POST-MATERIALISM: ITS IMPACT ON PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEAR ISSUES, 1972-2000

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the measurable effects of changing cultural values on American
presidential election year issues from 1972 to 2000.

Topics discussed: the long-term shift in cultural values and their impact on political
parties, party support, and political priorities. There is congruence between the content of
the two major political party platforms from 1972-2000 and the cultural priorities of party
supporters as defined by their presidential vote. This relationship also holds true for the
'most significant issue facing the nation' variable in the National Election Studies and
presidential vote choice. These results are reproduced in a completely different data set of
active political participants (follow the news closely, participate in political campaigns,
vote consistently) assembled by Sydney Verba.

Both political parties must contend with the tensions that arise from differing cultural
priorities of their supporters. This applies both within the parties as they must assemble
winning electoral coalitions and between the parties which have taken on the cultural and
political priorities of their strongest supporters. As the cultural priorities of major political
party supporters shift, so have their quadrennial party platforms.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the measurable effects of changing cultural values on American presidential election year issues from 1972 to 2000. These cultural values have been defined and studied by Ronald Inglehart over an extended period of time and across a broad range of nations. Inglehart provides a theoretical framework that facilitates the study of changing cultural values in American presidential elections. His post-materialist theory provides the foundation upon which the analysis of this paper is built.

Simply put, the hypothesis of this paper is that as the proportion of post-materialists in the American electorate changes so will the importance of post-materialist priorities in American presidential elections. If there are an increasing number of post-materialists in the electorate, then their priorities will be reflected in the range of pertinent issues found in a presidential election. The issues examined in this thesis consist of those identified in the party platforms of the two major American political parties and those identified by survey respondents in the National Election Studies (NES). For example, how often is economic growth mentioned in each party's platform? How does this frequency compare to the total number of policy issue mentions in a party platform? How does the relative importance of a particular issue area relate to the level of post-materialist supporters of each party?

The results are quite striking. With only one exception (Democratic Party, 2000), each party platform reflected the cultural priorities of the majority of its supporters. This congruence was also found in the 'most significant issue' variable in the NES, strength of party support, and party of presidential vote. These results were reproduced in another data set on political participation developed by Sydney Verba.

In addition to the congruence between party platforms and the cultural orientation of party supporters, there are significant differences between the two parties over certain post-materialist priorities identified by Inglehart. Thus, I find that at least some of the

political tension in the subject presidential elections is driven by the newly emerging cultural priorities that are operationalized by Inglehart.

I use the NES to examine the emerging cultural differences in the context of specific partisan choices over the subject time period. It also enables me to examine the differences in issue priorities for each cultural priority category. These differences are measured by comparing the proportion of respondents in each cultural category that identify a particular issue as the most important one facing the nation. For example, the preponderance of concern for the economy and maintaining order came from more culturally traditional voters while voters with a less traditional orientation had significantly higher concern for social welfare.

I also compare the NES data with another set of data developed by Sydney Verba's study of political participation. Without an explicit measure of cultural priorities or a 'most significant issue' variable in the Verba data set, I use strength of party identification and support for certain issues as proxies to determine the reproducibility of results. The trends identified in the NES data also exist in the Verba data and both data sets illustrate the congruence between cultural priority category, issue priority, and party support.

In the extremely complex process of winning presidential elections, the importance of cultural values indeed plays a role. Certainly there are an enormous number of variables, relationships and sub-processes outside of the cultural category construct that help explain presidential election outcomes. To be sure, using cultural priorities and party support cannot explain the dramatic Democratic Party shift to a materialist platform in the year 2000. Nevertheless, by and large the impact of culture and cultural shifts is unmistakable. From 1972 to 1992, the two major American political parties, using a rational vote-getting strategy, have matched the cultural priorities of their strongest supporters with the content of their platforms.

POST-MATERIALISM

One of the most important concepts of this paper is post-materialism and for the purposes of this paper, I consider post-modernism to be its synonym. In order to arrive at post-modernism, there must be a modernism before it. Modernism is characterized by hostility to tradition and enthusiasm for change. It is a shedding of the past and an embracing of a progressive, human-centered orientation.[1]

Post-modernism is a structure of thought to understand what follows from the mostly complete expansion of modernization. It remains a rejection of tradition and authority and continues the modern tradition of humanism, rationalism, science, and technology. Post-modernism differs with its predecessor in terms of its tendencies toward rejection of unified, totalizing universal frameworks in favor of difference, plurality, fragmentation, complexity in knowledge and epistemologies. It's important to note that post-modernism does not reject capitalism, it celebrates the market.[2] There are challenges this characteristic poses for Inglehart's conceptualization of post-materialism in both the major party platforms and voter attitudes. In short, Inglehart's theory does not provide for differences between economic and cultural post-materialism. Scott C. Flanagan's follow on work helps solve this problem and will be discussed in greater detail in the Theoretical Foundation section.

Inglehart studies post-materialism from a values change perspective.[3] He theorizes that the value changes observed in advanced industrial democracies are the result of vast proportions of industrialized populations being able to meet their basic material needs.[4] Inglehart observes that important groups among the populations of Western societies have passed beyond the pursuit of material comfort and security, "… and today are acting in pursuit of goals which no longer have a direct relationship to the imperatives of economic security."[5] The preponderance of those pursuing post-materialist or non-materialist goals is found among the younger cohorts of industrialized nations. These cohorts (primarily part of the middle class) "… have been socialized during an unprecedentedly long period

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[1] Briefing 6, PSCI 5214 Contemporary Political Theory, Virginia Polytechnic and State University, Fall, 1999
[2] Ibid
[3] Inglehart, Ronald, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies", The American Political Science Review, Volume 65 No. 4, December 1971, p. 991.
[4] Ibid

of unprecedentedly high affluence."[6] Inglehart continues by pointing out that if he is correct about the theory derived from his observations, it suggests that intergenerational political conflict is likely.[7] After approximately thirty years of study, Inglehart identifies more than just age as the entering argument for predicting post-materialist values. For example, education, job type (professional versus blue collar), and socioeconomic status are all variables, which explain the differences between materialists and post-materialists.[8] This construct supports my observations of voter attitudes in American presidential elections. Political conflict resulting from changing cultural values in the United States plays out not only between age cohorts, but between the more educated and less educated; the more urban and the less urban; the non-churched and the more traditionally-churched; the white collar professional and the blue collar tradesman.

Inglehart reasons that for the younger cohorts, a set of "post-bourgeois" values emerges.[9] These values include the need for belonging and to aesthetic and intellectual needs.[10] Inglehart draws on a study by Richard Flacks at the University of Chicago that indicates that students from relatively affluent homes tend to place greater emphasis on involvement in intellectual and aesthetic pursuits, humanitarian considerations, and opportunities for self-expression. These same students tend to de-emphasize material success, personal achievement, conventional morality, and religiosity.[11] These differences that Inglehart observes provide a good deal of the necessary theoretical foundation for the political cleavages I observe in comparing the demographic attributes of American Republican and Democratic Party voters and activists.

Linda F. Dennard provides another perspective on post-modernism. Dinnard defines post-modernism as a transitory phenomenon that marks an evolutionary trend in human culture and in the development of democratic government.[12] She has also characterized post-modernism as a search for a new, more inclusive order.[13] Dinnard's

[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid
[7] Ibid
[8] Inglehart, Ronald, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 162.
[9] Inglehart, APSA, Dec. 1971, p. 992
[10] Ibid
[11] Ibid
[12] Dinnard, Linda F., "The Democratic Potential in the Transition of Postmodernism", American Behavioral Scientist, Volume 41 No. 1, September 1997, p. 148.
[13] Dinnard, p. 151.

article was written in the context of public administration's response to post-modernism and it is instructive for its relevance to the political process. If we consider post-modernism as part of the evolution of American democracy, we can relate it to American political action including party platform development and voter attitudes.

Dinnard's suggested responses of public administration to post-modernism provide important insight into the practical application of a very complex, high-order body of intellectual thought. Her suggested responses to post-modernism are:[14]

1. Distinguish problematic symptoms from the broader set of relationships and processes from which they emerge.
2. Move out of decision-making models frequently enough to observe and respond to the pragmatic reality of everyday life and the potential therein to transcend problems rather than to simply reform them. Avoid creating long-term realities by embedding short-term problems through repeated reform.
3. Focus on nurturing relationships that will sustain the continuity of democracy rather than those designed to resolve temporary conflict. Do not fear conflict.
4. Feel empowered to act on what is right for the long term. Allow for imperfection and the opportunities it brings for insight and inclusion.
5. Nurture a sense of interdependence among citizens in each administrative act.
6. Nurture faith in citizens and their ability to contribute to the evolutionary field from the basis of their unique perspectives.
7. Consider that the social system stabilizes and transcends itself by accommodating diversity. Further, consider that diversity provides the seedbed for the continued evolution of individual and communal identity.

A brief content analysis of Dinnard's responses reveals key concepts that are found in both Inglehart's post-materialist construct and contemporary American politics. For example, 'accommodating diversity', 'empowerment', 'inclusion', and 'nurturing' all reflect cultural changes that have become a part of the new politics identified by Inglehart and Flanagan. The influence of these concepts on American political action can be observed and measured in the major party platforms and voter attitudes that nourish the analysis. Dinnard's work has identified some fundamental elements of the priorities of the New Left that are in direct conflict with those of the New Right. Thus, she has given

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[14] Dinnard, p. 149.

important context to some of the factors that account for the changing political cleavages in American politics.

Therefore, post-materialism in the context of this paper is an emerging set of values that are translated into political action. The reality of material comfort for the vast majority in the post-modern world is being translated into political cleavages that are played out in the conflict between the two major American political parties.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

Post-Materialist Values

This thesis is primarily based on the work of Ronald Inglehart. Over a long period of time (greater than 30 years), Inglehart has documented intergenerational change in the value priorities of advanced industrial nations' publics. Inglehart has hypothesized that the existence of persistent differences in the basic goals of different age cohorts has led them to accept different means of political action. The distinctive value priorities of the respective cohorts are in turn attributed to differences in their formative experiences. Shaped by gradual changes, Inglehart theorizes that these intergenerational differences may have long-term consequences for mass political behavior.[15]

What is the nature of these intergenerational changes? First, we must understand that the basis for Inglehart's analysis is found in the concept of hierarchical needs developed by Maslow.[16] That is when our physical needs are met, when our material well-being is secure, we turn to a higher order of issues and priorities. Inglehart has also gathered a great deal of evidence to show that early socialization is another variable that accounts for value orientations. Inglehart argues that if one's early childhood is relatively free from material want; this will carry over to adulthood and will not be seriously impacted by economic downturns.[17] Since World War II, the vast majority of advanced industrialized nations' publics have enjoyed an unprecedented level of material wealth and comfort. As a result, Inglehart and others have observed measurable changes in social, cultural, and political priorities.[18] No longer are advanced industrialized nations' publics

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[15] Inglehart, Ronald, in <u>Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies</u> ed. by Samuel H. Barnes et al., Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979, pp.305-306.
[16] Inglehart, p. 308.
[17] Inglehart, p. 306.
[18] Inglehart, p. 309.

primarily concerned with issues of physical and economic security. Rather, Inglehart has observed a distinct shift to what he terms 'post-materialist' values. These new values illustrate the relative material wealth of the publics he surveyed and a new emphasis on belonging, self-expression, and (non-material) quality of life.[19]

Inglehart operationalizes the concepts of materialist and post-materialist with one question asked twice that allowed him to build a four-item scale. The World Value Surveys he helped design asked:[20]

> Q. People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important?

	First Choice	Second Choice
A high level of economic growth	1	1
Making sure this country has strong defence forces	2	2
Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities	3	3
Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful	4	4

In terms of methodology, Inglehart decided early in his research that it was necessary to capture the concept of *priority* when considering a range of policy objectives. He postulates that in politics there can be a form of zero sum game where it is impossible to maximize one good (i.e. priority) without detriment to the other.[21] Thus, Inglehart's questions were cast in terms of forced choice items in an attempt to measure their relative importance. He found that "[e]mpirically, it appears that although nearly everyone strongly favors freedom of speech (for example), there are striking differences in the priority given to it by various social groups."[22]

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[19] Inglehart, Ronald, <u>Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society</u>. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990, p.66.
[20] Inglehart, Ronald, in Political Action: <u>Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies</u> ed. by Samuel H. Barnes et al., Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979, p.312.
[21] Inglehart, *APSA,* Dec. 1971, p. 995.
[22] Ibid

On the basis of the choices made among the four items in the survey question quoted above, it is possible to classify respondents into value-priority groups, ranging from a pure post-materialist (post-bourgeois in Inglehart's lexicon) type to a pure materialist (acquisitive) type with a couple of intermediate or mixed categories in between.[23] The mixed result is broken down to mixed-post-materialist or mixed-materialist depending on the order of choice of priorities. If a respondent chose from the acquisitive choices as first priority and then from the post-bourgeois choice, he was classified as mixed-materialist. A mixed post-materialist would have made the post-bourgeois choice first and the acquisitive choice second.[24] A full description of the coding instructions that return these four possible results is found in Appendix A.

The larger purpose of this treatment of Inglehart's approach and methodology is to establish a relevant starting point to study the impact of cultural priorities on political action in American presidential elections. The use of these four categories (materialist, mixed-materialist, mixed-post-materialist, and post-materialist) does not rest exclusively on an individual's choices among the four goals listed above.[25] Inglehart selected the four-item battery of answers because they seemed to form the basis of a typology that facilitated study of a broad range of other political preferences.

Inglehart tested the validity of this index against theoretically relevant attitudes; in all six countries surveyed, he found the attitudes of materialists differed from those of post-materialists by large margins and in the expected direction, and in every country the mixed respondents always fell between the two polar types.[26] He then carried out extensive individual level validation. He found that the four items used in the original index related to a broader twelve-item pool of indicators in the theoretically expected way, revealing a consistent tendency for the six items designed to tap a materialist emphasis on economic and physical security to be chosen together; while five of the six items designed to tap post-materialist needs for belonging and self-expression were also chosen together.[27]

In response to criticism for using factor analysis and ranking (most important, second most important, etc.) rather than a rating (high importance, medium importance,

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[23] Ibid
[24] Inglehart, 1990, p. 75.
[25] Inglehart, *APSA*, Dec. 1971, p. 995.
[26] http://courseware.vt.edu/users/clt/ingleabherson.htm, p. 2 of 30

low importance, etc.) procedure for each item in the index, Inglehart points out that the ranking approach, in contrast to the rating approach, returns the results predicted by his theory.[28] Researchers Bean and Papadakis tested this question by using the rating approach to administer the twelve item material/post-material battery and found that once they controlled for those giving high priority to all goals, the materialist and post-materialist clusters expected by Inglehart's theory appeared.[29] Thus, Inglehart's results are consistent, reproducible, and predictable, even when the materialist/post-materialist framework is operationalized by rating issues rather than by ranking them.

Inglehart recognized that his work reflected only one dimension of an individual's value priorities so he used a battery of items developed by Milton Rokeach to assess the fit of the post-materialist/materialist construct into the *overall* (Inglehart's emphasis) set of value priorities.[30] The detailed listing of Rokeach's value priorities is found in Appendix B. The important finding of Inglehart's comparisons with Rokeach's work is that the post-materialist/materialist dimension was clearly recognizable among the Rokeach battery and factor analysis showed several of Rokeach's items having substantial loadings on it. The congruence of values relationships independently identified by Inglehart and Rokeach provides the solid theoretical foundation needed to assess post-materialism's impact on American political party platforms and citizen attitudes. The rather limited framework of Inglehart's analysis seems to have a measurable relationship to a broader range of human priorities and issues.

Why Political Party Platforms and Political Issues?

What is the significance of the major political party platforms? Can we really study them to find measurable relationships between party platforms and the important political issues of the public? Can we observe and measure the impact of a growing segment of voters who have post-materialist values? Cause and effect or dependent/independent relationships will be very difficult if not impossible to establish. The purpose of examining party platform content is to study the change in value priorities over the past eight presidential elections and to compare the changes, if any, to changing

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[27] Ibid
[28] Ibid
[29] Ibid
[30] Ibid, p. 316.

attitudes of the public at large. In this way, it may be possible to model the change

mechanism(s) at work in American presidential election politics since 1972. In other

words, do the attitudes and priorities of elites lead the attitudes of the public or vice versa?

Content analysis of the major political party platforms provides the necessary entering

argument to study the political change mechanism of post-materialist values.

According to Gerald Pomper, party platforms, often attacked as meaningless

quadrennial rhetoric, are important because they are detailed, specific, and frequently

implemented. Party platforms are important as means by which different interests

establish a claim on the government while adjusting to the demands of other groups.[31]

The interests and priorities of post-materialists coupled with their active political behavior

can certainly be one of the competing groups that Pomper describes and their growing

numbers ought to have an impact on what American political parties put in their platforms

and campaigns.

One may argue that Pomper's work cited deals with the presidential elections

before 1972 and is therefore irrelevant to the thesis. Jeff Fishel provides the contemporary

support for Pomper's analysis. The specificity of party platforms required to successfully

endure a national party convention provides a great deal of substance upon which the

success of program implementation can be judged. Testable pledges in the party platform

range from a high of 91 percent in agriculture and defense to a low of 54 percent in labor.

[32] Thus, party platforms are not meaningless campaign trivia exclusively designed by

elites for their own consumption; they are a reasonably precise reflection of the trade-off

between what the probable nominee's organization considers politically acceptable and the

influence of group leaders who are interested in expanding or restricting the range of

acceptability.[33] In the end, Fishel contends that the relationship between what platforms

promise and what policies presidents *attempt* (Fishel's emphasis) to implement in the

governing season is remarkably high. [34]

Maisel adds excellent insight on contemporary American political party platform

development to this discussion of party platforms. Maisel documents the development of

the 1992 Republican and Democratic Party platforms and comes to same conclusion as

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[31] Pomper, Gerald, "The Contributions of Political Parties to American Democracy" in <u>Party Renewal in America</u> ed. By Gerald Pomper. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980, p. 6.
[32] Fishel, Jeff, <u>Presidents and Promises</u>. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1985, p. 27.
[33] Fishel, p. 27.

Pomper and Fishel; party platforms do matter and can be used to distinguish the parties, and once elected, party officeholders enact significant portions of what was in their platforms.[35] Each party used a different process for platform development but one thing they definitely had in common is that they reflected the goals of each presidential candidate, Bill Clinton and George H. W. Bush.[36] In both cases, the platform writing process was a political exercise to ensure that the various party factions were given a hearing and a feeling that their views were considered. Issue purists in both camps did not hold election victory as their primary objective; they participated to make their political points and in the end the platforms came from the presidential campaigns because they needed a platform which they considered appealing enough to win a majority of votes.[37]

Maisel concludes that the platforms are not really *party* (my emphasis) platforms; they are really candidate-centered platforms.[38] His conclusion reinforces two important observations of contemporary American political parties: one, that the American parties are not as institutionally strong as other industrial nations and two, that American party platforms are an entirely appropriate way of assessing political attitudes, priorities, and culture because they are designed to win and a politician can only win by persuading a majority of the value of his program.

Klingemann also supports the notion of party platform importance. He argues that the match between the policy preferences of voters and the parties is central to the operation of a representative democratic system.[39] Klingemann's work provides both a piece of the theoretical foundation of this thesis and the methodological approach as he compared party platform content to partisan self-placement. I expect that the party that more closely matches post-materialist priorities will find much of its support among the strongest partisans with post-materialist values. This approach should also help identify the shifting political cleavages that Inglehart and Flanagan observe.

More support for the idea of using party platforms in this analysis is found in Herrera and Taylor in their study of the structure of opinion in American political parties.

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[34] Fishel, p. 28.
[35] Maisel, L. Sandy, "The Platform-Writing Process: Candidate-Centered Platforms in 1992", <u>Political Science Quarterly</u>, Vol. 108 No. 4, p. 671.
[36] Maisel, pp. 674-675.
[37] Maisel, p. 682.
[38] Maisel, p. 685.
[39] Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, "Party Positions and Voter Orientations", http://courseware.vt.edu/users/clt/klingmann, p. 1 of 22.

Herrera and Taylor maintain that political parties hold a central place in the formation and use of public opinion by democratic governments.[40] Their reasoning is similar to Maisel and Klingemann; elected officials are motivated by electoral concerns,[41] thus we can expect them (and by extension their political parties) to be attuned to public opinions and priorities. Finally, one more important observation of American parties: we ought to think of them as more like coalitions tied to a candidate[42] rather than as autonomous institutions that produce slates of candidates such as the arrangement that predominates most other industrial societies. American political parties build their platforms to coincide with the presidential election and though the final product may be a collaborative effort by party elites, including compromise on contentious issues, the presidential candidate with the most delegates heavily influences it.[43] Presumably, the presidential candidate is interested not only in the politics of the various party platform positions, but is most concerned with presenting a unified party that supports the same issues as the public at large. The party platform is an important starting point to communicate these issues through the party organization and the mass media. Thus, American political parties, though institutionally weaker than their counterparts in other advanced industrialized nation, play an important role in establishing and advocating a platform that is designed by party elites but which also must address the salient public issues of that election year.

The Linkage of Party Platforms and Campaign Issues

Listhaug and Rabinowitz help develop the linkage between political party platforms and campaign issues. If party platforms are merely a product of party elites and activists, we should expect little congruence between their content and voter-identified political issues. In their study of issues and multiparty support, Listhhaug and Rabinowitz make the case for the directional model of voters' party support such that the stronger stands a party takes, the more likely a voter is to strongly identify with or against that party.[44] In directional theory, issues are perceived as a choice between two opposing alternatives and the farther one moves from the neutral ground, the greater is the intensity

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[40] Herrera, Richard and Taylor, Melanie K., "The Structure of Opinion in American Political Parties", Political Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4, December, 1994, p. 677.
[41] Herrera and Taylor, p. 677.
[42] Herrera and Taylor, p. 687.
[43] _____, "Platform Development", Congressional Digest, Vol. 71 No. 10, October, 1992.

in favoring a particular side of the debate.[45] I submit that the dichotomy between materialist and post-materialist values in the Inglehart construct can be understood as a form of the directional model and can be most instructive in understanding the evolution of party platforms as post-materialists increase over time. As Listhaug and Rabinowitz argue, voters favor a party that presents a strong case (on a political issue) rather than a weak one.[46]

John G. Geer supports the concept of linkage between political party platforms and campaign issues by identifying election victory as the sole concern of parties. In the context of 'realigning' issues, issues that cause the leadership of the parties to adopt polarized positions on a concern highly significant to the public,[47] Geer observes that parties that do not align their position with the electorate's preferred position will quickly lose relevance. Thus, a rational political party must pursue a vote-seeking strategy when confronted with a realigning issue or risk being denied access to government on a long-term basis.[48] The fundamental nature of the cultural shifts identified by Inglehart have given rise to new, realigning issues that have served to differentiate the two major political parties, especially in the past twenty years. If there is little or no relationship between the cultural issues important to post-materialists and party platform positions, it may indicate that these issues have not yet achieved a high priority status with the broader public and this finding would be completely supported by Geer's model.

Value Shifts and Political Parties

The shifting cultural values identified by Inglehart have broad reaching implications for the political process, especially on institutions such as political parties. Inglehart demonstrated quite clearly that post-materialists were more likely to distrust large institutions, especially hierarchical ones that impose order, and less likely to identify themselves with traditional political institutions such as political parties especially since

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[44] Listhaug, Ola and Rabinowitz, George, "Issues and Party Support in Multiparty Systems", American Political Science Review, Vol. 85 No. 4, December, 1991, p.1107.
[45] Listhaug and Rabinowitz, p. 1109.
[46] Listhaug and Rabinowitz, p. 1113.
[47] Geer, John G., "Critical Realignments and the Public Opinion Poll", The Journal of Politics, Vol. 53, No. 2., May, 1991, p. 438.
[48] Geer, p. 451.

they still often relied a great deal on the social cleavages of the Old Politics.[49] In short, post-materialists tend to be iconoclasts who do not have much use for conventional political institutions and processes.

Considering these observations, why is content analysis of party platforms and their relationship to campaign issues and voter attitudes worthwhile? Dalton argues that even though American political parties are institutionally weak, they still are the primary institutions of representative democracy.[50] Although there are a handful of unaffiliated politicians at the national level (one socialist, one independent in the House of Representatives),[51] few American politicians have enjoyed electoral success without being a member of (and receiving support from) one of the major parties. Of the fifty U.S. state governors, only two are not affiliated with either major party: Governor Ventura of Minnesota (Reform) and Governor King of Maine (Independent).[52] In fact the National Governors Association web site lists a total of nine independent governors in the 20th century.[53] So we can use survey data and other observations to hypothesize about the relative weakness of American political parties, but the fact remains that they are still relevant to the political process and cannot be discounted even as we observe gradual shifts in cultural values and priorities that distrust large institutions.

Can we expect political candidates and the parties that support them to evolve their positions toward the post-materialist cultural priorities? Recent theoretical work by Rebecca Morton supports an affirmative answer. In contrast to the Downsian model of political behavior where both candidates move to the median voter, Morton studies an ideological model that helps to explain substantial polarization of parties and candidates.[54] One of the major factors in party and platform divergence is candidate knowledge of voter preferences, but even when such knowledge is not extensive, divergence is still possible. More importantly, Morton's work shows that ideology explains platform divergence even when candidates have incomplete information about voter preferences.[55] By definition, post-materialist values and priorities present us with substantially new ideas and attitudes;

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[49] Inglehart, Ronald, in Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies ed. by Samuel H. Barnes et al., Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979, pp.310-311.
[50] Dalton, p. 143, 146.
[51] http://clerkweb.house.gov
[52] http://nga.org/governors
[53] Ibid
[54] Morton, Rebecca B., "Incomplete Information and Ideological Explanations of Platform Divergence", American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 2, June 1993, p. 383.

therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect the strong difference between post-materialist and materialist values to contribute to the kind of ideological cleavages that can be observed in political party platforms and to a broader extent, political action.

<u>Counterargument</u>

Nevertheless, there is a substantial body of work that documents the weakening influence of American political parties. Key observes that American political parties are poorly equipped to inform and shape the opinions of their followers. The relatively small number of citizens who pay sufficient attention to public affairs limits the impact of parties.[56] On the other hand, new policy proposals on matters of wide significance are not likely to make much headway unless a political party adopts them.[57] Furthermore, even if Key's conclusions are accurate, he also points out that correlations develop between issue opinions and party attachments.[58] The data analysis in this paper shows that there is congruence between issue priorities and party identification, controlling for cultural priority category. Key also observes that higher involvement in political participation tends to indicate stronger agreement with party orthodoxy.[59] We'll see that the strongest partisans illustrate the greatest cultural priority differences between the two parties. Thus, even if analysis of party platform content is not instructive, we can at least assess the relationship between party identification, issue priority, and cultural priority category.

Wattenberg has attributed the changing role of American political parties not so much to eroding confidence, but to the emergence of alternative political actors.[60] Inglehart's work supports this finding by identifying emerging alternative means of political participation in the form of boycotts, protests, petitions, and demonstrations.[61] Post-materialists are far more likely to engage in this kind of behavior but it is also

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[55] Morton, p. 389.
[56] Key, V.O. Jr. "Linkage and political parties" in Crotty, William J., Freeman, Donald M., Gatlin, Douglas S., eds. <u>Political Parties and Political Behavior, 2nd ed.</u> Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971, p. 527.
[57] Ibid, p. 532.
[58] Ibid, p. 518.
[59] Ibid, p. 515.
[60] Wattenberg, Martin P., "Do Voters Really Care About Political Parties Anymore?", Political Behavior, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1987, p. 115.
[61] Inglehart, Ronald, in <u>Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies</u> ed. by Samuel H. Barnes et al., Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979, p.310.

important to note that voting rates, as reported in the World Values Survey series[62] and the NES,[63] for post-materialists are virtually identical to those of the mixed and materialist value groupings. Since post-materialists have added non-traditional forms of political participation to voting behavior (as opposed to replacing), and since they are a growing segment of the population, it stands to reason that political parties or at least ideologically-sympathetic political candidates must recognize this fact and adjust their positions accordingly.

From Party Platforms to Party Identification to Political Action

        For the purposes of this paper, it's necessary to establish the linkage between political ideology (expressed as party platforms), party identification, and political action (expressed in the National Election Surveys). The scholars who argue against the efficacy and relevance of party platforms for the time being may be correct although over time we ought to observe distinct changes in party programs to reflect evolving voter attitudes. Nevertheless let's assume for the moment that party platforms are irrelevant to presidential election issues. We ought to be able to use party identification and attitudes toward the parties as surrogates for the content and importance of party platforms and observe the relationship between an individual's party identification and cultural values. Thus, at the very least there ought to be a measurable congruence between how a voter perceives a political party's general positions and that voter's cultural priorities.

        Niemi and Jennings and their study of issues and inheritance in the formation of party identification provide one piece of this puzzle. In contrast to traditional social cleavages as predictors of party identification, Niemi and Jennings make the case for party identification evolving into a function of current policy preferences. Party identification is becoming more responsive to events and individuals' attitudes on contemporary political

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[62] Inglehart, Ronald, et al. WORLD VALUES SURVEYS AND EUROPEAN VALUES SURVEYS, 1981-1984, 1990-1993, and 1995-1997 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research [producer], 2000. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2000.

[63] The National Election Studies, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan. The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior (http://www.umich.edu/~nes/nesguide/nesguide.htm). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [NES 1948-2000 Cumulative Data File, 1948.WT00], 1995-2000.

issues[64] and in my view this development helps explain the difficulty political parties have in forming stable, lasting, and ultimately winning coalitions. Niemi and Jennings' work is significant because it supports the idea of the continued importance of political parties, albeit with changing roles and attributes, and it gives a place to start examining the political affiliations of post-materialists in search of the congruence, if any, between the major party platforms, election year issues and increasing numbers of post-materialists.

Is Inglehart's Theory Adequate?

It is not surprising that Inglehart has his critics and this thesis cannot be fully developed simply with his post-materialist/materialist construct. Scott C. Flanagan of Florida State University argues that there are at least two kinds of value change taking place in the advanced industrial democracies. These two kinds of change are not only conceptually distinct but are explained by different causal phenomenon and exhibit different patterns of relationships with key demographic and political variables.[65]

While Inglehart describes a single post-materialist/materialist axis of change (see Figure 1), Flanagan describes two: one axis between the Old Politics and the New Politics and another axis between the New Left and the New Right.

Figure 1. Inglehart's conceptual framework[66]

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
[64] Niemi, Richard G. and Jennings, M. Kent, "Issues and Inheritance in the Formation of Party Identification", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35 No. 4, November, 1991, p. 970.
[65] Flanagan, Scott C. and Inglehart, Ronald, "Value Change in Industrial Societies", The American Political Science Review, Volume 81, Issue 4, Dec. 1987, pp.1303-04.
[66] Flanagan, p. 1304.

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Flanagan's materialism is defined by economic concerns such as high economic growth, fighting rising prices, and securing a high-paying job so he splits Inglehart's materialism into economic and non-economic issues describing the latter as authoritarianism. Flanagan's authoritarian values cluster around respect for authority, concerns for security and order, discipline, dutifulness, intolerance for minorities, and traditional and religious moral values. Thus, Flanagan reclassifies Inglehart's materialism as a grouping of traditional materialist tendencies (economic-centered) and non-materialist tendencies (culture-centered). The traditional cultural orientation of Flanagan's non-materialists constitutes the New Right Grouping of the New Politics (see Figure 2).

Figure 2 Flanagan's Conceptual Framework of Cleavage Structures in Advanced Industrial Societies[67]

The other half of the New Politics consists of libertarians (Inglehart's post-materialists) whose primary interest is the New Left issue agenda: abortion rights, women's rights, gay rights, protecting the environment, anti-nuclear weapons, and other quality of life issues.

Finally, Flanagan establishes a third axis of the cleavage structure to fully illustrate the concept of political realignment in advanced industrial societies. For example, the materialists (economic-oriented) are part of the Old Politics characterized by the conflict

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[67] Flanagan, p. 1304

between the Old Right (middle class) and the Old Left (working class). In Flanagan's model it would be possible to have a libertarian-materialist or an authoritarian-materialist orientation. In other words, we can expect to have, at an indeterminate level, an economically traditional yet culturally libertarian value orientation or traditional cultural values alongside economic or wealth oriented concerns. The dotted lines in Flanagan's model help to explain the possibility of having a materialist who is not moved by the libertarian/authoritarian cleavage. In other words, the 'culture wars' have little relevance for this profile, e.g. the working class of the Old Left. The same could be said of a middle class member of the Old Right. Figure 3 illustrates both Flanagan's value and political orientation concepts that explain the full cleavage framework for advanced industrial societies.

Figure 3. Flanagan's Full Cleavage Structure for Advanced Industrial Societies[68]

If Flanagan's model holds, it quickly becomes apparent that the problem of aligning the groupings to produce a winning coalition of political support is enormously difficult. Other scholars such as Everett Ladd have arrived at the same conclusion. Today's postindustrial sociopolitical environment makes it exceedingly difficult for any party to establish stable, long-term loyalties across much of the population.[69] The wide

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[68] Flanagan, p. 1306
[69] Ladd, Carl Everett , "1996 vote: the 'no majority' realignment continues". Political Science Quarterly, Spring 1997 Vol. 112, No 1, p. 37.

variance of party platform content over time as well as voter attitudes will bear this out as the two major parties strive to respond to the priorities of both the Old Politics and the New. With this understanding of advanced industrial political cleavages, it is not surprising to see the emergence of single-issue interest groups and very narrowly focused minor political parties such as the Concord Coalition (fiscal responsibility), the National Abortion Rights League (abortion), the Green Party (environment) or the U.S. Taxpayers Party (tax burden).

The third dimension of value change in Flanagan's work provides more support for the framework of analysis of party platform content. The concepts developed by Inglehart and Flanagan are used to categorize and codify the content of the two major party platforms in order to assess their congruence with the real cultural shifts identified and measured by these two scholars. I expect to find a measurable and significant relationship between the groupings in Flanagan's model and the major party platforms and voter issues in American presidential election years. The detailed application of Flanagan's analytical framework is in the next section, Methodology.

Political Action (Participation and Behavior)

I must build one more piece of the theoretical foundation before moving on to methodology. So far I have mainly dealt with observations of cultural priority shifts by Inglehart with a smattering of the political implications raised by Flanagan's theorized political cleavages. Another scholar, Dalton, addresses the changing culture in the context of political participation and behavior. Dalton provides the linkage between post-materialist theory and its practical effects that are necessary to investigate the thesis of this paper. One of the most important observations he makes is the impact of the information age on citizen politics. In short, the information age requires more voter sophistication, redefinition of issues of concern to the public, weakening of social networks and institutional loyalties, and a decline of traditional values and norms.[70] This concept certainly meshes well with the definition of post-materialism used in this paper. If Dalton's theory holds, we ought to see a continuous decline of traditional institutions (including political parties?) and priorities in favor of the new priorities of the information

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[70]Dalton, Russell J., "Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties" in Advanced Industrial Democracies. 2nd ed. Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1996, pp.9-10.

age. If a counter trend exists, perhaps growth of the authoritarianism identified by Flanagan, then it would signal a major counterpoint to the heretofore-observed cultural priority trends.

To reinforce Niemi and Jenning's view of the importance of ideological concepts in contemporary political action, Dalton has also observed a rise of ideological factors in the evaluation of political parties by the general public.[71] After all, if we are accurately observing the changes in advanced industrialized nations' publics' attitudes as generational shifts in cultural priorities, then the conflict of ideas (or values) ought to replace the traditional cleavages of the Old Politics. Thus, if the content of the major American party platforms tracks the shifts in cultural priorities, then we have identified a significant evolutionary trend with a significant impact on political action and behavior. One of the clearest examples of this impact is the proliferation of issue publics that are very narrowly focused on a single policy issue.[72]

DATA

There are three main parts of the methodological approach for this paper: coding of the two major party platforms, documentation of the issue evolution in American politics from 1972 to 2000, and organization of the National Election Studies data to facilitate investigation and analysis using cross tabulation.

Coding Methodology

The coding of the major party platforms relies heavily on the methods used by Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge. Their work considered party platform content across a broad section of advanced industrial democracies in the search for congruence between party programs and policy implementation; and to what extent the *choice* [Klingemann"s emphasis] posed by the competing programs forecast differences in policy depending on which party won power.[73]

I draw on two very important elements of Klingemann's analysis: the coding methodology and the emphasis on establishing predictive relationships without

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[71] Dalton, p. 26.
[72] Dalton, p. 138.

committing the mistake of arguing that correlation equals causation. There are far too many variables from election to election in western democracies to be able to establish causation with any certainty. The case of U.S. presidential elections is no different. My thesis investigates the congruence if any, between changing cultural priorities, the major party platforms and the most important election year voter issues.

Klingemann presents a theory of democratic policymaking that relies on party platform content analysis to measure the relationship between campaign promises made in various industrialized democracies' elections with actual policy outcome. Klingemann's approach included a specific approach to content analysis so that party platform texts could be transformed into numerical records (Klingemann, 1994, p.271). Klingemann used a particular coding scheme rather than a computer-aided word counting technique in order to measure the *relative* (my emphasis) stress on certain ideas, policies, issues, and concerns. For Klingemann, the sentence was the natural counting unit of analysis because he did not believe that single words or phrases would capture what was wanted from the party platforms (Klingemann, p. 272). My counting unit is the paragraph simply because I do not have the resources to conduct a deeper analysis.

Klingemann used 54 coding categories in to which sentences from the party platforms were placed. These categories were derived from lengthy meetings of experts who were to study each country in the research effort and they were designed to capture as closely as possible the most important issues and concerns expressed by each country's populace (Klingemann, p. 272). In the end, Klingemann's coding of party platforms involved many years of cooperative effort among many scholars from several countries (Klingemann, p. 271). Thus, Klingemann provides the necessary methodological support for the party platform coding methodology, specifically the transformation of text into numerical scores. In the same vein as Inglehart, Klingemann's work also supports the idea of examining the *relative* importance of certain issues. I use a ranking scheme of coded paragraphs in order to capture the relative importance of post-materialist issues in the two party platforms. By definition, ranking an idea signifies its relative importance in a larger body of ideas.

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[73] Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Hofferbert, Richard I., and Budge, Ian. Parties, Policies and Democracy, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, p. 281.

I coded the two major U.S. party platforms (Democratic and Republican) from 1972 through 2000. The unit of measure is the paragraph and the specific coding rules are found in Appendix C. I reviewed each platform, paragraph by paragraph, from beginning to end, in search of key words that I expected to fit into the categories of Inglehart's 12-item post-materialist index. I used the larger index because it provided more coding choices and I believe a more faithful representation of party platform content. The categories of Inglehart's 12-item post-materialist index are reproduced below:

Post-Materialist:

- Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities
- Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful
- Giving people more say in important government decisions
- Protecting freedom of speech
- Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society
- Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money

Materialist:

- A high level of economic growth
- Making sure this country has strong defence forces
- Maintaining order in the nation
- Fighting rising prices
- A stable economy
- The fight against crime

If I found a paragraph that contained key words from both major categories (post-materialist and materialist), I coded it as mixed. If I found a paragraph that did not fall into either category, I coded it as null. Thus, there were a total of fourteen possible coding categories. I did not weight mixed paragraphs based on the number of key words from each category.

I essentially used two sources of key words to code the party platforms: Inglehart and Flanagan. I did not limit coding decisions strictly to the key words I found in the literature; I purposely allowed other key words to count toward a coding category as long as they were consistent with the priority concepts developed by Inglehart and Flanagan. Appendix C provides a sample coding sheet and Appendix D documents every coding sheet used in the analysis including each key word.

After I completed the coding process, I counted the number of paragraphs in each category and determined the rank of each paragraph. Since I started from the top of each party platform, the lower the rank number, the more important the priority. Considering that high counts and low ranks reflected a higher priority, I subtracted the rank from 1 and summed the count percentage and rank percentage to establish an overall weighted score. This technique allowed me to compare each value category for a particular year and across several years. Appendix E illustrates this methodology.

Analysis Process (Issue Evolution)

I borrowed elements of the issue evolution analysis from Carmines and Stimson and their treatment of the issue evolution of race and its transformation effect in America. Carmines and Stimson have built a framework of analysis that provides for examining the linkage between sources of issues and outcomes. They hypothesize three models of issue evolution: cataclysm, gradualism, and punctuated equilibrium.[74] The long, slow process of value change documented by Inglehart and Dalton lends itself to the gradualism model of issue evolution. The gradual change is substantial, fundamentally altering the complexion of the political system over time.[75] Thus, the gradual model helps support Inglehart's theory of age cohort changes and explains the incremental emergence of the new political cleavages theorized by Flanagan. In other words, as the number of post-materialists in the American population grows over time, I expect the gradualism model of issue evolution to be the most instructive for understanding what's happening. I do not expect to find any sudden, abrupt changes linked to shifts in value priorities.

Carmine and Stimson also make the point that a simple measure of the importance of an issue is the space devoted to it.[76] This supports my decision to use count of mentions as a means of assessing issue importance.

National Election Studies Project

Another important argument is the idea that issue evolutions necessarily involve ordinary citizens.[77] That is why I used the National Election Studies (NES) as a major

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[74] Carmines, Edward G. and Stimson, James A. Issue Evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 12.
[75] Carmines and Stimson, p. 13.
[76] Carmines and Stimson, p. 56.

data source. I am concerned that differences in measurement may result from the fact that party platforms are written by political elites and the NES polls a much broader cross-section of society. But this possible distinction may add to the contribution of this thesis to the political science body of knowledge. If there is little congruence between the party platforms and the election year issues identified in the NES, then it may partially account for polls that document an increasingly wide gap between the general public and those who participate in national political processes.

Another reason I used the NES is because from 1972 through 1992 in the presidential election years the same priority questions are asked that Inglehart used in the World Values Survey. Thus, I was able to construct the same 4-item post-materialist index that Inglehart used to measure changing value priorities. Unfortunately, the NES stopped asking the priority questions after 1992 so the number of materialists, mixed, and post-materialists for the 1996 and 2000 elections are projections based on the best-fitting trend line for each category. I do not expect this to have any impact on results, one way or another.

One of Flanagan's criticisms of Inglehart was the lack of greater fidelity in the one-dimensional materialist/post-materialist model. In order to assess the tendencies of the mixed (which is also the largest) segment of NES respondents, I took the responses to the two 'what is more important' questions to establish two types of mixed cultural priority categories. The result is a variable where the materialists and post-materialists remain unchanged while the mixed are reclassified as either mixed/materialist or mixed/post-materialist based on which priority was put first. For example, a mixed respondent who placed 'maintaining order in the nation' first and 'protecting freedom of speech' second would be classified mixed/materialist. If the order were reversed, the respondent would be classified mixed/post-materialist. I believe this added level of measurement will help understand the strength and direction of issue evolution in the American public over time. Inglehart's work also takes this approach.[78]

[77] Carmines and Stimson, p. 115.
[78] Inglehart, Ronald, in Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies ed. by Samuel H. Barnes et al., Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979, p. 357

The Relevance of Verba's Research

The Verba data set in the thesis is comprised of only the responses of what the researcher identifies as 'elites'.[79] The survey structure is very similar to the NES and the purpose of using Verba is to capture the difference between the attitudes of the elites and the public. This will help identify the mechanism for value change in American politics. In other words, do changes in elites' value priorities lead or lag the larger public? Is there a relationship between elites' attitudes and the evolution of the major party platforms? Thus, if the political party platforms cannot support an understanding of the mechanism of change, the Verba data set should serve as a worthy alternative. The focus is on respondent attitudes toward the political parties in the context of their perceived stands on certain issues that easily fall into the New Politics, e.g. abortion, gun control, school prayer.

Organization of Data

The organization of data from the NES and Verba is quite straightforward. The comprehensive list of variables considered is found in Appendix F. The basic approach consists of cross tabulations of the variables in search of statistically significant relationships. Inglehart, Flanagan, and Carmines and Stimson inspired the variables I used. If there is to be a relationship between party platforms and election year issues, I expect that party identifiers and ideological identifiers of the respondent will be particularly instructive. Also, based on the post-materialist/materialist nature of party platform content, I expect to find congruence between the two groups such that materialists will support the party that has the more materialist-oriented platform and post-materialists will support the more post-materialist oriented party.

ANALYSIS I

Changes in Cultural Priorities Over Time

At the beginning of this paper, I theorized that as the proportion of post-materialists increased, there would be an increase in post-materialist content in the major party platforms. This theory is based in part on the assumption that a rational vote-getting

strategy in elections required party decision-makers to account for changing cultural priorities and adjust platform content to win the largest number of votes possible. A corollary to the thesis is that as the number of post-materialists increased and as the political parties responded (most likely in varying ways based on their constituencies), a political counter-point would develop in opposition to the changing culture. Flanagan's cleavage structure, built on the foundation of Inglehart's work, speaks directly to this hypothesis. Indeed, over time, there's been a gradual but marked shift in the cultural priorities of those respondents who identify themselves as Democratic or Republican Party supporters (See Table 1). The majority (55.1% in 1992) of Democratic Party supporters identified themselves as post-materialist or mixed-post-materialist while 45.2% of the Republican Party supporters place themselves in those two categories. In 1992, the majority of Republican Party supporters (54.8%) placed themselves in the materialist or mixed-materialist categories.

Another way to examine the differences between the two parties is to compare the percentages within the cultural priority scale to party support. It couldn't be clearer why, through the 1992 election, the party platform scores were so different. In 1992, of the 311 post-materialist respondents, 202 or 65% were in the Democratic Party support column while 132 out of 259 or 51% of the materialists were in the Republican Party support column (see the right three columns of Table 1). This does not make the answer to the hypotheses any easier, however, since post-materialist theory is neither liberal nor conservative, Democrat or Republican. There is a broad range of cultural priorities in the post-materialist construct, not only the New Politics issues of environmentalism, alternative lifestyles, self-actualization, but many libertarian values such as freedom of speech, self-determination, and distrust of large hierarchical institutions such as government.

Certainly, neither major political party has captured or will capture all the elements of post-materialism. We cannot look at one party and say there is the political home of post-materialism because post-materialist values are found in the priorities of both parties' supporters, thus we should observe a certain degree of post-materialism in both party platforms. Given this reality, I have created a post-materialist score for both major American political parties from 1972 through 2000 using the coding scheme described in

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[79] Phone conversation with Prof. Craig Brians, member of thesis committee, March 2001.

the Methodology section. The purpose of the scoring system is to quantify the relative

amount of post-materialist priorities in each party and compare them to the cultural

priorities of their supporters. In this way I demonstrate the influence of changing cultural

priorit **Table 1 Distribution of Cultural Priority within a political party and distribution of Support by Cultural Priority**

Party ID *Year/Cultural Priority*	Dem	Ind	GOP	Dem	Ind	GOP
	% within Party ID			% within Cultural Priority		
1972						
Materialist	33.0	38.0	36.6	48.8	11.3	39.8
Mixed_M	28.6	31.4	31.9	48.7	9.6	41.7
Mixed_PM	26.7	21.9	25.2	52.7	5.5	41.8
Post-Materialist	11.6	8.8	6.4	62.5	11.3	25.0
1976						
Materialist	29.7	30.6	33.5	48.6	11.4	39.5
Mixed_M	35.7	34.1	34.7	50.0	10.9	38.7
Mixed_PM	23.9	26.3	23.0	51.4	10.9	37.7
Post-Materialist	10.7	9.0	8.8	55.3	9.2	35.5
1980						
Materialist	33.3	37.1	35.3	47.1	10.2	42.3
Mixed_M	35.2	33.5	34.9	52.2	9.3	38.2
Mixed_PM	21.4	18.6	21.3	56.7	8.8	34.6
Post-Materialist	10.1	10.8	8.5	55.1	12.2	30.6
1984						
Materialist	17.0	24.5	23.9	35.3	15.1	51.1
Mixed_M	31.6	28.4	31.7	44.0	7.2	48.3
Mixed_PM	32.5	32.4	31.2	46.2	9.0	44.4
Post-Materialist	18.9	14.7	13.2	55.3	8.1	36.6
1988						
Materialist	18.0	19.5	18.8	43.9	7.3	48.8
Mixed_M	31.7	34.5	35.1	43.6	7.3	48.9
Mixed_PM	32.4	27.6	29.8	49.5	6.9	43.6
Post-Materialist	17.9	18.4	16.3	52.7	8.2	39.1
1992						
Materialist	14.0	18.5	18.8	40.2	8.9	51.0
Mixed_M	30.9	29.4	36.0	45.7	8.6	45.5
Mixed_PM	32.5	33.9	31.9	52.6	9.0	38.4
Post-Materialist	22.6	18.1	13.3	65.0	9.6	25.4

Table 2 Post-materialist Party Platform Score by Election Year including the absolute difference between the two parties

YEAR	TOTAL SCORE		ABS DIFF
	GOP	DEM	
1972	-0.70	15.82	16.52
1976	-3.51	9.97	13.48
1980	-24.44	17.29	41.72
1984	-10.02	15.34	25.36
1988	-12.48	12.88	25.36
1992	-18.08	4.74	22.81
1996	-23.97	0.93	24.90
2000	2.34	-2.57	4.91

The Election Year Platform Scores: A Macro View

Over the past eight presidential elections (1972 through 2000), it's clear that the cultural priority scores of the two major parties are sharply different (see Table 2). Interestingly, there is a dramatic change in the difference pattern between the two parties in the 2000 election from an extremely wide gulf to a very narrow one with the two parties actually reversing the sign of their scores. This change also coincides with what appears to be a convergence of percentages of both of the mixed cultural priority categories and the post-materialist category (see Figure 4, year 2000).

With the exception of 2000, the Republican Party is mostly deep in the negative territory of the score scale indicating the predominance of materialist priorities as described by Inglehart, the economic priorities described in Flanagan's Old Politics, and the authoritarianism (or traditionalism) in the New Politics. Similarly, the Democratic Party is mostly found in the positive territory of the post-materialist platform score scale indicating the predominance of post-materialist and New Politics issues in its platform.

Party Differences vs Cultural Priorities

Table 3 Significant Party Platform Differences

Election Year	TOTAL SCORE	BEAUTIFUL CITIES AND COUNTRYSIDE	SAY IN GOVERNMENT	IMPERSONAL SOCIETY	IDEAS OVER MONEY
	R	R	R	R	R
1972	-0.70	6.81	1.83	9.11	13.90
1976	-3.51	6.33	2.27	5.32	9.02
1980	-24.44	2.49	2.49	6.29	5.19
1984	-10.02	2.99	4.41	8.24	8.13
1988	-12.48	2.98	5.65	5.17	8.47
1992	-18.08	4.96	3.41	4.52	6.53
1996	-23.97	5.11	2.85	4.14	6.41
2000	2.34	3.60	5.75	5.53	13.26
Average	-11.36	4.41	3.58	6.04	8.86
	D	D	D	D	D
1972	15.82	6.31	6.23	11.53	12.41
1976	9.97	6.99	3.39	11.86	17.37
1980	17.29	10.85	8.91	36.25	33.09
1984	15.34	2.86	4.71	12.95	17.70
1988	12.88	5.31	4.75	9.98	11.74
1992	4.74	6.53	6.11	5.13	12.44
1996	0.93	7.10	5.47	7.35	12.74
2000	-2.57	7.60	2.45	9.10	8.95
Average	9.30	6.69	5.25	13.02	15.80
Wilcox (52)	39	48	52	45	47

Overall, there is a statistically significant difference between the total mean scores for the two parties (see Table 3). I use the Wilcox Rank Sum test because the number of paired cases is so small (8) I cannot assume a normal distribution of scores. At the .05 level the lower-tailed critical value is 52, the test statistic W for the difference of total mean scores is 39. Since W is in the rejection region, the null hypothesis (there is no difference in mean scores between the parties) is rejected.[80] All the while, the trend line of post-materialists in both parties continues up and to the right (see Appendix G for specific numbers) and the materialists continue to decline with the mixed categories remaining fairly stable. To verify the stability of the mixed categories, I built a 99% confidence interval (alpha = .01) for the mixed category percentages reported by the NES and found that for both parties, they all fell inside it. Thus, the slight changes in the mixed category scores over time are not significant. These initial observations seem to indicate that post-

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[80]Devore, Jay. L., <u>Probability and Statistics for Engineering and the Sciences, 3rd Ed</u>. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Grove Publishing Company, 1991, p.682.

materialist values have little to do with political platforms. The percentage of materialists in the population continues to fall and the post-materialists continue to rise while the mixed categories remain fairly stable. Since both parties have mostly been consistent in platform content and both parties have had their share of electoral success and failure, it would appear that at the macro level there is little congruence between cultural priorities and party support.

However, a closer look at the differences in the party platforms over time reveals a few stark areas of difference that match up well with the cleavages identified by Flanagan. Also, the areas in the party platforms where there is little difference such as the economy or fighting crime would not surprise Inglehart or Flanagan. They both made the point that post-materialist values would not necessarily replace more traditional political concerns, they would supplement them. There are four priority areas where the differences between the two parties, shaped in the materialist/post-materialist construct, can be seen: "Beautiful Cities and Countryside", "Say in Government", "Impersonal Society", and "Ideas over Money".

The Significant Differences in Party Priorities

'Beautiful Cities and Countryside' is one of the post-materialist items in Inglehart's 12-item battery of questions. It essentially has two components: environmental concerns and urban renewal/urban planning. The key words cited in the party platforms give a more thorough understanding of this cultural priority. For example phrases such as "protect food, water, air", "rural or urban renewal", "build more livable communities", and "natural environment too precious to waste" illustrate the content and tone of this cultural priority. Using the Wilcox Rank-Sum test, at the .05 confidence level, the critical value is 52 so we reject the null hypothesis if $W <= 52$ or $>= 84$ (two-tailed test). W (the test statistic) for this cultural category is 48 therefore we reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the scores of the two parties. For six out of the eight election years the Democratic Party had a higher score than the Republican Party, the only exceptions being 1972 and 1984 where the Republicans held a slight edge. The larger question is why would the Republican Party continue to place less emphasis on an issue that is important to an increasingly large percentage of the population (the post-materialists)? The answer goes back to the NES data, tabulated in that identified the

majority of Republican Party supporters through 1992 in the materialist and mixed-materialist categories. Thus, most Republican supporters do not put 'Beautiful Cities and Countryside' as a higher priority than more materialist values, explaining its lesser emphasis in GOP party platforms.

The difference between the two parties in the 'Say in Government' priority illustrates the desire to have a broader level of participation in the political decision-making process. This priority is illustrated by key words such as "open process", "make government more responsive", and "self-determination". Again, the Democrats have a higher average score than the Republicans, reflecting the same type of cleavages that characterized 'Beautiful Cities and Countryside'. At the .05 level, W is 52 and falls just inside the rejection region.

'Impersonal Society' is another cultural priority that illustrates the differences between Republicans and Democrats. At the .05 level, the critical value is 52; W is 45 and falls in the rejection region such that the difference of mean scores between the two parties is statistically significant. Considering the nature of the 'Impersonal Society' category and the source of support (in terms of cultural priorities) of the two parties, it's not difficult to understand why the differences are significant. Some of the post-materialist key words that capture the 'Impersonal Society' category include social and economic justice, social change, and tolerance of minorities and immigrants. This mix of values captures both the Old Politics class cleavage between the working and middle class and the New Politics cleavage between the Libertarian/post-materialists and the non-materialist Authoritarians for whom concepts of social change or disruption are particularly distasteful.

The fourth cultural priority that illustrates sharp differences between the two parties is 'Ideas Over Money'. At the .05 level, $W = 47$ and falls in the rejection region. This cultural priority also captures many of the cultural issues that animate the cleavages in the New Politics between the Libertarians/post-materialists and the non-materialists/Authoritarians. For example, the abortion issue is a classic case of the cultural divide played out in the two political parties. Other areas covered by 'Ideas over Money' include homosexual rights, alternative lifestyles and families, prayer in school, opposition to military power, especially nuclear weapons, less emphasis on hierarchy, social order, and tradition. This is by no means an exhaustive list of topics but it illustrates the

differences between the two parties and where we can look for the impact of changing cultural values on American political parties in presidential election years.

<u>The Relationship between Cultural Priority and Party Support</u>

Now that I've addressed the macro view of party support and cultural priorities, along with the specific platform issues that separate the two parties, I'll dig deeper into these relationships using the NES and Verba data. I will compare the NES 'Most Significant Issue Facing the Nation' variable with cultural priorities and party support, limiting the survey population by strength of partisanship and amount of campaign participation. Then I will compare some common issues handled by both the NES and Verba to compare the significant differences between the issues that are important to the voting population in general (NES) and the activists (Verba). Finally, I will examine the demographic data within and between the two studies.

ANALYSIS II: MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION

<u>Cultural Priority Category versus Party Support</u>

The overall tabulation of cultural priority and party identification was presented in Table 1 above. All three groupings: Democrat, Independent, and Republican share similar characteristics. They all experience a clear shift from supporters that are identified as materialists or mixed-materialists to mixed-post-materialists and post-materialists.

For the period 1972 through 1992, there is a measurable relationship between party support and cultural priority. The cross tabulation of party support and the cultural priority category returns a Pearson Chi Square value of 59.49, 9 df, p =.000. The strength of this relationship is weak, Cramer's V = .055 and there is a weak negative correlation, Pearson's R = -.08, between the two categories. The count of GOP supporters in the materialist and mixed-materialist categories was higher than the expected count while the same is true for the mixed-post-materialists and post-materialists who were Democratic Party supporters.

The hypothesis breaks down once I consider the party platform scores and compare them to the distribution of party support and cultural priorities. Only the GOP movement away from a materialist platform corresponds to the marked decrease in their

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materialist and mixed-materialist supporters. For the Democratic Party, the trend seems to be quite the opposite. Since the 1992 presidential election, as the number of Democratic Party supporters who fall into the post-materialist category increases, the party platform moves further and further away from post-materialist priorities. The mathematical reason for this incongruence is quite simple. The Democratic Party platform from 1992 through 2000 reflects a marked shift in priorities to materialist priorities such as "maintain order" and "fight crime" at the expense of "impersonal society" and "ideas over money". The underlying strategic decisions made by Democratic platform writers are more problematic and beyond the scope of this paper. However, this incongruence is an excellent opportunity to examine the shifting political cleavages in the Democratic party in the 1990's that may provide some explanation for an increasingly materialist platform while experiencing continued growth in post-materialist support.

The GOP, whose preponderance of support in 1992 still came from the Materialist and Mixed-Materialist groups, made a dramatic shift of its platform in 2000 toward post-materialist priorities (see Figure 5). The congruence between changing sources of support and platform content helps to explain the GOP's platform content shift. If we project the party support trends in Table 1, we find that by the year 2000, 53.6 per cent of GOP party support falls into the mixed-post-materialist or post-materialist categories (Table 4). But it doesn't explain the Democratic Party's gradual movement to a more materialist party platform since 1992, mainly because of the increasing scores in the 'fight crime', 'stable economy', and 'maintain order categories'. Clearly, political party platforms, as constructed for this thesis, do not provide sufficient explanatory power to the congruence between cultural priorities and political party support.

Table 4 Projected party identifiers by election year and Cultural Priority

Party ID		Dem	Ind	GOP
Year/Cultural Priority	% within Party ID			
1996	*Projected*			
Materialist		9.5	14	13
Mixed_M		32.3	28	35.9
Mixed_PM		34.7	37	33
Post-Materialist		23.5	21	17
2000	*Projected*			
Materialist		5.5	9.9	9.5
Mixed_M		32.3	26	36
Mixed_PM		37	44	35.2
Post-Materialist		26	24	18.4

Figure 5 Platform Scores & Party Supporters by Cultural Priority

Platform Scores v. Post-materialist Support

As with the party platforms, investigation of the individual issues in the NES will provide some insight into the relationship between cultural priorities and political party support.

The NES Data: Issue Relevance by Cultural Priorities and Party Support

In addition to the post-materialist scores of the major party platforms, the NES issue questions are another means to explore the relationship between cultural values and political party support. Have the political party decision-makers captured the priorities of the public at large? What is the relationship between cultural priorities, party support, and issue importance? To answer these questions, I use the six presidential election years in the NES that also ask the four item post-materialist index questions, covering 1972 through 1992. Throughout this section, the primary statistical analysis technique is the Measures of Association tool in SPSS.

The relative importance of each issue as defined by survey respondents in the two major party support categories is listed in Table 5. Given Flanagan's finding that traditional political concerns will not be replaced by post-materialist priorities, it's not surprising that the number one issue of concern is the economy.

Table 5 Rank of National Issue by Party Identifier

	Party Id	Dem	GOP
National Issue	Rank		
Agriculture		8	8
Economy and Business		1	1
Foreign Affairs/National Defense		3	2
Government Functioning		6	5
Labor Issues		9	9
Natural Resources		5	6
Public Order		4	4
Racial Problems		7	7
Social Welfare		2	3

Also, given the importance of the Cold War during this time period, national defense ranks in the top three for both parties as well. There are only slight differences in rank for all nine issues.

The Chi Square tests of the relationship between party identifier and most significant national problem return an F value of 224.97, (24, N = 7558), p = .000. The symmetric measures reveal a weak relationship with a contingency coefficient of .170, and a Pearson's R of -.112. The expected and actual counts for the Democrats and Republicans generally moved in opposite directions. For example, in the 'Economy and Business' category, the Democratic count was less than expected and the Republican

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count was more than expected. Thus, although there is little difference in the rank importance of issues between the two parties, the detail of the cross-tabulation of the party/issue relationship reveals discernable differences between the two parties.

The next investigative step is to inject cultural priority category into the comparison of issues and party support. The cross-tabulation of party identifier and the most important national problem, controlling for cultural priority returns the data needed to examine the impact of culture. The analysis of variance between the percentages of party supporters within a cultural priority category that identify a particular issue as the most important reveals significant differences in three of the nine issues in the NES data set. They are the economy, social welfare, and public order. Based on the key words discussed in the Methodology section and comparing them to the NES question, the match up of these issues is:

Party Platform	NES
Impersonal Society	Social Welfare
High Economic Growth	Economy
Maintain Order	Public Order

Thus, as with party platforms, the lens of investigation of post-materialist values in political party support must have a tighter focus, using specific issues to understand the relationship between cultural priority category and political party support.

The Three Significant NES Issues

Table 6 shows the issues whose variance of party support organized by cultural priority was significantly different. The entire tabulation of issues is found in Appendix H. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted across the party supporter columns to compare the average number of party supporters by cultural priority category that place an issue as the most important facing the nation. Table 7 reports the results for these three issues.

Table 6 Percent who named issue as the most important

Party		dems	ind	gop
ISSUE		percentage of supporters #1 issue		
Economics				
Materialist		39.5	41.2	47.9
Mixed M		37.8	41.2	46.7
Mixed PM		39.4	43	43.2
Post-Materialist		38.5	41.5	46.3
Public Order				
Materialist		9.7	9.8	11.2
Mixed M		7.9	9.9	14.6
Mixed PM		9.2	9.4	12.2
Post-Materialist		8.3	8.5	13.5
Social Welfare				
Materialist		28.3	33.8	15.2
Mixed M		31.1	40.2	16.8
Mixed PM		31.2	25.5	19.2
Post-Materialist		30.2	18.3	17.8

Table 7 Significant NES issue

Issue	ANOVA	% of Variance Associated with Party Support
Economy	$F_{(2,9)} = 29.36, p = .00$	87
Public Order	$F_{(2,9)} = 17.79, p = .00$	80
Social Welfare	$F_{(2,9)} = 6.60, p = .02$	59

It's not surprising that the number one issue of concern in the NES is Economics and Business. The congruence between the country's economic health and presidential political success has been well documented and won't be further addressed here. Notice that even though both sets of party identifiers named the economy as the most significant issue, the percentages of Republican identifiers were much higher than the Democrats. The same is true for public order and then the trends reverse for social welfare. For all three of these issue areas, the congruence between cultural priority, political party support, and specific issue salience is unmistakable. The predominately materialist party (the GOP) has a significantly higher proportion of supporters who place the economy and public order as the most important issue facing the nation. The predominately post-materialist party (the Democrats) has a significantly higher proportion of supporters that place social welfare as the most important issue facing the nation. In addition, these three NES issues match up well with Inglehart's post-materialist construct used to measure the major political party platforms. Thus, when controlling for cultural priority, the relationship between party identifier and certain 'most important issues' remains significant. A closer look at each particular issue shows that the variance in percentage of

supporters is significant for three issues: the economy, social welfare, and public order. All three of these issues have salience both in the party platforms and the broader public.

Strength of Partisanship, 1972-1992

Up to this point, the analysis has dealt only with voters who identify themselves as Democrat, Independent, or Republican. Given the relevance of party platforms and the relationship between party identification and cultural priority, it stands to reason that the more deeply partisan respondents ought to return stronger association between these two categories. In other words I continue the comparison between party identifier and cultural category by examining the different levels of party support. Table 8 shows this quite clearly.

Table 8 Strength of Partisanship versus cultural priority

Strength of Partisanship	Pearson Chi Sq	Deg Freedom	N	Sig	Cramer's V
Weakest (1)	3.09	3	625	.38	0.07
2	18.26	3	1545	.00*	0.109
3	7.25	3	2289	.06	0.056
Strongest (4)	43.60	3	2161	.00*	0.142
* = significant at the .05 level					

The cross-tabulation of party identifier and cultural category, controlling for level of partisanship (weak to strong), returns the highest Pearson Chi Square test statistic and the strongest association expressed as Cramer's V. The difference in party support among the strongest partisans in each cultural priority category illustrates some stark differences. For example, 51.1% of materialists are strong Republican partisans while 70.3% of post-materialists are strong Democratic partisans (Table 9). The congruence with the two party platforms is unmistakable. The predominately post-materialist platform of the Democrats attracts significant post-materialist support while the predominately materialist platform of the Republicans attracts a majority of the materialists in the survey.

Table 9 Distribution of cultural categories among strongest partisans

Party/Cultural Category	Materialist	Mixed-Materialist	Mixed-PM	Post-materialist
	% in cultural category who strongly support a major party			
Democrat	48.9	54.1	61.8	70.3
Republican	51.1	45.9	38.2	29.7

<u>Campaign Participation, Cultural Priority, and Party Support, 1972-1992</u>

It makes sense that those who actually participate in a political campaign feel very strongly about the candidates and the issues. It also makes sense that the strength of the relationships I've been studying would be even greater among those who participate in political campaigns.

The cross-tabulation of cultural priority and party support, controlling for level of campaign participation returns the strongest association, measured by Cramer's V, for those who participated the most in a political campaign (Table 10). For the most active respondents, over 65% of the materialists were Republican supporters and over 73% of post-materialists were Democratic supporters. The difference in expected and actual counts, confirmed by the symmetric measures of the cross tabulation also illustrates a strong association between the supporters of each party and their cultural priority category (Table 11). The full descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix I.

Table 10 Chi Square and Symmetric Measures: Party Support v. Cultural Category, Controlling for Campaign Participation.

Level of Campaign Participation	Pearson Chi Sq	Deg Freed	N	Sig	Cramer's V
Lowest (1)	11.62	9	3613	.24	0.033
2	65.55	9	2418	.00*	0.095
3	9.95	9	425	.13	0.108
Highest (4)	19.34	6	162	.004*	0.244
* = significant at the .05 level					

Table11 Most Active Campaign Participation: Percentage of Cultural Priority by Party Support

Cultural Priority	Materialist	Mixed-Materialist	Mixed-Postmaterialist	Post-materialist
Party Support				
Democrat	28.1	36.2	57.1	73.5
Independent	6.3	8.5	6.1	0
Republican	65.6	55.3	36.7	26.5

Thus, if we want to understand the nature of the relationship between cultural priority and party support, it helps to know the level of campaign participation and the depth of partisanship.

<u>The party of presidential vote and cultural priority, 1972-1992</u>

So far, I have used party identification, campaign activity, party platforms and NES issues as variables to compare with and to understand changing cultural priorities in presidential elections. But, the rubber meets the road when I look at how respondents actually vote. The focus has been on presidential election years and since the literature review has already established the relevance of party platforms to presidential campaigns, I look at the party of presidential vote and compare it with cultural priority.

The cross tabulation of party of presidential vote and cultural priority returns a statistically significant difference with the Pearson Chi Square (3, $\underline{N} = 6002$) = 112.62, p. = .000, Cramer's V = .137. The relationship between cultural priority and presidential vote choice is similar to its relationship with political platform content and NES issues. While the Democratic Party has had a predominately post-materialist party platform, 60% of post-materialists vote Democrat. While the Republican Party has had a predominately materialist party platform, 60% of materialists vote Republican (Table 12).

Table 12 Distribution of voters by Cultural Category

Cultural Priority		Materialist	Mixed-Materialist	Mixed-PM	Post-materialist
Presidential vote choice					
Democrat		39.8	44.2	51.4	60.5
Republican		60.2	55.8	48.6	39.5

To consider these results on a year-by-year basis does not dilute the results at all. With the exception of 1976, every presidential election returns significant differences between party of presidential vote and cultural priority (table 13). This exception is certainly due to virtually no difference in the presidential vote by cultural category in 1976. The tabulation by election year shows that by 1992, 75% of the post-materialists voted for the Democratic Party candidate, leaving 25% for the Republican and independent candidates. Compare the platform scores of each party from 1972 through 1992 and the results of this cross-tabulation come into even sharper focus. Both parties have distinctly opposite post-materialist scores with an average difference of 24.21. 60% of post-materialists who voted, voted for the Democratic Party candidate and the average Democratic Party post-materialist score was 12.67 while the average Republican Party

score was –11.53. It's not surprising that 60% of materialists who voted, voted for the Republican Party candidate.

Table 13 Chi square results: Presidential vote by year and cultural priority

Election Ye	Pearson Chi Sq	Deg Freed	N	Sig	Cramer's V
1972	46.6	3	717	.00*	0.255
1976	0.34	3	1282	.95	0.016
1980	9.49	3	857	.023*	0.105
1984	14.64	3	658	.002*	0.149
1988	16.97	3	1165	.001*	0.121
1992	55.94	3	1323	.00*	0.205
* = significant at the .05 level					

The NES and Verba's work. Are the results reproducible?

Sydney Verba's study of political participation includes an extensive survey similar in construct to the NES. I use Verba's 'activist' data because they provide another way to evaluate the relevance of party platforms and a way to reproduce and evaluate the relationship between issue importance and political party support. Verba does not ask the post-materialist index questions and he doesn't document presidential vote choice, only whether or not a respondent voted in the presidential election. As a result, I use party support as a proxy for cultural priority category based on the significant relationship between party support and cultural priority category in the NES. For example, since Republican support mostly comes from the materialist and mixed-materialist categories, I expect their attitudes on specific issues in the Verba study to roughly correspond to the materialist side. Likewise, since Democratic support mostly comes from the mixed-post-materialist and post-materialist categories, I expect their attitudes to roughly correspond to the post-materialist side.

Cultural Differences by Political Party using Verba

I examine four policy areas that illustrate the cultural political cleavage between post-materialists and materialists: prayer in school, abortion, gun control, and aid to blacks. I chose these issues because they fall under the public order and social welfare issue categories in the NES (where there were significant differences between Republicans and Democrats) so that I can assess the reproducibility of my findings.

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Given the predominance of materialist support for the Republican Party, it's not surprising that most strong Republicans (50.9%) in the Verba study believe the school day should start off with prayer. This is part of the 'maintain order' priority in Inglehart's post-materialist framework and its tradition orientation conflicts with the post-materialist priority set. A plurality of strong Democrats (45.9%) also supported prayer in school and it stands to reason that the blue-collar, more traditional Democratic constituency found in Flanagan's Old Politics cleavage is a factor in this result. Over 55% of the strongly Democratic skilled laborers and craftsmen in Verba's survey believe that the school day ought to start with prayer while about 25% of strongly Democratic professionals and managers agree. Almost 40% of strongly Democratic professional or technical workers believe that prayer has no place in public school. These results illustrate not only the cultural difference between the parties, they also provide some insight into the political tension within the parties that come from emerging cultural values. In this case, the Democratic Party has a substantial proportion of support from both sides of the cultural spectrum and this may help to explain why even though there are a growing number of post-materialists who support the Democratic Party, the party platform still reflects certain traditional values as an element of its vote-getting strategy. Verba's study was published in 1990 and the Democratic Party platform 'maintain order' (which includes traditional religious observances) score in 1992 was 8.38, ranking third out of twelve categories on the Democratic weighted score summary. This category continued to grow in 1996 and 2000 when it was the single most important priority in the Democratic Party platform.

The difference between strong Republicans and Democrats on public school prayer is statistically significant at the .05 level, Pearson Chi Square (6, $\underline{N}$ = 172) = 13.157, p. = .041, Cramer's V = .277.

The abortion question provides an even stronger difference. Over 72% of strong Democrats support abortion under any circumstances while only 25.8% of strong Republicans hold the same view. Over 45 % of strong Republicans answer in the two most restrictive abortion categories while a little more than 21% of strong Democrats do the same. The difference in the mean score is statistically significant at the .05 level, Pearson Chi Square (6, N = $\underline{170}$) = 17.731, p. = .007, Cramer's V = .323.

The results for handgun control and government aid to blacks are very similar to those above. The Pearson Chi Square tests for all four policy areas are tabulated in Table

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14 below. If we consider where these issues lay on the post-materialist scale and the cultural priorities of each party's supporters, it is not difficult to understand why there are significant differences.

Table 14 Significant Differences between strong Republicans and Democrats: Verba data

Issue	Pearson Chi Square	Degrees of Freedom	Number of cases	Alpha	P	Cramer's V
School Prayer	13.157	6	172	.05	.041	.277
Abortion	17.731	6	170	.05	.007	.323
Gun control	3.864	1	172	.05	.049	.150
Government Aid to Blacks	121.810	6	891	.05	.000	.370

Demographics

Inglehart's research revealed certain demographic trends in advanced industrialized nations that were associated with the growing number of post-materialists. Specifically, he found that post-materialists are best described as highly educated, urban, young, well-paid professionals. They have lower incidence of church attendance and usually smaller families, including fewer children.[81] In order to explore whether or not these demographic attributes have any bearing on this thesis, I compare the variance between average scores in selected demographic categories, organized by cultural priority category. The significant differences in mean demographic scores are presented in Table 15. They essentially confirm Inglehart's findings and illustrate the differences among the four cultural priority categories. The demographic differences among these categories also help to further explain why the strongest partisans in each cultural priority category make the vote choices they do. The party platforms, finalized at the quadrennial national convention, are designed to rally political support and provide a specific platform upon which each candidate runs. The demographic differences also help explain why particular cultural priority categories select certain national issues as the most significant. The NES data only return one demographic category that doesn't return a significant difference

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[81] Inglehart, Ronald, in Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies ed. by Samuel H. Barnes et al., Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979, p.343.

between the cultural priority categories: income. Inglehart's analysis supports this finding. He found that post-materialists have typically more affluent upbringings, which in turn exert more influence on value priorities than current socio-economic status.   But they don't necessarily pursue affluence as adults.[82] This finding explains why the variance in income across the four cultural priority categories is not significant. Thus, *current* income is not instructive for assessing the demographic differences between materialists and post-materialists. The significant differences in demographic data across the four cultural priority categories are tabulated below.

Table 15 Significant Demographic Differences by Cultural Category

Demographic	DF	F Value	Sig
Age Cohort	3	36.851	0.00
Gender	3	12.557	0.00
Education	3	32.212	0.00
Occupation	3	17.582	0.00
Church Attendance	3	32.285	0.00
Home Ownership	3	12.591	0.00
Urban	3	9.757	0.00

It's instructive to examine not only the significantly different mean scores across cultural priority categories, but also the direction of the scores. For example, from materialist through post-materialist, the age cohort tracks younger and younger. The education level from materialist to post-materialist goes up; urbanism increases from materialist to post-materialist; church attendance goes down from materialist to post-materialist. There is no back tracking in these trends either. In contrast to the fluctuation of the party platform scores, including the differences in mean platform scores, the demographic trends for all cultural categories consistently move with and are wholly supported by Inglehart's conceptual framework. The entire descriptive and ANOVA results are fully reported in Appendix J.

The profiles of the two extreme ends of the cultural priority categories provide even more context to the differences between party platforms, issue support and party supporters. They also indicate that the increase in post-materialist values has not led to a counter point of materialist values. I do not find comparable demographic profiles that

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[82] Inglehart, 1990, p. 122

support materialism and post-materialism. The differences in demographic profiles across the cultural priority categories (Table 16) couldn't be sharper or clearer.

Table 16 Demographic Comparison: Materialist vs. Post-materialist, NES data

Demographic	**Materialist**	**Post-materialist**
Urban	Rural/suburban	Suburban/urban
Home ownership	Rent	Own
Gender	Female	Male
Church attendance	More frequent	Less frequent
Age cohort	> 45	< 40
Education	@ 10th grade	HS diploma
Occupation	Skilled/semi-skilled/farm	Clerical/sales/professional

The next question is whether or not these demographic differences are also found in other variables such as party identification, strength of partisanship, and party of presidential vote. Given the relationship between cultural priority, support of party platforms, and national issues, it follows that the variance between demographic categories across party identification, strength of partisanship, and presidential vote choice will be similar to those across cultural priority. The list of demographic variables listed in Table 17 returning significant differences is remarkably similar:

Table 17 Demographics Returning significant differences between cultural priority categories, NES data

Demographic	Party ID:	Strength of Partisanship:	Pres. Vote:
Cohort (age)		X	X
Gender	X	X	X
Education	X	X	X
Urbanism	X	X	X
Income	X	X	X
Church	X	X	X
Home	X	X	X
Marital status	X	X	X
Occupation	X	X	X
X = significant difference, .05 level			

Appendix K has the full numerical results.

WRAPPING IT ALL UP: THE BIG PICTURE

So far I have examined the differences in party platform content since 1972 in the theoretical framework provided mostly by Ronald Inglehart. Since 1972, the differences in cultural priorities between the two major political parties in the United States have been fairly large (> 10 point difference), except for the year 2000 when the difference was negligible. From 1972 through 1992, the preponderance of Republican Party support has come from the materialists and mixed-materialists. This is also true when I control for the strongest partisans and for those who actually voted for the Republican presidential candidate. All non-voting respondents were filtered out from the data set. From 1972 through 1992, the preponderance of Democratic Party support has come from the mixed post-materialists and the post-materialists. Just as with the Republican Party, the strongest

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Democratic partisans and voters for the Democratic Party presidential candidate came from the same cultural priority categories.

The lack of cultural category data for 1996 and 2000 presents a problem I have not been able to surmount. An extension of the trend lines for party supporters in all four cultural category shows that by the year 2000 both parties draw their support mostly from the mixed post-materialists and the post-materialists. This observation may explain why the Republican Party platform in the year 2000 crosses into the post-materialist column for the first time but it does not shed any light on why the Democratic Party platform experienced a dramatic turn to the materialist column.

A closer look at the specific elements of the party platforms and the important national issues in the National Election Studies illustrates in more detail the differences between the two parties. There are four party content categories, defined using Inglehart's twelve-item index, that return significant differences: 'Beautiful Cities and Countryside', 'More Say in Government, 'Impersonal Society', and 'Ideas over Money'. There are two main points to make about these results. First, these differences are all what Inglehart would call post-materialist categories. It would seem that at least some of the political tension in presidential elections from 1972 to 1992 is driven by newly emerging cultural priorities. Second, these observations support Inglehart and Dalton's contention that post-materialist values are not replacing more traditional concerns; they are supplementing them. Even the post-materialist respondents in the NES place economic and business as the most significant political issue.

I use the NES to examine the emerging cultural differences in the context of specific partisan choices in the presidential elections from 1972 to 1992. The NES also enables me to examine the differences in issue priorities for each cultural category. The three issues that returned significant differences between the four cultural priority categories are: 'Economics and Business', 'Maintain Order', and 'Social Welfare'. The key words that I use to code party platform content provide the linkage between the NES issues and the twelve item index such that I can compare the concepts behind the variables in both data sets with a fair expectation of consistent results.

With respect to the three NES issues that return significant differences, the preponderance of concern for the economy and maintaining order came from materialist voters while the post-materialist voters had significantly higher concern for social welfare.

In other words, there is an unmistakable and measurable association between significant issue choice, cultural priority category, party identification, strength of party support, and presidential vote. From 1972 to 1992, materialist and mixed-materialists consistently voted Republican and cited more traditional political issues as most important. Over the same time period, mixed post-materialists and post-materialists consistently voted Democratic and cited at least one less traditional issue as most important.

In the interest of demonstrating reproducible results, I use a portion of Verba's work that was published in 1990. I use the 'elites' data set of respondents culled from a much larger survey population. Since Verba does not use Inglehart's post-materialist framework or question index, I use strength of party identification as a proxy for cultural priority category. This approach is supported by the congruence between party identification and cultural priority category I find in the NES. Verba also does not ask a 'what is the most significant issue … ' question; he focuses in on specific political issues that nicely illustrate the cultural tensions that are found in presidential election years.

For abortion rights, gun control, aid to blacks, and school prayer, the Republican voters are consistently on the more traditional or materialist side of the issue while Democratic voters are consistently on the post-materialist side. Thus, two different data sets plus the party platform analysis return consistent results. From 1972 through 1992, those respondents who hold to more traditional or materialist cultural priorities tend to support the Republican Party and vote for its presidential candidate and those who hold to post-materialist cultural priorities tend to support the Democratic Party and vote for its presidential candidate. The two major political parties, with their desire to win elections, have adapted and shaped their platforms to match the cultural priorities of their strongest supporters. The apparent tension, as modeled by Flanagan, between materialist and post-materialist values is being played out, in part, in American presidential elections.

With Flanagan's new political cleavage structure in mind, has a political counter point to post-materialist trends emerged? Using the NES demographic data, the answer is no. The profile of a post-materialist and materialist voter couldn't be more different. The demographic profiles I examine support Inglehart's findings; post-materialists tend to be more educated, urban, professional, and less inclined to attend church. The only NES demographic category that doesn't return a significant difference is income. There is virtually no difference in income level across the four cultural category priorities.

In the extremely complex process of winning presidential elections, the importance of cultural values indeed plays a role. Certainly there are an enormous number of variables, relationships and sub-processes outside of the cultural category construct that help explain presidential election outcomes. To be sure, using cultural priorities and party support cannot explain the dramatic Democratic Party shift to a materialist platform in the year 2000. Nevertheless, by and large the impact of culture and cultural shifts is unmistakable. From 1972 to 1992, the two major American political parties, using a rational vote-getting strategy, have matched the cultural priorities of their strongest supporters with the content of their platforms.

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THE 12- AND 4-ITEM POST-MATERIALIST INDEX

Questions in the World Values Survey upon which Inglehart's indices are based.

V104. People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY UNDER "First Choice."

V105. And which would be the next most important? CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY UNDER "Second Choice."

	First Choice	Second Choice
A high level of economic growth	1	1
Making sure this country has strong defence forces	2	2
Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities	3	3
Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful	4	4
Don't know [DO NOT READ OUT]	9	9

SHOW CARD M

V106. If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY

V107. And which would be the next most important? CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY

	First Choice	Second Choice
Maintaining order in the nation	1	1
Giving people more say in important government decisions	2	2
Fighting rising prices	3	3
Protecting freedom of speech	4	4
Don't know [DO NOT READ OUT]	9	9

SHOW CARD N

V108. Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important?
CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY

V109. And what would be the next most important? CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY

	First Choice	Second Choice
A stable economy	1	1
Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society	2	2
Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money	3	3
The fight against crime	4	4
Don't know [DO NOT READ OUT]	9	9

SPSS CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR Materialist/Postmaterialist Values

The following SPSS instructions show how these indices were created.

Four-item index: This is the index used in both the National Election Studies (NES) and the World Values Survey.

Materialist/Postmaterialist values [V1000]
COMPUTE V1000=2
IF ((V106=1 AND V107=3) OR (V106=3 AND V107=1)) V1000=1
IF ((V106=2) AND (V107=4)) OR ((V106=4) AND (V107=2)) V1000=3
(range = 1 - 3; missing data=9)

This index is based on the respondent's first and second choices in the original
four-item Materialist/Postmaterialist values battery. If both Materialist items are given
high priority, the score is "1;" if both Postmaterialist items are given high priority, the
score is "3;" if one Materialist item and one Postmaterialist item are given high priority,
the score is "2." If the respondent makes only one or no choices, the result is missing
data.

APPENDIX B
THE ROKEACH BATTERY

The Rokeach battery is worded as follows:

On the next page are 18 values listed in alphabetical order. Your task is to arrange them in order of their importance to *you*, as guiding principles in *your* life. Each value is printed on a gummed label which can easily be peeled off and pasted in the boxes on the left-hand side of the page. Study the list carefully and pick out the one value which is most important to you. Peel it off and paste it in Box 1 on the left.

Then pick out the value which is second most important for you. Peel it off and paste it in Box 2. Then do the same for each of the remaining values. The value which is least important goes in Box 18.

Work slowly and think carefully. If you change your mind, feel free to change your answers. The labels peel off easily and can be moved from place to place. The end result should truly show how you really feel.

The items are:

> A COMFORTABLE LIFE (a prosperous life)
> AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)
> A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution)
> A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)
> A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)
> EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
> FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of loved ones)
> FREEDOM (independence, free choice)
> HAPPINESS   (contentedness)
> INNER HARMONY (freedom from inner conflict)
> MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
> NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack)
> PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life)
> SALVATION (saved, eternal life)
> SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem)
> SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration)
> TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship)
> WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)

APPENDIX C
PARTY PLATFORM CODING

Some people have one set of social, economic, and cultural priorities while others have another set and they both have relevance to American politics. It's also quite possible for people to have a mixture of the two main sets of priorities. These two distinct sets of priorities are fully explained below. It will be your job to categorize the two major American political party platforms according to the rules given on this sheet.

The unit of measure is the paragraph, that is to say that the content of each paragraph in a party's platform will be coded 'post-materialist', 'materialist', 'mixed', or 'null'. When evaluating the content of each paragraph, it is important to consider the key words and phrases that speak to each priority set. Below, suggestions have been given in parentheses after each priority and more options have been listed after the priority groupings. It is important to understand that *implementation* (e.g. the private vs. the public sector) of these priorities, whatever they may be, is not relevant to the evaluation. The objective is to measure cultural priorities in each major party's presidential election year platforms.

Use the marking sheet provided to indicate the number of paragraphs that fall into each category (post-materialist, materialist, mixed, or null). Simply use whole numbers starting with 1 and continuing as far as necessary. The first priority identified will receive a 1, the second a 2, etc. There will be no repeated numbers. Enough marking sheets will be provided to code each party platform passage given.

In order to label a paragraph, there must be distinct and discrete evidence that falls into a category. The evidence is the key words given below. You are not limited to the given key words. Their purpose is to provide context to your decision-making. Words and phrases that are not listed but capture the same idea(s) should count in your coding decision. For all coded paragraphs, please indicate which key word(s) led to your coding decision in the far left column on the marking sheet. Paragraphs that do not fall under the priority sets, as defined by the key words given, should be counted in the 'null' category. ***If a mixture of distinct priorities in a single paragraph can be clearly identified, then mark the paragraph as 'mixed'.*** As before, indicate what key words led to your decision but also indicate with an asterisk what categories you think apply. An example of a marked sheet is provided with these instructions.

There will often be small subsections in the party platforms. If they take up one half page or less, count them as a single paragraph. Also, there often are lists of proposals/priorities, usually preceded by an introductory sentence and colon, covering a certain policy area. They should be considered as a single paragraph and coded accordingly. As described above, distinct priorities from each of the two separate priority sets should be coded 'mixed'.

POST-MATERIALIST VALUES

Post-materialist values are cultural values that are characterized by support of the following priorities:

- People ought to have more say about how things are done in their jobs and in their communities (political and civic participation)
- We ought to make our cities and countryside more beautiful (environment/urban renewal, urban planning)
- We must protect freedom of speech (freedom, civil liberties)
- People ought to have more say in important government decisions (political participation/democracy)
- Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society (social and economic justice)
- Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money (quality of life, alternative lifestyles, alternative priorities)

There are many key words and phrases that will help identify post-materialist values above and beyond the six items listed above. The list below is not exhaustive but should convey the basic principles of post-materialism:

- Social solidarity, social change
- Self-expression
- Non-material quality of life
- Performing interesting work; like your co-workers
- Woman's movement; abortion rights
- Unilateral disarmament; opposition to nuclear weapons, nuclear power
- Tolerance of minorities, immigrants
- Openness to new idea, lifestyles
- Self-indulgence; self-actualization
- Less emphasis on hierarchy
- We should act in the best interests of the nation, rather than ourselves

MATERIALIST VALUES

Materialist values are cultural values that are characterized by support of the following priorities:

- A high level of economic growth (economic growth/health)
- Making sure this country has strong defense forces (national security, strong nation)
- Maintain order in the nation (law enforcement, criminal justice, public behavior)
- Fighting rising prices (economic stability/inflation)
- A stable economy (economic and job security, housing, fiscal responsibility)
- Fight crime (public law and order)

There are many key words and phrases that will help identify materialist values above and beyond the six items listed above. The list below is not exhaustive but should convey the basic principles of materialism:

- Economic security
- Job security
- Adequate housing
- Comfortable life (materially)
- Personal responsibility
- Respect for authority
- Discipline, dutifulness
- Patriotism
- Intolerance for minorities, immigrants
- Traditional moral and religious values
- Conformity to customs
- Anti-abortion

TAB 1 TO APPENDIX C

The purpose of this table is to demonstrate a typical coding sheet for a political party platform, including key words and their relative placement, cultural priority categories, and ranking methodology.

KEY WORDS	P-M PARAGRAPHS	IN JOB	COUNTRYSIDE	GOVERNMENT	SPEECH	SOCIETY	MONEY	MIXED	M PARAGRAPHS	GROWTH	STRONG DEFENSE	MAINTAIN ORDER	PRICES	ECONOMY	FIGHT CRIME	PARAGRAPHS
inflation													1			
personal responsibility												2				
urban renewal			3													
environment/economic growth			*					4		*						
																5
																6
gang violence															7	
care for the elderly						8										
innovative solutions/war on drugs							*	9							*	
																10

APPENDIX D
CODED PARTY PLATFORMS

GOP Party Platforms   Democratic Party Platforms

GOP Party Platforms	Democratic Party Platforms
1972	1972
1976	1976
1980	1980
1984	1984
1988	1988
1992	1992
1996	1996
2000	2000

PARTY PLATFORM SCORING SCHEME

R/2000				SAY IN THE COMMUNITY/SAY IN JOB
Total Paragraphs		298		
Average Rank Position	Rank Position = Rank/Total Paragraphs			1.09%
Adjusted Rank Position	1-Average Rank Position			98.91%
Total Mentions		437		9
Percent of Mentions	Count/Total Mentions			2.06%
Raw Score	Sum of Rank Positions			966
Weighted Score	100 * (% mentions * Adjusted Rank)			2.04
P-M score	PM score minus M score			2.34

This table represents the methodology for determining the weighted score for each value priority for each party in a presidential election year.

In this case, the 2000 Republican Party platform had a total of 298 paragraphs and 437 mentions of the value priorities identified by Inglehart and Flanagan. The rank position reflects where in the document a particular priority is mentioned, in this case "Say in the community/say in the job". The lower number indicates higher placement. In order to have a meaningful weighted score, I subtracted the average rank position from 1 so that a higher adjusted rank number indicates a higher position placement in the party platform.

The number of mentions for the total number of divides a value priority mentions such that a higher ratio indicates more mentions.

The weighted score is derived from the product of adjusted rank and percent of mentions and then multiplied by 100 to give workable numbers, in other words, so that the scores are not extremely small and difficult to work with.

The P-M score is the simple difference of all materialist priorities from all post-materialist priorities such that a negative number indicates a stronger materialist orientation for the party platform and a positive number indicates a stronger post-materialist orientation.

APPENDIX E (Cont'd)

The rank sums are important for distribution-free comparison of the priorities within a particular platform, between platforms over time, and between platforms of the other party over time.

NES

I. POST-MATERIAL FOUR ITEM INDEX QUESTIONS.

VCF9019   1ST GOAL OF THE NATION
VCF9020   2ND GOAL OF THE NATION

Which One Goal is the Most Desirable for the U.S. as a Nation?
Among:

. Maintaining Order in the Nation
. Giving the People More Say in Important Political Decisions
. Fighting Rising Prices
. Protecting Freedom of Speech

There is no post-material four-item index for 1996 and 2000 so I used a predictive value
based on the trend line from 1972 to 1996.

II. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

VCF0103   RESPONDENT COHORT
VCF0104   RESPONDENT GENDER
VCF0110   R EDUCATION
VCF0111   URBANISM
VCF0114   INCOME
VCF0115   RESPONDENT OCCUPATION
VCF0129   RELIGION OF R
VCF0130   CHURCH ATTENDANCE
VCF0146   HOME OWNERSHIP BY R FAMILY
VCF0147   MARITAL STATUS OF R
VCF0151   RESPONDENT OCCUPATION

III. ISSUES

General.

VCF0875   WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT NATL PROBLEM

Domestic Social Welfare/Issues.

VCF0837   WHEN SHOULD ABORTION BE ALLOWED
VCF0838   WHEN SHOULD ABORTION BE ALLOWED BY LAW

Thermometers

VCF0301   7-PT SCALE PARTY IDENTIFICATION
VCF0303   PARTY ID COLLAPSED (1)
VCF0305   STRENGTH OF R PARTISANSHIP

Political Action

VCF0702   DID R VOTE IN ELECTION

VERBA

Party Identification

PARTY1   WHAT POLITICAL PARTY DOES R BELONG TO (p. 2)
PARTY2   STRONG OR NOT STRONG REPUBLICAN/DEMOCRAT

Political Participation

VTPRES   voted in all presidential elections since old enough

Religion

CS1YR   PAST TWELVE MONTHS BEEN ACTIVE AT CHURCH
CS5YR   PAST FIVE YEARS BEEN ACTIVE IN CHURCH
RLIMP   HOW IMPORTANT IS RELIGION IN R'S LIFE
RLATTEND   HOW OFTEN R ATTENDS RELIGIOUS SERVICES

National and Social Problems

BLACK7   GOV'T HELP BLACKS/BLACKS HELP THEMSELVES
PRAYER7   RELIGION BELONGS IN PUBLIC SCHOOL OR NOT
ABORT7   ABORTION A PERSONL MATTER/NEVER PERMITTD
GAYBOOK   R FAVORS TO REMOVE BOOK ON HOMOSEXUALITY
HANDGUN   FAVOR/OPPOSE PERMIT LAW TO BUY HANDGUNS

**APPENDIX G
POST-MATERIALIST TRENDS**

[Post-materialist Trends](#)

APPENDIX H
TABULATION OF NES ISSUES

NES Issues

APPENDIX I
CROSS TABULATION FULL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Cross tabulations: Full Descriptive Statistics

One-way (Party ID)

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
RESPONDENT COHORT	1	4794	3.84	1.19
	2	837	3.74	1.16
	3	3921	3.85	1.21
	9	18	3.94	1.06
	Total	9570	3.84	1.20
RESPONDENT GENDER	1	4811	1.58	.49
	2	840	1.50	.50
	3	3936	1.52	.50
	9	20	1.80	.41
	Total	9607	1.55	.50
R EDUCATION	1	4778	2.53	.94
	2	833	2.53	.93
	3	3893	2.79	.93
	9	20	1.85	.75
	Total	9524	2.64	.94
URBANISM	1	4811	2.01	.80
	2	840	2.16	.74
	3	3936	2.18	.72
	9	20	2.25	.79
	Total	9607	2.09	.77
INCOME	1	4482	2.89	1.10
	2	755	3.09	1.05
	3	3649	3.28	1.07
	9	18	2.33	1.19
	Total	8904	3.07	1.10
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	1	4778	3.09	1.71
	2	833	3.23	1.81
	3	3910	2.84	1.64
	9	20	3.25	1.97
	Total	9541	3.00	1.70
HOME OWNERSHIP BY R FAMILY	1	4731	1.31	.46
	2	829	1.25	.43
	3	3884	1.22	.41
	9	20	1.20	.41
	Total	9464	1.26	.44
MARITAL STATUS OF R	1	4804	2.00	1.49
	2	836	1.79	1.36
	3	3927	1.75	1.35
	9	20	1.95	1.36
	Total	9587	1.88	1.43
RESPONDENT OCCUPATION	1	4713	2.63	1.53
	2	822	2.66	1.56
	3	3871	2.56	1.68
	9	20	3.40	1.19
	Total	9426	2.60	1.60

APPENDIX J DEMOGRAPHICS: NES (Cont'd)

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
RESPONDENT COHORT	Between Groups	9.340	3	3.113	2.166	.090
	Within Groups	13748.365	9566	1.437		
	Total	13757.705	9569			
RESPONDENT GENDER	Between Groups	12.325	3	4.108	16.671	.000
	Within Groups	2366.480	9603	.246		
	Total	2378.805	9606			
R EDUCATION	Between Groups	169.904	3	56.635	64.723	.000
	Within Groups	8330.282	9520	.875		
	Total	8500.186	9523			
URBANISM	Between Groups	63.648	3	21.216	36.456	.000
	Within Groups	5588.641	9603	.582		
	Total	5652.289	9606			
INCOME	Between Groups	319.129	3	106.376	91.139	.000
	Within Groups	10387.944	8900	1.167		
	Total	10707.073	8903			
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	Between Groups	187.542	3	62.514	21.814	.000
	Within Groups	27330.456	9537	2.866		
	Total	27517.998	9540			
HOME OWNERSHIP BY R FAMILY	Between Groups	17.732	3	5.911	30.715	.000
	Within Groups	1820.455	9460	.192		
	Total	1838.187	9463			
MARITAL STATUS OF R	Between Groups	143.849	3	47.950	23.602	.000
	Within Groups	19468.386	9583	2.032		
	Total	19612.235	9586			
RESPONDENT OCCUPATION	Between Groups	27.089	3	9.030	3.549	.014
	Within Groups	23974.481	9422	2.545		
	Total	24001.569	9425			

APPENDIX K
DEMOS BY PARTISANSHIP AND PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: NES

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
RESPONDENT COHORT	1	855	3.74	1.16
	2	2196	3.61	1.12
	3	3354	3.81	1.19
	4	3165	4.05	1.23
	Total	9570	3.84	1.20
RESPONDENT GENDER	1	860	1.50	.50
	2	2202	1.49	.50
	3	3368	1.58	.49
	4	3177	1.57	.49
	Total	9607	1.55	.50
R EDUCATION	1	853	2.52	.93
	2	2185	2.80	.89
	3	3335	2.63	.93
	4	3151	2.57	.98
	Total	9524	2.64	.94
URBANISM	1	860	2.16	.74
	2	2202	2.06	.74
	3	3368	2.13	.77
	4	3177	2.06	.79
	Total	9607	2.09	.77
INCOME	1	773	3.07	1.06
	2	2059	3.20	1.05
	3	3145	3.10	1.08
	4	2927	2.94	1.15
	Total	8904	3.07	1.10
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	1	853	3.23	1.82
	2	2186	3.23	1.72
	3	3349	3.00	1.67
	4	3153	2.78	1.65
	Total	9541	3.00	1.70
HOME OWNERSHIP BY R FAMILY	1	849	1.25	.43
	2	2168	1.29	.45
	3	3316	1.25	.43
	4	3131	1.26	.44
	Total	9464	1.26	.44
MARITAL STATUS OF R	1	856	1.79	1.36
	2	2197	1.79	1.35
	3	3363	1.83	1.40
	4	3171	2.01	1.52
	Total	9587	1.88	1.43
RESPONDENT OCCUPATION	1	842	2.68	1.55
	2	2151	2.42	1.49
	3	3313	2.63	1.64
	4	3120	2.69	1.63
	Total	9426	2.60	1.60

One-way (Strength of Partisanship)

APPENDIX K (Cont'd)

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
RESPONDENT COHORT	Between Groups	266.451	3	88.817	62.976	.000
	Within Groups	13491.255	9566	1.410		
	Total	13757.705	9569			
RESPONDENT GENDER	Between Groups	14.760	3	4.920	19.986	.000
	Within Groups	2364.045	9603	.246		
	Total	2378.805	9606			
R EDUCATION	Between Groups	83.032	3	27.677	31.304	.000
	Within Groups	8417.154	9520	.884		
	Total	8500.186	9523			
URBANISM	Between Groups	14.198	3	4.733	8.061	.000
	Within Groups	5638.091	9603	.587		
	Total	5652.289	9606			
INCOME	Between Groups	84.229	3	28.076	23.523	.000
	Within Groups	10622.844	8900	1.194		
	Total	10707.073	8903			
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	Between Groups	316.212	3	105.404	36.955	.000
	Within Groups	27201.786	9537	2.852		
	Total	27517.998	9540			
HOME OWNERSHIP BY R FAMILY	Between Groups	1.897	3	.632	3.257	.021
	Within Groups	1836.290	9460	.194		
	Total	1838.187	9463			
MARITAL STATUS OF R	Between Groups	82.214	3	27.405	13.447	.000
	Within Groups	19530.021	9583	2.038		
	Total	19612.235	9586			
RESPONDENT OCCUPATION	Between Groups	104.395	3	34.798	13.720	.000
	Within Groups	23897.174	9422	2.536		
	Total	24001.569	9425			

One-way Party of Presidential Vote

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
RESPONDENT COHORT	1	4137	3.80	1.19
	2	4578	3.93	1.19
	Total	8715	3.87	1.19
RESPONDENT GENDER	1	4150	1.59	.49
	2	4598	1.52	.50
	Total	8748	1.56	.50
R EDUCATION	1	4116	2.56	.96
	2	4561	2.70	.94
	Total	8677	2.63	.95
URBANISM	1	4150	1.98	.80
	2	4598	2.18	.73
	Total	8748	2.09	.77
INCOME	1	3854	2.87	1.10
	2	4289	3.25	1.06
	Total	8143	3.07	1.10
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	1	4126	3.16	1.71
	2	4565	2.81	1.66
	Total	8691	2.97	1.69
HOME OWNERSHIP BY R FAMILY	1	4091	1.32	.47
	2	4540	1.21	.41
	Total	8631	1.26	.44
MARITAL STATUS OF R	1	4144	2.02	1.49
	2	4588	1.74	1.35
	Total	8732	1.87	1.42
RESPONDENT OCCUPATION	1	4056	2.59	1.51
	2	4527	2.65	1.69
	Total	8583	2.62	1.61

APPENDIX K (Cont'd)

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
RESPONDENT COHORT	Between Groups	41.109	1	41.109	28.930	.000
	Within Groups	12381.245	8713	1.421		
	Total	12422.354	8714			
RESPONDENT GENDER	Between Groups	9.420	1	9.420	38.300	.000
	Within Groups	2151.023	8746	.246		
	Total	2160.443	8747			
R EDUCATION (1)	Between Groups	44.298	1	44.298	49.433	.000
	Within Groups	7773.833	8675	.896		
	Total	7818.131	8676			
URBANISM	Between Groups	88.720	1	88.720	152.764	.000
	Within Groups	5079.382	8746	.581		
	Total	5168.102	8747			
INCOME	Between Groups	279.196	1	279.196	238.724	.000
	Within Groups	9521.184	8141	1.170		
	Total	9800.380	8142			
CHURCH ATTENDANCE (1)	Between Groups	264.150	1	264.150	93.427	.000
	Within Groups	24566.604	8689	2.827		
	Total	24830.753	8690			
HOME OWNERSHIP BY R FAMILY	Between Groups	26.671	1	26.671	139.755	.000
	Within Groups	1646.780	8629	.191		
	Total	1673.452	8630			
MARITAL STATUS OF R	Between Groups	161.152	1	161.152	80.312	.000
	Within Groups	17517.508	8730	2.007		
	Total	17678.660	8731			
RESPONDENT OCCUPATION (2)	Between Groups	6.592	1	6.592	2.541	.111
	Within Groups	22259.504	8581	2.594		
	Total	22266.097	8582			

VITA

LCDR John W. Carter
Hometown: Hingham, MA
Residence: Arnold, MD

Professional

- Commissioned at Officer Candidate School, Newport RI Sept 1985
- Surface Warfare Officer qualified
- Served on four ships: LPD 2, LSD 41, DDG 996, FFG 11

  - Auxiliaries, Main Propulsion Assistant, Assistant Operations, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Fire Control, Chief Engineer, Strike Warfare Officer

- Staff Officer, US Joint Forces Command

  - Joint Warfighting Center: Unified Endeavor, Joint Task Force Exercise program, NATO/Partnership for Peace program
  - Joint Experimentation: Executive Assistant

- Reserve officer since 1997. Permanent recall to active duty effective Oct 1, 2001

Academic

- 1985 BA Political Science (international relations): Trinity College Hartford, CT
- 1993 MS Systems Technology: Naval Postgraduate School
- 2002 MA Political Science: Virginia Tech
- Currently enrolled in the PhD program at Catholic University of America, Washington, DC

Personal

- wife: Laura Carter. Registered Nurse
- daughter: Falyn. Sophomore at George Mason University (pre-nursing)
- son: Daniel age 11
- son: Joseph age 9
- interests: Boy Scouts, sailing, physical fitness, history, politics, Boston Red Sox