

The Allocation of Funds within HOPE VI: Applicants and Recipients

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the allocation of funds over the entire tenure of the HOPE VI, a public housing competitive grant, to determine if the program adhered to its program goals. This study focuses on the application and selection phases of HOPE VI. Moreover, this study looks to the scholarship on redistributive politics to gain an understanding of any deviations from projected program results. Within the context of an institutional policy analysis approach, this dissertation explores the consequences of using competitive grants as a policy tool for the HOPE VI program and postulates on its effects on program outcomes. An empirical analysis of the grant applicants and grant recipients finds that overall, large developments had a better rate in receiving grants and received more grants on their initial attempt. However, small public housing developments, which were not the focus of the HOPE VI program, submitted four times as many applications with a success rate of fifty-two percent. Overtime, cities with smaller populations are awarded more grants.

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my grandmother, Vida Brown Kearse. Although she has passed on, her endearing encouragement and unwavering support sustains me to this day. She ended almost every call by telling me just how proud she was of me. Sometimes, I wonder if it were pre-destined from her days at Mamie Fields that I would receive my doctorate by studying public housing developments.

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Chapter One: Introduction

I. Overview of the Study

This dissertation explores housing policy; more specifically, it is a case study of the HOPE VI program. For the last two decades, HOPE VI, a public housing revitalization program was a critical component of urban housing policy. HOPE VI was an innovative and reformative federal government program that had attributes and implementation strategies that were new to the public housing paradigm. This dissertation examines the allocation of funds within HOPE VI. Moreover, this research explores the distribution of HOPE VI program resources over the entire tenure of the program to determine whether HOPE VI adhered to its primary program goal of revitalizing the most severely distressed public housing units. This study uses the benchmarks set by the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH), which referred to severely distressed public housing developments as large developments located in major cities¹.

This dissertation limits its focus to two distinct periods within a grant's lifecycle: the application and selection phases. Furthermore, this study analyzes the grant applicants and recipients and explores the theory that its policy tool, the competitive grant, influences and has consequences to program outcomes. In order to fully understand the allocation of resources within HOPE VI, one must gain a comprehensive understanding of its tool of government, the competitive grant. Thus, this study is grounded theoretically in the scholarship regarding competitive grants as a tool of government.

The HOPE VI grant is administered within a framework where the allocation of funds can be influenced by Congress and/or the bureaucracy. To better understand the politics involved, this research is partially grounded in the redistributive politics literature.

¹NCSDPH final report refers to large scale/high density developments with at least 500 units.

Moreover, this dissertation incorporates an institutional policy analysis approach and examines the consequences of allocating resources in a reformative government program (HOPE VI) using a competitive grant as the policy tool.

Finally, a central argument of this dissertation is that program results are not based upon how recipients effectively implement a project. Instead, in a competitive grant framework, program results are cemented by which entity applies and receives a grant. This dissertation examines this argument by empirically analyzing the applicants and grant recipients for the entire tenure of the HOPE VI program. Specifically, this research empirically examines which public housing authorities (PHAs) or public housing developments received grants, explores any patterns in the allocation of funds, and posits what factors that may influence the distribution of resources within the HOPE VI program.

This chapter introduces the framework, concepts, and methodology that are utilized in this dissertation. First, there is a discussion of HOPE VI grant program and its relevant literature. The next section sets a contextual framework by reviewing pertinent scholarship regarding policy tools, then grants. This literature provides a rich set of concepts and processes that enhances one's understanding of programs such as HOPE VI, which are implemented in an intergovernmental system. After the discussion of the framework, this dissertation's contribution to research and plan of study are detailed. Finally, this chapter ends with a summary of the methodology that is used in this study.

II. HOPE VI

a. A History of Public Housing

This dissertation uses the HOPE VI program as a case study because it was the first, and is now the largest competitive public housing grant program. Moreover, there are over ten thousand public housing developments. According to the Brookings Institution, there are over two million residents of public housing, which represents ninety billion dollars investment in America. Since 1992, HOPE VI has leveraged over \$ 50 billion to communities across America (Turbov 2005).

However, to better understand the significance of this innovative public housing program and to assist in framing HOPE VI, a brief history of public housing policy is helpful. Although most scholars cite the National Housing Act of 1937 as the impetus for public housing in America, the federal government was involved in eradicating urban blight since the late nineteenth century. Moreover, the modern structure of public housing was the result of a seminal court case, *U.S. vs. Certain Land in the City of Louisville* in 1935. This ruling restricted the federal government's role to funding rather than directly producing housing. In fact, the courts ruled that housing does not have a public purpose. As a result, a partnership relationship with local governments was necessary. Thus, this ruling is the impetus for establishing local public housing authorities to implement public housing production and management. Since the Wagner-Steagall Act (1937), public housing has evolved from temporary housing for working families to permanent housing for the very poor. In the United States, public housing is owned by approximately three thousand public housing authorities (PHAs) which are governed by state and local laws. In an effort to revitalize communities and de-

concentrate the poor, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has, over the years, implemented various community development programs including Model Cities, Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG), Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), and Empowerment Zones. However, while these programs addressed urban renewal problems, none of them were public housing programs – programs specifically tasked with housing individuals outside of the private market. HOPE VI was created within a framework of budget constraints, a negative media campaign, and an overall shift in the political thoughts about the role of federal government. HOPE VI represented extraordinary innovation and reformative government. Not only was it a competitive grant program that devolved authority to the PHA; but the PHA was to leverage funds and create public private partnerships with local businesses. Hence, the federal government was not saddled with the entire cost of this program.

Before 1992, there were no public housing programs that specifically focused on the eradication of urban blight. Since it was the only public housing new construction and redevelopment program, HOPE VI filled a void that had been lacking in public housing for decades. In the past, public housing programs were developed using a template that was established to implement New Deal programs. Due to several factors including continuous failures of prior programs, HUD policymakers decided to establish a program in a manner that it had never done.

b. Overview and History of HOPE VI

HOPE VI was a public housing demolition and revitalization program. Under this program, local PHAs apply for competitive grants to convert dilapidated public housing projects into mixed-use, mixed-income community developments. HOPE VI was a unique program because it was a public housing competitive grant program that leverages

private funds to revitalize housing developments and its surrounding communities. These key attributes and implementation strategies were new to the public housing paradigm; therefore, HOPE VI is considered as a reformative government program.

Each year, over 32 billion dollars are redistributed from the federal government to state and local entities for housing projects. For the last decade, over sixty percent of HUD's budget has been dedicated to public housing. In fact, the budget for public housing is larger than FHA and CDBG combined. Furthermore, HOPE VI represented a significant portion of that sixty-percent of HUD's public housing budget. Overall, HOPE VI has directly allocated over \$7 billion dollars in fungible funds to local entities and it has leveraged nearly \$50 billion to cities across the United States, which is unprecedented in public housing. HOPE VI had a longer tenure than any of HUD's other experimental programs such as Model Cities, UDAG, or Empowerment Zones and was the only source for new construction of public housing for the last twenty years. The HOPE VI program funded the redevelopment of over 150,000 public housing units(Goetz, 2010).

However, this program was plagued by problems. Most notably, the program experienced extensive delays in project implementation and development. Consequently, critics argue that this program was inefficient, due, in part, to its distributive tool: the competitive grant. For this reason, HOPE VI was a contentious program. However, critics often fail to take into account that first, due to their complexity, most HOPE VI projects struggle to meet redevelopment and implementation deadlines. Second, many projects struggle with tenant issues such as relocation, job training and self-sufficiency (GAO, 2002; Goetz, 2010). And, third, some projects are entangled in political or legal

disputes. Each of these factors alone might add several years to the scope of the revitalization projects.

HOPE VI had both staunch supporters and firm detractors across party lines and levels of government. In fact, the program was created under a Republican administration (President George H.W. Bush), but fully implemented during a Democratic administration (President Clinton). And while the program offered competitive grants to local PHAs, HOPE VI had tentacles that affected a myriad of stakeholders including politicians, public administrators, residents, nonprofits, and local businesses. Many of these stakeholders have become advocates for the retention of this program. However, the program ended recently, awarding its last grant in fiscal year 2010.

c. Legislative History of HOPE VI

In an effort to address the mounting problems surrounding public housing, Congress established the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing in 1989. The commission members visited 25 cities, inspecting public housing developments, interviewing workers, and meeting residents. In 1992, their final report estimated that 86,000 public housing units were most severely distressed by four major problems: high crime, high unemployment, deteriorating units, and disincentives for self-sufficiency. As a result of the Commission's report, Congress established the Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program, later renamed HOPE VI. The program's main objective was to replace the most severely distressed and obsolete public housing projects, occupied solely by the poor, with redesigned, mixed-income housing. Most of the severely distressed public housing was a part of large developments, which were under the purview of PHAs in central cities.

Because of the multi-faceted stressors on public housing units as found in the 1992 report, the HOPE VI program was not only a public housing reconstruction program. Rather, this program combined physical revitalization of public housing with funding for management improvements and supportive services. HOPE VI transformed public housing by combining the physical revitalization of distressed public housing properties with community building and supportive services such as education, job training, and transportation.

In 1993, the first cohort of HOPE VI grants was awarded. As interest in the program grew, by 1996 grant funding had to be capped at \$50 million per grant and the Clinton administration established a goal of demolishing and replacing 100,000 distressed or obsolete public housing units by 2000. As the scope and breath of the program goals increased, eligibility to participate was extended to all PHAs with distressed housing, whereas, in previous years only large and troubled PHAs were eligible. For its first six years, the HOPE VI program operated through annual appropriations by Congress. Finally, in 1998, the program was officially authorized by the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (Title V of P.L. 105-276).

In 2002, Congress re-authorized the program for two additional years. Whereas the initial estimate was 86,000 distressed units, in 2003, the Urban Institute concluded that at least 47,000 additional public housing units had some form of distress. Despite the need to address problems in a growing number of dilapidated units, Congress re-authorized the program for fiscal years 2003-2008 at significantly lower funding levels. Before 2002, the average yearly funding for the HOPE IV program was \$575 million, but by 2006, the program funding average was reduced to \$100 million per year due to the

controversies surrounding the program and the Bush administration's changing policy priorities. In 2007, House of Representative passed the HOPE VI Improvement and Reauthorization Act; however, this bill never was signed into law and in its final years, HOPE VI was appropriated annually in HUD's overall budget.

d. Survey of Relevant Literature on HOPE VI Program

Generally speaking, there are two major threads of scholarship regarding HOPE VI: implementation studies and program evaluation studies (Freedman, 1998; Wang, 2000; Wood, 2002). This research study builds upon the program evaluation thread. The objective of this study is to examine the allocation of award funds for the tenure of the HOPE VI program. The research also investigates the factors that may influence the allocation of funds, and to postulate on some of the consequences of using competitive grant as a policy tool to implement HOPE VI.

The academic literature regarding the HOPE VI program is very diverse and can be found through a profusion of qualitative resources such newspapers, think tank publications, and academic journals. However, most of the relevant scholarship is found in the urban policy literature. In his 1998 seminal study, Anthony Freedman took a baseline assessment of the program. In *Hope after HOPE VI*, Gilbert Rosenthal published a retrospective study of how HOPE VI evolved through the years and how HOPE VI influenced the PHAs, its residents, and community revitalization (Rosenthal, 2004). A significant portion of the academic scholarship includes case studies of specific revitalization projects. These studies chronicle the implementation of a HOPE VI grant from grant award to project closure.

In some respects, the HOPE VI program is one of the most researched and analyzed public housing programs. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has been one of the few organizations to consistently review the program. In 1997, GAO's first HOPE VI study focused on the status of the demonstration program. A follow-up study highlighted the process and problems of the program (GAO, 1997, 1998). Subsequent GAO reports examined the financial aspects such as leveraging of government funds for project development (GAO, 2002, 2007). Other GAO studies explored PHAs' capacity and accountability issues and HUD's poor oversight (GAO, 2003, 2007). The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has published several studies regarding HOPE VI. In addition to Government sponsored reports and academic literature, several studies regarding HOPE VI have been published by think tanks and advocacy groups such as The Urban Institute and Brookings Institution.

III. Key Concepts using the Relevant Literature Regarding Policy Tools and Competitive Grants

This is a dissertation of housing policy, which examines the allocation of resources within HOPE VI, a public housing competitive grant program. In order to fully understand the distributive aspects of HOPE VI, one must have a foundation in the key concepts and relevant literature regarding tools of government and competitive grants. This section reviews the key concepts and characteristics this dissertation's framework using relevant scholarship on policy tools and competitive grants.

In his seminal work, *Tools of Government*, Christopher Hood categorizes policy instruments into two basic types, those for gathering information and those for modifying behavior (Hood 1983). Moreover, he purports that the discourse around effective policy

instrument and government has its roots in the Enlightenment era. Lester Salamon first introduced the concept of the tools approach in his text, *Rethinking Public Management*. Salamon observed a fundamental shift away from the analysis of the organization, policy, program, function, or outcome and towards the policy tool. Furthermore, inquiry into Lester Salamon's tool approach gives a model for generically analyzing the implementation of programs; however, this study will not fully utilize his approach. Rather, this research explores various characteristics of the tools approach along ideas from institutional policy analysis framework regarding the consequences of government reform. Thus, this dissertation analyzes how the policy tool, the competitive grant, affects the allocation patterns within HOPE VI.

Moreover, this study borrows some ideas from *Institutional Policy Analysis: A Critical Review* by William Gormley. In his article, Gormley argues that there are consequences to institutional policy analysis and substantive policy choices. Institutional policy analysis is defined as the study of government reform and its qualitative and quantitative consequences. It speaks to procedural choices and the redefinition of relationships with government. However, substantive policy analysis focuses on programmatic choices and the authoritative allocation of resources by government (Gormley, 1987). One objective of this research is utilize a institutional policy analysis approach to postulate on some of the consequences of policy choices and to question whether using competitive grants as the policy tool in a reformative government program(HOPE VI) produces better results than past public housing initiatives.

The first section introduces the key concepts and the history of policy tools and the tools approach. The next section explains how this study deviates from the standard tools approach and examines literature on grants that is most relevant to this study.

a. Scholarship on Policy Tools and Tools Approach

Over the last fifty years, a transformation has occurred in government. This transformation involved not only the expansion in the scale and scope of government activity, but more importantly, a significant proliferation in the basic tools that the public sector uses to achieve its objectives (Salamon, 1981). Many scholars label the changing forms of public action and indirect administration as "government by proxy". The central characteristic of this process is the participation of nonfederal actors and institutions. To obtain its objectives, government has a myriad of policy instruments to accomplish policy goals and exercise influence at its disposal. Usually, these policy tools affect implementation patterns and policy outcomes in predictable and regular ways since they represent "the blueprint or template that shapes policy" (L. Salamon, 1981).

According to policy theorists, policy tools can significantly improve our understanding of policy making and public administration. Moreover, they serve as a model to help advance the understanding of new implementation systems. These tools encompass various types of grants, direct loans, loan guarantees, interest subsidies; contracts tax expenditures, vouchers, corporations, franchises, and much more. Policy makers frequently debate the correct tool or the appropriate policy instrument choice when making decisions about programs and projects. Moreover, the selection of a policy instrument may be based on several factors including familiarity with the tool, political tradition, or professional bias. Yet, governments have a tendency to favor the same instruments across problem contexts suggesting a close link between instrument

perception and choice (Linder S.H. and Peters, 1989). Moreover, Linder and Peters are the first scholars to emphasize the political context to choice of policy instruments (Hood 2007).

Lester Salamon defines a policy tool as “an identifiable method through which collective action is structured to address a public problem” (Salamon, 1981). Using a tool involves the sharing of governmental authority with a third party. A tool may be a “direct tool” such as classic direct government, economic regulation, and public information; or an “indirect tool” such as a contract, a loan guarantee, tax expenditure, or a grant (Salamon, 1981).

According to Salamon, policymakers should “concentrate on the generic tools or “techniques” of government action such as appropriation of funds from Congress to federal Executive branch. Furthermore, he proposes a framework for analyzing tools in terms of their degree of coerciveness, directness, automaticity, and visibility. This, he argues should guide public choice (Salamon, 1981). In *Beyond Privatization: The Tools of Government Action (1989)*, Lester Salamon and Michael Lund, detail the basic conceptual framework of the tools approach. Essentially, this approach proposes that policy tools possess certain characteristics that make it possible to predict some of the likely consequences of each approach (Lund, 1989). The utility of the tools approach hinges on a key assumption: that policy tools do, in fact, exhibit distinctive patterns. In fact, researchers note the occurrence of patterns across agencies and programs which use the same tool thus enabling policy makers to draw conclusions regarding the correct or appropriate use of each tool.

Salamon argues through the critiques of the various models have come an improved understanding of the various tools and its place in the delivery of services. There is no one policy instrument which is best for every situation. Salamon observes that each tool is an institution in its own right: a distinctive way of achieving the goals of public policy or of organizing public service delivery. And because each tool is distinct and unique, for any given project, only one tool is appropriate, and no other. Moreover, Salamon states that each tool has its own operating procedures, requirements, and delivery mechanisms. In this regard, the use of each tool modifies the organizational environment in specific way and each tool will shape behavior and produce outcomes favorable to the program for which it is being used. Consequently, the choice of one policy tool over another will have implications to accountability and coordination of government activities. Ingram and Schneider purports that policy designers should take into account the nature of the populations addressed by the instruments, rather than examining the instruments in isolation. Consequently, there must be a conscious selection of instruments, as opposed to selection strictly based on familiarity, custom, and institutional inertia(A. a. H. I. Schneider, 2007). This study examines the tool of government that is utilized in a public housing program. As a result of the U.S. vs. Certain Land in the City of Louisville court ruling, public housing is structured as a partnership between the federal government, who provides funding, and the local public housing authority, who implements operations and production. Thus, only indirect tools of governments fit into the public housing framework.

b. Policy Tools and Politics

According to theorists, different tools create different politics, which in turn affect the success or failure of a particular approach. In fact, one of the reasons politicians

authorize the tools they do is precisely because they favor interest groups and constituencies that the politician has access to, or influence over. At the same time, these, use of a particular tool may also diminish the influence of other interest groups. Salamon sees policymakers as under increasing political pressure to select those tools of public action that are the most difficult to manage and the hardest to keep focused on their public policy objectives.; namely, tools which are indirect, invisible, and automatic, such as formula grants, block grants, subsidies, and loan guarantees. In his view, these tools by their very nature, sacrifice efficiency, effectiveness, and social equity. The result of selecting tools that are less easy to manage leaves federal officials in the unfortunate position of being held responsible for programs over which they have no direct control. Salamon and Lund (1989) believe that less visible tools are easier to authorize, but harder to manage than more visible tools such as contracts, direct loans, and competitive grants. (Howard, 1995).

Although, the tools approach embraces the changing paradigm in the public sector, it is not a panacea to solving the complex problems or social ills such as poverty, faced by our federal government. Often the problems the federal government is called upon to solve are “wicked problems”; these issues are very complex, multi-dimensional and multi-generational and cannot be neatly or easily resolved by a single program or tactic. Gormley focuses on the complexity and salience of the problems addressed and their influence on the politics associated with crafting policy solutions. Government develops policy tools that enable counter expertise to be applied during the policy process. High level of technical content can create obstacles for widespread participation. Greater emphasis on expertise can minimize political conflict. Although choosing the appropriate

tool is fraught with complex political and social influences and implications, policymakers must make a concerted effort to utilize appropriate policy tool to implement policies and programs. Ultimately, a policy or program's effectiveness will be analyzed based on the policy tool.

c. Intergovernmental Grants: History and Implementation

Currently, many programs are created and funded at the national level, but are fully implemented at the state and local levels. Within the realm of social policy, it is believed that local organizations house the expertise to successfully implement programs, especially those programs which attempt to resolve wicked problems such as poverty or public housing. Therefore, intergovernmental grants, grants from the federal government to states, localities, or nonprofits, are a mainstay.

For years, grants have been considered the most appropriate tool available to the federal government for handling a broad range of domestic functions, especially those functions which traditionally had been performed by states, localities or nonprofit organizations. Grants are strongly encouraged as a tool of government because they help square the Constitutional circle of extending the federal role while respecting the autonomy and prerogatives of sub-national jurisdictions. The grant is viewed as the perfect vehicle for involving the federal government in domestic activities while leaving the recipient governments a considerable degree of responsibility and discretion in operating the programs. Grants are widely regarded as the most appropriate way for the federal government to support or expand public services in areas of traditional state and local responsibility because they essentially put the federal government in the position of "cooperating" with rather than displacing those governments in the provision of service.

The federal government uses three main types of grants to distribute money to state and local governments: categorical grants, block grants, and general purpose grants. Although categorical grants are historically the most common grant type, the other two are an integral part of the intergovernmental grant system. The distinctions between the different types of grant mechanisms are sometimes difficult to discern. In general, grants can be distinguished by the degree of authority exercised by the federal funding agency (the grantor) and the degree of discretion that the recipient agency possesses. A locality then will choose carefully before applying for a grant, for receipt of these grants implies varying degrees of discretion over the funds.

1. History of Intergovernmental Grants

The concept of grants as a facilitator of intergovernmental relations is not unique to contemporary times. According to Daniel Elazar, federal grants and regulatory programs, along with interactive relations among government, are present throughout the nineteenth century (Elazar, 1962). In 1926, Leonard White determined that the historical roots of the American administrative system are found in the English institutions of local government, and that most administrative work is performed originally at the local level (McGuire, 2004). With the New Deal, and its redistributive activities, Congress institutionalized the intergovernmental relations paradigm. Later, when Congress created the Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) in 1959 (Wright, 1965). This commission was created amid an increase of major intergovernmental grants-in-aid programs such as Pell Grants, National Highway Grants, and Urban Renewal Grants. Although there are several types of grants, any grant that allocates funds from the federal government to a sub-national entity such as states, localities, or nonprofits are labeled as intergovernmental grants.

In the early 1960s, during the creative Federalism period, categorical project grants, which were awarded to individual entities for specific purposes, dominated. There are two basic types of categorical grants: formula and project and these grants are distributed based on demography such as poverty level or per capita income, or competitively. The majority of programs funded by categorical grants serve relatively narrow purposes. The advent of creative Federalism facilitated the coordination dynamics between federal, state, and local entities (Lovell, 1979). In fact, the federal government significantly increased the number of grants awarded to local grantees. Suddenly, there were new programs designed to provide greater and more direct federal assistance to disadvantaged groups- the poor, the elderly, the poorly educated, and those living in inner cities and rural areas, which changed the face of American federalism (Cole, Stenberg, & Weissert, 1996). With creative federalism, federal grants were grounded in the policy tools of decentralized decision making and localized government preferences (Cho & Wright, 2004; Wright, 1990).

The early 1970s also saw a change involving direct federal-local relations. Between 1968 and 1978, all total federal aid more than tripled in nominal terms; however, federal aid received directly by local governments increased almost tenfold. Large cities, especially, became more dependent on federal grants. Federal aid as a proportion of source revenue in the nation's 47 largest cities increased from 2.7 percent in 1957 to 49.7 percent in 1978. The year 1978 is notable for being the year the most federal monies were disbursed in aid, the high point in federal-local fiscal relations (Nathan & Lago, 1990). Since the 1970s, federal funding to localities for social programs has steadily decreased due to many factors such as budget cuts and policy shifts (Reinvention of

Government or New Public Management). By the 1980's, the Reagan administration began to cut federal domestic program budgets, decentralize responsibilities through broad-based block grants, and deregulate private and public sector activities(Cole, et al., 1996). This trend continues today. Currently, federal aid to large cities as a percentage of revenue is below New Deal figures.

Beginning in the 1980s, there is a significant paradigm shift in public administration with the introduction of New Public Management (NPM). Under NPM, government administration changed its framework from governance to a market-based model. NPM advocated the delegation of authority to local governments and nonprofit organizations. The philosophy of New Public Management was that local government was more knowledgeable and better equipped to deliver social services than the federal government. Funds for most social service funding were delivered via the block grant; localities received very little direct funding via categorical grants or formula grants.

Block grants were a better tool under NPM because they had fewer restrictions and required a commingling of funds with private and nonprofit organizations to execute a program or project. And, in order to reduce administrative costs and increase efficiency, localities and nonprofits had to collaborate to implement federal policies and programs.

2. Implementation of Intergovernmental Grants

The growth of the federal grant system has increased the network of federal-state, federal-local and federal-nongovernmental organization partnerships. Grants promote not only cooperative intergovernmental relations, but also varying degrees of national influence over state and local government. Moreover, due to the surfeit of federal initiatives, lower level government organizations must solidify their management efficiencies as the federal government expands its role into their activities through the

grants awarded. This paradigm sets up many vertical intergovernmental administrative activities that may be viewed as regulatory or contractual transactions. In *Taken for Granted?*, Brian Collins and Brian Gerber suggest that it's useful to think about grant administration as a contracting process. Grants are agreements which specify deliverables, time tables, and exchanges of resources and often define dispute resolution mechanisms with grantees.

Another viewpoint on managing intergovernmental relations derives almost exclusively from its application of grants-in-aid and the importance of bargaining between the financial donor and the recipient of the funds. Federal aid may foster a framework consisting of bargaining, negotiating, and a mutual adjustment processes in which intergovernmental managers play key roles(Cho & Wright, 2004). As federal grants-in-aid are increasingly distributed via project grants directly from the federal government to localities, local government entities begin to bargain and negotiate for grant awards. Localities may even hire private consultants as grant lobbyists to assist them in securing federal funds and in managing the bureaucratic red tape(Wright, 1990). Furthermore, intergovernmental management may involve actions such as joint policy making, mobilizing resources, and coordinating projects, all of which are employed to manage relationships, particularly within networks composed of multiple organizations(Agranoff, 1999). Some of the organizational practices derived from intergovernmental management include—grantsmanship, regulation compliance, and cooperative and shared service agreements. These are prime examples of practices that are a direct result of processes a locality must implement when they receive a grant that follow the idea of mutual agreement, bargaining, and negotiating.

d. Grants as Policy Tools

Grants are payments from a donor government to a recipient organization. A grant is a gift which aims to stimulate or to support a service or activity by the recipient. Grant programs are relevant to any functional field and any legitimate public purpose and may warrant new activity or support ongoing programs. Compared with other policy instruments, grants are indirect, non-coercive (acceptance is voluntary), and moderately visible. In general, they are discretionary, but they have a measure of automaticity by virtue of their reliance on the existing administrative structures of grantee organizations. Grants leave a considerable amount of discretion over the operation of programs financed by a donor government, in the hands of the recipient organization. They encourage a recipient to take a certain action, and do not restrict the methodology of the recipient. Furthermore, grant recipients retain discretion over the administrative management of the grant funds. At the same time, grants form a structure that establishes a loose relationship between grantor and grantee. Usually, the grant tool utilizes an existing administrative structure to produce its effect rather than creating its own special administrative apparatus. In this way the responsibility for providing service is shared by multiple levels of government.

1. Categorical Grants

Categorical grants are defined as grants intended for specific program purposes and are usually limited to narrowly defined activities. There are two basic types of categorical grants: formula and project. The majority of programs funded by categorical grants serve relatively narrow purposes. The grants specify rather closely those particular kinds of activities that the donor organization may support. Categorical grants are usually fixed appropriations with conditions inherent in acceptance.

Categorical grants restrict the recipient's (i.e. the local government) discretion in the use of federal funds and increases the federal government's policy influence. Federal grants to states are mainly formula-based categorical grants and federal grants to local governments are generally project grants, meaning that they are distributed through a grant competition involving project proposals and evaluations.

Categorical grants are awarded competitively through an application process and must be used to support a particular activity for a limited period of time. Typically, federal grants to state and local government entities require an application describing the intended beneficiaries, detailed plans, and scheduled operations. These grant programs specify a large number of additional conditions of assistance, which may vary from program to program. Categorical grants, both project and formula, require a detailed initial application, which is subject to blind, peer review screening. After receipt of funds, recipients are typically required to undergo annual financial audits and to file annual reports.

2. Competitive Grants

Under the competitive grant framework, local governments submit applications justifying their project needs. Next, the federal agency that has purview over the program reviews the packages, selects the winners, and determines grant amounts. Most grants awarded today require a matching or leveraging of funds from nonprofit or private entities. Since competitive grants increase the flexibility of a local government, these tools have consequences for program outcomes. Competitive grants are utilized by policymakers when evaluation criteria are hard to quantify or weigh in a formula, which makes block or formula grants inappropriate for the program. The competitive grant process allows for a higher level of scrutiny by legislators and by the public administrators

who are actively involved in the application and selection process. Consequently, competitive grants are more susceptible to investments in grantsmanship (Huckins, 1988). Furthermore, competitive grants are subject to judgment, discretion, and political bargaining by their very nature. For example, the HOPE VI program permits two projects from the same PHA, or several PHAs from within a single county, to compete for the same funds. Politics often comes into the mix too; sometimes a competitive grant application might be modified to be more in line with a particular policy agenda.

IV. Contribution of This Research to the Field of Housing Policy

The goal of this study is to review the distribution of resources in the HOPE VI program to determine if this program adheres to its primary policy goals. The research explores whether housing programs such as HOPE VI, which allocate funds through competitive grants, have difficulties meeting their program goals. Moreover, this study will look to the scholarship on redistributive politics to gain an understanding of the possible reasons for any deviations from projected program results. With an in depth analysis of the HOPE VI program's funding allocation, the study aims to enrich the scholarship regarding distributive aspects of competitive grant making. By investigating the distribution of resources in HOPE VI, this study explores the consequences of allocating funds on a competitive basis especially within an intergovernmental framework.

There is a vast amount of research regarding grants as a tool of government. The academic literature regarding grants and program goals is growing. In fact, by studying the application and selection phases within HOPE VI, this study builds upon recent literature's general trend of highlighting the issue that a program that redistributes resources does not always adhere to policy mandates. As this study intends to enrich the

scholarship on competitive grants as a distributive policy tool the findings herewith may assist future research in discerning whether urban policies implemented through competitive grants have difficulties meeting their redistributive program goals. Consequently, the results of this research may influence the structure of future urban policies.

This study makes a unique analysis of the data regarding HOPE VI's applicants and grantees to postulate about program results. Moreover, the study argues that program results are set by the application and selection of grantees. In addition, this study will detail the specific processes involved in applying for grants, selecting grantees and appropriating competitive grants. Since the scholarship on the grant selection process is shallow, the conclusions from this study will add to the knowledge to this area and may be relevant to grant administrators. Unlike prior urban development programs, HOPE VI grants were given to PHAs for a discrete development. There have been several studies regarding HOPE VI, especially program implementation and evaluation studies. However, none have empirically analyzed the allocation of resources for the entire tenure of the program. Because earlier HOPE VI studies did not conduct in-depth analysis of the program's primary goal of revitalizing the most severely distressed public housing in America, an additional goal of this study is to add value to the existing scholarship on HOPE VI.

V. Plan of Study

This dissertation examines housing policy using HOPE VI, a public housing competitive grant as the case study. This empirical research investigates the allocation of funds over the entire tenure of HOPE VI. This study focuses on the application and selection phases of this competitive grant in order to analyze the applicants and award

recipients. The aim of this study is to determine whether the program adhered to its primary goal. To fully examine the distributive aspects of HOPE VI, one must have the foundation in the competitive grants and tools of government literature. Therefore, this dissertation explores key concepts and relevant literature on competitive grant. Since HOPE VI resources are distributed within a framework where Congress and the bureaucracy may have influence, this dissertation incorporates some aspects from the redistributive politics scholarship. In addition, this study takes an institutional analysis approach and postulates on some of the consequences of implementing HOPE VI via a competitive grant.

Initially, this dissertation sets up the framework by discussing the key concepts and relevant literature on competitive grants. To fully operationalize this dissertation, it is paramount that one has a comprehensive understanding of the relevant literature on competitive grants as a policy tool. The subsequent chapter reviews the competitive grant making process using HOPE VI as the case study. Section II of the dissertation includes a chapter that chronicles the history of public housing which highlights prior community development initiatives. The next chapter presents a comprehensive review of HOPE VI. Section III outlines this research's methodology, quantitative analysis, and quantitative findings. Finally, the last section is dedicated to the conclusions from this study and future research.

VI. Methodology

a. Introduction

This section describes the investigative focus, research methodology, and specific methods used in this study. In accordance with Gormley's scholarship on institutional

policy analysis, the methodology includes a mixed methods research framework encompassing both quantitative and qualitative methods and measures. The methodology involves collecting and analyzing data, then mixing qualitative and quantitative approaches. Moreover, this study utilizes both qualitative and quantitative research so that the findings of this study may be generalized to a larger population.

The primary objective of this dissertation is to chronicle the allocation of resources of the HOPE VI program, then assess whether the program adhered to its primary goal of revitalizing the most severely distressed public housing. This dissertation operationalizes severely distressed developments as high scale, high density developments containing at least 500 units and located in highly populated cities.² In order to understand the distribution of resources through the competitive grant process, a case study method is utilized. The case study focuses on the application and selection phases of the HOPE VI program. The dissertation analyzes every applicant and grant recipient for the entire tenure of the program. Furthermore, it investigates any patterns of allocation that develop as the program matures. In the HOPE VI program, a PHA submits an application for a discrete development. Moreover, a PHA has several developments in its housing stock. Thus, a PHA can submit several applications in any given year for a combination of grant types and discrete developments. However, HOPE VI legislation enumerates localities, not PHAs. Thus, this study includes analysis on PHAs based on location, population of the jurisdiction where the PHA is located, and the size of the discrete development.³

²Based on NCSDPH threshold.

³ Metropolitan areas may included several public housing authorities.

Using the qualitative data, the dissertation examines factors that may influence the distribution of resources within HOPE VI. It is expected that the analysis will show that small developments, structures with less than five hundred units, have significantly higher percentage of awards. Moreover, PHAs representing cities with small populations receive a significant portion of HOPE VI grants. Overtime, large PHAs who are awarded grants early in the tenure of the program receive more grants. Finally, the allocation of funds for HOPE VI is influenced by politics.

b. Phases of Analyses

The intent of this multiple phases sequential mixed methods study is to explore the applicants and winners of the HOPE VI grants. The purpose is to first explore qualitative source documents. Next, a data collection instrument in the form of a unique dataset spreadsheet was developed. Empirical data for this study is collected, recorded, and analyzed in this dataset. In the third phase, quantitative research questions and hypotheses will address any significant relationship between the applicants and winners and the explanatory and independent variables. In the fourth phase, qualitative documents including academic and contemporaneous literature are used to probe significant quantitative results by exploring aspects regarding political influences.

c. Limitations of the Study

There are several limitations to this study. A PHA located in one of the most populous cities can own a development that has less than 500 units. In turn, a PHA not located in one of the most populous cities can own a development with more than 500 units.

Furthermore, there may be multiple PHAs serving a metropolitan area.

In addition, this study operationalizes severely distressed development based on the final report from the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing. The

commission's recommendations become the tenets of the HOPE VI program. The commission's report described severely distressed developments as those located in major cities, are high scale buildings with 500 or more units and elevators, are densely populated with families, and have a vacancy rate of at least 15%. There was a Freedom of Information Act(FOIA)⁴ submitted to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development requesting vacancy rates and Physical Assessment scores(PASS) for each discrete development. The response was incomplete and insufficient to be included in this study.

d. Types and Sources of Documents

This study utilizes documentation from personal observation of the researcher, archival records, academic literature, and contemporaneous sources. Most of these materials are available on public domains such as the internet. Data collection instruments include public resources, informal interviews, personal observation, and a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). From the above referenced sources, a unique dataset was constructed. This dataset contains numerical data regarding the applicants and award recipients for the every year over the tenure of the HOPE VI program.

e. Qualitative Data

The qualitative section of this research study includes contemporaneous literature which encompasses previous studies and program evaluations. In addition, the qualitative methodology contains a review of newspaper, magazine, and internet articles. Other documents incorporated into the qualitative section include HOPE VI regulations,

⁴ FOIA requests were submitted on 02/19/2010, 4/13/2010, 02/03/2011, 05/02/2011, and 8/17/2011

reports to Congress, Notice of Funding Availability, Public Laws, and critical academic articles published by housing advocates and academics.

f. Quantitative Data

The quantitative section of this research study includes a unique data set that enumerates demographic information regarding every applicant and grantee of the HOPE VI program from years 1993-2010. The table below highlights the variables included in the data set.

Table 1: Variables in Unique Data Set

Name of Applicant(Public Housing Authority)	Name of Development	Year (Grant)
Type of Grant	Location(City/State)	Grant Amount(if successful)

VII. Conclusion

This study reviews the allocation of funds in the HOPE VI program, over time, to determine whether the program adheres to its primary policy goals. The research, which focuses on the early phases of the implementation of the award process of the HOPE VI competitive grant, explores whether housing programs, which allocate funds through competitive grants, have difficulties meeting their program goals. This dissertation’s expected outcomes are answered through qualitative and quantitative data. Some of the data include a unique dataset that enumerates applicants and grant awards by year for the entire tenure of the program along with demographic and explanatory variables. This research attempts to determine whether the HOPE IV program adhered to its goals and if its priorities became distorted. Moreover, this dissertation looks to the scholarship on

redistributive politics to gain an understanding of the possible reasons for any deviations from HOPE VI's projected program results.

Chapter Two: Competitive Grants

I. Introduction

The federal government uses grants to funnel money to localities for a variety of purposes including to ensure minimum levels of program provisions, to encourage new and expanded programs, and to help achieve national priorities (M. a. B. M. J. Schneider, 1990). Moreover, these grants fund a myriad of public policy areas such as healthcare, education, social services, environmental protection, and community development. Recently, there has been a proliferation of grants as the primary source of funding for many government projects and programs. In fiscal year 2010 alone, the federal government provided state and local governments with more than \$654 billion in federal grant funding (<http://www.governing.com/columns/public-finance/effect-federal-budget-cuts-states-localities.html>). As a result, interdependent cooperative relationships among different levels of government have developed extensively.

The concept of grants as a tool of government is not new to contemporary times. According to Elazar (1982), federal grants along with interactive relations among levels of government were present throughout the nineteenth century. In 1892, the Morrill Act, the first official grants-in-aid program, was established. But it's not until the 1930s that grants as a tool of government gained prominence with the implementation of the New Deal programs. Despite a history of about 150 years of grant making, the theoretical literature regarding federal grants is shallow. Most of the work on grants has been developed within the last forty years.

A grant is defined as a gift whose aim is to stimulate or support a service or activity by the recipient. Grants form a structure, yet there is a loose relationship between grantor and grantee. Grants utilize the existing administrative structure to produce its effect

rather than creating its own specific administrative apparatus. In this framework, a government agency participates in the provision of a service by providing money, and then allows another entity the task of actual performance. Compared with other tools of government, grants are non-coercive and indirect, and leave the grant recipient a considerable amount of discretion over the program. Currently, there is a general consensus which promotes grants as the policy tool for the federal government to use in handling a broad range of domestic functions. Grants are relevant to various fields and serve a legitimate public purpose in facilitating new activity or ensuring the continuance of ongoing programs. Grants are strongly encouraged as a tool of government because they help square the Constitutional circle of extending the federal role while respecting the autonomy and prerogatives of sub-national jurisdictions.

This dissertation is an empirical study of the allocation of funds within the HOPE VI program. It examines the applicants and awardees of HOPE VI. HOPE VI funding is distributed through a competitive grant. Therefore, it is paramount that this study conducts an in-depth review of the competitive grant framework including its relevant scholarship. This chapter chronicles and frames the key concepts and relevant scholarship regarding competitive grants. Moreover, this study uses an institutional policy analysis approach and postulates some of the consequences that the attributes of competitive grants may have on HOPE VI program results. In addition, this study highlights some substantive policy choices that are embedded in the competitive grant process and how these choices impact HOPE VI.

II. Types of Grants

The distinctions between the different types of grant mechanisms are sometimes difficult to discern. In general, grants can be distinguished by the degree of authority

exercised by the federal funding agency and the degree of discretion that the recipient agency possesses. The federal government uses three main types of grants to distribute money to state and local governments: categorical grants, block grants, and general purpose grants.

Categorical grants are grants for specific program purposes and are usually limited to narrowly defined activities. There are two basic types of categorical grants: formula and project and these grants may be awarded competitively or matching. Federal grants to local governments are generally project grants, meaning that they are distributed through a grant competition involving project proposals and evaluations. The majority of programs funded by categorical grants serves relatively narrow purposes and specifies rather closely the kinds of activities that the donor organization (the federal government) supports. Categorical grants are usually fixed appropriations that have conditions that may restrict recipient activity. In fact, categorical grant programs specify a large number of additional conditions of assistance, which may vary from program to program.

Typically, federal grants to state and local governments require an application describing the intended beneficiaries, detailed plans, and scheduled operations. These applications are subject to blind, peer review screening. The next section takes a more detailed look at some of the unique characteristics of competitive grants.

III. Characteristics of Competitive Grants

Competitive grants have characteristics that are similar to other categorical grants. At the same time, competitive grants have attributes that significantly distinguishes them. These attributes have consequences for program goals when the decision is made to implement a program through competitive grants. Some of the differences between competitive grants and other categorical grants are:

- The executive agency establishes the details of the NOFA (Notice Of Funding Availability), program parameters, application and selection process, and review and rating.
- A grantee's eligibility is stated in the parameters of the NOFA; therefore, eligibility must be proven by the applicant.
- Competitive grants are voluntary. An entity must proactively submit an application.
- The target audience may not have interest in the program/project and did not apply.

Competitive grants are attractive to legislators and policymakers because program requirements are updated annually. The yearly publication of NOFAs gives policymakers the opportunity to change program parameters. Ingram reports that grant legislation is purposefully vague in an effort to entice compliance (Ingram 1977). Despite vague language, the government wants organizations to be successful in implementing policy. By continually tweaking details, both the agency and Congress attempts to ensure the success of the policy/program while at the same time cater to their stakeholders. This is one reason that many new programs begin as pilot programs. During the demonstration phases, it is easier to manipulate elements and guidelines of a program so that it is successful. On the other hand, the inclusion of specific guidelines can be incompatible with intent. Within the framework of competitive grants, legislators outline broad parameters of the program within its authorizing legislation. Many times, this is a negotiated legislation. Therefore, the original intent of a program is not always premise of the bill voted into law. Ultimately it's the agency's responsibility to convert the vague language of the Congressional legislation into the detailed requirements that are published in the NOFA. Congress may attach riders to the annual appropriations legislation that reinforces their original intent.

Additionally, the competitive grant framework allows customization of each grant. Each program has a unique allocation method that allows for wide discretion for the grantee. Large federal grants are distributed to local governments without specific priorities being mandated. The grant agreement between the federal government and the grantee contains an agreed upon term limit by which the project should be completed. The grantee submits progress reports to the agency for the purposes of monitoring the project. However, each project is different and the grantee has a substantial amount of discretion to take several alternatives to achieve the end result. Missteps or incorrect decision making by the grantee can result in a myriad of problematic outcomes. Grants, specifically competitive grants, allow for changes in a program to address unforeseen outcomes. For example, HOPE VI's Demolition grants were established because PHAs received funds for revitalization, but could not demolish dilapidated projects with tenants still living in the buildings. One unintended consequence of the early HOPE VI's Implementation grants was a serious delay of the project implementation due to lack of relocation funding.

Grant funding, eligibility, and application rules are fluid. It is common for these elements to vary from year to year. For example, some competitive grants are designed on a fair share basis. In these instances, funds are allocated on an equal basis for all grants. This was the case for the HOPE VI program in FY1995 when twenty-seven Planning grants were awarded at \$400,000 each. In contrast, other grants operate on a "worst first" allocation. In this context, funds are distributed and based on need (M. Rich, 1991). In the competitive grant framework, this is usually a statistically significant relationship between local demand and program funds allocated. In some years, there

may not be enough funding for every organization which has been deemed as qualified. Therefore, the review team at its discretion may partially fund grants. In FY 1994, partial grants were awarded in the HOPE VI program. Furthermore, as issues of risk and compliance permeate the discussions regarding government budgets, more government grants programs were distributing funds via competitive grants. By using a competitive grant paradigm, agencies can reassure auditors that grantees are eligible for funding and that they comply with grant application and selection processes. The application process provides a means to rank applicants and therefore only highly rated applicants are selected, thus hopefully, minimizing the risk of the government's investment. A competitive grant is the apparatus that funnels funds to local governments in an effort to affect change. In the case of HOPE VI, grant funds have revitalized neighborhoods and changed the living conditions of all residents of a particular community, not just public housing tenants.

Certain features of competitive grants, which are distributed in the federal to local government paradigm, bear further discussion. As with all grants, the authorizing legislation set the parameters of a grant program and the appropriations legislation sets the funds. Competitive grants' authorizing legislation may explicitly identify the target audience. Yet, there are times when the target audience does not receive grants. If the target audience does not receive the funds over several years, the grant programs suffer goal displacement or cooptation. The government is not always culpable when a target audience does not receive the expected funding; for many reasons, target audiences do not apply for grants. These include ignorance of the grant program, an unwillingness to apply or limited or no capacity to complete the application. If a program is not properly

advertised and promoted, eligible entities may not be aware of funding. One of the primary purposes of NOFAs is to announce the availability of funds. In the first three years of the program, applicants were limited to PHAs in the forty most populous cities based upon 1990 Census and any PHA on HUD's "Troubled List". If any of these city governments were unaware of the grant, then they did not apply for money and results overall, for the program, were skewed. This study will examine the characteristics PHAs which were explicitly eligible to apply in the early years and did not do so.

Several new studies have addressed a phenomenon where entities, especially local governments, deliberately do not apply for federal grants. These entities concede that they are eligible, but do not wish to take the time to apply for a grant that may inject funds into their budgets on a temporary basis and come with so many stipulations. Finally, there are organizations that do not have the administrative or technical capacity to create a viable, competitive application nor the staff with the expertise to implement a program.

According to Robert Stein, the level of recipient demand has a significant impact on the distribution of federal grants. Stein expands the scholarship on grant allocation effectiveness by studying the demand side of grant allocations. He purports that local governments are not always equally desirous of national funding. Therefore, within a competitive grants framework, targeted constituencies may not benefit from the money that is distributed via competitive grant (R. M. Stein, 1979, 1981). Michael Rich's research builds upon the demand side theory of Stein. He insists that local characteristics have a significant impact on the quantity and the quality of federal allocations. These differences may be vital in understanding the grant allocation process.

There is always a contextual characteristic of the individual cities that applied for funding. Rich determines that local governments may exert considerable influence on the distribution of federal grants. Moreover, certain cities have a great capacity to secure grant funds (M. Rich, 1982; M. J. Rich, 1989). A complete understanding of the fiscal response of local governments to various grant structures can only be obtained by incorporating political and other considerations into relevant economics. The goals and objectives of federal policymakers have changed over time, generally corresponding to the changes in party control in Congress and the presidency. Kenneth Meier's and Laurence O'Toole's study in 2006 took this idea further showing that bureaucratic values moderate political control in bureaucratic outputs. Local governments are impacted by these varying goals and may choose not to apply for grants. In another study, RM Stein examined the critical effect that the grant application process has on the equitable distribution of resources by hypothesizing on the transferable costs that applicants incur (R. M. Stein, 1979). These costs adversely affected grant seeking activities of smaller, fiscally and socially needier communities, effectively eliminating them from the pool of eligible aid recipients and reducing the potential for equalization in the allocation of federal funds. Many needy and desirous municipalities found the costs of seeking and receiving grant assistance greater than the potential benefits of participation in the federal aid system. Moreover, due to the transactions cost involved both on the grantor and grantee, the allocation will be strongly influenced by the administrative capacity of the applicants rather than their need (Collins 2008).

This phenomenon is a major criticism of competitive grants. Critics are concerned that there is no mechanism to match a need to policy response (Collins 2008). Because

applying for a competitive grant is a voluntary process the burden rests on the qualified local entity to submit an application. However, for several reasons, including the arduous effort required to complete the application itself, many local entities simply do not apply.

IV. Survey of Relevant Scholarship on Competitive Grants

This study builds upon previous studies which focus on the effectiveness of competitive grants. In 1968, Wilde, an early supporter of project grants, published one of the first studies on grants. In his seminal research, John Chubb introduced a theoretical framework that examines the political economic impact of federal grants on state and local spending and taxation. Chubb noted that grantors selected grantees that lacked the commitment or the capacity to implement a grant consistent with grantor expectations. Since grant making consists of multiple agent relationships, he observed that problems in competitive grant making stem from the hierarchical relationship between the levels of government. Local political leaders and Congress are on one level as principals. Federal agencies, bureaucrats and grantees are agents.

Like academia, GAO (the Government Accountability Office) has also conducted several studies on competitive grants focusing primarily on specific competitive grants. For instance, GAO has reported on HUD's McKinney homeless grants (GAO, 2000), HHS's Health Career Opportunities Program and its process for awarding competitive grants (GAO 2007) and FEMA's project proposal, funding and implementation resulting from Hurricane Katrina (GAO, 2006).

a. Distribution of Competitive Grants

The very first step of the competitive grant process is Congress authorizing and appropriating funds. Within the framework of grants administration, Congress oversees program implementation to ensure that the federal agencies are held accountable for

making certain that Congressional expectations concerning program performance are met. In its legislative capacity, Congress first determines what it wants to accomplish and then decides whether a grant-in-aid program is the best means to achieve it. Congress then selects which of the six grant mechanisms to use (project competitive grant, formula categorical grant, formula-project competitive grant, open-end reimbursement categorical grant, block grant, or general revenue sharing), and crafts legislation to accomplish its purpose, incorporating the chosen grant instrument. To date, much of the previous research on the distribution of federal grants has centered on block grants, formula grants, and individual recipients (Anagnoson, 1983). Few scholars have focused on the grant application and selection processes. The distributive theory of politics predicts that federal budget allocations are responsive to the committee position of Congressmen and their majority/minority party status(Gist, 1984). Thus, Congressional members of the majority party, who sit on the Banking and Housing Committee, will likely receive funds for projects in their districts before a Senator of the minority party who is not on the committee.

In Taken for Granted: Managing for Social Equity in Grant Programs, Collins and Gerber examine social equity performance within the context of indirect governance. Their study concluded that the allocation of grant funds to match a target population may conflict with being accountable over the distribution of program funds (Collins, 2008). According to practitioners, grant funds should be allocated based on the needs of the program office. However, these grantees may not have the administrative capacity to run the program or be the best stewards of the government funds. While competitive grants are used as a primary mechanism for ensuring accountability, this may hinder social

equity performance. Therefore government has the monumental challenge of maintaining accountability while ensuring social equity. In their research, Collins and Gerber suggest that if structured properly, accountability bias against social equity in competitive grant allocation can be diminished. In one distribution study, Jeremy Hall extended beyond the government capacity literature and analyzed dimensions of capacity including administrative and political characteristics and how these controls influence grant distributions from the federal to the local level (Hall 2008b). While competition is not equivalent to high levels of performance accountability, proponents of competitive grants cite its advantages regarding accountability and transparency.

b. Competitive Grants and Politics

Another branch of academic literature investigates the relationship between politics and the competitive grant process. Essentially, competitive grants are intergovernmental tools that funnel resources from the federal government to local entities. The idea that policy influences politics is not a new phenomenon. First, Theodore Lowi (1964) argued that distributive, regulatory, and redistributive policies had distinct politics. Moreover, he argued that political parties play a prominent role in regulatory and redistributive policymaking. In fact, political parties provide the fundamental structure to policymaking. In addition, James Q. Wilson (1973) suggested that politics is an important determinant of who shapes policy and how (Howard, 1995).

Grants provide the basis for a political compromise between those in favor and those opposed to federal action and so politics is of central importance in the distribution of grant funds. The political advantages of grants have been so strong that they have led to the use of the grant tool even where the substantive rationale for it is highly questionable. Grant funds, often allocated competitively and with political considerations, seem to

dictate that all states or very broad range of localities, are awarded funds. In the case of project grants, a frequently voiced concern is that the allocation of grants is unduly influenced by overt political considerations. First, mayors, governors, and state or local legislators have a great deal of room for maneuvering in using federal grants of all types. Second, the ability of federal officials to control the behavior of the recipient state and local governments under grants is much more limited than is generally realized. Within the competitive grant framework, all grant applications become a part of the public domain and are open to public scrutiny. In addition, grantees execute grant agreements that avail the federal government several recourses if the grantees become noncompliant. Consequently, political and professional pressures regarding performance accountability have made competitive grants a norm (Collins, 2008).

Michael Rich's research finds that grant distribution is not just a Congressional political phenomenon. Local governments may exert considerable influence on the distribution of federal grants. In fact, some cities may have a greater capacity to secure grants than other cities of comparable size. Moreover, political capacity should be considered collectively with other local determinants such as administrative capacity (Hall, 2008a). Political capacity may have important impacts when examined alongside other forms of capacity like administrative, personnel and technical capabilities. According to the research, the capacity of the grantee and local politics matter on individual basis, but are not significant to the whole federal-to-local grant enterprise. Understanding the dynamics of policy distribution requires an appreciation of the politics of federal programs (M. J. Rich, 1989). Accordingly, competitive grants are usually modified in conjunction with political agendas. These agendas shift priorities within and

among programs, transferring principal responsibilities to the states and/or localities. Unfortunately, unintended consequences may arise where grant conditions can ultimately be misinterpreted as programmatic failure rather than as an administrative deficiency, and thus put conceptually well-founded programs under intense budgetary and political scrutiny (Collins, 2008). Grants are considered to provide the federal government with the means of better controlling where grant funds are allocated by the grantee governments. The competitive grant process gives policymakers some assurances that awards are allocated to entities which have been determined to be good stewards of federal funds (Bezdek, 1988).

c. Redistributive Politics and Competitive Grants

Competitive grants are intergovernmental tools that funnel resources from the federal government to local entities. Therefore, this study is grounded theoretically in certain aspects of redistributive politics literature. Redistributive politics is defined as the use of policy instruments, mainly grants, to devolve policy authority to lower level governments. The federal grants focus on “redistributive” functions, while the states and the localities focus on developmental or distributive activities. The vast majority of competitive grants are distributed to local governments to implement a myriad of projects which are consistent with federal policy objectives. Federal government looks to local entities because they are uniquely positioned to forecast the specific needs of their constituents. For example, disaster grants are set up to follow a series of pre-specified steps based on national goals (Dilger, 2009).

There is a long history of past studies regarding the politics of most notably with regard to the ability of Senators (Lee, 2000; Rundquist, 2008) and US Representatives (Anagnoson, 1983, 1980; Arnold, 1979) to bring grants to their constituents. According

to Stein and Bickers, agencies ensure political and budgetary support for their programs by favoring certain Congressional districts (R. M. a. K. N. B. Stein, 1995). In *Goal Conflict and Fund Diversion in Federal Grants to States*, Nicholson-Crotty examines the similarity level between the policy goals of a grant program and the goals of the recipients of the federal program (Nicholson-Crotty, 2004).

In *Assessing Local Capacity for Federal Grant-Getting*, Jeremy Hall explores the administrative capacity of applicants of competitive grants within a political context. He suggests that the distribution patterns vary over time, especially in the framework of federal- to- local grant making (Hall, 2008a). He argues that in the federal-to-local framework, the federal government is more responsive to the interests of Washington than the interests of localities but rational, election-seeking members of Congress will act in their own self-interests to support competitive categorical grants over block grants (Hall, 2008a). In fact, federal grants matter in local politics and local politics matter in distributing federal grants (Hall, 2008b). However, local officials still attempt to influence committee members by not only coming to Washington to testify about pending legislation, but also by retaining lobbyists in hopes of advancing their own political agendas during the legislative session. The influence of individual representatives has been shown to matter in the allocation and distribution of funds and politicians have a strong interest in funneling federal funds into their districts. The distributive theory of politics predicts that certain districts are likely to benefit disproportionately, specifically those whose representatives hold strategic positions on the authorization and appropriations committees, and those represented by majority party members (Gist, 1984).

Therefore, local governments who have political influence are more likely to be favored in the competitive grant process; thereby completing the circle of influence.

Many times, the fate of a program rests in the hands of the Congressional committee. Rational, election seeking members of Congress support competitive grants over block grants because project grants allow them to provide particular benefits to discrete constituencies and to claim credit for tangible benefits. According to John Chubb, Congressmen try to enhance their re-election prospects by supporting not only programs that specifically impact their state and local constituencies, but they try to establish a national profile (Posner & Wrightson, 1996). This affords politicians the opportunity to claim credit, and gives program administrators the opportunity to court the support of politicians. Generally Congressmen do not see merit in grant programs that do not benefit their districts even if a program's virtues include a fair share to all.

Federalism scholars agree that Congressional decisions concerning the scope and nature of federal grant-in-aid programs are influenced by both internal and external factors. Internal factors include Congressional party leadership and Congressional procedures, the decentralized nature of the committee system, the backgrounds, personalities, and ideological preferences of individual Congressmen, and the customs and traditions (norms) that govern Congressional behavior. Major external factors include input provided by voter constituencies, organized interest groups, the President, and executive branch officials (Dilger, 2009). Members of Congress are more likely to be recognized for supporting specific, narrowly focused competitive grants (M. J. Rich, 1989). HOPE VI has discrete grants are made to discrete cities, affording members of Congress an opportunity to court constituents' support. In return, members representing

recipient cities are permitted to announce the awards to the media in their home districts. Grants are used as electoral tools; Congressional leaders use their clout with federal agencies to direct grant funds to their districts to build political capital. Federal grants matter in local politics and local politics matters in distributing federal grants.

d. Executive Branch and Competitive Grants

Michael Ting introduces a model of professionalization for public administrators (Newmark, 2011). Building upon Michael Rich's research on distributive politics and the allocation of federal grants, this study looks at the distribution of funds within HOPE VI, a competitive grant. On the other hand, it is not only members of Congress who are seeking to gain politically in the decisions to allocate grant monies. The bureaucratic politics model of discretion argues that rational, self-interested public administrators should employ their discretion to benefit their agencies (Duffin, 1999). At the same time, Congress will give guidance to the agency regarding program eligibility and grant levels. It is the public administrators who make the decisions concerning the distribution of government funds. And, because they are not immune to political influence, administrators may sometimes strategically allocate competitive grants to reward key members of certain committees. When the programs are due for reauthorization, politics may become even more prominent (M. J. Rich, 1989).

Responsibility for a grant giving is typically directed to the head of a particular agency who delegates it further. The identification of the administering agency can be quite important since this agency has substantial discretion in determining how a grant program actually operates. In the case of project grants, the administering department defines the award criteria and ultimately chooses the winning applicants. The agency can enforce the program guidelines strictly or loosely. The legislation creating the program

often leaves significant ambiguity about the exact purposes to be served, or at least about the range of activities that can be construed as servicing the purpose, therefore the agency has considerable discretion in deciding those ambiguous issues. The agency must establish the rules it will use to operate the program and issue a set of “regulations”. These regulations detail the administrative process and criteria the agency will use to award funds, the purposes for which the funds are available and how the agency interprets any ambiguous language in the legislation establishing the program, and finally, the monitoring and review processes the agency will use to evaluate performance. Clearly stated in the legislation however, is the eligibility of various classes of recipients who might qualify for the grants.

In the project grant paradigm, the authority to approve grant applications is vested with the agency. Usually, applicant demand exceeds funding availability so the public administrator must make decisions about distribution, under pressure knowing that Congress may inquire about individual applications, advocate for a grantee, or ask for reasons for decline (Ting, 2009). However, the agency perspective expects public administrators to use their discretion to advance the mission and constitutional values of their specific agency. Barry Weingast and Mark Moran (1983) and Terry Moe (1987) incorporated a Congressional dominance approach to illustrate the complexity of controlling aspects of a bureaucracy’s overall performance in the presence of other political actors. These scholars argued that agency discretion derives from legislative delegation and vague statutory language(Wallace, 2003). Waterman and Meier expanded on Chubb’s research and concluded that wicked problems can be solved via grants if the public administrator relies on his or her expertise (Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Waterman,

1998). The data analysis will analyze whether public administrators successfully balanced these pressures.

Theories suggest that administrators may use their discretion to advance their agency's version of the public interest thereby courting political support from Congress. An agency's conception of the public interest is defined by that agency's task and by what the individual low level public administrators within that agency think is best for the public they serve. However, agency administrators may also engage in politics quite beyond what is best for the public. Some agency heads may also engage in what is referred to as "bureaucratic politics" whereby the administrator may attempt to court congressional support by awarding funds according to an agency's political agenda. In *The Influence of Legislative Oversight of Discretionary Authority*, Diane Duffin hypothesized that administrators courting political support, use their discretion to reward legislators who monitor their programs more closely than do other legislators. In 1970, Francis Rourke argued that engaging in bureaucratic politics is a necessity in administrative life. However, he cautioned that policy decisions still have to be technically sound. Expertise should be the backdrop against which administrators court political support. Bertelli and Grose probe Congressional influence over distributive grant allocations. The authors find that during policy implementation, bureaucrats traditionally balance Congressional influence with their expert judgments about grant allocations in anticipation of achieving legislated policy goals (Bertelli, 2009).

Arnold's scholarship also focuses on the role of the public administrator in the allocation process and complements a longstanding body of work on the institutional basis of the distribution of government resources. According to Arnold, in bureaucratic

processes such as competitive grant making, where there is a target audience, there will be constraint on legislative consent. In addition, tension inherently arises when policymakers are faced with using either expert bureaucracy to allocate public funds or allowing the legislature to appropriate funds directly. In his research of the Model Cities, Arnold discovered that HUD strategically awards Model Cities grants to key congressional districts in order to extend the program's constituency. In turn, Arnold finds that Congressional committee representation and votes in support of Model Cities funding were determinant of whether or not cities from a representative district were selected for participation in the Model Cities program (M. J. Rich, 1989).

The aforementioned studies incorporate some of the theories by William Gormley regarding the consequences of institutional policy analysis and of substantive policy analysis (Gormley, 1987). Many scholars note that agencies are critical to the policy process and that they have always played a critical role in securing funds from Congress while at the same time maintaining some autonomy in implementing programs. Finally, agency-specific studies have also emphasized the role played by internal agency procedures and expertise in determining outcomes (Newmark, 2011).

Public administrators play an important role in determining the outcome of a grant program based on their selection of grantees; bureaucratic expertise is critical in determining goal congruence. Scholars suggest that desirable outcomes could best be achieved through reliance on the values and professionalism of bureaucrats rather than on electoral oversight or other coercive means. The simple model of bureaucratic decision-making used here resembles in spirit those of Prendergast (2003) and Carpenter and Ting (2007), where the bureaucrat is asked to approve or reject a project of uncertain quality

on behalf of a principal. But these models do not consider the difference between professional and politicized allocation. Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin show that successful administrators learn how to balance good programmatic judgment with good political judgment. They learn how to parlay the actions that affect the districts and states of individual, well-placed Congressmen into helping them build supportive coalitions for their agencies (Duffin, 1999).

V. Conclusion

This chapter reviews the relevant literature regarding competitive grants. The primary objective of this study is to empirically analyze the application and selection phases of the HOPE VI program, a competitive grant. Since competitive grant is the policy tool utilized to allocate funds within the HOPE VI program, an understanding of the distributive aspects of HOPE VI is woefully incomplete without a comprehensive review of the relevant concepts, attributes, and scholarship on competitive grants. This chapter begins by discussing the different types and unique features of competitive grants. The scholarship on competitive grant frames the key concepts such as distribution of competitive grants, competitive grants and politics, redistributive aspects of competitive grants and the role of the Executive Branch in the competitive grant process. Although competitive grants ideally funnel funds to eligible applicants, the process can be impacted heavily by politics. Furthermore, the literature exposes several influences on the competitive grant process. In the next chapter, the competitive grant making process is discussed in detailed.

Chapter Three: The HOPE VI Grant: An Illustration of the Competitive Grant making Process

I. Introduction

Since this study focuses on the allocation of funds through HOPE VI, public housing competitive grant, it is fundamental to conduct a comprehensive review of the grant making process. This chapter further examines the competitive grant making process with special emphasis on two phases: the grant application phase and the grant selection phase. For the grant application phase, the Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) is published, eligibility criteria are determined, and the grant applications are submitted by eligible entities. Under the grant selection phase, grant applications are reviewed and rated, and then grantees are selected. By studying the grant application and selection phases, this research seeks to gain insight into award decisions, and to also offer insight into the consequences of HOPE VI's competitive grant making. Since this study builds upon Gormley's scholarship regarding institutional policy analysis, the chapter will also highlight where substantive programmatic choices and decision points may play an important role in the competitive grant making process, in general, and specifically with HOPE VI.

In order to gain deeper insight into competitive grant awards, one must conduct a comprehensive review of the five stages that make up the grant application and the selection phases. These processes are appropriations, Notice of Funding Availability, grant eligibility, grant application, and grantee selection. This chapter will discuss each in detail. First, each stage will be analyzed through the lens of competitive grants. Next, each stage will be examined as it relates to HOPE VI.

II. Appropriations

In recent years, there has been an increased competition for federal funds. Many of these federal funds are allocated through a merit based competitive grant making process. The competitive grant process begins with either program authorization or appropriation legislation. Ideas for new programs may derive from the executive branch (agency policymakers), the legislative branch (Congressional staff), the judicial branch (court rulings) or the private sector (advocacy groups). Yet, it is still the duty of the Authorizing Committee to pass the authorizing legislation that establishes a program. The authorizing legislation is specific authority in the form of a law that is necessary before funds can be appropriated and a program can be implemented. Authorizing legislation either establishes a new program or continues the operation of an existing federal program or policy. The authorizing legislation stipulates the details of the program including the method of allocation. It is in this detail that a program is classified as a competitive grant program. As the program works its way through the Congressional appropriations process, the authorizing language and the program parameters may be altered. Once a new program is authorized, the next step is appropriation. However, there are some program grants, which are never authorized, but rather, are appropriated on an annual basis. This phenomenon occurs when the appropriations committee funds projects or programs as addendums to appropriation legislation, similar to “pork barrel” projects.

Once appropriation legislation is approved by each chamber of Congress, a conference report is established and approved. The conference report is the negotiated language of the bill. This report usually contains legislative history of a program, specific details of the program, and instructions to the federal agency on how to execute

the program. Sometimes the instructions are specific and clear, and other times, Congress may grant the agency wider discretion to implement the program.

The HOPE VI grant program began as a demonstration program created by HUD in 1992. Initially, the program was not formally authorized, but it did receive annual appropriations from Congress between 1992 and 1997. The HOPE IV program was formally authorized in the Quality Work Responsibility Act for the years 1998-2003. After 2003, the program is again relegated to annual appropriations until it ended in 2010.

HOPE VI is an example of a competitive grant program, where the conference reports defined the program's mission and results. For example, in FY1994, Congress explicitly instructed HUD to fund any FY1993 applicant who did not receive funding in the prior year. This is one just example of Congress inserting its authority in the form of specific instructions to the agency administering the program.

But when Congress inserts itself in the process, the dynamics of the competitive grant program may change. Whenever the grants are not formally authorized, but instead, appropriated annually, stakeholders do not have advance notice on the amount of the appropriation nor do they have the criteria for application or selection. Thus, it may be difficult for the agency or the potential grantees to prepare for the upcoming grant process. Furthermore, as a demonstration program, the parameters may change with each conference report. For example, in FY1996, Congress capped the funding for each grant awarded to \$50 million, when in prior years it was unlimited. What these examples show is that the HOPE VI program was fluid. While this may have benefitted some PHAs and localities, it may have also worked against other stakeholders.

III. Notice of Funding Availability(NOFA)

Once the appropriations legislation passes and becomes law, each Department such as HUD, must review the conference report. The next steps are to establish the parameters of the program, ascertain grant eligibility, create application procedures, determine selection rating factors, and establish the rules of the selection process. Before the NOFA⁵ is published, the agency must determine the application provisions, the pre-application coordination process, application deadlines, information approval, and methods of appeal. In addition, the granting agency must establish the rules and regulations for the administrative process and the criteria that the agency will use to award the funds.

When an agency publishes a NOFA, it lists all details regarding funding availability including funding amounts, eligibility requirements, application requirements, selection factors, implementation procedures, and monitoring provisions. According to the grant policies and guidance from OMB, funding announcements are required to clearly state selection criteria and promote competition, yet also fairness, in the selection of grantees. These generally accepted grant policies ensure that goals are well defined, are focused on the federal interests, and that recipients of federal funds are accountable for results. Depending on the number of grants programs they administer, an agency may publish multiple NOFAs each year. NOFAs are utilized by the majority of government agencies for all types of grants and most times, are dedicated to a specific program. Regardless of the agency, all NOFAs contain the following information:

- Availability of Funds
- Purpose of the program

⁵ A NOFA is a public notice of funding for a specific program or project.

- Procedures the agency will use to distribute funds
- Eligible recipients
- Activities eligible for aid
- Criteria the agency will use to make the award
- Deadline for receipt of proposal
- Exact formal of proposal
- Weights assigned to various criteria

Each year, federal agencies publish NOFAs for a myriad of programs. The vast majority of NOFAs is for grants—formula, block grants or competitive grants. The instructions in the NOFA are the template for the grant application package. So for example, the NOFA for competitive grants should be detailed whereas the NOFA for the formula grants may just list the cities receiving funding. Since competitive grants are merit based, NOFAs must explicitly detail eligibility requirements, deadlines, grant application blueprints, selection factors and ratings. In addition, NOFAs describe provisions for appeals if an application is denied.

For the last eighteen years, HUD has published at least one HOPE VI NOFA each year. Occasionally, addendums to the NOFA are published such as in 1993 when, in order to receive a broader spectrum of participants, the HOPE VI NOFA was amended to broaden eligibility and increase applicants.

Each year, based on the appropriation legislation, HUD may focus on a different factor. For example, in 1999, HUD established a new requirement that applicants must target any development not yet revitalized within the stock of most severely distressed units. Because the mission of the program is to revitalize the most severely distressed

public housing units, HUD clarified that the selection factors would coincide with the definition of severely distressed to include factors based upon crime statistics, vacancy rates, maintenance costs, etc.

Whenever a NOFA is published, time is always set aside for public comments. Often, an applicant's comments, questions, and complaints are used as a basis to rescind or amend NOFAs. Such feedback assists in the evolution of NOFAs and program goals. For example, feedback from PHAs assisted in creating Planning grants as part of the HOPE VI program. The Planning grants were a mechanism to assist large PHAs, which are the intended recipients of this grant, with technical assistance to build the administrative capacity to apply for a grant. Planning grants were also developed as a way to ensure the accurate and timely implementation of the HOPE VI project once a PHA received funding. The feedback cycle then, is a very important part of the competitive grant process, and one that ensures the program evolves based on the needs of the target audience.

IV. Grant Eligibility

In general, only eligible entities should apply for grants. For competitive grants, entities must meet the minimum requirements and present evidence that they should be considered for the funding. Many times, competitive grants do not have a formalized eligibility process; thus the application process is open. Entities are deemed eligible during the application review process by the agency.

HUD established a preliminary review panel, a final review panel, a system administrator, and a policy group to determine applicant eligibility, conduct callbacks to obtain missing information, rate and rank applications, and award funds to applicants. The preliminary panel was responsible for determining applicant eligibility, preparing the

callback script to provide an applicant the opportunity to supply the information missing from required exhibits, and determining a preliminary score for the application. The preliminary review panel screened applications to determine whether a curable or noncurable technical defect existed. If the preliminary review panel determined that the applicant's documentation did not demonstrate compliance with NOFA eligibility requirements, then the application was to be rejected immediately. However, if the defect is curable, the preliminary panel initiated a callback procedure and gave the applicant fourteen days to correct. The system administrator was responsible for supervising application receipt, tracking the application through the review process, monitoring callbacks, and running status reports.

At the same time, grant eligibility requirements may be itemized in the authorization or the appropriation legislation. If the eligibility is not specified in the legislation, then the agency awarding the grant is responsible for establishing the guidelines. In general, the guidelines provided by the agency, should specify the conditions for assistance, which may vary by program. In the first round of HOPE VI grants in 1992, eligibility was limited to the 40 most populous cities (based on the 1990 Census) or to any PHA on HUD's Troubled PHA list as of March 31, 1992. Therefore, any PHA not located in the forty most populous cities or that was not on the Troubled list, was ineligible to apply for a HOPE IV grant in 1992-1995.

Within the competitive grant framework, eligibility requirements can change on an annual basis. There is always the potential for the annual appropriations language and conference report to change the requirements for any given year. As a result, the annual program NOFAs requirements list may change as well. Overall, eligibility requirements

should support the mission and program goals. If they do not, then the program is susceptible to goal displacement or co-optation. During the tenure of the HOPE VI program, in an effort to expand the number of PHAs eligible to participate, HUD's changed the eligibility requirements slightly, every year.

V. Grant Application

A grant application is a formal package created by the potential grantee and submitted to the agency. A grant application is an entity's response to the NOFA and it should adhere to the NOFAs parameters. The grant application is an action plan. It is an outline where the potential grantee demonstrates its understanding of the program, how it will implement the program, and how it will account for the federal funds it receives. The grant application will describe the intended beneficiaries; provide a detailed plan, and a schedule of operations. Grant applications may be subject to blind, peer review screening as well as reporting requirements.

As with other federal agency grants, HUD's HOPE VI grant applications are dictated by the NOFA and follow the same general format as other agency grants. The potential grantee for a HOPE VI grant is a local PHA which owns the public housing stock, and has also formed a limited liability partnership with local businesses and governments. This partnership was required to receive a HOPE VI grant for several reasons. First, the leveraging of funds and the increase in the number of stakeholders will ensure that the program goals are adhered to. Second, most public housing projects encompass several city blocks, and involve hundreds of residents along with police substations, schools, clinics and other social services. Other local government and social services must be involved to meet the HOPE VI program goals of providing education, job training, etc. And last, the staff of a typical PHA consists of public administrators and social workers,

who do not usually have experience in community revitalization. Partnerships with businesses and local governments can help the PHA meet the administrative requirements of the program and can make sure that revitalization efforts continue forward.

Along with the required documentation, it is common for HOPE VI grant applicants to include political endorsement letters, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with other local entities, and public private partnership agreements with their grant application. Applicants include these special endorsements as a way to increase their chances of winning an award. Even if the applicants do not submit special letters of endorsement and other supplemental extraneous materials, they are required to include evidence of resident consultation, local government certification, cost analysis of alternatives, and reconstructive vs. rehabilitation with their application.

The decision to award a PHA a grant is based on several factors including the availability of funds, strength of the application, administrative issues (i.e. capacity or past experience) and even politics. The weakness of the competitive grant paradigm however, is that not everyone in the target audience applies for a grant; participation is voluntary. A PHA or local government must grapple with several of issues when deciding whether to apply for a grant. The grant application stage represents a decision point in the competitive grant making process. The decision to apply for a grant is a substantive policy choice. Potential applicants must weigh the economic and administrative pros and cons especially in a framework where there are both transaction and opportunity costs to apply for grants. The first decision is whether the entity wants to incur the cost, usually non-refundable, of applying for a grant. Local governments want intergovernmental aid to reduce the costs of providing the public with goods and services.

Intergovernmental assistance also substitutes for locally raised revenues. There are plenty of incentives to seek grant assistance. However, the process can be expensive. In 1999, rejected HOPE VI applicants reported the application submission costs range from \$75,000 to \$250,000.⁶ A local government might concede that it is eligible, but it does not wish to take the time to apply for a grant that may inject funds into their budgets on a temporary basis and will likely come with many stipulations.

Furthermore, the costs of the application process are not uniformly distributed across local governments. According to Stein, the costs of application fall most heavily on communities that are fiscally and socially more needy. Given their lack of resources and staff support, these communities find it costly to overcome the entry barriers receiving federal grants (R. M. Stein, 1979). Thus, the unequal distribution of the costs of the application process affects the local decision about whether or not to apply for grants.

The second consideration for an entity is whether it has the administrative or technical capacity to create a viable, competitive application, or the staff with the expertise to oversee an urban re-development partnership should they receive grant money. The Planning grants were meant to alleviate some of the problems with an inexperienced staff, but still, were not enough to entice many eligible entities to apply.

There is a third, less often discussed impediment to applying for federal aid. Sometimes, local governments do not want national funding due to the numerous requirements that are attached to the grant agreements. Consequently, allocations may not go to the target audiences (M. Rich, 1982). Local demand for federal aid and the extent of participation in prior categorical programs were important factors in the

⁶ GAO-03-555 Management of the HOPE VI program.

allocation of grants-in-aid to certain target audiences. Yet, there are entities that are in the target audience, but refuse to apply for funds that would benefit them substantially.

In the end, the locality must conduct a cost/benefit analysis. A rational local government should apply for federal grants if the expected value of the grant exceeds local costs. But factored into the expected value is the probability of success – which is never certain.

VI. Grant Selection

The final step in the grant making process is the grant selection stage. Once an agency receives a grant application, the agency reviews and scores the application according to pre-determined selection factors. Within the selection phase of grant making, the agency must review applications and decide which organization will receive funding. This phase represents the second decision point in a competitive grant making process. Moreover, in accordance with Gormley's model, substantive policy choices, the authoritative allocation of resources by the government, occurs in the selection phase. The government decides which applicants to fund. This stage has significant consequences for program management, goals, and evaluation.

In the first round, preliminary review panel, who are randomly assigned applications, validate eligibility and confirm completeness of the package. Grant applications may be subject to blind, peer screening as well as reporting and auditing requirements during this review process. The initial review process gives agencies the discretion to determine which applications best address the program requirements and, are most closely aligned with the priorities of the government. Due to the increasing competition for federal funds, a large number of good projects will unfortunately, not receive funding in any given year. The preliminary review panel assesses and rates application, and then the

final panel reviewers make the final award recommendations. At HUD, there is a HOPE VI Policy Committee. The committee consists of members of the final review panel, the team captains from the preliminary review panel and the system administrator. The committee is responsible for responding to policy issues during the competition.

The first level review team should consist of members who are subject matter experts. In the case of HOPE VI, these duties fall within the purview of the preliminary review panel. This team must evaluate the consistency of the ratings and assess the accuracy of applicants' economic analysis and project readiness. The review team discusses the projects strengths and weaknesses, identifies areas of clarification or follow-up, and then ranks each project. The primary responsibility of the preliminary review panel is to conduct a merit-based technical review of each application based on the criteria developed by the agency. The team must consider only information presented in the applications, but they do not validate for accuracy. Once the individual team members complete their evaluations on a grant application, the team reconvenes and arrives at a consensus for an overall team rating for each application, creating a narrative describing their assessment of each project. The preliminary review panel prioritizes applications receiving an overall high team rating and advances these projects to the final review panel for further analysis.

The second-level Evaluation team consists of Senior level public administrators. Within the context of the HOPE VI program, the Senior level evaluation team is the final review panel. From the applications forwarded by preliminary review panel, the final review panel must select projects that they judge to have the greatest potential to meet the primary and secondary criteria. At HUD, the final panel must review the applications

slated for rejection by the preliminary panel, then concur on the other panel's assessment. It is the final review panel which makes the final recommendations, including funding levels for each project and presents the list to Secretary for review and approval.

Often, final review panel assesses projects of similar types, but must ensure that only the most meritorious projects are selected for award. At the conclusion of their assessments, the final review panel develops a memorandum with a final list of projects recommended for funding. The memorandum includes a description of each project's strengths, its benefits, and the impact it is projected to have, and is sent to the Secretary for approval. The final review panel is responsible for ensuring that the award recommendations made to the Secretary, taken as a whole, meet all statutory requirements. The members must validate that potential awardees are eligible, ready and that the information contained on the application is accurate. In the competitive grant paradigm, the authority to approve grant applications is vested with the agency. But, the public administrators must make decisions under pressure because Congress may get involved to the extent of inquiring about individual applications, advocating for a grantee, or asking for reasons for decline (Ting, 2009). However, the agency perspective expects public administrators to use their agency discretion to advance the mission and constitutional values of their specific agency.

Congress and the President have emphasized the need for accountability, efficiency, and transparency. However, agencies do not regularly publish the outcome of the selection process. Applicants may never know the reasons for panels' decisions or why some applications were selected over others. There is no requirement for federal programs to publicly disclose the reasons for their selection decision and therefore, many

do not. Some agencies do provide feedback to applicants, but there is no format for disclosing additional information to the public. Some government agencies claim that public disclosure of considerations or opinions taken into account by review teams during the application review and selection processes could hamper deliberation in future discretionary grant selection processes. On the other hand, others suggest that if the agencies released the selection decisions to the public, so that they have a better understanding about the basis for the distribution of funds to certain projects.

In FY2000, HOPE VI was appropriated \$575 million for Revitalization and Demolition grants. Revitalization applications were due on May 18, 2000. A total of seventy four applications requested funding in the amount of over 1.8 billion. On July 26, 2000, HUD awarded grants to only 18 PHAs in the amount of \$ 514 million. Of that amount, a decision was made at HUD to allocate funds slated for Demolition applications to funds additional Revitalization grants.

VII. Conclusion

This research project examines the distribution of funds within HOPE VI, a competitive grant, with a special focus on the application and selection phases. The purpose of this chapter is to gain insight into how grant award decisions are made. Thus, a look at the life cycle of a competitive grant, from the Congressional-level funding to the selection of grantees is useful to understanding the award decisions with regard to the HOPE VI program, and also to offer insight into the consequences of competitive grant making. Furthermore, the chapter enumerates the five stages of the grant making process, and then points out examples relating to the HOPE VI program.

One objective of this close scrutiny of the application and selection phases of the competitive grant process is to review the decision points and substantive programmatic

choices that are embedded in the process. In addition, the chapter examines the competitive grant framework to review how grants are formed, who applies for grants, who rates and selects grant recipients. This chapter discusses the many reasons why certain target organizations decide not to apply for grants.

Competitive grants are popular tools of government whose goal is to distribute funds to the most qualified and best stewards; yet, their consequences are poorly understood. It is the intent of the research to offer a clearer understanding into the risks and rewards of using this policy tool to allocate funds.

Chapter Four: The History of Public Housing

I. Introduction

Before HOPE VI, public housing programs followed a standard template. Prior policies focused on both production and operations of the structure or the tenants living in the developments. Moreover, these policies confined themselves to the public housing developments. Throughout the years, HUD established programs after programs. Many of these programs instituted new ideas into the public housing governance structure. Overtime, these programs either failed immediately or did not positive long term effects. By the early 1990s, there was a sense of urgency at HUD. There were the Reinvention of Government initiatives that eventually cut HUD's overall staff by forty percent. In a framework of budget constraints, the public housing line items continued to grow exponentially. Moreover, there were over ten thousand public housing developments scattered throughout the United States; many of whom required substantial rehabilitation. The program was getting to big to continue a series of failed policies. In addition, HUD was engrossed in a negative media campaign due to violence and drugs at several notorious public housing projects. Finally, there was serious mismanagement at several public housing authorities that were put into receivership. Therefore, drastic and dynamic change was warranted. Yet, the standard public housing governance structure stymied innovation. In order to shatter the glass box that ensconced all public housing programs, policy designers had to deregulate several long standing policies and procedures. HOPE VI is the first public housing grant program that takes a holistic view of the structure, neighborhood and its residents. As previously stated, HOPE VI was an innovative and reformative public housing competitive grant program. One objective of

this chapter is to showcase this distinction by reviewing prior public housing programs. Moreover, a review of prior public housing programs will evidence that HOPE VI has attributes and implementation strategies that were new to the public housing paradigm.

This research is a case study of the HOPE VI program. One objective of this study is to examine the application and selection phases of this public housing competitive grant. This study analyzes both the applicants and the grant recipients and explores the theory that its policy tool, the competitive grant, has consequences to program outcomes. In order to fully operationalize HOPE VI, one must gain an understanding of the grant's position within the context of public housing policy. This review begins with a court ruling in 1935, *U.S. vs. Certain Land in the City of Louisville* and it chronicles every prominent public housing policy to the most recent, Choice Neighborhoods. This history shows how the HOPE VI program changed the standard public housing governance structure by introducing new strategies and attributes into the public housing paradigm.

Although most scholars cite the National Housing Act of 1937 as the impetus for public housing in America, the federal government was involved in eradicating urban blight before the turn of the 20th Century. However, one landmark court case would change federal government's role in public housing. In 1935, *U.S. vs. Certain Land in the City of Louisville*, the courts ruled that there was not a public purpose for housing. Consequently, the federal government's role was restricted to funding rather than directly producing housing. As a result, a framework of partnership between the federal government and local public housing authorities were formed. Then in 1937, National Housing Act (P.L.75-412) was passed. Like other new policies from this period, the National Housing Act of 1937 was part of the New Deal legislation. The Act focused on

three initiatives: job creation/economic development, slum clearance, and affordable housing production. Initially, public housing served as transitional housing. Indeed, public housing was never originally supposed to provide long-term permanent housing for the poor. The explicit purpose of the National Housing Act of 1937 was to reduce unemployment and to remedy the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low income (United States 1937). This clean, affordable housing was to be inhabited by low-income families, which, at that time, had a rather loose definition as, “families in the lowest income group who cannot afford to pay enough” (United States 1937).

Furthermore, residents were expected to live in public housing temporarily, while attending college or saving for a home. However, it didn't take much time for policymakers to realize that many families were not moving out. Over time, fewer families transferred out and the PHAs began to develop a list for families awaiting safe and decent housing provided by the government. At the same time, the composition of the families living in and applying for public housing evolved from middle class to very low-income.

II. In The Beginning

The 1937 Housing Act also created the US Housing Authority to administer the public housing program at the national level and to preside over the network of local public housing authorities (PHAs). Local PHAs are chartered under state enabling laws. Although housing authorities have a strong relationship with local, state, and federal governments, they are actually independent agencies. A housing authority is an autonomous, not-for-profit public corporation. They are charged with building and administering their own housing projects using proceeds from the sale of tax exempt

bonds. This organizational structure allows housing authorities to work in conjunction with local governments and agencies to develop long-term housing strategies for communities. Most housing authorities were created in late 1930s and early 1940s in response to the National Housing Act. Though independently run, housing authorities are required to follow federal regulations. In addition, housing authorities receive a subsidy from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The federal government restricts how the PHAs spend federal dollars and operates federally funded programs. Despite these restrictions placed by the federal government, PHAs could operate any program and pursue any activity allowed under their enabling legislation, which was decreed by their respective states.

In the initial framework of the 1937 Act, public housing was built and managed by the local housing authorities with funds appropriated by the federal government. Thus, the local government entities were only responsible for capital costs. Rental income from the residents was expected to cover the operational costs such as maintenance, insurance, and utilities. Since the projects were owned by local government entities, the localities would assist the PHAs through tax relief and annual contributions. In 1938, Congress appropriated \$300 million for construction of new low-income housing. This allotment of funds was seen as important because it gave the low-rent housing program an element of permanence and credibility. With the commitment of Congress to the idea of public housing in no doubt, the National Housing Agency was created to coordinate all government housing concerns. The National Housing Agency established a central government housing agency while simultaneously handling the regional components of the public housing.

III. The Introduction of Urban Renewal

The Housing Act of 1949 reaffirmed and extended the National Housing Act of 1937(P.L.81-171). “For low-income housing advocates, the Housing Act of 1949 promised that the federal government, given the means and the authority, could solve the nation’s housing problem through the exercise of committed political leadership at the top and the implementation of a technically, skilled, socially conscious bureaucracy working its will with an eager housing industry and compliant local government” (Orlebeke 490). The Housing Act of 1949 introduced deeper subsidized housing programs including a housing priority for very low-income people, income limits, and maximum rents. Rents for federally funded public housing were now required to be 20% less than the lowest market rates (United States 1949; Bratt1986).

With the 1949 Housing Act, the federal government recommitted to its work with local government to solve housing problems beyond the Depression era. This Act facilitated the legitimacy of public housing as a domestic policy area. Slum clearance, a major focus of the 1937 Act, acquired more emphasis in the Housing Act of 1949. In addition to slum clearance, the idea of urban renewal was initiated with the 1949 Housing Act. Under urban renewal, building replacement was limited to publicly sponsored housing stock. It made large scale slum clearance possible without the requirement that all demolished housing be replaced. In fact, the 1949 Act t did not include a mandate for the construction of low or moderate income housing (Teaford 2000). However, between 1957 and 1960, an average of 26,750 public housing units per year were constructed (Biles 2000).

IV. The Changing Policies of the 1960s

In the Housing Act of 1961(P.L.87-70), Congress and the courts charged large urban PHAs with the task of becoming landlords of last resort for the very low income households. They authorized the first operating subsidy program for PHAs. By 1965, there was a new rent supplemental program, which anticipated bridging the gap between fair market rent and the amount of rent that lower income families could afford to pay.

By the late 1960's, further incentives were introduced to encourage the involvement of private developers and real estate interests in the development of low-cost housing. These solutions took the form of public financing of privately subsidized housing developments (HUD programs such as sections 235, 236, 221d, and 8). These programs gave private developers tax breaks, low-cost mortgages, and rent subsidies to house the poor (Atlas and Dreier 1992). Despite these incentives and other efforts by Congress, the 1960s and 1970s saw a dramatic disinvestment and decline in many of America's older cities. This decline profoundly reshaped the mission of this nation's public housing policy. The direction of housing policy steadily moved away from a supply-based model and toward subsidized private development and demand-based delivery systems, such as housing vouchers (Orlebeke 2000).

In 1961, a pilot program, the Section 23 Leased Housing Program amended the National Housing Act of 1937. The Section 23 Leased Housing Program was a predecessor to the very popular Section 8 program. Under this pilot program, housing authorities selected eligible families from their waiting lists and calculated tenant rents. The housing authority signed a lease with a private landlord and paid the difference between the tenant's calculated rent and the market rate rent. The housing authorities also maintained the buildings which housed any of these eligible families. This new law

signified a switch in focus. Instead of developing and managing public housing, housing authorities sought to financially assist low-income people who were spending too large a percentage of their earnings on housing find housing in the open market.

In 1968, Congress reaffirmed the Housing Act of 1949. Like its predecessor, the National Housing Act of 1968 was a part of several sweeping legislations under what President Lyndon B. Johnson heralded as “The War on Poverty”. Strategies of urban renewal provided a framework for development that included physical and economic development issues. As a result of the renewed focus, large federally sponsored programs became the new strategy for alleviating urban poverty. The Model Cities program, created under the 1968 Act, used federal funds to revitalize aging, poor neighborhoods. However, many of the other new programs established by the 1968 Act were not fully implemented due to unclear policies and lack of funding.

The Housing Act of 1968 quantified production targets, goals, and timetables. Furthermore, the new Act required the dispersion of low-income housing throughout a metropolitan area, rather than clustering all developments in one geographic area of a city. Before passage of the new Act, federal rules regarding the funds designated for the construction of public housing and local government policies led to the construction of public housing developments in undesirable areas such as near industrial zones, interstates, and railroads. The new Act attempted to remedy this situation.

V. Failed Policies

While the original intent of the Housing Act of 1937 was to fund operating costs of the public housing projects through rental income, during the 1940s, operating expenses began to grow exponentially and eventually exceeded rental income. Rental income decreased because higher income families transitioned out of public housing, or were

evicted because they exceeded the income thresholds. These families were replaced by lower income residents who often could pay only a fraction of the amount paid by previous tenants. The income of those families who lacked the income to move out of public housing was not sufficient to pay rents in amounts that could cover the operating costs of the public housing project. In fact, many argue that policymakers erroneously adopted policies that calculated rent levels based on income instead of operating costs. This policy set up an unsustainable framework.

A major flaw running continuously through United States' housing policy was the lack of reserve funds for replacing the major systems and equipment in a housing project. At the same time, the federally funded subsidy, which was based on construction costs, proved insufficient funds to cover maintenance and repairs. As time passed, these policy glitches became the major causes for the deteriorating conditions of public housing.

Since the 1930s, Congress has enacted various legislations to deal with the issues of providing a national housing delivery system. One of the early problems with housing policy was that there was a lack of a clear and focused housing agenda. Because housing deals with a multitude of issues, several cities argued that developing a national housing policy with clear and non-conflicting goals was difficult. A lack of clearly established goals made program evaluations problematic and also contributed to an unclear picture of the housing situation

From the beginning, production faltered. New programs were initiated, but never fully implemented. One reason programs were often unsuccessful was the fragmented structure of housing on the federal level. Although the National Housing Agency was created in 1942, it had struggled with implementing policy under too broad a mandate.

Consequently, in 1965, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development was created and with it, a host of new programs were established. Some of those new initiatives included expanding funding for existing federal housing programs, and creating new programs to provide rent subsidies for the elderly and disabled, providing housing rehabilitation grants to poor homeowners and providing assistance for veterans so that they could make very low down-payments to obtain mortgages. The new Housing and Urban Development agency provided authority for families qualifying for public housing to be placed in private housing where the landlords would receive subsidies.

VI. The Policies of the 1970s...Changing the Face of Public Housing

However, rising rents and reduction of services led to widespread tenant discontent and a series of rent strikes in the 1960's eventually culminated in the passage of the Brooke Amendment to the 1969 Housing Act (Hays 1995). In 1971, the Brooke Amendment capped public housing rents at 25% of income and provided operating subsidies to PHAs to pay for shortfalls and deficits (Bratt 1986; Hays 1995). Many of the working tenants moved out of their units to avoid rent increases. The amendment had the intended effect of creating concentrations of tenants who were either unemployed or receiving some type of federal assistance. At the same time, low-performing housing authorities continued to struggle and a lagging economy forestalled repairs and modernization efforts of troubled projects (Bauman 2000). Following the passage of the Brooke Amendments, PHAs had to tackle plummeting rent receipts and the need for increased operating subsidies among other problems. *Housing in the 1970s: A Report of the National Housing Policy Review* argued that housing policy was an unorganized, hodge-podge of authorizations with internal inconsistencies, duplications, cross-purposes

and conflicts. In fact, ever since the federal government first got involved in housing in 1937, there has always been a proliferation of contradictory regulations, confusion and conflicting multiple goals.

By 1970, studies showed that the major low-income housing crisis was no longer substandard housing, but rather the exorbitant percentage of government funds spent on housing the poor. In January of 1973, the Nixon administration imposed a freeze on most federal housing programs. The administration began a large-scale reorganization and consolidation of programs with a major emphasis on subsidies to private landlords as a replacement for public housing. At the same time, on the advice of Office of Management and Budget (OMB), President Nixon declared a moratorium on housing production. As a result, HUD introduced the Experimental Housing Allowance Program (EHAP). This program encouraged property owners to rent to allowance holders; therefore ensuring property owners a steady income stream and offering renters a steady supply of housing. In effect, the property owner entered into an Annual Contributions Contract with a local Public Housing Authority (PHA) and agreed to certain requirements including a subsidy amount and regular physical inspections (Orlebeke 2000). This program continued for over fifteen years and it was eventually merged into the Housing Certificate program in 1985.

Congress reacted to President Nixon's moratorium on new public housing construction by passing the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. Under Title I, the Community Development Block Grant replaced urban renewal and categorical programs. This Act further amended the National Housing Act of 1937 and created the Section 8 program. Section 8 provides a housing subsidy through which the federal

government paid the difference between fair market rent and the subsidized amount. The Section 8 program had three sub programs: new construction (project-based), substantial rehabilitation, and housing certificate program (tenant-based). New construction, or project-based assistance, covered costs for both new construction and for the rehabilitation of already existing public housing. The third component was a newly created housing assistance program administered by PHAs to provide tenant-based subsidies. Tenants selected a home from private housing stock within certain pre-approved HUD parameters, and were then issued housing vouchers to help pay the rent. HUD's role in this program was to provide the funds to make housing assistance payments on behalf of low income families, and to cover to the cost of administering the program.

VII. Public Housing in the 1980s...The Dominance of Public Private Partnerships

During the 1980s, the Reagan Administration implemented a plethora of changes to the housing program which reflected a new philosophy in the federal government overall; the federal government retreated from direct intervention and moved to a paradigm of public private partnerships. The nation's earliest and largest federally assisted housing program, public housing, shifted its focus from one of production to one of maintenance and revitalization. For example, the 1982 Housing Commission concluded that housing payments, not new production, would be the solution to the housing problems.

Based on the Commission's report, President Reagan repealed the production component of the Section 8 program. In a further modification of the Section 8 program, in 1985, the Reagan Administration introduced the Housing Certificate program. The Housing Certificate program gave the tenant the option of choosing a unit costing more

than the HUD approved fair market rent (FMR) and paying the difference. As a requirement of the program, project-based Annual Contributions Contract (ACC) expired after twenty-five years. Since the mid-1970s, tenant-based assistance through vouchers has become increasingly more prevalent than assistance based on the provision of public housing units. Tenant-based assistance dispersed tenants from concentrated poverty-stricken neighborhoods to neighborhoods with working and middle-class role models and greater opportunity. Most of the families which required assistance were headed by single mothers who lacked formal education or marketable skills. Additionally, a relatively high number of these public housing residents had, and continue to have, serious health problems such as mental illness, substance abuse, and come from situations where they have endured domestic abuse. Under any transformation plan, these residents, representing some of the neediest households in public housing, would require significant and comprehensive assistance before they could reside in private market housing.

Since 1981, there has been no large scale federal funding for newly constructed public housing. Although they received no federal assistance, local governments continued to build public housing, usually on the scattered site model. Moreover, some localities used public housing as a vehicle to selectively replace their public housing stock.

During the 1980s, cities and urban neighborhoods were under extreme stress due to concentrated poverty. Many scholars have drawn connections between concentrated poverty and crime. From 1980 to 1990, the number of people living in inner-city neighborhoods characterized by high poverty increased by 54 percent. According to William Julius Wilson (author of the 1987 book *The Truly Disadvantaged*), this

concentration affects the social isolation of inner-city residents from mainstream patterns of behavior and results in communities of underclass people who are plagued by flagrant and open lawlessness. Emblematic of these high poverty- high crime neighborhoods are the federal enclaves of concentrated poverty: public housing.

As public housing projects physically deteriorated, new federal policies prevented the demolition and redevelopment of the most distressed projects. Federal rules required housing authorities to build a new unit of public housing for every one that is destroyed. This mandate is very difficult to meet due to *Not in my backyard* (NIMBY) sentiment; cash deficient PHAs, and other HUD regulations. As a result, many deteriorating developments became warehouses for the very poor. Thus, by the early 1990s, public housing was widely considered to be one of the most dysfunctional of government programs.

VIII. Public Housing in the 1990s...The Age of Experiments

The Gautreaux program⁷ laid the foundation for the Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing Demonstration (MTO) which was authorized by Congress in 1993. This experiment was designed to examine whether moving to suburban neighborhoods with low poverty rates noticeably improved the lives of low-income public housing residents. An evaluation of MTO data in Chicago revealed that overall, those families in the MTO treatment group (group 1) reported higher levels of housing quality than did the other Section 8 families in groups 2 and 3. In addition, as compared to other Section 8

⁷ In 1976, the Supreme Court made an unprecedented ruling in *Gautreaux vs. Chicago Public Housing Authority* regarding public housing desegregation. In this case, several families living in public housing in Chicago sued HUD for damages based on racial discrimination and substandard housing. The court ruled that the department violated the Fifth Amendment and the Civil Rights of 1964. The families were awarded Section 8 vouchers to relocate into the suburbs.

families, families in the MTO treatment group who moved to neighborhoods that had higher overall economic status and more racially and ethnically diverse populations had more opportunities for socioeconomic advancement. The MTO program accepted its final class of residents in FY2006. The program's results included increases in personal safety, housing quality, physical and mental health, along with decreases in delinquency and drop-out rates.

By the early 1990s, HUD is a department influx. Its public housing program consists of approximately two million units managed by over 3000 public housing authorities throughout the United States and its territories. Many of these developments need serious repair. Policy designers were again in a position to create a program that would alleviate some of the stresses to public housing. However, HOPE VI policy designers realized that old initiatives merely modified old ideas. Drastic changes were needed. Unless the policy designers wanted the same results, there needed to be change in the public housing governance structure.

At the same time, HUD policymakers were anxious to try something radical. In the late 1980s, there was serious contemplation of dismantling the department. In addition, urban violence and public housing authority mismanagement were highly publicized in the media. Several PHAs were in receivership. Although PHAs are a local entity, the public associates these developments with HUD. Based on the Commission's recommendations, HOPE VI is established with a keen objective of innovation and experimentation. Thus, HOPE VI was the first public housing program that focused beyond the physical structures and its tenants and expanded the purview of public housing to a holistic constituency of the neighborhood.

In 1992, the HOPE VI program was established as a demonstration program. The program's main objective was to replace the most severely distressed or obsolete public housing projects, occupied by the poor, with redesigned and mixed-income housing. The intent of the HOPE VI program was to transform public housing by combining the physical revitalization of distressed public housing properties with community building and supportive services. HOPE VI was the first public housing program that focused on community building and resident empowerment. HOPE VI also contributed to the transformation of public housing management. Traditionally, public housing was highly regulated by the federal government, until President Reagan who took a less proactive role.

With the advent of HOPE VI, HUD deregulated public housing and promoted a more entrepreneurial, market-driven culture in public housing management. HUD streamlined and simplified the rules governing nearly every aspect of public housing management, eliminating dozens of handbooks and guidelines in the process. For example, in 1995, the One-for-One rule which required that for every public housing unit demolished, another one must be built, was lifted and HUD allowed the use of other forms of subsidies to be used towards housing, training, and educating the extremely poor. These changes were all aided by the government's new reinvention efforts, which emphasized the need for flexible rule-making and new public-private partnerships. Furthermore, HOPE VI grants placed substantial emphasis on developing public/private partnerships among housing authorities, private-sector developers, and management/consulting firms. In fact, housing authorities were encouraged to experiment with new forms of asset management approaches (S. Popkin & Levy, 2002).

The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QWRA) institutionalized the HOPE VI program. The HOPE VI program is an innovative and an attractive tool, which addresses the critical issues of severely distressed public housing. It is the first comprehensive housing policy that focuses not only on the physical structures, but also on residents and neighboring communities. Through their research, social scientists now understand that economically and socially segregated communities are not sustainable and that concentrations of the very poor and the unemployed households must be diluted. For the neighborhoods surrounding public housing, mixed income redevelopment has the potential to yield substantial reductions in poverty and unemployment, increases in property values, resident income, and education levels (Turner 2007). With the HOPE VI program, housing authorities must embrace market based development and management of public housing. This means that the focus moves to private investment and leveraging of public funds in order to boost the real estate market and attract diverse residents, consumers, and businesses to blighted areas. Redevelopment and investments are needed to protect not only public housing residents, but also the surrounding community. Distressed public housing not only has a negative impact on the immediate neighborhood, but it also causes the social and economic isolation of nearby neighborhoods (Salama 1999).

In FY10, HUD introduced a new public housing revitalization program, Choice Neighborhoods. The Choice Neighborhood program incorporates the best practices of the HOPE VI program and implements it on a smaller scale. The goal of the Choice Neighborhoods program is to transform distressed neighborhoods and public and assisted projects into viable and sustainable mixed-income neighborhoods. Choice

Neighborhoods grants seek to build upon HOPE VI to provide support for the preservation and rehabilitation of public and HUD-assisted housing, within the context of a broader approach to concentrated poverty. In addition to public housing authorities, the initiative involves local governments, non-profits, and for-profit developers in undertaking comprehensive local planning with residents and the community.

IX. Conclusion

This chapter chronicles the rise and the fall of federal public housing policy. This chapter discusses every major public housing initiative beginning with the National Housing Act of 1937 and ending with Choice Neighborhoods. Currently, public housing represents a \$90 billion investment in over ten thousand developments managed by 3200 housing authorities. These ten thousand plus developments shelter 3.4 million low-income individuals in over 1.2 million units. Including rental income, public housing is a \$9 billion annual enterprise. Public housing represents 2% of the nation's housing supply, yet questions about how to improve public housing are a major part of the public debate regarding of a national housing policy. Despite its poor public image, public housing remains one of the best alternatives for housing the poor. It provides decent affordable housing to many Americans. As a result of the elimination of the most distressed and obsolete public housing units, ninety percent of public housing developments are in good physical condition, meeting or exceeding HUD's physical condition standards. These results are a byproduct of some of the most experimental public housing initiatives such as HOPE VI, Moving to Work, and Housing Certificate Fund. Some lessons learned from these public housing programs are less regulations and more flexibility are paramount in public housing policy. Going forward, federal policy

changes should continue to move in the direction of allowing PHAs greater discretion in designing local uses of federal resources.

Chapter Five: The History of the HOPE VI Program

I. Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation is to quantitatively and qualitatively examine the applicants and grantees along with the allocation of funds within HOPE VI, a public housing demolition and revitalization competitive grant. Furthermore, this study investigates whether the choice of policy tool has any consequences to HOPE VI program goals. Using a unique data set, this dissertation empirically analyzes data on the applicants and winners for each year of the HOPE VI program. Moreover, it explores the distribution of resources within HOPE VI over the entire tenure of the program. This chapter gives an overview of HOPE VI and places the program in the context of other U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) public housing programs – both before and after HOPE VI. First, the impetus behind the program and its general history are discussed followed by a discussion of comparative urban revitalization programs. Next, the HOPE VI program itself is discussed with an analysis of its funding, legislative history, results, and scholarship. The section closes with a look ahead to future public housing programs.

II. Public Housing Before HOPE VI

The 1980s was a contentious time in American housing policy. The Reagan administration significantly reduced domestic spending and HUD was deeply affected. The department cut both program funding and personnel by forty percent. In accordance with the New Public Management paradigm, many housing programs were converted to block grants or voucher programs. Thus, previously held federal duties were delegated to the local level. The shift to the New Public Management paradigm led to a serious

discourse regarding HUD's role in future housing policies. More importantly, many in Congress advocated for the dismantling of this department, which seemed to always be entangled in scandals.

At the same time, public housing projects continued to serve as the shelter of last resort for over two million low-income Americans including many who are elderly or disabled. However, these public housing developments were very controversial. Beginning in the 1960's, public housing accepted residency from not only families with the lowest of incomes, but also those who were chronically unemployed, homeless, mentally ill and those who were addicted to drugs. Overall, the public thought of these developments as public eye sores. Due to HUD regulations, such as the One-for One replacement rule, and the general location and infrastructure of the developments, many public housing developments became havens for nefarious individuals who engaged in criminal activities involving drugs, crime, violence and corruption. Although they represented a small percentage of public housing residents, tenants who engaged in criminal activity gave rise to rent delinquency, increased management costs, and other administrative difficulties. Because of an open-acceptance policy, the distressing conditions in the public housing projects continued to grow and aggravate not only public housing projects, but the entire neighborhoods, further encumbering cities and states.

As the older housing stock deteriorated, the flawed physical designs of the projects resulted in overly dense housing, with patchwork rules that were formulas for failure. Hovering over all the problems was the issue of lax administration of the housing projects. Previous housing policies had clearly demonstrated that housing policies generally were ineffective in addressing the issues of chronic unemployment, large

concentrations of welfare dependency, crime, and the physical deterioration of its own stock of public housing. HUD eventually came to accept this reality and began to create programs, which attempted to address these non-housing related problems.

Decades of economic isolation and concentrated poverty had created dangerous enclaves that housing and development policy had had little impact in addressing. The problems associated with public housing were persistent. By the early 1990s, public housing was widely considered to be one of the most dysfunctional government programs. Thus, public housing came to a critical juncture with planners and policymakers calling for a transformation of public housing in its current form. In response to the criticism, HUD continually attempted to develop new mechanisms to implement programs and policies in innovative ways. The goals of these new strategies were to dramatically reorient the public housing system. These new initiatives for public housing reform gained traction amid a broader shift toward devolution in housing policy. The New Public Management and Reinvention of Government paradigms were very popular. Both Congress and Executive agencies were more open to the idea of state and local housing authorities having greater authority and responsibility for designing housing strategies tailored to their respective housing markets. A more flexible framework was introduced which allowed for the development of federal-local partnerships on subsidized housing. In an attempt to understand more fully the problems plaguing public housing policy, Congress, in 1989 commissioned a special committee to examine distressed public housing.

III. Prior Community Development Initiatives

This section discusses prior community development initiatives implemented by HUD. To some extent, each of these programs can be described as the pre-cursor to

HOPE VI. HOPE VI incorporates at least one attribute from each of these programs. However, there is one major distinction. These prior programs were “treatments” on a specific community or neighborhood. In addition, although administered by HUD, none of these programs included a project-based public housing development or was under the purview of a PHA. The intent of this review is to place HOPE VI into context in comparison with other prominent urban revitalization programs. Moreover, this section aims to highlight some of the similarities and differences of HOPE VI.

The implementation of housing policies via grants was not a new phenomenon either. In the 1960s, several new grants were established for community development (Economic Development Administration, Community Action Programs, et al). Most of these grants were developed in response to the needs and activism of the recipient communities. Many housing and community development grant programs prior to the HOPE VI program were based on standard demographic indicators such as population change, unemployment levels, income levels, poverty levels, and the age of the housing. Earlier programs used criterion based on these indicators to allocate funds to individual communities.

One of the most prominent of the urban revitalization programs implemented by HUD was Model Cities. Established in 1966, Model Cities was a part of President Johnson’s War on Poverty initiative. The main goal of this urban renewal program was to comprehensively plan the rehabilitation of distressed housing, commerce, and deliver social services to the residents of these projects by requiring citizen participation. Model Cities was a fresh attempt to alleviate the principal problems of community development, facilitate community participation in decentralized programs, and coordinate

intergovernmental efforts. Participation in the Model Cities program was restricted to cities, such as Oakland, Newark, Detroit, and other specific cities designated by HUD.

When the program ended in 1978, it was suffering from low funding and goal congruence. Model Cities' applicants were selected primarily on the basis of local administrative capacity and program innovativeness. However, the vast expectations in planning were eventually overshadowed by the limited capacity of local governments. Furthermore, the program administrators relied too much on outside consultants. All these factors constrained the operation and innovation of both the administrative structure and the program itself (Gilbert, 1974). Thus, the program was unfunded twelve years after it began.

Under the Nixon Administration, several types of categorical grants were consolidated into Community Development Block Grants (CDBG). Still an active program today, CDBG originally combined several narrower grants into one formula based block grant for local governments. The change stemmed from local criticisms of the complex web of federal aid that was developed in the 1960s. Although there are several sub funds, the majority of CDBG funding is still allocated to selected local governments for entitlement communities. However, thirty percent total grant funds is distributed to state governments based on Census data. The state governments then re-allocate funds to local governments and nonprofits for the purpose of addressing serious needs with particular urgency, such as preventing or eliminating blight, or having a particular benefit to low to moderate income persons. Most of CDBG funds are distributed via formula grants based on Census indices and thresholds. However a small

portion of funds are allocated via block grants based on competition (DeHaven, 2009). In FY 2009, CDBG allocated and leveraged over \$8 billion.

In 1977, Congress created the Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG) program for distressed communities. This grant program was the most similar to the urban revitalization grants of the 1990s. The primary purpose of UDAG was to assist local governments and communities that met the eligibility standards of “distress”, apply to HUD for project grants which would finance specific development projects. The action grants leveraged private sector capital to finance commercial, industrial, or neighborhood projects that would spur economic development. This program lasted for eleven years.

One of the major accomplishments of the program was the introduction of the term *severely distressed* and the concept of selecting developments based on their level of distress. In addition, UDAG represented one of the first urban development programs that required applicants to leverage private investments (Gist, 1984; Webman, 1981). The UDAG program confirmed that federal initiatives can influence methods that local governments use to promote economic development. In other words, leveraging federal funds for urban revitalization projects are attainable. Furthermore, the program proved that leveraging funds can stimulate development in places that had experienced years of decay and disinvestment (Gist, 1984).

During the late 1980s and 1990s, a major new community development city revitalization program was established: Enterprise Community/Empowerment Zones. Under this program, cities applied for funds to be utilized in a designated section of the city. This designation qualified a subsection of the city to benefit from funding, leveraging of private investment, and tax credits. Similar to Model Cities, the

Empowerment Zone program's focus was on community and economic development of commercial and industrial projects (Liebschutz, 1995). These grants were distributed via competition.

Although HOPE VI instituted many new innovations in housing grant making, a review of prior grants shows us that that the HOPE VI program built on the best practices and lessons learned from prior housing grants. But one criticism of previous programs was that the funding was only for physical improvements, and that systemic problems like lack of job training, poor education, and self sufficiency were not included. HOPE VI attempted to address these concerns as well. In addition, these prior grants were awarded to a locality, not a subset of local government such as a public housing authority. Moreover, never before did a revitalization program focus on public housing developments and their residents specifically.

IV. NCSDPH

Congress established the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing in an effort to address the mounting problems surrounding public housing. The Commission was a part of the larger legislation, The Department of Housing and Urban Development Reform Act of 1989. The Commission was charged with assessing severely distressed public housing and then devising a strategy to deal with deteriorating public housing.

The Commission members visited 25 cities, inspecting public housing developments, interviewing workers, and meeting residents. The Commission wanted to heighten awareness of distressed public housing, identify specific problems and solutions and then provide an action plan that could resolve all issues by year 2000. The final report, published in 1992, estimated that 86,000 public housing units were most severely

distressed by four major problems: high crime, high unemployment, the physical deterioration of units, and disincentives for encouraging self-sufficiency among the residents. Although the local PHAs were responsible for the management, maintenance and safety of the housing complexes, according to the Commission, upgrading or replacing the worst of the nation's public housing stock would require massive federal investment.

V. HOPE VI Program: A Bold, New Approach

In 1992, Congress created the Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program (URD) and funded it through the Appropriations Act of FY1993. The program's main objective was to replace the most severely distressed and obsolete public housing projects⁸, occupied by the poor, with redesigned and mixed-income housing.

The Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program was later renamed HOPE VI. The newly christened HOPE VI program followed a string of concurrent competitive grant programs established by HUD during the late 1980s each with the moniker HOPE which stands for Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere. HOPE I, II, and III programs provided funds for low income individuals to purchase public housing units, multifamily dwellings, and single family homes, respectively. The HOPE IV program innovatively combined rental assistance with case management for low-income disabled and elderly persons who required supportive housing instead of nursing homes.

⁸ Severely distressed public housing requires major redesign, reconstruction, redevelopment, or partial or total demolition; is a significant contributing factor to the physical decline and disinvestment in the surrounding neighborhood; is occupied predominantly by very low income families with children, whose members are unemployed and dependent on various forms of public assistance; has high rates of vandalism and criminal activity; and cannot be revitalized through assistance under other programs (Wang, 2000).

Motivated by the failure of earlier HUD programs to substantially improve distressed public housing developments, the HOPE VI program was a drastic change as a mechanism to save public housing, which had reached rock bottom in the court of public opinion. Simple replacements of the units on the same sites, framed by the same concepts and governed by the same regulations would certainly result in the same failures (Cisneros, 2009). Therefore, it was imperative to do more and in a different fashion. Thus, the HOPE VI program combined physical revitalization of public housing with funding for management improvements and supportive services

HOPE VI represented a major shift in the goals and target populations for both public housing and Section 8 programs. New emphasis was placed on the devastating impact of troubled projects on their surrounding communities and on the concentration of the extremely poor. HOPE VI funds were allowed for Section 8 tenant-based subsidies' relocation and replacements. Moreover, a fundamental promise of HOPE VI was to improve the managerial performance of the public housing system via deregulation and local capacity building. In fact, HOPE VI funds have been the only source of funds for the construction of new public housing, for the last twenty years.

Within its enacting legislation, policymakers enumerated four mandates which they believed were paramount to public housing transformation ("Title V, Public Housing and Tenant-Based Assistance of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998," 1998). They were:

- To change the physical shape of public housing so that it reflects the surrounding community;

- To develop comprehensive programs that will empower residents to become more self-sufficient;
- To lessen the concentration of the poor by promoting mixed income communities; and
- To create partnerships with other agencies, local governments, nonprofit organizations, and private businesses to leverage support and resources.

The intent of the HOPE VI program was to transform public housing by combining the physical revitalization of distressed public housing properties with community building and supportive services. This objective represented a significant governance reform on the structure and the intent of public housing policy. HOPE VI was the first public housing program that focused on community building and resident empowerment as it also sought to revitalize the physical condition of public housing units and restructure the management of public housing developments. Traditionally, public housing was tightly regulated by the federal government. With the enactment of the HOPE VI program, HUD deregulated public housing and promoted a more entrepreneurial, market-driven culture in public housing management.

In addition to community building and housing rehabilitation, HOPE VI grants placed substantial emphasis on developing public/private partnerships among housing authorities, private-sector developers, and management/consulting firms. Public housing authorities (PHAs) were encouraged to experiment with new forms of asset management approaches such as capital reinvestment and cost/benefit analysis (S. Popkin & Levy, 2002).

For the first time, the federal government implemented a mixed-income model that commingled subsidized rental housing with other affordable units and market-rate housing. In addition to the requirement that housing must be dilapidated, the surrounding neighborhood must also show signs of distress caused by the setting, design, or management of the nearby public housing. The HOPE VI grant program implemented significant public policy efforts to revitalize public housing communities which are adjacent to distressed areas and to dilute the concentration of very poor people in a neighborhood. Past efforts to update and upgrade substandard housing conditions for the poor focused on economic incentives and physical structure improvements. In contrast, the HOPE VI program focuses on neighborhood improvements and self sufficiency issues such as education and job training.

a. Types of HOPE VI Grants

When the HOPE VI program was first developed as the Urban Revitalization Demonstration program, there were three types of HOPE VI grant: the Planning grant, the Demolition grant, and the Implementation grant. Since many aspects of the HOPE VI program were unfamiliar to PHAs, HUD developed the Planning grants. These grants were awarded from Fiscal Years 1993 to 1995. Planning grants were boutique grants appropriated by Congress to assist PHAs who wish to apply for HOPE VI grants, but lacked any formal plan. Planning grants were used for technical assistance to help PHAs apply for funds in anticipation of either demolishing or revitalizing a property.

Demolition Only grants were instituted beginning in 1998 and continued until 2003. These were created to remedy a problem that affected both grantees and potential applicants. Several housing projects were so dilapidated that the structures needed to be razed before any new construction could begin. Unfortunately, PHAs lacked the funding

to relocate tenants or to demolish the structures, making it difficult for the early program grantees to meet their interim development goals. The Demolition grants were created to assist the PHAs with this unanticipated complication. Implementation grants, renamed Revitalization grants in 1997, were the heart of the HOPE VI program and were the only grants that were funded until the end of the program.

Other types of grants within HOPE VI were Main Street grants and Neighborhood Networks. Main Street grants were instituted in fiscal year 2001 and Neighborhood Network was created in fiscal year 2002. The purpose of the HOPE VI Main Street Program was to provide assistance to smaller communities in the development of affordable housing that was undertaken in connection with a Main Street revitalization effort. Neighborhood Network grants were used to enhance the self-sufficiency, employability, and economic self-reliance of low-income families.

b. HOPE VI and Troubled PHAs

The HOPE VI program was the first public housing program to acknowledge that many of the problems in public housing did not originate with HUD. During the 1970s and 1980s, many local PHAs were cited for mismanagement, corruption, and fraud. Those PHAs were placed in receivership or designated as “troubled PHAs”. “Troubled PHAs” were defined by HUD as having serious management issues and allowing significant maintenance problems to go unrelieved. Management problems included poor operational practices, the mismanagement of funds, and organizational dysfunction. The majority of “troubled PHAs” operated large, high-rise developments located within urban areas in neighborhoods challenged with crime issues, poor housing, and concentrated poverty.

The 1993-1995 Appropriations legislation specifically targeted projects own by troubled PHAs as being eligible for grants. The monitoring of troubled PHAs was handled in the Office of Distressed and Troubled Housing Recovery at HUD headquarters. In fact, during the initial years of HOPEVI, this office was responsible for the implementation and monitoring of all HOPE VI projects.

c. HOPE VI Funding

The HOPE VI program was created and implemented during its first six years from fiscal years 1993-1998 through annual Congressional appropriations rather than authorization. Consequently, the program was not hampered by obstructive program regulations like past public housing reconstruction efforts. The appropriations bills were not specific, thus allowing the HUD and Office of Distressed and Troubled Housing Recovery discretion regarding the interpretation of the rules. In turn, the annual Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) legal opinions, program guidelines, and individual grant agreements were substituted for formal regulations in managing the monies appropriated to the HOPE VI program.

The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA) (Title V of P.L. 105-276) officially established the HOPE VI program. This comprehensive legislation instituted several sweeping new provisions. QHWRA codified many of the HOPE VI programs best practices and implemented them in Section 24 of the National Housing Act of 1937.

This study examines the funding patterns of the HOPE VI program. In the HOPE VI program, the applicant is the PHA. However, a PHA must submit an application for a discrete development. Therefore, this study empirically analyzes the data for each PHA and discrete development. The goal of the study is to quantitatively analyze the data and

investigate any patterns. More importantly, the objective of the study is to determine whether the HOPE VI program adhered to its primary goal of revitalizing the most severely distressed public housing. For this study, “most severely distressed” is operationalized as a large public housing development located in one of the most populous cities in America. In addition, this study pays special attention to the cohort classes FY 1993 and FY 1994. In the initial years, the eligibility was set to the forty most populous cities based on the 1990 Census and PHAs listed on the Troubled PHAs list. In those years, there were a finite fifty PHAs eligible to apply for the grants. Twelve PHAs, who were eligible, did not apply during those early years. Additional quantitative and qualitative analysis is conducted on these cohort classes. Based on theories regarding learning curves, this study examines the application and selection patterns of these PHAs throughout the tenure of the program. These PHAs are important because they set the standard for what constitutes a winning application for subsequent applicants. During the demonstration phase, these PHAs feedback led to establishment of best practices and overall changes to the program. One example is the development of the Demolition only grants.

VI. Legislative History

The Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 added Section 24, which authorized the Severely Distressed Public Housing Program. HOPE VI’s primary mission was to revitalize the most severely distressed public housing, which typically is located in urban areas of major cities in America. The HOPE VI program was managed through a Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) process which annually publishes the parameters of the grant in the Federal Register. Since the appropriations bill and NOFAs are a part of the legislative process, the program requirements, including grant application

and selection rating factors, may change from year to year. PHAs apply for grants through proposals that are evaluated and ranked by HUD administrators. Each year, funding is allocated to the proposals that are most highly ranked, until the funding is exhausted.

In the first three years of the demonstration program, HUD awarded grants only to PHAs in the forty most populous U.S. cities based upon 1990 Census data, and Troubled PHAs as of March 31, 1992. In 1993, the first cohort of HOPE VI grants was awarded. The following year, under the direction of Congress, FY1994 grants were awarded to PHAs which failed to receive a FY 1993 grant. By the end of 1994, more than \$1 billion had been awarded to dozens of PHAs.

In fiscal year 1993-1995, Congress dictated to HUD which housing developments should receive HOPE VI grants. These decisions were based on a mixture of lobbying efforts by cities which did not receive funds in the previous grant cycle, and public relations campaigns by localities and housing advocacy groups. In 1994, Congress instructed HUD to allocate funds for planning grants to PHAs which owned “notorious” housing developments. In 1995, per the instruction of Congress, HUD funded eight PHA’s which were previously awarded planning grants. As Congress allocated more funding for HOPE VI, it began to cap funding per application, at \$50 million. HUD policymakers suggested that by limiting individual grant amounts, the program could fund more projects every grant cycle.

A December 1996 report issued by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) showed that during the first two award years of the HOPE IV program, thirty-seven applicants were ineligible for money based on HUD’s own criteria, but seventeen of these PHAs received

funding anyway. As a result, OIG recommended that HUD identify severely distressed units in the application process keeping in mind that the primary goal of the HOPE VI's program was to revitalize the most severely distressed public housing units.

In 1996, the Clinton administration set a goal of demolishing and replacing 100,000 distressed or obsolete public housing units. This was an increase from the Commission's original estimation of the existence of at least 86,000 severely distressed units from troubled PHAs and the forty largest cities. Thus, the HOPE VI program's eligibility expanded to all housing authorities with distressed housing. The fiscal year 1996 represented the first year that demolition grants were awarded, but at the same time, planning grants were discontinued.

By September 2004, approximately 115,000 distressed public housing units were demolished. However, due to slow implementation, this accounted for only half of the approved demolitions. In fact, only twenty percent of the projects were completed within its designated five year implementation deadline.

In 2004, the Bush administration advocated for the elimination of the HOPE VI program due to its poor PART scores. However, Congress did re-authorize the program for the fiscal years 2003-2006 but at significantly lower funding levels. In 2007, House of Representative passed the HOPE VI Improvement and Reauthorization Act; however, this bill never was signed into law and in its final years, HOPE VI was appropriated annually in HUD's overall budget.

VII. HOPE VI Program Results

a. Communities Leverage their Funding

In the twenty years since its adoption, HOPE VI has contributed significantly to the transformation of public housing. Since the inception of the HOPE IV program, the federal government has awarded over \$6 billion in funding to local communities. In turn, the cities have leveraged those funds to over \$50 billion in private investments (Wood, 2007). Studies show that this program is the facilitator for several changes including rejuvenation of blighted communities in urban areas. One can look to many communities across the nation to see evidence of the positive impact of the HOPE IV program: the revitalized Gold Coast in Chicago, the rejuvenation of the Capitol Hill area in the District, the arts district in Seattle.

b. An Increase in Demolition

While HUD has funded the redevelopment of over 150,000 public housing units to date, between 47,000 and 82,000 severely distressed units remain in public housing inventory and are not currently scheduled for demolition or replacement (Turner 2007). There are several reasons for the omission of these units from a renovation/demolition plan. In the years after 1992, lack of direct funding has resulted in several units becoming severely distressed. The original estimations by the Commission in 1989 did not account for these 47,000-82,000 units. Federal auditors later determined that HOPE VI program administrators did not target the most severely distressed public housing in their target demolition numbers. In addition, HUD's initial policy to grant funding only to PHAs which had no distressed housing stock, left thousands of severely distressed public housing with no source of rehabilitation funding.

One consequence of the HOPE VI program was that funds were siphoned from the general HUD public housing monies, to HOPE VI. Because only those PHAs who applied were awarded grants, many eligible PHAs did not receive money from HUD (because they did not apply for it). Furthermore, there were, and still are, plenty of PHAs who need funding for projects, but did not have housing in the “severely distressed” category, so those PHAs also received not money from HUD (they were considered ineligible under HOPE VI guidelines). So while the HOPE VI program continued to disburse funds, general funds available for Operating and Capital Funds decreased.

VIII. Criticisms of HOPE VI

Although lauded as a new approach to the public housing program, HOPE VI has not been without problems. Most notably, housing authorities have failed to adequately relocate residents from units requiring demolition, and have failed to provide sufficient support services to residents. For instance, residents who were supposed to be relocated from public housing altogether were simply moved to another troubled public housing development. The support services most needed by residents of public housing such as job training, transportation, and continuing education, were not provided by the HOPE VI program.

Another criticism of the HOPE VI program involves the selection of PHAs and projects that were funded under this program and whether the selection of grantees strictly adhered to the original purpose of the program. In 2002, the Office of Inspector General reported that HUD failed to conduct annual reviews of its grantees. Without oversight, the grants may have strayed from the original program goal of revitalizing the most severely distressed public housing units (*Public Housing: HOPE VI Resident Issues and Changes in Neighborhoods Surrounding Grant Sites*, 2003).

HOPE VI was a contentious program because of its complexity and because of the slow and inefficient expenditure of funds awarded to the PHAs. Due to the complexity of their needs, most HOPE VI projects struggled to meet redevelopment and implementation deadlines established by the grants they received. (GAO, 2002; Goetz, 2010).

While the HOPE VI did have detractors, it also had staunch supporters across party lines and levels of government. The HOPE VI program was created under a Republican administration, but fully implemented during a Democratic administration. Although it was a competitive grant to local PHAs, HOPE VI had tentacles that affected a myriad of stakeholders including politicians, public administrators, residents, nonprofits, and local businesses. Many of these stakeholders have become advocates for the retention of this program. At present, HOPE VI program has ended.

IX. The HOPE VI Program: A Reformative Government Program

The legacy of the HOPE VI program is a paradigm shift in public housing from the perspective of the PHAs. It transformed the public housing industry and it equipped the PHAs with the capacity and skills to better manage public housing. The HOPE VI program forced PHAs to rethink their basic practices and move toward more effective systems of asset management. The program gave PHAs greater control over funds distributed to them and introduced them to the advantages of leveraging federal funds with private capital. As a result, the PHAs embarked on partnerships with other interested entities in their communities.

Because of its flexibility and a willingness by policy makers to let the program evolve, the HOPE VI program served as a laboratory for the reinvention of public housing. It produced models for ending the isolation of the public housing developments, and reinvigorated policymaking at HUD, an agency on the brink of dismantle. Before the

HOPE VI program, HUD operated by issuing rigid uniform directives and then evaluating PHAs on how well they complied with the one-size-fits-all rules. In fact, as the program matured, new regulations were designed, new operational practices were recommended, and new financial incentives were provided by all housing authorities across the nation. HUD policymakers continuously changed the program to suit its constituents. In 2000, the HOPE VI program was awarded the Innovations in American Government Program.

X. Survey of Scholarship of HOPE VI

Generally speaking, there are two major threads of scholarship regarding HOPE VI: implementation studies and program evaluation studies (Freedman, 1998; Wang, 2000; Wood, 2002). This research study builds upon the program evaluation thread. The objective of this dissertation is to analyze the allocation of funds within the HOPE VI program to investigate the factors that may influence the allocation of funds, and to postulate on some of the consequences of using competitive grants as a policy tool. Furthermore, the study will empirically examine the allocation of award funds for the tenure of the HOPE VI program.

The literature regarding the HOPE VI program is very diverse and can be found through a profusion of resources such as newspapers, think tank publications, and academic journals. However, most of the relevant scholarship is found in the urban policy literature. In his 1998 seminal study, Anthony Freedman took a baseline assessment of the program. The author concluded that community development is a complex problem and the success of the HOPE VI program depends on individual project level implementation (Freedman, 1998). In *Hope after HOPE VI*, Gilbert Rosenthal published a retrospective study of how HOPE VI has evolved through the years and how HOPE VI

has influenced the PHAs, its residents, and community revitalization (Rosenthal, 2004). A significant portion of the academic scholarship includes case studies of specific revitalization projects. These studies chronicle the implementation of a HOPE VI grant from grant award to project closure. Some examples are “*The redevelopment of distressed public housing*” by Jerry Salama and “*Three remaining challenges*” by Alex Polikoff (Polikoff, 2010; Salama, 1999). Two additional prominent studies are Sean Zielenbach’s study, *Assessing Economic change in HOPE VI Neighborhoods*, and Susan Newman’s study, *Neighborhood Effects from HOPE VI* (Newman, 2002; S. Zielenbach, 2003).

In some respects, the HOPE VI program is one of the most researched and analyzed public housing programs. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has been one of the few organizations to consistently review the program. In 1997, GAO’s first HOPE VI study focused on the status of the demonstration program. A follow-up study highlighted the process and problems of the program (GAO, 1997, 1998). Subsequent GAO reports examined the financial aspects such as leveraging of government funds for project development (GAO, 2002, 2007). Other GAO studies explored PHAs’ capacity and accountability issues and HUD’s poor oversight (GAO, 2003, 2007). The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has published several studies regarding HOPE VI. In 2010, several of HUD’s studies focused on the effects of the HOPE VI program on the revitalization of communities and economic development (Castells, 2010; Goetz, 2010; S. a. R. V. Zielenbach, 2010).

In addition to Government sponsored reports and academic literature, several studies regarding HOPE VI have been published by think tanks and advocacy groups

such as The Urban Institute and Brookings Institution. Many of these studies examined residents' rights, supportive services, and relocation (S. a. D. L. Popkin, 2004; S. a. E. C. Popkin, 2007; Wang, 2000).

XI. The Future of HOPE VI

In 2010, HUD awarded the last class of HOPE VI grants. The program has been discontinued. To replace HOPE VI, HUD implemented the Choice Neighborhoods grant program. The goal of the Choice Neighborhoods initiative was to transform distressed neighborhoods and public housing projects into viable and sustainable mixed-income neighborhoods by linking housing improvements with appropriate services such as schools, transportation, and access to jobs. A strong emphasis is placed on local community planning for access to high-quality educational opportunities including early childhood education. Choice Neighborhoods grants will build upon the public housing transformation under HOPE VI to provide support for the preservation and rehabilitation of public and HUD-assisted housing, within the context of a broader approach to concentrated poverty. In addition to public housing authorities, the initiative will involve local governments, non-profits, and for-profit developers in undertaking comprehensive local planning with residents and the community.

XII. Conclusion

This chapter chronicles the lifecycle of the case study for this research -the HOPE VI program. The program was initially established by National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing as a result of the crumbling public housing projects across the United States, and was intended to focus on those projects located in large cities. When they created this public housing competitive grant program, HUD built upon lessons learned and best practices of past urban renewal programs and expanded the focus

beyond bricks and mortar into community revitalization and resident self sufficiency. To accomplish these expansive goals, the program required the leveraging of public/ private partnerships, and allowed local grantees more discretion and flexibility on how to spend the money. At the same time, HUD deregulated many restrictive and irrelevant policies. Through the life of the program, HOPE VI invested over \$150 billion in communities which resulted in the elimination of the most distressed and obsolete public housing units. By the end of FY2010, when the program concluded, ninety percent of public housing developments were in good physical condition, meeting or exceeding HUD's physical condition standards.

This chapter takes an in depth and comprehensive review of HOPE VI while also discussing some of the pertinent qualitative literature regarding HOPE VI. Because HOPE VI instituted many new innovations in public housing grant making, an analysis of this program through the lens of institutional policy analysis of public housing will assist in fleshing out some of the consequences of the substantive policy choice of using competitive grants. This study examines patterns of allocation for every type of HOPE VI grant throughout the entire tenure of the program to attempt to answer some of the unresolved issues regarding the program evaluation of HOPE VI: Did the program adhere to its original program goals? If not, can the blame for that be traced to its policy tool, the competitive grant? And last, what are some of the ramifications to using competitive grants as a policy tool? Can policy makers infer any generalities regarding the consequences of allocating funds from the federal to state levels via competitive grants?

Chapter Six: Methodology, Quantitative Analysis, and Findings

I. Introduction

This section describes the research methodology, quantitative analysis, and empirical findings of this dissertation. The methodology includes a mixed methods research framework encompassing both quantitative and qualitative methods and measures. The methodology involves collecting and analyzing data, then mixing qualitative and quantitative approaches. The object of the study is to chronicle the allocation of resources of the HOPE VI program, then assess whether the program adhered to its primary goal of eradicating the most severely distressed public housing. In this dissertation, severely distressed units are operationalized as large developments in highly populated cities.⁹

The following sections explain the design and construction of the research study and also describe the measures which were used to provide both qualitative (informational) and quantitative (analytical) perspectives, in anticipation of gaining an enriched understanding of allocation of funds through competitive grant making. In order to understand the distribution of resources through the competitive grant process, a case study method is utilized. The case study focuses on the application and selection phases of the HOPE VI program. Through a unique dataset, every applicant and recipient for the entire program is analyzed. .As the program matures, any patterns of allocation that develop are explored. Using the qualitative data, this dissertation examines factors that may influence the allocation of funds within HOPE VI.

⁹ Large developments are developments with 500 or more units. Cities population is based on 1990 and 2000 Census data

II. Mixed Methods Research

This research utilizes a mixed methods approach to include both qualitative research methods and quantitative research methods. This approach to inquiry combines the use of both research design methods to increase the strength of the study and to better understand this phenomenon. The intent of this study is develop a detailed view of the allocation of funds within the HOPE VI program, and draw conclusions on its effects on the overall program goals, by using an institutional policy approach to sift through consequences. Therefore, the mixed methods research design is the most appropriate. The qualitative analysis is based the exhaustive examination of the HOPE VI program as a case study of a housing program that allocates its funds competitively. At the same time quantitatively, this research mathematically analyzes the applicants and award recipients of HOPE VI grants throughout the entire tenure of the program(Creswell, 2009).

The intent of this two phase sequential mixed methods study is to explore applicants and winners of the HOPE VI grants. The purpose is to first explore qualitative source documents to generate themes about the allocation of funds within the HOPE VI program. Based on these themes and the availability of empirical data regarding the applicants and grant recipients of the HOPE VI program, a data collection instrument in the form of a unique dataset spreadsheet was developed. Empirical data for this study is collected, recorded, and analyzed in this dataset. The third phase addresses any significant relationship between the applicants and winners and the explanatory and independent variables. Additional information is examined further in a fourth qualitative phase. In the fourth phase, qualitative documents including academic and contemporaneous literature are used to probe significant quantitative results by exploring

aspects regarding political influences (Creswell, 2009). The reason for the following up with qualitative research in the fourth phase is to better understand and explain the empirical data results.

a. Sources of Documents

This study utilizes documentation from personal observation of the researcher, archival records, academic literature, and contemporaneous sources. Most of these materials are available on public domains such as the internet. Data collection instruments include public resources, informal interviews, personal observation, and a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the US Department of Housing and Urban Development. From the above referenced sources, a unique dataset was constructed. This dataset contains numerical data regarding the applicants and award recipients for the every year over the tenure of the HOPE VI program.

b. Qualitative

Qualitative research design allow for new suggestions and interpretation or the re-examination of old concepts in innovative ways. This method is used a lot to help expand theories especially in social science. Qualitative procedures seek to understand social action at a greater depth and richness to record actions through a more complex, nuanced subtle interpretation. These interpretations must be constructed to fit empirical data. In reference to this study, a qualitative approach is employed as an exploratory method since this exact topic has never been addressed and existing theories do not apply with this particular sample (Booth, 2008).

The qualitative section of this research study includes contemporaneous literature, which encompasses previous studies and program evaluations. In addition, the qualitative methodology contains a review of newspaper, magazine, and internet articles.

Other documents incorporated into the qualitative section include HOPE VI regulations, reports to Congress, Notice of Funding Availability, Public Laws, and critical academic articles published by housing advocates and academics. An exhaustive review of the qualitative data is the basis for proving and validating the influence of politics on the allocation of funds to specific PHAs and assessing the consequences of using competitive grants to distribute resources.

c. Case Study

A case study is an in depth multifaceted investigation using qualitative and sometimes quantitative research methods of a single social phenomenon. A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries between context and the phenomenon are not clear. A case study is useful in that it copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points and thus, must rely on multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2003). However, one particular case may represent a larger population and allows for theoretical generalizations. It permits a grounding of observations and concepts regarding social action and social structures. A case study can provide information from a number of sources over a period of time. Thus, it permits a more holistic study of a complex social action or network (Tellis, 1997).

In this study, the HOPE VI program is used as the case study. This study is an empirical analysis of the applicants and grant winners for the HOPE VI program. In this urban revitalization program, PHAs submit applications for the renovation of a public housing development. Besides the quantitative analysis, the study will incorporate a review of qualitative documents. These documents are used in an effort to support or explain the findings from the empirical analysis.

d. Quantitative

Quantitative research is the numerical representation and manipulation of observations for the purpose of describing and explaining the phenomena that those observations reflect. Quantitative research employs empirical methods and statements and provides an explanation or prediction about the relationship among variables in the study. Quantitative research provides the fundamental connection between empirical observation and mathematical expression of the quantitative relationship (Booth, 2008). The objective is that the numerical manipulation will yield an unbiased result that can be generalized to a larger population.

III. Unit of Analysis

The intent of this study is to measure and examine which public housing authorities applied for HOPE VI grants (applicants) and which public housing authorities were awarded these grants (winners) for the entire population of the program. Therefore, the unit of analysis is the public housing authority. However, HOPE VI legislation enumerates localities, not PHAs. Since a public housing authority must submit an application for a specific public housing development, the public housing development (discrete development) is a secondary unit of analysis for this particular study¹⁰. Furthermore, this study bifurcates each discrete development based on the number of units. Thus, this study includes analysis of the population of the jurisdiction where the PHA is located, and the size of the discrete development.¹¹

¹⁰ PHA has several developments in its housing stock. Thus, a PHA can submit several applications in any given year for a combination of grant types and discrete developments.

¹¹ Metropolitan areas may include several public housing authorities.

IV. Data Collection Instrument

The quantitative section of this research study includes a unique data set that enumerates demographic information regarding every applicant and grantee of the HOPE VI program from years 1993-2010. The table below highlights the variables included in the data set.

Table 2: Variables in Unique Data Set

Name of Applicant(Public Housing Authority)	Name of Development	Year (Grant)
Type of Grant	Location(City/State)	Grant Amount(if successful)

Using the FOIA process, the study presents demographic information regarding every applicant and grantee of the HOPE VI program from the years 1993-2010. The HOPE VI program is a competitive grant program which publishes the above variables annually in the NOFA. The research includes a review of each year’s NOFA with special attention to rating factors. All applicants and awardees for each year are examined. In addition, this study analyzes examine demographic data elements for each applicant and/or grantee per cohort year.

a. Excluded Information

Most of the data collection is retrieved from public resources. As a means to explore the influences on grant selection, a Freedom of Information Act request was submitted to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The FOIA document requested information of the physical assessment score (PASS) and the vacancy rate for each public housing development listed in the unique database. These data were

important to the study because a low PASS score (70 or less) and a high vacancy rate (50% or higher) are indicative of physical distress of a housing development. No vacancy data were received. In addition, HUD released PASS scores for less than 40% of the projects in this study. Consequently, these data elements are excluded from this study.

In addition, there are some PHAs who applied for a HOPE VI grant, the corresponding discrete development name is not published. These applicants are excluded from any analysis on public housing development (discrete developments)¹².

b. Limitations of the Study

There are several limitations to this study. A PHA located in one of the most populous cities can own a development that has less than 500 units. In turn, a PHA not located in one of the most populous cities can own a development with more than 500 units. Furthermore, there may be multiple PHAs serving a metropolitan area.

In addition, this study operationalizes severely distressed development based on the final report from the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing. The commission's recommendations become the tenets of the HOPE VI program. The commission's report cited severely distressed developments as those located in major cities, are high scale buildings with 500 or more units and elevators, are densely populated with families, and have a vacancy rate of at least 15%. There was a FOIA submitted to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development requesting vacancy rates and Physical Assessment scores(PASS) for each discrete development. The response was incomplete and insufficient to be included in this study.

¹² There is also incomplete data regarding the number of units for some discrete developments applicants. There are 259 applicants whose unit size is not available.

c. Severely Distressed Developments/Units

The impetus of the HOPE VI program was the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing in 1989. In their final report, the commission noted that there is a strong relationship between the number of units per development and the classification as troubled PHAs. Moreover, they characterized severely distressed developments as having excessive scale and density resulting in a high concentration of low income families. They stated that high density building and large scale sites of 500 or more units and 15% or more vacancy rates contributes to severely distressed conditions. In addition, the final report directed HUD to quantitatively define severely distressed. Until such time, qualitative attributes could be used to award grants. However, in a 1996 report, the GAO noted that HUD had not formally defined severely distressed. Based on a review of grant award recipients, GAO could not determine if only severely distressed units were being revitalized.

This study operationalizes severely distressed developments based on the number of units. A discrete development with more than 500 units is labeled as “large”. In addition, this study separates the original target grant recipients (40 most populous cities) from other grant applicants and recipients located in less populated areas.

d. Dependent Variables

Dependent variables are those that depend on the independent variables. They are the outcome or results of the influence of the independent variables(Miller, 2005). In this study, there are several dependent variables some which are either primary or secondary. Applicant and winners are the dependent variables in this research. However, the

applicants and winners may either be a public housing development (discrete development) or a public housing authority (PHA).

e. Applicants

The applicant for the HOPE VI program is the public housing authority. This study measures which public housing authorities apply for grants in any given year. In general, any public housing authority is eligible to apply. In fact, PHAs can apply for several grants within a year. These grants may focus on a discrete development and grant award type. An example is the Chicago Housing Authority submitting a revitalization grant application in FY 1996 for Cabrini Green public housing development. The number of applicants each year varies. Special emphasis is placed on applicants in the first two years (cohort FY1993 and FY1994) when there is a finite number (50) of PHAs eligible to apply.

f. Winners

This study mathematically analyzes which public housing authority receives a grant for the whole population of the program. A PHA must apply for a specific type of grant. A PHA can receive multiple grants a year based on grant type and discrete development. An example of a winner is the Atlanta Housing Authority receiving an Implementation grant in FY 1993 for Techwood public housing project. The number of winners varies each year depending on funding. PHAs who are awarded a grant in FY 1993 and FY 1994 have a special designation. An example of such a winner is Boston Housing Authority.

g. Explanatory Variables

Explanatory variables are those that cause, influence, or affect outcomes. They can be the treatment, antecedent, or predictor variables (Miller, 2005). There are several explanatory variables which are explained in detail below:

1. County

It is estimated that there are over 3200 public housing authorities in the United States. A PHA may represent different types of jurisdictions. This variable is included in this study to calculate the number of applicants and winners who are not located in a city. This data field measures whether the PHA is located in the city or a county. This data field is measured at the local level. This field contains a 1 if the PHA is located in a county and a 0 if the PHA is located in a city. It is expected that the majority of all PHAs are located in a city. An example of a county affiliated PHA is Baltimore County, MD. In addition, this data field is used to support the hypothesis that small and more rural PHAs received a statistically significant amount of grants.

2. First Year Application

This explanatory variable influences the *applicants*. This data element lists the year that a PHA applies for its first HOPE VI grant. This variable is included in this study because it segregates the applicants and winners. One way to explain the characteristics of an applicant or a winner is by the date of its first application submission. In general, most PHAs apply for a grant in the first five years of the program. Cities located in the forty most populous and troubled PHAs are eligible to apply for grants in the first three years of the program. This is a descriptive variable that labels each PHA with the first year of application. This variable is label in the unique dataset as the following: In the

“All” tab of the unique data set, the variable name is “FirstYearsofApplication”. The data field lists the year.

3. Developments First Attempts

Under this tab in the unique data set, there are several explanatory variables that influences the *Winner* dependent variable. These variables explain the characteristics of applicants and winners. Their inclusion in this study is necessary to help frame the descriptive aspects of the HOPE VI program. The four subset variables are listed below. Below are the formulas for this variable:

AttemptNum

This variable lists whether is the “First”, “Second” or “Multiple” attempt for a discrete development.

FirstWin?

This variable appears in the FirstAttempts tab of the unique dataset. This variable describes whether a particular grant is the first win for discrete development. The data field has a Yes, if it’s the first win and NO, if it isn’t.

FirstLargeWin?

This variable calculates whether it’s the first win and whether the development is large. If the discrete development has 500 or units, the data field is labeled “Yes”. Otherwise, the data field is labeled “No”. If it is the first win, this variable describes if the discrete development is Large.

Development Records

This variable counts the number of times that a discrete development appears in the unique spreadsheet.

Below are the formulas for this variable:

=COUNTIF(\$D\$2:\$D\$1417,D16)

=NewApplicantRecruitment!B

4. Number of Units

This variable lists the number of units for a discrete development. Some developments may include several structures. This data field enumerates the total number of units that includes all structures. An example of a public housing development which has several structures is the Robert Taylor homes in the Chicago Housing Authority's inventory. It is expected that developments with larger number of units will receive more grants and receive grants on their first attempt. Exceptions to this outcome are large developments which are located in small cities or counties. This variable is labeled as "units".

5. Small/Large

This variable measures discrete developments. If a public housing development has 500 units or more, it is labeled *large*. This study uses a binary tree structure to label each development as either *large* or *small* based on the number of units. It is expected that *large* developments will receive more grants and these *large* developments will receive grants on their first attempt. An example of a *large* development is Holly Park Apartments in Seattle, Washington. This development had approximately 900 units. Below is the formula for this variable:

Binary Tree structure

=IF(M18>499,"Large","Small")

V. Expected Outcomes

As previously stated, an exhaustive qualitative review of HOPE VI was conducted. This qualitative review is used to develop and frame the methodology for this study.

Based on this preliminary research, the research has several expected outcomes. These expected outcomes listed below are divided into two categories. The first category lists initial expectations. The second list enumerates patterned results. The quantitative data will analyze each expectation and the findings will be discussed later in this chapter.

a. Initial Expectations

Applicants with large number of units are more likely to receive grants: Large PHAs own eighty percent of all public housing stock. These large PHAs are usually located in large distressed urban areas and have a greater number of more severely distressed units.

Large developments receive funding on first attempt application: Since large developments are indicative of urban blight, they will receive funding on their first grant application.

Large PHAs submit applications for several developments in the same year: PHAs in large cities have several housing developments in their housing stock. Based on the economies of scale, these PHAs will submit grant applications for several housing projects in their jurisdiction in the same year.

Smaller developments receive funding on subsequent submissions: Since large developments contain more distressed units, grant applications for smaller housing development may not receive funding on their initial application.

PHAs submit an application for a specific development several times: A city may have multiple housing projects containing severely distressed public housing units. As it spurs economic development and eradicates blight, the funding package of the HOPE VI

grant is very beneficial to PHAs and local governments. Therefore, PHAs will submit applications for a specific development each year until funding is granted.

b. Expected Patterns

FY 93 and FY 94 awardees receive several grants: PHAs who received grants in the first couple of years of the HOPE VI program, will receive multiple grants due to their increased capacity and experience.

The funding amounts become smaller: As time passes, the annual funding is capped and grant awards must decrease in amount.

The number of applicants per year increase: As the program matures, NOFA becomes less restrictive. Thus, more PHAs are eligible to apply each year.

Awardees from smaller cities will win awards: As the program matures, cities with small average population win more awards.

VI. Quantitative Analysis

a. Heckman Correction

Since this study contains non-randomly selected samples from a general population of all PHAs, a Heckman correction model is necessary. Statistical analyses based on those non-randomly selected samples can lead to erroneous conclusions and poor policy. The Heckman correction, a two-step statistical approach, offers a means of correcting for non-randomly selected samples. The correction has a normality assumption that tests for sample selection and formula bias. Because this study is based only on PHAs which actually apply for the HOPE VI grant, bias may be introduced..

y= awardee

1 =if applicant received a grant

0 =if applicant does not receive a grant

The model corrects self selection by incorporating a transformation of these predicted individual probabilities.

h^* =PHA (active)

ρ =correlation between unobserved determinants and unobserved determinants of grant applicants

One disadvantage of Heckman correction for this research, is the limited information regarding the maximum likelihood estimator. In addition, the covariance matrix generated by OLS estimation of the second stage is inconsistent.

b. Panel Data

Panel data analysis is a method of studying a particular subject within multiple sites, periodically over a defined time frame. A panel data set varies across time and cross-sectional units. In panel data, the dependent variable differs across individuals, but at least some explanatory variables, such as the policies being studied, are constant among all members of a group (HOPE VI grants). In panel data models, the dependent variable may depend not only on the pure exogenous variables, but also on its own lag values.

Within the social sciences, panel analysis enables researchers to undertake longitudinal analyses in a wide variety of fields. In addition, panel data is used to study political behavior of parties and organizations over time. Panel data analysis endows regression analysis with both spatial and temporal dimension. The spatial dimension pertains to a set of cross-sectional units of observation. The temporal dimension pertains to periodic observations of a set of variables characterizing these cross-sectional units over a particular time span.

VII. Phases of Quantitative Analysis

In the first phase of the quantitative analysis, the empirical numerical data is analyzed over the entire population of applicants and winners.

1. **Success Rate**---By analyzing the dataset that contains every applicant and award recipients, this study calculates the number of times that a specific PHA applies for a grant in comparison to the number of times that the PHA received the grant. The calculation equals the success rate. The ten PHAs with the highest success rate will be highlighted. In turn, the five PHAs with the highest failure rate will be examined. In addition, the cohort year of the most successful PHAs are analyzed. The success rate of each PHA will be analyzed based on whether the PHA is located in a city or county and the overall population of the locality. The success rate of each discrete development is analyzed. The data shows the number of times that an application is submitted for each discrete development. The success rate is calculated by the number of development records in comparison to the number of awards received. If the development received a grant on its first application, it will be flagged with a First Attempt designation. In addition, the study will rank the success and failure rate of each state.
2. **Cohort Year/ First Attempt**- Every PHA is labeled based on the year that they first applied for any HOPE VI grant (1st Attempt) and were granted an award (Cohort Year). Grant recipient in FY 1993 and 1994 are labeled as such. All other years are labeled as "Subsequent". This study analyzes the success rate of

- FY 1993/1994 cohort classes in comparison to PHAs and discrete developments who receive grants in subsequent years.
3. **Discrete Development-** Based on the number of units in a development before revitalization, the development is labeled as *Large* or *Small*. A binary tree analysis labels any development with 500 units or more as Large and less than 500 units as small. This study calculates the rate of *Large* vs. *Small* developments.
 4. **New Applicant Recruitment-** This study calculates the New Applicant Recruitments. The data tells the story on the number of new PHAs who submit a HOPE VI application for the first time each year. This study will analyze any trends in recruitment against exogenous factors like political administration of executive branch. Special attention is placed on the demographic attributes of PHAs who submit applications for the first time in later years of the program.
 5. **Average Population Size:** This study uses 1990 Census data and FIPS codes to match the average population size of a locality with the location of each PHA that participates in the HOPE VI program as applicant or awardee. The data tells the story of the average size of the cities which apply for and receive grants over the tenure of the HOPE VI program.

Initial Expectations and Expected Patterns- Based on an initial qualitative review, several themes or expectations (initial or patterns over time) were noted. This research empirically analyzes each initial expectation and expected pattern.

Step 1: There will be a description of the applicant and awardees using the independent variables. The treatment variables include population size the cities where the PHAs are located.

Step 2: There is a description of the developments which grants are awarded. The description will include an analysis of the influence of size.

VIII. Findings

Applicants/Winners

In the first year of the HOPE VI program, there were fifty distinct PHAs who were eligible for grants. These PHAs consisted of PHAs located in the forty most populous cities in America based on the 1990 Census and PHAs listed on HUD's Most Troubled PHAs list. Some PHAs were listed on both lists. Those PHAs include Atlanta, Boston, Washington, DC, Philadelphia, Jacksonville, Detroit, Indianapolis, Chicago, New Orleans, Kansas City Los Angeles and San Francisco¹³. In FY 1993, forty-one applications representing thirty eight PHAs were submitted. There were fourteen PHAs that did not apply for the grants in FY1993. Moreover, the data show that six PHAs never apply for a grant throughout the tenure of the program. These PHAs are:

Springfield, IL
San Diego, CA
Long Beach, CA
San Jose, CA
Oklahoma City, OK
Virginia Beach, VA

¹³ **Forty Most Populous U.S. Cities:** New York, NY; Los Angeles, CA; Chicago, IL; Houston, TX; Philadelphia, PA; San Diego, CA; Detroit, MI; Dallas, TX; Phoenix, AZ; San Antonio, TX; San Jose, CA; Baltimore, MD; Indianapolis, IN; San Francisco, CA; Jacksonville, FL; Columbus, OH; Milwaukee, WI; Memphis, TN; Washington, DC; Boston, MA; Seattle, WA; El Paso, TX; Cleveland, OH; New Orleans, LA; Nashville-Davidson, TN; Denver, CO; Austin, TX; Fort Worth, TX; Oklahoma City, OK; Portland, OR; Kansas City, MO; Long Beach, CA; Tucson, AZ; St. Louis, MO; Charlotte, NC; Atlanta, GA; Virginia Beach, VA; Albuquerque, NM; Oakland, CA; Pittsburgh, PA.

PHAs on the Troubled List as of 3/31/92: [Bold citations are on both lists.] **Boston, MA;** Bridgeport, CT; New Haven, CT; Camden, NJ; Newark, NJ; **Washington, DC; Philadelphia, PA;** Chester, PA; **Atlanta, GA;** Birmingham, AL; **Jacksonville, FL;** Puerto Rico; Virgin Islands; Cuyahoga, OH (**Cleveland**); **Detroit, MI; Indianapolis, IN;** Lucas County, OH (Toledo); East St. Louis, IL; **Chicago, IL;** Springfield, IL; **New Orleans, LA;** **Kansas City, MO;** **Los Angeles, CA;** **San Francisco, CA.**

Recruitment


As displayed in the table below, FY 1996 marked a sharp increase in the number of applicants. FY1996 represents the first year that eligibility for the HOPE VI grants were extended to all PHAs. The Appropriations Act of 1996 allocated \$480 million for HOPE VI. HUD received 141 applications and 46 grants were awarded. A descriptive review of the grant applicants for this cohort year reveal several PHAs located in small cities or have limited public housing stock applied for grants including Hopkinsville, KS, Jasper, AL, and Alma, GA. On average, the population of each of these jurisdictions is under 15,000. Moreover, there are a couple of cities that are considered *Small* and won grants including Savannah, GA for a 210 unit public housing development and Spartanburg, SC, the fourth largest city in South Carolina, revitalized a public housing development with 266 units.

In fiscal years 2004-2008, the number of new applicants drops. However, FY2009 cohort class represents a resurgence. In fiscal year 2009, the number of new applicants is higher than the total applicant population of the previous four years. Also, FY09 marks a change in administration to the Democratic party.

Table 3: Recruitment Class of Applicants

Row Labels	Count of Recruit Year
1993	38
1995	15
1996	90
1997	50
1998	29
1999	27
2000	19
2001	13
2002	28
2003	26
2004	4
2006	4
2007	3
2008	1
2009	17
2010	7

Figure 1



First Attempt

In the competitive grant paradigm, applications are rated, ranked, and selected by the executive agency based on predetermined and published selection criteria. Grant selection is dependent on other factors such as appropriated funds, the number of applicants and the quality of applications. Therefore, it is not uncommon for an applicant not to win a grant on its first application within the HOPE VI program.

The following table highlights the winning percentage of all first time applicants. The data show that approximately 49% of all first time applicants win a grant.


Table 4: Applicants: First Attempt

All First Applicants	1029
All First Winners	503
First Win Percentage	48.9%

Success Rate by State

This study analyzes the number of applicants and winners by state. There are two states that have a success rate of 100%. However, this statistic is based on one attempt. The Housing Authority of Tulsa and the Housing Authority of Helena received a grant on their first attempt. Illinois has the fifth largest success rate. However of the most successful states, PHAs in Illinois applied for the most grants(86). Overall, the PHAs in Pennsylvania applied for the most grants throughout the HOPE VI program at 95 applications with an overall success rate of 56%.

Figure 2



A careful review of the data shows the opposite effect. Listed below is a chart displays the states with the lowest success rates. Vermont has the lowest success rate, but it is based upon two attempts for revitalization grants of for the same discrete development in FY2008 and FY2009. The PHAs in West Virginia are in second place at 11.11%. They applied for 18 grants and only received 2 grants.

Table 5: Lowest Success Rate by States

State	Rate(includes all grant types)
VT	0.00%
WV	11.11%
AR	13.33%
AZ	16.67%
HI	20.00%
KS	20.00%
DE	25.00%
PR	25.00%
IN	26.19%
VA	30.00%

Success Rate by PHA

The following table highlights the success rate of each discrete applicant. There are approximately 53 PHAs with a success rate of 100%; many of whom submitted only one application. However, this table lists the top six applicants. These PHAs received grants for every application that they submitted. The chart enumerates the number of attempts for each PHA. In addition, this list contains two FY1993 cohort PHAs (City of Chester and City of Columbus).


Table 6: Number of Attempts by PHA

PHAName	Attempts	Successes
Housing Authority of Baltimore	10	10
Housing Authority of the City of Chester	6	6
Housing Authority of the City of Douglas	6	6
Housing Authority of the City of Columbus	3	3
Housing Authority of the City of Hartford	3	3
Knoxville Housing Authority	3	3

The following chart highlights the number of attempts by applicants (PHAs).

This chart features PHAs who never receive a grant, but apply for a grant the most times. Although there are over 100 PHAs with a success ratio of zero, this chart shows the top six PHAs. Evansville Housing Authority submitted an application eight times and did not win. West Palm Beach Housing Authority submitted seven applications.

Figure 3



Success Rate by PHA

Success Rate of Applicants in Counties


The primary goal of the HOPE VI program is to revitalize the most severely distressed or obsolete public housing units. Many times, these dilapidated public housing developments are not located in a city. The locality is a county. Approximately, thirteen percent(13%) of all HOPE VI applicants were PHAs which represented a county jurisdiction. The chart below displays the top four most successful county PHAs. The Housing Authority of the County of Washington represents an area which includes Pittsburgh. The PHAs in Dayton and Louisville represent both the city and their adjacent county.¹⁴

¹⁴ Louisville Metro Housing Authority represents the city of Louisville and Jefferson County. Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority includes Montgomery County.

Table 7: Success Rate of Applicants by County

PHA	Success Rate
Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority	60.00%
Housing Authority of Baltimore	100.00%
Housing Authority of the County of Washington	80.00%
Louisville Metro Housing Authority	70.00%

Figure 4



Target PHAs as a Percentage of all Applicants

Expected Outcomes

Initial Expectation A

Applicants with large number of units are more likely to receive grants: Large PHAs own seventy percent of all public housing stock. These large PHAs are usually located in large distressed urban areas and have a greater number of more severely distressed units.

The primary goal of the HOPE VI program is to eradicate the most severely distressed public housing in America. It is estimated by CLAPHA¹⁵ that large PHAs owned approximately 70% of all public housing stock in the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, most of the housing stock that these PHAs owned consisted of large high rises or garden styles scattered buildings. This study segregates discrete developments based on the number of units contained in each development. This study empirically analyzes the

¹⁵ The Council of Large Public Housing Authorities.

attempts and success rate of large discrete developments, which is operationalized as containing 500 or more units. The data show that large discrete developments have a slightly better success rate (57.7%) than discrete developments with less than 500 units. Small developments successfully receive grants 52.7% of the time.

Table 8: Success Rate by Size

Large Attempts	196
Large Success	113
Eventual Win %	57.7%
Small Attempts	791
Small Successes	417
Eventual Win %	52.7%

Initial Expectation B

Large developments receive funding on initial application: Since large developments are indicative of urban blight, they will receive funding on their first grant application. In this study, large developments are operationalized as discrete developments with more than 500 units. Using a binary tree logic, discrete developments are separated and labeled as either *Large* or *Small*. A quantitative review of the data finds that there are 73% of all Large applicants receive funding on its initial submission.

Table 9: Large Applicants' Success Rate

All First Large Applicants	159
All First Large Winners	116
First Large Win Percentage	73.0%

Initial Expectation C

Large PHAs submit applications for several developments in the same year: PHAs in large cities have several discrete housing developments in their housing stock.

Based on the economies of scale, these PHAs will submit grant applications for several housing projects in their jurisdiction in the same year. This phenomenon begins in the initial year and can be observed in several years. In the FY1993, there were thirty-eight discrete applicants (PHAs). However, the total number of applications is forty-one. There are three PHAs (Detroit, San Antonio and San Juan) who submitted multiple applications. A descriptive review of the applicants for FY1999 reveal that several PHAs including Phoenix, Atlanta, Baltimore, Detroit, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, New York and Elizabeth, NJ submitted applications for multiple developments.

Initial Expectation D

Smaller developments receive funding on subsequent submissions: Since large developments contain more distressed units, grant applications for smaller housing developments may not receive funding on their initial application. The primary purpose of the HOPE VI is to fund the revitalization of the most severely distressed public housing units. However, according to data supplied by CLAPHA, the current average size of a public housing development is 100 units. Overall, PHAs’ housing stock consists of small developments. A qualitative review of the HOPE VI data reveals small city PHAs that submit applications for small developments.. Although grants are awarded to revitalize small developments, are these small developments awarded funds on its initial submission? The discrete development data is divided by unit size. Any development with less than 500 units is labeled *Small*. Quantitative analysis reveals that 42% of applications for *Small* developments receive funding on subsequent submissions.

Table 10: Subsequent Small Win Percentage

Subsequent Small Win Percentage	42.3%
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Initial Expectation E

PHAs submit an application for a specific development several times: A city may have multiple housing projects containing severely distressed public housing units. As it spurs economic development and eradicates blight, the funding package of the HOPE VI grant *is* very beneficial to PHAs and local governments. Therefore, PHAs will submit applications for a specific development for multiple years until funding is received. The table below shows discrete developments that were submitted several times for grants. The Housing Authority of Helena, AR submitted a scattered site grant over a dozen times before it received funding for this site. In addition, the PHAs in the cities of Jasper, AL, Evansville, IN, and Danville, VA submitted seven grants each for the same project and never received funding.

Table 11: Number of Attempts by Development

Scattered Sites	Helena	AR	13	1
Carver Courts	Jasper	AL	7	0
Erie Homes	Evansville	IN	7	0
Liberty View	Danville	VA	7	0
Alexander Hamilton Apartment Complex	Paterson	NJ	6	2
Campau Commons	Grand Rapids	MI	6	2
Carver Homes	Atlanta	GA	6	1
Dana Strand Village	Los Angeles	CA	6	1
Elizabeth Park Homes	Akron	OH	6	1
Kirkpatrick Homes	Granite City	IL	6	0
Lamar Terrace	Memphis	TN	6	1
Miami Village	Fort Wayne	IN	6	1
Springfield Townhouses	High Point	NC	6	1
Victoria Courts	San Antonio	TX	6	1
Victory Village	Meridian	MS	6	1

Expected Patterns:

Expected Pattern A

FY 93 and FY 94 awardees receive several grants: PHAs who received grants in the first couple of years of the HOPE VI program, will receive multiple grants due to their increased capacity and experience. This study analyzes the success rate of the FY1993 and FY1994 cohort class in comparison to all other subsequent classes. The success rate of the first and second cohort classes are significantly higher than subsequent years. A quantitative analysis of the data reveals that cohort class FY1993 has the highest success

rate. This study places special emphasis on these cohort classes for the following reasons:

- These cohort classes set the best practices for the remainder of the program
- Their winning applications become the norm for a winning application and a template for others.

FY1993Win Cohort has a success rate of 71%


FY1994Win Cohort has a success rate of 56%

Subsequent Cohort has a success rate of 39%

Expected Pattern B

The funding amounts become smaller: The first year of the HOPE VI program has the largest average grant size. The middle years show the smallest average size. There are three factors that must be considered. Years 2002-2003 mark the years with the number of grant awards. In addition, the middle years represented a period within the HOPE VI when several grants (i.e. Main Street and Neighborhood Networks) were offered. Finally, HUD’s HOPE VI appropriation for FY2002 places a \$20 million cap on award amounts.


Figure 5



Average Grant Size

The following graph shows the average units per grant. Fiscal year 1995 has the highest average at 857 units. In contrast, fiscal years 2002 and 2003 represent the smallest average at 68 units and 101 units respectively.

Figure 6



Average Units per Grant

Expected Pattern C

The *number of applicants* per year increase: As the program matures, NOFA becomes less restrictive. Thus, more PHAs are eligible to apply. The below chart shows the number of new applicants each year for the tenure of the HOPE VI. The largest year in reference to the percentage of number of applicants to numbers of awards occurs in FY 2003. In this year, the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution funded \$574 million in HOPE VI grants. The PHAs submitted 145 applicants and 114 of those applications were funded. In that year, Revitalization grants, Neighborhood Networks grants and two rounds of Demolition grants were funded. An additional \$65 million dollars were distributed in the second round for Demolition grants. Moreover, FY2003 marked the last year that Demolition Only grants were funded.


A descriptive review of the applicants and grant awards for the FY2003 shows several PHAs who apply for and receive multiple grants. For example, Spartanburg, SC applies for and receives four HOPE VI grants (Neighborhood Networks, Revitalization, and 2 Demolition) in the amount of over \$22 million. Other small grantee awards include Meridian, MS and Decatur, AL.

The results are not in line with initial expectations. The recruitment is robust in the early years of the program. The lull corresponds with the expiration of the QWRA. Beginning in FY2004, HOPE VI must be appropriated on an annual basis. However, the program has resurgence in FY2009. In the years FY2004-FY2008, each year the Bush Administration submitted a zero budget for the program. FY2009 marks the program's first year under a new administration. It was the largest Recruitment class in five years. A descriptive review of the FY2009 recruitment class includes some PHAs located in the following cities: Covington, KY, Aberdeen, MS, Rockwall, TX, and Wilson, NC. From the above mentioned small PHAs, Covington KY receives a \$17 million revitalization grant.

Table 12: Number of Awards/Applicants per Year

Row Labels	Sum of AWARD	Count of APPLICANTS
1993	15	41
1994	27	33
1995	40	40
1996	46	141
1997	27	130
1998	84	157
1999	53	111
2000	47	101
2001	60	127
2002	94	168
2003	114	145
2004	7	33
2005	11	31
2006	4	26
2007	5	29
2008	6	23
2009	6	44
2010	8	36
Grand Total	654	1416

Figure 7



Number of Awards/Applicants per Year


Expected Pattern D

Average Population of the City (Based on 1990 Census)¹⁶

This graph shows the average population for applicants and awardees throughout the tenure of the HOPE VI program. Regarding the awardees, this graph show the highest average population is in the initial year of the program. The lowest year is fiscal year 2006, where the average population of a city that receives a grant was less than 100,000. In addition, this graph shows that the average population of cities who apply for a HOPE VI grant. Although, the lowest year is fiscal year 2004, there is a marked decrease in the average population size of applicants in fiscal year 1996.

¹⁶ 1990 Census data is used because it's the data that the HOPE VI program is based. In addition, the changes in population are not significant.

Figure 8



Average Population of City (Applicants/Recipients) per Year

Chapter Seven: Summary, Conclusions, and Future Research

I. Introduction

This research is an empirical study of the allocation of resources in HOPE VI, a public housing revitalization competitive grant program. The purpose of this study is to determine if the program adhered to its primary goals of revitalizing the most severely distressed and obsolete public housing developments. This dissertation focuses on the application and selection phases of HOPE VI's competitive grant making process. It takes an in-depth look at applicants (who applies) and the grantees (who wins) and posits that program results are set by who applies and receives funding. Moreover, this study takes an institutional policy analysis approach to the HOPE VI program. Thus, it postulates on some of the consequences of implementing reformative government programs via competitive grants. Consequently, key concepts and relevant literature on competitive grants as policy tools are incorporated in this study as a means of providing a comprehensive understanding of HOPE VI's distributive attributes. Based on the quantitative analysis, this study looks to the literature on redistributive politics to explain any deviations from perceived program goals or unexpected outcomes. The results of this study may influence the choice of policy tools used in future urban revitalization programs.

This chapter is divided into three sections. First, there is a summary of the quantitative findings. The first section expands on the empirical analysis and incorporates the qualitative data to help explain some of the observed phenomena. The following section assesses the use of competitive grants as a policy tool in HOPE VI. Next, based on the qualitative and quantitative data analyzed for this study, conclusions

are posited regarding the consequences of implementing reformative government and housing policy such HOPE VI through competitive grants. This section will include possible remedies to overcome negative consequences. . Finally, this dissertation ends by suggesting possible avenues of future research that expand on the qualitative and quantitative aspects of this study.

II. Summary

The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the allocation of funds within the HOPE VI program to determine whether the program adhered to its primary program goals. Based on a review of the analytical data, this study posits on the consequences on housing policies when funds are distributed competitively.

Over the tenure of the HOPE VI program, three hundred and thirty-three PHAs representing approximately ten percent of the total population of PHAs participated in the program. These PHAs, located in forty-two states and territories including Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, received over \$ 7 billion. Moreover, the PHAs leveraged these grants funds into over \$ 50 billion in investments into communities across America. The Commissions original estimate was that only six percent of public housing required revitalization. In 1989, the figure equaled 86,000 in nominal terms. The Clinton administration increased the estimate to 100,000 units. During its entire tenure approximately 200,000-350,000¹⁷ public housing units were included in some type of grant. A conservative estimate is that at least 25% of public housing stock was impacted by HOPE VI. The HOPE VI program rid PHAs of their obsolete and severely distressed developments. Although the numbers support the theory that the HOPE VI program

¹⁷ The figure is an estimate due to the same units being counted in several grants(i.e. Planning, Demolition and Revitalization)

significantly impacted public housing, there are other aspects of HOPE VI that should be discussed. Throughout the program, there are more applicants for small developments than large developments. Certain PHAs located in town with populations of less than 50,000 won several grants. Moreover, the evidence shows that beginning in 1996, the target PHAs represented on average less than forty percent of all applicants each year. These results are contrary to initial program goals and support the critique that unintended coalitions co-opted the HOPE VI program.

In the first through third years of the program, there were a limited number of PHAs eligible to receive grant funds. However, there are six PHAs who are eligible, based upon their cities' population, and never applied for funding. Thus, the capture rate is eighty-eight percent.

Due to the active participation of the housing authorities representing Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, and Washington County, Pennsylvania applied for more grants than any other state and had a combined success rate of 56%. Chicago MSA area had a combined success rate of 80%.¹⁸ However, the PHAs representing the three largest cities in Tennessee tell a unique story. Knoxville PHA has a 100% success rate based on three submissions. Both Nashville¹⁹ and Memphis were in the 1993 cohort class. As a result, Tennessee has the highest state success rate of 73.02%.²⁰ Of the top ten most successful PHAs, three PHAs represent cities with populations of less than 50,000. Bridgeton, NJ has a population of 25,349. Douglas, GA has a population of 48,700 and

¹⁸ Combined success rate for Housing Authority of Cook County and Housing Authority of the City of Chicago.

¹⁹ Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency

²⁰ MT and OK success rate is based on one application.

Americus, GA was population of 17,000.²¹ These three PHAs submitted and won grants for small developments; the average units per grant were approximately twenty units.

Clearly, these PHAs do not reflect the population targeted at least initially by the HOPE VI program. Overall, PHAs submitted 610 applications to revitalize developments containing less than 500 units. In comparison, there are only 160 applicants for large developments. However, small developments do not receive funding on its initial application at a higher rate than large developments. Small developments receive grants on subsequent submissions. Many PHAs, especially small PHAs, who did not have access to Planning grants in the early years of the HOPE VI program, hire consulting firms such as ICF Consulting or Abt Associates to assist them in revising previously denied grants. In addition, a 1997 Office of Inspector General²² report states that HUD had an internal goal to fund as many grants as possible so that a wide constituency is impacted by this program.

Using Census data, FIPS codes, and variables from the American Community Survey, this dissertation examines the average population of the cities that apply for (applicants) and receive (awardees) HOPE VI grants. The data are based on 1990 Census data and reveal that the average population of the awardees was the highest in the initial year (FY1993). In 1996, there is a significant decrease in the average population of an applicant. This phenomenon is due to the eligibility being expanded in FY1996 to include all cities. The average population of awardees and applicants decrease throughout the tenure of the HOPE VI. For example, in fiscal year, 2006, the average population size of a grant recipient is under 100,000.

²¹ Based on Census 2010 census reports.

²² Audit of Fiscal Year 1996 HOPE VI Grant Award Process 98-FO-101-000

Overall, the data show that the average population size of cities that apply for and receive HOPE VI grants trend together. In other words, the data reveal that as HOPE VI program matures, more small cities not only apply, but they win awards.

As time passes, smaller cities continue to apply for grants. Although some small PHAs have a high success rate, a review of the PHAs with the highest “failure rates” finds that small PHAs dominate. Furthermore, shockingly there is a significant number of PHAs who apply for several grants and never win. By all estimates, a PHA spends at least \$75,000 in preparing and submitting a grant. There has to be insurmountable incentives for PHAs to continue to seek funding to no avail.

One of the main findings of this study is that a PHA’s or development’s size may not matter as much as its timing. The data analysis shows that a competitive advantage is given to the cohort years of 1993 and 1994. PHAs who applied in these years have a higher success rate than PHAs who submit their first application in subsequent years. Several factors may be pertinent here. Some PHAs received Planning Grants. Other PHAs received technical assistance from HUD. Moreover, as the first class of the Urban Revitalization Demonstration program, these PHAs set the standard or the template for a winning application. Thus, these PHAs developed a learning curve. Finally, these PHAs owned more of the obsolete and dilapidated public housing stock; thus they had more opportunities to apply.

The median years of the program, fiscal year 2002-2003, are the pinnacle with the highest number of applicants and recipients. Since the funding did not significantly increase, these years correspond to the lowest average grant amounts and average units

per grant. In FY2003, there was a second round of Demolition grants awarded. This year also marked the last year that Demolition grants were awarded.

In addition to the number of overall grants, this study examines the recruitment class for each cohort year. The recruitment class counts the number of PHAs who submitted their first grant in any given year. Fiscal year 1996 is the highest recruitment class. This represents the first year that a PHA of any size and location could apply for a grant. New recruitment was lean from FY2004-FY2008. In these years, the program was in flux and it is difficult for PHAs to pre-plan applications. HOPE VI was repeatedly not included in HUD's budget proposals. By this time, the program had exceeded its initial revitalization unit goals of 100,000 units. Moreover, several projects experienced implementation difficulties and there were several controversial debates surrounding HOPE VI and gentrification and residents' rights. However, the program had its staunch supporters in Congress who continued to fund the program. During this time, HOPE VI was appropriated on an annual basis by Congress. In the era of multiple Continuing Resolutions, there was limited time for the grant process. Instead of six month notice, PHAs had six weeks or less to develop a winning grant proposal. This short turnaround time was not conducive to new recruits. In FY09, there is an increase in the number of recruits. Many believe that this increase is solely a byproduct of the change in administration. However, a review of the NOFAs for FY09 and FY10 points to a different explanation. In the last years of the program, rating points are deducted from any PHA who received a previous grant and that grant is in noncompliance status (i.e. over budget violations, implementation delays). This new rating structure gives a new segment of PHAs the opportunity to receive HOPE VI grants.

III. Conclusions

a. Generalizations

This case study of HOPE VI produced a bevy of results that can be generalized to other studies about competitive grants as a tool of government. The tools literature purports that the federal government has a myriad of policy tools at its disposal to accomplish policy goals. However, public housing is not as flexible. In a court case that pre-dates Salamon's writings, *United States vs. Certain Land in the City of Louisville*, it is declared the federal government should not have a direct role in housing and that housing does not serve a public purpose. Based on this decision, a partnership relationship between the federal government and local public housing authorities is established. Consequently, public housing can only implement programs through indirect tools of government such as vouchers, loan guarantees, contracts, and grants.

Competitive grants are implemented within a framework where Congress and the bureaucracy have accountability, discretion, and authority. In general, competitive grants are known to be efficient, transparent; yet difficult to manage. However, HOPE VI's grant making process was not completely transparent. Although, the selection criteria along with the rating factors are published in the NOFA, there is little information about what actually happens in the selection process. A review of the OIG audits of the HOPE VI program show that program managers had difficulties implementing comprehensive oversight procedures. Furthermore, the audit reports reveal some grant decisions that had no evidentiary basis.

Another observation based on the data from this study is that the competitive grant paradigm allows for annual incremental changes. The competitive grant framework allows for feedback to be incorporated into programs (i.e. Planning and Demolition

grants). The competitive grant framework is flexible; throughout its tenure, HOPE VI grant types and eligibility requirements were expanded. At the same time, substantive programmatic changes may alter fundamental tenets of a program and result in negative consequences. In the case of the HOPE VI, these programmatic changes facilitated the co-optation of the program.

When policymakers choose to implement programs via competitive grants, there are implications for program outcomes. Policymakers should account for the nature of the target populations and match the policy tool with the intended constituency. Unlike formula grants, competitive grants stipulate applicants to prove their ability to meet program objectives and goals. Furthermore, competitive grant require a high level of technical capability. Usually, this is an obstacle for widespread participation. Initially, competitive grants seemed to be the correct tool to implement the HOPE VI program. Every applicant needed to demonstrate that they had the technical, administrative, and financial capability to implement the grant. In the first three years, the intended population was awarded grants. There existed enough distressed housing stock in the target cities to accommodate several more grant making cycles. However, as time pasts, there were pleas for eligibility expansion from several factions. PHAs craved fungible funds. Several PHAs partnered with consultants to improve their chances of award. In the hearings for HOPE VI, there was bipartisan support. In addition, mayors representing small cities argued that they have some of the same problems, just on a small scale. Based on the aforementioned series of events, when HOPE VI's eligibility expanded in fiscal year 1996, it was due to program drift, not saturation.

Although this dissertation is grounded theoretically in the scholarship regarding tools of government and redistributive politics, it uses the institutional policy analysis approach to examine the consequences of distributing funds in HOPE VI program via competitive grants. These funds are competitively distributed within a framework where the bureaucracy and Congress can influence program results. The following section enumerates each consequence, then gives a detailed explanation of the consequence and suggests a remedy.

b. Consequences

1. Due to resource dependency issues and substantive programmatic changes, an unexpected constituency may co-opt the program

The nature of the competitive grant should ensure compliance with the government requirements. Before they even apply, local governments must determine if their goals and priorities are in line with what the government is currently emphasizing. And then, only those local governments or PHA's that meet the requirements of the grant (such as size or scope of project) may apply. Thus by carefully selecting only a certain category of need, the federal government can more carefully target the aid and hopefully ensure greater compliance.

HOPE VI was the first program in years to allocate funds for new construction of public housing. Moreover, this program de-regulated many of the arduous rules that stymied public housing redevelopment such as One-for-One replacement. The One-for-One replacement was a key element in accomplishing one of the primary goals of HOPE VI: de-concentration of the poor. No longer did PHAs have to replace each unit that was destroyed. Thus, the public housing framework that HOPE VI established allowed for

extensive redevelopment and density reduction of public housing developments. These features made the HOPE VI program very attractive to PHAs not included in the target constituency. HOPE VI allocated no year discretionary funds that could be leveraged with money from public private partnerships. All other public housing allocations (i.e. Operating Fund and Capital Fund) were for specific purposes. At the same time, there were PHAs in the target population who did not apply for the funds. PHAs outside of the target population clamored for these funds. In fact, PHAs lobbied their local and federal elected officials to modify the program so that they could have access to these funds. Although some PHAs in the target population did not apply for grants, there still existed a significant amount of public housing stock in the participating cities, which required revitalization. In fact, throughout HOPE VI's tenure, approximately forty percent of all applicants each year were a part of the target population.

In FY1996, HUD made a major policy change and expanded eligibility to all PHAs. The response was overwhelming and the number of applicants increased by 250%. Hence, PHAs, who were not eligible in prior years, applied for and received grants. Throughout the lifecycle of HOPE VI, fifty-two percent of small developments received funding. Observed results show that towns with population less than 25,000 received grants. Thus, the inclusion of these PHAs and developments has dramatically shifted expected program results.

The expansion of the eligibility was not a reasonable evolution of the program, but a substantive programmatic change. The program was not experiencing program saturation or a reasonable evolution of the program. These factors are more indicative of program drift. A possible solution to counter this consequence is to create an interim grant

application. In this scenario, policy tool nor the eligibility changes. The flexibility and discretion of a competitive grant remains intact. Agencies would assess applicants and rank and prioritize them based on capacity. Other applicants would receive a “planning” grant or technical assistance. Competitive grants allow agencies the discretion and flexibility. Agencies could require potential grant recipient to submit an interim grant application and the agency could assess the organizations. Next, the agency can assist the entity with technical assistance or in the case of HOPE VI, a planning grant as a pre-requisite to a revitalization grant. If the pool of applicants begins to dwindle and new applications are not received from the target audience, the program ends. HOPE VI program is a product of cooptation. In 1996, the program had reached saturation based on target constituency. In fact, the original PHAs continue to represent on average about thirty-five percent of all applicants throughout the tenure of the program. These PHAs are awarded more grants on their initial attempt.

2. Politics may exert their influence on competitive grants

This dissertation is partially grounded in the literature of redistributive politics. As a competitive grant, HOPE VI funding is allocated within a framework where Congress and the bureaucracy can impact the decision making. The scholarship on redistributive politics state that politics can influence competitive grants; HOPE VI program is no different. A comprehensive review of the HOPE VI reveals that political influences are not isolated to Congress. The redistributive politics literature speaks to circumstances where there exist irresistible political pressures to create wide coalitions for programs, especially demonstration programs or programs that require annual appropriations. With HOPE VI, the agency desires more applicants and expands eligibility so that there is a larger Congressional coalition that supports the program. Therefore, the power of the

bureaucracy within a competitive grant process should not be discounted. HOPE VI represented a public housing revitalization program that targeted less than ten percent of public housing, but required a wide coalition for its political sustainment. In his scholarly work, Jeremy Hall purports that bureaucrats are politically astute and they may be more responsive to the needs of Washington. Senior level Executive branch personnel can exert preferences and pressures on lower level public administrators who are members of the review panels that rate, rank and select grant recipients. They judge each applicant and make recommendations regarding awards. A public administrator uses his or her discretion when analyzing whether an applicant qualifies for funding and recommends an award amount. In some years, there may not be enough funding for every organization who qualified. Therefore, the review team at its discretion may partially fund grants. In the FY1994, partial grants were awarded in the HOPE VI program.

A December 1996 report issued by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) showed that during the first two award years of the HOPE IV program, thirty-seven applicants were ineligible for money based on HUD's own criteria, but seventeen of these PHAs received funding anyway.

Moreover by 1997, several PHAs had serious violations and HUD has actually cited these PHAs for noncompliance of grant agreements. The OIG report recommended that no additional grants are given to several cities including Chicago and Baltimore. However, some of these PHAs (including Chicago and Baltimore) received subsequent grants. One reason may be politics; the Department's Secretary is the President's appointee. The Secretary has the final review and approval of the grant funding.

Each year, the list of grantees must be submitted to the Secretary of the Department, who is a political appointee, for final approval. The Secretary has the right to accept the list of recommendations submitted by the review team or make changes. It is not uncommon for the Secretary to make changes to the listed based upon feedback from other sources including the Congressional Intergovernmental Relations (CIR) office. CIR is an agency liaison to not only Congress, but to all state and local government organizations. This office often receives correspondence advocating for certain grant applicants. Many times, their advocacy efforts influence the Secretary's office, which then instructs the review teams to re-evaluate applications and make slight changes in their recommendations. Moreover, the applications may also contain letters of support from elected officials on every level of government. The competitive grant framework allows Congressional intervention regarding allocation of funds. In one dramatic interference, FY1994's, appropriations language, Congress instructed HUD to fully fund an FY 1993 applicant who didn't receive funding.

An in- depth review of the HOPE VI program shows the influence of politics on several aspects of the program. In recent years, competitive grants are the preferred funding tool. Thus, less funds are directed to formula and block grants. Consequently, organizations clamor for these funds allocated for competitive grants. Applicants begin to bargain and negotiate with key stakeholders such as politicians, agencies, and interested private sector parties. It is not uncommon for applicants to market their projects in hopes of being allocated these limited funds. It is expected for grant applications to include letters of support or endorsement from political leaders on every level. These endorsements are viewed as a sign of political buy-in for both HOPE VI

program and a specific redevelopment project. A review of the grant application for Westview Homes from the Housing Authority for the City of Frederick, MD includes endorsement letters from city council members, the mayor, state legislators, and Congressional delegation. Moreover, Maryland has representation on HUD's Oversight committees in the Senate and Housing of Representatives. Furthermore, a Maryland Senator, Barbara Mikulski, was the co-sponsor of the HOPE VI Reauthorization bill.

In addition, Congress inserted their influence on the program. Congress directly authorizes and appropriates funds for twelve of the program's eighteen year history. At times, Congress directly instructs the agency. In 1994, the appropriation bill required that HUD funds only application submitted for the FY1993 competition. In FY1998, the appropriation allocated \$26 million for a discrete development, Heritage House in Kansas City. A final example occurs in 1999, Congress stated that demolition was not required for revitalization of elderly units and directed HUD to review applications without regard to any proposed demolition.

Even with a cursory view of the redistributive politics literature, one will notice that there are very few solutions to removing politics from the grant making process. A change in policy tool may not be sufficient. Congress has the authority to place earmarks and amendments into any legislation.

3. The competitive grant framework allows for funds to be allocated to entities that are in the target population, but lack capacity

The competitive grant framework should facilitate higher levels of performance accountability than the formula grant based paradigm. Based on several reports from GAO, HUD's OIG, and think tanks like Urban Institute and Brookings Institution, many

HOPE VI grantees have experienced difficulties in implementing the program. PHAs have been cited for time and costs overruns, and not compliance with grant agreements. Official default letters were issued to PHAs, many of whom were in the target populations. At the same time, the target population included at least twenty PHAs who were officially classified as “troubled”. Therefore, it should be no surprise that these PHAs lacked the capacity to handle large redevelopment projects. Yet, as a member of the target population, the federal agency adhered to the program’s mission and allocated funds to these PHAs.

On the other hand, there are PHAs in small cities or PHAs that own small developments. These PHAs have the administrative capacity and are good stewards of public funds. Moreover, their public housing stock contains severely distress (in comparison to others in their city) or obsolete units. These PHAs may qualify for the program except they are not in the target population. The policy change in FY1996, gave these smaller PHAs and developments an opportunity to receive funds. These PHAs are very successful at acquiring funds. In fact, according housing scholars, small PHAs co-opt the program; thus, changing the expected program goals.

Because of the transaction costs associated with applying for a competitive grant, distribution can be influenced by the administrative capacity potential of the grantee (Collins, 2008). Applicants must not only consider the costs associated for vying for a grant, but must also fully commit to fulfilling the objectives of the program, which may entail a demonstration of intent and capacity to adhere to program objects. Likewise, the federal government as grantor should evaluate grantees and screen out those unlikely to perform at an acceptable level. Further complicating the application process and adding

to the cost of applying, are the public hearings on proposed grant applications which will consume the time, energy, and political capital of government officials. According to Schneider, a rational local government entity applies only if the expected value of the grant exceeds local costs. Thus, the value is a function of the expected funds and the probability of success in winning the funds (Schneider, 1990). According to Ting, public administrator must use their discretion to advance the mission and constitutional values of the agency. Thus, they play a major role in determining program outcomes. At the same time, professional expertise is a defense against and can counter balance political influence and judgment. The influence of politics is a known factor of competitive grants as a policy tool. In fact, politics can be exerted with other types of grants such as formula or block grants. However, competitive grants are more visible and less manageable. Furthermore, competitive grants are used so only technically and fiscally competent entities receive funding. Politics does not always consider the competency or capacity of grantees. Thus, funds may be allocated to entities who are not good stewards, efficient, and accountable. From the beginning of the HOPE VI programs, issues of inefficiency and accountability have always been difficult.

One solution to this problem is to redesign the program into a bifurcated structure, but to continue to allocate via competitive grant. A perfect example is the model of the Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Community. The Enterprise Community has the same structure and primary goals of the Empowerment Zones. There is a different target audience and funding amounts which better suits smaller cities that have the same social ills just on a smaller scale. In this model, small PHAs would have to demonstrate that they have the financial, administrative, and technical capability to implement public

housing revitalization projects. However, they will be eligible to receive demolition and revitalization grants for projects up to \$20 million.

c. Substantive Programmatic Choices

Many of the aforementioned consequences are the results of substantive programmatic choices that altered the application and selection of grant applicants and recipients; thus, they manipulated the initially anticipated program results. The next section discusses several substantive programmatic choices of the HOPE VI program.

In FY1996, the NOFA expanded the eligibility to any PHA that could prove severely distressed or obsolete units in their housing stock. At this point in HOPE VI's lifecycle, severe distress is based on PHAs assessment. It is two additional years before HUD requires an independent third party appraisal. This is a significant change in the program. Instead of fifty finite eligible PHAs, the number of potential applicants stretches to 3200. At the time of the change, it was well known fact that severely distressed unit was not universally dispersed. According to the Commission, there were only 86,000 severely distressed public housing units out of the entire population of one million units. This programmatic change dramatically changes the program results and obliterates the target constituency.

In FY2003, the Bush Administration capped the HOPE VI grant to \$20 million per grant. Historically, HOPE VI had awarded large grants. In its initial year, the average grant was \$35 million. These large funds were a necessity. HOPE VI demolished and developed housing projects in central cities. There were costly redevelopment projects. Hence, \$20 million was insufficient to fully fund these projects. Consequently, PHAs with large developments would be forced to highly leverage investments by their private partners. However, this is not the case for PHAs with smaller developments or PHAs

located in small cities. Twenty million dollars would be more than adequate to renovate or redevelop their public housing developments. The \$20 million limit per grant was more attractive to small cities. The ruling gave them access to the elusive fungible, no year, new construction funds available only through the HOPE VI program. Therefore, this program change gives small PHAs more incentives to apply for grants.

A major critique of the HOPE VI program is that the program is burdened by slow and inefficient implementation of the redevelopment projects. Although the grant agreement required that a five year implementation limit, the majority of grants exceeded that requirement. In addition, several PHAs violated other terms of the grant agreement. Yet, they continued to receive grants. In FY09 and FY10, HUD modifies the selection factors to include deductions for noncompliant prior grants. Also, the NOFA limits PHAs to submitting only one grant per year. This change gives an opportunity for grants to a constituency of PHAs who have never applied.

IV. Future Research

- a. One limitation of this study was the difficulty that the researcher experienced in obtaining data. Although most of the data contained in the unique data set was retrieved from public mechanisms like websites, books, and contemporaneous literature, the data was incomplete. Moreover, two Freedom of Information (FOIA) submissions yielded insufficient data regarding vacancy rates and PASS²³ scores for each discrete development. As stated in the study, along with crime statistics, PASS scores and vacancy rates are universally recognized as indicators of severe distress. Inclusion of these variables into this dataset could

²³ PASS scores record the Physical Assessment of a property. Physical inspections are conducted by HUD's Real Estate Assessment Center.

increase the confidence level of this study's quantitative and qualitative conclusions. Once the additional information is received, data from this study could be combined with distributive data from another competitive grant program. Additional quantitative analysis including regression modeling should be performed on the data. The results and conclusions from this combined study may be generalized to the appropriateness of the policy tool, the competitive grants.

- b. Within the framework of urban revitalization policy, future research may use the institutional policy analysis approach to compare HOPE VI program with other major reformative Housing programs.
- c. This study focuses on the application and selection phases of the competitive grant process. One central argument of this study and the basis for the methodology is that who applies and who wins a grant cements program goals. Moreover, goal displacement, saturation, and co-optation can occur early in the competitive grant making process. Future research may replicate or expand on this study. In addition to a case study of a program as a whole, future research can conduct smaller case studies on actual applicants or grantees within a specific year.
- d. This study uses general scholarship on redistributive politics and qualitative data specifically regarding the HOPE VI program to postulate on reasons for unexpected patterns or deviations. Future research can expand the purview and focus completely on redistributive politics and the HOPE VI program. The results from such a study could be generalized to all competitive grant programs

or influence the policy tool that is chosen to implement future urban revitalization programs.

- e. Future research study can be a case study on the PHAs that were a part of the target population of the HOPE VI program and choose not to apply for any grant funds. The case study should conduct an in depth investigation into the reasons these PHAs did not participate in the program. Possible explanations may include the physical conditions of the public housing stock or capacity of the PHA.
- f. Future research can include building a complex model, based on game theory, which analyzes applicants and predicts their probability of success.

V. Conclusion

This study empirically examined the allocation of funds through the competitive grant, HOPE VI. This study is grounded in the scholarship theoretically regarding tools of government and redistributive politics. Yet, it takes an institutional policy analysis approach to flesh out the qualitative and quantitative consequences of using competitive grant as a policy tool for a reformative government program (HOPE VI).

This research uses a mixed methodology to examine the allocation of resources within the entire tenure of the HOPE VI program. Based on the analytical data, the HOPE VI program does revitalize severely distressed and obsolete public housing units. It demolished and revitalized significantly more units than the Commission's initial estimates. It has altered the industry. Before HOPE VI, CLAPHA estimated that their members owned 70% of public housing stock; the current estimate is 40%. Moreover, the average size of a public housing development has decreased from 250 units to 100 units. However, it is not a perfect program; the program experiences goal drift based on

the several factors discussed in this research. Overall, HOPE VI has changed the way that public housing is developed in cities across America.

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
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
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Appendix

APPENDIX A
State Failure Rates



APPENDIX B
Public Housing Authority Failure Rate



APPENDIX C
Most Successful Public Housing Authorities

PHAName	Attempts	Successes	SuccessRatio
Housing Authority of Baltimore	10	10	100.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Chester	6	6	100.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Douglas	6	6	100.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Columbus	3	3	100.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Hartford	3	3	100.0%
Knoxville Housing Authority	3	3	100.0%
Bridgeton Housing Authority	2	2	100.0%
City and County of San Francisco Housing Authority	2	2	100.0%
Cleveland Housing Authority	2	2	100.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Americus	2	2	100.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Columbia MO	2	2	100.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Elizabeth	2	2	100.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Mercedes	2	2	100.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Newnan	2	2	100.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Pleasantville	2	2	100.0%
Housing Authority of the Fayetteville	2	2	100.0%
Lebanon Housing Authority	2	2	100.0%
Cambridge Housing Authority	1	1	100.0%
City of Tucson Community Services Department	1	1	100.0%
Cookeville Housing Authority	1	1	100.0%
Danbury Housing Authority	1	1	100.0%
Flint Area Housing Authority	1	1	100.0%

Forrest City Housing Authority	1	1	100.0%
Helena Housing Authority	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Humboldt	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Alexandria	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Allentown	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Brownsville	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Clearwater	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Covington	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Decatur	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Deland	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Duluth	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Dunedin	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Galveston	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Humboldt	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Jeffersonville	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Kingsport	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Laurel	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Menard County	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of Springfield	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Ft. Lauderdale	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Tulsa	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Winona	1	1	100.0%
Housing Authority of the County of Menard	1	1	100.0%
Knoxville's Community Development Corporation	1	1	100.0%
Marietta Housing Authority	1	1	100.0%
Middletown Housing Authority	1	1	100.0%
Red Lake Falls Housing and Redevelopment Authority	1	1	100.0%
Syracuse Housing Authority	1	1	100.0%
The Bristol Redevelopment and Housing Authority	1	1	100.0%
The Housing Authority of Ashland	1	1	100.0%
Weymouth Housing Authority	1	1	100.0%
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency	7	6	85.7%
Chicago Housing Authority	49	41	83.7%
Housing Authority of Portland	5	4	80.0%

Housing Authority of the County of Washington	5	4	80.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Charlotte	9	7	77.8%
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	21	16	76.2%
Housing Authority of Louisville	8	6	75.0%
Housing Authority of Columbus	4	3	75.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Denver	4	3	75.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Jackson	4	3	75.0%
Housing Authority of the city of Winston-Salem	4	3	75.0%
Utica Housing Authority	4	3	75.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	19	14	73.7%
Seattle Housing Authority	15	11	73.3%
Housing Authority of the City of Detroit	7	5	71.4%
Memphis Housing Authority	27	18	66.7%
Housing Authority of the City of Jersey City	12	8	66.7%
Chattanooga Housing Authority	9	6	66.7%
Housing Authority of the City of Spartanburg	9	6	66.7%
New York City Housing Authority	9	6	66.7%
Housing Authority of Salem	3	2	66.7%
Housing Authority of Savannah	3	2	66.7%
Housing Authority of the City of Greenville	3	2	66.7%
Housing Authority of the City of Prichard	3	2	66.7%
Housing Authority of the City of Tucson	3	2	66.7%
Housing Authority of the county of Champaign	3	2	66.7%
Indianapolis Housing Authority	3	2	66.7%
St. Louis Housing Authority	19	12	63.2%
Detroit Housing Commission	8	5	62.5%
Housing Authority of the City of Dallas	8	5	62.5%

Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	21	13	61.9%
Philadelphia Housing Authority	28	17	60.7%
Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority	10	6	60.0%
Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority	5	3	60.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Bradenton	5	3	60.0%
Houston Housing Authority	5	3	60.0%
King County Housing Authority	5	3	60.0%
Winnebago County Housing Authority	5	3	60.0%
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	17	10	58.8%
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	24	14	58.3%
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	18	10	55.6%
Housing Authority of Kansas City	9	5	55.6%
Housing Authority of New Orleans	26	14	53.8%
Boston Housing Authority	13	7	53.8%
San Antonio Housing Authority	24	12	50.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Las Vegas	10	5	50.0%
Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority	8	4	50.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Camden	8	4	50.0%
Housing Authority of the County of Fayette	8	4	50.0%
Jacksonville Housing Authority	8	4	50.0%
City of Phoenix Housing Department	6	3	50.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Daytona Beach	6	3	50.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Fresno	6	3	50.0%
Lexington Fayette Urban County Housing Authority	6	3	50.0%
Mobile Housing Board	6	3	50.0%
Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority	6	3	50.0%
Chester County Housing Authority	4	2	50.0%
Housing Authority of Puerto Rico	4	2	50.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Frederick	4	2	50.0%

Housing Authority of the City of Muncie	4	2	50.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Stamford	4	2	50.0%
Minneapolis Public Housing Authority	4	2	50.0%
Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority	4	2	50.0%
Benton Harbor Housing Commission	2	1	50.0%
Camden Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
City of South Tucson Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
Columbus Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
Fort Wayne Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
Franklin Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
Hagerstown Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
Housing Authority of Bremerton	2	1	50.0%
Housing Authority of Fayetteville	2	1	50.0%
Housing Authority of Lake Wales	2	1	50.0%
Housing Authority of Shreveport	2	1	50.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Biloxi	2	1	50.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Huntsville	2	1	50.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Rochester	2	1	50.0%
Housing Authority of the City of St. Petersburg	2	1	50.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Wilmington	2	1	50.0%
Housing Authority of the County of Clark	2	1	50.0%
Jasper Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
Louisville Metro Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
Macon Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
Mercer County Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
New Brunswick Housing and Urban Development Authority	2	1	50.0%
Newport Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
Oakland Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
Ocala Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
Peoria Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%

Sanford Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
Springfield Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
Taunton Housing Authority	2	1	50.0%
Albany Housing Authority	9	4	44.4%
Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority	9	4	44.4%
Housing Authority of the City and County of Denver	9	4	44.4%
Housing Authority of the City of Meridian	9	4	44.4%
Housing Authority of the City of Oakland	9	4	44.4%
Danville Redevelopment and Housing Authority	7	3	42.9%
Housing Authority of the City of Tacoma	7	3	42.9%
Housing Authority of the City of Tampa	7	3	42.9%
Indianapolis Housing Agency	7	3	42.9%
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles	12	5	41.7%
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority	15	6	40.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh	15	6	40.0%
Allegheny County Housing Authority	10	4	40.0%
Housing Authority of East Baton Rouge	5	2	40.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Newport, RI	5	2	40.0%
Housing Authority of the County of Cook	5	2	40.0%
San Francisco Housing Authority	13	5	38.5%
Housing Authority of Fulton County	8	3	37.5%
Newark Housing Authority	8	3	37.5%
Housing Authority of the City of El Paso	11	4	36.4%
Virgin Islands Housing Authority	11	4	36.4%
Housing Authority of the City of Orlando	9	3	33.3%
Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority	9	3	33.3%
Housing Authority of Dallas	6	2	33.3%

Metro Dade Housing Agency	6	2	33.3%
Municipal Housing Authority of Yonkers	6	2	33.3%
Atlantic City Housing Authority	3	1	33.3%
Decatur Housing Authority	3	1	33.3%
Holyoke Housing Authority	3	1	33.3%
Housing and Redevelopment Authority of Duluth	3	1	33.3%
Housing and Redevelopment Authority of Winona	3	1	33.3%
Housing Authority East St. Louis	3	1	33.3%
Housing Authority of City of Tallahassee	3	1	33.3%
Housing Authority of Long Branch	3	1	33.3%
Housing Authority of the City of Fort Myers	3	1	33.3%
Housing Authority of the City of Greensboro	3	1	33.3%
Housing Authority of the City of Lakeland	3	1	33.3%
Housing Authority of the City of North Charleston	3	1	33.3%
Housing Authority of the City of Pharr	3	1	33.3%
Housing Authority of the City of Pueblo	3	1	33.3%
Housing Authority of the City of Salisbury	3	1	33.3%
Housing Authority of the City of Texarkana	3	1	33.3%
Housing Authority of the City of Trenton	3	1	33.3%
Mid-East Regional Housing Authority	3	1	33.3%
Nashville Housing Authority	3	1	33.3%
Orange City Housing Authority	3	1	33.3%
Pontiac Housing Commission	3	1	33.3%
Troy Housing Authority	3	1	33.3%
Housing Authority of the City of Columbia SC	10	3	30.0%
Housing Authority of the City of High Point	10	3	30.0%
Housing Authority of Wilmington	10	3	30.0%

Housing Authority of the City of Paterson	11	3	27.3%
Housing Authority of the Birmingham District	8	2	25.0%
Beaumont Housing Authority	4	1	25.0%
Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority	4	1	25.0%
East Orange Housing Authority	4	1	25.0%
Greater Gadsden Housing Authority	4	1	25.0%
Housing and Community Development Corporation of Hawaii	4	1	25.0%
Housing Authority of Easton	4	1	25.0%
Housing Authority of Lubbock	4	1	25.0%
Housing Authority of Niagara Falls	4	1	25.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Durham	4	1	25.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Gary	4	1	25.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Wheeling	4	1	25.0%
The Housing Authority of the City of South Bend	4	1	25.0%
Wilmington Housing Authority	4	1	25.0%
Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority	5	1	20.0%
Austin Housing Authority	5	1	20.0%
Hartford Housing Authority	5	1	20.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Richmond	5	1	20.0%
Housing Authority of Tuscaloosa	5	1	20.0%
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority	5	1	20.0%
Sacramento County Housing Authority	5	1	20.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Corpus Christi	6	1	16.7%
Little Rock Housing Authority	6	1	16.7%
Housing Authority of the City of Charleston	7	1	14.3%
Saginaw Housing Commission	8	1	12.5%
Evansville Housing Authority	8	0	0.0%
West Palm Beach Housing Authority	7	0	0.0%
Granite City Housing Authority	6	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Grand Rapids	6	0	0.0%

Housing Authority of the City of Bridgeport	5	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the Township of Woodbridge	5	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Butler	4	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Fort Wayne	4	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Sarasota	4	0	0.0%
Miami-Dade Housing Agency	4	0	0.0%
Newport News Redevelopment and Housing Authority	4	0	0.0%
Puerto Rico Housing Administration	4	0	0.0%
City of Topeka Housing Authority	3	0	0.0%
Fort Worth Housing Authority	3	0	0.0%
Galveston Housing Authority	3	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Del Ray Beach	3	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Concord	3	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Fort Smith	3	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Huntington	3	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the County of Contra Costa	3	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the County of San Joaquin	3	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Williamsport	3	0	0.0%
Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority	3	0	0.0%
McKeesport Housing Authority	3	0	0.0%
Birmingham Housing Authority	2	0	0.0%
Harrisburg Housing Authority	2	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Champagin County	2	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of East Chicago	2	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Greenville	2	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Hazard	2	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Macon	2	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Rock Island	2	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Bristol	2	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Holyoke	2	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of	2	0	0.0%

Macon			
Housing Authority of the City of Middletown	2	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Titusville	2	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Williamson	2	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Wilson	2	0	0.0%
Huntington Housing Authority	2	0	0.0%
New Bedford Housing Authority	2	0	0.0%
Northwest Georgia Housing Authority	2	0	0.0%
Oxnard Housing Authority	2	0	0.0%
Rockford Housing Authority	2	0	0.0%
Slidell Housing Authority	2	0	0.0%
West Memphis Housing Authority	2	0	0.0%
Alexander County Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Alma Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Brockton Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Chesapeake Redevelopment and Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
City of Aberdeen Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Delray Beach Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Fall River Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Forest City Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Housing and Redevelopment Authority of Virginia	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Clackamas County	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Hamtramck	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Hopkinsville	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Michigan City	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Morgan City	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Plainfield	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Rockville	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Rutland	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of Suffolk	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Mercedes	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Bloomington, Ill.	1	0	0.0%

Housing Authority of the City of Bossier City	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Clayton	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Helena	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Lake Charles	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Laurel	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Michigan City	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Mission, TX	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Monroe	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Montgomery	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of North Little Rock	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Orange	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Richland	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Sacramento	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Van Buren	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Vincennes	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Waycross	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the City of Wellston	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the County of Douglas	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the County of Kern	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the County of Riverside	1	0	0.0%
Housing Authority of the County of San Bernardino	1	0	0.0%

Housing Commission Muskegon Heights	1	0	0.0%
Mercedes Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Merryville Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Mid-East Regional Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Muncie Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
New Brunswick Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Olney Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Oscale Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Osceola Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Palatka Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Quincy Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Rochingham Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Rutland Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
State of Hawaii Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Suffolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
The Housing Authority of City of Rockwall, TX	1	0	0.0%
The Housing Authority of the City of New Britain	1	0	0.0%
Town of Crossville Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Tuscaloosa Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Warner Robins Housing Authority	1	0	0.0%
Ypsilanti Housing Commission	1	0	0.0%

APPENDIX D
Applicants and Recipients

APPLICANTS	Development-ZS	YEAR	AWARD	SizeBin
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Techwood/Clarke Howell	1993	1	Small
Austin Housing Authority	Meadowbrook Homes	1993	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Lafayette Court	1993	0	n/a
Birmingham Housing Authority	Morton Simpson Village	1993	0	n/a
Boston Housing Authority	Mission Main	1993	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Bridgeport	Marina Apts, PTBarnum Apts, Pequonnock Apts	1993	0	n/a
Camden Housing Authority	McGuire Gardens	1993	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Charlotte	Earle Village	1993	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Cabrini Homes Ext	1993	0	Large
Cleveland Housing Authority	Outhwaite Homes, King Kennedy	1993	1	Small

Columbus Housing Authority	Windsor Terrace	1993	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Dallas	Lakewest/West Dallas	1993	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Denver	Quigg Newton Homes	1993	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Detroit	Parkside Homes	1993	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Detroit	Jeffries Homes	1993	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of El Paso	Kennedy Brothers Memorial Apartments	1993	0	n/a
Houston Housing Authority	Allen Parkway Village	1993	1	Large
Indianapolis Housing Authority	Concord Village, Eagle Creek	1993	0	n/a
Jacksonville Housing Authority	Golfbrook Terrace, Pottsburg Park	1993	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Kansas City	Guinotte Manor	1993	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles	Pico Gardens, Aliso South and Aliso North	1993	1	Large
Memphis Housing Authority	LeMoyne Gardens	1993	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Hillside Terrace	1993	1	Small
Nashville Housing Authority	Kennedy Brothers Memorial Apartments	1993	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	Elm Haven	1993	1	Small
Housing Authority of New Orleans	Desire	1993	0	Large
New York City Housing Authority	Beach 41st Street	1993	1	Large
Newark Housing Authority	Walsh Homes	1993	0	n/a
Oakland Housing Authority	Lockwood Gardens, Coliseum Gardens, Lower Fruitvale	1993	0	Large
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Richard Allen Homes	1993	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Allequippae Terrace	1993	1	Small
San Antonio Housing Authority	Mirasol Homes	1993	0	n/a
San Antonio Housing Authority	Springview Apts	1993	0	n/a
San Francisco Housing Authority	Bernal Dwellings and Yerba Buena Homes	1993	1	Large

Housing Authority of Puerto Rico	Crisantimos & M.A. Perez	1993	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Puerto Rico	Juanna Matos I	1993	0	n/a
Seattle Housing Authority	Holly Park Apts	1993	1	Large
Springfield Housing Authority	John Hay Homes, Charles Grandon Apt, Johnson Park	1993	0	n/a
St. Louis Housing Authority	Darst-Webbe	1993	0	n/a
Virgin Islands Housing Authority	Donoe Housing , Louis E. Brown	1993	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	Ellen Wilson	1993	1	Small
Birmingham Housing Authority	Morton Simpson Village	1994	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles	Pico Gardens, Aliso South/North	1994	1	Large
Oakland Housing Authority	Lockwood Gardens, Coliseum Gardens, Lower Fruitvale	1994	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Denver	Quigg Newton Homes	1994	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Bridgeport	Marina Apts, PTBarnum Apts, Pequonnock Apts	1994	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	Ellen Wilson	1994	1	Small
Jacksonville Housing Authority	Golfbrook Terrace, Pottsburg Park	1994	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Techwood/Clarke Howell	1994	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Cabrini Homes Ext	1994	1	Large
Indianapolis Housing Authority	Concord Village, Eagle Creek	1994	1	Small
Housing Authority of New Orleans	Desire	1994	1	Large
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Lafayette Court	1994	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Detroit	Parkside Homes	1994	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Detroit	Jeffries Homes	1994	1	Large
St. Louis Housing Authority	Darst-Webbe	1994	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Charlotte	Earle Village	1994	1	Small
Camden Housing Authority	McGuire Gardens	1994	1	Small

Newark Housing Authority	Walsh Homes	1994	1	Small
Columbus Housing Authority	Windsor Terrace	1994	1	Small
Springfield Housing Authority	John Hay Homes, Charles Grandon Apt, Johnson Park	1994	1	Large
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Richard Allen Homes	1994	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Allequippae Terrace	1994	1	Small
Housing Authority of Puerto Rico	Crisantimos & M.A. Perez	1994	1	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	LeMoyne Gardens	1994	1	Large
Nashville Housing Authority	Kennedy Brothers Memorial Apartments	1994	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Dallas	Lakewest/West Dallas	1994	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of El Paso	Kennedy Brothers Memorial Apartments	1994	1	Small
Houston Housing Authority	Allen Parkway Village	1994	1	Large
San Antonio Housing Authority	Mirasol Homes	1994	1	Large

San Antonio Housing Authority	Springview Apts	1994	1	Small
Austin Housing Authority	Meadowbrook Homes	1994	0	n/a
Virgin Islands Housing Authority	Donoe Housing , Louis E. Brown	1994	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Hillside Terrace	1994	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Manchester	1995	1	Small
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority	Carver Park	1995	1	Large
San Francisco Housing Authority	Hayes Valley	1995	1	Small
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Lexington Terrace	1995	1	Large
Indianapolis Housing Authority	Concord Village, Eagle Creek	1995	1	Small
Boston Housing Authority	Orchard Park	1995	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of El Paso	Kennedy Brothers Memorial Apartments	1995	1	Small
St. Louis Housing Authority	Darst-Webbe	1995	1	Large

Memphis Housing Authority	LeMoyne Gardens	1995	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Detroit	Parkside Homes	1995	1	Large
New York City Housing Authority	Arverne House	1995	1	Small
Seattle Housing Authority	Holly Park	1995	1	Large
San Antonio Housing Authority	Mirasol Homes	1995	1	Large
Cleveland Housing Authority	Woodhill Homes Estate	1995	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Tucson	Connie Chambers	1995	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Manchester	1995	1	Large
Austin Housing Authority	Chalmers Courts and Rosewood Courts	1995	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Perry Homes	1995	1	Large
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Flag House and Murphy Homes	1995	1	Large
Boston Housing Authority	Orchard Park	1995	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Chester	Lamokin Village and McCaffey Village	1995	1	Large

Chicago Housing Authority	ABLA, Henry Horner, and Rockwell Gardens	1995	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Columbus	Sullivan Gardens, Georgesville Hollow, and Linton Gardens	1995	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Dallas	Roseland	1995	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Denver	Curtis Park Homes	1995	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Detroit	Parkside Addition, Herman Gardens, and Gardenview	1995	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of El Paso	Rafael Marmolejo, Jr., Ruben Salazar Park, and Sherman Park	1995	1	Large
Jacksonville Housing Authority	Durkeeville	1995	1	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Lauderdale Courts, Fowler Homes, and Hurt Village	1995	1	Large
Nashville Housing Authority	Vine Hill Homes	1995	1	Small
Housing Authority of New Orleans	Fischer Development	1995	1	Large
New York City Housing Authority	Edgemere House and Arverne House	1995	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Oakland	Chestnut Court and Scattered sites	1995	1	Small

Philadelphia Housing Authority	MLK	1995	1	Large
Housing Authority of Puerto Rico	Ramos Antonini	1995	1	Large
San Antonio Housing Authority	Cassiano Homes and Wheatley Courts	1995	1	Large
San Francisco Housing Authority	North Beach	1995	1	Small
Seattle Housing Authority	Rainer Vista	1995	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Spartanburg	Tobe Hartwell and Phyllis Goins	1995	1	Small
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	Sheridan Terrace	1995	1	Small
Housing Authority of the Birmingham District	Elyton Village	1996	0	n/a
Jasper Housing Authority	Carver Courts	1996	0	n/a
Mobile Housing Board	Josephine B. Allen Homes	1996	0	Small
Little Rock Housing Authority	Joseph A Booker Homes	1996	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of North Little Rock	Eastgate Terrace	1996	0	n/a

City of South Tucson Housing Authority	Activity Center	1996	0	n/a
City of South Tucson Housing Authority	Connie Chambers	1996	1	Small
Housing Authority of the County of Kern	Oro Vista and Adelante Vista	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles	Aliso Village	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the County of Contra Costa	Las Deltas	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Oakland	Coliseum Gardens	1996	0	Small
Oxnard Housing Authority	Colonia Village	1996	0	n/a
Sacramento County Housing Authority	Franklin Villa	1996	0	n/a
City and County of San Francisco Housing Authority	Eddy Street	1996	1	Small
City and County of San Francisco Housing Authority	North Beach	1996	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City and County of Denver	Curtis Park	1996	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pueblo	Sangre de Cristo Apartments	1996	1	Small
Hartford Housing Authority	Harriet Beecher Stowe Village	1996	1	Small
Hartford Housing Authority	Bellevue Square	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Middletown	Long River Village	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Stamford	Southfield Village	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	West Rock and Brookside	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	McConaughy Terrace	1996	1	Small
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	Fort Dupont Addition, Stoddert Terrace	1996	1	Small
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	Valley Green	1996	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	Park Morton	1996	0	n/a
Wilmington Housing Authority	Eastlake and Riverside	1996	0	n/a
Jacksonville Housing Authority	Durkeeville	1996	0	n/a
Metro Dade Housing Agency	Scott Homes	1996	0	Large
Ocala Housing Authority	Forest View, N.H. Jones	1996	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Orlando	Orange Villa	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of St. Petersburg	Jordan Park	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Tampa	Ponce De Leon	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Tampa	Riverview Terrace	1996	1	Small
Alma Housing Authority	Queen City Heights	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Kimberly Courts	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Perry Homes	1996	1	Large

Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Carver Homes	1996	1	Large
Housing Authority of Fulton County	Boatrock Community Townhouses	1996	0	Small
Housing Authority of Savannah	Marcus Stubbs Towers	1996	1	Small
Housing Authority of Savannah	Garden Home Estate and Garden Homes	1996	0	Small
State of Hawaii Housing Authority	Kuhio Park Terrace	1996	0	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Dearborn Homes	1996	0	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Robert Taylor Homes	1996	1	Large
Housing Authority East St. Louis	Orr Weathers	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority East St. Louis	North Park Tower	1996	1	Small
Fort Wayne Housing Authority	Miami Village	1996	0	Small
Housing Authority of Michigan City	Harborside Homes	1996	0	n/a
Muncie Housing Authority	Munsyana Homes	1996	0	Small
The Housing Authority of the City of South Bend	Northwest	1996	0	Small

City of Topeka Housing Authority	Northland Manor	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Hopkinsville	Pennyville Homes	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Louisville	Cotter and Lang Homes	1996	1	Large
Housing Authority of New Orleans	St. Thomas	1996	1	Large
Brockton Housing Authority	Crescent Court	1996	0	n/a
Fall River Housing Authority	Sunset Hill	1996	0	n/a
Holyoke Housing Authority	Jackson Parkway	1996	1	Small
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Fairfield Homes	1996	1	Small
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Hollander Ridge	1996	1	Small
Detroit Housing Commission	Jeffries	1996	1	Large
Detroit Housing Commission	Herman Gardens	1996	1	Large
Housing Commission Muskegon Heights	East Park Manor, East Side Courts	1996	0	n/a
Pontiac Housing Commission	Lakeside Homes	1996	0	Small

Saginaw Housing Commission	Daniels Heights (MI 6-1)	1996	1	Small
Saginaw Housing Commission	Daniels Heights (MI 6-1)	1996	0	n/a
Housing and Redevelopment Authority of Winona	Arthur C. Thurley Homes	1996	0	n/a
Minneapolis Public Housing Authority	Bryant Highrises	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Columbia MO	Bear Creek	1996	1	Small
Housing Authority of Kansas City	Theron B. Watkins	1996	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Richland	Richland	1996	0	n/a
St. Louis Housing Authority	Carr Square Apartments	1996	0	n/a
St. Louis Housing Authority	Cabanne Court Apartments	1996	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Las Vegas	Evergreen Arms	1996	0	Small
Atlantic City Housing Authority	Shore Park	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Jersey City	Curries Wood	1996	0	n/a

New Brunswick Housing Authority	New Brunswick Homes	1996	0	n/a
Newark Housing Authority	Hayes Homes	1996	1	Large
Newark Housing Authority	Kretchmer Homes	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Paterson	Christopher Columbus Homes	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Paterson	Dean McNulty	1996	1	Small
Housing Authority of the Township of Woodbridge	Woodbridge Garden Apartments	1996	0	n/a
Albany Housing Authority	Steamboat Square	1996	0	n/a
Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority	Lakeview Homes	1996	0	Large
Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority	Commodore Perry	1996	1	Small
New York City Housing Authority	Edgemere Houses	1996	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Charlotte	Dalton Village	1996	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Greensboro	Morningside Homes	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of High Point	Springfield Townhouses	1996	0	n/a
Mid-East Regional Housing Authority	Mid-East Regional	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Wilmington	Robert S. Jervay Place	1996	1	Small
Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority	Elizabeth Park Homes	1996	0	Small
Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority	Laurel Homes	1996	0	Large
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority	Riverview	1996	1	Small
Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority	Linton Gardens	1996	0	Small
Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority	Southern Dayton View	1996	0	n/a
Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority	Westlake Terrace	1996	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the City of Chester	Lamokin Village	1996	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Chester	McCaffery Village	1996	1	Small
Chester County Housing Authority	Oak Street	1996	0	n/a
Harrisburg Housing Authority	Hall Manor	1996	0	n/a
McKeesport Housing Authority	Crawford Village, Harrison Village	1996	0	n/a
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Schuylkill Falls	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Allequippa Terrace	1996	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Bedford Additions	1996	1	Small
Allegheny County Housing Authority	McKees Rocks Terrace	1996	0	n/a
Puerto Rico Housing Administration	Las Acacias, Puerta de Tierra	1996	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Spartanburg	Tobe Hartwell Courts, Tobe Hartwell Extension	1996	1	Small
Franklin Housing Authority	Spring Street	1996	0	n/a

Memphis Housing Authority	Hurt Village, Lauderdale Courts	1996	0	Large
Memphis Housing Authority	Foote Homes	1996	1	Small
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency	Vine Hill Homes	1996	0	n/a
Austin Housing Authority	Chalmers Court	1996	0	n/a
Beaumont Housing Authority	Concord Homes	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Corpus Christi	D. N. Leathers II	1996	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Dallas	Roseland Homes	1996	0	Large
Housing Authority of the City of El Paso	Ruben Salazar Park	1996	0	Small
Fort Worth Housing Authority	Whispering Oaks	1996	0	n/a
Mercedes Housing Authority	Ebony Homes	1996	0	n/a
Olney Housing Authority	Bluebonnet	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Orange	Arthur Robinson	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of	Villa de La Esperanza	1996	0	n/a

Pharr				
San Antonio Housing Authority	Menchaca Homes	1996	1	Small
San Antonio Housing Authority	Alazan Apache Courts	1996	0	n/a
Danville Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Liberty View	1996	0	n/a
Newport News Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Lassiter Courts	1996	0	n/a
Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Ida Barbour	1996	0	Small
Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Blackwell	1996	0	n/a
Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Lincoln Terrace	1996	0	n/a
Virgin Islands Housing Authority	Estate Donoe Housing Community	1996	0	n/a
Seattle Housing Authority	High Point	1996	0	n/a
Seattle Housing Authority	Roxbury Village	1996	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Tacoma	Salishan	1996	0	Large

Housing Authority of the City of Tacoma	Hillside Terrace	1996	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Charleston	Orchard Manor	1996	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Wheeling	Grandview Manor	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Parklawn	1996	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Chester	Lamokin Village	1996	1	n/a
Chicago Housing Authority	ABLA, Brooks Extension	1996	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Henry Horner	1996	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Detroit	Parkside Addition, Herman Gardens, and Gardenview	1996	1	n/a
Jacksonville Housing Authority	Durkeeville	1996	1	Small
Mobile Housing Board	Josephine B. Allen Homes	1997	0	Small
Housing Authority of the Birmingham District	Elyton Village	1997	0	n/a
Jasper Housing Authority	Carver Courts	1997	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Helena	Scattered Sites	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Fort Smith	Ragon Homes	1997	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Texarkana	Pinehurst Village	1997	0	n/a
Little Rock Housing Authority	Joseph A Booker Homes	1997	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Van Buren	Van Buren	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Sacramento	Ping Yuen Center	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Oakland	Coliseum Gardens	1997	0	Small
Oxnard Housing Authority	Colonia Village	1997	0	n/a
San francisco Housing Authority	North Beach	1997	0	Small
San francisco Housing Authority	Valencia Gardens	1997	1	Small
Housing Authority of the County of Riverside	Midway Capri Apartments	1997	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles	Aliso Village	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the County of Contra Costa	Las Deltas	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the County of San Joaquin	Sierra Vista Homes	1997	0	Small
Sacramento County Housing Authority	Scattered Sites	1997	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City and County of Denver	Arapahoe Courts	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City and County of Denver	Curtis Park	1997	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Stamford	Southfield Village	1997	1	Large
Hartford Housing Authority	Stowe Village	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Middletown	Long River Village	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Bridgeport	Marina Village Apartments	1997	0	Small

Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	Valley Green/Skytower	1997	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Orlando	Colonial Park	1997	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Bradenton	Rogers Garden Park Apartments	1997	0	Small
Oscale Housing Authority	NH Jones/Forest View	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Tampa	Ponce de Leon, College Hill	1997	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Lakeland	Washington Park Homes	1997	0	Small
Metro Dade Housing Agency	Scott Homes	1997	0	Large
Housing Authority of the City of St. Petersburg	Jordan Park	1997	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Monroe	George Walton Homes	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Kimberly Courts	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Harris Homes	1997	0	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Clayton	Duckett, Shadyside Drive	1997	0	Small
Granite City Housing Authority	Kirkpatrick Homes	1997	0	Small
Housing Authority of Champagin County	Lakeside Terrace	1997	0	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	ABLA	1997	0	n/a
Peoria Housing Authority	Colonel John Warner Homes	1997	1	Small
Housing Authority East St. Louis	Orr-Weathers	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Fort Wayne	Miami Village	1997	0	Small
Indianapolis Housing Agency	Beechwood Gardens	1997	0	n/a
The Housing Authority of the City of South Bend	Plaza Gardens	1997	0	n/a
The Housing Authority of the City of South Bend	Northwest Apartments	1997	0	Small
Evansville Housing Authority	Lincoln Garden, Erie Homes	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Michigan City	Harborside Homes	1997	0	n/a

Housing Authority of Kansas City	Juniper Gardens	1997	0	Small
Lexington Fayette Urban County Housing Authority	Charlotte Court	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Morgan City	Brownell Homes	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of New Orleans	St. Thomas	1997	0	Large
Housing Authority of New Orleans	CJ Peete	1997	0	n/a
New Bedford Housing Authority	Caroline Street Apartments	1997	0	n/a
Boston Housing Authority	Washington-Beech	1997	0	Small
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Murphy Homes, Julian Gardens	1997	1	Large
Saginaw Housing Commission	Daniel Heights	1997	0	n/a
Detroit Housing Commission	Charles Terrace	1997	0	Small
Housing and Redevelopment Authority of Winona	Arthur C. Thurley Homes	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Kansas City	Heritage House	1997	1	Small
Metro Dade Housing Agency	Carr Square Apartments	1997	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the City of Wellston	Scattered Sites	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Meridian	Victory Village	1997	0	Small
Helena Housing Authority	Scattered Sites	1997	1	Small
Mid-East Regional Housing Authority	Scattered Sites	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Charlotte	Fairview Homes	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh	Dandridge Downs	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh	Halifax Court	1997	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of High Point	Springfield Townhouses	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Durham	Few Gardens	1997	0	Small
Rochingham Housing Authority	Westside Terrace, Oakdale Terrace	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Wilmington	Nesbitt Courts	1997	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the city of Winston-Salem	Kimberly Park Terrace	1997	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Greensboro	Morningside Homes	1997	0	n/a
Forest City Housing Authority	Amity Apartments	1997	0	n/a
Sanford Housing Authority	Garden Street Apartments	1997	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Paterson	Christopher Columbus Homes	1997	1	Small
New Brunswick Housing and Urban Development Authority	New Brunswick Homes	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the Township of Woodbridge	Woodbridge Garden Apartments	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Jersey City	Curries Woods	1997	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Elizabeth	Pioneer Homes, Migliore Manor	1997	1	Large
Newark Housing Authority	Kretchmer Homes	1997	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the City of Las Vegas	Cragin Homes	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Las Vegas	Evergreens	1997	0	Small
Albany Housing Authority	Steamboat Square	1997	0	n/a
Albany Housing Authority	Edwin Corning Homes	1997	0	n/a
Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority	Lakeview Homes	1997	1	Large
Municipal Housing Authority of Yonkers	Mulford Gardens	1997	0	Large
New York City Housing Authority	Prospect Plaza	1997	0	Small
Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority	Brand Whitlock Homes	1997	0	n/a
Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority	Linton Gardens	1997	0	Small
Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority	Lincoln Garden	1997	0	Small
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority	King Kennedy North	1997	0	Small

Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority	Summit Court	1997	0	n/a
Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority	Grandview Apartments	1997	1	Small
Chester County Housing Authority	McCaffery Village	1997	0	n/a
Chester County Housing Authority	Scattered Sites	1997	1	Small
McKeesport Housing Authority	Harrison Village	1997	0	n/a
Allegheny County Housing Authority	McKees Rocks Terrace	1997	1	Small
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Schuylkill Falls	1997	1	Small
Puerto Rico Housing Administration	New Puerta de Tierra	1997	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Columbia SC	Jaggers Terrace	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Greenville	Woodland Homes, Pearce Homes	1997	0	Small
Town of Crossville Housing Authority	Rosewood Terrace	1997	0	n/a
Memphis Housing Authority	Fowler Homes	1997	0	n/a

Memphis Housing Authority	Hurt Village	1997	0	Small
West Memphis Housing Authority	Scattered Sites	1997	0	n/a
Chattanooga Housing Authority	McCallie Homes	1997	0	Small
Knoxville's Community Development Corporation	College Homes	1997	1	Small
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency	Vine Hill Homes	1997	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of El Paso	Ruben Salazar Park	1997	0	Small
San Antonio Housing Authority	Menchaca Homes	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Mercedes	Ebony Homes	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Pharr	Villa De La Esperanza	1997	0	n/a
Austin Housing Authority	Chalmers Court	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Lubbock	Green Fair Manor	1997	0	Small
Houston Housing Authority	Allen Parkway Village	1997	1	Large

Housing Authority of the City of Dallas	Roseland Homes	1997	0	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Corpus Christi	D.N. Leathers II	1997	0	Small
Fort Worth Housing Authority	Whispering Oaks	1997	0	n/a
Newport News Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Marshall Courts, Orcutt Homes	1997	0	n/a
Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Lincoln Terrace	1997	0	n/a
Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Blackwell	1997	1	Small
Danville Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Liberty View	1997	0	n/a
Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Ida Barbour	1997	1	Small
Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Samuel Madden Homes	1997	0	Small
Seattle Housing Authority	High Point	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Tacoma	Salishan	1997	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Parklawn	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Charleston	Orchard Manor	1997	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Charleston	Washington Manor	1997	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of El Paso	Ruben Salazar Park	1998	0	Small
Puerto Rico Housing Administration	New Puerta de Tierra	1998	0	Small
Housing Authority of Fort Wayne	Miami Village	1998	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Gary	Duneland Village	1998	0	Small
San Antonio Housing Authority	Cassiano Homes	1998	0	n/a
Beaumont Housing Authority	Concord	1998	0	n/a
Memphis Housing Authority	Hurt Village	1998	0	Small
Indianapolis Housing Agency	Brokenburr Trails	1998	0	Small
Indianapolis Housing Agency	Clearstream/Georgetown	1998	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the City and County of Denver	Curtis Park and Arapahoe Courts	1998	1	Small
New Brunswick Housing and Urban Development Authority	New Brunswick Homes	1998	1	Small
Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority	Brand Whitlock Homes	1998	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Kansas City	Juniper Gardens	1998	0	Small
Mobile Housing Board	Central Plaza Towers - Elderly Application	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the Birmingham District	Elyton Village	1998	0	n/a
Greater Gadsden Housing Authority	Myrtlewood Homes	1998	0	Small
Housing Authority of the Township of Woodbridge	Woodbridge Garden Apartments	1998	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Charlotte	Fairview Homes	1998	1	n/a
Chattanooga Housing Authority	McCallie Homes	1998	0	Small

Granite City Housing Authority	Kirkpatrick Homes	1998	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Oakland	Chestnut Court and 1114-14th Street	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Richmond	Easter Hill Village	1998	0	n/a
Evansville Housing Authority	Erie Homes	1998	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Bradenton	Rogers Garden Park Apartments and Addition	1998	0	Small
Albany Housing Authority	Edwin Corning Homes	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh	Halifax Court	1998	0	Small
Atlantic City Housing Authority	Shore Park and Shore Terrace	1998	0	n/a
Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority	Taylor Terrace	1998	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of High Point	Springfield Townhouses	1998	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Champagin County	Lakeside Terrace	1998	0	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Camden	Westfield Acres	1998	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Williamson	Victoria Court	1998	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Williamson	Williamson Terrace	1998	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Wheeling	Grandview Manor/Lincoln Homes	1998	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Charleston	Orchard Manor	1998	0	Small
Huntington Housing Authority	Northcott Court	1998	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Durham	Few Gardens/Liberty Street	1998	0	Small
Seattle Housing Authority	Roxbury House & Roxbury Village	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of North Charleston	North Park Village	1998	0	Large
Housing Authority of Greenville	Woodland Homes, Pearce Homes	1998	0	Small
Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority	Lincoln Garden	1998	1	Large

Wilmington Housing Authority	Eastlake Neighborhood	1998	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	ABLA - Abbott, Addams, Brooks Extension	1998	1	Large
St. Louis Housing Authority	Carr Square Apartments	1998	0	n/a
Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Lincoln Terrace	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Flag House Courts	1998	1	Small
Harrisburg Housing Authority	Jackson Tower - Elderly Application	1998	0	Small
Chester County Housing Authority	McCaffery Village	1998	1	Small
McKeesport Housing Authority	Harrison Village	1998	0	n/a
Hartford Housing Authority	Harriet Beecher Stowe Village	1998	0	Large
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	Frederick Douglas and Stanton Dwellings	1998	0	Small
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority	Woodhill Homes Estate	1998	0	n/a
Slidell Housing Authority	Washington Heights	1998	0	Small

Housing Authority of New Orleans	CJ Peete	1998	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Salisbury	Lincoln Park	1998	0	n/a
Newark Housing Authority	Kretchmer Homes	1998	0	n/a
Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority	Edgewood Court, Metro Gardens	1998	0	Small
San Francisco Housing Authority	Velasco Elderly Housing - Elderly Application	1998	0	n/a
Houston Housing Authority	Clayton Homes	1998	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Dallas	Roseland Homes	1998	1	Large
Saginaw Housing Commission	Daniel Heights	1998	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Meridian	Victory Village	1998	0	Small
New Bedford Housing Authority	Caroline Street Apartments - Elderly Application	1998	0	n/a
Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority	A.D. Price Courts and Extensions	1998	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Greensboro	Morningside Homes	1998	1	Small

Detroit Housing Commission	Charles Terrace	1998	0	Small
Allegheny County Housing Authority	Groveton Village	1998	0	Small
Allegheny County Housing Authority	Homestead Apartments - Elderly Application	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Parklawn	1998	1	Large
Mid-East Regional Housing Authority	Scattered sites	1998	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles	Aliso Village	1998	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Lakeland	Washington Park Homes and Lake Ridge	1998	0	Small
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Martin Luther King Plaza	1998	1	Large
Merryville Housing Authority	Merryville Development Center	1998	0	n/a
Lexington Fayette Urban County Housing Authority	Charlotte Court	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Bridgeport	Marina Village Apartments	1998	0	Small

Metro Dade Housing Agency	Ward Towers - Elderly Application	1998	1	Small
Metro Dade Housing Agency	Scott Homes	1998	0	Large
Cambridge Housing Authority	John F. Kennedy Apartments - Elderly Application	1998	1	Small
Boston Housing Authority	Washington-Beech	1998	0	Small
New York City Housing Authority	Prospect Plaza	1998	1	Small
Danville Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Liberty View	1998	0	Small
Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Samuel Madden Homes	1998	1	Small
Sacramento County Housing Authority	Alkali Flats	1998	0	Small
Sacramento County Housing Authority	Franklin Villa	1998	0	n/a
Sacramento County Housing Authority	Dos Rios	1998	0	Small
Ocala Housing Authority	Forest Hills/NH Jones	1998	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Sarasota	Cohen Way	1998	0	n/a

West Palm Beach Housing Authority	Pleasant City Village	1998	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Carver Homes	1998	1	Large
Housing Authority of Fulton County	Boat Rock	1998	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Waycross	Bailey Heights	1998	0	Small
Alexander County Housing Authority	McBride Place	1998	0	Small
Decatur Housing Authority	Long View Place and Concord	1998	0	Small
City of Topeka Housing Authority	Northland Manor	1998	0	n/a
Red Lake Falls Housing and Redevelopment Authority	Fairview Manor - Elderly Application	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Laurel	West Beacon	1998	0	Small
Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority	Elizabeth Park Homes	1998	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Tulsa	Osage Hills	1998	1	Small

Virgin Islands Housing Authority	Louis E. Brown	1998	0	Small
Danbury Housing Authority	Laurel Gardens	1998	1	Small
Middletown Housing Authority	Long River Village	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Perry Homes	1998	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Wells Extension	1998	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Washington Park Homes	1998	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Darrow Homes	1998	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Brooks Homes	1998	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Brooks Extension	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of New Orleans	C.J. Peete	1998	1	Large
Housing Authority of New Orleans	Desire	1998	1	Large
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Broadway	1998	1	Small
Detroit Housing Commission	Herman Gardens	1998	1	Small

Pontiac Housing Commission	Lakeside Homes	1998	1	Small
Minneapolis Public Housing Authority	Glenwood, Lyndale Towers	1998	1	Small
Housing and Redevelopment Authority of Winona	Arthur C Thurley	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Columbia MO	Bear Creek	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Las Vegas	Ernie Cragin Terrace	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Las Vegas	Evergreen Arms	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Camden	Westfield Acres	1998	1	Large
Albany Housing Authority	Steamboat Square	1998	1	Small
Albany Housing Authority	Lincoln Park Homes	1998	1	Small
Utica Housing Authority	Goldbas Homes	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of High Point	Springfield Townhouses	1998	1	Small
Mid-East Regional Housing Authority	Scattered sites	1998	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh	Dandridge Downs	1998	1	Small
Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority	Elizabeth Park Homes	1998	1	Small
Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority	Linton Gardens	1998	1	Small
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority	Outhwaite Homes and King Kennedy North	1998	1	Large
Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority	Summit Court	1998	1	Small
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Scattered sites	1998	1	Small
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Richard Allen Homes	1998	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Addison Terrace High Rise	1998	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Northview Heights	1998	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	St. Clair Village	1998	1	Large

Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Garfield Heights Tower	1998	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Auburn Tower	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Arlington Heights	1998	1	Large
Franklin Housing Authority	Spring Street	1998	1	Small
Lebanon Housing Authority	Upton Heights	1998	1	Small
Lebanon Housing Authority	Inman Court	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Corpus Christi	DN Leathers II	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Mercedes	Ebony Homes	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Mercedes	La Retama	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pharr	Villa de la Esperanza	1998	1	Small
San Antonio Housing Authority	Villa Veramendi Homes	1998	1	Small

San Antonio Housing Authority	Rex Apartments	1998	1	Small
San Antonio Housing Authority	San Juan Homes	1998	1	Small
San Antonio Housing Authority	Alazan Apache	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Charleston	Orchard Manor	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Parklawn	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Carver Homes	1998	1	n/a
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Flag House	1998	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Chester	McCaffey Village	1998	1	n/a
Chicago Housing Authority	ABLA: Abbott, Addams, Brooks Extension	1998	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Dallas	Roseland	1998	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Denver	Curtis Park Homes	1998	1	Small
Housing Authority of Kansas City	Heritage House II	1998	1	Small

Housing Authority of the Birmingham District	Metropolitan Gardens	1999	1	Large
Greater Gadsden Housing Authority	Myrtlewood Homes	1999	0	Small
City of Phoenix Housing Department	Westside	1999	0	n/a
City of Phoenix Housing Department	Eastside	1999	0	n/a
San Francisco Housing Authority	Hunters View	1999	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Oakland	Westwood Gardens	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles	Dana Strand Village	1999	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Richmond	Easter Hill Village	1999	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Bridgeport	Marina Village Apartments	1999	0	Small
Hartford Housing Authority	Harriet Beecher Stowe Village	1999	0	Large
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	Frederick Douglas and Stanton Dwellings	1999	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Tampa	Riverview Terrace/Dyer	1999	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Orlando	Carver Courts	1999	0	n/a
Metro Dade Housing Agency	Scott/Carver Homes	1999	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Daytona Beach	Bethune Village/Halifax Park	1999	0	Small
West Palm Beach Housing Authority	Pleasant City Village	1999	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Lakeland	Washington Park Homes and Lake Ridge	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Bradenton	Rogers Garden Park Apartments and Addition	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Joel Chandler Harris Homes	1999	1	Large
Housing Authority of Fulton County	Boat Rock	1999	0	n/a
Decatur Housing Authority	Long View Place	1999	1	Small
Granite City Housing Authority	Kirkpatrick Homes	1999	0	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Bloomington, Ill.	Sunnyside Court	1999	0	n/a
Evansville Housing Authority	Erie Homes	1999	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Fort Wayne	Miami Village	1999	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Gary	Duneland Village	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of Kansas City	Juniper Gardens	1999	0	Small
City of Topeka Housing Authority	Pine Ridge Apartments	1999	0	Small
Newport Housing Authority	Newport Neighborhood	1999	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Hazard	Walkertown	1999	0	Small
Housing Authority of New Orleans	William J. Fisher Homes	1999	0	n/a
Housing Authority of East Baton Rouge	Oklahoma Street/East B	1999	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Bossier City	Riverview Circle	1999	0	n/a
Slidell Housing Authority	Washington Heights	1999	0	Small

Boston Housing Authority	Washington-Beech	1999	0	Small
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Broadway Homes	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Cherry Hill	1999	0	Large
Detroit Housing Commission	Charles Terrace	1999	0	Small
Pontiac Housing Commission	Lakeside Homes	1999	0	Small
Saginaw Housing Commission	Daniel Heights	1999	0	n/a
Ypsilanti Housing Commission	Parkridge Homes	1999	0	Small
Housing and Redevelopment Authority of Virginia	Pine Mill Court	1999	0	n/a
St. Louis Housing Authority	Carr Square Apartments	1999	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Biloxi	Bayou Auguste/Bayview Homes	1999	0	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh	Halifax Court	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of High Point	Springfield Townhouses	1999	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Salisbury	Lincoln Park Apartments	1999	0	n/a
Newark Housing Authority	Stella Wright Homes	1999	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Camden	Westfield Acres	1999	0	Small
Atlantic City Housing Authority	Shore Park/Shore Terrace	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of the Township of Woodbridge	Woodbridge Garden Apartments	1999	0	Small
East Orange Housing Authority	Acadian Gardens	1999	0	Small
New York City Housing Authority	University Avenue	1999	0	Small
New York City Housing Authority	Dr. Betances III	1999	0	Small
Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority	Laurel Homes	1999	1	Large
Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority	Edgewood Court, Metro Gardens	1999	1	Small
Allegheny County Housing Authority	Groveton Village	1999	0	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Addison Terrace Additions	1999	0	Large
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Martin Luther King Plaza	1999	0	n/a
Puerto Rico Housing Administration	New Puerta de Tierra	1999	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Newport, RI	Tonomy Hill	1999	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Columbia SC	Saxon Homes	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Greenville	Woodland/Pearce	1999	1	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Hurt Village	1999	0	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Lauderdale Courts	1999	0	Small
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency	Preston Taylor Homes	1999	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of El Paso	Ruben Salazar Park	1999	0	Small
San Antonio Housing Authority	Victoria Courts	1999	0	Small

Housing Authority of Lubbock	Green Fair Manor	1999	0	Small
Beaumont Housing Authority	Concord	1999	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Mission, TX	Anacua Village	1999	0	n/a
Danville Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Liberty View	1999	0	Small
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Roberts Village/Bowling Green	1999	0	Large
Virgin Islands Housing Authority	Louis E. Brown	1999	0	Small
Seattle Housing Authority	Rainier Vista Garden	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Lapham Park	1999	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Charleston	Orchard Manor	1999	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Wheeling	Grandview Manor/Lincoln Homes	1999	1	Small
Huntington Housing Authority	Northcott Court	1999	0	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Huntsville	Dr. Joseph F. Drake Tower	1999	1	Small
Mobile Housing Board	Josephine Allen Homes	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles	Aliso Village	1999	1	Large
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	High Land Addition	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	East Capitol Dwellings	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of Fulton County	Boat Rock	1999	1	Small
Winnebago County Housing Authority	Champion Park Apartments	1999	1	Small
Virgin Islands Housing Authority	Estate Donoe	1999	1	Small
The Bristol Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Rice Terrace Extension	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Tacoma	Salishan	1999	1	Large
Housing Authority of Lubbock	Green Fair Manor	1999	1	Small

San Antonio Housing Authority	Victoria Courts	1999	1	Small
Fort Wayne Housing Authority	Miami Village	1999	1	Small
The Housing Authority of Ashland	DeBord Terrace	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of New Orleans	St. Thomas	1999	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Elizabeth	Migliore Manor	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Jersey City	Pioneer Homes	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Jersey City	A. Harry Moore Bldg 3	1999	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Jersey City	A. Harry Moore Bldg 5	1999	1	Large
Weymouth Housing Authority	Cadman Towers	1999	1	Small
Detroit Housing Commission	Frederick Douglas	1999	1	Large
Detroit Housing Commission	Herman Gardens	1999	1	Small
St. Louis Housing Authority	Webbe Elderly	1999	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Columbia SC	Hendley Homes	1999	1	Small
Cookeville Housing Authority	Judge O.K. Holladay	1999	1	Small
New York City Housing Authority	Prospect Plaza	1999	1	Small
Troy Housing Authority	Ahern Apartments	1999	1	Small
Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority	Westlake Terrace Homes	1999	1	Large
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Scattered sites	1999	1	Small
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Cambridge Plaza	1999	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Addison Terrace	1999	1	Large
Housing Authority of the County of Washington	Highland Terrace	1999	1	Small
Greater Gadsden Housing Authority	Myrtlewood Homes	2000	0	Small
City of Tucson Community Services Department	Robert F. Kennedy Homes	2000	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Fort Smith	Ragon Homes	2000	0	Small
Little Rock Housing Authority	Hollinsworth Grove	2000	0	Small
Osceola Housing Authority	Rosenwald	2000	0	n/a
West Memphis Housing Authority	Courtyard Apartments	2000	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Fresno	Yosemite Village	2000	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles	Dana Strand Village	2000	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Oakland	Coliseum Gardens	2000	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Richmond	Easter Hill	2000	1	Small
San Francisco Housing Authority	Hunter's View	2000	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	West Rock	2000	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	East Capitol Dwellings, Capitol View Plaza	2000	1	Large

Housing Authority of the City of Daytona Beach	Bethune Village/Halifax Park	2000	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Orlando	Carver Courts	2000	0	n/a
Sanford Housing Authority	Monroe, Higgin, Moughton	2000	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Tampa	Riverview Terrace, Tom Dyer Homes	2000	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Titusville	Henry Maxwell Court	2000	0	Small
West Palm Beach Housing Authority	Pleasant City	2000	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Capitol Homes	2000	0	Large
Housing Authority of Fulton County	Red Oak	2000	0	Small
Macon Housing Authority	Oglethorpe Homes	2000	0	Small
Housing Authority of Savannah	Garden Homes	2000	1	Small
Housing and Community Development Corporation of Hawaii	Mayor Wright Homes	2000	0	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Madden/Wells/Darrow	2000	1	Large

Granite City Housing Authority	Kirkpatrick Homes	2000	0	Small
Winnebago County Housing Authority	Champion Park Apartments	2000	0	Small
Evansville Housing Authority	Erie Homes	2000	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Gary	Ivanhoe Gardens	2000	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Muncie	Millenium Place	2000	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Vincennes	Sunset Court	2000	0	Small
Housing Authority of Kansas City	Juniper Gardens	2000	0	Small
Housing Authority of Hazard	Walkertown, Highland Heights	2000	0	Small
Lexington Fayette Urban County Housing Authority	Bluegrass, Aspendale	2000	1	Small
Newport Housing Authority	Newport Neighborhood	2000	1	Small
Housing Authority of East Baton Rouge	Oklahoma Street, East Boulevard	2000	0	Small

Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Scattered-site A	2000	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Frederick	John Hanson/Taney	2000	0	Small
Hagerstown Housing Authority	Westview Homes	2000	0	Small
Boston Housing Authority	Maverick Gardens	2000	0	Small
Quincy Housing Authority	Germantown	2000	0	n/a
Benton Harbor Housing Commission	Whitfield Complex I	2000	0	n/a
Housing and Redevelopment Authority of Duluth	Harbor View Homes	2000	0	Small
Minneapolis Public Housing Authority	Near Northside	2000	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Biloxi	Bayview Homes, Bayou Auguste	2000	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Las Vegas	Evergreen Arms	2000	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Durham	Few Gardens	2000	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Camden	Westfield Acres	2000	1	Large

Housing Authority of the Township of Woodbridge	Woodbridge Garden Apartments	2000	0	Small
Albany Housing Authority	Lincoln Park Homes	2000	0	Small
Troy Housing Authority	Park Side Terrace	2000	0	n/a
Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority	Westlake Terrace Homes	2000	0	Large
Allegheny County Housing Authority	Homestead Apartments	2000	0	Small
Mercer County Housing Authority	Steel City Terrace Extension	2000	1	Small
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Cambridge, Ludlow	2000	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Garfield Heights	2000	0	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Newport, RI	Tonomy Hill	2000	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Columbia SC	Hendley Homes	2000	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Spartanburg	Woodworth Homes, Hub City Courts	2000	0	Small

Chattanooga Housing Authority	McCallie Homes	2000	1	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Hurt Village	2000	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of El Paso	Kathy White Memorial Apartments	2000	0	Small
Fort Worth Housing Authority	Butler Place/Butler Addition	2000	0	Small
Galveston Housing Authority	Palm Terrace	2000	0	Small
San Antonio Housing Authority	Victoria Courts	2000	0	Small
Danville Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Liberty View	2000	1	Small
Newport News Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Harbor Homes, Dickerson Courts	2000	0	Large
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Roberts Village, Bowling Green	2000	1	Large
Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Ida Barbour	2000	0	Small
Virgin Islands Housing Authority	Louis E. Brown	2000	1	Small
Seattle Housing Authority	High Point	2000	1	Large

Housing Authority of the City of Tacoma	Salishan	2000	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Lapham Park	2000	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Charleston	Littlepage Terrace, Orchard Manor	2000	0	Small
Little Rock Housing Authority	Booker Homes	2000	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Hartford	Stowe Village	2000	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Harris Homes	2000	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Douglas	West Bryan Homes 003	2000	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Douglas	West Bryan Homes 001	2000	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Douglas	Carver Homes	2000	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Lawndale	2000	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Brooks Extension	2000	1	Small

Chicago Housing Authority	Cabrini Homes Extension	2000	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Madden Park Homes	2000	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Stateway Gardens	2000	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Robert Taylor	2000	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Washington Park	2000	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Brooks Homes	2000	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Henry Horner	2000	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Rockwell Gardens	2000	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Stateway Gardens	2000	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Robert Taylor	2000	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Washington Park	2000	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Rockwell Gardens	2000	1	Small
Housing Authority of New Orleans	Florida	2000	1	Large

Housing Authority of the City of Jersey City	A. Harry Moore Bldg 4	2000	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Columbus	Taylor Terrace	2000	1	Small
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority	King Kennedy	2000	1	Small
Philadelphia Housing Authority	MLK	2000	1	Large
Seattle Housing Authority	Lake City Village	2000	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Lapham Park	2000	1	Small
Greater Gadsden Housing Authority	Myrtlewood Homes	2001	1	Small
Housing Authority of the Birmingham District	Metropolitan Gardens	2001	0	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Huntsville	Sparkman Homes	2001	0	Small
City of Phoenix Housing Department	Matthew Henson	2001	1	Small
Little Rock Housing Authority	Hollinsworth Grove	2001	0	Small

Housing Authority of the County of Contra Costa	Las Deltas Public Housing	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Fresno	Yosemite Village	2001	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles	Dana Strand Village	2001	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles	Dana Strand Village	2001	0	Small
San Francisco Housing Authority	Hunters View	2001	0	n/a
San Francisco Housing Authority	North Beach	2001	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	Rockview	2001	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	Rockview and Brookside	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	Sheffield Manor	2001	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	Winter Gardens	2001	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	Riverview	2001	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	East Capitol Dwellings, Capitol View Plaza	2001	0	Large
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	Arthur Capper/Carrollsborg	2001	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Bradenton	Rogers Garden Park Apartments and Addition	2001	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Daytona Beach	Bethune Village/Halifax Park	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Orlando	Carver Courts	2001	0	n/a
Palatka Housing Authority	Frank G. George Apartments	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Sarasota	Poe/Mitchell/Orange Ave./Courts	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Tampa	Riverview Terrace, Tom Dyer Homes	2001	1	Small
Miami-Dade Housing Agency	Liberty Square Homes	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Titusville	Henry Maxwell Court	2001	0	Small

West Palm Beach Housing Authority	Dunbar Village	2001	0	Small
West Palm Beach Housing Authority	Pleasant City	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Douglas	West Bryan Homes	2001	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Douglas	West Bryan Homes	2001	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Douglas	Carver Homes	2001	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the County of Douglas	Chicago Ave. Homes	2001	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Newnan	Hannah Homes	2001	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Newnan	Hannah Homes Addition	2001	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Capitol Homes	2001	1	Small
Macon Housing Authority	Oglethorpe Homes	2001	1	Small
Housing and Community Development Corporation of Hawaii	Kuhio Park Terrace	2001	0	Large

Housing and Community Development Corporation of Hawaii	Kalihi Valley Homes	2001	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Ida B Wells	2001	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Madden Park	2001	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Jane Addams	2001	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Grace Abbott	2001	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Rockwell Gardens	2001	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Rockwell Gardens	2001	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Stateway Gardens	2001	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Cabrini Extension	2001	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Robert Taylor	2001	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Robert Taylor	2001	1	Large
Housing Authority of the County of Cook	Mackler/Bergen/Sunrise	2001	0	Small

Granite City Housing Authority	Kirkpatrick Homes	2001	0	Small
Peoria Housing Authority	Harrison Homes	2001	0	Small
Winnebago County Housing Authority	Champion Park Apartments	2001	0	Small
The Housing Authority of the City of South Bend	Northwest	2001	1	Small
Indianapolis Housing Agency	Clearstream	2001	1	n/a
Indianapolis Housing Agency	Brokenburr	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of Fort Wayne	Miami Village	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Gary	Ivanhoe Gardens	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Muncie	Munsyana	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of Kansas City	Juniper Gardens	2001	1	Small
Housing Authority of Louisville	Iroquois Homes	2001	0	Large
Housing Authority of Louisville	Clarksdale	2001	0	Large

Lexington Fayette Urban County Housing Authority	Bluegrass, Aspendale	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of New Orleans	Fischer Highrise,	2001	1	Large
Housing Authority of New Orleans	Fischer Lowrise	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of New Orleans	Guste Homes	2001	0	Large
Housing Authority of East Baton Rouge	Oklahoma Street, East Boulevard	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Frederick	John Hanson/Taney	2001	0	Small
Hagerstown Housing Authority	Westview Homes	2001	1	Small
Boston Housing Authority	Maverick Gardens	2001	1	Small
Housing and Redevelopment Authority of Duluth	Harbor View Hillside	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Meridian	Victory Village	2001	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Meridian	Davis Courts	2001	0	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Meridian	Berry Courts	2001	0	Small
St. Louis Housing Authority	Cochran Gardens	2001	1	n/a
St. Louis Housing Authority	Vaughn Elderly	2001	1	Small
St. Louis Housing Authority	Blumeyer Family	2001	1	Large
St. Louis Housing Authority	Blumeyer Family	2001	1	Large
St. Louis Housing Authority	Paul Simon Elderly	2001	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Las Vegas	Weeks Plaza	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Salisbury	Lincoln Park Apartments	2001	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Charlotte	Piedmont Courts	2001	0	Small
East Orange Housing Authority	Arcadian Gardens	2001	0	Small
Orange City Housing Authority	Father Rasi Homes	2001	0	Small
Bridgeton Housing Authority	Cohansey View	2001	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Jersey City	Lafayette Gardens	2001	1	Small
Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority	Lakeview Homes	2001	1	Small
Syracuse Housing Authority	Pioneer Homes	2001	1	Large
Municipal Housing Authority of Yonkers	Mulford Gardens	2001	0	Large
Utica Housing Authority	Washington Courts	2001	0	n/a
Albany Housing Authority	Lincoln Park Homes	2001	0	Small
Troy Housing Authority	Park Side Terrace	2001	0	n/a
Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority	Lincoln Court	2001	1	Small
Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority	Laurel Homes	2001	0	Small
Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority	DeSoto Bass Courts	2001	1	Large
Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority	Parkside Homes	2001	1	n/a

Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority	Arlington Courts	2001	0	Small
Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority	Dunbar Manor	2001	1	Small
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority	Carver Park	2001	0	Large
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority	Carver Park	2001	0	Large
Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority	Westlake Terrace Homes	2001	0	Small
Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority	Elizabeth Park Homes	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of Portland	Columbia Villa	2001	1	Small
Mercer County Housing Authority	Steel City Terrace Extension	2001	0	Small
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Passyunk	2001	1	n/a
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Mill Creek	2001	1	Small
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Mill Creek	2001	1	Small

Philadelphia Housing Authority	Ludlow/Area Scattered Sites	2001	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Garfield Heights	2001	0	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Newport, RI	Tonomy Hill	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of North Charleston	North Park Village	2001	1	Large
Chattanooga Housing Authority	McCallie Homes	2001	0	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Lamar Terrace	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of El Paso	Kathy White Memorial Apartments	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of Lubbock	Green Fair Manor	2001	0	Small
Galveston Housing Authority	Palm Terrace and Addition	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of Dallas	Frazier Courts and Addition	2001	0	Small
San Antonio Housing Authority	Victoria Courts	2001	0	Small

Newport News Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Harbor Homes, Dickerson Courts	2001	0	Large
Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Ida Barbour	2001	0	Small
Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Washington Park	2001	1	n/a
Seattle Housing Authority	High Point Garden, Phase I	2001	1	Large
Seattle Housing Authority	High Point Garden, Phase II	2001	0	Large
Seattle Housing Authority	Holly Park Phase III	2001	1	Small
Seattle Housing Authority	Ranier Vista Garden Community	2001	0	n/a
King County Housing Authority	Park Lake Homes	2001	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Huntington	Northcott Court & Washington Square	2001	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Wheeling	Grandview Manor	2001	0	n/a
Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority	Elizabeth Park Homes	2002	1	Small
Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority	Elizabeth Park Homes	2002	1	Small

Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Samuel Madden	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of Fulton County	Red Oak	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of Fulton County	Red Oak	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of Fulton County	Red Oak	2002	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Capitol Homes	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Scattered-site A	2002	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Scattered-site B	2002	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Scattered-site C	2002	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Baltimore City	Scattered-site D	2002	0	n/a
Housing Authority of East Baton Rouge	Oklahoma Street, East Boulevard	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of East Baton Rouge	Oklahoma Street, East Boulevard	2002	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Bradenton	Zoller Apartments	2002	1	Small
Bridgeton Housing Authority	Ivy Glen	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Camden	Roosevelt Manor	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the county of Champaign	Burch Village	2002	0	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Ida B Wells	2002	0	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Henry Horner Homes	2002	0	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Jane Addams	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Las Vegas	Green Homes	2002	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Cabrini Extension south	2002	1	Large
Housing Authority of the County of Cook	Daniel Bergen Homes, John Mackler, and Sunrise Apartments	2002	0	n/a
Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority	Laurel Homes	2002	0	Small

Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority	English Woods	2002	0	Large
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority	Carver Park	2002	0	Large
Housing Authority of Columbus	George Foster Peabody Apartments	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of Columbus	George Foster Peabody Apartments	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of Dallas	Frazier Courts and Addition	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of Dallas	Frazier Courts and Addition	2002	1	Small
Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority	Arlington Courts	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Daytona Beach	Bethune Village/Halifax Park	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Daytona Beach	Bethune Village/Halifax Park	2002	1	n/a
Decatur Housing Authority	Long View Place	2002	0	Small

Housing Authority of the City and County of Denver	Arrowhead Apartments and Thomas Bean Towers	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City and County of Denver	Arrowhead Apartments	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City and County of Denver	Thomas Bean Towers	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City and County of Denver	Arrowhead Apartments and Thomas Bean Towers	2002	0	Small
Housing and Redevelopment Authority of Duluth	Harbor View Hillside	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of Duluth	Harbor View Homes	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Durham	Oldham Towers/Liberty Street	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of East Chicago	Indiana Harbor	2002	0	n/a
East Orange Housing Authority	Arcadian Gardens	2002	1	Small
Evansville Housing Authority	Erie Homes	2002	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the Fayetteville	Scales Heights(B)	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the Fayetteville	Scales Heights(A)	2002	1	Small
Forrest City Housing Authority	Turner Circle	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Fort Smith	Ragon Homes	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Frederick	John Hanson/Taney	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Frederick	John Hanson/Taney	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Fresno	Yosemite Village	2002	0	Small
Galveston Housing Authority	Palm Terrace	2002	0	Small
Granite City Housing Authority	Kirkpatrick Homes	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of Hamtramck	Colonel Hamtramck Homes	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Hartford	Dutch Point Colony	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of	Dutch Point Colony	2002	1	Small

Hartford				
Housing Authority of the City of High Point	Springfield Townhouses	2002	0	n/a
Housing and Community Development Corporation of Hawaii	Kuhio Park Terrace	2002	0	Large
Housing Authority of Humboldt	Fort Hill	2002	1	Small
Indianapolis Housing Agency	Brokenburr Trails	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Jackson	Whiterock Homes	2002	0	Small
Jacksonville Housing Authority	Brentwood Park	2002	1	Small
Jacksonville Housing Authority	Brentwood Park	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of Jeffersonville	Greenwood Apartments	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Jersey City	Lafayette Gardens	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of Lake Wales	Sunrise Park	2002	0	Small

Housing Authority of the County of Clark	Miller Plaza	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of Laurel	West Beacon Homes	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles	Dana Strand Village	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of Louisville	Iroquois Homes	2002	1	Large
Housing Authority of Louisville	Clarksdale	2002	1	Large
Housing Authority of Louisville	Clarksdale	2002	1	Large
Memphis Housing Authority	Lamar Terrace	2002	1	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Ford Road Apartments	2002	1	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Cypresswood Estates	2002	1	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Hawkins Mill Apartments	2002	1	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Oates Manor	2002	1	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Horn Lake Apartments	2002	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Meridian	Victory Village	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Meridian	Davis Courts	2002	0	Small
Miami-Dade Housing Agency	Scott Homes(A)	2002	0	Large
Miami-Dade Housing Agency	Scott Homes(B)	2002	0	n/a
Miami-Dade Housing Agency	Carver Homes	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Highland Park	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Highland Park	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Highland Park	2002	0	Small
Minneapolis Public Housing Authority	The Bryants	2002	1	n/a
Mobile Housing Board	Jesse Thomas and Albert F. Owens	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Muncie	Munsyana	2002	1	Small
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency	Sam Levy Homes	2002	1	Small

Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency	Sam Levy Homes	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	Eastview Terrace	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	Brookside	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	Quinnipiac Terrace	2002	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	Quinnipiac Terrace/Riverview	2002	1	n/a
Housing Authority of New Orleans	Fischer Homes	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of New Orleans	Desire	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of New Orleans	Florida Housing Development	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of New Orleans	BW Cooper Housing Development	2002	1	Large
Housing Authority of New Orleans	Guste Homes	2002	1	Large
Newark Housing Authority	George Read Village	2002	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the City of Newport, RI	Tonomy Hill	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Newport, RI	Tonomy Hill	2002	1	Small
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Broad Creek Renaissance	2002	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of North Charleston	North Park Village	2002	0	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Oakland	Coliseum Gardens	2002	0	Small
Orange City Housing Authority	Father Rasi Homes	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Orlando	Carver Courts	2002	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Orlando	Carver Courts	2002	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the County of Menard	IL028-01	2002	1	Small
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Abbottsford Homes	2002	0	Small
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Mill Creek off-site(B)	2002	0	Small

Philadelphia Housing Authority	Mill Creek off-site(C)	2002	0	n/a
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Mill Creek off-site(D)	2002	0	n/a
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Mill Creek off-site(A)	2002	0	n/a
Allegheny County Housing Authority	Homestead Apartments	2002	1	Small
Allegheny County Housing Authority	Ohioview Acres	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Garfield Heights	2002	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Bedford Dwellings Additions	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Hamilton-Larimer	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Garfield Elderly High Rise	2002	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Pleasantville	Woodland Terrace	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pleasantville	Woodland Terrace	2002	1	Small

Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Jeffrey Wilson Homes	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Prichard	Bessemer Avenue	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Prichard	Bessemer Avenue	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Prichard	Bessemer Avenue	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh	Chavis Heights	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Richmond	Easter Hill	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Richmond	Mosby Court South	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Rochester	Olean Townhouses	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Rochester	Kennedy Townhouses	2002	1	Small
Winnebago County Housing Authority	Champion Park Apartments	2002	1	Small

Winnebago County Housing Authority	Champion Park Apartments	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of Rockville	Lincoln Terrace	2002	0	Small
Saginaw Housing Commission	Town and Garden	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of Salem	WC Anderson Drive	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of Salem	Westside Court	2002	1	Small
San Antonio Housing Authority	Victoria Courts	2002	1	Small
San Antonio Housing Authority	Victoria Courts	2002	1	Small
San Francisco Housing Authority	Valencia Gardens	2002	0	n/a
King County Housing Authority	Park Lake Homes	2002	0	Large
Housing Authority of Shreveport	Naomi Jackson Heights	2002	0	Small
St. Louis Housing Authority	Euclid Plaza Family	2002	1	Small
Virgin Islands Housing Authority	Louis E. Brown Villas (A)	2002	0	Small

Virgin Islands Housing Authority	Louis E. Brown Villas (B)	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Stamford	Fairfield Court	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of Suffolk	Hoffler Community	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Tacoma	Salishan	2002	0	Large
Housing Authority of City of Tallahassee	Ebony Gardens	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Trenton	James Kerney Homes	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the County of Fayette	Lemon Woods Acres	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the County of Fayette	Dunlap Creek Village	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the County of Fayette	Snowden Terrace	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the County of Fayette	Brier Wood Acres	2002	1	Small
Utica Housing Authority	Washington Courts	2002	1	n/a

Utica Housing Authority	Washington Courts	2002	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	Eastgate Apartments	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of the County of Washington	Frederick Terrace	2002	0	Small
Housing Authority of Wilmington	Robert Taylor Homes	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of Wilmington	Taylor Homes Annex	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Winona	McNutt Hills	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Winston-Salem	Happy Hill Garden	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Winston-Salem	Happy Hill Garden	2002	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Winston-Salem	Happy Hill Garden	2002	0	Small
Municipal Housing Authority of Yonkers	Mulford Gardens	2002	0	Large

Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority	Westlake Terrace Homes	2002	1	Small
Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority	Westlake Terrace Homes	2002	1	Small
Albany Housing Authority	Lincoln Park Homes	2003	1	Small
Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Sycamore Place	2003	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Alexandria	Wooddale Park	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Americus	Sumter Homes B	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Americus	Sumter Homes A	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	McDaniel Glenn	2003	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Grady Homes	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of Baltimore	Scattered site 67	2003	1	n/a
Housing Authority of Baltimore	Scattered site 68	2003	1	n/a

Housing Authority of Baltimore	Charles K Anderson Village	2003	1	n/a
Housing Authority of Baltimore	Scattered Site 40	2003	1	n/a
Housing Authority of Baltimore	Scattered Site 63	2003	1	n/a
Housing Authority of Baltimore	Scattered Site 64	2003	1	n/a
Housing Authority of Baltimore	Scattered Site 65	2003	1	n/a
Housing Authority of Baltimore	Scattered Site 24	2003	1	Large
Housing Authority of Baltimore	Scattered Site 69	2003	1	n/a
Housing Authority of Baltimore	Scattered Site 66	2003	1	n/a
Benton Harbor Housing Commission	Whitfield Complex I	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the Birmingham District	Tuxedo Court	2003	1	Small
Boston Housing Authority	Franklin Hill	2003	1	Small
Boston Housing Authority	Franklin Hill	2003	0	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Bristol	Rice Terrace and Rice Terrace Extension	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of Brownsville	Poinsettia II	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of Butler	Bambo Harris	2003	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Camden	Roosevelt Manor	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the County of Champaign	Burch Village	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the County of Champaign	Lakeside Terrace	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Charlotte	Piedmont Courts	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Charlotte	Piedmont Courts	2003	1	Small
Chattanooga Housing Authority	McCallie Homes	2003	1	Small
Chattanooga Housing Authority	Maurice Poss	2003	1	Small
Chattanooga Housing Authority	Rev. HJ Johnson	2003	1	Small

Chattanooga Housing Authority	Harriet Tubman B	2003	1	Small
Chattanooga Housing Authority	Harriet Tubman A	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Chester	Chester Towers	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the County of Cook	Mackler/Bergen/Sunrise	2003	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the County of Cook	William Green	2003	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Dearborn Homes	2003	1	Large
Housing Authority of the County of Cook	Lena Canada Homes	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of Clearwater	Jasmine Courts	2003	1	Small
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority	Valleyview Homes	2003	1	Small
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority	Valleyview Homes	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Columbia SC	Hendley Homes	2003	1	Small

Housing Authority of Columbus	George Foster Peabody Apartments	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of Columbus	Jenkins Terrace	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Columbus	Worley Terrace	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Concord	Logan Homes and Chapman Homes	2003	0	Small
Danville Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Liberty View	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Daytona Beach	Martin Luther King Jr. Apartments	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of Decatur	Cashin Homes	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of Deland	Oakland Terrace	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of Dunedin	Highlander Village	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of East Chicago	Scattered Site Project 29-2	2003	0	Small
East Orange Housing Authority	Arcadian Gardens	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of Easton	Delaware Terrace and part of Delaware Terrace Annex	2003	0	Small

Evansville Housing Authority	Erie Homes	2003	0	n/a
Flint Area Housing Authority	Riverview Apartments	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Fort Myers	Michigan Court	2003	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Fresno	Yosemite Village	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Fresno	Yosemite Village	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Ft. Lauderdale	Dixie Court	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of Galveston	Palm Terrace	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of Grand Rapids	Campau Commons	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Greenville	Jesse Jackson Townhouses	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of High Point	Clara Cox homes	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of Humboldt	Rosedale Courts	2003	1	n/a
Indianapolis Housing	Brokenburr Trails	2003	1	Small

Agency				
Housing Authority of the City of Jackson	Whiterock Homes	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Jackson	Merry Lane Courts	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Jackson	Parkview Courts	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Jersey City	A. Harry Moore	2003	1	Small
Knoxville Housing Authority	Christenberry Heighs	2003	1	Small
Knoxville Housing Authority	Austin	2003	1	Small
Knoxville Housing Authority	Lonsdale Homes	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of Lake Wales	Sunrise Park	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the County of Clark	Miller Plaza	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Las Vegas	Rio Gallinas-Taos	2003	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Las Vegas	Rio Gallinas-Encino	2003	1	n/a

Housing Authority of Long Branch	Seaview Manor and Grant Court	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles	Dana Strand Village	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of Louisville	Clarksdale	2003	1	Large
Housing Authority of Louisville	Clarksdale	2003	1	Large
Marietta Housing Authority	Alexander Stephens Clay Homes	2003	1	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Lamar Terrace	2003	1	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Lamar Terrace	2003	1	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Lamar Terrace	2003	1	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Lamar Terrace	2003	1	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Oates Manor	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of Menard County	Greenview	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Meridian	Victory Village	2003	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Meridian	Victory Village	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Highland Park	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Scattered Site	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Scattered Sites 10	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Scattered Sites 24	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Scattered Sites 21	2003	1	Small
Mobile Housing Board	Jesse Thomas and Albert F. Owens	2003	1	Large
Housing Authority of the City of Muncie	Munsyana	2003	1	Small
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency	John Henry Hale Homes	2003	1	Small
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency	John Henry Hale Homes	2003	1	Small

Housing Authority of New Orleans	Fischer Homes	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of Niagara Falls	Center Court	2003	0	Small
Orange City Housing Authority	Father Rasi Homes	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Paterson	Alexander Hamilton Apartment Complex	2003	0	Small
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Abbotsford Homes	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh	Addision Addition	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of Portland	Columbia Villa	2003	1	Small
Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Jeffrey Wilson Homes	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh	Chavis Heights	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh	Chavis Heights	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh	Chavis Heights A	2003	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh	Chavis Heights B	2003	1	Small
Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Lincoln Terrace	2003	1	n/a
Saginaw Housing Commission	Town and Garden	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of Salem	Orchard Village	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of the County of San Joaquin	Sierra Vista Homes	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Sarasota	Janie Poe	2003	0	Small
King County Housing Authority	Park Lake Homes	2003	1	Large
Housing Authority of Shreveport	Naomi Jackson Heights	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Spartanburg	Phyllis Goins	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Spartanburg	Phyllis Goins	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Spartanburg	Woodworth Homes	2003	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Spartanburg	Northside Apartments	2003	1	Small
St. Louis Housing Authority	Cochran Gardens	2003	1	Small
St. Louis Housing Authority	Cochran Gardens	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Stamford	Fairfield Court	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of City of Tallahassee	Ebony Gardens	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Tampa	Central Park Village	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Trenton	James Kerney Homes	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Tucson	Martin Luther King Apartments	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of Tuscaloosa	McKenzie Court Apartments	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	Eastgate Apartments	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	Eastgate Apartments	2003	1	Small

Housing Authority of the County of Washington	Frederick Terrace	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the County of Washington	Highland Terrace	2003	1	Small
Housing Authority of the County of Washington	Maple Terrace	2003	1	Small
West Palm Beach Housing Authority	Dunbar Village	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of Williamsport	King Kennedy	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of Wilmington	Robert Taylor Homes	2003	0	Small
Housing Authority of Wilmington	Taylor Homes Annex	2003	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Wilmington	Southbridge Ext	2003	1	Small
Municipal Housing Authority of Yonkers	Mulford Gardens	2003	1	Large
Municipal Housing Authority of Yonkers	Mulford Gardens	2003	1	Large
Virgin Islands Housing Authority	Louis E. Brown Villas B	2003	1	Small

Virgin Islands Housing Authority	Louis E. Brown Villas A	2003	1	Small
Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Jeffrey Wilson Homes	2004	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Convent Hill	2004	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Bristol	Rice Terrace and Rice Terrace Extension	2004	0	Small
Housing Authority of Butler	Bambo Harris	2004	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Concord	Logan Homes and Chapman Homes	2004	0	Small
Evansville Housing Authority	Erie Homes	2004	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Fort Myers	Michigan Court/Flossie Riley	2004	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Grand Rapids	Campau Commons	2004	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Greenville	Jesse Jackson Townhouses	2004	1	Small
Housing Authority of Long Branch	Seaview Manor and Grant Court	2004	0	Small

Housing Authority of Niagara Falls	Center Court	2004	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Paterson	Alexander Hamilton Apartment Complex	2004	0	Small
Saginaw Housing Commission	Town and Garden	2004	0	Small
Housing Authority of City of Tallahassee	Ebony Gardens	2004	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Tucson	Martin Luther King Apartments	2004	1	Small
Housing Authority of Tuscaloosa	McKenzie Court Apartments	2004	1	Small
Housing Authority of Williamsport	King Kennedy	2004	0	Small
Housing Authority of Wilmington	Robert Taylor Homes	2004	0	Small
Housing Authority of Wilmington	Taylor Homes Annex	2004	0	n/a
Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority	Edgewood Homes	2004	0	Small
Housing Authority of Allentown	Hanover Acres and Riverview Terrace	2004	1	Small
Housing Authority of Dallas	Turner Courts	2004	0	Small

Housing Authority of Easton	Delaware Terrace	2004	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of El Paso	Alamito Apartments	2004	1	Small
Housing Authority of the County of Fayette	Bierer Wood Acres	2004	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of High Point	Clara Cox	2004	0	Small
Lexington Fayette Urban County Housing Authority	Bluegrass, Aspendale	2004	0	Small
Housing Authority of Macon	Lakeview Towers	2004	0	n/a
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Ludlow Scattered Sites	2004	1	Large
Housing Authority of Rock Island	Valley Homes	2004	0	Small
Housing Authority of Springfield	Lincoln Park	2004	1	Small
St. Louis Housing Authority	Arthur A. Blumeyer	2004	0	Large
Housing Authority of Wilmington	Southbridge Homes	2004	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Fresno	Funston Place and Funston Terrace	2005	0	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta	Grady Homes	2005	1	Small
Housing Authority of New Orleans	Florida Homes	2005	0	Small
Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Jeffrey Wilson Homes	2005	1	Small
Boston Housing Authority	Franklin Hill	2005	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Convent Hill	2005	0	Small
Housing Authority of Portland	Iris Court	2005	1	Small
Housing Authority of Butler	Bambo Harris	2005	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Concord	Logan Homes and Chapman Homes	2005	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Fort Myers	Michigan Court/Flossie Riley	2005	1	Small
Housing Authority of Grand Rapids	Campau Commons	2005	0	Small
Housing Authority of Long Branch	Seaview Manor and Grant Court	2005	1	Small
Housing Authority of Niagara Falls	Center Court	2005	0	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Paterson	Alexander Hamilton Apartment Complex	2005	0	Small
Memphis Housing Authority	Dixie Homes	2005	1	Large
Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority	Edgewood Homes	2005	1	Small
Housing Authority of Dallas	Turner Courts	2005	0	Small
Housing Authority of Easton	Delaware Terrace	2005	0	Small
Evansville Housing Authority	Erie Homes	2005	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the County of Fayette	Bierer Wood Acres	2005	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of High Point	Clara Cox	2005	0	Small
Lexington Fayette Urban County Housing Authority	Bluegrass, Aspendale	2005	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Oakland	Tassafaronga Village	2005	0	Small
Housing Authority of Rock Island	Valley Homes	2005	0	Small

San Antonio Housing Authority	San Juan Homes	2005	0	Small
Housing Authority of Williamsport	King Kennedy	2005	0	Small
Housing Authority of Wilmington	Robert Taylor Homes and Annex	2005	0	Small
Housing Authority of Wilmington	Southbridge Homes	2005	0	Small
Chicago Housing Authority	Robert Taylor II	2005	1	Small
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Mill Creek (Lucien E. Blackwell)	2005	1	Small
Danville Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Liberty View	2005	1	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Convent Hill	2006	0	Small
Housing Authority of Butler	Bambo Harris	2006	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Grand Rapids	Campau Commons	2006	0	Small
Housing Authority of Niagara Falls	Center Court	2006	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Paterson	Alexander Hamilton Apartment Complex	2006	0	Small

Memphis Housing Authority	Oates Manor	2006	0	Small
Housing Authority of Easton	Delaware Terrace	2006	1	Small
Housing Authority of the County of Fayette	Bierer Wood Acres	2006	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of High Point	Clara Cox	2006	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Oakland	Tassafaronga Village	2006	0	Small
San Antonio Housing Authority	Sutton Homes	2006	0	Small
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Liddonfield	2006	0	Small
Beaumont Housing Authority	Magnolia Gardens	2006	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Columbia SC	Allen Benedict Court	2006	0	Small
Housing Authority of Del Ray Beach	Carver Estates	2006	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Fayetteville	Delaware Terrace and Delaware Terrace Annex	2006	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Huntington	Washington Square	2006	0	Small

Jacksonville Housing Authority	Southwind Villas	2006	0	Small
Housing Authority of Kingsport	Riverview	2006	1	Small
Little Rock Housing Authority	Amelia B. Ives Homes	2006	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	Rockview and Brookside	2006	0	Small
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Moton Circle	2006	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh	Walnut Terrace	2006	0	Small
St. Louis Housing Authority	Arthur A. Blumeyer	2006	0	Large
Housing Authority of Tuscaloosa	Rosedale Court and Rosedale Court Annex	2006	0	Small
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	Sheridan Terrace	2006	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Scattered Sites	2007	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Grand Rapids	Campau Commons	2007	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of	Alexander Hamilton Apartment Complex	2007	0	Small

Paterson				
Housing Authority of the County of Fayette	Bierer Wood Acres	2007	0	n/a
San Antonio Housing Authority	Sutton Homes	2007	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Columbia SC	Allen Benedict Court	2007	0	Small
Housing Authority of Del Ray Beach	Carver Estates	2007	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Fayetteville	Delona Gardens and Campbell Terrace	2007	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Huntington	Washington Square	2007	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	Rockview and Brookside	2007	0	Small
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Moton Circle	2007	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh	Walnut Terrace	2007	0	Small
Housing Authority of Tuscaloosa	Rosedale Court and Rosedale Court Annex	2007	0	Small

Housing Authority of the District of Columbia	Sheridan Terrace	2007	1	Small
Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority	Sycamore Place	2007	0	n/a
Boston Housing Authority	Washington Beech	2007	1	Small
Housing Authority of Bremerton	Westpark	2007	0	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Stateway Gardens	2007	0	Small
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority	Garden Valley Homes Estate	2007	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Holyoke	Lyman Terrace	2007	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Jersey City	A. Harry Moore Apartments	2007	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Lake Charles	Booker T. Washington Courts	2007	0	Small
Housing Authority of New Orleans	CJ Peete	2007	1	Large
Housing Authority of New Orleans	St. Bernard and St. Bernard Extension	2007	0	n/a

City of Phoenix Housing Department	A.L. Krohn	2007	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pueblo	Sangre de Cristo Apartments	2007	0	n/a
King County Housing Authority	Lake City Village and House	2007	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Spartanburg	Woodworth Homes	2007	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Texarkana	Covington Homes, Stevens Court, Griff King Homes	2007	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee	Scattered Sites	2008	1	Small
Housing Authority of Grand Rapids	Campau Commons	2008	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Paterson	Alexander Hamilton Apartment Complex	2008	0	Small
San Antonio Housing Authority	Sutton Homes	2008	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Columbia SC	Allen Benedict Court	2008	0	Small
Housing Authority of Del Ray Beach	Carver Estates	2008	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the City of New Haven	Rockview and Brookside	2008	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh	Walnut Terrace	2008	0	Small
Housing Authority of Tuscaloosa	Rosedale Court and Rosedale Court Annex	2008	0	Small
Housing Authority of Bremerton	Westpark	2008	1	Large
Chicago Housing Authority	Stateway Gardens	2008	1	Small
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority	Garden Valley Homes Estate	2008	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Holyoke	Lyman Terrace	2008	0	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Jersey City	A. Harry Moore Apartments	2008	0	Small
Housing Authority of New Orleans	St. Bernard and St. Bernard Extension	2008	0	n/a
Seattle Housing Authority	Lake City Village and House	2008	1	Small
King County Housing Authority	Park Lake Homes II	2008	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Texarkana	Covington Homes, Stevens Court, Griff King Homes	2008	1	Small

Housing Authority of the City of Corpus Christi	Las Armadas	2008	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Dallas	Turner Courts	2008	0	Small
Housing Authority of Macon	Tindall Heights	2008	0	Small
Philadelphia Housing Authority	Mantua	2008	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Rutland	Forest Park	2008	0	n/a
City of Aberdeen Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
Allegheny County Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the Birmingham District		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Camden		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Charlotte	Boulevard Homes	2009	1	Small
Chicago Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the City of Columbia SC		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Corpus Christi		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Covington	Jacob Price Homes	2009	1	Small
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Dallas	Turner Courts	2009	1	Small
Holyoke Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
Houston Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Jersey City	A. Harry Moore Apartments	2009	1	Small
Louisville Metro Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Macon		2009	0	n/a

Memphis Housing Authority	Cleaborn Homes	2009	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Montgomery		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven		2009	0	n/a
Northwest Georgia Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Orlando		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Paterson		2009	0	n/a
Philadelphia Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
City of Phoenix Housing Department		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Plainfield		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Portland		2009	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh		2009	0	n/a
Rockford Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
The Housing Authority of City of Rockwall, TX		2009	0	n/a
Rutland Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the County of San Bernardino		2009	0	n/a
San Francisco Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Spartanburg		2009	0	n/a
Suffolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Tacoma		2009	0	n/a
Taunton Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Trenton	Miller Homes	2009	1	Small

Tuscaloosa Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia		2009	0	n/a
West Palm Beach Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
Wilmington Housing Authority		2009	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Wilson		2009	0	n/a
Allegheny County Housing Authority		2010	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the Birmingham District		2010	0	n/a
Boston Housing Authority	Old Colony	2010	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Camden		2010	0	n/a
Chesapeake Redevelopment and Housing Authority		2010	0	n/a
Housing Authority of Clackamas County		2010	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the City of Columbia SC		2010	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Corpus Christi		2010	0	n/a
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority		2010	0	n/a
Delray Beach Housing Authority		2010	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City and County of Denver	South Lincoln	2010	1	Small
Holyoke Housing Authority		2010	0	n/a
Louisville Metro Housing Authority	Sheppard Square	2010	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Macon		2010	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee		2010	0	n/a
The Housing Authority of the City of New Britain		2010	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the City of New Haven		2010	0	n/a
Housing Authority of New Orleans		2010	0	n/a
Northwest Georgia Housing Authority		2010	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Orlando		2010	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Paterson	Alexander Hamilton	2010	1	Small
City of Phoenix Housing Department	Frank Luke Addition	2010	1	Small
Housing Authority of Portland	Hillsdale Terrace	2010	1	Small
Housing Authority of the City of Pueblo		2010	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh		2010	0	n/a
Rockford Housing Authority		2010	0	n/a
San Francisco Housing Authority		2010	0	n/a

Housing Authority of the County of San Joaquin		2010	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Sarasota		2010	0	n/a
St. Louis Housing Authority	Arthur A. Blumeyer	2010	1	Small
Taunton Housing Authority	Fairfax Gardens	2010	1	Small
Warner Robins Housing Authority		2010	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the District of Columbia		2010	0	n/a
Wilmington Housing Authority		2010	0	n/a
Housing Authority of the City of Wilson		2010	0	n/a
Municipal Housing Authority of Yonkers		2010	0	n/a