The Effect of Regional Security Environments on State Attitudes Regarding the Use of Force and International Law

A Quantitative Analysis Utilizing International Positions on Operation Iraqi Freedom

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The Effect of Regional Security Environments on State Attitudes Regarding the Use of Force and International Law

Robert Wallace Mason, Jr.

(ABSTRACT)

The US-led war to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein elicited a wide range of responses among liberal states, from active diplomatic opposition in the prelude to war to actual combat support once hostilities commenced. These divergent responses, in part, reflected different perceptions of the legitimacy of force and international law. Furthermore, I contend that these perceptions are rooted in the unique regional security environment in which each state is situated, with states located in relatively insecure regional environments being more favorably disposed to view US military preponderance and use of force as a legitimate public good. Consequently, I hypothesize that the more insecure a state’s regional security environment, the more likely it was to support, either diplomatically or militarily, the “major combat” phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. To this end, I develop a measure of regional security based on concepts of power and polarity adapted from John Mearsheimer’s *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. I then test this measure using a logistic regression analysis for 85 states located in 10 regions. The results indicate support for the hypothesis, but also illuminate the need for more research on the implications of power distributions within regional settings for international conflict in the post-Cold War era.
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DEDICATION

John W. Mason
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Of
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Died June 9, 1944
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Chapter 1

Introduction

One of the most prominent aspects of the acrimonious buildup to the US-led war against Iraq was the divergent responses of liberal states, ranging from active diplomatic opposition to eventual participation in combat operations. While longstanding multilateral institutions were undergoing immense strains due to dissension between old partners, new opportunities for cooperation with countries that fifteen years earlier had been sequestered behind the Iron Curtain were also being presented. These developments were the outgrowth of searing differences regarding the use of force, the nature of threat, varying levels of military capability, and the legitimacy of international institutions that further besieged a world community already grappling with the convergence of terrorism and globalization.

What caused the emergence and ultimate eruption of these differences in the prelude to the war? Notwithstanding the pronounced split among the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council that evinced a steady and often self-serving erosion of the containment regime of sanctions, inspections, and monitoring\(^1\), several other proximate factors coalesced to propel the Iraq issue from the province of great-power squabbling to global controversy. Chief among these was the non-institutionalist predilections of the Bush

\(^1\) See Chapter 2.
The aversion of prominent members of the Bush administration to the seeming lassitude and indecision of certain multilateral institutions and processes, seen as an unacceptable and illegitimate impediment to the freedom and range of action of United States foreign policy, was well-known at the outset.\(^3\) Disagreement, if not undisguised disdain, greeted two of the European Union’s highest priority international projects – the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the International Criminal Court – while Asian allies were temporarily jolted by initial indecision regarding the efficacy of South Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s ‘sunshine policy’ toward North Korea.\(^4\) International, and particularly European, sensitivities were further rankled as a host of other UN-engineered conventions on issues such as landmines and small arms were met with either indifference or outright opprobrium. These actions, in turn, reinforced negative caricatures of Bush emanating from the 2000 campaign as either a stammering

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\(^2\) Prior to 9-11, these predilections were expressed most forcefully as opposition to various arms control treaties. These included the withdrawal from the Ant-Ballistic Missile Treaty, opposition to the Biological Weapons Convention, refusal to resubmit the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Senate, and a propensity to ignore or downplay US commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. See Phyllis Bennis, “Before and After: US Foreign Policy in 2001”, available online at http://www.tni.org/archives/bennis/before.htm; Daryl Kimball, “Future Challenges to Multilateral Arms Control and Non-Proliferation”, available online at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/nwc/mon3/kimball.html; and Stewart Patrick, “Don’t Fence Me In: The Perils of Going Alone”, *World Policy Journal*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Fall 2001.

\(^3\) See, for example, a letter to President Clinton dated January 26, 1998 and signed by Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, among others, which advocated regime change in Iraq and stated that “American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council”. Available online at The Project for the New American Century, http://www.newamericancentury.org.

dunce or a dangerous cowboy in thrall with unsavory practices and characters such as the death penalty or wild-eyed religious fundamentalists. Impressions such as these, especially when contrasted with the multilateralist inclinations of his predecessor, formed an integral backdrop to the Iraq war controversy, as hostility to Bush and the segment of American culture he symbolized became conflated with opposition to the war itself.5

Such underlying sentiments, however, were held in temporary abeyance after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Following Le Monde’s famous headline of “we are all Americans now”, NATO invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty, and allied aircraft conducted combat air patrols over major US cities. In Operation Enduring Freedom, however, NATO was relegated to spectator status as the theater became the first proving ground for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s transformation paradigm of lethality and speed built upon precision airpower, special operations forces, and instantaneous dissemination of battlefield information.6 NATO’s inactivation, however, was not due simply to a philosophical inclination, but also stemmed from a pronounced gap in advanced military capabilities between the US and the majority of its NATO partners. The gap was first revealed in Kosovo, as nearly a decade of divergent investments in research and development by the US and Europe resulted in widely differing capabilities in critical areas such as precision guided munitions and stealth technology. These differences kept all but the US and the

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5 This conflation is perhaps best exemplified by a placard at a Washington, DC anti-war rally that read “I love Iraq, Bomb Texas”. Victor Davis Hanson. “I Love Iraq, Bomb Texas”. Between War and Peace: Lessons from Afghanistan to Iraq (New York: Random House, 2004), 121-132.

UK on the sidelines in the opening days of Operation Allied Force.\textsuperscript{7} This degradation in interoperability, in turn, merely mirrored the increasing difficulties of political cooperation within an alliance whose central mission essentially concluded with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

\textit{Fundamental Causes}

The end of the Cold War, moreover, created a fundamental realignment in the international security architecture. Gone was the era in which two competing superpower blocs parried for advantage and influence on a global scale; in its stead was a “uni-multi polar” world in which the United States maintained unrivalled military and economic strength, while lesser powers held influence in their own immediate regional security environments.\textsuperscript{8} As political scientist Hans Morgenthau noted in his seminal work \textit{Politics Among Nations}, regional balances of power have less opportunity to operate autonomously to the extent that they are an integral element of the dominant global balance of power.\textsuperscript{9} The demise of superpower competition, therefore, permitted regional competition to reassume central importance. A concrete example of this phenomenon was the withdrawal of the Soviet and American navies from Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, and Subic Bay, Philippines, respectively. Their departure facilitated an ensuing competition among the People’s Republic of China, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, and


the Philippines for control of the strategically located Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

I posit that the main consequence of these more autonomous and less interconnected regional balances of power re-emerging after the end of the Cold War is that widely divergent security environments conditioned different state behaviors, thus creating varying trajectories for attitudes regarding the necessity and use of force and the legitimacy of international law. For states situated in relatively benign security environments, greater commitment to the architecture of liberal internationalism created after World War Two, especially given the accelerating nature of globalizing trends in communications and technology, constitutes a viable and logical policy. For those located in more insecure regions, however, the absence of any central authority to enforce the dictates of international law renders those protections impotent. Security becomes a scarce commodity, with states then becoming more inclined to cooperate with those who can provide the requisite military capability to ensure their security. For liberal states – and many others as well – this means the United States.

The controversy over the Iraq war, given its universal character and encompassing such fundamental issues as the legitimacy of international law and the sanctioning of force, thus provides a unique and convenient measuring point to determine if regional security environments influenced state behavior in their decision whether or not to support the United States. Consequently, I hypothesize that the more insecure a state’s regional security environment, the more likely it was to support, either diplomatically or militarily, the opening “major
combat” phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (“OIF”). To this end, I develop a measure of regional security for 85 states and test it for significance against a range of other independent variables using logistic regression analysis.

It is hoped that this paper will make a number of theoretical and practical contributions. First, it intends to demonstrate that security remains the major concern of state actors. However, by focusing on the ameliorative nature of certain regional security environments – for example, a hierarchal structure led by a preponderant power – it seeks to achieve a more nuanced view than that afforded by the overarching condition of global anarchy anchoring Waltzian neorealism. This nuanced view is that the conditioning effects of anarchy on state behavior as posited by neorealism ebb and flow between regions due to varying distributions of power within regions. These regional distinctions, in turn, can help explain the variations in approaching international security issues espoused by different states. A corollary to this approach is that it also focuses on the attitudes of minor-power states toward the use of force by a preponderant power – an area that has received scant attention in the scholarly literature.

This inattention is unfortunate, however, because on a practical level heretofore ‘minor’ states are likely to grow in importance as the global war on terrorism (“GWOT”) continues, primarily for two reasons. First, the planned reduction of US forces in traditionally forward-deployed areas and their corresponding return to the US homeland places a premium on obtaining use of geographic locations suitable for equipment pre-positioning and air/sea lift functions. This redeployment reflects a revised calculus that the political costs
of these traditional forward deployments are not compensated by strategic benefits. Knowing the impact of the regional security environment on the prospects of political cooperation with the United States would then undoubtedly be advantageous for US planners in selecting, developing, and maintaining these new deployment options. Second, the preoccupation among certain US elites with the political stance of leading OIF opponents will likely wane in importance during future permutations of the GWOT, as a rerun of the Iraq war protests would likely be viewed by the US public as a reflexive anti-Americanism. Far more damaging to the American psyche would be defections or refusals of support from minor powers that supported the Iraq war effort – a fact that al-Qaeda leaders and Iraqi insurgents alike have capitalized on with the Madrid attacks and the videotaped beheadings of targeted foreign workers.

Plan of Paper

The plan of this paper is as follows. First, I discuss the main branches of contemporary international relations theory – realism and liberalism – that provide a broader context for the fundamental issues that were the focus of the Iraq war controversy. In conjunction with this discussion, I then review Robert Kagan’s provocative essay on transatlantic relations, “Power and Weakness”, which examines the gulf in US and European attitudes on approaches to international security. After Kagan’s discursive introduction to regional security environments with his metaphors of the “Hobbesian jungle” and “Kantian paradise”, I then attempt to construct a more rigid foundation for the systematic
study of such settings. In this regard, I adapt concepts of power and polarity from John Mearsheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* to local security structures. I then expand upon these concepts with insights from the academic literature on the relative weights of power parity versus preponderance in conflict instigation. Next, I use these concepts to derive a measure for the level of insecurity within various regional security environments in order to test the hypothesis stated above. Finally, I discuss the results, not only in the immediate context of the Iraq war controversy, but also their broader implications for future efforts in the war against terrorism.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

Theories are an indispensable part of any scientific inquiry. By restricting the focus of inquiry to narrower and hence more manageable components, they permit powerful insights into the mechanisms of complex behavioral phenomena. These insights, more importantly, generate testable hypotheses which either confirm or disconfirm the underlying theory, leading to validated, revised, or entirely new theories that advance our collective repository of knowledge.

Political science is no exception to these observations regarding the utility of theory. The innumerable factors influencing social behavior, however, when combined with the inherent difficulties in devising valid and reliable measurements of such interactions, means that political science theories are less expansive and more tentative in explanatory value than their counterparts in the natural sciences. Nonetheless, these limitations remain just that – qualifiers, not nullifiers - and political theories remain useful for organizing perceptions of the world and recognizing the assumptions underlying those viewpoints. In this chapter, I review a portion of the vast literature on the theories of realism and liberalism for their insights concerning security, the use of force, and international law. I then conclude by examining Robert Kagan’s melding of these theoretical insights for their implications regarding both regional security environments and the war in Iraq.
Realism

Realism, the oldest of the main international relations theories, operates on the core assumption that a system of sovereign states existing without an overarching central authority condemns nations to a perpetual condition of either actual or potential conflict. In tandem with this assumption, realism further assumes that states pursue their own interests, which are defined in terms of power. This, in turn, produces an emphasis within realist thought on material factors such as military and economic capabilities, rather than on ideational factors. Consequently, realist theory purports to be empirically derived as a codification of past practice, instead of an abstract template from which prescriptive policies can and should be adduced.

While all realists acknowledge the centrality of anarchy as a condition precedent for unchecked conflict, there is disagreement on the seminal causes of that conflict. Some realists argue that conflict is the result of an irremediable drive for power that is rooted in human nature, as Hans Morgenthau stated when he noted that “the tendency to dominate, in particular, is an element of all human associations, from the family…to the state.”10 In Morgenthau’s formulation, therefore, the distinction between domestic and international politics is solely circumstantial as both spheres encompass incessant struggles for power. For other realists, however, the composition of domestic polities has a direct and material bearing on the potential for conflict. These realists, whom Michael Doyle refers to as ‘Constitutionalists’, stress such attributes as the homogeneity of domestic structures (e.g., monarchies) and shared cultural affinities among

10 Morgenthau, 37.
leading states in gauging the stability of international politics. The most influential strand of contemporary realism, however, holds that the perpetual possibility of war is enabled by the structure of the international system itself.

This school, known as Structuralism or neorealism and identified with its leading proponent, Kenneth Waltz, is careful not to exculpate human nature or domestic structures as causal factors. Waltz himself states that the “immediate causes of war are contained in the first and second images” [i.e., human nature and states’ internal structure] and that “if the framework is to be called cause at all, it had best be specified that it is a permissive or underlying cause of war.” With these caveats in place, neorealism builds a theoretical viewpoint that provides useful insights into the role of anarchy in producing the unmitigated potential for conflict and the effect this has on state behavior. These perspectives, in turn, provide the foundation for further insights concerning system-wide stability.

*The Problem of Anarchy*

Waltz develops the neorealist framework by examining the political thought of French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Like his successor Immanuel Kant, Rousseau devotes considerable effort to identifying the domestic structure that will enable the civil state to most effectively provide the best possibility of a moral life for its inhabitants. For Kant, this structure was legalistic, defined in terms of republican representative government, separation of powers,

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equality of citizens, and protection of private property and free enterprise.13 Rousseau also places emphasis on freedom and equality, yet his formulation skews toward a democratic egalitarianism as the citizenry consummates a social contract to promote a consensual understanding of the national interest (the “General Will”).14

Waltz’s rationale for juxtaposing Rousseau and Kant, however, is not to compare their domestic prescriptions but rather to contrast their perceptions as to how such constituted states might behave in their relations with each other. Kant’s notion is that liberal republics could form a “pacific union”, wherein an inherent republican caution against military action (since the citizenry would directly bear the cost), buttressed by reciprocal respect for basic human rights and cemented by commercial intercourse, would create the possibility of a zone of “perpetual peace” among them.15 For Rousseau, however, the notion that the General Wills of sovereign states could be mutually exclusive – for example, no competing interests over issues such as scarce resources – is a chimera, and thus no “particular will” has universal validity.16 When Rousseau’s advocacy of the inculcation of patriotism through democratic education is seen in the context of modern nationalism, with its emphasis on exaggerating differences through

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13 Doyle, 257.
14 The concept of the General Will extends beyond the narrow context of the national interest in foreign affairs to encompass the achievement of justice in domestic society through the constraint of individual wills in favor of common interests that are isomorphic with the polity and determined through equal participation. Ascertaining the extent of these common interests is aided through civic education, customs, and mores, which act to “limit the range of likely preferences” represented by individual wills. See John T. Scott, “Rousseau’s Anti-Agenda-Setting Agenda and Contemporary Democratic Theory”, American Political Science Review, vol. 99, no.1., February 2005, 137-144. See also George Kateb, “Rousseau’s Political Thought”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 76, no.4, 519-543.
15 Doyle, 280-283.
16 Waltz, 182.
mythologized histories and the creation of national languages congruent with state borders, his observation of the particularity of national interests achieves added potency. Thus, Waltz writes, “the absence of an authority above states to prevent and adjust the conflicts inevitably arising from particular wills means that war is inevitable.”

According to the neorealist framework, this absence of an overarching, adjudicating authority in a universe of competing interests also explains why cooperation among states is problematic. Cooperation involves, if not mutual compromises toward a collective goal, then at the very least the coordination of tactics to produce an effective collective effort. Without a mechanism for enforcing compliance, however, the danger of a state defecting from the cooperative effort in order to achieve a particular short-run advantage to the detriment of others is always a real possibility, even though the rational action would be to remain committed and increase the long-run benefit to all participants. In such circumstances, the rational action then becomes to defect first, since no state could be assured that all others would act rationally for the long-run benefit of all. “Harmony in anarchy”, therefore, falls prey to mutual suspicion, misunderstanding, and fear. Consequently, security in international politics is first and foremost a matter of self-help.

The erosion of the containment regime against Iraq under Saddam Hussein showcases the difficulty of sustaining cooperative efforts when

\[^{17}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[^{18}\text{Waltz, 167-169. This is Rousseau’s tale of the stag hunt, wherein a cooperative venture of five hunters hunting one stag is imperiled by the possibility of any single hunter defecting to pursue a hare. The dilemma is that each hunter’s hunger will be satisfied by either one-fifth of a stag or the hare, but in the event of a defection to capture the hare the stag will escape.}\]
opportunities exist for short-term enrichment. While the architecture and ultimate attenuation of containment is beyond the scope of this survey, several examples will suffice to show how suspicion or knowledge of defection by others can induce defection in oneself. In the 1999 negotiations leading to the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1284, which, among other things, established a new inspections regime (UNMOVIC), the United States agreed to link the lifting of economic sanctions with Iraqi compliance on disarmament. This concession – part of a diplomatic effort by the US to revive a long-moribund Security Council consensus – was, according to the French, a condition of their support. The French, however, reneged by abstaining, rather than voting for the resolution as previously indicated. According to Kenneth Pollack, a National Security Council staffer at the time, “the French switched their vote on Resolution 1284 at the last minute for fear that if they did not match Russia’s abstention the Iraqis would take contracts away from French firms and award them to Russians.” Thus, like the tempting hare in Rousseau’s stag hunt, cooperation was impeded by the cascading effects of defections for short-term gain. Unlike the instinctively scampering hare, however, Iraqi contracts functioned as a fulcrum of reverse leverage by which the object of a collective enforcement mechanism could manipulate the overseers and induce defections among them, thereby

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19 The use of the term 'containment' to describe post-1991 policy toward Iraq has been employed by Kenneth Pollack (see footnote below) and others such as John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt. See John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Keeping Saddam in a Box", February 2, 2003, available online at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/walt_saddam_box_nyt_020203.htm.
21 Ibid.
22 Pollack, 101.
weakening the enterprise.\textsuperscript{23} Similarly, Paris weakened the UN commercial flight ban to Iraq after Baghdad indicated that countries that honored the ban would be precluded from receiving further oil-for-food contracts.\textsuperscript{24}

In sum, then, all realists claim that anarchy creates the perpetual possibility of conflict, rendering cooperation unreliable and self-help necessary. In such circumstances, focusing on the national interest through the prism of power – specifically, military power – is a natural corollary. Neorealism offers insights into two significant questions arising from these observations: does anarchy condition state behavior, and what do variations in power portend for the peace & stability of the international system?

\textit{The Effects of Anarchy}

The unadjudicated “particular wills” that distinguish national interests have the ironic effect, according to neorealists, of homogenizing state behavior by causing states to make security their primary focus. This is because wars have potentially unbounded costs, including state extinction, and nearly all states have some offensive capability.\textsuperscript{25} Coupled with the “911 problem” – the absence of a guaranteed number to call for help when a state is threatened – self-help becomes the only practical solution for security under anarchy.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{23} The concept of reverse leverage employed by Saddam vis-à-vis the US during the 1980s is covered by Bruce Jentlesen. Bruce Jentlesen. \textit{With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam} (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997).
\textsuperscript{24} Pollack, 204.
\textsuperscript{26} Mearsheimer, 33.
The imperative of self-help means that there can be no specialization of labor among states internationally as there is within states domestically.\(^\text{27}\) This concept, however, has been challenged. The 19th century liberal Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini, for example, believed that “each nation had its own special task for which its special attitudes fitted it”, and that if nations willingly acted in accordance with this division of labor then the effect would be that “international harmony would prevail.”\(^\text{28}\) Mazzini’s conception, however, implies that states have no ambitions beyond fulfilling their “special task”; yet for this to occur there would already be in place, by definition, “international harmony”. This indicates that security (i.e., international harmony) is a prerequisite for the specialization of labor, and not an outcome of it. It is precisely this provision of security by the state which permits the division of labor to take root and expand domestically. When states fail to furnish security, the internal division of labor crumbles and physical safety becomes the primary focus, as most inhabitants become either refugees or combatants. Correspondingly, the absence of security internationally conditions a similar paramount concern with security among states. Since states cannot flee, this concern focuses on military power and its foundations.

This conceptualization of states as “discrete, homogeneous units”\(^\text{29}\) allows inferences to be drawn regarding the probabilities of conflict by considering the number of units and the distribution of power among them. Neorealist theories focus not on the absolute number of state units, but rather the number of “great

\(^{27}\) Doyle, 128.
\(^{29}\) Doyle, 128.
powers” or “poles” – those with the capacity to inflict significant damage on the strongest state in an all-out conventional war – that are present within a given region.

The central tenet of neorealism is that under conditions of anarchy great powers will attempt to balance power against power. The intensity of the ensuing security competition can then be estimated by determining whether the distribution of power creates a ‘balance’ or ‘unbalance’ among the great powers.

Mearsheimer’s survey of European history from the Napoleonic era through the end of the Cold War demonstrates that cycles of peace and war are directly correlated with the patterns of power distribution among the great powers. Periods of greatest strife, such as the Napoleonic and World Wars, coincided with what Mearsheimer terms “unbalanced multipolarity”. In this condition, a revisionist state with an edge in military power attempts to establish regional hegemony, which in turn provokes its rivals to form a balancing coalition against it. At the other end of the spectrum is “bipolarity”, a situation of equilibrium between only two great powers. In postwar Europe, Mearsheimer believes that the presence of nuclear weapons greatly enhanced the stability of the bipolar structure.

In this paper, the measure of regional security I employ is derived in large part upon the concepts of power and polarity developed by Mearsheimer. In Chapter 3, I will discuss these concepts in greater detail as they specifically relate to the measure’s construction. In addition, I will draw upon aspects of the scholarly debate concerning the roles of power-parity versus preponderance in

30 Mearsheimer, 5.
31 Mearsheimer, 347-359.
32 Mearsheimer, 358.
instigating conflict in order to more fully explain the measure. For now, I turn to some challenges to neorealist thought that construct alternative theories of peace and war and hold forth the prospect of conditioning different modes of state behavior.

Challenges to Neorealist Thought

Postclassical Realism

For all its influence in the postwar academic study of international relations, neorealism is not a monolithic school of thought. On the all-important question regarding the relationship between a state’s power and its level of security, neorealists divide into two broad camps. First, defensive realists emphasize the security dilemma – that a state undertaking to enhance its own security will likely cause other states to feel insecure, and thus lead them to react in ways that ultimately undermine its security – to propose that states should not seek so much power that they induce countermeasures by others. Offensive realists, on the other hand, stress that the impossibility of knowing with certainty other states’ intentions and how power will be distributed in the future impels states to pursue as much power as possible in order to gain the best possible assurance of security. Such a strategy, for example, countenances aggressive tactics to weaken potential rivals before they reach parity with the preponderant power. This distinction between offensive and defensive realism, according to
Stephen Brooks, reveals a more fundamental divide within realism itself, between Waltzian neorealism and what Brooks terms “postclassical realism”.33

According to Brooks, the theoretical driving force in neorealism is not structural anarchy but rather its assumption that anarchy irremediably produces the constant possibility of war. Utilizing the work of Robert Powell and Alexander Wendt, Brooks writes that “balancing behavior and attitudes are conditioned not by a lack of hierarchical authority per se but by the perceived relative likelihood that force will be used.”34 Consequently, without neorealism’s worst-case assumption, “there is no logical reason to infer that balancing behavior will constantly recur and that states will be highly averse to cooperate.”35

This emphasis on the probability of conflict, rather than its mere possibility, distinguishes the decision-making criteria of postclassical realism from neorealism. Whereas utilizing probabilities leads to a weighting of alternatives according to expected utility, the worst-case assumption of neorealism tends to produce decisions geared toward minimizing, if not eliminating, the maximum loss that can be suffered.36 Thus, neorealist theory privileges military power over economic power, and short-term considerations over the long-term.37 Postclassical realism, on the other hand, permits a broader and more nuanced array of theoretical alternatives, including options such as the utilization of international institutions to accrue economic advantages.38 While such

34 Brooks, 449.
35 Ibid.
36 Brooks, 454.
37 Brooks, 450.
38 Brooks, 456.
alternatives might suggest an affinity with nonrealist theories, postclassical realism nonetheless remains firmly wedded to the key tenets of realist thought. Instead of focusing on the acquisition of power solely for the sake of domination or to obtain security under anarchy, however, Brooks’ theory holds that “states pursue power because doing so allows for maximum flexibility in achieving the nation’s instrumental interests.”

Liberal Challenges

The most obvious flaw of realism is that its rigid and sweeping generalizations regarding state behavior are, in part, repudiated by experience. Far from being warily locked in a perpetual condition of possible war, liberal democracies have created amongst themselves a zone of peace. Moreover, this state of affairs is no statistical accident. Bruce Russett, for example, has calculated that over a 165 year period the joint probability that no liberal dyads are at war is statistically insignificant is .000000000000000000002, which he concludes “would appear to be impressive evidence for democratic peace.”

Critics such as Christopher Layne and David Spiro, however, have attacked the democratic peace theory on grounds that it doesn’t adequately explain “near misses” such as the 1898 Fashoda Crisis and that its methodological conventions improperly exclude falsifying cases such as Wilhelmine Germany and World War Two Finland. By elevating these marginal criticisms to the level of monumental importance, these critics obscure the fact

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39 Brooks, 462.
41 Russett, 166-169.
that outside academia policymakers act as if the democratic peace is axiomatic. The Canadian army is not planning to repel assaults from Minnesota and New York, and the United States Pacific Fleet is not preparing to meet the Japanese navy in a reprise of the Battle of Midway. Belief in the power of democracy to promote peace connects politicians as disparate as George W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Tacking back to theoretical discourse, even seemingly ‘hard’ realists such as Charles Krauthammer acknowledge the importance of democracy and freedom in furthering national interests, with Krauthammer himself giving his foreign policy philosophy the appellation of “democratic realism”.42

Not surprisingly, given the broad consensus regarding democratic peace theory, theorists have made democratic enlargement a central component of liberal grand strategy. In 1999 G. John Ikenberry, for example, writes of the “amity of democracies” and “the value of community” as two elements of a five-pronged approach for building and maintaining a stable, peaceful, and prosperous world order that is beneficial to US interests.43 This democratic foundation is buttressed by the proposition that free trade and open markets create an interdependence that promotes peace by making the pursuit of solely nationalistic economic goals prohibitively expensive. Augmenting these precepts of classical liberalism is the belief that international institutions can facilitate cooperation and ameliorate conflict by providing forums for sharing information and coordinating responses in the provision of public goods. These elements are readily apparent in the foreign policy initiatives of the 1990s, including support for

emerging democracies through NATO accession and the Partnership for Peace, the provision of economic incentives for Ukraine to relinquish inherited nuclear weapons, the growth of free trade agreements, and the rehabilitation of developing nation economies through structural adjustment programs mandated by the International Monetary Fund.

*Liberal Internationalism after September 11, 2001*

The commencement of the GWOT has seen liberal internationalist thought shift in emphasis from democratic enlargement and its corollary of promoting human rights to advocating the supremacy of international law and operating through institutional channels. Animating this penchant for legalism is a “deep suspicion of national interest as a justification for projecting power” exemplified by liberal Democrats in the US Congress overwhelmingly opposing Operation Desert Storm yet supporting humanitarian interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.44 After the invasion of Iraq, however, this suspicion has come packaged in realist concepts, as Ikenberry (now joined by Charles Kupchan) reveal in their ambivalently entitled essay, “Liberal Realism”.45

Writing just prior to the 2004 presidential election, Ikenberry and Kupchan aver that an “assertive unilateralism” without the imprimatur of international legitimacy or traditional alliances will induce others to balance against US power. This balancing is facilitated by the belief that “current power asymmetries will inevitably diminish in the years ahead”, and, as such, “Japan may tire of always

44 Krauthammer, 16.
following America’s lead, China will emerge as a major power, and Russia, India and Brazil are poised to become stronger and more assertive players."46 In lieu of traditional balancing, Ikenberry and Kupchan note that “more subtle forms of balancing” are occurring, one of which was the Security Council coalition that blocked passage of another resolution after Resolution 1441 explicitly authorizing immediate force against Iraq.47

Ikenberry and Kupchan misapply several principles of realist logic, and in the process betray an uneasiness with US power that is at the core of contemporary liberal internationalism. First, they assume that antagonism to US power is the overarching organizing principle of post-OIF international politics. While it is understandable that Japan may chafe at being a perennial junior partner to the United States, realist principles dictate that as Chinese power expands then Japan will attempt to balance it both internally and externally. The actual record tends to confirm most, but not all, of the elements of these principles. The Japan Defense Agency, for example, has requested 1.5% annual increases for fiscal years 2005-2009, although the Ministry of Finance has recently cut those requests.48 Japan has, however, engaged in several high-profile military exercises recently, and, most prominently, is moving towards debating amendment to the pacifistic mandates of the postwar constitution.49 More importantly, these efforts expand and strengthen what certain Japanese

46 Ikenberry and Kupchan, 40.
47 Ibid.
officials are coming to describe as an “alliance [with the US] in global terms”, ranging from Tokyo’s contributions to missile defense to the historic watershed deployment of noncombatant troops to Iraq.\textsuperscript{50} The recent intrusion by a Chinese submarine into Japanese waters highlights the security risks faced by Japan.\textsuperscript{51} Similarly, as Russian power increases and becomes “more assertive”, this will likely induce those states most affected – that is, those in the immediate regional security environment – to also engage in both internal and external balancing.

Not surprisingly, recent and aspiring members of NATO from among the former Soviet satellites were among the most stalwart supporters of OIF. This support was not due to a bribe or coercion or a belief in alliance for alliance’s sake, but rather a belief that US power represented their best hope for freedom and security. Even well-rooted liberal democracies recognized the central role of US power in an anarchic world. Thus, Australian PM John Howard reminded his countrymen “that no nation is more important to our long-term security than the United States” and, consequently, “Australia’s alliance with the United States is also a factor – unapologetically so” - in the decision to support OIF. \textsuperscript{52}

Second, Ikenberry and Kupchan treat the anti-OIF Security Council coalition as primarily a vehicle that arose to restrain the menace of US unilateralism. This coalition, however, was also active during the mid-1990s –  

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{51} Possible reasons for a deliberate incursion into Japanese waters are given in an interesting article by J. Sean Curtin. J. Sean Curtin. “Submarine Puts Japan-China Ties Into a Dive.” \textit{Asia Times Online}. November 17, 2004. Available online at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FK17Dh01.html. November 24, 2004. The article, however, also presents evidence that the incursion was inadvertent, with the Koizumi government being forced to take a harder line with Beijing due to the protests of the Japanese right-wing press.

when American foreign policy was decidedly more multilateralist. As pre-war economic relationships and revelations concerning endemic corruption in the UN Oil-for-Food program have made clear, the anti-OIF coalition was principally a mechanism for protecting narrower national interests. By subsuming these interests under the rubric of protecting vital international legal principles, this coalition recalled E.H. Carr’s observation from an earlier time that “the intellectual theories and ethical standards of utopianism, far from being the expression of absolute and a priori principles, are historically conditioned, being both products of circumstance and interest and weapons for the furtherance of interests.”

Thus, solemn invocations of the inviolability of the UN Charter are important when safeguarding concessions in the Majnoon oil fields of southern Iraq, but less sacrosanct when bombing Serbia or deploying to the Ivory Coast. Moreover, since appeals to international law are one means of masking national interest, shifting coalitions of convenience on tactical issues will likely be the norm. Iraq Survey Group head Charles Duelfer, for example, speculated that the Chinese government abruptly halted potentially illicit sales to Iraq, most likely by newly privatized Chinese companies. This appears to be a calculation by Beijing that its long-term interests in Taiwan – hardly for liberal ends - are best furthered by upholding the legitimacy of the UN Charter and the Security Council, which entailed acquiescing to US interests in the short-term.

53 Carr, 65.
Economic considerations, however, are only a part of the national interest calculus. Ikenberry and Kupchan show little appreciation for the notion that “subtle forms of balancing” are part of a longer, more historically grounded trajectory aiming to reduce American influence in Europe specifically and return to a multipolar world more generally. This was generally held in check during the Cold War, punctuated by periodic squabbles highlighted by indigenous views such as Gaullism and Brandt’s Ostpolitik. With Europe now free of the immediate Soviet threat, the United States, as personified in the caricaturing of Bush in the run-up to the war, has replaced Russia as the ‘Other’ around which European identity has historically solidified. Writing after Bush’s re-election, Irwin Stelzer plausibly notes that “European elites see the antipathy of their citizens to the American president as a decided asset in their fight to forge the ‘ever closer union’ for which they have been striving for decades.”55 This union is a necessary step for the re-emergence of multipolarity with Europe acting as a counterweight to the US. Again Stelzer:

“Europe today”, intoned Chirac, “has more than ever the need and necessity to reinforce its unity. That is the goal of the constitution.” Increased unity, he continued, is necessary “when faced with this great world power.”56

One could be forgiven for thinking that Chirac was referring to the re-emergence of a potential totalitarian hegemon in Europe instead of the nation that had done so much to liberate France the last time a marauding fascism menaced the continent. Such sentiments indicate a deep resentment of US power that could only be marginally ameliorated through more diplomatic American behavior, the

56 Ibid.
election of a Francophile US president, or deference to the authority of international bodies. There is an indication in some French quarters that its implacable opposition to OIF has damaged, or could potentially damage, its leading position in Europe, as Foreign Minister Michel Barnier implied to the annual conference of French ambassadors when he stated that “France is not strong if it is alone.” The larger point, however, is that Ikenberry and Kupchan err when they view Security Council opposition solely through the prism of principled objection to perceived US arrogance and not as part of a longer-term historical project.

Finally, Ikenberry and Kupchan make scant, if any, mention of the cause of democratic enlargement that was a core pillar of Ikenberry’s 1999 grand strategy. This omission is emblematic of a shift away from internationalism – used here as the linkages between individual nations to construct a Kantian ‘pacific union’ – to a transnationalism that seeks to enforce nebulous global norms through a loose network of NGOs, international boards and lawyers, and allied politicians and intellectuals. The shift is profoundly anti-democratic, with majority rule equated with the oppression of minorities, and property rights equated with a rapacious capitalism. Consequently, the transnational perspective shows little regard for whether legitimacy has been conferred on international law through the assent of sovereign nations since the organizing paradigms of those states – at least those in the West – are seen as

illegitimate. Underlying this shift is rising Western affluence, which has eroded adherence to ‘materialist’ values conducive to the political and economic bases of classical liberalism and erected instead ‘post-materialist’ norms that have replaced the patient modernist hope for incremental material progress with the impatient post-modernist demand for absolute moral perfection.

Kagan’s “Power and Weakness”

The theories discussed to this point all embody different approaches to security. Neorealism emphasizes self-help and balancing strategies, noting the primacy of military power in a world where conflict is always possible. Postclassical realism focuses on the probability of conflict, approximating neorealism as the probability increases but shifting to longer term wealth-building enterprises as the probability diminishes. Democratic peace theory, on the other hand, holds that democracies do not go to war against each other, and thus security is enhanced by expanding the community of democratic nations. Liberal internationalism, however, is less concerned with the fundamentals of classical liberalism, asserting that security can be attained through fealty to international law and immersion in international institutions.

59 International law advocates often claim that the US Constitution stipulates that treaties are ‘the supreme law of the land’, and thus adherence with treaties to which the US is a party, such as the UN Charter, is part of POTUS’ obligation to enforce the law. Article VI, Section 2, however, states that “this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.” A plain reading clearly indicates, through use of the conjunction and, that “treaties do not enjoy a status superior to acts of Congress”. Robert V. Lindsey v Commissioner (98 TC 672). In cases where treaty and law conflict, the Supreme Court has adopted a last-in-time rule, holding that “the last expression of the sovereign will must control.” Chae Chan Ping v United States (130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889).

As corollaries, these theories all condition attitudes regarding the propriety of the use of force and the legitimacy of international law. If neorealists assert that anarchy impels states to consider military power the ultima ratio of international affairs (which would also hold for the relations of democracies with non-democracies), what accounts for the intensification of appeals to the core tenets of liberal internationalism in an anarchic world? The answer, in short, is that anarchy does not follow a sort of universal Pascal’s Law by being applied equally and undiminished throughout the global system. The effects of anarchy ebb and flow, creating different regional security environments which induce different state responses. These responses, in turn, create varying psychological bases for discerning and then eliminating threat, and, ultimately, varying senses of identity and mission. Within the thesis that American and European perspectives over the necessity and legitimacy of force are distinct and diverging, these themes are provocatively explored by Robert Kagan in his essay “Power and Weakness”.\(^6\)

The foundation of Kagan’s thesis is two-fold. First, wide disparities in military power between the United States and Europe have produced different viewpoints for evaluating and addressing strategic threats.\(^6\) According to Kagan, this is not an innate difference. The military weakness of the nascent American republic, for example, produced an aversion, born of self-interest, to the power politics of the European great powers, which was complemented by

\(^6\) There are, of course, multiple perspectives regarding the legitimacy of force and international law in both the United States and Europe. The tendency of many commentators – this author included – to adopt monolithic conventions is a regrettable, but perhaps unavoidable, occurrence.
appeals to international law. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty, which stipulated the criteria for the pre-emptive use of force as “a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”, is one example of those appeals. 63 Next, the unique postwar experience of European integration has, in Kagan’s words, “opened a broad ideological gap” across the Atlantic.64 This ideological divide, reinforced by material power disparities, has given birth to a new sense of mission and identity in international affairs, typified by the EU’s engagement with Iran over the suspension of Tehran’s nuclear weapons program as an alternative to the use of force. This is but concrete example of how the notion of Europe – which, in the words of European Commission President Romano Prodi, means that “the rule of law has replaced the crude interplay of power” – has been amplified and extended on an international scale.65

The reluctance to use force, and even legitimate its use, is a perfectly rational strategy for weaker powers in Kagan’s formulation. Europe’s military weakness, he continues,

“has produced a powerful European interest in inhabiting a world where strength doesn’t matter, where international law and international institutions predominate, where unilateral action by powerful nations is forbidden, where all nations regardless of their strength have equal rights and are equally protected by commonly agreed-upon international rules of behavior. Europeans have a deep interest in devaluing and eventually eradicating the brutal laws of an anarchic, Hobbesian world where power is the ultimate determinant of national security and success.”66

64 Kagan, 6.
66 Kagan, 10.
How were European nations – whose average defense budgets typically fell to below 2 percent of GDP during the 1990s\textsuperscript{67} – able to circumvent the constraints of anarchy that had ravaged their continent for centuries and enter, hopefully, the “Kantian world of perpetual peace?”

According to Kagan, there are two reasons, one internal and specific to Europe, while the other is of a structural nature. First, he concurs with the assessment of German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer that the “commitment to the principle of integration” by France and Germany, spearheaded by figures such as Robert Monnet, was a necessary step.\textsuperscript{68} Second, and most important for this paper, is the role of US military power, through NATO, on the European continent. The overwhelming preponderance of American military power provided both a shield to thwart Soviet hegemonic ambitions and a “calming presence” that gave both France and Germany the security to proceed with their integrative efforts.\textsuperscript{69} In short, within the confines of NATO in Western Europe, anarchy was supplanted by hierarchy.

\textit{The Implications of Hierarchy}

The chief implication of hierarchy in the context of the transatlantic alliance is that it created divergent regional security environments for the United States and Europe. In Kagan’s estimation, “Europe’s new Kantian order could flourish only under the umbrella of American power exercised according to the rules of

\textsuperscript{67} Kagan, 8.
\textsuperscript{68} Kagan, 23.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
the old Hobbesian order.” Thus, for example, as Europe focused on its own integrative projects and retreated from its colonial role in the Middle East and elsewhere, American power stepped in to provide the security and access to resources and markets on which the West depended. The United States also assumed the role of imperialist bogeyman, partly through compromising its own liberal principles in constructing alliances to implement the containment doctrine, and partly through the fact that its increased role and visibility also brought increased vulnerability. As long as the Soviet threat loomed, the need for conforming with the Hobbesian laws of nature were understood by both Europe and America, although, as noted above, periodic disagreements did ensue. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Islamist attacks on the United States, however, the different security environments on both sides of the Atlantic were made brutally clear. It was at this point that the main secondary effect of institutionalized hierarchy – a “psychology of weakness” emanating from long-term power asymmetries – was manifested.

“The Europeans underestimate the problem of Al Qaeda-style terrorism”, remarked Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew prior to the Madrid attacks, by wrongly comparing the Islamist threat to “the IRA, the Red Brigade, the Baader-Meinhof, the ETA”. Besides al-Qaeda’s obvious qualitative and quantitative differences with the aforementioned – such as state sponsorship ranging from a minimum of providing territorial safe haven to the potential of furnishing WMD, an ideology

with adherents dispersed across a wide geographical area, and the desire to 
inflict massive numbers of casualties – the different perceptions of threat are also 
a function of the different capabilities for addressing it. According to Kagan, 
"Europeans focus on issues – 'challenges' – where European strengths come 
into play but not on those 'threats' where European weakness makes solutions 
elusive." 72 Thus, terrorism and the appropriate response are viewed through the 
prism of law enforcement and political engagement, along with a focus on the 
"root causes" of terrorism, which are typically understood to mean poverty. 
Conversely, American strength in the projection of military power leads to a focus 
on strategies where those strengths can be brought to bear.

Events in Europe since Yew's remarks – one catastrophic, the other 
symbolic – both highlight the psychology of weakness and call into question the 
efficacy of strategies derived from it. First, the response of Spanish voters and 
the Zapatero government to the Madrid railway attacks were arguably acts of 
appeasement, notwithstanding assertions that the vote was directed against the 
clumsy attempts of the Aznar government to place the blame on the ETA. While 
the pre-attack debate over Spanish troops in Iraq was a legitimate one 
encapsulating the overarching questions of the prewar controversy, once the 
attacks occurred it was inevitable that the vote and any subsequent actions 
would be interpreted as Spain's response to the attacks. This was essentially 
confirmed by bin Laden's offer of a truce to Spain (and Europe as a whole) after

the “positive reactions” of the Spanish polity. Spain has since been rewarded for its withdrawal from Iraq with an al-Qaeda plot to bomb the National Court in Madrid and kill the judges responsible for investigating the 3/11 attacks.

The second event is the slaying of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh and the convulsions that have gripped the Netherlands in its wake. Here, the psychology of weakness is manifested more as a blind frustration accompanied by the sinking realization that the attempt to mollify Islamic extremism via a willingness to assimilate local Muslim populations is ineffectual. In this respect, the Dutch experience mirrors that of Yew’s Singapore, who noted that Singapore and nearby Thailand have been targeted by extremists, although Muslims have generally prospered in those two countries and been treated tolerantly.

Perhaps these events are leading Europe to a tipping point, and creating the realization that Kantian gardens – if not simply a decent world – can no longer be guarded with mellifluous and utopian appeals to international law, but in addition require the ability and will to use force.

Conclusion

The intent of the literature review has been to describe theoretical viewpoints that emphasize different attitudes regarding such facets of security as the use of force, internal and external balancing, and the legitimacy of

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75 Zakaria. “We Need to Get the Queen Bees.”
international law. These theories also inhabit various points on a scale of anarchy, ranging from the pure anarchy of neorealism to the approximate hierarchy described by Robert Kagan. Moreover, the theories are all distinguished by the amount and distribution of power among the key actors in the system. Taken together, this plausibly indicates that the amount and distribution of power within a given region could significantly affect state attitudes toward those elements of security described above.

In the next chapter, I more fully explore the concepts of power and polarity – the distribution of power – in order to gain insights regarding the likelihood of conflict, and thus the level of security, within a given region. To do this I utilize concepts developed by John Mearsheimer in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* and the academic literature on power preponderance versus parity. In turn, I propose specific parameters to use in constructing a quantifiable measure of the regional security environments represented by the cases in the study.
Chapter 3
Regional Security Environments:
Background

The previous chapter concluded by noting that the amount and distribution of power was one of the chief distinctions among the various theoretical viewpoints examined. But what is power? How can it most effectively be gained, created, preserved, and deployed? These vital questions have long been the central focus of scholars and leaders alike.

Hans Morgenthau, who argued that the causes of conflict were inherently rooted in human nature, claimed that the goal of power was ultimately psychological: to control the minds, and thus the actions, of others.\(^76\) At the core of this control was the pervasive potential for it to be enforced through violence. Reflecting the lack of distinction between domestic and international politics that was characteristic of his thought, Morgenthau observed that “the threat of physical violence in the form of police action, imprisonment, capital punishment, or war is an intrinsic element of politics.”\(^77\) Perhaps strangely, this quintessential realist did not adhere precisely to von Clausewitz’s dictum that war was the continuation of politics through other means: political power, in its strictest sense, was properly conceived as “the psychological relation between two minds”, which

\(^76\) Morgenthau, 30.
\(^77\) Morgenthau, 31.
would be set aside if the threat of physical violence was actualized. 78

Morgenthau’s abrupt demarcation between military and political power could be a reflection of the time in which he was writing, just after the total war tactics of World War Two and at the emergence of the Cold War nuclear standoff. In contemporary affairs, precise, limited applications of violence have as their locus a broader psychological audience, such as the “shock and awe” campaign commencing OIF which was intended to vividly demonstrate to Saddam’s subalterns the futility of resistance. 79 As has also been seen in OIF, however, the overwhelming advantage in US power caused a significant number of its battlefield adversaries to melt away rather than fight in the campaign’s initial stages. This had the paradoxical effect that insufficient force was used to instill in them a complete, inevitable sense of defeat, thereby permitting those adversaries to become reconstituted as a stubborn insurgency that has subsequently plagued US efforts. 80

Nonetheless, in international relations the effectiveness of these threats of physical violence is a function not only of states’ ability to carry them out but also of other states to thwart or deter them. Political power, in essence, is relative. E.H. Carr stated this most succinctly when he noted that “the foreign policy of a country is limited not only by its aims, but also...by the ratio of its military strength

78 Morgenthau, 31.
79 In a briefing with military historian John Keegan, General Franks said that even though “the initial bombing of the government quarter did cause shock and awe, he had not seen that effect as the point of the air offensive.” John Keegan. The Iraq War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 239.
to that of other countries."81 Mearsheimer similarly remarked that “a state’s effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces and how they compare with the military forces of rival states.”82

Scholars associated with all theoretical schools, however, have disagreed over the degree to which military strength should be afforded primacy in assessing a nation’s overall level of power. Carr, for one, saw no distinction between military and economic power, seeing them as “merely different instruments of power.”83 On the other hand, Stephen Brooks noted in his thorough examination of neorealist literature that these thinkers privilege military over economic power, with economic might being primarily a foundational attribute of military power rather than an instrument of policy in its own right.84 Liberal thinkers, not surprisingly, offer a different degree of emphasis. Joseph Nye, for example, has argued that changing mores has caused a shift in the telos of power away from conquest and glory to wealth and welfare, as public opinion – in general terms – has caused militarized conflict to lose legitimacy as an acceptable means of implementing policy.85 These changing mores, strengthened and shaped by ongoing revolutions in communications and technology, have elevated the importance of what Nye terms “soft power”. This intangible form of power is realized largely through an agenda-setting ability that can work to shape the preferences of others to complement one’s own interests,

81 Carr, 103.
82 Mearsheimer, 55.
83 Carr, 109.
84 Brooks, 452.
and is derived in large part from a cultural appeal that itself is born from the appeal of a nation’s values as exemplified in domestic practice. Coming full circle, Nye’s concept is an elaboration of Carr’s earlier observation that “power over opinion” is itself an essential part of national power.

In constructing a measure of the regional security environments represented by the cases in this study, I have chosen to focus largely on military power for several reasons (I use economic power for the narrow purpose of determining whether a potential hegemon exists within a region). First, military power is more proximately connected with security than the other elements of power discussed above, and thus is a more valid parameter to measure the regional security environment. In addition, nearly all states possess some element of armed force. This permits inclusion of a greater number of cases than would be possible if a less commonly shared parameter were chosen. Finally, military power has the advantage of being quantifiable, and consequently it can be measured with valid and reliable parameters. While assessing military power involves more than simply counting manpower and materiel – witness estimates of Iraqi combat proficiency prior to Operation Desert Storm – it involves objective measurements to a much greater extent, for example, than determining the degree of influence yielded by a nation’s reserve of soft power. Knowing which elements of military power are decisive, and how to measure the effectiveness of those elements most accurately, are the areas covered in the next section.

86 Nye, 8-11.
87 Carr, 120.
Land Power

In *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, John Mearsheimer’s examination of power contains the observation that land power (including the air and naval forces that support land operations) is the decisive element of military power.88 Land power is decisive because it is the only element that can conquer and hold territory.89 Territory is the most basic foundational attribute of state power, and without delimited territorial boundaries a nation reverts to the inchoate and vulnerable realm of an “imagined community”. Even the power of non-state and non-national actors such as terrorist groups is limited by territorial availability. Recent research on mapping social networks, for example, claims that operationally effective and secure geographically dispersed communities are limited to approximately 80-100 members, whereas larger, secure groups require a territorial base.90 This could be provided in enclaves such as Fallujah after the April 2004 pullback or via state sponsorship.91 Given the necessity of territory for state survival, moreover, armies are the only elements which can win wars quickly by overrunning an enemy army.92 In sum, according to the US Army’s Force XXI doctrine, “land power equates to strategic staying power.”93

Theoretically, alternative strategies also have the ability to compel an enemy to surrender, although their efficacy is uncertain at best and they typically

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88 Mearsheimer, 83.
89 Mearsheimer, 86.
91 Ibid.
92 Mearsheimer, 87.
require a lengthy period to build their debilitating effects to a decisive level. One strategy, the naval blockade, takes time to cripple an opposing economy, and blockaded governments can implement countermeasures through the stockpiling or substitution of imported goods. In addition, civilian populations have historically shown great resilience in accepting and overcoming the privations of blockades.

These shortcomings also apply to conventional bombing campaigns. The ability of mobilized North Vietnamese civilians to quickly repair roads and bridges damaged in US air strikes is well known. Moreover, the incrementalism of Rolling Thunder – both in tempo and geographically – permitted the North Vietnamese to anticipate attacks and prepare defenses. Furthermore, the use of bombing as essentially a means of interdiction along the Ho Chi Minh Trail was logically unsound, since approximately 85% of North Vietnamese war materiel arrived via the port of Haiphong and there was no credible military obstacle to mining by the US Navy. Most importantly, however, these incremental tactics, interspersed with bombing pauses, likely signaled to the North Vietnamese an unwillingness by the US to use sufficient force to produce the necessary psychological sense of defeat. Later bombing campaigns largely eschewed Rolling Thunder-style tactics to concentrate on decapitation strikes (Operation Desert Storm) and shock and awe. These strategies, chiefly fostered by revolutionary advances in munitions targeting capabilities, nonetheless failed in their strategic objective of ending their respective wars quickly.

94 Mearsheimer, 94.
95 Mearsheimer, 95.
Measuring Land Power

Measuring land power is, of course, a science in itself, with none but the most specialized academicians and military thinkers qualified for such an undertaking. Consequently, devising and implementing a methodology for measuring land power capability is beyond the scope of this paper and the abilities of its author. Nonetheless, describing regional security environments in quantitative terms requires an assessment of the land power capabilities of the countries in the region. To make these assessments, I have utilized the “Armed Forces of the World” database compiled by noted military author James Dunnigan. In order to permit readers to form their own conclusions regarding the validity of the database, I will make some rudimentary observations regarding the measurement of military capabilities in general, and then follow with a brief explanation of Dunnigan’s methodology.

At its most basic level, military capability is a function of the resources available and their ability to be converted into warfighting competencies. Available resources consist not only of obvious, tangible inputs such as manpower, equipment, and weaponry, but also those such as the defense budget, institutionalized research and development, the defense industrial base, and military infrastructure. Moreover, while these inputs can be quantified, qualitative assessments for intangibles such as leadership, doctrine, and training

96 The database is located online at http://www.strategypage.com. According to the website, the data is current for 2002-2003. I accessed the site for this study on August 5, 2004. The data is derived from James F. Dunnigan’s How to Make War series (see fn 24 below), which is currently in its fourth edition.

are also necessary in order to accurately estimate military capability. Furthermore, there exists interdependent relationships between these components, as the increasing sophistication of weaponry and equipment requires increasingly sophisticated military personnel for their operation and a larger supporting infrastructure for their development and maintenance. The Force XXI concept, for example, envisions that the alacrity of information distribution in conjunction with the dispersal of forces on future battlefields “will alter, if not replace, traditional, hierarchical command structures with new, internetted designs.” Consequently, as responsibilities for decision-making are pushed down the chain-of-command, the educational and technical requirements for all soldiers goes up. This, in turn, requires greater outlays for troop training, as well as higher compensation to attract and retain quality recruits.

The quantity and quality of manpower and weaponry, however, are necessary, but not sufficient, inputs in determining battlefield victory. As Dunnigan observes, “superior motivation, leadership, and training have consistently proved the formula that produces victorious armies.” These vital traits, moreover, are developed and inculcated within an institutional structure. This includes not only visible components such as the service academies and commands within the services responsible for developing doctrine and training, but also intangible ones such as forums and colloquiums in which the military encourages innovation, professional debate, and post-combat performance

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98 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Section 2-3b(1).
A military that shuns its most innovative thinkers, for example, will not only deprive itself of these advances but will often ruefully find that a more receptive adversary has made use of them. This afflicted France in 1940 after a sclerotic and gerontocratic post-WWI French army leadership rejected de Gaulle's proposals during the 1930s for mechanized units and tactical coordination between aircraft and armored formations, which were then subsequently adopted by the Wehrmacht. The French campaign thus exemplifies how even an attacking army can overcome its own arguably inferior weaponry with innovative tactics and superior field leadership to achieve rapid, decisive victory.

The Armed Forces of the World Database

The measurements taken from Dunnigan and used in this paper are those shown under the “Land Power” heading of Table 2.1. These values correspond to those listed under the heading “Combat Power Land” in the databases located at strategypage.com. These numbers represent total combat capability exclusive of naval forces. The land power rating, according to Dunnigan, “is a combination of the quantity and quality of manpower, equipment, and weapons” (“raw combat power”) which is then adjusted by a “total force quality” percentage. This percentage, in turn, is derived by assigning ordinal values to the quality of six factors: Leadership, Equipment, Experience (both combat and training), Logistic

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100 Tellis, et al., 145.
102 Dunnigan, 46-47.
Support, Mobilizational Capability, and Military Tradition. In broad terms then, the general framework of the database conforms fairly well to the RAND methodology cited above.

A review of Dunnigan’s derivation of raw combat power for one specific element of land power – infantry – will serve as an example of his overall methodology. First, combat values are assigned to weaponry and equipment based on destructive power, ease of use, mobility, and reliability. For an infantry unit, these would include not only personal firearms but also items such as armored personnel carriers, anti-tank guided missiles, mortars, and anti-tank rocket launchers, among others, with individual soldiers given a combat value of 1. Next, given a fairly standard composition of unit levels, combat power can be calculated by an additive process wherein the combat power of a squad is used to determine the strength of a platoon, platoons of companies, companies of battalions, and so on. Once the value for these elemental units is established for all combat arms, overall raw land power can be calculated once major quantitative parameters (such as the number of divisions, tanks, and field artillery pieces) are ascertained or estimated.

Polarity

The land power capability of a given country, however, lacks meaning unless it is compared with the capabilities of others within its region. This distribution of power, or polarity, is of special interest to scholars and

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103 Ibid.
104 Dunnigan, 46-47.
policymakers alike since it provides a basis for inferences regarding the probability of conflict. As such, it is an essential component of assessing the regional security environment. In the remainder of this chapter, I first introduce the concepts used to determine a region’s polarity. I then define these concepts more precisely in order to permit valid and reliable comparisons among different regions. Finally, I examine how a preponderance of power within one country affects the region’s overall security by using elements of decision theory and offshore balancing to investigate the decision to attack under such conditions. These concepts thus provide the foundation for quantitatively measuring the impact of polarity on the regional security environment, which is a prime focus of the next chapter.

As mentioned previously, the polarity of a region is determined by the number of ‘great powers’ or ‘poles’ that are present. Mearsheimer’s definition of a great power provides a suitable framework for a qualitatively-based determination of the number of great powers, yet it is not precise enough to permit reliable measurements within and across regions. The key to standardizing the definition of a great power, therefore, is to determine the level of land power that will be perceived as being potentially able to inflict significant damage to the leading state in the region during an all-out conventional war.

Since attacks initiated by a weaker power against a stronger one are rare, conceptualizing the definition is best done by adopting the vantage point of the leading power and determining which, if any, of the lesser powers could mount a

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105 Mearsheimer uses the term “great power” on a global scale. To avoid confusion, I use the term “major power” when discussing regional security environments.
defense that would render an attack prohibitively expensive. The contemplation of attack by stronger powers to preempt the emergence of rival powers, it will be recalled, is one feature of offensive realism, which holds that states strive to increase their power until they reach the unchallengeable (and hence most secure) status of a regional hegemon.106 Attack thus contains the promise of great reward, but only at the potential of great risk. To mitigate this risk, Dunnigan, for one, counsels that an attacker should have, at a minimum, a three-to-one force advantage over a defender.107 Ideally, this advantage should be at least six-to-one.108 In this paper, I adopt this convention to define a major power within any given region as a state whose land power is greater than one-sixth of the land power held by the leading state.

There are several reasons for adopting an expansive definition of a major power that is conservative from the viewpoint of the leading regional power. First, since a failed attack leaves the attacking army vulnerable to a counterattack that could ultimately result in regime change or even state extinction, a cautious appraisal of the capabilities of other states in the region, either singly or in combination, is warranted. Next, estimates of rivals’ military power are notoriously difficult and susceptible to inaccuracies. A defending army, for example, can have a military power significantly greater than originally estimated. Prudence demands, therefore, that any bias in such estimates be

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106 "Regional hegemon" is used here in Mearsheimer’s sense of the term, and equates to roughly a continental or hemispheric scale. The United States, for example, is a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. Mearsheimer, 40. As will become apparent in the next chapter, I use the term ‘regional’ on a smaller scale.
107 Dunnigan, 47.
108 Ibid.
skewed toward an overstatement of capability. Finally, assessments of military power are primarily conceived as resource inputs in warfighting scenarios. Victory in battle, however, is dependent not only on military power but also a host of other variables such as the achievement of surprise, climate, and topography. These factors can, of course, either accentuate or diminish a nation’s military power, and thus should theoretically induce an additional element of caution in any forward-looking assessment of potential major regional powers.

The number of major powers, however, is only part of the calculus determining a region’s propensity for armed conflict. Mearsheimer’s empirical study of polarity and conflict focuses on whether a particular region is balanced or unbalanced, with regions exhibiting a markedly higher occurrence of war when they are in an unbalanced state than when they are balanced. The distinguishing characteristic of a unbalanced region, according to Mearsheimer, is whether it contains a potential hegemon. A state becomes a potential hegemon when it has both the region’s most formidable army – “by some reasonably large margin”- as well as its largest economy. This definition, like that of major powers, begs for some standardization to permit precise and objective measurements across regions.

In conceptualizing the definition of a potential hegemon, a reasonable starting point is from the position of lesser powers examining the leading regional state. The state with the most powerful army is potentially the most dangerous one in the region, since, ceteris paribus, the strongest land power is most likely to
prevail in an attack. A potential hegemon, however, is even more formidable, since it can use its military power to achieve rapid victory, or, failing in that approach, can still utilize its preponderant economic power to prevail in a war of attrition. These multiple means of achieving victory, which can theoretically neutralize even the most stalwart defense offered by a lesser power, likewise warrant a worst-case assessment of the capabilities of the leading power. In addition, the same vagaries of estimation and exogenous factors that induced an additional element of caution in the determination of major powers also applies from the perspective of lesser powers in gauging potential hegemons. The leading power can, of course, be stronger than initially thought, and can utilize the same multipliers of surprise and terrain to achieve an even greater force advantage. For these reasons, I adopt J.F.K. Organski’s convention that if $P_B \geq 80\% P_A$, where $P_A$ is the power of State A and $P_B$ is the power of State B, then B is at parity with A, to quantify what is meant “by a reasonably large margin”. I do this by simply taking the negation of Organski’s definition. Consequently,

\[
\text{If } P_A > 1.25 P_B \text{ and } GDP_A > GDP_{B-N},
\]

where A and B are both major powers, $P_A$ and $P_B$ are the land power ratings of States A and B, respectively, and $GDP_{B-N}$ indicates the GDP of States B through N compared singly to $GDP_A$, then State A is a potential hegemon.

Power Preponderance

If the presence of a potential hegemon encompasses the greatest potential for war, then it would be logical to conclude that a state with the most powerful army, the largest economy, and no rival major powers within its region (which I refer to hereafter in this paper as an actual hegemon) would pose an even greater threat to peace. In such circumstances, the already abundant opportunities for victory through either speed or attrition are amplified. Moreover, offensive realism stipulates that states attempt to gain as much power as possible since this is the best assurance of security under anarchy. Regions with a preponderant power, however, appear to experience a lower frequency of war than regions existing under conditions of relative parity. What accounts for this anomaly?

As E.H. Carr observed, as a state’s power relative to its rivals increases, the more likely it is to substitute economic weapons for overt military ones.\footnote{Carr, 117.} Such weapons include, but are not limited to, embargoes, restricting access to capital and markets, and manipulating aid levels. Economic supremacy permits leading states a degree of indirect influence and control unmatched by lesser powers without an ostentatious display of military superiority, although enough of this capability is revealed so that its primacy is understood by all. One example of this occurred in the post-1918 Middle East, where “Great Britain was able to abandon her formal authority over Iraq and to maintain her interests there” while a weaker France was unable to do likewise in Syria.\footnote{Carr, 119.} British economic
influence was realized directly through instruments such as shares in the Turkish (later Iraq) Petroleum Company, and indirectly, particularly in the Basra region, through its commercial intercourse emanating from the time of the East India Company.\textsuperscript{115} This influence was reinforced by regional British military power, not only through its longstanding naval superiority in the Persian Gulf, but also through garrisons in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Libya.\textsuperscript{116} In the contemporary, non-colonial world, the augmentation of power by leading regional powers has furnished them with a margin of security. This margin, as Brooks' theory of postclassical realism would predict, has allowed leading states to shift focus to longer-term projects such as expanding their economic bases in order to maintain their relative power advantages within their regions.\textsuperscript{117}

Regions, however, do not exist in isolation. An actual hegemon that was not satisfied with mere regional preponderance and sought to markedly increase its power in one region, such as through conquest, would most likely attract attention from neighboring regions or offshore balancers, who would intervene to prevent the imperialist state from attaining such a position that it could threaten other regions. From the standpoint of the actual hegemon, this situation represents the security dilemma that is at the heart of defensive realism. If this

\textsuperscript{115} Keegan, 18; 169.
\textsuperscript{116} Keegan, 21.
\textsuperscript{117} One example of a leading regional state’s shift in focus is South Africa’s decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. According to T.V. Paul, “with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Southern Africa, the end of the Cold War, the cease-fire in Angola, and the tripartite agreement on the independence of Namibia, a nuclear capability had ‘become not only superfluous, but in fact an obstacle to the development of South Africa’s international relations’” (quoting F.W. de Klerk). Important considerations in this development were “joining the international mainstream as an advanced state in areas such as nuclear energy and space technology.” Thus, an amelioration of South Africa’s regional security environment provided the capability to place emphasis on broader wealth-building pursuits rather than more narrowly defined matters of military security. T.V. Paul, \textit{Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons}, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 116-117.
were true, however, potential hegemons – who have a weaker position vis-à-vis their rivals relative to that of actual hegemons – would be even more cautious in their actions; yet Mearsheimer’s historical analysis provides persuasive evidence of the higher frequency of war under conditions of unbalanced multipolarity. An examination of the decision theory underlying attack can generate plausible deductions as to why actual hegemons are less belligerent than potential ones, and thus explain the relative security of conditions under a preponderant power rather than rough parity.

*The Decision to Attack: Dyads Under Preponderance*

As noted above, a failed attack often invites counterattack. The thwarted attacker may be vulnerable due to overextended supply lines, insufficient time to prepare defensive fortifications, numerical losses, and desultory morale. The defenders, whose own sense of vulnerability to invasion has been heightened, are likely to conclude that security cannot be adequately ensured through restoring the antebellum status quo, but instead requires the eradication of the offending army and its national leadership.

The decision to attack, therefore, transcends the general theory of expected utility and instead entails resolving a distinct temporal dilemma of the minimax decision framework (that of minimizing the maximum potential losses). In its most basic sense, the dilemma is this: since an attack can be repulsed and possibly lead to regime and/or state extinction, yet a successful attack augments relative power and thus security, does the risk of attack expose the state to
potentially greater losses in the short-term, or is the attack more likely to mitigate the potential for greater long-term losses?\textsuperscript{118} The different trade-offs involved under conditions of preponderance and parity lead to differing resolutions of the dilemma and, consequently, to varying potentialities for war. One method of analyzing these trade-offs is to examine the decision process under the minimax framework for the different possible dyads under preponderance and parity.

In regional security environments with a preponderant power, the following conflict dyads are possible (with arrow direction indicating direction of attack):

Preponderant power (PP) $\rightarrow$ Nonpreponderant power (NPP)

NPP $\rightarrow$ NPP

NPP $\rightarrow$ PP

Since the NPP $\rightarrow$ PP scenario is tantamount to suicide, it violates a core assumption of realist thought; namely, that states are rational egoists. Consequently, it will not be addressed further.

In the PP $\rightarrow$ NPP scenario, there are little potential short-term losses if the decision to attack is made. The preponderant power already has a security margin within its region, and its military power is likely to dissuade non-regional attackers. In short, immediate security risks are minimal, while opportunities for wealth maximization are substantial. Conversely, the maximum potential losses occur if the decision to attack is made. This is because the attempt to augment power by a state already preponderant in its region will likely be perceived in

\textsuperscript{118} This is one way to analyze the choice faced by Imperial Japan when the United States imposed a complete oil embargo on July 25, 1941, essentially giving the Japanese an 18-month window to achieve petroleum self-sufficiency. While Japan’s ultimate choice was risky, it did yield the possibility of favorable outcome (e.g., perhaps if US aircraft carriers had been present at Pearl Harbor) as opposed to the virtual certainty of economic strangulation.
neighboring regions as the imperialist state’s efforts to consolidate resources for use in expanding its sphere of domination. This, in turn, will provoke counteractions by other regions or offshore balancers to not merely balance the imperialist power but to eliminate the threat.

Potential hegemons, conversely, are unlikely to initially attract such a response because 1) war is inherently risky, thus creating a passive inertia, and 2) they could, after all, only be interested in more proximate matters rather than an insatiable appetite for expansion. Wily revisionist powers, therefore, are careful to cloak their ambitions, typically by adopting the utopian language used by status quo powers to justify their own leading position. One classic example of this subterfuge is, of course, Nazi Germany, as incursions into the demilitarized Rhineland, Austria, and the Sudetenland were purported to be for the limited aim of making the German nation isomorphic with the German state, all under the legitimate Wilsonian banner of national self-determination.

Another reason for the lower belligerence of established hegemons vis-à-vis potential ones is that offshore balancers are reluctant to intervene if there is a chance that proximate regional powers will be able to adequately contain the potential hegemon. This behavior, which Mearsheimer terms “buck-passing”, persists until the point that direct intervention is prudent to prevent the imperialist state from achieving victory and becoming an actual hegemon. Since there is no one to take the buck when there is an actual hegemon, the offshore balancer will intervene much sooner if the preponderant power appears to be expanding outside its understood domain. For the potential hegemon, however, there are a

119 Mearsheimer, 252.
number of routes through which its offensive attempts, although risky, could ultimately result in success. The offshore balancer could miscalculate the intervention point, and thus be too late to effect the outcome, or the attacker could achieve a lightning-strike victory and render any assistance moot. For these reasons, effective offshore balancing consists of a forward-deployed presence to ensure that the balancer will be involved from the commencement of hostilities, and an immediate reserve, typically airpower and/or nuclear capability, to quickly stabilize conditions after the initial attack.

The same basic considerations are present, albeit on a smaller scale, in the NPP → NPP dyads. A successful attack – or, more likely, a growing imbalance created by one state embarking on a military build-up - will be perceived by the preponderant power as an immediate threat to its leading position. There are no opportunities for buck-passing, but the preponderant power’s overall dominance mitigates the risk of a pre-emptive attack. In short, this dominance replaces anarchy with an approximation of hierarchy. Since any state that challenges the preponderant power is a threat, all states, in essence, share the preponderant power’s protection against the emergence of those threats. In sum, even weak states enjoy a relatively benign security environment in regions led by a preponderant power for the following reasons:

a. the ambitions of rival lesser powers are kept in check by the self-interested policing of the preponderant power;

b. who in turn is kept in check by the self-interested policing of other regional preponderant powers or offshore balancers.
**The Decision to Attack: Dyads Under Parity**

In regional security environments without a preponderant power, there is only one scenario: NPP → NPP. The more ratable distribution of power and absence of a regionally acknowledged dominant state shift the spectrum away from an approximation of hierarchy to the anarchy of Waltzian neorealism. This shift, in turn, places the decision theory under conditions of non-preponderance squarely within the minimax framework identified by Brooks.

As noted in Chapter 2, the structural constraints of the international system offer considerable incentives for states to expand their power. Without an overarching central authority to offer protection and enforce cooperation, security is primarily a matter of self-help. Moreover, since all states operate under these same constraints, the behavior of states, as rational egoists, tends to become homogenized. In such circumstances, states have compelling inducements to not merely balance opposing power, but to dominate it.\(^{120}\) First, estimates of opposing power are inherently subjective and thus prone to miscalculation. Consequently, a goal of equalizing the power of one’s rivals may, in actuality, leave one in an inferior position, while aiming for superiority yields a margin of safety if estimates are inaccurate. Next, awareness that potential rivals are motivated by a desire to dominate, and not merely balance, creates incentives for “mutual anticipatory violence” in the hope of pre-empting the ascendancy of others.\(^{121}\) Notwithstanding the prospect of pre-emption, power relations shift diachronically. A state that seeks only to avoid inferiority today

\(^{120}\) Tellis, et al., 94.

\(^{121}\) Ibid.
may yet become inferior tomorrow, while new and presently unforeseen rivals may emerge in the future as their power accretes. Consequently, the best assurance of security is to not only achieve dominance, but also to maintain it permanently.\footnote{Tellis, et al., 95.} If Tellis is correct, however, then the pressures for anticipatory attack would be acute even under conditions of balanced multipolarity; yet, according to Mearsheimer, there is less frequency of war under balanced rather than unbalanced conditions. Once again, an examination of the decision to attack can help explain differences between parity and preponderance, as well as balance and unbalance.

Using the minimax framework, the same temporal question exists under conditions of parity as under preponderance; the calculus, however, shifts to favor offense. There is, by definition, no preponderant power to deter the attacker, and at this stage the attacker is still not in a position to consolidate the area’s resources and hence threaten external regions. Furthermore, offshore balancers, with their understandable proclivity for buck-passing to proximate states, are prone to conclude that the aggressor can be contained. On the other hand, deferring the opportunity to attack carries great risk since other states are also increasing their power and will be in a more advantageous position to either repulse a future attack or launch one of their own. In conditions of parity, therefore, the decision to attack can mitigate the maximum long-term loss of regime or state extinction. Under preponderance, attack simply carries little upside potential.
Even though there are no preponderant powers, and offshore balancers are more reluctant to intervene, the decision to attack still exposes the attacker to the same maximum loss in the short-term (regime extinction), since, under parity, the defender is more capable to repel the attack. Given equivalent maximum potential losses in both the short-term and the long-term, the minimax framework induces the state contemplating attack to refrain from doing so. As the prospective attacker’s relative power increases, however, the probability of the maximum loss being realized through counterattack decreases. A potential hegemon, therefore, has a window of relative power advantage where the chances of a successful attack are maximized while being (it hopes) below the threshold of intervention by more powerful outsiders. Thus the area between true parity and preponderance – unbalanced multipolarity – holds, at least theoretically, the greatest potential for war.
Chapter 4
Measuring the Regional Security Environment

The literature review, it will be recalled, surveyed the concepts of anarchy and hierarchy, devoting particular attention to the theoretical effects those structures had on state attitudes regarding the use of force and the legitimacy of international law. The previous chapter amplified those concepts by investigating in greater detail the nature and distribution of power among the system’s key state actors. In this chapter, I build upon the previous chapters to construct a quantifiable measure of the regional security environment to test the hypothesis that the more insecure a state’s regional security environment, the more likely it was to support, either diplomatically or militarily, the opening “major combat” phase of OIF.

Defining Regions

The first step in measuring the various regional security environments represented by the cases in this study is defining the composition of the regions to be measured. I started this process by utilizing the geographic organization of the “Armed Forces of the World” database, which classified militaries by continent. Besides being intuitively appealing, this division is desirable because militaries tend to select as a benchmark the most advanced combat systems
possessed by their immediate neighbors.\textsuperscript{123} This benchmarking, in turn, is pragmatically driven, since a number of empirical studies have identified geographic contiguity as a major predictor of potential adversaries.\textsuperscript{124} Grouping militaries in this manner, therefore, permits more valid comparisons of land power ratings within a given region. As I will explain in greater detail later, this division also facilitates an analysis of the concentration of land power within given sub-continental regions (hereafter referred to simply as regions).

These regions, which along with their constituent states are shown in Table 2.1, are at the heart of this study. They are also geographically defined. Admittedly, there are no rigid, objective criteria, at least in this paper, that would ensure reliable regional assignments if this analysis were to be replicated. The guiding conventions I adopted in this task were two-fold: first, to make assignments geographically contingent (with several highly limited exceptions), and second, to implement Morgenthau’s observation by increasing regional size to the extent that the region is an integral part of a larger balance of power alignment or is part of a great power sphere of influence. I will illustrate these conventions with several examples.

From Table 2.1, Central Africa and Eastern Africa are both relatively compact regional security environments, consisting of 10 and 6 states, respectively. This reflects local conflicts in Eastern Africa between Ethiopia and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{123} TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Section 2-2e.
\end{itemize}
Eritrea and in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa, both of which are devoid of significant great power participation. Conversely, Western Europe and Eastern Europe are larger regional security environments, both in terms of area and constituent states (17 and 25, respectively). These larger regions incorporate Morgenthau’s observation, in Western Europe through NATO and the direct US military presence, and in Eastern Europe due to its proximity to Russia (which Mearsheimer defines as a great power). The size of these regions, due to their integration into great power strategic peripheries, also encompasses some geographic anomalies: Canada, for example, is included in Western Europe due to NATO membership and cultural affinities with certain Western European nations, while Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan are all assigned to Eastern Europe due to their proximity to Russia and status as former Soviet republics.

Nonetheless, there are a number of states that could plausibly be assigned to several different regions. In making these assignments, I attempted to determine the locus of the state’s main security concern based on either current conflict patterns or major historical adversaries, with preference given to contemporary conditions. Angola, for example, could be assigned geographically to either Southern or Central Africa. Given Angola’s involvement in the recent wars in the Congo, I opted to assign Angola to Central Africa. Similarly, Chad could also be assigned to a number of regions given its geographical location. I also placed Chad in the Central African region as a result of its involvement in the Congo.\textsuperscript{125} Finally, Poland could be placed in either Western or Eastern

Europe. Given Poland’s history with Russia, however, its fresh memories of Soviet domination, and its contiguity with former Soviet republics as well as the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, I assigned Poland to Eastern Europe. The threat to Poland of Russian neo-nationalism was vividly portrayed in a map drawn by Vladimir Zhirinovsky for former Swedish ambassador Rolf Gauffin. In Zhirinovsky’s conception, Poland is to be partitioned between Russia and Germany, with Poland acquiring the Ukranian district of Lvov as compensation.

After the regions selected for this study were assigned their constituent states, the actual quantification of the regional security environment variable could proceed (I will address the selection of cases and regions later). I operationalized the variable as the product of the concentration of power possessed by the case states and its geographically contiguous neighbors, and the polarity of the region inhabited by the case state. In its most reductionist terms, the variable can be described as a function of the capability for militarized conflict (concentration of power) and the probability of that conflict occurring (polarity). Both components are operationalized in such a way that as the product increases, the level of regional insecurity also increases. The next two sections discuss these components of the regional security environment variable (hereafter called the regional security product, or RSP).

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Concentration of Power

The departure point for using the concentration of power as one component of the RSP is the rather simple observation that for any interstate conflict to become militarized requires the presence of militaries. From this observation I posit that as the concentration of land power among geographically contiguous states increases, then, ceteris paribus, the level of regional insecurity also increases. This position is corroborated by a recent empirical study indicating that a systemic concentration of power exhibited strong effects as a major cause of war.\textsuperscript{127}

Geographic Contiguity

In order to measure the aggregate land power of a case and its geographically contiguous states, it was first necessary to standardize, for purposes of this study, a definition of geographic contiguity. For this standardization I utilized the direct contiguity data compiled by the Correlates of War (COW) project.\textsuperscript{128} One prominent feature of this data, which is presented dyadically, is defining different types of contiguity and then assigning one of these types to each dyad. Version 3 contains the following categories of contiguity:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Separated by a land or river border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Separated by 12 miles of water or less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Separated by 24 miles of water or less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Separated by 150 miles of water or less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Separated by 400 miles of water or less</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should also be noted here that if the dyad shares two or more categories of contiguity, then only the closest category is assigned.

As a general rule, if a dyad was coded 1 or 2, then I treated the states as geographically contiguous. If the dyad was coded 3 or 4, I treated the pair as geographically contiguous if one of the states possessed sufficient naval power to be included in the “Naval Forces of the World” database compiled by Dunnigan (unlike the ‘Armed Forces’ database, the Naval Forces database only includes the world’s top 40 navies).\(^{129}\) If the dyad was coded 5, then I required one of the navies to possess a combat value greater than 10, as listed in the database. Of the world’s top 40 navies, only 6 had a combat value greater than 10, while two had a value exactly equal to 10.\(^{130}\) I chose 10 as the cutoff because the navy with the lowest combat value greater than 10 (France, at 14) unquestionably has some blue-water power projection capabilities ashore (e.g., the aircraft carrier *Charles de Gaulle*), while it is unclear how much projection capability, particularly at distance, is available to India and Taiwan. The naval forces of China and Russia are also likely to be significant, but are less easily classified.

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\(^{130}\) The top six fleets, in ascending order of combat value, are: France, 14; China, 16; Japan, 26; Russia, 45; United Kingdom, 46; United States, 302. India and Taiwan are rated at 10.
forces of those two countries, on the other hand, appear to be oriented primarily toward conflict with their enduring rivals of Pakistan and China, respectively.

For particular regions, I amended the above general rules of contiguity to better reflect the regional security environment. In both Western and Eastern Europe, for example, contiguousities of Code 4 are not uncommon given the relative narrowness of the Mediterranean. Italy, for example, shares a Code 4 contiguity with Albania, Yugoslavia, Algeria, and Tunisia, while Turkey has a Code 4 contiguity with Lebanon. Given that both Italy and Turkey are listed in the “Naval Forces of the World” database, under the general rules those states would all be considered geographically contiguous. I chose to disregard the Code 4 general rules for these regions since there are no current security rivalries between states that share such a contiguity, and, more importantly, the overwhelming presence of the United States Sixth Fleet provides an incalculable public good by contributing to regional security.

In the dynamic region of Southeast Asia, comprised chiefly of littoral states, I extended the notion of geographic contiguity to account for the growing power of the China, and more specifically, its increasing naval strength and assertions in the region. Navies, as a highly mobile and visible force, are especially suitable for promoting a policy of prestige, or reputation for power.\textsuperscript{131} According to Morgenthau, this enhanced prestige can facilitate either a policy of the status quo or of imperialism, and achieves its ultimate utility if national aims can be achieved can be accomplished without resort to force.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{131} Morgenthau, 90.
\textsuperscript{132} Morgenthau, 93.
policy appears to be devoted to cultivating such a reputation for power. While a
full review of Chinese naval policy is well beyond the scope of this paper, several
examples will be offered in defense of my position that Chinese geopolitical
maneuvers in the Southeast Asia region warrant an expanded notion of
geographic contiguity for use in constructing the RSP.

Chinese Naval Policy in the South China Sea

In broad terms, the South China Sea represents the confluence of two
areas critical for the maintenance of the Chinese Communist party’s ruling
legitimacy: the availability of hydrocarbon resources to maintain continued
economic growth, and the fulfillment of nationalist and patriotic aims. First, the
South China Sea is the prime maritime conduit from the Indian Ocean to the
industrialized southeastern Chinese coast, and proven oil reserves are estimated
at approximately 7 billion barrels. 133 Second, China has claimed sovereignty
over the Spratly Islands since 1992, and refers to the surrounding seas as its
“historical waters”, stemming from the period of the Han Dynasty’s southern
thrust into present-day Vietnam around 111 BC. 134

During the Second Indochina War, China made its territorial gambit in the
South China Sea by seizing the Paracel Islands. This expansionism continued
after the fall of Saigon, as in 1978 China occupied six atolls formerly occupied by

133 Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy. “South China Sea Region
17, 2005.
134 Douglas A. Borer. Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared (London:
Frank Cass, 1999), 52.
Vietnam. Sino-Vietnamese tensions culminated in 1988, when 77 Vietnamese sailors were killed in a naval clash over the Johnson Reef.

The 1990s witnessed an acceleration of activity around the Spratly Islands, reflecting both the withdrawal from superpower naval bases mentioned in the Introduction and the area’s potential for hydrocarbon exploration. Major US companies such as Exxon, Mobil, and Conoco all signed exploration deals, which were accompanied by acrimonious charges of territorial infringement levied by China and Vietnam. China has been especially aggressive in this regard, granting a 1992 concession on the continental shelf claimed by Vietnam, allegedly operating an oil rig within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and drilling on the Vietnamese side of the Gulf of Tonkin median line.\textsuperscript{135} Vietnam, however, has not been the only victim of China’s encroaching claims. In 1993, Chinese officials at a workshop of ASEAN nations reportedly introduced a map documenting their claims which included part of Indonesia’s EEZ.\textsuperscript{136} A more brazen encroachment occurred in 1995 when China occupied the suitably named Mischief Reef, which lies within the Philippines’ EEZ, and constructed what the Chinese subsequently termed as “fishing facilities”.\textsuperscript{137}

These “fishing facilities” are one evidence of the doctrine of “offshore defense” that has replaced the Maoist doctrine of static coastal defense as

Chinese economic growth has increased its demand for natural resources.\textsuperscript{138} The importance of South China Sea trade routes will likely become even more important as hydrocarbon production in the Caspian Sea region increases and the difficulties of constructing a pipeline east through Xinjiang province, beset by Uighur Muslim violence, become more apparent, thus necessitating supertanker transport. To this could be added recent Chinese deals to increase its oil imports from Sudan. To protect these shipments entering the Strait of Malacca, the Chinese have constructed a radar installation off the southern coast of Myanmar.\textsuperscript{139} In addition, the Chinese navy has also constructed what one writer termed as “a chain of naval facilities and observation posts” from Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands north to the Paracel Islands, a distance of nearly 1,000 kilometers.\textsuperscript{140}

\textit{The Chinese Impact on Australian Security}

Australia’s geographic position and insularity make it potentially vulnerable to increasing Chinese naval strength for several reasons. First, Australia is a net importer of petroleum, with energy demand forecast to grow 50\% by 2020.\textsuperscript{141} Even more ominously, oil import dependency is anticipated to increase to 78\% of

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{141} Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy. “Country Analysis Briefs – Australia (November 2004).”
\end{flushright}
consumption within ten years.\textsuperscript{142} The majority of imports currently come from the UAE, Malaysia, and Vietnam over routes which could be vulnerable in times of crisis.\textsuperscript{143} Second, Australia is the world’s largest coal exporter, with 60\% of those exports to Japan.\textsuperscript{144} A major route for these exports is the Lombok-Makassar route through the Indonesian archipelago.\textsuperscript{145} While not as constricted as the Philips Channel in the Singapore Strait, Lombok and Makassar are nonetheless bottlenecks that pose tempting and probably lucrative locations for interdicting hostile shipping.

Arguably, these security concerns – brought to the forefront by Chinese assertions in the South China Sea, and against the backdrop of Taiwan Strait military exercises in 1995 – led Australia to conclude the December 1995 Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security. According to Stuart Harris of the Australian National University, while not a defense pact, the Agreement is nonetheless notable for the secrecy surrounding its negotiation (e.g., Australia did not consult the US) and its reticence toward China.\textsuperscript{146} The Indonesian foreign minister at the time, however, intimated that “an escalation of tensions in the South China Sea or a ‘flare-up’ between China and Taiwan [would be] adverse developments that would bring into play relevant consultation procedures.”\textsuperscript{147} Since China would be the likely military provocateur in a South

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{145} US Pacific Command, 18.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
China Sea crisis and unquestionably the one in a cross-strait conflict, the minister’s statement, as well as the Agreement itself, evidence a significant concern with China’s increasing capabilities. In Australia, according to Harris, “there was some unofficial indications of enhanced concern in Canberra at China’s growing military power, both following its South China Sea activities, the Taiwan Strait military exercises of 1995 and 1996, and China’s nuclear testing.” Meanwhile, nearly ten years after the Agreement with Indonesia, Chinese truculence continues to be displayed in such a way that can only be prudently viewed as a threat to Australia’s security. For example, within one month after Australia signed a memorandum of understanding with the US regarding the use of its missile defense radars, the new Chinese ambassador brazenly made an unspecified “warning” to Australia regarding its cooperation in American missile defense projects. 

Australian policy regarding China, however, is not monolithic, and reflects a profound ambivalence. Harris – whose personal view is that more hawkish strategies rest on exaggerated perceptions of Chinese power and hence counsels engagement – notes that there are ongoing differences between those Australians who see China mainly as a threat and those who view it as a potential opportunity. Like the disputatious debate over Australian participation in the Iraq War that was evident during the pre-war period as well as Prime Minister Howard’s re-election campaign, the division regarding China

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148 Harris, 132.
150 Harris, 132.
reflects, in large part, the ideological divide between Australia’s two main political parties.

In conclusion, however, I argue that the trajectory of Chinese power, in conjunction with the aggressive actions I outlined in the previous section, warrant an expanded notion of geographic contiguity (perhaps better thought of as geopolitical relevance in the context of the predominantly littoral states of the Southeast Asia region). In this section, I showed several Australian vulnerabilities to increased Chinese power as well as one response, the security agreement with Indonesia. From the Chinese point of view, Australia’s status as a stalwart US ally with proven military capability and its involvement in US missile defense can also be construed as a threat to Chinese security. Thus, grouping China and Australia together in the concentration of power calculation is justified.

Computing the Concentration of Power Multiplicand

After the states contiguous to the case state have been selected, the next step simply involves adding the land power ratings of the case and contiguous states. The only adjustment I made to this procedure is that if at the commencement of OIF a contiguous state and the case state were both members of a defensive alliance in which the US was also a member, then I rated the land power of the contiguous state at zero. I made this adjustment on the grounds that such a multiparty alliance approximates a hierarchical arrangement, and thus constitutes a more secure regional environment. As a
practical matter, I showed this zero rating by simply omitting the state from the listing of geographically contiguous states on Table 2.1.

Also on Table 2.1, the sum of the land power ratings of the case and contiguous states is shown under the column labeled “Group Power”. I then divide this sum by a base amount, which is equal to the aggregate land power ratings of all states within the continent from which the various regions were derived. The reader will recall that ‘continent’ in this usage refers to the groupings employed by Dunnigan in the “Armed Forces of the World” database. Since, as mentioned previously, militaries tend to emulate their most proximate potential adversaries, and Dunnigan’s categories already encompass a degree of political, economic, and military similarity, dividing the group power by a continental base permits comparisons regarding the concentration of power to be made between widely disparate regions. In the next section, I discuss how measures of the distribution of power among states can also be made comparable across dissimilar regions.

Polarity

Determining Regional Polarity

A major focus of Chapter 3 was developing the theoretical foundations for measuring polarity. This was accomplished chiefly by using concepts elucidated by John Mearsheimer. Two key concepts for determining polarity discussed by Mearsheimer were the number of major powers within any given region, and whether the leading major power qualified as a potential hegemon.
To assist in determining these key attributes, in Table 2.2 I list the regions and their constituent states that were defined in Table 2.1. Within each region, I rank the states by their land power rating. The state with the highest land power rating automatically qualifies a major power for that region. This rating, in turn, becomes the benchmark for determining which, if any, of the other regional states also qualify as a major power.

For reasons stated in Chapter 3, I define a regional major power as a state whose land power is greater than one-sixth of the land power held by the leading state. In the Middle East region, for example, Israel, Iran, and Egypt, with land power ratings of 617, 204, and 149 respectively, all qualify as major powers, while Syria, with a land power rating of 85, does not. Similarly, in Southern Africa, South Africa is the only major power since the second-ranking state, Zimbabwe, has a land power rating that is equal to, but not greater than, one-sixth of South Africa’s land power rating.

To qualify as a potential hegemon, the leading major power is required to possess both the largest annual GDP and greater than 125% of the land power rating of the second-ranked state. In Table 2.2 I list GDP by state in order to facilitate this determination. If a state met the above criteria and was the only regional major power – resulting in regional preponderance – I coded the state as ‘No’ under the ‘Potential Hegemon’ column and as ‘Actual’ under the ‘Reason’ column. Otherwise, the codings and explanations as shown in Table 2.2 are straightforward.
The regional polarities, as determined by reference to Table 2.2, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Polarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Balanced multipolarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Balanced multipolarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Regional preponderance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Africa</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>Regional preponderance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>ME</td>
<td>Balanced multipolarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Regional preponderance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>EEU</td>
<td>Unbalanced multipolarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Unbalanced multipolarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Asia</td>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>Balanced multipolarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Unbalanced multipolarity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quantifying the Regional Polarity Multiplier

Of course, in order to be useful in measuring the regional security environment through the RSP, the regional polarity must be quantified. As with the qualitative determination of polarity, in this endeavor I also relied on the methodology established by Mearsheimer. However, the extent of the data collection required in order to derive an empirically based quantitative model of global regional polarities using Mearsheimer’s methodology was well beyond the scope of this paper. To both acknowledge and compensate for this uncertainty, I made three different quantifications of regional polarity. I then used each
quantification separately in calculating the RSP, and then performed a regression analysis utilizing each variation. Consequently, in this section I report the methodology I used to make those quantifications in order to permit readers to draw their own conclusions regarding their validity.

The primary empirical study I relied upon was Mearsheimer’s “Study of European Wars by System Structure, 1792-1990.” In Table 2.3, the data pertaining to the period 1792-1990 is taken directly from Mearsheimer. Post-1990 data is derived from my analysis of post-1990 international conflicts, which is shown in Table 2.3a.

The Table 2.3a information is quantified in the top section of Table 2.3 entitled “Post-1990 International Conflict”. Following Mearsheimer’s convention, I count as a war year any or part thereof in which an international conflict occurred. I then computed the percentage of war years in the time period for each system structure. To facilitate the comparison of these percentages, I computed ratios for the balanced and unbalanced polarities by dividing their war year percentages by the percentage attributable to regional preponderance, with the regional preponderance ratio set equal to one.

The middle section of Table 2.3, which I refer to here as ‘Unweighted’, is a hybrid of Mearsheimer’s data and that from the above section. In ‘Unweighted’, I simply add the war years and then the total years from both data sets, compute the war year percentages, and then standardize into ratios as in the previous section. Readers will note in this section that Mearsheimer’s total years by polarity equate to the total time period spanned in his analysis, while in the post-
1990 data the total years for each polarity is equivalent to the number of years in the period from 1991 through 2003. This distinction is because Mearsheimer’s data is derived solely from an analysis of one regional security environment, while the post-1990 data encompasses multiple regions which were subject simultaneously to all three system structures.

The restricted regional focus of Mearsheimer’s analysis, as well as its reliance on pre-1990 data, does call into question the validity of using such an analysis to quantify current polarity for globally dispersed regions. The disparity between Mearsheimer and the post-1990 data is even more apparent if one examines the war year percentages from 1792-1990 only. For these years, the percentages for bipolarity, balanced multipolarity, and unbalanced multipolarity are 2.17%, 18.35%, and 79.55% respectively, or a ratio of 1/8.46/36.66. These ratios, of course, vary widely from those for the post-1990 period. This variance is mitigated to a certain extent in the final Unweighted ratios by incorporating the post-1990 data. Given that the post-1990 data more closely approximates the range and timing of the regions in this study than does Mearsheimer, however, I decided that a weighting of the post-1990 data would be appropriate. In the final section of Table 2.3 ('Weighted') I weight the post-1990 war year percentages by a factor of three before computing the standardized ratios. I used three since this is the closest whole number to the Unweighted ratio of unbalanced to balanced multipolarity (14.49/4.35). These sets of standardized ratios are then used as the polarity multiplier in the three permutations of the RSP.
Conclusion

The ratios and corresponding RSPs for all case states are listed in Table 2.4. The three ‘Product’ columns are then used, as appropriate, in the ‘RSP’ column of Table 3.1. In manipulating the Table 3.1 variable loading spreadsheet I would simply copy-and-paste the appropriate RSP and Variable 7 values into their respective columns. In the next chapter, I discuss those other columns in Table 3.1, examining case selection, the other independent variables, and the dependent variable.
Chapter 5
Other Independent Variables, Case Selection, and the Dependent Variable

Now that the construction and measurement of the regional security environment have been examined, a discussion of the other elements involved in testing the hypothesis can proceed. In this chapter, I turn my attention to case selection, the selection and measurement of other independent variables, and defining the dependent variable. This discussion sets the stage for the subsequent, and final, chapter, in which I examine the results of the hypothesis testing and offer my concluding remarks on its implications for both the war in Iraq and US national security policy more generally.

Case Selection

As I alluded to in the Introduction, two prominent postwar roles of the United States – promoting the architecture of liberal internationalism and providing military protection for it – that were often complementary during the Cold War were seen as conflicting by liberal states in the prelude to OIF. Moreover, liberal and illiberal states would have different perceptions of these conflicting roles. For example, liberal states would be reasonably expected to be more amenable to supporting the claims of the United States, whether due to mutual interests, shared liberality, or historical ties, than would illiberal states.
Conversely, liberal states could reasonably be expected to lend greater weight to the normative constraints of international law, such as the prohibition on the use of force unless sanctioned by the UN Charter, than illiberal states. On the other hand, liberal states should have found particularly compelling the insistence on enforcing international law as well as removing Saddam’s odious regime. Illiberal states, meanwhile, could be anticipated to appropriate the language of international law to eviscerate any hope of its enforcement, solely out of self-interest. Given these fundamental differences, a broad intermingling of liberal and illiberal states, therefore, would make it more difficult to isolate the effect of regional security environments on the decision to whether or not support OIF. Consequently, with one limited exception that I will detail below, I restrict the cases to liberal states.

To determine if a state is liberal, I consulted Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World 2004” country-by-country ratings, which covered developments from January through November 2003. I define a liberal state as one in which neither Freedom House assessment of political rights or civil liberties was rated greater than 5 (higher numbers indicating less liberality) and whose overall Freedom House rating was either ‘Free’ or ‘Partly Free’. This cross-sectional approach, of course, does not account for the sometimes diachronic nature of liberality – with the most notable recent example being Russia, which was rated Partly Free in the above survey, downgraded to Not Free for the 2005 survey.

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Since the overall study is cross-sectional, however, I utilize an equivalent time frame for defining liberality.

**Illiberal African States**

While focusing on liberal states is an important element of this study, I made a decision to include six illiberal African states. This inclusion was made for both methodological and substantive reasons. First, my initial sampling frame only included states from Europe and Asia. To avoid overparameterization and provide a greater number of cases to potentially falsify the hypothesis, I enlarged the pool of liberal states to include Africa. When African liberal states were added, however, two problems were presented. First, the issue of possible overparameterization still remained, albeit slightly, since with 8 independent variables and 79 cases the model was below the recommended 10 to 1 minimum ratio of cases to independent variables. Second, the various African regional security environments omitted several vital actors. In the Central African region, the major players in the Great Lakes conflict, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, were omitted. Similarly, in the East Africa region, the liberality criteria resulted in the inclusion of Ethiopia and the omission of Eritrea. Since these states have recently been engaged in interstate conflict – and given the delay in demarcating the 2002 Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission’s delimitation decision – I concluded that including Eritrea would be a more robust indication of the regional security environments.
In addition to the three states above, I decided to include the three African states that were non-permanent members of the UN Security Council at the time of the proposed ‘second resolution’ immediately preceding OIF. Including Angola, Cameroon, and Guinea is appealing for a number of reasons. First, these states were the focus of intense lobbying efforts over the second resolution. Utilizing these states and their ultimate disposition toward OIF thus provides a unique set of cases for measuring the significance of not only the regional security environment but also other independent variables. Second, these states are of obvious historical interest. Third, including these states functions as a proxy for nonaligned, illiberal states that may temporarily occupy a position of diplomatic importance in the future and whose assent will once again be critical for advancing US interests.

Anticipating questions of selection bias, I note that the six illiberal African states are evenly divided on the dependent variable, with Angola, Eritrea, and Rwanda coded as 1 for supporting OIF and Cameroon, the DRC, and Guinea coded as 0. In addition, I performed regression analyses without the six states. These alternative calculations are reported and discussed in Chapter 6, and comprise the Table 5 series in the Appendix.

Other Matters

I made three other adjustments to the selection in order to produce a more meaningful analysis. First, I excluded liberal states with a population of less than one million on the grounds that such states often lack significance in international
politics. I made an exception for Iceland and Luxembourg since both are NATO members and thus have more significance to the United States than their size would otherwise warrant. I also made an exception for Bahrain due to its critical geographic position and status as a major non-NATO ally. Second, I excluded non-NATO members of Western Europe, such as Switzerland and Sweden, who have assiduously cultivated a policy of neutrality. Including these states, therefore, would not offer any meaningful insights since their positions on OIF would be driven predominantly by their neutrality policies rather than any of the independent variables under consideration. Moreover, their inclusion would bias the analysis in favor of the hypothesis by adding states with relatively low RSPs and codings of 0 on the dependent variable. Consequently, their exclusion provides a sterner test of the hypothesis. Finally, I excluded Mexico and any liberal states in Central and South America. This exclusion is based principally on Mearsheimer’s statement that the US is a regional hegemon with regard to these areas.154 My conclusion is that that relationship inhibits comparability with other regions and thus would adulterate any analytical inferences if those states were included. In short, these states constitute a special case deserving of their own separate analysis.

Other Independent Variables

In determining the other independent variables to use in the regression analysis, I attempted to extract the most salient features of arguments advanced by both proponents and opponents of the war. In addition, I utilized variables

154 Mearsheimer, 40.
that I saw as plausibly possessing some explanatory value regarding governmental positions on OIF. In the former category, I decided that the proponents’ emphasis on terrorism and WMD proliferation merited inclusion, while opponents’ charges that the OIF coalition was a ‘coalition of the bribed’ also deserved to be tested. From observation, I concluded that the ideology of the chief executive or ruling coalition was an important factor in the decision to support or oppose the war, as well as each case’s percentage of Muslim population. My intention was also to test the relationship between the level of contracts under the UN Oil-for-Food program and support for OIF, but I was unable to obtain data on contracts by country. I made a crude compensation instead by utilizing data regarding illicit oil vouchers granted by Saddam. In addition, I included Anglophonic status, not only because of the prominence of the United Kingdom and Australia in the coalition, but also as a speculation derived from James C. Bennett’s idea of a common ‘Anglospheric culture’.

Finally, I also speculated that states’ experience with colonialism might cause them to be less inclined to support OIF. I operationalized this variable by coding a state ‘1’ if it was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, and ‘0’ if was not. In the remainder of this section, I cover several of these variables in greater detail.

**Terrorism and WMD Proliferation**

I specified the ‘Terrorism’ variable as the number of casualties (defined as the sum of fatalities and non-fatally injured persons) suffered by the citizens of a

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case state due to international terrorism from 1997 through 2002. Data for this measurement were taken from the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (‘MIPT’).\textsuperscript{156} MIPT was especially suited for this purpose since the incidents therein were categorized as perpetrated by either domestic or international actors. Unfortunately, however, the casualties were classified according to the location of the incident rather than the nationality of the victim. During the specified time interval, there were two major incidents in which an appreciable number of noncitizens of the target state were victims: the Bali bombing and the September 11 attacks. Utilizing sources that reported the nationality of victims in both attacks, I then adjusted the MIPT figures to arrive at the total number used in the regression analysis.\textsuperscript{157}

While quantifying casualties from international terrorism was relatively straightforward, any similar attempt to measure WMD proliferation is imperiled due to a variety of difficulties. As was made abundantly clear by the failure to find stockpiles of WMD in Iraq, even verifying existence, much less quantity, is highly problematic. Consequently, I narrowed the scope of operationalizing WMD proliferation from the existence of the agents themselves to the relatively more verifiable realm of ballistic missile ranges.\textsuperscript{158} Moreover, I restricted the missile threats to those emanating from rogue states.\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{156} MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. Available online at http://www.terrorismknowledgebase.net/AnalyticalTools.jsp. May 20, 2005. Specific data was taken from the ‘Incidents’ section, under the ‘By Region’ subheading, for the specified date range. Regional headings were then broken out by country.


These modifications, while making the measurement of the ‘Missile’ variable more manageable, had several other beneficial effects. First, by restricting the locus to rogue states, all of whom except Saudi Arabia were suspected of possessing or developing WMD at the time OIF commenced, I was able to approximate a measure of the threat induced by WMD proliferation without staking the validity of the measurement on highly probabilistic data. Second, focusing on ballistic missiles expanded the array of threats from the somewhat hit-or-miss efficacy of weaponized WMD agents to more conventional military uses. In this sense, ballistic missile capability functions as a bridge between methods of terror and traditional military force.

Iraq’s use of ballistic missiles is illustrative of this bridge. Iraqi advancements in missile technology in the latter 1980s more than doubled the range of the al-Hussein Scud missile, bringing the crucial Iranian cities of Tehran and Qom within range.\textsuperscript{160} The Iraqi missile campaign was thus one of several elements that swung the military advantage to Saddam in the decisive year of 1988. This campaign, however, gained added potency when rumors that the al-Hussein Scuds were filled with chemical agents caused nearly a million Iranians to flee the targeted cities.\textsuperscript{161} This fear was also palpable during Scud attacks against Israel in the Gulf War as well as the 20 missiles directed against Kuwait during OIF.

\footnotesize{dead link. Comparable data is available from either The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace or the Federation of American Scientists.} 
\textsuperscript{159} These include the state sponsors of terrorism as determined by the Secretary of State. Cuba is omitted because it is outside the sampling frame, and Sudan is omitted because it possessed no ballistic missile capabilities. To this list, I added Saudi Arabia. 
\textsuperscript{160} Pollack, 23. 
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
Economic Leverage Variables

In addition to the variables in the preceding section, I also attempted to operationalize variables that would validly measure the vulnerability of the case state to tools of economic leverage employed by the United States. To avoid problems with overparameterization, I rotated the four variables in this group within the Variable 7 position of each regression. These four variables were: 1) the presence of a free trade agreement between the case and the US; 2) the case’s exports to the US expressed as a percentage of the case’s GDP; 3) the percentage change in US aid to the case state from FY03 to FY04; and 4) US military aid to the case state.

The four variables were chosen primarily from a report issued by the Institute for Policy Studies, a staunch opponent of the war in Iraq and Iraqi democracy. The report did not operationalize variables; instead, it specified the mechanisms by which the United States could exert its economic influence. From the report:

With an economy that accounts for a quarter of economic activity on earth, the United States has ample economic levers to pressure poorer countries. These fall into several categories, the most important being in the realms of trade and investment. The United States is negotiating new “free” trade agreements with several nations; failure to support the United States could jeopardize these negotiations. The United States also gives a large number of countries military aid and military training; both could be cut to nations that oppose the United States. Finally, the United States has a long history of using trade sanctions against nations that have invoked its ire. In addition to trade, aid is a powerful lever. The U.S. has long used its aid program as a political instrument to reward allies and punish countries that stray from the path.

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163 Anderson et al, 2.
Expressing exports as a percentage of the case’s GDP is one means of measuring a case’s susceptibility to US trade sanctions; given their “long history”, then, ceteris paribus, the higher the percentage, the greater the probability of supporting OIF merely to avoid sanctions. Similarly, the level of US military aid (which could also be considered economic leverage since it frees resources for other uses) should induce the same effect. To operationalize the free trade variable, I used the presence of an agreement at the time of OIF, since this data was readily available and reliable. I agree with the authors that tracking free trade agreements under negotiation would be preferable since this represents the moment of greatest leverage; however, the presence of an agreement also entails leverage since it can be effectively curtailed.

The change in US aid variable is unique among the four since it is measured longitudinally, encompassing both the prelude to OIF and the period after the cessation of major combat hostilities. I included this variable primarily to test whether in the case of OIF the US aid to “punish countries that stay from the path”. If this were the case, one would expect the variable to have a positive coefficient, as an increase in aid would be a reward for supporting OIF (coded as 1), while a decrease in aid would be retribution for opposing it (coded as 0).

_Ideology_

I coded the Ideology variable on a scale of -1 to +1, with -1 representing governments led by leftist and left-of-center parties, 0 denoting centrist or undefined parties, and +1 representing rightist parties. For parliamentary
systems, the coding was based on the orientation of the parties in the ruling coalition; where different ideologies were present in the same ruling coalition, the ideological orientation of the majority party within the coalition was controlling. For example, the ruling coalition drawn from the Armenian National Assembly was formed by the HHK (conservative reformist party, 31 seats), OE (centrist party, 19 seats), and Dashnak (social-democratic party, 11 seats). Since HHK had a majority seats within the 61 seat coalition, I coded Armenia as +1. On the other hand, the ideology of the presidential party was determinative of presidential systems.

The ideological orientation of the various political parties, as well as election results, was derived from the extremely thorough Electionworld database. If the database noted that a party was liberal, socialist, or social-democratic, I treated its ideological orientation as left of center. Conversely, if a party was described as conservative or Christian-democratic, I coded the party as right of center. Finally, parties described as centrist were treated likewise.

Not all cases, however, fit neatly into these categories. For Middle Eastern countries monarchies that nonetheless met the Freedom House criteria for liberalality (Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait), ideology was coded as +1. Parties that were described in exclusively ethnic terms, such as the Front for the Democracy in Burundi as a “Hutu emancipatory party”, were coded as 0. Additionally, parties

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165 Electionworld.org (http://www.electionworld.org). In addition, I used the Electionworld data for the most recent election up to the commencement of OIF + 3 months.
labeled as “authoritarian” by Electionworld, in the absence of further clarification, were also coded as 0.

The presence of authoritarian parties was most prevalent in Africa. In fact, there was little to distinguish the Electionworld descriptions for a fair number of African states that met the Freedom House criteria and the six illiberal African cases. In The Gambia, for example, 45 out of 53 seats were held by the authoritarian Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction after the centrist United Democratic Party boycotted the January 2002 elections.166 In Guinea, meanwhile, 85 out of 114 seats were held by the authoritarian Party of Unity and Progress after the centrist Rally of the Guinean People party boycotted the June 2002 elections.167 Yet The Gambia was rated 4 (political) and 4 (civil), or partly free, while Guinea was rated 6 (political) and 5 (civil), or not free, in the Freedom House rankings.

In short, I rated the six illiberal African states as 0 except for Angola, which I rated at -1 for two reasons. First, Electionworld described the majority Popular Liberation Movement of Angola/Labor Party as an “authoritarian/extreme left party”. Second, the Marxist-influenced origins of the MPLA are well-known, emanating from the party’s founding in 1956 through independence in 1975 and the subsequent civil war with the UNITA rebels led by Jonas Savimbi.

Saddam’s Oil Vouchers

If the United States possessed economic and other levers capable of inducing nations to support the policy of regime change in Iraq, then Saddam likewise was not bereft of options for creating his own leverage. One of the more notorious examples of Saddam turning the tables on those who sought to control his behavior was the aforementioned UN oil-for-food scandal. Unfortunately, I was unable to locate data on the UN website that would denote the value of contracts, by country, executed pursuant to the oil-for-food program.

To test the hypothesis that Saddam’s leverage was a significant factor in influencing responses toward OIF, I instead used a listing of recipients of oil vouchers granted by Saddam. The list was originally published in Arabic by the Iraqi independent daily Al-Mada on January 25, 2004, and was subsequently made available in English by the Middle East Media Research Institute.\(^{168}\) While some of the named recipients responded with vociferous protests of innocence, others were more reticent.

Of the case states whose nationals were listed in the MEMRI article, French individuals and companies had the second-highest total of oil vouchers, at 165.2 million barrels. According to MEMRI, the value of the vouchers was dependent upon the price of oil, with vouchers earning from $0.25 to $0.30 per barrel in early years of the program to $0.05 to $0.10 per barrel in the later years. The 11 million barrels of oil vouchers allegedly granted to Jean-Bernard

Merimee, French ambassador to the UN, therefore could have been worth from $500,000 to over $3 million.

French venality, however, pales in comparison with that exhibited by Russia. Russian individuals and firms were granted vouchers for a staggering two-and-one-half billion barrels, with the Russian state alone accounting for over 1.3 billion barrels. If the Institute for Policy Studies and Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry had wanted to identify a true “coalition of the bribed”, they would have had to look no further than the UN Security Council.

Dependent Variable

The main source for coding the dependent variable was a White House press release on March 27, 2003 specifying 49 countries as “publicly committed” to supporting OIF. Of the 49 countries, 7 Central and South American countries were omitted from this analysis, 5 had populations under 1 million, and 3 failed to meet the Freedom House criteria and were not part of the special group of African states referred to earlier. The United States itself was listed in the press release; excluding the US results in 33 states from the press release being utilized as cases.

A total of 37 cases in the n=85 set, however, were coded as 1. This difference is due to the fact that either not all countries who privately supported OIF could publicly support it for internal political considerations or inclusion in the press release would have been inimical to OIF or other US interests. Thus, in

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addition to the 33 cases from the press release I added Bahrain, Jordan, Kenya, Israel, and Taiwan. Finally, I coded Turkey as 0 even though it was included by the White House. I adopted this classification because 1) the support eventually offered by Turkey was far less than originally hoped for by US officials, and 2) Turkey’s refusal to permit the disembarkation of the 4th Infantry Division had a deleterious impact on the post-war environment. This is because the unavailability of a northern front concurrent with the push to Baghdad from the south spared the Sunni Triangle of the full brunt of US power, at a time when US commanders had considerably greater flexibility regarding the level of force to apply. Regardless of Turkey’s ultimate effect, however, changing its dependent variable coding from 1 to 0 does not create a bias in favor of the hypothesis. Conversely, given Turkey’s placement in the Eastern European region and its relatively high RSP, such a change provides a sterner test by being biased in favor of falsifying the hypothesis.

Cases Coded as 1 Not Included in Press Release

Of the five cases designated as supporting OIF even though they were not included in the White House press release, Israel is the least controversial in terms of the validity of that assertion, and will not be dealt with further. Similarly, the leaders of Taiwan, according to one report, “seemed supportive of the war effort.” Its omission from the press release, consequently, was more likely a function of the US not offending the PRC and jeopardizing its support for other

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elements of the GWOT, rather than any substantial Taiwanese disagreement with US policy. This leaves Bahrain, Jordan, and Kenya as cases requiring further explanation.

Of these three cases, Bahrain evinced the most public support for OIF. Following the Gulf War, Bahrain signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement with the US, granting US forces access to Bahraini facilities and specifying their use as a pre-positioning hub. After 9/11, the US-Bahrain relationship was further solidified when Bahrain was designated a major non-NATO ally. During OIF itself, Coalition forces used the Sheikh Isa airbase for cargo storage and supply flights.\textsuperscript{171} The US Navy’s 5\textsuperscript{th} Fleet headquarters in Manama coordinated, among other functions, logistical support for naval special warfare units that were instrumental in securing Iraqi oil infrastructure.\textsuperscript{172} Further evidence of Bahraini support was also noted in a House of Representatives concurrent resolution, No. 211, which was introduced in the 108\textsuperscript{th} Congress. Perhaps the most unambiguous proof of Bahrain’s importance in supporting OIF, however, came from Usama bin Laden himself. In an audiotape released in early April 2003, the al-Qaeda chief exhorted fellow terrorists to engage in suicide attacks against several Arab governments, one of which was Bahrain.\textsuperscript{173}

The Jordanian government, however, faced a more precarious internal political situation than the Bahraini government. Jordan’s Palestinian population, whose sentiments toward the US were symbolized by the insipid ululations that

\begin{footnotes}
\item[171] House Con. Res. 211, 108\textsuperscript{th} Congress.
\end{footnotes}
celebrated the collapse of the Twin Towers, made public acknowledgement of support for OIF impossible. According to reporter Vivienne Walt:

> Publicly, Jordan’s government and almost all its 5 million people oppose a war against Iraq. In talks with President Bush, King Abdullah agreed to allow US military forces to be stationed here on condition their presence be kept as secret as possible. “The US knows we’re walking a very tight rope here”, Foreign Minister Marawan Muasher told foreign journalists.\(^{174}\)

Walt goes on to describe these deployments as including “hundreds” of US troops manning Patriot anti-missile batteries, B-1 bombers operating from the Jordanian air base at Safawi near the Iraqi border, and Muasher’s own admission of “2,000 to 3,000 special operations forces” in Jordan.\(^{175}\) Nor was Jordanian support restricted to US forces. GR7 Harriers from the Royal Air Force, for example, also operated from forward air bases in Jordan in support of British SAS units operating in western Iraq.\(^{176}\) These actions justify coding Jordan as 1 on the dependent variable.

Coding Kenya as 1, however, will likely be the most controversial addition to the White House press release. I made this judgment primarily on the basis of published reports. In addition, I also made inferences concerning the reasons for Kenya’s lack of public acknowledgement.

Kenya, of course, was well familiar with terrorist activity. Not only had Kenyans suffered immensely as a result of the 1998 attack on the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya also suffered from a smaller attack in Mombassa in November 2002. Exacerbating these tensions was a vocal Muslim minority, approximately

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175 Walt, “US Troops Keep Quiet on Iraq’s Western Border.”

10% of the Kenyan population, which vehemently opposed OIF as an “attack on Islam”.  

On March 21, 2003, the Kenyan Foreign Minister, Kalonzo Musyoka, implored his fellow citizens to not harbor terrorists. Musyoka also specifically urged Kenyan Muslims to “remain calm” following the commencement of hostilities. He also stated that Kenya’s position on Iraq was neutral.

On March 24, 2003, however, another published report contradicted Musyoka’s earlier claim of neutrality. This report, while stating that Kenya’s “earlier stance” was that the use of force required another UN resolution subsequent to Resolution 1441, reported that “Musyoka has now confirmed that Kenya supports the war underway.” Also reported was the existence of talks between Kenyan and British military officials, in which the upgrade of Kenyan military equipment was allegedly discussed. In addition, the article resurrected the presence of a longstanding bilateral US-Kenyan agreement that granted use of the Mombassa port facilities to the US, as well as other Kenyan assets.

Later, as was reported on April 8, 2003, Kenya requested to be permitted to participate in Iraqi reconstruction projects. In this article, Musyoka was reported to be dismissive of demands from Kenyan Muslim leaders that the

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178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
Kenyan government force the closure of the US and UK embassies. In rejecting these demands, Musyoka said that Muslims leaders “had asked the impossible” since the US and the UK were Kenya’s “traditional friends”.183

These reports, in their totality, lead me to conclude that it was more likely than not that the Kenyan government supported OIF. Given Kenya’s large Muslim population and al-Qaeda presence, its omission from the White House press release is neither surprising nor indicative of opposing US policy. Furthermore, US-Kenyan relations subsequent to the major combat phase of OIF exhibit, at the very least, no signs of discord emanating from disagreements over the war. On the contrary, US and Kenyan forces continue to participate in anti-terrorism exercises, and the US Navy’s new state-of-the-art supply vessel has been active off the Kenyan coast.184

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the issues of case selection, other independent variables, and the definition of the dependent variable. These elements are, of course, necessary for understanding the regression analysis used to test the hypothesis that the more insecure a state’s regional security environment, the more likely it was support to OIF. In the final chapter I report the results of that analysis and discuss their theoretical and practical implications.

183 Ibid.
Chapter 6
Results & Conclusions

The central theoretical claim of this thesis has been that the regional security environments in which states are situated are a significant factor in conditioning those states’ attitudes regarding the legitimacy of force and international law. The 2003 war against Iraq, featuring a non-institutional use of force by a collection of states that contravened the international legal standard of Security Council authorization, thus provided a unique point for measuring those attitudes and testing the claim that regional security environments are a significant factor. The preceding chapters have endeavored to construct the theoretical and methodological bases necessary to adequately test the hypothesis that the more insecure a state’s regional security environment, the more likely it was to support, either diplomatically or militarily, the ‘major combat’ phase of OIF. In this section, I discuss the results of that hypothesis testing.
Regression Analysis Results

First Polarity Model

The results of the n=85 set are reported in the Table 1 series. Table 1.1 summarizes the results for the three different polarity models, while Tables 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 report more detailed results for those models respectively.\textsuperscript{185}

In the first polarity model, based solely on post-1990 empirical data, the regional security environment, or RSP, is significant at the .05 level in the four basic regressions. Moreover, the significance of the RSP is quite robust, being very close to the .01 level in three out of those four analyses. The strongest support for the RSP, however, occurs in the fifth regression, where it reaches significance at the .005 level. In addition, the coefficient is positive, as expected. This indicates that there is a positive correlation between the RSP and support for OIF. Since the RSP is constructed such that higher values indicate a higher propensity for militarized interstate conflict, the results for the first polarity model confirm the hypothesis.

\textsuperscript{185} The original analysis for each model consisted of four regressions. Each regression was comprised of the Anglophonic status variable (‘Anglophone’), Saddam’s oil vouchers (‘Oil’), casualties from international terrorism (‘Terrorism’), percentage of Muslim population (‘%Muslim’), ideology of the ruling party or coalition (‘Ideology’), vulnerability to rogue state ballistic missiles (‘Missile’), and the RSP (‘Regional’) in the Variable 8 position. In the Variable 7 position, I rotated the four variables suggested by the IPS article. The fifth regression substitutes membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (‘NAM’) in the Variable 7 position. I did not think of this variable at the time of the original analysis; instead, the inspiration for its inclusion came when I was reviewing the results by region as part of writing this chapter. I chose to report the NAM variable in the Variable 7 position because the NAM variable is itself significant, its inclusion strengthens the significance of the RSP, and it exhibits the highest Pseudo-$R^2$. Ordinarily, this should have led to a revision of the model for the first four regressions, with the NAM variable substituted for one of the weaker variables. Due to the deadlines of this paper, however, I did not make such a revision, nor did I run the NAM regression for the Table 5 series. In the discussion that follows, when I refer to the four basic regressions I am referring to the original analyses with the IPS variable in the variable 7 position, while the fifth regression refers to inclusion of the NAM variable.
Two other variables were significant at the .05 level in the first model. The percentage of Muslim population in each case state was significant at .05 in three out of the four basic regressions (and at .10 in the fourth). As anticipated, the coefficient for the %Muslim variable was negative, indicating that as the Muslim population in a state increased the support for OIF decreased. Meanwhile, the Ideology variable was significant at .05 in all five regressions. This variable exhibited a positive coefficient, which was also expected, indicating that as the ideological orientation of the ruling party moved to the right support for OIF increased.

Of the four variables inspired by the Institute for Policy Studies article, none were significant at the .05 level. In fact, the insignificance of three of the four variables (free trade agreement, exports to the US, and percentage change in USAID outlays) was quite pronounced. Only did the US military aid variable exhibit a plausible level of significance and behave as predicted by the IPS article, with a positive coefficient indicating a positive correlation between a state’s receipt of military aid from the US and their support for OIF, and significance at the .10 level. Furthermore, the inclusion of the US military aid variable dropped the %Muslim variable from significance at the .05 level to significance at the .10 level. This is because 2 of the top 5 military aid recipients (Jordan and Turkey) are over 90% Muslim, and 2 of the top 3 recipients (Israel and India) have Muslim populations, which while below the average of the included cases, were still sizable enough to not completely counteract the effects of Jordan and Turkey. Finally, Turkey’s high level of military aid and -1 rating on
the dependent variable were likely to have been contributing factors in depressing the RSP’s significance from slightly greater than .01 in the three previous regressions to .0348 in this one.

The fifth regression showed markedly different results from the basic set. First, the NAM variable exhibited robust significance at the .01 level. Inclusion of this variable, however, surprisingly relegated the %Muslim variable to insignificance. The Ideology variable maintained its significance and was relatively unchanged. The Anglophone variable weakened considerably, while the Oil variable strengthened to the point where it nearly reached significance at .10. As noted previously, the RSP variable also strengthened markedly. Finally, it is noted that the NAM variable, as expected, displayed a negative coefficient.

Several other observations deserve attention. First, the overall significance of the model is quite robust, with p not exceeding .0001. This means that there is only a 1 in 10,000 chance that all of the regression coefficients are zero, which implies a satisfactory degree of validity in the fit of the regression equation to the data. Second, the Pseudo-R² for all five regressions ranges from .2790 to .3233. Given the number and diversity of cases in this analysis, and the complexity of the Iraq issue, explaining approximately 30% of the variance in a model that identifies a number of significant independent variables is not unsatisfactory. Third, the Anglophone variable is significant at the .10 level in the four basic regressions. The coefficients, however, are unexpectedly negative. The reason is that of the 20 cases for whom English is an official
language, 13 were in Africa, and of these 13 Anglophonic African cases, only two (Kenya and Uganda) are coded as supporting OIF.

Second Polarity Model

The second polarity model, it will be recalled, is based on an unweighted combination of Mearsheimer’s data with that from the post-1990 period. Consequently, this model exhibits the greatest variance between the ratios calculated for the conditions of balanced and unbalanced multipolarity. In all five regressions of this model, the RSP is not significant. As expected, the RSP continues to exhibit a positive coefficient. The lack of statistical significance in this model, however, disconfirms the hypothesis.

The other independent variables, with slight variations, exhibit the same characteristics as they did in the first model. In the four basic regressions, the %Muslim and Ideology variables are significant at the .05 level (except in one instance where Ideology drops to .10) and maintain the same polarity of coefficient. Additionally, the IPS variables show insignificance except for the US military aid variable, which again shows a moderate significance at the .10 level. Moreover, the interplay between the US military aid, %Muslim, Ideology, and RSP variables is consistent with that shown in the first model. As in the first polarity model, inclusion of the US military aid variable results in a noticeable weakening of the %Muslim variable and a strengthening in the significance of the Ideology variable. This inclusion also results in a weakening of the RSP variable, although much more markedly here.
In the fifth regression, the results follow the same pattern as in the first model, although to a lesser degree. The NAM variable is significant, but only at the .10 level. The RSP variable, moreover, is still insignificant, although closer to significance than in any of the previous four regressions of this model.

Of the insignificant variables in the first model, only the Missile variable exhibits sufficient strengthening to reach significance at the .10 level. The Missile variable itself can be conceived as a specific variant of the regional security environment in which states are situated. Thus, the fact that the Missile variable would reach significance when the RSP fell out of significance is more supportive of the overall hypothesis than would have been the case, for example, if some of the IPS variables had reached the .10 level.

Third Polarity Model

In the third polarity model, the reader will recall that I weighted the data in the second model due to the restricted geographic focus of Mearsheimer’s data and the incongruity between that data and those from the post-1990 period. As a result, the regression calculations tend to follow those from the first model. The RSP, for example, returns to significance at the .05 level for three of the four basic regressions, and to the .005 level in the fifth, with the same expected positive coefficient. These results confirm the hypothesis. The RSP is not quite as robust in this model as in the first model, however, exhibiting p at approximately .02 in the four basic regressions rather than close to .01 as previously. This slightly weaker correlation is nonetheless sufficient to knock the
RSP out of significance at the .05 level once the US military aid variable is included. Similar to the first model, this variable also caused the %Muslim variable to fall out of .05 significance while simultaneously resulting in a strengthening of the Ideology variable. Finally, in the fifth regression the NAM variable showed significance at the .05 level. As was the case in the first model, the %Muslim variable fell to insignificance.

The other items of interest in the third model also reverted to the form of the first model. The Pseudo-$R^2$ statistics for each regression showed improvements over their corresponding regressions in the second model, although not quite to the level of the first model. The overall model fit, however, did improve to the levels previously established, with $p=.0001$ in three regressions and $<.0001$ in two. Taken together, these results indicate that the third model is as equally valid statistically as the first model, while explaining slightly less of the variance in support for OIF.

**Interpreting the Models**

The three polarity models obviously yielded mixed results. The first and third models, which based measurements of polarity to a greater extent on the post-1990 empirical data than did the second model, confirmed the hypothesis. If this is true, however, then the results either question the validity of extending Mearsheimer's theory of unbalanced vs. balanced multipolarity to the post-Cold War era, or imply that the distinction between unbalanced and balanced multipolarity is not the crucial distinction in determining support for OIF.
To help understand the results further and provide a more definitive confirmation of the hypothesis, I made a simple listing of the case states by polarity of their regional security environments and coding on the dependent variable. This listing is shown in Table 6.2. The number of observations from this table was then incorporated into the 3 x 2 crosstab in Table 6.1. As is apparent from the crosstab, unbalanced multipolarity was irrelevant in determining support for OIF, with 17 cases for and 17 against, while balanced multipolarity and regional preponderance showed a much higher degree of variation.

In the next crosstab, I constructed a 2 x 2 table with the unbalanced and balanced multipolarity observations combined. The crosstab itself is statistically significant at the .005 level. More importantly, the Yule’s Q of -.6216 indicates a moderate relationship between the regional security environment and support for OIF.\footnote{The following are suggested interpretations of the absolute value of Q that fall within these intervals: .00 to .24, “virtually no relationship”; .25 to .49, “weak relationship”; .50 to .74, “moderate relationship”; .75 to 1.00, “strong relationship”. David Knoke, George W. Bohrnstedt, Alisa Potter Mee. \textit{Statistics for Social Data Analysis}, 4\textsuperscript{th} ed. (Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, 2002), 150.}

The final two crosstabs in Table 6.1 compare regional preponderance with the two types of multipolarity singly. The first, utilizing cases in balanced environments, exhibits robust statistical significance. Furthermore, the Yule’s Q of -.7285 confirms that a nearly strong relationship exists between the two environments and the dependent variable. The second crosstab, on the other hand, exhibits a noticeable weakening in both statistical significance and strength.
of association. Nonetheless, the Yule’s Q of -0.5483 indicates that at least a moderate relationship still exists.

If conditions of preponderance are indeed more secure than conditions of multipolarity, as I argued in Chapter 3, then the series of 3 x 2 x 2 crosstabs confirms the hypothesis. The theoretical foundations of the RSP variable, however, envisioned that unbalanced regions would show higher support for OIF than balanced regions. This was clearly not the case. Before addressing the results in the context of state attitudes, it is first necessary to make some tentative explanations for the unanticipated behavior of balanced and unbalanced regions.

**Balanced vs. Unbalanced Multipolarity**

In investigating the different behaviors of balanced and unbalanced regions in supporting OIF, it is helpful to recall the different sampling frames that furnished empirical data. The post-1990 data, while drawn from regions on a global scale, were nonetheless restricted to a relatively short time period. Mearsheimer’s study, on the other hand, while focused on Europe, covered an extensive time span. In Mearsheimer’s study, therefore, the great systemic conflagrations of the Napoleonic Wars, World War 1, and World War 2 were interspersed with periods of lesser wars or quiescence. The conflicts in the post-1990 period, conversely, were not systemic conflicts but rather localized disputes that reflected border controversies or enduring rivalries. These types of disputes are less dependent upon system structure because they typically involve fewer
actors, and may or may not involve as direct participants the major regional powers. This lack of dependence in system structure was reflected in the post-1990 data, which exhibited the same frequency of war-years in both balanced and unbalanced multipolarity. In short, the post-1990 period is too brief, in the absence of systemic conflicts, to confirm the extension of balanced and unbalanced behaviors into the post-Cold War era.

While region-wide wars, with the exception of the Congolese conflict, were absent from the post-1990 period, enduring rivalries were not. Enduring rivalries and longstanding border disputes function as a wild card in regional security environments, heightening insecurity by creating the potential for conflict to involve other regional actors. For the regions delineated in this study, however, enduring rivalries are most prevalent and acute in balanced, rather than unbalanced, regions. These include the Arab-Israeli rivalry in the Middle East, the standoff on the Korean peninsula in the Northeast Asia region, and the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute in the East Africa region. Conversely, the only comparable enduring rivalry in unbalanced regions is India-Pakistan. This distribution of enduring rivalries is another possible explanation for the seemingly anomalous behavior of balanced regions.

Perhaps the greatest distinction between the conditions of the post-1990 time period and Mearsheimer’s study, however, is the overwhelming military superiority of the US in the post-1990 era and the lack of a comparable offshore balancer during all but the Cold War portion of the Mearsheimer study. In essence, this distinction showcases a problem of endogeneity that was present
in conceptualizing the measurement of contemporary regional security environments: how can assessments of regional insecurity be made – and a corresponding value placed on the United States’ stabilizing role – when the empirical data on which the measures are based reflect the ameliorative effects of this stabilizing presence? As mentioned previously, I attempted to deal with this problem by excluding contiguous NATO members from calculations of group power, while no comparable adjustment was made in other areas (e.g., South Korea and Japan are treated as contiguous even though the US has bilateral treaties with both). One could argue that South Korea and Japan should be treated similarly to France and Germany; however, I argue that the institutional structure of NATO, encompassing nearly all the states in the Western Europe region, creates a qualitatively different security architecture than a series of bilateral treaties. For example, recall the Australian-Indonesian agreement noted in Chapter 4 and the Australians’ secrecy, especially regarding the US, in conducting the negotiations. It is difficult to imagine an agreement with a similar degree of secrecy crafted within the NATO environment.

Finally, several other observations concerning the two data sets are in order. First, the potential hegemons creating unbalanced regions in the post-1990 period – Russia and China – are qualitatively different than the potential hegemons of 1792-1990 Europe. Russia, of course, is a declining great power. China, while ascending, nonetheless started its ascent from a much more inferior position relative to the contemporary offshore balancer than either Napoleonic France or twentieth-century Germany. These facts alone would tend to produce
a lower incidence of systemic conflict, regardless of the brevity of the observed
time period. Second, the possession of nuclear weapons by both potential
hegemons and the offshore balancer introduces an additional element of caution,
and hence stability, in geopolitical calculations. This would also tend to blur the
distinction between balanced and unbalanced multipolarity.

Regional Security Environments and State Attitudes

The literature review focused primarily on two security environments and
their effects in conditioning various state attitudes. In the anarchic world of
neorealism, states are compelled to make security their overriding concern.
Consequently, such states appraise military power higher than other variants,
conceptualize security issues with a worst-case scenario approach, and place
reliance on self-help rather than an amorphous ‘international community’ and the
ideational paradigm of international law. Conversely, within the relative security
of the hierarchal structure described by Robert Kagan, military power loses
legitimacy, not only as means of conflict resolution, but also as a means of
promoting security. Instead, security is best achieved through institutionalized
cooperation and dialogue, with the expectation being that “process can become
substance”. This outlook, however, is not the result of a morally superior polity
but rather, according to Kagan, due to deficiencies in military power that
forecloses other options, and a benign environment that makes it less dangerous
to do so.
Did the results of the hypothesis testing confirm these theoretical predictions of state behavior? The answer depends upon the validity of two propositions. The first is that the RSP variable is a valid measurement of the theoretical environments depicted above. The second proposition is that the variation in the dependent variable is an indication of the state attitudes attributed to those environments.

The first proposition has been the focus of much of this paper. The RSP is heavily driven by assessments of regional polarity, with multipolarity functioning as an approximation of anarchy and preponderance functioning likewise for hierarchy. The linkage between polarity and the level of security is made by both empirical data (Mearsheimer and the post-1990 conflicts) and theoretical argument (the analysis of dyads under preponderance). In sum, then, the RSP, by determining the full spectrum of security environments and including all portions of this spectrum in the measurement, adequately demonstrates content validity and thus satisfies the first proposition.

The second proposition has been covered in far less detail. This is due, in large part, to the familiarity with which the issues surrounding the war are known. While the full domain of motives for supporting or opposing the war was diverse and complex, the basic attitudes described above were unmistakably evidenced during the prewar controversy. Thus, in many quarters, emphasis was placed on the processes of international law: obtaining unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council, reintroducing weapons inspectors, and the necessity of a second authorizing resolution. Conversely, other parties
emphasized substantive matters, rather than procedural ones, that reflected the worst-case and materialist proclivities of neorealism: the inability to verify disarmament, the erosion of containment, and the lack of confidence in institutionalized international cooperation to enforce sanctions.

Consequently, to the extent that international positions regarding OIF reflected this basic dichotomy, the confirmation of the hypothesis supports the broader theoretical claim that regional security environments are a significant factor in conditioning those attitudes. A review of the regions in this study where support for OIF was relatively strongest – Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Northeast Asia, and East Africa – all evince, either singly or in combination, a history of tyranny, proximity to a great power, an enduring rivalry, or recent conflict. With such shared environments, it is hardly surprising that a shared outlook regarding OIF would emerge (of the 33 cases in these four regions, 23 supported OIF). It is also not surprising that these countries, and any others in a relatively insecure environment, would use OIF as an opportunity to curry favor with the United States. In this respect, as the authors of the IPS study aver, US military preponderance does indeed function as 'leverage' which can influence other states' policies. However, the intemperate language of the IPS study – for example, deriding Eastern European supporters of OIF as “NATO wannabes” – carries the corresponding implication that these states cannot adequately gauge their security needs, or worse, that their security concerns are overblown exaggerations. A more measured interpretation came from a group of European leaders who reflected upon history and the exercise of American power and
noted that “thanks in large part to American bravery, generosity, and farsightedness, Europe was saved” from the twin menaces of fascism and communism.187

Similarly, from the deposing of the Baathist regime to the January 30 elections, Operation Iraqi Freedom has again showcased American power as a force for good – not perfection, but good – which, in the post-WW2 era, has been the most reliable guarantor of peace and security. The significance of regional security environments in this study shows that states which seek to ally themselves with this power cannot be dismissively explained as merely being victims of coercion, solely seeking access to international capital and markets, or even more erroneously as the product of different cultural practices of diplomacy. In general, such alliances are a logical reaction to environments where the security competition is most intense, and the promise of a perpetual peace based on international law is still a utopian dream.

Future Paths

One implication that should not be overlooked is that perseverance in the exercise of American power is both respected and admired. Validation for this will not come from the sanctuary of the salon or affluent Western youths at home and abroad who are the greatest beneficiaries of American vigilance and sacrifice – and who descend into apoplectic protests when reminded of that - but

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rather from the Japanese, Taiwanese, Israelis, Afghans, and Iraqis, among
others, who have embarked on the path of consensual government. However,
the strictures of the United Nations, based on an anachronistic Charter not
designed to combat the nexus of terrorism and WMD, and a Security Council
endemically hostile to US interests, are conducive to neither liberal goals nor US
security. Nonetheless, the widespread preference for institutionalized
international cooperation reflects, in most cases, a genuinely held yearning which
would be most unwise for the United States to dismissively ignore. Finally, the
innate suspicions of the post-colonial world to the use of force, amplified by the
United States’ sometimes clumsy and illiberal dealings during the Cold War,
poses its own challenges for diplomacy. How can American hard power
complement its soft power, contribute to reform of the United Nations, and
advance US interests?

Reform of the United Nations includes, at a minimum, expansion of the
Security Council to include Brazil, India, and Japan, and a liberalizing revision of
the self-defense article of the Charter to address the use of force against states
that marry the twin threats of terrorism and WMD. Kofi Annan himself
acknowledged the need for such revision when he told the UN General Assembly
that “members may need to begin a discussion of the criteria for an early
authorization of coercive measures to address certain types of threats.”¹⁸⁸ These
suggestions are not novel. To facilitate passage of these reforms, however, the
United States should take the lead in forming a standing UN military force for

¹⁸⁸ Kofi Annan. “The Secretary General Address to the General Assembly.” Delivered in New
York on September 23, 2003. Available online at
rapid peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. Tangible evidence of the US commitment would consist of air- and sealift assets, as well as a ground contingent. In the sections that follow, I address the utility of such a force, and the advantages that could possibly accrue to the US from this proposal.

The Utility of a Standing UN Intervention Force

One way to gauge the utility of a rapid reaction UN force is to examine previous situations and consider the possibility that such a force, if deployed sooner or in adequate strength, could have favorably impacted subsequent events. The United Nations’ independent inquiry into its own activities before and during the 1994 Rwandan genocide provides a fertile opportunity for such an analysis.\(^{189}\) A full exposition of the UN role is obviously beyond the scope of this concluding section; however, a few examples will be provided to illustrate the utility of a standing force.

In August 1993, the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) signed the Arusha Peace Agreement. Among other things, the Agreement called for the establishment of a Neutral International Force that would perform various peacekeeping operations. One month later

\[\text{a joint Government-RPF delegation met with the Secretary-General in New York. The delegation argued in favor of the rapid deployment of the force and the rapid establishment of the transitional institutions. Warning that any delay might lead to the collapse of the peace process, the delegation expressed the wish for a force numbering 4,260. The Secretary-General gave the delegation a sobering message: that even if the Council were to}\]

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approve a force of that size, it would take at least 2-3 months to be deployed.\(^{190}\)

The inability to timely deploy an international force of even this modest size thus allowed the momentum created by the signing of the Agreement to dissipate, with disastrous consequences.

While responsibility for this inability ultimately rests with the Member States, the UN itself allowed the meager military resources at its disposal to be underutilized. After the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established and an advance party arrived in Kigali, the Commanding Officer, Canadian Gen. Romeo Dallaire,

sent Headquarters a draft set of Rules of Engagement (ROE) for UNAMIR, asking for the approval of the Secretariat. The draft included in paragraph 17 a rule specifically allowing the mission to act, and even to use force, in response to crimes against humanity and other abuses….Headquarters never responded formally to the Force Commander’s request for approval.\(^{191}\)

Headquarters did respond to Dallaire’s second major cable, however, although not in the way Dallaire hoped. In a January 11, 1994 cable to the Secretariat, Dallaire relayed disturbing intelligence he had gained from an informant in the Interahamwe militia. Among other things, the informant told Dallaire that the death squads were trained to kill 1,000 Tutsis within 20 minutes of being ordered to do so. Moreover, the informant indicated the existence of a major weapons cache that was about to be distributed to militia members; he volunteered to lead Dallaire to the cache if his family members were given protection. Dallaire, while aware of the possibility of a trap, nonetheless lobbied

\(^{190}\) Ibid., 7.  
\(^{191}\) Ibid., 9.
Headquarters for authorization to “pursue the operation in accordance with military doctrine with reconnaissance, rehearsal, and implementation using overwhelming force.” Headquarters rejected Dallaire’s request, and its response ended with the pointed statement that “the overriding consideration is the need to avoid entering into a course of action that might lead to the use of force and unanticipated repercussions.”192

The tragic irony of subsequent events in Rwanda is that “unanticipated repercussions” were not averted by restraining from the use of force, but instead were brought to a macabre and sanguinary fruition, in part, by such imprudent and timid restraint.193

Advantages

The usefulness of a rapidly deployable peacekeeping force is readily apparent from the brief examples cited above. An immediate deployment on the heels of Arusha, for example, would have capitalized on the goodwill at the signing and sustained the momentum necessary for continued progress. Significant American leadership in establishing such a force would likely ensure that it would have a robust ROE which could put real teeth into peacekeeping operations. Moreover, US involvement would also likely ensure that the force possessed the operational flexibility to exploit opportunities such as the one presented to Dallaire.

192 Ibid., 10.
193 In his memoirs, Dallaire states that “in my view the inside information offered us by Jean-Pierre [the informant’s code name] represented a real chance to pull Rwanda out of the fire. The DPKO’s response whipped the ground out from under me.” Romeo Dallaire. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (New York: Caroll & Graf, 2004), 147.
The concept of a standing peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention force, however, also promises significant advantages for US foreign policy. First, by being proposed as part of a comprehensive set of reforms, the standing force facilitates a shift in UN emphasis, and ultimately legitimacy, away from the area where it is most inimical to US interests – as an adjudicator of the use of force against state sponsors of terrorism – to humanitarian and peacekeeping work where less vital national interests are at stake. In connection, the proposal would also smoke out members who utilize the Security Council to grandiloquently preen on the world stage or thwart the enforcement of international law, both to the detriment of US interests. The international leadership stature of France, for example, would be diminished if a series of humanitarian interventions spearheaded by a robust US commitment were successfully staged. As Victor Davis Hanson pithily observed, the world is still awaiting the arrival of the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle off the coast of Sumatra to dispense Cuban and Chinese aid to tsunami victims. For its part, China would likely be forced to resort to the veto, rather than continue its preferred policy of hiding behind the abstention, if it wanted to preserve the principle of nonintervention as the sine qua non of international law. The use of the veto in such circumstances, however, would be damaging to Beijing’s new and assiduously cultivated image. If a standing force were ready to intervene in the Sudan, for example, China would be under pressure to accede unless it wanted to risk having its intransigence seen solely in terms of protecting its oil deals with Khartoum.

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Finally, by having the capacity to intervene rapidly and alleviate human suffering, the UN itself would gain immeasurably in stature and legitimacy. A more narrowly focused but much more effective UN could lead to a renaissance for the organization, and would benefit US interests.

Next, a standing intervention force would yield concrete benefits in the GWOT by preventing troubled states from becoming failed states, with all the negative repercussions such states bring as incubators of terrorist activity. US Navy hospital ships and Army civil affairs units, for example, could be sufficient to quell incipient unrest. Furthermore, the impact of failed states on regional security logically suggests the possibility that a relatively modest US commitment in air-and sealift assets, plus tactical air support, could be leveraged with ground troop contributions from neighboring countries. This has the added benefit of utilizing predominantly Navy and Air Force assets, while minimizing additional obligations for the Army and Marine Corps.

Third, the concept of a standing humanitarian and peacekeeping force complements the goal of democratization that is now a central pillar of the GWOT strategy. Just as the Marshall Plan was a critical element in ameliorating material conditions and making Western Europe more resistant to communism, rapid humanitarian intervention can help restore the social fabric of states from Africa to southeast Asia, making those areas more resistant to terrorist appeals. Similarly, just as the use of American airpower in the Berlin airlift solidified the appeal of democratic values by standing in stark relief to Soviet tactics, contemporary humanitarian interventions will also offer an unmistakable contrast
between the democratic community and the nihilism of Salafist henchmen such as Zarqawi. These interventions, of course, will only reinforce the distinction between elections and executions that has already been made possible by the use of American power in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Perhaps the most salutary benefit of such an intervention force in the long run, however, is to contribute to a rehabilitation of the concept of force and a more realistic appraisal of the uses and limitations of international law. After the cataclysm of World War Two and the potential horrors of nuclear exchange, it is not surprising that in conjunction with the utopian dream of perpetual peace based on law a moral relativism toward conflict and combatants would emerge. These postmodern tenets of tolerance and nonjudgmentalism, while smugly deriding as ‘simplistic’ the supposedly atavistic notions of good and evil, nonetheless naively allow the continuance of those forces most intolerant of the humanitarian values the international community supposedly cherishes and espouses. If, as Edmund Burke said, it is only necessary for good men to do nothing in order for evil ones to triumph, then we can all be thankful that the good have awakened from their slumber, shaken off the delusions of their well-meaning brethren, and put force and law back into proper perspective.

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195 There is evidence that the most recent use of hard power assets to accomplish humanitarian ends – the tsunami relief effort spearheaded by the US and Royal Australian navies – is yielding real benefits in the ideological contest between democracy and bin Ladenism. According to a poll commissioned by the group Terror Free Tomorrow and conducted February 1-6, 2005 in Indonesia, “for the first time ever in a Muslim nation, more people favor US-led efforts to fight terrorism than oppose them (40% to 36%)”, while opposition to the US-effort has fallen from 72% in 2003 to 36%, and support for Osama bin Laden declined from 58% to 23%. http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/articlenav.php?id=56. April 24, 2005.