pan, and China in 1945-50. The apparent stability of the multistate system we see today may be due in part to prior periods of "imperial" aggregation within its sub-systems.

Most of this work was done prior to 1989 and focuses almost entirely on aggregation. While one cannot expect preoccupation of the authors, it would be very interesting to see greater attention devoted to the issue of dissolution of units through internal instability. Fortunately, since the computer code for the simulation is available from the authors and can be run on any reasonably powerful personal computer, such experimentation is possible for other researchers.

In summary, Cusack and Stoll provide a thorough analysis of a basic model of political power, decision making, and territory. It is neither the first nor the last word on the subject but provides a useful baseline for further experimentation and is to be recommended to individuals interested in formal models of international behavior.

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It is becoming increasingly commonplace among political scientists to recognize the impact of domestic politics on international politics, and vice versa. The two books under review represent the intricacies of this dialectical relationship. The volume by Lenczewski looks at how American presidents from Truman to Reagan have articulated their foreign policy toward the Middle East in light of domestic considerations at home. The book concentrates on the eight presidents' perceptions, priorities, and policies vis-à-vis the Middle East. However, as the author informs us early on, this is not "a psychopolitical analysis of the presidents' personalities and motivations" (p. 5).

Drawing on over 40 published memoirs by presidents, secretaries of state, national security advisors, and ambassadors, as well as Israeli, Egyptian, Iranian, and British statesmen, Lenczewski provides a lucid amount of how post--World War II American presidents viewed the Middle East. He identifies containment of the Soviet threat, survival of Israel, and accessibility of oil supplies as the three constant concerns of American policymakers in the region (p. 281). Lenczewski maintains that the first was considered to be the most important, while the priority of the other two fluctuated depending on the administration in power.

Although American Presidents and the Middle East deals with a host of international crises originating in the Middle East (Suez, Mosaddeq's oil nationalization, the civil war in Yemen, Cyprus, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), the central focus of the book is the Arab-Israeli conflict and U.S. involvement in it. The author pays particular attention to the pressures put on successive U.S. administrations by Israel and the American Jewish community. We are told of Truman's "misgivings and caveats" about supporting Zionist objectives (p. 26); Eisenhower's standing up to Israeli pressures; and Johnson's unequivocal support for Israel, which he regarded as a "strategic asset." Furthermore, Lenczewski insists that Nixon and Reagan's desire to appease strong constituencies at home and their Cold War view of the Soviet Union led them to seek closer ties between Israel and the United States. Overall, he considers Johnson as the most vulnerable, Eisenhower the most impervious, president when it came to domestic pressures (p. 280).

Lenczewski's work suffers from three weaknesses. Despite his treatment of certain domestic considerations and constituencies, many important factors and details are left out. The reader is not adequately informed of the compass of political impediments, interest calculations, domestic preoccupations, and partisan congressional agendas each respective president had to grapple with. The most conspicuous omission of the book, however, is any discussion of how presidents tried to build public support for their foreign policies at home in the midst of all these crises. Second, by relying exclusively on memoirs and certain official documents from the executive and the legislative branches, the volume suffers from its sparse source material. Considering the fact that political memoirs are more often than not marred by a sense of self-flattering and self-conceit, the author could have enhanced the value of his work by qualifying and corroborating his sources with other competent accounts that are available. Finally, Lenczewski does not refrain from interjecting his personal value judgments in the book. For example, he brands the Iranian Prime Minister Mosaddeq as "thirsty for power," his oil policy as "reckless" and his sense of nationalism as "misguided" (pp. 36, 64).

In contrast to Lenczewski's book, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah by Mark Gasiorowski deals with the exogenous determinants of domestic policy. In this original and highly competent book, Gasiorowski examines the nature and progression of the "clenacy" relationship that emerged between the United States and Iran in the aftermath of the 1953 coup overthrowing Premier Mosaddeq. After defining clenacy as "a mutually beneficial, security-oriented relationship between the governments of two countries that differ greatly in size, wealth, and power" (p. 2), the author provides a promising theoretical framework for how international clenacy relationships can influence the domestic politics of client countries.

Gasiorowski's main argument is that economic aid and security assistance provided by patron powers to their client states empower the latter to seek autonomy from civil society. Lacking any societal constraints, the state can begin to defy all demands for political participation, thereby leading to serious unrest, instability, and even revolution. Henceforth, the initial intention of patron powers to maintain political stability in their often strategically located client states may inadvertently produce the opposite results.

In seven detailed chapters, Gasiorowski examines the nature of state formation in Iran over the last four decades. He maintains that the formation of the client's relationship between the United States and the Shah and the rapidly augmenting oil revenues in the 1960s and 1970s helped to initiate and sustain a highly autonomous Iranian state in the prerevolutionary period. Gasiorowski contends that a mere 10 years after the overthrow of Mosaddeq, an autonomous Iranian state was firmly in place (p. 187). This state's premeditated use of repression as its most important autonomy-
enhancing mechanism contributed to the advent of the Islamic revolution.

In his analysis of the 1953 coup, which can quite properly be regarded as a turning point in modern Iranian history, Gasiorowski has left no stone unturned. Utilizing a wealth of recently declassified documents from the British Public Records Office, the U.S. National Archives and the U.S. Department of State, in addition to over 70 interviews with British, American, and Iranian officials and activists involved in the event, Gasiorowski has produced by far the leading study on the subject. Through his meticulous use of primary and secondary sources, Gasiorowski has authoritatively augmented our knowledge of that tempestuous event and its tragic aftermath.

This book, however, is not without its shortcomings. Many political economists would argue with Gasiorowski’s assertion that cliency was more important than oil as a determinant of state autonomy. It is highly doubtful whether the state could have sustained its autonomy from civil society to such a degree and for such an extended period of time without the petrodollars. One should not lose sight of the fact that the financial largess of the state, provided to it by oil exports, enabled it to coopt an already-subdued polity. Second, the author’s identification of the National Front (led by Mossadeq) as the main political organization of the modern middle class (p. 84) may be somewhat of an oversimplification, considering the eclectic constituency base of that party, which drew support from disgruntled bazaarists and the Qashqai tribe, in addition to the urban secular middle class.

Lenczowski and Gasiorowski respectively demonstrate that a great power can be pressured by a small ally and its vocal domestic supporters and that patron states should beware of enabling client states to become highly autonomous. Their virtue resides in the fact that by making the confluence of domestic and international policies problematic, they can provide all students of foreign policy with much food for thought.

Mehrzad Boroujerdi


Stephan Haggard seeks to compare the development policies of the East Asian “tigers” (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore) with those of two Latin American countries (Brazil and Mexico) and to account for the differences. More than that, however, he wants to explain the policy changes adopted in each of the countries during the postwar era.

The East Asian strategy of export-led industrialization has been much more successful than the import substitution strategy (ISI) adopted throughout Latin America. But Haggard points up an interesting paradox. Among the reasons ISI was instituted in Latin America was the belief—shared by technocrats and representatives of the organized working and middle classes—that ISI in a protected national market would allow for higher average wages and, consequently, greater distributive equity and less dependence on foreign and national control. Export-led industrialization, in contrast, was thought to entail severe wage restraint and dependency. Yet the outcomes have been the diametric opposite of these expectations: the data cited by Haggard show clearly that all but one of the “tigers” score higher than the Latin Americans on Gini measures of distributional equity and on quality-of-life indexes such as average level of education, longevity, and infant mortality rates.

Haggard, in seeking to unravel this paradox, is mindful of the impact of international forces and pressures. He notes, for instance, how both Korea and Taiwan actually began their industrial development along ISI lines but then shifted to export-led industrialization as declining U.S. economic assistance made the former policy less viable. However, his explanatory framework prioritizes domestic factors, since no theory of the international system can explain policy differences between developing countries whose situations are otherwise similar. For Haggard, the key domestic factor is the structure and capabilities of the state: in some countries, “political elites have inherited or built organizational structures that significantly constrain the ability of societal actors to achieve their political and economic objectives” (p. 3). This is important because successful development requires more or less drastic policy changes to adapt to changing world conditions or redress demonstrated failures. But any strategy of development creates social forces with a stake in it; and if those forces are well organized and politically mobilized, their tendency is to use their political power to block changes that would adversely affect their interests.

Consequently, the study of development policy becomes the study of efforts by ruling elites to build supporting coalitions in the context of a set of state institutions “that provides differential incentives for groups to organize. Because of variations in institutional structure, political elites differ in their organizational capabilities and the instruments they have at their disposal for pursuing their goals... . . . It is at the intersection of choice and institutional constraint that political explanations of economic growth must be constructed” (p. 4). Hence, Haggard eschews rational choice approaches to explaining policy output, although he admits that they can shed light on the actions of the contending societal groups.

This position reduces to restating development policy choice as a collective action problem along the lines discussed by Mancur Olson: when societal groups can organize to influence policy, they form coalitions to secure benefits for themselves and thereby restrict both the state’s ability to choose among available policy options and the coherence of policy itself. Haggard thus returns us to the argument of the 1960s (which much of the subsequent literature has been at pains to refute) that development may be less than fully compatible with an early broadening of democratic norms and institutions. To be sure, Haggard is not an advocate of all political authoritarianism, since he knows that such regimes may be penetrated by dominant groups with partial interests. In Latin America, where this penetration has been frequent, “the association between industrial strategy and authoritarian rule . . . appears to be weak” (p. 255). Rather, the authoritarianism he favors is the sort labeled “state autonomy.” The most effective development policies, he avers, are products of “those regimes which limit autonomous political organization and public contestation,” whether through the direct use of state power or via corporatist controls (pp. 44–45).