

Anti-Americanism, World Politics, and German-U.S. Relations

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(ABSTRACT)

This study examines German-U.S. relations during the George W. Bush administration. It utilizes Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane's theoretical framework of anti-Americanism to examine German perceptions of U.S. foreign policy. Katzenstein and Keohane distinguish four distinctive types of anti-Americanism. Liberal anti-Americanism is a reaction to unpopular U.S. foreign policies. Social anti-Americanism occurs in response to U.S. style capitalism and U.S. society. Sovereign-nationalist anti-American is a nationalistic response to the superpower's perceived intrusion on state sovereignty. Radical anti-Americanism is a Leninist or radical Islamic response to U.S. power. I hypothesize that anti-Americanism in German is primarily a political reaction to the policies of the Bush administration. However the negative attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy also manifest themselves in the form of the social and sovereign types of anti-Americanism.

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INTRODUCTION

Because of the global backlash against the policies of the Bush administration, the phenomenon of anti-Americanism has received greater attention in the United States. Foreign opinion of the U.S. government and Americans rapidly became very negative. This caused scholars to question what it is that the world dislikes so much about the U.S. and if there is anything the U.S. can do to improve its image in the eyes of others.

While it is certain that different countries can exhibit completely different types of attitudes towards the U.S., there has been little effort to study the political dynamics of anti-Americanism within specific countries. Most scholars have been satisfied to generalize about the causes of anti-Americanism, either writing it off as the by-product of unpopular U.S. foreign policies in connection with Iraq, a reaction to the overwhelming power of the U.S., or backlash against the forces of “modernity.”

Studying attitudes and opinions about the United States is important because in the 21st century, public opinion has emerged as a major force in international politics. The global media and the revolution in information technologies ensure that in the future, people will have strong opinions about what is happening in other parts of the world. U.S. foreign policy makers will have to take into account foreign public opinion to a much greater extent if they want to be successful. I assert that today it matters what people think about the U.S. and why they feel the way that they do.

Attitudes towards the United States are highly complicated and often contain internal contradictions. While many complain about U.S. foreign policy and globalization, they are attracted to the U.S. and love its pop culture. Though people often

want the U.S. out of their countries and despise the U.S. government, they will often jump at the chance to visit the U.S.¹

The purpose of this study is to examine anti-Americanism in Germany from 2002 to the present. Because of the level of historical interaction between the two countries, Germans are better informed about the U.S. and have more nuanced and developed opinions towards it than do people in most other countries. This allows for a more in-depth analysis of attitudes and opinion about the U.S.

To focus on the political, social, and national aspects of attitudes towards the U.S. in Germany, this study utilizes the theoretical framework of anti-Americanism developed by Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane. It seeks to determine what types of anti-Americanism exist in Germany and what the exact nature of negative public attitudes is.

The first chapter analyzes anti-Americanism from a theoretical international relations perspective as well as looking at some of the recent writings on anti-Americanism in Germany. The second chapter lays out Katzenstein's and Keohane's theory as the framework for analysis and poses the hypothesis. The third chapter looks at anti-Americanism as response to U.S. foreign policy. The fourth chapter examines anti-Americanism as a social critique of the U.S.'s democratic, business, social and economic models. The fifth chapter examines anti-Americanism as a nationalist response resulting from the domestic economic conditions within Germany and the perceived threat of U.S. neo-liberal policies. The fifth chapter provides analysis and conclusions. Throughout this thesis, the focus is on the political context in which anti-Americanism occurs and the political relations between the U.S. and Germany.

¹ In recent years, tourism in the U.S. has suffered slightly as many vacationers choose to visit countries other than the U.S.

CHAPTER 1

ANTI-AMERICANISM, PUBLIC OPINION, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter draws from previous research that helps to explain anti-Americanism. The first section examines anti-Americanism as a political concept. The second section looks at some of the various international relations theory research involving anti-Americanism. The third section looks at some of the major research done on anti-Americanism in Germany. The fourth section examines Katzenstein and Keohane's framework as a more complete synthesis of previous research on anti-Americanism in international relations.

Anti-Americanism as a Political Concept

Because perceptions of the U.S. are often related to complex global processes, opinions about the U.S. are often both multi-dimensional and conflicted. Because so much is associated with the U.S., it is easy for people to have mixed emotions towards it.

According to Robert Sing:

Anti-Americanism can encompass opposition to: the public policies—foreign and/or domestic—of the current administration; the administration's strategies and tactics; America's singular global influence (military, diplomatic, economic, and/or cultural); market democracy, a form of political economy that America is widely held to be exemplar of and primary ideological cheerleader for; 'American' values (individualism, democracy, equality of opportunity, private property, the rule of law, and populism); and/or antipathy to Americans as people (anti-Americanism as brute prejudice, stereotyping or bigotry).²

Sing continues:

² Brendon O'Connor, *The Rise of anti-Americanisms*. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 27.

To attach the “-ism” suffix to a markedly heterogeneous range of attitudes, beliefs and values that are antipathetic to America or Americans implies a systematic coherence in both America/‘Americanism’ as non-American worldviews that is *prima facie* implausible when ascribed to hundreds of millions of people within and outside the United States.³

Hence there is no definite consensus on the causes of anti-Americanism or even what anti-Americanism is. In fact the term “anti-Americanism” has different meanings depending on who is applying it. Scholars, such as Brendon O’Connor, argue that:

Anti-Americanism is not a comprehensive or coherent belief system or ideology, but rather a series of criticisms and prejudices regarding the United States that have haphazardly been labeled anti-Americanism. Chronologically the term is first associated with European cultural laments about Americans’ lack of manners and their general vulgarity and then, as America becomes a global power, more politically and economically based criticism comes to the fore. Finally, in recent times what has been labeled ‘anti-American terrorism’ has reared its head.⁴

Adding another layer of intricacy to public perceptions of the U.S. is that mass public opinion is often shaped by American cultural products that do not represent the realities of life in the United States. For many people who have never visited the U.S., Hollywood is America.⁵ Because of this, America is oftentimes viewed through whatever stereotypes or biases are shaped by the media and the global “U.S.” pop culture.

According to Robert Sing, there are two different schools of thought among scholars who study anti-Americanism.⁶ The first holds that anti-Americanism is a coherent cultural phenomenon and/or philosophical attitude that represent systematic views of the U.S. Andrei S. Markovits takes the position that European anti-Americanism is a systematic bias that pervades many areas of European culture and whose fundamental features can be traced back to viewpoints that were held earlier in

³ O’Connor., *The Rise*, 28.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 30.

European history.⁷ For him, anti-Americanism is by and large a product of nationalist European identity.

The second group of scholars believes that “anti-Americanism is a convenient but misleading ‘catch-all’ term that obscures more than it reveals—its capacious elasticity providing the explanation of its global ubiquity.”⁸ The term “anti-Americanism” can even come to be used to explain global events that do not fit into preconceived notions of how the world works. In this way, Anti-Americanism offers an all-encompassing explanation for world events that are difficult to understand, and comes to be a self-reinforcing political framework. The right wing argues that the U.S. is hated because of who the American people are. Anti-Americanism is an ideological marker that has come to be associated with concepts of America’s moral superiority; that is, because they hate Americans for who they are, they will hate the U.S. no matter what it does. Anti-Americanism becomes a way of defining who has the moral high ground in absolute terms.

The left wing argues that the United States is hated for what it does. Most people generally like American culture and the American people. Negative attitudes stem from poor U.S. foreign policies, not cultural differences. Anti-Americanism is not a cultural phenomenon as much as it is a political reaction against the self-serving policies of the United States.⁹ However, this viewpoint is somewhat simplistic because it ignores the strong evidence that, in many societies, anti-Americanism is a complex social

⁷ Markovits, Andrei S. *Amerika, dich hasst sich’s besser: Antiamerikanismus und Antisemitismus in Europa*. (Hamburg: KVV konkret, 2004).

⁸ O’Connor., *The Rise*, 30.

⁹ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Anti-Americanism in World Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 10.

phenomenon with multiple causes, many of which are outside the scope of U.S. foreign policy.

International Relations and Global Attitudes Towards the U.S.

The realists basically look at anti-Americanism as being a byproduct of the structure of the international system. They think that because we live in a uni-polar world, there is a tendency for countries to try to counterbalance U.S. hegemony. The cultural phenomenon of anti-Americanism occurs because the U.S. is the focus of world attention. Because the U.S. is a hegemonic power, a huge amount of attention is given to it in other countries. Whenever the U.S. acts there is a ripple affect throughout the international system. So when Mr. Big does something someone does not like (which is always because he can never make everyone happy), they end up blaming an inordinate amount of their problems on him.

Josef Joffe, in *Über Power: The Imperial Temptation of America*, argues that anti-Americanism is a result of the existence of American hegemonic power and not necessarily of what America does. Because of this, anti-Americanism is likely to occur when the U.S. follows unpopular foreign policies. Joffe argues that the realist concept of balancing can be seen at multiple levels. He differentiates between balancing by institution (UN), balancing by coalition (coalition opposing Iraq war), and balancing by terror (9/11). According to Joffe, most rhetoric against American policies is a politically correct way of voicing deep seated anti-Americanism that is an inherent feature of the international political system:

Language and selectivity serve as better gauges of the real thing, as opposed to “policy anti-Americanism,” because in polite Western society it is usually *infra dig* to say, “Yes, I hate the Americans.” But it is a thousand times more likely to hear ““I hate this American president.” At this juncture, Professor Freud would begin to muse about “displacement,” about the human habit of clobbering one object or person, but actually targeting another that is protected by fearsome power, be it a taboo or real clout. Lashing out at specific American policies and leaders doesn’t risk the raised eyebrows that demonizing the country as such would do. In a post-racist age, collectives usually are protected; individuals are not.¹⁰

According to Joffe, polling data fail to show adequately the extent to which anti-Americanism is entrenched in Europe because it is difficult to quantify concepts such as “language” and “selectivity.” The three basic themes that underlie anti-Americanism in Europe are the social and cultural biases that 1). America is morally deficient, 2). America is socially retrograde, and 3). America is culturally retrograde. Joffe argues that anti-Americanism as a concept is a reaction towards modernity: “And so it is easy to blame America for the miseries of modernity, for a relentless revolution in the way we live, produce, and consume. America embodies the “constant revolutionizing” that Marx and Engels cheered and reviled in the *Communist Manifesto*.”¹¹ However, even though the phenomenon of anti-Americanism may be a reaction to globalization and modernity, it has essentially politically causes:

But whatever the distribution of pre-, post-, and just modern features may be, the most critical difference between America and Europe concerns power and position in the global hierarchy... Its very power is provocation for the lesser players and, unlike Europe or Japan, No.1 cannot huddle under the strategic umbrella of another nation. Nor can it live by the postmodern ways of Europe, which faces no strategic challenge as far as the eye can see. (Neither would Europe be so postmodern if it had to guarantee its own safety.)... The United States is the security lender of last resort; there is no ISF, or International Security Fund, where the United States could apply for a quick emergency loan. And so,

¹⁰ Josef Joffe, *Über Power: the Imperial Temptation of America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006), 75.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 96.

the United States must endure in a Hobbesian world where self-reliance is the ultimate currency of the realm, and goodness is contingent on safety. The anatomy of the international system, to borrow once more from Sigmund Freud, is destiny. Where you sit is where you stand—postmodernism, post nationalism, and all.¹²

The United States is likely to be opposed because it will be forced to make decisions that the other countries do not have to make. However, because of the structure of the international system, when it takes action and fails, the cost will usually be imposed on others. It should be of little surprise that other countries would resent having to bear responsibility for the U.S.'s policies.¹³

Joseph S. Nye Jr. argues that the increased negativity towards the U.S. causes a sharp drop in U.S. power. Because we live in an information age, global public opinion has become a major force in global politics. And what the U.S. is seen to represent, both domestically and internationally, can increase or decrease its political power. Nye argues that the key for U.S. success in world politics is soft power, the ability to get other countries to “*want* what it wants.”¹⁴ He would argue that the decline of U.S. political influence is directly related to its present lack of soft power:

Soft co-optive power is just as important as hard command power. If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow. If it can establish international norms consistent with its society, it is less likely to have to change. If it can support institutions that make other states wish to channel or limit their activities in way the dominant state prefers, it may be spared the costly exercise of coercive or hard power.¹⁵

¹² Ibid., 125.

¹³ Katzenstein and Keohane, *Anti-Americanism in World Politics*, 308.

¹⁴ Joseph S. Nye Jr. *Power in the Global Information Age: from Realism to Globalization* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 76.

¹⁵ Nye, *Power*, 77.

Because public opinion can heavily influence government policy, the U.S.'s soft power is hinged on the success or failure of its domestic and international performance. What the world thinks of U.S. politics, culture, and society should matter a great deal for the U.S. because global opinion can change rapidly in reaction to events occurring in distant lands. Because the U.S. is the center of focus for much of the global media, it is constantly examined and critiqued, and the negative fallout from poor policies can be immense.

While Nye focuses on U.S. politics in the information age and their relation to global public opinion, Benjamin Barber argues that the globalization of markets and the marketing of global pop culture results in a backlash against capitalism and the U.S. He challenges the neo-liberal assumption that markets in and of themselves promote freedom or development. Instead he argues that the globalization of markets serves oftentimes as a justification for global exploitation by the U.S. By weakening traditional communities and civic institutions, globalization creates tremendous internal tensions within societies. Third world societies are forced to try to weigh the costs and benefits of globalization and come to see themselves as the victims of new age neo-liberal ideology and U.S. foreign policy:

Their quarrel is not with modernity but with the aggressive neo-liberal ideology that has been prosecuted in its name in pursuit of a global market society more conducive to profits for some than to justice for all. They are not even particularly anti-American; rather, they suspect that what Americans understand as prudent unilateralism is really a form of arrogant imperialism, that what Americans take to be a kind of cynical aloofness is really self-absorbed isolationism, and that what Americans think of as pragmatic alliances with tyrannical rulers in Islamic nations such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are really a betrayal of the democratic principles to which Americans claim to subscribe.¹⁶

¹⁶ Benjamin Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy* (New York, Ballantine Books, 2001), Intro. 15.

Barber worries that the democratic institutions of the modern nation state are threatened from the international level by McWorld-style globalization and the sub-national level by Jihad or pre-modern globalization backlash. This occurs because globalization essentially amounts to a type of cultural dominance that can rapidly affect societies at a very personal level:

... a pervasive culture of fast food, fast computers, and fast music advanced by an infotainment industry rooted in the spread of brands tend to homogenize global markets and render taste not merely shallow but uniform. McWorld's culture represents a kind of soft imperialism in which those who are colonized are said to "choose" their commercial indenture.¹⁷

Privatization policies, constantly pushed forward through the mass culture of "individual freedom," work simultaneously to weaken the state both domestically and internationally, thereby greatly decreasing the chances of equitable distribution. As their power decreases, governments become less and less capable to serve as social and market regulators, and populations increasingly blame their difficulties on neo-liberalism and the U.S.¹⁸

A third argument holds that conflicting identities, both domestically within the U.S. and abroad, are the real source of anti-Americanism. These scholars hold that the liberal multicultural globalism that the U.S. exports conflicts with the identities of many peoples. This process occurs as much internally within the U.S. as it does externally, as the new right Republic movement is a direct response to perceived cultural erosion, decadence, and sexual permissiveness. The culture war in the U.S. reflects larger global

¹⁷ Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld*, 21.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

conflicts, as the foreign policy attitudes associated with the right wing Christian and neo-liberal movement create global discord.¹⁹

Anatol Lieven sees certain strands of American nationalism, as they are reflected in the new right, as being comparable to nationalism in turn of the century 20th Europe and inviting anti-Americanism. He argues that the political philosophy of the new right contains major value differences from the political movements in other developed countries. The combined emphasis on religion and individualism finds no comparison in other major countries. Many aspects of the new right are backlashes against modernity: the new right developed out of the decline of the traditional white working class and is “an expression of social, economic, ethnic and above all racial anxieties.”²⁰ Because of the economic, demographic, and cultural changes in the U.S., there is a sense on the right that the traditional way of life is being attacked. The sense of loss of control and disjuncture between the past and the present gives nationalist conservatives their angry, bitter attitudes:

Such nationalism may encourage its adherents to cultivate not only specific national hatreds, but also hostility to all ideals, goals, movements, laws and institutions which aim to transcend the nation and speak for the general interests of humankind. This form of nationalism is therefore in direct opposition to the universalist ideals and ambitions of the American Creed—ideals upon which, in the end rests America’s role as great civilizational empire... and upon which is based America’s claim to represent a positive example to the world. These ideals form the core of what Joseph Nye has called “soft power” in its specifically American form.²¹

¹⁹ Anatol Lieven. *America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

²⁰ Lieven, *America Right or Wrong*, 7.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

The new right will tend to ignore the international community and seek to construct enemies in the outside world who are perceived to being a threat to U.S. values and interests. New right administrations will tend to act in more unilateral fashion because they conceive of the U.S. as being “a chosen people.” Because of this, there is likely to be an increase in global anti-Americanism during new right presidencies because of the perceived hypocrisy of U.S. policy.

While Lieven holds that globalization and conceptions of modernity divide U.S. society as much or more than they do the rest of the world, Samuel Huntington sees the “West,” the sole heirs of the enlightenment, divided from the rest by massive culture and value differences.²² He argues that conflict is likely to occur because, while the collapse of communism reinforced the west’s view that democratic liberalism had won and was therefore a universal truth, the west suffered from a decreasing ability to promote some sort of universal western culture in the way it had in the past.²³

While the U.S. global pop culture has enormous popularity and influence, the U.S. political system, business model, and life style have become for the most part examples of what not to follow.²⁴ What the U.S. sees as universal human values are interpreted as imperialism in many cultures.²⁵ Because of these perceptions, when the U.S. invades Iraq in the name of democracy and liberation, most of the rest of the world sees imperialism.

²² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

²³ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*.

²⁴ Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, *America Against the World: How We are Different and Why We are Disliked* (New York: Times Books, 2005).

²⁵ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 186.

U.S.-German Relations

The U.S. and Germany have generally had very good relations since WWII. The U.S. helped rebuild West Germany through the Marshal Plan and then provided military protection during the cold war. Because West Germany was on the front line of the Cold War, U.S.-German relations were highly important for U.S. national security strategy. The German and U.S. governments made extensive efforts to maintain good relations through the use of American study programs, education and work exchange programs, and other sorts of cultural exchanges. The U.S. had a huge influence on German society, and there were extensive trade relations as the German economy improved. However, there were also low points in the relationship between the two countries. During the Vietnam War, there were protests throughout Europe against perceived U.S. imperialism even while U.S. pop culture became hugely popular. Then, during the eighties, there were large protests against the U.S. deployment of tactical nuclear missiles in Germany and against the Reagan administration. But relations between the two countries did not really deteriorate until the second Iraq war. During this period there was a significant decline in opinion of the U.S. government and the U.S. as world leader in Germany. It is generally believed that U.S.-German political relations are unlikely to reach the level of cooperation that they were at in the past. The foreign policy strategy of the Bush administration has offended or worried much of the population in Germany.

Because Germany identifies itself as a civil power, both the government and the people prefer to operate diplomatically, multi-laterally, and within institutional frameworks. The reason for this are obvious when one considers German history and the move in Europe towards a post-modern state where interests are defined in different

terms then in the old state-centric system. Apart from this, German society as a whole is left of the U.S. on the political spectrum, and many Germans are pacifists. The equivalent of a U.S. hawk does not really exist in Germany.

Stephen S. Szabo argues convincingly that the conflict between the U.S. and Germany during the Iraq war was caused by a clash of strategic cultures brought out by the American revivalist tendencies within the Bush White House.²⁶ The Bush administration's approach, with its emphases on the U.S.'s centrality and moral superiority, was at odds with German political culture. Walter Russell Mead looks more broadly to the "Jacksonian" impulse and the new right in American politics as being central in understanding anti-Americanism in Germany:

It seems to me that the greatest single irritant in the relationship today is the sense in Germany that the United States does not take sufficient account of Germany's views on major international issues. The problem is less acute when the United States has a "blue state" government (a government reflecting the more liberal values of the states that voted for Vice President Gore in 2000), but when the United States has a "red state" government (reflecting the values of the George W. Bush and Ronald Reagan coalitions) the relationship has a tendency to stumble from one crisis to another.²⁷

Mead argues that the reason for this is that there are value differences between red state politicians and Germans. Red state Jacksonian America tends to be more unilateralist, see the world in more moralistic terms, and have far fewer qualms about the use of military force to achieve strategic objectives. For them, the war in Iraq is justified because Saddam Hussein was a ruthless dictator who threatened the global community. But to many Europeans, it appeared that the United States invaded Iraq because it wanted

²⁶ Stephen F. Szabo, *Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

²⁷ Walter Russell Mead, "Kisses and Kicks: German-American Relations in the Age of Bush," *AIGS German-American Issues 04: Power and Principle: Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation* (2004).

oil and revenge. The idea that some Americans would actually think of the invasion of a foreign land as some sort of mission from God seems more or less ludicrous to most Germans. However religion plays a key role in conservative American politics:

The revivalists, if they think long enough about Europe to work it all out, think that the rejection of Christianity is the cause of the European catastrophe—the massive political, moral, cultural, and now finally demographic collapse in the last one hundred years. Hundreds of millions died in terrible imperialist, atheist, and neo-pagan orgies of destruction until Europe fought itself into a trembling, exhausted quiet. The social and international peace that contemporary Europeans see as their proudest achievement strikes this kind of American as the quiet of the grave—or, at least the peace that comes with utter exhaustion. Europe has stopped warring with itself not because it has reached a plateau of spiritual enlightenment, but because it no longer has the vitality to live even biologically, much less to fight.²⁸

It is logical that an approach based on beliefs such as these from leading right wing politicians would bring about a less than happy response from Europeans. Of course, these politicians are not going to care, as they view the cost of following Germany's advice as far outweighing the benefits.²⁹

Part of what created such a strong response to the policies of the Bush administration is that the European elite, or those possessing advanced university degrees, tend to have very liberal points of views about international politics. Apart from this, in many European countries, especially France, there is a long historical tradition of looking down on the U.S. as being culturally inferior.

Andrei S. Markovits's thesis, based on extensive content analysis of newspapers and journals, is that anti-Americanism is a cultural reaction to perceptions of American culture, society, and economics. Anti-Americanism is pervasive in Europe and follows

²⁸ Mead, "Kisses and Kicks," 11.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

the same basic pattern in all European countries.³⁰ There is oftentimes little difference between the type of anti-Americanism found on the left and that found on the right.³¹ “A central characteristic of European anti-Americanism is that, though there exist a left and a right wing component everywhere, they resemble each other so much that—especially in recent years, one can hardly distinguish one from the other.”³² Markovits’s typology of anti-Americanism indicates this by categorizing anti-Americanism as left wing political economy, right wing political economy, left wing cultural, and right wing cultural.

The left wing political economic argument is that U.S. is the world’s dominant capitalist power. It seeks to dominate the world and establish an exploitive capitalistic world order. Germany is a “lackey” of the U.S. The economic problems that Germany faces are caused by the U.S., just as are the problems in underdeveloped countries.³³

There are two types of right wing economic anti-Americanism: the Tory Gaullist type and the nationalist folk type. The Tory Gaullists hold that the United States cannot take the role of the leader of the western world due to its vulgar nature. Because of its permissiveness and the failure of its traditional elite, the United States is completely disorganized, inept, and incapable of managing its own affairs, let alone those of the free world.³⁴ Nationalist anti-Americanism holds that the United States is attempting to destroy the national identities, cultural values, and customs of Europeans, and it is

³⁰ Andrei S Markovits, *Amerika, dich hasst sich’s besser: Antiamerikanismus und Antisemitismus in Europa* (Hamburg: KVV konkret, 2004), 55.

³¹ Markovits, *Amerika dich hasst sich’s*, 55.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., 56.

³⁴ Ibid.

therefore the duty of every responsible politician to resist the United States and its policies.³⁵

The left wing cultural argument is that American culture is the product of a soulless capitalist society that is dominated by corporate interests. “The American culture industry produces cheap, totally worthless things, in order to make quick profits in the mass market, thereby robbing people of their individual identity through the isolating power of capitalist society.”³⁶ Globalization feeds the rich at the expense of the poor, while at the same time destroying traditional culture. Right wing cultural anti-Americanism maintains that the United States has never really had a culture. However, the U.S. threatens European culture through the appeal of its mass culture, which threatens to destroy the Europeans’ historical identities and undermine the social fabric of societies.

Markovits argues that fear or dislike of Americanization is the driving force behind anti-Americanism. The political anti-American reactions in Europe toward the U.S. occur because anti-Americanism and Americanization are integral parts of European dialogue. He argues that Europeans perceive Americanization and hence respond with anti-Americanism in language, sports, lowering of standards, workplace, education, media, health, legal system, criminality, women’s rights, homosexuality, and anti-smoking laws.

These findings reflect the social and cultural biases of some of the elite in Europe. However, it is impossible to tell from this research how much these opinions carry over to the general public. This research ignores the global political context of opinion about

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

the U.S. by focusing only on the social and cultural aspects of anti-Americanism. A study done by Uwe Srp of print media coverage of the Iraq war produced similar findings.

Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: Theoretische und empirische Analyse basierend auf dem Irakkrieg 2003 examines the coverage of the Iraq war in the German print media.

Srp argues that the anti-Americanism in Germany at this time was to a large extent caused by media bias. His research indicates that the German media framed George W. Bush, the Iraq war, and the United States in consistently negative and overly simplistic terms. Srp based the study around the concept of media framing. The idea is that populations form their opinions about other countries based on the way that the media frames issues³⁷ and filters information, and in so doing relies on clichés, stereotypes, and oversimplifications.

The author concludes that during the war in Iraq, the German media used anti-American frameworks in order to simplify the events that were occurring, and that these frameworks stem out of preexisting anti-American sentiment in Germany. However, there was a significant political aspect, as anti-Americanism was most present in judging and criticizing the nature of the political institutions in the United States and the values that these institutions embody.³⁸ American democracy was criticized, and its political institutions were criticized as not being capable of “fulfilling the tasks of a super power.”³⁹ The other political criticisms of the United States fall into the category of “certain political decisions and orientations of American politics/policies”.⁴⁰ Srp found

³⁷ Uwe Srp, *Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: Theoretische und empirische Analyse basierend auf dem Irakkrieg 2003* (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac, 2003), 23.

³⁸ Srp, *Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland*, 199.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 200.

strong evidence of political and social types of bias towards the U.S. and U.S. foreign policy. The author concludes from his research that anti-Americanism is a direct reaction towards U.S. world politics. There are persistent anti-American undertones in German politics that are used specifically to incite voters in German party politics. This could not be done without the help of the media where widespread anti-American sentiment is present in the framing of issues.⁴¹

While the two previous studies look at the print media and elite attitudes towards the U.S., Gesine Schwan's *Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: Kontinuität und Wandel nach 1945* examines anti-Americanism and anti-communism in Germany as reflecting a tradition of anti-modernity within German culture. She asserts that anti-Americanism is grounded in German history and represents a rejection of western democracy and individuality in favor of nationalistic communal values. Anti-Americanism is a social phenomenon that is rooted in Germans' sense of identity in relation to the U.S. She defines four traditions of anti-Americanism in Germany: Romantic-cultural anti-Americanism, right wing extremist anti-Americanism, socialist anti-Americanism, and left wing anti-Americanism.

German Romantic-cultural anti-Americanism stems from the German Romantic tradition.⁴² It was based initially on reports from disappointed German immigrants who found America to be a land of uncultured materialists and conformists.⁴³ Heinrich Heine writes:

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Gesine Schwan, *Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: Kontinuität und Wandel nach 1945* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), 41.

⁴³ Schwan, *Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus*, 41.

Oder soll ich nach Amerika gehen, nach diesem ungeheuren Freiheitsgefängnis, wo die unsichtbaren Ketten mich noch schmerzlicher drücken würden als zu Hause die Sichtbaren, und wo der widerwärtigste aller Tyrannen, der Pöbel, seine hohe Herrschaft ausübt.⁴⁴

<Or should I go to America, monstrous prison of freedom, where the intangible (or invisible) chains will bind me even more painfully than the visible ones do at home, and where the most detestable of all tyrants, the rabble, exercises his exalted dominance.>

Heine wishes to love America, but he is unable to do so because of the egalitarian implications of democracy for the traditional elite.⁴⁵ Heine finds the new types of societal relations in the U.S., with the emphasis on the individual as part of the masses and lack of historical European social hierarchy, as unacceptable. This criticism of the lack of individuality and the superficiality of America in the form of an anti-liberal social commentary forms the basis of Romantic-cultural anti-Americanism.⁴⁶

Conservative anti-Americanism has therefore been an attack on liberal democracy in favor of organic anti-egalitarian communitarianism.⁴⁷ Traditional conservative anti-Americanism saw a connection between social justice, the monarchy, and anti-capitalism in the preservation of German society against Americanization.⁴⁸

According to Schwan, the differences between left and right wing anti-Americanism are superficial. The anti-Americanism found in Germany before 1945 and in the events of the late 60's show remarkable similarity.⁴⁹ They are both characterized by the turning away from liberal western democracy in favor of a hierarchical organic

⁴⁴ Ibid., 42.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 43.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 49.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 47.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 53.

social and political model.⁵⁰ Schwan argues that the normative basis behind these beliefs is that “because of the cultural costs of equality, freedom and equality do not belong together but should instead be separated”.⁵¹ *<Freiheit und Gleichheit gehören in ihm wegen der kulturellen Kosten der Gleichheit nicht zusammen, sondern auseinander.>* Anti-Americanism associates criticisms of America with who Americans are. For anti-Americans, American democracy is directly connected with who Americans are and their perceived evil.⁵² The left argues that while the U.S. form of government may allow for extensive individual freedom it is structured in such a way as to promote gross inequality. The individuality of Americans (who Americans are) allows for political systems that encourage world poverty. U.S. style democracy, U.S. society, and U.S. foreign policy are seen as interconnected.

The right argues that U.S. democracy encourages mass society and a shallow culture. The unconstrained freedom of U.S. society and the promotion of the middle class are seen as shallow replacements for more hierarchical social orders. Interconnected with conservative anti-Americanism is a sense of superiority over the United States.⁵³ Seen from this perspective, anti-Americanism becomes a form of national or ethnic prejudice.⁵⁴ This attitude is more easily explained when one considers the capitulation of the Weimar republic, the failing of National Socialism, and the post World War II programs aimed at Americanizing Germany.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., 54.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

Schwan separates left wing anti-Americanism into two historical forms: social democratic and orthodox Marxist. She argues that the social democratic left has traditionally not been anti-American. At the turn of the 20th century, the United States was seen as the model of liberal democracy. However, the Marxist form of anti-Americanism has always been opposed to the United States no matter which country it is in. Theoretically, orthodox Marxist anti-Americanism goes beyond harsh criticism and is inherently anti-liberal, viewing American policies as being flawed because of the inferior nature of capitalist liberal democracy. Marxist anti-Americanism is based in Marxist anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism and has undertones of nationalism.⁵⁶

National socialist and right wing extremist anti-Americanism builds on the frameworks laid by Romantic anti-Americanism. However, right wing extremist anti-Americanism functions to invite political confrontation with the U.S. which is seen as threatening Germany through global neo-liberalism and the destruction of individual European cultures.⁵⁷

Anti-Americanism can serve many political functions:

1. Turning away from the loss of national, political, and social status through the process of democratization
2. Basis for the preservation of political and cultural identity
3. Psychological justification of the war against the USA
4. Political integration through the conceptualization of the USA as the enemy
5. Overcoming capitalist and democratic systems.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Ibid., 60.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 59.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 68. I think that Dr. Schwan is referring to either the First or Second World War.

Schwan hypothesized that some people would form their opinions about the United States based on logical arguments (criticism), while others would take stances towards the U.S. based more on bias and stereotypes (non critical thinking). In order to test her hypothesis about anti-Americanism, Schwan conducted a series of interviews using a standardized battery of questions. She selected her questions to differentiate between criticism of the U.S. and anti-Americanism in the attitudes of the subjects. She differentiated hypothetical sets of test responses as democratic anticommunist, undemocratic anticommunist, democratic anti-anticommunist, undemocratic anti-anticommunist, democratic anti-Americanism, undemocratic anti-Americanism, democratic pro-Americanism, and undemocratic pro-Americanism.

However, the subjects' responses did not fit with the hypothesized answer patterns that she had formed based on her topology (of anti-Americanism/anti-communism). Instead, most people seemed to have a mixture of pro- and anti-American attitudes based on rational and irrational thought processes. And, in fact, the self-description that someone gave often did not match his or her responses to the questions. For example, someone would describe themselves as pro-American and then give several anti-American responses on the interview. Overall, Schwan found no evidence of right wing extremist anti-Americanism, though there were a great many positive responses for questions indicating conservative anti-Americanism and Marxist anti-capitalist anti-Americanism.⁵⁹

- 50% of the interviewees did not disagree with the statement “in America only the money matters.”

⁵⁹ Ibid., 208.

- 50% percent of the interviewees did not disagree with the statement “only the rights of the powerful” matter.
- 30% did not disagree with the statement that the USA was an economic model for Germany after WWII but certainly not a political one.⁶⁰

The questions to which Germans consistently gave critical responses about the United States involved differences in political and economic systems. The psychological bias seemed to be a type of socio-political anti-Americanism. According to Schwan’s research, this seems to be the most overriding theme in anti-American sentiment in Germany. It was often difficult to distinguish between those who were only critical of America and those who were anti-American, because the individual interviewees gave such mixed responses. Overall, Schwan found that there was no clear indicator for individuals who identified themselves as pro or anti-American. Topological frameworks of anti-Americanism may be theoretical constructions that can only be validated to a limited extent using empirical testing.

Katzenstein and Keohane’s Framework

Katzenstein and Keohane incorporate many of the ideas of other scholars in their theory of anti-Americanism. They include political, cultural, economic, and social aspects. They also differentiate between the intensity of negativity felt toward the U.S., from open-minded criticism to bias stemming from narrow cognitive frameworks.

The theoretical approach differentiates between four distinctive types of anti-Americanism that can overlap with one another. Liberal anti-Americanism is a reaction to

⁶⁰ Ibid.

U.S. foreign policies, both political and economic, as being essentially self-serving policies masked in the rhetoric of freedom and democracy. Social anti-Americanism is found in the liberal social states. It stems from value differences about what constitutes a just society and often manifests itself in the form of criticism of U.S. society and its economic and business model as being backwards and primitive. In practice, this type of anti-Americanism essentially amount to a type of inferiority complex. The national sovereign type of anti-American stems from nationalism, is potentially more potent than the social or liberal types, and can occur in a variety of different countries depending on the international political context. Radical anti-Americanism is the strongest type:

It is built around the belief that America's identity, as reflected in the economic and political power relations and institutional practices of the United States, ensures that its actions will be hostile to the furtherance of good values, practices, and institutions elsewhere in the world. For progress toward a better world to take place, the U.S. economy and society will have to be transformed, either from within or without.⁶¹

Radical anti-Americanism was traditionally associated with Leninism. However, today it is found within certain strands of radical Islam. For these groups, the violent destruction of the U.S. and Americans is necessary in order to free the subjugated victims of the U.S. system.

Katzenstein and Keohane see fear that the United States will adversely affect one's own society as being the driving force behind anti-Americanism. Anti-American attitudes will remain latent and barely noticeable within populations until U.S. foreign policy is seen as directly threatening their own society. So, the transition from latent to active anti-Americanism usually occurs as a direct or indirect repercussion of U.S.

⁶¹ Katzenstein and Keohane, 33.

foreign policy and the perceptions it brings about in populations. The next chapter examines their framework in greater depth and concludes by introducing the thesis hypotheses.

CHAPTER 2

KATZENSTEIN AND KEOHANE'S THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Attitudes towards the United States vary greatly depending on time and place. Different countries and groups of people have different beliefs about what the U.S. is and what the U.S. does. Because perceptions of the U.S. are so multi-dimensional, it is very difficult to pin down anti-Americanism with only a couple of basic concepts. A theoretical model must be able to explain a wide variety of different attitude and opinions towards the U.S. within a cohesive conceptual framework. This section begins by laying out Katzenstein and Keohane's theoretical model and concludes with my hypotheses about German attitudes towards the U.S.

The theoretical model of anti-Americanism developed by Keohane and Katzenstein attempts to categorize what they define as six distinctive types of anti-American resentment into four general categories of anti-Americanism. Their model also differentiates between the intensity of emotions felt towards the United States, which they describe at the individual level as being on a continuum ranging from criticism to bias to distrust.

The model establishes “a framework of concepts and questions that... explore the sources and consequences of anti-Americanism.”¹ They define anti-Americanism as:

a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general. Such views draw on cognitive, emotional, and normative elements. Using the language of psychology, anti-Americanism

¹ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Anti-Americanism in World Politics* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2007), 11.

constitutes an *attitude*. On further examination, anti-Americanism becomes much more complex than this broad definition suggests.²

The authors describe anti-Americanism as a complex psychological phenomenon that can be defined in a framework whose key features are:

1. Cognitive, emotional, and normative components
2. Anti-Americanism as heterogeneous and multidimensional
3. Concepts of opinion, distrust and bias
4. A typology with four main types, "...which scale from being less to more deeply experienced, as well as two additional forms of anti-Americanism. There are also particularistic and historically sensitive forms of anti-Americanism. In any particular situation we expect anti-Americanism to result from different constellations of the different forms and types that "bleed" into each other in variable constellations, activated by and manipulated through political processes."³

Schemas, Identities and Norms

Schemas

Individuals often perceive social phenomena through the use of schemas.

Katzenstein and Keohane define a schema as:

A cognitive structure that relies on specific metaphors, analogies, symbols, and narratives of specific events and general historical developments to make sense of the world.⁴

Schemas help us fill in missing information and form coherent accounts of the world around us.⁵ However, they do not necessarily imply bias but can be based on non-

² Ibid., 12.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

biased interpretation of world events.⁶ Schemas can create positive or negative bias when they become so deeply entrenched that they systematically filter out positive or negative information.⁷ But, just because an individual displays negative attitudes towards the United States does not necessarily mean that he or she interprets the U.S. through a biased mental framework. “It would be a mistake to infer that unfavorable attitudes about the United States, its policies, Americans and the American way of life are necessarily indicators of a systematic bias or prejudice against the United States that slants all new information in a negative direction.”⁸

Identity

Keohane and Katzenstein use a constructivist approach towards anti-Americanism in the political arena. They argue that assessments of the United States can serve as a way to regulate behavior. “As identity markers, they are ‘double-edged’ in that they ‘bind people to each other and at the same time turn people so bound against others.’ ... In situations where positive identities of ‘self’ are hard to come by, the ready availability of a powerful, prosperous, culturally omnipresent ‘other’ can provide a social glue that has broad appeal.”⁹ Anti-Americanism provides a symbol of collective identity.¹⁰

Keohane and Katzenstein’s constructivist conception of anti-Americanism shares many of the same characteristics of social constructivist nationalism. It follows that anti-Americanism can be used rationally for political ends by various groups within given

⁵ Ibid., 13.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

societies and can in fact become a replacement for “otherwise missing symbols of collective identity.”¹¹

Norms

Another important aspect of anti-Americanism is that it involves norms that regulate behavior.¹² Behavior regularities can shape people to the point that they are not open to reasoned dialogue. Norms also prescribe what actions are considered appropriate. Keohane and Katzenstein see a norm as being a collective standard that can prescribe what is appropriate political reaction. As such norms that pertain to anti-Americans are an inherent part of political processes.¹³

Anti-Americanism as a Dynamic Force

Anti-Americanism refers not only to individual attitudes towards the United States as reflected in polling, but also collectively held beliefs as seen in the perception of actual real world events.¹⁴

Anti-American attitudes increase or decrease because of changes within an individual country. As attitudes and beliefs change, countries will change in how easy or difficult they are for the United States to persuade. Persuasion takes place through schemas, emotional appeals, or norms.¹⁵ Because people do not perceive the world through fully developed clear conceptions, the manner in which issues are framed often

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., 14.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

determines the persuasiveness of a political argument. “As a result, how problems are ‘framed’ is often critical for belief-driven action in politics.”¹⁶

Anti-Americanism is multidimensional. Individuals often have a mixture of negative, positive, and oftentimes logically incoherent opinions of the United States. Many people are critical of the U.S. and attracted to it at the same time. Anti-Americanism also varies considerably depending on which country is being examined. In western Europe, attitudes and opinions towards the U.S. vary greatly in different countries. Keohane and Katzenstein suspect that in certain countries, negative public opinion of the Bush administration’s policies may intensify the level of anti-Americanism. “One of the important and to date unanswered questions is the extent to which opposition to American foreign policy spills over into more deep-seated antipathy toward America that generates a new kind of identity as well as institutionalized forms of bias.”¹⁷ A major research question is the extent to which the negativity towards the policies of the Bush administration is translated into changes in self-identification and more deep-seated biases.

Opinion, Distrust, Bias

That polling data may hide much that is of political significance is nothing new. While polls are of use for gaining basic information, it is very difficult to understand cognitive processes from polling data. Polls also “risk imposing a conceptual unity on extremely diverse sets of political processes that mean different things in different

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 19.

contexts.”¹⁸ Besides this, polling data are often a reflection of political climate. When politics change, polling data can change drastically.

Katzenstein and Keohane differentiate between predispositions and opinions. Within the category of predispositions, they define bias and distrust. They place bias on a continuum between distrust and opinion:

While opinion may or may not have serious consequences, distrust and bias should be of serious concern to policy-makers, particularly if these negative predispositions become deeply entrenched in societies that are important to the United States. For distrust can translate easily into opposition or lack of support of the United States. Governments of such countries are likely to demand more evidence, or more compensation, from the United States before they are willing to support U.S. policies. People who not only distrust the United States but are also biased against it will process information differently than unbiased people. For example, Indonesian and Egyptian members of focus groups list U.S. aid given to their countries erroneously in the millions, rather than as \$1 billion and \$7.3 billion, respectively. In general biased people are also more likely to attribute bad policies to essential features of the United States, rather than merely to specific situations.¹⁹

However, most of the world possesses views that are far too multidimensional to be categorized as biased. Keohane/Katzenstein believe that most world opinion is better termed distrust, rather than opinion or bias.²⁰

Typology of Anti-Americanism

Keohane and Katzenstein identify four major forms of anti-Americanism and two forms that are regionally/historically specific and can be subcategorized. However, these different types of anti-Americanism are responses to different aspects of the United States. Some, such as liberal anti-Americanism, are responses to U.S. foreign policy, while others, such as radical or social anti-Americanism, reflect value conflicts.

¹⁸ Ibid., 19.

¹⁹ Ibid., 21.

²⁰ Ibid., 24.

Liberal Anti-Americanism

Liberal anti-Americanism is widespread in Europe and the liberal societies of advanced industrialized countries. Liberal anti-Americanism criticizes the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy. It is not a radical movement. However, it can easily create difficulties for the U.S. when the U.S. is seen as using liberal rhetoric or institutions to advance its own self-interests. This refers to U.S. action in both the political and economic realms. Liberal anti-Americanism holds that “A country dedicated to democracy and self-determination supported dictatorships around the world during the Cold War, and continued to do so in the Middle East after the Cold War had ended. The war against terrorism has led the United States to begin supporting a variety of otherwise unattractive, even repugnant, regimes and political practices.”²¹ The United States also holds double standards in some economic areas. While favoring free trade, it protects its own agricultural producers from competition from the developing world and demands extensive protection for pharmaceutical companies and developers of intellectual property.²² Because U.S. rhetoric and policy often contradict each other, charges of hypocrisy are common.

Liberal anti-Americanism can hinder the U.S. by decreasing support for U.S. policy among its allies. Though people with political bias against the foreign policies of the U.S. are never going to attack the U.S., they can create political environments in which governments are disinclined to support U.S. policy because of repercussions at the polls.

²¹ Ibid., 30.

²² Ibid., 30.

Another potential consequence of political anti-Americanism is that it could lead to the stronger nationalist and social types of anti-Americanism. As U.S. foreign policy comes to be seen as threatening to affect someone's country in a negative way, or U.S. society is seen as being the cause of poor U.S. policy, sentiment will turn against Americans as a people.

Though the United States could presumably reduce the amount of liberal anti-Americanism by following less hypocritical policies, this is very unlikely to happen because the U.S. is the dominant power in world politics. Keohane and Katzenstein make the argument that hypocrisy in American foreign policy is the result of the role that the U.S. plays in the international systems as well as domestic politics within the U.S.:²³

Hypocrisy however, is inherent in the situation of a superpower that professes universalistic ideals ... But democracies display their own form of hypocrisy. When they engage in global politics, they generally find it convenient to mobilize their people by referring to higher ideals. Because states involved in power competition often find it useful to resort to measures that undercut democracy and freedom elsewhere, the potential for hypocrisy is inherent in global activism by democracies.²⁴

A second reason why the U.S. is unlikely to make fundamental changes to its foreign policy is that in pluralist democracies, leaders oftentimes must speak the rhetoric of freedom while at the same time responding to factions with narrow self interests.²⁵

Keohane and Katzenstein ultimately take a pessimistic view about the U.S.'s ability to reduce liberal anti-Americanism. Both U.S. pluralist politics and the structure of the international system ensure that U.S. foreign policy will follow the same patterns that it has for the last 40 years.

²³ Ibid., 31.

²⁴ Ibid. 30.

²⁵ Ibid.

Social Anti-Americanism

Social anti-Americanism is found in the more socially oriented countries in which the state is expected to play a much greater role in supporting people:

What we denote as social anti-Americanism derives from a set of social and political institutions that embed liberal values in a broader set of social and political arrangements that help define market processes and outcomes that are left more autonomous in the United States. This variant of liberalism is marked by a more encompassing support for a variety of social programs than are politically feasible or socially acceptable in the United States.²⁶

Social anti-Americanism reflects value differences between social democracies and the U.S. system. Social anti-Americanism ties in with global economic trends and the perceived threat posed by neo-liberal policies:

In the absence of the perception of a common external threat, “American conditions” (*amerikanische Verhältnisse*) that are totally market-driven are resented by many Germans, as they were in times of financial crisis by many, Mexicans, Asians, and Argentineans in 1984, 1994, 1997, and 2001.²⁷

Social anti-Americanism is in many ways the result of value differences between the U.S. and many of the other advanced industrialized nations about what constitutes the “good society.” Because of this, social anti-Americanism can have a stronger tone than the liberal type. In Germany and western Europe, social criticism of the U.S. has a long history, dating back to post WWII critiques of the masification of U.S. society and turn of the century criticism of Taylorism. However, these conflicts are relatively small, because the states where social anti-Americanism occurs have the same core values as the United States.

²⁶ Ibid., 31.

²⁷ Ibid.

Sovereign-nationalist Anti-Americanism

This type of anti-Americanism focuses on political power and the sovereignty of the nation state:

A third form of anti-Americanism focuses not on correcting domestic market outcomes but on political power. Sovereign-nationalist focuses on two values: the importance of not losing control over the terms by which politics are inserted in world politics and the inherent importance and value of collective national identities.²⁸

Because nationalist collective identities often contain values that contradict American values, “State sovereignty thus becomes a shield against unwanted intrusions from America.”²⁹ Sovereign nationalists feel that their state is threatened in some way by the U.S.

Sovereign-nationalism can emerge in three different forms. Some sovereign nationalists emphasize nationalism. In countries that have strong nationalism, anti-Americanism would provide counter values against the perceived threat.³⁰ However, in countries that are not as nationalistic, anti-Americanism can serve to replace the absent positive values associated with nationalism.³¹

Sovereign-nationalism can also emphasize sovereignty. In Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, state sovereignty was often only achieved after long struggles of liberation. These countries tend to place extra emphasis on their state sovereignty as something that was attained at very high cost from colonial oppressors.³²

²⁸ Ibid., 32.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

A third type of sovereign nationalist anti-Americanism can occur in states that are potential great powers. These societies come to define themselves as opposed to or different from the dominant state. This type of anti-Americanism is especially common among states that have strong central government traditions, such as China. In these states, “The issues of ‘respect’ and saving ‘face’ in international politics can make anti-Americanism especially virulent, since it stirs nationalist passions in a way that social anti-Americanism rarely does.”³³

Radical Anti-Americanism

Radical anti-Americanism holds that the U.S.’s actions are inherently flawed because the American economy and society reflect the flawed American identity. Radical anti-Americanism was characteristic of the Marxists states. Today, radical anti-Americanism is found mainly in radical strains of Islam and in Cuba and North Korea. Radical anti-Americanism holds that in order for the world to progress there must be fundamental change in the U.S. society and economy.³⁴

Though initially associated with Leninist ideology, radical anti-Americanism is mostly associated with radical strands of Islam. They believe that the west and the U.S. in particular are evil, form a threat to Islam, and must be destroyed. Because the people in western societies do not follow the righteous path they must be exterminated.

Elitist Anti-Americanism

Elitist anti-Americanism occurs in the European countries where the elite has a long tradition of looking down on U.S. culture and society.³⁵ Such attitudes are most markedly evident in France, but can be found in other European countries as well. This

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 33.

³⁵ Ibid., 36.

type of anti-Americanism is by far the oldest, and predates the founding of the United States. Americans are regarded as overly materialistic with little appreciation for the arts, music or “high” culture.

European anti-Americanism dates back to the 18th century when American society was found to be shallow, disorderly, and cultureless. Elite anti-Americanism provides European intellectuals with an ego boost and is not likely to go away. However, according to Katzenstein and Keohane, elite anti-Americanism has little or no effect on general public opinion in Europe.³⁶

Legacy Anti-Americanism

This type of anti-Americanism occurs in some countries because of the perception of past wrongs committed by the United States. For example, Mexican anti-Americanism is prompted not by the lack of contact with the United States, but instead because of U.S. military attacks and other forms of imperialist aggression. This is perhaps the most potent form of anti-Americanism, “...the highest levels of anti-Americanism recorded in Western Europe were in Spain and especially Greece—both countries that had experienced civil wars in which the United States had intervened on the side of the Right.”³⁷ Legacy anti-Americanism can be expected to decline over time as memory of perceived American wrongs fades.³⁸ However, “While it persists, it is likely to be restricted to specific places, taking the form of support for anti-American policies and tolerance of more radical anti-American movements, rather than being a source of direct attacks on the United States or on Americans.”³⁹

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., 37.

³⁸ Ibid., 37.

³⁹ Ibid.

Summary of Typology

Katzenstein and Keohane drop the last two forms of anti-Americanism, legacy and elitist anti-Americanism, in order to form a more applicable typology. They do this because they argue that these two types are more historical and particular to only certain countries.

They argue that the main way in which the various types of anti-Americanism vary from one another is *identification*.⁴⁰ Keohane and Katzenstein define identification as referring to “the degree to which individuals identify with the United States, or, on the contrary, identify themselves as in opposition or even hostile to it.”⁴¹ They argue that liberals identify with the United States though they may be extremely critical of U.S. foreign policy.⁴² For example, the Social and Christian Democrats may share democratic principles with the United States but have large value differences with regards to social policy.⁴³

The extent to which identification vis-à-vis the United States is translated into anti-Americanism varies in accordance with how much the U.S. is feared. “In general, we expect that fear can make even political liberals have negative views toward the United States, or activate and intensify the latent anti-American views of social, sovereign-nationalist, or radical individuals.”⁴⁴ For Keohane and Katzenstein, fear is the driving force in the activation and politicization of anti-American sentiment. The table below demonstrates how they think that fear affects anti-Americanism.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 28.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 34.

Liberals are generally pro-American. However, during times of fear of U.S. foreign policy, such as the war in Iraq, even they may become negative towards the U.S. government if not U.S. society.⁴⁵ For social and Christian democrats anti-Americanism may become more intense when U.S. neo-liberal economic policies are blamed for the erosion of domestic economies.⁴⁶ Sovereign nationalist anti-Americanism may come to the forefront in countries that feel threatened by U.S. actions, as is the case in China and Iraq. (The figures and images used, which are not my own, are of fair use.)

Table 1

Identification, fear, and anti-Americanism		
	<i>Degree of fear that the United States will adversely affect one's own Society</i>	
	Low	High
Positive: subject associates herself with what she considers U.S. practices	I. Pro-Americanism	II. Critique of hypocrisy <i>liberal anti-Americanism</i>
	III. Ambivalence <i>latent social anti-Americanism</i>	IV. Severe criticism <i>intense social anti-Americanism</i>
	V. Negative feelings but not intense; Unlikely to lead to action <i>latent sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism</i>	VI. Intense negative feelings; more likely to lead to action <i>intense sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism</i>
Negative: subject opposes what she considers U.S. practices	VII. Negative and more intense than V but less than VI and VII due to lack of fear <i>latent radical anti-Americanism</i>	VIII. Very negative and intense; likely to lead to action, violent or nonviolent <i>mobilized radical anti-Americanism</i>

Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Anti-Americanism in World Politics* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2007), 29.

Anti-American sentiment may lay dormant for long periods of time, only to be reinvigorated by political stimuli.⁴⁷ Both passive and active anti-Americanism may be

⁴⁵ Ibid., 34-35.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 35.

⁴⁷ Ibid..

seen when examining polling data. However, it is only active anti-Americanism which can have strong political effects in the form of social movements and government policies.⁴⁸ Politicized anti-Americanism is likely to be a configuration of various anti-American attitudes that is made use of by politicians and political organizations as they attempt to mobilize the masses.⁴⁹

Hypotheses

1. Katzenstein and Keohane's theory will be correct that distrust of the U.S., particularly its foreign policy and government, is widespread in Germany, and that there exists the potential for politicians to make use of anti-American stances. Though opinions and or distrust towards America may be heterogeneous and varied, anti-Americanism is essentially a result of specific policies of the United States. In other words, though it is easy to find clichés and stereotypes about America, these stereotypes need political events in order to be outwardly manifested as anti-Americanism. What is popularly defined as anti-Americanism has essentially political causes.

2. Individual attitudes towards the U.S. do not usually fall into narrowly defined ideological categories. Instead, they oftentimes represent a mixture of opinions and viewpoints. Because of this, liberal anti-Americanism, social anti-Americanism and sovereign national anti-Americanism will all exist in Germany in some form or another. However anti-American phenomena will often contain elements of more than just one type of anti-Americanism.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

3. Katzenstein and Keohane's theory is correct that attitudes about America are very heterogeneous. That is, individual attitudes can vary greatly because attitudes are shaped by very different perceptions of the United States.

CHAPTER 3

LIBERAL ANTI-AMERICANISM: ATTITUDES TOWARDS U.S.

FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter examines liberal anti-Americanism in Germany. Section one examines German liberal anti-Americanism from a theoretical perspective. Section two looks at German foreign policy and public opinion following German reunification. Section three examines elite opinion and the German media. Section four covers German public opinion towards militarism and U.S. foreign policy. The final section examines recent polling data in order to analyze changes in German public opinion of the U.S. as a global leader.

Theoretical and Historical Analysis of Liberal Anti-Americanism

Gesine Schwan defines two types of anti-Americanism on the left: the social democratic left and the orthodox Marxist left.¹ Before the Second World War, the liberal social democrats were pro-American, having internalized politically and pragmatically the liberal position.² Because they wanted to incorporate democracy in Germany, they were very interested in the U.S. as a successful democratic model. This liberal impulse translated to an admiration of the stoic liberal character of many Americans,³ and the lack of revolutionary or Marxist thought in the U.S. was viewed among the social liberals as

¹ Schwan Gesine, *Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: Kontinuität und Wandel nach 1945* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), 58.

² Schwan, *Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus*, 58.

³ Ibid.

the result of a political system that was widely accepted among the population.⁴ In 1887, the left wing political leader Wilhelm Liebknecht made this report after visiting the United States:

With regards to politics the Americans are conservative at heart; but this is not narrow mindedness, there are very good reasons for this. The American constitution truly makes it worthwhile to be conservative in spite of everything and because of everything. For people ruled by despots are never conservative, because they are never satisfied. Only democratic people can be conservative—a devilishly simple truth that has not been grasped by many statesmen.⁵

Representative social democracy was seen by the moderates within Germany as being the sensible alternative to the militant conservatism of the right. As such, the social liberals were not particularly critical of America because they saw the social inequality and lack of socialization in the U.S. not as reflecting inherent flaws in the American character, but rather as being due to the republican and egalitarian nature of U.S. democracy. Some of the Marxist left, on the other hand, was historically anti-American.⁶ Marxists socialists viewed America as representing expansionist capitalist imperialism.⁷

At the beginning of the 20th century, the U.S. was becoming the world's dominant economic power. The so-called “dollar imperialism,” the introduction of Taylorism, and the application of scientific methods to modes of mass production, came to be seen as a threat to traditional German society. Following the translation into German of an American Marxist critique, under the title “Dollar-Diplomatie” the Marxist critique of U.S. foreign policy, gained appeal in both the far left and the far right to the extent that

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid. quote comes from:
Ernst Fraenkel, *Amerika im Spiegel des deutschen politischen Denkens. Äußerungen deutscher Staatsmänner und Staatsdenker über Staat und Gesellschaft in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika* (Köln: Opladen, 1959).

⁶ Ibid., 59.

⁷ Ibid.

their attitudes towards the U.S. differed little.⁸ This type of reaction to the U.S. also rejects the U.S. form of democracy as being explicit in U.S. imperialism and often becomes a traditional conservative critique of the narrow-mindedness and conservatism of the American character.⁹

Though the older Marxist type of anti-Americanism is still found on the far left and the far right, contemporary liberal anti-Americanism is a political critique of U.S. foreign policy. In other words, the belief that the U.S. government does a lot of bad things abroad and does not seem to care what the rest of the world thinks. In Germany, liberal anti-American sentiments were expressed during the Vietnam War, in the eighties when the U.S. placed tactical nuclear missiles in Germany, and again in 2003 during the lead up to the Iraq war.

Political Reactions to the U.S. During the Sixties and the Eighties

Following WWII, West Germany saw the U.S. and U.S. democracy in a very positive light. The U.S. assistance had allowed rapid economic recovery, and the U.S. military offered protection from the Soviet Union. U.S. democracy and its liberal society was a model for Germany, and questions about the problems within U.S. society or the true motives behind U.S. foreign policy were generally not raised in public discussion.

German perception of U.S. foreign policy changed drastically during the Vietnam era. The atrocities during the Vietnam War, as well as racial turmoil within the U.S., changed public opinion. How could the U.S. government extol freedom and equality, while at the same time allowing such gross contradictions within U.S. society? Images of

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., 60.

burning cities and race riots in the U.S. and the brutality of the Vietnam War were simultaneously reaching Europe. A war fought using the rhetoric of freedom and democracy, but whose ultimate motives, as perceived by many in Europe, were imperial, moved many young Germans to question the sincerity of U.S. foreign policy.

The opposition to U.S. foreign policy occurred as the younger generation in Germany distanced themselves from their parents. The generation of Germans that grew up in the sixties felt estranged from the post WWII society that their parents had shaped. This was reinforced by the fact that some members of government, business, and academia were associated with the Nazi period, and German foreign policy was closely linked to the U.S. because of the dynamics of cold war politics.

It is important to note the widespread influence that Marxist thought had on the sixties generation in Germany. Because they viewed international relations from a Marxist perspective, they oftentimes associated problems within German society, such as the difficulty that immigrants and woman had in finding decent jobs, as well as the problems with international society, such as the cold war, and the long terms tensions between east and west, as stemming from a self interested elite business class. In short, during the sixties, anti-Americanism in Germany began to become a left wing political phenomenon, situated within the context of real political events, rather than a right wing cultural occurrence.¹⁰ German left wing anti-Americanism was only one political strand within the larger theme of anti-Imperialism.¹¹ The student protest movements represented revolt against the social order within German society as well as the perceived unjust foreign policies of the U.S.

¹⁰ Christian Schwaabe, *Antiamerikanismus: Wandlungen eines Feindbildes* (Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2003), 157.

¹¹ Schwaabe, *Antiamerikanismus*, 158.

As the protestors attempted to differentiate between what they saw as the positive aspects of American culture and the negative aspects of its politics,¹² they in effect westernized Germany. The result was that German society became more western and liberal, while at the same time becoming more left wing and politically less pro-America. The Germany of the 1960s took many of its ideas from the civil rights movement in the U.S. while at the same time U.S. culture had a huge impact on youth in Germany. The result was a further modernizing and westernizing of German society.¹³ Critics of the new left argued that the anti-Americanism that it expressed was in many ways an extension of older conservative forms of anti-Americanism.¹⁴ Instead of arguing that German culture was superior, the left now argued that Germany's political culture was superior to America's "dysfunctional democracy."

The Marxist philosophies of some of the German left during this time encouraged radicalism. During the seventies the Red Army Faction and their supporters sought to actively bring down the German state and replace it with a Marxist society. This type of left wing anti-Americanism believes that the American creed and system of political freedom does not stand in the way of the imperialistic oppression of other peoples.¹⁵

Politische Demokratie und kapitalistischer Imperialismus bestehen in Amerika nicht gegeneinander, sondern sind 'funktional aufeinander bezogen' <Political democracy and capitalist imperialism do not oppose each other in America, instead they are functionally related>.¹⁶

Orthodox Marxist anti-Americanism rejects U.S. democracy, U.S. culture, and the U.S. economic system as indistinguishable parts of a system that is evil.

¹² Ibid., 162.

¹³ Ibid., 159.

¹⁴ Ibid., 163.

¹⁵ Ibid., 59.

¹⁶ Ibid. Cited from "Probleme des Klassenkampfes," *Zeitschrift für politische Ökonomie und sozialistische Politik* 19. Jg., Heft 74, Nr. 1.

The protest movement of the sixties differed substantively from the peace movement of the eighties. During the eighties, the U.S. came to be regarded as the embodiment of a modern system wherein humans suffered through war, pollution, consumerism, etc. Protesting against the foreign policy of the United States was equated with protesting against a world system that created an artificial modernity. The rejection of many of the policies of the U.S. could be seen, not as anti-Western, but rather as a rejection of certain policies and approaches of the U.S. that differed substantially from the viewpoint of many Germans. The “no war ever again” attitude of much of the German population led oftentimes to a rejection of the politicization of war by the Reagan administration, and a general dislike of the cold war politics between the two super powers:

Then comes an important element that the citizen action movements in Germany have shown, that people want to become experts over their own lives. So there is a very emotional, of course (and I think very properly so), attitude of people saying, "We will not accept this anymore," because they are also tying this arms race to problems in the economy, to the social problems, and to the problems in the Third World. There is a war going on every day. There is mass destruction every single day of our lives. So this has become a real consciousness-raising effort that I think the peace movement has been successful at. People in Germany are now going to the second stage. They are now questioning, very slowly but surely, military alliances. Not quickly, but slowly; it is a new step, a new quality.¹⁷

However to speak of German idealism and American pragmatism misses the point.¹⁸ It is up for debate whether American foreign policy is pragmatic, and the German peace movement was rooted in everyday concerns. The peace movement of the eighties resulted not from differences in opinion between elements of the German population and

¹⁷ Petra Kelly and Gert Bastian, “The European Peace Movement,” Conversations with History Institute of International Studies (UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA: October 23, 1984) <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/>.

¹⁸ Schwaabe, *Antiamerikanismus*, 175.

U.S. foreign policy makers, but from a clash of two entirely different perspectives.¹⁹ It represented a general dislike among many Germans of certain trains of thought and logics in politics:

It is a rejection of militarism wherever it may be . . . I could never accept the Vietnam War. It was pure barbarism. To me, this barbarism was the worst kind, which is committed also on the other [Eastern bloc] side. And I think those soldiers were just as misused as German soldiers, as any soldier. The problem, I think, that the peace movement is trying to show is militarism. When you come to a certain degree, then there can be nobody who is a fine general or a fine soldier because they are all being misused or they misuse themselves. At a certain point, the United States had a tradition in Vietnam out of which they should have learned. Now, in fact, they are going back to policies again misusing their soldiers, misusing them completely as a kind of checkmate on a chess board. They are misused in the sense that American soldiers in Europe are becoming worried. They are sending us little slips through the fence saying please continue, because we don't like this here either. I think this is what has to be the warning to all political military leaders in both superpowers, that they cannot continue misusing. Because it's not the generals on the front, it's certainly the soldier out there who are going to be using nuclear weapons, who are going to throw them a few miles and hit his own territory and who are going to be misused in all this thinking. This has become the criticism. It is a criticism of militarism and of nuclear policies, nuclear barbarism. No person said it better than Archbishop Hunthausen, when he said it is a time now of nuclear Auschwitz. I think that is the correct wording. It is really, really horrifying. That is what the peace movement is trying to create. Of course, our criticism is very loud against our own protective power, called the United States.²⁰

The ends justifies the means approach to politics was viewed as perpetuating unjust political systems,²¹ so that the ideological basis of the movement became protesting the injustices against peoples created by the systems put in place by the two superpowers. Of course, the peace movement was criticized by conservative Americans in the eighties for being unrealistic in the face of a perceived Soviet threat, just as the Europeans are criticized today of being naïve in the face of “the Muslim threat.”

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Kelly and Bastian, “The European Peace Movement.”

²¹ Schwaabe, *Antiamerikanismus*, 176.

The peace movement in Germany had many similarities to the protests against the Iraq war in 2003. In both cases, the policies of the superpower(s) were rejected at a very basic level as being inherently non-humane, and the logic of the policies followed by the U.S. was rejected. However, the international political environment in which the protests against the Iraq war took place is fundamentally different. Because the world is now unipolar, the politically constraining structure of the cold war period is no longer in place in Germany.²² This deprives Germany of its central place in international politics as the focus of U.S. foreign policy shifts away from central Europe to the Middle East and gives German politicians greater freedom of movement by decoupling German foreign policy from the foreign policy of the U.S. They are able to act in ways that they never would have been able to during the Cold War.²³ And this allows much of the political thought that had existed for many years in Germany among elements of the left to become more openly incorporated in the rhetoric of Gerhard Schröder and other German politicians.²⁴

Germany as a New Actor on the World Stage: Changes in Public Attitudes in Germany during the Nineties

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union German elites were somewhat concerned about the U.S.'s perceived isolationist tendencies. The worry was that the U.S. would crawl into its shell and refuse to come out, regardless of what was going on in the outside world. Today, the situation has changed drastically. The U.S. is critiqued not for withdrawing from international affairs but for playing too large a role in them.

²² Josef Joffe, *Über Power: the Imperial Temptation of America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006).

²³ Josef Joffe, "Alliance Lost: The U.S. and Europe in a Unipolar World," *Conversations with History: Institute of International Studies* (UC Berkeley, CA: April, 4 2003) <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/>.

²⁴ Joffe, "Alliance Lost."

The Bush administration's unilateralist strategy before the second Iraq war alienated the U.S. from its traditional allies so that the U.S. came to be seen as a rogue state or the hyper power. While German policy makers had been slightly worried during the nineties about potential unilateralist tendencies in U.S. foreign policy, U.S. relations had remained strong with the European allies. The Clinton administration made efforts to conduct foreign policy multilaterally and to frame the discussion about foreign policy issues in multilateral terms. The Clinton administration refrained from the power political discourse²⁵ and chose to use a broader conception of the U.S. national interest than the Bush administration has. However, even during the nineties, when the U.S. did decide to pursue its interests in a more unilateral fashion many of the European nations looked on with worry.²⁶

Following German reunification there was considerable debate among scholars about the direction that German foreign policy would take in the future. While realists argued that Germany's economic power, size, and geographic location would lead it to become Europe's dominant power and follow more unilateralist Eurocentric foreign policies, Constructivists and institutionalists focused on the strong influence of Germany's political culture on foreign policy. They argued that because of the degree to which diplomacy, international institutions, and avoidance of violent conflict were ingrained within both the population and leadership, Germany would not conduct foreign policy through power politics. In other words:

²⁵ Robert Jarvis, "American Foreign Policy in a New Year," Conversation with History Institute of International Studies (UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA: November, 17 2005) <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/>.

²⁶ Some people viewed the unilateral element of U.S. foreign policy as being indicative of potentially greater cultural and historical trends within U.S. society.

Most analysts agree that, despite these far-reaching events, no real break occurred within the long-standing foreign policy culture of the old FRG. To the extent differences were noted, these constituted shifts of emphasis and modifications below the threshold of fundamental change.²⁷

However, while the post Cold War period did not show any major shifts in German foreign policy, it was marked by a newly found confidence. During the nineties, Germany became increasingly involved in various peace keeping missions under the UN umbrella. As it became apparent that the post Cold War world would be marked by ethnic conflict and civil strife, public opinion became much more supportive of Germany playing a more active role in dealing with these types of problems. These changes in public opinion stem from reassessment of what actually posed a threat to Germany and what needed to be done. The ongoing warfare in the Balkans, as well as various forms of internal violence in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world, caused a push for Germany's more active involvement in international affairs.

The extension of *Bundeswehr* missions in the decade following the FCC ruling of 1994 was accompanied by fierce and controversial discussions. This led to a change in attitudes across all political parties (with the exception of the PDS), which was "felt particularly painfully" in the Social Democratic Party, the Alliance 90, and the Greens. A growing number of people favored *Bundeswehr* missions outside the traditional areas of responsibility since the wars in former Yugoslavia. While only 17 percent of the German population had approved of *Bundeswehr* participation in the second Persian Gulf War in 1991, by September 1995 a majority of the population (54 percent) considered NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina necessary. *Bundeswehr* support of the United States in the fight against international terrorism was endorsed by 69 percent in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington.²⁸

However, this greater willingness to participate does not signal any fundamental changes in Germany's traditional role as a civilian power. The public by and large

²⁷ August Pradetto, "The Polity of German Foreign Policy: Changes since Unification," in *Germany's Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic*, ed. Hans W. Maull, 22 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

²⁸ Pradetto, "The Polity of German," 24.

opposes the deployment of troops into actual combat missions and sees Germany as playing a supportive and logistical role. They see the role of the *Bundeswehr* as protecting Europe.²⁹ On the other hand, an increased contribution in various military interventions was the real hallmark of the Red Green coalition and the Schröder Chancellorship. 9/11 signaled significant changes in the way German leadership approached involvement in multilateral operations. For Schröder and Fisher it was vital that Germany played a stepped up role in international politics by making real contributions towards the U.S. led war on terror. Following a cordial meeting with Bush in February 2002:

...Schröder told his aides that Germany could not play the same nonassertive and limited military role that it had during the cold war. Now and in the future it had to make a military contribution. This was consistent with a fundamental belief that he had brought with him to the Chancellorship-that Germany's foreign role should match its economic power and its growing geopolitical importance. This new self-assurance has been a leitmotiv of Schröder's time in office. Germany was ready to take on more international responsibilities and expected in return to be taken more seriously by major international players.³⁰

Elite Opinion and the Popular Media

U.S.-German relations reached a high point in the early nineties when the U.S. government helped to facilitate German reunification,³¹ and George H.W. Bush spoke of

²⁹ Ibid., The author of this chapter, August Pradettor writes: Although the population had approved of supporting the United States in the fight against terrorism, the majority of Germans (58 percent) in spring 2003 wanted to see their country participate only "indirectly in combat missions within the framework of NATO, for example by giving logistic support." Just over one-fourth (27 percent) of respondents backed a "direct participation in combat missions within the framework of NATO." Altogether, a clear majority (59 percent) of Germans said in June 2003 that the task of the *Bundeswehr* should be confined to the defense of its own territory and of NATO allies." Only 39 percent held that "the task of the *Bundeswehr* should also include the containment of crises outside NATO." His data was extracted from 2003 Emnid opinion polls. <www.tus-emnid.com>

³⁰ Stephen F. Szabo, *Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

³¹ The U.S. Government strongly supported German reunification and negotiated with Russia for the withdrawal of Russian troops out of East Germany, thereby allowing East German to reunite with West Germany ("Two Plus Four Treaty" Sep. 12, 1990). Support for German reunification was not a widely

the need for the new Germany to assume a greater role in world affairs.³² But by the end of the Clinton administration, tensions began to arise in Germany over America's perceived unilateralist tendencies. German complaints centered on the fact that the U.S. pursued its policies in a unilateralist manner regardless of what the rest of the world thought, and made a habit of asking the European states to pursue policies that the U.S. itself refused to follow. In the words of a member of the American Enterprise Institute:

Die USA haben in einem entscheidenden Augenblick der Geschichte beispiellos an Stärke, Einfluss und Dynamik gewonnen – und zugleich ihre Macht und Weltgeltung derartig ungeschickt gehandhabt, dass sie an Glaubwürdigkeit gerade bei ihren engsten Verbündeten, mit denen sie eine neue Weltordnung errichten wollten, verloren haben. Wir brüsten uns schamlos der Vortrefflichkeit der amerikanischen Wirtschaft (unvergessen der verunglückte G7-Gipfel in Denver vom Sommer 1997). Wir predigen, dass die Türkei Mitglied der EU werden müsse – einer Organisation, der wir nicht angehören. Wir tadeln den Protektionismus (und praktizieren ihn selbst). Und immer wieder versuchen wir, die europäischen Freunde zu gängeln – sei es bei der Wahl des IWF-Chefs oder beim Nato-Einsatz im Kosovo. Der Preis, den uns unsere Hybris kostet, ist hoch.³³

<The U.S. has during a decisive moment in history, won an unprecedented amount of strength, influence, and vitality- and at the same time clumsily mishandled its world power and legitimacy, so that it has lost credibility with its closest allies with whom it wished to construct a new world order. We boast shamelessly about the excellence of the American economy (without forgetting the bad luck during the G-7 summit in Denver during the summer of 1997). We preach, that Turkey must become a member of the EU- an organization which we are not a member of. We criticize protectionism (and practice it ourselves). And we are constantly trying to get the European friends to get on with it- if it is by the election of the international monetary fund President or by the NATO deployment in Kosovo. The price of our hubris is high.>

shared sentiment in many European countries such as Britain whose Margaret Thatcher was vehemently opposed.

³² The expectations of the George H.W. Bush administration was that Germany would, once reunited, assume the central leadership role in Europe while maintaining the close level of cooperation with the U.S. that had been present throughout the cold war.

³³ Franz Nuscheler, "Multilateralismus vs. Unilateralismus: Kooperation vs. Hegemonie in den transatlantischen Beziehungen," *Policy Paper 16, Development and Peace Foundation* (2001): 2. Quote was written in German in Nuscheler's paper. English translation is my own.

There were various instances when the U.S. made decisions that flew in the face of German public opinion. It refused to ratify various treaties and agreements (Kyoto Protocols, International criminal Court), and attempted to destroy some of the agreements that it had previously committed to, such as when the U.S. refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and withdrew from the anti-ballistic missile treaty in 2002 in order to pursue the development of a missile defense shield.³⁴

The U.S.'s refusal to keep its own treaties and its insistence on continuing research on missile defense systems and offensive weapons systems makes it more difficult to deter other states from gaining nuclear weapons because the major incentive, collective security, becomes lost.

Another major area of criticism of the U.S. in Germany is the U.S. attitude towards the U.N. Germans generally dislike the American attitude towards the U.N., arguing that the U.S. Congress and government constantly criticize the U.N. as being dysfunctional and lacking legitimacy because certain countries are not democracies. Slogans such as “get the U.S. out of the U.N., get the U.N. out of the U.S.”³⁵ gain irrational popularity. The U.S.'s failure to pay its U.N. dues in full has always been a point of discontentment, and the failure of the U.S. to consult the U.N. Security Council prior to the bombing of Kosovo in 1999 and the bombing of Iraq in 1998 was not particularly popular.³⁶ However, it was the invasion of Iraq in 2003 despite failing to gain approval of the U.N. Security Council, and the subsequent appointment of John Bolton as U.S. ambassador to the U.N. that increased the tensions surrounding the U.S.

³⁴ “U.S.-Russian Treaties and Agreements,” in *NTI: Working for a Safer World* (Monterey Institute's Center for non-proliferation Studies), http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1b2_2.html (accessed January 7, 2006).

³⁵ Nuscheler, “Multilateralismus vs. Unilateralismus,” 5.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

and U.N. A leading neoconservative in the Bush administration, Bolton had been quoted as saying, among other things, "There is no such thing as the United Nations. There is only the international community, which can only be led by the only remaining superpower, which is the United States,"³⁷ and "The Secretariat Building in New York has 38 stories. If it lost ten stories, it wouldn't make a bit of difference."³⁸ It is difficult to understand why someone with Bolton's political viewpoints, who was unable to gain approval even in a Republican controlled Senate, would be given a one year recess appointment as the Ambassador to the U.N. As could be expected, this appointment did not go over well in the German press, and was viewed as a final insult after the Iraq war. A *Spiegel* columnist wrote on Bolton's U.N. appointment:

John Bolton gehörte zu den dienstbaren Geistern, zu den Hausknechten, die sich immer um starke Figuren wie Rumsfeld scharen. Douglas Feith war auch so einer. Erinnert sich noch einer an ihn? Er durfte Geheimdienstleute kujonieren, die sich erfrechten, anderer Meinung über die Massenvernichtungswaffen zu sein, als es das Pentagon und das Büro von Vizepräsident Cheney wollten. Bolton landete als Botschafter der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika bei den Vereinten Nationen. Noch ein Treppenwitz: Bolton, Typ Betonkopf, Typ *America First*, bei der Uno. Als Diplomat. Er ist jetzt zurückgetreten. Endlich.³⁹

<John Bolton belonged to the ministering angels, the house servants, who always gather around such strong figures as Rumsfeld. Douglas Feith was also one of those. Does anyone remember him? He was allowed to bully intelligence personnel who had the audacity to be of a different opinion about weapons of mass destruction than the Pentagon and the Office of Vice President Chaney. Bolton came to the UN as the U.S. Ambassador. That was yet another cruel irony: Bolton, the blockhead, the *America First* guy, at the UN as a diplomat. He has now resigned. Finally.>

³⁷ Roland Watson, "Bush deploys hawk as new UN envoy," *The Times*, March 8, 2005, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,11069-1515816,00.html> (accessed January 15, 2007).

³⁸ Anne Applebaum, "Defending Bolton," *The Washington Post*, March 9, 2005, A21. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A18706-2005Mar8.html> (accessed January 15, 2007).

³⁹ Gerhard Spörl, "Bolton Rucktritt: By By Beton Köpfe," *Spiegel Online*, December 4, 2006, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,452444,00.html> (accessed January, 8 2007).

Another German liberal complaint about the U.S. is that it attempts to unduly influence the IMF and World Bank, particularly when it comes to the appointment of the general director of the IMF.⁴⁰ Naturally, the appointment of Paul Wolfowitz, a leading architect of the Iraq war, to president of the World Bank created somewhat of an uproar in the German media. Wolfowitz's sincerity about achieving third world development was questioned by many, due to his past history of routinely advocating U.S. foreign policies that ignored human rights violations.⁴¹ German development minister Heidemarie Wiecek-Zeul simply stated "The enthusiasm (over the nomination) in old Europe is not exactly overwhelming."⁴²

There have of course been numerous other instances where U.S. policy has flown in the face of German public opinion. The Iraq war and its tragic aftermath, the Abu Ghraib incidents, Guantanamo bay, the CIA's secret facilities in eastern Europe, the CIA's movement of prisoners through Germany without (allegedly) the German Chancellor's knowledge etc. The point is, by the beginning of the Bush administration there was a certain amount of dislike among some German elites⁴³ of the U.S.'s behavior internationally. This is laid out quite clearly in Franz Nuscheler's paper, a liberal political critique of the perceived self-centeredness and hypocrisy of post Cold War U.S. foreign policy, based around the perception that the U.S. had a tendency to act unilaterally in a hegemonic fashion. However, it was not until the U.S. began to really exercise power

⁴⁰ Nuscheler, "Multilateralismus vs. Unilateralismus," 5.

⁴¹ During his time as Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia he made no efforts to do anything about the human rights violations taking place in that country. This has been a trend throughout his career in Government.

⁴² Charles Hawely, Daryl Lindsey, and Ronald Heineman, "Wolfowitz, Nein Danke: Candidate to Lead World Bank gets Thumbs Down in Europe," *Spiegel Online*, March 17, 2005, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,346951,00.html> (accessed. January, 8. 2007).

⁴³ I use the term elites in the social science sense as referring to those people who are exceptionally well educated, tending to have white collar jobs.

during the Bush administration that broad popular sentiment in Germany against the U.S. government emerged, in part brought about by political elites, who have certain preferences about how they think the international system should operate.

The preferences of elites are mirrored perfectly in the German media. Media Tenor, a German based international media research institute, found that leading European newspaper and television stations produced twice as many negative statements about the U.S as positive ones.⁴⁴ However the media in Germany stood out in its negativity towards the U.S. Germany's lead TV news show, *Tagesthemen*, was slightly more negative (24 percent of statements) than *Al Jazeera* (23 percent).⁴⁵ And the result of previous studies showed the same pattern. In 2003, Media Tenor found that the German media covered U.S. military actions more critically than *Al Jazeera*.⁴⁶ The European media was even critical towards the Iraqi election:

During the two weeks prior to the Iraqi vote, Media Tenor conducted a study that focused on the coverage of the electoral process in Iraq rather than U.S. protagonists. Once again the results seemed to defy conventional wisdom. While the Arab media rated the democratic legitimacy of the election positively, the European coverage was from the outset much more skeptical. Germany's public broadcasters were particularly gloomy in their coverage. The media presented the German public with a situation in Iraq that is twice as negatively portrayed as the one under Saddam Hussein's dictatorship.⁴⁷

Elite preference distorted reality again in the lead-up to the 2004 election. The media's coverage of U.S. politics led European publics to believe strongly that John

⁴⁴ *Medien Tenor Forschungsbericht* 149- 1. (2005): 100.

Originally published as, Bush's Harshest Critics: Coverage of the U.S. in Selected European and Media Outlets," *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, February 24, 2005. "Media Tenor's Methodology, developed with and used by universities in many countries, allows the direct comparison of coverage in different languages and cultural backgrounds." *Medien Tenor Forschungsbericht*: 100.

⁴⁵ *Medien Tenor Forschungsbericht*, 100.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

Kerry would win. But the more accurate U.S. coverage and polling results showed that this was simply not the case:

In private, foreign correspondents (not only those based in Washington) complain at times that their editors tend to let their own prejudices determine the coverage and often ignore facts or insights from those closest to the event. It seems that a majority of European editors simply wanted President Bush to be replaced.⁴⁸

Consequently, European publics expected Kerry to win and were upset when he did not.

It is obvious that the strong preferences of the German media allow them to paint a picture of reality that is biased against anything conservative in U.S. government.


Because people working in journalism and the media often see the Bush administration as an ideological threat, they shape the news to try to contain the U.S. The implications of this coverage of the U.S. were also examined by Media Tenor. The results of the study, which was conducted from 2002 through 2005, showed a correlation between the German media's coverage of the U.S. government, and the public's response to the question "Who is the most important partner for Germany: the U.S. or France?"⁴⁹ The political preferences of the people who work in German media are gradually taken up by the general population in response to the negative coverage from the German media. The graph below shows the results of their study. As the media portrays the U.S. government in worse terms Germans begin to see the U.S. as a less important partner.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ "Liebes Entzug in Alten Europa: Warum die Berichterstattung über Politik und Wirtschaft für U.S.-Marken zum Image-Problem wird," *Medien Tenor Forcshungsbericht* 149- 1. (2005): 114.

Graph 1

1 Medienbewertung der US-Regierung vs. Umfragetrend 2002 bis 2005



Berichterstattung: explizite Bewertung (mittlere Bewertung +1/-1; Umfrage: FG Wahlen

Quelle: Medien Tenor/FG Wahlen
01.01.2002 – 31.03.2005

Basis: 6.524 Beiträge
in 7 deutschen TV-Nachrichten

“Liebes Entzug in Alten Europa: Warum die Berichterstattung über Politik und Wirtschaft für U.S.-Marken zum Image-Problem wird,” *Medien Tenor Forschungsbericht* 149- 1. (2005): 114.

The German Public’s Attitudes towards Militarism and U.S. Foreign Policy

Americans are much more concerned about threats to national security than are Germans. While Germans are generally less likely to feel that they are going to be personally affected by global problems in the near future, many Americans see the same issues in a totally different light. This is especially evident when comparing the responses of Americans and Germans regarding Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, and the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While Germans saw these issues as obvious problems, they generally did not feel that they were likely to be affected by them in the next 10 years.⁵⁰ The picture looks completely different in the U.S. Most of the population views terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and the spread of nuclear weapons as likely to affect their lives. Twenty-one percent of Americans thought that they were very likely to be affected by Islamic fundamentalism in the next 10 years while only nine percent of German did.⁵¹ The difference in responses to the question “And in the next 10 years, how likely are you to be personally affected by the following threat? How likely are you to be personally affected by international terrorism?”⁵² were even more pronounced. Only nine percent of Germans polled viewed themselves as very likely to be affected by international terrorism compared with 35 percent of Americans.⁵³ Thirty-three percent of Americans thought that the spread of nuclear weapons was very likely to affect their lives in the next 10 years, compared to only 14 percent of Germans.⁵⁴ Overall there was a substantial difference in public threat perception when comparing the U.S. and Germany over all issues that relate to violent or military type of threats. Of those Germans who did see these issues as likely to affect their lives in the next 10, years almost all responded “somewhat likely” not “very likely.”⁵⁵

⁵⁰ German Marshall Fund of the United States. *Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data 2005*, <http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/index.cfm?id=4> .

⁵¹ *Transatlantic Trends*, 22.


⁵² *Ibid.*, 24.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* , 21.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

Graph 2



German Marshall Fund of the United States. *Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data 2005*, <http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/index.cfm?id=4>.

Americans and Germans also differ significantly in their opinions about the use of force. Germans express very strong anti-war sentiment. Because in the past Germany participated in disastrous wars, the majority of the population believes war can rarely or never be justified.⁵⁶ Germans are also among the least likely to hold that territory beyond their borders belongs to them.⁵⁷ The E.U. integration process has instilled Europeans with a higher opinion of multilateral agreements and international institutions.⁵⁸

An analysis that analyzed survey responses using a hawk-dove typology found that over half of Germans could be classified as doves compared to only around 10 percent of Americans.⁵⁹ On the other hand, about a quarter of Americans were hawks

⁵⁶ Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, *America Against the World: How We are Different and Why We are Disliked* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 195.

⁵⁷ Kohut, *America Against the World*, 196.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ronald Asmus, Philip P. Everts, and Pierangelo Isernia, "Across the Atlantic and the Political Aisle: The Double Devide in U.S.-European Relations," *German Marshall Fund*.(2004): 3,

compared to only four percent of Germans.⁶⁰ A definite majority of Germans saw economic power as more important than military power and rejected the notion that war is sometimes necessary to obtain justice. Over half of Americans and over a quarter of Germans are pragmatists who believe that economic power is increasing but agree that war is sometimes necessary to obtain justice.⁶¹

Thus, Schröder's rhetoric in the lead-up to the Iraq war was not just simple vote pandering. It reflected a real concern among Germans about the direction U.S. foreign policy was taking. Schröder argued in an interview with the *New York Times*:

A new war in the Middle East, he says bluntly, would put at risk all that has been gained so far in the unfinished battle against Al Qaeda. The arguments against a war with Iraq are so strong, he said, that he would oppose one even if the Security Council approved.... Mr. Schröder said he had seen no new evidence indicating that the military danger from Iraq had increased, and so questions the administration's urgency. He says he believes "no one has a really clear idea of the political order that would follow in the Middle East" or of the effects of a war on the stability of moderate Arab states, or the cohesion of the antiterror coalition. There has been little discussion, he says, of the economic consequences, in particular the price of oil, for the rest of the world.⁶²

Schröder's interview essentially reflected German public opinion. While initially showing a tremendous amount of support for the U.S. following the 9/11 attack, Germans became increasingly worried about the U.S.'s policy of preventive war, and the potentially disastrous consequences that fighting a war in Iraq might imply for the war on terror.⁶³

<http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/index.cfm?year=2004> . This typology was based on the 2004 German Marshall Fund questions where respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statements 1) "Economic Power is becoming more important in the world than military power" and 2) "Under Some condition War is necessary to obtain Justice."

⁶⁰ Asmus, Everts and Isernia, "Across the Atlantic," 5.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Steven Erlanger, "German Leader's Warning: War Plan Is a Huge Mistake," *New York Times*, September 5, 2002, 1.

⁶³ Maull, *Germany's Uncertain Power*, 143.

The U.S. and Germany came to disagreement when U.S. foreign policy shifted focus away from international terrorism by merging various threats and problems together as immediate threats to U.S. security and then attempted to wage war against “rogue states”⁶⁴ that had caused headaches for U.S. strategists for years.

However, the “grand strategy” version of U.S. foreign policy has always been utterly rejected in Germany. The protest movements of the sixties and the peace movement during the eighties clearly show the extent to which Germans reject the use of military force as a geo-political tool.

Once Schröder realized that his populist anti-war message received such a strong response among the general population, he made it the center of his campaign speeches. He was able to create fears of German military participation in a bloody military conflict if the CDU were elected to power. He did this despite the fact that it was highly uncertain at that point in time if the U.S. would invade Iraq or if Germany would even be asked to send troops.

And yet again Iraq. The chancellor and his foreign affairs minister Joschka Fischer have been warning of the real danger of war for weeks. However this theme doesn't seem to ignite properly and the writing on the wall seems to exist more because of the needs of the candidates who through this game with anti-American clichés attempt to mobilize their followers.⁶⁵

After Vice President Richard Cheney's speech on August 26, 2002, that seemed to make clear that there would be a war, the gloves came off in Germany. The die had been cast; Cheney had made clear that he was convinced that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and posed a serious threat to U.S. security, and regime change was the only way to protect the U.S. He questioned if a containment strategy

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ralf von Beste, Konstantin von Hammerstein, Ralf Neukirch and Alexander Szandar, “Krieg der Worte,” *Der Spiegel*, September 2, 2002.

would even work against Saddam because of the problems that the UN inspectors had had during the nineties:

Against that background, a person would be right to question any suggestion that we should just get inspectors back into Iraq, and then our worries will be over. Saddam has perfected the game of cheat and retreat, and is very skilled in the art of denial and deception. A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with U.N. resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow "back in his box."

Chaney continued:

Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors -- confrontations that will involve both the weapons he has today, and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth.⁶⁶

This perception of Saddam Hussein as a threat to U.S. national security, driven by fear after 9/11 that Americans were involved in a life or death ideological struggle in which time was not on their side, formed the underpinnings of the conservative view of the Middle East. Within this dichotomy, the U.S. becomes a force for good in a world in which it is surrounded by evil.

In response to this speech, Schröder and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) greatly intensified the tone of their rhetoric. Schröder argued that the Americans should "address the ratification of the Kyoto Protocols more and military questions less"⁶⁷ and that an attack on Iraq was exactly the type of "adventure" that Germany would have nothing to do with.⁶⁸ As it became apparent how much appeal Schröder's anti-American clichés had to the general public, other parties quickly jumped on the band

⁶⁶ Office of the Vice President, *Vice President Cheney Speaks at Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention, August 26, 2002* www.whitehouse.gov (accessed February 5, 2007) .

⁶⁷ "Krieg der Worte," *Der Spiegel*.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

wagon. Edmond Stoiber changed his position from the traditional Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union party line⁶⁹ on the U.S., by stating that “the question of the American go it alone strategy in the Iraq-question deserves a clear answer.”⁷⁰ He stated that the “decision-and handling monopoly”⁷¹ for taking action against Iraq was with the U.N. When CDU foreign policy specialists Wolfgang Schäuble and Friedbert Pflüger tried to stick with the traditional pragmatic CDU party line, they were shot down by CSU *Landesgruppenchef* Michale Glos, who stated, “There is absolutely no intention within our party, to participate in a military adventure somewhere in the world, and I speak for our Chancellor candidate as well.”⁷²

Relations between the U.S. and Germany reached a low point when Schröder’s justice minister Herta Daubler-Gmelin compared George W. Bush to Adolph Hitler in a discussion with a small group of labor union members. The remark implied that Bush was invading Iraq to avoid criticism about domestic problems.⁷³ This statement and the subsequent letter of apology sent by Schröder, which was viewed by the White House as justifying what had happened rather than apologizing, had the effect of destroying relations between the two governments.⁷⁴ A White House staffer stated:

Bush felt personally betrayed. Her comments did not come out of the blue. Schröder created the general atmosphere, which encouraged these sorts of comments. During the final week there were more comments than just those of Däubler-Gmelin. Schröder was riding the Iraq issue. His letter to the President was insulting. He said, in effect, “I’m sorry that you feel angry about this.”⁷⁵

⁶⁹ The CDU/CSU sees political relations with the U.S. as being of paramount importance in Germany’s foreign policy. The CDU web site, with pictures of Angela Merkel and George W. Bush striking friendly poses, attests to this fact.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Stephen Graham, “Minister behind alleged Hitler-Bush comparison not a candidate for new German Cabinet,” *Associated Press*, September 23, 2002.

⁷⁴ Szabo, *Parting Ways*, 30.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

Public Opinion after the Iraq War

The changes in world politics and U.S. policy during the Bush administration have resulted in Germans viewing not just George W. Bush but also U.S. foreign policy in general in a very doubtful fashion. When asked if U.S. foreign policy considered the interests of others, only a minority of Germans (29 percent) answered yes.⁷⁶ In general, Germans completely disagreed with the U.S. decision to invade Iraq and with the way the war has been conducted. By 2005, 87 percent of Germans thought that Germany made the right decision not to use force in Iraq.⁷⁷ Fifty-eight percent of Germans think that the world is a more dangerous place without Saddam, while only 28 percent think that it is safer.⁷⁸ A 2004 Pew survey indicated that 69 percent of Germans thought that the U.S. leaders lied in order to attack Iraq, and 82 percent said the U.S. was less trustworthy than before.⁷⁹

Following the invasion of Iraq, European publics became more doubtful of basically all aspects of U.S. foreign policy, including the War on Terror. Support for the War on Terror declined significantly in Germany from 70 percent in 2002 to 50 percent in 2005.⁸⁰ In 2004, 65 percent of Germans said the U.S.'s motives in the war on terror were not sincere.⁸¹ The lack of faith in U.S. foreign policy has occurred despite, or perhaps due in part because of, the terrorist attacks in Britain and Spain and a number of

⁷⁶ *Trends 2005* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2005), 108.

⁷⁷ "U.S. Image Up slightly, But still Negative: American Character Gets Mixed Reviews," Country Facts sheet: Germany, 2005, *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/247germany.pdf>.

⁷⁸ "U.S. Image Up Slightly."

⁷⁹ Kohut, *America Against the World*, 173.

⁸⁰ "U.S. Image Up Slightly."

⁸¹ "A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher Muslim Anger Persists," 2004, *Pew Global Attitudes Project* <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=796>.

arrests of suspected terrorists in Germany. Seventy percent of Germans said they were less confident that the U.S. wants to promote democracy.⁸² When questioned about what they thought the U.S.’s real motives were in the War on Terror, as indicated in the graph below, 60 percent of Germans said to control Middle East oil; 47 percent believed the U.S.’s ultimate goal is to dominate the world; 40 percent said to target unfriendly Muslim governments and 30 percent said to defend Israel.⁸³ Put more bluntly, German public opinion towards U.S. foreign policy has shifted from being somewhat positive or nonchalant during the Clinton years to being highly unconfident and distrustful at present.

Graph 3



Questions asked of those who believe the war on terrorism is not a sincere effort, or have mixed views. Percentages show the percent of the TOTAL POPULATION who believe each is an important reason the U.S. is conducting the war on terrorism.

“A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists,” 2004, *Pew Global Attitudes Survey* <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=795> .

Naturally, the negativity towards the Iraq war and the War on Terror influenced public opinion perceptions of the U.S. as a global leader. In 2004, as shown in the graph below, when asked the question “how desirable is it that the United States exerts strong leadership in world affairs”⁸⁴ 44 percent of Germans thought that it was somewhat

⁸² *Trends 2005*, 119.


⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data 2004*, 8 <http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/index.cfm?id=12> .

undesirable, and 16 percent thought that it was very undesirable.⁸⁵ Only three percent of Germans thought that U.S leadership was very desirable and 34 percent thought that it was somewhat desirable; yet, before the Iraq war in 2002, 68 percent of Germans had a favorable impression of U.S. leadership, and only 27 percent were negative.⁸⁶

Graph 4

Desirability of U.S. Leadership in Germany



German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data 2004*, 8
<http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/index.cfm?id=12> .

The greatly increased negativity among Germans towards the U.S. as a global leader was part of a general trend in Europe during this period, as the policies of the Bush administration resulted in a huge loss of global confidence. However, unlike many other European countries, in Germany disfavor toward American foreign policy occurred across the political spectrum and not just among the left wing parties. The German public experienced a decreasing transatlantic sentiment among both the center left and the center right political parties. Statistical analysis conducted in 2004⁸⁷ based on the German

⁸⁵ *Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data 2004*, 8.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Asmus, Everts and Isernia, “Across the Atlantic.” The authors developed a methodological tool to determine those European publics that favored closer transatlantic relations and those that did not. They aggregated responses to those questions in the 2004 German Marshall Survey about “the “warmth” of

Marshall Fund surveys, indicated that the differences in opinion between the center left and center right in Germany towards relations with the U.S. are smaller than in the past. Historically, the major center right party (CDU) has generally been rather pro U.S. while the center left SPD has been more critical of U.S. foreign policy. This remained true in the lead up to the Iraq war when the CDU was concerned about a breaking down of relations with the U.S. However, today the difference between center left and center right in German politics with regards to opinions about relations with the U.S. is much smaller: 54 percent of center-left Germans and 61 percent of center-right Germans are supportive of relations with the U.S.⁸⁸ However, according to this survey the center left in Germany tends to have a significantly more favorable opinion of the U.S. than center-left parties in other European countries.⁸⁹ At the same time, as shown in the table below, the center right has declined in its favorability towards relations with the U.S. to levels resembling center right parties in other European countries. These findings are supported by the 2005 German Marshall Survey. When asked about their feelings towards the U.S. on a scale from 1-100, Germans on average gave a lukewarm response of 51 (only 1 point better than their responses towards Russia).⁹⁰ Additionally, the difference in response between conservatives and the left was small, 55 to 47.⁹¹

feeling toward the U.S. and the EU respectively; the desirability of American global leadership; NATO's essentiality; whether or not the U.S. and the E.U. share common values and finally, the importance of having allies when acting militarily." Ibid., 5.

⁸⁸ Asmus, Everts and Isernia, "Across the Atlantic," 7.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Constanze Stelzenmüller, "Leidenschaftslose 51 Grad" *Financial Times Deutschland*, September 7, 2005.

⁹¹ Stelzenmüller, "Leidenschaftslose 51 Grad."

Table 2

TABLE 5: ATLANTICISM BY
POLITICAL ALIGNMENT (IN %)

	Center-Left	Center-Right	Difference
Germany	54	61	7
France	34	50	16
Italy	45	78	33
Netherlands	56	74	18
Portugal	43	66	23
Poland	47	55	8
Slovakia	32	53	21
Spain	23	56	33
United Kingdom	66	66	0
USA	79	60	19

Ronald Asmus, Philip P. Everts, and Pierangelo Isernia, “Across the Atlantic and the Political Aisle: The Double Devide in U.S.-European Relations,” *German Marshall Fund*.(2004): 7, <http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/index.cfm?year=2004> .

During this same time period, Germans showed much greater support for a more independent European foreign policy. In 2004, 73 percent of Germans thought the E.U. should become a super power like the U.S.⁹² Only nine percent thought the U.S. should remain the world’s only super power.⁹³ However, those Germans who think that the E.U. should become a super power do so because they think this would improve relations with the U.S. In the 2004 German Marshal Survey, when those who thought the E.U. should become a superpower were asked the question “Do you think a more powerful European Union is desirable because it would be able.... A. To compete more effectively with the U.S. B. To cooperate more affectively with the U.S.” 70 percent answered to cooperate more effectively, while 25 percent answered to compete more effectively.⁹⁴ Though the German population wishes to see a more independent European foreign policy and an E.U. that is stronger militarily, there is little desire to compete with the U.S. Instead a

⁹²*Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data 2004*, 9.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

stronger Europe is seen as a means to change the dynamics of international relations and facilitate cooperation.

Public opinion polling about international relations issues indicates that the real opinion clash on foreign policy occurs between Europeans and Republicans. Democrats and Europeans actually have similar opinions on foreign policy issues:

The gap across the Atlantic is linked to the gap within the United States itself. Simply put, American Democrats are much closer to European public opinion than are Republicans. As a result, the real divide in the transatlantic relationship is between a conservative segment of the American political spectrum and Europe. That gap shows up both in attitudes towards power and the use of force and in the growing gap between Democrats and Republicans on an array of European security issues, multilateral institutions, and even the degree of “warmth” felt towards a country like France. What really sets the U.S. apart from Europe is the existence of a significant segment of the American public—the hawks in the typology—that hold very different views on power and the use of force and which have no real European counterpoint in terms of political weight. This group also has a more critical view of Europe and the utilities of alliances.⁹⁵

The vast differences on foreign policy issues between the U.S. Republicans and hawks and the Germans would explain why the Bush administration’s foreign policy was rejected both on the left and the right sides of German politics. This would also explain why following the liberal distrust of U.S. foreign policy across the German political spectrum, one might find the social and nationalist reactions towards the U.S. Because German are already critical of U.S. democracy and foreign policy following the re-election of Bush, U.S. society and businesses would be seen as reflecting the same cultural differences that manifested themselves in the foreign policy of the Bush administration.

⁹⁵ Asmus, Everts and Isernia, “Across the Atlantic,” 11.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL ANTI-AMERICANISM

Katzenstein and Keohane look at social anti-Americanism as occurring because of the differences between the European states with their vast social systems and parliamentary governments and the U.S. with its limited social network and presidential form of government. The fundamental difference between these two systems is the relationship between the individual and the state. In general, a German interacts with his government much more than an American does with his. The German social market economy relies on more structured social arrangements, long term planning, state intervention, and cooperative arrangements. By contrast, the American model stresses individual choice, competition, and limited government regulation of business.

Katzenstein and Keohane make the argument that the neo-liberal policies that the U.S. pushes causes social anti-American sentiment to become more intense. Because social market economies are often forced to make difficult adjustments in order to adapt to new global economic conditions, populations can come to see the U.S. domestic system as reflecting global inequalities brought about by U.S. neo-liberal policies. The first section of this chapter examines the social critique of the U.S. from historical and political perspectives; the second looks at social bias in the German media; the third is a case study of an anti-American segment of the German television station N-tv; the fourth section examines the content of popular magazines prior to the second Iraq war; and the final section looks at attitudes towards U.S. businesses.

The Social Critique of the U.S. and U.S. Foreign Policy

Historically, when the U.S. government has pursued unpopular policies abroad, foreign populations have criticized the government and not the U.S. people. However, during the Bush administration, populations began to associate U.S. foreign policy (what the government does) with Americans (who Americans are).¹ In Germany, according to Pew polling data, opinions about Americans as a people remained relatively more or less the same until 2005, after the re-election of George W. Bush.² Unlike in many other countries, German opinion of Americans did not decline much during 2003 and 2004. It was only after Bush's re-election that public opinion of Americans dipped.

These findings are supported by another Pew survey that asked those Germans with unfavorable opinions towards the U.S. if the problem with the U.S. was mostly Bush, America in general, or both. In 2003, 74 percent of Germans said the problem with the U.S. was Bush, 22 percent blamed America in general, and three percent answered both.³ In 2005, 65 percent said the problem was Bush, 29 percent blamed America in general, and five percent thought the problem was both.⁴

The idea of choosing a middle way, that is, developing a society that formed a middle ground between the mass culture of the U.S. and the planned economy of the Soviet Union, was a central idea for the moderate German parties. "The notion of mass-man and mass-civilization had long informed the European view of Americanism and Americanization, the latter of which was often presented as a soft or conformist

¹ Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, *America Against the World: How We are Different and Why We are Disliked* (New York: Times Books, 2005), 29.

² "U.S. Image Up slightly, But still Negative: American Character Gets Mixed Reviews," Country Facts sheet: Germany, 2005, *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/247germany.pdf>.

³ "U.S. Image Up Slightly."

⁴ Ibid.

totalitarianism of mental manipulation, herd mentality, and thoughtless conformity.”⁵ It was to some extent this perceived potential for “group think’ and extremism in American society, that drove German worries over America’s foreign policy:

Arguing in 1949 for a “conservative social democracy” based upon a “true and honest socialism,” the liberal, former head of the Weimar DDP, Willy Hellpach, ridiculed any trace of “vulgar-cultural conceit of European superiority,” but went on to warn against the ingrained American tendency toward unthinking excess on a vast collective scale: “The most dangerous inner enemy of all predominant power (*Vormacht*) is excessiveness (*Unmaß*). Hellpach was referring not only to tendencies in American military-strategic power... but also to its inherent civilizational dynamic, which showed a surfeit of escalating individual desire and collective self-aggrandizement in the clutches of self-righteousness.”⁶

So, historically, there has been a tendency in Germany to reject the commercialization and massification of society and to criticize the U.S. as being an overly commercialized, overly individualistic society. The German social-state was to be centered on concepts of community so that “if one refers to actual institutional structures and socioeconomic frameworks in practice, it is probably more apt to speak of the “Scandinavization” rather than the “Americanization” of West Germany.”⁷

The social economic system in Germany varies greatly from that found in the U.S. While the German social model is based on cooperation and more rigid structures, the U.S. model focuses on competition and a loosely structured plural system. Today, the economic dilemma has forced Germany to try to some degree to adopt the “Anglo-American” economic model.

⁵ Michael Ermarth, “Counter-Americanism and Critical Currents in West German Reconstruction 1945-1960: The German Lesson Confronts the American Way of Life,” in *Americanization and anti-Americanism: the German encounter with American culture after 1945*, ed. Alexander Stephan, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005).

⁶ Ermarth, “Counter-Americanism and Critical Currents,” 38.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 40.

Nevertheless, it is the differences in how the individual should relate to society, how people perceive society, and the role that institutions should play that create the normative differences between the U.S. and Germany:

German social policy and the variety of capitalism that accompanies it have created a different sort of everyday life than exists in America. They have promoted different expectations about security and risk, about work and leisure, about entitlement and inequality... In the last two decades the German-American rivalries about which variety of capitalism and which kinds of social policy are desirable and possible have been contentious in and of themselves. Moreover, they have fed into disputes about military and foreign policy. That has been especially true in the post-cold war era, when the values embodied in the American model of capitalism—the privacy of the individual over the collective, the national over the international, the short term over the long view, and profit over all else—guide foreign policy as well.⁸

While Germans share the U.S.'s commitment to capitalism and democracy, the population is highly critical of the perceived *U.S. style* of capitalism and democracy. Because Germans tend to think that society should play a more significant role in protecting the individual, they are prone to dislike many U.S. practices in both politics and business.

Germans tend to see the free market doctrine as general guidelines for policy, not something that needs to be religiously pursued. The so called Anglo-American model of capitalism is equated by many Germans with greater social inequality and the sacrifice of long term planning and cooperative governance in favor of ad hocism and cutthroat “cowboy” business practices. Many Germans believe that this type of system exploits workers and damages the environment in order to maximize profits for the excessively wealthy. At the same time, Germans tend to disapprove of certain aspects of American democracy such as the large role that business interests have in elections and government.

⁸ Mary Nolan, “Anti-Americanism and Americanization in Germany,” *Politics & Society* vol. 33. No. 1. (March 2005).

The 2002 Pew survey found that 58 percent of Germans disliked American-style business practices⁹ and 45 percent disliked American-style democracy.¹⁰

This disagreement between the continental European social states and the U.S. over business practices reflects fundamental differences in opinion among peoples about the free market system and conceptions of the good life. “In Germany, and in many Eastern European countries, people who said it is up to the government to ensure that no citizens are in need tend also to reject American-style democracy. By contrast, people who favor a more minimalist government role in providing a social safety net favor the American form of democracy by higher margins.”¹¹ The differences between the two economic systems are not superficial but reflect cultural differences as well. “While more than half of Americans believed owners should run businesses or appoint company managers; only... three in ten Germans agreed”.¹² The German cooperative economic system features a markedly different relationship between employers and employees. While in the U.S., business owners possess almost complete legal power, in Germany employees and unions take part in managerial decision making. And, while unions in the U.S. usually play very little role in company planning, German unions are oftentimes by law given a voice in a firm’s decision making process.¹³ Further reflecting these cultural

⁹ *What the World thinks 2002, How Global Publics View: Their Lives, Their countries, The World, America 2002*, Pew Research center for People and the Press, 68 <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/165.pdf>.

¹⁰ *What the World thinks*, 64.

¹¹ Kohut and Stokes, *America Against the World*, 123.

¹² *Ibid.*, 134.

¹³ “This system is highly regulated by a legal and political framework. The framework includes both law (including the Works Constitution Act) and regularized bargaining among centralized interest groups (business and labor). This ‘corporatist’ bargaining takes place in a variety of forums and at a number of levels, from (nationally coordinated) regional collective bargaining, to political processes that result in social and labor market policies, to the tripartite institutions that run West Germany’s vocations education system.” (P. 98) The author continues, “In spite of West German industry’s often cited shop-floor flexibility, management is therefore not free to reorganize work, given the myriad of personnel issues involved, without extensive discussion and negotiation with the works council.” (P. 99) Source: Lowell

differences, according to the World Values Survey only 22 percent of Germans believed that children should be taught the value of hard work compared with 60 percent of Americans.¹⁴

Though Germany and the U.S. have similar liberal values, systems Americans are more doubtful of the role of government and more resistant to government regulations.¹⁵ Americans are far less supportive of government intervention in their everyday lives, instead preferring individual freedom over government support; 58 percent of Americans believe that it is more important that they are free of government to pursue goals, and only 34 percent think that it is more important that the government guarantees that no one is in need.¹⁶ Germans, on the other hand, feel that it is much more important that the government guarantees that there is no one in need.¹⁷ Only 39 percent believe that it is more important to be free of government, while 57 percent thought that it is more important that the government provide a safety net.¹⁸

Much of the difference in perception between Germany and the Bush administration could be attributed to cultural differences between the U.S. and Germany caused by two differently structured societies. The idea of the free spirited American who flaunts the system and achieves success as a self-made businessman, or the idea of sports as active competition/rather than recreation,¹⁹ conflicts with the German notions of

Turner, *Democracy at Work: Changing World Markets and the Future of Labor Unions*, (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

¹⁴ Kohut and Stokes, *America Against the World*, 135, was originally in *World Values Survey, 1999-2000*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 55.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ In the U.S. competitive high school sports are taken much more seriously than in Germany. Compare a high school or college football game in America to a soccer league at a German University.

cooperation. The disagreements between the U.S. and Germany to a certain extent could be attributed at a very basic level to differing perceptions about social relations.

The German political economic system was designed to give preponderance to politics over economics (the normative over the material). The idea that the economy should serve the people and that people should not serve the economy is central to parties like the SPD, whose party platform begins: “The social democrats advance the democratic people’s movement of the 19th century and strive for both democracy and socialism: self determination for human beings in politics and at work.”²⁰ On the other hand, the CDU platform argues that:

The individual and the community are dependent on solidarity being demonstrated by everyone. Every citizen has a right to experience and an obligation to practice solidarity, and contributes through his or her work or achievements towards enabling the entire community to act in the interests of the individual... where the capacity of an individual or of independent association or groups is overtaxed, the community as a whole and the state have to provide assistance... The CDU confirms its beliefs in these mutual responsibilities—which are a far cry from both unfettered individualism and collectivism.²¹

The SPD platform is somewhat post-national, written to apply not just to Germans but to the entire world. The word “human” generally replaces the word “German.” And the platform makes constant reference to creating a world order based on social democratic principles and the rejection of all forms of violence. The CDU’s concept of solidarity and ethical Communitarianism stresses the importance of the interaction between society and individual and rejects the notion of “unfettered individualism.”

²⁰ *Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands*, 8
http://www.spd.de/show/1682028/spd_berlinerprogramm.pdf . (accessed April, 5 2007).

²¹ *Principles and Program of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany: Adopted by the 5th Party Conference Hamburg 21th to 23rd February 1994*. <http://www.cdu.de/en/doc/partyprinciples.pdf> .

These ideas have their origins in the *Ahlen Economic Programme* (February 1947) which represented a highpoint for Christian socialist ideas in Germany.²² The *Ahlen Economic Programme* sought to unite socialist government with private enterprise.²³ It was based in the belief that “many abuses of the Nazi state had derived from the political misuse of the capitalist system.”²⁴ The embrace of Christian socialist principles was seen as the only answer for Germany’s political problems.²⁵

In order to better understand the increasing negative views towards the U.S, in 2005 Pew conducted a survey to discover how various countries viewed Americans.²⁶ Those surveyed were asked if Americans are hardworking, inventive, and honest. They were also asked if Americans are greedy, violent, rude, and immoral. Germans ranked Americans highly on all three positive characteristics: “honest” (52 percent), “inventive” (76 percent), and “hardworking” (67 percent).²⁷ However, about half of Germans (49 percent) thought that Americans were violent and greedy, 31 percent thought Americans were immoral; only 12 percent thought Americans were rude.²⁸ Interestingly, Germans had perhaps the most positive opinions of Americans from those countries surveyed. A

²² Geoffrey Pridham, *Christian Democracy in Western Germany: the CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945-1976* (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 31.

²³ Pridham, *Christian Democracy*, 31.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.

²⁵ *Ibid.* The extent to which the National Socialist experience influenced the Christian Socialism of the CDU is clearly shown in the party documents of the 1940’s. The June 1945 *Kölner Leitsätze* reads: “National Socialism has plunged Germany into a catastrophe which is without parallel in her long history. It has covered the German name in the eyes of the whole world with shame and humiliation. All this would not have overwhelmed us if wide circles of our nation had not let themselves be governed by an avaricious materialism. In this way too many fell victim to National Socialist demagoguery, which promised each German a paradise on earth.” (Pridham, *Christian Democracy*, 25)

The March 1946 *Naheim-Hüsten Programme* reads: “. . . the Christian outlook on life must again replace the materialistic outlook, and instead of the principles resulting from materialism must come the principles of Christian ethics. They must be the determining factor in the rebuilding of the state and in fixing the limits of its power, in the rights and duties of individuals, for economics and social life, for our culture and for the relationship between peoples.” (Pridham, *Christian Democracy*, 25)

²⁶ “U.S. Image Up Slightly.”

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

lower percentage of Germans viewed Americans in negative terms and a majority viewed Americans as having many positive characteristics.

Social Bias in the German Media

During the days preceding the war in Iraq, the popular German media portrayed Bush as an arrogant cowboy who embodied much of the negative aspects of American society and culture: individualistic, violent, self-centered and greedy. The German media soon realized that by tapping into anti-Americanism or social critique and adding elements of sensationalism and fear they could increase sales and profit. The result of this massive media effort was that in Germany, as in most of Western Europe, anti-Bush opinions were very strong, especially among young people. “Those under thirty were the most likely to have the least confidence in the U.S. president. Two-thirds of young Britons, four-fifths of young Germans, and nine-tenths of young French men and woman held anti-Bush sentiment.”²⁹

Media Tenor, a leading German-based international media and journalism research institution, has concluded that German TV news is highly critical not just of Bush and U.S. foreign policy, but also of U.S. society, the U.S. economy, the U.S. government, and the U.S. in general.³⁰ On the other hand, German news is basically never critical of the U.S. justice system, congress, politics or lobbying.³¹ The data, as represented in the graph below, indicate that it is possible that the major news channels in


²⁹ Kohut, 35.

³⁰ “Liebesentzug in Alten Europa: Warum die Berichterstattung über Politik und Wirtschaft für U.S.-Marken zum Image-Problem wird,” *Medien Tenor Forschungsbericht* 149- 1. (2005): 115. Study examined 14,703 times when the U.S. was mentioned, in seven German TV stations during the time period 1.01. 2002-3.29.2005. The study examined in each instance if the U.S. is framed in positive, neutral, or negative terms.

³¹ “Liebesentzug,” *Medien Tenor Forschungsbericht*, 115.

Germany paint a picture of the U.S. that is far from accurate.³² They can be quite critical of U.S. society but are rarely critical of U.S. congress, politics or lobbying, the areas that Americans and American journalists constantly criticize and debate, worry about, and see as the root causes of U.S. foreign policy problems.

Graph 5



“Liebesentzug in Alten Europa: Warum die Berichterstattung über Politik und Wirtschaft für U.S.-Marken zum Image-Problem wird,” *Medien Tenor Forschungsbericht* 149- 1. (2005): 115.

Stranger still, the German TV-news has become more negative towards the U.S. economy and businesses and U.S. society than it is towards the U.S. government, almost as if trying to draw a connection between society and business practices and foreign policy. Following the persistently negative coverage of the U.S.’s massive effort to

³² The graph is titled “Evaluation of U.S.-Protagonists in German TV-News.” The red (left) represents negative statements, the yellow (center) neutral, and the green (right) positive. From top to bottom the categories are: U.S. economy, U.S. society, U.S. states, U.S. in general, U.S. government, U.S. justice, U.S. congress, and U.S. politics/lobbying.

relieve the Tsunami victims in Indonesia, the *European Wall Street Journal* gave this explanation; “Ideological opposition to the war still feeds the general opinion that leads European journalists to present a reality that is different from the reality presented by media outlets elsewhere.”³³

There is, however, a connection between anti-Americanism in the German media and U.S. foreign policy. A study by Media Tenor indicated that negativity towards the U.S. in Europe’s most publicly influential media increased dramatically in January 2006, when the European media began to pay more attention to the Iraq conflict as well as to the U.S. relationship with Iran, Syria, and Palestine.³⁴ The German state-run *ARD Tages-Themen* and *ZDF-heute Journal* emerged as the most U.S. critical mainstream news outlets in Europe.³⁵ The relationship between some of these critiques of U.S. society and critiques of the U.S.’s behavior in the international arena are obvious. When the U.S. acts as the unilateralist superpower, it is explained as being the result of a societal structure that is inherently corrupt and overly individualistic.

N-tv Portrays the U.S. as the Savage Society

N-tv is a main stream German TV channel that focuses on news, current events, and business. It is broadcast both in Germany and worldwide via the internet. A significant amount of this channel focuses on business relations with the U.S. and political events in Washington D.C. U.S. society is regularly examined as part of the

³³ “International Coverage of the U.S. Bush’s Harshest Critics: coverage of the U.S. in selected European and Arab Media Outlets,” *The Wall Street Journal, Europe*. Febuary 24, 2005, 101.

³⁴ “Bush hat bei Europas Journalisten einen schweren Stand: Internationale Media Tenor-Analyse: ARD und ZDF sehen USA am kritischsten,” Media Tenor, March 14, 2006 <http://www.mediatenor.de/newsletter.php> .

³⁵ “Bush hat bei Europas Journalisten.”

“Foreign Report” and also in foreign coverage specials that sometimes play between the regular news broadcasts. However, although the political and business coverage of the U.S is quite good, N-tv intentionally paints a negatively biased picture of American society.

A notable example of N-tv’s attitudes towards American society was the “Americans eating from the garbage” segment. The news for this night keeps showing clips of people rooting in garbage with the voiceover “coming up, Americans eat from garbage” so that the viewer thinks he is going to see a segment on poverty in the U.S. However, the actual segment covers a group of young people in New York who scavenge for food out of the garbage as an alternative life style. The focus is on how wasteful U.S. society is, so the segment keeps showing pictures of the food that restaurants and bakeries in New York throw away along with statistics about how much food America wastes. From the way N-tv depicts it, Americans are so wealthy and wasteful that the local dumpster is a veritable free super market. But bakeries and restaurants throw a lot of food away everywhere, not just in the U.S. N-tv could have shown the same segment with people in Berlin. However, they would not have had the opportunity to depict the U.S. as the epitome of sloth and waste. The more socially relevant, and less sensational subject hinted at from the clips, poverty, is ignored.

The Iraq War as the Product of an Inferior Society

A commonly held belief among Germans is that the U.S. invaded Iraq solely out of the desire to obtain its oil resources.³⁶ This viewpoint reflects the desire to see U.S.

³⁶ Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, „Die Mär vom Ölkrieg,“ *Die Zeit* (Issue 5. 2003), 5
<http://www.zeit.de/2003/05/01Leit1_05_2f03> .

society as being greedy and materialistic and is rooted in old clichés and stereotypes from the German romantic period.³⁷ From this point of view, the U.S. invaded Iraq in order to obtain the oil to maintain its destructive living habits. The actions of the U.S. as a state reflect the characteristics of an arrogant and self-centered society and government.³⁸

Deshalb ruft von links Oskar Lafontaine ins Land: „Es geht um Öl.“ Von rechts geißelt Jürgen Todenhöfer die „rohstoffpolitische Kolonisierung“ des Irak. Auf dem Titelblatt des Spiegels wird eine Kreuzung aus Maschinengewehr und Zapfhahn zum Symbol Amerikas. Keine der Großdemonstrationen vom Wochenende kam ohne den Slogan „Blut für Öl“ aus.³⁹

< Therefore Oskar Lafontaine calls from the left: “It’s about Oil.” From the right Jürgen Todenhöfer castigates the colonization of Iraq driven by the need for raw materials. On the cover of *Der Spiegel* a cross between an assault rifle and a gas pump is the symbol of America. None of the big demonstrations over the weekend could get by without the slogan “Blood for Oil.”>

While it is obvious that oil was one of many factors in the Bush administration’s decision to enter Iraq, this one dimensional perspective of the politics surrounding the Iraq war, U.S. foreign policy, and American culture and society, indicates a skewed perception of reality. When examining what was written in the major weekly papers and journals, one finds that the ideological orientation of the magazine directly corresponds to the level of criticism and anti-Americanism. In other words, the magazines that are ideologically left wing or far right contain deeply ingrained social bias towards U.S. society. So while the moderate left liberal *Die Zeit* may be highly critical and emotional towards U.S. foreign policy and the Bush administration, it refrains from writing about U.S. foreign policy in a style that implies that Americans or American society are

³⁷ Gesine Schwan, *Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: Kontinuität und Wandel nach 1945* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999).

³⁸ Andrei Markovits, *Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007) .

³⁹ „Die Mär vom Ölkrieg,“ *Die Zeit.*, 5.

inherently flawed. This would not go over well with *Die Zeit* readership. For example, the most extreme statement in the *Die Zeit* during the lead up to the Iraq war was:

“In Wahrheit gehe es nicht um Freiheit und Menschenrechte sondern ums Öl, um geostrategische Positionen, um die Weltherrschaft,“ die George W. Bushs Vereinigte Staaten „mit nachgerade messianischem Eifer und Erlösungspathos“ verfolgen.⁴⁰

<”In reality, it is not about freedom and human rights, but oil, about geo-strategic positions, and world domination” which George Bush’s United States pursue “with well-nigh messianic zealously and messianic pathos.”>

This statement was far outside the norm of what is found in *Die Zeit*. Note, however, that the negativity is geared more toward the Bush administration and U.S. foreign policy. It does not imply that there is something wrong with Americans, rather the statement implies that people in the U.S. are being manipulated by their government.

However, if one compares the critical coverage of U.S. foreign policy in *Die Zeit* with what is written in the left wing magazines and the right wing *Junge Freiheit*, the bias of the left and far right towards U.S. society is obvious. There is also substantial overlap in the substantive content between the left and the far right.

Der Spiegel contains such catch phrases as, “on the hunt for oil resources”⁴¹ and the “energy gluttonous America.”⁴² This issue also features a series of articles implying that the war in Iraq was being planned because Bush, along with many members of his administration, had connections to the oil industry.

Freitag-Die Ost-West-Wochenzeitung is more explicit, connecting the morally corrupt U.S. society directly with foreign policy. *Freitag* made a habit of arguing during the lead-up to the Iraq war that, because Iraq has the second largest oil reserve in the

⁴⁰ Uwe Srp, *Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: Theoretische und empirische Analyse basierend auf dem Irakkrieg 2003* (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac, 2005), 127.

⁴¹ “Kein Blut für Öl: Worum es im Irak wirklich geht,” *Der Spiegel* January 13, 2003, 9.

⁴² “Kein Blut für Öl,” *Der Spiegel*, 100.

world, the war is really about “unrestricted driving, affordable central heating, and barbaric climate change,”⁴³ and Americans are “a hopelessly guilty national economy, a people of investors, that is betrayed of its retirement pensions by cheating corporations.”⁴⁴ The far right *Junge Freiheit* also connects Iraqi oil with American inferiority. The magazine states that America:

In the course of their history, committed genocide with the Indians, enslaved the Blacks, atomized the civilians in Japan during the second world war, and in the last 20 years bombed Libya, Grenada, Iran, Panama, Iraq, Somalia, Serbia, Kosovo, Croatia, Sudan, and Afghanistan.⁴⁵

The oil argument basically said U.S. foreign policy is inherently evil because Americans are immoral. Below is a list of the terms and phrases used in reference to the U.S. in major German magazines prior to the Iraq war.

⁴³ “Vergeblicher Streit: NACHHILFE BEI RUMSFELD Das alte Europe hat noch nicht begriffen, dass Moral ist, wenn man es trotzdem macht,” *Freitag-Die Ost-West-Wochenzeitung*, January 31, 2003 <http://www.freitag.de/2003/06/03060101.php>

⁴⁴ “Vergeblicher Streit,” *Freitag*.

Table 3

Terms used Towards the U.S.A.

DER SPIEGEL

Americas war against Saddam, new crusaders, wild anger and enormous thirst for revenge has gripped the U.S.A, arrogance and incompetence of the conquerors, energy gluttonous America, Rambo's crusade against Islam, baiting, threatening, counting, conceited world power.

DIE ZEIT

Intoxicated from the feeling of power, the super power freed from its chains, excessive power creates excessive courage, giant, imperial decline, US-daredevilry, World domination.

Freitag

Legitimate successors of imperial Rome, unrestricted driving, air conditioning, absolute world domination, power hunger, oil thirst, American colonial domination.

Junge Freiheit

Cultural superiority of the U.S.A., have brought together and assimilated all cultures: ghetto building, drug addiction, Analphabetisierung, cold and insensitive, desire the war, moral sermons of a country who committed genocide against the Indians, enslaved the Blacks, atomized the civilian population in Japan, God has chosen the USA, to rescue the world, crude election beliefs, batch consciousness, omnipotence of the U.S. is in the military.

Stern

A land full of shit angry cowboys, religious fanatics, culturelessness and arrogant, hurra-patriotism, want to win another war, bewitched world power, giant, rambocratie, haughtiness, big mouthed, suspicion of the international community

Uwe Srp, *Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: Theoretische und empirische Analyse basierend auf dem Irakkrieg 2003* (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac, 2005), 193 .

The Effects of Anti-American Rhetoric in the Media: Declining Opinion of U.S.


Companies after Bush is Reelected

The German media's negativity towards the U.S., and the anti-U.S. business sentiment have caused a serious image problem for U.S. businesses in Germany.

Research conducted by Media Tenor indicates very strongly that the German media consistently displays U.S. business in a very negative light. Their study, of 34 major print and television media, conducted from January 2003 to March 2005, showed conclusively that there is a strong dislike of U.S. business in the German media.⁴⁶ The graph below shows the results of their study.⁴⁷

Graph 6

3 Bewertung von Unternehmen mit US-Bezug 01/2003 bis 03/2005



Saldo der positiven und negativen Bewertungen

Quelle: Medien Tenor
01.01.2003 – 31.03.2005

Basis: 43.756 Passagen über Unternehmen, in denen hauptsächlich ein US-Bezug angesprochen war, in 34 Medien

“Liebesentzug in Alten Europa: Warum die Berichterstattung über Politik und Wirtschaft für U.S.-Marken zum Image-Problem wird,” *Medien Tenor Forschungsbericht* 149- 1. (2005).

⁴⁶ “Liebesentzug,” *Medien Tenor Forschungsbericht*.
Study examined 43,756 passages about businesses with a U.S. relationship. Study used Bild, die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Tageszeitung; ARD Tagesschau und Tagesthemen, Fakt, Kontraste, Monitor, Panorama, Plusminus, Report (BR), Report (SWR), ZDF heute und heute journal, Berlin direct, Frontal 21, WISO, RTL Aktuell, Sat. 1 News, ProSieben Nachrichten; Bild am Samstag, Die Zeit, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntageszeitung, Focus, Rheinischer Merkur, Spiegel, Stern, Super Illu, Welt am Sonntag.
⁴⁷ The graph is title “Evaluation of Business with U.S.-relationship: January 2003 to March 2005.” The red indicates that business were evaluated negatively the green indicates they were evaluated positively.

The negativity towards U.S. companies reflects negativity towards U.S. foreign policy.⁴⁸ In a *Global Marketing Insite, Inc.* poll 20 percent of European and Canadian consumers said they made conscious efforts to avoid American products because of U.S. foreign policy, and half distrusted American companies.⁴⁹ Today, American companies are seen less as innovative leaders and more as bullies who have no respect for local cultures or other people's way of doing things. Already in 2004, 18 percent of Germans said they would avoid buying certain U.S. goods in the future (among Europeans this was about average),⁵⁰ 58 percent of Germans felt negatively towards U.S. multinational companies.⁵¹ According to international marketing expert Allyson Stewart-Allen:

The anti-American sentiment overseas is at risk of growing still further as Europeans perceive they have another four years of distasteful American foreign policies . . . If anything, the appointment of Condoleezza Rice, who is seen as even more hawkish in Europe than Colin Powell, may exacerbate this perception in Europe . . . American brands are at risk of suffering in the long-term unless they make more deliberate efforts to look and act like local brands, use local marketing tactics and obtain local knowledge much like Ford Motor Co. has successfully done with their Volvo, Jaguar and Land Rover Marques. According to the data, 29% of German respondents who indicated they would avoid American products thought Ford was extremely American, and 30% of this group said they would avoid purchasing Ford vehicles. Ford's chief competitor, General Motors, was not as fortunate: 56% of the same group of respondents thought GM was an extremely American company and 42% said they would definitely avoid GM's products. American companies shouldn't apologize or hide the fact that their heritage is American, but it is no longer an option to be their key unique selling point in Europe in the way it used to be.⁵²

A dislike of U.S. foreign policy combined with social bias against U.S. businesses in the media could result in a negative attitude towards U.S. businesses in Germany. This

⁴⁸ "European Backlash: International Consumers Shun European Brands," *Integrated Solutions for Market Intelligence: Global Marketing Insite, Inc.* November 22, 2004 <http://www.gmi-mr.com/gmipoll/release.php?p=20041122> (accessed February 17, 2007).

⁴⁹ "Half of European Consumers Distrust American Companies" *Integrated Solutions for Market Intelligence: Global Market Insite, Inc.* December 27, 2004 <http://www.gmi-mr.com/gmipoll/release.php?p=20041227> (accessed February 17, 2007).

⁵⁰ "European Backlash," *Global Marketing Insite, Inc.*

⁵¹ "Half of European Consumers Distrust," *Global Marketing Insite, Inc.*

⁵² "European Backlash," *Global Marketing Insite, Inc.*

sentiment is likely to be intensified because of the view that U.S. international businesses worsen the unemployment problem in Germany. Because those working in the media favor German economic and business models over American models, they find it easy to portray the U.S. in a very negative light. The behavior of U.S. companies comes to be seen as reflecting trends in U.S. society and U.S. foreign policy. Of course this has been made extremely easy because of the numerous business and financial scandals in the U.S.; Enron, Halliburton, and the Iraq contract scandals are fantastic opportunities for writers and journalists who don't like the U.S. to connect selfish U.S. businesses with unpopular unilateral U.S. foreign policies. Hence, when German workers lose their jobs, the U.S. is blamed and the U.S. businesses suffer the negative fallout of foreign policies that they had nothing to do with. The next chapter will examine these economic issues in more depth.

CHAPTER 5

SOVEREIGN-NATIONALIST ANTI-AMERICANISM: GERMANY UNDER ATTACK FROM NEO-LIBERALISM

Because of their history, Germans are not particularly nationalistic today. However, there is some of what Katzenstein and Keohane describe as nationalist anti-American sentiment among the far right, and some elements of the left in Germany, though it is not widespread among the population as a whole. Although themes dealing with international economics and the German economy are widely discussed in the German media, the debate takes place within the realm of “what should Germany do to meet the challenges facing it.” However, some left wing parties, such as the SPD and PDS, and far right groups, such as the NPD, attempt to play on people’s economic fears and worries by focusing on perceived U.S. “cowboy capitalism” and U.S. businesses as being the source of Germany’s problems. To put this in perspective it is necessary to look at the problems facing the German social state in the process of globalization. The first section looks at America as a threat to the German state. The second section examines the crisis of the German economy. The third section examines German public opinion on globalization and international economics. The fourth section is a qualitative analysis of the popular left wing print media in Germany. The fifth section examines the 2005 federal elections and the use of anti-Americanism as a political tool. The final section is an examination of German identity construction through the use of the U.S. “other” by German and European elite.

America as a Threat to the German State

Anti-American critiques of U.S. society originate on both the left and right from much older German lines of thought:¹

In the foreground of left wing anti-Americanism stands the alleged capitalism and imperialism as well as the assumed extreme individualism and materialism. The democratic ideals were unmasked in their hypocrisy and their ambiguous implementation was bemoaned. In opposition to this, the right feared exactly these ideals. Conservatives turned away from the massification, the rule of the masses and the decadence of U.S. society, by turning away from the U.S. itself. Such talk is not contemporary in our times, but at least the supposed lack of history and culture are still found in the speech of old Europe—in point of fact across the entire political spectrum. The left can also grab hold of the old clichés of the right.²

Criticism existed among the orthodox Marxists in the early twentieth century³ on up through the present. These ideas rely on a highly skewed perception of the U.S. and U.S. society, along with the view that the U.S. is in some way a threat to Germany. Much of this type of thought finds its roots in the mass immigration of Germans to the U.S. during the 19th century. During this period the Prussian government and intellectual elite perceived the U.S. as being a threat, because it tended to assimilate German culture, and tried to discourage immigration to the U.S. Then, during the Nazi period, the U.S. was portrayed as being greedy, cultureless, and weak. Anti-American rhetoric has been used as a nationalist political tool in Germany for a long time.

Although the mainstream of the German political spectrum does not use anti-Americanism or nationalism as a political tool, some unscrupulous politicians have.

¹ Michale Hahn ed. *Nichts gegen Amerika: Linker Antiamerikanismus und seine lange Geschichte* (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag, 2003) , 19.

² Michale Hahn, *Nichts gegen Amerika*, 19.

³ Gesine Schwan *Antikommunismus und Antiameranismus in Deutschland: Kontinuität und Wandel nach 1945* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), 59.

These ideas are, of course, part of the core ideology of the far left and far right of the German political spectrum:

In diesem Sinne signalisiert Antiamerikanismus eine gewisse Widerborstigkeit, die sich sogar aus konservativen Orientierungen speisen kann. Insofern ist auch nicht erstaunlich, daß der Antiamerikanismus von rechts nach links gewandert sein soll. Unsere Rechten haben per ‘adaptive upgrading’ gelernt, daß die US-Variante des Imperialismus eleganter und erfolgreicher ist als die alteuropäische. Demgegenüber wird heutzutage schon links, wer wertkonservativ ist.⁴

<In this sense anti-Americanism signals a certain unruliness that can even be fed by conservative ideas. Therefore it is not surprising that anti-Americanism should have migrated from the right to the left. Our right wing has learned by means of ‘adaptive upgrading’ that the U.S. version of imperialism is more elegant and successful than the old European one. Today, on the other hand, you are already on the left if you have conservative values.>

The Crisis of the German Economy

In order to better understand nationalist responses towards the U.S. in Germany, it is necessary to examine the crisis of the Germany economy from a global perspective. This will allow better understanding of public sentiment and the political attitudes of some of the left.

In many ways, the German social market system is not well suited to deal with the current trends in the global economy. Because more countries are reaching the point where they can compete with Germany in the production of goods and services, markets have become more competitive, and there now exists strong incentives for firms to outsource to cheaper labor markets. Thus, while German international firms perform exceedingly well because of access to larger markets and the ability to find the cheapest

⁴ Schwan., 59. quote is from Prokla 89:7.

means of production, the domestic economy in Germany experiences a steady decline because of outsourcing and the lack of actual physical investment in Germany.⁵

Three factors can generally be attributed to causing the decline of Germany's domestic economy. First, the German style of development, using long term planning to gradually improve existing products to a level of quality that other countries could not reach, ceased to give Germany an advantage during the 1980s. As other countries, such as Japan, began to produce quality goods at less cost than Germany, demand for German products began to fall. German firms were not able to cut costs enough to continue to compete internationally because of the cooperative, socialized form of German government. This put firms in a position where they could either outsource, or, if they chose to continue production in Germany, employ fewer people to try to balance Germany's very high international wage costs.⁶

Though the German economy might have been able to adjust to rising international competition, German reunification placed it under tremendous stress. Rising taxes and growing debt, caused by the need to rebuild the former East Germany, weakened economic performance. While firms were facing intense competition from abroad, they did not receive the government support to develop new technologies and infrastructure to the extent that they had in the past. Instead, the German government poured huge sums of money into the eastern states to try to integrate East German businesses. The problems in eastern Germany were made worse because West German government and businesses, rather than taking advantage of the low costs in eastern Germany relative to those in Western Europe, chose to try to integrate the new states

⁵ Horst Siebert, *The German Economy* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

⁶ Wolfgang Streeck, Yamamura Kozo, eds., *The End of Diversity Prospects for German and Japanese Capitalism* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 14.

directly into western Germany's highly competitive economy. The new states inherited all the problems that West Germany was facing. Eastern Germany was unable to compete, because plants were operating at eastern block levels of productions while workers were being paid west German hourly wages and competing with West German firms that had twice the level of production. Besides this, East German businesses were subject to the competitiveness and hard currency regimes of the West. The result of all this was the outsourcing of jobs and resources from eastern Germany and low levels of job creation.

Today, investment in eastern infrastructure, pension supplements, and unemployment benefits account for about 100 billion dollars a year.⁷ To rein in debt, the Berlin Republic has reduced public spending in other areas, especially research and technology. However, these cuts “are in more than one way obstructive of a quality competitive social market economy. And world markets for German products, hardly large enough to provide for full employment in West Germany, and shrinking perhaps for reason of their own, have so far proven too small for Germany as a whole.”⁸

A third factor that is contributing to the decline of the German economy is the increasing mobility of labor and capital brought on by globalization. The institutionalized cooperative style of negotiation was centered in a world where banking, businesses, and labor were all more or less locked within a state's borders. Because they could not easily remove themselves from national constraints, the various segments within the German economy had incentives for mutual cooperation. The increasing easiness of transnational business had a profound effect on the entire German economic infrastructure. “By

⁷ Streeck and Yamamura, *The End of Diversity*, 12.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

increasing the mobility of capital and labor across national borders, it not only extricated the labor supply from national control but also enabled the financial sector to refuse to do service as a national utility.”⁹ Also, as German capital became more international, firms began to remove themselves from the constrictive relationship with their *Hausbanken* (customary banks) in favor of more flexible investment opportunities.¹⁰ In response to this, banks became more like Anglo-American investment banks and were less willing to engage in long term monitored investments than they had been in the past. This caused already struggling domestic German firms to be unable to obtain the same type of financial arrangements that they had had. The result of all this was high levels long term unemployment, especially in the east, and a good deal of pessimism about the future situation in Germany.

Recently the German economy has experienced a substantial upsurge with a huge number of new jobs created. Between March 2006 and March 2007 the number of Germans seeking employment decreased by 900,000.¹¹ According to a recent article in *Der Spiegel*:

In their spring report, released last Thursday, Germany’s five leading economic research institutes predicted that this year will bring 450,000 new jobs. Each day, 1,200 people find new jobs. And the German job machine is expected to continue running at similarly high levels in 2008.¹²

Because the German economy is experiencing levels of economic growth comparable to the U.S., tax revenues have increased dramatically and it is predicted that the federal

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Christian Reiermann, “Wirtschaftswunder 2.0: German Economic Boom Creates Job Machine,” *Spiegel Online International*, April 24, 2007, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,479149,00.html> (accessed May 20, 2007).

¹² Reiermann, “Wirtschaftswunder.”

budget will be balanced by 2008.¹³ Though economist are puzzled about why the German economy has improved so suddenly they attribute the economic reforms of the Schröder government and the relaxing of labor market regulations as contributing to the surge in productivity.¹⁴

Public Opinion

Conservative nationalist anti-Americanism is the protective reaction to perceived threats from outside of the nation state. In German society there are many doubts about the phenomenon of “Americanization.” At the same time, Germans are by and large very positive about global trade and the process of globalization as an abstract concept. As in most other countries, the modern life style is viewed with mixed emotions.

Although Germany benefits greatly from global trade and globalization, these same processes are also viewed as attributing to its problems. In many western European countries, global economic trends that create unemployment and the outsourcing of jobs are associated with the U.S. neo-liberal economic model and the Washington consensus. This is particularly, so in Germany, where despite having the world’s third largest economy and being its number one exporter, the domestic economy stagnates and high long term unemployment levels are facts of life.

The “Americanization” of culture is seen in Germany with a mixture of positive and negative views. It is seen as a larger issue today than in the past, because of the increased influence of U.S. popular culture on German society through global mass media. Though Germany was influenced a great deal by American culture throughout the

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

second half of the twentieth century, and Americanization was a worry, the Americanization of youth culture did not become as big of an issue until the nineties. The perceived Americanization of youth culture and the German language is seen by some as being a cultural threat. However, taking a global perspective this is hardly exceptional, and similar worries that the native culture is being lost occur in many different countries. Although 69 percent of Germans believed that their traditional way of life was getting lost and only 39 percent thought that their traditional way of life remained strong, these numbers are very similar to those of other advanced democracies.¹⁵

While 67 percent of Germans saw a greater availability of movies, TV, and music from around the world, only 37 percent believe that more trade and faster communications have been very good for Germany.¹⁶ German opinions on the effects of globalization perhaps reflect the outlook on the general living conditions in Germany. Eighty percent thought it had become harder to find good paying jobs over the last five years; 68 percent thought working conditions had worsened; 90 percent said the gap between rich and poor had increased; and 90 percent thought that the affordability of healthcare had decreased.¹⁷ Perhaps a more telling statistic is that 24 percent of Germans blamed the increasing gap between the rich and the poor on globalization.¹⁸

Despite negative opinions of many phenomena associated with globalization, the majority of Germans viewed globalization as a concept in a positive light. Sixty-seven percent viewed the effects of globalization on Germany as being good, while only 26

¹⁵*Global Attitudes: 44 Nation Major Survey 2002* (Top line Data) 2002, Pew Research center for People and the Press, 12.

¹⁶*How Global Publics View: War in Iraq Democracy Islam and Governance Globalization, Views of a Changing World June 2003*, 2003, Pew Research Center for People and the Press, 72.

¹⁷*Views of a Changing World June 2003*, 80.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 84.

percent thought of it as being bad.¹⁹ Young people in Germany viewed globalization in the most positive light, with 75 percent of those ages 18-29 having a positive view of globalizations effects on Germany.²⁰ However, Germans are critical of some of the side effects of globalization. Sixty-three percent of Germans think that fast food has had a negative affect on daily life, while only 10 percent think fast food has had a positive effect.²¹ About half of Germans think that consumerism and commercialism are threats to their culture.²² Three quarter of Germans think that “television’s impact has been negative or at best neutral”.²³

However, as shown in the table below, Germans were very positive towards international trade.

Table 4

Attitudes Towards International Trade

	Strongly Favor	Somewhat Favor	Oppose	Don't Know
U.S.	42	45	10	3
Great Britain	49	38	8	5
Germany	35	54	10	1
France	26	57	16	1

German Marshall Fund, *Reconciling Trade and Poverty Reduction*, 2004. Retrieved from Kohut, 47.

Ninety-one percent of Germans saw growing trade and business ties as being good or somewhat good for Germany, while 83 percent of Germans thought that growing trade and business ties are good for both their nation and their family.²⁴

¹⁹ Ibid., 85.

²⁰ Ibid.,86.

²¹ Ibid., 87.

²² Ibid., 88.

²³ Ibid., 90.

²⁴ Ibid., 71-72.

Germans felt more threatened by immigrants and the Americanization of their culture. Over half saw immigration from the Middle East and North Africa as a bad thing and 60 percent of Germans saw immigration from Eastern Europe as being bad.²⁵ Only 34 percent of Germans saw immigration from the Middle East and North Africa as being a good thing.²⁶ And 31 percent saw immigration from Eastern Europe as being good.²⁷ Germans were also highly negative toward the spreading of what they perceived to be “American ideas and customs.” Though two thirds of Germans viewed American pop culture favorably when asked if the spread of American ideas and customs is a good or a bad thing, 67 percent thought that it was bad and only 28 percent thought that it was good.²⁸

Popular Left Wing Media



Sovereign nationalist anti-American sentiment is more likely to become a tool of political parties trying to gain votes by pandering to the masses or magazines such as *Stern* and *Der Spiegel* that are trying to increase sales. Both of these magazines have, in recent years, apparently made a habit of featuring exaggerated, (often times) humorous, U.S. critical pictures on their covers in an effort to increase sales. However some of these magazine covers may be of questionable taste. The magazine covers below are all recent portrayals of the U.S.

²⁵ “U.S. Image Up slightly, But still Negative: American Character Gets Mixed Reviews,” Country Facts sheet: Germany, 2005, *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/247germany.pdf> .

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ *Trends 2005* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. 2005), 115.



Stern, February, 20, 2004, Issue 44. *Der Spiegel*, 2006, issue 51. *Der Spiegel*, 2005, issue 50.

The *Stern* issue from 2004 is titled “Wild-West Style: more than 4,000 workers from the Bochumer Werke lost their jobs. The workers struggle but they are powerless.”²⁹ The main story is “How general motors toppled Opel during a crisis.” The cover image is a giant cowboy boot with the U.S. flag embroidered on it squashing protesting Opel workers. Essentially, the U.S. is depicted as squashing the life out of this German company. The second image, the December 2006 edition of *Der Spiegel*, is titled “The Greed of Big Money: Finance Investors Grasp at German Businesses.”³⁰ The cover depicts a city similar to New York sitting atop a giant locust that is eating the rest of the world. The third picture, *Der Spiegel* cover from 2005, is titled “The Shadow Empire: the Worldwide Operations of the U.S. Intelligence Service.”³¹ The cover shows the American flag along with photos of prisoners being transported by U.S. soldiers and George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice with harsh facial expressions.

²⁹ *Stern*, February, 20, 2004, Issue 44.

³⁰ *Der Spiegel*, 2006, issue 51.

³¹ *Der Spiegel*, 2005, issue 50.

The 2005 Elections and the Use of Anti-American Rhetoric by the Left

Following the SPD's defeat and the return of the CDU government, the left was desperate in the spring 2005 elections to not suffer a defeat, as this would result in a liberal conservative coalition in German government. Under Schröder, the SPD had launched a series of neo-liberal reforms that had reduced workers' social benefits. However, Schröder had been unable to make the actual market reforms needed to immediately create jobs. The result of this was that unemployed people still could not find work but they now received fewer benefits. Because of this, the SPD's traditional base was disinclined to vote for the SPD.

With his half-measured policies, though, Mr. Schröder has managed to give the word "reform" a bad name. That's why a large number of traditional SPD supporters simply stayed at home on election day. It's not so much that the opposition is winning as the SPD is losing.³²

The SPD attempted to use the U.S. as a scapegoat in order to draw attention away from its own poor track record. The SPD's party chair, Franz Müntefering, gave a speech in which he compared U.S. private equity firms to a "swarm of locusts"³³ that "graze"³⁴ on German business, downsize them, and sell them for a profit. He argued that executives of these companies were "extremists with no sense of responsibility."³⁵ "Müntefering upped the ante by circulating a so-called 'locust list' within his party, linking American company names and faces to the crop-destroying insects, which are used to symbolize destruction in the Bible."³⁶ Interestingly, though his attack seemed to be centered on American firms, the actual legislation proposed particularly strict

³² "Spring Time for Anti-Americanism in Germany," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 28, 2005.

³³ "Anti-Capitalism Debate: Marx or Markets German Politician Debate the Dangers of Capitalism," *Spiegel Online International*, May, 5, 2005.
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,354733,00.html> (accessed February 5, 2007).

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

sanctions on companies from Eastern Europe, not an area of the world known for either its wealth or the strength of its businesses. Naturally, Müntefering was attacked from all sides for comparing people to insects and creating a “black list.”³⁷

Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber, who heads the conservative Christian Social Union party, told SPIEGEL ONLINE the SPD was contradicting itself with the campaign. "The SPD can't liberalize the market while simultaneously describing foreign investors as locusts," he said. "That is downright counterproductive and damaging."³⁸

Müntefering's stance was so radical that it offended even the far left Green Party:

Known for their critical positions on globalization and commerce, some of the party's heaviest hitters have come out swinging at the Social Democratic leader. "Companies have to be able to make profits, otherwise there wouldn't be any jobs," Katrin Göring-Eckardt, head of the Greens' parliamentary group, told the *Berliner Zeitung* newspaper this week.³⁹

The SPD leadership defended Müntefering and called the accusations brought against him ridiculous. However, following his outburst some of the popular media decided to jump on the hate-America bandwagon. “Nicht nur die IG Metall trägt dazu bei, auch Wirtschaftsvertreter und einige Zeitungen vergreifen sich im Ton. Die *Welt am Sonntag* trieb es besonders toll.”⁴⁰ <Not only the IG Metall goes along with this, but also business representatives, and some newspapers really miss the mark in their tone. The *Welt am Sonntag* pushes it especially far.>

Schröder took this strange nationalist rhetoric to the next level by calling NATO irrelevant:

Mr. Schröder, in full campaign mode prior to a tight electoral test of the Social Democrat-Green coalition in Schleswig-Holstein on Sunday, last week even

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Elisabeth Niejahr and Klaus-Peter Schmid, “Kapitalisten, aufgepasst!: Die SPD hat eine Schwarze-Liste-von Private-Equity-Firmen ins internet gestellt. Was plant sie als Nächstes?” *Die Zeit*, April 5, 2005, nr. 19 http://www.zeit.de/2005/19/Prangerliste_SPD . (accessed February 5, 2007).

attacked the central institution of trans-Atlantic relations, the North Atlantic Alliance. A speech read on his behalf at the annual Wehrkunde security conference in Munich proclaimed that NATO is no longer the "primary venue" for trans-Atlantic strategy discussions. Presumably, Mr. Chirac, who has made a career out of obstructing NATO, was the ventriloquist holding the German chancellor on his lap for that utterance.⁴¹

Presumably Germany's utter lack of military spending could be made up for by the courage of its fearless leader, bravely standing up to the U.S. threat. At the same time the CDU's deputy chair Wolfgang Schauble was writing a Wall Street Journal piece to do damage control:

After years of mistrust and skepticism, it is urgent that both sides of the ocean recall that in this globalized world, freedom and security can only be preserved in our countries and promoted in the world if the old partnership works. We need to rebuild a climate of trust, which has been damaged by mistakes in Europe and the U.S. We need to commit ourselves anew to the principle of joint decision-making and to the fair sharing of burdens in the implementation of jointly-reached decisions, and show a willingness to refrain from populist anti-Americanism, on the one hand, and simplistic criticisms of Europe, on the other.⁴²

However, the SPD leadership were not the only political actors on the left who relied on anti-Americanism to attempt to sway public opinion. IG Metall is the dominant metal workers union in Germany. Its weekly magazine, *Metall: das MonatsMagazin* is Germany's most widely read union magazine, having a circulation of over 2 million.⁴³ In 2005, IG Metall ran a series of magazine covers attacking U.S. businesses. The May 2005 issue has on the cover a giant, evil looking mosquito with a business suit and a giant top hat with the stars and stripes painted on it.⁴⁴ The issue is titled "U.S. firms in Germany: the blood suckers."⁴⁵ The contents of the magazine are no less disturbing. The main

⁴¹ "How about some Goodwill from Europe?" *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, February 22, 2005.

⁴² "The Indispensable Marriage," *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, February 23, 2005

⁴³ "The Indispensable Marriage."

⁴⁴ "U.S. Firmen in Deutschland: Die Aussauger," *Metall: Das Monatsmagazin*, May 2005, Jahrgang 57. D 4713.

⁴⁵ "U.S. Firmen in Deutschland: Die Aussauger," *Metall: Das Monatsmagazin*.

article, titled "Die Plünderer sind da"⁴⁶ <The plunderers are here>, features pictures of swarming U.S. insect businessmen feeding from German factories. The theme behind the story is that American companies are directly responsible for destroying the German economy through their "tricks." One of the drawings features an insect picture sucking the life force from a smoke stack.⁴⁷

The same magazine contains an article called "8. Mai 1945 bis 8. Mai 2005: Tag der Erinnerung und Verantwortung"⁴⁸ <8. May 1945 to 8. May 2005: day of remembering and responsibility> with such choice selection of words as "the leadership of IG Metall promotes all those responsible in politics, economics and society to a long term engagement in the fight against racism and right wing extremism."⁴⁹ After publishing the article IG Metall head Jürgen Peters replied "Es sei völlig falsch, wenn einige Leute dies als eine Form von Ausländerfeindlichkeit betrachteten"⁵⁰ <It is completely wrong when some people look at this as a type of anti-foreigner hatred>. After FDP chairman Guido Westerwelle argued during a speech that the magazine was completely unacceptable, the unions were essentially praised and protected by all German political parties, instead of being criticized.⁵¹ Guido Westerwelle's suggestion that if 75 percent of the union workers agreed with business owners and not the union leadership this should override the union owner's position was condemned.⁵²

⁴⁶ Ibid., 14-15.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 16.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 8.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ "Freiheit der Kunst": IG Metall: Peters verteidigt 'Aussauger'-Titelblatt" *Rp. Online*. May 9, 2005, <http://www.rp-online.de/public/article/aktuelles/88736> (accessed January 25, 2007).

⁵¹ "Gewerkschaftskritik-Empörung über Westerwelles Attacken," *Spiegel Online* May 6, 2005.


⁵² Guido Westerwelle, "Westerwelle: Freiheit ist Vielfalt. Deutschland braucht die Kraft der Freiheit." 56 ORD. BundesParteitag Der FDP: Die Kraft der Freiheit: Deutschland erneuern, http://56.parteitag.fdp.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-20/_nr-18/_p-1/i.html (PDF version of speech was changed from original speech, however the mp3-version was not), (accessed January 25, 2007).

According to a *Spiegel Online* article:

Der DGB-Vorsitzende Michael Sommer warf Westerwelle eine "üble Politik der Verleumdung" vor. Seine Gewerkschaftskritik gehe "über jedes Maß hinaus", sagte Sommer im Bayerischen Rundfunk. Die Kapitalismus-Kritik des SPD-Vorsitzenden Franz Müntefering dagegen sei in weiten Teilen berechtigt. "Sie entspricht dem, was die Menschen empfinden, dass dieses System zunehmend ungerechter wird, insbesondere dort, wo es um die Auswirkungen der Globalisierung geht", sagte der Vorsitzende des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes.⁵³

<The DGB chairman Michael Sommer, accused Westerwelle of "foul politics of slander." His critique of unions goes "over and above every measure," Sommer said in the Bayerischer Rundfunk. The critique of capitalism of the SPD chairman Franz Müntefering, on the other hand, is for the most part justified. "It expresses what people feel, that this system becomes steadily more unfair, especially where it concerns the effects of globalization," said the chairman of the German Federation of Trade Unions.>

The July issue of *Metall: das MonatsMagazin* is titled "Neo-liberalism: the Wrong Politics,"⁵⁴ and the August issue is titled "Federal Election 2005: the Social Republic before the Collapse?"⁵⁵ with the German federal eagle shattered on the ground.



Metall: Das Monatsmagazin, May 2005. *Metall: Das Monatsmagazin*, July 2005. *Metall: Das Monatsmagazin*, August 2005.

⁵³ "Gewerkschaftskritik-Empörung über Westerwelles," *Spiegel Online*.

⁵⁴ "Neoliberalismus: Die falsche Politik," *Metall: Das Monatsmagazin*, July 2005, Jahrgang 57. D 4713.

⁵⁵ "Bundestagswahl 2005: Die soziale Republic vor dem Absturz?" *Metall: Das Monatsmagazin*, August 2005, Jahrgang 57. D 4713.

The German union leaders associate globalization and increased economic competition from Eastern Europe, China, and the U.S. with Germany's economic problems. Adopting neo-liberal policies is seen as unsuccessful; however, Germany is seen as being doomed to failure if it continues along its present course. However, this is illogical because Germany has become extraordinarily rich from international trade; it is the world's number one exporter, has a tremendous infrastructural base, has benefited greatly from U.S. policies, and does a huge amount of trade with the U.S. The underlying theme behind these magazines is fear, and it is to a certain extent probably the result of the economic reforms made by Schröder.

The left argues that greater mobility of capital is good for transnational corporations but hurts the domestic economies of advanced industrial nations. Ulrich Beck writes:

What is good for Deutsche Bank has for a long time not been good for Germany. The TNC's are bidding farewell to the framework of the national state and refusing further loyalty to its actors. This, however, lowers the degree of *internal* social integration, all the more so as its basis was purely economic. It is precisely the well-endowed welfare states which are facing the worst predicament. They have to provide statutory benefits for an ever higher number of registered unemployed (fast approaching five million in Germany), and at the same time they lose control over taxes because the TNCs deal themselves a quite unparalleled hand in the poker game over their local ties and obligations.⁵⁶

Because of the mobility of capital, goods, and services transnational corporations are no longer constrained by nation-states the way that they were in the past. International businesses no longer have to make social contributions. Instead their costs are externalized to the populations around them in the form of job losses and less revenue for

⁵⁶ Ulrich Beck, *What is Globalization?* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Inc.: 1997), 7.

government.⁵⁷ Then because of the lack of jobs minorities do not integrate as successfully into society.

Beck contends that the political discourse about globalization is more intense in Germany than in many other industrial nations for several reasons. Because German society has an “economic consciousness” Germans feel more endangered by economic globalization.⁵⁸ Because German society had an image of itself as largely homogenous the globalization debate brought about questions of German self-identification. “For, as we have seen, globalization means one thing above all else: *denationalization*—that is erosion of the national state, but also its possible transformation into a transnational state.”⁵⁹

Another reason that the globalization debate is particularly virulent in German society is because economic problems occurred after German reunification. During this period Germans questioned their own civic identity as they became aware of the cultural differences between the former East and West Germans. Under these circumstances, with Germans questioning what they even held in common with each other and the steady transfer of power away from the state and towards the EU, it is easier to understand why globalization takes on such a major role in political discourse in Germany.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Beck, *What is Globalization?*, 7.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 14. Beck writes: “First states and societies with a primarily economic consciousness of themselves – ‘deutschmark nationalism’, ‘export nation’, etc. – feel especially endangered by a world-market globalization supposedly coming from outside.” (p. 14)

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

European Identity Formation in Relation to an Imagined U.S.

The anti-war sentiment in Germany allowed the intellectual elite to gain increased attention. Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida argued that the ‘core’ western European states defined their European identity in opposition to the liberal U.S and should proceed as quickly as possible towards a common European foreign policy. Habermas argues this is necessary in order to form a level of governance beyond the nation state, rein in capitalism, and “defend and promote a cosmopolitan order on the basis of international law.”⁶¹ He writes “The desire for a multi-lateral and legally regulated international order is connected with the hope for an effective global domestic policy, within the framework of a reformed United Nations.” He argues that Europeans should focus on socially constructing a European post-national identity based on a strong transnational European public sphere that gives voice to minorities.

Habermas thinks that those “core” west European states could begin the process of giving the EU the characteristics of a state by:

... taking a first step toward a common foreign policy, a common security policy and a common defense policy. Only such a step will succeed in generating the momentum that other member-states—initially in the euro zone—will not be able to resist in the long run.⁶²

Habermas thinks that the “core” European states should focus on increasing their military power so that the EU can become more appealing to Eastern Europe. He also argues that Europe should balance against the U.S. in order to stop the advancement of the neo-liberal model and the Bush administration’s power politics agenda:

⁶¹Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida “February 15, or, What Binds Europeans Together: plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe,” in *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War*, ed. Daniel Levy, Max Pensky and John Torpey, 7-8 (New York: Verso, 2005). Originally published in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

⁶² Habermas and Derrida, “February 15,” 5.

At the international level and in the framework of the UN, Europe has to throw its weight on the scales to counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralism of the United States. At global economic summits and in the institutions of the WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF, it should exert its influence in shaping the design for a coming global domestic policy.⁶³

Habermas's main points are that Europe should develop a more independent military, a European identity should be formed, and Europe should make every effort to counterbalance against the U.S. Habermas worries that the neo-liberal model is winning against the European social model, and he thinks that a more powerful Europe can prevent this from happening.

Gianni Vattimo sees a fundamental difference between Europe and the U.S. based on religious and social differences. He sees the root problem as being that "the profound, 'libertarian' religiosity that characterizes the American spirit has ended up manifesting itself as what we fear it really is: the notion that 'God is with us,' and that the proof of it is our economic and military superiority."⁶⁴ Vattimo essentially sees the Weberian Protestant work ethic as the basis of the American character and the source of U.S. foreign policy problems.

He goes on to argue that the real difference between the U.S. and Europe lies within the realm of social values. Because of America's "pioneer" background there is a fundamental difference in "DNA." Unlike Europeans, Americans do not regard the state, at any level, as being important or a part of social life.⁶⁵

The reason the author uses the term DNA is to imply that Americans are culturally inferior. This goes back to the old 19th century fear that when Europeans

⁶³ Habermas and Derrida, "FEBRUARY 15," 6.

⁶⁴ Gianni Vattimo, "The European Union Faces the Major points of Its Development," Levy, Pensky, Torpey, in *Old Europe, New Europe*, 32. Originally published in *La Stampa*.

⁶⁵ Vattimo, "The European Union Faces," *Ibid.*, 32.

immigrated to the U.S. they would lose their cultural identity as their blood became mixed and they became corrupted by the primitive “pioneer” culture.

When Vattimo criticizes American’s laissez-faire attitudes towards health care and business, he explains this phenomenon as being the result of an “abundance of physical space.” Educated people in the U.S. would look at economics, history, or government policy, but for Vattimo the U.S. is suffering from being too big.

The author refuses to acknowledge the fact that there is a great deal of variance between different states in the U.S. with regards to socialization. Some are more socialized than many European countries. He also seems to view Americans as being anti-social. However, this is also completely inaccurate; according to surveys, Americans are about as politically engaged as Europeans⁶⁶ and participate in a wide range of social activities.

Habermas and Vattimo both construct European identity based on U.S. other. Structuring the debate around key questions of existence and problems posed by the other country is characteristic of nationalism. What these scholars put forward amounts to a Euro-nationalism.⁶⁷

However, it is somewhat ironic that, while old European nationalism is condemned, this new type, in response to the perceived U.S. other, is actively pushed forward by scholars. Jan Ross wrote in *Die Zeit* that:

One can only wonder where the faith in the harmlessness of such proclamations of pride and uniqueness comes from, where previous European nationalisms have

⁶⁶ Kohut, Andrew and Bruce Stokes, *America Against the World: How We are Different and Why We are Disliked* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 128. Americans are more likely than Canadians or west Europeans to have signed a petition or joined a boycott. They are about as likely to have participated in a demonstration, joined a strike or occupied a building. Original source was: *World Values Survey*, 1999-2000.

⁶⁷ Jan Ross, “The Ghosts of the Chocolate Summit,” Levy, Pensky, Torpey, in *Old Europe, New Europe*, 69. Originally published June 5, 2003. *Die Zeit*.

caused such devastation. Is it truly that much different and better if, instead of the virtues of being German, French, or Italian, the merits of Europeanness are now praised and are supposed to be endowed with such international standing?⁶⁸

The way in which the Iraq war was addressed by these scholars did not leave much room for dialogue. Whether or not someone agrees or disagrees with their arguments misses the point. They were marked by a unity of feeling and ideological thought that is not conducive to actual politics. Politics is about debate and compromise. But Habermas and Vattimo propose that Europe should try to increase its power so that it can veto the U.S.

Gianni Riotta argued that the ideas put forward by Habermas and Vattimo are essentially:

a 'leftist' version of the idea suggested by American essayist Robert Kagan, according to whom Americans are warriors and children of Mars, whereas Europeans are pacifists and children of Venus (just imagine the warrior Churchill and the pacifist Martin Luther King who right now must be rolling in their graves with laughter).⁶⁹

What these intellectuals in Europe propose as being 'European' is essentially a response to a fantasy U.S. The elite in Europe wanted a U.S. they could hinge European identity on. The foreign policies of the Bush administration allowed them to do so because they were definitely not in the (contemporary) European tradition.

The public and universal opposition of the churches in Germany against the Iraq war is also another good indication of how much anti-American rhetoric gave actors a chance to increase political power with little or no risk involved. The massive popularity of the Iraq protests allowed the European churches to gain new popularity through a

⁶⁸ Ross, "The Ghosts of the Chocolate," *Ibid.*, 69.

⁶⁹ Gianni Riotta, *Europeans, Americans, and the Exception of France*, *Ibid.*, 64. Originally Published June 4, 2003, *Corriere della sera*.

uniform anti-war response. This anti-war message allowed churches in Germany to gain increased attention:⁷⁰

Die mahnenden Predigten, Andachten, Synodalbeschlüsse und Bischofsworte werden mit einer Mischung aus wohlwollendem Staunen und schwacher Heilshoffnung weit über religiös interessierte Kreise hinaus wahrgenommen.⁷¹

<The exhortatory sermons, devotions, synodal rulings and Bishop speeches are recognized with a mixture of benevolent astonishment and weak hope for salvation by people well outside religious circles.>

During the nineties, even though the Catholic Church did not trust the U.S. with its military superiority and Anglo-liberal value system, it had been unable to publicly oppose the United States because it would have been politically incorrect to reject military intervention in countries such as Rwanda and Bosnia. For the Catholic and Protestant Churches in Europe, America epitomizes what in their view is wrong with the west.⁷² And the U.S. is essentially the scapegoat for what they view as the movement away from social values.

Aber eben auch deshalb, weil der Westen, wie er in der heutigen Weltpolitik erscheint und agiert, für Karol Wojtyla nicht mehr das christliche Abendland ist, sondern der Inbegriff einer höchstproblematischen Moderne. Und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika sind der Inbegriff dieses Inbegriffs.⁷³

<The West, as it appears and operates in today's world politics, is for Karol Wojtyla no longer the Christian occident, but is instead the embodiment of a highly problematic modernity. And the U.S. epitomizes this embodiment.>

The churches in Europe fear that the U.S. types of Protestant Christianity and the libertarian impulses of U.S. society have the potential to threaten European churches and social values if they spread. The Iraq war gave them an opportunity to attempt to decrease

⁷⁰ Jan Ross „Feldzug der Hohepriester“ *Die Zeit*, 2003, Issue 5, <http://www.zeit.de> (accessed February 16, 2007).

⁷¹ Ross, „Feldzug der Hohepriester“ 4.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

the influence of the U.S. and American ideas with no political risk. The behavior of the leadership of some of the churches in Europe essentially mirrors the behavior of the large conservative Christian movements in the U.S. but on a much lesser scale. In both cases, the ultimate goal is to try to increase political influence so as to further their own power political agendas.

CHAPTER 6

THE FUTURE OF GERMAN-U.S. RELATIONS

Anti-Americanism in Germany is mostly a reaction to U.S. foreign policy. The anti-Americanism that exists in Germany is mainly liberal, but there also exist social and nationalist types. The research undertaken indicates that the social and nationalist types of anti-Americanism emerged after the invasion of Iraq as a result of the initial liberal anti-American sentiment. Today, public sentiment seems to be moving towards the belief that the U.S. government is dysfunctional and dangerous.

The thesis' initial hypothesis was correct. Liberal distrust of the United States now exists across the political spectrum in Germany rather than just on the left. Because there is a more general consensus against U.S. foreign policy among the population, the incentives for politicians to actively support the U.S. have drastically declined. However, the polling data also indicated that individual attitudes towards the U.S. vary and a real concrete resistance to the U.S. has not yet occurred in Germany. The resentment is aimed mostly at George W. Bush and the U.S.'s policies during his administration.

The nationalist and social types of anti-Americanism were much harder to find in the form of strong public sentiment. After the Iraq war the social stigma against the U.S. manifested itself strongly in the form of business related anti-Americanism in the media. The nationalist type manifested itself mainly as a political tool for politicians and the left.

Anti-Americanism can function as a replacement for nationalism and can serve to increase the tensions already present in relations with the U.S. This study did not deal specifically with German nationalism. It seems that functionally sovereign nationalist

anti-Americanism is in many ways similar to nationalism. It serves to increase perceptions of difference with the other and allows for complicated problems to be blamed on one single entity.

Global economic factors and the economic situation in Germany cause much of the negativity towards the U.S. This has occurred to the extent that fear of neo-liberalism, rejection of U.S. policies, and using the U.S. as a scapegoat have emerged as potent political tools for the SPD and groups interested in the SPD winning elections. Targeting U.S. businesses as the enemy seems to be sanctioned in German politics and accepted by much of the society. Hard core anti-Americanism is essentially a leftwing phenomenon in Germany and is related to economic criticism of the U.S. In its worst form, it is basically a return to older conservative types of anti-Americanism that were found mostly before World War II. However, these are certainly not common sentiments among the population as a whole.

Liberal Anti-Americanism and Fear Push Anti-Americanism in Germany

U.S. conservative arguments that German foreign policy is organic and unchanging are basically wrong. We see changes in German public opinion about the use of force during the nineties, as Germany developed a more normalized national identity and realized the importance of intervention in ethnic conflicts. There was increased public support of Germany's taking a more active stance in international peace-keeping missions during the Clinton administration. Germany took a more active position in international politics during the Bush administration as well. However, this time it was to distance itself from America and U.S. foreign policy and to form a closer relationship

with France. This was reflected both in German foreign policy and in public opinion polls.

Katzenstein and Keohane theorize that fear is a driving force in anti-Americanism. Attitudes that are barely noticeable within a society can rapidly manifest themselves if a group somehow feels threatened. In Germany we see that the U.S. is perceived both as an economic and social threat and a political threat. Though the economic and social critiques of the U.S. have always existed in Germany, and became more intense during the nineties as a result of the globalization/neo-liberalism debate, social and nationalist anti-Americanism occurred in response to the initial liberal anti-American impulse during the lead-up to the Iraq war. Research indicates that the increased public perception of future conflicts between the West and Islam as a result of U.S. policy in the Middle East fueled anti-American sentiment in the media. Because the potential for terrorist attacks is high due to the large Muslim populations, public fear can result in negativity towards the U.S.

In 2006, at least 65 percent of Germans thought that there would be conflict between Western and Arabic-Muslim culture.¹ At least 61 percent thought that Islam and Christianity could not exist peacefully beside each other and there would be intense conflict in the future.² Politics in the Middle East creates fear of Muslim terrorism in Germany and increases dislike of U.S. policies in the Middle East.

After 9/11, 49 percent of Germans thought that there would be a deepening gulf with the Muslim population in Germany, and 43 percent responded there was nothing to fear. However, in 2006, 58 percent of Germans thought there would be a gulf with the

¹ "Fremde, bedrohliche Welt: Die Einstellungen der Deutschen zum Islam," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* May 17, 2006. Research done as part of the *Allensbacher Berichte und Umfragen*.

² "Fremde, bedrohliche Welt," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*

Muslim population, and only 22 percent disagreed. Forty-two percent of Germans agreed with the statement “There are so many Muslims living with us in Germany. Sometimes I have direct fear, that there are also very many terrorists.”³ Also the media tenor survey indicated that media negativity towards the U.S. increased in response to increased coverage of U.S. policies in the Middle East. The dynamics of East-West relations, Middle East policy, and anti-Americanism is a question that has not been explored and could serve as a future research agenda.

U.S. policies in Eastern Europe serve to create fear in Germany as well. The recent announcement of U.S. plans to station defensive missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic has met with large scale opposition from the German public. They are afraid that policies such as these invite confrontation between the U.S. and Russia and could lead to a new cold war. Because there is a large pacifist strain in the German public, the breakdown in U.S.-Russian relations is likely to increase tension in U.S.-German relations.

The confrontational relationship between Putin’s Russia and Bush’s United States, along with the U.S.’s distancing political relations with Germany and closer strategic relations with Poland and some of the East European countries, ensures that relations between the U.S. and Germany will not be particularly warm in the future. The attitudes found in the German media, which is overly focused on the U.S. as the source of Europe’s problems, serve as a driver of anti-Americanism. By constantly framing problems in international relations as being a result of U.S. foreign policy, the media serve to heighten or increase anti-Americanism. By ignoring the fact that Schröder’s pipeline ruined relations between Germany and Poland, and that Putin is not exactly a

³ Ibid.

friendly character, the German media manages to portray the U.S. as the threat in the same way that they portrayed the Iraq war as being only about oil.

German Nationalism, Economics, and Social-Anti Americanism

Anti-Americanism in Germany seemed to be potent as a quasi-nationalist response to domestic economic conditions. As such it did not fit perfectly within the typology developed by Katzenstein and Keohane.⁴ The research in this thesis indicates that because of the domestic economic conditions and bleak future outlook, the sense of being threatened by the U.S. neo-liberal economic model is strong enough that it can fall into the sovereign-nationalist category. U.S. global power and the neo-liberal model were portrayed as being a direct threat to Germany in numerous magazines. In fact in the popular media, anti-Americanism seemed to sometimes serve as a replacement for Germany's weak nationalism. However, this should really not be surprising because, as we have seen, nationalism and self identity in Germany have been historically tied to conceptions of the U.S. Today American pop culture is increasingly integrated within German society, while at the same time the U.S. government may become fundamentally rejected. Globalization allows for the complete adoption of some aspects of the U.S. and the rejection of many others at the same time.

Since Germany's political culture is opposed to conflict and violence and Germany is politically weak internationally, displeasure with the U.S. occurs mostly within the economic, social, and cultural spheres. Because Germany is very strong economically and there exist significant value driven differences between the German

⁴ Katzenstein and Kehane think that social anti-Americanism is a response to global and domestic economic conditions.

and the U.S. models of economic development, counterbalancing against the U.S., if significant political incentives exist, is most likely to occur in the economic realm.

The Future of U.S.-German Relations

Following World War II, German-U.S. relations were good because Germans believed that Americans were decent and American government, though flawed, essentially represented the rule of the people. But today, U.S. government is considered potentially dangerous, and Angela Merkel's and George W. Bush's attempt to repair U.S. European relations have not been entirely successful. Public sentiment towards the U.S. has not improved and, in fact, has the potential to worsen as a result of the missiles in Eastern Europe.

The main cause of anti-Americanism and the political disagreements between the U.S. and Germany is the huge disparity of political and military power between the U.S. and western continental Europe. In regards to relations with Europe, the U.S. military has traditionally been considered to be a sort of public good. The Americans spent all their money on guns and consequently the Europeans could spend everything on bread. Today, however, many Europeans are beginning to realize that there can be major costs to relying on a superpower for military protection. The superpower does not always have to do what you want it to do, and his incentives to listen to you are low if he does not pay many real political costs by ignoring you or gain much by taking you seriously. Consequently, Europeans are becoming more supportive of developing a more powerful independent European military. The argument is that if Europe could make more significant contributions to multilateral operations, the U.S. would pay far more attention

to it. This would facilitate transatlantic discourse and result in smarter U.S. foreign policies.

It is unlikely that Europe will develop a real military any time in the near future. There are several reasons for this. First, though European publics have actually become quite supportive of a European superpower in order to improve relations with the U.S., their support drops drastically when they realize the amount of money it would cost to develop stronger militaries.⁵ Second, the fiscal situation for the German and French governments does not allow them excess money to significantly improve their military capabilities. Germany has had to actually reduce the amount of money that it spends on its military because of the costs of reunification. Third, the global political environment demands military intervention in countries ravaged by ethnic conflict and violent civil strife. These types of conflicts tend to be bloody and politically awkward. However, the European publics have a very low tolerance for soldiers coming home in body bags and are not going to allow governments to keep sending them. So even if the European governments developed better militaries and the U.S. took them more seriously, a lot of European countries would not be able to send troops into combat areas in operations that the governments supported politically.

⁵ In 2005 68% of Germans responded that the EU should become a superpower like the U.S. This number was even greater in 2004 (73%) and 2003 (70%). According to German Marshall Fund polling data Europeans have become much more supportive of the idea of a European super power. Europeans think that an EU superpower should cooperate, not compete, with the U.S. In 2005 84% of Germans said that a EU superpower should cooperate with the U.S. Only 13% said that it should compete with the U.S. 66% of Germans agreed with the statement “NATO is dominated by the United States, Europe should have its own defense alliance separate from the US.” Germans were not willing to increase military expenditures. When those who had answered that the EU should become a superpower were asked the question “Would you be willing for the European Union to become a superpower even if this required greater military expenditures?” 64% answered no. Source German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data 2005*, <http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/doc/TTToplineData2005.pdf> .

Another major reason why U.S. German relations are unlikely to improve is that the U.S republican party is highly disliked in Germany. In simple good American/ugly American dichotomies, the rural religious republicans are bad and the progressive metropolitan Democrats are good. As such, the breakdown in U.S. relations essentially reflects the polarization of politics in the U.S. However, the re-election of a democratic president would be unlikely to significantly improve relations between the U.S. and Germany. The U.S. will still continue fighting the war on terror and is therefore likely to be embroiled in ugly ethnic conflicts that the German media will portray in a negative light. The politics in the Middle East are extremely precarious, and the U.S. can also expect significant blowback from any negative developments there.

The media and political parties can gain significantly by inciting and using anti-American sentiment. This creates the potential for unpleasant international situations to receive a visceral reaction among the German public. Apart from this, criticism of the neo-liberal model and U.S. businesses provides another easy avenue for politicians and the media to build anti-American sentiment.

There are several plausible scenarios which could lead to a real breakdown in U.S. German relations. If the Republican Party in the U.S. was able to make a comeback and get another nationalist conservative candidate into office, there would be real negativity in Western Europe. Using Katzenstein and Keohane's framework, liberal distrust could start to turn into liberal bias. And this could have more serious consequences for U.S. foreign policy.

Another disastrous situation for both the U.S. and Germany would be if the U.S. became embroiled in a more widespread conflict in the Middle East or southern Asia. If

the U.S. were to become involved in a conflict with Iran or Syria or Pakistan, this would increase German anxieties, and there would be a highly negative response towards the U.S. government. Since there is already a fair amount of worry about conflict between the west and Islam, the U.S. becoming embroiled in a conflict in a Muslim country could really strain U.S.-German relations.

Overall, the potential for political disagreement is high because the U.S. will continue to reject any perceived infringements on its national sovereignty and will tend to formulate policies based on a traditional conception of national interests. It will rely on the use of military power as a major political tool, and the Washington consensus will remain in place. Germany desires the expansion of international governmental organizations and would prefer the advancement of more social economic policies rather than the neo-liberalism pushed by the U.S. This leads to a situation where U.S. policies are likely to be seen as working in opposition to German national interests and can create resentment towards the U.S. A major decrease in unemployment in Germany could perhaps decrease the appeal of social-economic based negativity towards the U.S. However, this is uncertain since German attitudes towards the perceived “cowboy capitalism” are based to a large extent on social, ideological, and value differences. The clash between the two socio-economic systems is very political and reflects more than just high unemployment numbers.

Though there have been suggestions to put in place the U.S. cultural programs that existed during the Cold War as a means to try to improve the U.S. world image, this would have only limited success in Germany. Germans have had more exposure to the U.S. and American culture than almost any country in the world. Cultural understanding

in international relations tends to have its limits. And to seriously expect Germans to accept some of the rhetoric and policies of the conservative spectrum in the U.S. is naive. Anti-Americanism in Germany and the breakdown in U.S.-German relations have political causes and demand political solutions.

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Objective: Recent Masters graduate with focus in international relations, specifically German and European Union foreign policy and politics, German economic policy, transatlantic relations, and U.S. foreign policy, seeks an opportunity to work for a firm with an international market and global focus.

Education: M.A. - Political Science, December 2007
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Thesis: *U.S. - German Relations in the 21st Century*
B. A. - International Politics, with a minor in German, 2005
The Pennsylvania State University
Major GPA, 3.49
Study Abroad, Spring 2005
Christian Albrecht University of Kiel, Germany
Extensive German language training and cultural immersion.

Research Skills : Experience with foreign policy and political analysis, predictive analysis, risk assessment, quantitative and qualitative research methods, library systems and online academic research tools. These skills were used in papers titled: *The Prospects for the European Union Constitution* and *German Foreign Policy and EU Expansion*

Language Skills: Extensive working knowledge of German. Can communicate easily using written or spoken German. In addition to a minor in German, attended the summer language institute at the *University of Virginia* and spent a semester abroad in Kiel, Germany. Continued to using German language skills throughout graduate school to do thesis research.

Software: Experience using Word, Excel, Power Point, Internet Explorer, and SPSS.

- Work Experience:** Research and Teaching Assistant -
Virginia Tech Political Science, Blacksburg, VA. - 2005-2007
Teaching assistant for *American Government* and
International Politics and Economics and responsible for
all aspects of class preparation, lesson delivery, grading
and planning.
- Research Assistant (research centered on Eastern Europe) - 2006
Assisted Professor Stivachtis with his research. Was
responsible for preparing weekly written summary and
analysis of material for him.
- United Land Corporation - Charlottesville, VA.- 2003
Worked for a construction company in various phases of
land development.
- Volunteer Service:** Faber Volunteer Fire Department, Faber, VA. - 1998-2007
Worked within a local organization to develop and
implement community fire safety plans.
- Virginia Forestry Service, Charlottesville, VA. - 1999-2003
Assisted Virginia Forestry Service in outdoors work.
- Awards:** Awarded a teaching and research assistantship with tuition waiver
and full funding for 2005-2007 at *Virginia Tech*.
- Hobbies:** Enjoy fishing, weight lifting, traveling and reading.
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