

Defense Policy:
An Approach for Exploring the Military – Media Tension

Kevin J. Brogan

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James F. Wolf, Chair

Joseph Rees

Larkin Dudley

Larry Lane

Thomas G. White

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(Abstract)

Media coverage of Post-World War II military conflicts resulted in a reorganization of war coverage procedures. The predominant reason for the reorganization is the tension created within the organizational program that constantly sets one subgroup against another. This study is interested in the tension that caused the transformation of the war coverage effort as it evolved from one war to another.

This dissertation addresses how the different war coverage policies and programs were formed to manage media involvement during war. It is a descriptive account, identifying characteristics from past wars that caused the military and the media to revamp the war coverage procedures in the hope of addressing the tension inherent in their relationship. The study focuses on the organizational dimension of the war coverage program within the particular environment that influences the tension.

By exploring the war coverage practices this study determines how the military and media address their relationship during times of war drawing inferences from organizational elements to account for the contentious relationship. Specifically, this study examines the military-media relational characteristics within Richard Hall's organizational elements. It juxtaposes the war coverage programs against the elements of organizational structure (power, authority, and conflict), and environment (munificence, complexity and dynamism). The research focuses on specific techniques and processes that the war coverage programs use to initiate these practices. In doing so, it examines how certain characteristics influence the military-media relationship.

The research uses a multiple-case study approach to explore war coverage during WW II, the Vietnam War, The Gulf War, and the Iraq War. The multiple-case study approach compares and contrasts these different war coverage procedures from both military and media perspective. Media reports, scholarly writings, and other analytical studies for each period provide the data for the research. The findings of the research are substantiated through interviews, personal journals of war correspondents, and other reports. The findings identify significant trends and patterns within and across the wars.

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Dedication

To my Mom (and Dad) who taught me the value of an education.

And to my brothers and sisters, as well as my nieces and nephews
so they too can know that

"Nothing in the world can take the place of persistence. Talent will not; nothing is more common than unsuccessful men with talent. Genius will not; unrewarded genius is almost a proverb. Education will not; the world is full of educated derelicts. Persistence and determination alone are omnipotent."

President Coolidge

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PART I APPROACH

1.0 Military / Media Relationship

1.1 Introduction to Military / Media Relationship

In late 2001, following the events of 9/11, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the creation of the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI). This agency's purpose was to control and oversee the release of information to the public during the war on terrorism (e.g., the two campaigns; Afghanistan War – Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraq War – Operation Iraqi Freedom) (Worden Interview, 2004). However, members of the press severely criticized the perceived role of this new agency as being one of manipulation (Garamone, 2002). Within months of its conception, the office was defunct, shutdown abruptly before it even opened.

A media uprising such as this is not a modern-day phenomenon. In 1942, immediately after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9182 (Appendix A), creating the Office of War Information (OWI) to control the flow of war intelligence and news reporting. The press initially met this office with a degree of resistance, but the OWI managed to survive the duration of World War II through cooperative agreement between the military and the media. Resistance from the media to information control was common in other wars as well.

Conflict between the military and the media occurs when the Department of Defense implements practices for standard war correspondence procedures at the start of each war. The negotiation process for access to the battlefield defines the military-media relationship. One reason for this phenomenon is that military leaders assume that in a war, procedures for information control are essential. These leaders design procedures that fit within their mission's plan. They believe that each war requires new objectives for information control and media coverage. The media for its part see each war as an opportunity for improving the war coverage procedures. The press typically finds the previous war's procedures

unacceptable. Ironically, the inception of each new procedure continues to strain the cooperative relationship between the military and the media.

1.2 Background – A Historical Review of Military / Media Relationship

Throughout its history, U.S. governmental leaders and news bureau chiefs have implemented strategies wherein a journalist can travel with the military to report war activities. Standard methods included the steps taken by the military to organize the media within its ranks at the start of hostilities. Historians generally accept that the military successfully accomplished this action during World War II under the auspices of OWI.

In World War II, the populace saw controlling war information as an ethical means for the government to meet wartime challenges facing the country. Even prior to World War II, Congress gave the president the power to control information given to the media and the public. In 1938, the legislative body recognized the need for controlling public information that an enemy might exploit, and consequently passed legislation (Military Installation and Equipment Protection Act) that forbade media access to unauthorized photographs, sketches, or maps of military bases; furthermore, this legislation gave the president the authority to define which types of military information needed security protection.

At the start of World War II, Roosevelt was reluctant to exercise this authority, believing Americans needed to receive news about the war (Sweeney, 2001). To this end, Roosevelt created the Office of Censorship (OC) in 1941 and the Office of War Information (OWI) in 1942, designed to better inform reporters on the “dos and don’ts” of reporting military operations. To meet this objective Roosevelt knew he needed to find two individuals highly respected within the media to head up the offices. He picked Byron Price, the executive news editor of the Associated Press, to be the director of the OC. During his tenure, Price instituted a system of voluntary self-censorship. A year later, the president selected Elmer Davis, an experienced news reporter and editor, to be the director of OWI.

Price set two conditions for the media: stories must be accurate and the reports could not help the enemy (Boydston, 1992). Although this office played a role in maintaining secrecy, the OWI was the major government agency for war coverage and the clearinghouse for all American war news. Under Davis, OWI implemented a system of control over the flow of information and managed the procedures for releasing war data. The ultimate goal was “a strategy of truth” for the distribution, circulation and effects of information (Dizard, 1961). In order to achieve this goal, the OWI personnel designed procedures for promoting and encouraging news from the frontline.

The office issued a Code of Wartime Practices for the military and instituted a system of voluntary self-censorship for the American Press (Boydston, 1992). This two-part system delegated to the military the authority to release sensitive information and placed the onus for censorship directly on the war correspondent in his reporting (Sweeney, 2001). In short, the military leaders—from combat commanders to department heads—had the authority to decide what information they would release to the public. The media had the obligation to release it in a way that would not aid or abet the enemy. This acceptance of government censorship created a working relationship, if not a willing partnership, between the military and media (Ferrari and Tobin, 2003).

The initial research into World War II shows how governmental leaders, soldiers, and reporters all agreed to the rules of war coverage. Many reporters, such as Andy Rooney, Ernie Pyle, and Walter Cronkite freely accepted these OWI practices, yielding to the military authority in the name of unity. Historians (for example Fussell, 1989; Laurie, 1996; O'Brien and Parsons, 1995; Winkler, 1978) tend to speak favorably of OWI, citing it as the model governmental agency that effectively balanced national security against freedom of the press. These historical accounts of World War II war coverage suggest that the OWI achieved its goal for cooperation through trust.

After World War II, Truman shut down the OWI. The newly formed Department of Defense adopted the National Security Act of 1952, a uniform censorship plan for wartime media coverage that prohibited censorship other than that for security reasons. This process

proved adequate through the Korean War, wherein self-censorship continued to be the norm. One study (Emery and Emery, 1978) suggests that the only particular criticisms levied on the procedures were against General MacArthur and his staff, not the military as a whole. Even as journalists' irritation and frustration with the military increased during the Korean War, reporters did not challenge these conditions. It was not until the Vietnam War, when the conventions of war entered a culture where widespread unconditional justification was not ensured, that the self-censor war coverage method lost its effectiveness (Cooper, 2003b; Boorstin, 1977). The perceived success of World War II's war coverage agreement waned, as more and more reporters claimed the procedures failed to meet the objectives of truth, openness, and the public good.

The perennial debate over what constituted "security" grew within the media, solidifying the line of demarcation between the press and the military (Emery and Emery, 1978). This breakdown in procedures set the stage for the first "uncensored war" - the Vietnam War - marking the end of a cooperative effort. The uncensored reporting allowed the ultimate objective (access to the battlefield) to take precedence over the model procedure (cooperation). In this trade-off, tensions arose between the military and the media as to what constituted proper war coverage.

1.3 Discussion of Modern Military / Media Relationship

In modern warfare, the Department of Defense (DoD) has consistently restructured or recreated the rules and regulations for war coverage. Consequently, new rules and regulations modify the practice of reporting from the battlefield. Sometimes the revised procedures are acceptable to the reporter, other times they are not. Nevertheless, in each case, the restructuring of the procedures for wartime reporting raises the contentious argument between freedom of the press and national security. This dynamic between the government's national security goals and the media's rights to freedom of information creates a tension within the military-media relationship—a tension that has become more pronounced since World War II.

The teamwork and cooperative relationship formed during World War II did not carry forward to the next generation of wartime leaders. During the Vietnam War, the old procedures faded away leaving a void in protocol. Although the Pentagon kept the war coverage operation under the authority of the military, the military did not exercise its authority to any great extent. Some experts (Knightley, 1975; Hallin, 1986) suggest that the military's relaxed control of the media during the Vietnam War gave the media relatively free rein in the battlefield. Such free rein set a precedent that subsequent administrations found difficult to follow. This point is especially interesting considering that some reporters joined soldiers in the trenches during the Vietnam War, much the same as during World War II. Although the means were the same, the results were different.

By the next major conflict, the Gulf War, the military took total control of the reporting. Military leaders disregarded the established National Media Pool program that was supposed to bring a cooperative approach back to war coverage. Under strict guidelines, military leaders released only the information that the Pentagon wanted to reveal to the press. This military practice of limited information release and press conference did not sit well with the media pool forcing the military and the media to renegotiate once again the war correspondence practices. In 1992, the Pentagon developed the Nine Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations (Appendix B), which outlined basic concepts and emphasized the importance of incorporating news coverage procedures in military operations. The media assumed that these rules were the military's efforts to cooperate in war coverage (Pritchard, 2002).

At the start of the Afghan War, these nine principles proved to be inadequate for covert operations. The hazards of the environment were not conducive to war coverage logistics; but more so, civilian personnel would be a liability to the mission. The military simply could not take reporters into the rough terrain (Whitman Interview, 2004). As a solution to this challenge, the DoD attempted to create the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) to give an account of the war. However, the prior agreement between the Pentagon and the news bureaus on the Nine Principles for News Media Coverage kept the OSI in check

and opened the door for further negotiations. At the start of the Iraq War, the Pentagon and the media established a new method of actually embedding war correspondents with the troops.

Since World War II, implementing war coverage procedures has become as much a process for managing the inherent tension between the military and the media, as it is for managing the information itself. In the last fifty years, the DoD leadership deliberation on this relationship has driven the way the Pentagon organizes war coverage procedures within military operations. These leaders implement procedures and policies to distribute information, as well as manage the trade-off between openness and secrecy, truth and accuracy, licit and illicit war coverage. However, with each new procedure, certain characteristics for controlling war coverage created ill will and even hostility among the military and the media. For example, the role of the war correspondent came under increasingly heavy military scrutiny, especially when the military found disfavor in media reporting. When the media or the military perceived the latest procedure as inadequate, the effect was problematic, creating tension among the stakeholders (administration, military, media, and the public).

1.4 Research Question on Military / Media Relationship

The war coverage program withstood drastic events throughout its implementation. Historical accounts of the media in war zones reveal the changes in war coverage, and the changing aspects that created the next program. Each war finds that the military and the media often renegotiate the war correspondence practices, changing the organizational bases of their relationship. These changes are not always positive, as can be seen in the case of the media in the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, analysts still question why both the military and the media accepted OWI's World War II war coverage procedures while rejecting its successor. The conventional answer that changing times produces different requirements does not provide a realistic evaluation; this phenomenon requires a more empirical evaluation.

The research question examined in this dissertation is:

How have war coverage programs been organized to address the often-contentious relationship between the military and the media?

This question assumes that the need for creating the programs includes managing sensitive information, as well as organizing a cooperative effort between the military and the media.

To answer this question, the research examines the organizational dimensions of the war coverage programs. The presumption is that organizational elements (such as power) affect the characteristics of war coverage practice (such as access to the battlefield) to promote or stifle the working relationship between the military and the media. Studying war coverage characteristics within an organizational content serves a dual interest, revealing the determinants and consequences of the military-media dynamics.

Like most fundamental issues of governance, the question addresses administrative policies, organizational program, and established procedures. In this growing field of research, the concept of a war coverage policy invokes a debate over the issue of military authority over the press; where at the program level, questions arise concerning the organization of a structured protocol in a hostile environment. These two levels of analysis are the current trend of discourse. However, the studies suggest a more in depth approach. The core focus of this study examines the behavior and attitude of members of the media and the military, looking at characteristics concerning the reporters' adherence to military procedures and the military's attempts to manage the media.

2.0 The Study

2.1 Significance of the Study

This dissertation focuses on the inherent tension within the military-media relationship, with particular focus on how the military organizes to fulfill its ongoing responsibility to maintain national security, while satisfying the media's obligation to report on a war. This study provides an understanding of the organizational dimensions of the war coverage programs. The research discusses how certain military and media characteristics affect the military-media tension within the war coverage program. The point of interest is the tension created when principal objectives of the military come up against the basic responsibilities of the media.

Secrecy, an essential element of successful warfare, is counterproductive to full disclosure, the essence of successful journalism (Dower, 1982). This opposition affects the working relationship between the military and the media especially within the organizational dimensions of war coverage procedures. Hall (1991) suggests that changes in surrounding environments inherently intensify the effect. He posits that in a dynamic environment, such as a war zone, a program may adjust its organizational procedures. For example, a war coverage program may shift along the censorship - openness continuum from one war to another. In doing so, the military-media relationship restructures itself forming a bond that can range from two extremes: cooperation and autonomy. At times, these two groups may work together, under specific rules, or aversely, pursuing their own objectives, but in a "give and take" fashion, they adjust the procedures for war coverage along the censorship - openness continuum. In this transformation, the objective then becomes controlling the tension of the complex interactions between these actors.

This dissertation provides a descriptive account of the tension between the military and the media. It treats war coverage procedures as organizational programs and examines the behavior of the actors and stakeholders from an organizational perspective. The research explores the various war coverage principles created within an organizational context and describes the characteristics of the actual practices for reporting on a war. These

characteristics are of interest only to the degree that they affect the war correspondence procedures. The research highlights the significance of these characteristics as they contribute to a contentious relationship.

The study examines these characteristics by focusing on tension within the contextual understanding of organizational elements as identified by Hall (1991). The study focuses on examples of cooperation and conflicts that clearly support the notion of organizational management of the tension that arises between the military and the media over war coverage. While it is beyond the scope of this study to examine American news coverage in detail, this study provides an understanding of the military-media relationship and the significance of the tension within the relationship.

Some experts (for example, Willey Interview, 2004) suggest that the tension of past relationships is outdated, as the Embedded Program has established the procedures for a cooperative relationship. However, the truth is that each war brings its own requirements for war coverage, creating unique conditions within the relationship. This study recognizes that there will be those occasions during future conflicts when war coverage programs may challenge the overall credibility of both the military and the media as each group attempts to preserve their self-serving definitions of national interest and impartiality. Experts, such as Evans (2003), recognize this claim by denouncing the conventional wisdom that the perceived source of the tension is simply the trade-off between battlefield access and information control.

2.2 Scope of the Study

This study explores four war coverage procedures and the accompanying tension within the military-media relationship. It describes the war correspondence practices during World War II, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the Iraq War. These case studies examine the different formal procedures, and then describe the characteristics of each war

coverage practice that emerged during each war. This research is accomplished in three parts – the Approach, the Case Study, and the Conclusion.

Part I: Approach consists of five chapters that define a framework for studying the military-media relationship. Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the topic providing a historical review as background to the significance of the study. The literature review in Chapter 3 discusses the relevance of scholarly literature and sources. The discussion summarizes the literature pertaining to the war coverage programs and the military-media relationship debate. It is an in-depth discussion of war coverage programs and the effect on the military-media tension formed within. The study design and methodology in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively provides the conceptual lens for a qualitative description using the case study method. The use of a case study matrix provides an opportunity to investigate holistic characteristics of these complex organizational programs.

This research discusses how the media, the military, and government agents view their roles within this contentious organizational relationship. The discussion notes the interactions, alliances, and struggles of these actors to create and respond to the rules, while adhering to their own responsibilities. Stake (1995) acknowledges that in case studies some of the particulars may be different; however, each characteristic is chosen because, through its examination, a better understanding of the larger war coverage phenomenon can be understood. That is, these characteristics are crucial factors of the tension.

Part II: Case Study presents the cases of each war respectively. Each case study explores the organizational elements of the war coverage programs structure and environment. The research leads to a discussion of the tension within the military-media relationship. Chapter 6 examines World War II's Office of War Information as the model relationship, establishing OWI as the benchmark. Chapter 7 explores the System of Voluntary Cooperation during the uncensored war of Vietnam. Chapter 8 explores the Gulf War's National Media Pool and Chapter 9 considers the Iraq War's Embedded Program. These case studies identify and document critical events that shape the tension within these organizational programs against the conceptual lens of the organizational elements.

The study examines the interactions between the military and the media. The behaviors and attitudes of these actors and stakeholders are explored through writings and transcripts in the public domain, such as war correspondents' journals, articles, agency reports, and interviews. These sources of data provide information detailing the effects and consequences of actual war coverage programs. The collected data highlights the experience of war correspondents, military officials, and government representatives. The research analyzes and interprets this data to provide an explanation of the tension. This approach endeavors to, not only document how the actors interacted, but also how their actions sometimes undermine war coverage procedures, forcing the development of new programs and policies.

Part III: Conclusion consists of Chapter 10, which analyzes tension across the war coverage programs, providing an overview of military-media tension and concluding on the inherent tension within any war coverage program. The analysis considers the perspectives of the data sources in order to provide more objectivity to the scrutiny of the action. The subjective nature of the study requires an interpretation of these characteristics especially when assigning meaning within the context of organizational elements. The resulting discussion describes the war coverage program, highlighting the characteristics of the military-media relation and analyzing them under the concept of organizational elements. Ideally, this approach recognizes a correlation between war effort characteristics and organizational elements of structure and environment. In its interpretation, the study draws out the organizational phenomenon of the tension.

2.3 Literature Gap

The body of literature that analyzes war correspondence policy or evaluates organizational programs of war coverage is limited. This is interesting considering the amount of editorial and reports written on this topic. Several war correspondents, including Rooney (1995), Galloway (1992), Fialka (1991), and Shadid (2005) address their experiences

on reporting from the front in their memoirs; while other writers, such as Cutlip (1994), Laurie (1996), McMasters (2003), and Jensen (2003b), tackle war coverage programs in editorials, likening war coverage programs to propaganda machines or public relations efforts. Although there is discourse on the topic there have been few scholarly studies conducted.

A few analysts (mostly, Knightley, 1975 and Hallin, 1986; and to a lesser extent, Braestrup, 1983 and Hammond, 1991) examine the war coverage effort and media's access to information during the Vietnam War. However, these writings do not address the contentious relationship. Rather, they tend to examine the phenomenon within the scope of censorship, liberal media interpretation, or unfavorable military restrictions. These categorical studies do not provide a full account of the military-media relationship. Other analysts (such as Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995, Combelles-Siegel, 1996, and Bruner, 1997) explore present day war coverage providing lessons learned. Although there is considerable discourse describing the military-media relationship in times of conflict, there is little in-depth study about how war coverage programs manage the inherent tension among the actors.

Even the in-depth studies by military analysts, such as Aukofer and Lawrence (1995), Combelles-Siegel, (1996), Hill (1997), Edwards (1998), and Snyder (2003) tend to research the program looking for lessons-learned in the operations in order to apply them to the next war. This body of literature rarely analyzes the program down to an organizational dimension, and it does not note the causal elements that affect the development of regulations and restrictions on wartime correspondents. Likewise, government reports addressing the principles of wartime coverage typically address policies, with no discussion or analysis of the program. There have been few scholarly, dissertation-length descriptive studies of the relationship from an organizational prospective.

These bodies of literature fail to discuss the organizational dimension of how the military organizes war coverage programs to manage tension created within the military-media relationship. The shortcoming in these studies is that the lessons learned do not fit

well into the next war's program, as by the time the leadership has learned the lessons, the specific scenario has changed. A thorough study needs to temper these lessons with an understanding of the conditions that brings about the contentious behavior. The omission of such analytical writing creates a gap in the literature of the military-media relationship. This dissertation fills the aforementioned gap by focusing on the military-media relationship from an organizational perspective. It contributes to the discussion of military-media relationship by addressing the contentious relationship within its war coverage programs' organizational structure and organizational environment.

2.4 Limitation of the Study

The most significant limitation to this study is the subjective nature of the data. Specific information is lost over time, leaving equivocal data open to a misinterpretation—or even reinterpretation—of history. There is no fair way to quantify historical interpretation of war coverage characteristics. History does not provide quantitative control over these variables; therefore, the research must rely on strong assumptions for grounding the data. In addition, the study assumes a bias in the perspective of the source of the available data, regardless of its origin. As a result, the lack of accurate, centralized, and detailed information on this contentious issue leaves the study open to disagreement in the interpretation. However, the qualitative interpretation provides an opportunity to investigate the concepts of this study thoroughly.

Another limitation of the study is the different method of collecting data for each case study. Although this study includes valid and reliable data, the data gathering tools are not consistent across the three case studies. While each case study collects data from contemporary sources and interviews, some sources and genres are more readily accessible from one case study to another. For example, the Vietnam War case study has numerous books written on the subject while subject matter experts are fading into history. Conversely, the Iraq War has subject matter experts readily available for interviews while peer review literature is still being debated.

3.0 Introduction to the Literature

Theorists have acknowledged the concept of media involvement in military affairs. Concepts such as the Fourth Estate, where the media assumes an advocate role in political issues, or Clausewitz's (1976) triangle, where the media acts as the public's voice in the government-military-populace trinity, provide the framework for their writings. These theories claim that in a democratic society, it is necessary for the military to submit to a certain degree of scrutiny. Although one may assume the practice of reporting on military action is a necessary aspect of a democracy, there are times when such reporting is counter-productive to national security, which is undeniably another fundamental element of democracy. This dichotomy creates a discourse dedicated to understanding the struggle within the military-media relationship. Interestingly, a historical account of the literature reveals a debate on media involvement wherein the assertions change with each war (see Taylor, 1997). This section reviews the relevant literature to capture the progression of the debate on media involvement and war coverage program, in the hope of understanding the tension created within the military-media relationship. Although the debate does not take full form until after the Vietnam War, it is necessary to start with World War II, the cornerstone of the relationship.

Critical studies on World War II tend to examine media involvement as a propaganda tool of OWI. Although this discussion is lost among the chronicles of history, it does suggest an initial claim that the military has a history of using news outlets to influence public support. As the discussion progresses, aspects of the Vietnam War enters the debate. The discourse assumes that the media influences public opinion outside of the military process. This change in discourse emphasizes the breakdown of the traditional role of war correspondents as the military's voice. The discussion of the changing roles exacerbates the military-media debate. The two sides of the argument juxtapose media involvement as interfering with national security, against access to the battlefield as a media right under the First Amendment.

Analysts researching this issue comment on the relationship and the effect war coverage procedures have on both reporting the war and on the war outcome. These writers tend to examine the military's use of war coverage programs as mechanisms for controlling information and restricting media effort. Their findings range from revealing reporters' hardship with military procedures as they attempt to report independently on war activities, to inherent biases in media reporters that view the military negatively. These findings, and discussion of the findings, appear in professional journals and historical books, defense studies and monographs, and articles and editorials.

Analyses found in professional journals and studies tend to treat the topic of military affairs as historical research tracing the events of military-media relations from a particular campaign, or a specific war as a whole. Defense studies and monographs are primarily policy analyses and program evaluations designed to extract lessons-learned as support for a particular position in the debate. They explore the data for trends to define such lessons as where the military went wrong or how to use the media effectively. On the other hand, articles are narrative in nature, used to highlight the professional opinions of the actors and stakeholders. These editorials mostly serve to generate debate over military-media efforts.

The scholarly studies of the first two categories (historical and defense studies) are important to this review in that the analysts are dedicated to understanding defense policy and military operations studies, while creating discourse on war coverage programs and media involvement in time of war. The third category, articles and editorials, is considered source information and is discussed in subsequent sections to explain how the actors and the stakeholders see themselves and their work. These sources provide detailed data to examine the historical and procedural accounts of the military-media relationship. Analysts (both military and media) use this forum to provide their professional opinions about the merits of war coverage programs, with a majority being critical of any program. For these reasons, these published reports are discussed within their proper time-period as a means to understand the various schools of thought that came out of each war coverage program.

3.1 Review of Core Scholarly Literature

Scholarly literature regarding military-media relationship is rather sparse, especially for the period prior to the Gulf War (Snyder, 2003). As other studies have noted (Venable, 2002 for example) the dearth in this body of literature will likely remain the norm owing to the narrow field of public interest in military affairs. That being noted, analysts have explored certain issues of media involvement in historical settings. These discussions tend to be case-specific, limiting the assertions to certain military-media aspects during a specific war, and in some studies treating military-media relationship issues as secondary data. This is especially true for scholarly literature on World War II that explores media involvement as an accurate depiction of the war and approach OWI as a powerful organizational structure in a hostile war. Although these studies are precursors to the debate, they are noted here for their assumption of unity and cooperation between the military and the media. This assumption frames the debate and this dissertation.

Analysts, Weinberg, (*What to Tell America*, 1968) and Winkler (*The Politics of Propaganda*, 1978) approach the topic of media involvement by addressing the Office of War Information (OWI) as a controlling agent. They investigate this war coverage program's role and responsibilities for handling the media. These studies explicitly debate the traditional roles of the actors and the OWI personnel's sense of duty to influence public support. Weinberg study treats the OWI as a propaganda machine dedicated to national pride built around patriotism. His findings allege that OWI personnel treated war reporting as a mechanism for selling the war. Winkler furthers this claim by examining OWI's records and reports. Winkler findings reveal how the OWI promoted the war effort, and in so doing became a force in the political process. They claim that OWI's form of censorship produced at worst dishonesty and fake news and at best a rationalization for hostilities without proper discourse.

Another analyst, Fussell (1989), also speaks to the concept of false war experiences; however, his approach to World War II examines specifically media reporting. He suggests that war correspondents failed to capture the real war. In his report *Wartime*, he explores the

way news media communicates information, noting that the real war never gets into publication. He interviews soldiers and war correspondents to find that the combat soldier's experience is something that the war correspondent can never capture. He argues that the public cannot understand true war when reporters and editors only accentuate the positive or worse, when the military and media try to speak with one voice. This claim places the media's role during wartime in a new light.

These analyses add to the debate by noting how war coverage programs exploit optimism and euphemism to sanitize and even falsify the war experience. In the debate of media involvement, Fussell's work is an important contribution to understanding the value of the ideal relationship that underpins the debate. Fussell (1989) express a need to understand the behavior of war beyond the reported story. His work promotes an environmentally critical understanding of the relationship between the soldier and the reporter, while Weinberg and Winkler recognize that there is an inherent dilemma with war coverage programs. Although unsuccessful in changing public perception of World War II, these studies highlight the organizational and environmental aspects of war critical to this dissertation. They offer insight into analyzing all war coverage programs. Unfortunately, these studies do not develop into a full understanding of war coverage programs, media involvement, or military-media relationship during World War II. The topic of military-media relationship does not become part of scholarly discussion until Vietnam War studies.

The literature on the Vietnam War details the growing tension between the military and the media after the Vietnam War. The argument focuses on the perceived impact of media coverage in influencing public support for the war. This issue polarizes the debate of media involvement, and solidifies positions on media bias in reporting. Historians such as Knightley (1975) and to a lesser degree Hallin (1986) investigate the historical trends contributing to the relationship between the military and the media. Knightley's The First Casualty takes a historical look at the war correspondent, examining to what extent the media was responsible for the reports. His case study treatment of war correspondents reveals how they emerged from a military propaganda machine of World War II to a champion for truth during the Vietnam War. This concept of a champion for truth seems a bit strong for Hallin

(1986). His study, The Uncensored War, examines the Vietnam War to explore the extent to which a powerful media can operate from outside the policy process and still shape the outcome. His study of the complexity of the actors and the stakeholders under three administrations (Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon) demonstrates the determining influence the media exerted on public opinion throughout the Vietnam War.

The findings of these studies are of extreme importance to the discussion of the military-media relationship. They establish the role of the media separate from the war coverage program. Knightley's and Hallin's separate studies dispel the assertions that the reporter is unable to capture the war and raise a new one. Their argument claims that the reporter can capture the true war as an influential agent of the public. In the absence of other in depth research, these findings serve the popular discourse of the war. However, Braestrup and Hammond put forth an argument to dispute these conventional claims.

Braestrup and Hammond believe that media influence is too confined a scope to define military-media relationship during the Vietnam War. Braestrup (1983) rejects the notion that different ideologies were the cause of reporters' performance. Instead, he examines the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief to define national security, and the role of the media to reflect civil discourse. His in depth report, Big Story, uses the Tet Offensive as a case history to develop a representation of the war coverage in Vietnam. The report examines how the American press reported the Vietnam War, revealing the underlying efforts of U.S. politics that brought about the reporting styles and stories. Additional studies (Braestrup, 1985; 1991) note that the bias was not so much against the military as such, but a bias against reporting military operations in favor of social issues and human-interest stories.

Hammond (1998) also implicitly challenges the concept of media influence in his treatment, Reporting Vietnam. His analysis strongly disputes the assertions that the media's negative reports caused the U.S. to lose the war. His extensive interviews of government officials and examination of declassified government documents reveal how policy makers, and not the military, tried to manage the reported accounts. Together, Braestrup and Hammond dispute the conventional wisdom behind the military-media tension during the

Vietnam War. They dismiss the debate by calling for an understanding of what happens when policy makers misuse or ignore the media. This is a key aspect to the dissertation in that it attempts to refocus the argument. Braestrup's and Hammond's studies reject the debate by suggesting that the argument is not about media bias or influence but about proper roles and responsibilities; roles and responsibilities ideally delineated in an organizational program.

Their attempt to place media involvement into perspective is overshadowed by Gulf War studies that reintroduce the conventional Vietnam War discourse. The Gulf War discussion intensifies the Vietnam assertions, introducing new rhetoric to the discussion. The argument rephrases media bias into a claim of national security and the military need to control the battlefield while the opposition reasserts that media influence is simply the public voice through freedom of the press. Several academic research centers including War Colleges, Defense Management Centers and the Woodrow Wilson International Center have created forums to discuss and compare these lines of argument on war coverage programs and the military-media relationship.

The Gulf War discussion advances the debates to positions of absolutes. Military advocates assert that the military has absolute control over the battlefield and media advocates claim that any restrictions on the press, even in a war zone, constitute a violation of the First Amendment. The literature highlights the friction between military leaders, who must maintain secrecy to ensure successful mission operations, and media reporters, who want all information available. Analytical studies from these centers (e.g., Fialka, 1991; Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995, Combelles-Siegel, 1996; and Bruner, 1997) attempt to define the debate in terms of the media's role in war execution. This effort fosters a discussion of lessons learned within the military-media relationship discourse.

Fialka's study Hotel Warriors (1991) explores the failed implementation of the National Media Pool during the Gulf War. He reviews the day-to-day difficulties of the media pool to get access to the battlefield. Fialka's study notes that the organizational structure of NMP was not adept to handling the media. However, his study does not analyze

why such a structured program was incapable of fulfilling its objectives. Instead, he finds the military was either incompetent or outright obstructive of media war coverage. Fialka raises the argument that this obstruction was retaliation for Vietnam, keeping the assertions of the Vietnam era open for discussion. MacArthur takes this claim to a higher level.

In his study, Second Front MacArthur (1992) posits that the Pentagon implemented a censorship campaign. With the help of the Freedom of Information Act, he presents evidence of an official deception within the Pentagon; however, he holds the press to blame for failing to respond effectively to the military marketing of the war. He claims that the standards of media involvement were circumvented, and that a conspiracy to control the media was in effect since the Vietnam War. His posit of a conspiracy, and Fialka's claim of obstruction, are not proven in the court of public opinion (Milavsky's survey (1991) suggests that a majority of the public was satisfied with the military's account of the Gulf War); nevertheless, these studies are interesting to this study in that they take the debate to a new level. They demonstrate an extreme argument wherein the righteousness for freedom of the press and access to the battlefield needs no justification. These rights are without limits. As the public voice, the media decides what its needs, irrespective of public opinion or the accuracy of military information.

Another study adds to the assertion of distorted truth by examining the media. Aubin's (1998) Distorting Defense provides a more critical approach to the accuracy of media reporting. Conducting a content analysis of the major networks (ABC, NBC, and CBS) evening broadcasts, Aubin examines defense-related issues over the course of 16 years (1980-1996). His findings reveal the press' hostility toward defense-related issues, suggesting that war coverage programs are necessary to control a media bias. This allegation provides support for the argument of military control of information, even going so far as to suggest that the military can cover its own war. Most editorials rejected this argument partly because the research treated the media as something external to the organizational process. His arguments dismiss the organizational relationship between the military and the media (i.e., the National Media Pool).

These two contradicting positions of Fialka-Aubin and MacArthur demonstrate the level of tension in the military-media relationship at the extremes of the debate. However, most analysts accept the accuracy of reports, whether military or media generated. They recognize that the problem is much broader than simply determining if the war is properly reported or not. The key aspect for this discussion is the effect of such media involvement or lack thereof, on the war coverage and the military-media relationship. Aukofer and Lawrence's study, America's Team, The Odd Couple (1995) attempts to address the relationship within the National Media Pool.

Aukofer, a professional journalist, and Lawrence, a military professional, provide in depth research of the National Media Pool. Their study examines the news bureaus that sent reporters, with no experience in dealing with military matters, into a war zone. However, Aukofer and Lawrence address this topic more from a planning approach, rather than from a tension-focused inspection. Their research analyzes public affairs as an important part of military operations. They suggest that military personnel need to understand and accept the media's role, and that the media needs to understand its role in a war. This is not a new idea. Many analysts have suggested that greater attention must be paid to formal public affairs education and training. Still, their findings offer an opportunity to examine the tension within the relationship.

Aukofer and Lawrence account is of value to the scholarly literature. Their in-depth research to both sides of the argument provides insight into the characteristics of the relationship. Their study advances the discussion by recognizing the sharp differences between the two institutions and their different positions (i.e., the press' desire for free and open access and the military need to control all aspects of the war). This study remolds the debate into one of roles and responsibilities, creating a dialogue within contemporary literature for examining the media pool operations as a means of war coverage.

Combelles-Siegel (1996) study, The Troubled Path to the Pentagon's Rules on Media Access to the Battlefield: Grenada to Today, highlights this discussion of war coverage programs. She researches the exclusion of media pools in the Grenada Invasion and other

skirmishes of the 1980s (Panama, Gulf War, and Haiti). She clearly depicts the mistrust, poor planning and poor execution of the media pools on the part of the military. Bruner (1997) conducts a similar study titled Military-Media Relations in Recent U.S. Operations. These skirmishes of the 1980's and 1990's offer a field for comparable research to debate the involvement of the media. He provides additional lessons learned for a better war coverage program. These studies attempt to refocus the discussion by providing lessons-learned on military rules and procedures for handling the press within a case study context of military action.

These war colleges and research centers studies of the Gulf War refine the dialogue on the subject of military and the media. They promote the discussion regarding the role of the media against the rules of war coverage programs, but they do not contribute to the debate as a whole for several reasons. One of the predominant reasons is that they tend to produce critiques and discussions of specific events, where the lessons do not applied directly to the next scenario. The focus is largely at the program level. The discussion fails to address the characteristics of the organizational relationship within the program.

A body of work on organizational relationship is emerging, proposing that the media should be an integral part of military operations. Hill, (1997) examines journal articles, technical reports, and various texts that address issues of media involvement. His findings suggest a growing trend in the writings calling for the military to use the capabilities of the media. This discourse enters the debate with the study of Iraq War Embedded Program.

Iraq War studies are developing a discussion that recognizes the increasingly intertwining relationship between the military and the media. One of the first studies, Curtin (2002), examines the prospects for improving military-media relations within an organizational context in his report, Strategic Leaders. He analyzes various sources (articles, journals, and television reports) to determine if military leaders adequately accommodated the media during the Embedded Program. Snyder's (2003) research, Seeing through the Conflict, indirectly follows Curtin's lead. Snyder explores the media involvement against current public affairs policy to examine the concept of a supportive media. Their discussion

addresses teamwork, placing the issues of ethics and responsibility to national security alongside, instead of in opposition to, fairness and accuracy in reporting. These studies promote a new scholarly dialogue dedicated to placing the issue of military-media relationship into a broader and more rational perspective than the standard discussion of censorship versus free press.

Although this discourse is still taking shape, it lacks strong analysis of the contentious atmosphere. Today's debate addresses specific factors of media involvement through the lens of teamwork. These studies do not reveal the predominant themes and issues of military-media tension within the team. There is a faction of the debate that suggests the perpetual tension is not found in the program, but in the desires and attitudes of the actors. The actors' behavior towards the organizational program and the changing environment consistently creates the core issues of tension. These factors need to be explored with an understanding of the organizational procedures that affect this behavior.

This historical account of scholarly literature demonstrates the contemporary analysis of the war coverage programs and media involvement and delineates the changing debate and discourse from one era to the next. Most of these studies focus on specific topics of military-media relationship. These topics include access to the battlefield (Fialka, 1991; Combelles-Siegel, 1996); the influence of media reporting (Knightley, 1975, Hallin, 1986, and Aubin, 1998); military control of the media to influence public support (Braestrup, 1985; and Hammond, 1998; MacArthur, 1992); and the changing need for an organizational relationship (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995; Bruner, 1997; Hill, 1997; Curtin, 2002; and Snyder, 2003). The discussion provides insight into war coverage programs' practices and procedures, reviewing the successes, failures, and challenges, while exploring the harsh realities of wartime operations. However, these studies fail to consider the tension at its source; the relationship within the war coverage programs, even as they note the tension in the organizational program. In order to understand this discourse better and to gain insight into the tension aspect of the debate, the review examines the source material and published reports.

3.2 Published Reports and Research on World War II

The published reports addressing World War II's OWI examine war coverage as pertaining to a sense of patriotism and a call to civic duty. These historical accounts address the OWI role in instituting a system of voluntary self-censorship and creating the Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press. Typical discussion on this war coverage program treats the practices and procedures of the OWI as propaganda for justifying the war (Rhodes, 1976; Winkler, 1978); an instrument for home front pride (Lingeman, 1970; Voss, 1994); or a necessity for national security (Sweeney, 2001; Weinberg, 1968). Historians speak to how OWI promoted these agendas within the World War II war coverage policy.

Within these published works is a basic consensus that the press readily accepted the code of practices and agreed to self-censorship, within the established guidelines, because the cause was right. Historical accounts speak of military censorship as a necessary tool for national security. These writings posit that political leaders, soldiers, and reporters held a shared-opinion on the justification for the war and that this was the reason for forming a willing relationship, and a cooperative effort (Ferrari and Tobin, 2003). The military and the media recognized the need for censoring reports, while still releasing relevant stories back to the home front. This difficult task formed the bond between soldier and reporter. Several war correspondent accounts of their experiences acknowledge this commitment.

War correspondents' memoirs speak of their experience and their contribution to the war effort: In My War, Andy Rooney (1995) refers to himself as a soldier correspondent; Tobin's (1997) narrative of Ernie Pyle's life, perhaps the most famous war journalist, suggests that Pyle saw himself as a friend of the infantry; and Walter Cronkite (1996) claims that reporters were obligated to yield to military authority because World War II was a just war. Other World War II war correspondents' writings reflect a willingness to work with the military in maintaining secrecy for national security (Voss, 1994; Stenbuck, 1995). These published works of Rooney, Pyle, Cronkite and other less-famous war correspondents (identified by Voss, 1994 and Stenbuck, 1995) are important aspects of the military-media relationship discussion. These writings reveal the closeness and cooperative effort between

the soldier and the reporter during World War II. Consequently, their accounts emphasize the role of the reporter as a significant member of the military, countering the position of Fussell's (1989) research.

Despite the cooperative nature of the military and the media, not all writings of World War II and the OWI praise the acceptance of censorship. Knightley (1975) does not paint such a patriotic picture. He posits that the war correspondent went along with censorship out of misguided loyalty to the U.S. government. Knightley does not argue against the strength of the relations, or the commitment to cooperation, only the righteousness of such a relationship. He claims the official procedures for war coverage convinced the reporter that it was in the national interest to not report negatively on the war, and that this influence was the strength of the relationship.

Other historians, like Roeder, (1993) also suggest that the self-censorship might not have been so voluntary. Roeder claims that there were many times when OWI personnel censored the full extent of Allied failures and losses. He further asserts that OWI personnel conducted this action not because disclosure might help the enemy in playing to Allied weaknesses, but simply because disclosure reflected negatively on the Allied performance (Roeder, 1993).

Roeder's (1993) historical look at World War II contributes to an understanding of the war coverage 'propaganda' by which the government builds support for its policies. He suggests that the wartime reports manipulated American public opinion during World War II, not only in the images the citizens saw, but in the suppression of images as well. This book reveals techniques by which the Roosevelt administration controlled and sanitized the news, by manipulating a complacent media that allowed such power to exist. The presumption here, as with Knightley's treatment of World War II, is that there is a conspiracy as Winkler (1978) claims. However, taken in context with other accounts of World War II coverage, few analysts discuss the military-media relationship as a product of a propaganda ploy. Despite Knightley's, (1975), Roeder's, (1993) and others' assertion of misguided censorship during war, this argument represents a minority viewpoint of World War II war coverage

practice. It does not demonstrate a contentious relationship between the military and the press; in fact, it seems to take the media and the public to task for being a willing partner. Ironically, both the positive and the negative accounts of OWI substantiate that there was a seamless partnership during World War II, giving little account of a contentious relationship.

3.3 Published Reports and Research on the Vietnam War

The Vietnam War may be one of the most discussed wars in the debate over media involvement in the battlefield. This discussion centers on the military-media relationship and the suspended practice of censorship. Conventional wisdom holds that the uncensored aspect of the war coverage created the tension within the military-media relationship. Other research suggests that this is not so, therefore the debate must be reviewed from a holistic approach, starting with historical accounts of the war's beginning.

Analysts have created a historical discourse to examine the evolving procedures that permitted journalists the freedom to observe and report on all combat operations. Many authors, like Evans (2003), attempt to address the relationship of the early years in terms of teamwork established between the government and news bureaus during World War II. They make the assumption that during the early years of the Vietnam War (the 1950's and early 1960's) both the military and the media believed a cooperative relationship could sustain reports of American soldiers as "the good guys." The general account speaks to the procedures at the start of the Vietnam War in terms of fair and accurate coverage. Evans (2003) notes that the early days of the war found the military and the media working closely in a cooperative manner.

As the military's control over information lessened, the characteristics of a contentious environment became more apparent in the contemporary writing and the historical accounts. The claim is that after the news coverage aired the harshness of the 1968 Tet Offensive, the discourse turned into government agents calling for procedures that would ensure responsible and ethical reporting (Faulkner, 1981; Just, 1998). There is an agreement

among writers that the Tet Offensive was the turning point in this military-media relationship (Bonior, Champlin, and Kolly, 1984; Hallin, 1986; Hammond, 1998). These writings are important to the study of the contentious relationship by marking a timeline for the decline in the cooperative effort. From here, the writings take several directions.

Many authors speak of the decline in censorship in terms of a lack of proper control in the flow of the news (Hammond, 1991, 1998); increased press access (Knightley, 1975); and the harsh, and even somewhat influential, reports coming out of the battlefield (Hallin, 1986). Hallin's popular and respected book on Vietnam War coverage sums up this lost control in its title The Uncensored War (1986). Hallin reveals how Kennedy and Johnson both tried to discourage press coverage, and how relations between the press and the Nixon administration completely broke down. He ultimately makes the point that military officials felt that censorship in an undeclared war would be impractical. This revelation demonstrates a split in the perceived union of the administration and the military during the Vietnam War.

Hammond (1998) also claims that during this standoff between the military and the administration, control over the battlefield slipped out of the military's grasp. The emerging environment placed the responsibility for objective reporting solely on the media (Knightley, 1975), giving more weight to "self" than "censorship" in the "self-censorship" guidelines. Individual accounts speak to the effects that these voluntary guidelines had on the openness of Vietnam's war coverage, and how it differed from the formal censorship that existed during World War II (Roberts, 1968). Most of this writing comes from war journals and personal accounts, which include personal logs that mention the freedom to venture almost anywhere at any time, and to write about whatever interested reporters (Jacobs, 1992; O'Brien, 1999; Laurence, 2002).

Beyond the individual war correspondent behavior during the Vietnam War, there is the role of the news media as a whole to debate. Media analysts addressing this area of interest suggest that, although the war was uncensored, the media did not do a fair job of reporting it, claiming that the military offered the more accurate reports (Wyatt, 1993; Hammond, 1991). Hammond (1998) and others examine newspaper and broadcast reports

and military documents, demonstrating how various news bureaus contradicted themselves and one another in describing the war effort. His research attempts to put the contentious relationship discussion into historical political perspective.

These historical analyses address the evolving procedures that permitted journalists the freedom to observe and report on all combat operations, and the contentious relationship that developed out of it. As the Vietnam War writings reveal, there are diverse opinions on the military-media relationship, but there is a general agreement that the lack of support for developing formal war coverage procedures separated Vietnam's coverage from the established methods of World War II. Analysts agree that in the reporting of a new style of war, a new relationship surfaced between the military and the media, and the drafted soldier and the adventurous reporter.

3.4 Published Reports and Research on the Gulf War

Published research into the Gulf War coverage procedures captures the time between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War as well as the Gulf War itself. One reason why the debate of military-media relationship endures in the Gulf War literature is that the minor skirmishes of the '80s produced data to support both sides of the debate. Both sides focus on this new-found obsession of the military to control all aspects of the battlefield, including news reporting while producing successful operations. Although the discussion focuses mostly on the Gulf War, some analyses such as Cassell's (1985) treatment of the Sidle Panel and Hoffman Report sets the stage for the Gulf War debate. The debate readdresses the military-media relationship from the Vietnam War arguing the valor of media's free reign, over military's complete control. The assertions, from both the military point of view and the media, depict a bitter relationship. This dichotomy is prevalent in the Gulf War's discussion. The discussion stresses the presumptions of both groups.

Reporters claim that they are entitled to battlefield access, wherein they can roam freely in search of stories. Media analysts assert that media pools alter this right to free and

open access. This assertion is grounded in concepts of freedom of the press, fourth estate, and democratic governance. Meanwhile, the military argues for the need to manage information in order to avoid any misinformation. Military analysts claim that covert actions and quickness of attack contribute to mission success even if these attributes may make a story obsolete in its delayed reporting. Media involvement is not as important as mission success.

Authors advocating the media's position focus on how the development of a media pool excluded pertinent deliberation prior to its development (Williams, 1991); implemented a strategy based on exclusion of the press, rather than inclusion (Combelles-Siegel, 1996; Cronkite, 1991); and revealed a disassociated relationship wherein the reporter's involvement is irrelevant to the operational planning (Fialka, 1991). In opposition and with respect to the military, some analysts frame the debate to emphasize the military's authoritative claims to jurisdiction over the battlefield (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995) and the need to maintain secrecy in covert operations (Lichter, 1991). The discussion does not suggest that the two positions are mutually exclusive but attempts to highlight the way reporters handle themselves within press pools, frequently trying to gain an advantage over one another. These writers agree with, or at least acknowledge, the opinion of Williams, (1991) and Aukofer and Lawrence (1995) that the NMP was a workable program that failed due to attitudes and behaviors. Although this opinion is limited, it does introduce into the debate a claim of willingness on the military, however superficially, to allow the media back onto the battlefield. This implies an attempt to lessen the tension through media pools.

Fialka's (1991) own account of reporting the war from his hotel room in Riyadh and Dhahran argues against the idea of the military willingness to cooperate. He represents the level of frustration on the part of the reporter. Some writers speculate on how military-run media pools produce a greater tightening of the military's control on the media, instead of producing cooperative procedures (Kellner, 1992; Smith, 1993; Stanley, 1994). They posit that the selected procedure of the media pools forced information on the reporters. For example, they claim General Schwarzkopf's briefings were all part of an overall public relations plan, and, consequently, journalists expecting to cover the war actually ended up

attending press conferences (McDaniel and Fineman, 1991). However, in their writing these authors once again debate the old arguments without commenting on the relationship itself. These writers of the Gulf War coverage agree with Fialka and take issue with the military's claim to legitimate authority to control all aspects of the war. Editorials (Cronkite, 1991; Schanberg, 1991; Browne, 1991) focus on censorship inherent in the media pools' practice arguing that the NMP did not allow reporters to gain their own perspectives or angles on the stories. The debate against media pool argues that the pool alienated reporters' right to free and open access to information, stifling creative attempts at story generation.

Other studies focus on the military-media relationship itself. Aukofer and Lawrence (1995), and Edwards (1998), address this relationship in a broad sense, identifying the changes and challenges between the two groups. These analysts discuss the globalization of media, i.e., "CNN Effect" of 24-hour, around the world, instant reporting (Belknap, 2002) and the media's increased reliance on modern technology such as portable transmitters that changes the demographics of the press as a whole. They contribute to the debate, explaining the sharp differences between the two institutions and the factors that shape the military-media relationship from one war to another. They help to define the changing argument (and therefore the tension) between military and the media.

The discussion of the NMP demonstrates that the implementation of a program does not automatically resolve the contentious relationship. Although the Defense Department views the NMP as a success (Williams, 1991), the discussion outside the Pentagon focuses on its failures. The general discourse focuses on the media pool not working as planned (MacArthur 1992; Thompson, 2002); the impeded flow of information (Simpson, 1991); the military and not reporters choosing the stories and pictures (Fialka, 1991); and military escorts interfering with access to soldiers in the field (Dennis et al, 1991). Several analysts (Combelles-Siegel, 1996 and Bruner, 1997 among them) focus the debate on media pools that result in ineffective and disregarded ground rules. Fialka (1991) affirms that such disregard for the media and the agreed-to NMP program only adds to the difficulties for future collaborations between the two groups.

As a supplement to the discussion on the failure of NMP as a means of war coverage, several writers (Denniston, 1991; Kenealey, 1992; Boydston, 1992; Smith, 1993) addressed the legal issues and lawsuits filed in the name of freedom of the press (i.e., *Nation Magazine v. United States Department of Defense*, 1991; *JB Pictures, Inc. v. United States Department of Defense*, 1991). Although beyond the scope of this dissertation, the importance of addressing these lawsuits in this dissertation is to illustrate the level to which the military-media tension can rise. These suits dictated the legitimacy of the military i.e., the press has no more right to access the battlefield than civilians, citing *Pell v. Proconier*, 1974, as precedent (Cooper, 2003b). In doing so, these suits created another turning point in the military-media relationship discussion.

3.5 Published Reports and Research on the Iraq War

The Embedded Program is the newest discussion in the war coverage debate. Although analysts are still writing on this approach, there is a general discourse developing, from both the military and the media praising the effort. Many analysts claim that the practice is a fair and balanced procedure between the military's need for responsible journalism and the media's desire for accurate information. A sample of the military's experience speaks to the successful open policy of military-media relationship (Oehl, 2003), whereas the media reports on such events as a training program to familiarize the reporter with military culture (Jacobs, 2003). From an outsider's point of view, there is praise for the program effort to serve the public (Shepard, 2004). These analysts recognize the effort that went into negotiating the rules, particularly those designed to address the contentious relationship, while implementing a cooperative strategy into the program. However, not all analysts have found the program appealing.

The initial assertions at the start of the war, mostly in editorials, attempt to label the Embedded Program as another government-controlling agency. These articles speak to the effort of the military to control the flow of information. Writers (such as, Jensen, 2003b and Ricchiardi, 2003) are quick to criticize this practice as an attempt by the U.S. government to

sanitize, and even determine the nature of the coverage of the Iraq War. They agree with Carr's (2003) characterization that the Embedded Program is a one-sided affair. Although other editors and even embedded reporters deny these assertions, they do introduce several topics into the debate. The debates address the lack of independent verification (Jensen, 2003a); the tainted objectivity of the reporter (Grossman, 2003; Fisher, 2003a); and the inability of the procedures to capture the whole truth within an isolated environment (Johnson, 2003). In doing so, the discourse attempts to characterize the illegitimacy of the war coverage programs.

Newspaper editors, such as Jensen (2003a), and war correspondents, such as Shadid (2004a), argue that an embedded process can never be a source of legitimate news since the reporter cannot verify the information independently. Other writers contribute to the debate by addressing the partnership more closely. They argue the quality of writing and the accuracy of the report when delivered from within a homogenous environment. The discussion creates a new discourse on the contentious relationship, shifting the focus away from the organizational relationship and onto the legitimacy of the reporters. Fisher (2003a) particularly notes that having reporters absorbed into the military culture immediately taints the objectivity of the journalists. Grossman (2003) even likens the effect of embedding to the Stockholm Syndrome, where hostages take sympathy with their captors and their captors' cause. Johnson (2003) argues that the public may get the truth, but they will not get the whole truth. The scope of this position suggests that decreasing the tension may be a bad thing. Many embedded reporters counter this argument claiming that there is verification within the program (Baker, 2003). The argument suggests that the embedded correspondent tells the micro-story, while the unilateral reporter (the independent reporters, who travels alone without the benefits of a military unit) addresses the war at the macro-level (Whitman Interview, 2004). These differing positions pit reporter against reporter.

Cooper (2003b) and others argue that the embedded journalist effectively becomes a noncombatant member of combat units, living, working, and traveling as part of the unit. Other analysts (Bauder, 2003; Blumenthal and Rutenberg, 2003; Rieder, 2003) echo this position claiming that, with reporters in every unit, the program provides a more accurate

account of events by minimizing subjectivity of the reporter. In their book, Embedded, Katovsky and Carlson (2003) interviewed 60 journalists for their accounts of the embedded experience. Although not every interview or anecdotal story produced a glowing review of the Embedded Program, taken as a whole, the book reveals that the Embedded Program offered many reporters an eyewitness view to history. For the experience alone, many reporters praise the value of embedded reporting, challenging the criticism of the program.

Advocates for the Embedded Program reject the censorship argument in favor of the legitimate needs of the military to establish rules of engagement. Their analyses recognize the legitimacy of a strategy for war coverage through media involvement in military action. They claim that, through the embedded process, reporters attain fair and open access to military operations (Cooper, 2003b). Some embedded reporters (Jacob, 2003; Baker, 2003; Croft 2004; and others), agree with this assessment rejecting Grossman's Stockholm Syndrome analogy.

Interestingly, some military analysts (Bedway, 2003 and Rozen, 2003 among them) argue against the Embedded Program. They assert that the media's refusal to address the changing infrastructure conditions (i.e., better schools, roads, and health centers). This assertion emphasizes the military's belief that, like in the Vietnam War, the media only wants to print bad things about the military. Although this resurrects the old argument against censorship, the interesting point for studying the tension in the relationship is these military analysts believe that they have the stronger argument.

Although the debate covers the extreme points of view, the mainstream discussion views the embedded procedures as reducing tension and improving the process from the first Gulf War coverage (McLeod, 2003). Most analysts writing on the successful implementation of the program put the discussion of military-media relationship in a positive light. Some of these writers assert that the Embedded Program achieves a level of cooperation much like in World War II; however, the debate notes that not all writers in favor of the embedded process liken it to World War II. Some analysts claim that DoD personnel lowered the qualifications for being a reporter. These analysts agree with Schorr's (2003) summation that World War II

reporters were accredited war correspondents, not simply embedded reporters. They make the claim that in World War II war correspondents were legitimate members of the unit with a billet and responsibility, not merely reporters assigned to observe.

The debate over the Embedded Program continues; however, current editorials and published reports sufficiently address most of the arguments and discussions. It appears that further research will not add any new aspects, but continue the arguments over the Embedded Program as a whole. Having said that, the research notes that many analysts feel as though the discussion over the military-media relationship is over and the Embedded Program is the solution. For this dissertation, that answer is not the case. There are still contentious issues to address within the embedded process. Likewise, the next war will bring new problems into the war coverage program and new contentious aspects to the military-media relationship discussion. Although beyond this literature review section, the media is already seeing the affects of blogging (Web-access logging, bulletin board reports) as an acceptable means of reporting, creating a completely new contentious venue.

3.6 Literature Gap Revisited

The literature review and ensuing discussion introduce distinct issues within war coverage debate. The discourse creates widely divergent views on the practice of controlling information during wartime, ranging from media influence to the legitimacy of embedding journalists. The review discusses the unpredictability between wars that leaves the military-media relationship and the debate in a state of flux. Analysts (such as MacArthur, 1992) debate the changing procedures noting such contentious factors as how access to information becomes more restrictive, as censorship becomes less restrictive. That is, they assert that when the military opts not to censor the media's report, it instead refuses to provide access to information. The literature (Curtin, 2002 and Snyder, 2003, particularly) also reveals a growing trend calling for a discourse on organizational relationship. Yet despite the wealth of interest in military-media relationship, many important fundamental problems and questions remain unanswered.

While the literature affirms that the different styles of war coverage significantly influence the relationship, it remains void of any discussion of the specific mechanisms or organizational elements applied to manage the tension. Few researchers actually address the particulars of the guidelines used to manage the war coverage. The literature rarely discusses the organizational process necessary for the realization and formation of acceptable war coverage procedures. When the debate does discuss such discretionary topics such as values and rights, they do not address these issues consistently. Instead of consensus in the discussion, there are frequent conflicts over war coverage procedures goals and outputs. Likewise, the debate does not account for the changes in the war environments or the various degrees of dynamics in the environment. Specific insight into the process for controlling war coverage is limited. This literature gap suggests the need for more research into this area.

The claim here is both broad and simple. The literature reveals telling signs of the tension but it does not address the affect of wartime characteristics on the relationship itself. In their studies, these analysts reveal characteristics of the war coverage experience that can be drawn and extrapolated to determine their effects and consequences on war coverage. In this context, there appears to be a need to return to the theme of military-media relationship and examine it within the boundaries of organizational elements, where the source data can help determine the effort to manage the tension.

4.0 Study Design

4.1 Hall's Organizational Elements as Conceptual Lens

This dissertation focuses on war coverage programs using an organizational perspective. The study addresses the military-media contentious relationship through the lens of organizational structure and process. It uses Richard Hall's theories of organizational elements as the conceptual lens for the discussion. The study focuses on specific description of Hall's elements and exploring their range of influence on the tension (Chart 4-1).

Hall's Organizational	Description	Application to the Study
Structural Elements Defined		
POWER	Manage resource; capability to influence outcome; use of skills (i.e., knowledge, laborer, or role)	Determine how the exercise of power employed to enforce war coverage procedures affect the relationship.
AUTHORITY	Degree of legitimacy based on stakeholders individual viewpoints, goals, and behavior	Examine the legitimacy of the military's authority and the intentional, overt behavior of individuals, both the reporters and military officials, which affects the war coverage procedures.
CONFLICT	Willingness to cooperate to prevent or proper mechanisms for resolution	Identify causes of conflicts, and methods used to resolve them, as seen in behavior intended to promote the relationship or circumvent the war coverage objectives.
Environmental Elements Defined		
MUNIFICENCE	Capacity and availability of sources as well as the resources needed to obtain them	Identify the nature of the resources and availability of data that affected the war coverage.
COMPLEXITY	Diversity of stakeholders as seen in their behavior and attitude	Examine the degree of disparity of the stakeholders as evident by the willingness to voluntarily participate in the war coverage procedures.
DYNAMISM	Level of uncertainty that comes with changes in technology, regulation, culture, and public opinion	Determine the affect of uncertainty concerning how much and how quickly environmental changes affect war operations.

Chart 4-1 Study Design

Hall's approach to organizational elements recognizes their pervasiveness to influence simple tasks in an abstract way. He suggests their influence may lead to undesirable outcomes and outputs. These outcomes and outputs include products of the organizational program, as well as social changes that affect the environment of the organizational program. A closer look into Hall's discussion of organizational structures and environment reveals how these elements play into the tension aspect of the relationship.

4.2 Hall's Approach to Organizational Programs

Hall (1991) defines an organizational program as a collectivity of people as a whole, with a relatively identifiable boundary, a normative order, a ranking of authority, communications systems, and member coordinating systems. He bases his theory on the concept that groups form collectives to achieve specific objectives to produce outcomes. This collectivity exists on a relatively continuous basis in an environment that allows engagement in activities designed to meet a goal or set of goals.

Hall agrees with other theorists (Ranson, Hinings and Greenwood, 1980) that organizations are complex mediums of control that continually produce and recreate themselves in order to meet their objectives (Hall, 1991). Hall adds to this concept claiming that the organizational process, created within the organizational structure, causes the continually producing and recreating aspect of the organization. The organizational process may guide the organization through the changing times or the organization may change the organizational process to adapt to its new surroundings. This internal continuous development marks the activities or functions that succeed in a relatively fixed way towards the particular objectives of the organization. That is, the organizational process organizes the organization. This organizing aspect may be a means of managing the outcome or a product of the outcome of the organization. The effect on the process, found within the organizational structure, is in part a result of the environment acting on the organization. That is, the environment influence on the organizational structure influences the process as well.

Hall (1991) points out how changing times affect the circumstances that contribute to the initial conditions for forming the organization. The organizational structure adjusts to the ensuing changes, simultaneously accommodating and defying the environment. This creates a duality within the organizational process, wherein the organizational structure attempts to resist the environment, and in doing so, finds itself influenced by the environment. In the fluctuating environment, some change to the organizational process is inevitable. For example, there may be limited resources in the environment wherein individuals outside the organizational program and subgroups within may negotiate for their share. In this case, the organizational program must reassess its procedures for handling and controlling exterior resources to meet its goals. On the other hand, it may be that the environment itself has changed over time altering the cultural wants; then the organizational program must reconsider its place in the new culture. Likewise, the changing values and ideologies of stakeholders may affect the goals and purposes of the organization.

Hall (1991) discusses this organizational dynamic in terms of elements of the organizational structure, and the influential elements of the environment. He suggests that these internal and external elements constantly guide the nature of the process, influencing the adoption and implementation of new procedures designed to meet the objectives. That is, organizations are both affected by and dependent on elements within the structure and surrounding environment to create (and recreate) the program's objectives. Hall identifies these elements of the organizational structure (power, authority, and conflict) and organizational environment (munificence, complexity, and dynamism) and their affect on the organizational process.

4.3 Element of the Organizational Structure

Hall's (1991) treatment of structural elements focuses on the various types of organizations. He identifies three kinds of arrangements—centralization, formalization, and complexity—and the effect each have on the rules and procedures. The discussion of these

different types of structures reveals the elements that affect the organization's ability to function.

The first arrangement, centralization, distinguishes the degree to which coordination and control is concentrated within an organizational structure. The fundamental element is the limited dispersal of power and the hierarchical authority that maintains order within procedures. The second arrangement, formalization, encompasses the norms and standards of the organizational program. Formalization involves the legitimate authority to dictate procedures designed to meet the objectives with formal rules for operation and conflict resolution. Lastly, complexity speaks to the distribution of tasks and the myriad interactions among the actors and stakeholders. This structure is affected by the role assignments (and therefore power) that may lead to compliance or conflict. These organizational structures, regardless of their arrangement, adhere strongly to the hierarchical concepts of power, authority, and conflict. A detailed discussion on these structural elements, addressed below, better defines their ability to direct the tension within war correspondence procedures.

4.3.1 Power

Hall (1991) suggests power exists within a relationship between two or more actors or groups. He claims power resides within the dependency of a relationship; without a dependent relationship, there can be no power. Within this relationship, the central interest of power is the managing of resources desired by another. Many other theorists, besides Hall, such as Pfeffer (1977), Kanter (1979), Bacharach and Lawler (1980), and Robbins (1990) cite controlling of resources as one meaning of power. Pfeffer (1977) even notes that the access to resources by power holders, however limited, is used to strategically enhance and maintain their capacity for power. However, power is not simply controlling resources. It extends to one's capability to get others to do something through controlling of resources.

Hall takes the concept farther, suggesting that the controlling aspect is the influence over the other actors. He claims power includes the capability to control the behavior of

others (Hall, 1991). Hall highlights French and Raven's (1968) discussion of coercion, rewarding, and cooperation as some commonly cited methods to influence others. In this sense, power is defined as 'power over' someone rather than 'power to do' something (Barnes, 1988).

Beyond the definition of power is the manner in which it is applied. Hall (1991) gives a short description of Morgan's (1986) classifications of power structures: autocracies, bureaucracies, technocracies, codetermination, representative democracy, and direct democracy. These forms of structure define the distribution of resources, the interaction of its members, and the formal (and informal) relationships formed to achieve established goals. Various factors, such as the actors' roles, knowledge, and skills (Scott, 1998) determined the specific style of resource management.

For this study, the codetermination category, within which parties combine in a joint management of mutual interests (Morgan, 1997), best defines the exemplary war coverage programs. For the military to manage the flow of information properly, it develops a co-determination structure, where the actors agree to such issues relating to roles and responsibilities (i.e., who has the rights to the rules and under what circumstances these rules apply). Ideally, the military will create a program wherein the media, for one reason or another, agrees to the procedure. This relationship becomes power-driven in terms of how each side exercises its claim to power using their role, knowledge, or skills within the organizational program.

Hall's concept of power fits well into studying the organizational structure of the war coverage program. It demonstrates that the exercise of power has an influence on tension as seen in its ability to control resources and its capability to influence outcome. The affect on tension is evident when the power causes a breakdown in the dependency creating conditions for a new form of organizational procedures to emerge.

4.3.2 Authority

Where power is a relationship of dependency on resources, authority is a relationship of common values. Hall's (1991) concept of the authority structure focuses on the legitimacy established when common understandings of the actors suspend judgment on the decision-makers. The norms and expectations developed and agreed upon establish legitimacy and ensure that the line of authority is accepted and even expected. In an ideal setting, all actors would be in agreement with the organizational goals and methods and, therefore, would adhere to their assigned roles and responsibilities.

Hall also defines authority in situational terms, wherein obedience becomes independent of common goals. Hall agrees with other theorists (Meyer and Goes, 1988; Ely, 1999; Leonard-Barton, 1995), who suggest that the organizational norms and practices are found in the efforts of the actors, the judgment criteria of the decision-makers, and the participation and perception of the stakeholders, as they work towards a common goal. Within this concept of authority, Hall suggests that the attitudes and behaviors of the stakeholders legitimize the authority. The stakeholders' willingness to submit to the situational authority of the organizational program provides a degree of stability. A stable structure provides a better opportunity for the organizational program to incorporate and maintain the needed authority. Without the stability (i.e., a disagreement in the organizational norms reflected in the hostile behavior of the stakeholders), the authority becomes illegitimate.

Building on Weber's (1968) typology, Hall (1991) identifies three types of situational authority: legal, charismatic, and traditional. One gains legal authority from the responsibility to command; charismatic authority from the devotion of the subordinates; and traditional authority from institutionalized roles and established goals. In these cases, a stable authority structure emerges that guides the expectations of the participants (Scott, 1998). In other words, the situation determines an authority structure, whether legitimate or not, for the leader to lead and followers to follow.

The military ultimately assumes authority over war coverage practices. Whether the military can achieve a legitimate authority depends on the common goals of the stakeholders, methods for handling tasks, and willingness of the media to be led. The degree of stability within this organizational structure (i.e., level of tension) is dependent on these actors accepting the legitimacy of the authority. The military's actions to maintain its authority and the media's acceptance of this authority determine the sustainability of war coverage procedures and the overall behavior of war correspondents. When the military's and the media's goals, methods, or even viewpoints are not the same, military authority may weaken, diminishing the military's control over reporters. There may be a subversion of the procedure if the reporter's commitment to the rules comes in conflict with his responsibilities to the public. The consequences of these actions, such as ironfisted authority or rogue reporting, may lead to instability in the relationship and a revamping of war coverage procedures.

Hall's approach to legitimate authority is the most closely associated structural element to the war coverage tension. This element encompasses the role of the military to command others, while recognizing the required-willingness of the media to be supervised. It reveals the intentions of the subgroups and even individual behavior exhibited in the viewpoints, goals, and behavior of these actors. This study examines how these intentional, overt behaviors of individuals, both reporters and military officials affect the relationship.

4.3.3 Conflict

Conflict emerges when interests collide, either as a by-product of a power struggle or as a catalyst to question authority (Hall, 1991). It ignites out of the incompatibility of the actors or through questionable actions taken within the hierarchical structure. Hall suggests that an organizational program experiencing internal conflict may lose its ability to control outcomes, or its outputs may shift to other groups outside the organizational program. Conflict undermines the entrenched procedures eventually causing them to be obsolete. The resulting effects may be a reduction in activities, in which the relationship of the members

within the organizational program breaks down. As a last resort, members may choose to leave the program and continue their effort from outside the group. This shift in outputs to other organizations or individuals may affect the organizational structure.

When conflicts arise, they introduce an opportunity for departure from old patterns of operation and give rise to new courses of action. These new courses of action may be detrimental to the organizational structure. Inappropriate efforts to resolve conflict resolution may deteriorate the stakeholders' confidence in the organizational program and could affect the ability of the members to meet their objectives. Hall (1991) suggests that conflicts rarely go to such extremes unless ignored. Although conflicts exist within all organizational programs, the manner of conflict resolution is the key to internal stability.

As was discussed in the introductory section, conflicts have been predominant in the military-media relationship. Conflicts arise when the strategy for maintaining national security becomes incompatible with the concept of freedom of the press, wherein the war coverage procedures put the goals of the military at odds with the media's responsibilities. This conflict arises when the military takes drastic actions to control the information-sharing procedure, or the media departs from agreed-upon principles in order to reassert its role as the fourth estate. Such drastic efforts if not resolved results in tension within the war coverage program.

This study identifies the causes of conflict, and methods to address them. Of importance to this study is how the actors address and settle the conflicts. Ideally, conflict resolution attempts to emphasize common interest and goals, or openly confront the problem to determine a working solution (Hall, 1991). However, the actors' behavior and actions, whether overt or covert, may prove counter productive to the conflict resolution. Their efforts to resolve the tension will affect the degree of cooperation among the members.

4.4 Element of the Organizational Environment

Hall's approach to organizational environment addresses its effect on structure, and therefore the process. He posits that the volatility and uncertainty of contents in the environment—such as technological breakthroughs, new climates, or changing social perception—inevitably affect the organizational structure. However, the conservative nature of an organizational program sustains its outcomes and goals throughout its lifetime, ideally leaving its process intact (Hall, 1991). Yet, all the while, there is the human experience, an active and vital factor of the environment, directing the procedures (Hawley, 1968). In this human ecology aspect the organizational members selects only those factors of the environment that they are willing, or able, to manipulate within the structure to maintain or recreate the process (Hall, 1991).

Hall speaks to this affect on the organizational process through Aldrich's (1979) analytical dimensions. He recognizes that there are several factors exerting some degree of influence on the organizational process. Borrowing from Aldrich, Hall identifies six environmental factors: capacity, homogeneity-heterogeneity, stability-instability, concentration-dispersion, consensus-dissensus <sic>, and turbulence. His treatment uses Dess and Beard's (1984) research to condense these six factors down to three analytical categories: munificence (capacity), complexity (homogeneity-heterogeneity and concentration-dispersion), and dynamism (stability-instability and turbulence). These three environmental elements provide a lens for exploring the organizational environments contents and conditions. A detailed discussion on these environmental elements, addressed below, better defines their ability to influence the tension within war coverage program.

4.4.1 Munificence

As Hall discusses, one of the purposes of an organizational program is to control its resources and, in doing so, vie for control over other stakeholders. However, there may be resources in the environment outside of the internal control of the organizational program. In

such cases, the effect of the environment on the organizational program is partially dependent on the program's ability (or inability) to manage these external resources. This is particularly true when the environment itself readily supplies these coveted resources to other actors without the need for an organizational structure. Hall (1991) describes this capability within the environment as munificence. Although the American Heritage Dictionary defines munificence as a liberality in bestowing gifts, Hall formulates a meaning that defines munificence in terms of how the environment bestows, or makes available, resources.

The availability of resources in the environment has an effect on the organizational procedures; however, the different venues for acquiring these resources may produce a greater effect. Environmental resources are open to other programs and even subgroups within the program. All actors have access to these resources external to the organizational program. Since the organizational program does not control these external resources, resource management may be problematic to the organization (Hodge, Anthony, and Gales, 1996). In this case, the munificence in environment may be detrimental to the controlling aspect of the organizational process (Hall, 1991).

In this discussion, munificence in the environment refers to the many sources of information (i.e., people on the streets, commentaries, independent reporting). The study recognizes that other logistical factors may be of interest to both the military and the media but for this study, these factors are only important in so much as they affect the availability of information. It is the availability of information, or the munificence of such sources, that is critical to the war coverage program. The munificence allows the media to find other sources of information beyond the military control.

Finding other sources of information beyond the military is paramount to the concept of investigative reporting. Conversely, if information is not readily available to all, the military may change the organizational control to re-distribute information fairly, countering the negative effects of scarcity. Alternatively, the military may use this factor to its advantage and impose rules regulating the distribution of information. In such cases, military leaders must create and recreate the rules of distribution to offset this environmental

condition. When the military attempts to control the environment, tension undoubtedly arises. Depending upon the munificence of the environment, military leaders may need to develop alternative war coverage procedures or reconsider the war coverage purpose.

Munificence becomes a negotiating agent of the stakeholders by forcing the organizational procedures to ensure a continuous supply of needed resources. The abundance or scarcity of resources contributes to the actors' acceptance of the procedures, which in turn determines willingness to share resources. In this sense, the environment affects the working relationship (i.e., level of tension) to the degree that the availability of information adjusts the procedures to meet the needs of the war coverage effort.

This study identifies the availability of sources in the environment, as well as the resources needed to obtain them, against the manipulating factors of the various actors that attempt to control the environment and its resources. The study uses four general strategies for dealing with this environmental contingency: adapting to, or avoiding the external demands; absorbing the needed parts of the environment into the organizational structure; establishing a cooperative behavior with the stakeholders; or manipulating the environment. These strategies are of interest to the war coverage program in that the war coverage programs tend to be vulnerable to the amount of data sources in the environment.

4.4.2 Complexity

Complexity exists in an environment where there is disparity among the stakeholders. That is, the more heterogeneous the actors, the more complex the environment; and the more homogeneous the actors, the less complexity (Aldrich, 1979). Hall (1991) furthers this description of complexity by applying Aldrich's concepts of homogeneous/heterogeneous environment to the distribution of resources. He claims organizational programs will distribute resources within a concentration of like-minded members. When there is a likeness among the actors (i.e., a common value system), then standard procedures are agreed upon, and resources are disbursed in a reasonable manner. This ease of connections and

interaction among the stakeholders is critical to reducing the complexity effect in the environment.

The degree of diversity will dictate the degree of complexity in the environment, and the distribution of resources and therefore the level of tension. If the original stakeholders are homogenous in their manners and methods, or even in their perceived goals and objectives, then simplicity may arise from within the environment. However, often is the case where organizational programs create opportunities for new relationships to form and working agreements to develop. These new groups may or may not be homogenous to the original organizational program and they may very likely change over time. As these relationships form between the groups, they inherently introduce diversity into the organizational environment.

As these new relationships develop, the environment becomes more complex. Moreover, as the environment becomes more complex the organizational program must adapt. Meanwhile the environment itself is going through changes that affect the relationship of the stakeholders. This adaptation to complexity may prove to be a hindrance to the original organizational program in meeting its goals or may be a necessary part of negotiating the environment. This balance between complexity and adaptation creates the conditions for the players to forge specific war coverage procedures.

Inherently like-minded actors will agree on the structure of the working relationship. When the war grows in volatility, changes in the rules and regulations for reporting are inevitable. Ideally, the restructuring of the war coverage procedures diminishes the effect of complexity in the environment by increasing the likeliness of the actors' commitment to the program. However, if the media and the military are not in agreement on the war coverage program's goals and objectives, one subgroup may have to make compromises in order to maintain a collaborative relationship or suffer the consequences (i.e., tension) of these rules.

This study looks closely at the characteristics of the stakeholders and the sub-groups, focusing on the extent to which individual goals and behaviors form or break a cordial

relationship. It recognizes the diversity between the military and the media but presupposes a degree of shared commitment, evident in the need for war coverage procedures. For the military-media relationship, this means the cooperative effort in creating and accepting war coverage procedures ought to decrease the inherent tension in the heterogeneous relationship. The research notes, however, that in a hostile environment, such as battlefields, even the most uniformed group will find disparity in its ranks.

4.4.3 Dynamism

Hall (1991) discusses dynamism in terms of measuring the level of uncertainty inherent in a turbulent environment. The unstable nature of such environmental contents as technology, politics, and culture creates this uncertainty. The uncertainty does not allow the organizational program to plan effectively. As the environmental contents advance or progress, the effect permeates through the environment creating a chain reaction, wherein the change in one content has ramifications on the others. That is, new technology may change the established culture, leading to a shift in social politics. Hall (1991) refers to these interactions as environmental turbulence. Together, these concepts of uncertainty and turbulence account for environmental dynamism.

Hall agrees with other researchers, for example, Burns and Stalker (1961), Cyert and March (1963), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Thompson (1967), Galbraith (1973), and Weick (1979) in their common understanding of dynamism as the causality of uncertainty and the inability of an organizational program to cope with change. Changing events and trends in the environment continually create indicators of arising uneasiness. Organizational processes detect or receive these changes and use the information to adapt to new conditions. However, the organizational program must continue to operate even as it changes its methods and activities to survive the uncertainty. His theory suggests that organizational programs in dynamic environments develop procedures to deal with uncertainty (Hall, 1991).

During wartime, the environment undergoes drastic changes as politics are polarized, new technologies are introduced, and old cultural norms are re-evaluated. As these environmental contents change and interact with the environment, they change the circumstances for war and the conditions for war coverage programs. In such a dynamic environment, it becomes difficult to maintain the agreed upon procedures. The dynamism keeps the procedure in a state of flux. The resulting effect creates fluctuations in the environment that the military-media relationship must simultaneously resist and accept. In the dynamism, the subgroups may find different means to adapt to the uncertainties. When these subgroups adapt to the dynamism differently, the relationship becomes estranged and tension ensues.

This study is especially interested in exploring the environmental contents and changing conditions as they differ from war to war. The research determines the effect of the changing times and technology that shapes how the subgroups react differently, either adapting to or resisting the new environment. These conditions—whether they are changing social attitudes, contemporary technology for news reporting, or other influential contents—create turbulence in the environment, upsetting the stability of the status quo.

4.5 Study Design on Tension

Using Hall's approach to organizational elements as a conceptual lens, the research explores the contentious military-media relationship within each war coverage program. Hall (1991) identifies several situations that may create tension within an organizational program. First among them is the nature of the activities, where the task of one person or persons is dependent upon others. In this dissertation, this interaction occurs when the media must rely on the military for data. Another issue of tension is the inequitable treatment, wherein a person's perception of unjust treatment results in a bitter relationship. For example, when the military is the subject of what it feels is biased or negative reports; or when reporters believe they are being denied access to military operations. This inequality may be real or perceived which introduces another level to the contentious situation. Different perceptions result in

people attaching different meanings to the same stimuli. One sees this regularly when different reporters have different takes on a story. This may escalate into the opposing subgroups of the organizational program (i.e., military and the media) negotiating for social changes.

These characteristics and conditions of the war coverage programs demonstrate the influence of organizational elements. The organizational elements that are of interest to this study are power, authority, and conflict, as they exist within the war coverage program and how they play out in the munificence, complexity and dynamism of the battlefield environment. The discussion on the structural elements identified, among other things, the inherently incompatible goals and expectations that may create tension within the military-media relationship. The discussion on environmental elements highlighted the instability and uncertainty of wartime. Together the study explores how the military and the media tends to circumvent, or ignored the loosely established procedures, forcing the organizational program to reform its practices or limit any shared activities.

5.0 Research Method

5.1 Introduction to the Case Studies

Researchers trying to understand the issues and challenges of war coverage programs are likely to confuse themselves with the numerous contradictions and paradoxes that perplex the field. Too often, the notion behind policy stands independent of the organizational program it forms. In developing procedures, the Department of Defense and the news bureaus may agree at the policy level only to find that the established structure for war correspondence fails to fit firmly in the dynamics of the war environment; or the more likely event may occur wherein military leaders in the battlefield simply do not implement Pentagon directives. The effects of an unsuitable structure, or the failed implementation of new directives, create the contentious relationship between the military and the media.

Researching the various war coverage programs, within their respective war, reveals the effect they had on the relationship and the source of the tension. Such programs as OWI, System of Voluntary Cooperation, National Media Pool, and the Embedded Program contain the context of the negotiation process between the military and the media as they determine the objectives for war coverage. Exploring these programs highlights how the military determines the operational activities to manage the war coverage procedures, as well as how the media molds the cooperative activities of the war correspondents.

In the dynamics of the organizational process, the internal-group conflicts and external personal commitments give rise to the contentious military-media relationship. Examining this conflict versus commitment factor within the war coverage programs framework illustrates how the characteristics of the war coverage created or elevated the tension. The case studies examine the contentious relationship prevalent in war coverage programs during four periods of conflict – World War II, Vietnam War, Gulf War, and Iraq War.

5.1.1 Assumptions

The study addresses the OWI and the war coverage during World War II only for its contextual grounding. The research treats World War II war coverage as the template structure, in order to gain insight into other war coverage procedures. The study assumes, through historical indicators and conventional wisdom, that the OWI was a successful program for organizing the partnership between the military and the media. Therefore, its war coverage program would be the standard-bearer for all war coverage programs. The reasoning for this benchmark is the claim that the tension between the military and media during World War II was at a minimum. Likewise, establishing this benchmark assumes the environmental factors, supporting the war effort, were influential to a cooperative military media relationship.

These assumptions are based on several factors, not the least of which is the belief that there was a commonly shared opinion on the justification of World War II. Other historical factors include the media's and the public's high respect for the military and the war correspondent's willingness to conform to the military for the sake of national security. Historical research into World War II war coverage methods highlights these topics as rational reasons for unity and cooperation. This historical understanding however romanticized as Boorstin (1977) and Evans (Interview, 2004) claim will be the framework for analyzing war coverage in other major conflicts.

In order to ground the other war coverage program to OWI, it further assumes that the uncensored nature of Vietnam War created the contentious environment; the failure of the National Media Pool during the Gulf War exasperated the relationship; and the Iraq War's Embedded Program alleviates the inherent tension within the military media relation. These other war coverage programs entertained different challenges and therefore each is analyzed under different concepts provided by Hall (1991).

- Vietnam War – the challenges of the System of Voluntary Cooperation (SVC) were survival through change and innovation.

- Gulf War – the challenges of National Media Pool (NMP) were goal attainment and participant satisfaction.
- Iraq War – the challenges of the Embedded Program were relationship as a social function.

Although these challenges could possibly be applied to each case study, they are selected as exclusive descriptions of each case study to represent best the different objectives and uniqueness of the particular war coverage program.

5.2 Research Design – Case Study Method

The research conducts a proper analysis of the unique circumstances of war coverage using a case study approach. This research method is chosen for its approach to recognize the dynamic changes of specific events in history. Prominent researchers, such as Yin (1994), Stake (1994), and Babbie (1991) recognize the Case Study method as a viable method for focusing on contemporary events, as well as for providing clarity to understand the different circumstances arising during similar events. It provides a means of recording conventional and cultural discovery within and across the time periods.

Stake (1994) identifies three approaches to the case study method—instrumental, intrinsic, and collective. Each is designed for a specific research objective. An instrumental case study provides insight into a specific issue or event, while an intrinsic case study allows one to gain a deeper understanding of the event itself. However, neither of these two provides the required cross-checking from one war to another; the collective case study does. The collective method allows a number of cases to be studied in order to examine a particular phenomenon. Given this advantage, a collective case study method is used for this dissertation. This method recognizes World War II, the Vietnam War, Gulf War, and Iraq War as case studies with distinct conditions specific to their time periods.

The research recognizes the effects of certain conditions, such as the behavior and attitude of the actors themselves, the changing settings, and the effect specific events have on

the procedures affiliated with an each event (Miles and Huberman, 1994). For this study, the primary actors are the military and the media (i.e., the participants who make contributions directly to the organizational program (Scott, 1998); the settings are World War II, Vietnam War, Gulf War, and Iraq War; the events are the efforts to report within and without the war coverage program and their procedural rules. In keeping with Denzin and Lincoln's (2000) directions, the discrete events within a time period are treated as independent data points. These data points represent the particularity and complexity of the military-media relationship under specific war coverage conditions.

Each war is treated as a separate case within the specific phenomenon of military-media tension. The research explores this tension within and across these case studies. A matrix, based on the collective case study method, shows the relation of these characteristics to Hall's organizational elements. This matrix is the tool of research and analysis. It will be further discussed in Section 5.2.1: Research Matrix.

As is the situation with the case study method, the research and analysis occurs simultaneously. Specifically, data collection and analysis are part of a repetitive process, wherein the research moves between literature review, interviews with experts and data analysis, and then back to the literature again to verify the data. The literature is revisited between interviews to gain a better understanding of the collected data. While not bearing directly on the previous interview, these variables become the basis for analysis and possible further research. This style of triangulation provided an audit trail consistent with the principles of credibility, to assure an unbiased, accurate, and thorough research process.

The use of multiple sources, including literature and interviews, increases the reliability of the data and verifies its worth to the study. The case study's findings prove to be more convincing and accurate when based on several different corroborating sources. This will be further discussed in Section 5.3: Data Collection. This collective approach also aids in arranging the data (Section 5.4) for analysis (Section 5.5).

The empirical method of collecting, arranging, and analyzing, aids in identifying the trends within and across particular cases (Babbie, 1991). This method identifies similarities and differences for comparing and contrasting the case studies. It also explores the past within the framework of today's understanding. Bassford (1994) suggests that this revisiting is necessary to identify temporal bias. The effects from the different cases are traced back to their causes, giving dimension to abstract concepts and demonstrating how such effects came to being.

This style of research lends itself to a descriptive review of the various military-media resources. It yields a qualitative discussion of the war coverage program highlighting the consequences of the rules, and how these consequences affect the working relationship of the military and the media. This study principle depiction is a descriptive discussion of the military-media relationship as an organizational dimension within the organizational environment in which the phenomena occurs.

5.2.1 Case Study Matrix

The case study method presents general characteristics of separate issues and events within each war coverage program. Many researchers (for example, Lincoln and Guba, 2000; Lieberman, 2000; Gomm et. al., 2000) note that this generalization in the case study method is limited to the findings of the specific case. Their argument claims that the case study findings cannot predict or even provide insight into significant results outside of the actual event. However, Yin disagrees with this argument, likening generalization of the case study method to statistics, noting that statistical studies accept a sample set is a generalization of the population as long as the sample set and the population are both defined similarly. The principle of analytical generalization proposed by Yin (1993) allows for interpretation of the findings. His approach permits generalization in the case study method if the characteristics essential to the research, are well organized. To this end, the research uses a matrix designed to examine the specific war coverage program against Hall's organizational elements (Chart

5-2.1). This matrix allows the study to go beyond the accumulation of conditions and general characteristics and actually organize the data for interpretation and analysis.

This matrix, designed for the collective approach, provides an analytical framework for interpreting specific characteristics and conditions as Leedy (2001) suggests. It offers a comprehensive method for categorizing critical data that may prove valuable to the interpretation of the study. From the matrix, one can interpret the data within and across the different organizational contexts.

Hall's Organizational Elements	Study (Chart 4-1)		Research					
			Data Collection, Data Arrangement, Data Analysis					
STRUCTURE ELEMENTS	Specific Description	Application to the Study	World War II - Section 6	Vietnam War - Section 7	Gulf War - Section 8	Iraq War - Section 9		
POWER								
AUTHORITY			Characteristics and conditions as found in literature and expert opinions.					
CONFLICT								
ENVIRONMENT ELEMENTS								
MUNIFICENCE								
COMPLEXITY			Characteristics and conditions as found in literature and expert opinions.					
DYNAMISM								
			Summary					

Chart 5-2.1 Case Study Matrix

Hall's six organizational elements are the specific categories for labeling conditions and characteristics of the military-media relationship. These organizational elements are not products of the study but only tools for categorizing the phenomenon and interpreting the data. The effects of these characteristics and conditions may match up with different elements. As such, the tension created by controversial war coverage procedures is

interpreted not only against an elements level, but also within the context that created the tension. In other words, organizational elements alone do not account for the tension, how they play into the military-media relation must be considered.

The matrix categorizes the research findings to highlight the important characteristics of the observed aspect creating a starting point for specific discussion (i.e., interviews). The interview carefully negotiates the discussions with the experts to overcome the generalization. It is important to stress that despite the knowledge and professional experience of the interviewee, this matrix does not allow extrapolation of the findings to the other cases. Nevertheless, in keeping with Yin's approach the matrix enhances validity by identifying the specific characteristic of the war coverage program and demonstrating that this characteristic does indeed reflect the specifics of the organizational element. This approach to validation is especially valuable when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 1994), as is the case when considering the military-media phenomenon against the context of the war coverage method.

5.3 Data Collection

Data collection follows Yin's approach to case study research. Yin (1994) identifies six sources of research evidence: archival records, documentation, interviews, direct observations, participant, and physical artifacts. However, only three—archival records, documentation, and interviews—are practical sources for this study. The accepted convention of these sources allows for a systematic and organized manner of data collection. These sources are readily established and therefore the findings of the review can be traced back to their source. To ensure consistency and credibility, the collection process applies the following principles: review government documents to determine the war program; review literature and war journals to reveal the cause and degree of tension or efforts to alleviate the tension; and conduct interviews for clarity and corroboration of the research. Literature and other available background material are reviewed before the interview to ensure that the interview is both candid and meaningful.

Official archival records, government directives and other official documents are obtained from the DoD Public Affair office and Executive records. Only peer-review data is considered. Since this research is qualitative and subjective in nature, these sources are initially weighted equally in the research, demonstrating a decent respect to the professional opinion of each writer. However, as the discussion progresses, the study acknowledges the better-informed analyst through numerous references and the shared-opinions of other analysts.

These data sources establish the official operating procedures of war coverage; however, the bulk of the research is built on a foundation of historical writings and war correspondents' reports. These documents include articles, war journals, and other literature that addressed military-media relationship at the time. Such conventional data infers a veracity to sources for determining perceptions, overt actions, and reactions to the war coverage program. The study treats these sources as primary sources to establish the degree of tension within the war coverage program. As secondary sources, the study reviews war correspondent stories for their insight into the contentious relationship. These war journals reveal the perspective of the writer. Interviews with subject matter experts are conducted to corroborate the findings from these writings and reports.

Successful interviews are achievable through preparation, question design, and proper management of the interview process. Preparation requires identifying subject matter experts (SME); people who have experience with, and knowledge of, these particular organizational programs and their tasks. Their involvement in military-media affairs (i.e., expertise in military public affairs or media involvement in war coverage) is the principal criterion for selection.

Initial research into the topic identifies certain influential, prominent, and well-informed military and media personnel as prominent participants; however, not all were accessible or available. Four to five subject matter experts are approached and interviewed for each case study. Their willingness to participate varies from full interviews and follow-

up interviews, to sharing outstanding moments or ideas for approaching the topic. This is noted next to the participants' name listed below:

World War II

Harold Evans (US News and World Report) full interview
Pascale Combelles Siegel (PhD, Defense Analyst) full interview
William Hammond (Senior Historian, U.S. Army) full interview
Tom Brokaw (NBC News Correspondent) contributed insight to World War II
Steve Lawrence (Adm, Korean War) contributed insight to World War II

Vietnam War

Jim Galloway (Senior War Correspondent) full interview
Bill Smullen (Public Affairs Officer, COMUS MACV) full interview
William Hammond (Senior Historian, U.S. Army) full interview
Brayton Harris (Capt. Navy Public Affairs) full interview
Joe McKirker (Navy Fleet Atlantic Public Affairs Specialist) full interview

Gulf War

Jerry Broeckert (LtC, Marine Public Affairs Officer) full interview
Barry Willey (Col Deputy Chief of Army Public Affairs) full interview
Pascale Combelles Siegel (PhD, Defense Analyst) full interview
Brian Cullin (Capt, Navy Dir. Public Affairs) full interview
Richard Galen (VP Office Public Affairs) contributed insight to Gulf War

Iraq War

Victoria Clarke (DoD Public Affairs) full interview
Bryan Whitman (OSD Asst DepSec. Public Affairs) full interview
Tony Shadid (Washington Post reporter) full interview
Anonymous, (Prominent Army Public Affairs Officer) full interview
John Matheny (DoD Public Affairs - OSI) contributed insight to Iraq War
Pete Worden (Gen. Army, Dir. OSI) contributed insight to Iraq War

Although the experience and expertise of SMEs vary greatly, each group of interviewees provides the necessary first-hand knowledge of events required by Marshall and Rossman (1995) for quality research.

Initial interviews are conducted face-to-face with subject matter experts (SME). Conversations last approximately an hour, with follow-through efforts (i.e., phone calls or

emails) made to clarify any specific points. This affords the best opportunity to get content information. The interviewees address their actual participation in the various war coverage programs to determine the level of experience and knowledge of the phenomenon (Lambe, 2000). To ensure that the proper thoughts are captured, the first draft of the case study is sent to the subject matter experts for approval. In some cases, upon reviewing the text the SME may choose to further comment; offering corroboration or denial of other accounts. This is done to ensure that the interviewees clarify the perceptions and attitudes of the stakeholders as Denzin and Lincoln (2000) recommend and also to provide the needed accuracy to the investigation on which Marshall and Rossman (1995) insist.

As part of the case study protocol, a set of unbiased questions and discussion points form the core focus of the interview (Attachment 1). This list of questions is compiled and grouped by topics to guide the interview. They are designed to be neutral rather than leading. Remaining neutral helps establish a better rapport with the participants. Likewise, the questions are intentionally broad and loosely structured to allow a better exchange of information. They are open-ended to draw out the assumptions and perspectives of the interviewee. These open-ended questions are used to allow the participants to more fully discuss their views and involvement; while semi-structured questions are used to seek specific types of information regarding historical situations and critical incidents. Together, they serve to identify key points from the literature and guide the discussion. Their main function is to keep the discussion flowing (Yin, 1994), not to look for specific answers. They are scripted to elicit experience and solicit perceptions from the participants. This open, exploratory method allows the participant to determine the substance of the response. It allows the interview to delve into subjects gleaned from the literature that relate to the subject matter. However, should the discussion get off track or delve into an unrelated topic, specific pointed questions are raised to control the flow of the interview and identify gaps in the answers.

The answers to the questions and the ensuing conversation provide an frank, comprehensive account of the inherent tension, at least from the interviewee's perspective. The research notes that the nature of the data and the interviewee's comments may be biased.

However, logical arrangement and rational interpretation of the data ideally alleviates this bias. The potential findings are drawn from the relevant data (Chart 5.3).

Hall's Organizational Elements	Archival Records, Documentation, Interviews
STRUCTURE ELEMENTS	POTENTIAL ASPECTS of the STRUCTURE
POWER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regulations for controlling information • Agencies and programs mission and culture • Detail ground rules
AUTHORITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overt attitude or covert behavior that subverts the procedures • Cooperative effort that adheres to the rules • Understanding of one's roles and responsibility
CONFLICT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Colliding interests • Incompatible objectives
ENVIRONMENT ELEMENTS	POTENTIAL ASPECTS within the ENVIRONMENT
MUNIFICENCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commandeering the sources • Shutting out the press • Willingness to share information • Reporting unilaterally
COMPLEXITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishing unity in a just war • Protesting the war • Polarizing conservative and liberal views • Agreeing on roles for a cooperative environment
DYNAMISM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting the changing technology conditions • Advancing traditional versus progressive movements • Adjusting to cultural paradigm shifts – Industrial to Information

Chart 5-3 Potential Aspects

This approach offers a structure for collecting multiple sources of data for investigating contemporary phenomena within and beyond the environment (Yin, 1993). It is designed to bring together the different sources and data types found within the case studies. Emphasis is placed on reviewing the literature for insight into the characteristics and conditions of war coverage procedures, and on conducting in-depth interviews to provide

completeness in understanding this phenomenon. Although these interviews corroborate the literature data, not all interviews result in empirical data. Instead, the interviews produce a range of results: providing answers to questions, offering guidance for further research, or simply giving thought to more questions along the way. It is important to note that while conducting the research new factors emerge requiring further analysis.

5.4 Data Arrangement

Logical data arrangement is critical to the analysis in order to strengthen one's confidence in the collected data against the consistency of the data analysis. The arrangement method has three stages. They are 1) critique the event, 2) apply meaning to the evidence, and 3) assign to the specific domain. These categorical procedures are derived from several approaches including Bassford (1994); Mason, et al. (1997); and Leedy (2001). This three-stage approach to organizing the data brings together the evidence of a contentious relationship, as seen within the context of the organizational element.

The exploration draws out the evidence of tension within the case studies, examining the existing and emerging conditions as the result of intentional, or evolutionary development. These events are assessed (Stage 1) for similarities and trends among the case studies and are interpreted (Stage 2) for meaning across the organizational elements. The information is then arranged (Stage 3) for analytical criticism of the dynamic interactions between the media and military, defining the phenomenon, and applying meaning to the research. The data is then categorized into Hall's organizational elements.

Stage 1: Critique the Event.

This stage reviews events from the literature, as well as personal experiences from interviews for each time period. The research and interviews consider all significant factors within their critical timeframe as evidence that leads to the contentious relationship. Care is taken to separate analytical data from anecdotal events or other data that does not contribute

to an understanding of this phenomenon. The study considers data that increases clarity of the event or provides reasoning behind actions.

Specifically, official government documents, including rules and regulations, are examined as authoritative directives; war journals are reviewed for insight and experience; and military and media personnel are interviewed to corroborate the data. The data is critiqued to characterize the experience and event within the war coverage program of each case study. Critical examination of the data is conducted not just within an episode of a war, but against the ideas that contribute to the event, and the stakeholders that benefit from particular procedures.

Stage 2: Apply Meaning to the Evidence.

This stage applies specific definitions and descriptions to the evidence, interpreting meaning out of the data. Historical perceptions and misperceptions of the political culture, military events, and the stakeholders' involvement (as a personification of the phenomenon) are clarified and corroborated. The effects of the stakeholders' perception of their roles and responsibilities are an integral part of this stage, as well as the effects of the changing environment.

The assigned interpretation provides a critical understanding of past events in a larger context, reflecting the cultural circumstances and ideological assumptions within the phenomena, as well as the roles played by key actors. In doing so, significant meaning is applied to the event based on a new level of understanding. These events can then be attributed to the various organizational elements.

Stage 3: Assign to the Specific Domain.

This stage identifies characteristics associated with the meaning of the data and assigns the evidence to an organizational element or elements. The applied meaning of Stage 2 determines how the experience fits within the category(s). This assessment categorizes the characteristics of the events by assigning the data to an organizational element and then assessing its affect on the tension within the relationship. The assessment links the causes,

effects, and trends to specific elements. The rationale for selecting a particular category, validates the applied meaning, further explaining the phenomenon.

As the instruction for each stage suggests, these steps are not necessarily done in succession. The critiquing, assessing, and assigning are done concurrently for a coordinated effort. It is a dynamic process where data collection, research, and analysis happen simultaneously. For example, data analysis happens when meaning is applied to the events and experiences during the data arrangement stages.

5.5 Data Analysis

In the data analysis stage, the characteristics and conditions of the war program data is reviewed for insight into the military procedures and U.S. policies that contributed to the military-media relationship. The data reveals the particularities of the military and media characteristics affecting the contentious tension. To this end, when analyzing the data, five tactics, identified by Miles and Huberman (1994) are used for generating meaning from qualitative data. It is not necessary to use all of these tactics in any one case study; however, all are considered to determine the best explanation of the data. These five tactics are listed below with a summary of how they are applied.

1. Historical Information

In applying meaning to historical information, the characteristics and conditions are considered within the context of the time frame. This is done to determine and interpret what exactly was happening in history. It is important to recognize that the historical conditions surrounding events are often skewed to the past. For example, although television was “available” in World War II, it was not widely used.

2. See Things and Their Relationships More Abstractly

The evidence exists in a dynamic environment. In order to see events in the abstract, the data is explored from several angles and reference points. Extrapolating the particulars of

the evidence from these dynamic conditions requires an understanding of the fluidness of history. For example, as previously noted, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact start of the Vietnam War; a fair argument claims the war was a result of the Versailles Treaty of World War II.

3. Assemble a Coherent Understanding of the Data

In assembling a coherent understanding of the data, the analysis considers the events leading up to the specific data points and the effects of the data on events that followed. That is, the data does not stand alone as a snapshot of history, but within a larger chain of evidence. For example, OSI was long dissolved before the development of the embedded process, but the chain of evidence provides a relationship between the two programs.

4. What Goes with What

Determining what event goes with what event requires arranging the data with like events. Patterns and repetition give meaning to the events and recognition of the influencing effects. It is important to note the recurring evidence within the case studies. The contentious relationship across the wars demonstrates that there is evidence of reoccurring circumstances.

5. Sharper Understanding

Sharper understanding of the evidence requires dissecting the event; comparing and contrasting its applied meaning against other applied meanings. By associating one event with other events determines how each fits within the whole phenomenon. For example, the 1968 Tet Offensive of the Vietnam War, taken as a single event, is explained differently than when considered within in the whole of the Vietnam War.

Due to the qualitative nature of the study, it is imperative that the research demonstrates a rational interpretation of the data in order to allow a convincing analysis of this phenomenon. Since the research effort is focused on drawing comparisons among the three cases—Vietnam War, The Gulf War, and Iraq War—against World War II, certain generalizations for data analysis are needed (Chart 5-5).

Hall's Organizational Elements	Data Analysis
STRUCTURE ELEMENTS	General Aspects for Identifying Data and Assigning Meaning
POWER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Controlling resources and logistics · Influencing outcomes and outputs · Capitalizing on unique skills (knowledge, laborer, or role)
AUTHORITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Exerting ones own or sub-groups goals · Demonstrating a willingness to cooperate · Conducting overt /covert actions counter-productive to the program
CONFLICT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Understanding ones role and responsibilities · Adhering to specific ground rules · Establishing procedures for resolution
ENVIRONMENT ELEMENTS	
MUNIFICENCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Flooding the market of ideas · Regulating the openness / secrecy · Commandeering the illicit war coverage method
COMPLEXITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Freeing diverse viewpoints · Changing traditional behavior · Separating disparity in attitude
DYNAMISM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Changing social condition · Developing advance technology · Polarizing of political positions

Chart 5-5 Data Analysis

As this chart shows, the data from each case study is categorized within the organizational elements. While the circumstances are different in each case, the characteristics of the war coverage effort categorized within identifiable, definable organizational elements reveal trends and patterns within and across the wars. These specific organizational elements point towards the cause for veering from the model and the factors that create the contentious relationship between military and the media.

5.6 Research Verification

One cannot study the tension within the military-media relationship, especially during wartime, by observation or experimentation. Instead, this phenomenon must be considered from other case studies in history. History, as described within the case study approach, provides the contexts of the culture and military structure wherein the war coverage procedures are formed. This research method provides a rationale for the study design, techniques for data collection, strategies for data arrangement, and approach to data analysis. It is oriented to produce the needed reconstructed understanding of a social world (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). In general terms, this qualitative research relies on the trustworthiness criteria described by Lincoln and Guba (1985).

The research parallels the conventional criteria of internal and external validity, reliability, and neutrality (Guba and Lincoln, 1981). Yin (1994) suggests that the internal validity and reliability of such data may be skewed; however, Yin believes that such subjective input only adds to a better understanding of the larger phenomenon. Thus, traditional criteria of internal and external validity are replaced by terms such as trustworthiness of the sources and authenticity of the data. Such tactics are consistent with those described by Yin (1993, 1994), Stake (1994, 1995) Guba and Lincoln (1981), Lincoln and Guba (1985), and Miles and Huberman (1994).

5.7 Research Method Summary

The case studies explore the tension prevalent in war coverage during three periods of conflict—Vietnam War, Gulf War, Iraq War—and categorize them against the organizational elements for a descriptive discourse (Part II – CASE STUDY). By looking into war correspondence as case studies, the research highlights various characteristics of the tension brought about by the organizational elements. Within these categories, this review identified certain aspects of the tension found across the war coverage programs. The analysis approach applies meaning to build a descriptive summary of the contentious relationship,

tracing the assumptions and rationales back to the data and its source. The case studies analyze the war coverage programs in order to determine how the different approaches manage the tension within the relationship. The significant factors of these case studies are categorically linked to the organizational elements.

In the conclusion (Part III - CONCLUSION) of the dissertation, the findings of each case study are reviewed in the context of war coverage programs as a whole. The review ties together the organizational elements within the war coverage programs, to give an account of the tension within the military-media relationship. In its conclusion, this dissertation addresses how the specific elements of power, authority, conflict, and munificence, complexity and dynamism influence the military-media dynamics and the ability of the organizational program to manage the tension. As a final thought, the study provides insights into how this military-media dynamic incorporates these elements into managing the contentious relationship.

PART II CASE STUDY

6.0 World War II – The Model Relationship

6.1 Historical Introduction

World War II was one of the most publicly supported wars in American history. History records how the public concurred with the government policy to join the fighting in Europe and declare war in the Pacific. The citizenry viewed the actions taken by the government as acceptable and necessary during a troubled time (Brokaw Interview, 2004). This practice was appropriate to Americans because the public viewed the cause for war as right for America.

The government's immediate action was to form specific agencies to handle logistical issues. Analysts, such as Evans (Interview, 2004), claim the government's actions in creating programs dedicated to the war effort assisted in managing the challenges found in the hostile environment. This was especially true in the controlling of war information. The public and the media understood that secrecy was vital to the war's success wherein victory was the only option. Roosevelt had the support of the public to work the war effort in secrecy. He also had a legal standing.

As previously noted in the in Section 1.1 Background, prior to World War II, the president had the power to control military information given to the media. The Military Installation and Equipment Protection Act provided the president with the authority to censor the release of military secrets. This legislation, enacted in 1938, forbade the printing of photographs, sketches, or maps of military bases. It also gave the President the authority to define the type of military information requiring security protection. Nevertheless, even with this law in place, President Roosevelt was reluctant to exercise his authority. He believed it was critical for Americans to stay informed about the war (Sweeney, 2001).

The Roosevelt administration was committed to promoting the national interest and saw the handling of the war information as a strategy for maintaining national morale and

ensuring public support for the troops (Bliss, 2002; Edwards, 1998). Roosevelt needed a cooperative strategy, so that war correspondents could convey the warfare development to the public aiding the war effort (Cooper, 2003b). Obtaining the media's cooperation required placing the authority for such an effort within key agencies, managed by highly respected men. To this end, President Roosevelt created the Office of Censorship (OC) and the Office of War Information (OWI). These offices managed the strategic release of war news, with an ultimate goal of gaining and maintaining support for American involvement in World War II.

Many historians believe these managers of wartime information handled the organizational elements, such as authority and complexity properly to form a straightforward approach to war coverage during World War II. Whether it was the assumed righteousness of defense that decreased the complexity among the stakeholders, or the recognition of military's legitimate authority to operate, these stakeholders found an identity of purpose within an organized structure (Evans Interview, 2004).

6.2 Organizational Structure

6.2.1 Office of War Information's Structural Dimension

World War II's military leaders treated war coverage as a logistics issue, meaning that it was an aspect of military operations that requires procurement, distribution, maintenance, and materials and personnel. It was as much a part of military planning as food rationing or the Army Nurse Corps. As with these other tightly guarded resources, war information fell under the control of government-created programs. Roosevelt's administration created these programs with specific objectives in mind. In the case of war intelligence the Office of Censorship (OC), established in 1941, had the objective of preventing news organizations from publishing sensitive information. Its counterpart, the Office of War Information (OWI) created in 1942, established procedures for informing reporters on the rules and regulations of reporting military operations. The media did not initially accept this institutionalizing of discretionary power. The thought of controlling information conjured up images of propaganda and government misinformation (Knightley,

1975). Roosevelt understood this concern. To ease the acceptance of these controversial missions he looked for respected leaders, familiar with the working of the news bureau business to assist him. He found them in former news editors.

Roosevelt appointed Byron Price the director of OC. Price instituted a system of voluntary self-censorship, setting two conditions for the media: the stories must be accurate and in their telling and, they could not help the enemy (Sweeney, 2001). A year later, Roosevelt tapped Elmer Davis, a respected journalist, to be the director of OWI. Davis issued the Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press, placing the onus for censorship directly on the reporter and delegating the authority to release information to the appropriate military office. The operation of these two offices controlled the flow of wartime information; however, history suggests that OWI was the more influential agency in war coverage procedures.

Under Davis' leadership, the OWI became the major government agency for war coverage acting as a go-between for the media during the war. The OWI became the clearinghouse for all American war news (Boydston, 1992). Davis' goal was to establish a set of procedures wherein the war correspondents could travel with troops for an accurate recording of the battlefield. He did so with the intent of delivering factual representations of the war (Winkler 1978). It was his belief that the only way the press would accept censorship of reporting was through mutual trust (Clarke Interview, 2004; Evans Interview, 2004). This careful exercising of organizational power established a degree of trust first, that lead to a willing partnership in military-media relations. This trust relied on a great deal of self-censorship from the reporter.

OWI required the press to submit pictures and other sensitive information to the military for review prior to publication (Roeder, 1993). Moreover, the military was able to maintain control of intelligence and information distribution at the frontline. By this way, the military censored much of the intelligence before even releasing it to the press (Knightley, 1975). In this practice, military leaders exercised their authority over the battlefield through procedural guidance called the Code of Wartime Practice.

The Code of Wartime Practices and the war correspondent accreditation process formalized this procedure for managing information. The news bureaus voluntarily accepted the Code, registering reporters with military commands, and guaranteeing the good behavior of their reporters (Knightley, 1975; Schorr, 2003). In agreeing to this accreditation process, the military assigned war correspondents to individual army units. As members of the unit, they were entitled to the full support and protection of the military (Cassell, 1985). In exchange for support and protection, reporters agreed to submit all articles to their military leader in advance of sending them to their news bureau (Knightley, 1975). The reporter eagerly accepted this responsibility, believing that the best way to report on the war was to be in it.

Not everyone viewed the accreditation process favorably. Some in the military were opposed to this arrangement, quoting Admiral King's famous adage of World War II - "tell the press nothing until after the war then tell them who won". Weinberg (1968) suggests that these leaders believed it would prove challenging to separate public information from classified data. However, other leaders realized releasing certain information was crucial to maintaining public support for war. Most military leadership understood that by building public support for American mobilization, the military and the OWI could further encourage war correspondents to identify strongly with the war effort. Moreover, these leaders realized that if the military could get press cooperation, the military could more easily manage war information. It was essential for to make the reporter feel duty-bound to military authority. This was not difficult to do.

In the correspondent's mind, obeying the war coverage regulations meant the success of the war. War correspondents, such as Walter Cronkite (1996) wrote of reporters following the military's authority because it was a just war. John Steinbeck (1994) also declared that Americans knew which side they were on and that the Nazi were on the other side. For many reporters such as these, going outside the proper military channels seemed, under the circumstances, to be aiding and abetting the enemy. Even Knightley (1975), whose book The First Casualty does not paint such a patriotic picture, posited, "war correspondents went

along with the official scheme for reporting the war because they were convinced that it was in the national interest to do so”.

The media further yielded to the military’s legitimate authority to manage the information recognizing the necessity for a one-source explanation of the war effort. Some post-World War II analysts, such as Roeder (1993) see this practice of information control as media censorship, while others, such as O’Brien and Parsons (1995) recognize the need to keep confidential information out of the hands of the enemy. Although critics like Knightley (1975) believe that OWI policy co-opted the press during World War II, at war end few analysts share these opinions. Victory in World War II, and the holistic reporting, contributed to the achievements of OWI, and fostered a good relationship between the military and the media.

Conflicts between reporters and military leaders over releasing information were often avoided through mutual consensus and adhering to the rules of the war coverage program (Cassell, 1985; Evans Interview, 2004). The OWI provided a structure of cooperation and unity allowing leaders to exercise power discretely. The procedures guided the war coverage and allowed the system of voluntary censorship and military control of information to work with little conflict. Although the conflict over reporting did not subside completely, OWI was able to build a broad consensus over the goals of the war. The goal of war coverage recognized the military’s need for secrecy and military leaders’ legitimate authority over all resources in the battlefield. A mutual understanding and cooperative effort between reporters and the military lessened the affect of the inherent tension within the relationship.

6.2.2 OWI’s Structural Elements Influence on Tension

OWI control over the access to information during the war was a controversial proposition. Maintaining the tension created in the effort to control information was the responsibility of all: the trusted agency, the tolerant public, the honored soldier, and the

respected reporter. The reporter's willingness to be assigned to a military unit, and the military's respect for the war correspondent, demonstrated a desire to avoid conflict within the program. Nevertheless, perhaps the biggest reason for OWI's success was that in this hostile time, the public was not confused as to the purpose and goal of the war. During anxious moments, the public could turn to one source (i.e., its government) for reassurance, and the government and its agents, both military and media, offered the assurance of victory. The efforts of the program were apparent in the organizational elements that affected the characteristics of the military-media relationship. Breaking this argument down, one can see how the organizational elements kept the military-media relationship in check.

6.2.2.1 Power

As this case study demonstrates, the OWI's efforts maintained a low level of tension during World War II through trust. Trust was established by selecting respected leaders whose characters were beyond reproach. The war correspondents and the public then deem the actions taken by these trusted leaders in exerting organizational power, such as establishing the Code, as justifiable.

The creation of the Code reflected Davis' (and Roosevelt's) understanding that if the citizens were denied access to reasonable amounts of information, or, worse, if they were deceived about policies and events, their support could turn to opposition (Evans Interview, 2004). A key point to the low level of tension was this philosophy. Davis recognized that OWI's objectives were not only national security issues, but to maintain a free press in a democratic society. OWI's undisputed policies and the leadership behind them sustained the goodwill between the military and the media. Through the OWI, the military and the media were able to reach a successful level of trust in their respective goals of serving the public. This shared commitment to the public allowed both the media and the military to maintain a cooperative war coverage program.

Maintaining national morale and support for wartime policies depended heavily on a media-informed public (Edwards, 1998). Creating an organization with the proper trustworthiness was necessary to handle this delicate situation and establish a balance between the value of information and national security (Evans Interview, 2004). The OWI established itself as the sole arbiter for managing war information and managing the war correspondents, properly.

6.2.2.2 Authority

As this case study demonstrates, the accreditation process maintained a low level of tension. The accreditation process created a structure for legitimizing the military's authority over the media. Its goal was to assign war correspondents to army units, an essential procedure for media access to the battlefield (Schorr, 2003). This display of organizational authority requires acceptance among the actors. The war correspondent accepted this assignment knowing that in doing so he would be placed under the direction of the military leadership. This concurrence among the subgroups establishes a sense of cooperation and a low level of tension.

Being accredited meant the reporter had to adhere to certain rules before becoming a legitimate member of the unit; not the least of which was the recognition of the military authority over the battlefield and all actors in it. Agreeing to this assignment, the reporter became a viable member of the unit, and the military leader affirmed his legitimate authority over war coverage procedures.

Legitimate authority creates a cooperative organization among the actors through official recognition of roles and responsibilities. From the media's perspective, the reporter believed his responsibility lay with the military and the quest for victory. In his assignment, the war correspondent saw the front, but more importantly, the reporter saw the 'other side' of the war effort in its fullness (Evans Interview, 2004). In seeing the harshness of war and telling the soldier's story, the war correspondent saw his role as patriotic and a call to civic

duty. Many analysts (such as Mordan, 1999; Stebenne, 1991; Arant and Warden, 1994; Clarke Interview, 2004) agree that the success of the program resided in the element of cooperation and recognition of the separate but equally important roles of the military and the media during World War II. The war coverage program relied on a process of teamwork that allowed the military its authority and the media a place within the unit (Evans Interview, 2004). Through mutual respect and trust, the military and the media formed a cooperative structure.

6.2.2.3 Conflict

As the case study demonstrates, maintaining a low level of tension lessens the need for conflict resolution. Although conflict still existed within the war coverage program, an organized effort, with established rules and a shared understanding of roles and responsibility, offset the tension and dictated the proper course of action for conflict resolution. This case study primarily addresses OWI conflict resolution as found in the Code.

The OWI's Code imposed a balance between the openness of a free press and the secrecy for national security. While the struggle between accuracy and secrecy created obstacles for OWI, analysts, such as Sweeney (2001) and Hammond (1991) believe the Code of Wartime Practice maintained a workable balance between wartime security and the media's right to know. It was not controversial for the reporter to recognize the military as the only authority during wartime (Lingeman, 1970; Rhodes, 1976; Weinberg, 1968; Winkler, 1978). Through the OWI's rules, the military and the media were able to resolve contentious issues before these conflicts deteriorated the accepted roles and responsibilities.

From an organizational perspective, the OWI method proved successful in sustaining the goodwill between military and the media in World War II. The Code of Wartime Practice provided the guideline for roles and responsibilities of both the soldier and the reporter. By establishing specific rules, Davis left little room for debate or

misunderstandings that may have bred contempt. For example, the rules on not releasing pictures of the American dead or other harsh realities kept the decision out of the military and the media. That decision was left to Davis and OWI.

Some analysts (Knightley, 1975, Roeder, 1993, Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995) raise the issue regarding these rules of full disclosure, or lack thereof. Their claim is that OWI personnel kept certain graphic pictures out of public print in order to avoid negative opinions on the Allies performance. These analysts suggest that this action created a conflict in the form of military manipulation. The military manipulated the press to keep the harsh reality of war from the public (Roeder, 1993). However, this argument does not stand up to the fact that the media often sought the advice of the military before releasing pictures and copies (Knightley, 1975). For example, historical records reveal the dilemma of war correspondents reporting General Patton slapping a wounded soldier. These reporters, understanding their role and responsibility, sought the advice of General Eisenhower, a trusted leader.

6.3 Organizational Environment

6.3.1 World War II's Environmental Dimension

While controlling public information proved a challenge in classifying sensitive data, the single biggest problem was the war itself. World War II was a massive, dangerous effort within a new, dynamic setting. The wrong outcome would put the safety of the world at stake. Developing a sense of victory within the minds of the public was the real task for the war coverage program. Most of this information campaign countered the enemy propaganda. It was these varying reports, both good and bad, which allowed the public to form their own image of war.

During World War II, both the Axis and the Allies treated war coverage information an extremely limited resource necessary to feed the public. This was a separate campaign from intelligence data, the resources necessary to run the war. Each side disbursed its war coverage in the form of newspaper reports and radio broadcasting. Reports were from either

the Axis or the Allies; there were no other sources of information. Any external source from the environment was adapted into the war coverage effort by the military and the media. Leaders of the Allies could not control what the enemy released; they could only make an effort to limit the resources external to the war coverage program.

Government propaganda was a major weapon of the information war. Both the military and the media joined this effort to create a constant stream of war propaganda designed to establish a clear line between right and wrong, good and evil. Rhetoric and imagery were part of the government strategy to invoke patriotism and maintain an inclusive environment countering the exclusionary tactics of the Third Reich (O'Brien and Parsons, 1995). In creating these images and taking control of the developing war environment, OWI's methods countered other sources of information coming out of the battlefield.

OWI's goal was to build a consensus among Americans that the war was for a common goal -- to aid allies in Europe and defend American interests in the Pacific. Cooperation and commitment among civilians, soldiers, and war correspondents was needed to maintain a shared vision of victory during this world war. It was this culture, one of just cause reassured through propaganda and Roosevelt's fireside chats that the media served. These shared norms and values defined a unified culture of national pride and patriotism decreasing the complexity for the stakeholders. Many military and media analysts agree with Yoder (1996) and Evans (Interview, 2004) that the greatest trait of World War II was this common cause and the shared purpose among the citizenry that united a depressed nation.

Perhaps because of the hostile environment and the war's enormous task, the media choose not to aggressively pursue other sources of information (Brokaw Interview, 2004). War correspondents and their editors knew they were part of the common effort to defeat the enemy (Evans, 2003). The military relied on this alliance to minimize complexities in the war zone.

Beyond the cultural aspect of these common goals and national unity, there was the sheer desire of the war correspondent to be part of the war effort. Many in the press held the

infantry and military commanders like General Eisenhower in the highest regard. The reporters joined the army, wearing the uniforms and traveling with soldiers, if not officially, certainly unofficially. They wanted to be the war's storytellers. For the war correspondent in the battlefield, his desire was reporting to the home front the welfare and success of the unit, focusing on the heroics of army life.

In My War, Andy Rooney (1995) recorded his times as a soldier correspondent reporting for Yank Magazine. James Tobin (1997) wrote of Ernie Pyle - perhaps the most famous war journalist - and Pyle's appreciation of the infantry. Historians, such as Weinberg (1968), Lingeman (1970), Rhodes (1976), and Winkler (1978) speak of these war correspondents accepting battlefield censorship as standard operating procedures of military service, yielding independence and compromising objectivity to patriotic participation. As such, they were prominent in the daily life of the public (Wood, 1967). Elevating the reporter in this role was the growing technology of radio.

The radio reporter in particular came into his own during the war (Howeth, 1963; Wood, 1967). Where the war correspondent focused on descriptive tales, the radio reporter centered on a more detached narrative of U.S. success to keep public opinion high and morale positive (Wood, 1967). His voice offered comfort to the personal aspect of the news, narrating to the public the reality of war's human tolls (Cloud and Olsen, 1996). With regular periodical updates, it made a personal connection with the audience, literally speaking to them. This new means of reporting provided a stable source of information in a dynamic environment; bringing calm to one's living room and one's life.

In World War II, the war correspondents interaction with the community influenced public opinion. They helped sell the war (Zeman, 1982). The reassuring, fundamental reporting helped to fend off the hostile environment. In doing so reporters emerged as significant members of the news organization, but more importantly the war correspondent emerged as significant members of the military (Lawrence Interview, 2004). According to one analyst (Bliss, 2002), the military constantly honored the reporter in his role and responsibility to free a world. His efforts fostered and maintained a low level of anxiety with

the public (Evans Interview, 2004). He certainly could not be the catalyst of any relational tension.

6.3.2 World War II's Environmental Elements Affect on Tension

The World War II environment was conservative in nature. Roosevelt had been president for twelve years and the nation was in the midst of a great depression. After Pearl Harbor, when the U.S. entered the war there was a collective feeling that the U.S. would come out of its decline and achieve greatness. Everyone, from the soldier to the production line riveter, was working toward this prowess. This unity among the citizenry warded off any tension surfacing in the environment.

As the war developed, new technology entered the war zone in a military-controlled manner. That is, there was no other technical effort or entity attempting to influence the culture. The U.S. dedicated all resources and reserves to the war effort. Military needs effectively controlled the environment and the behavior of the actors. These factors guided the nation and its people through the dynamic war environment. The all-consuming effort of the war was apparent in the environmental elements that created and maintained a working relationship among all stakeholders, especially the military and the media.

6.3.2.1 Munificence

As this case study demonstrates, the relationship maintained a low level of tension by adapting the environment into the program. Munificence of information tends to overwhelm the message, but the reporters and OWI overwhelmed the environment with a singular message. Flooding the environment with controllable information diluted the negative effects of munificent sources, and brought the reporter and the military to a common goal.

The OWI's organizational structure resided in its effort to control the flow of intelligence. Along with this task came the effort to reduce the various sources of information inherent in the environment. Most of these sources were enemy reports and propaganda contributed to the munificence of information in the environment. There were many negative reports from the enemy. These false and biased reports played hard on the public's support. Providing a positive message back to the home front proved to be an enormous task for both the reporter and the OWI. The reporter was conscious of the effect his report would have on the military, and wrote to address or counter any misinformation. By attacking the negative reports, the war correspondent was able to join the war effort and fight the way he knew best.

The OWI's best method for managing this abundance of negative information was to counter it with positive messages (Bliss, 2002; Laurie, 1996). Under OWI's directive, the war correspondent released accurate and truthful stories that portrayed the war in a positive and heroic light (Lane, 1998). This type of coverage demonstrated that what matters for the war was not how to decipher the overwhelming information, but to place it within the proper context so the stories could be received (Evans, 2003). The media and the military contained the unwarranted sources of information by recognizing the critical need to keep "truthful the streams of fact which feed the rivers of opinion" (Steel, 1980); in doing so these two groups maintained a committed relationship.

6.3.2.2 Complexity

As this case study demonstrates, the stakeholders maintained a low level of tension in the complexity environment by finding a common cause and promoting it within and throughout the culture. OWI leaders understood that maintaining a shared cause and commitment among the stakeholders was necessary to form national unity. Its efforts created a high public morale. This commonality promoted a similarity within the citizenry and decreased the complexity of positions among Americans. Creating an environment wherein

the stakeholders shared the same goals and objectives minimized the agitating factors inherent in their different dispositions.

The reporter was committed to his role and responsibility in forming this unified front in public support. He kept the home front informed, bolstering morale, and building support for the war effort (Bliss, 2002). By promoting the virtues of a victorious war, the war correspondents lessened the effect of the divergence of opinion among the American public (Loving, 2001).

The OWI, on the military's behalf, presented the conflict between the Allies and the Axis, and other war-related issues, in unambiguous terms promoting the Allies success (Roeder, 1993). This dedication to victory created a public consensus of support for the war. OWI aided the forming of this consensus by lessening the complexity of the stakeholders, through controlling the images coming out of the battlefield. In order to help maintain the unity and focus of the war effort, OWI personnel kept harsh pictures out of the public domain until necessary (Morris and Henderson, 1945). Then as America grew wary of war, a divergence of opinion grew. OWI leaders released specific images that shored up support for victory.

6.3.2.3 Dynamism

As the case study demonstrates, the culture kept the effect of the dynamic environment to a minimum, maintaining a low level of tension. However, during World War II change was happening in several sectors of the culture. In the field of politics, there was an anti-war movement; in technology, television was in its infancy; and on a social front the war brought America out of its depression. Considering these dynamics of a war environment, it is safe to say that the military and the media maintained a degree of control for consistency.

Methods of information exchange were advancing in the commercial environment. By World War II, the media's procedures had outpaced the military's, whether through advanced technology, a shorter chain-of-command, or simply the difference between media-quick versus military-accurate. However, the news bureaus voluntarily placed aside these advances for the good of the war (Combelles-Siegel Interview, 2004). For most of the war, the main source of information for the American public was the war correspondents and their reports in newspapers and on radio.

The media restricted its use of technology and technique so as not to affect the dynamics of the war zone (Neuman, 1996). That is, the press did not attempt to introduce new media technology into the battlefield. Working with the available military technology, the media managed to keep the changing environment in check. As an extra measure of control over this dynamism, in the 1940s, the government had regulatory control over the airwaves, including both news wire and radio (Sweeney, 2001). By controlling one item of the environment, the government could lessen the turbulence-effect on the other contents in the environment.

Although the world was changing, the turbulence did not immediately affect the information exchange techniques. The inherent uncertainties in the war were enough for the military to handle, and neither media nor military leaders wanted to introduce more. The strain of the war itself would not allow tension, simply due to the dynamic environment, to arise within the war coverage program.

6.4 World War II as a Benchmark

The organizational structure of OWI represents a model method for examining the military-media relationship against the organizational elements. This war coverage program met the major objectives of providing media access to the war, mitigated misinformation, and ensured support from the public to justify the war, as Whitman (Interview, 2004) claims a program ought to. However, the success of World War II reporting was in handling the war

coverage procedure responsibly rather than in pursuing these specific objectives. OWI methods sought the means to produce an acceptable end.

The discussion demonstrates OWI approach for war coverage and the military-media relationship. It highlights the characteristics of the World War II war coverage program that reflected favorably on OWI efforts to manage the organizational elements (Chart 6.4). OWI leaders exercised power through trust; authority cooperation legitimized military authority; and the actors resolved internal conflicts in accordance with the Code of Wartime Practices. By developing a structured program, the relationship was able to combat the environmental elements during the war years. The war coverage produced positive accounts of military prowess to maintain unity in the citizenry. Through OWI and the Code of Wartime Practices, the deliberate management of the organizational elements produced these desired results.

Hall's Organizational Elements	World War II	Vietnam War	Gulf War	Iraqi War
STRUCTURE ELEMENTS	Their Affect on Tension within the War Coverage Program	Case Study		
POWER	Exercise of power requires a degree of trust in those controlling the resources. Trust is found in respected leaders whose characters are beyond reproach from the subgroups. The subgroups then deem the actions of the trusted leaders justifiable.			
AUTHORITY	Legitimate authority requires acceptance of a sanctioned process. The concurrence among the subgroups establishes a sense of legitimacy. Legitimate authority creates cooperation among the actors through official recognition of roles and responsibilities.			
CONFLICT	Conflict resolution requires an organizational structure of establishes rules. The rules then dictate the proper course of action for conflict resolution.			
ENVIRONMENT ELEMENTS				
MUNIFICENCE	The negative effect of munificence is countered by overwhelming it with controllable resources. Flooding the environment with positive information hostilities among the stakeholders.			
COMPLEXITY	The negative effect of complexity is minimized when the stakeholders share a common cause. Developing the same goals and objectives and promoting them to form a united front minimizes the agitating factors inherent in the diverse personas of the stakeholders.			
DYNAMISM	The negative effect of dynamism is lessen when programs maintain consistency throughout the changes. Change in the environment is inevitable but controlling the changes within the program sustains the working relationship of the sub-groups.			

Chart 6-4 World War II as a Benchmark

The following three case studies will research the characteristics of the next three major U.S. wars and their respected war coverage programs against the findings of World War II case study. This exploration of the war coverage programs will identify each program's effort to manage the emerging tension between the military and the media.

7.0 Vietnam War – Uncensored

7.1 Background into Vietnam War's System of Voluntary Cooperation

It is difficult for historians to pinpoint an exact date for the start of the Vietnam War. Many historians, like Palmer (1984) and Schulzinger (1997) have noted how the war in Vietnam was a continuation of U.S. World War II-China and 1950's Korea policy. These historians discuss how the conflict in the Asian Peninsula began in the 1940's and 1950's. With each new conflict, the war effort and its coverage continued to spread and adapt to a struggling post-World War environment. For some historians, such as Epstein (1973) the Korean War and Vietnam War were merely extensions of World War II; however, as the war continued certain standard operating procedures began to breakdown. One of them was the established war coverage code of World War II. The OWI-routine slowly vanished. Such disregard for the codes emerged after Truman closed the OWI in 1945, declaring censorship illegal except in cases for national security.

Truman's administration deemed an OWI-type agency unnecessary, believing such issues could be resolved through the System of Voluntary Cooperation (Harris Interview, 2004). However, MacArthur's command defied Truman's position. As battlefield reporting endured, military attempts to censor these reports failed. For example, General MacArthur, Supreme Commander of UN forces in Korea, tried to impose censorship against criticizing his leadership (Bliss, 2002). The press ignored this command and wrote openly on MacArthur's belligerence. This display of disloyalty, forced MacArthur to restrict war correspondents reporting to military headquarters in Tokyo (Hallin, 1986).

The procedure for reporting on the Korean War transformed the war coverage program. The cooperative program, established by the OWI, was not completely sustainable in the Korean War, specifically with reports on MacArthur and his leaders (Hallin, 1986). The media still maintained the rule of self-imposed censorship regarding military security through the System of Voluntary Cooperation (Knightley, 1975). However, reporters no longer submitted every article for military permission or considered military rules mandatory.

These minor dissensions from military rules created moments of contention (Willey, 1999). The cooperative atmosphere of World War II began to crack.

The dissension from the war coverage practice led to a changing relationship that allowed a seed of contempt to grow between the military and media. This seed sprouted full bloom when Kennedy Administration found itself involved in its own debate with the news media regarding the Bay of Pigs. President Kennedy was furious at the media for announcing the imminent Bay of Pigs invasion. He urged the press to ask itself if the reporting would be in the interest of national security before running potentially harmful stories (Kennedy, 1961). The media, as a whole, rejected this plea for self-restraint. The press believed that the guideline for self-censorship only applied during combat conditions (i.e., in the battlefield under a declaration of war) (Knightley, 1975). This guideline slowly took hold as the U.S. military began advising the South Vietnamese military. This media-determined requirement regarding censorship would haunt the Johnson administration, as well.

When President Johnson took office, the U.S. had yet to declare war officially in Vietnam. The U.S. involvement was still a handful of advisors and a few reporters, working under the System of Voluntary Cooperation (Smullen Interview, 2004). This agreement was still the predominant structure for coverage. However, Johnson was not satisfied with such a loose program. From his early days in the White House until his last, Johnson attempted to convince defense officials to impose regulations on the ever-increasing numbers of war correspondents. However, The Department of Defense and State Department officials concluded censorship would not work for several reasons (Thompson, 1991). First, the military did not control every means of communication. Most of the communication networks were in Saigon and neighboring countries. In the military's advisory role, it had limited logistical resources (Hammond Interview, 2004). Military leaders did not have the equipment or manpower to govern or restrict the transmitting of stories. Second, the military leaders had no legal authority over foreign media (Hammond Interview, 2004). They had no means to control reports coming out of Hong Kong or elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Third, since the Congress had not formally declared war in Vietnam, General Westmoreland did not

believe military commanders had the legal authority to impose censorship (Hallin, 1986). This belief harkened back to the guideline that only during declared wars did the military have the authority to restrict the media. In addition, the military believed that regular meetings between the Commander of US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) and the bureau chiefs to accredit reporters would promote cooperation (Galloway Interview, 2004). However, with the government's loose rein on censorship, reporters were easily accredited.

Reporters agreed to MACV criteria barring them from reporting certain specific military information - troop movements, exact casualty figures, and other security-related issues – in order to travel with the troops (Appendix C). In fact, anyone who wanted to be an "accredited reporter" simply needed proof of employment by a media firm (definition of media firm was very loosely interpreted) or have a letter from any editor affirming that copy submitted would be considered for publication (Harris Interview, 2004). Once in the field the reporter would then have access to the military and be transported to and from the battlefield with the DoD Public Affairs personnel accompanying him.

As troop build-up began, Vietnam became a media fest for reporters and would-be adventurers. As activities intensified, news bureaus sent war correspondents over, and free-lancers came on their own. With so many reporters in and out of the war zone, news was flowing freely. Many would-be reporters and free-lance adventurers took the opportunity to be part of this uncensored program (Harris Interview, 2004). This practice formed the war coverage program during the Vietnam War. The challenge to the System of Voluntary Cooperation was to survive through these changes and implement innovative approaches to protect the internal relationship. These changes and innovative approaches broke down the organizational structure weakening the relationship.

7.2 Identifying the Tension Aspect in the SVC's Structural Dimension

During the 1950s, from World War II to Vietnam, battlefields and rules of engagements were moving away from traditional warfare. The Pentagon imposed new methods for operations, yet it did not change the rules for war coverage (Cassell, 1985). In fact the original program (OWI) was shut down, leaving its basic rules - no advance information about planned operations; no photos of recognizable American dead; no troop movement –in effect under the System of Voluntary Cooperation (Homonoff, 1985). This program offered access to information in exchange for self-censorship.

The military believed these agreements with the news bureaus were still effective in that the media had committed few security violations during World War II and the Korean War (Hammond Interview, 2004). In addition, the military was riding high on its integrity and victories from World War II and Korean War. Its credibility as the line of defense against the spread of communism gave it respectability in the public eye. For the media's part, news bureaus agreed to the guidelines for war reporting under the System of Voluntary Cooperation (Homonoff, 1985; Boydston, 1992). By the 1960s, the self-censored war coverage program evolved into an uncensored program.

In the early 1960s at the start of major activities in Vietnam, the military believed it needed to be more open with the media. The military relaxed the ground rules so that reporters could write about whatever interested them (Braestrup, 1983). Military leaders hoped that a transparent war effort would maintain public support for the cause (Hammond Interview, 2004). As one historian (Luck, 2004), claims, this transparency brought the first real opportunities for accuracy in reporting, suggesting that war coverage of World War II was more propaganda in nature.

President Johnson's administration, on the other hand, wanted to use the integrity of the military to do the politicians job of selling the war. Johnson insisted that the military needed to take control of the media. His administration's demands for censorship regulations, such as restricted access or editorial reviews, were ignored by the military

(Jacobs, 1992). This attempt to define and dictate how the military would deal with the media came to no avail. The war coverage procedures remained self-imposed, based entirely on voluntary cooperation.

Without an organizational structure, the uncensored program allowed journalists and rogue reporters to observe and report freely on all combat operations. Military authorities rarely prevented reporters from recording any overt action, or specific firefights. In those rare instances where a military or Public Affairs officer imposed censorship, journalists were quick to rebel, labeling the action as a form of manipulation and concealment of information (Harris Interview, 2004). As the war progressed, reporters soon were free to venture almost anywhere, at any time, whether in the company of U.S. servicemen or on their own (Jacobs, 1992).

By the mid-60's the Pentagon had difficulty imposing order over the overwhelming group of reporters in country (Knightley, 1975). In order to control the situation, the Public Affairs Office provided information to the press every evening. Unfortunately, this effort did not give the military the desired control over information. The media rejected these reports as propaganda for political advantage (Hammond, 1998). These evening briefings simply fueled the media's skepticism and growing distrust of military leaders and government officials (Willey, 1999). The specifics of the data were often contrary to what reporters thought they saw. Hammond (1998) claims that many reporters referred to these press briefings as the "5 O'clock Follies" because of the lack of real information in them. When official military reports conflicted with the initial review of the reporter, the reporter would see these briefings as a conspiracy (Hallin, 1986). Military leaders like General Westmoreland lost credibility among the reporters due to the lack of full disclosure and conflicting statements in these official reports (Hammond, 1998; Smullen Interview, 2004).

The conflicting stories reflected a phenomenon wherein the more successful the U.S. campaigns were, the harder the Vietcong fought back making it seem, to the reporter at least, as if the military was under siege or worse. The reported versions placed appearance ahead of substance, creating a conflict between the reporter's viewpoint and the military's position.

As the war ensued, any rational political discourse of the war fell counter to the harsh description of military actions (Hammond Interview, 2004).

Pentagon leaders received no cooperation from the military in their effort to work with the media. Consequently, the Pentagon no longer desired to make war coverage resources available to reporters. In 1971, President Nixon's Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, cut media pool transports to a single Huey helicopter (Galloway Interview, 2004). Access then became a lottery to determine who would get a flight into the battlefield each day (Harris Interview, 2004; Hammond Interview, 2004). However, by then the success of the war came into doubt and news bureaus began withdrawing reporters to cover stories elsewhere.

7.2.1 Power

The mismanagement of the Vietnam War coverage procedures was the military's misguided directives and missed opportunities to create trust in an organized structure. Without an organizational structure, the exercise of power became a battle of will between the administrations and the military. After the closing of the OWI, and into the start of the Vietnam era, the executive branch and the military were unable or unwilling to agree on how best to organize the war coverage effort. These disconnections and disagreements between the administrations and the military failed to put policy to practice (Hammond Interview, 2004) creating a credibility gap (Wise, 1973).

Each administration (Johnson, Kennedy, and Nixon) pressured the military into exerting control over the media. In the government's pressuring, there was a tendency for politicians to demand overly optimistic reporting of military success (Hammond Interview, 2004). The political leaders at home realized the harsh reality the negative reports were having on the public (Smullen Interview, 2004). All the while, the leadership in Vietnam saw the open-access practice as a calculated effort to win the trust of the press and support of the public (Hammond Interview, 2004). The traditionalist military leaders of World War II

wanted to maintain the same relationship with the media as established in World War II. These military officials resisted embellishing the truth, believing that military operations should remain above the political sector (Hammond Interview, 2004). This disconnection between the military and the administration created the conditions for a contentious relationship between the military and the media.

The disagreement between the political sector and military arm of the executive branch grew into a distrust of one another's objectives, creating the credibility gap. The weak alliance between the government and the military provided neither camp the ability to exercise power to control the media or even war information effectively. The disparity in leadership gave the media an opening to exert its own power (Hammond Interview, 2004) in the form of the reporters' role, knowledge, or skills (Scott, 1998). An overwhelming number of reporters began writing their own independent account of the war in order to control the outputs and influence public opinion. Reporters no longer relied on the military as a sole source of information. Without the co-dependency (a major criterion in power and control) between the military and the media, the exercising of power weakened.

Many analysts (for example, Hallin, 1986; Bartley, 2003; Smullen Interview, 2004) point to General Westmoreland's position of 'no declared war' as a missed opportunity to enforce the administration's desire to control the press. These analysts claim that any legitimacy to this 'no war' stance in the early 60s vanished by the late 60s-early 70s. Smullen (Interview, 2004) claims that after the Tet Offensive (1968) the U.S. was definitely engaged in war and the military should have established influence over the reporting. Had military leaders officially acknowledged the war, they could have laid a legitimate claim to the battlefield and all aspects in it.

Other analysts (Harris Interview, 2004 and Willey Interview, 2004) believe that even if the military could not control the media or war information, it still could have exerted control over other logistical resources within the battlefield. These analysts claim that the military was overtly in control via logistic support to the reporters. For example, transportation, a military resource, was of great importance to the media. In his discussion,

Harris (Interview, 2004) explained how difficult it was for anyone to get anywhere in Vietnam, especially the battlefield, except through military transportation. If the military wanted to stop the media access to the battlefield it could simply make flights unavailable to reporters.

Limiting transportation to the battlefield might have been an effective use of power to gain reporters' compliance to a set of war coverage procedures. However, it was not the military's mindset to assert any undue pressure on the media. Military leaders believed such tactics would undermine the integrity of the military (Galloway Interview, 2004). Unfortunately, the military's desire not to exercise power over the resources (whether informational or logistical) did not produce trust between these two groups. The practice of open and uncensored reporting did not bring about a fundamental respect for one another's responsibilities.

Intentionally or otherwise, the media made full use of this divergence in the government- military's position. The growing gap between and among the war leaders (both military and administration) allowed the media to operate within the void of power. With no organizational structure to control the outcome, reporters soon disregarded the rules altogether. In doing so, military leaders felt the reporters betrayed their good faith effort to work with the media in winning public support (McKirker Interview, 2004). Their perceived betrayal allowed a contentious atmosphere to ensue (Hammond Interview, 2004). In losing the public support, the military blamed the media. In retrospect many analysts (Hammond, 1998 and Braestrup, 1983, especially) have attested, the blame probably lay in the politics and the politicians of the time more than the military or the media.

7.2.2 Authority

In the early 1960s, the military sought a better working relationship with the press. Military leaders put aside the traditional sanctioned rules of OWI in the hope that a more charismatic method would appease the media, and keep the military in the good faith of the

public. The military believed news coverage was so necessary to maintain public support that its leaders hesitated to increase pressure on the media to self-censor (Hammond Interview, 2004). Allowing such overt disregard for the process demonstrated, in effect, how the military chose to give up its legitimate authority.

Even as the presidential administrations were demanding that the military exert pressure on editorial review, military leaders declined to oblige. This miscommunication between the military and the administration found military leaders negotiating with the press and yielding more and more of the established process in the hope of favorable reports. Placating the media created incentives for the press to circumvent military authority. The two major reasons for this skirting of the rules had to do with the military and the reporters themselves. First, the military did not want to exert any undue influence over the media in the hope of receiving favorable reporting on an unfavorable war (Knightley, 1975). Military leaders found that provoking the press with rules was counter-productive to winning the public opinion (Hammond Interview, 2004). Instead, the military relied heavily on the System of Voluntary Cooperation, and the Commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUS MACV) Public Affairs Officers (PAO) for media cooperation.

Even though the major news bureaus and media outlets agreed to the war coverage regulations and an accreditation process, this agreement was not honored by each and every reporter nor upheld by the military (Knightley, 1975). Accreditation was easy to receive, and the accredited reporter could make his own arrangements with military units and troops to acquire access to the battlefield (Knightley, 1975; Smullen Interview, 2004). The inaction of the military led the media to dismiss military authority altogether (Cooper, 2003b).

Analysts (such as Willey Interview, 2004; McKirker Interview, 2004) believe the military should have coerced a cooperative effort by directing the media through this new warfare. Military leaders had legitimate authority over the battlefield. Nevertheless, the military chose not to display authority through guidance or directive. This lack of direction gave way to a liberal method in war coverage. From this accepted practice of not interfering,

it was a simple step outside the procedures for rogue reporters to enter the battlefield on their own accord without the benefit of any major media conglomerate.

The second reason the press discounted military authority was the attitude of the individual reporter. Many war correspondents did not trust the rationale offered up by the military or the politicians for sustaining war (Hammond, 1991). As the war effort moved from World War II to Korea to Vietnam, the reason for war became disingenuous. Contempt for the establishment replaced trust for the military and slowly grew into an abandonment of its authority. This attitude became paramount with the influx of adventure-seeking journalists. These writers wanted to mistrust the government and the military, while other contemporary reporters laid a claim to truth as the only legitimate authority (Harris Interview, 2004).

These unseasoned journalists believed their responsibility, as the fourth estate, laid with informing the public on the horror of war (Hallin, 1986; Smullen Interview, 2004). When the military achieved victory, these reporters saw only death and destruction. An example of this stance on truth was the reporting of the Tet Offensive. Many historians (including Braestrup, 1983; Wyatt, 1993) unequivocally believe Tet was a military victory for the U.S. yet it played out in the press as a massacre and an American failure. In their untrained eye, these reporters saw the paradox of war where the enemy fights hardest when it is losing (Evans Interview, 2004; McKirker Interview, 2004). These rogue reporters changed the basic role and responsibility of the war correspondent. As they began reporting in opposition to the war effort, support for the war waned, along with respect for the military.

Some military analysts (such as Homonoff, 1985; Thompson, 1991; Boydston, 1992) suggest that the military relied too heavily on its virtue and integrity established during the just war of World War II. In their untouchable position, military leaders did not recognize that the new generation of reporters did not hold the same respect as their World War II counterparts. Whether or not this was so, the generation gap between a conservative military and a liberal media could not sustain the influx of undisciplined reporters. The regulated

structure of military authority over these journalists eroded over the course of the war creating a symptomatic, steady decline in the relationship (Smullen Interview, 2004).

Interestingly, this generation gap (which is discussed further under Complexity) created its own tension within the media as older reporters, recalling the "good old days" of World War II and their honored role with the GIs, urged their younger counterparts to become "part of the team" (Minor, 1970; Knightley, 1975). However, in keeping with the times, the younger reporters did not follow the advice of any persons they deemed to be part of the war- coverage establishment.

7.2.3 Conflict

After World War II, President Truman closed OWI and did not create a new organizational program to handle the war coverage procedures. His administration deemed such an office as unnecessary, believing the cooperative nature of the voluntary system could sustain the war coverage procedure without the patronage of an official office. To Truman's credit, this effort allowed the media to serve well in the early years after World War II.

The cooperation among the military, administration and the media during World War II was a key aspect to the U.S.'s early involvement in Vietnam, both in explaining and justifying the political activities (Hammond, 1998). The news media, newspapers, and television reports remained supportive of the Vietnam policy as political efforts turned to war activities. The early collaborative nature created a setting wherein the military could resolve the conflicting issues of the emerging war coverage procedure. When problems materialized, the individual reporter and the military leader resolved the issues between themselves. This practice was amenable in the beginning of the Vietnam War. However, within the cooperative structure, a relaxing of the rules emerged while goals and perspectives changed.

News bureaus responded to increased pressures from the public to explain the war in a different light than military or political jargon (Hallin, 1986; Cross and Griffin, 1987). The

media, being free to observe and report on all combat operations, eventually produced publication of soldiers' low morale and other stories based on disputed data (Jacobs, 1992). Historians, such as Hallin (1986) and Stoler (1986) speak to the many accounts of American soldiers lacking discipline, using drugs on the battlefield, and even questioning authority. Although Hammond's (1998) research found no empirical evidence of such an epidemic, such reporting added to the public's growing opinion of a lost cause. Many other historians (Braestrup, 1983; Lichty, 1988; Hammond, 1998; Wyatt, 1993) have since pointed out the numerous military battles that the U.S. actually won in the Vietnam War. These military analysts claim that media reports should have emphasized these victories. Yet, won or lost, the media framed and interpreted the battles as defeats, either psychologically or physically (Bartley, 2003). The media's emphasis on defeat was especially effective when a television crew showed a snapshot account of an event.

The news reports portrayed the military as losing the war, and made government representatives look dishonest. The negative reports led military leaders to feel as though coverage was random and biased (Hallin, 1986). Military leaders never sensed or understood the rising hostility towards them and therefore did not realize the need for conflict resolution (Smullen Interview, 2004). Rather than focusing on strengthening war coverage procedures or seeking new procedures, the military sought to smooth over differences, shying away from tension as if it was an unnatural phenomenon. They continued to hope the military would rise above the political fray. Unfortunately, the hostility directed at the political sector found its way to the military.

The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) in his attempts to resolve conflicts, found himself caught between the administration's lack of credibility with the public and the misrepresentation of the war by the press (Hammond Interview, 2004). Reporters ignored PAO requests, and the military had no other arrangement for conflict resolution. Without a specific framework for war coverage procedure, no conflict resolution method could be adapted to Vietnam War coverage program. There were no structures or procedures available to dictate proper coverage or to resolve the ensuing tension. The best the administration and the military could do, and only in specific incidences, was to have the

PAO and COMUS MACV encourage the media to self-censor (Galloway Interview, 2004). When these efforts failed tension continued to rise on both sides.

7.3 Identifying the Tension Aspect in the Vietnam War's Organizational Environment

The Vietnam War was a defining movement for wartime journalism. Beyond the foreign affairs and historical actions that led up to the conflict, there were the changing environmental conditions that created a new form of reporting. Unconventional battlefields, a different breed of reporters, and advancing communication technologies dominated the traditional war coverage practices of World War II. Reporters no longer relied on the military for battlefield intelligence.

Prior to the Vietnam War and even into the early years, American war correspondents and national leaders generally had the same perspective on the justification of the political action. Up until circa 1965, America saw the activities in Vietnam as part of the World War/Cold War consensus (Lichty, 1988). In this environment, two major actors – the soldier and the war correspondent – retained their long-established roles and responsibilities in much the same form it had been during previous wars. However, as political realities transformed military strategy the traditional soldier and the conventional war correspondent took on individual idiosyncrasies.

The newly drafted infantry soldiers no longer held the status of the experienced GI of World War II. Likewise, the war correspondents of World War II were beyond their prime, yielding the battlefield reporting to the next generation of cub reporters (rookie reporter). These new journalists brought a different perspective to reporting, they saw the war effort less as advancing one's patriotic duty and more as maintaining a corrupted policy (Evans Interview, 2004).

As rogue reporters entered Vietnam, the Johnson administration insisted upon the military either censoring the reports or releasing its own briefings with favorable

information. President Johnson wanted explanations justifying the war to accompany description of battle activities. He believed a greater effort from the military would overcome the media's version and win support for the war (Hammond Interview, 2004). Unfortunately, information was not always immediately available from the military leaders, so reporters often talked to whoever would give a story, regardless of how uninformed the source may have been (Hammond Interview, 2004).

Reporting took on the convenient method of journalistic reaction to catastrophic information by releasing first and verifying later (Epstein, 1973). In the fog of war, first reports, typically based on rumors rather than fact, was often served the reporter as legitimate accounts (Galloway Interview, 2004). To add to this erratic reporting method, many stories came out of Saigon with a battlefield stamp of approval. When the report actually came from the frontline, there was no telling how long the reporter had been there (Hammond Interview, 2004). An hour, a day, a week, it all read of the same level of candor.

A reporter attached to a unit may have been at the front for as little as a day or even an hour. The new operational maneuvers saw smaller size and more-frequent troop movements than previously conducted in other wars (Smullen Interview, 2004). Troops were moving in and out of Saigon to the battlefield on short-term missions. Through this constant deployment, the reporter formed a different perspective of the war with no measure of substantial research or investigation. Aiding this instant-story process was a new technology for distributing the report--television.

Television crew teams were everywhere, in the battlefield and on the streets of Saigon. Said one American officer in Vietnam, "It seemed as if there were more cameras pointed at me than Viet Cong guns" (Lawrence Interview, 2004). Aided by the reporter's ease of movement in and out of the front line, the dynamics of television created instant images and opinions (Smullen Interview, 2004). As these images went back to the states, the televised medium allowed the public to see more of the reality of war. This new technology provided a perceived, real-time account of the war to the citizenry. It offered a snapshot of the battlefield, allowing the public to view different takes on the same event.

These harsh images, shown in America's living room, provided endless press for the news bureaus, creating a propaganda machine the military could not fight, and forcing the government to make radical quick decisions to appease the masses (Epstein, 1973; Mecklin, 1965). This new method of reporting created a new means of informing the public, which created a dynamic in environment. In the ensuing turbulence, tension increased as each subgroup grappled over the characteristics of the war and ultimately the heart and soul of the American public (Galloway Interview, 2004).

7.3.1 Munificence

For the reporter, Vietnam was a goldmine of war coverage information. Frequent troop patrols offered numerous opportunities for war correspondents to find stories in the battlefield (Smullen Interview, 2004). A reporter could easily move in and out of the lives of these infantrymen and Vietnamese citizens, getting a story for the day before heading back to Saigon for the night. Alternatively, the reporter could stay in Saigon and report on the war effect (Hammond Interview, 2004). With no definitive battlefield or frontline to determine the war zone, the environment itself became the source. From the jungles to the countryside and on the street corners of Saigon, every event became a legitimate war story (Smullen Interview, 2004). This ability to move around freely meant more 'reliable sources' for media stories. The military could not overcome the onslaught of reports.

With so much availability of information, the challenge was sorting out the details. With many sources and different viewpoints on the same event, journalists had to wade through the various data. In their reporting, they made value judgments on the data's worth and accuracy (Hammond Interview, 2004). As may be expected with such reporting, the reporters were bound to form varying opinions. This became a contentious issue when various news organizations contradicted each other, and even themselves, in assessing the war effort (Hammond, 1998). For instance, one reporter may have written on the immediate action while another correspondent might have reported the affair from a holistic approach.

Alternatively, in a journalistic haste to report, he may not have waited for the greater truth another moment would have revealed (Smullen Interview, 2004). The confusion from these multi-sources and a first-to-scoop competition drafted an image of a war going badly and of military actions that failed in their objective. These different reports on the same event created a communication gap in the chaotic environment.

The reporter's access to this wide range of sources allowed for the exposure of different opinions. The reporter no longer felt he needed to rely on the military for proper analysis (Galloway Interview, 2004). The war zone and its surroundings gave him all the data he needed to draft a story. These findings from other sources beyond the military created a venue for different viewpoints on the war. By the end of the decade, the negative stories helped form the opinion of the public, effecting the growing tension between and among the politician, the military, the public, and the media.

The military attempted to provide better information to the media, but even as these briefings became available from the military or elsewhere, favorable articles were slow in coming. Hammond (Interview, 2004) suggests that some reporters believed they had already given the military the benefit of the doubt in their initial reporting; while other analysts (such as Knightley, 1975 and Braestrup, 1983) claim these reporters were willing, even eager, to believe the worst of the battle scene. Even worse, when reporters recognized the inaccuracy of their reporting, they simply claimed they did not have the time to make corrections. Many reporters had to file copy daily (Harris Interview, 2004).

The overwhelming number of sources in the environment became so great that the military could not control all the information or even the reports (Knightley, 1975). With no control over the resources - neither controlling the sources nor controlling the distribution - the military could not arrange the war data into an orderly message. The best the Pentagon (i.e., administration) could do was to have its Public Affairs Officer release data to put a complete picture of the war out to the media. However, instead of diluting the negative reports with favorable accounts, the PAO's reports only contributed to the growing confusion and communications gap between military and government officials on what America's war

goals were (Hallin, 1986). In its effect, it also contributed to the communication gap between the soldier and the reporter (Hammond, 1998).

Many analysts (again, Braestrup, 1983; Lichty, 1988; Hammond, 1998) posit that the true environmental effect lay with the numerous, ambiguous sources and rogue reporters' unofficial assessments of the war that countered the military position. In the midst of frequent contradictions, the American public could not make sense of the war and came to see it as a hopeless cause. This created a state of deterioration in the relations between the military command and the media; a tension that the military was unable to manage as the media sought other sources of information and demonstrated a willingness to use them.

7.3.2 Complexity

During the Vietnam era, the World War II style of American journalism, where a professional attitude ensured that the news came without bias or subjectivity, was ending (Hallin, 1986). Although the reporting methods that brought the World War II GI and the war correspondent together remained similar, a comparable rapport did not develop. The cohesive bond formed between the reporter and the soldier from World War II lost its strength as disparity grew between these two groups creating complexity in the environment. By the mid-1960s, the government and media no longer shared the common vision of America's role in the world; a vision that was so much a part of sustaining a cooperative working relationship in World War II (Hammond, 1998).

The new generation of journalists introduced a new sub-group into the environment, one disengaged from the cooperative relationship of their predecessors. These reporters entered the battlefield with a growing social conscience; a willingness to question outmoded political affairs and military order; and demanded accountability in the military and America's actions abroad (Prochnau, 1996). As in World War II, the Vietnam War correspondent continued to gain the trust of the infantry by enduring the same discomfort and danger (Knightley, 1975; Sheehan, 1988). Reporters conducted frank discussions with the

soldiers in the foxhole and on the battlefield. Unfortunately, these discussions did not aid in building a shared vision; they simply filled the needs of the reporter to find reliable sources for his story of a harsh war (Smullen Interview, 2004; Hammond Interview, 2004). Evans (Interview, 2004) suggests this was only characteristic of reporters who had not served enough time with the military. Unfortunately, that accounted for a good number of reporters.

The growing complexity among the stakeholders (administration, military, media, and the public) caused contention as one group increasingly saw events from a very different perspective than the others (Hammond Interview, 2004). These diverse points of view developed multifaceted visions of America's role to the point where intellectual discourse was lost. The shared ideological perspectives of the war correspondents and military officials, essential in World War II, slowly eroded in Southeast Asia (Jacobs, 1992). The military could not transcend this unforeseen factor while some in the media played right into it.

World War II-tempered soldiers felt the pain of betrayal as these inexperienced reporters severed the working relationship. Military leaders viewed the harsh stories as treasonous acts. They believed these reports contributed to the public perception of the military losing the war: treasonous in their lack of respect for the military and America. Such harsh positions and rhetoric began to dissolve the public respect the military enjoyed.

As the war grew unpopular, the correspondents became progressively more critical of America's involvement (Galloway Interview, 2004). The emerging dichotomy of political positions among reporters and soldiers alike created a complex environment, one made up of an estranged but co-dependent relationship. The complex makeup of the actors, especially the new media and the old soldier, chipped away at the cooperative relationship leaving tension in the growing generational gap.

7.3.3 Dynamism

The era after World War II saw an increase in technological developments. This new dynamic changed the two basic traits of war coverage: the traditional means of war correspondence through censored articles, and the traditional role of the war correspondent as an instrument of military prowess (Jacobs, 1992). The new technology presented a new approach to the social construction of the military, one very different from the traditional world of World War II. This stage of advancing technology introduced the portable camera as a major tool of the news bureaus, especially in reporting the war. Television was already reporting news, but now the war correspondent had the opportunity to report the war beyond the traditional paper copy. News bureaus put cameras in the trenches and used the television images in sharp contrast to the newspaper articles (Hallin, 1986). The turbulence added to the tension by creating a reality out of the controversial reports that now came with uncensored pictures.

It became obvious to the news bureaus that whoever controlled this new technology could control the other dynamic factors within the environment (i.e., war, politics, and public opinion) and define the unknown. Unfortunately, for the military, it could not control this technology or the turbulence it created. Its graphic footage and stories of American atrocities undermined the public's will to support the cause, changing the assessment of the war (Olson, 1993). Some analysts believe that the public perception of the war, of one going very poorly for the military and as such for America, was self-prophesized by television reporting (Hammond Interview, 2004).

Television brought U.S. involvement into American living rooms on a nightly basis. The evening news brought the battles and fire exchange of the distant war a little closer to home (Braestrup, 1983). Although Braestrup and Lichty (1988) claim there were no visuals of blood and guts, as conventional wisdom has it, these televised images were more powerful than print medium in that they were America's first experience with "real live" war. Unfortunately, these images were not always genuine.

With U.S. soldiers in Vietnam, news bureaus believed the American people wanted to be up-to-date on troop's involvement. As the war ensued, producers demanded graphic content from their war reporters. The film crew would often shoot stock footage and save it for later use. This method of filming allowed news agencies to edit and air images at a later date (Hallin, 1986). The editor would clip these pieces with other footage to form a more compelling if not entirely accurate story of the war. In the editing process, these clips often appeared out of context of the war as a whole.

Analysts (Hammond Interview, 2004; Galloway Interview, 2004), claim that this process, which could take two to three days, was not an accurate account of the battlefield, certainly not in real time. The military for its part, viewed this new technical approach as inaccurate and misleading, claiming these "live shots" reduced the action to simple sound bites (Lawrence Interview, 2004). All the while, politicians continued to insist that the war was going better than these images indicated. This new dynamic means of reporting only confirmed the uncertainty of the war and the certainty of death and destruction. The ultimate stakeholder, the American public, saw the death and could no longer sustain support for the war.

Beyond a new means of reporting, some media analysts (especially, Sniderman et al, 1996, and Ettema, et al, 1987) claim the changing environment promoted a pluralistic approach to war, where no single position or political view could account for all the phenomena of the war. Sniderman claims the uncertainty of events gave the reporter the license to show all aspects of the war and allow the story to stand on its own merit. He defended the journalists, citing a professional approach required the reporter to work within, around, and through the uncertainties in order to disclose the unknown. While professing a moral authority, many journalists believed they were exposing the unknowns of war. In a pluralistic sense, the reporter arrived at an acceptable version of events, which in its revealing defined the truth (Ettema, et al, 1987).

7.4 Analysis of Tension in the Vietnam War

The challenge facing the System of Voluntary Cooperation in the uncensored war was to survive the changes and innovations in the new era. Surviving the changes was paramount to the war correspondent and soldier alike. The research shows how tension was a byproduct of the changing conditions wherein old procedures were unable to survive in the new environment. A fair analysis of this phenomenon reveals how the System of Voluntary Cooperation forced the media to confront the changes in the environment and how the military's traditionalist nature attempted to protect its procedures against the influence of the changing environment. The research suggests this was as much a cause of the tension as any specific media report.

The first element to consider in the Vietnam War coverage program is power - the controlling factor of the resources. The research shows how the military action did not sustain the controlling efforts sufficiently in the new environment (Hammond Interview, 2004). Military leaders were quite willing to provide the media with transportation to the war zone. Galloway (Interview, 2004) spoke well of his treatment; Willey (Interview, 2004) commented favorably on the COMUS MACV set up for reporters; and McKirker (Interview, 2004) relayed stories of his efforts to provide reporters with proper information. Analysts believe that by giving reporters full support in and out of the war zone the military failed to exercise discretionary power. McKirker (Interview, 2004) claims that many military officers saw (in hindsight) this leniency as contributing to the tension. They believe that the relaxed rules and responsibilities of the SVC breed a familiarity of contempt more than trust. The demise of rules led to the breakdown in roles and responsibilities, allowing two separate groups with separate goals to enter the battlefield, instead a singular cooperative war coverage program.

Analysts disagree on whether the loose structure brought contempt or if it was borne of a merging political persuasion, but it is clear that the contemporary reporters did not fit well in the conservative military structure. The cooperative structure between the traditional military and old school reporters broke down as the new generation of reporters entered

Vietnam (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995). A generation gap grew, creating tension among all the various stakeholders - military, media, government officials, and the public. Various attitudes and behaviors from different perspectives crept into the cultural mores and on to the battlefield, challenging the status quo of the war coverage (Hallin, 1986; Smullen Interview, 2004). The adventurous reporters no longer recognized the military's authority in a voluntary system. Without a shared objective among the actors (or even the stakeholders), the claim to legitimate authority could not be sustained. Without a formal program, there could not be a proper authority structure to dictate the course of action (Hall, 1991). A lack of structure, dereliction of duty, and uncooperative participants challenged the military leaders in their effort to guide the program through the changing environment. Neither the COMUS MACV nor PAO could resolve the conflict arising in the war coverage effort or contain the turmoil in the environment.

The changing environment during the Vietnam War provided the reporter with data separate from military briefs. The availability of sources for war coverage was no longer the one-source released through military channels. Reporters had other opportunities to gather data for stories beyond the official military release (Harris Interview, 2004). Even when the source was the military, the resulting news reports did not need the military approval. This availability of outside sources and unchallenged reporting produced incompatible accounts between the military's "truth" and the press's "accuracy", leading to disagreements in the progress of the war (McKirker Interview, 2004).

The military attempted to combat the negative press by releasing more information to discredit the rumors and expose falsehoods. Unfortunately, this worked against the military. The research demonstrated how more information did not dispel the munificence of rumors, but only added to the confusion. Media coverage increased drastically, to the point where reporting of such events as the Tet Offensive went unguarded; told through several conflicting sources. News reports viewed these battles as a moral defeat for the military instead of the more accurate account of military victory (Bartley, 2003). After the Tet Offensive, these conflicting accounts did not provide the public with the vision of victory,

and military leaders were unable to influence the public to believe otherwise. The military began to blame the media for losing the public support.

The case study highlights how these two groups were incompatible from the start and polarized after the reporting on Tet Offensive. Each group realized they had drastically different ideals regarding the war. By the late 1960's any common cause or shared norms of World War II era dissolved completely. Without the shared norms, the viewpoints on the war (and other geopolitical events) created a communication gap and bitter antagonism. The military and media competed to gain public support, leading to increased complexity between these actors, and sowing the seed of contention (Braestrup, 1983; Bartley, 2003). Moreover, the innovations in television reporting allowed the media to portray the chaos of the war.

While the environment progressed, along with the technology in it, the uncensored accessibility and availability of sources grew. Yet, many of these important fundamental changes went unchallenged by the military structure. The military ignored or dismissed efforts to institute innovative ideas, such as the administration's directives that might have promoted the war coverage procedures. Ignoring the challenges in the environment meant the military's part of the organizational program would not survive the changes. The media on the other hand, embraced the challenges and restructured the procedures to its needs.

Rogue reporters were prepared to survive and succeed in the environment as innovative journalists. They took advantage of the changes produced in the environment to undermine the traditional manner of war coverage (Harris Interview, 2004). This was apparent in the handling of television, wherein the media foresaw television's extreme usefulness for war coverage. The media used this new tool, while the military did not anticipate or capitalize on it (MacGregor, 1997; Hammond Interview, 2004). Military leaders held on to the status quo while news bureaus adjusted to the radical changes (Smullen Interview, 2004). The tension grew as the two groups negotiated differently with the environment.

7.5 Summary

As the tension analysis reveals (Chart 7-5) the war coverage program of World War II broke down during Vietnam War along the organizational elements. From the 1950's, the organizational structure of System of Voluntary Cooperation was loosely structured.

ELEMENT	WORLD WAR II	VIETNAM WAR
POWER	The exercise of organizational power requires a degree of trust. Trust is found in respected leaders whose characters are beyond reproach from the subgroups. The subgroups then deem the actions of the trusted leaders, such as establishing rules, justifiable.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Executive branch and the military unable or unwilling to agree on controlling effort -credibility gap • Misguided directives and missed opportunities to create trust in an organized structure. • Media exert its own power structure creating mistrust
AUTHORITY	The display of organizational authority requires acceptance among the actors. This concurrence among the subgroups establishes a sense of legitimacy. Legitimate authority creates a cooperative organization among the actors through official recognition of roles and responsibilities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military effort to accept media • Working relationship with the press; recognize provoking as counter productive • Military not wanting to exert undue influence • Attitude of reporter and adventurers not accepting military
CONFLICT	Conflict resolution is handled best within a structured organization. This organization establishes rules and a shared understanding of roles and responsibility. The rules then dictate the proper course of action for conflict resolution.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rely on WWII procedures without organizational structure • Three separate interpretation of procedures – administration, military, media • No framework for war coverage procedure, no method for conflict resolution
MUNIFICENCE	the affect of munificence on the organization is countered best by overwhelming it with controllable resources. Flooding the environment with controllable resource dilutes the negative affects of munificent sources.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment itself provided too much resource. • Three versions – pentagon, military, media - communication gap • Sorting out the details
COMPLEXITY	The affect of complexity on the organization is minimized when the stakeholders share the same goals and objectives. Finding a common cause and promoting it within and throughout the stakeholders minimizes the agitating factors inherent in their different personas.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • America's role after WWII created opposing views • New accountability in the military and government • New generation of journalists (adventurer) / new generation of soldiers (drafted); old generation of leaders - generation gap
DYNAMISM	The affect of dynamism on the organization is lessen when organization maintains consistency within. Change is inevitable for an organization but controlling the effect of the changes within the organization maintains the organization.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Change - the traditional means and needs war correspondence • Turbulence -technological developments. New warfare - Napalm; new reporting -cameras in the trenches • Misconceived images confirming the uncertainty

CHART 7-5 Tension Analysis of the Vietnam War

In the military's failure to exert control over the war coverage procedures, the SCV program failed to maintain the power structure criterion of unequal exchange, as suggested

by Hall (1991). Neither party sustained their traditional power-specific position of World War II. The unconventional environment of 1960's Vietnam, gave the media access to military resources, or at least a fair amount of sources and technology so as not to be dependent on the military (McKirker Interview, 2004). This lack of mutual need created gaps across the war coverage program (i.e., communication gap), the leadership (i.e. credibility gap), and even the stakeholders (generation gap), breaking down the established World War II-trust and legitimacy of the military. Unfortunately, for the military, the changing environment proved detrimental to the conventional war effort including war coverage (Aukofer and Lawrence 1995).

The military failure to establish a structured organizational program that could mitigate the changes, allowed politicians, military leaders, and reporters to act independently of one another (Hammond, 1998). As a result, the media gained the upper hand in socially constructing the war story. After the Tet Offensive, the military reports of success and victory in battle lost credibility. Towards the end of the war, the public bought into the television image of a war out of control. Many analysts (Bonior, Champlin, and Kolly, 1984; Hallin, 1986; Hammond, 2004) believe irreconcilable tension among the military and the media (and even the government and the public) emerged at this point of media's involvement. As a result, the military emerged from the conflict embittered, attributing defeat to media undercutting of public support (Hammond, 1991). The contentious relationship became a by-product of the military dissatisfaction with the war and a need to blame someone (Smullen Interview, 2004).

8.0 Gulf War – National Media Pool

8.1 Background into Gulf War's National Media Pool

In the decades following the Vietnam War, the military returned to a policy of strict censorship for wartime coverage. The official reason was national security (Gersh, 1991b). The military could not release information until it was determined that in doing so the data would not jeopardize operations or bring harm to operations. For the media this meant that news reports would be after the fact, often too late for anyone to consider them news worthy.

Throughout such major conflicts like Operations Urgent Fury (Grenada - 1983) reporters did not have permission to accompany the military. The working policy during this military operation stated that the military would release information to the media; reporters would not gather information. To establish the procedures the Secretary of Defense stated in the Principles of Information (DoD Directive 5122.5, 1983):

"It is the policy of the Department of Defense to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and members representing the press, radio, and television may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private citizens will be answered responsively and as rapidly as possible."

Analysts, such as Gailey (1983) and Farrell (1983) note how the media strongly protested this shutout, labeling it a policy of secret wars and hidden agendas. These complaints of secrecy forced the military to examine its war coverage procedures. In 1984, experts from both the military and the media convened a panel to examine this issue.

This conference, headed by General Sidle (then Deputy Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs), recommended a standing media pool with voluntary compliance to military ground rules (Cassell, 1985). Further recommendations spoke to the importance of

incorporating public affairs efforts into operational planning. In the final report of the Sidle Panel (1984), its Statement of Principle governing military-media relations stated:

"The American people must be informed about the United States' military operations, and this information must be provided through both the news media and the government. Therefore, the panel believes it is essential that the U.S. news media cover U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and the safety of U.S. forces."

The panel even went so far as to encourage both the military and the media to improve their understanding of each other.

In two naval skirmishes - Operation Ernest Will and Operation Praying Mantis (Kuwait, 1987 and Iran, 1988 respectively) - the navy attempted, in good faith, to incorporate these recommendations and establish media pools (Cullin Interview, 2004). However, despite the limited success of these trial runs and the panel's recommendations, the military did not integrate media pools into the operational planning during the next major conflict - Operation Just Cause (Panama - 1989). This forced another look at the military's handling of the media.

Fred Hoffman, former Associated Press reporter and DOD official, took the lead in re-examining the war coverage procedures. His report also stated recommendations for a responsive media pool (Hoffman, 1990). This time, General Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also weighed in with a message to the military commanders reminding them of the importance of planning support for news media coverage of military operations (Powell, 1990a). Heeding this order, the DoD attempted to create an organized press pool (Smullen Interview, 2004). The challenge to managing the tension was in attaining agreed-upon rules and promoting participation among the actors.

The Pentagon worked with news bureaus to develop a strategy for comprehensive wartime coverage through the National Media Pool (NMP) program (Aukofer and Lawrence,

1995). The National Media Pool served as a representative body of the news organizations. It consolidated the resources of media outlets by selecting a limited number of reporters to cover major news events for the all news media. These selected members of the media pool were required to share data gathered during these events with other members.

According to an article titled Media Access to the War (2003), in order to be included in the pool, U.S. owned and operated news organizations had to demonstrate a familiarity with U.S. military affairs. Most news organizations did so by maintaining a correspondent who regularly covers military affairs and Pentagon press conferences. Other requirements for participation in the pool state that pool reporters must be able to deploy within a minimum of four hours and upon deployment adhere to pool ground rules (Gersh, 1991a). When major events occurred, qualified reporters took turns serving in the pool through a Pentagon-formed lottery drawing.

As the Gulf War developed, DoD began coordinating the NMP efforts. Public Affairs Officers (PAO) assembled seventeen journalists and technicians to form the original National Media Pool. DoD PAO activated the pool two days after the first U.S. fighters arrived in Saudi Arabia (Mordan, 1999). However, citing an excessive number of correspondents, host nation restrictions, and exceedingly dangerous conditions, Central Command issued new instructions limiting media pool activities (Venable, 2002). Reporters would now receive nightly press conferences held by Junior Officers. After the briefings, PAO reviewed all media dispatches to ensure compliance with security guideline (Mordan, 1999). Pool reporters' news copy, video and still photographs were also subject to security review. Even after the PAO approved the copy, regulations required that reporters send their materials via military transmission (Fialka, 1991).

Although the NMP technically existed, the reporters did not travel in a press pool. There was very little media reporting within the combat operations (Combelles-Siegel, 1996). Although the public may remember incidents of the Iraqi army surrendering to the reporters, this was not typical of war coverage procedures. Such incidents only made the news because they were the only footage of combat the media saw. Media pool members

were limited to covering the war almost entirely through formal military briefings back in Kuwait (Fialka, 1991).

8.2 Identifying the Tension Aspect in the NMP Organizational Structure

Attempts to organize a structure to manage the tension between the military and the media in the Gulf War began long before ground movement. During the 1970's, media involvement was seen as a hot issue in military affairs, so that by the military skirmishes of the 1980's the effects of this contentious relationship were realized. Organizational efforts were a constant discussion in these interim decades between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War. The Pentagon and the news bureaus made several efforts to form a working relationship. Throughout the 1980s, panels and high-level discussions resulted in recommendations; however, with every recommendation came challenges to military operation. Whether these challenges were genuine or not, the results were always the same: the military left the media out of military operational plans.

The activities of the military that limited media participation during combat were certainly prevalent during the major conflicts in the 1980's. Many analysts speak to these restrictions as the Pentagon's way of resorting to a "Don't tell them anything until the war is over, then tell them who won" policy, once again quoting Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations – World War II. Some media analysts (such as Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995; Combelles-Siegel, 1996; and Smullen Interview, 2004) claim this form of censorship was the military's way of getting back at the media for the negative reports during the Vietnam War. Combelles-Siegel's (1996) study even concluded that shutting out the media was a conscious effort of the military. This contempt for the media brought the cooperation between the military and media to a new low, even below the level of the Vietnam War (Trotta, 1990).

After the Grenada Invasion, DoD backed away from its position and formed the Sidle Panel to evaluate the relationship and resolve any internal conflicts. Analysts saw this as a major attempt on DoD's part to create a structure around war coverage procedures. The

panel set the groundwork for a process to bring public affairs into the operational planning stage. However, even during the Navy operations, where many analysts (Willey Interview, 2004, especially) speak of the successful manifestation of legitimate media pools operations, the implementation of these pools was minimal. As media pools went, they faced the challenge of military – media affairs. Timely release of information took a back seat to operational priorities. During the next operation (Panama, Just Cause) the media pool practice was non-existent. The military choose to ignore the panel’s recommendations during the invasion of Panama in 1989. Again, the reason given was operational security. According to Galloway (Interview, 2004), few members of the media believed this claim. Journalist Steve Katz (1992) reported, "This was the Pentagon's first test of the military's ability to adopt the recommendations of the Sidle Panel. It flunked the test."

Just Cause was the first major opportunity to end the contentious relationship, and the military failed to pursue any press pool. Once again, DoD was forced to reexamine the military’s handling of the media. The findings did not change. The Hoffman Report reinforced the Sidle Panel recommendations for a media pool, again making strong endorsements for incorporating public affairs into operations planning (Hoffman, 1990). Prior to the Gulf War, these recommendations and requirements for media pools were well investigated and understood by the military. Many DoD personnel believed that such a media organization would help end the animosity between the media and the military, and if done correctly could put the virtue of the military operations into the minds of the general public (Smullen Interview, 2004). Some in the military were warming up to the concept of press coverage, recognizing that too many successful missions went unrecorded. It seemed the climate was right for a cooperative war coverage program.

During the Gulf War, the military instituted the National Media Pool. This agreement came about as government panels and official reports called for an end to the contentious relationship formed between the military and media during Vietnam War. The pool was the Department of Defense’s concession to allow limited number of reporters, representing a larger number of news media organizations, into the battlefield (Combelles-Siegel, 1996). The plan was to have the Public Affairs Officer aid the reporter in finding stories or assign

the correspondent to press pools. However, policy established in the Pentagon did not make it to the battlefield. Coordination planning between Operations and Public Affairs failed during the first stage of the Persian Gulf War (i.e., Desert Shield) (Combelles-Siegel Interview, 2004).

Without proper coordination, neither Public Affairs Officers nor the news bureau chiefs had any knowledge of the ground rules until Operations called up the reporters during the Desert Storm phase. Likewise, the screening process at the start of the war made it difficult and time consuming for the PAO to get reporters into the media pools. Then once begun, the military, instead of the PAO, tightly managed the pool (Venable, 2002). The PAO had no role to play or room to function within the military operations (Cullin Interview, 2004).

It did not take long for controversy to surround this organizational structure. Many news organizations complained that the pools were not working (MacArthur 1992; Thompson, 2002); that the flow of information had been impeded (Simpson, 1991); that stories and pictures were chosen by the military not reporters (Fialka, 1991); and that access to soldiers in the field was interfered with by a needless system of military escorts (Dennis et al, 1991). The media charged that this lengthy process amounted to censorship since the reports were often no longer timely (Kellner, 1992).

8.2.1 Power

There were several attempts at forming a cooperative effort to implement a press pool. By the time the build-up to the Gulf War began, the DoD's National Media Pool program seemed ready to succeed. It was attractive to the military because it limited the number of correspondents requiring protection in the field, and controlled the flow of information (Walker, 1990); to the media it meant first hand access (Combelles-Siegel Interview, 2004). Although there was a good faith effort within the Pentagon, this effort did

not make its way to the battlefield. The military operations, in the field, did not implement the Pentagon's media pools. This inaction created a structure of mistrust.

At the start of ground movement General Schwarzkopf, exercising a display of power, enforced a media-wide blackout, once again claiming security reasons. This action demonstrated just how weak the cooperative structure of the NMP was. Military leaders disregarded the NMP guidelines, once again barring the press from the action. Many analysts, both media and military (Fialka, 1991 and Combelles-Siegel, 1996, among them), believe the military's strict management of the information was intentional. The larger argument was whether it was still a matter of payback or a necessity of military operations. The one side of the argument claims that the military had to exert control over the battlefield. In addition to fighting the enemy, protecting reporters became an added duty. Military leaders felt this task was infeasible in the new war zone (Cullin Interview, 2004). It was simply the military's belief that the Pentagon's ground rules were not practical considering the ease of transmitting stories electronically and instantaneously with no procedure for censoring classified data (Combelles-Siegel, 1996). Limiting access to the war was the safest course of action and best method to guarantee security (Combelles-Siegel Interview, 2004).

Other analysts (such as Kurtz, 2001; Cullin Interview, 2004; and Smullen Interview, 2004) see this argument as too convenient. They claim that while DoD was creating the NMP, the military leaders were planning news conferences, "packed and shipped" briefings (Cullin Interview, 2004). Military operations never intended to allow the DoD's organization to develop (Kurtz, 2001). Some military leaders readily admitted that word went out not to trust the media (Smullen Interview, 2004). What the process came down to was, the leaders forming the organization (i.e., Pentagon personnel) were not the people with the power to implement its procedures (i.e., military in the field) (Smullen Interview, 2004).

Although the military did not employ traditional censorship, reporters felt undue controlling tactics were being used (Grossman, 1991). Even Cronkite (1991), weighed in on the controlling procedures with a Newsweek article wondering, "What is there to hide?" Interestingly enough, a historically contextual study of American war coverage found that

restrictions placed on the media were necessary and not excessive (Cooper, 2003b). The study suggests that the press complaints were based more in perception than in reality; a perception attributed to the lack of trust felt by many reporters (Kurtz, 1991). Nevertheless, by not bringing the media into the battlefield, the military behavior served only to aggravate media-military tension.

Goodwill existed in the formation of the NMP structure, but during the Gulf War, the military did not share the Pentagon willingness to accommodate the NMP (Smullen Interview, 2004). This lack of trust denied the program a chance to develop. Without a cooperative atmosphere, an important aspect in trust, military power and control became the predominant elements of the Gulf War coverage. Whether this obstruction was malicious or not is debatable but one thing that was certain, the controlling of all information did not sit well with the media. The military's display of power swung the impetus of the tension away from military leaders' dislike of the negative reports to reporters' anger over the military control of information. The military's lack of trust for the media soon shifted to the media's lack of trust for the military.

8.2.2 Authority

Obtaining access to real-time combat operations through the NMP program proved challenging. It required a certain degree of planning on the PAO's part to integrate the media pools into battlefield operations. Moreover, obtaining access required an acceptance among the military to work with the PAO within the ground rules of the NMP. This meant all the subgroups needed to recognize the roles and responsibilities of the actors. While Public Affairs were coordinating the media needs, military operations were not recognizing these efforts. This disregard for the PAO and the NMP constricted any recognition of roles and responsibilities, and weakened the NMP process.

In an attempt to exercise authority over battlefield, military leaders took charge of the reporters. For the military, it was imperative that the media not interfere with operations. It

was the position of military leaders that for operations to run smoothly the responsibility of the media should be under unit commanders (Smullen Interview, 2004). These leaders believed operations activities could better handle the needs of the media than public affairs. Under this assertion, the battlefield commander circumvented the role of the PAO and his authority over the media (Cullin Interview, 2004). The NMP process could not take effect and the PAO could no longer intervene on behalf of the media.

Interestingly, the research does not support the notion that had the military implemented the pools properly the media would have abided by the PAO rules. Many reporters felt that any press pool procedures were an interference with the rights of free and open access. They claim that organized reporting did not facilitate their role as war correspondents but controlled it (Smith, 1992). These reporters' positions were not so ill found. It became apparent to all concerned that the attitude of the military towards the media and the PAO had not changed much in the decades leading up to this war. This became a contentious point especially when the international reporters were producing better stories of the war without the military interference (Smullen Interview, 2004).

Such reporters as CNN correspondents Peter Arnett, Bernard Shaw, and the late John Holliman were broadcasting live from Baghdad, outside the NMP and apparently beyond military authority. This perception was only short lived. Television viewers may remember the Scud missile reports out of Israel and Kuwait. Unfortunately, the Iraqi Command also saw these reports and used them as missile spotting to re-adjust their launchers, much to the dislike of the U.S. military. It did not take long for General Schwarzkopf to request the networks turn off their cameras and limit reporting (Plato, 1995). During the Gulf War, the military arrested and detained several independent reporters for not following these rules (Mordan, 1999).

Throughout the war, news bureaus continued to lobby for access to the battlefield. Many articles such as the Washington Post's "News Chiefs vow to resist Pentagon war coverage rules in the future," revealed the media's desire not to recognize the military's authority in a combat zone (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995). As the news bureau chiefs fought

for access, their reporters went along with the restrictions as best they could simply because it was better than no coverage at all (Combelles-Siegel, 1996). For many reporters adhering to the pool was only a poor alternative to complete censorship (Walker, 1990; Smith, 1992).

8.2.3 Conflict

The DoD placed the NMP program under the control of the Public Affairs Office. However, military leaders had little use for what they saw as an external organization. The military saw itself as a cohesive unit wherein introducing a foreign, independent entity like the media would be cancerous (Cullin Interview, 2004). Even more so, military command did not want to deal with the extra duty and logistics of handling reporters (Willey Interview, 2004). Commanders, bred during the Vietnam War, wanted little to do with reporters or pools (Combelles-Siegel Interview, 2004). They left the specific handling of the NMP plight to the PAO, while providing no support. The PAO found himself in the middle of the contentious relationship when problems arose, and problems arose instantaneously.

Reporters immediately protested the lack of accommodations. There was a lack of dedicated transport and logistical support for the media (Cullin Interview, 2004; Smullen Interview, 2004). These complaints went to the Public Affairs Officer, only to have his recommendations ignored by the military command (Smullen Interview, 2004; Cullin Interview, 2004). This elusive behavior by military leaders and riled attitudes of the media created a setting wherein internal conflicts could not be resolved. The NMP had no mechanism to resolve these problems so that the military and the media could not work out their opposing goals (Cullin Interview, 2004; Combelles-Siegel Interview, 2004).

Without the proper use of an organizational structure, the NMP became a haven for conflicts. To exacerbate the problem further, the military refused to recognize its internal conflict with the PAO and instead stifled any movement to address it (Smullen Interview, 2004). The military instinctively rejected corrective measures leaving little room for wholesale change in the relationship; change that the NMP was supposed to bring. Under

these conditions, the organizational conflicts could not be resolved within the NMP organization. The pools disbanded after the Gulf War. (As a side note, many of the issues ended up in lawsuits.)

8.3 Identifying the Tension Aspect in the Gulf War's Organizational Environment

The changing environment from peacetime to wartime brought about increased attention to conflicting issues of security and openness that affected war coverage programs in the past. Beyond these traditional concerns, there were coalition nations to deal with and modern logistical problems to consider. The military no longer traveled on its stomach. It now moved quickly over the airwaves, the same airwaves the media used. This speed of movement became one of the most influential aspects of the environment. Time was not just a concept of temporal dimension but also a factor for goal attainment. That is, in certain cases the actors could not achieve a specific goal because the goal's endpoints were overtaken by other events, making its attainment irrelevant.

The actual war started with air support on January 16, 1991 (ground troops started February 24, 1991) and went until February 27, 1991. The whole war only took six weeks. This quick tempo did not allow for changing or even planning additional courses of action. The military did not have the time to correct battle plans or even plan its next maneuver much less allow the media to attain its goals (Willey Interview, 2004; Broeckert Interview, 2004). This fast pace war proved detrimental to NMP success (Albert, 1995).

Immediately at the start of the war, the National Media Pool had problems fitting into the environment. Events were changing constantly, greatly decreasing the ability of the PAO to form the pool. Many members of the media assumed these changes would be addressed within the agreed to rules of the NMP. However, the military did not put into practice certain agreed upon procedures as planned due to uncertainties and unknown conditions within the battlefield (Broeckert Interview, 2004). The changing conditions left the media to wonder if the military was hiding something from the press (Brown, 1992). The prove of a conspiracy

may never be determined, but an interesting aspect of this environmental element was how it affected each actor differently

In this new environment, military planning, including involving the NMP, proved to be more difficult to implement than anticipated by either the military or the media (Fialka, 1991). Military analysts, such as Cullin (Interview, 2004) believe that many activities, for example having the PAO providing the press with enough newsworthy spots, were impossible tasks. Success required an immediate adaptation to the environment. Adapting to the environment depended greatly on the natural skills of the different actors and the fundamental techniques of the subgroups. Each subgroup invoked a different method for adjusting to the environment. The military had advanced in recent years both technically and structurally. The weapons were battle-specific and with an all-voluntary force (as oppose to a draft) the soldiers were trained-qualified; whereas reporters were evolving from war correspondents to foreign correspondents station in country year round. (The distinction is war correspondents understand war: foreign correspondents report on their assigned country as a whole.) The absence of uniform adaptation between the media and the military was a cultural complexity where one group did not understand the other.

New dialogue and new ideas formed too fast for reporters to comprehend. For example, to the military "limited war" was a warfare operational concept to achieve certain objectives; but to the press it was simply a descriptive term of the conflict (i.e., a small version of a total war) (Young, 1992). Their separate cultures meant that they did not merge well in the dynamics. Simply put, the media did not understand the new military. Moreover, the speed of the war did not allow time for an education (Willey Interview, 2004). The media's ignorance towards the new military affected the military's ability to improve upon the NMP procedures (Willey Interview, 2004).

Reporters believed the press was still the public's eyes and ears; that the media was the sole voice of the public, especially when it came to keeping an eye on the military. In this old-fashioned belief, the media stereotyped the military from wars past (Smith, 1991). The media's indifference toward developing an understanding in military affairs during the

1970s and 1980s led to a wholesale ignorance that became apparent during the Gulf War (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995). This attitude demonstrated that the media was simply unprepared for the new military. The obedience of a new volunteer force, the advancement of technical weapons, and the preparation for desert warfare changed the dynamics of the actors: a reversal of fortune from the Vietnam War (Combelles-Siegel Interview, 2004; Cullin Interview, 2004). Now the military adapted quickly to the environment and took clear advantage of the uncertainties.

Some analysts (Thompson, 2002; Broeckert Interview, 2004; Combelles-Siegel Interview, 2004) claim the NMP program could not survive in the new environment with so many unknowns. From an environmental perspective, there were very few resources (information, logistic or time) available at the start of the war. Moreover, by the time the military organized operations, the war was moving too fast to reach back and address the media's concerns. In a sense, the war was over before any genuine military-media organization formed. These factors added to the unresolved tension.

8.3.1 Munificence

At the start of the war, reporters believed they would be part of a press pool, but Saudi Arabian officials would not issue visas for the vast majority of the reporters. The Saudis allowed only a few reporters into their country (Walker, 1990). This restriction, placed on the entire media by Saudi Arabia, was insurmountable for the NMP or the PAO (Smullen Interview, 2004). Finding other sources proved difficult for the PAO, not only in accessibility to sources (i.e., getting to the battlefield) but also in the availability of other resources (i.e., non-military sources). The availability of resources was not plentiful for the media, not in the form of sources, logistics, or time but was ample enough for the military (Willey Interview, 2004).

Many reporters noted that the media's logistical resources were conspicuous in their absence, while the military's equipment managed to get to the front (Fialka, 1991). During

the war, it became apparent that the needs of the media were considerably different from the resources of the military. The military had most of what it needed to press-on. The logistical aspects of the environment did not affect troop movement. While on the other hand, the media struggled to keep up (Smullen Interview, 2004). The press had to adapt to the little resources available or fall behind, while all along the military brought what it needed. Without the military to attend to them, and unable to move on their own, many reporters found themselves unprepared for the environment. “Pony Express” was how Fialka (1991) described his report filing.

The logistical resources in the battlefield were limited. When equipment arrived late, as it often did in the fast-paced war, there were no other suitable replacements available in country. Without available sources, pool reporters could only report on what the military released, unless one was daring enough to cover the war from Baghdad. Several Cable News Network reporters did. These reporters were handled through their international network subsidiaries (Combelles-Siegel Interview, 2004). Most other independent reporters like Fialka (1991), had to make do with immaterial data, covering the war from their hotel room in Kuwait. Their stories proved to be not so much covering the war as much as creating side stories (Edwards, 1998).

The military claimed it simply could not get reporters to the front due to logistical challenges of the Persian Gulf environment. The environment as a source of information was militarily uniform; as a stockpile of other resources, it was empty; and as for time, it was not on the media’s side. Without enough time to re-organize the NMP, and no other war coverage procedures in place, the media found itself once again left out of another war, and the military the war’s only messenger.

8.3.2 Complexity

From the first concept of a press pool, there was a difference in procedural understanding between the press and the military. Most journalists believed the press pools

were temporary solutions, implemented only when access to the battlefield was limited (Machamer, 1993); whereas the military saw them as a means to limit the number of reporters in the war zone (Walker, 1990). These differing viewpoints could not share the same goals and objectives of the war and the NMP.

From the military perspective, fighting the war was the number one priority. Operational plans relied on minimizing anyone or anything that hindered victory. Although some military units accepted reporters, most of the military leaders believed that having the media involved added no value to winning the war (Smullen Interview, 2004). For this reason, they believed the use of briefings was a legitimate way to provide reasonable coverage and access the battlefield (although limited). Besides, briefings minimized the potential leaks by bringing uniformity to the reporting (Cloud, 2001; Combelles-Siegel Interview, 2004).

On the other half of the complex relationship, the media believed it should provide its own perspectives and angles on stories separate from the military input. To this end, some reporters sought cooperation from the infantry, but found many foot soldiers reluctant to be interviewed (Fialka, 1991). Their anti-media mentality made their responses antagonistic in nature (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995). The media brought these concerns to DoD Public Affairs Officers. To make matters worse for the press there was division within the military ranks, as well. Public Affairs efforts, empowered to assist the media, were seen by military command as outside the military establishment (Walker, 1990; Cullin Interview, 2004). The relation between the DoD Public Affairs and military command was precarious at best (Cullin Interview, 2004).

The news bureau chiefs continued to insist on their rights and roles, as a vital independent channel to the public. Some reporters (such as Cronkite, 1991; Kurtz, 1991; MacArthur, 1992) in the media even questioned the credibility of the military data, seeking to discredit some of the troop's success by claiming military hype did not serve the public interest. However, the public, the other stakeholder in this affair, simply did not understand the press's argument for openness (Lichter, 1991). With round the clock coverage from

CNN and other news stations, the public did not feel it was missing any news. In fact, polling data suggests that most Americans agreed with the military's justification for secrecy and did not mind the constraints placed on the reporter in the battlefield (Walker, 1990; Milavsky, 1991). During the Gulf War, the public accepted the nightly military briefing as sufficient coverage (Lichter, 1991; Broeckert Interview, 2004).

The cultural complexity reflected the competing orientations, where both the military and the news media were deficient in their knowledge of each other and seemed to prefer it that way (Ricks, 1993). These diverse opinions between the various stakeholders could not be reconciled. With conflicting perspectives in a fast-paced environment, there was not enough time to manage the tension and put the war coverage procedures back on track. This clash of cultures and different norms served only to aggravate the contentious relationship.

8.3.3 Dynamism

The biggest environmental factor affecting the Gulf War was advanced technologies and the actors who used them. For example, modern equipment like portable satellite terminals for receiving and sending data was not available during Grenada, but was state of the art in the Gulf War (Walker, 1990). Whether it was the military air attack lighting up the sky, or the cable news coverage bringing events instantaneously to the public, both the military and the news bureaus brought their advanced technology to the war (Cullin Interview, 2004). Both sides prominently displayed the dynamics of war's emerging technologies (Broeckert Interview, 2004). However, new technologies meant new problems with using them (Smullen Interview, 2004). The ability versus inability to use the advanced technology within the environment produced a division in the media of the have's (international reporters such as CNN) and the have not's (NMP reporters). This situation quickly polarized the two groups of reporters, laying the blame on the military.

In spite of the new technology, there was a lack of press pool footage of the war and most pictures came from independent sources (Mordan, 1999). The military found the NMP

equipment so cumbersome that the unit command thought it best to leave the media equipment behind (Fialka, 1991). This mishandling of the NMP equipment only added to the tension, especially when the new technology provided the means for the international press to get the scoop on the NMP members.

The international reporters were able to gather and transmit information without the assistance of the military. New York Times foreign editor, Gersh (1990) rejected the military excuses for not handling the equipment, claiming, "We've done much better with our own people and equipment." Other news organizations such as CNN and with satellite feeds were able to provide battle coverage from Baghdad instantaneously. Although these independent reports were not without consequences, the Gulf War proved that the media was no longer local news stations but international cable companies with newer, better, longer broadcasting telecasts.

The live broadcast of the international reporters had many pooled reporters believing the NMP was a mistake (Thompson, 2002). These reporters believed that the failure of the NMP lay with the military not anticipating and preparing for these uncertainties. However, the changing factors of technology and competition between NMP and international reporters took both the military and the media by surprise. Whether the military could have done better is debatable, but the dynamic in the war zone proved to be detrimental to the NMP program (Thompson, 2002).

8.4 Analysis of Tension in the Gulf War

When the U.S. entered the Gulf War, there was an attempt to organize the war coverage to ease the contentious relationship. After two decades of negotiations between the military and the media, DoD created a war coverage program – the National Media Pool –to allow a limited number of reporters access to the battlefield. NMP was the agreed upon structure to bring participant satisfaction and goal attainment, (Hall, 1991) back into the program. DoD formed the NMP in good faith; however, getting the military to implement it

into operations failed. Although this missed opportunity was the major cause of tension during the Gulf War, it is important to consider it against other factors.

The case study depicts the challenge for the war coverage program to manage the persistent tension along two major criteria - trust and cooperation. The research discusses previous commissions' recommendations (specifically, Sidle Panel and Hoffman Report) to manage the conflict and tension by adjusting procedures to satisfy the needs of the media. The members on the panel believed these reorganizing efforts would achieve the needed cooperative atmosphere to meet specific goals (Thompson, 2002). This approach allowed for goal attainment and participant satisfaction. Unfortunately, the desired outcomes of the conferences were not realized.

The criterion, achieving participant-satisfaction, reveals the lack of willingness of the military and media to ease the internal tension. The Sidle Panel and Hoffman Report recommended a cooperative effort to promote participant satisfaction. Hall (1991) suggests that if this recommendation had been addressed properly, a shared culture might have emerged to override the divergence in these groups and shape the direction and operations of the organizational program. Although, attempts were made to organize the procedures for a cooperative relationship with the media prior to the Gulf War, these efforts never made it to fruition. The power structure of military control challenged the efforts of the media to participate in the war coverage program. The research demonstrates several points as to why these subgroups could not achieve a cooperative endeavor; not the least of which is Combelles-Siegel (2004) assertion that there was a conscious effort on the military's part to not deal with the media. Several analysts have noted this claim in their account of the Gulf War.

Fialka (1991) claims that military planning failed to address the press requirement for satisfactory access to battlefield; Plato (1995) maintains that no serious steps were taken to open the battlefield to the pool; while Cullin (Interview, 2004) suggests that there was no formal, direct guidance for the unit commands to execute the program consistently among the units. Also as a side note, Mordan (1999) points out that the military arrested several

reporters for not following the procedures. These actions and inactions demonstrate that the military did not even acknowledge others participants' responsibilities or roles. Such disregard for participant satisfaction, as well as the military ignoring the advice of its own PAO, threatened the legitimacy of military authority. Both the media and the PAOs expressed dissatisfaction with the military handling of the NMP operations (Fialka, 1991).

From the military point of view, total control of the battlefield was the desired practice in order to avoid any misinformation or the release of sensitive intelligence. The military strategy was to control the war zone completely, claiming an ultimate (whether legitimate or otherwise) authority over the battlefield. In the military leaders' collective mind, the purpose of the NMP was to share military provided-information among the news bureaus, not for the military to provide media access to military operations. By being the only source, the military believed it could manipulate and manage the environment to contain false stories, misinformation, and propaganda. Although this effort kept the effects of the environment to a minimum, its success did not ease the tension.

The military's overt actions to control the resources demonstrated that the media's desire to cover the war was not a priority in the planning. Some military analysts (such as Smullen Interview, 2004; Willey Interview, 2004, Albert, 1995) claim the military's action may have been necessary due to the dynamics of the war. They acknowledge time and other important factors affected the NMP goal attainment, but noted that it the strict organizational structure of the military was all that allowed war coverage effort in the fast-paced the war.

It may be fair to excuse the military due to the lack of time available to manage the NMP program properly. From a practical standpoint, analysts, such as Broeckert (Interview, 2004) and Smullen (Interview, 2004) acknowledge that the war simply rushed passed the NMP leaving no time to re-organize around the goals of the stakeholders. However, the study found cause to believe that the media participation in the NMP was undermined by a singular desire of the military to control the reporting and that this conspiracy was simply made easier under the quickness of the war (Cullin Interview, 2004; Smullen Interview, 2004).

Military actions demonstrated that the tension ran deeper than NMP's failure to meet specific goals or achieve participant's satisfaction. Analysts (Cullin Interview, 2004; Brochert Interview, 2004; Fialka, 1991; Thompson, 2002) claim there were more levels of uncertainty within the relationship than in the Gulf War environment. The unreceptive program and hostile environment only brought them out into the open for good. The news bureaus and the Pentagon each understood that without a more successful war coverage program, the military-media working relationship would not survive the next conflict (Smith, 1992). To drive this point home, news bureaus filed several lawsuits. Although beyond the scope of this dissertation, the lawsuits demonstrated the level of tension within the unreceptive NMP program.

8.5 Summary

The National Media Pool was an attempt to bring back a World War II-type cooperative war coverage program, by providing the media with access to the battlefield. Unfortunately it did not capture the organizational elements as successfully as OWI did (Chart 8-5).

ELEMENT	WORLD WAR II	GULF WAR
POWER	The exercise of organizational power requires a degree of trust. Trust is found in respected leaders whose characters are beyond reproach from the subgroups. The subgroups then deem the actions of the trusted leaders, such as establishing rules, justifiable.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pentagon's good faith effort of media pools. • Military did not trust the media • Media did not trust pools
AUTHORITY	The display of organizational authority requires acceptance among the actors. This concurrence among the subgroups establishes a sense of legitimacy. Legitimate authority creates a cooperative organization among the actors through official recognition of roles and responsibilities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PAO to integrate the media into pools; military to work with the PAO • Military took charge of the reporters; did not accept PAO role. • Media's did not accept military's authority in a combat zone • Unilateral reporters did not accept NMP
CONFLICT	Conflict resolution is handled best within a structured organization. This organization establishes rules and a shared understanding of roles and responsibility. The rules then dictate the proper course of action for conflict resolution.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NMP under the control of the Public Affair Office. • NMP external to the military structure • Military stifled any movement to correct conflict
MUNIFICENCE	the affect of munificence on the organization is countered best by overwhelming it with controllable resources. Flooding the environment with controllable resource dilutes the negative affects of munificent sources.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment did not provide resources; • Limited resources for pooled media • Foreign countries restrictions • Unilateral reporting and international network subsidiaries flooded the news
COMPLEXITY	The affect of complexity on the organization is minimized when the stakeholders share the same goals and objectives. Finding a common cause and promoting it within and throughout the stakeholders minimizes the agitating factors inherent in their different personas.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Difference in procedural understanding • Military - media involvement add no value to winning the war • Media - provide its own perspectives and angles on stories • Unilateral reporters provided for the public
DYNAMISM	The affect of dynamism on the organization is lessen when organization maintains consistency within. Change is inevitable for an organization but controlling the effect of the changes within the organization maintains the organization.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New technology / new problems • Military quicker faster war fighting • Media portable equipment – NMP mishandled; unilateral handled own • Unprepared for the dynamic war zone

CHART 8-5 Tension Analysis of the Vietnam War

Analysts, such as Thompson (2002) believe the attitudes of the military doomed the NMP long before its implementation. The military subverted the roles and responsibilities of not just reporters but also the Public Affair Officers as well (Cullin Interview, 2004; Broeckert Interview, 2004). This display of excess power, circumvented and ignored DoD-established procedure and PAO's recommendations so military leaders could exert control

and authority over the resources and the media (Thompson, 2002; Combelles-Siegel Interview, 2004). The military failed to provide reporters with access to the battlefield. Procedures focused almost exclusively on the military desire to limit the number of reporters in the battlefield, or more specifically, military' leaders' desire not to involve the press at all. The pool concept, as implemented, mostly addressed the military concerns and not the media's needs. Fortunately, for the military, the environment was receptive to this effort.

The military structure allowed the military to adapt to the environment, whereas the NMP structure did not allow the media to adapt to the military. The media pool became a ritual of daily briefing (Young, 1992; Combelles-Siegel Interview, 2004), leading many reporters to believe they were alienated from the information and the war (Fialka, 1991; Smullen Interview, 2004). This alienation became prominent when independent reporters (i.e., CNN) were able to report extensively from outside the organizational program (Smith, 1991). This alienation between the military and the media, as well as within the military structure, only added to the contentious environment. For many NMP reporters this was the core cause of the tension.

At the conclusion of the Gulf War, the effort to organize the press, and the NMP, came under review again. Military and media leaders once again held a major conference for war coverage practice. The Pentagon-Media Conference, hosted by the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation (1992), allowed the media to plead its case. Here news bureau chiefs insisted that press pools be a "last resort" option (McCormick, 1992), suitable only in cases of maintaining the security of sensitive information about military operations (Combelles-Siegel Interview, 2004).

9.0 Iraq War - The Embedded Program

9.1 Background into Iraq War's Embedded Program

In April 1992, the Pentagon and the news bureaus conducted another panel. As an epilogue to the Gulf War, or more accurately a prologue to the next war, this continuous war coverage debate formed a new policy of open and free coverage (Bruner, 1997). The panel developed nine principles (Appendix B) for news coverage of military operations (Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1992). These nine principles became policy under DOD Directive 5122.5, in December of 1993.

The policy emphasized the importance of having military commanders plan for news coverage as part of military operations. The key agreements were: open and independent reporting as a principal means of coverage; pool formation to be short in duration and scope; and military PAO to provide journalists with necessary logistical support (Ricks, 1993). The implementation of these rules had far-reaching effects for future operations.

Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti, 1994) saw the first test of these new guidelines. The military planned and implemented the key principles of media access to battlefield, operational security, and logistical support issues into operational plans. The Operational Plan directed several pools of journalists to accompany the invading force. This real-time viewing of the war meant that the military had to release information in a timely manner; therefore, security had to happen at the source. The military relied heavily on the cooperation of the reporters and their willingness not to reveal classified information that could compromise the operation. This plan went extremely well (Combelles-Siegel, 1996; Mitchell, 2001).

The military and media accepted this method throughout the 1990s. Following these guidelines, several military skirmishes (United Shield – Somalia, 1995; Assured Response – Liberia, 1996; Joint Forge – Bosnia, 1998) appeared in national news' reports with little criticism from either the military or the media. The military provided timely information, and the media documented the operations in order to inform the American public

(Combelles-Siegel, 1996). The ability of the military and the media to abide by these Nine Principles looked promising for future war coverage programs; however, these rules did not survive the next major war.

Immediately after the September 11, 2001 attack, it became apparent that U.S. was entering into an unconventional war once again. The present-day plan of action called for small teams of Special Operation Forces to infiltrate terrorists' camps in Afghanistan. This covert strategy, and the rugged terrain in which it took place, did not allow for the regular press pool members or their equipment (Whitman Interview, 2004). Yet both the military and the media knew that the press needed to be involved. The proposed solution was to establish an Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) to promote America's war on terrorism.

The goal of the OSI program was to assist the media with information operations and warfare policies, in the hope of influencing the opposition to lay down its arms (Matheny Interview, 2004). This method did not sit well with the media. The title alone suggested misinformation and propaganda designed to control the war coverage. The media quickly reminded the Pentagon of the 1992 agreement and its commitment to open and free coverage (Cooper, 2003b). DoD reluctantly agreed to shut down the office and abandon the program; however, there was still the Afghan War coverage to consider.

While Pentagon personnel and the news bureau chiefs were discussing a proper procedure for the Afghan War, the Bush administration was alluding to confrontation with Iraq. The media insisted on covering this latest conflict from the front lines, alongside the troops (Ricchiardi, 2003). Fortunately, the advanced planning of the Iraq War provided the opportunity to include media coverage in the operational strategy. DoD personnel took the initiative to regroup and re-organize the media program (Whitman Interview, 2004). Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Victoria Clarke, shared the media's concerns for access to war coverage (Clarke, 2002; Clarke Interview, 2004). She solicited input from the news organizations about ways reporters might be "embedded" with military units (ASD PA Meeting, 2001).

To deliberate on this issue, the Pentagon created another panel at the Brookings Institution. The panel's mission was to come to a decision on how the media could cover the military without compromising operations and how the military would work with the media to make this happen (Brookings, 2001). This conference began with the members recognizing the diverse purposes between the military and the media and that each had specific needs during wartime. The goal then was to achieve stability between secrecy of military operations and openness for media coverage (Brookings, 2001). The attendees acknowledged that a "perfect solution" would not be possible but that an acceptable procedure needed to be developed. This panel's objective was to determine ways to manage this contentious military-media relationship, not to eliminate it. Clarke (Interview, 2004) stated that the issue governing the program's development was to realize a "healthy yet balanced tension" within the program. Although there was a dedicated commitment to this agenda, it was not an easy task. Determining how to manage tension became an exercise in itself.

Pentagon personnel, military leaders, members of the Coalition Press Center, and news bureau chiefs worked in concert to establish acceptable guidelines for media access (Whitman Interview, 2004). Discussions started with the fundamental understanding that an element of good faith needed to be established (Clarke, 2002). With this agreement in place, working through the details of the specific activities and back-up plans for each scenario (i.e., lost reporter, transportation break down, media protection) became a mutual effort. In extensive meetings, members considered all factors and exhausted all possible scenarios (Clarke Interview, 2004). Clarke again commented, "Once we agreed to the front end, (making it better) and the back end, (exhausting all scenarios), the middle (the details) became easier" (Clarke Interview, 2004 – parenthetical remarks added). These discussions added a new dimension to the war coverage effort.

During these meetings, both sides agreed that there was no cause for controlling the information beyond the requirement to maintain operational control and security in the case of the naming of casualties (Brookings, 2001). Enforcing these two provisions simply meant information would be delayed in its release (Whitman Interview, 2004). In the field, the

Coalition Press Center and embedded reporters established other ground rules for releasing information within the framework of real-time ability and access (Anonymous Interview, 2004). The final product was a plan for embedding reporters with combat units. This plan became the Department of Defense's Public Affairs Guidance for Embedding Reporters (Appendix D). Its objective was to provide "the factual story – good or bad – before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions" (Rumsfeld, 2001). Clarke's only rule was, "Do no harm, and think twice before publishing" (Clarke Interview, 2004).

The Embedded Program became part of the operational plans of the Iraq War. The program directed Public Affairs Officers (PAO) and military leaders to identify opportunities for placing reporters with military units during maneuvers. On the media side, new bureau chiefs considered their needs and evaluated the qualifications of their reporters to determine who would be best suited for each assignment. The selected reporter then presented himself to the Coalition Press Center in Kuwait, who coordinated media interest with military units (Anonymous Interview, 2004).

When the war began, the battle plan started with air strikes from a detached location before ground troops moved into Iraq. During this air campaign, unilateral reporters gathered information from a great distance. It was not until the ground troop movement began that embedded reporters joined military units (Whitman Interview, 2004). As members of the Embedded Program, reporters had open access to military operations (Cooper, 2003b). The procedures allowed the reporter to live, work, and travel as part of the units with which they were embedded (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003). These journalists effectively became noncombatant members of combat units (Carr, 2003; Cooper, 2003b). As noncombatants, the reporters operated within the military chain-of-command, addressing issues or problems at the proper level.

Ideally, problems were resolved between reporters and the unit command (Anonymous Interview, 2004). When they were not resolved, the issues moved up the chain to the next level of command - reporters went to their editors; unit commands to their area command. At the next level, either the parties made compromises or the issue went to the

news bureau Chief and the DoD Public Affairs Officer (Clarke Interview, 2004). This agreed upon method provided a means for handling complaints laterally at the lowest possible level within the two groups (Whitman Interview, 2004).

The Embedded Program provided a new contemporary method for war coverage. Its goals were to create a military–media social function to meet the challenges of the contentious relationship. Although it was a committed effort by both the DoD and the news bureaus to provide media access to the war, this decentralized approach, based on the good faith and confidence in each other to do their job well, was not without controversial aspects.

9.2 Identifying the Tension Aspect in the Embedded Organizational Structure

When the U.S. began its “Shock and Awe” strategy on Iraq, discussions in the DoD Public Affairs Office quickly took on the topic of the media and war coverage (Clarke Interview, 2004). Clarke brought all the relevant actors together to resolve the war coverage issues. Although panels formed in the past had similar themes of military-media relationship, this one would actually create a decisive procedure based on mutual trust. In doing so, she hoped to develop a proficient, working relationship between the Pentagon and the news bureaus (Clarke, 2002). The challenge was to satisfy both the military and media needs. Historically, methods suited for one group were often seen as too much concession by the other actors.

Many in the media were cautious towards the DoD’s commitment to change (Bushell and Cunningham 2003; Ricchiardi 2003). Referencing the OSI fiasco and other historical failures, some media analysts, such as Taylor (2001), Porch (2002), and Gitlin (2003) claim the Pentagon had exhibited an unhealthy impulse to control the news or pressure the media not to publish unfavorable stories. Also of concern for the media was the military level of willingness to participate. Media personnel noted during the conferences, that the DoD’s operational policies were not always implemented at the tactical level (Brookings, 2001).

Any thoughts from military leaders reflecting these allegations would only distract from the planning effort.

Fortunately, senior military leaders assured the news bureau chiefs that they wanted reporters to witness the goings-on of the war to mitigate any misinformation or deception that may reflect poorly on the troops (Brookings, 2001). They believed a more direct observation from the media would provide a more accurate description of the action (Rutenberg, 2001). Some leaders even expressed regret for censorship during past mission that left successful operations unrecorded (Anonymous Interview, 2004). They recognized that the media had a great venue for influencing the public and noted how the military needed a channel to this market (Cooper, 2003b). In exchange, the military offered to accommodate the media if the reporters would agree to certain ground rules established for their protection and the security of the operation. After much discussion and negotiation, the news bureaus and journalists agreed to these conditions in exchange for attachment to a military unit during combat operations.

For a plan to succeed, all the actors had to agree to abide by the established rules. This meant that Secretary Rumfeld needed to be a forceful advocate, and the news bureau chiefs' active participants. Clarke states that this was the case. She claims that all stakeholders realized that there was a need for a new institution, "if these people were not on board, the Embedded Program would never have happened" (Clarke Interview, 2004). Nevertheless, even as the government and military attempted to stay as sincere as possible, tension still existed.

9.2.1 Power

The Embedded Program addressed a major concern of the press; providing direct access to the front lines of military operations for its reporters (Blumenthal and Rutenberg, 2003; Rieder, 2003). The practice of embedding journalists with combat units virtually guaranteed that the journalists would have access to operational intelligence. This method

also limited the military control over the information. For DoD and military leaders, the ground rules (Appendix D) for embedded reporters to stay with military units while reporting was control enough. Analysts pointed out that the willingness of embedded reporters to submit to these rules was due in part to the media cooperating and assisting in every step of the planning - instilling trust and confidence needed to maintain the guiding principles and overarching policies (Anonymous Interview, 2004; Clarke Interview, 2004; Whitman Interview, 2004). However, even in this cooperative program, military control over resources was still a contentious factor for some reporters.

Reporters, such as Gatlin (2003) and Grossman (2003), and even participants of the Embedded Program such as Carr, (2003), saw the ground rules as an attempt to sanitize, and even determine the nature of, the war coverage. These reporters saw restrictions as ensuring a military spin; symptomatic of the strategic influence plan. One Boston Globe op-ed columnist, Jensen (2003b), even alleged that the military was hiding information. His editorial pointed out that initial information in the first days of the war came overwhelmingly from government briefings and not from embedded reporting. Other commentators (such as, Hickey, 2002 and Younge, 2003) pointed to examples such as denial of coffin and body bag footage as a show of military deceit. Even one military analyst, Combelles-Siegel (Interview, 2004) acknowledged the practice of designing information – specific photograph sites, information left out, timing of the release –for promoting military prowess. Galloway (2003) suggests that any hiding of battlefield information was more a practice of self-censorship for self-preservation, than military manipulation. The reasoning was partially because reporters had the option of reporting outside the Embedded Program as unilateral reporters.

Journalists could trade safety and security for a higher level of free and open reporting. However, as unilateral reporters, they were no longer guaranteed the logistic support, physical protection, or access to combat operations (Fisher, 2003b; Ricchiardi, 2003). Nonetheless, some journalists preferred to operate unilaterally, rather than accept the resources from the embedding system. They believed that the Embedded Program method produced incomplete coverage (Shadid Interview, 2004b). Shadid claims that the embedded

method of information control, whether it was intentional or otherwise, did not allow access to the other side of a story.

Military leaders countered that they were showing the many sides of war but reporters only wanted to focus on combat, ignoring the humanitarian issues (Anonymous Interview, 2004). Critical articles, such as Miami Herald's "Pentagon, Press Wage War over Coverage," alluded to the military taking issue with the media for not printing positive day-to-day living stories (Frank, 2003). These articles inferred that some in the military would have liked to have even more control over the embedded reporter's story development, especially in the later days of the war. These arguments did not escalate into anything more than third-parties advocates publicizing minority positions (Bauder, 2003).

Typically, the handling of the information, from the timing of its release, to whether it would be live or copy, and other details, were arranged between the unit command and the reporter (Anonymous Interview, 2004). The unit commander, in his judgment, chose how best to disburse information to the reporter to prevent the disclosure of sensitive intelligence (Cooper, 2003b). Whitman (Interview, 2004) claims, as a show of good faith, the military established no form of censorship for controlling the reports. DoD affirmed that information restrictions were kept to a necessary minimum within the program guideline and certainly no more so than normal operations outside the program (Whitman Interview, 2004). With no formal restrictions and only locally imposed transmission delays, these actors handled contentious details simply as a matter of business.

9.2.2 Authority

The desire to create a cooperative program among the participants was an important aspect in facilitating legitimate procedures for media coverage of the war (Clarke Interview, 2004). DoD insisted on establishing guidelines so that a legitimacy of authority would be recognized giving the military control over the battlefield. The operational plans required military control of the battle space for mission success (Whitman Interview, 2004). Some

reporters (such as Baker, 2003, Bauder, 2003 and Jurkowitz, 2003b) recognized the need for such discipline and accepted their roles and responsibilities as being attributable to the reality of war. They credit the openness in creating the guidelines for alleviating some of the tension.

The military conveyed to the press that in order to be part of the embedded process the war correspondents had to accept the military's ground rules. Military leaders explained that these rules were necessary in order to secure, mitigate, or remove all factors that compromised the mission (Anonymous Interview, 2004). All factors referred not just to the battlefield, but material, personnel, and logistics, even the airwaves used by newscasters; all factors had to be secured. In addition, strict adherence to roles and responsibilities was necessary for access to the front line. This acceptance of one's role and responsibilities created the process within the Embedded Program. In doing so, it gave the embedded reporter greater latitude than his unilateral counterpart on the types of missions he was permitted to cover. Those reporters who would not agree to abide by the regulations did not have access to the program or the battlefield. The military removed those that disobeyed or attempted to circumvent the rules.

Legitimate or otherwise, recognizing the military authority was required for the embedded reporter to obtain support and protection. DoD believed that reporters accepted the ground rules willingly in that, with few exceptions, most reporters stayed with their assigned unit (Whitman Interview, 2004). When a reporter left the program typically, his news bureau pulled him for programming reasons; rarely did a reporter quit (Methany Interview, 2004). For the actors within the program, a stable role structure emerged significantly affecting the relationship.

Some embedded reporters (such as Carr, 2003 and; Cockburn, 2003) still maintained that the military did not have authority over freedom of the press, yet they accepted their responsibility to the program. Other media analysts (Gitlin, 2003 and Johnson, 2003) suggest the media's acceptance of military authority was for no other reason than the Embedded Program was better than the method of the Gulf War. Several other unilateral reporters,

Shadid among them, held to the principles of free and open reporting. Shadid (Interview, 2004b) reported from outside the program, claiming that by yielding to authority, one yields independence.

Interestingly, most of the criticisms of the military's authority came from the unilateral reporters outside of the battlefield (Whitman Interview, 2004). The subject of the criticism from such writers as Gitlin (2003), Workman (2003), and Jensen (2003a) was not specifically the legitimate authority of the military, but the Embedded Program as a legitimate method of reporting. Ironically, this argument pitted embedded correspondents against unilateral reporters.

9.2.3 Conflict

Conflict resolution was perhaps the single most important organizational element discussed in the development of the Embedded Program. By addressing the inherent tension early and recognizing the need to alleviate the causes of conflict, the participants agreed to handle issues within a professional relationship. To do so it was necessary to establish a chain-of-command procedure to resolve issues and complaints. Most reporters, service members, and DoD personnel saw the Embedded Program chain-of-command structure as a shared format for resolving contentious conditions (Anonymous Interview, 2004; Baker, 2003). Unfortunately, there was no legitimate way of handling complaints from unilateral reporters.

Several journalists of the Associated Press reported incidents where members of the military shoved them to the ground, pushed them out of the way, or told them to leave the battlefield (Harding, 2004). Others claim that the military confiscated cameras, disks and videotapes (Rozen, 2003). Prompted by such reports, the Committee to Protect Journalists and other ad hoc groups began investigating alleged incidents (Campagna and Roumani, 2003). They found no official violations. In fact, the research into articles and interviews did not identify any major dissatisfaction. There were no major incidents reported of

compromised missions or endangered personnel as a result of war coverage activities. Minor incidents, such as Geraldo Rivera drawing a map in the sand, were dealt with swiftly, successfully, and surprisingly without an objection from the reporters (Plante, 2003).

The military claims, and news bureaus confirmed, that the military often went out of its way to avoid bringing harm to embedded reporters or unilateral reporters through constant contact with their news bureaus (Methany Interview, 2004; Shadid Interview, 2004b). As one reporter cited, "It has exceeded my expectations and has been a lot more informative and balanced and journalistic than I'd anticipated" (Croft, 2004). As proof of the Embedded Program success, no reporter filed a complaint with the OSD – PAO (Whitman Interview, 2004).

9.3 Identifying the Tension Aspect in the Iraq War's Organizational Environment

The Iraq War zone was a new environment. It may have been the same location as the first Gulf War, but the environment was now different. The terrorist guerilla warfare was unconventional by Gulf War, and even Vietnam War, standards. Although DoD PA tried to anticipate every scenario, there were factors in the environment that no one could imagine. This brought on new challenges and new strategies.

One of the most demanding challenges was handling the overwhelming number of reporters in country (Bliss, 2002). The military agreed to the Embedded Program, but there were still unilateral reporters in the war zone searching for sources. Although all actors involved understood these reporters were not part of the Embedded Program, they were part of the war coverage effort (Workman, 2003). The issue then was how these journalists might fit into the planning.

DoD (i.e., Clarke Interview, 2004 and Whitman Interview, 2004) believed that the effort of the embedded reporters supplemented with the unilateral reporters' stories would provide a complete account of the war. The Embedded Program method provided a snapshot

of the battlefield. Although narrow in view, these accounts presented insight into the mission of the reporter's unit (Whitman Interview, 2004); whereas the unilateral reporters provided a once-removed, but slightly broader picture of the war (Bushell and Cunningham, 2003). This arrangement permitted each reporter to experience a particular effect of the war zone of his own choosing (Methany Interview, 2004). It allowed complete reporting within the environment, at least as far as operational planning was concerned.

This presented a major concern within the war coverage effort. The embedded reporter operated within a bubble of a controlled environment. The unilateral reporter, left to his own initiative, reported on situations the embedded correspondent could not cover. In addition, he did so without support or the necessary logistics, in a hostile environment that did not provide safety or even a neutral status. Many unilateral reporters found out that independent reporting did not make them neutral in the traditional sense of the word (Donvan, 2003; Shadid, 2004a). Both the military and the enemy treated them as any other civilians in the battlefield.

This equivocal status created dangerous situations for many unilateral reporters, as they went in search of stories. They placed themselves at great risk to their well-being and their life in their effort to get to their source. In this hostile environment, many unilateral reporters realized the trade-off between the security of accepting military logistics and their calling to a higher truth (Donvan, 2003). This perception of duty separated the unilateral reporters from their embedded counterparts. In their perception of reporting, they drew a line among themselves of legitimate and illegitimate reporting, creating two types of reporters (Shadid Interview, 2004b). This distinction was lost on the military.

For the military, there was only one media. Military leadership believed they did all they could for the media by providing the logistics, and in doing so the military provided the media with an opportunity to observe the well-trained, well-equipped, well-lead military (Whitman Interview, 2004; Pasquarett, 2003). As a trade-off, this cooperative effort provided the foot soldier with the opportunity to see the dedicated war correspondent enduring the hostile environment and putting his life on the line to do his job and get the

story (Clarke Interview, 2004; Zinsmeister, 2003). The development of the Embedded Program was about finding a common cause or least establishing a mutual respect. Although the military may have been able to establish a bond within the Embedded Program and perhaps an understanding among the unilateral reporters, there were other reporting efforts beyond the military's control.

The military had to consider foreign news organizations as sources of information within the environment, Al-Jazeera especially. For the military, this rogue source was feeding bad information to the public and needed to be dealt with decisively (Anonymous Interview, 2004). After Arabic reporters declined offers to embed with U.S. troops, the military believed the only option left was to shut down this news organization for a time (Clark Interview, 2004). This action brought criticism from U.S. and the international news organizations. Critics (such as Gitlin, 2003; McMasters, 2003) alleged that the military was only interested in reports favorable to U.S. military. This assertion supplemented the unilateral argument (i.e., Shadid Interview, 2004b) that the Embedded Program polarized news into legitimate – illegitimate reporting.

The existence of foreign news agencies was not the only turmoil in the environment; there were new methods for reporting military outcomes and other dynamic happenings in the war zone. For example, the advent of real-time websites, high technology cameras, and even personal emails provided other means of passing information (Smith, 2003; Spring, 2003; Simon, 2004). The PAO recognized that it could not monitor all transmissions, but it could maintain a degree of transparency to decrease the tension through a new form of military-media relationship (Whitman Interview, 2004). Even though embedded reporting filled the airwaves 24-hours a day these other reports made their way through the airwaves.

Most of these non-embedded reports became an epilogue to an embedded story or secondary information or even rumors on the Internet (Shadid Interview, 2004b). In some cases, they presented a departure from the official war coverage. When the unexpected surfaced, the military had to provide damage control often to defend against rumors and inaccurate information. During these situations, some reporters, and military alike,

questioned the value of the Embedded Program within this dynamic environment (Cooper, 2003a; Johnson, 2003).

9.3.1 Munificence

The availability of information in the environment was crucial to the argument of free and open war coverage. On this point, many media analysts feel the Embedded Program limited other sources and other stories (Shadid Interview, 2004b; Johnson, 2003; Jensen, 2003a). Analysts point out that the Embedded Program provided the reporter with information from only one vantage point (Bliss, 2002; Carr, 2003). Some media analysts further claim that historically speaking, military involvement in war coverage often created an environment wherein the military omitted crucial facts or distorted data (Jensen, 2003b). Although these media analysts are certainly in the minority, they raise a valuable point about single-source reporting as a deterrent to the negative effect of munificence in an embedded environment. Two issues often cited as factors of the program's weakness were incomplete information and inaccuracy in the haste to report.

Again, a second Boston Globe editor, Jurkowitz (2003a) stated that the Embedded Program methods did not allow for multiple sources of information. He posited this form of reporting would not provide trustworthy news. The argument given was that by limiting information to one source (i.e., military), reporters could not confirm the authenticity of the data given to them. Shadid (Interview, 2004b) suggests that this form of coverage sanctioned the reporting, when in fact the unsanctioned report might very well have been the more accurate piece.

In the embedded reporter's ability to release information quickly, the live report often provided an incomplete story. Although the embedded environment provided access to the battlefield, the embedded reporter may not have had the opportunity to double-check the military data or the experience to interpret military events accurately. (A Fox News expert noted once in the early days of troop movement, an embedded reporter implied that the

troops were “pinned down” when in fact movement halted so that the unit command could assess the enemy’s position). These limitations support the argument that first reports can often be wrong (Pasquarett, 2003); giving strength to Shadid’s (Interview, 2004b) claim that other sources were necessary for complete coverage.

For some media analysts, such as Shadid (2004a) and Broeckert (Interview, 2004), unilateral reporting is the only true method for accurate coverage of the war. Baker (2003) agreed that such reporting is at least necessary in verifying the embedded reporting. Ideally, non-embedded reporters took steps outside the military procedures either through additional investigation or by asserting their own perspective on the story. Alternatively, they would corroborate information with their embedded counterpart either directly or within their news organization, as Washington Post reporters Shadid (Interview, 2004b) and Baker (2003) did.

The military, although not opposed to this cooperative effort, believed that the logistics for such corroboration were the responsibility of the news bureaus (Methany Interview, 2004). By embedding reporters with the military unit, DoD (i.e., Clarke Interview, 2004) believed it was providing an open and free environment for reporting. She believed it was enough for the military to provide access and logistical support to the Embedded Program. The military’s limited resources could not provide for all unilateral reporters.

Shadid (2004a) raised the issue that this trade-off between safety and independent reporting placed truth in the balance. He cautiously advised keeping an open venue to other sources to ensure that reporters are getting the whole truth and not just the convenient story. Other media analysts (such as Johnson, 2003; Smith, 2003) suggest a more organized effort between embedded and unilateral reporting. This line of thinking produced a debate between the Embedded Program methods and the unilateral reporting methods as to which was more accurate (Pasquarett, 2003; Workman, 2003).

9.3.2 Complexity

One of the goals of the embedded process was to allow both the military and the media an opportunity to appreciate each other's duty and position in the war effort (Eisman, 2003; Clarke Interview, 2004). Clarke (Interview, 2004) wanted to establish an environment of respect among these diverse subgroups. She believed it was possible to achieve a cooperative engagement between the military and the media despite their differences in perspectives and objectives. Several analysts argue McMasters' (2003) and Gitlin's (2003) claim that this resistance to diversity within the reporting changed the war coverage from a pluralistic complexity to a patriotic simplicity.

Some media analysts (Bliss, 2002; Bedway, 2003; Cockburn, 2003; Strupp and Berman, 2003) see cooperation as further tarnishing the truth. They claim the lack of scrutiny tainted the source of information, and that the embedding practice co-opted the reporter's integrity. Even if the information was not tainted at the source, it certainly could not be viewed as anything more than propaganda. Their argument states that absorbing reporters into the culture of the military necessarily ruined the media objectivity (Bliss, 2002). These analysts suggest fraternization causes the reporters to lose the critical eye necessary for unbiased reporting (Cooper, 2003a). Other analysts, such as Grossman (2003) further posit that the embedded journalists likely suffered from "Stockholm Syndrome" when they showed compassion for the military while embedded with the troops. They (specifically, Cooper, 2003a) cite such reports as a Marine Corp's memorandum that states that after a few days correspondents became "Marine-like in discipline and structure".

Although the Marines issued this statement as a commendation to the Embedded Program, it highlighted the notion that the value of diversity in the environment was lessened when the media became militarized. Clarke (Interview, 2004) countered this position claiming that it was to the program's credit that these diverse actors, reporters and soldiers alike, could work together in an unfettered cooperative nature. The unfettered nature allowed the different reporters to write on any topic of interest to them.

Interestingly, this argument became a point for both sides, creating its own contentious effect. Media analysts, such as Gitlin (2003), claim that the unfettered nature decreased the level of competition in reporting. Without competition, there was no difference between one report and another (Jensen, 2003a). The irony was that recruiting war correspondents into the military structure might have decreased the tension within the relationship while it exacerbated the tension from without. Adding to this frustration of unilateral reporters and their supporters was the public's acceptance of the Embedded Program (Bauder, 2003). In the marketplace of public opinion, diversity was not selling well. Despite the fact that some media analysts suggest embedding the media would be detrimental, no article or on-air newscast provided proof of this claim. The issue of co-opting the reporter did not reveal any inaccuracies of the embedded stories themselves. In fact, many war analysts (Mitchell 2001; Bauder, 2003; Galloway, 2003; Zinsmeister, 2003) claim satisfaction with the diversity in the two style of reporting.

9.3.3 Dynamism

One of the ground rules specific to the environmental aspects of the war was that the military would not handle the media's equipment. Military leaders did not want to the media to fault them for leaving the cameras behind again. This was not a particular issue for the media. Modern media-technology was more portable, easy to transport into the war zone, and ready to use anywhere. However, it did present a challenge to the military when it realized it was not ready for the Information Age in the battlefield.

The embedded process was supposed to give the DoD a better handle on embedded journalist's reporting. Unfortunately, certain actions of reporters and even soldiers, with digital cameras, laptops, and an Internet connection undermined the desire of the PAO. Analysts Smith (2003) and Spring (2003) point to personnel emails sent home, or unauthorized pictures of prisoners as detrimental actions that exposed the worst of the battlefield to the world. Most these hi-tech transmissions were anecdotal in nature or simple

Internet rumors, but they had a profound affect on the public. Many would be journalists created their own website logs (blogs) to host and sustain these images.

This ease of communication and the availability of new technology added to the turbulence in the environment, creating unintentional consequences that the military could not control. Military personnel spoke to these stories as raising the tension level simply because such actions were not anticipated (Anonymous Interview, 2004). Clarke (Interview, 2004) suggests that, due to well-conceived plans and cooperative relationships, these reports fortunately did not happen to any great extent. Nevertheless, despite their infrequencies, these images and Internet rumors denied certain intended effects from happening or resulted in undesirable actions, especially in the case of Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prison.

Some military analysts suggest that DoD should have conducted a thorough risk-balance analysis before embedding journalists or allowing Information Age technology into the battlefield (Cooper, 2003a). Clarke (Interview, 2004) posits that to address the dynamism of the environment completely is impossible. She felt confident in the DoD's anticipation of all reasonable scenarios and adaptation to probable changes. She asserted that the success of the Embedded Program lay in this dynamic. Remaining open to "the good, the bad and the ugly" was important in facilitating the uncertainties of media coverage of war (Clarke Interview, 2004).

9.4 Analysis of Tension in the Iraq War

The Iraq War coverage was a product of various meetings between DoD, the military, and the media representatives. DoD representatives desired a meeting to develop an understanding of the goals and responsibilities of each. These conferences addressed the circumstances and consequences of the relationship (Brookings, 2001). The objective was to create a program that could manage the tension between these two groups. The meeting agenda focused on the power structure and ground rules needed to resolve the contentious issues (Clarke Interview, 2004). Both the military and the media were dissatisfied with past

war efforts. Each representative expressed a desire to find a means to keep the public well-informed (Brookings, 2001). These formal discussions highlighted both the military and media shared-desire to serve the public.

The desire to meet a common goal reflects Hall's (1991) discussion of a social-function aspect that is needed to manage the tension. Social function model requires a social aspect to the cooperation, such as serving the public good. Serving the public interest became an issue throughout the planning and implementation of the Embedded Program. The success of embedding relied largely on negotiating the complexity of a social network to establish a likeness within the military-media relationship. This goal formed the organizational baseline and established a cooperative engagement. It also demonstrated a commitment to recognize the line of authority within the war coverage program. The research reveals that both subgroups recognized the need to cooperate. However, the research raises several points that in themselves become contentious issues that require further assessment, not the least of which is the reasons behind the cooperation.

The research suggests there was a self-interest motivation to the cooperation, and not a grand desire to eliminate or reduce the tension. Analysts (such as Blumenthal and Rutenberg, 2003; Anonymous Interview, 2004) claim that the military agreed to embed the media with units particularly so that successful missions could be reported. Likewise, the media only agreed to the ground rules in order to get access to the battlefield (Carr, 2003). Neither of these reasons is within the concept of adapting the program into a social function of serving a common cause. Certain comments and viewpoints of the military and the media accused the other group of not providing the public with the whole story (Porch, 2002; Bedway, 2003; Jensen, 2003b; Johnson, 2003; McMasters, 2003). These comments are indicators of the larger issue that the cooperative program was far from an institutionalized social function, and that the tension was reduced just enough to satisfy the actors.

Interestingly, this social aspect of serving a common cause produced another form of tension. Some reporters were apprehensive to the Embedded Program. They expressed their discontent with the program claiming it would "draft" reporters into the military. These

doubts did not last long once the war began and the embedded reporters joined military units. However, other analysts (Gitlin, 2003; Jensen, 2003b; Zinmeister, 2003; Shadid Interview, 2004b) still raised the argument that camaraderie among the actors weakens the reporting. These analysts claim that in forming a “good relationship”, joining the Embedded Program caused reporters to lose their unique role in serving the public (i.e., the goals of a social function).

Some analysts (Shadid Interview, 2004b and Evans Interview, 2004) continue to assess the independent role of the media within the social function concept, as well. They claim that being integrated with the military is not the sole means of serving the public. Other reporters, referring to the unilateral reporters, serve the public as well. Unilateral reporters ideally contributed to the “other half” of the war coverage (Evans, 2003). These reporters may not be within the program but they are necessary to complete the war coverage picture (Shadid Interview, 2004b). This form of reporting brought about its own tension but not specifically within the military-media relationship.

The case study suggests that the Embedded Program achieved a proper balance between military security and free and open reporting, removing the shortcomings of previous war coverage programs identified by Rutenberg (2001). The program lowered the level of tension by providing procedural limits to military control, allowing reporters a first-hand, up-close view of combat. What was previously unattainable through unilateral means or even media pools was achieved through a proper balance in managing the tension and socializing the two groups with one another (Baker, 2003; Clarke Interview, 2004). Most analysts agree that the program created a fair and balanced process between responsible journalism that the military expects, and accurate and timely information the media requires.

9.5 Summary

The expressed purpose of the Embedded Program was to address the contentious relationship that plagued the war coverage programs in the past. DoD leaders believed that

addressing the core criteria of World War II’s OWI – trust and cooperation – they could recapture the successful aspects of the organizational elements (Chart 9-5).

ELEMENT	WORLD WAR II	IRAQ WAR
POWER	The exercise of organizational power requires a degree of trust. Trust is found in respected leaders whose characters are beyond reproach from the subgroups. The subgroups then deem the actions of the trusted leaders, such as establishing rules, justifiable.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conferences to establish trust no form of censorship • Embedded reporter to stay with the unit - respect. • Unilateral reporters trade safety and security for free and open reporting – justifiable action
AUTHORITY	The display of organizational authority requires acceptance among the actors. This concurrence among the subgroups establishes a sense of legitimacy. Legitimate authority creates a cooperative organization among the actors through official recognition of roles and responsibilities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embedded program structure grounded in role and responsibilities • Accept Military authority over battle space • Embedded program better than the alternative • Unilateral accept independence over authority
CONFLICT	Conflict resolution is handled best within a structured organization. This organization establishes rules and a shared understanding of roles and responsibility. The rules then dictate the proper course of action for conflict resolution.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conferences address the inherent tension early • Structured chain of command between both subgroups
MUNIFICENCE	the affect of munificence on the organization is countered best by overwhelming it with controllable resources. Flooding the environment with controllable resource dilutes the negative affects of munificent sources.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military provide resources and logistical support • News Bureaus responsible for unilateral reporters • Incomplete information; no multi-sources of information • Non-embedded reporters provide additional investigation
COMPLEXITY	The affect of complexity on the organization is minimized when the stakeholders share the same goals and objectives. Finding a common cause and promoting it within and throughout the stakeholders minimizes the agitating factors inherent in their different personas.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military and the media appreciate each other’s duty and position • Unfettered nature decreased the level of competition • Embedding co-opted the reporter’s integrity tainted objectivity • From pluralistic complexity to a patriotic simplicity
DYNAMISM	The affect of dynamism on the organization is lessen when organization maintains consistency within. Change is inevitable for an organization but controlling the effect of the changes within the organization maintains the organization.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information age technology in the battlefield - digital cameras, laptops, and an internet connection • Modern media-technology portable, easy to transport, ready to use • Cannot anticipate all uncertainties

CHART 9-5 Tension Analysis of the Vietnam War

DoD personnel believed that through unity the military and the media could create a successful war coverage program and get beyond the ill-will feelings of the past (Whitman Interview, 2004). They created a structure partnership for the military and the media to share information and respond quickly to changing environmental conditions. The practice of embedding journalists with combat units, similar to World War II custom, virtually guaranteed the journalists with access to operational intelligence while maintaining military authority over the actors. However, this method did limit military power over controlling the

information. For DoD and military leaders, the requirement for embedded reporters to stay with military units while reporting was control enough.

The Embedded Program method replaced power with trust and authority with cooperation. However, integrating the media into the war effort did produce contentious factors. These issues came from within the environment when some unilateral reporters (Shadid Interview, 2004b, among them) noted that lessening the complexity within the relationship might have lead to soft reporting. These analysts were suspicious of the Embedded Program, suggesting that it resembled sole-source reporting. Likewise, some in the military took issue with the type of stories being produced suggesting that the media ought to balance the war stories with the rebuilding effort (Frank, 2003). These criticisms were rare. The research indicates there was a degree of goodwill to reduce the tension.

Although, these harshest criticism and serious contention mostly came from outside the program, they did open the military-media debate. These debates gave pause to the many analysts who compare the program favorably to World War II. The belief is that with the internet and web-logging, new forms of reporting, information, and even technology will make the Embedded Program obsolete in the next war.

PART III CONCLUSION

10.0 Conclusion

10.1 Analysis of Tension in the War Coverage Programs

This dissertation explores tension at the procedural level. The study focuses on the cause of the military media tension, noting the conditions that lead to certain behavior patterns of the actors. It demonstrates how, in certain situations, the procedures ceased to be simple tools for regulating the trade off between openness and secrecy but became controlling agents for shaping the war and public information. For example, in censoring, or limiting reporting, the military controlled the perception of the war, while in an uncensored war the media influenced public opinion. The case studies explore how specific events and conditions unique to each war coverage program influenced the military-media dynamic. These various characteristics identified during each war, are interpreted within an organizational approach to manage the war coverage program. These significant factors are categorically linked to organizational elements (Chart 10-1). Examining the practices of war coverage within the concepts of organizational elements reveals the core issues of the tension.

Hall's Organizational Elements	CASE STUDIES FINDINGS
POWER	<p>The exercise of power is a paradoxical dichotomy. Its effect as a tool to manage the tension in the war programs tends to increase the tension its hopes to control. In Vietnam War it was loosened, in the Gulf War it was tightened. Neither effort alleviated the contentious relationship. The use or misuse inherently creates a credibility gap among one or more subgroups of the stakeholders especially when wielded by individuals who do not earn the respect and trust of the stakeholders. In the Iraq War, even backed by mutual respect and trust, the exercise of power still had its detractors.</p>
AUTHORITY	<p>The legitimacy of authority must exist in an established process. As a managerial tool for tension within war coverage program, authority works best when accompanied by agreed upon rules and regulations. It can then stand up the willingness of the sub groups to be governed. In Vietnam War there was no established process creating a disregard for any authority. In the Gulf War, although there was a process within NMP it was disregarded shining a light on the military's legitimate authority. In the Iraq War the process was embedded in the program and recognized by the subgroups as a necessary discipline.</p>
CONFLICT	<p>The cause of conflict in the war coverage program does not necessarily create the tension in the relationship. It is how the conflict is resolved that brings about or ease the tension. In the Vietnam War there was no conflict resolution structure, prevention was voluntary. The PAO was caught between diverse leadership. In the Gulf War there was a strict structure for prevention but no resolution found within. The PAO was once again left without the necessary support. In the Iraq War, to reduce the tension the program anticipated the causes of conflict and established specific methods for resolving them. This process was able to work to a degree with players outside the program.</p>
MUNIFICENCE	<p>Munificence in the environment is measured by availability of legitimate source. Its affect on the tension is strongly related to the classification of resources into channels of legitimate and illegitimate means. Not enough classification offends one sub-group too much affects the other. In the Vietnam War all sources were admissible into the market of ideas whether verifiable or not. In the Gulf War all sources were prohibited except to military's. In Iraq War there was a collaborative effort to bring legitimacy to the sanctioned and unsanctioned sources. This was done through the media putting the onus of truth and accuracy (one of the aspects of tension) on the press.</p>
COMPLEXITY	<p>Complexity is inversely related to the share- agreements in establishing the war coverage program. Each stakeholder brings his own norms to the culture, creating his own sub-environment that affects the tension. The level of diversity of the member in the program affects the culture norms or challenges the common cause. In the Vietnam War complexity was found in the sup-group of reporters that created their own common cause. In the Gulf War the diversity was found in the failure to agree upon procedural norms of reporting. In the Iraq War diversity was accepted and kept in check by the embedded reporters and the unilateral reporters.</p>
DYNAMISM	<p>Dynamism cannot be control but must be anticipated or at least acknowledged. It is not enough for the program to adapt change with the environment it must also ensure that sub-groups adapt to the turbulence equally as well, and to each other in order to avoid tension in the relationship. In the Vietnam War the media was able to adapt to the new environment better than the military, leaving the military lost in the new environment and stunned by the new media. In the Gulf War the military adapted better leaving the media confused in the new environment and bewildered by the new military. In the Iraq War the dynamics caused minor problems with individuals utilizing the unanticipated technology in the battlefield.</p>

Chart 10-1 Findings

There are six major elements used in this study - power, authority, conflicts, munificence, complexity, and dynamism. Each one acts as a lens on the war coverage programs to determine its unique influence on the military-media tension. The research:

1. Determines how the exercise of power, employed to enforce war coverage procedures, affects the relationship.
2. Examines the legitimacy of the military's authority and the intentional, overt behavior of individuals, both the reporters and military officials, to promote the relationship or circumvent the war coverage objectives.
3. Identifies causes of conflicts, and how methods used to resolve them, affects the war coverage procedures.
4. Identifies availability of external data and how the munificence of resources, affects the war coverage.
5. Examines how the degree of complexity in the actors, evident by their willingness to uphold the war coverage procedures, affects the relationship.
6. Determines how uncertainties during environmental changes affect war operations.

The research further analyzes the war coverage programs, considering the effect of these organizational elements to initiate, implement, or organize a program to address the military-media tension. Short discussions of these findings and their implications for managing military-media tension follow.

10.1.1 Power

Power's affect on tension proves to be a paradoxical dichotomy. The research shows the exercise of power places the subgroups at odds with one another. Its inherent nature places resources in the hands of one subgroup while leaving the other members to negotiate for their share (Hall, 1991). A power struggle ensues when members of the organization battle for control of the resources. Struggle tends to increase the tension. This is a key point to power's affect on tension in a relationship. It is not the existence of power, or the ability

to control resources, but the negotiation of this action that offsets the tension (Hall, 1991). Tension resides within the negotiation aspect of the relationship. Therefore, the first derivative of power to consider is the strength of the structure to handle the negotiation.

Weak structural conditions force a breakdown in the negotiation, as seen during the Vietnam War, while too much resource control may force the subgroup to seek other resources outside the organizational structure, as was the case during the Gulf War. Both cases highlight its paradoxical nature for managing the tension in the relationship. The tighter the control over resources the more the resources may flow through unauthorized sources while less control tends to lead to no legitimate sources at all. For example, the Gulf War case study demonstrates how an absolute power structure attempted to subvert the negotiating process and therefore the relationship. Removing the negotiation process effectively produced contentious positions among the actors. Likewise, during the Vietnam War there was no negotiating of boundaries or any exercising of discretionary power. The resulting weak program indicated that procedures were not important to war coverage. This breakdown bred contempt.

The research shows how the exercise of power becomes a tool, which affects the relationship of subgroups (Hall, 1991). Two of the case studies (Vietnam War and Gulf War) demonstrate moments where one group's use of resources was in direct opposition to the desires of the other. The use of power by one subgroup became a weapon for offending or punishing the other group, where ideally it should have been used as a means for negotiating the resources deficiency as Hall (1991) suggests. Even in the cooperative approach of World War II or the third case study (Iraq War), the exercise of power was not capable of managing the contentious relationship through resources control. Tension subsided when the negotiation process balanced the power structure through mutual respect and trust. This introduces the second derivative of power: trust.

Members of the Embedded Program conferences negotiated a desire for a level of trust before establishing war coverage procedures. Although trust may prove to be the guiding factor in negotiating the use of power, pre-negotiations in conferences do not ensure

trust in the battlefield. Once the war starts, the organizational dynamic changes both the structure and members. This was the situation with the NMP case study, wherein the trust factor in the Pentagon planning of NMP did not fit well into the military structure in the field. The research reveals that there was a conspiracy within the military not to trust the media at all, in a sense a willingness to keep the tension alive. The research also demonstrates that the trust factor does not extend to the next war. The changing membership and negotiating process behind the previous war is not sustained during times of peace. Therefore, each war coverage program will need to seek its own level of trust (Broeckert Interview, 2004).

This analysis of power explains the linkage between power and tension. It demonstrates that power itself is not a direct factor in managing the tension, although it may be prominent in creating it. Power, the controlling of resources, must be negotiated within a structure, through mutual respect and trust if one chooses to alleviate the tension within a relationship. Any breakdown within this chain will lead to tension at some level.

10.1.2 Authority

Authority's affect on tension demonstrates the importance of legitimate authority within a relationship. The research supports Hall's (1991) concept that an individual or groups are empowered or authorized to meet or resolve objectives. This is especially so in the military, where authority is derived from tasks and assignments. These assignments require leaders to take action, sometimes without discussion. In the military, discussion is unnecessary because the members share the same goals and recognize the legitimate authority of the individuals assigned to the task.

This explanation expounds the military's rationale for members in positions of responsibility to issue commands or take control of a situation. Yet for reporters, who are not members of the military, if the command does not come from a recognized authority, or if the objectives are not sound, then the military's control over the media may be met with resistance or at least dissension. This legitimacy of authority determines the stability of the

organizational program, and the tension among the members. The research identifies the factors that lead to legitimate authority.

The biggest factor is the recognition of this legitimate authority. Recognition comes from the willingness of the members to be led. This willingness manifests in the actions and behavior of the individual, as well as the ability of the leader to frame the issues. When one no longer recognizes the legitimacy of the leader, or the rationale behind the objectives, he will ideally leave the program. If he cannot quit the group, (for example a war correspondent in a war coverage program) then his unwillingness to be led creates tension within the group. The study notes how certain subgroups' perception of illegitimate authority manifested the tension into rebellious behavior.

The case study shows incidents where reporters were unwilling to respect the traditional authority of the military (as in the uncensored Vietnam War); or chose not to agree to the objectives of the ground rules (e.g., Gulf War's NMP); and even other groups' unwillingness to participate within the organizational structure (for example, Iraq War's unilateral reporters). This attitude created a rebellious and deviant behavior leading to a contentious relationship. Evans (Interview, 2004) claims that this rebellion happens because the reporter is not a natural member of the military but cannot leave the war coverage program (and still do his job thoroughly). Therefore, the military leaders must approach the media from a different position than military personnel.

When the reporter refuses to recognize the military's authority, it calls into question the concept of legitimate authority over one who does not belong to the group. The study highlights the resultant effect of the media not recognizing the military authority. The media desire not to be a part of the group played more of a role in the tension than the actual war coverage procedures. The lack of cooperation can be seen in the Vietnam War coverage when negative or less than accurate accounts of military activities went uncorrected. Likewise, the case studies also revealed incidents when military authority extends beyond its level of legitimacy. For example, the Gulf War case study revealed the effect of the military's unreasonable procedures resulting in lawsuits. This effect shows that subgroups

do not recognize authority is those exercising the authority are not perceived to have a legitimate claim to do so.

The analysis of authority reveals its role in managing the tension. The data supports the concept of a strong correlation between the exercising of authority and the willingness to cooperate (Hall, 1991). For war coverage programs, cooperation is found in the acceptance of reasonable ground rules; tension as a form of questioning authority is found in the rejection of the rules, typically due to a sense of not agreeing with the group. The challenge in achieving legitimacy as a goal of decreasing tension is in getting the subgroups to agree to operate in the best interest of a common goal. That is, the media will follow as long as the military leads in a direction the media can identify with (Brokaw Interview, 2004). This may require bring media leadership into the war coverage program, much the same way the Office of War Information and Office of Censorship were lead by Davis and Price, respectfully.

10.1.3 Conflict

The research into conflict's affect on tension focuses on how the organizational program steers the mission successfully through dynamic circumstances. Conflict develops when organizational members are opposed to a course of action serious enough to create a dissension within the group (Hall, 1991). In addition, individuals and groups outside the organization may cause conflict for the organizational program by creating or promoting dynamic circumstances. A degree of friction is inherent in organizational programs because members have different norms and values (Hall, 1991). Although such conflicts are inherent in organizational programs, tension arises in how the structure handles conflict resolution. The handling has functional, as well as dysfunctional consequences (Thomas, 1976).

For the military, the courses of action typically address issues of openness of reporting as they conflict with security. Whereas, the media (whether accredited, pooled, embedded, or unilateral) takes issue with the restrictions imposed upon the reporter. Conflict arises out of these diverse goals. These differences may give rise to instability within the

organizational program if addressed improperly. This point reveals that the first effect of conflict resolution on the tension is the decision process. The process applied to conflict resolution is just as important as the actions taken to resolve the conflict, as well as the outcome of the resolution. These stages of conflict resolution, marked by misunderstanding and friction, are evident in the study.

The research highlights the classical sources of conflict as identified by Hall (1991): unrealistic outlooks, perceived misuse of authority, and unfulfilled expectations. The case studies found incidents when the actors and other stakeholders' expectations were not realized or addressed incorrectly. For example, in the Vietnam War conflict surfaced when the administration and the military disagreed on the procedures for handling the press. In the military mindset, the Kennedy / Johnson administration's unrealistic and overly optimistic outlook created a credibility gap. During the Gulf War, the media had hoped to play a bigger role in the war reporting. The reporters perceived misuse of authority, and unfulfilled expectations added to the NMP's poor organizational structure. These issues in themselves did not create the tension but by not resolving them adequately, the initial opposition grew into a contentious relationship.

In these incidents, tension came out of the handling of the conflict: in the Vietnam War, the military hoped to avoid conflict, yet tension grew during and after the war; in the Gulf War the conflict factor was ignored along with the tension, creating even more tension; whereas in the Iraq War conflict was anticipated and lessened. The case studies show that when the organizational programs address conflicts within a decision process, proper action can be taken to alleviate the tension. Good examples are World War II's OWI, when the program shaped a realistic outlook (i.e., justifying the war); or in the Iraq War where DoD made structural, systemic adjustments to the ground rules to fulfill expectations; or even when DoD closed the Office of Strategic Influence because it gave the perception of a misuse of power.

This analysis demonstrates how members direct their hostility towards one another when they believe they are isolated from the decision process. The significance of this

observation is the recognition that the military and media are two groups that do not naturally form an alliance (Evans Interview, 2004). In their separate roles outside of war, each conducts their conflict resolution in a different manner. However, in the war coverage program the resultant actions taken by reporters, as well as those taken by military leaders, affected the outcomes experienced by both groups.

10.1.4 Munificence

The study explores the effect of munificence on the tension as measured in the legitimacy of the sources. In opposition to the concept of power, where controlling internal resources makes them legitimate, the resources from the environment are not so sanctioned. Labeling these external sources becomes a factor in the contentious relationship.

The case studies highlight what the military considers official sources and classified data, recognizing that it is the other sources, such as the unofficial stories, which affect the tension. The military leaders view these resources as illegitimate, especially when the sources cannot be controlled or even identified. The argument is that these external sources, outside the reach of the war coverage program, affect military operation and are therefore unacceptable. This labeling of information produces tension in the working relationship. It suggests that available information from the environment comes through improper channels. This is especially true when the use of such information produces negative reports.

The research shows how data became subject to interpretation because of an abundance of information. The abundance of information affects the military's tension when it contributed to false or negative stories; it affects the media when the military attempts to establish proper channels over, or prohibits gathering of, external information (Shadid Interview, 2004b). These outcomes are products of interpreting information that produces stories ranging from truth to propaganda. The constant reports from military briefings and reporters' articles make it difficult to get an accurate understanding. When the interpretation, by either the military or the media, is less than accurate, tension flares.

The interpretation becomes problematic when reporters are forced to use external resources due to a lack of available resources from within the organizational program, or when the interpretation of external data suggests a viewpoint contrary to the legitimate sources. For example, in the Vietnam War many reporters went to great length to find additional information to embarrass the military (McKirker Interview, 2004); while during the Gulf War, the military hoarded all the resources, releasing briefings as proof of U.S. prowess (Fialka, 1991). In the Embedded Program, the actors engaged in a willingness to work within the established procedure where the program made legitimate resources accessible to the reporters. That is, there was an abundance of available information within the program when one went through proper channel. For some reporters, like Baker (2003), the proper channels gave them all the stories they needed. Likewise, the willingness to cooperate also aided in bringing outside sources into the coverage, expanding the reach of the program. Some unilateral reporters who were not part of the Embedded Program were successful in their working with the embedded reporters.

The analysis reveals the effect munificence has on tension. The availability of illegitimate sources and their use have profound repercussions on the relationship. The existence of these resources, whether information or logistics, means the program must expand its boundary to stifle the false data (as was the case with shutting down Al-Jazeera); or work with others actors in the environment to improve the reporting through legitimate means (an effort attempted in the unilateral reporting during the Iraq War); or overwhelm the environment with internal reports as the military did during World War II. A deficit (either artificial or natural) in the availability of legitimate resources leads to tension if it cannot be compensated through improved procedures (an opportunity missed in the Gulf War). In the contentious relationship, the media looks for additional sources of information while the military attempts to discredit the legitimacy of any outside sources. The effect of munificence on military-media tension becomes one of availability versus legitimacy.

10.1.5 Complexity

The research into complexity highlights its affect on tension by examining the compatibility of the actors and stakeholders to the program. Each stakeholder brings his own norms to the culture, creating his own sub-environment that affects the organization program. The complexity within the organizational program manifests in the incompatibility of these actors to the program and its procedures, as well as the interaction with the each other. Likewise, complexity increases when the program is not well suited for its environment.

Within the environment, various norms and values surround the organizational program. Ideally, these standards are embedded in the culture of the program. However, if the program is incompatible with the environmental culture, the program may find itself operating under unfriendly condition. Complexity becomes a contentious factor when the diversity affects the subgroup at the cultural level. Initial examinations into the case studies reveal how this diversity among the actors played a part in creating tension within the military-media relationship. The research notes the incompatibility of the military's and media's cultures (Cullin Interview, 2004). For example, in the Vietnam War, the environment was so convoluted that different culture and norms could not survive simultaneously. The diversity of the subgroups grew as the environment changed, changing the perception of the actors even more. The war coverage procedures were incompatible with the norms and values of the changing culture. The media was no longer the instrument of military prowess (Jacobs, 1992), as the traditionalist military was losing out to the radically changing press.

During the Gulf War, the strict military environment captures the organizational culture disregarding the media's customs. The military subverted the complexity by controlling the procedures. Although the military was able to secure the norms and values of the public, this method was incompatible with the media's culture. The tension took the media to a receptive environment (i.e., the courts) to counter the strict military culture.

In the Iraq War, the incompatible efforts of previous war coverage program forced a change in the way the environment accepted the operation. The establishing of the Embedded Program forced the incompatible rules to change, creating new social norms. The Embedded Program captured the essence of a shared culture although in practice it came under scrutiny of critics from outside the program.

The study also notes the differences between the environment and the war itself. The research highlights incidences where these three entities, the war, war coverage program, and the environment, created a complexity about them as well. For example, in World War II all three entities were compatible to the culture. The organization (OWI) instilled a justification about the war and allowing all actors to do their part for victory. However, the Vietnam War revealed how a war can be incompatible with its environment (i.e., the culture and times). As an unpopular war, the military operations did not fit well into the culture. The former conservative culture was now accepting radical new reports.

At the start of the Vietnam War, the war and the culture were compatible, but the coverage was forming within a changing environment. This new cultural development brought about complexity. The war ethos (i.e., justification of the war, legality of operations, etc.) had to fight for its place in the culture as well. Eventually, none of the three entities was compatible with one another. Bitter tension ensued among the actors and even the stakeholders.

The analysis reveals how compatibility effect on tension is dependent on the culture. The group of actors, and stakeholders, that best reflect the culture will be the dominant group in the program. However, this does not guarantee that the program will be compatible to its environment. The proof is that after World War II the war coverage program separated completely from military operations. It was not until the Iraq War that DoD personnel plan for war coverage as a compatible effort among the military and the media. DoD personnel attempted to create a shared environment among the actors and stakeholders.

10.1.6 Dynamism

The research into dynamism's affect on tension examines the operational program's ability, and even desire, to accept and adapt to changes in the environment. Once the program accepts the dynamic changes, there is little chance they will be undone. The turbulence in the environment forces these changes on to other environmental contents. However, when the program resists, and the environment continues to change, contentious issues emerge within the program.

The study explores this effect of dynamism showing how the war coverage programs addressed these changes, examining them in the context of the goals and operations. The study notes how successful programs (or the subgroups within) took advantage of new technology and changes in the social and political dispositions and how unsuccessful programs did not. Yet, every program settles into its environment, one way or another as the actors (and stakeholders) consented to the change. This settling in is not always graciously done. For example, a new technical age (Vietnam War) was growing out of the Industrial Age of World War II and progressing towards the Information Age (Iraq War) forcing changes in the military-media relationship. These changes in the environment revealed that the conservative war coverage procedure of World War II simply did not fit with the new techniques and organizational methods. Although, these changes were gradual over the years, for the war effort, that only saw action once a decade, they seemed very revolutionary (Combelles-Siegel Interview, 2004).

The technology of both the military and the media played heavily in creating this dynamic and turbulence in the environment that led to the contentious relationship. As time changed so did the means of fighting and reporting. The changing conditions and developing cultures took the two groups in different directions. In the changing times, different methods and approaches emerge for war coverage. To add to the dynamism, each group did not progress at the same pace, so that the practice of these two different groups working together at intermittent times led to tension as one group was able to adapt easier, quicker, or better to the dynamics of the environment than the other group. For example, in the Vietnam War it

was the media that adapted, while in the Gulf War the media held on to the old ways of Vietnam. Tension between the military and the media grew as both struggled to adjust to the new conditions.

In the case of the Vietnam War, the turbulence placed military procedures under constant criticism. With the military unable or unwilling to adapt to the new environment, its function in the organizational program failed, while during the Gulf War, military's anticipation of the dynamics allowed it to progress in the fast-paced war. The progression in operations forced a free press society into a military-censored machination. The Iraq War had its moments of dynamism as well, when neither the military nor the media anticipated the rogue use of information technology (Internet, digital cameras, and emails).

This analysis demonstrates that tension, within the program, normally occurs when the program (or subgroup) found itself outside of the dynamic environment; or when members struggled against the program or other subgroups to survive the change. The analysis shows that programs cannot control the dynamism but must anticipate or at least acknowledge its effects. In addition, it is not enough that the program adapts to the changes; it must also ensure that its members adapt as well. Each subgroup needs to plan for the changes and developments and together develop a well-thought out strategy to achieve the desired objective (Dervitsiotis, 1998).

10.2 Overview of War Coverage Program Tension

The treatment of the military-media tension addresses the organizational elements of the war coverage programs. This examination reveals the influence of structural and environmental elements on each war coverage program and their influence on the military-media relationship. A central aspect of the study is that the programs had no specific characteristics in common. Their structures and environments were different; each war required new objectives and new war coverage methods to replace the outdated procedures of

the previous war. The research finds that every war introduced new factors into the military-media relationship.

In Vietnam's changing environment, organizational survival was essential to the subgroups changing roles. Ability to adapt to the environment separated the media from the military. The media's desire to survive the environment and the military's approach to maintain its traditional structure clashed. These constraints on the relationship were evident in the causal variables such as the changing philosophy and normative values of the public and the predominant attitude, motivation, and perception of the actors. To eliminate these constraints, the Pentagon attempted to create press pools for media participation; however, during the Gulf War the military established certain mechanisms to bring the media strictly under its control. The pursuit of this objective was counter to the media's goals and provided little room for participation. The military controlling mechanism over the press pools polarized the relationship between the military and the media and undermined the integrity of wartime reporting.

During the Iraq War, the Pentagon, military and media once again attempted to manage the tension. These groups agreed on the social value of serving the public needs. The military and the embedded media attempted to construct a tension-less program; however, the design was more to lessen the tension than to build a tension-less program suited to serving the public. That is, a new social function did not emerge. This new program still had separate subgroups known as the military and the media with separated norms and values. Tension still existed within the program and especially with the new subgroup it created— the unilateral reporters. As Evans (Interview, 2004) notes the war coverage program is not institutionalized, and perhaps never will be.

The one constant throughout the four case studies is the incompatibility of military guidelines that proved contrary to the media's concept of open reporting. The research demonstrates that the media does not fit well into a military structure, and that joining these two groups together immediately creates tension for both. That is, the tension cannot be defined singularly as military-media. Instead, there is media tension when access to the

battlefield is denied and military tension when reports are less than favorable. Lessening the tension for one group tends to increase the tension for the other group. For example, by appeasing the media through unlimited access to the war zone during the Vietnam War, the tension shifted along the continuum until it reached the military. Military leaders became outraged and determined to control the battlefield in the next skirmish. In the Gulf War, the war coverage procedures limited the role of the media, treating reporters and Public Affair Officers like bastard children (Plato, 1995). The military was pleased with its success in controlling the war information and its ability to shift the anxiety on to the media. However, this effort raised new contentious issues.

Even as the Embedded Program achieved a degree of success in lowering the level of tension and reaching a balance at the organizational level, this success was not institutionalized. The reason is that these two groups see integrating war coverage plans into military operational plans as a form of compromise instead of as an effort of cooperation. These groups still hold widely conflicting views on the value of war coverage and the accuracy of reports from within a controlled program. Several analysts (Brokaw Interview, 2004, Evans Interview, 2004, Whitman Interview, 2004) acknowledge these diverse views. These analysts recognize the need for tension to exist; and therefore, call for a resistance to cooptation and institutionalization.

This argument against cooptation is not particularly new. Selznick (1949) defines the notion of cooptation and institutionalization of opposing stakeholders. His study demonstrates the effects on a program when actors ceded their responsibilities to one another in exchange for support. Cooptation and the compromises it require come at a price. The unintended consequence is that cooptation tends to deflect the organizational activity from its intended goal. For example, the Embedded Program may have provided legitimate access and opportunity, but there may come a time when the embedded news reporting may pay the price of being a propaganda tool for the military through misinformation and spin doctoring (Evans Interview, 2004). The argument states that there needs to be a degree of opposition in order to report accurately. Without this tension to distinguish the equal but separate roles and

responsibilities of the actors, the relationship between the media and military is likely to get worse.

Maintaining a degree of tension within a program is not a new concept, especially in governance. Many other fields such as political economy speak to this idea in terms of competition, social equality, and democracy. The discussion seeks to explain how ultimate cooperation works to constrain the choices of the stakeholders. Analysts, such as Lindholm (1977), claim that competitiveness constrains authority and decentralizes decision making to diffuse power and other influential effects. Although this discussion typically applies to research into politics and marketplaces, one can draw a parallel to the military-media relationship and the marketplace of ideas. It is therefore likely that the contentious union between the military and the media will remain to maintain proper accountability within the war and war coverage.

10.3 Further Research into War Coverage Program Tension

This research explores the effect of war coverage procedures on the military-media relationship. The discussion notes how the relationship produces tension when one group exploited its roles and responsibilities. The findings reaffirm the belief of many analysts (such as, Arant and Warden, 1994, McMasters, 2003, and Pasquarett, 2003) that war coverage is a joint program, made up of two different organizations -- the military and the media. Bringing these two groups together within one organizational program can be problematic, since neither group fits well within the structure of the other. This summation provides an opportunity to examine the issues more thoroughly at the program level.

The study reviews other analysts' program evaluation studies (such as Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995 and Combelles-Siegel, 1996), as they examine military operations. As noted in the literature discussion, their careful scrutiny of past military operations, including war coverage programs, is critical to determine best practices. Their program evaluation models call for assessing goals, objectives, and criteria but better models (as directed by Franklin and

Thrasher, 1976; Mohr, 1988; and Patton, 1990) also explore behavior (i.e., the contentious factors). Otherwise, analysts will need to qualify their lessons-learned to the particular condition or explore the program down to the procedures to determine the causal factors in the mismatch between media's role and military's action.

As the case studies demonstrate, war coverage programs are affected by the boundaries of their structure and the constraints of the environment. These specific scenarios limit the applications of program evaluation lessons, in that from one military operation to another the situation is likely to be different. The merits of these lessons-learned can be of greater value to the next war coverage program if they are supplemented with a study of the contentious factors that hinder the practice. Consider the Embedded Program: in its formation, DoD personnel may have recognized the diverse attitudes of the actors and agreed to address it, but as Evans (Interview, 2004), notes it is unlikely that in the future this decrease in complexity among the actors will remain. Program analysts can benefit more if the lessons learned from evaluations are grounded in the organizational elements (such as power and dynamism) that are at the core of every program. Analysts following in the program evaluation research of Aukofer and Lawrence (1995), or Combelles-Siegel, (1996), or even researching the recommendations of Hill (1997), Edwards (1998), and Snyder (2003) would do well to consider these organizational elements when developing lessons-learned for future military operations.

Also of interest in the literature review is the historical perspective of the influence of the press and the legitimacy of the war coverage program (Knightley, 1975; Hallin, 1986; Fialka, 1991; and MacArthur, 1992). Some media analysts approach this topic as an issue of the First Amendment. The courts have responded to this debate by ruling that the media has neither special status as historians or special privileges as reporters, declaring that the right to publish does not give reporters carte blanche to information. This dissertation touches on these factors as adding to the tension, noting the continuous debate over policy that gives the military legal authority over all aspects of the battlespace. Although the legal position distinguishes the difference between the right to publish and the privilege to pursue information, several rulings recognize the necessity of the media for democratic governance.

Considering these rulings against the shortcomings of the historical studies provides another possibility to examine further the contentious relationship at the policy level. There is an opportunity to understand the institutions of governance that shape the policy process, by examining not just the historical results of policies, but the structuring factors and environmental influences that entitle such policies to exist.

The discussion for debate focuses largely on the media as the fourth estate, suggesting press restriction impedes the flow of timely and accurate information to the public. Several writers, such as Arant and Warden, (1994), Brown, (2002), Emery and Emery (1978), Milavsky (1991), and Sniderman, et al (1996) make strong arguments for the media acting as the public's eyes and ears; while Shadid (Interview, 2004) cautions that any war coverage policy that integrates the media with the military, even legally or properly implemented, may damage the practice of war coverage. Shadid's point is an important issue to the contentious factor in that his unilateral reporting provided significantly to the free and open process. This debate escalates to an argument over whether the military and the media are on an equal footing in times of war, suggesting a need for research at the policy subsystem level. Although it is an important policy subsystem, this aspect of the military-media relationship has not been mapped.

This dissertation provides a solid framework to capture the exact network, i.e., Iron Triangle, Fourth Estate, or Clausewitz's Public Voice. The concept of equal footing offers an opportunity for an in depth study of subsystems networking. The virtue of subsystems is that they join together specifics of the policy, examining the actors and institutions involved in policy-making and implementation (Ramesh and Howlett, 1995). In a subsystem, the essence of the process is not the achievement of the organization's goals but more so in maintaining the dynamics of the organization's behavior (Stalk, Evans, and Shulman, 1992). This dynamics occurs when it appears that the advantages to such a network (i.e., for the media, reporting the war) outweigh the cost of maintaining the relationship (i.e., level of censorship) (Uzzi, 1994). An exploration into this dynamic balance within subsystems and networks may provide an understanding of the equal footing status that is denied through constitutional rulings.

Networks are seen as intentional patterns of social relations between mutually dependent actors to promote their own success (Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995). Researchers on networks, such as O'Toole (1997), speak to structure of interdependence within a particular setting. These studies focus on the sets of recurring ties among the actors under varying circumstances to identify the consequences resulting from inter-organizational links. These links rely on social mechanisms for coordinating complex services in uncertain and competitive environments (Powell, 1990b; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). O'Toole (1997) argues that networking causes practitioners to reassess their understanding and approach to, authority, hierarchy, and bases of action. Networks offer a medium for an exchange of ideas often with the actors framing and brokering the issues (O'Toole, 1997).

If O'Toole is correct, and networks are important contexts for organizational program such as war coverage programs, then it is worth evaluating how the network perspective can inform program evaluation theories and improve military-media relationship. Networking may be a useful lens through which analysts can understand the multiple dynamic relationships that increasingly exist during wartime. Research into network outcome may be an important determinant of the military-media relationship, especially, when the interaction between these two groups deals with negotiating ulterior motive (see Sinclair, 1992).

Beyond the program and the policy, there is the philosophical discussion over who serves the public, the military or the media. Analysts and legal scholars continue to debate the social concerns of the role of the press in a democratic society. Media analysts view war reporting as writing the first draft of history (Evans, 2003). They claim that if reporters are denied access to reasonable amounts of information, or, worse, if they are deceived about policies or events, history may suffer. Without consideration for the independent aspect of recording history, future war coverage may very well be militarily-biased. That is, the number of "non-embedded" journalists may decrease as more and more reporters "enlist" with the Embedded Program, to the point where the next war may have no watchdogs. Yet, American politics without watchdogs is highly unlikely, which suggests that this debate is far

from settled. The study of military-media relationship is still paramount in defense policy studies.

Appendix A

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

Executive Order 9182, Federal Register, vol. 7, no. 117, June 16, 1942, p. 4468-69.

Office of War Information, created to "consolidating certain war information functions into an Office of War Information." Its duties included:

- Formulate and carry out, through the use of press, radio, motion picture, and other facilities, information programs designed to facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding, at home and abroad, of the status and progress of the war effort and of the war policies, activities, and aims of the Government.
- Coordinate the war informational activities of all Federal departments and agencies for the purpose of assuring an accurate and consistent flow of war information to the public and the world at large.
- Obtain, study, and analyze information concerning the war effort and advise the agencies concerned with the dissemination of such information as to the most appropriate and effective means of keeping the public adequately and accurately informed.

Appendix B

NINE PRINCIPLES FOR NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE

DoD Directive 5122.5, Enclosure 3 - Statement of DoD Principles for News Media

- E3.1.1. Open and independent reporting shall be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.
- E3.1.2. Media pools (limited number of news media who represent a larger number of news media organizations for news gatherings and sharing of material during a specified activity), are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. However, they sometimes may provide the only means of early access to a military operation. In this case, media pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity (in 24 to 36 hours, when possible). The arrival of early-access media pools shall not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.
- E3.1.3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be applicable for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.
- E3.1.4. Journalists in a combat zone shall be credentialed by the U.S. military and shall be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. Armed Forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules may result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations shall make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.
- E3.1.5. Journalists shall be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.
- E3.1.6. Military PA officers should act as liaisons, but should not interfere with the reporting process.
- E3.1.7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft when possible. The military shall be responsible for the transportation of pools.
- E3.1.8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military shall supply PA officers with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and shall make those facilities available, when possible, for filing independent coverage. If Government facilities are unavailable, journalists, as always, shall file by any other means available. The military shall not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.
- E3.1.9. Those principles in paragraph E3.1.8, above, shall apply as well to the operations of the standing DoD National Media Pool system.

Appendix C

MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM (MACV) CRITERIA

Memorandum for Correspondents: Rules Governing Public Release of Military Information in Vietnam

From: Chief, MACV Information. Col. Rodger Bankson, <signing>

Sub: MACV Criteria, 28 Feb 67

<The actual memorandum could not be found, it is summarized by William Hammond - Senior Historian, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Shorenstein Fellow, Spring 1999>

Major points of the memo:

- 1) Correspondent receives authorization from the South Vietnamese government to cover the war, in the form of Government of Vietnam press card – CARD B.
- 2) Submit card to the MACV Office of Information.
- 3) Fill out Correspondents Data Sheet - this require a little of personal information: Name, address and phone number, an estimate of length of stay, etc.
- 4) Submit:
 - Picture identification
 - Letter of referral from newspaper editor certifying their status as correspondents
 - Agreement to withhold certain categories of information when reporting the war until commanders issued a go ahead
- 5) Sign Letter of Release releasing the U.S. Command from any responsible if the reporter was killed or injured while with the troops.
- 6) MACV agreed to provide reporter with access to official briefings; transportation to South Vietnam's major military bases and cities with Saigon; and use of the American military's Post Exchange in Vietnam.

Appendix D

PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR EMBEDDING REPORTERS

<This document is 15 pages, a complete edition can be found on www.defenselink.mil>

Subject: Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Commands (CentCom) Area of Responsibility (AOR).

1. PURPOSE.

This message provides guidance, policies and procedures on embedding news media during possible future operations/deployments in the CentCom AOR. It can be adapted for use in other unified command AORs as necessary.

2. POLICY.

2.a. The Department of Defense (DoD) policy on media coverage of future military operations is that media will have long-term, minimally restrictive access to U.S. Air, Ground and Naval Forces through embedding. Media coverage of any future operation will, to a large extent, shape public perception of the national security environment now and in the years ahead...

2.b. Media will be embedded with unit personnel at air and ground forces bases and afloat to ensure a full understanding of all operations. Media will be given access to operational combat missions, including mission preparation and debriefing, whenever possible.

2.c. A media embed is defined as a media representative remaining with a unit on an extended basis - perhaps a period of weeks or even months. Rations and medical attention,...

3. PROCEDURES.

4. GROUND RULES.

5. IMMUNIZATIONS AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR.

6. SECURITY.

7. MISCELLANEOUS/COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

8. OASD(PA) POC FOR EMBEDDING MEDIA.

Attachment 1

Sample Questions and Discussion Points

(Note – this is not a survey but a list of topics and issues for engaging discussion)

Power – manage resources

1. Who are the key players for controlling the information within the organization?
2. Who were the key players in establishing the process?
3. What role did the media specifically play in the organizational process?
4. How does the military decide on what to report out?
5. Who affect the policy and the process the most?

Authority – attitude and behavior

1. How does the reporter perceive the organizational process for producing the news?
2. How does the reporter see his role and responsibilities in the war coverage process?
3. How does the government agent perceive the organizational process for controlling the information?
4. How does the government agent see its role and responsibilities in the war coverage process?
5. Who does the reporter / government agent believes he is responsible to?

Conflict – resolution for opposing interest

1. How are agreements reached in the creating of the rules?
2. How does the reporter adhere to what was expected of him in regards to war coverage?
3. What does the reporter think the general public expects of him in a free press society?
4. How does reporting impact the mission?
5. How are changes implemented to the procedures?

Munificence – abundance of information

What other venue is there for the reporter to get information?

How does the government agent stop leaks and rumors?

Complexity – similarity of the environment

How does your attitude towards the justification of the war affect the reporter's commitment to the ground rules?

How does the government agent accommodate the tension building within the media?

Dynamism – level of uncertainty

What were the conditions and changing environments during the war conflict?

What happen in the agency following the end of the military conflict?

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