

**U.S. Military Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction:
Meeting the Challenges of the Post-9/11 Environment**

Glenn B. B. Penner

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Ioannis Stivachtis, Chair
Laura Zanotti
Laura Sjoberg

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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to explore what strategy the U.S. Department of Defense should use and how its forces may/should be arrayed in future peace building and post-conflict reconstruction operations.

The nature of the research for this study was analytical and qualitative. It considers U.S. Army as well as joint doctrine, and explores the recent scholarly literature on military efforts at peace building and post-conflict reconstruction.

Based on this study, the author recommends the following as necessary implementations to U.S. doctrine and policy: 1) Revise NSPD-44, 2) Require a direct habitual relationship for training, planning, and operations between CRC and DOD, 3) Expand applicable training for CA personnel as well as other military officers, and 4) Revamp deployment cycle for civil-military peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations.

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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Introduction

Win the war, and also win the peace.

-General George Patton

Research Questions

A review of scholarly writings reveals there are gaps in the field of United States (U.S.) military involvement in post-conflict reconstruction operations and peacebuilding missions. The gaps primarily exist in the following three areas. First and foremost, how does the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) effectively involve itself in the interagency and sometimes inter-governmental process of conducting such operations? Second, with the increased reliance on and use of U.S. special operations forces (SOF), how has their involvement in these largely non-kinetic operations affected DOD ability to conduct such operations? Finally, the issue of whether or not the U.S. should even be involved in peacebuilding and post-conflict operations needs to be further addressed. These identified gaps will be the primary focus of this thesis.

In answering these three questions, this thesis will also explore what strategy the U.S. Department of Defense should use and how its forces may/should be arrayed in future peace building and post-conflict reconstruction operations? As this thesis will demonstrate, there is no doubt that the DOD has recognized the future potential for increased military involvement in civil military operations (CMO), including post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. The question is, how will it utilize its forces and plan for these operations? I will argue three main points in answering my research question. First, DOD needs to better collaborate with all

applicable U.S. Government (USG) agencies on these operations. Second, the forces that will primarily conduct peace building and post-conflict reconstruction operations should receive more extensive training. Lastly, there needs to be stronger understanding of the strategic intent for such operations by the tactical implementing forces on the ground.

My initial hypothesis prior to beginning this study was that DOD will continue to have a reactive rather than proactive strategy for conducting peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations. Additionally, I hypothesize that no effective format or doctrine for effective USG civil-military coordination is utilized in practice. I further hypothesize that despite this the military will have a robust role in future operations and that Civil Affairs (CA) units will be the primary tactical implementers of these operations. This is because no viable USG civilian agencies exist that are capable of completing peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction operations in areas with a deteriorated security situation.

Justification

As stated earlier, the basis for this thesis is the belief that there are gaps in the field of U.S. military involvement in post-conflict reconstruction operations and peacebuilding missions. Additionally, and possibly because of this there currently exists a disconnection between civil-military planners at the strategic and operational level and the tactical implementing forces on the ground. This is due in part to the relatively new emphasis placed on military involvement in peace building and post-conflict reconstruction operations. Since the close of World War II, these operations have been thought of as a mostly non-military function best left to the U.S.

Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State (DOS), and other agencies. The DOD has found such operations essential to effectively prosecuting counterinsurgency (COIN) and setting better conditions for conducting counterterrorism operations.

The importance of these operations has been placed on the same level as more traditional wartime operations.¹ This represents a fundamental shift in how the U.S. approaches conflict. This is because the present conflict(s) are unlike any the USG, and more pointedly the U.S. military, has ever faced. These conflicts are different because presently the U.S. is not fighting a state or a uniformed enemy. The enemy comes from the population and after a violent engagement the enemy goes back and lives in and amongst the population. Finding, fixing, and destroying an enemy is the traditional manner in which offensive operations are conducted. When an enemy hides inside the population, the threat of causing collateral damage skyrockets. Excessive collateral damage will cause the population to withdraw support from those causing harm, or even worse—take up arms against them. From the Revolutionary War to Desert Storm² the object was largely to secure and control the key geographic territory, i.e. countries, regions, cities, bridges, etc. Following the relatively quick and decisive victories against the states of Iraq and Afghanistan, the key terrain shifted. The key terrain in Afghanistan, and in other states where the USG is prosecuting the War on Terror more covertly, is now the population. Conducting peacebuilding operations prior to a state's collapse or quickly and/or effectively

¹ As laid out in Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05.

² The author acknowledges there have been U.S. military operations in which the key terrain was the population. The author acknowledges that there have been U.S. military operations in which the key terrain was the population. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam and operations in the Western Hemisphere come to mind. However, nothing previous compares to the U.S. focus since 9/11 on the population of a focus country rather than the need to hold territory.

providing security and reconstructing a state's infrastructure following hostilities may represent the most effective means of ensuring the security of the U.S. and its interests.

The recent increased focus on peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations also presents somewhat of an institutional divergence because the doctrine, culture, and infrastructure of the U.S. military have not traditionally been focused on a strategy predominately geared to carry out peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, and other largely civil-military operations. The notion that military peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction is a feasible, sustainable, and effective means to ensure U.S. security is a relatively new concept to the generation of senior military officers trained before and during the Cold War to conduct large-scale offensive and defensive operations.

After thoroughly examining past examples of civil-military operations and the forces traditionally used to carry out those missions, this thesis will give recommendations for how future operations should be conducted and how forces should be utilized, including recommendations for interagency collaboration. In answering my primary and secondary research questions, this thesis will also look at how the DOD has already and continues to shift its focus in order to meet these new challenges and also how certain segments of the military are better suited to operate where hard and soft power come together. Upon identifying these segments (forces), I will make recommendations for their future utilization based on the results of this study.

Method

The nature of my research for this thesis will be analytical and qualitative. I will explore the recent literature on military efforts at peace building and post-conflict reconstruction. I will also use DOD joint-doctrine as well as U.S. Army doctrine on civil-military operations as a basis for conducting this study. As past behavior is the most likely means to predict future behavior, I will look at past examples of military involvement in post-conflict reconstruction and peace building in order to assess perceived future requirements for these operations. This study will also examine the comparative advantages and disadvantages of military led peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations.

The primary DOD doctrine for conducting post-conflict reconstruction operations is contained in *U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07 Stability Operations*. As FM 3-07 is the foundation for U.S. post-conflict reconstruction, and peacebuilding operations, scholarly articles should (and usually do) take this manual into account when offering criticism of and suggestions to DOD involvement in these complex operations.

I believe it is necessary to define peace building and post-conflict reconstruction in order to proceed with this study. The initial use of the term peace building is most often associated with a report by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 titled *An Agenda for Peace*. There is no uniform definition for peace building, and as such I have hybridized two to use for my research: Peace building is sustained cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems using measures such as disarming, restoring order, destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, training security forces, monitoring elections, advancing the protection of human rights, reforming institutions, and promoting

political participation.³ One of the reasons for misunderstanding and lack of agreement on the term peace building is a debate as to its temporal nature. Henning Haugerudbraaten posits that there are two separate tendencies when defining peace building; one is a short-term outlook, the other long-term. U.S. military involvement in peace building can involve both short and long-term involvement.

Post-conflict reconstruction, according to the World Bank, involves “the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of society” and the “reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law.”⁴ While post-conflict reconstruction may be conducted prior to the complete end of a conflict, it is most effectively conducted when there is a tenable security situation (or better). The security aspect of both peace building and post-conflict reconstruction operations is what makes the DOD an ideal lead agency for beginning and maintaining such operations in which the U.S. is involved.

The concepts of peace building and post-conflict reconstruction are not mutually exclusive. In fact, there will likely be significant overlap of the two operations. It is to the benefit of all parties concerned if effective and targeted reconstruction can begin as soon as possible, given an acceptable security situation.

In Chapter One, this thesis will look at the post-Cold War rise in humanitarian assistance missions and the required doctrinal changes they brought about. It will also examine the effectiveness and desirability of foreign military involvement in peace building operations and

³ This definition is derived from UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s report titled “An Agenda for Peace” and Henning Haugerudbraaten’s description of that report which was first published in *African Security Review* Vol. 7 No. 6 1998 <http://www.isis.co.za/Pubs/ASR/7No6/Peacebuilding.html>.

⁴ World Bank. Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank. Washington, D.C. World Bank, 1998.

post-conflict reconstruction including what the relevant peace building related literature says about it and address the legitimacy issue.

Chapter Two will take a detailed look at past and present U.S. Army involvement in peace-building operations and post-conflict reconstruction and analyzing its strengths and weaknesses. It will also closely examine stabilization doctrine, and conduct analysis of case studies comparing the Russian approach to civil-military stabilization operations in Chechnya, British civil-military operations in Malaysia, and U.S. efforts at post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The third chapter of this study will examine alternatives to military and traditional military involvement in peace building and stability operations. The effectiveness and desirability of private military corporations, NGOs, civilian USG agencies, and non-traditional military operations will be looked at in this chapter. It will also look at theoretical future implementation of stability operations.

The fourth and concluding chapter of this thesis will offer recommendations for changes to doctrine, strategy, and composition of personnel to conduct post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding operations.

Chapter One

Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Operations: Is the U.S. Military a Sustainable and Viable

Option for the Future?

In the 1990's, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States Department of Defense began to recognize the need to incorporate stabilization, peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction operations planning into missions. This was a result of the numerous humanitarian interventions that occurred in the 1990's in places such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, and numerous African states. Historically however, and with only a few exceptions, the United States' efforts at peace building and post-conflict reconstruction have been woefully inadequate. These important missions were often left to USG agencies other than the DOD, such as the Department of State (DOS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), etc. Though better suited for large-scale, long-term development and diplomacy, DOS and USAID cannot operate where security is limited. When the DOD did play a role, it often involved soldiers who were primarily trained for combat duties rather than the more nuanced duties of development and diplomacy.

Since 9/11 the Bush and Obama administrations have increased the size and scope of the units that will primarily conduct civil-military operations (CMO), such as peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. On several occasions, Defense Secretary Robert Gates called for military officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO) to learn the critical skills necessary to plan and carry out peace-building and post-conflict civil reconstruction missions. In a November 2007 speech at Kansas State University Secretary Gates declared “I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use "soft" power and for better integrating it with "hard" power.” Gates went on to say “One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more – these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success.” What Secretary Gates is essentially calling for is a convergence of hard and soft power in order to defeat those who would do harm to the U.S. It is notable that relatively junior military officers and NCOs primarily conduct this convergence of hard and soft power at the tactical and operational levels.

The Bush and Obama Administrations have instituted policies to prosecute the War on Terror sometimes referred to as "persistent conflict" or "persistent engagement". These policies are aimed at preventing conflicts from flaring up across the globe. Persistent engagement involves utilizing all elements of national power, to include defense, development, and diplomacy to prevent conflicts and enable partners and allies to eliminate lawless and under-governed regions where unconventional threats can flourish. In other words, in order to pursue such policies effectively, it is necessary to combine hard power with soft power. In a certain

sense, when the military conducts peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction, there is an inherent combination of hard and soft power.

The unconventional conflicts the U.S. presently finds itself involved in have required officers across the military to acquire skills in tactical diplomacy, peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction. Additionally, Secretary Gates ordered a tenfold increase to the size of the U.S. Army's Special Operations CA forces and the establishment of a conventional CA brigade. These forces will be the spearhead of the DOD's role in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. This thesis will explore the development of civil-military related training to soldiers and officers in the military following 9/11 as well as the development and expansion of the U.S. Army's Civil Affairs branch.

The nature of conflicts and the scope of military operations that the U.S. has been involved in since the post-Cold War era has shifted significantly. There is more "grey area" in the spectrum of operations conducted by the military. This grey area is the realm between traditional combat operations and true peace enforced purely by a sovereign state without the involvement of outside states. Andrea Baumann describes this area as the "grey zone in between military and civilian responsibilities, or 'permissive' and 'non-permissive' environments."⁵ Military involvement in the grey areas of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations is necessary and desirable because of the presence of terrorist, paramilitary, criminal, and insurgent elements that use violence to maintain instability. For this reason, interventions by the U.S., or other well-trained, modern militaries are ideal institutions to establish and maintain peace in areas of chaos and conflict.

Where the U.S. approach to intervention is unique, even over other liberal democracies

⁵ Andrea Barbara Baumann. *Clash of Organizational Cultures*. Royal United Services Institute Journal. Vol. 153, No. 6. (2008), 71.

such as Britain and France, is its promotion of democracy as a central piece (rather than an after thought or a by-product) of its intervention strategy/strategies. In the 2006 essay on their research of democracy and military intervention from 1946 to 1996, “Forging Democracy at Gunpoint”, Jeffrey Pickering and Mark Peceny echo this assertion but take it one stop further by presenting research showing that military intervention by the U.N. is actually more effective in terms of democracy prospering post-intervention. They write: “although liberal intervention rarely democratizes target countries, it matters which liberal actor intervenes. Targets of UN interventions have been more likely to democratize than have the targets of liberal state actors. There is some evidence that the American record differs from those of France and Britain, but it is too thin to generalize from.”⁶ By one measure of post-conflict success—maintaining status as a democracy, the most successful example of U.S. post-conflict operations following military intervention during 1946 to 1996 is the invasion of Panama and the ouster of Noriega.⁷ Panama has maintained its status as a democratic state to this day. The other two examples studied by the authors was U.S. involvement in Nicaragua and Haiti where democracy has waivered.

The three U.S. operations studied and inferred upon by Pickering and Peceny are certainly important when studying U.S. efforts at peacebuilding and post-conflict operations. Two important components need to be considered for further study—geographical location, and size of the operation. First, in terms of location, all three operations studied were conducted in the

⁶ Jeffrey Pickering and Mark Peceny. “Forging Democracy at Gunpoint,” *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2006), 541.

⁷ It must be noted that other measurables of post-conflict success indicate that the U.S. operation was unsuccessful. In his 2004 essay at the U.S. Army War College titled *Disconnected Strategies: Why Success is Elusive in Stability Operations and Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, John M. Moore writes: “The President [Bush] did not articulate his vision of Panamanian “democracy.” This led commanders and responsible US Government agencies to define the end state themselves. The State Department, for example, viewed democracy as a Panamanian responsibility...Those most familiar with Panama understood that Panama would require assistance and time to develop a democracy. Dr. John Fishel, a senior planner for post-conflict reconstruction in Panama, argued that a better objective would have been “democratic legitimacy,” consisting of popular support, an acceptable level of corruption, and the ability to govern...The lack of a clear end state prevented the development of a sound strategy.”

Central America/Caribbean Basin geographic area. Second, the size of the operations studied by Pickering and Peceny pale in comparison to U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The fact that U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq easily represent the largest and most audacious U.S. attempt at peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction since the Marshall Plan makes them almost incomparable to other U.S.-led interventions since then.

In the post World War II years, and more specifically since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military has had to adapt to conduct what has sometimes been referred to as military operations other than war (MOOTW). This term refers to a variety of non-combat functions to include stability, peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction operations. Though these, and the many other terms referring to military operations less than high-intensity combat, at times have overlapping goals and principles, it must be noted that this paper will focus as much as possible on post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding operations. At times, some of the literature cited uses different terms, i.e. stability, when referring to what this thesis would refer to as peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction, the two prime operations conducted when transitioning a state from violent conflict to peace.

When studying the U.S. involvement in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding operations, we must first look at the effectiveness and desirability of any foreign military involvement in such operations. One of the key components of effectiveness and particularly desirability is legitimacy. “Legitimacy is central to building trust and confidence among the people.”⁸ This is the opening sentence from the section on legitimacy in FM 3-07. This study will examine legitimacy of military involvement in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding from two perspectives—legitimacy as determined by U.S. doctrine and legitimacy as determined by the international community and expressed through scholarly writings. In

⁸ United States Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations. Washington, D.C. October 2008. 18.

addition to U.S. doctrine, three journal articles will be examined— Martha Finnemore’s *Paradoxes in Humanitarian Intervention*, *Spanning “Bleeding” Boundaries: Humanitarianism, NGOs, and the Civilian-Military Nexus in the Post–Cold War* by Nancy C. Roberts, and Robert Egnell’s *The Organised Hypocrisy of International State-Building. Conflict, Security & Development*.

Martha Finnemore’s essay in 2000 titled “Paradoxes in Humanitarian Intervention” noted the rise of international humanitarian interventions following the end of the Cold War. Though Finnemore explores more than one aspect of legitimacy in humanitarian intervention, it is the following assertion that is most relevant to this study of military (primarily the U.S.) involvement in such interventions. She writes: “I suggest we have off-loaded much of the work in these crises onto international organizations, both inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), without thinking very hard about the implications of this move.”⁹ The problem, she goes on to assert, with IGOs and NGOs performing the lion’s share of the work in humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding operations is that there is little accountability required of such organizations. Though the involvement of such organizations, especially as part of a broad coalition can lend credence to claims of international legitimacy, their (sometimes perceived) lack of real accountability to the citizens of an affected state can in some cases be problematic. As such, military-NGO collaboration, from the perspective of the military, must be weighed by the NGOs ability to effectively contribute to the betterment of the population within a given operation.

For the purpose of this study, when examining the legitimacy of organizations conducting peacebuilding and post-conflict operations, I will break NGOs into three separate categories.

⁹ Martha Finnemore. “Paradoxes in Humanitarian Intervention,” Paper presented at the Symposium on Norms and Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention at the Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies, University of California at Irvine, April 14, 2000: 5.

Faith-based NGOs, national NGOs, and (secular) international NGOs (INGO) will be examined in terms of their efficacy and legitimacy in order to assess their desirability to conduct peacebuilding and post-conflict operations versus military led operations.

Faith-based NGOs are organizations whose mission is rooted in a particular faith. Examples of faith-based NGOs include the American Jewish World Service, Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision. David Smock prepared a report of a 2001 conference of faith-based NGOs sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace. Smock notes “World Vision, an ecumenical Christian relief and development organization active in 90 countries, has moved in recent years to promote conflict prevention and peacebuilding. As described by Michelle Garred, World Vision has recognized that progress on relief and development is often undermined by the renewal of conflicts. For instance, a major development project in Indonesia had to be abandoned because of an outbreak of violent conflict there. Moreover, World Vision recognizes that relief and development activities have on occasion contributed unwittingly to conflict.”¹⁰ While the report noted many positive aspects of faith-based peacebuilding and development efforts, the last sentence cannot be overlooked. The possibility that a faith-based NGO would unwittingly contribute to a conflict is disconcerting. Especially perturbing is the possibility that a faith-based NGO might foment religious/anti-religious based violence. Additionally, the fact that projects had to be abandoned due to violence must be a detractor for advocates of faith-based peacebuilding and limited-security development. The susceptibility to religious volatility in states where the U.S. is currently conducting post-conflict and peacebuilding operations renders

¹⁰ David Smock. “Faith-Based NGOs and International Peacebuilding,” *United States Institute of Peace*. October, 2001. 3.

faith-based NGOs a less than optimal option for leading or in some cases even participating in international peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations.¹¹

National NGOs, for the purpose of this study, are defined as NGOs whose sole or primary mission exists within a specific country. These organizations may or may not be secular, the most important criterion for falling into the national NGO category is geographic/national focus. In his article, *Conflict, Peacebuilding and NGO Legitimacy: National NGOs in Sri Lanka*, Oliver Walton provides an in-depth case study of three national NGOs during both peacebuilding and conflict. He looks at Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement (the largest NGO in Sri Lanka), the Tamils Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) (NGO with close ties to the Tamil Tigers), and the Foundation for Coexistence (FCE) (a relatively new NGO).

The benefits of national NGOs are relatively simple and similar to defending one's territory—they know the key-players as well as the turf and how to operate on it. The drawbacks to national NGOs are numerous and various when considering incorporating them into international peacebuilding or post-conflict operations. Walton found that the “NGOs’ multiple relationships were characterized by tensions, reversals and trade-offs. Sarvodaya’s established field presence and use of Buddhist discourse provided some insulation from nationalist critiques, but also reduced the extent to which its peacebuilding goals resonated with the objectives of donors. While TRO was able to sustain a range of alliances with government, [Tamil Tigers] and donors during the ceasefire period, this position became unsustainable as the two conflict actors returned to war and TRO’s political functions came to the fore. The demands placed on peacebuilding specialists like FCE by donors and nationalists increasingly clashed as the

¹¹ Any (perceived) criticism of faith-based NGOs is based solely on their capacity to partner with military forces conducting peacebuilding and post-conflict operations. Working unilaterally and at the national level, it cannot be overlooked that many faith-based NGOs from all the major faiths have done much toward establishing and maintaining peace and rebuild states following violent conflict.

ceasefire broke down. These organisations' capacity to respond to these challenges was closely tied to their existing territorial reach and financial position, as well as their political linkages. All three cases demonstrated the tendency for NGO legitimacy to become instrumentalised by domestic political actors in the context of national conflict. Conflict increased the supply of reasons to criticise NGOs, by increasing the gap between their peacebuilding objectives and the more belligerent aims of mainstream political discourse. It also heightened political competition between domestic political actors, making their own legitimacy more contested and increasing the demand for other actors to critique NGOs as a means of articulating their own political visions."¹² National NGOs are a double-edged sword. Their proximity and relation to the conflict makes them ideal actors. However, the nearly unavoidable nature of national organizations operating within their own borders to take political sides makes them a drawback. In this sense, the involvement of a foreign military with a regional or international mandate would not show the political favoritism demonstrated by national NGOs in Sri Lanka.

In the peacebuilding arena, the greatest overlap with the military in terms of responsibility or perceived "territory" lies with the INGO community. In her 2011 essay titled *Divided Partners: The Challenges of NATO-NGO Cooperation*, Alexandra Gheciu notes the emergence of these challenges as NATO began asserting its capabilities beyond its traditional Cold War roles. Referring to NATO involvement in conflict related humanitarian operations she writes: "This intrusion represents, in the eyes of many NGOs, not only a challenge to their *raison d'être*, but also a more fundamental attack on the category of humanitarian space—as the space in which impartial actors seek to enhance the welfare of individuals and communities without any

¹² Oliver Walton. "Conflict, Peacebuilding and NGO Legitimacy: National NGOs in Sri Lanka," *Conflict, Security & Development* March (2008): 160.

attention to, much less effort to promote, particular political agendas.”¹³ The belief that military involvement in humanitarian operations represents a step too far into the “humanitarian space” highlights a difference in the doctrinal definition of humanitarian assistance. As Gheciu writes, NGOs often believe their role is to not pay “any attention to, much less effort to promote, particular political agendas.”¹⁴ Obviously, military operations promote the political agenda of their government. However, at least for the U.S. military, the definition of humanitarian assistance is different than that of the INGO community. The U.S. Army defines humanitarian assistance as:

Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.¹⁵

The main difference between NGO and U.S. military approaches to humanitarianism is that NGOs usually require political impartiality in conjunction with their humanitarian efforts, whereas the U.S. military intends humanitarian assistance to be congruent with its military and thus political goal(s). In the U.S. Army definition for humanitarian assistance it is important to note its intention to “supplement or complement...agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.”¹⁶ This highlights what may be the most effective means to implement humanitarian operations—military and NGO cooperation aimed at alleviating human suffering regardless of political orientation. This will require great effort on the part of both the military as well as the NGO community to find common working ground but

¹³ Alexandra Gheciu. “Divided Partners: The Challenges of NATO-NGO Cooperation in Peacebuilding Operations,” *Global Governance* 17 (2011): 96.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 96.

¹⁵ United States Army. *Civil Affairs Operations (FM 41-10)*, February, 2000. 259.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 259.

the security benefits could be beneficial for all involved. The increase in Civil Affairs soldiers trained to work with and incorporate NGOs may be the key to future meaningful integration of combined NGO-military humanitarian assistance operations.

Steps have already been taken to bridge the gap between NATO and NGOs. Gheciu writes: “military staff from NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and representatives of large NGOs have agreed on extended visits to each other’s headquarters to familiarize themselves with the working methods of their counterparts.”¹⁷ Current steps, although showing great potential to be beneficial, are largely ad hoc. The formalization of military-NGO cooperation is perhaps a topic for another paper.

The involvement of militaries in these operations does not in itself increase the legitimacy of the operation. Generally speaking, a military commander has no more accountability requirement to the citizens of a foreign state where he is conducting any type of operation than that of an IGO or NGO. There is, however, a more structured command and control (C2) framework within most modern militaries that makes commanders on the ground accountable to their senior commanders who (in the U.S. case) must ultimately answer to their civilian superiors and are required to report to Congress. It is, therefore, the assertion of this thesis that military involvement in non-combat operations such as post-conflict reconstruction, peacebuilding, or humanitarian intervention is no less legitimate than the involvement of IGOs and NGOs. In some cases though, the military may be a more legitimate option because of its impartiality at the tactical level and ability to protect the population during humanitarian operations. While some may disagree with this assertion, it is not debatable that large, well-organized militaries bring much needed command and control plus a robust logistical capability to such operations.

¹⁷ Gheciu, 109.

In his 2010 essay titled “The Organised Hypocrisy of International State-Building”, Robert Egnell asserts two of the main factors, in this case hypocrisies, affecting the perceived legitimacy of international peacebuilding missions. The first hypocrisy he notes is derived from Finnemore’s essay, which states:

“While the international system is built on the principles of self-determination and national sovereignty, Western states similarly intervene militarily to change the self-determination process if they do not like either the process or the result. ‘If the political process becomes violent (e.g. Somalia), the state becomes a candidate for outside intervention; if an elected government becomes violent, the state becomes a candidate for intervention (e.g. Serbia)’.”¹⁸

The second hypocrisy is the inability of the international community to accomplish what it initially promises to. Egnell writes, “The hypocritical gap between words and deeds needs to be closed, or at least limited, by producing more pragmatic policies and strategies in state-building operations. Aims must be tempered, expectations managed and strategic narratives transmitted that reflect the actual activities in the field. Moreover, serious negotiations with local stakeholders are necessary to move away from predefined liberal aims and create a common, acceptable set of aims and operational benchmarks.”¹⁹ These two obstacles to the legitimacy of international military peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction posited by Egnell and derived from Finnemore and Egnell are what I see as the key obstacles that need to be overcome by the DOD when conducting these operations.

In her essay, Spanning “Bleeding” Boundaries: Humanitarianism, NGOs, and the Civilian-Military Nexus in the Post-Cold War, Nancy C. Roberts notes:

One of the most striking developments in contemporary warfare is how the dividing line between soldiers and civilians has blurred. Taliban spokesman

¹⁸ Martha Finnemore. “Paradoxes in Humanitarian Intervention,” Paper presented at the Symposium on Norms and Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention at the Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies, University of California at Irvine, April 14, 2000: 11.

¹⁹ Robert Egnell. The Organised Hypocrisy of International State-Building. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 10:4, 465-491, 2010. 469.

Zabiullah Mujahid made the point when he claimed there was no distinction between civilian and military personnel when justifying the Taliban's attacking and killing of International Rescue Committee workers in Logar, Afghanistan. They were the "foreign invader forces." They were "not working for the interests of Afghanistan and they belonged to those countries whose forces . . . took Afghanistan's freedom" (BBC News 2008). Such incidents are expected to increase in the future, not only in Afghanistan but in other conflict areas as well.²⁰

The incident referred to in this essay resulted in the deaths of three international aid workers and their Afghan driver, but unfortunately, represents a danger not uncommon to those who dare conduct development work or humanitarian assistance in many parts of the world. This danger is especially acute for NGO's and IGO's who do not have organic security and often travel with limited to no security.

Though the intended end results of U.S. military peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations are often similar or the same as NGO's or IGO's (security and/or stability), there is often little meaningful coordination conducted between them. Roberts writes "interaction potential between the military and civilians also is limited because of their mutual suspicions."²¹ The DOD units and personnel assigned to conduct peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations should strive to find common ground with civilian USG agencies, NGO's, and IGO's by sharing as much information as possible and by selling their unique capabilities to conduct common missions and achieve common goals.

Roberts note the effectiveness of military involvement in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction:

[Military] organizational designs reinforce hierarchical authority, clear lines of command and control, and explicit rules of engagement to ensure accountability to policy makers. Their general mandate is to establish and maintain public order and ensure operational security and force protection. Thus, they are less inclined to share information in order to protect operational security. Clear delineations of

²⁰ Nancy C. Roberts, Spanning "Bleeding" Boundaries: Humanitarianism, NGOs, and the Civilian-Military Nexus in the Post-Cold War, *Public Administration Review*, March/April 2010, 213.

²¹ *Ibid*, 213.

roles, responsibilities, and unity of command are viewed as necessary for mission success. They pride themselves on advanced planning and systematic execution of operational orders and seek a positive public image.²²

NGO and IGO activities and operations are inherently more transparent than military operations. Structurally, NGO's in particular are less hierarchical than the military. While this may, in some cases, allow for greater creativity and "outside the box" approaches to peacebuilding and reconstruction issues, the NGO approach can complicate and slow down operations due to the requirement to build consensus among the decision makers.

Conversely, at times the military approach may be less desirable and the NGO approach may be more appropriate for one reason or another. A national NGO in a specific region or an INGO with a particular strength or capability may be a better option than a military response that conducts operations too quickly and results in a heavy-handed approach that is doomed to lose the support of the population and fail in the long-run.

One drawback to military-led peacebuilding and post-conflict operations is a lack of transparency. Specifics of military operations are rarely given out prior to completion. The U.S. military could do a better job of sharing their overall strategy with NGOs and IGOs working in the same sector without giving away intelligence or sensitive operational details. This would avoid duplication of efforts and build mutual trust and willingness to cooperate on shared outcomes. Granted, the U.S. military and the greater NGO community will likely never share the exact same means or goals, however, where they have shared goals it would behoove both to share information and resources, be it overtly or behind-the-scenes.

Roberts divides "Civ-Mil" operations into the following four categories: "peacekeeping; disaster relief; development and reconstruction, stabilization/security/ transition/ reconstruction, peacebuilding, and nation building operations; and complete humanitarian emergencies (CHEs),

²² Ibid, 213.

complex contingency operations, peace enforcement, and warfare.”²³ Each one of these categories possesses different threat levels and different areas of what Roberts terms “domain conflict.” Domain conflict consists of varying degrees of turf battles. These domain conflicts can occur between any actor involved in the peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction operation, but for the sake of this study we will consider turf battles between DOD and other USG agencies, and between DOD and the NGO and IGO communities.

All stability operations, to include peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, cannot be successful without incorporating civilian agencies. Successful and effective coordination with and transition to agencies such as the UN, DOS, USAID and/or NGOs are crucial to achieving sustainable end states and achieving true mission success.

Critique of USAID is nothing new, and to reiterate, this thesis suggests that DOD be the lead agency during the initial stages of stability operations and then conduct a coherent, unified transition to another agency (USAID, DOS, UN, etc.). In a world in which the U.S. is likely to find itself in persistent conflict for the next decade, fixing civilian aid agencies should not be the first priority. In his July 2011 article in *The Atlantic*, Joshua Foust writes:

Fixing USAID should be a priority for the government and the policy community, regardless of the party or politics involved. A broken aid agency helps no one, whether the recipients of their projects or the people back here who fund it and expect returns on expenditure. The worst thing we could do to USAID would be to tell the Defense Department to perform more aid functions. Let the military fight wars. If our civilians cannot rebuild after, then let's teach them how. Demanding soldiers fight, rebuild, and rule afterward is not a healthy foreign policy; it is an imperial one.²⁴

Mr. Foust appears to be a USAID apologist who is unfamiliar with the findings (below) of those studying U.S. involvement in irregular warfare (IW).

²³ Ibid, 214.

²⁴ Joshua Foust. *How to Fix USAID*. *The Atlantic*. July, 2011. Available from <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/how-to-fix-usaid/241585/>

The robust ability of the U.S. military to conduct and coordinate reconstruction tasks is not nearly as well known as its combat capabilities. This is likely due to two factors—first, reconstruction is not a traditional role for the military; second, the increased focus on military Civil Affairs operations (which are the primary implementers for military reconstruction operations) has only occurred within the last decade. Trevor Keck and Ann Vaughan write, “While the military is able to provide security, it is not suited to perform civilian tasks, such as rebuilding infrastructure, setting up judicial systems, and establishing other government institutions. “It’s like sending police to guard a ruined neighborhood, but not sending the carpenters and the electricians and the plumbers to help residents rebuild it,” said one official regarding U.S. responses to weak and failing states.”²⁵ The following chapter will demonstrate that the U.S. Army does in fact have the organic capability to not only guard the neighborhood, but also to rebuild it. These organic assets come in the form of the hundred of engineers and planners within the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), thousands of vertical and horizontal construction trained combat engineers, hundreds of specially trained CA teams, and contracting officers capable of funding reconstruction projects, and many other applicable assets for conducting post-conflict reconstruction.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) noted that IW has become the “warfare of choice” for our enemies and will continue to be so until at least 2020.²⁶ Leading up to this QDR, the DOD developed the IW Execution Roadmap. This roadmap was an effort to fuse the policy recommendations with concepts for their execution. The roadmap listed ten IW activities,²⁷ of

²⁵ Trevor Keck and Ann Vaughan, "Securing the Peace" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, May 15, 2008)

²⁶ Kenneth C. Coons, Jr. and Glenn M. Harned. *Irregular Warfare is Warfare*. Joint Forces Quarterly. Issue 52, 1st quarter 2009.

²⁷ *Ibid*, 99. The ten activities of the roadmap, as listed by the authors are: insurgency and COIN, terrorism and CT, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, stability operations when conducted within the context of an IW strategy or campaign aimed at gaining or maintaining the support of a host population, transnational criminal activities that support or sustain IW and the law enforcement activities to counter them, civil-

which two are germane to this study—stability operations and civil-military operations. The roadmap tasked USSOCOM with developing a joint operating concept (JOC) for conducting IW. The JOC was tested through two USSOCOM sponsored war gaming exercises called Unified Quest 2007 and Unified Quest 2008. Coons and Harned noted that many of the civilian participants in the exercises “considered the military planning process stove piped and rigid. They stated that the U.S. Agency for International Development in particular has a more dynamic planning process that is derived from the political and cultural nature of the interagency process and, unlike the military planning process, factors in more ambiguity and longer term objectives (years, not months).”²⁸ Many of these same participants thought the civilian USG agencies would be unable to develop the sufficient capacity necessary to contribute to whole of government efforts to conduct IW. Coons and Harned write: “Some players argued that even if the agencies could build adequate capacity, it might be more cost-effective to expand DOD civil affairs, psychological operations, and foreign area officer capabilities and detail these resources to the civilian agencies or assign them to MILGRPs to function under the direction of Foreign Service Officers, especially in unstable or hostile operational environments where civilian agencies cannot operate effectively.”²⁹ The results of Unified Quest suggest that the military has the greater capacity to conduct stability operations but would benefit by implementing aspects of the USAID planning process into its stability operations planning. By more closely integrating USG civilian agencies (particularly USAID/OTI) with the U.S. military it would enhance the ability of all parties concerned as well as more effectively embracing the whole-of-government approach.

military operations, psychological operations, information operations, intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

²⁸ Ibid, 101.

²⁹ Ibid, 102.

One of the biggest challenges to the U.S. military's conduct of effective peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations has been the traditional lack of a coherent doctrine or mechanism to properly integrate with civilian agencies. A 2010 article by Beth Cole and Emily Hsu noted that "The civilian agencies of the U.S. government...operate without any unifying framework or shared set of principles to guide their actions."³⁰ This same article heralded the October 2009 joint publishing by the U.S. Institute of Peace and the U.S. Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute of *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. This manual, intended as a companion to the U.S. Army's FM 3-07, provides five end states (or results) of stability and reconstruction operations. These end states are the establishment of a safe and secure environment, rule of law, stable governance, sustainable economy, and social well-being. These end states are compatible with FM 3-07's primarily stability tasks which include establishing civil security, establishing civil control, restoring essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development. The *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* represents the first step in the right direction in terms of true USG inter-agency cooperation for post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding operations. However, it is far from an overarching and complete document. For this reason, until the practice of this doctrinal framework proves otherwise, the U.S. military should be the lead agency for conducting post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding operations.

³⁰ Beth Cole and Emily Hsu. *Guiding Principles for Stability and Reconstruction: Introducing a Roadmap for Peace*. Military Review. January-February 2010. 8.

Chapter Two

Modern U.S. Civil Military Strategy for Post-Conflict Operations

Peace building, post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization operations and terms such as these are becoming increasingly common in today's military lexicon. When conducted by the DOD they all fall under the CMO umbrella. This chapter will examine the composition of the U.S. military units primarily responsible for conducting peace building and post-conflict operations. As this chapter will point out, most of the peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations the U.S. military will conduct will be planned and carried out by CA units. This chapter aims to lay a foundation for future CMO, to include peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, by examining past CMO and taking a look at the evolution of the U.S. military's CA forces. It is necessary to identify these aspects before we can truly understand how future peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations will be conducted by DOD.

After detailing the U.S. composition for conducting CMO, this chapter will examine case studies of two different approaches to post-conflict and stabilization operations. The Russian

model during the Chechen conflict will be looked at as well as the U.S. approach in Afghanistan. The intent of scrutinizing the approaches to these operations is to assess the desirability and feasibility of U.S. involvement in post-conflict operations.

A Brief History of U.S. Civil Affairs Operations

While the concept of civil-military operations in the U.S. military dates back to the Revolutionary War, it was not until World War II that the need for CA units were officially recognized and organized. By the end of the war there were over 250 ten-man CA detachments. Each detachment consisted of four commissioned officers and six enlisted men, often NCOs. These ten man detachments were responsible for civil administration of cities and towns. Larger elements of CA personnel also served to administer and advise commanders at the provincial and national levels. As Cristen Oehrig points out in her article Civil Affairs in World War II, the term "civil affairs" was synonymous with the term "military government. Civil Affairs personnel were largely tasked with administration of occupied territories, rebuilding infrastructure, and minimizing civilian interference during military operations in Germany and Japan during and following combat operations.

Regarding CA operations in Germany Oehrig writes: "Germany presented more challenging objectives for civil affairs. Lessons learned from WWI taught military planners that a weak and degraded Germany was an impetus for retaliation. However, the sweeping power grabs illustrated in both world wars indicated that an independently strong Germany was also not ideal. While the objective of civil affairs in general was to assist military operations in winning

the war, Germany's case provided opportunities to use military government installations to inculcate democratic ideals, follow through with de-Nazification efforts, and develop sound economic plans for the future that would balance punishment with prosperity."³¹ In many ways, the lessons learned by U.S. CA units during World War II are applicable to the current struggle against violent and radical Islam as this thesis will explain in greater detail later. Civil Affairs units tried to avoid direct governorship in occupied territories whenever possible. Instead they formed advisory relationships with indigenous leaders and negotiated treaties with local, provincial, and national governments that allowed for the return of organic governance.

American CMO in affected areas following World War Two were highly successful and provide a post war model for winning the peace. In his book, Fighting the War on Terror, James S. Corum writes "the U.S. Army did a brilliant job in West Germany from 1945-1954, and in Japan from 1945 to 1950. With complete authority to manage large civilian populations and economies, the army set sound policies; got the two devastated nations functioning again; and effectively transformed both nations from totalitarian and militaristic states into models of democracy, prosperity, and stable government."³² Today's CMO planners should study the successes of the post-war army and its reconstruction efforts.

While there was little in the way of CMO during the Korean War, three CA companies were deployed as part of the Vietnam War. The 41st Civil Affairs Company was first to arrive and was followed by the 2nd and 29th Civil Affairs Companies. These CA companies deployed individual teams attached to infantry units and were responsible for the relocation of refugees and rural development projects. These rural development projects aimed to keep farmers in their

³¹ Cristen Oehrig. "Civil Affairs in World War II," *Center for Strategic and International Studies* accessed 12 October 2009 http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090130_world_war_ii_study.pdf . 4.

³² James T. Corum. *Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy*. St. Paul, MN, Zenith Press: 2007. 87-88.

fields and make joining the Viet Cong less attractive. The most well known civil-military undertaking of the Vietnam War was known as CORDS—Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. CORDS combined CA soldiers with other soldiers and representatives of other USG agencies (primarily USAID) in an effort to coordinate pacification programs throughout South Vietnam.

In October 1985 the U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command was established and was the parent command for the Army Reserve CA units. In November 1990 the Army established the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) at Fort Bragg, NC. This became the parent unit for both active-duty and reserve CA units. USACAPOC was at this time subordinate to USASOC.

During Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm Civil Affairs units and planners were active in preparing “no-strike” lists for combat forces. These lists included sites such as hospitals and mosques, which are off limits to targeting according to the Geneva Convention and whose destruction would greatly diminish the U.S. military’s information operations campaign. CA units also worked closely with the exiled Kuwaiti government to ensure a smooth transition following the ouster of Iraqi forces. Civil Affairs personnel working the Kuwaiti government were part of the Kuwaiti Task Force (KTF). The KTF was responsible for ensuring humanitarian assistance (HA) was delivered to Kuwaitis in need and that the government was prepared to reassert control of Kuwait following the ouster of the Iraqi army. Civil Affairs units ensured that no Kuwaiti died from malnutrition or lack of water. Civil Affairs units as part of the KTF also provided an efficient means of transfer of control from combat to civilian elements.

Following the hostilities of Desert Storm, CA units were involved in *Operation Provide Comfort* in Northern Iraq to provide HA to Kurdish refugees. CA teams also worked in

conjunction with Special Forces (SF) teams to construct refugee camps and provide medical care to sick or injured Kurds.

During the 1990s CA units participated in several smaller operations throughout the world. Civil Affairs units actively participated in *Operations Just Cause* and *Promote Liberty* in Panama. These units assisted in maintaining order among the civilian populace and delivered humanitarian assistance goods to Panamanian citizens in need of subsistence. John T. Fishel, in his book *Civil Military Operations in the New World* notes that in Panama "U.S. forces were used quite effectively to carry light engineering projects and medical civic action to many rural villages in the Panamanian interior—all under the auspices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) exercises. These "exercises" served to carry the message that the U.S. and Panamanian governments cared about the people of Panama."³³ These "exercises" were CMO planned and supervised by CA personnel from the active and reserve components of the Army. U.S. Army CA units planned and coordinated for the distribution of food and other HA supplies in Kenya and Somalia during *Operation Provide Relief* in August 1992 to February 1993. Civil Affairs units were also involved in operations in Haiti and Somalia. One theme that is apparent with all CA operations in the 1990s is they were all reactive operations aimed at relieving human suffering and/or restoring functioning governments in areas where the U.S. was conducting larger military actions. There is a distinct lack of preemptive CA operations.

In late 1995 the U.S. military, along with other NATO elements, entered Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to conduct peace enforcement. This operation was known as *Operation Joint Endeavor* and was followed up by *Operation Joint Guard* and *Operation Joint Forge*.

³³ John T. Fishel. *Civil Military Operations in the New World*, Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers: 1997. 12-13.

Large-scale peacebuilding operations began in late 1996 with the beginning of *Joint Guard*. The U.S. military conducted numerous civic action projects as well as infrastructure reconstruction projects.

Civil Affairs units were among the first to deploy to Afghanistan following the attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. in September 2001. Civil Affairs units were instrumental in gaining support from Afghan tribes for the U.S. fight against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Currently, CA units are working to rebuild and develop the infrastructure of Afghanistan and assist the Afghan people in developing or restoring social services. Civil Affairs personnel have been involved in Iraq from the initial invasion in 2003 to the present day. They have worked closely with elected officials at local, provincial, and national levels as well as tribal leaders. Civil Affairs personnel frequently conduct meetings with Iraqi leaders at all levels in order to minimize the impact of U.S. and Iraqi military operations on the Iraqi people. Additionally, CA units conduct liaison with other USG agencies to ensure unity of effort in rebuilding the infrastructure of Iraq and defeating insurgent networks throughout the country.

In October 2006, Civil Affairs became an official Army branch. Prior to this, CA was only a functional area and did not carry the same weight as other branches such as the Infantry, Artillery, or Special Forces Branches. This has given CA greater pull at the table in terms of budgeting and personnel requests. Also in October 2006, USACAPOC was moved outside USASOC, but USASOC maintained control of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade. This created a clear split between active-duty and reserve component CA units. All active-duty CA personnel now maintain their position as part of the SOF community while reserve component CA units are part of the general purpose (regular or conventional) army.

Humanitarian Intervention and Civil-Military Co-Operation

In 2003 NATO published Allied Joint Publication 9 (AJP-9), which laid out NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine. This was a needed response to the numerous peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions of the 1990's and the expanding counter-terror and counterinsurgency missions following 9/11. AJP-9 states: "CIMIC is applicable to both Article 5 Collective [Defense] and Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CROs). In both scenarios commanders are increasingly required to take account of social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting military operations."³⁴ This represents an early indicator that peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations would be viewed with the same level of importance as more traditional wartime functions. This change in focus toward a more population-centric view of conducting operations would be reflected in later U.S. doctrine and will be explored further in Chapter Three of this thesis.

Composition of U.S. Military Civil Affairs

Civil Affairs soldiers are gun-toting diplomats who can build ties with local residents, understand the complex web of relationships in a foreign land and get projects such as clinics and schools built.

-G. Gordon Liddy

³⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Allied Joint Publication-9 NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine. 2003. 9.

The DODs budget for 2010, unveiled by Defense Secretary Robert Gates in April 2009, makes it abundantly clear that the U.S. sees the need for expanding the ability of the U.S. military to fight unconventional threats. In his article “The Man Behind Irregular Warfare Push: Mike Vickers”, Greg Grant notes that Michael Vickers, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and Gates’ top adviser on irregular warfare has been a key proponent for the increase in CA forces. Grant writes that “Vickers has convinced Gates and others to embrace irregular warfare as the most likely form of conflict today and in the future.”³⁵ This view is also shared by many U.S. military commanders.

Grant goes on to write “Gates said his budget plan would increase special operations forces by 5 percent, some 2,800 personnel, along with more enablers: special helicopters, refueling aircraft and stealthy transport. Vickers said the additional special operations personnel would consist largely of civil affairs.”³⁶ In his May 14, 2009 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Admiral Mike Mullen stated that the need for more CA had been discovered in the current unconventional conflicts. Admiral Mullen went on to characterize CA as part of a contingent of key enablers that must be increased. The majority of the increase in CA forces will take place in the Army. Civil Affairs personnel in conjunction with Special Forces represents one of the most important and promising ways in which the U.S. will fight counterinsurgencies in the future. The remainder of this chapter will detail the current composition of CA units and examine how the military plans to grow its CA units.

³⁵ Greg Grant. “The Man Behind Irregular Warfare Push: Mike Vickers,” *DOD Buzz: Online Defense and Acquisition Journal* (April 7th) accessed October 11, 2009 <http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/04/07/the-man-behind-irregular-warfare-push-mike-vickers/>.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

Active Duty Army

The 95th Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina is presently the only fully manned active duty Civil Affairs unit in the Army. This unit falls under the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), which is subordinate to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and is primarily responsible for CA support to U.S. special operations units. The 95th CA Brigade consists of four regionally aligned CA Battalions. Each battalion has four CA companies, making a total of sixteen CA companies. The four CA Battalions, all assigned to Fort Bragg, NC provide support to each of the theater special operations commands (SOC). Civil Affairs soldiers are assigned military occupational specialty (MOS) 38. Officers are coded as 38A and enlisted are 38B. All CA soldiers in the 95th CA Brigade are airborne qualified and on active jump status. This enhances the ability of active-duty CA units to incorporate with other special operations units and the ability to deploy worldwide within 96 hours. Active duty CA units are capable of deploying alone or with other SOF units. Most CA soldiers have received foreign language training at the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Soldiers train in critical languages such as Arabic, Farsi, Russian, and French, etc. Language capability combined with extensive cultural training on an assigned region makes active-duty CA soldiers more effective than other soldiers when interacting with local peoples in areas where the U.S. military operates.

The 96th CA Battalion has the primary responsibility of supporting Special Operations Command, Central (SOCCENT) and is generally assigned to carry out missions in the U.S.

Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. Prior to October 2006, the 96th CA Battalion was the single active duty CA unit in the army and was responsible for carrying out CA missions worldwide. The 98th CA Battalion has the primary responsibility of supporting Special Operations Command, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) (SOCSOUTH) and is generally assigned to carry out missions in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. The 97th CA Battalion has the primary responsibility of supporting Special Operations Command, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) (SOCPAC) and is generally assigned to carry out missions in the PACOM area of responsibility. The 91st CA Battalion has the primary responsibility of supporting Special Operations Command, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) (SOCAF) and is generally assigned to carry out missions in the AFRICOM area of responsibility. The 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion is regionally aligned with the European theater of operations and supports U.S. European Command.

The five battalions in the 95th CA Brigade presently have four CA companies. Each company has five Civil Affairs Teams (CAT) assigned to it. Each CAT has four members. An officer (usually a Captain) serves as Team Leader and is responsible for mission planning and overall in charge of team functions. One non-commissioned officer (NCO) serves as team sergeant is second in command, and responsible for security as well as advising the team leader. A special operations trained medic conducts medical functions and advises the team leader on medical related missions for the team. The fourth member of the CAT is a civil affairs specialist who generally handles project management and other CA tasks.

By 2012 the Army is slated to field an active-duty civil affairs brigade to provide support to primarily conventional or general purpose Army units. The 85th Civil Affairs Brigade, will ultimately consist of five battalions and will primarily support general-purpose Army units rather

than special operations units. It has not yet been established if personnel in this CA Brigade will receive the level of cultural and language training as their counterparts in the 95th CA Brigade.

In 2006 CA units in the active duty Army represented four percent of all U.S. military CA units. By 2013 it will represent nearly twenty percent of all CA units. No other branch in the U.S. military will grow at this rate over this time period. This is indicative of the future of U.S. military strategy in the foreseeable future and its emphasis on civil-military operations as a means to win wars and maintain peace.

Army Reserves

Ninety percent of the Army's Civil Affairs personnel are assigned to Army Reserve units. Civil Affairs units in the Army Reserve fall under four regionally aligned CA Commands (CACOMs). A one-star general from the Army Reserves commands each CACOM. The 350th CACOM is located in Pensacola, FL; the 351st CACOM is located in Mountain View, CA; the 352nd CACOM is located in Ft. Meade, MD; and the 353rd CACOM is in Staten Island, NY. These CACOMs report directly to the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) at Fort Bragg, NC, which is subordinate to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC). CACOMs provide support and planning at the strategic level to the National Command Authority (NCA). Presently there are 112 Reserve CA Companies, spread throughout the US, in the reserve component. Each CA Company contains five CATs. These companies comprise eight CA Brigades and 28 Battalions. Reserve component CA Brigades provide support and planning at the operational level to theater commanders. Civil Affairs

Companies and teams are the primary planners for civil-military operations (CMO) at the tactical level.

In order to more effectively conduct CMO, each CACOM contains the following six functional teams: Governance, Infrastructure, Economic Stability, Public Health and Welfare, Public Education and Information, and Rule of Law. Additionally, each CACOM has a linguist team that provides linguists to support operations and trains CA personnel. Reserve component CA units are uniquely suited to manning these specialty teams because they can draw upon the skill sets obtained in the civilian occupations of its soldiers.




Figure 1: Civil Affairs Functional Areas

Figure 1 demonstrates the six CA functional areas and its subsections. The Governance Team contains functional specialists in public administration, public safety, and environmental management. A Governance Team may consist of soldiers who are employed in the civilian sector as judges, environmental managers, or police officers, etc. The Infrastructure Team consists of functional specialists in public transportation, public works, and public communications. An Infrastructure Team may consist of soldiers who are employed in the

civilian sector as city planners, plumbers, or telecommunications experts. The Economic Stability Team contains functional specialists in food and agriculture, economic development, and civilian supply. An economics and commerce team may consist of soldiers who are farmers, accountants, or warehouse managers. The Public Health and Welfare Team consists of functional specialists in medical services, cultural relations, and displaced civilians (DC) operations. A Public Health and Welfare Team may contain soldiers who are physicians, fire fighters, etc. A Public Education and Information Team often contains functional specialists in public information and civil information. Public Education and Information Teams may contain school principals, teachers, or college students. A Rule of Law Team contains functional specialists in International Law. Attorneys and paralegals are the most common civilian professions on these teams.

The Army Reserves plan to expand its civil affairs structure by an additional brigade consisting of 5 battalions and a total of 20 companies beginning in 2010. This additional brigade will increase the number of Army Reserve civil affairs companies from 112 to 132. Additionally, reserve component CA units will continue staffing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan and Iraq.

U.S Marine Corps

The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), with less than 200 CA personnel on active duty, has neither a civil affairs branch nor an MOS. Civil Affairs personnel are largely assigned to the headquarters and planning sections of Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU). The USMC has

utilized non CA personnel to accomplish its CMO missions. The 2009 Report to Congress on Civil Affairs reports: “The Marine Corps’ four artillery regiments were given a secondary CMO mission in December 2005. Their assigned mission is to carry out a range of CMO-related tasks in support of Marine Divisions to include operation of the Division’s Civil-Military Operations Center and primary of Division CMO.”³⁷ This has allowed artillery personnel, who have a limited mission in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to have a more productive impact on the battlefield.

There are just over 300 personnel assigned to perform CA duties in the USMC reserves. These Marines are primarily assigned to the 3rd and 4th Civil Affairs Groups (CAG). These two CAGs provide civil-military planning capabilities and tactical and operational support to the entire USMC.

The USMC has acknowledged it may possibly need to add civil affairs units to its force structure in the future. It is not presently known whether these units will, if any, will be added to the active or reserve components. For the time being field artillery units will be cross-trained and continue to fill a large portion of the civil-military operations requirements.

U.S. Navy

Like the USMC, Civil Affairs is neither an official branch nor an MOS in the Navy. The Navy has, however, begun deploying CA units as part of its maritime strategy and organized these personnel into Maritime Civil Affairs Groups (MCAG). Within the MCAG there are two

³⁷ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities. Report to Congress on Civil Affairs, Washington, DC, 2009: United States Department of Defense. 8.

Maritime Civil Affairs Squadrons (MCAS). MCAS 1 is stationed in Imperial Beach, California and MCAS 2 is in Yorktown, Virginia. Each MCAS has seven to eight Maritime Civil Affairs Teams (MCAT). Like the Army, MCAGs are regionally aligned, allowing them to gather regional and cultural expertise that better serves to accomplish their CMO mission. MCATs have conducted CAO across the Pacific and in Africa.

The Navy, in accordance with its overall decrease in manpower will decrease the number of civil affairs personnel by nearly 40 percent by 2010. The overall reduction in Navy manpower, combined with the large growth of the Army's CA component are likely reasons for the Navy's reduction in CA specific personnel.

U.S. Air Force

Like the Navy and Marine Corps, the Air Force does not have an independent CA branch or MOS. While the Air Force recognizes a need for such personnel, the nature of the Air Force's mission has made establishing CA units less of a priority and thus, there are no CA units in the Air Force. The Air Force is, however, "providing select personnel with relevant skills to serve in civil affairs capacities such as Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The Air Force Irregular Warfare Task Force has made it a priority to identify Air Force personnel that have already taken part in civil affairs operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere."³⁸ While the Air Force does not have specifically designated CA personnel, its recognition of the usefulness of personnel performing civil-military functions is apparent.

³⁸ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities. 2009. Report to Congress on Civil Affairs. Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense. 9.

The Air Force currently has not disclosed plans for establishment of CA units. It continues to grant Special Experience Identifiers (SEI) to personnel who have performed civil-military functions as a means to place experienced personnel in relevant positions in the future.

U.S. Civil-Military Doctrine

The military doctrinal terms CMO and CAO are often confused with one another. The following section of this chapter will define and differentiate these terms as well as demonstrate where they fit into the full spectrum of military operations. The term full spectrum operations refers to the entire range of military operations (offense, defense, and stability, etc.). The next two sections will also portray how Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) and post-conflict reconstruction and peace building fit under the larger CMO umbrella and how CMO fits into the greater picture of full spectrum military operations. The section of this chapter, Primary Civil Affairs Missions and Core Tasks, will detail what CA forces do and how their missions fit into the greater operational and strategic picture. The chapter summary will identify the elements of CA doctrine most pertinent to the War on Terror and future U.S. military strategy.




Figure 2: CAO, CMO in relation to full spectrum operations.

Civil-Military Operations

The DOD defines CMO as follows: "The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operation to consolidate and achieve operational United States objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated Civil Affairs, by other military forces, or by

a combination of Civil Affairs and other forces."³⁹ CMO does not necessarily need to be performed by CA units.

Civil Affairs Operations

Figure 2 demonstrates how CAO fits into the larger picture of full spectrum operations and falls under the CMO umbrella. The Army defines CAO as follows: "Those military operations planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by Civil Affairs forces through, with, or by the indigenous population and institutions, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, or other governmental agencies to modify behaviors, to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing the capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats in support of civil-military operations or other United States objectives."⁴⁰ CAO is performed exclusively by CA personnel. CAO can be conducted in conjunction with or without the host-nation, other USG agencies, or higher level Civil Affairs Planning Teams (CAPT), or NGOs.

³⁹ U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05.40 *Civil Affairs Operations*. Department of the Army. 2006. 163.

⁴⁰ U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05.40 *Civil Affairs Operations*. Department of the Army. 2006. 162.




Figure 3: CAO Mission Process

Primary Civil Affairs Missions and Core Tasks

In order to better understand how CA will play a significant role on U.S. peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations in the 21st Century, it is essential to understand what CA units bring to the table. Much of what comprises military peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction is found within the CA core tasks. This section will detail what CA units do and do not do and where they best fit into a mosaic of diplomacy, economic development, and military force when executing U.S. foreign policy goals. According to U.S. military doctrine CAO consists of six primary CA missions.⁴¹ They consist of the following: Support to Civil Administration, Foreign Nation Support (FNS), Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Populace and Resource Control (PRC), Military Civic Action (MCA), and Emergency Services. These missions are not independent of one another, that is, there exists a certain amount of overlap in

⁴¹ US Army Field Manual 41-10 and US Army Field Manual 3-05.401.

the tasks associated with each mission. Of these six missions, all but emergency services comprise what are known as the CA core tasks and noted in Figure 3. Figure 3 also demonstrates how CAO is conducted through the execution of the primary CA missions. The following brief explanation of each of these missions will serve to later demonstrate how CA will play a key role in US military strategy.

Support to civil administration missions are aimed at stabilizing foreign governments or other civil entities at risk of being destabilized or failing. During wartime or following combat operations this may include establishing military authority or the establishment of a temporary indigenous government. Support to Civil Administration is a large and often complicated mission that is performed at the strategic and operational levels. During peacetime, CA units may be utilized to increase civil stability in states where the U.S. has interests. Civil Affairs teams and planners can work in conjunction with the efforts of the DOS mission in order to provide short-term relief in the form of delivering food, water and shelter. They can also work to establish a longer-term means for states to support themselves. Building or repairing infrastructure that is critical to the achievement and maintenance of economic self-sufficiency can achieve this. Civil Affairs personnel can coordinate to repair critical infrastructure by working with local or international contractors and obtaining funding from a variety of sources including the USG, United Nations (UN), the host-nation government, or NGOs.

Civil Affairs units can provide assistance to foreign governments following natural or man-made disasters. The ability to deploy rapidly to any locale in the world makes active-duty Army CA units optimal to provide assistance on behalf of the USG. In the short term, CA personnel can deploy to affected areas and deliver humanitarian assistance supplies, assess the ability of the current civil administration to maintain order, and its ability to provide essential

services. Once assessments have been completed, CA personnel may recommend courses of action to the host government aimed at improving the situation for the populace.

Foreign nation support involves using the resources in a foreign nation to support U.S. operations in that country. Civil Affairs planners are able to determine what goods and services are locally available in a theatre of operations. Used primarily as a means to sustain U.S. military forces abroad, CA personnel obtain foreign nation support for food, labor, material, and other resources. This has the intended effect of shortening U.S. supply lines and maintaining combat manpower by keeping soldiers assigned to their primary duties. Utilizing foreign resources also promotes trade and creates employment opportunities for citizens of the host country. Foreign nation support can be a win-win situation because it helps to stimulate local economies. Where the local populace may see U.S. operations as a burden, obtaining local goods (when available) can serve as a positive link between the U.S. military and locals.

Humanitarian assistance encompasses the U.S. military's short-term efforts to relieve suffering, prevent loss of life, and protect property in a foreign country following a natural or man-made disaster. The U.S. becomes involved in foreign HA following request from the affected state. U.S. military involvement in HA operations are supplementary to the efforts of other government agencies and must not duplicate similar efforts. When conducting HA, CA planners conduct assessments of host-nation capabilities and organize U.S. military efforts aimed to fill in gaps in their capabilities. Civil-military planners also conduct interagency coordination aimed at synchronizing all efforts. Humanitarian assistance can come in the form of food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical supplies, etc. This mission differs from other CA missions, in that HA is meant purely as a means to help people in need and relieve immediate suffering.

For CA units, the PRC mission is one that is most likely to occur in a combat or near post-combat scenario. It involves providing or coordinating security for the civilian sector of a territory, which the U.S. finds itself responsible for. For all intents and purposes, the U.S. military will temporarily attempt to fill an essential services gap that was once filled by a foreign government or other agency. Military commanders have a legal obligation to ensure that all civilians are treated with a reasonable amount of humane care, and that property and resources are not unduly destroyed.

Populace and resource control can be broken down into two different elements—populace control and resource control. The primary goal of populace control is to minimize civilian interference in areas where the military is conducting operations. This is essential to a) save innocent lives, and b) more effectively conduct military operations. Civil Affairs personnel are trained to categorize civilians into certain categories and advise combatant commanders on how civilians should be handled. Controlling a populace can vary from implementing curfews to aiding in the resettlement of displaced persons. Two submissions of populace control are displaced civilian (DC) and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). When conducting DC operations, CA personnel aim to segregate innocent civilians from military operations, prevent and control the outbreak of disease, and relieve human suffering. Civil Affairs units usually work with the DOS to plan and conduct NEO following or in anticipation of combat or a natural or man-made disaster. The object of NEO is to protect U.S. citizens abroad and reduce the number of U.S. citizens at risk. It involves close interagency cooperation with the DOS through the U.S. Embassy and the DOD.

Resource control involves regulating and monitoring commonly used resources within a country where the U.S. military is operating. Control of resources in the short-term ensures even

distribution of food, water, fuel, etc. It also aims to keep supplies out of the hands of the enemy. In the long term, resource control involves licensing, regulating, and inspecting the distribution of resources. Long-term resource control can and should be done in conjunction with interim or permanent indigenous authorities as a means of getting a state to a position where it can once again control the flow of resources.

Military civic action (MCA) involves projects aimed at winning support of a foreign populace for their government or U.S. actions in their country. Much of the effort in MCA involves carrying out civic assistance actions and conducting projects with indigenous military or other security forces and with the support of elected officials or in some instances tribal leaders. MCA projects are divided into two categories, mitigating and developmental. Mitigating MCA projects are short-term projects carried out in conjunction with indigenous military forces and include projects such as food distribution, running temporary medical clinics, or construction of sanitation facilities. Developmental MCA projects are those whose scope is longer in duration. Developmental projects are usually intended to improve the basic infrastructure of a foreign nation. Developmental MCA projects in the past have included school construction, well drilling, and road construction. All MCA projects have an intended dual-purpose effect. First, they provide essential services and support for a targeted populace. Second, it helps win support for those providing the services (the host-nation partner of the U.S.).

One of the most commonly used and effective MCA missions is known as the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP). A MEDCAP involves U.S. military medics, physicians, or nurses treating foreign nationals. There is a dual purpose to a MEDCAP. The first is to treat injuries and illnesses of foreign nationals in a given region or village. The second is to build rapport with the locals and their elected or tribal leaders. An additional benefit to a MEDCAP is

the ability to collect information from the local population. People at MEDCAP clinics will often open up about other problems in the area. This can lead to further projects and increased cooperation between locals, the host-nation government, and/or the U.S.

The scale of such medical missions is dependent upon the medical capacity of the host-nation. It is important not to subvert the national, provincial, or local health agency in a region. A MEDCAP is most successful when it can incorporate indigenous or host-nation medical personnel into the operation. By placing indigenous medical personnel at the front of such an operation it has the effect of showing locals that their government cares for them. This has the obvious and intended effect of bolstering the perceived image of the host-nation government, which the U.S. is supporting.

Similar to a MEDCAP is a Veterinary Civic Action Program (VETCAP). In many regions of the world where life-expectancy rates are much lower than the West, medical treatment for humans is a far lower priority. In regions and cultures where livestock represents nearly the entire economy for a family or an entire tribe, veterinary care is a highly effective means to gain access to an area. In areas where access to veterinary care is limited or unavailable, treatment of intestinal parasites in a flock or herd can win "hearts and minds" and lead to increased support for U.S. efforts in an area. When such actions are performed in conjunction with host nation officials, it can have the effect of increasing the perceived legitimacy of the host nation government that the U.S. wants to strengthen.

For CA units to provide emergency services in a foreign nation, one of two options must occur. The affected nation must officially request assistance through the U.S. Embassy and have it approved by the DOS. Military commanders in the immediate area may begin operations aimed at relieving human suffering without waiting for the official request of the foreign nation.

Civil Affairs units also have a role to play in emergency services following a disaster in the continental U.S., but as it is not germane to this study it will not be detailed here.

This chapter has detailed the primary CA missions and core tasks, the evolution of CA forces, and the historical use of CA by the U.S. military. It has also explained CAO and CMO and how each relates to one another and fits into the greater scheme of full spectrum operations. It must be noted that the primary CA missions are not necessarily conducted separately. These missions can be conducted concurrently. Of the CA missions detailed in this chapter, Support to Civil Administration, Military Civic Action, and to a lesser extent Humanitarian Assistance are the most pertinent to U.S. military strategy and the preemptive use of CA units in the foreseeable future. All of the CA functions and core tasks are part of U.S. military efforts at peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. These elements are presently being combined in civil-military support element (CMSE) missions throughout the world and will be looked at in greater detail in the following chapter.

Russian, British, and U.S. Approaches to Peacebuilding and Stabilization

Military involvement in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations will be looked at by examining case studies of U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russian involvement in Chechnya, and beginning with the British involvement in Malaysia. This study will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of each and apply aspects of them to recommendations for improving U.S. military involvement in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding

operations. The Russian military model was chosen because its large, relatively well-trained force is more comparable than any other military to the United States. The British model was selected for two reasons—first, the British have a long history fighting counterinsurgencies and secondly, the British military doctrine is more similar to that of the U.S than most other states.

British civil-military operations during the Malayan (Malaysia) Emergency from 1948 to 1960 represent an interesting study for those wanting to understand modern day peace building and stabilization operations. The British civil-military strategy in Malay was developed by Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs and became known as the Briggs Plan. Joel Hamby notes “the [Briggs Plan] reorganized the government to handle the insurgency and temper the unrest from which the communists gained support. He believed there were “two key goals to accomplish in order to end the insurgency—first, to protect the population, and second to isolate them from the guerrillas.”⁴² Once security was established, the Briggs Plan called for civil-military unity of effort and the enhancement of legitimate indigenous civil government and police organizations.

The base doctrinal document for Russian stability operations is *Operatsi po Podderzhaniiu Mira* (Operations to Maintain Peace). When comparing it to its U.S. counterpart (Field Manual 3-07) the doctrine-based approaches in the field begin to take shape. With the Russian doctrine “no distinction is made between peacekeeping and counter-insurgency operations.”⁴³ The U.S. military has separate doctrine for stability and counter-insurgency operations and defines them as separate but related operations.

⁴² Joel Hamby. “Civil-Military Operations Joint Doctrine and the Malayan Emergency,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* Autumn (2002): 55.

⁴³ Richard E. Hayes & James J. Landon. Evidence Based Research, Inc. accessed August 27, 2011 http://www.dodccrp.org/files/landon_hayes.htm.

A concise case study of the U.S. and Russian approaches to post-conflict reconstruction is offered by Dan Fayutkin in his essay “Stabilization & Reconstruction of Nations after Military Conflict: Afghanistan and Chechnya Case Studies.”⁴⁴ Fayutkin points out “The basic organizational idea of the U.S. S&R [stabilization and reconstruction] approach is unity of effort. All governmental and non-governmental structures, including military forces, focus activities on the common objectives.”⁴⁵ In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, the common objective was to establish a secure, democratic, socially and financially stable state capable of transitioning to a sovereign existence.

U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated there is a tendency to move too quickly past the security-building phase of post-conflict operations and begin implementing reforms to the social and financial sectors that simply cannot be sustained by the tenuous (at best) security situation. As Fayutkin notes, “In 2002 U.S. official security and military structures developed the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The first significant weakness of the reconstruction model in Afghanistan was the concentration of the forces on the stabilization needs and not on the local military and security structures.”⁴⁶ USG led PRTs began preparing for the large-scale, long-term social and financial future of Afghanistan (and later Iraq) from the top-down. While the top-down approach was being started, criminal organizations and terrorists began tearing the countries apart from the bottom-up.

In 2004, during the Second Chechen War, the Russian Government began a strategy based on stabilizing security above all else. “The first priority of the Russian Federation was the stabilization of the security situation only. The Russian government did not reconstruct the

⁴⁴ Dan Fayutkin. “Stabilization & Reconstruction of Nations after Military Conflict: Afghanistan and Chechnya Case Studies,” *Comparative Strategy* 28 (2009): 4.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 368.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 369.

social structures of the Chechen Republic before imposing military control over all the territory,”⁴⁷ as the U.S. at first attempted to do in Iraq. As a result of the Russian emphasis on establishing effective local and national security sectors, the level of murders and kidnappings dropped significantly each year from 2004 to 2007. Fayutkin goes on to note that one of the primary outcomes “of the long-term efforts of the central and local governmental structures was the stabilization of all aspects of social life. The security and social policy in Chechnya reduced the influence of radical Islamic ideology.”⁴⁸ Juxtaposing the U.S. and Russian S&R approaches seems to suggest that the U.S. strategy of establishing democratic central and local governments while simultaneously developing the security, financial, and social institutions of a post-combat state appears to be an ineffective ad hoc strategy. This study suggests that, while not perfect, the Russian model of security before development is more effective at establishing the baseline level of security needed for long-term peace and effective post-conflict reconstructions.

It is apparent that the Russian approach did not consider protecting civilians as seriously as the British and American approaches. Due to its relevance and importance it must be noted that culturally the Russians were far more similar to Chechens than Americans are to Afghans or Iraqis, or the British were to the Malaysians. Despite the cultural differences and the obvious effects they would have had on civil-military operations, lessons can still be learned.

This thesis suggests that U.S. post-conflict operations should initially spend more time establishing security and then developing effective internal and indigenous security mechanisms as the Russians did in Chechnya. By taking the time to ensure there is a stable security situation before proceeding with larger-scale civilian development efforts it will also allow civilian development managers more time to plan and transition into their operations. After that, the

⁴⁷ Ibid, 370.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 371.

establishment of competent indigenous security, followed by an effective transition to larger-scale and longer-term civilian-led post-conflict development operations should be the U.S. model for future post-conflict operations. This cannot effectively be completed without the application of USG unity of effort.

It is no secret that the U.S. was caught off guard by the inability to maintain peace following quick military victories in Iraq and Afghanistan. Keck and Vaughan write, “the inability of coalition forces to establish a sustainable peace in Iraq and Afghanistan led many U.S. policymakers to question U.S. post-conflict reconstruction capabilities. And they were right. The chaos after the fall of Baghdad can largely be blamed on inefficient U.S. agency coordination, poor decision-making from senior policymakers, and a lack of a cadre of civilian professionals with reconstruction expertise. To remedy these failures and in response to a legislative initiative from Senate Foreign Relations leaders Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Joseph Biden (D-DE), then-Secretary of State Colin Powell established the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in 2004. The primary objective of S/CRS is to coordinate all U.S. civilian agencies involved in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.”⁴⁹ This is a simplified summation of the advent of the S/CRS. The role of the S/CRS and its potential integration with the U.S. military will be covered in subsequent chapters of this thesis.

⁴⁹ Trevor Keck and Ann Vaughan. "Securing the Peace." *Foreign Policy In Focus* May 15 (2008). Accessed August 9, 2011. http://www.fpif.org/articles/securing_the_peace.

Chapter Three

Forging a Civil-Military Strategy For Effective Peacebuilding and

Post-Conflict Reconstruction

One does not have to spend long in Bosnia, or Gaza or the lakes district in Africa to know that without economic hope we will not have peace. Without equity we will not have global stability. Without a better sense of social justice our cities will not be safe and our societies will not be stable. Without inclusion, too many of us will be condemned to live separate, armed and frightened lives.

-James D. Wolfensohn, address to
1997 World Bank Annual Meetings

When you're up to your elbows in alligators, it's tough to remember that your job was to drain the swamp.

-Stephen R. Dalzell

In order to fully understand how peace building and post-conflict reconstruction can best be accomplished we must now look at other options for conducting these complex operations. In his essay The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations, Volker Franke lists two actors that can conduct peace building operations—Civilian and Military⁵⁰. Obviously the military is the actor this study is most concerned with, but I believe the “civilian actor” needs to be broken down into four distinct actors. In addition to looking at the DOD, this chapter will explore and discuss what I believe are the four basic civilian organizational options that can conduct effective international peace building and post-conflict reconstruction. These organizations are: 1) the UN and other international organizations, 2) other USG conglomerations and agencies such as USAID and DOS, 3) NGO’s, and 4) Peace and Stability Industry (PSI) Contractors and Private Military Companies (PMC). As this study is on U.S. military involvement, it will merely touch upon alternative organizations conducting these missions rather than devoting a significant amount of time to their involvement.

In 2005 DOD issued Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. This was the first official statement that the U.S. military would now view peace building and post-conflict reconstruction as a core mission comparable to its more traditional offensive and defensive combat roles. While the previous chapter laid out many of the effects that were both a direct and indirect result of Directive 3000.05, the implementation of this directive is still being played out. In addition to looking at

⁵⁰ Volker Franke. “Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations,” *International Journal of Peace Studies* Volume 11, Number 2, Autumn/Winter (2006): 9.

civilian agencies involved in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, this chapter will analyze the possible operational policy shifts, personnel moves, and tactical implementation of future U.S. military involvement in peace building and post-conflict reconstruction.

Alternatives to Military Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding

This section will take a look at some of the present and emerging options to the military conducting effective post-conflict reconstruction. As this has been and will likely continue to be a growth industry, a private sector alternative has become viable. This section will examine private alternatives to peace building and post-conflict reconstruction and look at the emergence of the DOSs Civilian Response Corps (CRC). The CRC is not intended to play a large role in peace building operations but will play an increasingly large role in USG post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

Private Corporation Involvement in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The increased importance placed by the military on peacebuilding and post-conflict operations has been largely paralleled by the rise of private military corporations (PMC) and private security corporations (PSC). Sultan Barkat and Steven A. Zyck write, “The military has been joined by the private sector as a new entrant into post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction operations. In the post-2001 period, predominantly Western companies are

increasingly becoming the face of post-conflict recovery.”⁵¹ The increase in predominance of PSCs and PMCs brings with it both positive and negative aspects. PMCs may have an organic security force. For this reason, depending on the situation, a PMC may be a better choice to carry out certain missions over an NGO who has no organic security and can free up thinly stretched government assets.

In their essay, Ruthless Humanitarianism: Why Marginalizing Private Peacekeeping Kills People, Doug Brooks and Matan Chorev write, “UN peacekeeping standards have not matched the increasingly exacting demands of member nations.”⁵² This typifies international criticism of UN peace building and post-conflict reconstruction efforts when acting without the solid backing of Western governments. This essay goes on to assert that for successful peace building operations there are “four crucial factors for success: a competent and professional force, Western participation, long-term international commitment, and adequate resources.”⁵³ Private contractors are undoubtedly proficient at providing professional forces and adequate resources. This essay also notes that there are three major types of service providers within the conflict/post-conflict (CPC) private security industry (PSI): “Logistics and Support Companies (LSC) can provide construction, medical services, water purification; LSCs make up 90% of PSI. Private security companies work under legitimate mandates or contracts provided by governments, or IGOs. Security sector reform (SSR) companies provide development services, long-term training, and security reform to improve the strategic situation permanently [and] provide civil-military training and peacekeeping skills.”⁵⁴ Companies in the PSI arena are quite

⁵¹ Sultan Barkat and Steven A. Zyck. “The Evolution of Post-conflict Recovery,” *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 30, No. 6 (2009):1078.

⁵² Doug Brooks and Matan Chorev. *Ruthless Humanitarianism: Why Marginalizing Private Peacekeeping Kills People* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 117.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 117.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 118.

active in training local and national law-enforcement personnel in post-conflict states. All three sectors of the PSI/PMC have a place in modern peace building and post-conflict reconstruction, however they often come with a high price tag and even more worrisome is the limited oversight of their operations by non-shareholders.

Civilian USG Agencies

Introduction of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 resulted in the DOS establishing the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in July 2004. S/CRS was tasked with forming and training a reserve corps of civilians, known as the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) that could rapidly be deployed worldwide to conduct post-conflict reconstruction missions. In 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 mandating the Secretary of State to head any interagency post-conflict reconstruction operations. The CRC, subordinate to S/CRS, is to comprise active, reserve, and stand-by components. The active component (CRC-A) will comprise 250 personnel from eight government agencies.⁵⁵ CRC-A personnel have as their sole function— training, preparing for, and conducting international reconstruction missions. The standby component of the CRC (CRC-S) is comprised of full-time employees of one of eight government agencies that have “specialized expertise” and are prepared to deploy within 30 days in support of reconstruction missions. CRC-R is the reserve component and would send

⁵⁵ The CRC is comprised of the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Department of the Treasury.

temporary employees of the U.S. government to aid in reconstruction missions. The CRC-R has yet to receive funding from Congress.

In 2007 U.S. Senator Richard Lugar and then Senator Joe Biden cosponsored the Reconstruction and Stabilization Management Act of 2007 as a follow on to the 2004 legislation, which was never passed. This bill was attached to a DOD authorization and passed as an amendment. This legislation funded the CRC-A and CRC-S. Congressional findings in section two of the bill acknowledge “that the resources of the United States Armed Forces have been burdened by having to undertake stabilization and reconstruction tasks in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries of the world that could have been performed by civilians, which has resulted in lengthy deployments for Armed Forces personnel.”⁵⁶

Speaking at a 2008 panel discussion on U.S. Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Ambassador John E. Herbst, the U.S. State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization stated: “[The] S/CRS really has two major imperatives. First, they ensure that the U.S. government is organized in a unified way to handle stabilization or reconstruction crises, to make sure the next time we have such a crisis that all elements of U.S. power are used to address it, that there is a single comprehensive plan which uses all elements of that power, and that it is implemented effectively and efficiently. The second part of our mission is to make sure we have all the trained civilians with the right skill sets, the right equipment, ready to go in such a crisis.”⁵⁷ When post-conflict reconstruction operations have a military component, the S/CRS has an Integration Planning Cell that would deploy to the military headquarters. Again, Herbst: “If this is a U.S. run military operation, it will deploy to the relevant Combatant Command. At

⁵⁶ S.613 Reconstruction and Stabilization Management Act of 2007 accessed March 3, 2009 <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:S.613>.

⁵⁷ John E. Herbst. “When The Fighting Stops: U.S. Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” *Seton Hall Law Review* (2008): 2.

the intervention as to the operations in the Middle East, it would deploy to CENTCOM; if it is Latin America, it would deploy to SOUTHCOM. If it is an international military operation - for example, the U.N. - this outfit would deploy to wherever the U.N. military headquarters are. The purpose here is to make sure at the field level that military and civilian plans are completely in sync.”⁵⁸ The Integration Planning Cell is in theory a grand idea, however its ability to successfully ensure interagency synchronization is dependent upon a) its ability to effectively integrate with the military staff, and b) the reticence of the military commander and staff to incorporate the Integration Planning Cell into its planning and operational considerations.

The S/CRS aims to employ civilians with key skills that are useful when conducting post-conflict operations. Again, Ambassador Herbst on what type of employees his agency looks for: “The employees we are looking for need to have the skills required when there is no functioning government. So we are looking for people, for these pools to be comprised of people, who have the following sets of skills. There will be all types of engineering - road engineers, civil engineers, water and electrical engineers. There will be people who can handle public administration - public health officials, city planners. All the people involved in rule of law, meaning police, judges, corrections officials, attorneys, and also the economists. In some instances, there might be port operators. All the people that we need to stand up a government which does not exist or to help any number of functions for a government that does not perform very well.”⁵⁹ The civilian employees mentioned by Ambassador Herbst are quite similar to the make up of the CA Functional Area Teams mentioned in Chapter Two of this essay. The fact that these different elements are so similar and address basically the same issue will be further explored in the concluding chapter.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 3.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 3.

Establishment of S/CRS and introduction of the Reconstruction and Stabilization Management Act of 2007 is a tremendous leap forward for USG capability to conduct post-conflict reconstruction. The expertise that civilians can bring to bear on these operations represents a huge advantage and cannot be overstated. There are two glaring disadvantages to an expeditionary reconstruction unit comprised solely of civilians. The first is a lack of logistical capability by the DOS and the second is a lack of organic security.

Logistically, the CRC will have to rely on military and/or civilian contractors for its logistical requirements. The logistical aspect alone makes the CRC and NGO's a poor option for immediate response to global crises that threaten American interests.

In areas with limited to no security, it is often inefficient for civilians (including NGO's) to conduct peace building or reconstruction operations. In terms of security the CRC will have three options when conducting overseas stabilization and reconstruction operations: 1) conduct operations only in areas where there is a high-level of indigenous security, 2) rely on private security contractors to provide security, 3) rely on the U.S. military, likely already present, to provide security.

The USAID is the USG's lead agency for international development. USAID development projects are usually large-scale and take the long-term strategic view when conducting development projects. The work being done by USAID has had wonderful, long-term effects in dozens of countries and its Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has had success in the realm of shorter-term development projects. However, the problem with USAID, as with NGO's, is the lack of security and a limited logistical capacity.

Attempts by government development agencies and NGO's to conduct peace building and reconstruction in low-security environments can and has been shown to result in a siege or

entrenchment mentality. Edward Burke writes “In some provinces of Iraq, senior United Nations (UN) officials, who have spent the bulk of the European Union’s (EU) almost €1 billion in aid, have never actually seen the projects they commissioned. Agencies such as the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) have even resorted to monitoring projects through aerial photography.”⁶⁰ This phenomenon of civilian entrenchment illustrates a problem that also occurs within U.S. aid agencies. The secure mobility provided by integrating with CA and other military units will enhance the capability of all applicable USG agencies. Furthermore, integration will save government funds by eliminating dependence on private military corporations.

In 2009, U.S. Army Brigadier General Bennet Sacolick wrote: “The U.S. intelligence community predicts that our foreseeable future will be one of persistent conflict involving Third World countries, insurgencies and terrorist organizations. It will be fueled by poverty, illiteracy, injustice, expanding Islamic extremism, and competition for energy, food, water and other resources.”⁶¹ The nature of conflicts the U.S. will find itself involved with in the foreseeable future has required a fundamental shift in military tactics. The days of massive artillery bombardments followed by massing of armor and infantry forces has little place in the fight against religious extremists in Third World countries. Rather than placing the greatest emphasis on defeating enemy forces on the field of battle, the U.S. must now pay greater heed to maintaining peace following armed conflict. The U.S. must also strive to prevent violence from occurring in the first place by supporting elected governments that are at risk of collapse and supporting the governments of foreign nations (FN) in sustaining their own populations.

⁶⁰ Edward Burke. “Leaving the Civilians Behind: The “Soldier-Diplomat” in Afghanistan and Iraq,” *Prism* Vol. 1, No. 2 (2010): 33.

⁶¹ Bennet Sacolick. “SOF vs. SOF-Like,” *Special Warfare* Volume 22 Issue 4 July/August (2009): 10.

The current struggle fought by the United States against radical Islamic militants and terrorists is a struggle unlike any other the U.S. has ever faced. In this current war, possession of the most powerful Army, Navy, and Air Force is not sufficient to root out and destroy even an enemy with far fewer personnel and resources. The enemy currently facing U.S. forces often has the support of the populace and is able to disguise himself and easily blend in with non-combatants, especially in an urban setting. When those who would do harm to Westerners find safe haven in failed or failing states such as Afghanistan, Sudan, or Somalia, their ability to plan and train for attacks is increased exponentially. If the U.S. is to be successful in the struggle against violent Islamic terrorists and others who wish the West harm, it will need to engage the present enemy as well as the populace from which the enemy recruits with new and increasingly less lethal methods. Lethal and heavy-handed military tactics have been shown to stir up a populace and bring fence sitters over to the side of extremism.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War ushered in a new era in which the U.S. had no peer competitor. The lack of a true peer competitor or even a near-peer competitor has made it almost suicidal to challenge the U.S. military on a conventional battlefield. In the 21st century, the U.S. has and will continue to face threats of an unconventional nature. Following the events of September 11th and the subsequent military invasion of Afghanistan, the DOD began looking into ways to bolster its ability to fight irregular warfare (IW). Since 9/11 the Pentagon has looked to fight irregular wars with an increase of special operations soldiers and other assets. The DOD defines IW as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations”.⁶² U.S.

⁶² Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities. *Report to Congress on Civil Affairs*, Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense (2009): 4.

military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have been largely irregular and unconventional conflicts following an initial conventional warfare period.

The ability to possess the support of a populace in a war zone is extremely important, in general. Obtaining and maintaining the support of the population in areas in which the U.S. hopes to root out violent Islamic fundamentalism is essential. Civil Affairs units, when deployed to areas where the U.S. has a vested interest in either obtaining or maintaining the support of the local populace for U.S. operations, are the best option for military commanders. CA units are also adept at obtaining or maintaining support of a populace for a host nation (HN) government that is at risk of collapse. In this manner, CA units can help prevent collapse of governments in precarious positions. Civil Affairs teams in conjunction with general-purpose forces (GPF) and with special operations forces (SOF) have proven immensely fruitful in obtaining the support of the targeted populace. This support is essential for U.S. military operations in war and in peacetime to be successful.

The U.S. has pursued a policy of global persistent engagement in areas likely to be safe havens to Islamic terrorists and those who would do harm to American citizens and interests. The strategy of denying territory to terrorists and potential adversaries is one that incorporates several government agencies outside of the military. Strategic diplomatic efforts and large-scale economic development are obviously better left to agencies such as the Department of State, USAID, and its OTI. Civil Affairs units, however, are far more capable of operating in combat zones, and semi-permissive environments. Civil Affairs units are also adept at gaining initial entry and gaining a foothold in a targeted area in order to lay the ground work for follow on work by DOS and USAID. Additionally, CA officers conduct fellowships at DOS and USAID and are more familiar with the structure, terminology, and bureaucracy of other government

agencies and are thus able to form a bridge at the strategic and operational levels between the DOD and other government agencies in achieving the same goals. Civil Affairs units, when used properly, can enhance the ability of the U.S. Government to achieve foreign policy goals by serving as a bridge between DOD and DOS at the tactical level.

In the last twenty years two major events have occurred that have altered the nature of the threat to the U.S. – the end of the Cold War, and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Professor Donald M. Snow terms these two events “fault lines” and writes “Both have changed the landscape and operating rules of the world in which we live. The more recent of these fault lines, the events and aftermath of the terrorist hijackings and attacks of September 11, 2001, is more familiar to most of us, and because of the immediate and horrifying effects, it is the one on which we tend to focus most.”⁶³ While both of these “fault lines” have contributed to the rise in the importance of CA to U.S. military strategy, it is the more recent events of 9/11 that have necessitated the rapid growth and increased importance of CA forces and preemptive civil-military operations.

As this thesis pointed out earlier, the use of CA forces is not new. There presently exists a major shift in the implementation of these forces however. Where CA units were used in the Second World War during post-combat to manage and administer territory, and during the Vietnam War to “win hearts and minds”, they are being used in the twenty-first century as a preemptive force aimed at stabilizing partner states and making populations less attractive as recruiting bases for terrorist organizations. Rather than being used exclusively as a post-combat option, CA teams are now on the cutting-edge of the struggle against violent religious extremists and are aiming to prevent violence throughout the world.

⁶³ Donald M. Snow. *United States Foreign Policy: Politics Beyond the Water's Edge* (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005), 3.

On August 7, 1998 associates of Al-Qaeda bombed the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These vicious attacks that left hundreds of people dead were met with a cruise missile attack nearly two weeks later. The strike, dubbed *Operation Infinite Reach*, was aimed at Al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan and Sudan. The success of *Operation Infinite Reach* is debatable but the fact that the U.S. destroyed a building, which may have been a medicine factory, was a public relations fiasco. The Embassy bombings and Americas heavy-handed response was portrayed as largely an indiscriminate attack throughout the Muslim world, and was just one example of the U.S. reacting to a terrorist attack with a purely violent reaction. The events of 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have made it abundantly clear that if the U.S. is to stave off future terrorist attacks and improve its image in the Muslim world, it must engage the Muslim world in a positive manner on all fronts. The potential resource pool from which Al-Qaeda recruits must also be engaged. This resource pool consists largely of disaffected and impoverished Muslim youth that view the U.S. as an immoral beast that bullies Islamic states for the sake of stealing its oil. In order to defeat the threat posed by radical and violent terrorists the U.S. must engage the enemy and potential enemies on all fronts and with all means.

Civil Affairs units can be used as a preemptive source of nonviolent military power throughout the world. The lessons learned from post World War I Germany can be applied to the struggle against the rise of violent radical Islam and its associated terrorist organizations. Following World War I, Germany was left in economic shambles. There was a large-scale feeling of detachment and fear of the outside world. Similar feelings of fear exist throughout the Muslim world in the twenty-first century. This combined with high unemployment rates makes joining radical terrorist organizations more attractive to Muslim youth. Joining a terror organization, as it was with joining the Nazis, is a means to forming an identity for oneself. In

the absence of better opportunities, it is no wonder disaffected youth choose to join radical Islamic based terror organizations.

It is no secret that the U.S. has the preeminent military force in the world today. It has the ability to project its forces anywhere in the world and vanquish foes on a conventional battlefield in a matter of days or weeks. This has been demonstrated several times since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The military capability of the U.S. is a strong deterrent in most cases. State and non-state actors who would do the U.S. harm realize they cannot match the U.S. militarily. They rely on irregular or unconventional methods to strike at the U.S. These methods include terrorist attacks aimed at U.S. interests or recruiting and training foreign fighters to kill U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Failed or failing states provide fertile ground for terrorist and other criminal organizations to flourish.

Clearly the U.S. cannot send its combat forces to every country in which terrorist organizations are rampant and recruit adherents for the purpose of killing or capturing those who have or plan to attack the U.S. or its interests. The U.S. cannot, however, ignore states where terrorist organizations have and/or are likely to flourish. To do so could result in the large-scale mushrooming of dangerous terrorist organizations all over the globe. While it would not be prudent (or possible) to commit U.S. combat troops en masse to all states where terrorists are basing and organizing, it is possible to commit CA units to many of these areas.

Civil Affairs units are specially trained and uniquely capable of interacting with foreign governments on the local, provincial, and national levels. Additionally, CA units are more adept than other military branches at interacting with other U.S. government (USG) agencies and Non-governmental organizations (NGO). In a certain sense, CA units are a hybrid between hard and soft power. Being part of the military they often carry weapons and represent the hard power

options of U.S. foreign policy. The methods (CA missions) used are decidedly more indicative of using soft power to accomplish military goals.

The 9/11 Commission recommended a three-fold approach to combating Islamist terrorism. It called for a political-military strategy that would 1) attack terrorists and terror organizations (offensive response), 2) protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks (defensive response), and 3) prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism (preemptive response). The military's response to this third prong of America's strategy to destroy Islamic terror organizations is the basis for the rapid expansion of CA forces. While the large-scale offensive military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq were over relatively quickly – the military strategy for preventing the growth of Islamist terrorist groups cannot be completed nearly as quickly. It involves a political-military strategy that will take years, if not decades to accomplish.

It has been said that Al-Qaeda and other militant extremist organizations recruit from the swamps of the Islamic and Arab worlds. If one wants to stop Al-Qaeda and its associated movements, some believe the U.S. and its allies must in essence drain the swamps, making them more inhabitable. By ignoring the plight of struggling Muslims and Arabs or by only engaging them in a violent manner we are not draining the swamp. By ignoring the poor economic situation in the Muslim world we are essentially damming up the swamp and creating a bigger problem. Throughout the slums of the Muslim world, the Mosque is often the focal point for the people. When the local Imam preaches a message of violent, radical Islam the message may take root in the community. When CATs and other CA units can enter a neighborhood and build a youth center, soccer field, or technical training center it can take the focus of the community away from a radical Mosque and onto other more productive avenues.

While this paper has largely trumpeted the use of the military, primarily CA, to conduct peace building and post-conflict reconstruction it must be noted that there are disadvantages to exclusively using the military. The military simply does not have the expertise to conduct long-term large-scale development projects. This avenue is best left to the experts at USAID. The involvement of the military, especially uniformed personnel is a detractor, even a detriment in some situations. Some NGO's do not want their efforts to have even the slightest association with the military out of fear that it will have a detrimental effect on their perceived impartial image. Without a doubt, the military has and will continue to encounter situations where alienating the NGO community is detrimental to all parties concerned.

Strategic and operational diplomacy conducted as part of a peace building operation is best left to the DOS or the President's appointed representatives. The key to overcoming some of these disadvantages is to conduct better interagency planning before a crisis arises and during post-conflict reconstruction and peace building operations.

The technical aspects of conducting post-conflict reconstruction cannot be conducted solely by CA personnel. This will require close coordination with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), PSI/PMC contractors, or local national contractors. Short to medium-term reconstruction operations can be conducted exclusively by the military with a combination of CA, USACE, and other applicable units. While USACE is the preeminent expeditionary engineering unit in the world, long-term large-scale development will undoubtedly require the use of PSI/PMC contractors and/or local national contractors. Civil Affairs planners and officers are the best option for managing these operations in a limited security environment.

From a military strategy viewpoint, utilization of CA units represents a step forward for preempting combat actions. The importance of Civil Affairs to the future of U.S. military

strategy is immediately apparent when we consider that the active duty army will expand CA personnel by more than ten fold from 2006-2013. While Army branches such as field artillery and air defense are shrinking, CA is growing faster than any other branch in the army. The growth of the U.S. Army's Civil Affairs branch in conjunction with the growth of the Special Forces branch is indicative of the manner in which the U.S. military will engage its enemies in the 21st century. These highly trained SOF units have given the DOD greater reach and flexibility in terms of operational reach.

Tactical Integration with other USG Agencies

Fusing U.S. military units with representatives of DOS and USAID at the tactical level may be one of the most effective ways for the USG to conduct effective peace building and post-conflict reconstruction operations. In his essay Counterinsurgency Diplomacy: Political Advisors at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Dan Green relays his experiences as a DOS Political Advisor working with SF and CA teams at the tactical levels. Based on this study, I believe that USG peace building and post-conflict reconstruction operations as a whole would benefit if this concept were taken one step further and incorporated personnel from USAID (preferably OTI) into U.S. military tactical units conducting operations.

In his article An Untapped Resource for Stabilization and Reconstruction, William Fischer suggests that “the Air Force’s On-Scene Commander’s Course may provide an avenue to increase opportunities for success in post-conflict operations.”⁶⁴ This course provides a

⁶⁴ William Fischer. “An Untapped Resource for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” *Air & Space Power Journal* Spring (2007): 77.

foundation for understanding the background for engaging in post-conflict operations including instruction on DOD Directive 3000.05, NSPD 44, and the S/CRS, and applicable elements of the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).⁶⁵ While this course seems somewhat valuable in terms of strategic and operational peacebuilding and post-conflict planning it is run by the U.S. Air Force, which is not the primary proponent for conducting post-conflict civil-military operations. Courses like this one need to be delivered to officers and senior NCOs from the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, who will be the primary implementers of such strategies.

Civil-Military Support Elements

Ad hoc tactical integration is beginning to occur in some countries between SOF CA, USAID/OTI, DOS, and other USG agencies. Civil Affairs teams support U.S. policy goals and bolster the legitimacy of foreign governments during civil-military support element (CMSE) missions. CMSE missions are funded and coordinated by the DOD and subject to the authority of the U.S. Ambassador in the host-nation as well as the host-nation itself. These missions are conducted in states where the U.S. is not actively conducting combat operations. There are presently CA soldiers working out of U.S. embassies in roughly twenty countries throughout the world. Civil Affairs personnel conducting CMSE missions are able to carry out CA projects such as building schools, wells, and roads in conjunction with host-nation military units or official civilian institutions. As noted earlier, many youth throughout the Arab and Muslim

⁶⁵ Fischer writes that the UJTL “serves as the authoritative strategic source for determining tasks needed to carry out the national military strategy.” He deems the five most relevant tasks for stabilization and reconstruction as “1) Cooperate with and support NGOs/ private voluntary organizations; 2) Provide government wide support; 3) Coordinate activities within the interagency process; 4) Conduct civil-military operations; and 5) Foster interagency relations.

worlds feel threatened and afraid of the Western world. Missions such as CMSE aim to establish a partnership with foreign governments and militaries that will build infrastructure capacity, educate children, and generate employment. These missions encompass mitigating and developmental MCA and are congruent with the country plan established by the Ambassador and his staff. Civil Affairs teams conducting CMSE missions can have far reaching effects in the countries they operate in. By liaising with other USG agencies that have interests on a host-nation, CA teams can ensure DOD efforts are congruent with other agencies. By ensuring congruency between USG agencies CA teams and planners are helping to establish unity of effort, which is an essential component in defeating an insurgency or terror organization.

Civil Affairs soldiers conducting CMSE missions may perform civil reconnaissance (CR). The Army defines CR as "A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the environment. Civil reconnaissance focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented by the mnemonic ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events."⁶⁶ Gathering this information and submitting it to DOD, DOS, and other applicable USG agencies allows for the U.S. to better develop targeted plans for a given country or region.

Civil Military Support Elements may work in conjunction with Military Information Support Teams (MIST) to achieve U.S. Country Team and DOD goals in a given country or region. The MIST is a PSYOP detachment that fills a portion of the gap created by the elimination of the United States Information Agency in 1999. The MIST can broadcast and publicize the peace building and reconstruction efforts of the CMSE and the host-nation government. This serves to garner the support of the populace in a targeted area for U.S. and host-nation efforts.

⁶⁶ U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05.40 Civil Affairs Operations. Department of the Army. 2006. 164.

The CMSE and MIST units are comprised almost entirely of U.S. SOF units. These units are small and more expeditionary in nature than GPF units. This is indicative of an overall recognition by the U.S. special operations community to conduct proactive peace building and post-conflict reconstruction. By sending smaller, more effective SOF units into potentially troublesome areas before large-scale problems the U.S. can prevent local or national internal problems from becoming regional or international problems. This is essentially putting out small fires before they can become forest fires.

Civil Affairs, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism

Fighting an insurgency, known as counterinsurgency, and commonly referred to as COIN in military circles, has been the norm for U.S. forces since 9/11. The DOD's Counterinsurgency Field Manual defines an insurgency as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict."⁶⁷ The same manual defines a counterinsurgency as "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency."⁶⁸ The U.S. is presently fighting counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pakistan, America's ally in the War on Terror is currently engaged against Al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. Many other countries around the world are fighting insurgencies in varying capacities. In most cases for established governments to collapse under the weight of an insurgency would create chaotic conditions that would make conditions ripe for terror or criminal organizations to find refuge and destabilize the region. For

⁶⁷ Counterinsurgency Field Manual. The University of Chicago Press. 2007. Chicago, IL. 385.

⁶⁸ Ibid. 383.

the same reason it is important to fight alongside our Iraqi and Afghani partners to defeat insurgencies, the U.S. must stand by other nations to defeat unjust insurgencies and ensure peace.

As noted in the definition of counterinsurgency, political, economic and civic actions must be taken to defeat a counterinsurgency. While military operations are often enough to defeat a conventional threat, all aspects of fighting COIN must be implemented to achieve victory. It is in the realm of the softer forms of power (political, economic, and civic action) that CA forces are most effective when fighting COIN.

Assessing Operational Effectiveness and Local Opinion

Unfortunately, reliable statistics are scarce when assessing the effectiveness of peacebuilding, reconstruction, and other civil-military operations. Common metrics include security indicators and money spent on civil affairs development projects. For instance, the violent acts by enemy forces can be measured before and after reconstruction projects or civic programs in a given area. If the number of violent acts decreases after a school is built, then the construction of the school could theoretically be given some credit for increasing security and stability.

In Iraq and still in Afghanistan military commanders use funds from the commander's emergency response program, or CERP to carry out reconstruction projects. Commander's have been known to use the amount of CERP money spent in a given area as a means of assessing effectiveness. The amount spent on programs in a given area is a far less reliable (if at all) method to assess effectiveness and not recommended.

Assessing public opinion of locals in an area targeted for reconstruction projects or civic is another means of assessing effectiveness. However, this is another unreliable means of assessing effectiveness. Following the completion of reconstruction projects, public opinion is almost always largely in favor of the development. There are numerous newspaper articles with “man on the street” type interviews with locals professing pleasure at the completion of a school or a medical clinic. Linking local approval with projects to effectiveness and increased operational effectiveness is difficult.

Commanders and civil-military planners in the U.S. military often use one or more of three methods to assess need for and effectiveness of reconstruction projects in an area. Using the ASCOPE or PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information) methods allows military units to target their assessments and questions to locals in order to assess the level of need for reconstruction and development before carrying out projects. By developing baseline metrics before projects, the same categories can be assessed after projects to assess the level of local satisfaction with projects. The lack of transparency in military operations is another reason it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of military reconstruction projects. Increasing transparency would allow for greater interagency and international cooperation when assessing the need for peacebuilding operations and the effectiveness of post-conflict reconstruction operations.

The tactical conflict assessment and planning framework (TCAPF) was developed by USAID as a framework to identify, prioritize, and mitigate the causes of instability.⁶⁹ The U.S. military has utilized the four-question TCAPF survey on a limited basis. The TCAPF was

⁶⁹ Derleth, Jim. “Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework,” From a presentation at USAID Infrastructure Workshop, Washington, D.C., December 15, 2009, accessed November 1, 2011 http://www.energytoolbox.org/library/infra2009/references/2-30_12-15-09_setting_infrastructure_priorities_for_prts_crnkovich.pdf.

designed to create an unclassified database that would allow civilian program managers and military commanders to better understand their operating environment, target reconstruction projects to areas that will have the greatest overall increase in stability, and assess their effectiveness. Expanding the use of TCAPF in U.S. military peace building and post-conflict reconstruction operations could have a positive effect on the public opinion of U.S. operations in the states where they occur.

Chapter Four

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Conclusion

This thesis began by asking the following questions: how does DOD effectively involve itself in the interagency and sometimes inter-governmental process of conducting peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations? With the increased reliance on and use of U.S. SOF, how has their involvement in these largely non-kinetic operations affected DOD ability to conduct such operations? Should the U.S. military even be involved in peacebuilding and post-conflict operations?

Thus far, this thesis has examined both the military and civilian options for conducting peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations. It has also looked at U.S. military CA forces and their traditional use. The introduction of military doctrine and the establishment of federal agencies to specifically conduct these operations have demonstrated official U.S. recognition of the importance of conducting peacebuilding as a means to preempt direct action combat and post-conflict reconstruction as a way to mitigate the effects of combat and curtail insurgencies. A coherent strategy or doctrine for civil-military inter-agency cooperation is the glaring exception found by this study.

The ten-fold expansion of both general-purpose and special operations CA forces is a step in the right direction for the U.S. military. The increase in SOF CA in particular has given the DOD greater reach in terms of implementing a peacebuilding strategy and conducting post-conflict reconstruction operations. The recognition of the problem of USG response to post-conflict reconstruction and the eventual establishment of the S/CRS and the CRC represented a

great leap forward for the U.S. civilian involvement in post-conflict operations. Civil Affairs units, trained in cultural sensitivity and working with NGOs and the USG interagency, will serve to present a more positive view of U.S. military operations in the countries where they operate. Furthermore, CA units can serve as an effective bridge to facilitate cooperation between the DOD and the rest of the USG agencies involved in the interagency process.

While CA personnel are sometimes referred to as “warrior-diplomats”, it is important not to confuse soldiers for diplomats. Diplomats are clearly the best fit to handle strategic level diplomacy. Civil Affairs and other trained military personnel can handle small-scale foreign conflict resolution, tactical, and occasionally operational-level diplomacy. In other words, while the implementation of pre-emptive CA in the form of peacebuilding operations represents a step forward for U.S. military strategy, it is not in itself the answer.

In the twenty-first century, where the most important terrain is public opinion, CA units represent the best option for the U.S. to possess the human terrain. The projects and coordinating efforts of CA units in the present can, in many instances, replace the need for violent direct action in the future. This study has revealed that, while the military can be an effective executor of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations, it cannot accomplish these missions alone. The full breadth of all applicable U.S. agencies must fully cooperate and coordinate in order to ensure at-risk states do not become failed states that are susceptible to being overrun by organizations such as Al Qaeda or the Taliban.

The drawbacks to NGOs conducting peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction have been noted. Their relative lack of accountability, lack of organic security, lack of logistical capacity, and the presence of political favoritism within national NGOs makes the NGO

community a less effective option for carrying out large-scale peacebuilding and post-conflict operations.

The remainder of this thesis will offer policy recommendations for DOD involvement in peacebuilding and post-conflict operations. It will address how the U.S. military should array its forces to best complete the mission and how the DOD should integrate with other USG agencies when conducting these delicate operations.

Recommendations

In his two essays, Picking up the Pieces: Are United States Officers Ready for Nation Building?, and The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations, Volker Franke lists his own recommendations for U.S. military involvement in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations. My recommendations take these essays into account and build upon them. Based on this study, I recommend the following as necessary implementations to U.S. doctrine and policy: 1) Revise NSPD-44, 2) Require a direct habitual relationship for training, planning, and operations between CRC and DOD, 3) Expand applicable training for CA personnel as well as other military officers, and 4) Revamp deployment cycle for civil-military peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations. Additionally, I will offer tertiary recommendations that are less pressing but that would have a positive impact.

NSPD-44, which requires all interagency peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations to be headed by the Secretary of State, needs to be revisited. From a tactical standpoint, this directive is too restrictive and could potentially place the wrong personnel as the

lead elements in operations where others would be more effective. Simply put, there will be times when operations will require a security (defense) lead, and times when a diplomatic or development agency lead is required. A new presidential directive should be issued that allows the Secretary of Defense to be an option for leading such operations. Placing the Secretary of Defense in the lead of initial peacebuilding operations and post-conflict reconstruction operations and in areas of limited security would be most beneficial from a security and development perspective.

Volker Franke writes, “In general, most relief and stability operations are characterized by an *ad hoc* and oftentimes improvised response to an immediate humanitarian need. There is typically little time for organized advanced planning and coordination, especially in terms of bringing together civilian and military actors, so the need arises for improved a priori coordination and preparation.”⁷⁰ My study in this matter leads me to believe Dr. Franke’s recommendation of “a priori coordination and preparation” is right on target. Forming a habitual relationship between DOD, specifically CA units, and the CRC would be another step forward for the interagency ability to respond to peacebuilding and post-conflict operational requirements. Joint field training should be conducted with DOD units and CRC elements in order to more effectively conduct real-world operations. A habitual relationship for training and planning purposes could easily be transitioned into a more permanent element reminiscent. This would eliminate the ad hoc nature of the PRT’s (and other responses to peacebuilding and stability operations) and pave the way for a cooperative element better prepared to undertake complex peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations.

⁷⁰ Volker Franke. “Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations,” *International Journal of Peace Studies* Volume 11, Number 2, Autumn/Winter (2006): 18.

If a CAT or a CA company trains and plans with a CRC team or even one or two CRC officers the capability of both elements are exponentially increased. Furthermore, if these elements deploy and conduct missions overseas together they will benefit greatly from each other's strengths. Civilian Response Corps officers would benefit from the security, tactical knowledge, and language capabilities of a CAT. The CAT would benefit from the level of expertise brought by CRC officers. Furthermore, the fact that CRC officers are non-military offers two benefits. First, it places a less intimidating face on an operation where the targeted human centers of gravity are leery of the U.S. military. Second, it demonstrates the USG commitment to a whole of government approach to building peace and reconstructing areas in need.

The strategic planning staffs of U.S. Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) should require incorporation of the S/CRS Integration Planning Cells into their Theater Campaign Plans and planning exercises. Integration of these cells would allow for better interagency synchronization and thus a more unified whole of government approach to post-conflict operations. Furthermore, by incorporating the DOS Planning Cells into their planning, it will likely smooth the working relationship during real-world scenarios.

It cannot be overlooked that the pool of skilled employees for the CRC is very similar to the make-up of the CA Functional Area Teams. In order to save government resources and avoid duplication of efforts, DOD and DOS should work to fuse these bodies. Maintaining the habitual planning and operational relationship called for in this thesis can best do this. If the CRC or the DOD is missing an essential skilled employee component to accomplish a mission, one should be able to draw from the other. In other words, if the CRC is short medical doctors or nurses when preparing to take the lead conducting post-conflict operations in a relatively

permissive security environment, DOD should loan those personnel. Likewise, if DOD is conducting post-conflict operations in a less permissive security environment and has a need for civil engineers, the CRC should lend its support in the form of skilled employees.

Civil Affairs units most often deploy down to the smallest level. That is, a single four-man CAT will be responsible for a given area. One CAT may sometimes be assigned to a province or even an entire country. This makes undertaking large-scale projects difficult because the necessary oversight cannot be conducted. If entire CA Companies or Battalions are deployed to a given area, CATs can focus more closely on areas as small as a single neighborhood and be the sole unit responsible for its development.

Placing a greater emphasis on the continuity of CAO will increase the effect of CA units. Soldiers are most often deployed with their units for periods of one year or less. One entire CA unit will leave when a new CA unit arrives, with only a week or two of overlap time. Instead of rotating entire units out of an area and replacing them with an inexperienced unit, it would be better to replace individuals. This would better allow those with experience in the area to impart their knowledge of the local customs, political alliances, etc. to incoming CA soldiers. It is impossible to impart all the knowledge derived from an entire year in a week or two.

Essentially, the current system is a continuous chain of lost knowledge. This also highlights the potential benefits of mandated close interagency cooperation because incoming units would benefit from the regional knowledge of DOS or USAID personnel on the ground in the region.

In their extensive 2009 study of military officer's attitude toward civil-military peacebuilding, Picking up the Pieces: Are United States Officers Ready for Nation Building?, Dr. Franke and Karen Guttieri note that “[military officers] cited deficiencies in their civil-

military relations training/education.”⁷¹ Military officers would greatly benefit from receiving institutional CMO training similar to that of CA officers and senior NCO’s. A platform for these potential courses already exists within the U.S. Army and NATO. By allowing non-CA officers to attend CMO courses, their ability to conduct effective peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations would be greatly enhanced.

Civil Affairs need expanded language and targeted cultural training. While SOF CA officers and senior NCO’s do receive some language training at USAJFKSWCS, it is usually not sufficient to conduct significant negotiations in the indigenous language of the areas where they operate. While these same soldiers receive cultural training beyond that of most soldiers it still remains insufficient. I recommend that all CA officers be sent to the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, CA to receive language training that will render these officers fluent or near fluent in a given language. Additionally, officers should receive higher order courses on the areas in which they are to operate. Drawing upon the fields of anthropology, sociology, and political science, intensive graduate-level courses would make CA officers more effective when conducting peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations.

The CRC-R, if it is funded, would be a redundant element. The capacity that would be filled by the CRC-R already exists in the U.S. Army Reserve CACOM’s functional teams (see Figure 1), the CRC-A, and CRC-S. Adding an additional element to USG capability to conduct peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations would increase bureaucracy and further muddy the waters. The previously mentioned components are already in place and operational. Rather than throwing more money and personnel at the issue the USG needs to sharpen its personnel management and training for CA and CRC personnel.

⁷¹ Volker Franke and Karen Guttieri. “Picking up the Pieces: Are United States Officers Ready for Nation Building?,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* Vol. 37, No. 1 (2009): 22.

What is most needed is some sort of formal paradigm and eventual doctrine for DOD units conducting peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations to more closely cooperate and collaborate with the CRC, and other civilian USG agencies as well as with NGO's and IGO's for the purpose of accomplishing shared end states. In an era of shrinking budgets, the time for effective civil-military coordination is now

Appendix A: List of Acronyms

AFRICOM	Africa Command
ASCOPE	Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CA	Civil Affairs
CACOM	Civil Affairs Command
CAG	Civil Affairs Group
CAO	Civil Affairs Operations
CAPT	Civil Affairs Planning Team
CENTCOM	Central Command
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Fund
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
CMSE	Civil-Military Support Element
C2	Command and Control
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CR	Civil Reconnaissance
CRC	Civilian Response Corps
DC	Displaced Civilians
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State

EUCOM	European Command
FN	Foreign Nation
GPF	General Purpose Forces
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HN	Host Nation
IW	Irregular Warfare
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IO	International Organizations
JOC	Joint Operating Concept
KTF	Kuwaiti Task Force
MCAG	Maritime Civil Affairs Group
MCAS	Maritime Civil Affairs Squadron
MCAT	Maritime Civil Affairs Teams
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MIST	Military Information Support Team
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
NCA	National Command Authority
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NGO	Non-governmental organizations
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance, and Civic Aid
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PACOM	Pacific Command
PMC	Private Military Corporation
PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
SF	Special Forces
SOC	Special Operations Command
SOCENT	Special Operations Command, Central
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
TCAPF	Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework
UJTL	Universal Joint Task List
UN	United Nations
USG	U.S. Government
USACAPOC	U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAJFKSWCS	U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USARC	U.S. Army Reserve Command

USASOC	U.S. Army Special Operations Command
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command

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