

# **CHAPTER IV HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CITIZENSHIP AND COMMUNITY**

## **Introduction**

The historical development across time reveals that while democracy has evolved as a standard part of the modern idea of social organization, the idea of full democratic citizenship which is at the very core of Western Civilization has been deeply suppressed throughout the development of democracy. In order to make the reader aware of the dimensions of the evolutionary process of citizenship and community, an introductory rationale for this broad historical backdrop is necessary.

Citizenship could be said to have begun in Ancient Greece with the onset of constitutional government in the city-states.<sup>1</sup> This tradition of democratic citizenship, now regarded as the ancient or classical model, beginning with the Greeks, showed citizens as playing a de facto, integral role in governance: governance was citizenship and citizenship was governance. Further, citizenship was seen as an integral part of attaining mature adulthood: only citizens could be adults and adults could become adults only through being citizens.

## **In the Beginning of Classical Democracy**

Riesenberg views that “the history of citizenship began with Solon.”<sup>2</sup> Solon earned his role as legislator for his patriotism and wisdom. In 640 B.C., Solon stressed that the interest of the community must come before one’s class

or clan. As the wealthy took unfair advantage of their financial superiority, reigning in this imbalance of power became an issue. "Pisistratos (600-527 B.C.) increased the rights of the common man and brought nobility under the rule of law."<sup>3</sup> This is a big step towards the concept of *equality under the law* for all men. The Athenian assembly known as the Pnyx could accommodate 5,000 citizens in the late Sixth Century B.C.. It was not until the Fourth Century B.C. that 10,000 citizens could meet. Those who wished to express their disagreements with the majority met in the *perischoinisma*, "a roped-off place in the agora."<sup>4</sup>

Cleisthenes, in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries, B.C., according to Herodotus, provided the organizational foundations of what we have come to know as Classical Democracy. He did this by increasing the four existing tribes of Athens into ten. Then, each tribe chose its own phylarch (leader). The people (demes) were placed into a specific group which put structure in the new formation of the neighborhood tribes.<sup>5</sup> Today we describe these neighborhood groups as precincts. After the year 480 B.C., "the Boule, who were the representatives to all Athenians, became the city's executive body."<sup>6</sup> The demos (the body of people) also assumed a greater role in the court system known as dikasteria. In the United States today, we would describe these as majority and minority parties.

In this early classical democracy, citizenship was primarily based on family and neighbor. It was the leadership of Pericles, whose mother was a niece of Cleisthenes and whose father was an Athenian general (Xanthippes), that mainly influenced the establishment of the citizenship law of 451-50 B.C.<sup>7</sup> This law purports to place the 'state' in the role of setting requirements for citizenship.

By the Third Century, Thucydides wrote that Pericles seemed to have more faith in the common man in 450 B.C., than Plato did in 399 B.C..<sup>8</sup> However, it is made clear by Xenophanes that the Greeks were primarily concerned with culture and language in determining the citizenship laws. Race

did not seem to play a major determinant. It shows in Plato's thinking when he made it clear that one's lack of education, not one's 'race' was considered to be the "greatest obstacle to . . . becoming a citizen of Magnesia (Laws)."<sup>9</sup> It is interesting to note that in the United States, literacy laws were imposed that served as a barrier to voting rights--and mainly affected certain racial groups and new immigrants.

"Pericles ushered in a great age of democracy and the flowering of art."<sup>10</sup> By 450 B.C., the administration of Athens and her Empire placed a greater emphasis on citizenship participation because the needs were far greater. During the Pericles era, we find the "development of an urban civic center, broadening the base of participation, and instituting the payment for public service."<sup>11</sup> Of course, payment for public service drew criticism. Today, as well as in the time of the Founding, a fine line separates public service for a career versus public service as an avocation. The "*Americorps*" of today receives criticism because it is based on payment for community service to young people. Along with the administrative growth in the Golden Age of Pericles came the rules, regulations, and procedures that coincided with the development of the city. Plutarch discusses, for example, the debate among the demos on whether to build the Parthenon.<sup>12</sup>

As the development of civic institutions grew, the role of citizenship became more important. To be a citizen meant one was an Athenian or the other way around, to be an Athenian meant one was a citizen.<sup>13</sup> The private and public character of an individual became more apparent. At the core of Athenian society, one's oikos, (family), determined membership. "A foreigner or non-Athenian could only become an Athenian by being accepted and entering into that descent group--into the oikos, phratry and deme, and tribe."<sup>14</sup>

In Book III of the Politics, Aristotle asked, "What is a state?" He answered the question by describing what the citizen does. "The most suitable definition of a polites (citizen) is he who shares in the 'indeterminate' office of assemblyman or juryman or . . . one who is actively participating in the business and decisions

of his city.”<sup>15</sup> Aristotle stated that a citizen is one who is born from two citizens. The development of requirements for citizenship as determined by Athenian law began to take shape. Citizenship is not based on one’s service but on oikos, one’s descent or origin. Aristotle’s legacy is his definition as stated in his Book III of the Politics: “The good citizen should know and have the capacity both to rule and be ruled, and . . . is the virtue of a citizen.”<sup>16</sup> To be a citizen is to participate in the polis. Aristotle’s Greek maxim in his Nicomachean Ethics links equality to opinions: “Friendship is equality.” The importance of friendship in the community is explained by Mansbridge. “Equality of friendship is an equality of mutual respect, binding one person to another, a necessary basis of the state.”<sup>17</sup> It is this quality of community that Dewey sought to emulate for American communities.

Privilege and exclusion, for the most part, defined citizenship in Ancient Greece. What we have come to know as Democracy in Ancient Greece was actually incomplete democracy. Democratic roots were set down but the times remained undemocratic from the time of Classical Greece in the Fifth Century, B.C. until after 1789. Riesenberg described it this way: “The history of citizenship . . . is of the constant struggle in which the public good has always had to bargain and compromise with the private.”<sup>18</sup>

## **Two Eras of Citizenship.**

The history of citizenship is divided into two eras--before and after the French Revolution. The legacy of the first era existed from the time of the Greek city-state. It was “small-scaled, culturally monolithic, hierarchical, and discriminatory--and also moral, idealistic, spiritual, active, participatory, communitarian, and even heroic in that it commanded personal military service from its citizens.”<sup>19</sup> In the first era, one is truly considered a citizen only if one participates. The Aristotelian legacy’s hallmark required that one could only gain civic virtue “through active participation in governing.”<sup>20</sup> Riesenberg described

the second era of citizenship as “civic virtue being drained out of the citizenship--an ideal from the beginning . . . .”<sup>21</sup>

From the Greek city-state era, Aristotle and Plato defined citizenship in terms of privilege and status. While Athenian society divided itself into four orders based on an agricultural yield, landownership was not a prerequisite for citizenship in Sparta. Spartan citizenship, however, placed greater emphasis on responsibility of commitment to public service.<sup>22</sup> In Sparta, only a few voted, held public office, and made policy decisions. “Whether in Sparta, Athens or any other polis, citizenship was a privileged status.”<sup>23</sup> The primary difference was that Sparta struggled greatly against democracy.<sup>24</sup>

The great funeral oration of Pericles sets down for posterity the canons for Athenian democracy. Citizenship is seen as “part of an educational program and of an inspiring moral tradition in which each generation acknowledges a connection to all others and a responsibility to them all for maintenance of the community and the traditions.”<sup>25</sup> It is in this tradition that Dewey bases his philosophy--education becomes the basic tenet in providing the strong roots for participatory democracy. The encouragement of self-government began with the Greeks; but, Ancient Greek Democracy was partial. The subcultures, working-class populations, demanded allegiance. A new dimension of citizenship developed into two allegiances, first to one’s family, and then to one’s ethnic community. Subsequently, subcultures learned to coexist among each other because of self-government within these communities. Remnants of this form of ethnic allegiance and the practice of self-government within the confines of these ethnic communities have survived to the present day.

The prosperity of the Periclean Age gave way to wars and strife between the city-states. After the Sicilian campaign prophecy, “the spirit of the age had always tended to weaken the authority of tradition, to loosen the cohesion of the community, and to direct the individual reliance upon his personal judgment in all critical questions.”<sup>26</sup> The strength of keeping the community together lay in the strength of religion. One must keep in mind that the Hellenic religion was

interwoven into the fabric of daily life. The Golden Age of Pericles was a sign that the gods saw the people in great favor. When prosperity began to disintegrate, with war and strife taking its toll, the state religion was blamed for causing this great calamity.

“Together with the Hellenic gods, the human and civic virtues which they demanded fell into disrepute. . . and gradually all sense was lost of the truth, that a state cannot exist except by the virtues of its citizens. The Ancient religion became defenseless against the hostile spirit of the times.”<sup>27</sup>

### **Universal Citizenship.**

Concurrently in 509 B.C., Rome began to build its Empire on law of which citizenship was a keystone. The traditional monarchy came to an end as the Republic was born. Even though the Roman Empire became a republic, the idea of democracy did not take root. The Empire was based on “universal citizenship of free men and a Stoic notion of the universal brotherhood of mankind.”<sup>28</sup> While Greece gave us participatory citizen democracy, Rome gave us universal citizenship.<sup>29</sup> Two very different concepts. These are the two different perspectives that are in tension in American democracy. The one conceptual definition of citizenship is based on allegiance and service to the state. The other definition of citizenship includes the rights and privileges of being a citizen but also the responsibilities of citizenship to include involvement in the decision-making processes of governance.

The idea of Alexander the Great, to create a brotherhood of mankind, became a reality in the Roman Empire. One did not have to be born in Rome to become a citizen, as was the requirement in Athens. Outsiders were welcome and able to receive the high honor of becoming Roman citizens. As the Roman Empire expanded using citizenship as a reward for allegiance and service, it built an administrative apparatus which became supported by the institution of Roman Law.<sup>30</sup> In Rome, if one were an active citizen, twenty days of service would be

required in a given year. The typical day of the twenty days of service would begin at dawn by a trumpet call to duty. Sometimes it would be necessary to attend an informational session called a *contra*. Attendance was compulsory.<sup>31</sup>

## **Christianity Effects Change in Concept of Citizenship**

As Christianity began to spread in the Western World, the Roman Empire responded with barbaric measures. The early centuries after Christ, Christianity was seen as a cult and not taken seriously. As Christianity became more organized, its powers and influence as a movement dramatically changed. As Christianity became more influential and powerful within the Roman Empire, the concept of citizenship changed in unexpected ways. As the Empire spread, Christianity began to alter the thinking of the times. By 55-135 A.D., Epictetus answers the question, "What is a man?" as one who is a part of a civic community (polis). He is more specific in separating one's faithfulness into two communities. Epictetus presaged what was to become a conflict in values. Allegiance first belonged to the community of Gods and men, and then to the (civic) community. By the Third Century A.D., it is less easy being a good citizen. In 391 A.D., Emperor "Theodosius I made Christianity the official religion of the Empire."<sup>32</sup>

Christianity demanded a different kind of loyalty. Instead of loyalty to the community or service to the state, Christianity emphasized loyalty to one's private self and to the church community. St. John Chrysostom, the great Greek Orthodox theologian, wrote the "Sermons on the Statues" which reflect one's Christian citizenship responsibilities. St. Jerome, who served in Palestine, and St. Ambrose, who served in Italy, pronounced the faith of the Holy Fathers to accept the concept of Roman political universalism and Christian spirituality.<sup>33</sup> Besides writing on worship, organization, authority, history, and theological questions, Augustine emphasized that "true Christian citizens are those who in spiritual development, . . . model their lives on Christ and the Apostles."<sup>34</sup>

Augustine's interpretations and formulations of Christian and Platonic thought finally give Christianity its powerful stance.<sup>35</sup>

### **The Power of the Bishop.**

Out of this mix of theological messages, imperial authority replaced individual citizen participation and the growth of the monastic movement began. The development of the bishopric and the powers relegated to the bishop increased. The political and religious powers merged. Loyalty becomes relegated to the "city through the bishop and saint . . . ." <sup>36</sup> The key person in this "Christian cultural-political development was the bishop."<sup>37</sup>

As the influences of the bishop increased, the importance of citizenship and civic virtue waned. The bishop's main interest was in creating Christians out of pagans rather than converting the pagan public to active civic citizenship. Interest in the public domain became equivalent to having interest in pagan ideas.

### **Romans and Germans.**

As Christianity grew in its influence in numbers throughout Italy and into Germany, the early middle ages became the seed bed for the church being responsible for the basic educational institutions. Large numbers of educated citizens had become the norm prior to this time in point. However, as the church assumed the educational responsibilities, these great numbers of a well-educated citizenry soon plummeted.<sup>38</sup> In Gaul, the church dominated the learning institutions, while in Italy, the city was the main institution. However, in the plain of the Po, the northeastern Italian coastline region, civic institutions and civic virtue flourished.

As democracy stopped at the borders of Greece, it was held in abeyance until the American and French Revolutions. Citizenship as an issue remained



prevalent; however, due to the growth of the Roman Empire, interest in citizenship, as an exchange for allegiance and protection, continued to dominate the thinking on citizenship through the Middle Ages. Citizenship in the classical mode was eclipsed, blotted out.

Civic institutions survived one thousand years after Constantine's reign in the Third and Fourth Century (285-337 A.D.). The Byzantine era, from 1050 to 1150 A.D., witnessed the time of "great social mobility."<sup>39</sup> A transvaluation occurred in Italy where a new civic consciousness arose. Civic loyalty emerged, whereas in Europe, the driving force was making people subject to the monarchy. Interestingly, the concept and idea of citizen and citizenship continued. Citizenship embraced many subcultural and traditional concepts. The monarchy also found the idea of citizenship in their favor because of the implications of service to the state and active community service traditions.

## **The Second Era--Two Principal Traditions of Citizenship**

### **The Renaissance Ideology.**

In the next three centuries the citizenship construct survived in "two principal traditions."<sup>40</sup> The Renaissance ideology and the civic humanist institutions were given credence by the writings of Machiavelli and then onto others such as Harrington. James Harrington "thought it possible to create a perfectly stable and unchanging republic". . . "by arranging a suitable balance of interests in the organization of the government through such devices as a separation of powers, division of the legislature, and rotation in office."<sup>41</sup> He is known for his "blueprint" for a perfect republic in his work entitled, The Commonwealth of Oceana. These ideas reached the shores of France where Rousseau embraced and embellished the concept of citizenship in the civic humanist tradition. Property rights and the acquisition of property as pursued by the medieval merchants and lawyers set the tone for the second citizenship

tradition.

### **The Civic Humanist Tradition.**

The second concept of citizenship was encouraged by the writings of “More, Montaigne, Bacon, Shakespeare, Hobbes, Locke, Franklin, and many others . . . .”<sup>42</sup> As economic activity increased and improved for the average person in Europe, citizenship in the tradition of the Ancients flourished. During the Reformation, the theologians began to favor public activism for the betterment of the community. Sir Thomas More, fascinated with the Ancient Greek Model, believed that the individual can be virtuous by being active in community rather than in a passive state in isolation or in contemplation. From a different perspective, Bodin viewed citizenship in the promotion of subjectship to the monarchy.<sup>43</sup> Johannes Althusius (1557-1638) focused his writings on an individual’s life--whether it is contemplative versus an active one. Althusius expounded on the idea that “what makes a citizen is his membership in and service to the community.”<sup>44</sup> Althusius was an early advocate of popular sovereignty and became the intellectual father of modern federalism.<sup>45</sup>

No difference existed between naturalization and denization<sup>46</sup> in the Fifteenth Century. In the Seventeenth Century, English Law “incorporated aliens into the community.”<sup>47</sup> Naturalization costs consumed great amounts of time and monies. Even though aliens could purchase land, the king maintained ownership and use of the land.<sup>48</sup> Citizens began to resist the tyranny; however, this form of protest was limited in scope. The Levellers (1646-1649), religious dissidents from the major cities of England, made a dramatic announcement to Parliament. They demanded a democracy, but their pleas fell on deaf ears. Their ideas reflected the thinking following the bloodless English Revolution. However, the Levellers’ pleas for democracy foreshadowed the thinking and actions that were to take place 150 years later with the American Revolutionaries and the French bourgeoisie, workers, and peasants.

During the Middle Ages, the citizenship tradition continued to emphasize the exchange of protection for taxes and service between citizen and community in France. The Renaissance period followed in this tradition. Montesquieu's writings stressed the importance of the role of *citizen*--defining citizenship within the realm of liberty and society--"a life being lived under the rule of law."<sup>49</sup> Montesquieu's popularity and public acceptance gave credence to the ideas of young Rousseau, who echoed Montesquieu's thoughts and proposed his own ideas on the *virtuous citizen*. Early on, Rousseau discussed the new society, which was "to be based on civism, heroism, sacrifice, and equality."<sup>50</sup> Rousseau's writings left a legacy on the importance of education. He predicated his beliefs of educating the individual on the basis of liberty. He saw liberty as depending on an educated populace. The Rousseauian thought, that *the most important business of the state* is education, began to strengthen the roots of republicanism.

Both these citizenship traditions treated the public realm differently than they did the private domain. In Rousseau's elevation of 'Liberate, Egalite, and Fraternite,' men contracted with each other as citizens but in a form of brotherhood that treated women differently from men. Men were involved in the public realm in the community and commerce; whereas, women were considered to be in the private domain of domesticity requiring protections by the government. Rousseau excluded women in his lengthy writings on the equality of men. He also believed that "real democracy is only an ideal."<sup>51</sup> Carole Pateman, political theorist, in her two books, The Problem of Political Obligation and The Sexual Contract, delves into this subject of how brotherhood destroys "the practice of citizenship."<sup>52</sup> Mafia-type organizations are reminders of this destructive order. Other writers insist that the citizenship rules need to be rewritten, especially in terms of the effects on the sense of community relating to the private and public realm.<sup>53</sup>

The critics of the times were more inspired by the Ancient Greeks, especially the ideas of Aristotle, who saw a need for community involvement.

Philosophers, Hobbes and Locke, looked to the subject of *citizen* and *citizenship* not in the narrow legal sense but in the way the Ancient Greeks envisioned citizenship--as the form of civic virtue and civic consciousness of the community. They saw the individual as a moral, thinking being who reflected on society and acted on those demands and needs. Hobbsean thinking focused on the individual and the individual's influence in society. Locke, on the other hand, seized upon the idea of the role of the individual and expanded that role to include the individual's role in government and in property acquisition. During the 1700's, the moral side of citizenship is revived. The citizen, in the eyes of Montesquieu, is seen as "a worthy political figure."<sup>54</sup> Montesquieu's citizen is similar to Locke's in character--one who is law-abiding, productive, and a loyal subject.

### **Transvaluation Occurs.**

As we have seen the development of citizenship and community emerge out of Classical Greece and be transformed in Rome, we experienced a convergence with Christianity. The concept of citizenship reached a plateau and remained a secondary influence while the Bishopric and its institutional formation was cultivated. Along this strain of development converged the monarchical element. As these three doctrinal forces merged with each other, revolutions of spirit in the name of mankind and humanity occurred. The powers described as the church (religion), the monarchy, and the state, evolved in revolutionary terms to launch a new era. This is why, in the modern era, we have such difficulty with *getting* the idea of citizenship. Dewey, realizing this, developed a theory of democratic governance and citizenship that held that we can understand citizenship, and learn how to be citizens, only by doing it in the context of actual community processes. *We can never get the idea of citizenship from our theoretical traditions about governance because, in effect, it has been lost to us.* What we got in its place was citizenship through representative government.

## Representative Democratic Government

### Liberalism Influences.

At the dawn of liberalism, the era of American Democracy began. Liberal concepts such as individualism, republicanism, liberty, equality, and fairness were embraced. Dietz outlines the basic tenets of liberalism:

1. Individuals are rational in their thinking and have intrinsic worth.
2. Society ensures freedom to realize one's capabilities.
3. Individual liberty and human equality translate as political egalitarianism.
4. The individual is the bearer of formal rights and has equal access to those rights--which are inviolable and in a private realm that the state cannot legitimately interfere with.
5. Liberal thinking paved the way for an economic system based on profits.<sup>55</sup>

However, liberal concepts tend to promote the means to the ends of an economic system that declares that the "market maketh man."<sup>56</sup> Spotlighting the shortcomings of liberalism, Mary Shanley recognizes that "human interdependence . . . is part of the life of both families and polities. . . ."<sup>57</sup> Liberalism does not have the concepts or the language to help in that interaction. These weaknesses are identified in the liberal concepts of "rights, interests, contracts, individualism, representative government, and negative liberty."<sup>58</sup> In contrast to these liberal principles, Sheldon Wolin identifies the family of concepts surrounding citizenship as vital: "participation, action, democracy, community, and political freedom."<sup>59</sup>

### Republican Ideals.

Democratic theory then slowly develops in bits and pieces, but it does not recover the Greek tradition fully, producing, as a result, only an impoverished idea of citizenship as part of representative government. American Democracy is born out of the republican ideals that pronounce that sovereignty resides in the consent of the people. Lockean principles declaring that “the People shall be Judge” convinced those in the Virginia House of Burgesses to dissolve the government that bound them to the Motherland.<sup>60</sup> As the Eighteenth Century comes to a close, republican governments have been installed on each side of the Atlantic. However, the aftermath of the Reign of Terror in France and of Shay’s Rebellion in America held democracy at bay. Republican forms of government were instituted, with hierarchical structures and elitist political traditions.

John Pocock observed that “Machiavellian ideas are those that were prescribed for our republican government, and that it is Harrington, not Locke, who is the primary philosopher for the framers.”<sup>61</sup> Whether Lockean principles or Harringtonian premises are imbedded in the regime values of America, Pirsig resonates Kettner’s thoughts that the Natives practiced self-government long before the white man set foot on American shores. As Pirsig is so adept in illustrating that “when you borrow traits and attitudes from a hostile culture you don’t give them credit for it.”<sup>62</sup>

Pirsig overrides Lockean influences in America when he states that the idea “All men are created equal” is a gift to the world from the American Indian.<sup>63</sup> A Gestalt shift is needed to see the influences of the Indians to our American value system. The point of this discussion is that the questions of allegiance in America surfaced as new immigrants arrived, relations with the Indians deteriorated, and the pressures against slavery increased. One’s obligations to the community remained strong through the 1820’s. However, the period between 1820 and the Civil War marked this period as a “clash of principle and prejudice”--all in the quest for defining citizenship.<sup>64</sup>

## **Hierarchy--Aid or Threat to Democracy.**

The genius of representative democracy was to protect the citizenry from tyranny while democracy had time to develop and grow into a true democracy. Decisions are made at the top of the hierarchy by the representatives who represent those at the bottom levels of society because of their right to vote. If we believe that our vote is an expression of our feelings and that representatives automatically do our bidding, we have become hooked into the technocratic mind set. Follett called this *ballot box democracy* whereby we think we share in public opinion.<sup>65</sup> According to Thayer, “representative government preserves hierarchy.”<sup>66</sup> It is a Weberian hierarchical framework that establishes order and consistency in representative government created to look like democracy.<sup>67</sup> However, Merton cites the Weberian structure with excesses creating “irrationality and inefficiency” in its “punctilious adherence to formalized procedures” known as “red tape.”<sup>68</sup> The primacy of decision-making in Simon’s work is predicated on hierarchical organizational structures, which seek efficiency and control from subordinates.<sup>69</sup> Theorists Dahl, Eckstein, and Sartori-”emphasize the need for hierarchy.”<sup>70</sup> But Thayer states that representative democracy is impersonal democracy.

## **Technocracy Imposes Upon Democracy.**

The bottom line is that the traditions of democracy--civic virtue and community--stem from Ancient Greece and were seeded twenty-five hundred years ago. As the Industrial Revolution created great changes, the republican form of democracy took roots. The electoral process as designed by the Founders implied a *technocratic* system in determining the election of the President by a distant, mechanical process. Thayer described the electoral college as an “alienating character”(istic) in the election process.<sup>71</sup> Functionalism, as promoted by Frederick Taylor, in the 1920's, under the guise

of scientific management, left its mark on the republican form of government. One of Taylor's maxims--*one best way*--resonates in our society to the present day. The values of scientific management--economy, efficiency, and effectiveness--became relegated to a primary place in democratic thinking.<sup>72</sup>

The economic way of thinking permeated the upper levels of public management levels or executive circles as a means to satisfy the public. In the process of promoting efficiency, effectiveness and economy, democratic values of representativeness, responsibility, and reliability are relegated to a place of no return. For example, economic theories such as the Agency Theory and Transactional-Cost Economics Theory are both premised on contractual agreements between the agent and the client/customer.<sup>73</sup> These theories may be good for the business world but translated in governmental terms they obviate the possibility of true democracy.

Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB), and Management by Objectives (MBO) are some of the processes promoted as cost-effective, efficient, and economic.<sup>74</sup> These technocratic forms of operation function only too well; however, they are not a replacement for democratic processes any more than a computer is for a brain. They are detrimental to a democracy; because, they automatically assume a life of their own. They are outside democratic measures and thus bypass accountability, due process, deliberation by the people, the legislature, and public information on behalf of the people. Sartori describes this technology in the form of "horizontal communication" between the experts and the political leaders--the techno-experts.<sup>75</sup>

Waldo put the concept of efficiency in perspective. He reminds us that the concept of efficiency works within "a framework of consciously held values."<sup>76</sup> It is our responsibility to remember and practice our democratic values and beliefs when instituting the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness. In other words, democratic processes must be protected when utilizing these concepts of efficiency and effectiveness within the framework of our democratic value



system.

White and McSwain describe technocracy and the dangers with “the technicist episteme.”<sup>77</sup> White uses powerful language in describing technicism. “Technicism amounts to nothing less than a specter--a specter that portends the diminishment and possible loss of the human principle itself.”<sup>78</sup> With the onset of the electronic town hall made popular in the 1996 presidential election, the warning White issues may be coming true. “What we must truly fear is that technical decision will become our dominant social process.”<sup>79</sup> Abramson and Pearl also see the negative effects on the public. However, they see the process as an “awkward transition from a representative democracy to something closer to a true democracy, and official Washington is having a hard time coping.”<sup>80</sup> Technology creates a false sense of community at best.

Technocratic mechanisms are violating our privacy and our ways of deliberation. Caroline Kennedy Schlossberg and her colleagues are researching and writing about these kinds of violations as a breach of the public trust. These violations are all technically-based because they are automatic functions of a process and are relegated to a place of no return. The media, computer industry, cyberspace, Internet, and other electronic innovations are transgressing the domain of free speech, privacy ethics, and democratic processes.

In the mid-1990's, a modern view of technology and the future of political parties as organizations of the past is summarized by Kevin Phillips. The value of town meetings, initiatives, referenda, and the techniques of electronic democracy will become “technology-facilitated participatory democracy” as the United States moves toward the 21st century.<sup>81</sup>

## **Citizen Participation--Citizen Involvement**

In searching through the literature on how we as a people have attempted to clarify the purpose of democratic government and how to include citizens in government, I find it interesting and illuminating to actually define the concepts of

participation and involvement. In seeking out definitions for participation and involvement, one immediately senses confusion. The dictionary definition of participation is “to take part or have a share in common with others;”<sup>82</sup> the definition for involvement is the act of having an effect on.<sup>83</sup> It is a paradox which the citizen faces. Participation suggests action but is passive; involvement is the act of doing and effecting change. According to Barber, the political knowledge that one learns by doing or experiencing becomes the “epistemology of the process.”<sup>84</sup> These are the thoughts echoed over a century ago by Alexis DeTocqueville who believed that a person became “educated in the process” as one became involved.<sup>85</sup> We are at a critical crossroads of citizen participation and involvement in government processes. In other words, we are in transition that holds out the possibilities for a true, direct democracy existing within the confines of a republican form of democracy. However, it is threatened by a technocracy that masks as if it were a democracy. In our quest to determine whether or not we are ready for a more direct democracy, we must be alert to what could be alienating and repressive features of democracy in its true form. The words of *The Declaration of Independence* cry out, “That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”

### **Public Consciousness.**

Forces in this country are identifying and addressing the various problems and resolutions to those problems which are present or are on the horizon. Orion White’s “public consciousness” sets the tone.<sup>86</sup> He has resurrected Deweyan ideas of the public and its responsibility. Public as well as private institutions share responsibility for carrying out the democratic values of citizenship as practiced as civic virtue for the greater good or commonwealth, freedom, liberty, equality, and fairness through education.

## **In the Public Interest.**

In the Seventeenth Century, James Harrington believed that the main interest of all of mankind is the “‘Law of Nature’ and described ‘the publick interest of a commonwealth’ as ‘nearest that of mankind.’”<sup>87</sup> Charles Goodsell brings the “public interest” to focus for the Twenty-First Century. The “public interest” relegates democratic values to primary levels so that the public will is made for the long term, not for special interests in the short term. White equates the “public interest” with “public consciousness.” Mosca, Pareto and Michels feel that in the delegation of political power by the people to the representatives, the public’s interest may well be reflected by those representatives rather than the people.<sup>88</sup> However, the values inherent in the meaning and understanding of “public interest” elevate the concept in the public arena.

Goodsell dissects the value content of the term “public interest” into six value constructs. The *legal-moral* interpretation of the meaning of “public interest” implies that the individual applying the term is using discretion and operating in the legal and moral realm. Another interpretation of the public interest is the application of *political responsiveness* in a democratic manner. It also implies *political consensus* where deliberation involves all participants in the political spectrum. The expression, “in the public interest,” also is interpreted to mean a *concern for logic*. Things make sense because appropriate measures have been made to be accountable to the public. In this way, the *concern for effects* on the public is more readily received because it is felt that the public will receive benefits from a particular public policy that is instituted in the “public interest.” The final measure that Goodsell explains is why the term “public interest” suggests a safe haven. Because of *agenda awareness*, the responsible public administrator is knowledgeable of the big picture and takes into account all perspectives in helping to develop public policy.<sup>89</sup>

## **Active Citizenship.**

Camilla Stiver's "Active Citizenship" primarily begins by laying the groundwork for public deliberation. Before a community of self-interested individuals together with public officials and civic-minded citizens meet on behalf of the public interest, the language of understanding becomes a prologue to the deliberations. Stivers claims and demonstrates in her case studies that it is necessary for "the development of understanding that strengthens citizens' capacity for purposeful action."<sup>90</sup> As these ideas merge with each other, the key facilitator to this process becomes apparent--the public administrator.

Bureaucrats may need citizens, as Stivers suggests in her paper, "Toward a Community of Knowledge," but in a different way from that practiced in the early days of the Founding. "Active Citizenship" is not anathema to management but can be an effective way to improve policy-making decisions that have a public face, not just an administrative one.<sup>91</sup> "Shared understanding," "accountability," and "legitimation,"<sup>92</sup> are the dynamics engendered by both the public and public administrator in enhancing the sense of community and the greater sense of the whole. Where Stivers defines *shared understanding* as a necessary tool for the sense of community to function, White and McSwain describe it as generating a *lingua franca* for the process to serve the developing society.<sup>93</sup>

## **Agential Leadership.**

Wamsley's *agential leadership* ideas are necessary in building a community between interested citizens and government. The building up of a consensus around a problem which opens up dialogue among the interested parties can alleviate the tensions of power struggles between government officials and citizens to the sharing of the power. Wamsley sees "the Agency as a potential focal point for building community at all levels of our government, . . .

### **Essence of Community.**

This *sharing of the power* is the key principle of Thayer's "Essence of Community." He identifies the problem in terms of the "professional-citizen dichotomy." Each party separates from the other because of either status, expertise, and/or roles. If, on the other hand, citizens were considered *professional citizens*, the status and role may be erased. The issue at hand becomes the place from which the participants begin to deliberate and reach consensus or some conclusions. Mansbridge believes that it is this consensus-building process that focuses attention on the different arguments and places the onus on those participants to see the whole picture. The highest act of citizenship is involvement.

### **Sharing in the Office.**

In reflection, Herbert Croly was calling for a *Great Community* in the early part of this Twentieth Century.<sup>95</sup> Along came John Dewey, the pragmatist philosopher who wrote in his book, The Public and Its Problems (1927) that in our development as a nation we are processing toward the *Great Community*. Dewey shared the vision of Aristotle and Plato that each individual citizen has a responsibility to the public welfare as well as to oneself. Dewey called this the dual citizenship role. A citizen is first, a public officer of the state and has responsibility for the public interest, the public consciousness. The citizen is also the private self who votes for his own interests. When the public and private interests conflict with each other, the citizen is responsible for deliberating with others in face-to-face interaction in searching for the truth. It becomes a win-win situation whereby the public interest and private interest can coexist.

In Arendt's thinking, the community of co-existence and participation

guarantees that the people can retain their power. For, “power is the lifeblood of human artifact.”<sup>96</sup> “The people are their own best advocates.”<sup>97</sup> In a democracy, the people may choose their leaders, but the leaders can only be effective if the community is successful in including the public. Briand gives two reasons why the public must be involved in policy making and addressing a community’s problems:

1. Public problems cannot be solved without involvement by everyone who is affected by the problem.
2. Our most difficult problems require input and cooperation from everyone.<sup>98</sup>

As Arendt concludes: “Citizens who deliberate, choose, and act together are those who have power.”<sup>99</sup> Croly gave the most statesmanlike reason:

*“The character of a nation, like the character of an individual, is wrought not by submissive obedience to the law, but by the active assertion of the needs and purposes of its own life.”<sup>100</sup>*

These ideas in concert give credence and function well with Dewey’s ideas; each alone would not have that same value.

The genius of representative democracy may have been preferred by the Founders to protect the citizens from the tyranny of factions in the aggregate of the community.<sup>101</sup> However, “a democracy cannot delegate all its powers and remain a democracy.”<sup>102</sup> That is the danger of hierarchy in a representative democratic government. “Participation of the governed is necessary in a democracy.”<sup>103</sup>

Hannah Arendt identified “politics as the active life of citizens” with the community. For it is the citizens who form the community who make the “affairs of the community,” . . . “the people’s affair.”<sup>104</sup> Democratic citizenship is a relationship of civic peers. The guiding principles are mutual respect, “positive liberty” of democracy and self government, which is not the “negative liberty” of noninterference.<sup>105</sup> Arendt alerted us in the late fifties that “citizenship is the ‘lost treasure’ of American political life.”<sup>106</sup> It is in the public realm of the sense of

community that the spirit of democracy must be awakened.

As a new dawn arises on the horizon of the twenty-first century in America, the British are also reflecting on the concept of citizenship. The words of Douglas Hurd who purports to seek a new definition of citizenship sounds more like supporting the Tories of the past. The Conservatives feel that *active citizenship* will serve to alleviate the pressures of too much dependence on the welfare state, the crime rate, and also, help to increase responsible citizens. This kind of citizenship espoused by Hurd could prove to be destructive to the idea of society. Interestingly enough, caution is expressed to be careful not to make citizenship too burdensome and obligatory. However, in an editorial, the blare of the trumpets sound the cause for “a community of equals” whereby citizenship “grows up” from the people on “behalf of the community.”<sup>107</sup> It is the practicing of citizenship that will promote civic virtue that will, in turn, *harness* the sense of community.

## Conclusion

Americans are the inheritors of ancient traditions of citizenship and community. The two traditions from the Ancients that are intrinsically intertwined in our foundation are democracy and citizenship. As western civilization developed, the meaning of these two traditions has been transmuted with the onset of Christianity. As the organizational structures of Christianity became formalized, the power struggles between the church and state together with the remnants of monarchical powers strangled the development of democracy and put citizenship into a latent state. When civilization spread along with Christianity, the roots of democracy and citizenship that had been dormant for so long finally took sprout and broke through the surface and began to flourish.

In England, subjectship to the monarchy via parliament was automatically assumed. However, in America, the questions of allegiance surfaced. A revolution of the human spirit in the throes of freedom and equality of man

created a new paradigm of democratic values and self government. The value systems of citizenship in practice as civic virtue and a sense of community provided a strong foundation upon which a representative democratic government could flourish. The pioneer spirit continues in the ideals that have been entrusted to us and are at the threshold of our developing American democracy as envisioned by John Dewey.



## Endnotes

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31. Ibid., p. 82.
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33. Ibid., p. 88. St. John Chrysostom (Golden-mouth) wrote homilies against the display of statues in the homes of Christians.
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35. Stumpf, p. 132.
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