LITERATURE REVIEW OF THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES:

SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY,
INDIVIDUALIST AND COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY,
THEORETICAL MODEL, AND
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Chapter Overview

In this chapter, I explore theoretical and empirical ideas rarely examined in an organizational behavior dissertation. Ideas concerning social contract theory are engaged in order to develop a new perspective utilizing ideological orientation to study antecedents to organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). I illustrate how social contract ideas link directly to ideas about priorities of individual interests versus the common good expressed in the contemporary debate between individualist and communitarian theorists, and how these two different ideological orientations can serve to explain and predict variation in OCB by individuals.

In this chapter social contract theory concepts developed in political philosophy and augmented in contemporary political theory are analyzed. Contemporary individualist and communitarian theories derived from social contract theory are described. Studies are examined that use these theories as antecedents in empirical research conducted in political behavior and economics. Research studies are presented that support the thesis that differences in politically and economically informed ideological orientation directly influence variation in the performance of
citizenship behavior. The literature review presented in this chapter and in chapter two provide the foundation for the theoretical model presented at the end of this chapter, and the ensuing empirical model that begins chapter four.

Over the past three hundred and fifty years, social contract theorists have developed normative explanations about relationships between individuals and their respective communities. These ideas can help advance a rigorous comprehension of the concept of citizenship in the context of political, economic, and organizational environments.

Differences in normative ideological perspectives concerning the primary importance of individual (self-interest) or the primary importance of communal (common good) orientations can be found in the American population (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton, 1985; Shane, 1994; Watson, 1997). My general research hypothesis predicts that individuals with a stronger communitarian ideological orientation—the antecedent independent construct of this study—will engage in greater amounts and varieties of organizational citizenship behavior—the study’s dependent construct.

This chapter contains a summary review of the origin and development of social contract theory. Subsequently derived and debated views regarding individualist and communitarian ideological orientation among contemporary political theorists and political scientists are presented. A theoretical model is developed from the literature review and supported by Watson’s (1997) research on ideology and the economic social contract. Ideological dimensions consisting of personal identity, self-respect, and duty are theoretically linked with organizational citizenship dimensions of loyalty,
altruism, and participation.

SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

Origin and Introduction

Social contract theory is rooted in two opposing perspectives concerning human nature and justifications for the origin of the democratic political state.¹ The social contract framework began in the seventeenth century with the individualist political theories of Hobbes (1651/1996) and Locke (1690/1980). These two social contract political philosophers argued for the primacy and advantages of political liberty, individual autonomy, self-interest, and individual rights over traditional expositions of political and economic obligations innately owed to sovereign and ecclesiastic authorities.

The contrasting communitarian social contract perspective began in the eighteenth century with the theories of J. J. Rousseau (1762/1978). Rousseau emphasized the importance of community and the priority of the collective. He believed individual rights originated in and were defended by a viable community. Thus he asserted that in order to maintain and preserve a functioning community, individuals must sometimes sacrifice their own priorities for the collective priorities of their community. This is not an argument for authoritarian political rule, for the communitarian social contract is deeply rooted in a democratic political perspective. For the consummate individualist, the idea of self-sacrifice is anathema to what it means to be an autonomous person. In direct ideological opposition, for the consummate
communitarian, service to the community is an essential component of living a viable human life.

These two clashing perspectives play out as a dialogue between the advantages of individual freedom and choice versus the advantages of community and social affiliation. It consists of a discourse concerning preferences for being independent or for being interconnected and interdependent. Contemporary political theory portrays this as the debate between the individualist and the communitarian ideological perspective.²


The philosophy of Thomas Hobbes constitutes the first work in social contract theory. Hobbes’ political narrative provided a logical explanation for the genesis of the political state. He replaced traditional causation based on natural hierarchies ordained by God and his regents with a modern narrative based on rational thinking and a logical evolutionary construction of material human events.

For Hobbes, people were primarily driven by self-interest, which in an uncontrolled natural state resulted in misery for everybody. His conception of society rejected traditional explanation that natural inequality justified established social hierarchies. In contrast, Hobbes asserted that people were sufficiently equal³ that everyone desired everyone else’s possessions, and would act accordingly. His narrative described the horrors of unsupervised freedom and the necessity for subjection to a sovereign power.⁴ In Leviathan, Hobbes (1651/1996) presented the sequential development of his thesis, which I encapsulate as follows:
- Description of the natural human condition—the desire for self-preservation.

- The first fundamental law of nature regarding human being’s right of self-preservation and their consequent right to do anything they wanted—the state of war of all against all.

- The rhetorical creation of the state of nature.

- The second fundamental law of nature—people’s endeavor for peace.

- Description of how the mutual transferring of individual rights was made to achieve social peace—a process he called a contract.

- Causes, definition, and justification for a commonwealth.

- The individual actions required for the creation of a commonwealth.

- Origin and contractual justification of the legitimate rights and powers of the commonwealth’s all-powerful sovereign.

Hobbes began with a description and definition of the natural condition of human beings as consisting primarily of the right of individual self-preservation. People were driven by self-interest and consequently were naturally fearful and predatory.

**Hobbes’ State of Nature—a Fearful, Dreadful Life**

Hobbes’ creation of the state of nature concept is central to understanding the idea of the social contract. The primeval state of nature was described as the state of war, consisting of “…the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre, and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man” (1651/1996: 88). Hobbes constructed his theory of human nature to provide the foundation of his logical justification for the natural legitimacy of the political state and of the ruling sovereign.

Hobbes anticipated criticism that such a natural state of immutable war had
never existed. He replied that he believed such a place actually existed in the wilderness of America. He claimed that life consisted of “continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 1651/1996: 89).

Hobbes’ state of nature narrative was a rhetorical necessity to justify his second fundamental law of nature—that human beings would renounce their natural rights to prey upon everyone else in exchange for securing social peace. He staged his thesis describing the natural state of war in order that his political solution of the commonwealth logically and inevitably followed. Hobbes’ second fundamental law of nature stated that people desired peace, and would give up their natural rights and liberty to secure it. His vivid descriptions of unrestricted political life reflected his own experience during this period of great uncertainty, violence, and immense public discord. In addition, Hobbes wrote during a period when an ongoing violent social transition was shifting his society from an older English feudal social order to an eventually more integrated and centralized society supporting a market economy (Davies, 1986). Hobbes’ description of daily life as resembling a state of continuous armed conflict in fact accurately described the war torn society he lived in. It also provided him with the rhetorical justification to proclaim the necessity for a strong sovereign with sufficient power to maintain the public peace.

**Hobbes’ Conception of the Social Contract and Inception of the Political State**

Hobbes created an explicit narrative illustrating a mythic past when a generally agreed upon transference of individual natural rights was concluded in a rational exchange for securing social peace. In order to escape from the dreadful state of
nature, people agreed to give up their natural rights and create a new commonwealth.

Hobbes’ originality in political theory was permanently established with his creation of the idea of an artificial, rather than a natural, basis for social and political order and hierarchy. That human beings created the political state and society became the fountainhead of the justification for political individualism. The publication of Hobbes’ innovative theory in 1651 was as comparable a defining and causal moment for the concept of individualism as Luther’s posting his assertions of individual religious rights on the church door of Wittenberg castle in 1517.

Hobbes introduced his theory of structural political restraint, utilizing his creation of the artificial being called a commonwealth, in order to prevent people from breaking their mutual contract. He argued that verbal commitments alone cannot maintain and preserve a contract in which people have agreed to give up some of their own cherished rights and liberties. For Hobbes a key point was that the sovereign must have unlimited and absolute power over the commonwealth’s subjects if the social contract is to be enforceable (Johnston, 1986).

Social peace required a mutually agreed upon superior power with the vested authority to control and direct people toward their common advantage. The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, …is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will…to beare their Person; and every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person…and therin to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgments, to his Judgment. …This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH (Hobbes, 1651/1996: 120).

Hobbes argued that because people had originally endorsed the compact agreement,
the sovereign’s political power was legitimate. For Hobbes, the power of the Leviathan was entirely based on selfish human nature embedded in the original state of nature.

Indeed as Hobbes clearly saw, and this was to be the basis of the new individualist paradigm of social explanation, if self-interested striving is the dominant force active in individuals (and hence in the context of individualism the dominant force active in society), then it must be not merely compatible with useful social order, but in fact be the source or efficient cause of useful social order (Sinisi, 1992: 48).

Locke built upon Hobbes’ ideas, providing somewhat different descriptions of human nature, the state of nature, and the origin and justification of the political state. But Locke’s purpose, like Hobbes, was to explain and justify political authority. Locke’s views are described, and the foundational areas of agreement between Hobbes and Locke are identified in order to justify why they are correctly identified as the founders of the individualist tradition in social contract theory.

**Locke: Human Nature and the State of Nature**

Beginning with a less darkly competitive perspective than Hobbes, Locke (1690/1980) wrote about individual political liberty following the 1688 English revolution that removed James II and substantially reduced the political power of the sovereign and increased that of Parliament. Describing his view of the state of nature, he said that for human beings this consisted of:

> a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature. ...But though this be a state of liberty, yet is not a state of license: though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself. ...all men may be restrained from invading others’ rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of Nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind. (Locke, 1690/1980: 8-9).
Compared to Hobbes, Locke’s view of human nature in the state of nature depicted people as peaceful and possessing more goodwill toward each other. He also described a state of nature where people observed some restraint from incessantly attacking each other. People were endowed with reason and could comprehend their rights under natural law. Everyone had the power to punish those who violated the laws of nature, and to make reparations for damages. However, Locke did not envision Hobbes’ war of all against all.

Locke’s narrative of the state of nature said that individual authority proceeds government authority. Utilizing the same logical structure as Hobbes, Locke’s ‘contract theory’ of bargaining or exchange established that individuals willingly gave up a portion of their God-given rights to establish a civil government to provide safety for their person and their property.

Locke’s vision of the social contract provided a reasonable guide to judge whether a government was legitimate. His “account of the origins and aims of a government centers on the cutting of a deal” (May, 1988: 187). Government was justifiable if people mutually agreed to the social contract or in principle would have agreed in the distant past of pre-history. Locke declared that individuals could not be subject to the will of another without giving their consent—even if he did not clarify how or when their consent was actually granted.

*Locke and the Inception of the Political State*

Locke was well acquainted with Hobbes view that there could be no community beyond the self-serving cooperation of individuals attentive to their own life and
property. In fact “Hobbes rejects both the possibility and the desirability of a common good” (Schoolman, 1993: xii). Locke argued that sovereignty in fact resided in the rule of the people, not the political state and its sovereign.⁹ He justified the origin of the political state as necessary in the following illustration:

...the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offenses which any member hath committed against the society. (Locke, 1690/1980: 46-47).

Locke argued that if everyone had to enforce the laws in the state of nature, this would lead to confusion. Thus he claimed “that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature” (Locke, 1690/1980: 12).

**Conceptual Premises Shared by Hobbes and Locke**

Hobbes and Locke created theories that were in broad agreement in the emphasis of the priority of strong and compelling individual interests over less substantial social and community interests. Contemporary individualist social contract theory is based on their work. Both Hobbes and Locke emphasized the importance of autonomous self-interest and individual rights over traditional political and social obligations. Flathman contends in his examination of Hobbes and the development of individuality, that

My claim is that the primary unit of Hobbes’ thinking is the individual person and her makings, unmakings and remakings of herself and her worlds, the primary objective of his political and moral thinking is to promote and protect each person’s pursuit of her own felicity as she herself sees it (1993: 8-9).
Hobbes thesis began with a rejection of traditional natural law explanations premised on a society based on inherent natural hierarchy resulting from human inequality. Instead, he constructed his original narrative asserting individual human equality. Based on this premise, he wrote a compelling imperative for the creation of an artificial leviathan designed to preserve public security. In contrast to Hobbes’ melancholy view of unrestrained society, Locke asserted that the rights of the people, not the state, were sovereign. Power held by political authorities had definite limits for Locke because, originally, the people consented to give up some of their rights in order to create the state for their own benefit. Thus the people could return to the original state of nature if the political state failed to perform its part of the social contract.

Given their respective views of human nature and the state of nature, the political state was an absolute necessity for Hobbes. The political state was simply a useful and inevitable convenience for Locke.

J. J. Rousseau: Human Nature and the State of Nature

In the following century, J. J. Rousseau provided the initial turn to a communitarian perspective with his emphasis on the common good. His justification and description of the political state and the need for a ‘general will’ in support of the common good helped to sustain subsequent contemporary communitarian perspectives. Rousseau’s communitarian conception regarding the nature of the social contract, and the justification of the collective political state were quite different than the individualist political views of Hobbes and Locke, although both perspectives were based on social contract theory.
In the eighteenth-century, Rousseau (1762/1987) proposed an alternative social contract theory based on his intensely different account about a more benign human nature and more positive assumptions about life in the original natural state. He conceived of the social contract as primarily based on community rather than on individual rights. This is the key premise providing Rousseau’s radical opposition to the theories of Hobbes and Locke. Rousseau avowed the then very radical thesis that there could be no human nature prior to society.\(^{10}\)

Although Rousseau built upon the theories of Hobbes and Locke, he disagreed with Hobbes’ conceptualizations about a natural state of war between individuals prior to a social contract. “Hobbes maintains that man is naturally intrepid and seeks only to attack and fight.” (Rousseau, 1755/1987: 41). Rousseau argued that Hobbes was wrong.

Men are not naturally enemies, for the simple reason that men living in their original state of independence do not have sufficiently constant relationships among themselves to bring about either a state of peace or a state of war (Rousseau, 1762/1987: 145).

Hobbes’ error, according to Rousseau, was his confusion of selfish and violent qualities produced by society, primarily in the protection of property, with qualities that did not actually exist in a state of nature. Where Hobbes proposed human equality as the basis of insecurity and war in the state of nature, and Locke was more concerned with protecting property, Rousseau argued that people in the state of nature had lived in small groups and were not insecure.

Rousseau did agree with Hobbes on one crucial assumption—that people’s behavior in a state of nature was directed by self-preservation rather than by reasoning
Rousseau also agreed with Locke that people were naturally good. However, Rousseau maintained that people’s goodness came from society, not from individual human nature. He also completely disagreed with both Hobbes and Locke that self-interested desires would somehow provide the basis to improve social conditions (Cullen, 1993).

**Rousseau’s Social Contract and the Inception of the Political State**

Rousseau (1762/1987) commenced his social contract thesis using an argument employing a state of nature concept similar to that of Locke. He utilized Locke’s perspective to construct a social contract theory that claimed that individual liberty and political authority existed for each individual, but had been given to the political community. Rousseau’s social contract theory justified government legitimacy with his thesis that human beings existed in nature only as members of a specific community. Thus he argued that society was the basis of all political rights in the state of nature, not the natural rights of individuals. Rousseau emphasized that people gave up some of their socially provided individual rights to the political community, but in return received increased protection, safety, and a common purpose. Achievement of a common purpose was a social good not found in the narratives of Hobbes or Locke.

Rousseau attempted with his social contract narrative to resolve the tensions between individual and sovereign rights.

In Rousseau’s version of the *Social Contract*, man surrenders all his rights without becoming a slave. …Man can surrender his natural freedom because, while he becomes a subject, he remains a master. In the good community he essentially obeys himself (Gay, 1987: xv).

Rousseau produced a historical chronicle of participatory democracy that
represented a way for individuals to retain their original liberties from the state of nature and furthermore possess the benefits of democracy and community seeking the common good. He called this collective discourse and deliberation process resulting in aggregated public decision-making the 'general will' of the community.

Individual identity and liberty are derived from the community in Rousseau's theory and by definition must be beneficial for everyone involved. But viewed from the more individualist orientation of Hobbes or Locke, Rousseau’s ‘general will’ could easily be seen as an invitation to totalitarian authority and a precursor to government abuse of individual liberties. Rousseau’s general will that ‘cannot err’ and a social contract text that stated people must be ‘forced to be free’ possesses sinister connotations for those with primarily individualist values.¹¹

**Linkage with Individualist and Communitarian Theory**

Hobbes and Locke on the one hand, and Rousseau on the other, represent two distinct social contract perspectives regarding human nature, human equality, the state of nature, the inception and legitimacy of the political state, and explanations and justifications for political rights and liberty. Normative ideas about the proper role and influence of government in people’s lives and the tensions between individual rights and obligations to society are represented today from Hobbes’ and Locke’s perspective as individualist (emphasis on self-interest) and from Rousseau’s perspective as communitarian (emphasis on the common good) ideological orientations.
The initial social contract ideas and theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau have been transformed into contemporary individualist and communitarian political theory. I briefly illustrate this historic intellectual transition using the ideas of two prominent observers of the human social condition. The influential ideas of Adam Smith and Alexis de Tocqueville best illuminate this transition because their ideas and narratives created persuasive and paradoxical relationships between the respective priorities of pursuing individual self-interest or pursuing the common good. Influential economic and political ideas were written by a Scottish professor of philosophy venerated as the originator of capitalist market economics and a visiting French magistrate esteemed for his astute political and cultural observations about American democratic practices. Taken together their ideas embody the social contract foundation upon which much of contemporary individualist and communitarian discourse is conducted.

**Adam Smith: The Paradox of Self-interest Creating Common Goods**

Adam Smith (1776/1970) created his theory of economic development upon a foundation of prior ideas proposed by Hobbes and Locke regarding human nature and individual motivation.\(^{12}\) Hobbes’ conception of human nature based on desire for power over other people was reconstruction by Smith into a new vision of human nature based on desire for material goods. Hobbes’ disastrous political warfare metamorphosed into the miracle of economic development. Essentially Smith constructed a “transition from
a focus on power to a focus on wealth” (Sinisi, 1992: 260). In this way Smith transformed the dismal vision of Hobbes’ incessant warfare into the bright vision of consumer abundance and prosperity.

Essentially Hobbes’ narrative concerning human nature and the state of nature constituted three postulates: (1) human nature was defined by selfishness, (2) everyone threatened everyone else’s person and property, and (3) human beings generally behaved in a rational, self-interested manner for their own benefit (emotions prompted the exceptions). Thus any semblance of economic well being first required securing domestic peace. Adam Smith initially incorporated assumptions about human nature from Hobbes and Locke. Smith then proceeded to transform these assumptions into his innovative thesis advocating economic development utilizing a free market economy, which is emphasized today by theorists arguing for individualism.

In addition, Smith rejected Hobbes’ pessimistic conclusion that self-interested behavior would necessarily lead to disastrous conditions for everyone. Instead, Hobbes’ war of all against all resulting in misery was transformed into Smith’s war of all against all resulting in prosperous economic development. Smith incorporated Locke’s more optimistic perspective of human nature and thought that self-interested human nature would provide sufficient motivation to produce economic prosperity. Wolfe observed that:

Since the days of Adam Smith, economists, while believing that humans are naturally self-interested, have rarely thought of them as malevolent. …the market has been viewed by its defenders as a “soft” form of coercion because human nature is itself soft. People need to be guided, but they do not need to be pushed around at gunpoint. Give them the right incentives, and they will figure out what to do all by themselves (1995: 128).
Smith’s theory of economic development proposed that self-interested motivation worked to increase a nation’s material wealth under a free market economy (but not under any other type of economy). His idea of a free market in fact required insecurity to motivate productivity and innovation. Free market competition “forces individuals to pursue their self-interests in ways that create economic development” (Sinisi, 1992: 102). Everyone benefited from natural human selfish desires and striving through the economic market’s ‘invisible hand’.

Smith provided a paradoxical linkage between the motivations of self-interested individualists and achievement of the common good (through abundant common goods) advocated by communitarian proponents. For Smith, this achievement of the common good was not the result of individual desires, community interests or direct government control. His artificial and disinterested ‘invisible hand’, once set in motion by a free market economy, proceeded to automatically guide and motivate individuals to generate material goods and wealth for all.

**Tocqueville: Tensions between Democracy, Community, and Individualism**

Alexis de Tocqueville published his two-volume book *Democracy in America* in 1835 and 1840. Tocqueville is celebrated for his detailed observations and commentaries on the development and practice of democracy in the new United States of America. His description of individualist behavior established the basis for future discourse. His use of the term *individualism* in Volume II (1840) prominently introduced this word to English language readers.

To simply regard Tocqueville in his traditional role as the first to characterize
American individualism would result in missing half of his narrative, and most of his meaning. Although he is generally described as an advocate of individualism, he also addressed social and political concerns with communitarian premises and language.\textsuperscript{16}

It is clear from Tocqueville’s observations and comments that free citizens in the United States possessed enormous social and political obligations. He did not fault this situation, although he was concerned individuals would be subject to tyranny due to unlimited power of the democratic majority. He observed that the moral power the majority possessed was based on the principle “that the interests of the many are to be preferred to those of the few” (Tocqueville, 1835/1945: 256). He also worried about the power the majority had upon opinions and thoughts. “I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America (Tocqueville, 1835/1945: 263).

Nevertheless, Tocqueville thought that a free community can rightfully impose obligations and duties on its citizens, because it offers valuable resources to each individual, and, as thinkers as widely different as Socrates and Rousseau had suggested, such a community transforms the individual into something greater and better than he or she would have been outside this community. Thus, out of a sense of obligation and even a sense of self-interest, one should attend to the general good at least as much as to one’s narrowly defined self-interest (Boesche, 1987: 141).

Tocqueville admired the ideal of personal liberty, but was concerned that in practice individualism would so weaken each person’s connection to others that tyranny would be the result. “In the ages of equality all men are independent of each other, isolated, and weak” (1840/1945: 15).

Individualism as described by Tocqueville may describe more precisely a communal centered focus of attention in contrast to the self-centered individualism
concept expressed in twentieth century usage. Yet both of these descriptions of individualism reflect a turning away from participation in societal and political activities, resulting in the potential abandonment of public life which greatly troubled Tocqueville.

The interesting paradox described by Tocqueville consisted of his advocacy of individual freedom—which he chronicled and seemed to greatly admire in America — combined with his fear that the inevitable consequence of individualism would prove disastrous for individual freedom. He was apprehensive that people would focus attention on their own personal interests and business, and consequently withdraw from the public sphere. And thus the absence of public discourse and interest in a common good would provide the opportunity for tyrants to seize political power. He claimed despotism thrived by encouraging people to become self-interested and isolated. On the other hand, democracy was a learned skill that required education, discipline, and concern for public good. Without political participation, people would withdrawal from public life into selfish pursuits.

Essentially, Tocqueville thought that all the apparently wonderful and persuasive arguments supporting individual freedom and independence would, in all probability, create the very conditions of tyranny feared most by those stressing personal political and social liberty. In paradoxical contrast to his reputation for advocating American individualism, Tocqueville advocated a compelling and prescient perspective advocating communitarian cooperation and public democratic participation in political and social affairs in order to sustain freedom and liberty.

Comparison of Smith and Tocqueville

Smith and Tocqueville are generally remembered as valuing material abundance,
individualism, and political and economic liberty. However, the contrasting perspectives of Smith and Tocqueville are clearly seen in their respective optimism and pessimism concerning the outcomes of self-interest harnessed to the pursuit of material goods and wealth. For Smith, the outcome would consist of private wealth and abounding economic development. For Tocqueville, the outcome was less certain because he was concerned that individual selfish pursuit of wealth would eventually destroy public life and political democracy, and consequently provide the conditions for tyranny to seize political power and destroy individual liberty and wealth.

Historical Perspective on American Individualism

Standard historical premises regarding the origins of American democracy have been unequivocal that individualism was at the heart of political thinking for both the Revolutionary-era founders and general population. The certainty of this vision has significant consequences, however, because it absolutely legitimizes the contemporary individualist perspective and effectively trumps the communitarian perspective before any political theory debate can begin.

Recent investigations of political thought in the eighteenth century have provided insight into the contemporary individualist and communitarian discourse. For example, “...competing moral visions of what the Founding Fathers meant by ‘ordered liberty’: how to balance individual rights with the social responsibilities on which families and communities depend” (Woodward, 1992: 55). According to Shane (1994)

Until the last two decades, there was no such debate - not because the political thought of the late 18th-century was without influence in the 1950’s (and earlier) America, but because there was only one claimant to the role of reigning 18th-century political philosophy: the still-vibrant philosophy of liberal individualism. The proponents of this traditional interpretation argue (and continue to argue)
that late 18th-century Americans were advocates of political individualism and thus defended something like the modern concept of individual freedom — freedom to do what one wishes (Shane, 1994: xiv).

To understand how America was identified with the concept of individualism, a crucial distinction must be made between eighteenth century rural localism and the then emergent modern idea of centralized nation states. American localist agriculture communities with strong religious and social norms appeared atomistic to Europeans who valued highly centralized social and political structures. (Shane, 1994). He argued that this pivotal misunderstanding might have influenced Tocqueville to conflate the American generalized rural communal hostility to state and national governments with the then novel concept of individualism. Furthermore, a scholarly argument has been made that eighteenth century historical descriptions of individuality referenced the local community or collectivity rather than individual persons. (Pekelis, 1950). These decentralized communities exerted strong religious, social, and political control over individuals, which was in fact, the exact opposite influence desired by contemporary conceptions of individualism. Two hundred years ago in America, “autonomy and self-government were goals most appropriate to communities, or at the very minimum, to the family. They were clearly not appropriate goals for individuals (Shane, 1994: 95). From this historical vantage, individuals possessed the liberty of communal obligations rather than the unconstrained liberty advocated in twentieth century individualism.

What the historical record documented by Shane and other revisionist political theorists (Bender, 1978; Elshtain, 1988; Fox, 1988; Kirby, 1970; Miller, 1991; Smith, 1993) provide for my study is the possibility of a more undetermined intellectual and ideological terrain. Two competing ideological orientations regarding social contract
theory have existed in the United States since its inception.

Further supporting this perspective, Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton (1985) identified what they termed three layers of American tradition that provided two languages that served to inform individual identity. The first language incorporated political individualism and the contemporary self-expressive individualism; the second language comprised historical layers of American religious and secular life. “A secular version of that communitarian religious impulse ...emphasized not simply personal liberty but civil liberties and the necessity of a ‘public virtue’ upon which the flourishing of those liberties depends” (May, 1988: 186). From their recent sociological research, Bellah et al. suggested:

The question is whether an individualism in which the self has become the main form of reality can be sustained. What is at issue is not simply whether self-contained individuals might withdraw from the public sphere to pursue purely private ends, but whether such individuals are capable of sustaining either a public or a private life. If this is the danger, perhaps only the civic and biblical forms of individualism -forms that see the individual in relation to a larger whole, a community and tradition -are capable of sustaining genuine individuality and nurturing both public and private life (1985: 143).

INDIVIDUALIST AND COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGICAL THEORY

I will present two broad classifications of influential theorists who have participated in the contemporary debate regarding the premises and consequences of individualism and communitarianism. However, I hasten to add a caveat that my brief references to any specific theorist’s ideas are not intended to rigorously categorize any one of them as pure form proponents of individualism or communitarianism.
Contemporary Conceptions of Individualism and Communitarianism

Two fundamentally opposing perspectives regarding human nature and social contract theory are represented by individualist (Dworkin, 1989; Kymlicka, 1989; Nozick, 1974; Waldron, 1993) and communitarian (Etzioni, 1995a, 1995b; MacIntyre, 1981; Sandel, 1982, 1996; Taylor, 1985, 1989; Walzer, 1983) proponents. These perspectives present contrasting answers to questions regarding human motivation and behavior. People are either on the one hand essentially autonomous or on the other hand essentially social beings. Advocates of these opposing views ground their reasoning in two ideological traditions that endorse comprehensive but antipodal conceptions about human nature, individual choice, personal identity, sources of respect, commitment, duty, obligations to other people and to society, and the proper role of government policies.

These contemporary individualist and communitarians differ on their conceptions of three specific dimensions that are crucial to my study. These dimensions are:

- **Personal Identity** - sources of one’s self-definition.
- **Self-respect** - sense that one is a valuable and worthwhile person.
- **Duty** - acceptance or rejection of obligations to others.

The Contemporary Individualist Social Contract-Based Ideological Perspective

Primary conceptual touchstones for individualism are autonomous self-interested decision-making and personal liberty. An autonomous person governs his or her behavior with rational decisions and should remain unencumbered by other people’s
expectations. Liberty is conceived as a lack of restraint; allowing individuals to make their own choices in their political and personal life. “Liberty is a concept which captures what is distinctive and important in human agency…in the untrammeled exercise of powers of individual deliberation, choice, and the intentional initiation of action” (Waldron, 1993: 39). People should be free to choose from an array of life choices (Dworkin, 1989) and live their lives based on their own values and beliefs. Kymlica stated that for a life to be good it must be lived “from the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life” (1989: 13). Liberty includes the right to pursue one’s life goals and one’s definition of self, including the right to change one’s mind or life goals, and create new self-identities.

Individualism is concerned with distinctions concerning the value neutrality of the state (Kymlicka, 1989); the ideal of equality among autonomous persons (Ackerman, 1980; Dworkin, 1989); the importance of living by one’s own values and beliefs (Kymlicka, 1989; Waldron, 1993); and the primacy of individual rights (Nozick, 1974).

The individualist linkage to social contract theory is captured in the following argument:

…the constitution of a good society is best represented as something which will have been chosen by the people living under it, something whose main features are as intelligible to them as the charter of a club of which they are founding members, designed by them in order to serve the purposes that brought them together in the first place (Waldron, 1993: 45),

Yet, individual freedom should be modified by the recognition that all individuals in a society hold life choices, and thus one person should not restrain or harm another person’s life goals and projects. Kymlica (1989) provided transitional ideas between solitary individuals and social life in his statement that individualist political philosophy
was based upon human beings showing sufficient constraint to allow fellow individuals to make their own life choices and live them out.

Although individualism is criticized for advocating a type of negative liberty, defining freedom as an absence of coercion by the state or society, individualism does allow for self-interested cooperation among autonomous individuals. However, motives for cooperation are based on individual self-interest, not on obligations to others or to a community. But how does social life occur? Here Gauthier presents his individualist solution.\(^\text{18}\) (I use the broader word individualism because it carries less political baggage than liberalism. The word liberal should be translated as individualist for purposes of this study).

For the liberal individual realizes that she must choose among many possible ways of life, and that the breadth and richness of her choices depend on the existence of other persons choosing in other ways. She therefore sees her life in a social context, as made possible through interaction with others — interaction which of course also makes possible their lives. Just as each individual has her own conception of the good, and makes her own choice among possible ways of life, so each individual makes her own choice of others as objects of affection. She is not bound by fixed social roles, either in her activities or in her feelings. Although social affective relationships are essential to the liberal individual, there are no essential social relationships (Gauthier, 1986: 347).

“If life in society is practicable and desirable” (Waldron, 1993: 44) is a rhetorical issue that illustrates how an individualist theorist approached issues of human social life. In the answer to his own query, Waldron clearly illustrated the individualist perspective with his assertion that

intelligible justifications in social and political life must be available in principle for everyone, for society is to be understood by the individual mind, not by the tradition or sense of a community. ...Its legitimacy and the basis of social obligation must be made out to each individual... If there is some individual to whom a justification cannot be given, then so far as he is concerned the social order had better be replace by other arrangements, for the status quo has made
out no claim to his allegiance (Waldron, 1993: 44).

This statement clearly lays out the individualist position on society that communitarian theorists will intensely contest in the next section.

The individualist ideological orientation demands that the political state should be neutral regarding any conception or preferences about what constitutes the good life for human beings. The state should not specify what is good because that would restrict an individual’s right to choose her way of living life. In summary, individualism is concerned with establishing and sustaining political and personal liberty unencumbered by the demands of tradition or any form of authority.

The Contemporary Communitarian Social Contract-Based Ideological Perspective

In contrast to the individualistic perspective, the communitarian ideological orientation places primary importance on “a shared set of social bonds or a social web” (Etzioni, 1995a: 17), with a focus on social and political participation and the relationship between individual liberties and social responsibilities. Self-interested autonomous individuals are not at the foundation of society, as they are for Hobbes and Locke and contemporary advocates of individualism. Instead human beings occupy relationships and social positions among other human beings; thus relationships are of primary importance rather than derivative of the individual self (Taylor, 1989).

Avineri and de-Shalit (1992) stressed that communitarian theory has two primary lines of thoughts: a methodological one arguing that the basis of human nature exists in a social context, and a normative argument that the good life can be created and sustained only by people within the context of community. Both of these assertions
directly confront the foundational ideas of individualism.

Communitarian theory affirms that the network of relations provide “the social preconditions that enable individuals to maintain their psychological integrity, civility, and ability to reason” (Etzioni, 1995a: 16). Sandel (1982) suggests that distinctions between a person’s identity and his or her values incorrectly abstracted from actual human life. There are “social attachments which determine the self and thus individuals are constituted by the community of which they are a part” (Avineri and de-Shalit, 1992: 3). Arguments supporting the positive aspects of community association are found in the thinking of many contemporary communitarian theorists (Bell, 1993, 1997, 1998; Elshtain, 1988, 1995; Etzioni, 1995a, 1995b, 1996; MacIntyre, 1981, 1988; Oaks, 1991; Sandel, 1982, 1996; Selznick, 1995; Taylor, 1985, 1989, 1995; Walzer, 1983, 1992, 1995; and Wolfe, 1995).

Communitarians view personal choices and judgments about the good as resulting from discussion and shared deliberations. Political and economic liberty “requires a knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a concern for the whole, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake” (Sandel, 1996: 5). Walzer states that “the primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human community” (1992: 65), echoing a view that communitarian’s share, and individualists reject. Elshtain (1995) asserted that communitarian individuals have relationship with their family, society, and their traditions that the individualist perspective cannot adequately explain.
Contrasting Individualist and Communitarian Perspectives

The communitarian perspective holds that the theory of the autonomous self is a flawed and misinformed idea. The ideal individual in individualist theory who lives by making rational choices requires a self “shaped in its very being by traditions, attachments, and more or less irrevocable moral commitments” (Beiner, 1992: 16). Sandel (1996a) states that much of human life consists of choices and obligations that were never intentionally made or rationally selected. Taylor (1985) suggests that even the individualist enthusiasm for personal autonomy had been learned from a Western civilization that historically has placed a high value on this inclination.

Individualist advocates find fault with the communitarian view, stressing that strong historical and cultural communities advocate ideas that could easily result in an authoritarian state with the oppression of individual identity and liberty.

According to communitarian perspectives, personal identity and self-definition involve social constructions embedded in a community life. “One is a self only among other selves. A self can never be described without reference to those who surround it” (Taylor, 1989: 35). Communitarians’ believe that individual identity and fulfillment depend on participation in a social environment. Obligations are based on membership, not on subjective choice. People’s self-respect develops from their interconnections with other people. Consensus democratically achieved is valued over competition and contracts.

The communitarian perceives the self as historically and socially embedded, and thus necessitates a historical and sociological account.

Communitarians emphasize the innumerable ways in which individuals are indebted to the societies in which they are reared; liberals, they say, write as if
human beings came into the world with no social ties, owing no allegiances, and one way or another entirely detached from the societies they in some fashion inhabit (Ryan, 1993: 292).

Contemporary critics of individualism claim it has systematically destroyed its own foundational stability by excluding the traditional and communal aspects of social life (Daly, 1994). What began as assertions of liberty from political constraint evolved into selfish liberty to ignore and eventually destroy any legitimacy of social obligations. In relation to ideological history, Waldron (1993) pointed out the direct linkage between individualist ideas about human capabilities to understand and manipulate the natural and social world and the ideals of the European Enlightenment. However, MacIntyre questioned what had been lost:

Of what did the Enlightenment deprive us? What the Enlightenment made us for the most part blind to and what we now need to recover is…a conception of rational enquiry as embodied in a tradition, a conception according to which the standards of rational justification themselves emerge from and are part of a history in which they are vindicated by the way in which they transcend the limitations of and provide remedies for the defects of their predecessors within the history of that same tradition (MacIntyre, 1988: 7).

The individualist perspective tends to ignore any conception of embeddedness in a history or cultural tradition, conditions which the communitarian perspective claims are essential for understanding and sustaining human life. In response, the individualist critique of the communitarian perspective often focus on potential dangers that could emerge in regards to social coercion of individuals or communitarian paternalism. Dworkin (1989: 479) argued for tolerance in his statement that “it is wrong of government to use its coercive power to enforce ethical homogeneity” and that coercion can damage a sense of community. Furthermore, some theorists advocating
individualism claim they have no actual responsibility for contemporary problems resulting from destruction of community practices, because they are working primarily at the level of political theory (Macedo, 1990). Neal and Paris reply:

One cannot imagine Hobbes arguing that the adequacy of his theory is to be divorced from the practical effects of that theory as it was embodied in the self-understandings and lived experiences of a society in which it was practiced. Yet, by contrast, contemporary liberal theorists frequently respond to communitarian criticism of the substantive character of life in liberal societies by dismissing it as irrelevant, as sociological criticism which ‘misses the point’ (1990: 430).

Summary of Debate

Part of the communitarian critique of individualism as inherently self-destructive includes the explanation that the old authoritarian institutions and traditional social norms provided order and stability to people’s lives. Paradoxically, this social stability provided the foundation for individualistic political thought and action, the very ideas which communitarian theorists argue are now destroying social cohesion, and eventually liberty.

Partly it is a matter of perspective on society. For liberals, the point of reference is the “unencumbered” individual, free to shrug off his communal allegiances whenever he chooses. …Communitarians, on the other hand, take as their point of reference the shared lives of people who regard themselves as, in Sandel’s words, “defined to some extent by the community of which they are a part” (Waldron, 1993: 375).

Communitarian theory states that common concerns and priorities should be at the center of political philosophy, in contrast to the individual-centered concerns of individualistic political philosophers. For example, Barber defended the necessity of strong democratic participation:

If we accept the postulate that humans are social by nature, then we cannot
regard citizenship as merely one among many artificial social roles that can be
grafted onto man’s natural solitariness. …The civic bond is the sole legitimator of
the indissoluble natural bond: it makes voluntary those ties that cannot in any
case be undone, and it makes common and susceptible to mutuality the fate that
is in any case shared by all men (1984: 217).

In summary, proponents of both individualism and communitarianism agree that
individual rights and individual freedom are valuable goals; however, they intensely
disagree on these goods are based in human nature and how government policies
should be enacted when individual liberty comes into conflict with the common good.
The ideological content of this debate is important to my study because it provides the
basis for the antecedent independent construct in the theoretical model and the
subsequently developed independent variables in the empirical model.

In the final sections of this chapter I present the research question, the study’s
general hypothesis, and a description and justification of the theoretical model with its
three ideological dimensions and three organizational citizenship behavior dimensions.
The comprehensive literature review of social contract theory and individualist and
communitarian ideology presented in this chapter, and the review of organizational
citizenship behavior constructs and theoretical and empirical OCB antecedent research
studies presented in chapter two, represent an extensive but essential journey. It is vital
to understand and appreciate these fundamental ideas about social life in order to
provide the present study with a solid intellectual foundation upon which to construct a
theoretical model linking ideological orientation with organizational citizenship behavior.

THEORETICAL MODEL
I utilize a three dimension model of individualist and communitarian ideological orientation to develop the antecedent side of the theoretical model. These three dimensions—personal identity, self-respect, and duty—are based on Watson’s (1997) study of the relationship between ideology and “employee judgments of organizational fairness and social responsibility as well as implications of alienation and trust” (Watson, 1997: iv). He found that individualist and communitarian constructs served as both direct and moderating influences on his dependent variables.

**Contribution of Watson’s Research to the Present Study**

Watson’s research study focused on employee judgments concerning fairness of corporate restructuring and corporate social responsibility. His work endeavored to move the general idea of differences in focus between independence versus interdependent from the psychological domain to the normative ideological domain. Using a foundation based upon social contract theory, Watson developed a theoretical perspective for examining tensions between self-interest and the common interest as an individual difference factor.

The three ideological dimensions of personal identity, self-respect, and duty are linked in this model through the political social contract and the economic social contact (Watson, 1997). My theoretical model contribution consists of constructing a relationship linking these three antecedent ideological dimensions with three dependent
dimensions of the OCB construct. All of the individualist and communitarian ideological dimensions flow through political and economic social contract ideology. In designing this model I have directly linked relationships between personal identity and loyalty; self-respect and altruism; and duty and participation. The following literature review and commentary support the theoretical model linkages. I first discuss the three ideological dimensions, and then discuss the OCB dimensions.

**Individualist and Communitarian Ideological Orientation Dimensions**

The individualist perspective values individual autonomy and unfettered rational decision making in both personal and economic life, while the communitarian perspective values social connection and the ways personal and economic life is embedded in social life. The following sections discuss the two ideological orientations in terms of the dimensions of personal identity, self-respect, and duty.

**Personal Identity**

This dimension represents highly contested intellectual terrain. Personal identity is either based on one’s own perceptions and rational choices, or person identity is constitutive of community identity and embedded connections. These two opposite perspectives are debated in the context of comprehension about the political and economic social contract.

*Personal Identity and the Individualist Political and Economic Contract*

Personal identity is primarily something that can be innately chosen and created.
by each individual. It is a self-constructed project guided from within each person. This sense of independent individual identity can be clearly seen in Locke’s justification that people lived as free agents in the state of nature and must give their consent before they agree to any form of constraint. Identity is dependent on personal decisions, not those of the state (Kymlicka, 1989).

Freedom and liberty are enacted in the process of building one’s personal identity. “Our sense of what it is to have and exercise freedom is bound up with our conception of ourselves as persons and of our relation to value, other people, society, and the casual order of the world” (Waldron, 1993: 39).

Individualist personal and economic identities are interconnected in a free market economy. An individual is at liberty to pursue their own goals with little or no concern for other people or communities. Attachments to other people or communities would negatively affect rational decision-making. Nozick (1974) asserted that each person should receive material benefits according to their individual choices and efforts. Individuals thus can choose what they shall be and how they shall obtain their personal and economic identities.21

Critics of individual autonomy and self-created identity suggest that these very ideas require a prior society that produces self-conscious individuals. And if individuals are socially produced, how can the individualist priority of individual to community be justified? Gauthier answered that preferences and other capabilities do not have to be autonomously produced, they can be provided by a society. He stated:

What makes a being autonomous is his capacity to alter given preferences by a rational, self-critical, reflective procedure, not a capacity to produce preferences with no prior basis. ...In effect, we assume that human beings are socialized into autonomy. What matters is that their preferences and, within limits, their
capacities are not fixed by their socialization, which is not a process by which persons are hard-wired, but rather, at least in part, a process for the development of soft-wired beings, who have the capacity to change the manner in which they are constituted (Gauthier, 1986: 349-50).

Personal Identity and the Communitarian Political and Economic Contract

Sandel instates that the individualist view of personal identity can lead to what he called a corruption of individuals who are without intact personal narratives, “unable to weave the various strands of their identity into a coherent whole” (1996: 350). He argues that instead, personal identity is primarily developed from a person’s social and cultural environment, rather than something an individual autonomously chooses or constructs. Sandel asked why people’s political identities should not be integrated with and express their personal identities and convictions and furthermore, he asserts that individual liberty is linked with political self-government. “I am free insofar as I am a member of a political community that controls its own fate, and a participant in the decisions that govern its affairs” (Sandel, 1996: 26).

In addition to the physical security advantages of a community for a person, there is the necessity of a shared culture and specific language to even pose the question of how self-identity is developed. People have intellectual needs that can only be provided by a community (Sandel, 1982).

Self-fulfillment and even the working out of personal identity and a sense of orientation in the world depend upon a communal enterprise. This shared process is the civic life, and its root is involvement with others...because they contribute to the whole upon which our particular sense of self depends (Sullivan, 1982: 158).

Contrast the above statement with, for example, the rational agent of Gauthier’s rationally derived morals that “remain the individual utility maximisers of neoclassical
Advocates of communitarianism view human life as more than tallying exchange accounts. Sandel (1982) critiqued individualist theories of autonomy and identity with his observation that unreasonable separation was fabricated between the person choosing and the content of their choice.

One consequence of this distance is to put the self beyond the reach of experience, to make it invulnerable, to fix its identity once and for all. No commitment could grip me so deeply that I could not understand myself without it. …No project could be so essential that turning away from it would call into question the person I am (Sandel, 1982: 62).

Taylor (1985: 196) said. “For Hobbes our attachment to life is our desire to go on being agents of desire”, but in fact human life entails development with and through social connections with other people. “I am arguing that the free individual of the West is only what he is by virtue of the whole society and civilization which brought him to be and which nourishes him” (Taylor, 1985: 102). The communitarian perspective illustrated by Taylor clearly emphasized the thesis that a person’s identity is bound up with the practices and traditions of their particular life. Freedom is not the absolute tabula rasa proscribed by some individualist proponents.

Bell (1993) proposed an alternative view for thinking about personal identity. He claimed that there is a more plausible picture than either a self uncritically immersed in their particularistic social world, or a self that critically keeps the social world at distance in order to preserve their liberty and self-identity.

I have in mind the idea that we are indeed able to re-examine some attachments, but that there are others so fundamental to our identity that they cannot be set aside, and that an attempt to do so will result in serious and perhaps irreparable psychological damage. Can I choose to shed the attachment I feel for the family which brought me up, or will such an attempt lead to perverse and unintended
consequences? Is it possible for an Inuit person from Canada’s far North suddenly to decide to stop being an Inuit, or is the only sensible response to recognize and accept this constitutive feature of her identity? For most of us, our identities are necessarily bound up with at least some of what I call ‘constitutive communities’, however free and rational we might otherwise be (Bell, 1993: 10).

Within the ideological and communitarian debate, there is clear disagreement regarding the relationship between the individual self and the values and goals of that self. “Thus, while individualists think in terms of the priority of the self over its aims, communitarians regard this distinction and this priority as artificial, even impossible” (Avineri and de-Shalit, 1992: 3).

**Self-respect**

The critical sources of self-respect constitute the grounds for the debate on this dimension between individualists and communitarians. The debate is between the pursuit and achievement of self-interested goals as the source of self-respect versus connection and membership in a particular historical and cultural community as the primary source of self-respect.

*Self-respect and the Individualist Political and Economic Contract*

Self-respect is both experienced and created by pursuing and achieving one’s own goals. One’s potential is enacted through self-interested activities (Raz, 1986). One important way to enhance an individual’s self-respect is through economic success. Gauthier (1986) asserted that in a competitive market economy individual unconstrained behavior allowed each individual to produce whatever is in their best interests. Self-respect is derived from focus on one’s own economic success.
Furthermore, since in the market each person enjoys the same freedom in her choices and actions that she would have in isolation from her fellows, and since the market outcome reflects the exercise of each person’s freedom, there is no basis for finding any partiality in the market’s operations. Thus, there is also no place, morally, for constraint. The market exemplifies an ideal of interaction among persons who, taking no interest in each other’s interests, need only follow the dictates of their own individual interests to participate effectively in a venture for mutual advantage (Gauthier, 1986: 13).

For the individualist, the self has no inherent need to include to anyone but herself to achieve self-respect. Bloom (1987) remarked that this primary focus on self followed the theories of Hobbes which presented a portrait of the good man as one who cared for himself rather than of the good man who cared for others. What one theorist claimed exemplified self-absorption, another theorist determined represented essential liberty and personal freedom. For example, Stephen Macedo exclaimed in *Liberal Virtues*:

Liberalism holds out the promise, or the threat, of making all the world like California. By encouraging tolerance or even sympathy for a wide array of lifestyles and eccentricities, liberalism creates a community in which it is possible to decide next week I might quit my career in banking, leave my wife and children, and join a Buddhist cult (1990: 278).

Likewise, unfettered freedom to change one’s personal course is a foundational premise of Adam Smith’s (1776/1970) theory of economic development. This freedom allows the flexibility to make innovative economic decisions in a dynamic market economy and allows entrepreneurs to create new enterprises, products, and services. Current popular news stories about newly wealthy entrepreneurs who left their college or job to succeed in business by breaking ‘all the rules’ are a contemporary media manifestation regarding ideas that emphasize unlimited personal choice.
Self-respect and the Communitarian Political and Economic Contract

Self-respect entails more than exercising one’s own freedom to make choices. This freedom must take place in a historical and cultural context. To position a person living life without any connections to other people,

is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without character, without moral depth. For to have character is to know that I move in a history I neither summon nor command, and which carries consequences none the less for my choices and conduct (Sandel, 1982: 179).

Sandel stated that people are situated as members of particular families, communities, and nations and their membership thus partly determines their identity and self-respect. Etzioni emphasized that: “Communities are webs of social relations that encompass shared meanings and above all shared values” (1995a: 24).

Individualists state that self-respect is experienced through following one’s own direction, which I illustrated by reference to the current wildly popular advertisement campaigns employing an anti-constraint derivative theme expressed in slogans such as ‘what rules?’ or ‘no rules!’ to sell consumer products. In contrast, the communitarian perspective finds intrinsic value in societal connections and limits that serve to develop and sustain individual self-identity. Furthermore, there is the fear that the individualist self-expressive autonomy will open the door to totalitarian governments (Tocqueville, 1840/1945; Etzioni, 1995a).

Duty

Issues of duty and obligation are crucial to the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Their narratives were designed to explain and justify obligations
to the political state and its legitimate authorities. The social contract was the bridge that spanned individual liberty and political duty with narratives of original consent. Proponents of the individualist and communitarian perspectives differed on what exactly was consented to in the social contract. Their debate regarding specific political and social contract details of people’s social obligations follows.

Duty and the Individualist Political and Economic Contract

Duty is a matter of personal choice. Gauthier (1986) developed a normative theory of moral duties based primarily on the foundation of Hobbes’ ideas. Duty for Gauthier was based upon self-interest and personal advantage.

...rational constraints on the pursuit of interest have themselves a foundation in the interest they constrain. Duty overrides advantage, but the acceptance of duty is truly advantageous. …Our enquiry will lead us to the rational basis for a morality, not of absolute standards, but of agreed constraints. We shall develop a theory of morals as part of the theory of rational choice. We shall argue that the rational principles for making choices, or decisions among possible actions, include some that constrain the actor pursuing his own interest in an impartial way. These we identify as moral principles. (Gauthier, 1986: 2-3).

If a society is an agreement of autonomous individuals who cooperate for their mutual advantage, as individualist theorists would assert, then some individuals must receive certain benefits from their social interactions (Sugden, 1993). One can thus ask (as did Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau) how much autonomy or self-identity would an individual agree to give up, in order to receive the benefits of living in a viable society. Gauthier (1986, 1993) argued that a rational autonomous individual seeks a positive net gain in any transaction. The communitarian concern is that the individualist rational choice perspective would negate social obligations and eventually destroy both society and the benefits it provides (Daly, 1994; Tocqueville, 1840/1945).
Nozick (1974) stated that even if narratives about the origins of a social contract were instructive regarding justifications for political legitimacy, no individual obligations were justified by such an account. Furthermore, Waldron (1993) argued that the problem with a communitarian identification of freedom with social obligations is that this violates individualist principles of encouraging individual critical evaluation of choices and duties. He stated:

If a person’s true self is thought to be partly or wholly constituted by the social order, then that self cannot ask the critical question “Is this the sort of order I accept? Is it one that I would have chosen?” …This view of freedom, then, is at odds with the liberal insistence that all social arrangements are subject to critical scrutiny by individuals, and that men and women reveal and exercise their highest powers as free agents when they engage in this sort of scrutiny of the arrangements under which they are to live (Waldron, 1993: 41).

Gauthier maintained that the individual person is the foundation of social life because

A person is conceived as an independent centre of activity, endeavouring to direct his capacities and resources to the fulfillment of his interests. He considers what he can do, but initially draws no distinction between what he may and may not do. (1986: 8-9).

He continued this reasoning with his statement that “Morals by agreement offer a contractarian rationale for distinguishing what one may and may not do. As rational persons...they recognize a place for mutual constraint, and so for a moral dimension in their affairs” (Gauthier, 1986: 9). Yet agreement to any specific obligation could lead to consequences that impose constraints on individuals. For example, an individual might agree not to torture others, even though this becomes a constraint, because it is required to avoid being tortured (Waldron, 1993). Even here, for the individualist, all social obligations are self-imposed. Obligations to others can be accepted or rejected
based on one’s individual choice. An individualist believes in an atomistic perspective of community, defined as simply the sum total of individuals within it. Priority is thus given to competition and contracts over social consensus (Gauthier, 1993).

*Duty and the Communitarian Political and Economic Contract*

“Strong democracies require active citizens, one who participate in civic affairs and who shoulder responsibilities for the common good” (Spragens, 1995: 50). Active membership in a political community imposes encumbering obligations. To be a member of a community requires discussing and sharing in the affairs of government, “deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and helping to shape the destiny of the political community” (Sandel, 1996: 5). This is where the individualist focus on autonomy and self-interest fails to sustain public life and discourse, as Tocqueville so clearly warned in 1840. Sandel stated that the individualist ideological perspective “cannot secure the liberty it promises, because it cannot inspire the sense of community and civic engagement that liberty requires” (1996: 6). Oaks admonished that “no society is so secure that it can withstand continued demands for increases in citizen rights and decreases in citizen obligations” (1991: 41).

Thus a community that provides for the development and sustenance of the individual person creates legitimate obligations. “I want to claim finally that all this creates a significant obligation to belong for whoever would affirm the value of this freedom; this includes all those who want to assert rights either to this freedom or for its own sake” (Taylor, 1985: 103). He goes on to state that a person can only maintain her identity and freedom within a society of representative government, and thus has obligations to participate in and sustain that society.
This concludes the literature review of the theoretical model’s antecedent independent concept and construct. The theoretical and empirical literature review of the concept and construct development of organizational citizenship behavior was completed in chapter two.

RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS

This study examines how variations in individualist and communitarian ideological orientation influence citizenship participation within business organizations. I propose that the content of the values and beliefs of these two opposite ideological orientations will result in different types and quantities of organizational citizenship behavior performance. The proceeding theoretical framework provides the basis for this research question on the influence of individualist and communitarian ideological orientation on OCB:

Do people with a stronger communitarian perspective (emphasize on the common good) engage in greater amounts and varieties of organizational citizenship behavior than do individualists (emphasize on their own self-interest)?

I propose that the quintessential character of OCB will be discovered in social relations among other people within economic organizations. In order to understand differences in OCB we must turn to social factors, normative values and beliefs that reside outside of the work context and are external to individual personality differences. This study utilizes ideological values and beliefs from the political and economic spheres to understand and explain individual differences in the performance of OCB in the organizational sphere. This is not a study about socialization or the process of
teaching subsequent generations normative ideology. Instead, I examine the ideological content of values and ideas that inform individuals regarding their identity and self-respect, and their proper relationship with and duty to other people and the political state. My study employs differences in ideological orientation to study individual variation in OCB in business organizations.

To summarize, this study is based on the presupposition that proponents of the ideology of communitarianism focus more on the collective good, while subscribers to the ideology of individualism tend to pursue their individual good. The general hypothesis for this study states:

People with a stronger communitarian ideological orientation will significantly and positively engage in the performance of greater amounts and varieties of organizational citizenship behavior than advocates of the ideology of individualism.

The study’s specific hypotheses are presented in chapter four, the research design and methods chapter, after the empirical model has been described.

**SUMMARY**

This chapter’s literature review has provided the theoretical foundations necessary to understand the major order concepts of individualist and communitarian ideology, and my proposed linkage to understanding and predicting organizational citizenship behavior. In the next chapter I will describe the empirical model, survey instrument development, my three pretests, the formal hypotheses, moderating and control variables utilized, the final survey instrument, field sample characteristics, and data collection methods.
CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES

1 The importance of the ideas derived from these originators of political philosophy is expressed in the statement “How people think politically very much affects how they act politically.” (Cohen and Fermon, 1996). The rise and fall of governments and political parties, the flow of revolutions and counter-revolutions, and the existence and survival of communities, societies, and organizations depend, in part, on the political beliefs of their respective members to perceive, explain, motivate, and justify political behaviors. The French and American political revolutions during the late eighteenth century were in part inspired and justified by the then modern political theoretical writings of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Especially Locke, where his “…doctrine of limited government and a right of revolution was widely referred to in the years leading up to the American revolution” (Macpherson, 1980: vii).

2 “And, indeed, the debate between individualists and communitarians has become one of the most important and fascinating issues of political philosophy in the 1980’s” (Avineri and de-Shalit, 1992: 1).

3 “…yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable, as that one cannot thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend as well as he” (Hobbes, 1651/1996: 86)

4 Hobbes immense influence on the development of Western ideas is illustrated by the fact that the common origins of both rational choice economics and behaviorist psychology can be traced back to Hobbes. An engaging illustration linking these two disciplines together is a comment about viewing Hobbes theory as “the invisible hand-as a form of operant conditioning” (Calhoun, 1990: 70). Calhoun continued with the following description that “markets not only sorted out, through financial success or bankruptcy, capitalist pursuing good and bad strategies, they led to modifications of behavior. Even more basically, Thomas Hobbes specified assumptions about human nature -that man is rational and self-interested, but characterized by passions -which sound strikingly modern. In addition, he anticipated behaviorism in his arguments for (1) a strict determinism; (2) a logic of efficient (agent) and material (patient) causes; and (3) a materialism focused on the physical relations of persons understood primarily from an external point of view, as objects” (1990: 70).

5 “Social changes were accompanied by social violence. This reached a peak at the very time that Hobbes came to his conclusion that it is man’s nature to search perpetually for power and that furthermore, individual power must be surrendered to government if the suicidal war of individual against individual is to be avoided. Hobbes could observe this savage conflict on the London docks, where poor people fought each other for jobs that would let them stay alive. Himself briefly exiled to France, he could sense in his bones the savage conflict between factions among the elite for control of the state” (Davies, 1986: 46).

6 Thomas Hobbes can be considered the founder of the Great Leviathan Life Insurance Company Ltd. -ehартed by the Sovereign State of Nature. His ideological agents have been
more or less successfully marketing their founder’s ideas for the past three and a half centuries. I wish to thank Professor David Barzilai for his insightful characterization of Hobbes as essentially an insurance agent for Charles II—his student, protector, and king.

7 “And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all” (Hobbes, 1651/1996: 117).

8 In contemporary management language, the sovereign Leviathan was necessary to provide leadership in the form of employee consideration and direction.

9 Although Locke constructed a through argument in the Second Treatise, he considered the First Treatise essential to understanding his thesis. “It was directed against the principles of Sir Robert Filmer, whose books, asserting the divine authority of kings and denying any right of resistance, were thought by Locke and his fellow Whigs to be too influential among the gentry to be left unchallenged by those who held that resistance to an arbitrary monarch might be justified” (Macpherson, 1980: viii).

10 Precisely the argument Geertz (1965) made in ‘The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man’ where he described how human beings could only emerge and survive as human beings within a cultural and a social environment. I wrote a Levi-Straussian structuralist elaboration of Geertz’s cultural perspective on human nature for my senior thesis, which was a requirement to complete my A.B. degree in cultural anthropology at University of California, Santa Cruz in 1969.

11 See Ball (1995) and Bell (1998) regarding this interpretation of Rousseau. Another rather harsh critic interprets Rousseau on this point by saying: “the State has a right to conclude from a person’s action—er, implicitly, from his non-action—what his real beliefs or opinions are, to accuse him of perjury, and to put him to death. What is this, if not the doctrine of arrest on suspicion of wrong thinking? We need take only one further step to punish people for lack of enthusiasm” (Crocker, 1968: 99). I wonder if employees could be terminated for lack of OCB performance, then would in-role behavior become subject to reward and punishment. There would then be no need to study antecedents to OCB because employees would enthusiastically support the organization’s goals, or else be subject to termination.

12 The intellectual linkages from Hobbes through Adam Smith continue to be influential, as seen in the following observation in the resent book Human by Nature: Between Biology and the Social Sciences: “Sociology and economics share common roots in the work of Adam Smith, who posed the central problem that was to guide the use of biological metaphors in sociology as they were blended with Newtonian physics and Enlightenment philosophy” (Turner, Maryanski, and Giesen, 1997: 19).

13 My primary source is the original English translation by Henry Reeve (Volume I in 1835, and Volume II in 1840) as revised by Francis Bowen in 1862, with further corrections, editing, introduction comments, and editorial notes by Phillips Bradley for the 1945 edition (fourth printing, July 1948).

14 “By the route I am taking, I am reaching the goal I am setting for myself, which is to place myself successively in the midst of the time. But the process is so slow that I often despair of it. Yet, is there any other?” (Alexis de Tocqueville, Selected Letters on Politics and Society. Translated by James Toupin and Roger Boesche, 1985: 372-73).
The word individualism was first published in the English language in 1839 in the translation of Chevalier’s *Letters from North America* (Shane, 1994: 92). This point serves to correct the *Oxford English Dictionary*’s citation of Tocqueville (1835) as the first published usage of the work individualism.

This is especially the case in the second book of *Democracy in America* (1840/1945), where his criticism of the idea of individualism grows increasingly strident. In fact, the word individualism did not appear in Tocqueville’s writing until Volume II was published in 1840.

Quote from Shane (1994: xii-xiv) in his preface to *The Myth of American Individualism*

The book *Morals by Agreement* (1986) represents Gauthier’s combination of Hobbes’ theory of self-interest with rational choice theory to construct a contractual justification for human morality. The argument falters because Gauthier does not provide sufficient explanation of why those with power (the masters) would ever agree to bargain with those without power (the slaves), thus leaving no reason for the powerful to accept moral constraints (Gewirth, 1996).

Communitarianism can be traced back to at least the republicanism of the Renaissance. “It’s historical career parallels that of liberalism itself, and it makes itself heard, however faintly at times, as a counterpoint to liberalism. …In the twentieth century, the communitarian tradition was present as an undercurrent in prewar progressivism, as interpreted by writers like Josiah Royce, Jane Addams, Mary Parker Follett, and Randolph Bourne; and it was carried on in later years by John Collier, Waldo Frank, Lewis Mumford, and Paul Goodman, among others. It was an important ingredient in the new left” (Lasch, 1988: 175).

Within the limits of the present study, I cannot address Hegel’s thesis about historical conditioning of human beings, which is of course implicit in Sandel’s thesis.

Reference the Southern California normative statement: “You are what you drive”.

A wonderful illustration regarding the delightful paradox inherent when a person exercises their self-absorbed idealized form of individualism by embracing a traditional and most likely coercive form of rigorous communalism.

“Our theory of morals fall in an unpopular tradition, as the identity of its greatest advocate, Thomas Hobbes, will confirm” (Gauthier, 1986: 10).