"CANDLES OF THE NATION": COMMUNITY-BASED NONPROFIT HUMAN SERVICE INSTITUTIONS IN THE PROCESS OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE

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In The New State, Mary Parker Follett argues that the "neighborhood group" is the center of citizenship and democratic governance. In so doing, she takes us into territory that remains largely unexplored: social processes and how they can create an ideal democracy.

Just as it has been for more than a century with regard to writing about both social life and organizations generally, interpretations of Mary Follett's The New State have reflected a decidedly traditional, or functionalist, cast. Hence, she has not made sense to us; and such interpretations may have caused us to underestimate or dismiss her contributions. A "new-eye" view of The New State, however, may show us that her ideas carry richer intent than the traditional view indicates.

This work brings the "new eyes" of interpretive social theory together with the pragmatism of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead to analysis of Follett's "five ways for producing the integrated and responsible neighborhood." It argues that community-based nonprofit human service institutions are, or can be, powerful catalysts with which to give to ourselves the kind of democracy she envisions. Following therefrom, they also can be mutually supportive mechanisms with which to foster more integrated, cohesive social policy planning.

Following analysis of Follett's "five ways," illustrative case studies about contemporary community-based nonprofit human service institutions reveal that Follett's unwavering faith in the efficacy of neighborhood organizations in service of the democratic
ideal is not misplaced; and that the positive characteristics she saw in her Nineteenth Century "neighborhood group" are alive and well in their late Twentieth Century counterparts. Succeeding those are a series of theoretical propositions about latter-day nonprofit human service institutions.

The objective of the work is to show how such institutions, and their connection to the process of governance, can -- and do -- provide an organic forum within which people can make sense of and cope with their experiences in social, political and organizational life. It is a call for us to look at these "candles of the nation" with new eyes -- just as Mary Follett did.
DEDICATION

FOR MY JACK, WHO HAS MADE ALL THE DIFFERENCE

I LOVE YOU HIGHER THAN YOU CAN COUNT
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CHAPTER ONE
SETTING THE STAGE

Introduction

In 1541, Michelangelo completed what was destined to become one of the more spectacular artistic achievements in Western civilization: the painting of several massive frescoes covering a 13,000 square foot area in the Vatican's Sistine Chapel. The work is a breathtaking study in human anatomy and movement that remains unmatched in art history.

The frescoes were painted over ten years, in two stages. The first stage (1508-1512) brought into being nine scenes upon the ceiling and on the 14 "lunettes" (crescent-shaped areas above the Chapel windows) depicting events from the Book of Genesis. The second stage (1535-1541) produced the "Last Judgment," positioned over the altar.

For nearly five centuries, the frescoes were subjected to all manner of airborne environmental pollutants which had caused their marked deterioration and fading. In consequence, in 1980 the Vatican ordered their restoration, a twelve-year $11 million endeavor conducted by a large team of art scholars, restoration experts and technicians (R. Suro, 1987, p. 8; M. Suro, 1987, p. H27; Tsiantar, 1985, pp. G1, G4).

Praise and condemnation, in tandem, attended the restoration (see, e.g., M. Suro, 1987; Beck, 1988; Hochfield, 1990; Beck, 1992). There was, however, universal agreement on one point: whatever else the restoration accomplished, it certainly served to alter the appearance of Michelangelo's masterwork.

Midway through the restoration, for example, the art world was startled to discover that Michelangelo had "originally used bold, vibrant colors instead of...the muted brownish tones..." to which both scholars and lay viewers of the work had long been accustomed (Tsiantar, p. G1). Commenting upon that discovery, Walter Persegati, secretary general of the Vatican Museums, said: "A new Michelangelo appears in these bright colors. After the cleaning is complete, the evaluation of Michelangelo as a painter will have to be rewritten" (Tsiantar, p. G1). Likewise, Kathleen Weil-Garris Brandt, New York University Renaissance art scholar, remarked that "[t]he cleaning has completely reversed our idea of Michelangelo's contribution to the art world" (Tsiantar, pp. G1, G4).

The restoration also uncovered features that had long been obscured: "[t]he darkened somber figures that were barely discernable from the floor of the chapel 60 feet below
suddenly have become bold, clear images. New details—the lace of a hem of a gown, for example—have emerged from beneath layers of centuries-old grime" (Tsiantar, p. G4).

The brief discussion of the Sistine Chapel restoration is intended to highlight the fact that that endeavor gave to us a work that was at once the same, but somehow novel to our eyes. What was once familiar had become something altogether different. While I would not presume to equate the work of the world-class artisans engaged to undertake the Sistine Chapel restoration with my work here, my intent is quite similar. That is, I urge a "new-eye" view of community-based nonprofit human service institutions in the process of public governance.

The examination of these organizations is grounded conceptually in Mary Parker Follett's ([1918] 1965) The New State,¹ in which she argues compellingly for the value and necessity of the "neighborhood group" as the center of citizenship, democratic governance and social policy planning. In so doing, she takes us into territory that, even today, remains largely unexplored: social processes and how they can create and nurture an ideal democracy.

For present purposes, "community-based nonprofit human service institutions" are defined as those domestic organizations having 501(c)3 nonprofit "public benefit" status with the Internal Revenue Service. Hence, this work does not attend to the universe of nonprofits, but only to those that have as their primary function provision of health and human services.

With this work, then, I invite the reader to journey back to the social process territory Follett explored nearly a century ago, to rather "rediscover" her. This rediscovery is guided by two bodies of thought with which Follett shows sometimes astonishing agreement: interpretive social and organization theory; and the "Chicago School" pragmatism of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead.

Throughout, I attempt to show that the "fit" between and among Follett, interpretivism, and the Chicago School pragmatic tradition is a comfortable one. This is a departure from much literature both old and new, which attempts to explain Follett, or to apply her concepts, in traditional terms (e.g., Gulick and Urwick, 1937; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Cooper, 1991;

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Mary Follett throughout this work are from The New State.
Graham, 1995). As our new eyes look upon The New State, however, we see more robust colors. By extension, these newly-discovered colors also show that her process-centered contributions to theory and action, as they might apply to contemporary community-based nonprofit human service institutions, are worthy of our attention.

It is no understatement to suggest that much of what has been written about both social life and organizations generally for more than a century has exhibited a distinctly functionalist, or traditional, cast (e.g., Waldo, 1961; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; White and McSwain, 1983; Morgan, 1986). We see the phenomenon, for example, in many of what today are considered classic works in organization theory -- all written long after Follett's death in 1933 (e.g., Barnard, 1938; Simon, [1945] 1976; Selznick, 1957; Katz and Kahn, 1966; Thompson, 1967). We see it as well in the policy sciences (e.g., Korten, 1981; Bozeman, 1986; Quade, 1989; Robertson and Judd, 1989; Salamon, 1989; Goggin, Bowman, Lester and O'Toole, 1990; Gormley, 1991; Dobuzinskis, 1992).

We certainly see it laid bare in much classic or mainstream public administration literature (e.g., Chandler, 1987; Fry, 1989; Wilson, 1989; Mosher, 1990; Shafritz and Hyde, 1992). Seidman and Gilmour (1986), for example, wryly note this tendency in their review of a host of Twentieth Century government administrative reform efforts. They quote Wallace Sayre, pithily suggesting that "[p]ublication of the Papers on the Science of Administration in 1937 may have marked the 'high noon of orthodoxy in public administration theory in the United States,' but someone apparently stopped the clock" (p. 10).

Likewise, literature on nonprofit organizations, which did not appear with any force or volume until the late 1970's, falls victim to much the same functionalist tilt. This, too, is unsurprising: the literature arises from a number of decidedly traditional perspectives (e.g., Simon, 1989; Lohmann, 1992; Hall, 1993) and is nurtured by long-codified ideas about what role(s) these organizations have (or ought to have) in our social, political and economic life (e.g., Weisbrod, 1974, 1977; Hansmann, 1980; Orlans, 1980; Salamon, 1989; Bernstein, 1991; Wuthnow, 1991).

Such is the case with Mary Follett's The New State. As it is with society and organizations generally, we have attempted to understand this work in traditional terms; and she has not made sense to us. This, in turn, may have caused us to underestimate or dismiss her contributions. Indeed, viewed through a functionalist lens, her position in The
New State appears simple -- even simplistic. But if we view The New State with new eyes, we see that Follett's ideas carry richer intent than the traditional view might indicate.

In her remarkable work, Follett again and again admonishes that neither democracy nor freedom can be "given" to us, but that we must "win [them] for ourselves" (pp. 22, 71). She links democracy directly to the efficacy of the neighborhood group, saying that democracy is "every one building the single life, not my life and others, not the individual and the state, but my life bound up with others, the individual which is the state, the state which is the individual" (p. 156, emphases in original). Following from Follett, I will argue that contemporary community-based nonprofit human service institutions are, or can be, powerful catalysts with which to give to ourselves the kind of democracy she envisions. In so doing, it may become evident that they also can be mutually supportive mechanisms with which to foster more integrated, cohesive social policy planning.

Two fundamental arguments guide this work. First, the problem for democratic governance and administration does not reside in finding technically defensible "answers" to narrowly-defined social problems. Rather, the greatest problem for democratic governance resides in development of appropriate social mechanisms with which to solve or ameliorate not only a problem, but many.

The second argument is even more fundamental than the first: if we as a people have a mandate today, it is nothing less than keeping the social order intact. That requires not only vigorous and sustained attention to problems that may place it in jeopardy, but to the relational context forming the penumbra around solutions to those problems. Context, then, is the central issue. Community-based nonprofit human service institutions are the mechanisms by which we can build it. Indeed, it is to this argument that Mary Follett repeatedly returns.

So then, based on a synthesis of what we know about community-based nonprofit human service institutions, I seek to demonstrate that, in them, we have at hand forums of potent communicative and moral power, present since before the founding of the Republic, which both require and deserve a consciously-enacted attention. The overarching objective of the work is to show how they, and their connection to the process of governance, can -- and do -- provide an organic forum for developing a truly new kind of institutional process for such governance. In this, they offer a "home for the mind" (Berger, Berger, and Kellner,
such that people can make sense of and cope with their experiences in social, political and organizational life.

This chapter has six sections. First, to develop my argument, I turn to Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber's (1973) metaphor of "tame" versus "wicked" problems, using it rather as a "foil." Rittel and Webber's metaphor highlights their central argument: that concerns for the consequences of equity have subsumed traditional economic measures of accomplishment or social progress (p. 156).

For the interpretivists and pragmatists (and hence Follett), that is not "the" problem. Rather, they argue that the seedbed for myriad social problems is the relational distance between and among people. Follett, for example, contends that a properly organized and sustained social process, brought into being by a responsible citizenry engaged in neighborhood group life, is the primary mechanism with which to reduce that distance. As this process develops, it will "naturally" offer solutions to the plethora of problems confronted by individual, group, community and nation. Thus, to have a democracy worthy of the name, the institutions of government must consistently and sufficiently foster healthy community social processes such that the relational distance between and among people can be diminished. I call these community processes "context" or "relational context."

In the second section, I present a "real world" case as illustration of the problem I have identified. The case, a comparison between the 1965 Watts and 1992 South Central rebellions, demonstrates how important are contextual relations to social, political and economic processes. Although 1965 Watts and 1992 South-Central present some difficulty. The terms "riot", "rebellion", "uprising", and "insurrection" have all been used in both popular and scholarly literature; and terms such as "incident" or "episode" serve only to trivialize those events.

Johnson, Jones, Farrell, and Oliver (1992) have described the 1960-1990 era of collective violence in America as "urban rebellions", defining them as events in which African-Americans engage in violence "toward property of white and other signs of overt white control in black communities." A riot, in contrast, is defined by Paul Jacobs (cited in Dentler, 1992, p. 229) as "a violent public disorder or a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by a crowd whose members act with a common interest." While, as Dentler observes, each term carries "a grain of truth that is absent from the others" (p. 229), and chooses the term "riot" to avoid what he calls a "semantic disconnection" ("riot" was the most-frequently used term in news reports), I choose instead the term "rebellion". As will be seen, the 1992 rebellion, in particular, had elements more closely resembling Johnson, et al.'s "urban
organizational life, and to development of social policy. The third section discusses the necessity for this work and its contributions to theory and practice. In the fourth section, I briefly present the primary arguments Follett advances in The New State. This last serves as the "jumping off" point for the rest of the work. The fifth section is very brief. Here, I offer a rather droll exemplar of "context," compliments of E.B. White. Finally, section six outlines what will follow in the rest of the work.

Section One: "Tame" vs. "Wicked" Problems

Rittel and Webber say that, in the United States, many "relatively easy problems" have been addressed and successfully solved (most notably, by the professional) in the past century. These "tame" problems are rather easily solved because "...they are readily defined and separated from other problems and from their environment....Whatever difficulties and complexities are encountered in their solution are mainly technical" (Harmon and Mayer, 1986, p. 9, emphasis supplied). In short,

[the streets have been paved...houses shelter virtually everyone; the dread diseases are virtually gone; clean water is piped into nearly every building; sanitary sewers carry wastes from them; schools and hospitals serve virtually every district...](Rittel and Webber, p. 156).

On the other hand, say Rittel and Webber, "wicked" problems are neither so easily defined nor solved. For them, "wicked" problems are not "ethically deplorable," but rather "akin to that of 'malignant' (in contrast to 'benign') or 'vicious' (like a circle) or 'tricky' (like a leprechaun) or 'aggressive' (like a lion, in contrast to the docility of a lamb)" (p. 160). That is so because "[the tests for efficiency, that were once so useful as measures of accomplishment, are being challenged by a renewed preoccupation with consequences for rebellion" than Jacobs's "riot" (also Schulberg, 1967, pp. 1-2).

More specifically, and as Johnson, et al., note:

in contrast to the [1965 Watts rebellion], the burning and looting [in 1992] were neither random nor limited to a single neighborhood; rather the response was targeted, systematic, and widespread, encompassing much of the legal city. This fact has led us to purposefully and consistently refer to the civil unrest as a rebellion as opposed to a riot (p. 357, emphases in original).
equity" (Rittel and Webber, p. 156). This means that

[t]he seeming consensus, that might once have allowed distributional problems to be dealt with, is being eroded by the growing awareness of the nation's pluralism and of the differentiation of values that accompanies differentiation of publics. The professionalized cognitive and occupational styles that were refined in the first half of this century, based in Newtonian mechanistic physics, are not readily adapted to contemporary conceptions of interacting open systems and to contemporary concerns with equity (Rittel and Webber, p. 156).

Further, because "wicked" problems are complex and hence not readily susceptible to traditional analytic or evaluative measures, they "[serve] as a metaphorical reminder of our limitations in controlling the social world" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 11). That may be, but I would reformulate Rittel and Webber's "tame-wicked" distinction and send a different message, one that directs our attention away from the distributional question and toward that of relational or community context in social policy planning.

In reformulating their metaphor, I would argue that "tame" problems may have been precisely that at one time, but it cannot be said that they have been solved. From the turn of the Century until perhaps the emergence of the civil rights movements at mid-Century, it may have appeared that America had a clear idea of what it wanted to do about the "tame" problems of social life Rittel and Webber describe. It may even be fair to say that we solved these problems, at least momentarily, while this "consensus" held sway. They did not stay solved, however.

In my view, the reason they did not is that in order to solve social problems, there must be a stable and coherent relational context to which the agencies of government can refer as they seek solutions. By any other name "relational context" means "community." Only with such community context can agencies come to have an idea of what solving a problem might mean. Absent that context, because problems are intertwined, one with another, it is impossible to sort out the opportunity costs involved with various lines of action. It therefore becomes impossible to set priorities, and problems themselves become impossible. Thus, "equity-as-new-standard" is not the problem as Rittel and Webber submit, but our failure to nurture an enabling community context around problems. Those conditions lead me to suggest that that is the wicked problem.
Let me "nudge" public administration a bit on this point. There is little doubt that we have nearly limitless capacity for finding technical, rational solutions to problems. Indeed, our discipline's reputation may be said to rest upon that capacity -- and has done so for nearly a century. At the same time, what we lack (or perhaps have lost) is the capacity to maintain the context within which social problems can be addressed. And no solution, however technically defensible, will do us any good unless it is generated within such a context. Indeed, as the history of social reform in the United States has shown us repeatedly, proposed solutions grounded in principles of technical rationality, structural reorganization and market economics, if applied (alone) to social problems, will fail (see, e.g., Ford Foundation, 1989, chapter one, passim; Racine, 1995, pp. 439, 445).

The conditions described here also lead me to a fundamental point. The idea of community upon which we have traditionally relied comes to us via Durkheim's notion of *gemeinschaft* or community, an idea derived from an understanding of community as a group that shares a value system, an ideology, or some other normative basis. In short, "the whole is an absolute unity, and the parts are hardly distinguishable from one another" (Alpert, 1990, p. 36). This traditional view creates the kind of community that commits all the horrors stemming from the insistence on conformity (like Salem witch hunts) for which communities are famous.

This idea has long complicated the picture because such conceptualization fails to address the essential relational context needed for contemporary problem solving. What this means is that the traditional idea of community is inappropriate for us as a people at this point in history. Hence, Durkheim's *gemeinschaft*, if ever it existed, might have produced the temporary solutions cited earlier, but because a genuine relational context around those solutions had not developed sufficiently (or at all), priorities shifted and the older "tame" problems reappeared.

As illustration, consider hunger in America. In 1986, Harvard University's School of Public Health Physician Task Force on Hunger in America published *Hunger Counties 1986: The Distribution of America's High-Risk Areas*. In it, they observe that by 1977, thanks largely to Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, "poverty still existed...[but] widespread hunger and clinical malnutrition...had diminished as a widespread problem" (Physician Task Force, p. 4).
The Task Force documented that although 17.3 percent of the population, or 33.2 million people, lived in poverty in 1965, by 1973, 11.1 percent of the population (22.9 million people) did so. While poverty in absolute terms showed a marked decline in the period 1966-1979, it began again to climb dramatically in 1980 so that, by 1984, 14.4 percent of the population (33.7 million people) lived in poverty. This represents a 29.7 percent increase in poverty in the period 1973-1984, in contrast to a 35.8 percent decrease in the period 1965-1973 (Physician Task Force, p. 8).

Three additional complications may be cited. First, as political and policy priorities apparently shifted, other problems, some of even more complex and pernicious character, emerged (e.g., drugs, school violence, and a spiralling national debt and deficit). Second, deeply-rooted problems such as institutional racism (Knowles and Prewitt, eds., 1969) not only did not get "solved," but became even more complex, largely the result of neglect, unconscious or otherwise. Third, citizenship as idea, ideal and practice seems to have deteriorated markedly. This, in turn, has produced a decline in even the most basic responsibility of citizenship (the ballot box) (see, e.g., M. Davis, 1990; Knack, 1990; Oreskes, 1990; Glendon, 1991; Power and Power, 1992; Chrislip and Larson, 1994; Lewis, 1996; Hill, 1996).

A more efficacious approach to amelioration of those conditions, it seems to me, is to explore what I here call community-based nonprofit human service institutions and their role as vibrant, consequential partners in the processes of democratic governance and administration in the United States. For it is with these institutions I believe the very meaning, perhaps survival, of democracy may rest. In this, they may truly be "candles of the nation" (Follett. [1918] 1965, p. 257).

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3 I do not here suggest that hunger in America was ever a "tame" problem in the sense of easy or unimportant. I use the illustration to underscore the point that, although a problem (hunger) had been ameliorated for a time, it soon reemerged because political and social priorities shifted. This is consistent with my reformulation of the Rittel and Webber metaphors.

4 In saying that "the spirit of the neighborhood [must] be the candle of the nation", Mary Follett acknowledges drawing on Voltaire's comment that "The spirit of France is the candle of Europe." Just as Follett borrowed from Voltaire, I borrow from her.
Section Two: Comparison of Conditions Leading to the 1965 Watts and the 1992 South Central Rebellions -- The More Things Change, the More They Remain the Same

The problem I identify may be elaborated upon by briefly comparing the 1965 Watts rebellion with its 1992 "South Central" analogue. The literature contrasting those two events gives overwhelming evidence that nothing of substance changed for citizens there between 1965 and 1992. Indeed, little in either subjective or objective terms seems to have changed; and both quantitative and qualitative data indicate that many conditions in fact worsened (see, e.g., Callinicos, 1992; Dentler, 1992; Johnson, Jones, Farrell and Oliver, 1992; Stencel, 1992; Omi and Winant, 1993). Thus, that there seemed to be nearly universal surprise at the 1992 rebellion, may itself be surprising. Let us briefly look now at a comparison between these two rebellions.

In the waning hours of April, 1992, the South Central area of Los Angeles nearly incinerated itself out of existence. The proximate event precipitating what has been called that neighborhood's "self-inflicted wounds" (Peterson and Tobar, 1992, p. A24) was the acquittal of four Caucasian Los Angeles police officers accused of beating Rodney King, an African-American, during a routine traffic stop one year before.

As we watched the visceral intensity with which that seemingly purposeless destruction was carried out, what have come to be known as the "Los Angeles riots" were nothing if not profound testimony to the ultimate breakdown: a community that had turned on itself. And we were surprised somehow.

In the end, and in the worst occurrence of its kind in American history, over 22,000 law enforcement personnel were mobilized, 58 people were killed, nearly 5,000 injured, 10,000 stores burned, and 11,900 people arrested. Property damages were estimated to approach $1 billion (Facts on File, 1993, pp. 328-329; Johnson, et al., 1992, p. 357).

Should we have been surprised at the 1992 South Central rebellion? Consider the Watts rebellion of 27 years before, which occurred just a few miles from Florence and Normandie Avenues, "ground zero" in 1992.

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5 The area called "South Central" in Los Angeles is just a few miles Northwest of Watts. Thus, when citing Watts or South Central in this work, and unless otherwise indicated, I refer to the same general geographic area.
The Watts rebellion fomented on a hot August evening in 1965, when White Highway Patrol officer Lee Minikus stopped Marquette Frye, a 21-year old African American, for drunk driving. Reportedly, when members of Mr. Frye's family attempted to intervene, subsequently engaging in a struggle with Patrolman Minikus and another White officer, they were arrested. An angry crowd gathered, and the situation quickly escalated (Los Angeles Times, 1992, p. 9; Dentler, 1992, p. 232). There followed six days of civil unrest, during which nearly 15,000 law enforcement officers were called in, 34 people died, over 1,000 were injured, and 3,952 arrested. Two hundred buildings were completely destroyed, and 400 more were either fire-damaged and/or looted. Property damage (in 1965 dollars) totalled over $200 million (Los Angeles Times, p. 10; Johnson, et al., p. 357; Dentler, 1992, p. 231; Facts on File, 1966, p. 293-294).

A.T. Callinicos (1992) contrasts the two rebellions. He suggests that three factors sparked that of 1965: first, the effects of the civil rights movement were felt nationally; second, for Southern blacks the success of the civil rights movement "fed the appetite for a radical improvement in the status of all blacks [which, in turn, created] a polarisation within the civil rights movement" (p. 1603, emphasis in original); finally, the latter development was "part...of a more general process of political radicalisation occasioned chiefly by the Vietnam war" (p. 1604). In sum, says Callinicos, "the ghetto risings of the 1960's were thus the climax of a political movement that was ultimately defeated" (p. 1604).

Larry Aubry, Black activist, a deputy probation officer during the 1965 Watts riots and now member of the Inglewood School Board sums up the disturbing similarities between the 1965 and 1992 rebellions: "In '65, it was exclusively black in terms of the looting and the people who were doing the damage." Describing the rioters as "more mixed," ethnically, in 1992, Aubry says, "we're dealing with a class thing here as well as a racial thing...Education is worse than it was in '65. Housing is no better. Unemployment is as bad as it was. And here we are, 27 years later. What the hell's going on?" (quoted in Stencel, 1992, p. A15).

Roberta Senechal (1992) discusses the five primary conditions which may spur large-scale violence such as that witnessed in Los Angeles in 1992. For Senechal, collective violence may be the result of a high degree of

[1]...relational distance between the parties involved—meaning the degree to which [people] participate in one another's lives...[2]...cultural distance, known by the differences between individuals and groups in the symbolic aspect of their social life, as in language, dress, religion, and
art...[3]...functional independence—the extent to which individuals and groups rely on one another economically, politically...[4]...inequality... [and] [5] immobility...both sides cannot pack up their tents and migrate (pp. 7-11).

The 1992 conditions about which Senechial speaks were certainly present in Watts in 1965 as well (McConle, 1965; Schulberg, 1967). They were, however, underscored and made more complicated in 1992 by a number of elements, both old and new, which gave the latter rebellion far different and more complex texture than that of 1965. Both popular and academic literature on the 1992 rebellion repeatedly cite five such elements: economics, changing ethnic demographics, educational conditions, reductions in spending for government social programs, and law enforcement activities. At the risk of underestimating the complexity and interdependence of these elements, let us look at just three of them: economics, demographics, and law enforcement.

**Economics**

It would not be understating it to say that, economically, changes in South Central between the years 1965 and 1992 are breathtaking. Following the 1965 Watts rebellion, the McConle Commission (appointed by California Governor Pat Brown to investigate it) considered unemployment to be of the "highest priority and greatest importance" for the people of Watts (McConle, p. 8).

Following the 1992 South Central correlate, we discover that economic conditions were far worse. Although the South Central area of Los Angeles had been the industrial core of the city for the twenty years following World War II, the decades after Watts saw a "restructuring" of this industrial base. This precipitated the flight of both capital and manufacturing resources from the area (see, e.g., Los Angeles Times, pp. 10-11; Johnson, et al., p. 359; Dentler, p. 235).

For example, in the period 1982-1989 alone, 131 manufacturing plants were closed, citywide, nearly decimating the city's industrial base. In South Central proper, several multinational firms departed to labor-rich, low-wage manufacturing sites along the United States-Mexican border or to the Pacific Rim. These included such economic mainstays as Bethlehem Steel, Chrysler, Fibreboard, Firestone, Johns Manville, and Uniroyal. Additionally, between 1978-1982, over 200 more Los Angeles-based firms departed, among them
Northrup and Rockwell. The upshot is that, between 1978 and 1989, these departures eliminated some 124,000 traditionally well-paying, unionized, stable jobs, 70,000 of which were situated in South Central (Johnson, et al., pp. 359-360, 362; Institute for Alternative Journalism, 1992, p. 144; Callinicos, p. 1605).

At the same time, as it was with much of the country generally, Los Angeles witnessed the growth of the services economy and high-tech manufacturing as the country moved into what has been termed the "post-industrial" or "post-market" era (Johnson, et al., p. 359; Bell, 1980; Lash and Ury, 1987; Rifkin, 1995). While it is true that industrial centers were being established in other Los Angeles locales, particularly during the 1980's, South Central residents have had to look to "competitive sector industries, which rely primarily on undocumented labor and pay, at best, minimum wage" for employment opportunities (Johnson, et al., p. 361). The 1990 census reports that while 67.3 percent of Los Angelenos ages 16 to 65 had jobs, in South Central 57.6 percent did so; and that the unemployment rate among Black men in some South Central areas approaches 50 percent (Johnson, et al, p. 361).

In 1965, nationally, one quarter of Black Americans lived below the poverty line (then, for a four-person family, $3,130). By 1992 (at which time the poverty line was $12,575 for a four-person family), one third did so. As for Hispanics, the poverty rate among them rose from 21.6 percent to 28.2 percent in the period 1978-1987. For South Central in 1992, about 32 percent of that population (Black, Latino, Asian) lived in poverty, as compared with 9.3 percent, statewide. Nearly 45 percent of South Central children live in poverty, as opposed to 12 percent statewide (Callinicos, p. 1605; Senate Special Task Force, 1992, pp. 8-9).

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6 In 1965, the United States population, including Armed Forces personnel overseas, totalled about 194 million people, of which Blacks constituted 21 million. This means over 5 million Black Americans lived below the poverty level. Twenty-seven years later, in 1992, the total population was 255 million, also inclusive of overseas military. Nearly 30 million were Black Americans, ten million of whom lived in poverty (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1994).

Said another way, in 1965 Blacks living in poverty represented 2.7 percent of the total U.S. population. In 1992, they represented 3.9 percent. As a percentage of the population, then, that translates into a 45 percent increase in the period 1965-1992.
Changing Ethnic Demographics

In 1965, nearly all Black Los Angelinos lived in the Watts area of the City. It is thus perhaps not misstating things to say that the 1965 Watts rebellion was, at its core, a race-based rebellion, one governed by animosity toward White economic hegemony, and what were seen as racist power structures in both business and government. Even a cursory review of news reports both during and after the 1992 rebellion shows that much of the popular press framed it in "racial" terms as well. Callinicos (1992), Jackson (1992), Rodriguez (1992), and Painter (1992) have all convincingly argued, however, that "[a]lthough 'race' continues to be rammed down our throats, the issue here is class" (Rodriguez, 1992, p. 82, emphasis supplied). The validity of that argument is made manifest by the changing ethnic demographics in Los Angeles in the period 1980-1992:

In the 1980's...[Los Angeles] county added 1.4 million residents. Nearly 1.3 million of them –92.9% – were Latino...Although the new Latino immigrants were no more homogeneous in their politics, their culture or their nature than the Anglo plurality, their sheer number altered the sprawling Los Angeles region from end to end. In particular, they were remaking the black core of South-Central (Los Angeles Times, p. 26).

"Remaking of the black core of South-Central" translates into a 1992 ethnic breakdown of 55 percent Black, 45 percent Hispanic residents, and about 1 percent Asian (largely Korean), quite a different portrait from 1965, when Blacks constituted well over 80 percent of South Central's population (Dentler, p. 235; Jackson, 1992, p. T8; Los Angeles Times, p. 28; Senate Special Task Force, p. 7).

The departure of hundreds of Jewish-owned South Central storefront businesses throughout the 1980's gave way to an influx of Korean immigrants who, in turn, bought and managed those businesses. The Korean contingent, while small in absolute numbers, had been held up to South Central Blacks as an "ideal" model of industry and economic self-sufficiency. The assumption seems to have been that, if Blacks would only pay attention, they too would prosper (Lee, 1995, p. 13; Cho, 1993). This further complicated the economic picture, for the Jews apparently had made concerted attempts to hire employees of other ethnic minorities in the area, while the Koreans did not (Dentler, p. 235; M. Davis, 1992, p. 8; Johnson, et al., p. 359).
All these factors resulted in an ethnic triad, Black, Latino and Korean, each of whom saw the other as competitor for scarce resources (jobs, housing, public services) (Johnson, et al., p. 359; Dentler, p. 235). Further, whereas joblessness is the central problem for black males in south central Los Angeles, concentration in low-paying, bad jobs in competitive sector industries is the main problem for the Latino residents of the area. Both groups share a common fate: incomes below the poverty level. One group is the working poor (Latinos) and the other is the jobless poor (blacks) (Johnson, et al., p. 361).

Law Enforcement Activities

One of the most distressing outcomes of South Central's social, economic and educational conditions has been the proliferation of gang activity among the young. Gang activity in Los Angeles proper is not new, indeed it is a long-standing tradition, one dating back at least 60 years (Callinicos, p. 1605; Dentler, p. 236).

Ethnic gang activity in the city has been the target of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) for some 30 years. At the same time, there is nearly incontrovertible evidence that in the years before the 1965 Watts rebellion, up to and including its 1992 correspondent, police brutality has been a fact of life for South Central residents for much of those 30 years (McCone, 1965; Conot, 1967, Jacobs, 1967; Christopher, 1991; Amnesty International, 1992; Johnson, et al., p. 359). Further, of any factor advanced in the literature as contributing to either the 1965 Watts or the 1992 South Central rebellion, police brutality emerges repeatedly as being a particularly pernicious, and persistent, one (Callinicos, p. 1605; Johnson, et al., p. 369; Dentler, p. 236-237; Christopher, pp. 29-94, passim).

Ira Reiner, former Los Angeles District Attorney, reports that Los Angeles "spawns and hosts more gangs with larger aggregate numbers of members than any other city in the world" (cited in Dentler, p. 236). And, while it is impossible to determine just how many such gangs exist, estimates are that there are about 500 in Los Angeles city, and an additional 400 in the county, each having a membership of anywhere from 100 to 3,000 (Dentler, p. 236).

One significant difference between 1960's-era gangs and their 1980's counterparts was the arrival of crack cocaine as an economic force. Mike Davis (1990) estimates that 10,000 gang members earn their livelihood from the drug trade, further observing that "crack really is the employer of last resort in the ghetto's devastated east side—the equivalent of
several large auto plants or several hundred McDonalds" (p. 314). The staggering revenue derived from the drug trade throughout the 1980's thus allowed for improvements in gang "command and communication structures, and offered opportunities for creating sophisticated networks across other cities and for developing weapons caches and combating encroaching gangs more violently" (Dentler, p. 237; M. Davis, 1990, pp. 309-316).

In South Central in 1992, it is clear that no recommendation made by the 1965 McCone Commission took root. By 1992, and for the predominately white male LAPD, nearly every minority male between the ages of 12 and 30 was suspected of gang activity, and was treated so:

The contentious state of police/minority community relations...served as the linchpin of urban unrest [for both Watts in 1965 and South Central in 1992]. While relations have improved in several large cities in recent years, the...LAPD has been frozen in time. Black and Hispanic males have been particularly brutalized in their encounters with police....But more disconcerting is the fact that poor, central-city minority communities have become more crime ridden of late. Thus minorities find themselves in the ambiguous situation of needing greater police services on the one hand and protection from the excesses of those same services on the other (Johnson, et al., p. 369).

Those factors notwithstanding, and in the interest of fairness, the pressures on the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) give one pause. For example, "while the overall rate of violent crime in the United States increased three and one-half times between 1960 and 1989, the rate in Los Angeles during the same period was more than twice the national average" (Christopher, p. viii). At the same time, "of the police departments in the six largest United States cities, the LAPD has the fewest officers per resident and the fewest officers per square mile" (Christopher, p. viii).

As I write this in the Spring of 1995, four years after the beating of Rodney King and as the third-year anniversary of the 1992 rebellion approaches, two brief stories in the Los Angeles Times bear mention. The first appeared two days before the third anniversary carrying this lead paragraph:

Fed up with the Los Angeles Police Department's slow pace in implementing many Christopher Commission reforms, the civilian Police Commission has decided to flex its muscle by giving top department officials deadlines to put a handful of the key changes in place (Rohrich, 1995, p. B1).
The piece went on to describe the failure of the Los Angeles Police Department to enact 60 percent of the over 100 recommendations made by the Christopher Commission in its 1991 report. Whether the Police Commission's deadlines will have any substantive effect on the LAPD remains to be seen.

On the anniversary of the rebellion itself, a second story notes that "250 of the 607 properties--some of them housing multiple businesses-- that were seriously damaged or burned to the ground remain vacant" (Cheevers and Schoch, 1995, p. B1). Linda Wong, chief financial officer of RLA (formerly "Rebuild L.A.," a controversial public-private community development effort launched in the wake of the 1992 rebellion), observes that

You're talking about 30 years of neglect in those communities and people are just coming to grips and finding out how slow the work is. We haven't quite seen all the physical manifestations of revitalization yet, but part of that is due to the fact that we have to build a strategy and infrastructure from the ground up (Cheevers and Schoch, p. B5).

In nearly every news report detailing both rebellions, we see a startling similarity in the responses to them. Some examples from 1965:

Among the factors Los Angeles Police Chief William H. Parker believed contributed to the Watts rebellion were "people [who]...lost all respect for the law," and leaders of the civil rights movement. Said Parker, "[w]hen you keep telling people they are unfairly treated and teach them disrespect for the law, you must expect this kind of thing sooner or later" (McCurdy and Berman, 1965, p. 3; Facts on File, 1966, p. 294).

Bystanders, to police officers, while watching the incineration of a block of Watts storefronts: "That's the hate that hate produced, white man...." "This ain't hurting us none. We have nothing to lose. Negroes don't own the buildings. You never did a decent thing in your life for us, white man" (Hillinger, 1965, p. 2).

California Governor Pat Brown, on the other hand, was thunderstruck: "I don't think any of us had any idea that [the rebellion] would happen. No one advised me that Los Angeles was in a turbulent situation" (Berman, 1965, p. A4).

We see similar comments following the 1992 South Central rebellion:

Sam Yorty, Mayor of Los Angeles during the Watts rebellion in 1965: "People were looking for an excuse to riot or loot [during the 1992 rebellion] and they would have found an
excuse anyway. This has been building up here for a while...It's too bad that some people
don't trust the American system of justice" (Stencel, 1992, p. A15).

Gemora Knox, an 18-year old African-American, who witnessed the beating of White
truck driver Reginald Denny: "I didn't have no feeling for that man. I didn't have no feelings.
I been beat and I felt maybe it was his turn" (Duke, 1992, p. A14).

Diego Fernandez, a 19 year old Latino and participant in the 1992 rebellion: "Go
ahead and kill us; we're already dead" (Moore and Goodavage, 1992, p. 2A).

This case, it seems to me, brings to the fore some profound truisms those of us in
public administration might well heed. First, our institutions, both political and administrative,
have long and largely depended upon structural organization and market solutions to
sometimes intractable social problems since well before the New Deal. And, as the 1965
and 1992 rebellions may indicate, such approaches have too often been woefully inadequate
(e.g., Seidman and Gilmour, 1986; Robertson and Judd, 1989; Phillips, 1991; Rourke, 1994;
Caiden, 1994). Mike Davis (1992) makes this point abundantly clear: "[u]nhappily there is
little to believe that the dominant interpretation of the [1992] tragedy will be any more
profound than the McCone Commission's report 27 years ago" (p. 59). Hence, if the
"dominant interpretation" for the 1992 rebellion were virtually the same as for its 1965
analogue, can we expect any recommended solutions to be radically different -- or any more
enduring?

Second, if we learned anything from either rebellion, it is that we need appropriate
mechanisms, both institutionally and societally, with which people can grapple in the day to
day. For we live, after all, together, in the day to day. The Reverend Jesse Jackson makes
this point explicit when, several days following the 1992 rebellion, he said, "You can't have
people living that close together who have no operative appreciation of each other....We
have to stop viewing others as parasites. The fact is--all of us are hosts, and none of us are

Third, we are all one in the seemingly endless frustration, divisiveness, and despair
that seem to have become the watchwords, and conditions, of latter Twentieth-Century life,
particularly in the inner city. That those conditions should also become our century's legacy
-- and our measure, finally, as a people -- is profoundly disturbing to contemplate.

Finally, given that, it seems clear that we must look to something other than the
status quo, to something beyond a normative order or ethics, and certainly to something
beyond our historical structural/"3-E"/unitary and reactive approaches to social policy planning. The process features Follett ascribes to community-based nonprofit human service institutions may aid in this endeavor.

Over the life of the republic, community-based nonprofit human service institutions have been consequential providers of human services (e.g., Filer, 1990; Orlans, 1980; Powell, 1987; O'Neill, 1989).7 In them, we routinely see innovative, ground-up, pragmatic solutions to problems of everyday living that no structural or economic approach, used alone, can hope to approximate. They accomplish this by living with, and attending to, aspects and sources of problems "that can only be discovered, understood and intelligently addressed up close based on real knowledge of real lives" (Racine, 1995, p. 435). By any other description, that is community relational context.

Section Three: Necessity for The Work and Its Contributions to Theory and Practice

Nécessité for the Work

The contrast between the 1965 Watts rebellion and its 1992 correlate both implicitly and explicitly point to reasons why this work may be important. First, if we were "surprised" by the 1992 rebellion, it is clear we should not have been. For example, if we juxtapose the findings and recommendations of the 1965 McConie Commission with those of the (California) Senate Special Task Force on a New Los Angeles (1992) coupled with the Special Advisory panel to the Board of the Los Angeles Police Commissioners (Webster and Williams, 1992) — the last two having investigated the 1992 rebellion — we find many of the same findings and recommendations.

Second, and following from that, for whatever the institutions of government, both political and administrative, federal, state and local, thought they were doing to improve

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7 This would be hard to prove by most scholarly public administration publications. For example, in the fifteen-year period 1979-1994, when privatization and contracting of human services was much-written about, our flagship journal, Public Administration Review, published 15 articles on nonprofit organizations generally. Of those, two discussed the roles of such institutions in the process of democratic governance and/or citizenship (see Morgan and England, 1988; O'Connell, 1989). In the fifteen-year period 1960-1975, when the absolute number of nonprofit human service organizations in the United States more than doubled, Public Administration Review published six articles, none of which discussed such roles.
conditions in South Central between 1965-1992, their failure is, apparently, staggering. Most saliently, social and economic conditions that had long dogged the Black community both before and after Watts had, by 1992, "spilled over" and affected not only Blacks but new immigrants and poor Whites as well. Thus, as Luis Rodriguez (1992) and others have said, conditions deteriorated, became even more complex; and conditions long attributed to racism emerged as class concerns by 1992 (also Callinicos, 1992; Davis, 1992; Dentler, 1992; Johnson, Jones, Farrell, and Oliver, 1992; Painter, 1992). Third, our surprise at the 1992 South Central rebellion should not be underestimated as a consequential point for discussion. What seems to have been saliently lacking in government attempts to address conditions of the inner city in particular between about 1965 and 1992 was inattention to, or neglect of, the relational context within which people were living. As a result, conditions worsened, became more "wicked." Sufficient attention to that context, however, may have served to ameliorate those conditions.

Fourth, if we saw nothing during both the 1965 and 1992 rebellions, we saw alienation and despair. If we in public administration cannot, at minimum, nurture and help sustain institutional forums -- government or nonprofit -- within which citizens can feel genuinely attached to other citizens and to their government, from whence does our legitimation -- indeed, our moral authority -- come? For if as Justice Brandeis often remarked, the highest office in a democracy is the office of citizen (Goldman, 1953), our first substantive claim to legitimacy must rest with our commitment, willingness, and ability to encourage responsible citizenship.

If we have a second substantive claim to our legitimacy, it is that we are more than simply "technical experts." Rather, we are seen, and see ourselves, as vital to the preservation and enhancement of democratic principles. For public administrators do not, cannot, act in political or social isolation (Ripley and Franklin, 1987; Cooper, 1991; Caiden, 1994). Thus, we cannot preserve or enhance the social and moral order without citizens, nor can they do so without us. Seen in this way, Follett's process matters. Citizens and citizenship matter.

Finally, the most fundamental issue is the necessity for development of integrated social policy planning born of a process citizens themselves create and sustain in their own neighborhoods. We must, I think, move toward the idea of a relational community and the
role of community-based nonprofit institutions as the forums within which we can realize it, and the sensical social policy planning arising from it, more fully.

Contributions to Theory and Practice

I see this work as making two contributions. The first is to nonprofit theory and practice. The field of "nonprofit studies" is young still, and significant literature on nonprofit organizations generally is fewer than 20 years old. Development of a general statement guided by The New State (and hence by interpretive social and organization theory, and Chicago School pragmatism), has not, to my knowledge, been published since academic writing on nonprofits began to appear with any regularity in the late 1970's. It is time.

The second contribution is to public administration theory and practice. While this work attends to community-based nonprofit human service institutions, I take the view that the community processes which serve to make them seedbeds for integrated, cohesive social policy planning may also serve as an object lesson for public administration practitioners and academics alike. I would submit that it is sustained and genuine attention to community processes that helps us to confirm our legitimacy, and to define our role, in democratic governance.

On a more practical level, it also helps us to understand that technical "expertise" in social policy planning has little meaning unless it is combined with the "expertise" properly-organized citizens themselves can bring to bear upon that policy. In this way, policy can converge with the lives of people in the everyday. To the extent that we are willing to foster that convergence, "sensical" social policy results (e.g., Racine, 1995, p. 441). Follett argues that. Contemporary community-based nonprofit human service institutions are testament to it -- every day. In short, the process view Follett advances strikes at the very heart of the democracy to which we have pledged our careers, our lives, and our "sacred honor." As such, it merits our serious consideration.

Let us now pay a call on Mary Follett.

Section Four: The New State

Louis Brandeis once observed that

The great America for which we long is unattainable unless the individuality of communities becomes far more highly developed and becomes a common American phenomenon. ....The growth of the future...must be in quality and
spiritual value. And that can come only through the concentrated, intensified strivings of smaller groups (Goldman, 1953, p. 166).

Justice Brandeis' comment, of course, reflects his well-documented opposition to the "bigness" of government and business (see, e.g., McCraw, 1984, pp. 80-142, passim), but his comments also echo the substance of Mary Follett's arguments. Her work is written in opposition to the progressive reform movement and political parties of the time, and argues that each "wanted voters not men" (p. 6).

She also decries pluralist notions of democracy, which she says "gives us the group as the unit of politics, but most of the group theories of politics are as entirely particularistic as the old 'individualistic' theories...." (p. 10). As a result, "[s]ome of the pluralists tend to lose the individual in the group; others, to abandon the state for the group. But the individual, the group, the state -- they are all there to be reckoned with -- we cannot ignore or minimize any one" (p. 10).

She takes a dim view of representative government itself: "'Representative government,' party organization, majority rule, with all their excrescences, are dead-wood" (p. 4). She eschews as well "natural rights" and "social contract" views of politics, saying each wrongly supposes that individuals act in isolation. "...[People] can have no rights apart from society or independent of society or against society," says Follett (p. 137). As Terry Cooper (1991) notes:

Follett [insists] that since no such isolated individual exists, the fictions of natural rights and social contracts no longer provide a meaningful basis for democracy. They obscure the psycho-social interdependence of the individual and the community which provides the basis for democratic government, as well as its imperative (p. 126).\(^8\)

Further, Follett does not favor traditional top-down structural reform:

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\(^8\) Cooper (1991) also observes that Follett's repudiation of "natural rights" does not mean denial of "individual rights." Rather, she rejects the notion that these rights are attached to a freestanding individual apart from some society. Indeed, individual rights are essential for the healthy development of both the individual and the group. They are provided and maintained by some society or community from which the individual receives his or her very existence (p. 126).
We can never reform American politics from above, by reform associations, by charters and schemes of government. Our political forms will have no vitality unless our political life is so organized that it shall be based primarily and fundamentally on spontaneous association (p. 202).

Follett's solution to the myriad socio-political ills she identifies is a call for "the organization of non-partisan groups for the begetting, the bringing into being, of common ideas, a common purpose and a collective will" (p. 4). Simply put, Follett believes the "neighborhood group" to be the crucible within which interpretive group processes can evolve in service of individual and community development. These processes, in turn, produce the "collective idea." From the collective idea flows ground-up, integrated social and political action in service of democracy. Indeed, for Follett, these groups and the processes evolving therefrom are forums within which to genuinely discuss and make manifest the very meaning of democracy.

These are not linear processes. Rather, they are always emergent and circular, often unpredictable, fraught with conflict." She believes these processes produce a number of elements, none of which leads, in linear fashion, one from another. As the social process is activated, a kind of "group life" emerges. This group life springs from the desire of participants to "make meaning" appropriate for the group. The idiosyncratic meanings emerging from this continuous and circular process might be termed, in the manner of Karl Weick (1979), an exercise in "collective sensemaking." So long as this activity is consciously sustained by the group, not only can collective ideas be developed, but "achieved similarity" and "unification" blossom as well. "True purpose" becomes known. "Loyalty" and "love" follow (Follett, pp. 50-59).

Follett's aim is to advance a healthy group process in which neither accommodation nor compromise occurs, but within which "[t]he course of action decided upon is what we all together want, and I see that it is better than what I had wanted alone" (p. 25). This, Follett terms "integration," a notion of great power. Simply put, integration is "a harmonious marriage of differences which...come together in a way that produces a new form, a new entity, a new result, made out of old differences and yet different from any of them" (Fox, 1968, p. 524). Follett, in describing how the "collective" or "composite" or "common" idea can evolve in the healthy group process, explains how integration is achieved:

we gradually find that our problem can be solved, not indeed by mechanical aggregation, but by the subtle process of the intermingling of all the different
ideas of the group...A's idea, after having been presented to B and returned to A, has become slightly, or largely, different from what it was originally...But in the same way B's idea has been affected by all the others, and not only does A's ideas feel the modifying influence of each of the others, but A's ideas are affected by B's relation to all the others, and A's plus B's are affected by all the others individually and collectively, and so on and on until the common idea springs into being (pp. 24-25).

Central to her view is the idea that democracy is not the "brute numbers" upon which majority rule depends (p. 9). Democracy instead "rests on the well-grounded assumption that society is neither a collection of units nor an organism but a network of human relations" (p. 7, emphasis supplied). It is, in short, "a genuine union of true individuals" (p. 9).

Throughout her work, Follett exhorts both individuals and neighborhood groups to assume responsible and meaningful roles in democratic governance. Creation and nurturance of organized neighborhood groups as mechanisms with which to develop healthy social processes are essential to that end. Commitment to these processes can produce a sense of individual obligation to community and nation such that "the tragedy of individualism" (p. 3), and the pitfalls of "ballot box democracy" (p. 5) may be overcome. The overarching theme in her work, then, may be summed up in a single thought: "...every man is the state at every moment" (p. 12, emphasis in original).

For Follett, if democracy is made manifest in the flowering of human interaction and development, education must be its taproot. "If our present mechanical government is to turn into a living, breathing, pulsing life, it must be composed of an entire citizenship educated and responsible" (p. 168). The purpose of education, she says, is "to fit children into the life of the community" (p. 363). Believing that "[i]t is at school that children should begin to learn group initiative, group responsibility—in other words social functioning" (p. 363), she advocates creation of "school centres." These, she suggests, should engage in promotion of "group activities...direct civic teaching...and practice in self-government" (pp. 363-373). Predictably, however, this is not enough for Follett. "Training for the new democracy," she says, "...should be the object of all day school education, of all night school education, of all our supervised recreation, of all our family life, of our club life, of our civic life" (p. 363).

It is only through education and practice that active citizenship can emerge: "No training for democracy is equal to the practice of democracy" (p. 366, emphasis supplied).
Further, "citizenship is not obeying the laws nor voting... but that all the visions of their highest moments, all the aspirations of their spiritual nature can be satisfied through their common life, that only thus do we get 'practical politics'" (p. 366).

As for the role of the state, Follett sees its "supreme function" to be "moral ordering" (p. 333). But Follett's is no garden-variety definition of "morality." She sees morality variously as "integrated individuals acting as a whole, evolving whole ideas, working for whole ideals" (p. 57), or "[t]he fulfillment of relation by man to man, since it is impossible to conceive an isolated man..." (p. 333). Thus, the role of the state is to order

the whole infinite series [of relationships] into their right relations [so] that the greatest possible welfare of the total may be worked out. This ordering of relations is morality in its essence and completeness. The state must gather up into itself all the moral power of its day, and more than this, as our relations are widening constantly it must be the explorer which discovers the kind of ordering, the kind of grouping, which best expresses its intent (p. 333).

The state derives its moral authority both from "citizens in their growing understanding of the widening promise of relation" (p. 333), and "through the spiritual activity of [all] its citizens" (pp. 334-335). That is so because "[t]here is no state except through me" and "we cannot become the state imaginatively, but only actually through our group relations" (p. 334). In short, the efficacy of democracy depends exquisitely upon citizens' willingness to live it (p. 343).

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9 Just as this dissertation was approaching the final draft stage, Robert Putnam (1995) published "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital" in the Journal of Democracy. In it, he echoes many of Mary Follett's concerns and, in so doing, introduces the idea of "social capital" as a mechanism with which we can improve "civic engagement and social connectedness" (p. 66).

Putnam's ideas on social capital also echo Follett general view in that he refers to it as "features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (p. 67). Says Putnam:

For a variety of reasons, life is easier in a community blessed with a substantial stock of social capital....networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust. Such networks facilitate coordination and communication, amplify reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved. [Further,] networks of civic
Now that we have rudimentary understanding of Follett's ideas, let us briefly look at a recent example of the traditional view of The New State. We find it in Terry Cooper's An Ethic of Citizenship for Public Administration (1991), in which he offers a critique of the work. While some of the comments I will make at this point may seem rather cryptic, they will be made clear as the work develops in later chapters. My intent at present is only to demonstrate briefly the difference between the traditional view and that of Follett.

Cooper observes that "Follett's normative proposal...is rather vague and rhetorical" (p. 129). "Rhetorical" it may be. "Vague," it is not. Seen through interpretivist qua pragmatic eyes, we would not allow our irritation with her sometimes overwrought prose to cause us to miss one of her two fundamental points: that, absent responsible, substantive and sustained citizen involvement, democracy has little meaning. Second, Cooper's view is that her proposal is also

more than a little naive in its assumptions about the possibilities of creating ongoing groups in each neighborhood, and its hope for the achievement of a general will generated—from the bottom up seems to assume an accommodating kind of human being that does not exist, at least not in sufficiently great numbers (Cooper, 1991, p. 129, emphasis in original).

Let me counter Cooper's various observations, point by point. First, "ongoing groups" exist all day, every day, in cities and towns all over the nation. These are called community-based nonprofit human service institutions. As illustration, consider the Boys and Girls Clubs of America.

Although it is a national organization, the Boys and Girls Clubs has a long tradition of attending to the needs of kids in their own neighborhoods. Today, Boys and Girls Clubs have nearly 2,000 local chapters nationwide which, in aggregate, have the support of 77,000 volunteers (Saxon, 1996).

engagement embody past success at collaboration, which can serve as a cultural template for future collaboration. Finally, dense networks of interaction probably broaden the participants' sense of self, developing the 'I into the 'we,' or (in the language of rational-choice theorists) enhancing the participants' 'taste' for collective benefits (p. 67).

10 The same is also true of the YMCA and the YWCA.
Throughout the 1970's and 1980's, the organization engaged in an ongoing campaign to evaluate, and to develop improvements in, local services. Members of the organization discovered that there were many neighborhoods or areas which lacked sufficient children and youth programs. Among these were housing projects, American Indian reservations, military bases, homeless shelters, and a juvenile detention facility. The Boys and Girls Clubs thus opened chapters in those and other locations in the effort to meet the needs of children at the neighborhood level. In the case of the housing projects, the campaign resulted in a qualitative difference for hundreds of children, nationwide. In 1988 the organization had chapters in 40 projects; today, it has 280.

The services and activities the Boys and Girls Clubs offer are a testament to what an "ongoing" nonprofit human service organization seeks to offer its community. These services and activities, each and all, have the potential to promote individual and group development and, Follett would argue, the social and democratic ideal as well. They emphasize "educational achievement, career preparation, drug and alcohol avoidance, health and fitness, gang and violence prevention, cultural activities, leadership development and community service" (Saxon, 1996).

The second point in Cooper's critique concerns his observation about "the possibilities of creating ongoing groups in each neighborhood." Follett is steadfast in her belief that people are first, last and always, social creatures, that they cannot live in isolation. They are thus willing and purposive creators of their own lives. She believes as well that it is only in a responsible associated life that we learn such willingness and purposiveness. She thus does not so much assume that creation of neighborhood groups is possible, but that it is something people as social creatures develop an obligation to create and sustain.

Thirdly, by suggesting that Follett's goal is to have the social process produce "an accommodating kind of human being" (emphasis supplied) is well wide of the mark. The social process must never produce the accommodating human being, but the integrated human being, quite a different matter. Cooper seems to suggest that a "zero-sum" battle (what Follett calls "debate"), wherein there are "winners" and "losers," is the only alternative available to us. Not so! says Follett. That, she would argue, is the "shared values" orientation Durkheim advances and she abhors. Rather, the goal of the social process is to foster genuine discussion that is direct and face-to-face. As it does, the process properly
organizes social relations such that a "neighborhood consciousness" is animated and sustained (Follett, p. 208).

Fourthly, Cooper also believes that such "accommodating" individuals are not available in "sufficiently great numbers" to help generate a bottom-up "general will." That is, of course, Follett's other fundamental message: the neighborhood group, operating optimally, has the potential and the responsibility to produce just that. Further, while Cooper mentions "voluntary associations" in passing elsewhere in his book, nowhere in his own proposal does he suggest that latter-day community-based nonprofit human service institutions just might make consequential partners in the process of public governance as Follett today would.

Finally, as to Cooper's charge that Follett's proposal is "naive," she knows integration of the kind she advocates is no easy task; and herself acknowledges that it is devilishly difficult to realize (Follett, pp. 193, 202). She would empathize with the late President Charles de Gaulle, for example, who once asked in frustration, "How can anyone govern a nation that has 246 different kinds of cheese?" (Udall, 1988, p. xiv).

The important point is that, while Follett's proposals may be antithetical to how the political and administrative institutions of government have evolved over the past half-century, what she advances is an ideal — something for which we should always actively and consciously strive. That means that the optimally operating social group is involved in a process, a responsible, endlessly active and educative process. It is never finished. Indeed, that is sum and substance of the term "process."

Cooper's critique seems to be guided by two assumptions, both of which are consistent with the traditionalist. First, government, and government alone, has the ability to detect and communicate a "general will." Second, government and government alone can offer sensical and enduring solutions to social problems. Follett would soundly reject both assumptions. Indeed, she would argue that government, absent the responsible sustained involvement of citizens, is a hollow thing. She would also argue that solutions to social problems may well reside in citizens themselves. They need only be discovered in the properly organized and healthy social process. It is the role of government to encourage and help sustain that process.

Follett would also reiterate an argument I advance earlier and restate here: if public administration is to be among the great pillars of democratic governance that theorists and practitioners in our field say it is, or must be (Cooper, 1991; Wamsley, 1990; Rohr, 1989;
Waldo, 1985), we must give far more attention to community-based nonprofit human service institutions than we historically have. If we cannot encourage and help sustain community-based institutional forums that allow for development of healthy social processes in service of the democratic and social ideal, we are not part of the solution. We may be a very big part of the problem.

Section Five: An Exemplar of "Context"

Exemplars drawn from everyday experience can help us see and understand ideas that might otherwise be difficult for us. In the following, E.B. White (1982) wryly describes a town meeting he attended in Brooklyn, Maine, in March, 1940.

This was my first town meeting... and I was surprised to discover that there was not much discussion on the floor. The warrant contained thirty-eight articles, covering election of town officers and appropriation of town moneys as well as other matters of policy. Most of them aroused no debate. There were questions involving the schools, the roads, the library, public health, yet there was no general discussion of any of these subjects. New Englanders are jealous of their right to govern themselves as they like, but in my town we have learned that town meeting is no place to decide anything. We thrash out our problems well in advance, working in small queues and with a long history of spite as a background. The meeting is just to make everything legal. For the assemblage the meeting virtually was concentrated in the first thirty minutes of bloodletting. It began when one of the citizens, who we all knew was loaded for bear, rose to his feet, walked to the front, drew from his pocket a small but ominous sheet of paper, and in soft pacific tones began:

'Mr. Moderator...'

This was when democracy sat up and looked around. This was the spectacle the townfolk had walked miles for. Half way through the speech, when the air was heavy with distilled venom, my neighbor turned to me and whispered: 'I get so excited here it makes me sick. I'll commence to shake by and by.'

At the conclusion of the barrage the First Selectman rose and returned the fire. Both men held the floor without yielding. There was no motion before the house—this was just pleasure before business. It had the heat and turmoil of the first Continental Congress without its nobility of purpose and purity of design (p. 122).
What E.B. White describes there is relational history, born in part of collectively-developed meaning. When he says, for example, "[t]his was the spectacle the townfolk had walked miles for," or "in my town we have learned that town meeting is no place to decide anything," or "this was just pleasure before business," he is telling us that that community had come to see these exchanges as significantly symbolic, or meaningful, for it. It is activity of this kind, collectively-developed meaning, to which Follett is committed.

Section Six: Brief Chapter Outline

It should first be explained that, by using the 1965 and 1992 Los Angeles rebellions as illustrative of the problem and themes explored here, I neither intend nor presume to offer a comprehensive solution to our institutional, political or social ills. Thus, like Follett (p. 12), it is not my intent to recommend "solutions" to so large a problem as economic inequity in America. Rather, I see the contrast presented by the rebellions as a timely illustration of two points. First, "problems," absent sufficient and sustained attention by citizens and government alike, will inevitably worsen. Second, the institutions of government, both political and administrative, must take extraordinary steps to foster social processes most conducive to solution of problems. It is those processes, developed and sustained by property-organized neighborhood groups, that will give us a democracy "worthy of the name."

Chapter Two: One intellectual tradition I see as very consistent, although implicitly so, with Mary Follett's world view is interpretive social theory. In this chapter, I make explicit that consistence and thus the defensibility of using it to analyze Follett's work.

Chapter Three rounds out an interpretive view of social action. Here, I introduce the pragmatism of John Dewey and his views of democracy and education; the pragmatism of George Herbert Mead, who supplies his behavioral process view of social relations and action; Orion White's (1990) "rules" for process; and Orion White and Cynthia McSwain's (1983) "transformational" theory (also McSwain and White, 1993).

Pragmatism is a vital addition to analysis of Follett's work because interpretivism fails to address or categorically rejects politics. It does so in keeping with a fundamental tenet of interpretivist thought: that genuine understanding can come only from everyday, face-to-face interaction. Hence, interpretivists would argue that the very scale of politics (particularly in a democracy) precludes genuine discourse.
The Chicago School pragmatism of both Dewey and Mead is built upon a different foundation, and argues from the belief that democracy is an all-encompassing and moral ideal. It thus embraces politics. Although the pragmatists agree with their interpretivist brethren that face-to-face interaction is an essentiality for positive social action, they solve the scale problem by arguing that, organized properly, not only is politics, but genuine democracy itself, possible. "Proper organization" is the neighborhood group, capable of providing the forums within which individual human social actors can make collective meaning, and radiate those meanings both laterally and vertically. It is this idea to which Follett, Dewey and Mead all subscribe.

Chapter Four is a selective history of Twentieth Century organization theory; and two traditions in this literature are compared, the functionalist and the interpretivist. The chapter is intended to show that much of what we have come to understand and believe about organizations is rooted in functionalism. The section on interpretivism ends with Mary Follett, who exhibits great agreement with many in this school.

Chapter Five: Theories of nonprofit organizations. In this chapter, I cover economic/market theories, policy theories, and organization theories; and, following those, political and democratic theories. As regards the first three, we will see that, just as it is with literature about society and organizations generally, the same traditional view(s) obtain in mainstream theories of nonprofits. As for discussion about political and democratic theories of nonprofits, the objective is to link Follett's ideas on citizenship and democracy to the current "state" of political democratic theory of nonprofits.

Chapters Six and Seven advance the idea that, to "properly" view community-based nonprofit human service institutions, we must look to their unique interpretive and pragmatic character in our democracy. To help us see that character, I analyze Follett's "five ways for producing the integrated and responsible neighborhood" (p. 207), and use the lenses of interpretivism and Chicago School pragmatism to do so. In chapter six, I analyze the first three "ways." These are: 1) "regular meetings of neighbors for the consideration of neighborhood and civic problems, not merely sporadic and occasional meetings for specific objects" (p. 204); 2) "(fostering) genuine discussion at these regular meetings"; 3) "learning together -- through lectures, classes, clubs; by sharing one another's experience through social intercourse; by learning forms of community art expression; in short by leading an actual community life" (Follett, p. 205). In chapter seven, I analyze the last two of Follett's
"five ways." These are: 4) "taking more and more responsibility for the life of the neighborhood"; and 5) "establishing some regular connection between the neighborhood and city, state and national governments" (p. 205).

Chapter Eight: Case Studies. These case studies demonstrate that Follett’s ideas are made real in community-based nonprofit human service institutions, both large and small, every day, all over the nation.

Chapter Nine: In this final chapter, I posit some summary theoretical propositions about community-based nonprofit human service institutions. These propositions, which follow from all that precedes them, attempt to lay the groundwork for a reconstructed dialogue about such institutions.
CHAPTER TWO
INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

One intellectual tradition with which Mary Follett demonstrates clear, albeit implicit, agreement is interpretive social theory. The objective of this chapter is to make explicit that agreement. The chapter is in three sections. Section One is a broad introduction to interpretivism and details the theoretical concerns, key assumptions, and examples of methodological approaches consistent with it. These are followed by a few words on the "point" of theory as the interpretivists see it. This section is particularly important in analysis of The New State because it helps securely ground Follett's work both conceptually and methodologically — something she herself does not do.

Section Two briefly explores several faces of interpretive social theory. Finally, Section Three demonstrates Follett's obvious agreement with the broad tenets of interpretive social thought, and with some ideas distinct to selected writers situated in the paradigm.

Section One: Interpretivism: Theoretical Concerns, Key Assumptions, Methodological Approaches and the "Point" of Theory

Introduction

In Chapter One, I refer several times to the "traditional" or functionalist view of social life and organizations that has so dominated the literature for much of the last century and a half. It is thus useful to briefly outline the fundamental principles that are said to constitute this "traditional" view so that we may more clearly see how interpretivism departs from it.

Functionalism's reach is a long one, both backward and forward. Its tenets are generally thought to have derived from Auguste Comte in the early Nineteenth Century to Herbert Spencer and on to Émile Durkheim later in that same century. The tradition has spanned the Twentieth Century as well, most notably via Vilfred Pareto, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, Bronislaw Malinowski, Max Weber, and Talcott Parsons (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Harmon and Mayer, 1986; Turner, 1986).

In general terms, functionalists take as their problem "the social system conceived as a whole" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 159); or as Gareth Morgan pithily suggests, they attempt
to "create a world characterized by certainty" (1984, p. 312). In so doing, they search for explanations about

the relationship of the parts to the whole in order to show what appear to be isolated, if not inexplicable, social phenomena may fulfil [sic] some wider purpose related to the stability of society (Silverman, 1970, p. 45).

In the Twentieth Century, few in the functionalist school have had the influence of the towering Talcott Parsons. Parsons's views follow largely from the functionalist anthropology of Malinowski and Brown; and he later blended his own brand of sociology with that of Max Weber (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 54; Turner, 1986, pp 48-52; Harmon and Mayer, p. 159). Parsons is concerned to understand how whole social systems function, survive and change despite member turnover. In his well-known "AGIL" model, he identifies four universal functional imperatives he believes ensures maintenance of social systems: adaption, goal attainment, integration and latency or pattern maintenance (Burrell and Morgan, pp. 54-55; Silverman, p. 54).

In this view, individuals are relegated to functional roles which in turn allow them to develop, and to expect, predictable behavior from both themselves and from others. In this way, the social order is established and maintained, and change in societal membership is thus said to have minimal effect. Following from that, and figuring heavily in the Parsonian scheme, is creation of a "central value system," or shared orientation, which Parsons sees as constituting the foundation upon which any society is based (Silverman, p. 54). Parsons advances the idea that the processes by which this value system is created (i.e., integration of individual "personality systems" and a "cultural system" into a whole, stable "social system") are structured normatively. As that happens, the value system serves to regulate, and/or create coherence in, the social order. Further, Parsons believes that this "central value system" must be specified before functional roles can be attributed to any individual or system entity (e.g., an organization) (Silverman, p. 54; Burrell and Morgan, p. 55).

Burrell and Morgan say that most theorists who would call themselves "functionalists" are linked by the overarching belief that "society [is] ontologically prior to man." They thus "seek to place man and his activities within that wider social context" (p. 106). The view assumes that social life is regulated, ordered or patterned. As such, it can be observed, tested, and explained using the objective, value free social science methods common in the physical sciences (Burrell and Morgan, pp. 106-108; Morgan, 1984, pp. 311-312). Most
importantly perhaps, functionalism "focuses upon understanding the role of human beings in society. Behavior is always seen as being contextually bound in a real world of concrete and tangible social relationships" (Morgan, 1980, p. 608, emphasis in original).

We will see that most writers in interpretivism depart, sometimes greatly, from their functionalist brethren. Let us explore interpretivism now.

**Interpretive Social Theory: An Introduction**

Burrell and Morgan say that, unlike positivism, which seeks discovery of generalizable rules, laws, or patterns of behavior grounded in observation, interpretivism seeks to understand the world as it is, to understand the fundamental nature of the social world at the level of subjective experience. It seeks explanation within the realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity, within the frame of reference of the participants as opposed to the observer of action. It further sees the social world as an emergent process which is created by the individuals concerned (p. 28).

Gareth Morgan (1984) adds an important addendum:

"[The interpretivist paradigm] argues that order in the social world, however real in surface appearance, rests in a precarious, socially constructed web of symbolic relationships that are continuously negotiated, renegotiated, affirmed or changed. The interpretive theorist's problem is to understand the meaning and significance of this web of relationships, and how it exists as such" (p. 313).

**Theoretical Concerns**

Burrell and Morgan locate interpretive theory on the subjectivist end of the sociology of regulation continuum, saying that one of interpretivism's fundamental assumptions is that there is order in the world, and that it is "oriented towards obtaining an understanding of the subjectively created world 'as it is' in terms of an ongoing process" (p. 31). Thus, its theoretical concerns include: "the nature of the status quo, social order, consensus, social integration and cohesion, solidarity, and actuality" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 31; Gioia and Pitre, 1990, pp. 588, 591); or to "reconstruct the subjective experience of social actors" (Hughes, 1990, p. 93).

**Ontological Assumptions**

Gareth Morgan and Linda Smircich (1980) provide a useful mechanism with which
to guide this part of the discussion. They see the "subjective-objective debate" in social science as operating on a continuum, and two views of reality appearing thereon seem to be most complimentary with Follett's world view. These are reality as "symbolic discourse," and reality as "social construction" (p. 492).

The reality as symbolic discourse view makes the ontological assumptions that, in the process of human interaction, individuals strive to create and sustain "a pattern of symbolic relationships and meanings" (Morgan and Smircich, p. 494); that although "rule-like activities" constitute a pattern whereby continuity is sustained in any specific context, this pattern "is always open to reaffirmation or change through the interpretations and actions of individual members" (Morgan and Smircich, p. 494); and that these rules do not construct reality. Rather, they serve as mechanisms with which to sustain "enduring form." Reality, then, is constructed and resides "in the system of meaningful action that renders itself to an external observer as rule-like" (Morgan and Smircich, p. 494).

The reality as social construction view makes the ontological assumptions that individuals seek "a realm of meaningful definition" in their day-to-day encounters with others. Each interaction creates and recreates the social world, and this is thus a continuous process (Morgan and Smircich, p. 494). Second, language, labels, actions, and routines are constitutive of "symbolic modes of being in the world." Thus, "social reality is embedded in the nature and use of these modes of symbolic action" (Morgan and Smircich, p. 494). Third, the social world is therefore a symbolic construction, one actively created by participants. This creation is constituted by multiple meanings which, as the process proceeds, become shared. But these shared meanings are fleeting only, and are "confined only to those moments in which they are actively constructed and sustained" (Morgan and Smircich, p. 494).

**Epistemological Assumptions**

Interpretivism tells us that we cannot gain knowledge of everyday life nor can "scientific discourse" be advanced absent attention to the personal experience and subjective everyday life-meanings of relevant actors (Harmon and Mayer, p. 287). For the interpretivist, then, knowledge is not "hard, real and capable of being transmitted in tangible form" such as the functionalist would have it (Burrell an Morgan, p. 1). Rather, it is "[soft]...subjective...spiritual..." (Burrell and Morgan, pp. 1-2).
Human Nature

Traditionally, there have been two opposing views about human nature, and the debate centers on "the relationship between [people] and their environment" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 2; also Aldrich, 1992, pp. 22-23). One camp in this long-standing philosophical battle holds what has been called a deterministic view: "human beings and their experiences are regarded as products of the environment; one in which humans are conditioned by their external circumstances" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 2).

In contrast, there is the voluntaristic camp, which holds a more interpretivist view: "human beings [have] a much more creative role...where 'free will' occupies the centre of the stage...where man is regarded as the creator of his environment, the controller as opposed to the controlled, the master rather than the marionette" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 2).

In short, the more objectivist of the two views ("reality as symbolic discourse") characterizes human beings as active creators of reality, as having the capacity to create a world of "symbolic significance, interpreting and enacting a meaningful relationship with that world" (Morgan and Smircich, p. 494). In contrast, the more subjectivist level ("reality as social construction") sees humans as sensemaking creatures who make conscious attempts to "make their world intelligible to themselves and to others." Thus, people do not simply interpret social situations, but bring those situations into being through their own creative activity (Morgan and Smircich, p. 494).

These views of human nature are consistent with Follett. That is, people are seen as "purposive creators" and interpreters of realities which have meaning for them. They consciously seek responsibility for creating, interpreting and sustaining a "shared reality" -- but only so long as that prevailing meaning makes contextual sense. This is an ongoing process, which obliges individuals (or groups) to alter, negotiate, learn and relearn in an effort to sustain the social order.

Methodology

Several writers (e.g., Denzin, 1978; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Bailey, 1987) make clear that ontological and epistemological assumptions, together with those about human nature, all impose themselves directly upon methodology. That is because each is "likely to incline social scientists towards different methodologies" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 2). If, then, methodology is the "philosophy of the research process" (Bailey,
pp. 32-33), and thus "represents the principal ways in which [researchers] act on their environment...." (Denzin, 1978, p. 6), it is clear that what is good for the traditional methodological goose is not quite so good for the interpretivist methodological gander. As with combatants in the human nature debate, several interpretive theorists have attacked positivist methodology head-on.

Morgan and Smircich, for example, note that there is need for a more "reflexive" research stance, one that focuses on "the way in which favored techniques are often linked to underlying assumptions" (p. 499). They suggest that this stance should be mightily concerned with "the vital link between theory and method--between the world view to which the researcher subscribes, the type of research question posed, and the technique that is to be adopted as a basis for research" (p. 499).

That observation is crucial because, as they say, theory development generally would be better served "if researchers were more explicit about the nature of the beliefs they bring to their subject of study" (Morgan and Smircich, p. 499). The absence of explicitness on this matter, they say, has resulted in a research environment within which social scientists, rather than testing the fundamental assumptions upon which their research is based, generate research that only serves to support what they already believe (Morgan and Smircich, p. 499). That being the case, Morgan and Smircich, make the not inconsequential call for a focus of attention on the ground assumptions of social theory and research in order to transcend the abstract debate about methodology on its own account and the abstracted forms of empiricism, both qualitative and quantitative, that dominate the contemporary scene" (p. 499).

A few years later, Gareth Morgan (1983) signals that he still subscribes to that view. He sees science as "basically a process of interaction, or better still, of engagement" (p. 13, emphasis in original). He observes that

[s]cientists engage a subject of study by interacting with it through means of a particular frame of reference, and what is observed and discovered in the object...is as much a product of this interaction and the protocol and technique through which it is operationalized as it is of the object itself. Moreover, since it is possible to engage an object of study in different ways...we can see that the same object is capable of yielding many different kinds of knowledge. This leads us to see knowledge as...potentially resting in an object of investigation and see science as being concerned with the realization of potentialities—of possible knowledges (p. 13).
Karl Weick (1989) takes that a step further, observing that "[t]heorists often write trivial theories because their process of theory construction is hemmed in by methodological strictures that favor validation rather than usefulness" (p. 516). That is so because the literature on theory construction "tends to focus on outcomes and products rather than process" (p. 517, emphasis supplied). As a result, he takes the view that theory construction should be approached with an eye to "sensemaking," (p. 519).

Morgan and Smircich (1980) rather echo Weick, and suggest that researchers who take a process view of the social world cannot cleave to traditional methodologies. Rather, "they must move to investigate from within the subject of study and employ research techniques appropriate to that task" (p. 498).

Hence, the "processes through which human beings...create their reality, and project themselves from the transcendental to more prosaic realms of experience" should be central methodological concerns.

The interpretivist view may be seen as consonant with, and in the tradition of, Pitirim Sorokin's "logico-meaningful" method as posited in the massive Social and Cultural Dynamics ([1937] 1962). As Barbara Framer (1993) notes, "the logico-meaningful method is associated with the neo-idealistic tradition in sociology, which contends that the purpose of social theory and research is the promotion of understanding" (p. 48, emphasis in original). In short,

[hidden behind the empirically different, seemingly unrelated fragments of the cultural complex lies an identity of meaning, which brings them together into consistent styles, typical forms, and significant patterns. If, therefore, uniformity of relationship is the common denominator of causally unified phenomena, in the logico-meaningful union it is identity of central meaning or idea (Sorokin, p. 32).

Perhaps the best-known methodological statement from an interpretivist perspective is Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, which will be discussed more fully in section two. For present purposes, I simply wish to highlight the fact that ethnomethodology seeks to [examine] the ways in which societal members create a sense of social structure through interpretation. Social reality, along with its sense of being a naturalistic entity independent of perception, is the ongoing accomplishment of the methods people use to observe and describe the society in which they live (Leiter, 1980, p. 106).
Stephen Bailey believes that, while ethnomethodology has its problems (pp. 275-76), it does fill an important gap left by more traditional research methods. It fills this gap by emphasizing the similarity between social science methods and lay methods. While other methods see commonsense knowledge [of lay persons] as inferior knowledge generated by inferior methods, ethnomethodology seeks to understand the way in which members of society use the practices of commonsense reasoning not only to make sense of their world but even to construct and perpetuate the ongoing social world (p. 274).

Another fine example is Norman Denzin's (1978) view of methodology, seen through the symbolic interactionist's lens. Denzin posits seven methodological principles consistent with this view, the first four of which assume that "the forms and processes of interaction must be reflected in...methodologies" (p. 13).

The first and second appear to follow from George Herbert Mead: first, since there is interdependence between symbols and interaction, "[f]ocusing only on symbols...fails to record the emergent and novel relationships these symbols have with observable behavior" (Denzin, 1978, p. 9). Second, individuals are reflective beings who influence and are influenced by the larger world. As this happens, differing perceptions or definitions of "self" emerge, which means the researcher should explore how these definitions are reflected in behavior (Denzin, 1978, p. 10). To accomplish this, and thus to avoid the "fallacy of objectivism" (i.e., substituting a researcher's perspective and meaning for the actors'), the researcher must "take the role of the acting other..." (Denzin, 1978, p. 10).

This leads to the third principle, which suggests that researchers must demonstrate the interdependence existing between individual conceptions of self and "the social circles and relationships that furnish those symbols and conceptions" (Denzin, 1978, p. 12). The fourth principle posits that, since individuals have a number of differentiated "behavior settings" within which the social process can take place, and since all human interaction is dynamic and emergent, research methods must "consider the 'situated aspects' of human conduct" (Denzin, 1978, p. 12).

Fifth, "research methods must be capable of reflecting both the stable and processual behavioral forms" (p. 13). This principle refers to the "rule-like activities" mentioned earlier, and to the emergent nature of interaction. The network of relationships constituted by "self-conception, definitions of social objects, and ongoing patterns of interaction" are all part of the social interaction "package," as it were, and symbolic interactionism thus
demands that process or sequence be given primary emphasis in any scientific investigation. Social processes...involve time and its passage. The sequences or phases that persons go through as they move from one stage to another must be uncovered and causally analyzed before an investigation is regarded as complete (Denzin, 1978, pp. 13-14).

The last two principles concern the role of methods in inquiry. The sixth principle is an abstract one which says that

the very act of engaging in social research must be seen as a process of symbolic interaction, that being a scientist reflects a continual attempt to lift one's own idiosyncratic experiences to the level of the consensual and the shared meaning (p. 14).

The seventh and final principle calls attention to what Denzin calls sensitizing concepts, roughly analogous to Wilhelm Dilthey's method of verstehen (Burrell and Morgan, p. 229), an important concept discussed in the next section. Sensitizing concepts refers to those that are not transformed immediately into operational definitions through an attitude scale or checklist. An operational definition defines a concept by stating how it will be observed. [In contrast] a sensitizing approach to measurement [leaves] the concept nonoperationalized until [the researcher enters] the field and [learns] the processes representing it and the specific meanings attached to it by the persons observed (Denzin, 1978, p. 16).

The Point of Theory

As might be expected, interpretivists view the point of theory rather differently from their traditional research brethren. Jonathan Culler (1994), for example, provides a good operating definition of "theory," saying it is

the nickname for an unbounded corpus of works 'that succeed in challenging and reorienting thinking in domains other than those to which they ostensibly belong because their analyses of language, mind, history, or culture offer novel and persuasive accounts of signification, make strange the familiar and perhaps persuade readers to conceive of their own thinking and the institutions to which it relates in new ways' (p. 13).

Karl Weick (1989) is more direct, saying that "the contribution of social science does not lie in validated knowledge, but rather in the suggestion of relationships and connections
that had previously not been suspected, relationships that change actions and perspectives" (p. 524).

Weick notwithstanding, Culler acknowledges that new theory is both uncomfortable and "intimidating" because it forces people out of the long-held strictures of positivism. At the same time,

[all we can do is learn not to expect to have delineated, once and for all, the boundaries of our subject or to master the perspectives relevant to it, and thus learn to remember -- though this will not make things feel much easier -- that the intimidation we feel when confronted with discourses we don't know or understand is inseparable from the possibility of new understanding. If there is a general point, or a point to theory in general, this must be it (pp. 16-17).

Section Two: Some "Faces" of Interpretive Social Theory

Introduction

Burrell and Morgan specify four categories they say help constitute an interpretivist perspective, from most to least subjective: solipsism, phenomenology, phenomenological sociology, and hermeneutics. I focus attention on the last three, as Follett seems to fit most comfortably with their fundamental views.

The perspective springs largely from the 18th Century German idealism of Immanuel Kant, and emerges as principled opposition to positivistic social science (Harmon and Mayer, p. 290; Hughes, p. 90). Kant is followed in the 19th and 20th Centuries by several consequential theorists. Among them, Wilhelm Dilthey and, later, Hans-Georg Gadamer (hermeneutics); Max Weber; Alfred Schutz (existential phenomenology). Rounding out the picture are two writers briefly introduced in the first section: Harold Garfinkel (phenomenological sociology-ethnomethodology); and Norman Denzin (phenomenological symbolic interactionism). A brief survey of each of these six writers' primary ideas is useful.

Immanuel Kant

Interpretivism, like positivism, uses Kant for its own ends. For the latter, of course, Kant's ideas on "reason" serve it well. For the former, his ideas on knowledge are the linchpin. Kant's view is that "human consciousness, rather than the seemingly self-evident world of facts and things, is the core problem of philosophical discourse" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 291); and that "the ultimate reality of the universe lies in 'spirit' or 'idea' rather than
sense perceptions" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 227). Kant further believes that
a priori knowledge must precede any grasp or understanding of the sense
data of empirical experience.....A priori knowledge [is] seen as independent
of any external reality and...as the product of 'mind' and the interpretive
processes which go on within it (Burrell and Morgan, p. 227).

We also see that interpretivism uses Kant in its call for a retreat from positivism and
its preoccupation with imposing objectivism on social science; and makes a corresponding
call for movement toward a more subjectivist social science which attends to experience,
understanding and meaning. Kant's contribution is manifest in, and extended by, the neo-
idealism of Dilthey, Weber, Schutz, Garfinkel, Gadamer and Denzin.¹

Wilhelm Dilthey's Hermeneutics

Wilhelm Dilthey offers an "hermeneutics," in which he posits his notion of verstehen
("interpretive understanding"). This idea provides one of the unifying themes in the paradigm
(Burrell and Morgan, p. 229; Hughes, p. 90); and, for each of the contributors to
interpretivism, verstehen takes on different meanings, and is put to different uses. I thus
use verstehen as the linking mechanism among and between these contributors.

Fundamentally, Dilthey believes that a "textual analysis of meaning and significance
[is] more appropriate than a scientific search for knowledge of general laws" such as
positivist sociology attempts (Burrell and Morgan, p. 237). He believes that a natural science
perspective on social affairs is deficient inasmuch as it "[leaves] no room for the idea that
history and society [are] human creations and that this [constitutes] the essence of all social
forms" (Hughes, p. 90). He thus sees social science as imbued with "spiritual character,"
which means "the 'spirit' of a social situation or type of institution [is] of key importance"

¹ Gadamer does not strictly fall under the rubric "neo-idealism," as he himself
notes; however, Martin Heidegger, with whom he served and "apprenticeship" and
who exerted great influence upon his early work, should not go unnamed (Gadamer,
1985, pp. 177-193 passim). Further, Gadamer's late work sees language as a
primary contributor to interpretive understanding. Certainly Garfinkel and Denzin see
language as central as well. For both, however, language seems to serve as an
essential method to achieve greater understanding (e.g., Denzin, 1983, pp. 132-133).
Gadamer, in contrast, treats it more fundamentally, saying that one's very "being is
manifest in language" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 238, emphasis supplied).
Like Kant, Dilthey believes "[t]he study of human history has to be based on the fact that humans [are] purposive creators whose lives [are] bounded by a reality which has meaning for them" (Hughes, p. 90). Dilthey's "cultural sciences" thus direct attention to the mind and its processes (Burrell and Morgan, p. 229), and how individuals attempt to reconcile the subjective and objective dimensions of social existence. This they can accomplish by a process he calls objectification, which creates tangible constructs (e.g., law, art, institutions) that can "only be understood in relation to the minds which created them and the inner experience...they [reflect]" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 229; also Hughes, p. 90).

That being the case, and as Kuhn (1970) much later makes explicit, Dilthey believes that neither science nor social action are by any means value free, because

human social behaviour [is] always imbibed with values, and reliable knowledge of a culture [can] only be gained by isolating the common ideas, the feelings, or the goals of a particular historical society. It [is] these that [make] each social act subjectively meaningful (Hughes, p. 91).

Dilthey therefore thinks the greatest dilemma posed by social science is to "recognize the actions, events and artifacts from within human life not as the observation of some external reality" (Hughes, p. 90, emphasis in original; also Bailey, p. 7). His solution for this dilemma is verstehen, which says that "people's behaviors are mainly understandable in terms of the subjective meaning that they, themselves, give to them" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 294). The social scientist, therefore, should seek to understand human beings, their inner minds and their feelings, and the way these are expressed in their outward actions and achievements. In short, the outward manifestations of human life [need] to be interpreted in terms of the inner experiences which they [reflect] through the method of verstehen (Burrell and Morgan, p. 229, emphasis in original).

Verstehen can emerge only if people, and the contexts within which they live and relate, are seen in holistic and circular terms. Dilthey's notion of the "hermeneutic circle" affirms his belief that knowledge about human action can only be achieved via an iterative process which recognizes that there are no absolute starting points, no self-evident, self-contained certainties on which we can build, because we always find ourselves in the middle of complex situations which we try to disentangle by making, then
revising, provisional assumptions (Rickman, 1976, p. 11).

For Dilthey, then, *verstehen* is both concept and method. Conceptually, it is "interpretive understanding" which results from a circular and iteratively continuous process which has as its objective understanding the world within the realm of individual experience and subjective meaning. As a social scientific method, *verstehen* is "an interpretive procedure grounded in the imaginative recreation of the experiences of others" (Hughes, p. 90), which has the potential to rival the objectivity traditional science so clearly craves (Burrell and Morgan, p. 230).

**Max Weber**

The second consequential writer is Max Weber who, together with Dilthey, rejects the two dominant perspectives of the time (positivism and idealism), and attempts to harmonize those differing perspectives. In Weber's hands, *verstehen* becomes more method than concept, and serves to undergird and justify development of two potent methodological constructs which have since held places of prominence in social science: value neutrality and ideal types (Burrell and Morgan, pp. 229-231; Hughes, pp. 92-93).

Like Dilthey, Weber believes that "explanations of social affairs must be 'adequate on the level of meaning', and that the essential function of social science is to be 'interpretive', that is to understand the subjective meaning of social action" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 230). Said another way, and as Weber defines "social action,"

an action is social when a social actor assigns a certain meaning to his or her conduct and, by this meaning, is related to the behaviour of other persons. Social interaction occurs when actions are reciprocally oriented not in any mechanistic fashion of stimulus and response, but because actors interpret

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2 The reader will note in the chapter on organization theory that I have located Weber in the functionalist realm there, while he appears here as consequential to development of interpretivism. As Burrell and Morgan note, however, Weber can be seen as a 'sociologist of regulation', in that one of his central concerns [is] to provide a thorough-going analysis of social order. In this the notion of rationality [is] accorded a central role. Whether he can be more appropriately described as a positivist rather than an idealist will no doubt continue to be debated (p. 231).
and give meaning both to their own and to others' behaviour (Hughes, p. 95, emphasis in original).

Weber's belief in value neutrality emerges from a complex blending of his discomfort with positivist social science, which he sees as offering superficial causal explanations, together with his distaste for the "subjective and 'unscientific' nature of idealist thought" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 230). He suggests that social scientists should actively seek to separate their "everyday life" from their scientific roles, and "should never abuse their scientific authority by passing off value judgments as scientific truths" (Hughes, p. 93). His "ideal type" device is introduced specifically to yield causal explanations of social behavior (i.e., to rationalize that behavior), and thus "to build an objective science of sociology upon the foundations of subjective meaning and individual action" (Burrell and Morgan, pp. 230-231).

It is worth noting, then, that at their core, both value neutrality and ideal types seem to be little more than methodological tools with which to rationalize, delimit, isolate or control the subjective elements of human endeavor and experience. It is also clear that, for Weber, idealist notions of reality as social construction take a back seat in the search for causality (Burrell and Morgan, p. 231). Further, and to the extent that Weber joins positivism in its search for causal explanations of individual behavior and action, he "insists that such explanations...be reduced to the level of the individual" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 230).

In short, for Weber, verstehen is critical for social science inquiry, but only if intended specifically to result in objective science (Hughes, p. 92; Burrell and Morgan, p. 230; Bailey, p. 8). By using the idea of verstehen as a purely methodological tool, his intent to reconcile idealism with positivism is laid bare (Burrell and Morgan, p. 231).

Alfred Schutz's "Existential" Phenomenology

Schutz's existential phenomenology derives from both Edmund Husserl's "pure" brand of phenomenology, and Weber (see Burrell and Morgan, pp. 240-243; Schmitt, 1967, pp. 58-68). He seeks to reconcile Weber's and Husserl's views and draws upon Bergson's "stream of thought," calling it "stream of consciousness" in the manner of Husserl, in the
attempt (Burrell and Morgan, pp. 243-244). However, he takes us into another realm altogether.

Schutz takes as his problem "understanding the meaning structure in the world of everyday life" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 246); and believes that social science should seek to "see this world in its massive complexity, to outline and explore its essential features, and to trace out its manifold relationships" (Schutz, [1932] 1967, p. xxv). For Schutz, then, it is the "everyday" which is real, and social science can explore and discover these "essential features" in the various contexts ("finite provinces of meaning") within which individuals operate in the day-to-day (Hughes, p. 141). This allows interpretive social science to claim a scientific rigor equal to that of traditional science. In this goal, Schutz can be seen as paralleling Dilthey and Weber.

So then, Schutz believes that the social scientist should be "concerned with 'typical' schemes of [everyday] action," and that, if social science is to have any relevance at all, it must be undertaken "within the context of the human activity which has created them and which cannot be understood apart from this scheme of action" (Hughes, p. 142). For Schutz, The social scientist's interest and purpose is merely to display the meanings that enter into the actors' worlds. Various devices [e.g., ideal types] are important to this, but Schutz's concerns are with how 'objectivity' or 'truth' are established within a natural life-world and its socially organised settings. There is no question of one form of understanding being absolutely superior to any other (Hughes, p. 142).

Contra Weber, Schutz's conception of verstehen becomes "meaning [as] attached to actions retrospectively; only the already-experienced is meaningful, not that which is being experienced" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 244). Schutz therefore believes that verstehen, "understanding," occurs in reflexive action ("reflexivity"), another element of note in

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3 Bergson makes a distinction between the brain and consciousness. The former is a "system of images and reaction-patterns"; while consciousness is the "recall of images and the choice of reactions" (Durant, 1961, p. 339). Thus, his "stream of thought" supposes that "the intellect catches the states...of reality and life; thought is a stream of transitive ideas...; 'ideas' are merely points that memory selects in the flow of thought; and the mental current adequately reflects the continuity of perception and the movement of life" (Durant, pp.347-348, emphasis in original).
interpretive theory. Reflexivity is a process deriving from both Husserl's "phenomenological reduction" and Bergson. It says that "meaning is dependent upon...the process of turning back on oneself and looking at what has been going on" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 244).

There is more to Schutz's conception of verstehen, however, in that he seeks what he calls "genuine understanding." For Schutz, individuals generally do that which is "self-evidently meaningful;" and genuine understanding is thus "the intentional grasping of the experience of the other....It reflects the true comprehension of subjective meaning" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 245, emphasis supplied). Thus,

[w]e make sense of our own actions and those of others through a 'common stock of knowledge' we inherit as members of a society. Though such knowledge has its own personal biographical tonality and is continually changing, its intersubjective structure is familiar (Hughes, p. 141).

For Schutz, "knowledge of everyday life is...socially ordered" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 245). That, together with his ideas on "reflexivity" and genuine understanding, signals his belief that, as with Dilthey and Weber, individuals are purposive creatures who have the capacity to both create and interpret meaning and experience.

In Schutz's hands, Dilthey's "objectification" or Husserl's "bracketing" becomes "typification," a mechanism people use to organize everyday "taken-for-granted" life experiences. It means to apply "interpretive constructs akin to 'ideal types' to apprehend the experience of everyday life and the stock of knowledge or common-sense understandings which comprise the natural attitude" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 245). Most importantly for Schutz, genuine understanding can develop only through everyday interaction that is direct and face-to-face (Burrell and Morgan, p. 245).

Schutz gives most cogent expression to the role of social science from an interpretivist perspective:

The world of nature, as explored by the natural scientist, does not 'mean' anything to the molecules, atoms, and electrons. But the observational field of the social scientist—social reality—has a specific meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, acting, and thinking within it. By a series of commonsense constructs they have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world they experience as the reality of their daily lives (Schutz, 1963, p. 242).

Harold Garfinkel's Ethnomethodology
Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodology gives a decided nod to Husserl, Schutz and Parsons and, together with Norman Denzin's symbolic interactionism (which derives from, and seeks to extend, the pragmatism of George Herbert Mead and John Dewey, among others), helps constitute what Burrell and Morgan call phenomenological sociology (pp. 247-249; see also Denzin, 1983, p. 130).

Like phenomenologists Husserl and Schutz, their ethnomethodologist brethren operate with two concerns: 1) "studying the commonplace features of everyday life, with emphasis on those things that 'everyone knows'"; and 2) the belief that "social interaction [is] an ongoing process" (Bailey, p. 274). Further, by suggesting that individuals attempt to make social action "rationally accountable," ethnomethodology seeks to marry theory and method (Denzin, 1978, p. 5). Says Bailey:

[ethnomethodology is based on the notion that everyday, commonplace, or routine social activities and interaction are made possible through the use of a variety of skills, practices, and assumptions. These skills, practices, and assumptions are what ethnomethodology calls 'methods' (p. 273).

The importance of Garfinkel's view for present purposes is that he sees both the "lay" and "professional" sociologist as using the same "methods" and as engaging in much the same socio-interpretive process. As Zimmerman and Wieder (1970) observe,

the ethnomethodologist is not concerned with providing causal explanations of observably regular, patterned, repetitive actions by some kind of analysis of the actor's point of view. He [or she] is concerned with how members of society go about the task of seeing, describing, and explaining order in the world in which they live (pp. 287-289, emphases in original).

Because the professional engages in more methodologically "sound" research practices (i.e., is more concerned with reliability and validity) than does the lay sociologist, he or she might see reports emerging therefrom as more intrinsically valuable than that of the lay person. At the same time, argues Garfinkel, each approaches the problem under study in much the same way (Bailey, p. 276). Further, each has the same objective: the attempt to "understand, or make sense of, the ongoing social world" (Bailey, p. 273). In this, he gives theoretical and methodological weight to the average person in the everyday contexts of his or her "life-world" equal to that of the professionally-trained sociologist.

Two notions are central to Garfinkel's view: indexicality and reflexivity. Like Weber and Schutz, Garfinkel believes pure description such as that offered by positivist social
science is always incomplete: "[w]hatever is included in a description is always selective and cannot exhaust all that can be said about an object, event or person" (Hughes, p. 106). Enter "indexicality." If indexicals are "situation-specific words and phrases whose meaning may change from situation to situation and may depend on who is uttering the word or to whom the remarks are directed" (Bailey, p. 278); then indexicality refers to

[e]veryday activities [that] are seen as being ordered and rationally explicable within the context in which they occur. The way in which they are organised makes use of expressions and activities which are shared and not necessarily explicitly stated (Burrell and Morgan, p. 248).

Examples of indexicals might be: "she, we, he, you, here, there, now, this, that, it, I, then, soon, today, tomorrow" (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, p. 347). It is clear that these words require, at least, social context to give them relevant meaning. Indexicals, then, be they symbols, objects or events, "must be interpreted by individuals participating in the interaction before their meanings can become clear" (Bailey, p. 278).

Researchers operating from a traditional perspective, because of their desire to develop universalizable and/or generalizable rules and patterns, and have less interest in studying the process of "sensemaking" in the everyday; and indexicals give them pause. They therefore feel the need to either "[convert] indexical expressions into objective nonindexical expressions, or [to substitute] objective expressions for indexical ones" (Bailey, p. 279). Alternatively, they might also "attempt to repair or clarify its meaning until it is generalizable" (Bailey, p. 279).

Ethnomethodologists, in contrast, see indexical expressions "as phenomena of interest in their own right" (Bailey, p. 279), and thus make no attempt to either universalize, generalize, substitute or repair them. Although ethnomethodology assumes that interaction is highly structured, and that shared context/situation-specific meanings underlie each interaction, it also assumes that clarification continuously occurs throughout that interaction. Since this clarification process "proceeds in identifiable stages according to distinct rules" (Bailey, p. 288), ethnomethodology is concerned to study those elements of interaction requiring clarification as the interaction progresses (Bailey, p. 279).

As for reflexivity, Garfinkel's use of the term is pure Schutz: indexicality "depends upon the capacity to look back on what has gone before" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 248). It is this reflexive process, both consciously ordered and sustained by social actors, that allows
individuals to make their everyday actions "rationally accountable." As Bailey notes,

[ethnomethodologists feel that even though the meaning of [indexical expressions] can never be generalized to fit all situations, and can never be context free, the rules by which the meaning of such a term is made clear to participants in a conversation are general, and can be studied and learned. In general ethnomethodologists believe that emphasis in social research should be on the process of social interaction through which social reality is constructed and maintained, rather than on the end result or product of such interaction... (p. 288).

It appears that, for Garfinkel, verstehen goes the way of Dilthey and Weber, with a nod to Husserl and Schutz. That is, he sees ethnomethodology, and indexical language, as tools with which to discover context-specific meaning. Such discovery occurs when the researcher can 1) display taken for granted, everyday assumptions, by observing the process of interaction as it proceeds to clarify the explicit, albeit unstated, agreements that exist prior to the interaction; and 2) through the use of indexicals, identify, catalog and display meanings in context. These "meanings in context" appear to constitute verstehen.

**Hans-Georg Gadamer's Hermeneutics**

Hans-Georg Gadamer extends Dilthey's hermeneutics, and introduces a more profound idea of the use of language (than that of Garfinkel) to the interpretive stewpot. Using Heidegger's ideas on the "meaning of being" developed in his hermeneutic phenomenology and those of Dilthey on the "hermeneutic circle," Gadamer says that we cannot relate...to a historic tradition as if it existed as an object apart from us, since there is an interplay between the movement of tradition and the interpreter. In order to understand social or cultural phenomena, the observer must enter into a dialogue with the subject of study (Burrell and Morgan, p. 237).

While Dilthey argues for a kind of meshing, an intermingling of one person's subjective experience with that of another, Gadamer extends this, arguing instead for "appreciating the interchange of the frames of reference of the observer and the observed" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 238). In this, language takes center stage. "Being," says Gadamer, "is manifest in language" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 238).

Gadamer gives us yet another conception of verstehen. Since language is so
central to his view, its mediating role in mutual discovery constitutes *verstehen*. However, for Gadamer, unlike Garfinkel, language is neither narrowly defined nor is it an end in itself. He notes that

....[t]here are such things as hunger, and love, work and domination, which themselves are not speech and language but which circumscribe the space within which speaking-with-each-other and listening-to-each-other can take place (Gadamer, 1985, pp. 179-180).

History and tradition, says Gadamer, are neither "fragment[s] of our world-experience" nor are they a function of cultural transmission (p. 181). Instead, and here we see more subjectivist shades of Garfinkel,

it is the world itself that is communicatively experienced and constantly given over to us as an infinitely open task. It is not the world of a first day but one that is always already handed down to us. In all those places where something is experienced, where unfamiliarity is overcome and what occurs is the shedding of light, the coming of insight, and appropriation, what takes place is the hermeneutic process of translation into the word and into the common consciousness (Gadamer, p. 181).

Like all interpretivists, Gadamer sees people as first, last and always, social beings, and says that people have what appears to be a nearly insatiable "[striving] to understand." He thus sees dialogue as "an unending conversation." This dialogue is "real insofar as we seek to find our own language as the common one....in conversation, however, we attempt to open ourselves to [our conversation partner], and this means holding fast to our common ground (Gadamer, p. 188, emphasis supplied). Further, says Gadamer, hermeneutics

....insists that there is no higher principle than holding oneself open in a conversation. But this means: Always recognize in advance the possible correctness, even the superiority of the conversation partner's position (Gadamer, p. 189).

For Gadamer, then, hermeneutics is "the original form of 'being in the world', a universal principle of human thought" (Hughes, p. 138). In this, he rounds out his conception of *verstehen*, and signals that it is something far more fundamental than certainly Dilthey seems to have had in mind. Interpretation and understanding of experience cannot precede the use of language, broadly defined, because the latter has "disclosure power." "[T]radition and language form the context of interpretation and there can be no understanding outside
of these and nothing, therefore, for our understanding to be relative to" (Hughes, p. 139).

Norman Denzin's Phenomenological Symbolic Interactionism

Burrell and Morgan identify two strains of symbolic interactionism, behavioral and phenomenological, both of which derive largely from the work of George Simmel, George Herbert Mead and Herbert Blumer (pp. 68-82, passim); and both intend to bridge the philosophical region between sociological positivism and German idealism (Burrell and Morgan, p. 27). The three seminal writers noted above thus introduce a neo-idealist qua subjectivist approach to an otherwise objectivist view of social affairs. Burrell and Morgan locate behavioral interactionism in the "least objectivist regions" of the functionalist paradigm (pp. 46, 48); while phenomenological symbolic interactionism is more consonant with the interpretivist (p. 251).

For present purposes, the most likely candidate for discussion of symbolic interactionism would be Mead. Since, however, Mead is inextricably tied to the "Chicago School" of early Twentieth Century Pragmatism, I eschew discussion about him until Chapter Three, which addresses his "process" view.

We know that Mead published little of his work during his lifetime, and that the two strains of symbolic interactionism Burrell and Morgan identify stem largely from varying metatheoretical assumptions about, and thus paradigmatic interpretations, of Mead's work (Burrell and Morgan, pp. 73, 77; Rucker, 1969, p. 20). Here, I draw attention to the phenomenological "branch" of symbolic interactionism, citing contemporary symbolic interactionist Norman Denzin who draws from, among others, Mead (Denzin, 1978, pp. 4, 33).

Much like Schutz and Garfinkel, Norman Denzin's brand of interpretivism takes as its problem "the everyday life world, [a] world taken for granted and made problematic by self-reflective, interacting individuals" (Denzin, 1983, p. 129). Denzin speaks clearly about his principled opposition to positivist sociology, observing that, since the "world does not stand still, nor will it conform to the scientist's logical scheme of analysis" (1983, p. 133), social scientists must acknowledge that "[e]very human situation is novel, emergent, and filled with multiple, often conflicting, meanings and interpretations" (1983, pp. 132-133). Thus, he sees the task of the interpretive social scientist as "[attempting] to capture the core of these meanings and contradictions" (1983, p. 133).
Among interpretivists surveyed here, Denzin is alone in acknowledging that his brand of interpretivism, symbolic interactionism, "represents an effort to move beyond the pragmatism of Mead, Dewey...and others into the interpretive and structural realms of post-World War II European social theory and thought" (1983, p. 130). He thus provides a direct link to pragmatism and thus to Follett, which is comforting to those of us who would analyze the latter from these two perspectives.

Of particular concern to Denzin is the nature of the questions posed by interpretive social scientists. Specifically, and as with other adherents of interpretivism, Denzin calls for movement away from positivist "why" questions, and toward interpretivist "how" questions (1983, p. 132). Thus, the interpretive question becomes "how is social experience, or a sequence of social interaction organized, perceived and constructed by differentially wide-awake, self-reflective, socially constrained, free individuals?" (1983, p. 132).

Denzin (1978) says that symbolic interactionism operates with the assumption that, first, reality is socially constructed. In this, and as with many interpretivists, Denzin sees individuals as purposive, and as actively engaged in creating and interpreting their own lives and activities. Secondly, through self-reflexivity, people are "capable of shaping and guiding their own behavior and that of others" (Denzin, 1978, p. 7). Thus, and thirdly, they are assumed to engage in "interaction that is...emergent, negotiated, often unpredictable...." Further, this interaction is symbolic "because it involves manipulation of symbols, words, meanings, and languages" (Denzin, 1978, p. 7).

The social world is not seen by the symbolic interactionist as comprised of "objects that have no intrinsic meaning" (Denzin, 1978, p. 7). That being the case, human experience is such that the process of defining objects is ever-changing, subject to redefinitions, relocations, and realignments. The interactionist assumes that humans learn their basic symbols, their conceptions of self, and the definitions they attach to social objects through interaction with others. Each person simultaneously carries on conversations with himself or herself and with significant others. Behavior is observable at the symbolic and the behavioral levels (Denzin, 1978, p. 7).

Central to a symbolic interactionist perspective is "focused interaction," a notion first posited by Erving Goffman (1959). Such interaction has six characteristics. It involves, first, individuals and their attempts at taking one another's point of view; second, a physical social setting; third, social objects, upon which individuals act; fourth, individuals who use "a set
of rules [with which to] tacitly guide and shape their ongoing interaction" as they seek to take one another's point of view; fifth, the assumption that "all interaction involves persons differentially related to one another;" and sixth, an encounter, a "focused exchange" or interaction between these individuals (Denzin, 1978, pp. 7-8).

Denzin's use of verstehen would seem to borrow selectively from Dilthey, Schutz and Gadamer. That is, interpretive understanding arises from the continuously circular, reflexive, and thus always "emergent, negotiated and unpredictable," process of everyday "focused interaction." In this conception, language serves as the primary mechanism for such communication or interaction.

Section Three: Mary Parker Follett and the Interpretivists

Introduction

Even with the very brief introduction to the central arguments in Mary Follett's The New State in Chapter One, we already see her implicit agreement with many of the fundamental tenets of interpretivist thought. At the same time, interpretivism supplies us with an element saliently lacking in The New State: while Follett provides the process aspects of social action, she does not expressly outline either the philosophical or the methodological foundations that guide her work. Thus, by analytically uniting The New State with interpretivism, each may be seen as informing, and giving a robustness to, the other.

A word on Mary Follett's methods and methodology -- or lack of them -- in The New State is in order. Follett seems benignly neglectful of methodological considerations, particularly in her later works (Fox, 1968); however, she is self-consciously aware of them in her first major publication, the 1896 Speaker of the House of Representatives (Fox and Urwick, 1973, p. x). Further, and as Fox and Urwick note,

[although Miss Follett recognized the potential value of systematic social research and advocated the introduction of scientific procedures into the study of social processes, she had at her disposal none of the instruments and techniques that characterize social research to-day (pp. viii-ix).

In every work subsequent to her first, we see evidence that, while she may appear to eschew accepted research methods and methodology, she is also absolutely consistent across each and all of them. This consistency follows from two invariable principles:
(1) her commitment to the pragmatists' idea that experience rather than detached intellectual reflection was the surest guide to the discovery of truth; and (2) a psychology that held that the self does not exist prior to social interactions (Harmon and Mayer, 1986, p. 341).

We see those principles operating in Creative Experience (1924), in Dynamic Administration (Fox and Urwick, 1973), in her short piece in Papers on the Science of Administration (Gulick and Urwick, 1937), in Freedom and Coordination (1949), and certainly in The New State. For the sake of consistency in this chapter, however, The New State is the singular focus.

One apparent methodological difference between Follett and the interpretivists concerns unit of analysis. The interpretivists' unit of analysis is the individual, while Follett focuses attention on the "group in relation" (p. 10, emphasis in original). This difference, however, may be more a matter of degree than kind.

Follett by no means ignores the individual. Conceptions of the individual are bound up in, and help define, her belief in why the "group in relation" is so vital. She makes clear distinctions between group and individual, and spends a good deal of time identifying what the individual is, what individuality means ("the capacity for union", p. 62; or, alternatively, "finding my place in the whole", p. 65), and how crucial is individual responsibility in service of democracy (Follett, pp. 60-68). She also makes a distinction between the individual and society (pp. 61-62). Indeed, these are highly strategic distinctions for Follett, and they ground her fundamental purpose: to encourage thinking in collective relational, rather than in "particularistic" self-interested, terms.

Another example of her awareness of unit of analysis is evident in her remarks on the group and what she calls the "new psychology," and here we see clear resonance with Schutz, Garfinkel, and Denzin in their belief that social science should "examine the character of daily life" (Hughes, p. 140). To wit:

The study of democracy has been based largely on the study of institutions; it should be based on the study of how [people] behave together. We have to deal, not with institutions, or any mechanical thing, or with abstract ideas...or anything but just [people], ordinary [people] (p. 19).

Follett's sometimes overwrought prose, together with what may appear to be her neglect of methodology, does not invalidate her fundamental arguments; and the two
"inviolate principles" with which she operates are defensible from an interpretivist perspective. So then, specific to methodology generally, and Fox and Urwick's earlier comment notwithstanding, it does not seem that Follett is so much unaware of it as she seems to see her purpose as transcending strict methodological concerns. In this, Follett would likely agree with Gadamer, who says, "To what extent is method a guarantor of truth?" (p. 179). We may say, then, that the unifying element between Follett and the interpretivists is meaning and its function in the everyday. Indeed, their common unit of analysis may be said to be meaning.

The objective of this section is to make explicit those elements of harmony between Follett and the interpretivists as I see them. While any number of corollaries between them could perhaps be cited, I direct attention to five I see as particularly useful: 1) interpretive understanding; 2) circularity and reflexivity of the social process; 3) the purposiveness of human beings; 4) personal responsibility; and 5) the uses of language.

**Interpretive Understanding (Verstehen)**

Likely, the most fundamental point upon which both the interpretivists and Follett agree completely is that human beings do not, cannot, live in isolation. Thus, their views of human nature coincide: people are social creatures who have the capacity to create and shape the lives they would have. For example, Follett offers what might be described as a nice blend of pragmatism and interpretivism in discussion of the group organization movement. She says the movement rests upon

the solid assumption that this is a man-made not a machine-made world, that men and women are capable of constructing their own life, and that not upon socialism or any rule or any order or any plan or any utopia can rest our hearts, but only on the force of a united and creative citizenship (p.8).

Both Follett and the interpretivists also place great stock in, and hold out much hope for, people's willingness and ability to seek understanding of their fellows. They each thus believe that some level of understanding among people is possible.

If we explore the views of Follett and the interpretivists on the purposes of such understanding, however, an irreconcilable difference between them is brought to light. Follett sees the group process (i.e., the group "in relation") as a search for genuine understanding in service of both democracy and social action. For the interpretivists, discovery alone is
sufficient. That is, they seek to discover and report about how understanding is achieved, via the use of specific methods or practices, as seen through the lens of the subjective experiences, collectively-developed meanings and behavior of individuals.

So then, the interpretivists seem content largely to identify and describe the functions of meaning and experience in the everyday "life world," and to offer suggestions about their genesis. They do not explore the idea that, if knowledge of subjective experience and meaning are to have any relevance in the everyday life experiences of people, something must follow from that knowledge. Follett provides her pragmatic answer: creation of the collective idea and the collective will, produced by "integration" and followed by social action in service of democracy and the social group ideal. "Our progress," says Follett, "is measured by our ability to proceed from integration to integration" (p. 27). In this, she provides a singular rounding out of the interpretivist perspective: application of knowledge about subjective experience and meaning in service of "the practical scheme of living" (p. 8).

If Follett were to advance a corollary to verstehen, it would likely follow from her ideas on "integration" or "unification." Recall Fox's (1968) thumbnail definition of "integration:" "a harmonious marriage of differences which...come together in a way that produces a new form, a new entity, a new result, made out of old differences, and yet different from any of them" (p. 524).

My use of Follett's "integration" as a rough analogue to the interpretivist verstehen is defensible for three reasons: first, as with Schutz, Garfinkel, Denzin and Gadamer, she seems to assume that understanding can only begin with the face-to-face "we-relation" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967), and that is the first essentiality in the social process. Second, her notion of "integration" resonates greatly with Dilthey's circular and reflexive "hermeneutic circle," together with Goffman's "focused interaction." Finally, and as it is with Garfinkel, Gadamer and Denzin, language holds a central place in her arguments. While she would

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4 Fox (1968) makes the wry observation that Follett "was never one to limit herself to a single term if she could gain a nuance or two by using a dozen" (p. 523). Such is the case with the term "integration." Apart from numerous examples of the principle, she has a fine time positing a variety of synonyms for it. Among them, "synthesis," "interweaving," "unification."
not go so far as to say, as does Gadamer, that "being is manifest in language," (she would see "being" as manifest in the healthy group process -- the group "in relation") , she does seem to assume that language is crucial toward creating "meaning in context."

For example, in discussion of the "collective feeling," she says that "the unification of thought...is only a part of the social process. We must consider, besides, the unification of feeling, affection, emotion, desire, aspiration -- all that we are" (p. 44). Since people cannot adequately communicate any of those aspects of personhood in any substantive way save via language, it seems that Follett assumes unification can only ensue in a social process created and sustained largely through language.

I should note that the interpretivists' verstehen and Follett's corollary "integration" represent more than a garden-variety conception of "understanding." For both Follett and the interpretivists, sense, reality -- indeed, the social order itself -- are created in individual consciousness and interaction (interpretivism) or the group, "in relation" (Follett). And, for Follett in particular, that problem-solving may occur at the same time is purely incidental to, a nice "side-benefit" of, and a nearly inevitable result of, that process.

**Circularity and Reflexivity of the Social Process**

Follett may believe that people are social beings, but by no means does she think they are naturally inclined to become the ideal-typical citizens she craves. She relies on two basic elements, both congruent with interpretivism, circularity and reflexivity. To those, Follett would add "learning."

For Follett, the social process is both circular and reflexive: "The individual is created by the social process and is daily nourished by that process" (p. 62). Further, her ideas on "circular response," (pp. 25-26) developed later in Creative Experience, resonate with Dilthey's on the "hermeneutic circle." Recall Dilthey's view that "there are no absolute starting points, no self-evident, self-contained certainties on which we can build, because we always find ourselves in the middle of complex situations...." (Rickman, cited in Burrell and Morgan, p. 237). Note Follett's corollary idea: "we cannot view the content of the collective mind as a holiday procession, one part after another passing before our mental eyes; every part is bound up with every other part, every tendency is conditioned by every other tendency" (p. 25).

In yet another example, Follett says that both the "common idea and the common will
are born together in the social process" (p. 50), and she believes that this
does away with the whole discussion...of the priority of thought or action in
the social life. There is no order. The union of thought and will and activity
by which the clearer will is generated, the social process, is a perfect unity (p.
50).

More specific to circularity and reflexivity, recall that, emerging from Follett's social
or group process are a number of elements, none of which leads, one from another in
functional fashion, but are "born together in the social process" (p. 50). As the group
together learns to continually develop collective or common ideas, achieved similarity,
unification (the basis of association), sympathy, the common or collective will, and "true
purpose" (i.e., purpose or purposes which evolve as the group social process proceeds) all
emerge. From these elements come "loyalty" and, finally, "love" (Follett, pp. 50-59).

As for learning, it, too, is reflexive and circular: "We must learn and build and learn
again through the building, or we must build and learn and build again through the learning"
(Follett, p. 50). Or this observation:

What then is the essence of the group process by which are evolved the
collective thought and the collective will? It is an acting and reacting, a single
and identical process which brings out differences and integrates them into
a unity. The complex reciprocal action, the intricate interweavings of the
members of the group, is the social process (p. 33).

The Purposiveness of Human Beings

Follett also shares with Dilthey, Garfinkel and Denzin the idea that people are
"purposive creators whose lives [are] bound by a reality which has meaning for them"
(Hughes, p. 90). Note Follett: "...we stand now on the threshold of another age: we see there
humanity consciously generating its own activity, its own purpose and all that it needs for the
accomplishment of that purpose" (p. 47). More specifically, "[i]t is man's part to create
purpose and to actualize it" (p. 58), and it is through the "group organization movement" she
believes "the substitution of intention for accident, of organized purpose for scattered desire"
can occur (p. 8). It should be noted here that Follett believes that will or willingness is
an element bound up in purposiveness, an element left unexamined by the interpretivists:

[from the group process arise social understanding and true sympathy. At
the same moment appears the social will which is the creative will. Many

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writers are laying stress on the possibilities of the collective will; what I wish to emphasize is the necessity of creating the collective will (Follett, p. 48, emphases in original).

Follett sees this necessity as arising from the inadequacy of both political parties and what she terms "ballot box democracy" (p. 5). She is concerned to salvage democracy, quite a different concern from that of the interpretivists. At the same time, her notion of "will" is important to her argument and, in this, her idea of "purposiveness" seems to have more profound implications than those suggested by interpretivism. For example:

Democracy must be conceived as a process, not a goal. We do not want rigid institutions, however good. We need no 'body of truth' of any kind, but the will to will, which means the power to make our own government, our own institutions, our own expanding truth. We progress, not from one institution to another, but from a lesser to a greater will to will (p. 99).

Personal Responsibility

If interpretivism addresses personal responsibility, we cannot prove it by Dilthey, Weber, and Schutz. At the same time, Garfinkel, Gadamer and Denzin seem to confront it with their belief, either implicitly or explicitly, in the primary responsibility of individuals in interaction, or dialogue. Follett, too, showers a great deal of attention upon it (see Follett, e.g., pp. 26-27; 60-69; 74; 97-99; 168).

On several occasions Follett argues hotly for personal responsibility, and often charges individual actors with the very salvation of democracy. For example,

[w]hen we have organized the neighborhood group, when every man sees the problems of political and social reorganization not as abstract matters but as constituting his daily life, when men are so educated in politics as to feel that they themselves are politics functioning....[and, finally] when they are conscious of themselves as masters of the situation they will acknowledge their responsibility (p. 240).

Or this comment:

When I withhold my contribution...I am withholding far more than my personal share. When I fail some one or some cause, I have not failed just that person, just that cause, but the whole world is thereby crippled. This thought gives an added solemnity to the sense of personal responsibility (p. 67).

Finally, in order to produce the "group idea," the individual must
[if]irst and foremost...do his part. [That is] we [must] come together each to
give something. I must not subordinate myself, I must affirm myself and give my full positive value.... [Second, the individual cannot exhibit] a readiness to compromise.... [Third] we must be eager for what all others have to give.... The 'harmony' that comes from the domination of one man is not the kind we want.... To take our full share in the synthesis is all that is legitimate (pp. 26-27).

Garfinkel's notion of "rational accountability" may be said to be resonant here. Garfinkel's ethnomethodological objective is to provide explanations for the way in which actors make evident and persuade each other that the events and activities in which they are involved are coherent and consistent. They are interested in understanding the methods which characterise [an] accounting practise. [Thus] 'order' in human affairs does not exist independently of the accounting practices employed in this discovery (Burrell and Morgan, p. 250).

Note, too, Follett's resonance with Gadamer, who seems to suggest that personal responsibility is central to face-to-face interaction, holding that it is essential one should "[a]lways recognize in advance the possible correctness, even the superiority of the conversation partner's position" (p. 189).

Follett also places upon the individual responsibility for the "consciousness of oneness" (pp. 45, 55) she sees as essential for the sustainability of the neighborhood group and, indeed, of democracy. In discussion of the "social attitude," she says that "The only use for my difference is to join it with other differences. The unifying of opposites is the eternal process" (p. 29; also pp. 63-65). This, too, is in accord with Gadamer. Recall that he says history and tradition constitute an "unending conversation," which should make clear to us that

[i]n all those places where something is experienced, where unfamiliarity is overcome and what occurs is the shedding of light, the coming of insight, and appropriation, what takes place is the hemeneutic process of translation into the word and into the common consciousness (Gadamer, p. 181).

As for Follett's agreement with Denzin, it is clear that one's active and responsible participation in the social process is essential for the Goffman-Denzin "focused interaction" scheme to work. Recall that Denzin takes as his topic "consideration of how interacting selves cooperate in the construction of routine, and...taken-for-granted... meanings necessary for joint action" (cited in Douglas, 1970, pp. 295-296). Clearly, and as the several
illustrations noted above demonstrate, this is highly consistent with Follett's views on personal responsibility.

The Uses of Language

Follett assumes that language is central to any social interaction, and this assumption is apparent throughout her work, most particularly in her discussion of evolution of the "collective idea" (e.g., pp. 24-43, passim). While Follett may agree with the interpretivists that symbolic forms and forums are essential to a vibrant community life, both the face-to-face "we-relation," genuine dialogue and the relational context arising therefrom, are for her essentialities of humanness. It also seems that both Follett and most interpretivists make the implicit assumption that language has the potential to bridge differences or conflicts that may hamper the mutual discovery process.

For Follett, it is language dialogue in the context of the healthy group process alone that can create the "collective will" and "collective idea." As for the interpretivists, Burrell and Morgan say that existential phenomenology, ethnomethodology and hermeneutics converge with the "later" Wittgenstein in their "interest upon the role of language as a medium of practical social activity" (p. 254). Gadamer's notion of dialogue as an "unending conversation," in particular, seems to assume this; as does Garfinkel's notion of "indexicals" and Denzin's Goffman-inspired "focused interaction."

Gadamer's ideas on the centrality of language in social interaction are consistent with Follett's on the group process in action. Says Gadamer, "the world itself...is communicatively experienced and constantly given over to us as an infinitely open task" (p. 181). Recall that he also believes people mightily "strive to understand"; and that, through dialogue ("an unending conversation"), "we attempt to open ourselves to [our conversation partner], and this means holding fast to our common ground" (Gadamer, p. 188).

Like Follett, Gadamer has great hope for the unity of humankind, and holds fast to the belief that "[t]he possibility of reaching an agreement between reasonable beings can never be denied" (p. 180). Further, "[t]he communality that we call human rests on the linguistic constitution of our life-world" (Gadamer, p. 180). Follett's corollary to this is a two-pronged attack which derives, first, from her notions of "difference," and second, development of the "collective will."

It should be noted that interpretivism leaves conflict (what Follett would call
"difference") largely unexamined, and this derives from a key assumption in interpretivism. Because interpretivists believe the "world of human affairs [to be] cohesive, ordered and integrated" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 31), and that patterns or interaction "rules" can be observed and studied, it would probably undermine their basic position to explore it directly. On the other hand, Gadamer sees language as the mechanism with which to foster a continuous process of mutual discovery in the social process, and this, in turn, develops understanding of one's fellows. Denzin's "focused interaction" could be said to resonate here as well. The point is that both see language as a primary vehicle toward advancing this mutual discovery process, and neither says that conflict is absent in that process.

For Follett, un-integrated "difference" can undermine or sabotage the potential for development of a healthy social process. At all costs, then, it must be confronted. Indeed, she sees the integration of "difference" as one of the primary reasons for existence of the social process at all. As illustration, consider this comment -- and note the role of language here: "The only use for my difference is to join it with other differences. The unifying of opposites is the eternal process" (p. 29).

In this, Follett attends to conflict or "difference" head-on, seeing it as highly creative and useful (see, e.g., pp. 33-43, 97, 196). Recall that, for Follett, "difference" is an essentiality of the social process, and that "sameness indicates a meagre personality" (p. 196). Further, "we must learn to think of discussion not as a struggle, but as experiment in cooperation" (p. 97). It is only through appreciating and talking through one another's difference that integration can come about. This integration is made possible in large measure by language.

Notions of the face-to-face "we-relation" reverberate throughout Follett's work, and these are tied inextricably to the use of language. She does not believe that individuals and groups can have a substantive voice in government unless some social mechanism for creating a closer relational distance is developed. She sees this as occurring in the neighborhood group. It is there that face-to-face language dialogue is not only most possible, but essential; and it is there that the potential to bridge the relational distance between it and local, regional, state and national governments is also possible.

By way of example, in itemizing her "remedies for isolation and separation" Follett contends it is the "worthy and purposeful neighborhood life" that can ameliorate those ills:

Our proposal is that people should organize themselves into neighborhood
groups to express their daily life, to bring to the surface needs, desires and aspirations of that life.... (p. 192).

Follett, Gadamer and Denzin would likely concede that John Steinbeck (1962) has the right idea about language and its capacity to address conflict constructively when, in ruminating upon the changing seasons, he observes: "[f]or how can one know color in perpetual green, and what good is warmth without cold to give it sweetness?" (pp. 35-36).

Conclusion

This chapter has served to make explicit the agreement between Follett's arguments in The New State and some principal tenets of interpretivist thought. I cite five such tenets: interpretive understanding (verstehen), circularity and reflexivity of the social process, the purposiveness of human beings, personal responsibility, and the uses of language. In briefly analyzing each of the five, I demonstrate that this agreement, however implicit, is more than illusory. In the case of the "Chicago School" pragmatism of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, we find Follett's accord with them to be much more explicit. I turn now to that discussion.
CHAPTER THREE
MARY PARKER FOLLETT, PRAGMATISM, AND "PROCESS"

Introduction

This chapter directs attention to the "Chicago School" pragmatism of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, together with the transformational theory of Orion White and Cynthia McSwain, and the ways in which Follett parallels them. Dewey is covered in the first section, followed in sections two and three by Mead, and by White and McSwain, respectively.

As it is with Follett, reverberating throughout Dewey's body of work is the democratic ideal, seen as "all-embracing" and "moral" (Horwitz, 1987, p. 851; Morris, 1970, p. 95; Rucker, 1969; Damico, 1978). For present purposes, I attend to two elements Dewey sees as advancing the "great" and democratic society: public participation and political education. Two works are useful here. First is The Public and Its Problems ([1927] 1954). Of note too is Dewey's broad view of education, articulated in Democracy and Education ([1916] 1964).1

This chapter also attempts to reconcile a deficiency in The New State. That is, although Follett talks about the social process, she does not tell us exactly what that process is and how it operates.2 As a result, she shows us only one side of the social process coin. Of prime concern to the present work, neither does Follett address how a process approach might operate in institutional (in this case, nonprofit institutional) practice. Happily, however, we have at hand George Herbert Mead's descriptive work in Mind, Self, & Society, discussed in section two; and Orion White's (1990) process-focused ideal typical "model of participation," and Orion White and Cynthia McSwain's (1983) transformational theory, in section three.

As it applies to organizations, the last work is more properly explored in the chapter

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1 In all of their works, Follett, Dewey, and Mead use the universal "he" with reference to individual human beings. In taking direct quotations from any of them, I have tried to strike an editorial balance between the integrity of such quotations and the writers' use of what is (now) sexist language. If such attempts proved cumbersome or resulted in confusion, I erred on the side of the writer's convention.

2 This may be because she believes the "rules" for process are self-evident.
on organization theory, and I do so in the chapter following this one; however, it deserves some attention here as well. White (1990) and White and McSwain are particularly useful because they offer a practical balance to Mead's sometimes obscure, often difficult, description.

Section One: John Dewey's Pragmatism

Chicago School Pragmatism

Following the death of the eclectic transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson in 1882, the "golden age of American philosophy" (M. White, 1973, p. 13) emerged in the persons of Charles Peirce and William James, together with their Harvard colleagues Josiah Royce, George Santayana, and Hugo Münsterberg. Although each argued a different world view, each also helped shaped what was to become the backbone of American pragmatic thought (Conkin, 1968; Konvitz and Kennedy, 1962; Whittemore, 1964; Kuklick, 1977).

At that same time, a powerful duo was operating at the upstart University of Chicago: John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. They and their Chicago brethren James Hayden Tufts and James Rowland Angell (he, in experimental psychology), formed the intellectual hub around which the Chicago School of philosophy operated in its formative 1894-1904 period (Rucker, 1969, pp. 3-5).

Mead student and scholar Charles Morris (1970) identifies the "unproblematic" contexts of American pragmatism: it is seen as a revolt against the dominance of empiricism of the time; as cleaving to "science and the scientific method" -- more precisely, the experimental method; and as warmly accepting of both biological evolution and the American democratic ideal (Morris, 1970, pp. 5-6; Mead, 1934, p. x). While each of those "unproblematics" seems to have influenced all pragmatists, we find the evolutionary biology theme most evident in Mead, and the American democratic ideal palpable in Dewey.

Although the Chicago School advanced pragmatic views at least as eclectic as those of its Harvard counterpart, several elements may also be said to unite it. First, it rejects the long-held "mind-world" dualism (Rucker, p. 28). The Chicago pragmatists therefore generally view experience or "consciousness" as the "ultimate reality"; and Dewey suggests that experience, indeed, "is the means of penetrating continually into the heart of nature" ([1925] 1929, p. iii). This is a view shared by Mead, who sees reality as at once residing in, and as producing, the "reflective act" (Rucker, pp. 35-36).
Both Dewey and Mead hold that experiences are not unitary, but "pluralistic," phenomena (Rucker, p. 36); and that reality is therefore circumscribed by the contextual nature of experience. Hence, reality is no fixed thing, but is instead something that changes character and texture as new experiences are introduced and integrated.

This leads us to the second operating principle of Chicago School pragmatism: "action." This is no mechanistic reference to "activity," or "motion," but rather to "intelligent action ...purposive or goal-seeking behavior as influenced by reflection" (Morris, 1970, p. 10). The whole of their philosophy, then, converges upon an analysis of human action seen as intelligent, reflective, deliberative. This idea drives, and gives meaning to, science, values and purposive activity, both individual and collective (Rucker, pp. vi, 5-6).

Three features attend the Chicago School theory of "action," all of which parallel Follett:

[f]irst, it is a process theory: activity is something going on, and agents or persons and objects or the world are alike results of the process. Second, agents are essentially social beings: consciousness is the product of processes in which a number of agents interact. And third, ends are relative to the conditions of activity at a given time: a genuine evolutionary process is one in which real novelty enters, invalidating preconceived, fixed goals of action (Rucker, p. 6).

Yet another unifying principle in Chicago School pragmatism is that "any ethical standard or principle or imperative must come from within the act situation itself" (Rucker, p. 40). As it is with Follett, the Chicagoans see "morality" as circumscribed by that which is "social." Dewey finds people, social creatures that they are, compelled to act; and in this compulsion, lies moral obligation (Dewey, 1893, p. 664; Rucker, p. 42). Therefore, "since the moral situation is always social, the ideal must be social" (Rucker, p. 44). This idea is evident in Mead (1934) as well, who says "[o]ur morality gathers about our social conduct. It is as social beings that we are moral beings" (p. 385).

Although Dewey sees intelligent problem solving as a "moral activity," it is neither necessarily nor specifically directed toward resolution of moral dilemmas. Rather, problem-solving means identifying those conditions that lead, or contribute, to a problem (Damico, pp. 23, 25). This idea follows from the theory of reflective action which calls for tolerance of contextual and situational fluidity. Hence, the "moral activity" that is intelligent problem solving acknowledges that, as with reality itself, the "moral order is not something settled
once and for all but something constantly changing and dependent on the deeds of men" (Damico, p. 25).

As Rucker notes, although both Dewey and Mead generally "shy away" from an explicit articulation of the Chicago pragmatist's "overarching ideal," it is this: "The ideal of practice must be one of the intelligence to deal with constantly changing problems, of means for control of varying conditions, and of character to adapt to and grow with the possibilities being developed in the world" (Rucker, p. 44, emphasis in original).

We see that the notion of "ideals" figures heavily in the Chicago pragmatic scheme. An "ideal," whether political, religious, or aesthetic, is an objective, one having ethical character. It may be proximately unrealized, but that cannot preclude a continued striving for it. An "ideal," then, is an action-driven concept: while it has the potential to be realized in reflective action, realization rarely occurs. This is because action itself is reflective, circular, never finished. In The Public and its Problems, Dewey therefore defines an "ideal" as "the tendency and movement of some thing which exists carried to its final limit, viewed as completed, perfected" (p. 148). As such, all it can ever do is promote "more promising circumstances" toward its realization (Rucker, p. 44).

First and foremost, however, the social ideal is also the moral; and all follows from that. Dewey believes, and Mead agrees, that "right conduct" depends exquisitely upon the idea that no person lives or acts in isolation, and moral choices and conduct inevitably affect the larger community:

If a man lived alone in the world there might be some sense in the question 'Why be moral?' were it not for one thing: No such question would then arise. As it is, we live in a world where other persons live too. Our acts affect them. They perceive these effects, and react upon us in consequence. ..... Right is only an abstract name for the multitude of concrete demands in action which others impress upon us, and of which we are obliged, if we would live, to take some account. .....Hence the right can in fact become the road to the good only as the elements that compose this unremitting pressure are enlightened, only as social relationships become themselves reasonable (Dewey, [1922] 1930, pp. 297-298).

The final tenet of Chicago School pragmatism is attention to semiotics, or the theory of signs, conception of which derives from Peirce (Morris, 1970, pp. 10, 40). As used by the Chicago pragmatists, semiotics attends to both action and meaning and their influence upon one another. It is a conception well-articulated in Peirce's "pragmatic maxim" which Morris
paraphrases: "there is an intrinsic connection between meaning and action, such that the
nature of meaning can be clarified only by reference to the action" (Morris, 1970, p. 16).

For Peirce, semiosis suggests that "the relation of the sign to what is signifies always
involves the mediation of an interpretant, and an interpretant is an action or tendency to
action of an organism" (Morris, 1970, p. 40). We will see the action-centered social
behaviorism of Peirce's semiotics played out in Mead, most particularly in his focus on
language.

It is important to note that, contra the Harvard pragmatists, who either ridiculed
notions of "the individual" (Peirce) or lionized them (James), Dewey and Mead were in
complete agreement on the matter, as Morris well-states:

With Dewey and Mead...the individual and the social community [are]
completely correlative. With Mead [Dewey] agrees that the reflective, self-
conscious moral individual arises only in a social process, but that only such
an individual in turn makes possible the more complex and distinctive levels
of human society. So for Dewey and Mead human society is neither a
mosaic of independent individuals nor an organic whole in which the
individual is merged (1970, p. 96).

The term "meaning" bears brief mention, for it is a term used rather promiscuously
by members of the Chicago School. "In its various employments," says Charles Morris, "it
covers (at least) intention, signification, and value..." (1970, p. 18). I will revisit "meaning"
in both Dewey and Mead.

With those few sketchy ideas as backdrop, I turn now to John Dewey specifically.
In discussion, first, of his "all-embracing" moral conception of democracy, I rely on The Public
and Its Problems. Second, Democracy and Education supplies grist for discussion of his
views on political education. In comparing these works with The New State, we find Follett
often writing with Dewey's pragmatic pen.

Dewey and Democracy as a "Moral Conception"³

In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey takes as his task discovery of the "nature of
the state" (p. 6), and the rise of a "public" that constitutes the state. Dewey is concerned to

³ Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Dewey in this subsection are
from The Public and Its Problems.
explore the idea of democracy, of the need for "returning to the idea itself, of clarifying and deepening our apprehension of it, and of employing our sense of its meaning to criticize and re-make its political manifestation" (p. 144).

At least four principles unite Follett and Dewey. First, he has great expectations for the possibility of genuine democracy. He therefore wishes to discover "the means by which a scattered, mobile and manifold public may so recognize itself as to define and express its interests" (p. 146).

Second, he is distressed to find the public in "eclipse," so much so that "the political elements in the constitution of the human being, those having to do with citizenship, are crowded to one side" (p. 139). Dewey identifies several factors he believes contribute to this eclipse which, in turn, creates "political apathy" such that the public "is so confused...that it cannot even use the organs through which it is supposed to mediate political action and polity" (p. 121). These factors include, first, political parties as they inhibit what may be called democratic "habits of the heart." Here, he argues that "political parties may rule, but they do not govern" (p. 121). Of concern as well is increasing technicism and specialization, which results in a consequent need for professional administrative and technical expertise. Allied with that is the wide variety and complexity of problems confronting a public. Rounding out this enumeration are the increasing number and sophistication of special interest groups and, finally, "amusements" (pp. 134-139). The apathy these factors produce causes him to call for a reinvigoration of the democratic ideal. This, he suggests, can only come about by creation of a "Great Community" (p. 142), an idea I will revisit shortly.

Terry Cooper (1991, p. 129) observes that Follett fails to confront the effects of an enlarging administrative state upon the neighborhood organizations she champions. As we will see later, however, this may be wide of the mark. Follett does attend to that issue, albeit far less explicitly than does Dewey. For the present, Dewey's views on the rise, and potential influence, of technical experts upon democratic governance bear mention.

Dewey seems to be rather ambivalent about administrative and technical experts; although he does acknowledge the need for such expertise in certain circumstances (pp. 123-125). His concern rests with the notion that a government by experts diminishes the democratic ideal by introducing a "class of experts so removed from common interests as to become a class with private interests and private knowledge..." (p. 207). His fear is that
domination of the democratic process by experts is sure to follow (pp. 125, 207). He argues that specialized expertise, however important, "ignores forces which have to be composed and resolved before technical and specialized action can come into play" (p. 125). Further, 

[n]o government by experts in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few....The world has suffered more from leaders and authorities than from the masses (Dewey, p. 208).

The third principle binding Dewey and Follett is one mentioned a moment ago. For Dewey, as it is with Follett, democracy is "a moral conception" (Morris, 1970, p. 95, emphasis in original). Nowhere is this more evident than when, in discussion of the "discovery of the state," he says, "Politics is not a branch of morals; it is submerged in morals" (Dewey, pp. 41-42). Likewise, in The Ethics of Democracy he writes that democracy "is a social, that is to say, an ethical conception, and upon its ethical significance is based its significance as governmental" (1888, p. 18).

Finally, Dewey and Follett find both idea and ideal of democracy of crucial import. In both The Public and its Problems and The Ethics of Democracy Dewey calls democracy an "ethical and social ideal." The idea, he says, "remains barren and empty save as it is incarnated in human relationships" ([1927] 1954), p. 143). Juxtapose that with Follett's brief accounting of the "task" and "essence" of democracy: Its sole task, she says, is "to free the creative spirit of man...[which] is done through group organization" (p. 159). As for the "essence" of democracy, it is "in that organizing of men which makes most sure, most perfect, the bringing forth of the common idea" (Follett, p. 159).

Dewey rejects notions of "individualistic" politics Follett, too, abhors. Just as Follett says that it is impossible to separate the individual from society or from the state, Dewey says something similar:

...while singular beings in their singularity think, want and decide, what they think and strive for, the content of their beliefs and intentions is a subject-matter provided by association. Thus man is not merely de facto associated, but he becomes a social animal in the make-up of his ideas, sentiments and deliberate behavior (p. 25, emphases in original).

Dewey also echoes Follett's rejection of majoritarian politics and its reliance on what she calls "brute numbers" (Follett, p. 9). "[N]o amount of aggregated collective action of itself constitutes a community," says Dewey (p. 151).
As it is with Follett, Dewey takes political parties to task. While Follett sees them as so much "dead-wood," Dewey charges them with promoting "social and intellectual uniformity, a standardization favorable to mediocrity" (p. 115). "Mass production," he says, "is not confined to the factory" (p. 116).

Like Follett, Dewey also believes traditional top-down structural reforms to be useless: "an improved society can hardly result from formal changes in government or from a mere change in politicians. A changed public, and behind this changed objective conditions or changed habits and beliefs, is a prerequisite of enduring change in the state" (Conkin, p. 395).

Unlike Follett, Dewey takes pluralism as a fact of life: "Our doctrine of plural forms is a statement of fact: that there exist a plurality of social groupings, good, bad and indifferent" (p. 73). What matters with a plurality of social groups, however, and how their value is measured, is in the consequences of their actions (pp. 73-74).

This notion of "consequences" has great power for Dewey. He spends much of the first two-thirds of his book emphasizing the contrast between "democracy as a social idea and political democracy as a system of government" (p. 143). His theory hinges critically on the distinction between "private" and "public," and this distinction resides in the consequences of action.

"The Public" or "a public" is described as consisting "of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for. Officials are those who look out for and take care of the interests thus affected" (pp. 15-16). Thus, "the line between private and public is to be drawn on the basis of the extent and scope of the consequences of acts which are so important as to need control, whether by inhibition or by promotion" (p. 15).

Dewey identifies four elements or "marks" he believes cause the evolution from "public" or "political organization" to "state." First, there is "temporal and geographical localization." Neither "intimate associations" (e.g., the family) nor those associations at the other end of the continuum (i.e., those having vast geographic distances between and among them) require political organization, nor can they make a "public," because they are either too small or too geographically distant (Dewey, pp. 39-42). Rather, "[s]omewhere between associations that are narrow, close and intimate and those which are so remote as to have only infrequent and casual contact lies, then, the province of a state" (p. 43). That,
for Dewey, is a "public."

Dewey's second "mark" says that "the quantitative scope of results of conjoint behavior generates a public with need for organization" (p. 47). This follows from his "public-private" distinction: the more consequences accruing to participants outside the parties most proximate to a transaction makes that transaction, de facto, public and thus in need of organization (pp. 27, 47-57).

The third "mark" of this movement is that "it is concerned with modes of behavior which are old and hence well established, engrained" (p. 58). He effectively suggests that old habits die hard (p. 61). That being the case, there is "the tendency to put what is old and established in uniform lines under the regulation of the state..." (p. 61). But this is dangerous behavior. First, it can result in "routine, impulsive and...unreflected acts" (p. 18) which only serve to approach problems in old ways. In keeping with his regard for experimental methods generally, Dewey sees the creation of a state as an "experimental process," which can only proceed if the "organized community" can break the bonds of traditional modes of problem solving and "political forms" (pp. 31, 33, 61-62).

Further, public officials can be what John Locke calls "bad princes," whether from "deliberate graft" or from "density of mind and pomposity of behavior" (Dewey, p. 67). The state, then, can only maintain its integrity and usefulness through the "constant watchfulness and criticism of public officials by citizens" (p. 69).

The fourth and final "mark" again concerns consequences. If the public detects social inequalities, they will be compelled to act, feel morally obligated to act, in an attempt to equalize them. This will be particularly true "[i]f the consequences appear serious [or] if they seem to be irretrievable..." (p. 62).

Each of those elements or "marks" points to Dewey's primary contention:

[t]he lasting, extensive and serious consequences of associated activity bring into existence a public. In itself it is unorganized and formless. By means of officials and their special powers it becomes a state. A public articulated and operating through representative officers is the state; there is no state without a government, but also there is none without the public (p. 67).

While Follett would agree that "there is no state ...without the public," she would not agree that associated activity is "unorganized and formless" absent the involvement of public officials. While she would certainly not deny the need for public officials and the expertise they can bring to bear, she steadfastly believes the neighborhood organization gives "reality
to the political bond" by "providing the machinery by which a genuine control of the people can be put into operation" (p. 234). This allows "the community itself [to] grip its own problems...fill its needs [and] make effective its aspirations" (p. 235). In this way, communities "can operate as government as well as with government" (p. 236, emphases in original).

As might be indicated above, Dewey seems to take a more benign view of representative government generally than does Follett, taking it as a fact of life. He does not do so uncritically, however. He believes that, operating at its best, the public can help mediate the conflict officials encounter in their role as public officer having "genuinely political aims and acts," (p. 76), with that encountered as "non-political" private citizen (pp. 76-77).

Follett would probably disagree violently on that point. Although she would see such role conflict as predictable, it does not seem she would see it as requiring "mediation." Rather, she would see such conflict as presenting a ripe opportunity for a "public" to widen the scope of collective sensemaking and integration. Secondly, she believes "[r]epresentation is not the main fact of political life; the main concern of politics is modes of association" (p. 147).

Dewey's view of representative government notwithstanding, he sees it -- in partnership with bottom-up associative action -- as a primary mechanism with which to organize and make politically effective "the public." His central hypothesis is that the public is organized and made effective by means of representatives who as guardians of custom, as legislators, as executives, judges, etc., care for its especial interests by methods intended to regulate the conjoint actions of individuals and groups. Then and in so far, association adds to itself political organization, and something which may be government comes into being: the public is a political state (p. 35).

Following from that, Dewey says the "primary problem of the public is to achieve such recognition of itself as will give it weight in the selection of official representatives and in the definition of their responsibilities and rights" (p. 77). Follett would also likely disagree with that. While she would concede that the public should, indeed, "achieve ...recognition of itself," she would see such recognition as the first, crucial step toward furtherance of the democratic ideal. And, while selection of official representatives and the definition of their responsibilities and rights might well be part of that process, it is only a part. For Follett,
activation and nurturance of the social process is "the primary problem," and the intelligent action in service of the common good following therefrom.

Dewey does seem to show more consonance with Follett in his view that the public should be the seedbed for political action. So long as the public engages in communal activity to evolve its "common" ideas or interests, the democratic ideal is advanced. In the absence of substantive participation of a public, "representatives of the public interest cannot represent that interest if there is no public worthy of the name" (Damico, p. 112)

Follett makes no explicit distinction between "government" and "the state." Dewey, however, does. He gives preeminence to a "public" in governance, seeing the state as "a distinctive and secondary form of association, having a specifiable work to do and specified organs of operation" (p. 71, emphasis supplied). "Government is not the state," he says, "for that includes the public as well as rulers charged with special duties and powers" (pp. 27-28). The state, in contrast, "is the organization of the public effected through officials for the protection of interests shared by its members" (p. 33, emphasis supplied).

As for the role of the state, Dewey believes the state does or should "[provide] opportunity and [set] the rules for other types of association," a view Follett shares despite her failure to distinguish between "government" and "state" (Conkin, p. 395; Follett, p. 333). Most importantly for Dewey, the role of the state resides in understanding that there is "no antecedent universal proposition" (p. 74) enumerating what should constitute either the scope or functional activities of a state.

That being the case, the state's primary role is to acknowledge and understand fluidity and change. The state must see that "consequences vary with concrete conditions; hence at one time and place a large measure of state activity may be indicated and at another time a policy of quiescence and laissez-faire" (p. 74). For Dewey, the "good state" is one in which its "...officers...genuinely serve the public interests" (p. 71), and a primary measure of the goodness of the state "is the degree in which it relieves individuals from the waste of negative struggle and needless conflict and confers upon [them] positive assurance and reenforcement in what [they undertake]" (p. 72). Further, the "state" in this view has as "[t]he only constant...the function of caring for and regulating the interests which accrue as the result of complex indirect expansion and radiation of conjoint behavior" (p. 47). Follett would surely agree.

The role of democracy is quite another matter for Dewey. Alfonso Damico states his
position well: "[o]nly democracy provides a considerable guarantee that the line between private and public acts will be drawn fairly" (Damico, p. 111). Thus, democracy's role is to "arrange political institutions in order to secure representation of the public interest without violating individual or associative freedom. As a form of government, democracy establishes conditions for discovering freely the 'consequences' of actions" (Damico, pp. 111-112).

Follett's view of the role of democracy is rather similar to Dewey's, and it shows great similarity to her view of the role of the state, noted earlier. She defines democracy as "every one building the single life, not my life and others, not the individual and the state, but my life bound up with others, the individual which *is* the state, the state which *is* the individual (p. 156, emphases in original). Thus, its role is to allow people "opportunities to exercise that fundamental intermingling with others..." (p. 180).

Follett does not in any explicit way share Dewey's concern for "consequences" as he describes them (See Dewey, e.g., pp. 12-13, 47-69). For Follett, there is one consequence, and only one, if the genuine social and political process is inhibited or compromised. Predictably, this consequence applies to social relations: "[e]vil is non-relation....[n]on-relation is death" (pp. 62-63).

Dewey's view of the individual and the group corresponds well with Follett's. In discussing the "democratic idea in its generic social sense," he says that the individual should be seen as "having a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the values which the groups sustain" (p. 147). He elaborates upon this in an earlier work, in which he links personality to democracy, and in which he sounds much like Follett:

There is an individualism in democracy which there is not in aristocracy; but it is an ethical, not a numerical individualism; it is an individualism of freedom, of responsibility, of initiative to and for the ethical ideal, not an individualism of lawlessness. In one word, democracy means that *personality* is the first and final reality. It admits that the full significance of personality can be learned by the individual only as it is already presented to him in objective form in society....It holds that the spirit of personality indwells in every

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4 It should be noted yet again that Follett seems to make no distinction between "the state" and "government." Likewise, when she discusses the role of the "state," she often seems to be instead referring to the role of "democracy." It does seem that she uses "state," "government," and "democracy" interchangeably. Her semantics often leave much to be desired.
individual and the choice to develop it must proceed from that individual (Dewey, 1888, p. 22, emphasis in original).

As for the group, the democratic idea demands liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the interests and goods which are common. Since every individual is a member of many groups, this specification cannot be fulfilled except when different groups interact flexibly and fully in connection with other groups (p. 147).

As it is for Follett, Dewey finds the "associated life," broadly defined, to be the motor force for democracy. Thus, democracy cannot have substantive meaning absent participation by a "public" organized specifically for its advancement.

...a good citizen finds his conduct as a member of a political group enriching and enriched by his participation in family life, industry, scientific and artistic associations. There is a free give-and-take...since the pulls and responses of different groups reinforce one another and their values accord (Dewey, p. 148).

Indeed, Dewey thinks the idea of democracy "is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community of itself" (p. 148). That being the case, Dewey's definition of "community" logically follows:

Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a good shared by all, there is in so far a community. The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy (p. 149).

For Dewey, the ideal of democracy involves a "morale of fair mindedness, intellectual integrity, of will to subordinate personal preference to ascertained facts and to share with others what is found out, instead of using it for personal gain..." (Dewey, [1939] 1963, p. 148). The "morale" about which Dewey speaks seems to coincide with Follett's on the "social attitude," which she defines as "man willing to take his place in the group...." (Follett, p. 29). Indeed, for both Dewey and Follett, this attitude and moral obligation deriving from it may be said to circumscribe the whole of living.

Unlike Follett, Dewey takes some pains to distinguish between mere association and creation of a community. Associated or "conjoint" activity is seen as antedating and giving
life to community. "Association" is merely "physical and organic" (p. 151), and is defined as "any form of experience which is augmented and confirmed by being shared" (p. 205). In contrast, community "is moral, that is emotionally, intellectually, consciously sustained" (p. 151). Unsurprisingly, Dewey ties this idea to the consequences of communal action: "Human associations may be ever so organic in origin and firm in operation, but they develop into societies in a human sense only as their consequences, being known, are esteemed and sought for" (p. 152).

Dewey sees the structural and functional characteristics of the democratic form of government as having evolved, not from the "doctrines of doctrinaires," (p. 144), but from myriad technological and social innovations introduced to society over time. He believes these have been successful at addressing needs of the present, but have failed to advance the idea of democracy. These innovations, then, are "not the whole of the democratic idea but they express it in its political phase" (p. 146).

As with Max Weber, Dewey decries the effects of rising industrialism and the concomitant rise of "those 'great impersonal concerns, organizations'" (p. 107) upon society generally, largely because of the unexplored and unintended consequences he believes they have wrought (pp. 106-107; 163-166). "The Great Society created by steam and electricity may be a society," he says, "but it is no community" (p. 98). He thus searches for "The Great Community." And, "since democracy means the public interest is dominant, Dewey links democracy to community" (Damico, p. 112).

The crux of Dewey's arguments for what creates and sustains The Great Community sounds for all the world not only like Follett, but also any good interpretivist: "In its deepest and richest sense a community must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse" (p. 211).

Dewey's ideas on community turn on two interdependent elements. First, the difference between a rather "organic" form of association and real community is the idea of communication: "Interactions, transactions, occur de facto and the results of interdependence follow. But participation in activities and sharing in results are additive concerns. They demand communication as a prerequisite" (p. 152, emphasis in original).

We see here that this communication is of a distinct kind. Dewey thinks traditional ideas, ideals and symbols are inadequate to the changes wrought by, at least, the overt
manifestations of industrialization (pp. 141-142). As a result, if "[s]ymbols control sentiment and thought, [then] the new age has no symbols consonant with its activities" (p. 142). His contention is that rapid technological innovations have produced social instability, which in turn has profoundly affected the relational contexts within which people live. People therefore cleave to the "older symbols of ideal life" (p. 142) in an effort to sustain the social order as they have understood and known it. Says Dewey,

> We have the physical tools of communication as never before. The thoughts and aspirations congruous with them are not communicated, and hence are not common. Without such communication the public will remain shadowy and formless, seeking spasmodically for itself, but seizing and holding its shadow rather than its substance. Till the Great Society is converted into a Great Community, the Public will remain in eclipse. Communication can alone create a great community... (p. 142).

"Communication" means transmission of socially constructed meaning via the use of signs and symbols of import to the community. This is not communication or "transmission" in any instrumental sense: it is a method for sustaining the moral and social order through common meaning. But Dewey is not yet finished. Both "communication" and "understanding" constitute "knowledge" (pp. 158, 176); and knowledge also "depends upon tradition, upon tools and methods socially transmitted, developed and sanctioned" (p. 158).

It is from knowledge, born of "intelligence" and "education" that reflective action springs: "the perfecting of the means and ways of communication of meanings [is necessary] so that genuinely shared interest in the consequences of interdependent activities may inform desire and effort and thereby direct action" (p. 155).

Echoing Follett, Dewey does not believe we are "born members of a community" (p. 154). Rather, we learn community in the group process. The social process is in a continuing state of development, one both circular and reflective.

Dewey's notion of "habit" bears mention in this context, for impinges upon his ideas about "right conduct." For Dewey, "habit is the mainspring of human action, and habits are formed for the most part under the influence of the customs of a group" (p. 159). The idea of "habit" also has high profile in Democracy and Education (e.g., pp. 13-14, 46-53). Here, Dewey describes "habit" as "formation of intellectual and emotional disposition as well as an increase in ease, economy, and efficiency of action. Any habit marks an inclination—an active preference and choice for the conditions involved in its exercise" ([1916] 1964, p. 48,
emphasis in original).

Habit, then, is positive, consciously developed and sustained in group participation. Habits are learned, and as James says, serve as a "conservative influence" upon the social order (Dewey, p. 159). In short, habit "does not preclude the use of thought, but it determines the channels within which it operates" (p. 160). Commonly-evolved meanings, developed via communication within a group process, move us beyond "science," for example, and its highly specialized and "artificial" language understood only by scientists (p. 163). That kind of language is divisive and not conducive to advancing the democratic ideal. Social "habits," however, as they are consciously developed and used in the social process, are.

True community is highly dependent upon dissemination of social knowledge, for "only by distribution can such knowledge be either obtained or tested" (pp. 176-177). Here, Dewey echoes Follett's idea that ground-up associative action has meaning only if it is articulated both laterally and vertically. Dewey thus says that "[i]deas which are not communicated, shared and reborn in expression are but soliloquy, and soliloquy is but broken and imperfect thought" (p. 218). Further, if knowledge is indeed a function of association and communication,

[as a member of the public, the individual shares in, and contributes to, the store of social knowledge. Majority rule is never simply majority rule; what is important is the process whereby the majority is formed. Free communication permits [people] to share their needs and desires and to perceive consequences; the result is a public in fact as well as in name (Damico, p. 108).

The second interdependent element feeding Dewey's notion of "community" is the value of signs and symbols and their role in the creation of meaning. For Dewey, "community" is a hollow thing absent signs or symbols. "Symbols ...depend upon and promote communication," says Dewey (p. 153). That being the case,

[the results of conjoint experience are considered and transmitted. Events cannot be passed from one to another, but meanings may be shared by means of signs. Wants and impulses are then attached to common meanings. They are thereby transformed into desires and purposes, which, since they implicate a common or mutually understood meaning, present new ties, converting a conjoint activity into a community of interest and endeavor. Thus there is generated what, metaphorically, may be termed a general will and social consciousness... (p. 153).
Dewey's conception of "meaning" parallels elements found in Follett. His logic seems to be that, since signs and symbols are phenomena mutually agreed upon by the community, they help constitute that which is meaningful for it. And, so long as that meaning is sustained, action follows. But creation of meaning requires both interaction and reflection. Thus, meaning may change as individuals and groups engage in interaction and reflection about it. Follett would agree.

Following from that, Dewey develops a more robust definition of "community," saying that it "presents an order of energies transmuted into one of meanings which are appreciated and mutually referred by each to every other on the part of those engaged in combined action" (p. 153).

So concludes this section on Dewey's "all-embracing" and "moral" conception of democracy. We see many of the same themes articulated in his views on political education, the topic of the next section.

Dewey and Political Education

Before moving to my central concern in this section, Dewey's idea of education as "democratic conception" (p. 81), a brief summary of Dewey's broad view of education is useful.

Democracy and Education serves as the forum within which Dewey articulates the "conceptual trinity" of all his work: democracy, education and science (Morris, 1970, p. 158). In this work he indeed weaves the pragmatic "unproblematics" of biological evolution, scientific method, and the democratic ideal into a cohesive whole.

For Dewey, education has a number of functional characteristics. He describes it variously as a "necessity of life" (p. 1), as having a "social function" (p. 10), as producing "growth" (p. 41), and as possessed of moral quality (p. 360). Dewey's broadly-defined idea of political education turns on two fundamental principles: communication, and intelligent action. As with Follett, Dewey's overarching belief is that "[n]ot only is social life identical with communication, but all communication (and hence all genuine social life) is educative" (p. 5).

5 Unless otherwise indicated, all pages numbers referenced in this section are from Democracy and Education.
Dewey sees education as largely a matter of "reconstruction" (pp. 76-79). From this idea, he derives his "technical" definition of education: "that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases the ability to direct the course of subsequent experience" (p. 76).

And if education has an "aim," it is development or cultivation of "power" (p. 118). But it is power defined in terms of "social" and "civic" efficiency; and these exist to promote increased "capacity for growth," (p. 100), greater appreciation for the social process, and activity. "Social" efficiency "means neither more nor less than capacity to share in a give and take of experience" (p. 120). The aim of political education is to increase that capacity (p. 123). "Civic" efficiency is "good citizenship." Its aim is to "call attention to the fact that power must be relative to doing something, and to the fact that the things which most need to be done are things which involve one's relationships with others" (p. 120).

The fundamental issue for Dewey is that education must serve to develop, transmit and sustain common understanding and common meanings in service of human intellectual and emotional development and "common pursuit" (pp. 10-15, 17). This means education sets the stage for productive modes of association, which in turn promote "the continuity of any experience, through renewing of the social group..." (p. 2). Thus, "[e]ducation in its broadest sense, is the means of this continuity of life" (p. 2). So then, if education has a task, it is to produce "intelligent socialized beings, intelligent so that the consequences of action may be foreseen, socialized so that action will be under the direction of the interest in interests" (Morris, 1934, p. 18). Education should, to be sure, take into account people's history, but only insofar as it is linked in some meaningful way to present action: "The present...generates the problems which lead us to search the past for suggestion, and which supplies meaning to what we find when we search" (Dewey, pp. 76; 79-80).

Although education is a process that is "fostering...nurturing...cultivating" (Dewey, p. 10), it does not create community. Dewey argues that a community is formed only when "aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge--a common understanding" are transmitted from one generation to another in the social process. People "live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common" (p. 4). As a result, a "community" emerges when all members of it are "cognizant of the common end and all interested in it so that they [regulate] their specific activity in view of it..." (p. 5).
Following from that, and as it is with Follett, Dewey sees education as having two primary tasks: first, promotion of "social awareness" (what Follett calls "social functioning," p. 363) in children. Transmission of social knowledge, constituted by habits, ideas and practices, ensures the continuity necessary for such social awareness (p. 11). As communicated from older to younger, social knowledge is essential to a well-developed, sustainable community life. Thus, "[b]eings who are born not only unaware of, but quite indifferent to, the aims and habits of the social group have to be rendered cognizant of them and actively interested. Education, and education alone, spans the gap" (pp. 3, 76). Secondly, education should also "insure the continuance of education by organizing the powers that insure growth" (p. 51).

Both Dewey and his colleague George Herbert Mead argue that "information" is not "knowledge." Information is sterile, of little value in and of itself. Knowledge, social knowledge, is what matters. One can transmit information. One needs communication, largely of the language variety, for the conveyance of social knowledge. But, as we will see, it must be social knowledge of the "right" kind; for some social knowledge is best left untransmitted, as it has no enduring social value.

As for his views on language as primary mechanism for genuine communication, Dewey takes on shades of Harold Garfinkel and the latter's notion of "indexicals." Communication of the community's stock of knowledge via oral means is essential for development of language that is "mutually intelligible" to everyone, which is to say that "its meaning depends upon connection with a shared experience" (p. 15). Signs and symbols, together with language, are invoked in this process, and "are the means of communication by which a fraternally shared experience is ushered in and sustained" (Dewey, [1927] 1954, p. 218). While written symbols may be important, they alone do not transmit all "resources" of the community. What has real meaning for people is the language of "everyday life," something that cannot be transmitted faithfully by the written word alone (p. 19). It is thus a province of the school to ensure that oral language carries weight equal to the written.

Dewey highlights this process of communication via language when he says that ...the use of language to convey and acquire ideas is an extension and refinement of the principle that things gain meaning by being used in a shared experience or joint action....When words do not enter as factors into a shared situation, either overtly or imaginatively, they operate as pure physical stimuli, not as having a meaning or intellectual value (p. 16).
Dewey sees education as an engine for change. People, as [they grasp] the nature of [their] society and as [they are] provided with instruments for self-direction in and critical evaluation of that society, will be in a good position to take advantage of the signs of change and to help direct currents of change into desirable channels (Rucker, p. 95).

Dewey sees the school itself as a "special mode of social intercourse" (p. 19), a "miniature community" -- rather a prototype for the larger society (p. 360). It is socially constructed, a symbol of great power. It derives that power from the responsibility it has for identifying and raising consciousness about the importance and function of productive modes of association. To that end, Dewey -- sounding rather like Weick -- sees the school as, first responsible for providing a "simplified environment," because social life is "too complex to be assimilated in toto" (p. 20). As a result, the school should select and enact those fundamental features of environment the young can understand, using them to introduce features of increasing complexity (p. 20).

Second, the school has a primary responsibility for helping to identify and retain that which is best for a "better future society," and eliminating that which is undesirable for it. This revisits the idea that only "right" social knowledge should be chosen for communication. The school should strive to "[select] the best for its exclusive use [and]...to reenforce the power of this best" (p. 20).

Third, the school should assist in individual development because that development makes significant contributions to community, nation and world. Another central task for the school, then, is "to balance the various elements in the social environment, and to see to it that [individuals get] an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the social group in which [they were] born, and to come into living contact with a broader community" (p. 20).

Finally, the various social contexts in which people find themselves (e.g., family, church, workplace) have different "codes" or expected modes of behavior, which are confusing and conflictive for the individual. Thus, the school should serve as a "steadying and integrating" force to ameliorate that conflict (p. 22).

A fine link between science and education -- more precisely, the conscious use of scientific methods in the inquiry of social problems (and, not incidentally, in promotion of social reform) -- is part and parcel of Dewey's pedagogy (Damico, p. 36). But methods alone are insufficient. What matters is participation in the inquiry. As with Follett, Dewey believes
that "...in a social inquiry the persons for whom something is a problem must themselves partake in the inquiry, must come to agreement on goals and means, and must themselves test the proposed solution in terms of its effects on their lives" (Morris, 1970, pp. 161-162).

Dewey finds educational forms of his time to be inadequate because they "separate knowing from doing" (Damico, p. 34). Since we learn by doing, and doing by any other name is "activity" or "practice," substantive participation is essential. And substantive participation connotes reflective thinking. "The problem," says Dewey, "is to extract the desirable traits of forms of community life which actually exist, and employ them to criticize undesirable features and suggest improvement" (p. 83).

Like Follett, Dewey cleaves to the idea that

life is development, and that developing, growing is life. Translated into its educational equivalents, that means (i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself, it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming (pp. 49-50).

The kind of educational system Dewey envisions for a democracy corresponds almost completely with Follett and is well-articulated by Charles Morris (1970):

if a democratic society is one in which all persons, to the extent of their abilities, participate in the decisions and the development of the society, and if the method of scientific inquiry is the most effective form of intelligence...then the task of the democratic school is to produce persons with an experimental habit of mind and with the moral character which can cooperate with other persons in associated action consonant with the democratic ideal (p. 162).

Democracy, then, is defined in this context as "more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience" (Dewey, p. 87). Note Dewey's correspondence with Follett, who says that "[t]he deeper truth, perhaps the deepest, is that the will to will the common will is the core, the germinating centre of that large, still larger, ever larger life which we are coming to call the true democracy" (Follett, p. 49).

Following from his definition of democracy, Dewey defines education as "a freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social aims" (p. 98); and as "that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience" (p. 76). The task of education, then, is to assist people in developing an understanding of the interdependence
between "activity" and "consequences."

This brings us to "activity," as it is linked to education. As with all pragmatists, it is "intelligent" and purposive activity Dewey craves. "Activity with a purpose," says Dewey, "is deliberate; it involves a consciously foreseen end and a mental weighing of considerations pro and con. It also involves a conscious state of longing or desire for the end" (p. 347). Thus, "intelligent" action is "acting with an aim" (p. 103).

Intelligent activity is a function of both imagination and a habit of mind geared toward experimentation (Damico, pp. 33, 40). The use of symbols is tied as well to imagination, which Dewey believes is "as much a normal and integral part of human activity as is muscular movement" (p. 237). For Dewey,

[where it not for the accompanying play of imagination, there would be no road from a direct activity to representative knowledge; for it is by imagination that symbols are translated over into a direct meaning and integrated with a narrower activity so as to expand and enrich it (p. 237).

It is clear that Follett and Dewey both see education and democracy as inextricably bound up in the social ideal. Dewey, for example, says that "[i]f democracy has a moral and ideal meaning, it is that a social return be demanded from all and that opportunities for development of distinctive capacities be afforded for all" (p. 122). For Dewey, then, democracy is a "form of society in which every man has a chance...to become a person" (quoted in Morris, 1970, p. 159).

Dewey is absolutely steadfast in his belief that

A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure social change without introducing disorder (p. 99).

The crucial interdependence between and among education, social or "moral" life, and democracy seems clear. A democracy conceived as "moral" cannot be called such unless education, too, is morally conceived (Morris, 1934, p. 18). Both social processes and education help constitute the moral life. Democracy emerges as a manifestation of the moral life. Each and all involve reflective processes, are engaged in continuous, circular communication, and are geared toward renewal or reconstruction (Dewey, p. 9). If social
knowledge is comprised of ideas, practices, habits and history developed and held in common by the community, both the social process and education provide communication about, and thus continuance and renewal of, that social knowledge (Dewey, p. 9). In the "common possession" that is social knowledge resides community life. As it is with Follett, democracy resides in the social process and thus in community life (Marcell, 1974, p. 241).

Given Dewey's lifelong belief in the efficacy of democracy, it is small wonder that George Herbert Mead (1930) would say of him, "[i]n the profoundest sense John Dewey is the philosopher of America." Mead, whose views correspond nearly point for point with Dewey's, and whose social psychology contributes seminal ideas on a "process" approach to social affairs, is the subject of the next section.

Section Two: George Herbert Mead and "Process"

Dewey returns Mead's compliment, cited at the end of the previous chapter, in his remarks prefatory to Philosophy of the Present (Mead, 1932). Mead, he says, has "a seminal mind of the very first order" (p. x). This is evident, as Gary Cook (1993, pp. 166-173) makes clear, in the range and depth of ideas Mead advanced throughout his career. Unlike his colleague, Dewey, Mead published little in his lifetime, and much of what we see in print today is the work of Mead students and scholars who assembled manuscripts and class lecture notes, publishing them posthumously (Mead, 1934, pp. v-vi; McDermott, 1978, p. 13; Tugendhat, 1991, p. 170).

In advancing her own ideas about "group process" and its ties to democratic governance, Follett invokes ideas quite similar to those Mead postulates in his landmark Mind, Self, & Society (1934), which I use as the primary source here. For the sake of logical exposition of Mead's often difficult concepts, and in addition to Mead himself, I draw upon Grace Chin Lee (1945), Maurice Natanson (1956), and Israel Scheffler (1974), to develop a blueprint for discussion of Mind, Self, & Society.

6 Unless otherwise indicated, all page numbers with reference to Mead in this chapter are from Mind, Self, & Society.
Mind, Self, & Society

Mind, Self, & Society reflects Mead's "confidence in the emancipatory prospects of scientific rationality [and] a striving to root 'mind' or 'spirit' in the organism" (Joas, 1991, p. 57). Most importantly, and in keeping with Chicago-style pragmatism, he takes a decidedly radical approach to both inquiry and social affairs, saying that "mind" and "self" originate or are constructed from "society," rather than the other way around (Scheffler, p. 151; Joas, p. 57; Natanson, 1956, p. 7).

As it is with Dewey, Follett, and the interpretivists, Mead believes people to be de facto social creatures. They are, therefore, more than a conglomeration of conditioned reflexes, are driven by more than mere physiological impulses, and depend upon the social environment for their very existence (Mead, pp. 10, 228). The social process awaits discovery, and uses the mechanisms of gestures, language, self-consciousness, and reflection for its discovery.

Mead frames his analysis in the pragmatic "unproblematic" of Darwinism, which animates and suffuses the whole of his work. Like his colleague, Dewey, Mead finds a strict interpretation of Darwin's theory a la John B. Watson at best lacking, calling it "misguided and unsuccessful" (Mead, p. 10; Morris, 1932, p. 320). Watson, he believes, fails to account for the role of social processes in human action, and fails further to consider the functional value of symbols — most particularly language as significant symbol — in such action. Mead therefore emphasizes social behavior as process-driven and thus dynamic, rather than structured and static; and attempts "to analyze this social dimension genetically, and to see it as a new factor in human evolution itself" (Scheffler, p. 151; Morris, 1970, p. 126).

Mead and Follett agree on Darwinism. Although Follett has difficulty with the term "organism," saying it is "valuable as a metaphor, but it has not strict psychological accuracy" (Follett, p. 76), she is outright contemptuous of what she calls "the struggle theory" of society (Follett, pp. 96-98). Mead would concur with Follett's remark that "the strength of the group does not depend on the greatest number of strong [people], but on the strength of the bond between them, that is, on the amount of solidarity, on the best organization" (Follett, p. 96).

For Mead, human "organisms" are distinctly different from lower animals because the former have the ability to develop a "social attitude" (p. 231); or, more precisely, the "attitude of the community" (Mead, pp. 153-155), something he believes is activated in all communities and institutions, and developed in social processes therein. How this comes
about is the focus of *Mind, Self, & Society*.

Assumption of the social attitude has a number of implications. First, it helps individuals recognize that they do not live in isolation, but do so with others; second, functioning in the social world, to say nothing of creation and continuity of the social order, requires identification of the "self" with other individuals and groups; and third, once such identification occurs, there also emerges recognition that one's own actions and ends are inextricably tied to those of other individuals and groups (Lee, 1945, pp. 36-37). This is all made clearer when Mead says that social acts are "found in the life-process of the group, not in those of the separate individuals alone" (p. 7n).

Central to Mead's view is communication, a profound concept, and one shared with both Dewey and Follett. For Mead, communication is the most fundamental of human activities. He believes that

[y]ou cannot build up a society out of elements that lie outside of the individual's life-processes. You have to presuppose some sort of cooperation within which the individuals are themselves actively involved as to the only possible basis for participation and communication (p. 257).

Mead finds four "universal forms" in all human societies, all of which converge to make organized society possible. The first, organized religion, is grounded in "basic attitudes of kindliness, helpfulness and assistance"; while the second, economic exchange, acknowledges the reciprocity and value of such an exchange (p. 258).

The third universal form is democracy. For Mead, democracy receives its expression in the "bringing together of the attitude of universal religion...and the widening political development"; and is born in "the universal relations of brotherhood" (p. 286). Rousseau's notion of the "social contract" undergirds this idea of democracy. Mead says that "[w]e get what Rousseau referred to as the 'general will of the community' only when a [person] is able to realize him [or her]self by recognizing others as belonging to the same political organization as him [or her]self" (pp. 286-287). Mead elaborates:

...there can be a general will in terms of the individual because everyone else is expressing the same thing. There then arises a community in which everyone can be both sovereign and subject, sovereign in so far as [the individual] asserts his [or her] own rights and recognizes them in others, and subject in that [the individual] obeys the laws which [he or she]...makes (p. 287n).
The fourth universal form is communication itself, described by Mead as "more universal" than the others in that it operates in service of all (p. 259). Communication, therefore, is "the organizing process in the community" (p. 327), and is "the medium through which...co-operative activities can be carried on in the self-conscious society" (p. 259). For Mead, the "formal ideal" of communication is nothing less than "universal discourse" (p. 327).

Brief elaboration of Mead's ideas on "universal discourse" is useful. Mead says that, to be "universal," discourse must be "continually revised" (p. 269). Thus, "universal discourse" indicates a need for circular, reflective processes of interaction. This seems to square well with Follett who, in discussion of the interrelationship of individual and environment, says the "life of the people....must flow directly through our government and our institutions, expressing itself anew at every moment" (p. 99). Says Mead,

There are...different universes of discourse, but back of all, to the extent they are potentially comprehensible to each other, lies the logicians' universe of discourse with a set of constants and propositional functions, and anyone using them will belong to that same universe of discourse. It is this which gives potential universality to the process of communication (Mead, p. 269).

Like Follett and Dewey, since Mead does not believe individuals live or act in isolation, it follows that it is only within the context of the social, experiential character of human life that self-consciousness, reflection, and "communality of understanding" or meaning -- all born of communication -- can flower. These elements produce the social attitude; and it is only through it and them that one's true human potential is made manifest (Natanson, p. 7; Lee, 1945, p. 37).

The first salient result of the social attitude is the appearance of "mind." Individuals becomes "minded" when they demonstrate the ability to isolate, choose and control those meanings important for them, to transmit or "indicate" them to themselves and to others, to anticipate the consequences their behavior might have upon others, and to modify that behavior consistent with the consequences discovered in the process. That ability requires language (Mead, pp. 132-133; Natanson, 1956, p. 7).

For Mead, language "[presupposes] a social process for its appearance, but having appeared, it...[makes] possible complex human society and the human mind and self" (Morris, 1970, p. 126; also Mead, p. 77). Mead sees language as a symbol, no small matter for him. He sees the attainment of significant language as a primary task of an organized
community worthy of the name. That, because if "organized responses" constitute the mind of the community (and for Mead, they do), "for effective co-operation one has to have the symbols by means of which...[organized] responses can be carried out" (p. 268). Mead therefore explores the genesis of language (and hence "mind"), and follows its development through a four-stage process he believes results in a social act. In so doing, he draws upon psychologist Wilhelm Wundt's theory of "gestures" (Mead, pp. 19, 31-32).

In the first stage of development of a social act, a gesture serves as "a stimulus to other forms involved in the same social act" (p. 42). Taken together, these gestures constitute a conversation of gestures, which Mead defines as "a reciprocal shifting of...positions and attitudes" on the part of interacting organisms (p. 63; also, pp. 14, 42-43, 56, 80). In lower animals, gestures (e.g., growls and snarls in a dog fight) are merely stimuli, calling for an unconscious response (Mead, p. 43). As such, these gestures may have meaning for another organism, but not for the organism itself (Morris, 1932, p. 323).

In contrast, gestures in humans nearly always have rudimentary meaning (Mead, p. 80); that is, the human gesture has an idea behind it. Significance becomes attached to human gestures when "each organism...grasps the meaning of its own gestures" (Scheffler, p. 158); and when both transmitter and receiver of the gesture understand the meaning of that gesture in the same way (Mead, p. 47). Gestures thus form the basis from which significance or symbolic meaning may later emerge (Mead, pp. 42-46, 53, 76; Scheffler, pp. 157-158; Tugendhat, p. 174). Mead explains it this way:

within any social act, an adjustment is effected, by means of gestures, of the actions of one organism involved to the actions of another; the gestures are movements of the first organism which acts as specific stimuli calling forth the (socially) appropriate response of the second organism (pp. 13-14n).

The circular character of this process resides in the consequent effects perceived by the sender upon the receiver; and each subsequent gesture contains new consequences which determine future responses (Mead, p. 80). By way of example, Mead says that

[]just as in fencing the parry is an interpretation of the thrust, so, in the social act, the adjustive response of one organism to the gesture of another is the interpretation of that gesture by that organism—it is the meaning of that gesture (p. 78).

Mead sees the gesture (most specifically, the "vocal gesture") as responsible for "the rise and development of human intelligence" (pp. 13-14n), and also as laying the groundwork
for more sophisticated communication (Mead, p. 133; Tugendhat, p. 176). Gestures, then, are the bedrock of human communication. This constitutes the key to Mead's first stage: human language as a significant symbol in creation of shared meaning.

For Mead, "meaning" does not so much derive from the social process as it is activated by significant symbols, most specifically, language symbols. In the manner of Follett, Mead believes meaning is simply and objectively there, awaiting discovery (Mead, pp. 77, 80; Scheffler, pp. 157-158). Hence, meaning, like the social process itself, "can be described...in terms of symbols or language at its highest ...stage of development but language simply lifts out of the social process a situation which is logically or implicitly there already. The language symbol is simply a significant or conscious gesture" (Mead, pp. 78-79).

This idea gives rise to stage two in development of the social act. For Mead, "meaning" for humans emerges as the result of two interdependent elements, participation and communicability. Says Mead, ...

[m]eaning can arise only in so far as some phase of the act which the individual is arousing in the other can be aroused in him [or her]self. There is always to this extent participation. ...the result of this participation is communicability, i.e., the individual can indicate to him [or her]self what he [or she] indicates to others (p. 81n).

Of import here is the "vocal gesture." Alone, words have no meaning. Spoken aloud, they gain significance only when "one significantly says something with his own vocal process [and says] it to himself as well as to everybody else within reach of his voice" (Mead, p. 67). In this way, the individual has the ability to "indicate to him [or her]self what the other person is going to do and then to take his [or her] attitude on the basis of that indication" (Mead, p. 244). Here, he is advocating a circular process of mutual discovery such as that Follett advocates (Mead, pp. 167, 179). The point is that significant gestures change or modify the attitudes of both participants in the social process (p. 179), which makes both thinking and social communication possible at all:

The internalization of our experience of the external conversations of gestures which we carry on with other individuals in the social process is the essence of thinking; and the gestures thus internalized are significant symbols because they have the same meanings for all individual members of [a] society or social group; i.e., they respectively arouse the same attitudes in the individuals making them that they arouse in the individuals responding to them... (Mead, p. 47).
For Mead, then, the logical structure of meaning resides in a triadic relationship between and among gesture, the adjustive response to it, and the product of those -- the social act (Mead, p. 80). Thus, "[m]eaning is that which can be indicated to others while it is by the same process indicated to the indicating individual" (Mead, p. 89).

Mead's fundamental point with respect to stage two seems to be that to the extent the "minded" individual can see the effects of his or her gestures upon another, and can modify his or her behavior as a result of that realization, he or she also accepts personal responsibility for those gestures. This sense of obligation or responsibility causes the individual not only to "call out in him [or her]self...a single response of the other but [to call out] the response...of the community as a whole" (Mead, p. 267). For Mead, that ability constitutes "mind."

Both Mead and Dewey believe that it is only within the social process that significant symbols emerge. Both therefore do not locate "mind" in the brain, but in "the functioning of significant symbols" (Morris, 1932, pp. 320-323). Their doctrine, then, is, first, that "mind is the symbolic functioning of portions of experience"; and, second, that "the ultimate source of all symbols, and so of mind, is the language process" (Morris, 1932, pp. 321-322).

On the cusp of stages two and three in development of the social act is acknowledgement of the "generalized other." This acknowledgement also gives rise to "self." The third stage thus results from the obligation one feels for seeing his or her own acts from the perspective of another; and, following therefrom, "when the minded organism becomes the object of his own reflection, aware of itself from the standpoint of the 'generalized other'" (Scheffler, p. 161). As Lee notes, "[i]n communication the individual inevitably assumes the social perspective because his gestures have no significance unless he assumes the position of the generalized other" (Lee, 1945, p. 65). In this, we see the potential for meaningful cooperative activity (Mead, pp. 89, 254).

Assumption of the role of the "generalized other" occurs via a complex, three-step process. The first step is simple "role taking" (Natanson, 1956, p. 13). The next, intermediate, step is what Mead calls the "organized game" (p. 151). This requires both knowledge and acceptance of rules governing the social game. "Game rules are the mark of the transition from simple role-taking to participation in roles of a special, standardized order" (Natanson, 1956, p. 13). In this way, children are socialized to adult rules of the
The final step is assumption of the role of the generalized other itself, which occurs when "the individual goes beyond the game and takes the role of...the 'generalized other'...[or] the attitude of the community" (Mead, pp. 153-155). This action helps constitute self, which arises in cooperative activity (Mead, pp. 155, 317).

As for the "self," relative to cooperative and purposive action,

The self-conscious individual...takes or assumes the organized social attitudes of the given social group or community...to which he [or she] belongs, toward the social problems of various kinds which confront that group or community at any given time, and which arise in connection with the correspondingly different social projects or organized co-operative enterprises in which that group or community as such is engaged...(Mead, p. 156).

The important issue here is that the "self" can only be fully realized when it recognizes the effects not only of its own acts, but those of others. As the role of the generalized other is assumed and a sense of obligation to the whole emerges, a "self" in turn emerges. What inevitably follows from those processes are both self and social control (Mead, pp. 154-155).

Social control for Mead arises out of both individual "self-consciousness" and "self-criticism." That is, to the extent the individual takes the role of the generalized other (i.e., engages in substantive social relations), he or she can govern and modify conduct both self-consciously and self-critically. Hence, "self-criticism is essentially social criticism, and behavior controlled by self-criticism is essentially behavior controlled socially" (Mead, p. 255). It is likely Follett would agree with that assessment.

The notion of a "generalized other" is clearly a consequential one for Mead, as Natanson (1956) notes:

Abstract thinking is characterized by the individual's assuming the attitude or role of the generalized other. To speak of a 'universe of discourse' commonly shared by two or more thinkers is to insist necessarily that each of these thinkers, taking the role of a generalized other, makes him [or her]self intelligible both to [self] and to...fellow thinkers by thinking from a non-individual standpoint. Even further, the notions of social obligation and moral requiredness demand that the individual place him [or her]self in the position of the generalized other....The fully developed self is possible...when the individual accomplishes such projections (p. 14; see also Mead, pp. 258-260).
Apart from basic communication, acknowledgement of the generalized other also requires reflection (Mead, p. 98). Mead describes the "self" as having "a development; it is not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process" (p. 135). In short, reflection requires deliberation about the individual and collective nature of social activity.

Brief elaboration of the distinctions Mead makes between "consciousness" and "self-consciousness" is useful here. For Mead, "consciousness" is seen as "functional, not substantive," (p. 112), has reference only "to the field of experience" (p. 163), "indicates an experience with, and experience of, one's self" (p. 137), and is present only in "sensory processes" (p. 22). Taken together, these ideas seem to indicate that, for Mead, consciousness is unreflective, lacking significant or symbolic effect.

In contrast, Mead describes "self-consciousness" as "the [self] becoming an object to itself" (Natanson, 1956, p. 12). Mead calls this a "social fact," which he believes signifies that humans are more advanced in evolutionary terms than are lower animals (p. 137n, emphasis in original). Mead's point here is that if self-understanding is to accrue, an impersonal, objective view of ourselves is absolutely essential. Absent that view, "we have just consciousness, not self-consciousness;" and absent self-consciousness, "we cannot act intelligently or rationally" (Mead, p. 138). In taking such a view, we come to know ourselves "as something meaningful and understandable, something rationalizable in a socially significant sense" (Lee, 1945, pp. 67-68).

For Mead, when people "step outside" themselves and become "object," they can come to understand the dynamic interrelationship between themselves and the wider world (Mead, pp. 111-112, 332). This ability is a "social structure," one residing in and arising from the social process (p. 140). Thus, self-consciousness arises when the individual takes the attitudes of the other "within an organized setting of social relationships" (Mead, p. 225). This implies an achieved mutuality of attitudes among participants, which in turn "constitutes the social or common perspective" (Lee, 1945, p. 68; Tugendhat, p. 181).

The necessary preconditions for "intelligent" or "rational" action are self-consciousness and reflection (Lee, 1945, pp. 67-68; Mead, p. 138). And self-consciousness requires development of self-control born of language communication (Mead, pp. 140-142):

I know of no other form of behavior than the linguistic in which the individual
is an object to himself, and, so far as I can see, the individual is not a self in the reflexive sense unless he [or she] is an object to him [or her]self. It is this fact that gives a critical importance to communication, since this is a type of behavior in which the individual does so respond to him [or her]self (Mead, p. 142).

The self, then, "is a structure of attitudes...as distinct from a group of habits" (Mead, p. 163). The individual, however, cannot rely on direct or personal experience to step back and see him or herself as "object." Rather, the individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same social group, or from the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs....and he becomes an object to himself only by taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself within a social environment or context of experience and behavior in which [each is] involved (Mead, p. 138).

For Mead, the essence of the self...is cognitive: it lies in the internalized conversation of gestures which constitutes thinking, or in terms of which thought or reflection proceeds. And hence the origin and foundations of the self, like those of thinking, are social (p. 173).

To summarize to this point, what Mead has done is detail the distinctive features of human communication. These features are, first, "understanding of meaning as evidence in responding to one's own gestures"; second, "focussing on or indicating meanings through language symbols" (Lee, 1945, p. 42); third, "organizing anticipated responses into a system of common meanings relevant to a generalized other" (Lee, 1945, p. 43); and fourth, recognizing that social experience is circular and reflexive. As such, an individual can respond "to oneself as another responds...taking part in one's own conversation with others, being aware of what one is saying, and using that awareness...to determine what one is going to say thereafter" (Mead, p. 140).

At its heart, Mead's theory is one of reflective social action (Rucker, pp. 39-40), of the self of and in society, is evident in the fourth stage of development of the social act (Lee, 1945, pp. 71-76). This stage refers to a "community of selves, in a distinctly human sense. [It] arises continuously out of the social process, but constitutes an emergent level of human organization, influencing society in new ways" (Scheffler, pp. 165-166).

In constructing this theory of social action, Mead makes the distinction between the
two functionally distinctive aspects ("phases") of the self or social person, the "I" and the "me," both of which integrate to form a "personality" (Mead, p. 182). This distinction is an important one for Mead, because it is made "from the point of view of conduct itself" (Mead, p. 173).

The "I" is the individual aspect of the self. It gives one "the sense of freedom, of initiative" to act self-consciously (Mead, p. 177), and thus is the active and spontaneous aspect of the self which "really does things" (Lee, 1945, p. 67). "I", then, is the aspect of the self that is "unique, idiosyncratic, personal" (Lee, 1945, p. 66), representing memory of past individual experience and identity (Mead, pp. 74-75; Natanson, 1956, p. 16). Mead conceives of the "I" as both transcending and responding to the "me." That is, the "I" -- being spontaneous and active -- contributes a novel, albeit incalculable, quality to human action (Mead, pp. 174-175; Natanson, 1956, p. 16).

The "me," in contrast, is the social aspect of the self, is "conventional" and "habitual," a "permanent structure of the self" (Natanson, 1956, p. 16; Lee, 1945, p. 68). The "me" is thus that aspect "which expresses the institutionalized or generalized attitudes of society" (Lee, 1945, p. 68). In so doing, it gives rise to a "shared social identity" (Scheffler, p. 165).

"Me" resides first, in awareness of self as "object," and in responding to that self while taking the role of the other. Second, it resides in stability or habit. The "me" reflects the history of all that constitutes the social order (e.g., codes, norms, expectations). Third, the "me" -- being habitual and stable, and having taken the attitude of the other -- can come into being "only through the services of an 'I' that acts as liaison between the self and the objective situation facing itself in choice" (Natanson, 1956, p. 16). In turn, this allows for successful integration of the individual into the community. Says Mead,

We are not only what is common to all; each one of the selves is different from every one else, but there has to be a common structure...in order that we may be members of a community at all. We cannot be ourselves, unless we are also members of a community in whom there is a community of attitudes which control the attitudes of all (pp. 163-164).

Finally, the "me" resides in the totality of individual historical thoughts, actions and memories, which in turn are brought into the social process as occasion(s) warrant their introduction (Natanson, 1956, pp. 15-16). It appears that, for Mead, the integration of both individual history and community history/tradition (i.e., the social order) are bound up in, and help define, the "me". This may help explain what Mead means by the "me" as the
"permanent structure of the self."

Both "me" and "I," as constitutive of the "self," are seen as central to and as developing within the social process (Natanson, 1956, p. 17). Hence, both are "essential to the self in its full expression" (Mead, p. 199). At the same time, and unsurprisingly, Mead does seem to give preeminence to the "me."

What Mead appears to be saying is that these two structural aspects of the self, the "I" and "me," create a whole reflective person. Thus, the "I" and the "me" moderate one other. While the "I" introduces novelty, the "me" provides stability. Thus, the social order is sustained through the "me," and the "I" allows not only for preservation of individuality, but for changes in the social order as they are warranted.

The stellar role played by communication throughout Mead's analysis of development of the social act cannot be underestimated. Communication allows the individual to become an "other" unto him or herself because it makes possible emergence of the social perspective born of assumption of the role of the generalized other. That being the case, using another individual as a means to one's own ends becomes less likely as the individual, having become "other," has become "means" as well. Finally, to the extent that communication helps one become cognizant of the moral obligation he or she has for personal conduct, it also opens wide the door for the coming of self-control and the social order (Lee, 1945, pp. 65-66).

So then, the essence of stage four resides in the notion that "[t]he 'I' reacts upon the 'me' and therefore upon the socialization process itself, continually altering it. It is the constant reaction of the organism to its socialized selfhood" (Scheffler, p. 165).

Given all that, Mead's view on leaders and leadership is useful. For Mead, leaders are a special breed. A leader is defined as one "who is able to take in more than others of an act in process, who can put himself into relation with whole groups in the community whose attitudes have not entered into the lives of others in the community" (Mead, p. 256); or as one who "expresses the principles of the community more completely than any other" (Mead, p. 217). The leader thus offers an invaluable community service -- the ability to make possible communication between and among diverse groups.

As Mead's leaders enlarge the perspective of the community, they "stand out as symbolic," at which time it becomes evident that "[a person] who is a neighbor of anybody else in the group is a member of a larger society, and to the extent he [or she] lives in such
a community he [or she] has helped to create that society" (Mead, p. 217).

Further, by "entering into the attitudes" of the various groups in question, and establishing themselves as conduits and mediators between and among these groups, leaders can be catalysts for change. Mead does not say that such changes are necessarily positive, but only that change occurs (pp. 216-217).

Mead well-summarizes development of the social act in the *Philosophy of the Act* (1938). Sounding very like Follett, he says that

[w]e are all of us in some sense changing the social order in which we belong; our very living does it, and we ourselves change as we go on; there is always action to answer to reaction in the social world. That process of continuing reconstruction is the process of value, and the only essential imperative I can see is that this essential social process has got to go on--the community, on the one hand, and the selves that make up the community. It has to continue not so much because the happiness of all is worth more than the happiness of the individual but, being what we are, we have to continue being social beings, and society is essential to the individual just as the individual is essential to society (pp. 460-461).

Nowhere is the essence of Mead's thoughts on the social act more evident than in his views on conflict. Mead identifies two classes of conduct: "social" and "anti-social." Social conduct is described as having "tendencies ... which are friendly, or which make for friendliness and cooperation among individuals motivated by them" (p. 304). Anti-social conduct is characterized by those tendencies "which are hostile, or which make for hostility and antagonism" (p. 304). Both classes of conduct, while polar opposites, are seen as universal, as having ethical content, and as essential to human organization (p. 304). As it is with the "I" and "me," both types of conduct also moderate one another (pp. 304-305).

"Anti-social" conduct is usually a temporary state. In times of crisis such as war, internecine rivalries and competition shift from the "hometown," as it were, and unite to thwart a common enemy. Everyday social relations are another matter. Like Dewey and Follett, Mead has great faith in what might be called the benign intent of people, and believes that they are nearly compelled -- in Mead's case, it is an evolutionary and biological compulsion -- to act cooperatively. If conflict persists, it is the result of the inability of the individual to "integrate his [or her] social relations with other individual selves into a common, unitary pattern" (pp. 306-307). Follett agrees.

Mead recognizes that people and their social relations are complex affairs, and that
the various interests and "sets of social attitudes" inhering in each of the many groups to which the individual belongs may present conflict for both individual and group (p. 307). At the same time, he believes conflict to be a product of difficulties inherent in and existing "...between different aspects or phases of the same individual self...as well as between different individual selves" (p. 307). His point seems to be that, if you reduce or eliminate the "integration" problem, conflict will be reduced or eliminated accordingly.

Mead's solution to conflict is reconstruction and modification of social situations (pp. 307-308). This idea revisits his belief that, first, all human interaction proceeds from an antecedent social process which awaits discovery; and second, that individuals are compelled to act cooperatively. Such reconstruction begins and ends with "mind." Says Mead,

Mind, as constructive or reflective or problem-solving thinking, is the socially acquired means or mechanism or apparatus whereby the human individual solves the various problems of environmental adjustment which arise to confront him [or her] in the course of experience, and which prevent his [or her] conduct from proceeding harmoniously on its way, until they have thus been dealt with (p. 308).

Recall that Mead believes self-criticism to also be "social criticism." That being the case, human beings have not only the power but the responsibility for restructuring or modifying themselves, and the social structure itself, in order to meet the social evolutionary times (pp. 308-309). This makes sense in Mead's scheme: if the individual both constitutes and is constituted by society, and if people are inherently social creatures, motivated biologically to act cooperatively, both society and self must be modified and/or reconstructed in service of cooperative social activity.

Any such social reconstruction, if it is to be at all far-reaching, presupposes a basis of common social interests shared by all individual members of the given human society in which that reconstruction occurs; shared, that is, by all individuals whose minds must participate in, or whose minds bring about, that reconstruction. And the way in which any social reconstruction is actually effected by the minds of the individuals involved is by a more or less abstract intellectual extension of the boundaries of the given society to which these individuals all belong, and which is undergoing the reconstruction—an extension resulting in a larger social whole in terms of which the social conflicts that necessitate the reconstruction of the given society are harmonized or reconciled, and by reference to which...these conflicts can be solved or eliminated (Mead, pp. 308-309).
Mead also rather echoes Follett's notion of "difference" as it applies to, and is used in, conflict. Just as Follett says that "society needs each [person's] difference," (p. 39), Mead says that societies, finally, "develop in complexity of organization only by means of the progressive achievement of greater and greater degrees of functional, behavioristic differentiation among the individuals who constitute them" (p. 310). For Mead, each person's peculiarities or "socially functional individual behavior" are essential to the social community. Hence, the social construction that is community (grounded in an understanding of interdependence) is responsible for transforming difference into cooperative action in service of social or common ends (pp. 310-311).

If that is so, Mead contends, what ensues is the "ideal of any social situation respecting organization, unification, co-operation, and integration of the behavior of the several individuals involved" (p. 322). Says Mead,

There is...a functional difference, but it must be a functional difference which can be entered into in some real sense by the rest of the community. ....To do justice to the recognition of the uniqueness of an individual in social terms, there must be not only the differentiation which we do have in a highly organized society, but a differentiation in which the attitudes involved can be taken by other members of the group (pp. 324-325).

Each and all of those convictions mirror not only Follett's notion of "difference," but her views on development of the collective idea. That is, she too believes that recognition and integration of individual capacity and difference is the seedbed for collective action, and that such recognition and integration are only reliable mechanisms with which the community can develop common ideas (Follett, pp. 24-25, 39, 50-59).

Mead's views on the social group seems to follow generally from his views of conflict. He is convinced that

those social situations in which the individual finds it easiest to integrate his [or her] own behavior with the behavior of the other individual selves are those in which all the individual participants are members of some one of the numerous socially functional groups of individuals (groups organized, respectively, for various special social ends and purposes) within the given human society as a whole; and in which...they are acting in the respective capacities as members of a particular group (pp. 321-322).

Following from that, Mead believes that to the extent individuality (i.e., constructive use of one's differentiated, but socially functional, capacity) is allowed to blossom in the
group or social process, the individual can "realize" him or herself, and thus see his or her place in the life of the group. But the important issue is not so much that individual self-realization comes at all (in a healthy social process, both Mead and Follett would say that is inevitable), but it comes because of the high qualitative texture in his or her relations to the group. This qualitative texture allows for assumption of the role of the other. The individual can then "[integrate] him [or her]self with that situation or group by controlling his [or her] own behavior and conduct accordingly" (p. 322). The result is that competition and hostility are reduced.

As it is with both Dewey and Follett, Mead frames both idea and ideal of democracy in social processes. He says that both organized religion and the economic community, to the extent they have developed symbolic language communication common to all, have created a "universe of discourse" (pp. 281-283). In so doing, these communities have the potential to "speak" across social groups and to integrate "their different characters" into a unified whole. Thus, together these organized entities set the stage for "higher organization" which is greater than the sum of its parts. This, Mead calls the "universal society," or the "democratic community." Inhering in that community is the democratic ideal (Mead, pp. 284, 287, 328).

Mead's ideal democracy is a mirror-image of that advanced by both Follett and Dewey: it is a moral conception. Such ideal resides in the social process, which allows for development of individual capacity ("functional differentiation") and development of social participation (taking the attitude of others) (p. 326). These two factors moderate one another and, together, make possible political-social organization (p. 326). That being the case, the "implication" of democracy is that "the individual can be as highly developed as lies within the possibilities of his own inheritance, and still can enter into the attitudes of the others whom he affects" (p. 326).

As Morris (1934) notes, Mead does not conceive of democracy as having "quantitative sameness"; and, while there may be many individual differences, they are also preciousy unique since they contribute to the moral endeavor that is development of democracy (p. 20).

[The very universality of the processes which belong to human society, whether looked at from the point of view of religion or trading or logical thinking, at least opens the door to a universal society; and, in fact, these tendencies all express themselves where the social development has gone
far enough to make it possible (p. 284).

In "Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences" Mead sounds very like Dewey and Follett when speaking of the political role of the democratic ideal:

...[t]here cannot be self-government until there can be an intelligent will expressed in the community, growing out of the intelligent attitudes of the individuals and groups in whose experience the community exists. Our institutions are in so far democratic that when a public sentiment is definitely formed and expressed it is authoritative. But an authoritative public sentiment upon a public issue is very infrequent...(quoted in Rucker, p. 48).

Mead's "democratic ideal," much like Dewey's and Follett's, is broadly-conceived and grounded in significant (symbolic) communication, and is thought by Mead to create "an ideal of human society." What this ideal does is "bring people so closely together in their interrelationships, so fully develops the necessary system of communication, that the individuals who exercise their own peculiar functions can take the attitude of those whom they affect" (p. 327).

Further, as it is with Follett and Dewey, Mead believes that a democratic society, property constituted in the social process, can make possible a "democratic world" (Morris, 1932, pp. 20-21). Morris says that "[j]ust as the moral individual has transcended the conflict between him [or her]self and [the] social group, so could the moral nation make its self-realization compatible with social co-operation" (1934, p. 21).

As evidenced above, we see Mead's views on democracy as highly consistent with both Dewey and Follett. Predictably, so too are his views on education. Like them, he takes a broad view of it; seeing education as a primary mechanism for transmission of social knowledge, for acquiring the ability of taking the role of the generalized other and, thus, for development of mind and self (pp. 159-160, 264-265).

Education, like all other human activity, has social character. As such, it must have positive social effect, in which case it cannot be confined only to the school. Mead thus says that the task of the school is that of "unifying and relating life in the family and the school with stimuli ready to call out the immediate connection between the different spontaneous acts of the child with each other and the life that lies behind them" (quoted in Rucker, p. 87).

For Mead, Dewey and Follett, education does not mean transmission of information, for information is not knowledge. And knowledge means social knowledge. Mead echoes
Dewey: "whatever is stored up, without immediate need, for some later occasion, for display or to pass examinations is mere information, and has no enduring place in the mind" (quoted in Rucker, p. 87). Most importantly for Mead -- indeed, all the Chicago pragmatists -- education is a primary mechanism which helps children understand that they live in a larger world, and that their actions matter in the world. As school activities are geared to advance such understanding, they serve "to draw together the various segments of a community and to produce a sounder knowledge of community on the basis of which genuine progress can be promoted" (Rucker, p. 97). So then, for Mead,

Learning is essentially social and that social awareness comes naturally when teaching proceeds socially. Learning...should come from the conversation of concrete individuals rather than from pale abstractions of thought. We are social beings; our intellects are social products; and education remains partial and flimsy unless our sociality is explicitly used (Rucker, p. 93).

In nearly every important respect, Dewey and Mead's work coalesce (Morris, 1932, p. 322). The same could be said of Follett in relation to them. The notable difference between Follett and Dewey and Mead, of course, is that the Chicago contingent is far more systematic, more self-conscious of methodological concerns, in their presentations.

That notwithstanding, it seems to me that four primary beliefs link Follett to Dewey and Mead, and those three writers to the interpretivists: first, individuals cannot exist without, nor do they antedate, the group or social process. Second, all have unshakable trust in the human spirit or soul, and its willingness to engage in social processes that serve to enlarge and enrich it. Indeed, that willingness is itself built upon the trust one human being "naturally" feels for another. Third, the individual is a product not only of conscious, reflective and deliberative self-realization, but of a self-conscious society as a whole. The latter, in turn, is created and sustained by self-conscious individuals. Hence, "[t]he whole is a community of individuals; the individual is a member of a community" (Lee, 1945, p. 81).

Finally, no one, not a single writer, is suggesting that a healthy social process grounded in principles of human development is easily spawned or sustained, rapid, proximately decisive, or even possible in all situations. It is an ideal, something to work toward with persistence, patience, a willingness to experiment, and with an appreciation for situational fluidity and corresponding adjustment. It is in the process of human development that the ideal resides.

The theoretical foundations of a "process" approach to human affairs established, l
turn now to the flip-side of the social process coin -- the "rules" for process.

Section Three: Orion White, Cynthia McSwain and the "Rules" for Process

Since, as I observe earlier, both sides of the process coin are important, the following brief accounting of the rules may be useful to help us develop -- in both theoretical and practical terms -- a more holistic picture of what the social process may mean in community-based nonprofit human service institutional practice. For this, we turn to Orion White (1990), and Orion White and Cynthia McSwain (1983).

As noted earlier, White and McSwain's (1983) "transformational" view is one which will be addressed rather more fully in the chapter on organization theory, but it presently warrants brief attention. Their view, a theoretical leap beyond nearly all writers introduced here (with the possible exception of Mead), is drawn in large part from Jungian psychology. They see the unconscious as not only highly structured, but both individual and collective (pp. 292, 295). That is, in much the way the body operates, the unconscious "exists in conjunction with other separate entities to form an objective whole" (p. 295). However, as "collective whole," the unconscious is manifest only in individuals (p. 295).

For White and McSwain, consciousness is seen as constituted by "transformed unconscious energy" (p. 295). That being the case, our task as humans is to encourage "development of an appropriate relationship to the unconscious such that unconscious energy is transformed or made available to consciousness" (p. 295). They thus focus their efforts upon how the individual directs unconscious energy into social relations and activity via projections (individual or personal images of reality), which are directed outward, rather as personal "statements." The objective of the social process is therefore to resolve these differing images or projections of reality (p. 296).

White and McSwain emphasize that "meaningful experience involves the discovery of capacities and potentials in self and situations that have remain hidden" (p. 296). Meaningful experience arises in the transformation of unconscious energy and its subsequent introduction to consciousness. Following from that, they further believe that everything, most of all people, exists only in relationship—not relationship as social interaction, but relationship through direct and real flow of human energy from its collective source through the person into activity and interaction....Each element has a discrete identity that is made discrete through its relationship to the whole process of which it is a part (p. 297).
Orion White's (1990) elaboration upon this perspective has a distinctly Mead-like quality: "the crux of the process approach, the element that creates the synergy that makes group process worth more than the cost, is relationship. That is, the group members must achieve a certain quality or texture in their relations in order for this synergy to occur" (1990, pp. 196-197). While White admits that it is nearly impossible to specify just what that "quality" or texture might be, he does catalog some elements which may precondition it. He first identifies three "strategic" factors that feed effective group relations.

The first strategic consideration seems to follow from, or is at least congruent with, Mead's notion that individuals must become an "object" to themselves, which is to say that they must be "in contact with themselves and be highly aware of their own identities, their own personal process" (White, 1990, p. 197).

The second is that much of what confronts people in modern society can be so overwhelmingly complex that it "simply outsizes human discretion" (1990, pp. 197-198). That being the case, the social process must allow for people to use the sum of their capacity, which he sees as constituted by thinking, feeling, senses, intuition. This capacity, in turn, helps people make sense of that complexity.

Finally, the individual must surrender or submit to the process. This complex dynamic follows from Elias Canetti's ideas on the emergence of social pathology, which he believes arises from domination of elites over the masses, and the latters' reaction to such domination (White, 1990, pp. 198-203).

These elite dominators seek "immortality" (or, alternatively, "a permanent means of survival"), and thus wish to avoid death. They are ruthless in their attempts to occupy high positions in a hierarchy; and in so attempting, they "mask" subordinates (i.e., force them into submissive roles) (1990, pp. 198-199). At the level of the individual, this "masking" is

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7 In part, White develops his model from the Myers Briggs Type Inventory (MBTI), which makes the assumption that "people are different in basic ways from each other...[an assumption] that leads us to view that differences are not abnormalities but complementarities" (1990, p. 196). The MBTI, a typology derived from individual preferences, identifies the "four dimensions of mind," thinking, feeling, intuiting, and sensing. Following therefrom, it also produces sixteen specific preferential types, "which provide the basis for identifying four major behavior pattern categories (i.e., temperaments) that are easily observable as differences in information-processing styles among individuals" (1990, p. 196).
effected by "language formats," defined as "specific structural displays by which meaning is put into sentences" (1990, p. 204). These formats consist of such mechanisms as commands, evaluations and judgments which serve to stop the social process. That is, stopped are "changes, the development, that occur in people as they move through life participating in the network of human relationships that create and express their evolving and identity" (1990, pp. 198-199). Death occurs when the ability to promote change via the social process ceases. "Hence, at the bottom of the problem of social pathology, in Canetti's view, is the refusal to accept death, to submit to fate" (1990, p. 200). At the level of organization, the same process can obtain. White and McSwain see the formal organization as an "expression of the human psyche." That is, in organizations, the "pattern of activity may express or hinder the nature of human beings" (p. 297).

White rather turns Canetti on his head, explaining that psychological surrender or submission is a conscious and reflective process which, in its ideal form, allows the healthy social process to be created, and to proceed (p. 200). In White's view, attending the surrender or submission process are several elements. First, submission must hold in relations to others as a realization or actualization of submission to process. This means taking a stance outside of the ego and such in turn depends on an acceptance of the inevitable reality of death. [Second,] the paradox of life followed by death epitomizes the paradox of valid relationship and effective process. [Third,] in order to accept death we must accept the total aloneness (at least aloneness from the point of view of the ego) that goes with it. [Finally,] when we can accept our ultimate aloneness, it becomes possible to establish valid, contactful relationship to others. It is such relationship that is the essence of effective human process (p. 203). Following from White's strategic considerations are what he calls the "tactical principles of participation," which are in turn derived from specific communicative patterns: appropriate self-disclosure, skilled listening, and adequate feedback. A brief explanation of each is useful.

"Appropriate self-disclosure" hinges critically on the idea that the social process should allow for genuine expression of individuality. It means that the individual is given enough "social space" not only to grasp the meanings of his or her own "language formats," but to reflex with those formats sufficient to see their effects on both him or herself and others. In a practical sense, then, this means the process should allow for individual statements or desires attendant to the task or situation under consideration, and the time and distance for the individual to understand the effects of those statements (1990, p. 204).
"Skilled listening" refers to the avoidance of sympathy, advice, evaluation and judgment in communication. It means the process should encourage communication that is concrete and descriptive; that is, listener "B" repeats what speaker "A" originally said in words "as close to the ones ["A" used]...as possible" (1990, p. 204).

Finally, an adequate "feedback" pattern is very specific, and refers to feedback that "[describes] the event in question, the subsequent events, and one's own feeling reaction to the events" (1990, p. 204).

It is notable that White derives his model, in part, from Mary Follett's "law of the situation," developed in Creative Experience, and detailed in the following chapter. White takes Follett's view that "the generic examination of questions, the structural issues, faced in a situation will yield the most appropriate response to it" (p. 202). In short, "[t]he idea is that in a properly related and functioning group, the process itself will produce the best line of action. By truly listening to each other, the objective situation could speak to the group and identify the law governing it" (p. 202, emphasis in original).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has served two purposes. First, it rounds out an interpretivist view of social affairs by attending to an element that remains unexplored in interpretivism, but which is of more than passing interest to Mary Follett: efficacious democratic governance and how the social process can help create it. To do that, I draw upon the Chicago School pragmatism of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. We see that, in nearly every substantive sense, Follett's agreement with them is total. Secondly, and as I note in the chapter introduction, since Follett talks about the social process, but not specifically how it might operate, I introduce Orion White and Cynthia McSwain as standardbearers for the "rules" for process.

I have argued that not only has the traditional, or functionalist, view of social affairs dominated our beliefs about society generally, it has also dominated our beliefs about organizations. I turn to that topic now.
CHAPTER FOUR
TWENTIETH CENTURY ORGANIZATION THEORY

Introduction

This chapter concentrates on a selective history of Twentieth Century organization theory, in two sections. Section one surveys the traditional, or functionalist, view of organizations; section two, the interpretivist.

Literature on organizations for much of the 20th century reflects a decidedly functionalist perspective grounded in a preoccupation with reducing uncertainty and with increasing predictability. These in turn, and theoretically, are thought to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Such literature assumes that "objective" knowledge, scientific "facts," and observable (thus testable) hypotheses about behavior could direct theory and explain action. Much of Twentieth Century organization theory, then, certainly through the 1970's, has largely focused on the functional aspects of organizations and our lives within them (e.g., Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Harmon and Mayer, 1986; Morgan, 1984, 1986; Hughes, 1990).

In contrast, interpretive organization theory shifts our focus to less accessible -- i.e., less observable, and therefore less testable -- factors in organizations. Among the more important are language, the various meanings that come to be attached to events or situations; culture; and the role played by myths, symbols and ceremonies as they allow people to make sense of their organizational life experiences. What becomes important for management in organizations, then, is not so much control of meaning as Philip Selznick (1957), for example, once espoused, but careful attention to how people in organizations create meaning and, hence, to the role meaning assumes in the day-to-day (e.g., Smircich and Morgan, 1982; Parker, 1992). This focuses both organization participants and those in the larger organization context on the need for allowing diffuse meanings to emerge, as guided by the situation and as interpreted by the various players in the situation (Follett, 1924).

To the extent that we have become an "organizational society" (Presthus, 1978), it is not overstating things to say that we operate in, and are bound by, large and highly centralized rigid structures which seem no longer to have the capacity to respond with any timeliness or flexibility to the profound social problems with which we as a people must
struggle both today and in the new millennium (Gore, 1993). The following brief history may support that observation.

Section One: Traditional Organization Theory

Introduction

There seems to have been seven assumptions guiding traditional, or functionalist, organization theory for much of this century. First, we are a society of organizations. Second, organizations exist to fulfill some important societal function(s). Third, what matters in organizations is largely that which can be directly observed, described, tested and predicted. Fourth, organizations must be efficient. Fifth, they can be understood, however imperfectly (descriptively). Sixth, they can be improved (prescriptively). Finally, to the extent that 20th Century organization theory has been largely prescriptive, a sense of hope seems to pervade the literature. Implicit in the hope is the assumption that bureaucratic organizations are here to stay.

Seen in terms of the assumptions and operating principles driving functionalism, it is understandable why much 20th Century organization theory has focused on the aspects of organizational and administrative life it has. Let us look briefly at those now.

One of the hallmarks of structural functionalism is that it conducts a continuing search for explanations about why society continues to function despite constant turnover of members in the social system. Thus, when we read Max Weber and his description of bureaucratic organizations, for example, it is clear that this question is central to his inquiry. Following from that, functionalism has four overarching concerns. First, since it sees society as a system within which organizations "live," it views organizations holistically. It attempts therefore to identify factors that might influence system survival and stability (Harmon and Mayer, 1986, p. 160; Silverman, pp. 47-48; Morgan, 1984, p. 308).

Second, and to that end, functionalism explores subunits or subsystems within the organization, and seeks to explain their influence upon an organization's ability to adapt and thus achieve its goals (Silverman, p. 48). Attention to organization roles, then, is central to the perspective. That is, individuals as individuals are rather ignored, and are seen as playing only a functional organizational role, and this, solely for continued organizational functioning, stability and survival. Indeed, individuals are seen as little more than "interchangeable parts in an industrial machine" (Shafritz and Ott, 1992, p. 27). It is
unsurprising that, because people are seen as functional cogs in an organization context, they are also assumed to be rational, sense-making creatures and are therefore motivated largely by economic inducements (Silverman, p. 75).

Third, functionalism has come to be driven by an open systems perspective, which "[attempts] to establish the ways in which any system meets its needs through other systems" (Silverman, p. 49). In so doing, it signals its concern for "the imperative for system survival, the interdependency among system parts, and the contingent nature of the environment" (Harmon and Mayer, 1986, p. 160).

Finally, the view also holds that form follows function. As such, "structures can be understood by analyzing their functions" (Perrow, 1986, p. 157).

The tables of contents of any of a number of organization theory texts illustrate that the myriad theories comprising traditional organization theory could defensibly be presented using a variety of approaches. I have chosen to segment the following into selected "schools" that have emerged from the latter Nineteenth Century up through the 1980's. I will therefore discuss the school, the assumptions driving each, and the basic contributions of representative figures in that school. In order of appearance, these schools are: 1) the classical; 2) Chester Barnard; 3) human relations and neo-human relations; 4) neo-classical; 5) systems; and 6) institutional.

The Classical School

Sometimes referred to as having a "machine view" of organizations (see, for example, Silverman, 1970; Harmon and Mayer, 1986; Morgan, 1986), the Classical school has as notable contributors Max Weber, Frederick Taylor, Henri Fayol, and Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick. The classical school is well-described by Morgan (1986). The cardinal idea driving this school is that "organizations can or should be rational systems that operate in as efficient manner as possible.... [and that]...[its] main orientation [is] to make humans fit the requirements of mechanical organization" (p. 29).

The underlying assumption in most perspectives emerging from this school is that the dominant organizing mechanisms are (descriptively, à la Weber) or must be

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1 Barnard is not literally a "school" of course. He does stand apart from his contemporaries, however, and this dictates my decision to treat him separate from any identifiable "school."
(prescriptively, à la Taylor, Fayol, Gulick and Urwick) rationally-established norms or rules. The themes bequeathed to 20th Century organization theory by these bedrock theorists represent much of what is today believed about, and practiced in, functional management (Morgan, 1984, pp. 307-308).

Frederick Taylor's (1911) principles of efficient shop-floor production are a fine example of that assumption. It is in Taylor that the heart of the Industrial Revolution might be said to reside; and the real genius of the Industrial Revolution must be mass production, for which Taylor was almost single-handedly responsible for promoting.

Taylor reflects the "engineering" perspective in the classical school. Here, we see an attempt to wed man with machine, and science with "scientifically trained" workers. It should be noted, however, that Taylor himself saw his principles as "mechanism[s] for social reform" (Fry, p. 47); and that they could be brought to bear upon the "greatest social ill of the time: inefficiency" (Fry, pp. 47-48). His principles therefore outline a prescriptive layout of physical work and tasks, with the expectation (and result) that desired efficiency would be achieved.

For Taylor, "good" management meant application of "one best way" engineering principles; and management could therefore become more science than art. In this, he reflects four beliefs of his time. First, "motives or sentiments" attendant to human action should be ignored in any scientific endeavor (Durkheim, [1895] 1938, p. 89). Second, only direct observation and testable measures constitute explanation. Third, increasing mechanization required standardization. In Taylor's case, time and motion studies to improve shop floor systems and procedures and, thus, worker performance, served nicely. Finally, output can be measured in quantitative terms (and was, via the use of rates and norms). The organization itself could be called rational only if it were efficient; and individuals were "first class men" only if they efficiently served the needs of the organization.

Together with Henri Fayol ([1916] 1949), who first posited a general theory of management defined in "process" terms, Gulick and Urwick (1937) represent what has been called the "management theory" perspective in the classical school (C. Davis, 1990). Gulick and Urwick signal an interesting twist in the history of 20th Century organization theory as it applies to public organizations. That is, they might be said to have engaged in the definitive misplacement of Taylorism from the shop floor to national government.
Gulick and Urwick's goal is to concentrate power in the hands of a single executive (in this case, the national leader). Their unit of analysis is the "functions of the executive" in a government setting; and, for good or ill, they define the national leader in a simplistic framework of functional management activities. They believe specific functional areas of management can be named, and proceed to so name them in the acronym POSDCORB (Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting and Budgeting), which closely follows Fayol's acronym POCC (Planning, Organizing, Coordinating, Commanding, Controlling) of some 20 years before.

It is perhaps laudable that Gulick and Urwick were largely responsible for what came to be the dominant view in public management for the past sixty years (C. Davis, 1990, p. 604). At the same time, it is notable that they also fail to take into account such nagging considerations as separation of powers, or the dynamic political nature of public policy-making and governance (e.g., Waldo, 1948; Denhardt, 1984).

Morgan (1986) says that industrialism and the large organizations to which it gave rise in the latter 19th Century forced "an increasing trend towards bureaucratization and routinization of life generally" (p. 23). The early 20th Century work of Max Weber, of course, is perhaps the most comprehensive description of large bureaucratic organizations extant, and is often cited as the bedrock of modern organization theory (e.g., Perrow, 1986; Silverman, 1970; Harmon and Mayer, 1986).

It would add nothing to present a mechanistic recounting of Weber's characteristics of bureaucracy, as these are well-known. I will therefore focus on a more general discussion of Weber's sociology and his view of bureaucratic organizations. Weber (followed much later by Robert Merton [1940]; and Talcott Parsons [1964]) provides the sociological view in the Classical school. His unit of analysis is therefore society at large, and his concern is with "understanding the rationalizing aspects of modern society" (Harmon and Mayer, 1986, p. 69) wrought by industrialization. We find him preoccupied with the effects of large bureaucratic organizations on society generally, and profoundly concerned about the dominative and coercive power such organizations can impose (Perrow, 1986, p. 76).

Weber ([1922] 1947) defines the organization as "an ordering of social relationships, maintenance of which certain individuals take as their special task." Following from that are
his seven characteristics of the rational-legal bureaucracy noted a moment ago (Shafritz and Ott, 1992, pp. 81-82).

For Weber, freedom resides in rationality, and rationality is embedded in "calculable rules" (Weber, 1992, p. 81). The assumption is that rules are themselves rational. Rationality, ethics, authority and efficiency, therefore, reside in and are defined by rules, which in turn give legitimacy to the legal-rational authority upon which hierarchy is based. Acceptance or rejection of rules by organization members is of little consequence to the organization because such "in no way [alters] the facts that rules could be imposed and that coercion lay behind them" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 72n).

The role of rules, then, is central to Weber's scheme, as is his emphasis on the role of experts in organizations. In this, he signals his view of the role of bureaucracy in society and, not inconsequentially, his theory of the state. That is, he sees bureaucracy's role as transferring power from political leaders to experts.

David Silverman suggests that, like Taylor, Weber is "uninterested in the personality needs of individuals, but he is very much concerned... with individuals as social actors" (p. 74). That may be, but Weber's concern is more profound. He is troubled by the potential for bureaucracy to blunt individual freedom; and fears bureaucracy's potential to "[subject] people to oppressive routines...favor the 'crippled personality' of the specialist; and...overstep its function and attempt to control the rule of law rather than be subject to it" (Fry, p. 16). He also is concerned that, while organizations may be capable of formal (i.e., mechanical and efficient) rationality, they may not be capable of substantive (i.e., reflective and self-organizing) rationality (Morgan, 1986, p. 37).

Chester Barnard

Chester Barnard (1938) may well be the "giant" of 20th Century organization theory. Charles Perrow (1986), for example, says that much organization theory since the 1930's is an ongoing debate between the landmark work of Weber and that of Barnard (p. 63).

Barnard's ideas on how an organization moves from "cooperative activity" to "formal organization" are well-known and, like Weber's characteristics of bureaucracy, do not require detailed exposition here. Of interest at present are first, the core premises of his theory; and second, his influence on latter Twentieth Century organization theory.
Four premises form the nucleus of Barnard's theory, and Brian Fry (1989) nicely outlines them. First, the organization is a system of free exchange: both individual and organization have responsibilities for honoring it, and either may disengage from it if either concludes the agreement is violated. Hence, the individual who believes organizational inducements fail to exceed his or her contribution(s), will withdraw (Barnard, pp. 83-86).

Second, authority is cumulative in nature. Barnard sees authority as "the character of a communication (order) in a formal organization by virtue of which it is accepted by a contributor to, or member of, the organization as governing the action he contributes" (Barnard, p. 163). This premise signals a departure from classical thought on at least two dimensions. First, authority is bottom-up, not top-down; and second, rejected is the Weberian notion that authority resides in the position (or, more specifically, in rules which define the position). Rather, Barnard sees it as resting in the "relationship between a superior and a subordinate and that authority is not exercised on issues of a command but on its acceptance" (Barnard, pp. 163-165).

Third, organizations are cooperative social systems. Barnard defines the formal organization as a "system of consciously coordinated personal activities or forces" (Barnard, p. 72). This suggests that such coordinated activity is "conscious, deliberate, and purposeful..." (Hall, 1972, p. 6), and assumes that all members are willing participants in accomplishment of goals all hold in common. Fourth, there are functions of the executive, and Barnard confers "responsibilities of heroic dimensions" (Fry, p. 157) upon him or her. These responsibilities include formulating organization purpose, which Barnard sees as "an essential executive function" (Barnard, p. 87), establishing a communication system, "illiciting" individual effort or services (Barnard, p. 227), and establishing and observing an organizational moral code (Barnard, pp. 260-264).

Barnard's influence on latter Twentieth Century organization theory is vast. It is well known, for example that Herbert Simon ([1945] 1976) grounds his work in several themes Barnard initiates. Philip Selznick's (1957) ideas on the responsibility of leaders to "infuse" value into the organization resonate with Barnard's mandate to his "moral leader." His belief in the interdependence of organization and environment, defined in terms of "dynamic equilibrium" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 106), presages Thompson's (1967) seminal work. It could be argued that he had a powerful influence on the neo-human relationists of the 1950's and 1960's, who brought into flower theories of organizational behavior. American systems
theorists who emerged in the 1960's may also owe him a debt, although it is likely they were more influenced by their European counterparts of the time.

While we may rightly extol Barnard's contribution to Twentieth Century organization theory, we should be mindful that he is in "fine functionalist fettle" since his theory seeks control and predictability of both individual and organization processes. For example, early in his work, he states that "[d]eliberate conscious and specialized control of [people's motives, desires and impulses] is the essence of the executive functions" (p. 17).

The Human Relations/Neo-Human Relations Schools

This school gives rise to the "social man" perspective (Silverman, p. 78), and thus the first substantive challenge to the classical school. To the extent that the school's focus is on individual and group behavior, it signals a shift away from the classical school's preoccupation with structural elements of organization or task roles within it. Contributors early in the human relations schools' history include Elton Mayo, Fritz Roethlisberger and William Dickson. The "neo-human relationists" include Abraham Maslow, Douglas McGregor, Rensis Likert and Chris Argyris.

The early human relations theorists hold that "man" is not solely an economic creature, as many of the classicists would have it (Taylor and Barnard, for example), but a social one as well. This view therefore posits that individuals have needs, and that behavior following therefrom will influence organization functioning. The classicists' preoccupation with increased efficiency and productivity to the exclusion of individual needs and behavior is seen by human relations theorists as dehumanizing. Thus, they seek to replace that orientation with one that acknowledges the "impact of psychological conditions on employee productivity" (Shafritz and Ott, 1992, p. 143). Make no mistake: this is yet a traditional perspective. But the early human relations theorists remind us that understanding the "mechanical" or structural aspects of organizations is simply not enough; that people and their behavior "matter" as well.

2 Some have included Mary Follett in this school, although others plant her in the Classicists' garden. Follett's sweep, though, much like Barnard's and Simon's, is broad; and she could be located in any of a number of taxonomic schemes. For my purposes, and as demonstrated in Chapter Two, her view is consistent with interpretive social theory. Hence, I include her in the next section, which discusses interpretive organization theory.
Mayo, Roethlisberger and Dickson's Hawthorne studies of the 1930's have been well-discussed elsewhere and so do not need exhaustive exposition here (see, e.g., Pennock, 1930; Putnam, 1930; Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939). Although the methodology and assumptions driving these studies have been questioned (e.g., Miller and Form, 1951; Carey, 1967), the enduring contribution these studies make to the human relations school and to organization theory generally is their discovery of the power of informal groups in organizational life (Silverman, p. 75).

The so-called "neo-human relations" (Silverman, 1970) writers follow Mayo and his cohorts by nearly a decade. It is with this group (Maslow, McGregor, Likert and Argyris and others in organizational psychology) that we see an extension of, and leap beyond, "social man" to "self-actualizing man."

Specific assumptions arising from this line of thought (see Silverman, pp. 81-89) are first, that people have multi-dimensional "personality needs" and/or "generalized motives" which can be arranged in a hierarchy. We see this assumption embodied in Maslow's functional "hierarchy of needs" pyramid. Second, needs and motives directly influence behavior. Third, we can explain behavior once we understand the motives driving it. Fourth, individual needs and organizational goals may often conflict. Fifth, a change in organization structure is the key to conflict resolution. Finally, "need satisfaction" for both individual and organization is possible by establishing stable workgroups, a non-bureaucratic authority and decision-making structure, both of which should be undergirded by "good communications and expressive supervision" (Silverman, pp. 77-78).


In McGregor, we see Maslow operationalized. That is, his "Theory X" or "carrot and stick" approach to motivation, which attends solely to the extrinsic rewards of work and with which Taylor would find resonance, is rejected in favor of "Theory Y." This signals McGregor's belief that the higher one climbs up the pyramid, the greater the chance for organization conflict. Hence, management must to attend to the intrinsic nature of work and what kinds of rewards might follow from it in the effort to reduce the conflict (Shafritz and Ott,
p. 178). Note the functionalist assumption here: that people exist to serve the needs of the organization; and management's job is to ensure that they do.

The Neo-Classical School

The triumvirate of Max Weber, Chester Barnard, and Herbert Simon ([1945] 1976) lay the foundation of latter Twentieth Century organization theory. And, although Simon may represent the high water mark in traditional organization theory, his debt to Barnard is clear. There are a number of facets of Simon's theory which could be cited as drawing directly from Barnard; however, I confine the discussion to what appear to be the three principal ones.

First, recall that Barnard defines the formal organization as a "system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons" (Barnard, 1938, p. 116), and sees cooperation as the very essence of organized activity. Simon agrees in large measure, calling the organization a "complex pattern of communication and relationships in a group of human beings" (p. xvii). Note, however, that Barnard identifies and defines people in terms of "forces" or "activities," while Simon commissions them again to "human being" status.

Further, while Barnard says "organizations are, by their very nature, cooperative endeavors" (Fry, p. 160, emphasis in original), Simon observes that "cooperation" means "activity in which the participants share a common goal," and "coordination" means "the process of informing each as to the planned behaviors of the others" (Simon, pp. 71-72). The point is that Simon seems to see organization as a more actively conscious endeavor than does Barnard.

Second, their views of human nature coalesce. Barnard says people are limited in their choices by physical, biological and social factors; that "limitation of possibilities is necessary to choice"; and that the "processes of decision are largely techniques for narrowing choice" (Barnard, pp. 14-15).

Seeds of this idea can be found in Simon's notions of "bounded rationality," which posits that people must "satisfice because they do not have the wits to maximize" (Simon, p. xxviii, emphases in original). It is here we see Simon's information-processing "administrative man" (pp. xxix-xxx), who simply cannot consider all decision alternatives available to him. "Administrative man" therefore "satisfices" because the plethora of
information cum decision premises presented to him, and ramifications emerging from action upon them, overwhelm his capacity to process information.

We see that Simon, preoccupied as he is with the effects of human "irrationality" on organization performance (Simon, Chapter 2, passim), seems less trusting of people's ability to make rational choices than is Barnard. Simon sees people as limited by their ability to "perform," and to make "correct decisions"; by unconscious "skills, habits, and reflexes"; by their "values"; and "by the extent of his [or her] knowledge of things relevant to [the] job" (Simon, pp. 39-40). Hence, the organization must remove these "limits" if it expects its efficiency goals to be met.

Third, and finally, Simon draws upon Barnard's ideas on authority, although some distinctions could be drawn here as well. Recall Barnard's definition of authority (p. 163), which says that authority resides not in the position, but in the superior-subordinate relationship; and that authority means acceptance, not issuance, of a command. Simon defines authority as "the power to make decisions which guide the actions of another" (p. 125). The distinction between these two views may be illustrated by brief discussion of Barnard's "zone of indifference" and Simon's corollary "zone of acceptance."

Barnard's "zone of indifference" is characterized by the notion that an individual will accept any order falling within such "zone" without first examining the merits of the order (Barnard, pp. 168-169). Therefore, management should ensure that most orders fall within that zone (Barnard, p. 170). Simon's "zone of acceptance" (p. 134) is another matter. Simon sees acceptance of an order as a more active process than does Barnard: there is conscious action involved in the decision to accept the authoritative command. Thus, authority can be exerted only when "[the subordinate] holds in abeyance his own critical faculties" (Simon, p. 126).

Neither Barnard nor Simon treat organizational conflict. Since it would undermine Barnard's central premise (i.e., organizations are "cooperative systems") to do so, that is understandable. Simon leads us to believe that the "employment contract," together with the individual's decision to both join and produce in the organization (and thus subsume his or her own motives and goals to those of the organization), produces a Xanadu-like environment in which conflict is somehow resolved through conscious, if not legal, means.
One of Simon's enduring contributions to theory, of course, is his attention to individual decision-making; and his fundamental question concerns how organizations actually achieve goals when seen in light of organizational influences on decisions. For Simon, the heart of administrative praxis resides in the decision-making process. His unit of analysis is the decision premise, collapsed into two categories, "factual" and "value." Factual premises are statements about what can be observed, and thus known, in the world; and can be described as true or false. They are "true if the alternative selected leads to the predicted set of consequences. They are false if it does not" (Fry, p. 186).

As for value premises, notions of "right" and "wrong" should not inform rational decision-making, as Simon defines "rationality" (Simon, p. 223). Thus, value premises "may be good or bad, but they cannot be true or false" (Fry, p. 186). This so-called "fact-value dichotomy" appears to follow from Durkheim's ([1895] 1938, p. 89) positivism which holds that values have no place in decision making. Indeed, for Simon, those decisions grounded solely in factual premises provide "a better basis for a science of administration and a more appropriate standard for administrative conduct" (Fry, p. 186).

**Systems Theory**

Systems theory has many faces. Barnard may have been the first to identify the organization as a "system," which implies a dynamic rather than static condition such as the classicists seemed to propose. Selznick's institutional school and its specific preoccupation with the environment's impact on the organizational system appears to be an important antecedent to this school (see next section). It appears, however, that the school emerged largely from assumptions inherent in structural functionalism, together with the general systems theory of Ludwig Von Bertalanffy (1968) and his intellectual heirs, both European and American (Morgan, 1986, pp. 44-45; Harmon and Mayer, 1986, p. 158).

Systems theory roots itself in the biological sciences with its emphasis on "the idea of a supply of resources ('input'), a conversion process ('through-put') and production of an object or objects ('output')" (Silverman, p. 27). There is interdependence between system and environment (both external and internal to the organization), and the central focus of the school is thus to look at how each of those elements affect the process of, and are affected by, the whole system. Further, the role of technology is crucial to this perspective because
it "appears to be intimately related to organisational form and human behaviour" (Silverman, p. 100).

In systems theory, the distinction is made between "closed" and "open" systems. "Closed" systems theory "...depicts a self-contained entity in which the functioning of the component parts and their interrelationships are the primary objects of inquiry" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 162). Note that the environment external to the organization remains unexplored in this view. As a result, closed system theorists (e.g., many in both the classical and early human relations schools) believe that, first, organization structure or the psychological needs of participants determine behavior. Second, individual member needs, motives, or experiences warrant no attention. Neither do meanings such members might impute to situations (Silverman, pp. 32-35).

In contrast, "open" systems theory "introduces the environment into analysis in order to relate it to the problems of the system as a whole and the explanation of behaviour which it gives, in terms of the 'demands' of the environment...." (Silverman, p. 35). It is with Katz and Kahn (1966), who represent the functionalist camp in systems theory, that we find the most visible proponents of such a view.

Katz and Kahn's resonance with functionalism is clear. They say that "all social systems, including organizations, consist of the patterned activities of a number of individuals" (p. 17, emphasis supplied); and that such systems can be understood as "an energetic input-output system in which the energetic return from the output reactivates the system" (Katz and Kahn, p. 16). By introducing the importance of the environment in the life of organizations, they argue that an open systems approach "is an efficacious way of understanding the organization as a recurrent pattern of events, differentiated from, but dependent on, the larger stream of life in which it occurs and recurs" (p. 453). Thus, their open systems approach highlights the notion that

organizations are affected by what comes into them in the form of input, by what transpires inside the organization, and by the nature of the environmental acceptance of the organization and its output (Hall, 1972, p. 25).

Their typology of organizations (i.e., production or economic; maintenance; adaptive; and managerial or political) is merged with four differentiating characteristics they see as essential for organization functioning. These latter include 1) the nature of throughput; 2)
member orientations, defined in dichotomous "expressive-instrumental" terms; 3) organizational structure; and 4) how organizations use available resources). Taken together, this presumably offers a reliable description of how organizations, along "limitless dimensions," actually behave (Katz and Kahn, pp. 111-128, passim).

The second "face" in systems theory, the environmental, is found in James D. Thompson's (1967) landmark work, which may be described as the authoritative codification of structural functionalism of the time. At its root, Thompson's analysis "centers on the degree of 'fit' between the organisational requirements and environmental characteristics" (Silverman, p. 18). The environment is seen as a source of resources and problems for the organization, taken as a whole; and he believes that optimum efficiency and minimum uncertainty in the rational organization requires reduction or elimination of the variables impinging upon the organization's "technical core" (i.e., both technical and social structure of the organization) (Thompson, p. 12). This all helps explain Thompson's preoccupation with efficiency and, not incidentally,. with organization survival.

Thompson's series of 95 "propositions" presents a view of organizations he believes describes them along a number of dimensions. These include rationality; levels of responsibility; acquisition and preservation of power; kinds of technology used; organization structure and its relation to "internal differentiation" as well as the patterns of relationships that best protect the "technical core" from environmental influences; and kinds of interdependence (Thompson, pp. 9-12, 14-19, 23-24, 32-36, 51-55).

The fundamental logic in Thompson's exhaustive work is flawless: if organizations operate in an uncertain environment and the overarching goal of the organization is survival, it will do what it must to protect not only its limited resources, but its very existence. And if the organization is to survive, it must be sensitive to changes in, signals from, and the quality of its own contributions to, its environment.

The final "face" of systems theory is the socio-technical, as typified in the work of Burns and Stalker (1961). Theorists writing from this perspective (e.g., Woodward 1958, 1965; Blauner 1964; Emery and Trist, 1965; Miller and Rice, 1967) signal yet another shift away from the structural functionalists' preoccupation with functional structure, task, and task roles to "the ways in which behavior [can] be shaped by different organizational settings" (Silverman, p. 101). Note, however, the functionalist logic in such a focus. As with Thompson's logic, it is flawless: If behavior can be observed, studied and described, it can
be shaped. If it can be shaped, it can be controlled. If it can be controlled, finally, the potential for uncertainty arising from behavior is reduced.

Unlike most theorists preceding them, the socio-technicists, first, consider informal, formal and extra-organizational factors; second, they do not suggest that one organization form is superior to another in efficiency terms; and they have been successful at explaining intraorganizational differentiation (Silverman, p. 119).

Burns and Stalker focus on the rate of environmental change in the organization as brought about by fluctuations in environmental elements of import to the organization (e.g., technology or market demands) (Morgan, 1986, p. 50). They suggest that, contingent upon the stability (or instability) of the organization's total environment, such change can produce two ideal-typical forms. The mechanistic form is an analogue of the Weberian bureaucratic type, and is assumed to work best in stable environments within which a relatively unchanging technology is employed (Morgan, 1986, p. 50; Silverman, p. 115).

In contrast, the organic form is typified by a more flexible, informal structure with no institutionalized hierarchy; and the chief coordinating mechanism is lateral communication of a kind designed to advise rather than dictate. This, in turn, permits greater latitude for workers. Organic structures therefore work best in unstable, turbulent environments in which a rapid response-time is required (Silverman, p. 115; Morgan, 1986, p. 50).

Burns and Stalker, while still decidedly wed to functionalism, make an important point. They begin to see that the quintessential Weberian bureaucratic structure may not be universally applicable, and that structure is contingent upon myriad demands on the organization. They also suggest that there is no bureaucratic/nonbureaucratic dichotomy. Instead, what might be called "variations on a theme" may occur, and bureaucratization may emerge along a continuum. Just as important, new forms have the potential to emerge.

The Institutional School

At mid-century, we find the genesis of the institutional school in the person of Philip Selznick, who supplies yet another theoretical movement away from the mechanical views of organizations held by many who precede him. The functionalism he exhibits in his Leadership and Administration (1957), however, has more recently been supplanted by what he calls a "communitarian liberalism" in The Moral Commonwealth (1992, p. xi).
Powell and DiMaggio (1991) situate institutionalism in its early development[3] in the
political-economy works of Durkheim, Veblen and Commons, and in the functionalism of
Parsons and Selznick, who sought, they say, "to grasp the enduring interconnections
between the polity, the economy, and the society" (p. 2). In general terms, then, the
institutional school in this era sees the organization as
tangled in a web of relationships that prevent it from fulfilling its real goals,
and...how it deviates by examining this web. The institutional school is
preoccupied with values, and especially the way values are weakened or

Early institutionalism sees organizations as "embedded in local communities" (Powell
and DiMaggio, p. 13) which Powell and DiMaggio say calls for "interorganizational treaties"
or "co-optation" (Selznick, [1949] 1966). This is accomplished through face-to-face
interaction. Following from that, institutionalism analyzes group conflict from a decidedly
political perspective, suggesting that intraorganizational conflicts result from "political
tradeoffs and alliances" (Powell and DiMaggio, p. 12). Further, although institutionalism
rejects the idea that behavior in organizations is simply the aggregated deeds of individual
actors, it sees organizations as "'recalcitrant tools,'" often difficult to control (Powell and
DiMaggio, p. 14).

Among the operating principles of early institutionalism are first, that "rational actor"
models of organization are rejected; second, "institutionalization [is] a state-dependent
process that makes organizations less instrumentally rational by limiting the options they can
pursue"; third, it is preoccupied with the interdependence between organization and
environment; fourth, organizations' "formal accounts" of reality indicate a discontinuity with
other accounts, and institutionalism promises to "reveal" those accounts left unexamined in,
or at odds with, the formal version; and finally, culture is seen as having a central role in
creating and shaping organizational reality (Powell and DiMaggio, p. 12).

[3] For a good discussion of the distinctions between the "old" institutionalism
of Selzniick and neoinstitutionalism of, among others, Meyer and Rowan (1992),
Meyer and Scott (1992), see Powell and DiMaggio (1991, Chapter 1, passim). For an
example of neoinstitutionalism as regards public administration specifically, see
March and Olsen (1989).
Three elements strike me as essential to understanding the "old" Selznick. First, one of the injunctions of structural-functionalism is that organizations should be viewed holistically. Thus, the methodological hallmark of the institutional school is the conduct of case studies by way of achieving this end. The first significant study of this type comes to us from Selznick's *TVA and the Grass Roots* ([1949] 1966).

Second, as it is with much functionalist organization theory, the old institutionalism sees control as central to competent administration. Selznick bears this out in *Leadership in Administration* (1957). Here, and rather echoing Barnard, he pays no small attention to the role of the leader (specifically, the "institutional" leader). For Selznick, this individual is responsible for "promotion and protection of values" (Selznick, 1957, p. 28).

This second element, the role of the leader, figures prominently in Selznick's scheme. To be worthy of the title, the institutional leader must "infuse value" into the organization (Selznick, 1957, pp. 62-64). Selznick says that among the more important tasks of the leader are definition of both the institution's mission and role, and its "institutional embodiment of purpose." He also believes the most fundamental "problem" for the leader is to "choose key values and to create a social structure that embodies them" (Selznick, 1957, p. 60).

Alas, Selznick's talk of the "values of the external society" and the "strivings of internal groups" notwithstanding, his views in *Leadership in Administration* do not breach structural functionalism. That is, so long as Selznick's "institutional leader" is charged with defining mission, role and institutional purpose, with choosing "key values," and with creating "a social structure that embodies them," the values imposed and social structure created are those of the leader -- and no other. Thus, Selznick's concern rests less with infusion of values, and far more with control of values.

Finally, in *Leadership and Administration*, Selznick makes a distinction between "organization" and "institution"; and this distinction is a hallmark of the work. Selznick defines the organization as the crucible within which human action occurs. Organizations may be characterized as suggesting "a certain bareness, a lean, no-nonsense system....an expendable tool...engineered to do a job" (Selznick, 1957, p. 5, emphasis in original). Thus, organizations thus involve "little personal investment and can...be cast aside without regret" (Perrow, p. 167).

Institutions, in contrast, are "more nearly a natural product of social needs and pressures--a responsive, adaptive organism" (Selznick, 1957, p. 5). Thus, they "take on a
distinctive character; they become prized in and of themselves....People build their lives around them, identify with them, become dependent on them" (Perrow, p. 167).

Organizations become institutionalized via a process wherein the former "become infused with value as they come to symbolize the community's aspirations, its sense of identity" (Selznick, 1957, p. 19). Selznick says that "the organization derives added meaning from the psychological and social functions it performs. In doing so, it becomes valued for itself" (1957, p. 20). As it does, it "takes on... symbolic meaning," which means it can call upon the community to guarantee its survival (1957, p. 19). This call is therefore a legitimate one because "the organization adapts to the strivings of internal groups and the values of the external society" (Perrow, p. 167).

We see that Selznick's work at mid-century more than suggests a functionalist bent. In the 1992 The Moral Commonwealth, however, we find him in a much more subjectivist frame of mind. In keeping with a primary tenet of neoinstitutionalism (i.e., it looks at sector or society, while the "old" institutionalism confines inquiry to the organization), The Moral Commonwealth is broader in scope than is Leadership in Administration. Hence, in the former, discussion moves sequentially from the "moral person" to "the moral institution," and on up to the "moral commonwealth." Since this chapter is confined to organization theory, however, I limit the following brief discussion to his views on the "moral institution."

One of our first clues that Selznick has made a significant shift in his thinking is in the debt he acknowledges to the pragmatism of John Dewey (1992, p. xii). He acknowledges Mary Follett as well. In discussion of authority and bureaucracy, for example, he talks of the "morality of cooperation" as an alternative to the domination imposed by large organizations in the name of authority (1992, pp. 286-288). And, although Selznick rightly thinks a pragmatic approach to bureaucracy and authority has its difficulties, he also sees it as "full of promise" (1992, p. 288).

We find Selznick believing that the very ideal of community is at least "implicit" in both the institution-building process and, hence, in the openness of organizations (1992, pp. 236-237). He says that "[a] sense of institutional identity and an ideal of community are most likely to develop where values are more central than goals or at least are equally important, and where goals are multiplied in order to accommodate a broad range of interests" (1992, pp. 237-238).
We also find Selznick attending to consequences relative to organization action. In so doing, he seems to depart significantly from his earlier position, and takes something akin to John Dewey's view on the matter. In discussion of what constitutes an organization's moral "character," for example, he says that a "test of moral character is the ideal of integrity...." (1992, p. 322, emphasis in original), which has to do with "principles and...principled conduct" (p. 323). In an organization sense,

[a] political, administrative, or judicial decision is principled if it is guided by a coherent conception of institutional morality, that is, of appropriate ends and means. A principle is not an idée fixe; not an instrument of ideological thinking; not a prejudice; not a rule to be applied mechanically. It belongs to a larger whole, which includes textured meanings and concrete understandings as well as abstract ideas. Only if that whole is implicated can there be genuinely principled judgment. In this way the idea of integrity lends substance to the idea of principle (1992, p. 323).

In just these few examples, we see that, in The Moral Commonwealth, Selznick has come much closer to the subjectivism of Dewey, Follett, and the interpretivists. By using it to end the section on traditional organization theory, we can nicely segue into interpretive theories of organization.

Section Two: Interpretive Organization Theory

Introduction

Just as it is with interpretive social theory's challenge to a traditional world view, interpretive organization theory does much the same. Interpretive organization theory sees the organization, first, as a "cultural phenomenon rich in contextually based systems of meanings"; second, as having "organizational reality [that] is more often than not a mosaic comprising multiple realities" (Morgan, 1984, p. 314); and, finally, "as a realm of activity characterized by particular forms of myth making that express significant networks of rules or models of action and give form to contextually based systems of meaning" (Morgan, 1984, pp. 313-314).

Following from that, interpretive theory is concerned to understand "how a particular social reality is constructed and maintained" in organizations (Gioia and Pitre, p. 589, emphasis supplied); and thus concerns itself with

[the study and imputation of meaning, motive, intention, emotion, and feeling, as these mental and interactive states are experienced and organized...]

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by interacting individuals....The streams of situations which persons construct, give meaning to, and inhabit...(Denzin, 1983, p. 129).

So, when interpretivism asks the basic ontological question, "what do we mean when we say organizations 'exist?'" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 287) they take what Harmon and Mayer call a nominalist view on the matter, and reject the idea that organizations are objective, concrete, machine-like structures (p. 287). Rather, the social world is "a product of human consciousness [and]...the institutions and roles that constitute social reality are nothing more than labels or names" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 287).

Following from those fundamental beliefs, the perspective suggests that organizations are cultures engaged in a continuous process of transformation, as accomplished through the actions of organization members. In short, theories of organization from an interpretive perspective emphasize that the social world is no more than the subjective construction of individual human beings who, through the development and use of common language and the interactions of everyday life, may create and sustain a social world of intersubjectively shared meaning. The social world is thus of an essentially intangible nature and is in a continuous process of reaffirmation or change (Burrell and Morgan, p. 260).

Perhaps interpretivism's most fundamental contribution to organization theory is that it urges a reassessment of organizations, what they "are," our views of how they operate, and our lives within them. For them, our organizational world is not so easily described as the functionalists might suggest, and thus advance the idea that if the study of organizations is to have any relevance at all, it must attend to meaning and its function in organizational life (e.g., Astley and Van de Ven, 1983). As Gareth Morgan says,

an appreciation of the shared meanings that permit organized activity [must] emerge and assume coherence as an ongoing social form. For unless meanings are in some sense shared, there can be no alignment and coordination of action. The management of organized activity from an interpretive perspective thus depends on the successful management of meaning... (1984, p. 315).

We see from this brief introduction that interpretive organization theory signals a significant departure from functionalist organization theory, and it challenges each of two primary assumptions held by functionalism: 1) that organization efficiency is the imperative
for action; and 2) both organizations and their members are functional elements that can be studied, described, shaped and controlled.

As for specific contributors to interpretive organization theory, the work of four writers supply grist for the discussion: Gareth Morgan's (1980, 1986) use of metaphors in organizational analysis; Karl Weick's (1979) enactment-selection-retention model; and Orion White and Cynthia McSwain (1983; also McSwain and White, 1993), and their "transformational" theory of organizations.

Following a brief survey of those writers, I outline Mary Follett's principles of organization and management. In so doing, I make explicit her agreement with the aforementioned writers.

**Gareth Morgan: The Metaphor View**

Gareth Morgan presents what may be called the "organization as metaphor" view. "Metaphors" in this case are defined as "a way of thinking and a way of seeing that pervade how we understand our world generally" (1986, p. 12, emphases in original). For Morgan, then, specific metaphors attendant to any given "school" of organization theory derive from writing and research of social scientists who "view the world metaphorically, through the language and concepts which filter and structure their perceptions of their subject of study and through the specific metaphors..." (1980, p. 611).

In both "Paradigms, Metaphors, and Puzzle Solving in Organization Theory" (1980) and *Images of Organization* (1986), he argues that no one concept, theory, body of thought, or metaphor can serve to fully describe organizations. In *Images*, he thus renders a history of organization theory, and groups the various "schools" of thought into eight metaphorical categories. Since the history of organization theory presented earlier in this chapter covers many of these "schools" -- and, however implicitly, their metaphors -- I will simply give only a brief accounting of Morgan's (1986) classification scheme. First, the organization as "machine" view, which has long undergirded our conceptualization of bureaucratic organization, is well-illustrated by the work of Frederick Taylor, Henri Fayol and Max Weber (pp. 19-38).

Second, the organization as "organism" camp sees organizations as living systems, which exist "in a wider environment on which they depend for the satisfaction of various needs" (1986, p. 39), and includes Mayo, Roethlisberger and Dickson; "neo-human
relationists" Maslow, McGregor and Herzberg; the "open systems" perspectives of Katz and Kahn and James D. Thompson; the "contingency theory" of Burns and Stalker and Lawrence and Lorsch; and the "population ecology" views of Hannan and Freeman (1986, pp. 39-76).

Third, the organization as "brains" perspective is based on the principle of self-organizing and emphasizes information processing, learning and intelligence. It includes the decision-making models of Herbert Simon and James March; and what Morgan calls the "cybernetics" of Donald Schon, Irving Janis ("groupthink"), and William Ouchi ("Theory Z") (1986, pp. 77-110).


Organizations as "political systems" is the fifth metaphor, which operates with concepts of power, authority, and conflict. Here, Morgan includes Max Weber, Robert Dahl, Charles Perrow, and Jeffrey Pfeffer (1986, pp. 141-198).

Sixth, organizations as "psychic prisons" refers to the idea that, while organizations may be "socially constructed realities," and are sustained by those who construct them, "people can actually become imprisoned or confined by the images, ideas, thoughts, and actions to which [conscious and unconscious] processes give rise" (1986, p. 199). Morgan again includes Irving Janis here, together with Melanie Klein, Wilfred Bion, and Karl Jung (1986, pp. 199-232).

Seventh, the organizations as "flux and transformation" metaphor is based on David Bohm's theory of the universe as flowing and unbroken wholeness. It addresses the idea that "each moment of existence has similarities with, yet differs from, its predecessors, creating the appearance of continuity in the midst of change" (1986, p. 234). Included, among others, are Karl Marx and his ideas on the dialectical method of "management of contradictions," and Illya Prigogine's "dissipative structures" (1986, pp. 233-272).

Finally, organizations as "instruments of domination" are characterized by the "pursuit of goals of the few through the work and labor of the many" (1986, p. 275). Here, Morgan cites Robert Michels and his "iron law of oligarchy," Kenneth Benson's Marxist analysis of organizations, and Andrew Friedman's ideas on the ideological, political and economic domination of organization members (1986, pp. 273-320).
Morgan's "metaphors" view indeed argues convincingly that no one theory, or perspective, can articulate all there is to say about organizations. He shows us that one person's "brain" is another's "psychic prison."

Karl Weick: Natural Selection

Weick's The Social Psychology of Organizing (1979) makes a singular contribution. He takes a natural selection view of organization and organizing, but for Weick the process of organization rather than its visible manifestation is of import. Indeed, he sees organizations as "the inventions of people superimposed on flows of experience" (pp. 11-12); and organizing, a sense-making journey rather than a process in which goals achievement is paramount (p. 3).

Weick identifies four phases of organizing: ecological changes, says Weick, "provide the enactable environment, the raw materials for sensemaking" (1979, p. 130, emphasis in original). In this, Weick articulates what might be called the "squeaky wheel" principle. He believes that people do not notice when events or systems in their operating environment work well. When such events or systems come to be seen as somehow different, discontinuous, or otherwise failing work as they have in the past, the opportunity for change is presented. This opportunity, if seized, causes people to notice the change. "It is only the occasion of change," says Weick, "when attention becomes active" (p. 130). Enter enactment, the second phase.

Enactment ("saying"), which Weick says "is to organizing as variation is to natural selection" (1979, p. 130), refers to the idea that, once certain nonroutine or extraordinary episodes or problems occur in the environment, they are acted upon in one of two ways. Participants either "bracket" (i.e., "isolate those changes for closer attention"), or act so as to produce "an ecological change, which change then constrains what he [or she] does next, which in turn produces further ecological change..." (1979, p. 130).

Individuals then focus attention on, or select ("see") the episode, begin to classify and interpret their actions, and seek to answer the question, "What's going on here?" In short, they engage in a process whereby they interpret, or make sense of, that which has been enacted. Thus enters his "recipe for sense-making," "How can I know what I think until I see what I say?" (1979, p. 133). Note that this sense-making is retrospective (thought follows action), a notion that signals an important departure from mainstream theory. In the manner
of Schutz, Weick says people can only make sense of experience, and their "[guiding] motives," after they have had the opportunity to step back from the experience and evaluate it (1979, pp. 194-201).

Weick uses the idea of mental "cause maps" to illustrate the selection phase. These maps contain interconnected variables [which are] being built up out of past experience. When these maps, which have proven sensible on previous occasions, are superimposed on current puzzling displays, they may provide a reasonable interpretation of what has occurred or they may confuse things even more (1979, p. 131).

More specifically, this phase of the process places "interpretations on what we have directed our attention to, reduces the equivocality of enactments and thus enables us to construct a context within which we may act sensibly...." (Harmon and Mayer, p. 354).

Finally, the retention phase allows the individual to remember these interpretations. This is important because "the only way the sense-making recipe works is if you can remember the things you've said so that they're available for reflection" (Weick, 1979, p. 207).

The successful completion of this phase is contingent upon use of both enacted environments and cause maps. Weick sees the processes bound up in enacted environments and cause maps as the "products of successful sense-making [i.e., what is retained]" (1979, p. 131). Specifically, enacted environments "emphasize that meaningful environments are outputs of organizing, not inputs to it"; while cause maps allow participants to "interpret what goes on in a situation and they allow that person to express [him or] herself in that same situation and be understood by others" (Weick, p. 132, emphasis in original).

The crucial element for Weick, and one that sets him apart, is that the "organizing" about which he speaks is a circular process, one in which action informs thought and thought informs action. Clearly, Weick's formulation is a large step beyond nearly all that came before him in organization theory. As Harmon and Mayer rightly note, however, Weick's concern rests with the "how" of organizing, and the "why" is left unexamined. That is, he does not explore why people would want to organize in the first place (1979, p. 358). Questions attendant to why organizing processes might occur are addressed in Orion White
and Cynthia McSwain's "transformational" theory of organizations, the topic of the next section.

Orion White and Cynthia McSwain

White and McSwain (1983) and McSwain and White (1993) take as their problem organization development and change and, in the bargain, confront "some of the most significant value questions in public administration" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 359). Their approach is to "base organization studies in a humanist commitment" (White and McSwain, 1983, p. 304). In so doing, they call on the analytical psychology of Carl Jung and the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz, among others (White and McSwain, 1983, p. 292). Here, we see a kind of meshing of both interpretivism and radical humanism (e.g., Burrell and Morgan, 1979), which may be said to constitute the "leap" beyond interpretive theory to which I refer earlier.

As it is with Weick, White and McSwain attend to the process element of organization and organizing, and we find them distressed with the stranglehold of functionalist orthodoxy in social and organization theory (McSwain and White, pp. 82, 84). They thus direct attention to the importance of the unconscious in social interaction and in organizational life.

Following from Jung, McSwain and White take the ontological stance that "the human condition is governed preeminently by the unconscious" (McSwain and White, p. 83). Jung believes the unconscious, seen as operating on multiple levels simultaneously, is "the very source of meaning and hence rationality in an individual's life" (McSwain and White, p. 84).

Jung further sees the unconscious as "both structured and dynamic." "Structure" in this case refers to the idea that the unconscious is organized around archetypes, "permanent forms" (McSwain and White, p. 84) that "acquire content in the course of an individual's life as personal experience is taken up in these forms" (Morgan, 1986, pp. 223-224). Thus, archetypes are "structures of thought and experience, perhaps embodied in the structure of the psyche or inherited experience, which lead us to mold our understanding of our world in a patterned way" (Morgan, 1986, p. 224). The patterned character of archetypes follows from Jung's belief that they are both "timeless and universal," are found inevitably throughout human history, and that they "shape the way we 'meet ourselves' in encountering the external world...." He thus uses the notion of archetypes to illustrate not only our connection to the lived experience of both ourselves and others, but to show that they serve as "links
between conscious and unconscious aspects of the psyche" in the present (Morgan, 1986, p. 224).

As for the dynamism of the unconscious, Jung believes the unconscious operates rather at cross-purposes, between internal and external reality. This, in turn, creates tension. As a result, he believes that "unresolved tensions in ourselves [are] projected onto other people and external situations, and that to understand our external reality we must first understand what he called 'the other within'" (Morgan, 1986, p. 224).

Following from that, McSwain and White say that so long as the unconscious has the ability to facilitate such resolution, and as long as "groups and individuals are living in ways that allow such expression, mediated energy from the unconscious enters conscious life and enhances it" (1993, p. 84). So then, dynamism refers to the idea that the unconscious "seeks to create channels for expressions of the resolution of alienation in conscious life" (McSwain and White, p. 84).

As for application of transformational analysis in organization studies, McSwain and White note that [even with organization theorists' rather insistent emphasis on the need to face change, prepare organizations for it, and manage organizations such that they can cope with it, the conceptual frames such theorists offer for dealing with an anticipated world of flux have not kept pace with the actual unfolding of the future (p. 82).

White and McSwain identify four levels of "organizational reality." The first, "structural," is seen as the "least real" of the four, since it is far-removed from individual experience, whether past, present or future, and that a high degree of "abstractness and anonymity" therefore attends it (White and McSwain, pp. 293-294).

The second, "social relations," is the "focal point of action in organizational life," and refers to the world of lived experience of interacting individuals. In this process, the opportunity for individuals to "negotiate and renegotiate with others" is presented (White and McSwain, p. 294). The third level is the "nomological," which deals with the various realms or types of "individual consciousness." These, in turn, "reflect preferences or styles

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4 For a good discussion of Jung's analytical psychology, see Orion White (1973).
of coping with the outside world"; and are seen as mechanisms "through which individuals experience and construe reality in different ways" (White and McSwain, p. 294).

Finally, the "human encounter" level deals expressly with the unconscious, and "involves a dialogue with the deepest levels of the human psyche" (White and McSwain, p. 294):

[This process is activated by energy from the depths of the psyche, flowing through the medium of symbols into the conscious ego and the external world. This unconscious energy exerts a major impact on thought and action in the world, whether...directly recognized or not (p. 294).

"The project of human life," say White and McSwain, "is seen as the development of an appropriate relationship to the unconscious such that unconscious energy is transformed or made available to consciousness" (p. 295). Once an "appropriate relationship" is established, a kind of individual "maturation" ensues. This is a state of being characterized by the ability of the individual to summon the unconscious in service of individual control and "autonomous action" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 361). Enter transformation. This occurs as energy moves from the unconscious side of the person over to the conscious side. This energy is channeled from the unconscious by symbols through their evocative power....Since the process of transformation is dynamic, such that the person and the unconscious are constantly in a state of evolution, analogues [i.e., physical or operational representations of the psychic realm] can be [used] for evoking or blocking energy, or for drawing it off too rapidly in an eruption (White and McSwain, pp. 295-296).

White and McSwain see this concept of transformation as conjuring a "picture of social process that is centered in the individual, where the flow of energy from its source in the unconscious, through consciousness, into social relations and activity, is the central focus" (1983, p. 296; also McSwain and White, p. 85). This has important implications for theory and practice, most notably that "meaningful experience involves the discovery of capacities and potentials in self and situations that have previously remained hidden" (White and McSwain, p. 296).

Discovery of these hidden capacities and potentials is accomplished through language, seen as "[mediating] social interaction [and enabling] us to understand what we have been doing (retrospection) and to visualize what we might do in the future" (Harmon
and Mayer, p. 366, emphasis in original). This leads to the transformational view of "problems," an idea already briefly addressed in Chapter Two.

"Problems" in the traditional rational-instrumental view are "defined as the inability to achieve a prespecified end or goal" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 367). In contrast, White and McSwain define a "problem" -- indeed, the problem -- as one involving "stopped processes" (White, 1977, p. 14, emphasis in original). Linking this idea to action, they say that

...the process model...emphasizes that correct action...is achieved through establishing a *correct dialogue* about the situation within which or toward which the action is to take place. [Thus] the only 'rational' way to act is in direct response to the situation in which one finds oneself. This maximizes the information and other resources that can be brought to bear on it. Dialogue is the vehicle that carries these resources into action. Dialogue in turn is achieved through an emphasis on attaining a proper relationship between or among the parties to the dialogue. If the relationship is correct, the dialogue will be correct, and the correct line of action will emerge and be enacted (White and McSwain, pp. 89-90, emphasis in original).

White and McSwain's transformational view rejects instrumental-rational models of organization which holds to a "competition" principle. It argues instead for cooperation as both theoretical and organizational imperative. To the extent that they see "the human situation as one that entails mutual personal development as its core and source of meaning," their perspective indeed "provides a way of theoretically understanding, justifying, and managing organizations around [that imperative]" (McSwain and White, p. 94).

This is a propitious ending to discussion of an interpretivist view of organizations, for it allows us to segue nicely into Follett's views on management and organization.

Mary Parker Follett

As it is with interpretive social theory discussed in Chapter Two, Follett demonstrates great agreement with many interpretive theories of organization. As Harmon and Mayer (p. 345) remind us, Follett's management philosophy has its roots in her theory of politics, advanced in *The New State*, and developed several years later in *Creative Experience* (1924).

In general terms, Follett's views accord well with those of Weick and White and McSwain. There is agreement, first, in Follett's unwavering commitment to social process as the mechanism for fruitful social action. Indeed, Harmon and Mayer echo McSwain and
White (p. 90) by noting that Follett "is perhaps the first 'process' theorist of stature in American management thought" (p. 343).

Secondly, and in keeping with the tenets of pragmatism, Follett's arguments are framed in everyday, practical terms. In this, she is also in agreement with Weick and White and McSwain, all of whom believe that "something is true to the extent that it is interesting" (White and McSwain, p. 298, emphasis in original). Theory, therefore, can only be "interesting" if it has some meaning for us in the everyday of organizational life.

Follett operates from seven principles, each of which appears in one guise or another across all her works. Three of them are what I have termed "overarching principles," and these will be addressed in turn below.

Her first overarching principle is that "the individual is a social being who finds both identity and sense of fulfillment in a group experience" (Fry, p. 101). For Follett, expressive action, both individual and collective, can only ensue from social group processes -- in this case, the social group process in an organization context. Although this principle applies to groups rather than to individuals, it is consistent with views of both Weick and White and McSwain.

Second, and as regards organizational conflict, Follett holds that social conflict is inevitable and should be used creatively to produce an interpenetration of ideas and integrative solutions (Follett, [1918] 1965; Follett, 1924; Follett, [1926] 1992; Follett, in Fox and Urwick, 1973, chapter 1, passim; Fox, 1968, p. 528). Indeed, as Follett scholar Elliot Fox observes and reminds, "...we need not be afraid of difference, but rather should welcome it as the opportunity for new social creation [and that] the healthy resolution of conflict is part of the natural process of human intercourse" (1968, p. 528).

Karl Weick, in keeping with his "natural selection" view, sees conflict as largely adaptive, but we see shades of Follett in his formulation:

the presence of conflict does not necessarily indicate that a group is dissolving; it merely signifies that the group retains heterogeneous responses and preferences, all of which may be adaptive under some circumstances. But more importantly, if the conflict appears to be destroying the group, then conflict must be resolved so as to preserve rather than destroy the polarities exhibited in the conflict. A solution that permits alternate expressions of polarized responses would be more adaptive than one that produces compromise responses (1979, p. 220).
McSwain and White, however, seem closer to Follett's view on conflict than Weick. They draw on their experience as organization development consultants, and argue that "projection as an unconscious developmental process is a part of the daily life of every organization" (1993, p. 93). They compare projection and organization development to illustrate that conflict has developmental properties. In so doing, their resonance with Mary Follett becomes evident:

it is not an exaggeration to say that the technology of the field of organization development is at bottom a set of techniques for managing the resolution of individual and group projections, thereby releasing the energy that is bound up by them. Indeed, such a comparison reveals the fundamental transformational assertion that the development of an organization is coterminous with the development of the people who constitute it (1993, p. 93).

Follett's third principle follows from the second, and the idea of "integration" found in The New State becomes "co-ordination" in her lectures to business people (Fox and Urwick, p. xxiii). Unsurprisingly, "integration" is the second of her three overarching management principles, and for her it is a "universal goal" (Fox and Urwick, p. xxv).

In management terms, integration or coordination refers to the idea that, just as there can be no such thing as a stable society, since "the universal fact of change" is always at work, "[i]ntegrations are never permanent [and] as situations evolve new differences arise and come into conflict" (Fox and Urwick, p. xxv). As a result, integration (and the processes which produce it) becomes important to bring about those changes which can ameliorate or resolve the conflict:

Each solution contains the seeds of new differences, but these differences also contain the seeds of new solutions. What they need is freedom to grow within a milieu of intelligent and sympathetic cultivation. To provide this milieu is the function of leadership....(Fox and Urwick, p. xxv).

Follett sees one of the great management "problems" as learning "...how to maintain vigor and creativeness in the thinking of everybody, not merely of chosen spirits" (1924, p. 211). This brings us to the fourth principle, which is well-known and should not require

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5 This refers to "psychological projection," shorthand for "the perception of another person in terms of a negative or positive category that defines the other's identity for us and in turn, structures the manner in which we respond to the person" (McSwain and White, p. 92).
elaboration: the "giving of orders" which should attend to "power with" rather than "power over" (Follett, in Fox and Urwick, pp. 21-41).

Following from that, Follett's fifth principle argues for a movement toward participative management directed at improved productivity and constructive change. At the same time, and also unsurprisingly, she sees the central role of the organization leader as promoting "the harmonious integration of individual development within a democratic conception of social progress" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 341). Certainly, this could be seen as dovetailing well with White and McSwain in particular.

Her ideas on "integration" cum "co-ordination" are also prominent here. Arguing that "each situation should generate its own control" (Follett, 1937, p. 161), she posits her "four fundamental principles of organization:" "1. Coordination as the reciprocal relating of all the factors in a situation; 2. Coordination by direct contact of the responsible people concerned; 3. Coordination in the early stages;" and 4. Coordination as a continuing process" (1937, p. 161)

Sixth, Follett believes that the "law of the situation" should guide action and decision-making (Follett, in Fox and Urwick, pp. 29-35). For Follett, authority does not reside in one's position. Rather, it resides in the acknowledgement that each situation is a "developing" one, and that therefore "both superiors and subordinates 'take their orders' from the situation" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 343; also Follett, in Fox and Urwick, p. 65). Neither, therefore, is authority static. It is part of the process that is a constantly emerging dynamic which changes as each new interaction ensues, and as each person's distinctive contribution(s) to the process is brought to the fore (Follett, in Fox and Urwick, pp. 60, 65).

It is clear that Follett's ideas on "integration" drive much of her work, and nowhere is this more manifest than in her notion of "circular response." This is her third overarching management principle, which she calls the "universal fact" (Fox and Urwick, p. xxiii). In Creative Experience, just as in The New State, Follett uses the metaphor of a tennis game to explain circular response. This, Fox (1968) nicely sums up:

One player serves the ball and the other returns it, but the nature of the return is determined by the other player but also, in part, by the nature of the original serve. As the volley proceeds, each motion of the ball reflects the composite history of all the preceding motions. So it is with any other human interaction (p. 523).

The importance of circular response is similar to that of "integration:"
The nature of human interaction is such that healthy solutions to its conflicts are possible. The healthy solution is called an 'integration....' [and] in her advice to managers and administrators she often talked about coordination or cooperation, but which she meant the principle of integration as it applies to the problems of managing people in an organization (Fox, 1968, p. 524).

Conclusion

This chapter has compared traditional or functionalist views of organizations with the interpretivist. In the former, we see that the "machine" metaphor dominates; while in the latter, the "culture," "natural selection," and "transformation" metaphors hold sway. We find Mary Follett in sharp disagreement with most functionalist views (save the latter-day Philip Selznick); but in fine agreement with Karl Weick and Orion White and Cynthia McSwain in every substantive sense.

If we consider that most interpretivist organization theory is very new (fewer than twenty years old), it is not surprising that I would say, as I do in the first chapter, that our views of organizations mirror those we have long held about society generally. Such is the case with our views about nonprofit organizations, the topic of the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE
THEORIES OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: A SELECTIVE SURVEY

Introduction

This chapter, in five sections, reviews the literature on nonprofit organizations. My intent is to give the reader a sense of some major ideas that have emerged about these organizations since significant writing on them began to appear in the late 1970's.¹ I should note that although the present work attends only to those nonprofits that provide health and human services, most literature on nonprofit organizations does not distinguish among or between the various sub-categories of them (e.g., arts, human services, professional associations, labor unions, etc.). This review perforce reflects that.

Section One offers a brief accounting of the rise of scholarly attention to nonprofits. Section Two addresses economic/market theories. Section Three focuses on "policy" theories. Section Four looks at organization/institutional theories. In that fourth section, I eschew discussion of the plethora of "how-to" literature on functional management as it is outside the scope of this work. Section Five discusses political and democratic theories.

Before launching into the literature, some clarification of terms is in order. The literature on the nonprofit "sector" as a whole variously describes it and the organizations nestling therein with seven terms, often used interchangeably: independent, voluntary, philanthropic, charitable, third, private nonprofit, nonprofit. The profusion of terms notwithstanding, none provides an adequate "catch-all" description.² Conversely, each may be seen as descriptive in some sense of some organizations in the sector. Each also attempts, in a single reductionist expression, to identify those characteristics that distinguish nonprofits from their business or government counterparts.

If the term "independent" implies autonomy, "independent" they are not. Government

¹ For a good brief survey of theories of nonprofits, see Van Til (1988, Chapter 4).

² Apart from those terms, and apparently following from California Nonprofit Corporation Law, Salamon (1992) makes a useful distinction between "public benefit" and "mutual benefit" organizations. The former are said to serve some larger societal function, while the latter largely serve the interests of their memberships.
determines which organizations merit nonprofit status. Nonprofit organizations are formally incorporated and regulated at the State level through State Attorneys General offices; and the federal government regulates their activities as well, most directly through IRS codes; and indirectly, through what it will or will not fund (see e.g., Wolch, 1990, pp. 215-217).

Government at all levels is responsible for a third of the revenues accruing to nonprofit "public benefit" organizations (Salamon, 1992, p. 26). These government revenues, in the form of grants, contracts and various reimbursement schemes, carry with them myriad, often complex and conflicting, compliance provisions (see, e.g., Bernstein, 1991), all of which may call into question the presumed independence of nonprofits.

Further, some nonprofit organizations are created by legislative fiat. Such was the case, for example, with a number of Great Society programs of the 1960's. This practice carried over into the 1970's. An illustration is creation of "independent living centers" for physically and developmentally and, later, mentally disabled Californians. These organizations, which served as national model-incubators, were (and are) funded in large part by the California Department of Rehabilitation as provided for in the legislative action that animated them.

Service-providing nonprofits are not independent of other nonprofit organizations. Many philanthropic foundations, particularly large traditional ones, have strict and sophisticated criteria for grant applications, use of funds and performance.

Neither is the sector as a whole best-described as "voluntary." Voluntarism or volunteerism are not the exclusive purview of nonprofit sector organizations; for government, too, uses volunteers, although not nearly so extensively as do nonprofits. The Peace Corps and VISTA are good examples. As for nonprofits, many use no volunteers in service provision, although most have voluntary boards of directors which theoretically serve, among other things, as a link between organization and community.

The idea that organizations in the sector as a whole may be described as "philanthropic" or "charitable" is also misleading. The Internal Revenue Service awards nonprofit status to at least 25 categories of organizations, among them employee-funded pension trusts, farmers cooperatives and credit unions (Salamon, 1992, p. 4), none of which could be described as "philanthropic" or "charitable" or as necessarily offering some "public benefit." At the same time, philanthropic foundations (e.g., Ford, Rockefeller, Getty) and federated funders (e.g., United Way), which Salamon has called "funding intermediaries,"
generally offer no concrete social services (1992, pp. 13, 16-21). They do, however, perform a critical public benefit function by soliciting funds on behalf of, and/or awarding grants to, other nonprofits which in turn provide services.

"Third sector" is a widely used term. It suggests that there is some substantive distinction(s) between the first (government) and second (business) sectors. These distinctions, however, may be more a matter of degree than kind, as the brief discussion of government regulation of nonprofit status, above, may indicate. The term "private nonprofit" is troublesome for much the same reason. "Private nonprofit" organizations are "private" to the extent that they are not legal government entities. Such is the case, however, with business firms. Further, the blurring of lines between government and nonprofits in particular -- and in some cases between nonprofit and business -- makes this term suspect as well (see, e.g., Smith and Lipsky, 1993, pp. 3-19, passim; Salamon, 1987a, 1987b). As with the terms "independent," and "third," then, "private" should be seen as a relative one.

The term "nonprofit" is perhaps most descriptive, but it too is misleading. "Nonprofit" implies that an organization may not, under IRS codes, distribute profits or residual income to directors, officers or others in that organization's sphere. Again, however, that restriction does not apply exclusively to nonprofits. It applies as well to government organizations. Neither is tax exemption peculiar to nonprofit organizations, for government endeavor is also tax exempt.

Even the term "sector" is misleading. The "cross-pollination" or blurring of the lines between and among the three sectors, noted earlier, has been the topic of no small attention for some time, particularly in literature dealing with the explosion of government privatization and contracting of social services in the last fifteen years (see, e.g., Smith and Lipsky, 1993; Demone and Gibelman, 1989; Bernstein, 1991; Salamon, 1981, 1987a, 1987b).

As we see, no term which references those organizations addressed in this work is precisely descriptive. At the same time, I use the term "nonprofit" not because it is necessarily more precise than any of the others, but because of all terms currently in use, it seems most descriptive.

The focus of this work is on those domestic organizations having 501(c)3 status with the Internal Revenue Service. More specifically, and as noted in Chapter One, it addresses those community-based organizations which have as their primary function provision of human services. For the sake of clarity, 501(c)3 organizations as the IRS code defines them
must have some public benefit purpose. The IRS takes this idea, and collapses 501(c)3 organizations into the breathtaking categories of

[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or education purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition....and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.

Section One: The Rise of Scholarly Attention to Nonprofits

The history of the rise and development of nonprofit organizations in the United States is well-documented elsewhere and so does not need exhaustive exposition here (see, e.g., Chambers, 1985; Block, 1987, 1990; O'Neill, 1989; Van Til, 1988; Ellis and Noyes, 1990; Hall, 1992). Development of scholarly writing/research about, and practice in, nonprofit organizations generally is another matter altogether, and so requires brief summary.

As several writers note (e.g., Hall, 1987a, 1987b; Langton, 1987; Hodgkinson, 1988; Rubin, Adamski and Block, 1989), academia did not "discover" the nonprofit sector until the 1970's. Indeed, so pathetically scanty was our knowledge about the sector in 1977 that John Simon, founding director of the Yale Program on Nonprofit Organizations (the first university-based research center on nonprofit organizations in the country), likened it to our understanding of "the dark side of the moon" (quoted in Hodgkinson, 1988, p. 1).

No specific academic discipline has claimed the nonprofit sector as its own. Rather, academic work on the sector is decidedly multi-disciplinary and has drawn attention of scholars from such diverse disciplines as organization studies, economics, political science, sociology, psychology and anthropology. This is important, for it helps explain the rather uneven development of nonprofit literature (see, e.g., Block, 1990, p. 46; Van Til, 1987, p. 50; Lohmann, 1992, p. 7).

This is not to suggest, of course, that multi-disciplinary approaches to either social science generally or to nonprofit organizations specifically are not useful. Indeed, such approaches offer a textural richness that may be lacking in a unidisciplinary approach.

3 A particularly insightful recounting of the development of the nonprofit sector in the United States, and the historic complexity of its relationship to both business and government, can be found in Hall (1992, Chapter 1).
Further, to the extent that a multidisciplinary approach allows for rapid development of a broad range of perspectives that can foster continuing dialogue, it may be seen as a strength. It is also a weakness, however, in that it may not allow for common understandings about the nature of the object of inquiry, and thus may dilute, or preclude development of, a unified body of thought so important for maturation of a discipline (Van Til, 1988, p. 38).

There is little evidence of substantive writing on nonprofits prior to the 1960's. However, the philosophical impetus and financial support of the New Frontier and Great Society programs of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, together with the corresponding growth in absolute numbers of nonprofit human service organizations in the period, set the stage for what can only be termed an "explosion" of writing and research in the 1970's.4

The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs (The Filer Commission) provided nonprofits their "scholarly kickstart." The Commission was convened in the early 1970's by John D. Rockefeller III in response to congressional debates about the proposed Tax Reform Act of 1969. During those debates, Rockefeller noted that "public opinion respecting nonprofit institutions and their donors was not, in tax terms at least, universally benign" (Commission, 1977, p. v).

The Commission, chaired by John Filer, Chairman of Aetna Life and Casualty, and charged with "[focusing] public attention on the significance and importance of the voluntary sector" (Commission, p. v), proceeded to detail the history, development and character of the sector, and published its exhaustive research reports in 1977. Nonprofit scholarship was off and running.

Apart from general exploratory work spawned by the Filer Commission, scholarly attention to nonprofits in the 1970's centered around two fundamental issues. First, the regulatory mandates of the 1969 Tax Reform Act, while directed at philanthropic foundations specifically (O'Neill, 1989, pp. 144-146,) affected the whole of the nonprofit sector. That, together with increasing public criticism with what Peter Dobkin Hall (1987a, p. 24n) has called the "methodless enthusiasm" of nonprofit organization management, spurred nonprofit

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4 It is worth noting that the growth of nonprofit sector organizations at mid-century is, by any measure, staggering. Over 60 percent of the nearly 1.5 million nonprofit organizations in existence in 1984 were founded after 1960 (Salamon, 1984, p. 264).
organization-specific professionalization efforts (Hall, 1987a, p. 13). The period thus gave rise to dozens of professional "management development" programs of various stripes, targeted specifically at the nonprofit manager (e.g., Gorman, 1988; O'Neill, 1989, pp. 170-171). Most were not yet campus-based, however. Rather, a cottage industry in training and education of nonprofit managers by non-university organizations and individuals emerged (e.g., the Grantsmanship Center; Support Centers of America; United Way; The Fund Raising School; and all manner of consultants).

The period also saw formation of The Association of Voluntary Action Scholars (now Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action), which published the first academic journal attending to nonprofit studies, the Journal of Voluntary Action Research (now Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly) in 1972. Interestingly, for all the attention showered upon sector professionalization from the late 1970's and throughout the 1980's, it took another 20 years for a nonprofit-specific management journal to come upon the horizon. This gap was filled, in 1990 by Nonprofit Management and Leadership, published out of the Mandel Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Case Western Reserve University, in cooperation with the Centre for Voluntary Organisation of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

The second issue for 1970's writers concerned what Langton, 1987, p. 135) has been called "intersector consciousness." Basic questions were posed, many still debated: What characteristics distinguish the sector from business and government? What is its role in a democracy? In policy? In the economy? Are nonprofit and public organizations "fundamentally alike in all unimportant respects" (Allison, 1992, p. 457)?

In this period, "conventional" theories of nonprofits emerged (Ostrander, 1987), many centered on the independence of the sector (e.g., Levitt, 1973), on their roles in society (most notably, Berger and Neuhaus, 1977), and on "defining characteristics" of organizations in the sector (e.g., Etzioni, 1973; McGill and Wooton, 1975; see also Langton, 1987, p. 135). Greatly enhancing these efforts were the founding of the Yale Program on Nonprofit Organizations in 1977. Of note as well is the founding of Independent Sector, a coalition of some 650 nonprofit service organizations, corporations and foundations, in 1980 -- itself the result of the merger of two nonprofit organizations (Mooney, 1980, p. 19).

During the 1980's, 25 more universities followed Yale's lead and founded campus-based nonprofit research centers (Crowder and Hodgkinson, 1991, pp. 43-44), which served
to broaden the base of nonprofit scholarship. Also during this period, campus-based management degree programs emerged with a vengeance, most as concentrations in degree programs in other disciplines. Such concentrations appeared largely in public administration programs (Gorman, 1988; Dede, 1991, 1995). The University of San Francisco began offering the first "real" nonprofit management degree program in 1983, followed in 1985 by the New School, and in 1989 by Case Western Reserve.

Throughout the 1980's the Reagan "revolution" precipitated a crisis in the "intersector consciousness" about which Langton speaks, one that continues to this day. Indeed, Salamon (1987c) alerted us to this crisis in bald terms, observing that the failure, in both academic and policymaking spheres, to seriously explore sectoral interpenetration was the result "not simply of an absence of research, but more fundamentally a weakness of theory" (p. 100).

Reagan policies were felt immediately in the nonprofit sector. With Reagan, we began to see that the "independence" of the sector was illusory (Kramer, 1985b; Langton, 1987, pp. 135-136; Van Til, 1987, p. 16; Hall, 1987a, pp. 11-12). Thus, this era saw much writing on the interdependence of the three economic sectors (e.g., White, 1981; Salamon, 1987a, 1987b; Gronjberg, 1987). There also emerged much writing on the impacts of Reagan's social welfare policies (e.g., Altheide, 1987, 1988), tax policies (Clotfelter and Salamon, 1986), and budgetary policies (e.g., Salamon and Abramson, 1982; DeMone and Gibelman, 1984).

In the 1990's, there seems to be sustained preoccupation with the "blurring" of the sectors issue begun in the 1980's. This preoccupation is manifest in the plethora of work on government contracting, some of which is covered in the section on "policy theories," below.

Susan Ostrander (1987) identifies three failings of "conventional" theories on nonprofit organizations. These theories have routinely posited, first, that the nonprofit sector is "independent" from the other two (Ostrander, p. 126). As the clarification of terms, above, indicates, this is by no means the case. Nonprofit theory from this perspective, says Ostrander, "has contributed to an antagonistic view of the relations between the voluntary sector and government that obscures the historic cooperation between them" (p. 126). Of the three failings Ostrander cites, this one is most evident in the nonprofit literature. The second failing of conventional nonprofit theory is its tendency to see the nonprofit sector "as separate and distinct from society...and from history" (Ostrander, pp. 126-127). Finally,
traditional theory has "obscured the ways in which people in everyday life move among the three sectors, linking them in ways yet to be specified...." (p. 127).

While Ostrander's concerns were legitimate at the time, there have been significant challenges to conventional theory since. Some of these challenges are evident in the following sections.

Section Two: Economic/Market Theories of Nonprofits

Nowhere is the "antagonistic view" Ostrander cites more evident than in economic theories. Economic/market theories of nonprofits fall into two overarching types. First are those which seek to define the role of nonprofit organizations in the economy, and are largely developed from a demand-side perspective. Second are those which describe the economic behavior of nonprofits. The latter, albeit much less systematically than role theories, have attempted to explain nonprofit behavior with a supply-side view and, by extension, offer explanations about why nonprofits arise in specific industries or areas of economic activity (Hansmann, 1987, pp. 27-28, 37; also, Newhouse, 1970; Feldstein, 1971; Lee, 1971; James and Neuberger, 1981; Hansmann, 1981; White, 1981; Young, 1983). Since my own primary concern rests with the role of nonprofit organizations in the United States, I attend to two dominant economic role theories here.


Hansmann notes that traditional economic theory operates on principles of individual economic rationality (i.e., only those economic activities in which benefits outweigh costs will be chosen). It may be assumed, then, that individuals will not engage in economic activity which falls short of that standard. As a result, those individuals choosing to voluntarily support production of a public good (that is, when the costs may outweigh benefits) may be seen as "economically irrational." To overcome this dilemma, he shifts the unit of analysis from individual to society. Hansmann says that, once the unit of analysis shift is made, it becomes clear that "altruistic or socially cooperative behavior is extremely common...and it typically represents a very high level of economic rationality" (1980, p. 898n).

Hansmann attempts to specify the economic role of nonprofit organizations by first outlining the "essential characteristics" of such organizations. The most important such
characteristic for purposes here is the "nondistribution constraint," to which I alluded earlier. This means that nonprofit organizations are "barred from distributing ...net earnings [or accounting surpluses], if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees" (1980, p. 838).

Following from Nelson and Krashinsky (1973), Hansmann argues that nonprofits may be more "suitable" for some activities than business or government, and cites "contract failure" as the primary reason for it. This idea says that nonprofit organizations appear in response to conditions in which, "owing either to the circumstances under which a service is purchased or consumed or to the nature of the service itself," consumers have asymmetric information about quantity and/or quality of that service (Hansmann, 1987, p. 29).

In such cases, nonprofit organizations emerge and, theoretically, use quantity and quality of care as a surrogate for economic efficiency. The nondistribution constraint plays a central role here: since nonprofits are prohibited from distributing accounting surpluses to their officers or directors, that constraint is presumed to be a disincentive to compromise quality of care. It is also presumed that since business firms have no such disincentive, there may be greater inclination to compromise such quantity and quality of service. As a result, consumers see the nondistribution constraint as exercising a crucial "policing" function as regards this service in the nonprofit firm (Hansmann, 1980, p. 840). This "policing" function may be particularly important in cases such as child or elderly infirm care, for example, when the direct beneficiary of the service may not be the person paying for it. The child or infirm elderly person may be unable to communicate information about quality or quantity of care to those who are paying. The nonprofit thus becomes a proxy for the latter, which presumably provides a greater sense of comfort to them (Salamon, 1987a, p. 36; Hansmann, 1980, pp. 840-842; Douglas, 1983, p. 97).

Hansmann's notion of "contract failure" follows from the concept of "market failure," which also attempts to offer an explanation for the economic role assumed by nonprofits and, not incidentally, for that of government (Hansmann, 1980, p. 845). Traditionally, "market failure" refers to those situations when market demand is so low or "thin" for a specific good, producers will produce less of it than is demanded. More specifically, it refers to the "failure

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5 It is not my intent here to engage in analysis or criticism of "contract failure" or "market failure" theories. For those readers interested in such analysis, James Douglas (1983, chapters 5 and 6) is recommended.
of the market system to produce the most efficient outcome (in the Pareto sense) under certain conditions" (Douglas, 1983, p. 38, emphasis in original). By way of example, these "certain conditions" may refer to the business firm engaged in production of pharmaceuticals. Given the low demand for some pharmaceuticals, the firm cannot produce a product in quantities sufficient to garner a profit.

Enter the so-called "free rider" problem, in economic terms a negative externality, and often touted in economic theory as one reason why government must intervene in the economy. The free rider problem, briefly stated, refers to occasions when "a good cannot be divided and nonmembers cannot be excluded from benefiting from it." Thus, "nonmembers who have made no sacrifices on behalf of the organization can take a 'free ride' on the backs of the members who have borne the costs" (Douglas, 1983, p. 31). Government or nonprofits can then intervene. The former can ameliorate, if not overcome, the free rider problem by imposing taxes; while the latter, because of their tax-exempt status and access to philanthropic contributions, have the potential to approximate much the same result (Gronjberg, 1993, p. 18; Salamon, 1987a, p. 35).

The second dominant economic theory was developed by Burton Weisbrod (1974, 1977), who posits his "public goods" or "government failure" theory of nonprofits, and which may be seen as complementary to Hansmann's "contract failure" (Hansmann, 1987, p. 30). Weisbrod observes that, since government will produce public or collective goods only to the extent that the "median voter" is satisfied, residual demand will exist for some smaller segments of the population. This demand can be met by nonprofit organizations as they assume a gap-filling role in production of such goods and services. He uses the American Heart Association and the March of Dimes as examples of organizations which may conduct research in generally the same realms as government, but which may concentrate efforts in one narrow research area in those realms.

The nondistribution constraint also serves an important policing function in public goods theory. Here, nonprofits are again seen as helping to reduce the "free rider" problem. If individuals believe a free ride is unnecessary, odious or otherwise unacceptable, and will thus choose to contribute toward production of a public good, they will prefer that donation go to the nonprofit simply because of the policing function they see as inhering in the nondistribution constraint (Weisbrod, 1988, pp. 1-15, passim).

The idea of "trust" does not attend most economic role theories in any substantive
way (although many at least mention it). This is unsurprising, since "trust" falls outside the realm of mainstream economic theory (Weisbrod, 1988, p. 222). The notable exception is Hansmann. He argues that nonprofit organizations are often "thought to be invested with an ethical quality that places them beyond mere utilitarian concerns" (1980, p. 898). His theory sees nonprofits instead as "a reasonable response to a relatively well-defined set of social needs that can be described in economic terms" (1980, p. 898).

At the same time, he notes that consumers prefer nonprofits for production of certain services (particularly those affected by a contract failure scenario) and thus, by implication, have a belief that they are "better served by a firm in which the profit motive has been curtailed" (p. 897). This preference, he says,

is based upon a feeling that nonprofits can be trusted not to exploit the advantage over the consumer resulting from contract failure. This trust derives its rational basis from the nondistribution constraint that characterizes the nonprofit form (1980, p. 896).

James Douglas (1983), another nonprofit economic theorist of note, and Weisbrod (1988) take a different view. The former says he has "little difficulty in accepting that in all transactions with nonprofit organizations, the contributor has to rely heavily on the trustworthiness of the organization" (p. 100). Douglas rejects the idea that "trust" is sufficient to explain why nonprofit organizations arise, however, and believes trust is essential for the market system, writ large, to operate at all (p. 100). Weisbrod's position echoes Douglas', and rests in large measure upon a two-component rationale, which he says does not constitute an "alternative justification," but is, rather, complementary: "nonprofits are useful in providing collective goods when consumer demand is heterogeneous" (1988, p. 25). He too, then, rejects the idea of "trust" as justification for emergence of nonprofit organizations in a market economy (1988, pp. 23, 25).

In sum, traditional nonprofit economic role theories attend to two elements. First, they view nonprofits, not with an eye to traditional Pareto-optimum "three-E" considerations, but to their role in the conscientious provision of quality service. Second, the "tie that binds" these theories is well-stated by Levitt (1973), who says that, in economic terms, the nonprofit

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6 For more radical support for this observation, see Kenneth Arrow (1963), and Nelson and Krashinsky (1973).
sector exists "to do things business and government are either not doing, not doing well, or not doing often enough" (p. 49). In this, Levitt highlights Ostrander's concern vis-a-vis both the presumed "independence" of nonprofits and the antagonistic nature of theory deriving therefrom.

Perhaps the best-known challenger to these conventional economic theorists is Lester Salamon, who has been writing for many years on the increasing role and fiscal features of nonprofit organizations in delivery of human or social services (1981, 1987a, 1987b; also Hall, 1987a, p. 17).

Salamon takes a political economy view, saying that the government and nonprofit sectors established a pattern of cooperation well before the American Revolution (1987a, p. 31; also O'Neill, 1989, pp. 98-105). This has evolved into a "partnership" of both depth and breadth which is neither unpredictable nor unexplainable (Salamon, 1981; 1987a; 1987b; 1992). Salamon's view is well-supported by Michael O'Neill (1989), Stephen Block (1990), Robert Wuthnow (1991), Peter Dobkin Hall (1992), and Roger Lohmann (1992).

Salamon is concerned that this partnership has been "largely ignored in both public debate and scholarly inquiry, as attention has focused instead on the evolution of government policy" (1987a, p. 30). Hence, dominant theories of both the welfare state and the nonprofit sector need reassessment, because such theories make the implicit assumption that the state and nonprofits are "in conflict." This, in turn, has precluded our seeing this relationship with new eyes (1987a, p. 33).

He proceeds to detail the prevailing theories of both the welfare state and "voluntary" organizations (1987a, pp. 33-36). The primary failure of (American) welfare state theory rests with the idea that "it fails to differentiate between government's role as a provider of funds and direction, and government's role as a deliverer of services" (1987a, p. 36). He is also troubled by the dominant economic theories of nonprofits (discussed above) which see them as "derivative and secondary," and as coming to the fore only in the event of failures in either government and/or the market (1987a, p. 39).

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7 Given Salamon's political economy approach, his work could be just as easily have been included in the "policy theories" section which follows. Indeed, we will note many of the same themes he introduces here in that literature. I introduce him in this section, first, because his arguments apply to both economic and policy theories; and second, because he meets conventional economic theories "head on."
Salamon rightly observes that "in neither set of theories is there much hint that the nonprofit sector should play as substantial a role as it does in the provision of government-financed services" (1987a, p. 36). His answer to these theoretical failures is a two-pronged attack. The first is his theory of "third party government."

"Third party government" refers to the array of institutional arrangements, both business and nonprofit, government employs and funds in delivery of human services. It is not a synonym for privatization. While the latter term "suggests the surrender of governmental functions or responsibilities to private, non-governmental institutions," the former "suggests only the sharing of governmental responsibilities with other entities" (1987b, pp. 30-31, emphasis in original).

Several elements have precipitated use of such arrangements. Third party government includes state and local governments, and thus is consistent with our federal "constitutional structure"; but introduction of nonprofits into the mix also precipitates a move beyond that tradition (1987a, p. 37). He says such arrangements have also emerged in part due to America's "pluralistic political structure," together with latter-day concerns for "flexibility and economy" (1987a, p. 37). Most importantly for purposes here, he says they have surfaced as well because they mirror the conflict that has long existed in American political thinking between a desire for public services and hostility to the governmental apparatus that provides them. Third-party government has emerged as a way to reconcile these competing perspectives, to increase the role of government in promoting the general welfare without unduly enlarging the state's administrative apparatus (1987a, p. 37).

The second prong of his attack concerns what he calls "voluntary failure theory." Here, he rather "[turns] on its head the notion that the voluntary sector does best what government fails to do" (Ostrander, 1987, p. 130) such as many traditional economic theories suggest. Instead, he argues that, "the voluntary sector's weaknesses correspond well with government's strengths, and vice versa" (1987a, p. 42).

The four "voluntary failures" Salamon identifies to bolster his point are first, philanthropic insufficiency: the nonprofit sector does less well where the need is great and significant resources are required (Salamon, 1987a, pp. 39-40). Second, there is philanthropic particularism, occurring when "...resources—financial as well as organizational—may not favor all segments of the community equally" (1987a, p. 40). This results in gaps...
in service coverage for certain subgroups decision-makers may neglect (1987a, pp. 40-41). Third, philanthropic paternalism speaks to the idea that "most of the influence over the definition of community needs [may be] in the hands of those in command of the greatest resources" (1987a, p. 41). As a result, the needs of the poor may be sacrificed to preferences of the wealthy. Finally, philanthropic amateurism is tied to the paternalism noted above. Salamon says that the long-standing association with "amateur approaches" to service delivery, particularly those involving the poor, has continued to plague nonprofit organizations (1987a, p. 42).8

Since he believes that organizations in each sector bring to the relationship several elements of import to the other (1987a, esp. pp. 45-46), Salamon's theme may be seen as a departure because he preaches government-nonprofit "cooperation" and "partnership" rather than the "conflict" dogma so prevalent in traditional approaches. He does, however, echo Bernstein (1991), discussed below, when he voices his concern that, [for the most part, the resource allocation processes in these two sectors proceed independently, and often in ignorance, of each other. Public sector organizations have little clear idea of the uses to which private philanthropic dollars are being put, and the charitable sector frequently has only imperfect knowledge of, and limited influence over, the allocation of public funds. Even basic information about the scope and structure of the private, nonprofit delivery system is unavailable in most locales, making coherent policymaking difficult (1987a, p. 46).

We also see the antagonism about which Ostrander speaks in some of what I call "policy" theories. These theories are important because they speak to the de facto interdependence between the government and nonprofit sectors. The literature is broad-based, and can be seen as attending to the complexity of policy determination, formulation, and implementation in a democratic, capitalist welfare state. Today, this inevitably means government contracting. We also note an undercurrent of distrust present in many of these theories, and it is directed largely at government.

8 This is highly debatable now, particularly with the explosion of professional nonprofit management programs coming upon the scene throughout the 1980's. At the time Salamon was writing, however, these programs were in their infancy (see, e.g., Gorman, 1988; Young, Hollister, Hodgkinson and Associates, 1993, p. 2).
Section Three: Policy Theories of Nonprofits

Conventional economic theories have tended to see the nonprofit organization as a "stepchild," called upon only in the event of market, contract or government failure. Rather mirroring that perspective, conventional policy theories have been inclined to see the nonprofit sector as "tools" of government action, as Orleans (1980) so explicitly states in the title of his book (also Salamon, 1987a; Havens, 1980).

At the same time, and from its earliest incarnation, the "contract state" (Orleans, 1980, pp. 95-121) has given rise to profound questions across the spectrum of academics, politics and practice. These include questions about the role of the state and of nonprofit organizations in contracting arrangements, accountability, and quality and reliability of service. Harold Seidman, in speaking of the whole idea of government contracting, makes the point:

So great is the interpenetration between 'public' and the 'private' sectors that this basic distinction...has ceased to be an operational way of understanding reality...In the new political economy, the traditional distinction between the public and private sectors has become nearly obliterated through the flow of public funds to universities, industry, nonprofit institutions, voluntary hospitals, social welfare agencies, and other quasi-public entities (quoted in Orleans, 1980, p. 121).

In the sixteen years since Orleans's book was published, government use of contracts has increased severalfold, and the concerns to which Seidman gave voice continue to be debated. The work of three theorists is illustrative.

Susan Bernstein's (1991) ethnomethodological study of seventeen nonprofit human service organizations in New York addresses each of the concerns Ostrander raises. Her book highlights the palpable frustration of nonprofit workers who administer and/or deliver services under government contract. For the individuals speaking throughout the book, government contracting is a "game," (pp. 21-39, passim), one that finds them "coping in the best ways they know how with what they suspect is an insane system" (p. ix).

As Milward (1994, p. 73) rightly notes, Bernstein does not discuss the government's "side" of the game and so does not address the various constraints impinging upon public administrators, and how such constraints might influence behavior in contracting arrangements. She takes a decidedly "us-them" approach, and "blame" for systemic
problems with process and procedure comes down cleanly upon government's front porch.

One element Bernstein emphasizes well, however, is the sometimes exquisite interdependence between government contractors and nonprofits as each attempts to ensure reliable and quality service delivery, while subject to the sometimes conflicting realities of contract compliance requirements, scarce resources, and client demand in a decentralized human services delivery system. She reports on a symbiosis of the highest order, conflict and gameplaying notwithstanding, which speaks volumes about how both public administrators and nonprofit administrators "live" in the day to day.

The second illustration is Steven Smith and Michael Lipsky's work (1993), which speaks of the "contracting regime," the foundations of which are the dualism of law and politics. "Regime" in this case refers to "a set of stable relationships that transcend simple common practice and reveal assumptions about how the world works" (p. 43). Citing Stephen Krasner (1982), they further expand the definition, saying "regime" attends to "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area" (p. 43).

Smith and Lipsky draw some useful distinctions between and among three types of nonprofit human service agencies, and develop a triadic typology, saying that each has "very different connections to community" (p. 38). The first is "traditional," described as "old line service associations," and typified by the Boston-based Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children founded in 1878 (pp. 38-39). Such agencies are described as being "founded by wealthy civic leaders," as enjoying often large endowments (which may make them less reliant upon government funding), as providing a wide range of social services, and as having rather large boards of directors "drawn from the political and economic elite of a community" (pp. 38-39).

The second type are "young" or "new" agencies, those emerging during the War on Poverty in the 1960's. In contrast to the traditional type, these agencies have small boards, "usually derive most if not all of their revenues from government...[and] do not exist as nonprofit organizations for very long prior to receiving a government contract" (p. 39).

The "upstarts" are the third type, those "founded in response to unmet neighborhood or other community needs" (p. 39), and which may be

...devoted to solving problems experienced as local concerns, such as homelessness, hunger, or runaway youth. Or they may be established to solve problems for communities of people who are less identifiable by
geography than by some other characteristic: battered women, developmentally disabled individuals, or AIDS patients (p. 39).

These organizations, usually animated by "volunteers or underpaid workers," operate with a dedication to "alleviate suffering or to help other people realize their potential when it is otherwise thwarted by social conditions" (p. 39). Unsurprisingly, these organizations -- particularly in their formative life-stages -- are "typically shoestring operations built on shaky financial grounds" (p. 39).

One of Smith and Lipsky's more important arguments is that, type notwithstanding, an organization's "relationship to the community depends upon the relationship to government" (p. 40). They say that government contracting will produce "virtually inevitable" change within any given organization, and that such changes will be different for each type. "The most profound shifts and the greatest conflicts with government occur among those agencies that initially resemble government least" (p. 40). This could apply to either the "traditional" or to the "upstart," which only engage in government contracting after having been in operation for some period before having done so.

In contrast, the "new" nonprofit was either created by, or very early in its life entered into, government contracting arrangements. Thus, they will be more "rule-bound, concerned with consistency, and highly responsive to the priorities of the government agencies whose grant programs were the occasion for their establishment and development in the first place" (p. 40).

The second part of their argument suggests that, as each type of nonprofit continues to depend upon government funding and contracts, and as each are subject to the accountability strictures attendant to them, each type also runs the great risk of organizational isomorphism (pp. 96-97), an idea that will be discussed in the next section on organization qua institutional theories. Milward, for one, is mightily distressed about this from an accountability perspective:

If...we simply have a voluntary sector that mirrors public sector agencies but is far less controllable or accountable...[t]he implications of this leakage of accountability are far reaching. Public policy becomes cloudy as authority and who is funding what become mixed in a nonprofit that delivers services for government and for its own purposes. Are citizens clients of the nonprofit ...or the government agency whose policy is being administered (1994, p. 75)?

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Smith and Lipsky's primary concern is not so much that the state may dominate, through its funding or contracting practices, nonprofit organizations. Rather, they are concerned that, with such a system, each sector may be weakened unless the significance of the relationship is recognized:

[The challenge for the United States and other countries which have moved to increase the role of private actors in public service provision is to find the proper balance between the efficiencies of markets and the inventiveness of the voluntary sector, and the legitimate role of the state in raising revenues, setting standards, and allocating resources (pp. 231-232).

Jennifer Wolch (1990), taking a rather hard-edged Marxist perspective, addresses many of the same concerns as Smith and Lipsky, coining the term "the shadow state" in the bargain. The "shadow state" refers to

a parastate apparatus comprised of multiple voluntary sector organizations, administered outside of traditional democratic politics and charged with major collective service responsibilities previously shouldered by the public sector, yet remaining within the purview of state control (p. xvi).

Wolch attends to a comparison of nonprofit organizations in the United States and Great Britain, and says that the nature of the relationship between nonprofits and government is "in transition." In the United States, this transition has evolved from a number of changing "contexts" in recent years. First were the welfare policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations. This created a crisis within which "concerted attempts were made...to roll back the welfare state and to rewrite the social contact between citizen and state" (Milward, 1994, p. 75).

Second is the increased demand for social services. This is the result of a flat economy coupled with reductions in government social spending and services. Third, reductions in welfare spending have caused nonprofits to institute or raise client fees, alter their programs, and/or engage in business activities to close the gap. This has produced a "commodification of voluntary output" (Wolch, p. 211), a theme well-captured by David Altheide (1987, 1988) in his work on government cutbacks of social services funding in Maricopa County, Arizona. Fourth, increases in government contracting have been significant in recent history. Finally, government regulatory changes have resulted in a strengthening of nonprofit organizations' capacity to provide services (Wolch, pp. 210-211).
Wolch's primary concern is that the weaknesses Smith and Lipsky predict are already evident. She believes that "as voluntary services have assumed a more pervasive influence on individuals' lives and life chances, the sector has become politicized....[and] its full implications remain hidden..." (p. 209).

Following from that, because of the high degree of dependence nonprofits have on government support, she notes a number of "dilemmas" presented with the rise of the "shadow state." While these dilemmas cut both ways, Wolch is largely concerned with their effects on nonprofit organizations. The underlying theme in Wolch's work is her distress over what she calls "statization," defined as "the increasing penetration of state control in everyday life." Indeed, she says that "[s]tatization via voluntarism is to be resisted strongly if the only beneficiary is the power of the state apparatus" (p. 218).

She is concerned about the coercive power of the state to impose unwanted "constraints" on nonprofit effort and objectives; force cooptation; or worse, to cause the nonprofit "become a puppet or payn in the service of goals that are antithetical to their organizational mission" (pp. 217; 47-79, passim, 210, 215). Further, since government contracts are nearly always service-specific, nonprofits are forced to accede to state-mandated ideas about both the nature and kind of service provided. Self-defining agendas for nonprofits are thus compromised (p. 216). Finally,

For state institutions directed by conservative regimes, efficiency and accountability are most often the watchwords. Although both are admirable goals to which taxpayers and consumers should expect publicly subsidized groups to adhere, there may be an inherent conflict among organizational efficiency and accountability and some of the most prized features of voluntarism: innovation, flexibility, and participation (p. 216).

As for direction by "left-wing/liberal" regimes, the dilemmas are no less serious for Wolch. In an effort to promote participation and reduce alienation, such regimes will sacrifice efficiency and accountability. In this scenario, when nonprofit mismanagement ensues and is discovered, it may "lead to policies that penalize large numbers of groups [which in turn] can ultimately discredit the state's cause" (pp. 216-217).

Those concerns all notwithstanding, Wolch posits four "progressive goals" she believes nonprofits should undertake, and the sooner, the better. First, the participation of nonprofit organizations in human services delivery specifically should be celebrated by both state and citizen alike. The historical responsiveness of nonprofit organizations to
community need and "perception," to say nothing of their antibureaucratic bent, should be used by the state to "avoid rigid routinization of service practice, employ a wider diversity of service delivery approaches, and develop new methods as client situations and needs change...."

Second, nonprofits are powerful vehicles, she says, toward "empowering service recipients and, ultimately, individuals with shared problems or objectives" (p. 219). While acknowledging the idea of client cum citizen "empowerment" has taken on "a somewhat mythical quality," and while it cannot be said the state lacks the ability to help foster such empowerment, she also says

the growing reaction against the power and domination of professional [state] service provision experts and demands for greater consumer control and input into the service design process stand as powerful rationales for voluntary sector service delivery predicated upon client rights and abilities to affect the services they receive (p. 219).

Wolch also wants the "voluntary sector" to direct its efforts toward increasing our national productive capacity with new and/or innovative methods, particularly in those areas hit hardest by poverty and deindustrialization: "As older patterns of labor and capital relations break down and are renegotiated, voluntary organizations can be instrumental in forging new relations among companies, workers, and markets..." (p. 220). Finally, and most fundamentally for Wolch, the voluntary sector must "limit the destructive and insidious dynamics of Western democratic states," by demanding the state be accountable, responsive, provide adequate information and adhere to laws the state itself enacts (pp. 220-221): "The capacity of the [nonprofit] sector to limit state powers and, in the extreme case, to smash the state is precious indeed and must be protected from the possible deformations of the shadow state" (p. 221).

What we see manifest in these theories, exhortation for cooperation and partnership between government and nonprofits notwithstanding (Ostrander, 1987; Salamon, 1987a; Hall, 1987a; DeLaat, 1987; and Van Til, 1987, 1988), is palpable distrust of and frustration with government action or intrusion upon delivery of human services, particularly as reported in Bernstein, or theorized in Wolch.

At the same time, no theorist denies that, in the variously named "shadow state," "third party government," "hollow state" (Milward, Else and Raskob, 1991) or "contracting
regime," both government and nonprofit sectors have much to gain by attempting to cooperatively manage what is the highly decentralized, very messy system of human service delivery in the United States. It perhaps goes without saying that, absent cooperation, there is much to lose.

That being the case, the challenge to theory it seems to me is to foster suspension of our traditional view of nonprofits. Whatever their functional value to the administrative state, their contributions to social life -- and to the democratic ideal -- transcend mere functionality. As we begin to move away from the traditional view and toward a more process-centered and pragmatic one, we just might discover that we are better able to articulate how the historic and vibrant relationship between government and nonprofits can be affirmed so that cohesive, integrated social policy planning can result.

Section Four: Organization/Institutional Theories of Nonprofits

In this section, I address a few broad themes found in nonprofit organization/institutional theory. We will note that, just as it is with much mainstream organization theory, a structural-functionalist perspective reigns supreme.

I focus on four themes in this realm of theory. First are those theories which attempt to identify the "defining characteristics" of the organizations in the sector. The second theme concerns organizational change, as illustrated in resource dependency theories, and concerns about institutional isomorphism. Theme three introduces varying views of leadership in nonprofits. Although the term "leadership" certainly applies to both governing board volunteers and to ranking (paid) staff officers, I confine discussion about this theme to the latter. Finally there is the nonprofit organizations as "mediating institutions" theme, perhaps the most visible theme in all nonprofit literature.

In what follows, it should be noted that I make some distinctions between organization "theory," organization "behavior," and organization "management." Certainly, these categories are neither mutually exclusive nor rigid; and we see overlap among and between them as the review of mainstream organization theory attests. At the same time,
the distinctions are important and so require brief explanation.

First, I see "management" (more precisely, "functional management") as focusing on function-specific activities presumed to constitute day-to-day operations in organizations. In the nonprofit literature, this includes what I have called the "plethora of 'how-to' literature" (e.g., Mason, 1984; Setterberg and Schulman, 1985; Anthony and Young, 1988; Gies, Ott and Shafritz, 1990, *passim*; Connors, 1992; Gelatt, 1992; Herman and Associates, 1994).

As for myriad specific functions of nonprofit management, included are writing on funding, fundraising, and funding structure (e.g., Brakeley, 1980; Broce, 1986); financial management and budgeting (e.g., Haller, 1982; Vintner and Kish, 1984; Bryce, 1987); strategic management and/or planning (e.g., Unterman and Davis, 1982; Bryson, 1988; Stone, 1989); marketing and public relations (e.g., Kotler, 1982; Dannelley, 1986).

Organization "behavior" refers to behavior or assumption of certain roles, whether formal and functional or informal, of individuals in organizations. As regards nonprofits, we see much attention directed to the roles and behaviors between and among staff officers and service provision staff and volunteer boards of directors. "Board effectiveness" also looms large, as does volunteer management generally (e.g., Shestack, 1978; Provan, 1980; Gelman, 1983; Kramer, 1985a; Swanson, 1986; Gardner, 1987; Taylor, Chait and Holland, 1989; Cyert, 1990; Knight, 1991; Young, et al., 1993).

I see "organization theory" as addressing organized entities with a more holistic perspective than either organization behavior or organization management. It is distinguished most importantly by its attempts to catalog defining characteristics which, in turn, can help to identify the role(s) nonprofit organizations may play in society. Hence, since my primary aim throughout this work is to take a broad view of community-based nonprofit human service institutions, it makes sense to take a more holistic view in this section on organizations as well.

In general terms, we see principles of organization theory/behavior at work in much nonprofit literature. For example, Kirsten Gronbjerg (1993), in a comparative analysis of funding structures in social service and community development nonprofits in Chicago, locates her study in concepts of resource dependency, together with those of organization environment and strategic management (p. 32).

Another example is Richard Heimovics and Robert Herman's (1989) curricular model for nonprofit managers, developed from a "salient management skills" perspective, and
derived from "empirical research about the role and expected activities of the chief executive and general theories of organizations" (p. 5).

Yet another illustration is Earle Lippincott and Elling Aannestad's (1979) work. Their premise is that "the continuing significance of the voluntary agency in social welfare will depend on how well it does its work and on how strong its citizen leadership is" (p. 47). They suggest that there are seven questions organization leaders, both staff and volunteers, should ask relative to the effective management and performance of the organization. Without specifically identifying organization theory/behavior principles, these questions clearly derive from them: five are tied to what they call "management standards," and include concerns for intraorganizational communication systems, management control, and coordination (pp. 48-53). Two concern the extraorganizational environment (pp. 53-55).

I turn now to discussion of four central themes in organization theory-based literature on nonprofits.

**Theme I: Defining Characteristics of Nonprofits**

The first theme involves theories that purport to identify defining characteristics of organizations in the sector. Many of these theories emerged early and fundamental principles inhering in those theories have continued to be debated. This literature may be said to have helped seed the antagonistic nature of much nonprofit literature throughout the 1970's and 1980's. It may also constitute much of what Van Til (1988, p. 37) has called the "celebratory literature" on the sector.

Several writers have developed "laundry lists" of defining characteristics, said to distinguish nonprofit organizations from their business or government counterparts (e.g., Commission, 1977; Nielsen, 1979; Gardner, 1983; O'Neill and Young, 1988; O'Connell, 1988; O'Neill, 1989; Wuthnow, 1991; Jeavons, 1992). Many of these lists overlap, so it is useful to collapse them. I do so by integrating one developed by the late Terry McAdam (1986) with that of Stephen Block (1987), who draws from David Horton Smith (1990).

For McAdam, Smith and Block, nonprofit organizations:

1. are incubators of a wide range of ideas, from think tanks to policy initiatives to social innovations (McAdam, p. 14; Block, p. 20).

2. Are mediating and corrective forces in the amelioration of social problems, serving as the social conscience of society and providing leadership and vision for change (McAdam,
3. Are vehicles of social integration for both early immigrants and, more recently, refugees to America. They can, therefore, provide a sense of social kinship -- particularly to the degree to which "social integration" is facilitated when individuals and families have been uprooted (McAdam, p. 14; Block, p. 21).

4. Can be activists, catalysts, agents or watchdogs for (constructive) social change, by helping us "define problems, confront them, and stimulate action on them...." This occurs, generally, through advocacy and education (McAdam, pp. 14-15; Block, p. 21).

5. Are direct providers of service which, because of the small size of many nonprofits, are likely to attempt to be responsive to localized need. Further, since social welfare has long been a major responsibility of the nonprofit sector, service to such particularized at-risk populations as the homeless, the poor, the disabled and others, has been a central role of the sector (McAdam, p. 15; Block, p. 22).

6. Are safe havens for and provide a forum for experimentation with new modes of living and human relations (McAdam, p. 15).

7. Are instruments for preservation of religious and cultural continuity (including events, beliefs and customs), which occurs under the aegis of historical societies, ethnic and religious organizations, and which can therefore be used, examined and valued by future generations (McAdam, p. 15; Block, p. 21).

8. Are wellsprings from which new or rediscovered ethical standards might flow, in that they provide a process for measurement of institutional and individual performance having its base in ethics, while promoting development or retention of social values (McAdam, p. 15; Block, p. 21).

9. Are sources and havens from which periodic bursts of reformism in public life can come. They are also living laboratories, in which to nurture and carry out esthetic, spiritual, and intellectual innovation (McAdam, p. 15; Block, p. 21).

10. Provide channels through which the impulse to altruism can be preserved, empowered and kept alive. The third sector is also a "latent resource" with vast potential to help society achieve goals. That is, nonprofits can mobilize charitable giving and voluntary activities for societal goal attainment (McAdam, p. 16; Block, p. 21).

11. Can provide strong support for business and government. This form of support to the American economy is particularly evident through the activities of professional
membership organizations and trade associations (Block, pp. 21-22).

The "celebration" of nonprofits about which Van Til speaks is clearly evident in any of a number of items on lists such as the one presented above. At the same time, they do indeed attempt to identify not only what distinguishes them from business or government, but also to identify their roles in the larger society.

More recently, another theme has emerged, organizational change. This theme appeared with some force in the 1980's and has been a preoccupation of nonprofit theorists since. Included here are, first, some views on "resource dependency"; and, second, a concern seen to be allied with it, institutional isomorphism.

**Theme II: Organization Change**

In traditional organization theory, one overarching principle is that form follows function. In the nonprofit literature it seems to be that form follows funding. As the foregoing may indicate, this preoccupation appears to be an undercurrent in much of the nonprofit literature, whether economics, policy, organization or management-based.

In the nonprofit literature we find theories that link to funding or funding structure to such diverse (and predictable) factors as organization structure (Milofsky, 1987; Smith and Lipsky, 1993); environment, both internal and external (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1982); accountability (e.g., Kettl, 1987; Jeavons, 1992); leadership (e.g., Heimovics, Herman and Coughlin, 1993; Young, et al., 1993); decision-making (e.g., Kramer, 1985a; Kirk, 1986; Powell and Friedkin, 1986; Gronbjerg, 1993); and life cycle (e.g., Prestby and Wandersman, 1985).

The resource dependency view touches on each of those factors, implicitly if not explicitly. The view is derived from the organization behavior-based resource dependency model of, among others, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Provan, Beyer and Kruytbosch (1980).

Resource dependency theory says that "organizations will (and should) respond to the demands of those groups in the environment that control critical resources" (Powell and Friedkin, 1987, p. 182). It thus treats "the environment of an organization as a potential resource pool [and] describes how organization leaders respond to conditions created by their resource dependency" (Heimovics, Herman and Coughlin, 1993, p. 421). This view is typified in the work of Melissa Middleton (1987), Judith Saidel (1991), Heimovics, Herman

From a resource dependency perspective, the nonprofit funding environment is assumed to be unstable and thus uncertain. As a result, what might be called "critical" funding sources (e.g., those providing "irreplaceable" funds) exercise a high degree of influence "and absorb most of the energy devoted to resource relationships" (Gronbjerg, 1993, pp. 291-292).

Heimovics, Herman and Coughlin, for example, draw on their previous research and on the "multiple-frame orientation" (i.e., structural, human resource, political, and symbolic) of Bolman and Deal (1991) as they study staff executive leadership and resource dependency. They also sound suspiciously like James D. Thompson when they speculate that

the more effective nonprofit chief executives can sometimes influence organizational outcomes through political actions taken to manage or stabilize their organizations' dependence on the environment, and that boards are crucial in mediation of environmental uncertainties (p. 421).

In their study, Heimovics, et al. focus on Bolman and Deal's "political frame," finding it more "uniquely salient" for nonprofit executives than the other three, and hypothesize, first, that "a group of executives...considered to be effective were much more likely to think and act in accordance with a political frame than [that] not so designated..." (pp. 422-423). Their second hypothesis is that "a sample of effective executives would more likely employ multiple frames in dealing with critical events than would those executives not deemed to be especially effective" (p. 423).

Both hypotheses were supported. Following from both their prior research and their frame analysis in this work, they posit three summary "propositions" which tie executive leadership to resource dependency: first, "nonprofit chief executives occupy a socially construed position of psychological centrality" in the organization, which derives from his or her "position in information flows, expertise, and full-time career commitments...." (pp. 425-426). Second, it is important for the effective staff leader to help the board realize its "potential to mediate environmental dependencies" (p. 426, emphasis in original). Finally, given the depth and reach of government involvement in their organizations, nonprofit leaders have "learned to think and act politically." That is, they "...act in relation to external resource dependencies in terms of mobilizing constituencies, forming coalitions, creating
obligations, and negotiating and bargaining" (p. 426).

Judith Saidel (1991) turns the "resource dependency" view rather on its head, making a distinction between resource dependency and resource interdependency. The latter term is used to describe a reciprocally dependent relationship between government and nonprofit.

"Resource" in this case refers not only to monetary funding, but to "anything of value, tangible or intangible, that can be exchanged between organizations" (Saidel, p. 544). Following from Richard Hall's working definition of resource interdependence, which refers to "situations in which two or more organizations are dependent upon one another for the resources each has access to or controls" (cited in Saidel, p. 550), Saidel defines resource interdependence as a "simultaneous two-way flow of resources" (p. 550). That is, organizations from each sector provide specific resources that are seen as complementing one another. Public organizations provide not only revenue, but "information, including expertise and technical assistance; political support and legitimacy, in the sense of external validation...and access to the nonlegislative policy process" (p. 544); while nonprofits "supply their service-delivery capacity, information, political support, and legitimacy..." (p. 545).

Saidel studied 80 nonprofit and 73 (public) executive agency managers in New York State, across several "service areas" (among them, human services). Her inquiry rested with perceptions of reciprocal dependency of managers in both sectors. The study leads Saidel to conclude that the traditional idea of nonprofit dependency upon government does not obtain. Using three measures: magnitude (i.e., "extent of interdependence"); distribution ("relative dependence in a relationship"), and symmetry and asymmetry (of the relationship), her findings show instead a high level of interdependence between the two (p. 550). Saidel says that, regardless of the service provided by the nonprofits, there was symmetry in the distribution of resource dependence between state agencies and nonprofit organizations at all levels of analysis-sector, sector/service area, service area. Relationships of resource interdependence in all four subsectors [included in the study] were characterized by resource flows upon which public agencies and nonprofit organizations are equally dependent...(p. 550).

In addition to resource dependency theory, Kirsten Gronjberg's (1993) comprehensive study of funding structure or "funding relations" in social service and community development agencies in Chicago calls upon a number of other organization theory perspectives. In her work, Gronjberg addresses the complexities multiple funding sources engender in both kinds
of organizations, and their impacts on the whole of organization character and functioning.

Like Saidel, she concludes that the "independence" of nonprofit organizations, particularly from government, is a myth. She suggests that her findings support the need, first, to see nonprofit organizations from an open systems perspective:

…it is not possible to understand the behavior of nonprofits, including their internal structures and processes of decision making, without paying careful attention to the complex organizational environments in which they operate and with which they interact on multiple levels (p. 309).

Her study also finds support for a "key tenet" of ecological theory: "once organizations establish basic structures for interacting with their environment, these structures tend to persist" (p. 309). For Gronjberg, institutional theory is useful as well. Following from Zucker (1988), her study confirms that external environments in which organizations operate take on institutionalized forms that contribute to the formation of distinctive organizational cultures. These institutionalized forms vary by the specific population of organizations under consideration" (p. 309).

As for application of contingency theory, she found that organizations have only limited control over their environment...[and] entrepreneurship, boundary-spanning activities, skillful manipulation of strategic opportunities, and careful attention to potential limitations may counteract some of the sources of external control but will not eliminate them (pp. 309-310).

As regards resource dependency, Gronjberg's findings support much of what that theory would expect as regards power and control, both internal and external to the organization (see Gronjberg, 1993, esp. Chapter 12). The source of power and influence derive, externally, from the ability of a critical funding source to provide those funds; while those internal actors charged with establishing and preserving good relationships with that source(s), particularly as they can reduce whatever uncertainties attendant to it, can wield great "internal leverage" (p. 292).

Her general argument -- which would not be "news" to those of us who have been in nonprofit organization management -- is that "an organization [depending] heavily on an exchange relationship with one particular funding source will be subject to considerable influence from that source" (p. 292). This influence, however required, is unwelcome; and
nonprofit organizations will

seek to reduce its dependency on the source, minimize uncertainty by linking itself closely to the source, seek to gain some control over the source, or otherwise buffer itself from adverse actions or other developments originating with the source. Correspondingly, the organizational units responsible for maintaining the exchange relationship will command power in the organization (p. 292).

The second strand in the organizational change theme is the specter of institutional isomorphism. Here, we see what I have called the "form follows funding" principle in action. We note in policy theories and in the resource dependency theories of nonprofits that there has emerged an increasing body of literature which suggests that, indeed, no meaningful "sectoral" dichotomy exists. This is important for nonprofit organizations, particularly for the so-called "grass roots" variety, which (theoretically) emerge in counterpoise to the "dominance of bureaucratic principles of organization in society" (Van Til, 1988, p. 61; also Lundberg, 1975, p. 473).

The literature on institutional isomorphism indicates that the more nonprofit organizations rely on government funding (i.e., the more "resource dependent" they are), the more likely they will be to take on structural and process characteristics of large bureaucracies. In so doing, they relinquish their claim to being small, "home-grown," and locally responsive. Specifically, they become increasingly "professionalized and bureaucratized [which concomitantly produces] a diminution of their community constituency" (Cooper, 1980, p. 412). The concern for institutional isomorphism is evident in, among others, Nielsen (1979), in Smith and Lipsky's (1993) "contracting regime," in David Korten's (1980) work on international development agencies, and in Terry Cooper's (1980) analysis of urban renewal projects undertaken by the Pico Union Neighborhood Council in Los Angeles in the 1960's and 1970's.

In the nonprofit literature, perhaps the best-known of these works is DiMaggio and Powell's (1982) ideas on "organizational homogenization." They apply this idea to all organizations, with special attention to nonprofits; and reformulate Weber's ideas on how organizations become increasingly rationalized, bureaucratized and thus come to control and dominate. They suggest that Weber's formulation may no longer describe contemporary organizational life (p. 1), and argue instead that inquiries about institutional isomorphism are best conducted using the "organizational field" as the unit of analysis (p. 10). This they
define as
those organizations in a population that, in the aggregate, are responsible for
a definable area of institutional life. In an organizational field, we would
include key suppliers, resource and product consumers, and regulatory
agencies, as well as other organizations that produce a similar service or
product (p. 10).

They say that, given the severalfold increase in bureaucratized organizations since
Weber's time, bureaucratization originates from sources different from those Weber
identifies. Following Giddens, they say these sources stem from "the structuration...of
organizational fields... [which], in turn, is affected in large part by the state and the
professions which have become the great rationalizers of the second half of the twentieth
century" (p. 2).

They define "structuration" as a
complex of related developments including: increase in the information load
with which organizations in a field must contend; increase in the level of
interaction among organizations in the field; the emergence of sharply defined
interorganizational structures of domination and patterns of coalition; and the
development of mutual awareness among participants in a set of
organizations that they are involved in a common enterprise (p. 40n).

DiMaggio and Powell suggest that "initially organizational fields display considerable
diversity in approach and form" (p. 4); but that certain isomorphic processes (coercive,
mimetic and normative), lead organizations to increasing "homogenization" over time. This
may be seen as a departure from traditional functionalist theory, which posits "a diverse and
differentiated world of organizations" (Hall, 1987a, p. 18; also, DiMaggio and Powell, 1982,
p. 3).

Coercive isomorphic processes refers principally to the power of the state, and its
ability to impose conformity via rules. Mimetic or imitative change processes, in contrast to
the more common incremental organization change, occur when such change is "more
dramatic," at which time "successful innovations are rare and widely copied" (p. 6). Normative processes evolve from the mimetic: "as the innovation spreads, a threshold point is reached....[T]he innovation is strongly reinforced by popular opinion and legitimated by
prestige or political power; it is taken for granted as legitimate apart from its internal
effectiveness" (p. 8).

The thrust of DiMaggio and Powell's argument is that homogenization, as manifest
in isomorphic processes, is grounded in the organization's desire to increase stability and to reduce unpredictability. This may be seen as consistent with much in traditional functionalist organization theory. I may also note (although DiMaggio and Powell do not) the explicit link between isomorphism and resource dependency here: government contracting in particular may be seen as a fiscal mechanism nonprofit human service institutions use to stave off diminution of service and to help guarantee survival -- in short to increase stability and reduce unpredictability. At the same time, and as the section on "defining characteristics" indicates, among the more powerful attributes nearly universally imputed to nonprofit organizations are their flexibility and responsiveness. Institutional isomorphism is seen as compromising those attributes. DiMaggio and Powell note the importance of this to nonprofit organizations:

To the extent that pluralism is a guiding value in public policy deliberations, we need to discover new forms of intersectoral coordination that will encourage diversification rather than hastening homogenization. An understanding of the manner in which fields become more homogeneous would prevent policy makers and analysts from confusing the disappearance of an organizational form with its substantive failure (p. 38).

Cooper (1980) takes a different view, seeing no alternative to isomorphism. He describes the gradual three-stage metamorphosis of the Pico Union Neighborhood Council (PUNC) (born in large part of the partnership between it and several governmental urban renewal agencies) from a "small core of lay volunteers...to an organization with 500 community members and a paid staff, and, finally, to a small group of community-development professionals whose involvement was much less than that of the community volunteers" (Cooper, 1980, p. 434).

Throughout the planning, approval and implementation stages of the process, PUNC made valiant attempts to maintain its close ties to the community. However,

[as the survival of the community became more directly linked to the urban renewal process, the planning, development, and political tasks became dominant....PUNC was able to meet the needs of some of its members for political efficacy in relationship to modern society, but in so doing it neglected the affective and social needs of those who could not or would not participate in the increasingly technical planning process (p. 438).

Cooper thus infers that transactions in the modern society, de facto, require some "bureaucratic and technical knowledge." He says that, if nonprofit organizations are to serve
as mediating forums, some degree of isomorphism should be expected; is, indeed, "inevitable" (p. 439). He concludes by saying that

[the critical task may be one of attempting to minimize the professionalizing of these local organizations in order to mitigate the screening out of participation by community residents. Public agencies may need to take greater initiative in order to reduce the burden on community resources and the consequent pressures both to professionalize and to neglect the social and affective aspects of community maintenance (p. 439).

Just as the defining characteristics literature, resource dependency views and -- to a slightly lesser extent -- writing on institutional isomorphism all exhibit an undercurrent of structural functionalism, so too does the literature on leadership in nonprofit organizations. This is the next theme in line for discussion.

**Theme III: Leadership in Nonprofits**

These views have drawn in large measure from the "objectivist" views of such writers as G.A. Yukl (1981) and Robert House (1988), and can be seen as having been advanced with epistemological and ontological assumptions consistent with objectivism: that leadership "is 'real,' can be measured in a relatively objective manner, and has generalizable and lawlike characteristics waiting to be discovered" (Kay, 1994, p. 296).

This literature is also consistent with much of the nonprofit literature that seems, implicitly or explicitly, to dichotomize the public and nonprofit "sectors." Most notable in this regard is work that compares public or business and nonprofit managers (e.g., Drucker, 1973; Buchanan, 1975; McGill and Wooton, 1975; Selby, 1978; Brinkerhoff, 1979; Fottler, 1981; DiMaggio, 1988).

With regard to leadership and ranking staff officers, we see traditional assumptions in the nonprofit leadership literature, which has variously assumed a "competence"-based approach (Heimovics and Herman, 1989); a "functions"-based stance (e.g., Young, 1987); a "management control" perspective (e.g., Anthony and Young, 1988); and what might be termed the "personal attributes" view (e.g., O'Connell, 1988).

A notable exception to that literature is a recent work by Richard Kay (1994). He draws from Gareth Morgan's and Donald Schöns work on metaphors, and brings a decidedly interpretivist approach to the matter. Kay rejects objectivist notions of leadership which searches for a "true definition" of it. Rather, he sees leadership "as the creation of
meaning...both directly and through a face-to-face process and also indirectly such as by influencing the development of the organizational or group culture" (p. 297). So saying, he shows remarkable resonance with Mary Follett's "qualities of leadership" discussion in The New State (pp. 228-231). He argues that the "multiple and creative metaphor use is an important aspect of leadership in the voluntary sector, for leadership can be usefully conceptualized as a sense-making and sense-shaping process in which metaphor plays a central role" (p. 285). In prototypical interpretivist fashion, Kay is concerned to understand how leaders use language to make sense of experience, situations and actions, to identify both practice theories and "theories in use," and, finally, to identify the metaphors they use to construct the latter (p. 287).

He studies 26 executives in large service-provision nonprofits in Great Britain, asking them to identify two "critical incidents" over the previous 12 months they believed they had confronted effectively, and two they believed they had handled ineffectively (p. 289). Following from Morgan's observation that "organizations are many things at once" (1986, p. 339), Kay calls upon the five dominant metaphors Morgan uses to describe organizations together with Schöns on "surface language" which serves as an indicator of "deep, generative (or 'core') metaphors" (p. 289). He discovers that not only do these executives routinely use Morgan's five, but three more as well: "journey, game and theater" (Kay, p. 289).

While some metaphors are used more commonly than others (see esp. pp. 290-291), among the more frequent are Morgan's "machine" and "culture" metaphors. The "machine" metaphor, as we have seen, is a dominant one in generalist organization theory. Often, the idea is tied to organization size (i.e., the larger the organization, the more formalized, routinized and "machine"-like). For this sample, however, Kay finds that assumption wanting. While all 26 leaders use that metaphor, leaders of the four largest nonprofits (defined as having two thousand-plus staff) use the machine metaphor less frequently than seven other of their counterparts in smaller organizations (p. 292).

Lending some support to Heimovics and Herman's observations about effective nonprofit leaders' use of multiple "frames" in everyday action cited earlier, Kay finds that these executives are not "either-or" metaphor users. They seem to understand that multiple meanings inhere in every situation, and that "their sensemaking is structured by a wide variety of images of distinct, dominant core metaphors" (pp. 296-297). They are therefore
"multimeta
or" users, calling upon as many as twelve such images with which to consciously make decisions about which metaphors fit individual situations (pp. 292, 295). Not only, then, do they acknowledge the tension such variety can produce, they seem to encourage it. This all leads Kay to conclude that "there is choice in the use of metaphors, not determinism" (p. 292, emphasis in original).

These executives are also "creative metaphor users" (pp. 292-293). This means they are able a) "live with paradox"; which thus allows them b) to engage in creative sensemaking; and c) to "create new meanings" by allowing a tension among and between as many as four core metaphors (p. 293). These leaders, in short, engage in the "management of meaning" (Smircich and Morgan, 1982). They

not only [place] great importance on their own sense making...but also [strive] to develop a shared 'making of sense' of the situation, problem, and reality among others inside and outside of their...organizations. This is the leadership process. Through communication and dialogue with others...those created meanings of the leaders can become shared institutionalized meanings (Kay, p. 296).

Theme IV: Nonprofits as "Mediating Structures"

The final theme in nonprofit organization theory concerns nonprofits as "mediating structures" in society. It is a concept of great power, and constitutes a principal undercurrent in nearly all nonprofit literature. While at least implicit in economic theories and some policy theories, it is both an explicit and dominant theme in nonprofit organization and political theories. The concept thus warrants no small attention.

The term "mediating structures" was developed by Peter Berger and John Neuhaus (1977, 1990) of the American Enterprise Institute. It derives from both Tocqueville's Democracy in America (Stephenson, 1994, p. 1; Smith and Lipsky, 1993, p. 73) and Weberian bureaucratic theory (Weber, [1910] 1972), and refers to "those institutions standing between the individual and his private life and the large institutions of public life" (Berger and Neuhaus 1990, p. 13). Their concern rests with four such institutions: neighborhood, family, church, and voluntary associations (Berger and Neuhaus, 1990, p. 14).

Modernization, they say, has produced "an historically unprecedented dichotomy between public and private life" (1990, p. 13). This dichotomy has, in turn, bred both political and individual crises, which can be seen in terms of the kinds of institutions with which people interact in the day-to-day. Further, the "megastructures" of public life born of
modernization (among them, the state itself, large enterprise firms, and big labor) may be seen by individuals as "typically alienating," "unreal," "even malignant" (1990, p. 13). In this, they "are not helpful in providing meaning and identity for individual existence" (1990, pp. 13-14).

The modern individual's private life offers little succor. Hence, the individual is isolated, uncertain and anxious (1990, p. 13). So then, while public life is "hard" and "personally unsatisfactory," private life is "soft," and "cannot be relied upon" (1990, p. 13).

Enter nonprofit organizations into their scheme. Individuals who might better cope with these crises than others make use of such institutions in the attempt to reconcile, or mediate, the public and private spheres of their lives (1990, p. 14). The realm of nonprofit institutions can thus "[reduce] both the anomic precariousness of individual existence in isolation from society and the threat of alienation to the public order" (1990, p. 14).

Their primary argument is a three-pronged one. The first is analytic:

[w]ithout institutionally reliable processes of mediation, the political order becomes detached from the values and realities of individual life. Deprived of its moral foundation, the political order is 'delegitimated.' When that happens, the political order must be secured by coercion rather than by consent. And when that happens, democracy disappears (1990, p. 14, 15-16).

A central element in their argument is that since mediating structures have empowerment potential, they are the "principal expressions of the real values and the real needs of people in society" (1990, p. 16). That being the case, government is duty-bound to empower mediating structures. As a result, the second prong of their attack, a "programmatic" recommendation, is that "public policy should protect and foster mediating institutions" (1990, p. 16):

Democracy is 'handicapped' by being more vulnerable to the erosion of meaning in its institutions. Cynicism threatens it; wholesale cynicism can destroy it. That is why mediation is so crucial to democracy. Such mediation cannot be sporadic and occasional; it must be institutionalized in structures (1990, p. 14, 16, emphasis in original).

The final prong is another programmatic recommendation: since people "understand their own needs better than anyone else," (p. 16), competent social policy should always emerge from the ground-up. For reasons outlined earlier, this can be done only with mediating structures (1990, pp. 14, 16).
As for social service-providing "voluntary associations" specifically (and as distinct from neighborhood, church and family), Berger and Neuhaus describe them as "a body of people who have voluntarily organized themselves in pursuit of particular goals" (1990, p. 17). They see these organizations as serving two important functions. First, in their political role they serve as "schools for democracy." Second, their historic role as providers of social services was established before the founding of the republic, and (with good reason, they think) continues apace.

They decry both the increasing professionalization of society and the unionization of professionals. They contend that "...ordinary people are the best experts on themselves" (p. 18), and that the professions have failed to realize that their efforts should be in service of society, "not the other way around" (p. 18).

Finally, and echoing what we have seen in other nonprofit organization literature, it remains true that mediating structures can be co-opted by government, that they can become instruments of those interested in destroying rather than reforming American society; and that they can undermine the institutions of the formal polity. These are real risks. On the other side are the benefits....Together they constitute a major challenge to the political imagination (1990, p. 20).

Berger and Neuhaus's formulation now presented, it is interesting to note the ways in which this concept has been applied. Jacqueline DeLaat (1987), for example, uses the concept to advance the idea that volunteering can serve an "integrative" function between and among the three economic sectors.

Charles Wilber and Kenneth Jameson (1981) and, following from them, Van Til (1987), use "mediating institutions" to advance their new political economy view. Say Wilber and Jameson: "Choices made at the national level cannot be relied upon as the most effective manner of working toward revitalization of the U.S. economy. They will...create more mega-institutions" (p. 28). Van Til takes this a bit further, observing that not only is "voluntary action [a] mediating structure...[and] a central focus in the life of society," it "expands to the very heart of governmmental and corporate system, to the core of the political economy" (1987, p. 53).

From a policy perspective, Smith and Lipsky cite government contracting as eroding the autonomy of nonprofits, and thus as having the potential to dilute their mediating role (p. 73). At the same time, they also say that the very fact that nonprofit organizations are
mediating structures may compromise equity in service provision: "the contracting relationship...limits the ability of public officials to insist on absolute norms of equity...." (p. 209).

Several writers have challenged Berger and Neuhaus's concept of "mediating structures." Among the more visible is Lester Salamon (1984) who, in a blistering repudiation of Ronald Reagan's failure to effectively use nonprofit social service organizations in social policy and service delivery in the 1980's, takes Berger and Neuhaus to task, rightly suggesting they were behind the times.

Salamon says that developers and proponents of the concept "took too little account of the extent to which existing government program structures already used mediating institutions for the realization of social purposes, [and emphasized] instead the ways in which government harmed such institutions" (p. 269). At the same time, Salamon finds the concept useful because

by virtue of [Berger and Neuhaus's] explicit acceptance of federal welfare responsibilities and its commitment 'not to revoke the New Deal but to pursue its vision in ways more compatible with democratic governance,' [they offer] a bridge between the conservative and liberal traditions, and a program of action around which a conservative president might muster liberal support (p. 269).

These last three sections have offered a selective review of economic, policy and organization theories of nonprofit organizations. In them, we see many of the same traditional precepts undergirding functionalist theories of social life and of organizations. Berger and Neuhaus's notion of "mediating structures" is a particularly apt ending to the chapter: it is an idea appears with equal force in political-democratic theories of nonprofit organizations, up next for discussion.

Section Five: Political and Democratic Theories

While one cannot deny the value of theories surveyed in the previous sections, they do not necessarily address the locus of Mary Follett's preoccupation: the democratic ideal. There are three reasons why I might say this, all of which derive from arguments Follett herself might advance. First, she would vigorously reject what appears to be a primary assumption in economic and policy theories of nonprofits particularly: that, because
nonprofits arise in response to what might be called objective conditions (e.g., market failure or government failure), they do -- or should -- have narrowly-circumscribed and/or merely instrumental roles in social life.

Second, and following from that, Follett would argue that advancement of the democratic ideal can be neither narrowly-circumscribed, nor can it be an instrumental proposition. The primary aim of the neighborhood group and the social processes inhering therein is to establish relationships sufficient to create a democracy. This is no objective nor instrumental process. As a result, she would argue that economic theories, policy theories, and principles of organization theory (alone) do not offer sufficient justification for, or explanation about, why such organizations should be created and maintained.

Finally, Follett herself does not seem to hold to political ideology of any stripe; and, while she may believe rigid fidelity to any ideology inhibits development of relation, she also believes we should have some understanding of such ideologies because they are a source of "difference." As such, they offer an opportunity for genuine discussion which, in turn, helps integrate difference.

Given what Follett may have argued, we see that the literature surveyed in this chapter, political-democratic theory of nonprofits, is another matter. In the interest of Follett's "understanding," then, I address this realm of nonprofit theory and attempt to link Follett's ideas on citizenship and democracy to it.

Several writers address the "positive" role of nonprofit organizations as they serve to advance -- or enhance -- democratic principles (e.g., Schindler-Rainman and Lippitt, 1971; Bremner, 1977; Chambers, 1987; Van Til, 1988; Cohen and Rogers, 1992; Hirst, 1994). In this chapter, I take some license with two sources, using them as a general organizing

9 In the interest of both balance and good scholarship, it should be noted that some writers suggest theories identifying the "positive" roles of nonprofits in democratic governance do not hold in theory or practice. This "negative" view is particularly evident in Ware's comparative work (1989). It is found also in David Sills's (1968) commentary on "minority rule" and "goal displacement" in nonprofits; in David Horton Smith (1990) who, along with a number of "positives," cites some of what may constitute negative "impacts of the voluntary sector on society"; in Theodore Lowi's (1979) pithy observations about the proliferation of "do-gooder" groups generally; and in Cohen and Rogers (1992), who make note of traditional "natural objections" to the idea of "associative democracy." I do not challenge the validity of these views. My interest, however, rests with the positive nature of nonprofit endeavor.
mechanism. First, I draw on Alan Ware's (1989) exposition of some ways "intermediate organizations" have traditionally been seen as "agents of democracy" (p. 12). I combine that with Jon Van Til's (1988, chapter 3) scheme of viewing three types of voluntary action ("service," "self-help" and "grassroots" volunteering) through the lenses of five dominant democratic theories (pluralism, populism, idealism, social democracy and neo-corporatism) (pp. 41-45). I begin in Section One by citing some dominant themes in democratic theories of nonprofits; and, following in section two, discussion of the parallels and divergences between them and Mary Follett's theory of the state.

**Dominant Themes in Democratic Theories of Nonprofits**

Predictably enough, it appears that many nonprofit democratic theories emerge from a latter Twentieth Century pluralist perspective, which has given birth to a number of themes in the literature. Not incidentally, the pluralist view also affirms a fundamental tenet of much traditional nonprofit literature generally. This is the "need to preserve the autonomy of the major societal sectors in decision-making, and [to preserve] ... multiple centers of power in each of those sectors" (Van Til, 1988, p. 43). We see this pluralist perspective in the work of, among others, Mancur Olson (1971), Eva Schindler-Rainman and Ronald Lippitt (1971), Robert Dahl (1982), Berger and Neuhaus (1977), discussed above, James Douglas (1987), and David Horton Smith (1990).

Schindler-Rainman and Lippitt offer a nice summary of the pluralist view:

In a pluralistic and fragmented democratic social system, made up of many

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10 Ware's term "intermediate organizations" may be seen as rather complementary to Berger and Neuhaus's "mediating structures." It refers to those organizations that "lie between the state and the profit-making sector" (p. 1). Unlike my concern here, which rests with human service-providing nonprofit organizations, his rests with the universe of nonprofit organizations.

11 Van Til uses the terms "voluntary action" in its positive sense. He describes "voluntary association" as more formalized than voluntary action, and the latter refers to "a structured group whose members have united for the purpose of advancing an interest or achieving some social purpose." Voluntary associations in this sense have a "clear aim toward a chosen form of 'social betterment'" in that they couple the group "in some direct way to the larger society" (1988, pp. 7-8).
types of individuals and groups, a major requirement is that the system establish procedures to provide for full communication, for orderly confrontation and conflict resolution, and for the coordination and blending of the energies and interests of the disparate subgroups (p. 6).

The Filer Commission was among the first to explicitly articulate the pluralist perspective on nonprofits. The Commission identifies five "underlying functions of voluntary groups," which they suggest advance democratic aims. Such groups, they say, are important for "initiating new ideas and processes...developing public policy...supporting minority or local interests...providing services that the government is constitutionally barred from providing...[and for] overseeing government" (Filer, 1990, p. 85).

Douglas (1987) moves beyond this rather sketchy accounting, saying that the role of nonprofit organizations in a democracy derives from a number of "categorical constraints" impinging upon government, and each concerns accountability. The "diversity constraint" requires that government afford equal treatment for all citizens. Government efforts must thus be justice-based. Nonprofits have no such constraint (pp. 46-47). As a result, its activities can be more spontaneous and even, if need be, aleatory. Spontaneity, in turn, can release that style of human warmth and loving care that a generalized pattern of defensible rules tends to crush. At its best, voluntary action can be based on true charity...(Douglas, 1987, p. 46).

The "experimentation constraint" attends to the fact that nonprofits have fewer constituencies to convince of the rightness of certain endeavors, while the state must make its case with the population at large (Douglas, 1987, pp. 48-49). Finally, the "bureaucratization constraint" says that the state "must treat equals equally and it must show that it is doing so" (Douglas, 1987, p. 49); while nonprofit organizations, being "private," are not so constrained.12

Pluralism also lauds the ability of nonprofits to help "[mobilize]...interests and demands in...society" (Ware, p. 21). Certainly we see this theme in economic theories. As for democratic theories, the theme is an old one, developed early David Truman's (1951) piece on political interests in politics, and in Robert Nisbet's (1962) work on community and

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12 For Douglas, "bureaucratization" refers to "the rigidly rule-bound requirements and restraints that [public] administrators are almost forced to impose, since they may be called upon to defend their actions publicly in any specific case" (1987, p. 50).
power. Much later, we see this same theme in Ronald Schmidt's (1988) work on cultural pluralism, and Raffaella Nanetti's (1980) on city planning.

Pluralism also gives root to the "mediating institutions" theme, discussed earlier. Several writers suggest that nonprofits, and/or voluntary action arising therein, derive legitimacy in a democracy to the extent that they serve as mediating forces between the individual and what might be called the "distant state" (Schindler-Rainman and Lippitt, 1971; Weber, [1910] 1972; Berger and Neuhaus, 1977; Comuelle, 1983a; Lerner, 1983; Ware, 1989).

Max Weber, for example, sees "voluntary associations" as mediating "the transition between the closed hierarchical society of the Old World and the fragmented individualism of the New World" (cited in Lerner, 1983, pp. 81-82), a view clearly shared in its more contemporary incarnation by Berger and Neuhaus. These mediating structures are seen as helping individuals and groups to acquire the capacities to be "democratic persons" or to develop a "democratic personality." This, in turn, strengthens democratic structures, processes and procedures (Schindler-Rainman and Lippitt, 1971, p. 5; also Bellah, et al., 1985, 1991; Smith, 1990). Max Lerner (1983), for example, sees participation in nonprofit organizations as a way to "avoid the excesses...of state worship and of complete individualism" (p. 86).

Pluralists, while generally supportive of most forms of voluntary action, more heartily approve of those providing the broadest opportunities for decision-making (e.g., the "self-help" variety). Community-based "bottom-up" action is seen as messy, and a threat to the social and pluralist order, in that it "[shortcuts] more established paths to participation...." (Van Til, 1988, pp. 45, 50, 51).

The "struggle" theme seems most evident in social democratic ideology, and resides in ideas about distributive justice — social, political, and economic. Central ideas in this view are "participation, the reduction of inequality, and the special role of the state in assuring democracy" (Van Til, 1988, pp. 43-44).

Social democratic views attack pluralism head-on, charging that it promotes elitism and inegalitarianism, that it is "insufficiently aimed toward the provision of justice in its quest to balance interests...."; and that, as a result, it serves to undermine, or even destroy, whatever cohesion may exist in a political community (Van Til, 1988, p. 43). Tocqueville comments on this:
Among the laws that rule human societies there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which equality of conditions is increased ([1835] 1983, p. 57).

The "struggle" issue for the social democrat involves the difficulty of individuals alone to ameliorate such systemic and long-standing problems as poverty, hunger, or inadequate health care (Van Til, 1988, p. 52). The state may have a "special role in assuring democracy"; however, its power (to say nothing of the power of large enterprise institutions) is oppressive. As a result, individuals (who must "struggle" to be heard) have little choice but to band together in an organized, ground-up, collective effort to effect change. Both Gar Alperovitz and Marcus Raskin subscribe to this idea. Raskin, for example, says that grassroot effort may help to "[withdraw] legitimacy from the colonizing apparatus' of state and large institutions, while providing a chance for its participants to embrace their humanity of developing 'projects' for the restructuring of political society along more fully democratic lines" (quoted in Van Til, 1988, p. 53). The value of "self-help" and "grassroots" varieties of voluntary action is central to social democratic thought. The former, however informal and "spontaneous," may arbitrate and become an "independent [center] of political consciousness and action" when social change is afoot (Van Til, 1988, pp. 52-53). As for the latter, they take the view that decentralized collective action is essential for the survival of democracy.

The "role of the state" theme is one we saw in economic and policy theories. As those indicate, the proliferation of "the contract state" engendered profound questions about the role of the state and of nonprofits alike. A dominant political philosophy which seeks to answer some of these questions is the "neocorporatist" view, one that weds democratic theory to economics and nonprofit organizations, and has as its central concerns social order (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985) and decentralization of power and authority (Hirst, 1994). That it also seeks to advance democratic aims is questionable.

Neocorporatism, variously described as "associative democracy" (Hirst), or "associative order" (Streeck and Schmitter), is not new and has its genesis in Nineteenth Century reformism. Its latter-day incarnation may be said to rest with four overarching beliefs. The first is a normative proposition, which argues against individualism and seeks instead to advance individual freedom. It says that, as far as is practicable, the widespread use of organized associations is essential for they help promote both liberty and the general
welfare (Hirst, p. 19). Second, freedom's efficacy rests with the ability of people "both enabled and supported by society [to join] with their fellows in voluntary associations..." (Hirst, pp. 19-20). Third, and as a result, "[a]ssociations must...be protected by a public power that can enforce the rule of law and also, where necessary, be funded by the public through taxation" (Hirst, p. 20). Finally, since the market is the best arbiter of certain social goods, government's role should be a narrowly circumscribed one (Van Til, 1988, p. 47).

We saw these principles in action during the Reagan years. His policy of nearly wholesale privatization of social services formerly provided by government was most evidently embodied in the Presidential Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives. While seen as a monumental failure vis-a-vis nonprofits and voluntary action generally (e.g., Van Til, 1988, p. 47; Salamon, 1984; Corneuelle, 1983b), the Task Force advanced two themes, each "wrapped in a mantle of the glorification of the [neocorporatist] concept," (Van Til, 1988, p. 47). First, "voluntarism is a major source for the provision of social services"; and second, "decision-making in the voluntary sector should be the prerogative of a variety of 'public-private partnerships' (Van Til, 1988, p. 47).

Given the four central neocorporatist "associative democracy" principles, and their application during the Reagan years, it is unsurprising Van Til (1988) would observe that, for proponents of that view, "the major value of volunteering is found in the tax savings it engenders, and not in its strengthening of democracy" (p. 46).

The "countervailing power" theme is evident most often when viewed through the populist lens and, to a lesser extent, the social democratic lens (Ware, p. 12; Van Til, 1988, pp. 43-44, 47-48). In much the way economic theories of nonprofits see them as a "check" on the failures of either government or the market, some democratic theories address the ability of nonprofits to check the potent power of the state (Tocqueville, [1835] 1990; Wuthnow, 1991, p. 302; Cohen and Rogers, 1992; Ware, 1989, p. 13). Waldemar Nielsen (1983), for example, says that "third sector" institutions represent the organized pestiferousness of the active citizenry on all those issues where the standard organs of representative government including legislatures and political parties do not perform effectively, either because they have become ossified or corrupted. They are stubborn and belligerent protection against nonfeasance and malfaisance by government [and stand] between the citizen and the dangers of bureaucratic and political misconduct...[They are] an indispensable, inbuilt adaptive and survival mechanism (pp. 368-369).
Another theme rooted in populism is the idea that nonprofits can mediate the tension between self-interest and cooperation. Van Til cites Lawrence Goodwyn (1978) as the standard-bearer here. Goodwyn describes the populism of the latter Nineteenth Century as "an assertion of how people can act in the name of the idea of freedom. At root, American Populism was a demonstration of what authentic political life can be in a functioning democracy" (p. 296, emphasis in original). He further notes, writing with some eloquence, that the populist movement was a "moment of democratic promise," a spirit expressed "in a self-generated culture of collective dignity and individual longing" (p. 295). Nearly 150 years before Goodwyn, Tocqueville expresses much the same sentiment:

Feelings and opinions are recruited, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is developed only by the reciprocal influence of men upon one another. I have shown that these influences are almost null in democratic countries; they must be artificially created, and this can only be accomplished by associations ([1835] 1983, p. 55).

As for populism's view of voluntarism, it is unsurprising that "service volunteering" would be a less attractive alternative than either the "self-help" or the "grassroots" variety (Van Til, 1988, pp. 47-48).

The "democratic values" theme does not seem to be captive to any specific political ideology, but is taken up, to one degree or another, by most of them. We note the idea of democratic values in the "laundry list" of values founders of Independent Sector generally agreed either should or do direct nonprofit activity. These values, what Wood and Hougland (1990) have called "selfless values" evident in the American character, are not the exclusive purview of nonprofit organizations, but are "essentially those of a democratic society" (O'Connell, 1988, p. 157). Among them are "responsibility, freedom, justice and responsibilities for citizenship" (O'Connell, 1988, p. 156).

As for freedom, often included in enumeration of democratic values, James Douglas (1983) has observed that "[t]he extent to which, in any society, [nonprofit] organizations are free and healthy is probably as good a measure as any of how far that society can be called free" (p. 15). Tocqueville, too, comments on this:

Nothing, in my opinion, is more deserving of our attention than the intellectual and moral associations of America. ...they are as necessary to the American people as [political and industrial associations], and perhaps more so. In democratic countries, the science of associations is the mother science; the progress of all the rest depends upon the progress it has made.
Among the laws that rule human societies there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all the others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased ([1835] 1983, pp. 56-57).

The "arenas of participation" theme (Ware, pp. 13-14) or, alternatively, the "nonprofits as 'schools for democracy'" theme, may be said to be in keeping with some in the pluralist camp (e.g., Berger and Neuhaus). It is also consonant, however, with much in interpretive social theory outlined in Chapter Two, as well as with idealist political ideology. The idealist sees the polity "as the locus of dialogue and mutual enlightenment" (Van Til, 1988, p. 42). As such, politics itself is not constituted by garden-variety "bargaining." Rather, it is "a process of mutual education and the creation of community" (Van Til, 1988, p. 42) born of face-to-face dialogue. That being the case, substantive citizen participation is a "humanizing activity" (Van Til, 1988, p. 42), which rests with locating oneself in a "rational community."

Political participation, then,... is an activity, an experience, a reciprocity of consciousness among morally and politically equal rational agents who freely come together and deliberate with one another for the purpose of concerting their wills in the positing of collective goals and in the performance of common actions (Wolff, 1968, p. 192).

Interestingly, this is a view recently advanced by management specialist Peter Drucker (1993) who says that the "megastate has all but destroyed citizenship" such that responsibility, active commitment -- or even the need to exercise them -- lie dormant (pp. 171-172). At the same time, and citing the "upsurge" in volunteer activity in nonprofit organizations in recent years, he says that nonprofits can, and do, bring these essentialities of citizenship back to life (pp. 175-176).

For Drucker, organizations comprising this "autonomous social sector" (1993, p. 171, emphasis in original) are mechanisms wherein people can "recreate" citizenship, discover a sense of community, can alleviate the "emptiness" of post-capitalist society life, and can feel as though they are making a contribution to something larger than themselves (1993, pp. 175-178).

Their beliefs about politics notwithstanding (i.e., that it is "a process of mutual education and the creation of community" born of face-to-face interaction), idealists harbor
healthy mistrust of nonprofit organizations and voluntary action generally. This seems to stems from the concern that such organizations may be captive to larger, more powerful bureaucratic forces (notably, the state). This concern leads contemporary idealist Theodore Lowi (1979), for example, to remark that "[a]ll of the larger voluntary associations, as well as most of the smaller ones have given up their spontaneity for a solid administrative core" (p. 28).

A second concern of contemporary idealists is the particularistic nature of nonprofit or voluntary endeavor, to say nothing of its unremitting intrusion upon individual and collective life. Lowi decries the proliferation of "do-gooder groups," those "manifestly dedicated to ministering to one problem or another of socialization or social control" (p. 28). He sees them as creating an unnecessary formalism in everyday life such that almost nothing is left to the family, clan, neighborhood, or guild -- or to chance. Even sandlot baseball has given way to Little Leagues, symptomatic of an incredible array of parental groups and neighborhood businesses organized to see that the child's every waking moment is organized, unprivate, wholesome, and, primarily, oriented toward an ideal of adjustment to the adult life of rationality that comes too soon (p. 28).

As for the idealist position on voluntary action, it is largely skeptical. For the idealist, nonprofit organizations can only legitimate themselves, lay claim to having a role in democratic governance, indeed only have value, when they emerge as expressions of "the active will and voice of the people" (Van Til, 1988, p. 50). This is a fine segue to discussion of Mary Follett and her links to democratic theories of nonprofits.

**Mary Parker Follett and Democratic Theories of Nonprofits**

In his discussion of the various lenses through which we can view voluntary action, Jon Van Til locates Mary Follett in the idealist camp (1988, p. 49). This may be a most likely place for her, but I should note yet again that her views do not seem confined to a single political ideology, but rather traverse their spectrum. As illustration, we find her diverging on two key tenets of idealist philosophy. First, recall that, as Van Til outlines, idealists generally view voluntary nonprofit endeavor skeptically. This is particularly true of Lowi, who voices his concern with needless proliferation of "do-gooder groups," and with their intrusion into all aspects of life.
Follett does not share those concerns. While Lowi would want some areas of life considered "private," Follett says that "all our private life is to be public life" (p. 42). Likewise, in her three-pronged "new system of ethics," she proposes that "there is no private conscience" (p. 52). Still later, she says that "there is no line where the life of the home ends and the life of the city begins. There is no wall between my private life and the public life" (p. 189). This is not to suggest that privacy is to be sacrificed. Rather, all human interaction "must in its way be serving the common cause...because there is always the consciousness of my most private concerns as tributary to the larger life of [people]" (Follett, p. 42).

As for Lowi's concern for the proliferation of "do-gooder groups," Follett would counter that concern as well. She believes that, since people are manifestly social creatures, the desire for group association is very nearly compulsive. Further, since she also believes that "[people are] a complex of experiences [and that] there are many selves in one" (p. 20), membership in not only a single group, but in many, is the surest way for the individual to acquire "true understanding of his [or her] place in society [and in his or her] relation to the state" (p. 171).

Save those divergences, Follett's agreement with idealist political thought is nearly total. She defines the "democratic community," for example, as "one in which the common will is being gradually created by the civic activity of its citizens. The test of democracy is the fulness with which this is being done" (p. 51). This is not, of course, Follett's whole point. For her, the efficacy of citizenship, of democracy itself, rests only with the quality of individual and group development and relationship. Thus, she defines "public spirit" as "the recognition that it is not merely that my city, my nation needs me, but that I need it as the larger sphere of a larger self-expression" (p. 83).

Central to idealism is the idea of active responsibility, a recurring theme in Follett. "No one can give us democracy," she says, "we must learn democracy" (p. 22). Further, "no member of a group which is to create can be passive. All must be active and constructively active...." (p. 28). The result of this constructive, conscious action is "the substitution of intention for accident, of organized purpose for scattered desire" (p. 8). Finally, constructive group association can make the individual see that each "is the state at every moment" (p. 12, emphasis in original).

Follett reserves her most vociferous attacks for pluralist democratic views. Her primary concern here is the divisive nature of pluralism, for her aim is integration or
unification, not consensus or compromise. She therefore rejects the pluralist "competing demands" argument (Follett, pp. 29, 63-65), saying that "[s]ome of the pluralists tend to lose the individual in the group; others, to abandon the state for the group. But the individual, the group, the state—they are all there to be reckoned with—we cannot ignore or minimize any one" (p. 10).

A related argument, designed to attack the "particularistic" nature of pluralistic politics, is framed in her definition of "morality." She says, first, that "we can have no true moral judgment except as we live our life with others" (p. 55). Second, morality is characterized by "integrated individuals acting as a whole, evolving whole ideas, working for whole ideals." (p. 57).

Her conception of "difference" is also related to her repudiation of the pluralist "competing demands" argument. "Difference" is seen as "much larger than mere pluralism" (p. 40). That is, "every difference that is swept up into a bigger conception feeds and enriches society; every difference which is ignored feeds on society and eventually corrupts it" (p. 40). That being the case, she rejects any interaction having "zero-sum" potential, and instead calls for creative uses of conflict or "difference" (pp. 40-41).

For Follett, "difference" is a fundamental tool with which to advance understanding and integration. "We must learn to think of discussion not as a struggle, but as an experiment in cooperation" (p. 97). Recall she also says that "the only use for my difference is to join it with other differences. The unifying of opposites is the eternal process" (p. 29). Note, this is not a "reconciliation of opposites" (p. 29n) such as the pluralists would have it. It is integration or unification, another process (and result) altogether. It is the circular and self-reinforcing social process that matters, and it is the social process which has the potential to "unify" difference: "Differences develop within the social process and are united through the social process" (p. 63).

The notable effect of properly dealing with "difference" is that it engenders "an enrichment of our personalities that together we shall mount to new heights of understanding and endeavor" (p. 41). Further, "[d]ifference itself is not a vital force, but what accompanies it is—the unifying spirit" (p. 41).

Follett would also generally support the populist idea that neighborhood groups have the potential to bridge self-interest and cooperation. She would again link this to "difference." By discussing and acting on differences, we come to learn that "our interests are inextricably
interwoven. The question is not what is best for me or for you, but for all of us" (p. 81).

On much the same grounds as she would reject Lowi's concern for the intrusion of "do-gooder groups" into all areas of life, she would also reject the pluralist's "mediating institutions/structures" argument. There are three fundamental reasons in addition, however.

First, Follett would argue that pluralism (indeed, all political ideologies discussed here) takes the state as a "given." Second, she would also argue that the idea of "mediating institutions" is a reification. Follett is very clear that neither her "neighborhood group," nor the state, nor democracy itself, can exist absent the sustained and substantive interaction of individuals who meet regularly to learn together, to create and to help evolve ideals and ideas of importance for them. Thus, the group, the state, and democracy do not antedate an active social process, nor can they be animated without it. Indeed, it is only through this process that each is animated. People become "democratic persons" or develop "democratic personalities" only through this process. Thus the state cannot be a "given." Those are much the same reasons she would advance for the charge that the "mediating institutions" concept is a reification.

The third reason why Follett might argue against the pluralist "mediating structures" theme concerns responsibility, a principal theme for her. In this, she telegraphs her belief and great faith in the ability of people to "make meaning" and thus engage in intelligent action.

She would argue that most political ideologies -- pluralism in particular -- blunts the potential for people to develop collective ideas. As for responsibility, the "mediating institutions" concept seems to assume that people are passive, perhaps having neither the will nor the capacity to create for themselves the lives they would have. It thus seems to assume that these "structures" are created by some force outside the people themselves.

For Follett, such assumptions are anathema, for they reinforce a distrust she believes has been present since the founding of the republic. In discussion of the views of the Framers, for example, she writes: "the individual was given no large positive function...while the government was given no positive power" (p. 164). Thus, "power was not granted

\[13\] For a good discussion of this idea, see Curt Ventriss (1987, 1989).
because no [person] and no institution was trusted" (p. 165). Most importantly for Follett, this distrust undermines the group process.

Follett would heartily support the idealist concept of nonprofits or "neighborhood groups" as arenas of participation or "schools for democracy." She would add, however, that arenas are created in, and defined by, the social process. Further, "[c]itizenship is not to be learned in good government classes or current events courses or lessons in civics. It is to be acquired only through those modes of living and acting which shall teach us how to grow the social consciousness" (p. 363).

Although Follett would harbor great regard -- and hope -- for voluntary action generally, she would also share the idealist's skepticism of it. She would agree that the legitimacy and value of neighborhood groups can accrue only to the extent that they are the expressions of "the active will and voice of the people" (Van Til, 1988, p. 50).

Follett would be mightily uncomfortable with the neocorporatist view of the role of the state. She would take issue not only with its political vision, but its consequent privatization/contracting policies, and its instrumental view of voluntary action. She notes that "[c]ontract never creates one will" (p. 124). She would perhaps call its view "fallacious," seeing it as paternalism. She says, "[t]here are many forms of the fallacy that the governing and the governed can be two different bodies, and this one of conforming to standards which we have not created must be recognized as such before we can have any sound foundation for society" (p. 53).

The "struggle" theme evident in social democratic theory is one Follett would generally reject, saying that "struggle suggests conquest and domination; it implies necessarily victors and vanquished" (p. 96). For Follett the "struggle" is not one grounded in the desire for distributive justice, such as the social democrats would have it. Rather, people struggle "for the freedom of [their] nature. What is [their] nature? Manifold being" (p. 291). For Follett, the neighborhood group can stem the struggle and, in so doing, make real one's "manifold being." Further, there is no small fear of government in social democratic theory. Follett says this can be overcome: "[w]e need not fear the State if we could understand it as the unifying power" (p. 314).

Follett would also reject, although not summarily, a central element of social democratic thought: that people must "struggle" to be heard in an oppressive state, big-business, big-labor environment. Recall social democrats believe that that environment
perforce compels people to "resort," as it were, to bottom-up, collective action in an effort to "[withdraw] legitimacy from the colonizing apparatus' of state and large institutions" (Raskin, quoted in Van Til, 1988, p. 53). Follett would say, first, that the objective is not to wrest power and authority from institutions, but rather to strive for "unification" or "integration" among and between them. Second, she would also see bottom-up collective action as a force of community will, and would thus question whether people were somehow compelled to do it by forces outside the control of the community.

Further, and as noted, she does not believe the state to reside in any institution. Rather, "the true state is not an arbitrary creation. It is a process: a continual self-modification to express its different stages of growth which each and all must be so flexible that continual change of form is twin-fellow of continual growth" (p. 315). That, she would say, is how change is effected. "The state is not the servant of the people. The state must be the people before it can reach a high degree of effective accomplishment" (p. 140, emphases in original).

She would generally agree, however, that bottom-up collective action provides people the opportunity to "embrace their humanity of developing 'projects' for the restructuring of political society along more fully democratic lines" (Raskin, quoted in Van Til, 1988, p. 53). She would see this "restructuring," however, as born of social processes. "Democracy," she says, "is every one building the single life, not my life and others, not the individual and the state, but my life bound up with others, the individual which is the state, the state which is the individual" (p. 156, emphases in original).

She would also see this restructuring as a forever evolving form of "progress." For Follett, "progress implies respect for the creative process not the created thing; the created thing is forever and forever being left behind us" (p. 98). Most importantly for Follett, however,

Democracy must be conceived as a process, not a goal. We do not want rigid institutions, however good. We need no 'body of truth' of any kind, but the will to will, which means the power to make our own government, or own institutions, our own expanding truth. We progress, not from one institution to another, but from a lesser to a greater will to will (p. 99).

On much the same grounds, Follett would be contemptuous of the idea, found in populism and social democratic thought, that nonprofits can serve as "countervailing powers"
to the distant state or large enterprise institutions. She would, however, agree with one comment, noted earlier, from Waldemar Nielsen (1983):

without the opportunity for...manifestations of citizen initiative--outside the usual channels of parties and politics when those become blocked--the American system would progressively lose its resilience and ultimately destroy its own legitimacy. The Third Sector, then, in addition to its other great services to American democracy, is an indispensable, inbuilt adaptive and survival mechanism (p. 369).

Conclusion
So concludes this section on democratic theories of nonprofits and Mary Follett's agreement and disagreement with them. We find her at odds with many of the dominant ideas advanced for the role, legitimacy, and efficacy of nonprofits in a democratic society. At the same time, and unsurprisingly, we see that she does not take any specific ideological stance. Rather, she is more concerned about the qualitative texture of social processes as they serve to advance the democratic ideal. Indeed, she sees rigid ideological positions as undermining the democratic ideal because they have the potential to calcify the very processes she believes can foster its realization. Hence, she believes both process and ideal transcend ideology.

In the chapters that follow, I analyze Follett's "five ways for producing the integrated and responsible neighborhood," all of which she says can advance the democratic ideal. In this analysis, using the "new" eyes of interpretive social theory and Chicago School pragmatism as counterpoise to the traditional view, it is my hope that we can begin to get an idea of what Follett "really" intends in The New State.
CHAPTER SIX

"CANDLES OF THE NATION": COMMUNITY-BASED NONPROFIT HUMAN SERVICE INSTITUTIONS IN THE PROCESS OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE

(PART I)

The First Five Chapters In Brief

It is useful to summarize the central arguments in each of the foregoing seven chapters. Chapter One sets the stage for the work, and identifies "the" problem this work seeks to address. Using Rittel and Webber's "tame-wicked" distinction rather as foil, together with the case of 1965 and 1992 South Central rebellions as illustration, I make three arguments. First, I argue that, in general terms, we have tended to see society and organizations from a traditional or functionalist perspective. This tendency is manifest, I say, in literature that explores organizations, policy sciences, mainstream public administration, and nonprofit organizations alike.

In my second argument, I contend that we have been inclined to attempt explanation of Mary Follett's work in The New State in traditional terms as well. As a result, we have found it easy to dismiss her contributions because they are not "sensical" to us. I thus offer interpretive social and organization theory and the Chicago School Pragmatism of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead together with the transformational theory of Orion White and Cynthia McSwain as alternative "eyes" with which to view Follett.

My third argument follows from the second. We in public administration must consciously consider and encourage community contextual relations ("context") of the kind Follett advances if social policy planning is to have any enduring effect upon the lives of people.

Chapter two argues that, although we traditionally have tried to understand society objectively, the only sensible way to understand a social order is to see it in terms of collectively-developed meanings which, in turn, become stabilized or institutionalized as the social process producing them, matures. Interpretivist social theory helps us to understand this, and thus is offered as one alternative to the traditional view.

Chapter three supplements, and gives added richness to, an interpretive view of social action. Here, I introduce pragmatist John Dewey and his views of democracy and
education, George Herbert Mead and his behavioral process view of social relations and action, and Orion White and Cynthia McSwain's "rules" for process.

I note that pragmatism is an essential ingredient to any analysis of Follett's work because unlike interpretivism, which has difficulty with the "scale" problem in democratic politics, pragmatism embraces politics. Indeed, both Dewey and Mead argue from the belief that democracy is an all-encompassing and moral ideal. We find Dewey and Mead therefore contending that the scale "problem" is no problem: organized properly, they say, not only is politics but genuine democracy itself, possible.

In the brief history of Twentieth Century organization theory in chapter four, I note the differences between functionalist and interpretivist views of organizations. We see that the "machine" metaphor dominant in much Twentieth Century organization theory has caused us to understand organizations in much the way we have attempted to understand society (i.e., as a "machine" with functional problematic "parts" that can be fixed in some objective unitary way). Interpretive organization theory offers a different, albeit equally valid, view of organizational life as it attends to meaning and its function in that life.

Chapter five looks broadly at the nonprofit literature. This review demonstrates that, as it is with our machine views of both society and organizations, nonprofit theory (particularly as it has developed in theories of economics, policy and organization) features much the same traditional cast. I say the challenge to theory is to articulate how the vibrant relationship between government and nonprofits can be affirmed and legitimated in some substantive way that allows for development of cohesive, integrated social policy planning. This, I suggest, can come by viewing nonprofits from a process-centered qua pragmatic perspective. This chapter also looks at political-democratic theories of nonprofit organizations. In comparing Follett's world view with that literature, we find that Follett does not fit definitely into any one ideological cubbyhole. This concerns her not at all. Rather, she makes clear that ideology has no place in the new state; and that her process-centered approach to social action must, indeed, transcend mere ideological concerns.

The vital link throughout these first five chapters has been Mary Follett's world view as articulated in The New State. Hence, each of the foregoing chapters seeks to advance three fundamental points, all of which derive from Follett. First, people -- social creatures that they are -- want to be responsible and active in the lives they would have with both themselves and with the larger world.
Second, if we are to expect anything approaching enduring social change born of competent social policy planning, we must begin to look at society and organizations (indeed, democracy itself) in a different way. The long-held machine view of social life, of organization, and of social policy can no longer hold, for such a view paints what is, at best, an inadequate picture. It therefore offers what are, at best, inadequate "answers."

Finally, the most fundamental argument I make throughout is that our single most compelling mandate as a people today is nothing less than keeping the social order intact. Central to accomplishment of that mandate, it seems to me, are public and nonprofit organizations, both attending to community processes in service of competent social policy planning and the democratic ideal.

Introduction

Follett argues the neighborhood is more than "the physical contiguity of people;" and that "[t]he place bond must give way to the conscious of real union" (p. 204). Such consciousness evolves via five interdependent and complex elements, all of which have their "home" in the neighborhood group. This chapter and the next analyze those elements, her "five ways for producing the integrated and responsible neighborhood" (p. 207), and uses interpretivism and pragmatism to analyze them. The analysis has three objectives. First, it suggests that our traditional "old eye" view of Follett's work may be an impoverished one. As we examine the work through the eyes of interpretivism and pragmatism, however, we can see what she may "really" mean as she delineates the activities she contends make for such a neighborhood.

Second, the analysis attempts to outline the various aspects of context-building. For my purposes here, therefore, Follett's "five ways" become "context-building activities."

Finally, the analysis is intended to show that Mary Follett's unwavering faith in the efficacy of neighborhood organizations as they promote individual and group development in service of the democratic ideal is not misplaced. I therefore attempt to demonstrate that the positive characteristics Follett saw in her Nineteenth Century "neighborhood groups" are alive and well in their late Twentieth Century counterparts. In this, I take both John Dewey's and Mary Follett's view, which the former well-articulates: "[d]emocracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighborly community" ([1927] 1954, p. 213).

As the chapters on theories of nonprofit organizations might indicate, to say nothing
of myriad works on government contracting and privatization (see, e.g., Weddell, 1986; Johnson, 1989; Salamon, 1989; Gormley, 1991; Kettl, 1993; Smith and Lipsky, 1993), government already sees the functional value of community-based nonprofit human service institutions to the administrative state. That value notwithstanding, and as I argue in the first chapter, such institutions can, and do, provide much more to the democratic ideal. We need only look at them a little differently to see it. I argue that, to view them more properly, we must look to the unique interpretive and pragmatic character of these institutions in our democracy. In short, this chapter, the work generally, invites us to look at community-based nonprofit human service institutions "a little differently" -- just as Mary Follett did.

Mary Parker Follett’s "Five Ways for Producing the Integrated and Responsible Neighborhood": An Analysis (Part 1)

In this chapter, I analyze the first three of Follett's five ways for "producing the integrated and responsible neighborhood" (i.e., her five context-building activities). The fourth and fifth context-building activities will be taken up in the next chapter.

It is useful to note that Follett's discussion of the five context-building activities is preceded by a listing of five "advantages" she sees as inhering in neighborhood organizations generally. In that discussion, we find her using the context-building activities to build a case for each of the five advantages she itemizes earlier. I will therefore note each advantage as its meaning becomes clear in discussion of the context-building activity she posits to support it.

Follett's First Context-Building Activity

"[R]egular meetings of neighbors for the consideration of neighborhood and civic problems, not merely sporadic and occasional meetings for specific objects" (p. 204).

From an interpretivist and pragmatic perspective, Follett's term, "regular meetings," is a rich and consequential one. In what follows, I advance the argument that the idea of "regularity" undergirds nearly all substantive elements asserted in both interpretive and Chicago School pragmatic thought. Hence, I argue that much is created by, and bound up in, "regularity" as Follett seems to mean it. Figure 1 (Addenda) illustrates the several
elements I suggest Follett seems to argue constitute this first context-building activity. In this and all such activities, there are three kinds of elements at work: those that are developed, those that are discovered, and those both developed and discovered. I have supplied a figure for each of the five context-building activities, and these elements are appropriately noted in each figure.

The singular point Follett attempts to make as regards this activity is that "regular meetings" open wide the door for the coming of a healthy social process that can in turn give rise to enduring social change. Indeed, the fact that Follett lists this activity first may give some indication of the significance she attaches to it.

Before launching into my arguments, I first review what Follett herself says about this context-building activity. For Follett, the primary benefit of regular meetings in neighborhood organizations is that such meetings provide a principal forum within which a "neighborhood consciousness" can be animated (p. 208). This consciousness, as always, attends the democratic ideal: "the men and women of those neighborhoods, while getting to know one another and their local conditions, can be training themselves to function with government and as government" (p. 207).

Follett uses "community centres" as illustration, saying that such institutions have multiple functions in the life of the community. All such functions are, or should be, directed toward development of the "neighborhood consciousness" about which she speaks. She sees community centers as a principal means by which people can discover and channel not only their own distinctive capacities, but also those of the community as a whole. To the

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1 It is entirely possible that when Follett extols the virtues of the neighborhood group, she is referring specifically to community centers and/or settlement houses. She was instrumental in creation and management of a number of such community-based organizations in Boston, and helped develop programs -- after-school study and recreation clubs housed in public schools -- that are staples of settlement house activity (see, e.g., Graham, 1995, pp. 15-16; Fox and Urwick, 1973, pp. xii-xv).

Follett scholars Elliot Fox and Lyndall Urwick note her contributions to the community center movement nationwide. They say she found in them "creativity ... enthusiastic participation...salutary change in individual attitude [and]...progress in the art of self-government" such that she was convinced these organizations constituted "a great untapped resource for the solution of social problems" (p. xv).
extent that such institutions help the community identify "its own desires, its own gifts, its own inherent powers to bring to the life of the whole city," they are primary mechanisms by which to develop "self-realization of the neighborhood" (Follett, p. 205).

For Follett, regular meetings constitute the most fundamental of activities, the essential precondition for all that follows on the path to building a healthy social process. At a practical (structural) level, "regular" meetings means, first, some level of consciously-enacted formal organization. Formal organization, in turn, implies continuity or constancy ("regularity"). She is crystal clear about this, earlier arguing that group organization signals "the substitution of intention for accident, of organized purpose for scattered desire" (p. 8).

That observation indicates that Follett may view formal organization in much the way the interpretivist does. Never would she suggest, for example, that formal organization is an element apart from the individuals or groups creating it. For Follett, formal organization is nothing more than what Ditlev would call a "tangible construct" people develop with which to learn the "laws of association" (Follett, p. 19). These are learned in a dynamic social process that social actors themselves socially construct within an organized medium. This helps explain why she says that "the strength of the group does not depend on the greatest number of strong [people], but on the strength of the bond between them, that is, on the amount of solidarity, on the best organization" (Follett, p. 96).

Follett's ideas on formal organization also help explain why she believes traditional top-down reforms fail to work; and this is a view she shares with John Dewey. Both contend that genuine and enduring reform, if it is to come, must arise from the bottom, up. Recall Follett's observation: "Our political forms will have no vitality unless our political life is so organized that it shall be based primarily and fundamentally on spontaneous association" (p. 202). She earlier argues that "the organization of [people] in small, local groups must be the next form which democracy takes" (p. 142). For Dewey, we will remember that development of a state, as constituted by both public officials and a "public," is an "experimental process," one which can only come into being when an "organized community" can begin to bring innovative solutions to problems (Dewey, [1927] 1954, pp. 31, 33, 61-62).

As it is with the interpretivists, Follett also seems to think, as Gareth Morgan has observed, that "order in the social world...rests in a precarious, socially constructed web of symbolic relationships that are continuously negotiated, renegotiated, affirmed or changed"
(1984, p. 313). As Follett would see it, "order in the social world," as constituted by "laws of association," awaits discovery in the social process made possible in part by formal organization of neighborhood groups.

Follett’s agreement with both pragmatists and interpretivists as regards regularity (however implicitly the interpretivists in particular address it) appears to be nearly complete. This agreement specifically regards the centrality of regular face-to-face interaction which, as we already know, is a notion that holds a place of prominence in both interpretive and pragmatic thought. Interpretivism contends that genuine understanding can develop only through regular everyday interaction that is direct and face-to-face. Follett would thus echo Gadamer, and suggest that regular meetings serve as forums within which the "unending conversation" that is the social process begins. Pragmatist John Dewey certainly agrees, when he says that the "Great Community" he advocates "must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse" ([1927] 1954], p. 211).

Such regular interaction helps social actors come to understand and appreciate Schutz’s "finite provinces of meaning," or White and McSwain’s "projections," or what Mead calls "socially functional individual behavior" social actors bring to the social process. Follett’s corollary to those ideas is "difference" (as in "society needs every man’s difference," p. 33n).

If that is all so, for Follett "regular meetings" set the stage for establishment of a healthy social process which must be consciously and continuously sustained to work properly. That being the case, "sporadic and occasional meetings" simply won’t do the job. Just as importantly, regular meetings of neighborhood groups also provide a principal framework within which individual development can flower. That, too, requires conscious and constant sustenance — regularity.

To sum up to this point, Follett seems to indicate she believes there is an interdependence between and among formal organization, continuity or constancy, idiosyncratic meanings ("difference"), and how the last can be integrated and made effective in group experience. As people come together in regular meetings, not only is "difference" made manifest, but the "commonplace features of everyday life" (Bailey, p. 274) are articulated as well. Thus regular meetings have, at minimum, a two-fold task: first, they should help social actors identify and attempt to understand just what "commonplace features" may be at work, and what they may mean to the group; and second, to provide a
forum within which difference may be integrated or unified. In this way, neighborhood "consciousness" or "self-realization" emerges or is discovered.

Given that interpretation of what Follett seems to mean by "regular meetings," let us revisit an observation which may now be clearer. She argues that the study of democracy "should be based on the study of how [people] behave together. We have to deal, not with institutions, or any mechanical thing, or with abstract ideas, or [people] or anything but just [people], ordinary [people]" (Follett, p. 19). This also brings us to the first advantage Follett believes inheres in neighborhood groups generally. She believes they make "possible the association of neighbors, which means fuller acquaintance and a more real understanding" (p. 192).

Personal responsibility is also implied in regularity. I noted earlier that most interpretivists do not in any detail address personal responsibility. In pragmatic thought, however, personal responsibility is a recurring theme. For Follett, it is an article of faith.

Follett's idea of personal responsibility circumscribes that which she calls "the social attitude" (p. 19), discussion of which will be more fully addressed in Follett's second context-building activity. For present purposes, let me note that Mead's corollary is the "social attitude" or "attitude of the community," (1934, pp. 152-155, 231); while Dewey's is "social efficiency" (Dewey, [1916] 1964, p. 120).

Follett defines the social attitude as simply "[people] willing to take [their] place in the group, no less and no more" (p. 19). Mead echoes both Follett and Dewey here, describing it as "recognition by the individual that he [or she] is not alone in the world but exists among other individuals" (Lee, 1945, pp. 36-37; see also Dewey, [1922] 1930, p. 297).

If we accept that the "social attitude" is born of the recognition that we are "not alone in the world," we must also accept responsibility for that recognition. Just as it is with the social process itself, the social attitude arising from it must be consciously and "regularly" sustained as well. And if personal responsibility circumscribes the social attitude, it too must have conscious, regular attention.

At bottom, when we speak of personal responsibility and its links to regularity it seems that Follett is indicating an element of import to her argument: to the extent individuals

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2 The exceptions appear to be Garfinkel and Denzin (implicitly) and Gadamer (explicitly).
and groups choose to engage in "regular meetings," they perforce feel an obligation to encourage and sustain the social process. In so doing, they affirm their crucial social, and hence moral, role in its creation. And make no mistake: for Follett, as it is with Mead and Dewey, this obligation is seen as having universal, moral, and ideal character. Recall that Follett sees personal responsibility in those terms:

When I withhold my contribution...I am withholding far more than my personal share. When I fail some one or some cause, I have not failed just that person, just that cause, but the whole world is thereby crippled. This thought gives an added solemnity to the sense of personal responsibility (Follett, p. 67).

Recall as well Dewey's comment on the matter, when he speaks of the interdependence of personality and democracy. He says that individualism in democracy "is an ethical, not a numerical individualism; it is an individualism of freedom, of responsibility, of initiative to and for the ethical ideal..." (Dewey, 1888, p. 22). Finally, there is Mead: "[o]ur morality gathers about our social conduct. It is as social beings that we are moral beings" (1934, p. 385).

That brings us to will or willingness. If the social process is created by individuals and groups who organize and accept responsibility for its continuance, will or willingness must perforce antedate those elements.

As it is with personal responsibility, this element seems to have more pragmatic than interpretive character. Recall that, for both Follett and Dewey, "will" resides at the heart of personal responsibility. For Follett, "will" antedates, but is made manifest in, the healthy social process (Follett, p. 48). Central to "will" is the notion that, if democracy is to have any meaning, people must develop not only the capacity to think in collective relational terms rather than individualistic or "particularistic" self-interested ones, but have the will to do so. Recall, for example, her comment that "[d]emocracy must be conceived as a process, not a goal" (p. 99). That being the case,

[w]e do not want rigid institutions, however good. We need no 'body of truth' of any kind, but the will to will, which means the power to make our own government, our own institutions, our own expanding truth. We progress, not from one institution to another, but from a lesser to a greater will to will (Follett, p. 99, emphasis in original).

Compare that with Dewey, who sees will or willingness as crucial to advancement of
the democratic ideal. This ideal, he says, requires "a morale of fair mindedness, intellectual integrity, of will to subordinate personal preference to ascertained facts and to share with others what is found out, instead of using it for personal gain" (Dewey, [1939] 1963, p. 148). Presumably, none of those elements springs, de novo, to human consciousness. However, regular face-to-face interaction, and the willingness to engage in it, can help encourage their emergence.

Of import to Dewey as well is the willingness of people to develop democratic "habits." Habits, as Dewey understands them, have positive effect and are consciously developed and sustained in group interaction. For Dewey, habit is "the mainspring of human action, and habits are formed for the most part under the influence of the customs of a group" ([1927] 1954, p. 159). "Habits," in any conventional sense of the word, then, require at least sustained attention for their development. This sustained attention, Follett would argue, is promoted at regular meetings of neighbors.

Yet another element seemingly bound up in regularity is purposiveness. Like the interpretivists, Follett believes people are "purposive creators whose lives [are] bound by a reality which has meaning for them" (Hughes, p. 90). For Follett, though, it means that and more. For her, purposiveness means creation: "[i]t is [people's] part to create purpose and to actualize it" (Follett, p. 58). Such creation antedates and emerges from the group in relation: "purpose is involved in the process, not prior to the process...." (Follett, p. 57). It logically follows that if purposiveness is bound up in the social process, and that regular meetings, de facto, foster that process, it is regular sustained dialogue which allows for such purpose to emerge.

Dewey and Mead as well as Follett link regularity and purposiveness to intelligent "action." For Dewey and Mead both, "purposiveness" by any other name is reflective action born of equal parts relational history of the group (what I have called "context"), collectively-developed meanings arising therefrom, and an all-encompassing civic education. Those elements, relational history, collectively-developed meaning and civic education -- all of which require regular attention for their efficacious cultivation -- converge to create a product that is greater than the sum of its parts: social knowledge.

For Follett, Dewey and Mead, then, social knowledge is, first, developed in regular, sustained interaction. Second, it is the sum of both individual and group history, and of collectively created meaning (e.g., traditions, symbols, myths, social rules). This contextual
social knowledge helps make what Bellah, et al. (1985) have called a "community of
memory." While the latters' perspective does not come down cleanly on the side of either
interpretivism or pragmatism, they do bind this idea together nicely for us:

The communities of memory that tie us to the past also turn us toward the
future as communities of hope. They carry a context of meaning that can
allow us to connect our aspirations for ourselves and those closest to us with
the aspirations of a larger whole and see our own efforts as being, in part,
contributions to a common good (p. 153).

The link between a group relational history ("context") and social knowledge is no
small matter for either the pragmatists or for Follett. All agree that, alone, history is sterile,
has no meaning, unless it has social value. Further, social knowledge, as certainly Follett,
Dewey and Mead understand it, is not an end in itself. To have any relevance or use in real
social life, and as Dewey and Mead have made clear, social knowledge must be transmitted.
For "social knowledge" is never simply "social knowledge." For Follett, Dewey and Mead,
social knowledge circumscribes and constitutes nothing less than the social order; and to the
extent that the social order is also the moral order, transmission of social knowledge is
essential to maintenance of that order. In turn, conscious transmission of social knowledge
is among the more important essentialities for high-quality reflective action. Thus, we see
why its' transmission is so important. Note, for example, Follett's view on the matter:

The fluctuating population of neighborhoods may be an argument against getting all we should like out of the neighborhood bond, but at the same time it makes it all the more necessary that some organization should be ready at hand to assimilate the new-comers and give them an opportunity of sharing in civic life as an integral, responsible part of that life. Moreover a neighborhood has common traditions and memories which persist and influence even although the personnel changes (p. 201).

Dewey's parallel here is that "[i]deas which are not communicated, shared and reborn in expression are but soliloquy, and soliloquy is but broken and imperfect thought" (Dewey, [1927] 1954, p. 218). The transmission of social knowledge -- for Dewey, largely a function of schools -- must be selective, and should include only that which is best for a "better future society" (Dewey, [1916] 1964, p. 20); and this vital knowledge is continuously developed and transmitted from one group to another, one generation to another. The community's aim in such transmission should be to "[select] the best for its exclusive use [and]...to reenforce the power of this best" (Dewey, [1916] 1964, p. 20). One presumes that neither selection nor
reinforcement of the community's "best" can happen only sporadically. It takes constancy -- what Follett calls "regular meetings."

We see, then, that social knowledge thus requires, at least, a group relational history for its effective transmission. This history is made in large measure via face-to-face interaction in "regular meetings." All of this is in complete agreement with Dilthey, who says that interpretive understanding, or verstehen, can only result only when we begin to realize that "history and society [are] human creations and that this [constitutes] the essence of all social forms" (Hughes, p. 90).

It can be argued as well that just as the distinction between "regular" and "sporadic and occasional" meetings is consequential for Follett, the distinction between consideration of general neighborhood and civic problems at regular meetings versus occasional meetings for the purpose of "specific objects" is also a consequential one. Follett frames this distinction as a query:

The question in neighborhood organization is -- Is our object to get a new playground [for example] or to create methods by which playgrounds will become part of the neighborhood consciousness, methods which will above all educate for further concerted effort? (p. 208).

Further, she says,

our object is not to get certain things, or to have certain things; our object is to evolve the kind of life, the way of thinking, within which these specific things will naturally have place. We shall make no real progress until we can do this (p. 208).

Following from that, it is not unreasonable to suggest that, for the community that "grips its own problems" (Follett, p. 235), regular meetings of a general nature have the potential to detect and provide forums for discussion of specific problems as they arise. Sustained, regular interaction about those specific problems may serve to help people find solutions or alter conditions such that specific problems do not reach crisis proportions.

In summary, we see that Follett's first context-building activity signals what she finds to be the essential preconditions for development of a healthy social process. Her broad notion of "regular meetings" indicates she believes them to be, first, mechanisms for learning (that is, how to develop each and all of the features attendant to "regularity" -- personal responsibility, willingness, purposiveness, etc.); and second, forums within which people can
interact, seek genuine understanding of one another, and find their connection to, and roles in, the larger social world.

From a Chicago pragmatic perspective, those preconditions will lead nearly inevitably to deliberative, intelligent social action, or "activity with a purpose" (Dewey, [1916] 1965, p. 347). Note Follett's parallel: "...we stand now on the threshold of another age: we see there humanity consciously generating its own activity, its own purpose and all that it needs for the accomplishment of that purpose" (Follett, p. 47). I discuss the pragmatic notions of learning or "education" and "action" more fully in Follett's third context-building activity.

From an interpretivist perspective, where the idea of regularity is far less explicit, these preconditions will lead to activities Schutz has said are "self-evidently meaningful" to group social actors. All begin and end with sustained interaction ("regular meetings"). Within that framework, meaning in context can evolve. Verstehen can happen. Follett's "regular meetings" thus have the potential to help make real what Gadamer has said is possible via language communication:

In all those places where something is experienced, where unfamiliarity is overcome and what occurs is the shedding of light, the coming of insight, and appropriate, what takes place is the hermeneutic process of translation into the word and into the common consciousness (Gadamer, p. 181).

**Follett's Second Context-Building Activity**

"[T]o foster genuine discussion at these regular meetings" (p. 205).

Just as it is with "regularity," there is much bound up in Follett's "genuine discussion." Follett seems to be making three fundamental points in positing this second context-building activity. First, note that she repeats the expression "regular meetings." This may underscore the importance she accords them. Second, and allied with that, "genuine discussion" can only ensue after the essential preconditions outlined in the first activity are met. Finally, most importantly, if the first activity promotes development of a formative social process, this second activity signals a maturing and more effective one. Indeed, Follett links the first two activities, saying that it is by way of regular meetings and genuine discussion that the "neighborhood bond" is forged (p. 212).

As for Follett's observations on this activity, in discussion of it she elaborates upon her initial straightforward postulate, noted above. She says the aim of the activity is to learn
and practice genuine discussion which, in tum, "shall evolve a true collective purpose and bring the group will of the neighborhood to bear directly on city problems" (pp. 208-209). She also sees genuine discussion as something that must be "used constructively for the good of society" (p. 209).

She makes a distinction between "debate" and "discussion," saying the former is thoughtless, an "artificial mental process" that merely seeks to prove a point. In contrast, the latter alone is most productive for advancement of the democratic ideal in that it seeks truth, grounded in reflection and deliberation. Thus, in genuine discussion, "you can be flexible, you can try experiments, you can grow as the group grows..." (p. 210).

Follett itemizes what she believes to be the advantages of genuine discussion. First, it promotes that which "we need above everything else": clear thinking. For Follett, "clear thinking" refers to the responsibility each social actor must take for thinking "...appreciatively and discriminatingly in order to take his [or her] part worthily" (p. 210).

Second, genuine discussion is a unifying force, one having circular and reflexive character. Thus, "no one question can be adequately discussed without an understanding of many more" (p. 211). The issue here appears to be a two-fold one. First, and as Dewey says, "we live in a world where other persons live too" ([1922] 1930, p. 297). Since we do, the experiences and beliefs of those other persons matter in our lives, in our relationships, and in the life of our community. We thus have a responsibility to strive for an understanding of them.

Second, a "question" is never simply a "question." Social life has many facets, each impinging upon and affecting the other. Each "question," then, has many others attendant to it; and we cannot understand one without some appreciation and acknowledgement of those others. Thus, Follett would argue that it is only through "an understanding of many more" that evolution of the "collective idea" followed by the emergence of the "collective will" can have any meaning.

Following from that, the third advantage of genuine discussion is that it helps us "overcome misunderstanding and conquer prejudice" (p. 211). Taken together, these first three advantages of genuine discussion indicate that Follett is explaining the integrative character of genuine discussion in an organized social setting. That is, integration of difference into a collective will.

Follett's fourth advantage flows from the first three. Here, she seems to make her
fundamental point with respect to this context-building activity generally. Believing that "it is not opposition but indifference which separates [people]," she says that

[g]enuine discussion...will always and should always bring out difference, but at the same time it teaches us what to do with difference. The formative process which takes place in discussion is that unceasing reciprocal adjustment which brings out and gives form to truth (p. 212).

In positing her final advantage, Follett says that genuine discussion at regular meetings encourages attention to "questions...before they come to a political issue, when there is not the heat of the actual fight and the desire to win" (p. 212). She seems to be making two points here. First, debate (the wish simply to make a point) can never be a productive method with which to foster genuine discussion. Her second point revisits an observation of mine in discussion of the first context-building activity. She appears to say that problems, if addressed as they arise, will not blossom into full-blown crises if genuine discussion is at work consistently.

Follett sees "genuine discussion" as both constituted and promoted by each and all of the foundation features bound up in "regularity," development of which is the aim of the first context-building activity. We will recall that these features are formal organization, personal responsibility, will or willingness, purposiveness, development and transmission of social knowledge.

When speaking of "genuine discussion" in this second context-building activity she builds upon the foundation laid in the first, but adds another level of equal import and complexity. This new level indicates the social attitude and reflection (See Figure 2, Addenda). Although these two features may be seen as having more pragmatic than interpretive character, Follett's views on this activity signal a number of elements that coalesce with interpretivist thought as well. So then, I first analyze this context-building activity from an interpretive perspective. Following that is analysis of Follett's agreement with both the Chicago Pragmatists and with Orion White and Cynthia McSwain.

Interpretivists Dilthey and Schutz both believe that the goal of social science is to attempt holistic understanding of the mind, its processes, and how people attempt to harmonize subjective/experiential elements with the objective elements of social life. Follett's corollary as she applies it to social life and democracy might lie in her argument that "[t]he group in relation must be the object of our study if that study is to be fruitful for politics" (p. 208).
10, emphasis in original). She would argue that it is only by engaging in genuine discussion that such "holistic understanding" can come about.

Another element of clear correspondence between Follett and the interpretivists as regards "genuine discussion" concerns circularity, as Dilthey intends the term. As noted in the second chapter, we know that Follett is in near-complete agreement with Dilthey's notion of the hermeneutic circle. She makes this agreement clear by saying that "we cannot view the content of the collective mind as a holiday procession, one part after another passing before our mental eyes; every part is bound up with every other part, every tendency is conditioned by every other tendency" (p. 25). Or this comment: "The individual is created by the social process and is daily nourished by that process" (p. 62). Yet another appeared just a moment ago in her observation that genuine discussion is an "unceasing reciprocal adjustment which brings out and gives form to truth" (p. 212).

Reflexivity, as Schutz, Garfinkel and Denzin see it, is also crucial to genuine discussion. Follett sees it in much the same way, believing "clear thinking" to be the bulwark of genuine discussion. Presumably, reflexivity -- the ability of individuals to "[turn] back on [themselves] and [look] at what has been going on" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 244) -- is a necessary ingredient for "clear thinking." The argument Follett would make here follows from her views on learning. Generation of the common idea or will requires learning born, in part, of experimentation: "[w]e must learn and build and learn again through the building, or we must build and learn and build again through the learning" (p. 50). Such learning derives from genuine discussion in regular meetings. It therefore must be, at least, reflexive. For how can we learn and develop "clear thinking," without individual and group reflexivity? How, indeed, can a group relational history be built without it? Most importantly for Follett, without reflexivity, how can difference be integrated, and how can we learn to build upon hard-won individual and group wisdom?

The importance of circularity and reflexivity resides in the fact that they are essential features of social living which can only be animated with sustained interaction (i.e., genuine discussion in regular meetings). Further, since reflexivity and circularity are features central to efficacious genuine discussion and thus to the social process itself, it does not seem that "occasional or sporadic" meetings would be sufficient to allow those elements to be fully exploited.

Follett is also in agreement with Gadamer's hermeneutic views on the role of
language in service of mutual discovery. Follett would agree that, social creatures that they are, people indeed "strive to understand," to gain an operative appreciation for one another. To the extent that individuals and groups engage in the "unending conversation" (Gadamer, p. 188) that is genuine discussion, those aims are advanced. Likewise, Follett would agree with Gadamer as he links willingness and personal responsibility to genuine discussion. Gadamer says that "[i]n conversation...we attempt to open ourselves [to our conversation partner], and this means holding fast to our common ground" (Gadamer, p. 188).

So concludes discussion of Follett and the interpretivists as regards this second context-building activity. However well-suited Follett’s views may be to interpretivism, it is Dewey, Mead, and Orion White and Cynthia McSwain with whom she most obviously resonates. I turn now to discussion of her correspondence with them. Here, I argue, as do Dewey and Mead, that the two elements central to this context-building activity, the social attitude and reflection, are the desired, if not natural, outcomes of "genuine discussion" in a socially organized setting.

At bottom, Follett's goal in positing this second context-building activity is to point out that genuine discussion makes possible meaningful cooperative action. For Follett, of course, "cooperative action" means advancing the democratic ideal. This explains why she would say that genuine discussion can "evolve a true collective purpose and bring the group will of the neighborhood to bear directly on city problems" (pp. 208-209); and that it should be "used constructively for the good of society" (p. 209).

Further, while the potential for cooperative action may be discovered via the six elements articulated in the first context-building activity, it is with this follow-on activity, genuine discussion, that makes real that potential. Such realization is largely a matter of development of the social attitude, of reflection and, following therefrom, of pragmatic action. This is a view Follett clearly shares with John Dewey. Let us revisit Follett and Dewey and how they see the complex interrelationship between the social attitude and reflection, both of which seem to undergird what Follett means by "genuine discussion."

As noted earlier, Follett and Dewey appear to part company as regards the aims of genuine discussion. As we look more closely here, however, we see that their views indeed coincide. Follett sees the aim of genuine discussion as creation of the "collective idea" or "will" and, hence, social purpose. Dewey takes us in another direction, seeing discovery of the consequences of social action as its principal aim (Dewey, [1927] 1954, pp. 39-70,
At the same time, for Dewey and Follett both idea and ideal of democracy is circumscribed by, and derives from, the social attitude. This, in turn, is promoted by genuine discussion. Note Follett on this point: "the very essence and substance of democracy is the creating of the collective will" (p. 48). As for Dewey, the idea of democracy "remains barren and empty save as it is incarnated in human relationships" ([1927] 1954, p. 125). Recall as well Dewey believes an ideal democracy can only come to life via an "associated life" born of the social attitude: "[people are] not merely de facto associated, but [they become] ... social [animals] in the make-up of [their] ideas, sentiments and deliberative behavior" ([1927] 1954, p. 25, emphasis in original). Thus we see the assumption in each view: genuine discussion is essential to development of a social attitude because both advance the democratic ideal.

We also know that neither Follett nor Dewey subscribes to the idea of majoritarian politics -- variously described as "brute numbers" (Follett, p. 5) or "aggregated collective action" (Dewey, [1927] 1954, p. 151). Such politics do not make for genuine discussion and thus, neither does it promote a social attitude. This is a crucial point because each is addressing the "scale" problem in politics. They seem to be arguing that it is only with the properly organized neighborhood group, one engaged in and sustained by regular genuine discussion, that democratic politics has a chance. Dewey is quite clear on the matter. Recall that, in The Public and its Problems, he is concerned to discover "the means by which a scattered, mobile and manifold public may so recognize itself as to define and express its interests" (p. 146). Follett takes this a bit further, saying that "it is not only that we must invent machinery to get a social will expressed, we must invent machinery that will get a social will created" (p. 9). How else but by regular genuine discussion in neighborhood groups? Indeed, can the democratic ideal be otherwise well-served? To the latter question, both Follett and Dewey would respond in the negative.

As for reflection, we see a fine example of interpretive circularity and reflexivity in both Follett's and Dewey's arguments. First, it is "genuine discussion" (Follett) or "communication" (Dewey) that spurs reflection. And if genuine discussion/communication spurs reflection, the latter will perforce help individuals and groups develop what Dewey calls social "habits." These, in turn and as noted, promote a social attitude.

For Dewey, communication (comprised not only of language, but of signs and
symbols) qua "genuine discussion" is the only reliable mechanism by which The Great Community can come into being (Dewey, [1916] 1964, p. 19). Recall that Dewey believes people only "live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common" ([1916] 1964, p. 4).

That requires participation; and from participation flows an awareness and appreciation of interdependence (Dewey, [1927] 1954, p. 152). This explains what he means when he says that "[c]ommunication can alone create a great community. Our Babel is not one of tongues but of the signs and symbols without which shared experience is impossible" (Dewey, [1927] 1954, p. 142). It also helps explain what Follett means when she says that "[n]o member of a group which is to create can be passive. All must be active and constructively active. It is not, however, to be constructively active merely to add a share; it must be a share which is bound up in every other share (p. 28).

As it is with regularity, genuine discussion for both Dewey and Follett is seen as sustaining the social and moral order. This emerges from, and follows development of, common meaning discovered in genuine discussion. As the social process proceeds, genuine discussion offers another benefit: it helps promote transmission of those socially developed common meanings ("social knowledge"). For Dewey in particular, this is the essence of the social attitude.

Let us turn now to George Herbert Mead. It is good to remind ourselves at this juncture that Mead's work in Mind, Self, & Society is descriptive; while Follett's in The New State is decidedly prescriptive. Still, their views generally converge on fundamental points. Indeed, and while in near-complete agreement with Dewey, Mead gives added richness to our understanding of what Follett may mean by "genuine discussion."

It is clear that Follett shares Mead's general view which, we will recall, emphasizes social behavior that is process-driven and dynamic rather than instrumental and static. The crux and equivalency of their arguments rests with the idea that this dynamic behavior antedates the social process, and is discovered and made manifest in what Follett calls "genuine discussion" and Mead, "language communication," promoted by that process.

We remember that Mead sees language as the most universal of all "universal forms," (1934, p. 259), and as "the organizing process in the community" (1934, p. 327).
Thus, the goal of genuine discussion or "communication" is nothing less than "universal discourse" (1934, p. 327). If that is all so, Mead argues, language alone makes possible cooperative action. Indeed, for Mead, it is "universal discourse" and the cooperative activity following therefrom which makes human society itself possible at all (Morris, 1970, pp. 96, 126).

Follett also agrees that the goal of genuine discussion or language communication should be "universal discourse." For her, however, universal discourse becomes, variously, "unification," "interpenetration," "intermingling," "togetherness," or "integration." For example, she observes that "it is useless to preach 'togetherness' until we have devised ways of making our togetherness fruitful, until we have thought out the methods of a genuine, integrated togetherness" (p. 149). As it is with Mead, she would see genuine discussion as the mortar for such togetherness.

Although Mead sees the individual as creating society rather than the reverse, he also believes that human development or growth resides in a circular and reflexive process of interaction between individual and society: one informs and gives meaning to the other. Further, Mead sees life itself as a process of discovery. This process is incarnate in genuine discussion or language communication among conscious, reflective individuals. Follett agrees wholeheartedly: "...[people are] at the same time a social factor and a social product" (p. 60). Likewise, in discussion of what constitutes one's duty or loyalty to the whole, she says, "[w]e belong to our community just in so far as we are helping to make that community..." (p. 59). It would logically follow that both Mead and Follett would see reflection as a consequential element for such to ensue.

For Mead, competent reflection is developed in the social process, and means deliberative and intelligent consideration about the nature of collective activity. It is when reflection takes on profound dimensions that Mead's "self" emerges. These dimensions emerge in large part from one's assumption of the role of the "generalized other" and all that that implies: obligation, reflection, self-consciousness, self cum social criticism. Therefore, it is the "self" that gives us the "social attitude" or the "attitude of the community." In turn, it is the ability, and willingness, to produce a "self" which gives rise to meaningful cooperative activity (Mead, 1934, pp. 89, 254). I will revisit this crucial idea in a moment.

This brings us to "difference" and how Mead and Follett see its integration through the medium of genuine discussion. Mead and Follett, while using terms distinct to each, see
"difference" (Follett), or "individuality" or "functional, behaviorist differentiation" (Mead), in much the same way. Both believe genuine discussion can promote integration of such difference. I have noted Follett's views on this important point several times before. We note Mead's agreement with Follett when he says that conflict arises when the individual is unable to "integrate his [or her] relations with other individual selves into a common, unitary pattern" (Mead, 1934, pp. 306-307).

That observation returns us to both Follett and Mead's central arguments on the aim of genuine discussion or communication. By any other term, Mead's integration of relations "...into a common, unitary pattern" is "universal discourse." As such, it is also Follett's "genuine discussion" or integration of difference: "the only use for my difference is to join it with other differences. The unifying of opposites is the eternal process" (Follett, p. 29).

That idea is extended by both Mead and Follett as they confront "conflict" resolution (Mead) or integration of "difference" (Follett). For Mead, conflict resolution calls for "reconstruction" of social situations. He believes people are compelled to engaged in such reconstruction because they are predisposed biologically to act cooperatively. That being the case, the individual develops "the socially acquired means ... whereby [he or she] solves the various problems of environmental adjustment which arise to confront him [or her] in the course of experience..." (1934, p. 308). Follett's equivalent notion involves individuality, which she defines as "finding my place in the whole" (p. 65). "It is not my uniqueness which makes me of value to the whole," she says, "but my power of relating" (p. 64). However each states it, genuine discussion or communication grounded in reflection is the prime generator for development of both such "socially acquired means" and the "power of relating."

Mead argues, and Follett would agree, that insofar as "universal discourse" or "integration" is the aim of genuine discussion, that discussion must become what Mead calls a significant symbol. This is important because from such significance does common understanding arise. As it does, it also gives rise to the social attitude or attitude of the community. This attitude in turn makes possible reflective action. This action or "social act" is "found in the life-process of the group, not in those separate individuals alone" (Mead, 1934, p. 7n). This squares with Follett's definition of the "democratic community," which she says is one in which the common will is being gradually created by the civic activity of its citizens. The test of democracy is the fulness with which this is being done. The practical thought for our political life is that the collective will exists

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only through its self-actualizing and self-creating in new and larger and more perfectly adjusted forms (p. 51).

If "the life-process of the group" is made manifest in genuine discussion, it resides in a social attitude born in part of reflection. So then, to the extent that Mead believes this social attitude, "the attitude of the community," arises in "an organized setting of social relationships" (1934, p. 225), he is in absolute agreement with Follett. This helps explain what she means when, in describing this second context-building activity, she observes that both regular meetings and genuine discussion forge the "neighborhood bond" (p. 212). It also helps explain Follett's second advantage of neighborhood groups generally. She believes them to provide "the opportunity for constant and regular intercourse" (p. 192). She further observes that "people must socialize their lives by practice, not by study. Until we begin to acquire the habit of a social life no theory of a social life will do us any good" (p. 192).

The links between and among genuine discussion, reflection, the social attitude and reflective or cooperative action as Mead and Follett appear to see them, may be presented logically: the individuals' ability to assume the role of the "generalized other" and the social attitude arising therefrom require a socially organized medium (genuine discussion in regular meetings). It is genuine discussion at regular meetings that brings into being a distinctly human "community of selves" (Scheffler, pp. 165-166). This in turn make possible the properly functioning social process which itself results in ideal-typical cooperative activity. Note Follett's agreement here: "to recognize the community principle in everything we do should be our aim, never to work with individuals as individuals" (p. 79). Mead echoes that:

...the notions of social obligation and moral requiredness demand that the individual place him [or her] self in the position of the generalized other....The fully developed self is possible...when the individual accomplishes such projections (Natanson, 1956, p. 14).

Let us now briefly revisit Mead's ideas of the two aspects of "the self" and how they seem to converge with Follett's. We recall that these aspects are the "I" (its individual or "novel" aspect) and the "me" (its social or "stable" aspect). Mead argues that these aspects, which act as moderating influences upon one another in social behavior, both converge to assist in development of a whole reflective person.

While far less explicit on the matter, Follett does demonstrate some agreement in
several observations which, taken together, take on Mead-like qualities. First, she says that "[people are] a complex of experiences [and] there are many selves in each one" (p. 20). She also acknowledges that the individual is "the unification of a multiple variety of reactions" (p. 61); and that "[t]he new psychology must take people with their inheritance, their 'tendencies,' their environment, and then focus its attention on their interrelatings" (p. 21). That being the case, and finally, in her discussion of the "collective feeling" she also says that in the social process, all parts of people must be taken into account. In this process, it is not only "unification of thought" that is important, but "unification of feeling, affection, emotion, desire, aspiration - all that we are" (p. 44). We thus see that both Mead and Follett argue that socially organized forums within which genuine discussion ensues have the potential to call out, and integrate, "I" and "me" -- "all that we are."

Those ideas segue into discussion of Follett's correspondence with Orion White and Cynthia McSwain, and it is here that we begin to see the social process in institutional terms. First, however, I briefly revisit Orion White's (1990) discourse on the "rules" for process, which he advances at the level of the individual, and which serves as introduction to the White and McSwain discussion.

I should note here that Follett does not in any explicit way address the unconscious as do White and McSwain; however, to the extent that she does believe genuine discussion promotes "unification of...all that we are" and that she believes people to be multi-faceted beings, it is unlikely she would, in principle, exclude the unconscious. She would thus agree with McSwain and White that so long as the unconscious serves and enhances the social process, and if it continually "seeks to create channels for expressions of the resolution of alienation" (McSwain and White, 1993, p. 84) individuals and groups might find in life, she would see the unconscious as doing its job. She would, of course, add that the overarching reason for the existence of any such process at all would be advancement of the democratic ideal.

In Orion White's (1990) "rules" for process, he argues that central to development of an efficacious social process is the idea that individuals and groups must willingly, consciously and reflectively submit to that process. This is absolutely consistent with Follett, who says that "there is no such thing as an individual conscience." As a result, "[t]o obey the moral law is to obey the social ideal. The social ideal is born, grows and shapes itself through the associated life" (p. 55). Likewise, her definition of "morality" attends the same
idea. She defines it as "integrated individuals acting as a whole, evolving whole-ideas, working for whole-ideals..." (p. 57).

In invoking Follett's "law of the situation" as articulated in Creative Experience, White acknowledges his debt to her. He contends that "...in a properly related and functioning group, the process itself will produce the best line of action" (p. 202, emphasis in original). Thus, as White observes, "[b]y truly listening to each other, the objective situation could speak to the group and identify the law governing it" (p. 202). Follett would argue that the "law of the situation" White describes arises from genuine discussion. From that "law" will "evolve a true collective purpose and bring the group will of the neighborhood to bear directly on city problems" (Follett, pp. 208-209). She would add that the "properly related and functioning group," as guided by the "law of the situation" and the "laws of association," will eschew "debate" in favor of genuine discussion.

Let us shift now to White and McSwain's transformational theory of organizations as regards genuine discussion in this second context-building activity. We recall from the earlier discussion of White and McSwain's theory that they are concerned to explore the unconscious and its relation to human development. This concern leads them to take a decidedly process approach to organizational life and change. Their central operating assumption is one that squares well with Follett: "meaningful experience involves the discovery of capacities and potentials in self and situations that have previously remained hidden" (White and McSwain, 1983, p. 296). Follett's correspondence here rests, first, with her definition of "individuality" which, we will recall is "finding my place in the whole" (p. 65). This, one does by discovering within both him or herself and others the unique and valuable "personal share" (p. 67) each brings to the process. Secondly, the "best organization" is one that hinges critically upon our willingness to see genuine discussion "not as a struggle, but as an experiment in cooperation" (p. 97). Such experimentation, indeed, allows us to discover "capacities and potentials" about which we would otherwise be unaware.

Perhaps the clearest correspondence between White and McSwain and Follett concerns how the formers' transformational theory defines a "problem." Recall that Orion White (1977, p. 14) well-states this: "Problems are stopped processes" (emphasis in original). Follett would see that not only as a "problem," but the ultimate, most catastrophic, problem. For Follett, therefore, "stopped processes" would augur a number of deadly effects upon the social process and for the genuine discussion she believes helps animate and
promote it. First, to the extent that Follett believes people's individuality resides only in their "relation to the whole" (Follett, p. 62), and that "our progress is measured by our ability to proceed from integration to integration," (p. 27n), anything which serves to undermine that progress, that process, is to be avoided at all costs.

Second, "stopped processes" also means that learning ceases. Predictably, Follett would be mightily concerned about this, for when learning is impeded or stopped, so too is the potential for discovery of and learning about "the laws of association..." (Follett, p. 193).

On an allied note, and third, we know Follett agrees that the aim of genuine discussion and the social process within which it takes place is to harmonize what White and McSwain (1983, p. 296) call "projections" (recall these are individual or personal images of reality) or what she calls "difference." That being so, if the continuous integration of "difference" is the aim of genuine discussion, of the social process itself, it cannot be stopped. For, as goes the social process, so goes life itself: "Evil is non-relation...non-relation is death" (Follett, pp. 62-63).

Finally, most importantly, once genuine discussion ceases to be sustained, the social (and, hence, moral and democratic) ideal is lost to us. Thus, if "every man sharing in the creative process is democracy" (p. 103, emphasis in original), and if "no one can give us democracy, we must learn democracy" (p. 22), stopped processes will mean the decline or extermination of the democratic ideal. For Follett, there would be no more catastrophic effect than that.

As for Follett's agreement with White and McSwain's (1983) ideas on the four levels of "organizational reality" (i.e., "structural, social relations, nomological, human encounter"), it is likely that she would agree, first that the traditional idea of "organization as structure" is alienating insofar as it does not account for the experiential character of human life and relations (White and McSwain, pp. 293-294).

Follett's true agreement, however, would likely fall somewhere between White and McSwain's second and third levels of organizational reality ("social relations" and "nomological," respectively). With regard to White and McSwain's second level, she does see social relations as the "focal point of action" in neighborhood organizations. She also believes that genuine discussion in regular meetings allows individuals the chance "to renegotiate and renegotiate with others" (White and McSwain, 1983, p. 294) in service of development of the collective will.
Further, and with regard to the third level, she would agree that the individual consciousness White and McSwain (p. 294) see as inhering in this level (i.e., realms of consciousness that "reflect preferences or styles of coping with the outside world"), to say nothing of the experiences deriving therefrom, provide a golden opportunity for integration of difference.

It is with the fourth level (the "human encounter" level) in White and McSwain's typology that their agreement with Follett becomes more difficult to assess. In my reading of her, it seems that she would give a qualified nod to the characteristics they impute to this fourth level.

First, she would not see the social process as centered upon the individual as White and McSwain contend. Rather, she sees the social process as centered upon "the group...in relation" (p. 10). While it is true that she sees the individual as a unique and valuable element in the process, she also argues that it is only in the social process, engaged in and sustained by a group, that one's true individuality is made manifest (Follett, pp. 256-257).

Second, we know she also believes that all individual characteristics that go to make up the "whole person" (which, as I have noted, assumes inclusion of the unconscious), are essential to the social process. It does not seem that she would specifically target the unconscious as a point for discussion, however. She would see it as simply another element that need be taken into account when we consider each other in our totality -- "all that we are." Indeed, I would argue that the "flow of energy" to which White and McSwain refer would be seen by Follett as not having its source in the unconscious, but in the conscious life of the "group...in relation, "

On the agreement side, we already know that, via Follett's resonance with Gadamer, Dewey and Mead, she would also agree that the language communication about which White and McSwain speak serves to "mediate social interaction [which] enables us to understand what we have been doing (retrospection) and to visualize what we might do in the future" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 366, emphasis in original).

As for Follett's agreement about organization action, she would be in absolute agreement with McSwain and White (1993) when they say that [d]ialogue is the vehicle that carries these resources [i.e., 'correct action' following from 'correct dialogue' established in the social process] into action. Dialogue in turn is achieved through an emphasis on attaining a proper relationship between or among the parties to the dialogue. If the relationship
is correct, the dialogue will be correct, and the correct line of action will emerge and be enacted (pp. 89-90).

Were she writing today, Follett would also agree with White and McSwain that the still-dominant instrumental view of organizations has not kept pace with contemporary organizational reality. She would be steadfast in her agreement with McSwain and White (1993, p. 94) that cooperation must be the imperative for both theory and organizational action.

Finally, Follett's agreement with McSwain and White as regards "genuine discussion" and, by extension, reflection and the social attitude, resides in the latters' observation that "the development of an organization is coterminous with the development of the people who constitute it" (p. 93).

In sum, as regards this second context-building activity Follett appears to suggest here that genuine discussion allows social actors to move beyond Mead's "rudimentary meaning" — that meaning which itself sets the stage for later development of significant or symbolic meaning — established in the first context-building (Mead, 1934, p. 77). In this second activity, "genuine discussion," the group engages in more conscious, reflective and mature attempts to create collective symbolic meaning. In so doing, they develop the "social attitude." For Follett, this collectively created symbolic meaning would be the "common" or "collective" thought: "the essential feature of a common thought is not that it is held in common but that it has been produced in common" (Follett, p. 34). It is through "genuine discussion" that people come to know themselves, as Grace Chin Lee (1945) notes, "as something meaningful and understandable, something rationalizable in a socially significant sense" (pp. 57-68).

We see that, for Follett, genuine discussion is decidedly not goal-seeking.³ It does, however, allow for both the integrated "whole person" and the "properly organized" neighborhood group to flower. It promotes experimentation and learning in service of cooperative activity, which itself is in service of the democratic ideal. We thus see more clearly what she means when she says that the social process, and the genuine discussion animating it, has the potential to produce elements of incalculable worth to that ideal:

³ As we will see in analysis of Follett's third context-building activity, however, action or "activity" is goal-seeking (see next section).
learning, morality, purpose, loyalty and, finally, love (pp. 50-59).

Follett's Third Context-Building Activity

"[L]earning together -- through lectures, classes, clubs; by sharing one another's experience through social intercourse; by learning forms of community art expression; in short by leading an actual community life" (p. 205).

Follett's views on this activity seem to center on two fundamental elements already addressed in some detail: education (what Follett calls "learning" or "training"), and action as the pragmatists intend the term (See Figure 3, Addenda). Follett touches on both of these elements in the first two context building activities. Here, however, she highlights their importance to her argument.

In discussion of this activity, Follett again uses "community centres" to make her point. She argues that, while regular meetings and genuine discussion are crucial for "[forging] the neighborhood bond" and for advancing the democratic ideal, it is not enough (pp. 207, 212). Admixed with those must be education or training for democracy. This, because "[w]e are not going to take any kind of citizen for the new state, we intend to grow our own citizens" (p. 207). Most importantly, however, she earlier argues that "[i]f our present mechanical government is to turn into a living, breathing, pulsing life, it must be composed of an entire citizenship educated and responsible" (p. 168).

For Follett, an "actual community life" is created and shaped in regular genuine discussion coupled with participation in an array of communal activities (e.g., classes and lectures, various forms of recreation, festivals and pageants). These, she believes, allow people to share experiences, and to find fulfillment in "the real re-creation of active participation" (pp. 212-213). She also sees such activities as a mediums for individual and community "self-expression" (p. 213) which, in turn, give rise to the neighborhood "consciousness," or "self-realization" referred to earlier. Ashley Montague nicely sums this up for us:

It must never be forgotten that society is fundamentally, essentially, and in all ways a cooperative enterprise, an enterprise designed to keep [people] in touch with one another. Without the cooperation of its members society cannot survive, and the society of [people] has survived because the cooperativeness of its members made survival possible—it was not an adventitious individual here and there who did so, but the group (1965, p. 162).
Using the family as exemplar, Follett reiterates her belief that properly organized community groups have both the potential and the responsibility to radiate the collective "idea" and "will" both outward and upward. She also demonstrates the high interdependence she believes to exist between education or training and action:

...food conservation taught in various ways in the Neighborhood Centre -- by cooking classes for women, by lectures for both men and women showing the relation of food to the whole present world problem [i.e., World War I], by having regular afternoons for meeting with agents from the Health Department, by comparison between neighbors of the results of the new feeding -- food conservation, that is, taught as a community problem, is more effective than taught merely to classes of mothers. For if the mother makes dishes the father and children refuse to eat, the cooking classes she has attended will have no community value. To give community value to all our apparently isolated activities is one of the primary objects of neighborhood organization (pp. 213-214, emphasis supplied).

She says that, by engaging in community activities, "the family realizes that its life is embedded in a larger life, and the richer that larger life the more the family gains. The family learns its duty to other families, and it finds that its external relations change all its inner life..." (p. 213).

That illustration signals Follett's primary message for this context-building activity, which is summed up in the phrase "...by leading an actual community life" (p. 205). It also encompasses the third advantage she sees as inhering in neighborhood organizations generally: "when we have come together and got acquainted with one another, then we shall have an opportunity for learning the rules of the game -- the game of association which is the game of life" (p. 193).

We find Follett postulating her "bottom line" with regard to this activity in the following observation, which again demonstrates her belief in the interrelationship of education and action. Once more, she uses the family to amplify the point:

...if we have learned that sacred as our family life must always be, the significance of that sacredness is its power of contributing to the life around us, the life of our little neighborhood, then we are ready to understand that the nation too is real, that its tasks are mighty and that those tasks will not be performed unless every one of us can find self-expression through the nation's needs (p. 214).
The ideas she advances in discussion of this third context-building activity have a number of implications from both an interpretive and pragmatic perspective. First, for Follett, activity must make "sense" in people's day-to-day lives. It is in daily living and interrelating that people's understanding about, place in, and responsibility to, the larger world can be made clearer to them. Follett's fine example of this idea is her discussion of food conservation, cited above. If that is so, we now see the richness Follett intends when she observes that "to have democracy, we must live it day by day" (p. 160). That, indeed, is the essence of what she means by "leading an actual community life."

Note as well Follett's agreement with interpretivists Schutz, Denzin and Garfinkel on that point. They would argue that "commonplace features of everyday life" can be explored and discovered in communal activities — just as they can in regular meetings (indeed, regular meetings are, by definition, communal activities). These activities are Schutz's "tangible constructs," which can help promote what he calls "genuine understanding." Surely, then, Follett would agree with the goals of interpretive social science generally, which sees itself as seeking to understand "the streams of situations which persons construct, give meaning to, and inhabit..." (Denzin, 1983, p. 129).

Let me attempt to trace Follett's apparent logic here as it might relate to interpretivism: it is through communal activities, coupled with genuine discussion in regular meetings, that individuals and groups can come to see, describe and explain the socially-constructed order that constitutes day-to-day living. These activities also help make their behavior, as Garfinkel would say, "rationally accountable" to both themselves and to others (Zimmerman and Wieder, 1970, pp. 287-289).

Further, we already know that Follett takes a page from the Chicago pragmatism handbook, and sees these activities as emerging from both reflection and the meaning it produces. Thus, as meaning becomes attached to activities, they become symbolic features of everyday life. As such, they also become "self-evidently meaningful" to social actors. Hence, so long as that meaning is sustained, these symbolic constructs help "make sense of...the ongoing social world" (Bailey, p. 273).

This is all highly consistent with Garfinkel's notion of indexicality, which, we will recall, refers to "[e]veryday activities [that] are seen as being ordered and rationally explicable within the context in which they occur" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 248). That being the case, these activities, or "indexicals," "must be interpreted by individuals participating in the interaction
before their meanings can become clear'' (Bailey, p. 278).

Given our "new-eye view" of Follett's work, we can confidently make three assertions at this point. First, both education ("training") and action are all-embracing moral ideals, because the social ideal is also moral. Second, each informs, gives meaning to, the other. We will remember that those ideas derive from one of the principles that unify the Chicago pragmatists: "any ethical standard or principle or imperative must come from within the act situation itself" (Rucker, p. 40). Thus, if the social process itself is moral, education to promote it and action arising from it must also be possessed of moral quality.

The final assertion we can make is that the "activities" about which Follett speaks do not refer to garden-variety instrumental action. I noted in discussion of the second context-building activity that each of the two elements attendant to it (development of the social attitude, and reflection) will lead inevitably to deliberative, "intelligent" action. Recall Charles Morris' fine definition of "action" as the pragmatists intend the term. It refers to "intelligent action...purposive or goal-seeking behavior as influenced by reflection" (1970, p. 10).

"Activity" in the sense Follett uses it here, then, refers to what Dewey and Mead would call "reflective social action" grounded in part in an all-encompassing moral qua civic education. For both Follett and Dewey, action (or activity) is inextricably bound up in practice. As Follett says, "[n]o training for democracy is equal to the practice of democracy" (p. 366, emphasis supplied). Or this observation: "The group process must be learnt by practice" (p. 363). Yet again: "...people must socialize their lives by practice, not by study" (p. 192).

For Dewey and Follett, action, in part, means experimentation. Neither believes that enduring social change can take place unless action is somehow guided by the capacity for looking at problems in new ways. Recall Darnell Rucker's observation which echoes both Dewey and Follett, chapter and verse: "ends are relative to the conditions of activity at a given time: a genuine evolutionary process is one in which real novelty enters, invalidating preconceived, fixed goals of action" (p. 6). That helps explain what Follett means when she says that education should be largely the training in making choices....[and] [w]e must breed through the group process the kind of [person] who is not fossilized by habit, but whose eye is intent on the present situation, the present moment, present values, and can decide on the forms which will best express them in the actual world (p. 54).
In *Democracy and Education*, Dewey concurs, as he advances his definition of education: "that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience" (p. 76).

So then, for Dewey, to have any meaning action must be "intelligent." That is, it must be deliberative, reflective. It is only through intelligent action, "activity with a purpose" or "acting with an aim" ([1916] 1964, pp. 347, 103) that genuine social change can come about. It takes both imagination and experimental habits, born of experience, reflection, education, and all that attends them.

Both Dewey and Follett link the social attitude and reflection to learning or education. We will remember that for both, education should have, at least, two aims. The first is to promote Dewey's "social awareness" or Follett's "social functioning" in children. Second, it should be a primary mechanism with which individuals enhance their capacity for growth. This, by their reckoning, means the increased capacity for cooperative action. First, last and always, however, the overarching aim of education should be to set the stage for productive modes of association. For Dewey, that means the capacity to foresee and understand the consequences of action (e.g., Morris, 1934, p. 18). For Follett, it means individual and group development, directed to a greater awareness of personal responsibility and participation as those in turn serve the social and democratic ideal (Follett, p. 363).

The assertions noted above show us how Follett and the pragmatists can come to equate both education and action with the social ideal. "Efficient" education means that it must always be in service of development of socially functional knowledge. The primary mechanism by which that occurs is sustained genuine discussion, spurred by reflection. But neither reflection nor social knowledge has any meaning unless it is transmitted and used. Hence, the need for education. Recall Dewey: "[n]ot only is social life identical with communication, but all communication (and hence all genuine social life) is educative" ([1916] 1964, p. 5). Follett agrees. "Training for the new democracy," she says, "must be... on and on through every activity of our life." Thus, it must be "...the object of all day school education, of all night school education, of all our supervised recreation, of all our family life, of our club life, of our civic life" (p. 363).

It is good to underscore the point that Follett is not suggesting any specific activity -- but to all activity in which individuals and groups engage. At the same time, we also know
Follett believes activity must always be purposeful. For activity or action to be purposeful, it must emerge from the social process. And social processes, she believes, must be learned. That is, individuals and groups must be trained or educated to it. This all helps explain what she means when she says that learning genuine discussion "should be considered an essential part of our education" (p. 365). It is with that idea that we again see the exquisite interdependence Follett finds between education and action.

While it is true that Follett does not specify any particular activity she sees as desirable for "leading an actual community life," she does tell us about her experiences in her beloved "school centres." In so doing she identifies three broadly-drawn categories of activity that might be fruitful to that end. It is useful to briefly recount her views on these categories.

The first of these are "group activities," largely of the recreation variety. These group activities have a number of "lessons" to teach us. First, each person can learn "to identify him [or her]self with a social whole." "This," she says, "is the first lesson for all practical life" (p. 367). As people engage in group activities, solidarity is possible: "neighborhood life [becomes] a preparation for neighborhood life; thus does it prepare us for the pouring out of strength and strain and effort in the common cause" (pp. 367-368).

Finally, and following from solidarity, are responsibility and initiative, both "in a group and for a group" (p. 368). As detailed many times before in this work, this is crucial to Follett's argument. She confirms that importance here: "[e]very single act of our life should be looked at as a social act" (p. 368). Taken together, these three elements constitute what "group activities" should teach us: "how to take one's place worthily in a self-directed, self-governing community" (p. 368).

"Direct civic teaching" is the second general category of activity, which may include lectures, citizenship classes and membership in various civic societies and clubs. The primary lesson here harkens back to the second context-building activity ("genuine discussion"): "the chief value of these clubs is not the information acquired, not even the interest aroused, but the lesson learned of genuine discussion with all the advantages therefrom" (p. 369).

4 The programs Follett describes in these "school centres" are quintessentially community center or settlement house programs, as noted earlier.
She is very clear that education to citizenship is not the purview of the young only. Thus, both young and old should share these experiences. She thus notes yet again that "[t]he training for democracy can never cease while we exercise democracy," because the objective of direct civic teaching is simply to help people "acquire the attitude of learning, to make them see that education is for life, that it is as valuable for adults as for young people" (p. 370). Thus, she says, direct civic teaching helps us learn that "[l]ife and education must never be separated" (p. 369). Dewey's corollary is his belief that "the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end..." ([1916] 1964, pp. 49-50).

Finally, Follett's third general category is what she calls "practice in self-government" (p. 371). She sees the "school centre" as providing "real training in self-government, a real opportunity for the development of those qualities upon which genuine self-direction depends..." (p. 371). This category is no small matter for Follett, and much of what she argues here concerns leadership, an element she does not address in any substantive way until discussion of her fourth context-building activity.

She believes practice in self-government promotes "development of responsibility and self-direction [which are] the most effective means of raising standards" (p. 371). She also believes that the primary aim of leaders in neighborhood organizations should be always to "educate our young people to want higher standards by interpreting their own experience to them and by getting them to think in terms of cause and effect" (p. 371).

Let us consider her apparent intent in the term "cause and effect." It may be that she is signalling qualified agreement with Dewey and his ideas on how a "community" emerges. Recall he believes this to occur when social actors become "cognizant of the common end and all interested in it so that they [regulate] their specific activity in view of it..." (Dewey, [1916] 1964, p. 5).

At the same time, I would argue that, for Follett "cause and effect" is much more. Given her overarching intent, it would follow, first, that "cause and effect" means that young people must learn their experiences and actions matter in the life of the community. As they do, they can become one of the "community of selves" (Scheffler, pp. 165-166). Second, this is not simply a question of determining the effects of action as Dewey seems to intend. For Follett, people must learn how their behavior affects the social process itself. This calls for learning or developing a "social attitude." This seems to be what Follett intends when she defines the social attitude as one "willing to take his [or her] place in the group..." (p. 29).
Her point is that the social attitude teaches us how to "lead an actual community life"; or, alternatively it fosters our willingness to take our "place in the group..."

Conclusion

Taken together, these first three context-building activities constitute what Follett believes to be absolute necessities for what she seeks: reconstruction of the social and political order. In the next chapter, which analyzes her last two context-building activities, we find her arguing for that reconstruction. It is from such reconstruction that genuine citizenship and, finally, true democracy, blossoms.
"CANDLES OF THE NATION": COMMUNITY-BASED NONPROFIT HUMAN SERVICE INSTITUTIONS IN THE PROCESS OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE (PART II)

Mary Parker Follett's "Five Ways for Producing the Integrated and Responsible Neighborhood": An Analysis (Part 2)

Follett's Fourth Context-Building Activity

"[T]aking more and more responsibility for the life of the neighborhood" (p. 205).

In my view, it is with this context-building activity that Follett makes her most sumptuous arguments. Here, we find her bringing together all substantive precepts her work advances, shaping them into a cohesive whole. In discussion of this activity, Follett makes a call for nothing less than reconstruction of the social and political order. Indeed, this single powerful notion is the beacon illuminating The New State. And if reconstruction is the beacon, individual and group responsibility conduct the energy.

In this call, she brings to bear three elements: first, she believes neighborhood organizations can deliver "the death blow" to political party organization (pp. 217, 232-233). Second, such organizations also have the unique ability to help create the true will of the people (alternatively, this is also genuine "public opinion," the "common will," "united will," or "group conviction"). Third, she also believes that leadership in neighborhood organizations must arise from the group and the group alone.

I have added another element that seems appropriate for discussion here: the role of government experts (what we today call public administrators) and their relation to neighborhood groups in democratic governance. Although Follett herself does not explicitly address this element in the present context-building activity, we will see that she seems to do so indirectly.

In discussion of this activity, Follett argues compellingly that personal responsibility, and the reconstruction deriving therefrom, lies at the heart of the social and democratic ideal. Hence, as citizens increasingly assume a sense of personal responsibility, it makes possible

1 As it is with any of the several terms she uses as synonyms for "integration," attendant to "public opinion" are a number of terms that appear to be roughly analogous to it (see Follett, pp. 216-226).
elimination of political parties, development of the "true will" of the people, and genuine leadership. I would also argue that it also helps define the role of government experts. From such does reconstruction evolve (See Figure 4, Addenda).

It should be noted at this juncture that to the extent interpretivism ignores or rejects politics, analysis of this activity must rest largely with pragmatism. So then, following some brief remarks about responsibility itself, I analyze each of the four elements in turn. Thereafter, I address how all seem to be directed at "reconstruction."

In Follett's discussion of the first context-building activity ("regular meetings"), she attends to individual responsibility, and sees it as circumscribing the social attitude. In this fourth activity, she appears to argue for development of group responsibility. Thus, for Follett, responsibility has both individual and group character.

The logic here appears to be that, as individuals assume a sense of responsibility, that sense is consciously and purposively introduced into the social process. Follett seems to have at least this in mind in an earlier observation: "the individual both seeks the whole and is the whole" (p. 65). As the process proceeds and the group comes to understand the importance of personal responsibility to thought and action, it takes on new, and larger, meaning. It becomes incorporated into group experience and becomes a group responsibility. In this way, the group develops the potential to radiate that sense of responsibility to other groups, both laterally and vertically. This perhaps helps us better understand her when she says "there is no such thing as an individual conscience" (p. 55). Or this: "[t]here is no wall between my private life and my public life" (p. 189).

At bottom, the individual's responsibility, indeed his or her individuality, emerges from a willingness to find "his [or her] place in the group..." (p. 65). That is, whatever one sees his or her distinctive capacities to be, they should always be called forth and used in service of group, community, nation and world (Follett, p. 67). So then, to the extent that individual responsibility takes on group character, the group has like obligation. That idea is well-articulated much later when Follett says that "the deeper thought of neighborhood organization [is] that through performing my humblest duties I am creating the soul of this great democracy" (p. 242). That, for Follett, is the essence of the "social attitude."

Dewey agrees, and provides a nice summary of the idea. Recall that, in discussion of the "democratic idea in its generic social sense," he says the individual should be seen as "having a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing activities of the
groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the values which the groups sustain" (Dewey, [1927] 1954, p. 147). That belief rather echoes Mead, who believes the social process to have universal character. As the social process develops and a "universe of discourse" (1934, pp. 281-283) ensues, this process has the potential to create the "universal society" or the "democratic community," (1934, pp. 284, 287). Recall Charles Morris's comment as he understands Mead on the matter: "[j]ust as the moral individual has transcended the conflict between him [or her]self and [the] social group, so could the moral nation make its self-realization compatible with social co-operation" (Mead, 1934, p. 21).

As for the first element at work in this context-building activity, elimination of political parties, we recollect that Follett finds them to be woefully inadequate, and describes them as "dead-wood" (p. 4). She also sees them as "choked with personal ambition, the desire for personal gain" (p. 216), and as producing only "bosses" (p. 227). This is a view shared with John Dewey ([1927] 1954, p. 121), who sees political parties as a principal reason why the public is in "eclipse."

She decries the political party structure generally, saying it "gives no exercise to judgment.... [prevents] us from having genuine group opinion....[and stifles] all difference of opinion" (p. 225). Further, that such a structure inhibits our ability to allow difference to emerge in the social process is anathema: "[i]f we get into the habit of suppressing our differences, these differences atrophy and we lose our sensitiveness to their demands" (p. 225).

As might be expected, Follett uncategorically rejects political parties as "democracy," arguing that neighborhood organizations have a unique role in a true democracy because they have the potential to do something political parties cannot or do not: they can create "a genuine will of the people, [and can produce]...real leaders to take the place of the bosses" (p. 227). In this, we see explicit agreement with Dewey: "political parties may rule, but they do not govern" ([1927] 1954, p. 121).

Follett believes community-based organizations can "deal the death blow" (pp. 217, 232-233) to political parties in three ways:

1. by substituting a real unity for the pseudo unity of party, by creating a genuine public opinion, a true will of the people,
2. by evolving genuine leaders instead of bosses,
3. by putting a responsible government in the place of the irresponsible party (p. 217).
In addition to that "death blow," such organizations can also make a direct and continuous connection between our daily lives and needs and our government...diminish race and class prejudices...create a responsible citizenship, and...train and discipline the new democracy....[In short], to make a creative citizenship the force of American political life (p. 217).

For Follett, Dewey and Mead, neither "politics" nor the "state" can be imposed from above. This is no small matter for any of them. Ideally, politics, the state itself, is a creation of responsible individuals who meet regularly, reflectively discuss, learn, and act, always in service of the social and democratic ideal. Thus, we see more clearly what Follett means when she says "[n]o member of the group which is to create can be passive. All must be active and constructively active" (p. 28). Or this observation: "...every [person] is the state at every moment" (p. 12, emphasis in original). Undergirding those beliefs is the idea that if democracy shall have any meaning for us, we must come to know that people are "the centre and [shapers] of [their] universe. In [their] nature all institutions are latent and perforce must be adapted to this nature" (p. 19). Grounding each and all of those is individual and group responsibility. That being the case:

Neighborhood organization, brought into existence largely by the growing feeling of [individuals who are] responsible for the life around [them], itself then increases and focuses this sense of responsibility. .....Whereas [individuals seem] lost in the big city, through [their] neighborhood [they] not only [become] an integral part of the city but [become] keenly conscious of [their] citizenship (p. 240).

If that is all so, only the "group...in relation" can develop the "common will." This development constitutes the second element operating in this context-building activity. She defines "public opinion" or "potential will" of a community (p. 218n) as "that common understanding which is the driving force of a living whole and shapes the life of that whole" (p. 219). Thus, for Follett, true democracy rests with citizens who, engaging in regular interaction, together create a common will. "...[Y]ou can't put a wreath round 'the popular will' and call it democracy," she says. "The popular will to mean democracy must be a properly evolved popular will -- the true will of the people" (p. 220).

But let us not forget that this "common will" or "genuine public opinion" is no fixed thing. Echoing Dewey's definition of an "ideal," she calls it a "potential will" only (p. 217n):
it is something for which we always strive. That is, we should not expect any "crystallizing process by which any particular expression of the common will should be taken as eternally right because it is the expression of the common will. It is right for to-day but not for to-morrow" (p. 226). In this, she does not suggest that no "answers" are ever found, no action ever taken. What she does suggest is that human life is a dynamic process, one that changes character and intent as situations present themselves, and as difference is discovered and integrated in the social process. That explains what she means when she outlines what she understands "progress" to be: "[p]rogress implies respect for the creative process not the created thing; the created thing is forever and forever being left behind us" (p. 98).

Allied with that is the idea that the social process fosters what Dewey and Follett both call "experimentation." New difference, new information, continuously flow into that process. As they do, social actors then alter the process to meet those new contingencies. That is what she has in mind when she says that "[w]e must learn and build and learn again through the building, or we must build and learn and build again through the learning" (p. 50). She elaborates:

"[when] we evolve a...common will, then we take it into the concrete world to see if it will work. In so far as it does work, it proves itself; in so far as it does not, it generates the necessary idea to make it 'common.' Then again we test and so on and so on. In our work always new and necessary modifications arise which again in actualizing themselves, again modify themselves. This is the process of the generation of the common will. First it appears as an ideal, secondly it works itself out in the material sphere of life, thereby generating itself in a new form...(pp. 50-51, emphasis in original).

Development of "a genuine public opinion" or "common will" resides in three benefits inhering in neighborhood organizations. First, "neighborhood groups...naturally discuss their local, intimate, personal concerns" (p. 222), which in turn forms the "the basis of politics." This "basis," of course, is the associated life: "politics must have a technique based on an understanding of the laws of association," she says (p. 19).

Once that technique is in place and operating, "as soon as the responsibility is put upon us, our whole attitude changes" (p. 234, emphasis in original). We therefore learn that "the affairs of the city and state are our affairs [and we can] no longer be apathetic or indifferent in regard to politics" (p. 222).
That last reinforces a number of earlier observations about both the character and advantages of regular genuine discussion. Recall she notes it is not opposition that separates us, but indifference. She sees regular discussion as setting the stage for "the formative process which takes place in discussion [and] is that unceasing reciprocal adjustment which brings out and gives form to truth" (p. 212). "Truth" in this sense indicates commonly-evolved meaning, "the collective idea," which requires a sustained social process for its evolution. It is something purposively and consciously developed by the group. That, by definition, reduces indifference.

The second benefit that helps in creation of a genuine public opinion concerns "[t]he introduction of social programs into party platforms." This means "that a powerful influence is at work to change American politics from a machine to a living thing" (p. 223). In this, she seems to assume that neighborhood groups have the potential to become genuine standardbearers for, and evolve a secure place in, development of integrated social policy.

She explains this by observing that partisan political parties have the overarching goal of "keeping its members together" (p. 224). This, in turn, causes rigidity in party platforms. The properly organized and functioning neighborhood group, however, recoils at such an eventuality. It recognizes that "different alignments" ("difference") will emerge and that it is the integration of these alignments -- born of sustained genuine discussion -- which will give freshness to discussion and problem-solving. "We can get no force without freshness," she says, "[but] you cannot get freshness from a machine, only from living [people]" (p. 224).

She decries the fact that, while political parties may articulate platforms, they do so in a vacuum. Further, parties have no "official" responsibility for executing those platforms. "What we need," she says, "is a kind of government which will delegate the job but not the responsibility" (p. 232). Predictably, this means the responsibility should be largely in the hands of properly-organized neighborhood groups. These, she believes, can teach people responsibility such that they are "not to influence politics through their local groups, [but] to be politics" (p. 240, emphases in original).

Finally, political parties subsume the individual, make for a "crowd" mentality. In so doing, they "weaken the will...[which] does away with personal responsibility" (p. 225). The neighborhood organization, on the other hand, "discovers and conserves the individual" (p. 225). As it does, it at once curtails the "mass influence" parties attempt to impose, and enhances individual and group responsibility.
This all causes her to call for a creative, active and responsible citizenship. This means "a citizenship building its own world, creating its own political and social structure, constructing its own life forever" (p. 222). It is neighborhood organizations, she believes, that provide us the "machinery" with which to make real this responsible citizenship (p. 222).

We now get a sense of what Follett means when she uses the expression "taking more and more responsibility for the life of the neighborhood." But there is more, of course. This brings us to the third element at work in this context-building activity: leadership.

For Follett, leadership in neighborhood groups and elimination of political party organization ride in tandem. Her views on leadership in The New State mirror those she elaborates upon several years later in Creative Experience: that the situation will determine leadership at any given moment, and with any specific problem.

It is important for us to understand that she is not suggesting anarchy, a case in which everyone -- and no one -- is "leader." Her argument mirrors that of Mead, who believes that proper application of one's "functional differentiation" or distinctive capacity is an essentiality for reflective action and, hence, advancement of the social ideal.

As it is with Mead, Follett sees leaders as having a distinctive role in the life processes of the community. Note, for example, her remarks on how "real leaders" have the potential to emerge in the properly functioning social group:

[[there should be in a democracy some sort of regular and ceaseless process by which ability of all sorts should come to the top, and flexibility in our forms so that new ability can always find its greatest point of usefulness, and so that service which is no longer useful can be replaced by that which is. In neighborhood groups where we have different alignments on different questions, there will be a tendency for those to lead at any particular moment who are most competent to lead in the particular matter in hand. Thus a mechanical leadership will give place to a vital leadership (p. 228).]]

For Follett, leadership can neither be understood, nor can it be effective, apart from the "group...in relation"; and she identifies several characteristics or qualities she believes make for leadership in the new state. First and foremost, the leader must emerge from the group. This makes sense in her scheme: if the social process produces true community among people, and if specific situations call for specialized capacities the community recognizes as present among one or more of its members, those having those capacities will rise to lead as the situation calls for it. This explains what she means when she says that "[t]he leader guides the group and is at the same time...guided by the group, is always a part
of the group” (p. 229).

But the individual may not be shy! He or she must take responsibility for making the community aware of his or her socially useful capacities. So then, should a leader ever be imposed from the "outside"? Can a leader be recognized as having a legitimate role in the community (i.e., be "genuine") if he or she comes from outside it? For Follett, never.

Follett’s second characteristic of competent leadership is quintessential Mead. Recall that Mead describes the leader as one "who is able to take in more than others of an act in process, who can put him [or her]self into relation with whole groups in the community whose attitudes have not entered into the lives of others in the community" (Mead, 1934, pp. 216-217, 256). Echoing that, Follett says the leader must possess the ability to help integrate difference: "[t]he power of leadership is the power of integrating. This is the power which creates community" (p. 229). But Follett refines this idea a bit, say that the leader must interpret our experience to us, must see all the different points of view which underlie our daily activities and also their connections, must adjust the varying and often conflicting needs, must lead the group to an understanding of its needs and to a unification of purpose...He [or she] must be able to lead us to wise decisions, not impose his [or her] wise decisions upon us (p. 229).

Third, the community leader has a unique role in individual development. Hence, the leader "is not [one] who does great deeds but [one] who makes me feel I can do great deeds" (p. 230). In so doing, the leader "can liberate the greatest amount of energy in [the] community" (p. 230) in service of the social ideal.

Fourth, the neighborhood leader "must be a practical politician. He [or she] must be able to interpret a neighborhood not only to itself but to others" (p. 230). This revisits the fine parallel Follett exhibits with Mead, and their view of the distinctive role of leaders in the life processes of the community noted earlier.

Finally, and extending that last point, if the neighborhood leader has a duty, it is to "shape politics continuously" (Follett, p. 231). Thus, "[h]is [or her] guiding, embracing and dominant thought is to make that community consciousness articulate in government" (p. 231).

If there is a single desirable result of competent neighborhood leadership for Follett, it is this:

As soon as we are given opportunities for the release of the energy there is
in us, heroes and leaders will arise among us. These will draw their stimulus, their passion, their life from all, and then in their turn increase in all passion and power and creating force (p. 231).

We see now the fine interdependence Follett intends between personal qua group responsibility and leadership: each informs and gives life to the other. That is, as individual and group responsibility informs leadership and leadership in turn informs the group, together they can effectively strive for the ideal that is reflective social action. This ideal is born entirely of the context-building activities detailed earlier -- all of which are undergirded by responsibility.

This brings us to discussion of the role of government experts, their relation to neighborhood groups in democratic governance, and the importance of responsibility in that relationship. Following Terry Cooper (1991), I note in chapter three that, unlike Dewey, Mary Follett does not in any substantive way address the increasing influence of (what was then) a maturing administrative state upon community-based organizations. That is true, but only as far as it goes.

Follett by no means ignores these experts. She does seem to believe that, absent a responsible citizenship, Dewey's worst fear will be realized. That is, the increasing influence of government experts and their effect upon both the democratic process and advancement of the democratic ideal will continue to keep the public in "eclipse" unless and until that public acts. We recall Dewey believes that such experts have the potential to be "so removed from common interests [they will] become a class with private interests and private knowledge..." ([1927] 1954, p. 207).

That is plainly a fear Follett shares. Her analogous thought is in her argument that we cannot expect government alone to solve our problems, to satisfy our needs. Rather, "satisfaction also must be found in that fermenting life from which our demands issue" (pp. 214-215). That being so, "only the active process of participation can shape me for the social purpose" (p. 235).

Additionally, insofar as we allow government to provide for all our needs, personal responsibility lies fallow. The sad result is that the potential for collective reflective action is extinguished. This explains what she means when she says that "I am constantly being acted upon, no one is encouraging me to act" (p. 235).

"Neighborhood organization," she says, "must be the method of effective popular
responsibility: first, by giving reality to the political bond; secondly, by providing the machinery by which a genuine control of the people can be put into operation" (p. 234). By any other name, that is "responsibility," both individual and group. Further, Follett says that "[t]he relation of neighbors one to another must be integrated into the substance of the state. Politics must take democracy from its external expression of representation to the expression of that inner meaning hidden in the intermingling of all [people]" (p. 257, emphasis in original).

Follett is not denying the need for professional expertise. Rather, she is calling into question the context within which that expertise is applied. Her arguments might be as follows: the state itself is created by responsible social actors who engage in a circular and reflective social process in community organizations. That process, operating optimally, in turn produces a "genuine will of the people." If that is so, no expertise or action by government administrators (or, one might add, elected officials) can have legitimacy or value absent a genuine acknowledgement, and willingness to work within the demands, of that will.

Those ideas all make sense, are given added richness, when we consider that Follett sees assumption of individual and group responsibility as "moral integration" (p. 214). This, of course, follows from her pragmatic belief that the social ideal is also the moral ideal. And lest we forget: democracy, too, is a moral ideal.

At the same time, she says that "we do not exist on one side and government on the other" (p. 236). This is a quintessential Follett argument, one that underpins the whole of her view on this context-building activity and, not incidentally, The New State generally. Terry Cooper (1991) nicely sums up the point in discussion of Follett's view of "efficiency." Follett places efficiency at the service of democracy, rather than vice versa. In this understanding of efficient government, professional administrative experts do not remove themselves from the citizenry to apply some sort of arcane scientific knowledge to the operations of government in order to achieve efficiency. Rather, neighborhood groups are organized to assess the needs of the people of a given area, and then the expertise of the people is combined with that of the government (p. 124, emphasis in original; also, see Follett, p. 175).

We now see why, in discussion of this fourth context-building activity, Follett argues that "...we can operate as government as well as with government, [and] the citizen functions through government and the government functions through the citizen" (p. 236,
emphases in original). She can mean nothing but responsibility from the ground up. For Follett, "true democracy" is nothing if not that.

In an earlier discussion of administrative expertise, Follett identifies "the concentration of administrative responsibility" as one of three movements that have served to create a sea-change in our political life (p. 174). Here, she notes the absolute interdependence between public administrators and a responsible citizenry, saying that "[w]e are at present trying to secure (1) a more efficient government, and (2) a real not a nominal control of government by the people" (p. 174). She says that those ideas are not in opposition:

Democracy...is not antithetical to aristocracy, but includes aristocracy. And it does not include it accidentally....Therefore administrative responsibility and expert service are as necessary a part of genuine democracy as popular control is necessary accompaniment of administrative responsibility. They are parallel in importance. ...[C]entralized responsibility and popular control [are] not one dependent on the other, but both [are] part of the same thing -- our new democracy (p. 175).

She also believes that unitary, reactive solutions to social problems can never be successful in the long run; and that more than an "empty technicism" (my term) is required:

Those who are working for particular reforms to be accomplished immediately will not be interested in neighborhood organization; only those will be interested who think that it is far more important for us to find the right method of attacking all our problems than to solve any one (p. 202).

We see in these arguments a number of what Follett might call "truisms" as regards the interdependence among public administrators, neighborhood organizations, and the responsibility they share. Let us step through the points as she might argue them.

Bound up in the social process is the will to personal responsibility. The social process is thus a responsible process. It exists not to solve any one problem, but to establish a socially-evolved mechanism by which any problem confronting the community may be addressed. Within that circular and reflective process arises a social attitude, one having both individual and group character. This social attitude allows the social process to proceed such that a genuine or collective "will" of the group becomes known. As that will

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2 The other two are "direct government" and "the increase in social legislation" (pp. 171-172, 174).
becomes known, the individual or individuals uniquely qualified to articulate and advance that will shall arise and provide leadership. Reflective social action follows. If that is all so, professional expertise, however well-developed or well-intentioned, cannot be properly applied absent attention to the contextual character of the community life individuals and groups themselves responsibly create. That is the democratic ideal.

Recall Dewey's view on the matter, one Alfonso Damico well-states: "representatives of the public interest cannot represent that interest if there is no public worthy of the name" (p. 112). What this means is that administrative experts must assume the same responsibility for the democratic ideal as citizens themselves. Not only do both community-based groups and government experts have important roles to play in the "new democracy," then, these roles have like character. Follett is crystal clear about that: "it is not for government to 'get nearer' the people; it must identify itself with the people" (p. 233).

Follett gives us a wonderful example of the ideal-typical relationship between experts and community-based organizations she envisions:

If we want the latest scientific knowledge in regard to food values, let us get an expert to come to us, not wait for some society to send an 'agent' to us; if the stores near us are not selling at fair prices, let us make a cooperative effort to set this right. If we want milk and baby hygiene organized, our own local doctors should, in proper cooperation with experts on the one hand and the mothers on the other, organize this branch of public service. The medical experts may be employees of the government, but if the plan of their service be worked out by all three -- the experts, the local doctors and the mothers -- the results will be: (1) that the needs of the neighborhood will really be met, (2) much valuable time of the expert will be saved, (3) a close follow-up will be possible, (4) the expert can be called in whenever necessary through local initiative, and (5) the machinery will be in existence by which the study of that particular problem can be carried on not as a special investigation but as a regular part of neighborhood life (p. 235).

Follett details her "bottom line" as regards community-based organizations which nicely rounds out this part of the discussion:

...the finest word that can be said for neighborhood organization, for my finding my place through my response to every daily need of my nearest group...is not that I serve my neighborhood, my city, my nation, but that by this service I become my neighborhood, my city, my nation (p. 242, emphases in original).

Those thoughts also direct attention to the fourth advantage of neighborhood
organizations generally: "the realization of oneness which will come to us with a fuller sense of democracy, with a deeper sense of our common life, is going to be the substitute of what men now get in war" (p. 194).3

Let us now explore the central tenet operating in both this fourth context-building activity and in The New State as a whole: reconstruction. Follett well-sums her view on the matter. Through community-based organizations, she says,

...I can learn...that I am the city, I am the nation, and that fatal transference of responsibility to the invisible and non-existent 'they' can be blotted out forever. When neighborhood organization begins to teach that there is no 'they,' that it is always we, we, we, that mothers are responsible and fathers are responsible, and young men are responsible, and young women are responsible, for their city and their nation, it will begin to teach its chief lesson (pp. 241-242).

By any other description, that is reconstruction. But it is reconstruction brought about, first, by a responsible citizenship, by education, and by practice or reflective activity (p. 168). Before launching into what Follett's arguments appear to be here, let us briefly revisit both Dewey and Mead on reconstruction.

First, recall Dewey believes it is only a "changed public" that will produce enduring change in the state (Conkin, p. 395). For Dewey, this change evolves in part from political education; and we recall, in fact, that his "technical" definition of education is framed in "reconstruction" terms (1916 1964, p. 76). The aim of political education, he believes is to cultivate "power" (1916 1964, p. 118) and to enhance the "capacity for growth" (1916 1964, p. 100). Together, these give rise to "civic efficiency" or "good citizenship," a view Mead shares. Given all that, political education should "call attention to the fact that power must be relative to doing something, and to the fact that the things which most need to be done are the things which involve one's relationship with others" (Dewey, 1916 1964, p. 120).

For Dewey and Follett both, reconstruction both derives from and produces community. That is, if education is "fostering...nurturing...cultivating" (Dewey, 1916 1964, p. 10), and if it is defined as "a freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed

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3 At several points in The New State, it is clear that the causes and effects of World War I (which was being fought as she wrote), are much on Follett's mind. This reference is, presumably, to that war.
to social aims" (Dewey, [1916] 1964, p. 98), it must also be seen as enhancing the ability and willingness of groups to transmit socially functional knowledge and common meaning from one generation to another, one group to another. This appears to be what Dewey means when he says that education means nothing less than the "...continuity of life" ([1916] 1964, p. 2). For Dewey, that is the essence of community.

As for Mead, he seems to take two different "cuts" on reconstruction. Responsibility, however, buttresses both. First, in discussion of emergence of the "self" he argues that responsibility lies at the heart of assumption of the role of the "generalized other," which in turn produces a sense of obligation to the whole. Mead says that that sense of obligation causes one to engage in both self and social criticism (1934, pp. 154-155). As that occurs, one also takes responsibility for modifying or reconstructing his or her behavior in service of the whole. Hence, "self-criticism is essentially social criticism, and behavior controlled by self-criticism is essentially behavior controlled socially" (1934, p. 255).

As for his second "cut" on reconstruction, he sees it as leading from amelioration of conflict, or what Follett calls "difference," in social life (Mead, 1934, pp. 307-310). Although Mead believes people to be biologically roused to cooperative action, that alone is insufficient for reconstruction. As it is with Follett, Mead believes personal responsibility is discovered, learned and transmitted in a circular and reflective social process.

This responsibility, then, gives life to a restructuring of social situations such that they become more compatible with changing needs of the time. Recall Mead's remarks on this: "Any such social reconstruction, if it is to be at all far-reaching, presupposes a basis of common social interests shared by all individual members of the given human society in which that reconstruction occurs..." (p. 308). This results in "a larger social whole in terms of which the social conflicts that necessitate the reconstruction of the given society are harmonized or reconciled, and by reference to which...these conflicts can be solved or eliminated" (1934, pp. 308-309).

Follett's views on reconstruction appear to be a nice melding of Dewey and Mead. She argues that, as the individual feels a sense of personal responsibility, and thus becomes "free" to release energy in service of the social and democratic ideal, that individual is perforce reconstructed. As the individual is reconstructed, so too is the group. And as the group reconstructs itself, city, state, nation and world are reconstructed as the various groups radiate purpose and common will from one to another, outward and upward. In this
way, the social and political order are also reconstructed. At root of all is personal and group responsibility.

We see this all made abundantly clear in Follett’s commentary on personal responsibility, which bears repeating now:

When I withhold my contribution, therefore, I am withholding far more than my personal share. When I fail some one or some cause, I have not failed just that person, just that cause, but the whole world is thereby crippled. This thought gives an added solemnity to the sense of personal responsibility (p. 67).

Indeed it does.

Follett’s Fifth Context-Building Activity

"[E]stablishing some regular connection between the neighborhood and city, state and national governments" (p. 205).4

It is with this last context-building activity that we find Follett at her most concrete. We also find her leaving little to chance or to misinterpretation. Here, she argues for reconstruction of the highest order, in its most all-embracing and global sense. The concrete nature of her arguments is represented in the question, "[h]ow can the will of the people be the sovereign power of the state"? (p. 245); and all follows from that question.

In discussion of this activity, Follett elaborates upon two arguments she advances in the previous activity and, in both arguments, she meets the "scale" issue in democratic politics head-on. To that extent, analysis of the present activity again rests largely with pragmatism, most specifically with that of John Dewey. I explore each of these arguments in turn.

In her first argument, she makes explicit a belief that up to now has been overshadowed (or overwhelmed) by her preoccupation with the neighborhood group itself:

4 I must again stress that Follett seems to make no specific distinction between the terms "government" and "state," and often seems to use them synonymously. This is particularly unfortunate for discussion of this context-building activity; for while there is always an implied difference, Follett never articulates it. Since we cannot know what she has in mind for certain, and for purposes of discussion here, I take them to be synonyms.
that community-based organizations and government, both political and administrative, are one and the same democratic "package" as it were. Properly organized, they become the "unifying state" (pp. 245, 311), or what Dewey calls the "political state" ([1927] 1954, p. 35). We know she also believes that neither the group nor the "state" is created -- nor can either be sustained -- by the actions of any but an "entire citizenship educated and responsible" (p. 168). So, in discussion of the previous context-building activity, when she says "we do not exist on one side and government on the other" (p. 236), that is her point.

That also revisits something Follett contends earlier in the work. That is, the realization that the individual, the group, and the government are all one and the same helps us come to know that "the state is not the servant of the people. The state must be the people before it can reach a high degree of effective accomplishment" (p. 140, emphases in original).

While her ideal democracy is rooted firmly in the notion of "the organization of [people] in small, local groups..." (p. 142), she also recognizes that democracy is just that: an ideal. As such, although it is preferable that the ideal be fed from the bottom-up, she says "...it is not impossible for the two...to go on at the same time" (p. 248). However, she repeatedly advances her belief that neither democracy nor the "state" can be a top-down proposition: "back we must go to this small primary unit," she says, "if we would understand the meaning of democracy, if we would get the fruits of democracy" (p. 257).

Her first argument as regards this context-building activity is that "...we are ready for membership in a larger group only by experience first in the smaller group" (p. 249). Such membership and experience in turn "opens the path to the State" (p. 254). To that end, Follett advances her first criterion for how the "will of the people can be the sovereign power of the state." In so doing, she directs our attention to the responsibility of individuals and groups in the effort: "every neighborhood must be organized; the neighborhood groups must then be integrated through larger intermediary groups, into a true state" (p. 245). This revisits her beliefs about the need for formal organization ("regular meetings") discussed in the first context-building activity.

[N]eighborhood groups join with other neighborhood groups to form the city -- then only shall we understand what it is to be the city; neighborhood groups join with other neighborhood groups to form the state -- then only shall we understand what it is to be the state. We do not begin with a unified state which delegates authority; we begin with the neighborhood group and create
the state ourselves. Thus is the state built up through the intimate intertwining of all (p. 255).

For Follett, attempting to form the "true" or "unifying" state from the top-down is neither socially nor logistically possible. As noted, neither is it particularly desirable. That is, top-down efforts inhibit development of both responsibility and "real solidarity," neither of which can flower "except by beginning somewhere the joining of one small group with another" (p. 251).

This returns us to the necessity for direct and face-to-face interaction as it advances the social and democratic ideal, an essentiality to which Follett, as well as Dewey ([1927] 1954, pp. 152, 211) and Mead (1934, pp. 321-325), repeatedly refer. For purposes of this context-building activity, she essentially argues that "tall oaks from little acorns grow" (Bartlett, 1955, p. 401). What that means is that personal experience and responsibility will get lost in larger, ever more complex groups unless a relational context is first established in the smaller group. It is thus only through participation in neighborhood groups that one comes to understand that he or she is "at the same time...a member [of the neighborhood] and a responsible member of the state" (p. 251).

Follett applies that same principle to the group:

...when neighborhood joins with neighborhood all the lessons learned in the simple group must be practised in the complex one. As the group lesson includes not only my responsibility to my group but my responsibility for my group, so I learn not only my duty to my neighborhood but that I am responsible for my neighborhood. Also it is seen that as the individuals of a group are interdependent, so the various groups are interdependent, and the problem is to understand just in what way they are interdependent and how they can be adjusted to one another. The process of the joining of several groups into a larger whole is exactly the same as the joining of individuals to form a group -- a reciprocal interaction and correlation (pp. 252-253, emphases in original).

Let me restate this crucial argument from an interpretive methodological perspective as it applies to organizations. Recall that the theoretical thrust of interpretivism rests with "obtaining an understanding of the subjectively created world 'as it is' in terms of an ongoing process" (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 31). Framed in those terms and from Follett's perspective, that means we cannot label as "trivial" any organization or group we may see as worthy of study. For Follett, largeness and complexity are no particular virtue in the new
state; smallness and relative simplicity, no particular vice. Indeed, it is regular, genuine, face-to-face, active participation in local neighborhood groups that shows us how to integrate into "larger intermediary groups" to make real a true democracy. Since each small group is the large group, there can be no trivial organizations: each is part of the whole.

For those reasons, good functionalists in organization theory (e.g., Perrow, 1986, pp. 172-173) who would argue that the case study method tends to focus on "trivial," "inconsequential," or "symptomatic" organizations are wide of the mark from this perspective. The organizations discussed in the cases (next chapter), then, can be seen as vital and consequential elements of the larger whole that is the "state."

Additionally, and of equal import to this work, the idea that the relative small size and presumed "simplicity" of community-based groups or institutions make them somehow "trivial" is, de facto, rejection of the whole of which they are constituents. From the two perspectives invoked here, such rejection would deny as well the efficacy and value of a social process so central to realization of a true democracy. That concludes discussion of Follett's initial argument as regards this last context-building activity. Let us move now to the second, which follows from the first.

Just as the individual both seeks and is the whole (p. 65), she says there is a "natural tendency for a real group to seek other groups" (p. 249). That being so, "[e]very group once become conscious of itself instinctively seeks other groups with which to unite to form a larger whole" (p. 249). This is a powerful idea for Follett:

We have seen the process of a single group evolving. But contemporaneously a thousand other unities are a-making. ... Alone [a single group] cannot be effective. As individual progress depends upon the degree of interpenetration, so group progress depends upon the interpenetration of group and group. ... This is the social law. (p. 249).

Follett now directs our attention from the responsibility of individuals and groups to that of government as she offers her second criterion for "how the will of the people can be the sovereign power of the state." She argues that the organized neighborhood group must have "official recognition," an idea that revisits the importance of formal organization or "regular meetings." What she seems to say is that, in order to garner "official recognition," the neighborhood group must first formally organize itself. Only then can it be "...a regular part of government. The neighborhood must be actually, not theoretically, an integral part of city, of state, of nation" (p. 245).
She beautifully details how this can happen, using the United States government's prosecution of World War I as illustration. She describes how, in the bid to rally the American public to that endeavor, the government engaged in a conscious and planned system of bottom-up and top-down communication to foster cooperative action (pp. 246-247). That planned system, she maintains, illustrates that our national government clearly sees and specifically states that neighborhood organization is both for the neighborhood and for the nation: that it looks in, it looks out. Thus that which we are coming to understand as the true social process receives practical recognition in government policy (p. 250).

This is a good time to note the clear distinction between Follett's brand of "group organization" and "interest groups." Follett believes that membership in an array of community-based organizations is an ideal method by which to develop her prototypical citizen. She also knows that such numerous memberships can produce conflict in the individual. And, although she acknowledges that such conflict is inevitable as both individual and group mature in relation, she also maintains that loyalty ("allegiance") for both must be to the state — not to any specific group or interest. "Every group which we join must increase our loyalty to the state because the state must recognize fully every legitimate interest" (p. 313). This is not "multiple allegiance," she says, but "unified allegiance" (p. 313). An earlier observation makes the point: "our individual conscience is not absorbed into a national conscience; our individual conscience must be incorporated in a national conscience as one of its constituent members" (pp. 55-56).

Such is Dewey's view. As members of any of a number of groups, people learn that "[t]here is free give-and-take: fulness of integrated personality is therefore possible of achievement, since the pulls and responses of different groups reenforce one another and their values accord" ([1927] 1954, p 148).

Predictably, then, for Follett neither ideology nor competition can have places in the new state:

It is true that the state as state no more than family or trade union can 'capture my soul.' But this does not mean that I must divide my allegiance; I must find how I can by being loyal to each be loyal to all, to the whole....There is no competing here, but an infinite number of filaments cross and recross and connect all my various allegiances....Competition is not the soul of true federalism but the interlocking of all interests and all activities (p. 312).
To reduce the potential for undue influence of ideological or special interests, she advocates creation of local "non-partisan" community councils. It is from such, she believes, global common responsibility and a unified will can be made real by ever-larger integrated groups. She sees this as

a plan for sending the news backwards and forwards from individual to nation, from nation to individual, and it is also a plan for correlating the problems of the local community with the problems of the nation and of cooperating nations (p. 248).

That observation follows from Follett's arguments about the efficacy of the social group generally. That is, the "properly organized" neighborhood group has (at least) five-fold aim: first, it teaches individuals responsibility such that he or she comes to know "I am the city, I am the nation..." (p. 241). Second, it provides a forum within which the group can develop a neighborhood "consciousness" or "self-realization" (i.e., genuine contextual relations). Third, and bound up in that, it integrates "difference" such that a common will can be developed. Fourth, it allows group to integrate with group. Finally, and in so doing, it motivates the group to radiate that will and sense of responsibility outward and upward. Thus, and as detailed several times earlier, the "properly organized" neighborhood group is one that meets regularly, engages in genuine discussion, and therefore engages in "activity with a purpose" — all in service of the social and democratic ideal. As she makes clear, the same principles apply even as this integrated responsibility and will grows ever numerically larger.

Follett's views there all correspond with George Herbert Mead's ideas on the "formal ideal" of communication. Recall that Mead uses organized religion and the economic community to illustrate that, to the extent those communities have developed symbolic language all in those communities hold in common, they have created a "universe of discourse" (1934, pp. 281-283). As these communities integrate "their different characters," a universal society or "democratic community" is born (1934, pp. 284, 287).

Let us return for a moment to Follett's example of how the federal government encouraged active participation of community-based organizations in its prosecution of the First World War. It is good to remind ourselves that war is a crisis, a national crisis. Just as Follett did, one could offer countless examples of how citizens can be inspired to cooperative
action in such times. Follett's intent in citing that example, however, is quite different. She asks, ". . . why should we be more efficiently organized for war than for peace? Is our proverbial carelessness to be pricked into effectiveness only by emergency calls" (p. 248)?

That is a fine question. Recall in the previous context-building activity she advances the idea that the social process does not exist to attempt reactive solutions for any one immediate problem. Rather, problem-solving is incidental to (but a nice side-benefit of) the social process. Functioning optimally, it inevitably occurs that the process will construct social relations such that all problems confronting the community may be addressed as they arise or change. In short, the process exists, is sustained, such that it becomes the *modus operandi* for individuals and groups in their day-to-day lives. Equally valuable, she also shares the belief with Dewey ([1927] 1954, pp. 31, 33, 61-62) that the process promotes continuing experimentation directed at problem amelioration or solution.

In this context-building activity Follett makes much the same argument: that coming together in cooperative activity in times of crisis is not the test of the true democratic state. The test of the "true state" rests with the extent to which it encourages social forums such as neighborhood groups. Government, she believes, must acknowledge a social process that allows the community itself to treat all problems, crisis or not, with efficiency and social rationality. These last emerge "naturally" and simply because the mechanism for addressing them is in place, operating, and sustained by that community.

This feeds directly to Follett's idea that the "true state" is also the "moral state," a view she shares with both Dewey and Mead. It is an idea that also revisits her view of the "supreme function" of the state. That, she says, is "moral ordering," defined as the "fulfilment [sic] of relation by [person] to [person]. . . . the ordering of [an] infinite series into their right relations that the greatest possible welfare of the total may be worked out" (p. 333). Note how this converges with Dewey's view on the role of the state, which he says is to "[provide] opportunity and [set] the rules for other types of association" (Conkin, p. 395).

"This ordering of relations," Follett says, "is morality in its essence and completeness" (p. 333). Hence, she argues that the true state has an inherent responsibility to "gather up every interest within itself. . . . [to] take our many loyalties and find how it can make them one" (p. 312). But! The "moral state" can only be achieved "through the creative power of man as brought into visibility and actuality through his group life" (p. 342). That is, "[w]e cannot become the state imaginatively, but only actually through our group relations" (p. 334).
Absent group relations, then, the state loses its moral authority. So too does democracy.

For all the attention Follett showers on the neighborhood group, she believes that what we finally seek through neighborhood organization is "the individual" (p. 256). Here, she echoes both Dewey and Mead, who see both the individual and society as completely correlative. As it is with them, Follett believes that the "reflective, self-conscious moral individual arises only in a social process, but that only such an individual in turn makes possible the more complex and distinctive levels of human society" (Morris, 1970, p. 96). Hence, we accomplish social aims by understanding, first, that "the life of every [person] must contribute to the growth of the state" (Follett, p. 257), that this accomplishment "...demands the activity of every [person]," and that "our national life must be grounded in the daily, intimate life of all [people]" (Follett, p. 256). She continues:

The great historic task of the Anglo-Saxon people has been to find wise and reasoned forms for the expression of individual responsibility, has been so to bulwark the rights of the individual as to provide at the same time for the unity and stability of the state (pp. 256-257).

Follett's summary arguments as regards this context-building activity now make sense. First, she suggests that development of the "unifying" cum "moral" state requires that citizens themselves must change or reconstruct that state. To do so, they must, first, recognize that "the state must be the actual integration of living, local groups, thereby finding ways of dealing directly with its individual members" (p. 245). Second, "other groups than neighborhood groups must be represented in the state: the ever-increasing multiple group life of to-day must be recognized and given a responsible place in politics" (p. 245).

Thus, we see that Follett believes neighborhood organization to be the absolute necessity for both reconstruction and for a new and "creative" citizenship arising therefrom. It is worth repeating what she has to say on this specific point:

Exhortation to good citizenship is useless. We get good citizenship by creating those forms within which good citizenship can operate, by making it possible to acquire the habit of good citizenship by the practice of good citizenship. The neighborhood group gives the best opportunity for the training and for the practice of citizenship (p. 339).

This leads us to what Follett believes the fifth advantage of neighborhood organizations generally to be: "[A]s a member of a neighborhood group we get a fuller
and more varied life than as a member of any other kind of group we can find, no matter how big our city or how complex or comprehensive its interests" (p. 195).

We can also see that much of what Follett argues in advancing this last context-building activity resonates, top-to-bottom, with John Dewey. These arguments return us to the four fundamental principles I have argued Dewey shares with Follett. First, democracy is a "moral conception"; second, a genuine and ideal democracy is possible; third, the public will only be in "eclipse" if it allows itself to be; and fourth, as Dewey says, the idea of democracy "remains barren and empty save as it is incarnated in human relationships" ([1927] 1954, p. 143).

Finally, there is reconstruction as it applies to this context-building activity. Dewey, via Conkin, all but defines it for us: "an improved society can hardly result from formal changes in government or from a mere change in politicians. A changed public, and behind this changed objective conditions or changed habits and beliefs, is a prerequisite of enduring change in the state" (p. 395). In her concluding remarks about the "moral state," Follett says much the same:

[w]e need today new principles. We can reform and reform but all this is on the surface. What we have got to do is to change some of the fundamental ideas of our American life. This is not being disloyal to our past....Let us be loyal to our inheritance and tradition, but let us understand that what inheritance and tradition truly is. It is not our tradition to stick to an outworn past, a conventional ideal, a rigid religion. ....To spring forward and then to follow the path steadfastly is forever the duty of Americans. We must live democracy (pp. 342-343, emphases in original).

Conclusion

The analysis of Mary Follett's "five ways" in these last two chapters demonstrates rather conclusively, I think, that The New State indeed carries a richness more traditional interpretations fail to detect. In my view, it seems clear that her proposals, written at the dawn of the Century, have incalculable value for those of us who live at its twilight. Case studies on contemporary community-based nonprofit human service institutions may serve to illustrate that point. I turn to those in the next chapter.
CHAPTER EIGHT
CASE STUDIES

Introduction

The following case studies are introduced to support Mary Follett's central contentions, and are designed to illustrate that her "five ways" are not soft-headed, idealistic (or, as was observed at the time, "mystical") proposals but everyday, doable ones. That is, they are routinely made "real" in community-based nonprofit human service institutions all over the nation.

Since I take these proposals to be "universal" (i.e., applicable across a range of organization sizes and locales), I selected case studies about nonprofit organizations situated in cities as well as rural areas; those that deliver multiple as well as single services; and those of varying sizes. The intent here is not to make a statistical case, but to advance a general view of community-based nonprofit human service institutions, and to offer up a variety of organizations as illustration of this general view.

Case I: Settlement Houses

This case, rather than focusing on a single organization, draws attention to a sub-class of community-based nonprofit human service institutions, variously called settlement houses or community centers. As discussion of the third context-building activity indicates, these organizations are particularly apt for discussion here. We will see that ideas of individual and group development and deliberative social action Follett espouses have long been manifest in such organizations.

Little has been written either about settlement houses or their animating philosophy in recent history. In current literature, they are rather "lumped" together with other nonprofit human service institutions, and are seen as "multiservice center by any other name" (Edelman and Radin, quoted in Husock, 1992, p. 56). This is unfortunate because not only have settlement houses historically played a substantive role in effecting enduring social change, many today operate in much the same tradition. Following a brief discussion of the settlement house movement philosophy, I present some case studies about settlement houses and their contributions to the lives of their communities.

Settlement houses in the United States began to appear in 1889; and among the
more well-known at the time were New York’s Henry Street Settlement, Chicago Commons, Boston’s South End House and, of course, Chicago’s Hull House. Today, estimates are that there are 300 in 80 cities nationwide (Worrest, 1979, p. 13; Knight, 1991, p. 127; Husock, 1992, pp. 54, 59).

Chicago’s Hull House may be seen as an ideal-typical settlement house. Indeed, it served as the model for many of its American counterparts. It was established upon principles developed by Canon Samuel Barnett for the world’s first settlement house founded in 1886, London’s Toynbee Hall. Jane Addams, the American settlement house movement’s “visionary and theoretician,” founded Hull House in 1889, following a visit to Toynbee in 1888 ((Husock, p. 56; Knight, p. 127).

The early settlement house movement, as Carlson (1993) tells us, is characterized by three words: residency, reform and research (p. 70). Residency meant that volunteers, usually college-educated and generally more well-off economically than those in the neighborhoods the settlement house served, took up residence and lived in those neighborhoods (Knight, p. 127; Carlson, p. 70). The objective of the residency requirement was three-fold. It served, first, to promote individual development of volunteer residents themselves. Second, the settlement house facility provided a forum within which such development could be shared with the community at large. One Hull House resident explains: "Each [resident] elects that for which she thinks herself best fitted, finding her own field and inaugurating and carrying out her own work" (quoted in Knight, p. 128). Finally, it also served as a mechanism by which residents could learn from the community about the community.

As both Husock and Carlson note, settlement houses were not "shy" about transmission of middle-class values (Husock, p. 57; Carlson, pp. 70-71). That is unsurprising: most of the residents were at least middle class, and some were quite wealthy. This may appear, on its face, paternalistic; however, note Jane Addams’s -- herself born to wealth -- remarks as she explains and describes Hull House’s formative period. Note, incidentally, how closely she mirrors Follett:

Perhaps these first days laid the simple human foundations which are certainly essential for continuous living among the poor: first, genuine preference for residence in an industrial quarter to any other part of the city, because it is interesting and makes the human appeal; and second, the conviction...that the things which make men alike are finer and better than the things that keep them apart, and that these basic likenesses, if they are
property accentuated, easily transcend the less essential differences of race, language, creed, and tradition ([1910] 1960), p. 89).

Reform refers to amelioration of both poor working conditions and creation or enhancement of social supports in the community (Husock, p. 57; Carlson, p. 70). Such efforts were designed to extend beyond the immediate neighborhood and into the wider social world; and included, among other things, youth art and recreation programs, lobbying for child-labor legislation, investigation of the causes of specific illnesses found in the neighborhood, day care and juvenile justice reform (Knight, p. 128; Carlson, p. 69; Husock, p. 58; Worrest, 1979, p. 13).

Research is the third element that typified the settlement house movement. Settlement house staff would routinely conduct neighborhood surveys to gauge what problems existed and what services and/or solutions the neighborhood itself might find valuable toward their amelioration. This allowed both professional and resident settlement staff not only to help the community identify and develop possible solutions for such problems, but to gather data for larger reform efforts (Carlson, p. 70; Husock, pp. 55-56).

Following from each of those elements, Jane Addams believed the "subjective necessity for social settlements" to emerge from three factors. First, she saw them as a response to the isolation and inequity wrought by industrialization in the great cities of 19th Century America (Addams, pp. 92-95; Husock, p. 56). Second, there is little doubt that no small part of the philosophy guiding early settlement houses has a rather messianic cast. Addams illustrates this, drawing a clear connection between Christianity, social action, and "progress":

[It]hat Christianity has to be revealed and embodied in the line of social progress is a corollary to the simple proposition that man’s action is found in his social relationships in the way in which he connects with his fellows; that his motives for action are the zeal and affection with which he regards his fellows (Addams, [1910] 1960, p. 96).

[Further], I believe that there is a distinct turning among many young men and women toward this simple acceptance of Christ’s message. They resent the assumption that Christianity is a set of ideas which belong to the religious consciousness...They insist that it cannot be proclaimed and instituted apart from the social life of the community and that it must seek a simple and natural expression in the social organism itself (Addams, p. 97).

Finally, and as indicated above, Addams sees the active, deliberative social process
as absolutely essential to the success of the movement, and she frames this in terms of the aims of the social settlement movement. Her views are pure Follett:

It aims...to develop whatever of social life its neighborhood may afford, to focus and give form to that life, to bring to bear upon it the results of cultivation and training; but it receives in exchange for the music of isolated voices the volume and strength of the chorus (Addams, p. 97).

Addams further observes that she believes it is hard for us to realize how seriously many [young people long]...to socialize their democracy, are animated by certain hopes which may be thus loosely formulated; that if in a democratic country nothing can be permanently achieved save through the masses of the people, it will be impossible to establish a higher political life than the people themselves crave; that it is difficult to see how the notion of a higher civic life can be fostered save through common intercourse... (Addams, pp. 91-92).

For Addams, settlement house activities should not be confined to a single neighborhood, but should extend to the larger community. Further, these activities should be soundly experimental: the settlement, she says, is "an experimental effort to aid in the solution of the social and industrial problems which are engendered by the modern conditions of life in a great city" (Addams, p. 98). Further, and as it is with Follett, neither political ideology nor unitary responses to social problems have a place as solutions are attempted:

From its very nature [the settlement] can stand for no political or social propaganda. It must...give the warm welcome of an inn to all such propaganda....The one thing to be dreaded in the Settlement is that it lose its flexibility, its power of quick adaptation, its readiness to change its methods as its environment may demand....Its residents must be...ready to arouse and interpret the public opinion of their neighborhood. They must be content to live quietly side by side with their neighbors, until they grow into a sense of relationship and mutual interests...They are bound to regard the entire life of their city as organic, to make an effort to unify it, and to protest against its overdifferentiation (Addams, pp. 98, 100).

The history of settlement house activity in the United States is a long and rich one. The social settlement philosophy, and the institutional manifestations of that philosophy, did not emphasize mechanistic delivery of social services. Rather, the philosophy sought to establish neighborhood institutions which could become home-grown, legitimate forums for recreational, educational and cultural activities -- in short, "a community living room or gym"
Thus, the settlement house movement, as Lewis Mumford (1938) observes, called for establishment "in its random neighborhoods an appropriate social nucleus which [served] as a meeting point for its social and educational activities" (p. 297). The following vignettes are testament to that.

New Orleans' Kingsley House, the first settlement house in the South, was founded in 1896 by clergy and lay parishioners of the Trinity Episcopal Church, although its by-laws were quickly amended to include people of all religious beliefs (Stuart, 1992, p. 113). Kingsley's programs were of quintessential settlement house variety: recreation, day care, day and overnight camping programs. Consistent with conditions in the South at the time, most Southern settlement houses -- including Kingsley -- offered segregated social and recreation programs, although several had biracial programs (identical programs, Blacks in one building, Whites in another). About half served only one race (Stuart, p. 112).

In 1941, Emeric Kurtagh, a social worker late of New York's Henry Street settlement, became head resident and proceeded to reinvigorate the organization, which had been foundering for several years (Stuart, p. 113). Kurtagh's philosophy was consistent with the settlement house tradition, and he believed that Kingsley's recreation programs should not be seen as "mere recreation, but 'recreation with a plus: informal education where people live by doing, by living'" (Stuart, p. 113, emphasis in original). His goal, in addition to maintaining and enhancing existing programs, was to help the community develop ways to "adapt...to today's realities" (Stuart, p. 113). Inevitably, those realities involved racial segregation.

In 1945, Kurtagh's dual interests in community organizing and expansion of Kingsley's youth programs were piqued. A regional organizer for the Textile Workers Union, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), who knew Kurtagh through their involvement with the New Orleans Council of Social Agencies and the Area (social services) Coordinating Committee, approached Kurtagh and asked that Kingsley House institute a recreation program for youth at the union hall. The union's request stemmed from difficulties caused by young people in the area of the Lane Cotton Mills.

Most of the textile union members worked at the Lane Mills, located near the union hall but some distance away from Kingsley. Since there were no recreation facilities in the Mill area, the union hall served as a de facto neighborhood center. It is important to note
here that the Textile Workers Union had an interracial membership. In approaching Kingsley House, therefore, the union explicitly stated that the recreation program must be an interracial one (Stuart, p. 114) Armed with an increase in his Community Chest allocation to support this new extension program, and a “reluctant” endorsement from some members of his own Board (something Kurtagh attributed to both the interracial issue, as well as the fact that the union sponsored the program), Kurtagh hired Constance Grigsby to staff the program, which opened in January, 1946 (Stuart, pp. 114-115). The approach was to staff the program with a resident group worker/director (Grigsby), and to create an advisory committee for oversight. The latter was comprised of union representatives, Lane Cotton Mill management, and community members (Stuart, p. 115).

The population of the area around Lane Mill was 20 percent Black; however, the extension program served only White children for its first six months of operation. At that point the Twelfth Ward Negro Improvement League complained to Kingsley about the dearth of recreational facilities for Black children. This prompted Kurtagh and Grigsby to suggest that a recreation program for Black children be developed in a vacant lot some distance from the union hall, using physical education teachers from historically black Dillard and Xavier universities for supervision. Given the union’s integration policies, not only the advisory committee, but both the union and Lane Cotton Mills’s management, violently opposed this idea (Stuart, p. 115).

Kurtagh suggested a compromise, proposing that Black children use the hall two days per week, but only when white children were not using it. In keeping with segregationist practices of the time, both rest rooms and drinking fountains were racially separated at the hall during Kingsley program hours (something the union itself had never done), and the swimming program was open only to White children. Interestingly, segregation of Black from

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1 Stuart notes that, unlike the American Federation of Labor (AF of L) craft unions, “CIO unions promoted integration and nondiscrimination in the South as well as in the North” (p. 114).

2 The Community Chest, which represented about 80 percent of Kingsley House’s budget at the time, was the precursor to today’s United Way.

3 Unfortunately, Stuart fails to elaborate upon these two important elements as they seemed to have informed the board’s resistance.
White children was vigorously enforced when Kingsley House staff members were present; however, "black and white children used the union hall together without conflict" when they were not (Stuart, p. 116).

Staff turnover presented a large problem: in the period 1946-48, the program had five different staff members, one of whom observed before leaving that Kingsley House should reevaluate the [recreation] program. In particular, providing a biracial program was problematic because of the prejudice of the white parents. [She] suggested that, if the decision was made to continue the...program, explaining [it] to the neighborhood should be considered a high priority (Stuart, pp. 116-117).

The program continued to operate in the years 1946-1949 as a biracial, but segregated, program. Around 1947, the New Orleans Recreation Department (NORD) broke ground on a new recreation facility near the union hall. This caused some members of the advisory committee to question whether the Kingsley House program was any longer necessary -- this, despite the fact that the new facility would serve only Whites (Stuart, p. 117).

In 1949, Emeric Kurtagh was accused by the House Un-American Activities Committee of membership in two Communist organizations, allegations he denied. That denial notwithstanding, the Kingsley House Board forced his resignation. Shortly thereafter, the Board also abandoned the union hall recreation program, saying the new NORD recreation facility was adequate. At the same time, it urged NORD to expand its services, a move (the case writer presumes) designed to fill the gap precipitated by the closing of the Kingsley House recreation programs for Black children (Stuart, p. 117). And so this experiment in integrated youth recreation programs ended.

At the conclusion of the case, Stuart tells us that Tulane University, which had long placed (White) education students from its School of Social Work at Kingsley House for field experience, integrated its school of social work in 1963. This, in turn, stimulated discussions among Kingsley House board members about what might happen "if Tulane... should wish to send one of its Negro students to Kingsley House for field education" (Stuart, pp. 117-118). These discussions led, first, to acceptance of black social work students at Kingsley House, and to the House's full integration in 1966 (Stuart, p. 118).

This case may be seen as an exercise in failure. That would be an impoverished view, for in it we can find the seeds of hope. Several elements make its inclusion here
important. First, most importantly, the Kingsley House recreation program was a sound experiment in substantive social and social policy change, "an effort to confront segregation at a time when such confrontations were rare and unpredictable" (Stuart, p. 119).

Second, while it is true that the Textile Workers Union and the management at Lane Cotton Mills appear to have been the "prime movers" in the effort, with the settlement house playing what appeared to have been a largely reactive role, the fact is that each needed the other. Given the times, it is very nearly miraculous that such a program got off the ground at all, so the deliberative (and cooperative) efforts of all three were absolutely essential. There is evidence that Kurtagh, in particular, made several attempts to "speak across" the various constituencies in the institution's environment (labor and management, White and Black neighbors, city government and other nonprofit organizations) in the attempt to unite them in achievement of a common purpose (Stuart, p. 118).

Finally, and as Follett, Dewey and Mead all remind us, a healthy, reflective social life is, as Follett says with reference to democracy, "a process, not a goal." As such, that process is a vital mechanism with which to experiment. So, although it does seem that both Kurtagh and his board felt exquisitely the violent opposition that would attend establishment of a fully integrated program at that time in history, they were willing to take steps to realize it. They also seem to have understood that both learning and radical change can take time; and that incremental change is sometimes essential for a higher good to result. Thus, they seem to have been willing to take the time for the program to develop -- to reap the rewards of experimentation and learning.

A more recent incarnation of the traditional settlement house is the Franklin-Wright Settlements in Detroit. Franklin-Wright was founded in the closing decades of the 19th Century and, at that time, served European immigrants in what was then an area of middle class single family homes and some commercial businesses. Today, the area is comprised of "low-income families, unemployed youth, and isolated elderly with inadequate housing and insufficient services" (Checkoway, 1991, p. 17).

We see Franklin-Wright changing as both population and community needs have changed over time. As it was with its Hull House counterpart, in the 1880's Franklin-Wright established a day nursery and kindergarten for children of working parents (Checkoway, p. 17; Carlson, pp. 73-76). In the 1920's, health clinics and improvements in housing and sanitation took center stage. In the 1940's, it was creation of social clubs for youths and
senior citizens, together with voter registration. In the 1960's, the settlement was instrumental in working with the community to oppose some urban renewal efforts, and to advocate for, among other things, welfare rights and increased public funding of social programs (Checkoway, p. 17).

Franklin-Wright operates several sites in the neighborhood, and its programs represent standard settlement house fare: "subsistence services," group work and outreach for youth and adults, youth counseling, family programs and community organizing assistance, the needs of elderly residents in public housing, and those of children and families, youth employment, and an annual "sleepaway" camp for children in the summer. "Each facility," says Checkoway, "has a physical presence which reinforces its legitimacy as an institution in the neighborhood" (p. 18).

Currently, Franklin-Wright's board of directors reflects the community along racial, ethnic, and cultural lines. Of particular interest here is the board's efforts at long-range planning, an activity spearheaded by a standing committee of the board. In the early 1980's, the committee surveyed the community to get its views on problems the latter felt required sustained attention. Among the critical problems the committee documented were crime, unemployment, teen pregnancy and inadequate health care. This was followed by an inventory of services currently offered in the area and, not inconsequentially, an analysis of how well Franklin-Wright itself was meeting community needs. For each "condition" the community had identified, the committee developed specific strategies, identified what board and staff responsibilities attendant to them, and recommended implementation steps (Checkoway, p. 18).

Throughout the 1970's and 1980's, the Franklin-Wright board concentrated on housing and community revitalization. In this effort, we see a fine example of the value, and reality, of a community that — as Follett says — "grips its own problems." In that twenty-year period, the board

formed a nonprofit housing corporation to rehabilitate housing by construction of a large-scale 'village development' on the edge of the neighborhood....worked with district councils to develop a revitalization plan that would include housing repairs, park construction, and a commercial shopping area....convened meetings for homeowners with city officials to discuss home improvement loans....helped create community block clubs and neighborhood watch programs [which] conduct clean-up campaigns...demolish deteriorated structures, and join local boards and citywide coalitions (Checkoway, p. 18).
Franklin-Wright sees itself as in it for the long haul, as it were, and therefore "takes a broad time perspective on neighborhood planning." That is, it "[selects] strategies after careful consideration in the manner of an established institution rather than as a new group for a temporary purpose" (Checkoway, p. 18). In sum, Franklin Wright "aims to help people to develop themselves and participate in the community without compromising the ability to create change" (Checkoway, p. 18).

Howard Husock notes that the professionalization of social work throughout the 1920's and 1930's in particular served to "undermine" the kind of settlement house Jane Addams may have envisioned in that it caused them to "lose their community focus" (p. 60). He also believes, however, the settlement movement left an enduring legacy for latter-day settlement houses; and I would submit that this "legacy" may apply to many contemporary community-based nonprofit human service institutions.

First, "settlements appeal to a broad cross-section of citizens -- not only those with specific problems -- within a geographically defined area" (p. 61). Husock studied 14 settlements in 11 cities and found that "no settlement defines more than half its programs in terms of specific problems or problem populations" (p. 61). This is important because while most government-funded programs attempt to address a specific problem, settlement houses attempt to attend to the social contexts within which the problems might arise. Thus, the Morristown, New Jersey, Neighborhood House offers not just anti-drug programs but a 'homework' club open to all. Omaha's Social Settlement Association offers not just 'professional counseling' but 'friendship' clubs for groups ranging from 'latchkey children' to adults. The Harvard Community Services Center in Cleveland not only offers a program for teen parents but provides meeting space to the local Republican...ward committee and sponsors social clubs for youths from specific streets (Husock, p. 61).

The flexibility with which settlements adapt to changing social policy and funding conditions, and make use of private dollars to develop programs that benefit the community at large (rather than offering only government-funded, "problem-based" services), is worth mention. This, because it belies (in this case at any rate) the "inevitability" of institutional isomorphism argument Terry Cooper advances. Husock's analysis of 410 programs offered in 36 New York City settlement houses reveals that only 84 of those programs (about 20 percent of the 410) were apparently "problem-based" and thus susceptible to government
funding — this, despite the fact that those 36 settlements as a group garnered 80 percent of their funding from government (p. 62).

The same is true of Grace Hill Neighborhood Services in St. Louis which, although also receiving 80 percent of its funding from government, developed its Member Organized Resource Exchange (MORE) program with private funding. MORE is an interesting program. Money is not accepted for its maintenance. Rather, it is "a network of help that money can't buy," and is designed for maximum participation of the entire community. The "network of help" can only be activated when a community member contributes something he or she can do (a "distinctive competence," if you will) and "exchanges" it for a service another community member has to offer (Husock, p. 53). To receive assistance with a specific task (e.g., car repairs, babysitting, furniture moving, or respite from care of an infirm relative), a community member must him or herself contribute, make a "deposit," of a service to the resource exchange "bank." For those community members who are infirm, and therefore unable to make a "deposit" (but for whom "withdrawals" may be important), volunteers from suburban churches and synagogues can contribute labor in that person's name (Husock, p. 53).

A cadre of volunteer computer industry consultants designed ATM-type cards so that members can see what the "balance" in their resource exchange account is at any given time. Local retail businesses were recruited to provide terminals with which to check the cards (Husock, pp. 53-54). At present, more than 4,000 people participate, 70 percent of whom have annual incomes under $10,000 (Husock, p. 53).

The second element in the settlement philosophy's enduring legacy is that "settlements, to a significant extent, represent a privately funded stream of U.S. social policy" (Husock, p. 62). Husock notes that, in settlements in the 11 cities he studied, 33.4 percent of funds originated with government. In most cases, however, the primary funding source was United Way, which Husock sees as "a reflection of a community consensus that such institutions are of value" (p. 62). United Way funding is followed distantly by fees for specific activities (e.g., materials for art classes).

The third element is that "settlements have boards of directors that link residents of poor neighborhoods with representatives of the general metropolitan area" (p. 62). While Husock says this element is a legacy of the "maximum feasible participation" mandate of 1960's War on Poverty; however, given the settlement movement's guiding philosophy, it is
entirely possible that this tendency was there in any case.

The institutional relationships between settlement houses and the larger community (e.g., businesses, churches, philanthropic foundations) is equally important. Husock found that churches, for example, "often use settlements as a kind of secular arm" (pp. 63-64).

The final element is that "although they now have both administrative and program staffs, settlements continue to use significant numbers of volunteers" (p. 64).

Husock's fundamental question, those factors notwithstanding, is "do settlements work"? "Almost by definition," he says, "it is difficult to assess the value of such efforts" (p. 64). Still, he offers some anecdotal data that speaks volumes on the value of individual and group development and community processes as they serve to enhance the social ideal:

the director of Friendly House in Worcester, Massachusetts, believes that the outlook of the unemployed adults who play on the house softball team has changed since a local physician became a regular member. Officials at the Greater Cleveland Neighborhood Centers Association are convinced that city's Collinwood Community Services Center, situated on a tense racial dividing line, has, by offering a neutral site for meetings, prevented race-related incidents from becoming more serious. The director of Boston's Lena Park Community Center proudly notes that rival gang members from nearby housing projects use the center's gym without incident; the center serves as a safe haven in the neighborhood (p. 65).

As the foregoing may indicate, the effects of settlement house activities on the young (however difficult objective assessment of such effects admittedly are) is of particular import. As Angel Ortiz-Soto of Philadelphia's Dixon House Settlement, which sees social activities and recreation as primary mechanisms with which draw in children and youth, observes: "kids are not going to pound down the door to be taught social skills" (quoted in Husock, p. 65).

Husock documents that, in addition to traditional settlement house programs, many such organizations serve as incubators for enduring social change and improvement. For example, when the NCAA mandated that athletic eligibility was contingent upon academic performance, Boston's Lena Park Community Center established LEAP (Linking Educators, Athletes, and Parents), and developed a relationship with the Stanley Kaplan SAT coaching firm which tutors high school athletes and non-athletes alike. LEAP's specific objective is to give its students the chance to be placed in historically black colleges in the South (p. 66).

Husock believes that the prospects for revival of the settlement movement ideal will
be, at best, difficult, and that the greatest obstacle to that revival "is society's tendency to devalue their common sense approach" (pp. 67-68). Thus, recreation programs for the young are seen as "frivolous," rather than a crucial element in individual development and, as Follett might say, "learning the art of community."

Husock's suggestions for how this revival might take place center on funding. He argues first, that, to the extent settlements hold a special place in the community, more aggressive fundraising "outside the United Way umbrella" must be undertaken (p. 68).

Second, it would be a "mistake" for government alone to fund settlement house activities, largely because it would tend to drive away private charitable support, together with "all the beneficial community relationships that settlements engender" (p. 70). If government is to have a role, it should be to provide a) capital grants for building, expansion and renovation of settlement facilities (p. 69); and b) incremental public funds (he cites the 1991 National and Community Service Act and Community Development Block Grant programs as examples) for program-specific activities. These might also include both capital-improvement and operating dollars for the settlements (p. 70).

Says Husock, "[s]ettlements offer an historically proven way of bringing some of the resources of the affluent to bear on poor neighborhoods, of providing organization in disorganized communities" (p. 71). That being the case, revival of the settlement ideal does not imply a specific mix of programs. Rather, it would recognize that there is a need...to link the social classes and to offer neighborhood amenities for the poor in ways that income redistribution and therapeutic programs by themselves do not.... Traditional, but similarly devalued programs such as the Police Athletic League...YMCA/YWCA's, Catholic Youth Organization activities, and Boys and Girls Clubs share many of the attributes of settlements and deserve similar consideration as being more than marginal contributors to creating and preserving a social fabric in troubled neighborhoods (p. 71).

Case II: The Center for Family Life and the Sunset Park Community

This case is an account of the life of a mid-sized (FY 1992-1993 budget of $1.8 million), multi-service, community-based nonprofit human service institution serving children and families in Sunset Park, Brooklyn, in the period 1978-1991 (Sheffer, 1992). The Center for Family Life (CFL) was founded in 1978, a satellite organization of its parent, St.
Christopher Ottilie, a large Roman Catholic multi-service nonprofit based in Long Island (Sheffer, pp. 8, 42-43). CFL operates under the guidance of St. Christopher Ottilie's volunteer board of directors; and CFL itself has an advisory board, comprised in large part of members of the Sunset Park community, together with key actors in the organization's environment -- the school district, other nonprofit social service agencies, and government social service agencies (pp. 44-45).

CFL's full-time professional staff number 24, 17 of whom live in or near Sunset Park. These staff members, most of them social workers, are described as having a "long-term commitment" to CFL, and the turnover has thus been very low over the life of the center (pp. 45-46). Thirty-eight of 49 part-time volunteers are Hispanic community members (the numerical ethnic majority in Sunset Park) who also help with service provision. There are also a number of other program volunteers from both the Sunset Park neighborhood and the larger New York metropolitan area (p. 45).

As it was with many American metropolitan areas, Sunset Park experienced a radical restructuring of its ethnic composition in the decade 1980-1990. In that decade, the White population decreased by 25.5 percent, while the Hispanic population rose nearly 15 percent; and non-White, non-Hispanic population (largely East Asians) increased by nearly 200 percent. Today, with a total population of just over 100,000, Sunset Park is described as a "low-income, multi-ethnic" neighborhood (p. 7).

CFL's comprehensive array of core services are targeted for the children and families residing in Sunset Park. Its mission is to

counter the forces of marginalization and disequilibrium which impact on families...sustain families and children in their own homes...provide alternatives to foster care or institutionalization...stem influences which

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4 CFL's administrative and funding structure is such that its parent, St. Christopher Ottilie, covers nearly all operating and administrative costs. Thus, the $1.8 million budget noted above should be seen as directed largely at service provision.

5 In practice, there is a distinction between the "board" volunteer and the "program" volunteer in nonprofit organizations. The former (theoretically) joins his or her colleagues on the board of directors to set policy and to provide general oversight. As a general rule, he or she does not assist in day-to-day service delivery; while the latter assists paid professional staffers with service delivery only.
contribute to delinquency of children and alienation of youth from their parents... the Center's activities and foci necessarily become multidimensional [and] ... rather than organizing its methods on any categories such as runaways, the learning disabled child, the neglected or abused, the depressed, the substance abusers, and so on, the Center pursues a *generic* social work practice (cited in Sheffer, p. 8, emphasis in original).

The "organizing principles" of the Center indicate why this case is particularly apt here:

1. individuals must be understood within a cultural and environmental context;
2. the unit of analysis is always the family, no matter which member of that family first comes to the Center's attention; and
3. the Center itself exists within a community and must intersect with other local groups and organizations (Sheffer, p. 8)

The Center is described as "solidly in the settlement house tradition and, over time, it has become what has been termed "an exemplary family service program" by a number of observers (Sheffer, p. 9). That is interesting because, contrary to the traditional practice of identifying and advancing objective performance or "3-E" measures as the only explanation for such success, the case writer notes that of equal explanatory power are the social and organizational processes at work in the center. Those processes both ground and give substantive meaning to the actions of CFL's founding co-directors, Sisters Mary Paul and Geraldine, of the Order of the Good Shepherd. Both are clinical social workers; both live on-site (Sheffer, p. 7).

Sheffer says that, while the Center has been studied from a number of different perspectives, what has been saliently lacking are "the specific ways in which this organization has created and now conducts its programs in interaction with the particular history and changing needs and institutions of the Sunset Park community" (p. 11). Following from that, Sheffer asks a number of crucial questions, which she makes it her business to answer:

Community leaders and government and service providers alike agree that a social service system should reflect needs, demographics, and geography of neighborhoods. But how to develop such a system? Which programs offer good examples? What characterizes a 'truly' neighborhood-based organization? And what defines 'community'? (p. 11).
In 1978, Sunset Park had only fragmented and few family services available; and there was near-universal agreement from not only the community, but from government officials, the local school board, the police and other nonprofit services providers, that a center for children and families was a necessity for the neighborhood (pp. 17-18).

From the beginning, Sisters Mary Paul and Geraldine made conscious and concerted efforts to root the center in the life of the community, efforts absolutely consistent with the center's organizing principles. This approach bore fruit early, helping to mediate one of the first problems attendant to creation of the center: non-Catholic church leaders in Sunset Park, already concerned with dwindling memberships, were worried that CFL might impinge upon -- and subsume -- the religious diversity in the neighborhood. In a series of meetings to discuss this, Sister Geraldine and the church leaders together all came to see that the consuming needs of families and children far outweighed any sectarian concerns (p. 18).

Following from its three organizing principles, and apart from the direct services it offers, CFL sees its primary aim as promoting healthy and competent community-based processes which, in tum, can make more effective city-wide social policy changes. Indeed, organization members believe that, absent those processes, no top-down "intervention" or imposition of services will be effective (p. 26). Some brief illustrations of the ways in which these processes are encouraged are useful.

CFL has consistently opposed government-mandated unitary responses to highly individual and community problems. It thus also has made concerted efforts to eschew "restricted" funding -- i.e., that confined to a specific problem or "labeled clientele" such as "alcoholism," or "learning-disabled child" -- in its programs generally. The Center believes such funding creates "new groups of people for purposes of funding" rather than promoting services the community itself says it needs (Sheffer, p. 17). I might add that such funding may also be a significant impediment to development of community processes because it may tend to enact attention to only a single element of community life. The Center's philosophy with regard to counseling services is pure Follett. Its fundamental belief is that change, beginning with the individual and the family, can be radiated outward and directed toward an improved community. It is at the level of individual and family, then, "rather than...[change in] the structures of the community in order to produce individual benefits" that socially rational and hence productive change ensues (Sheffer, p. 25).

Interestingly, although there has been a persistent problem with inadequate pre-
school day care in Sunset Park, CFL does not provide such a program. This is a considered
decision. CFL believes that, with coordinated expansion efforts, the distinctive capacity
organizations already providing services bring to the neighborhood could be further tapped
and used (p. 30). Further, there is a long-standing informal reciprocal process of cross-
referral between CFL and those providers such that the Child Welfare Administration (CWA)
of New York often uses this informal arrangement in its own placement efforts (pp. 29-30).

Unemployment is also a consistent and profound problem in Sunset Park. How CFL
approaches this problem is a study in how an organization can come to understand the
needs of its community. CFL’s employment services are funded largely by the New York
State Department of Employment (DOE), which makes this CFL program different from all
its others. While all other CFL programs are limited, geographically, to Sunset Park, DOE
regulations stipulate that services be offered not only in that neighborhood, but in other
geographic areas as well.

In CFL’s employment program, two operating principles guide it: first, jobs should be
above minimum wage; second, and in keeping with its organizing principles, "placing women
with children in dead-end jobs may be counterproductive to improved family life” (p. 32). As
a result, CFL has resisted industry-specific job training (e.g., for food service) and opted
instead to engage in training that "would relate more closely to its counseling efforts and
would reflect the diversity of its clientele's needs” (p. 30). In this way, the Center increases
the likelihood that it will identify jobs better-suited to a particular client's interest and skill.
This is no small task. What is required to sustain this effort is the ability to persistently work
with private industry, State and local government, and other nonprofits (sources not only for
job referrals, but jobs themselves) to produce a coordinated program.

Another element of the employment program illustrates how CFL adjusts to changing
needs. Finding DOE red tape and its narrow definition of service "exceptionally onerous," and as the case was written, CFL had begun taking steps to use private money to help those
unemployed clients not falling cleanly into DOE's "restricted groupings" for employment
services (p. 33). Says Sr. Mary Paul:

DOE does not care much whether an applicant got child care or solved a
personal/family problem related to employability...they credit only the number
of placements and 'negotiated wage'....By using our private funding in a more
relevant way I can look forward to giving them a report next year that will
possibly be influential (p. 33)
The upshot is that, in the 24-month period, 1989-1991, the Center served 571 people,
and made 413 placements -- 395 of which were above minimum wage (p. 31).

It is in CFL's school programs that a sometimes astonishing consonance with Follett and Dewey can be seen. Both nuns had extensive experience in child welfare services in greater New York City prior to their arrival in Sunset Park (pp. 15-17), and both came to see the public school as a crucial link between children and families and the larger world.

Overcrowding in the five Sunset Park public schools ranges from a staggering 99 percent to 133 percent of capacity. Nearly 100 percent of the total school population are children with limited English language skills, and their reading scores often fall below grade-level proficiency (p. 33). Further complicating this picture is pervasive gang activity in the neighborhood.

CFL's answer to these problems was one developed very early in the Center's life: creation of free neighborhood centers in three of five local public schools, which have after-school programs for children and youth. These programs offer an array of recreation and arts activities, youth leadership and tutoring programs, all of which are designed to emphasize "group experiences to foster expressive skills" (Sheffer, p. 35). As for parents, there are myriad activities for them as well, and include everything from parenting classes and sewing, to discussions with invited lecturers (p. 35).

As if reading from the Mary Follett "handbook," the Center's intent for these programs is specifically not to supplement academic study. Rather, it is to foster "group-oriented, socializing activities" (p. 35):

the goals of learning are not only the acquisition of facts but also the fostering of feelings of self-acceptance, self-confidence, and habits of mind that are conducive to new learning, and the school must recognize that it must work with the community to further such ends (p. 35)

Thus, the rationale for creation of these programs is twofold:

that parents need a safe place for their school-age children....and that such a program should not be merely an extension of the academic school day, but should be a means to expand the horizons of children, encourage group activity, and bring the life of the community into the school (p. 34).

Further, says literature distributed by the center,

...it is all too common...to find major interference with effective education of children, if the school alone is left 'in charge....' There is a widely found tendency to ignore family and community unless they are factored in negatively....We find ourselves urging strongly that schools be allowed to
become new neighborhood settlement houses where neighborhood family-focused agencies and parents develop a lively, socially healthy and stimulating resource array for families (pp. 35-36).

It should be noted that these school programs did not bloom, conflict-free, nor do they remain so. It has taken years of persistent work by all involved to sustain them. For example, although CFL’s after-school programs had been in one of the schools for nearly 12 years, there was a "continuing conflict over the presence and appropriateness of community-based programs, operated by an outside, nonschool agency in the school building" (p. 36). This was brought to a head in 1990 when the school principal, citing the Board of Education's new "school-based management initiative," stated that she and the school's faculty would assume "control" of non-school based activities. She then restricted CFL’s program to a single room in the school.

Sr. Geraldine, in a letter to the School Superintendent, said that "[w]e would like to avoid media confrontation...if possible, and rely on the shared, authentic concern for the children and parents of this school and the immediate community." She then organized the parents, who contacted the School Board with much the same message (pp. 36-37).

There is a stark difference in CFL’s community-based foster-care programs, begun in 1988, from other such programs. Specifically, CFL’s program insists that children, if they must be removed from a troubled home, must also be placed within the Sunset Park community (p. 40).

The city’s Child Welfare Administration’s policy of foster placement (rooted in part in case law) requires that all foster care placements be made on a first-come, first-served basis, and geography is not considered in that decision (p. 41). Believing that separating a child from his or her neighborhood, school, family and friends is unnecessary and cruel, CFL developed "satellite" foster homes inside Sunset Park, operated by CFL itself (p. 40). These homes allow the troubled family to work together with foster parents so that the former can maintain contact with their children. The upshot of all this is that Sr. Mary Paul arranged with the Deputy Director of the district CWA to give preferential referrals to Sunset Park children and families. At the same time, bureaucratic resistance within CWA to such localized placement has presented continuing problems. While CFL’s community-based foster care program had not, as the case was written, been formally evaluated, professionals in the child welfare arena "have consistently called it 'promising,' and say that it demonstrates
the feasibility of linking foster care and community-based services in a form of shared parenting" (p. 42).

In my view, that is a crucial point on three counts. First, it illustrates the importance of contextual family, group and community relations in the lives of individuals -- however young. Further, removal of children from the social contexts of their neighborhoods may have devastating effect upon development and transmission of social knowledge so elemental to a vibrant community life. In keeping with CFL's settlement house tradition, it is unlikely that notion was lost on them. Second, it reinforces the importance of Center's role in sustaining (and enhancing) those relations in the community. Finally, if neighborhood organization exists in part as a forum for experimentation (and Follett believes they do), CFL is a fine example of it.

Predictably, while the Center has had stellar successes, its track-record is not without some failures. For example, another persistent problem in Sunset Park generally has been woefully inadequate facilities for non-school-based sports and recreation programs for youth (p. 54). CFL operates summer day camps, camp counselor training for school-age child programs and teen camps. In the early 1990's the Center was asked to assume control of the city-wide Summer Youth Employment Program, which it subsequently did. In so doing, it was charged with "empire building." The case writer says another, more positive, interpretation is that "CFL saw this opportunity as related to its overall mission and was able to act quickly and improvise" (p. 39).

As for housing, it too has been a long-standing problem in Sunset Park. There had been no new construction to speak of in the years 1980-1990 and, while gentrification did not keep pace with the surrounding areas, low-income housing has remained inadequate. Indeed, all social service providers in the neighborhood call the problem "overwhelming" (p. 52).

As the case was written, CFL continues to assist families in securing housing, but does not plan to expand into housing development as other social service agencies in the area have been forced to do. Housing development is a costly, highly complicated affair. That, together with a failed development attempt in the mid-1980's, has made the Center reluctant to try it again anytime soon (pp. 28-29).

As with many communities, Sunset Park has a number of problems which have persisted over the life of the neighborhood. Much of this persistence has been ascribed to
the heterogeneity of the neighborhood. Sunset Park has been described as neither "culturally cohesive [nor] homogeneous;" but as a "loose conglomeration of numerous communities [which is] not likely ever to be anything but a community of communities" (p. 58). In part, this is due to the high rate of immigration to the area. This diversity has resulted, it has been observed over the years, in ethnic "enclaves" rather than "a truly integrated, functioning social arrangement" (p. 58). Such diversity, the case writer suggests, also helps explain why, even in the face of common problems, community-based organizations have had difficulty "in making truly united efforts" to address those problems (p. 58). Further,

[n]ew immigrant groups bring new energies, but also the need for new and additional services, which sometimes can compete with the service needs of other, earlier settlers. And new immigrant populations may also bring...old problems such as the proliferation of nonunion storefront garment manufacturing sweatshops, staffed by Asian immigrant workers, which now exist throughout Sunset Park (p. 60).

However profoundly difficult the problems, both CFL and other community-based organizations in the area appear to have great potential to bridge them; and can be seen as building upon the great vitality in the community to do so. The case writer notes that the Center for Family Life, while not claiming to be "mediator" among factions and competing interests, nor "solver" of the myriad problems confronting the community, does make several significant contributions to the life of the community and the processes inhering therein. First,

it is...a unifying force because in serving the poorest segment of the community, it does attempt to cut across all ethnic groupings. The Center has also been a link between diverse community agencies and institutions, most notably the schools and the wider surrounding neighborhood...[all of which express and foster] the community's oneness (p. 60).

Second, the kind of leadership with which Mead would find resonance is patently obvious in the two nuns. In my view, their greatest achievements have rested with their ability to foster communication between and among the diverse elements in the community and the larger world in which it lives. Apart from whatever skill they might have as social workers, a primary reason for this, it seems to me, is that they live in the neighborhood, have taken "more and more responsibility for the life of the neighborhood" (Follett, p. 205).

Finally, and as the case writer notes,
The work of the Center for Family Life in Sunset Park...must be seen as a process rather than as a series of statistically verifiable outcomes. CFL has been rooted in its community, helping to shape the community's key institutions such as its schools, and has changed as the community has changed (p. 66, emphasis in original).

Case III: "Collaborations" Between Community-Based Nonprofits and Schools

Among the more persistent problems faced by American schools in the last generation has been the alarming dropout rate among the young. Over the last decade, there has developed a nationwide movement which has brought together community-based human service agencies and schools in the effort to develop comprehensive, community-based responses to the needs of at-risk youth (Jones, 1992, p. 496; Hobbs, 1994, p. 1). In the literature, these are called "collaboratives." It is likely Follett would be troubled with that term, but she would also argue that, semantics notwithstanding, they are simply manifestation of healthy community processes at work.

Beverly Hobbs (1994) notes that "collaboration" can be viewed in a number of ways. For purposes here, the view of Barbara Gray (1991) is useful as it most closely resembles Follett's view. For her, collaboration refers to a process of joint decision making among key stakeholders of a problem domain about the future of the domain. Five key aspects of this definition are: 1. The stakeholders are interdependent. 2. Solutions emerge by dealing constructively with differences. 3. Joint ownership of decision is involved. 4. Stakeholders assume collective responsibility for the future direction of the domain. 5. Collaboration is an emergent process (p. 227).

Although collaborations between schools and the business sector have been widely publicized and touted, little has been written on those between schools and community-based nonprofit human service agencies. This is rather startling when one considers that creation of such collaboratives showed a 60 percent increase in the years 1983-1992, that

6 In the past three years, however, the research base has begun to blossom on public school and community-based nonprofit collaborations. Most notable among the contributors are the Harvard Family Research Project, and the Center on Families, Communities, Schools and Children's Learning at Johns Hopkins and Boston University.
they are reported across all locales in the United States, that they now number some 140,000, and that they represent a wide range of programmatic size and scope (Institute of Educational Leadership, 1986; Lieberman, 1986; Evans, 1988; Jones, 1992; Heath and McLaughlin, 1994; Hobbs, 1994).

This movement developed from the realization of parents, teachers, school systems and community-based nonprofits alike that unitary and unilateral responses of a single agency (whether government or nonprofit) are inadequate to the needs of at-risk kids. Increasingly, all have come to see that the "interrelatedness of economic, social, and educational risk factors such as poverty, substance abuse, minority status [and] poor achievement...demands a community-based comprehensive response" (Hobbs, 1994, p. 7).

Although few case studies have been written, we can get a snapshot of the efficacy of collaborations between public schools and community-based organizations by reviewing a few vignettes. These indicate that such institutional relationships have produced results, both quantitative and qualitative, of some moment. Of general interest here is the idea that community-based organizations are shown to be seedbeds of experimentation. By this I mean not only innovation or experimentation in gross programmatic terms, but in small, symbolically significant terms that matter in the lives of the people they serve.

Shepherd Zeldin and Joanne Bogart (1990) catalog fifteen programs identified as bringing "innovative and promising approaches" to education and community support of homeless children and youth. Of the fifteen, two are state-administered, six are district-administered, and seven are offered by community-based organizations in collaboration with school districts in various parts of the country.

An element of import to children who live in "transitional" housing such as a homeless shelter is the need for structure -- a sense of place, of continuity, and of safety. Hence, this need holds a place of centrality in the mission of any organization seeking to serve them. A staff member at Children's Center at Martha's Table in Washington, D.C., for example, says that "with homeless children [you] have to start with basic things, and ensure that everything is done on a set schedule, in order for them to develop trust..." (Zeldin and Bogart, p. 28).

The development of social skills among homeless children are thought to lag behind those of their peers who live in stable homes. As a result, the need for kids to develop social skills such that they can more readily integrate into the life of the larger community after
leaving the shelter becomes important. We see these overarching needs articulated in various ways in each and every homeless program Zeldin and Bogart cite.

There are programs offered by community-based nonprofits in most large American cities that attempt to meet the social and educational needs of homeless children with high dropout potential. Examples are The Children's Center at Martha's Table in Washington, D.C., Kansas Children's Service League in Topeka, and the Atlantic Street Center in Seattle.

The Children's Center at Martha's Table in Washington, D.C., is a fine example of a large city program. This agency does not have an on-site school, but does offer after-school recreation activities, homework assistance and an intensive one-on-one tutoring program (staffed solely by community volunteers under the direction of a staff "master tutor") which involves both child(ren) and parents as well.

Both Center director and staff maintain a working relationship with area elementary schools as well as with other nonprofit organizations, each of which inform the other in the effort to provide the most comprehensive services available for at-risk kids. It was in routine discussion with public school teachers and staff, for example, that led The Children's Center to expand both its homework assistance and tutorial programs in support of the school's efforts (Zeldin and Bogart, pp. 28-29).

Mid-sized cities also sustain such collaborations. One such is the South Area Emergency Housing Center (SAEHC) in Sacramento, California. SAEHC is a shelter for homeless children and families which has an on-site school funded by Sacramento city and county. The aims of the agency's school program are to "provide a structured and safe environment for children," and to "ensure prompt placement of children into the school system when the family leaves [SAEHC]" (p. 22). Apart from those, its aim is to promote "cooperative learning between older and younger students [and] to promote reinforcement of basic skills and social development" (p. 22). One innovation in this program illustrates how a single, symbolic word can be both powerful and meaningful for all participants, whether individual or institutional. The staff at SAEHC learned that, as children left the shelter and attempted to enroll in a school, they often lacked the paperwork the district demanded for enrollment. The staff thus developed a "passport" (which includes immunization records, birth verification, and teacher assessment of each child's educational progress and needs), and worked with the school district so that, by now, the district routinely
accepts this "passport" as legitimate documentation to allow for the child's enrollment (Zeldin and Bogart, p. 23). To the extent this "passport" innovation has worked, the term alone has become a powerful symbol for both kids and their parents.

School dropout problems are not, of course, confined to cities. For example, the Attala County Homeless Assistance Tutorial Project (ACHATP) in Salas, Mississippi, is situated in a low-income rural area. The area is depressed, with an average annual family income of $8,000, where people generally attain little more than a seventh grade education, and where the average number per children in a family is 8.5 (Zeldin and Bogart, p. 30).

The children who receive services here are not "homeless" in the traditional sense of the word. Rather, "they're living in tight quarters or [in] doubled-up homes -- which can mean 18 people living in two rooms" (Zeldin and Bogart, p. 30). The result is a home study environment fraught with distractions, noise, and limited study space, "all of which diminish a child's opportunities to complete homework successfully and come to school prepared to concentrate and learn" (Zeldin and Bogart, p. 30).

ACHATP is truly a "bottom-up" creation. The Project came to life when the felt concern of a group of citizens led them to both the local PTA and school superintendent with ideas about how they might offer supplemental tutoring to children in these "doubled-up" homes so as to improve their educational fortunes.

This is "collaboration" of the highest order: the local school provides both the school building itself, and certified teachers to conduct tutoring sessions which are geared for both individualized and group teaching. These sessions are held three times per week for both elementary and high school students, and focus on the basic "Three-R" curricula children are studying in school. The school also makes available textbooks any individual child might be using in the classroom so that tutoring sessions can be consistent with what the child is already learning (Zeldin and Bogart, p. 30).

Of primary import with regard to this program, however, is the idea that, while its objective function may be tutoring (and this, the Project apparently does well), much more is required to sustain it. For example, transportation must be provided to the school since few families own cars. Child care during tutoring sessions is a must because not only are there young parents in the program, but also older siblings who must care for their smaller brothers and sisters. Adequate and nutritious food, too, is a problem. ACHATP therefore routinely coordinates with a food bank to help supplement the family's pantry (Zeldin and
Let us look for a moment at the "scale" issue as regards such collaborations. Bruce Jones (1992), for example, reports upon a three-year longitudinal study (1985-1989) conducted by Columbia University on the New York City Attendance Improvement Dropout Prevention Program (AIDP) in 19 New York City middle schools. He compares the objective results of two types of collaborative efforts: the first, between schools and "exogenous" (i.e., large nonprofits, located outside the community and serving large geographic areas); and, the second, between schools and "indigenous" (smaller, community-based organizations).

The objectives of the AIDP program were, first, to promote development of collaboratives between schools and community-based organizations; second, to reduce absenteeism and dropout rates; and third, to improve student achievement (Jones, pp. 499-500). Four core services offered at each of the 29 schools (in addition to those already offered at the schools) were guidance and counseling services both individual and group, diagnostic screening and/or referral for kids with physical, psychological, and educational problems, home visits, parent-teacher conferences geared at attendance outreach, and "alternative educational activities that incorporated basic skills instruction with individualized attention and after-school academic and social support programming" (Jones, p. 499).

The reported relationships between the staff and the two types of nonprofit organizations are interesting: for those AIDP staff (N=13) working with "indigenous" community-based organizations, 47.1 percent reported that they worked "very well" with them, while only 15.3 percent of those working with the "exogenous" organizations (N=12) reported so. This, the case writer attributes to the fact that the "collaborative levels were highly affected by the schools' familiarity or prior experience with community-based organizations" (p. 503).

As regards improving the linkages between schools and other institutions in the community, 55 percent of AIDP staff (N=16) working with the indigenous form rated those linkages as "good" (about 47.5 percent) or "excellent" (7.7 percent); while for those operating with the exogenous organizations, 50 percent rated the quality of those linkages as "poor," and none rated them as "excellent" (Jones, pp. 503-504).

Student perceptions suggest that, for those participating with the "indigenous" organizations (N=165), about 12.7 percent reported that the collaboration between the indigenous organization and AIDP helped them with family problems "very much," as
opposed to 5.6 percent of those participating with the "exogenous" organizations (Jones, p. 504).

Responses to this question are also interesting: "How much time, since the beginning of the school year, have you talked one-on-one with a teacher, counselor or other adult in the school about problems you may be having"? For the indigenous organizations, 20.8 percent of students responded "every week," while only 8.5 percent of those participating with the exogenous reported weekly talks. Further, 30.4 percent of those participating with indigenous organizations responded that they "never" talked with an adult, while 44.1 percent of those participating with the exogenous never did (B. Jones, pp. 504-505).

Of significance as well are the attendance outreach figures. Workers in indigenous organizations made two-thirds more home visits than those from the exogenous organizations (417 vs. 250); and had nearly three times more face-to-face contact with parents (413 vs. 147). As for phone or mail contacts, workers in the indigenous organizations made 70 percent fewer phone or mail contacts with families than their counterparts in exogenous organizations (1,962 vs. 3,330) (Jones, p. 505).

Those last figures are telling for several reasons. By any objective measure, the needs of a specific community were better addressed by indigenous organizations, which Jones says results largely from the fact that they know their communities (pp. 505-506). As for exogenous organizations participating in the study, these were found to be less successful because they lacked that significant advantage. The exogenous organizations attempted to do the job in an environment that was, in essence, "foreign." As a result, "their staffers had to expend more time building trust and establishing new relationships between program participants to sustain commitment to the program" (Jones, p. 505).

Jones says that findings in this study confirm the need for using smaller, community-based organizations. For him, the reasons are clear:

...compared to their exogenous CBO peers, indigenous CBO staff spend less time in the collaborative process learning about the school and community. [Hence] they have more time to develop and implement the collaborative programs in which they participate. Moreover, the collaborative process between the school and the CBO is substantially affected by whether or not the CBO has a prior history of working with the school, and by the nature of this prior relationship, as well as by the level of familiarity CBO staff have with the community whose students they serve (Jones, pp. 506-507).

Clearly, collaborations of any sort are not easy to sustain, and impediments to their
continuation are legion (see, e.g., Redekop, 1986; Heath and McLaughlin, 1994). Further, traditional theories such as "domain," resource dependency, microeconomic, or negotiated order theories (see, e.g., Gray, 1985, Gray and Wood, 1991) are inadequate because they fail to account for a process view which might offer an equally valid explanation.

Case IV: The Beethoven Project

Otherwise known as the Center for Successful Child Development, Chicago's Beethoven Project was founded in 1986 by the Ounce of Prevention Fund and is funded by the latter, together with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Downs, 1994, p. 23). The organization's mission is

to provide developmental services to children from the earliest possible moment so that they will be prepared to enter preschool and kindergarten...

improve family interactions through helping parents learn about their children and ways to promote their development, and by helping parents develop as parents and as adults...promote health in women and children by providing health care and health education (Downs, p. 24).

Following two-year negotiations with the Chicago Housing Authority, the Beethoven Project moved into the Robert Taylor Homes, a 28-building housing project on Chicago's South Side. Residing therein are about 13,000 residents, nearly all African-Americans. Built in 1962, the Robert Taylor Homes are today rapidly deteriorating; crime and violence are "rampant." Indeed, the area had the highest crime rate in the City in 1990 (Downs, p. 24).

Nearly all families living in Robert Taylor are on some form of public assistance, and the average family income is under $5,000. Seventy-five percent of households are headed by women. Many children living in Robert Taylor enter first grade lagging in development, lack basic immunizations, and are plagued by a number of untreated health problems. The dropout rate in area high schools approaches 60 percent (Downs, p. 24).

The Beethoven Project has two features that bear mention: location and staffing. First, the Project is located in the Robert Taylor projects themselves. This is a crucial element because it is "convenient for parents and their young children, and makes visible the program's intent to be part of the community and its commitment to stay when so many other programs have left" (Downs, p. 24). Second, one of the primary program objectives was to hire Robert Taylor residents to staff it in order "to build expertise and leadership within the projects and to provide employment to residents" (Downs, p. 24). At present, about half of
those staffing the program are residents or "lay" staff, many having begun as program participants.

The value of this approach resides in these factors:

Lay staff have helped the program gain trust and credibility in the community, and have provided valuable insights and information to the program about the community. Also, they become aware of dangerous situations and alert other staff of them (Downs, p. 25).

This staffing philosophy has also produced a number of problems. Many "lay" staffers have never worked outside the home and have thus required not only intensive and sustained training in basic work skills, but in "socialization to the world of work." Further, perhaps most importantly, these lay staffers have required sustained support "in separating their work lives from their personal lives, a task made more complicated because they are relatives and neighbors of the people they serve" (Downs, p. 25).

The Beethoven Project has four core programs. First, there are home visiting services. These include an intake interview during which the interests and needs of the family are discussed, and an appointment for both parents and children at Beethoven's Primary Health Care Center are scheduled. Most importantly, the family is matched with a Parent-Child Advocate a lay staff member who, in a series of home visits, helps the family develop an Individual Family Service Plan dictated by the specific needs of that family (Downs, p. 25).

The second, the Family Enrichment Center, is a drop-in program for children and parents where the latter can get respite from child care. While the children play, parents can simply visit, get counseling, or attend group parenting classes. The last are important, for they "give parents the opportunity to learn from each other, and to discover that their problems are usually shared by others" (Downs, p. 25).

The Primary Health Care Center is the third core program. It offers both primary health care for the entire family, as well as prenatal and well-baby, and preventive health care education. This particular program developed more slowly than expected, largely because residents are long accustomed to seeking medical care only in emergencies, and therefore are either unfamiliar with, or expect little from, preventive care (Downs, p. 25).

The last core program is the Infant/Toddler Center which offers day care for working Moms with children up to age two, and is provided by both professional and lay staffers. At
present, there is room for 14 children. Allied with this program are special services for teen parents, designed to help them on the road to economic self-sufficiency. These services include job readiness classes and help with identifying educational opportunities (Downs, p. 26).

In addition to the Infant/Toddler Center, there are two Head Start classrooms for 33 children and a developmental child care program for two year olds, both of which are full-day programs. Taken together, the Infant/Toddler Center, Head Start, and the developmental child care program represents a comprehensive response to the care and development needs of children in Robert Taylor from infancy until they enter school. Another consequential benefit of these particular services is that they free parents to prepare for, search for, and keep employment (Downs, p. 26).

All members of The Beethoven Project, both professional and lay staff, see themselves as constituting a community-based "learning organization." They have demonstrated both a willingness and ability to modify service programs as exigencies demand. Several "lessons" have been identified since the program was established in 1986. First, "it takes a long time to earn participant's trust but the program cannot function without it" (Downs, p. 26). As might be expected, the lay Parent-Child Advocates play a crucial role here; however, even with them, progress is sometimes slow. Simply gaining entry to a resident's home may take many visits and, once in, many more may be required to begin discussions of substance with the family (Downs, p. 26).

The second "lesson" is that organization members have come to appreciate the sometimes crushingly difficult life conditions of families who live in the projects. Fundamental services (e.g., telephones, laundry facilities, grocery and drug stores) are nearly nonexistent in the neighborhood. Residents often must travel long distances, usually on public transportation, to attend to even basic necessities. Crime is "pervasive," and families are always in peril. There are "meager or nonexistent" youth recreation programs, mental health or other social services. Further, inexpensive recreational activities such as simply playing outside or taking a trip to the zoo are unknown to project kids. These events are seen as "difficult and dangerous at best" (Downs, p. 26).

At the time this case was published (May, 1994), the organization was in the process of conducting a "retrospective analysis" designed to identify "successes and strategies that work" (Downs, p. 26).
Third, organization members have come to know that "family needs must be addressed before parents can be attentive to the developmental needs of children" (Downs, p. 26). Everyday concerns such as housing repairs, food and clothing -- to say nothing of unremitting violent crime -- coupled with high incidence of substance abuse and domestic violence in the projects, makes simple survival a day-to-day challenge for residents (Downs, p. 26).

It is important to note at this point that the Project's plan originally called for preparation of a cohort of children residing in six Robert Taylor buildings for entry into kindergarten at the local Beethoven Public School (hence the nickname for the program). It was expected that such preparation could reasonably be accomplished in five years (Downs, p. 24). The complex conditions outlined above, however, significantly affected both start-up and program development time projections; and each took far longer than expected.

The "lessons" members of the Beethoven Project learned caused them to modify the home visiting services program, which today uses a team approach. Now, both a Parent-Child Advocate and a professional child development specialist are included in such visits. In this way, the Beethoven Project can attend not only to funder-mandated (objective) goals, but to the specifics of each family's circumstances (Downs, pp. 26-27).

Several positive outcomes have been documented (Downs, p. 27), some susceptible to objective measurement, many not: first, the program is now well-known, firmly established and well-accepted by the community. Its programs are also "fairly well-developed" by this time. Second, residents are gradually coming to see the value of preventive health care. More children are immunized, prenatal and well-child care visits are up, and use of medical emergency services is down. Third, parents have begun to learn the value of understanding and articulating their children's developmental needs, and are coming to see that successful child development requires continued stimulation and learning opportunities for their children. Fourth, the drop-in program has been instrumental in helping parents develop a sense of trust and self-confidence. They have therefore "become more relaxed and 'emotionally available' to their children." This in turn has produced improved "social interaction skills" in both parents and children. Fifth, parents are pursuing education and employment opportunities in greater numbers than they did before the program was established. Finally, the children who entered kindergarten in Fall, 1994, were thought to be more likely "at ease
with their peers, more able to interact with adults, and more likely to receive support at home for their school efforts" (Downs, p. 27).

The case writer nicely sums up the difficulties encountered with, and subsequent modifications required in, establishing this program in what can only be called a hostile environment in the Robert Taylor Homes:

The project learned that it would have to pay attention to safety concerns of families and staff in selecting and remodeling buildings for program activities. The goal of having a cohort of children who had spent several years with the program ready for kindergarten after five years of program operation has had to be modified. Delays occurred in negotiating with the housing authority for space, and in gaining the trust of residents so that they would participate...[and] as the immediate, concrete needs of families required attention before they could be helped to encourage and promote their children's development and health. The project learned that it needed to help create a caring community through creating trust among neighbors and between staff and families, within which the project could operate (Downs, p. 27).

Case V: United Services for Effective Parenting

This case demonstrates convincingly that Follett's belief in the ability of individuals and groups to engage in regular and genuine discussion, to create a "universe of discourse," and hence to radiate a "common will" both laterally and vertically, is eminently possible. The very first sentence in the case sets the tone: "It is important to recognize that not all or even most of the important events or policies which influence families are the result of governmental action" (Badger and Burns, 1980, p. 1).

The United Services for Effective Parenting (USEP) is an organization involved with primary prevention for high-risk children from birth to three and their families, and seeks "to provide optimal developmental experiences for their children during the first three years of life" (Badger and Burns, 1980, p. 1). USEP is a Cincinnati, Ohio-based organization, founded in 1974. Actually, the term "founded" is rather a misnomer. As Follett might predict, USEP was not so much "founded" as it was a study in institutional development.

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8 The term "primary prevention" is not defined in the case; however, my many years as both volunteer and staff member in nonprofit human service organizations together with the "clues" provided in the case indicate that the case writers are referring to comprehensive services attendant to child abuse prevention, training and counseling in "effective" parenting, and development of (parental) knowledge about child care and development.
USEP began as many "grass roots" efforts do. In this case, it was a loosely-organized group comprised largely of social workers, nurses, psychologists, and pediatricians, all with an interest in early childhood development, who began to meet regularly in 1974 for "emotional support" in the face of "token funding and low service priorities for birth-to-three programs in their agencies" (Badger and Burns, p. 2).

Much like those who created the Attala County Homeless Assistance Tutorial Project in rural Mississippi, these service providers believed that a single organization, government or nonprofit, simply could not offer the array of services Cincinnati parents and children appeared to require. As a result, they came to see that "health care, education, and social service agencies could unite [and] share information, resources, referrals, staff development programs for the benefit of all" (Badger and Burns, pp. 2-3). Given that understanding, USEP sought the expertise of both teachers and parents, inviting them to join professionals in the effort to develop a comprehensive services system for Cincinnati families.

Three years and sixteen participating agencies later, it was apparent that USEP had become "an important translation of interagency coordination and cooperation" (Badger and Burns, p. 3). It was also apparent that it was time to seek the active involvement of state-level decision-makers, who were responsible for state funding and monitoring of birth-to-three programs. USEP decided to hold a symposium, after which 12 of 40 attendees agreed to form a steering committee with the intent of bringing together all birth-to-three programs under the umbrella of a state-wide coalition.

This 12-person committee first surveyed all programs in each of Ohio's 88 counties to discover where they were, whom they served, and the kinds of services they offered. From this effort, a state directory of these programs was compiled (Badger and Burns, p. 4).

Out of that effort emerged an interest in a state-wide conference for infant/family educators, which took on four primary areas of concern: intervention strategies, program logistics, child development, and program evaluation (Badger and Burns, p. 5). This conference, planned by both the original 12-person steering committee and several interested respondents to the survey questionnaire, intended to offer "an innovative approach to learning." That is, it was hoped that the conference would "provide an environment for interaction among the participants based on the recognition that the necessary expertise already existed among the participants themselves" (Badger and Burns, pp. 4-5). That being the case, it was expected that "each person...[would] take charge of his/her own learning..."
The conference, held in May, 1978, hosted a diverse group of 120 -- program volunteers, parents, and professionals from both large regional, and local community-based, institutions. Workshops, each addressing one of the four primary areas of concern to conference participants were conducted and, as anticipated, "the participants themselves provided a wealth of information" (Badger and Burns, p. 5).

This conference was a watershed: it laid the foundation for creation of what was to become USEP-Ohio, a formally organized state-wide organization. In the letter of invitation to join a statewide planning conference scheduled for September, 1978 (from which the state-wide organization would be created), is one sentence both Follett and the Chicago pragmatists would applaud. In addition to restating the general aims of the incipient organization (earlier agreed upon at the May conference), potential members were promised "an exciting respite from [their] daily routine, camaraderie, and an opportunity to exercise [their] leadership qualities" (Badger and Burns, p. 7).

At the September conference, and after the Cincinnati-based "founders" of USEP explained to participants how their organization had begun and developed, three major agreements were reached. First, they agreed to create an organized structure within which USEP could operate so as to garner what Follett calls "official recognition," and what we today would call "legitimation." This led to USEP's incorporation as a 501(c)3.

Second, conference members divided the state into 12 "regions," a strategy designed to allow members to work within their own communities so as to build and nurture regional coalitions. As Follett would see it, the implications of that are clear: theoretically, members working in their own communities have at hand the ability to gather information about needs specific to that community, and what innovative programs are being brought to bear upon those needs.

The third agreement concerns both learning and communication. Members agreed to send progress reports about what they had learned in their local coalition-building efforts to the Cincinnati office so that others in the membership might take what they could from those experiences and, as far as made sense, apply them in their own locales. The Cincinnati office, in turn, published a bi-monthly newsletter to relay that information.
By 1980 when the case was written, two years had elapsed since that watershed conference. Over that period, the steering committee (now called The Ohio Council, a de facto board of directors) had expanded from 12 to 30, and four operating principles for the 12 state regions had been discovered as member efforts proceeded: "(1) to build bridges between programs at the local, regional, and state levels, (2) to offer consultation to the membership and community at large, (3) to coordinate program services and resources, and (4) to establish local central referral sites" (Badger and Burns, p. 8).

It appears that the ways in which these operating principles have been "translated" are textbook Follett. The first involves "regular meetings." The Ohio Council meets bi-monthly, and regional meetings of service providers occur monthly. It appears that the former attend to traditional policy and planning, while the latter attend concerns about program coordination and service delivery.

Apart from the direct, face-to-face interaction at those regular meetings, two-way communication continues to be a crucial element. The bi-monthly newsletter became a mainstay, as did the directory of services and the annual state-wide conference, all of which serve as primary mechanisms for sharing information about the regional coalitions and program innovations.

As it is with the Beethoven Project in Chicago, members of USEP-Ohio see themselves as constituting a learning organization, and the lessons they report to have taken from the experience would have done Follett proud. The members learned that

(1) each city has to develop its own way; the Cincinnati model can offer only a guideline, (2) a core group within a limited geographic area needs to be strengthened before reaching out to far away counties, (3) a change in the monthly meeting site and an interesting program or speaker are keys to success, and (4) the strengths of all the members of the regional group must be recognized and utilized (p. 9, emphasis in original).

It is apparent that USEP had also achieved a number measurable results by 1980, all of which speak to the idea that creation of a "universe of discourse" is no small matter. These results also give credence to Follett's notion that the integration of smaller into ever-larger groups can produce much in the way of a genuine group will.

In evaluating itself in 1980, USEP-Ohio found that it had be able to foster wider acceptance of the program among both individual and institutional service providers, to make parents aware of the range of programs available to them and their children, to improve
service delivery (largely through increases in agency funding bases which allowed them to make maximum use of Title XX monies for program innovation), and to cooperate with large institutions (e.g., the university of Cincinnati College of Medicine, the Health Department’s Maternity and Infant Care Project, and the State Department of Maternal and Child Health) for better coordination of programs and services (Badger and Burns, p. 3).

USEP’s creation and evolution also enacted the environments of a number of non-member organizations as regards birth-to-three programs. Members report that, following USEP’s incorporation and increased visibility in the state, several educational, health and human service organizations (e.g., community colleges, hospitals, and the Red Cross) had begun expanding their core services to include parent training. This, USEP was delighted to hear: "[USEP] has encouraged a diversity of program models, recognizing that parents should have choices, based on their needs and expectations for their children" (Badger and Burns, p. 10).

In their remarks at the conclusion of the case, Badger and Burns note that creation and development of USEP hinged critically upon "the leadership provided by a small group of program practitioners" in the early going (p. 10). What these individuals and, later, the statewide organization, wrought causes the case writers to note some additional lessons all took from the experience. Although the case writers use language that is quite different from Follett’s as they itemize these lessons, we note many of the same ideas the latter advances in building her case. The fundamental point, however, is that they describe a healthy social process in action.

Among the more important lessons for purposes here, then, are these. They learned, first, that "improved service to families occurs when communication transcends professional disciplines as well as the boundaries of agencies and institutions" (p. 11). Second, "child and family advocacy as well as program survival is possible through unified, informed action on social policy issues" (p. 11). Third, "personal development of program practitioners occurs through a support system which provides a forum for sharing, resolving, and directing individual and group concerns" (p. 10). Finally, "coordination of programs can be demonstrated at the service delivery level even if it is difficult or impossible at the administrative level" (P. 10).
Case VI: South Central Revisited

Coston, Cooper and Sundeen (1993) present brief case studies on four South Central Los Angeles community-based nonprofit human service institutions that responded to the 1992 rebellion: The Harvard Heights Neighborhood Association, Unity House, the First African Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Korean Youth Center. In these brief case studies, the authors document the crucial roles these organizations assumed both during and after the rebellion.

The authors identify the factors they believe were important to such responses. First, they were organized entities. That is, there was an "existing structure" which allowed them to respond to the crisis at all. This helped both the community and "outsiders" see them as having a legitimate role in that community (Coston, et al., pp. 360-361, 365-366).

Second, because these organizations "lived" in the community, had sprung from it, people knew where to go for assistance, whether giving or receiving. That being the case, they were seen as "...trusted community-based [sources] of assistance" (p. 365). That trust served to help join community members in need of assistance with those interested in donating goods, services and time -- individuals, business entities and foundations -- for solutions to both short-term and long-term problems (pp. 361-365).

Third, because "of their smaller scale," they could be more flexible and responsive -- largely because they already had a sense of what community needs might be both during and after the rebellion (pp. 366-367). Both the Harvard Heights Neighborhood Association and Unity House demonstrated this in a very simple way while the rebellion was in full cry: each had a core group of active members who took to the telephones and to the streets to reduce fear and anxiety and to learn what the proximate needs of the neighborhood were and how best to meet them (Coston, et al., pp. 364-366).

Finally, "each organization was able to provide more of a holistic approach to recovery" (p. 366). Apart from the myriad concrete services these organizations provided the community (e.g., food distribution, short-term housing assistance, street-clean-up), they also attended to the emotional healing each saw as important toward recovery.

Not incidentally, they also became forums, post-rebellion, for long and short-term recovery efforts. In this, they often assumed roles of different character than those present before the rebellion. This involved what Coston, et al. call, after Berger and Neuhaus (1977), a "mediating role" in this process. They served additionally as "resource conduits," and
"informants" (e.g., transmitting community needs to government agencies such as police and fire departments) (pp. 366-367). Most importantly, however, these organizations "provided their members with opportunities to interact with others, experience and share common values, and involve themselves in various social, political, and economic issues" (p. 366).

Comments on Cases
Among and between these cases, we see the result of healthy community processes, however sometimes formative, at work. To one degree or another, we therefore can detect every substantive element Follett advances as producing the "integrated and responsible neighborhood": regularity or constancy, individual and group responsibility, will or willingness, purposiveness, development of the social attitude, reflection, education, "intelligent" action, experimentation, and leadership.

In all cases, we see illustration of
* great opportunity for the face-to-face interaction that is so crucial to development of a social process;
  * at least a formative social process;
  * the importance of "regularity" and all that attends it (i.e., willingness, purposiveness, etc.);
  * the ability of these organizations to aid in individual and group development and, hence, in development of a "social attitude";
  * "intelligent" and "reflective" action;
  * the idea that solutions to problems reside in people themselves.

Apart from those, we can detect other elements at work in specific cases as well. That is, we see demonstrated:
* Leadership (as Follett and Mead understand it), with the Center for Family Life, the United Services for Effective Parenting, Kingsley House, the Franklin-Wright Settlements, and the South-Central cases;
  * development of individual and group responsibility (Kingsley House, Franklin Wright Settlements, the Beethoven Project, and the Center for Family Life);
  * willingness to experiment (Kingsley House, Beethoven Project, Center for Family
Life and the South Area Emergency Housing Center [Sacramento]);

* the ability of these organizations to attempt integration of "difference" (Kingsley House, United Services for Effective Parenting, Center for Family Life, Beethoven Project);

* their ability to develop and help radiate a "group" or "collective" will both outward and upward (Attala County Homeless Assistance Tutorial Project, the Center for Family Life, United Services for Effective Parenting, and Kingsley House).

Let us return for a moment to the 1992 South Central rebellion. A logical (and fair) question the now-"enlightened" reader might ask would be this one: "The 'community processes' you and Follett champion didn't seem to work in South Central. Why?"

Large-scale rebellions such as we saw in South Central in both 1965 and 1992 can be "explained" in any number of ways. In the first chapter, I briefly detail only three of several elements the literature cites as having fueled them. Together, these and many other elements constitute what might be called "life conditions."

We would find little argument with the suggestion that life conditions for people in South Central were and are very nearly crushing. There is also little doubt that most such conditions had become increasingly serious and highly interdependent, one with another. As a result, in the 27-year period between 1965 to 1992, nothing substantively changed for people there; and, indeed, many conditions worsened. We also would find little argument with the suggestion that such life conditions -- many of which had their genesis in circumstances or changes over which the community had little control (e.g., decimation of the City's industrial base) -- made a significant contribution to development of the relational history in South Central.

That returns us to the problem. I have ascribed positive connotations to the terms "relational context" or "relational history" throughout this work. The same is true of Follett, Dewey, Mead, Orion White and Cynthia McSwain in their work. But, as John Dewey reminds us, some relational histories have negative character. That is, to the extent that they do not reflect selection or reinforcement of a community's "best," they are negative (Dewey, [1916] 1964, p. 20). As such, those histories cannot help constitute useful and, hence transmittable, "social knowledge."

The role of life conditions and experience -- and people's interpretations of them -- in development of social knowledge complicates this picture. For the sake of discussion, let us make three assumptions. Let us assume Dilthey is correct when he says that competent
social science ought to result in greater understanding of people, "...their inner minds and their feelings, and the way these are expressed in their outward actions and achievements..." (Burrell and Morgan, p. 229). Let us also assume that Dewey is correct when he says that experience "is not a verb that shuts [people] off from nature; it is the means of penetrating continually into the heart of nature" ([1925] 1929, p. iii). Let us assume as well that the subjective comments from residents themselves (related in chapter one) are reliable indicators of what the community was feeling in 1992.

The interpretations people in South Central advanced about both life conditions and the experiences deriving therefrom indicate a community which had come to believe that life is an unending struggle for (at least) recognition from the larger world. Their experiences with that world told them so. Hence, if violent rebellion were manifestation of that community's inner life (and it appears it was), and if, as Dewey says, experience resides at the heart of that life, the rebellion seems to have been a rather "natural" outcome of how both life conditions and the experiences they spawned were interpreted. In turn, those experiences seem to have helped feed a process which evolved into something distinctly negative and destructive.

Certainly, although neither life conditions nor experience are a community's only touchstone, what we saw in the 1992 rebellion was graphic manifestation of stopped processes (White, 1977, p. 14) born of experience. Follett would say what we saw was manifestation of the catastrophic result of stopped processes: non-relation. "Evil is non-relation...non-relation is death" (Follett, pp. 62-63).

South Central is a community which seems to have had little cause to believe it was part of something larger. We must always remember that creation of relationship (to say nothing of creation of a state) is not an "either-or" proposition (i.e., it is created neither from the top-down, alone, nor from the bottom-up, alone). Rather, it is willing and integrated individuals and groups who, together with the institutions of government, build the "true" or "unifying" state (Follett, pp. 311-315). The true state, Follett says, "is not an arbitrary creation. It is a process" (p. 315, emphasis supplied).

If that is all so, to speak of alienation and despair is to speak not only of overwhelming life conditions, but of the fact that the people had themselves stopped building a positive relational context such that it might ameliorate that which they faced. One reason why these processes stopped may reside in the absence of genuine encouragement from
the very government and larger society of which this community was, and is, a part. Hence, I would submit that untenable life conditions and the experiences arising from them, when combined with stopped processes, brought the 1992 rebellion into being.

At the same time, it is likely Follett would predict that the 1992 rebellion might, finally, auger well for South Central. She would argue that the seeds for creation, or reconstruction, of a healthy social process are already in place. As it was with the Kingsley House attempts at integration in the 1940’s, she would suggest that residing in the four organizations discussed above, and the myriad other such neighborhood groups operating in South Central, are kernels of hope. The fact that those four organizations were able to respond to the crisis that was the 1992 rebellion with mechanisms established long before its ignition, may be one illustration of why she might think that.

If we look back at the other case studies presented in this chapter, we see that such organizations indeed can foster each and all of the substantive elements Follett proposes will animate a healthy group life. In so doing, and as she repeatedly argues, they offer us the opportunity to consciously build and sustain social mechanisms whereby we not only can look at ourselves and our neighborhoods, but become actually, not “theoretically,” a part of the larger life of nation and world. To do that, however, it is essential that those social mechanisms be seen as vital, legitimate, and worthy of preserving.

And, while it is true that an individual "will" must antedate, and undergird, development of personal and group responsibility, community-based organizations can reinforce that will. Thus, if these four organizations can be encouraged, can encourage themselves, to sustain the trust and legitimacy they had built both before and after the crisis, the potential for creation of a genuine collective will and subsequent transmission of that will outward and upward can be made very real.

The labored history of life conditions and public social policy attempts to overcome them in South Central over the last 30 years suggest that many of the same responses, however reactive, unitary and instrumental, have been attempted repeatedly. That point is illustrated by the fact that both the 1965 McCon Commission and the 1992 California Senate Special Task Force on a New Los Angeles found both rebellions to be spurred by the same causes, and made virtually the same recommendations in response. Whatever recommendations may have been put into practice (and, in the case of the McCon Commission at any rate, few were), it does not appear that they made for substantive or
enduring change. It thus may not be overstating it to say that the very survival of the South Central community will be absolutely correlative with the willingness of individuals and groups to create and sustain healthy social processes such that it can "grip its own problems." This can only come about in the "neighborly community."

In the final chapter, I offer some summary propositions about community-based nonprofit human service institutions together with some concluding remarks.
CHAPTER NINE
SUMMARY PROPOSITIONS AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

The propositions presented in this chapter are grounded in two realms as I attempt to lay the foundation for a reconstructed discourse about community-based nonprofit human service institutions in both the nonprofit and public administrative worlds. First, there is the conceptual realm. In analysis of Mary Follett's "five ways," I have identified a corpus of "correct" concepts with which to lay such a foundation. As I have argued throughout, these concepts derive from interpretivism and Chicago School pragmatism.

Second, there is the realm of practice. The case studies outlined in the previous chapter illustrate that the essential conceptual ingredients Follett sees as driving a healthy social process (and, inevitably, sensical social policy) are manifest in everyday practice. So then, after articulating each proposition or cluster of propositions, I make reference to the conceptual and practice elements relevant to them.

To the extent that these propositions intend to give us a "new-eye" view of contemporary community-based nonprofit human service institutions, they invoke the spirit of Jonathan Culler's view on the ideal aims of theory noted in the second chapter. Theory, he says, can "succeed in challenging and reorienting thinking...make strange the familiar and perhaps persuade readers to conceive of their own thinking and the institutions to which it relates in new ways" (p. 13).

Methodologically, I have attempted to follow Norman Denzin's (1978, pp. 36-74) "rules" for construction of propositions. In so doing, I attempt to order the concepts Mary Follett advances into a formative propositional system.

Summary Propositions

The following cluster of three propositions centers on the primary element at work in the second context-building activity, genuine discussion, and how the "neighborhood bond" (Follett, pp. 207, 212), or neighborhood "self-realization" is brought into being (Follett, p. 1)

1 I would repeat that this work has focused on community-based nonprofit human service institutions; not on the universe of nonprofits.
Proposition 1: Community-based nonprofit human service institutions help foster and sustain genuine discussion.

Proposition 2: Community-based nonprofit human service institutions, because they arise from and reside in the neighborhood, can attend to individual experience.

Proposition 3: Community-based nonprofit human service institutions can help evolve a sense of trust.

We know that face-to-face interaction helps animate "genuine discussion." This results in part from one of the essentialities for the social process outlined in the first context-building activity: regular meetings. This regular face-to-face interaction can, in turn, transform simple "interaction" into "genuine discussion." In so doing, it also helps develop trust among social actors.

One of the hallmarks of this process is the central role individual experience plays in development of both genuine discussion and trust. By sharing experiences, people can come to know two essentialities of day-to-day living. First, as we saw in the Beethoven Project case, they can come to see that "their problems are usually shared by others" (Downs, p. 25). Second, and as Dewey says, people can also come to know that they "live in a world where other persons live too" ([1922] 1930, pp. 297-298). From such does trust evolve. Not only do people come to trust other individuals, but they come to trust the process itself. As they do, they begin to get a sense of what it means to be social.

The case studies that seem to best-fit the arguments advanced for those three propositions are The Beethoven Project, the United Services for Effective Parenting, Kingsley House, the South Area Emergency Housing Center, and perhaps many of the "indigenous" community-based organizations Bruce Jones describes in his report on the New York City Attendance Improvement Dropout Prevention Program.

Proposition 4: Community-based nonprofit human service institutions are symbolic forums within which both individuals and groups can increase their capacity to "make meaning."

This proposition refers to three elements. The first concerns how Follett views "organization." The second and third are interdependent, elements Follett sees as among the happy results of healthy social processes: individual growth and development of
collective meaning.

With regard to the first element, Follett's views on "organization," her arguments on this point are detailed in the first context-building activity. As the interpretivists and Follett understand it, "organizations" or "institutions" are not concrete entities such as the traditionalists would have it. Rather, they are "tangible constructs" (Dilthey), or "figments...of our collective imaginations" (Harmon and Mayer, p. 337), that we create, shape and sustain in the effort to make sense of, and bring order to, a dynamic and uncertain world.

Further, just as it is with creation of a "state," Follett believes the formally organized neighborhood group to be engaged in an endless process of purposive creation by social actors (p. 315). This view follows from the belief that people are first, last and always, social creatures who "naturally" seek out others with whom they can make sense of the ongoing social world. That being the case, the neighborhood group is animated by the individual and, later, the group desire to "make meaning" in an organized social setting. Seen in that light, the neighborhood group may be seen as a highly symbolic forum within which that can happen.

On an allied note, we cannot mandate relationship, nor a social process, into existence. Neither can we proscribe their character and texture. Hence, top-down dictums (mandates about "maximum feasible participation" in the 1960's, for example) have no enduring value. If it is have enduring effect, the social process must be animated and sustained by small local groups.

As for the second and third elements, individual growth and collectively-developed meaning respectively, we will recall in discussion of the Follett's third, fourth and fifth context-building activities she observes that what we seek, finally, in neighborhood organization is "the individual" (p. 256); and that to the extent the neighborhood group "discovers and conserves the individual" (p. 225), the individual can "grow as the group grows" (p. 210).

For Follett, Dewey and Mead all, one's individuality, and very identity, cannot emerge absent relationship. More specifically, Follett and Dewey in particular see "individual growth" as development of the capacity to learn "the laws of association," as Follett says, in genuine social relations. This, Dewey terms "power," which comes about in large measure via political education. Dewey is quite explicit on the matter, describing political education as "freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social aims" ([1916] 1964, p. 98).
Recall as well that Dewey believes efficacious political education should "call attention to the fact that power must be relative to doing something, and to the fact that the things which most need to be done are the things which involve one's relationship with others" (Dewey, [1916] 1964, p. 120). In discussion of the third context-building activity Follett concurs, saying that learning "the laws of association," means that people learn "to identify [themselves] with a social whole" (Follett, p. 367).

The idea of collectively-developed meaning is bound up in individual growth, and is grounded in the principle that it is only via "the group...in relation" (Follett, p. 10, emphasis in original) that collective meaning, what Follett calls, alternatively, "common will" or "truth," can emerge. And lest we forget: "truth" for Follett means commonly-evolved meaning.

That principle follows from the three benefits Follett sees as inhering in the neighborhood group generally as noted in fourth context-building activity. Since I have already detailed these benefits at some length, I refer to them only briefly here. First, "neighborhood groups...naturally discuss their local, intimate, personal concerns" (p. 222); second, the introduction of social programs into party platforms means that neighborhood groups can exert "a powerful influence...to change American politics from a machine to a living thing" (p. 223); and third, competent neighborhood organization ("the group...in relation") means "a citizenship building its own world, creating its own political and social structure, constructing its own life forever" (p. 222).

I would argue that all cases detailed in the previous chapter manifest these crucial elements to one degree or another; however, there are five in which they appear to be particularly salient: Ohio's United Services for Effective Parenting, the Center for Family Life in Brooklyn, Detroit's Franklin-Wright Settlements, Chicago's Beethoven Project, and Sacramento's South Area Emergency Housing Center.

This next cluster of seven propositions derives largely from Follett's fourth and fifth context-building activities, and the centrality of individual and group responsibility therein. At bottom, these seven propositions argue that responsibility means continually learning about and leading "an actual community life" (Follett, p. 205).

**Proposition 5:** Community-based nonprofit human service institutions help social actors develop a sense of both individual and group responsibility.

**Proposition 6:** Community-based nonprofit human service institutions help individuals and groups see their roles in, and connection to, the larger world.
Proposition 7: Community-based nonprofit human service institutions can help integrate "difference."

Proposition 8: The "social attitude" can evolve only in regular meetings of neighbors.

Proposition 9: Community-based nonprofit human service institutions offer a forum wherein arises a responsible group will.

Proposition 10: Nonprofits can help bring into being the distinctly human "community of selves" essential to social problem solving.

Proposition 11: Community-based nonprofit human service institutions are a primary mechanism by which development and transmission of social knowledge may occur.

Each and all of the foregoing seven propositions follow from this principle: the social process is a responsible process. That is, as people come to know what it means to be social -- via regular meetings with neighbors engaged in genuine discussion -- a sense of responsibility emerges. As the social process proceeds, this sense of personal responsibility takes on new, and larger, meaning: it becomes group responsibility. It is at this level of relationship that people come to live both in a group and "for a group" (Follett, pp. 252-253); and not inconsequentially, also come to understand that "every [person] is the state at every moment."

We see that development of the "social attitude" is also at work here. This, we will recall, Follett believes means finding one's "place in the group." Development of the social attitude is, first, circumscribed by the responsibility individuals and groups must assume to integrate their differences: "society needs every [person's] difference" (Follett, p. 33n). This is crucial, because as was outlined in the second context-building activity, only well-integrated difference can produce a genuine group will. Second, responsibility also implies that individuals must make their distinctive contributions to neighborhood group life known to it (Follett, p. 228). Third, and following from the first two, if reflective social action directed at common aims is to occur, that distinctly human "community of selves" (Scheffler, pp. 165-166) must come into being.

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Out of this evolving, purposive, and responsible social process -- and the "community of selves" it produces -- comes contextual social knowledge, as detailed in the first context-building activity. It is such knowledge, we remember, that circumscribes and constitutes the social qua moral order, but must be transmitted to do so.

Again, we can see manifestations of each and all of these elements at work in the universe of cases detailed in the previous chapter. That is, all can be seen as fostering individual and group responsibility, as helping to integrate "difference," as encouraging people to make known -- and to develop -- their distinctive contributions to group life, as helping evolve a genuine "group will," and as engaging in reflective social action.

**Proposition 12:** Because of their generally small size, community-based nonprofit human service institutions offer opportunities for more regular face-to-face interaction among individual social actors than the institutions of government might.

**Proposition 13:** The optimally operating social process will emerge only at the level of neighborhood organization.

These two propositions reference the "scale" problem in democratic politics as discussed in the fifth context-building activity. Both Follett and Dewey argue that the sheer scale of democratic politics, to say nothing of the party system, not only inhibit face-to-face interaction, but make it difficult to sustain. Community-based nonprofits on the other hand, can help neutralize, or eliminate, this scale problem. Recall that, for Follett, largeness and complexity are not necessarily good for her new state; nor is smallness and relative simplicity, bad. Indeed, she believes that it is only in the small localized group that the face-to-face interaction so crucial to development of the social process and, hence, of contextual relations, does the "true state" emerge. She is very clear about this: "[b]ack we must go to this small primary unit if we would understand the meaning of democracy..." (p. 257). Further, she says, neither responsibility nor "real solidarity" can bloom "except by beginning somewhere the joining of one small group with another" (p. 251).

The potent message here was highlighted earlier: personal experience and responsibility will get lost in larger, ever more complex groups unless a relational context is first established in the smaller group.

As for pertinent cases, the Attala County Homeless Assistance Tutorial Project, the Beethoven Project, St. Louis' Grace Hill Neighborhood Services, and Ohio's United Services
for Effective Parenting cases all seem to qualify.

**Proposition 14:** Community-based nonprofit human service institutions can help groups integrate with larger groups to create and shape a truly collective "global will."

In the fifth context-building activity, Follett outlines how "...the will of the people [can] be the sovereign power of the state" (p. 245). She argues that although the individual, the group, and the government or state are completely correlative, "...we are ready for membership in a larger group only by experience first in the smaller group" (p. 249). This is an important idea for Follett. Recall she believes that when neighborhood groups join with other neighborhood groups to form the city -- then only shall we understand what it is to be the city; neighborhood groups join with other neighborhood groups to form the state -- then only shall we understand what it is to be the state. We do not begin with a unified state which delegates authority; we begin with the neighborhood group and create the state ourselves. Thus is the state built up through the intimate intertwining of all (p. 255).

This joining, one group with another, is reflective action at its best. Recall that Follett first says that there is "a natural tendency for a real group to seek other groups" (p. 249). As a result, "[e]very group once become conscious of itself instinctively seeks other groups with which to unite to form a larger whole" (p. 249). Further, she sees such joining as a plan for "correlating the problems of the local community with the problems of the nation and cooperating nations" (p. 248).

In sum, to the extent community-based groups attend to individual and group experience, promote genuine discussion and trust, integrate difference and help social actors develop a "social attitude," it will naturally follow that such organizations can also promote what Follett sees as the "natural" result of all that: integration of smaller groups into ever-larger groups to create a common global will.

The most visible cases in this regard are the Center for Family Life, Kingsley House, United Services for Parenting and the Attala County Homeless Assistance Tutorial Project cases.

**Proposition 15:** Those technical experts attending to community processes will find that citizens themselves often have solutions or recommendations consistent with
the actual needs and relational context in the community.

**Proposition 16:** Development of integrated social policy rests largely with relationship. This can arise only from substantive participation in community-based nonprofit human service institutions.

**Proposition 17:** Community-based nonprofit human service institutions generally help develop and sustain a social process whereby not only specific problems, but all problems, may be addressed.

In the fourth context-building activity, we find both Follett and Dewey arguing that the specter of a government by "technical experts" who might fail to see, or neglect to consider, the importance of the social process in policy planning, is very real.

They argue that to the extent we allow, or expect, government alone to solve social problems, we abdicate responsibility so essential to their meaningful solution. Follett says, and Dewey agrees, that "[n]eighborhood organization must be the method of effective popular responsibility: first, by giving reality to the political bond; secondly, by providing the machinery by which a genuine control of the people can be put into operation" (p. 234).

We also know Follett believes that the expertise individual citizens and groups can bring to bear upon problems, when combined with that of technical experts, can produce more cohesive, "sensical" and enduring solutions to them. This expertise emerges from experimentation and experience, which Follett and Dewey both see as essential to efficacious problem-solving. Recall Follett: "[w]e must learn and build and learn again through the building, or we must build and learn and build again through the learning" (p. 50).

Follett is absolutely convinced that social processes, once in place and operating optimally, have the potential to solve not just a problem, but all problems arising in the community. Recall her comment on the matter: "our object is not to get certain things, or to have certain things; our object is to evolve the kind of life...within which these specific things will naturally have place" (p. 208). Indeed, for Follett development of that capacity constitutes the litmus test for the "true state." This is consistent with her views on the "supreme function" of the state, which she sees to be "moral ordering" (p. 333). Undergirding all of that is a fundamental tenet of pragmatic thought, outlined in the second context-building activity and which, we will recall, George Herbert Mead well-articulates: "it is as social beings that we are moral beings" (1934, p. 385).
We see each and all of these elements at work most notably in the Franklin-Wright Settlements, the United Services for Effective Parenting, and in each of the public school-nonprofit collaboration cases.

Concluding Remarks

I would make several points here. First, Mary Follett imputes to neighborhood organizations attributes of nearly mythic proportions. At the same time, and as the case studies presented in the preceding chapter demonstrate, these attributes generally tend to hold up. It might also be added that the David Horton Smith/Terry McAdam/Stephen Block "laundry list," which purports to synthesize the "defining characteristics" of these organizations, is also supported.

Second, it is important for us to remember that, in advancing her view about the efficacy of neighborhood groups, Follett is saying that all follows from a healthy social process animated and sustained therein. That is, so long as the process is encouraged and continues, increased substantive participation will follow. Reconstruction will follow. Cohesive and integrated social policy planning will follow. Social, political and economic equity will follow. Democracy itself will follow. Each and all will follow -- "naturally" and inevitably.

Third, I would argue that, in The New State, Follett has legitimized the "place" of community-based nonprofit organizations in a democracy in a way most literature on nonprofits since the 1970's has not. That is, she sees them as integrative forums -- in a profoundly important social and democratic sense. In my view, the influence of economics and traditional policy approaches in the nonprofit literature, to say nothing of the great power of the "mediating structures" idea, all fail to do that. Indeed, in social and democratic terms, the dominance of these views has done little more than marginalize the substantive role nonprofits can, and do, have in our democracy. Follett herself concurs, when she says that

[[in a country which is even nominally a democracy you cannot win a war without explaining your aims and your policy and carrying your people with you step by step. If beyond this the country wishes to be really a democracy, the neighborhood groups must have a share in forming the aims and the policy (p. 248).]]

Fourth, I note several times earlier that the most critical mandate we, as a people, must today confront is nothing less than preserving the social order. Daunting as that
sounds, we can confront it together -- and in the only way that makes sense: upwards from our neighbors, and so on to our communities, to our nation and, finally, to our world. It is our commitment to that preservation that will sustain our "candles of the nation."
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Figure 1: Essential Preconditions for Development of the Social Process
The Social Process

MEANINGFUL COOPERATIVE ACTION
Makes Possible

Democratic Community
Collective Will
UNIVERSAL DISCOURSE

THE "SCALE" PROBLEM IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

THE SOCIAL ATTITUDE
REFLECTION

GENUINE
Regular Meetings
Face-to-Face Interaction

Acknowledgement of Interdependence
Holistic Understanding

Integration of "Difference"
Clear Thinking
LEANING

Experimentation
Circularity
Reflexivity

Figure 2: A More Maturing Process - Genuine Discussion, the Social Attitude, Reflection
Figure 3: Leading an Actual Community Life

The Social Process

**LEGEND:**
- Developmental Element
- Discovery Element
- Discovered and Developed
- Desired Effect

**SOCIAL CHANGE**

**RECONSTRUCTION OF EXPERIENCE**

**EDUCATION**

Participation in

Genuine Discussion

Communal Activities

**INTELLIGENT ACTION**

Promotes

Active Participation

Individual and Neighborhood Self-Realization

Understanding of Place and Role in a Larger Life

Individual and Group Responsibility

Radiation of Collective Will, Outward and Upward

Productive Modes of Association

Acquire the Attitude of Learning

Practice Democracy

What animates the Social Process is the active participation in genuine discussion of communal activities that promote understanding, self-realization, and group responsibility. This process leads to the reconstruction of experience and the radiation of collective will, fostering a practice of democracy and acquiring the attitude of learning.
Figure 4: Reconstruction of the Social and Political Order
The Social Process

Democracy

True Citizenship

Reconstruction

The True Or Government

The Social Process

Membership in Smaller Groups

Integration into Larger Groups

THE SOCIAL PROCESS

So long as sustained, becomes a singular mechanism for solving all problems confronting the community

Teaches personal and group responsibility
Promotes Neighborhood Self-realization
Allows for sustained face-to-face interaction
Helps integrate "difference"
Promotes experimentation
Evolves "activity with a purpose"

Applying same principles learned in the small group to ever-larger intermediary groups

Figure 5: Goal of Process: Creation of the Unifying State
Vita

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