

Crisis Management in the Delivery of Women's Reproductive Health Care:  
Responding to Social Activism

by

Maureen P. Bezold

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APPROVED:

---

Richard E. Wokutch, Chair  
Department of Management

---

Donald E. Hatfield  
Department of Management

---

Julie L. Ozanne  
Department of Marketing

---

Carroll U. Stephens  
Department of Management

---

Pamela A. Weaver  
Department of Hospitality and Tourism

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Blacksburg, Virginia

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## ABSTRACT

This research extends work done in business and society by employing institutional theory to examine organizational responses to social activism. This work examines how women's reproductive healthcare facilities have responded to anti-abortion activism. Institutional theory, coupled with the crisis management literature, was used to develop a set of hypotheses. Survey data indicate that rather than conforming to pressures by anti-abortion activists, facilities develop features that actively resist the pressures exerted by this stakeholder group. The work extends research in corporate social performance by pointing out that crisis management can be subsumed under stakeholder management. The work also contributes to the crisis management literature by providing a theoretical base for that work and moves the focus of the work from product/process failures in large organizations to social crises faced by small organizations. It also extends research in institutional theory by expanding the way in which researchers conceive of coercive pressures.

## DEDICATION

Many people have provided a shoulder to cry on and words of wisdom while I struggled through this program. I am forever grateful to all of them. However many of these people have been through this experience. They know what earning a Ph.D. is all about. Academically they know my capacity to do the work. And so their support came from an “I’ve been there, I know you can do it too” perspective. But my family has not been there. My father, George Bezold, went to school on the GI Bill and earned an undergraduate degree. But he has never been to graduate school. He hasn’t been there. My mom, Marion Bezold, wanted to go to school but didn’t because sending a girl to college was a waste of money. She hasn’t been there either. My older brother George finished law school before I went back for my masters degree. He understands a little bit more than Mom and Dad do but we all know law school isn’t anything like a real graduate degree. Melanie, my sister-in-law, was smart enough to realize that one degree is enough for her. She hasn’t been there. Michael, my younger brother, is not quite finished his undergraduate degree. He hasn’t been there either. And finally George Thomas Bezold, my nephew, hasn’t be around long enough to have been there. But he provides some perspective. He has made me realize that even dissertation research isn’t nearly as important as my family.

My family’s faith in me remained steadfast over the years. They believed in me. Even when I was convinced it was all a horrible, expensive mistake their faith in me and my ability to do this persisted. And so this is for them. Thank you. I love you all very much. And thank you Tom for watching over me.

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Earth First! spikes trees in the Pacific Northwest. PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) splashes "blood" on bystanders wearing fur coats. In New York City, ACT-UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power) disrupts a Mass at St. Patrick's Cathedral and throws condoms at shocked parishioners. An anti-abortion advocate guns down a doctor and his bodyguard in Pensacola, Florida. The majority of Americans would not consider using such tactics to further their organizations' causes because mainstream America considers the tactics socially unacceptable. However, some of the more radical social activists continue to use such tactics to further the causes they support. Elsbach and Sutton, quoting Haines (1988), define radical social movement organizations as organizations that call for "fundamental social change and exhibit tactics that 'are widely viewed as unconventional, inappropriate, or illegitimate' and 'are widely perceived as threatening'" (p. 701). This definition seems appropriate for our purposes for two reasons. First, anti-abortion advocates fight to make abortion illegal in the United States. This change could be viewed as a fundamental change in American society because abortion is currently legal in the United States. On January 22, 1973 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that access to abortion was protected by the U. S. Constitution. Second, the tactics used by anti-abortion activists are perceived as unconventional, inappropriate, and threatening in the eyes of their targets, womens' reproductive health care facilities. Womens' reproductive healthcare facilities serve as the population from which my sample was drawn. Thus the actions of many anti-abortion advocates, along with the actions of Earth First!, PETA and ACT-UP, fall neatly into Haines' definition of radical social movement organizations.

### **PROBLEM STATEMENT**

#### **Research Question**

Anti-abortion activism has been particularly violent in recent years. Picketing has been relatively common and bombings and murders occurred more frequently in the mid 1980s and the early 1990s than anytime in the past. Women's reproductive health care facilities (WRHCFs) have undertaken a variety of measures to protect their

staff members and clients including the use of surveillance cameras, escorts, and locked lobbies. However, according to the Feminist Majority Foundation (1996), the most potent weapon against anti-abortion violence has been federal laws passed in 1993 and 1994 that make the denying access to abortion clinics a federal offense. Clinics have reported a drastic decline in several types of anti-abortion activities since 1994. However, social activists continue to target them in a variety of ways. Occasionally WRHCFs do shut their doors but many remain open despite continued targeting by social activists. The focus of my study was an investigation of the development of crisis management programs as a result of social activism. My central research question was: What crisis management strategies do WRHCFs use in response to anti-abortion activism?

To answer the central research question, I developed a theoretical framework that combined the crisis management literature with institutional theory. The crisis management literature suggests that organizations will focus on crises precipitated by technical or economic failures rather than those precipitated by people, social, or organizational failures. However this focus is inappropriate for WRHCFs. Their focus should be on crises precipitated by social activists. Institutional theory argues that organizations will *conform* to pressures exerted by various stakeholders in their external environment to ensure survival. The argument fails regarding the pressures exerted by anti-abortion organizations on WRHCFs. If facilities conformed to the pressures of anti-abortion activists they would shut down their operations. Some do close, but many continue providing services in defiance of the pressures to conform. As such this project poses two fundamental arguments: (1) rather than conforming to coercive pressures, the structural features developed by WRHCFs actually defy the pressures exerted by anti-abortion activists; and (2) WRHCFs will focus their energies on developing or enhancing components of a crisis management program that address crises precipitated by social activists. Thus WRHCFs that face more frequent and more hostile pressures from anti-abortion activists will have more fully developed crisis management programs than WRHCFs that do not face frequent or hostile pressures.

## **RELEVANT LITERATURE**

This section provides a brief introduction to the literature relevant to this research. A more complete presentation of each stream is presented in the third chapter.

### **Corporate Social Performance**

“The concept of corporate social performance...can provide a coherent framework for the field of business and society...by allowing scholars to ‘locate’ works

within a broad model of business-society relationships” (Wood, 1991, p. 691). Wood’s reformulation of the corporate social performance (CSP) models provides a context for examining the development of crisis management programs in organizations responding to social activism. Her work expands on attempts by Carroll (1979), and Wartick and Cochran (1985) to lend some unity to the work done by business and society scholars. Wood defines CSP as “a business organization’s configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm’s societal relationships” (p. 693). So we can frame the examination of the development of crisis management programs in WRHCFs in terms of the principles of social responsibility, the processes of social responsiveness, and the observable outcomes as it relates to their relationships with social activists. A more extensive review of Wood’s work as it relates to my research is provided in the literature review.

### **Stakeholder Management**

While other authors have used the term stakeholder to describe organizational claimants, Freeman's (1984) work regarding stakeholders and strategic management serves as the foundation for subsequent work on stakeholder theory. Freeman suggests that strategic managers must take into account not only the concerns of stockholders, but also those of other individuals and groups who might have a claim on the organization. Freeman refers to these individuals and groups as stakeholders. More specifically, Freeman defines a stakeholder as "...any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (p. 46). Thus, according to Freeman, the concerns of a variety of stakeholders, rather than solely stockholders, should be taken into consideration in strategic decision making.

While Freeman's book serves as a fundamental piece on the topic of stakeholders in business and society literature, the concept has been modified in various ways in subsequent works. More recent works make explicit the necessity of balancing values, needs and desires of organizational claimants. Recognizing differences in the values, needs and desires of stakeholders can assist us in interpreting the development of crisis management programs in WRHCFs.

### **Issues Management**

The issues management literature stream begins with Ansoff (1980) who defines a strategic issue as "a forthcoming development, either inside or outside of the organization, which is likely to have an important impact on the ability of the enterprise to meet its objectives" (p. 133). The definition has undergone extensive revisions since then. Wartick and Mahon (1994) provide one of the more current attempts at revision. They synthesize definitions gleaned from a variety of literature

streams and present the following definition of a corporate issue:

...a controversial inconsistency based on one or more expectational gaps...involving management perceptions of changing legitimacy and other stakeholder perceptions of the changing cost/benefit positions...that occur within or between views of what is and/or what ought to be corporate performance or stakeholder perceptions of corporate performance and...imply an actual or anticipated resolution that creates significant, identifiable present or future impact on the organization (p. 306).

Wartick and Mahon point out that issues management deals with responses to gaps in organizational performance and the solutions used to close those gaps.

Turning to the relationship between issues management and crisis management, Wartick and Mahon (1994) point out that issues management is different from crisis management because crisis management deals with organizational responses to specific events rather than expectational gaps, the domain of issues management. For example, in 1992 eight miners were killed in a mining accident in southwestern Virginia. According to Wartick and Mahon the deaths were the crisis the organization faced. The issue surrounding the crisis is mine safety. Thus the issues management literature allows us to recognize the difference between the issues and crises faced by WRHCF managers. The issue they face is safety of staff and patients and the crises can range from bomb threats to murders. The following section develops the notion of crises and the crisis management construct.

### **Crisis Management**

Nearly all of the literature on crisis management written by management scholars has focused on crises faced by large industrial organizations (Perrow, 1984; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1993; Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia, 1987). The crises most often addressed in this literature include the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Union Carbide's crisis at Bhopal, nuclear power plant accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, and Johnson & Johnson's Tylenol poisonings. The literature typically examines the events leading up to an organizational crisis and, upon analysis of the account, provides suggestions for the development of a crisis management program (Mitroff & Pearson, 1993; Mitroff, Shrivastava, & Udwadia, 1987; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992).

Virtually none of the management literature addresses organizational crises that are precipitated by social activism. Social activists constitute just one of the many stakeholder groups with which organizations should be interacting. However organizations often ignore the demands of social activists because the activists' demands are not compatible with the organizations' goals and the demands of more

traditional stakeholder groups. Yet these groups warrant attention because evidence suggests that in some circumstances, overlooking their concerns in organizational decision-making can lead to devastating results. Activists have thrown “blood” on people wearing furs; engaged in treespiking; ruined years of research by releasing lab animals; committed murder to further anti-abortion causes; and waged expensive court battles to protect the environment. The detrimental effects of these actions could have been reduced or avoided had organizations engaged in constructive dialog with the activists.

## **Institutional Theory**

This section provides a brief introduction to institutional theory. I provide a more in-depth explanation in succeeding chapters. Organization theorists provide competing theories to explain and predict organizational forms. Institutional theorists suggest that organizational environments are composed of two elements, a task environment and an institutional environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Carroll & Huo, 1986). The task environment is conceptualized as those "factors directly related to the work of the organization...the concept of the institutional environment is used to describe external factors that indirectly affect an organization through societal norms, resources, and constraints" (Carroll & Huo, p. 838). This distinction between the organization's task and institutional environments serves as the foundation upon which institutional theorists explain and predict organizational forms.

Powell and DiMaggio (1991) as well as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that organizational forms are the result of isomorphic pressures exerted by the state, the professions and society. According to the authors "isomorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions" (1983, p. 149). The authors further assert that there are three types of isomorphic pressures. These include coercive pressures, mimetic pressures, and normative pressures. Coercive isomorphism can be a "direct response to government mandates" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150) but it can also be the result of cultural expectations found in the organization's society. The second type, mimetic isomorphism, refers to a process in which organizations imitate the structures of organizations they perceive as successful. The third mechanism, normative isomorphism, has its roots primarily in professionalization. This is interpreted as "the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work..." (p. 152).

A variety of theories has been developed by organizational researchers to explain and predict structural variations in organizations. Competing theories examine the conditions under which reporting structures, programs, policies and procedures develop or change in response to changing environmental conditions. While DiMaggio and Powell (1983) propose three different isomorphic pressures, my

study focused on coercive pressure and its usefulness in explaining and predicting the development/enhancement of crisis management programs in response to social activism. Recall that mimetic isomorphism calls for imitating organizations perceived as successful, normative isomorphism addresses professionalization of an occupation, and coercive isomorphism focuses on societal expectations. Since the focus of my research is on the effects social activism<sup>1</sup> has on the development of crisis management programs, it was not appropriate to include mimetic and normative isomorphism in this study.

### **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

My work examined organizational responses to social activism. More specifically, my project addressed the incorporation of responses to social activism into organizations' crisis management programs. I chose to examine crisis management programs in womens' reproductive health care facilities.

My primary purpose was to examine the usefulness of institutional theory in explaining and predicting the development or enhancement of crisis management programs in organizations. Institutional theory, as developed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Powell and DiMaggio (1991), predicts that organizations will conform to the pressures from the external environment to ensure their survival. Oliver (1991) suggests circumstances surrounding the pressures to conform will dictate organizational responses. Sometimes organizations will in fact defy the pressures to conform. In this study it is predicted that WRHCFs will develop or enhance structural features, in this case crisis management programs, that defy the pressures exerted by anti-abortion activists. More specifically I was interested in the circumstances under which WRHCFs introduce elements into their crisis management programs that deal specifically with anti-abortion activists.

The significance of my study originates from four sources: (1) synthesizing Wood's (1991) notion of responsive processes from her corporate social performance model which includes environmental assessment, stakeholder management, and issues management into one process, that of stakeholder management; (2) examining the contribution of institutional theory to our understanding of the development of crisis management programs; (3) shifting of the focus of crisis management research to crises precipitated by social forces external to the organization rather than the historical focus on crises that occur as a result of failures in organization technology; (4) contributing to our understanding of the

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<sup>1</sup> Since DiMaggio & Powell (1983) suggest that society can impose coercive pressures, the question of mimetic isomorphism is moot in this study.

coercive isomorphic process.

## **PLAN OF THE STUDY**

My work has seven chapters. The second chapter, which contains a discussion of the abortion controversy, is provided to give readers an appreciation for the context in which WRHCFs operate. The third chapter provides a review of the relevant literature. Included is a discussion literature in corporate social performance, stakeholder management, issues management, crisis management, institutional theory, and contingency theory. The fourth chapter contains a set of hypotheses that explain and predict the conditions under which crises precipitated by social activism are incorporated into crisis management programs. The fifth chapter presents the research design and analytical methods employed to conduct this work. It also includes results and discussion. The sixth and final chapter of the study addresses the implications and the limitations of my study.

There is potential for this work to contribute to knowledge in three areas. First, Wood (1991) presents processes of social responsiveness as one of the components in her corporate social performance model. The processes include environmental assessment, stakeholder management, and issues management. This work suggests that instead of three separate processes of social responsiveness there is just one, stakeholder management under which all other processes can be subsumed.

The second area to which this work contributes is organization theory. Institutional researchers have examined the organizational responses to coercive pressures. However, the focus is almost exclusively on coercive pressures by the state. This work will be the first to test hypotheses which examine the circumstances under which organizations resist coercive pressures by social activists. It is also the first work to employ institutional theory to understand the development of crisis management programs.

Finally, virtually all of the research on crisis management focuses on large industrial organizations. This work serves as an initial contribution to the crisis management literature focusing on small service organizations facing crises initiated by social activists.



## CHAPTER 2

### ABORTION AND SOCIAL ACTIVISM<sup>2</sup>

This chapter introduces the abortion debate as it is currently being played out in the United States. The intention is to provide some background on the environment in which WRHCFs operate. The chapter opens with a review of a number of U.S. Supreme Court opinions on abortion related legislation. The cases presented in this section were chosen because of their significance in terms of their impact on the legality of abortion in the United States. Others were chosen because they were first to test various aspects of the constitutionality of *Roe v. Wade*. One of the cases, *Simopolous v. State of Virginia*, was included because the attorney arguing for the state of Virginia, and against abortion rights, serves as a member of the Board of Visitors of Virginia Tech. The chapter also presents a summary of several organizations that both support and oppose legalized abortion in the U.S. I conclude the chapter with some statistics on abortion related violence over the past decades.

#### **Abortion and the U.S. Supreme Court since 1973**

On January 22, 1973 the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision regarding a matter referred to as *Roe v. Wade*. This decision made abortion on demand legal in the United States. Many praised the decision as a victory for women's reproductive rights. Others were appalled that such an august body as the Supreme Court of the United States could rule in favor of such an immoral act as abortion. The debate between the two sides has waxed and waned over the years.

In recent years the debate has heated up as evidenced by shootings in Florida, Massachusetts, and Virginia. A rise in prominence in the religious right has also led to greater debate on the issue of abortion. Several states, particularly Pennsylvania, have passed some of the most restrictive laws regarding abortion that have been seen since before the *Roe v. Wade* decision was rendered.

According to Colker (1992), the *Roe v. Wade* decision found a Texas statute that provided for criminal sanctions against women for having abortions if the pregnancy was not jeopardizing the woman's life to be unconstitutional. The plaintiff

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<sup>2</sup> This work focuses on the legal aspects of the abortion debate.

in the case was Norma McCorvey who filed under the pseudonym Jane Roe. The defendant was Henry Wade who served as the district attorney for Dallas, Texas. The question before the Court was the constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion law. The law stated that it is “a crime to ‘procure an abortion,’ ...or to attempt one, except with respect to ‘an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother’” (Harrison & Glibert, 1993a, p. 5). Roe claimed that her right of personal privacy was abridged and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Roe claimed the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments supported her right to privacy argument (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993a).

The initial complaint was filed in 1970. The case began with Wade arguing that the case was moot since Roe was no longer subject to the 1970 pregnancy. According to Justice Blackmun “(t)he usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate...review, an not simply at the date the action is initiated” (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993a, p. 7). However, the Court concluded that the rule was too rigid because a single pregnancy does not last long enough to endure the appellate process. If the Justices adhered to the rule, an appellate review would always be denied. The Justices argued that “(p)regnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’” (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993a,p. 8).

After hearing final arguments on October 11, 1971, the Court handed down its decision on January 22, 1973. The Justices concluded that a woman's right to privacy was violated by the statute and, therefore, was unconstitutional. Justice Blackmun, in writing for the seven to two majority, states:

We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among, physicians and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One’s philosophy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one’s religious training, one’s attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one’s thinking and conclusions about abortion (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993a, p. 5).

Blackmun continues:

[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993a, p. 5).

The decision goes on to state that the right to privacy protected by the Ninth Amendment is broad enough to cover a woman's right to choose whether or not to have an abortion. However, according to Blackmun, the right is not unconditional because there are "important state interests." The Justices then lay out the following parameters for the establishment of a constitutional statute regarding abortion: (1) abortion cannot be criminalized; (2) abortion cannot be regulated in the first trimester; (3) abortion can be regulated in the second trimester to protect the woman's health; (4) abortion can be regulated in the third trimester to preserve fetal life as long as the woman's health was also protected (Colker, 1992). Colker explains that the fourth provision of the statute is based on the issue of fetal viability. Viability refers to the time at which a fetus has a statistically significant chance of surviving outside the womb without substantial medical intervention.

Justice White who, along with Justice Rehnquist were in the minority, writes:

During the period prior to the time the fetus becomes viable, the Constitution of the United States values the convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative mother more than the life or potential life of the fetus....I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support the Court's judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action invests the right with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion statutes (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993a, p. 48).

White continues:

As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has the authority to do what it does today; but in my view its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993a, p. 48).

Rather portentously, Rehnquist states:

I have difficulty concluding, as the Court does, that the right of 'privacy' is involved in this case....the 'privacy' that the Court finds here (is not) even a distant relative of the freedom from searches and seizures protected by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which the Court has referred to as embodying a right to privacy (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993a, p. 51).

According to Harrison and Gilbert there were approximately 15,700,000 legal abortions performed in the United States during the 1980s. This figure alone suggests the impact of the Roe v. Wade decision on American society. But the Roe v. Wade decision is not the only significant decision rendered by the U.S. Supreme

Court regarding the abortion debate. The Court rendered significant abortion related decisions thirteen times between 1980 and 1993. Eight of those decisions were made in the 1980s, and five in the 1990s. In the following section I present some of the most influential of those decisions. It appears that during the 1970s the decisions rendered by the Court protected a woman's right to choose. However with the appointment of several more conservative Justices during the Reagan/Bush years, the decisions became more and more restrictive. More recent appointments have been less conservative than those during the 1980s. As such we have seen a slight swing back to a more moderate position on the abortion issue by the Court.

Two cases were brought before the court in 1980. They include *Harris v. McRae* and *Williams v. Zbaraz*. In essence the Court was asked to determine whether Medicaid was required to pay for abortions. In the first case *McRae* was a medicaid recipient seeking an abortion and *Harris*, the Secretary of Health and Human Services. *Williams* was physician and *Zbaraz* was Director of Illinois Public Aid. According to Harrison and Gilbert, the Court found in favor of *Harris* and *Zbaraz* stating that "a State that participates in the Medicaid program is not obligated under (Medicaid) to continue to fund those medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable..." (p.18). Harrison and Gilbert (1993b) provide several excerpts from the decisions that illustrate the essence of the decision and the dissension. The first is from Justice Potter Stewart who states:

regardless of whether the freedom of a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core or the periphery of the due process liberty recognized in [*Roe v.*] *Wade*, it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices (p. 1).

The second excerpt is from Justice Thurgood Marshall who was in the minority in the decision reached regarding these two cases. Marshall states that "[t]he Court's opinion studiously avoids recognizing the undeniable fact that for women eligible for Medicaid - poor women - denial of a Medicaid-funded abortion is equivalent to denial of legal abortion altogether" (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 35).

The U.S. Supreme Court addressed only one abortion related case in 1981. The U.S. Supreme Court rendered its decision on *H. L. v. Matheson*. At question in this case is whether or not Utah's parental notification statute is constitutional. The statute requires that the physician "notify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed, if she is a minor..." (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 50). At the time of the case *H. L.* was a pregnant minor and *Matheson* was the governor of the state of Utah. The Courts upheld the constitutionality of the statute stating "that the requirement of notice to parents may inhibit some minors from seeking abortions is not a valid basis to void the statute"

(Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 54).

Justice Stephens, concurring with the majority wrote:

[b]ecause my view in this case,..., is that the State's interest in protecting a young pregnant woman from the consequences of an incorrect abortion decision is sufficient to justify the parental-notice requirement, I agree that the decision...should be affirmed" (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 60).

Justice Marshall dissents.

The ideal of a supportive family so pervades our culture that it may seem incongruous to examine the 'burdens' imposed by a statute requiring parental notice....Realistically, however, many families do not conform to this ideal....the minor may confront physical or emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial support...(Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 63).

The Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court heard three abortion related cases in 1982 and rendered decisions in each of those cases in 1983. The first case addressed the constitutionality of Akron, Ohio's abortion ordinance. The City of Akron was the plaintiff and the Akron Center for Reproductive Health was the defendant. Five sections of the ordinance were at question including sections requiring: (1) all abortions after the first trimester be performed in a hospital; (2) all unmarried minors provide parental notification and consent; (3) all physicians make "certain specified statements" to the patient 'to insure that the consent for an abortion is truly informed consent' (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 76); (4) all those seeking an abortion are subject to a 24 hour waiting period between signed consent and the actual abortion; (5) all remains be disposed of humanely and sanitarly.

As there was no sound medical reason for such a requirement, the Court found it unconstitutional to require abortions be performed in hospitals. Regarding parental notification and consent, the ordinance did not require a case by case evaluation of the maturity of the minor involved. Because of this oversight, the Court found it unconstitutional to require written parental consent for all minors under the age of fifteen. The Court also found the informed consent requirement unconstitutional. The ordinance required doctors to inform women that "the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception" (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 86) which is counter to the provisions of Roe v. Wade which state that "a State may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of abortions" (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 86). Regarding the imposition of a twenty-four hour waiting period, the Court also found that to be "invalid." The purpose of the ordinance, according to the City of Akron, was to ensure that the decision was made after consideration, by the woman, of the consequences of such a procedure. The Court found that "careful consideration...by

the woman is beyond the state's power to require" (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 90). Finally, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision invalidating the requirement of humane and sanitary disposal of the remains.

The second case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1983 was *Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft*. Planned Parenthood of Kansas City and John Ashcroft, Missouri's Attorney General were the parties involved in this case. The constitutionality of Missouri's abortion statutes was argued in this case. More particularly, at question were statutes requiring: (1) that abortions after twelve weeks be performed in a hospital; (2) that a pathology report must be done for each abortion performed; (3) that a second physician be present during abortions performed after viability; (4) that minors secure parental or judicial consent.

Eventually the Court found Missouri's hospitalization requirement unconstitutional. However the Court upheld the other portions of the statute that had been debated. In terms of the second physician requirement, Justice Powell wrote "(w)e believe the second-physician requirement reasonably furthers the State's compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses...and we reverse the judgement of the Court of Appeals holding that...(it) is unconstitutional" (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 112). In addressing the portion of the statute that required a pathologist's report Powell states "(w)e view the requirement for a pathology report...as a relatively insignificant burden.... we reverse the judgement of the Court of Appeals on this issue" (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 113). Finally regarding parental consent, Justice Powell, in writing for the majority, that the "statute..., as interpreted, avoids any constitutional infirmities" (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 113).

As always, a minority of the judges dissented. In writing his dissent, Blackmun first addresses the portion of the statute that requires a pathologist's report. At the time, the report could increase the cost of an abortion by as much as \$40.00. Blackmun, in voicing his dissent writes:

[a]lthough this increase may seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable perspective, I cannot say that it is equally insignificant to every woman seeking an abortion....the requirement adds significantly to the cost...and Missouri has not shown that it serves any substantial health-related purpose. Under these circumstances, I would hold that constitutional limits have been exceeded (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 117).

Regarding the requirement that a second physician be present Blackmun points out that a second physician is necessary only if the method of abortion allows for a live birth. Not all do and, as such, the second physician is superfluous in some situations. Yet the statute does not recognize this and, according to Blackmun, it "remains impermissibly vague" (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 119).

The third abortion related decision handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1983 was in a case known as *Simopoulos v. Virginia*. Simopoulos, a physician, was the plaintiff and the State of Virginia served as the defendant. Simopoulos challenged the constitutionality of the Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement. At the time Virginia laws required, "in furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal health" (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 129), that second trimester abortions required hospitalization. Simopoulos argued that the statute prohibited nonhospital abortions and that requirement infringes on the right to privacy. The Court found that the definition of a hospital, according to Virginia State statute, includes outpatient facilities as long as they have been licensed as a hospital and as such is not "an unreasonable means of furthering the state's compelling interest in 'protecting the woman's own health and safety'" (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 131). Thus the Court decided in favor of the State of Virginia.

In 1986, after a three year hiatus in abortion related decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in *Thornburgh vs. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists*. According to Drucker (1990) this case was thought by many to be a test case that might lead to the overturning of *Roe vs. Wade* because of the " 'new' conservative ideology that reflected the Reagan White House" (p. 122). Thornburgh was governor of the state of Pennsylvania at the time. The plaintiffs in the original case, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists among them, challenged many of the provisions of the Pennsylvania abortion statutes. The provisions in question addressed the issues of informed consent, printed information, reporting requirements, determination of viability, degree of care required in postviability abortions, and second physician requirements (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b). The lower courts struck down many of the provisions of the statutes as "facially invalid" and Thornburgh appealed the decision in what "was one of the most angrily and hotly debated Supreme Court sessions in history" (Drucker, 1990; p. 122).

In writing for the majority Justice Blackmun states:

In the years since this Court's decision in *Roe*, States and municipalities have adopted a number of measures seemingly designed to prevent a woman, with the advice of her physician, from exercising her freedom of choice....Thornburgh claim[s] that the statutory provisions before us today further legitimate compelling interests of the Commonwealth. Close analysis of those provisions, however, shows that they wholly subordinate constitutional privacy interests and concerns with maternal health in an effort to deter a woman from making a decision that, with her physician, is hers to make (Harrison and Gilbert, 1993b, p.141).

Blackmun goes on to say that the reporting requirements and the informed consent requirements extend beyond that of promoting the state's interest in protecting the

health of the mother. The Justice asserts that the provisions are designed to dissuade women from exercising their right to have an abortion. Provisions regarding postviability care and a second physician were also struck down by the Court “because it required a ‘trade-off’ between the woman’s health and fetal survival, and failed to require that maternal health be the physician’s paramount consideration....” (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 146).

In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger writes:

...the Court concludes that the State cannot impose...simple information-dispensing requirement in the abortion context where the decision is fraught with serious physical, psychological, and moral concerns, of the highest order. Can it possibly be that the Court is saying that the Constitution *forbids* the communication of such critical information to a woman?(Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 152).

Justice White, as part of the minority, states:

...(T)he fact that many men and women of good will and high commitment to constitutional government place themselves on both sides of the abortion controversy strengthens my own conviction that the values animating the Constitution do not compel recognition of the abortion liberty as fundamental. In so denominating that liberty, the Court engages not in constitutional interpretation, but in the unrestrained imposition of its own, extraconstitutional value preferences (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 159).

He continues stating that “(o)ne searches the majority’s opinion in vain for a convincing reason why the apparently laudable policy of promoting informed consent becomes unconstitutional when the subject is abortion...” (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 162). White contends, in objecting to the word significant in the provision requiring abortion methods that result in fetal survival unless it threatens maternal health, that “(t)he majority resorts to linguistic nit-picking in striking down the provision”(Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 166). White concludes his contentious dissent with the following passage: “I do not share in the warped point of view of the majority, nor can I follow the tortuous path the majority treads in proceeding to strike down the statute before us” (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 169).

The final abortion related decision handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court during the 1980s was Webster vs. Reproductive Health Services. Arguments were heard in April 1989 and the decision was dated July 3, 1989. The constitutionality of the Missouri abortion laws was in question in this case. At the time Webster was the attorney general for the state of Missouri and Reproductive Health Services was a nonprofit offering family planning and gynecological services including abortions up to



22 weeks (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b). According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the provisions in question include the preamble of the statutes which states that life begins at conception, tests required to determine viability, and prohibitions against the use of public employees, funding, and facilities “to encourage or counsel women to have such abortions” (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 181).

Chief Justice Rehnquist rendered the opinion for the majority. He begins by stating that the Court did not have the authority to make decisions on “abstract propositions” referring to the question of when life begins as it was raised in the preamble to the Missouri statutes. Chief Justice Rehnquist continues:

Missouri’s refusal to allow public employees to perform abortions in public hospitals leaves a pregnant woman with the same choices as if the State had chosen not to operate any public hospitals at all. The challenged provisions only restrict a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion to the extent that she chooses to use a physician affiliated with a public hospital....Having held that the State’s refusal to fund abortions does not violate *Roe v. Wade*, it strains logic to reach a contrary result for the use of public facilities and employees....it is difficult to see how any procreational choice is burdened by the State’s ban on the use of its facilities or employees for performing abortions (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 185-186).

Thus the Court upheld the constitutionality of the prohibition on using public employees, funds, and facilities to perform abortions. They also upheld the provisions requiring viability tests stating that the provision “is reasonably designed to ensure that abortions are not performed where the fetus is viable - an end which all concede is legitimate - and that is sufficient to sustain its constitutionality” (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 192).

Justice Blackmun, dissenting in part, writes:

Although the Court extricates itself from this case without making a single, even incremental, change in the law of abortion, the plurality and Justice Scalia would overrule *Roe* (the first silently, the other explicitly) and would return to the states virtually unfettered authority to control the quintessentially intimate, personal, and life-directing decision whether to carry a fetus to term....The plurality opinion is filled with winks, and nods, and knowing glances to those who would do away with *Roe* explicitly (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993b, p. 202).

As was stated earlier there have been five abortion related decisions handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court between 1990 and 1993. One of these cases, while related to the abortion debate, was really a civil rights case (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993c). Of the remaining four cases perhaps the most influential was *Planned*

Parenthood vs. Casey. Because the decision in this case overshadows the others decided in the 1990s it is the focus of this section.

In April of 1992 the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in Planned Parenthood vs. Casey and the decision was handed down on June 29, 1992. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania served as the plaintiff and Robert Casey, then governor of Pennsylvania, served as the defendant. At question were five provisions of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act. The provisions in question include informed consent, a waiting period of at least 24 hours, parental informed consent for minors, husband notification for married women, and reporting requirements for facilities providing abortions. However, of greatest concern was the request by Casey to overturn *Roe* which is largely the focus of the decision handed down in this case.

Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, in writing the majority opinion, point out that in "joining ...[Casey] as...[friends of the Court], the United States, as it has done in five other cases in the last decade, again asks us to overrule *Roe*" (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993c, p. 113). However the majority concluded that "the essential holding of *Roe v. Wade* should be retained and once again reaffirmed" (p. 115). The Justices support their conclusion stating that:

[O]nly in the most convincing justification under accepted standards of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling the first was anything but a surrender to political pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of the principle on which the Court staked its authority in the first instance. So to overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993c, p. 129).

However the Justices go on to say that the trimester framework is not workable and should instead be replaced with an "undue burden" standard. The Justices suggest that abortion provisions will be deemed unconstitutional if the provisions represent an undue burden for women seeking abortions.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, in writing for the minority, finds that "(w)hile purporting to adhere to precedent, the joint opinion instead revises it. *Roe* continues to exist, but only in the way a storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality..." (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993c, p. 177). The Chief Justice goes on to say that "(t)he decision in *Roe* has engendered large demonstrations,...,both in opposition to and in support of that opinion. A decision either way on *Roe* can therefore be perceived as favoring one group or the other" (Harrison & Gilbert, 1993c, p. 182). Justice Scalia adds that "(t)he states may, if they wish, permit abortion-on-demand, but the Constitution does not *require* them to do so....(t)he issue is whether it is a liberty protected by the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not"

(Harrison & Gilbert, 1993c, p. 193). Scalia goes on to condemn the applicability of the "undue burden" standard and concludes his writings with the following: "We should get out of this area, where we have not a right to be, and where we do neither ourselves nor the country any good by remaining"(Harrison & Gilbert, 1993c, p. 211).

The decisions rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court that are presented here are representative of the nature of the legal debate surrounding the abortion issue in the United States. The decisions rendered throughout the years reflect the changing face of the Court. These changes come about as members retire and new members are sworn in. Those chosen for confirmation are a reflection of the political climate at the time of confirmation. Given the recent re-election of President Clinton it would seem that decisions made by the Court will be more moderate and therefore less restrictive than those seen during the 1980s.

### **Anti-abortion Associations**

There are twenty-seven anti-abortion associations listed in the Encyclopedia of Associations (Schwartz & Turner, 1995). The organizations range from Feminists for Life of America to Operation Rescue. The listing also includes organizations with religious affiliations as diverse as the Jewish Anti-Abortion League and the Association of Black Catholics Against Abortion. This section summarizes some of the ideas and activities of several anti-abortion associations including Feminists for Life of America, the American Academy of Pro-life Pediatricians, Pharmacists for Life International, Christian Americans for Life, the Seamless Garment Network, and STOPP (Stop Planned Parenthood) International.

Feminists for Life of America (FFLA) publishes a quarterly newsletter called The American Feminist. In this publication Rosemary Oelrich Bottcher (1994), President of FFLA states that "Feminists for Life seeks to eliminate abortion, but we believe that the best way to do so is by enhancing the status of women"(p.16). According to Oelrich Bottcher the original feminists, including Victoria Woodhull and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, opposed abortion. According to the author, the women who founded feminism viewed "abortion as a symptom of the many problems imposed upon women"(p. 16). FFLA seeks to eliminate the need for abortion by assisting in the creation of a world in which abortion is unnecessary. To accomplish this goal the organization actively engages in public policy debates affecting women and children (Oelrich Bottcher, 1994).

Rather than focusing on multiple public policy issues, the American Academy of Pro-life Pediatricians focuses its energies on making explicit the effects of contraceptives, particularly RU-486, on the "pre-born." Literature from this association suggests that the effects of various contraceptives have been examined exclusively from the woman's perspective and not from that of the unborn child. They suggest

that some women may, subsequent to the use of RU-486, reconsider the decision and choose to have the child. As such, the organization seeks to educate people on this drug's effects on the unborn child.

Another organization representing those involved in healthcare is Pharmacists for Life International (PFLI), located in Powell, Ohio. PFLI fights for the "basic anti-abortion for the preborn, the handicapped and the elderly." Their motto is "let the gift of medications promote life, not destroy life." Literature received from this organization suggests that pharmaceutical companies serve as the new abortionists. PFLI proceeds explaining that oral contraceptives accomplish their goal in several ways, one of which results in the expulsion of a human embryo. Their literature further states that oral contraceptives will lead to the destruction of Christian culture and the rise of the Moslem threat in Western civilizations. The PFLI believes that abortion will eliminate western civilizations' ability to provide their own labor. The only solution envisioned by the PFLI is an increase the immigration rate from non Christian and particularly Moslem countries.

While they share a anti-abortion focus, the Christian Americans for Life is different from the PFLI in that it addresses the debate solely from a religious perspective. Much of the literature from this organization quotes Scriptures and then provides interpretations by biblical scholars. They have a monthly newsletter that seems to focus mostly on political initiatives that are related to anti-abortion activism. One article examined the future scenarios for the anti-abortion movement dependent upon the outcome of the 1992 presidential elections. Also included in the literature from this organization is a pamphlet promoting adoption over abortion. It was written by a woman who faced that decision as an unmarried 19 year old in the mid 1970s. She chose adoption and promoted that choice to other women who faced similar circumstances.

The Seamless Garment Network is perhaps the most interesting of the organizations working for the anti-abortion cause. This association is a coalition of organizations that work to reduce the cruelty that they suggest is inherent in today's society. Some of the organizations protest wars, others work to reduce poverty, and others work to end abortion in the U.S. The organization takes its name from a speech made by the late Cardinal Bernardin who stated that for every freedom there is a corresponding responsibility and that human rights are a seamless garment, all composing a single cloth.

STOPP (Stop Planned Parenthood) International, founded in 1985 by Jim Sedlak, seeks to "expose the truth" about Planned Parenthood (PP) activities . The organization's newsletter, the Ryan Report, includes articles addressing all facets of PP activities. The newsletter also contains information on guides for fighting PP including; "defeating" government funding for PP; countering PP plans for local

communities; and “defeating” PP public school sex education programs. The organization also makes religious appeals regarding its work in “telling the world about Planned Parenthood, about how it has deceived many concerning the real intention of its programs”(Easter Thoughts, April 1995, p. 8).

The organizations that constitute the anti-abortion movement embrace a range of missions, goals and objectives with one overriding desire, to overturn Roe v. Wade. Many of the organizations seek to educate people on the “evils” of abortion. Other tactics used vary from letter writing, to picketing, to various violent acts. It is the actions of more violent anti-abortion proponents that lead to the development of crisis management programs in WRHCFs.

### **Pro-abortion Associations**

The Encyclopedia of Associations refers to organizations that are pro-abortion as reproductive rights organizations (Schwartz & Turner, 1995). Members of these organizations support legalized abortion in the U.S. and engage in activities designed to preserve that right. Some of the organizations active in the struggle to keep abortion legal in the U.S. include the National Abortion Federation (NAF), The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice, and National Abortion Rights Action League. A summary of each of these organizations is presented below.

According to their literature, the National Abortion Federation (NAF) seeks to “preserve and enhance the quality and accessibility of abortion services in the U.S. and Canada” (Conference program, 1996 Annual Meeting, p. 1). The organization provides continuing education for abortion providers, educates facilities directors on risk management and other administrative issues, and works with the federal government on behalf of reproductive rights.

The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy (CRLP), founded in 1992, is an organization of “reproductive rights attorneys and activists united to secure women’s reproductive freedoms in the U.S. and around the world” (Schwartz & Turner, 1995, p. 2143). The organization works to provide information on reproductive rights to various organizations playing a part in the debate on abortion rights.

The Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice (RCRC) is composed of thirty-eight “national mainline Christian, Jewish, and other religious organizations” who “work to create a public opinion climate that is conducive to pro choice policy making, and affirms women as moral decision-makers” (Cook, NAF Annual Meeting Syllabus, 1996, p. 66). Cook states that “(p)recisely because violent acts against women and their healthcare providers are justified as ‘Godly,’ they demand a unique response from the religious community” (p.65). Cook also states that for many pro-abortion

activists their work stems from religious, moral, or spiritual convictions. For long term success, the RCRC states that some of the Christian Right's activities need to be countered. These include pervasive portrayals of women that degrade and dehumanize them. As Cook says, pro-abortion activists "need Christian clergy to stand up to the women-bashing, oppressive use of Christianity" employed by many anti-abortion activists (p. 63).

The National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), founded in 1969, works to "develop and sustain a pro-abortion political constituency in order to maintain the right to legal abortion for all women" (Schwartz & Turner, 1995, p. 2143). The organization engages in a wide range of political activities to ensure that abortion remains legal in the U.S. Interaction with Congress constitutes the bulk of work of NARAL. The organization employs a lobbyist, compiles statistics, and maintains a political action committee to support pro-abortion candidates.

### **Violence Against WRHCFs**

The organizations presented above seek to maintain reproductive rights in the United States. Many people supporting a woman's right to choose naively thought the battle was over when the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision on Roe v. Wade on January 22, 1973. But they were wrong. From January 1, 1977 through December 31, 1988 Grimes, Forrest, Kirkman, and Radford (1991) found that there were 110 cases of anti-abortion violence. The authors define anti-abortion violence as "an attempted or completed act of arson, bombing, or firebombing directed against an abortion provider or organization supportive of abortion rights" (p. 1263). They found that 80 facilities in 28 states and the District of Columbia were attacked in the twelve years covered by the study. Ohio reported the highest number of incidences with sixteen, followed by California, Texas, and Florida with ten, nine, and eight respectively (Grimes et al.). Grimes et. al also found that 20% of the facilities were targeted more than once. Arson (39%) and attempted arson (13%) was the most frequently reported type of violence with bombing and attempted bombing following closely with 21% and 15% respectively (Grimes et al.). The authors also gathered data on harassment and found "that several factors were significantly related to harassment: type of facility (e.g., clinic vs. physician's office) [clinic harassment is more frequent], region of the country (higher in the Midwest and South), and proportion of patient visits that involved abortion services [more patient visits involving abortion services resulted in more frequent harassment]" (p. 1267). Despite the violence and harassment, the authors point out that most facilities that have been targeted, face disruptions in providing services but do not close permanently.

In 1993 the United States witnessed the first murder in the name of anti-abortion. Dr. David Gunn was shot and killed by Michael Griffin. Griffin was convicted in the case and is now in prison in Florida serving out his sentence (Guasch-

Melendez, 1996). Dr. John Britton and his escort, Lt. Col. James Barrett were shot and killed on July 29, 1994 outside a Pensacola, Florida abortion clinic by Paul Hill. Hill was later convicted in the crime and is also serving out his term in the Florida prison system (Guasch-Melendez, 1996). And on December 30, 1994 two clinic workers were shot and killed in Brookline, Massachusetts by John Salvi. Salvi was convicted and committed suicide in late 1996 while serving time for the murders.

There was a drastic decline in abortion related violence in 1995, a trend that began in 1994. The Feminist Majority Foundation speculates that the decrease in abortion related violence in 1994 was the result of two Supreme Court rulings. In January 1994 the Court ruled that “anti-abortion terrorists could be sued under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)....the Court also upheld the constitutionality of ‘buffer zone’ injunctions created by a state court to protect clinics”(Feminist Majority Foundation, 1996). As a result, research indicates that “(i)n every category of violence, more clinics in 1995 reported decreases than increases in incidents. The smallest net decreases, however, were in reports of death threats and stalking” (The Feminist Majority Foundation, 1996). The Freedom to Clinic Entrances Act (F.A.C.E.) was signed into law on May 26, 1994 by President Clinton and many attribute the continued decrease in violence to F.A.C.E. The act makes anti-abortion violence a federal crime. According to the Feminist Majority Foundation “(t)he Act provides federal jurisdiction and enacts specific federal penalties, including felony offenses and civil fines, for those convicted of using force, the threat of force, or physical obstruction against patients, health care workers, and clinics” (1996). However, according to the Feminist Majority Foundation (FMF) “anti-abortion extremists largely have abandoned clinic blockade and clinic invasion strategies in favor of more threatening strategies aimed at particular physicians and clinic workers such as death threats, stalking, and home picketing” (1996). The FMF also found that while anti-abortion violence continued nationwide, Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts, North Dakota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin were particularly hard hit.

Despite the United States Supreme Court's decision to uphold *Roe v. Wade*, the U.S. continues to witness violence by anti-abortion activists. The battle culminated in the early 1990s with the murders of several WRHCF workers and the convictions of those found guilty of murder in the name of anti-abortion (Guasch-Melendez, 1996). Despite the decline in violence, the battle continues.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Several research streams falling under the rubric of business and society relationships contribute to crisis management research including stakeholder management and issues management. Organization theory can also contribute to our understanding of crisis management programs. This chapter presents some of the contributions made by researchers in each of these areas, as well as contributions of crisis management researchers to this project. The chapter closes with a discussion that addresses some of the gaps in the literature as it pertains to organizations' crisis management programs.

### **PREVIOUS RESEARCH**

Research addressing corporate social responsibility, organizations and the natural environment, stakeholder management, issues management, and crisis management all address the nature of the relationship between business and the societal context in which they find themselves. Each recognizes, whether explicitly or implicitly, that the relationship between business and society is not a one way interaction but one in which business affects society and vice versa. This section highlights some of the research done in corporate social performance, stakeholder theory, issues management, and crisis management.

#### **Corporate Social Performance**

“The concept of corporate social performance...can provide a coherent framework for the field of business and society...by allowing scholars to ‘locate’ works within a broad model of business-society relationships” (Wood, 1991, p. 691). Wood’s reformulation of corporate social performance (CSP) models provides a context for examining the development of crisis management programs in organizations responding to social activism. Her work expands on attempts by Carroll (1979), and Wartick and Cochran (1985) to lend some unity to the work done by business and society scholars. Wood defines CSP as “a business organization’s configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm’s societal relationships” (p. 693). The author states that assessment of an



organization includes an examination of the following:

the degree to which principles of social responsibility motivates actions taken by the company, the degree to which the firm makes use of socially responsible processes, the existence and nature of policies and programs designed to manage the firm's societal relationships, and the social impacts...of the firm's actions...(p. 693).

Wood suggests that there are three principles of corporate social responsibility including the institutional principle, the organizational principle, and the individual principle. According to Wood, the institutional principle is legitimacy of the firm. By this she means legitimacy of the organization in the eyes of the public as a member of society. The organizational principle refers to public responsibility or a responsibility to solve problems they caused or to help solve problems related to their operations (Wood, 1991). Wood suggests that the individual principle refers to managerial discretion. As Wood states "because managers possess discretion, they are personally responsible for exercising it and cannot avoid this responsibility through reference to rules, policies, and procedures" (p. 699).

As for the processes of corporate social responsiveness, Wood (1991) suggests there are three: environmental assessment; stakeholder management; and issues management. Both stakeholder management and issues management are addressed more thoroughly below. Wood introduces the discussion on environmental assessment by explaining that "responsiveness is an ecological concept, suggesting organizational survival through adaptation to environmental conditions" (p. 704). Thus Wood suggests that to ensure organizational survival organizations need to know something about their environments and respond appropriately. Wood suggests that stakeholder management and issues management are two ways in which organizations can do this.

The final component of Wood's (1991) model of corporate social performance is referred to as outcomes of corporate behavior. This includes social impacts, social programs, and social policies (Wood, 1991). Social impacts is a rather loose term used to refer to anything from factory disasters to technological innovation. Social programs "seek to meet particular needs or ends through the investment of resources in some course of action seen by the company as socially desirable" (Wood, p. 709). Wood suggests that corporate social policy is different in that policies "guide decision making (a) in areas where problems recur...and (b) in areas of great interest or importance to the organization" (p. 709).

According to Wood (1991) research into the development of crisis management programs in WRHCFs can be "located" in her model of corporate social performance. Clearly my research addresses the legitimacy principle. A small, albeit

vocal, segment of society does not feel that the services provided by WRHCFs are socially acceptable. This is in contrast to the majority of the population that views the right to choose a legitimate right for the citizens of this country. In terms of responsiveness, Wood does not recognize crisis management as one of the activities covered under this rubric. However, as is argued later, crisis management is really just a component of a well developed stakeholder management program. As such, developing crisis management programs does have its place within Wood's model of corporate social performance. Finally, in terms of outcomes, we will see that many WRHCFs have well developed crisis management programs. Thus Wood's improvements to earlier CSP models allow for the "location" of this work in business and society research.

### **Stakeholder Theory**

While other authors have used the term stakeholders to describe organizational claimants, Freeman's (1984) work regarding stakeholders and strategic management serves as the foundation for subsequent work on stakeholder theory. Freeman suggests that strategic managers must take into account not only the concerns of stockholders, but also those of other individuals and groups who might have a claim on the organization. Freeman refers to these individuals and groups as stakeholders. More specifically, Freeman defines a stakeholder as "...any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (p. 46). Freeman promotes the notion of enterprise strategies which are strategies that answer the question "what do we stand for?" (p. 90). The concerns of a variety of stakeholders, rather than solely stockholders, will be paramount in strategic decision making, dependent upon how the organization responds to the question "what do we stand for?"

While Freeman's book serves as a fundamental piece on the topic of stakeholders in business and society literature, the concept has been modified in various ways in subsequent works. Starik suggests that ideas or concepts are stakeholders (Jones, 1994). Starik asserts that, in addition to individuals and groups of people, we also must consider ideas such as love, honesty, and goodness, as well as hate, deceit, and evil, as stakeholders. He supports this notion by providing famous quotes that demonstrate his meaning. Some of those include "... life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and "nothing to fear except fear itself." His point is that people tend to think of these ideals as things in and of themselves and they can affect or be affected by the actions of organizations.

In the same piece by Jones (1994) in which Starik's ideas are found, is an essay by Wartick. Wartick summarizes three major conclusions reached by those attending the Toronto Conference which contribute to our understanding of the stakeholder concept. First is the need to recognize normative cores for each

stakeholder. What the conferees meant by this is the norms or values that each stakeholder "brings to the table" when making demands regarding the actions of other stakeholders. Wartick suggests that if an appreciation for the normative core of each stakeholder can be developed, perhaps the "us versus them" mentality exemplifying organizational decision making can be replaced with one which espouses "we are all in this together." For this to be successful all organizational stakeholders need to recognize that their demands need to be balanced with the demands of other stakeholders. Compromise is at the heart of what Wartick is suggesting. The second major conclusion Wartick presents is, as he puts it, the reality of power relationships in stakeholder management. Wartick states "...how the business organization goes about dealing with multiple stakeholder interests rests with any particular stakeholder's power to influence other stakeholder interests" (p. 113). He goes on to say that this power has two components, "the type and legitimacy of the claimed stake..., and ...the ability of a particular stakeholder to influence others who can affect a stakeholder's interests" (p. 113). Power, in whatever form, has always been implicit in stakeholder theory/stakeholder management and most other theories of the firm. Explicit recognition of power as an integral part of stakeholder theory provides one more rich, albeit untapped, area for research. The third major topic Wartick presents is the relevance of situational factors to stakeholder theory. Stakeholders' normative cores, and the power one stakeholder has over another, depend on the context in which the interaction occurs. As Wartick states "...the characteristics of differing situations will help explain and predict variability in stakeholder interactions. The implication for management is that monitoring and responding to changes in stakeholder demands and expectations ...is a managerial necessity" (p. 115). Thus, stakeholder management requires continuous attention to the ever-changing nature of stakeholder demands.

Wicks, Gilbert, and Freeman (1994) provide a "feminist reinterpretation of the stakeholder concept"(p. 475). This builds on Wartick's (Jones, 1994) contention that a "we're all in this together" mindset needs to be embraced in organizational decision making. The authors suggest that there are shortcomings to the concept of stakeholder, as it has been developed. They state that the concept "relies too much on a (sic) individualistic-autonomous-masculinist mode of thought to make it intelligible" (p. 476). Wicks et al. suggest that a feminist reinterpretation would allow "the us/them and internal/external distinctions (to) fade into a sense of communal solidarity in which one sees the corporate identity as manifest within an entire network of stakeholders and a broader social context" (p. 483). This reinterpretation brings to the forefront the need for stakeholder groups to "recognize their interdependence, to embrace it, and to work together to meet the changing needs and expectations of each group" (p. 486).

The notions put forth by these authors enhance our understanding of the richness of the relationship between organizations and the social context in which

they operate. Wartick's (Jones, 1994) normative core and Starik's (Jones, 1994) ideals provide a rich foundation from which to examine organizational interaction with stakeholders in both the task and institutional environments. Explicit recognition of power relationships and ever changing contexts of interaction realistically reflect the complexity and uncertainty inherent in organizational decision-making. However, Wicks, Gilbert, and Freeman's (1994) work implies that power relationships need to give way to a sense of community. From here, Wicks et al. suggest, organizations can more appropriately recognize the various changing needs for all stakeholders.

While the calls made by each of the authors above are laudable, in some instances organizational stakeholders have incommensurable needs and demands which preclude any sort of compromise. For example, it would be difficult to reach a compromise between those opposing legal abortion in the U.S. and those determined to maintain the right. The values that these two stakeholder groups bring to the table make it very difficult to come to some mutual understanding that would result in a win/win situation. This is not to suggest that what the authors are calling for is inappropriate. It most surely is and can serve as a basis from which to begin interactions for many of the organizations with which we interact. But we need to recognize that in some instances this call for action will be met with more resistance than in others. It will be much more difficult to achieve a sense of community due to a lack of common ground.

The stakeholder concept implies that each stakeholder group has its own set of values, needs and desires. These can be thought of as the issues stakeholders bring to the table as managers engage in organizational decision-making. The following section presents some of the work addressing issues and issues management. A review of this literature assists us in understanding the issues/issues management construct. This, in turn, allows us to appreciate the contributions of issues management to crisis management.

## **Issues Management**

**Definitions.** Investigating what constitutes a crisis raises the question of how crises and crisis management are different from issues and issues management. Ansoff (1980), who serves as an early contributor to the issue management literature, assists us in understanding the issues management construct. He defines a strategic issue as "a forthcoming development, either inside or outside of the organization, which is likely to have an important impact on the ability of the enterprise to meet its objectives" (p. 133). Ansoff goes on to say that strategic issue management grew out of strategic planning, but differs from strategic planning in that "strategic issue management...responds to signals in `real' time. ...compared to periodic strategic planning..." (p. 131). Ansoff continues the article with prescriptions for successful strategic issue management programs including early detection,

dedicated resources, top management commitment, and input at all levels of the organization's hierarchy.

While the definition of a corporate issue has undergone extensive revisions since 1980, Wartick and Mahon (1994) suggest that the definition still is not adequate. The authors identify weakness in the definitions of issues and issues management provided in the past and attempt to reformulate the definition of a corporate issue. They synthesize definitions gleaned from business strategy, public policy, and business and society literatures and present the following definition of a corporate issue:

...a controversial inconsistency based on one or more expectational gaps...involving management perceptions of changing legitimacy and other stakeholder perceptions of the changing cost/benefit positions...that occur within or between views of what is and/or what ought to be corporate performance or stakeholder perceptions of corporate performance and...imply an actual or anticipated resolution that creates significant, identifiable present or future impact on the organization (p. 306).

Wartick and Mahon point out that issues management deals with responses to gaps in organizational performance and the solutions used to close those gaps. According to the authors controversy and inconsistency also play a part in issues management. Additionally Wartick and Mahon suggest that the resolution of inconsistency will have an obvious and significant impact on the organization. While this is not a particularly parsimonious definition, by incorporating perceptions, corporate performance, and stakeholders, it does more fully address the nuances of issues and issues management overlooked in other definitions.

**Types of issues.** Other authors, expanding upon Ansoff's work, make distinctions regarding the type of issue addressed. Fleming (1981) examines public issues scanning and states it is "a critical element in both strategic planning and issues management" and is defined as "a process designed to obtain, analyze, and report information relating to issues in the societal/political environments" (p. 156). He contends that the purpose of public issues scanning is to identify significant issues so companies can be proactive rather than reactive in their responses. Fleming employs concepts from the public issues literature to analyze data from the food industry. His efforts lead him to suggest that firms need to have individuals and departments designated to undertake the public issues scanning function. Fleming concludes his work stating the lack of corporate commitment to public issues scanning is disappointing despite his contention that public issues scanning is vital to strategic planning and issues management.

**Identifying issues.** Rather than addressing public issues or social demands, Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan (1983) examine activities involved in the diagnosis of strategic issues. After defining a strategic issue as "an emerging development which in the judgment of some strategic decision makers is likely to have a significant impact on the organization's present or future strategies," Dutton et. al state that strategic issue diagnosis (SID) "refers to those activities and processes by which data and stimuli are translated into focused issues (i.e. attention organizing acts) and the issues explored (i.e. acts of interpretation)" (p. 308). Dutton et al. suggest that there are three elements fundamental to SID including inputs, process, and outputs. The authors use examples to develop each of the components and then conclude their article stating that "(i)f an organization is to escape the boundedness of decision making that typically leads to pathological behaviours the inputs, process and outputs of diagnosis need to be continually monitored and assessed" (p. 321).

**Types of issues management programs.** Instead of focusing on identifying strategic issues Dutton and Ottensmeyer (1987) examine the types of programs businesses have developed. But first they join their colleagues by providing additional revisions to the concept of strategic issues. They define issues as "developments or trends that emerge from an organization's internal or external environments: they are perceived to have the potential to affect an organization's performance" (p. 355). Then the authors examine the forms and functions of organizational strategic issues management (SIM) programs. The authors contend that there are four distinct forms SIM programs take on based on the types of issues addressed and the scope of the activities. The issues can be either internal or external to the firm and the scope can be either active or passive. If it is active the SIM program will be aggressive in "shaping strategic decisions outcomes or environmental forces" (p. 357). If the SIM program is passive, little effort will be made to change the internal structure or the external environment. The integration of the type of issue and the scope of activities leads to four different SIM program forms. The program can be classified as either a collector, an antennae, an activator, or an intervener. Collector programs are passive and detect internal issues. Antennae programs are also passive but have an external focus. Activator programs are active in influencing internal issues and intervener programs actively influence external issues. In addition to identifying the form SIM programs can take, Dutton and Ottensmeyer point out that the program can perform either an instrumental function or a symbolic function. If the SIM program serves an instrumental function it assists the organization in adapting to its environment. However, if the program performs a symbolic function, it serves to "create and communicate shared meanings for organizational members through the structures and processes they design" (p. 358). The authors found that SIM programs assisted organizations in encouraging "causal analysis of the issues and their relationships to one another" (p. 360). Additionally the Dutton and Ottensmeyer suggest that the "an organization's context affects pressures...and...demands that determine the form and function of SIM systems' (p.

361). Finally the authors state that "SIM systems represent a set of structures and processes that organizations adopt to manage critical activities" (p. 363).

While examining the evolution of the issues management construct since the 1970s, Wartick and Rude (1986) suggest structures and processes vital to the success of the program. They begin by examining its strengths and weaknesses and conclude with suggestions for improvement. Quoting Jon Johnson, the authors define issues management as "the process by which the corporation can identify, evaluate, and respond to those social and political issues which may impact significantly upon it" (p. 124). The authors found that IM was meant to serve as a complement to rather than a replacement for existing corporate activities. The perceived benefits include "competitive advantage...avoidance of serious mistakes which had been made in the absence of IM...(and) enhancement of the firm's credibility" (p. 126). Wartick and Rude also found that IM has been adopted mostly by larger firms found in more mature industries. Additional findings include a set of "critical success factors" for issues management programs including top management team support and involvement, the involvement of "field and related" departments, adaptation to organization culture, and an emphasis on output not process. The authors conclude the article stating that IM activities can be integrated and coordinated using a general model that includes issue identification, evaluation, and response. Wartick and Rude thus imply that it is up to issues managers to determine what constitutes an issue for their organization and what does not.

**Responses to issues.** Issues management programs provide for organizational responses to issues addressed by the program. Arcelus and Schaefer (1982) examine the notion of societal demands as strategic issues and review a variety of responses an organizations use to address issues they face. The authors, referencing Preston and Post (1975), suggest that organizations should limit their incorporation of social demands to those that relate to the primary activities of the organization. Arcelus and Schaefer further suggest there are four strategic responses available to organizations when addressing societal demands including status quo, pro-active adaptation, public stance, and pro-active/public stance. When an organization chooses a status quo response it chooses to "disregard the social demands at the present time" (p. 349) and continue operations as they currently stand. Alternatively, if a pro-active adaptation response is chosen, the firm has determined that "it is more advantageous to make an early response to a social demand even though it is not yet required to do so by law" (p. 349). Firms choosing a public stance response have decided to "influence the evolution of the demand by entering the public policy process" (p. 349). The final strategic response Arcelus and Schaefer develop is the pro-active/public stance alternative. Firms engaging in this strategy not only respond to the social demand prior to legislative directives, they also enter the political arena in an attempt to mold the evolution of the social demand. Arcelus and Schaefer also point out that issues evolve through five stages including

public awareness, formation of pressure groups, political debate stage, legislative process stage, and the legislation stage. The authors contend that "the strategic decision facing the firm is to determine what response to make at any given point in time during the evolution of the demand" (p. 349). The authors conclude their article pointing out that social demands will place additional claims on organizational resources and as such "will require the integration of the decisions of when and how to respond into the strategic decision process" (p. 355).

**Issues management and crises.** Wartick and Mahon (1994) point out that issues management is different from crisis management because crisis management deals with organizational responses to specific events rather than expectational gaps, the domain of issues management. For example, in 1992 eight miners were killed in a mining accident in southwestern Virginia. According to Wartick and Mahon the deaths were the crisis the organization faced. The issue surrounding the crisis is mine safety.

Bigelow, Fahey, and Mahon (1993) provide support for the contention that a crisis refers to a particular event. They present a typology of issue evolution based on the evolutionary paths of various issues. They suggest that the occurrence of a crisis plays a part in the evolution of various issues. Other authors have also included crisis as one of the steps relevant to an issues management program (Mahon & Waddock, 1992). This inclusion of crises in issues management programs suggests that managers are cognizant of the issues facing their organizations. But they do not give the potential for crises proper attention. They fail to incorporate crisis management into their issues management programs. The following section follows the develops the notion of crises and the crisis management construct.

### **Crisis Management**

Virtually all of the research in crisis management has been published within the last ten years. Much of the work examines crises organizations have faced and provides a framework for developing crisis management programs (Mitroff, Shrivastava, & Udwadia, 1987; Shrivastava & Mitroff, 1987; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). Occasionally a typology of crises will also be included in the work (Mitroff, Shrivastava, & Udwadia, 1987; Pearson, & Mitroff, 1993). More recent works in the field lament the "shotgun" approach of the research and call for reflection on the direction research in the field ought to take (Pauchant, 1993; Shrivastava, 1993; Pauchant & Douville, 1993). The following section defines organizational crisis, presents the major works in the field of crisis management, and provides an abbreviated overview of work on crisis management done by scholars in other disciplines.



**Definitions.** Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia (1987) provide the following definition for corporate crises:

disasters precipitated by people, organizational structures, economics, and/or technology that cause extensive damage to human life and natural and social environments. They inevitably debilitate both the financial structure and the reputation of a large organization (p. 283).

At first glance this definition is a useful one. It recognizes implicitly that crises can be precipitated by any one of the many stakeholders with which organizations interact. It also points out that crises invariably have negative impact on organizational performance. However, there are three major problems with this definition. First, if one explores the origins of the word crisis one finds that a crisis is not limited to negative outcomes and instead positive outcomes are explicitly recognized. This definition leaves no room for crises having a positive impact on organizational performance. The second problem with the definition provided by Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia comes in determining what constitutes "extensive damage to human life, to the natural environment and to the social environment." Does a single death constitute extensive damage to human life or does serious injury? How many deaths or how many serious injuries? Imagine this scenario. The life of the only doctor in a remote African village is taken by a religious fanatic who opposes the use of modern medicines. That death will undoubtedly debilitate the financial structure of the clinic at which the doctor worked. The death of the doctor could also damage the reputation of the clinic. If patients fear for their lives because they use the modern medications given them by clinic workers, they may choose not to patronize the clinic. So does the doctor's death constitute extensive damage? The third problem deals with the size of organization facing crises. It would seem that clinics in remote parts of the world tend to be small organizations yet the definition provided by Mitroff et al. explicitly refers to large corporations. This suggests that only large organizations face crises. This is clearly not the case as the aforementioned example demonstrates.

A more recent, more refined definition of crisis from the management literature is offered by Pauchant & Mitroff (1992). The authors, incorporating ideas from both Perrow and Habermas suggest that a crisis can be defined "as a disruption that physically affects a system as a whole and threatens its basic assumption, its subjective sense of self, its existential core" (p. 12). This definition allows us to discard the implication that only large manufacturing organizations suffer crises. It also eliminates the difficulty in determining what constitutes significant damage to human life. The definition also suggests that crises do not affect solely individual organizations. Rather, they could conceivably affect entire industries. By way of example recall the shooting deaths of the doctor and his body guard outside a Florida WRHCF. The deaths most certainly served as a disruption for the facility at which the shootings occurred. It may also have do so for all WRHCFs. These deaths, along

with those in Massachusetts and Virginia, have had a profound effect on the entire industry. These events may very well have precipitated a crisis for this industry.

Curiously enough, Mitroff and Pearson (1993) do not provide a definition of a crisis in their work. However, one valuable bit of information regarding crises does come to light in their book. In other works by Mitroff and various co-authors, specific events were used to illustrate what constitutes an organizational crisis. Examples usually include the Challenger disaster, the nuclear accident at Chernobyl, and the Exxon Valdez oil spill. However, in their 1993 book, Mitroff and Pearson include the following item in a list of organizational crises; "(t)hreats of terrorism directed against a New York publisher for publishing The Satanic Verses, a book thought to be sacrilegious" (p. xiv). This example is not consistent with the definitions that Mitroff et al. (1987) supplied earlier regarding extensive damage to human life and the natural and social environments. However, intimidation by terrorists instills fear of retribution which does threaten basic assumptions organizations make. So while Mitroff and Pearson do not provide an explicit definition of crisis they contribute to our understanding of the crisis construct by implicitly incorporating fear into the definition.

Again, earlier definitions state that profound loss of life, financial insolvency, or major environmental damage has to occur for an event to be considered a crisis. Subsequent definitions of organizational crises, less restrictive than that presented by Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia (1987), provide for crises faced not only by individual organizations, regardless of size, but also those with which entire industries must contend. The definition provided by Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), allows one to research the phenomenon at several levels of analysis. The definition also allows freedom in choosing organizational types for empirical work. This breadth makes it attractive for investigating crises faced by WRHCFs and thus serves as the working definition of a crisis used for this project.

**What causes organizational crises?** Moving from definitions of crises to relevant literature, one cannot overlook the contributions Perrow (1984) makes to the field of crisis management. Perrow uses a systems approach to examine what he refers to as "normal" accidents. According to Perrow "(i)f interactive complexity and tight coupling - system characteristics - inevitably will produce an accident...we are justified in calling it a normal accident" (p. 5). From Perrow's perspective, the technological advances people have witnessed during the twentieth century make the world ripe for organizational crises. The author suggests that the system accidents, or the "unanticipated interactions of multiple failures" (p. 70), are the inevitable result of the complex technologies employed by the industrial world in which we live.

Mitroff, Shrivastava, Udwadia (1987) have developed a typology of crises. According to the authors there are two major dimensions that can be used to classify organizational crises. One is the location of the crisis, that is, is the crisis precipitated

internally or externally? The second dimension is the nature of the crisis. The authors suggest that crises are precipitated either by technical/economic failures or by people, organizational, or social breakdowns. The resulting two by two matrix presents internal crises that are either technological/economic or human/organizational/social in their origins or external crises that are either technical/economic or people/organizational/social in their origins. This is a useful way for us to organize our thinking on organizational crises. Much of the management literature dichotomizes organizational environments into external and internal so this distinction falls in line with the rest of the field. To classify crises as either technical/economic or people/organizational/social in nature also seems useful. Technical and economic crises tend to be more "objective" in nature; managers may be more likely to have data that allows for detection of these types of crises. This may not be the case for crises result from people, organizations or society.

**Purpose of crisis management.** Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia (1987) state that "the prevention of all crises is not the basic purpose of...crisis management" (p. 285). Instead the purpose of crisis management programs is to better prepare organizations to "roll with the punches." Given the inevitability of crises, organizations who have incorporated crisis management programs into their structures will be better able to survive than those that have not.

**Phases in crisis management programs.** Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia (1987) present a model of crisis management that contains four elements, or phases, including detection, crisis, repair, and assessment. Logically, the authors contend that detection must be the first step because "it is difficult...to prevent or prepare for a crisis that one has not detected" (p. 285). As such the occurrence of the crisis is the second phase in Mitroff et. al's model. The third phase the authors propose is repair. This element refers to the organizational structures including crisis management teams, plans, policies, and procedures, that organizations have put in place to cope with the eventuality of an organizational crisis. The authors' work concludes with suggestions for preventive measures for each of the four crisis types developed.<sup>3</sup> Some of the suggestions include preventive packaging, tighter security, periodic mandated reviews, expert monitoring systems, adequate emotional preparation, installation of social support groups, consumer education, and collaborative work with industry associations. Assessment is the final phase Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia include in their model of crisis management. Ideally, in this phase organizations analyze their successes and their failures and make appropriate changes to their crisis management programs.

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<sup>3</sup> Recall that crises can be either internal or external. They can also be precipitated by technical/economic failures or human organizational or social breakdowns. This 2x2 matrix results in four types of crises.

In a model more refined than that of Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia (1987), Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) develop a diagnostic tool referred to as the Onion Model of Crisis Management. The authors suggest that there are four "factors that make an organization either crisis-prone...or crisis-prepared" (p. 48). The four factors, or layers, include the individuals employed by the organization, the organization's culture, structure, and strategies. After presenting tools for determining the extent of crisis preparedness demonstrated by an organization, the authors provide a list of crisis management actions organizations should engage in to enhance their crisis preparedness. The actions include strategic, technical and structural, evaluation and diagnosis, communication, and psychological and cultural actions, all designed to improve organizational crisis management programs. Strategic actions include incorporating crisis management into the strategic management process. Many of the organizations that engage in strategic actions view crisis management as a source of competitive advantage for their organization (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). The authors suggest that technical and structural actions include the formation of crisis management units that are proactive rather than reactive, the introduction of computerized crisis management inventories and decision aids, and a reduction in hazardous technologies employed by the organization. In terms of evaluative and diagnostic actions the Pauchant and Mitroff suggest assessing legal threats and financial liabilities, modifying insurance coverage appropriately, and developing environmental impact statements. Along with these more common evaluative and diagnostic actions, the authors suggest the addition of methods for early warning signal detection, and dedicated research programs to uncover potential hidden dangers. Communicative actions refer to "how organizations manage their communications and what kind of information is being processed between them and their stakeholders" (Pauchant & Mitroff, p. 158). Media training and public relations along with collaborative efforts with other stakeholders are some of the suggested actions in this section. The last set of actions suggested by Pauchant and Mitroff includes psychological and cultural actions. According to the authors these actions are the most difficult to develop and require a shift in corporate philosophy. This shift requires organizations to recognize that their actions can be highly destructive "if some issues are left unmanaged" (p. 161). Some of the suggestions offered by the authors include the incorporation of stress and anxiety management training. According to Pauchant and Mitroff these techniques are used most often when dealing with issues that could erupt into a crisis situation. They further suggest providing psychological counseling to employees in the aftermath of a crisis.

In another article providing diagnostic tools, Mitroff and Pearson (1993) state that "studies of major, human-induced crises demonstrate repeatedly that four main factors or variables emerge as critical in their causes, as well as their prevention" (p. 14). These include types of crises, phases of the crises, systems, and stakeholders (Mitroff & Pearson). The authors build on the crisis typology developed by Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia (1987) and integrate it with a discussion of the phases

through which all crises pass (Mitroff & Pearson). The five phases include signal detection, preparation and prevention, damage containment, recovery, and learning. Signal detection refers to the sensing of early warning signs. The authors contend that most crises can be averted if organizations detect and correctly interpret the early warning signs that accompany most crises. In the preparation and prevention stage the goal is crisis aversion as well as preparation for those that cannot be avoided. During the damage containment phase the objective is to keep the crisis from spreading to other parts of the organization and the environment. The recovery stage allows for prepared organizations to resume normal operations as soon as possible and as comprehensively as possible given the occurrence of a crisis. The final phase, the learning phase, is evidenced by organizational members reflecting on their successes and failures in dealing the crisis they just experienced. Upon evaluation of the organization's performance the appropriate changes to the crisis management programs should be made. The integration of a typology, crisis phases, interpenetrating systems and stakeholders in this work is designed to assist strategic managers in developing proactive crisis management programs.

The only paper in the crisis management literature focusing on crisis management and social activism is a piece by Pearson and Kirby (1993). In this work the authors examine the Los Angeles riots' impact on surrounding businesses. The authors use the five phases of crisis management including signal detection, preparation, containment, recovery, and learning to examine the activities of local businesses. They conclude the piece with a "lessons learned" section that is designed to "enhance future preparedness" (p. 273).

**Evaluation of the field.** Recently, leading authors in crisis management have assessed the nature of the work done in the field over the last decade (Pauchant, 1993; Shrivastava, 1993; Pauchant & Douville, 1993). Each of these works suggests that there needs to be more emphasis on unifying the research in crisis management.

Shrivastava (1993) suggests that our understanding of crisis management continues to be highly fragmented. He states that, over the years, the research has shifted from a reactive to a proactive stance including forecasting occurrence, monitoring strategic issues, planning and preparation, and promoting public safety at the industry level. Despite these advances Shrivastava points out that, as yet, "there is no overarching paradigm that synthesizes these diverse findings"(p. 32). The author asserts that the concept of "sustainable development" can serve to not only reorient but also to unify the study of crisis management, from both theoretical and practitioner perspectives. Shrivastava states that sustainable development "refers to economic growth that is mindful of the limited natural resources available on earth" (p. 35). The author continues, stating that sustainable development "requires creating sustainable corporations, sustainable institutions, sustainable life styles, and sustainable value

systems" (p. 36). Shrivastava goes on to give examples of how crisis management researchers might go about engaging in research with sustainable development as the guiding principle. Perhaps one of the most controversial suggestions Shrivastava presents is the personal commitment required of scholars engaged in crisis management research. Shrivastava specifically calls for "researchers to engage personally in changing crisis situations (p.38). The author goes on to say "(c)risis research can have social significance only if researcher observers also become participants in crisis transformation" (p. 38). Shrivastava concludes stating the following:

(t)hese requirements for successful study of crises are different from traditional models of scientific research. They call for personal involvement. They conflict with the 'objective observer' model of scientist. They go beyond the qualitative researcher or even 'participant-observer' model of the scientist. They advocate a praxis in which researchers simultaneously seek to understand, explain and change the subject of their study (p. 38).

The author implies that by espousing the concept of sustainable development and by actively engaging in crisis research we can reduce the fragmentation the depicts the field of crisis management today.

Pauchant and Douville (1993) have examined the works of what they refer to as "24 leading scholars" in crisis management and come to the same conclusion that Shrivastava (1993) does. The authors suggest that more effort be put forth regarding a unifying theory of crisis management. However, contrary to Shrivastava's (1993) contribution, these authors do not make explicit suggestions for unification.

In the same spirit as the previous two works is a work by Edgar Morin (1976) presented to crisis management researchers by Pauchant (1993). According to Pauchant, Morin's work "is one of the best texts...that presents some of the bases on which a general theory of 'crisisology', i.e. a general theory of crisis and a praxis of crisis management, could be built" (p. 1). Pauchant continues with his introduction of Morin's work stating that the theme of his work is as follows:

(it) stresses the interplay existing between order and disorder, life and death....it argues that a human system, such as an organization, should be viewed from many different perspectives, including the biological, psychological, sociological, etc. in order to appreciate the many facets of a crisis (p. 2).

Morin suggests to the reader that one must think of society as a system if the notion of crisis has any merit. He expounds on this by stating that there are "three levels of existence: 1) the systemic level, 2) the cybernetic level, and 3) the negentropic level.

Otherwise the theory of society would be insufficient and the notion of crisis inconceivable" (p. 6). Morin continues to expand on each of these levels. This call for the recognition of society as a system is reminiscent of the work in stakeholder management by Wicks, Gilbert, and Freeman (1994). Recall that the authors call for "a sense of communal solidarity" and recognition of stakeholder interdependence (p. 486). The notions put forth by these authors enhance our understanding of the richness of the relationship between organizations and the social context in which they operate.

Management scholars are not the only researchers engaged in scholarly endeavors addressing crises. Rosenthal, Charles, and 't Hart (1989), provide a crisis typology that is "based on the distinction between two types of variables: those pertaining to the threat itself, and those pertaining to the perception of solutions held by crisis participants" (p. 11). The authors, referring to their field as emergency management, elaborate on this explaining the "object of the basic threat" (Rosenthal, et. al p. 11) varies depending on the particular crisis as does the "domain of threat." Management scholars would typically refer to the domain of the threat as the extent of the impact of a crisis. Rosenthal, Charles, and 't Hart suggest that there are "some more relevant areas that have been incorporated into the field of emergency management" (p. 7). The "areas" the authors deem "more relevant" include international relations and brinkmanship in which crisis pertains to situations in which two or more countries find themselves on the verge of warfare; disaster research which addresses both natural and manmade disasters; conflict management by which the authors mean "large-scale urban riots, strikes and other labor disputes, domestic disturbances and insurgencies, coup d'etats, revolutions, and domestic and international terrorism" (p. 8); psychological research into decision-making in crisis situations; and crisis analysis as it relates to the effects of crises on organizational performance. Crisis management, from a strategic perspective, is conspicuous in its absence.

Rosenthal, Charles, and 't Hart (1989) provide the reader with an analysis of each case that is part of this compilation of research on crises and crisis management. Interestingly, Rosenthal et al. employ, after making expected disclaimers regarding the selection, a "process model of crisis management developed by the American Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)" (p. 14) rather than developing their own model with which to conduct the analysis. The FEMA model is composed of four time-oriented stages. The first stage is prevention and mitigation and the second is preparedness. These two stages are considered the pre-impact functions or pre-crisis stages according to Rosenthal et al. The post-impact stages are response and recovery.

The case studies presented in Rosenthal, Charles, and 't Hart's (1989) volume are separated into four sections based on the nature of the crisis. The first section is

composed of cases which examine what the authors refer to as unanticipated crises. The authors call these crises archetypical crises in which those playing key roles in the management of the crisis faced unanticipated problems. Examples include Chernobyl, Bhopal, and the downed Korean airliner flight KAL 007. The second section focuses on cases that not only address crises themselves but also the events leading up to the crisis. The most well known crisis included in this section is the Challenger disaster. The third section incorporates cases that introduce the reader to "creeping" crises. According to the authors creeping crises are defined as follows:

the long-term variant of compulsive emergencies....[s]ome pathogens within a social or political system take a very long time to develop into full-scale crisis....in a quick succession of events, [these pathogens] can reach peak moments where the latent danger materializes and transforms into an acute crisis (p. 27).

Examining the contributions of researchers in other disciplines can assist business and society authors in broadening the scope of the work done in crisis management. Many of the crises addressed presented by Rosenthal, Charles, and 't Hart (1989) directly impact business organizations. If other scholars are doing research that can contribute to our understanding of the nature of organizational crises, it is imperative that we embrace their efforts. As Shrivastava (1993) suggests, we need to actively engage in activities that will allow us to prevent as many crises as possible.

**Discussion of the literature.** Business and society researchers speak of corporate social responsibility, corporate social responsiveness, stakeholder management, issues management, crisis management, moral imagination, and the ethic of care. Often we cannot agree among ourselves on what each of these concepts/fields of study entails. A case in point is the terminology we use to describe stakeholder management (SM), crisis management (CM), and issues management (IM). There are separate bodies of literature that have developed around each of these, yet the distinctions between the concepts are quite ambiguous. Stakeholders, for example, have issues about which they are concerned; and issues often become crises. One cannot have an issue or a crisis without a stakeholder; and if you are managing stakeholder relations you are certainly managing issues and attempting to avoid crises.

One way to address this problem is to recognize that the concepts of stakeholder management, issues management, and crisis management are parallel and competing models for viewing essentially the same phenomena and organizational responses to them. This can be illustrated by examining several dimensions common to each of the three literatures. Please refer to Table One. First is the presence of a critical event. In this context a critical event refers to a specific



event that must be addressed by the organization. The SM literature is silent regarding the presence of critical events precipitating stakeholder management activities. However, it would seem that organizations engage in SM to avoid critical events that have the potential to jeopardize the organization. Turning to issues and crisis management, Wartick and Mahon (1994) state “crisis management deals with responses to specific events...whereas IM focuses on the impact of resolutions to gaps involving particular companies” (p. 308). However, if the organization is unsuccessful in addressing the concerns of stakeholders in their SM and IM programs it may find that issues have developed into crises. So while a critical event is not integral to SM and IM it is possible that a critical event may occur. This would force the organization to address a crisis it is not prepared to handle. Thus we can conclude that a critical event is not necessary for SM and IM but is necessary for CM.

**TABLE 1: CLARIFYING THE SM-IM-CM DISTINCTIONS**

<u>Dimension</u>	<u>Stakeholder Management</u>	<u>Issues Management</u>	<u>Crisis Management</u>
Presence of Critical Event	not necessary	not necessary	yes
Ability to Influence Outcomes			
Macro Environment	no	no	no
Task Environment	yes	yes	yes
Temporal Criticality	varies	varies	very high
What/whom should be addressed?	select stakeholders	select issues	all types
Potential Impact on the Organization	situation dependent	situation dependent	inevitably high
Program Components			
Analyze	included	included	included
Formulate	included	included	included
Implement	included	included	included
Evaluate	included	included	included
Control	included	included	included

The second dimension is the organization’s ability to influence outcomes. When

examining this dimension it is useful to borrow the notion of macro and task environments from the strategic management literature. Generally, organizations exert little influence over the macro environment which includes economic, socio-cultural, and technological forces. This appears to be true for SM, IM and CM. I will use socio-cultural forces to illustrate this contention. Changing demographics is an issue stakeholders require organizations deal with but there is little organizations can do to stem the changes. When it comes to crisis management, social unrest is a crisis over which most organizations have little control. For example, most organizations had little influence over the rioting that occurred in Los Angeles after the Rodney King verdict. However there were many small businesses that faced crisis situations as a result of the rioting (Pearson & Kirby, 1994). But organizations can prepare for the possibility of this type of crisis and can better survive the crisis.

While organizations have little influence over the macro environment, it is generally accepted that organizations have greater influence over the task environment. The task environment includes customers, competitors, suppliers, local communities, governmental entities, unions, and activist groups. SM, IM, and CM programs can all more effectively prepare for and perhaps reduce the potential for problems arising from the task environment.

Temporal criticality is the third dimension on which SM, IM, and CM programs can be compared. In this context temporal criticality refers to the amount of time an organization has available to respond to the matter in question. The amount of time SM and IM program managers have to respond varies depending on the circumstances. Some stakeholder concerns and issues develop slowly over time for an organization or an industry and others develop much more rapidly. For example, if an organization plans to enter a new industry, the organization can formulate and implement programs for the relevant issues allowing the organization to deal with the concern or issue slowly. However, for organizations currently in the industry, their success in dealing with the issue will depend on the strength of the organization's environmental analysis and the speed with which the issue develops.

Timing issues are more critical for crises. Although organizations can prepare for crises the amount of time available to address it is very limited. If managers hope to limit the damage incurred or inflicted by the crisis they must act very quickly. Thus there are substantial differences in terms of temporal criticality for CM as compared to SM and IM.

The fourth dimension compares the stakeholders, issues or crises organizations need to address. Recall that the term stakeholder refers to "...any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). The concerns of a variety of stakeholders will be addressed in strategic decision making. Which stakeholder demands take

precedence is determined by the organization's response to the question "what do we stand for?" So SM programs, as conceived by Freeman, do not address the concerns of all stakeholders. The same can be said for IM programs. In an article on issues management, Arcelus and Schaefer (1982), referencing Preston and Post (1975), suggest that organizations should limit their attention to those social demands that relate to the primary operations of the organization. According to Arcelus and Schaefer, primary operations refer to "the production process, marketing, procurement and employment" (p. 348). In contrast to SM and IM researchers, CM scholars suggest an organization should be prepared to address a crisis anywhere in the organization and not just in areas related to primary operations. Thus, if managers follow the advice of scholars in the development of SM, IM and CM programs, SM and IM programs will be limited in their scope while CM programs will encompass the entire organization.

Potential impact on the organization is the next element addressed. The SM literature appears to be silent on the potential impact of stakeholder concerns however, it seems reasonable to assume that impact of stakeholder concerns would be situation dependent. This appears to hold true for IM as well. In an article on the IM construct, Wartick and Rude (1986) imply that the impact an issue can have on the organization will vary depending on the issue and the organization. For example, a holding company that realizes only a small percentage of its revenue from logging trees will be less impacted by the environmental lobby than will an organization whose sole source of income comes from logging operations. In contrast to the variable impact of stakeholder concerns and organizational issues, the CM literature suggests that the potential impact of a crisis on an organization is inevitably high (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). So, while the impact of stakeholders and issues can vary, crises are high impact events for organizations.

The final dimension on which SM, IM, and CM is compared is program elements. This refers to the components of SM, IM, and CM programs. Scholars in all three areas suggest managers engage in environmental analysis, develop and implement programs based on the results of environmental analysis, and evaluate the usefulness of the programs. There are no substantive differences between program recommendations.

Upon examination of the dimensions the close relationship between the three literature streams becomes apparent. It appears that IM programs should address specific concerns identified by SM programs. CM programs come into play when IM programs have not been successful in addressing organizational issues. This suggests that a well designed SM programs will include both IM and CM programs. However we must recognize that an organizational crisis can lead to the development of both an IM program and a CM program. For instance, most organizations have never had a deranged employee hold fellow workers hostage at work and would not

be prepared to handle this type of crisis. The crisis could serve as the impetus for incorporation of workplace violence into the issues management program and the development of a CM plan to address this type of crisis. However, I contend that the lack of an issues management program to defuse a situation before it becomes a crisis can be interpreted as a failure in the organization's stakeholder management program. This assumes we accept the premise that a well designed stakeholder management program includes both an issues management and a crisis management component. This discussion leads us to conclude that SM, IM and CM programs are not separate concepts at all. Rather, we can now appreciate that a successful stakeholder management program will include both issues management and crisis management components. Furthermore this allows us to recognize that while there are differences in some of the dimensions of the programs the differences are not substantive. The whole point of SM, IM, and CM is to assist organizations as they try to do what it takes to survive in extremely complex environments.

The previous discussion provides us one method for understanding the purposes of and relationships among SM, IM, and CM. Institutional theory is another vehicle which can aid us in our efforts to understand the relationships between these concepts. To this end I have outlined institutional theory in the next section of this paper.

### **Institutional Theory**

Selznick (1949) provides an early conception of institutional theory suggesting that organizations will adapt to demands from the external environment in order to ensure continued existence of the organization. From Selznick's perspective, the nature of the demand is largely irrelevant as long as conforming to the demand improves the likelihood of the organization's survival

The "new institutionalists" (e.g. Meyer & Rowan, 1977, DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) have expanded on the foundation established by Selznick. Meyer and Rowan contend that organizations must respond to multiple institutional environments. This is illustrated by the recognition of society, the state, and the professions as separate components of organizational environments. DiMaggio and Powell provide further clarification of the notion of institutional environments suggesting that "structural change in organizations seems less and less driven by competition or by the need for efficiency" (1983, p. 147) and more by "processes that make organizations more similar without necessarily making them more efficient" (1983, p. 147). The authors contend that changes in organization structure often result in organizations that are similar in form. However, according to the authors, such structural changes often have little to do with making the organization more efficient.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991) suggest that often the actions of individual organizations, when examined from the perspective of the structure, culture, and output of the organizations that constitute the organizational field, result in a homogeneous field of organizations. Organizational field refers to "organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). DiMaggio and Powell term the dynamic process of homogenization of the organizational field "isomorphism." They define isomorphism as "a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions" (p. 149).

According to DiMaggio and Powell, "the theory of isomorphism addresses not the psychological states of actors but the structural determinants of the range of choices that actors perceive as rational or prudent" (1983, p. 149). In addition to economic fitness, organizations are competing for social fitness or legitimacy in the society in which they exist.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) as well as Powell and DiMaggio (1991) theorize that organizational forms which contribute to social fitness are the result of isomorphic pressures exerted by the state, the professions and society. The authors identify three types of isomorphic pressures: Coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive isomorphism may be a function of both "formal and informal pressures exerted by other organizations upon which the organization is dependent" (1983, p. 150). Coercive isomorphism can be a direct response to government mandates (Sutton, Dobbin, Meyer, & Scott, 1994; Sutton & Dobbin, 1996); it may also result from cultural expectations of the society in which the organization is embedded. Notably, such cultural expectations are often forcefully expressed by activist groups (O'Connell, Betz, Shepard, & Stephens, 1995).

Mimetic isomorphism is the second mechanism in the institutional isomorphic process. Mimetic isomorphism refers to a process in which organizations imitate the structures of organizations that are perceived as powerful or successful. Uncertainty spurs mimetic isomorphism: As DiMaggio and Powell (1983) state, "uncertainty is...a powerful force that encourages imitation...when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other organizations" (p. 151). Organizations that are perceived as successful by other organizations often serve as a source of practices that the borrowing organization can use.

The third mechanism DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest contributes to institutional isomorphism is normative isomorphism, which has its roots primarily in professionalization. This is interpreted as "the collective struggle of members of an occupation across organizations to define the conditions and methods of their work..."

(p. 152) according to cosmopolitan professional values, rather than allowing workplace behavior to be controlled solely by the local economic values of managers.

Although DiMaggio and Powell (1983) propose three different isomorphic pressures, this study focuses on coercive pressures and its usefulness in examining the development of crisis management programs in response to social activism. Specifically, this research examines coercive pressures imposed by activist groups opposed to the services provided by WRHCFs. Since the focus of my research is the effects of social activism on the development of crisis management programs, coercive isomorphism is the type of interest for this study.

Much of the research testing DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) presentation of the isomorphic processes focuses on coercive pressures faced by organizations. More specifically, research on coercive pressures focuses on pressures from the political entities that compose the organizations' environments (Dobbin, Sutton, Meyer, & Scott, 1993; Sutton & Dobbin, 1996). Some work has examined the mechanisms involved in mimetic pressures (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989). But virtually none of the work examines changes in organizational structures that are the result of coercive pressures exerted by social activists (O'Connell, Betz, Shepard, & Stephens, 1995). This paper is one attempt to fill this gap in the literature on isomorphic pressures.

Meyer and Rowan (1977) imply that organizations passively attempt to comply, even if its only ceremonial compliance, to competing pressures. Oliver (1991) suggests that under certain conditions, organizations will not passively conform to isomorphic pressures. Instead, Oliver suggests, responses will range from passive conformity to active resistance. Oliver asserts the following:

organizational responses to institutional pressures toward conformity will depend on why these pressures are being exerted, who is exerting them, what these pressures are, how or by what means they are exerted, and where they occur (p. 159).

So organizations will make structural changes in an attempt to conform to external pressures but efforts to conform are tempered by factors such as the source of the pressures and the tactics used to exert those pressures. This suggests that organizations will evaluate the circumstances surrounding the pressures to conform before they decide on the proper response. This implies that changes in organizational form will occur as the environment in which the organizations exist change. So as the circumstances surrounding the provision of abortion services changes so will the structures of WRHCFs. But the changes are qualified by an evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the pressures to conform. This is very reminiscent of the tenets of contingency theory. As such a review of contingency theory is pertinent to the discussion of the rise of crisis management programs in

WRHCFs. Miles' examination of the rise of external affairs functions in the insurance industry employs contingency theory to explain changes in organization structure making it particularly appropriate for this discussion. The next section addresses Miles' work.

### **Contingency Theory**

Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) suggest that there are different environments in which organizations exist and that each environment places different demands on the organization. Specifically, environments that experience rapid change will require different organizational structures than will more stable environments. As such, contingency theory suggests that "organizations whose internal features best match the demands of their environments will achieve the best adaptation" (Scott, 1987b, p. 88).

Miles (1987) presents business and society scholars a theory for the development of external affairs functions based on the organization's exposure to the environment. This work is one of the few pieces of business and society research that marries organization theory and business and society. The gist of Miles' argument is that the level of sophistication of an organization's external affairs functions (EAF) must correspond to the level of market exposure, or the social environment in which the organization finds itself. His contentions are entirely compatible with institutional theory since he theorizes that the external environment's normative standards, in addition to its economic demands, constitute contingencies around which organizations must be structured.

While abortion was made legal in the United States in 1973, facilities and individuals providing such services have been continually subjected to physical violence by segments of American society opposed to legalized abortion with the vast majority of that violence occurring in the 1980s. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) give examples of the types of actions that constitute coercive pressures but do not include activist pressures as one of the examples. However, picketing, bombings, and gunfire can be very persuasive in convincing members of organizations to make changes. However, more often than not, women's reproductive health care facilities (WRHCF) have chosen to protect themselves from further attack rather than shutting their doors in response to attacks by anti-abortion activists. Many facilities have developed crisis management programs to address the violence that has marked this controversial issue that continues to be one of the most highly contested social issues of our day.

## CHAPTER 4

### THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

The following hypotheses have been derived from an analysis of the crisis management and organization theory literatures. The hypotheses test the nature of the relationship between crisis management programs in WRHCFs and the coercive pressures to which, it is hypothesized, the facilities respond. The methodology used to test them is presented in Chapter Three.

Institutional theory suggests that organizations try to conform to isomorphic pressures from various stakeholder groups to ensure survival. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) suggest that organizations exposed to the same external pressures will exhibit the same or similar structural features as a result of the isomorphic process. The implication is that the resultant structural elements will be consistent with the demands of the stakeholders exerting the pressures.

Oliver (1991) qualifies this suggesting that the lower the degree of legal coercion associated with the pressure to conform, the greater the likelihood for resistance to the pressure. Thus, the less the pressures to conform have been codified into law the greater the likelihood that there will be resistance to the pressure. This suggests that illegal activities will be strongly resisted. Expanding further, if criminal activity is thought of as one way to apply coercive pressure, the nature of the criminal activity should have an impact on the likelihood of resistance to that pressure. For example, if you are robbed by a person carrying a gun you are more likely to conform to the request to hand over your money than if you are robbed by someone who is unarmed. For organizations, the more serious the crime employed to exert pressures to conform, the greater the likelihood that organizations being pressured will resist. This will occur because of society's condemnation of the action evidenced by the fact that the activity has been deemed illegal.

Oliver (1991) suggests that some organizations do resist pressures from external stakeholders to conform. She further suggests that in some instances organizations subjected to coercive pressures will choose to ignore or even defy the demands of various external stakeholder groups. For example, anti-abortion activists exert pressures on WRHCFs hoping that the facilities will discontinue their services. Some do, but many others establish crisis management programs and continue



servicing their clients, defying the demands of the anti-abortion activists.

Elaborating on this argument a bit further, assume that the extent of the defiance by WRHCFs is exemplified by the comprehensiveness of the crisis management program. A more comprehensive program represents a more defiant response to pressures to conform. It seems that facilities facing more serious crimes would have more comprehensive programs than those subjected to less serious crimes. Therefore those exposed to serious coercion are most likely to have responded with more developed programs. For example, imagine that a WRHCF repeatedly suffered broken windows, picketing marked by violence, gassings, gunshots, and murders. Oliver suggests that the crisis management program at this facility would be more fully developed than that at a facility that had only been subjected to unlawful yet peaceful picketing twice in its many years of existence<sup>4</sup>. This is because the coercive pressures are both more frequent and more serious for the first facility than for the second. However, by developing crisis management programs, both facilities are defying the demands of the external stakeholders to discontinue services.

The above discussion points out that the frequency of criminal activity and the seriousness of criminal activity can each impact the development of crisis management programs independently. However, it seems plausible that WRHCFs exposed to both more frequent and more serious crimes will have more fully developed crisis management programs than facilities subjected to less frequent and less serious crimes.

Combining the above discussion with Pauchant & Mitroff's (1992) contention that crises serve as triggering events in the development of crisis management programs, leads to the following set of hypotheses:

H1: WRHCFs experiencing more frequent and more serious crimes will have more fully developed crisis management programs than WRHCFs experiencing less frequent and less serious crimes.

H2: WRHCFs experiencing more serious crimes will have more fully developed crisis management programs than WRHCFs experiencing less serious crimes.

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<sup>4</sup> Picketing is unlawful if the picketers trespass on facility property.

H3: WRHCFs experiencing crimes more frequently will have more fully developed crisis management programs than WRHCFs experiencing crimes less frequently.

Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia (1987) suggest that organizations understand crises associated with internal operations better than other types of crises. According to the authors this occurs because crises external to the organization are more difficult for the organization to assess. As the authors write "a big difference exists between warning signals external to an organization...and those internal to them. Those internal to the organization...are more likely to be taken seriously because they 'fit in' with the business" (p. 286).

The above argument, that organizations are more likely to take seriously internal warning signals, implies that they may overlook crises precipitated by social conditions because they originate outside the organization. The argument also suggests that organizations will also overlook crises "typical" to the industry in which the organization operates again because they are not internal to the organization.

Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia (1987) address this issue stating that organizations do address crises that are part of the industry in which they operate. They suggest that organizations will more readily address the early warning signals of crises grounded in the industry in which the organization operates than early warning signals external to the industry. Thus the authors suggest external crises typical to the organization's industry will be more thoroughly addressed than external crises outside the organization's industry.

The assertions made by Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia (1987) regarding attention given to external crises seems particularly appropriate given the nature of the abortion debate in recent years. It would seem that external crises "typical" to the industry, for example bombings, gassings and physician death threats, will be given primary attention because of the nature of these actions. It would seem that this type of crisis would be of paramount concern to WRHCFs. This argument is consistent with the arguments of DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Powell and DiMaggio (1991), and Miles (1987). Again, DiMaggio and Powell suggest that organizations will respond to external pressures to enhance survival prospects. Miles contends that corporations need organizational structures "sophisticated enough to cope with the degree of social and political uncertainties to which the businesses are exposed" (p. 13). The assertions of these authors combined with those of Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia (1987) suggest that WRHCFs will have developed crisis management programs that address the level of activism they face. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H4: WRHCFs will have more fully developed those crisis management program components that address crises precipitated by social activists than the components that address other external crises.

This hypothesis focuses on external crises because WRHCFs managers were not willing to share information on internal operations because they were concerned the data would "get into the wrong hands." They were referring to anti-abortion activists.

While there is minimal research on social activism in the organization theory literature, Greening & Gray (1994) did find that high levels of pressure from interest groups led to the development of issue management structural components. Moving to the crisis management literature, Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) offer added insights into the development of crisis management programs by pointing out that there are three "triggers" that can function as an impetus for change in organizations including leadership, grassroots movements, and crises. Thus coercive pressures, whether legal or illegal, exerted by anti-abortion activists can function as an impetus for the addition of, or changes to, crisis management programs in WRHCFs. Sustained pressure would contribute to the expansiveness of the program. Furthermore, it seems that facilities that have been subjected to more frequent activist pressures will have more comprehensive programs than organizations targeted less frequently. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H5: Levels of activist pressures, whether legal or illegal, will be positively related to the extensiveness of crisis management programs.

This hypothesis is different from the third hypothesis in that it addresses all types of pressures anti-abortion activists might engage in whereas Hypothesis Three focuses solely on criminal activities.

One of the fundamental assertions of the organization theory literature is that increases in size lead to greater structural differentiation (Pfeffer, 1982). This assertion is most closely associated with contingency theory and is based on the notion that as the size of the organization increases it can realize the benefits of greater division of labor (Pfeffer, 1982).

Scott (1987b) has stated that "larger organizations are more likely to be the targets of institutional actors" (p. 258). He supports this argument by stating that they tend to be "closely associated with visibility and respectability" (p. 258). Miles (1987) found support for this contention in his work on external public affairs departments in the insurance industry. He found that larger organizations have more fully developed

external public affairs departments than smaller organizations. This is consistent with findings in the crisis management literature (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). Combining Scott's contention with the findings of Miles as well as Pauchant and Mitroff, one would expect that crisis management programs in large WRHCFs would be more fully developed than those in smaller facilities. This occurs because the visibility of larger organizations makes them more subject to uncertainty in the external environment.

Another fundamental assertion of organization theory, and particularly contingency theory, is that older organizations will have more fully developed structures. This would seem plausible because they have faced more contingencies in the external environment and have made structural adaptations to address those contingencies. Turning to WRHCFs, it would seem that older WRHCFs will have taken advantage of the opportunity to develop crisis management programs that address environmental uncertainties they or their counterparts have faced. Conversely, younger facilities will not have developed their programs as completely as older organizations because they may very well have faced fewer potential crises than have the older facilities.

The above discussion points out that the age of an organization and the size of an organization will each impact the development of crisis management programs independently. Thus, it seems plausible that larger, older WRHCFs will have more fully developed crisis management programs than younger, newer WRHCFs. This leads to the following set of hypotheses:

H6: Larger, older WRHCFs will have more fully developed crisis management programs than will smaller, younger WRHCFs.

H7: Larger WRHCFs will have more fully developed crisis management programs than will smaller WRHCFs.

H8: Older WRHCFs will have more fully developed crisis management programs than will younger WRHCFs.

## CHAPTER 5

### RESEARCH DESIGN, ANALYTICAL METHODS, RESULTS, AND DISCUSSION

The primary objective in conducting this research was to examine what crisis management strategies WRHCFs use in response to anti-abortion activism. More specifically, I used institutional theory to explain and predict the development or enhancement of crisis management programs in organizations. My goal was to examine the inclusion of components in crisis management programs resulting from social activism.

I begin this chapter with a presentation of the steps taken to gather the data. The section includes a discussion of the organizations that made up the population from which I gathered the data, the survey instrument, and sampling techniques used to select the WRHCFs that were surveyed. The next section includes a discussion of the analytical techniques employed and results of the analysis. I begin with descriptive statistics followed by a confirmatory factor analysis. I then present each hypothesis explaining both the independent variable(s) and dependent variable(s), the analytical technique employed, the results of the analysis, and a discussion of the results.

#### RESEARCH DESIGN

##### Organization Type

Social activism opposing legalized abortion culminated in several deaths in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, bombings and shootings have begun to decline, thanks to the passage of several laws in 1993 and 1994. However, women's reproductive health care facilities managers continue to search for ways to make their facilities as safe as possible. As such, WRHCFs served as a useful population of organizations for testing the hypotheses I presented in the last chapter.

Contrary to popular opinion WRHCFs do not consist solely of not-for-profit organizations. There are for-profit facilities as well. WRHCFs often belong to a "federation" of organizations such as Planned Parenthood, but some do not carry any

affiliation. While the differences in the practices of these facilities would be interesting in and of itself, it was not the focus of my research and as such was not a concern in the sample selection.

## **Sample**

A national sample was prohibitive for several reasons. First, it appears that no comprehensive listings of WRHCFs exist. Second, the size needed to represent a national sample was cost prohibitive. Therefore, it was more realistic to narrow the sample to large metropolitan areas in the U.S.

Given the constraints mentioned above, my sample consisted of facilities in the 42 largest cities in the U.S., in terms of population, as of 1992. See Table Two for a list of the 42 largest cities in the U.S. I used a national telephone directory found on the CD-ROM to compile the names and addresses for the WRHCFs. A total of 404 facilities from across the United States made up my final sample. These facilities represent all the facilities found in each of the 42 largest cities in the U.S. with one qualification. The facilities located in the twentieth through the twenty-sixth largest cities in the United States were used for the pretest and as such were not included in the final sample.

## **Survey Instruments**

My survey instrument was part of a larger diagnostic tool Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) employed when determining crisis preparedness for their client organizations. The Pauchant and Mitroff survey is discussed below. The instrument was modified to be more specific in terms of the types of crises that women's reproductive health care facilities might face (discussed in greater detail below).

**Pauchant & Mitroff Survey.** Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) surveyed the public affairs officers of the Fortune 1000. Their survey looked at the companies' experiences with crises over the last three years, evaluated the activities the companies had engaged in to address the crises, and gauged general attitudes toward crises (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). The Pauchant and Mitroff survey is included in Appendix One.

Only 114 companies responded to Pauchant and Mitroff's (1992) survey for a response rate of 11.4%. Pauchant and Mitroff used orthogonal factor analysis to develop crisis clusters and preventive action clusters. They employed varimax rotation to eliminate "the least consistent structural dimensions" (p. 201). Six crisis clusters and five preventive action clusters emerged from the data. The crisis clusters include external economic attacks, external information attacks, megadamage (referring to environmental accidents), breaks (referring to breakdowns in plant and

**TABLE 2: POPULATION OF 42 LARGEST U.S. CITIES AS OF JULY 1, 1992<sup>5</sup>**

1. New York, NY	7,312,000
2. Los Angeles, CA	3,490,000
3. Chicago, IL	2,768,000
4. Houston, TX	1,690,000
5. Philadelphia, PA	1,553,000
6. San Diego, CA	1,149,000
7. Dallas, TX	1,022,000
8. Phoenix, AZ	1,012,000
9. Detroit, MI	1,012,000
10. San Antonio, TX	966,000
11. San Jose, CA	801,000
12. Indianapolis, IN	747,000
13. San Francisco, CA	729,000
14. Baltimore, MD	726,000
15. Jacksonville, FL	661,000
16. Columbus, OH	643,000
17. Milwaukee, WI	617,000
18. Memphis, TN	610,000
19. Washington, D.C.	585,000
20. Boston, MA	552,000
21. El Paso, TX	543,813
22. Seattle, WA	519,598
23. Cleveland, OH	502,539
24. Nashville, TN	495,012
25. Austin, TX	492,329
26. New Orleans, LA	489,595
27. Denver, CO	483,852
28. Fort Worth, TX	454,430
29. Oklahoma City, OK	453,995
30. Portland, OR	445,458
31. Long Beach, CA	438,771
32. Kansas City, MO	431,553
33. Virginia Beach, VA	417,061
34. Charlotte, NC	416,294
35. Tucson, AZ	415,079
36. Albuquerque, NM	398,492
37. Atlanta, GA	394,848
38. St. Louis, MO	383,733
39. Sacramento, CA	382,816
40. Fresno, CA	376,130
41. Tulsa, OK	375,307
42. Oakland, CA	373,219

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<sup>5</sup> U.S. Department of Commerce. 1994. County and City Data Book, 12<sup>th</sup> Ed. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government.

equipment and mistakes by human operators), occupational health diseases, and psycho which refers to activities like terrorism, sabotage, and tampering. Pauchant and Mitroff's data were further analyzed and eventually reduced to four crisis clusters and four preventive action clusters. The four preventive clusters include audits, internal repair/design, external information/communication, and internal emotional preparation. The authors used the following criteria to select the clusters:

1. More than 10% of the variance had to be explained by each cluster.
2. To be included, each item had to load close to 0.60 on each factor.
3. Each factor had to have a Coefficient Alpha of 0.70. (One factor did not meet this criterion but its Alpha was of reasonable magnitude.)
4. The clustering pattern uncovered from the MDS [sic] had to be similar to the clustering patterns established in the factor analyses (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992, p. 208).

Their reliability measures for the crisis factors range from 0.57 to 0.85 and from 0.72 to 0.83 for the preventive action clusters. Specific information on reliability measures for each of the crisis and preventive action clusters is included in Appendix One.

**Modified Survey.** I modified the Pauchant and Mitroff survey for this research. The modified survey can be found in Appendix Two. The modified questionnaire has three sections. The first section contains questions about general demographic information. In the second section I asked respondents how often their facilities have been exposed to different types of potential crises in the past three years. In the third section of the survey I asked respondents to indicate which actions they are engaging in to address potential crises and to what extent those actions have been implemented.

### **Survey Techniques**

A mail survey proved the most feasible way to gather my data. According to Babbie (1992) surveys are an appropriate method for gathering data when engaging in exploratory research.

**Distribution.** Babbie (1992) suggests that the survey, along with a cover letter explaining the purpose of the research be sent to each subject in the sample. He further suggests that follow-up letters be mailed to those not responding in a timely fashion. This follow-up mailing, consisting of another letter and survey, should be mailed two to three weeks after the initial mailing takes place. Finally Babbie suggests that a third and final letter and survey be mailed to those that have not responded to the first two letters. The author suggests that the third mailing be sent four to six weeks after the first surveys are sent.



While Babbie suggests mailing the survey three times, the costs involved are prohibitively large. Rather than mailing out the survey three times, my first follow-up mailing consisted of a reminder letter which I sent approximately two weeks after the first survey was sent. The third and final mailing included a survey. I sent the final mailing four weeks after the first set of questionnaires was sent.

In an attempt to ensure the anonymity of the facilities responding to the survey, I made certain that the surveys did not have any means of facility identification on them other than the basic data on facility size, age and metropolitan area. A postcard with my return address was included in both the first and third mailings. Each respondent was asked to mail the postcard separately from the survey when the survey was completed. This way I was able to identify which facilities responded, but matching respondents with the returned questionnaires would not be possible.

## **ANALYTICAL METHODS, RESULTS, AND DISCUSSION**

### **Pretest**

I pretested the survey instrument in six cities; El Paso, TX; Seattle, WA; Cleveland, OH; Nashville, TN; Austin, TX; and New Orleans, LA. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce (1994) these cities are the 21<sup>st</sup> through 26<sup>th</sup> largest cities, respectively, in the U.S. as of July 1, 1992. I used the 21<sup>st</sup> through the 26<sup>th</sup> largest cities because I wanted to use the largest cities for my sample. I found it necessary to include six cities in the pretest because of the limited number of facilities listed in each city according to the address database. After discussions with local facilities managers, I asked Norrine Bailey Spencer Ph.D., Associate Dean, Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Tech, to write an introductory letter and then included my own letter providing added details on the research and completing the survey. The local facilities managers suggested that a letter of introduction by Dean Spencer, who serves as a board member for Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge, would perhaps lend some legitimacy to the request for information in the eyes of facilities managers.

I was using the pretest to make sure respondents were able to understand my questions and to determine the overall response rate the survey might generate. I sent out 42 surveys for the pretest. Four were returned by the U.S. Postal Service for an actual mailing of 38. Sixteen completed surveys were returned for a response rate of 42%.

**Response rates.** Even though my response rate on the pretest was 42%, I turned to Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) to determine what response rate could be expected for my final survey. Pauchant and Mitroff sent out 1000 surveys and received 114 back realizing a response rate of 11.4%. As they state "considering the sensitivity of the topic, (this) seems acceptable" (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992, p. 201). So, to be on

the conservative side and given the sensitive nature of the research, a response rate of approximately 10% was the target with at least 40 surveys needed for statistical analysis. This meant I had to have a sample of at least 400 facilities. Surveys were sent to 404 facilities throughout the United States. A copy of the survey is included in Appendix Two.

After completing the pretest I made several modifications to the survey instrument. In the first section of the pretest I asked whether the facility is for-profit or not-for-profit. I added "private practice" as a response option since that more accurately reflects the industry norms. I also added a question regarding the types of services the facility provides. In the third section, which asks about actions for addressing crises, I eliminated two response categories, one because it was ambiguous and the second because it was not an appropriate response given the nature of the questions.

Once the modifications to the survey were completed I began surveying my sample. The first mailing consisted of a letter of introduction by Dean Spencer, a letter with directions from me and a survey. Two weeks later I sent out a reminder letter. Shortly after I sent out the reminder letter, Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) contacted me. Because they had not approved the survey prior to distribution to their affiliates, they contended that any completed surveys returned by local affiliates could not be used for this research or any other research I might engage in. PPFA also demanded that their affiliates not be sent any additional mailings. This request reduced my sample to 309 facilities. After the initial mailing took place I realized that the sample contained six duplicate addresses and 13 facilities whose mission clearly was at odds with the provision of abortion services.<sup>6</sup> These were all eliminated from the sample leaving 290 facilities in the sample. The U.S. Postal Services was not able to deliver 39 surveys further reducing my sample size. The final sample included 251 facilities. I received 82 completed surveys for a response rate of 33%. A few factors may have contributed to my response rate. First, Dean Spencer's letter may have convinced some to participate. Second, I had had some contact with the National Abortion Federation and some may have recognized my name or heard of the work prior to receiving the survey. And finally, the survey did not ask the facility directors to disclose any information on internal operations and therefore they may have been more willing to participate.

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<sup>6</sup> Crisis pregnancy centers are listed as in the phone book under "abortion alternatives." I eliminated them from the sample along with organizations whose names implied a religious affiliation since many religious organizations oppose abortion.

In the remaining portion of this section I present the descriptive statistics and explain how each hypothesis was tested and the results of that testing.

### **Descriptive Statistics**

In the first section of the survey I asked the respondents to provide general demographic information about their facility. The responses are presented in this section. Please see Table Three.

**Location.** WRHCFs from thirty cities responded to my survey. I received the greatest number of responses from Dallas, Texas with six completed surveys or 7.3% of the sample. Los Angeles, California was next with five completed surveys or 6.1% of the responses. I received four completed surveys from each of the following cities: Houston, TX; Columbus, OH; Milwaukee, WI; Portland, OR; Charlotte, NC; Albuquerque, NM; Atlanta, GA; and Sacramento, CA with facilities in each of these cities representing 4.9% of the responses. The southwestern U.S. was the most well represented section of the country. I received 30 surveys from facilities in California, Arizona, and New Mexico. This represents 36.6% of the responses. The least represented section of the country was the Northwest with only four responses or 4.9% of the sample. These responses were all from facilities in Portland, Oregon.

**Number of full time equivalent employees.** The majority of the facilities (53%) had nine or fewer employees. Eight of the respondents, or just over 10% of the sample, had ten employees. This was the most frequent response. The smallest facilities, or five of the respondents, had two employees and the largest facility had over 200 employees.

**Year facility began providing services.** Thirty-nine of the facilities, or 53.4% of the sample, began providing services before 1976. Ten facilities, or 13.7% of the sample, began providing services in 1973. The year 1973 is the most frequent response which is not surprising since this was the year in which abortion became legal in the United States. One facility began providing services in 1928, the earliest date given. Three facilities began providing services in 1993, the most recent date given by survey respondents.

**Membership in a chain or federation.** Fifty of the respondents indicated that they do not belong to a chain or federation of facilities. This represents 61% of the sample. The remaining 39%, or 32 of the facilities, do belong to a chain or a federation of facilities. They were not asked to indicate their affiliation in an another attempt to ensure their anonymity.

**Classification of facility.** WRHCFs can be classified as either for-profit, not-for-profit, or private practice. Forty of the facilities that responded are not-for-profit. This

represents 49.4% of the responses. The remaining responses were almost evenly split with 22 for-profit and 19 private practice facilities. These figures represent 27.2% and 23.5% of the responses respectively.

**Number of facilities providing abortions.** Nearly 71% of the respondents indicated that their facility provides abortion services. Twenty-four of the facilities, or the remaining 29% do not provide abortions.

In the second section of the survey I asked facilities managers to indicate the number of times in the last three years they had faced various crises. The results are summarized in Table Four.

In the third section of the survey I asked respondents to indicate the types of actions they have engaged in to address crises they might encounter. The results are summarized in Table Five.

### **Confirmatory Factor Analysis**

Ideally confirmatory factor analysis would have been run for the items in both the second and the third sections of the survey to determine if my results supported Pauchant and Mitroff's (1992) results (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). However this was not possible since I did not have enough data to run factor analysis. According to Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1987) a general rule of thumb for factor analysis is that you need "four or five times as many observations as there are variables to be analyzed" (p. 227). I did not have enough responses to meet this requirement. Instead correlations were run for the items in Section Two: Types of Crises Facilities Might Face and for the items in Section Three: Actions for Addressing Crises. The results are presented in Tables Six and Seven respectively. Then I compared the correlations with the factor loadings Pauchant and Mitroff realized. Pauchant and Mitroff's loadings for types of crises are presented in Table Eight. The loadings for actions for addressing crises can be found in Table Nine.

The following section presents the correlations found between the items that were contained in both Pauchant and Mitroff's (1992) survey and in my survey. Weak correlations are less than +/-0.300. Moderate correlations fall between +/- 0.300 and +/-0.600. Strong correlations are greater than +/-0.600.

**Types of Crises: Factor 1.** As is indicated in Table Eight only three of the items that loaded on the first factor were found on my survey. The three items that the surveys have in common include counterfeiting of products, copyright infringement, and boycotts. The correlation between counterfeiting of products and copyright infringement could not be calculated because the sample is too small. The correlation between counterfeiting of products and boycotts is -0.019 and the

**TABLE 3: GENERAL INFORMATION  
(N = 82)**

<b>TITLE OF PERSON COMPLETING SURVEY</b>		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>			
	Top-Level Administrator	51	62.2
	Mid-Level Administrator	19	23.2
	Client Contact Employees	8	9.8
	<b>Total</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>95.1</b>
<u>Missing</u>	99	4	4.9
	<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4.9</b>
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>METROPOLITAN AREA FACILITY LOCATED IN</b>		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>			
	New York City	1	1.2
	Los Angeles	5	6.1
	Chicago	1	1.2
	Houston	4	4.9
	Philadelphia	3	3.7
	San Diego	3	3.7
	Dallas	6	7.3
	Phoenix	2	2.4
	Detroit	1	1.2
	San Antonio	3	3.7
	San Jose	3	3.7
	Indianapolis	1	1.2
	San Francisco	3	3.7
	Baltimore	1	1.2
	Jacksonville	1	1.2
	Columbus	4	4.9
	Milwaukee	4	4.9
	Washington, D.C.	2	2.4
	Boston	2	2.4
	Fort Worth	3	3.7
	Portland	4	4.9
	Charlotte	4	4.9
	Tucson	2	2.4
	Albuquerque	4	4.9
	Atlanta	4	4.9
	St. Louis	2	2.4
	Sacramento	4	4.9
	Fresno	1	1.2
	Tulsa	1	1.2
	Oakland	3	3.7
	<b>Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

TABLE 3, CONTINUED

NUMBER OF FTE EMPLOYEES

		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		5	6.1
	2	6	7.3
	3	6	7.3
	4	4	4.9
	5	6	7.3
	6	5	6.1
	7	6	7.3
	8	3	3.7
	9	8	9.8
	10	4	4.9
	12	4	4.9
	13	2	2.4
	15	1	1.2
	16	1	1.2
	17	2	2.4
	20	3	3.7
	25	1	1.2
	30	2	2.4
	35	1	1.2
	50	2	2.4
	60	1	1.2
	75	1	1.2
	95	1	1.2
	100	1	1.2
	120	1	1.2
	138	1	1.2
	200	1	1.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>95.1</b>
<u>Missing</u>	99	4	4.9
	<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4.9</b>
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.00</b>

YEAR FACILITY BEGAN PROVIDING SERVICES

		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>			
	1928	1	1.2
	1950	1	1.2
	1954	1	1.2
	1964	1	1.2
	1966	1	1.2
	1967	2	2.4
	1968	1	1.2
	1969	1	1.2
	1970	2	2.4
	1971	3	3.7
	1972	4	4.9
	1973	10	12.2
	1974	5	6.1
	1975	6	7.3
	1976	4	4.9
	1977	1	1.2
	1978	1	1.2

TABLE 3, CONTINUED

	1979	6	7.3
	1980	1	1.2
	1981	2	2.4
	1982	5	6.1
	1984	2	2.4
	1985	2	2.4
	1987	2	2.4
	1988	1	1.2
	1990	1	1.2
	1991	1	1.2
	1992	2	2.4
	1993	3	3.7
	Total	73	89.0
Missing	99	9	11.1
	<b>Total</b>	9	11.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0
<b>MEMBERSHIP IN CHAIN/FEDERATION</b>			
		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
Valid	Yes	32	39.0
	No	50	61.0
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.00
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.00
<b>FINANCIAL CLASSIFICATION OF FACILITY</b>			
		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>	For-Profit	22	26.8
	Not-for-Profit	40	48.8
	Private Practice	19	23.2
	<b>Total</b>	81	98.8
<u>Missing</u>	99	1	1.2
	<b>Total</b>	1	1.2
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0
<b>PROVIDE CONTRACEPTIVES</b>			
		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>	Yes	79	96.3
	No	3	3.7
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0
<b>PROVIDE PAP SMEARS</b>			
		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>	Yes	76	92.7
	No	6	7.3
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0

TABLE 3, CONTINUED

PROVIDE STD TESTING		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
Valid	Yes	68	82.9
	No	14	17.1
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0
PROVIDE PREGNANCY TESTS		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>	Yes	81	98.8
	No	1	1.2
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0
PROVIDE ABORTIONS		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>	Yes	58	70.7
	No	24	29.3
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0
PROVIDE ULTRASOUNDS		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>	Yes	68	82.9
	No	14	17.1
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0
PROVIDE GYN EXAMS		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>	Yes	73	89.0
	No	9	11.0
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0
PROVIDE HIV TESTING		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>	Yes	53	64.6
	No	29	35.4
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION AS INFO SOURCE		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>	Yes	49	59.8
	No	33	40.2
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0



**TABLE 3, CONTINUED**

**PLANNED PARENTHOOD AN INFO SOURCE**

<u>Valid</u>		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
	Yes	23	28.0
	No	59	82.0
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0

**COMPUTER DATABASES AN INFO SOURCE**

<u>Valid</u>		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
	Yes	5	6.1
	No	77	93.9
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0

**OTHER FACILITIES AN INFO SOURCE**

<u>Valid</u>		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
	Yes	31	37.8
	No	51	62.2
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0

**SECURITY FIRMS AN INFO SOURCE**

<u>Valid</u>		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
	Yes	20	24.4
	No	62	75.6
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0

**POLICE AN INFO SOURCE**

<u>Valid</u>		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
	Yes	33	40.2
	No	49	59.8
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0

**BOOKS AN INFO SOURCE**

<u>Valid</u>		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
	Yes	26	31.7
	No	56	68.3
	<b>Total</b>	82	100.0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0

99 = missing value

**TABLE 4: NUMBER OF INCIDENTS FACILITIES HAVE FACED IN LAST THREE YEARS  
(N = 82)**

<b>NUMBER OF NATURAL DISASTERS SINCE 1993</b>		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>			
	Zero	62	75.6
	One	10	12.2
	Two-Five	6	7.3
	Not Applicable	1	1.2
	Unknown	2	2.4
	<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.8</b>
<u>Missing</u>			
	99	1	1.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>NUMBER OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS SINCE 1993</b>		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>			
	Zero	68	82.9
	One	2	2.4
	Two-Five	1	1.2
	Not Applicable	10	12.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.8</b>
<u>Missing</u>			
	99	1	1.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>GOVERNMENT CRISES SINCE 1993</b>		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>			
	Zero	56	68.3
	One	3	3.7
	Two-Five	8	9.8
	Five	5	6.1
	Not Applicable	7	8.5
	Unknown	2	2.4
	<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.7</b>
<u>Missing</u>			
	99	1	1.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**TABLE 4, CONTINUED**

**NUMBER OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACCIDENTS SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	75	91.5
One	2	2.4
Not Applicable	2	2.4
Unknown	2	2.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.7</b>
<u>Missing</u>		
99	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**NUMBER OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	71	86.6
One	3	3.7
Two-Five	1	1.2
Not Applicable	2	2.4
Unknown	3	3.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>97.6</b>
<u>Missing</u>		
99	2	2.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2.4</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**NUMBER OF BRIBERY INCIDENTS SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	75	91.5
Not Applicable	2	2.4
Unknown	2	2.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>96.3</b>
<u>Missing</u>		
99	3	3.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3.7</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**TABLE 4, CONTINUED**

**NUMBER OF RUMORS SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	43	52.4
One	4	4.9
Two-Five	11	13.4
More than Five	14	17.1
Not Applicable	1	1.2
Unknown	8	9.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.8</b>
<u>Missing</u>		
99	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OF NEGATIVE PUBLICITY**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	40	48.8
One	6	7.3
Two-Five	16	19.5
More than Five	13	15.9
Unknown	5	6.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>97.6</b>
<u>Missing</u>		
99	2	2.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2.4</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OF PRICE FIXING**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	71	86.6
One	1	1.2
Two-Five	2	2.4
Not Applicable	3	3.7
Unknown	4	4.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.8</b>
<u>Missing</u>		
99	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	72	87.8
Not Applicable	5	6.1
Unknown	4	4.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.8</b>
<u>Missing</u>		
99	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**TABLE 4, CONTINUED**

**NUMBER OF BOYCOTTS SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	72	87.8
Two-Five	1	1.2
More than Five	1	1.2
Not Applicable	3	3.7
Unknown	4	4.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.8</b>
<u>Missing</u>		
99	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**EXECUTIVE KIDNAPPINGS SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	77	93.9
Not Applicable	3	3.7
Unknown	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.8</b>
<u>Missing</u>		
99	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OF OFFSITE TAMPERING SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	70	85.4
One	2	2.4
Two-Five	2	2.4
Not Applicable	4	4.9
Unknown	3	3.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.8</b>
<u>Missing</u>		
99	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OF COUNTERFEITING OF PRODUCTS SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	73	89.0
One	1	1.2
Not Applicable	6	7.3
Unknown	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.8</b>
<u>Missing</u>		
99	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

TABLE 4, CONTINUED

**BOMB THREATS SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	42	51.2
One	16	19.5
Two-Five	13	15.9
More than Five	9	11.0
Unknown	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.8</b>
<u>Missing</u>		
99	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**BOMBINGS SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	78	95.1
One	3	3.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.8</b>
<u>Missing</u>		
99	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**BLOCKADES SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	55	67.1
One	6	7.3
Two-Five	10	12.2
More than Five	9	11.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>97.6</b>
<u>Missing</u>		
99	2	2.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2.4</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OF PICKETING SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	23	28.0
One	7	8.5
Two-Five	5	6.1
More than Five	46	56.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.8</b>
<u>Missing</u>		
99	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

TABLE 4, CONTINUED

**NUMBER OF SHOOTINGS SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	77	93.9
One	3	3.7
Two-Five	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	81	98.8
<u>Missing</u>		
99	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	1	1.2
<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0

**NUMBER OF GASSINGS SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	76	92.7
One	2	2.4
Two-Five	3	3.7
<b>Total</b>	81	98.8
<u>Missing</u>		
99	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	1	1.2
<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0

**NUMBER OF STAFF THREATS SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	56	68.3
One	8	9.8
Two-Five	11	13.4
More than Five	4	4.9
Unknown	2	2.4
<b>Total</b>	81	98.8
<u>Missing</u>		
99	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	1	1.2
<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0

**NUMBER OF INFILTRATORS SINCE 1993**

	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>		
Zero	63	76.8
One	9	11.0
Two-Five	2	2.4
More than Five	3	3.7
Unknown	4	4.9
<b>Total</b>	81	98.8
<u>Missing</u>		
99	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	1	1.2
<b>Grand Total</b>	82	100.0

TABLE 4, CONTINUED

**NUMBER OF PIPEBOMBS SINCE 1993**

		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>			
	Zero	80	97.6
	One	1	1.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.8</b>
<u>Missing</u>	99	1	1.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**OTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM SINCE 1993**

		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>			
	Zero	64	78.0
	One	2	2.4
	Two-Five	5	6.1
	More than Five	5	6.1
	Unknown	5	6.1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.8</b>
<u>Missing</u>	99	1	1.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**COPYCAT THREATS SINCE 1993**

		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>			
	Zero	68	82.9
	One	2	2.4
	Two-Five	1	1.2
	More than Five	1	1.2
	Not Applicable	1	1.2
	Unknown	8	9.8
	<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98.8</b>
<u>Missing</u>	99	1	1.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**MALICIOUS SLANDER SINCE 1993**

		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
<u>Valid</u>			
	Zero	52	63.4
	One	3	3.7
	Two-Five	8	9.8
	Not Applicable	1	1.2
	Unknown	6	7.3
	More than Five	10	12.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>97.5</b>
<u>Missing</u>	99	2	2.4
	<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2.4</b>
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100.0</b>

99 = missing value



**TABLE 5: EXTENT TO WHICH FACILITIES HAVE  
IMPLEMENTED ACTIONS FOR ADDRESSING CRISES  
(N = 82)**

<u>ACTION FOR ADDRESSING CRISES</u>	<u>MEAN</u>
Implement Early Warning Systems	2.41
Improve Facility Design	2.34
Systemwide Safety and Security	2.58
Improve Chain of Command	2.31
Bring Experts to Review Plan	2.28
Bring Experts to Review Operations	2.17
Develop Emotional Preparation	1.78
Media Training for Key Executives	1.96
Establish Issues Management Programs	1.89
Develop Behavioral Profiles of Terrorists	1.79
Establish Relationships with Government Officials	2.72
Establish Whistleblower Programs for Internal Crises	1.47
Share Crisis Plan with Other Providers	2.24
Reduce Inventories of Hazardous Materials	1.94
Sponsor Special Legislation	1.87
Conduct Legal Audits	1.75
Conduct Financial Audits	1.89
Establish Relationships with Right to Life Activists	1.39
Conduct Emergency Classes on Emergency Preparedness	2.75
Establish Pledge a Picket Programs	1.43
Install Surveillance Cameras	1.88
Provide Secured Lobbies	2.29
Install Bullet Proof Glass	1.65
Install Protective Films	1.87
Clarify & Reinforce Risk Management System	2.37
Post Clear Instructions for Incident Management	2.28
Routine Review of Risk Management Policies	2.51
Security Audits by Law Enforcement Experts	2.24
Improve Maintenance Schedules for Plant & Equipment	2.12
Establish 800 Number for Client Questions	2.12
Implement Preventive Product Packaging	1.19
Improve Design of Equipment	1.32
Improve Design of Products	1.11
Improve Frequency of Inspection of Facilities and Equipment	2.03
Develop Special Legislation	1.46

1 = not at all

3= have implemented

**TABLE 6: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TYPES OF CRISES**

Pearson Correlation	Number of Natural Disasters Since 1993	Number of Hostile Takeovers Since 1993	Government Crises Since 1993	Number of Environmental Accidents Since 1993	Number of Industrial Accidents since 1993	Bribery Incidents Since 1993
Number of Natural Disasters Since 1993	1.000					
Number of Hostile Takeovers Since 1993	.210	1.000				
Government Crises Since 1993	.426	.349	1.000			
Number of Environmental Accidents Since 1993	.077	-.030	2.62	1.000		
Number of Industrial Accidents Since 1993	-.013	-.036	.112	.518	1.000	
Number of Bribery Incidents Since 1993	.	.	.	.	.	1.00
Number of Rumors Since 1993	.001	.240	.231	.197	.255	.
Number of Incident of Negative Publicity	-.155	-.132	.202	.190	.099	.
Number of Price Fixing	.216	-.037	-.050	-.034	-.040	.
Number of Copyright Infringement	.	.	.	.	.	.
Number of Boycotts Since 1993	.342	-.022	-.049	-.026	-.036	.
Executive Kidnappings Since 1993	.	.	.	.	.	.
Number of Incidents of Offsite Tampering Since 1993	.078	.263	.475	-.033	-.040	.
Number of Incidents of Counterfeiting Products Since 1993	.332	.	.	.	.	.
Bomb Threats Since 1993	-.105	-.057	-.098	-.065	-.131	.
Bombings Since 1993	-.094	-.034	-.094	-.033	-.046	.
Blockades Since 1993	-.073	.045	.090	-.092	-.128	.
Number of Incidents of Picketing Since 1993	-.075	-.004	-.048	-.007	-.188	.
Number of Shootings Since 1993	.263	-.039	.401	.241	.100	.
Number of Gassings Since 1993	-.013	-.052	-.106	-.041	-.050	.
Number of Physician Death Threats Since 1993	-.052	-.017	.290	.126	-.035	.
Number of Staff Death Threats Since 1993	-.027	-.042	.156	-.060	-.098	.
Number of Infiltrators Since 1993	-.027	-.055	.207	.022	-.038	.
Number of Pipebombs Since 1993	-.054	-.024	-.053	-.019	-.026	.
Other Acts of Terrorism Since 1993	.039	-.051	-.021	-.043	-.070	.
Copycat Threats Since 1993	.063	-.031	-.071	-.024	-.040	.
Malicious Slander Since 1993	.000	-.097	.304	-.067	-.112	.

. = sample too small to compute correlation

**TABLE 6, CONTINUED**

Pearson Correlation	Number of Rumors Since 1993	Number of Incidents of Negative Publicity	Number of Incidents of Price Fixing	Number of Incidents of Copyright Infringement	Number of Boycotts Since 1993	Executive Kidnappings Since 1993
Number of Natural Disasters Since 1993						
Number of Hostile Takeovers Since 1993						
Government Crises Since 1993						
Number of Environmental Accidents Since 1993						
Number of Industrial Accidents Since 1993						
Number of Bribery Incidents Since 1993						
Number of Rumors Since 1993	1.00					
Number of Incident of Negative Publicity	.603	1.00				
Number of Price Fixing	.123	-.130	1.00			
Number of Copyright Infringement	.	.	.	1.00		
Number of Boycotts Since 1993	.245	.123	-.032	.	1.00	
Executive Kidnappings Since 1993	.	.	.	.	.	1.00
Number of Incidents of Offsite Tampering Since 1993	-.030	-.094	-.046	.	-.031	.
Number of Incidents of Counterfeiting Products Since 1993	-.082	-.092	-.024	.	-.019	.
Bomb Threats Since 1993	.039	.173	.106	.	.105	.
Bombings Since 1993	-.072	.292	-.041	.	-.025	.
Blockades Since 1993	.131	.113	.246	.	.038	.
Number of Incidents of Picketing Since 1993	-.054	.126	.022	.	.131	.
Number of Shootings Since 1993	.017	.003	-.044	.	-.034	.
Number of Gassings Since 1993	-.138	.018	-.051	.	-.039	.
Number of Physician Death Threats Since 1993	.029	.338	-.108	.	.001	.
Number of Staff Death Threats Since 1993	-.136	.129	-.074	.	.013	.
Number of Infiltrators Since 1993	.002	-.061	-.072	.	.070	.
Number of Pipebombs Since 1993	-.082	.229	-.023	.	-.018	.
Other Acts of Terrorism Since 1993	-.092	-.133	-.042	.	-.041	.
Copycat Threats Since 1993	.039	-.071	-.043	.	.141	.
Malicious Slander Since 1993	.038	.204	-.058	.	-.012	.

**TABLE 6, CONTINUED**

Pearson Correlation	Number of Incidents of Offsite Tampering Since 1993	Number of Incidents of Counterfeiting Since 1993	Bomb Threats Since 1993	Bombings Since 1993	Blockades Since 1993	Number of Incidents of Picketing Since 1993
Number of Natural Disasters Since 1993						
Number of Hostile Takeovers Since 1993						
Government Crises Since 1993						
Number of Environmental Accidents Since 1993						
Number of Industrial Accidents Since 1993						
Number of Bribery Incidents Since 1993						
Number of Rumors Since 1993						
Number of Incident of Negative Publicity						
Number of Price Fixing						
Number of Copyright Infringement						
Number of Boycotts Since 1993						
Executive Kidnappings Since 1993						
Number of Incidents of Offsite Tampering Since 1993	1.00					
Number of Incidents of Counterfeiting Products Since 1993	-.023	1.00				
Bomb Threats Since 1993	-.065	-.084	1.00			
Bombings Since 1993	-.046	-.020	.240	1.00		
Blockades Since 1993	.394	-.067	.452	.055	1.00	
Number of Incidents of Picketing Since 1993	.183	-.159	.481	-.039	.441	1.00
Number of Shootings Since 1993	-.051	-.026	-.039	-.042	-.119	-.249
Number of Gassings Since 1993	-.058	-.030	.045	-.048	-.040	.128
Number of Physician Death Threats Since 1993	.241	-.071	.445	.390	.459	.419
Number of Staff Death Threats Since 1993	.145	-.060	.436	.381	.387	.378
Number of Infiltrators Since 1993	.348	-.042	.189	-.071	.409	.263
Number of Pipebombs Since 1993	-.026	-.014	.065	.570	.078	.095
Other Acts of Terrorism Since 1993	.030	-.043	.299	.192	.192	.285
Copycat Threats Since 1993	-.041	-.024	.299	-.033	.319	.146
Malicious Slander Since 1993	.133	-.066	.265	.247	.404	.373

**TABLE 6, CONTINUED**

Pearson Correlation	Number of Shootings Since 1993	Number of Gassings Since 1993	Number of Physician Death Threats Since 1993	Number of Staff Death Threats Since 1993	Number of Infiltrators Since 1993	Number of Pipebombs Since 1993
Number of Natural Disasters Since 1993						
Number of Hostile Takeovers Since 1993						
Government Crises Since 1993						
Number of Environmental Accidents Since 1993						
Number of Industrial Accidents Since 1993						
Number of Bribery Incidents Since 1993						
Number of Rumors Since 1993						
Number of Incident of Negative Publicity						
Number of Price Fixing						
Number of Copyright Infringement						
Number of Boycotts Since 1993						
Executive Kidnappings Since 1993						
Number of Incidents of Offsite Tampering Since 1993						
Number of Incidents of Counterfeiting Products Since 1993						
Bomb Threats Since 1993						
Bombings Since 1993						
Blockades Since 1993						
Number of Incidents of Picketing Since 1993						
Number of Shootings Since 1993	1.00					
Number of Gassings Since 1993	-.053	1.00				
Number of Physician Death Threats Since 1993	.046	.062	1.00			
Number of Staff Death Threats Since 1993	-.020	.224	.760	1.00		
Number of Infiltrators Since 1993	-.078	.033	.290	.412	1.00	
Number of Pipebombs Since 1993	-.024	-.027	.416	.401	-.040	1.00
Other Acts of Terrorism Since 1993	-.071	.245	.342	.551	-.505	-.043
Copycat Threats Since 1993	-.038	.312	.502	.484	.769	-.023
Malicious Slander Since 1993	-.106	.120	.558	.533	.512	.275

**TABLE 6, CONTINUED**

Pearson Correlation	Other Acts of Terrorism Since 1993	Copycat Threats Since 1993	Malicious Slander Since 1993
Number of Natural Disasters Since 1993			
Number of Hostile Takeovers Since 1993			
Government Crises Since 1993			
Number of Environmental Accidents Since 1993			
Number of Industrial Accidents Since 1993			
Number of Bribery Incidents Since 1993			
Number of Rumors Since 1993			
Number of Incident of Negative Publicity			
Number of Price Fixing			
Number of Copyright Infringement			
Number of Boycotts Since 1993			
Executive Kidnappings Since 1993			
Number of Incidents of Offsite Tampering Since 1993			
Number of Incidents of Counterfeiting Products Since 1993			
Bomb Threats Since 1993			
Bombings Since 1993			
Blockades Since 1993			
Number of Incidents of Picketing Since 1993			
Number of Shootings Since 1993			
Number of Gassings Since 1993			
Number of Physician Death Threats Since 1993			
Number of Staff Death Threats Since 1993			
Number of Infiltrators Since 1993			
Number of Pipebombs Since 1993			
Other Acts of Terrorism Since 1993	1.00		
Copycat Threats Since 1993	-.582	1.00	
Malicious Slander Since 1993	.544	.414	1.00

**TABLE 7: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ACTIONS FOR ADDRESSING CRISES**

	Implement Early Warning Systems	Improve Facility Design	Systemwide Safety and Security	Improve Chain of Command	Bring Experts to Review Plan	Bring Experts to Review Operations	Develop Emotional Preparation
Implement Early Warning Systems	1.00						
Improve Facility Design	.532	1.00					
Systemwide Safety and Security	.537	.373	1.00				
Improve Chain of Command	.467	.263	.509	1.00			
Bring Experts to Review Plan	.387	.417	.515	.315	1.00		
Bring Experts to Review Operations	.360	.500	.412	.314	.704	1.00	
Develop Emotional Preparation	.230	.329	.201	.195	.044	.140	1.00
Media Training for Executives	.182	.307	.200	.130	.146	.241	.215
Establish Issues Management Programs	.303	.431	.339	.386	.315	.417	.233
Develop Behavioral Profiles of Terrorists	.353	.212	.372	.482	.203	.398	-.005
Establish Relations with Government Officials	.458	.386	.626	.317	.478	.457	.150
Establish Whistleblower Programs for Internal Crises	.156	.298	.174	.236	.242	.298	.233
Share Crisis Plans with Other Providers	.417	.264	.359	.357	.302	.265	.143
Reduce Inventories of Hazardous Materials	.400	.401	.110	.189	.115	.230	.260
Sponsor Special Legislation	.403	.493	.291	.169	.235	.301	.283
Conduct Legal Audits	.346	.310	.184	.232	.341	.476	.240
Conduct Financial Audits	.368	.294	.298	.231	.392	.480	.243
Conduct Environmental Impact Audits	.242	.328	.164	.204	.354	.194	.182
Establish Relationships with Rights to Life Activists	.138	.176	.255	.230	.272	.276	.089
Conduct Employee Classes on Emergency Preparedness	.392	.249	.469	.400	.331	.299	.227
Establish Pledge a Picket Programs	.161	.184	.225	.160	.285	.110	-.006
Install Surveillance Cameras	.130	.170	.304	.321	.226	.211	.015
Provide Secured Lobbies	.281	.274	.253	.259	.263	.111	.182
Install Bullet Proof Glass	.205	.319	.287	.192	.376	.307	.076
Install Protective Films	.304	.275	.291	.196	.237	.257	.286
Clarify & Reinforce Risk Management Systems	.358	.357	.518	.420	.338	.330	.356
Post Clear Instructions for Incident Management	.342	.333	.422	.547	.361	.418	.145
Routine Review of Risk Management Policies	.255	.362	.516	.614	.419	.459	.127
Security Audits by Law Enforcement Experts	.321	.272	.480	.530	.521	.590	-.011
Improve Maintenance Schedules for Plan and Equipment	.399	.384	.188	.400	.234	.330	.160
Establish 800 Numbers for Client Questions	.358	.316	.280	.348	.071	.084	.167

**TABLE 7, CONTINUED**

Implement Preventive Product Packaging	.005	.090	-.015	.239	-.046	-.021	.045
Improve Design of Equipment	.226	.216	.130	.230	.167	.101	.166
Improve Design of Products	-.010	.000	.173	.211	-.011	.003	-.011
Improve Frequency of Inspection of Facilities and Equipment	.296	.232	.336	.390	.228	.139	.221
Develop Special Legislation	.288	.312	.142	.271	.156	.217	.210



**TABLE 7, CONTINUED**

	Media Training for Key Executives	Establish Issues Management Programs	Develop Behavioral Profiles of Terrorists	Establish Relations with Government Officials	Establish Whistleblower Programs for Internal Crises	Share Plans with Other Providers	Reduce Inventories of Hazardous Materials
Implement Early Warning Systems							
Improve Facility Design							
Systemwide Safety and Security							
Improve Chain of Command							
Bring Experts to Review Plan							
Bring Experts to Review Operations							
Develop Emotional Preparation							
Media Training for Executives	1.00						
Establish Issues Management Programs	.287	1.00					
Develop Behavioral Profiles of Terrorists	.466	.355	1.00				
Establish Relations with Government Officials	.277	.312	.313	1.00			
Establish Whistleblower Programs for Internal Crises	.402	.390	.490	.131	1.00		
Share Crisis Plans with Other Providers	.300	.280	.536	.464	.384	1.00	
Reduce Inventories of Hazardous Materials	.169	.425	.113	.150	.373	.307	1.00
Sponsor Special Legislation	.462	.354	.303	.378	.340	.375	.298
Conduct Legal Audits	.437	.534	.400	.171	.683	.257	.627
Conduct Financial Audits	.439	.431	.357	.155	.507	.115	.500
Conduct Environmental Impact Audits	.264	.274	.093	.103	.400	.104	.441
Establish Relationships with Rights to Life Activists	.333	.127	.166	.218	.317	.308	.075
Conduct Employee Classes on Emergency Preparedness	.225	.310	.218	.445	.184	.198	.219
Establish Pledge a Picket Programs	.251	.216	.317	.206	.159	.190	.204
Install Surveillance Cameras	.065	-.038	.349	.238	.130	.245	-.045
Provide Secured Lobbies	.138	.166	.175	.316	.125	.361	.172
Install Bullet Proof Glass	.273	.173	.379	.266	.320	.383	.200
Install Protective Films	.256	.207	.282	.188	.187	.275	.243
Clarify & Reinforce Risk Management Systems	.506	.534	.272	.393	.264	.287	.250
Post Clear Instructions for Incident Management	.274	.489	.358	.301	.328	.298	.205
Routine Review of Risk Management Policies	.388	.535	.305	.416	.318	.236	.208
Security Audits by Law Enforcement Experts	.281	.317	.408	.475	.366	.458	.240
Improve Maintenance Schedules for Plan and Equipment	.284	.480	.363	.154	.409	.272	.615
Establish 800 Numbers for Client Questions	.285	.286	.321	.191	.223	.184	.264

**TABLE 7, CONTINUED**

Implement Preventive Product Packaging	.183	.042	.225	-.035	.232	-.035	.162
Improve Design of Equipment	.151	.222	.174	.140	.297	.166	.447
Improve Design of Products	.097	.050	.292	.050	.176	-.015	.190
Improve Frequency of Inspection of Facilities and Equipment	.358	.424	.436	.244	.347	.365	.366
Develop Special Legislation	.458	.397	.429	.234	.434	.447	.343

**TABLE 7, CONTINUED**

	Sponsor Special Legislation	Conduct Legal Audits	Conduct Financial Audits	Conduct Environmental Impact Audits	Establish Relationships with Right to Life Activists	Conduct Employee Classes on Emergency Preparedness	Establish Pledge a Picket Programs
Implement Early Warning Systems							
Improve Facility Design							
Systemwide Safety and Security							
Improve Chain of Command							
Bring Experts to Review Plan							
Bring Experts to Review Operations							
Develop Emotional Preparation							
Media Training for Executives							
Establish Issues Management Programs							
Develop Behavioral Profiles of Terrorists							
Establish Relations with Government Officials							
Establish Whistleblower Programs for Internal Crises							
Share Crisis Plans with Other Providers							
Reduce Inventories of Hazardous Materials							
Sponsor Special Legislation	1.00						
Conduct Legal Audits	.426	1.00					
Conduct Financial Audits	.334	.868	1.00				
Conduct Environmental Impact Audits	.370	.624	.589	1.00			
Establish Relationships with Rights to Life Activists	.371	.283	.191	.212	1.00		
Conduct Employee Classes on Emergency Preparedness	.213	.221	.242	.153	.162	1.00	
Establish Pledge a Picket Programs	.314	.308	.241	.179	.134	.063	1.00
Install Surveillance Cameras	.075	.022	-.075	-.040	.162	.146	.192
Provide Secured Lobbies	.239	.166	.038	.171	-.008	.184	.250
Install Bullet Proof Glass	.437	.205	.053	.090	.113	.217	.439
Install Protective Films	.198	.106	.060	.023	.063	.257	.284
Clarify & Reinforce Risk Management Systems	.273	.381	.457	.291	.098	.400	.092
Post Clear Instructions for Incident Management	.314	.339	.359	.267	.118	.467	.082
Routine Review of Risk Management Policies	.255	.327	.356	.208	.190	.622	.123
Security Audits by Law Enforcement Experts	.180	.329	.239	.201	.325	.294	.157
Improve Maintenance Schedules for Plan and Equipment	.295	.623	.547	.407	.193	.325	.100
Establish 800 Numbers for Client Questions	.185	.191	.089	-.028	.171	.170	.124

**TABLE 7, CONTINUED**

Implement Preventive Product Packaging	.215	.261	.215	.335	.077	.132	.361
Improve Design of Equipment	.464	.391	.337	.345	-.061	.188	.188
Improve Design of Products	.154	.189	.197	.258	-.124	.121	.167
Improve Frequency of Inspection of Facilities and Equipment	.316	.368	.369	.348	.194	.210	.095
Develop Special Legislation	.693	.337	.297	.405	.362	.187	.233

**TABLE 7, CONTINUED**

	Install Surveillance Cameras	Provide Secured Lobbies	Install Bullet Proof Glass	Install Protective Films	Clarify & Reinforce Risk Management Systems	Post Clear Instructions for Incident Management	Routine Review of Risk Management Policies
Implement Early Warning Systems							
Improve Facility Design							
Systemwide Safety and Security							
Improve Chain of Command							
Bring Experts to Review Plan							
Bring Experts to Review Operations							
Develop Emotional Preparation							
Media Training for Executives							
Establish Issues Management Programs							
Develop Behavioral Profiles of Terrorists							
Establish Relations with Government Officials							
Establish Whistleblower Programs for Internal Crises							
Share Crisis Plans with Other Providers							
Reduce Inventories of Hazardous Materials							
Sponsor Special Legislation							
Conduct Legal Audits							
Conduct Financial Audits							
Conduct Environmental Impact Audits							
Establish Relationships with Rights to Life Activists							
Conduct Employee Classes on Emergency Preparedness							
Establish Pledge a Picket Programs							
Install Surveillance Cameras	1.00						
Provide Secured Lobbies	.502	1.00					
Install Bullet Proof Glass	.385	.401	1.00				
Install Protective Films	.324	.395	.581	1.00			
Clarify & Reinforce Risk Management Systems	.210	.276	.242	.225	1.00		
Post Clear Instructions for Incident Management	.385	.293	.299	.241	.577	1.00	
Routine Review of Risk Management Policies	.249	.251	.266	.190	.587	.717	1.00
Security Audits by Law Enforcement Experts	.346	.366	.350	.302	.328	.444	.556
Improve Maintenance Schedules for Plan and Equipment	.290	.278	.150	.091	.423	.548	.421
Establish 800 Numbers for Client Questions	.335	.267	.185	.302	.386	.403	.254

**TABLE 7, CONTINUED**

Implement Preventive Product Packaging	.078	.258	.180	.162	.103	.214	.201
Improve Design of Equipment	.062	.201	.306	.203	.213	.353	.186
Improve Design of Products	.060	.120	.328	.238	.195	.119	.126
Improve Frequency of Inspection of Facilities and Equipment	.212	.345	.145	.241	.444	.443	.390
Develop Special Legislation	.122	.286	.305	.178	.389	.365	.272

**TABLE 7, CONTINUED**

	Security Audits by Law Enforcement Experts	Improve Maintenance Schedules for Plant and Equipment	Establish 800 Numbers for Clients Questions	Implement Preventive Product Packaging	Improve Design of Equipment	Improve Design of Products	Improve Frequency of Inspection of Facilities and Equipment
Implement Early Warning Systems							
Improve Facility Design							
Systemwide Safety and Security							
Improve Chain of Command							
Bring Experts to Review Plan							
Bring Experts to Review Operations							
Develop Emotional Preparation							
Media Training for Executives							
Establish Issues Management Programs							
Develop Behavioral Profiles of Terrorists							
Establish Relations with Government Officials							
Establish Whistleblower Programs for Internal Crises							
Share Crisis Plans with Other Providers							
Reduce Inventories of Hazardous Materials							
Sponsor Special Legislation							
Conduct Legal Audits							
Conduct Financial Audits							
Conduct Environmental Impact Audits							
Establish Relationships with Rights to Life Activists							
Conduct Employee Classes on Emergency Preparedness							
Establish Pledge a Picket Programs							
Install Surveillance Cameras							
Provide Secured Lobbies							
Install Bullet Proof Glass							
Install Protective Films							
Clarify & Reinforce Risk Management Systems							
Post Clear Instructions for Incident Management							
Routine Review of Risk Management Policies							
Security Audits by Law Enforcement Experts	1.00						
Improve Maintenance Schedules for Plan and Equipment	.207	1.00					
Establish 800 Numbers for Client Questions	.191	.406	1.00				

**TABLE 7, CONTINUED**

Implement Preventive Product Packaging	-.046	.294	.214	1.00			
Improve Design of Equipment	.002	.374	.376	.345	1.00		
Improve Design of Products	-.002	.191	.249	.556	.523	1.00	
Improve Frequency of Inspection of Facilities and Equipment	.171	.587	.429	.156	.399	.267	1.00
Develop Special Legislation	.214	.355	.267	.336	.383	.179	.383

correlation between copyright infringement and boycotts could not be calculated since the sample is too small. No strong correlations exist among the three items that the surveys had in common. The correlations can be found in Table Six.

**Factor 2.** All of the items loading on the second factor were eliminated from my survey making any analysis impossible.

**Factor 3.** Three items loaded on the third factor and all three were found on the modified survey. The items include off-site product tampering, terrorism, and copycat threats. The correlation between off-site product tampering and terrorism is 0.030. The correlation between off-site product tampering and copycat threats is -0.041. There is a moderate inverse correlation between terrorism and copycat threats. The correlation between these two items is -0.582.

**Factor 4.** Two items loaded on Pauchant and Mitroff's fourth factor. However only one of those items was found on both surveys making comparative analysis impossible.

The types of crises section of the Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) survey was modified substantially for this project. Nine of the 20 original items were deleted, 13 new items were added and four items were modified substantially. As a result it is not surprising that there is little support for Pauchant and Mitroff's results.

**Preventive Actions: Factor 1.** All the items loading on factor one were found on my survey. These items include early warning systems, media training, special 800 number, relationships with government, and sharing of crisis plan within industry. The correlation between early warning systems and media training is 0.182. The correlation between early warning systems and special 800 number is 0.358. The correlation between early warning systems and relationships with government is 0.458.



**Table 8: Factor Loadings for Types of Crises**

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
r-Counterfeiting of products	<u>.62</u>			
d-Sexual harassment	<u>.67</u>			
d-Occupational health diseases	<u>.67</u>			
d-Loss of confidential information	<u>.74</u>			
r-Copyright infringement	<u>.63</u>			
r-Boycotts	<u>.58</u>			
d-Product defects		<u>.62</u>		
d-Defects in Plant and Equipment		<u>.81</u>		
d-Poor operator training/screening		<u>.66</u>		
d-Computer breakdowns		<u>.60</u>		
r-Off-site product tampering			<u>.85</u>	
r-Terrorism			<u>.74</u>	
r-Copycat threats			<u>.89</u>	
r-Bribery				<u>.71</u>
d-Product recalls				<u>.80</u>

underlined items represent factor loadings  
r = item retained on modified survey  
d = item deleted from modified survey

The correlation between media training and special 800 number is 0.285. The correlation between media training and relationships with government is 0.277. The correlation between media training and sharing crisis plan within the industry is 0.300. The correlation between special 800 number and relationships with government is 0.191. The correlation between special 800 numbers and sharing of crisis plan within industry is 0.184. The correlation between relationships with government and sharing of crisis plan within industry is 0.464.

**Factor 2.** All of the items in factor two were found on my survey. These items include improved safety and security, improved design plants/equipment, and improved inspection/maintenance. The correlation between improved safety and security and improved design plants/equipment is 0.373. The correlation between improved safety and security and improved inspection/maintenance is 0.188. The correlation between improved design plants/equipment and improved inspection/maintenance is 0.384.

**Factor 3.** All of the items in factor three were included on my survey. The items include emotional preparation for crises, behavioral profiles of terrorists, whistleblower programs, and relationships with activist groups. The correlation between emotional

**Table 9: Factor Loadings for Preventive Actions**

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Early warning systems	<u>.66</u>			
Media training	<u>.68</u>			
Special 800 number	<u>.66</u>			
Relationships with government	<u>.62</u>			
Sharing of crisis plan within industry	<u>.74</u>			
Improved safety and security		<u>.75</u>		
Improved design plants/equipment		<u>.79</u>		
Improved inspection/maintenance		<u>.81</u>		
Emotional preparation for crises			<u>.73</u>	
Behavioral profiles of terrorists			<u>.78</u>	
Whistleblower programs			<u>.64</u>	
Relationships with activist groups			<u>.56</u>	
Reductions of hazardous inventories				<u>.72</u>
Development of special legislation				<u>.56</u>
Legal and financial audit of liabilities				<u>.69</u>

underlined items represent factor loadings  
all items were retained for modified survey

preparation for crises and behavioral profiles of terrorists is -0.005. The correlation between emotional preparation for crises and whistleblower programs is 0.233. The correlation between emotional preparation for crises and relationships with activist groups is 0.089. The correlation between behavioral profiles of terrorists and whistleblower programs is 0.490. The correlation between behavioral profiles of terrorists and relationships with activist groups is 0.166. The correlation between whistleblower programs and relationships with activist groups is 0.317.

*Factor 4.* All of the items in factor four were found on my survey. One of the items was divided into two separate items. The items include reduction of hazardous inventories, development of special legislation, and legal and financial audits of liabilities. Legal and financial audits of liabilities is the item that was divided into two separate items. The correlation between reductions of hazardous inventories and development of special legislation is 0.343. The correlation between reductions of hazardous inventories and legal audits of liabilities is 0.627. The correlation between reductions of hazardous inventories and financial audits of liabilities is 0.500. The correlation between development of special legislation and legal audits of liabilities is 0.337. The correlation between development of special legislation and financial audits of liabilities is 0.297. The correlation between legal audit of liabilities and financial audits of liabilities is 0.868.

There is moderate correlation between several of the items that loaded on the first factor. These include the correlations between early warning systems and special 800 numbers and between early warning systems and relationships with government. I also realized moderate correlations between several of the items that loaded on the second factor. These items include the correlation between improved safety and security and improved design of plants/equipment and improved design plants/equipment and improved inspection/maintenance. There also is moderate correlation between several items loading on the third factor. These include behavioral profiles of terrorists and whistleblower programs and whistleblower programs and relationships with activist groups. Finally there were moderate to strong correlations between several items that loaded on the fourth factor. The moderate correlations include the correlations between reductions of hazardous inventories and development of special legislation, reductions of hazardous inventories and financial audits of liabilities, and development of special legislation and legal audits of liabilities. The strong correlations include correlations between reductions of hazardous inventories and legal audits of liabilities and between legal audits of liabilities and financial audits of liabilities. These results suggest that there is some support for Pauchant and Mitroff's (1992) findings.

The survey developed by Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) was sent to the public affairs officer of the Fortune 1000, all large, publicly held organizations. However, nearly 75% of the organizations represented by the data were classified as either not-for-profit or private practice and 53% were small organizations with less than ten employees. The organizations included in my sample all face the very real possibility of reprisal from anti-abortion activists. Its not clear as to whether or not the organizations Pauchant and Mitroff surveyed all face similar pressures from activist stakeholders. Given these substantial differences in the organizations surveyed the support for Pauchant and Mitroff's work is interesting.

### **Hypothesis Testing**

H1: WRHCFs experiencing more frequent and more serious crimes will have more fully developed crisis management programs than WRHCFs experiencing less frequent and less serious crimes.

H2: WRHCFs experiencing more serious crimes will have more fully developed crisis management programs than WRHCFs experiencing less serious crimes.

H3: WRHCFs experiencing crimes more frequently will have more fully developed crisis management programs than WRHCFs experiencing crimes less frequently.

### Independent Variables

*Frequency of crimes.* Data for this variable came from the second section of the survey. Recall that each respondent was asked to indicate the number of times various crises were encountered in the last three years. The survey items I used to create this variable are listed below.

1. gassings
2. executive kidnapping
3. bomb threats
4. realized bombings
5. blockades
6. picketing
7. shootings
8. other acts of terrorism

The frequency score can range from zero to 40. Scores of two or less constitute infrequent criminal activity, scores of between three and seven indicate moderately frequent criminal activity and scores of eight and over indicate frequent criminal activity.

*Seriousness of the crime.* As with the previous variable, I used items from the second section of the survey which addresses frequency and types of potential crises to create this variable. The survey items I used are listed below:

1. shootings
2. executive kidnappings
3. bomb threats
4. realized bombings
5. other acts of terrorism

I asked respondents to indicate the number of incidents they have faced in the last three years. The variable was scored by totaling the responses. If the respondent indicated that the item does not apply or that she does not know, I assigned the variable a zero. Scores for this variable can range from zero through 25. It is possible that the facility has not faced any serious crimes which means the score is zero. Alternatively, it is possible that the facility has faced each of these crimes more than five times in the last three years. This would result in a score of 25. The variable was divided into two categories; facilities that had not faced any serious crimes and facilities that had faced serious crimes.

Dependent Variable

*Extensiveness of crisis management program.* This is a composite variable made up of responses to the variables in the third section of the survey. Again, in the third section of the survey I asked respondents to indicate to what extent they have incorporated a variety of actions into their crisis management programs. Facilities with extensive programs have higher scores. This means that these facilities are either planning to implement or have implemented more of the actions for addressing crises than other facilities. Facilities with less extensive programs have lower scores because they have not implemented many of the actions for addressing crises or are only in the planning stages. The modified survey in Appendix Two has a listing of the items included in this variable. Scores can range from one to 108.

Analytical Technique

Initially I used a Levene Test to test for homogeneity of variance since that is one of the assumptions of ANOVA. Then I used a single 2x3 factorial design (seriousness of crimes x frequency of crimes) to test the first three hypotheses.

**TABLE 10: 2 X 3 FACTORIAL DESIGN ANOVA FOR H1, H2, H3**

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**NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 81**

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EXTENSIVENESS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM**

SOURCE		DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F VALUE	PROB. > F
Model		5	7646.568	1529.314	7.148	.000
Residual		75	16047.10	213.961		
Total		80	23693.70	296.171		
Extensive Main Effects	(Combined)	3	7579.970	2526.657	11.809	.000
	Frequency of Crime	2	727.180	363.590	1.699	.190
	Seriousness of Crime	1	2238.238	2238.238	10.461	.002
2-Way Interactions						
	Frequency of Crime by Seriousness of Crimes	2	66.598	33.299	.156	.856

---

### Results for Hypothesis One

The Levene statistic tests for the homogeneity of variance with the null hypothesis stating that all group variances are equal. The Levene statistic for frequency of crime and extensiveness of the crisis management programs was 1.091 with significance of 0.341. For seriousness of crime and extensiveness of the crisis management programs, the Levene statistic was 0.109 with significance of 0.742. As such, the null hypothesis was supported for both frequency of crime and seriousness of crime. This allows us to move on to the analysis of variance.

Please refer to Table Ten. Recall that a 2x3 factorial design was used to test for the interaction. The F-ratio for the interaction is 0.156 with significance of 0.856. Hypothesis One is not supported. The interaction of the seriousness of crimes and the frequency of crimes does not have significant impact on the extensiveness of the crisis management programs. It is now appropriate to turn to the second and third hypotheses.

### Results for Hypothesis Two

Please see Table Ten for results. The F-ratio for the impact of seriousness of the crime on the extensiveness of the crisis management program is 10.461 with significance of 0.002. Hypothesis Two is supported by the data. This means that the seriousness of the crimes faced by WRHCFs has an impact on the extensiveness of the crisis management programs they develop.

### Results for Hypothesis Three

The results are presented in Table Ten. The F-ratio for the impact of frequency of the crime on the extensiveness of the crisis management program is 1.699 with a corresponding significance of 0.190. Hypothesis Three is not supported by the data. The frequency of criminal activity does not have a significant impact on the extensiveness of the crisis management programs developed by WRHCFs.

### Discussion for Hypothesis One

The results of the first hypothesis suggest that we need to turn to the main effects of the independent variables on the extensiveness of crisis management programs. In terms of the literature, these results suggest that organizations may not need a string of serious crimes to convince them that they need to put in place a crisis management program. Instead they may develop programs that are proactive rather than reactive. For example, rather than waiting until they are the target of frequent, serious crimes precipitated by anti-abortion activists, managers at WRHCFs develop programs that protect them from these types of activities. Whether or not they have

faced these activities themselves is immaterial; because other facilities have faced these activities, WRHCFs develop crisis management programs to protect themselves, knowing they are potential targets. This also suggests that managers at WRHCF develop programs because other facilities that they perceive as powerful or successful have developed programs. To understand the effects of the independent variables

### Discussion for Hypothesis Two

The results for this hypothesis do not support Powell and DiMaggio (1991) who theorize that organizations facing the same environmental pressures will tend to exhibit similar organizational forms. It seems plausible that facilities facing more serious criminal activity have, at one point or another, been disappointed in the ability of law enforcement agencies to protect them from anti-abortion activists. Given this disillusionment, the managers put in place measures designed to protect themselves, their staff, and their clients from the various tactics employed by anti-abortion activists

From the crisis management perspective, the support for the hypothesis may mean that managers conceive of crises as being more and less serious. Thus the seriousness of the crisis may result in different responses from organizations. Thus managers will consider the seriousness of the incident faced when they develop programs to deal with the activities of anti-abortion activists.

### Discussion for Hypothesis Three

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that facilities facing criminal activity will mimic efforts of facilities they perceive as having been successful in developing crisis management programs. They may do this to avoid becoming the target of frequent attack. Thus while the hypothesis is not supported, institutional theory suggests that there will be little variance in the crisis management programs developed by WRHCFs since they face similar environmental pressures.

In terms of the crisis management literature, Pauchant and Mitroff (1993) suggest that there are triggering events leading to the development of crisis management programs. The results support this suggesting that WRHCFs facing more crises have developed more comprehensive programs for dealing with those crises. Pragmatically, managers running these facilities have grown tired of the failure of the law enforcement agencies to provide adequate protection. In frustration they have taken matters into their own hands.

H4: WRHCFs will have more fully developed those crisis management program components that address crises precipitated by social activists than the components that address other external crises.

### Independent Variable

*Level of activist pressures.* Activist pressures is a composite variable determined from responses to variables in the second section of the survey. Recall that the second section of the survey asked respondents to indicate the frequency with which their facilities faced a variety of crises. The following variables from the survey comprised this composite variable:

1. negative publicity
2. other acts of terrorism
3. executive kidnapping
4. bomb threats
5. realized bombings
6. blockades
7. picketing
8. shootings
9. gassings

In the second section of the survey I asked respondents to indicate the frequency with which they have faced each of these crises in the last three years. As with other variables, if the respondent indicated that the item does not apply or that she does not know the answer, the variable was allotted a score of zero. The lowest possible score for this variable is zero and the highest possible score is 45. Scores of zero through three indicate low levels of activist pressures, from four through seventeen signify moderate levels of activist pressures, and scores 18 and over indicate high levels of activist pressures.

### Dependent Variable

*Social activism components.* This variable was also determined based on responses to several of the variables in the third section of the survey. Recall that the third section of the survey asked respondents to indicate the extent to which actions for addressing crises have been incorporated into their crisis management programs. WRHCFs should have more actions that address social activism than they have actions addressing other external crises. This was measured by dividing the sum of the responses to the variables listed below from the third section of the survey, by the total score for all the variables in section three of the survey.



1. Improve systemwide safety and security testing
2. Develop behavioral profiles of terrorists and copycats for better and warning protection
3. Sponsor/develop special legislation
4. Establish relationships with activists
5. Establish a “pledge a picket” program
6. Install surveillance cameras
7. Provide secured lobbies
8. Install bulletproof glass
9. Install shatter resistant glass

Again, if the respondent indicated that the variable did not apply or that he/she does not know the answer, the variable was allotted a score of zero. The resulting number represents the ratio of social activism variables to all the variables that represent actions for addressing potential crises. Facilities with high scores have the most extensive programs relative to social activism and those with low scores have the least extensive programs relative to social activism. Since this is a ratio, the lowest possible score is zero and the highest possible score is one.

#### Analytical Technique

Initially I used a Levene Test to test for homogeneity of variance since that is one of the assumptions of ANOVA. Then the hypothesis was tested using a one-way ANOVA.

#### Results for Hypothesis Four

The Levene statistic tests for the homogeneity of variance with the null hypothesis stating that all group variances are equal. The Levene statistic for level of activist pressures and social activism components was 0.992 with a significance of 0.376. This supports the null hypothesis of equal cell variances which allows us to move on to the ANOVA.

Please see Table Eleven for results. The F-ratio was 2.070 with a corresponding significance of 0.133. This suggests that Hypothesis Four is not supported by the data. We can conclude that the level of activist pressures does not influence the number of social activism components managers of WRHCFs incorporate into their crisis management programs.

#### Discussion

Mitroff, Shrivastava, & Udwadia (1987) suggest that organizations focus on crises that are part of the industry in which they exist and tend to overlook other types

of external crises. The data do not support this contention. However, WRHCFs appear to have fairly sophisticated crisis management programs so the lack of support could be a function of the environment in which these organizations exist. Healthcare is a highly regulated industry with its own health and safety requirements which serve as coercive isomorphic pressures. This, coupled with the exposure to social activists has led many organizations to bring in experts to assist in the development of crisis management programs. Thus managers at WRHCFs may be very sophisticated when it comes to implementing what they refer to as risk management programs, attempting to plan for all types of crises, whether internally or externally generated, whether precipitated by technological or human failures.

H5: Higher levels of activist pressures, whether legal or illegal, will be positively related to more fully developed crisis management programs.

**TABLE 11: ONE-WAY ANOVA FOR HYPOTHESIS 4**

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**NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 81**

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PERCENTAGE OF ACTIVIST COMPONENTS**

<b>SOURCE</b>		<b>DF</b>	<b>SUM OF SQUARES</b>	<b>MEAN SQUARE</b>	<b>F VALUE</b>	<b>PROB. &gt; F</b>
Model		2	9.9E-03	5.0E-03	2.070	.133
Residual		78	.187	2.4E-03	---	---
Total		80	.197	2.5E-03		
Main Effects	Level of activist pressures	2	9.9E-03	5.0E-03	2.070	.133

## Variables

*Level of activist pressures.* Activist pressures is a composite variable determined from responses to variables in the second section of the survey. Recall that the second section of the survey asked respondents to indicate the frequency with which their facilities faced a variety of crises. The following variables from the survey comprised this composite variable:

1. negative publicity
2. other acts of terrorism
3. executive kidnapping
4. bomb threats
5. realized bombings
6. blockades
7. picketing
8. shootings
9. gassings

In the second section of the survey I asked respondents to indicate the frequency with which they have faced each of these crises in the last three years. As with other variables, if the respondent indicated that the item does not apply or that she does not know the answer, the variable was allotted a score of zero. The lowest possible score for this variable is zero and the highest possible score is 45.

*Extensiveness of crisis management program.* As was stated earlier, this is a composite variable made up of responses to the variables in the third section of the survey. Again, in the third section of the survey I asked respondents to indicate to what extent they have incorporated a variety of actions into their crisis management programs. Facilities with extensive programs have higher scores. This means that these facilities are either planning to implement or have implemented more of the actions for addressing crises than other facilities. Facilities with less extensive programs have lower scores because they have not implemented many of the actions for addressing crises or are only in the planning stages. The modified survey in Appendix Two has a listing of the items included in this variable. Scores can range from one to 108.

## Analytical Technique

This hypothesis tests the correlation between levels of activist pressures and the extensiveness of the facilities crisis management programs. It takes on the following form:

Ho:  $p = 0$

H1:  $p = 0$

Results for Hypothesis Five

Results are presented in Table Twelve. With a correlation coefficient of .79579 and a p-value of .0001, the null hypothesis has been rejected. Hypothesis Five is supported. There is a positive relationship between the level of activist pressures and the extensiveness of the facility's crisis management programs.

Discussion

The data support work done by O'Connell, Betz, Shepard, and Stephens (1995) who seek to refine institutional theory. The data also support Greening and Gray's (1994) work in issues management. The authors found that high levels of activist pressures led to the development of issue management structural components. The results also lend support to Pauchant and Mitroff's (1992) contention that there are triggering events, including crises, that can lead to the development of crisis

**TABLE 12: CORRELATION ANALYSIS**

**LEVEL OF ACTIVIST PRESSURES AND EXTENSIVENESS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS**

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SIMPLE STATISTICS

<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>STD. DEV.</u>	<u>SUM</u>	<u>MINIMUM</u>	<u>MAXIMUM</u>
Extensiv	82	64.71951	17.10698	5307	13	98
Activcom	82	15.51220	5.15259	1272	3	27

Pearson Correlation Coefficients / Prob > R under Ho:  $Rho = 0$  /  $N = 82$

	<b>EXTENSIV</b>	<b>ACTIVCOM</b>
<b>EXTENSIV</b>	1.00000 0.0	0.79579 0.0001
<b>ACTIVCOM</b>	0.79579 0.0001	1.00000 0.0

---

Correlation = .79579  
p Value = .0001

management programs. However, we must be careful in interpreting what these results. Correlation between variables does not suggest a causal relationship.

H6: Larger, older WRHCFs will have more fully developed crisis management programs than will smaller, younger WRHCFs.

H7: Larger WRHCFs will have more fully developed crisis management programs than will smaller WRHCFs.

H8: Older WRHCFs will have more fully developed crisis management programs than will younger WRHCFs.

### Independent Variables

*Size.* I asked respondents to indicate the number of full time equivalent employees at their facilities. Responses ranged from two to 200 employees. Size was broken down into three groups. Small facilities had between one and five employees, medium sized facilities had between six and 13 employees, and large facilities had more than 13 employees.

*Age.* I requested that respondents indicate what year they began offering services to clients. Age was also broken down into three groups. Old facilities began providing services between 1928 and 1972. Middle-aged facilities began providing services between 1973 and 1981, and young facilities began providing services in 1982 or later.

### Dependent Variable

*Extensiveness of crisis management program.* As was stated earlier, this is a composite variable made up of responses to the variables in the third section of the survey. Again, in the third section of the survey I asked respondents to indicate to what extent they have incorporated a variety of actions into their crisis management programs. Facilities with extensive programs have higher scores. This means that these facilities are either planning to implement or have implemented more of the actions for addressing crises than other facilities. Facilities with less extensive programs have lower scores because they have not implemented many of the actions for addressing crises or are only in the planning stages. Scores can range from one to 108.

### Analytical Technique

Since homogeneity of variance is one of the assumptions of ANOVA, I first tested for this using the Levene Test. Then I used a 3x3 factorial design (size x age) to test Hypotheses Six, Seven, and Eight.

### Results for Hypothesis Six

The null hypothesis for the Levene test is that all group variances are equal. The Levene statistic is 1.255 and the significance is 0.292 when examining age and extensiveness of the program. Therefore the null hypothesis is supported. In terms of size and extensiveness of the program, the Levene statistic is 1.020 and the significance is 0.364. Once again the null hypothesis is supported. Since we have homogeneity of variances we can go on with the analysis.

Please refer to Table Thirteen for results. The F-ratio of the interaction of size and age on the extensiveness of crisis management program was 2.164 and with a significance of 0.084. The interaction of the two variables is not statistically significant at the .05 level and therefore Hypothesis Six is not supported. We can conclude that the interaction of the size and age of the facilities does not have a significant impact on the extensiveness of crisis management programs developed by WRHCFs. It is now appropriate to turn to Hypotheses Seven and Eight.

### Results for Hypothesis Seven

Please see Table Thirteen for output. The F-ratio for the effects of size of the facility on the extensiveness of crisis management programs is 0.765 with a corresponding significance of 0.470. This suggests that the results are not statistically significant and as a result Hypothesis Seven is not supported. This suggests that the size of the facility does not have an impact on the extensiveness of the crisis management program.

### Results for Hypothesis Eight

Please see Table Thirteen for output. The F-ratio for the impact of age on the extensiveness of crisis management programs is 0.233 and has a significance of 0.793. Therefore Hypothesis Eight is not supported. Thus the effects of age on the extensiveness of crisis management programs is not statistically significant.

### Discussion for Hypothesis Six

While the organization theory literature suggests that larger, older organizations would have more extensive structural components this is not supported by the data in

this study. However, Blau and Schoenherr (1971) as well as Hall, Haas, and Johnson (1967) would suggest the lack of significant results is function of the organization type and not due to sampling error. These authors imply that all of the organizations in my sample are young, small organizations and therefore the hypothesis could not be supported. Another reason we did not see any significant results could be that WRHCFs face unique pressures from various components of the external environment and as such constitute a "special case" when it comes to the development of structural components designed in response to the pressures exerted by a potentially dangerous segment of society. We now turn to the main effects in an attempt to understand the impact of age and the impact of size on the extensiveness of crisis management programs.

**TABLE 13: 3 X 3 FACTORIAL DESIGN ANOVA FOR H6, H7, H8**

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**NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 81**

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EXTENSIVENESS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM**

SOURCE		DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F VALUE	PROB. > F
Model		8	3221.795	402.724	1.489	0.180
Residual		62	16772.6	270.525	---	---
Total		70	19994.4	285.634		
Extensive combined		4	619.013	154.753	.572	.684
Main Effects						
	age	2	125.996	62.998	.233	.793
	size	2	414.002	207.001	.765	.470
2-Way Interactions		4	2341.293	585.323	2.164	.084

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*Discussion for Hypothesis Seven*

The results are not statistically significant. Once again this comes as no surprise since Blau and Schoenherr (1971) as well as Hall, Haas, and Johnson

(1967) suggest that all of the organizations in my sample are small organizations. Once again, this is characteristic of the industry and is not due to sampling error. However, it is generally accepted by organizational theorists that larger organizations will be more fully developed structurally. Scott (1992) suggested that larger organizations are more likely to be targeted by stakeholders because they are generally assumed to be more respectable. However, from the anti-abortion activists' standpoint, WRHCFs, regardless of size are not respectable and need to be shut down. The response of the facilities is to develop as extensive a program as possible to deal with this hostile component of the environment. So for the environment in which WRHCFs operate, this contention does not hold true. WRHCFs face one group of stakeholders that seeks to shut down their operations and will use whatever tactics are available, whether legal or illegal. Given the unpredictability and the hostility of this component of the organization's external environment, WRHCFs, regardless of size, take no chances in terms of protecting their physicians, staff, and patients.

Researchers in crisis management also found that larger organizations have more fully developed crisis management programs than smaller organizations (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). Once again it would seem that WRHCFs serve as a unique organization type when it comes to generalizations made by crisis management researchers. Because of the unique situation in which WRHCFs find themselves, they are compelled, regardless of size, to have implemented crisis management programs that reduce their vulnerability to anti-abortion activities.

### *Discussion for Hypothesis Eight*

It is a generally held contention in organization theory that older organizations will have more fully developed structural components than younger organizations. Much of the empirical work in organization theory supports this contention. However it is not borne out by the data in this study. Again, Blau and Schoenherr (1971) and Hall, Haas, and Johnson (1967) suggest this is due to the lack of variance in the age of the facilities in my study. According to the authors all of the organizations in my sample are young organizations. This is characteristic of the industry and not due to sampling error. However we must realize that much of the previous work testing the age/structural development relationship was conducted using populations of organizations for which there is a wide range experiences with respect to how threatening various components of the environment can be. In this study all the organizations have at least one very hostile group of stakeholders in their environments. We also need to appreciate that this segment of the healthcare industry is only 24 years old and as such significant differences have had little time to develop. So it appears that WRHCFs, regardless of the number of years they have been in existence, engage in activities that allow them protection from a potentially dangerous group of stakeholders in their environment. But this conclusion must be tempered with the qualifications addressed above.



## CHAPTER SIX

### IMPLICATIONS

#### Theoretical

**Organization theory.** Most organization theorists contend that organizations respond, at least to some extent, to the environment in which they exist. The results of this work provide general support for this contention. However, some generally accepted assertions have not been supported. For example, the results of this study do not lend support to the notion that larger organizations have more fully developed crisis management programs than smaller organizations. Further, we find that while it is generally accepted that older organizations have more fully developed structures this too is not supported by this work. This suggests that we need to be a bit more specific in explaining the conditions under which these assertions hold true. We need to explain the environmental conditions under which we are more likely to see larger organizations and older organizations exhibiting greater structural differentiation. The data suggest that the level of structural differentiation may be far more dependent on the complexity and uncertainty in environment than on the age or size of the organization dealing with the complexity and uncertainty in the environment. We need to incorporate the environmental conditions under which age and/or size will determine the level of structural differentiation organizations exhibit.

Turning specifically to institutional theory, we must first realize that the results suggest that, generally, there is no significant variation in the crisis management programs used by WRHCFs which is just what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) would predict. So a lack of support for the hypotheses results in support for the basic tenets of institutional theory.

DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) provide us with the initial categorization of the three types of isomorphic pressures. The results suggest that there are instances in which these conceptions need to be refined. DiMaggio and Powell suggested that coercive pressures are external, forceful pressures. This results in operationalization of coercive pressures as regulation by the state. However, Sutton & Dobbin (1996) as well as Edelman (1992) suggest that regulation often does not have the substance to be coercive leaving DiMaggio & Powell's with an operationally empty isomophic

pressure.<sup>7</sup> O'Connell, Lenahan, Betz, Shepard, & Stephens (1995) point out that social activism comes to DiMaggio and Powell's rescue.

It seems Oliver (1991) may have provided the seed for this idea suggesting that there are instances in which organizations will not passively conform to pressures exerted by society. She contends that the extent to which the organization exerting the pressures has the force of law behind them will impact the likelihood of conformance by the targeted organization. It would seem that the converse would also be true; that the extent to which a pressuring organization foregoes legal remedies will have an impact on the level of resistance exhibited by the focal organization. However, since we see that the seriousness of the crime faced by the organization does not have an impact on the crisis management program, this does not hold true. This suggests that we need to reconsider the conditions under which organizations feel coerced into conforming to demands from the external environment. Because frequency of criminal activity was the only hypothesis grounded in institutional theory that was supported, we need to consider the impact of the frequency of coercive pressures as we continue to refine the basic tenets of institutional theory. We also need to consider the circumstances under which, rather than developing organizational forms that comply with external pressures, organizations develop forms which resist external pressures.

As we attempt to refine DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) notion of isomorphic pressures we may want to extend the efforts to normative isomorphism as well. Recall that normative isomorphism refers to attempts by the professions to influence the conditions under which they do their work. The healthcare industry serves as a convenient example to illustrate this. Generally speaking the capacity for doctors and nurses to make decisions regarding patient care has diminished over the years. Instead, insurance companies and health maintenance organizations dictate what services can and cannot be provided. So we, once again, face a vacuous category of isomorphic pressures.

However, if we redefine normative pressures refer to societal norms and recognize that due to social norms some segments of society exert coercive pressures we have extended DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) conceptions of coercive and normative pressures to more adequately reflect much of what is going on in society.

The crisis management literature also contributed to the development of the hypotheses developed in this work. Only one of the contentions suggested by Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) was supported by the data. The authors suggest there

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<sup>7</sup> Thanks to Carroll Stephens for assistance in developing this line or reasoning.

are triggering events that lead to the development of crisis management programs. This was supported by the data. However, because the crisis management literature has not been tested using institutional theory the results are useful in theory development for crisis management researchers. First, it appears that WRHCFs distinguish between the level of seriousness of a crisis. Thus it might be useful for researchers in crisis management to develop typologies and taxonomies of crises as seems to be the norm in other areas falling under the rubric of management research. Secondly, the results support Pauchant and Mitroff's (1993) contention that there are triggering events that lead to the development of crisis management programs in organizations.

The vast majority of the research done in crisis management focuses on large industrial organizations facing crises that have to do with either their products or their processes. Womens' reproductive healthcare facilities serve as a very different organization type in which to do crisis management research. Many of the people that work in these organizations have a strongly held internal belief that they need to continue providing the types of services their organizations offer. This conviction and dedication to their work may have a dramatic impact on the zeal with which they seek to protect themselves, their co-workers, and their clients from forces that seek to shut them down.

Another factor that makes these facilities unique the nature of the relationship the doctor has with the facilities at which he/she practices. Many doctors are "shared" by facilities practicing their profession at a number of locations. Given the unique nature of this relationship and the dedication of the directors its possible that the organization is defined by the physician and/or director and not by the physical location. Perhaps charismatic leaders, combined with cohesive dedicated staffs, have a dramatic impact on the efforts extended to protect themselves from anti-abortion activism.

### **Practical**

Stout (1988) has stated that "[o]ur capacity to live peacefully with each other depends upon our ability to converse intelligibly and reason coherently.... this ability is weakened by the very differences that make it necessary. The more we need it, the weaker it becomes and we need it very badly indeed" (p. 3). While Stout was referring to the plurality of views regarding major social issues of our time and not one specific issue, his comments are fitting for the abortion debate raging in the United States.

Engaging in productive discourse seems a simplistic answer to what has proven a deadly debate. The conversation would be stilted at best. So other strategies that address the realities of the situation must be developed and implemented.

Schultz and Sloan (1980), in their work on responses to political terrorism, suggest that organizations have an obligation to their employees to prepare them for terrorist attacks. As the authors state:

the greater the likelihood that an individual may become a victim of terrorism as a result of his or her duties, the greater the responsibility of the organization he or she works for to sensitize the individual to the threat and provide effective training to deal with it (p. 248).

While attacks on women's reproductive health care facilities cannot be categorized as political terrorism as Schultz and Sloan define it, the contention that organizations have a responsibility to provide effective training seems appropriate for women's reproductive health care facilities. The data suggest that WRHCFs are already engaged in this activity.

## **LIMITATIONS**

Thankfully individual organizational crises do not occur very often. However, for crisis management researchers, this presents one of the major limitations of research on crisis management: How to assess the effectiveness of individual crisis management programs. For WRHCFs it is difficult to determine the effectiveness of their crisis management programs. If the facility has never been threatened or attacked does that mean that the program is effective? Or does it mean that the facility has not as yet been singled out by anti-abortion activists because of its location or the number of abortions performed?

Another limitation of this study is the nature of the sample. It would seem that the conclusions reached in this work would be more generalizable if the sample had included facilities located in rural areas. It is possible that rural facilities are targeted less frequently than those found in metropolitan areas because they are less visible. Conversely, it is generally accepted that rural populations tend to be more conservative than urban populations and many radical organizations locate in rural communities. As such the rural facilities may be targeted more frequently than others. Given the uncertainty of the effects of the rural/urban dichotomy, it would have been useful to include rural facilities in the sample. However, resource limitations and the difficulty of locating rural facilities precluded their inclusion.

My study is further limited by the exclusion of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. At their request the data collected from their affiliates has not been used in this work. Planned Parenthood is the most visible federation of facilities providing abortions which make it unfortunate that they have not been included in the sample. One of the generally accepted tenets of organization theory is that the

largest, most visible organizations serve as the targets of environmental pressures. Ideally the Planned Parenthood Federation of America should have been included in the sample.

While it would be interesting to test whether crisis management programs in WRHCFs support this contention, facility managers were not willing to share information about internal operations. They were concerned that the information would “get in the wrong hands” and then be misconstrued. Some facilities managers were concerned that anti-abortion activists would claim that WRHCF managers are incompetent by their own admission using the survey data to back up those claims.

This work is an initial attempt to understand the nature of crisis management programs developed in response to social activism. Much work needs to be done in expanding on this both in terms of institutional theory and refinement of the isomorphic pressures and in terms of the crisis management literature and more micro issues like leadership and cohesiveness of staff. Stay tuned for more.

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**INSERT APPENDIX 1 HERE**

**INSERT APPENDIX 2 HERE**

## **MAUREEN P. BEZOLD**

115 Eisenhower Drive  
York, PA 17402  
717-757-6543

York College of Pennsylvania  
Dept. of Business Administration  
York, PA 17405-7199  
717-846-7788 ext. 1571  
MBEZOLD@YCP.EDU

### **EDUCATION**

Ph.D. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Pamplin  
College of Business, Department of Management.  
Expected Completion : May 1997  
Major: Strategic Management/Business Ethics  
Minor: Sociology

M. S. University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, School of Business  
Administration  
Awarded August 1990.  
Major: Management  
Focus: Organization Science

B. B. A. University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, School of Business  
Administration.  
Awarded December 1983.  
Focus: Finance and Real Estate

### **TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

Aug. 1996 - Assistant professor of strategic studies. York College of  
current Pennsylvania. Department of Business Administration. Sole  
responsibility for designing and teaching undergraduate  
Business, Government, and Society course and MBA Strategic  
Management course. Teach two sections of Principles of  
Management.

Sept. 1992 - Instructor. Virginia Tech. Department of Management. Full  
May 1996 responsibility for designing and teaching of two sections of  
undergraduate Business Policy and Strategy class.

- Jan. 1988 - Graduate teaching assistant for Dr. Masoud Yasai-Ardekani.  
Aug. 1990 University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee. Sole responsibility for grading and fielding questions regarding written assignments for three sections of undergraduate Strategic Management.

## RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

### PUBLICATIONS

Bezold, Maureen P., Richard E. Wokutch, & Virginia Gerde. If its Monday, This Must be a Crisis! Forthcoming in a special issue of Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, Sandra Waddock, guest editor.

Weaver, Pamela, Suzanne Murrmann, & Maureen P. Bezold. 1994. "Hotel Selection: The Effects of Recruitment and Employment Practices on the Over 55 Market." World's Eye View on Hospitality Trends, 8(2): 18-22.

### PROCEEDINGS

Bezold, Maureen P. 1993. "Markets, Hierarchies, and Employment Discrimination: Integrating Organization Theory and Social Responsibility." In Collins, Denis (Ed.), Proceedings of the International Association for Business and Society, 332-337.

Bezold, Maureen P., & William B. Lamb. 1994. "The SIM Researcher's Responsibility: Objective Observer or Active Advocate?" In Collins, Denis (Ed.), Proceedings of the International Association for Business and Society, 585-589.

Bezold, Maureen P., & Richard E. Wokutch. 1997. Stakeholder Management, Crisis Management, and Issues Management: Complements, Supplements, or Distinctions without a Difference? Forthcoming in the Proceedings of International Association for Business and Society.

Lamb, William B., & Maureen P. Bezold. 1997. The Internet and the Social Issues Researcher: A Discussion of the Possibilities. Forthcoming in the Proceedings of the International Association for Business and Society.

Phillips, Robert A., & Maureen P. Bezold. 1996. "Organizations as the Object of Stakeholder Activism." In Logsdon, Jeanne M., & Kathleen Rehbein (Eds.), Proceedings of the International Association for Business and Society, 596-601.

## PAPERS PRESENTED

Bezold, Maureen P. "Markets, Hierarchies, and Employment Discrimination: Integrating Organization Theory and Social Responsibility." Presented at the annual meeting of the International Association for Business and Society, San Diego, CA, March 1993.

Bezold, Maureen P., & William B. Lamb. "The SIM Researcher's Responsibility: Objective Observer or Active Advocate?" Presented at the annual meeting of the International Association for Business and Society, Hilton Head Island, SC, March 1994.

Bezold, Maureen P., & Richard E. Wokutch. Stakeholder Management, Crisis Management, and Issues Management: Complements, Supplements, or Distinctions without a Difference? Presented at the annual meeting of the International Association for Business and Society, Destin, FL, March 1997.

Lamb, William B., & Maureen P. Bezold. The Internet and the Social Issues Researcher: A Discussion of the Possibilities. Presented at the annual meeting of the International Association for Business and Society, Destin, FL, March 1997.

Phillips, Robert A., & Maureen P. Bezold. "Organizations as the Object of Stakeholder Activism." Presented at the annual meeting of the International Association for Business and Society, Santa Fe, NM, March 1996.

Weaver, Pamela, Suzanne Murrmann, & Maureen P. Bezold. "The Impact of AIDS in the Workplace on Hotel Selection." Presented at the International Marketing Congress, Istanbul, Turkey, July 1993.

Weaver, Pamela, Suzanne Murrmann, & Maureen P. Bezold. "The Impact of AIDS in the Workplace on Hotel Selection." Accepted for presentation at the annual International Seminars on Tourism Development, Cairo, Egypt, May 1993. Conference canceled due to terrorist attacks against Americans.

Wokutch, Richard E., & Maureen P. Bezold. "Research and Teaching for Crisis Preparedness." Presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Cincinnati, OH, August 1996.



## CAUCUSES

Bezold, Maureen P., & William B. Lamb. "Crisis Management: Strategic Implications of Social Activism." Caucus held at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Vancouver, BC, Canada, August 1995.

## WORKS IN PROGRESS

Bezold, Maureen P. Crisis Management in Women's Reproductive Healthcare Facilities: Responding to Social Activism. Being completed for submission for presentation at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management, in 1998.

Bezold, Maureen P., & William B. Lamb. The SIM Researcher's Responsibility: Objective Observer or Active Advocate? Being revised for submission to a journal during the summer of 1997.

Bezold, Maureen P., & Richard E. Wokutch. Stakeholder Management, Crisis Management, and Issues Management: Complements, Supplements, or Distinctions without a Difference? Being revised for submission to Business and Society during the summer of 1997.

Phillips, Robert A., & Maureen P. Bezold. "Organizations as the Object of Stakeholder Activism." Being revised for submission to Business and Society during the summer of 1998.

## TEACHING INTERESTS

Business and Society/Business Ethics  
Business Policy and Strategy  
Organization Theory  
Principles of Management

## INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE

June 1990 - Administrative Assistant, Koehler & Company, and executive  
Aug. 1991 search firm, Bravell Claims Management, a prescription drug insurance claim company, and Borgardt, Scheibel & Partners, Inc., an advertising, public relations, and communications company.

May 1986 - Mortgage Loan Underwriter. First Financial Savings. Full  
July 1987 responsibility for determining mortgage loan approval and denials.

July 1985 - Mortgage Counselor. Fleet Mortgage Corporation.  
May 1986 Responsible for counseling delinquent mortgagors on options available to them for bringing mortgage current.

June 1984 - Sales Associate. Wauwatosa Realty Company. Employed  
May 1985 by the largest Realtor in Southeastern Wisconsin.

## **PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS**

International Association for Business and Society  
Academy of Management  
Society for Business Ethics  
Southern Management Association

## **COLLEGE/COMMUNITY SERVICE**

### **YORK COLLEGE OF PENNSYLVANIA**

College Representative on the Government Improvement Commission of  
York County  
College Representative with the Non-Profit Management Assistance  
Program of the York Foundation  
Member, York College Task Force on Honors  
Member, Dept. of Business Administration Admissions and Alumni Group

### **GRADUATE STUDENT ASSEMBLY, VIRGINIA TECH**

President, 1994-1995  
Office Manager, 1993-1994  
Representative, Student Legal Services Advisory Board, 1993-1995  
Representative, Commission on Graduate Studies and Policies, 1993-  
1994  
Representative, University Advisory Council on Human Concerns and  
Social Responsibility, 1992-1993.  
Community Service Coordinator, 1993-1995  
Apex Co-editor, 1993-1994

## GRADUATE HONOR SYSTEM, VIRGINIA TECH

Judicial Panel Member, 1992-1996  
Investigative Panel Member, 1995-1996

## OTHER

Retired Board Member, Voluntary Action Center of Montgomery County,  
VA

## HONORS, AWARDS, DISTINCTIONS

- 1995 Jack Hoover Award - Doctoral Student Teaching Award, conferred by the faculty, Department of Management, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
- 1995 Outstanding Graduate Student Leader, awarded by the Division of Student Affairs, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
- 1995 Outstanding Achievement Award, awarded by the Division of Student Affairs, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
- 1995 Who's Who Among Students in American Universities and Colleges
- 1994 Academy of Management Social Issues in Management Doctoral Consortium - August 1994
- 1994 Omicron Delta Kappa - National Leadership Fraternity
- 1993 Outstanding Leadership and Service Award - Graduate Student Assembly, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
- Beta Gamma Sigma - National Business Fraternity for Scholastic Achievement

## REFERENCES

Richard E. Wokutch, Professor\*  
Virginia Tech  
Pamplin College of Business  
Department of Management, Pamplin 2007  
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0233  
540-231-5084  
\*Dissertation Chair

R. Edward Freeman, Professor  
University of Virginia  
Darden Graduate School of Business Administration  
Department of Management  
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550  
804-924-0935

Dr. Thomas Goodale, Associate  
National Association of Student Personnel Administrators, Inc.  
1875 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 418  
Washington, DC 20009-5728  
202-265-7500

Donald Hatfield, Assistant Professor  
Virginia Tech  
Pamplin College of Business  
Department of Management, Pamplin 2007  
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0233  
540-231-6353

Leonard Peters, Vice Provost for Research and Dean of the Graduate School  
Virginia Tech  
Research Division, 306 Burruss  
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0244  
540-231-6077