

SECTION 1

THE NATURE OF POLICY ANALYSIS IN THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW

**"Men make their own history,
but they do not make it just as they please"**

Karl Marx

The traditional view of the development of the theory of policy analysis and policy subsystems usually begins in the 1950s. Such an approach fails to recognize important philosophical and historical elements that have affected the theoretical conceptualization of policy analysis. In order to clearly assess the development and current direction of the theory, one must examine the structural principles that have guided the development of the theory within the context of American political history.

The English Tradition

The structural principles for the American view of policy analysis and policy subsystems, are grounded in the concepts of two British empiricists, David Hume and John Locke. Hume provides the view of the nature of man within a political system, and Locke provides the object toward which man's nature and actions will be directed.

Hume argues that man is only a collection of sense based impressions with no predetermined end. Because we are only "a bundle of perceptions", there are neither ethics or morality inside our basic nature. Our actions are simply the results of our passions, and reason is not directed by moral ends or norms, but rather is directed by desire. Any social view of ethics, morality, or reason, is simply the result of some external person exercising their personal "tastes" in judgment over our actions. In fact, Hume states, ethical choices involve neither comparisons of ideas or causal relations. Thus, Hume concludes,

"Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of passion." (Hume, 1738)

While Hume argues that reason does not constitute either ends or norms, he does state that reason can help man by showing man what are the consequences of taking action. Reason can assist man because man has two levels of passion, one "violent" and one "calm". "Violent" passions are exercised when we take the immediate view, and ignore the possible consequences of our actions. "Calm" passions are exercised when we consider the distant consequences of our actions, and take them into account before we act. In both cases, we are still being directed by our desires, but by exercising our "calm" passions we are minimizing harm and damage that may result from pursuing our own self-interest.

When Hume extends his argument to the area of government, he premises the establishment of any government on the concept stated originally by Machiavelli, namely that you should assume that every man is a knave, and will behave as such. In order to offset man's nature, Hume proposes that you should use reason in the service of passion to make government effective. You accomplish this end by including in government three structural components.

The first component is to enlist passion and self-interest into the decision-making process through the establishment of a legislative body that deliberates before making a decision. The process of deliberation is exercising "calm" passion rather than "violent" passion, and will lead to a minimalization of harm and damage. Reflecting his own social background, Hume believes such a body should be composed of "cultivated" men, who he felt would be more apt to use "calm" passions (reason) for the benefit of all members of the society.

The second structural component is to link self-interest to duty and obligation. By requiring that men must exercise "calm" passions before receiving the benefits of their self-interest, one assures society that a certain level of social tranquillity will be maintained. In addition, by promoting the concept that privilege entails responsibility, the cultivated men making the decisions will gain a

sense of *noblesse oblige* that will further dampen their tendency to exercise man's "violent" passions.

The third structural component involves the actual size of the territory administered by the government. Since men are driven by passion and self-interest, it is wise to seek to blunt this drive by pitting individual self-interest and passion against other individual self-interest and passion. In order to blunt this tendency, he felt, you should increase the geographical size of the country, thus expanding the number of factions pursuing collective self-interest. In essence you counteract the rise of factions by increasing the possible number of factions that can develop, and assure that it will be difficult for any one faction to obtain enough strength to dominate the entire society.

Hume thus presents a structural system of checks and blocks that offset the use of our "violent" passions, and instead promote the use of our "calms" passions. But what Hume does not answer is what is the self-interest that men are pursuing. The reason why he does not provide an answer is because Locke already provided that answer at an earlier time.

In Locke's "pre-political state of nature", all men are free and equal. In this "state of nature" each man has a right to that property which he mixes with his own labor. The reason he has a right to this property is because property, and the acquisition of it, is necessary for self-survival and self-preservation. Thus because there is a basic right to life, it naturally follows that there is a right to have property., which he defines as life, liberty, and estate.

But the "state of nature" is an unsettled existence, and eventually causes men to form, by mutual consent, civil society. One element of the formation of civil society is the establishment of the ability, by the state, to regulate and preserve individual property. This power allows for the creation of a sense of security and permanence, and actually encourages further labor. The process of creating a purpose for further labor is the basis for the creation of wealth in the society, which leads to a state of plenty for all of the members of the society. Thus the common good is realized by the pursuit of private goods, and the protection of private property.

The state is the facilitating instrument by which individuals are able to pursue private goods with a minimal amount of interference. Thus the ultimate goal and end of government is the preservation and protection of private property.

When Hume and Locke are joined, you create a total view of man at work within society. Men, because they are pursuing their passions without internal ethical constraints - they are amoral and will behave as knaves - will unjustly seize each others property - since they have an acquisitive nature. In the process they will destroy the reason for labor, and end the production of wealth necessary for the creation of the common good. Government should be constructed to protect the common good - wealth and private property - by having cultivated men, - using their "calm" passions - deliberate together over the issue of the pursuit of individual self-interest, namely the pursuit of wealth and prosperity. This dynamic thus becomes the structural principles that are transported to America, by James Madison, and form the basis for the American theory of policy analysis and policy subsystems.

The American Theory

We hear the voices of Hume and Locke in the Federalist/Anti-Federalist debate over the ratification of the United States Constitution. In Federalist 10, James Madison discusses the effects that factions might have upon the government.

"Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments, never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice...By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community" (Madison, 1787)

Madison concludes that it is in the very nature of people to form groups based on common interests, and that it would be impossible to remove this tendency from human nature. The only way to control this tendency, he proposed, was the establishment of a government in which power is dispersed and fragmented horizontally between the branches of the federal government, and vertically between the federal and state governments. The fragmentation of power will not stop human nature from forming interests groups, but it will make it difficult for any one group or coalition to obtain enough power to dominate the society and the government.

Madison's view of interest groups and factions was decidedly negative. Interest groups represented a potential capacity for the majority to eventually dominate the minority through the formation of self-supporting coalitions. The threatened minority, in this case, were the political and economic elites of Colonial America, of which Madison was a member, and who feared that the "overbearing majority" would gain control of the government, and eventually take away their property.

"But the most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, and many lesser interest, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principle task of modern Legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary operation of Government." (Madison, 1787)

The system of Constitutional fragmentation of power provided the elites with a check and block mechanism against the majority's potential to exercise the collective will, especially in terms of redefining the nature and rights of private property.

Theory In Practice

To insure that the majority would not undermine the development of sound public policy, the Federalist proposed, and implemented, a system of governmental administration that fulfilled Hume's requirement to exercise "calm" passions. Preferences in office were given to men of wealth, class, and advanced education, and administration was exercised through a strong chief executive, namely the President.

"The Federalist preference for the executive branch was a faithful reflection of their distrust of the people. An intelligent perception of sound public policy, in their

view, could only come from well-educated men of affairs, men with trained minds, and broad experience - in short from the upper class." (White, 1948: 510)

Madison's 'checkmate' against the majority was a short lived phenomenon. The inheritors of the Anti-federalist position, namely the Jeffersonians, were driven by an almost missionary zeal to extend enlightened democracy to the "common man". Once they had begun to attain power, after 1803, they began to challenge the Federalists position by dismantling executive authority, and replacing it with a fragmented approach that vested decision making authority within the State governments as opposed to the Federal government. (Caldwell, 1944).³

Thus, within twenty years after the adoption of the Constitution, political parties had been formed, and factions formed around the unsettled debate between the Federalist's centralized conception of government, and the Anti-Federalist movement for a populist-based decentralized government.

By the 1830s interest groups had become a basic element of political life in the United States. Alexis de Tocqueville commented on not only the development of interests groups, but also on the power they wielded with government officials and politicians:

"As soon as several of the inhabitants of the United States have taken up an opinion or feeling which they wish to promote in the world, they look out for mutual assistance; and as soon as they have found one another out, they combine. From that moment they are no longer isolated men, but a power seen from afar, whose actions serve for example and whose language is listened to." (Tocqueville, 1835: 2:117-118)

But Madison's fear of the majority dominating the minority did not disappear from American political theory. In one of the ironies of political theory, considering his position on slavery, we find John C. Calhoun echoing the thoughts of Madison.

Calhoun argued that majority self-interest in a democracy could be as ruthless as any cruel monarch:

"...(it is) folly to suppose that the party in possession of the ballot box and the physical force of the country could be successfully resisted by an appeal to reason, truth, justice, or the obligations of the Constitution." (Calhoun, 1848: 33-34)

Calhoun states that the rights of the minority must be protected, but that guarantees cannot be achieved through reliance on the good will of the simple majority. Rather he proposes that decisions should only be reached by a 'concurrent majority' which represents all the major elements of the society, and that each of these major elements has a veto right over the proposed legislation. Calhoun argues that interest groups represent the legitimate interests of all citizens, and only through their participation in the legislative process can equity and justice be achieved within the society. In essence, Calhoun was proposing 'consensus' government as a remedy for the potential ills created by majority interests groups. (Colt, 1950)⁴

³ But even under the Jeffersonian view, there existed a natural aristocratic leadership. Natural rights were abstract, and needed to be interpreted through the sovereigns of the present generation, and especially their existing social and economic positions. (Beitzinger, 1972)

⁴ While couched in the concepts of preserving freedom for all, Calhoun's arguments were themselves an attempt to promote self-interest. The South, faced with an expanding population in the North inclined toward abolishing the

But Calhoun, rather than arguing for the continuation of pitting self-interest against self-interest, couches his terms in the acceptable concepts of "uplifting" men in government.

"So powerful is the operation of the concurrent majority, in this respect, that, if it were possible for a corrupt and degenerate community to establish and maintain a well-organized government of the kind, it would of itself purify and regenerate them, while, on the other hand, a government based wholly on the numerical majority, would just as certainly corrupt and debase the most patriotic and virtuous people." (Calhoun, 1848 :50-51)

Calhoun's argument, once again, advanced the idea that majority self-interest was a threat to the property rights of the minority elite, and needed to be stymied through a Constitutional mechanism, but he supplemented Madison's argument by stating that the majority will experience a virtuous and redemptive life by voluntarily giving up the potential majority control mechanism - namely the concept of majority voting deciding issues of public policy.

Calhoun's arguments against interest groups, like Madison's before him, failed to change the direction of American politics. In the years following Calhoun's death, in 1850, interest group pressure resulted in shoddy arms, clothing, and food for the Union Armies, the give-away of Veteran's pensions by the Congress, the distribution of the land in the American West to the railroad companies, and a host of corruption scandals through local, state and federal governmental sectors. (White, 1958)



Saving the Nation

During and after the Civil War the degree of interest group influence in government achieved historic proportions.. The level of outright, blatant favoritism reached such a level that a reform movement emerged seeking to not only remove corruption from government, but also restrict the influence of interests groups over the decision making mechanisms of government.

During the mid-nineteenth century the movements of transcendentalism and revivalism began to undermine the basis for the existing political order. Under this newly emerging view of social order, it was felt that there was a higher law than majority rule, a higher law grounded in natural rights. The anti-slavery issue was an example of this movement. But the new ideas went further than just ownership of men. What before had been an acceptable attitude toward the "spoils system", now began to be questioned, and the issue of the proper role of government and law over men began to be discussed. The corruption of the Civil War and the Republican Era helped fuel

institution of slavery in the South, sought to nullify the wishes of the majority of citizens by creating a new check and block mechanism that would protect the interests of the slave-owning elites of the Southeast

this debate, a debate that ultimately centered around where the answers to political and constitutional questions and answers could be located and discovered.

Science was selected as the method to discover these answers, and history was studied to determine the necessary social pre-conditions required to develop moral government. Science was used to gather facts, and from these facts to determine answers that would solve the problems of administration.

It was concluded that answers should include four elements: maintenance of majoritarianism, application of moral principles, determination of social pre-conditions for moral government, and application of solutions to the appropriate institutional structure. Yet intermixed with this new awareness was a degree of Nationalism, overlaid with Social Darwinism, and a belief in the destiny of American superiority. (Nelson, 1982)

The new focus on the proper role of government, that developed at the end of the nineteenth century in the United States, was grounded in the perceived necessity for reform of government. The concepts of reform focused on the institutional arrangements of government, and the desire to improve government while still retaining its democratic spirit.

But the question arose as to what aspect of the institutional arrangement of government should be reformed. One focus was on the institutional arrangements of "governance", and involved the methods for establishing public policy. The second focus was on the institutional arrangements of "government", and involved the methods for the administration of the implementation of policy. Two schools of thought arose concerning these different foci of emphasis, with one school emphasizing the policy establishment, and the other school concerned with policy implementation and administration.

While emphasizing different foci of analysis, both schools of thought shared a common framework for interpreting the nature of government. This common framework was known as the Theory of Teutonic origin.

The earlier theories of Hegel had laid the foundation for the study of the state in Germany. The development of the Prussian state's movement for German unification, lead by Bismarck, fueled interest in the academic communities of Germany to examine the nature of the state. Eventually the formalization of governmental study, within the German academic system, was legitimated by the establishment of the first known departments of political science.

American historians who were interested in the study of the state, traveled to the German universities to study this new body of academic knowledge. While attending these various programs, American scholars were introduced to Hegel's theories of historical destiny, and the subsequent German theoretical developments that formed the basis for the theory of Teutonic origins. Upon their return to the United States, these historians developed theories of American government, and its historical development, based on the underlying assumption that American governmental institutions were historically grounded in the Teutonic race. (Saveth, 1965) ⁵

⁵ At its most basic level, the theory of Teutonic origin held that in the pre-historical period of the development of civilization, the Teutonic race existed in a single homeland. In this pre-historic "homeland", the Teutonic culture developed a unique system of governance patterns. In time, the Teutonic race migrated to other parts of the world, and specifically to Greece, Rome, Germany, England, and eventually the United States. The Teutons recapitulated their pre-historical governance patterns in the areas that they settled. Eventually this led to the development of the city-state and empire, and ultimately to the evolution of the nation-state. Because the Teutons were the recipients of the highest levels of racial

American historians, at this time, were also seeking to legitimate their profession by adopting the mantle of science. In order to accomplish this scientific legitimization, they modified the theory of Teutonic origin to include the biological findings of Darwin. Under their new theory, American governmental institutions and culture were rooted in the Teuton's racial heritage, but these heritage's had been modified and purified through the processes of natural selection and survival of the fittest resulting from the hardships of settling the forests and frontiers of America. This frontier experience had purged the American character of the influences of lesser races on the Teutonic heritage, and rekindled in the United States the purest form of Teutonic traditions. As a result of this purging process, the United States had developed the most advanced form of government and nation, and was destined to lead and teach the world. (Parkman, 1899; Roosevelt, 1917; Turner, 1920)

Within this framework of Teutonic origins and Darwinian natural selection, American scholars of government developed their theories of modern government in the United States. At this time, the late 1800s, they felt especially driven to develop these new theories because of perceived threats to the national character emanating both from industrialization and immigration.

The majority of these early American theorists viewed with alarm the changing character of immigration to the United States in the period after the Civil War. Prior to the Civil War, immigrants to the United States tended to come from Northern Europe or Ireland. After the Civil War, the immigration patterns began to change, with the bulk of immigration occurring in Southern and Eastern Europe, and parts of Asia. The new immigrants appeared, to many Americans at this time, as strange in customs, and unappreciative of the traditions that had established the country.

The shifting immigration pattern also occurred at the same time that modern large-scale industrialization began to occur in the United States. The unintended consequences of the industrialization process spilled over into areas such as urbanization, slums, poverty, corruption in government, and a rising tide of class conflicts. The immigrant became associated with these growing social problems, and was seen as a major factor in the deterioration of social conditions.

At the same time, the impact of technological development and industrialization began to threaten the economic position of the older economic and social elites. Rather than recognizing the impact of capitalism on the displacement of wealth, the social elites tended to blame the influence of "strange" immigrants, thus reinforcing the growing sense that "something had to be done" about the "immigration problem" before it destroyed the fabric of American society. (Saveth, 1965)

The budding school of political science was called upon to study the problem of the deteriorating national character, and offer working solutions. Faced with a growing, and alien, population, the necessity for developing new forms of institutional checks on majoritarianism seemed imperative. But the scholars involved in the search for answers focused their efforts in two different directions, one focus being government, the other focus being governance. Probably the two men who epitomized this division were John W. Burgess and Woodrow Wilson.

John W. Burgess (1841-1933)

purity, they were destined to be the both the rulers and teachers to the rest of the world, and held a significant place in the evolution of the human race. (Freeman, 1873)

Burgess is generally considered to be the father of American political science. He is credited with the development of political science as a separate discipline not only because he created the first Ph.D. political science program in the United States, in 1880 at Columbia University, but also because the format for the program became the structural divisions of political science that are still in effect to this day. (Gunnell, 1993)

The program that Burgess developed was organized with two purposes in mind. The first purpose was the development of all branches of the political sciences - history, law, and philosophy. Under the developed curriculum, the branches of study were organized around the history of institutions that comprised the development of the state.

While the State was the focus of study, and the institutions of the State the objects of study, Burgess personally emphasized that the State and government were separate concepts. While the State was the ultimate source of law, government was often capricious, and generally a threat to the liberty and property of the people and the nation - especially the legislative arm of government. (Gunnell, 1993) Burgess feared "the masses", especially the possibility that the "majority" might gain control of government, and redistribute the wealth of the upper class. (Saveth, 1965)

"...the freedom of association, incorporate and unincorporate, must continue to exist under full constitutional guaranty, protected by the courts, of all those rights and immunities which are of a purely private character." (Burgess, 1895: 413)

The second purpose of the program was to prepare the future national political leaders for public service. Burgess felt that this second purpose was critical for the preservation of the Republic.

"...unless a sounder political wisdom and a better political practice be attained, the republican system may become a form, and republican institutions but a deception." (Burgess, 1882: 346)

The new program was thus constructed to not only train the future leaders of the Republic, but to also instill in them a proper understanding of the nature of government, and its tendency to behave in a manner detrimental to the personal and economic liberties of its citizens.

Burgess was a member of the "American Nationalism" school of political thought. This school, which dominated the middle to end of the nineteenth century American political theory, was greatly influenced by the Hegelian emphasis on historicism, which assumed that historically determined sociocultural forces drove the rise and fall of societies. Under this view, history is seen as an eternal process of a dialectic composed of forces in opposition to each other, yet mutually dependent on each other. Eventually, the tension of contradiction between the two forces erupts, destroying both. Out of their mutual destruction, a new force is born in history, and history progresses onward and upward. The state is seen as the ultimate manifestation of this supreme moral organism and process, and the realization of our freedom. (Hegel, 1770-1831)

Burgess accepted the basic concepts of historicism, and developed a conceptualization of the evolution of the state from a theocracy, through despotism and monarchy, to eventually the highest form of government; constitutional law. To Burgess, the United States was the highest form of government, and the purest form of governmental structure. He credited this development on the accepted "conventional wisdom" of the time, namely that the United States was the depository of the Roman and Teutonic heritage's. Under this view, which Burgess accepted, only the Teutonic race possessed the internal political psychology needed to found the national state.

But Burgess saw this "highest form of government" threatened by a new enemy. Immigrants from non-Aryan nations were pouring into the United States, undermining the basic structures of American government through the granting of the right to vote to newly nationalized citizens.

" But now we are getting people of a very different sort - Slavs, Czechs, Hungarians...They are inclined to anarchy and crime...They are, in everything which goes to make up folk character, the exact opposite of genuine Americans. It remains to be seen whether Uncle Sam can digest and assimilate such a morsel."
(Burgess, 1907)

This perceived threat to the national character required a response, and Burgess formulated a strategy to deal with the matter. To Burgess, the development of government was dependent on the exercise of representative institutions and laws, and the processes that created such laws. The administration of laws was mechanistic, and responsive to the political will as manifested in the "law maker". Thus the focus of the study of government should be on the law making process, and the effects of laws on the development of society's historical destiny. (Gunnell, 1993)

The non-Aryan threat to the governmental order of the United States required that the focus of the development of government study be directed toward the new national leaders, and their preservation of the Constitutional order. Like Hume and the Federalist, Burgess sought protection against the amoral, property acquisitive majority through a selection and training process aimed at the social elites. Burgess's addition to the old check and block mechanism had two new twists to the old song of control of the majority. The first was to instill in the leaders a sense of Aryan and Teutonic superiority within their formal training as statesmen. The second was to strengthen the court's power to protect the private property of citizens from any encroachment by Legislative acts. Since the courts and the government would be staffed with "properly" trained leaders, the acquisitive, amoral actions of the newly enfranchised majority would be thwarted. (Saveth, 1965)

This approach to the study of government was juristic, formalistic, and metaphysical. To Burgess, the study of political science should be focused on the nature of the state, government, nation, and sovereignty, and should contain lengthy and detailed descriptions of existing governmental institutions, and historical analysis of the Teutonic foundations of the modern national state. (Burgess, 1913) Burgess's view left little room for the study of government administration as a separate discipline from the study of political science.

While his views reflected the prevailing wisdom of many of his peers in the newly developing field of political science, they were being challenged by another group set upon the idea of the reform of government administration. This group's champion was Woodrow Wilson.

Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924)

Wilson marks the turning point away from Burgess's formalistic and legal approach to the study of politics and government. Wilson, and the individuals who followed his direction, took a more "realistic" view of government. Yet underlying this new approach was a strong "reformist" movement, one which sought to achieve a new sense of responsible exercise of power within the governmental administration of the American society.

Wilson was heavily influenced by Edmund Burke (1729-1797), specifically Burke's conception of the complexity of politics, and the trusteeship nature of public service. Burke saw political parties as groups united on various public principles. The primary purpose of a political party was to serve

as a link between the executive and legislative branches of government, a link that centered on the public principle being advanced by the political party. Under his view, Burke believed that elected members of the legislative branch should play the role of trustee, and exercise their own best judgment rather than being bound by prior instructions from their constituency. (Beitzinger, 1972)

"Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment: and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion." (Burke, 1774)

Building on Burke's concept of public stewardship and personal judgment, Wilson rejected Burgess's emphasis on law and political accountability through institutional arrangements. To Wilson, the nature of politics and government administration was more complex than the formal arrangements of authority.

"While it is generally easy enough to determine what the law is, political fact is subtle and elusive, not to be caught up whole in any formula."(Wilson, 1891: 188)

To Wilson, democracy should be studied as a process that was evolutionary, and changing through the lens of historical experience. Under this view, the study of government was grounded in the "stage of development" that existed, rather than in the past perceptions of how government should be constructed - or theories of "Teutonic purity". To Wilson, the "standards of common sense" should outweigh the "political witchcraft" found in the traditional study and analysis of government through the formal Constitution seen through the theories of questionable historical analysis. (Beitzinger, 1972)

Like Burgess, Wilson was also concerned about the "immigration problem", and, like Burgess, felt that the non-Aryan immigrants that poured into the United States after the Civil War posed a threat to the American character and governmental traditions.

"...men of the lowest class from the south of Italy and men of the meaner sort out of Hungary and Poland, men out of the ranks where there was neither skill nor energy nor any initiative of quick intelligence; and they came in numbers which increased from year to year, as if the countries of the south of Europe were disburdening themselves of the more sordid and hapless elements of their population, the men whose standards of life and work were such as American workmen had never dreamed of hither to." (Wilson, 1902:187)

But unlike Burgess, Wilson did not claim that the American Constitutional order was in anyway either biologically or racially derived. He saw the development of democracy as cultural, a concept developing within the basic human capacity for self-improvement and self-redemption. This redemptive quality of democracy would be triggered in the non-Aryans based upon their individual exposure to the benefits derived from living in a free society. To Wilson, the American consciousness was a "melting pot" where dissimilar national characters merged into a single national spirit through the process of democratic life. To Wilson, in time, the problems facing the country due to immigration would be alleviated by experience, and the proper role of government was to maintain social equilibrium while the process worked. (Saveth, 1965)

Wilson believed that the greater problem facing America was the irresponsible exercise of power by elected officials, especially Congress. If the administration of government were allowed to work to maintain balance in the society, in time the redemptive nature of democracy would work on the non-Aryan character, and the Republic would be preserved. But if the legislative branch thwarted the process by pandering to the majority's interests and desires, courting the immigrants

votes without regard for the historical traditions of the country, then the redemptive process would be obliterated, and the Republic would fall. The solution he proposed was structural separation of government administration from politics. (Beitzinger, 1972) The separation process not only would assure effective government, it would provide a buffer to protect the national spirit during the transition period of "merging" with the new immigrant cultures.


The Lines are Drawn

Wilson's rejection of the Constitutional emphasis in the study of American political science found little room in the world of academia grounded in the traditionalist view of governmental study formulated under Burgess's vision. But Wilson's call for administrative reform did find favor among the Progressive Reformers seeking to move the government toward the concepts of efficiency and economy in management. Since Wilson's ultimate goal was to reform rather than just describe the workings of government, the fit of the two approaches, Wilsonian pragmatism and Progressive Reform, seemed ideal for its time.

While Wilson's views found a receptive home in the Progressive Reform movement, Burgess's view of the study of government had become entrenched into the academic disciplines of political science. The Columbia model dominated the developing programs of study, and influenced the methods of analysis used to examine the nature of both government, and man in government.

It was at this point in time, the early 1900s, that the division of public administration from political science developed. At first, their similarities were greater than their differences. Both were focused on law and moral philosophy. Both examined legal frameworks and administrative arrangements. Both sought to base their explanations on historical origins and governance mechanisms. They tended to be preoccupied with formal structures and legal systems, and provided detailed accounts of rules, rights and procedures. (Bill and Hardgrave, 1981)

The difference, though, on the focus of study - Burgess focused on "Government", Wilson focused on "Administration" - would have a profound impact on both fields during the twentieth century. Eventually, public administration would accept the theoretical structure of organizational theory, while political science would seek to legitimate its knowledge in the area of policy analysis. In order to trace this development we must now diverge, and first focus on the development of the theories of policy analysis and policy subsystems, and then turn our attention toward the concepts of organizational theory within American public administration theory.



Policy Analysis and Policy Subsystems

We begin the twentieth century with a theory of public policy and interests groups that is negatively oriented, and narrow in scope. In terms of motivation, interests groups are seen as economically driven, seeking to usurp either property rights, or gain unfair economic advantage. In terms of methods, Interest groups are seen as focused on influencing elected officials, and interacting with such officials to pass laws that promote their individual economic interests. In terms of targets of exploitation, interests groups seek to raid the private property of economic elites, or to raid the public coffers which hold money and resources in the public trust. In all cases, interests groups, and the public officials that collude with them, are conscious of their motives and tactics, and operate in tandem with full knowledge that they are violating both Constitutional principles of ownership, and principles of public trust within a democracy. In general, interest groups interaction with elected officials and public policy is seen as harmful to the general interests of the nation, and a threat to the maintenance of a representative democracy.

The proposed solution to the problem of interests groups focused exclusively on structural components of governance. It was assumed that Hume's definition of man's nature was correct, and would naturally gravitate toward socially damaging acts, usually associated with the second part of man's nature as defined by Locke, the unjust acquisition of property. To offset this native inclination, men created institutionalized systems of checks and balances that sought to maintain Locke's concept of minimal government linked to maximum property protection. Protection was to be found in structural solutions.

What is missing from this theory, though, is the realization that governmental organizations are in fact people interacting with other people, and that structure is actually only human actions. Thus any structural solution offered will automatically contain within it the very element you are seeking protection from, namely human nature.

Probably the credit for being the first to recognize this link, and for developing the beginnings of modern political interest group theory, is Arthur F. Bentley (1870-1955). Writing in the early 1900s, Bentley developed a conceptualization of the policy making process that expanded the scope of analysis to include the dynamics of interest groups interacting with all levels of government, political parties, administrative agents, and other factions also seeking a position in the same area of interest.

To Bentley, the dynamics of policy making have two foci of action. The first focus is on competition between groups which seek advantage in the same area of interest.

"All phenomena of government are phenomena of groups pressing one another, forming one another, and pushing out new groups and group representatives (the organs or agencies of government) to mediate the adjustments. It is only as we isolate these group activities, determine their representative values, and get the whole process stated in terms of them, that we approach to a satisfactory knowledge of government." (Bentley, 1908: 269)

In Bentley's view, groups are engaged in a constant dynamic of competition and creation. While groups may be pursuing their own interests in opposition to the interests of other groups, the process of interaction forms the bases for the collective process where all activities are commingled into a single system.

"...the activities are all knit together in a system, and indeed only get their appearance of individuality by being abstracted from the system; they brace each other up, hold each other together, move forward by their interactions, and in

general are in a state of continuing pressure upon one another." (Bentley, 1908: 218)

For its time, Bentley's conceptualization is remarkable. It pre-dates by almost fifty years the idea of a system's theory of both politics and policy making.

The second focus of Bentley's theory is on the interaction between interest groups and the formal structures of government. Bentley's conceptualization moves beyond the view of formal institutional arrangements based on the legislative process, and instead brings into the dynamic the agencies of government and the individuals within both the legislative and bureaucratic structures.

"In governments like the United States we see these manifold interests gaining representation through many thousands of officials in varying degrees of success, beating some officials down in delegate activity, intrusting representative activity...to other officials at times in high degree, subsiding now and again over great areas while 'special interests' make special use of officials, rising in other spots to dominate, using one agency of the government against another, now with stealth, now with open force, and in general moving along the route of time with that organized turmoil which is life where the adjustments are much disturbed." (Bentley, 1908: 452-453)

Bentley's concept of a dynamic system of policy making in which interest groups, legislative systems, and administrative agencies intermingled, was not well received in its time. Presented in a time dominated by institutional theories, progressive reform's emphasis on scientific management of government, and a generally negative view of the impact of interest groups on government and governance, Bentley stood little chance of advancing an alternative view of the policy making process that emphasized a continuous systems dynamic between all levels of government, interest groups, and individuals.

To a great extent, Bentley's ideas challenged the institutional approach to the study of policy making that dominated political science until the mid-twentieth century. Flowing from the political theories developed in the nineteenth century, the Institutionalists focused on how policy was made, and the bias within the design of the various institutions of government that often predetermined the outcome of policy decisions. The structure of the institutions - Congress, the Courts, the Presidency - defined both the process and outcomes of policy making. The idea of a broad system of interaction, based on relationships and contact, and driven by a natural social order as opposed to political fictions such as laissez-faire, as was being proposed by Bentley, fell out of the prevailing institutional focus of the time, and was rejected. It was not until the 1950s that Bentley's ideas were adopted into the general theories of policy making. (Beitzinger, 1972)

Bentley was not alone, though, in challenging the institutional focus that dominated this period of time. Shortly after Bentley's book was released, Charles Beard published his Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (1913). Beard argued that a group of personally connected individuals, motivated by a desire to protect their own private self-interests, manipulated the Constitutional Convention process. These individuals, seeking, once again, to promote their own economic self-interest, fostered a structure of government on the United States that, in fact, supported elites, not the majority of citizens. While structure still controlled the policy making process, it was a structure dominated by elites, in close relationship with each other, who defined the final outcomes of the process. Beard was attacked by the traditionalist and Institutionalists as a heretic and anti-American, a defiler of the reputation of the founding fathers. Eventually, Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University and a protégé of John W. Burgess, forced

Beard's resignation from Columbia University (1917), and, shortly after that, Beard retired from academic life. (Gunnell, 1993)

Both Bentley and Beard proposed a new view of the policy making process and the impact of interests groups on the process. Rather than taking the classical position that the rights of the minority - especially their property rights - needed to be protected from the amoral, acquisitive majority, Bentley and Beard suggested that the amoral, acquisitive majority might need to have their rights protected from encroachment by the amoral and acquisitive economic and social elite minority. They proposed that rather than a system designed to foster democratic and republican principles, that the Constitutional/governmental structure was a system designed to sustain the position of a closely connected, and interacting group of powerful individuals. To Bentley and Beard, the threat to the Republic was not from majoritarianism or newly enfranchised non-Aryan immigrants, but rather from the industrialists and the wealthy minority. In their view, economic class existed, and it controlled the policy making processes of government.

While the Institutionalist still maintained their dominate position, they were not able to silence completely the call for a broader perspective on the theories of policy making. Still, when the next attack came, it was muted, and came from a direction more palatable to their tastes.

In 1921 Charles Merriam, criticizing the strict institutional approach, called for an expanded view of research concerning policy making. Rather than attacking directly the institutional principles, though, he called for the creation of a multi-disciplinary approach to the study:

"...a cross fertilization of politics with science, so called, or more strictly with modern methods of inquiry and investigation..." (Merriam, 1921: 181)

Merriam's call for the development of a multi-disciplinary approach to the study of public policy, was not a complete break with the Institutionalists. Merriam was a protégé of Burgess, and in many ways he modified rather than abandoned Burgess's institutional focus. While he shifted the object of study from an emphasis on the state to one of process, he still focused on institutions. The major shift, though, was on the way he defined institutions. To Merriam, institutions were primarily ideas, ideas that needed to be understood within the contextual settings in which they developed and evolved. Only by focusing research in this direction could policy making be understood, especially in terms of the actions taken by the various interests groups in conflict with each other. (Merriam, 1920)

Merriam continued, though, the idea that the ultimate goal of the study of policy making and political behavior was to apply that knowledge in the public policy arena through governmental institutions and social elites. He sought to use the instruments and theories of the social sciences to explain, predict, and control political behavior. While he took the position that the country was slowly drifting toward social equality, and would continue to do so as governmental direction and control was extended through the democratic process. he still advanced the ideas of social control through the institutions of government, and supported an instrumental view of the nature of the state, and the nature of man in government. (Merriam, 1920)

While not generally accepted by the Institutionalists, Merriam did help found the Social Science Research Council in 1923. In the years following, the Council sought to support and encourage the use of interdisciplinary research on all elements and aspects of sociopolitical problems, and especially to direct research beyond the institutional focus to include the theories of sociology and human interaction.

In 1939, Ernest Griffith presents the first detailed description of what will become known, eventually, as policy subsystems.

"Looking at our government from another angle, one can see it to be composed of a number of dispersive and virtually uncoordinated units, each whirling in its own orbit...the relationship among these men...legislators, administrators, lobbyists, scholars...who are interested in a common problem is a much more real relationship than the relationships between congressmen generally or between administrators generally. In other words, he who would understand the prevailing pattern of our present governmental behavior, instead of studying the formal institutions...may possibly obtain a better picture of the way things really happen if he would study these 'whirlpools' of special social interest and problems." (Griffith, 1939: 182-83).

Griffith proposes that the study of informal alliances and coalitions, rather than the study of formal institutions, will reveal the true processes at work in the creation of public policy. To Griffith, structure may form the framework within which policy is developed, but people in interaction with each other across the expanse of the system form the dynamic that fuels the process. (Griffith, 1939)

Griffith, like Merriam, felt that research in political science and policy making needed to expand its scope and knowledge beyond absolute principles about the nature of government, and rather should seek to locate those "timeless" concepts that undergird the policy process. To Griffith, the location of these "concepts" was to be found in the study of psychology, sociology, history, geography, and anthropology, namely human action rather than human institutions. (Griffith, 1944) Unfortunately, Griffith had no more success than Bentley, Beard, or Merriam, of moving the Institutionalists off of their pillar of belief concerning structure.

Up to this point in time, policy making was not seen as an area of study separate from the study of political science. Even Merriam's call for a multi-disciplinary approach sought to bring sociological methods and techniques into the field of political science. That all changed in the early 1950s.

Policy Sciences of Democracy

Harold D. Lasswell is generally considered to be the father of modern policy analysis. Lasswell who presented his ideas in the 1950s, was a student of Robert K. Merton, and adopted Merton's prescription that the analysis of government required a broader perspective developed by examining the theories and methods of the social sciences. Reflecting his own broad intellectual background, Lasswell stressed the need to develop social science knowledge as a whole rather than segmented knowledge, and emphasized a multi-disciplinary approach to the development of a policy science. He couched his ideas under the broad umbrella of creating a "policy sciences of democracy" centered around a problem oriented and contextual analysis of policy. The contextual emphasis moved policy analysis from a purely academic orientation to a more judgmental form of art and craft. In essence, it sought to clarify the values and goals of policy, and bring a focus on both knowledge of the policy process, and knowledge of the knowledge in the policy process. Lasswell also sought to define the policy sciences as providing knowledge that integrated values in both interpersonal relations and human dignity, and that ultimately would lead to the realization of full human capabilities. This new science was to have a predictive quality since it would examine the past as a whole, and develop highly reliable models using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950)

In essence, Lasswell rejected the concept of institutional analysis, and focused instead on process analysis, seeking to uncover the deeper layers of interaction and effects created through the policy making mechanisms. But in spite of his expanded orientation of the policy making process, he still retained the traditional view that ultimately the study of policy was a study of power, and who got what, when they got it, and how they got it. The distribution of benefits was still the final result of the process. (Lasswell, 1936)

Following Lasswell's emphasis on power, David Truman proposed that the method of access to power by interests groups was control over decision points within the institutions of government that affected their areas of concern.

"...power of any kind cannot be reached by a political interest group, or its leaders, without access to one or more key points of decision in the government. Access, therefore, becomes the facilitating intermediate objective of political interest groups....Toward whatever institution of government we observe interest groups operating, the common feature of all of their efforts is the attempt to achieve effective access to points of decision." (Truman, 1951: 264)

While power, and the receipt of benefits, was still the ultimate goal, the mechanism used to achieve the end was access and control of critical decision points spread-out across the decentralized structures of government.

Shortly after Lasswell advanced his concept of a policy science, David Easton proposed a radical shift in the theoretical orientation toward the policy process. This new orientation was to be centered on values.

Easton conceived of all institutions and organizations within the society as mechanisms for the reflection and reification of values held within the society. Government was only one of many such mechanisms operating in society, but government had a unique role that other institutions and organizations did not possess. Because of its unique role of guarantor of rights and definer of laws, governmental allocation of values carried both legitimacy and authority over the members of society. It was because of this unique role of authority, that the members of society complied with this legally binding definition of values.

"A policy...consists of a web of decisions and actions that allocate values." (Easton, 1953: 130) "A policy is authoritative when the people to whom it is intended to apply or who are affected by it consider that they must obey." (Easton, 1953: 132)

He goes on to criticize political sciences fixation on power, and the role it plays in achieving compliance with government decisions. To Easton, power is important, but it is not the primary factor in the determination of public policy. People, who must comply with laws, do so because they perceive that the persons delegating the laws have legitimacy to do so, and thus possess authority. From this, he redefines the goal of political science:

"Political Science is the study of the authoritative allocation of values as it is influenced by the distribution and use of power." (Easton, 1953: 146)

Easton sees policy making as a "web of decisions and actions" emanating from authority holders in the government, reflecting values within the society, and accepted as binding by the members of

society because they are perceived as legitimate. Easton's new focus shifted policy analysis away from institutions, and into the values within the process of policy making.

Policy Subsystems

The actual concept and term 'policy subsystem' was first advanced by J. Leiper Freeman in 1955. He defined a policy subsystem as:

"...pattern of interactions or participants, or actors, involved in making decisions in a special area of public policy." (Freeman, 1955: 5)

. Freeman examined the relationships that were established between the bureaucracy, Congress, and the public interests all concerned with a specific political issue. He found, because of the decentralization of authority across the branches of government, that there was a great deal of interaction between all the agents within the policy issue area, and a limit on the amount of control and accountability that could be exercised by elected officials.

"While the Administration, Congress, and the major parties in their general structures and relationships tend to reflect gross distribution of public sentiment and public power, the resolution of issues tends to be accomplished through specialized lesser units. The subunits - bureaus, committees, and interest groups - enjoy considerable autonomy in the special policy area with which they are concerned...The leading members of these subunits are the major, constant participants in a process through which special issues are discussed and policy solutions are formed. In their interactions which form the subsystem of behavior of the participants is most immediately affected by the nature and interests of the subunits which they lead." (Easton, 1955: 120)

Freeman's findings stand in stark contrast to the political theories of the nineteenth century American political Institutionalists. Rather than a collection of special interests courting elected officials that write laws and direct the mindless bureaucracy to implement, we find a lower level of public official continuously interacting with special interest agents, and defining the structures of policy, which are then approved by the elected bodies. Special interests may be after economic benefit, but the vote and graft are not the tools of their trade. None-the-less, there is something sinister about the interaction, especially the fact that it is hidden from the public view behind the closed doors of bureaucracy.

While Freeman presented the first concept of a policy subsystem, it was stated in such general terms that it received only token recognition.

In 1964 Douglass Carter clearly defined the nature of policy subsystems, and their ultimate purpose for existence.

"In one important policy after another, substantial efforts to exercise power are waged by alliances cutting across the two branches of government and including key operatives from outside. In effect, they constitute sub governments of Washington comprising the expert, the interested, and the engaged...the sub government's tendency is to strive to become self-sustaining in control of power in its own sphere. Each seeks to aggregate the power necessary to its purpose. Each resists being overridden." (Carter, 1964: 17).

Carter exposes the 'real' purpose of policy subsystems, it is power and control. In essence, each special interest seeks to cut-out an area of special concern, and dominate the decisions and actions that are taken in the arena. It is Madison's worst nightmare come true. These are not just people engaged in Easton's allocation of values, or the nineteenth century theorists fear of the seizure of property. This is a sinister force operating independently of democratic principles, and seeking to undermine the very foundations of Constitutional order. The agents involved in the process are reprehensible in the behavior.

"They become arrogant in their jurisdictions, defiant of the efforts to form a larger consensus than each finds sufficient to its needs. Like princely states, jealous and contentious, they would substitute a new confederation for the 'more perfect union' which the Constitution sought to form." Carter, 1964: 25)

Soon scholarly studies developed that sought to expose how private interests, supported by powerful allies in Congress and the bureaucracy, formed policy subsystems to manipulate the policy making process in order to control of the area at issue, and receive special treatment or the distribution of benefits in their favor. (McConnell, 1966; Lowi, 1969; Woll, 1965).

During this, the only person not quite prepared to take such a sinister view of the policy making process was Charles Lindblom, who was not writing about policy making, but instead was focusing on how groups make decisions in both democracies and centralized governments.

To Lindblom, power, and the pursuit of it, is not the dominant factor in either decision making processes or public policy processes, rather it is "mutual adjustment". Under this concept of "mutual adjustment", political agents in democracies negotiate, bargain, and maneuver with each other to locate and establish a process of mutual support and accommodation within the decision area. They operate within this process of "mutual adjustment" under a set of both formally and informally established rules. (Lindblom, 1965, 1968) ⁶

While Lindblom's description of the bargaining and adjustment process gave a clearer picture of the limits and constraints affecting policy making and various policy subsystems, it failed to explain either the methods or mechanics used to establish this system of mutual adjustment.

Shortly after the publication of Lindblom's theory, Wamsley and Zald sought to address some of the weaknesses within Lindblom's theory by developing an explanation of the methods and mechanics used in the process of mutual adjustment. In 1973, they proposed the concept of the political economy of public organizations.

The theory of political economy states that public organizations vary in their political economies. The political economy involves the acquisition and maximization of resources within the organizational milieu. Both the political and economic systems, and their points of intersection, must be analyzed. Two major components comprise the political environment of the agency. The first is the ethos or values both internal and external to the agency. The second is the power

⁶ The process usually leads to a series of incremental decisions over time that seeks to maintain the sense of mutual adjustment. Lindblom goes on to further state that the reason decision-making operates in this manner is because the decision makers have inadequate information to begin with, cannot invest the time or resources in a thorough analysis of the information, and usually have an unsatisfactory set of pre-existing criteria guiding their decisions. (Lindblom, 1965, 1968).

systems existing both internally and externally. What we refer to as political encompasses both power and the values, and is reflected in the ends which the power is used to achieve.

The economy is a system for producing goods and services, and also has two parts. The first is the goods and services produced; types and quantities, and forms of production. The second is the means of exchange of goods and services, and is composed of the mechanisms, rules, and institutions that shape the exchange.

While the political and economic systems can be usefully distinguished from one another for heuristic purposes, they will inevitably interpenetrate.

This interpenetration can produce a sense of ambiguity in terms of what is political versus what is economic. What is political ultimately refers to matters of legitimacy, and the distribution of power. This affects each government agency's functional niche, institutional goals, plus the propriety of the agency's existence and the parameters of its economy. What is economic ultimately refers to combinations of factors of production, the division of labor, the allocation of resources, the means of task accomplishment, and the perception of the maximization of efficiency. Ultimately, however, political factors can reach and impact upon economic matters like the means of task accomplishment, or economic matters can become so problematic that they result in political consequences. (Wamsley and Zald, 1973)

Just as the concept a policy subsystem began to gain dominance, events in the political arena moved the policy making process away from the foundations outlined originally by Carter for the creation of these 'iron triangles' of relationships. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the structures of political power in the United States began to fray, and eventually fragmented. Political parties lost a great deal of their influence over members of Congress, and special interest groups proliferated. Legislative power was divided between committees in Congress, and the age of strong committee chairs was replaced by a consensus system within the Congressional committees. Administrative agencies grew in both size and numbers, while the President's power to influence both legislation and agency operations was replaced by micro-management by Congressional committees. Further destabilization occurred as the age of direct public participation within the policy process increased exposure of the Congressional committees to media scrutiny.

By the late 1970s the concept of a policy subsystem was supplemented by a new concept of an 'issue network'. First proposed by Hugh Heclo in Social Policy in Britain and Sweden (1974), an issue network, eventually, became defined as a shared-knowledge group dealing with some specific aspect of public policy. The members within the network have a common body of information and understanding on the policy area and problems, but may not have a shared-belief about solutions to problems or specific direction of policy development. The members regard each other as knowledgeable, and at least needing to be listened to and answered when objections or questions arise in the policy arena.

Heclo argued that the concept of a policy subsystem and an iron triangle was "disastrously incomplete", and in fact was too simplistic to explain the dynamics of the policy making process. He further suggested that the changing nature of the structure of political influence and power suggested that a new political phenomenon was emerging within the policy arena (Heclo, 1978: 88).

Seeking to counter Heclo's argument concerning the "simplistic nature" of a policy subsystem, Milward and Wamsley (1984) argued that in fact the concept of an issue network did not displace the concept of a policy subsystem.

Under Milward and Wamsley's view, a policy subsystem was composed of both a horizontal and vertical structure. The horizontal structure was composed of interest groups, government agencies, and Congressional Committees. At the horizontal level both the overall policy of the subsystem is set, and funds are allocated from the larger political system. On the vertical structure are the various levels of government agencies that have been created through the Constitutional order established within the process of compound federalism. It is here that policy is implemented through the Federal, State, and even local government levels. By examining both the horizontal and vertical structures, using a heuristic method such as Wamsley and Zald's political economy framework, one can discover the integration that exists between both structures.

By linking the two structures, one is able to connect the concept of a policy subsystem to the concept of an issue network. Under this new approach, the subsystem is the interaction of the system as a whole, while the issue network is the pattern of relationships between the actors within the subsystem. (Milward and Wamsley, 1984) Milward and Wamsley further advanced the idea that linking the concept of a policy subsystem and policy network together would allow for the additional linkage of both traditional political science methodology and the theories of organizational behavior, and reveal the interaction between both the public and private segments of the policy arena.⁷

With the expansion of the concept of a policy subsystem to include issue networks, a shift also occurred in the study of the development of such subsystems and networks. Previously, works focused on the formation and current arrangements of such subsystems. As the concept of a network began to influence the research in policy analysis, a change in the foci occurred. The question arose as to how these subsystems and networks actually decay, transform and change over time. It was this new focus on change that currently forms the basis for developing theory in the policy analysis literature.

The scholarly policy analysis literature now contains two bodies of theory relevant to the processes of decay and transformation in policy subsystems and monopolies. The first body of theory is known generally as Agenda Setting, and the second body of theory is referred to as Advocacy Coalition. In order to understand possible future development of the analysis of policy subsystems, it is necessary that we examine these two theories in greater depth.

Agenda Setting Models

The first work in this area of research was Roger Cobb and Charles Elder's 1983 book Participation In American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building. Cobb and Elder sought to explain why certain policy issues eventually were addressed by governments, while other worthy policy issues were ignored. Using concepts based on earlier works by Schattschneider (1960, 1969), they developed an analytical framework centered on the concept of issue expansion. Under their theory, policymakers seek to expand the sphere of participation in areas of policy disputes by explaining issues in broader and broader terms, thus mobilizing larger constituencies in support of their position. While effective in explaining the creation of a policy subsystem, and the forces at work at developing specific policy orientations, Cobb and Elder did not address factors involved in the decay or transformation of an existing policy subsystem. In addition to their failure to examine

⁷ Wamsley continued the development of the idea of linking both political science and organizational theory by examining how the authoritative allocation of values within specialized policy subsystems spanned both public and private sectors as well as the various levels of government (Wamsley, 1985).

transformation, they also failed to recognize that issue expansion can also occur at the institutional level without resort to mass mobilization.

In 1984 John Kingdon published his work Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Basing his theory on the work of Cobb and Elder, Kingdon developed an analytical framework in which three separate policy streams - problems, policies, and politics - come together at an auspicious time, referred to as a policy window, and are recognized by policymakers as a policy area worthy of attention and action. Under Kingdon's theory, first, public discussion clarifies that in fact a problem does exist. Once this is recognized, that there is a problem, further discussion by policy experts determines that there is a policy solution that is compatible with existing social values. Further discussion ensues in the political corridors, and a public consensus is built that translates the issue into the political arena. Provided that the political arena is positive for government intervention, the policy window opens, and the three streams converge, becoming an established public policy. While Kingdon's model offered an effective explanation for the process of policy subsystem creation and change, it did not address any of the possible causes for policy subsystem decay. In addition, Kingdon, like Cobb and Elder, relied exclusively on a mass mobilization model, and did not consider other methods of venue change which did not rely on mass political action.

Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones extended agenda theory to include the processes of decay and transformation when they published, in 1993, their work Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Drawing upon Kingdon's theory, Baumgartner and Jones constructed a theoretical framework in which long periods of equilibrium within a policy subsystem and monopoly are punctuated with rapid periods of change and transformation. Extending the time frame for analysis, they show that in the American system of politics it is impossible for any policy monopoly to remain stable over an extended period of time. According to Baumgartner and Jones, within any arena of policy action there exist policy entrepreneurs seeking to displace existing policy arrangements. Over time, these policy entrepreneurs are able to reframe the three policy streams - problems, policies, and politics - into a new conceptual framework more inclined toward their position. While the process of reconstruction may be slow, in time it reaches a critical level of mass mobilization, and once again the policy window opens. In the period of rapid change that ensues, the existing policy monopoly is displaced, and a new policy subsystem is created. Institutional arrangements are the legacies of these periods of change, and form the structure for policy subsystem stability until the next wave of disequilibrium occurs..

While Baumgartner and Jones model does account for both creation and decay within a policy subsystem, thus greatly expanding Cobb and Elder's, plus Kingdon's, models, it still relies on mass mobilization to activate the process.

The Agenda Setting Model has advanced a major contribution to the concept of what composes a policy subsystem. In addition to the traditional view of a policy subsystem being composed of institutions and individuals directly related to the specific policy subsystem, this model also expands the system boundaries to include the courts, the press, and stock markets. In this sense, the agenda setting model presents a more comprehensive institutional view of the nature of a policy subsystem.

While the Agenda Setting model is a powerful tool for analyzing creation and change in policy subsystems, it does have two areas that need further development.

The first area of development relates to change strategies that involve processes other than mass mobilization. While public image and understanding of public policies and problems do have an

impact on political agendas and issues, other tools for policy change exist outside of the public view. Institutional venue, administrative rules, powerful political supporters, budgetary allocations are just a few examples of devices which can be manipulated by policy entrepreneurs to achieve change in policy philosophy and influences. None of these possible avenues of action is successfully explained under the agenda setting model.

Of far greater concern, at least in terms of this dissertation proposal, is the lack of explanation of the nature of underlying belief systems forming the various bases for differing views on both the definition of policy problems, and the assessment of acceptable policy solutions. In order to understand this aspect of policy subsystem decay and transformation, one has to turn to the second body of theory referred to as Advocacy Coalition.

Advocacy Coalition Models

The roots for the advocacy coalition model are found in the work of Hugh Heclo (1974), and his study of welfare policies in Britain and Sweden during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Heclo found that macro sociological and economic factors could only account for a portion of the changes in such policies. Heclo argued that the additional factor influencing the development of the policy was the learning curve encountered by the policy specialists as they experimented with various options in order to achieve their objectives. He concluded that policy change was the result of two factors: (1) large scale social, economic, and political changes, and (2) the interaction of specialists within the policy community as they sought to become more knowledgeable about the most effective methods to use to address the policy problem and objectives.

In 1988 Paul Sabatier published an article in Policy Sciences called "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-oriented Learning Therein". Sabatier presented a conceptual framework for policy change over time based on Heclo's insights and conclusions.

Sabatier focused on the belief systems of coalitions within the policy subsystem, and the ways in which these belief systems evolved and changed over time. He postulated that tracking such changes in belief systems would explain how the subsystem communities learned, and in turn reveal how changes came about in various government programs as they developed over several decades. Sabatier developed a typology of the belief system structure, of policy elites, composed of three levels. The first level, Deep (normative) core, contains the person's underlying personal philosophy. Within this deep core, beliefs concerning the nature of man, ultimate basic values, and the relationship of the individual to the collective, form the basic world view of the coalition member. At this most basic level, beliefs are very difficult to alter or change.

The next level, Near (policy) core, contain the basic strategies and policy positions taken by coalition members to achieve their deep core beliefs in the specific policy subsystem. Concepts such as public versus private intervention in policy problems, mutual accommodation versus zero-sum competition, social welfare versus personal responsibility, are manifested at this level. While difficult to change, this level of belief can be altered if personal experience reveals serious anomalies.

The final level, Secondary aspects, is the instrumental level where specific methodologies and institutional relations are developed to implement the near (policy) core beliefs. Administrative rules, budgetary allocations, statutory authority are examples of the instrumental and applied nature of this level of belief. Change, at this level, is moderately easy, and has been the focus of the majority of policy analysis literature and study.

Sabatier contends that in any policy subsystem there exists both dominant and minority coalitions. The dominant coalitions' core belief system will control the policy process, but the minority coalition will continue to learn over time. Eventually, the minority coalition will out learn the dominant coalition, and reveal the deficiencies in the belief system undergirding the policy subsystem. When the level of deficiencies are finally revealed, and larger socio-economic forces produce a climate conducive to change, the dominant coalition will be overturned, and a new core belief system will dominant the subsystem.

Sabatier's model, since 1988, has been applied to a number of policy areas, primarily dealing with energy and environmental policy (Jenkins-Smith 1988, Heintz 1988, Weyent 1988, Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1991). While the basic concept of an advocacy coalition and learning process has been confirmed, areas requiring further research have been revealed (primarily the hierarchy of belief structures, and the lack of coverage of both individual and institutional interest).

One of the serious flaws in the advocacy coalition model is the lack of an institutional focus. This is intentional on the part of Sabatier:


"I find this (advocacy coalition) superior to the most likely alternative - that viewing formal institutions as the dominant actors - because in most policy subsystems there are at least 20 - 30 organizations at various levels of government which are active over time. Developing models involving changes in the position and interaction patterns of that many units over a period of a decade or more would be an exceedingly complex task." (Sabatier 1988; 139)

Sabatier goes on to state that institutional models also have difficulty in accounting for the importance of specific key individuals, and the different behavior of various individuals within the same institution. Although he rejects the inclusion of an institutional aspect within the advocacy coalition model, he does acknowledge that institutions do bring critical resources to members of coalitions, and can affect authoritative decisions within policy subsystems.

Ideally, the design of a comprehensive, analytical framework created to examine the decay, transformation, and change in a policy monopoly and subsystem, as a belief maintenance system, would include elements from both the Agenda Setting Model and the Advocacy Coalition Model. From the Agenda Setting model it would incorporate elements of the institutional focus, and the expanded view of a policy subsystem. From the Advocacy Coalition Model it would incorporate elements of its hierarchy of social belief systems, and the learning processes within the policy coalition. While such a comprehensive framework does not exist within policy analysis research, a theoretical framework incorporating these elements does exist within the field of sociology. Such a framework exists within the work of Anthony Giddens, and is referred to as the "theory of structuration".

The theory of structuration is a deep conceptual framework covering the breadth of human existence. It is considered one of the most significant social theories of our age. For this dissertation I will focus on only one aspect of Giddens's theory, namely the concept known as "the duality of structure", and the possibility that this concept offers toward expanding on the concepts developed within both the Agenda Setting Model and Advocacy Coalition Model of policy analysis. But before we enter that area we need to consider another area of theoretical development, namely the field known as Organizational Theory and Neo-Institutionalism within American public administration.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF POLICY SUBSYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES



Organizational Theory and the School of Neo-Institutionalism

The marriage of Wilsonian pragmatism and Progressive Reform formed the basis for the study of "government" in the newly emerging field of public administration. At this time, the early 1900s, another movement was at work, though, which was to have a profound impact on the vision of "man in administrative government".

While the general perception, in the late 1800s, was that the changing nature of American society was due to the increasing non-Aryan immigration, in fact it was not the immigrant but the rapid industrialization of the country that was fueling the change. From 1880 to 1910 the United States underwent the fastest industrialization of any country in the Western World. (Bendix, 1956)

Accompanying this fast industrialization was a form of Social Darwinism that permeated the society. The new industrial leaders were seen as the "captains of industry", and held in both awe and respect. The struggle for economic domination between them was seen as a sign of national progress and growth. (Perrow, 1986)

Responding to the American value for personal success, and the subsequent lowering of the living standards for the average worker under the new manufacturing system, the union movement arose in the United States. The dialectic struggle between the muscle of the industrialists, and the demands of the unionizing workers, lead to violent clashes - a true form of the struggle of the fittest. (Bendix, 1956)

In the minds of many public scholars and government officials, the workers clashes with the industrialist was confirmation of the Madisonian fear of the majority's desire to seize the property of the wealthy minority. The challenge to the employer's authority, and property, was taken up by the social scientist of the day and the engineers that staffed the various industrialized complexes. Out of this search for new answers arose the management movement known as "Scientific Management".

The "Scientific Management" movement was founded by the engineer Frederick W. Taylor in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The basic goal of the movement was to apply rational thought to the production process, and redesign job processes and techniques to achieve maximum efficiency. By standardizing processes, work could be deskilled, decreasing the industrialists dependency on workers, and, at the same time, segment production processes to achieve higher output. The use of time-motion studies allowed engineers to redesign work processes, and eventually to locate "the one best way" to mix labor, standards, and machines within each production area. (Taylor, 1915)

In a bow to labor, the movement advanced the idea that this standardization of processes would permit management to train labor to their highest abilities, and thus foster a sense of cooperation and trust between management and labor. By implication, the necessity for unions would thus be done away with, and tranquillity would once again be restored to the labor market. (Taylor, 1915)

Although never stated by the Scientific Management followers, who after all were engineers and not philosophers, the concept also fulfilled the Lockean belief in the protection of property leading to the greater creation of wealth for all citizens, thus reinforcing the existing order of wealth and position within the society.

The marriage of Wilsonian Pragmatism/Progressive Reform to modern Scientific Management Industrial Capitalism, and its introduction in the study of Public Administration, was due to the efforts of Frank J. Goodnow.

Goodnow was a professor of political science at Columbia University at the same time that John W. Burgess held sway over the program. Goodnow was leader of a small group at Columbia who wished to shift the study of political science away from the Institutional historicism of Burgess, and redirect it toward the more practical matters of government administration. The tension at Columbia had been building for some time between the two factions, - the one hearing the siren call of Burgess's Hegelian historicism, and the other listening to the Pragmatism of Wilson - and eventually resulted in Burgess successfully blocking Goodnow's ascendance to the Ruggles Professorship in Political Science. (Gunnell, 1993)

While Burgess was successful in blocking Goodnow at Columbia, he was less successful in stilling Goodnow's national voice or influence. In 1903 Goodnow was elected the first president of the American Political Science Association, and after that point in time his voice carried both academic and professional authority in the United States. (Shafritz, 1988)

Goodnow strove to develop and refine Wilson's original idea of the separation of administration from politics. His work in this area was so successful that he is generally credited with being one of the co-founders of the "political/administrative dichotomy" in public administration - the other being Woodrow Wilson himself. (Shafritz, 1988).

His work, *Politics and Administration* (1900), clearly spelled-out the difference between politics and government administration.

"Politics has to do with policies or expressions of the state will."... while administration "...has to do with the execution of these policies." (Goodnow, 1900: 10-11)

Under his concept, the legislative branch, assisted by the interpretations from the Judicial branch, expressed the will of the state, and developed policies to direct this will. The executive branch was charged with administering these policies, and did so in both an impartial and apolitical manner. Under Goodnow's view, the study of public administration was definitely focused on the executive branch and the bureaucracy, while the legislative and judicial focus was directed toward the study of political theory and constitutionalism. (Henry, 1992)

But the study of administration required a firmer grounding than just political theory. Techniques for management needed to be developed, and efficiency needed to be applied to the application of public resources. To Goodnow, this demand for economy and efficiency required the application of administrative engineering knowledge to locate the "one best way" to perform public functions. The principles of Scientific Management provided the framework for developing such skills, for, as Goodnow said, "there is no Republican way to build a road" only a right way to build a road. (Henry, 1992)

In time, Goodnow's thesis dominated the growing field of public administration. Within its heart it held four values and principles that structured its future direction. The first value was that politics and administration should be separated, and politics should not interfere with the administration of government. The second value was that public management could be improved through the use of scientific study and research, and that there was "one best way" to do everything - if only it could be discovered. The third value was that government administration could be an apolitical institution able to exercise its charges without personal or agency political issues or concepts infusing its operation. And the fourth value was that the ultimate mission of all government administration is to achieve economy and efficiency in the use of public funds. (Waldo, 1948)

The net effect of this development was to leave the perception that public administration was grounded in facts and science, while policy making was grounded in historicism, philosophy, and law - namely political science. Under the concept thus developed, all rationality and reason was located within government administration, and all human character (or lack of it) was grounded in policy and policy making. Science and rationality ruled the world of administration, and human self interest ruled the world of policy making.

During the years after 1900, public administration theory was linked to public administration practice. While the ultimate end sought was to control individuals and direct energies toward defined management ends, the entire movement was cloaked in a sense of high moral purpose "Good government" was the end, and removing politics from the decision making process was the immediate goal. ⁸

Scholarship also followed the trend. In 1926 Leonard D. White released the first textbook devoted exclusively to public administration, the *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*. The following year, 1927, W. F. Willoughby released the second textbook, the *Principles of Public Administration*. Willoughby's book set the tone for the next fifteen years. Under his view of the field of public administration, certain scientific principles of administration existed, and could eventually be discovered. Public administrators would become experts in the administration of government as they discovered and applied these principles of management. (Gunnell, 1993)

Willoughby's work marked the beginning of the 'golden age' for public administration. Since principles of management were the same in both the public and private sector, public administrators were regarded with respect, for their knowledge, in both sectors. Their concentration on the upper levels of management increased the field's prestige with important and powerful mentors and patrons.

The drift away from political science also continued. In 1935, at the Princeton Conference on Public Administration, the political science community recommended abolishing all separate academic programs in public administration, and instead retaining the field under the general umbrella of political science. The response from the public administration scholars was the establishment of the American Society for Public Administration, and a rejection of the idea that political science could represent the needs of administration within government. (Waldo, 1979)

Probably the height of Public Administration's prestige was reached in 1937 when Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick published their famous *Papers on the Science of Administration*. - which was a report to Franklin D. Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Science. In the *Papers*, Gulick and Urwick spelled-out what the basic problem of government administration was in the real world.

⁸ In 1906 the New York Bureau of Municipal Research was founded with the intention of improving the management of local government. In 1911, The Bureau established the first school for the training of public administrators, with Charles Beard of Columbia as its first director (later it was the move to Syracuse University, in 1924, and became the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, the first public administration program affiliated with a University). In 1912 the Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency was established to reform the federal bureaucracy, and centralize more authority in the executive office. Eventually, in 1921, the Executive Budget System was adopted by Congress, and started the process of enlarging the powers of the President. (Henry, 1992)

"If it be true that continual intrusion of varying scales of value has served to hinder the development of all the social sciences, may it not be well to minimize this difficulty...? This, it seems to the writer, is already possible in the study of public administration by regarding all value scales as environmental with the exception of one - efficiency." (Gulick and Urwick, 1937: 192-193)

Efficiency in government was the primary directive for public administration and administrators, and this could only be accomplished by applying scientific principles. Gulick and Urwick then go on to state that they have discovered these principles, and they are defined as POSDCORB - planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting.

With the discovery of "the" principles of organization, administration is now able to operate inside government without concern for human or social nature.

"It is the general thesis of this paper that there are principles which can be arrived at inductively from the study of human organizations which should govern arrangements for human associations of any kind. These principles can be studied as a technical question, irrespective of the purpose of the enterprise, the personnel comprising it, or any constitutional, political, or social theory underlying its creation. (Gulick and Urwick, 1937: 49)

By the end of the 1930s, public administration theory had successfully withdrawn "political man" from government administration. The amoral, acquisitive man of Hume and Locke had been replaced by a rational, scientific individual who operated within a set of pre-determined principles. Both the Institutional arrangements of government and the administrative institutions of government were mechanistic. Values, beliefs, and norms were manifested in the operation of policy making, but science and proven principles of management determined the means of implementing policy. The allowance for values and norms within the administrative institutions of government was removed, and instead replaced with calculated decisions based on achieving economy and efficiency, not political ends.

Just as public administration had reached its zenith, though, an attack was forming that would question the rational nature of organizations. The attack had been forming for quite some time, but in an area separate from administrative science, in an area known as Sociology.

The Holy Trinity:

The theories of the sociology of organizations are grounded in the "Holy Trinity" of organizational theory: Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. What binds these three men together is the fact that they all examined two interrelated themes which have dominated Western organizational theory.

The first theme was the social and psychological consequences of the complex division of labor under industrial capitalism. The second theme was the development of rational bureaucracy as the organizational mechanism used for administrative coordination and control.

Marx stated that it is in the nature of man to be "producers". Like Locke, he believed we created out of necessity. He felt that the nature of man was "man the maker" rather than "man the knower, concluding that our knowing is dependent on our making. To a great extent we are what we make, thus we create things, and in turn our things re-create us. Our minds take on the characteristics of the objects we create. If we create in a fragmented, piecemeal manner, our minds become

fragmented. If we create useless objects, our minds become useless, and we become useless as human beings.

The processes of modern production are influenced by historical forces. These forces are social, political, and economic, and they drive a wedge between individual humans and their creations, resulting in alienated labor. Capitalism is the supreme form of socioeconomic system that creates this sense of alienation, and in turn creates a form of wage slavery. It is the division of labor, and specialization, which drives modern capitalism, that is ultimately the source of human alienation. The necessity to break work down into routines and activities that disconnects the worker from the object of production, creates this sense of alienation. In turn, since we construct ourselves through the things we create, we structure relations within organizations in such a way that they reify the alienation, and perpetuate the wage exploitation. The only possible solution is not to reconceptualize the ideal of labor within a capitalistic system, but rather to change the physical and material relations through revolution. By changing the construction of the material relations, we reconnect ourselves to our internal values, and achieve our fullness of being. (Marx, 1845)

The materialism of Marx was challenged by the idealism of Durkheim. In formulating his challenge, Durkheim was heavily influenced by the democratic individualism of Rousseau, - filtered through Comte - especially Rousseau's concept of the "general will".⁹ Building off of Rousseau's "general will", Durkheim develops the concept of "conscience collective". "Conscience collective" is basically the values common to the members of any society that has attained any level or type of integrated social system.

"Conscious Collective" is composed of "collective representations" - language, currency, professional standards, etc. These representations are "collective", not "universal", but still exist outside the individual's consciousness. These "collective representations" create "social solidarity"; common identification that binds people together.

The most primitive form of social group is the clan, which is a form of "mechanical" solidarity. As society becomes more complex, we begin to exhibit attributes of "organic" solidarity. At this level of social development, our "conscious collective" is weakened, and instead of being attached to society through "collective representations" we are attached to society through "functional groups". This is the result of the process of the division and specialization of labor manifested in industrial capitalism.

As we become more and more separated from the "collective representations", and ultimately the "conscious collective", we begin to develop pathologies. This pathological development is reflected in the breakdown or absence of social norms and values. We begin to behave as if we are an uprooted people; in fact we have reached the state of "anomie". At this point we are not alienated, as stated by Marx, but are rather "dehumanized", because we have lost our internal concept of being.

⁹ The unique contribution Rousseau gave to the concepts of natural law and natural rights, which dominated seventeenth and eighteenth century European political thought, was that he postulated a social contract that was based on neither coercion, or the pursuit of individual self-interest. Rather the creation of society occurred through an integrated process of action between individuals, a process where different interests became joined together as an offshoot of collective interaction. The end result of this collective interaction is the creation of social solidarity not based on either economics or politics, but rather based on a form of consensus achieved through the very act of social interaction. The "general will" is the final product of this social process, and exists above formal government or formal organizations and institutions. In essence, it is a consensual understanding between all the members of the society that is above law or economics. (Rousseau, 1762)

Still, we are unable to stop the historical advance of capitalism, and must find ways to bring back society's influence over both individual behavior and individual passion. We do this by not dismantling the social structures that exist under the capitalistic mode of production, but instead by developing networks of occupational groups and associations that link the individual to the wider social structure. Under this way, we retain the stability that is the result of the division of labor, and a sense of "conscious collective" necessary to bind the society together. (Durkheim, 1893)

Weber's ultimate influence on both sociology and organizational theory is based on his attempt to successfully reconcile the materialism of Marx with the idealism of Durkheim. He was able to do this because he held a unique position, one not grounded on any specific philosophical view of the nature of man, but rather grounded on a view of the nature of reason.¹⁰ In Weber's view of man, we do not just mechanically respond to events and actions - Hume's position about man as a "bundle of perceptions" who acts on "violent passions" - but first interpret events and actions - Kant's position on sense data filtered through the a priori rules of the mind -, and then select a response. We are rational, we have practical reason, and we give meaning to events and actions at a subjective level.

Weber agreed with Marx that material conditions and interests did constrain our choices and the actions we could take, but he also agreed with Durkheim that the subjective, normative values we shared with others, which are based on practical reason (sense perceptions interpreted by a priori mental rules), shape our motivations, and form the basis for our actions. He concluded, thus, that social institutional arrangements did limit our actions, but consensual values undergird the meaning we give to both our acceptance of the orders given within the institutional arrangements, and the actions we take in response to these orders. Thus there is "rationality" within both our actions, and the social institutions constructed by man.

¹⁰ Kant (1724 - 1804), was a respected university professor of rationalistic metaphysics in the Prussian city of Königsberg. In his middle-age, he was fifty at the time, he read Hume's *A Treatise on Human Nature*. He realized that Hume's skeptical arguments concerning rationality, and the nature of man being nothing but "sense perceptions", refuted everything that he had spent a lifetime defending. It was this challenge, to put rationalism back into philosophy, that motivated his writing *The Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant concedes to Hume that knowledge comes through the senses, and that man is a bundle of sense perceptions, but then goes on to ask how is it possible to have sense perceptions. According to Kant, sense perception is possible because what our mind is referring to is not an external reality, but in fact is a representation of the structure of the mind. His famous examples are the concepts of space and time. He asked how it is possible to know what is the height of the Matterhorn if Hume is correct that we never physically perceive the abstract concept of Space? And how is it possible to know the amount of time it takes to travel to Berlin if we cannot physically perceive the abstract concept of Time? Both Space and Time have no sense physical manifestation, they are only abstracts, and therefore have no sense data that can be known. Yet we do know Space and Time, so how is this possible? Kant concludes that both space and time are forms of mental rules which help us understand our world, and they are linked together - one cannot understand one without understanding the other. From this, Kant states, that we are not born with a group of a priori ideas, but rather are born with a set of a priori rules within our minds which produce ideas and knowledge when fed information by the senses. There is no such thing out here as substance or causation, but rather only an ordering of perceptive data within our minds that helps us understand the constructs of causation and substance. Our minds need sense data in order to structure substance and causation - so there cannot be knowledge without sense data -, but sense data alone cannot produce knowledge because it must first interact with the a priori rules of the mind to be transformed into human knowledge. Rationality is constructed through this process of sense perception interacting with mental rules. We are limited in our knowing to the sense data of our perceived world as it is passed through the a priori rules of the human mind. Because of this limitation, we cannot know what is ultimate reality. We can never know God, justice, freedom, immortality, they overreach our human capacity of thought. At the same time, though, we cannot exist in the world as if these things - God, justice, freedom, immortality - did not exist - we would die from despair. We thus have a right to believe in a pure reason and knowledge about God, justice, freedom, in order to give us a spirit to live and attain higher goals. But, at the same time, we are limited to only having practical reason available for understanding the world we exist in. (Kant, 1775)

Weber "captures" both "rationality" and "institutionalization" within modern society by postulating that man is involved in a long-term historical process. Pressures are exerted upon mankind by both technological and commercial change which are the result of our historical rationalization of Western civilization - echoes of Hegel's *Geist*. It is the inevitable development of "Progress", and is ultimately manifested in the creation of industrial capitalism. Like Marx, Weber agrees that history moves mankind.

But industrial capitalism, in order to function, must strive for "efficiency" and "economy". It achieves this by applying "rationality" to both organizational and work processes. It breaks work down into simplified and specialized routines, and then uses administrative structures, based on a hierarchy of authority, to recombine these work processes. The administrative/institutional control systems developed to achieve this end of efficiency, greatly reduce the level of discretion exercised by workers and individuals within the organization through the use of prescribed rules and procedures. The combination of work simplification, work specialization, administrative control procedures, hierarchical authority, and prescribed rules and procedures, forms the basis for the highest level of "rational" organization, namely "Bureaucracy". (Weber, 1906-1924)

The development of a theory of organization as was being proposed by Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, contained a strong link between organizational structure and individual belief. In addition, flowing from Hume, we are conceptualizing man not as an entity with any internal, pre-existing set of norms or values, but rather a creature evolving from a sense-based environment, capable of rationalistic thought. The conceptualization of man inside organizations, as was being proposed by the "Holy Trinity", stood in stark contrast to the man in organization that was being proposed by both the Scientific Management theorists and the Administrative Science theorists of the 1920s and 1930s. It was this new creature, thus, that became the clay upon which we built the concepts of man within public organizations during the last half of the twentieth century.

In terms of organizational theory in the United States, each of the "Holy Trinity" had their day in the sun. Durkheim was first, and formed the basis for challenging the existing paradigm (Barnard, 1938). Weber followed Durkheim, and once Weber was translated into English his ideas dominated the development of organizational theory in the United States. His functionalistic approach, coupled to his institutional focus, fueled theoretical development, and Weber was being cited or discussed in all the major works being produced during the late 1940s and 1950s (Merton, 1952; Gouldner, 1954; Blau, 1953). And finally, as postmodernism arose in the 1960s and 1970s, Marx's concepts were reexamined and modified to new theories of organizational development and structural properties (Giddens, 1984).

In the late 1930s and mid 1940s, the concepts of scientific management and the administrative science movement, were challenged by this new group of theorists heavily influenced by the writings of Durkheim and Weber. While proposing a different view of organizations and man in organizations, they none-the-less were seeking to continue the extension of "science" into the operations of organizational structures and systems of control.

In terms of their efforts, these new theorist sought to create a synthesis between the "positivist" concepts which formed the basis for the early twentieth century's writings on social and political theory, and the concepts of "administrative practicality" which permeated the development of organizational theories and management philosophy during the 1920s and 1930s. (Waldo, 1948)

In a sense, the new movement can be seen as a continued extension of the tendency to expand the methods and theories of science into the area of human behavior in organizations, but at the same

time to provide managers with practical solutions to problems arising from the movement of technological development within modern organizations. (Tillet, 1970) Probably the person most representative of this changing conceptualization was Chester Barnard.

Building off of Durkheim's concepts of the "Conscious collective" and worker "anomie", Barnard theorizes that authority within an organization arises from the bottom rather than descending from the top. (Reed, 1985). He defines organizations as "co-operative social systems" composed of both "formal" and "informal" groups, which jointly create the organization's "personality". The "personality" of the organization, dominates individual action and thought within the organization. This domination of thought creates a sense of "collective conscience" and organizational purpose, and forms the cooperative basis for the organization's existence.

Barnard's view of the organization, and man in the organization, contains an area of emphasis, namely the proper indoctrination of people to the "cooperative" "personality" of the organization. While upper management will be properly "socialized" into the organization due to their technical training and functional orientation, lower levels of employees may be unevenly socialized into the overall organizational mission and purpose embodied in the "organizational personality". It is here, at the level of the lower personnel's indoctrination, that the greatest challenges for management arise.

Since all organizations face both internal and external threats, it is incumbent upon upper management to protect the moral integrity of the organization which is reflected in the organizations personality. This is done by management applying the theories and findings of science to ensure that persons are both properly indoctrinated into the organization, and provided with incentives - and disincentives - to maintain the organizational culture. The combination of psychological and social conditioning of lower level employees produces organizational equilibrium through the merger of individual personality and collective personality, and thus assures that the organization will continue to exist and fulfill its primary purpose. (Barnard, 1938)

Barnard presents both a functional and moral argument for the existence of an elite group in charge of the organization, and a justification for their use of physical and psychological power to maintain organizational coherence. In addition, Barnard states that management of an organization is not the discovery of a set of administrative principles, rather it is the mastery of "processes" for the creation of collective representations and individual indoctrination to the collective conscience. Implied in Barnard's thesis is also the idea that leadership requires enlightenment and moral character, and a sense of paternalistic stewardship toward the "masses".

Barnard marks a watershed in the development of organizational theory in public administration, not because of his influence, directly, on government administration, - at this time he was President of New Jersey Bell Telephone Systems - but rather because of the influence he had on two later theorists, Herbert Simon and Philip Selznick.

What Barnard offered both Selznick and Simon was a conceptualization of an organization that was not focused on the institutional arrangements or principles of earlier theorists, but rather focused on the organization as a social form that was contained within collective human interaction. Under this new theory, the nature of man was seen as non-rational, but within the interaction of membership in organizations, man achieves rationality - Weber's position. Unlike Wilson's view of the redemptive nature of democracy, Barnard states that the redemption of man lies within the influence of organizational life. Upper management brings morality and rationality to the collective group through the use of the principles and findings of science.

Herbert Simon marks the zenith of the rationalization of man's amoral nature into organizational systems. Simon represents an extension of the classical approach toward the concerns of management; namely the objective to develop a science of administration, construction of a value-free decision-making process, the search for general principles of management that guide decision-making, and the emphasis on hierarchy as the system for framing organizational decisions and power. He adopts Barnard's concept of the organization as a system of exchange between the members of the organization, and the view that complex organizations evolve from simpler organizational forms. He also accepts Barnard's view that communication is critical, but shifts the emphasis from creation of the collective conscience to an emphasis on decision-making. (Fry, 1989)

Under Simon's new view, the organization is a complex series of interlocked decision-making processes. This process provides rationality to the organization in terms of outcomes, but also ensures that individuals within the organization develop a uniform view of their work which, in turn, ensures that the subjective rationality of the organization properly connects to the objective rationality of the surrounding social collective. The organization thus provides a structured social environment in which individual behavior is created that is considered rational from both the internal group values of the organization, and the external values of the social environment in which the organization exists. (Simon, 1945)

Simon takes Barnard's implied redemptive nature of organizations, and extends the concept to its ultimate conclusion, namely that organizations are critical for maintaining social order. Modern, irrational, amoral, acquisitive man has freed himself from the traditional normative restraints of society. This lack of social regulation has given rise to increased individualism which threatens to destroy the foundations of civilization. (Giddens, 1976). Formal organizations provide an alternative form of social order and discipline to offset the rise of rampant individualism. (Wolin, 1961). Thus Simon provides a moral and intellectual justification for administration to develop a manipulative system of social control. Organization's provide the structural means to link subjective personal rationality to societal objective rationality, and ensure that individual man operates within the collective goals of the society in which he resides.

"The organization takes from the individual some of his decisional autonomy and substitutes for it an organizational decision-making process...Organizations limits the natural autonomy of the individual by placing him in an environment and by providing him with the information needed to make decisions correctly. By limiting the range within which an individual's decisions and activities lie, the organization reduces his decisional problems to manageable proportions." (Simon, 1945: 199)

Individual wants and desires are thus constrained by the organizational structure and environment, and help channel individual effort toward the institutional goals of the organization. While dominant coalitions may exist within the organization, their work and decision-making is evaluated against the "objective rationality" of the "principles of efficiency" "Cost-minimalization", of the ratios of input to output, measure if the dominant coalition's actions are "rational". Since the human mind has a limited ability to handle information, the process reduces the levels of decisions, and allows the organization to function within the limits of man's "bounded rationality". (Simon, 1945)

When Simon turns his attention toward the process of public administration, he finds that Wilson's/Goodnow's ideas concerning the political administrative dichotomy are false. Simon contends that both policy and administrative functions are performed by administrative officials,

and that public administrators are involved in both the implementation and the initiation of public policy. (Simon, 1945)

At this point in time Simon stands at the threshold of reconnecting administrative man in government and political man in government, but he rejects the idea of connection, and instead proposes a new form of separation. The new form he defines as value/fact dichotomy. He states that decisions are based on two categories, values and facts. Values reflect ethical considerations, and as such can never be true or false. Facts, on the other hand, are related to the observable world, and thus can be determined if the premises underlying them are either true or false. Simon proposes that administrative practices should be guided by factual premises that can be tested for truth or falsity. Thus the administration of government should always be premised on factual areas, not value areas. (Simon, 1945)

Simon's ideas were extended even further in 1958 in his collaboration with James March. March and Simon assimilated several sociological views on the operation of organizations into a behaviorally based social psychology premised on universal assumptions about the nature of individual rational choice. The modified view, now, is focused on "organizational learning", and an explanation as to why individual responses to changing or disruptive influences affect organizational routines. The underlying assumption is that human nature is simply responding to external stimuli, and that by studying such behavior, eventually, a body of knowledge will be developed that explains both the anticipated and unanticipated consequences these stimuli have on the operation of the organization. (March and Simon, 1958) Basically, man's nature is mechanistic, and thus can be understood through field observations - not too dissimilar to the view taken by psychological researchers studying rats movements through a maze.

Under their view, since man is limited in terms of rationality and information processing, deviation from normal practices is generally met, by management, with reliance on control devices. In turn the continued use of these control devices reproduce the deviant behavior they were originally meant to counteract. In time, the continued use of control devices leads to rigidity and defensiveness on the part of individuals within the organization, and a form of "satisficing" behavior based on what is acceptable rather than what is the most efficient or effective. To offset these forms of deviance, "performance programs" must be developed within organizations. These 'programs' are preset routines that guide individual decision-making as persons encounter new demands. By limiting individual discretion and choice, equilibrium within the organization is established and maintained. These 'programs', in turn, are composed of cognitive frames, rules, routines, and value assumptions within the organization, and form the organizational identity and rationality. (March and Simon, 1958)

March and Simon's view provided an expanded view of how power politics impacted on organizations, and in turn, how organizational structure affected individual decision-makers. It also advanced the argument that organizational analysis should be framed around a behaviorist approach, using an "instrumentalist" methodology. This approach framed the dominate theories of public organizational analysis during the 1960s and early 1970s.

The "Expose" Tradition:

The translation of Weber's writings on bureaucracy sparked interest in the effect that bureaucratization had on behavior in organizations. This was especially the case at Columbia University, where Robert K. Merton had been examining the effects of unintended consequences on organizational decisions since the mid 1930s. (Merton, Gray, Hockey, Selvin, 1952).

Merton had been studying the effects that rules had on the behavior of organizational leaders. He was especially interested in the actions taken by officials to conform to organizational rules, even if conforming to the rules undercut the organizations purpose or goals. Merton concluded that multiple forces inside the organization structured forms of discipline and normative values that often lead officials to act on rules in a rigid and formal manner - even to the point of becoming, in time, ritualized.

"There may ensue, in particular vocations and in particular types of organization, the process of sanctification...through sentiment-formation, emotional dependence upon bureaucratic symbols and status, and effective involvement in spheres of competence and authority, there develop prerogatives involving attitudes of moral legitimacy which are established as values in their own right, and no longer viewed as mere technical means for expediting administration." (Merton, 1957: 202)

One of Merton's students was Philip Selznick. Selznick provided the link between Barnard's 'administrative science' and Weber's focus on "bureaucracy". Within this new conceptualization, Selznick was able to examine the practical problems of organizational control, but to also examine the Weberian concern related to the rationalization of Western Capitalism, and the moral and political issues that arose from this process.

Like Merton, Selznick was interested in the "unanticipated consequences" that resulted from organizational actors, but he focused on this phenomena through the process of rule conformity. While organizations are seen as mechanical instruments designed to achieve specific goals, they are also viewed as adaptive systems composed of the social characteristics of the individuals within the organization. Over time, institutionalization of both organizational goals and individual values results in a "bureaucratization" in which goals and procedures are valued within their own right without regard for the purpose of the organization.

"Institutionalization is a process. It is something that happens to an organization over time, reflecting the organization's own distinctive history. the people who have been in it, the groups it embodies and the vested interests they have created, and the way it has adapted to the environment. In what is perhaps its most significant meaning, "to institutionalize" is to infuse with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand." (Selznick, 1957: 16-17)

In time, the institutionalization of values within the organization leads to a situation in which the concern for the self-maintenance of the values becomes a purpose within itself, and leads to a specific organizational identity. At this point in time, survival of the organization means survival of the values of the organization.

To Selznick, leadership of the institution is critical. Like Barnard, he sees the institutional leadership as the key to maintaining and defending the "proper" values of the organization - in this case the maintenance of democratic responsiveness versus bureaucratic power.

Selznick reveals the organization for what it actually is, an artificial construct or human contrivance developed to apply power and resources to maintain the domination of social rationality used to protect vested social interests. Social structures, originally designed to advance democratically defined policies, are subverted and transformed by the bureaucracy's institutionalization process, and wreck havoc on the original wishes of the hopes and ideals of the people. (Selznick, 1949)

Selznick's new critique of public organizations led to a series of studies over the years seeking to reveal the true nature of public organizations. An "expose" tradition arose seeking to confirm that organizations were not rational, but rather were instrumental devices that embodied, often, surreptitious values. (Perrow, 1986).

Selznick's view ran counter to Simon's "value/fact" dichotomy, and set the stage for examining organizations from two different perspectives. Simon's view advanced a scientific manner of building administrative knowledge, over time, that would reveal underlying processes of organizational control. Selznick's view, on the other hand, presented the organization as a unique entity subject to specific environmental influences, that were not necessarily replaceable between organizations. In addition, Selznick's conceptualization presented organizations as less structural and more cultural.

These two views were eventually challenged in the 1970s, but out of the challenge developed a new view of organizations generally referred to as Neo-Institutionalism.

In the 1960s, once again, the theoretical conceptualization of public organizations began to be challenged. Kuhn's reconceptualization of the dynamics of scientific change (1962) set the stage for reexamining the underlying theories, and challenging the existing paradigms within which they were developed. The theories of public organizations, to this time, had failed to explain critical areas of interest such as social conflict, or the relationship between human agency and social structure. The failure to incorporate these areas into the prevailing systems or cognitive theories, set the stage for the challenge. As more and more of the flaws within the theories became evident, pressure mounted to reexamine both theories. (Reed, 1985) A key theorist in developing a new view of organizations, at this time, was David Silverman.

Silverman challenged both the contingency arguments of Simon, and the institutionalization of Selznick. To Silverman the correct analysis of organizations should be focused on the ways in which meaning systems were constructed within organizations, and the manner in which they were continually reconstructed through social actions. He called this new orientation the "Action Frame of Reference":

"The systems approach tends to regard behavior as a reflection of the characteristics of a social system containing a series of impersonal processes which are external to actors and constrain them. In emphasizing that action derives from the meanings that men attach to their own and each other's action, the Action frame of reference argues that man is constrained by the way in which he socially constructs reality." (Silverman, 1971: 141)

Heavily influenced by Durkheim, Silverman presents a conceptualization of human action in which meaning operates both in the minds of individuals, and also in the "social facts" which are found in social institutions. Under this new view, the environment not only supplies the resources and outputs of the organization, but also is "...the source of meaning for the members of the organizations." (Silverman, 1971: 19)

Social reality becomes a network of self-constructed subjective meanings that, in time, become institutionalized. Under this view, the understanding of reality cannot be known or explained without detailed knowledge of the subjective logic which undergirds the construction of the institution, and the transformations of this logic that have occurred over time. (Silverman, 1971)

While Silverman's work was little known in the United States, it was adopted, in the mid 1970s, by John Meyer and Brian Rowan, to form the basis for a new view of organizations called Neo-Institutionalism. But while this development was occurring, another theorist was on a journey of self-doubt

After his work with Herbert Simon, James March began a long journey seeking rationality within organizations. His 1963 work with Richard Cyert explored the importance of uncertainty and the need to reduce its effects within organizations. In 1974, working with Cohen and Olsen, he developed the concept of the "garbage can" which showed that problems and solutions are typically decoupled, and that decisions are often the result of the match of problems with general solutions rather than an optimally maximum solution. In the late 1970s and early 1980s his work with Martha Feldman ascertained that often information is fitted to support pre-existing positions as to the types of solutions used to solve problems.

Slowly, over almost twenty years, March began to question the position that organizations are rational and cognitive systems that can be understood and managed through science. Finally, in 1984, his new position becomes clarified in his work with Johan Olsen. At this time he openly questions the theoretical foundations of previous work.

"...what we observe in the world is inconsistent with the ways in which contemporary theories ask us to talk". (March and Olsen, 1984: 747)

Over the next few years March's view of organizations shifts even more, and finally becomes crystallized in his 1989 work, again with Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions*.

In March and Olsen's new view, institutions are not only affected by politics and the political process, but also affect the politics and process. In this new view, institutions not only react to the environment, but also consciously and unconsciously participate in the creation of their own environment. Institutions, within this process, define and defend values, norms, and beliefs, and in the process of defining and defending these concepts, the institutions create a framework in which politics operates.

The process is constructed in three areas: rules and the institutionalization of action; interpretation and the institutionalization of meaning; and the transformation of the institution itself. This new view rejects the idea that there is a rational decision making process going on which is based on the examination and weighing of calculated consequences of various actions. Rather, rules direct our behavior within the institution, but the behavior must be appropriate to the institutional environment which reflects the cultures and values of the institution itself.

In the interpretation and the institutionalization of meaning, March has moved to an interpretivist view of the social construction of reality. There exists within the institution itself a set of meanings and concepts which construct the institutions view of reality. This view affects the interests, resources, and rules that define the area of action in which the institution exists.

March argues that transformation of an institution is intertwined with the agency's history. Stability within the institution must include the institutional history, which is a major factor in the institutions construction of reality. History provides the consistency needed for the institution to respond to the various roles and missions assigned to its charge.

The three basic foundations of institutional reality affect decision-making. Rather than operating from calculated self-interest, individuals are influenced by institutional roles, and the perceived

duties associated with the roles. The social construction and interpretation of reality frame the arguments and ideas advanced within the institution and its environment. (March and Olsen, 1989)

With the development of this new view on organizations, March joined the camp of the Neo-Institutionalist.

Neo-Institutionalism

In 1977, John Meyer published two papers which framed the various components for the theories of Neo-institutionalism. Meyer's research had been directed toward the examination of educational systems, and the replication of certain institutional principles across a variety of local government settings. (1968) His continuing research, and collaboration with Brian Rowan and W. Richard Scott, focused on the effects that culture, ritual, ceremony, and higher-level structures had on organizations. (1977, 1983) By 1985 interest in these developing principles had reached a stage that a conference was called by Lynne Zucker at UCLA to discuss the new theory, and it was there, at the conference, that the theory and school of Neo-institutionalism was defined. (Zucker, 1987)

Neo-institutionalism has its base in the old institutionalism of Philip Selznick. Like the old institutionalism, it is skeptical of the rational-actor model of organizations, and views organizations as a process of institutionalization that eventually limits the options that can be pursued by individuals within the organizations. In addition, Neo-institutionalism, like Selznick's institutionalism, strongly emphasizes the link between organizations and their environments, and seeks to reveal inconsistencies within the organizations rationalization of its actions. Under both views, culture plays a major role in shaping the organization's view of reality. (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991)

Neo-institutionalism departs from the older institutionalism, though, in several critical areas. The older institutionalism focused on political analysis of group conflict and organizational strategy. The new view shifts the focus away from conflict, and instead concentrates on the ways in which organizations develop complex administrative structures to deal with conflict. Under this new focus, the stress is placed on the relationships that are created to achieve stability and legitimacy, and the influence of "common understanding" that frame the creation of stability and legitimacy. (DiMaggio, 1988: Zucker, 1985)


There is also a fundamental shift in the view of organizational structure between the two schools of thought. In the old institutionalism, structure was used to show how informal coalitions and groups subverted the formal structures of the organization, which were designed to fulfill the rational mission of the organization. Under the Neo-institutional approach, formal structure contains elements of irrationality composed of inter-organizational influences, conformity, and culture. These influences define the nature of the structure developed, rather than functional requirements. (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: DiMaggio and Powell, 1991)

Under the older institutionalism, the environment was composed of local communities. The organization was linked to the local community and interests, and eventually co-opted by these interests. The environment under Neo-institutionalism is broader, and encompasses industries, professions, and national social constructions. These environments penetrate the organization, affecting the perceptions of the actors within the organization. Rather than being co-opted, the institution becomes limited to the cultural frames of reference, and defines understanding through these cultural factors rather than specific local interests. (Meyer and Rowan, 1977)

The process of institutionalization is also defined differently between the two schools. Older Institutionalists viewed the institutionalization process at work within the organization. Neo-Institutionalists view the institutionalization process as occurring on the societal level in which organizational forms, components, and rules are loosely coupled in a series of standardized elements that form the basis for the organizational institutionalization. (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991)

Neo-institutionalism offers a new and expanded view of the organization, one in which culture and environment play a critical role in developing the structures and meaning of public organizations. This new orientation offers an opportunity to link the concepts of the nature of administrative man in government and political man in government. This linkage would allow public administration to reconceptualize the nature of government administration, and to reform such a conceptualization in a way that would once again form an organic whole of the nature of man in government, a whole that would abolish, once and for all, the false division that occurred in the original political/administrative dichotomy, and Simon's later substitution of the value/fact dichotomy.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF NEO-INSTITUTIONALISM
WITHIN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES



Theoretical Synthesis

For over one hundred years, in the United States, the functional nature of "man in administrative government" has been divorced from the nature of "man in political government". In essence, we have attempted to divide the "nature of man in government" into two spheres. On the one side we have placed rationality and reason in the arena of government administration, and on the other side we have placed "passions" and values in the arena of politics and policy.

The line that has been drawn between these two arenas has generally been accepted within our society, and become part of the society's "conventional wisdom". Elected officials assume that government administration should be "value-free", and should respond in an almost mechanistic manner to changes in political positions and policies. The general public bemoans the lack of "public good" manifested in the decisions of elected officials, but faults the failure of government on "mindless bureaucrats" who, they feel, are not operating within the agreed upon parameters of efficiency and economy. And public administrators find themselves buffeted from both sides by the conflicting demands to be both politically responsive and, at the same time, administratively efficient.

To a great extent the responsibility for this sad state-of-affairs can be laid at the feet of both political science and public administration scholars. For the past 120 years that political scholarship has attempted to analyze government operations within the United States, the vast majority of the scholars involved in this effort have perpetuated the myth that there exists a distinction between value laden politics and rational administration. These scholars have been so successful in their efforts at divorcing politics from administration, that now, as the falsity of the concept is become evident, they find themselves in the uncomfortable position of having to publicly refute their position inside a culture which has come to accept their original proposition.

What we are observing, in this intellectual Gordian Knot, is the impact of the double hermeneutic process on public policy theory and public administration theory. Social researchers depend on social agents to generate accurate descriptions of processes within organizations, but often social agents appropriate social researchers theories and concepts within their own personal behavior and understanding of social processes, thus changing the potential character of both the social agent and the social process. (Giddens, 1987) The end result of this interaction is that both the researcher and social agent create a confirmation of the researcher's theoretical base through a recursive process that links both the observer and the social agent. This is exactly what occurred in public organizational research's conclusion that there does exist a distinction between policy development and policy administration, or to frame the distinction in a slightly different perspective, between structures and actions, and the social adoption of the "conventional wisdom" of the separation of politics and administration.

Intertwined in this social and scholarly divorce of structure and action as it relates to administration and politics, has also been a cultural belief in another distinction between structure and action; namely the separation of the public sector from the private sector. Today, in the United States, there exists an almost religious belief that governmental institutions, and their administrative actions, are deliberately directed at reducing the rights and freedoms of the private sector. But prior to the development of the modern state, though, the concept of the private sector or civil society did not exist separate from the concept of the public sector. The two spheres were intertwined in terms of traditions and views of existence, and represented the political center of society. Day-to-day life was exercised in an established pattern that was untouched by either the administrative arm of the

state or the institutions of state sovereignty, and viewed all that occurred as part of the public sphere. (Sennett, 1977)

The development of the modern state, and with it the power of the state to influence all aspects of day-to-day life, saw the transformation of this previously defined view of existence. The developing capacity of the state to influence all aspects of society brought forth the creation of a distinction between the public and private. The private was structured as the opposite of the penetration of the state into day-to-day life. But in the process of the creation of this distinction, both the public and private became internally referential to each other, and were linked in a process of mutual transformation. The public became the domain of the state, while the private became that which resisted the encroachment of the state. But the state/public arena maintained a disproportionate weight of influence. The state/public sphere became the guarantor of law, and retained the power of defining what was private. The private thus became not only what was not delegated to the public, but also what the public defined and allowed as private rights and prerogatives. (Giddens, 1991)

The development of modern constitutional democracy, and its extension of enfranchisement to all citizens, further reinforced the referential nature of the public/private relationship. While the public sphere continued to retain the legal oversight of the private, the private exercised its limits to oversight by ultimately defining the laws which empowered the public oversight. In the end we created a system where the private sphere became the creation of the public sphere, and the public sphere became the creation of the private sphere.

This interpenetration of both public and private spheres of existence eventually was recognized within the area of policy analysis, forming the basis for policy subsystem theory. Only recently, though, has this process become recognized within public organizational theory with the development of the Neo-Institutionalist school. The recognition of the interpenetration of the public and private spheres has lead public sector scholars to realize that the process of cultural penetration is pervasive, and in fact, is reflected in both the organizations of government and the policy processes of government, plus the administrative and legal distinctions that are established to separate the public sphere from the private sphere.

The clear lines of structure and process have fallen, and a new view has emerged, one which has led both schools of thought to the same point of analysis. This new point of analysis leads one to conclude that examination of both policy and organization must be built upon the conclusion that structure and action, values and organization, administration and politics, public and private, are in fact one and the same, and are linked in a process of self-creation and reification.

It is this “duality of structure”, where structure and action are conjoined, which offers the field of organizational theory in public administration and policy analysis an opportunity to determine where the boundary between administration and politics, plus the public and private, exists, and to examine the distinct processes that also exist within each sphere as action and structure interact and inter-create. In this new approach, structural analysis involves the examination of organizational and social systems patterned over both time and space, and the recursive practices that are also patterned over a range of social and institutional interactions and transformations. The most deeply layered practices constitute the sense of institution, and clarify both the distinctions, and the reifying influence of culture and collective meaning within organizational structure and individual beliefs.

In order to advance this new conceptualization of government, new theories of analysis and organizations need to be explored. One of the most promising avenues for this exploration is the Theory of Structuration advanced by the sociologist Anthony Giddens.

THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION

Instead of concentrating upon epistemology, Giddens focuses on ontology, and specifically on the conceptions we hold of human beings: their actions, the ways in which they socially reproduce themselves, and how they socially transform themselves. He believes that only by focusing in this direction can we ever hope to discover the epistemology which has been the main concern of social scientist.

Giddens rejects the idea that there exist metaphysical needs which are universal, and which lead to a type of historical evolution based on forces outside of human control. To Giddens, people are social agents who produce, reproduce, and transform their own history.

In his view, nature and society are fundamentally different. Nature, which is not created by man, may hold universal laws and principles that are discoverable through scientific positivism. Society, on the other hand, is created by persons engaged in social encounters that are continuous. We are constantly creating and recreating our society. Social agents have the individual power to intervene in any course of events, and to use their power and resources to alter potential outcomes. Social outcomes, thus, are under the control of social agents. It is this potential for action which negates any concept of scientific positivism in the realm of human interaction and agency.

Still, regularities of actions do occur. This is due to the fact that all social structures are “dual”, they are both the medium and the outcome of the practices which constitute “social systems.” (Giddens, 1976) These social systems are empirically observable and inter-twined social practices that link and bound people across both space and time. They are principles that pattern practice, and are a form of “virtual” existence. (Giddens, 1984) Thus structure does influence our social practices, but our social practices also constitute and reproduce structure.

The “duality of structure” means that structure must be regarded as a process rather than a fixed social system. Because it is a process rather than a rigid and fixed entity, it is possible to change structure. Knowledgeable human agents, people who know how to do things, can enact and transform structure by putting their knowledge, resources, and power into practice. (Giddens, 1976) The power to act, thus, is grounded in human consciousness, which Giddens divides into two categories.

The first category is discursive consciousness. Discursive consciousness is defined as:

"What actors are able to say, or to give verbal expression to, about social conditions, including especially the conditions of their own action: awareness which has a discursive form." (Giddens, 1984: 375).

Discursive consciousness involves a conscious awareness of the procedures and rules for action. It is basically knowledge of how to do something or how to go on living. At this level of consciousness, social agents can explain the reasons for their actions, and what are their perceived intentions.

The second category is practical consciousness. Practical consciousness is defined as:


"What actors know (believe) about social conditions, including especially the conditions of their own action, but cannot express discursively..." (Giddens, 1984: 375).

Under this concept, social agents are only tacitly aware of why they are performing actions. Practical consciousness is the level where we apply basic skills necessary to handle day-to-day existence. This level involves little if any motivation or concentration since it is routinized into our daily existence, but if pressed, the social agent could explain their actions.

Generally speaking, social agents ultimately can explain their intentions and reasons for actions under both discursive and practical consciousness. Giddens goes on to further explain that the distinction between the two levels of consciousness is fluid, and can be penetrated from either side.

"I do not intend the distinction between discursive and practical consciousness to be a rigid and impermeable one. On the contrary, the division between the two can be altered by many aspects of the agent's socialization and learning experiences. Between discursive and practical consciousness there is no bar: there are only differences between what can be said and what is characteristically done." (Giddens, 1984: 7).

The same cannot be said, though, of what are the motives of social agents. Although voicing reservations about Freud's interpretation of the nature of unconsciousness, Giddens concedes that unconscious motivation is a significant feature of human conduct. (Giddens, 1984: 6). These unconscious motivations are encased within repression, which creates a barrier between the discursive consciousness and the unconsciousness - although the unconscious is affecting both the practical and discursive levels of consciousness. He displays this interaction in the following manner:



(Giddens, 1984: 7)

Thus unconscious motivation affects both the practical and discursive levels, but is barred from discursive explanation by consciousness because of the barrier created through repression, which denies the very existence and being of unconscious motivation. But, the question still remains, "What is this unconscious motivation?"

Giddens begins his explanation of human motivation by stating that even here, at our most basic level, there exists a form of structure.

"Human motivation may be aptly conceived of as *hierarchically* ordered, both in a developmental sense and in terms of the distribution of wants at any given time in the life of a person." (Giddens, 1993: 122)

He goes on to explain that infants are not born with the capacity to sustain their own organic needs. Yet infants have needs, the provision of which must be met by others. These others not

only provide for the infants needs, they also mediate the infants involvement in the social world, and guide it as its involvement expands. This mediation between others and the infant is the first experiences we have with socialization, and involves the infant developing the capacity to manage tension in its environment.

"The earliest period of 'socialization', therefore, can be presumed to involve the development of the capacity for 'tension management' on the part of the infant, whereby it is able actively to accommodate its wants to the demands or expectations of others." (Giddens, 1993: 123)

In presenting this concept of socialization, Giddens echoes Margaret Mead's thesis that at the most primitive level, socialization is grounded in the reciprocal social relations found in the interactions between infants and the other members of the family group.

Giddens asserts that this early level of management by the infant of tensions based on organic needs, remains central to later personality development. At the core of our personality is a 'basic security system' formed when we are infants, and largely inaccessible to our consciousness. Our involvement with the social world is a process of maintaining this basic security system, and an on-going accomplishment of each social agent. (Giddens, 1993: 123-124) This basic security system is called 'ontological security' by Giddens, and is defined as:

"Confidence or trust that the natural and social worlds are as they appear to be, including the basic existential parameters of self and social identity." (Giddens, 1984: 375)

In order to sustain this sense of 'ontological security' we seek to produce modes of interaction which are unproblematic and predictable. Routines produce a sense of self-integrity, security, predictability, and a feeling of control. In time this leads to an attachment to the familiar, and a tendency to reproduce predictable patterns. In our encounters with each other there always exist the potential for risk. To minimize this risk, individuals cooperate, through the use of tact and trust, to establish routines and rules to reduce the possibility of assaults on one's own self. Thus a system of social practices is created that forms the social system (Giddens 1984).

To Giddens, people are driven by a need for self-integrity, self-identity, and personal security. This level of need is manifested in our creation of routines of predictable behavior. We institutionalize this need for routine and predictability in the structures of our societies. In essence, we are seeking ontological security in an environment that is often insecure, unpredictable, and hostile.

While Giddens himself never specifically states it, it might be implied that both the need for ontological security, and fear of the unknown, are two of the great drivers of human motivation.

If human motivation is grounded in the infant's need for a 'basic security system', it must be concluded that this security system reflects what is commonly referred to as 'nurturing'. Child development theory specifically shows that an infant's survival includes both the provision of organic needs - food, warmth, shelter - and emotional substance - love, compassion, touching. These needs are provided by 'others' who, through the positive reinforcement of providing the above, produce in the child a sense of security. Within this sense of security, the infant thrives, and ultimately grows to fulfill its full potential human capacity.

On the other hand, lack of the provision of nurturing, or erratic provision of these necessities, produces a tension within the infant. Should the infant fail to receive either organic needs or emotional substance, damage at either the organic or emotional level occurs to the infant. At its extreme, this damage leads to death. At its best, this damage leads to a permanent tension inside the infant over its ability to experience ontological security. In either case, the infant's ability to grow and ultimately fulfill its full human potential is thwarted.

Thus the fulfillment of ontological security has both a physical and emotional side that must be achieved in order for a balance to be reached internally. This process of searching for ontological security and balance drives human motivation and experience, and forms a recursive pattern through both individual and social existence. As we advance in the socialization process, we gain additional information which refines our knowledge of how to obtain, or seek, ontological security. This process is referred to by Giddens as "Mastery of Skills".

The mastery of skills falls into two areas. The first, practical consciousness, is basically the skills necessary to handle day-to-day conduct. The second, discursive consciousness, is basically the ability to create and actually bring things into existence in this world. Discursive Consciousness involves a conscious awareness of the procedures for action: it is knowledge of how to do something or how to go on. Giddens refers to it as Mutual Knowledge, a knowledge shared by all who are competent to engage in the performance of a specific range of social practices. Practice and knowledge are in fact linked, and examined as rules. They are the tacitly understood social procedures, and are different from laws, regulations, and formal rules. (Giddens, 1984)

Mutual knowledge has two aspects that are interconnected. The first aspect is Semantic, and involves both the procedural meaning of practices and rules, and the qualitative interpretation of the practices. In addition, semantic aspects are also linked to the location where the practices and rules are enacted, and the general outcomes that are expected to occur from instituting the practice. (Giddens, 1984)

The second aspect is Normative, and also refers to practices and rules, locations of action, and outcomes. But the viewpoint of assessing these things is different. Under the normative view, the focus is on both rights and obligations of the agents, and creates a perception that their actions are either legitimate or illegitimate - plus appropriate or inappropriate. These actions are interpreted in the way in which the agents actually carry out their actions. (Giddens, 1984)

The process whereby social events are altered or transformed involves the use of resources, which agents may manipulate to influence the course of action of other agents. But this manipulation of resources must occur within the semantic and normative aspects of the mutual knowledge.

Resources are distinguished into two categories. Authoritative resources have the capability to command other peoples, organizations, positions, and relations with others. They are basically human resources which can be used to gain and control power. Allocative resources have control over material objects, means of production, and goods. They are non-human resources that are used to enhance and maintain power. These resources are unevenly distributed across the social system. Thus some agents will have more resources and power than other social agents. But no matter how destitute or oppressed a social agent may be, they always have some measure of both resources and power, and are thus empowered to act - although their empowerment may be limited. (Giddens, 1979)

In the end, the social agents' actions always exist within the limits imposed by the types of resources they have available to them, their mastery of the skills involved in the practice in which

they are engaged, and their knowledge of the broader social conditions that may be influencing both the historical and spatial boundaries in which they exist.

In order to understand how forms of conduct are reproduced, Giddens examines the interaction between the cognitive capabilities of humans, and their use of situationally based rules. His focus is on the concept of social institutions, and the ways in which routine practices are both recognized and carried out by the collective membership of the social institution.

Within the social institution exists a series of almost reflexive rules of conduct that have a formalized pattern. Yet these formalized patterns are always interpreted within the specific context of each social encounter. These patterns may possess an institutionalized regularity, but subtleties of interaction contain significant aspects which alter the surface interpretation of the action. These often physical aspects of interaction shape and facilitate the regularity of interaction, and are used to shape the social setting and social routines. They are keys that help social agents to understand what is necessary in order to engage in any discussion or discourse. (Giddens, 1993)

This patterning of relations and actions over both space and time creates a sense of system stability and organization. In this way, rules are drawn upon during day-to-day practice to create a sense of regularity, and in turn these regularities regenerate the idea that the rules are part of this foundation of the historically bounded social institution. Rules and institutional practices are linked; they become routinized activities recognized by the collective members, and are reproduced over a considerable period of the history of the group. In time every act of reproducing the rules, in essence, reproduces the structure of the institution and its context. In the process, mutual knowledge is reinforced, and structure is reproduced. But, as stated earlier, all agents may elect to follow a different conduct, thus the possibility for change exists in every social encounter of reproduction. (Giddens, 1993).

A social system, to Giddens, is based on a generalized human attachment to the routinized character of social life. Routines produce a sense of self-integrity, security, predictability, and a feeling of control. In time this leads to an attachment to the familiar, and a tendency to reproduce predictable patterns. In our encounters with each other there always exist the potential for risk. To minimize this risk, individuals cooperate, through the use of tact and trust, to establish routines and rules to reduce the possibility of assaults on one's own self. Thus a system of social practices is created that forms the social system (Giddens 1984).

Giddens asserts that all institutional arrangements and structures are in essence social systems composed of social practices. He further states that these institutional arrangements and structures are both the instruments for creating the social system, and the end result of the creation of the social system. The reason why these institutional arrangements are both the means and the end, is because of the mutual dependency that exists between structure and the character of social life, namely our predilection toward routinization. The individual and collective social practices that constitute the social system also constitute the institutional arrangements and structures. This dynamic of mutual dependency and influence sets-up a process whereby individual and collective social practices form institutional arrangements and structures, and in turn institutional arrangements and structures form individual and collective social practices. He refers to this process as the "duality of structure" (Giddens 1979).

This process of routinization and reflexive reinforcement of both institutional structures and social practices, forms what Giddens refers to as "structural principles". Structural principles are the bedrock upon which social integration and stability are based in all social systems. They are the collective understanding of how and why the system exists, and form the sense of underlying trust

necessary for social reproduction and personal security. From this bedrock of understanding, further institutional and personal arrangements are developed.


First, the basis for legitimization and authority arise, plus the distribution of resources and power. Giddens refers to this level as "structures". At this level, formal social and authoritative relations are defined. Once this level has been established, the final level of structure is created, the elements of structuration. At this level are the institutionalized features of the social system. It is here, at the level of elements, that the underlying structural principles and structures of power are translated into the instrumental mechanics of daily existence (Giddens 1984).

While, initially, Giddens' duality of structure would appear to be a closed, re-creating system, in fact Giddens does allow for transformation and change through the introduction of two additional influences.

The first influence causing change is people. To Giddens, people are social agents who produce, reproduce, and transform their own history. People are engaged in a continuous process of social encounters, and are thus constantly creating and recreating their society. In addition, people are knowledgeable about the institutions and practices of their society. In fact, people's knowledge of their society is not incidental to the operation of society, but is absolutely essential for the society to continue to exist. These people, or as he refers to them "social agents", have it within their own power to intervene in any course of events, and to use their knowledge, and whatever power and resources they may possess, to alter the outcome of any event. All that is required for this to happen is that the social agent chooses to act. If the agent is successful in his or hers action, the end result will become routinized into the process of social reproduction (Giddens 1976)

The second influence causing change is the unintended consequences that result from social agents choosing to act. A single act may result in an effect never intended by the social agent, but by itself the consequence is not large enough to affect the social system. But if a set of individual actions results in a pattern of unintended consequences, then the effect may be large enough to affect both the social system and the pattern of regularized social practices. This may lead to an end result that no one ever sought, but which becomes routinized into the social system. In any event, the pattern of social reproduction is altered (Giddens 1976).

STRUCTURATION PROCESS



MODEL AND THEORY INTEGRATION

Giddens, concept of the "duality of structure" presents an analytical framework that could link the theories of policy subsystems with the theories of organizations. By reconceptualizing a policy subsystem as a reflexive system of social practice, one in which structure and social practice are intertwined and reconstructing each other, a method is open to incorporate both the institutional focus of organizational theory, and the belief focus of policy analysis. Such a model would view the interaction between the two spheres as continuous and self-recreating, and would reveal the processes whereby coalition members' beliefs structure the institutional arrangements within the subsystem, and in turn how the institutional arrangements within the subsystem structure the beliefs of the coalition members.

By applying this model to a policy subsystem that has been in existence for at least a decade or more, it would be possible to observe the patterns of interaction between beliefs and structures, and the processes of change that would occur over time as the policy subsystem is transformed.

Such an approach would also allow for the incorporation of Hecllo's and Sabatier's concept of learning within the policy community, and yet still retain an emphasis on human agents as the key factors in the process of transformation and change by stressing Giddens' view of people as the primary impetus for change. Larger socio-economic factors would be accounted for through a focus on Giddens' concept of the aggregation of unintended consequences, and the effect of aggregation on the patterns of regularized social practices within the policy subsystem over time, and the structuring of organizational patterns in both the public and private spheres. This would allow for the incorporation of various concepts developed originally by Merton, Selznick, and other members of the Neo-Institutionalist school.

The concept of a policy subsystem's boundary is also radically altered under this new conceptual framework. While the institutional boundary is expanded by incorporating the broader perspective offered by the Agenda Setting Model, the inclusion of the belief system concept of the Advocacy Coalition Model expands the concept of system dynamics and interaction. By including the effect of individual perspectives connected to larger patterns of membership in the outside world beyond the immediate subsystems components, plus the reflexive process of creation between social agents and organizational structure, we conceptualize a policy subsystem as both affected by the external environment, and an active agent affecting the external environment. Within such a framework, the subsystem and environmental boundaries are lost, and are replaced by a view of mutual creation and evolution. The subsystem is no longer a passive recipient of external influences, but rather an active agent involved in creating its own form of existence, - similar to March and Olsen's Neo-Institutional approach - but also empowered with the capacity to actually transform the external world in which it exists.

There is another aspect to this model that should be discussed, and it relates to the basic premise that Giddens holds as to why human beings set-up patterns of reflexive interaction. To Giddens, people are driven by a need for self-integrity, self-identity, and personal security. This level of need is manifested in our creation of routines of predictable behavior. We institutionalize this need for routine and predictability in the structures of our societies. In essence, we are seeking security in an environment that is often insecure, unpredictable, and hostile. While Giddens himself never specifically states it, it might be implied that fear of the unknown is one of the great drivers of both human motivation and organizational collective motivation.

The above idea is not provable, but if proof were required, and available, then many of our current theories of conflict within political and social arenas would fail. Rather than conceptualizing policy

subsystems as clusters of groups motivated by economic greed, the desire for power and personal benefit, locked into conflict with other groups seeking similar goals. we would have to put our combatants on a less heroic pedestal. Instead of Titans battling in the lofty towers of political glory, we would instead see these policy combatants as descendants of our primordial ancestors, still seeking only security, predictability, and a sense of routine in an unpredictable world. While the image is less heroic, it is more human, and possibly offers a more realistic point from which we can start to resolve the differences between ourselves.

Such a perspective would allow both political theorists and organizational theorists to reconnect the "nature of man" in "government" and "politics". Rather than divorcing reason and rationality from passion and values, we would, in effect, be recognizing that social and cultural values interpenetrate both sides of human nature simultaneously, and the end result is that administrative structure and political action are in fact only opposite sides of the same coin of the realm; personal ontological security.

CLOSING THE POLITICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE DICHOTOMY



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