


*THE STORY OF THE TECHNICAL EDUCATION, VOCATIONAL AND  
ENTREPRENEURSHIP TRAINING (TEVET) REFORMS IN ZAMBIA:  
1994-2008*



by

Joseph Siloka Mukuni

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Blacksburg, Virginia, USA  
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## Foreword

It has been said today's Zambians do not have a strong reading culture. One hopes that since reading and writing tend to go together, the decision by Dr. Joseph Mukuni to write this short History of TEVET in Zambia indicates that things are already changing for the better. I recall that during my primary education a decade or so before Zambia's independence, we read many entertaining and serious books written by Zambian writers. The decline of this art in latter-day Zambia may be an indictment of the way my colleagues and I amongst the new crop of Zambian leaders have handled the task of "Educating Our Future". Perhaps even the perversions of TV in our daily lives may not be the only culprit.

I spent almost four years at the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training, between 1999 and 2004 as Minister, and so I may not be the best person to judge the extent of the achievements of the period which Dr. Mukuni is reviewing in this book. However, even as a player within the game, one develops a keen understanding of the game, its players and its unique challenges. I therefore came to understand the critical role that Science, Technology and Vocational Training play in any country's development. For me it became an obsession, and although I am proud to have been associated with this period of the Ministry's development, I left it reluctantly and with a feeling that I had not stayed long enough to see the fruits of many of the plans Dr. Mukuni tabulates in this short History of TEVET in Zambia.

As Dr. Mukuni points out in the book, one of the most difficult challenges during the time was the role played by the various donor agencies in the development of TEVET. As every experienced administrator knows, plans can look grand and polished on paper, but when it comes to funding, that becomes the acid-test as far as implementation is concerned. Of course, availability of funds is not the only test: I found that the frustrations arising out of participating in the formulation of a plan of historic proportions, and then being held back for several months or years due to perceived indifference in officials at the National Treasury or at the Donor Agencies' Offices, was at times unbearable. In the end, one had to get used to this as a fact of life, after all there were many other national needs competing for the same funds.....

Each time artisan students in technical colleges shouted during the occasional joint meetings: "We want Starter! (Meaning 'help us with start-up capital and personal tools after graduation') I felt a sense of helplessness at having to respond to them in the negative. I understood well that at the time the shrinking formal employment sector could not absorb most of them, that they had to depend on their own ingenuity to start off in 'The Life of Work', but could not do anything more to answer their request for 'Starter'. Today, it is wonderful to hear the Ministry has launched TEVET Graduates' "Toolkit Scheme"! This is a very important development and a very positive step towards the job-employment of our young adults.

As President Levy Patrick Mwanawasa, SC, pointed out during the launch of the 'Toolkit Scheme' on 14<sup>th</sup> November 2007 at the Lusaka Business and Technical College:

**"My administration has noted that skills development does not necessarily lead to formal employment or employment creation. It is possible to have unemployed**

skilled people. It is important, therefore, to provide graduates of skills development programmes with additional support such as toolkits, capital, access to land, market support, and many other forms of support”

Readers of this Story of TEVET Reforms may recall how suspiciously many Government office workers initially viewed the push to computerize certain aspects of their work in the 1970s, 1980s and even during the 1990s. Now of course, the sight of a Government Office devoid of a computer evokes much surprise.

Today, even the sending of mail by means of a trip to the Post Office is becoming rarer; and many Zambian traders are purchasing vehicles and other merchandise from the Republic of South Africa, Dubai, and Japan through the internet. The ‘Digital Divide’ is narrowing day-to-day, almost un-noticeably, and thanks to Government’s improving budgetary policies, Computers now come into Zambia duty – free.

It is therefore important that policy makers and policy implementers periodically catalogue these policy outcomes in books such as the one offered here by Dr. Mukuni. With the disappearance of the fabled ‘poor reading culture’ of Zambian, the histories written about the development of the Zambian TEVET System will find many keen readers and will greatly assist researchers and all those who wish to evaluate dispassionately, the achievements of the New Deal Administration.

In his book, Dr. Mukuni mentions the high turnover of political leaders at the Ministry as having contributed to some of the difficulties in implementation of the TEVET Policies. To a large extent this was simply unavoidable. But fortunately, also, the Civil Service structure allows for certain technocrats to remain long enough in their positions, for them to become the “institutional memory” of their organizations.

In the comprehensive history of TEVET Reforms offered here, Dr. Joseph Mukuni has demonstrated very ably the fact that he has become part of the vital ‘institutional memory’ of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training. In addition to his usually humble and dedicated disposition, Dr. Mukuni has, by writing this book, more than earned his pension, as they say. He has brought into the limelight some of the important activities of the Ministry concerned which I also often complained that we were not doing enough to bring Science and Technology into the daily lives of our people.

In retrospect, however, I think the Ministry has had its fair share of glory: it was during my time that the controversial GMO debate raged, culminating in appropriate legislation and the establishment of a GMO laboratory at Mount Makulu; it was also during the same period that the Ministry initiated the establishment of a Gemstone Training Centre in Ndola; it was also during the same period that the Technology Business Centre (NTBC) and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) were established, to mention a few projects of historic importance.

It is my sincere hope that soon the Ministry will find an opportunity to establish also, a satellite- based remote sensing center, to complete the implementation of the Vision and Work plans we had set for the Ministry soon after 1996. I have no doubt that under the dynamic leadership of the current Minister, more visioning and implementation programmes will be successfully worked out. As for TEVET, the results of the plans and activities initiated over the last few years are already finding fertile ground in the rapid growth of the economy. Truly, exciting times lie ahead of us!

---

Abel M. Chambeshi  
Former Minister of Science, Technology and Vocational Training



Honourable Minister Abel Chambeshi addressing stakeholders, 2001

## Acknowledgments

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- Mr. Abel Musonda Chambeshi for agreeing to write the foreword to this book; and
- Mrs. Benita Moonga Malupande for formatting the manuscript.

Any grammatical or historical inaccuracies that might be noted in the story being told in this book are entirely the responsibility of the author.

## ACRONYMS

CBMT	Competence Based Modular Training
CTEVT	Commission for Technical Education and Vocational Training
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DFiD	Department for International Development
DTEVT	Department for Technical Education and Vocational Training
EDCs	Entrepreneurial Development Centres
EIST	Entrepreneurial and Informal Sector Training
EISTP	Entrepreneurial and Informal Sector Training Project
GNVQ	General National Vocational Qualifications
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
ISTARN	Informal Sector Training and Resource Network
ISTEC	In Service Training Education Centre
LIBES	Livingstone Institute for Business and Engineering Studies
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOFNP	Ministry of Finance and National Planning
MCDSS	Ministry of Community Development and Social Services
MSTVT	Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training
MTENR	Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources
MYSCD	Ministry of Youth, Sport and Child Development
NFTI	Non-Formal Training Institutions
NGOs	Non -Governmental Organizations
NORTEC	Northern Technical College
NVQ	National Vocational Qualifications
NSDP	National Skills Development Plan
NTB	National Training Board
PCO	Programme Coordinating Office
PRSP	Public Service Reform Programme
PSC	Programme Steering Committee
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
STED	Skills Training and Entrepreneurship Development
TDP	Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Development Program
TEVET	Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training
TEVETA	Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Authority
TEVT	Technical Education and Vocational Training
TVTC	Technical and Vocational Teachers College
TOT	Training of Trainers
TTIs	Trades Training Institutes
VEET	Vocational Education and Entrepreneurship Training
VET	Vocational Education and Training
VETA	Vocational Education and Training Authority

ZASTI  
ZTEA  
ZUTEL

Zambia Aviation Services Training Institute  
Zambia Technical Education Association  
Zambia Union for Technical Education Lecturers

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## INTRODUCTION

*“A need to tell and hear stories is essential to the species Homo sapiens--second in necessity apparently after nourishment and before love and shelter. Millions survive without love or home, almost none in silence; the opposite of silence leads quickly to narrative, and the sound of story is the dominant sound of our lives, from the small accounts of our day's events to the vast incommunicable constructs of psychopaths.” Price (1978).*

### 1.1. Background

At independence, Zambia was one of the prosperous nations in the Southern African region. The copper mines were the greatest employers of skilled labour, which at independence was predominantly expatriate personnel. Shortly after independence, a number of expatriates left the country, thereby creating a great demand for local human resources. As a result of the growing demand for skilled labour, the country developed a vibrant demand-driven skills development system through the Technical Education and Vocational Training (TEVT) Policy of 1969 and TEVT Act of 1970.

By the early 1990s, however, Zambia's economy had become one of the least developed in the world, with a per capita GDP of USD 370. In 1995, the Zambian economy had contracted by 3.8%. This dismal economic status was largely a result of the drastic slump in copper prices in 1975. Industry experienced severe foreign exchange restrictions, which constrained the supply of inputs to production. The poor performance of the economy led to shrinkage of the formal labour market and an expansion of the informal sector, which by 1995 was estimated at about 70% of the labour force.

This state of affairs affected the TEVT sector in two main ways. Firstly, public financing to the sector declined, resulting in a drastic fall in training standards as a consequence of insufficient inputs to training. Secondly, the majority of skills training graduates could not find employment in the formal sector, whose labour force by 1995 had shrunk to about 30%. There was a general perception among some employers that the students that managed to find jobs did not have the right competences required by the labour market. At that time, the TEVT sector was (as appeared to be the case up till 2007) described as supply driven as it had stopped being relevant to the realities of its demand side.

It, therefore, became necessary for the TEVT Policy of 1969 to be reviewed. For this and other reasons, therefore, Zambia embarked on a Vocational Education and Training (VET) reform process in 1994 with a view to aligning skills development to the nation's socio-economic skill needs.

### 1.2. Scope of the book

This book describes the reform process from 1994 to 2007 with special reference to the following aspects of the reform:

1. Rationale for the reform: The aim of the chapter is to answer the question: What factors led to the reform of the TEVT policy?

2. Reform methodology: The chapter describes the procedure used to reform the TEVT sector in Zambia.
3. Reform outputs: The chapter presents the achievements of the reform process.
4. Challenges of the reforms: The chapter discusses the main challenges faced by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training (MSTVT) during the reform process.
5. The final chapter presents a summary of a TEVET policy impact evaluation that was conducted in 2008.

### 1.3. Motivation for the book

The author has used the key points of this book as workshop material during the induction programmes of management board members of Institutions under the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training.

During the induction workshops that were held between 2000 and 2007, participants showed a lot of interest in the story of the Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training (TEVET) reforms. A need was, therefore, identified to put the workshop notes in book form.



Deputy Minister Newton Ng'uni (third in the front row) with ministry senior staff, VEET Secretariat team, and college principals at a VEET Policy Review workshop in 1997

RATIONALE FOR THE TECHNICAL EDUCATION, VOCATIONAL AND  
ENTREPRENEURSHIP TRAINING REFORMS

“To everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the  
heaven...” Ecclesiastes 3:1

2.1. Background

The Technical Education and Vocational Training policy developed during the period 1968-1969 with the assistance of the Canadian Government was very comprehensive. It defined a number of aspects of skills development that made the Zambian technical education and vocational training system produce skilled human resources for not only Zambia's industry and commerce, but also the economies of other countries in the region.

The policy defined the following key areas of skills development:

- a) Levels of training: These comprised craft certificate, technician certificate and technologist diploma. In addition to these three levels, the policy recognized that some training programmes would lead to proficiency awards or trade test levels;
- b) Training standards and certification: Examinations would be used in a way that would describe the competence standard of the successful candidates. The policy intended to harmonize the different certificates in the country and give them national validity;
- c) Teacher training: The policy provided for the training and constant upgrading of teaching staff, to be recruited from industry; candidates were persons with occupational competence with at least three years' experience;
- d) Staffing: The policy identified the staffing requirements of the Commission for Technical Education and Vocational Training, and the need to have strategies for staff recruitment and retention. The policy recognized the need to pay salaries and wages that would compete with those of industry;
- e) Finance: The policy provided for the establishment of a Training Fund to be financed through a levy;
- f) Legislation: The policy provided for the introduction of legislation that would proscribe any deviation from the regulations and give legal powers for the Training Fund;
- g) Physical development: The policy provided for the number and sizes of public training institutions, subjects, standards, teaching equipment and requirements for each discipline. For example, specifications for classrooms, workshops, libraries and storage were given;
- h) Governance: The policy provided for the establishment of a semi-autonomous body to be in charge of technical education. Autonomy was required to enable the corporate body to have sufficient flexibility to execute its mandate with minimum hindrance.

Even by modern standards, the Technical Education and Vocational Training Statement of Policy and Intent issued by the Zambian Government in 1969 was a thorough and well thought-out blueprint for a good technical education and vocational training system.

Why, then, did Zambia have to begin reforming its Technical Education and Vocational Training policy in the early 1990s? A number of factors leading to the reform can be traced. They include the ones outlined below.

The factors that conspired to bring about change in the policy could be classified into two types, namely pressure from within and pressure from outside the technical education system.

## 2.2. Pressure from within

Up to the mid-eighties, technical education and vocational training in Zambia was experiencing its honeymoon. Staff members were proud of belonging to the Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training (DTEVT), which had replaced the autonomous Commission for Technical Education and Vocational Training (CTEVT) in 1972. Training facilities had just been rehabilitated; training equipment and consumable materials were available; staff development was well coordinated, with training opportunities at home and abroad; terms and conditions of service were attractive.

However, the close of the eighties heralded a great sense of desolation in the TEVT sector. It appeared as though skills development had ceased to be a priority, contrary to the philosophy of the policy document that had said in part about the technical education programme:

It must be applied with vigour and resolution, and it must remain viable to meet the changing needs and advances made in the field of technology...we cannot succeed if the input and the methods are either outmoded, or not based upon definable beliefs...investment in the educational and human skills does not only deserve the highest priority, but the only meaningful and permanent form of national development. (Statement of Policy and Intent, 1969, page 6)

Some of the issues giving the impression that skills development was no longer a priority were as follows:

- Insufficient inputs such as training equipment and consumable materials due to poor funding;
- Dilapidated training facilities due to lack of funds for preventive maintenance;
- Unattractive conditions of service;
- Insufficient funds for operations, constraining implementation of activities such as regulation of training standards, curriculum review, counseling and guidance, student placement, etc.;
- Reluctance by industry to provide places for industrial attachment of students, which was by design an integral part of the curriculum;
- Irregular meetings of the Technical Education and Vocational Training Council, which was a policy steering body comprising private sector and government representatives;
- Dismemberment of the technical education system by transferring Zambia Air Services Training Institute (ZASTI) and the College Hotel from the department of Technical Education and Vocational Training to the Department of Civil Aviation and the Ministry of Tourism respectively. Furthermore, Zambia Institute of Technology was swallowed up by the Copperbelt University. This was contrary to

the policy which had intended to put all public and para-statal training institutions under one central control to rationalize on resources.

- Insufficient facilities and resources to cater for the increased number of applicants to training programmes. By 1990, out of twenty thousand applicants, DTEVT could only take a little less than three thousand per year. On this issue of access, the policy document had said: “...every citizen is entitled to technical and vocational training to such an extent as his educational background, creativity, and aptitude will allow him, and the opportunity, therefore, must always be provided...” (ibid, page 6)

Staff members in Institutions and at headquarters had become disillusioned and this was evidenced by the following features:

- High rate of staff turn-over and failure to recruit and retain appropriately qualified and experienced personnel from industry. Many experienced professionals chose to go back to industry because when the mandate of technical education and vocational training was transferred to Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry harmonized the salary scales of TEVT with those of Education which used to be lower than the former;
- Student upheavals arising from inadequate teaching materials and (more important to them) poor diet; and
- Agitation by staff through the Zambia Technical Education Association (ZTEA) initially, and, later in the early nineties, a staff pressure group which became the fore runner of the Zambia Union for Technical Education Lecturers (ZUTEL);

Staff and senior management were convinced that the policy on technical education and vocational training had fallen apart. Discontentment began when the Commission for Technical Education and Vocational Training was turned into a Government Department in 1972, signaling the end of the partnership between Zambia and Canada in the technical education and vocational training reforms. Some of the effects of the developments that led to the dissolution of the Commission for Technical Education and Vocational Training were as follows:

- The mandate of TEVT was transferred from the Office of the President to that of the Vice President, and then to the Ministry of Education and Culture;
- The Canadian experts and financial resources that had been critical to the rolling out of the policy were withdrawn;
- The construction projects which the Canadian Government had embarked on were abandoned. For example, works at Mansa Trades Training Institute were left incomplete;

Consequently, there was pressure from within the technical education headquarters to revert to the days of the Commission. Plans were muted at head office to repeal the 1972 Technical Education and Vocational Training Act and re-introduce the Commission. It was felt that as a semi-autonomous Commission, DTEVT would be able to attract and retain public and private funding and use the money without being subject to civil service circulars, budgets or procedures.

In the mind of headquarters, the want of money was the root of all the evils afflicting technical education. The policy of 1969 was just all right. What was needed to address the funding issue

was to amend the Act, and not the policy. If through amending the law the Commission was re-introduced in the spirit of the 1969 policy, all other things would fall in place.

Staff in Institutions, on the other hand, felt that the organization that was “eating” their resources and therefore needed to be severed was the DTEVT headquarters. They suspected that funding meant for institutions was being diverted to sustain a structure that had long failed to deliver on its mandate. One of the issues that were frustrating professionals was that of ineffective inspection routines. Staff were not happy with the fact that inspection reports did not seem to be acted upon since they were submitted to the Department’s Chief Executive Officer (who also happened to be the “owner” of the institutions) instead of being submitted to an independent authority.

By 1991, staff in institutions and at headquarters were eager for change. At the beginning of 1993, Mr. Sandford Abraham Mupanga was appointed Director of the DTEVT. The new director issued a forty-one-item manifesto which included the restructuring of DTEVT Headquarters and Institutions. Soon after that, the DTEVT prepared a position paper for the consideration of the Ministry. The conclusion to the position paper read in part:

In view of the current Government Policy to liberalize and privatize the Zambian commerce and industry, we believe that there now exists an urgent need to reorganize the structural and operational status of DTEVT to make it more responsive and accommodating to the changing environment. Indeed, any organization that does not change is unhealthy and will stagnate or even die.

Within the spirit of the forty-one-item manifesto, the following new Institutions were opened between 1993 and 1999:

1. Lusaka Vocational Training Centre;
2. Zambia Institute for Business Studies and Industrial Practice;
3. Kitwe Vocational Training Centre; 4. Kaoma Trades Training Institute;
5. Ukwimi Trades Training Institute;
6. Solwezi Trades Training Institute;
7. Chipata Trades Training Institute;
8. Mongu Trades Training Institute;
9. Mwinilunga Trades Training Institute

This brought the number of institutions to twenty-three and broadened access to training. The issue of access to TEVET was of great concern because in the early 1990s, DTEVT was only able to recruit a little under 2,000 students per year, out of 10, 000 eligible annual applicants. Expansion of training facilities was, therefore, a felt need.

### 2.3. Pressure from outside

Much of what has been said in the foregoing section above could be said to be supply side pressure. The technical education policy was being affected by inadequate financial, human and other inputs to the process of skills development.

There was also pressure from outside the technical education and vocational training system. This external pressure could be seen not so much as the reason for change but the confirmation

for the decision already made to change. In some cases, external factors influenced the strategies for implementing the revised policy.

Pressure from outside could be classified into two types, namely: demand-side pressure and environmental pressure.

### 2.3.1. Demand-side pressure

First and foremost, on the litany of demand-side challenges, employers were dissatisfied with the quality level of graduates of training programmes. They complained that graduates were half-baked and that they were too theoretical. It was not uncommon for a graduate motor mechanic to discover that the world of work had computerized types of engines different from the non-runner 1960 models that he had seen at college. This was perhaps not surprising since lecturers themselves were complaining of lack of training materials and equipment for practical training. Furthermore, employers had stopped providing places for industrial attachment, which would have completed the training process.

The other challenge on the demand side was the diminishing size of the formal sector. Many graduates could not find employment because of the shrinking formal labour market. This meant that institutions were churning out graduates for an industry that had no need for them. In effect, at least to some extent, the training system had lost its relevance and therefore needed to be reformed.

A third factor on the demand side was the emergence of a new client that had never been anticipated during the design stage of the 1969 policy. By 1990, Zambia had begun to acknowledge the existence of an informal sector comprising about 80% of the active labour force. The informal sector was characterized by predominantly poor quality of goods and services and stunted economic growth of the enterprises. There was need for training institutions to respond to the training needs of the informal sector. Unfortunately, in the form in which it was at the time, the technical education and vocational training system was not able to provide training in a manner that would be appropriate to a sector that had neither the money nor the time (let alone the need) for the type of training programmes offered by public training institutions. In fact, the institutions themselves considered it beneath their standard to offer services to the informal sector.

### 2.3.2. Pressure from Environment

In plotting the external factors that contributed to the nature of strategies adopted for implementing the revised policy, two types of environmental factors may be recognized, namely:

- changes in technical education and vocational training systems in the region; and
- political changes at home.

#### a) Regional and International trends

The Zambian technical education and vocational training system is not an island. When all the forces cited above were putting pressure on the system to change, comparisons were being made with what was happening in the technical education systems in other countries, particularly within the region. Most of the comparisons with systems in the region were made

a few years after the start of the Zambian technical education and vocational training reforms. In a sense, they acted more like re-enforcers and models than triggers for the reforms.

In interactions with other technical education systems, it was learnt, for example, that Mauritius had a sustainable financing system supported by a training levy, just like Tanzania. It was also learnt that Tanzania had transformed its department responsible for vocational training into a private sector-led semi-autonomous body called the Vocational Education and Training Authority (VETA).

Long before the National Task Force for the Vocational Education and Entrepreneurship Training (VEET) Project was established, South Africa had been identified as a model for two of the dreams that the Zambian technical education system had. First, it was identified as a model for Competence Based Modular Training (CBMT). To this effect, some Zambian instructors were sent for training in CBMT to South Africa. The other lesson to get from South Africa was the governing of training institutions through management boards.

Zimbabwe had two interesting features. It had a strong apprenticeship system alongside the institution-based pre-employment training system supported by a sustainable financing system for human resource development. Zimbabwe was also running a project (called Informal Sector Training and Resource Network project) which linked informal sector trainees to a formal training institution, informal sector operators for their attachments, local authorities for market opportunities and micro bankers for capital.

These and other trends in the region and beyond added to the conviction that the dreams that managers of Zambia's technical education and vocational training system had were attainable. From beyond the region, two overtures may be noted by way of example. The British Department for International Development (DFiD) drew the attention of DTEVT to some interesting innovations in the United Kingdom in the area of vocational qualifications. DFiD sponsored an officer to the United Kingdom to study the General National Vocational Qualifications (GNVQ) and the National Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) with a view to determining how the British experiences could be used to enhance Zambia's technical education and vocational training system. At the same time, the Netherlands Embassy submitted a proposal to help in reviewing the TEVT system in line with international trends. One conclusion drawn from the trends was that it would be best for the DTEVT to let go on its administrative reigns of training institutions and concentrate on matters of quality assurance such as curriculum development, inspection and examinations)

## **b) Changed political environment**

In the early 1990s, Zambia experienced a spirit of change on the political scene. People yearned for change to break away from the economic fetters that had constrained them. When change finally came, it brought along new philosophies that also affected the direction of reform in the technical education system.

The new political leaders placed emphasis on democratization, decentralization and privatization of service provision. The guiding maxim was that the business of government was to govern, and not to get involved in the direct provision of services. Accordingly, government departments were staked for restructuring to make them right sized for efficiency and effectiveness. The creation of semi-autonomous grant-aided institutions became fashionable.

Educational and health institutions were to be run by boards comprising representatives of the private and public sectors, preferably headed by people from the private sector.

## 2.4. Summary

In conclusion, it can be noted that the technical education and vocational training reforms that began in the mid-1990s were impelled and affected by two winds that blew onto the skills development system: one from within and the other from outside.

From within the system came a strong urge to do something to improve the conditions of service of staff, refurbish the training facilities, make training equipment and materials available, modernize training systems and reclaim the glorious days of the Commission for Technical Education and Vocational Training.

From outside the system came pressure from the users of the skills development services that demanded quality and relevance. From external pressure can also be noted the wind of change blowing across technical education systems in the region, coinciding with changes on the political scene pushing for new ways of managing social services.

No one factor therefore can be said to be the reason for the reform other than the fact that the season for change had come.

### THE REFORM METHODOLOGY

*“However much the rhetoric changes to participation, participatory research, community involvement and the like, at the end of the day there is still an outsider seeking to change things... who the outsider is may change but the relation is the same. A stronger person wants to change things for a person who is weaker. From this paternal trap there is no complete escape.” Chambers (1983)*

#### 3.1. Introduction

A joint study of the World Bank and the International Labour Office has described the TEVET reforms as follows: “Following the election of a new government in 1991, concern about the deplorable state of skills development in the country led to many policy reviews and reform initiatives. Of these, VET reforms have perhaps been the most innovative in terms of both the procedure and proposals.”<sup>1</sup>

The procedure used in the TEVET reforms in Zambia was characterized by the following features:

- Stakeholder involvement through an all-inclusive task force and transition committee;
- Thematic studies to have in-depth knowledge of critical issues;
- Study visits to other countries to learn from experiences of other nations;
- Piloting of ideas before wide scale replication;
- Use of a Secretariat to hold things together

#### 3.2. Stakeholder Involvement

The Minister of Science, Technology and Vocational Training, Hon Gabriel Maka, MP, appointed a National Task Force to spearhead the policy review process in 1994. The Task Force comprised members drawn from the Church, Non-Governmental Organizations, Government Ministries, employers, labour unions, public and private training institutions, donors, chambers of commerce and industry, village industries service, Small Industries Development Organization and universities.

The Task Force held a number of regional and national workshops to get consensus on policy issues proposed for inclusion in the revised policy. The chairman and vice chairman of the Task Force were Professor Jorry Mwenechanya (from the University of Zambia) and Dr. Chiselebwe Ng’andwe (from Small Industries Development Organization) respectively.

In 1997, the Task Force was dissolved after it had accomplished its task of producing a revised policy and a Strategy Paper.

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<sup>1</sup> Gill, Indermit S, Fluitman, Fred and Dar, Amit (editors: 2000): **Vocational Education and Training Reform: matching Skills to Markets and Budgets**, Oxford University Press, New York

To carry the reform forward, the Ministry appointed a Transition Committee whose main task was to establish the proposed training authority and to oversee the piloting of some aspects of the new policy. The Transition Committee was chaired by the then Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training, Ms. Josephine Mapoma. The Transition Committee had the following composition:

- MSTVT headquarters (Permanent Secretary, Deputy Permanent Secretary and Director of Planning);
- Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training (Director, Deputy Director and two Assistant Directors);
- Zambia Federation of Employers;
- Small Scale Industries Association of Zambia;
- Private sector (two persons)
- Zambia Congress of Trade Unions;
- Transition Committee Secretariat

In 2002 a Steering Committee was appointed to give policy direction to the TEVET Development Programme, which was Phase III of the Policy Review during which a five-year plan was to be implemented. The Committee, chaired by the Permanent Secretary of MSTVT, comprised representatives of the following stakeholders:

- Ministry of Education;
- Ministry of Sport, Youth and Child Development;
- Ministry of Community Development and Social Services;
- Ministry of Tourism;
- TEVETA Board;
- Royal Netherlands Embassy;
- Royal Danish Embassy;
- World Bank;
- European Union;
- Japanese International Cooperation Agency;
- German Agency for Technical Cooperation.

The Ministry greatly benefited from the involvement of stakeholders in the review process. It was noted, however, that most stakeholders hardly provided any feedback to their constituencies. Visits to colleges that were represented on the task force, or whose heads attended regional workshops, revealed that information on critical outputs of the reform never reached the people affected by the reforms. The same was noted with other constituencies represented on the task force or transition committee. On this issue of lack of feedback, Mclink (2001) observed as follows:

Staff at institutions complained of inadequate and often distorted information about the implications of the reforms on their future. Industry representatives felt the planned introduction of the levy had been legislated without adequate consultation. What seems clear is that those who received information by virtue of their positions did not always disseminate it effectively to others below them or to those they represented.

### 3.3. Thematic studies

The Ministry, through the Vocational Education and Entrepreneurship Training (VEET) Project, commissioned nine studies to get in-depth understanding of the themes of the revised policy. These themes were as follows:

- a) Management, Organization and Structure of TEVET;
- b) Financing TEVET
- c) Training Needs Assessment
- d) Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training (TEVET) Systems
- e) Informal Sector Training System
- f) Entrepreneurship Development
- g) Policy and Legal Environment
- h) Audit of Training Institutions
- i) Information, Library and Document Systems

The results of the studies were subjected to regional and national debates in order to come up with generally acceptable strategies for implementing the revised policy.

#### 3.4. Study Visits

Some study visits were made to the following countries:

- a) Tanzania
- b) Mauritius
- c) Zimbabwe
- d) Denmark



Part of the Zambian delegation visiting Denmark in 2000. Front row (left to right: Professor Richard Siachiwena, Dr. Eustacio Kazonga, and Mr. Niels Lauridsen. Back row: Dr. Joseph Mukuni and Ms. Josephine Mapoma.

### 3.5. Piloting

There were two new ideas in the TEVET Strategy Paper that needed to be piloted before replication in the entire public TEVET system. Consequently, in September 1997, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training, with the support of the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), began implementing a Skills Training and Entrepreneurship Development (STED) project with the following objectives:

Models developed, **tested** and documented for:

- a) financially viable training institutions, managed by management boards, responding to the manpower requirements of the labour market, leading to improvement in relevance and quality of training programmes; enhanced employment opportunities for graduates; and improved performance of manufacturers in the areas;
- b) environments which promote entrepreneurship development and an increased level of production activities in the small scale and micro-enterprises, leading to increased employment opportunities and income generation outside the well-established industries.

In 1998, with the help of the Royal Netherlands Government, the Ministry began another pilot project called Entrepreneurship and Informal Sector Training Project (EISTP) with the following aims to supplement the STED project:

- a) developing and **testing** methods for the support and monitoring of operations of Non-Formal Training Institutions (NFTIs) in the two geographical areas of Lusaka and Ndola;
- b) identifying and **testing** methods for entrepreneurship development through the established Entrepreneurship Development Centres (EDCs) for provision of advisory services and human resource development.

Two institutions (Northern Technical College and Lusaka Trades Training Institute) were selected to pilot management boards and Entrepreneurship Development Centres.

The Ministry had intended to gain lessons from Northern Technical College and Lusaka Trades Training Institute before releasing to management boards another set of institutions such as Evelyn Hone College, Zambia Air Services Training Institute, Technical and Vocational Teachers College, Zambia Institute for Business and Industrial Practice and InService Technical and Education Centre. Some institutions in rural areas (such as Mongu TTI, Kaoma TTI, Solwezi TTI, Mwinilunga TTI, Chipata TTI and Ukwimi TTI) would be released last after strengthening them using the experience gained from the pilot.

This gradual release of institutions to management boards was not done, however. Nearly all institutions, weak and strong, were released at the same time (January 2000) because the hiving off of the institutions from civil service structures by 31<sup>st</sup> December 1999 was one of the benchmarks that the country had to meet in order to qualify for World Bank and IMF support. The Ministry only managed to retain two institutions (Ukwimi Trades Training Institute and Kaoma Trades Training Institute).

The idea of piloting did not therefore work out as planned.

### **3.6 Vocational Education and Entrepreneurship Training (VEET) Secretariat and Programme Coordinating Office.**

To service the Task Force, a VEET Secretariat was created by the Ministry in 1994 comprising initially two people on consultancy basis, as follows:

- Mr. Griffin Nyirongo, Executive Secretary (later replaced by Mr. Protassio Chipulu)
- Mr. Niels Lauridsen, Project Coordinator

In 1996, a Joint Mid-Term Review Mission of the VEET Policy Review Project recommended that the Ministry should:

Strengthen the Secretariat by appointing a full-time staff (of DTEVT/MSTVT) on terms which will enhance efficiency as well as sustainability of the project. The officer will ensure the continuity by taking over the running of the Secretariat in subsequent Phase III of the Policy Review during which a 5-year plan will be implemented.

It was intended that after the reform process, the Secretariat should be fully institutionalized in the appropriate section of MSTVT. Consequently, the Permanent Secretary, Mrs. Grace Mulapesi, with the approval of the Teaching Service Commission appointed, on consultancy

terms, Mr. Joseph Mukuni who was Principal at Solwezi TTI and had been on the Task Force from inception. That brought to three the number of consultancy staff at the Secretariat.

The three were supported by an accountant, two secretaries, a driver and an office messenger.

The Secretariat's role was to carry out day-to-day activities of the Task Force and, later, the Transition Committee. The Secretariat also offered secretarial services incidental to the VEET Project. In addition to the Secretariat staff mentioned above, the VEET project was supported by two area advisors recruited from Denmark. These were Mr. Erick Lageforges and Mr. Samir Mali.



Left to right: Dr. Joseph Mukuni, Mr. Samir Mali, and Mr. Erick Lageforges at a VEET Project planning meeting in Ndola in 2000.

This idea of setting up a secretariat was well conceived as it ensured that the Ministry had the services of full-time officers who were not directly affected by the uncertainty of the future of the structures undergoing reform. Furthermore, adding the responsibility of coordinating the review project to existing structures of a structure that was undergoing reform would have resulted in overload of duties to the officers concerned. The idea of a secretariat was not, however, fully accepted by some people who felt that the VEET Secretariat was duplicating the functions of existing structures. This led to constant conflicts between the Secretariat and the Department for Technical Education and Vocational Training.

In the case of the TEVET Development Programme (TDP) that started in 2002, a structure similar to the VEET Secretariat was established. It was called the Programme Coordinating Office comprising the following positions:

- Programme Coordinator (Dr. Joseph Mukuni)
- Monitoring and Evaluation Manager (Mrs. Mpongwe Ndebele-Shawa)
- Finance Manager (Mr. Mdaniso Sakala)
- Procurement Manager (Mr. Martin Siame)
- Accountant (Mrs. Emma Hamweetwa)
- Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (Mr. Wotela Kambidima)
- Procurement Officer (Mr. Henry Malikiyama)
- Support staff (x 5)

The PCO was established to strengthen the Ministry's capacity to coordinate the programme activities. However, the mid-term review of the programme recommended dissolution of the PCO and incorporation of the functions within the Ministry's structures but retaining the programme staff. This was thought to be the solution to the problem of perceived role conflicts between some permanent structures and the PCO.

### 3.7. Summary

One key feature of the methodology of the VEET Policy Review was the close involvement of the stakeholders, comprising institutions affected by, or affecting, the national policy on technical education and vocational training. Through this strategy, it was hoped that the end product of the reform process would be acceptable to the majority of those for whom the policy was intended. In other words, there would be ownership of the reform product and therefore more chances of good will in the implementation of the policy.

The other key feature of the reform methodology was the realization that there was need to have in-depth understanding of the components of the policy. Hence a number of studies were undertaken to ensure that decisions on the policy options were based on knowledge. This quest for knowledge-based decision-making was also the motivation for the study visits made to other countries.

A third key feature was the piloting of new concepts. The concept of autonomous governance structures was tried in at least two institutions, although there was no opportunity to draw some lessons from the two institutions before putting the other institutions under management boards.

The fourth key feature of the reform methodology was the use of a stand-alone Secretariat. It was necessary to establish a team of consultants dedicated on full time -basis to the coordination of the review project. However, in the eyes of some people, the Secretariat was seen as a parallel structure usurping the functions of legitimate structures.

### ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE TEVET REFORMS

“Success is relative. It is what we can make of the mess we have made of things.” T. S. Eliot

#### 4.1. INTRODUCTION

The fear of what happened to Dag Hammarskjold Stadium in Ndola perhaps need not have affected any one when reflecting on the possible consequences of reviewing the TEVT Policy of 1969 and repealing the TEVT Act of 1972. A few years ago, Zambia decided to build a modern stadium to replace the Dag Hammarskjold Stadium in Ndola. It was therefore decided to demolish the old stadium to pave way for a new one. However, after demolishing the old stadium, it was not possible to build a new one for decades.

In the case of the TEVET reforms, the key desired outputs of the reform process were achieved and could be listed as follows:

- Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Policy, 1996
- Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Strategy Paper, 1997
- Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Act, 1998
- Creation of TEVETA, 1999
- Creation of management boards, 2000
- Establishment of TEVET Fund, 2005

Other fruits of the revised policy were not yet evident by 2007. These included the establishment of the proposed training levy.

#### 4.2. Outputs

##### 4.2.1. TEVET Policy

In 1996, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training issued a new policy document called the Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Policy. The TEVET Policy was developed with the following broad objectives in mind:

- i. to balance the supply of skilled labour at all levels with demands of the economy;
- ii. to act as a vehicle for improved productivity and income generation;
- iii. to be an instrument for the minimization of inequalities among the people.

The TEVET Policy has the following key elements:

- i. Policy Framework

The policy framework is one in which institutional and non-institutional training, both inside and outside government establishment will be recognized, encouraged and coordinated.

ii. Entrepreneurship Development, Self-employment and the Informal Sector

The TEVET Policy seeks to encourage and foster informal sector training systems by strengthening links between the sector and TEVET training institutions.

iii. Levels and Objectives of Training

The policy provides for alternative channels of progression on the basis of credits obtained from completed lower training levels. To this effect the new system will give institutions the flexibility to develop programmes that meet the needs of their localities and take into account the geo-economy of the areas in which they are located.

iv. Organization and Management

Present management systems of TEVET will be strengthened to meet the broader training needs. The new system must conform to the liberal economic environment and increased private sector participation in various spheres of the economy.

v. Infrastructure, Equipment and Other Requisites

In view of the current economic constraints which do not allow for the immediate construction of new facilities, the TEVET system will, in the short run, support rehabilitation of infrastructure and optimize their use.

To facilitate the process of infrastructure development, there will be a system of incentives for industries and institutions that support or provide TEVET.

vi. Curriculum Development

The policy provides for the creation of an environment in which the development and review of the curricula is end-user driven through increased co-ordination between end-users and training institutions.

vii. Monitoring and Follow-up

The TEVET Policy will provide for the establishment of a continuous internal and external evaluation system based on an effective tracer mechanism.

viii. Financing

The greater part of the burden of the cost of training will be shifted to the beneficiaries including industry, trainees and informal sector.

The policy will ensure that all institutions and persons providing TEVET – whether formal or informal training- will have equal access to training funds, provided that they deliver training in an acceptable manner.

ix. Human Resources

The policy provides for employment of staff who are knowledgeable, skilled and well-motivated. To achieve this, a coherent staff development programme will be established to improve the skills of the lecturing and management staff through specialized and short courses. In addition, the working environment, remuneration and conditions of service will be improved.

#### 4.2.2. TEVET Strategy Paper

In March 1997, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training issued a Strategy Paper to guide the implementation of the policy. Each of the policy provisions had some strategies. The following are some of the highlights of the Strategy Paper.

At the national level, it was proposed that an autonomous National Training Board be created to carry out the following functions:

- i. advising the Minister responsible for vocational training, from time to time, upon all matters pertaining to technical education, vocational and entrepreneurship training and upon any question referred to it by the Minister;
- ii. facilitating necessary technical assistance to all the public and private training providers within the national training system;
- iii. contributing to improving the relevant delivery of TEVET in Zambia through the provision of high-quality support services to training organizations and providers in the public and private sectors;
- iv. facilitating operational level contacts with other government agencies involved in TEVET and to provide assistance to the large, medium and small-scale enterprises and informal sector;
- v. setting up sub-committees and/or working groups to investigate and report on specific issues, and
- vi. initiating projects/studies to be carried out and identifying sources of funding for such projects.

#### Institutional Management Boards

Institutions would be given autonomy through the creation of management boards that would be responsible for governing the institutions, enabling them to make decisions at the source of training needs without requiring to refer to a national body for authority to do what is in the interest of the institution.

The generic structure of training institution would change to allow for the Principal to report to the Management Board instead of reporting to the national head office.

The functions of the management boards would be as follows:

- i. to administer the affairs of the institution; ii. to provide TEVET to persons enrolled in the institution;
- iii. to provide training for staff;
- iv. to ensure that standards prescribed by the Minister are maintained by the institution; and
- v. to do all such things as the management board may think necessary to promote TEVET;

Board members would be appointed by the Minister by statutory instrument.

Whereas management boards would have the power to appoint the Principal, Vice Principal and other staff, the existing staff in training institutions may opt to be employees of the management boards or choose to be public officers seconded to the boards.

As chief executive of the training institution, the Principal would be responsible for the day to day running of the institution, and would be the secretary of the Board, but would have no vote during Board meetings.

### Proposed Strategies for Financing of TEVET

A combination of sources would be established for financing TEVET. This would take into account government budgetary allocation, company pay roll levy, and individuals i.e trainees.

Below is the proposed list of sources and schemes identified in the Strategy Paper:


	SOURCE	SCHEME
1.	Students	User fees
2.	Employers	Pay roll levy
3.	Government	Budgetary allocations
4.	Training institutions	Income Generating Activities
5.	Donors	Grants, loans, etc

Apart from students' fees, money from institutional income generating activities, and donations made direct to institutions, all funds would be pooled under the NTB which shall be the sole custodian of TEVET funds.

Institutions would have to apply to NTB for funds to supplement their direct income in order to meet their operational budgets. NTB funds would also be made accessible to other TEVET providers outside MSTVT, so the demand for NTB funds would be very high. The major financial objective of institutions would therefore be expected to be ability to be selfsustaining through institutional initiatives.

The flow of TEVET funds may be expressed diagrammatically as follows:

**Figure 1: Proposed Flow of Training Funds**



#### 4.2.3. Tevet Act, Number 13 Of 1998

In 1998, the Ministry facilitated the enactment of the TEVET Act, which made legal provisions for the following:

- The dissolution of the Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training;
- The establishment of management boards;
- The establishment of the TEVET Authority

It had been intended that the Act should have also made provisions for the establishment of the TEVET Fund and the TEVET Levy. These provisions that were in the draft bill were edited out by legal experts on grounds that only the Minister responsible for Finance was competent to institute a levy. This would be done in a separate Act.

Despite the deletion, from the TEVET Bill, of the provisions for instituting the levy, the TEVET Act maintained the levy as one of the sources for financing TEVETA and institutions, provided the Minister responsible for Finance made legal provisions for the establishment of such a levy.

#### 4.2.4. Tevet Fund

As one of the key outputs of the TEVET Development Programme, the TEVET Fund was established through the TEVET (amendment) Act (number 11 of 2005), which provided for the Fund to be managed by TEVETA. According to the Act, the Fund shall consist of:

- a) such monies as may be appropriated by Parliament for purposes of the TEVET

- Fund;
- b) such monies as may be paid to the Fund by way of loans, grants or donations;
  - c) such percentage of the registration, examination, assessment and other fees payable to TEVETA as the Minister may determine in consultation with the Authority;
  - d) subject to the approval of the Minister responsible for finance, such monies as may be paid to the Fund from any levy which may be imposed and collected for purposes of TEVET.

In the initial year of the Fund, its main source of financing was the World Bank and the Royal Netherlands Embassy as part of the five-year TEVET Development Programme which began in 2002. It had been hoped that by 2004 (which was the second year of the TEVET Development Programme) the payroll levy would have been in place. However, up till 2007, employers were still asking Government to reconsider the proposed nature of the levy.

Ironically, the training levy, had been provided for in the 1969 Technical Education and Vocational Training policy as well as the TEVT Act of 1972 which was repealed through the 1998 TEVET Act. This seemed to be the proverbial case of throwing away the baby with the bath water. Stakeholders (including employers and trade unions) in the TEVET reforms upheld in 1997 through the TEVET Strategy Paper the need for a training levy as a sure way of sustaining a vibrant demand-responsive TEVET.

#### 4.2.5 ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE TEVET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

The achievements<sup>2</sup> shown below have been made from inception of the TDP to 2006. They are presented in accordance with the four development indicators of the programme, namely:

- (a) **Demand Responsiveness** - Establishment of a training system that is responsive to the demands of both the formal and informal sectors of the economy;
- (b) **Quality** - Improvement in the quality of training;
- (c) **Equity** - Assurance of equity (gender, disability and vulnerability) in the delivery of training;
- (d) **Sustainability** - Development of mechanisms for assurance of financial sustainability of the training system.

##### 4.2.5.1 Demand responsiveness

- Since 2003, a Sector Skills Development Strategy has been developed and implemented, which guides the skills training and other TEVET Sector activities aimed at the formal and informal sectors;
- The 2004 tracer study found that over 70% of TEVET graduates find employment within 6 months of graduation, indicating that TEVET institutions are increasingly offering demand driven training;
- In response to market demand, elaborate systems for curricula review involving relevant sectors of industry and other stakeholders have been implemented. The

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<sup>2</sup> As presented in MSTVT (2007): "TEVET Development Programme Annual Progress Report for 2006"

result has been that 72% of all national courses now use curricula that have been reviewed and updated;

- The number of new National training courses that have been introduced into the TEVET system has increased from two (2) courses in 2002 to 17 by 2005, indicating an increasing demand from various stakeholders for new courses to be introduced;
- Fifteen networking arrangements linking informal sector networks has been established in four out of Zambia's nine Provinces.

#### 4.2.5.2 Quality

- A grading system for training providers has been developed and implemented since 2002. This has assisted in structuring the TEVET sector and is also part of the eligibility criteria for accessing the TEVET Fund. The combined effect has been a grading system which act as an incentive for training institutions to seek to improve on their delivery of training;
- An improvement in the provision of training has been visible during 2003-2005 through the migration of training providers to higher grades. Grade 1 being the highest grade. Thus, 5.1% of institutions in Grade 2 migrated to Grade 1, while 2% of institutions in Grade 3 migrated to Grade 2.

Table 1 below shows the increase in the number of training institutions inspected and registered from 2002.

	2002		2003		2004		2005		2006	
Applications for registration	274		367		479		430		550	
Institutions inspected	258	94%	349	95%	448	94%	429	99%	515	94%
Institutions registered	231	84%	254	69%	314	70%	319	74%	351	64%

Table 1: The number of training institutions inspected and registered from 2002.

- More than 400 managerial and teaching staff have undergone various types of skills upgrading courses, i.e. Financial Management, Procurement, Human Resources Management and Strategic Planning, as well as technical and pedagogical skills;
- 300 instructors from registered training providers have been trained in delivering the Entrepreneurship curriculum;
- Distance Vocational Training is being piloted at three training institutions in two disciplines and at three different levels.

Course Level	Marketing	Human Resource
Level 1 Certificate	✓	✓

Level 2 Advanced	✓	✓
Level 3 Diploma	✓	

Table 2: Disciplines and levels for the piloting of distance vocational training

- Continuous Assessment of learners is being piloted at four training institutions contributing towards improved delivery and quality of training;
- More than 60 Trade Testers have been trained. Trade Testing procedures are being streamlined to ensure consistency and uniformity in testing procedures for various trades across many testing centres;
- Renovation of buildings and facilities has been made in selected public training institutions; the initial target set was to rehabilitate 60% of the 59<sup>3</sup> TEVET public institutions. In total, 13 training institutions have undergone rehabilitation representing 37% of the Public Institutions targeted; This has improved the training environment in the TEVET Institutions;
- Tools and equipment have been provided to 57 training institutions at a cost of approximately US\$4.7 million. The lack of tools and equipment had constrained practical training.

#### 4.2. 5..3 Equity

- The number of socially disadvantaged learners has almost doubled from 8.5% in 2003 to an estimated 15% in 2006;
- At programme inception, 44% of the graduates were female. The challenge in this indicator has therefore been to ensure that the TEVET sector maintains and improves its level of female participation. In commercial courses the gender balance has improved to close to a 50:50 ratio, while a slight improvement in the technical courses to an 88:12 male: female ratio has been noted.
- Sector policies on HIV/AIDS, Gender and Disabilities have been developed and disseminated to selected registered training institutions; 405 Institutional Managers have been oriented in developing HIV/AIDS institutional policies and Guidelines, representing an orientation of 64% of the managers in TEVET institutions; and 480 HIV/AIDS Focal point persons and peer educators have been trained, operating in 240 training institutions.

#### 4.2.5.4 Sustainability

The table below shows an upwards trend in the annual disbursement although Government funding has tended to remain at 0.4% of the discretionary budget. From 2007, Government will raise the TEVET disbursements towards the 0.8% of the discretionary budget.

All figures in ZMK	2002	2003	2004
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<sup>3</sup> The data covers the ministries of Community Development & Social Services, Education, Tourism Environment & Natural Resources and MSTVT for training institutions that offer courses of one year duration or longer..

GRZ Budgeted	3,879,407,696,925	6,931,510,010,142	5,614,944,249,448
GRZ Actual Disbursed	3,106,482,490,625	4,755,054,232,934	4,838,721,870,314
TEVET Sector Budget	21,761,892,000	17,594,560,308	21,212,703,348
TEVET Sector funds Disbursed	14,415,184,802	16,782,556,631	20,184,614,101

Table 3: Annual disbursements from 2002 to 2004

- Of the 51 Public training institutions that responded, 13 reported that they are able to recover at least 25% of their recurrent costs by fees from trainees.
- The TEVET Fund was established in 2005 and became operational in 2006. Through its four windows, the fund contributes to attaining all the four development objectives of the program;
- The TEVET Fund has entered into 39 contracts with 22 training providers comprising both public and privately owned institutions. The table below summarizes the results of the Funds' work:

TEVET Fund Achievements by 30 September 2006										
TEVET Fund Window	Total contract values (ZMK)	Total funds disbursed (ZMK)	Funds disbursed	No contracts	No. Institutional/ companies	No subjects	No learners targeted	Actual no learners	Achievement	
W1: Pre-Employment training	3,548,683,567	1,350,360,924	38.1%	15	15	16	519	501	96.5%	
W2: In-Service training	770,150,000	312,775,000	40.6%	7	4	2	152	151	99.3%	
W3: SME/Informal Sector	2,245,177,931	1,125,264,743	50.1%	12	12	4	952	885	90.9%	
W4: Infrastructure/HRD	53,797,500	53,797,500	100.0%	5	5	N/A				
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,817,788,998</b>	<b>2,842,198,167</b>	<b>42.9%</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>1,623</b>	<b>1,517</b>	<b>93.5%</b>	

Table 4: Achievements of TEVET Fund by 2006

As indicated in the table the Fund has had good success in reaching the number of students targeted in each Window, thus assisting in promoting skills training;

### 4.3. Summary


Between 1994 and 2007, the TEVET reforms achieved a number of successes which included the following:

- The TEVET Policy of 1996, which recognized the need to reach out to the informal sector and the need to make skills development more relevant to socio-economic development than had been the case before then;
- The TEVET Strategy Paper of 1997, which gave detail to the policy by providing strategies for each policy objective. The document also provided implementation charts and a broad budget for the initial five years of the implementation phase;

- The TEVET Act of 1998, which created the necessary legal framework for the creation of TEVETA and the introduction of management boards in order to institutionalize the involvement of stakeholders in the management of TEVET at national and institutional level.

The reform process, however, failed to achieve one of its important targets, i.e. the introduction of a training levy by the second year of the five-year TEVET Development Programme. This target was crucial because it held the key for the sustainability of all the gains of the reform.

It must be noted, however, that failure to retain provisions for a training levy in the statutes was not a matter of resistance on the part of employers. It was a question of appropriate legislative style by legal experts at the time.



**Left to right: Deputy Minister Kazala-Laski, Permanent Secretary Paul Zambezi, Mrs. Mpongwe Shawa, Mrs. Sarah Kaulule, and Mr. Henry Malikiyama, inspecting a consignment of computers purchased through the TDP in 2004.**

### CHALLENGES OF THE TEVET REFORMS

*“A rattlesnake that doesn't bite teaches you nothing.”* Jessamyn West

#### 5.1. Introduction

The TEVET reforms have not been without challenges. Some of them were:

- Scope of change (policy, regulation, delivery, funding, etc.)
- Un-clarified roles
- Multiplicity of donors
- Financial burden
- High rate of turnover of TEVET leaders
- Resistance to change

#### 5.2. Scope of Change

When in 1994, the then Minister responsible for vocational education and training (Hon Gabriel Maka) looked at what needed to be changed first and foremost, he thought of the governance of institutions. He therefore set out to develop guidelines for management boards. However, when he appointed a national task force to facilitate stakeholder participation, he probably did not expect that they would treat as top priority all the aspects of technical education, to be tackled all at once. His predecessor, Hon Kabunda Kayongo advised that before attempting to modify TEVET at the centre, the focus of the reform should be at training provider level.

Oblivious to that ministerial counsel, the reform process went about dismantling the DTEVT at the same time that management boards were being introduced; changing systems of TEVET delivery while reviewing the regulatory framework for TEVET; increasing TEVET expenditures while formulating new funding modalities; re-engineering the TEVET system before designing any monitoring and evaluation system suitable for the new order of TEVET.

The scope of the reform seemed too broad, considering the fact that at the same time as the TEVET reforms, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training was itself undergoing restructuring as part of the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP). One result of the broadened scope was that the Ministry, which ought to have owned the reform, was not quite able to monitor the system. Monitoring instruments were not developed on time, and the people that could have been used to monitor the changes were themselves out-placed from the system by the reform. The justification for this state of affairs was that you cannot expect fish to drain its own pond.

### 5.3. Un-Clarified Roles

As new structures emerged from the reform process, it did not seem clear to those outside the reform drawing room what the roles of the structures were and how they differed. For example, the difference between the role of TEVETA and that of the Ministry did not seem clear to some people. Some donors had decried the establishment of the new department of Vocational Education and Training at MSTVT as they saw it as a source of conflict with TEVETA. This perception seemed to have been aggravated by the comparison between TEVETA and Tanzania's Vocational Education and Training Authority (VETA) which in addition to being a regulator of training standards, it was also the "owner" of public training institutions the same way that DTEVT used to be in Zambia.

The issue of clarity of roles was so crucial during the appraisal of the TEVET Development Programme that it not only enjoyed prominence on the agenda of several meetings between MSTVT and donors but also had to be included in the World Bank's Project Appraisal Document (PAD). A section of the PAD listed the roles of MSTVT, TEVETA and management boards.

The success of the TEVET Development Programme was seriously affected by the perceived conflict of roles between TEVETA and the MSTVT in general and the Programme Coordinating Office (PCO) in particular. To save the programme from premature closure, a Mid-term Review proposed the dissolution of the PCO and the redistribution of component coordination functions between TEVETA and MSTVT.

Within the Ministry itself, it was not clear to many what the role difference was between the Department of VET and the Department of Planning and Development concerning monitoring and evaluation of the TEVET Policy.

### 5.4. Multiplicity of Donors

In commenting on the Vocational Education and Entrepreneurship Training project, a Danida-supported Review Mission noted as follows: "Donors supporting the VET sector in Zambia have had different and, at times, conflicting objectives which have seriously hampered the reform process."

During the first and second phases of the reforms, the Ministry had no structure for coordinating donor participation. However, in the third phase, the problems associated with coordination of multiple donors were minimized by the following measures:

- The preparation of a Programme Implementation Plan (PIP) by the host ministry, in which the TEVET investment priorities of Government were outlined;
- The establishment of a Programme Steering Committee (PSC) bringing together all the donors supporting TEVET, to make joint decisions on the programme. The PSC was chaired by the Permanent Secretary of MSTVT; this placed the leadership of the programme in the hands of Government.

However, these measures were not sufficient to protect the TDP from all the problems associated with multiple donors. Despite having a common document of priorities and management guidelines, some donors preferred to do things their own way (perhaps by force

of cultural inclinations) while still championing a common front. Some donors, for example, preferred direct support to the beneficiary institutions instead of putting their contribution in the common pool. Furthermore, nearly every donor demanded a donor-specific reporting format. As a result, preparation of unified progress reports became a challenge.

At one point, the attempt by the host ministry to reassert its leadership by demanding timely reports on the flow of funds outside the pool led to a very serious conflict with one donor (who suspended aid as a result of this). The conflict with one donor led to a dented relationship with the rest of the donors.

## 5.5. Financial Burden

TEVET reforms attracted a lot of external financing right from the start in 1994. When in 1999 it was decided to retire all TEVET staff at headquarters and in Institutions, the World Bank made available sufficient resources to pay off the pension bills.

However, up till 2007, some institutions were facing court cases for failing to pay the terminal benefits for staff whose first term of contracts under management boards ended a year after introduction of management boards. The reform had not anticipated the financial burden arising from the decision to put staff on short employment contracts.

Apart from the human resource-related outstanding bills in institutions, the other serious financial challenge was the financing of TEVETA salaries. In 2000, one donor offered to stand in the financial gap by making available some resources to cover operating costs of TEVETA.

Table 5 shows the role played by donors in supporting TEVETA's budget.

Source of Income	K'Billion						
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Government	0.63	0.43	0.60	0.84	0.95	1.02	13.10
Total Donor	1.07	1.88	3.60	8.45	11.99	9.40	18.69
Internal Generation	0.21	0.12	0.42	0.22	0.36	0.69	2.60
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.91</b>	<b>2.43</b>	<b>4.62</b>	<b>9.51</b>	<b>13.30</b>	<b>11.11</b>	<b>34.39</b>
<b>Percentage of Donor Support</b>	<b>56.0</b>	<b>77.4</b>	<b>77.9</b>	<b>88.9</b>	<b>90.2</b>	<b>84.6</b>	<b>54.3</b>

Table 5: Proportion of Donor Support to the Budgets of TEVETA (2001 – 2007)

The challenge facing both Government and donors was how the financial burden carried by donors in supporting the operations of TEVETA would be sustained after donor support. This challenge featured prominently on the list of triggers for continued donor support.

The list of prior actions for continued donor funding also included the issue of the introduction of the levy, which was seen as a sustainable source of financing for both TEVETA and the sub-sector in general.

## 5.6. High Rate Of Turn-Over Of Tevet Leaders

The TEVET reforms were characterized by a high rate of turnover of ministers and permanent secretaries. Table 6 shows the leaders at different stages of the reforms:

Reform Stage	Period	Ministers	Permanent Secretaries
1. Conceptualization of policy review project	1994	Hon Gabriel Maka, MP	Mrs. Grace Mulapesi
2. Issuance of TEVET Policy	1996	Hon Kabunda Kayongo, MP	Ms. Josephine Mapoma
3. Preparation of TEVET Bill	1997	Hon Enoch Kavindele, MP	Ms. Josephine Mapoma
4. Enactment of TEVET Bill	1998	Hon Prof. Lawrence Shimba, MP (died in office)	Ms. Josephine Mapoma
5. Appointment of TEVETA Board	1999	Hon. Alfeyo Hambayi, MP (died in office)	Ms. Josephine Mapoma
6. Appointment of management board members	2000	Hon Abel Chambeshi, MP	Ms. Josephine Mapoma
7. Preparation of TEVET Development Programme	2000	Hon Abel Chambeshi, MP	Ms. Josephine Mapoma
8. Appraisal of TDP	2001	Hon Abel Chambeshi, MP	Ms. Josephine Mapoma
9. Negotiation of TDP	2001	Hon Valentine Kayope, MP	Mr. Romance Sampa
10. Launch of TDP	2002	Hon Valentine Kayope, MP	Mrs. Eva Jhala
11. Mid-term Review of TDP	2004	Hon Abel Chambeshi, MP	Ms. Josephine Mapoma
12. Implementation of restructured TDP	2004-2005	Hon Abel Chambeshi, MP Hon Bates Namuyamba, MP, Hon Kabinga Pande, MP, Hon Judith Kapijimpanga, MP	Mr. Geoffrey Mukala; Dr. Paul Zambezi
13. Negotiating extension of TDP	2006	Hon Brig Gen Dr Brian Chituwo, MP	Dr. Paul Zambezi
14. Implementation of extended TDP	2007	Hon Brig Gen Dr Brian Chituwo, MP; Hon Peter Daka, MP	Dr. Paul Zambezi

Table 6: TEVET leaders from 1994 to 2007

As can be seen from the table, the rate of turn-over of leaders was very high and posed a challenge to effective implementation of the reforms, mainly in terms of achieving the targets on time. Generally, each successive minister or permanent secretary continued on the path set

by their predecessors. The effect of the change was more on the time than the direction to be taken.



Ministry Bidding Farewell to Permanent Secretary Josephine Mapoma, 2001. She was the longest serving Permanent Secretary at MSTVT (1996-2001).

### 5.7. Resistance to Change

One of the apparent assumptions of the reform was that the people affected by the reforms were going to be cooperative in the change process. This assumption proved invalid as was noted by nearly all the evaluation missions. The 2002 Country Report by DANIDA, for example stated:

The project was based on the spirit of cooperation. However, even before the key organizational and management changes began to be implemented, powerful stakeholders affected by the reform process realized that their jobs and other interests were seriously threatened. More should have been done, therefore, to anticipate these problems and this should have been explicitly incorporated into the project design.

Another report also noted that: “Some resentment towards the reform was found due to future employment insecurity and the lack of funds for terminal benefits and pensions.”<sup>4</sup> Mclink (2001) similarly observed that:

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<sup>4</sup> DANIDA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (March 1999): “Joint Mid-term Review of the Pilot Project for Skills

Attitudes to the project were less than positive and some staff actively conspired to frustrate the activities. Unfortunately, many were able to hide their technical and administrative inadequacies behind such complaints. The net effect was to slow down the project and to reduce the efficiency of interventions.

The amount of resistance to change was overwhelming among staff and students in institutions. Up till 2007, some were still unconvinced that the devolution of college governance to management boards was a good idea. They would have preferred a centralized approach to the governance of institutions. It is worth noting, however, that no amount of resistance could have reversed or derailed the train of the TEVET reforms. The only net effect, as observed by Mclink (op cit.) was to slow down the process and make it less efficient.

## 5.8. Summary

The TEVET reforms faced a number of challenges from inception in 1994 to 2007. The Ministry has learnt many lessons from these challenges. Key among these challenges were:

- **Scope of change:** The Ministry attempted to change too many things at the same time making it hard to monitor the changes as they unfolded;
- **Un-clarified roles:** The Ministry faced a lot of conflicts within its structures arising from un-clarified roles among the structures. Some role conflicts had an adverse effect on the success of the reform programme;
- **Multiplicity of donors:** Lack of complete harmonization among donors posed a challenge to the Ministry despite the strategies designed to minimize the impact of having more than one donor;
- **Financial burden:** Up till 2007, institutions governed by management boards were still grappling with debts arising from the reform process. Paramount among these debts was the payment of terminal benefits for staff whose contracts ended in 2001.
- **High rate of turnover of TEVET leaders:** The reforms were seriously affected by the high rate of staff turn-over. However, changes in key decision makers did not, fortunately, lead to reversal of gains made during the reform. Successive leaders continued on the same agreed reform path. The changes mainly affected the timely achievement of set targets.
- **Resistance to Change:** From inception of the reform process, some of the people affected by the changes were opposed to some of the interventions.

These challenges only served as learning points for the Ministry. They did not derail the reform.



The following people from the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training provided logistical support to the Technical Committee:

- a. Mrs. Sarah S. Kaulule
- b. Mrs. Alice M. Kombe
- c. Mr. Emmanuel K. Lutelo
- d. Mr. Gabriel S. Konayuma
- e. Mr. Dominic Kasosa
- f. Ms. Precious Lisulo
- g. Mrs. Benita M. Malupande

## 6.2. Methodology

In carrying out the terms of reference, the Technical Committee used a participative, interactive and reiterative approach in which a selected number of stakeholders were engaged in the information gathering process. In order to ensure stakeholders' ownership of the review product, the Committee promoted stakeholder participation and dialogue in the review process.

The review process consisted of the following phases:

- a) Desk work: A review of literature was conducted to collect data from existing policies, strategies and laws relating to TEVET and other documents that are relevant to TEVET. Desk work also involved the collection, collation, analysis and evaluation of documentary and other collected data and information;
- b) International best practices: In addition to reviewing the literature on international best practices relating to TEVET, the committee made a study visit to the Republic of Tanzania, which was one of the countries that had served as a vocational education and training reform model in the Southern African region;
- c) Field work: The Committee made field visits to all the nine provinces to collect data from, and disseminate information to, various stakeholders on the TEVET System, policies, strategies and laws. The stakeholder groups comprised Faith-based institutions, Employers, TEVET students, TEVET graduates, Training Providers, Professional Associations, Sector ministries, Cooperating Partners, Provincial and District leadership, Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Authority and Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training. During the field visits, data was collected through surveys, interviews, workshops, document analysis, focus group discussions, and observations. In addition to taking notes, minutes of meetings, and collecting survey instruments, the Committee also took photographs of various infrastructure, lectures, students and surroundings of the institutions visited as well as the various stakeholders that participated in the research process.
- d) Synthesis: Having collected and analyzed data collected from the literature, the visit to the Republic of Tanzania, and local field visits, the Technical Committee compiled a report synthesizing all the data and making recommendations on what ought to be done in view of the findings of the review process.

### 6.3. Results

An analysis of the data revealed some successes and challenges in the implementation of TEVET reforms. Some of the successes and challenges identified by the Committee are as follows:

- a. Successes: There was an increase in public financing of the TEVET Sector from 0.3% to 0.8% of the discretionary funding. Generally, there were also some investments in the private sector.

Successes relating to institutional development included the following:

- Establishment of Technical Educational, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Authority (TEVETA) to regulate training;
  - Establishment of management boards to manage public training institutions under MSTVT;
  - Establishment of the TEVET fund to finance both public and private institutions
  - Government recognized the need for effective monitoring and evaluation of TEVET, and established the Department of Vocational Education and Training (DVET) in the Ministry Headquarters.
  - Construction of campuses at Chipata, Solwezi, Mongu, Kaoma, Ukwimi;
  - Establishment of specialized training institutions i.e. Gemstone Processing and Lapidary Training Centre in Ndola and Thorn Part Construction Training Centre in Lusaka;
  - Establishment of the only two Vocational Training Centers in the country to provide training to Grade 9 school leavers, 'never beens', retirees and retrenches;
  - Rehabilitation of the infrastructure in the institutions;
  - Provision of tools and equipment to both public and private training institutions;
  - Introduction of the graduate empowerment scheme through the provision of tool kits;
  - Increase in the number of registered private training providers;
  - Increased technical and financial support by cooperating partners
  - Development of sector polices i.e. Gender, Disability, HIV/AIDS, Maintenance;
  - Designing of TEVET Qualification Framework;
  - Tracer Study to determine employability of graduates;
  - Establishment of sector training advisory committees; and
  - Establishment of the bursary scheme for vulnerable groups.
- b. Challenges: In spite of the achievements outlined above, there were some challenges and failures at all the levels of the TEVET system in policy regulation and training provision. The 1998 Act was enacted to give legal effect to the 1996 Policy and 1997 Strategy. To some extent, this Act was successful in that the structures of TEVET as envisaged were established. However, a number of challenges were identified mainly in relation to the roles and responsible of the core regulatory institutions, that is, TEVETA and the MSTVT and the reporting channels within the TEVET structure.

There appeared to be some ambiguity in the roles and functions of the Ministry and TEVETA particularly with reference to monitoring of TEVET activities.

Other challenges and failures identified by the Committee included the following:

- The big paradigm shift from a Government controlled and run TEVET sector was not well planned and did not have the necessary human, financial and material support to launch it and ensure its effective and sustainable operation.
- Public skills training institutions are spread across different Ministries. In some of these Ministries, skills training activities are not given due importance, leading to under-funding and consequently poor standards in TEVET delivery.
- Some of the functions given to TEVETA as the regulator should not have been within its mandate. Such functions include examinations, fund management and entrepreneurship training.
- Non-MSTVT Institutions' reporting lines to and from MSTVT were not very clear. This created disharmony among stakeholders, resulting in inefficient policy implementation and service delivery. Furthermore, this has led to misunderstanding and misinterpretation of policy objectives.
- There is a proliferation of sub-standard private training institutions operating without registration.
- There is no representation of MSTVT in the provinces whilst other Ministries have. The result has been lack of effective participation by the Provincial Administration in the implementation of TEVET Policy.
- Training providers have had a high rate of staff turn-over due to unattractive salaries and other conditions of service. Furthermore, most Management Boards have no capacity to recruit and retain qualified staff due to financial constraints. This has resulted in public primary school teachers earning higher salaries than lecturers in some MSTVT training institutions. The other effect of financial constraints is that Management Boards have not been able to pay terminal benefits resulting in large outstanding bills.
- Too few public Vocational Training Centres compared to great numbers of youths below Grade 12 requiring skills training. The Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training has only two Vocational Training Centres out of twenty-four training institutions;
- Tendency of Trades Training Institute to shift their focus from technical training programmes to business studies, which are more profitable to run than technical ones; and
- Too few technical training programmes at advanced certificate and diploma levels despite the demand for graduates of such programmes in industry and commerce. Many programmes that used to be offered by the former Zambia Institute of Technology (ZIT) are no longer being offered in Zambia.
- Lack of continuous training for trainers to make them remain abreast with the changing technology;

- Non replacement of teaching aids with modern ones;
- Mismatch between equipment used in training and that found in Commerce and Industry
- Lack of accreditation of staff at training institutions.
- Training institutions do not have training packages that could be delivered to informal sector operators with little disruption of their work. Informal sector operators do not seem to be consulted in the identification of their own training needs or packaging of courses. Institutions are not flexible and innovative enough to offer mobile training sessions to informal sector operators;
- Generally, infrastructure in most of the public training institutions remains dilapidated despite the on-going rehabilitation programme by the Government. This state of affairs has a negative impact on the quality of training. Furthermore, the abandonment and disuse of dilapidated facilities has tended to limit access to TEVET.

#### 6.4. Recommendations of the Technical Committee

The Technical Committee made a number of recommendations, including the following:

a) Legislative and Regulatory Framework: The TEVET Act should be revised to clarify the roles and functions of the core regulatory institutions, that is, TEVETA and the MSTVT and the reporting channels within the TEVET structure.

b) Human Resource Management and Development: In order to attract, recruit and retain qualified and experienced staff, it is recommended that terms and conditions of service of employees in public institutions should not be less favorable than those of employees in the civil service. To this effect, grants to institutions should be adequate to cover the institutional wage bills.

All Instructional staff must be encouraged to obtain a minimum qualification of Bachelor of Education (Technical and Vocational). In order to raise the qualifications of staff who are in disciplines that have no qualifications higher than crafts certificate level, programmes that end at craft level should be enhanced by creation of higher courses to levels of technician, technologist and bachelors at local colleges such as the amalgamated Luanshya institutions, Northern Technical College.

c) TEVET Financing: A training levy based on commodity consumption should be introduced. The levy should be collected by Zambia Revenue Authority. Furthermore, there is need for an independent institution to manage the Fund.

d) TEVET Governance arrangements: In order to enhance harmonization of policies and practices in the skills training sub-sector, and in order to rationalize public resources for skills training, it is recommended that:

- Skills training institutions currently under different ministries should be under the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training;
- To facilitate coordination of training programmes in provinces, there should be Provincial Management Boards that shall be responsible for all training institutions in a given province;
- There is, therefore, need for MSTVT to establish offices at Provincial Headquarters, to be headed by a Senior TEVET Officer for each province.

#### 6.5. Summary

Fourteen years after launching the TEVET reforms, the Government of the Republic of Zambia appointed an eleven member Technical Committee to evaluate the impact of the reforms. One key feature of the methodology used by the Committee was the involvement of

key stakeholders in assessing the successes and challenges of the reforms. Stakeholder involvement was at two levels. First, the composition of the Technical Committee reflected Government's intention to involve stakeholders in the evaluation process. The Committee comprised representatives of employers, private and public TEVET institutions, scholars, legal draftsmen, imminent citizens with expertise in TEVET, and representatives of Government. Second, the Technical Committee consulted stakeholder groups during the process of data collection. Stakeholder involvement in policy formulation and review is important, as Greene (1987) pointed out: "Meaningful participation in the evaluation process by individuals and groups who have a vested interest in the evaluation will enhance utilization of evaluation results" (p.379).

Another notable feature of the methodology used in the review process was the multiplicity of data sources and strategies such as interviews, focus group discussions, surveys, observations in the field, workshops, and scrutiny of primary and secondary documents. This approach ensured methodological triangulation as well as data triangulation. According to Oppermann (2000) these two types of triangulation can be defined as:

Methodological triangulation refers to using more than one research method in measuring the same object of interest, for example, using participant observation as well as questionnaires. Data triangulation refers to using the same approach for different sets of data in order to verify or falsify generalizable trends detected in one data set. (p142)

The Technical Committee identified a number of successes and challenges in the implementation of the TEVET reforms. The successes included the establishment of governance structures in TEVET (such as TEVETA and management boards for public training institutions) and a significant increase in funds allocated to the TEVET sector. The challenges included dilapidation of physical infrastructure, high rate of staff turnover, and inadequate human, financial, and material support to effective and sustainable implementation of the reforms.

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## About the Author



Dr. Joseph Mukuni is an assistant professor of career and technical education (CTE) in the school of education at Virginia Tech. He earned his Education Specialist degree as well as his Ph.D. in career and technical education at Virginia Tech. He also holds a master's degree in English Language Teaching from Aston University in Birmingham, UK.

Dr. Mukuni worked in Zambia's vocational education and training system for many years, starting as a lecturer in 1975 and rising through the ranks to the position of national Director, a post he held until his retirement from government service in 2008. One of his major achievements as Director was his lead role in the design, implementation and coordination of a \$60 million multi-donor funded investment program for the strengthening of vocational education in Zambia between 2000 and 2008. The donors for the technical education, vocational and entrepreneurship training development program (TDP) included the World Bank, the Royal Netherlands Government, the Royal Government of Denmark, GTZ, and the Zambian Government. The TDP was preceded by a vocational education and entrepreneurship training (VEET) policy reform project which was conducted from 1994 to 1999. During the VET policy reforms, Dr. Mukuni served as a project officer representing the Government at a three-man VEET project secretariat comprising representatives of donors, industry, and the Zambian Government.