

Determining Source-Based and Party-Based Perspectives in the Federal Budget Process: A
Content Analysis of United States Executive, Congressional, and Agential Budget
Communication from 1998-2000

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explored the differences in federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Federal Budget Resolution for Fiscal Years 1999, 2000, and 2001. A computer-aided (i.e., DICTION) content analysis was completed to explore Executive, Legislature, and Agency budget communication for source-based and party-based differences. Source-based differences were explored using the variables *Activity*, *Realism*, *Optimism*, *Commonality*, *Certainty*, *Public Interest*, *Budget Concepts*, and *Functional Budget Categories*. When reviewing the findings as a whole – and taking into account the variables, data, and time period analyzed - a distinct and predominant source-based perspective was not present in the federal budget communication associated with the development of the Congressional Budget Resolution. However, it was possible to identify predominant sources for individual variables *Activity*, *Optimism*, *Commonality*, and *Certainty*.

Party-based differences were explored within seven themes: the use of Lakoff's value language; discussions of campaign actors; coalition building rhetoric; moral virtue and entrepreneurialism rhetoric; language of order, efficiency and unity; public interest; and, accusatory language. Variables included *Liberal Language*, *Conservative Language*, *Party References*, *Voter References*, *Leader References*, *Commonality*, *Familiarity*, *Realism*, *Human Interest*, *Rapport*, *Praise*, *Inspiration*, *Liberation*, *Tenacity*, *Communication*, *Denial*, *Public Interest*, *Blame*, and *Pessimism*. The analysis of party-based differences revealed that Democrats were more likely to incorporate language associated with the following variables: *Liberal Language*, *Conservative Language*, *Party References*, *Voter References*, *Leader References*, *Human Interest*, *Rapport*, *Liberation*, *Blame*, and *Pessimism*. Republicans were more likely to incorporate language associated with *Familiarity*, *Realism*, *Tenacity*, *Communication*, and *Denial*.

This research illustrates that within our political institutions generally, and the budget specifically, there are significant source-based and party-based differences in the goals and values communicated by the actors within the federal budget process. If it is possible to gain a better understanding of how actors within this key process communicate, public administrators will be better equipped to engage each other in an honest dialogue and debate that facilitates agreement and understanding. Until source-based and party-based communication barriers have been broken down, the negative tenor in political communication and the public's apathy and frustration towards the political process will continue.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my family for their continued love and support. A special feeling of gratitude is extended to my loving parents, Lloyd and Margaret Trimble, and my aunt, Donna Trimble, whose words of encouragement never wavered. My brother Lloyd experienced many of the difficulties of the Ph.D. experience with me and offered me many supportive words. Finally, my sister Christina has shown me that, no matter what challenges lie ahead, one should never give up or lose faith. The strength and determination she demonstrates on a daily basis served as an example and source of inspiration.

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¹ Moffat, S. (Writer). (2007). Time Crash [Television]. In P. Collinson, R. T. Davies and J. Gardner (Producer), *Children in Need Special*. United Kingdom: BBC.

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Determining Source-Based and Party-Based Perspectives in the Federal Budget Process: A Content Analysis of United States Executive, Congressional and Agential Budget Communication from 1998-2000

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The federal budget is arguably the most important policy tool in the American political system. For public administrators a detailed understanding of the federal budget process is crucial. In a representative democracy voters choose representatives to act in their interests, but not as their proxies i.e., representatives act not necessarily according to voters' wishes, but with enough authority to exercise initiative in the face of changing circumstances. A representative democracy by definition connotes a form of government that is responsible to the people. The budget, thus, should be a reflection of the values of society as reflected through the decisions of policy-makers. Miller and Wamsley posit that the "budget is a powerful symbol in society and the budget process is an important institution – a political institution providing crucial legitimate authority for our societal structure, for our government and governing process" (Miller & Wamsley, 1999). Additionally, David Levasseur posits that the budget now serves as the nation's preeminent policy document because it sets forth policy choices that constrain all other policy choices (Levasseur, 2005). Kettl (2002, p.3) argues that the budget "is the one place in American government where almost everything of importance comes together" while Ippolito (2003) notes that the federal budget has become the focal point of national policy making.

Miller and Wamsley (1999) note that the budget operates on many different yet interrelated levels. At minimum, the budget operates on mechanical (for example, see Axelrod, (1995) and his discussion of eight interrelated major functions of the budget), political (e.g. interest group liberalism, partisan politics), economic (e.g. Keynesian economics) societal (e.g. class conflict), and institutional-symbolic (e.g. Clay's public-institutional processes, 1994)

levels. These levels, when considered in total, provide a complicated framework for decision making.

Others also have noted the complex nature of the budget. For example, Rubin (1997) categorized views of budgeting as reformism, incrementalism, bargaining, interest-group determinism, process, and policymaking. It has been noted that the budget has many meanings including that of a priority-setting document (Rubin, 1993), a planning document (Lynch, 1991), a policy document and a prospective statement of expected future revenues and expenditures (Lee, Johnson, & Joyce, 2004, Reed & Swain, 1996), a political statement of scarce resources (Wildavsky, 1984), and as a “vehicle to achieve sweeping economic and policy changes” (LeLoup, 1986, p.3).

Clay (1996) noted, “management processes in government agencies are important not only for the end products and finite decisions they produce (e.g. a budget document), but also for enabling agencies to interact with their interested publics, make sense of institutional and environmental forces, marshal resources, and serve the public interest.” These public-institutional processes play an essential role in the democratic process and provide a sense of stability for those people involved by allowing for the development of shared understandings.

Clay (1994) presented the concept of the budget process as a public-institutional process that allows for institutional sensemaking. She writes that the budget process is one of the management processes of government, like personnel management, that characterizes public administration. She characterizes this process as having regularity, cycles of activity, interaction, and an outcome orientation. The regularized pattern of social interaction provides policy makers with cognitive structures for making sense or interpreting the meaning of events and situations (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Weick, 1979). Further, the budget is a symbol. For example, an

increasing budget can represent an agency's power and importance and can enhance an agency's legitimacy. Public-institutional processes and symbols serve as an important stabilizing and legitimizing vehicle for guiding organizational and individual behavior and for coping with environmental instability and ambiguity.

Because the management process associated with the budget process is so complex, by extension, the relationships of the actors within this process are necessarily complex. This dissertation hopes to contribute to the previous efforts by further exploring the relationships of the actors within the federal budget process on a micro-level. Specifically, this dissertation will examine the executive, legislature, and agential communication surrounding the federal budget for the period 1998-2000 (i.e., Fiscal Years 1999, 2000, 2001). In doing so, this research expands previous findings within the federal budget communication by:

- Extending the research on differences in the organizational goals and values expressed by actors within the budget process;
- Contributing to a better understanding of the incorporation of public-minded goals in the budget deliberation process; and,
- Adding to the studies on political party-based differences within administrative processes.

Study Objective and Theoretical Propositions

The objective of this dissertation is to use content analysis to examine federal level communication within the budget process for the period between 1998 and 2000 in order to provide a richer understanding of the communication surrounding the federal budget process. This research examines arguments associated with the federal budget communication for Fiscal Years 1999, 2000, and 2001. This time period was chosen because it was a logical extension of

previous analyses by David Levasseur (Levasseur, 2005), who analyzed federal budget communication associated with this period. He used a pattern analysis approach for his analysis and focused solely on the role of public opinion in federal budget arguments. By analyzing the same time period for analysis, this research extends Levasseur's work.

The use of a robust computer-aided analytical tool (i.e., DICTION) allows for the examination of a number of additional variables and themes not present in the 2005 Levasseur analysis. Using the DICTION software package, executive, legislature, and agency communication can be examined based on variables associated with source-based budget perspectives and party-based goals and values. Conclusions can then be drawn about statistically significant differences based on the source of the communication and speakers' political party affiliation. Source refers to the government sector of government or the speaker's organizational affiliation (Table 2 and Table 3). Legislative communication is associated with the legislative branch of government. The executive branch is divided in order to pull out agency communication for analysis. Executive data sources are those directly tied to the president. Agency sources are those that are cabinet level agencies and cabinet-level status agencies. Two research hypotheses will be explored.

Hypothesis 1: There are source-based differences in the organizational goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for years 1998-2000.

Hypothesis 1a: Executive communication will have a higher score on the 5 managerial-related organizational goals and variables than the Legislature.

Hypothesis 1b: Executive communication will have a higher score on the 5 managerial-related organizational goals and values than the Agency.

Hypothesis 1c: Agency communication will have a higher score on the 5 managerial-related organizational goals and values than the Legislature.

Hypothesis 1d: Executive and Legislature communication will have no significant difference in the use of public-minded language.

Hypothesis 1e: Executive communication will have a higher score on the public-minded language than Agency communication.

Hypothesis 1f: Legislative communication will have a higher score on the public-minded language than Agency communication.

Hypothesis 1g: Executive communication will score lower on the budget concepts variable than the Legislature, but will score higher on the functional budget category variable.

Hypothesis 1h: Executive and Agency communication will have no significant differences in the use of budget concepts and functional budget category variables.

Hypothesis 1i: Agency communication will score lower on the budget concepts variable than the Legislature, but will score higher on the functional budget category variable.

Table 1. Hypothesis 1 Variables

Independent Variable	Dependent Variables
1. Source of Communication a. Agency b. Executive c. Legislature	1. Activity 2. Realism 3. Optimism 4. Commonality 5. Certainty 6. Public Interest 7. Budget Concepts 8. Functional Budget Categories

Table 2. Executive and Legislative Data Sources

Executive Data Sources	Legislative Data Sources
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • President • Vice President • White House Chiefs of Staff • Office of Management and Budget Officials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • House of Representative Members • Senate Members • Congressional Budget Office Officials

Table 3. Agential Data Sources

Agential Data Sources	
Cabinet Agencies	Cabinet Level-Status Agencies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State • Treasury • Defense (DOD) • Justice (DOJ; Attorney General) • Interior • Agriculture (USDA) • Commerce • Labor • Health and Human Services • Education (ED) • Housing and Urban Development (HUD) • Transportation (DOT) • Energy (DOE) • Veterans Affairs (VA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) • U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations • Director of the National Drug Control Policy • U.S. Trade Representative • Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) • Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) • Administrator of the Small Business Administration (SBA)

Lee, Johnson, and Joyce (2004) suggest that fragmentation occurs within the budgeting process. For example, while the president has control over the executive branch, he is not guaranteed the support of administrative units nor are administrative units guaranteed the president's support for every budget recommendation. Additionally, Lee, Johnson, and Joyce (2004) note that constituency differences can cause fragmentation. They note that the president, because he is elected through a nation-wide vote, is more likely to have a broader policy perspective and be more concerned with government-wide issues than legislators, who have

smaller constituencies to please and who, therefore, may be more likely favor decreased spending. Because both the Executive and the Legislature are directly accountable to constituents through elections, one also can posit that the incorporation of public-minded language would be greater in these groups than in Agency communication.

Ippolito (1978) further notes that there exist reasons for fragmentation and varying goals and objectives among actors within the federal budget process. Most significant to this research is Ippolito's assumption that the department's perspective is not presidential (Ippolito, 1978). Ippolito stated that the department's perspective should not be presidential since "enforcing and articulating the president's interests and preferences is more appropriately the province of other participants in the budgetary process, particularly the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other presidential advisory groups" (1978, p. 58).

Additional support for source-based differences in federal budget communication is found in Wildavsky (1964, 1978, 1984), Niskanen (1971, 1975), Ippolito (1978), Dolan (2002), Levasseur (2005), and Imbeau (2006). This literature suggests that source-based differences in federal budget communication correspond to the roles speakers play within the federal budget process. Specifically, this literature would suggest that guardians of the federal budget (i.e., the Legislature) would favor reducing public spending, would refer more often to public deficits or debts (i.e., higher scores for budget concepts), and would refer more often to government in general as opposed to specific policy projects (i.e., lower scores for budget categories).² Conversely, advocates of increased program spending (i.e. the Executive and Agencies) would favor increased public spending, refer less often to public deficits and debts (i.e., lower scores for

² It should be noted that the Legislature communication was drawn from House and Senate Budget Committee Hearings on the President's Budget Proposal and floor debate on the passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution. Therefore, it was theorized that budget discussions would focus on a broad range of issues and the overall fiscal policy as opposed to specific agency priorities.

budget variables), and refer more often to specific policy projects than to government in general (i.e., higher scores for functional budget categories).

Hypothesis 2: There are political party-based differences in the goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for the years 1998-2000.

Hypothesis 2a: Democrats will have higher scores for Lakoff's Liberal language variable than Republicans. Conversely, Republicans will have higher scores for Lakoff's Conservative language variable than Democrats.

Hypothesis 2b: Democrats will have higher scores for the Campaign Actor Reference variables (i.e., *Party References*, *Voter References*, *Leader References*) than Republicans.

Hypothesis 2c: Democrats will have higher scores for the Coalition Building variables (i.e., *Commonality*, *Familiarity*, *Realism*, *Human Interest*, *Rapport*) than Republicans.

Hypothesis 2d: Republicans will have higher scores for the Moral Virtues and Entrepreneurialism variables (i.e., *Praise*, *Inspiration*) than Democrats.

Hypothesis 2e: Republicans will have higher scores for the variables associated with language of order, efficiency and unity (i.e., *Liberation*, *Tenacity*, *Communication*, and *Denial*) than Democrats.

Hypothesis 2f: There will be no difference in the scores for the public-minded values variable between Democrats and Republicans.

Hypothesis 2g: Republicans will have higher scores for the Accusatory Language variables than Democrats.

Hypothesis 2h: An examination of party-based differences in the goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the

Congressional Budget Resolution for the years 1998-2000 for Legislature-only texts will be the same as for the all-texts analysis of party-based differences.

Table 4. Hypothesis 2 Variables

Independent Variable	Dependent Variables
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political Party <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Democrat b. Republican 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lakoff's Value Language <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Liberal Language b. Conservative Language 2. Discussion of Campaign Actors <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Party References b. Voter References c. Leader References 3. Coalition Building Rhetoric <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Commonality b. Familiarity c. Realism d. Human Interest e. Rapport 4. Moral Virtue and Entrepreneurialism Rhetoric <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Praise b. Inspiration 5. Language of Order, Efficiency, and Unity <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Liberation b. Tenacity c. Communication d. Denial 6. Public Interest 7. Accusatory Language <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Blame b. Pessimism

These hypotheses are based on previous DICTION research efforts. Richardson (2004) examined the use of *Lakoff's Liberal Language* and *Lakoff's Conservative Language*. Jarvis (2004) explored the inclusion of language referencing campaign actors (i.e., *Party References*, *Voter References*, *Leader References*), coalition building (i.e., *Commonality*, *Familiarity*, *Realism*, *Human Interest*, *Rapport*), and moral virtues and entrepreneurialism (i.e., *Praise*,

Inspiration). Both Jarvis (2004) and Bligh and Hess (2007) explored accusatory language (i.e., *Blame, Pessimism*).

Organization of the Dissertation

The remainder of the dissertation will provide the information necessary to address the research questions presented above: Are there source-based or party-based perspectives present in federal budget communication? Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the relevant literature including the placement of this dissertation within the literature. Chapter 3 presents the methods used for completing the content analysis. Chapter 4 presents the statistically significant results and discussion of the content analysis associated with source-based differences in federal budget communication. Chapter 5 provides the statistically significant results and discussion of the party-based differences in federal budget communication. Chapter 6 presents conclusions and recommendations for additional research.

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In broad terms, this dissertation is an examination of the communication surrounding the federal budget process. Budgeting is intended to serve as a mechanism for setting goals and objectives, measuring process toward objectives, for identifying weaknesses or inadequacies in organizations, and for controlling and integrating diverse activities carried out by large bureaucracies, both public and private (Lee, Johnson, & Joyce, 2004). Budgeting is a means for examining how resources have been used previously, analyzing what has been accomplished and at what cost, and for charting a course for the future through allocations. Budget process communication is a means of creating meaning among individuals or actors of differing perspectives and agendas.

Two hypotheses regarding budget process communication emerged from the literature. This chapter proceeds to put these questions in perspective by first briefly outlining the history of the budget in American politics. Next, the literature associated with each research question is explored.

Focus of Budget Communication Analyses: The Federal Budget as a Reflection of Political and Administrative Goals and Priorities

Federal budget decisions represent the policies and managerial goals and objectives valued by the constituency as reflected by the electorate and bureaucracy. Tangible examples can be seen in recent political decisions. For example, using the budget tool of reconciliation, President Barack Obama and the Democratic majority in Congress passed sweeping health care reform. President George W. Bush and the Republican majority in Congress passed multiple tax cuts for the middle class. Also, due in large part to campaign promises made during the 2000 presidential campaign and the 2002 mid-term election, Congress, with Bush's support, passed a

drug coverage plan for senior citizens, arguably at the expense of other proposed programs. In each case, the policies demonstrated the values of the majority and demonstrated the goals and values deemed most important at that point in time, be it health care, tax cuts, or reductions in government services. The following represents a brief history of the institutional goals and values of the federal budget process.

From the founding until 1891, Congress controlled the budget and executive branch agencies went to Congressional subcommittees for appropriations. The budget was a coordinating tool and a tool to deter waste and inefficient government. It was not until the twentieth century and the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 that the nation saw the establishment of the executive budget, which serves as the foundation for present day budgeting at the federal level. The budget soon became a tool for economic control. During the Great Depression, the budget reflected Keynesian orthodoxy and was used to stimulate the economy and reduce social conflict. The 1937 Brownlow Commission Reports furthered the role of the budget as a managerial tool as well as a means of control. In 1949 the Hoover Commission recommended the adaptation of performance budgeting, which prior to this point was called functional or activity budgeting. The Hoover Commission recommended that budget information for the federal government be structured in terms of activities rather than line-items and that performance measures be provided along with performance reports. In 1950, the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act (BAPA) was passed. The key elements of program budgeting included long-range planning, goal setting, program identification, quantitative analysis such as cost benefit analysis and performance analysis.

The 1960s saw the emergence of Planning, Programming Budget Systems (PPBS). The impetus for PPBS came from economics, the data sciences, and planning and was inspired by

Robert McNamara and the Department of Defense (Schick, 1971, p.32). PPBS was based on the premise that efficiencies and improvements would be achieved through a common approach for long range planning, analyzing the costs and benefits of alternate programs which meet these objective, and translating these programs into the budget.

In the 1970's, President Richard Nixon attempted to gain greater budgetary control over the major executive departments and agencies through the implementation of Management by Objectives (MBO) and by changing the Bureau of the Budget to the OMB and by strengthening OMB's management responsibilities. MBO was intended to centralize goal-setting decisions while at the same time allowing managers to choose how to achieve the goals. However, Congress re-established its role in the budget process through the passage of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 which added some centralizing influence to the Federal budget process, and constrained the use of impoundments and other executive encroachments on the budget. One of the most important developments to emerge from this act has been reconciliation – a process whereby Congress changes existing laws to conform to tax and spending levels set in a budget resolution. Reconciliation has developed into an important procedure for implementing policy decisions and assumptions embraced in the budget resolution.

By the mid-1970's, the annual deficit had become a matter of public debate and a general sense existed that federal spending was out of control. In a 1977 presidential memo, President Carter mandated the use of zero-based budgeting (ZBB) – a process that would replace, not simply accompany – existing formulation processes. In theory, ZBB sought to create a clear and precise link between budgetary resources and program results; however, in practice, there was widespread use of arbitrary chosen percentages to identify funding levels rather than genuine zero-based analysis. By the end of the 1970's, as a result of the growth of entitlement programs,

mandatory spending began to overtake discretionary spending. In response, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 was passed by Congress. Further budget reduction attempts occurred in 1985 with the passage of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (i.e., Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, or GRH). This act attempted to control the budget through setting gradually declining deficit targets and represented a fundamental change in the focus of the budget process. The budget was now to be an instrument to be used to specify the end result to be achieved, rather than simply the rules to be followed in order to achieve any number of results. The 1990 Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) replaced the GRH system of deficit limits with two independent enforcement tools: caps on discretionary spending and a pay-as-you-go requirement for direct spending and revenue legislation.

Congress next passed the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993. GPRA's purpose was to increase public confidence and to improve program effectiveness by systematically holding agencies accountable for results. The building block of the comprehensive initiative was performance budgeting. GPRA required agencies to prepare five-year strategic plans that describe the agencies' overall goals and objectives, annual performance plans containing quantifiable measures of agency progress and annual performance reports. Performance measures thus became linked with the budget. As a result, the focus of the budget began to shift away from the cost of a program and to the measurable results of the program.

In 1997, a Republican Congress, working from its "Contract with America," and President Clinton, a Democrat, passed the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997. The passage of the BBA 97 signified the beginning of a period of balanced budgets and budget surpluses. With the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the United States subsequent entry into war, the United States saw a return to deficit spending.

Kelly summed the history of budget reforms as a reflection of changing public support for the role of government in American society (Kelly, 2005) and posited that budget preferences fell on a continuum ranging from public interest and social justice on one end and concern for private interest and economic prosperity at the other. Specifically, she argued that budget reform was centered on cost control and improved efficiency during periods when Americans favored the private sector over the public sector. Conversely, when the public sector was favored, budget reform focused on programmatic effectiveness (Kelly, 2005). The following sections will discuss in further detail the source-based and political party-based goals and values exhibited through the federal budget process and communication.

Source-Based Differences in Federal Budget Communication

As noted in Chapter 1, Hypothesis 1 predicts that there will be differences in the communication in goals and values surrounding the budget in the period examined according to the source (Executive, Legislature, Agency). While previous efforts have examined agency efforts in terms of motivations (i.e., to seek base, fair share, or pad), examinations of agency communication as it compares to that of the President or members of Congress has been lacking. Several theories exist regarding the role of agency administrators within the budget process. These theories provide difference assumptions regarding possible source-based differences in the goals and values expressed in federal budget communication.

Fragmentation in the Budgetary Process

As with any management process, opportunities for fragmentation exist and have many sources. For one, the Constitution, in setting forth a bicameral system, has ensured fragmentation within the legislature. Both the Senate and the House seek to create their own identities and agendas, but must reconcile differences in order to adopt a budget. While political

parties can act as a unifying force – for example, when the leadership of both the House and Senate are represented by the same political party, parties may not wield the control they once did (Lee, Johnson, & Joyce, 2004). Members may no longer be as willing to support party platforms as they once were given reelection concerns. For example, a regional issue, such as a military base closing, may trump party preferences. Additionally, interpersonal relationships have been shown to have greater influence than party ties (Arnold, Deen, & Patterson, 2000).

Second, fragmentation occurs within the executive branch. While the president has control over the executive budget, he has no guarantee that administrative units will support his decisions. Additionally, the president may not uniformly support budget recommendations either, choosing instead to single out a few recommendations as priorities (Lee, Johnson, & Joyce, 2004).

Third, constituency differences can cause fragmentation. The president, because he is elected through a nation-wide vote, is often considered to have a broader perspective and be more concerned with government-wide issues. Legislators, because they are elected by smaller constituencies, may be less concerned with government-wide issues and, therefore, be more likely to decrease spending. Legislators also may choose to spend beyond what is sound in an effort to act responsively to their constituents, thus resulting in pork barrel spending (Lee, Johnson, & Joyce, 2004). Ippolito (1978) additionally noted that competition exists within and between departments for available funds as administrators attempt to obtain support for the policies and interests that fall within their departments' or agencies' domains. Agency leadership may find it necessary to advocate their positions and negotiate with OMB and the president to protect or increase departmental allocations as the final budget decisions are made (Ippolito, 1978). As a result, tension in this process is almost inevitable. Agency heads are political

appointees and, therefore, some degree of loyalty to the president and his programs is expected. At the same time, agency heads have a duty to “subordinates within his department, to the interests or groups that the department serves, and to the general goals and purposes of his departments” (Ippolito 1978, p. 56). Most significant to this research is Ippolito’s assumption that the department’s perspective is not presidential (Ippolito, 1978). Ippolito stated that the department’s perspective should not be presidential since “enforcing and articulating the president’s interests and preferences is more appropriately the province of other participants in the budgetary process, particularly the OMB and other presidential advisory groups” (1978, p. 58).

Contrasting Theoretical Perspectives

Much of the aforementioned fragmentation can be attributed to politics. Lasswell defines politics as “who gets what, when, and how” (Lasswell, 1950). In this research partisan politics will be considered as a firm adherence to a party, faction, cause, or person, especially one exhibiting allegiance to a political party (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th Edition, 2003).

A representative bureaucracy theory would indicate that bureaucrats are representative of the citizenry; therefore, administrative actions represent the will of the citizens their agencies serve. Administrative views toward the budget should be similar to those of the officials elected by the citizens to represent their interests. Similarly, the politics-administration dichotomy suggests politicians are to make political and policy decisions. Administrators, on the other hand, are to remain politically neutral and implement the policies determined by the politicians. Principal-agent theory also suggests that administrator’s should serve the wishes of the principals – in this case the Executive or the Member of Congress.

Niskanen (1971, 1975) has argued that bureaucrats have a unique perspective. Niskanen posited that bureaucrats are primarily self-interested individuals who attempt to maximize their own utility through the obtainment of larger discretionary budgets. The motivations behind such actions are not representative of the public's demand for increased spending. Rather, administrators seek to increase their agencies' budgets in order to obtain increased salaries and prestige.

Dolan (2002) examined the representative-bureaucracy theory and Niskanen's budget maximization theory to see how well the top ranks of the federal government represented the demands of the public. Through a survey of senior executive service (SES) members, Dolan determined that, contrary to Niskanen's portrayal of the budget-maximizing bureaucrat (1971), members of the SES preferred less spending than the public on most broad spending categories (i.e., Social Security, crime, AIDS research, health care, homelessness, and financial aid for college students), while only preferring increased spending on two issues: the environment and foreign aid (2002). These preferences held true even for issues falling under the administrators' departments. Dolan concludes that the budget-maximizing tendencies of SES members suggest that self-interest is not as powerful a motivator as previously believed and that theories about self-interested bureaucrats inflating government budgets for their own gain should be revised (2002).

Still others have argued that the arguments for larger budgets is not for personal gain, but rather to fulfill the policy mandates of their agencies and specific departments (Simon, 1957; Wildavsky, 1964; LeLoup, 1977; Ippolito, 1978; Feno, 1996). For example, Nadia M. Rubaii-Barrett (1991) posited that bureaucrats have three priorities in the budget process: service or authorization levels; adequate funding or appropriations; and efficiency. Their actions in the

budget process are motivated by their desires to have policy outcomes that match their notions of “good public policy” (Rubaii-Barrett, 1991). Philip Joyce also examined agency budget strategies, specifically to determine the extent to which agency budget strategies differed based on the level of Congressional oversight (Joyce, 1990). Joyce hypothesized that the type of budget strategy used by an agency in dealing with Congress was dependent on the level of oversight exercised by appropriations subcommittees and authorizing committee that were responsible for monitoring the agency. Joyce posited that the greater the oversight, the more likely the agency would be to allocate its budgetary resources toward the states with representation on the oversight committees. He found support for his hypothesis in three of the five agencies he examined. His findings, he argues, provide support for the level of oversight as a factor in explaining agency budgetary responses to Congress (Joyce, 1990).

Perhaps most notably, Wildavsky (1964, 1978, 1984) presented a guardian-advocate model in which there is an assumption that participants in the budgetary process play two main roles; they are either guardians of the treasury or advocates of program spending. By definition these roles are attached to institutional positions - guardians are participants from central agencies controlling the budget, advocates are from program agencies. Within the budget process departments and agencies are expected to be advocates of increased appropriations (Wildavsky, 1964). Agencies need additional funding to continue or expand existing programs or to establish new programs. However, congressional appropriators are constrained in their guardian and appellate roles; therefore, they permit agency budgets to grow only at an incremental rate consistent with balanced budgets (Wildavsky, 1964). These interactions create a stable pattern of budgeting based on mutual expectations. “Administrative agencies act as the advocates of increased expenditure, and central control organs function as guardians of the treasury. Each

expects the other to do its job; agencies can advocate, knowing the center will impose limits, and the center can exert control, knowing that agencies will push expenditures as hard as they can. Thus, roles serve as “calculating mechanisms” (Wildavsky, 1975, p. 7).

To empirically test Wildavsky’s theory of the guardian-advocate mode, Imbeau (2006) conducted a content analysis of policy speeches in Quebec from 1980-2004. Imbeau sought to determine whether Wildavsky-type budget role-playing was found in the fiscal policy speeches of government officials in Quebec and, if so, the role-playing in fiscal policy speeches is stable over time. Imbeau adopted a perspective of budgeting based on Wildavsky (1964, 1988) and Niskanen (2007) which views the budget as resulting from the interaction among actors playing given roles in the administrative process. Based on Wildavsky’s definitions, Imbeau explored the roles of actors within the Canadian budget process. The Treasury board, its secretariat, and the Finance Department were identified as guardians of the treasury; Health and Education departments were identified as examples of advocates of program spending. Imbeau posited that if guardianship and advocacy roles were at work within the Canadian budgetary process, guardians’ speeches should be systematically different from advocates’ speeches. Guardian speech was identified as that which implied reduced public spending, referred more often to public deficit or debts, and referred more often to government in general as opposed to specific policy projects. Conversely, advocate speech was that which implied increased public spending, referred less often to public deficit and debts, and referred to specific policy projects more often than to the government in general. Imbeau found significant role-playing in policy speeches that explained 6 percent of the variance in the content of speeches from 1981-2004. He concluded that while Wildavsky’s roles did not completely explain the variation in the content of policy speeches, roles did matter and could predict content.

Source-Based Differences in Budget Communication

The literature reviewed above, leads to the conclusion that source-based fragmentation in federal budget-related communication exists. However, a statistical analysis of the extent to which this fragmentation occurs at the federal level through the use of DICTION has not been previously explored. This dissertation addresses the gap in our knowledge of fragmentation within the management process that is the federal budget process. The following sections provide an overview of the questions analyzed and their relation to the hypotheses presented in the Introduction.

General Attitudes toward the Budget

In order to determine the general managerial goals and values expressed in the budget process, the following question was informed by the above literature and explored:

- What do source-based differences reveal in terms of speakers' general attitudes toward the management process that is the federal budget?
 - Does communication reflect values associated with immediacy and present concern, suggesting that speakers are more concerned with short-term versus long-term effects of policy decisions? Consequently, a longer-term approach would indicate that speakers have considered multiple dimensions of issues.
 - Does the federal budget communication reflect concern for multiple groups and the need to reach consensus among competing ideas?

An exploration of the above question will provide answers to the following hypotheses which address general attitudes toward the budget as a management process:

- **Hypothesis 1a:** Executive communication will have a higher score on the 5 managerial-related organizational goals and variables than the Legislature.

- **Hypothesis 1b:** Executive communication will have a higher score on the 5 managerial-related organizational goals and values than the Agency.
- **Hypothesis 1c:** Agency communication will have a higher score on the 5 managerial-related organizational goals and values than the Legislature.

These hypotheses explore general attitudes toward the management processes and the federal budget specifically. These hypotheses build on previous DICTION research in the area of federal economic policy, which incorporates certain variables as a means of determining managerial goals and values. For example, Bligh and Hess (2007) explored Alan Greenspan's communication through the use of the variables *Activity*, *Optimism*, *Certainty*, *Realism*, and *Commonality* (Bligh & Hess, 2007).

Immediacy: Activity, Realism, Optimism

Using the variables *Activity*, *Optimism*, *Certainty*, *Realism*, and *Commonality*, the present study explores whether speakers take a long-term or short-term approach to budgetary decisions. A short-term approach would be reflected with increased immediacy and present concern. A longer-term approach would be reflective of increased optimism and would indicate that speakers have considered multiple dimensions of issues. The variable *Activity* refers to language that features movement, change, or the implementation of ideas. The use of *Activity* within policy communication indicates that speakers are more likely to be focused on reaching an implementable policy decision. *Realism* also indicates whether a speakers' perspective is long-term or short-term in nature. *Realism* was created in an attempt to tap into John Dewey's pragmatism and examines the use of language describing tangible, immediate, recognizable matters that affect people's everyday lives. Higher *Activity* and *Realism* scores would indicate that speakers are more focused on short-term effects of policy decisions as opposed to long-term

implications. Conversely, higher *Optimism* and *Certainty* scores would indicate a longer-term outlook towards policy development. *Optimism* is language that endorses or highlights the positive entailments of some person, group, concept, or event. Higher optimism scores would indicate that speakers have a more positive outlook regarding the economy.

Certainty

Additionally, higher *Certainty* scores within budget communication would indicate that speakers' are discussing concrete policy objectives and are projecting strong opinions regarding obligations. *Certainty* refers to words that indicate resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness. Hart and Childers (2004, p. 521) argue that if left to their own devices "people would behave in their own self-interested ways-maximizing their gains and minimizing their losses, responding to their salient needs above all else, refusing to coordinate their actions with others or doing so only reluctantly". Through politics, individuals are forced to cooperate and engage in dialogue regarding the future direction of the country. The communication used to engage in politics, employs verbal certainty. Verbal certainty represents the ideal and the possible, and points to the line in politics where "dreams and realities collide" (Hart & Childers, 2004, p. 521). Hart and Childers note that conventional politics often does not include routines that encourage high verbal certainty (2004). For example:

- Decreased certainty is expected when a politician is talking to groups of neutral or distrusting audiences (e.g., a Democrat talking to a Republican audience) as opposed to talking with groups with philosophically similar views (e.g. a Democrat talking to a Democratic audience);

- Decreased certainty is expected when a speaker is constrained by his/her role (e.g., the president is less likely to use verbal certainty than religious leaders, editorial writers, and chief executive officers); and,
- Decreased certainty is expected when a speaker is held to a higher standard of accountability (e.g., during political debates speakers are less likely to speak with certainty and more likely to speak more broadly as the specifics of their speech will be dissected and analyzed in greater detail than the stump campaign speeches).

Commonality

To determine whether speakers show concern for multiple groups and speak in a manner conducive to consensus building, the variable *Commonality* was explored. *Commonality* provides an approximation of the communication concepts found in the work of Etzioni and examines language that highlight agreed-upon values of a group and rejects idiosyncratic modes of communication. It has been noted that communitarian characterizations will be popular in the strategic discourses of organizations such as joint ventures (Short & Palmer, 2008). The use of *Commonality* could vary for several reasons. For example, Lee, Johnson, and Joyce (2004) theorized that constituency differences can cause fragmentation. Because the executive is elected through a nation-wide election versus a local election, Executive communication may have higher *Commonality* scores than the Legislature or Agencies. Alternatively, because members of Congress must work together on issues other than the budget, they may seek commonality on budgetary issues to ensure continued working relationships with their colleagues.

Public-Minded Goals Reflected in Budget Communication

In addition to the variables above, fragmentation is also explored through an analysis of the role that public minded values play in the expression of federal budget priorities. This analysis is accomplished through the creation and analysis of the variable *Public Interest*. The *Public Interest* variable incorporated all DICTION variables that references ideas associated with public-mindedness and cooperation as well as specific references to voters. Specifically, *Public Interest* was examined by combining the variables *Commonality*, *Cooperation*, *Familiarity*, *Realism*, *Human Interest*, *Rapport*, and *Voter References*. The examination of the following question quantifies the role of public minded language in federal-level budget communication and in doing so adds to our understanding of source-based and party-based differences in the use of public minded concepts.

Are public-minded values expressed in the federal budget communication?

An exploration of this question will address the following hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis 1d:** Executive and Legislature communication will have no significant difference in the use of public-minded language.
- **Hypothesis 1e:** Executive communication will have a higher score on the public-minded language than Agency communication.
- **Hypothesis 1f:** Legislative communication will have a higher score on the public-minded language than Agency communication.
- **Hypothesis 2f:** There will be no difference in the scores for the public-minded values variable between Democrats and Republicans.

The role of public opinion in budget communication is of significance to public administrators. Rohr noted that public administrators are constitutional officers, bound by an

oath to uphold constitutional principles, and deriving legitimacy from the debate of the American founding period (Rohr, 1986). Public administration's role in the policy process is to search for the public interest (defined not necessarily as a defined public interest, but as an ideal and a process) and to guide policy in the direction that is indicated by that research. Administrators are not just managers of public agencies, but are representing the interests of one's fellow citizens. As Wamsley (1990) notes public administrators can be thought of as "special citizens"; "not one with special status or privileges but rather one with special skills and responsibilities; standing in place of and acting for fellow citizens" (p. 117). Stivers (2001) posits that the major ingredients of a citizenship ethic in public administration as authoritative judgment, the public interest, citizenship as education, and community. Moore (1976) argued that public sector obligations arise from three different realms which includes: 1.) respecting the processes that legitimate the actions of public officials, 2.) serving the public interest, and 3.) treating colleagues and subordinates with respect, honesty, and fairness.

To definitively identify the public interest in terms of specific policies and preferences is a near impossible task. Wamsley, Bacher, Goodsell, Kronenberg, Rohr, Stivers, White, and Wolf (1990) suggest that instead of thinking of the public interest in terms of specific policy decisions, one can instead consider the value public interest as a "combination of several habits of mind in making decisions and making policy" (p. 40) As such, the authors posit that the public interest can be thought of as: dealing with the multiple ramification of an issue, adopting a long-term perspective that is tempered by concern for short-term results, and considering the demands and requirements of multiple groups (Wamsley et al., 1990, p. 40). This perspective necessarily emphasizes the role of communication and discourse within the policy process.

Role of Public Opinion

Levasseur's 2005 research examined how politicians incorporated public opinion into their budget-based communication and how others responded to their use of public opinion. Levasseur found that for any budget proposal, if one side claims public opinion favors its plan, the opposition can:

1. Claim, given the intersubjective nature of public opinion, that the public actually rejects the plan;
2. Highlight a specific aspect of the plan to demonstrate its unpopularity;
3. Claim that the plan elicits public support by taking the easy but irresponsible path; or
4. Reply that the plan is popular with the public only because it is misunderstood.

Within his research, Levasseur explored how the meaning of “public opinion” has varied over time. Rhetoric, according to Levasseur (2005), not only creates and sustains publics, but also determines the meaning of public opinion. The rhetorical view of public opinion states that public opinion is seen as “epiphenomenal, as arising out of the process of social and communicative interaction” (Lipari, 1999, p. 86). The ancient Greeks associated public opinion with public rhetoric – the rhetoric of citizen assemblies in Greek city-states constituted public opinion (Glynn, Herbst, O’Keefe, & Shapiro, 1999). Habermas illuminated a similarly strong connection between communication and public opinion in eighteenth century Europe (Habermas, 1989). Furthermore, citizens created public opinion as they came together in public spaces to discuss matters of public concern (Levasseur, 2005). More recently, Levasseur notes that public opinion has lost the vital association with discourse (2005). “The advent of George Gallup and modern public opinion polling techniques have transformed public opinion from a discursive product into an empirical product” with polling becoming the “dominant definition of

public opinion” (Glynn et al., 1999) as well as a cultural obsession (Hogan, 1997). This research extends Levasseur’s by further extending source-based differences in the use of public opinion in federal budget communication.

Role-Based Communication Differences

This dissertation additionally quantifies how budget actors see themselves as expressed through federal budget communication. Specifically, variables associated with role-based behaviors were identified and source-based differences were explored through the following question:

Do source-based differences reflect role-based behaviors?

Analysis of the above question will provide answers for the following hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis 1g:** Executive communication will score lower on the budget concepts variable than the Legislature, but will score higher on the functional budget category variable.
- **Hypothesis 1h:** Executive and Agency communication will have no significant differences in the use of budget concepts and functional budget category variables.
- **Hypothesis 1i:** Agency communication will score lower on the budget concepts variable than the Legislature, but will score higher on the functional budget category variable.

To determine role behavior, one can find guidance in Niskanen (1971), Wildavsky (1975), Ippolito’s (1978), and Imbeau (2006) work. Imbeau, drawing upon Niskanen and Wildavsky, found that budget maximizers (i.e., advocates of increased program spending) referred less often to public deficits and debts than budget minimizers (i.e., guardians of the budget). Imbeau, drawing upon Niskanen, posited that budget maximizers (i.e., advocates) would refer to specific policy projects. Subsequently, budget minimizers (i.e., guardians) would refer

more to the government in general as opposed to specific policy projects. Additionally, Ippolito noted that agency perspective should be different from the presidential perspective (1978). These concepts were explored using DICTION. To examine the extent to which speakers focused on public deficits and debts (and budget theory, in general), a list of budget concepts was drawn from Ippolito’s writing on the budget. These concepts were used as the basis of the custom DICTION variable, *Budget Concepts*. To determine the extent to which specific policy projects were referenced, the custom variable Functional Budget Categories was created (Table 5).

Analyses of the above concepts will provide an answer to **Hypothesis 1**: There are source-based differences in the organizational goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for years 1998-2000.

Table 5. Budget-process Specific DICTION Variables and Descriptions for Source-based Communication Analyses

DICTION Variable	Description
Budget Concepts	A custom dictionary based on Ippolito (1978). This is a list of concepts commonly associated with the budget process. Included terms are budget authority, appropriation, appropriations, cash-equivalent payments, general funds, trust funds, special funds, contract authority, borrowing authority, spending authority, controllability, outlays, tax expenditures, incremental, line-item, performance-based, zero-based budgeting, tax, spend, borrow, appropriate, off-budget, on-budget, debt, deficit.
Functional Budget Categories	Heniff and Murray (2008) provide a list of the functional budget categories within the federal budget. Based on that list, a custom dictionary was created. While not an exhaustive list, this grouping of primary budget categories presents an indication as to how often specific programs are referred to within federal budget communication. Terms included are: defense, military, international affairs, science, technology, natural resources, environment, agriculture, commerce, transportation, community development, regional development, education, social services, health, Medicare, Medicaid, social security, veterans, administration, justice, general government, interest, allowances, undistributed offsetting receipts.

Political Party-Based Differences in Communication

Because the budget process is a reflection of political values and goals, fragmentation in the budget process can also occur along party lines. As such, partisan political communication plays a significant role in the budget process. The following literature will provide insight into Hypothesis 2:

- **Hypothesis 2:** There are political party-based differences in the goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for the years 1998-2000.

Levasseur notes that centuries ago Cicero observed that deliberate rhetoric involves an active tension between “advantages” and “moral goodness,” and this tension between economic advantage and moral principles has had a prominent place in political rhetoric (Levasseur, 2000).

Partisan political arguments are best defined as communication that is argumentative and is directed at either the opposing political party or member(s) of the opposing party. The partisan political debate surrounding federal budget initiatives is heated and often adversarial in tone. Partisan communication is used by those within the federal budget process (i.e., Members of Congress, Congressional staff, bureaucrats), those affected by the outcomes of the process (i.e., interest groups, citizen groups), and the media to promote the idea of an adversarial American political system – a system consisting of winners and losers. Understanding the impact of partisan political communication is important to the field of public administration as the escalation of partisan politics surrounding the federal budget process arguably contributes to the deterioration of meaningful communication regarding substantive policy and budgetary decisions. This research will determine whether there is validity to the anecdotal view that partisan communication exists.

Previous research has examined the goals and value judgments associated with partisan political communication. For example, Levasseur (2000) identified the conflict between wants-regarding and ideal-regarding rhetoric in federal budget discussions. Kelly (2005) identified the values of public interest and social justice versus private interest and economic prosperity in federal budget rhetoric. Schlesinger (1986) identified public purposes and private interests. McClosky and Zaller (1984) identified capitalistic and democratic values and found statistically strong evidence that those adhering to the conservative ideology support capitalistic values and that those who adhere to the liberal ideology support democratic values.

Burden and Sanberg (2003) also look at the influence of public opinion on the budget process. Burden and Sanberg offer a theory to identify the determinants of presidential campaign rhetoric related to the federal budget (2003). Their theory is based on issue ownership, candidate strategy, retrospective voting, and voter preferences. Using over 800 campaign speeches from the major parties' presidential nominees from 1952 to 2000, Burden and Sanberg explored the volume and tone of the budget communication. The authors found that volume of communication is driven by the objective balance of the budget and the subjective importance given to the budget by the voters and a conditional effect involving budget balance, incumbency and partisanship. "Positive" communication was determined mostly by the budget balance and partisanship and "overstated" communication was shaped solely by the salience of the budget to the electorate (Burden & Sanberg, 2003). Burden and Sanberg found that incumbency, partisanship and budget balance interact so that Democrats emphasize the budget more when they are incumbents during a time of surplus. Conversely, Republicans emphasize the budget more when they are challengers and the budget is in deficit. Specifically, Burden and Sanberg found that Republicans talk about the budget more than Democrats. Democrats only spoke about

the budget more than Republicans in 1956 and 1996. This research supports the common held belief of issue ownership – Republicans “own” the issue or tend to appear more fiscally responsible than their Democratic counterparts. Burden and Sanberg also found that budget communication tone is more positive when the budget balance is larger and when democrats are doing the talking.

Lakoff argued that strategic communication is pivotal to election outcomes (Lakoff, 1996) Lakoff posited that the party that is more capable of integrating issues with values, and the candidate with the sound bite that more intuitively evokes the triggering metaphor for the appropriate value system, wins (1996). In the case of the federal budget process, this has become clear. Lakoff put forth the argument that American culture consists of two competing worldviews that broadly correspond to the “strict” versus “nurturing” role of the parent (Lakoff, 1996). The “strict father” is necessary because human nature is weak. The “strict father” resorts to punishment and discipline to set the child on the path of human development. This “strict parent” perspective is associated with a limited view of the appropriate scope of government – while governance is necessary to maintain law and order and protect society from external threats, most domestic problems are and should be matters of individual responsibility. Social welfare programs are counterproductive because they breed dependence instead of self-reliance. The “strict parent” model is most associated with the post-1980 Republican Party platform.

Conversely, the Democratic Party platform and other progressive groups stand for policies that stem from the “nurturing parent” perspective. From this perspective, with appropriate parental care and nurturing, all children have the potential to develop into fundamentally decent and productive human beings. This view necessarily implies a more expansive set of governmental responsibilities focused on the realization of the personal potential

of all member of society and the elimination of social barriers impeding normal development. Lakoff's account suggests that political communication is framed in terms of fundamental value systems rather than in terms of specific measures of performance or effectiveness or a candidates' personal demeanor (Lakoff, 1996).

Alternatively, Iyengar (2005) noted the importance of political context as being as important as anything the candidates might say over the course of the election. He argued that in the political science literature on voting results, presidential elections could be predicted with a high degree of accuracy from economic indicators and public approval of the incumbent. For example, as Bartels and Zaller (2001) and Campbell (2004) discovered, changes in gross national product over the prior year or the incumbent's public approval rating during the period before the election are relevant to the election outcomes. Because context matters, campaign content is designed to best capitalize on the critical issues (Iyengar, 2005).

In his 2000 study of the 1995 budget battle, Levasseur (2000) found that the debate highlighted the tension between the want-satisfaction provided by popular programs and the ideal-satisfaction provided by balancing the budget. The Congressional debates on the proposed budget resolutions divided clearly along partisan lines. Democrats waged a distributive want-regarding attack directed at the Republican tax cuts which focused on highlighting the negative effects the Republican cuts would have on "ordinary people" and reflected what Brain Berry in his treatise *Political Argument* refers to as a "want-regarding" basis for policy judgments. Policy judgments grounded in "want-regarding principle" arguments "concentrate attention entirely on the extent to which a certain policy will alter the overall amount of want-satisfaction" (Levasseur, 2000, p. 187). "Want-satisfaction" refers to the fact that "public policies are designed to satisfy human wants.

Conversely, Republicans used several “ideal-regarding” arguments to defend their budget. Barry notes that “ideal-regarding” principles are “contradictory of the want-regarding” principles. Levasseur notes that “ideal-regarding principles suggest that some wants should not be satisfied because those wants are subservient to certain ideals” (p. 189). In this case, the Republicans argued that their “budget resolution furthered the ideals of fiscal responsibility and generational equity by balancing the budget in seven years” (p. 189).

Use of DICTION to Explore Party-Based Communication

DICTION was created to be used to analyze political leadership discourse and has been used extensively for this purpose (Hart, 1984; Hart & Jarvis, 1997; Hart, 2000a; Hart, 2000b; Hart & Childers, 2004; Hart & Childers, 2005). For example, Richardson (2006) used two custom dictionaries, *Liberal Language* and *Conservative Language* which were based on Lakoff’s 2002 lists of conservative and liberal language (2006) to analyze party-based communication within 660 political advertisements which aired between 1990 and 2000. Richardson found that party-based differences between the average use of *Liberal Language* and *Conservative Language* were only statistically significant for the use of *Liberal Language*, with Democrats incorporating concepts of *Liberal Language* more often.

Jarvis (2004) focused on language patterns related to two key differences between parties: their attitudes toward government and governance. Attitudes toward government pertain to the size and scope of government (Jarvis, 2004 citing: Aldrich, 1995; Baumer & Gold, 1995; Rahn, 1993; Rahn & Cramer, 1996; Sanders, 1988; Trilling, 1976). Democrats were more likely to use government to protect citizen’s rights and interests, while Republicans sought to protect voters from the overreaching power of government (Jarvis, 2004, citing Ehrenhalt, 1992; O’Leary & Kamber, 1996). Additionally, Jarvis notes that Democrats were viewed as

representing a wide variety of interests and being compassionate and inclusive whereas Republicans were recognized for their values, moral commitments, efficiency, and entrepreneurialism (2004, citing Baumer & Gold, 1995).

In regards to governance, Jarvis draws upon Freeman's (1986) cultural analysis of Democrats and Republicans. Freeman found that Democrats were composed of recognized internal blocs (e.g., labor, gays, women, minorities, etc.). Power is seen as flowing upward from the blocs to the party, but with many privileging their membership in the bloc over that of the party. Jarvis (2004), citing the earlier work of Freeman (1986), noted that Democratic language would encourage coalition building and would engage in more communication, clarification, and reassurance while Republicans were found to organize by ideology, identify primarily with the party, embrace order, and prefer a more unified style; therefore, Republicans would speak more directly, acting as trustees of the long range interests of their party.

Using DICTION, Jarvis examined partisan patterns in presidential campaign speeches for the period 1948 – 2000. Using the aforementioned assumptions regarding government and governance, Jarvis (2004) chose DICTION variables that were reflective of these concepts as follows:

- Democrats would be more likely to talk about the actors involved in campaigns and the people helped by governance: *Party References, Voters, Leaders* Dictionaries
- Republicans would be more likely to call attention to moral virtues and entrepreneurial matters: *Praise, Religious References, Patriotic Terms* Dictionaries.
- Democrats would be more likely to use the language of groups, shared commitments and togetherness in order to build their coalition and mobilize the internal blocs: *Commonality, Familiarity, Realism, Human Interest, Rapport* Dictionaries.

- Republicans, due to their more ideologically aligned party, would use language that honored order, efficiency, and unity: *Liberation, Tenacity, Communication, and Denial* Dictionaries.

Jarvis's analyses found that Democratic candidates were more likely than Republicans to discuss campaign actors and to use nouns to rhetorically bring their coalitions together (i.e., DICTION custom dictionaries of *Party References, Voters, and Leaders*) and to mobilize their core constituencies by including the language of groups, shared commitments, and togetherness in their rhetorical coalition building (i.e., DICTION dictionaries of *Commonality, Familiarity, Realism, Human Interest, Rapport*). Conversely, Republicans were posited to be more likely to call attention to moral virtues and entrepreneurial matters (i.e., DICTION dictionaries of *Praise, Patriotism, Religious References*), and, as a result of their more ideologically aligned party, speak in a style that honored order, efficiency, and unity (i.e., DICTION dictionaries of *Liberation, Tenacity, Communication, Denial*).

Further, Bligh and Hess (2007) explored Alan Greenspan's communications and his responsiveness to changes in the economic environment. Greenspan's speech was examined using the DICTION variables, *Certainty, Optimism, Pessimism, Immediacy, and Activity*. They found that during down periods in the economy, Greenspan's communication exhibited less certainty and activity and increased immediacy and pessimism as compared to periods of market upturns which indicated a stronger sense of certainty. Two measures are *Pessimism* (i.e., communication endorses or highlights the negative entailments of some person, group, concept, or event (Bligh & Hess, 2007) and *Blame*. *Blame* is of particular interest when determining the negative nature of party-based communication as *Blame* measures:

Terms designating social inappropriateness (mean, naive, sloppy, stupid) as well as

downright evil (fascist, blood-thirsty, repugnant, malicious) compose this dictionary. In addition, adjectives describing unfortunate circumstances (bankrupt, rash, morbid, embarrassing) or unplanned vicissitudes (weary, nervous, painful, detrimental) are included. The dictionary also contains outright denigrations: cruel, illegitimate, offensive, and miserly.

Pessimism and *Blame* can be used to determine whether there is any validity in the commonly held belief that party-based communication surrounding the budget process is adversarial.

Party-Based Hypotheses

The aforementioned literature led to Hypothesis 2 which stated that there are party-based differences in the goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for the years 1998-2000. Table 6 presents a summary of previous statistically significant party-based findings which guide this research. Based on this research, the following sub-hypotheses were constructed:

- **Hypothesis 2a:** Democrats will have higher scores for Lakoff's Liberal language variable than Republicans. Conversely, Republicans will have higher scores for Lakoff's Conservative language variable than Democrats. (Richardson, 2006).
- **Hypothesis 2b:** Democrats will have higher scores for the Campaign Actor Reference variables (i.e., *Party References*, *Voter References*, *Leader References*) than Republicans (Jarvis, 2004).
- **Hypothesis 2c:** Democrats will have higher scores for the Coalition Building variables (i.e., *Commonality*, *Familiarity*, *Realism*, *Human Interest*, *Rapport*) than Republicans (Jarvis, 2004).
- **Hypothesis 2d:** Republicans will have higher scores for the Moral Virtues and Entrepreneurialism variables (i.e., *Praise*, *Inspiration*) than Democrats (Jarvis, 2004).

- **Hypothesis 2f:** There will be no difference in the scores for the public-minded values variable between Democrats and Republicans.
- **Hypothesis 2g:** Republicans will have higher scores for the Accusatory Language variables than Democrats (Jarvis, 2004; Bligh & Hess, 2007).
- **Hypothesis 2h:** An examination of party-based differences in the goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for the years 1998-2000 for Legislature only texts will be the same as for the all-texts analysis of party-based differences.

Table 6. Summary of Previous Party-Based Findings

Variable	Previous Findings Regarding Statistically Significant Language Use
Lakoff's Value Language <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberal Language • Conservative Language 	Democrats —
Discussion of Campaign Actors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Party References • Voter References • Leader References 	Democrats Democrats Democrats
Coalition Building Rhetoric <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commonality • Familiarity • Realism • Human Interest • Rapport 	Democrats Democrats Democrats Democrats Democrats
Rhetoric of Moral Virtues and Entrepreneurialism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Praise • Patriotism/Religious References (Current Study Variable = Inspiration) 	Republicans Republicans
Language of Order, Efficiency and Unity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberation • Tenacity • Communication • Denial 	Republicans Republicans Republicans Republicans
Public-Mindedness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Interest 	—
Accusatory Language <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blame • Pessimism 	— n/a

CHAPTER THREE: METHOD

This chapter presents the research approach used in this dissertation. The discussion included within the chapter provides an overview of content analysis as an analysis method, describes the appropriateness of DICTION as an analytical tool for content analysis, details the sampling procedures used and the method for determining the analyses sample, and presents the description of the variables used. The chapter concludes with a review of potential research limitations associated with the methods presented.

Content Analysis

The basic research approach was a comparative analysis of texts to analyze the content of text first from different sources representing Presidential, Congressional, and agency texts and second, by political party. This research used content analysis and was both quantitative and qualitative. Content analysis is “the study of recorded human communications” (Babbie, 2001, p. 304). Babbie (2001) notes that content analysis is well suited to answer the question: “Who says what, to whom, why, how, and with what effect?” (p. 305). Shapiro and Markoff (1997) further define content analysis as any methodological measurement that is applied to text for social science purposes (1997).

Holsti (1969) defines content analysis as “any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of.” Holsti groups fifteen uses of content analysis into three basic categories: to make inferences about the antecedents of a communication; to describe and make inferences about characteristics of a communication; and to make inferences about the effects of a communication. Holsti’s second purpose is the purpose of content analysis in this dissertation – content analysis will be used to describe and make inferences about the characteristics of communications.

Duriau, Reger, and Pfarrer, in their 2007 content analysis of the content analysis literature, identified several advantages of content analysis methodologies including being a replicable methodology with analytical flexibility. Content analysis provides a replicable methodology to access deep, individual or collective structures such as values, intentions, attitudes and cognitions. As a result, content analysis methods can be applied to a wide range of organizational phenomena (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007). Content analysis in this case will provide insight into the values, intentions, and attitudes associated with the development of the federal budget process.

Additionally, content analysis provides for analytical flexibility (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007). Quantitatively, content analysis allows the researcher to take large amounts of textual information and systematically identify its properties using keyword in context routines to detect the more important structures of its communication content. Textual information can then be categorized according to theoretical frameworks which will inform the data analysis at the end. It is assumed that the words and phrases that are mentioned most often are those reflecting important concerns. Using DICTION 5.0, textual information associated with the federal budget process was categorized thematically. Content analysis also allows for qualitative analysis. Qualitatively, content analysis involves any kind of analysis where communication content is categorized and classified. The qualitative aspect of this research includes a descriptive analysis of the communication based on the origin of the communication (i.e., Executive, Legislature or Agency).

Content analysis is based on coding. Babbie defines coding as “the process of transforming raw data into a standardized form” (2001, pp. 304-305). Because coding schemes

can be corrected if flaws are detected as the study proceeds, content analysis is considered a safe methodology (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007).

Analysis Using Diction

This research followed a threefold methodological approach. First, documents were identified and coded using the code sheet in Appendix A. Second, analyses were conducted using DICTION, version 5.0. Third, after all the documents are analyzed using DICTION, the output was exported into SPSS for statistical analyses.

Analyses were completed using DICTION. The DICTION software functions by comparing each text to a database of previously analyzed texts, thus each passage is located in a semantic space in a precise manner (i.e., the use of normative profiles). The use of normative profiles allows each text to be placed within the context of a broader range of previously analyzed documents based on the source and type of communication.

DICTION was chosen for the present analyses due to its proven record as an analytical tool for use in content analysis and the benefits it provides. DICTION was developed explicitly for the analyses of political leadership discourse (Hart, 1984; Hart & Jarvis, 1997; Hart, 2000a; Hart, 2000b; Hart & Childers, 2004; Hart & Childers, 2005). Furthermore, DICTION was specifically designed for public policy dialogue, and its dictionaries contain the types of words “most frequently encountered in contemporary American public discourse” (Hart, 1984). Hart and Childers (2005) note that while there are many products available for doing empirical research on language, DICTION is distinguished by three factors:

Capacity: Diction evaluates a text with the assistance of approximately 40 dictionaries or word lists housed in a corpus consisting of 10,000 search words, none of which is duplicated in its routines;

Normativity: DICTION compares each text to a 25,000-item sample of contemporary discourse, thereby giving the user normative insight into the text being examined; and

Universality: DICTION can be used with any English-language text (and indeed comes equipped with generic norms for some 35 subgenres) and has been profitably used by Hamilton (2003) to differentiate entertainment from news shows; by Patterson (2002) to distinguish hard news from soft news; by Eidenmuller (2002) to study religious ideology; by Emrich, Brower, Feldman, and Garland (2001) and Bligh, Kohles, and Meindl (2004) to calculate charismatic effects; and by Sydserff and Weetman (2002) and Carroll (2004) to analyze corporate publications. DICTION has been often been used to study political materials, including campaign advertising (Ballotti and Kaid, 2000; Richardson, 2002), gubernatorial pronouncements (DiLeo, 2000), welfare policy (Kinney, in press), party politics (Kabanoff, Murphy, Brown and Conroy, 2001; Jarvis, 2004), and presidential discourse (Hart, 2000a).

The universality of DICTION can be further seen through the following studies. Short and Palmer (2008) provide an overview of the use of DICTION to aid in content analysis. They note that DICTION has been used for the analyses of a wide variety of topics in a wide variety of disciplines including: the study of leadership by behavioral researchers (Bligh, Kohles & Meindl, 2004a; Bligh, Kohles, & Meindl, 2004b); and, the study of image management (Rogers, Dillard, & Yuthas, 2005) and communicative action (Yuthas, Rogers, & Dillard, 2002) by accounting researchers. In the field of political communication, in addition to aforementioned work, relevant DICTION studies include studies of liberal and conservative thinking in political advertising (Richardson, 2006) and the institutionalization of the presidential speechwriting process from a process involving a few “ghostwriters” to the “prose machine” (Collier, 2004).

Bligh and Hess (2007) discuss advantages of using DICTION to aid in content analyses. They note that computer-aided content analyses is highly systematic, objective, and reliable; it is ideal for uncovering aspects of language that may be missed by the human coders; and, all the dictionaries contain individual words only, and homographs are explicitly treated by the program through statistical weighting procedures to partially correct for context (Hart & Childers, 2004; Bligh & Hess, 2007). Additionally, Hart and Jarvis (1997) note that:

DICTION forgets nothing, thus exposing patterns that would remain hidden to case-specific analysts; DICTION fully operationalizes the constructs and does so in a manner that can be manipulated and scrutinized by the researcher at any point in the research process; DICTION allows for sophisticated construct building through the simultaneous application of linguistic categories; DICTION allows for a constant re-analysis of passages under conditions unforeseen by the researcher; DICTION compares each text to a database of previously analyzed texts, thus permitting a passage to be located in a semantic space in a precise manner (i.e., the use of normative profiles); and, DICTION word lists are especially useful for dealing with political materials.

For purposes of this research, three normative profiles were explored. First, each text identified for analysis was processed through DICTION using the *All Texts Normative Profile*. In order to obtain additional insight regarding party-based communication differences, texts were also processed through DICTION using the *Political Debate* and *Public Policy Speeches Normative Profiles*. These profiles were established using presidential communication over time. Thus, these normative profiles provide a “best fit” for norm-based analysis of political party-based communication differences. However, because the *Political Debate* and *Public Policy Speeches Normative Profiles* are based on presidential communication, using these profiles for the analyses associated with source-based communication questions may have resulted in biased results. Therefore, source-based communication questions were examined only using the *All Texts Normative Profile*.

Although the findings that resulted from the use of the *Political Debate* and *Public Policy Speeches Normative Profiles* resulted in different findings of statistical significance than the *All Text Normative Profile* analyses, these findings were minor (See Appendix B for a complete discussion of these findings). Differences in findings of statistical significance occurred for two out of nineteen variables. Although the findings provided insight as to the potential use of *Public Interest*, overall, the findings suggests that the budget process is equally well described using the *All Text Normative Profile*. The *All Text Normative Profile* includes, among others, business,

corporate, financial, legal, problem-solving, journalism, and political reporting profiles. The complexity of the budget process may require considerations that are not fully recognized in normative profiles associated with political debates or public policy debates, especially when the debates are based upon presidential candidate debates or policy speeches delivered by sitting presidents.

Sampling Procedures

This research examined arguments associated with the federal budget communication for FY 1999, 2000, and 2001. This time period was chosen because it was a logical extension of previous analyses efforts (Levasseur, 2005) and expanded the research using numerous DICTION research studies which will be discussed in this section. Levasseur analyzed federal budget communication associated with this period. He used a pattern analysis approach for his analysis and focused solely on the role of public opinion. By using the same time period for analysis, this research extends Levasseur's work by looking for differences based on the origin of the communication. Additionally, by using a robust computer-aided analytical tool (i.e., DICTION), a number of additional variables and themes not present in the Levasseur analysis can be examined.

In order to adhere to the time frame examined by Levasseur (2005), the time frame included within this analysis coincides with the consideration and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolutions. As has been noted, the federal budget process is built around the budget resolutions. The president is required to submit a budget to Congress within 15 days of the start of the legislative session. Congress then holds hearings to evaluate the proposal. These hearings are followed by the creation of a Congressional budget resolution. A general timeline associated with the federal budget process is presented in Table 7. Generally, this analysis attempts to

examine the period from January 1 through the date the conference report was accepted. It should be noted that Congress did not complete action on a budget resolution for FY 1999.³ As a result, analysis for the year 1998 covers the period from January 1 through the initial passage of the budget resolution in the Senate, the later chamber to act on the budget. The specific timelines have been included as Table 8.

Table 7. Federal Budget Process Time Table, Fiscal Year 2003

Date	Action to Be Completed
Between the first Monday in January and the first Monday in February	President transmits the budget, including a sequester preview report
Six weeks later	Congressional committees report budget estimates to Budget Committees
April 15	Action to be completed on Congressional budget resolutions
May 15	House consideration of annual appropriation bills may begin
June 15	Action to be completed on reconciliation
June 30	Action on appropriations to be completed by House
July 15	President transmits mid-session review of the budget
August 20	OMB updates the sequester preview
October 1	Fiscal year begins
15 days after the end of a session of Congress	OMB issues final sequester report, and the president issues a sequester order, if necessary

Note: U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2002). *Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 2003: Analytical Perspectives*. Washington, DC: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, p. 434.

³ In the absence of the passage of a budget resolution, Congress passed a deeming resolution. The House agreed to H.Res. 477 on June 19, 1998 and H.Res.5 on January 6, 1999. These resolutions deemed the budget levels contained in FY1999 budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 284) generally to have been adopted by Congress for budget enforcement purposes. The Senate agreed to S. Res. 209 on April 2, 1998, and S. Res. 312 on October 21, 1998. Similarly, these resolutions deemed the budget resolutions to be enforced as if they were included in a budget resolution agreed to by Congress (Heniff and Murray, 2008).

Table 8. Timing of House Actions on Budget Resolutions.

Fiscal Year	Timing of Actions Budget Resolution and Companion Measure	Date Consideration Began	Date of Final Passage	Date Conference Report Accepted
1999	H.Con.Res. 284 S.Con.Res. 86	June 4, 1998 March 27, 1998	June 5, 1998 April 2, 1998	N/A
2000	H.Con.Res. 68 S.Con.Res.20	March 25, 1999 March 25, 1999	March 25, 1999 March 25, 1999	April 14, 1999 April 15, 1999
2001	H.Con.Res. 290 S.Con.Res. 101	March 23, 2000 April 4, 2000	March 23, 2000 April 7, 2000	April 13, 2001 April 13, 2001

Note: Heniff, B., Jr. & Murray, J. (2008). *Congressional Budget Resolutions*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Executive Data Collection

Executive communication is considered to be communication originating from President Bill Clinton, Vice-President Al Gore, Chiefs of Staff Erskine Boles and John Podesta,⁴ Directors of the Office of Management and Budget Franklin Raines and Jacob Lew,⁵ and associated subordinates (Table 9). Executive communication associated with President Clinton was gathered by searching the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents for speeches, oral statements, addresses, and interviews. For identified communication, a search for the word “budget” was conducted. Each speech, oral statement, address, or interview that included the word “budget” was included for initial analysis. Political party identification was assigned to all executive data for inclusion in the party-based comparisons.

⁴ Erskine Boles was the White House Chief of Staff from 1997-1998. He was followed by John Podesta who served from 1998 to 2001.

⁵ Franklin Raines served as the Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 1996-1998. Jacob Lew served from 1998-2001.

Table 9. Executive Data Sources

Executive Data Sources
President Vice President White House Chiefs of Staff Office of Management and Budget Officials

Communication originating from Vice-President Gore, White House Chiefs of Staff, and Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and associated subordinates were collected based upon a search the following. First, two sections of the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* titled “Digest of Other White House Announcements” and “Checklist of White House Press Releases” were searched for references to statements and speeches involving executive actors other than the president. Second, an Internet search was conducted in an effort to obtain these documents. Web sites consulted include each agency’s web site, House and Senate Budget Committee web sites, GPO Access and LexisNexis. Third, testimony of executive actors before the House and Senate Budget Committee was identified and included as executive communication. Political party identification was assigned to all executive data for inclusion in the party-based comparisons. For all executive speakers, it was noted whether the speaker was elected or appointed.

Legislature Data Collection

Legislature data is drawn from two sources: Congressional committee hearings and Congressional floor debate (Table 10). Using the Congressional Record, House and Senate Budget Committee hearings on the president’s overall budget proposal were gathered. Including hearings on individual department budgets would have varied from the original methodology (Levasseur, 2005); therefore, hearing data on specific departmental budgets were excluded. Additionally, by using the Congressional Record, the floor debate on House and Senate floor

debate on the budget resolutions were gathered. Again, this analysis was limited to only that debate surrounding the passage of the Congressional Budget Resolutions. Documents were segmented based on speaker, source (i.e., Executive, Legislature or Agency communication), electoral status and political party. Legislature communication also included communication from representatives of the Congressional Budget Office. Sixty-seven documents were included from the CBO.

Table 10. Legislative Data Sources

Legislative Data Sources
House of Representative Members
Senate Members
Congressional Budget Office Officials

Agency Data Collection

To ensure that agency views were adequately represented, this research also included agency specific communication for time periods noted previously in this work. Agency statements were drawn from the 14 executive departments in place during the Clinton Administration. Additionally, those agencies with representatives granted cabinet-level status were included. These agencies and associated secretaries are included as Table 11. Official agency statements addressing budgetary issues were compiled for inclusion in this analysis. Also, agency statements included the testimony identified during the examination of House and Senate Budget Committee hearings. Additionally, agency statements included those statements posted on agency web sites during the budget period discussed above. For each identified communication found on an agency’s web site, a search for the word “budget” was conducted. Each speech, oral statement, address, or interview that included the word “budget” was included for initial analysis.

Agency communication was segmented based on originating agency, speaker type (i.e., political appointee or career civil-service), and party. To ensure appropriate party identification, administrative biographies were obtained from multiple sources, including The Library of Congress' Thomas database as well as resources provided by the Thomas.⁶ It should be noted that President Clinton assigned one Republican cabinet member, Department of Defense Secretary William S. Cohen. With the exception of agency press office statements, agency speakers were political appointees with determinable political parties. It was assumed that, because the administration served at the will of the president, press office releases would reflect the political viewpoint of the secretary and president; therefore, press office statements were given Democratic Party assignments. Nineteen unique texts fell into this category. Table 11 provides an overview of the Cabinet Level Agencies and Secretaries for the study period.

Table 11. Cabinet Level Agencies and Secretaries for Study Period

Cabinet Departments	Secretary
State	Madeline Albright
Treasury	Lawrence Summers
Defense (DOD)	William Cohen
Department of Justice (DOJ; Attorney General)	Janet Reno
Interior	Bruce Babbitt
Agriculture (USDA)	Dan Glickman
Commerce	William Dailey
	Norman Mineta
Labor	Alexis Herman
Health and Human Services	Donna Shalala
Education (ED)	Richard Riley
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)	Andrew Cuomo

⁶ For a list of resources recommended by Thomas, please see <http://thomas.loc.gov/links/>.

Cabinet Departments	Secretary
Transportation (DOT)	Rodney Slater
Energy (DOE)	Federico Peña
	Bill Richardson
Veterans Affairs (VA)	Togo West
	Hershel Gober (Acting)
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	Carol Browner
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations ⁷	Bill Richardson
	Richard Holbrooke
Director of the National Drug Control Policy	Barry McCaffrey
U.S. Trade Representative	Charlene Barshefsky
Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)	James Lee Witt
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	George Tenet
Administrator of the Small Business Administration (SBA)	Aída Álvarez

Sample Determination

Based on the methods described above, documents containing executive, legislative, and agency communication were gathered. These documents were organized by day, speaker, source (i.e., Executive, Legislature, Agency), electoral status (elected or appointed), and party. This information was also tracked using a code sheet (see Appendix A). Missing data was assigned a unique identifier within the dataset to prevent its inclusion in the analysis. A total of 17, 286 documents were identified for initial analysis.

This analysis was dependent upon speakers' party and source affiliations. Therefore, those cases in which the speaker and/or source were unidentified or those cases in which the

⁷ The official title for this position is the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, with the rank and status of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and Representative of the United States of America in the Security Council of the United Nations (i.e., U.S. Permanent Representative).

source was not consistent with the methods described above (e.g., not-for-profit agencies, think tanks) were excluded. The elimination of these documents resulted in a total of 17,050 remaining documents.

DICTION was designed to analyze texts based on 500-word text sizes and has a special accommodation for smaller files. In order to fully exercise DICTION's analytical capabilities, long texts (e.g., speeches) were processed by averaging all 500-word units of the text within DICTION. This is the DICTION default setting and helped to ensure that the argument in question focused on budgetary issues. Likewise, to ensure that small files include arguments focused on budgetary issues as well as enough data for analysis; files containing less than 100 words were excluded. Using the size criteria that documents were equal to 100 words or greater in size, 8,523 documents were excluded from analysis.⁸ Of those, 59% were 20 words or less. The small sample word size indicates that these files represented parliamentary procedures versus significant budget discourse.

Of the remaining 8,527 documents, an additional 74 files were excluded from analysis. These files were excluded due to the way in which DICTION handled documents. The 74 documents excluded from analysis represented 0.43% of the initial 17,286 documents identified for analysis. A total of 8,453 documents remained.

In order to account more for the importance of the word "budget", and indeed the concept of the budget, within the context of the communication, for each 500-word text, a special *Budget Insistence Score* was calculated. The *Budget Insistence Score* is a unique score developed for this research project. Using Levasseur's (2005) methods for identifying executive and supplemental

⁸ Excluding files with fewer than 100 words resulted in a total of 2,841 unique texts being excluded from the analysis. Each text was processed through DICTION using the All Texts Normative Profile, political debates, and public policy debates.

agency communication, only the first ten paragraphs of each text would have been examined for use of the word “budget”. This method fails to account for the length of the communication thereby potentially introducing sampling error in the selection of salient documents.

The formula for the budget insistence score built upon DICTION’s *Insistence Score* and provided a means for identifying non-relevant communication. The *Budget Insistence Score* was calculated as follows:

$$\text{Budget Insistence Score} = \frac{\left(\frac{\text{Actual Occurences of the Word Budget}}{10} \right)}{\text{Document's Word Count}}$$

Once the *Budget Insistence Score* was calculated, the scores were arranged in quartiles. Those documents with scores falling in the lowest quartile (i.e., those documents with a budget insistence score of 0.0001 within the dataset) were excluded from analysis as it was theorized that the focus of those communications were not budget-based. Excluded from analyses were 378 files.

The resulting sample of 8,075 texts was analyzed using three DICTION normative profiles. Of the total texts, 2,695 documents were analyzed using the All Texts DICTION Normative Profile, 2,107 using the Political Debate DICTION Profile, and 2,107 using the Public Policy DICTION Profile. The All Texts analysis included 314 Executive texts; 2,091 Legislature texts; and 275 Agency texts. The breakdown of party affiliation is presented in Table 12. Additional breakdown of text sources is presented in Table 13. Although not all agencies are represented equally, there are two possibilities. First, this sample may be representative of the population. That is, some agencies may not take as active a role of the budget process or may not publicize their budget-related activities to the same degree. Secondly, the major analytical technique examined the variables as rates (via the budget insistence score which accounts for the

frequency of the occurrence of the word budget in consideration of the word budget); therefore, the relative imbalance in sample size amongst agencies does not have an adverse outcome on the results.

Table 12. Breakdown of Texts by Party Compilation

	DICTION Normative Profile		
	All Texts	Political Debate	Public Policy
All Text Sources			
Democratic Texts	1741	1747	1747
Republican Texts	937	948	948
Legislature Texts Only			
Democratic Texts	1157	1162	1162
Republican Texts	932	943	943

Table 13. Source and Classification of Agency Texts

Agency	Source Association	Number of Texts
Office of Management and Budget	Executive	374
Congressional Budget Office	Legislature	201
Central Intelligence Agency	Agency	3
Commerce Department	Agency	3
Defense Department	Agency	24
Department of Energy	Agency	3
Education Department	Agency	33
Federal Emergency Management Agency	Agency	24
General Accounting Office	Agency	9
Health and Human Services Department	Agency	66
Housing and Urban Development	Agency	354
Justice Department	Agency	30
Labor Department	Agency	24
National Drug Control Policy	Agency	27
State Department	Agency	87
Transportation Department	Agency	3
Treasury Department	Agency	132
Veterans Affairs Department	Agency	9

Summary of Variables

The following provides a summary of the variables explored through the use of DICTION. DICTION’s output includes a “normal range” that spans scores within ± 1 standard deviation of the mean of scores from the texts within the chosen normative profile. For example, the “normal range” for the *All Texts Normative Profile* (i.e., a combination of all the available profiles) is generated through the analysis of the characteristics of 22,027 texts. These texts include public speeches, poetry, newspaper editorials, music lyrics, business reports, scientific documents, television scripts, and informal telephone conversations which were produced in the United States between 1945 and 1998. The normal range was designed to compare each text and evaluate how each compares to the texts within DICTION. The DICTION output was used for statistical analyses. This research included an examination of fifteen DICTION variables (Table 14) and nine custom variables (Table 15). Additional information about DICTION has been included as Appendix C in order to fully illustrate the capabilities of this software package and justify its use for this study.

Table 14. DICTION Variables and Descriptions (Hart, 2000b)

DICTION Variable	Description
Activity	<p>A reflection of that language which features movement, change, or the implementation of ideas. The formula for the <i>Activity Score</i> is as follows:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Activity Score = (<i>Aggression + Accomplishment + Communication + Motion</i>) – (<i>Cognitive Terms + Passivity + Embellishment</i>)</p>
Blame	<p>Terms designating social inappropriateness (mean, naive, sloppy, stupid) as well as downright evil (fascist, blood-thirsty, repugnant, malicious) compose this dictionary. In addition, adjectives describing unfortunate circumstances (bankrupt, rash, morbid, embarrassing) or unplanned vicissitudes (weary, nervous, painful, detrimental) are included. The dictionary also contains outright denigrations: cruel, illegitimate, offensive, and miserly.</p>

DICTION Variable	Description
Certainty	<p>Explores language that reflects resoluteness, inflexibility, completeness, and a tendency to speak from a position of authority or rank. The formula for the <i>Certainty Score</i> is as follows:</p> <p>Certainty Score = (<i>Tenacity + Leveling + Collectives + Insistence</i>) – (<i>Numerical Terms + Ambivalence + Self Reference + Variety</i>)</p>
Commonality	<p>Language which highlights the agreed-upon values of and rejecting idiosyncratic modes of engagement. The formula for the Commonality Score is as follows:</p> <p>Commonality Score = (<i>Centrality + Cooperation + Rapport</i>) – (<i>Diversity + Exclusion + Liberation</i>)</p>
Communication	<p>Terms referring to social interaction, both face-to-face (listen, interview, read, speak) and mediated (film, videotape, telephone, e-mail). The dictionary includes both modes of intercourse (translate, quote, scripts, broadcast) and moods of intercourse (chat, declare, flatter, demand). Other terms refer to social actors (reporter, spokesperson, advocates, preacher) and a variety of social purposes (hint, rebuke, respond, persuade).</p>
Denial	<p>A dictionary consisting of standard negative contractions (aren't, shouldn't, don't), negative functions words (nor, not, nay), and terms designating null sets (nothing, nobody, none).</p>
Familiarity	<p>Consists of a selected number words that are the most common words in the English language. Included are common prepositions (across, over, through), demonstrative pronouns (this, that) and interrogative pronouns (who, what), and a variety of particles, conjunctions and connectives (a, for, so).</p>
Human Interest	<p>Includes standard personal pronouns (he, his, ourselves, them), family members and relations (cousin, wife, grandchild, uncle), and generic terms (friend, baby, human, persons) because concentrating on people and their activities gives rhetoric a life-like quality.</p>
Inspiration	<p>Abstract virtues deserving of universal respect. Most of the terms in this dictionary are nouns isolating desirable moral qualities (faith, honesty, self-sacrifice, virtue) as well as attractive personal qualities (courage, dedication, wisdom, mercy). Social and political ideals are also included: patriotism, success, education, and justice.</p>
Liberation	<p>Terms describing the maximizing of individual choice (autonomous, open-minded, options) and the rejection of social conventions (unencumbered, radical, released). Liberation is motivated by both personality factors (eccentric, impetuous, flighty) and political forces (suffrage, liberty, freedom, emancipation) and may produce dramatic outcomes (exodus, riotous, deliverance) or subdued effects (loosen, disentangle, outpouring). Liberatory terms also admit to rival characterizations: exemption vs. loophole, elope vs. abscond, uninhibited vs. outlandish.</p>

DICTION Variable	Description
Optimism Score	Represents language that supports some person, group, concept or event or highlights their positive qualities. The formula for the <i>Optimism Score</i> is as follows: Optimism Score = (Praise + Satisfaction + Inspiration) – (Blame + Hardship + Denial)
Praise	Affirmations of some person, group, or abstract entity. Included are adjectives describing important social qualities (dear, delightful, witty), physical qualities (mighty, handsome, beautiful), intellectual qualities (shrewd, bright, reasonable), entrepreneurial qualities (successful, conscientious, renowned), and moral qualities (faithful, good, noble).
Rapport	This dictionary describes attitudinal similarities among groups of people. Included are terms of affinity (congenial, camaraderie, companion), assent (approve, vouched, warrants), deference (tolerant, willing, permission), and identity (equivalent, resemble, consensus).
Realism Score	Language which describes tangible, immediate, recognizable matters that affect people’s everyday lives. The formula for the <i>Realism Score</i> is as follows: Realism Score = (Familiarity + Spatial Awareness + Temporal Awareness + Present Concern + Human Interest + Concreteness) – (Past Concern + Compexity)
Tenacity	These verbs that connote confidence and totality. This dictionary analyzes all uses of the verb “to be” (is, am, will, shall), three definitive verb forms (has, must, do) and their variants, as well as all associated contraction.

Note: Hart, R. P. (2000b). *DICTION 5.0: The text analysis program*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage-Scolari.

Table 15. Custom DICTION Variables and Descriptions

Custom DICTION Variable	Description
Budget Concepts	A custom dictionary based on Ippolito (1978). This is a list of concepts commonly associated with the budget process. Terms included are budget authority, appropriation, appropriations, cash-equivalent payments, general funds, trust funds, special funds, contract authority, borrowing authority, spending authority, controllability, outlays, tax expenditures, incremental, line-item, performance-based, zero-based budgeting, tax, spend, borrow, appropriate, off-budget, on-budget, debt, deficit.
Conservative Language Use	A custom dictionary replicating Lakoff’s 2002 list of conservative language (2006). The following words were included for analysis: <i>character, virtue,</i>

Custom DICTION Variable	Description
	<i>discipline, tough, strong, self-reliance, self-reliant, individual, responsibility, backbone, standards, authority, heritage, competition, earn, hard work, enterprise, property, reward, freedom, intrusion, interface, meddling, punishment, traditional, dependency, self-indulgent, elite, quotas, breakdown, corrupt, decay, rot, degenerate, and deviant lifestyle.</i>
Functional Budget Categories	Heniff and Murray (2008) provide a list of the functional budget categories within the federal budget. Based on that list, a custom dictionary was created. While not an exhaustive list, this grouping of primary budget categories presents an indication as to how often specific programs are referred to within federal budget communication. Terms included are: defense, military, international affairs, science, technology, natural resources, environment, agriculture, commerce, transportation, community development, regional development, education, social services, health, Medicare, Medicaid, social security, veterans, administration, justice, general government, interest, allowances, undistributed offsetting receipts.
Leader References	A custom dictionary based on Jarvis (2004) which includes references to those Members of Congress serving during from 1998 – 2000, as well as President Clinton, members of the Executive including White House staff members, Cabinet members, and Supreme Court Justices.
Liberal Language Use	A custom dictionary replicating Lakoff's 2002 list of liberal language (2006). <i>The following words were included for analysis: Social forces, expression, human rights, equal, concern, care, help, health, safety, nutrition, dignity, oppression, diversity, deprivation, alienation, corporations, corporate, welfare, ecology, ecosystem, biodiversity, and pollution.</i>
Party References	A custom dictionary comprised of variations on the terms Democratic (e.g., Dems, Democrats) and Republican (e.g., GOP).
Pessimism	A custom dictionary based on Bligh and Hess {, 2007 #454} that examines <i>Language endorsing or highlighting the negative entailments of some person, group, concept, or event</i> Pessimism is calculated as follows: <i>Pessimism = (Blame + Hardship)</i>
Public Interest	A custom calculated variable that takes incorporates DICTION variables which present public-minded values and references as well as the custom variable <i>Voter References</i> . The formula is as follows: <i>Public Interest</i> <i>= (Commonality + Cooperation + Familiarity + Realism + Human Interest + Rapport + Voter References)</i>
Voter References	Based on Jarvis (2004), <i>Voter References</i> is a custom dictionary comprised of terms representing voters and the public. Words included in this dictionary are: crowd-dwellers, classes, body-politic, constituents, constituencies, electorate, majority, citizenry, citizens, individuals, masses, population, public, voter, voters, resident, residents, taxpayer, taxpayers, and electors.

Research Limitations

The results of the present analysis must be viewed in light of certain constraints when attempting to generalize beyond the analysis dataset. As an initial effort at determining distinct agency voice in federal budget communication, this analysis was limited to committee hearings on the president's overall budget proposal as opposed to hearings on individual department budgets and was limited to debate on the Congressional Budget Resolution. By limiting the analysis to exclude appropriations discussions, the conclusions that can be made regarding the budget-maximizing and representative nature of budget positions are undoubtedly limited. For similar reasons, conclusions regarding principal-agent relationships are limited. However, this approach is consistent with Levasseur's 2005 methodology and will provide an avenue for future research. This is an area that should be examined in future research efforts. Likewise, this research also provides a new tool for examining relationships and differences in communication between members of the Executive, Legislature, and Agencies as it relates to the federal budget process.

Additionally, this research examined the budget at the point of committee and floor debate. By the time the budget reaches this level of discussion, it is possible that significant changes to the original intent of the legislation have taken place. The legislation presented in committee or on the floor of the House or Senate may no longer resemble that which was initially envisioned by agency-level administrators. However, an examination of agency original intent was beyond the scope of this current research effort.

This analysis was dependent upon the researcher's ability to identify additional agency documents that were appropriate for inclusion for analysis. Agency documents were obtained from Congressional hearing testimony and agency web site archives. Every effort was made to

thoroughly search agency web sites for appropriate documents using the criteria noted above.

While efforts were made to ensure that no agency documents were missed, searches across widespread archival resources of varying indexing are often problematic. Based on this process, it was determined that every effort was made to include potential documents. However, due to human error, documents could have potentially been excluded from analysis unintentionally. As technology becomes more robust, allowing for indexing and archival databases to better provide relevant search results, the results of this analysis may be updated, accordingly.

Computer-aided content analysis has noted disadvantages. Some noted disadvantages are (Bligh & Hess, 2007): the sterility of computer-aided content analysis may preclude creative insights or innovative breakthroughs; it is based on the assumption that higher word or phrase usage is more meaningful than less-used words or phrases; and it does not account for the fact that words are divorced from their original texts. This is also a criticism of content analysis as an approach generally. As such, content analysis can only be applied on manifest content; that is, the words, sentences, or texts themselves, rather than their meanings (Levasseur, 2005).

However, as the goal of this research was to identify the differences in communication, the benefits of the DICTION software and content analysis as an approach were determined to outweigh any disadvantages. Furthermore, this approach addresses another limitation of content analysis - its potential for coder subjectivity. Because this analysis was looking for subjective norms and characteristics, the use of DICTION ensured that each passage was coded in the same manner and thus eliminated the need for a second coder.

CHAPTER FOUR: SOURCE-BASED DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL BUDGET COMMUNICATION

This chapter explores the findings in regards to hypothesis one, which states there are source-based differences in the organizational goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for years 1998-2000. First, insights as to speakers' budget-related management goals and values will be explored. Second, the emphasis placed on public-minded goals and values will be presented. Third, possible role-based communication differences will be discussed. Each section will compare:

1. Executive versus Legislature Federal Budget Communication
2. Executive versus Agency Federal Budget Communication
3. Agency versus Legislature Federal Budget Communication

Because the objective of this research is to determine statistically significant differences or similarities in communication based on the source of the communication or political party affiliation of the speaker, Mann-Whitney *U* tests were conducted. The Mann-Whitney *U* test is a non-parametric test which is used to determine whether two populations are equal. When a Mann-Whitney *U* test is conducted, two groups are compared. First, the scores for the test variable are converted to ranks. Next, the Mann-Whitney *U* test evaluates the mean of the ranks for each of the variables (i.e., the mean rank) to see if the groups differ significantly from each other.⁹ As a non-parametric test, it is suited to analysis of the present dataset as a normal distribution of DICTION scores may not be assumed. Additionally, as compared to other non-parametric tests such as the Pearson chi-square test, Mann-Whitney *U* is preferred as it does not

⁹ <http://teorionline.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/the-mann-whitney-u-test.pdf>

hold the assumption that the analysis is conducted on frequency count data (DICTION scores may not be regarded as frequency counts). Following screening of the dataset for outliers indicative of data coding errors, the research questions were analyzed via SPSS for Windows (version 11.5). All analyses were conducted at $\alpha \leq .05$, unless otherwise specified.

Source-based Differences in the Use of Managerial Goal-Related Concepts

The first aspect of budget communication explored managerial goal-related differences in communication. Managerial goals were explored through an examination of the use of the variables *Activity*, *Realism*, *Optimism*, *Certainty*, and *Commonality*. Three hypotheses were explored to determine whether there are differences in federal budget communication that can be attributed to the speaker's source affiliation (i.e., Executive, Legislature, Agency).

Executive versus Legislature Managerial Goal-Related Concepts Findings

Hypotheses 1a explored communication differences between Executive and Legislature use of communication. When examining the differences between Executive and Legislature communication, statistically significant differences at the $p \leq .05$ level were found for the following variables: *Activity*, *Optimism*, *Certainty*, and *Commonality*. Source-based variations in the use of concepts associated with *Realism* were not statistically significant ($p > .05$ in all cases) as shown in Table 16. On average, the Executive incorporated concepts associated with *Optimism* and *Certainty* more often than Legislature. Conversely, on average, the Legislature was more likely to incorporate language corresponding with the following concepts: *Activity* and *Commonality*. Statistically significant differences are discussed below.

The results of the Mann-Whitney *U* test indicate that source-based differences between the average use of *Optimism* was statistically significant with the Executive, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Optimism* more often, $z = -5.92$, $p \leq .05$. The Executive

had an average rank of 1,419.21 while the Legislature had an average rank of 1,170.53. Additionally, source-based differences between the average use of *Certainty* was statistically significant with the Executive, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Certainty* more often, $z = -2.31, p \leq .05$. The Executive had an average rank of 1,287.26 while the Legislature had an average rank of 1058.57.

Source-based differences between the average use of *Activity* was also statistically significant with the Legislature, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Activity* more often, $z = -2.84, p \leq .05$. The Legislature had an average rank of 1,099.21 while the Executive had an average rank of 1,218.59. The Legislature (mean rank 989.44), on average, also incorporated concepts associated with *Commonality* more often $z = -2.84, p \leq .05$ than the Executive (mean rank 793.72).

Table 16. Findings for Executive versus Legislature Use of Goal-Related Concepts

Budget-Attitude Related Language	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Activity	295698.50	-2.84	0.01*	50.49	3.80	
Executive						1099.21
Legislature						1218.59
Realism	312347.00	-1.39	0.17	50.85	3.30	
Executive						1253.60
Legislature						1195.38
Optimism	260395.50	-5.92	≤0.01*	51.10	3.04	
Executive						1419.21
Legislature						1170.53
Certainty	301829.00	-2.31	0.02*	47.08	4.31	
Executive						1287.26
Legislature						1190.35
Commonality	301056.00	-2.37	0.02*	51.02	2.88	
Executive						793.72
Legislature						989.44

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Executive versus Agency Managerial Goal-Related Concepts Findings

When examining the differences between Executive and Agency communication, statistically significant differences at the $p \leq .05$ level were found for the following variables: *Activity*, *Realism*, *Optimism*, and *Commonality*. *Realism* and *Optimism* were more often associated with Executive communication, while *Activity* and *Commonality* were more often associated with Agency communication. Source-based variations in the use of concepts associated with *Certainty* were not statistically significant ($p > .05$ in all cases). A summary of the findings is presented in Table 17.

Table 17. Findings for Executive versus Agency Use of Goal-Related Concepts

Budget-Attitude Related Language	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Activity	31918.00	-5.46	≤0.01*	50.49	3.80	
Executive						259.15
Agency						335.93
Realism	23213.00	-9.69	≤0.01*	50.85	3.30	
Executive						358.57
Agency						222.41
Optimism	36907.00	-3.04	≤0.01*	51.10	3.04	
Executive						314.96
Agency						272.21
Certainty	42117.00	-0.51	0.61	47.08	4.31	
Executive						298.37
Agency						291.15
Commonality				50.80	2.81	
Executive	34398.00	-4.26	≤0.01*			267.05
Agency						326.92

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

The results of the Mann-Whitney *U* test indicate that source-based differences between the average use of *Realism* was statistically significant with the Executive, on average, incorporating *Realism*-related concepts more often, $z = -9.69$, $p \leq .05$. The Executive had an average rank of 358.57 while Agency communication had an average rank of 222.41. The Executive (mean rank 314.96), on average, also incorporated concepts associated with *Optimism* more often $z = -3.04$, $p \leq .05$ than the Agency (mean rank 272.21).

Source-based differences between the average use of *Activity* was statistically significant with Agency communication, on average, incorporating *Activity*-related concepts more often, $z = -5.46$, $p \leq .05$. Agency communication had an average rank of 335.93 while Executive communication had an average rank of 259.15. Agency communication (mean rank 326.92), on

average, also incorporated concepts associated with *Commonality* more often $z = -4.26, p \leq .05$ than Executive (mean rank 267.05).

Agency versus Legislature Managerial Goal-Related Concepts Findings

When examining the differences between Agency and Legislature communication, statistically significant differences at the $p \leq .05$ level were found for the following variables: *Activity*, *Realism*, and *Commonality*. *Realism* was more often associated with Agency communication, while *Activity* and *Commonality* were more often associated with Legislature communication. Source-based variations in the use of concepts associated with *Optimism and Certainty* were not statistically significant ($p > .05$ in all cases). A summary of the findings is presented in Table 18.

The results of the Mann-Whitney *U* test indicate that source-based differences between the average use of *Realism* was statistically significant with Agency communication, on average, incorporating *Realism*-related concepts more often, $z = -2.26, p \leq .05$. Agency communication had an average rank of 1,238.40 while Legislature communication had an average rank of 766.04. The results of the Mann-Whitney *U* test indicate that source-based differences between the average use of *Activity* was statistically significant with the Legislature, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Activity* more often, $z = -3.85, p \leq .05$. The Legislature had an average rank of 1,332.71 while Agency communication had an average rank of 1,163.88. The Legislature (mean rank 1,306.64), on average, also incorporated concepts associated with *Commonality* more often $z = -3.18, p \leq .05$ than Agency communication (mean rank 1,167.31).

Table 18. Findings for Agency versus Legislature Use of Goal-Related Concepts

Budget-Attitude Related Language	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Activity	246479.00	-3.85	≤0.01*	50.49	3.80	
Agency						1163.88
Legislature						1332.71
Realism	172710.00	-2.26	0.02*	50.85	3.30	
Agency						1238.40
Legislature						766.04
Optimism	263420.50	-1.57	0.12	51.10	3.04	
Agency						1171.98
Legislature						1271.11
Certainty	27076.10	-1.57	0.12	47.08	4.31	
Agency						1175.49
Legislature						1244.41
Commonality	253650.00	-3.18	≤0.01*	50.80	2.81	
Agency						1167.31
Legislature						1306.64

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Discussion of Source-Based Differences in Managerial Goal-Related Concepts

The findings above provide insight as to the source-based differences in goals and values presented in federal budget communication and are summarized in Table 19, Table 20, and Table 21. These findings allow one to make conclusions regarding the Hypothesis 1a, 1b, and 1c.

These hypotheses are:

- **Hypothesis 1a:** Executive communication will have a higher score on the 5 managerial-related organizational goals and variables than the Legislature.
- **Hypothesis 1b:** Executive communication will have a higher score on the 5 managerial-related organizational goals and values than the Agency.

- **Hypothesis 1c:** Agency communication will have a higher score on the 5 managerial-related organizational goals and values than the Legislature.

The first four variables, *Activity*, *Realism*, *Optimism*, and *Certainty*, were chosen because they are presumed to determine attitudes toward management processes, in general, and the federal budget specifically. Additionally, these variables provide indications of speakers' outlook toward the economy by either presenting a short-term or long-term perspective. Language reflective of increased immediacy and present concern can be considered representative of a short-term outlook, while a long-term outlook can be indicated by increased optimism. Variables representative of a short-term perspective are *Activity* and *Realism*. *Optimism* and *Certainty* are equated with a long-term perspective. The fifth variable, *Commonality*, was examined to determine whether speakers show concern for multiple groups and speak in a manner conducive to consensus building.

Table 19. Summary of Findings for Executive versus Legislature Use of Activity, Realism, Optimism, Certainty, and Commonality

Executive versus Legislature Communication		
Variable	Statistically Significant	More Often Associated with Executive or Legislature Communication
Activity	Yes, at the $p \leq .05$ level	Legislature
Realism	No	—
Optimism	Yes, at the $p \leq .05$ level	Executive
Certainty	Yes, at the $p \leq .05$ level	Executive
Commonality	Yes, at the $p \leq .05$ level	Legislature

Table 20. Summary of Findings for Executive versus Agency Use of Activity, Realism, Optimism, Certainty, and Commonality

Executive versus Agency Communication		
Variable	Statistically Significant	More Often Associated with Executive or Agency Communication
Activity	Yes, at the $p \leq .05$ level	Agency
Realism	Yes, at the $p \leq .05$ level	Executive
Optimism	Yes, at the $p \leq .05$ level	Executive
Certainty	No	—
Commonality	Yes, at the $p \leq .05$ level	Agency

Table 21. Summary of Findings for Agency versus Legislature Use of Activity, Realism, Optimism, Certainty, and Commonality

Agency versus Legislature Communication		
Variable	Statistically Significant	More Often Associated with Agency or Legislature Communication
Activity	Yes, at the $p \leq .05$ level	Legislature
Realism	Yes, at the $p \leq .05$ level	Agency
Optimism	No	—
Certainty	No	—
Commonality	Yes, at the $p \leq .05$ level	Legislature

The first variable *Activity* represents language featuring movement, change, or the implementation of ideas. While the Executive and Agencies provide input regarding funding levels and priorities, the budget process is designed with the Legislature ultimately responsible for the development and passage of the budget resolution. As such, the Legislature is required to engage one another and to make decisions regarding policy actions. On average, Legislature communication incorporated language associated with *Activity* more often than Executive or Agency communication. This could be the result of the nature of the communication being studied. Executive and Agency communication, for the most part, were made up of broader policy speeches and statements. Legislature communication, conversely, were drawn from budget committee testimony and floor debate. The nature of the legislature communication

requires that speakers made concrete decisions regarding the future direction of federal spending. As such, the incorporate of language more often associated with movement, change, and the implementation of ideas is not unexpected.

The second variable indicative of a short-term perspective is *Realism*. *Realism* was created in an attempt to tap into John Dewey's pragmatism and examines the use of language describing tangible, immediate, recognizable matters that affect people's everyday lives. Again, the findings may be the result of the nature of the communication reviewed. Broad policy speeches by the Executive and Agency leaders were often made to a specific group of constituents. When speaking with a constituent group, speakers often attempt to target their messages in order to better relate with that group. Differences in the use of Realism between the Executive and Legislature were not significant. However, the Executive, on average, was more likely to use concepts associated with *Realism* than Agency speakers, and Agency speakers, on average, were more likely to use concepts associated with *Realism* than the Legislature.

The third variable explored was *Optimism*. *Optimism* is language that endorses or highlights the positive entailments of some person, group, concept, or event. Differences in the average use of *Optimism* were statistically significant with the Executive communication on average using language associated with *Optimism* more than both Legislature and Agency communication. Again, this could be attributed to the type of communication included in this analysis. Executive communication often drew from statements President Clinton made to specific stakeholder groups. For example, communication included statements to various branches of the Democratic National Committee. Because he was rallying his base, one would expect him to use language highlighting the positive nature of the event in question, be it the

financial outlook of the nation, the policy proposal in question, or the general state of government.

The fourth variable, *Certainty*, refers to words that indicate resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness. Through politics, individuals are forced to cooperate and engage in dialogue regarding the future direction of the country. The communication used to engage in politics, employs verbal certainty. Because of the numerous ways that verbal certainty is constrained or influenced, it is not surprising that the only statistically significant finding in the use of *Certainty* was between Executive and Legislature communication. Executive communication, since it was largely directed at the President's base (i.e., those attending fundraisers or invited speaking engagements) encourages *Certainty* within communication (Hart & Childers, 2004).

An additional reason for the lack of statistically significant differences between the Executive and Agency communication and Agency and Legislature communication may be the political leadership in place, their stated goals and objectives, and the overall state of the economy. During the period in question, the Executive was headed by President Bill Clinton, a member of the Democratic Party. Both chambers of the legislature were under the control of the Republican Party. The House of Representatives was under the leadership of Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, from 1995 to 1999. Chief Deputy Dennis Hastert was ultimately chosen to replace Gingrich and served as Speaker of the House, a position he held until 2007. The House leadership included Dick Armey (Republican-TX), Dick Gephardt (Democrat-MO), John R. Kasich (Republican-OH) and John M. Spratt, Jr. (Democrat, SC).¹⁰ Senate leadership included Trent Lott (Republican-MS), Tom Daschle (Democrat-SD), Pete V. Domenici (R-NM), and

¹⁰ Kasich and Spratt were the Chair and Ranking Member, respectively, of the House Budget Committee.

Frank Lautenberg (Democrat-NJ).¹¹ President Clinton and the executive, including Vice President Gore, as well as the Congress and Republican Leadership, exhibited a dedication to goals and values associated with improving government processes. During this period, the GPRA effort was undertaken and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 was passed. The passage of the BBA 97 signified the beginning of a period of balanced budgets and budget surpluses. With the relative stability of the economy, there may have been less need for differences in verbal certainty amongst organizational speakers.

The fifth variable, *Commonality*, explores the concepts that represent agreed-upon values. One would expect that the Legislature, because it was engaged in a process that required agreement and cooperation, would be more likely to engage in language that incorporated *Commonality*. A similar assumption could be made for Agency communication drawn from budget testimony. In fact, Legislature and Agency communication both were, on average, more likely to incorporate *Commonality* than Executive communication.

Summary of Findings Comparing Source

Table 22 provides a summary of the preceding discussion. As noted, the preceding analysis allows one to make conclusions regarding the Hypothesis 1a, 1b, and 1c.

Table 22. Summary of Source-Based Managerial Goal-Related Concepts Findings

Source	Activity	Realism	Optimism	Certainty	Commonality
Executive vs. Legislature	Legislature	—	Executive	Executive	Legislature
Executive vs. Agency	Agency	Executive	Executive	Executive	Agency
Agency vs. Legislature	Legislature	Agency	—	—	Legislature

¹¹ Domenici and Lautenberg served as the Chair and Ranking Member, respectively, of the Senate Budget Committee.

Hypothesis 1a: Executive communication will have a higher score on the 5 managerial-related organizational goals and variables than the Legislature. Hypothesis 1a is rejected. Lee, Johnson, and Joyce (2004) noted that constituency differences can cause fragmentation within the budget process. Specifically, the president is more likely to have a broader policy perspective and be more concerned with government-wide issues than legislators, who have smaller constituencies to please and who, therefore, may be more likely to favor decreased spending.¹² Even though Hypothesis 1a can be rejected, there is partial support which is consistent with arguments concerning fragmentation. The Executive used values associated with *Optimism* and *Certainty* more, on average, than the Legislature. The Legislature was more likely to include values associated with *Activity* and *Commonality*. Both Executive and Legislature communication reflected short-term and long-term values in their communication.

Hypothesis 1b: Executive communication will have a higher score on the 5 managerial-related organizational goals and values than the Agency. Hypothesis 1b is rejected; however, there is partial support for the hypothesis. The Executive was more likely, on average, to incorporate values associated with *Realism*, *Optimism*, and *Certainty* than Agencies. Furthermore, as Ippolito noted: the department's perspective should not be presidential since "enforcing and articulating the president's interests and preferences is more appropriately the province of other participants in the budgetary process, particularly the OMB and other presidential advisory groups" (1978, p. 58). The findings suggest clear statistical differences in communication of the Executive and Agencies.

¹² This assumption does not hold true for spending within one's own Congressional district or for projects in which the legislator has shown specific interest. While the Legislature may favor an overall decrease in spending or budgetary cuts, this same perspective may not hold true for projects and spending that directly impact their constituents or interests.

Hypothesis 1c: Agency communication will have a higher score on the 5 managerial-related organizational goals and values than the Legislature. Hypothesis 1c is rejected. If one assumes that Agency officials, while not blindly supportive of the Executive, still represent the goals and values of the Executive, one could anticipate the Agency communication would provide similar results in comparison to Legislature communication. However, what one finds is that while the Executive used language reflecting *Optimism* and *Certainty* more than the Legislature, there is no statistical significance in the use of *Optimism* and *Certainty* between Agency and Legislature communication. Agency communication incorporated *Realism* on average more than the Legislature (which also used *Realism* less frequently than the Executive). The Legislature was more likely to integrate language of *Activity* and *Commonality*. One may assume that the lack of a clear statistically dominant Legislature or Agency perspective is a sign that agency speakers are tailoring their speech to match the goals and perspectives presented by the Legislature in an effort to maximize their own budgets.

Source-Based Differences in the Use of Public-Minded Language

The second issue explored in the content analysis was the role that the public-minded goals and values played in the federal budget decision-making process. That is, this research sought to determine if there were differences in the emphasis that different policy actors placed on the public and concerns for the public's welfare. Again, three hypotheses based upon the source of the communication were explored. Because both the Executive and Legislature are accountable through elections, the hypotheses posited that Executive and Legislature communication would incorporate public-minded language in a similar manner which would be greater than the use of these concepts within Agency communication. While Agency

representatives are answerable to their agencies constituents, they also must answer to multiple other masters, including the President and the Legislature (Rohr, 1989).

A custom variable that incorporated all DICTION variables that referenced ideas associated with a public-minded orientation as well as specific references to voters was created within DICTION and was used for these analyses. Statistically significant differences at the $p \leq .05$ level were found for comparisons of *Public Interest* use between the Executive and Agency communication and also for Agency and Legislature communication. The variation in the use of *Public Interest* between Executive and Legislature communication was not statistically significant ($p > .05$ in all cases; Table 23).

Table 23. Findings for Source-based Differences in the Use of Public-Minded Language

Public-Minded Language	Mann-Whitney U	z	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Public Interest	308003.50	-1.77	0.08	269.88	22.16	
Executive						1267.60
Legislature						1193.30
Public Interest	19820.00	-11.34	$\leq 0.01^*$	269.88	22.16	
Executive						369.38
Agency						210.07
Public Interest	156015.50	-12.35	$\leq 0.01^*$	269.88	22.16	
Agency						1246.39
Legislature						705.33

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

The results of the Mann-Whitney *U* test indicate that source-based differences between the average use of *Public Interest* was statistically significant with the Executive, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Public Interest* more often, $z = -11.34$, $p \leq .05$. The Executive had an average rank of 369.38 while Agency communication had an average rank of 210.07.

Source-based differences between the average use of *Public Interest* was statistically significant with the Legislature, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Public Interest* more often, $z = -12.35, p \leq .05$. Legislature communication had an average rank of 1,246.39 while Agency communication had an average rank of 705.33.

Discussion of Source-based Differences in the Use of Public Minded Language

Three hypotheses were posited regarding the incorporation of public minded language. Two theories can be presented in regards to the use of public-minded language. First, one can argue that because they are elected, the Executive and the Legislature will be more likely to incorporate public-minded language in their communication than Agency communication. Alternatively, the argument can be made that public administrators are working as agents, representing all citizens (Wamsley, 1990). Hence, public administrators would necessarily include language indicative of a public-minded perspective in their budget communications. The three hypotheses presented focused on the former, rather than the latter perspective. Table 24 provides a summary of the findings that will be used to inform the decision regarding the hypotheses.

Table 24. Summary of Source-based Findings for the Use of Public-Minded Language

Source	Public Interest
Executive vs. Legislature	—
Executive vs. Agency	Executive
Agency vs. Legislature	Agency

Hypothesis 1d states that Executive and Legislature communication will have no significant difference in the use of public-minded language. Hypothesis 1d is accepted. There was no statistical difference in the use of public-minded language. This finding indicates that both the Executive and the Legislature both approached the public in a similar manner.

Hypothesis 1e states that Executive communication will have a higher score on the public-minded language than Agency communication. Hypothesis 1e is accepted. Executive communication was more likely to incorporate public-minded language than Agency communication. This finding suggests support for the theory that the Executive was more likely to include public-minded communication concepts because there were election concerns. As previously noted, Executive communication often addressed specific constituent groups. As such, it is likely that such communication would necessarily include these concepts as part of the Executive's efforts to connect with constituent groups.

Hypothesis 1f states that the Legislature's communication will have a higher score on the public-minded language than Agency communication. Hypothesis 1f is rejected. While members of the Legislature no doubt act with the public in mind, Agency communication may provide greater opportunities for the inclusion of such concepts. Much of the Legislature communication, especially floor communication, is parliamentary in nature. The result is communication focused on details of legislation as opposed to communication directed at constituents. Hence, this finding may have been different if speeches Members of Congress made outside committee chambers or off the floor of the house were considered.

Source-based Differences in the Use of Role-Related Concepts

The third aspect of source-based differences in communication explored the use of role-related concepts. The literature suggests that source-based differences in federal budget communication correspond to the roles speakers play within the federal budget process. Role-related behavior is approximated through an examination of the variables *Budget Concepts* and *Functional Budget Categories*. Three hypotheses were explored:

- **Hypothesis 1g:** Executive communication will score lower on the budget concepts variable than the Legislature, but will score higher on the functional budget category variable.
- **Hypothesis 1h:** Executive and Agency communication will have no significant differences in the use of budget concepts and functional budget category variables.
- **Hypothesis 1i:** Agency communication will score lower on the budget concepts variable than the Legislature, but will score higher on the functional budget category variable.

Executive versus Legislature Role-Related Concept Findings

Statistically significant differences at the $p \leq .05$ level were found for the variables *Budget Concepts* and *Functional Budget Categories*. The results of the Mann-Whitney U test indicate that source-based differences between the average use of *Budget Concepts* was statistically significant with the Legislature, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Budget Concepts* more often, $z = -3.90, p \leq .05$. Legislature communication had an average rank of 1224.36 while Executive communication had an average rank of 1060.73. Conversely, the use of *Functional Budget Categories*, was more often, $z = -2.69, p \leq .05$, associated with Executive communication. Executive communication had an average rank of 1301.13 and Legislature communication had an average rank of 1188.26. Table 25 provides a summary of the findings for the Executive versus Legislature use of role-related concepts.

Table 25. Findings for Executive versus Legislature Use of Role-Related Concepts

Role-Related Language	Mann-Whitney U	z	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Budget Concepts	283615.50	-3.90	≤0.01*	15.83	24.31	
Executive						1060.73
Legislature						1224.36
Functional Budget Categories	297473.50	-2.69	0.01*	15.06	22.23	
Executive						1301.13
Legislature						1188.26

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Executive versus Agency Role-Related Concepts Findings

Statistically significant differences at the $p \leq .05$ level were found for the variable *Budget Concepts*. The difference in the use of *Functional Budget Categories* was not statistically significant ($p > .05$). The results of the Mann-Whitney *U* test indicate that source-based differences between the average use of *Budget Concepts* was statistically significant with the Agencies, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Budget Concepts* more often, $z = -3.10$, $p \leq .05$. Agency communication had an average rank of 318.21 while Executive communication had an average rank of 274.67. Table 26 provides a summary of the Executive versus Agency use of role-related concepts findings.

Table 26. Findings for Executive versus Agency Use of Role-Related Concepts

Role-Related Language	Mann-Whitney U	z	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Budget Concepts	36791.00	-3.10	≤0.01*	15.83	24.31	
Executive						274.67
Agency						318.21
Functional Budget Categories	39358.00	-1.85	0.06	15.06	22.23	
Executive						282.84
Agency						308.88

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Agency versus Legislature Role-Related Concepts Findings

Statistically significant differences at the $p \leq .05$ level were found for the variable *Functional Budget Categories*. The difference in the use of *Budget Concepts* was not statistically significant ($p > .05$). The results of the Mann-Whitney *U* test indicate that source-based differences between the average use of *Functional Budget Categories* was statistically significant with the Legislature, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Functional Budget Categories* more often, $z = -3.10, p \leq .05$. Legislature communication had an average rank of 1372.49 while Agency communication had an average rank of 1158.63. Table 27 provides a summary of the findings for Agency versus Legislature use of role-related concepts.

Table 27. Findings for Agency versus Legislature Use of Role-Related Concepts

Role-Related Language	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Budget Concept References	284428.00	-0.29	0.77	15.83	24.31	
Agency						1182.02
Legislature						1194.72
Functional Budget Categories	235539.50	-4.89	$\leq 0.01^*$	15.06	22.23	
Agency						1158.64
Legislature						1372.49

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Source-based Differences in the Use of Role-Related Concepts Conclusions

Budgeting role literature suggests that guardians of the federal budget (i.e., the Legislature) would favor reducing public spending, would refer more often to public deficits or debts (i.e., higher scores for budget concepts), and would refer more often to government in general as opposed to specific policy projects (i.e., lower scores for budget categories). Conversely, advocates of increased program spending (i.e. the Executive and Agencies) would favor increased public spending, refer less often to public deficits and debts (i.e., lower scores for

budget variables), and refer more often to specific policy projects than to government in general (i.e., higher scores for functional budget categories). Table 28 provides a summary of role-related communication findings.

Table 28. Summary of Source-based Differences in the Use of Role-Related Concepts Findings

Source	Budget Concept References	Budget Category References
Executive vs. Legislature	Legislature	Executive
Executive vs. Agency	Agency	—
Agency vs. Legislature	—	Legislature

Hypothesis 1g states that Executive communication will score lower on the budget concepts variable than the Legislature, but will score higher on the functional budget category variable. Based on these findings, Hypothesis 1g is accepted. The Legislature on average used language that referenced budget concepts more than the Executive, thus indicating that the Legislature was more likely to act as guardians of the budget than the Executive.

Hypothesis 1h states that Executive and Agency communication will have no significant differences in the use of budget concepts and functional budget category variables. Hypothesis 1h is rejected. While it was hypothesized that there would be no difference in the use of role-related communication, Agency communication was more likely to incorporate budget concept references than the Executive. This suggests that Agency members are more conscious of budget concepts and are more likely to reference the state of the budget than the Executive.

Hypothesis 1i states that Agency communication will score lower on the budget concepts variable than the Legislature, but will score higher on the functional budget category variable. Hypothesis 1i is rejected. The use of budget concepts in communication was not statistically different between the Agency and the Legislature. This finding suggests that both agency and legislature representatives are similarly aware of the budget challenges as hand. In regards to

budget category references, the Legislature was more likely to reference the functional budget categories. While it was hypothesized that references to the functional budget categories would be indicative of the increased spending desires associated with budget advocates, it may instead be representative of the debate that occurs during the formulation of the budget resolution.

Conclusions Regarding Source-Based Differences in Communication

This chapter has explored source-based differences in federal budget communication. A summary of the statistically significant findings is presented in Table 29. When reviewing the findings as a whole – and taking into account the variables, data, and time period analyzed - a distinct and predominant source-based perspective is not present in the federal budget communication associated with the development of the Congressional Budget Resolution. However, even though there was not a clear overarching distinct source-based perspective, for certain variables, it was possible to identify a predominant source. The Legislature appears to have a distinct perspective for the variables *Activity* and *Commonality*. In both cases, the Legislature was more likely to incorporate *Activity* and *Commonality*. For the variables, *Optimism* and *Certainty*, the Executive was more likely to incorporate those concepts. Furthermore, there was no difference in the use of those concepts between the Agency and the Legislature. Hence, it appears that the Executive voice is distinct in terms of *Optimism and Certainty*.

Table 29. Summary of Source-based Findings of Statistical Significance

Source	Activity	Realism	Optimism	Commonality	Certainty	Public Interest	Budget Concept References	Budget Category References
Executive vs. Legislature	Legislature	—	Executive	Legislature	Executive	—	Legislature	Executive
Executive vs. Agency	Agency	Executive	Executive	Agency	Executive	Executive	Agency	—
Agency vs. Legislature	Legislature	Agency	—	Legislature	—	Agency	—	Legislature

CHAPTER FIVE: PARTY-BASED DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL BUDGET COMMUNICATION

The second aspect of budget communication explored was the political party-based budget goals and values. Hypothesis 2 explored whether differences in federal budget communication could be attributed to the speaker's political affiliation (i.e., Democrat or Republican). Specifically, Hypothesis 2 states: There are political party-based differences in the goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for the years 1998-2000. Hypotheses regarding partisanship built upon previous studies. This chapter first explores party-based differences found in federal budget communication drawn from all sources (i.e., Executive, Legislature, and Agency). Additionally, this chapter explores party-based differences within Legislature-only federal budget communication.

Findings for Party-Based Differences in Federal Budget Communication for All Communication Sources

To determine party-based differences in communication, the following concepts were explored using DICTION's All Text Normative Profile: *Liberal Language Use, Conservative Language Use, Party References, Voter References, Leader References, Commonality, Familiarity, Realism, Human Interest, Rapport, Praise, Inspiration, Liberation, Tenacity, Communication, Denial, Public Interest, Blame, and Pessimism*. Mann-Whitney *U* tests were then conducted to determine statistically significant differences in party-based communication.

Statistically significant differences at the $p \leq .05$ level were found for the following variables: *Liberal Language, Conservative Language, Party References, Voter References, Leader References, Familiarity, Realism, Liberation, Tenacity, Communication, Denial, Blame,*

and *Pessimism*. Party-based variations in the use of concepts associated with *Commonality*, *Human Interest*, *Rapport*, *Praise*, *Inspiration*, and *Public Interest* were not statistically significant ($p > .05$ in all cases).

On average, Democrats incorporated the following concepts more often than Republicans: *Liberal Language*, *Conservative Language*, *Party References*, *Voter References*, *Leader References*, *Liberation*, *Blame*, and *Pessimism*. Conversely, Republicans, on average, were more likely to incorporate concepts associated with *Familiarity*, *Realism*, *Tenacity*, *Communication*, and *Denial*. Statistically significant differences are discussed below.

Party-Based Differences in the Use of Lakoff's Value Language

Hypothesis 2a (Table 30) explored the use of Lakoff's value language in federal budget communication. The results of the Mann-Whitney U test indicate that party-based differences between the average use of *Liberal Language* was statistically significant with Democrats, on average, incorporating *Liberal Language* concepts more often, $z = -5.40$, $p \leq .05$. Democrats had an average rank of 1397.98 while Republicans had an average rank of 1230.85. Democrats were also, on average, more likely, $z = -7.36$, $p \leq .05$, to incorporate *Conservative Language* concepts. The mean rank for Democrat use of *Conservative Language* was 1416.57 while the mean rank for Republican use was 1196.30. These results are summarized in Table 30.

Based on the above findings Hypotheses 2a is rejected. Hypothesis 2a states:

- Democrats will have higher scores for Lakoff's Liberal language variable than Republicans. Conversely, Republicans will have higher scores for Lakoff's Conservative language variable than Democrats.

In theory, one would expect that dominance in liberal and conservative language use would fall on party lines. However, Richardson's analysis (2006), which also used DICTION, found

support only for the use of the first half of this hypothesis – that Democrats used *Lakoff's Liberal Language* more than Republicans. Both Lakoff (2002) and Richardson (2006) note that Republicans do more than just incorporate conservative words into their communication. Republicans also use certain modes of reasoning which influence their communication, decision-making, etc. An alternative reason may be that, for the period in question, Democrats were in the minority. Because the Republicans were in control of the Legislature, Democrats may have embraced conservative language in order to increase the appeal of their ideas. Either reason for the increased use of Lakoff's Conservative Language requires an assessment of speakers' reasoning process, which is beyond the scope of this research.

Table 30. Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Lakoff's Value Language

Lakoff's Value Language	Mann-Whitney U	z	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Lakoff's Liberal Language	713851.50	-5.40	≤0.01*	5.73	9.55	
Democrat						1397.98
Republican						1230.85
Lakoff's Conservative Language	681477.00	-7.36	≤0.01*	2.30	4.30	
Democrat						1416.57
Republican						1196.30

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Party-Based Differences in the Discussion of Campaign Actors

References to campaign actors were explored to determine party-based differences which correlated with Hypothesis 2b that states:

- Democrats will have higher scores for the Campaign Actor Reference variables (i.e., Party References, Voter References, Leader References) than Republicans.

Campaign actors were broken into three categories. The first category was composed of references to the political parties. The second included references to groups of voters. The third

was comprised of references to those in leadership positions which included members of the Executive branch (e.g., the President, Vice-President, cabinet leaders), the Supreme Court, and Members of Congress. Statistically significant findings were identified for all three categories and are presented in Table 31.

Table 31. Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Discussion of Campaign Actors

Discussion of Campaign Actors	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Party References	762090.00	-3.56	≤0.01*	0.92	2.40	
Democrat						1370.27
Republican						1282.33
Voter References	735391.00	-4.56	≤0.01*	1.53	3.15	
Democrat						1385.60
Republican						1253.84
Leader References	714601.50	-5.37	≤0.01*	4.82	8.07	
Democrat						1397.55
Republican						1231.65

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

The results of the Mann-Whitney *U* tests indicate that party-based differences between the average use of *Party References* were statistically significant with Democrats, on average, incorporating the concepts more often $z = -3.56, p \leq .05$. Democrats had an average rank of 1370.27 while Republicans had an average rank of 1282.33.

Party-based differences between the average use of *Voter References* was statistically significant with Democrats, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Voter References* more often, $z = -4.56, p \leq .05$. Democrats had an average rank of 1385.60 while Republicans had an average rank of 1253.84.

Party-based differences between the average use of *Leader References* was statistically significant with Democrats, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Leader References* more often, $z = -5.37, p \leq .05$. Democrats had an average rank of 1397.55 while Republicans had an average rank of 1231.65.

The above dominant Democratic voice was consistent with previous findings for these variables. Jarvis (2004) found, through her examination of presidential campaign speeches from 1948 – 2000, that Democrats were more likely to reference campaign actors than Republicans. She theorized that campaign actor references would use nouns to bring coalitions together. Hart (2000) also posits that Democrats will have higher scores for *Leader References* and *Party References*. Hart contends that the incorporation of *Leader* and *Party References* indicates an institutional perspective.

Hypothesis 2b, which states that Democrats will have higher scores for the Campaign Actor Reference variables (i.e., Party References, Voter References, Leader References) than Republicans, is therefore accepted and extends Jarvis's (2004) findings and Hart's (2000) findings to policy process communication.

Party-Based Differences in the Use of Coalition Building Language

Using the variables *Commonality*, *Familiarity*, *Realism*, *Human Interest*, and *Rapport*, party-based differences in the use of coalition building language were explored and the findings are summarized in Table 32. Statistically significant findings, $p \leq .05$, were identified for *Familiarity* and *Realism*.

The results of the Mann-Whitney *U* test indicate that party-based differences between the average use of *Familiarity* was statistically significant with Republicans, on average,

incorporating concepts associated with *Familiarity* more often, $z = -3.43, p \leq .05$. Republicans had an average rank of 1409.37 while Democrats had an average rank of 1301.90.

Party-based differences between the average use of *Realism* was statistically significant also with Republicans, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Realism* more often, $z = -4.22, p \leq .05$. Republicans had an average rank of 1425.49 while Democrats had an average rank of 1293.22.

Table 32. Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Coalition Building Language

Coalition Building Rhetoric	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Commonality	803797.00	-0.62	0.53	50.80	2.81	
Democrat						1332.69
Republican						1352.16
Familiarity	750189.00	-3.43	$\leq 0.01^*$	132.39	16.30	
Democrat						1301.90
Republican						1409.37
Realism	735083.00	-4.22	$\leq 0.01^*$	50.85	3.30	
Democrat						1293.22
Republican						1425.49
Human Interest	787307.50	-1.49	0.14	26.51	13.35	
Democrat						1323.22
Republican						1369.76
Rapport	781122.50	-1.83	0.07	2.44	3.01	
Democrat						1359.34
Republican						1302.64

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Previous findings found that Democrats were more likely, on average, to use the variables associated with Coalition Building more than Republicans. Again, it is important to note that these findings were based on political advertisements, not policy discussions (Jarvis, 2004). Hypothesis 2c states:

- Democrats will have higher scores for the Coalition Building variables (i.e., Commonality, Familiarity, Realism, Human Interest, Rapport) than Republicans.

Hypothesis 2c is rejected. Jarvis (2004) noted that Democrats would be more likely to use coalition building language in order to motivate their internal blocs, which placed bloc membership of party membership. Conversely, Republicans, with a more unified party base, would instead focus on language associated with order, efficiency, and unity (Jarvis, 2004). This analysis revealed no difference in the use of coalition building language between Democrats and Republicans for three of the five variables. When a difference was present, Republicans, not Democrats, were more likely to incorporate coalition building language (i.e., *Familiarity*, *Realism*).

Party-Based Differences in the Use of Moral Virtues and Entrepreneurialism Language

Hypothesis 2d states: Republicans will have higher scores for the Moral Virtues and Entrepreneurialism variables (i.e., Praise, Inspiration) than Democrats. An examination of the party-based variations in the use of *Praise* and *Inspiration* were not statistically significant ($p > .05$ in all cases). Therefore, Hypothesis 2d is rejected.

Table 33. Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Moral Virtue and Entrepreneurialism Language

Moral Virtue and Entrepreneurialism Language	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Praise	792758.00	-1.20	0.23	5.03	3.97	
Democrat						1352.65
Republican						1315.06
Inspiration	815628.50	0.00	1.00	7.21	5.84	
Democrat						1339.52
Republican						1339.47

Party-Based Differences in the Use of Language Associated with Order, Efficiency, and Unity

The next variables represent concepts associated with order, efficiency, and denial. Previous research associated these concepts with Republicans (Jarvis, 2004). Subsequently, Hypothesis 2e states:

- Republicans will have higher scores for the variables associated with language of order, efficiency and unity (i.e., Liberation, Tenacity, Communication, and Denial) than Democrats.

The results of the Mann-Whitney U test indicate that party-based differences in the use of all four variables, *Liberation*, *Tenacity*, *Communication*, and *Denial*, were statistically significant, $p \leq .05$ (Table 34).

The results of the Mann-Whitney U test indicate that party-based differences between the average use of *Liberation* was statistically significant with Democrats, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Liberation* more often, $z = -2.93$, $p \leq .05$. Democrats had an average rank of 1369.77 while Republicans had an average rank of 1283.25.

Party-based differences between the average use of *Tenacity* was statistically significant with Republicans, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Tenacity* more often, $z = -4.47$, $p \leq .05$. Republicans had an average rank of 1430.48 while Democrats had an average rank of 1290.54.

Table 34. Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Language of Order, Efficiency, and Unity

Language of Order, Efficiency, and Unity	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Liberation	762952.00	-2.93	≤0.01*	1.04	1.87	
Democrat						1369.77
Republican						1283.25
Tenacity	730414.50	-4.47	≤0.01*	31.35	12.37	
Democrat						1290.54
Republican						1430.48
Communication	753571.00	-3.25	≤0.01*	8.70	6.27	
Democrat						1303.84
Republican						1405.76
Denial	723202.50	-4.85	≤0.01*	5.89	4.74	
Democrat						1286.39
Republican						1438.17

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Additionally, party-based differences between the average use of *Communication* was statistically significant with Republicans, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Communication* more often, $z = -3.25$, $p \leq .05$. Republicans had an average rank of 1405.76 while Democrats had an average rank of 1303.84.

Party-based differences between the average use of *Denial* also was statistically significant with Republicans, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Denial* more often, $z = -4.85$, $p \leq .05$. Republicans had an average rank of 1438.17 while Democrats had an average rank of 1286.39.

Hypothesis 2e is rejected. However, there is strong support for 3 of the 4 variables for Hypothesis 2e. Hypothesis 2e states:

- Republicans will have higher scores for the variables associated with language of order, efficiency and unity (i.e., *Liberation*, *Tenacity*, *Communication*, and *Denial*) than Democrats.

With the exception of the use of *Liberation*, Republicans were more likely to speak in a style that honored order, efficiency, and unity (i.e., DICTION dictionaries of *Tenacity*, *Communication*, *Denial*). While Jarvis (2004) attributed the use of order, efficiency, and unity-related communication to the result of a more ideologically aligned party, in this case (i.e. an examination of a specific management process), the Republican dominance in these areas of communication may be attributed to the fact that Republicans were in leadership positions in both the House and Senate and, as such, were responsible for ensuring that the hearings and floor debate were conducted in a manner representative of those ideals.

Party-Based Differences in the Use of Public Minded Language

Hypotheses 2f states: there will be no difference in the scores for the public minded language variable between Democrats and Republicans. This assumption was made as both parties are dependent upon electorate and its continued support in order to achieve power and influence. Party-based variations in the use of concepts associated with *Public Interest* were not statistically significant ($p > .05$; Table 35). As a result, Hypothesis 2f is accepted.

Table 35. Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Public Interest

Public Interest	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Public Interest	780436.50	-1.85	0.07	269.88	22.16	
Democrat						1319.27
Republican						1377.09

Party-Based Differences in the Use of Accusatory Language

Based on previous studies, it was theorized that accusatory language would be more frequently associated with the Republican Party (Jarvis, 2004; Bligh & Hess 2007). Specifically, Hypothesis 2g states:

- Republicans will have higher scores for the Accusatory Language variables than Democrats.

The results of the Mann-Whitney *U* test indicate that party-based differences between the average use of *Blame* was statistically significant with Democrats, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Blame* more often, $z = -3.36, p \leq .05$. Democrats had an average rank of 1374.80 while Republicans had an average rank of 1273.91.

The results of the Mann-Whitney *U* test indicate that party-based differences between the average use of *Pessimism* was statistically significant with Democrats, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Pessimism* more often, $z = -9.30, p \leq .05$. Democrats had an average rank of 1441.18 while Republicans had an average rank of 1150.57.

Table 36. Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Accusatory Language

Accusatory Language	Mann-Whitney U	z	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Blame	754201.00	-3.36	≤0.01*	1.27	1.89	
Democrat						1374.80
Republican						1273.91
Pessimism	638630.00	-9.30	≤0.01*	4.47	0.00	
Democrat						1441.18
Republican						1150.57

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

As noted, Hypothesis 2g theorized that accusatory language would be more frequently associated with the Republican Party. In addition to building on previous research, Hypothesis 2g was informed by the political climate during the time of this analysis. During the study period, the leader of the Executive, a Democrat, was under attack by the Republican-led Legislature. Impeachment proceedings were under way and it was popularly thought that communication was contentious. This hypothesis attempted to determine if that contention carried over into budget deliberations. Additionally, popular thought suggests that political debate and policy formulation within federal government is increasingly contentious and negative. When determining whether one party was more negative than another in their budget-related discourse, it can be argued that, for this period, Republicans, who were leading the impeachment effort and leading the Congress, were more likely to use negative language than Democrats. In order to accuse the Democratic leadership of wrongdoing and to sway public opinion, it was hypothesized that Republicans would necessarily include more accusatory language. However, the findings show that Democrats were more likely, on average, to use both *Pessimism* (i.e., communication endorses or highlights the negative entailments of some person, group, concept, or event (Bligh & Hess, 2007) and *Blame*. *Blame* is of particular interest when

determining the negative nature of party-based communication as the dictionary *Blame* includes language that would be detrimental to cohesion building, including:

Terms designating social inappropriateness (mean, naive, sloppy, stupid) as well as downright evil (fascist, blood-thirsty, repugnant, malicious) compose this dictionary. In addition, adjectives describing unfortunate circumstances (bankrupt, rash, morbid, embarrassing) or unplanned vicissitudes (weary, nervous, painful, detrimental) are included. The dictionary also contains outright denigrations: cruel, illegitimate, offensive, and miserly.

In this case, Democrats were more likely, on average, to including blaming and pessimistic language. Democrats may have felt the need to use negative language in an effort to deflect focus back on the Republicans. Although Hypothesis 2g is rejected, these findings suggest that there is validity to the commonly held belief the party-based communication surrounding the budget process is adversarial.

Summary of Party-Based Findings for All-Source Analysis

The purpose of this chapter was to explore political party-based differences in the goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication in order to determine whether there was support for Hypothesis 2: There are political party-based differences in the goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for the years 1998-2000. Based on a review of the statistically significant findings presented in Table 37, Hypothesis 2 is accepted. Statistically significant party-based differences existed in the use of *Liberal Language*, *Conservative Language*, *Party References*, *Voter References*, *Leader References*, *Familiarity*, *Realism*, *Liberation*, *Tenacity*, *Communication*, *Denial*, *Blame*, and *Pessimism* (Table 37). These differences in communication encompassed value language, leader references, coalition-building rhetoric, language associated with the use of order, efficiency and unity, and accusatory

language. Party-based agreement in communication existed only when using rhetoric of moral virtue and entrepreneurialism, and public mindedness (Table 38).

Table 37. Summary Comparison of Previous and Current Party-Based Findings

Variable	Previous Findings Regarding Statistical Significance	Current Findings
Lakoff's Value Language <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberal Language • Conservative Language 	Democrats —	Democrats Democrats
Discussion of Campaign Actors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Party References • Voter References • Leader References 	Democrats Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats Democrats
Coalition Building Rhetoric <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commonality • Familiarity • Realism • Human Interest • Rapport 	Democrats Democrats Democrats Democrats Democrats	— Republicans Republicans — —
Rhetoric of Moral Virtues and Entrepreneurialism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Praise • Patriotism/Religious References (Current Study Variable = Inspiration) 	Republicans Republicans	— —
Language of Order, Efficiency and Unity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberation • Tenacity • Communication • Denial 	Republicans Republicans Republicans Republicans	Democrats Republicans Republicans Republicans
Public-Mindedness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Interest 	—	—
Accusatory Language <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blame • Pessimism 	— n/a	Democrats Democrats

Table 38. Summary of Hypothesis 2 Findings

Hypothesis Two Sub-hypotheses	Accepted or Rejected
Hypothesis 2a: Democrats will have higher scores for Lakoff’s Liberal language variable than Republicans. Conversely, Republicans will have higher scores for Lakoff’s Conservative language variable than Democrats.	Rejected
Hypothesis 2b: Democrats will have higher scores for the Campaign Actor Reference variables (i.e., Party References, Voter References, Leader References) than Republicans.	Accepted
Hypothesis 2c: Democrats will have higher scores for the Coalition Building variables (i.e., Commonality, Familiarity, Realism, Human Interest, Rapport) than Republicans.	Rejected
Hypothesis 2d: Republicans will have higher scores for the Moral Virtues and Entrepreneurialism variables (i.e., Praise, Inspiration) than Democrats.	Rejected
Hypothesis 2e: Republicans will have higher scores for the variables associated with language of order, efficiency and unity (i.e., Liberation, Tenacity, Communication, and Denial) than Democrats.	Rejected
Hypothesis 2f: There will be no difference in the scores for the public-minded values variable between Democrats and Republicans.	Accepted
Hypothesis 2g: Republicans will have higher scores for the Accusatory Language variables than Democrats.	Rejected

Party-Based Differences in Legislative Communication

An analysis of Legislative-only communication was conducted to determine if the party-based differences identified in the preceding analysis of party-based differences in all-source communication (i.e., Executive, Agency, Legislature) also were present in Legislative-only communication. As noted, Legislature communication accounted for the largest number of documents analyzed (2,091). The analysis of Hypothesis 2h focused on the communication associated with members of the Legislature. Hypothesis 2h states:

- An examination of party-based differences in the goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for the years 1998-2000 for Legislature-only texts will be the same as for the all-texts analysis of party-based differences.

Again, the following concepts were explored using DICTION: *Liberal Language Use, Conservative Language Use, Party References, Voter References, Leader References, Commonality, Familiarity, Realism, Human Interest, Rapport, Praise, Inspiration, Liberation, Tenacity, Communication, Denial, Public Interest, Blame, and Pessimism*. Mann-Whitney *U* tests were then conducted to determine statistically significant differences in party-based communication.

Statistically significant differences at the $p \leq .05$ level were found for the following variables: *Liberal Language, Party References, Voter References, Realism, Tenacity, Communication, Blame, and Pessimism*. Party-based variations in the use of concepts associated with *Conservative Language, Leader References, Commonality, Familiarity, Human Interest, Rapport, Praise, Inspiration, Liberation, Denial, and Public Interest* were not statistically significant ($p > .05$ in all cases; Table 39 through Table 45).

Party-Based Differences in the Legislature's Use of Lakoff's Value Language

Hypothesis 2a stated that Democrats will have higher scores for Lakoff's Liberal Language variable than Republicans and, conversely, that Republicans will have higher scores for Lakoff's Conservative Language variable. Table 39 provides a summary of the findings for the use of Lakoff's value language by members of the Legislature. The results of the Mann-Whitney *U* test indicate that party-based differences between the average use of *Liberal Language* was statistically significant with Democrats, on average, incorporating *Liberal Language* concepts more often, $z = -2.94, p \leq .05$. Democrats had an average rank of 1079.37 while Republicans had an average rank of 1002.33. Democrats were also, on average, more likely, $z = -1.12, p \leq .05$, to incorporate *Conservative Language* concepts. The mean rank for

Democrat use of *Conservative Language* was 1057.39 while the mean rank for Republican use was 1029.61.

Table 39. Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Legislature’s Use of Lakoff’s Value Language

Lakoff’s Value Language	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	Z	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Lakoff’s Liberal Language	499395.50	-2.94	<0.01*	4.83	7.76	
Democrat						1079.37
Republican						1002.33
Lakoff’s Conservative Language	524822.50	-1.12	0.26	1.53	2.82	
Democrat						1057.39
Republican						1029.61

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

These results indicate that party-based differences in the Legislature’s use of Lakoff’s Value Language are consistent with the party-based differences found in the analysis of all-sources. Therefore, Hypothesis 2a, as it applies to legislature only communication is rejected.

Party-Based Differences in the Legislature’s Discussion of Campaign Actors

Hypothesis 2b explores references to campaign actors. Party-based differences in the Legislature’s use of *Party References* and *Voter References* were statistically significant (Table 40). The results of the Mann-Whitney *U* test indicate that party-based differences between the average use of *Party References* was statistically significant with Democrats, on average, referencing the political parties more often, $z = -7.34, p \leq .05$. Democrats had an average rank of 1116.76 while Republicans had an average rank of 955.92. Democrats were also, on average, more likely, $z = -2.33, p \leq .05$, to incorporate *Voter References*. The mean rank for Democrat use

of *Voter References* was 1070.17 while the mean rank for Republican use was 1013.75. Party-based differences within the Legislature’s use of *Leader References* were not significant, $p > .05$.

Democratic members of the Legislature’s use of *Party References* and *Voter References* are consistent with the findings with the party-based differences found within the all-source analysis. However, the all-source analysis also found a significant difference in the use of *Leader References*. This suggests that the Executive influenced the all-source party-based differences analysis. Executive communication was drawn largely from speeches and press statements. The President often acknowledged other leaders in the audience and actors in the policy process.

Hypothesis 2b states:

- Democrats will have higher scores for the Campaign Actor Reference variables (i.e., Party References, Voter References, Leader References) than Republicans.

As it applies to Legislature communication, Hypothesis 2b is rejected; however, there is strong support for two of the three variables.

Table 40. Party-Based Differences in the Legislature’s Discussion of Campaign Actors

Discussion of Campaign Actors	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Party References	456141.00	-7.34	0.00*	1.08	2.60	
Democrat						1116.76
Republican						955.92
Voter References	510039.00	-2.33	0.02*	1.37	2.81	
Democrat						1070.17
Republican						1013.75
Leader References	534015.50	-0.38	0.70	3.68	5.90	
Democrat						1049.45
Republican						1039.48

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Party-Based Differences in the Legislature's Use of Coalition Building Language

Party-based differences within the Legislature's use of coalition building language was explored by exploring the variables *Commonality*, *Familiarity*, *Realism*, *Human Interest*, and *Rapport*. The findings are presented in Table 41. Differences in the use of *Realism* was statistically significant, $z = -2.25$, $p \leq .05$. Republicans had an average rank of 1078.02 while Democrats had an average rank of 1018.40. The all-source analysis of these variables identified statistically significant differences in the use of *Familiarity* and *Realism*. Republicans were more likely to use *Familiarity* and *Realism* than Democrats. Hypothesis 2c states:

- Democrats will have higher scores for the Coalition Building variables (i.e., Commonality, Familiarity, Realism, Human Interest, Rapport) than Republicans.

Hypothesis 2, as it relates to Legislature communication, is rejected. Only the use of *Realism* was significant and Republicans, not Democrats, were more likely to incorporate *Realism* concepts.

Table 41. Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Legislature's Use of Coalition Building Language

Coalition Building Rhetoric	Mann-Whitney U	z	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Commonality	530207.50	-0.65	0.51	50.82	2.88	
Democrat						1037.26
Republican						1054.61
Familiarity	537474.50	-0.12	0.90	133.71	16.20	
Democrat						1043.54
Republican						1046.81
Realism	508386.50	-2.25	0.03*	51.07	3.28	
Democrat						1018.40
Republican						1078.02
Human Interest	528905.50	-0.75	0.45	26.81	13.16	
Democrat						1036.14
Republican						1056.00
Rapport	532646.00	-0.48	0.63	2.41	3.16	
Democrat						1050.63
Republican						1038.01

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Party-Based Differences in the Legislature's Use of Moral Virtues and Entrepreneurialism Language

Consistent with the analysis of all-source party-based differences, the Legislature's use of language associated with moral virtue and entrepreneurialism were not statistically significant ($p > .05$ in all cases). Table 42 provides a summary of the findings for the Legislature's use of *Praise* and *Inspiration*. Hypothesis 2d states: Republicans will have higher scores for the *Moral Virtues* and *Entrepreneurialism* variables (i.e., Praise, Inspiration) than Democrats. As there was not a statistically significant difference in the use of *Praise* or *Inspiration*, Hypothesis 2d as it applies to Legislature communication is rejected.

Table 42. Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Legislature's Use of Moral Virtue and Entrepreneurialism Language

Moral Virtue and Entrepreneurialism Language	Mann-Whitney U	z	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Praise	532646.00	-0.48	0.55	4.90	4.09	
Democrat						1037.94
Republican						1053.76
Inspiration	531136.00	-0.59	0.56	7.33	6.00	
Democrat						1051.94
Republican						1036.39

Party-Based Differences in the Legislature's Use of Language Associated with Order, Efficiency, and Unity

When comparing party-based differences in the Legislature's use of language associated with order, efficiency, and unity with the party-based differences within all-source analysis, noticeable differences in findings of significance were present. The all-source analysis identified statistical significance, $p \leq .05$, for *Liberation*, *Tenacity*, *Communication*, and *Denial* (Table 34). However, the analysis of the Legislature found significance, $p \leq .05$, only for *Tenacity* and *Communication* (Table 43).

Party-based differences between the average use of *Tenacity* was statistically significant with Republicans, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Tenacity* more often, $z = -2.82$, $p \leq .05$. Republicans had an average rank of 1086.41 while Democrats had an average rank of 1011.64. Additionally, party-based differences between the average use of *Communication* was statistically significant with Republicans, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Communication* more often, $z = -2.13$, $p \leq .05$. Republicans had an average rank of 1076.35 while Democrats had an average rank of 1019.75.

Table 43. Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Legislature's Use of Language of Order, Efficiency, and Unity

Language of Order, Efficiency, and Unity	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Liberation	524584.00	-1.15	0.25	0.99	1.75	
Democrat						1057.60
Republican						1029.36
Tenacity	500566.50	-2.82	0.01*	32.01	11.83	
Democrat						1011.64
Republican						1086.41
Communication	509946.50	-2.13	0.03*	8.95	6.62	
Democrat						1019.75
Republican						1076.35
Denial	534223.00	-0.36	0.72	6.43	4.86	
Democrat						1040.73
Republican						1050.30

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Hypothesis 2e as it applies to party-based differences within the Legislature is rejected.

Hypothesis 2e states:

- Republicans will have higher scores for the variables associated with language of order, efficiency and unity (i.e., Liberation, Tenacity, Communication, and Denial) than Democrats.

The all-source analysis found that Democrats were more likely, on average, to express language associated with Liberation and Republicans were more likely, on average, to express language associated with Denial.

Party-Based Differences in the Legislature’s Use of Public Minded Language

Party-based variations in the Legislature’s use of concepts associated with *Public Interest* were not statistically significant ($p > .05$; Table 44). This finding is consistent with the finding for the all-source analysis. Hypothesis 2f states:

- There will be no difference in the scores for the public-minded values variable between Democrats and Republicans.

As a result, Hypothesis 2f, as it applies to the Legislature, is accepted.

Table 44. Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Legislature’s Use of Public Minded Values

Public Interest	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Public Interest	527449.00	-0.86	0.39	271.38	21.93	
Democrat						1055.12
Republican						1032.43

Party-Based Differences in the Legislature’s Use of Accusatory Language

The results of the Mann-Whitney *U* tests indicate that party-based differences within the Legislature between the average use of *Blame* was statistically significant with Democrats, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Blame* more often, $z = -3.52$, $p \leq .05$. Democrats had an average rank of 1084.81 while Republicans had an average rank of 995.58. The results of the Mann-Whitney *U* test indicate that party-based differences between the average use of *Pessimism* was statistically significant with Democrats, on average, incorporating concepts associated with *Pessimism* more often, $z = -7.76$, $p \leq .05$. Democrats had an average rank of 1136.59 while Republicans had an average rank of 931.30 (Table 45). The all-source analysis of party-based differences found similar results, with the Democrats using *Blame* and *Pessimism* more, on average, than Republicans. These findings, while certainly illustrative of party-based

differences, also may be attributed to the majority-minority relationship between budget actors. If Republicans had been in the minority during this period as opposed to the majority, these findings may be reversed. Hypothesis 2g, which states that Republicans will have higher scores for the accusatory language variables than Democrats, is rejected as it applies to the legislature.

Table 45. Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Legislature’s Use of Accusatory Language

Accusatory Language	Mann-Whitney U	z	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Blame	493106.00	-3.52	<0.01*	1.31	1.97	
Democrat						1084.81
Republican						995.58
Pessimism	433194.00	-7.76	<0.01*	4.50	4.18	
Democrat						1136.59
Republican						931.30

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Summary of Party-Based Differences within Legislature Budget Communication

On average, Democrats in the legislature budget communications incorporated the following concepts more often than Republicans: *Liberal Language, Party References, Voter References, Blame, and Pessimism*. Conversely, Republicans, on average, were more likely to incorporate concepts associated with *Realism, Tenacity, and Communication*. Table 46 provides a summary of previous research, the research from Chapter 5 addressing Hypothesis 2, and the current chapter’s findings. When comparing the findings of the preceding section, which drew from Executive, Legislature, and Agency communication, five differences were found. In the preceding section, variations in the use of *Conservative Language, Leader References, and Liberation* were statistically significant and were more likely, on average, to be used by

Democrats. Additionally, variations in the use of *Familiarity* and *Denial* were statistically significant and were more likely, on average, to be used by Republicans.

Table 46. Summary Comparison of Previous Party-Based Findings and Current All-Source Findings with Legislature Communication Only Findings

Variable	Previous Findings Regarding Statistical Significance	All Sources Party-Based Significant Findings	Legislature-Only Party-Based Significant Findings
Lakoff's Value Language <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberal Language • Conservative Language 	Democrats —	Democrats Democrats	Democrats —
Discussion of Campaign Actors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Party References • Voter References • Leader References 	Democrats Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats —
Coalition Building Rhetoric <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commonality • Familiarity • Realism • Human Interest • Rapport 	Democrats Democrats Democrats Democrats Democrats	— Republicans Republicans — —	— — Republicans — —
Rhetoric of Moral Virtues and Entrepreneurialism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Praise • Patriotism/Religious References (Current Study Variable = Inspiration) 	Republicans Republicans	— —	— —
Language of Order, Efficiency and Unity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberation • Tenacity • Communication • Denial 	Republicans Republicans Republicans Republicans	Democrats Republicans Republicans Republicans	— Republicans Republicans —
Public-Mindedness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Interest 	—	—	—
Accusatory Language <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blame • Pessimism 	— n/a	Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats

Party-Based Differences in Federal Budget Communication Conclusions

Hypothesis 2 stated that there are political party-based differences in the goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for the years 1998-2000. This hypothesis is accepted. There were definite party-based differences present in federal budget communication. As Table 46 presents, current findings were not entirely consistent with past studies. However, it should be noted that the communication examined in previous studies, while political in nature, in large part focused on campaign-related communications. The current research examined communication associated with a management process. The nature of the budget resolution development process as a management process may require the use of communication that varies significantly from campaign-related communications.

Furthermore, the present findings support commonly held beliefs that the federal budget process is contentious and can be negative in tone. *Denial*, *Blame*, and *Pessimism* all have a negative tone associated with them. When looking at the overall party-based analysis, there were statistically significant differences in the use of these three variables. Republicans were more likely, on average, to incorporate *Denial*, and Democrats were more likely to use *Blame* and *Pessimism*. Within the Legislature only analyses, Democratic communication continued to be more likely to make use of language associated with *Blame* and *Pessimism*.

Subsequently, these findings draw attention to the significance of communication within the political process generally, and the budget process specifically. Within the budget process, the inability of the actors to reach consensus, especially within the legislature, can be seen in the number of times Congress has failed to adopt the resolution by the April 15th deadline required

by the 1974 Budget Act.¹³ During the 35 years that the congressional budget process has been in effect, Congress has completed action on the budget resolution by the deadline only six times (most recently in 2003 for the FY 2004 budget resolution). In four years, 1998 (for FY 1999), 2002 (for FY 2003), 2004 (for FY 2005) and 2006 (for FY 2007), Congress failed to adopt a resolution (Heniff and Murray, 2008). If managerial processes are to function more efficiently and effectively, party-based divisions in communication must be addressed.

¹³ Prior to 1986, the deadline was May 15.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS

This research explored federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for the years 1998-2000. The goal of the research was to explore communication differences associated with the source of the communication and the speaker’s political party affiliation. These goals led to the exploration of two hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Source-Based Differences in Budget Communication

Chapter 4 explored the source-based differences in budget communication. Included in this task was a comparison of Executive and Legislature communication, Executive and Agency Communication, and Agency and Legislature communication. This analysis resulted in findings of statistically significant source-based differences in the communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for years 1998-2000. Hypothesis 1, which states that there are source-based differences in the organizational goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for years 1998-2000, was accepted. Table 47 and Table 48 provide reviews of the findings associated with Hypothesis 1.

Table 47. Review of Source-based Findings of Statistical Significance

Source	Activity	Realism	Optimism	Commonality	Certainty	Public Interest	Budget Concept References	Budget Category References
Executive vs. Legislature	Legislature	—	Executive	Legislature	Executive	—	Legislature	Executive
Executive vs. Agency	Agency	Executive	Executive	Agency	Executive	Executive	Agency	—
Agency vs. Legislature	Legislature	Agency	—	Legislature	—	Agency	—	Legislature

Table 48. Review of Hypothesis 1 Related Findings

Hypothesis 1	Accepted or Rejected
Hypothesis 1: There are source-based differences in the organizational goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for years 1998-2000.	Accepted
Hypothesis 1a: Executive communication will have a higher score on the 5 managerial-related organizational goals and variables than the Legislature.	Rejected
Hypothesis 1b: Executive communication will have a higher score on the 5 managerial-related organizational goals and values than the Agency.	Rejected
Hypothesis 1c: Agency communication will have a higher score on the 5 managerial-related organizational goals and values than the Legislature.	Rejected
Hypothesis 1d: Executive and Legislature communication will have no significant difference in the use of public-minded language.	Accepted
Hypothesis 1e: Executive communication will have a higher score on the public-minded language than Agency communication.	Accepted
Hypothesis 1f: Legislative communication will have a higher score on the public-minded language than Agency communication	Rejected
Hypothesis 1g: Executive communication will score lower on the budget concepts variable than the Legislature, but will score higher on the functional budget category variable.	Accepted
Hypothesis 1h: Executive and Agency communication will have no significant differences in the use of budget concepts and functional budget category variables.	Rejected
Hypothesis 1i: Agency communication will score lower on the budget concepts variable than the Legislature, but will score higher on the functional budget category variable.	Accepted

While there was support for the overall hypothesis, the specified differences hypothesized for 5 of the 8 sub-hypotheses were not supported. Nonetheless, the overall findings of significance support the proposition that the budget is a fragmented process (Wildavsky, 1964, 1978, 1984; Niskanen, 1971, 1975; Ippolito, 1978; Dolan, 2002; Lee, Johnson, & Joyce, 2004; Levasseur 2005; Imbeau, 2006). Yet, as Table 47 illustrates, no one source had an overarching, dominant voice that would suggest either clear source-based leadership or deep-seated source-based divisions in ideology as expressed through budget communication. Rather, the communication surrounding the budget process demonstrated no significant difference in the use

of certain variables between sources and source-based dominance in the use of other variables. The Executive showed dominance in the use of *Optimism* and *Certainty* over the Legislature and Agencies. *Activity* and *Commonality* were used more often by the Legislature than both the Executive and Agencies. The Executive and Agencies used *Realism* and *Public Interest* more than the Legislature.

When examining these findings through the theoretical lenses presented in Chapter 2, these findings are most consistent with Ippolito's discussion. Ippolito maintained that competition existed within and between departments for available funds as administrators attempt to obtain support for the policies and interests that fall within their departments' or agencies' domains (1978). As a result, administrators face conflicting loyalties. Agency heads are political appointees and, therefore, some degree of loyalty to the president and his programs is expected. Ippolito stated that the department's perspective should not be presidential since "enforcing and articulating the president's interests and preferences is more appropriately the province of other participants in the budgetary process, particularly the OMB and other presidential advisory groups" (1978, p. 58). At the same time, agency heads have a duty to "subordinates within his department, to the interests or groups that the department serves, and to the general goals and purposes of his departments" (Ippolito 1978, p. 56). Consequently, competition exists within and between departments for available funds as administrators attempt to obtain support for the policies and interests that fall within their departments' or agencies' domains (Ippolito, 1978). As noted, tension exists within the budgeting process as agency heads balance their loyalty to the president and his agenda with those of their agency and its stakeholders. Because Agency communication was neither consistently reflective of either the Executive or the Legislature, one can conclude that the language of Agency officials within the

federal budget process reflects their attempt to balance goals and objectives. The current findings are also important because they further add to literature by providing additional support for role-based differences in federal budget communication (Wildavsky 1964, 1978, 1984; Niskanen 1971, 1975; Ippolito, 1978; Dolan 2002; Levasseur 2005; Imbeau, 2006). This literature suggests that source-based differences in federal budget communication correspond to the roles speakers play within the federal budget process.

To explore this idea, it was hypothesized that the Legislature would act as guardians of the budget and would refer more often to budget concepts associated with spending and saving strategies and less time focusing on specific budget categories. Conversely, the Executive and Agencies would refer less often to budget concepts and more often to specific policy projects than to government in general. An examination of the budget communication for the period in question found that the Legislature's communication scored higher on the budget concepts variable and lower on the functional budget category variable than both the Executive and Agencies. The statistically significant difference in communication between the Legislature and Executive communication as well as Legislature and Agency communication provides support for Wildavsky's role-based behavior in the federal budget process. However, the use of DICTION can only provide an approximation of role-based behavior. To determine the extent to which the concepts tracked by DICTION equate to role-based behavior, an in-depth contextual analysis of the budget communication for this period is necessary.

Hypothesis 2: Party-Based Differences in Budget Communication

Chapter 5 explored party-based differences in the goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for the years 1998-2000. Party-based differences were

explored in communication from all three sources (i.e., Executive, Legislature, and Agency) as well as from the Legislature alone. Table 49 provides a summary of the findings in regards to Hypothesis 2.

Table 49. Review of Hypothesis 2 Related Findings

Hypothesis 2	Accepted or Rejected
Hypothesis 2: There are political party-based differences in the goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for the years 1998-2000	Accepted
Hypothesis 2a: Democrats will have higher scores for Lakoff’s Liberal language variable than Republicans. Conversely, Republicans will have higher scores for Lakoff’s Conservative language variable than Democrats.	Rejected
Hypothesis 2b: Democrats will have higher scores for the Campaign Actor Reference variables (i.e., Party References, Voter References, Leader References) than Republicans.	Accepted
Hypothesis 2c: Democrats will have higher scores for the Coalition Building variables (i.e., Commonality, Familiarity, Realism, Human Interest, Rapport) than Republicans.	Rejected
Hypothesis 2d: Republicans will have higher scores for the Moral Virtues and Entrepreneurialism variables (i.e., Praise, Inspiration) than Democrats.	Rejected
Hypothesis 2e: Republicans will have higher scores for the variables associated with language of order, efficiency and unity (i.e., Liberation, Tenacity, Communication, and Denial) than Democrats.	Rejected
Hypothesis 2f: There will be no difference in the scores for the public-minded values variable between Democrats and Republicans.	Accepted
Hypothesis 2g: Republicans will have higher scores for the Accusatory Language variables than Democrats.	Rejected
Hypothesis 2h: An examination of party-based differences in the goals and values expressed in the federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution for the years 1998-2000 for Legislature-only texts will be the same as for the all-texts analysis of party-based differences.	Rejected

Table 50. Review of Previous Party-Based Findings and Current All-Source Findings with Legislature Communication Only Findings

Variable	Previous Findings Regarding Statistical Significance	All Sources Party-Based Significant Findings	Legislature-Only Party-Based Significant Findings
Lakoff's Value Language <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberal Language • Conservative Language 	Democrats —	Democrats Democrats	Democrats —
Discussion of Campaign Actors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Party References • Voter References • Leader References 	Democrats Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats —
Coalition Building Rhetoric <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commonality • Familiarity • Realism • Human Interest • Rapport 	Democrats Democrats Democrats Democrats Democrats	— Republicans Republicans — —	— — Republicans — —
Rhetoric of Moral Virtues and Entrepreneurialism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Praise • Patriotism/Religious References (Current Study Variable = Inspiration) 	Republicans Republicans	— —	— —
Language of Order, Efficiency and Unity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberation • Tenacity • Communication • Denial 	Republicans Republicans Republicans Republicans	Democrats Republicans Republicans Republicans	— Republicans Republicans —
Public-Mindedness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Interest 	—	—	—
Accusatory Language <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blame • Pessimism 	— n/a	Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats

Table 50 provides a comprehensive review of party-based differences in federal budget communication. When comparing the present study's DICTION findings with those of previous DICTION studies, party-based issue ownership is apparent. Democrats were more likely to use

Lakoff's Liberal Language, to discuss campaign actors (i.e., *Party References*, *Voter References*, *Leader References*), and to employ accusatory language (i.e., *Blame*, *Pessimism*). Republicans were more likely to use language associated with coalition building (i.e., *Familiarity*, *Realism*) and language of order, efficiency, and unity (i.e., *Tenacity*, *Communication*, *Denial*). The issue ownership suggests that fragmentation in the federal budget process occurs along party lines. Additionally, this fragmentation results in budget communication that is negative in tone. Republican communication was more likely, on average, to include adversarial language as exhibited through use of *Denial*. Democrats, overall, were more likely to use language associated with adversarial concepts (*Blame* and *Pessimism*). These findings add to our knowledge of party-based differences within the United States political system and, more specifically, extend the body of research associated with computer-aided content analysis, in this case DICTION (Hart & Childers, 2004; Jarvis, 2004; Richardson, 2006; Bligh & Hess, 2007).

Future Research

Several areas present themselves for further research. First, in order to follow previous data collection methods for this time period, this effort included only federal budget communication surrounding the development of the federal budget resolution. Additionally, only budget committee hearings addressing the president's budget were included. In order to obtain a richer understanding of the period in question, especially in regards to the role of administrative communication, hearings on specific agency budgets, appropriations hearings, and floor debate on appropriations bills could be included. The expanded analyses, when combined with the tracking of proposed and final spending levels for agencies represented within the analyses, would allow for more accurate assumptions regarding the budget-maximizing or representative nature of agency federal budget communication. The incorporation of additional texts may also

provide a richer pool of data for exploring Wildavsky's guardian-advocate model. Imbeau (2006) found support for this model within the Canadian system. Further analysis using DICTION would provide empirical analysis that could serve as the basis of a comparative analysis.

Second, this research examined a period of divided government. Analysis of a periods characterized by Republican control of the executive and legislature as well as Democratic control of the executive and legislature would prove insightful to see if the same trends continued. Additionally, the time period chosen for this analysis was exemplified by budget surpluses, prosperity, and peace. Examining additional time periods that are distinguished by budget constraints may present different characterizations of the source-based goals and values and also party-based goals and values present within federal budget communication.

The Role of Communication within Public Administration

While not all of the following issues were directly and empirically examined within the current research effort, they are of significance and the present work may be viewed as a preliminary view of the topics. As future research moves forth, these issues will deserve at least consideration, if not serious discussion.

Communication and Legitimacy

If public administration is to remain legitimate,¹⁴ and subsequently ethical, the field, as a whole must achieve constitutional competence.¹⁵ Of specific relevance to this discussion are the founding debates. These debates, much like political discussions today, were marked by the struggle for power and self-interest. In the book *Legitimacy in Public Administration*, O.C.

¹⁴ Legitimacy will be accepted to mean that public administration is accepted with "at least confidence and respect and at times even warmth and affection." John A. Rohr, *To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of the Administrative State* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986).

¹⁵ The term "constitutional competence" is one that I am borrowing from David H. Rosenbloom, James D. Carroll and Jonathan D. Carroll, *Constitutional Competence for Public Managers: Cases and Commentary* (U.S.A.: F.E. Peacock, Publishers, Inc., 2000).

McSwite (1997) makes a very convincing argument for the founding of the field of public administration Anti-Federalist theory. McSwite (1997) argues that public administration was born out of the desire for “good government,” government which was representative of and responsive to the wishes of the populous.

Public Interest figures prominently in ethical discussions regarding administration. For example, Stivers (2001) posits that the major ingredients of a citizenship ethic in public administration as authoritative judgment, the public interest, citizenship as education, and community. Moore (1976) argued that public sector obligations arise from three different realms which includes: 1.) respecting the processes that legitimate the actions of public officials, 2.) serving the public interest, and 3.) treating colleagues and subordinates with respect, honesty, and fairness. Governing also requires meaningful communication. As Wamsley (1996) wrote in *Refounding Democratic Public Policy*,

Governing in other words may be the ability of political elite to create circumstances that evoke the kinds of relations among citizens that ...foster conditions that ultimately permit us to discover ourselves and the meaning of our lives. Good governance should also enable us to occasionally transcend, renew or recreate ourselves independently and collectively in ways that maintain democracy while fostering human development and fulfillment (p. 369).

As Dudley (in press) notes in her discussion of dialogue within citizen forums, the voicing of dissenting opinions and disagreement are important parts of the decision process. Actors within policy discussions will understand the situation differently, prioritize different problems, include or exclude different aspects, and favor different kinds of solutions. A participatory approach results through the discussion and exploration of these differences and their consequences (Dudley, in press). These discussions illustrate the need for public administrators who are able to communicate in a manner that provides for the two-way symmetrical exchange of information with citizens.

Maintaining legitimacy within the field of public administration is an ongoing effort. While legitimacy stems from the founding debates between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists and an understanding of the constitution, if the field is to maintain that legitimacy it must continue to seek collaboration and the sharing of ideas within our political institutions. However, as this research illustrates, within our political institutions generally, and the budget specifically, there are significant source-based and party-based differences in the goals and values communicated by the actors within the federal budget process.

Communication and Governance Processes

Negative and divisive communication can have upsetting consequences for governance processes. For example, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) explored negative political communications in the form of advertising in presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional races. They found that negative advertising worked better than positive advertising, worked better for Republicans than Democrats, and for men than for women. Negative communication is not limited to political advertising. It has permeated through American society to the extent that even media coverage has taken on a negative tone. The Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism's review of media coverage John McCain and Barack Obama during the 2008 political campaign determined over half of McCain's coverage was negative and approximately one-third of Obama's coverage was negative.¹⁶

The impact of negative political communication is disconcerting. As Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) note, negative campaigning results in lowered voter turn-out – largely amongst

¹⁶ The Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism examined the tone of the media coverage of the 2008 presidential campaign for the six weeks following the conventions through the final debate. The number of negative assertions in each story were tallied to determine whether the tone was positive, negative, or inherently neutral. Negative assertions in stories had to outweigh positive assertions by a margin of at least 1.5 to 1 for the story to be deemed negative. Obama's coverage was 36% positive, 35% neutral or mixed, and 29% negative. McCain's coverage was 14% positive, 29% neutral or mixed, and 57% negative.
<http://www.journalism.org/node/13307>

independent voters who are disproportionately well educated and open minded. Increased apathy amongst independent voters has the result of political communication targeted to the remaining active base, which is often comprised of the extremists. Substantive policy discussions between policy actors become challenging as actors employ communication concepts associated with party values, negativity, or division.

Negative political communication has carried over into our governance processes. As noted, within the budget process, the inability of the actors to reach consensus is illustrated by the failure of the Congress to adopt the budget resolution by the April 15th deadline¹⁷ only six times in the 35 years the congressional budget process has been in effect (Heniff and Murray, 2008). If managerial processes are to function more efficiently and effectively, party-based divisions in communication must be addressed.

Beginning in 1994 with the return of the control of the House of Representatives to the Republican party (and the associated Contract with America) and continuing through the 2008 election of Barrack Obama and the 2010 Tea Party Protests, Americans are witnessing what can be considered the second reemergence of Anti-Federalist ideals. These milestone elections indicate that the nation is unhappy with current practices and are ready for a change. As such, the nation's leaders and the bureaucracy have attempted to make themselves appear more responsive and open to engaging discourse. A current example of this effort is the Gov 2.0¹⁸ efforts to use technology to address challenges within our society and to make government more accessible. Obtaining a more complete awareness of the communication associated with governance

¹⁷ Prior to 1986, the deadline was May 15.

¹⁸ For additional information about Gov 2.0, see the December, 23, 2008, White Paper prepared by USA.gov titled "Social Media and the Federal Government: Perceived and Real Barriers and Potential Solutions" online at http://www.usa.gov/webcontent/documents/SocialMediaFed%20Govt_BarriersPotentialSolutions.pdf

processes will allow public administrators to better understand and the issues and challenges facing the field of public administration as it continues into the 21st Century.

As noted in the introduction to this effort, the “budget is a powerful symbol in society and the budget process is an important institution – a political institution providing crucial legitimate authority for our societal structure, for our government and governing process” (Miller & Wamsley, 1999). Clay (1996) noted, “management processes in government agencies are important not only for the end products and finite decisions they produce (e.g. a budget document), but also for enabling agencies to interact with their interested publics, make sense of institutional and environmental forces, marshal resources, and serve the public interest.” These public-institutional processes play an essential role in the democratic process and provide a sense of stability for those people involved by allowing for the development of shared understandings.

Clay (1994) presented the concept of the budget process as a public-institutional process that allows for institutional sensemaking. She writes that the budget process is one of the management processes of government, like personnel management, that characterizes public administration. She characterizes this process as having regularity, cycles of activity, interaction, and an outcome orientation. The regularized pattern of social interaction provides policy makers with cognitive structures for making sense or interpreting the meaning of events and situations (Berger and Luckman, 1967; Weick, 1979). Further, the budget is a symbol. For example, an increasing budget can represent an agency’s power and importance and can enhance an agency’s legitimacy. Public-institutional processes and symbols serve as an important stabilizing and legitimizing vehicle for guiding organizational and individual behavior and for coping with environmental instability and ambiguity. However, the stabilizing ability of public institutions is in jeopardy due to poor communication.

Brock, Huglen, Klumpp, and Howell (2005) note the significant role that language plays within a democracy. Specifically, they draw attention to the detrimental effects of poor political communication that results with neither political party able to create the consensus necessary for policy implementation. Additionally, they posit that the current lack of coherence, context, and predictability within discourse results in language that distances citizens from engaging with one another and prevents the debates and discussions essential for a democratic process (Brock, Huglen, Klumpp, & Howell, 2005). The resulting system is one lacking connection among ideology, language, and action. Moreover, it is one marked by gridlock without the ability to address the major issues clearly and effectively (Brock, Huglen, Klumpp, & Howell, 2005).

If it is possible to gain a better understanding how actors within this key process communicate, we will be better equipped to engage each other in an honest dialogue and debate that facilitates agreement and understanding. Until source-based and party-based communication barriers have been broken down, the negative tenor in political communication and the public's apathy and frustration towards the political process will continue.

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APPENDIX A: CODE SHEET

Code Sheet for Demographic Data/Party Affiliation

Document Number: _____ Document Date: _____

Document _____ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents

Source: _____

_____ Congressional Register

Agency Web Site

Speaker: _____

President

_____ President's Representative:

Identify: _____

_____ Member of Congress

Identify: _____

House or Senate: _____

Party Affiliation: _____

State: _____

_____ Agency Representative

Identify: _____

Agency: _____ Agency Type:

Regulatory/Service

Political Appointee (yes/no): _____

_____ Other

Identify: _____

APPENDIX B: NORMATIVE PROFILE ANALYSIS

The purpose of Appendix B is to explore the operational alternatives that DICTION provides. The DICTION software functions by comparing each text to a database of previously analyzed texts, thus each passage is located in a semantic space in a precise manner (i.e., the use of normative profiles). The use of normative profiles allows each text to be placed within the context of a broader range of previously analyzed documents based on the source and type of communication. Using alternate normative profiles will demonstrate the opportunities for exploration that computer-aided content analysis provides. Additionally, by exploring the results through the lenses of varying normative profiles, one can better understand the precision of the content analysis findings. That is, repeated analysis of the same texts will determine how precise DICTION is at revealing nuanced differences in findings based on normative values.

Table 51. Hypothesis 3 Variables

Independent Variable	Dependent Variables	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political Party <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Democrat b. Republican 2. DICTION Normative Profile <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. All Texts Normative Profile b. Political Debate Normative Profile c. Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lakoff's Value Language <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Liberal Language b. Conservative Language 2. Discussion of Campaign Actors <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Party References b. Voter References c. Leader References 3. Coalition Building Rhetoric <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Commonality b. Familiarity c. Realism d. Human Interest e. Rapport 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Moral Virtue and Entrepreneurialism Rhetoric <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Praise b. Inspiration 5. Language of Order, Efficiency, and Unity <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Liberation b. Tenacity c. Communication d. Denial 6. Accusatory Language <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Blame b. Pessimism 7. Public Interest

Effects of DICTION Normative Profile Selection on Party-Based Communication Findings

To examine budget communication with greater specificity, two normative profiles were drawn from the Politics grouping of normative profiles. The Political Debate Normative Profile was created using the communication from all presidential debates from 1960 through 1996.¹⁹ The Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile was based on speeches delivered by sitting presidents from Harry Truman through Bill Clinton. These normative profiles were chosen as it was thought that they would best represent Rohr's regime values (1989, 1998). As Rohr notes, regime values represent the fundamental principles of the polity, which should guide administrative behavior when the law does not provide guidance or when faced with administrative discretion. Specific regime values include freedom, equality, and property (1998, p. 1929). The use of DICTION's Political Debate Normative Profile and Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile provided additional insight regarding the use of *Public Interest*. Republicans were more likely to include *Public Interest* concepts than Democrats. A review of the sources of documents indicates that Republican communication was drawn from the Legislature, while the Executive and Agency communication was Democratic.

Political Debate Normative Profile Analysis of Party-Based Communication Differences

Using the Political Debate Normative Profile, statistically significant differences at the $p \leq .05$ level were found for the following variables: *Liberal Language*, *Conservative Language*, *Voter References*, *Leader References*, *Familiarity*, *Realism*, *Liberation*, *Tenacity*, *Communication*, *Denial*, *Public Interest Blame*, and *Pessimism*. Party-based variations in the use of concepts associated with *Party References*, *Commonality*, *Human Interest*, *Rapport*, *Praise*, *Inspiration*, were not statistically significant ($p > .05$ in all cases).

¹⁹ Debate transcripts were segmented by speaker and analyzed separately.

On average, Democrats incorporated the following concepts more often than Republicans: *Liberal Language, Conservative Language, Voter References, Leader References, Liberation, Blame, and Pessimism*. Conversely, Republicans, on average, were more likely to incorporate concepts associated with *Familiarity, Realism, Tenacity, Communication, Denial, and Public Interest* (Table 52 through Table 58).

Table 52. Political Debate Normative Profile Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Lakoff's Value Language

Lakoff's Value Language	Mann-Whitney U	z	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Lakoff's Liberal Language	756577.50	-3.77	<0.01*	5.40	9.33	
Democrat						1388.93
Republican						1272.58
Lakoff's Conservative Language	710791.50	-6.44	<0.01*	2.17	4.20	
Democrat						1415.14
Republican						1224.28

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Table 53. Political Debate Normative Profile Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Discussion of Campaign Actors

Discussion of Campaign Actors	Mann-Whitney U	z	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Party References	806643.50	-1.42	0.16	0.89	2.38	
Democrat						1360.27
Republican						1325.39
Voter References	757489.50	-4.01	<0.01*	1.44	3.10	
Democrat						1388.41
Republican						1273.54
Leader References	712374.50	-6.12	<0.01*	4.59	8.03	
Democrat						1414.23
Republican						1225.95

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Table 54. Political Debate Normative Profile Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Coalition Building Language

Coalition Building Rhetoric	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Commonality	822392.00	-0.30	0.77	51.42	2.75	
Democrat						1351.25
Republican						1342.00
Familiarity	758782.50	-3.59	<0.01*	132.41	16.27	
Democrat						1308.33
Republican						1421.10
Realism	720454.50	-5.58	<0.01*	50.00	3.29	
Democrat						1286.40
Republican						1461.53
Human Interest	798705.50	-1.52	0.13	26.55	13.36	
Democrat						1331.19
Republican						1378.98
Rapport	798658.50	-1.54	0.12	2.46	3.05	
Democrat						1364.84
Republican						1316.97

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Table 55. Political Debate Normative Profile Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Moral Virtue and Entrepreneurialism Language

Moral Virtue and Entrepreneurialism Language	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Praise	802349.50	-1.33	0.18	5.03	3.97	
Democrat						1362.73
Republican						1320.86
Inspiration	825652.50	-0.13	0.90	7.19	5.84	
Democrat						1349.39
Republican						1345.44

Table 56. Political Debate Normative Profile Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Language of Order, Efficiency, and Unity

Language of Order, Efficiency, and Unity	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Liberation	776790.50	-2.82	0.01*	1.05	1.89	
Democrat						1377.36
Republican						1293.90
Tenacity	741593.00	-4.48	<0.01*	31.38	12.35	
Democrat						1298.50
Republican						1439.23
Communication	761719.00	-3.44	<0.01*	8.71	6.27	
Democrat						1310.02
Republican						1418.00
Denial	733578.50	-4.90	<0.01*	5.90	4.73	
Democrat						1293.91
Republican						1447.68

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Table 57. Political Debate Normative Profile Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Public Interest

Public Interest	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Public Interest	786444.00	-2.16	0.03*	269.64	22.28	
Democrat						1324.17
Republican						1391.92

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Table 58. Political Debate Normative Profile Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Accusatory Language

Accusatory Language	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Blame	764209.00	-3.46	<0.01*	1.26	1.89	
Democrat						1384.56
Republican						1280.63
Pessimism	644057.50	-9.56	<0.01*	4.75	4.47	
Democrat						1453.34
Republican						1153.89

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Comparison of Political Debate Normative Profile Analysis and All Texts Normative Profile Findings

Table 59 presents a comparison of the statistically significant findings for the Political Debate Normative Profile and the All Texts Normative Profile. When comparing the findings for the two profiles, there were variations in two of the findings. First, when using the All Texts Normative Profile, the incorporation of *Party References* was statistically significant with Democrats, on average, more likely to make party references than Republicans. However, the party-based differences in the use of *Party References* were not statistically significant when analyses were conducted using the Political Debate Normative Profile. Second, while statistically significant party-based differences in the use of *Public Interest* was absent using the All Texts Normative Profile, the Political Debate Normative Profile findings revealed statistically significant findings regarding party-based differences in the use of *Public Interest*.

Table 59. Comparison of Political Debate Normative Profile and All Texts Normative Profiles Findings

Variable	Political Debate Normative Profile	All Texts Normative Profile
Lakoff's Value Language <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberal Language • Conservative Language 	Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats
Discussion of Campaign Actors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Party References • Voter References • Leader References 	— Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats Democrats
Coalition Building Rhetoric <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commonality • Familiarity • Realism • Human Interest • Rapport 	— Republicans Republicans — —	— Republicans Republicans — —
Rhetoric of Moral Virtues and Entrepreneurialism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Praise • Patriotism/Religious References (Current Study Variable = Inspiration) 	— —	— —
Language of Order, Efficiency and Unity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberation • Tenacity • Communication • Denial 	Democrats Republicans Republicans Republicans	Democrats Republicans Republicans Republicans
Public-Mindedness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Interest 	Republicans	—
Accusatory Language <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blame • Pessimism 	Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats

Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile Political Party-Based Goals and Values

Party-based differences were also explored using DICTION's Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile and Mann-Whitney *U* tests for analyses: *Liberal Language, Conservative Language, Voter References, Leader References, Familiarity, Realism, Liberation, Tenacity, Communication, Denial, Public Interest Blame, and Pessimism*. Party-based variations in the use

of concepts associated with *Party References*, *Commonality*, *Human Interest*, *Rapport*, *Praise*, *Inspiration*, were not statistically significant ($p > .05$ in all cases).

On average, Democrats incorporated the following concepts more often than Republicans: *Liberal Language*, *Conservative Language*, *Voter References*, *Leader References*, *Liberation*, *Blame*, and *Pessimism*. Conversely, Republicans, on average, were more likely to incorporate concepts associated with *Familiarity*, *Realism*, *Tenacity*, *Communication*, *Denial*, and *Public Interest* (Table 60 through Table 66).

Table 60. Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Lakoff's Value Language

Lakoff's Value Language	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Lakoff's Liberal Language	756508.50	-3.77	<0.01*	5.41	9.33	
Democrat						1388.97
Republican						1272.50
Lakoff's Conservative Language	712831.50	-6.33	<0.01*	2.17	4.20	
Democrat						1413.97
Republican						1226.43

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Table 61. Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Discussion of Campaign Actors

Discussion of Campaign Actors	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Party References	806643.50	-1.42	0.16	0.89	2.38	
Democrat						1360.27
Republican						1325.39
Voter References	759607.50	-3.89	<0.01*	1.44	3.10	
Democrat						1387.19
Republican						1275.77
Leader References	710968.50	-6.19	<0.01*	4.60	8.03	
Democrat						1415.03
Republican						1224.47

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Table 62. Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Coalition Building Language

Coalition Building Rhetoric	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Commonality	809966.00	-0.94	0.35	3.04	31.31	
Democrat						1337.63
Republican						1367.11
Familiarity	758782.50	-3.59	<0.01*	132.41	16.27	
Democrat						1308.33
Republican						1421.10
Realism	735423.50	-3.59	<0.01*	50.01	3.46	
Democrat						1294.96
Republican						1445.74
Human Interest	798705.50	-1.52	0.13	26.55	13.36	
Democrat						1331.19
Republican						1378.98
Rapport	798658.50	-1.54	0.12	2.46	3.05	
Democrat						1364.84
Republican						1316.97

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Table 63. Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Moral Virtue and Entrepreneurialism Language

Moral Virtue and Entrepreneurialism Language	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Praise	802349.50	-1.33	0.18	5.03	3.97	
Democrat						1362.73
Republican						1320.86
Inspiration	825652.50	-0.13	0.90	7.19	5.84	
Democrat						1349.39
Republican						1345.44

Table 64. Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Language of Order, Efficiency, and Unity

Language of Order, Efficiency, and Unity	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Liberation	776790.50	-2.82	0.01*	1.05	1.89	
Democrat						1377.36
Republican						1293.90
Tenacity	741593.00	-4.48	<0.01*	31.38	12.35	
Democrat						1298.50
Republican						1439.23
Communication	761719.00	-3.44	<0.01*	8.71	6.27	
Democrat						1310.02
Republican						1418.00
Denial	733578.50	-4.90	<0.01*	5.90	4.73	
Democrat						1293.91
Republican						1447.68

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Table 65. Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Public Interest

Public Interest	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Public Interest	784772.00	-2.25	0.03*	269.08	22.46	
Democrat						1323.21
Republican						1393.68

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Table 66. Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile Findings for Party-Based Differences in the Use of Accusatory Language

Accusatory Language	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	<i>z</i>	Asymp. Sig. 2-Tailed	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Rank
Blame	764209.00	-3.46	<0.01*	1.26	1.89	
Democrat						1384.56
Republican						1280.63
Pessimism	644057.50	-9.56	<0.01*	4.75	4.47	
Democrat						1453.34
Republican						1153.89

Note: * Denotes significance at the $p \leq .05$ level

Comparison of Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile Analysis and All Texts Normative Profile Findings

Table 67 presents a comparison of the statistically significant findings for the Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile and the All Texts Normative Profile. The comparison revealed the same finds as for the use of the Political Debate Normative Profile. The party-based differences in the use of *Party References* were not statistically significant when analyses were conducted using the Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile. Also, the Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile analyses identified a statistically significant party-based difference in the use of *Public Interest* with Republicans more likely to include language addressing the public.

Table 67. Comparison of Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile and All Texts Normative Profile Findings

Variable	Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile	All Texts Normative Profile
Lakoff's Value Language <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberal Language • Conservative Language 	Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats
Discussion of Campaign Actors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Party References • Voter References • Leader References 	— Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats Democrats
Coalition Building Rhetoric <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commonality • Familiarity • Realism • Human Interest • Rapport 	— Republicans Republicans — —	— Republicans Republicans — —
Rhetoric of Moral Virtues and Entrepreneurialism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Praise • Patriotism/Religious References (Current Study Variable = Inspiration) 	— —	— —
Language of Order, Efficiency and Unity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberation • Tenacity • Communication • Denial 	Democrats Republicans Republicans Republicans	Democrats Republicans Republicans Republicans
Public-Mindedness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Interest 	Republicans	—
Accusatory Language <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blame • Pessimism 	Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats

Conclusions Regarding the Use of Alternative Normative Profiles

The purpose of exploring party-based differences in political communication through the lens of alternate normative profiles was to determine whether different findings of statistical significance would be revealed. Table 68 provides a side-by-side comparison of previous research efforts findings regarding party-based differences, findings associated with the All

Texts Normative Profile, the Political Debate Normative Profile, and the Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile.

Table 68. Comparison of Statistically Significant Findings of Party-Based Differences for Previous Studies, All-Texts Normative Profile, Political Debate Normative Profile, and Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile

Variable	Previous Findings Regarding Statistical Significance	All Texts Normative Profile	Political Debate Normative Profile	Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile
Lakoff's Value Language <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberal Language • Conservative Language 	Democrats —	Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats
Discussion of Campaign Actors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Party References • Voter References • Leader References 	Democrats Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats Democrats	— Democrats Democrats	— Democrats Democrats
Coalition Building Rhetoric <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commonality • Familiarity • Realism • Human Interest • Rapport 	Democrats Democrats Democrats Democrats Democrats	— Republicans Republicans — —	— Republicans Republicans — —	— Republicans Republicans — —
Rhetoric of Moral Virtues and Entrepreneurialism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Praise • Patriotism/Religious References (Current Study Variable = Inspiration) 	Republicans Republicans	— —	— —	— —
Language of Order, Efficiency and Unity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberation • Tenacity • Communication • Denial 	Republicans Republicans Republicans Republicans	Democrats Republicans Republicans Republicans	Democrats Republicans Republicans Republicans	Democrats Republicans Republicans Republicans
Public-Mindedness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Interest 	—	—	Republicans	Republicans
Accusatory Language <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blame • Pessimism 	— n/a	Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats	Democrats Democrats

Focusing on the analyses conducted in the present study, only two differences in findings of statistical significance occur. First, using the All Texts Normative Profile, the incorporation of *Party References* was statistically significant with Democrats, on average, more likely to make party references than Republicans. However, the party-based differences in the use of *Party References* were not statistically significant when analyses were conducted using the Political Debate Normative Profile or the Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile. Second, while statistically significant party-based differences in the use of *Public Interest* was absent using the All Texts Normative Profile, both the Political Debate Normative Profile and the Public Policy Speeches Normative Profile revealed statistically significant findings regarding party-based differences in the use of *Public Interest*. Both political-based normative profiles indicated that, on average, Republicans were more likely than Democrats to incorporate *Public Interest* in their budget-related communication.

Although the findings that resulted from the use of the Political Debate and Public Policy Speeches Normative Profiles resulted in different findings of statistical significance than the All Text Normative Profile analyses, these findings were minor. Differences in findings of statistical significance occurred for two out of nineteen variables. While these findings provided insight as to the potential use of *Public Interest*, overall, the findings suggests that the budget process is equally well described using the All Text Normative Profile. The All Text Normative Profile includes, among others, business, corporate, financial, legal, problem-solving, journalism, and political reporting profiles. The complexity of the budget process may require considerations that are not fully recognized in normative profiles associated with political debates or public policy debates, especially when the debates are based upon presidential candidate debates or policy speeches delivered by sitting presidents.

APPENDIX C: DICTION DICTONARY AND SCORE DESCRIPTIONS (HART, 2000B)

- ACCOMPLISHMENT:** Words that express completion of tasks (establish, finish, influence, proceed) and organized human behavior (motivated, influence, leader, manage). Includes capitalistic terms (buy, produce, sell), words related to expansion (grow, increase, generate, construction) and general functionality (handling, strengthen, succeed) and programmatic language (agenda, enacted, working, leadership).
- AGGRESSION:** Words that highlight competition and forceful action. This includes physical energy (blast, crash, collide), domination (conquest, attacking, dictatorships, violation), words associated with personal triumph (mastered, rambunctious, pushy), excess human energy (prod, poke, pound, shove), disassembly (dismantle, demolish, overturn, veto) and resistance (prevent, reduce, defend, curbed) are included.
- AMBIVALENCE:** Words expressing hesitation or uncertainty, implying a speaker's inability or unwillingness to commit to the verbalization being made. Included are hedges (allegedly, perhaps, might), statements of inexactness (almost, approximate, vague, somewhere) and confusion (baffled, puzzling, hesitate). Also included are words of restrained possibility (could, would) and mystery (dilemma, guess, suppose, seems).
- BLAME:** Terms designating social inappropriateness (mean, naive, sloppy, stupid) as well as downright evil (fascist, blood-thirsty, repugnant, malicious) compose this dictionary. In addition, adjectives describing unfortunate circumstances (bankrupt, rash, morbid, embarrassing) or unplanned vicissitudes (weary, nervous, painful, detrimental) are included. The dictionary also contains outright denigrations: cruel, illegitimate, offensive, and miserly.
- CENTRALITY:** Terms denoting institutional regularities and/or substantive agreement on core values. Included are indigenous terms (native, basic, innate) and designations of legitimacy (orthodox, decorum, constitutional, ratified), systematicity (paradigm, bureaucratic, ritualistic), and typicality (standardized, matter-of-fact, regularity). Also included are terms of congruence (conformity, mandate, unanimous), predictability (expected, continuity, reliable), and universality (womankind, perennial, landmarks).
- COGNITIVE TERMS:** Words referring to cerebral processes, both functional and imaginative. Included are modes of discovery (learn, deliberate, consider, compare) and domains of study (biology, psychology, logic, economics). The dictionary includes mental challenges (question, forget, re-examine, paradoxes), institutional learning practices (graduation, teaching, classrooms), as well as three forms of intellection: intuitional (invent, perceive, speculate, interpret), rationalistic (estimate, examine, reasonable, strategies), and calculative (diagnose, analyze, software, fact-finding).
- COLLECTIVES:** Singular nouns connoting plurality that function to decrease specificity. These words reflect a dependence on categorical modes of thought. Included are social groupings (crowd, choir, team, humanity), task groups (army, congress, legislature, staff) and geographical entities (county, world, kingdom, republic).
- COMMUNICATION:** Terms referring to social interaction, both face-to-face (listen, interview, read, speak) and mediated (film, videotape, telephone, e-mail). The dictionary includes both modes of intercourse (translate, quote, scripts, broadcast) and moods of intercourse (chat, declare, flatter, demand). Other terms refer to social actors (reporter, spokesperson, advocates, preacher) and a variety of social purposes (hint, rebuke, respond, persuade).
- COMPLEXITY:** A simple measure of the average number of characters-per-word in a given

input file. Based on the idea that convoluted phrasings can make ideas abstract and implications unclear.

CONCRETENESS: A large dictionary possessing no thematic unity other than tangibility and materiality. Included are sociological units (peasants, African-Americans, Catholics), occupational groups (carpenter, manufacturer, policewoman), and political alignments (Communists, congressman, Europeans). Also incorporated are physical structures (courthouse, temple, store), forms of diversion (television, football, cd-rom), terms of accountancy (mortgage, wages, finances), and modes of transportation (airplane, ship, bicycle). In addition, the dictionary includes body parts (stomach, eyes, lips), articles of clothing (slacks, pants, shirt), household animals (cat, insects, horse) and foodstuffs (wine, grain, sugar), and general elements of nature (oil, silk, sand).

COOPERATION: Terms designating behavioral interactions among people that often result in a group product. Included are designations of formal work relations (unions, schoolmates, caucus) and informal associations (chum, partner, cronies) to more intimate interactions (sisterhood, friendship, comrade). Also included are neutral interactions (consolidate, mediate, alignment), job-related tasks (network, detente, exchange), personal involvement (teamwork, sharing, contribute), and self-denial (public-spirited, care-taking, self-sacrifice).

DENIAL: A dictionary consisting of standard negative contractions (aren't, shouldn't, don't), negative function words (nor, not, nay), and terms designating null sets (nothing, nobody, none).

DIVERSITY: Words describing individuals or groups of individuals differing from the norm. Such distinctiveness may be comparatively neutral (inconsistent, contrasting, non-conformist) but it can also be positive (exceptional, unique, individualistic) and negative (illegitimate, rabble-rouser, extremist). Functionally, heterogeneity may be an asset (far-flung, dispersed, diffuse) or a liability (factionalism, deviancy, quirky) as can its characterizations: rare vs. queer, variety vs. jumble, distinctive vs. disobedient.

EMBELLISHMENT: A selective ratio of adjectives to verbs. Embellishment is calculated according to the following formula: $[\text{Praise} + \text{Blame} + 1] \div [\text{Present Concern} + \text{Past Concern} + 1]$

EXCLUSION: A dictionary describing the sources and effects of social isolation. Such seclusion can be phrased passively (displaced, sequestered) as well as positively (self-contained, self-sufficient) and negatively (outlaws, repudiated). Moreover, it can result from voluntary forces (secede, privacy) and involuntary forces (ostracize, forsake, discriminate) and from both personality factors (small-mindedness, loneliness) and political factors (right-wingers, nihilism). Exclusion is often a dialectical concept: hermit vs. derelict, refugee vs. pariah, discard vs. spurn).

FAMILIARITY: Consists of a selected number words that are the most common words in the English language. Included are common prepositions (across, over, through), demonstrative pronouns (this, that) and interrogative pronouns (who, what), and a variety of particles, conjunctions and connectives (a, for, so).

HARDSHIP: This dictionary contains natural disasters (earthquake, starvation, tornado, pollution), hostile actions (killers, bankruptcy, enemies, vices) and censurable human behavior (infidelity, despots, betrayal). It also includes unsavory political outcomes (injustice, slavery, exploitation, rebellion) as well as normal human fears (grief, unemployment, died, apprehension) and in capacities (error, cop-outs, weakness).

HUMAN INTEREST: Includes standard personal pronouns (he, his, ourselves, them), family members and relations (cousin, wife, grandchild, uncle), and generic terms (friend, baby, human, persons) because concentrating on people and their activities gives rhetoric a life-like quality.

INSISTENCE: A measure of the repetition of key terms that may indicate a preference for presented a limited or ordered view. All words occurring three or more times that function as nouns or noun-derived adjectives are identified and the following calculation performed: [Number of Eligible Words x Sum of their Occurrences] ÷

INSPIRATION: Abstract virtues deserving of universal respect. Most of the terms in this dictionary are nouns isolating desirable moral qualities (faith, honesty, self-sacrifice, virtue) as well as attractive personal qualities (courage, dedication, wisdom, mercy). Social and political ideals are also included: patriotism, success, education, and justice.

LEVELING: A dictionary of words that build a sense of completeness and assurance used by ignoring individual differences. Included are totalizing terms (everybody, anyone, each, fully), adverbs of permanence (always, completely, inevitably, consistently), and resolute adjectives (unconditional, consummate, absolute, open-and shut).

LIBERATION: Terms describing the maximizing of individual choice (autonomous, open-minded, options) and the rejection of social conventions (unencumbered, radical, released). Liberation is motivated by both personality factors (eccentric, impetuous, flighty) and political forces (suffrage, liberty, freedom, emancipation) and may produce dramatic outcomes (exodus, riotous, deliverance) or subdued effects (loosen, disentangle, outpouring). Liberatory terms also admit to rival characterizations: exemption vs. loophole, elope vs. abscond, uninhibited vs. outlandish.

MOTION: Terms connoting human movement (bustle, job, lurch, leap), physical processes (circulate, momentum, revolve, twist), journeys (barnstorm, jaunt, wandering, travels), speed (nimble, zip), and modes of transit (ride, fly, glide, swim).

NUMERICAL TERMS: Any sum, date, or product specifying the facts in a given case. The presumption is that these term hyper-specify a claim and detracting from its universality.

PASSIVITY: Words ranging from neutrality to inactivity. Includes terms of compliance (allow, tame), docility (submit, contented), and cessation (arrested, refrain, yielding). This dictionary also contains references to inertness (backward, immobile, inhibit), disinterest (unconcerned, nonchalant, stoic), and tranquility (quietly, sleepy).

PAST CONCERN: The past- tense forms of the verbs contained in the Present Concern dictionary.

PRAISE: Affirmations of some person, group, or abstract entity. Included are adjectives describing important social qualities (dear, delightful, witty), physical qualities (mighty, handsome, beautiful), intellectual qualities (shrewd, bright, reasonable), entrepreneurial qualities (successful, conscientious, renowned), and moral qualities (faithful, good, noble).

PRESENT CONCERN: This dictionary includes a selective list of present-tense verbs and is not topic-specific. This score points to general physical activity (cough, taste, sing, take), social operations (canvass, touch, govern, meet), and task-performance (make, cook, print, paint).

RAPPORT: This dictionary describes attitudinal similarities among groups of people. Included

are terms of affinity (congenial, camaraderie, companion), assent (approve, vouched, warrants), deference (tolerant, willing, permission), and identity (equivalent, resemble, consensus).

SATISFACTION: Terms associated with positive affective states (cheerful, passionate, happiness), with moments of undiminished joy (thanks, smile, welcome) and pleasurable diversion (excited, fun, lucky), or with moments of triumph (celebrating, pride, auspicious).

SELF-REFERENCE: All first-person references. This dictionary tracks how often the locus of action appears to be the speaker and not in the world at large.

SPATIAL AWARENESS: Terms referring to geographical entities and physical distances. Included are general geographical terms (abroad, elbow-room, local, outdoors) as well as references to specific locations such as nations. Also included are politically defined locations (county, fatherland, municipality, ward), points on the compass (east, southwest), terms of scale (kilometer, map, spacious), and other references to geographic terms (latitude, coastal, border, snowbelt). This dictionary also measures as well as quality (vacant, out-of-the-way, disoriented) and change (pilgrimage, migrated, frontier) in geography.

TEMPORAL AWARENESS: Terms that fix a person, idea, or event within a specific time-interval, thereby signaling a concern for concrete and practical matters. The dictionary designates literal time (century, instant, mid-morning) as well as metaphorical designations (lingering, seniority, nowadays), calendrical terms (autumn, year-round, weekend), elliptical terms (spontaneously, postpone, transitional), and judgmental terms (premature, obsolete, punctual).

TENACITY: These verbs that connote confidence and totality. This dictionary analyzes all uses of the verb “to be” (is, am, will, shall), three definitive verb forms (has, must, do) and their variants, as well as all associated contraction.

VARIETY: This measure divides the number of different words in a passage by the passage’s total words. A high score reflects an avoidance of overstatement and a preference for precise statements.

Note: Hart, R. P. (2000b). *DICTION 5.0: The text analysis program*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage-Scolari.