.

- 38 see BT, p. 43.
- 39 *pravartanālakṣaṇā doṣāḥ*, NS, I. i. 18.
- 40 *tatirāśyaṃ - rāgadveṣamohārthānṭharabhāvāt*, NS, IV. I. 3.
- 41 *bhāvadoṣo upadhā'doṣo'nupadhā*, VS, VI. II. 4. see also Śaṅkaramiśra on it. VU, p. 350.
- 42 *prayatnaḥ samrambhaḥ, utsāhaḥ, iti paryāyāḥ. sa dvividhaḥ-jīvanapūrvaka, icchādveṣapūrvakaśca*, PBNK, p. 638.
- 43 *daivam purā yat kṛtamucyate tat tat pauraṣaṃ yattuviha karma dṛṣṭaṃ*, CS, Sa, II. 44, Vi. III.29-30, Ci. III, 33. *pauraṣaṃ karma daivam ca phalavṛttisvabhāvataḥ*, MB, Mokṣa, 224.51
- 44 CS, Sa, VI, 28.
- 45 CS, Sa, I. 77.
- 46 For details see CS, Su, XI. 3- 6.
- 47 Loc. cit., F. Note 32.
- 48 For details see CS, Su, XI, 39-40.
- 49 *dhīdhṛtismṛtīvibhraṣṭaḥ karma yat kurute'subhaṃ prajñāparādhaṃ taṃ vidyāt sarvadoṣaprakopaṇaṃ*, CS, Sa, I. 102.
- 50 *īrṣyāśokabhayakrodhamānadveṣādayaśca ye manovikārāste'pyuktāḥ sarve prajñāparādhajāḥ*, CS, Su, VII. 52.
- 51 *tyāgaḥ prajñāparādhānāmindriyopaśamaḥ smṛtiḥ deśakālātmavijñānaṃ sadvṛttasyānuvartanaṃ*, Ibid., 53.

- 52 CS, Su, VII, 26-29.
- 53 Ibid., 56-59.
- 54 Ibid., 38.
- 55 Ibid., VIII. 18.
- 56 See, CS, Sa, VIII. 10-14.
- 57 *vidyā vitarko vijñānaṃ smṛtistatparatā kriyā*  
*yasyaite ca ṣaḍguṇāstasya na sādhyamativartate*, CS. Su, IX. 21. See  
 also *ibid.*, 5.
- 58 CS, Su, II. 36.
- 59 *Ibid.*, I. 126-127.
- 60 *Ibid.*, I. 130.
- 61 *varamātmā huto'jñena na cikitsā pravartitā*, *Ibid.*, IX. 15.
- 62 *ato viparītā rogāṇāmabhisarā hantāraḥ prāṇānāṃ, bhiṣakcchadma-*  
*praticchannāḥ...*, CS, SU, XXIX, 8.
- 63 *maitrī, kāruṇyamārteṣu śakye prītirupekṣaṇaṃ*  
*prakṛtistheṣu bhūteṣu vaidyavṛtiścaturvidheti*, CS, Su, IX, 26.
- 64 *tasmācchastre'rthavijñāne pravṛttau karmadarśane*  
*bhiṣak catuṣṭaye yuktaḥ prāṇābhisaraḥ uchyate*, *Ibid.*, IX, 18.
- 65 CS, Su, I. 15-17.
- 66 *atha maitrīparaḥ puṇyamāyurvedaṃ punarvasuḥ*  
*śiṣyebyo dattavān ṣaḍbhyaḥ sarvabhtānukaṃpayā*, *Ibid.*, 30.

- 67 Ibid., 39-40.
- 68 CS, Su, XI. 27.
- 69 Albert Shewitzer was a contemporary altruist of the West, who decided to make his life fit his thoughts. He preached a humanistic philosophy of “reverence for life and respect for individual”. He believes that desire is the cause of sufferings. EWU, p.162-63
- 70 All Indian religions and philosophical systems except the Cārvākas take freedom (*mukti*) from suffering as the goal of spiritual endeavour.
- 71 .....*tatra svabhāvaḥ pravṛtteruparamo maraṇamanityatā nirodha ityeko'rthaḥ; ityāyusaḥ pramāṇaṃ.....*, CS, Su, XXX. 25.
- 72 *vipāpaṃ virājaḥ śāntaṃ paramakṣaramavyayaṃ amṛtaṃ brahma nirvāṇaṃ paryāyaiḥ śāntirucyate*, CS, Sa, V. 23.
- 73 CS, Sa , V. 8; cf. Yāska who mentions six kinds of modifications: birth, continuance, growth, transformation, decay and death. Nirukta, p. 1.
- 74 Positive action (*pravṛtti*) is suffering and negative action (*nivṛtti*) is happiness. “*pravṛtirdikhaṃ nivṛttih sukhaṃ*”, For details see CS, Sa, V. 10- 11.
- 75 For details see Ibid., II. 37-38.
- 76 *icchā dveṣātmikā tṛṣṇā sukhaduḥkāt pravartate tṛṣṇā ca sukhaduḥkhānāṃ kāraṇaṃ punarucyate.*, CS, Sa, I. 134.  
Happiness is *duḥkha* because it is liable to change.

- 77 *sarvapravṛttiṣvaghasaṃjñā*, *ibid*, V. 12.
- 78 *vide supra*, world construction, F. Note, 62.
- 79 *ibid* Loc. Cit. p. 362.
- 80 CS, Sa, I. 99-101.
- 81 *Ibid.*, V. 16-18.
- 82 *nivṛttirapavargaḥ, tat paraṃ praśāntaṃ tattadaḥśaraṃ tadbrahma sa mokṣaḥ*. *Ibid.*, 11.
- 83 *tasmiṃścaramasanyāse samūlāḥ sarvavedanāḥ sasañjnājñāna vijñānānivṛttiṃ yānti aśeṣataḥ*. *Ibid.*, I. 154.
- 84 *Ibid.*, V. 22.
- 85 *mokṣo rajastamo'bhāvāt balavatkarṃsaṅkṣayāt viyogaḥ sarvasaṃyogairapunarbhāva ucyate*, *Ibid.*, I, 142.
- 86 *Ibid*, 151.
- 87 *Ibid*, V, 19.
- 88 *sarvalokamātmānānaṃ ca sarvaloke samamanupaśyataḥ satyā buddhiḥ samutpadyate. sarvalokaṃ hyātmani paśyato bhavatyātmaiva sukhaduḥkhayoḥ kartā nānya iti. karmātmakatvācca hetvādibhiryuktaḥ sarvaloko'hamiti viditvā jñānaṃ pūrvamutthāpyate'-pavargāyati*, *Ibid.*, V. 7; V. 20- 21 .
- 89 *tayoravṛtṭiḥ kriyate parābhyāṃ dhṛtismṛtibhyāṃ parayā dhiyā ca*, *Ibid.*, , II. 42.
- 90 *Ibid.*, I. 150.
- 91 *Ibid.*, I. 148-149.

- 92 Ibid., I. 143-146.
- 93 Ibid., 147.
- 94 However, Caraka does not give the scheme of eight fold *yoga* in a systematic way.
- 95 EWU, p.83.
- 96 CS, Sa, I. 140-141.
- 97 CS, Sa, V.12. Loc. cit., F. Note 89.
- 98 *savāsanāsamucchedo jñānoparama ityeke*, Nyāyakandalī, PBNK, p. 6; NM, Part--II, 81.
- 99 KFL, p. 265.
- 100 ACJ, p. 4.
- 101 *tasya heturavidyā*, Y. Su, II. 24 *viparyayajñāna-saṃskārasa-hitā vidyete sūtrārthaḥ*, Pātañjalarahasya on ibid., YD, p. 233.
- 102 *vivekakhyātiraviplava hānopāyaḥ*, Y. Su, II. 26. *sattvapuruṣānyatā-pratyayo vivekakhyātiḥ*, Vyāsabhāṣya on ibid, YD, p. 236.
- 103 The eight stages are *yama*, *niyama*, *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, *pratyāhara dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi*. Y.Su, II. 29.
- 104 VS, I. i. 2,
- 105 VS, I. i. 4.
- 106 “*samastātmaviśeṣaguṇocchedopalakṣitā svarūpasthitireva*”, Nyāyakandalī, PBNK, p. 692.

- 107 *tadatyantavimokṣo'pavargaḥ*, NS, I. i. 22.
- 108 *duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānānām uttarottarapāye  
tadanantarapāyadapavrgagaḥ*, NS, I. i. 2.
- 109 NS, I. i. 1., See Supra, p. 87.
- 110 *tadabhayamajaramamṛtyupadaṃ braḥmakṣemaprāptiriti*, Vātsyāyana  
on NS, I. i. 22, N. Bh, p.39.
- 111 *navānām ātmaguṇānām buddhisukhaduḥkheccadveṣa-prayatna-  
dharmādharmasaṃskārānām nirmūlocchedo'pavarga ituktaṃ  
bhavati*, NM, Part--II, 77.
- 112 KFL, p.264.
- 113 JNS, Vol. I, p. 879.
- 114 *yasmin prītiḥ puruṣasya tasya lipsārthalakṣaṇā vibhaktatvāt*. M.  
Su, IV. i. 2.
- 115 *na hyabhāvātmakaṃ muktvā mokṣanityatvakāraṇaṃ*, Slokavartika.,  
cited in JNS, Vol. I, p. 879 (F. Notes).
- 116 *sakalabudhyādiviśeṣaguṇavilaye satyātmanaḥ svarūpāvasthānaṃ  
mokṣa iti prābhākaramataṃ*, MM, p.214.
- 117 EIP, p. 149.
- 118 ACJ, p. 4.
- 119 “*Brahmaveda brahmaiva bhavati*”, Mu. U., III. ii. 9 . *ānandātmaka-  
brahmāvāptiśca mokṣaḥ*, VP, p. 204; *nityaniratiśayasukhābhvyak-  
turityapare*, PBNK, p. 8.
- 120 ACJ , p. 4.



## **Chapter - IX**

### **CONCLUSION**

Carakasamhitā is the first and foremost compendium which has laid a systematic, comprehensive, and consistent theoretical foundation for Āyurveda. It was mainly on the basis of Caraka's theoretical propositions that Āyurveda had its later development. Even though a number of treatises originated in the later period, Caraka outshines all of them since it is revered for its meticulous account of the fundamental principles. The unique characteristics of the fundamental principles lie in the fact that they are basically dependent on a fabulously interwoven philosophy. If we take away the philosophical speculations, then the fundamental principles of Āyurveda will become baseless. The following are some of the important aspects which add to the excellence of Caraka's philosophy.

#### **1. Practical orientation of philosophical tenets**

The main characteristic of Caraka's philosophy is the practical orientation of philosophical tenets. Caraka evolved the philosophy with the purpose of the conceptualization and practice of Āyurveda in a jubilant historical context in which the classical philosophical systems were in the making. He made use of the philosophical systems then existed. Even then it was neither a replica of any one of the philosophical systems nor an

insulation of fragments of philosophical concepts. It does not also appear as a fringe to the mainstream of pragmatic theories of medicine. On the contrary, it serves as the source of deriving theoretical propositions for the maintenance of health. In fact, science and philosophy appear as co-ordinate species in Carakasamhitā. The distinction between *parā vidyā* and *aprā vidyā* is dissolved.

The six categories enumerated in the beginning presume Kaṇāda's categories only for developing the tenets concerning health and cure. He makes a paradigm shift for this. Based on the concept of universal and particularity in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra he successfully explains the basic cause of equipoise. His new conjecture was that universal and particularity are objective realities which function as the causal determinants of increase and decrease respectively. This ingenious doctrine became the cardinal principle of treatment. The important point to be noted in this connection is that this conceptual transformation does not contradict Vaiśeṣika theory because Caraka takes into account only the "universal particularities". Neither the highest universal called "beingness" (*satta*) nor the ultimate particularity (*viśeṣa*) is taken into account.

It is a fact that Caraka defines substance in conformity with Kaṇāda. But he does not accept the atoms as the substantial cause of the world. On the other hand, in coherence with the pre-classical Sāṃkhyas, he postulates a conscious entity called *cetanādhātu* at the ground level. This foundational "Self" enveloped by the adjuncts *rajas* and *tamas* is called *avyakta*. It is

conceived as the cosmological substrate. In the case of attributes also, he has elaborated the list of Kāṇāda by including many more in the list. The remarkable thing is the addition of the twenty physical qualities. They are common to the five physical substances and have high therapeutic value. The categories of time and space are also described in such a way as to suit the purpose of maintaining of health. Again the idea of inherence refer to the relation of “identity in difference” in the substratum and super stratum

The postulation of the *tridoṣa* theory which is cardinal to Āyurveda is an original and unique discovery of Caraka. In order to conceptualize this theory he successfully makes use of the theory of five physical elements which is derived from the harmonization the Vaiśeṣika’s concepts with the concepts of pre-classical Sāṃkhya. In brief, the enumeration of the six categories is mainly intended to formulate the fundamental principles. He achieves this without contradicting the Vaiśeṣika categories and his own philosophical vision.

## **2. Theoretical proposition of man**

The excellence of Caraka’s philosophical speculations lies in the theoretical proposition of man. It is without the subordination or super ordination of scientific methods of empirical verification and philosophical consciousness that Caraka constructs his theoretical propositions of man. Human beings are not conceived as mere constitutions of material elements or as body-mind complex. They are regarded as combinations of body, mind, and sense capacities owned by the conscious self. The conscious self

is regarded as responsible for everything. The very existence of the Universe is explained on the basis of consciousness. Without consciousness there is no existence. Even the pulses of the heart, which are the dear ones of science, are determined by consciousness. Without addressing consciousness, the propositions about man would be incomplete. So he valued consciousness more since the whole human complex is governed by consciousness. The relation of the body and mind to the self is also not regarded as extraneous or accidental. But there is a causal nexus which binds them together. Above all, he envisages the inner self responsible for the very human existence. The self is bound to a particular body and the mind in a particular birth due to causal and moral reasons. It is the inherent *kārmic* impressions of the self carried from the previous life that decide it and it accounts for the birth, death, transmigration, and liberation. No science of the world has given us such an all embracing concept of man as Caraka has given.

### **3. Philosophical vision**

In the discrete task of theoretical construction, Caraka naturally transcends the limited sphere of objects and their isolated empirical relations to their innermost unity and the ultimate ground. The entire conceptualization and practice had been shaped on the vision that the manifold world has a true, efficient, and absolute continuance in relation to the enfoldment in the ultimate cause.

Caraka's philosophy is a representation of extreme realism and monism. The world is a reality and not an illusion. It is a transformation of

the ultimate reality. Unity in diversity is a plan of “*sṛṣṭi*” and it is the one that becomes the many and explains the many. Ultimate reality is self-existent (*sat*). It is without a second at the *pralaya* state also. That is, *pralaya* is not the dissolution but the involution of the multitudinous variety of forms and names. Similarly, the origin of the universe is also a real occurrence. It is the renewal of the cosmic life and activity, “Being becomes”. The world is a living process sustained by an infinite series of periodic pause and repose alternating with activity. Unity and distinction co-exist and are in intimate relation in his philosophy. There exists no incompatibility of substance, quality, universal, particularity, and part and whole which are known and treated as different or opposed at the empirical level. They can be reconciled in a unity which pervades the diversity.

Caraka’s philosophy can be equated to or called as the philosophy of “identity in difference” (*bhedābheda*) or as theory of development (*brahmapariṇāmvāda*) according to which the ultimate reality is not static but is continually changing and yet maintaining its identity throughout. It has got its own fascination for certain temperament interested in the meeting of the extremes of pluralism and monism.

#### **4. Methodological excellence**

Methodological compactness is another aspect that adds to the excellence of Caraka. With equal importance to conceptualization and practice, he describes a well planned methodology that is to be followed for cognizing and practice. In other words, epistemology, which is the main

concern of philosophy, is discussed with utmost care. He has presented a well structured account of the means of knowledge, logic, and dialectical terms capable of generating comprehensive and thorough proficiency in Āyurveda. Even though there exists a dispute regarding the discovery stage of the epistemological concepts, what we see in Nyāya-sūtra is often regarded as a refined form of Caraka's epistemology. The descriptions of different kinds of source of valid knowledge and dialectical speculations are more or less similar. Still there are differences. With the exception of *ceṣṭā* and *anupalabdhi*, Caraka refers to almost all means of knowledge without any disregard. At the same time, only verbal cognition, perception, inference, and heuristic reasoning (*yukti*) are recognized as investigative means. The five member syllogism first appears in Carakasamhitā.

The introduction of heuristic reasoning as a distinct source of knowledge is one of the most striking features of Carakasamhitā. In no other systems of knowledge *yukti* is found to be accepted as a distinct source of knowledge. It is the method of arriving at the right judgment of things by an intellectual exercise which involves the right combination of manifold causes or reasons.

There exists a difference in the basic issues concerning the transaction of the instruments of knowledge and the effects of cognizing process on the knower. The conception of the self, mind, and consciousness as spiritual substances and of sense capacities as physical are something peculiar to Caraka. It is Caraka who puts forth the innovative idea that the sense

capacities are different from the end organs which serve as the sites (*adhiṣṭānas*). He locates the centre of the sense organs as the head. Caraka's epistemology is not limited to the mere description of the different sources of knowledge and defining them. On the contrary, it is one of the deepest thoughts which extends to the association of consciousness. Beyond that, he analyses the basic issues of the relation of awareness and consciousness to the self. He also discusses in detail the transaction of the instruments of apprehension, namely consciousness, "I-consciousness", mind, sense faculties, the role of the inner self as the co-ordinator, the way in which knowledge affects the knower with respect to ordinary experience causing pain, and also the final knowledge that culminates in ultimate freedom.

Caraka always relies on discursive reason in formulating his thesis. But he avoids *vāda* seen in the form of hair-splitting jugglery which often leads us ultimately to nothing creative. The symposia found preserved in *Carakasamhitā* exemplify the healthy application of dialectics that contributes to the clarity of understanding and dispelling doubts. Observation and intuition were also given equal importance.

## **5. Vision of life and ethics**

Caraka puts forth a unique perspective of life. He gives due importance to material pursuits and places spiritual goal at their apex. The spirituality envisaged is not in any way opposed to material life. It is counted as an inevitable continuity of the material life. He gives emphasis to the fact that the attitudes and behaviour of man to his fellow beings, to nature and to

himself, must be such that it will not disturb the cohesion of the universe while trying to satisfy the material needs. Otherwise it will cause impediments even in maintaining the positive health of man which is essential for him to contemplate the ultimate goal of life.

Caraka envisages a noble ethical code based on a non-prejudicial holistic outlook. His moral thoughts hinge on the basic idea of micro-macro relationship of man and as such they are enshrined in compassion and non-injury to all living beings. The compassion advocated by Caraka is not to be understood in the limited sense of consideration for human beings and their “well-being”, but the concern for everything, both animate and inanimate, that has evolved from the non-dualistic vision of man and universe. It is the compassion which is the result of the eradication of egoism, the root cause of dual thought leading to love and hate tendencies.

Caraka’s unbiased approach and compassion is reflected even in his explanation of the nature of ultimate freedom. Caraka declares that the attainment of ultimate freedom is possible only through the realization of the micro-macro relationship of man and nature. Caraka has used almost all the terms which connote specific ideas of freedom used in different philosophical systems without prejudice and affirms that the nature of final state of freedom is inexplicable. The philosophy of Caraka is a representation of true intellectual freedom unfettered by the dogmas and doctrines of sectarianism.

Caraka philosophised not for the sake of philosophy nor for personal liberation, but for the well-being of humanity and the world in total. Usually,



the concerns sparked by philosophical systems are general in nature. But Caraka has obviously and successfully employed them for the specific and complicated empirical issue of maintenance of human health without ignoring the ultimate goal of life. It has got its own brilliance.

In brief, Carakasamhitā is a complete book which contains deliberations and insightful knowledge of the complex man and his environment in its totality. Caraka construes man as a somatic being and spiritual being. It is a compendium in which Philosophical abstractions and scientific observations are found interlocked. It is a synthesis of the subjective and the objective, the two cornerstones of epistemology.

In concluding the thesis, it would not be improper to point out that at least some among the Āyurvedic community too frequently take the attitude of comparing the therapeutic principles with those in the Western medical science which is purely experimental and objective oriented. Consequently, they often forget to give due attention to the philosophical concepts in which the fundamental principles of treatment are rooted. It is unfortunate. If the reason is the risk factor of probability and precision, plausibility and demonstrability in the practice of Āyurveda, it is the same for Western medicine also. So it is not the actual reason. The actual reason is that we are prone to think whatever that is contributed by Western science is faultless. What is needed is that the physicians who are willing to push the limit of the theoretical constructs of Āyurveda have to work along original lines either to show the flaws or to justify them. At any rate, it is essential

to address the philosophical abstractions. It would at least help us to bridge the gulf between ethical reasoning and scientific reasoning. Correct philosophical pursuit creates the way for entering the domain of consciousness. A fuller grasp of the philosophy of Caraka could possibly provide improved interpretative perspectives for the understanding of the underlying complex systems of knowledge, archaic notions and values. It offers insights in understanding Āyurveda as a whole.

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