

**CLIENTS' EVALUATIONS OF LAWYERS:
PREDICTIONS FROM PROCEDURAL JUSTICE RATINGS
AND INTERACTIONAL STYLES OF LAWYERS**

By

Judith Mitchell Herrin

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the

Virginia Polytechnic and State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy


in

Sociology


APPROVED:



John N. Edwards
Co-Chair



Terance D. Miethe
Co-Chair



Alan E. Bayer



Jill Kiecolt



James W. Michaels

September, 1996
Blacksburg, Virginia

Keywords: Social Psychology, Procedural Justice, Social Power,
Lawyers, Clients

c.2

LD
5655
V856
1997
H479
c.2

[Faint handwritten marks]

**Clients' Evaluations of Lawyers: Predictions from
Procedural Justice Ratings and Interactional
Styles of Lawyers**

by

Judith M. Herrin

Terance D. Miethe, Co-chair

John N. Edwards, Co-chair

Sociology

(ABSTRACT)

In evaluating clients' satisfaction with their lawyers, some research indicates that clients consider the interpersonal aspect of the lawyer-client relationship just as important as the legal competence of the lawyer. The purpose of this study is to assess factors hypothesized to be involved in clients' evaluations of lawyers and the legal system. These factors are ratings of procedural justice, perceptions of lawyers' interactional styles and types of social power, and clients' demographic and legal case characteristics.

Data for the quantitative analysis in this study comes from a national telephone survey of legal clients. In addition, qualitative data from responses to an open-ended question in the telephone survey and focus groups of legal clients in divorce cases are analyzed.

The results of the multiple regression and path analyses reveal that lawyers' interactional orientation (combinations of social power and adoption of occupational role) have the greatest effect on ratings of procedural justice. Ratings of procedural justice and lawyers' interactional orientation have the greatest effect on satisfaction with lawyers. Smaller effects come from the outcome and the type of legal case.

Satisfaction with the attorney has a greater effect on satisfaction with the courts for women than it does for men. Ratings of procedural justice and lawyer's interactional styles have a large effect on satisfaction with the courts for both men and women.

Comments by the survey respondents and the focus group participants support previous research that the major sources of dissatisfaction with lawyers are fees, discourtesy, and delays. Issues which coincide with elements of the rating of procedural justice emerged from the focus groups. The components of representation, quality and accuracy, and respect and concern for the client were brought up in various ways. A suggestion is made for the use of the components of procedural justice as a guideline or checklist for lawyers and clients as a way of improving the image of lawyers and increasing clients' consumer power.

DEDICATION

To my daughters,

Jessica

and

Kathryn

And to the memory of my parents,

George Lester Herrin

and

Atla Virginia Mitchell Herrin

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to thank several groups for their help and support during the course of my doctoral training. First, I want to thank my committee as a whole for their tremendous support and guidance.

A special thank you to Terry Miethe, first as chair and then as co-chair, upon his departure from Virginia Tech. Without his belief in the project and his efforts in obtaining the grant, this study would not have been possible. The distance between Virginia Tech and University of Nevada, Las Vegas did not prevent him from always being cheerfully available to answer the many questions I had.

I would also like to thank John Edwards for his ready willingness to step in as co-chair at Terry's departure and for guidance since the beginning and during the completion of my training.

Sincere thanks to Alan Bayer for his encouragement, optimism, and thoughtful suggestions since the initial formation of my committee and the dissertation project.

Many thanks to Jim Michaels for his enthusiastic support and suggestions for improvements throughout the dissertation and my training as a sociologist.

And sincere appreciation to Jill Kiecolt for her thoughtful editing and many helpful suggestions in formatting and fine tuning the dissertation.

I would also like to thank my wonderful daughters, Jessica and Katy Freeman. Without their patience and understanding, I would not have been able to begin and complete the doctoral program.

Many thanks also to Paula DuPrey for her support and encouragement as we have travelled the same path.

A special thank you to Liz Cromer, Brenda Husser, and Barbara Townley for their gracious and cheerful help in countless ways during my doctoral training at Virginia Tech.

And finally, my thanks to the participants in the focus groups for sharing their legal experiences with me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES. ix

LIST OF TABLES. x

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1

**CHAPTER 2. DEVELOPMENT OF LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION,
USE OF LEGAL SERVICES, AND THEORETICAL MODEL
OF EVALUATIONS OF LEGAL SERVICES. 6**

 Development of Law and the Legal System. 6

 Law and Justice 9

 Use of Legal Services 11

 Theoretical Model of Clients' Evaluations of
 Lawyers. 12

 Clients' Evaluations of Legal Services. 14

 The Concept of Justice 16

 Procedural Justice 17

 Justice and Power. 23

 Social Power Theory 24

 Power in Interpersonal Perception 27

 Lawyer-Client Interaction 28

 Lawyers. 29

 Clients. 33

 Summary and Formation of Hypotheses 35

CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODS	42
Quantitative Method.	42
The Sample.	42
Measures of Variables	44
Survey Comments.	49
Qualitative Method.	49
Survey Comments	50
Focus Groups.	51
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS.	53
Univariate Analysis	53
Bivariate Analysis	54
Multivariate Analysis	57
Multivariate Analysis, Revised Measures. . .	66
Multivariate Analysis Separately for Men and Women.	68
Summary of Multivariate Analysis.	71
Path Analysis.	74
CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS.	114
References Cited.	128
Appendix A. Tables.	136
Vita.	169

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Factors in Clients' Evaluations of Lawyers. . .13

Figure 2. Significant Path Coefficients for Predicting
Procedural Justice Ratings, and
Satisfaction Ratings. 75

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Variables and Summary Measures 137

Table 2. Bivariate Correlations Among All Variables . . 139

Table 3. Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients
for Procedural Justice Ratings with Exogenous
Variables 144

Table 4. Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients
for Satisfaction with Attorney with Exogenous
Variables 145

Table 5. Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients
for Satisfaction with Attorney (Recommend or
Use Again) with Exogenous Variables 146

Table 6. Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients
for Satisfaction with Court with Exogenous
Variables 147

Table 7A. Factor Loadings of the Social Power Items . . .148

Table 7B. Factor Loadings of the Additional Social
Power Items and Interactional Style Items . . 149

Table 7C. Factor Loadings of Social Power Items and
Interactional Style Items Factored
Separately150

Table 8. Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients
for Procedural Justice Ratings with Revised
Exogenous Variables.151

Table 9. Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients
for Satisfaction with Attorney with Revised
Exogenous Variables 152

Table 10. Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients
for Satisfaction with Attorney (Recommend or
Use Again with Revised Exogenous Variables . .153

Table 11. Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients
for Satisfaction with Court with Revised
Exogenous Variables 154

Table 12.	Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for Procedural Justice Ratings with Revised Exogenous Variables for Men and Women Separately	155
Table 13A.	Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for Men for Satisfaction with Attorney with Revised Exogenous Variables	156
Table 13B.	Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for Women for Satisfaction with Attorney with Revised Exogenous Variables	156
Table 14A.	Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for Men for Satisfaction with Attorney (Recommend or Use Again) with Revised Exogenous Variables	157
Table 14B.	Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for Women for Satisfaction with Attorney (Recommend or Use Again) with Revised Exogenous Variables	157
Table 15A.	Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for Men for Satisfaction with Court with Revised Exogenous Variables	158
Table 15B.	Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for Women for Satisfaction with Court with Revised Exogenous Variables	158
Table 16A.	Summary of Total, Direct, Indirect Effects of Predetermined Variables on Satisfaction Ratings	159
Table 16B.	Summary of Total, Direct, Indirect Effects of Predetermined Variables on Satisfaction Ratings for Men	161
Table 16C.	Summary of Total, Direct, Indirect Effects of Predetermined Variables on Satisfaction Ratings for Women	163
Table 17A.	Summary Table for One-Way Analysis of Variance and Multiple Range Test of Procedural Justice Classified by Comment Group	165

Table 17B.	Summary Table for One-Way Analysis of Variance and Multiple Range Test of Satisfaction with Attorney Classified by Comment Group	165
Table 17C.	Summary Table for One-Way Analysis of Variance and Multiple Range Test of Satisfaction with Attorney (Recommend or Use Again) Classified by Comment Group166
Table 17D.	Summary Table for One-Way Analysis of Variance and Multiple Range Test of Satisfaction with Court Classified by Comment Group166
Table 17E.	Summary Table for One-Way Analysis of Variance and Multiple Range Test of Income of Client Classified by Comment Group167
Table 17F.	Summary Table for One-Way Analysis of Variance and Multiple Range Test of Education of Client Classified by Comment Group	167
Table 18.	Crosstabulation of Gender and Comment Groups	168

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Modern society increasingly relies on formal, legal mechanisms to resolve matters that were once resolved by informal, nonlegal mechanisms. Many people argue that a "litigation explosion" has occurred. Some life experiences, however, require legal representation and are unavoidable, for example, divorce and personal injuries.

Generally, there are two perspectives on the role of law in our society. One perspective views law as a neutral framework for maintaining societal integration through just and fair solutions to problems presented as legal situations. A second perspective views law as an instrument reflecting the values and interests of those who control the state. A more pragmatic view of law is that law is what lawyers say to one another and to clients in their offices rather than what judges say in reports (Shapiro 1981). The sparsity of information on this interaction prevents placing it under either of the general perspectives.

The legal system resolves only conflicts that have been translated into legal disputes. Lawyers serve as gatekeepers by rejecting requests for assistance, by transforming disagreements into claims (disputes), or by providing minimal help (Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat 1981). Lawyers also represent the legal system, as more people see

lawyers than have direct contact with formal institutions (Curran 1977; Miller and Sarat 1981). Lawyers influence economic, political, social and cultural life (Abel 1989) and daily confront matters involving such central sociological issues as power, social control, stratification, socialization, and the social organization of law work (Vago 1988). Law and society, portrayed through legal norms and folk norms, come face to face in the interaction between lawyers and their clients (Sarat and Felstiner 1986).

Lawyers have never been popular, but research and popular commentary suggests that lawyers in the United States have a very unfavorable image (Ruddy 1983; Abrams 1984; Friedman 1989; Zunker 1985) and that clients are generally dissatisfied with the services they provide (Casper et al. 1988; Jost 1988; Curran 1977). Lawyers worry that their unfavorable image detracts from the practice of law (Abrams 1984; Jost 1988). Negative experiences with lawyers can hamper resolution of disputes. Consequently, it may discourage the use of law to resolve conflicts and encourage the use of informal, nonlegal methods, such as violence. Use of informal, nonlegal methods may injure the individuals involved and eventually, the larger society by weakening the capacity of law as social control (Black 1983).

Research on lawyer-client relationships is sparse compared to studies of other professional relationships such as the studies of doctor-patient communication (Danet et al. 1980). Over the past few decades, however, some research finds that clients consider the interpersonal aspect of the lawyer-client relationship, (such as warmth, openness, consideration and care, listening to the client, and explaining court jurisdiction, procedure, and relevant case law) just as important as the competence of their lawyers (Rosenthal 1976; Curran 1977; Feldman and Wilson 1981; Abrams 1984; Hillary and Johnson 1989). Lawyer-client interaction has been examined using French and Raven's model of social power bases, which emphasizes the situational nature of power in interpersonal relationships (Hillary and Johnson 1989). The effects of lawyers' interpersonal skills and legal skills on clients' satisfaction with their lawyers have also been examined (Feldman and Wilson 1981).

A related area of research on legal evaluations comes from the literature on the importance of decision-making procedures and individuals' sense of "fairness" (Tyler and Lind 1991), a term that is frequently used interchangeably with justice. This concern with the process of decision-making, termed procedural justice, is subsidiary to retributive justice and distributive justice (Homans 1982), or a second general dimension of interpersonal justice

(Austin and Tobiasen 1984). Procedural justice has not been described previously as a basis for clients evaluating the lawyer-client relationship. It seems likely that this could be a helpful measure in assessing evaluations of lawyers by clients.

Within sociology, the concept of justice is most often related to enduring inequalities in the distribution of advantage and disadvantage, that is, stratification (Rytina 1986). Social psychologists and psychologists have been surprisingly slow to look past outcomes, which are primary in research on distributive justice, to the decision-making procedures which influence people's judgments about justice (Leventhal 1980; Furby 1986; Austin and Tobiasen 1984). Participation in decision-making influences perceived procedural fairness (Austin and Tobiasen 1984). How a lawyer chooses to interact with the client determines the level of participation a client experiences within the lawyer-client interaction and therefore, the client's perceptions of fairness and satisfaction with the experience.

In summary, as gatekeepers and representatives of the legal system, lawyers daily deal with justice and power in social life. If clients perceive or anticipate unfair treatment by a professional group who represents them and institutionalized rules of fairness, they may cease to

support and follow those rules.

In this study, I present and test a model of the lawyer-client relationship based on the perceptions of individual legal clients. The major research questions are: (1) How satisfied are clients with their lawyers, and does satisfaction vary by ratings of procedural justice? and (2) Do satisfaction and ratings of procedural justice depend on type of case, case outcome, clients' demographic characteristics, and clients' perceptions of the interactional style and social power bases used by their attorneys?

Data for the quantitative analysis in this study comes from a national telephone survey of legal clients. In addition, qualitative data from responses to an open-ended question in the telephone survey and focus groups of legal clients in divorce cases are analyzed.

**CHAPTER 2. DEVELOPMENT OF LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION,
USE OF LEGAL SERVICES, AND THEORETICAL MODEL OF
EVALUATIONS OF LEGAL SERVICES**

In this chapter, I discuss the development of law and the legal profession as the context of the lawyer-client relationship. Then I discuss the relationship between law and justice followed by research on clients' use of lawyers and legal services. Finally, I present a model of factors in clients' evaluations of lawyers and legal services. The presentation of this model includes a review of previous research on clients' evaluations of lawyers, the concept of justice in social psychology, and then two social psychological theories of decision-making: procedural justice and social power. Following this, I discuss characteristics of the actors and the context of the lawyer-client relationship in the section on lawyer-client interaction and the section on client characteristics (demographic and legal case).

DEVELOPMENT OF LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM

Law is defined as "a body of rules governing a social order" (Abadinsky 1991). All societies have mechanisms for enforcing rules, but not necessarily formal legal systems. As societies become larger and more complex, possibilities

for conflict and dispute increase, as does the need for mechanisms to settle disputes and enforce rules. Hoebel (1954) notes that "...the more civilized man becomes, the greater is man's need for law, and the more law he creates. Law is but a response to social needs" (p. 292).

Three functions of law are (1) to make and enforce rules concerning appropriate behavior; (2) to settle disputes between individuals, individuals and organizations, or between organizations; and (3) to bring about social change (Vago 1988). Sociologists of law generally take either an "integration-consensus" or a "conflict-coercion perspective" (Vago 1988). The integration-consensus perspective construes law in a pluralist society as a way of maintaining social order and harmony. The conflict-coercion perspective, however, views law as a tool of the ruling class to exercise control.

The role of lawyer, along with legal systems, arose with industrialization, bureaucratization, and complexity of business transactions (Vago 1988). A recent sociological analysis of the legal profession argues from a Weberian perspective that the legal profession in the United States consciously pursued social closure (monopolization) through controlling the market and enhancing their professional status (Abel 1989). Today, the number of lawyers has increased to over 800,000, an increase from 285,933 in 1960,

making it the fastest growing of all professions in the U.S. and after physicians, the highest paid professionals as a group (Vago 1988; Abel 1989).

The United States uses an adversarial format to adjudicate legal disputes. The opposing sides have representatives (lawyers) who present the dispute before a third party for a decision. This differs from the inquisitorial method used in some countries, in which the third party asks questions of the opposing parties. Other formats of dispute resolution include arbitration/mediation and bargaining/negotiation. Based on experimental studies of individuals' evaluations of legal dispute resolution procedures, Thibaut and Walker (1975) report that people in the U.S. prefer an adversarial format. This format allows more control over presentation of evidence, but gives control over the outcome to a neutral third party (Thibaut and Walker 1975). However, Hayden and Anderson (1979) question the concept of control and the role of the judge in the experimental methods used to reach this conclusion. Critics of the adversarial format claim that it sacrifices an objective search for the truth in favor of courtroom theatrics, and that it is expensive, time-consuming, stressful, and frustrating (Austin and Tobiasen 1984). The adversarial format does not guarantee just results, but depends on "the relative ability of the parties to prosecute

their case, the relative rationality of the procedures by which the decision is made and the relative impartiality of the triers" (Chambliss and Seidman 1971, p. 418). These factors are controlled by the rules governing the proceedings. In turn, the rules are a function of the current social forces, the historical development of the institutions, and the dominant ideologies (Chambliss and Seidman 1971).

LAW AND JUSTICE

While the consensus and conflict positions view law as the servant or the enemy of justice respectively, ideally our historically evolved laws "...may be conceived as a distillation of justice considerations..." (Sporer 1986, p.283). Much legal writing is concerned less with justice as an abstract value than as a concrete practical matter (Bell 1992). Two central concerns in the daily administration of justice are fair procedures in dispute resolution and equal access to legal institutions and therefore to justice (Bell 1992). Four factors contribute to these concerns through the daily administration of justice: (1) the form and functions of the law; (2) the structure of the administrative organization; (3) the role and functioning of the administrative official; and (4) the

relation between officials and clients (Arts and van der Veen 1992).

Whether or not the legal system can solve all of the problems brought to it, legal representation is a minimum prerequisite for access to the system and presumably to justice (Sarat 1986). As representatives of the legal system, lawyers play a crucial role in the administration of justice and therefore, are regarded as administrative officials. Lipsky (1980) describes administrative officials as those officials in direct contact with the public. In their administrative role, lawyers may not assess needs correctly or meet the legal needs of clients adequately so as to insure access to courts and justice.

Several points made about bureaucratic administrators also apply to the lawyer-client relationship. One point is that measurement and control of their performance is very difficult (Arts and van der Veen 1992). Another is that the interpersonal organizational structure and nature of the role creates professional (unauthorized) discretion (Arts and van der Veen 1992). A third point is that when clients are in legal situations arising from crises, lawyers may not have much to lose by being unresponsive (Lipsky 1980). Finally, the clients with whom lawyers interact are usually not among their primary reference groups, which might relegate a lower priority for client satisfaction

(Lipsky 1980).

In summary, two issues confronted daily in the administration of justice are the use of fair procedures and access to justice. As administrative officials of the law, lawyers can facilitate or impede citizens' access to justice through procedures. With these general ideas about law and justice in mind, I will review information on the clients of lawyers.

USE OF LEGAL SERVICES

Legal work in the United States today accounts for two percent of the gross national product. Legal work occurs in diverse settings such as private practice, government offices, and corporations, with the majority of lawyers in private practice (Vago 1988).

Corporations and wealthy individuals are the most common clients of legal services, and less than one quarter of lawyers' efforts are devoted to alleviating the legal problems of individuals (Laumann and Heinz 1979). Sixty-four percent of American adults have had at least one professional contact with a lawyer on matters other than those connected with their business (Curran 1977), yet individual clients in dispute cases represent only a small share of the U.S. legal market. However, these experiences

with the legal system leave more long-lasting impressions on clients and shape the public's attitudes about legal solutions to personal problems. These cases are usually involuntary (that is, they arise out of crises), involve other parties, require a zero-sum judgment, and may have long-term personal and economic consequences for clients. Fees for legal services for individual clients are relatively small, and these clients are referred to as "one-shotters" (Galanter 1974), that is, parties who rarely go to court as opposed to "repeat players" who go many times. This type of legal service usually involves non-adversarial or uncontested cases (for example, property acquisition, wills, estate settlement). Disputes and grievances (for example, divorces, torts, criminal charges) are less common, but are given more attention in the mass media and popular culture (Chase 1986; Mindes and Acock 1982).

THEORETICAL MODEL OF CLIENTS' EVALUATIONS OF LAWYERS

The model (see Figure 1) guiding this study draws on the previous research on the use of legal services, lawyer-client relationships, social power and procedural justice. These factors have not been considered together previously as important indicators of evaluations of lawyers by their clients.




Figure 1. Factors in Clients' Evaluations of Lawyers

CLIENTS' EVALUATIONS OF LEGAL SERVICES

Several patterns have been revealed by previous studies on clients' evaluations of legal services. First, client evaluations of their lawyers and legal services vary widely by type of legal problem. Clients in non-adversarial cases such as real property and estate planning/settlement report the higher levels of achieving the outcome initially sought, whereas clients in adversarial cases such as criminal, marital, consumer, and torts report lower levels. Clients in nonadversarial cases also give the most favorable ratings to lawyers on promptness in taking care of matters, interest and concern about clients' problems, honesty in dealing with clients, explaining matters fully to clients, keeping clients informed of progress, paying attention to what clients had to say, and being fair and reasonable in charging for services (Curran 1977). Clients in marital conflict, torts, and criminal cases rate lawyers low on the above characteristics and rate them lowest in terms of the achievement of expected outcomes (except for marital outcome). Clients in criminal complaints and personal injury suits are generally dissatisfied with both the process and outcome of settlements, whereas clients in marital disputes are highly frustrated with the process even though the outcome is more consistent with their

expectations (Curran 1977).

Second, persons who have first-hand contact with the legal system are more critical of legal services than those who do not (Sarat 1977), and they tend to report the contact as alienating and dissatisfying (Nelson 1988). Curran (1977) reports that clients who have negative experiences, that is, those who rate lawyers most negatively on a lawyer assessment score, hold the most unfavorable views of legal services of any group. She concludes that the "relationship between particularly negative lawyer experiences and perceptions is sufficiently clear to suggest that further attention needs to be given to the long-term impact of the quality of the lawyer-client exchange" (p. 265). Overall, the most common sources of client discontent with lawyers are fees, discourtesy, and delay (Abel 1989).

Based on previous research on evaluations of legal services, I expect that characteristics of the most recent dispute will have a direct effect on evaluations of legal services. Specifically, I expect that clients in divorce and "other" cases (criminal, personal injury, and traffic) will rate lawyers less positively than clients in cases involving wills, deeds and inheritances. I also expect that a positive outcome will have a direct positive effect on evaluations of lawyers and the legal system.

THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE

Justice has become a growing focus in social psychology since the late 1960s and early 1970s, although it "has been a fundamental theme in the history of thought and in the practice of political and social institutions" (Cohen and Greenberg 1982, p.1). Justice processes are a central concern in large and small group interactions which involve an evaluation of how benefits or burdens are distributed (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995). Within social psychology, concerns about justice that result in consequences for individuals and groups seem to be emphasized more than justice as a guiding ideal for social organization (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995). Justice may refer to the outcomes of an interaction, the procedures used for allocation, the motive underlying people's behavior, or perceptions of fairness of distribution principles. Justice includes all of those, and justice is achieved "when people receive what they are due, and they are due not only fairness but treatment consistent with their natural rights as human beings" (Furby 1986, p. 154).

A major indicator of evaluations of legal services is the individual's sense of fairness and equality of procedures (Tyler and Lind 1991). Two types of perceived fairness are (1) "distributive justice," the belief that the

outcome of a dispute is fair and equitable, and
(2) "procedural justice," the belief that the procedures used to resolve a dispute are fair and satisfying (Walker, Lind, and Thibaut 1979). Perceptions of procedural justice may influence perceptions of distributive justice, that is, if participants perceive a fair process in receiving outcomes, they may tolerate inequity in some outcomes. This study focuses on procedural justice, that is, justice as fairness in treatment of the client by the lawyer.

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

The concept of procedural justice has implications beyond legal settings to perception of fairness of rules in the everyday interaction of groups (Austin and Tobiasen 1984). For example, role behavior could be viewed as a type of procedural justice. Deviations from role expectations might then be interpreted as unjust and might produce emotional distress and/or retaliatory action. Reactance theory, proposed by social psychologist Jack Brehm (1966), centers around the concept of psychological reactance to explain reactions to loss of control or violations of personal freedom (Deaux et al. 1993). It is also concerned with procedural processes in that the experience of "psychological reactance" may be mediated by an evaluation

to a procedural violation that is experienced as unfair (Austin and Tobiasen 1984). Such a response could likely produce various negative behaviors, such as a decrease in liking or more aggression. In relation to procedural justice, psychological reactance describes choice and participation in decision making. "Lawyer jokes" might be such a negative behavior as a consequence of perceived loss of control or lack of participation in the lawyer-client relationship and therefore, the legal process.

Three different approaches have explored procedural justice in social relations (Thibaut and Walker 1975; Leventhal 1980; Lind and Tyler 1988). First, a control or instrumental approach distinguishes two types of control (Thibaut and Walker 1975). Process control refers to participants' opportunity to present evidence. Decision control refers to participants' control over the decision. Process control affects decision control through presentation of evidence. This approach suggests that people's primary concern in dispute is the outcome, and that the way to influence the final decision or outcome is to seek indirect control over decisions (Lind and Tyler 1988). Research during the last two decades has confirmed their finding that people affected by decisions react to fairness as well as to outcome favorability.

Second, Leventhal (1980) has suggested six criteria that influence judgments about the fairness of a procedure: (1) consistency, or the similarity of treatment and outcomes across people or time or both; (2) bias suppression, which refers to the ability to prevent favoritism by following the same rules every time; (3) decision accuracy, which depends on using accurate information or informed opinion; (4) correctability, or opportunities to correct unfair or inaccurate decisions through a process of appeals or grievances; (5) representation, or the involvement of parties affected by a decision in the decision-making process; and (6) ethicality, or the degree to which the decision-making process is assessed as fair and moral by general standards. Some studies which have examined Leventhal's criteria have found that the major criterion used to assess procedural justice is consistency, with representation and accuracy also being important (Tyler 1988). Tyler (1988) reports that the major criteria used are ethicality, honesty, and the effort to be fair. Studies also indicate the importance of representation, which affords the opportunity to "voice" opinions on matters that affect the participants. This desire for voice and two-way communication is important even if one has no chance for control over the outcome (Folger 1977; Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995).

A third approach proposes that process control is more important to the sense of being fairly treated than decision control, and that process control is important independent of decision control (Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler 1989). This approach is called a "group-value" model because of its assumption of the importance of group membership as a powerful aspect of social life and because of the centrality of procedures to group life. This model views procedural justice judgments emerging from the values held by an individual's reference group and from the desire to belong to that group (Hamilton and Rauma 1995). The group-value model comes from more of a social contract approach which focuses on the collective good and deemphasizes individual desserts. This model of procedural justice assumes that people involved in disputes brought before a third party for resolution do not view their relationship with the third party as a momentary one, concerned only with the problem that brought them to the third party. Rather they care about their long-term social relationship with the authorities or institutions acting as third parties (Lind and Tyler 1988). Because of this concern with the long-term association, people are also concerned with three issues considered to be noncontrol issues. First, the neutrality of the decision-making procedure, or the concern with whether a neutral arena (a "level playing field") for

resolving a dispute has been afforded is predicted as an important issue. A second issue is trust in the third party, that is, a concern for the intentions of third parties. This concern involves having an unbiased decision maker who is honest, who uses appropriate factual information to make decisions, and who has benevolent intentions and the desire to treat people in a fair and reasonable way. Third, the issue of standing, which refers to the information which the experience communicates about social status within the group, is predicted to be an important issue. For example, rude treatment from an authority might communicate low status while polite and respectful treatment might communicate regard for high status (Tyler 1989). This model also predicts that violations of procedures provoke strong feelings of anger and dislike towards perpetrators (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995).

In summary, three major approaches have been taken in considering procedural justice in social relations. Thibaut and Walker's (1975) experiments in legal settings point to disputants' desire to control procedures in determining outcomes in conflict resolution. Leventhal's six criteria call attention to procedural justice rules in general contexts. And Lind and Tyler's research emphasizes the centrality of procedures to group life and the

evaluation of procedures as fair if they are consistent with the group's values (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995).

Studies conducted since Thibaut and Walker's (1975) original laboratory experiments on procedural justice have confirmed the robustness of their findings and also have explored the scope of procedural justice (Tyler and Lind 1991). Tyler and Lind (1991) report procedural justice influences on evaluations of authorities and institutions, in work settings (evaluations of supervisors and/or employers), in legal settings (evaluations of judges, police officers, and the court system) and in the political arena (evaluations of political leaders and institutions). It seems likely that clients' evaluations of procedural justice within lawyer-client interaction would strongly influence public ratings of legal services. I use Leventhal's justice judgment criteria because of the more general applicability of this approach. Based on the importance of procedural justice in other legal and general contexts, I expect that clients who perceive fair treatment by their lawyers will be more satisfied with the lawyer and the legal system, regardless of case outcome (see middle block in model, Figure 1).

Justice and Power. The relationship between justice and power is rarely explored in philosophical or social psychological discussions of justice (Cohen 1982). An attributional approach to perceptions of justice (Cohen 1982) points to Ross's (1977) discussion of the importance of the effects of roles on interactions between individuals differing in power. Encounters are

"shaped and constrained by the formal and informal roles that the various actors must play. More specifically, social roles typically confer unequal control over the style, content, and duration of an encounter; such control, in turn, facilitates displays of knowledge, skill, wit, or sensitivity, while permitting the concealment of deficiencies" (p. 193).

As an example, Ross points to the role of physician, who is "relatively free to assume with his patient whichever role--stern parent, sympathetic friend, or detached scientist--he wishes" (p. 195). This is also true of the lawyer role.

As noted in Chapter 1, clients value the interpersonal aspects of the lawyer-client relationship such as warmth and consideration as much as legal competence. Following from the discussion on perceptions of justice, two bodies of literature that may pertain to clients' perceptions of fairness are lawyers' uses of social power and lawyers' interactional styles. These two bodies of literature (left side of model in Figure 1) will be reviewed next.

SOCIAL POWER THEORY

Efforts to manipulate or influence others occur frequently in daily life, and they are a part of social psychological theories on social power, social influence, impression management, and self-presentation (Jones 1990; Raven 1993). Hollander (p. 488 1985) claims that power is commonly viewed as "the ability to exert a degree of control over persons, things, and events." Hollander (1985) quotes Weber's (1947 p.152) definition of power: "Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance."

A model of different types of social power was developed by French and Raven (1959) and later Raven (1965). French and Raven (1959) propose that there are at least five bases of social power from which people can influence the attitudes or behavior of others. Reward power refers to the ability to administer desired rewards or remove or decrease undesired ones. Coercive power involves the perceived ability to dispense punishments and can also refer to the ability to remove or decrease rewards. Legitimate power emphasizes the powerholder's right to prescribe behavior because of cultural values or some legitimizing actions such as elections or qualifying certification. It can also refer

to the ability to administer feelings of obligation or responsibility to another (Hinkin and Schriesheim 1989).

Referent power (charisma) is based on one's ability to be a frame of reference or identification for another. This type of power is achieved by emphasizing similarities of attitudes, beliefs, and values (Rodin and Janis 1979; Janis 1982). It can also refer to the ability to administer feelings of approval or acceptance to another (Hinkin and Schriesheim 1989). Personal approval from another that one likes can be a powerful reward power; the same is true for the possibility that disapproval from an admired other can be a basis for coercive power (Raven 1993).

Finally, expert power is based on having special knowledge or expertise that the recipient lacks. A desire to retain expert power may be a primary reason why professionals resist demystifying their knowledge and explaining their recommendations in lay terms (Rodin and Janis 1979).

While the original examples of social power were drawn from relationships between supervisors and subordinates, the French and Raven model has been used to examine the influence of parents on children, husbands on wives and vice-versa, children on one another, teachers on students, doctors on patients, salesmen on customers, and political figures on one another (Raven 1993). Research indicates

that the choice of power base is situationally contingent, that is, it is dependent on the setting and the status of the parties involved. Different types of power can be used in tandem (Podsakoff and Schriesheim 1985). Another elaboration of the types of social power is that they can be nested in a hierarchical structure as in one interpretation which suggests a two-tiered hierarchical structure consisting of personal and positional power (Yukl and Falbe 1991).

A recent meta-analytic study of how the bases of social power affect satisfaction with supervision, job satisfaction, and performance reveals that referent power most strongly influences satisfaction and expert power positively influences all the outcomes (Carson, Carson, and Roe 1993). Hinkin and Schriesheim (1990) also argue that their findings support popular or conventional wisdom that "good" leaders are ones with "expertise" and "charisma," that is, those who use expert and referent power bases. Based on social power theory, which has found positive effects of expert and referent power on satisfaction with leaders and based on procedural justice theory which has found positive effects of procedural justice ratings on satisfaction, I expect the perception of lawyers' use of referent power and expert power to be positively associated

with favorable procedural justice evaluations and therefore with greater satisfaction with lawyers and the legal system.

Power in Interpersonal Perception. Power is also a consideration in theories of impression management and self-presentation which is an integral part of the study of interpersonal perception (Jones 1990). These theories are based on Erving Goffman's (1959) theory of the presentation of self in everyday life which describes social interaction as a theatrical performance in which the image that is presented to others is like a role played by an actor. From this perspective an individual presents a particular self based on his or objectives in a situation, the context of the interaction, and the expectations of the audience (Jones 1990). A perceiver's expectancy about another person can come from various sources, for example, from direct interactions or observations of that person, or from stereotypes about a group to which that other person belongs. A third aspect in understanding interpersonal perception is the immediate context of the interaction, that is, the characteristics of the roles and constraints.

In summary, understanding interpersonal perception requires a grasp of the self presented by an individual, a perceiver's expectations drawn from various sources, and a context with its roles and constraints. In this case, an

understanding of the lawyer-client relationship requires a grasp of lawyers' self-presentations, clients' expectations, and the context of this interaction with its different roles and constraints. I will discuss these three aspects next.

LAWYER-CLIENT INTERACTION

Several structural features characterize the lawyer-client relationship. First, the lawyer-client relationship is characterized by an unequal distribution of power and knowledge (Sarat and Felstiner 1986). The client depends on the lawyer for information about the case, and often the lawyer withholds it (Abel 1986). There is some evidence that lawyers exercise considerable power over their clients and often shape disputes to fit their own interests or the interests of the profession rather than the interest of their clients (Felsinter, Abel, and Sarat 1981). Second, lawyer-client relationships are usually involuntary and short-term, arising in response to a crisis such as injury or divorce (Abel 1986; Curran 1977). Again, measurement and control of the lawyer's performance is difficult. The unequal power distribution, the involuntary nature of many cases, and the arcane jargon form a context in which a sense of control and freedom of choices appears very limited for clients. In addition to these structural features of the

lawyer-client interaction, a grasp of the characteristics of lawyers and clients is necessary.

LAWYERS

Public Image. Several studies have examined images of lawyers by the public. Mindes and Acock (1982) identify three conflicting images of lawyers: (1) the hero, who is aggressive, self-confident, competitive, energetic, and successful; (2) the trickster, who is evasive, manipulative, overbearing, greedy, cold, unethical; and (3) the helper, who is likable, cooperative, broad-minded, understanding, and fair. The trickster is the most common image of lawyers, and the helper is the least common. At least 30% of the American public believe that lawyers take too long to get things done, take cases that they are not qualified to handle, work harder at getting clients than in serving them, and needlessly complicate clients' problems (Curran 1977).

Lawyer Role. As noted in Chapter 1, legal clients value interpersonal aspects of the lawyer-client relationship as much as legal expertise. Professional competence encompasses legal expertise and interpersonal skills (Rosenthal 1976; Abrams 1984). Role expectations of lawyers appear to be based on legal rules, administrative regulations, and professional ethics, yet no clear consensus

exists (Evan 1990). Consequently, lawyers exercise discretion in carrying out role obligations.

Lawyers' five tasks are to (1) get information; (2) sift it; (3) devise a preliminary strategy for going forward; (4) implement that strategy; and (5) review and revise the strategy in the light of new information (Rosenthal 1976). Further, people expect (1) completeness (thoroughness); (2) economy of effort; (3) accuracy; (4) consistency; (5) clarification of ambiguities; and (6) responsiveness, which involves being a good listener and encouraging clients to be forthcoming (Rosenthal 1976). Clients "do not need to be expert in the law to be able to assess such things as consistency, responsiveness, accessibility, and clarity of expression" (Rosenthal 1976, p. 255). However, clients may need help in setting and assessing some standards (Rosenthal 1976) if they are to be competent consumers of legal services. The characteristics of the lawyer role described by Rosenthal (1976) are similar in concept to the procedural justice criteria described previously.

Lawyers' Interactional Styles. Attorneys (like other professionals) can adopt one of several styles in dealing with their clients (Gifford 1987; Emanuel and Emanuel 1992). As noted previously, lawyers have a lot of discretion in

carrying out the obligations of the lawyer role. The degree and type of discretion is partly a function of the lawyer's role orientations or attitudes toward role expectations (Evan 1990). Two dimensions for classifying role orientations, or interactional styles, are especially appropriate. First, interactional styles can be classified as client-centered or "participatory," or attorney-directed or "traditional" (Hillary and Johnson 1989; Feldman and Wilson 1981; Hosticka 1979; Sarat 1986). A client-centered orientation places primary importance on the needs of clients and the treatment of them with mutual respect. The attorney-directed orientation encourages a passive role for the client and a paternalistic approach by the lawyer. Using this approach, the lawyer presumes to know what the client needs and pursues this goal without regard for the client's actual desires (Gifford 1987). Even though legal textbooks and professional guidelines advocate a client-centered, participatory orientation and advise lawyers against being too directive (ABA 1983; Freeman and Weihofen 1972; Rosenthal 1974), a lawyer-centered orientation appears to characterize lawyer-client relationships.

Practitioners in psychotherapy also advocate a client-centered approach. One element of this approach is unconditional positive regard for the client. Others (Rodin and Janis, 1979; Janis 1982) speculate that unconditional

positive regard may be an important factor in acquiring referent power, the base of social power most often associated with higher levels of satisfaction. Rodin and Janis (1979) argue that health-care personnel use referent power less often than the other power bases, but they hypothesize that it is the base most likely to promote internalization of recommendations. They suggest that the use of expert and coercive power may actually lessen the patient's feelings of personal control. They further argue that patients are frequently encouraged to feel helpless in interactions with professionals.

Second, lawyers' interactional styles differ by roles adopted. Specifically, lawyers may adopt one of the following roles: (1) the court official, that is, as a detached provider of information and representative of the court, (2) a legal educator, that is, someone who helps clients understand the law and informs them of the legal basis for decisions and legal procedures, and (3) the social worker/counselor role, by showing compassion and understanding for the client and by trying to offer help beyond expectations. There are similarities in these two classifications in that the court official role appears to be closest to a traditional approach, the social worker/counselor role to a participatory approach, and the legal educator role to a combination of the traditional and

participatory approaches. I will use the occupational role distinction because of its broader scope. Based on guidelines from the legal profession and studies in other "helping" professions, I expect that adoption of a legal educator or social worker/counselor role by a lawyer and use of referent power will be associated with higher procedural justice ratings and more favorable evaluations of legal services.

Clients

Social Characteristics. Clients' perceptions may be influenced by social characteristics such as age, gender, education, and income. These social characteristics expose individuals to different conditions of life and thereby bring about different perceptions, values, and ideologies.

Clients' opinions and perceptions about lawyers and their work vary by these social structural characteristics. For example, Curran (1977) reports that white females evaluate the responsiveness of the courts and the legal system and the concern of lawyers more positively than other groups such as black/Latino females and white males. The elderly, the less educated, and people with lower incomes have higher regard for the competence of the legal system, but are less optimistic about how well the system would serve them. Those with higher education and income are less

optimistic about the quality and fairness of the legal system, but more optimistic about attaining their objectives in the legal system.

Research on gender differences in attributions of social power has yielded contradictory results (Nesler et al. 1993). The same is true for research on evaluations of distributive justice (Major and Deaux 1982). Males rely on equity and females on equality in allocation. The interpretation for this is that males are more concerned with agency, achievement, and status and that females are more concerned with communion and affiliation (Reis 1982). Because women also tend to attribute their inputs to external factors and men to internal factors, women are more likely to perceive lower reward levels as fair (Major and Adams 1983). These gender differences might bring about differences in procedural justice evaluations, that is, differences in expectations and perceptions of fair treatment might elicit higher procedural justice evaluations from women.

A conflict perspective which views law and the legal system as reflecting the values and interests of those who control the state would predict that those who have less power within the society (for example, women, the elderly, and those with less education and income) would regard the legal system as less responsive to them. Consequently, they

would rate lawyers lower on procedural justice evaluations and satisfaction evaluations. However, based on Ross's (1977) finding that "the disadvantaged and powerless overestimate the capabilities of the powerful" (p. 196), less powerful groups such as women and those with less education and income might evaluate lawyers more favorably.

In summary, clients' characteristics, specifically age, gender, education, and income should affect procedural justice ratings, and satisfaction with lawyers and the legal system. A conflict perspective would predict that less powerful groups in society, that is, women, the elderly, and those with less education and income would view their handling by lawyers and the legal system less favorably. An attributional approach would predict that this same group would overestimate the responsiveness of lawyers and the legal system and rate them more favorably.

SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES

Lawyers play an important role in our society as gatekeepers to and representatives of the legal system. Law and society meet in the lawyer-client relationship (Sarat and Felstiner 1986). This relationship is characterized by professional discretion, unequal power, and lack of accountability of the lawyer. In summary, the lawyer-client

relationship can be a major hurdle to access to the courts. Because of their different positions in the social structure, not all individuals are equally adept in perceiving the problems, negotiating the hurdle, and evaluating the experience. The present study examines the factors which influence clients' evaluations of lawyers and the legal system. Based on research on the importance of procedural justice effects on satisfaction with actors in legal settings, I assess the effects of procedural justice on satisfaction with lawyers and the legal system. In addition, three other factors assessed are (1) perceptions of lawyer's interactional style (occupational role), (2) attribution of the social power base used by the lawyer, and (3) clients' characteristics, specifically gender, age, education, and income. These factors have not been examined together before in studies of the lawyer-client relationship.

Based on studies which have reported procedural justice influences on evaluations of authorities in legal settings, the following major hypothesis will be tested:

H1: Perceptions of fair treatment by lawyers increase the likelihood of positive evaluations of lawyers and the legal system independent of the effect of the case outcome. Specifically, higher procedural justice evaluations (perceptions of fairness) of lawyers lead

to greater satisfaction with lawyers and the legal system.

In addition, research using French and Raven's social power model in diverse settings indicates that referent power and expert power positively influence measures of satisfaction with supervision, job satisfaction, and performance. Based on these findings of the positive effects of use of referent and expert power, and based on procedural justice theory which has found positive effects of procedural justice ratings on satisfaction, I hypothesize that:

H2A: The type of social power used by the lawyer directly affects procedural justice ratings of lawyers.

Specifically, use of referent and expert power leads to higher procedural justice evaluations.

H2B: The type of social power used by the lawyer directly affects evaluations of lawyers and the legal system and indirectly affects evaluations of lawyers and the legal system through procedural justice evaluations.

Specifically, attributions of expert and referent power lead to favorable evaluations of lawyers and the legal system, and indirectly through higher procedural justice ratings.

As suggested above, interactional styles adopted by professionals affect satisfaction and compliance. The following hypothesis is advanced:

H3A: The adoption of certain occupational roles by the lawyer directly affects procedural justice evaluations. Specifically, adoption of a legal educator or social worker/counselor role leads to higher procedural justice ratings.

H3B: The type of role adopted by the lawyer directly affects evaluations of lawyers and the legal system as well as indirectly through procedural justice evaluations. Specifically, adoption of a legal educator or social worker/counselor role, which are more client-centered leads to more favorable evaluations of legal services.

A social structural perspective suggests that people differ in their abilities to negotiate hurdles in accessing the courts because of their positions in the social structure. Such characteristics as gender, age, and socioeconomic level have consistently been linked to a broad range of conditions for the individual (House and Mortimer 1990). As note previously, Curran reports that white females are more positive about the responsiveness of the courts and the legal system. Additionally, those

disadvantaged socially and economically (the elderly, the less educated, and those with lower incomes) have higher regard for the competence of the system while being less optimistic about their own success with the system. Those with higher education and income are less optimistic about the fairness of the legal system, while have more optimism about their own success in dealing with the system. Based on these findings that level of satisfaction depends on social structural characteristics, I hypothesize that:

H4A: Social structural characteristics will affect procedural justice evaluations. A conflict perspective predicts that less powerful people, that is women and those with less education and income, will rate lawyers lower on procedural justice. An attribution perspective which suggests that disadvantaged and powerless individuals overestimate the abilities of the powerful, predicts that women and those with less education and income will evaluate lawyers more favorably on ratings of procedural justice. Research on allocation preference also suggests that women will evaluate lawyers higher on procedural justice.

H4B: Social structural characteristics directly affect clients' evaluations of lawyers and the legal system and indirectly affect these evaluations through procedural justice evaluations. A conflict perspective

predicts that women and those with less education and income will be less satisfied with their attorneys. An attribution perspective predicts that women and those with less education and income will be more satisfied with their attorneys.

Finally, previous research has found that characteristics of the case, such as the type of case and the outcome of the case, have an effect on lawyer assessment scores (Curran 1977). As described in the section on evaluations of legal services in this chapter, clients in nonadversarial cases report the highest level of achieving their expected outcomes and give the most favorable ratings to lawyers. Clients in marital conflict, torts, and criminal complaints give the least positive ratings on a lawyer assessment score and are also rated low in terms of expected outcomes. Based on these findings, the following hypotheses are generated:

H5A: Characteristics of the most recent dispute directly affect procedural ratings of lawyers. Specifically, clients in adversarial cases such as divorce, torts, and criminal cases will evaluate lawyers lower on the procedural justice measure than will clients in wills, deeds, and inheritances; clients with unfavorable outcomes will evaluate lawyers lower on the procedural

justice measure than will clients with favorable outcomes.

H5B: Case characteristics will directly affect evaluations of lawyers as well as indirectly through procedural justice ratings. Specifically, clients with favorable outcomes will evaluate lawyers more favorably than clients with outcomes in favor of the opposition, mixed outcomes or outcomes still pending as will clients in such cases as deeds, wills, and inheritances.

CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODS

In order to obtain a more complete picture of clients' perceptions and evaluations of lawyers, this study uses a multimethod approach referred to as triangulation. The major portion of the study involves a quantitative analysis of survey data. Additionally, a qualitative approach involves analyzing responses to an open-ended question on the telephone survey and data from focus groups of legal clients from divorce.

QUANTITATIVE METHOD

Data for this study come from a national sample of adults with various legal experiences. Sample characteristics and measurement of variables are discussed below.

THE SAMPLE

The national telephone survey was conducted in 1993 at the Survey Research Center at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Random Digit Dialing was used to select respondents, because this method includes people who have recently moved and people with unlisted numbers.

The sample was stratified by region of the country and type of legal experience. Following the distribution of the U.S. population, 50% of the respondents were selected from states in the eastern time zone, 30% from central states, 15% from western states, and 5% from states in the mountain time zone. To insure diversity in prior legal experiences, screening questions were used to stratify the sample, resulting in a sample of (1) 340 adults with no prior experiences requiring a lawyer; (2) 200 adults who hired a lawyer in a divorce case (i.e., cited divorce as their most serious legal problem); (3) 190 adults in which a property deed, will, or inheritance was their most serious legal situation; and (4) 274 adults who hired a lawyer for other types of legal disputes such as criminal complaint and personal injury. Only those respondents with legal experience are included in this study (n=664).

Interviewers initially contacted 1,655 adults and completed 1,004 interviews, which represents a 61% response rate. Apparently, a large proportion of non-respondents hung up quickly because they had not consulted a lawyer. In comparison to U.S. census data, women (55%) are slightly overrepresented. Actual sample size varies depending on the variables used in the analysis because of missing data.

MEASURES OF VARIABLES

Endogenous Variables. Because of the greater reliability of multiple indicators (Carmines and Zeller 1979), the dependent variables, clients' evaluations of lawyers and the legal system, were measured in three ways. First, a three-item scale measuring satisfaction with the attorney, consists of three questions: "Overall, how satisfied were you with...

- (1) the way your lawyer treated you?
- (2) the advice your lawyer gave you? and
- (3) the amount of money you had to pay for legal services?"

Valid responses were 1=Not satisfied, 2=Satisfied, and 3=Very satisfied. The responses were summed and divided by 3 so that the range is 1 - 3. Cronbach's alpha, a measure of internal consistency of a set of items, is .844.

A second measure of satisfaction with the lawyer consists of two questions:

- (1) "Would you recommend your [last] lawyer to a friend with a legal problem?"
- (2) "Would you use the same lawyer for a problem in the future?"

The responses, 1=No and 2=Yes were recoded so that 0=No and 1=Yes and summed, yielding a range of 0 - 2. Cronbach's alpha for this is .945.

Satisfaction with the court system was measured by a two-item scale consisting of two questions:

"Overall, how satisfied were you with ...

(1) the judge in your case?

(2) the way your case was handled in the court system?"

The choices of responses are 1=Not satisfied, 2=Somewhat satisfied, and 3=Very satisfied. The responses were summed and divided by 2 to yield a range of 1 - 3. Cronbach's alpha is .789.

A rating of procedural justice evaluations is measured by the following questions: "Do you think that...

(1) you had control over how your lawyer handled the case? [REPRESENTATION]

(2) the outcome of your case was what you expected?" [CONSISTENCY]

"Did your lawyer...

(3) try to treat you fairly? [IMPARTIALITY]

(4) try to present your case accurately? [QUALITY]

(5) give you all the options and alternatives for handling your case successfully? [CORRECTABILITY]

(6) express concern for you as a person? [ETHICALITY]

(7) keep you informed about what was going on?" [REPRESENTATION]

The two choices, 1=No and 2=Yes were recoded 0=No and 1=Yes. Items (1) and (7) were summed and divided by 2, then summed with the other items to yield a procedural justice rating

ranging from 0 - 6. Cronbach's alpha for the procedural justice scale is .873.

Exogenous Variables. Clients' social characteristics included in the analysis are gender, age, education and income. The gender of the respondent was asked only if it was unclear to the interviewer. The birth year of the respondent was asked to determine age. Age was recoded into the following categories: (1) 18-29 years, (2) 30-39 years, (3) 40-49 years, (4) 50-59 years, (5) 60-69 years, and (6) 70-92 years.

Educational attainment was assessed by the following question: "What was the highest grade of formal education you have completed?" The categories are 1=grade school, 2=some high school, 3=high school grad or GED, 4=trade or vocational school after high school, 5=some college, 6=college graduate, and 7=graduate school or professional school.

Income was determined by the question, "Which of the following broad categories best represents your total family income before taxes in 1992? Please tell me when I get to the category that represents your situation. Is your income... (1) less than \$10,000, (2) between 10,000 and \$30,000, (3) between \$30,000 and \$50,000, (4) between \$50,000 and \$75,000, (5) between \$75,000 and \$100,000, and

(6) over \$100,000?

The model also includes type of legal problem and the outcome of the case. The three categories of type of legal case are 1=Divorce, 2=Property deed, wills and inheritances, and 3=All other (traffic, personal injury, and criminal). The categories were dummy coded so that the "Other" category is the omitted reference category. The four categories of case outcomes are 1=My favor (respondent's favor), 2=Opposition's favor, 3=Mixed outcome, and 4=Pending. The categories were dummy coded so that the "Pending" category is the baseline group.

Questions tapping attributions of social power are as follows: "How often did your [last] lawyer...

- (1) Use legal language without explaining it? [EXPERT]
- (2) Tell you that he/she was an expert on these kinds of cases? [EXPERT]
- (3) Do something without your permission? [LEGITIMATE]
- (4) Say that the judge would not allow something or would not like something? [LEGITIMATE]
- (5) Ask for your advice on issues? [REFERENT]
- (6) Express sympathy and understanding of what you were going through? [REFERENT]
- (7) Praise you for following his/her advice? [REWARD]
- (8) Question your judgment about what you thought about some issue? [COERCIVE]
- (9) Threaten to quit if you didn't follow his/her advice? [COERCIVE]

The three choices are 1=Never, 2=Sometimes, and 3=A lot. Responses to items (1) and (2) were summed and divided by two to represent expert power (Cronbach's alpha=.514). Responses to items (3) and (4) were summed and divided by two to represent legitimate power (Cronbach's alpha=.544). Responses to items (5) and (6) were summed and divided by two to represent referent power (Cronbach's alpha=.427). Responses to item (7) represent reward power. And finally, responses to items (8) and (9) were summed and divided by two to represent coercive power (Cronbach's alpha=.131). The alphas for the social power measures are low, a reflection of the number of items and their interitem correlation.

Lawyer orientation was assessed by the following questions:

"How often did your [last] lawyer.....

- 1) Explain the legal basis for his/her actions to help you understand things better? [LEGAL EDUCATOR]
- 2) Show compassion and offer help beyond what you expected? [SOCIAL WORKER/COUNSELLOR]
- 3) Act formally and more like a police officer or other court official? [COURT OFFICIAL]

The three choices of response are 1=Never, 2=Sometimes, and 3=A lot.

Survey Comments

Responses to the following open-ended question were coded and analyzed: "Is there anything else that you would like to tell us about your experiences with lawyers and the legal system?" Initially the 362 responses were interpreted as "substantive" or "nonsubstantive" (for example, "Free Mike Tyson" and remarks about the questionnaire itself). The substantive comments were then further interpreted as positive or neutral, and negative. All of the 664 respondents were placed into one of the following comment groups: 1=No comment, 2=Nonsubstantive, 3=Positive or neutral comment, and 4=Negative comment. A one-way analysis of variance was performed to analyze the relationship between the comment groups and procedural justice ratings, satisfaction with the attorney, satisfaction with the courts, and client's education and income.

QUALITATIVE METHOD

Interest in qualitative methodology has been renewed in the past decade and is a lively topic in current social research. From its roots in the Chicago school in sociology, the resurgence of interest in qualitative research has been attributed to such factors as the

persistence of symbolic interactionists in producing important field research even through the dominant period of quantitative sociology, the maturing of a large cohort of qualitative sociologists trained in the Chicago school, the expense of quantitative research, and the growing feminization of sociology (Cahill, Fine and Grant 1995).

Qualitative data in this study come from responses to the open-ended question described above and from focus groups. I analyzed the data using the text approach in which data are represented as strings of free text, that is, transcripts entered into a word processing program capable of producing ASCII text files. The specific computer software used is The Ethnograph (Seidel and Clark 1983). The data are stored as text files. Particular segments referring to some concept are identified, classified as special codes, and then retrieved for later analysis.

Survey Comments. In an attempt to capture unanticipated findings and richer detail from the survey respondents, the responses to the open-ended question noted above were analyzed for content. After several thorough readings of the transcripts involving a process of examining, comparing, conceptualizing, and categorizing the comments (Strauss and Corbin 1990), I identified and coded segments. From this process, I identified about twenty-five topics that were

mentioned five or more times. I then combined these topics into several major areas of concern.

Focus Groups. Focus groups as qualitative research are basically group interviews with a reliance on interaction within the group rather than merely the participants' responses to the researcher's questions (Morgan 1990). The researcher typically plays the role of moderator. Focus groups are well suited to studying attitudes and cognitions (Morgan 1990). These groups provide the opportunity for spontaneous responses from participants and for responses to the interaction of the participants.

Three focus groups--one male group, one female group, and one mixed sex group--were used in developing the questionnaire. I recruited the participants from my acquaintances who had divorced and had been a legal client. I then asked them for other names. Generally, it is desirable that focus groups be homogeneous. One group, however consisted of two women and one man. I knew these three participants from interacting with them in a different context, but I had no prior knowledge of their experiences with lawyers. Several people who had accepted the invitation to participate did not appear, which accounts for the small numbers in each group. The male group had three participants, and the female group had two participants.

All of the participants are white. The participants were asked to recall helpful or particularly annoying things that the lawyer did and the effect of those experiences on any future use of the legal system. The transcribed materials from these groups are used as a component of this study.

CHAPTER 4. RESULTS

UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Descriptive statistics for the sample are reported in Table 1. This sample has more females (53.5%) than males (46.5%). The respondents average about forty years of age, with education beyond high school, and incomes between \$30,000 and \$50,000.

Thirty per cent of the participants reported on a divorce, 28.6% on settling a deed, will, or inheritance, and 41.3% on another type of case, such as personal injury, traffic, or criminal cases. Forty-six percent had case outcomes in their favor, 18.6% in favor of the opposition, 26.5% had mixed outcomes, and 5.8% were still waiting for the outcome.

The means for perceptions of lawyers' interactional styles (occupational roles) are 2.07 for legal educator, 1.37 for court official, and 1.78 for social worker/counselor which indicates that the role of the lawyer as legal educator is more often perceived than the social worker/counselor and the court official roles. The means for attributions of the lawyer's social power base are 1.33 for expert power, 1.33 for legitimate power, 1.41 for reward power, 1.27 for coercive power, and 1.82 for referent power. All of these means lie between never and sometimes with

coercive power perceived the least and referent power perceived the most of the five social power bases.

The mean for the procedural justice evaluation is 4.8 on a scale ranging from 0 (none at all) to 6 (high). The distribution of procedural justice is positively skewed. However, since there is sufficient variation in procedural justice to be explained by other variables, then it also has sufficient variation to explain other variables.

Overall satisfaction with the attorney based on the three-item scale is 2.38, slightly better than "somewhat satisfied" (1=satisfied, 2=somewhat satisfied, 3=very satisfied). Based on the two-item measure, the recommend or use again measure, the mean is 1.5 with a range of 0 (low satisfaction) to 2 (high satisfaction). The mean for overall satisfaction with the court is 1.96, which is slightly lower than "somewhat satisfied."

BIVARIATE ANALYSIS

The bivariate relations among all the variables in the analysis are shown in Table 2. Bivariate correlations between exogenous variables and each endogenous variable are also listed in the first column in each multiple regression table (Tables 3-6, 8-15). The reduction in the number of cases in these analyses is the result of a lower number of people who actually go to court compared to the number who

see lawyers, missing responses from the lawyer assesment measures, missing responses on procedural justice items, and missing responses from case outcome.

Bivariate correlates indicate that a lawyer's interactional style and social power base as well as the case outcome and case type are significantly associated with procedural justice ratings of the lawyer. Specifically, adoption of a social worker role or legal educator role and use of referent or reward power are positively associated with procedural justice ratings of the lawyer; adoption of a court official role and use of expert, legitimate or coercive power are negatively associated with procedural justice ratings. Additionally, respondents with outcomes in favor of the opposition rate lawyers lower on procedural justice than those with outcomes still pending while respondents with outcomes in their favor rate lawyers higher on procedural justice than do respondents with mixed or still pending outcomes. Divorce clients rate their lawyers higher on procedural justice than do clients in cases of deeds, wills, and inheritances and in cases of personal injury, traffic, and criminal.

The bivariate correlations of the two measures of satisfaction with the attorney with the exogenous variables are very similar in that the lawyer's interactional style and power base and case outcome are significantly associated

with these measures. As with procedural justice ratings, adoption of a legal educator or social worker role and use of referent or reward power are positively associated with satisfaction with the attorney whereas adoption of a court official role and use of legitimate, expert, and coercive power are negatively associated with satisfaction. As expected, case outcome also is significantly associated with satisfaction with the attorney, with a favorable outcome being more positively associated than the pending group, and an unfavorable outcome more negatively associated than a mixed outcome or a pending outcome. Additionally, client's age and income are also significantly associated with the three-item measure of satisfaction with the attorney; age is inversely related to satisfaction while income is positively related to satisfaction. Finally, the procedural justice rating of lawyers is the strongest significant correlate of all the variables with satisfaction with the attorney.

In summary of assessment of the courts, both measures of satisfaction with the attorney and procedural justice rating are significant correlates; following from this, the lawyer's interactional style and social power base are also significant correlates. The case outcome is significantly associated with assessment of the courts; an outcome in favor of the respondent is more positively associated with

satisfaction than the pending group, and outcomes in favor of the opposition or mixed outcomes are more negatively associated with satisfaction than the pending group. The only significant client demographic correlate of satisfaction with the courts is gender, and again, women seem to be more satisfied with the courts than men.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

In this section, I present the results of the initial multiple regression analysis (Tables 3 - 6), which generally follow figure 1 and the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. Further multivariate analyses are presented in the two sections which follow this section.

The numbers in Models 1 and 2 refer to the beta weights, which are the coefficients of the independent variables when all variables are expressed in standardized form. The effect of the demographic variables of the client, case characteristics, and the lawyer's interactional style and power base is shown in Model 1, and the effect of the addition of the procedural justice variable is shown in Model 2. The R-squares given for each model are adjusted R-squares.

Procedural Justice. Table 3 indicates that hypotheses 2A and 3A are supported in that the lawyer's role is a

significant predictor of procedural justice ratings as are three of the five social power bases. The strongest and most significant predictor ($p < .001$) of procedural justice ratings is the court official style which is in a negative direction, that is, the more a lawyer is perceived as a court official, the lower is the procedural justice rating. Adoption of a social worker/counselor style is the next strongest predictor ($p < .01$) and is in a positive direction, that is, the more a lawyer is perceived to adopt a social worker role, the higher the procedural justice rating. Adoption of a legal educator style is also a significant predictor ($p < .05$) of procedural justice ratings and is also in a positive direction, so that adoption of a legal educator style will also lead to higher procedural justice ratings of lawyers. Among the social power bases, a referent power base is the strongest predictor ($p < .01$), and it is in a positive direction. Legitimate power is also a strong significant predictor ($p < .01$), but is in a negative direction as is expert power ($p < .05$).

Hypothesis 4A is partially supported in that gender is a significant ($p < .05$) predictor of procedural justice ratings. The negative sign indicates that men rate lawyers higher on procedural justice measures than do women. Hypothesis 5A is also partially supported in that case type is a significant predictor of procedural justice ratings.

The reference category for case type is "Others" (personal injury, traffic, and criminal). Clients in divorce cases give higher procedural justice ratings to their lawyers than clients in "deeds, wills, and inheritances" cases and clients in "personal injury, traffic, and criminal" cases. The outcome of the case is not a significant predictor of procedural justice ratings of lawyers. As a group these variables explain about 41% of the variation in procedural justice ratings of lawyers.

Consistent with hypothesis 1, procedural justice ratings of lawyers lead to greater satisfaction with lawyers (Tables 4 and 5). However, the effect of procedural justice ratings of lawyers on satisfaction with the courts appears to be indirect through evaluations of lawyers (Tables 4 and 6). Procedural justice is the strongest predictor of satisfaction with attorneys (Table 4), but overall satisfaction with attorneys is the strongest predictor of satisfaction with courts (Table 6). As shown in model 2 of Tables 4 and 5, the amount of additional variation explained by the procedural justice rating of attorneys is 15 percentage points for the three-item measure of satisfaction with the attorney (satisfaction with treatment by lawyer, advice given by lawyer, and fee) and 35 percentage points for the two-item measure (recomment or use again). The results in Table 6 reveal that satisfaction with the

attorney is the strong predictor of satisfaction with the court system, especially for women.

Satisfaction with Attorneys. From the regression coefficients in model 1 in Tables 4 and 5 we can see that the lawyer's interactional style and power base, case outcome, and the client's income are all significant predictors of satisfaction with the lawyer. Model 1 in Table 4, which displays the results using the three-item measure of satisfaction with the attorney, indicates that people with higher incomes are more satisfied with their lawyers. Further, Table 4 (model 1) indicates that adoption of a legal educator style or a social worker style leads to greater satisfaction with the attorney; use of referent power leads to greater satisfaction while use of expert or legitimate power (the strongest predictor of the power bases) leads to less satisfaction with the attorney. The negative effect of the use of expert power was not expected. As a group, these variables explain about 45% of the variation in satisfaction with the attorney. When procedural justice ratings of the attorney are entered into the regression equation (model 2), income remains a significant predictor, which partially supports hypothesis 4B. Use of expert and legitimate power and adoption of a legal educator style also remain significant predictors of

satisfaction with the lawyer, which seems to support hypotheses 2B and 3B respectively. This means that these effects are direct and are not being mediated through the procedural justice rating. Referent power becomes insignificant indicating that the effect of referent power is mediated through the procedural justice rating. By far, the strongest predictor of satisfaction with the attorney (three-item measures) is the procedural justice rating of lawyers. Case type becomes a significant predictor indicating that people in deeds, wills, and inheritances are less satisfied with their attorney than people in the reference category of "Others" (personal injury, traffic, crime); this is not consistent with hypothesis 5B. The addition of the procedural justice rating increases the explanatory power of the model to 60%.

The results using the recommend or use again measure of satisfaction with the attorney, displayed in model 1 of Table 5, reveal that case outcome, lawyer's interactional style and power base are significant predictors of satisfaction with the lawyer. As expected, a favorable outcome for the respondent results in greater satisfaction with the attorney. Adoption of a court official style and use of expert, legitimate, or coercive power all lead to less satisfaction with the attorney, whereas adoption of a social worker style leads to greater satisfaction with the

attorney. Again, the negative effect of use of expert power was not expected. This group of variables explains about 33% of the variation in satisfaction with the attorney. When the procedural justice rating is entered into the equation (model 2), those variables become insignificant, indicating that their effects are mediated through procedural justice. The amount of variation explained increases to 68% with the addition of the procedural justice rating.

The two different measures of satisfaction with the lawyer provide mixed results for assessing overall support for hypotheses 2B and 3B, which predicted that the client's perception of the social power base used by the lawyer and the interactional style adopted by the lawyer would have a direct effect on evaluations of lawyers and the legal system and an indirect effect through procedural justice ratings. Models 1 and 2 in Table 4 indicate that the effect of a legal educator style is mostly direct, as well as use of expert and legitimate power. The effect of use of referent power appears to be indirect through perceptions of fairness. Models 1 and 2 in Table 5 indicate that the interactional style and social power base as well as the case outcome are all mediated through perceptions of fairness.

Satisfaction with Courts. Results of the analysis of satisfaction with the courts are shown in Table 6. The impact of client demographic variables, case type and outcome, and the client's perception of the lawyer's interactional style and power base are shown in model 1. Gender and age are significant predictors of satisfaction with the courts. This means that women are more satisfied with the courts than men, and younger people are more satisfied with the courts than older people. Perceived legitimate power is a significant negative predictor of satisfaction with the courts. Twenty-six per cent of the variation in satisfaction with the courts is explained by those variables. When satisfaction with lawyer and the procedural justice rating of the lawyer are added to the model, an additional 8% is explained. The three-item measure of satisfaction with the attorney is the strongest predictor of satisfaction with the courts. The effects of age and use of legitimate power become insignificant. Gender remains significant, which indicates that women are more satisfied with the courts than men, and this effect is direct. This finding partially supports hypothesis 4B and an attribution perspective.

As a further assessment of validity of the procedural justice and social power measures, factor analyses were performed on the six items measuring procedural justice, and

the nine items measuring the social power bases. Principal components extraction was used with varimax rotation. One factor emerged from the procedural justice items with eigenvalue of 4.03279, and this factor accounted for 57.6% of the variance. Three factors with eigenvalues of 2.31, 1.66, and 1.01 emerged from the social power items (Table 7A). These three factors accounted for 55.3% of the variance. Five items had loadings higher than .5 on the first factor, three on the second factor, and only one on the third factor (Table 7A).

The first factor is defined by items 1 and 2 representing expert power, items 3 and 4 representing legitimate power, and item 8 representing coercive power. The second factor is defined by items 5 and 6 representing referent power, and item 7 representing reward power. The single item representing coercive power was the only item that loaded highly on the third factor.

These results are similar to those found by Hillary and Johnson (1989) who found three dimensions underlying the power bases. They labelled these dimensions task orientation (composed of four legitimate power items and one expert power item), distancing orientation (four coercive power items, one legitimate power item, and one expert power item), and client orientation (two referent power items, two reward power items, and one legitimate power item). In the

current study, the results of the factor analysis together with the low Cronbach's alpha (see p. 48 in Chapter 3), caused some concern about the reliability of the social power indices. In considering the different conceptualizations of the lawyer's interactional style discussed in the review (e.g., the occupational styles of legal educator, court official, and social worker/counselor, social power bases, and participatory or client-centered vs. traditional or attorney-directed) and the intercorrelations of the occupational styles and social power bases (Table 2), I wondered if these conceptualizations could be simplified. To determine this, a factor analysis was performed on the twelve items representing the five social power bases and three occupational styles plus two additional social power items available from the survey data. The two additional items included are "How often did your [last] lawyer... (10) tell you to check out his/her advice with friends or another lawyer [representing coercive power] and (11) reassure you that what you want is worthwhile and the right thing to do [representing referent power]?"

The results of this factor analysis are shown in Table 7B. Three factors with eigenvalues greater than one emerged from the analysis. When these three factors were analyzed separately (Table 7C), only one factor emerged from each set. Factor I is defined by items 5, 6, and 11 representing

referent power, item 7 representing reward power, item 12 representing a legal educator style, and item 13 representing a social worker/counselor style. Factor II is defined by items 1 and 2 representing expert power, items 3 and 4 representing legitimate power, item 8 representing coercive power, and item 14 representing a court official style. Factor III is defined by items 9 and 10, both representing coercive power. The items defining Factor I seemed to coincide more with a participatory or client-centered approach, whereas those defining Factor II with a traditional or attorney-directed approach. The items defining Factor III are less clear, perhaps an authoritarian style. Cronbach's alpha for the participatory measure (.778) and the traditional style measure (.69) lend some assurance for this approach; Cronbach's alpha (.25) for the authoritarian measure is weaker.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS USING REVISED MEASURES

The multiple regression analyses of the exogenous variables, using the more parsimonious measures of the lawyer's interactional style, with procedural justice, satisfaction with attorney, and satisfaction with the courts were repeated. The results are shown in Tables 8 - 11.

Procedural Justice. The result of the regression analysis for procedural justice shown in Table 8 is similar to those in Table 3 in that gender, case type, and the lawyer's interactional orientation are all significant predictors of procedural justice ratings of the lawyer. Age and case outcome, significant at the bivariate level, are not significant when controlling for all other variables while gender becomes significant and case type increases in significance. The amount of variation explained by the simpler model increases from approximately 41% (Table 3) to 45% (Table 8).

Satisfaction with Attorneys. Tables 9 and 10 also show similar results to those shown in Tables 4 and 5. Using the 3-item measure of overall satisfaction with the attorney (Table 9), income is significant and remains significant, and case type becomes significant when the procedural justice measure is added. The two interactional styles of lawyers are also significant. With the recommend/use again measure of satisfaction with the attorney (Table 10), the outcome is significant as are the two interactional styles. Once again, procedural justice is the stronger significant predictor when added to the model. The lawyer's interactional orientation also remains significant in that the traditional orientation is a significant and negative

predictor of satisfaction with the attorney.

Satisfaction with Courts. The results of the simpler model shown in model 2 of Table 11 are similar to those in 6, that is when social structural characteristics of the client, case type and outcome, procedural justice ratings of lawyers and satisfaction with lawyers are considered together, overall satisfaction with the lawyer is the stronger predictor of satisfaction with the courts along with gender becoming a stronger and more significant predictor.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS SEPARATELY FOR MEN AND WOMEN

The changes in significance and signs of the various structural variables prompted a decision to repeat the regression analyses of the four endogenous variables separately for males and females. The results, shown in Tables 12 - 15, are discussed below.

Procedural Justice. The results in Table 12 indicate that the demographic characteristics of age, education, and income have an opposite effect for men and women when controlling for case characteristics and lawyer's interactional style. Although they are not significant, the procedural justice rating of lawyers becomes lower as age, education, and income increase for women while for men, it

becomes higher as age, education, and income increase. Case type (women in divorce cases) is a significant predictor for women, but is not for men. For men, the impact of all of the variables together account for 35% of the variation in procedural justice ratings of lawyers, whereas the impact accounts for 49% for women.

Satisfaction with Attorneys. The impact of the demographic, case type and outcome and lawyer interactional style variables on satisfaction with the attorney (3-item measure) separately for men and women are shown in model 1 in Table 13A and B; these variables account for 37% of the variation in satisfaction with the attorney for men and 47% for women. Age is a negative predictor for both men and women, while education is positive for men and negative for women. Neither age or education are significant. Income is positive for both men and women. When the procedural justice evaluation is added, income becomes a significant predictor for women. The amount of variation explained increases to 56% for men and 58% for women.

Model 1 in Tables 14A and 14B show the impact of the demographic, case type and outcome, and lawyer interactional variables on the recommend or use again measure of satisfaction with the attorney. For men, the outcome is significant in that a favorable outcome or a mixed outcome

might lead to recommending or using the attorney again more than an outcome in favor of the opposition or a pending outcome. These variables account for 28% of the variation in the recommend/use again measure of satisfaction with the attorney. For women, the interactional style of the lawyer is the only significant predictor of recommending or using the attorney again and the direction of the style is the same as for men. For women, these variables account for 35% of the variation in recommending or using the attorney again.

With the addition of the procedural justice measure (model 2), the case type becomes significant, indicating that men in divorce cases are less likely to use that attorney again or recommend that attorney than those in other types of cases. Lawyer interactional style also remains significant for men in that a traditional style of interaction is a negative predictor of using the attorney again or giving a recommendation; procedural justice is the strongest predictor of the use again or recommend measure of satisfaction for men and is the only significant predictor for women. With the addition of the procedural justice evaluation, the amount of variation accounted for increases to 79% for men and to 60% for women.

Satisfaction with Courts. The results shown in model 1 of Tables 15A and 15B indicate that the lawyer's interactional style is a significant predictor; both traditional and participatory styles are significant for men, while only a participatory style is significant for women. The impact of these variables for men accounts for 29% of the variation in satisfaction with the court and 19% for women. When the procedural justice and lawyer assessment measures are added, a traditional style remains a significant negative predictor for men, while only the three-item measure of satisfaction with the attorney remains significant for women. The amount of variation explained with the addition of the procedural justice evaluation increases to 34% for men and to 32% for women.

SUMMARY OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

In summary of the initial multiple regression analyses, the results indicate that an attorney's interactional style and social power base as perceived by the client are important predictors of an assessment of fair treatment by the client, and ultimately satisfaction with the attorney and the courts. These variables are important predictors over and above the type of case, the outcome of the case, or the demographic characteristics of the client. Perception of an adoption of a legal educator or a social

worker/counselor style by a lawyer and use of referent power leads to a higher procedural justice rating of the lawyer and to satisfaction with the lawyer. Perception of the adoption of a court official style and use of expert, legitimate, or coercive power leads to a lower procedural justice rating of the lawyer and satisfaction with the lawyer. Finally, overall satisfaction with the attorney is a very important predictor of satisfaction with the courts among the variables considered with gender also being a significant predictor.

Changing the lawyer's interactional style and social power base to a more parsimonious conceptualization of a participatory and traditional orientation, with the additional orientation labelled authoritarian yields essentially the same results. The participatory or client-centered approach is defined by elements of referent and reward power as well as with a legal educator and social worker/counselor role. The traditional or attorney-directed approach is defined by elements of expert, legitimate, and coercive power and a court official role. The third style, defined by coercive power, is not significant in any of the analyses.

And finally, repeating the multiple regression analyses separately for men and women reveals a few differences. For procedural justice ratings of attorneys, the lawyer's

interactional style is the significant predictor for men and for women in that a participatory style is the strongest predictor and is positive; a traditional style is the next strongest predictor, and it is negative. Case type is a significant predictor for women in that women in divorce cases rate lawyers higher on procedural justice than women in the other case types. Men and women differ in the demographic characteristics of age, education and income in that, when controlling for case type, outcome, and lawyer's interactional style, the signs are all positive for men and negative for women, indicating that older men, with more education and higher incomes rate their attorneys higher on the procedural justice measure, whereas younger women with less education and lower incomes rate attorneys higher.

Using the three-item measure of satisfaction with the attorney, for both men and women age is a negative predictor and income a positive predictor, whereas education is positive for men and negative for women. For both women and men, the procedural justice evaluation is the strongest significant predictor, with the lawyer's interactional style also being significant.

With the recommend/use again measure of satisfaction with the attorney, age and income are positive predictors for women and men, but education is positive for women and negative for men. None of these are significant however.

For both men and women, procedural justice is the strongest predictor of satisfaction with the attorney using the two-item measure. In addition, men in divorce cases are less satisfied with attorneys than men in deeds cases and "other" cases. Apparently, men in particular also do not like a traditional style of lawyer interaction.

In looking at satisfaction with the courts separately for men and women, a traditional style of interaction by lawyers is the significant predictor of satisfaction with the courts for men, and it is negative. For women, satisfaction with the attorney is the significant predictor of satisfaction with the courts, and it is positive.

PATH ANALYSIS OF SATISFACTION WITH LAWYERS AND COURTS

The path model suggested by the findings of the multiple regressions is presented in Figure 2, p. 75. It consists of the significant path coefficients for predicting procedural justice, satisfaction with attorneys, and satisfaction with courts. As an extension to the multiple regression analyses presented above, the standardized regression coefficients were used for a path analysis of the direct and indirect effects of predetermined (exogenous) variables on satisfaction with lawyers and the courts (legal system). Respondents' demographic characteristics and case




Figure 2. Significant Path Coefficients for Predicting Procedural Justice Ratings and Satisfaction Ratings

characteristics were considered predetermined, as well as lawyers' interactional styles.

The total effects of the exogenous and intervening variables on satisfaction with attorneys and courts are calculated by adding the direct effect to the indirect effects, which are derived by first multiplying the coefficients for each path and then adding the indirect effects. The path coefficients presented in Table 16A are the standardized regression coefficients taken from Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11. The path coefficients presented in Tables 16B and C are the standardized regression coefficients taken from Tables 12, 13A and B, 14A and B, and 15A and B.

The results of the path analysis of satisfaction with lawyers and courts for the sample overall is shown in Table 16A. Looking first at **satisfaction with attorneys**, the total effects indicate that procedural justice (.503) and the interactional styles of participatory (.467) and traditional (-.349) have the greatest overall impact. The direct effect (.248) of a participatory style is somewhat greater than its indirect effect (.219), whereas the indirect effect (-.206) of a traditional style through procedural justice is greater than its direct effect (-.143). This means that the primary effect of a participatory style is not being mediated through procedural

justice, whereas the effect of a traditional style is mediated through procedural justice. Smaller effects come from case outcome (MyFavor=.126) and income (.103). The direct effect (.083) of income is greater than its indirect effect (.020).

Looking next at the recommend or use again measure of satisfaction with attorneys, the total effects indicate that procedural justice (.783), interactional styles (traditional = -.410 and participatory = .345), and case outcome (MyFavor = .216 and Mixed = .112) have the greatest impact. The case outcome is more direct than indirect, whereas the interactional styles are largely indirect.

For satisfaction with courts, the measures of satisfaction with the attorney (.403), procedural justice rating (.246), participatory (.260) and traditional (-.206) interactional styles have the greatest impact. The direct effect of procedural justice (.125) is only slightly larger than its indirect effect (.121) through the two satisfaction with attorneys measures. The effect of the interactional styles is largely indirect. Case outcome (Opposition = -.268) also has a comparatively large total effect, and its effect is primarily direct. Smaller effects come from gender (.152) and age (-.105), and these effects are mostly direct. The recommend or use again measure also has a smaller total effect (-.104).

The results of the path analyses separately for men and women are shown in Tables 16B and C. For men, the procedural justice rating (.534), a participatory interactional style (.440), and a traditional interactional style (-0.331) have the greatest impact on **satisfaction with attorneys** (Table 16B). The effect of a participatory style is more direct than indirect, whereas the opposite is true for a traditional interactional style. Case outcome (MyFavor=.201) also has a large effect, which is more indirect than direct. A smaller total effect comes from education (.108), and its direct effect (.064) is slightly larger than its indirect effect (.044).

Results for the **recommend or use again** measure for men indicate that procedural justice (.851), a traditional style (-.454), case outcome (MyFavor = .374, Mixed = .279, and Opposition = .141), and a participatory style (.234) have the greatest impact. The effects of case outcome and interactional styles are largely indirect through procedural justice.

For **satisfaction with courts for men**, a traditional interactional style (-.385) has the greatest effect on men's evaluations of the courts, and its direct effect (-.262) is about twice as great as its indirect effect (-.123). This is followed by case outcome (Opposition = -.364 and Mixed = -.347), and its effect is largely direct. The effects of

procedural justice (.298), mostly direct, and a participatory interactional style (.303), mostly indirect, are also relatively high in total magnitude. And finally for men, the demographic characteristics of income (-.132) and education (.110) have a smaller effect on satisfaction with courts than do case outcome and interactional style of the lawyer. The direct effect of education (.076) is more than twice as large as the indirect effect (.034). A much wider difference in direct (-.150) and indirect effects (.018) is found for the impact of income on satisfaction with the courts.

For women, the procedural justice rating of the attorney (.469) as well as a participatory interactional style (.467) have the greatest impact on satisfaction with attorneys. The direct effect (.249) of a participatory style on satisfaction with the attorney is slightly larger than its indirect effect (.218). A traditional interactional style (-.334) has a large negative effect on satisfaction with attorneys, and its indirect effect (-.196) through procedural justice is slightly greater than its direct effect (-.138). In addition, women's income (.110) has a smaller positive effect, and the impact of higher income on satisfaction with attorney is largely direct and not mediated by procedural justice ratings. An authoritarian style also has a smaller total effect (-.107),

more direct (-.099) than indirect (-.008) indicating that women who perceive an authoritarian interactional style by their lawyer are less satisfied with their attorneys, regardless of the procedural justice rating.

The results for the **recommend or use again measure for women** indicate that procedural justice (.728), a traditional interactional style (-.467), and a participatory style (.336) have the greatest impact. A smaller effect comes from case outcome (Mixed = -.143, Opposition = -.127, and MyFavor = -.120).

In looking at **women's satisfaction with courts**, satisfaction with the attorney (.544), procedural justice (.263), and a participatory interactional style (.265) have the greatest impact. The indirect effect of the procedural justice rating (.142) through its impact on the satisfaction with attorney measures is larger than its direct effect (.121), which indicates that it is being mediated through satisfaction with the attorneys. The indirect effect of a participatory interactional style by the attorney (.258) through the evaluation of attorney measures is also much greater than its direct effect (.007). Smaller total effects come from case outcome (Opposition = -0.259 and Mixed = -.198), and respondent's age (-.147) and income (.101). The effect of case outcome is largely direct. For women, the direct effect of age (-.095) is greater than its

indirect effect (-.052), whereas the indirect effect of income (.055) is slightly larger than its direct effect (.046).

In summary, the path analyses indicate the importance of procedural justice ratings and lawyers' interactional styles on satisfaction with attorneys and with courts. A favorable case outcome has a positive effect on **satisfaction with attorneys**, as does higher income. Based on the multiple regression analysis alone, outcome did not appear to be important, whereas case type did. The results are similar in looking at **satisfaction with courts** in that satisfaction with the attorney, procedural justice rating, and lawyers' interactional styles have the greatest impact. Case outcome is also important in assessing satisfaction with courts, as is gender.

Based on the separate path analyses for men and women, several observations can be made in summary of the evaluations of attorneys and courts. In summary of **satisfaction with attorneys**, the procedural justice rating is the most important variable for both men and women, followed by the interactional style of the lawyer. Generally, a participatory style has a direct effect while a traditional style has an indirect effect. For women, an authoritarian style has a negative direct effect. The effect of education and case outcome appear to have more of

an effect for men in assessing satisfaction with attorneys than for women. For women, income has a direct effect on satisfaction with attorneys.

When considering **recommending or using the attorney again**, the procedural justice rating, interactional style, and case outcome have the greatest total effects. The effects of procedural justice and interactional style are largely indirect for both men and women. The effect of case outcome is more indirect for men and more direct for women.

In evaluating **satisfaction with courts**, men and women differ more. For men, a traditional interactional style by the lawyer, case outcome, procedural justice rating, income, and education have largely direct effects on assessing satisfaction with courts and apparently are not mediated through satisfaction with the attorney. Only a participatory interactional style by the lawyer appears to be mediated through satisfaction with the attorney. For women, however, the effects of the procedural justice rating of the lawyer, participatory and traditional interactional styles, and income appear to be mediated through satisfaction with the attorney. Only case outcome and age have direct effects on women's assessment of courts.

SURVEY COMMENTS

For this analysis, the responses to the open-ended question were interpreted as substantive or nonsubstantive. The substantive comments were then interpreted as positive or neutral, and negative. A one-way analysis of variance was performed to analyze some differences in the four categories: 1=No comment, 2=Nonsubstantive, 3=Positive or neutral comment, and 4=Negative comment. These results are displayed in Tables 17A-F. The Tukey b comparison was used to determine which of the four groups differ. This type of comparison maintains a constant .05 probability of erroneously rejecting a null hypothesis.

The results in Table 17A indicate that the mean of the procedural justice rating of respondents who made negative comments (Group 4, 4.16) differs significantly from those who made no comments (Group 1, 5.01), nonsubstantive comments (Group 2, 5.21), and positive or neutral comments (Group 3, 5.63). This is true also for both measures of satisfaction with the attorney (Tables 17B and C). In addition, the results in Table 17B indicate that those who made no comments are also significantly different in that they are less satisfied with attorneys than those who made positive comments. The information presented in Table 17D indicates that only the no comment and negative comment groups are significantly different from each other in

satisfaction with the courts. The negative comment group has the lower mean satisfaction with courts (1.72) than the no comment group (1.98).

The group who made positive or neutral comments is significantly different from the other three groups in income (Table 17E), and this group has the highest mean income of the four groups. For education (Table 17F), only the no comment group is significantly different from the negative (4.97) and positive or neutral (5.24) comment group, and the no comment group has the lowest level of education (4.46).

Table 18 presents a crosstabulation of the comment groups by gender. Approximately 41% of the men in the sample made no comment at the end of the survey compared to approximately 50% of the women. About 15% of the men made what was called a nonsubstantive, or noninterpretable comment compared to about 21% of the women. Looking at positive or neutral comments, about 13% of the men made this type of comment compared to about 11% of the women. And then, about 32% of the men made a negative comment compared to 19% of the women. Chi-square for this crosstabulation is 17.291 ($p < .001$). Crosstabulations of case type and outcome with comment groups yielded no significant differences.

In summary, respondents who made negative comments about lawyers or the legal system also rated lawyers lower

on procedural justice evaluations and satisfaction with attorneys and courts. Respondents who made positive comments have the highest income mean than the other three groups, and this difference is significant. This group also has the highest average education, but is significantly different only from the negative comment group which has the next highest mean in education. And finally, 59% of the negative comments and 51% of the positive or neutral comments came from men.

Qualitative Analysis of Comments

As already stated, respondents made many more negative than positive comments. Negative comments centered around time and money, ethics, the necessity of lawyers, and work style of attorneys. Litigiousness, laws, politics, racism and social class also emerged as issues.

The topic which elicited the most comments is money, whether addressed as legal fees, "time is money," "money talks," or awards. A few typical comments about fees:

"Lawyers charge too much and do not always do a good job when they bill for services as they go along."

"Legal fees are way too high, therefore, the public defender office is a necessity for middle class, poor people."

"Contingency fees too expensive."

"The fees are outrageous."

"Lawyers are expensive. Would only hire after trying to settle myself."

Time and time as money also emerged as the subject of many comments. Several comments which capture time as money are:

"Lawyers and the court system take too long to settle cases and the delay means more money for the lawyers."

"Some tend to drag their heels on their cases to make more money."

"When you have to hire a lawyer, you lose because of the time and money, even if you win the case...."

"Now have an attorney who is above the rest. Other attorneys dealt with are 'rip off artists.' Prolong cases so they can collect more fees."

"Overcrowded courts. Legal system too expensive to afford."

"It's a shame that lawyers waste so much time and charge you for every minute that they goof off. I had to fire my first lawyer because he was charging \$250/hr for everything and each minute was worth about \$15."

And some advice:

"Ask a lot of questions of the attorney, get the legal fee amount up front, and find out length of time case will take."

Several comments that started out in a positive manner turned negative when talking about time and money:

"Thinks it is a fantastic system but you get bogged down in courts and monies involved are astronomical."

"There is not a better system in the world. If you have money, the court favors you more. You have a better chance."

Money as power was also evident in comments such as the

previous one and the following ones:

"I think that all lawyers charge too much, and if you don't have money to a hire good lawyer then you might not win your case, so get the best you can afford."

"There is a wide spectrum of lawyers, from good to bad. If a person has money, they can hire the best."

"It seems to be that the more a lawyer charges or is worth, the more cases he wins. So if you want to win, you hire the best lawyer you can afford."

"If you have to hire a lawyer, hire the best one you can afford. Money talks and B.S. walks. If you can't afford a lawyer, you are in trouble."

"If you are rich you can get better justice."

Money as awards also emerged as a topic as evidenced in these comments:

"Settlements are out of hand and should be curbed."

"Should be a cap on personal injury claims..."

"There needs to be legal reform on malpractice and a cap on jury awards, and a cap on the percentage of amounts that lawyers can get."

Many voiced a call for reform of the legal system along with concern for higher ethics:

"Exasperating, frustrating, not concerned with the truth. The system needs to be reformed."

"Revamp the legal system. Higher ethics are needed."

"Courts need to be overhauled. Fox in the hen house."

"The jury system needs revamping."

"The legal system should be made easier to understand for the layman."

The ethics of attorneys are called into question in some of this sampling of the thirty comments on that subject:

"Lawyers tell you they can win your case, charge a lot of money and are not sure if they can win or not, but they have your money."

"It is tough to find an honest lawyer and they all charge too much."

"As long as you keep a lawyer's palms greased, you stand a chance of winning."

"I find that lawyers are more concerned with the number of clients they can handle than the individual client, and they don't follow through an individual case."

"Most of the time the lawyers are more interested in the money that they are going to get than the outcome of the case. They win and get paid regardless of how the case comes out for us."

"I work for a legal firm and they are a good group of people. However, there are some lawyers that don't do right by their clients."

"Greedy bastards."

"Wish they could be a little more honest."

"They charge too much, generally not trustworthy. Would use if needed."

This last comment touches on another topic which emerged, that of the necessity of lawyers, or at least the perception of the necessity of lawyers. The following additional comments bring out the importance of that concept to many:

"The way society is today, the average lay person is at the mercy of lawyers. You have no choice but to hire a lawyer..."

"Not sure I'd get a fair deal, but lawyers are necessary."

"Lawyers are a necessary evil. Costs over 100K so far. Three years involved in a case."

"They are over priced. Judges don't want to talk to people, only the lawyers."

"Had a situation once when car was stolen. Lawyers, sheriff, and judge were all in cahoots. Later sheriff was impeached. Unfortunately, lawyers are necessary in the system we live in."

"Almost every situation today requires the services of a lawyer and his fees. A lot of these requirements should be done away with."

Another group of comments specifically relating to attorneys had to do with the attorney's work ethic or style and manner such as in the following comments:

"They don't answer phone calls and slow in getting the work done."

"There are too many of them who are not prepared in court."

"The legal system should dictate better communication between lawyer and client."

"Lawyers should prepare their clients for courtroom procedures and not have them go in cold."

"Lawyers seem unconcerned about a client. They should be more understanding and compassionate."

"The larger law firms are not as feeling for the client as the smaller ones. With lawyers, you get what you pay for."

A few comments touched on attorney discipline:

"Lawyers are rarely sued for malpractice which should not be the case."

"ABA needs to make rules for its members and then monitor those who do not follow the rules, and make a list of them or publish their names so other people are not stuck with them doing the same things to other people while still being paid."

"Lawyers should be socialized and not have a free rein. They should not be allowed to lobby for their own rules."

And then, finally, comments were made about litigiousness and therefore the numbers of attorneys; racism, social class, and politics were mentioned as topics of concern. Several quotes on litigiousness and attorney numbers:

"Too many people hire lawyers for trivial matters."

"A lot of things could be settled without using lawyers to sue."

"Too many lawsuits. Too many appeals."

"Too many frivolous lawsuits just to make money."

"People now are too eager to sue and it bogs down the system for important issues."

Some comments on racism, social class, and politics:

"System favors whites over blacks who usually do not have means to hire a lawyer."

"Racism is growing in the legal system. I think it's awful."

"Legal system is set up to help upper class people. This is a white man's world. Minority feel powerless."

"The law applies to the poor and helpless. The rich can get away with anything."

"The legal system is now only for the people who can afford the lawyers' high hourly fees..."

"Lawyers seem to be the rich and famous, but they also seem to be the ones who break the laws and say they didn't know they were doing it, like the ones in government."

"...All judges were lawyers first, and they make the law, interpret the laws, and rule on the laws that they make. They get paid for each segment time and time again...."

"I think it is too bad that only lawyers are elected to make the laws that they then practice on and charge the public and the taxpayers for their practice time."

A few examples of some of the positive or neutral comments follow:

"Although I know there are some bad ones out there, there are some good ones also. I think we do better when we don't have to use them, however."

"Had good experience. There are good and bad in all professions."

"The time I've used lawyers have been for the right reasons and my lawyers have facilitated my needs."

"I've had one bum experience twenty years ago, but since then everything's been pretty favorable."

"There are both good and bad lawyers in the system. You have to know which one to pick. My lawyer is a friend so I know he will take care of me, but I can't say how he will treat someone else."

In summary, the bulk of the comments were negative comments and centered generally on topics that have

previously been connected with the negative image of the legal system, specifically the time and money involved, the ethics of attorneys, and attorneys' manner and style of work. In addition, there seems to be the perception that the public is helpless against a social system that necessitates the use of lawyers.

FOCUS GROUPS

The focus groups were initially used to inform the construction of the survey questionnaire. During the transcribing of the material, the richness of the interactions emerged as an important source of information separate from the information provided from the survey respondents.

The three focus groups consisted of a mixed sex group (Andy, Ginny, and Julie), a male group (Robert, John, and Fred), and a female group (Ann and Jean). Of the four male and four female focus group participants, three of the women (Ginny, Jean, and Julie) and one man (Robert) changed attorneys either during the divorce process or immediately following a major phase of the legal process. One man (Andy) switched to a different process for his second divorce. The reasons given for the change in attorneys were the lack of substantive work done on the case by the

attorney and the attorney's manner of relating to the client.

Ginny: I had two lawyers during my divorce, the first of whom did absolutely nothing. I saw him two or three times and he didn't file the first paper. [Laugh]. So I fired him and when I hired my second attorney, he was referred to me uh by someone who said to me, "This man will do the job. He won't hit on you. He's very no nonsense, and he's just going to take care of the situation." ...But he too was one who said, "Well, this should be very simple. We should have it done in a matter of weeks," and it dragged on for nine or ten months after that, and it, we'd been separated for quite some time at that point. Uh, but by and large, I guess because of my experience with the first one who was rude and kept me waiting all the time and didn't do anything, I think that I was so grateful that there was someone who was willing to do SOMETHING [laugh] to get things moving and to take care of some problems that existed that I was willing to accept what he did and I, I don't feel that he really was my champion, but I do think that he did what he needed to do to get the job done. ...I really did not feel condescended to by the second person I used, but I certainly did by the first, and I'm not sure whether it was because I was a woman or because there, it wasn't worth anything to him.

Of her two attorneys, Julie had the following to say:

Julie: He was rude and condescending. He said he wasn't going to take care of me and maybe I didn't need it. He did sloppy work and turned it over to my husband's lawyer to come back and uh. [Pause]. Dragging his feet, and apparently they all do. Maybe he knew what he was doing. I couldn't judge that. ...I switched lawyers the day my divorce papers came in the mail. I called my new lawyer and said, "O.K., it's done and now I want you to do my will and take care of me legally."

Jean had a particularly stressful situation that prompted her to change attorneys:

Jean: Well, I had two attorneys...I fired the first lawyer...a week would pass without a return phone call and I just got the feeling that I was not an important, my case was not important. All the agony that I was going through was like not even penetrating his consciousness. That was really, there were several reasons, but that was the bottom line reason for why I

fired him was that he just plain didn't return my calls. And I told him that and he just kept doing this. ...I think the bottom line reason I really was unhappy with the first attorney was just that he was incredibly cold. I mean, I didn't want someone to hold my hand. I have friends to do that. But I wanted somebody to understand a little bit of what I was going through. He was just like a computer, and he became very angry at me, uh, you know the morning after Ed beat me up and my ribs got broken and all that stuff. Instead of being compassionate with what I'd been through, he scolded me for having signed the separation agreement that night. ...I can still remember I was standing there in the kitchen with tears streaming down my face and a bandage on my rib cage because I had just been beaten up and he scolded me on the telephone. You know... ...I felt like I was definitely in a subservient role. He never asked me what my professional interests were. I never felt like he was, you know, took me seriously as a person. I really felt like he just saw me in that niche as the spouse of a _____, and that was all he needed to know. I really didn't feel that he was respectful. And I think not returning phone calls is a way of showing disrespect really. It's just like the person who is habitually late. ...But I mean I think those are all very subtle signs of things...

Robert, too, switched attorneys but only after the first major phase of his divorce:

Robert: I've had two lawyers now. ...Yeah, I switched in, it's not really in midstream, but after thinking about it, it was impossible to switch once you're mired in this thing. I mean you invest a lot of time and a lot of money and they've got a file this thick [gesture] on you. And to try to, and you realize this guy's a dumb butt, who doesn't care, he doesn't do his homework and he comes into court unprepared because this is just a divorce case. This is not a personal injury case, or a, uh, trial case. ...And they don't really care. You know, they don't take them seriously. That was my biggest problem with my first lawyer and it probably cost me a lot of money, but there's nothing you can do. ...There were three big phases that went on went over a course of probably two to two and a half years...but once you get into that sort of thing, it's all...interrelated and tied together. You can't really fire that guy. Because I mean, for someone else to come in after the divorce was decided...but not, and

then try to pick up with the finances or the custody, I mean you'd pay somebody thousands of dollars just to review the garbage in the files and stuff. And then, could he make heads or tails out of it?

Andy's experience with his first divorce is revealed in the following exchange:

Moderator: Did you have a court hearing the first time?

Andy: Oh, yeah. Oh, YEAH.

Ginny: [Laugh]. Were there fireworks?

Andy: Uh, no, she got the sleaziest one in town, and I got the second sleaziest one in town. They're different sleazes. They change every five years. They have new sleazes.

Ginny: A new crop. [Laughter].

Andy: Yeah, back then it was _____ and _____ so uh yeah, talk about sleazy.....Captain Sleaz. Uh, we don't want that whited out either. [Laughter]. ...So I was mad just sitting back watching these two guys slime. Man, do you ever bathe?

This experience did not prompt him to change attorneys for his second divorce, but he did switch to a different mode of getting a divorce:

Andy: ...There were no kids involved this time so that's why absolutely we both, we might not have agreed on a lot of things but we AGREED no lawyers, no sleazy old lawyers. And once the mediation thing was taken care of, and there was some hard negotiating, then a lawyer was involved and made it so, you know, just took care of the paper work.

The other three participants, Ann, Fred, and John were all relatively satisfied with their attorneys. Fred and John were friends, and John had recommended his attorney, who was also his best friend, to Fred. John was the most

satisfied of all the participants and freely acknowledged that it was probably because of his close relationship as a friend:

John: ...it was a devastating experience, but I will say that I was 100 percent aware of everything that was going on before it ever happened, and I'm assuming that it was because we were such good friends. We practiced hours. Uh, there wasn't a question that was ever asked that I didn't know it was coming. ...Well, I'll tell you, without the coaching uh that I received, I would have been absolutely blown out in court. I mean I really would have...

Fred, who had the same attorney as John, was satisfied overall, but had a few reservations about the quality of work:

Fred: I had, uh, a relatively good experience. It was not a contested divorce so I didn't have the court problems. The negative is I, in reading the documents, they were not as professional as I would have hoped. They uh, it seemed like they just typed it and sent it out as opposed to typing it and reviewing it and looking at it. But uh, the lawyer that I dealt with was very, uh, easy to get along with, uh, down to earth. Uh, he called it very straight, uh, he never pulled any punches. Uh, whenever I would ask a question, he would tell me the, uh, worst case as well as the best case scenarios with them...but uh, he needed, uh, clerical help because they lost my file once. [Laughter]. So I had to start over. But I had a very positive, uh, feeling in working with him.

What makes a good attorney came out in positive statements made by the participants about the good attorneys that they had or in things they didn't like that the attorney had done or not done. Characteristics of a "good attorney" also came out in negative statements about the bad attorneys that they had. Being informed of what was going

on or what would happen next is an important issue as well as being treated with respect as in this interchange between Ann and Jean:

Jean: ...But my second attorney was a personal friend and was at the other extreme, very compassionate...he didn't need to coddle me or give me counseling, but at least he had some appreciation for the agony I was going through.

Moderator: Did he, do you think he was helpful in trying to explain things to you?

Jean: Oh, yeah.

Moderator: He was?

Jean: Very much so.

Moderator: You felt like you knew what was going on then all the time?

Jean: No, I don't think that. I think with both of them, I had the feeling that there was some kind of mechanism out there somewhere that I was caught up in. No, I never felt like I was completely informed, but I thought the second one did a better job than the first one in giving me support and informed. But with both of them I had the feeling that I was caught up in a process that was kind of a dehumanizing process.

Ann: I felt informed, but I didn't feel like I was always understood. Does that make sense?

Jean: That's a very good way to put it. Yeah. Like they wouldn't go the extra mile to really make sure you were on board with every little detail. ...It goes without saying, just to be treated as an I-Thou, rather than an I-It.. Just for the record I'm not talking about hand holding and coddling 'cause I got that elsewhere. But just some degree of compassion and understanding that this was rough. ...I would have just rather have the feeling that I was respected and that I was a person, a real person instead of somebody's case, sort of like the doctor that makes you feel like a case instead of a person. That's how it made me feel. The second, the second attorney was not like that at all. He was definitely a real person.

In the mixed sex group, too, the lack of being informed and being confused came up as an issue as well as the attorney's manner as in this exchange:

Julie: I wasn't given any information. Uh, I read books and asked questions. I got virtually nothing from my attorney. What I understood I got from other places. I didn't understand the deposition. Uh. The words in that were so hurtful, but then everything was at that point. It would have been nice if he had explained that, but I got it in the mail...but it would have been nice, I don't know, somehow to prepare you for some of this. I got no preparation and no understanding, and no warning of anything. I found out about my divorce in the newspaper. He didn't even let me know that it was final. It was in the Neighbors section. One of the people at work threw the Neighbors section on the table and said, "Well, you're in the paper this morning." Again, no compassion, no thought about how I was going to feel. He was just doing his job. But absolutely no concern for me, that there was a human being involved.

Moderator: He pretty much thought of you as just a case?

Julie: Oh, absolutely. Jane. [Laugh]. Jane. He still calls me Jane. [Laugh]. And he still thinks he's my lawyer. [Laughter].

Andy: ...You see, it's like we accept the fact that they're just doing their job and they don't have to care. I don't know if I buy that. I was going to ask you 'cause your stories seem similar, the patronizing attitude. Is that, uh, I didn't, I don't get that attitude, but I wonder if it's a man-woman thing? Cause I don't take that kind of crap from anybody...

Andy: ...[To Julie]: You know that thing you said really, got me, about how upset you were when you read the deposition. You should have been warned, and then, of course, I realize I wasn't warned either.

Julie: There were awful words...

Andy: ...But they could have warned you, somebody could have warned you that, "Look, there are going to be some words here, they're legalese, and they're going to get nasty."

And then a little later, the confusion topic arose again in this excerpt:

Ginny: Uh, I really feel that the man who actually obtained my divorce for me did a really good job. Uh, I was like Julie, though, in that I didn't know, what are you supposed to do, I know we've gone on from this, but what exactly do you do in a situation like this, you know, what is it I should be asking for, what kinds of questions should I be asking, and I never got any, any of that kind of feedback, none of that kind of thinking, you know, nobody pressed me to those issues, and if there's anything I regret, it's probably that...

Andy: So in other words, it was almost as if you guys were asked, not you guys but, what do you want and you didn't have enough background to know what you wanted, or know what you would do.

Julie: He asked me what I wanted, and I said, "I don't know."

Ginny: That's what I said. I mean, I said, "What am I supposed to want? I don't know. What do I want?"

Julie: I can't, I'm not sure I can get up in the morning. How can I know what I'd want in twenty years?

The participants in the male focus group also expressed a concern for not being informed:

Robert: ...I found out I was divorced by reading the Neighbors section and seeing it in the newspaper.

John: You're kidding.

Robert: Three weeks after the divorce had been granted. I didn't get anything from my attorney.

John: Damn.

Robert: I just happened to be, and I never read that stuff.

Fred: Yeah, I wanna go back. That's the same problem I had. I kept, I called them and called them. "Have you taken care of it?" "Oh, we went down there." "You haven't gotten any word yet or anything?" I said, "I meant word from you. You should know what's going on."

As with the respondents in the telephone survey, money was also a topic of concern with the participants in the focus groups. There seemed to be a lot of confusion about this topic also. The men, especially, were vocal about this.

Robert: ...it's really very frustrating, you know. It's your life laying there on the line, your financial wellbeing, your children, up for grabs, and the guy doesn't care, doesn't do his homework. I found that very, very frustrating...But you don't know what it can be like. There is no incentive, there's no incentive, given the current system, for a lawyer to encourage you to settle out of court or to get together and mediate. There is no incentive. They make, my lawyer charges me \$175/hour and he charges me from the minute he gets into his, leaves his office, not gets into his car downtown, leaves his office, the clock starts running. I get charged while he drives up to the county courthouse in _____. The whole time he's there now the court is not in session. If we have to wait or if it's delayed an hour, I pay \$175/hour, and then when he gets back and puts his briefcase on his desk, then the clock stops. So I can pay, some days I can pay \$350 just for travel time and standing around staring out the window.

John: And while he's at the courthouse he did three other people's work, too.

Robert: He certainly might well have been working on other people's cases and then charged them for time, too.

Frank: ...That incentive comment is interesting, because my lawyer told me that he does not advise me not to contest it. He said, "It doesn't make me any money to have an uncontested one. We love the contested one because we just start hitting the time clock and add it up."

Robert also had a concern about his original fee, which prompted a suit against him in small claims court. He also had a concern about his exwife's fee.

Robert: Well, he told me up front that he wanted a

retainer of \$3500, which I thought was an exorbitant fee. And he said, "As we go along, I'll deduct from that what we use, and I'll take, and if it's not complicated," he said, "I'll accept that as my full fee." So we went through everything and got down to the bottom line, and he screwed me and didn't do his homework, and so forth and so on, and sends me a bill for \$2500....When my first attorney sent me that \$2500 bill, I said, "No way. I'm not paying this." So he took me to court....Much to their chagrin, this, oh, you're going to love this. You're going to love this story...Uh, I went to court and much to their chagrin, I showed up. You know, usually in debtor's court, or you know when they file a warrant for an unpaid bill, the lawyers show up and there's a clerk there, and there's a judge who's sitting there about half asleep. And they file, and they throw all their little things out. And they say, "Is somebody here?" And there's nobody there to contest it. So it's just granted, you know the judgement is granted, and they go and do their thing...So they said, "Is _____ here?" And I said, "Yeah, I'm here." And they all of them, the judge woke up, the other attorney, he had one of his little underlings down filing this thing, you know. And I said, "Yeah, I believe I owe that to him, and I'm here to contest it." And uh, so the judge had to disallow himself from the case because he knew the attorney involved. So they were going to bring in, they were going to bring in an outside judge from another county.

John: You're kidding. Over a \$2500 bill?

Robert: Yeah, now wait a minute. You haven't heard the best, you haven't heard the best part. This is probably one of the most classic parts of this whole thing. "Is," the guy said, "OK, well when is Judge _____ from _____ County supposed to be down hearing some cases?" "He's supposed to be here in about a month." "Well, we'll get Judge _____ to hear this case." And I said, "Your Honor, there's one small problem there. He's dating my exwife." And the guy goes, [Gesture]. And he was. [Much laughter]. So the outside judge they wanted to hear the case was dating my exwife so they couldn't do that.

And Robert's question about his exwife's fees:

Robert: Well the interesting thing is that my wife you know went through two lawyers during the first phase of the divorce. She's now on her third one. And her bill for the second lawyer was like \$17,000. I was astounded. Now whether or not, because they tried to

get me to pay that. And it ended up that the judge said, "No, each of you pay your own legal fees out of the monies that you've been given." So I didn't have to pay for that, and I always wondered and I was never sure, knowing that my total bill was \$6000 of which I only paid \$4750.

Moderator: You got a reduced rate if you went ahead and paid?

Robert: Was that a trumped up bill just to try to get me to have to pay for it, or was that what he really, honestly charged her and she literally wrote him a check for that. And to this day, I don't know. But I doubt that it was. I don't see how anybody could have run up over the same case. We were all there the same time.

Fred: I think the lawyers do that on purpose. And whether it's legit or not, they run it up on purpose knowing that they have a chance to have the other person pay for that. A very good chance.

Robert: That was exorbitant. I mean what I had to pay was incredible, but if he really charged her \$17,000, she really got taken to the cleaners.

This last comment brings up another topic related to money and that is the ethics of attorneys. As with the survey comments, this topic was discussed in relation to just about all aspects of the clients' relationship with their attorneys. As it relates to money, it came up in the exchange between Robert and John about the possibility that the attorney charges several clients for time during the same trip to the courthouse. It also came up in discussions of the perceptions that attorneys intentionally escalate conflict to inflate their fees as in the following exchange:

Julie: Mine had the reputation for uh, sleeping with most of his female clients...

Andy: With that common knowledge, why do people use him?
Why?

Julie: Because he was supposed to be, my husband had the other good divorce lawyer, and I thought I had to get someone to match _____. He had _____, and I had to have an equal.

Andy: Gotcha. So you got the sleeeeziest one you could get because, by damn, O.K., I feel better now. Especially divorce lawyers, because they're sucking out of the most unpleasant time of your life. That's where they make their bucks.

Julie: If he hadn't gone big time, I probably wouldn't have either.

Andy: And that shows that escalation. You know, it's like this, then this, then escalate to get that more high-powered lawyer, and then we'll bring in this bit of sleaze, and oh, we've got to bring in this bit of sleaze to counter that, and it just keeps going and going and going. Of course, in my job, I deal with lawyers who represent clients for _____ claims. And they just...

Ginny: Oh.

Julie: No conscience.

Andy: No. Lie, teach, coach people how to lie. It's obvious when you're sitting in a hearing. Where did this come from? I've never seen these people, swear an oath and start perspiring because they know they're lying. Good Lord!...

Andy further questioned the ethics of attorneys in what he perceived as questionable things that lawyers encourage clients to do:

Andy: I was recommended to do certain things, that even then felt uncomfortable that I did not do because, it just didn't feel right. Ways of playing with money, you know, ways of hiding things. It just didn't feel right. They might have been legal but they weren't right. ...I was recommended to do some sleazy things by my attorney, and it was designed specifically to minimize financial obligations, and I didn't do them, uh, because they were sleazy things.

Julie: Yeah, so the bottom line is the client maybe and not the lawyer.

Andy: Yeah, but he shouldn't have suggested it because if it's really one of those bitter things, bitter fights, where just give me anything. I just want to stab and be sleazy.

Julie: And do you think he saw this as his job to advise you how to?

Andy: And that I think gets to the meat of the matter. There's something innately wrong especially when children are involved with this kind of thing being so adversarial, because it's O.K. for the husband and wife to have this adversarial relationship, but it's NOT O.K. when you've got kids involved and it can't help but bleed over. The kids KNOW that Mommy and Daddy are doing these ugly, nasty things. Ohhhhh, I don't like lawyers very much...

Julie: I question some of the ugly, nasty things that go on too. I mean I don't consider an affair a nice thing.

Andy: I agree.

Julie: It's pretty scummy, too, and I guess that's what starts the process of being not very nice. And lawyers get in a not very nice.

Andy: Yeah, but they escalate that "not very nice" and drag it out, to keep those fees, you know, and stuff coming.

Julie: Sort of feed on the ugliness and.

Moderator: So you think that he suggested those not very nice things just to, to?

Andy: Escalate? Yeah.

Moderator: Escalate the fees or just, you think that was the ultimate?

Andy: Yeah now, I do. Then I did not. I didn't know what to, I was like, I didn't know what. What do you do now?...You know, after thinking about it a lot, it was just BAD. Just immoral stuff. What I consider wrong. Just not nice.

And in response to a question about his mediation experience:

Andy: ...It was HARD. It was NO FUN, and none of this is fun, uh, but we didn't have to talk to lawyers and they didn't keep escalating it. The purpose of the people across the table was to see where we could agree the whole time. ...You agree on a little thing and it's off the table. And eventually you agree, you find yourself agreeing and gosh you've solved all these things. It wasn't like with an attorney, well, escalate, escalate, escalate. Find areas of disagreement and magnify them.

Perhaps because of his bad experience with his first attorney, Robert was especially critical of the ethics of attorneys and made reference three times to the idea of a "courtroom work group," that is, that the attorneys and judge were all working together more for the benefit of the system than for the benefit of the client. He also tried unsuccessfully to find an attorney to sue his first attorney for malpractice.

Robert: Uh, I, I consulted a couple of lawyers later on about even trying to see if anybody would uh, pursue a med, a legal malpractice suit. And two people told me I had good grounds but nobody would take it. What they do is you get into court and then they have a little recess, and they all go back to the judge's chambers and have a bourbon, and yuk it up about how they're digging into some poor _____'s pocket, you know. And then come back out and fight again, at your expense. ...Uh, and it's a lot of blustery kind of stuff to make you think that they're doing something for you when really, they met back in the clubhouse and they've already, of course, decided what they're going to do. You know, in their little free meeting when they have bourbon with the judge. ...But you try to sue one of their own, and nobody will touch it. It was incredible. I tell you I called all over the state. ...I got some names and called people in _____ and _____. And nobody would touch it...Once I told them who it was, they all knew him. You know, "Well, I

just don't like to handle this kind of case, you know." And of course my buddy here in Roanoke, the guy who was handling the question over the \$2500 for me wouldn't take it. He refused to take it because of course he sees this guy every day and buddy, buddy, you know, in the judge's office with the bourbon, you know.

Fred: Kind of like a clubhouse.

Robert: Uh, a clubhouse affair.

Fred: I think that's one of the problems of the legal system because it is such a buddy, buddy system. And uh, uh, sometimes the deals are cut, and they don't have anything to do with the facts of the case...

Robert: But a lot of it's theatrics. You know they go back there and they have their little meeting before we walk into court. And they, they, you know laugh about it and shake everybody's hand and then they go out there, and put on these stern faces and they yell and shout at each other. And it's, you know, they're sitting there, you know, just probably laughing inside.

Fred: Uh, huh.

Robert: You know they are.

Fred: I couldn't be a lawyer. You have to leave your conscience at the door, and that's a difficult uh, uh thing to do.

Robert: Well, and you have to have some scruples. And those are far, those are in rare supply in that particular profession....

Another participant, Jean, also made reference to "a courtroom work group" in the following excerpt about the selection of an attorney in the future:

Jean: ...I would also want somebody who had a good rapport with the judges. I found out through my current spouse's divorce that one of the things that really worked in his favor was that the judge had a very good relationship with his attorney. And this attorney, who is now my attorney, is a very kind of hang loose, off the cuff guy. ...He's just a really kind of a good old boy, and that works around here. And that would have

been something I would never have known in those days when it happened. The good old boy system. That would never even have crossed my mind.

A final question that was probed in the focus groups concerned whether their experience had affected how they viewed the legal system and the likelihood of using the legal system to solve a conflict. With the exception of John whose attorney was his best friend, all the participants made comments and suggestions about what they would do differently. Andy responded first to repeat that he had already addressed that in that he had changed from an adversarial format involving two attorneys to a mediation format. His response was followed by a lengthy discussion of the advantages of the mediation process. Then Ginny and Julie responded in the following exchange:

Ginny: Certainly would feel more comfortable. Do you ever, I mean this is an authority figure. Do you ever get beyond the fact that, you know, it's an authority figure and you have to respect the fact that. I don't know, I mean.

Moderator: Do you see them as authority figures?

Ginny: I don't, I, no, not as, not like I did. No.

Moderator: Not any more?

Ginny: Not any more. No. Uh, part of that's a girl thing, you know growing up, and learning to uh to deal with those kinds of issues. I think Julie touched on it.

Moderator: Uh, do you have sort of an inventory for yourself, that if you had to use a lawyer, you would do thus, thus and thus? Or?

Julie: Trusting is a lot harder. That's a big issue, uh, in general. It would be really hard for me to trust.

I would have to, I would take a lot more time and try to think on my own a lot more, and have more input. I don't, trusting anybody is really hard, socially or professionally, uh, but maybe that's good, because I was too trusting. And I guess I'd have to, or I would certainly try to have a lot more input. I would GO to a lawyer, a lot more input, and think about what he was telling me. I used to, I adored my father and I just thought all lawyers were like Daddy and then I found out a lot about lawyers. ...and I know enough about lawyers now to know that I would have to look very carefully at the person and everything they said and be responsible myself for some independent work, uh, pay more responsibility.

Ginny: I think that's the key. I mean I think you have to take more, not expect them to take care of you as much. I think you have to be more aware, more concerned, think things through, uh, maybe.

Andy: Well, maybe not take care of you emotionally, but at least tell you your options without...

Ginny: I mean you have to be a smart consumer.

Moderator: Did you think that before this experience?

Ginny: No, no. ...I think something else uh that might be important that I would never have, I mean I, when I went into this initially, I took the word of someone who had used my first lawyer and thought he was wonderful and did the right thing. So I thought that was fine and so that's who I went to. Well, pfff, nothing. So then I did the same thing a second time and fortunately that was a better, better experience, but I do think that uh you know how sometimes, you interview your kid's pediatrician. I think there are times when I think it's the proper thing to do to interview a potential lawyer, and I, just to get a feel for how I mean, people don't always get along.

Julie: Personalities.

Ginny: People don't always get along. And see what the fit's like.

Julie: ...Well, I think, I think in the support groups we had, some things came out that were helpful to people. I think someone told me it never occurred to them that they could change lawyers, you know?

Ginny: [Laugh]. You know, I think you kind of feel like if you've hired somebody, you're locked in.

Moderator: Yeah, when you were talking about interviewing. I don't think I would have felt comfortable going from one.

Ginny: No, but I think I would feel more comfortable now.

Julie: I would now. I wouldn't have then. Except we're all really different people, but I would definitely look around. And find someone, I realize it's not their role to take care of us but I would want someone who at least made me feel a little bit comfortable and that would be part of, it may not be necessary for an attorney to do that, but I would find one who was, a little bit.

Ginny: Have some compassion, maybe just a little.
[Laugh].

And then a little later, Ginny mentioned again:

Ginny: I really think, I mean I'm going to go back to this because I really believe it's true. We have got to be better consumers. I mean, I think we're, as consumers as much at fault as they are because we've let them, we've allowed this to happen.

Julie: I think you're right.

Ginny: Uh, and I think part of that is lack of knowledge, fear, whatever. Having been through one particular situation, I think we'd be smarter the second time, certainly if we faced the same obstacles or even similar obstacles, again, we'd be smarter the third time. Uh, before I was divorced, I, I never had any cause to be in court.

Julie: Maybe it is, too, that maybe they used to be like my father. Maybe, you know, lawyers were, maybe, the books we read growing up, and the movies we saw, the lawyers were the dignified, respected men in town. We didn't know back when I was growing up that there were, there weren't any scummy lawyers back then, I don't think. If there were, we didn't know about them.

Ginny: Maybe you weren't aware of it.

Julie: Uh, but it is, maybe they had such respect, that they've come down and maybe we've been good consumers because we've watched them. They've taken advantage of the respect, the built-in respect.

Ginny: And it's like anything. I mean, there are good people and there are bad people everywhere, and we just have to be wary, I think.

A word of caution about attorneys also came from the men's group:

Robert: ...you've got to watch those court orders like a hawk 'cause they're sitting there scribbling while the judge is talking and you've got to take your own little set of notes 'cause I found with my first attorney again, he just drew something up, signed it, sent it in, the judge signs it, and man that thing is written in stone. And then they send you a copy and that's not what the judge said. [Laugh].

Fred: Could that be?

Robert: That's not in my notes. I finally had to tell my lawyer, my first lawyer, and I told my second lawyer right at the outset, you don't sign a thing for me, you don't enter a court order until I have reviewed it, checked it with my notes. And there have been at least two occasions now where our notes and the opposing attorney's notes have not agreed, and we've had to send it back to the judge and the judge has said, "Well, this is what I said." And both times, it was according to what I had written in my notes. And you know, you've got to be right on top of those guys. ...I think you have to be very defensive. I think you have to be very, question. ...I think you have to be very cautious. I think you have to be up-to-date on where you stand, what the rules are, what the laws are, you know, get a copy of the code.

And even though Fred was generally satisfied, he, too, would be more cautious in dealing with an attorney:

Fred: ...I would definitely think about everything before it happens, not just agree to, "Oh, yeah, we'll do it this way, we'll do." I would think about it. I would be a little more cautious.

Moderator: Question your lawyer in detail more?

Fred: Right. Right. And, uh, I guess not assume that because he has a law degree, he knows everything. You know, that unfortunately is an assumption that all of us make in many professions, uh, that just because they have something on the wall, they know everything. There are good lawyers and there are bad lawyers, and you find that in every profession. I think I had a good one, but uh at the same time, uh, you have to be cautious and be sure that he's doing what he's supposed to be doing. In my work, I've been very surprised at some of the things I get from lawyers that are just not what I thought they should be.

And finally, in the women's group, Ann and Jean also expressed changes that they would make even though Ann was satisfied with her attorney and Jean with her second one. In response to a probe about their experience possibly discouraging them from using the legal system in the future, the following comments were made:

Ann: Mmm, no, I don't think it discouraged me from using the legal system.

Jean: I would be less naive about it though. I mean I think I went into it just the way some people go to the doctor with this kind of assumption that the doctor will do anything that he possibly can to save them, which is a bunch of malarkey. But uh, no, I think I had that attitude that the attorney will absolutely do everything they can to fight for me. I would not be that naive again. I would have much more self-defending kind of attitude. I would follow my case more closely. I would be more inclined to get more opinions and ask more questions and just generally be more assertive about things. That's just because you get tougher when you go through things like that. It hasn't wiped me out, it's toughened me up if that's the right way to put it.

And then in response to having anything else to add:

Jean: Well, what the bottom line is, and this may sound like a radical feminist statement, but if I really did

have to get divorced again, God forbid, I think I really would have a woman attorney.

Ann: I was thinking the same thing, Jean. I really was thinking that.

Jean: You know, I just feel like there's something there that would be a whole lot easier if I didn't have to go through all the feelings of, and at that time in your life anyway, you just sort of, I get this sexual image of being on the bottom. I mean that's just how I felt and I, you know, I just would do that. There are enough good women lawyers around that I would just find a woman. And I don't have a woman gynecologist which I know a lot of women insist on, so it's not that I always insist on a woman. But in that particular situation at that particular time in my life when you have all that anger and everything, I think that's just sort of what I wish I had done.

Moderator:...So you feel like you would get a woman attorney? Do you feel like you would spend more time interviewing that person? Shopping around?

Jean: Probably a good idea.

Ann: Yeah.

Jean: I mean I might not have thought of it.

Ann: Now that you've said it.

Jean: But now you've given me that idea. I would tell people with medical problems to get another opinion and I don't see any reason why you shouldn't do that with an attorney. Uh, I think that would be a very smart way to go.

Ann: Especially since the majority of them offer an initial consultation at no cost.

Moderator: So you think you'd have a better idea of what you'd be looking for in an attorney?

Both: Mm, humm.

Jean: I think a lot of people play the game where they get the person they think is going to scare the spouse the most. Especially in this town. You know there are a couple of big name people that everybody goes for if they really want to scare the poop out of somebody. I didn't do that, but I did get somebody who I thought

would be at least taken seriously in both cases.
...And I wouldn't, that would be a problem in a sense with a woman because of all the chauvinistic stuff that goes along and I would want to make sure that the person did have a strong reputation, too, just because of the way things work.

In summary, the issues which emerged as important to the focus group participants are similar to the ones which emerged in the survey comments: the quality of work, the manner in which they were treated, the way fees are handled, and a general feeling that the legal system is a humanless mechanism. Complaints about sloppy work, not returning phone calls, not keeping the client informed as well as being insensitive and unresponsive to clients as human beings all came out as characteristics of a "bad attorney." The necessity of being a good consumer as a client came out as well as the perceived inability to do so during times of crisis in one's life.

CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In recent years, lawyers have been described as gatekeepers and representatives of the legal system and also as shapers of mass legal consciousness (Sarat and Felstiner 1986). Research on lawyer-client interaction has described the lawyer's role in this relationship as enshrouded in a veil of mystery. It has also been argued that law, that great distillate of justice considerations, is not what judges say in their reports, but what lawyers say to one another and to clients. The current study is an attempt to lift a corner of the veil of mystery by assessing some factors linked to satisfaction with attorneys and through clients' own comments and experiences with their attorneys. Major questions posed at the outset concerned clients' satisfaction with their attorneys and the effects of the perception of procedural justice evaluations on satisfaction with attorneys and courts. In addition, the question of whether or not these evaluations of procedural justice, attorneys, and courts vary by type of case, case outcome, clients' perceptions of lawyers' interactional style and social power bases, and clients' demographic characteristics is also assessed.

Procedural Justice

The multiple regression analysis and the path analysis of the data in this study strongly support the primary hypothesis that procedural justice ratings predict satisfaction with attorneys and courts, independent of case outcome. This adds to the support of other studies of the importance of procedural justice effects in evaluations of personnel in legal settings, work organizations, and political leaders and institutions (Tyler and Lind 1991). The comments of the survey respondents also give support to the importance of procedural justice in that respondents who made negative comments rated their lawyers lower on procedural justice than the other three groups (no comment, nonsubstantive comment, and positive or neutral comment) (Table 17A). This would seem to support Tyler's assessment that people want to be treated with respect and politeness, and if they are not, some people will speak out.

Support for the importance of a procedural justice component in the lawyer-client exchange can be found also from the interaction of the focus group participants. Even though specific questions about procedural justice were not asked, the elements of procedural justice as described in this study emerged in many of the exchanges. For example, being kept informed as a way of feeling some control over

the case is an aspect of the representation component of procedural justice. The participants expressed disappointment in not having phone calls returned, not being prepared for the procedures that would occur, and not being informed of important events. Quality and accuracy, another procedural justice component, were also issues with the participants. Not filing papers, filing them late, inaccuracies in court orders, and sloppiness in finished work were among the particular problems mentioned in their dialogues. A concern for the procedural justice component of ethicality, that is, an expression of concern for the client as a person, was also evident in the focus group dialogues. A lack of respect, even in such a simple way as returning a phone call, was mentioned as well as compassion and sensitivity to the difficulties of the legal process in handling certain life events. And finally, impartiality, or being treated fairly, is also part of the perception of the client as evidenced in the excerpts which related the rude and condescending manner of several of the attorneys. That this many aspects of procedural justice emerged from the participants' descriptions of their legal experiences gives strong support to the importance of the procedural justice measure found in the results of the survey.

Austin and Tobiasen's (1984) vision of role behavior as a procedural justice concept appears to have validity based

on the findings in this study. Work content and manner of interacting are certainly aspects of the role behavior of attorneys, and based on the comments of the focus group participants and the survey respondents, are important aspects of that relationship. The elements of procedural justice that have emerged in previous studies and used in this study are bound up with how lawyers carry out their work role.

Implications for procedural justice theory from this study are particularly important for two groups: legal clients and lawyers. In the words of one focus group participant, "We have got to be better consumers." The criteria of procedural justice used in this study seem a fitting start for an evaluation form in assessing the lawyer both during and following a legal experience. If a lawyer does not measure up, then an appropriate place for grievance and assistance should be available. Reflecting on Rosenthal's (1976) notion that clients may need help in assessing lawyers if they are to be competent consumers of legal services (see p. 30 in Chapter 2), the procedural justice criteria seem fitting guidelines for a checklist for the legal profession to adopt and share with clients.

Satisfaction with Attorneys

The results from this study indicate that clients on average are only somewhat satisfied with their attorneys, with less than one-third being very satisfied. The elements of procedural justice and the style of interaction chosen by lawyers appear to be the most important aspect that clients use in assessing satisfaction with their lawyers. This supports other studies which have found that the interpersonal aspects of the lawyer-client relationship are just as important as legal competence. This information should sound an alarm for the legal profession as an area that needs attention if the image of the profession is to be improved.

The effects of case type and outcome as revealed in the regression and path analyses, while important, do not appear to be as important in their assessment of their attorneys as had been expected. Apparently, people are able to separate these issues. This supports Tyler's (1986) argument that people have difficulty assessing a system based on one outcome, and perhaps their particular type of legal problem; instead they seem to focus on the procedures used to reach the outcome.

While the survey respondents do seem somewhat satisfied with their attorneys, many of their comments confirm

previous observations that the most common sources of client discontent are with fees, discourtesy, and delay (Abel 1989). Several comments reflect this, such as one that the delay in settling cases makes more money for the lawyers, another comment that lawyers drag their feet to make more money for themselves, and then another's advice to ask questions up front about how long the case will take. The analysis of the four comment groups shows that the respondents with the lowest mean of satisfaction with attorneys on both measures tend to make most negative comments and are significantly different from the other three groups. The issues which emerged from the focus group also reflect the common sources of client discontent in their remarks on delays and rude manner. Overall, considering the number in the groups who changed attorneys and that their reactions seem lukewarm at best, the "somewhat satisfied" finding in the survey is supported. It's as if there is a generalized qualifying statement such as, "Well, he did an O.K. job, BUT." All in all, the survey results, comments, and focus groups support others' findings that satisfaction with lawyers is based on more than legal competence measured in outcomes.

Satisfaction with Courts

A final important finding of this analysis is that satisfaction with the attorneys and the procedural justice rating are important predictors of satisfaction with the courts, as is gender. From the separate analyses for men and women, it is important to note that overall satisfaction with the attorney is the significant predictor of satisfaction with courts for women but not for men, and the effects of procedural justice ratings, interactional styles, and income are mediated through women's evaluations of attorneys. Perhaps this reflects the importance for a concern for communion and affiliation associated with women.

For men, a traditional or attorney-directed style, as well as case outcome, procedural justice, income and education, all have mostly direct effects on assessing courts. This means that they are not being mediated through the evaluations of the attorney. The traditional interactional style of the lawyer seems particularly troublesome for men. Perhaps this is so because males in patriarchal societies are accustomed to dominating or "directing," but may be particularly offended by or sensitive to directive behavior when they are the recipient of, rather than the source of directive behavior.

These findings indicate that there might be a "his and her" legal experience just as others have found a "his and her" marriage and divorce. Future research should look more specifically at why this is so.

Lawyers' Interactional Style and Social Power Base

The results of this study generally support other studies which have found that relational skills have a significant effect on evaluations of professionals. However, the measures of these two aspects of the study are troubling and perhaps the major limitation in this study. The number of items used for each social power base was constrained by the time limit for the whole questionnaire.

In spite of this limitation, several observations about the interpersonal aspect of the lawyer-client relationship can be made. In the interest of parsimony and on the basis of factor analysis of the items used in this study and the multiple regression analyses using the simpler conceptualization of the lawyer role, a simpler model of the lawyer role seems just as informative as considering interactional style and social power bases separately. The client-centered or participatory orientation (with elements of referent and reward power and legal educator, and social worker/counselor roles) and the attorney-directed or

traditional orientation (with elements of expert, legitimate, and coercive power and a court official role) seems to be a good possibility for further research on lawyer-client research. A client-centered orientation is clearly preferred by clients. I speculate that this approach gives clients greater feelings of personal control, similar to findings in health-care settings that the use of expert and coercive power lessens feelings of personal control. There is a great deal of literature in social psychology on the importance of a sense of agency, mastery, and control for well-being in our culture (White 1959; deCharms 1968; Harter 1978)

The findings of this study present important implications for social power theory. While social power concepts have had a major role in industrial and organizational psychology where the superordinate/subordinate relationship is more clearly defined and acknowledged, less has been done within professional relationships, especially within the "helping professions." The studies which have been done in this area clearly point to the importance of referent power. One suggestion for future research in this area is to conduct in-depth interviews of legal clients specifically asking for their descriptions of the relationship with their attorneys, similar to Hinkin and Schriesheim's (1990) suggestion for

studying supervisory power from descriptions of subordinates' perceptions.

A second observation is that some of the power bases appear in tandem, and delineation of what they are and in what situations they occur would seem helpful in training personnel in the helping professions in the use of social power. A further suggestion specifically for the legal profession would be to specify that the lawyer role is one of a "helping profession" and to provide this kind of training in law school.

Clients' Characteristics

In procedural justice evaluations, only gender is a significant predictor along with case type, that is, males give lawyers higher procedural justice ratings than females; however, for women, clients in divorce cases rate attorneys higher than clients in other types of cases. This may be simply a reflection of greater use of lawyers for marital problems by women. One explanation for a higher procedural justice rating by males may be that male concerns of agency, achievement, and status (for example, through consistency, bias suppression, accuracy, and correctability) seem to be represented in more of the procedural justice items than are the female concerns of communion and affiliation (for

example, through representation, or involvement, and ethicality). It could also be that these concerns are transmitted more so because the sex of the majority of attorneys are male (about 85% in this study, which is similar to the findings in other studies).

Clients with higher incomes are more satisfied with their lawyers than those with lower incomes, and this is a significant positive predictor of satisfaction with attorneys for women. That income is a positive predictor for men and women both for the two satisfaction with attorneys measures and for women for satisfaction with courts gives some support for a conflict perspective, which would predict that people with greater advantages (men generally, and then women with higher incomes) are more satisfied with attorneys and the courts. Most likely, they have used lawyers and the courts more frequently and for a greater variety of problems, consequently affording them wider experience in assessing satisfaction levels.

While the regression analyses in this study do not indicate that the demographic characteristics are very important, the path analysis does indicate some importance for these characteristics. Again, they differ for men and women. For men, the positive effect of education on satisfaction with attorneys and courts is largely direct, and the effect of income on satisfaction with courts is

negative and largely direct. This means that men with more education are more satisfied with attorneys and courts than men with less education, and men with greater incomes are less satisfied with courts than men with less income. For women, the effect of income on satisfaction with attorneys is positive and largely direct, but the effect on satisfaction with courts is mostly indirect. The effect of age for women is negative and largely direct in assessing satisfaction with courts; older women are less satisfied with courts than younger women.

The analysis of the comment groups also provides a little more information on demographic characteristics. Consistent with a conflict perspective, those with higher incomes and more education are more likely to make positive or "neutral" comments followed by the group which makes negative comments. So people with higher levels of education and income are more likely to "speak out" regardless of the substance of the comment. Again, many of the comments reflect the perception that money is an important consideration in participation in the legal arena, in such expressions as "Money talks, " and "If you are rich you can get better justice." Getting justice seems to be equated to winning the case, which means having a good lawyer, which naturally takes money. This idea recently (1995) received a lot of reinforcement during the O. J.

Simpson trial when the defense lawyers' fees were emphasized repeatedly.

In addition, males are also more likely to speak out, whether to make a positive/neutral comment or a negative comment. This may well be a reflection of the more powerful position of males in this society to engage in activities which support the efficacious action of "speaking out."

Conclusion

While the results of this study are subject to the limitations of survey research in general (for example, the short amount of time spent with each respondent, different interviewers who are not face-to-face with respondents, lack of time to probe some questions, possible distortion by respondents because of time lapse), they nevertheless point with some reliability to the need to "examine the long-term impact of the quality of the lawyer-client exchange" (Curran 1977, p. 265). The results of the analysis of the comment groups and focus groups also support this point.

As lawyers are the gatekeepers to the legal system, they are in the position to be obstacles to citizens' access to justice. In the words of one respondent, "...Judges don't want to talk to people, only [to] the lawyers." In order to be competent consumers of legal services, people

may need help in choosing and evaluating the performance of lawyers (Rosenthal 1976). This study indicates that the concept and criteria of procedural justice would be a strong contender for a measure of evaluation.

The perceived veil of mystery surrounding lawyers' work gives some indication that help may not be forthcoming from the legal profession. Such help could come from expansion of legal consumer groups such as HALT (Help Abolish Legal Tyranny) and Consumers for Legal Reform. Such help could come also from further research on lawyer-client relationships, especially qualitative projects using the components of procedural justice to explore the clients' perceptions in different types of cases. In this age of evaluations of other occupational groups (for example, student evaluations of professors, disputants' evaluations of mediators, and the medical insurance industry's watchguard of medical services), a similar system of evaluation of legal services seems reasonable. This should most certainly include user-friendly avenues for obtaining information about and help in questioning the quality of legal services and reporting dissatisfaction with those services.

may need help in choosing and evaluating the performance of lawyers (Rosenthal 1976). This study indicates that the concept and criteria of procedural justice would be a strong contender for a measure of evaluation.

The perceived veil of mystery surrounding lawyers' work gives some indication that help may not be forthcoming from the legal profession. Such help could come from expansion of legal consumer groups such as HALT (Help Abolish Legal Tyranny) and Consumers for Legal Reform. Such help could come also from further research on lawyer-client relationships, especially qualitative projects using the components of procedural justice to explore the clients' perceptions in different types of cases. In this age of evaluations of other occupational groups (for example, student evaluations of professors, disputants' evaluations of mediators, and the medical insurance industry's watchguard of medical services), a similar system of evaluation of legal services seems reasonable. This should most certainly include user-friendly avenues for obtaining information about and help in questioning the quality of legal services and reporting dissatisfaction with those services.

REFERENCES CITED

- Abadinsky, Howard. 1991. Law and Justice: An Introduction to the American Legal System, 2nd edition. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers.
- Abel, Richard L. 1986. "Lawyers." Pp. 369-444 in Law and the Social Sciences, edited by Leon Lipson and Stanton Wheeler. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- _____ 1989. American Lawyers. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Abrams, Robert. 1984. "The Lawyer's Dreadful Image." Bar Leader, March-April:14-16.
- American Bar Association. 1983. "Model Rules of Professional Conduct." Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards. Chicago: American Bar Association.
- Arts, Wil and Romke van der Veen. 1992. "Sociological Approaches to Distributive and Procedural Justice." Pp. 143-176 in Justice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by Klaus R. Scherer. Cambridge: University Press.
- Austin, William and Joyce M. Tobiasen. 1984. "Legal Justice and the Psychology of Conflict Resolution." In The Sense of Injustice, edited by Robert Folger. New York and London: Plenum Press.
- Bell, John. 1992. "Justice and the Law." Pp. 114-142 in Justice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by Klaus R. Scherer. Cambridge: University Press.
- Black, Donald. 1983. "Crime as Social Control." American Sociological Review, 48(1):34-45.
- Brehm, J. W. 1966. A Theory of Psychological Reactance. New York: Academic Press.
- Cahill, Spencer, Gary A. Fine, and Linda Grant. 1995. "Dimensions of Qualitative Research." Pp. 605-629 in Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology, edited by Karen S. Cook, Gary A. Fine, and James S. House. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

- Earmines, Edward G. and Richard A. Zeller. 1979. Reliability and Validity Assessment. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Carson, Paula Phillips, Kerry D. Carson, and C. William Roe. 1993. "Social Power Bases: A Meta-Analytic Examination of Interrelationships and Outcomes." Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 23 (14):1150-1169.
- Casper, Jonathan D., Tom Tyler, and Bonnie Fisher. 1988. "Procedural Justice in Felony Cases." Law & Society Review, 22 (3):483-507.
- Chambliss, William and Robert Seidman. 1971. Law, Order, and Power. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
- Chase, Anthony. 1986. "Lawyers and Popular Culture: A Review of Mass Media Portrayals of American Attorneys." American Bar Foundation Research Journal, 281-300.
- Cohen, Ronald L. 1982. "Perceiving Justice: An Attributional Perspective." Pp. 119-160 in Equity and Justice in Social Behavior, edited by Jerald Greenberg and Ronald L. Cohen. New York and London: Academic Press.
- Cohen, Ronald L., and Jerald Greenberg. 1982. "The Justice Concept in Social Psychology." Pp. 1-41 in Equity and Justice in Social Behavior, edited by Jerald Greenberg and Ronald L. Cohen. New York and London: Academic Press.
- Curran, Barbara A. 1977. The Legal Needs of the Public: The Final Report of a National Survey. Chicago: American Bar Foundation.
- Danet, Brenda, Kenneth B. Hoffman, and Nicole C. Kermish. 1980. "Obstacles to the Study of Lawyer-Client Interaction: The Biography of a Failure." Law and Society Review, 14:905-929.
- Deaux, Kay, Francis C. Dane, and Lawrence S. Wrightsman. 1993. Social Psychology in the 90s. Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
- Emanuel, Ezekiel J. and Linda L. Emanuel. 1992. "Four models of the physician-patient relationship." Journal of the American Medical Association, 267(16):2221-2226.

- Evan, William M. 1990. Social Structure and Law. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Feldman, Stephen, and Kent Wilson. 1981. "The Value of Interpersonal Skills in Lawyering." Law and Human Behavior, 5(4):311-324.
- Felstiner, William L. F., Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat. 1981. "The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming and Claiming...." Law and Society Review, 15:631-654.
- Folger, Robert. 1977. "Distributive and Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of 'Voice' and Improvement on Experienced Inequity." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35:108-119.
- Freeman, Harrod and Henry Weihofen. 1972. Clinical Law Training: Interviewing and Counseling. St. Paul, MN: West.
- French, John R. P., Jr., and Bertram Raven. 1959. "The Bases of Social Power." In Studies in Social Power, edited by Dorwin Cartwright. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan.
- Friedman, Lawrence M. 1989. "Litigation and Society." Annual Review of Sociology, 15:17-29.
- Furby, Lita. 1986. "Psychology and Justice." Pp. 153-203 in Justice: Views from the Social Sciences. Edited by Ronald L. Cohen. New York and London: Plenum Press.
- Galanter, Marc. 1974. "Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change." Law & Society Review, 9:95-160.
- Gifford, Donald G. 1987. "The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiation Models: Preserving Client-centered Advocacy in the Negotiation Context." UCLA Law Review, 34:811-862.
- Goffman, E. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor.

- Hamilton, V. Lee, and David Rauma. 1995. "Social Psychology of Deviance and the Law." Pp. 524-547 in Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology, edited by Karen S. Cook, Gary A. Fine, and James S. House. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Hayden, R. M. and J. K. Anderson. 1979. "On the Evaluation of Procedural Systems in Laboratory Experiments: A Critique of Thibaut and Walker." Law and Human Behavior, 3:21-38.
- Hegtvedt, Karen A. and Barry Markovsky. 1995. "Justice and Injustice." Pp. 257-280 in Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology, edited by Karen S. Cook, Gary A. Fine, and James S. House. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Heinz, John P. and Edward O. Laumann. 1982. Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Hillary, Marcia Amanda, and Joel T. Johnson. 1989. "Social Power and Interactional Style in the Divorce Attorney/Client Dyad." Journal of Divorce, 12 (4):89-102.
- Hinkin, Timothy R. and Chester A. Schriesheim. 1989. "Development and Application of New Scales to Measure the French and Raven (1959) Bases of Social Power." Journal of Applied Psychology, 74 (4):561-567.
-
- . 1990.
 "Relationships Between Subordinate Perceptions of Supervision Influence Tactics and Attributed Bases of Supervisory Power." Human Relations, 43 (3):221-237.
- Hoebel, E. Adamson. 1954. The Law of Primitive Man, A Study of Comparative Legal Dynamics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hollander, Edwin P. 1985. "Leadership and Power." Pp. 485-537 in Handbook of Social Psychology, edited by Lindzey Gardner and Elliot Aronson. New York Random House.
- Homans, George. 1982. "Foreward." Pp. xi-xviii in Equity and Justice in Social Behavior, edited by Jerald Greenberg and Ronald L. Cohen. New York: Academic Press.

- Hosticka, Carl J. 1979. "We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What Is Going To Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality." Social Problems, 26(5):599-610.
- House, James S. 1977. "The Three Faces of Social Psychology." Sociometry, 40:161-177
- House, James S. House and Jeylan Mortimer. 1990. "Social Structure and the Individual: Emerging Themes and New Directions." Social Psychology Quarterly, 53 (2):71-80.
- Jones, Edward E. 1990. Interpersonal Perception. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company.
- Jost, Kenneth Jost. 1988. "What Image Do We Deserve?" ABA Journal, November 1:47-51.
- Laumann, Edward O. and John P. Heinz. 1979. "The Organization of Lawyers' Work: Size, Intensity, and Co-Practice of the Fields of Law." American Bar Foundation Research Journal, 217-246.
- Leventhal, Gerald S. 1980. "What Should Be Done with Equity Theory?" Pp. 27-55 in Social Exchange: Advances in Theory and Research, edited by K. Gergen, M. Greenberg, and R. Willis. New York: Plenum Press.
- Lind, E. Allan and Tyler, Tom R. 1988. The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice. New York and London: Plenum Press.
- Lipsky, Michael. 1980. Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. New York:
- Major, Brenda and J.B. Adams. 1983. "Role of gender interpersonal orientation and self presentation in distributive justice behavior." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45:598-608.
- Major, Brenda and Kay Deaux. 1982. "Individual Differences in Justice Behavior." Pp. 43-76 in Equity and Justice in Social Behavior, edited by Jerald Greenberg and Ronald L. Cohen. New York: Academic Press.
- Miller, Richard and Austin Sarat. 1981. "Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture." Law and Society Review, 15 (4):525-565.

- Mindes, Marvin W. with Alan C. Acock. 1982. "Trickster, Hero, Helper: A Report on the Lawyer Image." American Bar Foundation Research Journal, Winter (1):177-233.
- Morgan, David. 1990. Focus Groups As Qualitative Research. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Nelson, Robert. 1988. "Ideology, Scholarship, and Sociolegal Change: Lessons from Galanter and the 'Litigaton Crisis'." Law & Society Review, 21 (5):677-693.
- Nesler, Mitchell S., Herman Aguinis, Brian M. Quigley, and James T. Tedeschi. 1993. "The Effect of Credibility on Perceived Power." Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 23:1407-1425.
- Neuman, W. Lawrence. 1994. Social Research Methods, 2nd Ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Ng, Sik Hung. 1980. The Social Psychology of Power. London: Academic Press Inc. Ltd.
- Podsakoff, Philip M., and Chester A. Schriesheim. 1985. "Field Studies of French and Raven's Bases of Power: Critique, Reanalysis, and Suggestions for Future Research." Psychological Bulletin, 97 (3):387-411.
- Raven, Bertram H. 1965. "Social Influence and Power." In Current Studies in Social Psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- _____. 1993. "The Bases of Power: Origins and Recent Developments." Journal of Social Issues, 49(4):227-251.
- Reis, Harry T. 1984. "The Multidimensionality of Justice." Pp. 25-61 in The Sense of Injustice, edited by Robert Folger. New York and London: Plenum Press.
- Rodin, Judith and Irving L. Janis. 1979. "The Social Power of Health-Care Practitioners as Agents of Change." Journal of Social Issues, 35 (1):60-81.
- Rosenthal, Douglas E. 1974. Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge? New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- _____. 1976. "Evaluating the Competence of Lawyers." Law & Society, 11:257-285.

- Ross, Lee. 1977. "The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process." Pp. 174-221 in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, v. 10, edited by L. Berkowitz. New York: Academic Press.
- Ruddy, Clarence J. 1983. "The Image of A Lawyer." Illinois Bar Journal, July:542.
- Rytina, Steven. 1986. "Sociology and Justice." Pp. 117-151 in Justice: Views from the Social Sciences, edited by Ronald L. Cohen. New York and London: Plenum Press.
- Sarat, Austin. 1977. "Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey Evidence." Law & Society, 11:427-488.
- _____. 1986. "Access to Justice: Citizen Participation and the American Legal Order." Pp. 519-580 in Law and the Social Sciences, edited by Leon Lipson and Stanton Wheeler. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Sarat, Austin and William L.F. Felstiner. 1986. "Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office." Law & Society Review, 20(1):93-13_.
- _____. 1989. "Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office." Yale Law Journal, 98:1663-1688.
- Shapiro, Martin. 1981. "On the Regrettable Decline of Law French: Or Shapiro Jette le Brickbat." Yale Law Journal, 90:1198.
- Shorter, Charles W. 1975. "What do your clients think of you?" New York State Bar Journal,
- Seidel, John, and J. Clark. 1983. "The Ethnograph." Computer programs demonstrated at the 45th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Sociological Society.
- Sporer, Siegfried Ludwig. 1986. "Justice as Fair and Equal Treatment before the Law." Pp. 283-298 in Justice in Social Relations, edited by Klaus R. Scherer. Cambridge: University Press.
- Strauss, A. and J. Corbin. 1990. Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques. Newbury, CA: Sage.

- Thibaut, John, and Walker, Laurens. 1975. Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
- Tyler, Tom R. 1984. "The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of Their Courtroom Experience." Law & Society Review, 18 (1):51-74.
- Tyler, Tom R. 1986. "The Psychology of Leadership Evaluation." Pp. 299-316 in Justice in Social Relations, edited by Hans Bierhoff, Ronald Cohen, and Jerald Greenberg. New York and London: Plenum Press.
- _____ 1988. "What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens To Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures." Law & Society Review, 22 (1):103-135.
- _____ 1989. "The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57 (5):830-838.
- Tyler, Tom R. and E. Allan Lind. 1991. "Procedural Processes and Legal Institutions." Pp. 71-98 in Social Justice in Human Relations, V. 2, edited by Herman Steensma and Riel Vermunt. New York and London: Plenum Press.
- Vago, Steven. 1988. Law and Society, 2nd Ed. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Walker, Laurens, Lind, E. Allan, and Thibaut, John. 1979. "The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Justice." Virginia Law Review, 65 (8):1401-1420.
- Weber, Max. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Translated and edited by T. Parsons and A.M. Henderson. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Yukl, Gary, and Cecilia M. Falbe. 1991. "Importance of different power sources in downward and lateral relationships." Journal of Applied Psychology, 76:416-423.
- Zunker, Jerry. 1985. "Public Perception of the Legal Profession." Texas Bar Journal, 48:78-79.

APPENDIX A. TABLES

Table 1
Variables and Summary Measures

Variable	(N=664)	Percentages
<u>EXOGENOUS VARIABLES:</u>		
<u>Client Characteristics</u>		
Gender		
0 Male		46.5%
1 Female		53.5%
Age		
1 18 - 29 years		12.2%
2 30 - 39 years		26.7%
3 40 - 49 years		24.7%
4 50 - 59 years		15.8%
5 60 - 69 years		10.7%
6 70 - 92 years		8.7%
Education		
1 Grade school		3.7%
2 Some high school		4.7%
3 High school grad or GED		20.3%
4 Trade/Vocational school after high school		6.6%
5 Some college		31.0%
6 College graduate		19.9%
7 Graduate school/ Professional school		13.3%
Family Income		
1 Less than \$10,000		6.8%
2 Between \$10,000 and \$30,000		32.2%
3 Between \$30,000 and \$50,000		31.0%
4 Between \$50,000 and \$75,000		16.3%
5 Between \$75,000 and \$100,000		7.4%
6 Over \$100,000		5.4%
<u>Characteristics of Most Recent Legal Experience</u>		
Type of Case		
1 Divorces		30.1%
2 Deeds, wills inheritance		28.6%
3 Others (Personal injury, traffic criminal)		41.3%
Case Outcome		
1 My favor		47.5%
2 Opposition's favor		19.2%
3 Mixed		27.3%
4 Still pending		6.0%

Table 1, Continued
Variables and Summary Measures

Variable	(N=664)	Mean
<u>Perception of Lawyer Interactional Style</u>		
(1=Never, 2=Sometimes, 3=A lot)		
Legal educator		2.07
Court official		1.37
Social worker		1.78
<u>Attributions of Social Power of Lawyer</u>		
(1=Never, 2=Sometimes, 3=A lot)		
Expert		1.33
Legitimate		1.33
Reward		1.41
Coercive		1.27
Referent		1.82
<u>ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES:</u>		
Procedural Justice (0 - 6)		4.8
0	4.4%	
1	5.2%	
2	4.2%	
3	4.4%	
4	8.3%	
5	20.1%	
6	53.4%	
Overall satisfaction with attorney (1=Not satisfied, 2=Somewhat satisfied, 3=Very satisfied)		2.38
1	24.5%	
2	49.9%	
3	25.6%	
Satisfaction with attorney: Use again or recommend (0 - 2)		1.5
Overall satisfaction with court (1=Not satisfied, 2=Somewhat satisfied, 3=Very satisfied)		1.96
1	35.9%	
2	47.9%	
3	16.2%	

Table 2. Bivariate Correlations Among All Variables

	1	2	3	4
1. Age	----			
2. Gender	-.01	----		
3. Education	.02	.05	----	
4. Income	.04	-.14*	.18**	----
5. Divorce	-.08	.08	-.17**	-.08
6. Deeds	.05	.02	.07	-.00
7. MyFavor	-.04	.13*	.07	.01
8. Oppose	.08	-.06	.00	-.08
9. Mixed	-.02	-.08	-.08	.07
10. LegalEdu	-.22***	.04	-.05	-.06
11. CourtOff	.02	-.07	-.06	.02
12. SocWork	-.05	-.09	-.11	.00
13. Expert	-.03	-.02	.07	-.01
14. Legit	.05	-.07	-.09	.02
15. Reward	.01	-.04	-.11	.04
16. Coercive	.14*	-.00	-.20**	-.21**
17. Referent	-.05	-.00	-.04	-.00
18. ProcJust	-.13*	-.12	-.03	-.00
19. SatAtty	-.16*	-.04	-.02	.07
20. RecUse	-.04	-.05	.02	.03
21. SatCourt	-.17*	.20**	.01	-.03
Mean=	2.80	.52	4.70	2.87
SD=	1.30	.50	1.56	1.28

N=191 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

1 - 4 = Demographic characteristics of respondent

5 - 6 = Type of legal case

7 - 9 = Outcome of referent case

10 - 12 = Perceived occupational role adopted by lawyer

10 = Legal Educator

11 = Court Official

12 = Social Work

13 - 17 = Social power attributed to lawyer

13 = Expert power

14 = Legitimate power

15 = Reward power

16 = Coercive power

17 = Referent power

18 - 21 = Endogenous variables

18 = Procedural justice rating of lawyers

19 = Satisfaction with lawyer

20 = Use Again or recommend lawyer

21 = Satisfaction with courts

Table 2. Bivariate Correlations Among All Variables,
Continued

	5	6	7	8
1. Age				
2. Gender				
3. Education				
4. Income				
5. Divorce	----			
6. Deeds	-.20**	----		
7. MyFavor	-.13*	-.00	----	
8. Oppose	-.11	.15	-.50***	----
9. Mixed	.25***	-.13*	-.57***	-.36***
10. LegalEdu	.07	-.01	.18**	-.23***
11. CourtOff	.04	-.08	-.05	.02
12. SocWork	.09	-.04	.10	-.17*
13. Expert	.01	-.13*	-.03	.06
14. Legit	.03	-.07	-.13*	.04
15. Reward	.03	.03	.06	-.04
16. Coercive	.17**	-.12*	-.11	.02
17. Referent	.07	.01	.16*	-.22***
18. ProcJust	.12*	.07	.12*	-.17*
19. SatAtty	.05	-.05	.24***	-.23***
20. RecUse	-.05	.11	.14*	-.11
21. SatCourt	.02	.02	.34***	-.27***
Mean=	.50	.04	.44	.24
SD=	.50	.19	.50	.43

N=191 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

1 - 4 = Demographic characteristics of respondent

5 - 6 = Type of legal case

7 - 9 = Outcome of referent case

10 - 12 = Perceived occupational role adopted by lawyer

10 = Legal Educator

11 = Court Official

12 = Social Work

13 - 17 = Social power attributed to lawyer

13 = Expert power

14 = Legitimate power

15 = Reward power

16 = Coercive power

17 = Referent power

18 - 21 = Endogenous variables

18 = Procedural justice rating of lawyers

19 = Satisfaction with lawyer

20 = Use Again or recommend lawyer

21 = Satisfaction with courts

Table 2. Bivariate Correlations Among All Variables,
Continued

	9	10	11	12
1. Age				
2. Gender				
3. Education				
4. Income				
5. Divorce				
6. Deeds				
7. MyFavor				
8. Oppose				
9. Mixed	-----			
10. LegalEdu	.06	-----		
11. CourtOff	.01	-.03	-----	
12. SocWork	.01	.49***	-.06	-----
13. Expert	-.03	-.03	.34***	-.04
14. Legit	.10	-.07	.30	-.04
15. Reward	-.05	.23***	-.01	.39***
16. Coercive	.12	.00	.28***	-.07
17. Referent	.01	.50***	-.11	.51***
18. ProcJust	.05	.34***	-.34***	.40***
19. SatAtty	-.02	.46***	-.19**	.36***
20. RecUse	-.03	.21**	-.34***	.26***
21. SatCourt	-.13*	.27***	-.13*	.27***
Mean=	.29	2.02	1.38	1.72
SD=	.46	.65	.60	.69

N=191 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

1 - 4 = Demographic characteristics of respondent
5 - 6 = Type of legal case
7 - 9 = Outcome of referent case
10 - 12 = Perceived occupational role adopted by lawyer
10 = Legal Educator
11 = Court Official
12 = Social Work
13 - 17 = Social power attributed to lawyer
13 = Expert power
14 = Legitimate power
15 = Reward power
16 = Coercive power
17 = Referent power
18 - 21 = Endogenous variables
18 = Procedural justice rating of lawyers
19 = Satisfaction with lawyer
20 = Use Again or recommend lawyer
21 = Satisfaction with courts

Table 2. Bivariate Correlations Among All Variables, Continued

	13	14	15	16
1. Age				
2. Gender				
3. Education				
4. Income				
5. Divorce				
6. Deeds				
7. MyFavor				
8. Oppose				
9. Mixed				
10. LegalEdu				
11. CourtOff				
12. SocWork				
13. Expert	-----			
14. Legit	.44***	-----		
15. Reward	.11	.03	-----	
16. Coercive	.34***	.30***	.19**	-----
17. Referent	-.11	-.06	.45***	-.06
18. ProcJust	-.37***	-.35***	.19**	-.27***
19. SatAtty	-.36***	-.40***	.19**	-.21**
20. RecUse	-.44***	-.38***	.09	-.34***
21. SatCourt	-.23***	-.30***	.18**	-.11
Mean=	1.32	1.37	1.47	1.29
SD=	.47	.42	.61	.35

N=191 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

1 - 4 = Demographic characteristics of respondent
5 - 6 = Type of legal case
7 - 9 = Outcome of referent case
10 - 12 = Perceived occupational role adopted by lawyer
10 = Legal Educator
11 = Court Official
12 = Social Work
13 - 17 = Social power attributed to lawyer
13 = Expert power
14 = Legitimate power
15 = Reward power
16 = Coercive power
17 = Referent power
18 - 21 = Endogenous variables
18 = Procedural justice rating of lawyers
19 = Satisfaction with lawyer
20 = Use Again or recommend lawyer
21 = Satisfaction with courts

Table 2. Bivariate Correlations Among All Variables, Continued

	17	18	19	20	21
1. Age					
2. Gender					
3. Education					
4. Income					
5. Divorce					
6. Deeds					
7. MyFavor					
8. Oppose					
9. Mixed					
10. LegalEdu					
11. CourtOff					
12. SocWork					
13. Expert					
14. Legit					
15. Reward					
16. Coercive					
17. Referent	----				
18. ProcJust	.43***	----			
19. SatAtty	.46***	.67***	----		
20. RecUse	.29***	.81***	.67***	----	
21. SatCourt	.30***	.39***	.52***	.34***	----
Mean=	1.82	4.80	2.20	1.56	1.93
SD=	.52	1.78	.63	.81	.61

N=191 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

1 - 4 = Demographic characteristics of respondent
5 - 6 = Type of legal case
7 - 9 = Outcome of referent case
10 - 12 = Perceived occupational role adopted by lawyer
10 = Legal Educator
11 = Court Official
12 = Social Work
13 - 17 = Social power attributed to lawyer
13 = Expert power
14 = Legitimate power
15 = Reward power
16 = Coercive power
17 = Referent power
18 - 21 = Endogenous variables
18 = Procedural justice rating of lawyers
19 = Satisfaction with lawyer
20 = Use Again or recommend lawyer
21 = Satisfaction with courts

Table 3
Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for
Procedural Justice Ratings with Exogenous Variables

Variables	r	Beta
Client Characteristics		
Gender	-.06	-.114*
Age	-.09	-.004
Education	-.03	-.037
Income	.06	.047
Case Type		
Divorce	.14**	.145**
Deeds	.07	.083
Case Outcome		
MyFavor	.15**	.095
Opposition	-.23***	-.030
Mixed	.03	.054
Lawyer's Occupational Role		
Legal Educator	.34***	.124*
Court Official	-.36***	-.201***
Social Worker	.44***	.178**
Social Power Base		
Expert	-.32***	-.117*
Legitimate	-.31***	-.161**
Reward	.18**	.076
Coercive	-.25***	-.090
Referent	.43***	.168**
N=298		R ² =.412***

*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001

Table 4
Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for
Satisfaction with Attorney with Exogenous Variables

Variables	r	Model 1	Model 2
Client Characteristics			
Gender	-.01	-.061	-.003
Age	-.14**	-.035	-.033
Education	.03	.014	.033
Income	.13*	.119**	.095*
Case Type			
Divorce	.08	.083	.009
Deeds	-.05	-.048	-.090*
Case Outcome			
MyFavor	.23***	.092	.044
Opposition	-.29***	-.069	-.054
Mixed	-.00	.019	-.008
Lawyer's Occupational Role			
Legal Educator	.45***	.260***	.197***
Court Official	-.25***	-.081	.021
Social Worker	.42***	.116*	.026
Social Power Base			
Expert	-.30***	-.150**	-.090*
Legitimate	-.38***	-.250***	-.169***
Reward	.15**	.045	.006
Coercive	-.20***	-.017	.029
Referent	.45***	.163**	.078
Procedural Justice Rating	.71***		.506***
N=298		R ² =.448***	R ² =.597***
*p<.05			
**p<.01			
***p<.001			

Table 5
 Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for
 Satisfaction with Attorney (Recommend or Use Again)
 with Exogenous Variables

Variables	r	Model 1	Model 2
Client Characteristics			
Gender	-.02	-.074	.027
Age	-.02	.026	.063
Education	-.01	-.006	.030
Income	.08	.067	.023
Case Type			
Divorce	-.00	.035	-.067
Deeds	.08	.058	-.009
Case Outcome			
MyFavor	.22***	.220*	.116
Opposition	-.18***	.062	.061
Mixed	-.03	.108	.054
Lawyer's Occupational Role			
Legal Educator	.26***	.099	-.005
Court Official	-.35***	-.182**	-.034
Social Worker	.35***	.151*	.011
Social Power Base			
Expert	-.35***	-.150*	-.039
Legitimate	-.34***	-.138*	-.007
Reward	.13*	.054	.006
Coercive	-.30***	-.126*	-.052
Referent	.34***	.106	-.028
Procedural Justice Rating	.82***		.790***
N=288		R ² =.329***	R ² =.675***
*p<.05			
**p<.01			
***p<.001			

Table 6
Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for
Satisfaction with Court with Exogenous Variables

Variables	r	Model 1	Model 2
Client Characteristics			
Gender	.20**	.165*	.202**
Age	-.17*	-.135*	-.098
Education	.01	.032	.039
Income	-.03	-.002	-.029
Case Type			
Divorce	.02	-.001	-.024
Deeds	.02	.013	.046
Case Outcome			
MyFavor	.34***	.120	.019
Opposition	-.27***	-.158	-.202
Mixed	-.13*	-.097	-.160
Lawyer's Occupational Role			
Legal Educator	.27***	.023	-.078
Court Official	-.13*	.016	.022
Social Worker	.27***	.141	.108
Social Power Base			
Expert	-.23***	-.147	-.067
Legitimate	-.30***	-.186*	-.081
Reward	.18**	.078	.059
Coercive	-.11	.043	.056
Referent	.30***	.105	.005
Procedural Justice Rating	.39***		.119
Overall Satisfaction with Attorney	.52***		.399***
Satisfaction with Attorney (Use again or recommend)	.34***		-.106
N=191		R ² =.257***	R ² =.339***

*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001

Table 7A
Factor Loadings of the Social Power Items

Items	<u>Extracted</u>			<u>Rotated</u>		
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>
1	.675	-.008	-.254	<u>.714</u>	-.095	-.038
2	.589	.118	.176	<u>.525</u>	.120	.318
3	.723	-.111	-.126	<u>.713</u>	-.171	.115
4	.673	.081	.020	<u>.645</u>	.048	.203
5	-.006	.715	.256	.001	<u>.751</u>	.112
6	-.272	.710	-.098	-.155	<u>.690</u>	-.298
7	.095	.703	.140	.128	<u>.711</u>	.035
8	.575	.276	-.312	<u>.666</u>	.177	-.172
9	.340	-.195	.839	.070	-.040	<u>.923</u>
Eigenvalue				2.308	1.657	1.008
% of Variance				25.6	18.4	11.2

"How often did your [last] lawyer...

1. Use legal language without explaining it? [Expert]
2. Tell you that he/she was an expert on these kinds of cases? [Expert]
3. Do something without your permission? [Legitimate]
4. Say that the judge would not allow something or would not like something? [Legitimate]
5. Ask for your advice on issues? [Referent]
6. Express sympathy and understanding of what you were going through? [Referent]
7. Praise you for following his/her advice? [Reward]
8. Question your judgment about what you thought about some issue? [Coercive]
9. Threaten to quit if you didn't follow his/her advice? [Coercive]

Table 7B
Factor Loadings of the Additional Social Power Items
and Interactional Style Items

Items	Extracted			Rotated		
	I	II	III	I	II	III
1	-.334	.565	-.191	-.054	<u>.676</u>	-.090
2	-.223	.569	.012	.034	<u>.601</u>	.110
3	-.438	.553	-.109	-.160	<u>.695</u>	-.011
4	-.254	.603	.067	.017	<u>.635</u>	.171
5	.490	.306	.219	<u>.557</u>	.032	.265
6	.763	.177	-.147	<u>.775</u>	-.141	-.118
7	.404	.376	.114	<u>.515</u>	.147	.175
8	-.143	.585	-.294	.134	<u>.629</u>	-.190
9	-.289	.234	.726	-.213	.217	<u>.756</u>
10	.358	.157	.649	.346	-.112	<u>.664</u>
11	.724	.219	-.049	<u>.751</u>	-.102	-.015
12	.630	.308	-.243	<u>.716</u>	.047	-.190
13	.731	.204	.007	<u>.747</u>	-.128	.038
14	-.297	.446	.048	-.087	<u>.516</u>	.125
Eigen- value	3.179	2.385	1.234	3.179	2.385	1.234
% of Variance	22.7	17.0	8.8	22.7	17.0	8.8

- "How often did your [last] lawyer...
1. Use legal language without explaining it? [Expert]
 2. Tell you that he/she was an expert on these kinds of cases? [Expert]
 3. Do something without your permission? [Legitimate]
 4. Say that the judge would not allow something or would not like something? [Legitimate]
 5. Ask for your advice on issues? [Referent]
 6. Express sympathy and understanding of what you were going through? [Referent]
 7. Praise you for following his/her advice? [Reward]
 8. Question your judgment about what you thought about some issue? [Coercive]
 9. Threaten to quit if you didn't follow his/her advice? [Coercive]
 10. Tell you to check out his/her advice with friends or another lawyer? [Coercive]
 11. Reassure you that what you want is worthwhile and the right thing to do? [Referent]
 12. Explain the legal basis for his/her actions to help you understand things better? [Legal educator]
 13. Show compassion and offer help beyond what you expected? [Social worker/Counselor]
 14. Act formally and more like a police officer or other court official? [Court official]

Table 7C
 Factor Loadings of Social Power Items and
 Interactional Style Items Factored Separately

<u>Participatory Items</u>		<u>Traditional Items</u>	
<u>Item</u>	<u>Factor Loading</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Factor Loading</u>
5	.555	1	.674
6	.789	2	.604
7	.505	3	.715
11	.775	4	.655
12	.703	8	.595
13	.768	14	.531

<u>Authoritarian Items</u>	
<u>Item</u>	<u>Factor Loading</u>
9	.761
10	.761

"How often did your [last] lawyer...

Factor I items:

- 5. Ask for your advice on issues? [Referent]
- 6. Express sympathy and understanding of what you were going through? [Referent]
- 7. Praise you for following his/her advice? [Reward]
- 11. Reassure you that what you want is worthwhile and the right thing to do? [Referent]
- 12. Explain the legal basis for his/her actions to help you understand things better? [Legal educator]
- 13. Show compassion and offer help beyond what you expected? [Social worker/Counselor]

Factor II items:

- 1. Use legal language without explaining it? [Expert]
- 2. Tell you that he/she was an expert on these kinds of cases? [Expert]
- 3. Do something without your permission? [Legitimate]
- 4. Say that the judge would not allow something or would not like something? [Legitimate]
- 8. Question your judgment about what you thought about some issue? [Coercive]
- 14. Act formally and more like a police officer or other court official? [Court official]

Factor III items:

- 9. Threaten to quit if you didn't follow his/her advice? [Coercive]
- 10. Tell you to check out his/her advice with friends or another lawyer? [Coercive]

Table 8
Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for
Procedural Justice Ratings with Revised Exogenous Variables

Variables	r	Beta
Client Characteristics		
Gender	-.12	-.112*
Age	-.13*	-.015
Education	-.03	-.025
Income	.00	.040
Case Type		
Divorce	.13*	.150**
Deeds	.07	.098
Case Outcome		
MyFavor	.12	.128
Opposition	.17**	-.011
Mixed	.05	.067
Lawyer's Interactional Style		
Participatory	.48***	.435***
Traditional	-.46***	-.410***
Authoritarian	.05	.035

N=309

R²=.445***

*p<.05

**p<.01

***p<.001

Table 9
Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for
Satisfaction with Attorney with Revised Exogenous Variables

Variables	r	Model 1	Model 2
Client Characteristics			
Gender	-.01	-.058	.001
Age	-.14**	-.054	-.058
Education	.02	.036	.035
Income	.13*	.101*	.083*
Case Type			
Divorce	.08	.083	.000
Deeds	-.05	-.051	-.091*
Case Outcome			
MyFavor	.23***	.119	.062
Opposition	-.30***	-.067	-.053
Mixed	-.00	.036	.002
Lawyer's Interactional Style			
Participatory	.53***	.469***	.248***
Traditional	-.38***	-.347***	-.143**
Authoritarian	.00	-.037	-.061
Procedural Justice Rating	.71***		.503***
N=295		R ² =.438***	R ² =.580***
*p<.05			
**p<.01			
***p<.001			

Table 10
 Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for
 Satisfaction with Attorney (Recommend or Use Again)
 with Revised Exogenous Variables

Variables	r	Model 1	Model 2
Client Characteristics			
Gender	-.02	-.073	.024
Age	-.02	.030	.063
Education	-.00	.026	.031
Income	.09	.061	.027
Case Type			
Divorce	-.00	.046	-.070
Deeds	.09	.060	-.007
Case Outcome			
MyFavor	.22***	.227*	.116
Opposition	-.18***	.068	.068
Mixed	-.03	.120	.060
Lawyer's Interactional Style			
Participatory	.40***	.349***	.004
Traditional	-.46***	-.421***	-.089*
Authoritarian	.04	.012	-.010
Procedural Justice Rating	.82**		.783***
N=285		R ² =.353***	R ² =.678***

*p<.05
 **p<.01
 ***p<.001

Table 11
Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for
Satisfaction with Court with Revised Exogenous Variables

Variables	r	Model 1	Model 2
Client Characteristics			
Gender	.19**	.145*	.182**
Age	-.17**	-.115	-.071
Education	.01	.026	.024
Income	-.03	-.027	-.039
Case Type			
Divorce	.01	.019	-.013
Deeds	.02	.010	.043
Case Outcome			
MyFavor	.35***	.112	-.022
Opposition	-.28***	-.179	-.237
Mixed	-.13*	-.117	-.057
Lawyer's Interactional Style			
Participatory	.34***	.261***	.053
Traditional	-.26***	-.217***	-.057
Authoritarian	-.02	.017	.022
Procedural Justice Rating	.39***		.125
Overall Satisfaction with Attorney	.52***		.403***
Satisfaction with Attorney (Use again or recommend)	.34***		-.104
N=188		R ² =.250***	R ² =.338***

*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001

Table 12
 Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for
 Procedural Justice Ratings with Revised Exogenous Variables
 for Men and Women Separately

Variable	Men		Women	
	r	Beta	r	Beta
Age	.09	.053	-.22**	-.033
Education	.15*	.082	-.16*	-.051
Income	.04	.043	.08	-.001
Divorce	.09	.119	.19**	.158*
Deeds	.10	.071	.05	.079
MyFavor	.14*	.353	.17*	.010
Opposition	-.26***	.130	-.22**	-.094
Mixed	.13	.281	-.05	.003
Participatory	.42***	.360***	.57***	.465***
Traditional	-.40***	-.356***	-.46***	-.417***
Authoritarian	.18	.137	-.01	-.018

(N=138)

R²=.351***

(N=157)

R²=.491***

*p<.05

**p<.01

***p<.001

Table 13A

Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for Men for Satisfaction with Attorney with Revised Exogenous Variables

Variables	r	Model 1	Model 2
Age	-.03	-.020	-.048
Education	.18*	.107	.064
Income	.05	.067	.044
Divorce	-.00	.042	-.021
Deeds	-.01	-.048	-.086
MyFavor	.21**	.200	.012
Opposition	-.32***	-.041	-.111
Mixed	.07	.093	-.057
Participatory	.50***	.440***	.248***
Traditional	-.36***	-.331***	-.141*
Dictatorial	.09	.042	-.031
Procedural Justice Rating	.71***		.534***

N=138

R²=.374***

R²=.555***

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Table 13B

Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for Women for Satisfaction with Attorney with Revised Exogenous Variables

Variables	r	Model 1	Model 2
Age	-.27***	-.085	-.069
Education	-.10	-.024	-.000
Income	.19**	.110	.110*
Divorce	.15*	.093	.019
Deeds	-.09	-.062	-.099
MyFavor	.25***	.075	.070
Opposition	-.28***	-.071	-.027
Mixed	-.07	.013	.011
Participatory	.56***	.466***	.249***
Traditional	-.41***	-.333***	-.138*
Dictatorial	-.07	-.107	-.099
Procedural Justice Rating	.71***		.469***

N=157

R²=.471***

R²=.580***

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Table 14A
Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for Men for
Satisfaction with Attorney (Recommend or Use Again)
with Revised Exogenous Variables

Variables	r	Model 1	Model 2
Age	.12	.052	.024
Education	.09	.040	-.051
Income	.01	.018	.052
Divorce	-.09	-.101	-.132*
Deeds	.10	.007	-.024
MyFavor	.19*	.582*	.074
Opposition	-.18*	.398	.030
Mixed	.06	.552*	.040
Participatory	.26**	.215*	-.072
Traditional	-.49***	-.436***	-.151**
Dictatorial	.07	.098	-.049
Procedural Justice Rating	.87***		.851***
N=90		R ² =.281***	R ² =.785***
*p<.05	**p<.01	***p<.001	

Table 14B
Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for Women for
Satisfaction with Attorney (Recommend or Use Again)
with Revised Exogenous Variables

Variables	r	Model 1	Model 2
Age	-.16	-.030	.040
Education	-.03	.038	.037
Income	.04	-.003	.032
Divorce	-.00	-.021	-.122
Deeds	.12	.071	.015
MyFavor	.12	-.178	-.127
Opposition	-.07	-.166	-.059
Mixed	-.12	-.178	-.145
Participatory	.36***	.324***	-.003
Traditional	-.56***	-.513***	-.163
Dictatorial	-.06	-.004	.003
Procedural Justice Rating	.77***		.728***
N=98		R ² =.351***	R ² =.601***
*p<.05	**p<.01	***p<.001	

Table 15A
Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for Men for
Satisfaction with Courts with Revised Exogenous Variables

Variables	r	Model 1	Model 2
Age	-.03	-.053	-.058
Education	.15	.110	.076
Income	-.16	-.162	-.150
Divorce	-.03	.071	.063
Deeds	.12	.052	.051
MyFavor	.30**	-.032	-.229
Opposition	-.26**	-.251	-.386
Mixed	-.07	-.232	-.422
Participatory	.32**	.300**	.161
Traditional	-.43***	-.383***	-.262*
Dictatorial	-.06	-.009	-.052
Procedural Justice	.47***		.238
Sat/Attorney	.49***		.137
Recommend/Use Again	.45***		-.015

N=90

R²=.292***

R²=.337***

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Table 15B
Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients for Women for
Satisfaction with Courts with Revised Exogenous Variables

Variables	r	Model 1	Model 2
Age	-.27**	-.177	-.095
Education	-.10	-.081	-.052
Income	.11	.083	.046
Divorce	.03	-.046	-.076
Deeds	-.06	-.016	.037
MyFavor	.36***	.054	-.052
Opposition	-.28**	-.225	-.229
Mixed	-.17*	-.180	-.227
Participatory	.37***	.248*	.007
Traditional	-.15*	-.076	.102
Dictatorial	.01	-.016	.025
Procedural Justice	.39***		.121
Sat/Attorney	.58***		.544***
Recommend/Use Again	.29***		-.155

N=98

R²=.189**

R²=.322***

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Table 16A. Summary of Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Predetermined Variables on Satisfaction Ratings*

	Total Assoc. (r)	Total Effect	Direct Effect	Indirect Effects
Procedural Justice Rating				
Gender	-.12	-.112	-.112	---
Age	-.13	-.015	-.015	---
Education	-.03	-.025	-.025	---
Income	.00	.040	.040	---
Case-Divorce	.13	.150	.150	---
Case-Deeds	.07	.098	.098	---
MyFavor	.12	.128	.128	---
Opposition	.17	-.011	-.011	---
Mixed	.05	.067	.067	---
Participatory Style	.48	.435	.435	---
Traditional Style	-.46	-.410	-.410	---
Authoritarian Style	.05	.035	.035	---
Satisfaction with Attorney				
Procedural Justice	.71	.503	.503	---
Gender	-.01	-.055	.001	-.056
Age	-.14	-.066	-.058	-.008
Education	.02	.022	.035	-.013
Income	.13	.103	.083	.020
Case-Divorce	.08	.075	.000	.075
Case-Deeds	-.05	-.042	-.091	.049
MyFavor	.23	.126	.062	.064
Opposition	-.30	-.059	-.053	-.006
Mixed	-.00	.036	.002	.034
Participatory Style	.53	.467	.248	.219
Traditional Style	-.38	-.349	-.143	-.206
Authoritarian	.00	-.043	-.061	.018
Recommend/Use Again				
Procedural Justice	.82	.783	.783	---
Gender	-.02	-.064	.024	-.088
Age	-.02	.051	.063	-.012
Education	-.00	.011	.031	-.020
Income	.09	.058	.027	.031
Case-Divorce	-.00	.047	-.070	.117
Case-Deeds	.09	.070	-.007	.077
MyFavor	.22	.216	.116	.100
Opposition	-.18	.059	.068	-.009
Mixed	-.03	.112	.060	.052
Participatory Style	.40	.345	.004	.341
Traditional Style	-.46	-.410	-.089	-.321
Authoritarian	.04	.017	-.010	.027

Table 16A, Continued. Summary of Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Predetermined Variables on Satisfaction Ratings*

	Total Assoc. (r)	Total Effect	Direct Effect	Indirect Effects
Satisfaction with Courts				
Sat. with Attorney	.52	.403	.403	---
Recommend/Use Again	.34	-.104	-.104	---
Procedural Justice	.39	.246	.125	.121
Gender	.19	.152	.182	-.030
Age	-.17	-.105	-.071	-.034
Education	.01	.031	.024	.007
Income	-.03	.001	-.039	.040
Case-Divorce	.01	.031	-.013	.044
Case-Deeds	.02	.031	.043	-.012
MyFavor	.35	.022	-.022	.044
Opposition	-.28	-.268	-.237	-.031
Mixed	-.13	-.046	-.057	.011
Participatory Style	.34	.260	.053	.207
Traditional Style	-.26	-.206	-.057	-.149
Authoritarian Style	-.02	.007	.022	-.015

*Note: The total effect of a predetermined variable on a dependent variable is the sum of its direct and indirect effects. Direct effects refer to the impact of a predetermined variable on the dependent variable controlling for all other variables in the model. The total indirect effect is the sum of all indirect paths. For example, the total indirect effect for gender is the sum of the path from gender to procedural justice to satisfaction with courts, the path from gender to procedural justice to satisfaction with the attorney to satisfaction with courts, the path from gender to satisfaction with the attorney to satisfaction with courts; in addition, it includes the path from gender to procedural justice to recommend/use again to satisfaction with courts, and the path from gender to recommend/use again to satisfaction with courts. A (---) line indicates that no indirect effect is posited for that variable.

Table 16B. Summary of Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Predetermined Variables on Satisfaction Ratings for Men*

	Total Assoc. (r)	Total Effect	Direct Effect	Indirect Effects
Procedural Justice Rating				
Age	.09	.053	.053	---
Education	.15	.082	.082	---
Income	.04	.043	.043	---
Case-Divorce	.09	.119	.119	---
Case-Deeds	.10	.071	.071	---
MyFavor	.14	.353	.353	---
Opposition	-.26	.130	.130	---
Mixed	.13	.281	.281	---
Participatory Style	.42	.360	.360	---
Traditional Style	-.40	-.356	-.356	---
Authoritarian Style	.18	.137	.137	---
Satisfaction with Attorney				
Procedural Justice	.71	.534	.534	---
Age	-.03	-.020	-.048	.028
Education	.18	.108	.064	.044
Income	.05	.067	.044	.023
Case-Divorce	-.00	.043	-.021	.064
Case-Deeds	-.01	-.048	-.086	.038
MyFavor	.21	.201	.012	.189
Oppositon	-.32	-.042	-.111	.069
Mixed	.07	.093	-.057	.150
Participatory Style	.50	.440	.248	.192
Traditional Style	-.36	-.331	-.141	-.190
Authoritarian Style	.09	.042	-.031	.073
Recommend/Use Again				
Procedural Justice	.87	.851	.851	---
Age	.12	.069	.024	.045
Education	.09	.019	-.051	.070
Income	.01	.089	.052	.037
Case-Divorce	-.09	-.031	-.132	.101
Case-Deeds	.10	.036	-.024	.060
MyFavor	.19	.374	.074	.300
Oppositon	-.18	.141	.030	.111
Mixed	.06	.279	.040	.239
Participatory Style	.26	.234	-.072	.306
Traditional Style	-.49	-.454	-.151	-.303
Authoritarian Style	.07	.068	-.049	.117

Table 16B, Continued. Summary of Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Predetermined Variables on Satisfaction Ratings for Men

	Total Assoc. (r)	Total Effect	Direct Effect	Indirect Effects
Satisfaction with Courts				
Sat. with Attorney	.49	.137	.137	---
Recommend/Use Again	.45	-.015	-.015	---
Procedural Justice	.47	.298	.238	.060
Age	-.03	-.049	-.058	.009
Education	.15	.110	.076	.034
Income	-.16	-.132	-.150	.018
Case-Divorce	-.03	.098	.063	.035
Case-Deeds	.12	.061	.051	.010
My Favor	.30	-.123	-.229	.106
Opposition	-.26	-.364	-.386	.022
Mixed	-.07	-.347	-.422	.075
Participatory Style	.32	.303	.161	.142
Traditional Style	-.43	-.385	-.262	-.123
Authoritarian Style	-.06	-.015	-.052	.037

*Note: The total effect of a predetermined variable on a dependent variable is the sum of its direct and indirect effects. Direct effects refer to the impact of a predetermined variable on the dependent variable controlling for all other variables in the model. The total indirect effect is the sum of all indirect paths. For example, the total indirect effect for gender is the sum of the path from gender to procedural justice to satisfaction with courts, the path from gender to procedural justice to satisfaction with the attorney to satisfaction with courts, the path from gender to satisfaction with the attorney to satisfaction with courts; in addition, it includes the path from gender to procedural justice to recommend/use again to satisfaction with courts, and the path from gender to recommend/use again to satisfaction with courts. A (---) line indicates that no indirect effect is posited for that variable.

Table 16C. Summary of Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Predetermined Variables on Satisfaction Ratings for Women*

	Total Assoc. (r)	Total Effect	Direct Effect	Indirect Effects
Procedural Justice Rating				
Age	-.22	-.033	-.033	---
Education	-.16	-.051	-.051	---
Income	.08	-.001	-.001	---
Case-Divorce	.19	.158	.158	---
Case-Deeds	.05	.079	.079	---
MyFavor	.17	.010	.010	---
Opposition	-.22	-.094	-.094	---
Mixed	-.05	.003	.003	---
Participatory Style	.57	.465	.465	---
Traditional Style	-.46	-.417	-.417	---
Authoritarian Style	-.01	-.018	-.018	---
Satisfaction with Attorney				
Procedural Justice	.71	.469	.469	---
Age	-.27	-.084	-.069	-.015
Education	-.10	-.024	.000	-.024
Income	.19	.110	.110	-.000
Case-Divorce	.15	.093	.019	.074
Case-Deeds	-.09	-.062	-.099	.037
MyFavor	.25	.075	.070	.005
Opposition	-.28	-.071	-.027	-.044
Mixed	-.07	.012	.011	.001
Participatory Style	.56	.467	.249	.218
Traditional Style	-.41	-.334	-.138	-.196
Authoritarian Style	-.07	-.107	-.099	-.008
Recommend/Use Again				
Procedural Justice	.77	.728	.728	---
Age	-.16	.016	.040	-.024
Education	-.03	-.000	.037	-.037
Income	.04	.031	.032	-.001
Case-Divorce	-.00	-.007	-.122	.115
Case-Deeds	.12	.073	.015	.058
MyFavor	.12	-.120	-.127	.007
Opposition	-.07	-.127	-.059	-.068
Mixed	-.12	-.143	-.145	.002
Participatory Style	.36	.336	-.003	.339
Traditional Style	-.56	-.467	-.163	-.304
Authoritarian Style	-.06	.016	.003	.013

Table 16C, Continued. Summary of Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Predictor Variables on Satisfaction Ratings for Women

	Total Assoc. (r)	Total Effect	Direct Effect	Indirect Effects
Satisfaction with Courts				
Sat. with Attorney	.58	.544	.544	---
Recommend/Use Again	.29	-.155	-.155	---
Procedural Justice	.39	.263	.121	.142
Age	-.27	-.147	-.095	-.052
Education	-.10	-.071	-.052	-.019
Income	.11	.101	.046	.055
Case-Divorce	.03	-.005	-.076	.071
Case-Deeds	-.06	.023	.037	-.014
MyFavor	.36	.008	-.052	.060
Opposition	-.28	-.259	-.229	-.030
Mixed	-.17	-.198	-.227	.029
Participatory Style	.37	.265	.007	.258
Traditional Style	-.15	-.058	.102	-.160
Authoritarian Style	.01	-.038	.025	-.063

*Note: The total effect of a predetermined variable on a dependent variable is the sum of its direct and indirect effects. Direct effects refer to the impact of a predetermined variable on the dependent variable controlling for all other variables in the model. The total indirect effect is the sum of all indirect paths. For example, the total indirect effect for gender is the sum of the path from gender to procedural justice to satisfaction with courts, the path from gender to procedural justice to satisfaction with the attorney to satisfaction with courts, the path from gender to satisfaction with the attorney to satisfaction with courts; in addition, it includes the path from gender to procedural justice to recommend/use again to satisfaction with courts, and the path from gender to recommend/use again to satisfaction with courts. A (---) line indicates that no indirect effect is posited for that variable.

Table 17A. Summary Table for One-Way Analysis of Variance and Multiple Range Test of Procedural Justice Classified by Comment Group

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between groups	85.64	3	28.55	10.73***
Within groups(error)	1005.95	378	2.66	
Total	1091.59	381		

Mean	N	Group	Grp4	Grp1	Grp2	Grp3
4.16	104	Grp4				
5.01	167	Grp1	*			
5.21	72	Grp2	*			
5.63	39	Grp3	*			

* Denotes pairs of groups significantly different at the 0.05 level.

***p<.001

Table 17B. Summary Table for One-Way Analysis of Variance and Multiple Range Test of Satisfaction with Attorney Classified by Comment Group

Source	SS	df	MS	f
Between groups	12.85	3	4.28	11.66***
Within groups(error)	154.65	421	.37	
Total	167.50			

Mean	N	Group	Grp4	Grp2	Grp1	Grp3
2.00	113	Grp4				
2.30	84	Grp2	*			
2.33	180	Grp1	*			
2.55	48	Grp3	*		*	

* Denotes pairs of groups significantly different at the 0.05 level.

***p<.001

Table 17C. Summary Table for One-Way Analysis of Variance and Multiple Range Test of Satisfaction with Attorney (Recommend or Use Again Measure) Classified by Comment Group

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between groups	20.27	3	6.76	10.07***
Within groups (error)	287.96	429	.67	
Total	308.24			

Mean	N	Group	Grp4	Grp1	Grp2	Grp3
1.17	115	Grp4				
1.58	190	Grp1	*			
1.59	76	Grp2	*			
1.85	52	Grp3	*			

* Denotes pairs of groups significantly different at the 0.05 level.

***p<.001

Table 17D. Summary Table for One-Way Analysis of Variance and Multiple Range Test of Satisfaction with Court Classified by Comment Group

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between groups	4.21	3	1.40	3.58*
Within groups (error)	107.21	274	.39	
Total	111.41	277		

Mean	N	Group	Grp4	Grp1	Grp2	Grp3
1.72	85	Grp4				
1.98	118	Grp1	*			
1.99	52	Grp2				
2.02	23	Grp3				

* Denotes pairs of groups significantly different at the 0.05 level.

Table 17E. Summary Table for One-Way Analysis of Variance and Multiple Range Test of Income of Client Classified by Comment Group

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between groups	33.54	3	11.18	6.85***
Within groups (error)	1013.82	621	1.63	
Total	1047.36			

Mean	N	Group	Grp1	Grp2	Grp4	Grp3
2.86	85	Grp1				
2.98	111	Grp2				
3.11	153	Grp4				
3.59	76	Grp3	*	*	*	

* Denotes pairs of groups significantly different at the 0.05 level.
 ***p<.001

Table 17F. Summary Table for One-Way Analysis of Variance and Multiple Range Test of Education of Client Classified by Comment Group

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between groups	51.57	3	17.19	6.69***
Within groups (error)	1695.18	660	2.57	
Total	1746.75	663		

Mean	N	Group	Grp1	Grp2	Grp4	Grp3
4.46	302	Grp1				
4.74	118	Grp2				
4.97	166	Grp4	*			
5.24	78	Grp3	*			

* Denotes pairs of groups significantly different at the 0.05 level.
 ***p<.001

Table 18. Crosstabulation of Gender and Comment Groups

	Men	Women	Total
No Comment	40.8%	49.6%	45.5%
Nonsubstantive Comment	14.6	20.6	17.8
Positive or Neutral Comment	12.9	10.7	11.7
Negative Comment	31.7	19.2	25.0
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.1%</u>	<u>100%</u>
N	309	355	664

Chi-Square=17.291 (p<.001)

VITA

of

Judith Mitchell Herrin

HOME ADDRESS

3533 Londonderry Lane
Roanoke, Virginia 24108
(540) 989-4403

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Sociology, 1996
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Blacksburg, Virginia

Dissertation Title: "Clients' Evaluations of Lawyers:
Predictions from Procedural Justice Ratings and
Interactional Styles of Lawyers"

Master of Science in Sociology, 1990
(under the name of Judith Herrin Freeman)
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Blacksburg, Virginia

Thesis Title: "Correlates of a Sense of Control of
Aging"

Bachelor of Science in Biology, 1965
Madison College (now James Madison University)
Harrisonburg, Virginia

HONORS

Sigma Phi Lambda Honor Society (Madison College)
Alpha Kappa Delta International Sociology Honor Society
(Virginia Tech)
President, Alpha Kappa Delta, 1991-92 (Virginia Tech)

PRESENTATIONS AT MEETINGS

Moderator, Open Forum: Problems of Graduate Students, Mid-
South Sociological Association, October, 1987.

"Working Women in Rural Virginia," North Carolina
Sociological Association, April, 1989.

SPECIALTY TRAINING, MEDIATION

Basic Mediation Training, 1991
Orientation to Virginia's Judicial System, 1993
Divorce Mediation, 1994
Domestic Violence: Issues and Screening Processes, 1995
Juvenile Restitution Mediation Training, 1995
Conflict Resolution Skills for the Workplace, 1995
Handling High Emotions in Family Mediation Training, 1996
Virginia Supreme Court Mediator Certification #0795, 1996

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Social Problems, Virginia Tech, Spring, 1993
Criminology, Virginia Tech, 1993-94

RECENT WORK EXPERIENCE

Substitute Teacher, Roanoke County Public Schools, Fall,
1995 - present.

Graduate Assistant, Virginia Tech, 1994-95, Assistant to
Dr. James Michaels (Social Psychology) and Dr. Jill Kiecolt
(Social Psychology and Social Research Methods).

Graduate Assistant, Virginia Tech, 1991-92, Assistant to Dr.
Terance Miethe (Criminology and Sociology of Law).

Graduate Assistant on National Science Foundation Grant,
"Public Evaluations of Legal Disputes: A Study of Causes
and Consequences," Virginia Tech, 1991. Principal
Investigator: Dr. Terance Miethe.

Graduate Assistant, Virginia Tech, 1986-1987, Assistant to
Dr. Terance Miethe (Criminology and Sociology of Law).

SUMMARY OF PRIOR WORK EXPERIENCE

Laboratory Research Assistant, Case Western Reserve Medical
School, Cleveland, Ohio, 1971-74.

Laboratory Research Assistant, University of Tennessee
Medical Units, Memphis, Tennessee, 1968-71.

Assistant Secretary to the President, Haverford College,
Haverford, Pennsylvania, 1967-68.

Laboratory Research Assistant, University of Virginia
Medical School, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1965-67.