

**Social Structure and Anger:
Social Psychological Mediators**

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Abstract

This study uses 1996 General Social Survey data to examine potential social psychological mediators, suggested by equity theory and research on distress, of the relationship between social structure and anger. A broader social structure and personality approach to anger is compared with the equity and stress models proposed.

Among social structural locations, anger varies only by age when other social characteristics are controlled in OLS regressions. Frequency of anger declines with age. No direct relationship between anger and gender, ethnicity, education, income, or marital or parental statuses is evident. However, the tendency to express anger is associated with more frequent anger.

Equity beliefs about gender and individualism do not significantly affect anger. However, the belief that others cannot be trusted is positively related to anger and mediates the relationship between age and anger. Similar to findings related to distress, both self-efficacy and social integration suppress anger.

As suggested by the social structure and personality approach, combining cultural factors, such as beliefs, and proximal influences, such as social and personal resources,

explains more of the relationship between social structure and anger than either an equity or stress model alone. Mistrust and self-efficacy together explain more variation in the frequency of anger than either alone.

In this study, social disadvantage does not directly predict anger. Because anger is prevalent in work and family relationships, the relationship between age and anger may be explained by age-graded changes in work and family roles (Schieman 1999). However, this would not explain the lack of variation in anger by other structural locations in which social disadvantage likely affects work and family relationships.

The social psychological factors that have the most significant effect anger in this study (mistrust and self-efficacy) vary by ethnicity and socioeconomic status. Were it not for greater mistrust and lower self-efficacy, blacks and the socioeconomically disadvantaged would be angry significantly less often than whites and those of higher socioeconomic status. These findings suggest that expectations and perceptions of control, shaped by in-group comparisons and experience, and which vary by social structural location, may affect anger.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	Introduction	1
II.	Statement of the Problem	9
III.	Review of the Literature	12
IV.	Hypotheses	58
V.	Description of Methods	60
VI.	Results	72
VII.	Discussion	107
VIII.	Conclusions	124
	Appendices	127
	Bibliography	132
	Vita	144

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

<u>Figures</u>		<u>Page</u>
3.1	An Equity Model of Anger	37
3.2	A Stress Model of Anger	51
3.3	A Social Structure and Personality Model of Anger	57
6.1	Mistrust and Anger	90
6.2	Self-Efficacy and Anger	94
6.3	Social Integration and Anger	97
6.4	Mistrust, Self-Efficacy, and Anger	101
<u>Tables</u>		
1	Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables	73
2	Analyses of Variance in Study Variables by Marital and Parental Status	78
3	Unstandardized and Standardized OLS Coefficients from Regressing Frequency of Anger on Independent Variables	80
4	Unstandardized and Standardized OLS Regression Coefficients from Regressing Intervening Variables on Independent Variables	84
5	Unstandardized and Standardized Coefficients from Regressing Frequency of Anger on Independent Variables, Equity Model Intervening Beliefs and Significant Interaction Terms	88
6A	Bivariate Correlations of Variables in Figure 6.1	91
6B	Standardized Regression Coefficients for Figure 6.1	91
6C	Decomposition of Effects in Figure 6.1	91

<u>Table</u>		<u>Page</u>
7	Unstandardized and Standardized Coefficients from Regressing Frequency of Anger on Independent Variables, Stress Model Intervening Variables, and Significant Interaction Terms	93
8A	Bivariate Correlations of Variables in Figure 6.2	96
8B	Decomposition of Effects in Figure 6.2	96
9A	Bivariate Correlations of Variables in Figure 6.3	98
9B	Decomposition of Effects in Figure 6.3	98
10	Unstandardized and Standardized Coefficients from Regressing the Frequency of Anger on Independent and Significant Intervening Variables	102
11A	Bivariate Correlations of Variables in Figure 6.4	103
11B	Decomposition of Effects in Figure 6.4	104
12	Targets of Recent Anger	109
 <u>Appendices</u>		
1	Descriptive Statistics by Survey Form Version	127
2	Zero-Order Correlations among Study Variables Available for All Cases	128
3	Zero-Order Correlations among Study Variables for Cases with Data on Individualism	129
4	Zero-Order Correlations among Study Variables for Cases with Data on Mistrust	130
5	Zero-Order Correlations among Study Variables for Cases with Data on Social Integration	131

I. INTRODUCTION

Sociological Phenomenon Under Study

Many life experiences stem from one's location within surrounding social structures, like systems of stratification according to gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic class, and age. Such systems result in unequal distributions of opportunities and personal, social, and material resources. Low status within the social structure may be a source of difficult life conditions (Pearlin 1989) and, consequently, of more undesirable physical, cognitive, and emotional experiences. Emotions are of sociological concern because "emotions are an important feature of human experience, represent a major source of human motivation, and have a significant effect on human behavior" (Rosenberg 1991:124). People experience their worlds physically, cognitively, and emotionally (Smith-Lovin 1995).

Anger is of particular sociological significance. It is product of social life: People get angry when treated unfairly or when others fail to fulfill a social contract (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995; Ross and Van Willigen 1996; Smith-Lovin 1995; Tavris 1982). Anger is also a social problem: All societies must control anger to make social life possible (Rosenberg 1991; Stearns and Stearns 1986; Tavris 1982); and anger has social costs insofar as it increases morbidity and mortality (Ausbrooks, Thomas, and Williams 1995; Palfai and Hart 1997), familial

discord and divorce (Hochschild 1989; Noller and Fitzpatrick 1991; Ross and Van Willigen 1996), and aggression and violence (Stearns and Stearns 1986). As a potent motivator (Rosenberg 1991), anger is also a social force: it may be the single most important emotion in social change, inciting action on behalf of one's own or others' social rights (Barbalet 1994, 1998; Piven and Cloward 1993). Buffering, diverting, or tempering anger may contribute to the reproduction of the social structure. Despite its importance as an emotion of social cause and consequence, we lack information about social patterns of the experience of anger in the U.S.

Cross-cultural sociological and anthropological studies find universal recognition of facial expressions of anger, suggesting it is universally experienced, albeit culturally variable (Gordon 1990; Kemper 1990; Smith-Lovin 1995; Tavris 1982; Walbott and Scherer 1988). Within cultures, variation in gender, ethnicity, social class, and age may lead to different emotional experiences because location in social structure is associated with differences in people's conditions and experiences.

Social inequality places greater constraints on some while others enjoy greater opportunities. Since unfairness and injustice lead to anger (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995; Kemper 1990; Ross and Van Willigen 1996; Smith-Lovin 1995; Tavris 1982), anger may be experienced more often by those in disadvantaged

social groups. The strain of structured social arrangements "sends a day-to-day message about inequality and disadvantage. It translates the larger social order into daily experience. The burdens of economic hardship may increase stress and frustration and seem unfair, thus producing anger" (Ross and Van Willigen 1996:573). Theoretically then, because the socially disadvantaged confront more inequality, they should experience more anger than socially advantaged groups.

In the last decade, knowledge has accumulated about the effects of social structure on individuals. It influences people's attitudes (Kiecolt 1988) and beliefs (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Mirowsky and Ross 1989; Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen 1996); self-esteem and self-efficacy (Gecas 1989; Hughes and Demo 1989; Schwalbe and Staples 1991); and socialization and work-orientation (Kohn, Naoi, Schoenbach, Schooler, and Slomczynski 1990; Parcel and Menaghan 1994). It is clear that social structural location affects people's beliefs about the world and their resources for dealing with life's difficulties. These factors, in turn, influence individual outcomes, such as people's perceptions of equity and satisfaction, and experience of anger, depression, and distress.

Differences in beliefs about fairness often result from socially structured differences in experiences (Kiecolt 1988; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Kohn, Naoi, Schoenbach, Schooler, and

Slomczynski 1990; Mirowsky and Ross 1989; Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen 1996). Higher socioeconomic status is associated with more egalitarian gender role attitudes and social liberalism (Hochschild 1989; Kiecolt 1988; Mirowsky and Ross 1989; Thornton 1989), while members of lower education and income groups typically subscribe to more conventional gender roles, authoritarian attitudes, and greater mistrust of others (Mirowsky and Ross 1989).

Studies of economic inequality show that people's beliefs influence their perceptions such that they do not necessarily view inequalities as unfair but rather as the way things should be. Kluegel and Smith (1986) cite the "ideology of individualism," the belief that people generally receive what they deserve for their efforts, as a nearly universal American ideology that makes social inequality tolerable since rewards are seen as fairly distributed. Also, the extent to which women are distressed by the inequitable division of household labor depends somewhat upon whether they hold a conventional or traditional "gender ideology" (Blair and Johnson 1992; Shelton and John 1996).

Research on stress indicates that personal and social resources can buffer the impact of difficult social circumstances. Individuals in disadvantaged social locations tend to have fewer personal resources, such as self-efficacy

(Gecas 1989; Hughes and Demo 1989), and social resources, such as social integration (McClanahan and Booth 1991; Pearlin 1989; Pearlin and McKean 1996) to enable them to manage difficulty. In addition to producing varying experiences and beliefs, social inequality contributes to differences in the resources individuals have available to ameliorate the frustrations and demands of daily life (Hughes and Demo 1989; Pearlin and Schooler 1978; Thoits 1995).

Given the deleterious effects of social disadvantage on individual outcomes and the intervening effects of beliefs and resources, it seems reasonable to suspect similar patterns in emotional experience may exist. Several studies examining the epidemiology of emotions and the effects of inequality on emotions are underway using data from the 1996 General Social Survey's special module on emotions (Lynn Smith-Lovin, personal communication to K. Jill Kiecolt, January 28, 1998). This study is not an attempt to preempt or duplicate these studies. Instead, it is an investigation of the potential social psychological mediators of anger using models from equity and stress research.

At first glance, equity theory predicts more anger among those suffering social disadvantage since they face more unfair circumstances and barriers to desired outcomes (Ross and Van Willigen 1996). However, members of disadvantaged groups might not experience more anger because they may not perceive

unfairness as a result of their beliefs and expectations that things are as they should be (Kluegel and Smith 19986; Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen 1996). And, those with greater personal and social resources, typically members of socially advantaged groups, may be more likely to anger and act than those with fewer resources because they believe themselves capable of changing unfair situations (Pearlin 1989). A sense of potency differentiates anger from fear (Morgan and Heise 1988, Smith-Lovin 1995). So one's sense of control may determine whether the response to unfairness is acceptance and resignation or anger and agency. With a diminished sense of potency to change their situations, disadvantaged individuals may passively accept inequalities or rationalize them as just. In these ways, social location and its effect on social psychological characteristics may have compounding effects on social differences in the experience of anger.

In sum, variations in individuals' locations in the social structure contribute to socially patterned differences in social psychological qualities and, as a result, individual outcomes. This study follows previous investigations of the effects of social structure on well-being by using models from research on equity (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen 1996; Sprecher 1986) and stress (Mirowsky and Ross 1989; Pearlin 1989; Pearlin, Lieberman, Menaghan, and Mullan 1981; Thoits 1995)

to examine the effects of beliefs and resources on anger.

Significance of the Study

Since "(t)he distinguishing mark of sociological inquiry is its effort to uncover patterns and regularities shared by people whose social characteristics and circumstances are similar" (Pearlin 1989:242), learning about the socially patterned distribution of emotions is an appropriate sociological pursuit. Although there is abundant research on social sources of depression and distress (Aneshensel 1992; Mirowsky and Ross 1989; Pearlin 1989; Thoits 1995), we lack such information on emotions. Despite the sociological import of anger, our knowledge is limited to studies exploring culture and anger (Cancian and Gordon 1988; Stearns and Stearns 1986; Stearns 1987), and anger in interpersonal interactions (Hochschild 1983; Sprecher 1986; Smith-Lovin 1990); there remains an absence of empirical sociological studies of social structure and anger.

Like non-sociological studies of stress and depression, most treatments of anger apply a medical model. This approach assumes that anger is a random, individual experience, and is problematic (Ross and Van Willigen 1996; Tavris 1982). Previous sociological studies of depression and distress reveal that although these phenomena are treated as anomalous in medical models, they are socially patterned (Aneshensel 1992; Mirowsky and Ross 1989; Pearlin 1989; Thoits 1995). Like sociological studies of

distress and depression, studying anger sociologically is likely to uncover differences in individual experience that reflect social arrangements.

This study examines anger as a *social* emotion which:(1) stems, in part, from structurally determined differences in experience; (2) is affected by social psychological qualities that also are shaped by variation in social location; and (3) is of social consequence for individual well-being, as well as for the change and reproduction of the social structure. By exploring the links between social location and anger, this study extends the literature on both emotions and social structural effects on individuals. In addition, this study may contribute to our understanding of results from concurrent epidemiological studies of emotions.

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

This study investigates the role of social psychological characteristics in mediating social structural effects on the experience of anger by adults in the United States. Social structure affects individuals in a myriad of complex ways as evidenced by variations in beliefs and resources by social location. This study uses data from the 1996 General Social Survey (National Opinion Research Center), a national probability sample, to investigate how people's beliefs and resources affect their experience of anger.

The question this study seeks to address is: How do social structural variations in beliefs and resources affect the experience of anger. Specifically:

- 1) How does social structural location relate to the experience of anger?
- 2) Does gender ideology mediate anger among women?
- 3) Do beliefs about individualism affect anger?
- 4) Does trusting others influence anger?
- 5) Does self-efficacy, as a personal resource, mediate the relationship between social location and anger?
- 6) Does social integration, as a social resource, mediate the relationship between social location and anger?
- 7) Do gender, ethnic, class, and age differences in beliefs and resources have varying effects on the experience of anger?

Delimitations and Limitations

The primary limitation of this study is the data available on the experience of anger in the U.S. The delimitations outlined below provide parameters for investigating social psychological mediators of social structural effects on anger in this study.

1. Although emotions include physiological and/or observable aspects, this study relies solely on subjective, retrospective self-reports of experience.
2. A broad spectrum of beliefs, past experiences, and attitudes may influence individuals' interpretations of circumstances which in turn may affect their emotions. The beliefs examined in this study are only a few that may impact the experience of anger.
3. In addition to one's resources and beliefs, the salience of individuals' roles may intervene between social location and feelings of anger (Stryker 1991 in Smith-Lovin 1995), but they are outside the bounds of this study.
4. This study considers only self-efficacy as a personal resource and only social integration as a social resource which may mediate anger. Other personal resources such as self-esteem, and other social

resources such as perceived social support, are potential mediators of angry feelings. However, data on these other resources are not included in the 1996 GSS.

5. In regard to social location and ethnicity, this study is limited to investigating the effects of beliefs and resources on anger for blacks and non-blacks. Too few non-black minority respondents are available for examining differences between whites, blacks, and non-black minorities, although such differences are likely.

The aim of studying social structural effects on anger, as well as the social psychological factors that may mediate those effects, is akin to Pearlin's pursuit of the sociological study of stress:

This search, I believe, will reveal how ordinary people can be caught up in the disjunctions and discontinuities of societies, how they can be motivated to adopt socially valued dreams and yet can find their dreams thwarted by socially erected barriers, and how as engaged members of society they come into conflict with others and themselves (Pearlin 1989:242).

Investigating the effects of social psychological characteristics, such as beliefs and resources, on anger provides an important theoretical and empirical link between social structure and individual experience.

III. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

A. The Sociological Relevance of Anger

Emotions happen to us, or so we tend to think (Rosenberg 1991; Thoits 1985). Most people view emotion as something outside of our control that instead controls us. When it comes to our feelings, we believe "we play no part in eliciting them" (Rosenberg 1991:129). Contrary to conventional wisdom however, people affect the emotions they experience, collectively through structural effects of power and status entitling some to more emotional due than others (Clark 1997; Gordon 1990; Kemper 1990) and through cultural norms (Hochschild 1983; Thoits 1985; Stearns and Stearns 1986). Individually, people affect their emotions through behavioral responses and cognitive interpretations of events and sensations (Rosenberg 1991; Thoits 1985, 1989). Emotions do not spring from some essential source, but result from complex interaction of our bodies, minds, and social worlds. Emotion is of sociological interest because of its significance in the constitution of social relationships, institutions, and processes (Barbalet 1998).

The sociological study of anger can help establish links between social structure and individuals' experiences and well-being. Anger has real consequences in everyday life. It is an important indicator of psychological well-being and is associated with lower levels of physical health (Ross and Van Willigen

1996). Anger has been largely absent in sociological studies and treated mostly within a medical model that assumes it is a random, individual problem rather than caused by social problems and of social consequence. As with distress, sources of anger may be uncovered by examining "the social arrangements of society and the structuring of experience within these arrangements" (Pearlin 1989:242).

A casual survey of pop-psychology self-help books reveals that society views anger as an emotion to be managed, tamed, or otherwise controlled or overcome because of its powerful and dangerous consequences. In contrast, in her book *Anger--The Misunderstood Emotion*, psychologist Carol Tavris (1982) describes anger as a ubiquitous emotional experience necessary for defining and maintaining social boundaries, albeit with undesirable personal and interpersonal consequences. In particular, Tavris cites research on anger's negative impact on mental and physical health, especially for those who cope with anger through open acknowledgment and expression. Tavris maintains that people are better off psychologically, interpersonally, and physiologically if they get over anger as quickly as possible, letting it go rather than dwelling on its causes and seeking revenge. Tavris makes a good case for the social causes and functional purposes of anger. However, advocating the quick diffusion of anger neglects anger's potential to motivate people to change

undesirable individual or collective circumstances.

Understanding the mechanisms that intervene between social structural location and anger has many sociological implications. What individuals think, do, and *feel* both reproduce and change the social order. Emotions not only are a social effect, but a causal force in society. Emotions can motivate action, and anger in particular facilitates the reassertion of dignity and rights (Barbalet 1998). Thoits (1995) cogently argues that collective coping responses to structural effects on distress are important to understanding catalysts of social movements and social change, and that stress research is relevant to broader social questions. The same might be said for research on emotions, particularly anger.

In theory, the unfairness and frustration of social disadvantage should lead to anger and a desire for change. Anger is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for individuals to try to change social inequities (Barbalet 1998; Piven and Cloward 1993). Barbalet explains, "If we are subject to arbitrary power, for instance, if we are punished when we should be rewarded, if we are frustrated in attempting to satisfy our needs, then it is our emotional engagement with these things which will determine that we claim our rights in such situations" (1994:38). Formal and informal collective responses to structural inequities are potent forces in social change. Piven and Cloward (1993)

describe how individuals acting "separately but in concert...fueled the relief rise" of the mid-1960s in America, despite both structural and cultural barriers (pp. 464-465). To facilitate such responses and succeed in convincing the "disenfranchised that there are practical solutions to help them...reformers must kindle anger from the coals of depression" (Tavris 1982:105).

The oppressed may have nothing to lose but their chains, but individual and social barriers often prevent the disadvantaged from getting angry and acting (Kluegel and Smith 1986), if not collectively, then "separately but in concert" (Piven and Cloward 1993:464). As Mills asserts, "individuals, in the welter of their daily experience, often become falsely conscious of their social positions" (Mills 1959:5). Therefore, uncovering buffers of anger may shed some insight on another dimension of false consciousness, and perhaps another angle for breaking through it, so that "the personal uneasiness of individuals is focused upon explicit troubles and indifferences of publics [and] is transformed into involvement with public issues" (Mills 1959:5).

B. Definitions

Emotions

There is general consensus that emotions are products of biological, cognitive, and social elements (Hochschild 1983; Kemper 1990; Thoits 1985). Some emotions are believed to be

universal: Anger, fear, sadness, and happiness have cross-cultural human value, are universally recognized (Gordon 1990; Thoits 1989), and each are differentially wired in the human autonomic nervous system (Kemper 1990). Cross-cultural semantic research indicates that emotions also are universally structured according to three dimensions: (1) evaluation, indicating positive or negative affect; (2) activity, the degree of arousal associated with the feeling; and (3) potency, one's sense of power in relation to the feeling (Kemper 1990; Morgan and Heise 1988; Smith-Lovin 1995). However, the causes, meaning, expression, and regulation of emotions vary widely across cultures (Stearns and Stearns 1986; Thoits 1989).

Emotions involve: (a) situational stimulus or cues, (b) changes in physiological or bodily sensations, (c) expressive gestures, and (d) a cultural label (Thoits 1989:318). A simple model traces emotions through a three-step sequence: (1) a stimulus event is followed by (2) a cognition or interpretation, which results in (3) an emotion (Rosenberg 1991). This is not to say that emotions require extensive cognitive awareness. Cognitive processing of situational and physiological stimuli can occur so rapidly as to seem automatic. However, we learn what and why we feel through language and the cultural meanings assigned to particular constellations of situations, sensations, and gestures (Hochschild 1983; Thoits 1985). Therefore, to a

large extent, "subjective experiences and emotional beliefs are both socially acquired and socially structured" (Thoits 1989:319). Consequently, we learn more subtle and culturally bound emotion labels, such as shame, guilt, and pride through socialization (Kemper 1990).

Anger

Anger, like other emotions, results from the complex interplay of social, psychological, and physiological factors. No emotion can be reduced to its physiological or behavioral symptoms. Thus, anger cannot be measured by blood pressure or aggression (Stearns and Stearns 1986). If meaning is specified in difference (Luhmann 1995), perhaps one reasonable way of establishing what anger means--without tautologous references to antecedents or consequences--is to identify how people differentiate anger from other emotions. Morgan and Heise (1988) analyzed the structure of emotions according to their three semantic dimensions: evaluation, activity, and potency (EPA). Anger-related terms signify a negative, active, and potent emotion. Among negative emotions, anger differs from sadness, which is inactive and impotent, and from fear, which is active but impotent (Morgan and Heise 1988). Thus, anger is a negative, potent, active emotion.

In sociological research on structural effects on well-

being, depression¹ is often used as the primary indicator of psychosocial health. However, inequality and disadvantage also may lead to increased emotional distress of all kinds, including anger (Ross and Van Willigen 1996). Negative outcomes attributed to others cause anger (Kluegel and Smith 1986). In social interaction, anger results from perceptions of inequality, being treated unfairly, or violations of a social contract. Although the *expression* of anger may be carefully regulated in society (Stearns and Stearns 1986), the *experience* of anger may be a useful indicator of inequality (Ross and Van Willigen 1996).

C. Theories of Emotion and Anger

Although there is little empirical evidence on the social distribution of emotional experience (Thoits 1989; Smith-Lovin 1995), several theories of emotion are reasonably well-developed. Contemporary sociological theories of emotion center on "the structural, situational and interactional sources of emotional responses" (Smith-Lovin 1995:124). A brief review of each of these approaches reveals similar predictions about when and why we experience anger.

¹ Depression in sociological research on stress and emotions typically refers to recent depressed affect and/or depressive symptoms but does not require or assert diagnosis of clinical depression, nor does it usually differentiate severe, chronic, or organically-based depression from recent depressive affect or symptomology. (For a thorough review on depression, see Mirowsky and Ross 1986).

Interactional Approach to Emotions

Interactional theories of emotion, such as Affect Control Theory (ACT), draw on identity and impression formation theories to predict emotions (Heise 1999; Smith Lovin 1990). ACT predicts that people act in ways that confirm expected meanings of identities and roles (Smith-Lovin 1990; 1995). Emotions signal our situational definitions of ourselves and others, as well as problems with our definitions (Hochschild 1983). When our sentiments are not confirmed, we adjust our definitions of the situation or our identities to better fit our lived experiences. In this way, actors create and maintain culturally shared meaning systems (Heise 1999).

Using the EPA dimensions of emotions, ACT researchers find that most Americans share similar sentiments about a wide range of identities, settings, attributes, and behaviors (Smith-Lovin 1990, 1995; Heise 1999). ACT proposes that emotions emerge from individuals' identities and related actions: "We expect lived experience to confirm our sentiments about how good or bad, how powerful or powerless, how lively or quiet such people are supposed to be. We also construct experiences that are likely to produce such confirmations" (Heise 1999:5).

Interactional approaches to emotions predict that anger follows disconfirmation of expected meanings. We get angry at ourselves when we fail to enact an identity adequately. We get

angry at others when they fail to support us in our role performances (Stryker 1987 in Smith-Lovin 1995) or when they violate our expectations or perceived "rights" (Barbalet 1994; Smith-Lovin 1995). But when we have no recourse for unfairness, we tend to become depressed rather than angry (Smith-Lovin 1995).

Cultural Approach to Emotions

Cultural theories of emotions follow two related strands: one which views emotions as socially constructed, and another in which individuals are active agents who produce emotion in interaction. In the first case, the social environment shapes individuals' emotional experiences through culture and status. Two similar concepts, Russel's "emotion scripts" and Hochschild's "feeling rules," suggest that we learn to feel particular emotions in response to stereotypical situations according to our culture and place in society (Smith-Lovin 1995). For example, anger is the scripted or expected response to unfairness or personal offense in Western culture, yet these cultural rules also dictate that one should control anger toward those of higher status.

In the second strand of the cultural approach to emotions individuals do not merely follow scripts, but they interpret meanings associated with situations and other actors, and thus interpret their emotions in response to those meanings (Smith-Lovin 1995). In this way, "it is not the objective fact but the

subjective meaning assigned to it that is responsible for the immediate emotional effect" (Rosenberg 1991, pp. 131-132). In addition to using cultural norms to interpret others' actions, people also use norms to gauge what their own feelings in a given situation should be. When emotions fail to match those that are culturally prescribed in given situations, individuals engage in emotion work to bring feelings in line with expectations (Hochschild 1979, 1983; Thoits 1985).

Individuals can manage or transform feelings by altering their situational, physiological, behavioral, and cognitive elements. As Thoits (1985) remarks:

The most obvious and straightforward technique is to directly alter the situational circumstances. . . avoid or leave the situation, replace certain situational features with others, or construct entirely new situations. . . However, the use of this emotion management technique is usually possible only for persons with situational power or resources. Consequently, most people are likely to use other techniques to eliminate or reduce norm-state discrepancy (p. 234).

A more readily available means of manipulating one's emotions than changing the circumstances is altering the physiological sensations associated with the feelings. By using alcohol, caffeine, nicotine, and other drugs, as well as exercise and breathing techniques, a people can change the physiological state that coincides with their feelings and reinterpret their emotions (Thoits 1985).

A more common way than changing the circumstances and

physiological sensations that people can manage their feelings is through expression. While "surface acting" merely masks one's real, less appropriate feelings, "deep acting" uses gestures associated with a desired emotion to elicit that feeling (Hochschild 1983). Surface acting may become deep acting when repeated over time as the "actor" attends to different features of the situation and perceives others and their actions in new ways that produce the desired emotion (Hochschild 1983; Thoits 1985).

In addition to working on features of the situation, bodily sensation, and expression, people can manipulate their feelings cognitively because cognitions intervene between the event and the resulting emotion (Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Rosenberg 1991). Cognitions and interpretations of events are premised on cultural norms and scripts (Rosenberg 1991; Thoits 1985). Rosenberg (1991) suggests that individuals strive to control subjective meaning through four self-processes: selective attention, perspectival selectivity, selective interpretation, and self-deception. Through selective attention to what one thinks about, individuals maximize desired emotions by exposing themselves to desired situations and thoughts while trying to shut off undesired experiences and mental content. Perspectival selectivity refers to how individuals think about events and minimize the importance of events or problems that evoke

undesired feelings. Selective interpretation allows individuals to assign meanings to events in order to produce desired emotions. For instance, a person may selectively attribute success to himself, but failure to external causes or lack of effort. Or, by comprehending only selected meanings or questioning the validity of feedback that elicits undesired feelings (e.g., admirable feelings reflect authentic self, but undesirable feelings are not the "real me"), the individual evokes desirable emotions for herself. Finally, while individuals may use some self-control strategies to deceive others in order to save face or make another feel better, people cannot deceive themselves for emotional gain. However, successful self-deception and mental manipulation seems to be adaptive, resulting in greater emotional satisfaction and adjustment, less depression, and greater productivity (Rosenberg 1991).

There are several ways that self-processes may fail to control emotion. The event that stimulated the emotions may not produce the cognitions necessary for the desired emotional experience. Or, cognition may fail to produce the desired emotion. A person also may be unable to control his/her cognitions. The physiological arousal underlying the emotion may persist beyond the event to which the feelings were attributed. Self-deception efforts may fail if there is an awareness of

mental manipulation, as well. And, one may not be conscious of the cognitions fueling the emotion and therefore cannot control them (Rosenberg 1991).

In this cultural view of emotions, norms and interpretations interact to determine emotions, including anger. A person's emotional response will differ depending on whether another's actions reflect an intentional slight or an unintentional oversight, for example. Widespread ideological beliefs may be one source of "cultural logic" that intercedes between circumstances and emotions.

Structural Approach to Emotions

Social structural theories of emotions, such as Kemper's Social Relational Theory (1990), focus on dimensions of power and status. In developing a positivist approach, Kemper (1981) rejects the notion that norms determine emotions and looks to social structure, social relations, and emotional links to biology. However, Kemper (1981) endorses the cultural view that actors' definitions of the situation are relevant to the emotions that emerge in interaction. Kemper (1990) offers structurally-based categories for defining situations and predicting emotions. Three theoretical propositions underlie Kemper's (1990) structural approach:

1. Power and status outcomes of social interaction produce emotions.

2. The basic emotions--fear, anger, depression, and happiness--*naturally* result from power and status relations.
3. Basic emotion outcomes of power and status relationships have pre-wired physiological correlates, thus the social, emotional, and physiological are interconnected.

Kemper conceptualizes social structure as the stratification of actors according to power and status (1981), which produces recurring, predictable patterns of social relations (1990). Power refers to the ability to control and coerce others with the threat of punishment. Status is the voluntary deference, reward, and compliance accorded one by others within the social system. In every situation, actors' overlapping social categories (e.g., ethnicity and gender) determine their power and status. Power and status are affected in social interaction, and these outcomes have emotional consequences.

In the structural theory of emotions, anger is predictable. Kemper (1990) outlines the four power/status outcomes of each dyadic interaction which may actually occur out of twelve possibilities. Each actor's power and status can increase, decrease, or stay the same, and there are predictable emotional correlates for each outcome configuration. Elevation of one's own power or a decrease of the other's power results in feelings of security, while decreases in one's power or increases of the other's power evokes fear; increases in status lead to happiness

and decreases in status lead to anger, shame, and/or depression. More precisely, anger is the "natural" reaction to being unjustly or arbitrarily deprived of status *by another*. The resulting emotion depends on the source of the status deprivation. If the agent of status loss is oneself, then shame is the predicted response. If loss of status cannot be corrected and the agent is some irremediable source like fate, then depression is expected (Kemper 1990).

D. Social Structure and Anger

A common theme in all of these theories of emotion is that anger stems from injustice associated with social expectations. Whether others fail to confirm our identities and meanings in interaction, violate cultural norms and social contracts, or deny us due status, we get angry as a result of unfairness. American culture espouses an ideology of fairness and reward on merit. However, as a society, the United States remains the most socially unequal Western democracy (Rossides 1993). Today we have growing wealth in an increasingly unequal American society (Wolff 1995), continued racial discrimination (Jencks 1992), gender role inequity (Hochschild 1989) and the feminization of poverty (Abramovitz, 1996; McLanahan and Booth 1991), a scarcity of jobs that pay a living wage to individuals with low skills (Wilson 1996), and the social isolation and status loss among the elderly (Mirowsky and Ross 1989; Pearlin and McKean 1996). Yet,

with so much inequality and so many potential social sources of anger in America, we see little of "the trauma and anger of an oppressed people...turned against the social structure" (Piven and Cloward 1993:227).

In everyday life, people have an array of concerns other than social injustice. Work and family life, daily hassles, and personal worries are enough for most people to contend with, and often more difficult for the disadvantaged. In addition, perceiving oneself as a victim of society can be distressing. Therefore, people may be motivated to ignore social inequalities (Kluegel and Smith 1986). Still, given the extent of structural inequality and resultant distress, it seems reasonable to expect some correspondence between social disadvantage and anger. Anger may indicate perceived unfairness in social life. However, the relationship between social location and anger may not be straightforward.

Anger that stems from the conditions of social disadvantage may be difficult to detect because much of such anger may be displaced. Displacement entails the unconscious shifting of emotion from one target to another. Individuals' emotions may be situationally displaced, such as carrying anger home from work, or objectively displaced, such as repressed resentment toward the system or more powerful individuals directed toward weaker persons or groups (Swanson 1988). Anger resulting from many

experiences of perceived discrimination or other non-personal, systemic forms of unfair treatment might be repressed or displaced onto close others until or unless a catalyzing experience provokes a release, as in "black rage" (Grier and Cobbs 1968) and "social rage" (Berry 1999). In cases of displacement, disadvantage may not result in anger directed at structural sources but at more proximal substitute targets.

It is also possible that anger may spill over from one realm of life into another. The spillover thesis suggests that qualities and experiences related to individuals' occupations spill over into other areas of individuals' lives, such as family and social activities (Kohn and Schooler 1983; Kohn and Slomczynski 1990; Wilensky 1961 in Wilson and Musick 1997). Whether individuals are involved and rewarded at work or alienated and distressed at work, these same patterns may spillover into social and family participation and relationships. If a similar phenomena occurs with anger, social disadvantage should be reflected in social patterns of anger even though the sources of anger may be difficult to detect.

There are still further complications and contradictions in predicting anger from social structural location. Taking gender as an example, these problems become apparent: Biological and behavioral theories of emotion predict that men are angrier than women due to differences in sex hormones and socialization (Ross

and Van Willigen 1996; Quigley and Tedeschi 1996; Tavris 1982). However, since anger is also an emotional response to inequality, women might be angrier than men because of their inequitable share of domestic and family responsibilities (Hochschild 1991; Ross and Van Willigen 1996), and lower status and pay in the workplace (Mueller and Wallace 1996). Despite their disadvantage, women may tend to suppress or recast anger into alternative feelings because gender roles prescribe that women refrain from displays of anger (Brody 1997; Cross and Madsen 1997). In addition, many women may not view unequal gender arrangements as unfair because they subscribe to gender ideologies that give women the predominant responsibility for home and family, regardless of contemporary expectations that women also participate in paid work outside the home (Bumpass 1990; Hochschild 1989). Further, since a central component of anger is potency, and men have more power in society and tend to have a greater sense of power and control in the form of self-efficacy (Schwalbe and Staples 1991), perhaps men get angry more often. From this example, it is clear that cultural beliefs and orientations may intervene between social location and emotional experience. Therefore, it is important to account for intervening factors. Two sociological approaches are particularly useful for this purpose: equity theory and the stress process.

E. Equity Theory and Anger

Equity theory and its principles of distributive justice also predict anger as the response to unfair treatment and outcomes (Hedgvedt and Markovsky 1995; Kluegel and Smith 1986; McClintock, Kramer, and Keil 1984; Smith-Lovin 1995). A principle of distributive justice, equity means that individuals receive rewards proportional to their investments (Hedgvedt and Markovsky 1995; Kluegel and Smith 1986; McClintock et al. 1984). As a basis for reward, it is highly compatible with capitalism and meritocracy and so reflects American values (Rossides 1993). As a cultural value, equity is a normative expectation learned through observing the investments and rewards of comparison groups and individuals during socialization (Hedgvedt and Markovsky 1995; McClintock et al. 1984).

According to equity theory, violations of expectations of fairness lead to anger and dissatisfaction for the disadvantaged, and may, less frequently, lead to guilt for the advantaged (Hedgvedt and Markovsky 1995; McClintock et al. 1984; Michaels, Edwards, and Acock 1984; Smith-Lovin 1995). Anger may also signal unfairness, triggering cognitive reassessment of a situation and perceptions of inequity (Smith-Lovin 1995). In response to perceived inequity, people strive to reduce their distress by either altering the situation or their cognitive perceptions of it (Hedgvedt and Markovsky 1995). Beliefs about

what is fair determine both what people come to expect and how they construe events, and consequently what they perceive as fair and equitable. For example, believing that people get what they deserve makes one less likely to perceive or respond to injustice (Hedgvedt and Markovsky 1995). Believing that women are responsible for the home and family whether or not they work outside the home makes one less likely to perceive or respond to inequitable divisions of household labor (Hochschild 1989). Believing that most people cannot be trusted and they are out for themselves makes one more likely to perceive, experience, and respond to inequity (Mirowsky and Ross 1989).

Since beliefs and the expectations they create are important arbiters of perceptions of fairness and equity, and those perceptions are closely tied to anger, beliefs also may influence anger. Three particular sets of beliefs about the social world may mediate the relationship between individuals' social structural location and their feelings of anger: gender ideology, individualism, and mistrust of others. These three beliefs correspond to features of social stratification, are widespread within American culture, and their effects on individuals' perceptions and well-being are well-researched.

Gender Ideology

Gender ideology refers to beliefs about appropriate sex roles for each gender. Normative attitudes about appropriate

gender roles in contemporary America are typically conceptualized as ranging from traditional to egalitarian. Individuals with traditional gender ideologies believe that men should be the breadwinners and heads of the family and that women should maintain the household and family relationships, rear children, and play supportive roles to men (Wilkie, Ferree, and Ratcliff 1998). Traditional gender ideology bases men's identities in work and accords them more power in the family and bases women's identities in home and familial roles and accords them less power than their male partners (Hochschild 1989). An egalitarian gender ideology holds that men and women should have equal status in the home and workplace and equally share responsibility for housework and child care. An egalitarian gender ideology bases men's and women's identities on the same spheres and accords each equal power in relationships (Hochschild 1989).

Perceptions of fairness are strongly related to marital satisfaction (Blair and Johnson 1992; Hochschild 1989), marital conflict (Perry-Jenkins and Folk 1994) and job satisfaction (Mueller and Wallace 1996) among women, even when objective circumstances disadvantage women. Not surprisingly, men and women have different expectations about what is fair and it is these differences in expectations, rather than differences in actual housework or pay, that determine marital satisfaction (Blair and Johnson 1992; Perry Jenkins and Folk 1994; Wilkie,

Ferree, and Ratcliff 1998) and job satisfaction (Mueller and Wallace 1996). Nevertheless, many researchers find only weak or no direct relationships between gender ideology and actual divisions of household labor, reported fairness of the division of household labor, and marital satisfaction (Blair and Johnson 1992; Mederer 1993; Shelton and John 1996; Wilkie, Ferree, and Ratcliff 1998). Ross and Van Willigen (1996) suggest we can supplement our understanding of inequity by investigating anger:

By studying anger we may be able to identify objective conditions perceived as inequitable by individuals. Instead of asking people directly whether they consider arrangements fair, we use an unobtrusive measure. If doing the majority of child care increases anger, if having difficulty paying the bills and paying for food, clothing, and medical care increases anger, if having difficulty providing care for one's children while at work increases anger, we infer messages about social inequality (p. 583).

Women and younger people tend to have more egalitarian gender ideologies than men and older adults (Thornton 1989). Black men and women also tend to be more egalitarian than their white counterparts (Taylor, Chatters, Tucker, and Lewis 1991). Education and income are also associated with more egalitarian attitudes about gender roles (Hochschild 1989). Since an egalitarian gender ideology runs counter to objective gender inequity in the home and workplace, I expect that those with more egalitarian gender beliefs, especially women, will be more angry than those who subscribe to a more traditional gender ideology.

Two role-based locations in social structure are

particularly relevant to gender ideology: spouse and parent. Ross and Van Willigen (1996) investigated the effects of these roles on anger and found that women report more anger than men; the more children there are in a household, the greater the anger among adults, especially women; and the divorced report more anger than the married, widowed, and never married. They attribute these findings to gender inequities in domestic labor and child care, and economic hardships associated with gender inequality. Because these two structurally based roles are relevant to equity, they are included as controls in this study.

Ideology of Individualism

The vast majority of Americans embrace the ideology of individualism--the belief that people can and do get what they deserve from their own efforts (Kluegel and Smith 1986). Further, Americans reject the notion that those at the top get there through greed and exploitation of others. Reward is primarily a function of effort and ability. Mirowsky, Ross and Van Willigen (1996) summarize this belief and its implications:

The premise states that opportunity for economic advancement is plentiful in America; it follows that individuals bear responsibility for their own economic fate. An individual's place in the distribution of economic rewards depends on effort, skills, talents, and attitudes. Inputs determine outcomes: thus the resulting inequality of economic reward is equitable and fair. People get what they deserve and deserve what they get.

The dominant American ideology adds judgmental overtones to instrumental views, attributing a broad fairness to socioeconomic inequality. In a land of

opportunity, people at the top get there through their own hard work and effort, and deserve what they have. Conversely, people at the bottom are there because of their own failings or poor choices (p. 323).

The ideology of individualism reduces or eliminates perceptions of economic inequality as unfair, and thereby makes it less likely that people will attribute their own difficulties to structural inequalities.

Although there is little variation in the belief in individualism in America, there are some social differences. The poor, blacks, and those with less education endorse this ideology less enthusiastically than the middle and upper classes, whites, and those with more education (Mirowsky, Ross and Van Willigen 1996). Women do not endorse individualism as strongly as men, and older persons subscribe to this ideology more strongly than younger people (Kluegel and Smith 1986). Despite these small variations, most Americans embrace the ideology of individualism. Since this ideology reduces perceptions of unfairness, I expect that it reduces anger.

Mistrust

Mistrust is the belief that others act primarily in their own self-interest and, given the chance, will exploit other people (Acock and Kiecolt 1989). According to Mirowsky and Ross (1989), mistrust is indicative of three related beliefs:

- (1) awareness that one's internal impulses are frustrated and controlled by external authority, which means that others also have selfish motives

- which must be restrained;
- (2) belief that there is inherent scarcity of wealth, power, and prestige, so that one person's gain is always another person's loss; and
 - (3) belief that victimization and exploitation are common and have dire consequences for the victim (p. 157).


Mistrust is associated with a diminished sense of well-being (Acock and Kiecolt 1989) and lower life-satisfaction (Hughes and Thomas 1998). It is greatest among those with lower levels of education, low prestige jobs and socioeconomic status, and who live in low-status neighborhoods (Mirowsky and Ross 1989). Compared with whites, African Americans have substantially less trust in others, although levels of mistrust among whites have increased in recent years (Hughes and Thomas 1998).

Mistrust of others also increases the likelihood that a person will be less inclined to develop and use support networks and be more apt to act defensively and preemptively. Mistrust may contribute to encountering more hostile and threatening conditions (Mirowsky and Ross 1989) which may contribute to experiencing more anger. Therefore, I expect that the greater the mistrust, the greater the anger.

Equity theory provides an appropriate framework for predicting social structural effects on anger. Perceptions of fairness and equity are integral to the experience of anger, as theories of emotions and equity theory predict. Because such perceptions are affected by beliefs and expectations, anger may

be mediated by prevalent beliefs about gender, individualism, and mistrust of others (see Figure 3.1). Anger may also provide an indirect indicator of perceptions of fairness concerning social arrangements.

Figure 3.1 An Equity Model of Anger



F. The Stress Model and Anger

The sociological literature on stress also provides guidance for investigating social structural effects on anger and its potential mediators. Sociological studies of stress focus on the social antecedents, patterns, and consequences of distress (Aneshensel 1992; Thoits 1995). Examining stress, emotional experience, or other individual level phenomenon without attention to distribution across social strata assumes independence of social location and neglects consideration of social causation for such phenomenon. As Pearlin explains: "Many stressful experiences, it should be recognized, don't spring out of a vacuum but typically can be traced back to surrounding social structures and people's locations within them" (1989:242). The stress process as conceptualized in sociological research considers social location, differential resources, and individual affective outcomes, thus making it an apt model for linking social structure to anger.

One problem in stress research is the ambiguity of the meaning of "stress." Stress, broadly, encompasses a host of negative subjective experiences and their impact on well-being. Pearlin and Schooler describe stress as "experiences that adversely penetrate people's emotional lives"(1978:3). Thoits combines the definition of stress and stressor to mean "any environmental, social, or internal demand which requires the

individual to readjust his/her usual behavior patterns" (1994:54). Mirowsky and Ross (1986) define *distress* as a combination of elements including depression and anxiety with both physiological and psychological aspects, affective symptoms such as anger and guilt, and cognitive components like mistrust and paranoia. Stress and distress are often used interchangeably in the literature (Aneshensel 1992; Kessler, Price, and Wortman 1985; Pearlin et al. 1981; Pearlin and McKean 1996; Thoits 1995).

Aneshensel (1992) comprehensively refers to stress as arousal resulting from taxing demands or a lack of means to desired ends. Stress originates from stressors, such as undesirable and uncontrollable life events as well as challenging circumstances or barriers in the environment, and strains stemming from role demands and conflicts (Aneshensel 1992; Pearlin 1989; Thoits 1995). The same circumstances do not necessarily have the same effects as their stressfulness depends largely on the resources one has for coping with them. "Thus, stress is not an inherent attribute of external conditions, but emanates from discrepancies between those conditions and characteristics of the individual--his or her needs, values, perceptions, resources, and skills" (Aneshensel 1992:16).

The stress process contains three primary conceptual components: stressors and strains, moderating resources, and individual outcomes (Pearlin 1989; Pearlin and McKean 1996).

Thoits (1995) summarizes the model of the stress process as follows:

1. Individuals' locations in the social structure differentially expose them to stressors which in turn can damage their physical and/or mental health;
2. This damage is generally moderated or lessened by individuals' social and personality resources and the coping strategies that they employ; and
3. The possession of psychosocial resources and the use of particular coping strategies are socially patterned in way which at least potentially may leave members of disadvantaged groups more vulnerable to the harmful physical and psychological effects of stress (p. 68).

Given the broad nature of stress, its wide ranging effects on individuals is expectable. From a social structural perspective, stress is both a consequence of social location and a determinant of other outcomes such as depression, physical illness, and psychological distress (Aneshensel 1992; Mirowsky and Ross 1986; Pearlin 1989; Thoits 1995). While there appears to be little difference between groups in exposure to life changes, there are socially patterned differences in stressors (Thoits 1995). The research points to social causation for most psychological distress with the exception of severe, organically-based disorders (Aneshensel 1992).

Empirical evidence from stress research confirms that location in the social structure influences a person's chances of encountering stressors and strains. Women, the elderly, and the

poor tend to experience more stress than those of higher status (Thoits 1995). Economic strains are prevalent among the young, poor, those with children, undereducated, and nonwhite. Women are more likely than men to encounter interpersonal strains (Aneshensel 1992). The elderly may not experience more stressors, however they may encounter different stressors resulting from illness and declining health, loss of loved ones, exposure to the painful events in family members' lives, caregiving burdens for spouses and/or grandchildren, loss of employment roles and resources, and deteriorating neighborhoods and access to vital services (Pearlin and McKean 1996). The elderly suffer more from chronic stressors while the young experience more acute stressors (Aneshensel 1992). While not generally more vulnerable to stressors, members of disadvantaged groups are exposed to more stressors and susceptible to the cumulative effects of particular subsets of stressors (Thoits 1995).

Anger may be similar to stress in terms of epidemiology and social causation. Low-status social groups show higher rates of mental disorder because members of these groups are more likely to encounter difficult, harsh, or dramatic life conditions (Aneshensel 1992). Such trying life circumstances are likely to evoke strong emotional reactions.

Distress and Social Psychological Resources

In addition to differential exposure to stressors and strains, socially patterned deficits in resources for coping with them exacerbate their stressful effects (Aneshensel 1992; Pearlin 1989). Reducing or resolving problems, avoiding or diminishing distress, and preserving a positive sense of self are signs of stress buffering (Aneshensel 1992; Pearlin and Schooler 1978; Thoits 1994). Often, however, those exposed to the most stressors and strains -- women, the poor, minorities, and those with less education -- tend to have the fewest resources for coping with stress (Pearlin 1989).

Two kinds of resources, personal and social, buffer individuals from the structural effects on distress (Aneshensel 1992; Pearlin 1989; Thoits 1994, 1995). Personal resources include self-esteem and self-efficacy (Aneshensel 1992; Pearlin 1989; Thoits 1994, 1995), and social resources include perceived social support (Aneshensel 1992; Thoits 1995) and social integration (Pearlin 1989). Personal and social resources are important in reducing distress, although they do so in different ways.

Personal Resources--Self Efficacy

As a personal resource, self-efficacy has a profound impact on individuals' ability to cope with challenges and problems and has extensive effects on well-being (Gecas 1989; Mirowsky and

Ross 1986; Taylor and Brown 1988). Self-efficacy denotes a personal belief about one's own control over his or her outcomes, synonymous with instrumentalism, mastery, and internal locus of control, and in contrast to fatalism, helplessness, or powerlessness (Aneshensel 1992; Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen 1996). While not precisely the same, these concepts are generally interchangeable in a wide variety of circumstances (Gecas 1989; Mirowsky and Ross 1986).

Self-efficacy has both a motivational component, encouraging action that allows a person to experience herself as effective, and a cognitive component, the expectancy of control (Gecas 1989; Gecas and Burke 1991). High self-efficacy predicts more positive outcomes, such as greater satisfaction and well-being, while fatalism and powerlessness contribute to more negative outcomes, including distress and depression (Gecas 1989; Gecas and Burke 1991; Mirowsky and Ross 1986). Sociological perspectives on self-efficacy can be traced back to Marx's work on alienation and the theme of self-creation through efficacious action, particularly at work (Gecas 1989). "Self-efficacy may be the most direct expression of the self-concept as a social force" (Gecas and Burke 1991:47).

This broad view of self-efficacy does not differentiate between self-judgements of general competency and more action-specific expectations about success. Bandura (1977), however,

further specifies self-efficacy as efficacy expectations, a person's beliefs about successfully performing particular actions. Bandura differentiates efficacy expectations from outcome expectations, more contextualized estimates of whether certain actions will result in particular outcomes in given circumstances (Gecas 1989). For example, according to Bandura's distinctions, individuals may have generally high self-efficacy, but low efficacy expectations about their success in exercising regularly, or low outcome expectations that asking an employer for a raise in salary will result in receiving a raise, even though they feel capable of asking. In the later case, the outcome expectation points to the individual's belief about the responsiveness of an external factor to a given action. Thus, Bandura distinguishes self-appraisals from estimations of the responsiveness of the system or environment (Gecas 1989). While these refinements of self-efficacy theory offer greater specificity, unfortunately, only measures of general self-efficacy are available in the 1996 GSS data.

Self-esteem, another personal resource, has limited effects on individual outcomes. Indeed, high self-esteem may result, at least in part, from efficacious activity. For example, school performance has a greater effect on self-esteem than self-esteem has on school performance (Gecas and Burke 1991). Self-efficacy also is greatly influenced by one's social status, while self-

esteem depends more on proximal influences, such as social niches, and interpersonal contexts (Aneshensel 1992; Gecas 1989; Gecas and Burke 1991; Hughes and Demo 1989). Stress research shows that, among personal resources, self-esteem has less effect on distress than self-efficacy (Pearlin and Schooler 1978) and its effects on stress have been less frequently investigated (Thoits 1995). Since "the most thoroughly developed linkage between social standing and stress is the concept of self-efficacy" (Aneshensel 1992:27), self-efficacy is the personal resource of focus here.

Individuals' self-concepts, including self-efficacy, develop through interactions with others and interpretive self-processes (Demo 1992; Gecas 1989; Hughes and Demo 1989; Rosenberg 1981). Through reflected appraisals, we come to see ourselves as we believe others see us (Swann 1987). In making social comparisons, we compare ourselves with similar others (Festinger 1950). And, in making self-attributions we assign internal or external causes to our success and failures based on our subjective observations of ourselves, usually biased toward a positive self-concept (Greenwald 1980). Of these three processes, self-attributions may be most implicated in the development of self-efficacy because they shape self-perceptions about oneself as a causal agent in the environment.

The condition of individuals' structural locations largely

determine their chances to develop a sense of self-efficacy (Gecas 1989). Self-efficacy depends upon the experience of efficacious activity. Opportunity to be efficacious is affected by dimensions of institutional inequality such as occupational prestige, education and income, and by practices associated with cultural beliefs that result in discrimination (Hughes and Demo 1989). Logically, performing effectively contributes to high self-efficacy. However, since "social contexts that are particularly conducive to efficacious activity are institutional in nature--part of the macrostructure of society--indicators of a individual's location in the macrostructure (specifically, social class and work) should be strong predictors of personal efficacy" (Hughes and Demo 1989:138). Thus, relatively disadvantaged groups such as the poor, minorities, and women should have lower self-efficacy. Indeed, whites, men, and people with higher income, education, and occupational prestige have relatively higher levels of self-efficacy than minorities, women, and people of lower socioeconomic status (Gecas 1989, Thoits 1995). Although age has little effect on self-esteem (Demo 1992; Dietz 1996), sense of control diminishes with age (Mirowsky and Ross 1986). The effects of these status characteristics may interact, further reducing self-efficacy (Gecas 1989).

Self-efficacy influences distress through coping behavior (Aneshensel 1992) because "what people do or fail to do in

dealing with their problems can make a difference to their well-being" (Pearlin and Schooler 1978:18). In coping with stress, self-efficacy makes instrumental, problem-solving behavior more likely than passive or avoidant behavior (Aneshensel 1992; Chwalisz, Altmaier, and Russell 1992; Thoits 1995). Problem-focused coping that changes the situation or its meaning appears to be more beneficial for well-being than passive coping that merely manages distressing feelings but does not change the situation or its meaning (Pearlin and Schooler 1978; Thoits 1995).

Although structural constraints contribute to low self-efficacy, individuals with low self-efficacy do not necessarily blame external sources for undesirable outcomes. Hughes and Demo (1989) found that self-efficacy does not depend on whether blacks blame the system for poor personal outcomes. Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen found that "Americans who feel little control over their own lives take heart from the belief that most Americans can achieve what they really set their minds to, that in the United States most people's problems result from their bad decisions and lack of effort, and that in America good and bad outcomes are more than a matter of luck" (1996:335).

Control is a key element of self-efficacy (Gecas 1989; Pearlin and Schooler 1978; Thoits 1995), and potency and control are central components of anger (Morgan and Heise 1988).

Therefore, self-efficacy may affect anger. However, potency is not an element of depression, an indicator of distress.

Therefore, it is possible that self-efficacy will have the opposite effect on anger that it has on stress. In difficult circumstances, individuals with high self-efficacy may become angry because they believe they can change the situation, whereas individuals with low-self-efficacy may feel powerless and become depressed instead. In such cases, the effect of self-efficacy on anger may not be ameliorated by attributing difficulties to systemic causes. However, for most people, I expect that self-efficacy will be *negatively* related to anger.

Social Resources--Social Integration

The second primary social psychological factor in distress is social resources, such as support and ties with others. Social resources include dimensions of integration, relation networks, and support systems which address "whether a person's basic social needs -- affection, esteem, approval, belonging, identity and security -- are satisfied through interaction with others" (Aneshensel 1992:17). Integration refers to individuals' social embeddedness according to the number of their relationships and frequency of contact with others (Thoits 1995). Most people's social networks include formal and informal relationships, ties of varying strengths and amounts of interaction. People potentially get support through

relationships "in virtually all institutional and social contexts: religion, occupation, family, neighborhood, voluntary associations, the medical care system, and elsewhere" (Pearlin 1989:251).

Although some research indicates that only *perceived* social support and fulfilling personal relationships suppress the effects of stressors (Mirowsky and Ross 1986; Thoits 1995), Pearlin (1989) contends that:

Certainly there is nothing wrong with data that bear on perceived support [the resources that one actually uses in dealing with life problems]; studies indicate that perceived support indeed has a mediating function in the stress process (Turner 1983). Yet, when the study of perceived support is separated from the study of networks, we are unable to see how individuals' support is associated with their integration into various social institutions and contexts (p. 251).

Socially patterned differences in social integration may mediate social structural effects on distress. Women are thought to be more oriented toward relationships and more interdependent with others (Cross and Madsen 1997) and are more likely to seek social support in coping with difficulties (Thoits 1995). However, they are also more likely to be single-parents and economically strained (McClanahan and Booth 1991), and, single or not, to work a "second shift" (Hochschild 1989). These conditions leave women less time and opportunity to participate in social networks. Consequently, men have more extensive social integration, as do people of higher socioeconomic status (Thoits

1995). The poor and minorities are more likely to live in disadvantaged neighborhoods and higher crime urban environments which may contribute to a lack of social integration (McClanahan and Booth 1991). As people age, sources of support tend to shrink and replacement of social contacts slows (Pearlin and McKean 1996; Thoits 1995). Just as with self-efficacy, those most in need of social support to cope with stressful circumstances tend to have less of this resource.

While relationships may frequently be sources of stressors or strains, ties with friends, neighbors, relatives, and religious and social groups may buffer people from the effects of stress and enhance psychological and physical well-being (Aneshensel 1992; Kessler, Price and Wortman 1985; Mirowsky and Ross 1986). As social integration is a key element of social support, I expect that individuals with greater social integration will experience less anger because of the buffering effect of this social resource.

Marital status has also been shown to be an important determinant of social support, although it is not a guarantee (Mirowsky and Ross 1986). In stress research, "the simplest and most powerful measure of social support appears to be whether a person has an intimate, confiding relationship or not (typically a spouse or lover; friends or relatives function equivalently but less powerfully)" (Thoits 1995:64). Having children in the home


is also correlated with distress, especially among women and single parents (Mirowsky and Ross 1986; Ross and Van Willigen 1996). Therefore, marital status and the presence of children in the home serve as controls in the stress model of anger (see Figure 3.2), as they do in the equity model.

Pearlin and Schooler (1978) suggest that when it comes to stress:

there are important human problems...that are not responsive to individual coping responses...Many of the problems stemming from arrangements deeply rooted in social and economic organization may exert a powerful effect on personal life but be impervious to personal efforts to change them. This perhaps is the reason that much of our coping functions only to help us endure that which we cannot avoid (p. 18).

The same may be true of anger, leaving some direct structural effects on anger unaccounted for by personal and social resources.

Figure 3.2 A Stress Model of Anger



G. A Social Structure and Personality Approach to Anger

Just as individual-level explanations of social phenomena omit powerful social and cultural factors, structural and cultural explanations are incomplete unless they explicitly link these phenomena to the individuals who comprise society. An equity model of anger would incorporate cultural beliefs about gender, fairness in opportunities and outcomes, and the trustworthiness of others, but fail to consider the resources people have available for coping with structural inequities. Conversely, the stress model of anger considers resources for dealing with adversity, but omits the beliefs that may affect individuals' perceptions of their circumstances. In addition, beliefs and resources may have reciprocal effects and interactions that further affect individual experience. A social structure and personality (SSP) approach to anger would integrate the equity and stress models to provide a more complete model of the effects of structure, culture, social psychological characteristics on emotional outcomes.

According to House (1981), understanding the relationship between macro-social phenomena and individual personality traits requires conceptual and empirical analysis of both structural and cultural influences. Similar patterns of social interaction (structure) and shared beliefs (culture) shape the actions, thoughts, and feelings of individuals through social

interactions. Without understanding how social structure, culture, interaction and stimuli are processed, we cannot adequately understand or explain the relationship between social structure and personal outcomes.

Structure and culture imply different proximal effects and psychological influences on individuals, so intervening mechanisms must also be specified. Accordingly, House identifies three basic analytic principles of the social structure and personality approach. The first principle is the components principle: macro-social phenomena have multiple components, and those that are relevant to the personality outcomes in question must be clearly identified. House uses "social system" to encompass both structure and culture, but distinguishes between the two. The distinction lies in what people, collectively, believe (culture) and what they do (structure in the form of patterns of relations and activities). Culture includes shared beliefs and values. Structure includes features of the social system such as ethnic and socioeconomic composition. The second principle, the proximity principle, links the effects of social structure to individuals through proximate stimuli that directly impinge on them. The last principle, the psychological principle, addresses how and to what extent macro and proximal micro-social phenomena affect individual personality, behavior, and experience as a function of psychological processes. Thus,

to account for the relationship between social systems and individual experiences, we need to identify the linkages and interactions between them.

The social structure and personality approach allows us to trace the often strong effects of social position on individual experiences through the less direct channels of cultural beliefs and social and personal resources. Beliefs and resources may have mutual effects on individual outcomes. The possible interaction between self-efficacy and the ideology of individualism provides an apt example of the importance of considering beliefs and resources together: An efficacious view of oneself leads one to believe that "(a)ctions effect outcomes; thus hard work, ability, insight, and effort generate success" (Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen 1996:323). Similarly, the ideology of individualism gives "little weight to exploitation or bad luck as explanations of poverty, and attach great importance to the lack of effort, ability, or talent among the poor (Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen 1996:323). Consequently, individuals may feel powerless either from low self-efficacy or from "perceptions of a social system as unresponsive to one's actions" (Gecas 1989). In the fatalistic view, "people merely react to external conditions that direct their lives. Circumstances, forces and events outside personal control determine outcomes. Success or failure merely reveals a destiny

imposed from outside" (Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen 1996:322).


Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen (1996) tested the effects of the potential reinforcing and counterbalancing effects of resources and beliefs on distress: First, in keeping with the "just world" hypothesis that people are responsible for their own outcomes, they hypothesized that the ideology of individualism would reinforce self-efficacy and reduce distress. Second, they expected that believing others have control over their outcomes would reduce distress among individuals with diminished self-efficacy by counterbalancing a lack of control of one's own life. They found strong reinforcing effects between individualism and self-efficacy and counterbalancing effects of the ideology of individualism on distress among individuals with below average self-efficacy. However, people who feel powerless are not comforted by believing that they are not alone in their powerlessness, instead those who believe themselves and others to be powerless hold a sense of resentment (Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen 1996).

Among individuals suffering economic hardship, belief in individualism buffers individuals with low self-efficacy from feelings of depression: "Those who feel overwhelmed by external or random forces take heart if most others seem to manage their lives effectively. Control in principle is better than no hope

of control at all" (Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen 1996:325). Subscribing to an ideology of individualism may buffer the disadvantaged from anger, as it does depression, by influencing perceptions of control and fairness. However, among people experiencing economic hardship who are *not* buffered by a strong belief in individualism, resentment is related to depression. Such resentment and resignation signals "a peculiarly destructive form of alienation. Hardship itself does not decrease or increase instrumentalism, but it encourages a very depressing dog-eat-dog view of success" (Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen 1996:335). These findings suggest that resources and beliefs, such as self-efficacy and the ideology of individualism, should be considered together, as in a social structure and personality approach, to better account for individual outcomes.

Given the theorized effects of beliefs on perceptions of fairness, and resources on the power to cope with difficulty, a social structure and personality model (see Figure 3.3) may link anger to relative power and privilege. Depression, a less potent negative emotion, may be the negative affective option for the disadvantaged. Consequently, individuals subject to more difficult and inequitable conditions may experience more depression than anger. Emotions, and particularly anger, may mark yet one more way that life is easier for the socially advantaged.

Figure 3.3 A Social Structure and Personality Model of Anger



IV. Hypotheses

Based on the preceding review of the literature, I derive the following hypotheses:

H1: The greater the social disadvantage, the more frequently individuals get angry.

The relationship between disadvantage and anger may not be direct, but affected indirectly by social psychological features.

H2: Beliefs about equity affect the frequency of anger:

a. The more individuals' subscribe to an egalitarian gender ideology, the more frequently they get angry. However, since egalitarian men are less affected by the objective circumstances that disadvantage women, they are less likely to encounter situations that provoke an affective response in relation to this belief. Therefore, gender ideology may be less relevant to men's experience of anger.

b. The more strongly individuals subscribe to the ideology of individualism, the less frequently they get angry.

c. The more individuals mistrust others, the more frequently they get angry.

H3: The greater social and personal resources, the less frequently individuals are angry.

a. The more socially integrated, the less frequently

individuals get angry.

- b. The greater the self-efficacy, the less frequently individuals get angry. This hypothesis is offered with a caveat: Since most people have relatively positive self concepts, including a sense of control over their outcomes, those with very high self-efficacy, and thus an exaggerated sense of control, may experience anger significantly more often than others. For the majority of people, self-efficacy may provide an effective means of coping with daily difficulties, thereby reducing anger in everyday life.

H4: The combined effects of beliefs and resources will account for more of the variance in anger than either beliefs or resources alone.

V. DESCRIPTION OF METHODS

A. Sample

The data for this study come from the 1996 General Social Survey (GSS), a full probability sample of non-institutionalized adults in the United States with a 76 percent response rate (National Opinion Research Center 1996). Two sub-samples, 1996-A and 1996-B, each responded to different special modules in addition answering the permanent and rotating core questions. This study uses data from the 1460 respondents from sample 1996-A who took part in the special emotions and gender modules. Data from 76 non-black minority respondents are omitted because there are too few cases within the individual non-black ethnic groups in this sample to discern differences between non-black minorities.

The remaining sample of 1384 reflects the adult population of the U.S. as reported by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The GSS sample is 85.5 percent white and 14.5 percent black, similar to the Census Bureau's (1998) reported 83 percent white and 13 percent black 1996 U.S. population. In 1996, the median age of the total U.S. population was 35 years (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998) and the GSS sample, which excludes individuals under 18 years old, has a median age of 43 years. The median household income category for the sample is \$30,000 to \$34,999, similar to the \$35,172 median income of the general population in 1996 (U.S.

Bureau of the Census 1998). The median education of respondents is 13 years, while 12.7 is the median years of education of those age 25 and older in the general population (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998). As is common in survey research, women are slightly overrepresented among respondents, comprising 57% of the sample but 51% of the U.S. adult population (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998).

B. Measures

Independent Variables

This study uses several indicators of location in social structure. *Gender* compares women (coded 1) with men (0). *Age* is based on respondents' date of birth which is recoded into actual age (National Opinion Research Center 1996) and ranges from 18 to 89 years. Missing data for five cases is coded to the mean age of 45.38 years. *Ethnicity* contrasts whites (coded 0) with 201 blacks (1).

Education is measured as the highest grade of school completed. It ranges from no formal education (coded 0) to 8 years of college (20). Four missing cases are coded to the mean of 13.37 years.

Income is coded in thousands of dollars per year using the median value of the household income category reported. The twenty-one original categories range from "under \$1,000" to "over \$75,000." The unequal sizes of the original income categories

prohibits treating this variable as if it had the continuous properties necessary for more sophisticated statistical analyses (Bohrenstedt and Knoke 1994). Therefore, recoding the data to the median dollar value of each category is necessary. In recoding this way, the ordered categorical data takes on properties of interval-level data for analyses and retains the specificity that would be lost by collapsing categories into equal intervals. Missing data for 153 of those who did not respond to this item or who did not know their household income are coded to the mean value of \$40,134.

Two other control variables are included because evidence indicates they are associated with distress and anger (Mirowsky and Ross 1986; Ross and Van Willigen 1996; Thoits 1995). *Marital status* is a series of dummy variables for married, divorced and separated, and widowed, with those who have never married serving as the comparison group. *Children present* measures the number of children under age 18 in the household.

Anger expressiveness serves as an additional control to address the possibility that some people are more inclined to express anger than others (Ross and Van Willigen 1996). After reporting on their recent emotions, respondents were asked how strongly they agree or disagree that, "When I'm angry I let

people know."² Higher scores reflect a greater agreement and greater anger expressiveness, while lower scores indicate disagreement and more reserve in expressing anger. For example, "strongly agree" is coded +2, while "strongly disagree" is coded -2. Responses of "neither agree nor disagree/it depends" are coded 0.

Intervening Variables

Between social structure and individual experience lay a host of possible intervening factors. In this study, two types of intervening variables are considered: beliefs and resources.

Beliefs

Gender Ideology. Five items measure respondents' beliefs about gender roles, particularly in regard to marriage and child

² Individuals responding to survey form Y (N= 720) were asked two additional questions about emotional expressiveness: (1) "I'm not afraid to let people know my feelings;" and (2) "I keep my emotions to myself" (reverse coded). These items factor together with the item concerning anger expression and average into an emotional expressiveness scale which has a reliability of .70. The mean response of those who were asked only the first item does not differ significantly ($p < .05$) from the mean score on the general emotional expressiveness scale of those who were asked all three items.

Ross and Van Willigen (1996) control for emotional expressiveness by using the second item above and found that, contrary to response bias theory expectations, those who are more emotionally reserved report anger more frequently than those who are more expressive. In analyses not shown, the effect on reported anger of general emotional expressiveness, as measured by the two additional items, was tested and found to be insignificant. Therefore, only the item which was asked of all respondents and specifically addresses the expression of anger is used in this study.

rearing. The first four items ask respondents how strongly, on a four point scale, they agree or disagree with the following statements: (a) "A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works"; (b) "A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work" (reverse coded); (c) "It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family;" and (d) "It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself." A fifth item asks "Would you prefer the type of relationship described in statement 1 or statement 2? 1. A relationship where the man has the main responsibility for providing the household income and the woman has the main responsibility for taking care of the home and family. 2. A relationship where the man and woman equally share responsibility for providing the household income and taking care of the home and family." Responses reflecting the first statement are coded one, the second statement coded two, and nine missing cases coded to the mean of 1.75. The five items factor unidimensionally and are converted to standardized values (Z-scores) and summed into a scale with an alpha reliability of .75. The scores range from -10.33 to 6.78 with higher scores indicative of a more egalitarian gender ideology.

Although gender remains highly relevant as a workplace and

political issue, this measure of gender ideology primarily focuses on gender in domestic roles for two reasons: First, gender ideology is put into action and comes into conflict at home in people's roles as spouses and parents, as the vast literature on division of household labor attests. Second, women and men seem to be equally satisfied with their work conditions (Mueller and Wallace 1996). In addition, neither men nor women readily identify themselves as feminists; just 20 percent of the 1996-A GSS sample indicated they thought of themselves as feminists. Therefore, gender ideology based on domestic roles is likely to be more fruitful in analyses than gender attitudes concerning politics or the workplace.

Belief in *individualism* is measured by a single item which asks, "Do people get ahead by hard work or lucky breaks and help from others?" Respondents attribute getting ahead to hard work (coded 1), hard work and luck equally (0), or to luck (-1). The mean of responses is 0.63. This construct reflects the degree to which others are believed to control their own outcomes, similar to "American instrumentalism" (Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen 1996) and the "ideology of individualism" (Kluegel and Smith 1986). The belief that people largely "get what they deserve and deserve what they get" is widely embraced by Americans (Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen 1996:323), including those in this sample, 73 percent of whom attribute getting ahead to hard work. Four

hundred and eighty-seven respondents in the sample were not asked this question, so these cases are omitted for analyses on individualism, along with 10 cases with missing data on this item.

Individuals' degree of *mistrust* is operationalized by summing three items ($\alpha = .65$). The first question asks, "Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?" The second item asks, "Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?" And the third item inquires, "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Trusting responses are coded -1, distrusting responses are coded 1, and those who volunteered another answer or said it depends are coded 0. The scale ranges from -3 to 3 with a mean of .20. Higher scores reflect more mistrust of others. Only 937 individuals in the sample were asked these items, therefore the 447 cases without data for these variables are omitted from analyses involving mistrust, along with 7 other cases with missing data on one or more of these items.

Personal and Social Resources

Self-efficacy is operationalized with four statements from the Mirowsky/Ross Sense of Control Index (1991 in Sastry and Ross

1998): (1) "There's no sense in planning a lot--if something good is going to happen, it will"; (2) "Most of my problems are due to bad breaks"; (3) "The really good things that happen to me are mostly luck"; and (4) "I have little control over the bad things that happen to me." Higher scores reflect a greater disagreement and sense of control, while lower scores indicate agreement and a perceived lack of control and a sense of fatalism. For example, "strongly agree" is coded -2, while "strongly disagree" is coded +2. Responses of "neither agree nor disagree/it depends" are coded 0. This coding scheme shows both negative and positive directions of responses (Sastry and Ross 1998). The handful of cases with responses of "don't know" or no response to four items (10, 14, 11, and 19, respectively) are coded to the mean category of each variable which was of one (1) for all but the first variable which was zero (0). The four items factor unidimensionally and are summed to comprise a self-efficacy scale ($\alpha = .68$) which ranges from -8 to 8 with a mean of 1.97. The four questions are phrased negatively and emphasize denying control over both good and bad outcomes. Still, they suggest a sense of being able to control one's own outcomes and therefore serve as indicators of self-efficacy for the purpose of this study.

A scale of informal *social integration* consists of four items asking respondents how often they(a) spend a social evening

with relatives; (b) spend a social evening with someone who lives in your neighborhood; (c) spend a social evening with friends who live outside the neighborhood; and (d) go to a bar or tavern. Seven response categories ranging from "never" (0) to "almost every day" (6) are coded so that the more one socializes the higher their score. Because these items measure different types of socializing rather than different aspects of socializing, they are not highly correlated and do not form a single dimension. Thus, the four items are summed into a simple social integration score ranging from 0 to 23 with a mean of 10.48. Among the sample, 934 respondents were asked these items. The other 450 respondents are excluded from analyses involving social integration, along with 7 cases with missing data on one or more of the items.

Dependent Variable

Anger

Level of anger is measured by three items asked among a battery of questions about respondents' emotions during the previous week. Each was asked, "On how many days in the past 7 days have you felt...:" (a) "outraged at something somebody had done;" (b) "mad at something or someone;" and (c) "angry at someone." Responses to these three items range from zero to seven. In factor analysis of the nineteen items concerning emotions, the three items about anger factor unidimensionally.

Each of the three anger items had a handful of missing cases; twelve, eleven, and nine respectively. Respondents who said "don't know" or did not answer an item (12, 11, and 9 cases, respectively) are coded to the mean values which were 1.52, 1.68, and 1.49, respectively. Responses are averaged to create an anger scale ($\alpha = .85$) which ranges from 0 to 7. On average, respondents reported being angry 1.56 days per week. These items measure variation in day-to-day affective experience.

Three versions of the 1996 GSS was administered to sub-sample A. As a result, no case has data for every variable in this study. The item on individualism was asked of people responding to versions 1 and 3. Items on mistrust were asked of individuals administered versions 2 and 3. And, items on social integration were asked of respondents to versions 1 and 2. Since the GSS sub-samples are probability samples, randomness can be assumed. However, to account for potential sampling bias, possible differences between respondents to versions 1, 2, and 3 were examined for all study variables (see Appendix 1). No significant differences ($p < .05$) were noted. Therefore, these sub-samples are comparable as systematic or non-random sampling bias is not apparent.

C. Analyses

The statistical analyses proceeds as follows: First, I report descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations of the

variables in the study. Second, I investigate sociodemographic differences in the study variables by analyses of variance according to gender, ethnicity, and marital and parental statuses. I then regress anger on the independent variables to identify differences in the frequency of anger. Next, the proposed intervening variables are regressed on the independent variables to determine social variations. A series of regressions are then used to test the effects on anger of the proposed intervening variables from the equity and stress models, as well as their potential mediating and moderating effects. Finally, I test a model which reflects a broader social structure and personality approach by regressing anger on the significant intervening variables from the equity and stress models.

Although the terms moderator and mediator are sometimes used interchangeably in social science research, there are important distinctions between the two. Moderators are characterized by interactions between the independent variables and the intervening variables. Tests of moderation are typically used when the direct relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable is weak. Moderators specify when a given effect occurs. Mediators are intervening variables that specify how and/or why such effects occur as indicated by their transformation of the independent variable's effect on the dependent variable. Tests of mediation are typical when the

direct relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable is relatively strong. Only direct relationships between independent and dependent variables can be mediated. Establishing mediation requires three regression equations: In the first, the independent variable must affect the proposed mediator. In the second, the independent variable must affect the dependent variable. And, in the third, the mediator must affect the dependent variable and the effect of the independent variable must be less than in the second equation (Baron and Kenny 1986).

VI. RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 shows the medians, means (or percentages, as appropriate), and standard deviations of each of the study variables. As previously described, the sample is 56.6 percent female and 14.5 percent black. On average, respondents are 45.4 years old with 13.4 years of education and \$40,130 annual household income. Nearly half (46.5 percent) of respondents are currently married, 21.1 percent are divorced or separated, 10.4 percent are widowed, and 21.9 percent have never been married. The mean number of children per household is only .64 as two-thirds (66 percent) of those surveyed have no children in the home. Respondents with children at home have an average of 1.9 children in the household. Descriptive statistics for the individual sub-samples are shown in Appendix 1 and reveal no significant ($p < .05$) differences in sociodemographic characteristics between respondents to different versions of the survey.

Bivariate Correlations

Bivariate correlations are used to test whether anger is associated with sociodemographic characteristics or the proposed intervening variables. Appendices 2 through 5 report bivariate correlations between study variables for the various sub-samples in the study. Appendix 2 shows correlations among variables

available for all respondents. Appendix 3 reports correlations for the 887 respondents asked about their belief in individualism. Appendix 4 reflects correlations among variables for the 930 individuals who responded to items about mistrust of others. Appendix 5 indicates bivariate correlations for the 927 respondents with data on social integration. Consistent patterns of relationships between the variables are evident across the four sample sub-sets.

TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables

	<i>N</i>	Median	Mean or %	<i>SD</i>
Age	1384	43.00	45.38	16.69
Gender (Female)	1384		56.6%	
Ethnicity (Black)	1384		14.5%	
Education	1384	13.00	13.37	2.92
Household Income ^a	1384	37.50	40.13	27.84
Marital Status				
Married	1384		46.5%	
Divorced/Separated	1384		21.1%	
Widowed	1384		10.4%	
Never Married	1384		21.9%	
Number of Children at Home	1384	0.00	0.64	1.07
Anger Expression	1384	1.00	0.43	1.17
Egalitarian Gender Ideology	1384	0.54	0.24	3.57
Belief in Individualism	887	1.00	0.63	0.67
Mistrust	930	1.00	0.20	2.20
Self-Efficacy	1384	2.00	1.97	3.17
Social Integration	927	10.00	10.48	4.12
Frequency of Anger	1384	1.00	1.56	1.63

^a In thousands of dollars.

Relationships between gender and other study variables are consistent with previous research discussed earlier. Compared to men, women have lower household income, are more likely to be divorced or separated, widowed, have more children at home, hold a more egalitarian gender ideology, and have fewer social contacts. Also, there are significantly more black women than black men in the sample.

Compared with whites, blacks typically have fewer years of education, less household income, and are younger. Blacks are also less likely to be currently married and have lower self-efficacy than whites. Blacks are more likely to have never married, have more children in the home, express anger, have a more egalitarian gender ideology, and to mistrust others to be fair than do whites.

Those with greater education and household income, positively correlated indicators of social class, are more likely to be married, have a more egalitarian gender ideology, express anger less readily, trust others more, and see themselves as more efficacious. The widowed tend to have less education and income. Those with less education are older and believe more strongly in the ideology of individualism, while those with more education are more likely to never have married and have more social contacts. However, those with lower levels of household income are more likely to have never married, as well as to be divorced

and separated. Those with more household income tend to have more children in the household.

Age is the only socioeconomic independent variable significantly related to the frequency of being angry, and the relationship is negative. Older persons are more likely to be married or widowed, while younger persons are more apt to have never married, have more children in the household, express anger more readily, espouse a more egalitarian gender ideology, have greater mistrust of other, and engage in more social contacts.

In contrast to those of other marital statuses, married individuals tend to have more children at home and greater self-efficacy, but hold a less egalitarian gender ideology, trust others more, and have fewer social contacts. Being divorced or separated is correlated with having a more egalitarian gender ideology and greater social integration. Widows have fewer children in the home, hold a less egalitarian gender ideology, have lower self-efficacy and fewer social contacts, and experience anger less frequently. The never-married have fewer children in the home, a more egalitarian gender ideology, greater mistrust of people, lower self-efficacy, more social contacts, and experience anger more frequently.

The two additional control variables, the number of children in the household and anger expression, have significant positive relationships with the frequency of being angry. In addition,

the number of children at home is correlated with greater mistrust of other people. Anger expression is associated with a more egalitarian gender ideology and greater mistrust of others, but also with greater social integration.

Among the intervening variables, self-efficacy and mistrust are the most strongly related to frequency of anger. Self-efficacy is negatively related to frequency of anger while mistrust of people is positively correlated with frequency of anger. Having an egalitarian gender ideology is associated with greater self-efficacy and social integration and, albeit weakly, with frequency of anger. Belief in the ideology of individualism is positively related to self-efficacy. Mistrust is negatively related to self-efficacy.

In sum, the frequency of being angry is negatively associated with age, widowhood, and self-efficacy, and is positively associated with never having been married, number of children in the household, anger expression, gender ideology, and mistrust. The ideology of individualism and social integration have no direct relationship with frequency of anger, however, they may be indirectly related to anger through self-efficacy and gender ideology, respectively.

Analyses of Variance

As initial tests of the hypotheses that anger and the proposed intervening social psychological factors vary by social

structural location, analyses of variance tested for mean differences in these variables. Table 2 shows the means and significant differences in study variables by gender, ethnicity, and marital and parental statuses. There are some significant mean differences between gender and ethnic groups in the intervening beliefs and resources, as well as between parents and non-parents, and between those of various marital statuses. Men, whites, and non-parents, hold more traditional gender ideologies than their comparison groups. Not surprisingly, the widowed hold the most conventional gender ideology while the never married are the most egalitarian. Blacks, parents, and the never married are most mistrustful of people. Whites and married people have higher self-efficacy than blacks and those not currently married. The widowed have significantly less self-efficacy than others, and are the least socially integrated group in terms of contact with friends, neighbors, and relatives.

Unlike divorced individuals in Ross's and Van Willigen's (1996) study, the divorced and separated in this study do not get angry significantly more often, on average, than those in other marital status categories. The widowed get angry significantly less often than others, while those who have never been married get angry significantly more often. Consistent with Ross's and Van Willigen's (1996) earlier findings, however, parents get angry more frequently, on average, than people without children

TABLE 2. Analyses of Variance in Study Variables by Marital and Parental Status

	Gender		Ethnicity		Parental Status		Married		Divorced/Separated		Widowed		Never Married	
	Men	Women	White	Black	Parents	Non-Parents ^b	Married	Others	Div/Sep	Others	Widowed	Others	Never Married	Others
Age	44.97 (16.07)	45.69 (17.15)	45.85** (16.80)	42.57 (15.75)	37.21*** (10.30)	49.56 (17.76)	46.68** (14.48)	44.24 (18.33)	45.98 (12.97)	45.21 (17.55)	65.87*** (15.37)	42.99 (15.44)	32.26*** (13.33)	49.05 (15.66)
Gender (Female=1)	-----	-----	0.55*** (0.50)	0.69 (0.46)	0.63*** (0.48)	0.53 (0.50)	0.52** (0.50)	0.61 (0.49)	0.17 (0.37)	0.14 (0.35)	0.77*** (0.42)	0.54 (0.49)	0.50** (0.50)	0.58 (0.49)
Ethnicity (Black=1)	0.10*** (0.30)	0.18 (0.38)	-----	-----	0.19*** (0.40)	0.12 (0.33)	0.07*** (0.26)	0.21 (0.41)	0.63** (0.48)	0.55 (0.50)	0.19 (0.39)	0.14 (0.35)	0.25*** (0.44)	0.11 (0.32)
Education	13.51 (2.93)	13.27 (2.91)	13.52*** (2.88)	12.47 (3.00)	13.32 (2.72)	13.39 (3.02)	13.58* (2.86)	13.19 (2.97)	13.34 (2.77)	13.38 (2.96)	11.33*** (3.34)	13.61 (2.77)	13.92*** (2.55)	13.22 (3.00)
Income ^a	44.18*** (28.70)	37.04 (26.77)	41.90*** (28.16)	29.74 (23.37)	43.50** (29.40)	38.40 (26.86)	51.54*** (28.78)	30.21 (22.75)	31.69*** (21.87)	42.39 (28.82)	27.05*** (22.55)	41.65 (28.01)	30.20*** (23.58)	42.92 (28.31)
# Children at Home	0.52** (0.50)	0.43 (0.50)	0.60*** (1.02)	0.92 (1.27)	1.90 (0.99)	-----	0.86*** (1.20)	0.45 (0.90)	0.55 (0.99)	0.67 (1.09)	0.25*** (0.70)	0.69 (1.09)	0.45*** (0.88)	0.70 (1.11)
Anger Expression	0.37 (1.18)	0.47 (1.16)	0.39** (1.17)	0.67 (1.14)	0.52* (1.13)	0.38 (1.18)	0.38 (1.14)	0.47 (1.19)	0.54 (1.16)	0.40 (1.17)	0.26 (1.33)	0.45 (1.15)	0.52 (1.14)	0.40 (1.17)
Gender Ideology	-0.70*** (3.48)	0.57 (3.56)	-0.10** (3.64)	0.76 (3.04)	0.32* (3.52)	-0.13 (3.59)	-0.45*** (3.58)	1.43 (3.52)	0.59* (3.65)	-0.13 (3.54)	-1.60*** (3.46)	0.21 (3.54)	1.25*** (3.01)	-0.32 (3.64)
Ideology of Individualism	0.59 (0.69)	0.65 (0.64)	0.64 (0.65)	0.53 (0.75)	0.62 (0.66)	0.63 (0.67)	0.58 (0.68)	0.66 (0.65)	0.68 (0.63)	0.61 (0.67)	0.67 (0.60)	0.62 (0.67)	0.65 (0.68)	0.62 (0.66)
Mistrust	0.19 (2.19)	0.20 (2.21)	-0.01*** (2.20)	1.41 (1.76)	0.58*** (2.13)	0.002 (2.21)	-0.12*** (2.15)	0.45 (2.21)	0.35 (2.23)	0.15 (2.19)	0.07 (2.12)	0.21 (2.21)	0.71*** (2.19)	0.05 (2.18)
Self- Efficacy	2.06 (3.20)	1.90 (3.14)	2.25*** (3.09)	0.36 (3.11)	1.92 (3.31)	2.00 (3.09)	2.43*** (2.89)	1.58 (3.34)	1.93 (3.17)	1.98 (3.17)	0.82*** (3.35)	2.11 (3.12)	1.58* (3.45)	2.08 (3.08)
Social Integration	10.84* (4.23)	10.22 (4.14)	10.51 (4.02)	10.30 (4.73)	10.49 (4.12)	10.48 (4.14)	9.83*** (3.67)	11.09 (4.43)	11.10* (4.42)	10.32 (4.04)	8.90*** (4.28)	10.65 (4.08)	12.08*** (4.26)	10.05 (4.01)
Frequency of Anger	1.59 (1.66)	1.54 (1.61)	1.55 (1.63)	1.62 (1.64)	1.83*** (1.65)	1.42 (1.61)	1.55 (1.61)	1.57 (1.65)	1.59 (1.57)	1.55 (1.65)	1.21** (1.61)	1.60 (1.63)	1.73* (1.74)	1.52 (1.60)
n	600	784	1183	201	470	914	644	740	292	1092	144	1240	303	1081

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

^a In thousands of dollars.

^b Non-parents include individuals who may have children not living in the home.

in the home (1.83 vs. 1.42 days in the past week), and are more likely than non-parents to express anger (0.52 vs. 0.38).

Blacks also express anger more often than whites. Blacks in this sample tend to be younger and have less education than whites, factors associated with being more expressive which may account for blacks' more frequent anger expression.

Regressions

To ascertain the effect of individual social structural locations on the frequency of anger and potential intervening social psychological factors, it is important to control for other factors. To further test the first hypothesis that social structural disadvantage is associated with greater frequency of anger, OLS regressions are used to determine the effects of structural location on the frequency of anger while controlling for the effects other sociodemographic factors.

Table 3 shows the standardized and unstandardized coefficients of regressing frequency of anger on the independent variables. Social structural location predicts little about the frequency of being angry in this sample. However, age consistently predicts a significant decline in the frequency of anger, as Ross and Van Willigen (1996) found. However, Ross and Van Willigen (1996) also report that women, blacks, the divorced, and those with children in the household experience anger more frequently, as do individuals inclined to keep their emotions to

TABLE 3. Unstandardized and Standardized OLS Coefficients from Regressing Frequency of Anger on Independent Variables

Independent Variables	Equation 1		Equation 2		Equation 3		Equation 4	
	<i>b</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>B</i>
Age	-.021*** (.002)	-.219	-.024*** (.003)	-.241	-.023*** (.003)	-.231	-.021*** (.003)	-.219
Gender (Female=1)	-.027 (.088)	-.008	-.049 (.089)	-.015	-.054 (.089)	-.016	-.064 (.089)	-.020
Ethnicity (Black=1)	.002 (.125)	.0003	.019 (.126)	.004	.005 (.128)	.0009	.024 (.127)	.005
Education	-.019 (.016)	-.034	-.015 (.016)	-.027	-.014 (.016)	-.026	-.011 (.016)	-.020
Household Income	.002 (.002)	.026	.001 (.002)	.021	.001 (.002)	.021	.001 (.002)	.023
Marital Status ^a								
Married			.140 (.128)	.043	.108 (.134)	.033	.102 (.133)	.031
Divorced/ Separated			.184 (.139)	.046	.166 (.141)	.041	.147 (.140)	.037
Widowed			.256 (.197)	.048	.232 (.199)	.043	.237 (.199)	.044
# Children at Home					.038 (.045)	.025	.039 (.045)	.025
Anger Expression							.133*** (.037)	.095
Intercept	2.742*** (.265)		2.682*** (.270)		2.628*** (.277)		2.484*** (.279)	
R ²	.047***		.049***		.049***		.058***	
Adj. R ²	.043		.043		.043		.051	

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

N=1384

Standard errors of the unstandardized coefficients are shown in parentheses.

^a Never married is the omitted comparison category.

themselves. Here however, gender, ethnicity, marital status, and parenthood were not significant predictors of the frequency of being angry. Ross and Van Willigen (1996) used a measure of general emotional expressiveness and found expressiveness was unrelated to the frequency of feeling angry. In contrast, here, where the propensity to express anger, specifically, is measured, anger expression predicts more frequent angry feelings. In the earlier analyses of variance, parents and blacks were significantly more likely to express anger. After controlling for other sociodemographic characteristics associated with anger expression, such as age, education, income, and anger expression, neither ethnicity nor parental status are significant predictors of anger. Ross and Van Willigen (1996) found that having children in the home increases anger due to increased economic hardship associated with raising children. Although there is no substantial difference in parents' average number of children in this study (1.9) and parents in the Ross and Van Willigen study (1.8), here there is a positive correlation between household income and number of children in the home. Ross and Van Willigen measured economic hardship but did not control for household income, which are likely to be related. Perhaps anger associated with the economic strains of raising children is felt primarily by those with lower incomes. In this study, the presence of children at home has no effect on anger once income is

controlled.

In addition, in Ross's and Van Willigen's (1996) study, mothers experienced more anger than fathers as a function of their disproportionate share of child care. By controlling for gender in this study, the effect of gender and having children in the household on anger may be suppressed. However, in separate analysis not shown, there was no difference in frequency of anger between men and women with children, and no difference between parents and those without children at home once other sociodemographic characteristics were controlled.

The first hypothesis is only minimally supported. The only significant direct relationships between social structural location and anger evident after controlling for other sociodemographic characteristics are those between age and anger and anger expression and anger. Thus, in this study these are the only two relationships that might be mediated. However, the first hypothesis was offered with a caveat: the relationship between disadvantage and anger may not be direct, but indirectly affected by social psychological features. To determine whether differences in potential social psychological factors exist in this sample, the proposed intervening variables were regressed on sociodemographic characteristics.

Table 4 reports the unstandardized and standardized coefficients from the regressions of the intervening variables on

the independent variables. The relationship between social structural location and equity beliefs is consistent with prior research. As reported previously (Thornton 1989), women, blacks, younger individuals, the never-married and divorced espouse a more egalitarian gender ideology than men, whites, and the married, respectively. Egalitarianism increases with greater education and household income, and declines as the number of children at home rises.

Consistent with previous findings on belief in individualism (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Mirowsky, Ross, and Van Willigen 1996), blacks embrace the ideology of individualism less strongly than whites. Also, belief in individualism decreases with years of education.

Blacks also mistrust others more than whites, as Hughes and Thomas (1998) found. In keeping with Mirowsky's and Ross's findings (1986), mistrust of others is greater among those with less education and household income. Mistrust declines with age. This may be either a generational or aging effect, which cannot be determined using cross-sectional data.

The effect of sociodemographic characteristics on potential intervening social psychological factors in the stress model also is consistent with previous findings. In this study as elsewhere (Gecas 1989; Gecas and Burke 1991; Hughes and Demo 1989; Thoits 1995), self-efficacy is higher among whites than blacks, and

TABLE 4. Unstandardized and Standardized OLS Regression Coefficients from Regressing Intervening Variables on Independent Variables

Independent Variables	Egalitarian Gender Ideology		Belief in Individualism		Mistrust		Self-Efficacy		Social Integration	
	<i>b</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>B</i>
Age	-.057*** (.007)	-.267	-.001 (.002)	-.026	-.029*** (.005)	-.217	.015* (.006)	.079	-.057*** (.010)	-.230
Gender (Female=1)	1.426*** (.179)	.197	.055 (.046)	.041	-.145 (.137)	-.033	.137 (.158)	.021	-.520† (.268)	-.062
Ethnicity (Black=1)	.743** (.256)	.073	-.182** (.067)	-.095	.999*** (.197)	.159	-1.250*** (.227)	-.139	-.606 (.380)	-.052
Education	.234*** (.033)	.191	-.030*** (.008)	-.134	-.190*** (.026)	-.244	.374*** (.029)	.345	.066 (.049)	.047
Household Income	.010** (.004)	.079	.0002 (.0009)	.009	-.005* (.003)	-.069	.012*** (.003)	.107	-.0005 (.005)	-.003
Marital Status ^a										
Married	-.727** (.268)	-.102	-.095 (.070)	-.071	-.211 (.208)	-.048	.254 (.238)	.040	-1.495*** (.398)	-.181
Divorced/ Separated	.167 (.282)	.019	.016 (.073)	.10	-.070 (.215)	-.013	.214 (.249)	.028	-.143 (.425)	-.014
Widowed	-.660 (.399)	-.056	-.014 (.101)	-.006	-.023 (.306)	-.003	.376 (.354)	-.036	-.754 (.626)	-.054
# Children at Home	-.370*** (.090)	-.111	.013 (.024)	.021	.050 (.069)	.024	.036 (.080)	.012	-.043 (.132)	-.011
Anger Expression	.134† (.075)	.044	.018 (.019)	.031	.095† (.057)	.051	-.021 (.066)	-.008	.245* (.112)	.069
Intercept	-1.273* (.561)		1.083*** (.140)		4.233*** (.441)		-4.235*** (.497)		13.338*** (.842)	
R ²	.204***		.033**		.168***		.205***		.113***	
Adj. R ²	.199		.019		.159		.199		.103	
N	1384		887		930		1384		927	

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Standard errors of the unstandardized coefficients are shown in parentheses.

^a Never married is the omitted comparison category.

among those with more education and household income. Mirowsky and Ross (1986) find that individuals' sense of control declines with age, but Gecas (1989) reports that self-efficacy typically follows a curvilinear pattern over the life course. In the data here, self-efficacy increases with age in a linear model. In analyses not shown, however, it has a curvilinear relationship: self-efficacy increases from young adulthood into mid-life, dips briefly in the mid-40s, but recovers and increases into the mid-to late-60s, when it begins to decline. Widows' significantly lower level of self-efficacy revealed by analyses of variance reported previously is not evident once other sociodemographic characteristics are controlled in regression. Widows have significantly less education and income and are significantly older which may account for their lower self-efficacy.

Consistent with the previous analyses of variance, social integration declines with age. Currently married people are less socially integrated in terms of contact with others than are unmarried individuals. However, in theory, having a spouse or significant other is an important source of social support (Thoits 1995). Therefore, although they may have fewer social contacts with friends, neighbors, and relatives, married people may have no fewer social support resources than unmarried people.

Social integration is positively related to anger expression. No causal order can be assumed, but greater social

contact with others may provide more opportunities to express anger.

The two independent variables directly related to anger, age and anger expression, are also related to some of the intervening variables--a necessary requirement for mediation. Age is related to gender ideology, mistrust, self-efficacy, and social integration. Anger expression is weakly related to gender ideology, mistrust, and social integration. Recalling the requirements for mediation and the bivariate correlations discussed earlier, neither the ideology of individualism nor social integration were significantly associated anger, therefore among the proposed intervening variables, these two variables cannot mediate the relationships between age and anger or anger expression and anger.

Equity Model

The second hypothesis proposed that anger is affected by equity beliefs. Therefore, anger is regressed on each proposed intervening variable in the equity model while controlling for sociodemographic characteristics. In addition, the possible moderating effects of beliefs on anger are tested by examining potential interactions between sociodemographic characteristics and the intervening beliefs and resources. Interaction terms were created by multiplying each sociodemographic characteristic by each belief. Interaction terms were included individually in

regression equations with all sociodemographic characteristics and each corresponding intervening belief.

Table 5 shows the unstandardized and standardized coefficients from regressing frequency of anger on the independent variables and the intervening variables in the equity model, as well as significant interactions between independent and intervening variables. Frequency of anger decreases with age and increases with anger expression, regardless of other sociodemographic or intervening factors in these equations. Gender ideology is not a significant predictor of frequency of anger, nor is belief in individualism. However, there is a significant interaction between being divorced or separated and belief in individualism which suggests a moderating effect on anger: among respondents who are divorced or separated, the greater belief in the ideology of individualism the less frequently they experience anger. Still, neither gender ideology nor individualism increase the amount of explained variation in the frequency of anger than that accounted for by the independent variables, and, in fact, decrease it from 5.1 percent to five percent and 3.6 percent, respectively.

Among the proposed intervening variables in the equity model, only mistrust has a substantial effect on frequency of anger. Thus, the first hypothesis that beliefs related to equity affect the relationship between social structural location and

TABLE 5. Unstandardized and Standardized Coefficients from Regressing Frequency of Anger on Independent Variables, Equity Model Intervening Beliefs and Significant Interaction Terms

	Gender Ideology		Belief in Individualism				Mistrust	
	Equation 1		Equation 1		Equation 2		Equation 1	
	<i>b</i>	Beta	<i>b</i>	Beta	<i>b</i>	Beta	<i>b</i>	Beta
Age	-.022*** (.003)	-.220	-.020*** (.004)	-.205	-.020*** (.004)	-.205	-.020*** (.004)	-.204
Gender (Female=1)	-.062 (.091)	-.019	-.063 (.115)	-.019	-.067 (.114)	-.020	-.063 (.108)	-.019
Ethnicity (Black=1)	-.023 (.128)	-.005	.115 (.165)	-.024	.118 (.165)	.025	-.167 (.157)	-.035
Education	-.011 (.017)	-.019	-.010 (.021)	-.018	-.010 (.021)	-.017	.012 (.021)	.020
Household Income	.001 (.002)	.023	.001 (.002)	.018	.001 (.002)	.017	.001 (.002)	.022
Marital Status ^a								
Married	.101 (.134)	.031	.195 (.172)	.059	.202 (.172)	.061	.237 (.163)	.071
Divorced/ Separated	.148 (.140)	.037	.297 (.181)	.072	.592* (.231)	.144	.147 (.169)	.037
Widowed	.234 (.199)	.044	.282 (.249)	.054	.283 (.248)	.054	.464† (.240)	.084
# Children at Home	.038 (.045)	.025	.018 (.058)	.011	.018 (.058)	.011	.032 (.045)	.021
Anger Expression	.134*** (.037)	.096	.112* (.048)	.078	.111* (.048)	.078	.124** (.045)	.087
Gender Ideology	-.002 (.013)	-.004	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Ideology of Individualism	-----	-----	-.109 (.084)	.044	-.028 (.092)	-.011	-----	-----
Mistrust	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	.168*** (.026)	.221
Div./Sep. X Individualism ^b	-----	-----	-----	-----	-.437* (.213)	-.104	-----	-----
Intercept	2.481 (.280)		2.493 (.358)		2.439 (.359)		2.036 (.364)	
R ²	.058***		.048***		.052***		.110***	
Adjusted R ²	.050		.036		.039		.099	
N	1384		887		887		930	

† $p < .10$ * $p > .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Note: Standard errors of unstandardized coefficients are shown in parentheses.

^a Never married is the omitted marital status reference category.


^b In analyses not shown, interactions between independent and intervening variables were tested. Only those that are significant are shown.

anger is partially supported: believing that others cannot be trusted to be fair significantly increases how frequently individuals experience anger. Adding mistrust to the regression equation nearly doubles the amount of variation explained in the frequency of anger (5.1 percent vs. 9.9 percent). In addition, because mistrust affects the frequency of anger and its addition to the equation diminishes the effects of age and anger expression on the frequency of anger, mistrust mediates the relationships between the independent variables and anger, albeit modestly. As reported earlier in Table 4, blacks mistrust others significantly more than whites, even when controlling for other predictors of mistrust (age, education, and household income). Despite greater mistrust, which predicts more frequent anger, blacks do not feel angry significantly more often than whites. On the contrary, this finding suggests that were it not for greater mistrust of others, blacks would be angry *less often* than whites.

Figure 6.1 is an informal path model of the relationships between social characteristics, mistrust and the frequency of anger. For simplicity, path coefficients are derived by regressing anger on mistrust and only those independent variables that are significant ($p < .10$) in predicting anger or mistrust.

Table 6A shows the bivariate correlations between variables in the model, and Table 6B reports the regression

FIGURE 6.1. Mistrust and Anger (N=930)



coefficients. In addition, the effects of each variable are decomposed into their direct, indirect, and total effects and reported in Table 6C. The direct effects of two significant independent variables are bolstered by their indirect effects. The negative effect of age on the frequency of anger increases by twenty-two percent when the indirect effect of age on declining mistrust and, consequently, less frequent anger, is taken into account. The direct role of anger expression in increasing the frequency of anger is heightened by its indirect effects through mistrust such that its total effect is 12.5 percent greater. The remaining independent variables have negligible effects on anger, despite their significant relationships with mistrust.

TABLE 6A. Correlation of Variables in Figure 6.1 (N=930)

	Age	Ethnicity	Education	Income	Anger Expression	Mistrust
Age						
Ethnicity (Black=1)	-.082**					
Education	-.180***	-.112**				
Income	-.009	-.155***	.349***			
Anger Expression	-.130***	.062†	-.034	-.060†		
Mistrust	-.208***	.225***	-.249***	-.189***	.104**	
Frequency of Anger	-.228***	.022	-.004	.004	.128***	.248***

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

TABLE 6B. Standardized Regression Coefficients for Figure 6.1

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	
	Mistrust	Frequency of Anger
Age	-.232***	-.173***
Ethnicity	.163***	-.041
Education	-.244***	.004
Income	-.078*	.042
Anger Expression	.051†	.088**
Mistrust		.221***
R^2	.166***	.105***

N = 930

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

TABLE 6C. Decomposition of Effects for Figure 6.1

Independent Variable/ Dependent Variable	Causal Effects		
	Direct ^a (A)	Indirect (B)	Total (A and B)
Age/Mistrust	-.232***	0	-.232
Age/Anger	-.173***	-.051	-.211
Ethnicity/Mistrust	.163***	0	.163
Ethnicity/Anger	-.041	.036	-.005
Education/Mistrust	-.244***	0	-.244
Education/Anger	.004	-.054	-.050
Income/Mistrust	-.078*	0	-.078
Income/Anger	.042	-.017	.025
Anger Expression/Mistrust	.051†	0	.051
Anger Expression/Anger	.088**	.011	.099
Mistrust/Anger	.221	0	.221

^a Standardized regression coefficients controlling for other independent variables.

Stress Model

To test the third hypothesis that personal and social resources suppress anger, the frequency of anger is regressed on the proposed intervening social psychological resources and independent variables. As with the intervening variables in the equity model, interaction terms were created and individually tested in regression equations with each resource and independent variable for potential moderating effects on anger.

Table 7 reports the unstandardized and standardized coefficients from regressing frequency of anger on the independent variables and the stress model intervening variables, as well as significant interactions between independent and intervening variables. Again, age and anger expression are consistently significant predictors of the frequency of anger regardless of intervening variables. Both self-efficacy and social integration predict less frequent anger. Therefore, the third hypothesis is supported: personal and social resources suppress anger. Adding mistrust to the regression equation nearly doubles the amount of variation explained in the frequency of anger (5.1 percent vs. 9.9 percent). In addition, because self-efficacy affects the frequency of anger and its addition to the equation diminishes the effects of age and anger expression on the frequency of anger, self-efficacy partially mediates the relationships between age and anger and anger expression and

TABLE 7. Unstandardized and Standardized Coefficients from Regressing Frequency of Anger on Independent Variables, Stress Model Intervening Variables, and Significant Interaction Terms

	Self-Efficacy				Social Integration				Self-Efficacy & Social Integration	
	Equation 1		Equation 2		Equation 1		Equation 2		Equation 1	
	<i>b</i>	Beta	<i>b</i>	Beta	<i>b</i>	Beta	<i>b</i>	Beta	<i>b</i>	Beta
Age	-.020*** (.003)	-.206	-.021*** (.003)	-.212	-.021*** (.004)	-.218	-.021*** (.004)	-.218	-.020*** (.004)	-.213
Gender (Female=1)	-.053 (.088)	-.016	-.051 (.087)	-.015	.048 (.105)	-.015	-.610* (.282)	-.191	-.039 (.105)	-.012
Ethnicity (Black=1)	-.127 (.127)	-.027	-.142 (.127)	-.031	-.204 (.149)	-.046	-.194 (.149)	-.044	-.264† (.150)	-.060
Education	-.020 (.002)	.035	-.021 (.017)	.038	-.008 (.019)	-.014	-.009 (.019)	-.016	.010 (.020)	.019
Household Income	.002 (.002)	.040	-.002 (.002)	-.032	.002 (.002)	.034	.002 (.002)	.039	.003 (.002)	.047
Marital Status ^a										
Married	.123 (.132)	.038	.126 (.132)	.038	-.107 (.159)	-.034	-.116 (.157)	-.037	-.097 (.156)	-.031
Divorced/ Separated	.165 (.139)	.041	.169 (.138)	.042	.013 (.166)	.003	.011 (.166)	.003	.017 (.166)	.004
Widowed	.206 (.197)	.039	.195 (.196)	.037	-.045 (.245)	-.008	-.023 (.245)	-.004	-.097 (.245)	-.018
# Children at Home	.042 (.044)	.027	.040 (.044)	.026	.057 (.052)	.039	.050 (.052)	.034	.060 (.052)	.041
Anger Expression	.132*** (.037)	.094	.131*** (.036)	.094	.162*** (.044)	.120	.167*** (.044)	.124	.161*** (.044)	.120
Self- Efficacy	-.082*** (.015)	-.159	-.140*** (.024)	-.272	-----	-----	-----	-----	-.053** (.018)	-.105
Social Integration	-----	-----	-----	-----	-.028* (.013)	-.074	-.057** (.019)	-.150	-.028* (.013)	-.073
Self- Efficacy X Income ^b	-----	-----	.002** (.001)	.167	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Soc. Integ. X Gender ^b	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	.053* (.025)	.198	-----	-----
Intercept	2.137 (.283)		2.265 (.285)		2.784 (.372)		3.108 (.401)		2.605*** (.375)	
R ²	.078***		.084***		.072***		.076***		.080***	
Adjusted R ²	.071		.076		.060		.064		.068	
N	1384		1384		927		927		927	

†*p* > .10 * *p* > .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* < .001

Note: Standard errors of unstandardized coefficients are shown in parentheses.


^a Never married is the omitted marital status reference category.

^b In analyses not shown, interactions between independent and intervening variables were tested. Only those that are significant are shown.

anger. However, social integration, while affecting anger, does not reduce the direct effects of age and anger expression on anger and hence is not a mediator of these relationships.

Both self-efficacy and social integration have significant moderating effects in combination with particular social characteristics. Self-efficacy interacts with income to increase anger. Thus, those high in self-efficacy and high in income would get angry significantly more often than others. Social integration interacts with gender to moderate anger, as well, so that the more social contacts women have, the more frequently they feel angry.

FIGURE 6.2. Self-Efficacy and Anger (N=1384)



Of the two intervening social psychological resources in the stress model, self-efficacy has a more potent effect on anger. Tables 8A and 8B report the bivariate correlations and decomposed effects for Figure 6.2, an informal path model of self-efficacy's effects on the frequency of anger. Again, to simplify the model, only variables significant ($p < .10$) in predicting anger or self-efficacy are included.

The positive relationships between self-efficacy and age, education, and income add little to the direct effects of each independent variable on anger. The negative effect of age on anger is slightly increased when the indirect effect of age on anger through higher self-efficacy is added. The nominal positive effect of ethnicity on anger is nearly doubled when the negative relationship between being black and self-efficacy is taken into account, but self-efficacy's potent negative effect on anger, these total effects remains small. While both education and income have small positive effects directly on anger, and both positively affect self-efficacy. However, after tracing their indirect effects through self-efficacy, both education and income have negative total effects on anger.

TABLE 8A. Bivariate Correlations of Variables in Figure 6.2 (N=1384)

	Age	Ethnicity	Education	Income	Anger Expressio n	Self- Efficacy
Ethnicity (Black=1)	-.069**					
Education	-.178***	-.127***				
Income	-.027	-.154***	.351***			
Anger Expression	-.117***	.086***	-.055	-.054*		
Self-Efficacy	.010	-.210***	.397***	.263***	-.050*	
Frequency of Anger	-.214***	.015	.014	.021	.119***	-.138***

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

TABLE 8B. Decomposition of Effects for Figure 6.2

Independent Variable/ Dependent Variable	Causal Effects		
	Direct ^a (A)	Indirect (B)	Total (A and B)
Age/Self-Efficacy	.065**	0	.065
Age/Anger	-.197***	-.010	-.207
Ethnicity/Self-Efficacy	-.143***	0	-.143
Ethnicity/Anger	.026	.023	.049
Education/Self-Efficacy	.348***	0	.348
Education/Anger	.026	-.055	-.029
Income/Self-Efficacy	.120***	0	.120
Income/Anger	.048	-.019	.029
Anger Expression/Self-Efficacy	-.005	0	-.005
Anger Expression/Anger	.076***	-.001	.075
Self-Efficacy/Anger	-.158***	0	-.158

N = 1384

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

^a Standardized regression coefficients controlling for other independent variables.

Figure 6.3 traces the effects of the independent variables on anger through social integration. Tables 9A and 9B report the bivariate correlations and decomposed effects for Figure 6.3. The only notable indirect effect on anger through social integration is that older individuals' lower-levels of social integration result in a small positive indirect effect on anger which slightly diminishes the total negative effect of age on anger. While there are significant differences in social integration by social structural location, social integration has only a marginal effect on anger.

FIGURE 6.3. Social Integration and Anger (N=927)




TABLE 9A. Bivariate Correlations of Variables in Figure 6.3 (N=927)

	Age	Gender	Married	Anger Expression	Social Integration	Frequency of Anger
Age						
Gender (Female=1)	.052					
Married	.023	-.076*				
Anger Expression	-.117***	.055†	-.057†			
Social Integration	-.273***	-.074*	-.153***	.095**		
Frequency of Anger	-.229***	.018	-.003	.135***	.004	

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

TABLE 9B. Decomposition of Effects in Figure 6.3

Independent Variable/ Dependent Variable	Causal Effects		
	Direct (A)	Indirect (B)	Total (A and B)
Age/Social Integration	-.259***	0	-.259
Age/Anger	-.231***	.019	-.212
Gender/Social Integration	-.075*	0	-.075
Gender/Anger	.019	.005	.024
Married/Social Integration	-.150***	0	-.150
Married/Anger	-.003	.000	-.003
Anger Expression/Social Integration	.061†	0	.061
Anger Expression/Anger	.116***	-.004	.112
Social Integration/Anger	-.072*	0	-.072

N = 927

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

^a Standardized regression coefficients controlling for other independent variables.

Since both self-efficacy and social integration affect anger, together they may explain more of the variance in frequency of anger when combined. However, Table 7 shows that when self-efficacy is in the equation, social integration does not explain any additional variation in anger. The adjusted R^2 with self-efficacy intervening is .071 and with social integration intervening the adjusted R^2 is .060. With both self-efficacy and social integration intervening the adjusted R^2 is .068, less than with self-efficacy alone. As the more potent intervening factor in the stress model, self-efficacy explains two percent more of the variance in the frequency of anger than the 5.1 percent explained by the independent variables alone. Self-efficacy also has a less potent effect on anger than mistrust which accounts for 9.9 percent of the variation in the frequency of anger.

Social Structure and Personality Model


Combining significant beliefs from the equity model and resources from the stress model serves to test the fourth hypothesis that a broader social structure and personality approach explains more of the variation in anger than either the equity or stress models alone. Regressing the frequency of anger on mistrust, self-efficacy, and social integration together explains a greater proportion of the variation in the frequency of anger than mistrust alone, increasing the adjusted R^2 to .110.

In this equation, however, neither self-efficacy nor social integration significantly ($p < .05$) affect anger, attesting to the potent effect of mistrust on anger. Regressing frequency of anger on mistrust and social integration also results in a greater R^2 (.107), but it explains less than one percent more of the variation explained by mistrust alone. Regressing anger on mistrust and self-efficacy, however, results in an R^2 of .115, a more substantial improvement over mistrust alone, likely because mistrust and self-efficacy are strongly related. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is supported: relevant cultural beliefs about expectations for fairness and a potent resource for coping with difficulty explain more of the variation in frequency of anger than significant factors from either the equity model or the stress model alone.

Figure 6.4 illustrates the nearly counter balancing effects of mistrust and self-efficacy. Tables 11A and 11B report the bivariate correlations and decomposed effects for Figure 6.4, a path model with both mistrust and self-efficacy intervening between social structural location and the frequency of anger. Again, to simplify the model, only variables significant ($p < .10$) in predicting anger, mistrust, or self-efficacy are included.

Although age has a significant direct effect on anger, because mistrust is negatively related to age and positively

FIGURE 6.4. Mistrust and Self-Efficacy as Mediators of Anger (N=930)



related to self-efficacy, the total effect of age on anger is thirty-two percent greater than the direct effect. Ethnicity has a significant, albeit small, negative direct effect on anger when blacks' relatively greater mistrust and lower self-efficacy are controlled. The positive indirect effect on anger of being less trusting and having less control results in blacks being angry no more frequently than whites. This suggests that if blacks' social experiences were more conducive to developing trust and self-efficacy, they would be angry less often than whites. Finally, the relationships between anger expression and greater

TABLE 10. Unstandardized and Standardized Coefficients from Regressing Frequency of Anger on Independent and Significant Intervening Variables

	Mistrust and Self-Efficacy		Mistrust and Social Integration		Mistrust, Self-Efficacy, and Social Integration	
	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Age	-.020*** (.004)	-.195	-.022*** (.005)	-.234	-.022*** (.006)	-.232
Gender (Female=1)	-.057 (.107)	-.017	-.073 (.143)	-.023	-.065 (.143)	-.020
Ethnicity (Black=1)	-.251 (.157)	-.053	-.424* (.206)	-.095	-.462* (.207)	-.103
Education	.039† (.022)	-.067	.006 (.029)	.010	.018 (.030)	.033
Household Income	.002 (.002)	.034	.002 (.003)	.036	.003 (.003)	.044
Marital Status ^a						
Married	.252 (.161)	.075	-.014 (.0214)	-.004	-.012 (.214)	-.004
Divorced/ Separated	.179 (.167)	.044	-.065 (.224)	-.017	-.055 (.224)	-.014
Widowed	.449† (.238)	.081	.198 (.344)	.035	.142 (.345)	.026
# Children at Home	.032 (.054)	.021	.067 (.070)	.047	.067 (.070)	.046
Anger Expression	.117** (.044)	.082	.161** (.059)	.120	.155** (.059)	.116
Mistrust	.148*** (.026)	.195	.136*** (.034)	.192	.128*** (.035)	.180
Self-Efficacy	-.077*** (.018)	-.148	-----	-----	-.040 (.025)	-.080
Social Integration	-----	-----	-.031† (.018)	-.078	-.031† (.018)	-.078
Intercept	1.747*** (.358)		2.600*** (.547)		2.494***	
R ²	.127***		.129***		.134***	
Adjusted R ²	.115		.107		.110	
N	930		482		482	

† $p < .10$ * $p > .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Note: Standard errors of unstandardized coefficients are shown in parentheses.

^a Never married is the omitted marital status reference category.

TABLE 11A. Bivariate Correlations of Variables in Figure 6.4 (N=930)

	Age	Ethnicity	Education	Income	Widowed	Anger Expression	Mistrust	Self-Efficacy
Ethnicity (Black=1)	-.082*							
Education	-.180***	-.112***						
Income	-.009	-.155***	.349***					
Widowed	.389***	.036	-.204***	-.096**				
Anger Expression	-.130***	.062†	-.034	-.060†	-.047			
Mistrust	-.208	.225***	-.249***	-.189***	-.019	.104***		
Self-Efficacy	.051	-.217***	.394***	.250***	-.084*	-.082*	-.313***	
Frequency of Anger	-.228***	.022	-.004	.004	-.045	.119***	.248***	-.178***

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

TABLE 11B. Decomposition of Effects in Figure 6.4

Independent Variable/ Dependent Variable	Causal Effects		
	Direct ^a (A)	Indirect (B)	Total (A and B)
Age/Mistrust	-.216***	-.013	-.229
Age/Self-Efficacy	.073*	.038	.111
Age/Anger	-.180***	-.058	-.238
Ethnicity/Mistrust	.135***	.021	.156
Ethnicity/Self-Efficacy	-.120***	-.023	-.143
Ethnicity/Anger	-.060†	.047	-.013
Education/Mistrust	-.178***	-.054	-.232
Education/Self-Efficacy	.312***	.031	.343
Education/Anger	.054	-.085	-.031
Income/Mistrust	-.059†	-.015	-.074
Income/Self-Efficacy	.084**	.010	.094
Income/Anger	.056†	-.025	.031
Widowed/Mistrust	.005	.007	.012
Widowed/Self-Efficacy	-.041	-.001	-.042
Widowed/Anger	.039	.007	.046
Anger Expression/Mistrust	.043	.006	.049
Anger Expression/Self-Efficacy	-.033	-.007	-.040
Anger Expression/Anger	.083**	.014	.097
Mistrust/Self-Efficacy ^b	-.174***	0	-.174
Mistrust/Anger ^c	.195***	.025	.220
Self-Efficacy/Anger ^d	-.146***	-.034	-.180

N = 930

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

^a Standardized regression coefficients controlling for other independent variables.

^b Controlling for independent variables.

^c Controlling for self-efficacy and independent variables.

^d Controlling for mistrust and independent variables.

mistrust and less self-efficacy result in a seventeen percent increase in the total effect over the direct effect of anger expression on the frequency of anger.

The greater explanatory power of the social structure and personality model is not surprising for two reasons: First, combining significant intervening variables in a regression equation should produce a larger R^2 . Second, and more theoretically important, mistrust and self-efficacy are correlated. The latter is of greater relevance because it points to a basic relationship between a belief and a resource that is overlooked when the effects of cultural beliefs and personal and social resources are examined separately in regard to individual outcomes. Believing that others can be trusted to be fair and having a sense of control are critical to individuals' well-being (Acock and Kiecolt 1989), yet frequently they are not considered in tandem as influences on individual outcomes that bear on well-being such as emotions (Folkman and Lazarus 1988; Ross and Van Willigen 1996; Schieman 1999; Sprecher 1986; Young, French, and Wales 1993), mental health and quality of life (Hughes and Gove 1981; Hughes and Thomas 1998; Kessler, Mickelson, and Williams 1999; Keyes 1998), and stress (Kessler et al. 1985; Pearlin et al. 1981; Thoits 1994). (Notable exceptions include Acock and Kiecolt 1989; Kohn et al. 1990; Mirowsky and Ross 1989). This points to a need for examining together related cultural and

proximal influences that may intervene between social structural location and individual outcomes.

VII. DISCUSSION

This study focused on two goals: first, to examine the relationships between social structure, anger, and potential intervening social psychological factors. Second, to demonstrate the usefulness of applying a broader approach to investigating individual level phenomena than typically used in much social psychological research. It is easier to address the second aim of the study because the results clearly point to greater explanation when both relevant cultural and proximal individual factors are examined together. While such a conclusion seems obvious, it is evident from the foregoing discussion that the improved explanations of variance in frequency of anger comes not from merely the additive effects of including more relevant variables but for important theoretical reasons. This should encourage broader theoretical approaches and empirical efforts which link social location, cultural factors, and proximal influences in order to better understand individual outcomes.

In the case of the first aim, this study was an initial exploration as little is known about the social distribution of emotions and intervening factors between social structural location and individual affective experience. This makes the results valuable but somewhat difficult to interpret due to the lack of comparable research. Nonetheless, this study points to several important relationships between social structural

location, related social psychological characteristics, and anger, as well as directions for future research.

Social Structure and Anger

Perhaps the most remarkable finding is the lack of social variation in the frequency of experiencing anger. From an epidemiological standpoint, there are few sociodemographic differences in the frequency with which people experience anger in this sample. In contrast to Ross's and Van Willigen's (1996) study, social structural locations, such as gender, ethnicity, social class, and marital and parental statuses fail to predict any differences in the frequency of anger. This is somewhat surprising given the existing research and theory which indicates variation in social structural location contributes to differences in cognition, behavior, and affect. Here, age is the only significant predictor of anger. In fact, individuals under age 60 are angry nearly twice as often as those age 60 and over (1.72 vs. 0.97 days per week). This raises two questions: (1) why is there so little variation in anger according to most social characteristics, and (2) why is age related to less frequent experiences of anger?

One explanation that addresses both of these questions centers on the prevalence of anger in ongoing, personal relationships (Schieman 1999). In response to supplemental questions asking about a recent anger episode, nearly two-thirds

of the GSS respondents reported feeling angry at family members or those in their workplaces (see Table 12). Since most people have family and work roles, this may be one reason varies little across social boundaries. And, because these roles become more liberated in later life, age is inversely related to anger (Schieman 1999). This suggests that anger occurs largely within roles associated with responsibility and obligations. Indeed, anger is less prevalent in more voluntary relationships: in this sample, only about one in ten respondents were angry at friends, neighbors, or acquaintances.

TABLE 12. Targets of Recent Anger

Target of Anger	N	% ^a
Family Members	353	31.6
Those in the workplace	350	31.3
Friends, Neighbors, Acquaintances	118	10.6
Service Providers	74	6.6
Government, Public Figures	62	5.6
Self	50	4.5
Strangers, Crowds	34	3.0
Circumstances	93	8.3
Other	83	7.4

N = 1,118

^a Percentages total more than 100% because some respondents chose more than one category.

A second and related potential explanation for the lack of variation in frequency of anger by social structural location may be biases in reporting. The retrospective reporting of emotions

shares the problems inherent to other retrospective self-reports. Accuracy of self-reports depends largely on the recency of the experience, its impact on or salience to the respondent, and the experience's consistency with the respondent's thinking about things (Fowler, 1995). In reporting anger, individuals may readily recall feeling angry at another driver on the commute home from work or at the clerk in the check-out line on the day of the interview, but fail to recall such episodes from several days prior. This may be in part because of recency, and in part because such episodes have little lasting impact or salience to the individual. People likely remember angry feelings relevant to ongoing relationships within the family or workplace. Anger aimed at strangers or "the system" may be quickly forgotten. And, since older persons may have fewer salient, personal relationships and fewer day-to-day interactions within them, they may recall and report less frequent angry feelings than younger individuals.

These first two explanations are unsatisfying in light of the substantial evidence that features of social disadvantage, such as economic hardship and inequity, place greater strains on relationships and contribute to more frequent anger (Mirowsky and Ross 1986; Ross and Van Willigen 1996; Sprecher 1986). Furthermore, if role-related responsibilities and strains are the primary catalysts of anger within relationships, we would expect

women to be angry more often than men since typically they are responsible for more household labor; parents to be angry more often than those without children at home due to their childrearing responsibilities; and minorities and the socioeconomically disadvantaged to be angry more often than others because of the added hardships of meeting family and work responsibilities with fewer resources and greater barriers. However, this is not the case. Still, it is unlikely that social disadvantage has no effect on anger.

Another possible reason for the lack of social variation in anger is that there may be a qualitative distinction between day-to-day experiences of anger and "moral anger" directed at social injustice or inequity. Such a distinction would have important implications for understanding the role of emotions in social movements and social change. Berry (1999) distinguishes between "personal rage" and "social rage," although the two overlap. Personal rage indicates an emotion resulting from individual, personal experience, while social rage stems from a social occurrence or phenomenon. Even if anger and "moral anger," or personal rage and social rage, are experienced differently, such a difference would not explain why the day-to-day hardships associated with social disadvantage do not translate into more frequent day-to-day anger in interpersonal relationships. A more viable explanation for the relative lack of social variation in

anger may come from the findings regarding the intervening social psychological factors that affect anger.

Beliefs and Anger

Although there was little variation in the frequency of anger to explain, examining the potential effects of social psychological factors proves important. Two of the three equity beliefs, gender ideology and the ideology of individualism, do not significantly affect anger. However, believing that others cannot be trusted to be fair has a strong, positive impact on anger. As the term "ideology" denotes, gender ideology and the ideology of individualism are beliefs about the way things *should* be. Mistrust, on the other hand, is a belief about the way things are. The ideological beliefs predict little about anger, but the belief about what can be expected is a potent predictor of anger.

As anticipated, blacks in this study are much more likely than whites to believe that they will not be treated fairly by others. Blacks have good reason to mistrust others because, as a group, blacks have been subject to unfair treatment in the U.S. Although other ethnic groups have encountered discrimination, it was never anything like the nearly universal economic and legal discrimination against blacks that prevailed until the 1960s (Jencks 1992) and the social discrimination that persists today (Kessler et al. 1999). Physical differences make it impossible

for blacks to shed their ethnic identities and assimilate (Jencks 1992).

Given blacks' unique status in American society, their greater mistrust of others is not surprising. Blacks' mistrust may reflect an awareness of discrimination. If blacks' individual and collective experiences engendered no greater mistrust than that of whites, blacks would be angry less often than whites. Mistrust is inversely related to education and income, as well, implying that those of lower socioeconomic status would be angry less often were it not for their higher levels of mistrust. And, because mistrust and age are negatively related, less frequent anger among older persons is due, in part, to less mistrust of others. These findings suggest that beliefs about the way things are may function as expectations which theories of emotion assert play an important role in anger.

Previous studies on perceptions of equity and fairness in the division of household labor have shown the importance of the distinction between beliefs about the way things should be and those about the way things are. Repeatedly, gender ideology proves to be a poor predictor of perceived fairness in the division of household labor (Blair and Johnson 1992; Greenstein 1996; Shelton and John 1996). Although individuals may espouse an egalitarian gender ideology, inequities in household labor are not necessarily viewed as unfair because, by and large, both

women and men still believe that women will take primary responsibility for the home and children (Hochschild 1989; Orbuch and Eyster 1997; Wilkie, Feree, and Ratcliff 1998). Because there is no expectation of equality, there is no perception of unfairness (inequity) despite the unequal contributions of men and women to household labor. Thus, the distinction between ideology and expectation may help to explain, for instance, why women are not angry more frequently than men. This is consistent with theories of anger which predict that anger results from violations of expectations.

How does group membership result in differences in expectations that might diminish the effect of social structural disadvantage on anger? Status value theory and relative deprivation approaches highlight the role of comparison groups in establishing expectations and perceptions of fairness. According to Hegtvedt and Markovsky (1995), people's expectations come, in part, from comparisons with past experiences, other individuals, and reference groups. People come to expect to get what other people like themselves generally get. Relative deprivation and gratification are "subjective feelings that stem from reward comparisons within one's group" (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995, p. 267).

When expected gratification declines, two types of deprivation may result: egoistic deprivation, feeling deprived in

one's own situation; and fraternal deprivation, feeling one's group is deprived compared with others. Egoistic deprivation occurs when there is a discrepancy between the actual outcomes and the outcomes a person desires or is entitled. The outcomes individuals desire or feel entitled to receive are influenced by comparative expectations and referents. Fraternal deprivation leads to collective action to remedy perceived injustice (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995). "Moral anger" may be an emotional component of the fraternal deprivation hypothesized to lead to collective action, while everyday anger may be an aspect of egoistic deprivation. And, because egoistic deprivation depends on in-group comparisons, structural disadvantage may not be evident in measures of everyday anger.

Women, blacks, and the socioeconomically disadvantaged generally get less in American society: less status, education, income, and opportunity, and as a consequence endure greater hardships including fewer resources, greater role strains, and more distress. But those outcomes may not violate expectations and result in more frequent anger because these outcomes comparable to those of similarly disadvantaged others. We know, for example, that blacks compare themselves with other blacks, not whites, as a reference group in obtaining information about self-worth (Crocker and Major 1989; Hughes and Demo 1989). And, both women and men compare husbands' contributions to household

labor to those of other husbands, not to wives' contributions (Hochschild 1989). If the same phenomena is at work with anger, the outcome differences *between* social groups would not result in socially patterned differences in anger. Instead, anger would be contingent on outcomes that fail to meet expectations based on individual experiences and those of others *within* the social group.

Taking the factors that shape expectations into account may also help explain the less frequent anger among older persons. Popular views of growing old portray the later years of life as a time of dependency and relative physical, mental, social, and economic impoverishment (Rowe and Kahn 1998). Since a person cannot make in-group comparisons with other elderly people until one has entered later life, expectations for old age may largely be based on popular views of the elderly and perceptions of the experiences of preceding generations, especially one's parents and grandparents. Today, older people in the U.S. are more independent, healthy, and economically secure than at any time in history (Gatz and Zarit 1999). Therefore, individuals' experience of their later years may be better than they had expected, resulting in less frequent violations of expectations and consequently less frequent anger. In addition, compared with younger people, older adults are more apt to actively attempt to avoid negative interpersonal experiences and to cognitively put

negative experiences into a more positive light. Thus, the inverse relationship between age and anger may be attributable to changes in the nature of age-graded roles, as Schieman (1999) proposes, but also to age-related differences in behavioral and cognitive responses, and relative gratification of expectations for old age.

Personal and Social Resources and Anger

Self-efficacy and social integration, as personal and social resources, affect anger in much the same way they do distress. Both are suppressors, although the effect of self-efficacy is more potent (Aneshensel 1992; Pearlin 1989; Thoits 1995). Were it not for the social structural barriers to greater self-efficacy, blacks and those with lower education and income would be angry less often than they are. A diminished sense of control over one's own outcomes makes it less likely that people will try to remedy inequities and instead "may simply respond with resignation" (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995, p. 266), suggesting depression rather than anger as the affective response.

Social integration, in the form of contacts outside the immediate family, slightly suppresses anger for most people. For instance, age's negative effect on anger is indirectly diminished because of the inverse relationship between age and social integration. However, social integration appears to exacerbate anger among women. Since anger is more prominent in close

relationships and women tend to have more intensive social network involvement than men, this may account for the positive effect of social integration on anger for women. Social integration may increase the potential for anger provocation by exposing people to more interactions with important others. On the other hand, having more social contacts may benefit some people by providing interaction alternatives. Men, for instance, participate in more extensive social networks (Thoits 1995), and anger is less prominent in relationships with friends and acquaintances. Thus, more social contacts may be beneficial for some, but detrimental for others. Research on distress indicates that perceived social support is more important than number of social contacts in buffering people from the effects of stress. Therefore, the nature and quality of the relationships, not simply the number, likely plays an important role in determining whether social contacts contribute to more or less frequent anger.

Implications for Theories of Emotions

Whether theories of emotion base their predictions on identities, cultural meanings and scripts, or structural status, they tend to focus on the emotional outcomes of face-to-face interactions. Because society is comprised of socially patterned interactions, emotions should be socially patterned as well. On the surface, this does not appear to be the case with anger,

except for the age-related differences. However, theories of emotions also propose that anger obtains when expectations are violated or unfairness occurs in interactions. In this study, the belief that others will be unfair is positively associated with anger and this belief is more prevalent among socially disadvantaged groups. However, socially disadvantaged groups are not more frequently angry than others, perhaps because they do not view their outcomes unfair. The results of this study might be seen as supporting the role of expectations in predicting anger, as well as suggesting the need to more explicitly account for group differences in expectations to understand social patterns of anger.

The expectations that affect perceptions of fairness are shaped, in part, by status values attached to various social characteristics and comparisons with similar others. Status values of different identities, roles, and structural statuses vary (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995; Ridgeway and Walker 1995), and therefore the expectations and consequent perceptions of unfairness that govern emotional responses will vary as well. Incorporating the factors that influence expectations, such as status values and reference groups, into theories of emotions may be helpful in understanding differences in emotional experiences across social groups. The role of status values, reference groups, and associated expectations which play an important role

in perceptions of justice may contribute to lower levels of anger despite social disadvantage.

In addition to expectation beliefs, this study suggests that social and personal resources, such as social integration and self-efficacy, suppress anger. Theories of emotions do not account for the intervening effects of such resources on emotional outcomes, and perhaps they should. The nature and quality of individuals' social contacts likely affect exposure to anger provoking sites, such as family and work relationships. Variations in people's sense of control over outcomes likely influences their cognitive interpretations of events and thereby affects their emotions. In sum, theories of emotions need to take into account social patterns of the cultural and individual factors that influence emotions.

Directions for Future Research

We still know relatively little about the epidemiology of emotions. Research suggests there are social structural effects on happiness and well-being (Hughes and Thomas 1998) and affect related to depression such as sadness (Aneshensel 1992; Mirowsky and Ross 1989; Thoits 1995) However, measures of affect are typically included in scales of well-being and distress and not studied apart for affect alone. Given the lack of social variation in frequency of anger, future research should examine the distribution of other emotions as well.

Empirical evidence suggests that anger is not socially patterned in ways we might expect (Ross and Van Willigen 1996; Schieman 1999). And, where some find differences in anger by gender, marital, and parental status (Ross and Van Willigen 1996), those findings are not replicated here or in Schieman's (1999) recent study. It may be that affect cannot be traced directly to social structural location and intervening factors must be taken into account. Accordingly, research is needed on the effects of social differences in expectations on anger, including what expectations influence emotional outcomes, how status values and referent groups shape expectations relevant to emotions like anger, and under what conditions expectations do and so not influence emotional outcomes.

Future research should also examine the role of social and personal resources on anger. In particular, more needs to be known about the effects of nature and quality of work and family roles on anger. And, as research on age and emotions highlights (Labouvie-Vief 1999) there may be social differences in cognitive strategies for coping with emotions that impinge on the experience of anger. In addition, further investigation of the conditions under which self-efficacy, or its lack, contributes to anger or depression in the face of inequity.

Longitudinal data will also be helpful in investigating emotions. The models considered here assume a casual order. It

seems reasonable to assume that social location precedes social psychological characteristics, and, because those characteristics are fairly stable over time (Demo 1992; Gecas 1989), we might assume that they precede recent experiences of anger. However, experiences of anger may have reciprocal, though not necessarily equal, effects on individuals' beliefs and resources. For instance, if an individual recently felt angry because someone violated his or her trust, this experience might result in greater mistrust and a diminished sense of control, as well as contributing to recent anger. Cross-sectional data makes it difficult to disentangle these relationships.

Of interest to the relationship between emotions and social movements is the possible distinction between everyday anger and "moral anger." If such a distinction exists, it would be valuable to understand under what conditions "moral anger" is produced, and whether and at what point everyday anger becomes "moral anger," and thus an emotional catalyst for social change. This is one more way that more explicit links between the affective results of micro-level interactions and macro-level social phenomena are needed in general.

More specific measures of anger are needed to improve validity and discern between anger in interpersonal contexts and anger associated with social conditions. In this study, anger is a gross assessment that may encompass both systemic and

interpersonal sources of anger. Coupled with retrospective reporting, this general operationalization of anger may reduce variation and capture only a base level of anger. The possibility of reporting bias in recalling emotions suggests that researchers of emotion need to conduct more naturalistic studies, as well. Such studies might involve asking respondents to record their emotions and the surrounding circumstances over a period of time. Advances in technology makes such strategies more feasible than ever. For instance, respondents might carry hand held computers programmed to solicit information about their emotions at random intervals. The resulting data could be downloaded directly into a data file at the conclusion of the study, or uploaded via wireless communications throughout the study period. Studies that collect data on affect as it is experienced rather than as it is remembered might tells us more about who gets angry, how often, at whom, and why.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

Does social structural location affect anger? This and other recent studies suggest that there are both direct and indirect effects of social location on anger. Evidence of direct effects are mixed, with some studies finding significant effects of gender, ethnicity, marital and parental statuses (Ross and Van Willigen 1996), while this and another recent study do not (Schieman 1999). However, age is consistently related to less frequent anger.

Evidence is accumulating that a variety of structurally influenced factors indirectly affect anger. Material, social, and personal resources appear important. In one study, economic hardship increases anger (Ross and Van Willigen 1998), while in another satisfaction with finances decreases anger (Schieman 1999). In this study, social integration is inversely related to anger, and Schieman (1999) finds interpersonal estrangement positively related to anger. Role strains also contribute to anger as difficulties with child care (Ross and Van Willigen 1996), perceived time pressures, and dissatisfaction with family life (Schieman 1999) predict more anger. Perceived control over outcomes is negatively related to anger, as evident in this and Schieman's (1999) study.

The growing explanations of the relationship between anger and social structure are helpful, but far from complete.

Schieman (1999) argues that age-related differences in health, self-efficacy, socioemotional outlook and, especially, family and work roles account for age differences in anger. While shifts in roles and responsibilities likely are important, they would not account for the lack of variation in anger among other groups whose relationships are affected by differential resources and constraints. Older persons may have more positive than expected experiences in later life which may also help explain the age-anger relationship.

Socially patterned differences in expectations may contribute to less frequent anger among socially disadvantaged groups, as well as older individuals. This study suggests that beliefs which reflect expectations rather than ideologies, such as mistrust, play an important role in anger. Here, mistrust has a strong positive relationship to anger. Were it not for an awareness of likely unfair treatment by others, those who are more mistrustful--blacks and the socioeconomically disadvantaged--would be even less angry than they are, and less angry than whites and the more socioeconomically advantaged.

People's expectations are shaped by experience and in-group comparisons, so those who tend to get less perhaps also tend to expect less. This does not necessarily mean the disadvantaged generalize from what is to what *ought* to be (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995; Kluegel and Smith 1986). When coupled with the

lower-levels of self-efficacy among disadvantaged groups, comparisons with others "like us" may result in expectations that cede what is will be and there is not much to be done about it. In either case, more difficult life circumstances do not necessarily translate into differences in anger. Consequently, patterns of anger will not tell us much about social inequality unless we take into account social patterns in the conditions, expectations, and resources that affect anger.

APPENDIX 1. Descriptive Statistics by Survey Form Version

	Version 1	Version 2	Version 3	X^2 or F
Gender (Female)	57.9%	57.1%	54.9%	0.91
Ethnicity (Black)	15.0%	14.8%	13.8%	0.31
Education	13.40 (3.07)	13.45 (2.83)	13.25 (2.89)	0.61
Household Income†	40.61 (28.49)	39.41 (27.14)	40.45 (27.98)	0.26
Age	45.39 (15.65)	45.60 (16.74)	45.12 (16.70)	0.97
Married	49.4%	46.6%	43.6%	3.12
Divorced/Separated	19.0%	22.6%	21.6%	1.87
Widowed	10.7%	9.0%	11.6%	1.67
Never Married	20.8%	21.8%	23.1%	0.70
Number of Children in Home	0.64 (1.07)	0.68 (1.10)	0.60 (1.04)	0.65
Anger Expressiveness	0.49 (1.15)	0.37 (1.19)	0.43 (1.17)	1.07
Egalitarian Gender Ideology	0.29 (3.57)	-0.06 (3.74)	-0.15 (3.38)	1.94
Belief in the Ideology of Individualism	0.60 (0.68)	N/A	0.65 (0.65)	1.52
Mistrust	N/A	0.14 (2.24)	0.26 (2.16)	0.68
Self-Efficacy	2.12 (3.12)	2.12 (3.17)	1.67 (3.20)	2.99
Social Integration	10.73 (4.22)	10.26 (4.04)	N/A	2.96
Frequency of Anger	1.60 (1.56)	1.45 (1.59)	1.65 (1.75)	1.98
<i>N</i>	457	487	450	1394

Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

† In thousands of dollars.

APPENDIX 2. Zero-Order Correlations among Study Variables Available for All Cases

N = 1384	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
(1) Gender													
(2) Ethnicity	.10***												
(3) Education	-.04	-.13***											
(4) Household Income	-.13***	-.15***	.35***										
(5) Age	.02	-.07**	-.18***	-.03									
(6) Married	-.09***	-.19**	.07*	.38***	.07**								
(7) Divorced/ Separated	.07**	.03	-.01	-.16***	.02	-.48***							
(8) Widowed	.14***	.04	-.24***	-.16***	.42***	-.32***	-.18***						
(9) Never Married	-.07**	.17***	.10***	-.19***	-.42***	-.49***	-.27***	-.18***					
(10) # Children at Home	.08**	.10***	-.01	.08**	-.31***	.19***	-.04	-.13***	-.10***				
(11) Anger Expression	.04	.09***	-.05*	-.05*	-.12***	-.04	.05	-.05	.04	.04			
(12) Gender Ideology	.18***	.09***	.25***	.07**	-.31***	-.12***	.08**	-.16***	.18***	-.01	.08**		
(13) Self- Efficacy	-.03	-.21***	.40***	.26***	.01	.13***	-.01	-.12***	-.07*	-.01	-.05	.13***	
(14) Anger Frequency	-.01	.02	.01	.02	-.21***	-.01	.01	-.07**	.05*	.10***	.12***	.06*	-.14***

* $p > .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

APPENDIX 3. Zero-Order Correlations among Study Variables for Cases with Data on Individualism

N = 887	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
(1) Gender														
(2) Ethnicity	.10***													
(3) Education	-.05	-.11***												
(4) Household Income	-.15***	-.15***	.34***											
(5) Age	.01	-.07*	-.16***	-.03										
(6) Married	-.08*	-.19**	.06	.38***	.10**									
(7) Divorced/ Separated	.08*	.02	.03	-.16***	.01	-.47***								
(8) Widowed	.13***	.05	-.25***	-.17***	.40***	-.33***	-.18***							
(9) Never Married	-.08*	.18***	.08*	-.17***	-.43***	-.49***	-.27***	-.19***						
(10) # Children at Home	.11***	.12***	-.01	.07*	-.30***	.18***	-.04	-.11***	-.10**					
(11) Anger Expression	.06	.06*	-.09**	-.05*	-.10**	-.01	.03	-.06	.04	.03				
(12) Gender Ideology	.14***	.07*	.25***	.06	-.29***	-.11***	.10**	-.16***	.16***	.03	.08*			
(13) Individualism	.05	-.06	-.12***	-.06	-.02	-.06	.04	.03	.02	.00	.04	-.06		
(14) Self-Efficacy	-.03	-.21***	.40***	.26***	.04	.15***	-.01	-.10**	-.09**	-.01	-.05	.11***	.08*	
(15) Anger Frequency	-.01	.04	.01	.02	-.19***	-.01	.03	-.07*	.03	.08*	.10**	.03	-.04	-.06***

* $p > .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

APPENDIX 4. Zero-Order Correlations among Study Variables for Cases with Data on Mistrust

N = 930	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
(1) Gender														
(2) Ethnicity	.12***													
(3) Education	-.03	-.11***												
(4) Household Income	-.11***	-.16***	.34***											
(5) Age	.01	-.08*	-.18***	-.01										
(6) Married	-.11***	-.19***	.07	.36***	.11***									
(7) Divorced/ Separated	.09**	.04	-.06	-.15***	.01	-.48***								
(8) Widowed	.14***	.04	-.20***	-.10**	.39***	-.30***	-.18***							
(9) Never Married	-.05	.16***	.12***	-.21***	-.43***	-.49***	-.28***	-.18***						
(10) # Children at Home	.05	.09**	-.02	.07*	-.33***	.17***	-.02	-.13***	-.09**					
(11) Anger Expression	.01	.06	-.03	-.06	-.13***	-.06	.07*	-.05	.04	.05				
(12) Gender Ideology	.20***	.10**	.26***	.08*	-.30***	-.16***	.08*	-.12***	.19***	.03	.05			
(13) Mistrust	.01	.22***	-.25***	-.19***	-.21***	-.13***	.04	.02	.13**	.10**	.10***	-.01		
(14) Self-Efficacy	-.02	-.22***	.39***	.25***	.05	.11***	.00	-.08*	-.07*	-.04	-.08*	.12***	-.31***	
(15) Anger Frequency	-.02	.02	.00	.00	-.23***	-.01	.04	.04	.05	.11***	.13***	.05	.25***	-.18***

* $p > .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

APPENDIX 5. Zero-Order Correlations among Study Variables for Cases with Data on Social Integration

N = 927	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
(1) Gender														
(2) Ethnicity	.09**													
(3) Education	-.05	-.16***												
(4) Household Income	-.13***	-.15***	.37***											
(5) Age	.05	-.05*	-.19***	-.04										
(6) Married	-.08*	-.17***	.07*	.41***	.02									
(7) Divorced/ Separated	.04	.02	.00	-.16***	.04	-.49***								
(8) Widowed	.17***	.05	-.25***	-.21***	.46***	-.32***	-.17***							
(9) Never Married	-.07*	.15***	.09**	-.19***	-.40***	-.50***	-.27***	-.17***						
(10) # Children at Home	.07*	.11***	-.02	.09**	-.31***	.22***	-.07*	-.14***	-.10**					
(11) Anger Expression	.06	.13***	-.04	-.05	-.12***	-.06	.06	-.04	.04	.05				
(12) Gender Ideology	.18***	.09**	.26***	.08*	-.32***	-.11***	.07*	-.18***	.19***	-.03	.09**			
(13) Social Integration	-.07*	-.02	.10**	-.03	-.27***	-.15***	.07*	-.13***	.20***	.02	.10**	.13***		
(14) Self- Efficacy	-.03	-.21***	.40***	.28***	.05	.15***	.01	-.19***	-.04	-.01	-.04	.14***	.02	
(15) Anger Frequency	-.02	-.01	.03	.03	-.24***	-.00	.00	-.11***	.08*	.10**	.14***	.09**	.00	-.07*

* $p > .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

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Gender and Society 1:126-147.

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Ratcliff. 1998. "Gender and Fairness: Marital Satisfaction
in Two-Earner Couples." *Journal of Marriage and the Family*
60:577-594.

Wilson, John and Marc A. Musick. 1997. "Work and Volunteering:
The Long Arm of the Job." *Social Forces* 76:251-272.

Wilson, William Julius. 1996. *When Work Disappears: The World
of the New Urban Poor*. New York: Vintage Books.

Wolff, Edward N. 1995. *Top Heavy: A Study of the Increasing
Inequality of Wealth in America*. New York: Twentieth Century
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Young, Thomas J., Laurance J. French, and S. N. Wales. 1993.
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Americans." *Psychological Reports* 72:482.

CURRICULUM VITA

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EDUCATION

Postdoctoral Multidisciplinary Research in Aging Training Program
Andrus Gerontology Center
University of Southern California
Preceptor: Vern L. Bengtson

Ph.D. Virginia Tech, 1999 (Sociology)
Dissertation: "Social Structure and Anger: Social Psychological Mediators"
Dissertation Director: K. Jill Kiecolt

M.S. Virginia Tech, 1994 (Education)

B.S. Virginia Tech, 1987 (Sociology)

RESEARCH INTERESTS

The Self through the Life Course
Social Structure, Inequality, and Emotions
Social Policy Impacts on Families & Individuals

TEACHING INTERESTS

Family and Life Course
Social Psychology
Social Theory and Research Methods

PUBLICATIONS

Kiecolt, K. Jill and J. Beth Mabry. 1999. "Agency in Young Adulthood: Intentional Self-Change Among College Students." *Advances in Life Course Research*, Vol. 1. Edited by T. J. Owens. JAI Press (*in press*).

Mabry, J. Beth. 1998. "Pedagogical Variations and Student Outcomes in Service-Learning: How Time, Contact, and Reflection Matter." *Michigan Journal of Community Service Learning*, 5: 32-47.

Parker-Gwin, Rachel and J. Beth Mabry. 1998. "Service-Learning as Pedagogy and Civic Education: Outcomes for Three Models." *Teaching Sociology*, 26: 276-291.

GRANTS AND PROPOSALS

Title: Enhancing Service-Learning Pedagogy, Faculty Development Incentive Grant
Sponsor: Service-Learning Center at Virginia Tech
Position: Principal Investigator
Amount: \$300 Duration: 1998

Title: Partners in Caregiving: Rural Outreach & Respite Care Expansion
Adult Care of Roanoke Valley, Salem, VA
Sponsor: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Position: Proposal & Marketing Coordinator
Amount: \$76,000 Duration: 1994-1996

Title: Alzheimer's/Dementia Specialized Adult Day Care, Care Unit Development
Adult Care Center of Roanoke Valley
Sponsor: United Way of Roanoke Valley, Virginia
Position: Proposal Coordinator
Amount: \$12,000 Duration: 1992-93

PRESENTATIONS

1998

Bailey, Carol A., Lisa Norris, J. Beth Mabry, and David W. Murphree. "What Do You Want to Know?: Evaluating Writing-Across-the-Curriculum Programs." Rocky Mountain Modern Language Association Annual Meeting, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Kiecolt, K. Jill and J. Beth Mabry. "Gender Differences in Attempts at Self-Change." American Sociological Association 93rd Annual Meeting, San Francisco, California.

Mabry, J. Beth. "Planning for Academic and Civic Learning: Evaluating Service-Learning in Adult Day Care Settings." Virginia Tech Conference on Intergenerational Service-Learning, Blacksburg, Virginia.

Mabry, J. Beth. "Writing-to-Learn" and "Sequencing Writing Assignments." University Writing Program Annual Faculty Development Summer Seminar. Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, Virginia.

Mabry, J. Beth. "Evaluating Civic and Academic Learning in Service-Learning Courses." Virginia Campus Outreach Opportunity League Faculty Fellows Meeting, University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia.

Parker-Gwin, Rachel R. and J. Beth Mabry. "Service-Learning as Pedagogy and Civic Education: Outcomes for Three Models." American Sociological Association 93rd Annual Meeting, San Francisco, California.

PRESENTATIONS (continued)

1997

Mabry, J. Beth. "So, you want to start an adult day care center?: Assessing Program Need, Resources, and Viability." Department of Family and Child Development, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, Virginia.

Schnitzer, Marcy H. and J. Beth Mabry. "Evaluation to Improve Tutoring and Mentoring Programs." British Petroleum Second International Conference on Tutoring and Mentoring, London, England, UK.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

1999-Present Longitudinal Study of Generations

Principal Investigator: Vern L. Bengtson, University of Southern California

- Researched intergenerational family member referents for six waves of longitudinal data.
- Processed qualitative data from wave six of the longitudinal study.

1997-99 University Writing Program at Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA

- Developed faculty and departmental writing-across-the-curriculum needs and utilization surveys, coded, analyzed, and reported data to university review committee.
- Developed questionnaires to assess students' attitudinal, behavioral, and learning outcomes associated with participation in writing intensive university courses in various curricula.
- Coordinated collection of writing-intensive course evaluation data from 1000 students and 25 faculty in three academic departments.
- Coded and analyzed student and faculty writing-across-the-curriculum assessment data, departmental and instructional faculty needs survey data.
- Authored summary reports of assessment findings and recommendations for improved use of writing intensive components of current academic courses.

1997 Research Project: "Who we are and who we want to be: Self and Self-Change."
Principle Investigator: K. Jill Kiecolt, Department of Sociology, Virginia Tech

- Assisted with questionnaire construction.
- Coded quantitative and qualitative data in conjunction with the principle investigator.
- Conducted data analyses.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE (continued)

1996-97 The Service-Learning Center at Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA

- Conducted program evaluation of academic service-learning department, including administration of questionnaires, conducting personal interviews, and facilitating focus groups.
- Analyzed quantitative and qualitative evaluation data, wrote and presented results and recommendations to faculty and community agency representatives.
- Researched and designed evaluation instruments including interview questionnaires, focus groups, and self-report surveys.

TEACHING and INSTRUCTIONAL EXPERIENCE

1997-99 University Writing Program at Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA

- Collaboratively designed and authored faculty development informational publication series on Writing-Across-the-Curriculum.
- Co-trained undergraduate students in peer review of writing.
- Team-facilitated week-long faculty development seminars on Writing-Across-the-Curriculum.

1996-97 The Service-Learning Center at Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA

- Designed and conducted student orientation seminars.
- Developed and delivered orientations on “Working with Special Populations: Older Adults and the Disabled” for service-learning students.
- Wrote sections of student and faculty service-learning program handbooks.
- Advised at-risk service-learning students.

1997 Instructor, Department of Sociology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA

- Course: Individual and Society

1996 Department of Sociology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA

- Guest lectures: The Self through the Life Course
Social Exchange and Equity in Close Relationships
Sociology of Emotions
Identity and Interests: Elite Culture

TEACHING and INSTRUCTIONAL EXPERIENCE (continued)

1990-95 Adult Care Center of Roanoke Valley, Inc., Salem, VA

- Developed, coordinated, and delivered community education programs on adult day care, aging, Alzheimer's disease, long term care, and support programs.
- Provided more than 75 public presentations annually to promote awareness of community-based eldercare services.
- Launched and programmed continuing educational forum for caregivers of impaired elderly individuals.
- Trained and coordinated students in field/clinical experience for sociology, health promotion, and nursing internships for Radford University, Lynchburg College, and Virginia Western Community College.
- Developed and delivered training programs for adult day care, respite, and volunteer programs.

PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS

1999-Present Postdoctoral Trainee, Multidisciplinary Research Training Program
Andrus Gerontology Center
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California

1997 - 1999 Graduate Assistant, University Writing Program
Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, Virginia

1997 Research Assistant to Dr. K. Jill Kiecolt, Department of Sociology
Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, Virginia

1996 - 1997 Graduate Assistant for Evaluation, Service-Learning Center
Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, Virginia

1994 - 1996 Writer, Market Communications, Trigon Blue Cross Blue Shield
Roanoke, Virginia

1991 - 1995 Coordinator, Community & Volunteer Resources,
Adult Care Center of Roanoke Valley, Inc., Salem, Virginia

1987 - 1991 Coordinator, Respite Program
Adult Care Center of Roanoke Valley, Inc., Roanoke, Virginia

COMPUTING SKILLS

Platforms: PC and Macintosh

Data: SPSS, MS Excel, FileMaker Pro

Word Processing: WordPerfect, Microsoft Word and Works, Claris Works

Desktop Publishing: HTML, PageMaker, Powerpoint, Presentations, Photoshop

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS

Alpha Kappa Delta, International Sociological Honor Society
American Sociological Association
(Sectional Memberships in Aging and the Life Course, Family, Social Psychology, and
Sociology of Emotions sections)
Gerontological Society of America
National Council on Family Relations
Sociologists for Women in Society
Southern Sociological Society

PROFESSIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE

1997-98 Department of Sociology Graduate Mentor Program, Coordinator

1996-97 Alpha Kappa Delta, Epsilon Chapter at Virginia Tech, President

1996-97 Long-Term Evaluation Sub-Committee, Advisory Board
Service-Learning Center at Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA

1996 Mid-Atlantic Alliance for Computers in Writing Conference, "Networks:
Connecting Learners Across the Curriculum," Virginia Tech, Session Presider

1996 Alpha Kappa Delta Annual Sociology Graduate Symposium
Virginia Tech, Session Presider

1994-95 Vocational Education Advisory Committee
Roanoke City Schools, Roanoke, VA

1994-95 United Way of Roanoke Valley, VA, Communications Committee
Chair, Work Place Communications sub-committee

1993 Internship Development Committee, Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
Radford University, Radford, VA

1992 Co-authored nomination of volunteer for recognition resulting in the Virginia
Governor's Award for Voluntary Excellence for nominee

1991 Authored nomination of volunteer for recognition resulting in The Presidential
"Point of Light" Award for nominee

1991-95 Voluntary Action Center, Professional Advisory Committee
Council of Community Services of Roanoke Valley, VA