

**Revitalization of an Historically Black College:
A Maryland Eastern Shore Case**

by

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(ABSTRACT)

This study comprises a multi-faceted case study of the growth and development of the University of Maryland Eastern Shore (UMES), with an emphasis on the leadership of Chancellor William T. Hytche during his tenure from 1975 to 1995. The study takes into account the complex, dynamic, and interrelated internal and external forces that led to the survival and subsequent development of UMES. An attempt was made to describe the relationship of Chancellor Hytche's leadership behavior and the resolution of critical problems affecting the growth and development of UMES during his period as chancellor.

The University of Maryland Eastern Shore is an historically black university that has been able to overcome its historical and environmental roadblocks and situate itself squarely in the mainstream of higher education, even though, like other small historically black colleges, UMES faced an uncertain future. Historically black colleges and

universities (HBCUs) are among America's most valuable resources, but for more than 130 years, these institutions of higher learning had to overcome the obstacles of limited financial and structural resources to provide quality education to hundreds of thousands of Americans of all races and socioeconomic strata.

The literature on historically black colleges is limited and significantly devoid of research in the area of black college leadership. The majority of the research on black colleges focuses on issues such as student recruitment, the lack of black males, black college culture, and the effect of court decisions on desegregation and affirmative action.

This research utilized the case study method. It can be characterized as primarily a descriptive case study, in that it describes the key events affecting the evolution of UMES, key events that influenced Hytche's decisions as chancellor of UMES, and also those key events directly initiated by Chancellor Hytche. Case study research is holistic, providing researchers with descriptions of total phenomena. According to Robert K. Yin, in Case Study Research: Design and Methods, "A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (p. 13)."

In each of the identified critical events during Hytche's tenure as chancellor, the researcher describes and analyzes the overall vision and strategy used by Hytche. Internal and external relationships that were established or fostered (e.g. "town and gown," political, and faculty) are explored to determine their effect on the growth and development of the institution.

It is postulated that Hytche's effective leadership of UMES was a significant contributing factor to its success. Among the most significant findings of the study was the fact that UMES had failed to flourish in the absence of strong advocacy, and its fortunes only changed when State leadership in higher education changed. This case illustrates a situation in which major cultural and political issues were at stake (in this instance, the segregation of Maryland's institutions of higher learning), and in which institutional and systems leaders within the state had limited ability to shape events affecting their dependent institutions. However, when those prevailing political and cultural values were challenged by a powerful, controlling outside authority (in this case, the Federal judiciary), the resulting stalemate and accompanying chaos offered those same institutional and system leaders an opportunity to influence subsequent events, particularly if they act in concert, which in this case was found to be the combination of Hytche and the president of the University of Maryland System.

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Chapter I

Introduction

Historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) are among America's most valuable resources. For more than 130 years, these institutions of higher learning have overcome the obstacles of limited financial and structural resources to provide quality education to hundreds of thousands of Americans of all races and socioeconomic strata (USED, 1989). Black colleges since the 1970's have received a greater share of available resources. Yet, there are still black colleges failing and on the brink of demise, and one has to question why more are not flourishing. Perhaps one of the reasons is the quality of leadership of black colleges and universities.

The University of Maryland Eastern Shore (UMES) is an historically black university that has been able to overcome its historical and environmental roadblocks and situate itself squarely in the mainstream of higher education, although, like other small black colleges (enrollments less than 1000), UMES faced an uncertain future in 1975. At that time, UMES had a shrinking budget, no endowment, facilities greatly in need of repair, and a faculty with less than 50 percent having terminal degrees. Yet, twenty years later, this study will show that UMES has been able to overcome its historical and environmental roadblocks and is squarely in the mainstream of higher education.

Prior to 1978, UMES had not had a new program added to its curriculum since 1945. Today, UMES offers 35 Bachelor's degrees, 7 Master's degrees, and 2 Doctoral

degrees to a full-time graduate and undergraduate enrollment of approximately 3,000 students. The institution's enrollment has more than tripled since 1975. Included in its curriculum now are majors in Engineering, Physical Therapy, Hotel and Restaurant Management, Computer Science, Marine-Estuarine and Environmental Science, Construction Management, Toxicology, Business and Accounting. Also, the institution has added pre-professional programs in pre-law, pre-medicine, pre-nursing, pre-pharmacy, and pre-veterinary science, as well as an Honors Program designed in cooperation with the University of Maryland at Baltimore to prepare students for professional school study.

Between 1985 and 1995, the institution has spent approximately 51 million dollars in capital projects to expand, restore, and revitalize the campus. Contract and grant award monies have grown from literally nothing in 1975 to over 11 million dollars for the 1995 academic year. Regarding the faculty, over 81% have terminal degrees. Finally, UMES has been able to establish some contractual ties with several major universities on some international projects, and it has been the lead institution on other international projects, particularly in Africa.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this research was to study and analyze the leadership of UMES, taking into account the complex, dynamic, and interrelated internal and external forces that led to its survival and subsequent development. The focus of this study will be, specifically, the leadership provided by William T. Hytche, chancellor of UMES during

the period of this study 1975 to 1995. It is important to note that Hytche's title changed from chancellor to president during the span of this study. Each time there was a statewide reorganization of higher education the leaders titles changed. From 1975 to 1988, Hytche's title was Chancellor and from 1988 to 1995 his title was President. Although Hytche's title changed, he will be referred to throughout this study as Chancellor.

Hytche was selected as Acting Chancellor of UMES in 1975, and it is postulated that his effective leadership at UMES was a significant contributing factor to its success. This research comprises a multi-faceted single case study of the growth and development of UMES since 1975, and further, the leadership of Hytche is studied and described from the period of 1975 to 1995. In this study, an attempt was made to determine the relationship of Chancellor Hytche's leadership behavior and the resolution of critical problems affecting the growth and development of UMES during his tenure as chancellor. In each of the critical events in the growth and development of the institution since 1975, the researcher will describe and analyze the overall vision and strategy used by Hytche. Internal and external relationships that were established or fostered (e.g. "town and gown," political, and faculty) will be explored to determine their effect on the growth and development of the institution. Finally, the study will reflect on the implications for leaders at similar institutions that are struggling for survival.

This study is guided by the following research questions:

1. What were the events/conditions preceding Hytche's tenure?

2. What were the critical events/conditions during Hytche's tenure?
3. What was the nature of Hytche's leadership behavior in the context of the critical decisions that were made during his tenure?
4. What alternatives did Hytche have and what was the nature of the resources he used?
5. Can the survival and subsequent growth and development of UMES be attributed to Hytche, or did he just happen to be in the right place and the right time, or is he just prolonging the merger of UMES?

The Need for the Study

The literature on historically black colleges is limited and significantly devoid of research in the area of black college leadership. The majority of the research on black colleges focuses on issues such as student recruitment, the lack of black males, black college culture, and the affect of court decisions on desegregation and affirmative action. However, much has been written about black college pioneers such as Mary McLeod Bethune, Booker T. Washington, and Benjamin Mayes. With HBCUs still being the only choice for many black youth who desire a college education, more research needs to be conducted on the leadership of these important institutions.

Significance of the Study

The importance of historically black colleges was highlighted by an Executive Order signed by former President Ronald Reagan (1981). In the introduction to the Executive Order President Reagan stated, “Historically, black colleges have enriched our nation in the past, and I just have to believe that their future will be even brighter. Let us look to the years ahead; to the vital role that these colleges will play in training young Americans for full lives in traditional fields, and of the new and limitless frontiers of science, technology, and space. “

The results of this study are significant for several reasons:

1. This study will provide lessons in management for leaders of black and other small colleges.
2. This study will be a beginning in filling the void in the research on black leadership.
3. This study will provide the Federal government and accrediting agencies with an example of how a successful black college has responded to critical events that may have affected its eligibility for funding or accreditation.

Do Presidents Make a Difference

There are mixed opinions on whether or not the president makes a difference if a college grows and develops or collapses. Burns (1978), Bass (1985), Fisher (1988) and

others reflect the conventional wisdom that presidents make a difference in the survival or growth of an institution. The evidence offered by the performance of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the political field, Lee Iacocco in the industrial world, and Charles Eliot, Ezra White and Booker T. Washington of the academic community suggest that some presidents make a difference.

Burns (1978) reported that it is the exercise of leadership through persuasion and compromise rather than exercise of "naked power" that can have the most comprehensive and lasting influence as measured by real change. He has maintained that the prior statement is true because leaders who motivate followers and other leaders at all levels of movements and organizations are able to exploit the massed social energies of all persons consciously involved in a joint effort.

Peters and Waterman (1982) and Iacocco (1986) have shown in the eighties prime examples of Burns contention that leadership has comprehensive and causal influence. Peters and Waterman's study of the characteristics of America's best run companies has as its central theme the ability of the leadership to get its followers totally committed to a common purpose or goal. Iacocco's work about his struggle to return the Chrysler Corporation to a dominant force in the industry, has as its central theme a leader who is able to gain the commitment and respect of his followers as they rally around a common goal. Additionally, Peters and Waterman (1982) stated that the one striking feature of an excellent company is its ability to manage ambiguity and paradox.

Fisher (1988), Cowley (1980) and Kauffman (1984) reported that a president's ability to provide effective, empowering leadership is the key element in an institution's success or failure. According to Fisher, Tack and Wheeler's (1988) study on the effective college president, higher education's survival is dependent upon finding effective leaders for American's institutions. Their research identified the following characteristics as a profile of an effective college president:

- *Less collegial and more distant
- *Less likely to be spontaneous in speech and actions
- *Less restricted by organizational structure or by the consensus of those to be led
- * Less likely to appear to make decisions easily
- *More confident
- *More inclined to rely on gaining respect than on being liked
- *More inclined to take calculated risks
- *More committed to an ideal or a vision than to an institution
- *More inclined to work long hours
- *More supportive of the controversial concept of merit pay
- *More interested in encouraging people to think differently and creatively

*More likely to be concerned about higher education in general than one institution

However, Cohen and March (1974 and 1986), Perrow (1970) and Tolstoy (1958) have stated that leadership does not make a difference. According to Tolstoy, Napoleon was the most dominant leader of the nineteenth century, yet, he was not the cause of the turmoil in Europe. He postulated that the social movements were caused by all the people involved, and a leader's actions were determined by events.

Cohen and March's (1974 and 1986) studies of the college presidency supported the Tolstoyan view of leadership. Essentially, their major conclusion was that the position of college president was one of impotence, with larger social forces influencing the institution and college presidents playing largely ceremonial roles. Accordingly, Cohen and March maintain that decision-making in the university results extensively from a process which diffuses problems and choices and makes the president's role more sporadic and symbolic than significant. A president's contributions are easily overshadowed by outside forces or the diffuse qualities of university decision-making.

Cohen and March have described the role of the college presidency in the context of identifying colleges and universities as "organized anarchies." An organized anarchy exhibits the following general properties:

1. Problematic goals. The goals of the organization are vague or in dispute. It can be best described as a loose collection of changing ideas.

2. Unclear technology. Although the organization manages to survive and produce, it does not understand its own processes. Instead it operates on the basis of a simple set of trial and error procedures.
3. Fluid participation, Its major participants wander in and out of the organization and as a result, standard theories of power and choice seem to be inadequate; and the boundaries of the organization appear to be uncertain and changing.

Finally, Cohen and March reported that the ambiguities of leadership in an organized anarchy require a leader who thinks of himself as trying to do good rather than trying to satisfy a political or bureaucratic audience; he would be better advised to define his role in terms of the modest part he can play in making the college slightly better in the long run than in terms of satisfying current residents of solving current problems. In essence, Cohen and March concluded that the college president has some influence over events, but little magic. Presidents can act with a fair degree of confidence that if they make a mistake, it will not matter much (p. 205).

Perrow (1970) has flatly stated that one cannot explain organizations by explaining the attitudes and behavior of the individuals and small groups with them. He maintains that manipulating the structure, analyzing the goals, and grasping the nature of the environment are more practical and efficient ways of dealing with organizational problems than trying to change human behavior directly. Perrow reported organizational leaders or college presidents must first determine whether the structure of the

organization is appropriate for the tasks being demanded. Even if the structure is appropriate, it can be adjusted to compensate for particular human qualities. Therefore, according to Perrow, it is an organization's structure rather than its leadership which makes a greater difference in an organization's growth or failure.

Baldrige (1971) and Pfeffer (1978) stated that the growth and development of an organization depends on various coalitions, their interests and preferences. Essentially, these different groups in an organization are the primary decision-makers as reflected in their resources and power.

Chapter II

Methodology

The Case Study Research Method

The research employed the case study method as a comprehensive strategy for addressing the complexity of the context that has influenced the evolution of the University of Maryland Eastern Shore (UMES) and in particular, the challenges faced by Chancellor Hytche in overcoming UMES' difficulties. This research can be characterized as primarily a descriptive case study, in that it describes the changes that occurred during the evolution of UMES, and in doing so, attempts to account for those changes by examining the leadership behavior of the administration of UMES, with emphasis on the leadership behavior of Chancellor Hytche. According to Robert K. Yin, in Case Study Research: Design and Methods, "A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. In other words, you would use the case study method because you deliberately wanted to cover contextual conditions -- believing that they would be highly pertinent to your phenomenon of study"(p. 13). Goetz and LeCompte (1984) report that case study research is holistic, providing researchers with descriptions of total phenomena. The case study method enabled the

researcher to navigate complex situations and to identify and describe the leadership behavior of Hytche during his tenure at UMES.

The Unit of Analysis

In beginning case study research, it is first necessary to identify the case study's unit of analysis, which may be an individual, a group, a program, an event, or other topics that can be defined. The unit of analysis can be considered to be the case under investigation (p. 22). In this research, the administration of UMES was used as "the unit of analysis," with particular consideration given to Chancellor Hytche's role in the evolution of the institution. This unit of analysis was examined within the wider context of political, social, and historical conditions, including the history of the development of UMES as an institution. UMES was chosen over other HBCUs as the institution to study for the following reasons:

1. The University has successfully overcome its apparently inevitable demise and is now in the mainstream of higher education.
2. President Hytche was willing to open himself up and make his records and staff available for the study.
3. UMES was reasonably convenient to the researcher.

Data Collection

Three principles of data collection can be identified as being beneficial to case study research. These are: 1) the use of multiple sources of evidence; 2) the creation of a case study database; and 3) maintaining a chain of evidence (Yin, p. 90).

1. For this research, the data included interviews, observations, documents and other printed material including faculty senate meeting minutes, the University's annual budget, accreditation self-study reports, and the researcher's impressions and judgments recorded in field notes. All interviews were tape-recorded; the tapes were transcribed by the researcher, and then grouped thematically. Typically, the case study "relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion. . ." (p. 13). "With triangulation, the potential problems of construct validity can also be addressed, because the multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon" (p. 92). In this study there was a multiplicity of data sources, and triangulation was used to cross-validate and assess the accuracy of data.

2. The case study database consists of two components: the data that is collected during the documentation phase of the research, and then the investigator's report (p. 94), which is represented in this study by the dissertation produced here. "Every report should. . . contain enough data so that the reader of the report can draw independent conclusions" (p. 94-95). The database primarily consisted of the researcher's notes, and

also included the documents mentioned above. This material was analyzed and grouped into categories, which became the chapters of this research and subsets of topics within the chapters.

3. The principle of maintaining a chain of evidence refers to allowing "an external observer -- the reader of the case study, for example -- to follow the derivation of the evidence from initial research questions to ultimate case study conclusions" (p. 98). In this study, specific documents were cited as they occurred in the text. Citations included the circumstances under which interviews were conducted, and the derivation of reports used as data. Thus, it should be possible for the reader to evaluate the integrity of the data and identify the link between the initial data and the study questions.

Data Analysis

According to Yin, the case study is particularly appropriate for addressing "how" and "why" questions. The assumption postulated in the first chapter of this research was that Hytche's effective leadership was a significant contributing factor to the success of UMES. The focus of this research is on "how" Hytche was able to achieve UMES' dramatic turn-around.

An effective analytical strategy is that of developing "a descriptive framework for organizing the case study (p. 104)." It was necessary to collect, organize, and analyze material that would articulate the context of the study, and then to focus on Hytche's decisions within that context. The study report begins with an historical overview of the

origin and development of black colleges in America. Once that groundwork was in place, it was then reasonable to present the background of the University of Maryland Eastern Shore. Added to the context in which Hytche functioned as Chancellor were the political antecedents of higher education in Maryland. The Chapter, "Hytche: The Vision," begins with Hytche's professional history and then describes the challenges he faced as Chancellor of UMES, including the civil rights movement, the proposed merger with Salisbury State, the lack of financial support for UMES, and the raising of academic standards at UMES. The next chapter, "The Strategy," presents a description of the strategies used by Hytche in achieving the success of UMES. This material has been organized into eight thematic areas, which include 1) the work force: collaboration; 2) faculty recruitment; 3) advisory council: community involvement; 4) honors program; 5) costs; 6) student recruitment; 7) research, and; 8) the UMES/SSU agreement. The concluding chapter describes policy and legal precedents in Maryland as they affected the future of UMES, and presents the conclusions that can be drawn from this research as they might affect decision-making at other institutions.

Chapter III

Black Colleges: An Historical Overview of their Origin and Development

Bowles and DeCosta (1971) reported that the development of black colleges may be divided into four time periods. The periods are (1) Pre Civil War, (2) Civil War to 1895, (3) 1896 to 1953, and (4) 1954 to present. Prior to the Civil War only 28 black students had been awarded degrees in the United States. Moreover, only two colleges for blacks had been founded: Lincoln University (1854) and Wilberforce University (1856) (Bowles and DeCosta).

Although only 28 blacks had been awarded degrees during the antebellum period, many blacks had participated in apprenticeship training, teacher training, training abroad, self-education, and nondegree courses. However, it was not until the restoration of the Union in 1865 that a greater awareness of the educational needs of blacks was realized. After the Civil War there were approximately five million freed men without a formal system of education. Northern missionary groups had exclusively provided blacks with elementary education until 1865. President Lincoln in 1865 signed the act which established the Freedmen's Bureau. The Bureau was established to provide relief for blacks and refugees, yet, according to Bowles and DeCosta, the Bureau developed an elaborate organization for elementary education throughout the South. Thus, with the federal government now directing its attention to elementary education for black students,

missionary and church groups redirected their efforts into developing colleges for blacks (Bowles and DeCosta, 1971).

From 1865 to 1890 the American Missionary Association, Baptists, Methodists and Presbyterians, along with the Freedmen's Bureau founded 41 black colleges and universities. Of these 41 institutions, twenty-six were privately controlled. Bowles and DeCosta reported that although these colleges were largely elementary and secondary schools, it is estimated that by 1895 they had produced 1,151 college graduates. It must be noted that elementary and secondary programs were required in black colleges as preparatory to the college programs (Bowles and DeCosta).

Although 15 public black colleges were founded prior to 1890, only two of them were listed as colleges and universities. The other 15 were listed as normal or industrial schools, in 1890. The remaining black public colleges were established as a result of the Second Morrill Act of August 30, 1890. These were land-grant colleges established as non-degree-granting institutions offering agricultural, mechanical and industrial education. Most of the black private colleges provided the bulk of higher education for blacks prior to the 1930s (Bowles and DeCosta).

Philanthropy

Any discussion of the development of black colleges also must involve a brief discussion of philanthropy by Northern industrialists. The Peabody Fund, established in 1867, focused the majority of its attention on establishing permanent systems of public

education in the South for both whites and blacks. Bowles and DeCosta (1971) reported that although there is no complete record of the Fund's direct assistance to black colleges, some reference is made to small contributions to individual colleges to assist them with their normal school and teacher-training scholarship programs.

The John F. Slater Fund was established in 1882 specifically for the education of blacks. Bullock (1967) reported that the Slater Fund had two primary objectives: (1) to provide more normal and industrial work in black schools and colleges (modeled after Hampton and Tuskegee); and (2) to establish black county training schools throughout the South.

According to Bullock, the Anna T. Jeanes Fund began as a result of the problem of neglected school supervision for rural black schools. Many of these rural school programs had been started by black colleges such as Hampton and Tuskegee. In 1937 the Slater Fund merged with the Negro Rural School Fund or Anna T. Jeanes Foundation, to form the Southern Education Foundation. The Southern Education Foundation devoted the majority of its resources to the earlier work of the Jeanes Fund; supervision of black schools in the South by individuals called Jeanes Teachers (Bowles and DeCosta, 1971).

In 1917, Julius Rosenwald established a fund first to build rural schools; later, toward the support of high schools and colleges and finally toward the provisions of fellowships to enable blacks and whites of unusual promise to advance their careers. The Rosenwald Fund had far-reaching effects on every aspect of education for blacks. Concerning higher education, the Fund provided support to develop "university centers"

for the education of black professionals. Grants were provided for summer institutes for teachers, preachers, and agricultural workers. Funding for libraries, administration and classroom buildings was also provided (Bullock, 1967).

The General Education Board founded by John D. Rockefeller in 1902 had contributed approximately \$63 million to the education of blacks by 1964. Most of these funds were contributed to black colleges for items such as endowment, buildings, current expenses, teachers' salaries, medical education, libraries, teacher training, and fellowships and scholarships (Bowles and DeCosta, 1971). According to Bowles and DeCosta the General Education Board was the largest direct philanthropic contributor to black colleges during the period 1896-1953.

Black Higher Education and the Courts

Several authors have referred to the period between 1896 to 1953 as the "separate but equal" period of education. The initial case against the segregation of black and white students was the Roberts case of 1850. Benjamin Roberts attempted to enroll his daughter in a white primary school in Boston, Massachusetts. His daughter was denied admission; subsequent legal action resulted in the courts upholding the school's decision to deny black students admission into white schools. This case essentially created the "separate but equal" doctrine. Consequently, the Plessy v. Ferguson case of 1896, which dealt with the segregation of railroad passengers, was significant in its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court determined that the existence of separate but equal facilities for blacks and whites was not in violation of the equal protection clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the "separate but equal" doctrine was embraced by the Supreme Court and its decision laid the groundwork for Jim Crow laws which had great impact not only on education but every aspect of American society (Alexander and Solomon, 1972).

According to Bowles and DeCosta (1971), numerous court cases were prosecuted relating to the education of blacks in the South between 1896 and 1953. Cases settled up to about 1930 were settled by the courts largely on the basis of the "separate but equal" doctrine. Beginning about 1930; and extending to about 1945, the NAACP began to attack the "equal" aspect of the doctrine, particularly as it related to graduate and professional education of blacks in the South.

Alexander and Solomon (1972) reported that although the doctrine was "separate but equal," little had been done by the courts to establish what constituted "equal." Most southern states did not provide separate facilities for blacks at the graduate or professional levels. Southern states usually made scholarships available to black students to attend graduate or professional schools outside the state. In 1936 a black student in the state of Maryland challenged the "separate but equal" doctrine when he was denied admission to the University of Maryland Law School. The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled in favor of the student and directed the state to admit him into the law school. Two years later, in 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court had to face the definition of "equal" in the *Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada* case. The issue was whether the University of Missouri was required to accept a black into the University's law school. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the

student. Thus, the Gaines case had established the minimal parameters, that equal facilities must be offered within the state (Alexander and Solomon, 1972).

However, it soon became evident that states were not financially equipped to provide blacks with "separate but equal" education at either the undergraduate or graduate levels. In the Texas case of *Sweatt v. Painter* (1950), a separate law school was created, but the black student refused to attend, claiming that the school was not equal to the University of Texas Law School to which he had sought admission. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the student after determining that the facilities, faculty, library books, etc., were not equal. This was the court's first attempt to define the term equal. In the subsequent case of *McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education* (1950), the Supreme Court expanded equal protection to require equal treatment of blacks once they were actually enrolled in a white school (Alexander and Solomon, 1972).

Finally, after numerous court cases, studies, books, etc., the entire "separate but equal" doctrine would be challenged in the 1954 Brown cases. A total of five cases, from four states and the District of Columbia were collectively called the Brown I cases. The Supreme Court ruled that in the field of public education, the doctrine of "separate but equal" had no place and that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal (Alexander and Solomon, 1972). To address the issue of how to make desegregation work, the Supreme Court decided, in the case commonly referred to as Brown II (1955), that desegregation should be accomplished with "all deliberate speed." Thus, black

colleges have had a relatively short history of being able to legally compete for equal resources.

Black Colleges: 1954 to the Present

By 1954, black private colleges had developed into full-fledged colleges. All of the students enrolled were high school graduates, except in several cases where elementary or secondary schools were operated as practice schools for teacher education students. Furthermore, by 1954, 39 of the 54 four-year private colleges were accredited by regional associations (Bowles and DeCosta, 1971).

There had been marked improvement among the private black colleges by 1954. According to Bowles and DeCosta, significant improvement had been made with respect to administration and organization; preparation of faculty; endowment and other sources of income; supporting instructional services such as library holdings and science laboratories; and other physical expansion. Bowles and DeCosta attributed these improvements to the presidents of the individual colleges, yet, they believed the greatest influence should be attributed to the regional accrediting associations, particularly the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. As a result of on-site evaluations and the colleges' individual self-study reports, the accrediting associations were able to make recommendations concerning the governance, curriculum, administration, organization, fundraising, instructional methods, etc.

By 1950 black public colleges had overtaken black private colleges in the enrollment of black students. Bowles and DeCosta cite three reasons for the shift of black student enrollment:

1. Black public colleges' tuition was more economical.
2. Jobs were provided by the National Youth Administration, thus making it advantageous for black youth to attend public institutions rather than private ones.
3. Black public colleges were becoming competitive with black private colleges on the basis of program offerings and their quality.

In comparing black public colleges to black private colleges, Bowles and DeCosta reported that by 1954 the public colleges had developed into full-fledged degree-granting institutions as well. By 1954, 32 black public colleges had become regionally accredited. Like the private colleges, significant improvement had been made by black public colleges by 1954 as a result of individual leaders and the regional accrediting associations.

With legal segregation ending in 1954, employment opportunities began to expand for blacks, and black colleges changed their curriculum in order to prepare their students for the new career opportunities. In addition to the institutional curriculum changes, there was tremendous growth in enrollment until 1980. Growths in enrollment

and curriculum expansion in the 1960's were symbolic of the increasing demand for and support for higher education in the United States.

Hill (1985) reported that the largest increases in enrollment occurred at black colleges during the early 1970's. Perhaps the growth can be attributed to reduced barriers to higher education; including student financial aid programs (e.g., BEOG or Pell Grants, SEOG, NDL, etc.).

From 1970 to 1980, student enrollment in HBCUs increased from about 170,000 to 233,557 (27%). Of this increase of 66,000 students 45,000 were in public 4-year HBCUs. Table I shows that from 1980 to 1990 enrollment increased from 233,557 to 257,152 (10%). Of this increase of 23,600 students, 16,800 were in public 4-year HBCUs. Private 4-year HBCUs enrollment increased by 18% between 1970 and 1990. Conversely, private 2-year HBCUs lost 40% of their enrollment from 1970 to 1990 (NCES, 1996).

Table 1. ----- Fall Enrollment in Historically Black Colleges and Universities, by Type and Control: Selected Years From 1970 to 1994

Year	Total enrolled	Public inst. total	Public four-year	Public two-year	Private inst. total	Private four-year	Private two-year
1970	170,000	114,000	109,500	4,500	56,000	53,500	2,500
1975	213,000	149,000	141,000	8,000	65,000	61,800	3,200
1980	233,557	168,217	155,085	13,132	65,340	62,924	2,416
1985	225,801	163,677	150,002	13,675	62,124	60,646	1,478
1990	257,152	187,046	171,969	15,077	70,106	68,528	1,578
1994	280,071	206,520	187,735	18,785	73,551	72,262	1,289

Source: U. S. Department of Education , National Center for Education Statistics, “Historically Black Colleges and Universities 1976-1994” and “The Traditionally Black Institutions of Higher Education 1860 to 1982.”

The early 1980's began with a slight decline in overall enrollment growth. For example, from 1980 to 1982 total HBCUs' enrollment declined from 233,557 to 228,371, a change of 2 percent. Hill maintains that much of the decline in total enrollment can be attributed to a drop in freshman enrollment. There were 54,940 freshmen enrolled in 1980, while only 48,610 enrolled in 1982, a decline of 12 percent (Hill). Additionally, this subsequent decline and stabilization of enrollments at black colleges during the early 1980's was marked by intense competition for the best and brightest black students by the majority institutions (NAFEO, 1986).

U.S. Department of Education statistics indicate that enrollments at HBCUs decreased from 233,557 in 1980 to 223,275 by the fall of 1986. The enrollment trend since 1986 has been a steady increase, as evidenced by the 1989 total enrollment of 249,096. NAFEO (1995) reported that some of the increase in enrollment at HBCUs could be attributed to changes in the curriculum and a lack of adequate support mechanisms at majority institutions. Thus, the 1980's were characterized by an early decline, followed by stabilization and some growth. Enrollment in the 1990's has been on a continuous increase from a fall enrollment in 1990 of 257,152 to a fall 1994 enrollment of 280,071. Finally, the most dynamic increase in enrollment at HBCUs has been in the number of women students which has increased from 117,944 in 1976 to 166,055 in 1994 (29%). The enrollment of men at HBCUs has increased from 104,669 in 1976 to 114,006 in 1994 (9%)(See Tables 2 and 3) (NCES, 1996).

Table 2 -----	All Institutions					Public 4 -year		Public 2-year		Private 4 -year		Private 2-year	
	Year	Total	Men	%	Women	%	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1976	222,613	104,669	47.0	117,944	53.0	66,122	77,406	7,664	5,644	29,514	33,634	1,369	1,260
1977	226,062	104,178	46.1	121,884	53.9	66,405	79,045	6,843	6,530	29,554	34,894	1,376	1,415
1978	227,797	104,216	45.7	123,581	54.3	68,034	82,134	6,933	6,136	27,767	33,716	1,482	1,595
1979	230,124	105,494	45.8	124,630	54.2	69,555	83,584	7,058	6,118	27,535	33,473	1,346	1,455
1980	233,557	106,387	45.6	127,170	54.4	70,236	84,849	6,758	6,374	28,352	34,572	1,041	1,375
1981	232,460	106,033	45.6	126,427	54.4	69,992	84,277	6,731	5,991	28,154	34,729	1,156	1,430
1982	228,371	104,897	45.9	123,474	54.1	69,033	82,439	7,765	6,634	27,216	33,329	883	1,072
1983	234,446	106,884	45.6	127,562	54.4	70,522	85,143	7,325	7,061	28,243	34,001	794	1,357
1984	227,519	102,823	45.2	124,696	54.8	68,393	82,896	6,313	6,514	27,431	34,124	686	1,162
1985	225,801	100,698	44.6	125,103	55.4	66,695	83,307	6,833	6,842	26,587	34,059	583	895
1986	223,275	97,523	43.7	125,752	56.3	64,086	83,545	6,859	7,558	26,021	33,579	557	1,070
1987	227,994	97,085	42.6	130,909	57.4	63,926	86,634	7,199	7,727	25,501	35,593	459	955
1988	239,755	100,561	41.9	139,194	58.1	66,097	92,509	6,772	8,294	27,216	37,425	473	966
1989	249,096	102,484	41.1	146,612	58.9	68,383	98,098	6,319	8,351	27,284	39,125	498	1,038
1990	257,152	105,157	40.9	151,995	59.1	70,220	101,749	6,321	8,756	28,054	40,474	562	1,016
1991	269,335	110,442	41.0	158,893	59.0	74,650	107,554	6,477	9,166	28,767	41,122	548	1,051
1992	279,541	114,622	41.0	164,919	59.0	77,207	110,554	6,972	9,851	29,935	43,011	508	1,121
1993	282,856	116,397	41.2	166,459	58.8	77,823	111,209	8,091	11,074	30,028	43,370	455	806
1994	280,071	114,006	40.7	166,065	59.3	76,654	111,081	7,778	11,007	29,108	43,154	466	823

Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics (February 1996)

Table 3-----Fall Enrollment in historically black colleges and universities, by type and control of institutions: 1976 to 1994

Year	Total Enrolled	Type of Institution		Public Institutions			Private Institutions		
		2-year	4-year	Total	4-year	2-year	Total	4-year	2-year
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1976	222,613	206,676	15,937	156,836	143,528	13,308	65,777	63,148	2,629
1977	226,062	209,898	16,164	158,823	145,450	13,373	67,239	64,448	2,791
1978	227,797	211,651	16,146	163,237	150,168	13,069	64,560	61,483	3,077
1979	230,124	214,147	15,977	166,315	153,139	13,176	63,809	61,008	2,801
1980	233,557	218,009	15,548	168,217	155,085	13,132	65,340	62,924	2,416
1981	232,460	217,152	15,308	166,991	154,269	12,722	65,469	62,883	2,586
1982	228,371	212,017	16,354	165,871	151,472	14,399	62,500	60,545	1,955
1983	234,446	217,909	16,537	170,051	155,665	14,386	64,395	62,244	2,151
1984	227,519	212,844	14,675	164,116	151,289	12,827	63,403	61,555	1,848
1985	225,801	210,648	15,153	163,677	150,002	13,675	62,124	60,646	1,478
1986	223,275	207,231	16,044	162,048	147,631	14,417	61,227	59,600	1,627
1987	227,994	211,654	16,340	165,486	150,560	14,926	62,508	61,094	1,414
1988	239,755	223,250	16,505	173,672	158,606	15,066	66,083	64,644	1,439
1989	249,096	232,890	16,206	181,151	166,481	14,670	67,945	66,409	1,536
1990	257,152	240,497	16,655	187,046	171,969	15,077	70,106	68,528	1,578
1991	269,335	252,093	17,242	197,847	182,204	15,643	71,488	69,889	1,599
1992	279,541	261,089	18,452	204,966	188,143	16,823	74,575	72,946	1,629
1993	282,856	262,430	20,246	208,197	189,032	19,165	74,659	73,398	1,261
1994	280,071	259,997	20,074	206,520	187,735	18,785	73,551	72,262	1,289

Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics (February 1996)

The number of bachelor's and higher degrees conferred by HBCUs increased significantly between 1954 and 1974. HBCU's awarded over 13,000 degrees in 1954 and almost 32,000 in 1974. However, since 1974, the number of degrees awarded by HBCUs had only slightly increased to 33,637 by 1994 (See Table 4) (NCES, 1996).

Table---4 Degrees conferred by historically black colleges and universities, by level of degree and sex of students: 1976-77 to 1993-94

Year	Associate			Bachelor's			Master's			Doctor's			First-professional		
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
1976-77	2,753	1,283	1,470	23,551	10,201	13,350	6,150	2,421	3,729	66	42	24	731	567	164
1977-78	2,601	1,190	1,411	23,631	10,210	13,421	6,024	2,341	3,683	73	42	31	747	553	194
1978-79	2,465	1,011	1,454	23,649	10,067	13,582	5,440	2,103	3,337	83	56	27	801	586	215
1979-80	2,574	1,105	1,469	23,469	9,906	13,563	4,809	1,814	2,995	71	48	23	826	583	243
1980-81	2,635	1,101	1,534	22,922	10,142	12,780	4,622	1,865	2,757	102	65	37	883	620	263
1981-82	2,580	1,128	1,452	22,279	9,737	12,542	4,477	1,768	2,709	87	59	28	887	571	316
1982-83	2,482	1,024	1,458	22,205	9,675	12,530	4,491	1,872	2,619	135	89	46	866	552	314
1983-84	2,386	962	1,424	21,430	9,383	12,047	4,129	1,791	2,338	118	74	44	913	565	248
1984-85	2,691	1,085	1,606	20,887	9,188	11,699	4,190	1,791	2,399	174	106	68	962	592	370
1985-86	2,639	963	1,676	20,799	9,195	11,604	4,016	1,730	2,286	182	99	83	1008	595	413
1986-87	2,614	1,014	1,600	20,291	8,838	11,453	4,012	1,584	2,428	194	105	89	878	544	334
1987-88	2,559	952	1,607	19,914	8,215	11,699	4,056	1,616	2,440	204	113	91	841	482	359
1988-89	2,526	963	1,563	19,748	7,895	11,853	3,916	1,477	2,439	190	105	85	843	493	350
1989-90	2,489	916	1,573	19,914	7,851	12,063	4,036	1,494	2,542	207	105	102	820	489	331
1990-91	2,664	893	1,771	21,624	8,148	13,479	4,145	1,461	2,684	200	118	82	812	464	348
1991-92	2,560	855	1,705	23,579	8,822	14,757	4,222	1,472	2,750	205	105	100	756	424	332
1992-93	2,805	1,047	1,758	26,140	9,764	16,376	4,612	1,614	2,995	219	94	125	966	500	466
1993-94	2,830	984	1,846	27,425	10,249	17,176	4,986	1,640	3,316	213	105	108	1013	522	491

Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics (November, 1995)

The greatest shift in the curriculum occurred between 1982 and 1993. There were substantial increases in the percent of degrees awarded in education, social science, the letters and mathematics disciplines (See Table 5). All of these disciplines had suffered substantial decreases between 1972 and 1982. It was during this period that enrollments at HBCUs were declining.

**Table 5-----Percent of Degrees Awarded by HBCUs to Blacks in the Education and
Social Sciences Disciplines: 1972, 1982 and 1993**

Percent of total degrees awarded			
Selected discipline divisions	1972	1982	1993
Education	35	17	38
Social sciences	22	11	25
Letters	5	2	26
Mathematics	3	2	44

Hill, Susan T. (1985). *The Traditionally Black Institutions of Higher Education 1960 to 1982*, USED/NCES. Hoffman, Charlene M. (1996). *Historically Black Colleges and Universities 1976-1994*, USED/NCES.

Table 6-----Percent of Degrees Awarded to Blacks by HBCUs in Other

Disciplines: 1972 and 1982

Selected discipline divisions	Percent of total degrees awarded		
	1972	1982	1993
Business and Management	15	26	30.3
Engineering	2	7	25.4
Public Affairs and Services	2	7	26.5
Health Professions	2	4	18.9
Psychology	3	4	24.4
Communications	*	3	26.9
Computer and Information Systems	*	2	36.8

Hill, Susan T. (1985), *The Traditionally Black Institutions of Higher Education 1960 to 1982*, USED/NCES. Hoffman, Charlene M. (1996). *Historically Black Colleges and Universities 1976-1994*, USED/NCES.

There were seven disciplines which had noticeable increases in their share of bachelor's degrees awarded since 1972. Business and Management, Engineering, Public Affairs and Services, Health Professions, Psychology, Communications and Computer and Information Systems all had increases of more than 15 percent (See Table 6).

The trends exhibited in the curriculum changes were fairly consistent with national trends. However, the slower growth in enrollment is directly attributable to increased black student enrollment at predominantly white institutions and two-year colleges, plus the overall decline of black males in higher education.

How are Black Colleges Governed?

As defined in the Higher Education Act of 1965, to be designated an HBCU, "the institution was founded prior to 1964, its principal mission was, and is, the education of Black Americans, and is accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency or association ."

Historically, colleges have been governed by a board of trustees, a president and his cabinet (i.e., vice presidents, deans and departmental chairpersons).

McGrath (1965) reported that although the faculty and administrative organization of both the early public and private black colleges follow typical academic patterns, one element differs, the dominant, if not, patriarchal role of the president. This tradition which permitted, indeed often encouraged, one person to dominate the whole academic organization and the community undoubtedly stemmed from the marginal status of many black colleges. These colleges were and still are heavily dependent on the goodwill of influential private benefactors, local and national political powers; thus they remained "presidential" institutions. Also, the history of the black college concedes that in most

instances the only person in the academic body capable of giving the leadership and making the decision on which the very survival of the institution depended was the president.

Since McGrath's study, most black colleges have evolved to the point where there are various faculty members and administrators who are capable of being president. However, the presidents of black colleges are still the dominant force on campus. Hill (1985) reported that of the 43 chief executives of public historically black institutions in 1978, only 16 or 37 percent remained in 1983; of the 60 presidents of private historically black institutions, 31 or 52 percent remained five years later.

Budget deficits, inadequate funding, and little or no endowments cause many black administrators at HBCUs to make decisions in a crisis mode. A recent forum on the difficulty HBCUs face in obtaining essential funds concluded that HBCUs must think more like corporations if they are to compete successfully for the funds they need to survive (Black Issues in Higher Education, 12/7/1989). Accordingly, HBCUs have spent little time and resources on creating a strong development office. Maintenance of the status quo has been the dominant issue when little brushfires are not popping up around the campus or community. Finally, it is apparent that the role of a black college president takes on various meanings, shapes, and forms when considering the impact of outside forces such as alumni, Federal and State government, accrediting associations and inside forces such as the faculty and students.

The Dilemmas Facing Historically Black Colleges and Universities

In 1995, the black community, black colleges, federal and state agencies were struggling with ways and means of making black colleges more viable under changing conditions (e.g., new technologies, and the demand for excellence and accountability).

Since 1969, over 11 billion dollars (USED, 1994) have been provided to black colleges, yet several are on the brink of failure (e.g., Texas College, Concordia College, and Barber Scotia College), while others are just surviving (e.g., Knoxville College, Central State University, and Shorter College). Financial stability has been cited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools and the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools as the primary reason several private historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) have lost their accreditation (i.e., Bishop College, Selma University, Shorter College, Morristown College, Knoxville College, Allen University and Texas College). Consequently, Bishop College has closed. However, the struggle to make a significant contribution to education and to survive continues.

While historically black colleges have received 11 billion federal dollars since 1969, one must consider where these colleges have come from. Historically, black colleges have operated on small budgets, are limited by their students' ability to pay tuition and, for many public institutions, by small state appropriations. Many black colleges still operate with a marginal surplus or deficit each year and many have no, or small endowments to serve as buffers in time of financial hardship (Hill, 1985). Yet, HBCUs continue to enroll and graduate an increasing percentage of students who otherwise may not have been given an opportunity to attend college. HBCUs have provided undergraduate and graduate education to 46 percent of the Nation's black business executives, 50 percent of the Nation's black engineers, 60 percent of the black pharmacists, 75 percent of the black officers in the military and 80 percent of all black judges (USED, 1994).

As HBCUs continue to carry out their legacy of educating black students, the educational stability of a number of these institutions has faltered. Within the last ten years, seven HBCUs have had their accreditation withdrawn and subsequently restored; however, one has closed. The lack of financial stability has been cited as the primary link to the demise of HBCUs.

The research reveals that black colleges were able to successfully compete for available revenues during the 1970's. Daniel Avent (1981) reported that during the 1970's HBCUs received more federal government revenues per FTE student than white colleges; state and local government revenues also were higher per FTE student for black colleges than for white colleges; private gifts, grants and contracts were higher per FTE student for black colleges than for white colleges, and total revenues per FTE student were higher for black colleges than for white colleges. Conversely, Avent (1981) reported that tuition and fees in dollars per FTE student were higher for white colleges than for black colleges, and the endowment income was higher per FTE student for white colleges than for black colleges.

Hill (1985) reported that the revenues for black colleges, when adjusted for inflation, increased 50 percent overall from the fiscal year 1971 to 1981. There were two major areas of revenue growth for black colleges during the 1970's. Revenues from the State and Federal governments grew the most. The next largest area of growth was from tuition and fees, which was mostly derived from increased enrollment during the decade.

Hoffman (1996) reported that public black colleges showed similar patterns of revenue sources as other public colleges from 1984 to 1994. An example provided by Hoffman revealed that public black colleges derived about 21 percent of their revenue from tuition, slightly higher than the figure for all public colleges, which was 18 percent. However, public black colleges derived a smaller portion of their revenue than other public colleges from endowments, private gifts, grants and contracts (2 percent v. 5 percent). A higher portion of revenue for public black colleges (61 percent) came from government sources than at other public institutions (51 percent) (Hoffman).

The revenue sources for private black colleges exhibit a different pattern than other private institutions. Hoffman reported that private black colleges derived about 29 percent of their revenue from tuition and fees in 1994 compared to 42 percent for all private colleges. Private black colleges also earned a smaller share of their revenue from endowments compared to other private institutions, but received a slightly higher proportion of revenue from private gifts, grants, and contracts (Hoffman).

Although the studies by Avent, Hill and Hoffman demonstrate that black colleges have done equally as well, or better in some instances than white colleges in attaining revenues during the 1970's, 1980's and early 1990's, it is vital to remember that much of the funding was for "catch up" purposes. Prior to the 1970's, black colleges had historically been underfunded by the federal, state and local governments. Private gifts, grants and contracts were also sources of the underfunding for HBCUs.

One of the most visible areas affected by the underfunding has been the condition of the physical plants. The most recent data on the recorded age and condition of higher education facilities was the "1974 HEGIS Inventory of College and University Physical Facilities." It was reported that 42 percent of "assignable space" (i.e., all space that is, or could be assigned to an occupant) at the HBCU was constructed before 1930. The "HEGIS Inventory" concluded that despite the potential for deterioration, 77 percent of the HBCUs total assignable space for classrooms, offices, residence halls and general use facilities was in satisfactory condition (Hill, 1985).

The capitalization or improvement on the use of the 11 billion dollars in Federal funds is not totally visible throughout the black college community. The physical plants are in continuous need of maintenance and renovation. Moreover, the ability to bring in research funds has been limited to a few black colleges. According to Avent (1981) black colleges were getting equal funding, but probably not enough supplementary funding to make up for the years of neglect. However, despite several initiatives by the federal government urging them to become research centers, etc., the majority have not been able to respond. Yet, there are certain exceptions, such as Hampton University, Morehouse College, Xavier University, North Carolina A&T State University, Florida A&M University, Spelman College, Tuskegee University, and the University of Maryland Eastern Shore.

Perhaps the most significant feature of the institutions cited as exceptions is the fact that a high proportion of their graduates get jobs for which they are trained and are

readily admitted to graduate schools, thus magnifying the quality of the programs offered. Hampton University has tripled its endowment from \$30 million (1980) to \$90 million (1990) as a result of its academic reputation. During that same timeframe, its enrollment has almost doubled. Morehouse College, with an enrollment of less than 2000 students continues in its historical tradition of graduating the highest proportion of students who go on to become doctors, lawyers, dentists, and CPA's of any black college in the United States. Xavier University continues to lead the Nation in the proportion of its graduates admitted to medical school. Further, several publications have listed Xavier's Pharmacy Program as one of the top ten in the United States.

Avent (1981) and Hill (1985) have reported that black colleges have gotten their share of available resources in the 1970's. Further, President Reagan's Executive Order (USED, 1981) required the coordination of Federal agencies' efforts on behalf of black colleges and universities to identify, reduce, and eliminate barriers which may have unfairly resulted in reduced participation in and reduced benefits from federally sponsored programs. As a result, black colleges have fared as well in the 1980's as they did in the 1970's in terms of increasing revenues. Finally, the *Adams v Califano* (1977) case was significant for public black colleges during the 1970s and 1980s. It required ten states to desegregate their higher education school systems, both black and white schools, and to provide black public colleges with increased resources and the opportunity to compete for equal resources to carry out their missions (Garibaldi, 1985).

Chapter IV

Background of The University of Maryland Eastern Shore

The Location

The University of Maryland Eastern Shore (UMES) (founded in 1886) numbers among the 100 institutions commonly recognized as historically black colleges and universities. UMES is located less than a half mile from the center of the town of Princess Anne in Somerset County, Maryland. It is important to note that the university is located across the railroad tracks from the town. To the north, approximately fifteen minutes or twelve miles, is the town of Salisbury, where Salisbury State University (founded in 1925) is located. About 40 miles northeast is Ocean City, and less than two and one-half hours northwest is Baltimore. Additionally, Washington, D.C. is approximately two and one-half hours northwest of UMES. Finally, the borders of Delaware and Virginia are 35 and 45 minutes away, respectively.

Princess Anne is a rustic little Southern town with a wealth of history and tradition. Although the town is only about eight blocks long and four blocks wide, there are over 35 houses and buildings on the National Register of Historic Places. Upon entering the town, it seems as if one has traveled back in time over 100 years as most of the buildings were erected between 1755 and 1855. Princess Anne was the center of 18th century society for the region.

As noted earlier, Princess Anne is located in Somerset County, where it is the seat for local government. Somerset County is located at the southernmost tip of the Eastern Shore of Maryland. According to the 1990 census, Somerset County is the most economically depressed county in the state of Maryland. The county is characterized by quaint fishing villages and the barrier islands of Deal, Tangier, and Smith, where the watermen earn their living catching crabs, some oysters, and fish. Inland there are low-lying fields of wheat, corn, and tomatoes. Spotted around the county are the poultry farms that support the Perdue processing plant in Salisbury, which is located in Wicomico County. There are also some swine farms throughout the county. Finally, it should be noted that the county's largest employer is the University of Maryland Eastern Shore.

As determined by the 1990 census, Somerset County has a population of 23,440 with only 2,880 of those considered urban inhabitants. The percentage of county residents with bachelor's degree or higher is 9.6. Further, the census reveals that the county has the lowest median household income in the state, \$23,379.

Institutional History

UMES is one of 100 historically black colleges and universities in the United States. They share the common history of being founded to educate blacks at the college level. However, most black colleges began by offering elementary and secondary level work as a necessity, and then evolved into college-level institutions. The first federal government report on black secondary and higher schools described three black institutions as "college grade" in 1915: Howard University, Meharry Medical College,

and Fisk University. There also were 30 black institutions that offered some college-level work, but were not considered college-grade because of their large secondary departments.

The University of Maryland Eastern Shore's history until the late 1970's could fairly be described as "Houdini Reincarnated," or "The School that Would Not Die." Since its founding in 1886 as the Delaware Conference Academy under the aegis of the Centenary Biblical Institute of the Methodist Episcopal Church, the university has faced numerous challenges to its survival. UMES has undergone six name changes in its history, with almost every change signaling a derailment of a previously defined and cultivated course or a question of the institution's purpose. The six name changes are as follows: (1) 1886 - Delaware Conference Academy; (2) Industrial Branch of Morgan College; (3) 1890 - Princess Anne Academy; (4) 1919 - Eastern Branch of the Maryland Agriculture College; (5) 1948 - Maryland State College; and (6) 1970 - University of Maryland Eastern Shore. Although its original mission has changed through the years from preparation of African American teachers and clergy, the core remains the preparation of African American students with an emphasis on teaching, research, and public service.

The following information traces the development of UMES and some of the challenges it has faced. Subsequent to its founding as the Delaware Conference Academy, the institution assumed the title of Industrial Branch of Morgan College, yet was still under the influence of the Methodist Church. While under the control of the

Methodist Church and operated by Morgan College (known today as Morgan State University), the school became commonly known as Princess Anne Academy (Wennersten, 1976).

The passage of the second Morrill Act in 1890 set the stage for another name change. This act ostensibly forbade appropriations to any college where racial distinctions were a criterion for school admission. However, it also sanctioned the establishment of separate institutions for the two races. A total of seventeen black land-grant colleges were established as a result of this Act. Inasmuch as the State of Maryland wanted to continue receiving federal funds for the Maryland Agricultural College (known today as the University of Maryland), a contract was accepted; thus, Princess Anne Academy became the black land-grant institution for Maryland. Morgan College continued to manage the day to day operations (Wennersten).

As reported by Wennersten (1976), there were no public high schools for Negroes on the Eastern Shore until after 1919. Therefore, in accordance with its environment, Princess Anne Academy provided blacks with basic instruction in reading, writing and mathematics at the elementary and secondary levels, plus the industrial education courses.

Princess Anne Academy had its control and ownership transferred from Morgan College to the University of Maryland in 1928. This action was the result of a federal survey of the Academy, which found that it was not being run properly. The transfer of ownership notwithstanding, the institution continued to provide some secondary level

work until 1935. Moreover, the little growth that was achieved came about as a result of perseverance and dedication by the staff without adequate funding (Wennersten, 1976).

Organizationally, UMES today is one of 13 public institutions in the State of Maryland that are governed by a 15-member Board of Regents. Reporting directly to the Board of Regents is the University of Maryland Central Administration. The day-to-day governance of UMES is headed by the Chancellor, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, Vice Chancellor for Administrative Affairs, Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs, Director of Research and Grants, Director of Institutional Research and Planning, Director of Development, and University Relations Officer.

A game of "political football" best describes the plight of UMES during its first 50 years as a part of the University of Maryland system. The institution literally has struggled to remain in existence as an institution of higher education throughout its history. During the 1930s, the institution became a key political pawn in the hands of those who feared integration of higher education facilities within the state. This fear generated increased state funding for the institution. However, in 1935, the Maryland legislature formed a commission specifically to study the higher education of Negroes in the state. Regarding Princess Anne Academy, the Commission recommended that it should be abandoned rather than continue its pretense as a college. As an alternative to closing, the commission recommended that the institution be converted into a high school with special emphasis on vocational training. Nothing, however, was done to implement the recommendations of the commission. Since the legislature considered Negro

political pressure insignificant, little additional funding was provided. Instead, more funding was appropriated to provide scholarships for Negroes to attend colleges out of state (Callcott, 1966).

Threatened by growing demands for integration and court actions, the legislature appointed a commission in 1947, chaired by William Marbury, to review Negro higher education. Commonly referred to as the Marbury Report (1947), the commission concluded that the conditions at the Princess Anne college were deplorable, as compared with the other institutions in Maryland. Further, the commission noted that because the college was located in Princess Anne, on the inaccessible Eastern Shore, it was handicapped and could never attract a student body large enough for an efficient operation as a land-grant college. Accordingly, the commission recommended that the land-grant program be transferred to Morgan State in Baltimore and that Princess Anne be abandoned. In that year (1947) the institution had an enrollment of 163 students (Marbury Report).

According to Callcott (1966), contrary to this latest commission report, the President of the University of Maryland, Harry C. Byrd, decided to change the name of Princess Anne Academy to Maryland State College. At the beginning of the 1947-48 school year, the Eastern Shore Branch of the University of Maryland, popularly known as Princess Anne College, became officially Maryland State College, a division of the University of Maryland. Since the President of the University was a politically influential man in Maryland at that time, he was able to manipulate the legislature into quadrupling

its appropriation to Maryland State from approximately \$116 thousand annually to \$429 thousand, despite the commission's recommendations. President Byrd's past history indicated that he acted out of a sense of preservation of his empire, the University of Maryland system, rather than a genuine concern for Negro higher education (Callcott).

In 1949, the Senate of the Maryland Legislature commissioned another statewide study on higher education for Negroes. Judge Morris A. Soper of Baltimore chaired the commission (commonly referred to as the Soper Commission). The study was commissioned because of growing criticism around the state regarding the university's failure to bring Maryland State up to the standards of four-year institutions and the financial difficulty of supporting four Negro colleges. In 1950, the findings and recommendations of the study were made public. According to the report, the physical plant at Maryland State was woefully inadequate, despite the recent infusion of funds. Finally, the report supported the position of abandoning Maryland State as the increased funding was becoming a source for some political resentment. Again no action was taken on the recommendations presented in the report. It appears that the power of the University of Maryland and its president were the keys to Maryland State's survival at this time (Soper Commission, 1950).

Throughout the 1950's, Maryland State had made some incremental gains academically, and perhaps the next significant event in the history of the College was gaining separate recognition and accreditation from the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools in 1954. Also in 1954, the college was admitted into the Central

Intercollegiate Athletic Association (CIAA), a Negro college conference (Wennersten, 1976).

There was turmoil on campus throughout the 1960's. Racial conflicts were prevalent between the students and the white residents who constituted approximately 85 percent of the population of Princess Anne and Somerset County. There were protest marches, demonstrations, and confrontations with the townspeople. The students complained about inadequate facilities, an inflexible curriculum, an autocratic administration, and almost every other aspect of the institution. A reputation for mediocrity as a four-year college publicly reared its head again during the turbulent 60's. Throughout this time period, there were racial and academic pressures on the College. Students and faculty protested the racial discrimination against them by the Princess Anne townspeople and others throughout Somerset County. While this was going on, the College was getting pressure from the Maryland Legislature to increase its standards or consider closing or merging. In 1967, the university's Board of Regents complained that Maryland State's standards were embarrassing and that the university should either raise its standards to make it a viable branch of the University of Maryland, or abandon it. Three other alternatives were suggested by the Board. These were: to relinquish control of the college to the State Board of Trustees of the State Colleges, reduce it to a community college, or change it to a technical institute (Wennersten).

In 1969, HEW ordered Maryland to develop a desegregation plan for its colleges. Consequently, the state conducted a study of Maryland State College. Although

there was some support from African American legislators, the Senate passed a resolution that Maryland State College become a branch of the University of Maryland and merge with Salisbury State College, just twelve miles to the north. At this time (1969), Maryland State's enrollment was approximately 70 percent black, 17 percent white, and 3 percent "other" (total FTE 685), while Salisbury State's enrollment was approximately 95 percent white, four percent black, and one percent "other" (total FTE 895) (State Board for Higher Education, 1972) . Following a review of the issue by the Legislative Council and numerous appeals from alumni, supporters, faculty, students, and the administrations of both institutions to deny the merger, it was determined that there would be no change to Maryland State's status at this time. The most significant recommendation of the study was that the College be integrated into the university system. Thus, in February 1970, the Regents voted to accept Maryland State College as an equal branch campus. The College officially had its name changed to the University of Maryland Eastern Shore (UMES) (Wennersten, 1976).

The Governor intervened in the racial conflicts and campus demonstrations during the late 1960's. An uneasy peace ushered in the 1970's. On campus, the president of twenty-three years, J.T. Williams, resigned in the summer of 1970. That summer the State University Board decided to accept Maryland State College as an equal branch, provided that entrance requirements were upgraded to those of the other campuses (Wennersten).

Once UMES became a full branch campus in 1970, Maryland and the Board made a commitment to upgrade the institution. The first several years of the 1970's resulted in substantial increases in enrollment and state funding. Enrollment had grown from 740 in the fall of 1970, to 1,081 in 1974. From 1970 to 1974, state general fund appropriations had increased from \$1,974,361 to \$3,294,956 (University of Maryland System, Annual Reports: 1970 - 1974). However, by 1976 enrollment had declined by 32% to 837 FTE and operating costs at UMES were spiraling. Additionally, the legislature was having increased difficulty funding the cost of higher education in the state. These conditions, among others, led to another report ordered by the Governor concerning the structure and governance of education in Maryland.

The Governor's Study Commission on Structure and Governance of Education in Maryland (1975), chaired by Leonard Rosenberg, (commonly referred to as the Rosenberg Commission), included a recommendation that a regional university system be established on the eastern shore that would consist of UMES, Salisbury State College, Chesapeake Community College, and the University of Maryland Center for Environmental and Estuarine Studies at Horn Point. The first phase of the regional university would have been the merger of UMES and Salisbury State. Following submission of the report, the Governor appointed a special task force to review the report and make final recommendations as to the most desirable structure for Maryland education. The task force, chaired by Alan M. Wilner, determined that irrespective of a merger between UMES and Salisbury State there were alternatives and planning needed

to be done before creating a regional university (Wilner Report, 1975). Again UMES escaped with its status in tact.

The Emergence of Bill Hytche

The summer of 1975 marked a significant event in the history of UMES, as William "Bill" Hytche was appointed Acting Chancellor by the Board of Regents. Throughout the turbulent history of UMES, there was never a time when the administration and the faculty could feel secure that they would endure as an institution of higher education. Each commissioned study or name change caused either a new direction or focus at the institution, or stagnation. There was no such thing as a cooperative "town and gown" relationship between UMES and Princess Anne. Essentially, there had developed a level of tolerance by both parties. Academically, the institution had achieved a level of respect with the granting of individual accreditation in 1954. However, as late as 1975, no new courses had been developed and implemented at UMES since 1945. Politically, the institution was still being ignored by State decision-makers. The physical plant was deteriorating, enrollment was declining, and faculty and staff were disgusted by what they considered to be indifference.

At the time Hytche was appointed Chancellor in 1976, it is not clear that much was expected of him other than the fact that his appointment as Chancellor would satisfy the faculty and staff. Since Hytche had been employed by the University since 1960 in various positions he was well liked and respected. He came to the campus from Oklahoma as a math instructor, and quickly achieved assistant and associate professor

status. At the time of the unrest on campus and in the community during the late 1960's, Hytche served as Dean of Student Affairs. Once there was sustained peace on campus he requested to return to the classroom, which he did, and was promptly named the Head of the Math and Computer Science Department. After spending four years as Head of the Department, Hytche became Chairman of the Division of Liberal Studies. It was from this position that he was selected as Acting Chancellor in July, 1975, and was given a permanent appointment as Chancellor in June, 1976.

In the first year of his administration, Hytche was faced with two primary tasks. The first task was to bring a sense of togetherness and pride to the campus and to start to address the issue of "town and gown." Equally important was the need to fight the most recent commissioned study that recommended the creation of an Eastern Shore University by combining the resources of Salisbury State and UMES.

In order to lobby the Legislature effectively and to begin the process of healing the "town and gown" relationship with the community, Hytche formed the UMES Chancellor's Advisory Council. The Council's 28 members (14 black and 14 white) consisted of local business leaders, public school personnel, ministers, farmers, lawyers, and other influential individuals from the tri-county area (Somerset, Wicomico, and Worcester) of the Eastern Shore.

Under his leadership UMES has fought off several merger or closure recommendations in order to develop into a solid educational establishment. The Chancellor has provided the leadership for seventeen new programs, which include two

Ph.D. programs. Research and contract dollars have steadily climbed to an all time high in FY 1995 of \$10.1 million. This amount ranked the school fourth in the University of Maryland system. Also, the enrollment has grown to an all time high of 2,925 for Fall 1995. Moreover, the alumni donated more money in 1987-88 than in all the other years of institutional recordkeeping combined and each year thereafter alumni giving has increased.

As further evidence of nationwide respect for the academic growth of the University, the President of Henson Aviation donated (1986) two million dollars to the University's endowment fund because he was impressed with UMES' work and dedication. This was one of the largest single gifts ever to an historically black college by an individual. In addition, UMES was awarded a Management Internship Program in 1988 by the Disney World Corporation. This is significant because UMES was one of only six institutions awarded the Program nationwide. The other institutions were Penn State University, Cornell University, University of Wisconsin-Stout, Michigan State University, and the University of Houston. UMES' Hotel and Restaurant Program has been consistently ranked among the top programs in the United States. Finally, the University has received the largest award ever made to an historically black college by the United States Agency for International Development. The award is designed to fund agricultural projects in Africa (i.e., Togo, Zambia and Cameroon).

Since 1978, UMES has developed and implemented seventeen new programs, which include Ph.D. programs in Marine Biology and Environmental Science. These two

doctoral degree programs are the only ones of their type offered by black colleges in the United States. Included in the new programs were majors in Engineering, Physical Therapy, Hotel and Restaurant Management, Computer Science, Business and Accounting. Moreover, UMES has added professional programs in law, medicine, nursing, pharmacy, and veterinary science. All of these programs suggest the presence of an underlying strategic plan to meet the needs of its constituents and the public at large.

UMES had an enrollment of 1,578 students in the fall of 1988, an increase of approximately 40 percent since 1976. In 1976, there were 41 black colleges with enrollments of 999 and below; UMES was one of those colleges (HEW, 1979). The fall 1988 enrollment data indicated that there were 47 black colleges (41 were private) with enrollments of 999 and below (NAFEO, 1988). UMES has obviously grown significantly while others have declined or stagnated. The growth demonstrated by UMES has occurred during a decade of overall decline (i.e., six to eight percent) of black students' participation in post-secondary education.

A comparison of UMES with two other public black colleges (Bowie State University and Coppin State College) in the State of Maryland reveals a telling pattern of growth. Table 5 provides a comparison of enrollment data. Although Morgan State University is the other black public four-year institution in the State, it was not chosen as a comparison because it has historically been larger and better funded than the other black colleges in the State.

Another area of comparison involves research and contract funding. Table 6 highlights the funding for each school during fiscal years 1976 and 1988.

The growth of UMES, which was undreamed of in 1975, essentially parallels William P. Hytche's tenure as Chancellor (1975-1995). In this study, an attempt was made to determine the relationship of Chancellor Hytche's leadership behavior and the resolution of critical problems affecting the growth and subsequent development of UMES during Chancellor Hytche's tenure.

Table 7 --- Comparison of UMES with Two Other Black Maryland State Colleges

Enrollment Data for 1976, 1982, 1993

	1976	1982	1993	% Change 1976-1993
Bowie State	2,845	2,223	4,946	57.5
Coppin State	2,949	2,210	3,265	.9
UMES	994	1,214	2,637	175.0

(From Univ. of Maryland System's Data Reports, 1989 and 1994)

**Table 8 -- Comparison of Research and Contract Funding At UMES
and Two Other Black Colleges in Maryland: 1976 and 1994**

	1976	1994	% Change 1976-1994
Bowie State	\$ 95	\$2,144	200.4
Coppin State	1,313	1,767	.7
UMES	397	8,280	479.0

(Amounts in thousands)

From Turner, William H., et. al. (1979), Traditionally Black Institutions: A Profile and an Institutional Directory, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, National Center for Education Statistics, (p. 47) and FY 1994 SBHE Consolidated Capital and Operating Budget (1994); State of Maryland.

Chapter V

The Political Antecedents of Higher Education in Maryland

(1935-1975)

The scope and nature of this study must be viewed and understood within the framework of Maryland's overall system of public higher education and the context of the political antecedents during the period 1935-1975. This chapter provides a brief overview of Maryland's higher education structure and the political antecedents of the period.

Until 1988, the State of Maryland had a tripartite system of higher education that consisted of sixteen community colleges, the five campus University of Maryland System, six State colleges (Bowie, Coppin, Frostburg, Towson, Salisbury and the University of Baltimore), the Board of Regents of Morgan State University, and the Board of Trustees of Saint Mary's College (a state institution). The community colleges were governed by local boards of trustees, and coordinated through the State Board for Community Colleges (SBCC). The six institutions under the governance of the Board of Trustees of the State Universities and Colleges was consolidated with the University of Maryland System in 1988. Also, in 1988, Maryland abolished the State Board for Higher Education and created the Maryland Higher Education Commission. On July 1, 1992, the

SBCC ceased to exist and its responsibilities are now handled by the Maryland Higher Education Commission (MHEC).

MHEC coordinates the entire system of public higher education within the state. The Commission is responsible for approving programs and mission statements for all public colleges and universities. Additionally, the Commission conducts statewide planning for higher education and makes budget recommendations to the state.

The University of Maryland System now consists of eleven campuses. Prior to 1988, the system consisted of five campuses, including the University of Maryland Eastern Shore (UMES). This segment of the public system of higher education in Maryland provides a comprehensive curricula from the bachelors through the doctorate level, inclusive of professional programs in law, medicine, engineering, dentistry, etc. The other six state campuses were added to the University System in 1988. These universities primarily provide bachelor's and master's curricula in the arts and sciences and various professionally oriented fields. One of the six universities (University of Baltimore) also awards degrees at the doctoral level.

Although MHEC coordinates the University of Maryland System, its Board of Regents has specific powers to set local management, operational and academic policies which guide campus administration and faculty in the day-to-day administration of the System. There is also a Central Administration for the System, headed by the chancellor. Each individual campus of the University System is headed by a president. As a result of

the reorganization in 1988, each campus president is now responsible for developing and administering the budget for his/her institution, as well as hiring and firing campus personnel -- most significantly faculty.

The third part of the public system of higher education is made up of Saint Mary's College and Morgan State University. Both of these institutions believed that by remaining independent and not joining the University of Maryland System in 1988 they would fare financially better and have more control over their missions. Morgan State offers a comprehensive curriculum from the bachelors through the doctorate. Saint Mary's College offers a four-year liberal arts curriculum.

Just as the 1980's provided historic changes to the public higher education system in Maryland, the 1930's provided the foundation for major political involvement in how higher education in the state would evolve, particularly for UMES.

Maryland Litigation Leading to Desegregation

The courts played a significant role in the desegregation of the University of Maryland. Prior to 1935, Maryland, like the other Southern states, had a totally segregated system of higher education at the undergraduate and graduate school levels. To address the "Negro problem," Maryland continued to provide access to higher education through the four Negro colleges (i.e. Morgan College, Princess Anne Academy [forerunner of UMES], Bowie State Teachers College, and Coppin State Teachers College). Additionally, the State instituted its "Out of State Scholarship Fund for

Negroes" in 1932. George Callcott (1966) reported that in 1932 Maryland had established a fund totaling \$600 from which Negroes could apply for tuition to out-of-state institutions. Wennersten (1976) noted that this grant was established for students seeking higher education opportunities unavailable to them at Negro colleges in Maryland, and who wished to attend out of state institutions for courses offered at the University of Maryland and other white campuses within the State from which they were barred. This was a tacit admission by the State that it could not provide separate but equal facilities; however, race-mixing was not an option. In 1934, a Baltimore Negro named Donald Murray, who had paid his way through Amherst College, refused the small out-of-state grant and sued to enter the University of Maryland law school. Murray, who was represented by Thurgood Marshall, won his lawsuit and entered the law school in 1935 (Callcott, 1966). As Callcott stated, the Murray case officially opened all of the University of Maryland system's professional schools to Negroes, but to avoid "indiscriminate mixing," the legislature promptly increased the out-of-state scholarship fund to \$30,000. Callcott notes that to evade possible suits to enter the undergraduate schools, the legislature appropriated \$100,000 in 1935 so that the University could purchase Princess Anne Academy from Morgan College and bring it up to a full four-year program for Negroes. The rationale for the prompt appropriation to purchase the Academy was to evade possible suits to enter the undergraduate schools (Callcott). It was reported in the Baltimore Sun (1973) that University of Maryland President, Harry C. Byrd, lobbied to build up the Eastern Shore Branch and stated, "If we don't do something about Princess Anne we're going to have to accept Negroes at College Park where our

girls are." According to Callcott, since Negro pressure was insignificant, the legislature ignored their commitment to pour large sums of money into Princess Anne. The legislature continued to give a pittance to the University for Princess Anne merely to appease the Negroes.

In addition to opening the System's schools for Negroes, the Murray case focused attention on the inadequate and unequal educational facilities provided for Negroes in Maryland. Wennersten (1976) noted that before the Murray case it was clearly evident that the State was doing the bare minimum required by law to provide higher education opportunities for Negroes in professional fields. Opportunities to pursue professional careers out of state were remotely possible with the limited out-of-state scholarships.

Following the Murray case, the state legislature in 1935, formed a Commission on the Higher Education of Negroes in Maryland. The Commission was instructed to report back in 1937 with its conclusions. Judge Morris A. Soper, a trustee of Morgan College,

chaired the Commission. The Commission's report became known as the Soper Report. Judge Soper reported to the legislature in 1937 that in comparison with the provisions for higher education of the white people, the state is far in arrears of reasonable and justifiable provisions for the colored people of the state. Concerning Princess Anne Academy, the Commission recommended that ". . . it had far better be abandoned altogether than continue its present pretense as a college . . . In its present condition, it is

no credit to the state." The Commission recommended an alternative to closing by concluding that Princess Anne could be converted into a high school with special emphasis on vocational training (Soper Report, 1937).

Wennersten (1976) reported that, fortunately for Princess Anne, nothing was done to implement the Soper Commission proposals. It appears that the primary reason nothing was done to implement the report was the desire to ensure that there were alternatives sources of higher education for the Negroes of the State. In light of the Murray case, legislators and University personnel were starting to become more concerned about Negroes integrating the University of Maryland System's white campuses. The primary beneficiary of Princess Anne remaining a college was the University of Maryland System.

Princess Anne was now in a rivalry with Morgan College for political support, students, and recognition. Subsequently, most studies on higher education for Negroes in Maryland pitted Morgan College and Princess Anne against each other for power, control of Negro education, and financial resources. Morgan College became a state institution in 1939.

Callcott (1966) stated that because Negro pressure was insignificant, the legislature ignored the pleas of President Byrd to pour large sums of money into Princess

Anne. As a means of appeasing the Negroes, small sums were provided to both Princess Anne and Morgan State. Additionally, the legislature contrived to provide scholarships for Negroes to attend colleges out of state.

Directly stimulated by World War II's post-war prosperity and the growing demand for integration, Negroes began pressing for admission to the University. Both the Board of Regents and the legislature were threatened with court actions to force the opening of the University to Negroes. Alarmed by these threats, the legislature appointed another commission in 1947 to review the entire question of Negro higher education (Callcott).

The Commission's report became known as the Marbury Report, as an indication of its chair. It was again reported that the state has maintained its consistent policy of providing higher educational facilities for Negroes which were inferior to those provided

for whites. Further, the Marbury Report concluded that the state had not taken seriously its responsibilities for the development of a land-grant college program for the Negro population. The state of Maryland, the report noted, has scattered its resources for Negro higher education among several institutions instead of concentrating them in a single center where a strong program could be developed (Marbury Report, 1947).

The Marbury Commission conducted an in-depth study of Princess Anne College and revealed that the conditions there were deplorable as compared with the other

institutions in Maryland. Stating that the physical plant of Princess Anne is sadly deficient and a disgrace to the state of Maryland, the Commission made numerous recommendations for improving the physical plant. Moreover, Marbury stated that the faculty at Princess Anne had no Ph.D.s and more than one-fourth of the staff lacked Master's degrees. Princess Anne College was reported by the Commission to be the lowest ranking state-supported institution. Finally, the Commission commented that Princess Anne, located on the inaccessible Eastern Shore, was handicapped because it can never hope to attract a student body large enough for efficient operation as a land-grant college (Marbury Report, 1947).

Wennersten (1976) indicated that the Marbury Commission also criticized the white Board of Regents and wondered how they could have the interests of Negro higher education as a major concern. It was evident from the condition of Princess Anne that they did not. However, the Commission did note that Morgan State, more centrally located to the Negro population of the state and already having developed relatively strong departments in science and other fields which are necessary for the support of an effective program in technical subjects such as agriculture, home economics, engineering, and industrial arts, should have the land-grant program transferred to its campus in Baltimore and that Princess Anne be abandoned.

Callcott (1966) reported that University of Maryland President Byrd immediately made Negro education his first priority as a result of the Marbury Report. According to Callcott, Byrd's past history would indicate that he reacted to threats against his empire,

rather than a genuine concern for the Negro. Moreover, with Princess Anne recommended to be abandoned, Byrd feared the obvious likelihood of increased Negro protests for admission to the University. Notwithstanding his motives, Callcott indicated that Byrd changed the name of Princess Anne Academy to Maryland State College in 1948 and manipulated the legislature into quadrupling the state's investment (\$116,367 to \$429,768) in the institution. Callcott added that Byrd continued to flex his political muscle by demanding that Morgan State be abandoned, or at least be absorbed by Princess Anne and the University.

While the Marbury Report and Byrd's demands again pitted Morgan State against Maryland State in the eyes of the legislature, the courts were changing the primary issue from one of expanded Negro colleges to one of integration. As noted previously, the Murray case had opened the professional schools of the University. In 1950, after the decision in the McCready v. Byrd case, the first Negro was admitted to the Baltimore Nursing School. The following year, the University accepted its first Negro graduate student at College Park. One month following the landmark Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court case of 1954, which ordered integration of all public schools; with all deliberate speed, the University became the first southern institution to admit Negro undergraduates (Callcott).

The integration for all public school systems began in 1954; however, it also was the year in which President Byrd was narrowly defeated in his bid for the governorship of Maryland. Callcott (1966) maintained that Byrd's defeat could largely be blamed on his handling of Negro education in Maryland. On one hand Byrd was attacked as a segregationist, and on the other as an integrationist, while also being under fire from Negroes who deplored his effort to destroy Morgan State.

Although Maryland State officially became a branch of the University in 1935, the chief executive of the institution was not designated as the president, but the Acting Dean of Administration. In 1947, John T. Williams became the new head of the College, and was given the title of President with full authority to begin a reorganization of the school (Wennersten, 1976).

Williams had a twenty-three year (1947-1970) tenure as President of Maryland State College. Wennersten reported that when Williams arrived at Maryland State, he found the institution to be poorly equipped, had low enrollments, an understaffed faculty, and a minute budget. Williams streamlined the institution's administration and established four divisions: Agriculture, Home Economics, Mechanical Arts, and Arts and Sciences, with those students meeting the requirements for graduation at Maryland State College receiving their bachelors degrees from the University of Maryland (Wennersten, 1976).

In Williams' first academic year (1947-48) at Maryland State, students numbered 163. By the next year, the student population increased 98% to 323. At the beginning of

the 1947 academic year, there were a total of eleven instructors on the faculty. Williams had increased the faculty to twenty-four by the end of the spring semester, and by the next year there were thirty-three full-time and three part-time instructors. The faculty included nine doctorates, and twenty-one masters degrees (Biennial Report, 1949).

Following the Marbury Report in 1947 and other widespread criticism of Maryland State and the University's responsibilities for bringing the college up to standards for four-year institutions, the Senate of the Maryland Legislature commissioned another statewide study on higher education for Negroes. Declaring that it was financially impossible for the state to maintain two colleges for Negroes, and difficult enough to maintain even one school, Senator Ellison of Baltimore called for the study to come up with a definite policy of appropriating money for Negro education (Baltimore Sun, 1949). Again the two Negro colleges, Morgan State in Baltimore and Maryland State on the Eastern Shore, were pitted against each other.

The Report and Recommendations of the Commission to Study the Question of Negro Higher Education to the Governor and Legislative Council and the General Assembly of Maryland was publicly presented in 1950. In the comparison between Maryland State and Morgan State, Maryland State again fared poorly, in large part because the Commission relied heavily on the data and recommendations of the Marbury Report. The Commission noted that despite the recent building program at Maryland State, the physical plant at Princess Anne was woefully inadequate. For example, one men's dormitory housed 176, yet, its maximum capacity was 92. The library with its

6,000 volumes (4,000 of which were obtained within the past two years) were crammed into one room (Report and Recommendations, 1950).

In addition to criticizing the facilities at Maryland State, the Commission chronicled the new levels of spending spearheaded by President Byrd. The Report noted that before all the money was spent on the school, there was little doubt in the minds of many that the College should be abandoned. The money the Commission referred to was its quadrupled state appropriation in 1948, and \$3,450,000 appropriated for capital outlays (Minutes of the Board of Regents, 1948). However, with all the money being spent on the institution, the Commission concluded that the fate of Maryland State College was becoming a source of political controversy and resentment. Accordingly, the argument to immediately abandon Maryland State was materially weakened (Report and Recommendations, 1950).

Furthermore, the need for a Negro land-grant college was questioned by the Commission. The Commission reported that there was a growing trend away from the study of agriculture by Negro students. For example, the Commission commented that out of a student body of 409 at Maryland State, only twenty-eight were taking courses in the agricultural curriculum. Moreover, because the College only received \$15,000 annually in land grant funds, there would not be a great loss if the land grant curricula were eliminated (Report and Recommendations, 1950).

Although praising Maryland State's will to succeed, and noting the great pride for that institution in the hearts of Maryland citizens on the Eastern Shore, the Commission recommended that no further capital outlay for the construction of new buildings or for additions to present buildings be expended. Finally, the Commission recommended that another advisory commission be formed to study the ultimate disposition of Maryland State College for educational or other state or local purposes (Report and Recommendations, 1950).

Within a three-year period, two state sponsored commissions had recommended the abandonment of Maryland State College. Yet, like the recommendations of the Marbury Report of 1947, the recommendations of the 1950 Commission would not be acted on. According to Wennersten (1976), the power of President Byrd and the University of Maryland guaranteed the survival of Maryland State. Consequently, Byrd was widely criticized in the Baltimore area. Morgan State was highly favored by the Baltimore community and its politicians. Thus, the controversy continued in Maryland over Morgan State and Maryland State (Wennersten).

While President Byrd, the Morgan State supporters, and other political leaders were jockeying for the political upper hand, President J. T. Williams embarked on a campaign to protect Maryland State. According to Wennersten, Williams' strategy involved three main tactics: (1) the development of a successful agricultural program, (2) the establishment of a federal ROTC program on campus, and (3) the creation of winning

athletic teams. Williams apparently believed that these endeavors would attract students, federal funds, community support, and statewide recognition.

Wennersten reported that Williams was obsessed with the survival of Maryland State and demanded the complete loyalty of his faculty and staff. Only one voice prevailed at Maryland State, and that was J.T. Williams whose phrase "my way or the highway," became a part of the campus vernacular. During this period, Williams recruited highly qualified faculty members in agriculture and called upon a fellow Oklahoman, Vernon "Skip" McCain, to build an athletic program (Wennersten, 1976).

As documented in a 1955 Report on Admissions, Maryland State's enrollments stabilized during the early 1950s. There were 409 students in 1949, 384 in 1950, 377 in 1951, 431 in 1952, 425 in 1953, and 440 in 1954. Further evidence of the success of Williams' strategy was the beginning of the United States Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corp on campus. According to an article in the institution's campus paper, Maryland State College had the honor of being the smallest college in the United States to have an ROTC program. Enrollment in ROTC was required of all male freshmen and sophomores (The Maroon and Gray, 1951).

On the athletic field, the football team became widely known as a result of its twenty-five game winning streak from 1948 through October, 1951 (The Maroon and Gray, 1951).

The Division of Agriculture underwent major improvement as well. A new dairy was built with the purchase of new livestock. It was noted in the campus paper that over \$30,000 was spent on farm machinery and equipment for the campus farm. The campus poultry house expanded its operation and increased profits for the institution (The

Maroon and Gray, 1952). Furthermore, Maryland State hosted numerous conferences, meetings, and workshops. Among these were the Farmers and Homemakers Conference, the New Farmers of America, Ministers School, and 4-H Club activities (Annual Report of the President, 1953-54).

Verification of Maryland State's academic improvement and Williams' success in gaining recognition for his college came in 1954, as the Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools granted Maryland State its initial separate accreditation and recognition. According to President Williams, Maryland State would still be part of the University of Maryland, but the separate accreditation would mean academic listing and individual recognition of the college (Salisbury Daily Times, 1953). Finally, in 1954, Maryland State was admitted into the Central Intercollegiate Athletic Association, a Negro college conference (Maryland State College News, 1954).

The Civil Rights Movement of the late 1950's and early 1960's began to transform the relationship between Maryland State College and the town of Princess Anne. Wennersten (1976) commented that President Williams often complained that the

school was imprisoned by "an invisible wall of racism." The entrance to the college was located one-half-mile from the center of the tiny southern town of Princess Anne. Racial segregation was a way of life. Maryland State's activities were encapsulated on its campus across the railroad tracks while the townspeople simply tolerated the Negro school. Furthermore, according to Wennersten, black faculty members did not live in Princess Anne because housing was not available and the faculty members disliked the lack of respect they received from the town's merchants.

Direct conflicts began to occur between Maryland State and the town of Princess Anne as a result of the 1964 Civil Rights movement on campus. The initial difficulties arose over white restaurant owners refusing to serve the black students from the college. A peaceful protest march was planned; however, it ended in violence with injuries and arrests. Several publications reported that the next day a cross was burned on the college's football field and the home of a black student leader's uncle was bombed. The protest march was also a reaction to Somerset County's failure to have a public accommodations law forbidding discrimination in hotels, motels, and restaurants (Washington Post and Baltimore Evening Sun, 1964).

A Student organization affiliated with the student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Somerset County Biracial Commission tried to negotiate a peaceful

settlement. The negotiations failed because the restaurant owners refused to budge. As a result, more violent confrontations prevailed. State troopers, K-9 dogs, and fire hoses were used to disperse the demonstrators (Baltimore Evening Sun and New York Times, 1964). Political leaders appeared to stick their heads in the sand. Alexander Jones, Chairman of the Biracial Commission, denounced the lack of cooperation the Commission received from "County Commissioners, our Delegates to the General Assembly, and our State Senators" (Washington Post, 1964).

After a student delegation met with Maryland's Governor, William Tawes, the demonstrations and confrontations ceased. The Governor promised the students that he would use all the powers of his office to get all the state included in the Maryland public accommodation law and that police dogs would not be used unless actions degenerated into the riot stage (Baltimore Evening Sun, 1964). According to Wennersten (1976) racial tension between Maryland State and the town of Princess Anne subsided.

However, during the next few years, President Williams complained about the "invisible walls" separating the college from the town (Baltimore Evening Sun, 1966).

President Williams came under fire from the Board of Regents in 1967 because a five-year master plan requested by Middle States for the development of Maryland State was late in preparation and lacked definitive goals. The Board complained that President Williams dwelled too much on past problems and not enough on the future. Further, the

Regents complained that Maryland State's standards were embarrassing to the University, and the school should either raise the standards to make it a branch of the University, or abandon the school. Other alternatives suggested by members of the Board were to relinquish control of the college to the State Board of Trustees of the State Colleges, make it a community college, or change it to a technical institute (Baltimore Evening Sun, 1967).

Support for Maryland State came from black State Senator Verda Welcome of Baltimore, who charged that the Regents "have allowed it to rot on the vine. They have channeled millions (dollars) to their other branches and programs at home and abroad but only crumbs to Princess Anne." Senator Welcome also stated that the Regents treated Maryland State worse than a "stepchild" (Baltimore Afro- American, 1967).

Notwithstanding Senator Welcome's support, the Senate passed a resolution suggesting that Maryland State College become a branch of the University of Maryland and merge with Salisbury State College. The Legislative Council, the between-session study arm of the General Assembly, was to report back on its findings. It was believed that a merger would expand the educational operation of the state on the Eastern Shore (Wennersten, 1976).

The Legislative Council presented its decision in May, 1967 that in the interest of higher education, it would be better to retain the present relationship between the

University of Maryland and Maryland State College and for Salisbury State College to continue as a component of the State College System (Baltimore Evening Sun, 1967). With the report of the Legislative Council in hand, President Elkins of the University of Maryland commented that he wanted to make the branch on the Eastern Shore an integral part of the university system (Report of the President, 1968-1969).

In the spring of 1968, students began actively to protest the deteriorating conditions at the college. The students complained that the cafeteria food was of poor quality, buildings were in disrepair and there were too many unnecessary school regulations (e.g., 9:00 p.m. curfew for girls). President Williams responded that the college could not do much about the food situation because Maryland State's board costs were the third lowest in the nation: \$445 per student annually equated to a daily ration of \$1.33 per student. Yet, President Williams did employ a dietitian for the college. He also agreed to the membership of two students on the Student Life Committee (Baltimore Evening Sun, 1968).

The students invited Senator Welcome to tour the campus to investigate their complaints. Senator Welcome was outraged at the gross neglect of the college. She criticized the overall poor condition of the physical plant and called for appropriations to construct a student union, dormitory, swimming pool, and to build bleacher seats (Baltimore Afro-American, 1968). Senator Welcome attached a \$300,000 amendment to a bill for constructing a pool at Maryland State. However, the bill failed. A fellow

senator who opposed the bill stated that "if they want to swim, they can use the Manokin River," which runs through Princess Anne (Washington Post, 1968).

By the end of the 1968 spring term, the students were again complaining about the poor physical plant conditions and discrimination in Princess Anne and Somerset County. The students took their grievances to Governor Spiro Agnew. One of the issues that prompted the meeting with the Governor was the issue of the funding for the pool. Salisbury State had recently received planning funds for a pool "so it can attract more male athletes while Maryland State with a nationally recognized athletic program, has no pool" (Baltimore Evening Sun, 1968).

The students again directed their grievances against Princess Anne. More than five hundred student demonstrators protested the hiring practices of the town's police and fire departments, a bank and a supermarket (Washington Post, 1968). Governor Agnew requested a meeting with the students to avoid any violence. Following the meeting, the Governor stated that his staff would contact members of the political and economic community in Princess Anne to work toward solutions to problems (Salisbury Daily Times, 1968). Student leaders halted further demonstrations.

One of the most important events in the growth and development of Maryland State College occurred in 1969. The State of Maryland was one of ten southern states ordered by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to

develop a plan to desegregate their public colleges. At the time the order was given, Maryland State College had an enrollment of 727 students, 127 or 17.4 percent were white. The faculty was composed of thirty-nine black and twenty-five white or 38.4 percent (Washington Post, 1969). Fearful of losing federal funding, the Board of Regents appointed a committee to study the feasibility, cost, and consequences of developing Maryland State College as an integral part of the University. The Regents believed that by bringing Maryland State up to the standards of the other University system campuses, enrollments would increase and the institution would no longer be considered a Negro college (Salisbury Daily Times, 1969).

The Feasibility Committee recommended a general expansion of the college's physical plant, enrollments, and an upgrade and change in the curricula. Academic requirements would need to be strengthened, yet, those needing compensatory education would not be neglected. Further, the Committee called for more emphasis to be placed on mathematics and computer science, social and behavioral sciences, and life and environmental sciences (Feasibility Committee Report, 1969).

Besides meeting the legal obligations set forth by HEW, making Maryland State an integral part of the University was perceived by the Committee to be the historical and honorable thing to do, because Maryland State had been neglected for so many years as a state institution. The Committee also determined that it would be economically feasible to effect the change since a minimum amount of resources, estimated at about one percent of the state budget, would be all that was necessary. Moreover, the Committee reasoned

that it would be much easier to solve the racial imbalance by "diluting pure black with white, than trying to find enough blacks to dilute pure white" (Feasibility Committee Report, 1969).

The plan to upgrade Maryland State was not accepted by everyone. Opponents of the plan argued that the standards of the college were too low for a university and the facilities and academic programs were too limited. Notwithstanding the critics, the Board of Regents voted in February of 1970 to accept Maryland State College as an equal branch campus provided that entrance requirements became the same as the other campuses. The action by the Board was to take effect on July 1, 1970, with Maryland State College becoming the University of Maryland Eastern Shore. Both the University of Maryland and the State had agreed to provide more funding (Salisbury Daily Times, 1970).

Before the college could become a university, more conflict surfaced. On April 7, 1970, 178 students were arrested for demonstrating on campus to protest the conditions at the institution and to demand the resignation of President Williams (Salisbury Daily Times, 1970). The primary grievances were inadequate facilities, including laboratories, equipment and building maintenance; the president's reported dismissal of at least two faculty members whom the students supported; an inflexible curriculum and the need for more diversified courses and an active black studies program (Baltimore Evening Sun, 1970).

Wennersten (1976) reported that the students developed a document delineating their grievances in which almost every aspect of the college was criticized. According to Wennersten, the students attacked President Williams because he had no perception of their needs. Additionally, Wennersten noted that the students' report further criticized President Williams by stating that he might have had the qualities in the past but now he lacked imagination, perceptiveness and foresight to lead the college or meet the demands of black students. Students solicited the aid of alumni, parents, and politicians in their demand for removal of President Williams (Wennersten, 1976).

The students received political support from black State Senator Clarence Mitchell of Baltimore City, Secretary of State Blair Lee, and Governor Marvin Mandel. Governor Mandel acknowledged that the college's problems were partially financial and a question of leadership. A meeting was held in Annapolis with the Governor, Secretary of State, students, alumni, and parents to discuss the situation. Governor Mandel all but assured students that President Williams would not be named chancellor of the college when the new system was instituted (Salisbury Daily Times and Washington Post, 1970).

It was somewhat ironic that President Williams was defended by a white Delegate, Carlton Dize of Somerset County. Delegate Dize praised President Williams' administration and noted that for his twenty-three year tenure, in spite of an unenthusiastic Board of Regents and Maryland Legislature, he has fought for, and guided the growth of the College to its present status (Baltimore Evening Sun, 1970).

President Williams resigned after all of the turmoil, citing that he was now beyond sixty-five years of age. He announced his resignation at a June 26, 1970 Board of Regents meeting to be effective August 1, 1970 (Minutes of the University of Maryland, Board of Regents, 1970).

Wennersten (1976) reflected that "J.T. Williams had outlived his usefulness at Maryland State College. A stern and enigmatic man, President Williams had administered the college in a strict and often puritanical manner. A decade of civil rights agitation and the many changes in higher education in general in the 1960's rendered Williams an anachronism."

Black Delegate Howard Rawlings (1993) of Baltimore, Chair of the House Appropriations Committee, reflected that President Williams was an autocratic leader with a powerful presence. "He prided himself on returning money to the College Park campus (the University of Maryland) at the end of each fiscal year. . . which to him indicated that he was running the college appropriately. But, probably he was typical of the black college presidents of public institutions who were primarily interested in keeping the students under control and if by chance they received an education, that was an added plus. . . because there were few resources to use for education. . . That's what we found back in 1970."

Although J.T. Williams was gone, the Board of Regents had obligated themselves to upgrade the faculty, facilities, and programs at UMES to the level of other university campuses. The UMES Office of Administrative Affairs reported that from fiscal year 1970 to 1974, state general fund appropriations had increased some sixty-four percent, from \$1,974,361 to \$3,294,956. Moreover, a total of \$6,762,300 had been provided for improvement of the physical plant during the three-year period 1970-1973 in contrast to \$3,910,800 over the previous ten-year period.

On July 1, 1971, the Board of Regents hired Archie Buffkins as Chancellor of UMES. He was the “young and vigorous leader“ that then Secretary of State, Blair Lee, (Baltimore Sun, 1970) had earlier opined was needed at Maryland State . The Baltimore Sun (1971) described Buffkins as a “36 year old composer and former music professor who has the job of turning a small, traditionally black and traditionally neglected college into a full-fledged branch of the large, predominantly white state university system.” Prior to assuming the UMES Chancellorship, Buffkins was Executive Assistant to the Chancellor of the eight-campus University of Maine system. He had also held positions at Rhode Island College, Texas Southern University, Kentucky State College, Jackson State College, and Morristown College. Buffkins received his bachelor’s degree in music education from Jackson State College of Mississippi. Later he received his master’s and doctoral degrees from Teacher’s College of Columbia University in New York.

Buffkins believed that the Board of Regents had given him a mandate to experiment with UMES as a result of the Board’s decision to make UMES an equal

branch of the University system. Buffkins stated in the Afro American and Baltimore Sun, (1971), “The potentialities for doing creative, exciting and experimental things at UMES are fantastic . . . We can become a laboratory, an experimental school, under the protection of the whole university system.” As further reported in the Sun (1971), Buffkins maintained that in order to make UMES one of the finest institutions of higher learning in the country , ”I am going to be beating doors to get what is needed to run a top institution . . . I am not going to settle for a second-rate institution. I am not going to take a back seat.” The Sun added that Buffkin’s aims and style were new both for the school and the surrounding communities which have customarily given their civic allegiance to nearby Salisbury State College (1971).

Buffkins tenure ended on June 30, 1975. His tenure was marked by controversy. Near the end of his tenure, the faculty had lost confidence in him. Several community leaders commented that the President either was not very interested in cultivating the town and gown relationship, or Buffkins did not stay long enough. He was removed from office after a confrontation with the Controller of the University over an incorrect travel voucher (Salisbury Daily Times, 1975).

By the end of Buffkins’ term, a rapid enrollment decline had begun. In the Fall of 1974 UMES had an enrollment of 1,081 FTE. UMES had enjoyed an increase of over 30 percent enrollment from the fall of 1970, its first as a part of the University of Maryland System. However, by the fall of 1976, enrollment was down by 32 percent in three years to 837 FTE (Webb Task Force, 1977).

As a result of the enrollment declines, the operating costs per student began to spiral upward. UMES already had the highest cost per student (i.e., UMES: \$3,640.00 for FY 1974 state average: \$2,097.00) in the State of Maryland (Maryland Council of Higher Education, 1975). Concomitantly, in 1975 there was heightened concern about the overall state budget. The legislature debated more than usual about the costs of higher education during a session when the legislature was asked to increase the sales tax. According to the Webb Report, education in general was no longer a high government priority as demands for other public services accelerated.

Another report was issued in May 1975 from the Governor's Study Commission on Structure and Governance of Education in Maryland that rejuvenated the issue of merging UMES and Salisbury State. Specifically, the Commission recommended the creation of a regional university system on the eastern shore that would consist of UMES, Salisbury State College, Chesapeake Community College, and the University of Maryland Center for Environmental and Estuarine Studies at Horn Point. The first phase of the regional university recommendation would have been the merger of UMES and Salisbury State. Merger was recommended because the Commission believed that the two institutions would result in better opportunities for students of both, better teaching and learning situations for all, and more adequate service to the community. An institution created by uniting these two schools should be more economically efficient and biracially constituted (Final Report of the Governors' Commission on Education in Maryland, 1975).

Following submission of the Commission's Report, a special task force was appointed by the governor to review the report and make final recommendations as to the most desirable structure for Maryland education. The task force submitted its report in December 1975. The report is commonly referred to as the Wilner Report, referencing the chair of the task force. The task force concluded that even if a merger of UMES and Salisbury State is desirable, "there are alternatives to the Study Commission's proposal of creating a new university that ought to be considered in our judgment, the planning ought to be done before the University is created, not afterwards" (Wilner Report, 1975).

This chapter has presented the political antecedents of higher education in Maryland from 1935 to 1975. These political antecedents provided for an uncertain future for UMES. In 1975, the future of the University was still in doubt, however, William Hytche accepted an interim appointment as Chancellor.

Chapter VI

Hytche: The Vision

Hytche became acting Chancellor of the University of Maryland Eastern Shore on July 1, 1975. He was not new to the University. Hytche was originally hired by the university in 1960 as an instructor of mathematics. During a 1990 interview with Hytche, he noted that he came to UMES by accident. He related that the University's head football coach, who was from Oklahoma, "came to Oklahoma State University to recruit a woman someone had told him about that was good in mathematics. And someone said to him, oh you don't want her, there's a boy here you ought to talk to named Bill Hytche." Further, Hytche reported that the coach could not find him, yet, he left word for him to call the Dean at Maryland State College. Hytche noted that the Dean did convince him to visit that summer. He then stated, "I was treated royally. . . and I found one of my freshmen college English teachers on the staff who told me I ought to really consider coming out here." According to Hytche, he was not convinced he should seriously consider the job because he had a home, was well established, and highly regarded as a math teacher (Hytche, 1990). His experience as a math teacher was at an all white high school, where he was the first black to integrate the system as a teacher (Hytche, 1990).

After returning to Oklahoma, Hytche called the Dean at Maryland State College, who offered him the job of math instructor at \$6,500 per year. Subsequent to negotiating

another \$500 as a part of his salary for moving expenses, Hytche accepted the position. He noted that at that time his teaching job in Oklahoma paid about \$3,200 and the superintendent of schools in Oklahoma was only making \$7,000. Hytche stated, "that was a big, big salary jump for me" (Hytche)!

After a few years as an instructor, Hytche returned to Oklahoma State University to pursue his doctorate degree. He noted, "I readily recognized the fact that in order to be truly successful and advance at the college level, I needed it." Hytche was awarded his Ed.D. in Math in 1968. Upon his return, Hytche reported that he was asked to take the position of Dean of Student Affairs (Hytche).

As Dean, Hytche was plunged into the middle of the Civil Rights Movement. In one corner were the students who demonstrated against discrimination practices of the town of Princess Anne and protested the conditions on campus. Another corner included the Maryland State College Administrators, who supported peaceful protests as the way to gain their fair share. Hytche stated, ". . . it was rough! Kids were burning down buildings and demonstrating." The Salisbury Daily Times (April, 1970), reported that, "On April 7, 1970, a total of 178 students' were arrested after staging demonstrations on campus protesting conditions at the school and demanding the resignation of President Williams." The students main grievances, according to a Baltimore Evening Sun article (April, 1970), were "inadequate facilities, including laboratories, equipment and building maintenance; the president's reported dismissal of at least two faculty members whom the

students supported; an inflexible curriculum and the need for more diversified courses . . . and an active black studies program."

Wennersten (1976) reported that the demonstrations and arrests brought the issues before the public. A report entitled "Demands and Recommendations from a Maryland State College Student Body" was submitted to the college's Administrative Council listing their grievances in detail. Almost every aspect of the college was criticized. Following the criticism of the college, the students attacked President Williams. The report provided that "he no longer has the confidence of the students at the institution, nor any perception of the students' needs . . . President Williams might have had the qualities in the past, he lacks imagination, perceptiveness, and foresight to lead Maryland State College . . . to meet the demands of a majority of Black students." According to Wennersten, the students enlisted the aid of alumni, parents, and politicians in their call for removal of President Williams. Wennersten further reported that black State Senator Clarence Mitchell (D-Baltimore City), supported the students and Secretary of State, Blair Lee, called President Williams "autocratic." Governor Marvin Mandel, Secretary Lee, students, alumni, and parents met in Annapolis to discuss the situation and to form a committee for the improvement of the college. At that meeting Governor Mandel acknowledged that the college's problems were partially financial and partially a question of leadership. Both the Salisbury Daily Times and the Washington Post (April, 1970) reported that the Governor all but assured students "that President Williams would not be named chancellor of the college when the new system was instituted."

In February of 1970, the Board of Regents had voted to accept Maryland State College as an equal branch of the University of Maryland System--provided that entrance requirements became the same as the other campuses (Salisbury Daily Times, February, 1970). Accordingly, the university would increase its budget for the Princess Anne campus and the State would also provide more funding. The new branch would have a president and a change in its academic thrust. The change took effect on July 1, 1970 (Salisbury Daily Times, February, 1970).

President Williams announced his retirement as of August 1, 1970 claiming that he was past sixty-five years of age (Board of Regents Minutes, June, 1970). When the new president was appointed, Hytche noted that he had weathered the turbulent 1960's and requested a transfer back to the classroom. Hytche reported that he was only back in the classroom two months before he was asked to assume the position of Head of the Department of Mathematics and Computer Science. He stated that his goal was to make "that Department one of the best departments on the campus." Hytche held that position for four years before he became the Chairman of the Division of Arts and Sciences (Hytche, 1990).

Although the university had become an equal branch of the University of Maryland System in 1970, it was still floundering in 1975. Archie Buffkins, who became the permanent chancellor at UMES on July 1, 1971, had provided four years of turbulent leadership. Any growth spurred by joining the system had become stagnant. Sheldon Knorr, former Commissioner of the State Board for Higher Education (1976-88), reported

that Buffkins was a destructive force for the University. Knorr noted that he alienated the Legislature, Central Administration, and the public's perception of the University. "He just didn't know how to communicate with people" (Knorr, 1993). Buffkins was removed after a confrontation with another administrator over a travel voucher. That incident was a prime example of the friction that existed among the administrators and the faculty (Washington Post, June, 1975).

Hytche reported that he was asked by the faculty to serve as acting chancellor during the school year 1975-76. Central Administration agreed with the faculty and Hytche became Acting Chancellor on July 1, 1975. That school year was one in which Hytche tried to bring a sense of togetherness and pride to the campus and the community. A study was conducted in 1974-75 that was requested by the Governor to report on the structure and governance of education in Maryland. One of the recommendations that occurred in a section of the report captioned "additional recommendations," provided for an "Eastern Shore University System" by combining the resources of Salisbury State and UMES (Wilner, May, 1975).

Upon taking office, Hytche immediately began the fight to save the University from the proposal for merger with Salisbury State. Hytche (1990) stated that the first thing he did was to put together the UMES Chancellor's Advisory Council. "I invited 28 members . . . influential community people hoping that I would at least get 15 and all 28 accepted." Tony Bruce, a prominent lawyer in the town of Princess Anne, was the chairman of the council. Bruce (1991) noted that the council consisted of local business

leaders, public school personnel, ministers, farmers, and other influential individuals from the tri-county area (Somerset, Wicomico, and Worcester). Bruce stated that everybody accepted the invitation for membership on the Chancellor's Advisory Council because we "realized that it (UMES) was an asset to the area . . . We started meeting just to learn more about the campus." Moreover, Bruce concluded that "Bill Hytche was unique . . . he was one of the few black faculty members to have been able to find a home in this community. . . we saw him as being more responsive to community needs . . ."

Herman Franklin, the Vice President for Administrative Affairs at UMES, reported that Hytche had inroads to the school hierarchy because "he owned a business in town (nightclub) . . . and as a result of owning that business he sat on the Town Business Council, the equivalent of the Chamber of Commerce" (Franklin, 1991).

According to Hytche (1991) and Tony Bruce(1991), the Council "went to bat," and marshalled its forces to lobby the Legislature. After little more than a year of extensive lobbying, the Legislature announced that they were not going to recommend closure or merger. Instead the Legislature requested the State Board for Higher Education to appoint a panel to "explore the feasibility of creating a single higher education institution on the Lower Eastern Shore using the existing educational resources of the two institutions" (Webb Report, November, 1977).

In discussing the university's struggle for existence, Hytche (1990) exclaimed, "See . . . there again was a disturbance of the progress of the campus! Let me go back just to put a footnote in here . . . because this campus, as all black schools have had a lot

of problems staying open . . . but this campus has had more than its share . . . in that the name for this institution has been changed about six times. Each time the name changed the philosophy or the direction of the institution would change . . . even to the extent that the curriculum would change in many instances. I use an analogy of a farmer with a garden who goes out into his garden . . . pulls up a plant, looks at the roots, sticks it back into the ground . . . a week later he goes and pulls it up again, consequently the plant never grows . . . and that's what has happened to this campus."

On May 6, 1977, the State Board for Higher Education appointed a seven-member panel to study the feasibility of merging UMES and Salisbury State into one institution. The panel was chaired by John W. T. Webb, a prominent lawyer from Salisbury. Knorr (1993) reported that J. T. Webb was chosen as chair because he had the clout and guts needed to put the issue to rest. Hytche and the UMES family were concerned about the composition of the panel because there was only one member directly involved in higher education. The others were essentially representative of the business community and elementary and secondary education (Webb Report, 1977).

Again Hytche requested the support of his Advisory Council to insure that the panel heard all of the facts and recognized the potential of the University. Tony Bruce recalled that Hytche and the Advisory Council decided to prepare some recommendations to get UMES and Salisbury State off of a collision course. Abe Spinak, current chair of the Advisory Council and former Assistant Director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Wallops Island Flight Center, reported (1991) that both UMES

and Salisbury State "had similar missions, although this school (UMES) had an agricultural mission, they both had a similar teachers college, liberal arts type mission. So we recommended that we bring programs here that we could keep the place unique; tracks that would focus on professional careers."

According to Tony Bruce the Advisory Council members and Hytche began to talk with some of the community people who had contacts at both institutions. "By the time the hearings were set up, we were able to pull several hundred residents in . . . in support of this campus . . . political, business as well as the social and ethnic support . . . The Somerset County Farm Bureau supported this campus . . . not a black person in the Somerset County Farm Bureau. The County Commissioners, the town commissioners, the Mayor and Council of Crisfield endorsed the campus" (Bruce, 1991).

Hytche appeared before the panel on August 3, 1977 and presented suggestions in four major categories. The first category dealt with program duplication entered into by Salisbury State. "Art, music, physical education, and business administration were for some time the most promising programs UMES had with respect to attracting "other" race students and to building enrollment. And they were low in cost when compared with agriculture, home economics, and industrial education. They were our avenues to reducing overall per-student costs . . . physical education and business are particularly sensitive matters. Physical education held promise for growth on the UMES campus until we experienced the inequity of a one million dollar "bare bones" gymnasium on the UMES campus and a 5.1 million dollar physical activity facility at Salisbury State. Under

these circumstances, we can only anticipate that recruiting students for this program at UMES will be extremely difficult at best. Yet five years from now we will be asked to explain our enrollment trend at UMES in the area of physical education when the support facilities, constructed by the same state, are so vastly different. Then there is the program in business administration, the principal link between a college and the business/industrial community. And again, the program has been duplicated at Salisbury State College” (Hytche, 1977).

Hytche added, “the overall effect of the duplication at SSC has been to divide an already limited pool of students, the majority of whom might otherwise have been enrolled at UMES. It has obviously had a very negative effect on enrollment growth at the Eastern Shore campus while producing a very positive effect on enrollment at SSC. With the decline in enrollment at UMES has come an increase in per-student costs and decreased opportunity for state funds to develop new programs and facilities since enrollment is perceived to be the primary criteria for funding” (Hytche, 1977).

The second major topic Hytche discussed was the status of cooperation between the two institutions. He maintained that "cooperation could not be left to the initiatives of the institutions as long as there is an imbalance in the capabilities of the institutions to obtain funding and other resources. Such an imbalance provides no incentive for the more privileged institution to cooperate, and casts the lesser institution into a compromising and inferior bargaining position. The result is, at best, unilateral efforts on behalf of the lesser institution and, at worst, an adversarial relationship between

institutions even with the best of personalities heading the two institutions. This has historically been the case in the UMES-SSC situation” (Hytche, 1977). Hytche noted that several attempts for a cooperative agreement had been initiated either by UMES or the Maryland Council for Higher Education (MCHE) during the late 60’s and early 70’s. A cooperative agreement was finally realized in August 1981. The agreement included pooling manpower, sharing specialized courses, developing future degree programs that would not be duplicated, exchanging faculty members. As an example of the give-and-take by both institutions, UMES received a degree program in computer science while SSC got the master's program in business administration that both wanted (Baltimore Sun, July, 1984).

The third subject discussed by Hytche was facilities. The Chancellor again referenced the "bare bones" gymnasium at UMES and the physical activities facility at SSC to highlight his concern over how a facility has a long-range influence on a program and enrollment. Hytche also noted that there were some quality buildings on campus. However, there were a number of obsolete buildings on the 500-plus acre campus. Thus, the obsolete buildings skewed the computation of square feet per student. Accordingly, maintenance costs increased with the aging and obsolete structures. Finally, Hytche stated, "The Catch 22 relates to present enrollment and projected enrollment . . . It is extremely difficult to obtain a favorable hearing with any State agency for new buildings on a college campus against the background of rumors of closing, of merger, of redirection and declining enrollment, especially when the present square footage record is

not correctly discounted for obsolete plants . . . What magic are we expected to perform in attracting students to programs with inferior facilities . . .” (Hytche, 1977).

Costs were the final area Hytche chose to discuss. He stated up front that per-student costs were high at UMES. Some of the reasons cited by Hytche for the high costs were its land-grant tradition of hands-on programs in agriculture, home economics, and mechanical arts; remedial education programs; an obsolete physical plant; and low enrollments (Hytche, 1977). For years all state and federally generated reports concerning per-student costs had listed UMES as the highest among the public colleges in Maryland, as well as the highest among public historically black colleges within the United States.

In Hytche’s concluding remarks to the Webb Task Force, he suggested that the panel consider the issue of desegregation. He maintained that the state had formally committed itself to desegregating public institutions of higher education and concomitantly enhancing its historically black institutions. "The courts and the federal government have also demonstrated intentions to reinforce that commitment through the ruling in the case of *Adams v. Califano*, and by the guidelines published recently by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. It suggests that if there is to be a merger, it must have the effect of preserving and enhancing UMES as an institution. The same criteria would apply to any change in structure and governance. This concept of desegregation clearly underscores my position that UMES should be developed as an attractive university for the region, and, at the same time, would accommodate the

position of the Board of Regents to incorporate Salisbury State College into the University of Maryland System” (Hytche, 1977).

The panel, which was officially named the Lower Eastern Shore Task Force, solicited opinions from all areas of the communities directly affected. The Task Force conducted four open hearings that resulted in 900 pages of testimony. Further, there were more than 200 position statements read and analyzed by the Task Force. Chairman Webb reported that the Task Force met fourteen times over the six-month period and reviewed detailed educational, fiscal, enrollment, and program information on both institutions. All conclusions and recommendations provided in the Task Force's report, popularly known as the Webb Report, were unanimous. In the cover letter transmitting the report, Mr. Webb stated, "We believe that our recommendations, if implemented in good faith, will remove the uncertainties surrounding the future of both institutions, and will provide genuine and needed higher educational opportunity for all citizens not only of the region, but also of the State” (Webb Report, 1977).

Recommendations of the Webb Task Force

The Webb Task Force provided nine recommendations. (See complete text of Webb Report Recommendations in Appendix A) In response to their primary task of determining whether merging UMES and Salisbury State was feasible, the Task Force concluded, “The history of neglect by the University of Maryland and its concentration of resources on College Park to the exclusion of the rest of the State, make this alternative absurd, and intolerable to the region. Further, the Task Force added that swallowing up a

small black institution in a large white institution would be intolerable to blacks and politically impossible in view of the University of Maryland's posture. Moreover, the Webb Task Force maintained that there was no assurance that funds would be available in the future for rehabilitation and enhancement. In summary, the Webb Task Force stated, "we believe the educational needs of the Lower Eastern Shore, at this stage of the area's history, require two separate institutions, but with specific roles and missions clearly defined to prevent duplication of resources and to maximize choice based on the quality of program" (Webb Report).

Following the Task Force's recommendation on the question of merger, they believed it was also their responsibility to address the future roles of both UMES and Salisbury State. In that regard, the Task Force recommended that Salisbury State should offer the traditional liberal arts curriculum and UMES should be a science-oriented institution, with graduate and undergraduate programs in marine, estuarine and environmental sciences and in agriculture. Additionally, the Task Force recommended that there be no limitation on out-of-state enrollment for UMES; Salisbury State's enrollment should be limited for the foreseeable future to 3,300; both institutions should maintain their developmental programs until some other source of remedial programs is available to the Eastern Shore region; a comprehensive performance evaluation of UMES should be made by a qualified independent consultant, focusing especially on management procedures, student services, and physical plant utilization; the State of Maryland should develop with Delaware and Virginia tri-state reciprocal arrangements designed to reduce the cost to the Maryland taxpayer of out-of-state students from these

states; the State Board for Higher Education should create an oversight mechanism to assure compliance by the respective institutions with the policy directions outlined above; and the Princess Anne-Somerset community should take active steps to improve its relationship with UMES (Webb Report).

The Webb Report had provided the most significant acknowledgment that UMES had the potential to positively impact the entire Eastern Shore of Maryland, given sufficient resources and marketable programs. Hytche and his Advisory Committee had been successful in getting representatives of the local communities to either present testimony at the hearings or submit written statements. There were individuals who presented oral testimony that represented the state and local governments, the state and local NAACP, both institutions' faculty, UMES alumni and students, Boards of Trustees for the State Universities and Colleges, Board of Regents of the University of Maryland System, and the chief administrators of both UMES and SSC (Webb Report, 1977).

Following the acceptance of the Webb Report by the State Board for Higher Education, the president of the University of Maryland System appointed a task force to develop a plan for enhancing the University of Maryland Eastern Shore. Until this time, Hytche's administration had been operating in a crisis mode. Emphasis had been placed on survival and providing a calm atmosphere with level-headed leadership. Although proposals for enhancing the University had been put forth in the past, Hytche believed that this was his greatest opportunity for actually seeing some positive results. The Webb

Report had not only documented the years of neglect that UMES had suffered under the UM System, but it highlighted the duplication and lack of new programs at UMES.

The report of the task force on enhancing UMES was entitled "A Prospectus for the University of Maryland Eastern Shore." The Prospectus was in part a response to a State Board of Education request, yet, more importantly it was the vehicle used by UMES and the University of Maryland to set forth the role and mission for UMES within the University System. It was made clear that this document was supported by not only UMES and the System, but the Board of Regents as well. Further, the Prospectus called attention to the fact that its fulfillment would require a commitment of effort and resources by the State that would be significantly greater than that which characterized the past.

One of the significant ingredients in getting the Prospectus completed and accepted was the selection of John Toll as the new president of the University of Maryland. Toll began his tenure on July 1, 1978. From 1953-1965 he had served as Chairman of the Department of Physics at the University of Maryland. Toll had previously served as president of the State University of New York at Stony Brook from 1965-1978. The Washington Post (1978) reported that "when Toll assumed the presidency at Stony Brook, the school had about 1,200 full and part-time students, and according to the Long Island newspaper Newsday, the eight years of its existence had been characterized by chaos, drift, and indecision . . . By the time Toll left, the state of New York had spent about a half-billion dollars building the Stony Brook campus,

enrollment had swelled to 17,000 and Toll had been remarkably successful in attracting top academicians . . . "

Toll had replaced Wilson H. Elkins as president of the University System. Elkins had been president for 24 years. It was during Elkins' administration that UMES had experienced both limited growth and chronic neglect. UMES had become a full branch of the UM System under Elkins. However, the physical plant was somewhat obsolete; there had been no new programs in over 30 years; the enrollment had declined; and per-student costs were the highest in the system. During Elkins administration, the University of Maryland had grown to be one of the five largest universities in the country. Knorr (1993) reported that Elkins' primary priority to the neglect of others was the University of Maryland College Park. When Toll took over he stated that his number one priority was "to put the University of Maryland on a par with leading state universities as the University of California at Berkeley or the University of Wisconsin or the University of Michigan. Toll believed that the period of expansion was over and it was now time to emphasize quality" (Washington Post, 1978).

Toll believed that in order to raise the academic reputation of the System, all of its parts needed to be enhanced. Accordingly, Toll determined that UMES needed the most attention. Within days of his appointment as president, Toll met with Hytche to discuss what he and his faculty felt were the most important steps to be taken for overall enhancement and improvement of UMES. At that meeting, Toll noted that he and Hytche agreed to develop a Prospectus for UMES (Toll, 1991).

In an interview with Toll (January, 1991), he stated that at the time of his appointment "all new degree programs by law had to be approved by the State Board for Higher Education. The Board was taking the doctrine that there should not be any duplication. That made it very difficult for UMES to get new programs approved for many years given this atmosphere" (Toll, 1991). Hytche reported on several occasions that UMES had not had any new programs in 33 years prior to 1978.

The Prospectus embodied the primary vision of Hytche, the collective thinking of the UMES curriculum committee, and to a lesser degree input from Toll. It was noted by Toll that "The bulk of the Prospectus was done by Bill (Hytche)" (Toll, 1991).

Toll reported that the Prospectus was submitted to the State Board for Higher Education a month-and-a-half after he came. "We worked very hard to build support for it. We met with Jack Webb and the Greater Salisbury Committee and to everybody's (State higher education community) surprise . . . Bill Hytche and I . . . and I give most of the credit to Bill, persuaded them to agree to support the plan. We had a press conference in which the Greater Salisbury Committee announced that they were supporting the UMES Prospectus" (Toll, 1991).

The Prospectus was presented to the State Board under the signatures of Hytche, Toll, and B. Herbert Brown, Chairman of the Board of Regents. It was a comprehensive plan to strengthen UMES. In addition to the primary vision of Hytche, and to a lesser degree Toll, and the long-range curriculum plan developed by the UMES faculty, the content of the Prospectus included some of the ideas from the Webb Report, and some

program proposals that had already been approved by the Board of Regents. Further, the Prospectus incorporated some of the concerns of the community, State Board for Higher Education and the Maryland Legislature.

One of the key ingredients of the Prospectus was that it clearly outlined a role for UMES in the University System. In its statement of principle the Prospectus stated, "UMES will become the University's major presence on the Eastern Shore, performing the range of instructional, research, and service functions of a university campus. The intention is to utilize the resources of the total University in providing services of university level, wherever appropriate, on the Eastern Shore. In this way, the University will act as a major catalyst in the social and economic development of the region" (Prospectus, 1978).

As a part of the introduction to the actual plan, the drafters called attention to the fact that fulfillment of the plan, as outlined, would require a commitment of effort and resources significantly greater than that which characterized the past. It was noted that the University was willing to put forth the effort, but effort alone would not be enough. Considerable support was needed from other units of the University as well as increased efforts to obtain outside funding. However, it was most important to emphasize the need for State support beyond prior experience (Prospectus, 1978).

The Summary Statement of the Prospectus outlined and requested the following in pertinent part:

1. The University would establish a work force drawn from throughout the University to work with Hytche in carrying out identified changes.
 2. The objective of the University was to make UMES the focal point of the University's activities on the Eastern Shore.
 3. The University will continue to involve UMES as a partner within the system, sharing both human and physical resources.
 4. New and interrelated majors will be added at UMES.
 5. Facilities will be brought up to a competitive level of quality and the cost of their maintenance will be related to the functions they serve.
 6. Costs estimates will indicate consistency with per student costs at other Maryland four-year public institutions.
 7. Research efforts at UMES will be coordinated with other research units of the University and supportive services will be provided.
 8. Both Salisbury State and UMES will share the responsibility for sustaining cooperative efforts between the two campuses.
 9. The academic programming presented in the Prospectus addresses regional needs and in some instances Statewide needs (Prospectus, 1978).
- (Complete text of the nine items cited above is in Appendix B)

Finally, the Prospectus was submitted to the State Board for Higher Education on August 1, 1978. Toll reported that they had worked very hard to garner support for it. He stated, “We met Jack Webb and the Greater Salisbury Committee, and to everybody’s surprise . . . Bill Hytche and I, and I give most of the credit to Bill . . . persuaded them to agree to support the plan. We had a press conference in which the Greater Salisbury Committee announced that they were supporting the UMES Prospectus” (Toll, 1991). The State Board for Higher Education also agreed to support the Prospectus.

The Prospectus was the vehicle through which Hytche's vision for UMES became a reality. It was the developmental foundation for the future of UMES.

Chapter VII

The Strategy

Since the founding of UMES in 1886 until the summer of 1978, the University had waged an ongoing battle to survive, fighting off one effort after another to merge UMES with SSU, closure, or various other recommendations such as being converted into a correctional facility. Finally, as a request from the State Board for Higher Education, UMES had been given an opportunity to provide explicit detail on what it had the potential to become and the road map that would get it there. With the hiring of Toll, UMES took full advantage of his goal to put the University of Maryland on a par with the University of California at Berkeley, University of Wisconsin, or University of Michigan. Toll firmly believed that to strengthen the University you must build up its weakest link . . . UMES. Supported by the Board of Regents, Hytche and Toll joined forces to develop their vision for UMES -- the Prospectus, a comprehensive plan of action to strengthen UMES.

Hytche (1990) had noted that, "We have to play defense so often . . . any team whose defense is on the field all the time very seldom wins. You've got to have some offense! So that's another thing I've got to watch, when do we play offense and get off that defensive field? That's a real struggle that black colleges and universities have to deal with. And the leader who can make the right decisions about the defensive and offensive teams, that's the one who's going to win the game." Accordingly, the

Prospectus was Hytche's and the UMES family's greatest offensive strategy in the history of the institution. If we consider the Prospectus UMES' game plan, then Toll assumes the role of head coach and Hytche both the offensive coordinator and quarterback.

Thus, on August 10, 1978, the State Board approved the Prospectus. Hytche noted that approval of the Prospectus meant that five new programs (one graduate and four undergraduate) had been approved. "I want you to know that those were the first new programs approved for this campus in 33 years! Thirty-Three years!! The first stand-alone program for the campus in its entire history at the graduate level. . . Guidance and Counseling. The Commissioner turned to me and said, Dr. Hytche, today is August 10th, school starts on August 23rd, are you planning on starting this program this semester? I said, Yes! The Commissioner said, well you know you must have at least 10 students to start the program! I said, Mr. Commissioner that's my problem! He let me do it. Well I want you to know that when we started school we had 33 graduate students enrolled in the program. So. . . now you ask the question, why or how could you start this program? And this is a part of John Toll's support for me. He sent a list of faculty resumes from the Baltimore and College Park campuses. He told those chancellors we've got to help Bill Hytche. We chose from this select group of faculty people we wanted to come to campus to help us with the graduate courses" (Hytche, 1990).

During the course of data analysis the researcher identified the following areas as components of Hytche's strategy for addressing the future of UMES:

1. The Work Force/Collaboration

2. Faculty Recruitment
3. Advisory Council/Community Involvement
4. Honors Program
5. Costs
6. Student Recruitment
7. Research
8. UMES/SSU Agreement

The Work Force/Collaboration

It was clear that fulfillment of the plan outlined in the Prospectus would require a commitment of effort and resources significantly greater than that which had characterized the past. Toll and Hytche had proposed a work force from individuals throughout the University system to work with them to carry out the changes identified in the plan. The work force included individuals with special competence in academic standards of performance, academic programming, student services, long-range planning, and fiscal management. Participants on the work force were formally given part-time assignments but sufficient time was allotted as needed to carryout each task (Prospectus, 1978).

The work force related directly to Hytche's office at UMES. Members of the work force included its chair, the Director of Articulation of the system's Central

Administration; Assistant Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs at College Park; Associate Dean of the College of Agriculture at College Park; Chancellor of the University of Maryland at Baltimore (UMAB); Associate Professor of Education at the University of Maryland Baltimore County (UMBC); Professor of Mechanical Engineering from College Park; Dean of the School of Social Work and Community Planning from UMAB; Executive Assistant to the Chancellor at UMES; Assistant Provost, Division of Arts and Humanities, College Park; and support services from Central Administration's Director of Budget, Director of Planning, and Consultant in Athletics (Prospectus).

Ruth Young (1981) reported that the process of forging a new identity for UMES required not only the willingness of other campuses to be supportive and helpful but they had to change their perceptions of UMES and recognize its new mission and goals. "Full partnership in a university system depends almost as much on being recognized as a full partner as it does on performing as one" (Young).

One of the keys to changing the perception of others was the 5/5 University seminars designed by the work force. Essentially five faculty members were selected from each of the then five campuses of the system to attend a series of seminars. The long-range goals of those interactions were to provide faculty members from the different campuses an opportunity to:

1. Meet and gain a better understanding of the challenges facing each;

2. Compare teaching approaches and techniques;
3. Review research activities;
4. Study new thrusts in public service; and
5. Stimulate future interaction, particularly in such areas as joint research and publication (Young).

The work force proved most effective in providing Hytche and UMES with human resources that previously were unattainable. Members of the work force were also able to see first-hand the academic and research potential that UMES held if it was cultivated through appropriate funding and support from Central Administration and the State.

Faculty Recruitment

With the State Board's approval of the Prospectus and the five new programs, Hytche and Toll needed to immediately recruit faculty and staff. The strategy employed by them was to utilize the services of faculty from other campuses in the University system. Hytche noted that Toll sent resumes to UMES from which faculty were selected to come to the campus and teach. In one instance, Toll sent to UMES resumes from faculty at UMBC and the College Park campus to be considered for the new graduate program in Guidance and Counseling. "They flew here every Tuesday and Thursday evening for three semesters until we could get ourselves on solid footing. At that time we had about 46% of our faculty with terminal degrees. Today, I can boast of the fact that

we have about 81% with terminal degrees and in the tenure track . . . 91% of our faculty have terminal degrees” (Hytche, 1990).

While Hytche had picked the faculty from a select group of resumes supplied by Toll, the work force provided the coordination among the campuses to meet the growing need for faculty. One of the creative ways used by UMES to get and retain faculty were dual appointments at UMES and their home campus. Further, Hytche reported, "I was trying to go out and get good faculty members and John Toll supported me in paying these folks. In other words I was bringing some people in here, seasoned faculty from other universities, strong people . . . I paid them Johnny-on-the-spot more money than some of our people who have been here for years . . . but I had to build and I had to build at such a fast rate. In order for black institutions to do well you have to be instant, almost like black athletes. Any time you see these black athletes out there playing on these major colleges and the pros . . . they are super players! Instant players! The minute they hire you, they want you to be able to be on the first team! Well, that's basically the problem we have being a black institution. I had to go for it and go for it fast! I had to do a lot of that. I had to do a lot of things without faculty approval” (Hytche).

Hytche noted that his faculty did not immediately agree with the direction in which he was trying to move UMES. He stated, "I wanted to become unique and I wanted to develop programs where students could get jobs . . . I had to convince them (faculty) all along for a program in Hotel and Restaurant Management, Construction Management Technology, Engineering Technology and Poultry Management. My

faculty said what in the world are you trying to do make a technical school out of us” (Hytche)? Hytche added that although he moved fast with the support of Toll, he realized that the campus faculty must be kept abreast of what was happening. "You can't just run over people. To lead them, you've got to take them right with you” (Hytche).

Hytche reviewed the resumes of all personnel hired at UMES until the mid-eighties. His desire was to hire superstars. Mortimer Neufville, Dean of the School of Agricultural Sciences noted that when he was recruited, Hytche made all the contacts. "He called me constantly," stated Neufville (1991). Similarly, Chester Hedgepeth, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences reported that Hytche was the first person to greet him when his plane landed and took him to dinner. Hedgepeth stated, "That impressed me . . . not only that he took the time out to interview me himself, but that he was interested in my future, what I was doing and where UMES was at that point . . . (1991)." Also, John Mishler (1991), Dean of Graduate Studies and Research, reported that he came to UMES because of conversations with Hytche and the promise that he would get the support at UMES to do research similar to what he had previously done.

Regarding the faculty, Franklin noted that Hytche early on stated that UMES needed to get a greater percentage of faculty with terminal degrees in their chosen profession. Franklin recalled that Hytche stated, "We need to get people with international or national credibility in terms of their own credentials and their ability to espouse in their chosen fields." One of the people cited by Franklin was Raymond

Blakely, Head of the Department of Physical Therapy. Franklin noted that he was one of the very few black Ph.D. recipients in Physical Therapy in the country (Franklin, 1991).

The Advisory Committee

A major strategy used by Hytche as soon as he began his tenure was the creation of an Advisory Council. His primary purpose in establishing this council was to involve the community, especially the business community, in helping to promote and assist the University in any way that they could. This Advisory Council was very instrumental in helping to develop, sponsor, and staff some of the new programs approved by the State Board.

The relevance of the Chancellor's Advisory Council was clearly explained by Franklin and Abraham Spinak, Director of the Airway Science Program. Franklin noted that what Hytche did with the Advisory Council was to establish subcommittees. Each subcommittee had academic interests in particular programs. "We have developed as a result of that Hotel and Restaurant Management, Industrial Education and Technology, Physical Therapy, and Computer Science. In later years we've come up with Airway Science. Well, if you look at it, theoretically, each one of these Departments has an advisory council, but sitting on the Chancellor's Advisory Council is a person who might be chairing the Department's advisory council, but they expand it to include people from those industries. In Industrial Education for example, the chairman sits on the Chancellor's Advisory Council, but he has a committee of people who are construction

industry people who helped develop the curriculum to make it relevant to the construction industry. It has worked very well for us” (Franklin, 1991).

Spinak (1991) reported that the real leverage in the Chancellor’s Advisory Council is in its subcommittee structure. "As new professional programs were introduced, a subcommittee was established of people from the industry who were very interested in the program . . . My Airway Science Program has a committee. I don't know what I would have done without them. I have members from the FAA (Federal Aeronautics Administration), State aviation organization, plain businessmen, airline pilots, people who are interested in the graduates. Not only that each of the committees try to bring in role models . . . like we have minority pilots and air traffic controllers. It's powerful in terms of helping to get grants and it's an excellent tack to build a relationship with the outside world” (Spinak).

Clearly, Hytche was aware that if UMES would succeed, he needed the support of the community. From barbecues at his home, to monthly meetings with all of the local mayors and members of their staffs, to special events on campus, Hytche invited the community. Inviting the community leaders to the campus was an effective method of salesmanship and marketing utilized by Hytche. Once on campus, Hytche believed that he could sway nonbelievers that UMES was viable and bursting with potential for the Eastern Shore.

Bruce (1991) reported that the Advisory Council recommended that Hytche invite the mayors of the Lower Eastern Shore to meetings. "Initially it built the foundation for

his support in the community. When the Hotel and Restaurant Management program was established . . . what was just a meeting for dinner at his home became the super event of the year for them. They (the mayors) established an organization and started meeting and began to learn about the institution. They became a source for good students as well as a public relations outlet for the University. So if you go to the little town of Hurl in Dorchester County now . . . the whole big business there is a pickle factory, but they know . . . they and everyone of their Councilmen and everyone that works in the town office there knows the University of Maryland Eastern Shore. Three to four hundred mayors have been invited during Hytche's tenure” (Bruce).

Bob Cook, Director of the Greater Salisbury Committee, recalled that he took Richard Henson, owner of regional airline, to a banquet at UMES in 1985. Cook noted that Mr. Henson had never been on campus. Cook (1991) added, "It really looked run down back then . . . it's getting a lot better, a lot better”. After dinner, Mr. Henson said, this is a wonderful place! I never dreamed that this was here! But, boy it needs a lot of work doesn't it? Wonder what I can do to help” (Cook, 1991)? Following that visit, Henson talked with Hytche and agreed to give UMES a gift annuity of \$2,000,000. However, being an astute businessman, Henson talked to the Governor and told him that the campus looked terrible. Henson then promised to give the two million dollars to UMES only if the Governor agreed to fix-up the campus and not just make superficial improvements. Cook further noted that as a result of that maneuver by Henson, UMES was awarded substantial funding for physical improvements.

Honors Program

A major piece of the Prospectus was implementation of the Honors Program. Toll was the key figure in the development and implementation of the Honors Program. During Toll's tenure at Suny-Stony Brook a similar honors program had begun. The purpose of the program was to provide "high quality undergraduate programs to academically talented students, particularly those from professionally underrepresented groups within the State" (The Honors Program, 1991).

"Specific educational and operational goals of the program are: 1. to increase the number of highly qualified students underrepresented in the professions; 2. to strengthen the academic preparation of students to professional and graduate schools; and 3. to serve as a model enrichment program, in terms of quality, for comparable historically black institutions (The Honors Program)." Toll reinforced the three goals and added that The Honors Program was established with "a series of mutually reinforcing objectives: (1) to enhance UMES; (2) to attract good students to UMES; (3) to get more medical students into the medical school; and (4) to help integrate UMES and UMAB" (Toll, 1991).

There was one Honors Program. However, a student meeting the admissions requirements could elect to pursue one of three components of the program. The UMES-UMAB Honors Program was introduced into the curriculum in the fall of 1979. As its primary purpose was to overcome under-representation of minority groups, students in rural areas, and women in allied health, dentistry, law, medicine, nursing, pharmacy, physical therapy, and social work, students who entered the program at UMES as

freshmen, or sophomores were simultaneously tracked to the appropriate professional school at the Baltimore campus (The Honors Program, 1991).

The second component of the Honors Program was a cooperative effort between the Virginia-Maryland Regional College of Veterinary Medicine and UMES. Minority Maryland students seeking to pursue a career in veterinary medicine were the reason the program developed. Finally, the third component of the Honors Program was called the General Honors Program. The purpose of this program was to provide "outstanding programs at the baccalaureate level for academically talented students aspiring to attend graduate school or seeking to obtain immediate career opportunities following graduation from UMES" (Honors Program).

Requirements for admission into the program were each student: 1. must have graduated from an accredited high school; 2. successful preparation in the sciences, mathematics, and humanities; and 3. above average SAT scores. Performance requirements included maintaining a 3.00 grade point average or better in all honors courses on a semester basis and cumulatively in all courses taken. Before entering UMAB or the Regional College of Veterinary Medicine students must have passed the required entrance examinations (Honors Program).

An Honors Program Committee that included faculty and administrators from UMES, UMAB, and the Virginia-Maryland Regional College of Veterinary Medicine was responsible for the organization and administration of the Program. The Committee's responsibility included the admission of students, development of curricula,

academic and personal advisement, guidance and counseling, and the evaluation of both the students and the Program. Students were continually motivated and monitored by the professional school faculty (Honors Program).

Toll and Hytche were able to convince the UMAB faculty/administration, Board of Regents, State Board for Higher Education, and the State Legislature that the Honors Program had unlimited potential throughout the State. The Honors Program launched a three-pronged attack on the under-representation of minorities in the professions; the increased integration of UMES and UMAB; and enhancing the overall academic quality of UMES and the caliber of students admitted.

Costs

UMES traditionally had the highest per-student costs of any institution in the University of Maryland system. The Maryland Council of Higher Education (MHEC) reported in 1974 that the total unit cost per student at UMES was approximately \$3,640, compared with the average cost of \$2,097 for all Maryland public institutions. As indicated by Knorr (1993), most of the legislators did not understand the factors involved in per students costs and clearly did not understand why UMES' costs were more than College Park's. Franklin (1991) also reported that individual legislators out of ignorance of what existed at UMES, did not try to do anything to help. Hytche and Toll believed that the most effective strategy to effect change was to educate the Board and Legislators about the reasons for high costs and to present reasonable solutions.

Whenever the opportunity presented itself, Hytche and Toll noted that the presentations of UMES costs had disregarded programs, facilities, and student differences. Regarding program differences, it was pointed out that since UMES was an 1890 Land-Grant College, its programs emphasize laboratory courses, farms and farm buildings, and "hands on experiences." Low enrollment in the traditional land grant programs merely aggravated the high cost ratio.

Student Recruitment

To combat the low enrollment in the traditional land grant programs, UMES developed and was approved to offer a variety of new programs that would attract students and lead to employment. Physical Therapy, Hotel and Restaurant Management, Computer Science, Engineering Technology, Poultry Technology and Management were some of the programs initiated between 1978 and 1980. Several of the programs were unique to the State of Maryland while others were designed with the explicit goal of attracting students of all races and meeting statewide needs (Young, 1981).

The Prospectus provided insight on the obsolete and inadequate buildings on campus that helped to inflate the per-student costs. It was proposed that several of the obsolete and high maintenance cost buildings be razed. These were proposed to be replaced by constructing buildings that would accommodate related programs to meet contemporary educational and career needs. For example, a new structure was proposed to house Hotel/Restaurant Management, Business Administration, Business Education, Human Ecology, and Food Technology (Prospectus, 1978).

Traditionally, UMES has given special attention to a percentage of students who enter college with academic deficits. According to Franklin, UMES provides access to higher education for a class of students who otherwise could not go to college. Further, Franklin reported that Hytche had personally and publicly stated that as long as he was chancellor at UMES there would be a place for students who could not get into other universities, but who had the potential to go to college. "And out of that philosophy comes a great deal of optimism, enthusiasm, and sometimes failures . . . but it hasn't yet dampened his desire to put a different class of people in college than would otherwise not get there" (Franklin, 1991). Concomitantly, Toll (1991) stated, "The campus turns losers into winners. The atmosphere at UMES is one of helping students . . . nourishing them. Hytche embodies that spirit of nourishment. He sets the tone for the campus."

The development of the Honors Program was the centerpiece of the strategy to improve the overall quality of the students. Providing access to the State's professional programs was considered an inducement to applicants that could not fail. Increased enrollment, better quality of students, and enhanced desegregation of both UMAB and UMES were the achievable objectives of the Honors Program.

Finally, the admission standards for out-of-state students were raised. Toll had discovered that the SAT scores of students from other states averaged less than those within State. Therefore, by raising the admission standards, it would have the effect of decreasing the number of students from out of state and raising the overall quality of the student body (Toll, 1991).

Research

Hytche and Toll believed that to increase the research efforts at UMES, a coordinated effort with other units of the University would make UMES a full partner in the research program of the Maryland Agricultural Experiment Station. Full partnership included joint faculty appointments in Agriculture between UMES and the University of Maryland at College Park. Library resource support, centralized computer services on the College Park campus both for recordkeeping and for research support, joint seminars and other professional interaction were immediately pursued. Additionally, the Work Force was used to make other recommendations on the coordination of research activities between UMES and several of the other campuses of the system (Prospectus, 1978).

UMES/SSU Agreement

Finally, Hytche and Toll realized that in order for UMES to develop, there had to be sustained cooperative efforts between UMES and Salisbury State University (SSU). Toll (1991) recalled that Hytche worked out a series of agreements, culminating in a major agreement between UMES and SSU in August 1981. "Fields were identified that each would emphasize. Now Salisbury State got the typical Arts and Sciences program and Teacher Training, while UMES got Hotel/Restaurant Management, Poultry Management, and so on" (Toll). There was to be no more duplication as had previously occurred. Inter-campus registration and shared faculty resources were also proposed for several programs, such as Business Administration (Prospectus, 1978).

In conclusion, Hytche and Toll concentrated on four primary areas to insure the survival and development of UMES. New and unique academic programs, the Honors Program, inter-institutional cooperation, and community involvement. All of these areas complemented one another in the pursuit of increased enrollments, better quality of student, improved academic offerings, and an enhanced reputation and image. In summary, the strategy used employed the following components:

1. Linked UMES' future growth and development to the strategic interests of the State system;
2. Put UMES on the fast track for state support; gained state's political as well as financial support;
3. Moved on a broken front toward multiple targets to avoid linear sequential plan;
4. Developed an explicitly stated strategic plan;
5. Convinced faculty to support his (Hytche) vision;
6. Gently manipulated faculty through use of outsiders (both experienced professionals as well as vocal laymen from targeted constituencies); and
7. Established influential service contacts (e.g. mayors).

Chapter VIII

Turning Historical Disadvantage to Advantage

In the Quest for Institutional Survival and Improvement

The policy-making bodies of the state of Maryland continue to wrestle with their disposition toward race and racial segregation. Therefore, there has been a tendency for policy changes to be dictated or caused by outside forces, primarily the Federal government. An area where Hytche was particularly effective was in his ability to utilize governmental policy and rhetoric in order to effect positive change at UMES. This chapter comprises a description and analysis of the dynamics of Hytche's response to and utilization of the political climate in Maryland and the interventions of the Federal government, which included key Supreme Court decisions and the development of the Title III - Part B, Strengthening Historically Black Colleges and Universities program.

Although the Murray case officially opened all of the University's professional schools to Negroes in 1935, no Negro students were allowed to enter the University of Maryland until one month after the 1954 decision in the Brown v. Board of Education case. This monumental Supreme Court decision ordered integration in the public schools "with all deliberate speed." Although the University of Maryland could have delayed the matter, one month after the decision the Board of Regents declared that every branch of the University was open to all residents of Maryland without regard to race. That fall the

first two Negro undergraduates entered the University without incident. Maryland was the first Southern state to accept Negro undergraduates.

Throughout the history of UMES there have been numerous legislative and public calls for its abolishment, merger or retooling into something other than a state-supported four-year institution. These pre-Brown decision requests/recommendations were primarily driven by the desire to continue the Southern tradition of racial segregation. Following Brown, the college was often challenged because of racial prejudice and its existence highlighted the embarrassing support received from the State. Since the institution had the highest per student costs in the state, the poorest facilities of any institution in the state, the least prepared faculty, and the highest proportion of students requiring remedial education, it appeared that closing or merging UMES should have been accomplished rather easily. However, that was not the case.

In 1969, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) concluded that ten states (Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Virginia, Maryland, Florida, and North Carolina) were operating racially segregated higher education systems in violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Enrollment data was used by OCR to establish the violations. The racial enrollments at both the historically black colleges and the historically white colleges were essentially the same as they had been when they were legally segregated. In other words, the black schools were nearly all black and the white schools were still nearly all white.

Based on these findings, HEW requested the ten states to submit plans designed to desegregate their dual higher education systems (Garibaldi, 1984).

In 1970, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and Educational Fund, Inc., filed a class action law suit (*Adams v. Richardson*) against HEW stating that the agency had been derelict in its duty to enforce the Civil Rights Act because it had not taken steps to compel states to desegregate their racially segregated systems of higher education. The suit requested that HEW take action to cut off federal funds to these states. HEW responded by asking that the suit be dismissed because it had the authority to decide what actions, if any, should be taken against the ten states. Three years after the suit was filed, Judge Pratt of the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C. ruled that the states were in violation of the Civil Rights Act and that HEW must begin enforcement proceedings within 60 days (Garibaldi).

Prior to a ruling in the *Adams v. Richardson* case, two other cases that dealt with elementary and secondary education had a profound impact on the history of black colleges. In *Green v. County School Board* (1968), the Supreme Court decided that a school board's adoption of a "freedom-of-choice" plan for desegregation was not adequate to constitute compliance with the school board's responsibility to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis as directed by *Brown II*. Further, in *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education* (1971), the Supreme Court outlined the responsibilities of the local school authorities in eliminating racially separate public schools established and maintained by state action. Issues such as

personnel, transportation, maintenance of buildings, new construction and extracurricular activities were identified by the Court as areas to be addressed by the local authorities and courts in desegregating the states' dual school systems (Kirp and Yudof , 1974).

Maryland responded to HEW by submitting a plan for desegregation in 1971. That plan was subsequently updated in 1973. Following a review by OCR, Maryland's plan was rejected. The State submitted a new plan in 1974 that was deemed acceptable by OCR. After submitting its first mid-year desegregation status report to OCR , Maryland was informed that it had failed to execute its plan "promptly and vigorously." When Maryland was informed in December 1975 that OCR was referring the matter to HEW's Office of General Counsel for administrative fund termination proceedings, it brought suit against OCR and received an injunction against OCR to halt its termination proceedings (Enhancement Task Force, 1974).

Judge Pratt's ruling in the Adams case ensured that public historically black colleges would not be unilaterally or systematically eliminated in the name of desegregation. During HEW's appeal of Judge Pratt's decision, the National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (NAFEO), an organization of presidents of historically black institutions, participated as *amicus curiae*. NAFEO argued that the historically black public institutions had not practiced segregation and discrimination, and stressed that these institutions had a unique role in higher education. NAFEO further stated that the HBCUs had provided compensatory and reparative educational services to black students who had historically suffered from segregated school systems. The court

was swayed by NAFEO's argument and ruled that it was important that desegregation of public higher education be resolved on a state system-wide basis, rather than on an individual institutional basis (Garibaldi, 1984).

In a 1977 court action (*Adams v. Califano*), HEW was required to develop and issue specific criteria for the states to utilize in developing their desegregation plans. The criteria developed by HEW required the states to consider the unique role of HBCUs. The court specifically stated:

The process of desegregation must not place a greater burden on black institutions or black students' opportunity to receive a quality public higher education. The desegregation process should take into account the unequal status of the black colleges and the real danger that desegregation will diminish higher education opportunities for blacks. Without suggesting the answer to this complex problem, it is the responsibility of HEW to devise criteria for higher education desegregation plans which will take into account the unique importance of black colleges and at the same time comply with the Congressional mandate. It should be noted that the court's premise in the *Adams* case was that long-range planning offered the best and most realistic premise for desegregating within a reasonable time.

Even before the *Adams* case, the Federal government in 1966 created a discretionary grant program specifically to assist HBCUs. The program was Title III of the Higher Education Act (HEA), the Developing Institutions Program. Its purpose was to enhance the infrastructure of the HBCUs by supporting activities which strengthened

their academic quality, faculty, student support services, facilities, and administrative management. With this program the Federal government indicated that it recognized the significance of HBCUs in serving a high percentage of minority students and students from low-income backgrounds, their historical lack of financial support, as well as their potential to provide quality education and assist in equalizing the educational opportunities for minority and low-income students. The underlying aim of the program was to bring the HBCUs into the mainstream of higher education. However, by the early 1970's Title III's eligibility had been expanded to the point that even the University of Maryland and Harvard University were deemed eligible, thus the program never was able to reach its maximum capacity for HBCUs during the decade of the 1970's through the mid 1980's.

While the Federal government was trying to enforce its laws, creating policies and programs to address the issue of higher education for blacks, the state of Maryland was also addressing the issue. In submitting its plan for desegregation to HEW, Maryland made it clear that it recognized the unique and precious resource represented by its HBCUs. In the Foreword of the 1974 Maryland Plan it states:

This Plan should not be construed as a device to destroy the historically Black colleges. It is the clear intent of this Plan to enhance these institutions as open, quality colleges selected by students primarily on bases other than race.

Further, in carrying out this Plan, the historically Black colleges will not bear an unequal burden in the implementation of the desegregation process.

The 1974 Plan also established a bi-racial task force under the auspices of the Maryland Council of Higher Education (MCHE), to propose ways of enhancing the role and image of the public HBCUs in the State. The following are some of the more important task force recommendations:

1. A degree of conscientious funding . . . beyond the conventional funding must be provided to allow the historically Black public colleges to further enhance their role and image, and to develop internal management systems to achieve greater efficiency in realizing institutional objectives. We further recommend that this special funding be initially reflected in the Fiscal 1976 budget of the State of Maryland.
2. It is essential that each State College president receive professional and personal support from a body of public citizens who have a strong commitment to the welfare of the State Colleges . . .
3. The State College presidents must be delegated an increased degree of flexibility in handling their College's budget and academic affairs - this greater degree of fiscal autonomy to include an appropriate accountability system . . .
4. Each historically Black public college should develop its own specialty areas or programs within the total State system of higher education that will broaden the appeal of the institution to a more diverse student body. Adequate planning funds must be allotted for the research and development aspects of these specialty programs . . .
5. Each historically Black public college should be allocated adequate specific funds to conduct a full-scale public information program to inform the public, recruit students - - specifically including other-race students - - and to disseminate information to other institutions of higher education . . .
6. The historically Black public colleges should explore further possibilities for cooperation with other college campuses in the metropolitan Baltimore area . . .
7. Each historically Black public college should plan a program of internships in administration for interested and capable persons on their staff or new persons coming into the organization . . .

8. We recommend that special attention and funding be given to financial aid and other student-support service offices in these colleges. These offices must have a full complement of experienced personnel so that they can handle the unique problems at predominantly Black colleges, notably the problems contingent upon serving many students of a socio-economic level who in some instances exhibit a need for considerable financial and academic aid . . .
9. The Task Force further recommends that UMES develop selective undergraduate and graduate programs that utilize its close proximity to, and resources at, the Center for Environmental and Estuarine Science at Horn Point.

The preceding was the environment in which Hytche had to negotiate in order to get UMES into the mainstream of funding within the University of Maryland system. Clearly, it was the tradition of the State to underfund higher education in general, and HBCUs specifically. A State Board for Higher Education Enhancement Study (1982) revealed that Maryland ranked in the upper 20th percentile among states in terms of its per capita income, but in terms of its financial support for higher education the state ranked at the lower 20th percentile. The Enhancement Study further indicated that the share of State funds available to higher education declined by 3.4 percent between FY 1976 and FY 1980. During that same period, because of inflation, the purchasing power of the funds appropriated for higher education declined by 10 percent (Enhancement Study).

With the initiation of the Adams case and subsequent court decisions, it is possible that UMES would have survived as a separate institution without Hytche. The Senate of the Maryland State Legislature passed a resolution to officially merge UMES and Salisbury State initially in 1967. However, a Legislative Council studied the issue and recommended that the merger not take place at that time. The next time the issue of merging UMES and Salisbury State arose was in 1975. It is not clear that the Federal Government would have allowed a merger at this time with the advent of the Adams case.

What is clear was when Hytche assumed the office of chancellor, his initial task was to ensure the survival of UMES. He did two major things: (1) Fashioned his own strategic plan to coincide with the State's strategic plan regarding HBCUs as directed by the Adams case; and (2) Created a regional political resource within the state through his organization of business, political, and civic leaders to argue UMES' case to the legislature.

Hytche's testimony before the Webb Task Force, which was created by the legislature in 1976 to settle the issue of a proposed merger between UMES and Salisbury State College, dealt with four major categories:

- 1) Program duplication entered into by Salisbury State College;
- 2) The status of cooperation between the University of Maryland Eastern Shore and Salisbury State College;
- 3) Facilities; and
- 4) Costs.

That testimony presented by Hytche essentially laid the foundation for his strategic plan to get into the mainstream of the State's higher education funding. Regarding Salisbury State's duplication of programs such as physical education and music, Hytche indicated that the overall effect of the duplication has been "to divide an already limited pool of students, the majority of whom might otherwise have been enrolled at UMES. It has obviously had a very negative effect on enrollment growth at the Eastern Shore campus while producing a very positive effect on enrollment at SSC. With the decline in enrollment at UMES has come an increase in per student costs and

decreased opportunity for state funds to develop new programs and facilities since enrollment is perceived to be the primary criterion for funding” (Hytche, 1977).

Regarding the status of cooperation between UMES and SSC, Hytche noted that so long as there is an imbalance in the capabilities of the institutions to obtain funding and other resources, it puts the lesser institution into a compromising and inferior bargaining position. He added that historically, UMES had taken the initiative, made concessions and still had to bear the burden for lack of cooperation (Hytche).

In discussing facilities and costs, Hytche stated that many of his facilities were old and obsolete with maintenance increasing with the age of the buildings. He cited the proposed new programs in hotel/restaurant management and construction technology, both of which would need a new facility. Coupled with the lack of adequate facilities, Hytche noted the increased costs associated with an obsolete physical plant and traditional land-grant programs that require hands-on-instruction and are accompanied by low enrollments. In addition, Hytche reported that costs are also high because UMES serves a high percentage of students who enter college with academic deficits (Hytche).

To conclude his testimony before the Webb Task Force, Hytche declared, “We can no longer continue under a situation where the odds are clearly against us and we feel that it can only be remedied by action at the state level. At the very least, state policies and plans must be developed that will provide for: (1) the curtailment of unnecessary program duplication . . . ; (2) some realignment of duplicated programs in those areas where there is little, if any, capital investment in specialized facilities; (3) the development of new and unique programs at UMES; and (4) a clarification of the mission and role of UMES in terms of its status as a university campus, and in relation to SSC as a state college” (Hytche).

Hytche was very calculating in using the rhetoric of both the State and federal government during his concluding remarks which clearly played the “race card.” He stated, “The State has committed itself to desegregating public institutions of higher education and, at this time, enhancing its historically black institutions. The courts and federal government have also demonstrated intentions to reinforce that commitment through the ruling in the case of Adams v. Califano, and by the guidelines published recently by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. It suggests if there is to be merger, it must have the effect of preserving and enhancing UMES as an institution . . . This concept of desegregation clearly underscores my position that UMES should be developed as an attractive university for the region, and , at the same time, would accommodate the position of the Board of Regents to incorporate Salisbury State College into the University of Maryland” (Hytche).

The testimony presented by Hytche to the Webb Task Force not only gave him an opportunity to address the issue of merging UMES and SSC within the context of federal desegregation laws and policies but he was also able to frame the future role and mission of UMES. His testimony alone was not the only voice the Task Force heard supporting non-merger and a mainstream future for UMES. Hytche had convinced the members of his Advisory Board that UMES had tremendous potential for the students and businesses of the region if it was fully supported. Thus, many of the powerbrokers of the region testified on behalf of non-merger. However, there were some who testified against the merger not to support UMES but to maintain some resemblance of the traditionally segregated system of higher education as long as possible. The president of SSC also testified against the merger. He noted that Salisbury State and UMES were both needed to provide higher education on the Eastern Shore of Maryland. Further, he indicated that Salisbury State also had not received its fair share of funding from the State, especially

with its steadily increasing enrollment. Finally, he stated that it was a detriment to the growth of both institutions to be constantly studied and recommended for merger, closure, or reduced to a community college.

The final report submitted in November, 1977 by the Webb Task Force clearly indicated that they had been successfully influenced by Hytche and UMES' supporters. In its report, the Task Force indicated that they were asked to explore "the feasibility of creating a single higher education institution on the Lower Eastern Shore using the existing educational resources of the two institutions." The Task Force determined that "the educational needs of the Lower Eastern Shore, at this stage of this area's history, require two separate institutions, but with specific roles and missions clearly defined to prevent duplication of resources and to maximize choice based on the quality of program" (Webb). However, the Task Force reported that the problem was such that they needed to go beyond their identified purpose and make recommendations on the individual futures of both institutions.

The Task Force maintained that the genesis of the problem was embedded in the issues of race, relevancy, and resource allocation. In effect, the Task Force had extended the arguments against merger as presented by Hytche. They identified three documents that they had consulted:

1. The Maryland Plan to Complete the Desegregation of the State's Public Postsecondary Institutions and Addendum to the Plan, June 1974.
2. Report of the Task Force To Propose Ways of Enhancing the Role and Image of Predominantly Black Colleges in Maryland, August 1974.

3. Amended Criteria Specifying Ingredients of Acceptable Plans For Desegregating State Systems of Public Higher Education , (Adams v. Califano, Jr. Civil Action), Federal Register, Vol. 42, No. 155, August 1977.

Essentially, the recommendations of the Task Force were particularly supportive of the goals, recommendations and requirements of the three documents identified above. Specifically, the Task Force recommended clearly defined roles and missions for both institutions that were sufficiently unique and non-duplicative so as to attract students of both races to UMES and SSC. It was recommended that the University of Maryland College Park transfer all of its undergraduate and graduate programs offered by its School of Agriculture to UMES. In addition, the Task Force recommended that UMES receive support to develop programs in Environmental Science, Marine Biology, Sea Grant, Rural Studies, Forestry, and Veterinary Medicine. All of the new programs had been suggested to the Task Force via the UMES Curriculum Development Plan for 1975-1985. Concomitantly, it was recommended that there be a realignment of courses and degree programs within the two institutions which was consistent with the liberal arts role of SSC and the agricultural and scientific role of UMES (Task Force, 1977).

Additionally, the Task Force recommended operating and capital resource reallocation to assist in removing the physical evidence of past neglect of UMES; SSC 's enrollment should be capped to insure non-duplication and avoid unproductive competition for students in the region; and community support of UMES via its business leaders needs to increase in order for UMES to realize its potential (Task Force).

With the spectacular results of the Webb Task Force, Hytche was primed to press the case of UMES even more. He was aware that the State Board for Higher Education which was created on July 1, 1976 to coordinate the future development of higher education in Maryland also had a mandate to develop a statewide plan by July 1, 1978.

This plan was to include an identification of the role, function, and mission of each public postsecondary institution in the State.

Hytche realized that the future of UMES as an individual entity had begun to be mapped out and strengthened during the review and subsequent recommendations by the Webb Task Force. The momentum begun with the Webb Report was just a prelude to the significant events that would take place in the history of UMES during the next year. First would be the selection of John S. Toll as president of the University of Maryland System in the spring of 1978. Since Wilson H. Elkins had been the president of the University of Maryland for 24 years prior to the arrival of Toll, Hytche was not convinced that he had the full support of the system. As the history of UMES clearly illustrates, it floundered under the Elkins administration. Under Elkins, UMES did not have any new programs and was traditionally underfunded. Accordingly, Hytche looked forward to a new beginning under a different leader.

Even before Toll took office on July 1, 1978, Hytche had several meetings with Toll, who also visited the UMES campus. Hytche was able to convince Toll that UMES was unique and had the potential to serve all the citizens of Maryland as an equal educational partner within the system. As a result, Toll publicly stated that upgrading UMES was his top priority along with putting the University of Maryland on a par with leading state universities. Toll was aware that in order to transform the University into a top public state system he had to upgrade its weakest link, UMES. The Washington Post (1979) reported that when he took office July 1, Toll stunned aides with a dizzying work schedule that required three secretaries working in overlapping shifts from 7:30 a.m. until 9 or 10 p.m. One of his vice presidents told the Washington Post, "He seems to be working every waking minute . . . John is impossible. The minute he got here, he was

already running at full speed. He seems to be oblivious to anything like a normal schedule, including lunch periods” (Washington, Post).

Hytche (1993) reported that he and Toll just “hit it off immediately.” Their workaholic mentality was one of the key characteristics that Hytche and Toll had in common. Hytche, like Toll, worked long hours. Several administrative aides reported that they worried about Hytche’s health because he worked such long hours. Ronnie Holden (1991), UMES Vice President for Administration, stated that all the staff knew that “no matter how hard you worked, you would never be able to out work Hytche.”

Hytche and Toll agreed to put together a blueprint for the future of UMES and submit it to the Board of Regents first for their approval and then to the State Board for Higher Education to be included as a part of its statewide plan. This blueprint was appropriately called the Prospectus. It was required to be submitted by August 1, 1978, just 30 days after Toll officially took office. The Prospectus represented the collective wisdom of Hytche, the UMES Curriculum Development Plan 1975-1985, Toll, and the Webb Task Force.

As fully outlined in Appendix B and summarized in the previous chapter, the Prospectus provided parameters within which the rest of the members of the University system and the State would collaborate and work with UMES on issues such as research, joint faculty appointments, and enhancement and maintenance of facilities. Further, new and interrelated majors were presented that addressed regional and Statewide needs.

The Summary Statement of the Prospectus indicated that all who approved it agreed that there was “an awareness of the historical, legal, political, demographic, and economic circumstances which have made educational planning difficult at UMES . . .

With adequate support, the objectives can be accomplished (Prospectus, 1978). Hytche, Toll and B. Herbert Brown, Chairman of the Board of Regents, signed the Prospectus and presented it to the State Board for its approval.

Toll (1991) stated that it was Hytche who convinced the powerbrokers of the Eastern Shore to support the Prospectus. However, as reported in the Evening Sun (1978), Richard Kline, the vice president of the Board of Regents, stated that it was Toll's commitment to the plan, rather than the content that convinced him and several of the board members to support it. Kline stated, "Up to this point, I was leaning toward another solution . . . But now I'm thinking differently because the head guy's got his hind parts on the line" (Evening Sun). The comments by Kline reflected the traditional view of UMES as a "stepchild" during the administration of Wilson Elkins. If Toll had failed to fully exhibit his support for UMES, the Prospectus may not have become the blueprint for UMES' future.

As Toll's ultimate goal was to elevate the entire system, he knew that his goal would never be accomplished so long as UMES was a marginal institution. Hytche took advantage of the opportunity afforded him when he learned of Toll's ultimate goal. The Adams case saved UMES from closure or merger, but it was the political savvy of Hytche who orchestrated the results of the Webb Report and the Prospectus, both of which outlined a unique mission and mainstream programs for UMES. Hytche's ability to infuse his speeches and reports with the rhetoric of the Federal and State governments was a key to his success. He did not let the State forget that the Office of Civil Rights desegregation criteria would not allow an historically black college to bear the brunt of any desegregation plan and if there was a merger, the historically black college would survive as the lead institution. Additionally, he reminded the State that there was a State Plan to enhance its historically black public institutions. Finally, he had secured the

support of regional business, political and social leaders who were willing to help argue the case for UMES. These local leaders had been courted and convinced by Hytche that the future development of UMES would have a major impact on the economic and social development of the Eastern Shore. Perhaps most important in gaining their confidence was Hytche's strategic plan of exposing them to what the campus currently offered and providing personal invitations to social events on campus and his home. Further, Hytche was able to demonstrate, via his strategic plan, that both UMES and Salisbury State were needed to provide quality education on the Eastern Shore.

In an early interview with Hytche (1991), he noted that in order to get things done during those early years he had to move fast and gain the support of the faculty later. Essentially, Hytche had personally recruited and selected faculty and administrators that were loyal to him. Accordingly, Hytche was able to make unilateral changes at UMES consistent with his strategic plan as well as avoid campus revolt since his hand-picked staff provided him with a wide "zone of indifference." The administrative actions taken by Hytche were consistent with those normally exhibited by the leaders of other small institutions that were emerging into the mainstream of higher education. As UMES' future became stabilized, increased its financial strength and academic quality, the governance of UMES became more of a "managerial model." Garibaldi (1984) describes the "managerial model" as one in which the president and his senior administrators manage their institutions. Thus, Hytche was able to make many crucial decisions immediately while the institution was emerging.

What Can Be Learned From This Case Study

Finally, this case illustrates a situation in which major cultural and political issues are at stake (in this instance: segregation of the State's institutions of higher learning), institutional and systems leaders within the state have limited ability to shape events

affecting their dependent institutions. However, when those prevailing political and cultural values are challenged by a powerful, controlling outside authority, (in this case, the Federal judiciary) the resulting “stalemate” and accompanying chaos offer those same institutional and systems leaders an opportunity to influence subsequent events, particularly if they act in concert, as illustrated in this case involving Hytche and Toll.

Recommendations for Future Research

This case study serves as a beginning in filling the void in the research on black leadership in small minority institutions of higher education. However, it is not clear (in the absence of on-going involvement in decision-making) that faculty today could be committed as readily and radically by its college president, even were the current president as gifted as Hytche appeared to be. It is also not clear how an individual campus officer could be effective in reshaping State higher education policies and programs and financial plans if actively opposed by the State system’s officer. Clearly, UMES failed to flourish in the absence of strong advocacy; its fortunes only changed when State leadership in higher education changed.

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Appendix -- A

The Webb Report

In 1977, the Webb report stated, "The Task Force believes that a basic policy decision as to the two institutions must be made promptly if each is to be a productive part of the State program for Higher Education. Neither time nor our individual expertise has permitted total and specific definition of detail. Our recommendations constitute our best judgment on policy direction for higher educational opportunity on the Eastern Shore and in the State."

Recommendation One

Merger of the University of Maryland Eastern Shore and Salisbury State College is not feasible at this time.

We recognize that the above recommendation concludes our prescribed assignment. In reaching our conclusions, we have addressed the issue of economics that triggered our assignment. The result, however, leaves the University of Maryland Eastern Shore and Salisbury State College as existing institutions within their respective present structures.

We believe that with our first conclusion our charge further requires the Task Force to address the future of each institution, and to suggest a specific role and mission for each within the total framework of higher education, both within the region and the state. In this fashion, the needs of both the region and state can be met and the overlap, for which there is justifiable criticism, can be largely eliminated. To this end we offer the additional recommendations which follow.

Recommendation Two

The emphasis on offerings at both the University of Maryland Eastern Shore and Salisbury State College should be the quality of educational opportunity. The role and mission of each institution should be identified and defined. Salisbury State should be a college offering essentially the traditional liberal arts curriculum. The University of Maryland Eastern Shore should be a science-oriented institution, with undergraduate and graduate programs in marine, estuarine and environmental sciences and in agriculture. In order to avoid the expense and dilution of the quality of these offerings by duplication at College Park, the University of Maryland Eastern Shore should be designated the "Sea Grant" campus and the 1862 and 1890 "Land Grant" campus of the University.

This recommendation includes supplemental recommendations:

- (a) University of Maryland Eastern Shore has already proposed a baccalaureate degree program in Environmental Science, which should be approved for prompt implementation. This offering can constitute the commencement of a concerted attention to the training of students in the problems and possibilities of the waters of Maryland, coordinated with the existing facilities of Horn Point and the various Marine laboratories already a part of the University system. It will provide the trained personnel needed by these facilities, and by private industry in the state, and for which there is no directly related undergraduate training.
- (b) All undergraduate and graduate programs currently offered by the School of Agriculture at the College Park campus should be transferred to the University of Maryland Eastern Shore over the next decade, and consolidated with the duplicated programs presently offered on the Princess Anne campus. An interdisciplinary agriculture sciences program in rural studies, recommended by the Chancellor's Advisory Committee at University of Maryland Eastern Shore, should be developed for early implementation, with an objective of structuring a curriculum to prepare individuals to serve the special needs of a rural environment.
- (c) The Task Force has received strong suggestions of the need for Maryland undergraduate training on the baccalaureate level in Forestry. There should be a study of the feasibility of such a program, and, if feasible, it should be established on the Princess Anne campus as a part of the School of Agriculture.
- (d) With the above policy direction of the respective roles and missions of the University of Maryland Eastern Shore and Salisbury State College, qualified consultants should be retained to identify and define the precise course offerings and programs to be placed on each respective campus. Courses on one campus should be accepted for credit at the other. One campus should be the location for a particular department, to enhance the strength of the department and the quality of its offerings. While there will inevitably be some duplication of in course offerings of fundamental core subjects, there should be a reduction of competition and overlap, with a consequent improvement in quality and concomitant economy.
- (e) If there should be a decision to establish a School of Veterinary Medicine in Maryland, the School should be a part of the University of Maryland system, with the major components located on the Princess Anne campus.
- (f) Operating budgets for each of the institutions should provide adequate funds for the transportation of students, faculty and resources between University of Maryland Eastern Shore and Salisbury State.

(g) Budgets for the University of Maryland Eastern Shore, both for operating funds and capital expenditures, should recognize the need for high priority in enhancing this seriously deteriorated facility and for achieving the shift in its mission and responsibility described below.

Recommendation Three

The State of Maryland should develop with Delaware and Virginia tri-state reciprocal arrangements designed to reduce the cost to the Maryland taxpayer of out-of-state students from these states at the University of Maryland Eastern Shore and Salisbury State College, and the out-of-state tuition differential, in recognition of the reliance of Delaware and Virginia students on the institutions for their higher education.

Recommendation Four

Any limitation on out-of-state enrollment at the University of Maryland Eastern Shore should be eliminated at present as counterproductive.

Recommendation Five

Effective for the 1978-1979 academic year, and for the foreseeable future, full-time equivalent enrollment (F.T.E.) at Salisbury State College should be limited to 3,300. This enrollment ceiling should be applied immediately to all present and future requests for increased positions and capital project funding.

Recommendation Six

Until some other source of remedial programs is available to the Eastern Shore region, remedial programs are necessary at both University of Maryland Eastern Shore and Salisbury State. In order to maintain the quality of offerings, both institutions should maintain their developmental programs and support services for this segment of their student population. Both institutions should regularly evaluate the result of the developmental programs through continuous appraisals of student progress. There should be a specific allocation provided in the budget of each institution for the support of the developmental programs and services.

Recommendation Seven

A comprehensive performance evaluation of the University of Maryland Eastern Shore should be made by a qualified independent consultant, focusing especially on management procedures, student services, and physical plant utilization. This report should be directed both to the State Board for Higher Education and the Board of Regents, and the State Board should require prompt implementation with respect to shortcomings, if any, found by the consultants.

Recommendation Eight

The State Board for Higher Education should create an oversight mechanism to assure compliance by the respective institutions with the policy directions outlined above. If the University of Maryland has not evidenced its assignment of high priority to the enhancement in good faith of its Princess Anne campus within a short but reasonable period of time, as recommended above, then the State Board for Higher Education and the legislature should consider removing the Princess Anne campus from the governance of the Board of Regents of the University of Maryland.

Recommendation Nine

The Princess Anne-Somerset community should take active steps to improve its relationship with the University of Maryland Eastern Shore and to provide the private local supporting facilities which are critical in making a campus attractive to students (pages 15-29).

Appendix -- B

The Prospectus

In 1978, the Prospectus proposed the following:

1. The University will establish a workforce of highly competent people drawn from throughout the University to work with the President of the University and the Chancellor of the UMES campus in carrying out the changes which were identified or necessary or desirable.

The workforce would include people with special skills in academic standards of performance, academic programming, student services, long-range planning, and fiscal management. This workforce would relate directly to Hytche's office.

2. The objective of the University is to make the UMES campus the focal point of the University's activities on the Eastern Shore.

The plan was to utilize the resources of the total University in providing services of university level, wherever appropriate. The University of Maryland at Baltimore, University of Maryland College Park, the University of Maryland University College, the Center for Environmental and Estuarine Studies, the Maryland Sea Grant Program, and the Maryland Cooperative Extension Service were asked to submit proposals for developing working relationships with UMES in academic and related pursuits.

3. The University will continue to involve UMES as a partner within a system, sharing both human and physical resources and engaging the campus in cooperative planning for the optimal use of available resources.

An example provided in the Prospectus was the previous preparation of a combined application booklet for UMBC, UMCP, and UMES undergraduate admissions. Included in this section were discussions about how the Central Administration has worked and will work with UMES in areas such as articulation agreements, facility planning, budgeting, computer usage, and libraries.

4. The instructional resources at UMES will be expanded to allow various new and interrelated majors. It is assumed the SBHE will approve the program plans which are covered in this paper.

Specifically, the plan required that the agricultural program be complemented by an Institute for Applied Agriculture, programs in Poultry Technology and Management and Agricultural Mechanization, and an Institute for Small and Part-

Time Farmers. Hotel and Restaurant Management, Industrial Arts and Building Construction will be modified. Construction Management and Engineering Technology will be initiated. A preprofessional health curriculum will be developed for students who expect to transfer to complete a bachelor's degree in Nursing Pharmacy, Dental Hygiene, Medical Technology or Radiologic Technology. UMES will develop a full four-year program in Physical Therapy. In addition, an honor's program would be developed for students who aspire to enter the University of Maryland's Schools of Medicine, Dentistry, Law or Pharmacy. UMES faculty and students will increase their participation in the Center for Environmental and Estuarine Studies and the University of Maryland's Sea Grant Program. An umbrella arrangement will be developed for master's programs in Special Education, Agriculture and Extension Education, and Marine-Estuarine-Environmental Sciences.

5. Facilities will be brought up to a competitive level of quality and the cost of their maintenance will be related to the functions they serve.

Six of the programs on the UMES campus-Human Ecology, Industrial Arts Education, Business Education, Business Administration, Art, and Physical Education-are now housed in inadequate facilities. Replacement of these facilities would be imprudent and uneconomical. Therefore, the plan requires constructing buildings that will accommodate related programs to meet educational and career needs. For example, Industrial Arts Education, Construction Management Technology, Art, and Engineering Technology would be housed in the same structure. New facilities were also requested for programs in Agriculture and a structure for Hotel/Restaurant Management, Business Administration, Business Education, Human Ecology, and Food Technology.

There was also a request for new dormitories. Further, it was a part of the plan to raze several obsolete, high maintenance cost buildings. Finally, the University previously decided that if the State of Maryland decides favorably upon the creation of a School of Veterinary Medicine fully within the State, the major if not exclusive facility for the School should be placed on the UMES campus. Alternatively, if the State decides to develop a School of Veterinary Medicine cooperatively with another state, such as Virginia, the Maryland part of the facility should be placed on the UMES campus.

6. Cost estimates are offered in response to the State Board for Higher Education's requirement that the cost per student at UMES become consistent with the per-student costs at other Maryland four-year public institutions.

The cost projection made assumes that the campus will reach the enrollment targets which appear in the SBHE Master Plan. It assumes also the advent of new programs previously cited, the construction of new and more cost-efficient facilities, and the razing of obsolete structures. The projection further assumes

that the Agricultural experimental facilities will not be assessed against the student enrollment but, rather, will be associated with the program those facilities support. Faculty housing will be considered outside the institutional budget . . . We further assume a fuel and utilities cost reduction will occur with modifications in the heating plant. These heating plant improvements are expected in 1981 and 1983 if they are funded.

It should be clear that both enrollments and costs are directly related to new facilities. Six of the existing programs, previously cited, are housed in inadequate facilities. Three new programs, already forwarded to the SBHE, and two additional programs of the same general category (Engineering Technology and Food Technology) are completely dependent upon new facilities. These new facilities will not be available for at least three years even if every potential obstacle in funding and construction is overcome.

Any immediate gain in enrollment is heavily dependent upon those new programs which do not require new or renovated facilities and dependent also upon the intra-University program assistance presented in other parts of this paper.

7. The research efforts at UMES will be coordinated with research efforts at other units of the University and supportive service will be provided.

The UMES campus presently operates a significant research program. The United States Department of Agriculture supports agricultural research at the level of approximately \$500,000 per year. Major research projects relate to soybean culture and the nutritional value of selected pork products. Other research awards from six additional sources amount to approximately \$250,000 per annum. During the year 1977-78 the total grant/contract award dollars to UMES amounted to \$2,659,987. The trend in grant/contract funding is upward for the campus, rather than diminishing.

The University proposes to make the agricultural research effort at UMES a full partner in the program of the Maryland Agricultural Experiment Station. Joint faculty appointments will be developed between UMES and UMCP in Agricultural Research farms, and facilities of the Experiment Station and UMES will be made available to both faculties.

The University President and UMES Chancellor will have the work force recommend how the UMES campus should coordinate the research activities on that campus and how the several campuses of the University should better coordinate their research activities to perform more effectively and more efficiently.

8. Sustained cooperative effort between the University of Maryland Eastern Shore and Salisbury State College is important to the educational welfare of the Eastern

Shore residents. The plan being offered by the University assumes the responsibility for this cooperation will be shared equitably by the two campuses.

It should be common knowledge that those events which began in February 1977 and threatened the closing of UMES, coupled with the tensions associated with the Task Force chaired by John W. T. Webb, reduced inter-campus communication and further curtailed the already limited cooperation which had developed. It would be professionally irresponsible to portray the present interactive climate as cordial.

We confirm the need for inter-institutional cooperation. It is possible to share faculty resources in an efficient and educationally sound manner. Graduate level courses, particularly for in-service teachers as in reading, curriculum, counseling, supervision, and administration can be at a higher level of quality if the faculty resources of both institutions are shared.

9. We share in common an awareness of the historical, legal, political, demographic, and economic circumstances which have made educational planning difficult at UMES. The academic programming presented in this paper is addressed to regional needs and in some instances to Statewide needs. With adequate support, the objective can be accomplished (pages 2-48)!

Appendix -- C (Overview)

Appendix B provides a summary of the interviews that I identify within the text. However, I conducted interviews with 32 individuals from January 1990 to October 1994. Although these additional interviews were not identified in the text they provided a framework for the direction and analysis for the study. The 32 individuals interviewed represent the following: two members of the State Legislature, four members of the Board of Regents, three Deans at UMES, three Vice Presidents at UMES, two members of the President's Advisory Council, three administrators of the System's Central Administration, five UMES faculty, three Eastern Shore power brokers, one president of another Maryland HBCU, three UMES second level administrators, two alumni and Hytche. Further, individuals such as Hytche, Knorr, Toll, and Franklin were interviewed on more than one occasion.

Appendix -- C

Summaries of Interviews Included in the Text

Chapter V: Personal Interview

Delegate Howard Rawlings -- Interviewed on May 3, 1993. Black Delegate from Baltimore; Current Chair of the House Appropriations Committee and Chair of the Legislative Black Caucus Education Committee (as of 1998). Issues discussed included the role and administrative history of UMES in the University of Maryland System. Del. Rawlings stated, "Prior to 1970, UMES was essentially a part of the University of Maryland plantation...It began in a subservient role...Born clearly out of segregation." He added that Wilson Elkins (President of the University of Maryland System from 1954 to 1978) considered UMES nothing more than an annoyance because it was part of the segregated culture. Regarding the two presidents who immediately preceded Hytche at UMES, Del. Rawlings described J. T. Williams (1947 to 1970) as an autocratic leader who prided himself on returning money to the University of Maryland. Archie Buffkins (1971 to 1975) was described as a guy that had to be in control. Rawlings concluded that both Williams and Buffkins had an "overseer mentality."

In discussing the growth and survival of UMES Del. Rawlings stated, "Over the last 25 years the two most significant individuals in the growth and development of UMES are Hytche and Johnny Toll. Without them, the institution might have been

closed or floundering around today or a subset of Salisbury State. Hytche's management style and the confidence that people had in him and his ability to deal with the white power structure...and with his own campus and the community were paramount."

While discussing UMES' relationship with the State government, Del. Rawlings maintained that none of the State's governors have had any special interest in UMES. He concluded by saying that he and Hytche complained all the time in the mid 1970's about the constant bombardment of proposals to merge or close UMES. Del. Rawlings provided an example of UMES' dilemma in dealing with the Legislature. "It was kind of interesting, one of my best friends, who is a liberal Montgomery County legislator, who voted right on every issue...Somehow she had to show her conservative credentials and to do that she would pick on UMES." (Pages 55 and 56 of the text)

Chapters VI, VII and VIII: Personal Interviews

William Hytche -- Interviewed on June 6, 1990. Appointed as Acting Chancellor of UMES July 1, 1975, became permanent Chancellor one year later. The primary topics of the interview included Hytche's description of how he came to UMES in 1960 as an instructor, why he stayed, and the major administrative actions taken during his first years in office. Hytche stated, "All the success I may have had as president over these fifteen years I've been in office...I think my greatest success was my ability to pull town and gown together!" (Pages 59-63 of the text)

Sheldon Knorr -- Interviewed March 5, 1993. Commissioner of the State Board for Higher Education in Maryland, 1976 - 1988. Topics discussed included the treatment of UMES by the University of Maryland system, Hytche's effectiveness as an administrator and communicator, Buffkins (President of UMES from 1971-75), and the UMES/SSC relationship. Knorr reported, "Bill Hytche, the University, and the community worked very hard to ensure the College's survival prior to the Prospectus. The President's Advisory Council especially worked hard. Before 1960, it really wasn't an issue because the school was viewed as a place for black students. The President of the University of Maryland, Curley Byrd, expressed it very clearly that if we don't have this place for black students they will want to go to College Park and we will have black make students around our women."

Knorr noted that Hytche knew how to work with people, "He (Hytche) knows how to talk with people . . . He knows how to deal with Legislators . . . A big part of it is relations . . . Knowing how to get along with people. Where Archie (Buffkins) antagonized everybody, Bill (Hytche) came along and sort of charmed everybody . . . Met with them . . . Talked to them. He had a purpose in mind . . . So people were willing to help him." He added that when Hytche decided to dissolve the college's football team in 1976 although it was a small college power, people were convinced that Hytche was "not one to sit back when he wanted to make something happen, he pressed forward."

Concerning the Maryland Desegregation Plan, Knorr reported that it was "filled with promissory notes . . . Just a lot of talk." In discussing the SSC/UMES cooperative

agreement, Knorr maintained that the president of SSC (Norman Crawford) talked a lot about cooperation, but never really did much. “He wanted every-thing for SSC and nothing for UMES. He was a real operator.” (Pages 61, 63, and 72 of the text)

Tony Bruce -- Interviewed May 5, 1991. Prominent, white Princess Anne attorney. First Chair of the Chancellor’s Advisory Council as formed by Hytche. Topics discussed included the formation of the Advisory Council and the role of “town and gown.” When asked why people accepted Hytche’s invitation to join the Advisory Council Bruce stated that all of the people realized that UMES was an asset to the community. He added that both he and the Town Manager had made some suggestions to Hytche regarding people to invite. Further, Bruce reported that Bill Hytche was unique in that he was one of a few faculty members that lived in Princess Anne, owned a business and had developed a pretty good relationship with the community personally. When asked about the current town and gown relationship, Bruce stated, “We’ve got a source of employment, number one particularly in a county that has as low a median income as we do. It has become a good example of Black achievement . . . As an academic/technical resource, it’s become more of an enticement to industry. We’ve established a Rural Development Office on campus that is now working with our economic development individuals in the towns and counties. I can’t find a negative now . . . 15 years ago, I couldn’t have said that . . . So as optimistic as I was as a supporter, I still couldn’t have said that there were no negatives.” (Pages 62 - 64 of the text)

Herman Franklin -- Interviewed May 23, 1991. Vice President for Student Affairs at UMES since 1977. Topics discussed included how he was recruited to UMES, Hytche's philosophy and leadership style and the town and gown relationship. Franklin reported that Hytche personally recruited him to come to UMES. Franklin stated, "Hytche is the best cheerleader this campus has . . . By that I mean he exhibits a level of enthusiasm that would cause one to come and work with him. He believes in what he's doing." One of the things that Franklin said convinced him to come to UMES was Hytche's philosophy regarding students. Essentially, Franklin stated that Hytche believes that every person should have the opportunity to go to college if they have the potential which was consistent with Franklin's background. Consistent with that philosophy, UMES has historically had the largest proportion of entering freshmen needing remedial support as well as the largest number of students being accepted based on less than full compliance with the admission standards.

Franklin described Hytche's leadership style as laissez faire. "He's laid back...He knows what he wants. He allows his officers the latitude to function in the roles that he has assigned. He expects one to perform. He delegates responsibility commensurate with ones authority. "

Regarding the issue of town and gown, Franklin indicated that when he first came there were hardly ever any meetings on the campus whereby the elected town officials were a part of the affair. "Now as a matter of course when the president is going to have some activity on the campus that has either national, State, or international

representatives . . . Then his guest list will automatically include the leadership of Princess Anne, the Superintendent of Schools, etc. Further, Franklin noted that as a result of the President's Advisory Council several new academic disciplines have been developed. He noted that subcommittees of the Advisory Board were formed with individuals who had academic interests in a particular program. Out of these committees the following programs have been developed: Hotel and Restaurant Management, Industrial Education/Technology, Physical Therapy, Computer Science and Airway Science. Franklin added, "theoretically each of the Department's has an advisory council . . . but sitting on the President's Advisory Council is a person who might be chairing the Department's advisory council whose membership includes people from those industries." (Pages 62 and 90 of the text)

Abraham D. Spinak -- Interviewed on August 1, 1991. Former NASA employee for 34 years; Former Assistant Director of NASA's Wallops Island Flight Center on the Eastern Shore of Maryland. Former member of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Prior to joining the faculty at UMES he developed the pre-Engineering Program at UMES while on loan from NASA. Coordinator of the UMES/UMCP Engineering Program and UMES' Airway Science Program. Topics discussed during the interview included the role of the Chancellor's Advisory Council and Hytche as a leader. Spinak reported that the Advisory Council played a significant role in convincing the Webb Task Force that there should not be a merger of UMES and SSC by recommending programs that would be unique to UMES and help for the community.

The strategy was to designed to eliminate the constant competition between UMES and SSC for the same students.

Spinak described Hytche as “politically very savvy. He knows who to call and what to say. He knows everybody . . . He’s as interested in the janitor as he is with the most sophisticated/educated person . . . He comes across as a personal friend.” (Pages 63 and 90 of the text)

John Toll -- Interviewed on January 26, 1991. Former President of the University of Maryland System from 1978 to 1988. Former President of the State University of New York at Stony Brook from 1965 to 1978. Former Chair of the University of Maryland Department of Physics and Astronomy form 1953 to 1965. Topics of discussion included the development of the Prospectus and the work of Hytche. Toll stated that when he and Hytche agreed to submit the Prospectus, they immediately began to look around the State to see what other programs were needed and Physical Therapy was identified. Toll added that although there was a Physical Therapy program already in existence at the University of Maryland at Baltimore, “the program at UMES has been a resounding success, they have many more applicants than they can take. Every single graduate of the program has passed the state boards.” Toll reported that it was Hytche who convinced the powerbrokers of the Greater Salisbury Committee to support the Prospectus.

Toll noted , “Hytche has done an outstanding job as president because of his remarkable ability to respond to problems by just determining to work harder. His spirit

has carried the campus through difficulties . . . He doesn't discourage . . . He is devoted and dedicated to the campus . . . he is very open minded and willing to accept criticism . . . Very good in working with people . . . Just the kind of person you respond to. There is strong loyalty to him. People know he will do everything he can to help them." Toll added, "I remember taking the Chairman of the Board of Regents once down to UMES for commencement exercises . . . He was tremendously moved by how much UMES meant to the families and the graduates. It was a much deeper sense of attachment than you run into on other campuses and I think Hytche has built that spirit that is a campus that will do everything it can to help you, and has helped people tremendously. It changed the Chairman from thinking UMES was too small to becoming an ardent supporter of UMES. The campus turns losers into winners . . . Hytche embodies that spirit of nourishment . . . He sets the tone for the campus." (Pages 73, 94 , 95 and 111 of the text)

William Hytche -- Interviewed on June 7, 1990. Topic of the discussion was a continuation of his perspective on the Prospectus and its aftermath. Hytche noted that he had to make a lot of decisions without the consent of his faculty in the early years. He stated, "I had to go for it and go for it fast! I had to do a lot of that. I had to do a lot of things without faculty approval . . . and now, today, if I want to start a new program, I'd go through all of the channels . . . But during that period of time, faculty members would come to me to discuss and argue over what it should be or what have you . . . I skipped a lot of that . . . went on and I did it and told them afterwards and told them why I did it and

tried to explain to them that this had to be done . . . And my faculty has supported me throughout on this whole effort.” (Pages 86 - 88 and 112 of the text)

Mortimer Neufville -- Interviewed on May 22, 1991. Assistant Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and Dean of Agricultural Sciences. Topics of discussion included his recruitment to UMES and the leadership of Hytche. Neufville stated that Hytche made all the contacts to personally recruit him. He reported that Hytche emphasized the possibilities and the challenges at UMES and Neufville accepted the challenge. Neufville described Hytche as a people person. He stated that Hytche “in his decision-making he allows for input . . . Gives you an opportunity to grow. Has good political savvy . . . Knows when to call in his chips.” (Page 89 of the text)

Chester Hedgepeth -- Interviewed on January 31, 1991. Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. Topics of discussion included his reasons for coming to UMES, his relationship with Hytche, and Hytche’s leadership style. Hedgepeth maintained that he came to UMES because of the challenge of the leadership in English and the Languages and the Deanship. He noted that he liked the one-on-one and the challenge of the administrative work. Regarding his relationship with Hytche, Hedgepeth described it as “A number one . . . That’s one of the reasons why I have come here and stayed, chiefly because of his leadership and his personal interest in his faculty and staff and administrators. He was the first person to greet me when I came and took me to dinner...and that impressed me . . . not only that he took the time out to interview me himself but he was interested in my future . . . what I was doing and where UMES was at

that point . . . I think that if it were not for Hytche, one wonders whether one would stay because he has provided the resources for me to be able to in turn provide the resources to the faculty and other staff that I supervise. He has in fact brought home the bacon . . . He has advocated this University to the point where it has flowered and flourished under his leadership and I have been proud to be a member of his staff.” (Page 89 of the text)

John Mishler -- Interviewed on January 30, 1991. Dean of Graduate Studies and Research. Former Chief of the Blood Resources and Transplantation Branch at the National Institutes of Health. Topics discussed included his recruitment, Hytche’s effectiveness, and the research capabilities of UMES. Mishler stated that he came to UMES as a result of being personally recruited by Hytche. He noted that when he had conversations with Hytche, “he seemed to understand the kinds of things I had done at Kansas City and he wanted the same kinds of programs here. The excitement was that I was going to get a lot of professional and financial support.”

Mishler reported that what made Hytche effective was a combination of his longevity and savvy. Mishler stated, “He’s (Hytche) been here since 1960 . . . so I think he’s had a long time in the community . . . I think he owns property here, residential . . . I think at one time commercial, so from that perspective if you’ve been here a long time . . . it’s a small town, so I think just longevity in knowing who’s in town . . . Plus I think he has made a real effort to get to know the local and state legislators and through them he was able to start getting programs for the institution. Also, letting the various legislators know about this institution which is important because sometimes they are busy

individuals who may read a newspaper article and take that as the full scale of their knowledge about the institution. In most cases there's a lot more behind the headlines and they need to ferret that out and Hytche does a good job of giving them the kinds of information they need to make sense."

Mishler reported that although UMES ranked fourth among the institutions in the University of Maryland system in acquiring research and contract funding, UMES has substantial potential to improve on those amounts. He noted that several of the Departments such as Arts and Sciences will either surpass or equal Agricultural Sciences in the future because of the research faculty that have been hired over the last few years in that area. He added that the primary reason is "Hytche who has the ultimate decision on who will be hired . . . from the janitor to the Vice Presidents." (Page 89 of the text)

Herman Franklin -- Interviewed on July 26, 1991. Vice President for Student Affairs. Topics discussed included the recruitment of top faculty and the survival of UMES. Franklin reported it was Hytche's strategy to increase the percentage of faculty with terminal degrees and to hire faculty with international and national credentials to strength UMES at a time when the university's future was in doubt. Franklin stated, "out of that have come people like Blakely, for example who heads our Physical Therapy Program . . . one of the very few black Ph.D.s in Physical Therapy and we have him . . . It's no accident that we have a guy who heads our Hotel Restaurant and Management Program who came out of industry . . . had seen that side of it . . . knew what industry wanted and needed. Students finish that program we know they have a competitive edge

in the market place . . . and they have job offers in their pockets before graduation. It's those kind of things that the president was doing and he never stopped that momentum because . . . The president had been around long enough to see other studies and he had been around long enough to believe that this University was going to survive another study and he wasn't going to sit around and wait to pick over the bones after they got through killing the dragon. He believed the University was going to survive and he acted like a survivor. Not going to say he did it without headaches . . . you know he had a heartattack and he survived that. He believes in this University and the people he brought to the University. There have been some people who have retired that were out of the old era of what a university is all about . . . that has allowed Hytche to bring new people in with fresh ideas, fresh perspectives. What has happened to us has not been an accident, its been a coming together of a whole lot of dynamics . . . Not the least of which have been President Toll and the joint cooperation of Chancellor Hytche.” (Pages 89 - 90 of the text)

Bob Cook -- Interviewed on May 24, 1991. Director of the Greater Salisbury Committee (GSC), a private non-profit organization made up of Chief Executive Officers of businesses from the Eastern Shore region of Maryland. To be a member one must be a “committed community leader.” Its mission is to help solve problems and make it a better community for all. Topics discussed included the involvement of the GSC with UMES and Hytche. Cook reported that he felt that John Williams, former President of UMES, was a fine man. “At that time the University was low-key . . . really unknown and the county looked upon it . . . it might as well have not been there. It's looked upon

now as an asset.” Cook reported that once Hytche and Toll convinced the GSC to support the Prospectus, the GSC began to support UMES in any way they could. He added, “We encouraged business/education partnerships . . . Tried to draw UMES into the community. As a part of that Hytche was made an ex officio member . . . members of the GSC were made members on the President’s Advisory Council. We really tried to bring the institution and the community together . . . Tried breaking down the ancient barriers of no one talking to one another . . . Believes they had a big influence on the local community with the major business leaders of the area becoming involved with the University . . .the local leaders began to start working in cooperation with the College.” Cook believed that the Salisbury business community never had the barrier . . . an old Southern kind of atmosphere as the old timers in the community.

Cook recalled that when the Webb Task Force was created in 1977, the GSC was directly involved. He states that the Commissioner of State Board for Higher Education asked the GSC to select one of their members to head the task force. Jack Webb, a prominent local attorney, was asked to head the task force. Cook said that Webb accepted with the understanding that there were no preconceived conditions that would dictate closure or merger.

Cook indicated that the GSC supports UMES in many ways, for example, UMES has a President’s Scholars program in which 14 members of the GSC have contributed \$1000 per person for the last four years. “Annually, we have the Grande finale to the leadership development seminar (17 session program over six months) . . . because of

UMES' wonderful Hotel and Restaurant Management Program, we have our final banquet down there." Cook also noted that another member of the GSC, Richard Henson, provided the largest contribution (\$2 million) ever to UMES. Cook reported that when he took Henson to a banquet at UMES he had never been on the campus and was surprised by what he found. Cook recalled that Henson stated, "This is a wonderful place . . . I never dreamed this was here . . . But it needs a lot of work doesn't it? Wonder what I can do to help?" Henson helped by providing not only his contribution but leveraged his money by talking to the Governor and telling him that the campus looked terrible and he would only give his gift if the Governor agreed to fix up the campus and not just superficially. Cook added that subsequently the State has provided \$8 million in physical improvements and a total capital improvement program of \$39 million.

Concerning Hytche, Cook stated, "He is unbelievably dedicated, strong, just so dedicated . . . and his enthusiasm you have to admire and respect him for those two great characteristics . . . and his integrity...I believe he has done a tremendous amount of good for UMES, this county, this whole region and I think for a black institution, he has given a lot of leadership and shown the way to make it happen right." (Page 91 of the text)

John Toll -- Interviewed on February 8, 1991. Topics discussed included the Honors Program , the UMES/SSC agreement and Hytche. The Honors Program was created by Toll based on a similar program he had at SUNY/ Stony Brook. He stated, "It has been the greatest source of black students for our professional schools in several areas . . . dentistry and medicine, but it's also supplied them to law, nursing , social work and to

pharmacy. We have a series of mutually reinforcing objectives . . . We want to enhance UMES; We want to attract good students to UMES; We want to get more medical students into our medical school; and we want to help integrate UMES' campus . . . both campuses (UMAB).” Toll added, “ The professional schools were involved in the planning of the curriculum, admission, and in helping students. Students who graduated with honors from UMES and got a marginally acceptable score on the MCAT for example would be admitted.”

Discussing the UMES/SSC agreement, Toll noted, “There is a State college down there which is a predominantly white institution that was started after UMES . . . which has gotten substantially better support and has more students . . . Salisbury State College. We wanted those colleges to work together . . . Bill (Hytche) was marvelous at not taking offense . . . He was always positive. He worked out a series of agreements . . . and it culminated into a major agreement between UMES and SSC and it identified which fields each would emphasize. Now SSC got the typical Arts and Sciences program and Teacher Training while UMES got Hotel and Restaurant Management, Poultry Management and so on. They worked out exchange programs and so on. Salisbury State has not been as forthcoming as UMES, yet they have made considerable progress. There were attempts by Salisbury to duplicate the Hotel Restaurant Management Program at UMES. However, I sat on the request and said that’s not fair. I left the system feeling that the cooperation between UMES and Salisbury was unfinished business.”

Toll reported that he got a running start in his relationship with Hytche prior to beginning his tenure on July 1, 1978 as President of the University of Maryland system. He noted that he came to UMES on several weekends during May and June. Toll stated, "Bill Hytche is a very remarkable man . . . he pursues everything for the benefit of his University and his students. For example, there was a pig farmer who felt that UMES wasn't moving fast enough in meeting the needs of the swine industry . . . For the benefit of everyone, Bill bought him in to help plan the swine program." (Pages 92 - 96 of the text)

William Hytche -- Interviewed on October 3, 1993. Topic of discussion was his relationship with Toll. Hytche stated, "We just hit it off immediately. We had similar goals . . . We both had UMES as our number one priority." (Page 110 of the text.)

Ronnie Holden -- Interviewed on January 31, 1991. Vice President for Administrative Affairs. Topics discussed included the leadership style of Hytche. Holden stated, "Hytche is a master politician . . . I have seen him go to the Legislature with a prepared text, however, if the session starts to move in a different direction, Hytche is able to smoothly and effectively go in the different direction to make his point concerning UMES' budget request." (Page 110 of the text)

VITA

Carl S. Person

Experience

1978 - 1998 U.S. Department of Education Washington, DC

Education Program Specialist, Division of Institutional Development (Title III of the HEA) (1978 - 1984) - Analyzed, evaluated, and monitored discretionary grants primarily for HBCUs in Alabama, Texas, Georgia, Mississippi and Louisiana.

Education Program Specialist, Accrediting Agency Evaluation Branch (1984 -1992) - My primary responsibility was to evaluate accrediting and State approval bodies that the Secretary could list as reliable authorities concerning the quality of education or training offered by the institutions or programs they accredit. Specialized in the regional, health related and traditional accrediting bodies such as the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education, the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business, and the Accrediting Board for Engineering and Technology, Inc. Presented recommendations for recognition of all accrediting and approval bodies to the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity.

Chief, Accrediting Agency Evaluation Branch - (1992 - 1995) Also carried out the responsibilities of an Education Program Specialist during this period.

Leader, Program Development and Service Team II (1995 - 1997) - Responsible for the day-to-day management of the Strengthening Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) Program (Title III, Part B), the Hispanic Serving Institutions Program (Title III, Part A) and the Minority Teacher Recruitment Program. Title III, Part B is the largest discretionary grant program (\$130 million) in the Federal Government designed exclusively for HBCUs.

Executive Director, HBCU Capital Financing Program and Advisory Board (1996 - Present) - This program was created to provide HBCUs access to low-cost capital (\$375 million) to fund construction, renovation, and maintenance projects.

U.S. Department of Education Liaison for the Howard University account (1998 - Present) - Annual appropriation approximately \$200 million plus.

Education

1998 Ed. D. Higher Education Administration Virginia Tech

1982 M. Ed. Higher Education Administration Howard University

1976 B. A. Political Science Fayetteville State University