

The Discursive Construction of Taiwanese National Identity

Chengqiu Wu

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Dr. Timothy W. Luke, Chair

Dr. Scott G. Nelson

Dr. Ioannis Stivachtis

Dr. Edward Weisband

Dr. Dennis T. Yang

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Abstract

Since the early 1990s, more and more people in Taiwan have come to view Taiwan itself as a country independent of China. They consider themselves Taiwanese rather than Chinese. Drawing on a social constructionist perspective to nationalism and Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse, this dissertation attempts to analyze the discursive mechanisms that have constructed this new collective imagination by many people in Taiwan that now regard themselves as members of an independent Taiwanese nation. The research questions of this dissertation are: how has the post-1949 national identity of Taiwan been discursively transformed since the early 1990s? What are the discursive and institutional mechanisms that have reproduced the Taiwanese national identity? What challenges is the Taiwanese national identity facing? To answer these questions, this dissertation outlines three nationalist discourses and five representations that have been derived from them regarding Taiwan's status, its relationship with mainland China, and the national identity of people in Taiwan. It examines the changes in Taiwan's discursive regime and symbolic economy since the early 1990s, showing how the rise of Taiwanese national identity has been closely related to political leaders' identification with Taiwanese nationalism. I argue that the rise of Taiwanese national identity in Taiwan has been an effect of a discursive contestation among the three major nationalist discourses and the polarization of the discursive field. This dissertation also explores the provincial origin issue---which has been closely related to ethnic tension in Taiwan---and the relations between the nationalist discourses and democratization. In addition, to explore the possibility for a deconstruction of the Taiwanese national identity, I examine the challenges that the Taiwanese national identity faces, focusing on democracy, the Democratic Progressive Party's performance as the ruling party, and the cross-Strait economic integration and political interactions.

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Taiwan, a laboratory of identities.

----Stéphane Corcuff

Until I went to Beijing, I had not realized that my rank was so low.

Until I went to Guangzhou, I had not realized that my money was so little.

Until I went to Hainan, I had not realized that my health was just so-so.

Until I went to Taiwan, I had not realized that the Cultural Revolution was still going on.

-----Translated from a Chinese doggerel by the author


Chapter 1. Introduction

More and more people in Taiwan have come to view Taiwan itself as a country independent of China and consider themselves Taiwanese rather than Chinese. As Figure 1.1 shows, trend studies conducted by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University in Taiwan indicate that the percentage of people in Taiwan who considered themselves only Chinese had decreased from 26.2% in June 1992 to 6.4% in December 2006. In the mean time, the percentage of those who considered themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese had been between 39.1% and 50.9% and as a whole slightly decreased from 45.4% to 45.2%, and the percentage of those who considered themselves only Taiwanese had increased dramatically from 17.3% to 44.1%.¹

These demographics indicate that there has been a rise of an independent Taiwanese national identity and a decline of a Chinese national identity in Taiwan since the early 1990s. This change seems to be a revolution to outsiders. Over four decades since the end of World War II, when Japan returned Taiwan to the Republic of China (ROC), the dominant ideology on the island was that Taiwan was part of China and all people in Taiwan were Chinese. Taiwanese was supposed to be only a local identity embraced by part of Taiwan's population. For a long time since the early 1950s, Taiwan under the rule of the Kuomintang (KMT, or the Chinese Nationalist Party) claimed to be the "free China," as opposed to the "communist China" ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Yet, in present day Taiwan, the Republic of China has become a term that many pro-Taiwan independence politicians ridicule, and the term of China has become a stigma that the current Chen Shui-bian government is trying to cleanse from Taiwan's body.

¹ Election Studies Center, National Chengchi University, "Important Political Trend Distribution," Election Studies Center, <<http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/data/data03.htm>>.

Figure 1.1



Sources: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, important political attitude trend distribution.

A recent speech given by Chen Shui-bian may offer a glimpse at Taiwan's identity politics and political speaking. On January 1, 2007, in an official occasion that was supposed to celebrate the 96th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China, after citing the latest survey results on self-identity and noting that over 70 percent of respondents in Taiwan support their government's applying for United Nations membership under the name of Taiwan, Chen said,

This demonstrates that Taiwan-centric consciousness, based on the core value of putting Taiwan first, is coming into full bloom. The international community must forthrightly pay heed to the will of Taiwan's people, and must respect their right of free choice. More importantly, based on their ardent love for this land and their unwavering faith in the universal values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and peace, and rooted in the spirit of their common struggle over the past half-century to survive and flourish, the people of Taiwan must endeavor to transcend boundaries of ethnicity, partisanship, and political interests, and persist in working to coalesce and galvanize their awareness of their identity as a national community. Once again, it must be emphasized and reiterated that: Our country, Taiwan, has a total land area of 36,000 square kilometers. The sovereignty of Taiwan belongs to its 23 million people, not to the People's Republic of China. Only the people of Taiwan have the right to decide Taiwan's future. Meanwhile, Taiwan is a part of the world, not a part of China.²

In his speech, Chen was proud that his government had achieved a great success in transforming the national identity of people in Taiwan from Chinese to Taiwanese, and he reiterated an independent Taiwanese national identity by emphasizing that the sovereignty of Taiwan belongs to its people rather than the People's Republic of China. In his speech, he mentioned the Republic of China---Taiwan's formal designation---only once while mentioning Taiwan 53 times. Chen's party, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has been striving for Taiwan independence since the late 1980s. It officially sets the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan as its goal in its political platform.³ This goal implies changing Taiwan's formal designation from the "Republic of China" to the "Republic of Taiwan" and redefining its territory as only Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu in its constitution.

² Chen Shui-bian, "President Chen's New Year Message," Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), January 1, 2007, <<http://www.president.gov.tw/en/>>.

³ Democratic Progressive Party, "Platform," Democratic Progressive Party, <<http://www.dpp.org.tw/>>.

This dissertation attempts to analyze the discursive mechanisms that have constructed this new collective imagination by many people in Taiwan that now regard themselves as members of an independent Taiwanese nation. The research questions that I attempt to answer are: how has the post-1949 national identity of Taiwan been discursively transformed since the early 1990s? What are the discursive and institutional mechanisms that have reproduced the Taiwanese national identity? What challenges is the Taiwanese national identity facing? The task of this dissertation is to clarify the discursive regime and symbolic economy underlying the rise of Taiwanese national identity since the early 1990s, to examine the ideational and institutional mechanisms that have reproduced the Taiwanese national identity, and to explore further possibilities of Taiwan's identity politics. Treating the discourses on Taiwan's status, its relationship with mainland China, and the national identity of people in Taiwan as a site of struggle and viewing speeches, documents, and policies as discursive practices, this dissertation analyzes who speak, what their positions are, what makes the speaking possible, the power relations involved in the discursive construction of the "self" and "other" of Taiwan and China, and how the "self" and "other" have been sustained or disrupted. In doing so, it is meant to focus upon the contingency and fluidity of the Taiwanese national identity and the conditions behind the on-going development of identity politics in Taiwan.

This dissertation employs a social constructionist perspective to Taiwan's identity politics and view Taiwan's national identity change as a process of interaction between the state and the society and between politicians and the populace, involving contestations among multiple political forces and multiple discourses. These political forces and discourses have been organized around three major political parties that have great influences on Taiwan's society---the KMT, the CCP, and the DPP. The KMT ruled Taiwan from 1945 to 2000 and is now Taiwan's largest opposition party. The CCP has been ruling the Chinese mainland since it defeated the KMT in 1949, and it claims sovereignty over Taiwan as the representative of China. The DPP was founded on 1986, as the inheritor of Taiwan's opposition movement in the previous decades, and it has been Taiwan's ruling party since 2000. This dissertation draws on Ernesto Laclau and

Chantal Mouffe's theory of discourse for theoretical insights.⁴ Particularly, such concepts as discourse, hegemony, and social antagonism proposed by Laclau and Mouffe are useful for analyzing the relations of power involved in Taiwan's national identity issue. In its analysis, this dissertation will focus on three major factors that have great impacts on Taiwan's identity politics, namely nationalism, democratization, and cross-Taiwan Strait political and economic interactions.⁵ And it will analyze how these factors have supported the discursive construction of Taiwanese national identity.

First, nationalism has worked as a discursive formation, representing and constituting the reality of Taiwan, and the rise of Taiwanese national identity has been an effect of an on-going contestation among multiple nationalist discourses. The major nationalist discourses that have participated in the contestation for hegemony in defining Taiwan's national identity are the KMT's Chinese nationalism, the CCP's Chinese nationalism, and Taiwanese nationalism that has developed in the opposition against the KMT by many people on Taiwan since the end of the World War II and particularly embraced by the DPP in the last two decades. Each of these nationalist discourses has its own representation of Taiwan's status, Taiwan's relationship with mainland China, and the national identity of people in Taiwan. These discourses not only have manifested themselves in the political parties' documents, speeches, and policies, but they also have influenced common people's imaginations of the society and themselves. They are not merely created by political parties. Instead, they have deep social roots in collective memories and have involved close interactions between the government and the society. The Taiwanese national identity has been constructed discursively by particular discursive mechanisms whose features are defined by Taiwanese nationalism. More specifically, the KMT's Chinese nationalism has produced an antagonism of "free China"/ "communist China," and Taiwanese nationalism has continued this antagonism and transformed it into an antagonism of Taiwan/China.

⁴ For Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse, see Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso 1985); Jacob Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1999); and David Howarth, *Discourse* (Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 2000).

⁵ Scholarly publications on Taiwan often use the term "cross-Strait" to mean "cross-Taiwan Strait," or "between Taiwan and mainland China." In the rest of this dissertation, I also follow this usage.

Second, institutions provide conditions for the contestation among the multiple discourses and the hegemony of a particular discourse, and a particular national identity has to be reproduced on daily basis in order not to decline. In this sense, the rise of Taiwanese national identity has been closely related to Taiwan's democratization since the late 1980s, and the Taiwanese national identity has been reproduced institutionally by Taiwan's democratic political system. Taiwanese nationalism has interacted with Taiwan's democratization, not only propelling the progress of democratization, but also taking advantage of the democratic system to institutionalize its hegemonic status. Democracy not only has prepared a key institutional basis for people in Taiwan to imagine themselves as Taiwanese instead of Chinese, but also has provided a theatre and incentives for politicians to identify with Taiwanese nationalist discourse.

Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that democracy has also provided space for multiple nationalist discourses to coexist in Taiwan's society and made an overarching Taiwanese national identity a tough mission for Taiwanese nationalists. Moreover, democracy also provides opportunities for challenges to the Taiwanese national identity. As a matter of fact, the DPP's exploitation of the national identity issue has created division in the "imagined community" of Taiwan, which in turn has paved way for the deconstruction of the Taiwanese national identity.

Third, the interaction between Taiwan and mainland China has played an important role in the construction of both the Chinese national identity upheld by the KMT's Chinese nationalism and the Taiwanese national identity upheld by the DPP's Taiwanese nationalism. In the construction of the KMT's Chinese national identity, mainland China has been perceived as the Other that threatened the full realization of the KMT's Chineseness. In the construction of the DPP's Taiwanese national identity, mainland China is perceived as the Other that threatens Taiwan independence and the realization of the Taiwanese national identity.

However, in recent years, Taiwanese national identity is facing challenges from the cross-strait economic and integration. A cross-border production network has woven the economies of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait together. To some degree, this

phenomenon has helped to overturn the Taiwan/China dichotomy. Nonetheless, the different effects of economic regionalization on different classes in Taiwan may result in contrasting positions in Taiwan's political spectrum regarding the cross-Strait economic integration: while the pro-independence parties such as the DPP blame mainland China for absorbing Taiwan's money and draining Taiwan's talents, the pro-status quo parties such as the KMT are trying to push for more cross-Strait economic exchanges so as to maintain the competitiveness of Taiwan's economy. This difference further reinforces the division regarding national identity issue.

In general, nationalism, democratization, and cross-Strait political and economic interactions interact with one another, empowering certain discourses and marginalizing others. While the CCP's Chinese nationalism is gaining hegemony in representing Taiwan's status in international society, the DPP's Taiwanese nationalism is also gaining hegemony in Taiwan's domestic political arena. The competition among the multiple nationalist discourses has resulted in a polarization in the discursive field regarding Taiwan's status and its relationship with mainland China, leading to the rise of the Taiwanese national identity as well as preparing challenges to it. In general, Taiwan's identity politics provides a typical case to test the validity of social constructionism on nationalism and national identity. Stéphane Corcuff, a French Taiwan expert, even calls Taiwan "a laboratory of identities."⁶

This dissertation is organized in the following way. Chapter 2 reviews some relevant research on identity politics in Taiwan. Chapter 3 introduces theories on nationalism and discourse, particularly the social constructionist theoretical orientation to nationalism and Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse, which the analysis in this dissertation is based on. Chapter 4 outlines three nationalist discourses and five representations that have been derived from them regarding Taiwan's status, its relationship with mainland China, and the national identity of people in Taiwan. These discourses and their representations have participated in the contestation for hegemony in

⁶ Stéphane Corcuff, "Introduction: Taiwan, A Laboratory of Identities," in Stéphane Corcuff, ed., *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), xi-xxiv.

defining the national identity of people in Taiwan. Chapter 5 examines the changes in Taiwan's discursive regime and symbolic economy since the early 1990s, showing how the rise of Taiwanese national identity has been closely related to political leaders' gradual identification with Taiwanese nationalism. In particular, the chapter reviews the strategies employed by the Lee Teng-hui administration in 1988-2000 to promote the Taiwanese national identity and those employed by the Chen Shui-bian administration since 2000. Chapter 6 examines the discursive mechanisms that have constructed the Taiwanese national identity. I argue that the rise of Taiwanese national identity in Taiwan has been an effect of a discursive contestation and polarization. The contestation among three major nationalist discourses has resulted in polarization of the discursive field regarding Taiwan's status, its relationship with mainland China, and the national identity of people in Taiwan. When the assertion of the CCP's Chinese nationalism increasingly marginalizes the KMT's Chinese nationalism in international society, many people in Taiwan have been forced into a dilemma: they can either accept the People's Republic of China, or support the DPP's strife for Taiwan independence. This led to the rise of the DPP's Taiwanese nationalism and the Taiwanese national identity. As mentioned above, the change of national identity has involved not only political speaking by political parties and politicians, but also the society's collective memories and the interactions between politicians and the populace. Bearing this in mind, I explore in Chapter 7 the provincial origin issue---which has been closely related to ethnic tension in Taiwan---and how this issue has been capitalized by the DPP, who has used a series of strategies to move "Taiwanese" from a local identity of ethnic meaning to a national identity of civic meaning. Chapter 8 examines the institutional mechanism that has interacted with the nationalist discourses. Particularly, the chapter analyzes why nationalism has propelled democratization in Taiwan while not having the same effect on mainland China. Chapter 9 examines the challenges that the Taiwanese national identity faces, focusing on democracy, the DPP's performance as the ruling party, and the cross-Strait economic integration. It also explores the possibility for the deconstruction of the Taiwanese national identity. Chapter 10 concludes with some discussions on Taiwan's identity politics and the relations between Taiwan and mainland China.

Before we start an academic exploration of Taiwan's national identity issue in this dissertation, one thing worth noting is the Chinese correspondence for the term national identity. Some scholars refer to national identity as *guojia rentong*, which literally means state identity in Chinese. Though national identity in English context has the meaning of state identity, it tends to mean more than that. Some other scholars refer to national identity as *minzu rentong*. However, in the Chinese context, *minzu* is more about cultural and ethnic meanings. Therefore, national identity in the English context literally means *guozu rentong* in Chinese, consisting of both political and ethnic-cultural meanings. It is with this understanding that I use the term in this dissertation.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

Taiwan has been of interest to political scientists for a long time. This has been for two reasons: first, Taiwan's relations with mainland China have had a great impact on East-Asian security;⁷ second, Taiwan has achieved great success in economic development and political democratization.⁸ Tun-jen Cheng classifies scholarly approaches to the cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and mainland China into five categories: the diplomatic history approach, the divided nation approach, the rational choice approach, the elite conflict approach and the asymmetrical political approach.⁹ Generally speaking, many studies have focused on the strategic interactions among the major actors, namely, mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States. Some have been heavily influenced by neo-realism with an emphasis on structure.¹⁰ Yet, more and more researchers have come

⁷ For examples of recent studies on the security across the Taiwan Strait, see recent research on the security across the Taiwan Strait are Robert S. Ross, "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance and U.S.-China Relations," *International Security*, vol. 27, no. 2 (Fall 2002), 48-85; Zhongqi Pan, "US Taiwan Policy of Strategic Ambiguity: A Dilemma of Deterrence," *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 12, no. 35 (May 2003), 387-407; Steve Chan, "Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Learning from Rationalist Explanations in International Relations," *World Affairs*, vol. 166, no. 2 (Fall 2003), 109-125; Hsu-hsiung Fang, "The Transformation of U.S.-Taiwan Military Relations," *Orbis*, vol. 48, no. 3 (Summer 2004), 551-561; and Michael McDevitt, "The Security Situation across the Taiwan Strait: Challenges and Opportunities," *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 13, no. 40 (August 2004), 411-425. For a broader understanding of the security situation across the Taiwan Strait and some possible solutions to the Taiwan issue, see two collections of articles: one is Alexander C. Tan, Steve Chan, and Calvin Jillson, eds., *Taiwan's National Security: Dilemmas and Opportunities* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001); the other is Steve Tsang, ed., *Peace and Security across the Taiwan Strait* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004). For information on Taiwan's security, see website <www.taiwansecurity.org>.

⁸ For examples of studies on Taiwan's democratization, see Tun-Jen Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," *World Politics*, vol. 41, no. 4 (July 1989), 471-499; Hung-Mao Tien, *The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989); Jaushieh Joseph Wu, *Taiwan's Democratization: Forces Behind the New Momentum* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Bruce J. Dickson, *Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1997); and Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien eds., *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1999).

⁹ Tun-jen Cheng, "The Mainland China-Taiwan Dyad as a Research program," in Tun-jen Cheng, Chi Huang, and Samuel S.G. Wu, eds., *Inherited Rivalry: Conflict across the Taiwan Straits* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 5-13.

¹⁰ Some examples are Emerson M. S. Niu, "A Strategic Analysis of the Taiwan Independence Issue," Working Papers in Taiwan Studies #29, American Political Science Association (APSA) Conference Group on Taiwan Studies (CGOTS), 1998, <<http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/cgots/Papers/29.pdf>>; Brett Benson and Emerson M. S. Niu, "Comprehending Strategic Ambiguity: US Security Commitment to Taiwan," Working paper, Duke University, 2001, <<http://www.duke.edu/~niu/teaching/strategic%20ambiguity.pdf>>; and Chengqiu Wu, "The Balance of

to be interested in Taiwan's national identity issue and realize the important role that it has been playing in the cross-Strait relations.¹¹

I. Approaches

The literature on Taiwan's national identity issue can mainly be classified into three categories according to their approaches.

1. Quantitative data analysis approach

The first category of studies employs quantitative data analysis approach to study Taiwan's national identity issue. By employing statistical techniques, these studies analyze survey data of Taiwan's public opinion on national identity as well as on other issues. For example, Wang and Liu find that the majority of Taiwan residents have Taiwan-centered national identities and view Taiwan independent of mainland China. Mainland China's "one country, two systems" formula has received little support from residents on the island.¹² Wang and Chang utilize survey data to show that mainlanders have been increasingly moving away from a Chinese identity to a dual Chinese-Taiwanese identity and that as a result of the identity change, many mainlanders are more supportive of Taiwan independence or maintaining the status quo instead of Chinese reunification.¹³ They argue that while mainlanders have often been accused of "lack of love for Taiwan" and "loyalty to China," these accusations have been problematic and have strengthened mainlanders' sense of crisis. They believe that their studies support both primordialism and constructionism: their empirical findings that mainlanders are more likely to identify themselves as Chinese than *hoklo* and *hakka* indicate that ethnic

Threat across the Taiwan Strait: A Game-theoretical Analysis," *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, vol. 10, no. 2 (fall 2005), 43-76.

¹¹ Some books on this issue are Alan Wachman, *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994); Christopher Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society* (New York: Routledge, 1997); Stéphane Corcuff, ed., *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002); John Makeham and A-chin Hsiao, eds., *Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

¹² T. Y. Wang and I-chou Liu. "Contending Identities in Taiwan: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations," *Asian Survey*, vol. 44, no. 4 (2004), 568-590.

¹³ T. Y. Wang and G. Andy Chang, "Ethnicity and Politics in Taiwan: An Analysis of Mainlanders' Identity and Policy Preference," *Issues and Studies*, vol. 41, no. 4 (December 2005), 35-66.

ties and language have a great influence on identities, yet mainlanders' shifting away from Chinese identity to Taiwanese identity and to Chinese-Taiwanese dual identity also indicate that identities may be socially and structurally constructed.¹⁴

Since many surveys on the self-identity of people in Taiwan also include questions about their preference for Taiwan's statehood (e.g., Taiwan independence, reunification of China, or status quo) and the national identity issue is closely related to the independence-unification issue, some scholars analyze the implications of Taiwan's identity politics on the cross-Strait relations using statistical methods. For example, classifying people in Taiwan according to the underlying forces that affect their attitudes on the independence-unification issue---rational or affective, Emile Sheng finds that whereas people's preferences on the independence-unification issue appear to be stable over time, the number of people who take a rational approach on this issue has increased. He also finds that the number of people in Taiwan who affectively support independence has increased, whereas the number of those who affectively support unification has decreased. These opinion patterns have important implications for Taiwan's domestic politics and the cross-Strait relations. Sheng finds that affective pro-independence people have a stronger ethnic Taiwanese identification than the rest of the people, and they, as opposed to pro-unification people, are more likely to have an optimistic view about the issue of Chinese military threat and the U.S. likelihood to defend Taiwan.¹⁵

Another example exploring the implication of Taiwan's national identity issue on the cross-Strait relations is Yun-han Chu's study. He reviews the rise of Taiwanese identity, outlines the major constraints and countervailing forces against Taiwanese nationalism, and explores the prospect of peaceful reconciliation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.¹⁶ Contrary to the widely held perception that Taiwan's move to Taiwanese independence has passed to the point of no return and few people in Taiwan except for elderly mainlanders would embrace reunification, Chu, based on a series of

¹⁴ Ibid., 61.

¹⁵ Emile C. J. Sheng, "Cross-Strait Relations and Public Opinion in Taiwan," *Issues and Studies*, vol. 38, no. 1 (2002), 17-46.

¹⁶ Yun-han Chu, "Taiwan's National Identity Politics and the Prospect of Cross-Strait Relations," *Asian Survey*, vol. 44, no. 4 (2004), 484-512.

data, finds that the political project of Taiwanese nation building has only accomplished a limited success, and that neither pro-independence Taiwanese nor pro-unification Taiwanese have a dominant number to give Taiwanese leader a clear mandate to impose a solution on the question of national identity. Since there are a large number of non-committed rationalists, the prospect for Taiwan's national identity is still unclear.

To some degree, Chu's conclusion is also supported by Emerson Niou and T. Y. Wang, on the basis of their quantitative data analyses. Niou introduces a new measure for people's preference for independence-unification by taking into consideration the costs of unification and independence, and he analyzes the factors that affect people's preference on the independence-unification issue. He finds that Taiwanese's preferences for unification and independence are highly conditional at their political consequence, especially with regard to whether or not mainland China will attack Taiwan and whether mainland China will become more democratic.¹⁷ Wang finds that the majority opinion in Taiwan is still maintaining the status quo, and that those who prefer maintaining the status quo are potentially flexible. He argues that the policy preferences of people in Taiwan do not depend on primordial difference, but they are conditioned by their perception of threat from mainland China and their expectations about the likelihood of armed intervention by the United States.¹⁸

Generally speaking, the approach of quantitative data analysis enables these studies to find out the distribution of people in Taiwan favoring the various identity options and the changes in these preferences over time. It also helps scholars find out factors that influence people's preferences on the independence-unification issue as well as its policy implication. Yet these studies mostly assume the meaning of Taiwanese and Chinese as given and fixed, and they lack a critical perspective towards the nature of these identities. This dissertation does not take the meaning of the Taiwanese national identity and the Chinese national identity for granted. Instead, it attempts to examine the construction of

¹⁷ Emerson M.S. Niou, "Understanding Taiwan Independence and Its Policy Implications," *Asian Survey*, vol. 44, no. 4 (2004), 555-567.

¹⁸ T. Y. Wang, "The Perception of Threats and Pragmatic Policy Choice: A Survey of Public Opinion in Taiwan," *Issues and Studies*, vol. 41, no. 1 (March 2005), 87-111.

the Taiwanese national identity by focusing on the major discourses related to the national identity issue.

2. Historical approach

The second category of studies employs a historical approach to the development of Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwan's national identity issue. For example, Alan M. Wachman provides a seminal examination of the process of Taiwan's democratization as a contest for power between Taiwanese and mainlanders. He views national identity as a perception and traces the origin of Taiwanese identity to "reasons why Taiwanese think of themselves a group distinct from other Chinese."¹⁹ These reasons are: "1. The separation from the rest of China and the collective memory of succeeding periods during which forces came from elsewhere to impose control on the island's people; 2. The friction between the KMT and the Taiwanese stemming from persistent memories of initial misperceptions and early conflicts; 3. The sense that a distinct Taiwanese culture and consciousness differs from Han culture and Chinese consciousness, and 4. a legacy of frustration resulting from the authoritarian nature of KMT rule, which seemed to favor mainlanders and their interests over the Taiwanese, and which, in an effort to re-socialize Taiwanese as Chinese, inadvertently reinforced mutual perceptions of difference."²⁰ While Wachman solidly founds his study on interviews with dozens of prominent figures in Taiwan, he tends to take the Taiwanese national identity as it is and use the Taiwanese-mainlander dichotomy as a framework to explain the role of national identity in Taiwan's democratization.

Christopher Hughes' work is another example using historical approach to study Taiwan's national identity issue. Compared to Wachman's work, Hughes' study focuses more on nationalism as an ideology. He examines the significance of Taiwan in Chinese nationalism and the challenge that Taiwan's democratization has brought about to Chinese nationalism.²¹ Hughes provides a historical review of the imposition of Chinese

¹⁹ Alan Wachman, *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 91.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 91-91.

²¹ Christopher Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

national identity on Taiwan under the KMT's authoritarian rule, and he argues that Taiwan's democratization has led to the deconstruction of Chinese nationalism and the establishment of a new "post-nationalist" identity on the sense of *Gemeinschaft*. Understanding nationalism as the political doctrine that "the political and the national unit should be congruent,"²² Hughes interprets the new identity in Taiwan as being "post-nationalist" on the basis of the expectation that the Taiwanese government would not forsake the benefits of being part of Chineseness while not comprising its political independence from the mainland. However, this understanding has been more or less disproved by the later development of identity politics in Taiwan since Chen Shui-bian became president. This dissertation attempts to remedy Hughes' mis-prediction by reviewing Taiwan's identity politics in recent years, comparing the Lee Teng-hui administration's strategies to construct the Taiwanese national identity with those of the Chen Shui-bian administration, and explain for the differences.

Another example is Jou-jou Chu's longitudinal analysis of the dynamic of Taiwan's identity politics that has given rise to three types of national identity in Taiwan's politics: the Chinese nationalism, the separatist Taiwanese nationalism, the continuance of the status quo.²³ Similar to Hughes, Chu argues that the rise of a Taiwan-centered identity---which sometimes takes Taiwan independence as its extreme form---is primarily a quest for sovereignty to guarantee its international space instead of for identity that cuts its cultural and ethnic ties with China. Chu clearly demonstrates the interactions of internal and external factors underlying the rise of the Taiwanese national identity and correctly emphasizes the role that the PRC pressure has been playing in the process. Both Hughes and Chu tend to understand national identity in terms of certain cultural elements and have an optimistic view on Taiwan's pursuing political independence while preserving Chinese culture. Yet, Taiwan's national identity issue has by nature been about politics instead of culture, and cultural policies have also been heavily influenced by political struggles.

²² See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 1. Also see Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 2.

²³ Jou-jou Chu, "Nationalism and Self-determination: The Identity Politics in Taiwan," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vol. 35, no. 3 (2000), 303-321.

Another example employing historical approach is C.L. Chiou. He reviews the historical formation of Taiwanese nationalism and argues that the “February 28 Incident” marked the origin of Taiwanese nationalism that was related to a political struggle for self-determination and independence from China ruled by the KMT and the Chinese Communists.²⁴ Chiou also argues that Taiwanese nationalism is not ethnically or culturally based, but a popular and civic nationalism. He points out, “Evolving Taiwanese nationalism is therefore not anti-Confucian or anti-Han, but anti-authoritarian, anti-communist and anti-Chinese-irredentist.”²⁵ In my opinion, it is problematic to view Taiwanese nationalism as a linear and continuous development and define “February 28 Incident” as its origin, not to say recovering the history of “February 28 Incident” has become a site of political struggle in Taiwan. Nevertheless, Chiou insightfully points out the complexity of the relationship between democracy and identity and the uncertain future of Taiwanese nationalism. He says, “It is difficult for nationalism to evolve more rapidly and fully in Taiwan, precisely because Taiwan is a democracy and ethnic politics continue to divide Taiwanese society.”²⁶ In this dissertation, I will argue that democracy prevents the formation of an overarching Taiwanese national identity and poses a challenge to the Taiwanese national identity.

Chia-lung Lin uses a combination of historical approach and quantitative data analysis approach to analyze how the self-identity of people in Taiwan and their position on Taiwan’s relationship with mainland China have changed during the democratization process.²⁷ Based on secondary data on Taiwan’s general public as well as his interviews with Taiwan’s legislators, Lin finds that “political elites are generally more concerned with national identity than others in Taiwan, and that the sudden rise of Taiwanese identity is to a certain extent the result of mobilization of the elites.”²⁸ He argues that democratization in Taiwan and threat from mainland China are the two major forces that

²⁴ C.L. Chiou, “Taiwan’s Evolving Nationalism: Ideology for Independence,” in Leong H. Liew and Shaoguang Wang, eds., *Nationalism, Democracy and National Integration in China* (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 107-121.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 107.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 118.

²⁷ Chia-lung Lin, “The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism,” in Leong H. Liew and Shaoguang Wang, eds., *Nationalism, Democracy and National Integration in China* (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 122-44.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 126.

have explained the rise of a civic national identity among people in Taiwan. On the one hand, democratization has created a type of “everyday plebiscite” for people in Taiwan, bringing people together and generating many issues that provide incentives for groups to form various cross-cutting issue coalitions. On the other hand, the threat from mainland China have generated a sense of common suffering among people in Taiwan and made them imagine as a community. While this dissertation agrees with Lin that the Taiwanese national identity has been politically constructed, it is different from Lin’s research in that it focuses more on the discursive aspect of the formation of Taiwanese national identity and examines some specific techniques that the political elites have used in their mobilization. While Lin understands national identity as subject to change in that it is under the intensive mobilization of political elites, this dissertation understands national identity as fluid in that national identity is discursively constructed and is always under challenge of the discursive outside. Meanwhile, this dissertation examines both the political and social dimensions of the discursive construction of Taiwanese national identity.

While quantitative data analysis has enable many scholars to analyze the effect of Taiwan’s national identity issue on the relations between mainland China and Taiwan, a historical approach has also done so. For example, Liu Wenbin categories national identity into institutional identification, cultural identification, and ethnic identification and examine how the changes in Taiwan’s national identity have affected the cross-Strait relations.²⁹ Liu’s study is very solid and offers many detailed historical facts. While Liu’s study views Taiwan’s national identity as an independent variable and the cross-Strait relations as a dependent variable, this dissertation focuses more on the effect of cross-Strait relations, particularly mainland China’s actions, on the construction of Taiwanese national identity, viewing the cross-Strait relations as an independent variable and Taiwan’s national identity as a dependent variable.

Generally speaking, a historical approach enables scholars to examine the historical background and actual political struggles underlying the evolution of Taiwan’s national

²⁹ Liu Wenbin, *Taiwan Guojia Rentong Bianqian Xia de Liangan Guanxi* [*The Cross-Strait Relations under the Changes in Taiwan’s National Identity*] (Taipei: Wenjintang 2005).

identity. However, similar to studies that employ a quantitative data analysis approach, these studies tend to lack a critical perspective and put less emphasis on theoretical contemplation on Taiwan's identity politics.

3. Discursive approach

The third category of studies focus on the discursive aspect of Taiwan's national identity issue, and some of them employ discourse analysis. For example, Pei-chi Chung employs textual analysis and studies how the Taiwanese and South Korean media construct their national identities by means of discourses of exclusion and the process of differentiation from the others---mainland China and North Korea.³⁰ Chung derives on postcolonial and poststructuralist theorists such as Edward Said and Stuart Hall theoretical insights and focuses her analysis on the representation of national identity in four news organizations in Taiwan and South Korea. She finds that the media there construct national identities by creating images of the "Other" in their news coverage. She argues that "different ideologies compete with each other and try to fulfill the space of national identity on the performative level."³¹

Carl K.Y. Shaw outlines the various modulations of nationalism in Taiwan, namely, the KMT's official nationalism, the DPP's Taiwanese nationalism, and the emerging civic nationalism crafted by Lee Teng-hui during his presidency. In addition, he compares Taiwan's civic nationalism to China's cultural nationalism. Shaw argues that a mode of "heterocentric self-understanding" is needed to resolve the ideological conflict between mainland China and Taiwan.³² To some extent, the four nationalisms that Shaw outlines correspond to the four representations that I will outline in this dissertation: the KMT's "one China, anti-communism" representation, the DPP's Taiwanese independence representation, the KMT's "one China, two political entities" representation, and mainland China's "one China, unification" representation. Shaw insightfully points out that "democratization goes hand in hand with nation-building" and

³⁰ Pei-chi Chung, "The Cultural Other and National Identity in the Taiwanese and South Korean Media," *Gazette*, vol. 62, no. 2 (2000), 99-115.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 104.

³² Carl K. Y. Shaw, "Modulations of Nationalism across the Taiwan Strait," *Issues and Studies*, vol. 38, no. 2 (2002), 122-147.

argues that Taiwan's periodic direct presidential elections provide the institutional basis to realize nation-building through "daily plebiscite."³³ In my opinion, while attempting to conduct a discourse analysis, Shaw has not analyzed the various modulations of nationalism in Taiwan critically or pointed out the relations of power involved in each modulation of nationalism. Like Christopher Hughes and Jou-jou Chu, Shaw tends to have an optimistic view about the development of Taiwan's identity politics and argues that the modulation of nationalism that Lee Teng-hui's administration crafted was a civic nationalism. However, the nationalism that Lee Teng-hui promoted has never been free of ethnic issues. In particular, ethnic issues have been exploited in Taiwan's elections during recent years. There has never been a clear boundary between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. In general, the discursive and institutional mechanisms of Taiwan's identity politics deserve a more critical examination. The same observations may also be applied to another study by Gunter Schubert. He examines the positions of Taiwan's political parties to the "one-China" principle and cross-Strait relations and argues that "a Taiwanese nation already exists."³⁴

Some studies focus on the symbolic dimension of Taiwan's identity politics, particularly of some recent events. For example, Stéphane Corcuff examines some important changes in national identity-related symbols in Lee Teng-hui's terms of presidency.³⁵ He argues that "the transition to national identity was already proceeding at a fast pace under Lee's presidency."³⁶ Daniel Lynch provides a review of the DPP's efforts to construct a Taiwanese identity in its nation-building project.³⁷ In particular, Lynch focuses on some radical nation-building programs and the intellectual constructs developed by historian Chang Yen-hsien, curator of the National Museum of History, and his colleagues. Wei-chin Lee examines Chen Shui-bian administration's policies to transform Taiwan's identity since Chen became Taiwan's president in 2000. He reviews

³³ Ibid., 136.

³⁴ Gunter Schubert, "Taiwan's Political Parties and National Identity: The Rise of an Overarching Consensus," *Asian Survey*, vol. 44, no. 4 (July/August 2004), 535.

³⁵ Stéphane Corcuff, "The Symbolic Dimension of Democratization and the Transition of National Identity under Lee Teng-hui," in Stéphane Corcuff, ed., *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 73-101.

³⁶ Ibid., 74.

³⁷ Daniel C. Lynch, "Taiwan's Self-Conscious Nation-building Project," *Asian Survey*, vol. 44, no. 4 (2004), 513-533.

and analyzes how, through a series of political issues, Chen has been trying to gradually eliminate the symbolic elements of the Chinese identity and consolidate the Taiwanese identity.³⁸ Even though they do not intentionally employ a discourse analysis method, in my opinion they still fall into the third category: these studies help to reveal that national identity is a social construct.

This dissertation views nationalism more as a discursive formation and focuses on the discursive aspect of Taiwan's identity politics. Compared to Chung's study, this dissertation attempts to provide a more complete and in-depth analysis of the discursive contestation underlying Taiwan's identity politics. And compared to Shaw's study, this dissertation employs a more critical perspective, because it aims at examining the relations of power underlying the discourses on Taiwan's status and its relationship with mainland China. It focuses upon the contingency and fluidity of the Taiwanese national identity and the conditions behind the on-going development of identity politics in Taiwan.

II. Views on Taiwanese national identity

The literature on Taiwan's national identity issue can also be classified according to their view on Taiwanese national identity. Generally speaking, those studies that employ a quantitative data analysis approach are more interested in the factors that influence national identity and the effects of the national identity issue than the national identity itself. The studies that employ either a historical or discursive approach can be categorized into two groups.

One group of studies argues that the Taiwanese national identity can be traced back to some origins and the development of Taiwanese national identity is a linear, continuous process, though sometimes being repressed and sometimes being reenergized. Some authors trace the origin of "Taiwanese consciousness" to the early years when *hoklo* and *hakka* migrants from the mainland settled in Taiwan in late Ming Dynasty and

³⁸ Wei-chin Lee, "Taiwan's Cultural Reconstruction Movement: Identity Politics and Collective Action since 2000," *Issues and Studies*, vol. 41, no. 1 (2005), 1-51.

early Qing dynasty.³⁹ Some scholars argue that a Taiwanese collective identity did not emerge until 1920s when people in Taiwan strived for more autonomy from Japanese colonial rule.⁴⁰ Some scholars trace the origin of Taiwanese collective identity to Taiwan's frustration about the KMT's misgovernance and authoritarian rule after taking over Taiwan in 1945.⁴¹ From the perspective of this group, Taiwan's quest for its own identity and the Taiwanese consciousness have simply been repressed, and ironically been preserved at the same time, by the KMT regime, which ruled Taiwan with an authoritarian hand and justified its ruling and the mainlander elites' dominance on the basis of the "one-China" principle. And as the KMT's authoritarian ruling was democratized since the late 1980s, Taiwanese consciousness and identity have been reawakened naturally. Simply put, the Taiwanese national identity has been there, and its rise has been natural as the temporary suppression was removed. Some other scholars partially disagree with this view. For example, Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin argue that at the end of Japanese colonial rule, "there was no tangible social support for a political struggle for national sovereignty and Taiwan had not yet emerged as a self-contained political community with a distinct political identity," and that a Taiwanese nationalist movement with broad social base emerged along with the decline of the KMT authoritarian rule and the Taiwanization of the KMT regime in the 1970.⁴²

The other group argues the Taiwanese national identity has been the result of social and political construction.⁴³ Some scholars of this group examine the state and politicians' involvement in the construction of the identity.⁴⁴ Some other scholars tend to

³⁹ Ming Shih, *Taiwan's 400 Years History: The Origins and Continuing development of the Taiwanese Society and People* (Washington, DC: Taiwanese Cultural Grassroots Association, 1986).

⁴⁰ For example, Mau-kuei Chang, "On the Origins and Transformation of Taiwanese National Identity," in Paul R. Katz and Murray Rubenstein, eds., *Religion and the Formation of Taiwanese Identities* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 21-58; and Leo T.S. Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

⁴¹ For example, Wachman, *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization*.

⁴² For example, Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, "Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State Building, Regime Transformation, and the Construction of National Identity," *The China Quarterly*, no. 165 (March 2001), 102-129.

⁴³ Yun-han Chu and Chia-lung Lin, "Consolidating Taiwan's New Democracy amid Competing National Identities," in Marie Taciana and Leila Fernandez Stenbridge, eds., *China Today: Economic Reforms, Social Conflict, and Collective Identities* (London: RoutledgeCurzon Press, 2003).

⁴⁴ For example, see Chia-lung Lin, "The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism."

analyze the discursive economy of Taiwanese nationalism.⁴⁵ Nonetheless, very few scholars embrace a poststructuralist perspective to the Taiwanese national identity. Pei-chi Chung is one of them, yet her analysis mainly focuses solely on Taiwan's media in representing mainland China as the Other. Another scholar is William Callahan. He examines how mainland China understands the Taiwan issue in a nation-state framework and how the development of democracy and identity in Taiwan have challenged the logic of the nation-state and pushed for a cosmopolitan construction of Greater China. Drawing on Charles Taylor's notion of "politics of recognition," Callahan explores the possibility for the recognition of friendship and proposes for a horizontal notion of ethical encounters in Greater China.⁴⁶ While not focusing on Taiwan's national identity issue, Callahan makes some insightful observations. He argues,

the Taiwan Straits crisis, then, is not just a political-military struggle, part of the Cold War/civil war logic. The struggle is also over different notions of Chineseness, and how they are realized, recognized, and insitutionalized in political space in much more direct ways than in Hong Kong.⁴⁷

Another scholar embracing a poststructuralist perspective to Taiwanese national identity is Yih-jye Hwang. Drawing on Michel Foucault's theories of knowledge, he reviews two types of knowledge about Taiwanese national identity---historians' analyses of Taiwan's history and political theorists' studies of Taiwan's political lives---and argues that "knowledge produced by these intellectuals in fact discursively constituted people's self-identification."⁴⁸ Hwang insightfully points out,

The process of the constitution of Taiwanese identity is much more complex. Taiwanese identity is in fact constituted in a dissemination of specific historical narratives and certain political discourse. Through various social practices, those historical narratives and areas of political discourse take precedence over other alternatives, so that the latter disappear and are excluded and silenced. Identity formation in Taiwan is indeed situated in a realm in which different historical,

⁴⁵ For example, see Pei-chi Chung, "The Cultural Other and National Identity in the Taiwanese and South Korean Media."

⁴⁶ William A. Callahan, *Contingent States: Greater China and Transnational Relations* (Minneapolis, MN and London: University of Minnesota Press 2004), 179-217.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 182.

⁴⁸ Yih-jye Hwang, "Historical and Political Knowledge in the Discursive Constitution of Taiwanese National Identity," *Perspectives*, vol. 7, no. 3 (September 2006), 110.

cultural and political discourses have mutually interacted, intersected and competed.⁴⁹

Though Hwang's argument may be more solidly substantiated by an examination of the multiple political discourses competing for hegemony in the constitution of Taiwanese national identity, rather than just a review and critique of the major intellectual explorations on this issue, he makes some insightful arguments from a Foucauldian perspective. In fact he also calls for studies in a poststructuralist direction on Taiwan's national identity issue. He says,

The important tasks of current studies on Taiwanese identity are, firstly, illustrating the process of how and through which social practices, specific narratives/discourses/interpretations take precedence over other alternatives; and secondly, elucidating how historical narrative and political ideology are used to help constitute Taiwanese identity through various social practices – a much more complex and drawn-out process of determining significance, deployment, and ritualization. In short, there is a need to create a history of the different modes to which the people residing in the island of Taiwan are made subject, and to expose the beginning and development of current subjectifying discourse and practices.⁵⁰

This dissertation is an attempt to move in the direction pointed out by Hwang. I problematize the Taiwanese national identity and explore the discursive contestation in the constitution of Taiwanese national identity. While Hwang focuses on intellectual discourses, I focus more on political discourses.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 128.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

Chapter 3. Theories on Nationalism and Discourse

I. Theories on nationalism

Despite its great impact on people's lives, nationalism had not been studied as a "discrete subject of investigation" by social scientists until 1920s-1940s, when such historians as Carleton Hayes, Hans Kohn, Louis Snyder, and E. H. Carr studied nationalism by making use of sociological factors.⁵¹ Before 1920s, discussions on nationalism were mainly ethical and philosophical, though many of the discussions have been insightful even till today.⁵² For example, French historian Ernest Renan emphasizes the primacy of politics, shared history, and collective sentiment in the origin and characteristics of nations. His definition of nationalism is often referred to by students of Taiwanese identity politics to emphasize the significance of people's will in the formation of Taiwanese national identity.⁵³ Renan says,

A nation is ... a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation's existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite, just as an individual's existence is a perpetual affirmation of life.⁵⁴

Studies of nationalism after the World War II have been propelled by "decolonization" and the establishment of many new states. In the 1960s, theoretical debate on nationalism began to be more visible in academia, mainly revolving around such

⁵¹ Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (New York: St. Martin Press, 2001), 1. For examples of these authors' works, see Carleton Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York: MacMillan, 1926); Carleton Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1931); Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Collier, 1944); Hans Kohn, *Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1946); Louis Snyder, *The Meaning of Nationalism* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954); Louis Snyder, *The New Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); and E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan, 1945).

⁵² For example, O. Bauer, "The Nation," in G. Balakrishnan, ed., *Mapping the Nation* (London: Verso 1996 [1924]), 39-77; and E. Renan, "What is a Nation?" (1888), in H. Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge 1990 [1882]), 8-22.

⁵³ For example, see Carl K. Y. Shaw, "Modulations of Nationalism across the Taiwan Strait," 136; and Chia-lung Lin, "The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism," 140, 141.

⁵⁴ Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?" (1888), in H. Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990), 19.

questions as what is nationalism, how nations originates, whether nation is a modern phenomenon or has existed for long since premodern time, whether nation has been invented and imagined or evolved from certain cultural elements. Umut Özkirimli classifies the theories on nationalism since 1960s into three paradigms, namely primordialism, modernism, and ethno-symbolism: primordialism emphasizes that nationality is a “natural” part of human lives and has existed since antiquity, modernism distinguishes between traditional society and modern society and emphasizes the modernity of nations and nationalism, and ethno-symbolism emphasizes the ethnic pasts and cultures in explaining nationalism.⁵⁵

The 1960s witnessed the publication of pioneering works by Karl Deutsch, Elie Kedourie, and Ernest Gellner, who were from the modernist paradigm. Deutsch emphasizes the significant role that communications play in “nation-building” through processes like urbanization, mobility, literacy and the significant role that nationalism plays in modernization.⁵⁶ Kedourie understands nationalism as an ideological doctrine which holds “that humanity is naturally divided into nations, and nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government.”⁵⁷ He traces the origins of nationalism to German Romantic thought at the beginning of the nineteenth century and emphasizes the intellectuals’ role in the evolution of nationalism as an ideology. In a chapter of his book *Thought and Change*, Ernest Gellner proposed his theory of nationalism that was later elaborated in his book *Nations and Nationalism*.⁵⁸ Gellner defines nationalism as “primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent,” and he argues that “it is nationalism which engenders nations.”⁵⁹

Since the 1960s, the paradigm of modernism has received many theoretical inputs and has attained dominance in the studies of nationalism. Özkirimli classifies scholars of

⁵⁵ See Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (New York: St. Martin Press, 2001), particularly 64

⁵⁶ Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966), 2nd edition.

⁵⁷ Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994 [1966]), 4th edition, 1.

⁵⁸ See Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964); and Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

⁵⁹ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1, 55.

modernism into three groups on the basis of the factor that they emphasize in explaining nationalism, namely those who emphasize economic factors, those who emphasize political factors, and those who emphasize social and cultural factors.⁶⁰ Examples of the first group are such neo-Marxist scholars as Michael Hechter (who emphasizes “internal colonialism” in the process of national development) and Tom Nairn (who emphasizes the “uneven development” of capitalism and the mass mobilization by elites in the periphery). Examples of the second group are John Breuilly (who views nationalism as a form of politics and emphasizes the role of state) and Eric Hobsbawm (who views nations and nationalism as products of social engineering and highlights the invention of traditions). And examples of the third group are Ernest Gellner (who argues that nationalism emerged when a high culture was formed as a result of industrial social organization) and Benedict Anderson (who views nations as “imagined political communities”).⁶¹ Meanwhile, in the 1980s, John Armstrong and Anthony D. Smith offered an ethno-symbolist critique of modernist theories.⁶² They are regarded as the representative scholars of ethno-symbolist understanding of nationalism.

The theoretical debate on nationalism has entered into a new stage since the late 1980s.⁶³ One of the important theoretical insights gained in this period is the understanding of nationalism as a “discursive formation.” As Craig Calhoun says, “Nationalism is, among other things, what Michel Foucault...called a ‘discursive formation’, a way of speaking that shapes our consciousness, but also is problematic enough that it keeps generating more issues and questions, keeps propelling us into further talk, keeps producing debates over how to think about it.”⁶⁴ As a way of speaking,

⁶⁰ Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*.

⁶¹ See Michael Hetcher, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul); Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1977); John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982); Eric J. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

⁶² John Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); and Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

⁶³ See Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism*, 55-56.

⁶⁴ Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press 1997), 3.

nationalism involves relations of power in that it “enables or disables other ways of speaking or acting.”⁶⁵ Calhoun argues that nationalism has three dimensions:

First, there is nationalism as discourse: the production of a cultural understanding and rhetoric which leads people throughout the world to think and frame their aspirations in terms of the idea of nation and national identity, and the production of particular versions of nationalist thought and language in particular settings and tradition. Second, there is nationalism as project: social movements and state policies by which people attempt to advance the interests of collectivities they understand as nations, usually pursuing in some combination (or in a historical progression) increased participation in an existing state, national autonomy, independence and self-determination, or the amalgamation of territories. Third, there is nationalism as evaluation: political and cultural ideologies that claim superiority for a particular nation; these are often associated with movements or state policies, but need not be.⁶⁶

Özkirimli defines nationalism similarly, “nationalism is a particular way of seeing and interpreting the world, a frame of reference that helps us make sense of and structure the reality that surrounds us.”⁶⁷ Nationalism offers representations that compete to make certain national identities at a hegemonic position, and the dominance of certain national identity is a discursive effect of the competition. Özkirimli outlines four ways in which the nationalist discourse operates: 1) “The discourse of nationalism divides the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’,” which means that nationalist discourses are full of practices of exclusion, dividing the world into self and other and imposing a homogeneous and fixed identity on either side; 2) “The discourse of nationalism hegemonizes,” which means that nationalist discourses are full of contestation and domination, and the hegemony of certain representations involve hierarchies over other representations; 3) “The discourse of nationalism naturalizes itself,” which means national identities tend to be taken for granted and treated as natural and eternal; and 4) “The discourse of nationalism operates through institutions,” which means nationalist discourse have to be reproduced by everyday life and institutions.⁶⁸ Özkirimli argues that there are four dimensions of the discourse of nationalism: the spatial, the temporal, the symbolic and the everyday life.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 4.

⁶⁶ Calhoun, *Nationalism*, 6.

⁶⁷ Umut Özkirimli, *Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical Engagement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2005), 30.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 32-33.

What differentiates nationalism from other discourses is the ‘combination’ of all four dimensions.⁶⁹

These theoretical insights on nationalism can be referred to as social constructionism. This dissertation will base its analysis on this theoretical framework and can be also viewed as a test of it by using the case of Taiwan. It draws on the new theories on nationalism emerging in the 1990s. Employing a discourse analysis approach to the Taiwanese national identity, I emphasize that national identity has always involved contestation and has always been unfixed, dynamic. Introducing the social constructionist theories on nationalism and some poststructuralist theories on identity into the analysis of Taiwan’s identity politics, this dissertation may contribute to the literature on nationalism by providing an empirical study of the important case of Taiwan as well as contribute to the studies on China, particularly mainland China-Taiwan relations.

II. Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse

Since we can understand nationalism as a discursive formation and national identity as being discursively constructed, this dissertation attempts to employ a discourse analysis approach to analyze the discursive construction of the Taiwanese national identity. There are many types of discourse analysis. This dissertation will mainly use the discourse analysis approach developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.⁷⁰ Laclau and Mouffe provide a theory of discourse which revolves around three important concepts, namely discourse, hegemony, and social antagonism.

1. Discourse

In Laclau and Mouffe’s view, since there is not a fixed center extending the process of signification infinitely, there is no complete totalization, or closure, and the field of signification is characterized by multiplicity of mutually substitutable centers. “The

⁶⁹ Ibid., 179-194.

⁷⁰ The introduction of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse in this dissertation is based on such books as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso 1985); Jacob Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1999); and David Howarth, *Discourse* (Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 2000).

creation of a relative structural order is conditional upon the exclusion of a constitutive outside which threatens the relative order of the structure and prevents an ultimate closure.”⁷¹ Discourse is “a differential ensemble of signifying sequences” that “together constitute a more or less coherent framework for what can be said and done.”⁷² It partially fixes social meaning. As a result, there is always a surplus of meaning that escapes the differential logic of discourse. The field of surplus of meaning is called the discursive. The distinction between discourse and the discursive is based on the degree of fixity. The discursive field consists of multiple discourses that compete to gain hegemony. Since the discursive field are characterized by a “surplus of meaning” that can never be exhausted by particular discourses, every particular discourse always requires the construction of a discursive “outside” to constitute itself and at the same time faces challenges from the discursive “outside.” As David Howarth summarizes, “as discourses are relational entities whose identities depend on their differentiation from other discourses, they are themselves dependent and vulnerable to those meanings that are necessarily excluded in any discursive articulation.”⁷³

While Foucault believed that there should be a distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive, Laclau and Mouffe reject this distinction and believe that discourses consist of not only linguistic elements and ideas, but also practices, which people use to impose order and necessity on the field of meaning. For Laclau and Mouffe, all actions have meaning. The semantic aspects of language and the pragmatic aspects of actions are interwoven. While Foucault suggests that our study of discourse focus on the rules that produce and organize discourses, describing the enunciative regularities and the modes of enunciation, Laclau and Mouffe focus on the construction of identity. In analysis of particular concrete discourses, their approach of discourse analysis approach tends to pay attention to three important factors, “the relations of difference and equivalence, the workings of different kinds of over-determination, and the unifying effort of nodal points.”⁷⁴

⁷¹ Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse*, 86.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 86, 300.

⁷³ David Howarth, *Discourse* (Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 2000), 103.

⁷⁴ Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse*, 96.

The logic of difference is “a way of relating discursive moments in and through their mutual differences.”⁷⁵ Identity is constituted by the differential relations between discursive moments. On the other hand, “the logic of equivalence constructs a chain of equivalential identities among different elements that are seen as expressing a certain sameness.”⁷⁶ Jacob Torfing describes the logics of difference and equivalence and their relations to the constitution of identity in the following way.

The partial fixation of meaning within discourse produces an irreducible surplus of meaning which escapes the differential logic of the discourse in question. However, the expansion of the logic of difference is not only prevented by its lack of a deep foundation in a fixed center capable of revealing the full essence of all social identities. It is also prevented by the presence of an alternative logic of equivalence which collapses the differential character of social identity by means of expanding a signifying chain of equivalence... The relation between difference and equivalence is, in other words, undecidable. The discursive identities are inscribed both in signifying chains that stress their differential value, and in signifying chains that emphasize their equivalence. The tension between the differential and equivalential aspects of discursive identities is unresolvable, but political struggles may succeed in emphasizing one of the two aspects. Emphasis on the equivalential aspect by the expansion of chains of equivalence will tend to simplify the social and political space by delimiting the play of difference. The collapse of difference into equivalence will tend to involve a loss of meaning since meaning is intrinsically linked to the differential character of identity.

Besides the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence, Torfing introduces overdetermination in the symbolic level which takes the form of either condensation or displacement. “Condensation involves the fusion of a variety significations and meanings into a single unity,” and “displacement involves the transferal of the signification or meaning of one particular moment to another moment.”⁷⁷ According to Laclau and Mouffe, every discourse attempts to dominate the field of discursivity by expanding signifying chains and constructing nodal points that partially fix meaning.⁷⁸ Torfing defines nodal point as “an empty signifier that is capable of fixing the content of a range of floating signifiers by articulating them within a chain of equivalence.”⁷⁹ Discourses

⁷⁵ Ibid., 300.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 301.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 98.

⁷⁸ Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, 98.

⁷⁹ Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse*, 303.

involve sets of nodal points. Yet, identification is always temporarily fixed. There is always a “discursive exterior” that renders the “necessary moment” under contingency.

2. Hegemony and social antagonism

Hegemony is “the achievement of moral, intellectual, and political leadership through the expansion of a discourse that partially fixes meaning around nodal points.”⁸⁰ It involves the expansion of a particular discourse through a persuasive way of viewing and describing the world. More specifically, hegemony involves articulating unfixed discursive elements into partially fixed moments so as to construct a predominant discursive formation. Discourses are the result of hegemonic articulations. And hegemonic articulation involves the negation of alternative identities and the people who identify with those identities. Moreover, the construction of a discursive formation, or the limit of a particular discourse, is established by social antagonism. “Social antagonism is a result of the exclusion of discursive elements, the differential character of which is collapse through the articulation in a chain of equivalence.”⁸¹ A discourse requires a discursive “outside” to constitute itself, and the establishment of limits of the discourse involves excluding a radical otherness that poses a threat to the differential system of the inside. All identities are discursively constructed and contingent. According to Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse, since it is impossible for social agents to have fully constituted identities, they tend to construct the “other” that is responsible for the failure of the constitution of their identities. The discursive construction of identity involves the construction of social antagonisms, which define the boundaries between the “inside” and the “outside” and the political frontiers. As a result, “the social, that is the realm of discursive differences, becomes homogenized into a chain of equivalence vis-à-vis a purely negative outside.” The constructed identity is also vulnerable to those forces that are excluded in the process of political constitution.”⁸² In fact, the hegemony of a particular discourse is always temporary. Meanwhile, there are two types of social antagonism. One is popular antagonism, which involves the simplification of the social

⁸⁰ Ibid., 302.

⁸¹ Ibid., 305.

⁸² Howarth, *Discourse*, 104.

space into two antagonistic camps. The other is democratic antagonism, which tends to divide minor social space into a variety of antagonistic battlegrounds.

In order to construct a positive identity, a discourse has to construct an external negative identity shared by all people interpellated by the discourse as a discursive threat. In Laclau and Mouffe's view, "politics is about the construction of collective identities, of 'we' opposed to 'them'," in the process of which "historic blocs" are formed.⁸³ In this process, both the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference can be involved. Laclau and Mouffe also emphasize "subject positions" within a discursive structure. "As every subject position is a discursive position, it partakes of the open character of every discourse."⁸⁴ When structure fails to confer identity on social actors, they will act to reposition and identify with new discourse. This is referred to as political subjectivity. In Laclau and Mouffe's view, hegemony emerges in the field of articulatory practices and presupposes the contingency and openness of all social relations. They argue that "the two conditions of a hegemonic articulation are the presence of antagonistic forces and the instability of the frontiers which separate them."⁸⁵ "The major aim of hegemonic projects is to construct and stabilize systems of meaning or 'hegemonic formations'...on the societal level, these formations are organized around the articulation of nodal points, which underpin and organize social orders."⁸⁶ "The creation of hegemony is the fixation of a certain number of nodal points," and it makes a certain interpretation into "commonsense."⁸⁷

III. Other scholars on discourse and identity

Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse has either influenced or been confirmed by other scholars. For example, William Connolly argues that identity is "historically

⁸³ M. M. Bosman and L. Barr, "A Critical Examination of the Concept of 'Radical Democracy': An Interview with Chantal Mouffe," *disClosure: Journal of Critical Social Theory*, vol. 3, no. 1 (1994), 100.

⁸⁴ See Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, 115.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 136.

⁸⁶ Howarth, *Discourse*, 110.

⁸⁷ Bosman and Barr, "A Critical Examination of the Concept of 'Radical Democracy'," 99.

contingent in its formation and inherently relational in its form” and “every identity is particular, constructed, and relational.”⁸⁸ He says,

[Identity is] established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized. These differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness and solidity... [Moreover,] entrenched in this indispensable relation is a second set of tendencies...to congeal established identities into fixed forms...the maintenance of one identity (or field of identities) involves the conversion of some differences into otherness, into evil, or into one of its numerous surrogates. Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.⁸⁹

Meanwhile, threat arises from the establishments of identity and otherness. As Connolly observes, identity is threatened “not merely by actions that the other might take to injure or defeat the true identity but by the very visibility of its mode of being as other.”⁹⁰ Difference and otherness constitute self-identity, and they also threaten it.

The discursive construction of national identity has not only been theoretically explored, but also empirically examined. Examining the role of the US foreign policy in constructing the American national identity, Campbell argues that identities are always contingent, relational, and “performatively constituted”.⁹¹ Viewing culture as being “composed of potentially contested codes and representations, as designating a field on which battles are fought over meaning,” Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and Duval argue that insecurity emerges in the cultural processes of identity construction and is a cultural production. They apply this theoretical assumption to a series of empirical studies of international relations.⁹² In their view, identities and insecurities emerge out of the process of representation. Moreover, in their studies, they pay attention to how statist discourse produces the state as a particular kind of subject with a particular kind of

⁸⁸ William E. Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 46.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 64.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁹¹ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 8.

⁹² Weldes, Jutta, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duval., “Introduction: Constructing Insecurity,” in Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duval, eds., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 1-33.

interest in representing their insecurity. In addition, Laclau and Mouffe's discourse analysis approach has also been applied to empirical studies on such issues as European integration, welfare, human rights, etc.⁹³

This dissertation does not take national identity as given but focuses on the discursive regime and symbolic economy underlying the vicissitude of Taiwan's national identity. Deriving upon the theoretical insights provided by the social constructionist perspective to nationalism and Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse, this dissertation examines the contestations among multiple nationalist discourses that resulted in the rise of Taiwanese national identity. This dissertation views Taiwan's status and its relations with mainland China as "a site or object of struggle where different groups strive for hegemony and the production of meaning and ideology" and attempts to analyze "the institutional bases of discourse, the viewpoints and positions from which people speak, and the power relations these allow and presuppose."⁹⁴

⁹³ David Howarth and Jacob Torfing, eds., *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).


⁹⁴ Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, *Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1991), 26.

Chapter 4. Three Nationalist Discourses and Their Representations

From a social constructionist perspective to nationalism and on the basis of Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse, we know that identity centers on the construction of social antagonism that defines boundary between inside and outside. More than that, the imagination by a community to be a nation is also crucial. For example, people in Hong Kong have a strong regional identity, but they tend not to imagine themselves as an independent nation. Many scholarly explorations on Taiwan's national identity issue define the issue solely on the basis of the unification-independence spectrum, which involves the contestation on boundary. Yet, Taiwan's national identity not only hinges on political positions on the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan, but also on political positions on Taiwan's status. That is, is the government in Taipei a national government or a local government? This is a crucial question given the fact that though both the KMT and the CCP had pursued reunification of China most of time in the last five decades, they antagonized each other on the issue of whether Taipei or Beijing was the central government of China. If someone views the ROC government in Taipei as a national government, he may not embrace the CCP's position that the PRC government is the sole legal government of China, no matter whether he is pro-independence or pro-reunification. Therefore, to outline the representations of the status of Taiwan and its relationship with mainland China by multiple nationalist discourses, I propose a two-dimensional definition of national identity to clarify various positions on Taiwan's status and its relationship with mainland China. As Figure 4.1 shows, one dimension is the reunification-independence spectrum, and the other is a local-national spectrum. The second dimension centers on whether the government on Taiwan is a national government or a local government. While the first dimension defines identity, which is related to the boundary between Taiwan and mainland China, the second dimension defines whether or not the identity is a national identity. The rectangular figures below

can not only help us describe positions more clearly, with the two dimensions of defining national identity in mind, but also help us compare different positions more effectively.

Figure 4. 1: Two-dimensional Definition of Taiwan’s National Identity



Identity politics in Taiwan has involved contestations among multiple nationalist discourses for hegemony. Generally speaking, there have been three nationalist discourses--the KMT's Chinese nationalism, the CCP's Chinese nationalism, and the Taiwanese nationalism. Each nationalist discourse has its own representations of Taiwan's status and its relationship with mainland China. The major representations include the KMT's "one China, anti-communism" representation from 1949 to the early 1990s, the KMT's "one China, two equal political entities" representation most of the time since the early 1990s, the CCP's "one China, unification" representation from 1949 to early 2000s, the CCP's "one China, status quo" representation since early 2000s, and the DPP's "Taiwan independence" representation that has existed for a long time, even since the years before the foundation of the party in 1986. These representations not only have competed with each other to shape people's imagination, but also have embodied themselves in political parties' positions, politicians' statements, and governments' policies. It is noteworthy that political parties may change their positions, and politicians may deviate from their parties' positions and change their positions across time. For example, Lee Teng-hui, President of the ROC and Chairman of the KMT in the 1990s, actually moved his


position from “one China, two equal political entities” representation to “Taiwan independence” representation. In the mean time, the DPP also adjusted its position, from aiming at establishing a Republic of Taiwan in early 1990s to claiming that Taiwan is an independent country and its national designation is the Republic of China in late 1990s. This chapter will outline three nationalist discourses and their five representations. In this chapter, I focus more on the representations upheld by political elites and parties. This does not mean that I embrace an instrumentalist, or top-down, view about the political construction of national identity. Instead, I believe that the nationalist discourses have embodied in the minds and practices of both political elites and the general populace. This is particularly evident in the case of Taiwanese nationalism.

1. The KMT's Chinese nationalism

After being Japan's colony for fifty years, Taiwan was returned to the ROC in 1945, in accordance with the arrangement made by the major powers before the end of World War II.⁹⁵ Four years later, the KMT regime, or the government of the ROC, was defeated by the CCP in the Chinese civil war and retreated to Taiwan. From the late 1940s to the early 1990s, the KMT had exerted an authoritarian rule on Taiwan and a few islands off the mainland's coast under the formal designation of the “Republic of China,” claiming to be the sole legal government of all China. The irredentist KMT regime under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and, after he died in 1975, his son Chiang Ching-kuo, developed Taiwan as an anti-communist base, aspiring to recover the mainland from the “communist bandits” (*gongfei*). At the same time, the KMT imposed Chinese national identity on Taiwan by “re-Sinicizing” the Japanized Taiwanese through a series of legal, educational, and cultural measures. The KMT represented Taiwan's relationship with mainland China with a “one China, anti-communism” representation, which included two aspects: first, it claimed that Taiwan was a province of China; and second, more importantly, it transformed Taiwan into the seat of the ROC state architecture. The “one China, anti-communism” representation can be captured by Figure 4.2.

⁹⁵ See the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation.

Figure 4. 2: The KMT’s “One China, Anti-communism” Representation of Taiwan and Mainland China



1. Taiwan as a province

The KMT insisted that there is only one China and Taiwan is a province of China. Though the island of Taiwan was most of the territory that the KMT controlled, the KMT retained the provincial government of Taiwan with its governor appointed by the central government. In order to impose Chinese national identity among the people on Taiwan, particularly among those who have lived under the Japanese rule for fifty years, the KMT adopted a series of cultural policies: banning the use of Japanese, making Mandarin the national language, renaming streets after places on the mainland, imbuing into the minds of young generations respect for national symbols such as the national flag, national anthem, and national designation of the ROC, cultivating personal cult for national leaders such as Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, etc.⁹⁶ As a result, in the KMT’s public discourse, Taiwan, together with Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, and the mainland, was part of the territory of China, and Taiwanese were part of the Chinese nation. A Taiwanese identity was only a local identity. In fact, the term “Taiwanese” (*Taiwanren*) before the early 1990s was used to mainly refer to those whose place of origin was the Taiwan

⁹⁶ Christopher Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 29-30.

province. They were mainly comprised of Polynesian aboriginals (who made up about 2-5 percent of Taiwan's population and had lived in Taiwan probably since the seventh century), *hoklo* (who made up about 65 percent of the population and whose ancestors migrated from southern Fujian Province on the mainland to Taiwan in the late Ming Dynasty and the Qing Dynasty around the seventeenth century), and *hakka* (who made up about 15-20 percent of the population and whose ancestors migrated from northeastern Guangdong Province on the mainland to Taiwan around the same time). They were also called *benshengren* (literally meaning people from this province). The term "Taiwanese" was sometimes also used narrowly to refer to only *hoklo*. As a contrast of the term "*benshengren*," those people who themselves or whose ancestors migrated from the mainland to Taiwan following the KMT regime after 1945 were called *waishengren* (literally meaning people from other provinces). They made up about 15 percent of Taiwan's population.

2. Taiwan as the seat of the state of China

The KMT brought the state architecture of the Republic of China to Taiwan and made the latter the seat of the state of China. The KMT claimed that the ROC government was the sole legal government of all of China including Taiwan and the mainland and the CCP was a rebellion group who temporarily controlled the mainland. From 1949 to the early 1990s, the KMT imposed Chinese nationalism on Taiwan and set "recovering the mainland" as its top mission. To sustain its claim to be the sole legal government of China, the KMT adopted a number of measures covering legal devices, diplomacy, social structure, etc.

First, the legality of the KMT's ruling rested on the ROC Constitution designed for the whole China and passed on 25 December 1946 plus the Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion passed by the first meeting of the ROC National Assembly in April 1948. The Temporary Provisions suspended the full implementation of the democratic procedures stipulated in the Constitution. Instead, it gave the president Chiang Kai-shek great power, including the power to activate martial

law. Martial law was activated on Taiwan by emergency decree in May 1949.⁹⁷ Moreover, since Taiwan was only a province of the ROC and elections could not be held on the mainland, the representatives (National Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan) at the central level elected on the mainland in 1947 and 1948 were frozen in office until reunification of China.⁹⁸ As a result, as long as the KMT claimed to be the sole legal government of China and pursued the project of “recovering the mainland,” it had constitutional legitimacy (*fatong*) for its authoritarian ruling.

Second, thanks to the US support, the KMT regime managed to retain the ROC’s seat in the United Nations and its Security Council, which enabled the KMT to continue to act as the representative of China in international arena until 1971, when the ROC was forced to withdraw from the UN and the seat of China was transferred to the PRC. Meanwhile, before 1971, the majority of countries in the world recognized the ROC as the government of China and had diplomatic relations with it.

Third, the KMT classified the population in Taiwan into *benshengren* (aboriginals, *hoklo* and *hakka*) and *waishengren*, with the latter dominating the government, educational institutions, state-run enterprises, army, media, etc. It was supposed that *waishengren* lived in Taiwan only temporarily and that they would return to their homes after the recovering of the mainland. Moreover, since *waishengren* were from many provinces of the mainland, they had significant symbolic meaning that could support the KMT regime’s claim to represent all of China. As a result, the proportion of *waishengren* in the government and the public sector was much higher than their proportion in the population. The project of “recovering the mainland” helped to silence the resistance of *benshengren* towards *waishengren*’s privilege in the government. Though making up the majority of the population under the KMT’s ruling, *benshengren* were perceived to be a small part of the Chinese nation.

⁹⁷ See Tien, Hung-mao, *The Great Transition* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution 1989), 110; and Tsang, “Transforming a party-state to a democracy,” 8.

⁹⁸ Christopher Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 26-27.

As the KMT regime emphasized its representation for the whole China and promoted a Chinese high culture in Taiwan, many local Taiwanese cultural elements were marginalized. For example, using *Minnan* dialect in schools was banned. Popular folk dramas, stories, puppet shows and operas were repeatedly refused to broadcast.⁹⁹ Actually, Taiwan's local *hoklo* and *hakka* cultures were very "Chinese", sharing many characteristics with the cultures in southern Fujian Province and northeastern Guangdong Province. The relations of power involved in the suppression of local Taiwanese culture indicated that the so-called "Chineseness" is contingent and contested.

In general, the KMT brought the state architecture of ROC to Taiwan and made the latter a temporary seat of the state of China. Since it was widely accepted that Taiwan was part of the Republic of China, people in Taiwan were supposed to embrace their national identity as Chinese. The ROC state architecture in Taipei was supposed to represent not only the Taiwan Island, but also other territories including the vast mainland. Since the seating of the ROC state architecture in Taiwan was supposed to be temporary, many *benshengren* were convinced to accept the situation that they were under-represented in political institutions and their culture was marginalized, though many *benshengren* elites felt alienated from the KMT regime. Moreover, since Taiwan was the seat of the state of China, the Chinese national identity was by no means elusive to people on Taiwan.

3. The anti-communist feature of Taiwan's Chinese national identity

The KMT not only imposed a Chinese national identity among all people in Taiwan, but also emphasized the notion that since people on the Chinese mainland were controlled and repressed by the "communist bandits," people on Taiwan were the "authentic" representatives of the Chinese nation. The Chinese national identity imposed by the KMT regime was conditioned by its anti-communism and the semi-Chineseness of the PRC. The KMT's Chinese nationalist discourse was characterized by the logic of difference between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

⁹⁹ Wei-ming Tu, "Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan," in David Shambaugh, ed., *Contemporary Taiwan* (Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks, 1998), 89.

First, in keeping with its claim to be the sole legal government of China, the KMT regime constructed the image that the Chinese communists were collaborating with foreign powers and doing harm to the Chinese nation. In the first years after the PRC was founded on October 1, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek labeled it as a puppet controlled by the Soviet Union, similar to Manchuria that the Japanese established after militarily invading northeastern China and the Wang Jingwei regime in Nanjing that collaborated with the Japanese aggressors in World War II. In his “A Message to All Military and Civilian Countrymen” (*gao quanguo junmin tongbao shu*) issued on the ROC’s national day (October 10) of 1949, Chiang said, “The military rebellion by the Chinese communist bandits is not to fight for political power and to overthrow our nation’s government, but to exterminate our nation under the order of Russia. Therefore, the means that it employs are the same as those by which Russia annexed the Eastern European countries.”¹⁰⁰ He further said,

Fellow countrymen! If Russia conquers all of our China, this will be like tiger that has grown wings with its might redoubled, and the whole human being will never have peace. If Mao Zedong and Zhu De, leaders of the bandits, hand over all of our China to Russia, this will be like playing a jackal to the tiger to help the villain do evil, and one quarter of the world’s population will be imprisoned under the black curtain and be slaves for Russia, without any hope to stand up in the future... At this critical juncture of life-and-death importance, only by wiping out the communists completely and resisting Russia determinedly can our countrymen nationwide save the nation and ourselves.¹⁰¹

In this way, the Chinese civil war between the CCP and the KMT was described by Chiang Kai-shek as a war against the Russian aggression. While Mao Zedong declared at the founding of the PRC that “the Chinese people have stood up,” Chiang described the founding of the PRC as the Chinese danger of being imprisoned by the Russians “without any hope to stand up in the future.” This way of description also reminded Chinese people of the history that Chiang led the Chinese people to fight the Japanese in 1937-1945. Later, Chiang Kai-shek also said, “The Russian imperialists and their puppet Mao

¹⁰⁰ Chiang Kai-shek, “Guoqing jianghua (1949) [National Day Message (1949)],” in You Zixiang, ed., *Lingxiu de Shengyin: Liangan Lingdaoren Zhongyao Yanjiang Xuanji, 1906-2006* [*Leaders’ Voices: 100 Significant Political Speeches by Leaders of China and Taiwan, 1906-2006*] (Taipei: Wunan Tushu Chuban Gufen Youxian Gongsi, 2006), 335.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 337, translated from Chinese by the author.

Zedong and Zhu De bandits, who are strangling the life of our Chinese nation, exterminating the culture of our Chinese nation, and destroying the moral ethic of our Chinese nation, are the single enemy of our Chinese nation.”¹⁰² To create a contrast to the communist mainland, Chiang Kai-shek declared to implement the Three Principles of the People on Taiwan and build it into a “model province of the Three Principles of the People” (*sanminzhuyi mofan sheng*).¹⁰³ By defining the Chinese communists and Russia as the enemy of the Chinese nation and the people on Taiwan as the preserver of the Chinese culture and morality as well as the salvation army of the Chinese nation, Chiang constructed the former as the Other and the latter as the authentic representative of the Chinese nation.

After the disputes between the CCP and the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the KMT replaced Russia with communism in its public discourse and continued to construct the Chinese communists (or the PRC) as “evil bandits” (*jianfei*) harming the Chinese nation and destroying the Chinese culture. By identifying the CCP as “bandits,” the KMT identified itself as “the Han” (the orthodoxy). That is, though the KMT regime controlled only a small part of China’s territory, it was the orthodoxy that defended “Chineseness” against communism. Contrasting to the CCP’s purging traditional Chinese cultural elements on the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek argued that “the main issue of constructing Taiwan is how to make Taiwan the center for national cultural tradition.”¹⁰⁴ Particularly, in the same year as Mao launched the “Cultural Revolution” in 1966, Chiang launched the “Cultural Revival Movement” (*wenhua fuxing yundong*) in Taiwan, signaling that the ROC was the cultural orthodoxy (*daotong*) of China. As Chiang said in 1972, “Today, we and the communist bandits have formed a strong, sharp opposition between right and wrong, good and evil, reality and illusion, solidarity and

¹⁰² Chiang Kai-shek, “Dierren Zongtong Jiuzhi Yanjiang (1954) [The Second Presidential Inaugural Speech (1954)],” in You Zixiang, ed., *Lingxiu de Shengyin: Liangan Lingdaoren Zhongyao Yanjiang Xuanji, 1906-2006* [*Leaders’ Voices: 100 Significant Political Speeches by Leaders of China and Taiwan, 1906-2006*](Taipei: Wunan Tushu Chuban Gufen Youxian Gongsi, 2006), 341, translated by the author from Chinese.

¹⁰³ The Three principles of the People were proposed by Sun Yat-sen, referring to nationalism, democracy, and the people’s well-being.

¹⁰⁴ Chiang Kai-shek, “Disanren Zongtong Jiuzhi Yanjiang (1960) [The Third Presidential Inaugural Speech (1960)],” in You Zixiang, ed., *Lingxiu de Shengyin: Liangan Lingdaoren Zhongyao Yanjiang Xuanji, 1906-2006* [*Leaders’ Voices: 100 Significant Political Speeches by Leaders of China and Taiwan, 1906-2006*](Taipei: Wunan Tushu Chuban Gufen Youxian Gongsi, 2006), 349, translated by the author from Chinese.

division!”¹⁰⁵ For Chiang, the conflicts between the “Han” and the “bandits” were irreconcilable (*han zei bu liang li*). Therefore, when the PRC was accepted as the representative for China in the UN, the KMT did not seek to retain a seat in the organization, so as not to create the coexistence of “two Chinas” in international society.

According to the logic of equivalence proposed by Laclau and Mouffe, the threat from the CCP and the ROC mission to recover the mainland helped to construct a homogeneous Chinese national identity among people on Taiwan. In the KMT’s Chinese nationalist discourse, the Chinese nation (*zhonghua minzu*) and anti-communism were two nodal points. In order to construct the narrative that the KMT was the sole legal representative for China and the defender of the Chinese nation, the KMT employed the logic of difference heavily. It excluded the fact that the PRC was the Chinese government that was ruling most of the Chinese people. At the same time, the equivalential signifying chain is expanded inside Taiwan. The stronger the cross-Strait antagonism was, the stronger the logic of equivalence inside Taiwan was. As Wei-ming Tu, a Harvard Confucian philosopher who has experienced Taiwan of the 1950s-1960s, writes,

The rhetoric of launching a counter-attack against the Communist bandits was greatly reinforced by the propaganda machine of a totalistic state which became particularly intolerant after the Lei Chan Incident (1960) and assertive in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward in the PRC in the early 1960s. This was compounded by an international anti-Communist league supported by the United States. Ironically, the slogan “millions of people all of one mind” (*wanzhong-yixin*) tellingly captured the spirit of the time. If anything remotely resembled the “common life community” which is currently evoked in Taiwanese political parlance, it was the sense of “togetherness,” a sort of artificially constructed “lifeboat” mentality forged by the KMT at the height of its dictatorial power.¹⁰⁶

Ironically, by constructing the Chinese communists on the mainland as a threat, Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT regime lay a foundation for an imagined community of

¹⁰⁵ Chiang Kai-shek, “Yuandan Jianghua (1972a) [New Year’s Day Speech (1972a)],” in You Zixiang, ed., *Lingxiu de Shengyin: Liangan Lingdaoren Zhongyao Yanjiang Xuanji, 1906-2006* [Leaders’ Voices: 100 Significant Political Speeches by Leaders of China and Taiwan, 1906-2006](Taipei: Wunan Tushu Chuban Gufen Youxian Gongsi, 2006), 356.

¹⁰⁶ Wei-ming Tu, “Cultural identity and the politics of recognition in contemporary Taiwan,” in David Shambaugh, ed., *Contemporary Taiwan* (Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks, 1998), 78-79.

the “Republic of China on Taiwan” that Taiwanese nationalists have strived for.¹⁰⁷ The KMT regime brought the ROC state architecture to Taiwan and provided people on Taiwan with the imagination as an independent state, which partly accomplished the task of state-building for Taiwan. On the one hand, Taiwan was imagined not only as a province of China, but also as the seat of the state of China, which distinguished itself from an ordinary province of China. For example, while people in Taiwan often use the word “all of China” (*quan zhongguo*) to refer to both the mainland and Taiwan together, they often used the word “national” (*quanguo*, literally meaning the whole nation) to refer to people living in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. This implied that even people of the Taiwan area alone could be viewed as the whole nation, or at least representing the whole nation. On the other hand, the antagonism between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait became a defining feature of the national imagination of people in Taiwan. As a result, when mainland China reclaimed its Chinese identity and Beijing was regarded as the representative of the Chinese nation after the 1970s, many people in Taiwan would rather imagine Taiwan as an independent state than a renegade province of China. This was more so when these two options was described as a dichotomy in the 2000s.

4. The “one China, anti-communism” representation of Taiwan in crisis

Since the early 1970s, the KMT’s “one China, anti-communism” representation had faced series challenges. The international society increasingly switched its recognition from the ROC to the PRC. Moreover, since the late 1970s, the CCP has decreased the importance of communism in its ideology, and mainland China re-embraced traditional Chinese culture. As a result, the KMT’s “one China, anti-communism,” which was conditioned by the semi-Chineseness of mainland China, was in crisis. In this situation, Taiwan had two options, either to reposition, or to create new difference from the negative threat so as to continue to partially stabilize its identity. The KMT did both.

¹⁰⁷ Françoise Mengin, “State and Identity,” in Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien, eds., *Democratization in Taiwan* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1999), 118.

First, after the ROC was forced to withdraw from the UN in 1971, the KMT regime increasingly incorporated local Taiwanese population into the party and the government to localize (*bentuhua*) the ROC regime. As Tien Hung-mao says, “The party leadership has been compelled by the disheartening diplomatic events to undertake measures for the purpose of fortify internal solidarity and to pacify discontented Taiwanese.”¹⁰⁸

Second, after the ROC was derecognized by the United States in 1979 and when the hope of Chinese reunification under the terms set by the KMT became more and more elusive, the KMT then led by Chiang Ching-kuo advocated the slogan of “Reunifying China under the Three Principles of the People” (*sanmin zhuyi tongyi zhongguo*), transforming the project of reunifying China by military means into a competition of political and social systems between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. This slogan not only continued the constitutional legitimacy of ROC and the project of “recovering the mainland,” but also focused the politics on Taiwan as the base for implementation of the Three Principles of the People.

Both the localization of the ROC regime and the focus on politics on Taiwan to some extent marked the adjustment of the KMT’s position. The measure political liberalization and democratization mentioned below marked the KMT’s efforts to create further difference between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Third, in the mid-1980s when Chiang Ching-kuo started the process of political liberalization and democratization, the PRC factor should be one of his concerns. At least back in the early 1980s, Chiang had decided to democratize Taiwan sooner or later.¹⁰⁹ As Chiang Ching-kuo said in 1981, “Especially today when the communist bandit regime is near the end of its road, with its vile reputation known to everyone, and the communist system has been proven a total failure...it is more important than ever for us to strengthen the construction of constitutional government to demonstrate clearly that the strong contrast between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is basically due to the fact that one

¹⁰⁸ Hung-mao, Tien, “Taiwan in Transition: Prospects for Social-Political Change,” *China Quarterly* no. 64 (1975), 617.

¹⁰⁹ See James Lilley, “Recent Developments in China,” May 6, 2004, <<http://user688038.wx13.registeredsite.com/speech/pre%20sept%2004%20speeches/lilley%202004.htm>>.

side has implemented a constitution based on the Three People's Principles while the other has not."¹¹⁰ Here, on the one hand, Chiang Ching-kuo continued to articulate the antagonism between the sides of the Taiwan Strait, with Taiwan as a success of the Three People's Principles, and the mainland as a "total failure" of communism. On the other hand, an important goal underlying Chiang Ching-kuo's policies was to build a "strong contrast between the sides." Taiwan's Chinese self-identity depended on its difference from mainland China, and the KMT felt pressure to create more difference when mainland China receded from its communist experiment and re-Sinicized itself.¹¹¹ Chiang Ching-kuo launched the process of political liberation in his late years, appointing a task force of Central Standing Committee members to propose measures of political reform in early 1986, tolerating the foundation of the DPP in September 1986, lifting the martial law that had been effective for 38 years in July 1987, and lifting bans on publishing new newspapers and forming new parties in January 1988. Since then, Taiwan has experienced a gradual process of democratization, and it held its first direct presidential election in 1996.

Fourth, in the early 1990s, the KMT further repositioned by abandoning its long-held "one China, anti-communism" representation and adopting a "one China, two equal political entities" representation. When Chiang Ching-kuo died and Lee Teng-hui took office as President of the ROC in 1988, Taipei's hope of recovering the mainland had become elusive, and its claim to be the sole legal government of China had lost its persuasiveness. As mentioned before, the legitimacy of the KMT's authoritarian ruling depended on the Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion, the project of recovering the mainland, and the international recognition that Taipei is the sole legal government of China. These factors, together with the communism on the mainland, were key elements of the state-deployed "one China, anti-

¹¹⁰ Chiang, Ching-kuo, *Jiang Zongtong Jingguo Xiansheng Xianzheng Yanlunji* [President Chiang Ching-kuo's Statements on Constitutional Government] (Taipei: Guomin Dahui Mishu Chu [Taipei: The Secretary Office of the National Assembly]), quoted in Andrew Nathan and Helena V.S. Ho, "The Decision for Reform in Taiwan," in Andrew Nathan, *China's Transition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 96.

¹¹¹ In this dissertation, I use the term "re-Sinicization" and "de-Sinicization" with an assumption that there is no essence of "Sinicization," and the content of "Sinicization" is contingent and dynamic. Generally, from the perspective of the KMT's Chinese nationalism, "Sinicization" implies embracing of Chinese traditional culture.

communism” representation. When the democratization process started, these elements were no longer necessary for the KMT. Moreover, in order to accomplish democratization, Lee was determined to demarcate a political community centering on Taiwan and further Taiwanize the KMT and the ROC regime. With the abolition of the Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion in April 22, 1991, Taipei decided to no longer challenge the CCP’s rule on the mainland. As a result of the ending of the cross-Strait struggles on who to represent China and the growth of cross-Strait economic and cultural exchanges, the “one China, anti-communism” representation was phased out rapidly.

5. The KMT’s “one China, two equal political entities” representation of China

The KMT gradually changed to represent Taiwan’s status and its relationship with the mainland as “one China, two equal political entities.” While insisting on the “one-China principle” that both the mainland and Taiwan are parts of China, the KMT viewed the Chinese mainland and Taiwan as two “political entities of equal status.” The KMT no longer viewed mainland China as a “rebel group,” but recognized it as a “political entity” more or less on an equal footing with the Republic of China on Taiwan.¹¹² With the redefinition of cross-Strait relations, the “one China” principle changed its role from a battlefield for the KMT and the CPP to compete for right to represent China to the key common ground between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

On August 1, 1992, the National Unification Council of the ROC adopted a One-China Resolution. This resolution stated:


Both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is only one China. However, the two sides of the Strait have different opinions as to the meaning of “one China.” To Peking, “one China” means the People’s Republic of China (PRC), with Taiwan to become a “Special Administration Region” after unification. Taipei, on the other hand, considers “one China” to mean the Republic of China (ROC), founded in 1911 and with de jure sovereignty over all of China. The ROC, however, currently has jurisdiction only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and

¹¹² Chi Su, “Driving Forces behind Taiwan’s Mainland Policy,” in Steve Tsang, ed., *Peace and Security across the Taiwan Strait* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 45-76.

Matsu. Taiwan is part of China, and the Chinese mainland is part of China as well.¹¹³

This representation of the reality across the Taiwan Strait can be captured by Figure 4.3. On the one hand, while the KMT continued to embrace the idea that there is only one China whose state sovereignty covers both the mainland and Taiwan and whose formal designation is the Republic of China, it also acknowledge the other formal designation, the People’s Republic of China, for the country. On the other hand, it perceived the territory that it controlled over, including the Taiwan Island, the Penghu Archipelago, Kinmen and Matsu, and some other islands as a relatively integrated and independent “Taiwan area,” which was the actual jurisdiction of the ROC. By recognizing the establishment of other (PRC) and stabilize the boundary between self (Taiwan) and other (the Chinese mainland), this representation provided possibility of reducing the Republic of China to Taiwan. Though Taiwan was still a local entity, it became the substance of the symbol of ROC.

Figure 4. 3: The KMT’s “One China, Two Equal Political Entities” Representation of Taiwan and Mainland China



On the reunification-independence dimension of national identity conceptualization, the KMT also adjusted its position. While it no longer challenged the CCP’s rule on the

¹¹³National Unification Council, ROC, “Guanyu ‘yige Zhongguo’ de hanyi [The Meaning of ‘One China’],” Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China, 1992, <www.mac.gov.tw>.

mainland, it designed a step-by-step path to reunification. The *Guidelines for National Unification* adopted by the ROC's National Unification Council on February 23, 1991 and by the Executive Yuan Council on March 14, 1991 upheld the "one China principle" that "both the mainland and Taiwan areas are parts of Chinese territory" and set a 3-phase process for unification.¹¹⁴

According to the *Guidelines*, in the short term, the two sides of the Strait should promote exchanges and reciprocity, and they should "establish a mutually benign relationship by not endangering each other's security and stability while in the midst of exchanges and not denying the other's existence as a political entity while in the midst of effecting reciprocity."¹¹⁵ They should also "end the state of hostility and, under the principle of one China, solve all disputes through peaceful means, and furthermore respect--not reject--each other in the international community, so as to move toward a phase of mutual trust and cooperation."¹¹⁶ This implied that both sides should recognize each other as political entities and renounce the use of force. However, in the early 1990s, mainland China still adhered to the argument that the ROC has been replaced by the PRC in 1949 and ceased to exist since then and that the KMT regime ruling Taiwan was but a local government. Mainland China also believed that if it renounced the use of force, Taiwan would declare independence and separate itself from the mainland.

The *Guidelines* also stipulated that in the medium term, both sides of the Strait should "establish official communication channels on equal footing," allow "direct postal, transport and commercial links" (*san tong*), and "assist each other in taking part in international organizations and activities." However, to prevent Taiwan independence and maintain its sovereignty claim over Taiwan, mainland China believed that allowing Taiwan to join international organizations that require members to be sovereign states would create the situation of "two Chinas."

¹¹⁴ National Unification Council, ROC. *Guidelines for National Unification*, 1991, Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China, <<http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/macpolicy/gnueng.htm>>.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

In the long term, according to the *Guidelines*, “a consultative organization for unification should be established through which both sides, in accordance with the will of the people in both the mainland and Taiwan areas, and while adhering to the goals of democracy, economic freedom, social justice and nationalization of the armed forces, jointly discuss the grand task of unification and map out a constitutional system to establish a democratic, free, and equitably prosperous China.” That is, the unification of China should be preconditioned by the democratization of both sides of the Taiwan Strait and be in accordance with the will of the people in both the mainland and Taiwan. Emphasizing democracy and freedom, the *Guidelines* differentiated Taiwan from mainland China and deferred unification to the far future. Moreover, it also paved way for the later articulation of the “popular sovereignty” (*zhuquan zaimin*) principle, which has oftentimes displaced as the principle of “self-determination” by Taiwanese nationalists.

In general, the *Guidelines for National Unification* could be a tool both to resist reunification and to pursue it. Therefore, I understand that with the “one China, two equal political entities” representation, the KMT distanced from the position of reunification. This is shown by Figure 4.3. However, since the *Guidelines* stipulated the “one China” principle that “both the mainland and Taiwan areas are parts of Chinese territory,” they were still in consistence with the KMT’s Chinese nationalism. This was why Chen Shui-bian from the DPP decided to make both the *Guidelines for National Unification* and the Council for National Unification cease to function in 2006.

In keeping with the “one China” principle, most people in Taiwan identified themselves as citizens of the Republic of China and therefore as Chinese in the early 1990s. They retained the imagination constructed under Chiangs’ rule that Taiwan is the seat of the central government of the ROC. This national imagination provided a basis for people in Taiwan to resist the PRC’s position that the government of PRC is the sole legal government of China. This resistance has been reinforced by the democratization of the ROC regime and Taipei’s setting democratization of mainland China as the precondition for holding talk about reunification between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Yet, since both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhered to the one-China principle, they held negotiations in 1992 in Hong Kong and reached the “1992 Consensus.” While mainland China tends to interpret the “1992 Consensus” as the “One-China Consensus” (*yi zhong gongshi*) --- there is only “one China” including the mainland and Taiwan, the KMT tends to call it “One China, with Respective Interpretations” (*yi zhong ge biao*) --- there is only “one China” including the mainland and Taiwan and each side would state its own definition of “one China.”¹¹⁷ The late 1980s and the early 1990s were the periods that witnessed the best relations between Taiwan and mainland China. The antagonism between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait was resolved gradually. Interestingly, these periods also witnessed the most intensive conflicts between the *benshengren*-dominated mainstream fraction and the *waishengren*-dominated non-mainstream fraction in the KMT. When the external negative threat became weakened, the signifying chains of equivalence inside Taiwan were also disrupted. To some extent, the logic of equivalence and the logic difference have substitutory effects on Taiwan’s society.

Despite the weakening of the antagonism between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in the early 1990s, Lee Teng-hui gradually changed his position and moved from the “one China, two equal political entities” representation to a “Taiwan independence” representation in the 1990s, which has brought about great changes in the self-identity of people in Taiwan.


II. The CCP’s Chinese nationalism

The CCP’s Chinese nationalist discourse centers on the “one-China principle” that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China. On the basis of this, there have been mainly two representations of Taiwan’s status and its relationship with mainland China: one is the “one China, unification” representation, the other is the “one China, status quo” representation. The former has been dominant in the PRC’s public discourse before the early 2000s, and the latter is increasingly asserted in recent years. However, these two representations have generally coexisted: even though the “one China, status quo” representation is increasingly embraced by officials and the populace in mainland China,

¹¹⁷ See Chi Su, “Driving Forces behind Taiwan’s Mainland Policy.”

the “one China, unification” representation is still prevalent. Particularly, the CCP tends to act in accordance with the “one China, unification” representation in the field of diplomacy when dealing with other countries, whereas it acts in accordance with the “one China, status quo” representation when dealing with Taiwan’s opposition parties.

Figure 4. 4: The CCP’s “One China, Unification” Representation of Taiwan and Mainland China



1. The CCP’s “one China, unification” representation

The “one China, unification” representation can be best captured by the statement that “there is only one China on the world, Taiwan is part of China, and the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China.”¹¹⁸ When establishing diplomatic relations with other countries, Beijing usually insists on putting this statement or words of similar meaning in the communiqués. Beijing also insists that Taiwan cannot join international organizations that require members to be sovereign states. Beijing emphasizes that the Taiwan issue is China’s internal affairs and opposes any foreign countries for interfering with it. The CCP’s “one China, unification” representation can be shown by Figure 4.4.

¹¹⁸ For examples of its appearance in diplomatic documents, see *The Joint Communiqué between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (Shanghai Communiqué)*, 28 February 1972, <<http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-us/26012.htm>>; *the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China*, 1 January 1979, <<http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-us/26243.htm>>; and *the Joint Communiqué between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America (China-US August 17 Communiqué)*, 17 August 1981, <<http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-us/26244.htm>>.

First, similar to the KMT's "one China, anti-communism" representation, the CCP's "one China, unification" representation argues that Taiwan is part of China and Taiwanese is a local identity. China's 1993 white paper *The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China* argues that "Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times" and "Chinese governments of different periods set up administrative bodies to exercise jurisdiction over Taiwan."¹¹⁹ Mainland China traced the written account of Taiwan to Shen Ying of the period of Three Kingdoms 1700 years ago and traced the Chinese government's administration over Taiwan to the Song Dynasty in the mid-twelfth century.¹²⁰ From Beijing's perspective, the PRC has been the successor of all the past dynasties including the Yuan dynasty in which Han Chinese were ruled by Mongolians and the Qing dynasty in which Han Chinese were ruled by Manchurians. This dynasty-styled conceptualization of history is crucial to the construction of continuity of the Chinese history.

The CCP interprets the Taiwan issue in the context of the Chinese modern history of humiliation, division, and sadness, and views the reunification between Taiwan and mainland as a way to the revival of the Chinese nation. The 1993 white paper says:

The modern history of China was a record of subjection to aggression, dismemberment and Humiliation by foreign powers. It was also a chronicle of the Chinese people's valiant struggles for national independence and in defense of their state sovereignty, territorial integrity and national dignity. The origin and evolution of the Taiwan question are closely linked with that period of history.¹²¹

From Beijing's perspective, the origin of the Taiwan question was foreign interference, particularly the US's sending the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait in 1950 and signing a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan in 1954. The U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan, though very ambiguously worded in its Taiwan Relations Act passed in 1979, is another example. This narrative implies that the KMT regime has been a collaborator with foreign powers to obstacle the great cause of the reunification of China.

¹¹⁹ Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, PRC, *The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China* (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 1993), <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=WhitePaper&title=White%20Papers%20On%20Taiwan%20Issue&m_id=3>.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

Nonetheless, the ROC in the 1990s tended to refute Beijing's interpretation by attributing the state of non-unification of China to mainland China's non-democracy and economic backwardness. Taipei's White Paper on Relations across the Taiwan Straits issued in 1994 says,

The fundamental reason why China cannot be unified is not, as Peking would have it, that a section of the Taiwan population wishes to separate itself from China, neither is it due to the "interference of certain foreign forces." It is that the political system and level of economic development in mainland China, and its frequent large-scale and violent power struggles, have destroyed people's confidence in the CCP regime.¹²²

On the basis of the *Guidelines for National Unification* and Taiwan's accomplishments in democratization and industrialization, Taipei tended to emphasize differences in political system and economic development between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to legitimate its de facto separation from the mainland in the 1990s. In fact, this emphasis on difference in political system was a continuation of the Chiangs' emphasizing the antagonism between the "Three Principles of the People" on Taiwan and communism on the mainland. Based on this antagonism, Taipei blamed the CCP for China's non-unification. Its 1994 white paper says, "The crux of the problem thus lies with no one else but the CCP regime itself. This is why the ROC government has repeatedly insisted that 'there is no Taiwan problem, only a China problem.'"¹²³

Second, the greatest difference between the CCP's "one China, unification" representation and the KMT's "one China, anti-communism" representation is that the former emphasizes that the PRC is a succession, rather than secession, of the ROC. It argues that as the PRC was founded in 1949, it succeeded the ROC as the government of China and inherited all the territory of China. As the white paper *The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue* issued by the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council of the PRC on February 21, 2000 says,

On 1st October, 1949, the central people's government of the PRC was proclaimed, replacing the government of the Republic of China to become the

¹²² Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, "Relations across the Taiwan Straits," (5 July 1994).

¹²³ Ibid.

only legal government of the whole of China and its sole legal representative in the international arena, thereby bringing the historical status of the Republic of China to an end. This is a replacement of the old regime by a new one in a situation where the main bodies of the same international laws have not changed and China's sovereignty and inherent territory have not changed therefrom, and so the government of the PRC naturally should fully enjoy and exercise China's sovereignty, including its sovereignty over Taiwan.

Since the KMT ruling clique retreated to Taiwan, although its regime has continued to use the designations "Republic of China" and "government of the Republic of China," it has long since completely forfeited its right to exercise state sovereignty on behalf of China and, in reality, has always remained only a local authority in Chinese territory.¹²⁴

This representation of Taiwan's status excludes the existence of the ROC regime after 1949. From Beijing's perspective, the ROC has lost its statehood since 1949, even though it retained China's seat in the UN as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council till 1971. As a result of the exclusion, Beijing argues that the central government of the PRC is the only national government of China, and the national identity of people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait is Chinese. This position is shown by Figure 4.4. By emphasizing "the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government," the "one China, unification" implies that the ROC government is illegal, and that Taiwan is but a renegade provincial of China.

Third, similar to the KMT's "one China, anti-communism" representation, the CCP's "one China, unification" sets the reunification of China as the goal. Before the late 1970s, the CCP had set military attack as the primary means for unification. Since the 1980s, the CCP has pursued "peaceful reunification" between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.¹²⁵ Deng Xiaoping proposed the formula of "one country, two systems" for reunification. According to the formula, Taiwan can be a special administrative region

¹²⁴ Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, PRC, *The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue* (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2000), <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=WhitePaper&title=White%20Papers%20On%20Taiwan%20Issue&m_id=4>.

¹²⁵ See National People's Congress Standing Committee, "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," January 5, 1979, <<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ljzg/3568/t17790.htm>>; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Chairman Ye Jianying's Elaborations on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan to Motherland and Peaceful Reunification," September 30, 1981, <<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ljzg/3568/t17783.htm>>.

with its capitalist system unchanged, and it can keep its own army, “have its own administrative and legislative powers, an independent judiciary and the right of adjudication” and “run its own party, political, military, economic, financial and cultural affairs.”¹²⁶ According to the “one China, unification” representation, the relationship between the central government of the PRC and Taiwan is a center-locality relationship. The ROC central government is only a local authority. That is, the CCP refrained from agreeing on the imagination that Taiwan is the seat of the central government of the ROC and the ROC government in Taipei is a national authority. However, the CCP was willing to hold “consultations on an equal footing” with Taiwan.¹²⁷ Even back in 1992, the CCP declared, “On the premise that there is only one China, we are prepared to talk with the Taiwan authorities about any matter.”¹²⁸ Later on, Beijing argues that whether the cross-strait talks are between central and local authorities can be left aside.¹²⁹ However, for mainland China, given the size difference between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and the nearly universal acceptance of Beijing as the government of China, it was important that only Beijing can represent China in the international society.¹³⁰ Therefore, Beijing refrained from completely accepting the “one China, two equal political entities” representation. However, many people in Taiwan oppose mainland China’s “one China, unification” representation. The majority of people in Taiwan reject the formula of “one country, two systems.” To some extent, Chiang Kai-shek’s moving the ROC regime to Taiwan has provided people in Taiwan with an imagination to be a nation.

¹²⁶ For details on “one country, two systems,” see People’s Daily, “What Are the Basic Contents of the Policy of ‘Peaceful Reunification; One Country, Two Systems?’” (June 26, 2003), <<http://www.chinataiwan.org/web/webportal/W5027134/Uadmin/A5113244.html>>.

¹²⁷ See Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, PRC, “Jiang Zemin’s Eight-Point Proposal,” (January 30, 1995), <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=JiangEP&title=Jiang+Zemin%27s+Eight%2Dpoint+Proposal&m_id=3>.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ In the second “Koo Chenfu-Wang Daohan” talks held in Shanghai in 1998, mainland China’s spokesman said, “The Government of the People’s Republic of China is universally acknowledged internationally as the only legitimate government representing China. In spite of this, the two sides should still negotiate on equal footing under the principle that there is but one China. The issue of whether the talks are between central or local authorities can be left aside.” See Monte R. Bullard, “Second ‘Koo-Wang’ Talks (Shanghai) (1998),” *Strait Talk: Avoiding a Nuclear War between the U.S. and China over Taiwan*, E-book, <<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/straittalk.htm>>.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

Fourth, the CCP's Chinese nationalist discourse consists of not only linguistic representation regarding the reality of Taiwan, but also actions that is consistent with its representation. The CCP has maintained its threat that it would attack Taiwan if it declares independence. In 1995-1996, after Lee Teng-hui, President of the ROC, visited the United States, the CCP conducted a series military exercises and missile tests to deter Taiwan's seeking for international space and to warn the United States not to invite Taiwan's top leaders again. After the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Beijing deployed hundreds of missiles on its coast area facing Taiwan. The number of the missiles has been increasingly gradually. These efforts may also aim at making Beijing's threat to use force credible.

2. The CCP's "one China, status quo" representation of Taiwan and mainland China

Since the early 2000s, facing the great political changes in Taiwan (e.g. the pro-independence DPP became the ruling party, and more and more people identify themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese), the CCP gradually changed its priority from "opposing Taiwan independence, promoting unification" to "opposing independence, maintaining the status quo." As a result, a "one China, status quo" representation gradually emerged. While sharing commonality with the "one China, unification" representation in adhering to the "one China principle," the "one China, status quo" representation tends to deemphasize the PRC's monopoly in representing China.

In July-August 2000, mainland China's vice premier Qian Qichen reformulated the "one China principle." He said, "With regard to cross-Strait relations, the one China principle we stand for is that there is only one China in the world; the mainland and Taiwan all belong to one China; and China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division."¹³¹ Compared to PRC's previous representation of Taiwan that "there is but one China in the world, Taiwan is part of China, and the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China," this new representation puts

¹³¹ See Shirley A. Kan, "China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy- Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei," *CRS Report for Congress*, March 12, 2001, 65.

Taiwan on an equal footing with the mainland and emphasizes less on the dichotomy of PRC/ROC. To some extent, the “one China principle” defined as such is the bottom line that Beijing tries to defend. It is often called the “red line.” Such a statement shares a lot of commonality with the KMT’s “one China, two equal political entities” representation, and it can furnish a lot of flexibility and ambiguity for both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Qian Qichen’s reformulation of the “one China principle” was reconfirmed by Jiang Zemin, the General Secretary of the CCP, in his speech in the party’s 16th National Congress in 2002. Besides reiterating the formulation, Jiang said, “All issues concerning the question of Taiwan can be discussed on the premise of one-China principle.” Jiang further explained, “We may discuss how to end the cross-Straits hostility formally. We may also discuss the international space in which the Taiwan region may conduct economic, cultural and social activities compatible with its status, or discuss the political status of the Taiwan authorities or other issues.”¹³² In other words, under the one-China principle, Taiwan can negotiate with mainland China to challenge the zero-sum game between the symbol of PRC and the symbol of ROC and change the monopoly of PRC on representing China in international arena.

On March 4, 2005, when proposing his guidelines for the cross-Strait relations, Hu Jintao, President of the PRC, defined the status quo as: “Although the mainland and Taiwan are not yet reunified, the fact that the two sides belong to one and the same China has remained unchanged since 1949.”¹³³ He also says, “As long as the Taiwanese authority recognizes the ‘1992 Consensus’, the cross-Strait dialogue and negotiation can be resumed at once, and all issues can be talked about...Taiwan belongs to 1.3 billion Chinese including the 23 million Taiwanese compatriots. Any issue related to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity need to be collectively decided by all the 1.3 citizens of China.” The strategy that Hu Jintao employs here is inclusion and the logic of

¹³² www.chinataiwan.org.cn, “Jiang: All Cross-Straits Issues Can Be Discussed Under One-China Principle,” 2002, <<http://www.chinataiwan.org/web/webportal/W5098652/Uadmin/A5194079.html>>.

¹³³ See Monte R. Bullard, “President Hu Guidelines on Taiwan,” *Strait Talk: Avoiding a Nuclear War between the U.S. and China over Taiwan*, E-book, <<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/straittalk.htm>>. Also see Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, “Hu Jintao jiu xin xingshi xia fazhan liangan guanxi ti si dian yijian [Hu Jintao Proposes Four Points in regard to Developing cross-Strait Relations under the New Situation],” 2005, <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zyjh/zyjh0.asp?zyjh_m_id=1046>.

equivalence. By including mainland China and Taiwan under the umbrella of “one China,” Hu redefines the principle of “popular sovereignty” as the sovereignty of China belonging to 1.3 citizens of China and minimize the differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Based on this understanding, the PRC’s National People’s Congress passed an Anti-secession Law in March 14, 2005. The law reiterated the CCP’s new formulation of one-China principle and the principle that solving the Taiwan question is China’s internal affair. It also stipulates that “the state shall do its utmost with maximum sincerity to achieve a peaceful reunification” and “promote cross-Strait relations.” The Article 8 of the law states:

In the event that the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹³⁴

By legislating for the “one China” principle and stipulating that the state should employ non-peaceful means if Taiwan is separated from China, the PRC tends to free itself from the task of making credible its threat to use force to prevent Taiwan independence. Meanwhile, by making the law, Beijing also clarifies the “red line” that it defends, which is the “one China” principle. Instead of pursuing reunification with “one country, two systems,” the CCP concentrates on opposing Taiwan independence and maintaining the status quo.

On the other hand, the CCP accepted the ambiguity about the status of Taiwan and promoted cross-Strait economic exchanges and political exchanges with the KMT and other oppositional parties in Taiwan. To some extent, by representing the cross-Strait relations as “both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China,” it tried to provide space to differentiate “China” from the “People’s Republic of China.” It also provides space to change its position that “The government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China.” Rather than silencing the voice of the Republic of

¹³⁴ Monte R. Bullard, “Anti-secession Law Text,” *Strait Talk: Avoiding a Nuclear War between the U.S. and China over Taiwan*, E-book, <<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/straittalk.htm>>.


China, mainland China has acknowledged to some extent the existence of ROC government and wished to increase the persuasive power of the “one China, two equal political entities” representation.¹³⁵ The CCP’s “one China, status quo” representation can be captured by Figure 4.5. Compared to the “one China, unification” representation, the “one china, status quo” tends to replace the “People’s Republic of China” with “China” in defining national identity. This representation also shares many similarities with the KMT’s “one China, two equal political entities” representation with only some differences. First, while the “one China, two equal political entities” representation recognize both designations of China, namely “People’s Republic of China” and “Republic of China,” the “one China, status quo” representation has not clearly acknowledged the designation of “Republic of China.” Second, in international areas, the CCP still insists on single representation and the PRC’s monopoly in representing China. However, the “one China, status quo” has provided space for negotiation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. There is a possibility that in the future cross-Strait negotiation, the CCP will accept ROC to be a legal designation for China.

In general, the “one China, unification” representation equates China to the PRC and exclude the existence of the ROC government in Taiwan, leaving no space for the ROC. Moreover, it tends to ignore the fact that many people in Taiwan identify with the ROC. By squeezing the space for the ROC, the CCP’s “one China, unification” representation tended to force the people in Taiwan to either accept Taiwan to be a province of the PRC or to identify with an independent Taiwan. In contrast, the “one China, status quo” representation employed by Beijing in recent years emphasizes adherence to “one China principle,” promoting cross-Strait economic exchanges, and opposing Taiwan independence. Employing this representation, the CCP insists both mainland China and Taiwan are parts of China, but tolerates Taiwan’s imagination to be the Republic of China. In order to oppose Taiwan’s move to *de jure* independence, the

¹³⁵ According to some scholars, the change in the CCP’s position can be traced back to the reinterpretation of the “one-China principle” by Wang Daohan, top representative of mainland China’s delegate to negotiate with Taiwan, in 1998. He said that the “one-China” concept did not refer to either the ROC or the PRC, but a unified China created by the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait in the future. See Suisheng Zhao, “Chinese Nationalism and Beijing’s Taiwan Policy: A China Threat?” *Issues & Studies*, vol. 36, no. 1 (January/February 2000), 96.

CCP emphasizes preserving the status quo and tolerates ambiguity about the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan.

Figure 4. 5: The CCP’s “One China, Status Quo” Representation of Taiwan and Mainland China



However, in practice, the difference between the “one China, unification” representation and the “one China, status quo” representation is dynamic and contingent. For example, the Anti-secession Law stipulates a series of action that “the state” should take to enhance cross-Strait relations and oppose Taiwan independence. Yet, the underlying presumption, though not stated clearly, is that “the state” is the “People’s Republic of China” with Beijing as its center. Moreover, while the law states that “Taiwan is part of China,” “the state” that makes and enforce this law tend to be out of touch with people in Taiwan. While it was passed by the National People’s Congress and there were also Taiwanese representatives in the Congress, these representatives were mainly those Taiwanese who went to the mainland before 1949 or escaped the KMT regime after 1949. Some of these representatives who represented Taiwan had not set foot on Taiwan for decades.

Meanwhile, there is no clear-cut periodization of the CCP’s Taiwan policy. Currently, while the CCP employs “one China, status quo” representation in developing relations with people on Taiwan, particularly the opposition parties such as the KMT and

the People First Party, it still employs “one China, unification” representation in dealing with Taiwan’s developing diplomatic relations with other countries. It continues to require other countries to recognize the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China as well as to oppose Taiwan’s joining in intergovernmental organizations.

III. Taiwanese nationalism

Taiwanese nationalist discourse mainly centers on the claim that Taiwan is a country independent of China. This implies an independent Taiwanese national identity and the quest for Taiwan independence. The Taiwanese nationalist discourse has developed in Taiwan’s opposition movements, against the Japanese colonial rule before 1945 and the KMT authoritarian rule after 1945. The opposition movements oftentimes took the form of a Taiwan independence movement.

1. History of Taiwan independence movement

Before Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895, people in Taiwan were defined and divided according to their places of origin, with *hoklo* conflicting with *hakka*, both of them conflicting with aboriginals, and among *hoklo*, people from Zhangzhou conflicting with Quanzhou. After Taiwan became a Japanese colony, many people in Taiwan resisted Japan’s ruling, and some of them argued for more political autonomy. For example, in 1920, a group of young students studying in Tokyo began publishing a journal titled *Taiwan Seinen* (Young Taiwan). They criticized the dictatorship of Japan’s colonial government in Taiwan and called for Taiwan’s autonomy. In the 1920s, Taiwan Cultural Association was formed on the island with a mission of cultivating Taiwanese nationalism.¹³⁶ When Taiwanese Communist Party was founded, under the instruction of Comintern and Japanese Communist Party, in Shanghai in 1928, it claimed that a Taiwanese nation had been formed, and it set Taiwan’s independence from Japan as its

¹³⁶ See Ong Joktik, “A Formosan’s View of The Formosan Independence Movement,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 15 (July-September 1963), 107.

top political goal.¹³⁷ After the Manchurian Incident in 1931, Japan employed an approach of conciliation but tightened its control over Taiwan.

After Taiwan was returned to China in 1945, Taiwanese nationalism and the quest for Taiwan independence continued to develop. Immediately after Japan's defeat, some young Japanese military officials in Taiwan planned to found Taiwan Security Maintenance Commission (*Taiwan zhihan weichi hui*) and invited Taiwanese elites to participate in it. This action was intended to resist the ROC's taking over Taiwan. Though it failed eventually, it was one of the first attempts for Taiwan independence.¹³⁸

Before long, the "February 28 Incident" (1947) alienated many *benshengren's* hearts for the KMT regime. Though, at the wake of World War II, *benshengren*, who had lived as second-class citizens under the Japanese colonial rule for fifty years, had high expectation for people from the motherland, they were soon disillusioned by the corruption and harsh ruling style of the KMT, particularly by those of the Chen Yi administration appointed to Taiwan by the ROC government in Nanjing. On February 28, 1947, policemen' beating a woman tobacco peddler to implement government monopoly on tobacco with one person being killed ignited an island-wide protest against the Chen Yi government. The martial law proclaimed by Taiwan Garrison Headquarters (*Taiwan jingbei silingbu*) further kindled *benshengren's* attacks on the government and violence against *waishengren*. For a period of one week, *benshengren* took control over the entire island, except for the ROC's military bases. They founded the "Committees to Manage February 28 Affairs" (*ererba shijian chuli weiyuanhui*) and demanded for autonomy for the island.¹³⁹ The uprising was shortly cracked down by the overwhelming ROC military reinforcements from the mainland. In the aftermath of "February 28," many opposition activists went underground and joined the Communist Party.¹⁴⁰ The potential Taiwanese leadership and the Japan-educated intelligentsia either were purged or co-opted, or fled

¹³⁷ Li Yongchi, Li Qiao, Zhuang Wanshou, and Guo Yusheng, *Taiwan Zhutixing de Jiangou* [The Construction of the Taiwanese Subjectivity] (Tanshui, Taiwan: Caituan Faren Lee Teng-hui Xuxiao, 2004), 55-56.

¹³⁸ Chen Yujun, *Women shishui, Taiwan shi shenme?* [Who Are We, and What is Taiwan?] (Shanghai: Shanghai Yiwun Press, 2006), 60.

¹³⁹ Ong Joktik, "A Formosan's View of The Formosan Independence Movement," 108-109.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 109.

out of Taiwan.¹⁴¹ A group of political leaders fled to Hong Kong and issued on September 1, 1948 their petition to the United Nations to place Taiwan under UN trusteeship. After the CCP defeated the KMT on the mainland, some of them such as Hsieh Hsueh-hung went to Beijing aiming at liberating Taiwan through the CCP, and some others such as Liao Wen-yi went to Japan. Liao organized the Taiwan Democratic Independence Party in February 1950 and founded a Provisional Government in 1955 in Tokyo with himself as President.¹⁴² For decades, the “February 28” was a taboo in Taiwan’s politics under the KMT’s authoritarian rule as well as a symbol for *benshengren*’s resistance against the ROC regime and alienation from *waishengren*. The victimization created by the “February 28 Incident” among *benshengren* motivated many of them to struggle for Taiwan’s independence from the ROC regime. In Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo’s eras, facing the suppression from the KMT, Taiwan independence activists limit their activities in Japan and the United States. Many of them returned to Taiwan after activities and speeches for Taiwan independence became legal in the 1990s, particularly after the abolition of Article 100 of the Criminal Law in 1992.

In 1964, Peng Ming-min, a promising young professor of law at National Taiwan University, drafted the “Declaration of Taiwanese Self-Salvation” (*Taiwan ziji yundong xuanyan*) in which he rejected the KMT’s Chinese nationalist ideology. He and two of his students, Hsieh Cong-min and Wei Ting-chao, were promptly arrested for secretly printing the declaration. Later Peng managed to flee to the United States in 1970. He lived in exile there and did not return to Taiwan until 1991. In his 1964 declaration and his 1972 book *A Taste of Freedom*, Peng described Taiwan’s history as a process of “struggling to escape the yoke of the mainland,” and he argued that people in Taiwan should create their own states.¹⁴³ Moreover, he developed the concept of “community

¹⁴¹ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 25. A well-known narration of the “28 February Incident” has been given by George Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966). Yet, Kerr’s position has also been questioned. For example, see Chen Yujun, *Women shishui, Taiwan shi shenme?* [*Who Are We, and What is Taiwan?*], 61-62.

¹⁴² Ong Joktik, “A Formosan’s View of The Formosan Independence Movement,” 109-112.

¹⁴³ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 36.

of shared destiny” (*mingyun gongtongti*) that included all residents on Taiwan regardless of their places of origin.¹⁴⁴

Though the Taiwan independence movement had been harshly suppressed by the KMT before the early 1990s, it tended to develop by combining with the quest for democracy. While in a disadvantaged position for political participation, some *benshengren* took advantage of the elections held by the ROC to develop into an important opposition political force, *Dangwai* (literally meaning outside the Party) in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, when the ROC had to withdraw its representatives from the UN, many people participated in the discussion of the situation of the state, which provided important social conditions for the assertion of Taiwanese nationalism. As Wei-ming Tu says, “The erosion of the government’s legitimacy in the international arena and thus its effectiveness in dealing with the outside world through formal diplomatic channels empowered the society to take charge of its own fate and encouraged a new dynamism in the private sector.”¹⁴⁵ And the participation in the discussion of the situation and future of Taiwan involves many segments of the society. Even in the early 1970s, Taiwan’s Presbyterian Christian Association under the leadership of Kao Jun-ming, pronounced that “Taiwan’s future should be determined by Taiwan’s 17 million residents.”¹⁴⁶ Later on, Taiwanese nationalism provided great emotional resources for *Dangwai* to mobilize social forces to pressure the government for democracy. Typical cases of open conflicts between democratic activists and the ROC government were the Chung-li Incident in 1977 and the Formosa Incident in 1979.

On September 28, 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was founded. At its foundation, the DPP was an alliance of all forces that were opposing the KMT regime, including those who advocated ending of the authoritarian regime and those who advocated Taiwan independence as well as environmentalists, anti-nuclear activists, feminists, etc. When the party was founded, its main goal was to end the Martial Law and


¹⁴⁴ See Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 35-38 for a discussion on Peng Min-min and his ideas.

¹⁴⁵ Wei-ming Tu, “Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan,” 88.

¹⁴⁶ Wang, Liu, and Zeng, *Guomindang XiaTai Neimu* [*The Insider Truth of the KMT’s Losing Power*], 333.

advocate democracy rather than to struggle for Taiwan independence.¹⁴⁷ In 1988, the DPP passed its *April 17 Sovereign Independence Resolution (siyiqi zhuquan dili jueyiwen)* declaring that the DPP will support Taiwan independence under four conditions. Later on, with more and more Taiwan independence activists abroad returned to Taiwan, the DPP adopted its political platform that argues for Taiwan independence.

Figure 4. 6: The DPP’s “Taiwan Independence” Representation of Taiwan



2. The “Taiwan independence” representation of Taiwan

The “Taiwan independence” representation is the major representation of Taiwanese nationalism. Its basic claim is that Taiwan is not part of China but a country independent of China. Accordingly, Taiwanese is a national identity for all people living on the Taiwan Island, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu only, as indicated by Formal 4.6.¹⁴⁸ This representation argues for Taiwan independence by severing Taiwan’s relationship with mainland China and establishing a Republic of Taiwan with Taipei as the center. This

¹⁴⁷ International Crisis Group, “Taiwan Strait I: What’s Left of ‘One China’,” *Asia Report N°53*, 6 June 2003, <<http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/2003/ICG-1.pdf>>, 42.

¹⁴⁸ Some Taiwan independence activists argue that Kinmen and Matsu are not territory of Taiwan. See Huang Chao-tang, “Tuochu jicheng guojia lilun, fenlie guojia lilun lai cucheng xinsheng guojia de dansheng---Taiwan xinsheng guojia lilun [Distancing from Theory of Inherited State and Theory of Divided State to Push for the Birth of New-born State: Theory of the Taiwan New-born State],” in Zhuang Wanshou, ed., *Taiwan Duli de Lilun yu Lishi [Theory and History of Taiwan Independence]* (Taipei City: Qianwei Chubanshe, 2002), 18-19.

representation embodies in a series of arguments concerning international law, ethnicity, culture, etc.

While Chinese nationalists believe that China resumed sovereignty over Taiwan in 1945, Taiwanese nationalists claim that Taiwan is a sovereign country. The DPP's political platform says,

The fact that Taiwan is sovereign and independent, that it does not belong to the People's Republic of China, and that the sovereignty of Taiwan does not extend to mainland China, reflect historical realities as well as the present situation, and at the same time they form part of the consensus of the international community. According to this reality of sovereignty and independence, Taiwan should draw up a constitution and establish a nation.¹⁴⁹

Taiwanese nationalists define Taiwan's independence by its not belonging to the People's Republic of China. They oppose Chinese nationalisms, both the CCP's and the KMT's, and set China as the other. Accordingly, the Taiwanese national identity defined by the "Taiwan independence" is conditioned by its non-Chineseness. However, what is Taiwan's relationship with the Republic of China? Why Taiwanese nationalists proposed to "draw up a constitution and establish a nation?"

Taiwan independence activists have often drawn on the claim that the status of Taiwan was uncertain for legitimacy for Taiwan independence. They argue that Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed by Japan and the Allied Powers in San Francisco in 1951 stated that, "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Paracels."¹⁵⁰ Yet, it did not specify the recipient. Therefore, the legal status of the Taiwan is uncertain, and it should be determined on the basis of the principle of "self-determination" (*zhumin zijue*) by all its residents.¹⁵¹ Taiwanese nationalists argue that

¹⁴⁹ Democratic Progressive Party, "Platform," Democratic Progressive Party, <<http://www.dpp.org.tw/>>.

¹⁵⁰ However, in 1952, Japan and the ROC signed a separate peace treaty. Article Four of the treaty stated, "It is recognized that all treaties, conventions and agreements concluded before December 9, 1941, between China and Japan have become null and void as a consequence of the war." See Monte R. Bullard, "Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan (1952)," *Strait Talk: Avoiding a Nuclear War between the U.S. and China over Taiwan*, E-book, <<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/straittalk.htm>>. Therefore, the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ceded Taiwan to Japan should have been nullified.

¹⁵¹ For more details, see Chen Longzhi, "'Taiwan de duli yu jianguo'---faxing sanshiyi nian hou de huigu yu zhanwang ['Taiwan's Independence and State Building:'] Review and Prospect Thirty-One Years after

only people in Taiwan have the right to determine the future of Taiwan. For example, the platform of the pro-independence DPP says, “Based on the fundamental rights of the people, the establishment of a sovereign Taiwan Republic and the formation of a new constitution shall be determined by all citizens of Taiwan through a national referendum.”¹⁵² For the DPP, Taiwan independence is first and foremost to establish a Taiwan Republic and to form a new constitution through a national referendum.

For Taiwanese independence activists, in accordance with the argument that the status of Taiwan is uncertain, Taiwan is not part of the Republic of China. They argue that when the representative of the KMT regime, under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Pacific Douglas MacArthur, accepted Taiwan from Japan in 1945, Taiwan was only under the “military occupation” of the Ally, and it did not mean that the ROC has gained the sovereignty of Taiwan.¹⁵³ Furthermore, the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan also recognize Article 2 of the San Francisco Treaty.¹⁵⁴

Its Publication],” in Zhuang Wanshou, ed., *Taiwan Duli de Lilun yu Lishi [Theory and History of Taiwan Independence]* (Taipei: Qianwei Chubanshe, 2002), 49-52.

¹⁵²Democratic Progressive Party, “Platform,” Democratic Progressive Party, <<http://www.dpp.org.tw/>>.

¹⁵³ See Chen Longzhi, “‘Taiwan de duli yu jianguo’---faxing sanshiyi nian hou de huigu yu zhanwang [‘Taiwan’s Independence and State Building:’ Review and Prospect Thirty-One Years after Its Publication],” 50.

¹⁵⁴ Personally, I think the argument that Taiwan’s legal status is uncertain is based on selective interpretation and is by no means unchallengeable. In the Proclamation of China’s Declaration of War Against Japan issued in December 1941, the Chinese government announced that all treaties, agreements and contracts concerning Sino-Japanese relations, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki, had been abrogated, and that China would recover Taiwan. While Taiwanese nationalists such as Chen Longzhi tend to argue that this proclamation is unilateral and ineffective, it is noteworthy that Article IV of the Treaty of Peace between the People’s Republic of China and Japan in 1952 says, “It is recognized that all treaties, conventions and agreements concluded before December 9, 1941, between China and Japan have become null and void as a consequence of the war.” Meanwhile, Article X of the treaty says, “For the purposes of the present Treaty, nationals of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all the residents and former residents of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and their descendants who are of the Chinese nationality in accordance with the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores); and juridical persons of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all those registered under the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores).” This confirmed that all residents of Taiwan and Penghu are Chinese nationals. From the ROC perspective, the ROC had accepted Japan’s surrender based on the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation and has never forsaken the sovereignty over Taiwan and Penhu. Meanwhile, as the then representative of China in international community, it signed the treaty of peace with Japan. Even the ROC has occupied Taiwan, the occupation has been long enough to establish sovereignty. Therefore, the KMT believes that there should be no problem that Taiwan and Penghu belongs to the ROC. See Chen Yujun, *Women shishui, Taiwan shi shenme? [Who Are We, and What is Taiwan?]*, 78. From the PRC perspective, while China has fought Japan for the longest time and sacrificed the largest number of lives among all the

Taiwanese nationalists have blamed the KMT for the exclusion of Taiwan from the international society and for creating national identity problem in Taiwan by imbuing the Chinese consciousness to Taiwanese. They argue that Chiang Kai-shek's insisting on the ROC government as the sole legal government and Taiwan as a province of China has made "one China" principle widely accepted by international society. In particular, before the ROC was forced to withdraw from the United Nations in 1971, Chiang Kai-shek declined the United States and Japan's proposal that the ROC stay in the United Nations in the name of Taiwan. Taiwanese nationalists argue that had Chiang Kai-shek not decline the proposal, Taiwan would have been a member of the UN and recognition would not have been a problem for it.¹⁵⁵ Instead, Chiang Kai-shek's "one China" policy made Taiwan an "international orphan" (*guoji guer*) after 1971.¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, from the perspective of Taiwanese nationalists, decades of imposition of Chinese nationalism in Taiwan and the existence of the ROC regime in Taiwan have created confusions in national identity among people in Taiwan. The manifestation of the confusions is that a large percentage of people in Taiwan consider themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese and the majority of people in Taiwan hoped to maintain the status quo in terms of Taiwan's relationship with mainland China.¹⁵⁷ Taiwanese nationalists have also tried to replace the ROC constitution with a new constitution. For them, the ROC constitution was made when the ROC central government was still on the mainland, and its Chinese features in consistence with Chinese nationalism made it unsuitable for Taiwan's current

countries in the Ally, it was not invited to participate in the signing of the San Francisco peace treaty. The San Francisco treaty has been maneuvered by the western great powers. The PRC government has never recognized the San Francisco treaty. Furthermore, when Japan established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1971, it announced that the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan became null. The peace treaty between the PRC and Japan in 1978 states that Japan acknowledge the PRC's position that Taiwan is part of China. Therefore, Taiwan belongs to the PRC.

¹⁵⁵ For example of arguments as such, see Huang Chao-tang, "Tuochu jicheng guojia lilun, fenlie guojia lilun lai cucheng xinsheng guojia de dansheng---Taiwan xinsheng guojia lilun [Distancing from Theory of Inherited State and Theory of Divided State to Push for the Birth of New-born State: Theory of the Taiwan New-born State]," 19-20.

¹⁵⁶ Chen Longzhi, "'Taiwan de duli yu jianguo'---faxing sanshiyi nian hou de huigu yu zhanwang [Taiwan's Independence and State Building: Review and Prospect Thirty-One Years after Its Publication]," 63.

¹⁵⁷ Huang Chao-tang, "Tuochu jicheng guojia lilun, fenlie guojia lilun lai cucheng xinsheng guojia de dansheng---Taiwan xinsheng guojia lilun [Distancing from Theory of Inherited State and Theory of Divided State to Push for the Birth of New-born State: Theory of the Taiwan New-born State]," 25-28.

situation. Meanwhile, by creating a new constitution, the ROC's territory can be redefined to be only Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, and even the formal designation of Republic of China can be changed into Taiwan. In general, Taiwanese nationalists aspire to purge the influence of the KMT's Chinese nationalism and change anything that can imply Taiwan is part of China. As the political platform of the pro-independence DPP says,

But because the Kuomintang persists in using the fiction of being the “only legal government of the whole of China” and wants to continue the pompous but useless “five power constitutional system of the Republic of China,” on which it has depended for a long time to uphold its anti-democratic control and privileges. The Kuomintang's stand against the sovereignty of Taiwan has not only blocked internal constitutional reform, but has also attracted the territorial ambitions of the Chinese Communists. Going against international law and international political reality, the KMT's claim prevents Taiwan from playing a normal role in the international society. Furthermore, such a claim has damaged the national consciousness of the Taiwanese people and obstructed cultural development.

While Beijing often warned Taiwan of transforming the ROC symbolic system in line of the Taiwan independence ideology, Taiwanese nationalists believe that the ROC symbolic system gives the CCP an excuse to threaten to use force, and that, in order to stop mainland China's “linguistic attacks and military threat” (*wengong wuhe*), Taiwan should get rid of the ROC symbolic system to sever its relationship with mainland China.

3. “Taiwan independence” as a project

As Craig Calhoun points out, one of the dimensions of nationalism is that it remains project.¹⁵⁸ For Taiwanese nationalists, an independent Taiwan is a project to work on. The project of Taiwan independence involves distancing from Chineseness and constructing Taiwanesehood in political, ethnic, cultural, and other aspects.

First, Taiwanese nationalists generally argue for establishing a new nation, drawing up a new constitution, eliminating any symbols in Taiwan that may imply that Taiwan is

¹⁵⁸ Calhoun, *Nationalism*, 6.

part of China, promoting a Taiwanese national identity, and seeking international recognition for an independent Taiwan. However, as the ROC regime was democratized and Taiwanized in the 1990s, there emerged controversies among Taiwanese nationalists on how to treat the ROC regime, what the current state of Taiwan is, and how to achieve Taiwan independence.

One group of Taiwanese nationalists understands that Taiwan should be independent, and it has not been a *de jure* independent state. For them, Taiwan has achieved at most a *de facto* independence because the Republic of China on Taiwan has not received wide recognition by international society.¹⁵⁹ They argue that Taiwan should, externally, proclaim to the international society the establishment of a new state other than the Republic of China and, internally, achieve state-building and nation-formation.¹⁶⁰ Taiwan Independence Alliance tends to embrace this view. Its chairman, Huang Chao-tang, argues that both “inherited state theory” and “divided state theory” will be harmful to Taiwan, and, instead, Taiwan should use “new-born state theory” to legitimate its cause for independence.¹⁶¹ This implies that Taiwan should sever its relations with Republic of China utterly and establish a brand new state.

The other group of Taiwanese nationalists argues that Taiwan has achieved independence with the democratization and Taiwanization of the ROC in 1990s and that Taiwan can establish a new nation by transforming the symbolic system of the ROC into that of “Republic of Taiwan.” As a result, this group tends to take advantage of the ROC regime to pursue Taiwan independence. The DPP falls into this group.¹⁶² After debates on the DPP Platform, namely the Taiwan independence platform, the DPP adopted a *Resolution on Taiwan’s Future* in 1999. The Resolution states that “following the 1992

¹⁵⁹ See Shih Cheng-feng, “Taiwan minzu zhuyi de jieshi---zhengzhi mianxiang de san ge jingzhi tujing [Explanation for Taiwanese Nationalism: Three Competing Paths of Political Prospects],” in Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwanren de Minzu Rentong [Taiwanese National Identity]* (Taipei City: Qianwei Chubanshe, 2000), 45-46.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 44-54.

¹⁶¹ See Huang Chao-tang, “Tuochu jicheng guojia lilun, fenlie guojia lilun lai cucheng xinsheng guojia de dansheng---Taiwan xinsheng guojia lilun [Distancing from Theory of Inherited State and Theory of Divided State to Push for the Birth of New-born State: Theory of the Taiwan New-born State],” 11-42.

¹⁶² For more information, see Shih Cheng-feng, “Taiwan minzu zhuyi de jieshi---zhengzhi mianxiang de san ge jingzhi tujing [Explanation for Taiwanese Nationalism: Three Competing Paths of Political Prospects],” 60-64.

general elections of the National Legislature, the 1996 direct presidential elections and constitutional reform to abolish the provincial government, Taiwan has become a democratic and independent country.”¹⁶³ It also states,

Taiwan, although named the Republic of China under its current constitution, is not subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China. Any change in the independent status quo must be decided by all residents of Taiwan by means of plebiscite.¹⁶⁴

The DPP’s representation of Taiwan according to its *Resolution on Taiwan’s Future* can be illustrated by Figure 4.7. This implies that the DPP accepted the “Republic of China” as a temporary name of the independent Taiwan, and what is left for Taiwan independence is to transform the ROC nation into a Taiwan nation. Instead of embracing the ROC regime, the DPP has appropriated the title of “Republic of China” for Taiwan. For the DPP, as well as for the Taiwan Solidarity Union formed in 2001 with Lee Teng-hui as its driving force, the policy implication of Taiwan independence is to change Taiwan’s formal designation from the “Republic of China” into the “Republic of Taiwan” and create a new constitution that defines Taiwan’s territory only as Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. These can be summarized as Rectification of the Name and Creation of Constitution (*zhengming zhixian*).


Second, Taiwanese nationalists argue for rectifying Chiangs’ policies that privileged *waishengren* and for building a Taiwan-centered national imagination. Instead of distinguishing *waishengren* from *benshengren*, Taiwanese nationalists represent Taiwan as being made up of four ethnic groups--*hoklo*, *hakka*, aboriginals, and new residents (*xin zhumin*). According to this imagination, *hoklo*, who usually give Taiwanese nationalism the greatest support, is the majority group, and new residents, namely *waishengren*, form a minority group. *Benshengren* and *waishengren* were deemed to be concepts based on a person’s province of origin. They imply that Taiwan is a province of China and some people are from Taiwan province and some people are from other provinces. The underlying imagination is a China consisting of multiple provinces. In

¹⁶³ Democratic Progressive Party, *The Resolution on Taiwan’s Future*, Democratic Progressive Party, <www.dpp.org.tw>.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

contrast, *hoklo*, *hakka*, aboriginals, new residents are deemed to be concepts of ethnicity, and they imply that there are linguistic-cultural and even physical differences among the four groups. The imagination underlying these concepts is that Taiwan is a nation made up of four ethnic groups.

Figure 4. 7: The DPP’s Representation of Taiwan in Its *Resolution on Taiwan’s Future*



Waishengren’s becoming an ethnic group is a typical case of the construction of ethnicity. *Waishengren* are used to refer to people from provinces other than Taiwan. The differences among *waishengren* (for example, between those from Guangdong Province and those from northern China) in terms of biological features and language are sometimes even larger than those between some *waishengren* and *benshengren* (for example, between those from Fujian Province and *hoklo*). However, in order to construct a Taiwan-centered ethnic landscape, *waishengren* became one of the four ethnic groups. Moreover, Mandarin, which has been set by Chiang Kai-shek as the national language, is increasingly understood as the language of *waishengren* and called as “Beijing dialect” (*Beijing hua*). Again, the identification of Mandarin as the language of *waishengren* is also a construction, given the facts that *waishengren* are diverse and that people from different places speak different dialects.

Meanwhile, this reclassification of the people in Taiwan into four categories in Taiwan tends to exclude people living in Matsu. People living in Matsu speak a dialect different from *Minnan* dialect and *hakka*. So they can not be called *hoklo* or *hakka*. However, it is odd for them to be called new residents because they lived in Matsu for a long time. So the reclassification of people into four ethnic groups is Taiwan-centric.

Some Taiwanese nationalists argue that anthropological evidence showed that Taiwanese are not ethnic Chinese. They argue that the blood of *hoklo* and *hakka* have been distinct from Han Chinese because their ancestors have been intermarried with Dutch, Spanish, Han Chinese, and the aboriginals such as the *Pingpu* ethnic group.¹⁶⁵ Interestingly, by arguing that Taiwanese and Chinese have different blood, this argument transforms a *benshengren-waishengren* difference into a national difference. And for this argument to be true, *waishengren* were excluded and deprived the right to be part of the Taiwanese nation. This argument replaces an argument about Taiwan and China with an argument about *benshengren* and *waishengren*, with *waishengren* on Taiwan excluded. It also assumes that there exists a standard Chinese ethnicity and a standard Taiwanese ethnicity. Yet the Chinese identity has been defined mostly culturally rather than ethnically. No one in today's China can claim to have the most authentic Chinese blood. The argument also ignores the ethnical diversity of the Chinese nation and reduces Taiwanese to *hoklo*.

Third, the cultural policy imperative to Taiwanese nationalism is to rectify the KMT regime's imagination of Taiwanese culture as part of the Chinese culture and to construct a Taiwan-centered worldview. Along with the political liberalization, Taiwan's local cultural elements such as local operas, folk religion, and so on have experienced revivals. Politicians often attempt to move closer to voters by speaking *Minnan* dialect and *hakka* dialect. To construct a Taiwan-centered worldview, Taiwanese nationalists tend to expand the logic of difference and overstate the difference between Taiwan and mainland China. For example, some Taiwanese nationalists claim that Taiwan's culture is an

¹⁶⁵ Wei-ming Tu mentioned this in his article about Taiwanese consciousness and identity. See Weijing Tu, "Cultural identity and the politics of recognition in contemporary Taiwan," in David Shambaugh, ed., *Contemporary Taiwan* (Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks, 1998), 71-96. Also see Shaw, "Modulations of Nationalism across the Taiwan Strait," 127.

oceanic culture (*haiyang wenhua*) or island culture (*daoyuxing wenhua*), and China's culture is a continental culture (*dalu wenhua*), with the former being open and progressive and the latter close and stagnant. In a book titled *Constructing Taiwan's Subjectivity* published by the Lee Teng-hui School, the authors says,

Taiwan's location as an island has been the main reason that Taiwan has not been annexed by China since antiquity. Taiwan's location in the ocean has made it to escape the domination of multiple powers. The fixed space as an island is why the nations have to identify with Taiwan as a place where their bodies and lives can reside. Taiwan's natural climate and landscape is the mother that has molded Taiwan's culture. Therefore, Taiwan's subjectivity is based on Taiwan's geographic space as the subjective precondition, and Taiwan's cultural subjectivity develops from here.¹⁶⁶

In general, Taiwanese nationalists tend to define Taiwan's status by excluding China. By emphasizing Taiwan as an island separate from the mainland, they tend to minimize the fact that 98 percent of Taiwan's population are Han Chinese who themselves or ancestors migrating from the mainland and the culture of *hoklo* is little different from the culture in southern Fujian Province. For many Taiwanese nationalists, Taiwan's cultural policy should serve the purpose of emphasizing Taiwan as an independent country. Thus, radical Taiwanese nationalism implies eliminating any Chinese cultural elements that imply, directly or indirectly, Taiwan is part of China. This is often referred to as "de-Sinicization" (*qu zhongguohua*).

¹⁶⁶ Li Yongchi, Li Qiao, Zhuang Wanshou, and Guo Yusheng, *Taiwan Zhutixing de Jiangou* [*The Construction of Taiwanese Subjectivity*] (Tanshui, Taiwan: Caituan Faren Lee Teng-hui Xuexiao, 2004), 55.

Chapter 5. The Rise of Taiwanese National Identity

I. Multiple levels of meaning of Taiwan

Taiwan is a word that has been used in various occasions that people hardly notice that the same word can refer to different things. Even if we narrow our scope to the geographical meaning of Taiwan, we can still outline three levels of territory that can be called Taiwan.

First, the term of Taiwan can be used to refer to the area that the ROC regime controlled over since 1950. In this case, Taiwan covers the Taiwan Island, the Penghu (Pescadores) Archipelago, Kinmen, Matsu, and their affiliated islands. Before the early 1990s, this meaning was mainly used by actors outside Taiwan such as mainland China and the United States. In the PRC's position that "there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China," Taiwan should be used to refer to all the area controlled by the ROC regime.¹⁶⁷ Since Beijing believes that the PRC has succeeded the ROC and the latter no longer exists, it almost always uses Taiwan to refer to the area that the ROC controls. Oftentimes, the term opposite to this meaning of Taiwan is the mainland (*dalu*). In the title and text of the United States' Taiwan Relations Act, Taiwan also refers to the areas controlled by the ROC regime.¹⁶⁸ However, it is noteworthy that the United States oftentimes does not consider Kinmen and Matsu as part of Taiwan, or is ambiguous about

¹⁶⁷ *The Joint Communiqué between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China (Shanghai Communiqué)*, 28 February 1972, <<http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-us/26012.htm>>; *the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China*, 1 January 1979, <<http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-us/26243.htm>>; and *the Joint Communiqué between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America (China-US August 17 Communiqué)*, 17 August 1981, <<http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-us/26244.htm>>.

¹⁶⁸ See *Taiwan Relations Act*, Public Law 96-8, 222 U.S. Code, secs. 3301-3316, 10 April 1979, <<http://www.taiwandocuments.org/tra01.htm#3301>>. Section 2(b)(4)-(6) of the Taiwan Relations Act states, "It is the policy of the United States...(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; (5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and (6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."

it.¹⁶⁹ Since the early 1990s, the ROC government also increasingly used “Taiwan” to refer to the area of “Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu.”¹⁷⁰ Particularly, the ROC’s official documents tend to define this usage of Taiwan as “Taiwan area.” For example, Article 2 of Chapter One of the *Statute Governing Relations between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area* of the ROC defines “Taiwan area” as “composed of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu and other areas under the sovereignty of the Republic of China.”¹⁷¹

Second, Taiwan sometimes can be used to refer to the island of Taiwan. For example, the ROC often describes the people under its ruling as people of “Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu” (*tai peng jin ma*). This usage of the term of Taiwan can be seen in many occasions. It is noteworthy that both the first usage of Taiwan and the second usage can appear in the same document. For example, the one-China resolution passed by the ROC National Unification Council says, “The ROC, however, currently has jurisdiction only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. Taiwan is part of China, and the Chinese mainland is part of China as well.”¹⁷² Here, the first Taiwan means the island of Taiwan, and the second Taiwan means the Taiwan area.

¹⁶⁹ For example, Section 15 (2) of the Taiwan Relations Act states, “For purposes of this Act the term ‘Taiwan’ includes, as the context may require, the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the people on those islands, corporations and other entities and associations created or organized under the laws applied on those islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities (including political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities thereof).” Actually, even back to the 1950s, when the United States signed the mutual defense treaty with the ROC government in 1954, it was ambiguous about whether it would help the KMT defend Kinmen and Matsu or not. For example, Article VI of the treaty states, “For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms “territorial” and “territories” shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect to the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.” Also see Benson and Niou, “Comprehending Strategic Ambiguity.”

¹⁷⁰ For example, the one-China Resolution passed by the ROC National Unification Council in 1992 says, “Taiwan is part of China, and the Chinese mainland is part of China as well.” See National Unification Council, ROC, “Guanyu “yige Zhongguo” de hanyi [The Meaning of “One China”],” Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China, 1992, <www.mac.gov.tw>.

¹⁷¹ Monte R. Bullard, “Statute Governing Relations between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area,” *Strait Talk: Avoiding a Nuclear War between the U.S. and China over Taiwan*, E-book, <<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/straittalk.htm>>.

¹⁷² National Unification Council, ROC, “Guanyu “yige Zhongguo” de hanyi [The Meaning of “One China”],” Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China, 1992, <www.mac.gov.tw>.


Third, Taiwan can be used to refer to the area of the Taiwan Island and the Penghu Archipelago. In this situation, it is used in the form of “Taiwan province.” For a long time after 1949, the ROC claimed to effectively control territory of two provinces: one was Fujian Province covering Kinmen and Matsu, and the other was Taiwan Province covering the Taiwan Island and the Penghu Archipelago. Based on this categorization, people from places other than Taiwan Province were called *waishengren*, and people from Taiwan Province were called *benshengren*. Actually, before the streamlining of Fujian Province (?) and Taiwan Province (1998), the ROC government had four provincial-level governments, namely Taiwan provincial government, Fujian provincial government, Taipei municipal government, and Kaosiung municipal government. Taipei and Kaosiung are two centrally-administered municipalities, and Taiwan provincial government administered the area of Penghu Archipelago and Taiwan Island except Taipei and Kaosiung. Thus, the Taiwan provincial government did not rule the whole Taiwan province.

In general, the three levels of territory referred to as Taiwan are the larger “Taiwan area,” “Taiwan Island,” and “Taiwan Province.” They can be illustrated by Figure 5.1. The so-called Republic of Taiwan that Taiwanese nationalists aspire to establish covers the same territory of the “Taiwan area.” And the backdrop for consideration of a Taiwanese national identity is the Taiwan area. The goal of Taiwanese nationalists is to construct a Taiwanese national identity for all people in the Taiwan area that is often also called “Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu.” The realization of their goal involves two conditions: first, they need to define the Taiwan area as an independent state; second, they need to have all people in the Taiwan area to identify with the Taiwan state and consider themselves as nationals of the Taiwan state. For example, Shih Cheng-feng, a pro-Taiwan independence scholar, defines Taiwanese as “Taiwanese nation:” “all people who identify Taiwan as their own home country (*zuguó*) and are willing to fight for her are Taiwanese.”¹⁷³ In my view, the Taiwanese national identity is much more complex than simply saying “I am a Taiwanese.” In this dissertation, when I talk about Taiwanese

¹⁷³ Shih Cheng-feng, “Taiwanren de guojia rentong---taiwanren yu zhongguoren rentong de jiuge [Taiwanese’s National Identity: The disputes of Taiwanese and Chinese Identities],” in Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwanren de Minzu Rentong [Taiwanese National Identity]* (Taipei City: Qianwei Chubanshe, 2000), 16.

national identity, it is presupposed that Taiwan is used to refer to the territory of Taiwan area.

Figure 5. 1: Taiwan Area, Taiwan Island, and Taiwan Province



Given the complexity of the Taiwanese national identity issue, we cannot equate the fact that an increasing percentage of people in Taiwan consider themselves only as Taiwanese to the rise of Taiwanese national identity. Yet, I believe there has been a rise of Taiwanese national identity in Taiwan, which has been closely related to the political speaking on Taiwan's status and its relationship with mainland China as well as Taiwan's China policy. To some extent, Taiwanese officials' speaking and policies have been discursive practices to hegemonize Taiwanese nationalist discourse and construct an independent Taiwanese national identity. In this chapter, I will outline the speaking and policies of Lee Teng-hui from the early 1990s to 2000 and those of Chen Shui-bian since 2000 to examine the changes in discursive regime and symbolic economy in Taiwan since the early 1990s. As a result, the Taiwanese nationalist framework has gradually gained hegemony in Taiwan.

II. Lee Teng-hui's "two Chinas" discursive regime

After Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1988, Lee Teng-hui, a *benshengren* himself, became President of the ROC. He continued to advance the political liberalization and democratization started by Chiang Ching-kuo. At the beginning of the 1990s, Lee Teng-hui's speaking and policies generally followed the KMT's Chinese nationalism. He emphasized his Chinese identity and acted as a loyal successor of Chiang Ching-kuo. In his succeeding speech shortly after Chiang Ching-kuo's death, he promised to "obey the Constitution, maintain the national security, increase the people's wellbeing, devote all my strength, and, together with all my countrymen, do my utmost to accomplish the great cause of reunifying China with the Three Principles of the People."¹⁷⁴ In his inaugural speech in 1990, he says,

Taiwan and the mainland are indivisible parts of China's territory, and all Chinese are compatriots of the same flesh and blood. At this time when all of humanity longs for peace and is pursuing conciliation, all Chinese should work together to seek peaceful and democratic means to achieve our common goal of national reunification... We hope then, when objective conditions are ripe, we will be able to discuss the matter of our national reunification, based on the common will of the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.

Nonetheless, in order to defeat his challengers within the KMT, Lee pushed for democratization. He did it by appropriating the DPP's political agenda and cooperating with the DPP in the form of "National Affairs Conference" (*guoshi huiyi*) or "National Development Conference" (*guofa huiyi*) to form consensuses, and then transforming these consensuses into amendments of the ROC constitution. Lee successfully pushed for several important steps on the path of democratizing Taiwan: the termination of the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion in 1991, the resignation of all the lifelong *waishengren* members from the national representative bodies in late 1991, direct elections of the national representative bodies in 1992, direct election of Taiwan's provincial governor in 1994, and direct election of the ROC president in 1996.

¹⁷⁴ Lee Teng-hui, "Di qi ren zongtong jiren yanjiang (1988) [The Seventh Presidential Succession Speech (1988)]," in You Zixiang, ed., *Lingxiu de Shengyin: Liangan Lingdaoren Zhongyao Yanjiang Xuanji, 1906-2006* [*Leaders' Voices: 100 Significant Political Speeches by Leaders of China and Taiwan, 1906-2006*] (Taipei: Wunan Tushu Chuban Gufen Youxian Gongsi, 2006), 398.

By pushing for democratization to satisfy the people's desire for political participation and capitalizing on his identity as a *hoklo*,¹⁷⁵ which is the majority ethnic group, Lee Teng-hui transformed the irredentist ROC regime into a Taiwan-centered "Republic of China on Taiwan." After Lee Teng-hui consolidated his power in the KMT, he gradually moved his position closer to Taiwanese nationalism. He retained the imagination of Republic of China as a state and appropriated it for Taiwan by demarcating the ROC jurisdiction only for Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. By doing so, Lee Taiwanized the ROC regime. On the other hand, by freezing the provincial government of Taiwan in 1998, Lee accomplished the nationalization of Taiwan. As a result of these changes, a political community of "Republic of China on Taiwan" was increasingly evident, and an independent national identity was constructed. This section outlines several "nodal points" that Lee Teng-hui has employed in his discursive practices.

First, people in Taiwan were increasingly described as a community. When Taiwan was under Chiangs' ruling, people in Taiwan were often called to work with overseas Chinese to recover the mainland and save their compatriots on the Chinese mainland. *Waishengren* were perceived to be living in Taiwan temporarily and to return to the mainland in the future. After the project of "recovering the mainland" was given up and the CCP was treated as a political entity on an equal footing, *waishengren* were increasingly believed to have settled down in Taiwan, and all people in Taiwan increasingly perceived themselves as a community. In August 1991, Lee proposed that there was a need to combine the concept of "community of life" (*shengming gongtongti*, equivalent to *Gemeinschaft*) with traditional family ethnics and morality.¹⁷⁶ Later in his speech in the KMT's 14th National Congress in 1993, Lee says, "In the last over forty years, on the revival base, comrades and compatriots of different provincial origins and from different places have been consolidated into a strong community of life, striving to exterminate communism and rebuild the great cause of reunifying China with democracy,

¹⁷⁵ Lee Teng-hui claimed to be a *hakka* by blood, but he cannot speak *hakka*. Instead, he speaks fluent *Minnan* dialect and Japanese.

¹⁷⁶ Lee Teng-hui, "Regional Security and Economic Cooperation: The Case for the Asian-Pacific Region," in Lee Teng-hui, *Creating the Future*, Taipei: GIO, 1992. Also see Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 97-98 for a discussion on it.

freedom, and equality.”¹⁷⁷ This was an attempt to build a demarcated civic society for the statehood of “Republic of China on Taiwan” defined as a political entity.

Lee’s concept of community of life (*shengming tongtongti*) naturally reminded people of the concept “community of shared destiny” (*mingyun gongtongti*) proposed by Peng Ming-min, who had been advocating Taiwan independence. Similar to Peng’s concept, Lee’s concept also defined all people in Taiwan, including the *hoklo*, *hakka*, *waishengren*, and the aboriginals, as a community.

Second, as a sense of collectivity is constructed and the boundary of the “imagined community” is clarified, Lee proposed the doctrine of “popular sovereignty,” or “sovereignty in the people” (*zhuquan zai min*), in his speech to the National Assembly on May 26, 1994.¹⁷⁸ Interestingly, people who had lived with the notion that Taiwan is part of China for decades might wonder, “Who is ‘the people’ (*min*)?” Is it the Chinese nation including all the people on the mainland and Taiwan or just the people in Taiwan? Some further questions are: “Whose sovereignty?” And “Can the sovereignty of China be divided with part of it located to part of the people?” By proposing the doctrine of “sovereignty in the people,” Lee proclaimed that the sovereignty of the ROC, whose jurisdiction had been narrowed to the Taiwan area, belonged to the people, and more specifically to the voters in the Taiwan area. This made Lee move closer to the idea of self-determination embraced by Taiwanese nationalists.”

Third, while “recovering the mainland” was the top mission under Chiangs’ ruling, Lee Teng-hui advocated re-centering the ROC politics on Taiwan. In January 1995, Lee proposed to “manage the great Taiwan, establish the new Central Plains” (*jingying da Taiwan, jianli xin zhongyuan*). In his presidential inaugural speech on May 20, 1996, he further expounded this slogan, defining Taiwan as the new cultural “Central Plains,” with far-fetching influence on the rest of China. “Central Plains” (*zhongyuan*) in the Chinese literature usually refers to the central part of China, such as Henan Province. In Chinese

¹⁷⁷ Lee Teng-hui, “Shisiquan Jianghua (1993) [Speech in the KMT 14th National Congress (1993)],” in You Zixiang, ed., *Lingxiu de Shengyin: Liangan Lingdaoren Zhongyao Yanjiang Xuanji, 1906-2006* [*Leaders’ Voices: 100 Significant Political Speeches by Leaders of China and Taiwan, 1906-2006*] (Taipei: Wunan Tushu Chuban Gufen Youxian Gongsi, 2006), 404.

¹⁷⁸ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 96.

history, rulers who could control the Central Plains generally could influence other parts of China and eventually control the whole country. Moreover, the idiom of “chasing deer in the Central Plains” (*zhulu zhongyuan*) was often used to refer to the ambition to rival for the Central Plains so as to take over the whole China. By proposing to “manage the great Taiwan, establish the new Central Plains,” Lee seemed to call on people in Taiwan to give up their aspiration for the old “Central Plains,” namely the mainland, and center their politics on Taiwan. For him, this would also enable the ROC regime to be a beacon for the rest of China.

Fourth, Lee Teng-hui pushed for a multiparty “national development meeting” in 1996 to discuss freezing the provincial government of Taiwan. As mentioned above, the Taiwanese provincial government used to govern the area of Penghu and the Taiwan Island except Taipei City and Kaosiung City. In his 1964 “Declaration of Taiwanese Self-salvation,” Peng Ming-min used to point out that the government of Taiwan Province had many administrative organs overlapping with the government of ROC and should be streamlined.¹⁷⁹ By freezing the Taiwanese provincial government and streamlining it into a branch of the Executive Yuan, Lee Teng-hui further undermine the imagination that Taiwan is only part of China and Taiwanese is a local identity. The symbolic effect of this action is the nationalization of Taiwan.

Fifth, Lee gradually distanced Taiwan from the one-China principle and redefined Taiwan and mainland China as two independent countries. While the mainland adhered to the “one China” principle that Taiwan and the mainland are both parts of China, Lee Teng-hui tried to make it the precondition for cross-Strait political dialogues that the CCP should recognize Taiwan and mainland China as two separate countries and should not oppose Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and developing diplomatic relations with other countries. However, from the point of view of the PRC, since Taiwan has its own government, population, and defined jurisdiction, allowing Taiwan to join international organizations and develop diplomatic relations is equal to allow Taiwan to establish its own sovereignty, which conflicts with the “one China” principle and the

¹⁷⁹ Xu Jieli, *Lee Denghui yu Taiwan Zhengzhi* [*Lee Teng-hui and Taiwanese Politics*] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian Chubanshe [Social Scientific Literature Press], 2002), 95.

PRC's sovereignty claim over Taiwan. In general, though Lee paid some lip service to the future goal of a unified China, his policies pointed to the goal of making mainland China and Taiwan two independent countries, or "two Chinas."

There have been many examples among Lee Teng-hui's speeches and policies that have pointed to two separate Chinas, namely the ROC and the PRC. Since the early 1990s, Lee often emphasized in his speeches that "the Republic of China is an independent country." In 1994 APEC meeting, under Lee Teng-hui's order, Chiang Ping-kun, Taiwan's Minister of Economy, proposed the concept of "two Chinas over a certain period of time" (*jieduanxing liang ge zhongguo*). In the same year, when interviewed by *Liberty Times*, Lee said, "At this point I don't see one China. Where is one China ... We should forget such words as 'one China,' 'two China'."¹⁸⁰ In 1995, in an "eight-point statement," PRC President Jiang Zemin opposed the propositions of "split the country to rule under separate regimes" and "two Chinas over a certain period of time" as well as Taiwan's efforts to participate in intergovernmental organizations. But he also proposed to hold cross-Strait negotiations to end the state of hostility under the one-China principle, to expand cross-Strait economic exchanges and cooperation, and to have cross-Strait visits by leaders of both sides.¹⁸¹ In his "six-point response" to Jiang's statement, Lee Teng-hui says, "The fact that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan have been ruled by two political entities in no way subordinate to each other had led to a state of division between the two sides and separate governmental jurisdictions, hence, the issue of national unification. ... Only by facing up to this reality can both sides build greater consensus on the "one China" issue and at the earliest possible date." He proposed that "leaders of both sides could meet with each other on international occasions in a natural manner" because "the more international organizations both sides join on an equal footing, the more favorable the environment will become for the growth of bilateral relations and for the process of peaceful unification." Lee also argued that mainland China should renounce the use of force. To some extent, by urging Beijing to recognize the current state of division and emphasizing the principle of equality, Lee tried to

¹⁸⁰ Chen Yujun, *Women shishui, Taiwan shi shenme?* [*Who Are We, and What is Taiwan?*], 151.

¹⁸¹ See Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, PRC, "Jiang Zemin's Eight-Point Proposal," (January 30, 1995).

consolidate Taiwan's separateness from mainland China. Meanwhile, by transforming the "one China" principle that both sides had generally agreed on in the early 1990s into an "issue" that still need more efforts of consensus-building, Lee tended to depart from the "one China" notion.

On August 3, 1998, Lee Teng-hui published an article in *The Wall Street Journal*. In the article, Lee said,

The path to a democratic China must begin with a recognition of the present reality by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. And that reality is that China is divided, just as Germany and Vietnam were in the past and as Korea is today. Hence, there is no "one China" now. We hope for this outcome in the future, but presently it does not exist. Today, there is only "one divided China," with Taiwan and the mainland each being part of China. Because neither has jurisdiction over the other, neither can represent the other, much less all of China.¹⁸²

On July 9, 1999, when interviewed by the Voice of Germany, Lee Teng-hui said:

The fact that disregarding the reality that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are under separate administrations of different governments, the Chinese communist authorities have been threatening us with force is actually the main reason why cross-strait ties cannot be improved thoroughly. ... Since the PRC's establishment, the Chinese communists have never ruled Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, which have been under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China. ... Since our constitutional reform in 1991, we have designated cross-strait ties nation-to-nation, or at least as special state-to-state ties, rather than internal ties within "one China" between a legitimate government and a rebellion group, or between central and local governments....¹⁸³

By defining the two sides of the Taiwan Strait as two independent nations, Lee Teng-hui finally severed Taiwan's relationship with the mainland. In pushing for this goal, Lee Teng-hui has taken advantage of nodal points such as "equality," "democracy," "peace." By arguing that Taiwan and mainland China are two "political entities" on an equal footing, Lee Teng-hui legitimated Taiwan's quest for international recognition. Actually, since 1993, Taiwan has been applying for membership in the UN every year. Meanwhile, Taiwan's democratization has helped Taiwan it gain legitimacy. By

¹⁸² Lee Teng-hui, "U.S. Can't Ignore Taiwan," *Wall Street Journal*, August 3, 1998.

¹⁸³ Quoted from Shirley A. Kan, "China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy- Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei," *CRS Report for Congress*, March 12, 2001, 41.

emphasizing peace and goodwill, Lee Teng-hui argued that mainland China should renounce the use of force.

Six, Lee has promoted a Taiwanese national identity to replace the Chinese national identity. Lee has done this by first emphasizing provincial origin to exploit the division between *benshengren* and *waishengren* and then proposing the concept of “new Taiwanese” to redefine an inclusive national identity for them.

In March 1994, when interviewed with Japanese writer Shiba Ryotaro, Lee talked about the sadness of being born a Taiwanese. He said, “Being born a Taiwanese, I have also had sadness for not being able to devote my heart and strength to Taiwan.” In the interview, he called the KMT a “foreign regime” and said that he deposed the then Premier Hau Pei-tsun in 1993 because Hau was a *waishengren*. He said, “Up to now, all rulers of Taiwan have been foreign regimes...the KMT is also a foreign regime. It is but a party that came to rule Taiwanese, so it is necessary to transform it into Taiwanese’s KMT.” He also teased the CCP’s sovereignty claim on Taiwan by saying, “The Chinese Communist Party includes Taiwan as a province of the People’s Republic of China. What a weird dream!” At last, he also alluded that he would lead the Taiwanese people to depart from China. He said, “Yes, we have departed! From now on, there is a lot of work for Moses and his people to do. In general, we have departed. Yes! Whenever I think of ‘February 28 Incident’ in which many Taiwanese sacrificed their lives, I believe Exodus is a conclusion.”¹⁸⁴ Here, by labeling the KMT as a foreign regime, Lee alluded that *waishengren*, who followed the KMT to Taiwan and had lived in Taiwan for over four decades were also foreigners. By calling himself Moses, he might mean that he would lead Taiwan out of the ROC regime and the “one-China” principle. Through this interview, Lee not only sent a message that he would pursue in line of Taiwan independence, but also broke the relatively homogeneous Chinese national identity landscape in Taiwan.

¹⁸⁴ Lee Teng-hui and Shiba Ryotaro, “Lee Zongtong yu Sima Liaotailang Duihua/ Sheng wei Taiwanren de Beiai [Dialogue between President Lee and Shiba Ryotaro: The Sadness of Being Born a Taiwanese],” written by Shiba Ryotaro, translated by Xing Fang, *Zili Zhoubao* [*The Independence Weekly Post*], 13 May 1994.

For decades, thanks to the KMT's ideological indoctrination, most people in Taiwan considered themselves Chinese, and they believed that Taiwanese were also Chinese. By constructing the Chinese communists as the threat and a negative identity, the KMT introduced the logic of equivalence talked about by Laclau and Mouffe into Taiwan's society and subdued the differences between *waishengren* and *benshengren* and between *hoklo* and *hakka*, and aboriginals. Even though *waishengren* controlled the majority of the positions in the government, the irredentist ROC regime made it as natural. Though provincial origin (*shengji*) was an important concept in people's lives, it had not been a significant factor to create cleavage among people's imagination. However, by talking about the sadness of being born a Taiwanese, Lee introduced the logic of difference and made the difference between *waishengren* and *benshengren* become a significant factor to define Taiwan's political landscape. As a result, *waishengren* tended to be attached with an "original sin" and was in a disadvantaged position in democratic politics. In contrast, Lee Teng-hui could not only take advantage of the resources of the KMT, but also of his identity as a *benshengren*.

After democratization has made Taiwan a "political community", and *waishengren* could incur more costs than benefits from their ethnic label, Lee came to promote a new inclusive national identity for people in Taiwan. When he appeared in Ma Ying-jeou's campaign for mayor of Taipei in 1998, he proposed the concept of "new Taiwanese" (*xin Taiwanren*). Lee, speaking in Mandarin, and Ma, speaking in *Minnan* dialect, had the following talk before the audience.

Lee Teng-hui: "Where are you from?"

Ma Ying-jeou: "Report to Mr. President. I am a Taiwanese, a new Taiwanese who grew up by eating Taiwan's rice and drinking Taiwan's water. A genuine child of Mengka¹⁸⁵."

Lee Teng-hui: "What line are you in?"

Ma Ying-jeou: "Report to Mr. President. I am in President Lee's line of democracy and reform. I am in the line of Taiwan first, Taipei first, and I will work hard together with residents of Taipei."

...

Lee Teng-hui: "No matter you are those who came (to Taiwan) four or five hundred years ago, or those who came (to Taiwan) from the mainland forty or

¹⁸⁵ Mengka is a place in Taiwan.

fifty years ago, or aboriginals, we are all Taiwanese, fighting here for the Republic of China, we are new Taiwanese.”¹⁸⁶

Ma Ying-jeou, a Hunan native, was born in Hong Kong in 1950 and moved with his parents to Taiwan when he was one year old. By declaring Ma as a “new Taiwanese,” Lee Teng-hui incorporated *waishengren* into the Taiwanese nation. In 1999, Lee explained the term “new Taiwanese” in his autobiography by saying,

The “new Taiwanese” who will create a new Taiwan include the aboriginal people, those whose ancestors came here four hundred years ago, and those who arrived only recently. Anyone who lives in and loves Taiwan is a “new Taiwanese.”¹⁸⁷

Lee Teng-hui’s concept of “new Taiwanese” has generally been welcomed by *waishengren*, and it tended to provide a channel for *waishengren* to be included into the new nation. However, while Lee Teng-hui tended to view new Taiwanese as a civic national identity, many *waishengren* were not necessarily ready to give up their Chinese national identity. In fact, it is not impossible to have a “new Taiwanese” local identity and a Chinese national identity at the same time. Even Chiang Ching-kuo said in his last years that, “I am a Chinese, and I am also a Taiwanese.”

There is an internal tension within the project of constructing an inclusive Taiwanese national identity. The project inherits Chiang Kai-shek’s constructed antagonism of “free China”/ “communist China” and transformed it into the antagonism of Taiwan/China. However, since Chiang had imposed a Chinese national identity on people in Taiwan and mainland China had increasingly monopolized the right of representing China, Taiwanese nationalists have tried to distance from Chiangs. In order to do this, Lee Teng-hui called the KMT a foreign regime. However, does it mean that those *waishengren* who have followed Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan are also foreigners? Does it mean that these people need to return to the mainland? While Spanish and Dutch colonialists left Taiwan or were assimilated into Han Chinese and aboriginals through

¹⁸⁶ Quoted in Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwanren de Minzu Rentong* [*The Taiwanese National Identity*] (Taipei: Qianwei Chubanshe, 2000), 1.

¹⁸⁷ Lee Teng-hui, *The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity* (Tokyo: PHP Institute, 1999), 200, quoted from June Teufel Dreyer, “Taiwan’s Evolving Identity,” *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Asia Program Special Report*, no. 114 (August 2003), 8.

intermarriage, and the Japanese colonialists returned to their country, *waishengren* settled down in Taiwan. Accepting the Taiwanese nationalist representations implies accepting to be foreigners and being willing to change their self-identity. Therefore, a Taiwanese national identity distinct from a Chinese identity implies a transformation of hearts and minds for many *waishengren*.

It is noteworthy that though Lee Teng-hui had been moving from “one China, two equal political entities” representation to “Taiwan independence” representation and promoting Taiwanese national identity to replace the Chinese national identity, he generally did not radically challenge the ROC symbolic system.¹⁸⁸ He reformed and democratized the ROC through constitutional amendments rather than through creating a new constitution. Rather than redefining Taiwan’s scope of territory, he has only narrowed the jurisdiction and emphasized the independence of the Republic of China on Taiwan area. Therefore, the discursive regime is characterized by a policy of “two Chinas.” He has tried to construct the situation of “two Chinas”---one being the ROC, and the other being the PRC---and define it as the status quo.

Lee’s efforts inevitably conflict with mainland China’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan. For Beijing, by promoting Taiwanese identity as opposed to the Chinese identity and appropriating the sovereignty that is meant to be shared by all Chinese to the Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui was separating Taiwan from the rest of China. Nonetheless, the CCP’s “linguistic attacks and military threat” (*wengong wuhe*) could only push people in Taiwan further away from the Chinese identity. What a stark contrast between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, with Taiwan holding its first presidential election and mainland China conducting military exercises and missile tests in 1996!

III. Chen Shui-bian’s “one China, one Taiwan” discursive regime

Chen Shui-bian from the DPP won the 2000 presidential by getting 39.3 percent of the votes. Generally speaking, Chen’s position regarding national identity issue has been in

¹⁸⁸ As Stephane Corcuff’s analysis points out, Lee did change part of the ROC symbolic economy by no longer talking about Chiang Kai-shek, stop talking about the Three Principles of the People, partially changing the surface of currencies, etc. See Corcuff, “The Symbolic Dimension of Democratization and the Transition of National Identity under Lee Teng-hui.”

keeping with the DPP's *Resolution on Taiwan's Future*. He accepted the designation of Republic of China, but he viewed it only as a temporary cover for the Republic of Taiwan. Even in the presidential campaign, Chen considered Taiwanese as only ethnic and cultural Chinese, not political Chinese. For example, he used to argue that "Taiwan and the People's Republic of China are two Chinese (*huaren*) states that are independent and not subordinate to each other." *Huaren* in Chinese usually means Chinese in ethnic and cultural senses, while *Zhongguoren* in Chinese means Chinese in all political, ethnic, and cultural senses. Chen considered Taiwan similar to Singapore, and he recognized only the cultural proximity between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

At the beginning of his first term, Chen gave people an impression that he would go a middle way. In his inaugural speech on 2000, Chen made a "five no's" commitment:

Therefore, as long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title, I will not push forth the inclusion of the so-called "state-to-state" description in the Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question of independence or unification. Furthermore, the abolition of the National Reunification Council or the National Reunification Guidelines will not be an issue.¹⁸⁹

This commitment has a precondition that is nearly impossible. It is well-known the CCP threatens that as long as Taiwan declares independence, it will attack Taiwan with military force. But this commitment still conveyed the message that Chen would not pursue the projects of Taiwanese nationalism in his term. However, shortly after his inauguration, Chen made many policies in accordance with Taiwanese nationalism. Chen inherited Lee Teng-hui's "two Chinas" line and implemented a policy of "one China, one Taiwan." This slogan means that Taiwan and the mainland China are two equal countries.

1. Replacing "Republic of China" with "Taiwan"

Chen's government has implemented a series of policies to transform the national symbols of Taiwan. Examples of the changes have been as follows: Chen's government

¹⁸⁹ Chen Shui-bian, "President Chen's Inaugural Address," Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), May 20, 2000, <<http://www.president.gov.tw/en/>>.

revised school textbooks for history to treat Chinese history as foreign history,¹⁹⁰ added the word of “Taiwan” in English on the cover of ROC passports starting from September 1, 2003, removed “China” from the names of a series of official institutions (e.g., the English names of the China Central Bank, China Central Printing Plant, China Central Trust, and China Central Mint) and publications (*Republic of China Yearbook* was renamed as *Taiwan Yearbook*, and the title of government publication *Free China Review* was renamed as *Taipei Review*, and as *Taiwan Review* starting from March 2003) as well as state-run companies.¹⁹¹ In January 2004, Taiwan’s Department of Civil Service began publish a new type of map titled “Taiwan Region Map” covering all administrative areas of Taiwan to replace the “Republic of China Map,” and the new map only cover Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. In order to construct Taiwan as an independent normal state, Vice President Annette Lu even proposed to set up four provinces inside Taiwan. In various occasions, Taiwanese leaders declared that the “Republic of China” was just “Taiwan” and “Taiwan” equaled the “Republic of China,” and they captured the process as a transition from “Taiwan, ROC” to “ROC (Taiwan).” In fact, the website of the Office of the President has changed the title of the state into the Republic of China (Taiwan). Moreover, in public speeches by state officials, “Taiwan” was emphasized, while the “Republic of China” was seldom mentioned.

Table 5.1 lists the number of times of using certain words in Taiwan’s major public speeches given by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. These speeches include the inaugural speeches in 1990, 1996, 2000, and 2004, all the National Day’s messages by the presidents since 1996, and all the New Year’s messages since 1997. All the speeches before May 20, 2000, when Chen Shui-bian inaugurated as president, were given by Lee Teng-hui and all the speeches since May 20, 2000 were given by Chen Shui-bian. The

¹⁹⁰ For example, Chen’s government proposed to rewrite history texts to place the mid-Ming dynasty era in world history rather than in the section on Chinese history in 2003.

¹⁹¹ See Shirley A. Kan, “China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy- Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei,” *CRS Report for Congress*, March 12, 2001, 7; Wei-chin Lee, “Taiwan’s Cultural Reconstruction Movement: Identity Politics and Collective Action since 2000,” *Issues and Studies*, vol. 41, no. 1 (2005), 1-51. Taiwan’s Executive Yuan, disregarding many criticisms, quickly rename three state-run firms’ names, changing “Chinese Petroleum Co” (zhongguo shiyou) into “CPC Corp, Taiwan” (Taiwan zhongyou), “China Shipbuilding Corporation” into “CSBC, Taiwan” (Taiwan guojia zaochuan) and Chunghwa Post Co (zhonghua youzheng) into Taiwan Post Co (Taiwan youzheng). See Agence France Presse, “Taiwan Sticks to State Firm Name Changes Despite US Concerns,” Taiwan Security Research, February 11, 2007, <<http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/2007/AFP-110207.htm>>.

change in the frequencies of using these terms offers us a glimpse at how the ROC-centered symbolic system has been deliberately abandoned by political leaders in Taiwan and how a Taiwan-centered symbolic system has been rising.

First, while the term of “China” (*zhongguo*) has been used generally not very often in the speeches except in recent years, its meaning has changed greatly in the speeches. In the speeches given by Lee Teng-hui before May 20, 2000, “China” meant to include both Taiwan and the mainland. In the speeches given by Chen Shui-bian, “China” meant only mainland China. For example, in Chen’s inaugural speech in 2000, he says,

Over the past one hundred plus years, China has suffered imperialist aggression, which left indelible wounds in her history. Taiwan's destiny has been even more arduous, tormented by brute force and the rule of colonialist regimes. These similar historical experiences should bring mutual understanding between the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, setting a solid foundation for pursuing freedom, democracy and human rights together.¹⁹²

Interestingly, in speeches of recent years, the term of “China” was used much more frequently. At the same times, the terms “Taiwan” and “Formosa” (*fuermosha*) were also used more frequently. This is because Chen deliberately juxtaposed “China” and “Taiwan” in his speech to signal that Taiwan and China are independent of each other. To some extent, the movement of Calling Taiwan Taiwan (*Taiwan zhengming*, or Rectification of Taiwan’s Names) has taken the form of calling mainland China China.

¹⁹² Chen Shui-bian, “President Chen’s Inaugural Address,” Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), May 20, 2000, <<http://www.president.gov.tw/en/>>.


Table 5. 1: Word Usage to Call China and Taiwan

Date	China (<i>Zhongguo</i>)	Chinese (<i>Zhongguoren</i>) Chinese Nation (<i>zhonghuaminzu</i>)	Chinese Communists (<i>Zhonggong</i>)	ROC (<i>zhonghua</i> <i>minguo</i>)	ROC on Taiwan	Taiwan(Taiwan, <i>Tai</i>) Formosa (<i>Fuermosha</i>)	Taiwanese people	Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu
05/20/1990	2	14	4	8	0	5	0	2
05/20/1996	7	19	3	8	1	9	0	4
10/10/1996	2	1	1	3	0	0	0	1
12/31/1996	2	1	2	6	0	4	0	0
10/10/1997	0	1	1	4	0	1	0	0
12/31/1997	0	0	0	6	2	3	0	0
10/10/1998	0	2	0	4	0	0	0	0
12/31/1998	1	0	1	3	0	3	0	0
10/09/1999	3	0	1	5	1	5	0	0
12/31/1999	1	0	1	6	0	2	0	0
05/20/2000	2	2	1	9	0	41	5	1
10/10/2000	0	0	1	6	0	8	4	0
01/01/2001	0	0	2	9	0	14	3	0
10/10/2001	0	0	0	2	0	15	4	0
01/01/2002	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	2
10/10/2002	0	0	4	3	0	29	4	1
01/01/2003	2	0	0	3	0	20	2	0
10/10/2003	0	0	0	3	0	29	4	0

01/01/2004	1	0	0	4	0	36	9	0
05/20/2004	3	0	1	8	0	48	7	2
10/10/2004	0	0	0	2	0	26	1	0
01/01/2005	0	0	3	3	0	29	5	0
10/10/2005	0	0	0	2	0	24	5	0
01/01/2006	19	0	0	2	0	65	9	0
10/10/2006	10	0	0	2	0	57	6	0
01/01/2007	12	3	2	1	0	53	12	0

Sources: Counted by the author based on transcripts of the speeches. See Office of the President, Republic of China, News Release, <www.president.gov.tw>. Speeches by Lee Teng-hui on May 20, 1990 and May 20, 1996 are in You Zixiang, ed., *Lingxiu de Shengyin: Liangan Lingdaoren Zhongyao Yanjiang Xuanji, 1906-2006* [Leaders' Voices: 100 Significant Political Speeches by Leaders of China and Taiwan, 1906-2006](Taipei: Wunan Tushu Chuban Gufen Youxian Gongsi, 2006), pp. 398-402, 415-420.

Figure 5. 2: Number of Times That “Republic of China” and “Taiwan” (or “Formosa”) Was Used in Important Speeches by Lee Teng-hui (Before May 20, 2000) and Chen Shui-bian (Since May 20, 2000)



Sources: Counted by the author based on transcripts of the speeches. See Office of the President, Republic of China, News Release, <www.president.gov.tw>. Speeches by Lee Teng-hui on May 20, 1990 and May 20, 1996 are in You Zixiang, ed., *Lingxiu de Shengyin: Liangan Lingdaoren Zhongyao Yanjiang Xuanji, 1906-2006* [Leaders’ Voices: 100 Significant Political Speeches by Leaders of China and Taiwan, 1906-2006](Taipei: Wunan Tushu Chuban Gufen Youxian Gongsi, 2006), pp. 398-402, 415-420.

Second, while the term “Chinese” (*zhongguoren*) and “Chinese nation” (*zhonghua minzu*) often appeared in Lee Teng-hui’s speeches before he became the first directly elected ROC president, he used them much less frequently. However, “Chinese” and “Chinese nation” in Lee’s speeches still meant people in both mainland China and Taiwan. In contrast, Chen Shui-bian almost never used these words. He used the term twice in his inaugural address in the following setting:

Chinese people emphasize the difference between statesmanship and hegemony, believing in the philosophy that a government which employs benevolence "will please those near and appeal to those from afar," and "when those afar will not submit, then one must practice kindness and virtue to attract them." Such Chinese wisdom will remain universal words of value.¹⁹³

This is consistent with Chen’s position that he consider Taiwan as a culturally Chinese state, but he did not identified himself as a Chinese in political sense. While he used the term “Chinese” (*zhongguoren*) three times in his New Year Message in 2007, it was only a citation of research findings about national identity.

On the other hand, while Lee Teng-hui never used the word “Taiwanese people” (*Taiwan renmin*) in these speeches, Chen has used the term frequently. In fact, praising the Taiwanese people has been an important part of Chen’s speeches. For example, in his 2000 inaugural address he praised the Taiwanese people’s contribution to democracy:

If not for the fearless sacrifice of our democratic forebears, if not for the unswerving faith of the tens of millions of Taiwanese people in freedom and democracy, we could not possibly be standing on our beloved land today and celebrate a glorious occasion that belongs to all the people.¹⁹⁴

He also called for solidarity and determination among Taiwanese people. For example, in his New Year message of 2007, he says:

If we unite as one, our reach is beyond the sky, as the ambitions and ideals of the Taiwanese people can surpass even the highest of limits. If we act with one heart, the wisdom, determination, and willpower of the Taiwanese people can create infinite possibilities. Let us work in solidarity and forge ahead with unswerving

¹⁹³ Chen Shui-bian, “President Chen’s Inaugural Address,” Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), May 20, 2000, <<http://www.president.gov.tw/en/>>.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

resolve. No matter how daunting external constraints are, or how imposing future challenges may be, we shall overcome. Opportunity and success will always be ours!

Third, while Lee Teng-hui's usually referred to his country as the "Republic of China" (*zhonghua minguo*), Chen Shui-bian has used "Taiwan" to call his country much more frequently. In Lee Teng-hui's speeches, he generally used the "Republic of China" more frequently than "Taiwan," and sometimes he used the term "Republic of China on Taiwan". Moreover, when "Taiwan" appeared in his speeches, it was usually in such terms as "Taiwan Experience" (*Taiwan jingyan*), "Taiwan economic miracle" (*Taiwan jingji qiji*), or "Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu." Yet it is noteworthy that Lee tended to use "Taiwan" to replace the "Republic of China" after 1998. In Lee's 1999 New Year message, he says:

Ladies and gentlemen, the sovereignty of a nation belongs to all the people of such nation. The future, the destiny, the reform, as well as the development of a country are the compelling responsibilities of its citizenry. Here, in our society, although we came to Taiwan at different times and from different places, every one of us dedicates oneself to and works for the prosperity and development of this land, making irreplaceable contributions. Taiwan is our home. If we stop categorizing ourselves on the basis of ethnic or native origins, and if we empathize with and tolerate each other, unite closely together, continue to promote the Taiwan spirit, and fully cooperate with each other, I am confident that we can overcome all difficulties and challenges, and fulfill the mission of creating an even more brilliant future for our country in the 21st century.

In these words, Lee Teng-hui described a Taiwan-centered picture and emphasized that Taiwan is the home for all people on Taiwan. Since he has argued for "sovereignty in the people" (*zhuquan zaimin*), by putting "Taiwan" in this context, Lee alludes that Taiwan is a nation with its sovereignty belonging to all people on Taiwan. This position is also consistent with the concept of "new Taiwanese" that Lee proposed in 1998.

In Chen's speeches, he mentioned the "Republic of China" only at the beginning or at the end. For example, in his speech on the 2004 national day, Chen only mentioned the "Republic of China" twice. The first time was at the beginning of the speech, when Chen said, "Today, on the 93rd National Day of the Republic of China, we stand here in this solemn and momentous occasion to welcome this day, a glorious day that belongs to our

23 million fellow citizens.” The second time was at the end of the speech, when Chen said, “In closing, let us wish a happy birthday and prosperity to the Republic of China, as well as good health and happiness to all our distinguished guests and my dear colleagues.” In contrast, Chen mentioned “Taiwan” for 26 times in the speech. On 2006 New Year’s Day, in the ceremony celebrating the 95th founding anniversary of the ROC, Chen opened his speech by saying, “Today marks the 2006 Founding Anniversary of the Republic of China.” Interestingly, Chen did not mention it was the 95th founding anniversary, in memory of the declaration of the founding of ROC in 1912 New Year. Probably mentioning this would remind Taiwan’s people that Chen inherited the ROC regime that was established in 1912. Again, in his speech, Chen mentioned the “Republic of China” twice, while he mentioned “Taiwan” for 65 times and “Taiwanese people” for 9 times.

Figure 5.2 compares the frequency of “Republic of China” and the frequency of “Taiwan” in all the speeches. It shows that since Chen assumed his presidency, he has deliberately replaced the “Republic of China” with “Taiwan” in his public speeches. Moreover, since 2005, in the English version of every speech by the president, the Office of the President has added “(Taiwan)” to “Republic of China,” even though “(Taiwan)” was not in the original Chinese version of the transcript. Since the DPP has been using “Taiwan” to represent all the territory under the ROC’s control, Chen seldom uses the term “Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu.”

2. Defining independence of mainland China

Chen Shui-bian not only has replaced “Republic of China” with “Taiwan” in his public speeches, but also has defined in many occasions that Taiwan and mainland China are two independent states.

For Beijing, the “one China” principle that there is only one China and both the mainland and Taiwan belong to China is the foundation for cross-Strait political dialogues. Since Lee Teng-hui defined the relations between Taiwan and the mainland as “nation to nation, or at least special state-to-state” relations, Beijing has frozen all cross-

Strait dialogues at government level. Since Chen Shui-bian assumed his presidency, though often paying lip services to “goodwill, active cooperation and permanent peace” and arguing that “the people across the Taiwan Strait share the same ancestral, cultural, and historical background,” Chen has refused to accept the “one China principle.” Regarding the “one China” principle, Chen says in his 2000 inaugural address, “While upholding the principles of democracy and parity, building upon the existing foundations, and constructing conditions for cooperation through goodwill, we believe that the leaders on both sides possess enough wisdom and creativity to jointly deal with the question of a future “one China.”¹⁹⁵ For Chen, “one China” has become a “question” that Taiwan needs to deal with in the future instead of a reality that Taiwan is supposed to recognize.

While both the CCP and the KMT recognize that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait reached consensus in 1992---both sides agreed on the “one China” principle, but have respective interpretations of the specific content of the “one China”---Chen denied that there has been any consensus. He said, “The ‘1992 consensus’ simply does not exist, and ‘one China’ means making Taiwan a part of the People's Republic of China, becoming another Hong Kong. This, of course, is something we cannot accept, and that’s all.”¹⁹⁶ For him, if there was a consensus, it was that there was no consensus. Instead of “1992 Consensus,” he proposed the term “spirit of 1992” that both sides should put aside disputes and promote dialogues and exchanges.

Chen has not only refused to recognize the “one China” principle and “1992 Consensus,” but also has articulated a series of statements in line of the DPP’s *Resolution on Taiwan’s Future*. For example, on August 3, 2002, when addressing an annual meeting of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations via live video link, Chen pronounced that “there is one country on each side.” He said:

Taiwan is our country, and our country cannot be bullied, downgraded, marginalized, nor treated as a local government. Taiwan is not a part of any other country, nor is it a local government or province of another country. Taiwan can

¹⁹⁵ Chen Shui-bian, “President Chen’s Inaugural Address,” Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), May 20, 2000, <<http://www.president.gov.tw/en/>>.

¹⁹⁶ Chen Shui-bian, “Report to the People,” Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), June 20, 2006, <<http://www.president.gov.tw/en/>>.

never be another Hong Kong or Macau, because Taiwan has always been a sovereign state. In short, Taiwan and China standing on opposite sides of the Strait, there is one country on each side.¹⁹⁷

For Chen, Taiwan is facing the PRC's "linguist attacks and military threats" (*wengong wuhe*), and the Taiwanese people are heroes in confronting these external "bullies." From Chen's view of point, since Taiwan has always been an independent nation, accepting the "one China" principle is to make Taiwan a local government and a Hong Kong, which will "downgrade" (*aihua*) Taiwan. Moreover, accepting the "one China" principle means "sell out my country for personal benefits" (*mai guo qiu rong*), which reminds people of many people who betrayed their motherland.

Chen based his stance of Taiwan independence on the principles of "democracy," "freedom," "human rights," and "self-determination," and he described unification as undemocratic and against people freedom to choose their lives. For example, he said,

No matter how cross-Strait relations develop, we will adhere to the four principles of "sovereignty, democracy, peace and parity." I will remain firm on this position, for it is the undisputable stance espoused by the majority of the people. With regard to Taiwan's future, no leeway will be given for either the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) or the Chinese Communist Party to establish an undemocratic premise or impose a set of choices that precludes democratic freedom or in any way contravenes these four principles. We must say to the world, loud and clear, that the ultimate decision on Taiwan's future must--and will--be made by the 23 million people of Taiwan, on their own free will.¹⁹⁸

Such nodal points as "democracy" and "self-determination" tend to be empty signifiers that fix very diverse and dynamic meanings. The reality of democracy in developing countries is complex. For example, Taiwan's legislators sometimes attack each other physically and value polarized confrontation. Many people can use the term democracy to accuse his rival for being anti-democracy. However, by using these terms, the DPP have succeeded in linking the KMT to China and Chinese communists.

¹⁹⁷ Chen Shui-bian, "President Chen's Inaugural Address," Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), May 20, 2000, <<http://www.president.gov.tw/en/>>.

¹⁹⁸ Chen Shui-bian, "President Chen's New Year Message," Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), January 1, 2006, <<http://www.president.gov.tw/en/>>.

3. Policies to build a Taiwanese nation

The discursive practices that have constructed a Taiwanese national identity consist not only of words and languages, but also of policies and actions. Chen Shui-bian not only has grasped every opportunity to replace the “Republic of China” with “Taiwan,” but also has adopted policies to move Taiwan to *de jure* independence, particularly through the procedure of establishing the nation by referendum, as is suggested by the DPP’s political platform.

In 2003, Chen Shui-bian proposed for a referendum law, and the KMT/PFP controlled Legislative Yuan passed a referendum law in November 2003. Though the adopted referendum law excluded possibility of referendum on such issues as territory and national designation, Chen made use of an article in the referendum law about defensive referendum and held the first referendum in Taiwan along with the presidential election. Since the DPP had been advocating for establishing a new nation and declaring Taiwan independence through referendum, adopting a referendum law and holding a referendum all across Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu provided pro-independence people the imagination that Taiwan was moving closer to establishing a nation through referendum. This helped Chen mobilize Taiwanese nationalists to vote.

In September 2003, Chen announced his intention to push forth drafting a new constitution. He promised that the new constitution would be adopted by referendum in 2006 and enacted in 2008. The current ROC constitution was adopted on December 25, 1946, when the KMT ruled both the mainland and Taiwan. Since Article 4 of the current ROC Constitution states that “the territory of the Republic of China according to its existing national boundaries shall not be altered except by resolution of the National Assembly,” which implies Taiwan, along with other provinces on the mainland, is part of China, many Taiwan independence activists have aimed at drafting a new constitution and severing the last link between Taiwan and the “one China” principle.¹⁹⁹ Chen’s

¹⁹⁹ Office of the President, ROC, “Zhonghua minguo xianfa yu zengxiu [Constitution of Republic of China and its Additions and Amendments],” <http://www.president.gov.tw/1_roc_intro/law_intro.html>. Also see Gunter Schubert, “Closing the Gap: An Alternative Reading of National Identity and Cross-Strait

proposal was again interpreted as a move to Taiwan's *de jure* independence. In fact, despite the delay because of Chen's wife was prosecuted of corruption and Chen was demanded by mass protests to resign in 2006, Chen still had Chen Ming-tong, a political science professor from National Taiwan University, draft a new constitution. Chen is planning to propose a referendum on the constitution along with the 2008 presidential election. In fact, in order to make it possible for amending the constitution or adopting a new constitution by means of referendum, Chen pushed forth a constitutional amendment in 2005 to abolish the National Assembly and set the procedure for constitutional amendment that constitutional amendment should be proposed by three fourth of the legislators in the Legislative Yuan and approved by over one half of all voters.

As a whole, under Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian's rulings, the government of Taiwan has moved its position on Taiwan's status and its relationship with mainland China from the "one China, two equal political entities" representation to a "Taiwan independence" representation. While Lee focused on drawing a boundary between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, Chen has tried to reinforce the boundary between Taiwan and mainland China. While Lee has employed a policy of "two Chinas," Chen's policy has been "one China, one Taiwan." As a result of these policies, Taiwanese nationalist discourse has gained hegemony in Taiwan.


IV. Changes of positions by the parties

Having examined the nationalist discourses embraced by the KMT, the DPP, and the CPP in Chapter 4 and the political speaking and policies by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian in Chapter 5, I summarize in Figure 5.3 the trajectories of the positions held by three parties so as to clarify the position changes regarding Taiwan's status and its relationship with mainland China. Before late 1980s and early 1990s, the KMT that was ruling Taiwan embraced the "one China, anti-communism" representation. It viewed the government of the ROC as the sole legal government of China and the CCP as a rebellion group. Therefore, from its point of view, Taipei was the national government, and Beijing was a local authority. On the other hand, the CCP embracing "one China, unification"

Relations in Taiwan's Party Politics," in Gunter Schucher, and Margot Schuller, eds., *Perspectives on Cross-Strait Relations: Views from Europe* (Hamburg, Mitteilungen des Insituts fur Asienkunde, 2005), 65.

presentation viewed the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China and Taiwan as a renegade province. Therefore, from its point of view, Beijing was the national government and Taipei was only a local authority. In late 1980s and early 1990s, the KMT repositioned and embraced “one China, two equal political entities” representation. As a result, the KMT recognized Beijing as a national government, but it also viewed Taipei as a national government. Moreover, under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui, the KMT’s position moved gradually to a “two Chinas” position, which argued that the ROC and the PRC were two states rather than one. The DPP embraced Taiwanese nationalism and argued that Taiwan’s future should be determined by the Taiwanese people. In 1990, it even adopted a “Taiwan independence” platform and set establishing the Republic of Taiwan as its goal. It was evident that they viewed Beijing as the national government of the PRC and Taipei as the national government of Taiwan, and Taiwan was independent of the PRC. However, in order to grasp votes from the middle ground, the DPP adopted a *Resolution on Taiwan’s Future*, accepting the national designation of Republic of China as well as committing to pursue *de jure* independence for Taiwan in the long term. The resolution gave people in Taiwan the impression that the DPP was going a middle way. However, after Chen Shui-bian became president and consolidated his power, he strived to move Taiwan into *de jure* independence. Meanwhile, in recent years, the CCP has tended to move to a “one China, status quo” presentation, accepting that both Taiwan and mainland China belong to China and they are on an equal footing. After Lee Teng-hui was expelled from the KMT in 2001, the KMT under the leadership of Lien Chan distanced itself from the “special state-to-state position.” Instead, it tended to return to its original position consistent with “one China, two equal political entities” by recognizing the “1992 Consensus.” These position changes have been described in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5. 3: Trajectories of the Positions of KMT, DPP, and CCP



Chapter 6. The Discursive Mechanisms Underlying the Rise of Taiwanese National Identity

In Chapter 4, I have outlined the three major nationalist discourses that have participated in the contestation in defining the status of Taiwan and its relationship with mainland China. All the discourses have their articulations on the boundary between Taiwan and mainland China and the level of Taiwanese identity. In Chapter 5, I have reviewed the discursive practices, including languages and policies, employed by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian in constructing the boundary between Taiwan and mainland China and promoting a Taiwanese national identity among people in Taiwan. Starting from this chapter, I will explore the discursive and institutional mechanisms underlying the rise of the Taiwanese national identity. I will focus on the contestation among the major discourses, the issue of provincial origin, and Taiwan's democratization in explaining for the hegemony of Taiwanese nationalist discourse and the rise of a Taiwanese national identity.

1. National identities defined by the three nationalist discourses

The KMT's Chinese nationalism, the CCP's Chinese nationalism, and the DPP's Taiwanese nationalism are the major discourses that have competed with one another to define the national identity of the people in Taiwan. The KMT's Chinese nationalism and the CCP's Chinese nationalism tend to define the national identity of people in Taiwan as Chinese, though the specific meanings of their Chinese national identities may not be the same. While the KMT's Chinese nationalism argues for identification with the Republic of China, the CCP's Chinese nationalism argues for identification with the People's Republic of China. In contrast to both Chinese nationalisms, Taiwanese nationalism has defined the national identity of people in Taiwan as Taiwanese instead of Chinese. The rise of Taiwanese national identity has been an effect of the contest among them, which results in the ascension of Taiwanese nationalism in Taiwan.

All these nationalist frameworks tend to define their own national identity by constructing antagonism between the self and the Other. In the KMT's Chinese nationalist discourse, the Chinese national identity in Taiwan has been defined by constructing PRC as a threat to the Chinese culture and the Chinese nation: the KMT's "one China, anti-communism" representation distinguishes between the CCP and the hundreds of millions of "compatriots on the mainland" (*dalu tongbao*), and it labeled the former as puppet of the Soviet Union or "communist bandits" and the latter as being silent and unable to represent themselves. In contrast, in the CCP's Chinese nationalist discourse, the Chinese national identity for Taiwan has been defined by constructing an antagonism between Chinese and foreign forces. As a result, a relation of equivalence is built between Taiwan and mainland China. The CCP's "one China, unification" representation distinguished between the ROC government and the people in Taiwan, labeling the former as collaborators with foreign forces and the latter as being waiting to be liberated. After Taiwan was democratized, the CCP tended to represent people in Taiwan as desiring for reunification. Meanwhile, the PRC refused to renounce the use of force by arguing that this was to prevent Taiwan from being interfered by foreign forces.²⁰⁰

Before the late 1970s, while the KMT described the CCP as "communist bandits" that were enthralled by communism and did harm to the Chinese nation, while the CCP described the KMT as the "running dog" of imperialism.²⁰¹ In fact, in his three "Messages to Compatriots in Taiwan" (*gao Taiwan tongbao shu*), Mao Zedong often teased Taipei about the Chiang regime's dependence on foreign forces, particularly on the United States.²⁰² While the KMT claimed to be the orthodoxy of China by accusing the CCP of destroying the Chinese traditional culture, the CCP also claimed to be the orthodoxy by declaring to replace the ROC with the PRC and accusing the KMT regime

²⁰⁰ As PRC president Jiang Zemin said, "Our not undertaking to give up the use of force is not directed against our compatriots in Taiwan but against the schemes of foreign forces to interfere with China's unification and to bring about the 'independence of Taiwan.'" See Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, PRC, "Jiang Zemin's Eight-Point Proposal."

²⁰¹ For example, see Mao Zedong, "The Chinese People Have Stood Up!" (September 21, 1949), *East Asian Studies Documents*, UCLA Center for East Asian Studies, <<http://www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/documents/mao490921.htm>>.

²⁰² For example, see Mao Zedong, "Gao Taiwan Tongbao Shu [A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan]," October 6, 1958, <<http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/TCC/haixia/17417.htm>>.

of harming the national interests of China by making Taiwan American's "unsinkable aircraft carrier." Both sides viewed each other as a lost and deviant part of China and claimed to defend China, yet with different definitions of "Chineseness." From the KMT's perspective, defending the Republic of China (ROC) against the CCP was meant to defend the "Chineseness" against communism. Its "Chinese" is interpreted as traditional Chinese culture. On the other hand, from the CCP's perspective, defending the new China (PRC) and "liberating" Taiwan were meant to defend the "Chineseness" against American imperialism. That is, these actions would defend the Chinese nation against foreign control and domination. The CCP interpreted "Chineseness" as Chinese strategic interest. While both the KMT and the CCP insisted that Taiwan is part of China and set the unification of China as their goals, they both constructed antagonism of Chinese/foreign and demonized each other: they viewed the other as a deviance from, and a threat to, "Chineseness."

To some extent, the discursive structure since Chiang Kai-shek era regarding Taiwan's status and its relationship with mainland China has been continued even after Taiwan was democratized. Though in early 1990s, the KMT repositioned and recognized the CCP's ruling on the mainland, which lowered the tension across the Taiwan Strait, the cross-Strait antagonism was soon reinforced by Lee Teng-hui government's move to Taiwanese nationalism. In fact, Lee's government constructed "new Taiwanese" national interest by constructing antagonism between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, with mainland China being the negative outside and the primary threat to the "Republic of China on Taiwan." In Lee Teng-hui's speeches in the 1990s, he often emphasized the Chinese communists' non-democracy, blocking the ROC's quest for international living space, and threatening to use force. The contrast between a democratic, wealthy, peaceful, and open "Republic of China on Taiwan" and an autocratic, poor, aggressive, and closed mainland China made people in Taiwan view themselves as a homogeneous community.

Since Chen Shui-bian became the ROC president in 2000, he has promoted the Taiwanese nationalist discourse and a Taiwanese national identity by constructing an antagonism of Taiwan/China and stigmatizing China. For example, Chen Shui-bian often mentioned mainland China's deploying a few hundreds missiles targeting Taiwan,

increasing its military spending, bullying Taiwan for its quest for international space. A negative China helped people in Taiwan to be more willing to accept a Taiwanese national identity.

II. The contestation among the three major discourses

The contestation among the major discourses has also involved the contestation among the five specific representations of Taiwan's status and its relationship with mainland China. The self-identification of people in Taiwan to be a Chinese has mainly derived from the KMT's "one China, anti-communism" representation and the KMT's "one China, two equal political entities" representation. Nonetheless, as a result of the contestation, these two representations have been losing their persuasiveness, and the discursive field has been characterized by polarization, with the CCP's "one China, unification" representation and the "Taiwan independence" representation competing with each other. Particularly, the CCP's "one China, unification" has gained hegemony in international society while the DPP's "Taiwanese nationalism" has gained hegemony in Taiwan. This has led to the rise of Taiwanese nationalist discourse to hegemony. As a result of the hegemony of Taiwanese nationalism, an independent Taiwanese national identity has been rising among people in Taiwan.

The CCP's Chinese nationalist discourse depended on the exclusion of the existence of the Republic of China in the last over fifty years in Taiwan. The DPP's Taiwanese nationalist discourse depends on the exclusion of the fact that for at least over forty years, both governments on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait agreed that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP has excluded the existence of ROC in Taiwan by labeling it as the "Chiang Kai-shek group," and called the replacement of ROC with PRC as "resuming the seat in the UN." The DPP has labeled the KMT rule for decades as "authoritarian era" (*waiquan shidai*) and argued that the belief that Taiwan is part of China has been a "heritage of authoritarian era" (*weiquan shidai de chanwu*) and a "poison of great China consciousness" (*da zhongguo yishi duhai*). However, the sovereignty of Taiwan is by no means a widely recognized established reality. Since both of CCP's "one China, unification" representation and the DPP's "Taiwan independence" representation negate

the ROC, there was a polarization of the discursive field regarding Taiwan's status and its relationship with mainland China.

1. The KMT's "one China, anti-communism" representation vs. the CCP's "one China, unification" representation

It was the rise of the CCP's "one China, unification" representation that has led to the declines of the KMT's "one China, anti-communism" representation before the late 1980s. Both the two representations involved practice of exclusion. The "one China, anti-communism" representation involved the exclusion of the PRC and the fact that most Chinese were living under the PRC instead of the ROC. By labeling the PRC as communists, the KMT constructed the image that people on the mainland could not represent themselves and they had to be represented by the ROC government in Taipei. The "one China, unification" representation involved the exclusion of the ROC. It argues that the PRC founded in 1949 has succeeded the ROC, ignoring the fact that the ROC government has ruled Taiwan for over five decades after 1949.

From 1949 to the late 1980s, the contestation between the "one China, anti-communism" representation and the "one China, unification" had manifested as the competition between the government of ROC and the government of PRC on who represented China. The persuasiveness of the former depended on the recognition of the ROC by international community and the "de-Sinicization" of mainland China. Here, de-Sinicization refers to the actions that the CCP under the leadership of Mao Zedong took to purge Chinese traditional cultural elements. Particularly in the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), many traditional books, customs, and values were destroyed as "heritage of feudal society" (*fengjian shehui de chanwu*). Because of this, the KMT believed that the CCP was semi-Chinese. However, these two conditions had gradually disappeared by the late 1980s. As the "one China, unification" was attaining hegemony in international society, the "one China, anti-communism" discourse has been increasingly marginalized.

Table 6. 1: Competition between ROC and PRC for Diplomatic Recognition

Year	Number of Countries Having Diplomatic Relations with ROC	Number of Countries Having Diplomatic Relations with PRC
1950	53	26
1963	58	42
1966	60	50
1970	68	53
1971	66	48
1972	39	58
1974	20	93
1976	26	109
1977	23	111
1979	21	118
1980	21	121
1981	22	122
1985	25	129
1986	23	131
1988	22	134
1990	27	134
1991	29	133
1992	29	152
1993	29	156
1994	29	158

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC, Department of Treaty and Legal Affairs, quoted from Liu Wenbin, *Taiwan Guojia Rentong Bianqian Xia de Liangan Guanxi* [*The Cross-Strait Relations under the Changes in Taiwan's National Identity*], 2005, p. 20.

First, the recognition competition between the ROC and the PRC increasingly turned out to be a victory for the latter. Table 6.1 indicates that an increasing number of countries have switched their diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC.

Particularly, after the UN's decision to transfer the seat for China to the ROC to the PRC in 1971, the countries that had diplomatic relations with the ROC decreased from 66 in 1971 to 20 in 1974, while the number of countries that had diplomatic relations with the PRC increased from 48 to 93 in the mean time. Today, over 160 countries have diplomatic relations with the PRC, while only about 27 countries have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Since Beijing does not tolerate recognition of both the PRC and the ROC at the same time, these countries, in establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, have generally recognized the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China. Moreover, the expulsion of the ROC from the United Nations in 1971 and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States in 1979 had greatly undermined the legitimacy of Taipei's claim to represent all of China and strengthened the "one China, unification" representation. For example, in 1979, Marshall Ye Jianying, then Chairman of the PRC's National People's Congress, called for negotiation between the two sides for peaceful reunification. In response, the KMT could only take a defensive position by adopting a "3 no's" policy---"no contact, no negotiation, no compromise."

Second, the persuasiveness of the KMT's "one China, anti-communism" representation depended on the perceived "de-Sinicization" of mainland China. By designating itself as a defender of Chinese culture and the CCP's as a threat to Chineseness, the KMT managed to construct an antagonism between Taiwan and mainland China as "Chinese" vs. "communism". However, the antagonism can never fully fix its meaning, and it always faces the challenge from the "discursive exterior." Whenever the people on the mainland "re-Sinicized" themselves, the KMT's "one China, anti-communism" representation lost persuasiveness. This came true in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. In the aftermath of the "Cultural Revolution," radical Maoist communist ideology that emphasized promoting domestic class struggles and international expansion of communism declined. The CCP changed its Taiwan policy from "liberating Taiwan" (*jiefang Taiwan*) to "peaceful unification" (*heping tongyi*) and launched its program of "reforms and opening" (*gaige kaifang*) that centering on economic development. With the people and the government on the mainland rediscovered the value of traditional

Chinese culture, the perception that the CCP was destroying Chinese culture and harming the Chinese nation embraced by the “one China, anti-communism” representation elapsed. The KMT’s “one China, anti-communism” representation was losing legitimacy.

2. The KMT’s “one China, two equal political entities” representation vs. the CCP’s “one China, unification” representation

The KMT changed its position from “one China, anti-communism” representation to “one China, two equal political entities” representation in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. In accordance with this change of position, the KMT’s political regime was transformed in the early 1990s. The National Assembly whose members were representatives of all provinces of China was transformed into one whose members were only representatives of the Taiwan area; the Legislative Yuan was also transformed into one with all members representing Taiwan instead of the whole China; the president was elected by people living in Taiwan instead of all Chinese across the strait; and the provincial government of Taiwan was frozen in Lee Teng-hui’s second term. Because of these changes, the ROC was transformed from a central government with representatives from all China to a government only representing the people in Taiwan. However, the ROC still retained its sovereignty claim the Chinese mainland. For example, the ROC Constitution is a legal device coherent with the “one China” principle. Another document that is consistent with the “one china principle” was the *Guidelines for National Unification*. The *Guidelines* clearly stated that “both the mainland and Taiwan areas are parts of Chinese territory” and that “helping to bring about national unification should be the common responsibility of all Chinese people.”²⁰³ Meanwhile, the formal designation of Taiwan was still the “Republic of China,” which also alluded that Taiwan was part of China. However, the CCP’s “one China, unification” representation continued to silence the voice of “Republic of China” and squeeze the space of the KMT’s “one China, two equal equalities” representation.

²⁰³ National Unification Council, *Guidelines for National Unification*, Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China, 1991, <<http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/macpolicy/gnueng.htm>>.

Beijing has not allowed Taiwan to participate in international organizations for which statehood is a requirement. Even if Taiwan was allowed to join some major international organizations for which statehood is not a requirement, it had to modify its formal designation. For example, Taiwan was a member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) under the name of “Chinese Taipei,” and the ROC national flag is not allowed to appear in the Olympics. Taiwan is a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) under the name of “Chinese Taipei.” It joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 under the name of “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu (Chinese Taipei).” Because of lack of international recognition, the name of “Republic of China” has been ridiculed by Taiwan independence proponents. For example, after being expelled from the KMT in September 2001, Lee Teng-hui has been openly advocating Taiwan independence. He argued that the Republic of China had been dead, and it only left a ghost that was still haunting the Taiwanese people. He argued that it was the Republic of China regime that had made Taiwan unable to participate in international society and have to suffer China’s military threat.²⁰⁴ To some extent, the CCP’s driving the Republic of China out of the international society has forced people in Taiwan into a dilemma: they either accept Taiwan to be “a renegade province” of the PRC or strive for an independent Taiwan state. Many Taiwanese who do not accept the “one country, two systems” formula of reunification find the middle ground between unification and independence to be narrowed and turn to support the DPP’s “Taiwan independence” representation.

Meanwhile, with the rise of the “Taiwan independence” representation, mainland China’s threat to attack Taiwan should Taiwan declare independence and its actions to make the threat credible have provided rich experience for people in Taiwan to imagine themselves as an independent political community rather than part of the Chinese nation. After Lee Teng-hui visited his alma mater Cornell University in 1995, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted military exercises and missile tests in the Taiwan Strait, both to protest against the Clinton administration’s mishandling the visit and to

²⁰⁴ Lee Teng-hui, “Tai ri zuotanhui zhici (2004) [Address in the Taiwan-Japan Symposium],” in You Zixiang, ed., *Lingxiu de Shengyin: Liangan Lingdaoren Zhongyao Yanjiang Xuanji, 1906-2006* [*Leaders’ Voices: 100 Significant Political Speeches by Leaders of China and Taiwan, 1906-2006*] (Taipei: Wunan Tushu Chuban Gufen Youxian Gongsi, 2006), 429-433.

warn against Taiwan's quest for international living space. Later, these military exercises were intended to influence Taiwan's first direct presidential election in March 1996, warning Taiwanese voters not to vote for candidates that advocated Taiwan independence. Table 6.2 summarizes the CCP's major military exercises in 1995-1996. Figure 6.1 shows the locations of PLA's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-1996. What a contrast across the Taiwan Strait: while on one side, people were building democracy by holding presidential election, on the other side, people were trying to intimidate the presidential election. This contrast further confirmed the constructed antagonism with mainland China as an autocratic threat and Taiwan as a vibrant democracy. Furthermore, facing the threat from mainland China, people in Taiwan were more united and more likely to consider themselves as Taiwanese distinct from the Chinese on the mainland. The logic of equivalence outlined by Laclau and Mouffe worked perfectly in this situation. No doubt Lee Teng-hui gained wide support when he proclaimed the slogan of "Be a proud Taiwanese" and "long live Taiwanese."²⁰⁵ Only a few months ago, Jiang Zemin, President of the PRC, proclaimed that "Chinese do not fight Chinese."²⁰⁶ Eventually, Lee Teng-hui won the presidential election with 54 percent of the votes.

The antagonism between Taiwan and mainland China drove people in Taiwan to seek their own national identity and international status. This is the general structure in the discursive field regarding Taiwan's status and its relationship with mainland China. As a result, many people in Taiwan who identified themselves either only as Chinese or as both Chinese and Taiwanese came to accept a Taiwanese national identity. To some extent, it was the rise of the CCP's "one China, unification" representation has led to the decline of the KMT's "one China, two equal political entities" representation and the rise of the DPP's "Taiwan independence" representation.

²⁰⁵ Shih Cheng-feng, "Taiwanren de guojia rentong---taiwanren yu zhongguoren rentong de jiuge [Taiwanese's National Identity: The disputes of Taiwanese and Chinese Identities]," 14.

²⁰⁶ Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, PRC, "Jiang Zemin's Eight-Point Proposal," January 30, 1995, <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=JiangEP&title=Jiang+Zemin%27s+Eight%2Dpoint+Proposal&m_id=3>.


Table 6. 2: PLA Military Exercises, 1995-1996

Date	Weapons Used	Distance from Taiwan
May 15, 1995	Underground Nuclear Test	Approx. 2,000 miles
Jul 21-26, 1995	6 DF-15 (M-9) Missiles (Range 360 miles)	87 miles
Aug 15-25, 1995	20 naval ships, 40 aircraft, artillery, anti-ship and anti-air missiles	85 miles
Aug 17, 1995	Underground Nuclear Test	Approx. 2,000 miles
Nov 15-25, 1995	Large scale amphibious exercises, Dongshan Island, Fujian Province	100 miles
Mar 8-15, 1996	4 DF-15 (M-9)	(NE Zone 22 miles and SE Zone 33 miles)
Mar 12-20 1996	Live fire naval and air exercises, 10 ships, 40 aircraft (new Su-27 jet fighters)	100 miles
Mar 18-25, 1996	Joint Ground, Navy, Air exercises	90 miles

Source: Monte R. Bullard, *Strait Talk: Avoiding a Nuclear War between the U.S. and China over Taiwan*, E-book, <<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/straittalk.htm>>.

Interestingly, on the one hand, the PRC's "one China, unification" representation is conditioned by the exclusion of the ROC. And on the other hand, facing Taiwan's moving to independence, the PRC has been trying to Taiwan to retain its ROC symbolic system. The conflicts between the goal and the strategy of mainland China's Taiwan policy made its efforts to support a Chinese national identity in Taiwan futile, contradictory and confusing. Moreover, Mainland China's Taiwan policy, which consists of squeezing the space for the ROC and threatening to use force against Taiwan, in the 1990s had helped the rise of Taiwanese national identity.

Figure 6. 1: Map of PLA Military Exercise Areas in 1995-1996



Source: Monte R. Bullard, *Strait Talk: Avoiding a Nuclear War between the U.S. and China over Taiwan*, E-book, <<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/straittalk.htm>>.

3. The DPP's "Taiwan independence" representation vs. the KMT's "one China, two equal political entities" representation

The KMT's losing the 2000 presidential election to the DPP incited a sense of crisis among those who identified themselves as defenders of the Republic of China. They protested and demanded Lee Teng-hui to resign as Chairman of the KMT. Lee later became the spiritual leader of an ultra-pro-Taiwan independence party named Taiwan Solidarity Union in 2001. After Lee Teng-hui left the KMT, the party redefined its position regarding cross-Strait relations and returned to the "one China, two equal political entities" discourse. Since then, the KMT has generally been arguing for maintaining the status quo of Taiwan and enhancing exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Generally speaking, the KMT acknowledges the consensus reached by the dialogues between mainland China and Taiwan in 1992, which has been denoted as the "1992 Consensus." The KMT interprets the consensus as "one China, with respective interpretations" (*yizhong gebiao*) that there is only "one China" including the mainland and Taiwan, and each side would state its own definition of "one China." More specifically, in the KMT's interpretation, mainland China calls the "one China" the "People's Republic of China," and Taiwan calls it the "Republic of China." The KMT also contends that China is governed separately by two governments of equal status--- Beijing and Taipei. In January 2003, Lien Chan proposed in his book *Lien Chan's Arguments: New Blueprint, New Motivation* that the reunification of China should be achieved through the form of confederation. On February 11, 2003, the then KMT Chairman Lien Chan said, "The KMT's cross-Strait policy is to implement the '1992 Consensus' and push for positive cross-Strait interactions under the principle of 'one China, with respective interpretation' (*yige zhongguo, gezibiaoshu*)." Lien Chan described the KMT's return to "1992 consensus" as a process of "rediscovering the party's soul and morality. He summarized the KMT's tasks as "being no longer confused about the status of the state, being loyal to defending the Constitution and state sovereignty, being courageous in criticizing the ruling party's shortcomings in administration, and stepping out in developing international relations."

On the other hand, the People First Party founded by James Soong after the 2000 presidential election also embraced similar view on the cross-Strait relations. James Song argued in March 2001 that the both sides of the Taiwan Strait should return the consensus

of “one China, with respective interpretations” reached in 1992 and push for cross-Strait interactions on the basis of the *Guidelines for National Unification*.

Since the DPP became Taiwan’s ruling party in 2000, facing the fundamental difference between the KMT’s “one China, two equal political entities” representation and the DPP’s “Taiwan independence” representation in defining the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China, the DPP chose to prop up the “Taiwanese independence” representation into hegemony. In order to achieve this, the DPP tends to employ such nodal points as “state sovereignty,” “loving Taiwan,” and so on in its public discourse. DPP politicians argue that Taiwan’s state sovereignty is the utmost important, and whoever embracing the “Taiwan independence” representation and tolerating no ambiguity about Taiwan’s status are just and “loving Taiwan.” They accuse those who argue for preserving ambiguity about the cross-Strait relationship and promoting cross-Strait economic exchanges as “identifying with China” and “not loving Taiwan.”

The political discussions on Taiwan’s national identity issue have increasingly been shaped by two antagonisms, one being the cross-Strait antagonism, and the other being the antagonism between the pan-green camp and the pan-blue camp. On the one hand, the DPP politicians tend to divide the Taiwanese society into two camps---the pro-Taiwan independence “pan-green” camp and the pro-status quo and pro-unification “pan-blue” camp---and stigmatize supporters of the latter as “not loving Taiwan.” In this way, the “Taiwan independence” discourse has tried to silence the “one China, two equal political entities” discourse and to eliminate any middle ground between unification and independence. The pro-status quo KMT often has to keep silent on the issue of national identity because its pro-status quo arguments have often been labeled as “selling of Taiwan to China” and “identifying with China.” Since China has been constructed as a negative threat to Taiwan, this labeling has made the KMT in a disadvantaged position. While the DPP’s actions like this have created cleavages in Taiwan’s society and may not be conducive to the formation of an overarching Taiwanese national identity, it provides the DPP with the power to marginalize any voices in the middle ground between independence and unification, especially the KMT’s. As a result, the discursive structure regarding the status of Taiwan has come to be characterized by simplified dichotomies

and confrontations between Taiwan's pro-independence parties and mainland China. Though the KMT tried to differentiate Taiwanese consciousness (*Taiwan yishi*) from Taiwan independence and linked the latter to war, it is not effective unless the cross-strait antagonism collapses. On the other hand, the DPP pushes for making Taiwan a "normal" country so as to provoke threats and angry reactions from mainland China, which in turn justify the "Taiwan independence" representation. The highly developed mass media in Taiwan can magnify the negative effect of mainland China's threat on Taiwanese's perception and reinforce mainland China's image as a threat. These cross-strait interactions have helped construct an antagonism between "Chinese" and "Taiwanese" and led to the rise of Taiwanese national identity. The precondition for the Taiwanese national identity is a negative Chinese identity with China as the Other.

In general, the rise of the DPP's "Taiwan independence" representation depends on the strategy of otherness, demonizing mainland China and marginalizing the KMT's "one China, two equal political entities" representation. Taiwan is often described as a wealthy, democratic, peaceful country as opposed to the poor, tyrannical, aggressive mainland China. Meanwhile, politicians embracing Taiwanese nationalism often exploit the independence/unification opposition in their speeches, especially in political campaigns, and divide Taiwan's society into two parts, those who identify with Taiwan and those who identify with China.

4. The DPP's "Taiwan independence" representation vs. the CCP's "one China, unification" representation

In recent years, the DPP's "Taiwan independence" representation has gradually gained hegemony in Taiwan. "Taiwan is an independent country" has become a new political correctness, even though this Taiwan is sometimes called the "Republic of China." The tension between the DPP's "Taiwan independence" representation and the CCP's "one China, unification" representation has helped the DPP to consolidate its domestic support. Provoke the CCP and generating victimization syndrome among people in Taiwan has been a useful strategy for the DPP to play with identity politics. For example, in the SARS crisis in 2003, Taiwanese government utilized the opportunity to apply for

membership in the World Health Organization. Beijing objected the application by arguing that only sovereign states could join the organization. Inside Taiwan, the DPP government justified the application by arguing that every individual should have basic right to health, and that Taiwan should not be ignored from the global disease control network. The PRC argued that only sovereign states could join the organization, and Taiwan could participate in the global disease control network through the membership of China. Conflicts between the DPP's "Taiwan independence" representation and the CCP's "one China, unification" presentation can often make people in Taiwan to feel humiliated. Usually, the result of the conflicts is that the CCP's "one China, unification" representation continues to be hegemonic in international society and the DPP's "Taiwan independence" continues to be hegemonic inside Taiwan. The conflicts make more people in Taiwan perceive the PRC as a threat and feel alienated from the "Chinese national identity."

Another example of conflict is the Olympic torch route issue. Beijing announced on April 26, 2007 that the 2008 Olympic torch relay route will include Taiwan, with torch going from Vietnam to Taiwan, and then from Taiwan to Hong Kong and Macau. Taiwan rejected the route because this could be interpreted to symbolize that Taiwan is part of China. In fact, some media in mainland China did interpret the route starting from Taiwan as "domestic route." This was how this route arrangement worked, by providing "one route, separate interpretations." However, the DPP government rejected the route, which made the torch relay bypass Taiwan.²⁰⁷ Again, this has created the impression that China has bullied Taiwan. This is due to the situation that the "one China, unification" representation has gained hegemony in international society, yet the "Taiwan independence" is hegemonic in Taiwan.

III. The discursive strategy to construct a Taiwanese national identity

While the structure of the discursive field regarding Taiwan's status and its relationship with mainland China has played a crucial role for the rise of Taiwanese nationalism, the

²⁰⁷ BBC News, "China and Taiwan in Olympics Row," 27 April 2007, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6598711.stm>>.

discursive strategy that the DPP has employed to exploit the structure has also been important. The discursive strategy that the DPP has been employing is constructing a series of dichotomies. By doing this, the DPP politicians have promoted a simplified worldview revolving around the division between “us” and “them” and forced voters in Taiwan to choose from the either-or options. The major dichotomies that the DPP have constructed are as follows.

First, the dichotomy of Taiwanese/Chinese. The DPP politicians argue that since China is an enemy threatening to invade Taiwan, a person can identify himself or herself either as Taiwanese or as Chinese, with no possibility of double identities. Some DPP politicians argue that those who identify with Taiwan are Taiwanese, and those who identify with China as Chinese. Since “China” increasingly refers only to mainland China, which the KMT used to call Chinese communists, people who support to preserve the ROC regime in Taiwan are often accused of collaborators with mainland China. In March 15, 2003, Chen proposed in his speech in the “World Taiwanese Meeting” that the party competition in 2004 would center on “fighting for the economy and reforms” (*ping jingji, ping gaige*) vs. “fighting for election and lip services” (*ping xuanju, ping koushui*), “wiping out ‘black gold’” (*saochu heijin*)²⁰⁸ vs. “restoring ‘black gold’” (*heijin fupi*), “a sovereign Taiwan” (*zhuquan Taiwan*) vs. “one China” (*yige zhongguo*). In June 23, 2003, Chen said when meeting pro-independence groups that Taiwan’s independent sovereignty is very evident and the 2004 presidential election will be a campaign between “each side of the Taiwan Strait is a country” (*yibian yiguo*) vs. “one China” (*yige zhongguo*), “great reform” (*da gaige*) vs. “the restoration of ‘black gold’” (*yizhong fupi*). In summer of 2006, many people in Taiwan protested against Chen Shui-bian and demanded him to resign: Chen’s aides, son-in-law, and wife had been prosecuted for corruption, and he had also been involved in the corruption. However, the DPP was determined to back Chen, and Yu Shyi-kun, Chairman of the DPP, even described the protest as “Chinese bullying Taiwanese.” Another example was that when Yu Shyi-kun declared to campaign for the 2008 presidential election, he wore a American cowboy

²⁰⁸ “Black gold” is a phenomenon emerging in Taiwan’s democratization in which politicians are backed by gangsters and businessmen and return with political and economic favors. It is generally believed that this problem is more serious in the KMT than in other parties.

dressed and said that he is a Taiwanese cow (*niu*) and would defeat the Chinese horse (*ma*, referring to Ma Ying-jeou, presidential candidate of the KMT).

Second, the dichotomy of loving Taiwan/loving China. The DPP often proclaims that it is a party that loves Taiwan, alluding that the KMT and the People First Party do not love Taiwan. Underlying this dichotomy is the Taiwan/China dichotomy, with the DPP representing Taiwan and the KMT and the PFP representing China. Moreover, the DPP politicians often interpret the KMT and PFP's efforts to promote the cross-Strait exchanges as kowtow to China, ignoring that cross-Strait exchanges are necessary for Taiwan to maintain economic competitiveness and alleviate the tensions.

Third, the dichotomy of new age/old age. Many DPP party members argue the change in the ruling party in 2000 was a democratic epoch that marked the starting of a new age, even though Chen Shui-bian won by a margin of only 2 percent of the votes over James Soong. It marked the turning point between the old age and the new age. The old age was characterized as authoritarianism, corruption, Republic of China, darkness, and being ruled by the foreign regime, whereas the new age is characterized as democracy, cleanness, Taiwan, brightness, and Taiwanese being in control of their fate. Chen's inaugural speech in 2000 was titled "Taiwan Stands Up," imitating Mao Zedong's proclamation in 1949 "the Chinese people have stood up." Since the change in the ruling party marked such a difference in history, Chen understood that he had the heaven's mandate to transform Taiwan's state and society. This dichotomy also provides further legitimacy for the DPP to clean up the ROC symbolic system. Because of this mythical great leap, Chen and other politicians feel justified to make statements that are opposed to the ROC Constitution and to modify the history textbooks.

Fourth, the dichotomy of democracy/authoritarianism or democracy/autocracy. In Taiwan's political rhetoric, a democratic Taiwan and a dictatorial China, a democratic current Taiwan and an authoritarian KMT regime become two antagonisms. It is often claimed that a dictatorial China bullying a democratic Taiwan, and thus the justice always resides on the side of Taiwan. It is often claimed that the United States is committed to defend Taiwan because of common democratic values. Thus, the U.S. commitment is

secure. This excludes any realist security consideration in the U.S. commitment and any possibility that the U.S. may not fulfill its commitment. Based on the dichotomy of democracy versus authoritarianism, many symbols related to the Republic of China are believed to be the products of the KMT authoritarian era (*weiquan shidai de chanwu*). As a result, they should be transformed and eliminated. However, this dichotomy disregards many shortcomings of Taiwan's democracy. For example, the DPP dominates Taiwan's Central Election Committee, and when the KMT pushed for legislation to regulate the Central Election Committee, the DPP blocked the Congress forcefully. In the 2004 presidential campaign, Chen decided to combine a nationwide referendum with the presidential election so as to mobilize those Taiwan independence fundamentalists to go out to vote. The two referendum questions are about whether Taiwan should acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons to defend Taiwan against mainland China's missiles and whether Taiwan should negotiate with mainland China. Moreover, Chen's government declared that it would not be bound by the referendum outcome. Meanwhile, by emphasizing Taiwan is a democracy valuing human rights, freedom, and peace, the DPP government tends to reinforce the image of China as an autocracy violating human rights and threatening regional security. For example, in his opening address of the 29th Annual Meeting of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations, he says,

We must have confidence in ourselves, and we must have confidence in the future of Taiwan. In the past, we did not fear the bullying of hostile powers. We loved Taiwan, our native land, remained committed to going our own way, and finally marched upon the road to freedom and democracy. Today, Taiwan faces China's military threat as well as its attempts to suppress our international activities. We cannot escape from this reality, nor can we harbor any illusions. I am confident that if we stand resolute and united, confident in our own direction, we will again be able to walk our own road and determine our own future... What does "Taiwan to walk its own road" mean? This is very simple, very clear, and easily understood: Taiwan's own road is Taiwan's road to democracy, Taiwan's road to freedom, Taiwan's road to human rights, and Taiwan's road to peace."²⁰⁹

²⁰⁹ Chen Shui-bian, "President Chen Delivers the Opening Address of the 29th Annual Meeting of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations via Live Video Link," Office of the President, the Republic of China (Taiwan), (August 03, 2002), <<http://www.president.gov.tw/en/>>.

Fifth, the dichotomy of indigenusness/foreignness. This dichotomy was proposed by Lee Teng-hui, who argued that the KMT was a foreign regime.²¹⁰ What makes difference is the boundary between indigenusness and foreignness. That is, who is indigenus, and who is foreign? In Taiwan's real identity politics, this dichotomy is often closely related to such dichotomies as *benshengren/waishengren*, Taiwanese (*Minnan* dialect)/national language (Mandarin), countryside/city, southern Taiwan/northern Taiwan, resisting exchanges with China/exchanges with China, the class being ruled in the past/the class ruling in the past, and pro-Taiwan independence/pro reunification.²¹¹ To activate its constituency's support, the DPP politicians tend to label part of the people in Taiwan as foreign and exclude them.

Sixth, the dichotomy of normality/abnormality. Taiwanese nationalists often argue that Taiwan should become a normal state. However, what does it mean to be normal? The substance of what is considered "normal" is contentious.²¹² While Taiwanese nationalists use this word as if it is self-evident that normality means *de jure* independence, which is the opposite to the current situation that is featured by the ROC regime, limited international space, the existence of Chinese identity in society, etc. However, one can argue that normality implies not amending the constitution so frequently, or not using political means to constrain cross-Strait economic integration, or not pursuing changing the official symbols of the state, or not exploiting ethnic cleavages in political campaigns, etc. Normality cannot be defined without its opposites, and the dichotomy of normality versus abnormality is dominated by the former.²¹³ For Taiwanese nationalists, China is the source for Taiwan's abnormality. Similarly, what does it mean to be independent? For Taiwanese nationalists, independence is defined by not being part of China or being recognized by other countries. However, one may argue that

²¹⁰ Lee Teng-hui and Shiba Ryotaro, "Lee Zongtong yu Sima Liaotailang Duihua/ Sheng wei Taiwanren de Beiai [Dialogue between President Lee and Shiba Ryotaro: The Sadness of Being Born a Taiwanese]," written by Shiba Ryotaro, translated by Xing Fang, *Zili Zhoubao* [*The Independence Weekly Post*], 13 May 1994.

²¹¹ You Zixiang, *Lingxiu de Shengyin: Liangan Lingdaoren Zhengzhi Yuyi Piping, 1906-2006* [*Leaders' Voices: A Rhetorical Criticism of Significant Political Speeches by Leaders of China and Taiwan, 1906-2006*] (Taipei: Wunan Tushu Chuban Gufen Youxian Gongsi, 2006), 453-454.

²¹² Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 213.

²¹³ *Ibid.*

independence means not taking others into so much consideration politically and economically. As long as Taiwan cannot completely rule out the perception of China as a threat, which is impossible, it is hard for Taiwanese nationalists to believe that Taiwan is independent and a normal state.

According to Laclau and Mouffe's concept of social antagonism, the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference involved in the construction of social antagonism, resulting in a homogenization of both the inside and the outside. In the construction of Taiwanese national identity, the logic of equivalence for the outside is "KMT=ROC=Chinese=China=PRC=CCP=authoritarianism," and the logic of equivalence for the inside is "DPP=Republic of Taiwan=Taiwanese=Taiwan=democracy." The expansion of the logic of equivalence both inside and outside has been driving Taiwan to a situation of what Torfing calls popular social antagonism, in which the society is increasingly divided into two camps, namely a pan-green camp surrounding the DPP and a pan-blue camp surrounding the KMT.

It is noteworthy that some political and social conditions have been crucial to the discourses on national identity issue in Taiwan and the polarization in position. First, Taiwan's political liberalization and democratization have made discursive contestations among different nationalist discourses possible and has provided an institutional basis for the nationalist discourses to be reproduced in everyday life. Moreover, democratization also empowers the Taiwanese nationalist discourse. Second, Taiwan's media has provided another theatre for the discussions and magnified the tensions among different nationalist discourses. Taiwan has a very developed, to some degree over-saturated, media market. There are 56 domestic and 17 foreign providers supplying more than 135 satellite channels for a population of 23 million. There are at least seven 24-hour cable news channels. Taiwan also has one of the highest densities of satellite news gathering (SNG) vehicles in the world. There are more than 100 news papers, with 30 of them published regularly, and more than 170 radio stations, with many of them having no

licenses.²¹⁴ During the 2004 presidential campaign, every night from 8:00PM to midnight, there were 32 political commentary programs in 10 channels being broadcast successively. These programs find their special ideological niche and made Taiwan's society quite ideological. The talk show programs with political topics usually are ideology-driven, with the hosts and guests often obsessed with political quarrels rather than compromise.²¹⁵ As a result, a democracy and media with wide ideological spectrum enable the debates on national identity to go on and on in everyday life and in every person's life.

²¹⁴ See Ong Hwee Hwee, "Taiwan: Taiwan TV Station Filmed, Broadcast Gangster's Video," *Straits Times*, March 30, 2007; and BBC News, "Country Profile: Taiwan," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1285915.stm>.

²¹⁵ Taipei Times, "Editorial: Taiwan's Media Need Discipline," August 2, 2005, <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/08/02/2003266116>>.

Chapter 7. The Social Dimension behind the Discursive Construction of Taiwanese Nationalism

In previous chapters, I have focused on both political speaking and policies by major leaders to examine the three nationalist discourses in their contestation underlying the rise of Taiwanese national identity. However, national identity formation is more than political leaders' words and actions. Instead, it is closely related to social issues such as ethnicity. In this chapter, I will focus on the issue of provincial origin (*shengji*), which has been a manifestation of ethnic conflicts in Taiwan, and explain how this issue has been politicized in Taiwan's democratization and evolved into disputes on national identity. To some degree, the provincial origin issue has been the social basis for the national identity issue in Taiwan. According to Lalau and Mouffe, the discourse is viewed as coextensive with the social.²¹⁶ In the case of Taiwan, the provincial origin issue has played an important role in the discursive contestation among the nationalist discourses.

1. The historical background of the provincial origin issue

As mentioned above, under Chiang Kai-shek's ruling, *waishengren*--- who retreated to Taiwan from the mainland following the KMT in the late 1940s---dominated the ROC government, educational institutions, army, etc. As Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show, the proportions of *waishengren* working in the government and military leadership were much higher than their proportion in the population. From the point of view of the "one China, anti-communism" representation, this seemed reasonable: the ROC government was the sole legal government of China, and officials in the central government of China should be from all over the country. Therefore, people from other provinces as a total had higher proportion in the public sector. Moreover, since Chiang Kai-shek brought many experts and scholars from mainland China to Taiwan. These people had made great

²¹⁶ For a discussion on this, see Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse*, 32.

contributions to Taiwan’s economic development and social progress. However, from *benshengren*’s point of view, it was apparent that they were underrepresented in the government and in other public institutions, with less opportunity to “be the master” (*chutoutian*). As a result, the difference in provincial origin was attached meaning of difference in social-economic status.

Table 7. 1: Statistical Breakup of Leading Party, Government and Military Personnel in 1988

Division	Total number	<i>benshengren</i>	<i>waishengren</i>
KMT	243	33 (13.6%)	210 (86.4%)
Administration	150	21 (14.0%)	129 (86.0%)
Congresses	1300	220 (16.9%)	1080 (83.1%)
Military	350	15 (4.3%)	335 (95.7%)
Police	150	11 (7.3%)	139 (92.7%)
Total	2193	300 (13.7%)	1893 (86.3%)

Source: Shih-shan Henry Tsai, *Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 176.

Table 7. 2: Makeup of Military Leaders prior to Lee Teng-hui’s Presidency (in %)

Year	General & Admiral		Colonel & Major		Captain & Lieutenant		Sergeant & Corporal	
	<i>benshengren</i>	<i>waishengren</i>	<i>benshengren</i>	<i>waishengren</i>	<i>benshengren</i>	<i>waishengren</i>	<i>benshengren</i>	<i>waishengren</i>
1950-65	1.3	98.7	9.6	90.4	13.8	86.2	52.8	47.2
1965-78	7.4	92.6	18.8	81.2	34.7	65.3	68.4	31.6
1978-88	15.8	84.2	32.6	67.4	48.3	51.7	78.7	21.3

Source: Shih-shan Henry Tsai, *Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 176.

Benshengren were comprised of *hoklo*, *hakka*, and aboriginals, with *hoklo* being the majority. Both *hoklo* and *hakka* were descendants of Han Chinese who migrated from the mainland to Taiwan around the 17th century. Making up the majority of the population, *hoklo* were alienated by the KMT’s cultural policies such as banning the *Minnan* dialect, native language of the *hoklo*, in schools, marginalizing the local *hoklo*

cultural elements, etc. They have been attempting to disrupt the domination of *waishengren* on Taiwan's cultural production. Therefore, the provincial origin tension has also involved meaning of ethnic inequality.

Because of the inequalities in political power, economic resources, and cultural policy between *benshengren* and *waishengren*, there had been a “victim syndrome” (*beiqing qingjie*) among the former towards the latter. The provincial origin issue has also been connected with the “February 28 Incident,” in which *benshengren* were believed to be purged and repressed. Under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo's ruling, the “February 28 Incident” was a political taboo for the ROC. Steps to release and heal *benshengren's* bitterness from this incident had not been taken until February 28, 1995, when a monument to remember “February 28 Incident” was built, and Lee Teng-hui, as ROC President, apologized to the families of all the victims in the incident. Along with this, a committee was established to investigate the incident and compensate the victim families. However, “February 28 Incident” has become a symbol for the cleavage between *benshengren* and *waishengren*. Taiwan independence activists tended to make use of the incident to justify their pursuit and to mobilize support from *benshengren*. Actually, when Lee Teng-hui talked with Shiba Ryotaro about the “sadness of being born a Taiwanese,” he also utilized the “February 28 Incident” by saying “Whenever I think of ‘February 28 Incident’ in which many Taiwanese sacrificed their lives, I believe Exodus is a conclusion.”²¹⁷

Interestingly, pro-Taiwan independence has not only utilized “February 28 Incident” as a symbol for tension between *benshengren* and *waishengren*, but also interpreted it as a symbol for resisting the sovereignty claim by the PRC. On February 28, 2004, the DPP held a human-chain rally called “Hand in Hand Taiwan Rally” to protest against mainland China's deployment of over four hundred missiles in its coastal area facing Taiwan. About two million DPP supporters participated in forming a nearly-500-kilometer-long human-chain, stretching from the very north of Taiwan to the very south

²¹⁷ Lee Teng-hui and Shiba Ryotaro, “Lee Zongtong yu Sima Liaotailang Duihua/ Sheng wei Taiwanren de Beiai [Dialogue between President Lee and Shiba Ryotaro: The Sadness of Being Born a Taiwanese],” written by Shiba Ryotaro, translated by Xing Fang, *Zili Zhoubao* [*The Independence Weekly Post*], 13 May 1994.

of the island. The themes of the rally were “love peace,” “Oppose Missile,” “Need Democracy,” “Love Taiwan,” and “Great Solidarity among Ethnic Groups, Hand in Hand for Taiwan” (*zuqun da tuanjie, qianshou hu Taiwan*).²¹⁸ In this event, on the one hand, the DPP reminded Taiwanese of China’s military threat---especially its missile deployment in the costal provinces facing Taiwan---and the KMT’s putting *benshengren* in a disadvantaged position under the Chiangs’ rule. On the other hand, this rally sent a message to Taiwanese that the KMT who committed the “February 28” massacre is the collaborator with China, and Taiwan has always been facing the Chinese threat. The evolution of “February 28 Incident” into a symbol for opposing mainland China is interesting. In fact, the CCP have, more or less, had connection with the Taiwanese rebellion leaders in the “February 28 Incident.” As a matter of fact, Lee Teng-hui, a participant in the “February 28 Incident,” even joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1946.

In the 1950s, the first decade after the ROC regime moved to Taiwan, while declaring to “recover the mainland,” the KMT imposed harsh control over Taiwan’s society. This period has been called “White Terror.” Any leftist organization, activity, thought, or scholarly research was repressed. Totally, about sixty thousand people were arrested, and about six thousand people were executed.²¹⁹ Among these executed victims, about 40 percent were *waishengren*. The “White Terror” was part of the battle between capitalism and communism in the Cold War background. However, the “White Terror” has also become one of the symbols that pro-Taiwan independence politicians used to describe the KMT as an authoritarian regime and as one of the evidences for *waishengren*’s mistreating Taiwan.

As Taiwan’s industrialization took off the 1960s, more and more *benshengren* became successful in business. A structure of specialization with *benshengren* excelling in business and *waishengren* excelling in the public sector began to emerge. In the 1970s, Chiang Ching-kuo began to incorporate some Taiwanese youths into the KMT. This trend continued to develop in the 1980s. After Lee Teng-hui became President of the

²¹⁸ For more information, see <<http://www.archive.org/details/taiwan>>.

²¹⁹ Chen Yujun, *Women shishui, Taiwan shi shenme?* [*Who Are We, and What is Taiwan?*], 85-86.

ROC and Chairman of the KMT and, the strength of *benshengren* grew rapidly in the KMT. The provincial origin issue developed into conflicts between the *benshengren*-dominated mainstream fraction and the *waishengren*-dominated non-mainstream fraction in the KMT with the former supporting Lee Teng-hui and the latter opposing him. In the early 1990s, with the cooperation from the *benshengren*-dominated DPP, Lee defeated the non-mainstream fraction in the KMT. As a result of the conflict, some young *waishengren* political elites broke from the KMT and formed the New Party in 1993. Along with the fractional conflicts in the KMT, Lee pushed for democratization, particularly for restructuring the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan as well as direct presidential election. He also gradually moved his position closer and closer to the position of “two Chinas” in the 1990s.

On the other hand, provincial origin has also been an important issue for the political forces outside the KMT. The development of opposition politics in Taiwan from the 1950s to the founding of the DPP in 1986 could be divided into three generations.²²⁰ The first generation emerged mainly along with the *Free China* Incident,²²¹ with *waishengren* such as Lei Zhen, Hu Shi and *benshengren* such as Li Wanju and so on as key figures. Many of the opposition activists were *benshengren* who went to the mainland before the end of World War II and were sent back to Taiwan by the KMT as representatives to take over Taiwan from Japanese colonialists. The second generation emerged in the by-elections of the central representative institutions in the early 1970s, with Kang Ningxiang, Huang Xinjie, and Fei Xiping as key figures. The third generation emerged since 1970s in democratic elections, with Hsu Hsin-liang, Shih Ming-de, and others as key figures. They made use of the seats they won to criticize the KMT’s ruling. Generally speaking, *benshengren* have dominated the *Dangwai* political forces.

²²⁰ Wang Jianming, Liu Hong, and Zeng Runmei, *Guomindang XiaTai Neimu* [*The Insider Truth of the KMT’s Losing Power*] (Beijing: Xinhua Press 2005).

²²¹ *Free China* was a magazine created by Lei Zhen, a senior party member of the KMT, and his friends on November 20, 1949. The magazine criticized the KMT’s authoritarianism and Chiang Kai-shek’s autocracy. Due to *Free China*’s criticism of Chiang Kai-shek’s violation of the Constitution by seeking to be a life-long president and Lei Chen’s organizing Chinese Democratic Party, Lei Chen and others were arrested in September 4, 1960. For more information, see Wang Jianming, Liu Hong, and Zeng Runmei, *Guomindang XiaTai Neimu* [*The Insider Truth of the KMT’s Losing Power*] (Beijing: Xinhua Press 2005), 53.

In 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party was founded by a group of political opponents, with its primary goal as demanding for democracy. Later, with its *waishengren* leaders as Fei Xiping withdrawing from the party, the DPP gradually reconfirmed its self-identity as a Taiwanese party. Moreover, its political platform passed in 1991, the DPP set establishing a Republic of Taiwan as its goal. With most of its members being *benshengren*, the DPP has often asserted its identity as a “Taiwanese party” or an “indigenous force” (*bentu lilian*) representing *benshengren* so as to grasp votes from *benshengren*, particularly *hoklo*, who made up the majority of Taiwan’s population.

II. Provincial origin in the construction of national identity

Scholars of nationalism often classify nationalism into ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism emphasizes the common preexisting characteristics---language, culture, tradition, religion---among members of a nation, while civic nationalism emphasizes a nation being “a community of equal, right-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values.”²²² While this classification may be useful in conceptualization, it is hard to distinguish between the two types of nationalism in reality. All nations rely on common culture and history for imagination of themselves.²²³ Without resorting to common culture and history, loyalty to common political creeds cannot be called nationalism, not to say civic nationalism.²²⁴ If nations, as Benedict Anderson argues, are “imagined political communities,” both the boundary and the characteristics of the communities are result of contestation. The three nationalist discourses that have participated in the contestation on Taiwan’s status and its relationship with mainland China have also participated in the contestation on defining the common culture and history of people in Taiwan. Each nationalist discourse excludes or subdues certain aspects of the history of certain ethnic groups.

²²² See Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (London: Vintage, 1994), 3-4.


²²³ For a review and critique of the ethnic-civic distinction of nationalism, see Oxkirimli, *Contemporary Debates on Nationalism*, 22-26.

²²⁴ C. Gans, *The Limits of Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 12.

As Özkirimli argues, the discourse of nationalism differs from other discourses in that it usually consists of four dimensions: the spatial, the temporal, the symbolic and the everyday life. In previous chapters, I have examined the different positions of the three nationalist discourses regarding Taiwan's territory and the boundary between Taiwan and mainland China. In this section, I will focus on the temporal and symbolic dimensions of the three nationalist discourses. The three nationalist discourses have offered very different master narratives about Taiwan's past, present, and future as well as about its symbolic system. Wang Chang-fu outlines the different master narratives provided by the KMT's Chinese and the DPP's Taiwanese nationalism in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2.


The KMT's Chinese nationalism argues that all people in Taiwan share a common Chinese culture that has five thousand years long. They have common ancestors such as Emperor Huang and Emperor Yan, two mythical figures believed to live around 2600 AD. According to the master narrative of the KMT's Chinese nationalism, the Chinese share past glory such as Han Dynasty and Tang Dynasty, which created brilliant civilizations, and the victory of Anti-Japanese War that the Chinese people won after enduring tremendous suffering. The eight years' anti-Japanese war (1937-1945) has become part of the nation's historical memory. Before the late 1980s, the KMT argued that the Chinese nation had suffered, and was still suffering, the rebellion of the communist bandits. In order to recover its past glory, the Chinese nation needed to reunify China under the Three Principles of the People. According to this narrative, all people in Taiwan should be proud of being a Chinese and cherish the Chinese culture and Chinese language represented by Mandarin. They should also be loyal to the Republic of China and love the symbols of the ROC, because the ROC founded by Sun Yat-sen in January 1912 had been the inheritor of the Chinese culture and history and had also been the first democratic republic in Asia.

Figure 7. 1: Master Narrative of the KMT's Chinese Nationalism




Source: Wang Fuchang, “Taiwan fandui yundong de gongshi yundong: yijiuguojiu dao yijiubajiu nian liangci tiaozhan gaofeng de bijiao [Consensus Mobilization of the Political Opposition in Taiwan: Comparing Two Waves of Challenges, 1979-89],” *Taiwan Zhengzhi Xuekan* [Taiwanese Political Science Review], No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 146.

Figure 7. 2: Master Narrative of the KMT’s Taiwanese Nationalism



Source: Wang Fuchang, “Taiwan fandui yundong de gongshi yundong: yijiuqijiu dao yijiubajiu nian liangci tiaozhan gaofeng de [The Consensus Movement of Taiwan’s Opposition Movement: The Comparison between Two Challenge Climaxes in 1979-1989],” pp. 186.

Figure 7. 3: Master Narrative of the CCP’s Chinese Nationalism



On the other hand, the DPP's Taiwanese nationalism argues that Taiwan's history mainly started about four hundred years ago, when the ancestors of *hoklo* and *hakka* crossed the Taiwan Strait and migrated to this island. Taiwan has long suffered for being ruled by foreign regimes including the Dutch, the Spanish, Zheng Chenggong, Qing Dynasty, Japanese, and lastly the KMT from China. Particularly, the "February 28 Incident" in which the ROC regime massacred *benshengren* has become part of Taiwanese's common memory. Moreover, many Taiwanese nationalists may argue, the fifty years' colonial rule by Japanese has made Taiwanese culture different from Chinese culture, which has also formed part of the common memory shared by Taiwanese. According to Taiwanese nationalism, though being ruled by foreign regimes for a long time, Taiwanese people are diligent and enduring. They have not only created an "economic miracle" by accomplishing industrialization and making Taiwan a hub for electronic and informational industries, but also created a "political miracle" by accomplish democratization, which climaxed in the change in the ruling party in 2000. Taiwanese nationalists argue that people in Taiwan should be proud of being a Taiwanese and of Taiwan's culture and history. Taiwanese should speak and love Taiwan's language represented by Taiwanese (*Minnan* dialect, spoken by *hoklo*, who make up the majority of Taiwan's population, and by people in southern Fujian Province of mainland China). Moreover, to make Taiwan a normal state and defend Taiwan's economic, political, and social achievements, Taiwanese people should establish an independent state, the Republic of Taiwan, and be masters of Taiwan.

Borrowing Wang Chang-fu's framework, I summarize the master narrative offered by the CCP's Chinese nationalism in Figure 7.3. The CCP's Chinese nationalist narrative is very similar to the KMT's in their views on the Chinese common culture and ancestors. Yet, on past glory and suffering, the CCP interprets the Chinese history since the Opium War in 1840 as a process in which Western countries transformed China into a semi-feudalist, semi-colonial society and Chinese people struggled with the "three mountains on Chinese people's heads" (*zhongguo renmin toushang de san zuo dashan*), namely Imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. Particularly, the CCP interprets the Chiang Kai-shek ruling group as bureaucratic capitalism that was one of the enemies of

the Chinese people. On historical memory, the CCP emphasized not only eight years' anti-Japanese war, but also the anti-Chiang Revolution War (1946-1949). In the CCP's narrative, the "February 28 Incident" was part of the Chinese people's struggles against the bureaucratic capitalism represented by the Chiang Kai-shek counter-revolutionary group. While also emphasizing Chinese culture and history as content of education and Mandarin as common language, the CCP has proposed for reunification of China under the formula of "one country, two systems." Since the CCP argues that the establishment of the PRC in 1949 was a succession of the ROC, all Chinese people should identify with the PRC and loves the symbols of PRC such as its national flag and anthem.

The provincial origin issue has also been involved in the contestation among the three nationalist narratives in defining the national identity of the people of Taiwan and the past, present, and future of the nation, because each nationalist empowers certain ethnic groups and excludes the voices of others.

First, the narrative of the KMT's Chinese nationalism has excluded the culture and history of the Polynesian aboriginals. While the ancestors of aboriginals had lived in the Taiwan Island since the 7th century and their languages are different from Mandarin, the narrative of the KMT's Chinese nationalism still describes them as Chinese, implying that they are descendents of Emperor Yan and Emperor Huang and their culture was part of the Chinese culture. Moreover, the KMT's narrative also excludes the historical memories of many *benshengren* by defining the anti-Japanese war as part of the past glory and historical memories of the Chinese nation.

While there were some *benshengren* who participated in anti-Japanese movements to resist Japan's ruling on Taiwan or went to the mainland to join the anti-Japanese war, they were only a very small proportion of Taiwan's population. The majority of the population had lived obediently under Japanese colonial rule, and many of them might even have a romantic memory of the Japanese period. As Wei-ming Tu describes, even though the Japanese colonial rule was "brutal, exploitative and deliberately discriminatory," it had many good aspects:

In the half century of the Japanese occupation there was substantial development, especially of the economic infrastructure. Rule of law was fully implemented, complete household registration, reliable demographic and other vital statistics, and an effective police system helped to maintain the social order. Violence and organized crime were rare.²²⁵

In the first years after Taiwan was returned to the ROC, Taiwanese who were disappointed at the corrupted KMT officials described the situation as “dogs gone, pigs come:” though brutal, dogs (Japanese colonialists) at least guarded the doors earnestly, unlike pigs (KMT officials) eating all days without doing anything. Lee Teng-hui, who was born in the 1920s, acquired Japanese as his mother tongue and was proud of being Japanese until the age of 22.²²⁶ Some pro-Taiwan independence scholars argued that it was Japanese that led Taiwan onto the road of modernization.²²⁷

Second, the narrative of the DPP’s Taiwanese nationalism about Taiwan’s history and culture tends to put *hoklo* in the hegemonic status and silence aboriginals and *waishengren*. Taiwanese nationalists often claim that Taiwan has a history of four hundred years, referring to the fact that *hoklo* and *hakka* began to cross the Taiwan Strait and move from the mainland to the island of Taiwan in the sixteenth century. This description is distinct from the Chinese nationalists’ belief that the Chinese civilization has a history of five thousand years. It excludes the fact that aboriginals have live in Taiwan long before *hoklo* and *hakka* arrived in Taiwan. It also severs the relations of *hoklo* and *hakka* with their places of origin on the mainland and with the Chinese history. Moreover, Taiwanese nationalists argue that in the four hundred years’ history of Taiwan, Taiwanese have always been ruled by foreign regimes and have never been their own master. This is believed to be Taiwan’s past suffering and Taiwanese’s sadness.²²⁸ However, by identifying these rulers as foreign regimes, this narrative assumes that there

²²⁵ Wei-ming Tu, “Cultural idneity and the politics of recognition in contemporary Taiwan,” in David Shambaugh, ed., *Contemporary Taiwan* (Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks, 1998), 81.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.81-82, 87.

²²⁷ Li Yongchi, Li Qiao, Zhuang Wanshou, and Guo Yusheng, *Taiwan Zhutixing de Jianguo* [*The Construction of the Taiwanese Subjectivity*] (Tanshui, Taiwan: Caituan Faren Lee Teng-hui Xuxiao, 2004), 41.

²²⁸ See Lee Teng-hui and Shiba Ryotaro, “Lee Zongtong yu Sima Liaotailang Duihua/ Sheng wei Taiwanren de Beiai [Dialogue between President Lee and Shiba Ryotaro: The Sadness of Being Born a Taiwanese],” written by Shiba Ryotaro, translated by Xing Fang, *Zili Zhoubao* [*The Independence Weekly Post*], 13 May 1994.

has been a stable essence of Taiwanese identity for four hundred years. To Taiwanese nationalists, Taiwan is an ahistorical substance. For them, one example of the suffering that Taiwanese people have borne for being slaves of foreign regime was the “February 28 Incident.” They interpret the “February 28 Incident” as a story in which a foreign regime repressed the resistance of Taiwanese people and systematically purged Taiwan’s political and intellectual elites. Treating the KMT as a foreign regime or a colonial government, Taiwanese nationalists argue that the change in the ruling party in 2000 was remarkable because it ended the foreign regime’s rule on Taiwan and for the first time, Taiwanese people became master of their fates. In his inaugural address on May 20, 2000, Chen Shui-bian declared:

Taiwan stands up, demonstrating a firmness of purpose and faith in democracy.
Taiwan stands up, representing the self-confidence of the people and the dignity of the country.
Taiwan stands up, symbolizing the quest for hope and the realization of dreams.²²⁹

For Taiwanese nationalists, the change of Taiwan’s ruling party in 2000 marked a turning point between Taiwanese being ruled by foreign regime and Taiwanese controlling their own fates. However, this view alienated *waishengren* from the Taiwanese identity since they came to Taiwan by following the ROC regime. In order to be considered Taiwanese, *waishengren* had to adopt the DPP’s view of history and culture and be assimilated into the Taiwan-centered worldview. Moreover, *waishengren* are often viewed as the bearers of the KMT’s negative past including the “February 28 Incident” and the “White Terror.”

Third, while the CCP’s Chinese nationalism has similar narrative as the KMT’s on Chinese history and culture, it also tends to exclude the aborigines’ history and *benshengren*’s colonial memory. Describing Chiang Kai-shek’s ruling on the mainland and Taiwan negatively, it tries to establish a view that it is perfectly legitimate for the PRC to replace the KMT to rule all of China. However, this view generally fails to attract those people who are loyal to the ROC and the KMT in Taiwan.

²²⁹ Chen Shui-bian, “President Chen’s Inaugural Address,” Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), May 20, 2000, <<http://www.president.gov.tw/en/>>.

The CCP's Chinese nationalism tends to describe Taiwan's history as a history of resisting foreign invasions. Viewing Taiwanese as part of the Chinese nation, it interprets Taiwan's history as a story of Chinese people resisting foreign invasion and occupation. The 1993 white paper says, "Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits carried out a prolonged, unremitting struggle against foreign invasion and occupation of Taiwan."²³⁰ And it lists such examples of General Zheng Chenggong's (Koxingga's) expelling Dutch colonialists from the Taiwan Island in 1662, the fierce resistance against Japanese by Chinese in Taiwan after the Qing court ceded the island to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and the anti-Japanese war in the World War II that led to the return of Taiwan as examples.²³¹ By describing Taiwan's history as a history of Chinese struggling against foreigners, the CCP further reinforces the idea that the Taiwan issue is an internal affair among Chinese and foreign powers such as the United States should not intervene into it.

Interestingly, Taiwanese nationalists who struggle for Taiwan independence also interpret Taiwan's history as a story of resisting foreign invasion and occupation. Yet, they tend to perceive all the past rulers including the Dutch colonialists, the Spanish colonialists, General Zheng Chenggong, the Qing Dynasty, Japan and the Chiangs as foreign occupiers. To them, while Lee Teng-hui was not a foreigner, the KMT that he chaired for 12 years was still a foreign regime. While the CCP's interpretation of Taiwan's history constructs a Chinese/foreigner antagonism to sustain the notion that all people across the Taiwan Strait are Chinese, the Taiwanese nationalists' interpretation constructs a Taiwanese/foreigner antagonism to sustain a Taiwanese national identity centering on Taiwan, even though it was highly possible that the ancestors of many Taiwanese nationalists actually came to Taiwan following General Zheng Chenggong or in response to the Qing Dynasty's policy to cultivate Taiwan.

²³⁰ Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, PRC, *The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China* (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 1993), <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=WhitePaper&title=White%20Papers%20On%20Taiwan%20Issue&m_id=3>.

²³¹ Ibid.

The CCP's Chinese nationalism also constructs the notion that Taiwan is part of China by having Taiwanese representatives in the National People's Congress. These representatives are mainly Taiwanese living on the mainland. In fact, before 1945, many Taiwanese went to the mainland to join the Chinese efforts to resist Japanese invasion. Some of them later returned to Taiwan following the KMT regime, and others stayed on the mainland being loyal to the CCP. Even after 1949, some Taiwanese in the United States and Japan identified the PRC as their motherland, and they returned to the mainland instead of Taiwan, particularly in the 1950s and the 1970s. These Taiwanese *benshengren* on the mainland had significant symbolic meaning to Beijing's constructing an image that Taiwan is part of the PRC. However, these Taiwanese are only a minority among all Taiwanese. Moreover, many Taiwanese representing Taiwan in the PRC's National People's Congress have not set foot on Taiwan for decades, not to say have contact with ordinary people in Taiwan.²³² Their representation for Taiwan is based on the exclusion of millions of Taiwanese living on Taiwan, similar to Chiang Kai-shek's using *waishengren* in Taiwan to represent a much larger number of Chinese on the mainland.

While the PRC's "one China, unification" representation has been in a hegemonic position in international society, it fails to gain acceptance by people in Taiwan, partly due to the KMT's anti-communist education in the past decades, the DPP's construction of the cross-strait antagonism, and the lack of persuasiveness of the CCP's narrative to the majority of people in Taiwan because of its exclusion of the ROC. Therefore, the competition between the Chinese national identity and the Taiwanese national identity was mainly between the KMT's Chinese nationalist narrative and the DPP's Taiwanese nationalist narrative. Since the KMT's Chinese nationalist narrative tends to uphold *waishengren's* common memory and interpretation of Chinese history and culture and exclude many *benshengren's*, it tends to receive more support from *waishengren* than from *benshengren*. On the contrary, since the DPP's Taiwanese nationalist narrative tends to uphold *benshengren's* common memory and exclude *waishengren's*, it receives

²³² The Associated Press, "Taiwan 'Delegates' in Beijing Spotlight," *International Herald Tribune*, March 11, 2005, <<http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/03/10/news/taiwan.php>>.

more support from *benshengren* than from *waishengren*. Therefore, the provincial origin issue has been heavily involved in the national identity issue in Taiwan.

III. The multiple meanings of “Taiwanese”

As Shih Cheng-feng outlined, the term of Taiwanese has about six types of meaning: first, it is used to refer to *hoklo*, the largest ethnic group in Taiwan; second, it is used as the synonym of *benshengren*, referring to *hoklo*, *hakka*, and the aboriginals; third, it is used to refer to whoever identifies with Taiwan and consider himself Taiwanese; fourth, it is used to refer to all people born in Taiwan; fifth, it is used to refer to all residents of Taiwan; and sixth, Shih himself defines Taiwanese as “Taiwanese nation.” “whoever identifies Taiwan as his motherland and is willing to fight for her is a Taiwanese.”²³³ Shi defines Taiwanese by contrasting it to a Chinese national identity and a Chinese-Taiwanese dual national identity. Based on his definition, as long as someone embraces a Chinese national identity, he is not a Taiwanese. Similarly, many Taiwanese nationalists have defined Taiwanese-ness in terms of political identification rather than ethnicity. For example, *Taiwan Independence Monthly* (September 20, 1976) says, “All people who identify with Taiwan, love Taiwan, view Taiwan as homeland, and are willing to have common destiny with Taiwan are Taiwanese, no matter when they migrated to Taiwan. They will all be new nationals of equal status after Taiwan achieves independences.”²³⁴ Among the types of meaning of Taiwanese listed above, the first and second are defined in terms of ethnicity, the fourth and fifth are defined in terms of residence, the third is defined in terms of self-identity, and the sixth is defined in terms of national identity. Moreover, as mentioned above, the meaning of Taiwan is not fixed either: it sometimes is used to refer to “Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu,” sometimes to “Taiwan province,” and sometimes to “Taiwan Island.” The ambiguity of the meaning of Taiwan also generates problems with the meaning of the third and fourth types of meaning of Taiwanese.

²³³ Shih Cheng-feng, “Taiwanren de guojia rentong--taiwanren yu zhongguoren rentong de jiuge [Taiwanese’s National Identity: The disputes of Taiwanese and Chinese Identities],” 11-17.

²³⁴ Quoted in Shih Cheng-feng, *Taiwanren de Minzu Rentong [The Taiwanese National Identity]* (Taipei: Qianwei Chubanshe, 2000), 1.

Despite the multiplicity of meanings of the term “Taiwanese,” politicians have often blended the different types of meaning of the term in their political speaking. Generally speaking, the DPP has used the ethnic meaning of Taiwanese to justify its nationalist project that aims at the national identity meaning of Taiwanese. This has both empowered the Taiwanese nationalist discourse and provided challenges to it. It has also made it possible for the provincial origin issue to participate in the discourses regarding national identity in Taiwan.

First, the DPP politicians tend to emphasize the ethnic meaning of Taiwanese when they need to mobilize their constituency. Since *benshengren* makes up about 85 percent of Taiwan’s population, and particularly *hoklo* makes up 65 percent, the DPP has tried to grasp votes from *benshengren* by claiming to be a “Taiwanese party.” In the 1994 direct election for governor of Taiwan, which was a competition between *waishengren* James Soong and *benshengren* Chen Jinnan, the DPP proposed a slogan that “Taiwanese vote for Taiwanese.” This slogan indicated that the DPP viewed James Soong not as Taiwanese. In the 2000 presidential election, after Chen Shui-bian, a *hoklo* from the DPP, defeated James Soong, a *waishengren* independent candidate, Lien Chan, a *benshengren* from the KMT, and Li Ao, a *waishengren* representing the New Party, he said in his inaugural speech that “Taiwan stands up!” It implied that if James Soong won the election, Taiwan would fall down. As a matter of fact, James Soong failed to gain nomination by the KMT as a presidential candidate mainly because Lee Teng-hui, then Chairman of the KMT did not want a *waishengren* to become Taiwan’s president.

Second, the DPP often uses the national identity meaning of Taiwanese to accuse the KMT of not identifying with Taiwan. For example, after Ma Ying-jeou was elected the KMT chairman in 2005, he proposed an interpretation of the early history of the KMT as “Sun Yat-sen first connected to Taiwan then had China.” Yu Shyi-kun of the DPP criticized Ma Ying-jeou for having “no Taiwan priority, no Taiwanese identity, and no Taiwanese subjectivity.”²³⁵

²³⁵ Duoweishe, “You Shyi-kun da jiaxiangdi: tongpi Ma Ying-jeou ‘sange meiyou’ [You Shyi-kun Fight Imagined Enemy: Criticizing Ma Ying-jeou for ‘Three Nos’],” www.duoweinews.com, August 24, 2005.

Third, the construction of a Taiwan-centered national imagination involves localizing the ROC's national cultural elements into just for *waishengren* and nationalizing the Taiwanese local cultural elements. For example, while in the KMT's Chinese nationalist discourse, *waishengren* were representatives of people from all over China except Taiwan, in the Taiwanese nationalist discourse they are just a minority ethnic group in the Taiwanese nation. While in the KMT's Chinese nationalist discourse Mandarin is the national language that is generally used, the DPP government is attempting to challenge its hegemonic status by listing *Minnan* dialect, *hakka* dialect, and the native languages spoken by aboriginals as national languages.²³⁶

Fourth, Taiwanese nationalists also like to reduce the identification with Taiwan to identification with Taiwan's land. For many Taiwanese nationalists, since the land of Taiwan has been there for a long time, Taiwan is assumed to be there naturally. By attaching the Taiwanese-ness to such symbols as the land, the island, the ocean, and a specific type of climate, Taiwanese nationalists tend to construct an ahistorical Taiwan, a Taiwan as an eternal entity. Facing the DPP's accusation of "not loving Taiwan," Lien Chan and James Soong, the presidential candidate from the KMT and the vice-presidential candidate from the People First Party, chose to kiss the land in the 2004 presidential campaign to show their loyalty to Taiwan and to ensure the people that they would not sell off Taiwan to China.

²³⁶ China Times, "Sukui: Rang gezhong muyu dou shou zunzhong [Premiere Su: Let All Native Languages Be Respected]," March 21, 2007, <<http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-News/2007Cti-News-Content/0,4521,110502+112007032100041,00.html>>.

Chapter 8. Nationalist Discourses and Democratization

Nationalism has played an important role in Taiwan's democratization and has also been one of the defining forces of Taiwan's democracy. In the KMT's Chinese nationalist discourse and the Taiwanese nationalist discourse, democracy has been a very important nodal point. In fact, the persuasiveness of the Taiwanese nationalist discourse largely depends on its claim that the international society should value the freedom and democracy of people in Taiwan. Meanwhile, the DPP often linked the KMT's Chinese nationalism and the CCP's Chinese nationalism to dictatorship and authoritarianism, is this linking true? In this chapter, I will analyze the effects of the KMT's Chinese nationalist discourse and the Taiwanese nationalist discourse on democratization of Taiwan and the effects of the CCP's Chinese nationalist discourse on democratization of mainland China. I will explore why nationalisms, particularly the KMT's Chinese nationalism and the Taiwanese nationalism, have propelled Taiwan's democratization.

Since nationalism has a great impact on the legitimacy of pre-democratization regimes and can provide enormous symbolic power for opposition political forces to achieve solidarity, mobilize the masses, and exert pressure upon authoritarian regimes, the role of nationalism in democratization should be significant. To better understand the role that nationalism plays in democratization, this chapter will compare Taiwan with mainland China, outlining the role of the KMT's Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism on Taiwan's democratization and that of the CCP's Chinese nationalism on mainland China's democratization. More specifically, this chapter attempts to show why nationalism has propelled Taiwan to democratization while it has not had the same positive effect in mainland China. Despite differences in size, economic development level, and legal heritage, Taiwan and mainland China share many similarities: both of them are Chinese societies, and both of them have been a party-state ruled by a Leninist party or a party of Leninist characteristics.²³⁷ The basic logic underlying the research

²³⁷ Steven Tsang insightfully points out that the Kuomintang before Taiwan's democratization was not a Leninist party. See Steve Tsang, "Transforming a party state into a democracy," in Steve Tsang and Hung-

design in this chapter is that for these two similar cases---Taiwan and mainland China---their different perceptions of threat and ideal lead to different outcomes of democratization.

In previous chapters, I have adopted the theoretical insight that identity is constituted through othering and the construction of outside as the threat. In this chapter, I expand this understanding by arguing that in nationalist discourses, not all the outside is perceived to be negative. Outside consists not only threat, but also ideal. In nationalist discourses, there is usually not only a negative other, but also a possible other. The discursive elements of nationalism can be categorized into defensive nationalism and catch-up nationalism and supposing that these two types of nationalism involve two types of otherness---a negative other and a positive other---respectively. I argue that nationalism has been much more conducive to democratization in Taiwan than in mainland China because Taiwan's negative other and its positive other are different, with mainland China being its negative other and the West---particularly the United States, Japan---being its positive other, whereas mainland China's negative other and positive other are the same, the West.

1. Theoretical explorations

We know that the imagination of being a nation always involves boundaries between inside and outside and that the nationalist way of speaking often involves the construction of self/other. While Laclau and Mouffe as well as Connolly observe that the inside and the self are often privileged and the outside and the other are often relegated, I argue that this is not necessarily the case for the discourses of nationalism. In nationalist discourses, the other is often perceived to be positive, and the self is often perceived to be negative. For example, while some nationalists in China perceive the United States as the other and a threat to the Chinese great cause of national revival (*minzu fuxing daye*), others may admire the US's market economy and democracy and aspire to build a great China with the United States as a model. The same group of Chinese students who "are willing to die for the future of China" built a statue of liberty in the Tiananmen Square in their 1989

mao Tien eds., *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1999), 1-22.

protest. Many Chinese economists who pursue the rise of China have an idealist view of the US market economy, and they often justify their policy suggestions by simply saying “because the US has done so.” Therefore, I argue that while the others are often constructed by nationalists as being negative and a threat to the self, they can, in some occasions, be constructed as being positive and as an ideal for the self to imitate. Whereas discourses revolving around the imagination of other nations as a threat and how to defend the nation against the threat can be defined as defensive nationalism, I define discourses revolving around imagining other nations as an ideal to catch up and how to mobilize the nation to do so as catch-up nationalism.²³⁸ While defensive nationalism takes part in the construction of national identity by praising the self against the other, emphasizing threat, humiliation, survival, and so on, catch-up nationalism takes part in the construction of national identity by praising the other against the self, emphasizing strength, values, progress, stages of development, and so on. The threat and the ideal are sometimes the same agent, and sometimes they are not. For example, for nationalists in mainland China, the United States can be both a threat and an ideal. For nationalists in Taiwan, the others are separate, with mainland China being the threat to defend against and the West being the ideal to catch up. For the case of Taiwan and mainland China, both defensiveness and catch-up are important themes in their nationalist discourses. And for both defensive nationalism and catch-up nationalism, learning from the others can be an important strategy for the nationalists to accomplish their tasks.

Is nationalism conducive to democratization, or an obstacle to it? It depends not only on nationalists’ perception about the effects of democracy on the nation, but also on whether the ideal is a democratic country. Table 8.1 summarizes the impacts of defensive nationalism and catch-up nationalism on democratization. Generally speaking, when the ideal country that catch-up nationalists want to imitate is a dictatorship, nationalism can by no means lead a country to democratization. For example, in 1950s, when the ideal country for mainland China was the Soviet Union, there were no motives for mainland China to pursue democratization. At that time, mainland China’s situation was a

²³⁸ To my knowledge, David Shambaugh first used the term to characterize mainland China’s nationalism. See David Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of China: Calculating Beijing’s Responses,” *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 2 (1996), 180-209.

combination of Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. When the ideal for catch-up nationalists is a democratic country, catch-up nationalism is conducive to democratization. However, in this case, the overall effect of nationalism on democratization will also depend on the perception of defensive nationalists. When defensive nationalists believe democratization can strengthen its defense against the threat, the overall effect of nationalism on democratization will be positive. For example, Taiwanese defensive nationalists believed that democratization could help Taiwan gain international support and create conditions to hold referendum and establish the Republic of Taiwan. In addition, Taiwanese catch-up nationalists viewed the United States and Japan as their ideal countries. Therefore, Taiwanese nationalism could be described as a combination of Scenario 3 and Scenario 4, and it has been conducive to democratization. When defensive nationalists believe that democratization would undermine the necessary centralization of power and undermine the defending of the nation, the general effect of nationalism depends on the competition between defensive nationalism and catch-up nationalism. Both the KMT's Chinese nationalism before the mid-1980s and the CCP's nationalism since the 1980s fall into this situation, and they can be described as a combination of Scenario 1 and Scenario 4. Moreover, if the democratic ideal in the eyes of catch-up nationalists and the threat in the eyes of defensive nationalists are the same countries, it is hard for nationalism to have positive overall effect on democratization. For example, mainland China's experience with nationalism involves more struggles because both its threat and its ideal are the West. When the democratic ideal in the eyes of catch-up nationalists and the threat in the eyes of defensive nationalists are different countries, it may not be so hard for the country to launch democratization. The KMT's Chinese nationalism before Taiwan's democratization was an example. Generally speaking, whether a nation launch the process of democratization to a large extent depends on how defensive nationalists and catch-up nationalists interpret the effect of democratization, their relative strengths, and whether the ideal country is a democracy. In Sections II and III, I will test these propositions by examining the cases of Taiwan and mainland China.

Table 8. 1: Effects of Nationalism on Democratization

	Defensive nationalism	Catch-up nationalism
Other	Threat	Ideal
Nationalism is an obstacle to democratization when:	1. Democratization is believed to undermine the defending against the threat. That is, when the centralization of power is believed to be necessary.	2. The ideal country to imitate is a dictatorship.
Nationalism is conducive to democratization when:	3. Democratization is believed to strengthen the defending against the threat. For example, when democratization can help the government to gain international support.	4. The ideal country to imitate is a democracy.

II. Taiwan’s nationalisms and its democratization

Since Taiwan was perceived to be a province under the state architecture of ROC, *waishengren* tended to be identified as representatives of the state, and *benshengren* as representatives of Taiwan Province. This state-province, or central-local, inequality constrained *benshengren*’s political participation and put *waishengren* in an advantaged position.

The Chinese national identity imposed by the KMT regime was conditioned by its anti-communism and its construction of mainland China as the threat. The KMT argued that temporary centralized leadership, which rested upon Chiang Kai-shek and, after he died, upon Chiang Ching-kuo was necessary for defending the ROC against the Chinese communists. Chiang Kai-shek believed that he inherited his leadership of the Chinese nationalist revolution from Sun Yat-sen. The mission of the revolution includes, on the one hand, defending the ROC against the “communist bandits” and “recovering the

mainland,” and, on the other hand, building China in accordance of the Three Principles of the People---nationalism, democracy, and the people’s wellbeing. Therefore, the KMT’s defensive nationalism set the CCP on the mainland as the other and sought to defend the ROC and the Chinese traditional culture against the “communist bandits,” and its catch-up nationalism set the West as its ideal and sought to build Taiwan into a “model province of the Three Principles of the People” (*sanminzhuyi mofan sheng*).

In order to accomplish the task of defensive nationalism, besides activating martial law on Taiwan and freezing the central representatives in office, Chiang Kai-shek reformed the KMT from 1949 to 1952 by launching a campaign called *gaizao yundong*: reorganizing the party to forge a unitary (*yiyuanhua*) leadership, reestablishing a political officer system in the army, reinstating the Three Principles of the People as the official ideology of the party-state, and introducing the Leninist principle of democratic centralism into the party, etc.²³⁹ The rationale underlying this campaign was defensive nationalism. As Chiang Kai-shek once said, “If we want to beat the Communist bandits, we must understand all their methods and use their techniques to overcome them.”²⁴⁰ To cleanse the humiliation of losing the China proper to the Chinese communists and to survive the imminent attacks from them, the KMT regime learned from its threat---the CCP---by establishing Chiang Kai-shek’s unprecedented control over the party and in turn the party’s control over the state and the society. Since authoritarian rule was believed to be necessary for defending the communist threat, the KMT’s defensive nationalism in its Chinese nationalist discourse was an obstacle to democratization.

In order to accomplish the task of catch-up nationalism, the KMT regime tried to lead Taiwan to imitate the West in terms of economy, and, at least theoretically, politics. On the one hand, the KMT employed a developmental state model and actively managed the economy to achieve industrialization and internationalization. Taiwan’s per capita income increased from less than US\$100 in 1949 to about US\$1400 in 1973.²⁴¹ The economic development led to the emergence of a middle class. People with a higher

²³⁹ Tsang, “Transforming a party-state into a democracy,” 2-5.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁴¹ Chen Yujun, *Women shishui, Taiwan shi shenme?* [*Who Are We, and What is Taiwan?*], 107.

standard of living increasingly demanded for political reforms since the 1970s. On the other hand, though with flaws, the ROC has regularly held local elections since the early 1950s. The KMT regime introduced county and city legislator elections in July 1950, and later elections of county magistrates and city mayors, elections to the Provincial Assembly, elections of town mayors, elections to town assembly, and elections of village and neighborhood heads were also introduced. Since 1972, the KMT party-state also introduced by-elections to the central representative institutions such as the Legislative Yuan.²⁴² These elections not only cultivated an election culture, but also made it possible for local *benshengren* elites outside the party to emerge and grow into an oppositional political force known as *Dangwai* (outside the Party).

Generally speaking, the Chinese nationalism that the KMT promoted in Taiwan consisted of elements of both defensive nationalism and catch-up nationalism. Defensive nationalism was mainly an obstacle to democratization because the KMT tended to justify its tight control over the state and the society by the need for centralization to defend against the communist threat and to recover the mainland. Moreover, the KMT regime activated martial law, infinitely postponed the elections to the central representative institutions, and lifted constitutional limitation for Chiang Kai-shek's presidential tenure in 1960, all of which were justified by the project of "recovering the mainland." The KMT argued that the authoritarian rule was necessary for the emergency period of mobilizing resources to recover the mainland and to prevent the penetration of the communist espionages. By constructing the CCP on the mainland as a threat, it often labeled political dissidents as "collaborators with the CCP" and repressed them harshly. In this sense, the defensive nationalist elements of the Chinese nationalism promoted by the KMT regime had negative effects on democratization. However, there are elements of catch-up nationalism in the KMT's nationalist discourses, and these elements were generally conducive to democratization. Setting the West as a democratic model and pursuing economic development to improve the people's welfare, catch-up nationalism provided important social and political conditions for the later democratization. The election culture cultivated through regularly holding local elections, and the KMT's

²⁴² Wang Jianming, Liu Hong, and Zeng Runmei, *Guomindang XiaTai Neimu* [*The Insider Truth of the KMT's Losing Power*] (Beijing: Xinhua Press 2005), 89.

respect for the Constitution, though somewhat hypocritically, also laid a foundation for democratization.

Before the late 1970s, because of the confrontation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and in the background of the Cold War, defensive discursive elements dominated the KMT's nationalist discourse, and catch-up nationalism mainly focused on economic development. Therefore, Taiwan did not launch democratization until defensive aspect of the KMT's Chinese nationalism gradually lost its persuasiveness. However, since the threat and the ideal were different for the KMT in its Chinese nationalism---with mainland China being construed as the threat, and the West as the ideal---there were greater chances for catch-up nationalism that called for democracy to gain hegemony, in particular when mainland China became less a threat.

Since the early 1970s, Taiwanese nationalism has been rising, which challenged the KMT's Chinese nationalism. Furthermore, in the KMT's Chinese nationalism, defensive discursive elements were losing persuasiveness, and catch-up discursive elements were gaining increasing legitimacy. For Taiwanese nationalism, both defensive nationalist discourses and catch-up nationalist discourses were gaining increasing legitimacy. Since the catch-up nationalist discourses in both Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism have been rising since the early 1970s, the pressure for democratization has also increased.

As mentioned above, the KMT regime legitimated its authoritarian rule with defensive Chinese nationalism in 1950s and 1960s, and it was so dominant in Taiwan's nationalist discourses that call for democracy consistent with Chinese catch-up nationalism was harshly suppressed. However, in the 1970s, the defensive discursive elements in the KMT's Chinese nationalism faced challenges from the changing international environment and suffered a series of setbacks. As a result, Chinese catch-up nationalists in Taiwan increasingly asserted their demand for political reform of the ROC regime. For example, when the United States transferred the Diaoyu Islands to Japan in 1971, many college students in Taiwan, together with overseas Chinese, protested against the United States. These protests later developed into a social movement calling for

political reform of the ROC regime.²⁴³ The ROC's losing its seat in the UN in October 1971 and the resulting derecognition by many governments in the 1970s greatly challenged the KMT regime's sovereignty claim for the whole China, which in turn undermined the legitimacy of its authoritarian ruling. In response, the KMT regime increasingly incorporated *benshengren* into the party and the government to indigenize the KMT regime, which was the start of the Taiwanization of the KMT. However, the Taiwanization of the KMT could not prevent its authoritarian ruling from losing legitimacy. Democratic activists increasingly called for democratization and *benshengren's* political participation. In the democratic movement, Taiwanese nationalism was increasingly asserted and posed a great challenge to the Chinese nationalism promoted by the KMT regime.

Taiwanese nationalism also included elements of defensive nationalism and catch-up nationalism. The defensive discursive elements in Taiwanese nationalism also view mainland China as the other and a threat to Taiwan. However, they tend to interpret the KMT's Chinese nationalist ideology and, in particular, its claim of sovereignty over the whole China as a collaboration with mainland China's threat. Moreover, radical Taiwanese nationalists tend to transform outward resentment to mainland China into inward resentment to *waishengren* in Taiwan. Since *hoklo* make up the majority of Taiwan's population, democratization would no doubt empower them and make a *benshengren*-dominated government. Therefore, Taiwanese nationalists have always been calling for democratization. Meanwhile, democracy could also enable Taiwan to gain more supports from Western countries, particularly from the United States. The catch-up discursive elements in Taiwanese nationalism set the United States and Japan as the other and the ideal to imitate. While for Chinese nationalists in Taiwan, the ROC regime should catch up the West in terms of democracy and economic development, catch-up for Taiwanese nationalists implies building Taiwan into a normal state, eliminating any ambiguity in its relationship with mainland China and achieving complete independence. This could involve a plebiscite to determine Taiwan's status, a new national designation, or a new constitution, etc. A democratic political system would

²⁴³ Wang, Liu, and Zeng, *Guomindang Xiatai Neimu* [The Inside Truth of the KMT's Losing Power], 88.

be conducive to Taiwan's efforts to achieve these goals. Therefore, both the defensive discursive elements and catch-up discursive elements of Taiwanese nationalism are conducive to democratization. This is why Taiwanese nationalism has been closely connected to Taiwan's democratic movement. Taiwanese nationalism propelled the development of *Dangwai* political force in the 1970s.

As mentioned above, the KMT's Chinese nationalism was conditioned by anti-communism, and its persuasiveness depended on the "de-Sinicization" of mainland China. However, as a result of mainland China's gaining the seat of China in the UN in 1971, the establishment of US-China diplomatic relations in 1979, and, more importantly, mainland China's "reforms and opening" program and "peaceful unification" policy, mainland China was "re-Sinicized." It was the "re-Sinicization" of mainland China and the international society's recognition of mainland China that made the KMT's defensive Chinese nationalism lose its legitimacy. As a result, the catch-up discursive elements in the KMT's Chinese nationalism increasingly took a central place. Moreover, for the KMT's Chinese defensive nationalists, democratization became an important policy to increase the ROC's legitimacy in its competition with Beijing for recognition and international support. Democratization, which used to be identified as contradictory to the KMT's defensive nationalism, now became a strategy consistent with it. When the KMT's defensive Chinese nationalism faced challenges and was losing legitimacy, the KMT tended to reemphasize the catch-up discursive elements of the Chinese nationalism. This is a key motivation for Chiang Chiang-kuo to initiate the democratization of Taiwan in his late years.

Chiang Ching-kuo's starting of democratization was also a response to the challenge of Taiwanese nationalism. In the 1980s, social movements demanding for civil rights and social justice grew rapidly. For example, the number of collective protests in Taiwan, many led by Taiwanese nationalists such as the *Dangwai* and later the DPP, increased from 173 in 1983 to 335 in 1986, and to 1172 in 1988.²⁴⁴ Since pressures from

²⁴⁴ The-fu Huang and Ching-hsin Yu, "Developing a party system and democratic consolidation," in Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien eds., *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1999), 92.

both Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism for democracy had increased, the demand for democracy in the nationalist discourses became irresistible. Thus, Chiang Ching-kuo, a Chinese nationalist, started the democratization of Taiwan in 1986.

As mentioned before, the KMT regime's Chinese nationalist ideology, which set up mainland China as the other, actually helped to construct a "sense of belonging" among all people in Taiwan. It became the emotional basis for the "imagined community" of Taiwanese nation. Therefore, the boundary of the nation constructed by the KMT's Chinese nationalism and that of Taiwanese nationalism are not very different. The difference between them centers more on the distribution of political resources among different ethnic and sub-ethnic groups and the symbols of the state. While the KMT's Chinese nationalism empowered *waishengren*, Taiwanese nationalism would empower *hoklo* since the latter made up the majority of Taiwan's population.

After Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1988, Lee Teng-hui successfully implemented democratization in Taiwan. Taiwanese nationalism has played an important role in pushing for these progresses. On the one hand, in the central representative institutions, the DPP---the major flag bearer of Taiwanese nationalism---cooperated with Lee Teng-hui and his *benshengren*-dominated mainstream fraction of the KMT to oppose the KMT old guards' resistance to democratization. On the other hand, at civil society level, the DPP led a series of social movements to press for democratization.

Collective identity and democracy are mutually constituted. On the one hand, democracy cannot operate without a clearly demarcated political unit and a clearly defined "we." On the other hand, democracy itself can be a type of discursive practice that helps to construct a sense of community and collective identity.²⁴⁵ No doubt Taiwan's democratization went hand in hand with the rise of a Taiwanese collective identity and the rise of Taiwanese nationalism. Taiwan's democratization implies two

²⁴⁵ Yingjie Guo provides a very insightful discussion on the relationship between national identity and democracy in Yingjie Guo, "Barking up the wrong tree: The liberal-nationalist debate on democracy and identity," in Leong H. Liew and Shaoguang Wang, *Nationalism, Democracy and National Integration in China* (London: RoutledgeCurzon), 23-43. See also Ghia Nodia, "Nationalism and democracy," in Larry Diamond and marc Plattner, eds, *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 3-22.

processes: the first process is to construct a community with clear boundary, and the second process is to enforce the principle of popular sovereignty, proclaiming that the sovereignty belongs to the people, and more specifically to the voters. Taiwan's experience clearly indicates that nationalism and democratization are neither mutually exclusive nor contradictory concepts. Instead, they go hand in hand.

As mentioned in previous chapters, Taiwan's democratization has made the contestation among the major discourses possible in Taiwan and has provided an institutional basis for the nationalist discourses to be reproduced in everyday life. Open political campaigns have made Taiwanese national identity and its relationship with mainland China one of the most sensitive issues that can differentiate candidates and mobilize voters. No doubt Taiwan's democratization witnessed the rise of Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwanese collective identity. The public discourse on Taiwan's national identity has been characterized by President Lee Teng-hui's change of position from the "one China, two equal political entities" representation to "Taiwan independence" representation in the 1990s and President Chen Shui-bian's "de-Sinicizing" Taiwan by transforming its discursive regime and symbolic system to be more and more consistent with the "Taiwan independence" representation since 2000.

III. Mainland China's nationalism and its democratization

With reference to Taiwan's experience, this part explores the role of nationalism in mainland China's democratization. Since the late 19th century and the early 20th century, nationalism has been an important driving force in China's history. Mainland China's nationalism also consists of elements of defensive nationalism and catch-up nationalism. For the CCP's defensive Chinese nationalism, the other is the West, Russia, and Japan. Facing aggression and humiliation from these countries and areas, China has struggled to survive division and maintain its independence. It was in the struggles against the West's aggression that the Chinese transformed their view of the world from culturalism to nationalism, from viewing itself as the center of the world to one of the many equivalent units in the world.²⁴⁶ Bitterness and humiliation have been an important part of the

²⁴⁶ Calhoun, *Nationalism*, 94-98.

Chinese nationalist politics.²⁴⁷ In the view of many defensive Chinese nationalists, the simple fact that the West was stronger and had more advanced technology than China was the fundamental cause for Western aggression. As Deng Xiaoping says, “Backwardness leads to being beaten” (*luohou jiuyao aida*). Therefore, the primary way to survive the aggression and maintain China’s independence is to develop a strong economy and a strong military and, sometimes more importantly, to maintain solidarity. For the CCP’s catch-up Chinese nationalism, the ideal other used to be the Soviet Union, but most of time, it has been the West, particularly the United States. Since the foundation of the PRC in 1949, the ideal that many mainland Chinese believe their nation should imitate was first Soviet Union in the 1950s, then themselves or communism in the Cultural Revolution, and then the West in the 1980s. Many Chinese admire the economic advancement, political rights, and democracy in Western countries and hope to make China catch up in terms of economy and politics.

Liberal nationalism, which could be traced back to the New Culture Movement in the mid-1910s and the May Fourth Movement in 1919, was a major type of catch-up nationalism. In the New Cultural Movement, on the one hand, liberal nationalists believed that the cause for China’s weakness and backwardness was the Confucian culture, and in order to save the nation and transform China into a modern country, Chinese must introduce the Western civilization, especially introducing “Mr. De” (democracy) and “Mr. Sai” (science) into China. On the other hand, while elevating individual rights, liberal nationalists prioritized the survival of the nation, and put the collective before individuals. For liberal nationalism, the survival and a better future of the nation is the purpose of pursuing democracy, and the former is also the result of the latter. Meanwhile, only when the nation is liberated can individuals have true freedom and democracy. Liberal nationalists argue for a government of the people, by the people and for the people, and they pursue this as a nation. Before 1949, elements of liberal nationalism have existed in the ideologies and policies of both the KMT and the CCP. Later liberal nationalists criticized the CCP’s monopoly of power in Mao Zedong’s

²⁴⁷ William A. Callahan, “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation and Chinese Nationalism,” *Alternatives*, vol. 29, no. 2 (2004), 199–218.

Hundred Flowers Campaign in 1957, and they were purged and did not re-emerge until 1980s.²⁴⁸

In the 1980s, catch-up nationalism, which argued for re-introducing about the West and advancing the Chinese nation to democracy and freedom, reappeared. The May Fourth spirit was embraced by many intellectuals. Proposing the thesis of *qimeng yu jiuwang* (Enlightenment vs. saving the nation), some intellectuals believed the anti-traditional Enlightenment of the May Fourth Movement had been interrupted by the Communist revolution because of the urgency and necessity of the nation's survival.²⁴⁹ As a result, there was a necessity to resume the task of Enlightenment in the new era of "reforms and opening." In the 1980s, except for occasional resistances and warnings from some old-guards in the CCP, elements of catch-up nationalism were prevalent in the Chinese nationalist discourse in mainland China. Modernization was often understood as westernization. Western ideas were rapidly introduced into China, particularly in the universities, and imitating the West, particularly its democracy, became a dream for Chinese intellectuals. Traditional culture was blamed for China's backwardness, and western civilization was believed to be China's future. This theme was best expressed in a documentary series, *He Shang* (River Elegy), in 1988. The eulogy of the West coincided with a romantic period between China and the United States in the 1980s. At that time, the two countries formed a de facto alliance to counter the Soviet threat, and the United States welcomed mainland China's market-oriented economic reforms. Catch-up nationalists tended to idealize the West, and the image of the United States in their minds tended to be everything that was not about China. The United States became an idealized "non-China," the contrast of a problematic China. The catch-up Chinese nationalism reached its climax when students demonstrated for democracy in the

²⁴⁸ Ross Terrill, Shiping Hua, Anne F. Thurston, and Suisheng Zhao, "Inside the Chinese mind. (Cover Story)," *The Wilson Quarterly*, vol. 29, no. 4 (Autumn 2005), 49-83.

²⁴⁹ Mobo Changfan Gao, "The Rise of Neo-nationalism and the New Left: a Postcolonial and Postmodern Perspective," in Leong H. Liew and Shaoguang Wang, eds., *Nationalism, Democracy and National Integration in China* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 44. For more information, see Li Zehou, *Zhongguo Xiandai Sixiang Shi Lun [A Discourse of China's Modern History of Thought]* (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1986), 7-49; Bao Zunxin *Pipan yu Qimeng [Criticism and Enlightenment]* (Taipei: Lianji chubanshe gongsi, 1990); Gan Yang, "Ziyou de linian: wusi chuantong zhi qieshimian [The ideal of freedom: some faults of the May 4 tradition]," in Li Yusheng, ed., *Wusi de Duoyuan Fansi [Multiple Relrections on the May 4 Movement]* (Hong Kong: Sanlian chubanshe, 1989); and Wang Yuanhua, *Chuantong yu Fan Chuantong [Tradition and Anti-tradition]* (Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 1990).

Tiananmen Square in 1989, which was cracked down by the authorities. Though the prevalent catch-up nationalism in the 1980s was based on a constructed romantic image about the West and a radical rejection of the traditional culture, it provided rich emotional resources and strong motivation for Chinese to demand for democracy.

Defensive nationalism has always been an important part of the Chinese nationalist discourse. Even the May Fourth movement started as a response to China's diplomatic failure in the negotiation for the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The defensive Chinese nationalist discursive elements consist of statist defensive nationalism and popular defensive nationalism.

Perceiving the international society as a Darwinian world, defensive nationalists tended to emphasize the overwhelming importance of a strong state. As Yongnian Zheng observes, "Chinese nationalism tended to preoccupy with creating and maintaining a strong and unified State," and what the Chinese government has been promoting is patriotism, literally meaning loving the State (*aiguo zhuyi*). It implies having a strong state identity and being loyal to the party.²⁵⁰ Zheng argues that in the state-sponsored discourse of patriotism, the CCP has consistently emphasized three elements--- economic development, political stability, and national unification.²⁵¹ For defensive nationalists, all these elements serve the need of defending the threat from the West. As Deng Xiaoping used to say,

The role we play in international affairs is determined by the extent of our economic growth. If our country becomes more developed and prosperous, we will be in a position to play a greater role in international affairs...Therefore...the two tasks of opposing hegemonism and reunifying the country by achieving the return of Taiwan to the motherland both require that we do well in our economic development.²⁵²

²⁵⁰ Yongnian Zheng, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations* (Hong Kong: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 89.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 91.

²⁵² Deng Xiaoping, "The Present Situation and the Tasks before Us," in Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1982* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 224-58, quoted in Yongnian Zheng, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China*, 91.

Besides emphasizing the importance of economic development, the statist defensive nationalism also emphasizes domestic political stability as the prerequisite for China's modernization. Similar to the KMT before Taiwan's democratization, the CCP uses defensive nationalism to legitimate its authoritarian rule, claiming that democracy can undermine the political stability and the strong central leadership that are essential to mainland China's economic development, social solidarity, and its pursuit of national unification. Statist defensive nationalists have a deep fear of chaos (*luan*), and China's past experience of being like "*yi pan san sha*" (a sheet of loose sand) has been a nightmare to them. The rationale of Deng's decision to crack down the 1989 Tiananmen Square student movement was the fear of chaos and the unhappy memory of the Cultural Revolution. In addition, the statist defensive nationalism often emphasizes the role of the state in defending the integrity of territory and pursuing national unification. It is noteworthy that in the discourses of statist defensive nationalism, insecurity tends to be pervasive, and as a result, a strong state is necessary.

Since the 1990s, statist defensive nationalism has been dominating the nationalist discourse in China, and it shows some new characteristics.

First, the state not only continues to emphasize the centeredness of economic development, but also puts the growth of "comprehensive national power" (*zonghe guoli*) as the top priority. What is more, the state-sponsored defensive nationalist discourses set it as national mission to realize the great revival of the Chinese nation and restore the past glory of the Chinese civilization. This implies not only building a prosperous economy and a strong military so that China can defend itself against external threat, but also reemphasizing Chinese traditional culture. In the mid-1990s, the Chinese government started promoting Confucianism, in particular encouraging traditional culture education in universities. In October 1994, Jiang Zemin personally attended the 2545th anniversary of Confucius' birth. In recent years, with Hu Jintao's proposition for "constructing a harmonious society" (*jianshe hexie shehui*), the CCP aspires to build a Confucian theoretical basis for its ruling. Moreover, China is going beyond the concept of "harmonious society" to "build a harmonious world," which forms a stark contrast to the US's realist discourse based on the anarchy assumption or the new thinking of "clash of

civilizations.”²⁵³ China has established over 120 “Confucius Institutes” all over the world to promote Chinese teaching and spread Chinese culture.²⁵⁴ The pursuit of recovering the Chinese nation’s past glory is a project to give the government a mission so that its leadership is beyond challenge, more or less similar to Chiang Kai-shek’s “recovering the mainland.”

Second, since most of the members of the party’s leadership teams in the 1990s and 2000s have not participated in the revolutions that made the PRC, the statist defensive nationalism since the 1990s has emphasized that the leadership teams derived their legitimacy from the party’s past, which we may call it *dangtong* (party legitimacy) as is opposed to the KMT’s *fatong* (constitutional legitimacy). The underlying logic is: the CCP’s status as the ruling party has been the result of China’s revolutions. It has got its mandate of heaven after leading the Chinese revolution to victory in 1949, and the CCP leaderships in the 1990s and 2000s inherit their mandate of heaven from their past generations in the party--- from the Mao’s generation and Deng’s generation. Since the CCP’s status as the ruling party is the result of the nation’s history and the necessity of the nation’s current mission, it is beyond challenge. Therefore, there is no need for Western-style democracy.

Defensive nationalism consists of not only statist defensive nationalist discourse, but also popular defensive nationalist discourse. While the rise of popular defensive nationalism may be partly attributed to the state’s role in mass media, educational system, and institutions, it has also been the reaction to the change of the US’s China policy in the wake of the Cold War. The US’s changing of its China policy helped to construct the image that the West is threatening China. Many actions that the US took in the 1990s --- selling 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan in 1992, opposing China’s bid for the 2000 Olympics in 1993, issuing to Lee Teng-hui a visa to visit Cornell University in 1995,

²⁵³ “Building a harmonious society” has become the key term for the Hu leadership team. Hu also used the term “building a harmonious world” when speaking to the United Nations 60th Anniversary Summit on September 2005, as well as in other occasions. For a discussion on the Confucianization of Chinese diplomatic thinking, see Jeremy Paltiel, “The enigma of arrival: Chinese debate the significance of ‘rising’,” paper presented in the 2006 International Studies Association Convention, San Diego, March 22-25, 2006.

²⁵⁴ See the Office of Chinese Language Council International, Kongzi Xueyuan (Confucius Institute), (2007), <http://www.hanban.edu.cn/cn_hanban/kzxy.php>.

sending two aircraft carriers to the waters near the Taiwan Strait in the area's 1995-1996 crisis---confirmed many Chinese that the United States is hostile to China. The US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 finally led to the eruption of anger and bitterness that had been accumulated for nearly a decade. Hundreds of thousands of college students protested against the United States, which formed a stark contrast to the idealization of the United States by college students in the 1980s. Meanwhile the growing debate on an ascending China in the United States since the first half of 1990s have also incited strong responses from Chinese intellectuals, and common Chinese tended to construe the China debate in the United States as evidence of the West's hostility to China.²⁵⁵ Figure 8.1 shows the number of articles with "China threat theory" in their titles from 1993 to 2005 collected by the Chinese Journal Full Text Database (*Zhongguo Qikan Quanwen Shujuku*).²⁵⁶ Even today, when the United States is more ready to accept China as a "stake-holder" of the international system and to regulate the effects ensued by the rise of China, the Chinese intellectuals are still obsessed in criticizing the US's "China threat theory," which has become a type of identity politics in China.²⁵⁷

It is noteworthy that popular defensive nationalists do not necessarily take a position in line with the statist defensive nationalism. One example is the New Left, a group of Chinese intellectuals, some with overseas education background, who emerged in the mid-1990s and took critical positions against the government's economic and political policies. Employing a Marxist, or postmodern, or postcolonial approach, the New Left tended to blame China's neo-liberalist economic policies for increasing income inequality, environmental degradation, and other social problems. In their view, China's economic liberalization was encouraging the privileged minority to appropriate public properties and to exploit the disadvantaged majority. Meanwhile, they often criticized the


²⁵⁵ For more information on this issue, see Chengqiu Wu, "Barking Up the Wrong Tree? The Master Narrative of 'China Threat Theory' Examined," in Sujian Guo and Baogang Guo, eds., *Challenges Facing Chinese Political Development* (Lexington-Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 111-142.

²⁵⁶ *Zhongguo Qikan Quanwen Shujuku* [Chinese Journal Full Text Database], 2006, www.cnki.net.

²⁵⁷ William A. Callahan, "How to understand China: the dangers and opportunities of Beijing a rising power," *Review of International Studies*, vol.31 (2005), 701-714.

inequality and power relations between the developed countries and developing countries underlying the democratization discourses.²⁵⁸

Figure 8. 1: Number of Chinese Articles with “China Threat Theory” in Their Titles




Facing the rise of defensive nationalism in the 1990s, liberal nationalism, as a type of catch-up nationalism, has experienced great setbacks in the 1990s. While liberals in the 1980s embraced the “May Fourth spirit” and were determined to press strongly for democracy and political rights with a nationalist passion, they tended to distance from nationalism and focus on individual rights and negative freedom in the 1990s. By criticizing the collectivist approach and radicalism in the 1989 Tiananmen student protest, they tended to embrace the Anglo-American conceptualization of freedom and distance from the French Revolution. Meanwhile, many liberal economists---such as Wu Jinglian, Lin Yifu, Zhang Weiyong, and so on---became influential on the government’s economic decision making. While their views may involve elements of catch-up nationalism, they mainly focus on economic issues instead of cultural and political issues. These economists tend to believe that there are many problems with China’s economy that need to be addressed, and that the Western countries such as the United States and Europe provide an ideal model for China to imitate. They admire the Western countries’ well-

²⁵⁸ See Guo, “Barking up the wrong tree;” and Gao, “The rise of neo-nationalism and the New Left.”

developed market economies and believe that only by learning from the West can China achieve long-term stability and its national revitalization. In the 1990s and 2000s, many catch-up nationalists still believe the Western political system is superior to China's, but they are willing to defer their demand for democratization to the future, assuming that democracy will be the natural result of a developed economy.

Figure 8. 2: Ideological Positions in mainland China in the 1990s and 2000s



At the turning of the new millennium, there was a debate between the New Left and liberals on democracy and identity: while the New Left emphasized comprehensive democracy---which appeared to include “participatory, economic, political and cultural democracy”---and popular sovereignty, the liberals emphasized private property rights and individual rights and warned that the collectivist and statist nationalism could lead to the tyranny of the majority and intrusion of individual rights. Representatives of the New Left are Wang Hui, Han Yuhai, Wang Binbin, and so on, and liberals who participated in

the debate are Liu Junning and others.²⁵⁹ Generally speaking, while the New Left incorporates elements of defensive nationalism into their discourses, it tended to point out China's real economic and political problems and criticized the government's failure to better defend the national interest. Despite the differences between the New Left and the liberals on attitude to the West and ideal model of democracy for China, neither of them had positions completely in line with the state-sponsored defensive nationalism. On the one hand, while the New Left identified the West as the negative Other and employed elements of defensive nationalism, it tended to take critical positions on China's reality and undermined the effectiveness of the Chinese government's using defensive nationalism to legitimate its authoritarian ruling. On the other hand, while the liberals often defended the government's economic and political policies and employed a optimistic view on the country's progress, they tended to identify the West as the positive Other and warn of the negative effects of nationalism, including both the statist defensive nationalism and the popular defensive nationalism represented by the New Left and other nationalists. The positions of the New Left and the liberals, as well as the statist defensive nationalism, can be illustrated by Figure 8.2. The debate between the New Left and the liberals was noteworthy because it betrayed the failure for the nationalists and the liberals to see the possibility and great potential of synergy.²⁶⁰ As long as liberalism and nationalism fail to form consensus, they are unable to challenge the government's authoritarian ruling effectively. Interestingly, the separation between liberalism and nationalism since the 1990s can be attributed to the fact that for nationalists in mainland China, their threat and their ideal are both the West.

What distinguishes mainland China from Taiwan is that mainland China's threat and ideal are mostly the same---the West, particularly the United States. As a result, while for Taiwan democratization is the process of differentiating from its "enemy" and learning from its "friends," and realizing what the constitution and government have promised to a full degree, democratization for mainland China implies is a process full of struggles and identity crises: demanding for democracy can often be labeled as being pro-

²⁵⁹ For a comprehensive survey of the debate between the liberals and the New Left as well as other groups of intellectuals of nationalist positions, see Guo, "Barking up the wrong tree," 23-43; and Gao, "The rise of neo-nationalism and the New Left," 44-62.

²⁶⁰ Guo, "Barking up the wrong tree," 37.

West and learning from “enemy,” even as collaborating with the “enemy.” As Yingjie Gao insightfully points out, “At any rate, a real or imaginary ‘enemy’... has changed much in China’s search for democracy, not least by making less attractive what the ‘enemy’ claims to uphold: democratic values.”²⁶¹ That is, the Chinese identity that set the West as the other has constrained Chinese nationalists from wholeheartedly accepting democratic values and demanding for democracy.

Since defensive nationalism---both statist and popular---has dominated the Chinese nationalist discourses in China since the 1990s, liberalism that embraces western-style democracy and individuals rights has been deprived of nationalist resources. While liberalism that argues for catch-up still exists, liberal nationalism that has been prevalent in the 1980s has been greatly weakened. Therefore, while the United States, the only great power that has a commitment to defending Taiwan against mainland China, could effectively exert pressure on Taiwan for democratic reform, its pressure on mainland China since early 1990s has often stirred up great resistance from mainland China. In general, as a result of the separation of liberalism from nationalism in China since the early 1990s, catch-up nationalism has experienced great setbacks, and the demand for democratization from the society has been weak. This partly explains the contrasting political outcomes between Taiwan and mainland China.

However, nationalism is a discursive form that regulates and reproduces certain way of talking, and the Chinese national identity involves the contention of multiple discourses. While defensive nationalism that tends to legitimate the CCP’s authoritarian rule has achieved hegemony in China’s current nationalist discourse, it always face challenges from discursive outside. Under the condition that the United States and other western countries employ a more affirmative approach to China, there is a possibility that the liberals will reach consensus, and ally with, with the New Left and other popular nationalists based on the principle of popular sovereignty. In that case, catch-up nationalism may resurge with a focus on political rights and democracy, which may be conducive to democratization. Moreover, those defensive nationalists who pursue

²⁶¹ Ibid, 38.

national capability and greatness may find that only through democracy can China's economic success be sustained.

IV. Summary

This chapter divides nationalism into defensive nationalism and catch-up nationalism and explores the role of both these two types of nationalism in democratization of Taiwan and mainland China. In particular, I pay attention to the effects of the Other---both positive and negative. The positive and negative others correspond to the threat and the ideal in the nationalist discourses on democratization. Table 8.2 shows the effects of Taiwan's Chinese nationalism, Taiwan's Taiwanese nationalism, and mainland China's Chinese nationalism on democratization. Since the democratic West is the ideal to imitate for both Taiwan and mainland China, catch-up nationalism in both places is conducive to democratization. Since Taiwanese defensive nationalists believe democratization can strengthen Taiwan's defending against the threat from mainland China, Taiwanese nationalism has been generally conducive to democratization. Since both Taiwan's defensive Chinese nationalism and mainland China's defensive nationalism believe democratization would undermine their defending against their threats, they tend to be obstacles to democratization. While Taiwanese nationalists often link the KMT's Chinese nationalism and the CCP's Chinese nationalism to dictatorship and authoritarianism, I argue that the overall effects of Taiwan's Chinese nationalism and mainland China's nationalism on democratization depend on the contentions between their elements of defensive nationalism and their elements of catch-up nationalism. What is more, it is argued in this chapter that nationalism has been much more conducive to democratization in Taiwan than in mainland China because Taiwan's negative other in its defensive nationalism and its positive other in catch-up nationalism are different, with mainland China being its negative other and the West being its positive other, whereas mainland China's negative other and positive other are the same---the West, and in particular, the United States.

Table 8. 2: Comparison between Taiwan’s Chinese Nationalism, Taiwan’s Taiwanese Nationalism, and Mainland China’s Chinese Nationalism

	Taiwan’s Chinese nationalism		Taiwan’s Taiwanese nationalism		Mainland China’s Chinese nationalism	
	Defensive nationalism	Catch-up nationalism	Defensive nationalism	Catch-up nationalism	Defensive nationalism	Catch-up nationalism
Other	Mainland China	The West	Mainland China, <i>waishengren</i>	The West, Japan	The West, Japan	The West
Reasons	Elements of Leninism, the scale of mainland	Economic development, Democracy	Chinese national identity, China’s aspiration for unification	Democracy, state status	Economic and military powers	Economic and military powers, Democracy
Factors as obstacle to democratization	Resistance to the threat of mainland China, recovering the mainland				Resistance to external pressure and criticisms, pursuing economic and military strengths	
Factors conducive to democratization	National identity crisis as a result of diplomatic failures and mainland China’s change, KMT’s legitimacy crisis	Look on the West as the democratic model to imitate	Gaining western moral support, eliminating the <i>waishengren’s</i> privilege	Pursuing democracy, self-determination, and a normal state	Legitimacy crisis if the authority fails to defend the image or interests of the nation	When political catch-up is emphasized, the populace’s demand for democratization may be asserted

Chapter 9. The Challenges Facing the Taiwanese National Identity

Based on this analysis, the strategy that Taiwanese nationalists use to discursively construct Taiwanese national identity among people in Taiwan mainly rests on two antagonisms. The first part of the strategy is to construct an antagonism between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. This is a hierarchical opposition, with Taiwan being democratic, developed, peaceful, rational, and oceanic, and mainland China being autocratic, backward, aggressive, irrational, and continental. Mainland China has served as the negative Other that threaten the Taiwanese national identity in Taiwan. The second part of the strategy is to construct an antagonism between pan-green and pan-blue inside Taiwan. Since Taiwan is a democracy, in order to gain the political power to transform the ROC symbolic system into the Taiwan-centered symbolic system, Taiwanese nationalists need to become ruling party and defend its ruling. As a result, gaining the majority vote to be elected is the paramount task for the DPP. As Hsieh Chang-ting, the DPP candidate for the 2008 presidential election, used to say, “No substitute for victory.” In the second antagonism, the “pan green” camp led by the DPP represents “Taiwan first,” democracy, cleanness, striving for human rights, identification with Taiwan, fighting for Taiwan’s state sovereignty, and *benshengren*, while the “pan-blue” camp led by the KMT is described to be “lack of Taiwan subjectivity,” authoritarianism, corruption, lack of respect for human rights, and identification with China, fighting for China’s state sovereignty, and *waishengren*. These two antagonisms have worked together to help the DPP expand its constituency in Taiwan. By constructing mainland China as a threat, Taiwanese nationalists make Taiwanese identity in an advantaged position. By linking the KMT to the Chinese identity, the DPP tends to silence, and even stigmatize the Republic of China, emphasize “Taiwan,” and put itself in an advantaged position to gain hegemony in Taiwan.

1. Challenges to the discursive construction of Taiwanese national identity

Based on the discursive structure underlying the rise of Taiwanese national identity in Taiwan, we can find that there are at least three challenges to the discursive construction of Taiwanese national identity.

First, democracy prevents the formation of an overarching inclusive Taiwanese national identity. The Taiwanese national identity depends on the construction of mainland China as the negative Other that poses threat to Taiwan. Based on this cross-strait antagonism, if Taiwanese nationalists expand the signifying chain of equivalence in Taiwan covering all people in Taiwan, they should be able to construct an inclusive Taiwanese national identity.

Actually, this was partly what Lee Teng-hui did in the 1990s. By describing mainland China as the threat and proposing the concepts of “community of life” (*shengming gongtongti*) and “new Taiwanese” (*xin Taiwanren*), Lee emphasized that all people in Taiwan were Taiwanese and constructed the antagonism between the “Republic of China on Taiwan” and the Chinese communists. Lee did to some extent succeed in help form a national identity based on political citizenship rather than ethnic origin. However, the precondition for this was the Lee’s unique position and the political resources that he possessed. Since Lee was the Chairman of the KMT and at the same time a *benshengren* Taiwanese nationalist, he could make use of the political resources of the KMT and the ROC regime to pursue a Taiwanese national project and construct an inclusive Taiwanese identity. Though the non-mainstream fraction of the KMT opposed his Taiwanese nationalism and broke from the KMT to found the New Party, this could only make Lee Teng-hui have more control over the political and economic resources as the KMT chairman. At the same time, since he pursued the goals embraced by the DPP in moving to Taiwan independence, he was able to obtain cooperation from the DPP. Taking advantage of and defending this advantaged position, Lee Teng-hui Taiwanese the KMT and promoted a Taiwanese subjectivity.

However, Chen Shui-bian was from the DPP whose most loyal supporters are those who wish for an independent country. It is nearly impossible to him to grasp votes from those who are the KMT loyalists. He can only attract those in the middle ground in terms of party identification. Therefore, winning elections was the precondition for Chen to succeed in his Taiwanese nationalist project. In order to gain the majority of votes to implement his Taiwanese nationalist agenda, Chen Shui-bian has led the DPP to discursively construct the antagonism between pan-green and pan-blue inside Taiwan. This led to the discursive structure characterized by double antagonism mentioned above. Moreover, Chen Shui-bian aimed at a Taiwanese nationalist project greater than Lee Teng-hui's.

While Lee Teng-hui has attempted to construct a collective identity on the basis of the framework of "Republic of China on Taiwan" and called this collective identity as "new Taiwanese," Chen has attempted to achieve the goal of "Taiwan independence," which consists of transforming the Republic of China symbolic system into a Taiwan symbolic system and creating a new Constitution that defines the state's territory only as Taiwan area. On the one hand, Lee Teng-hui moved the ROC that he inherited from Chiang Chiang-kuo to the direction of "two Chinas," one being the Republic of China, and the other being the People's Republic of China. He has done so by Taiwanizing the Republic of China. On the other hand, Chen Shui-bian has pushed for "one China, one Taiwan," transforming the Republic of China into the Republic of Taiwan. While Lee constructed the antagonism between Taiwan and the mainland, Chen tends to construct both the cross-Strait antagonism and the antagonism between the Chinese symbolic system and the Taiwanese symbolic system inside Taiwan.

Though the discursive regimes of these two presidents share many commonalities, their symbolic economies have been very different. Chen's project has, and will continue to, received opposition from people who are loyal to the Republic of China inside Taiwan, people who want to have peaceful cross-Strait relations in Taiwan, and mainland China who oppose the DPP's denying that Taiwan is part of China. This reinforces the antagonism between pan-green and pan-blue in Taiwan. Meanwhile, Chen Shui-bian emphasizes "loving Taiwan," implying that many people in Taiwan do not love Taiwan.

He presumed that Taiwan has been an independent country, and label those who still identify with the Republic of China as not loving Taiwan. This implies dividing the people in Taiwan into “loving Taiwan” and “loving China,” supporting democracy and supporting authoritarianism. By dividing and stigmatizing his rivals, Chen successfully activated his constituency.


If Taiwan is under a dictatorial political system, the ruling Taiwanese nationalists would not worry about gaining majority votes and could implement its nationalist project by force. This was what Chiang Kai-shek did in the 1950s and 1960s. He imposed Chinese nationalism on Taiwan by implementing by force a series of policies covering legal devices, culture, and social structure. He expanded the logic of equivalence in Taiwan and constructed the antagonism between “Free China” and “Communist China,” which results in two highly solid camps, one being the Chinese communists, the other being the people in Free China. This resulted in a highly integrated, inclusive Chinese identity in Taiwan. However, the current democratic system provides space and representation for people who are loyal to the Republic of China symbolic system. Moreover, the democratic system also provide institutional basis for people in Taiwan to discuss the cost and benefits of the Taiwan independence project and make their choices based on rational calculation. As a result, though many people identify with the Taiwanese national identity, they prefer to maintain the status quo, as Figure 9.1 shows. This is to a very large extent due to mainland China’s threat to use force if Taiwan declares independence.

Moreover, the DPP’s efforts to construct the antagonism between pan-green and pan-blue and label the pan-blue as collaborators with mainland China have received resistance from Taiwanese voters. Many people in Taiwan have resentment against the green-blue antagonism and the efforts to create cleavage in Taiwan’s society. This will undermine the DPP’s efforts to hegemonize its Taiwan independence project. In Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan election in the late 2004, the KMT won victory, which indicated that voters in Taiwan had resentment to the DPP’s strategy of division and worried about the security across the Taiwan Strait as a result of DPP’s advancing Taiwan’s to *de jure* independence.

Second, the DPP's ruling since the year of 2000 has been another challenge to the discursive construction of Taiwanese national identity. The DPP's logic of equivalence tends to relate the DPP to Taiwan subjectivity (*Taiwan zhutixing*), and further to democracy and cleanness, and relate the KMT to Chinese identity, and further to authoritarianism and corruption. As a result, the DPP has promoted such condensations as "indigenous regime" (*bentu zhengquan*) and "normal state" (*zhengchang guojia*). The DPP constructs the argument that as long as Taiwanese (*hoklo* or *hakka*) is ruling, Taiwan's state sovereignty can be better protected and the government will be clean. On the other hand, if the KMT is the ruling party, Taiwan will be ruled by foreign regime and the government will be corrupted. However, since the DPP became the ruling in 2000, it has also suffered corruption. Moreover, even Chen Shui-bian himself, his wife, and his son-in-law have been involved in corruption. These have disrupted the logic of equivalence employed by the DPP and broken the condensations that the DPP has used. Actually, many Taiwanese nationalists tend to think of Taiwan independence and Taiwan's becoming a "normal state" can solve all problems in Taiwan. However, these are only a myth.

Third, mainland China has also posed a challenge to the Taiwanese national identity. Mainland China has served as the Other for the construction of Taiwanese national identity. And its military threat and hostile words have reinforced the image that mainland China is an enemy of Taiwan, which is the condition of possibility for an independent Taiwanese national identity. However, in recent years, the cross-Strait social antagonism constructed by Taiwanese nationalists has been gradually disrupted. On the one hand, investments, trade, and travels across the Taiwan Strait have woven the two sides together. On the other hand, mainland China has taken actions to show good will to people in Taiwan and have dialogues and exchanges with the KMT, which have improve its image in many Taiwanese minds. I will elaborate these two points in Section II and Section III.

Figure 9. 1:



Sources: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, important political attitude trend distribution.

II. The cross-Strait economic integration

From early 1950 to 1987, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait had been completely isolated from each other. If anyone went to the other side, he would be treated as a “traitor,” and the other side would view him as a hero. For example, after the armistice of the Korean War in 1953, about 14,000 PLA soldiers who were captured by the UN armies decided to go to Taiwan, and they received warm welcome from Chiang Kai-shek. In early 1970s, some Taiwanese students studying in the United States were disappointed by ROC’s failure to stop the United States from handing the Diaoyu Islands over to Japan, and they decided to go to mainland China and view the latter as their motherland. To some extent, the Chinese national identity in constructed in Taiwan by the KMT’s Chinese nationalism before the early 1990s was conditioned to the isolation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Because of the isolation, the logic of difference was sustained, with Taiwan perceived to be the free China, and mainland China perceived to be controlled by the communists. In this imagination, since people in mainland China deviated from Chineseness, the ROC government in Taiwan claimed to be sole legal government of China. Moreover, many Taiwanese had little knowledge about a real China at that time. As a result, the “Chineseness” in their minds was very different from the actual China.

After Chiang Chiang-kuo lifted the ban on traveling to mainland China, the number of travelers between the two sides has increased dramatically. Table 9.1 lists the statistics of travels between the mainland and Taiwan in since 1987. In the year of 2006 alone, with a population of 23 million, Taiwanese paid over 4.41 million trips to mainland China.²⁶² On average, out of every five people in Taiwan, there was one person visiting the mainland once in 2006. Meanwhile, there have also some communication programs between the public institutions of the two sides. These communications programs have also increased rapidly. Table 9.2 lists the statistics of cross-Strait trade. The trade between the two sides before the late 1980s mainly was completed through Hong Kong. Since the 1990s, the total cross-Strait trade volume has increased drastically from 4.043

²⁶² Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, PRC, “2006 nian liangan renyuan wanglai yu jiaoliu tongji [Statistics of the Cross-Strait Travels and Communications in 2006],” *Liangyan Jiaoliu yu Wanglai [Cross-Strait Travels and Communications]*, (2007), <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/jlwl/lajl0.asp?lajl_m_id=702>.

billion US dollars in 1990 to 91.23 billion US dollars, even though direct transportation of goods from one side to the other is still in a small volume and Taiwan has a large amount of surplus to mainland China. Mainland China has replaced the United States to be Taiwan's largest export market. Meanwhile, Taiwan businessmen have heavily invested in mainland China. As Table 9.3 shows, the annual real Taiwanese investment in mainland China had increased grown from 0.155 billion US dollars to 3.97 billion US dollars in 2002, and it has slightly decreased in recent years to 2.15 billion US dollars in 2005. Now, mainland China has become the largest recipient of Taiwan's foreign direct investment. Along with the economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, the two societies that used to be isolated from each other are increasingly connected together. Over one million Taiwanese, most of them are businessmen and students, are living in mainland China.²⁶³ About 500 thousand Taiwanese live in Shanghai.²⁶⁴

Table 9. 1: Statistics of Travels between the Mainland and Taiwan

Year	Number of Persons Traveling from Taiwan to mainland	Growth Rate (percent)	Number of Persons Traveling from mainland to Taiwan	Growth Rate (percent)	Number of Communication Programs to Taiwan	Growth Rate (percent)	Number of Communication Programs to Taiwan	Growth Rate (percent)
1987	46679	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1988	446000	855.46	--	--	--	--	--	--
1989	551800	23.72	--	--	--	--	--	--
1990	890500	61.38	8545	--	13	--	13	--
1991	946632	6.30	9005	5.38	18	38.46	27	107.69
1992	1317770	39.21	10904	21.09	155	761.11	920	3307.41
1993	1526969	15.88	14615	34.03	507	227.10	3309	259.67

²⁶³ Linda Jakobson, "Taiwan's Challenge to China and the World-Part II: A 'Greater Chinese Union' Offers Best Political Solution," YaleGlobal Online, March 15, 2004, <<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3520&page=1>>.

²⁶⁴ People's Daily, "Forty Shanghai-Taiwan Flights to Celebrate Holiday," January 09, 2003, <http://english.people.com.cn/200301/09/eng20030109_109802.shtml>.

1994	1390215	-8.96	17583	20.31	563	11.05	3396	2.63
1995	1532309	10.22	42180	139.89	787	39.79	5210	53.42
1996	1733897	13.16	65205	54.59	971	23.38	5592	7.33
1997	2117576	22.13	56570	-13.24	1257	29.45	8707	55.70
1998	2174602	2.69	78423	38.63	1746	38.90	11462	31.64
1999	2584648	18.86	103977	32.58	1816	4.01	13554	18.25
2000	3108643	20.27	102933	-1.00	1787	-1.60	13623	0.51
2001	3440306	10.67	122198	18.72	2915	63.12	24719	81.45
2002	3660565	6.40	138981	13.73	4384	50.39	38259	54.78
2003	2730891	-25.40	124616	-10.34	2847	-35.06	24480	-36.02
2004	3685250	34.95	144526	15.98	4475	57.18	30728	25.52
2005	4109188	11.50	159938	10.66	5902	31.89	33421	8.76
2006	4413238	7.40	207650	29.84	7243	29.97	40981	22.62
Total	42407678	--	1407849	--	37386	--	258401	--

Source: Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, PRC, “Dalu Taiwan linian wanglai renshu tongji biao [Statistics of Persons Traveling between the Mainland and Taiwan],” 2007, <<http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/jlwl/rywl1.htm>>.

Table 9. 2: Statistics of Cross-Strait Trades

Year	Total Trade Volume (US\$ billion)	Growth Rate (percent)	Export to Taiwan (US\$ billion)	Growth Rate (percent)	Import from Taiwan (US\$ billion)	Growth Rate (percent)
1978	0.046	—	0.046	—	0	—
1979	0.077	67.4	0.056	21.7	0.021	
1980	0.311	303.9	0.076	35.7	0.235	1019.1
1981	0.459	47.6	0.075	-1.3	0.384	63.4
1982	0.278	-39.4	0.084	12	0.194	-49.5
1983	0.248	-10.8	0.09	7.1	0.158	-18.6
1984	0.553	123	0.128	42.2	0.425	169
1985	1.101	99.1	0.116	-9.4	0.985	131.8
1986	0.955	-13.3	0.144	24.1	0.811	-17.7
1987	1.516	58.7	0.289	100.7	1.227	51.3

1988	2.721	79.5	0.479	65.7	2.242	82.7
1989	3.484	28	0.587	22.5	2.897	29.2
1990	4.043	16.08	0.765	30.41	3.278	13.18
1991	5.793	43.26	1.126	47.11	4.667	42.36
1992	7.41	23.9	1.12	-0.6	6.29	34.7
1993	14.395	94.26	1.462	30.54	12.933	105.6
1994	16.32	13.44	2.24	53.21	14.08	8.87
1995	17.88	9.49	3.1	38.39	14.78	4.97
1996	18.98	6.1	2.8	-9.6	16.18	9.5
1997	19.838	4.5	3.396	21.2	16.442	1.6
1998	20.498	3.3	3.869	13.9	16.629	1.1
1999	23.479	14.5	3.95	2.1	19.529	17.4
2000	30.53	31.1	5.04	27.6	25.49	30.6
2001	32.34	5.9	50	-0.8	27.34	7.2
2002	44.62	38.1	6.59	31.7	38.03	39.3
2003	58.37	30.7	90	36.7	49.37	29.7
2004	78.32	34.2	13.55	50.4	64.78	31.28
2005	91.23	16.5	16.55	22.2	74.68	15.3
Total	495.795	—	81.728	—	414.077	—

Source: The General Customs, PRC, <<http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lajmsj.htm>>.

Table 9. 3: Statistics of Taiwanese Businessmen's Investment on Mainland

Year	Projects of Investment	Growth Rate (percent)	Contracted Taiwanese Investment (US\$ billion)	Growth Rate (percent)	Real Taiwanese Investment (US\$ billion)	Growth Rate (percent)
Before 88	437	—	0.6	—	0.022	—
1989	540	23.57	0.432	-8.33	0.155	600
1990	1103	104.26	0.89	61.82	0.222	44.16

1991	1735	57.3	1.39	56.18	0.466	109.91
1992	6430	270.61	5.543	298.78	1.05	125.32
1993	10948	70.27	9.965	79.78	3.139	198.95
1994	6247	-42.94	5.395	-45.86	3.391	8.03
1995	4847	-22.4	5.849	8.4	3.161	-6.8
1996	3184	-34.3	5.141	-12.07	3.474	10.19
1997	3014	-5.3	2.814	-45.3	3.289	-5.54
1998	2970	-2.55	2.982	10.38	2.915	-7.43
1999	2499	-14.1	3.374	10.2	2.599	-13.82
2000	3108	22.16	4.042	16.49	2.296	-9.39
2001	4214	36.15	6.914	73.1	2.98	32.82
2002	4853	15.2	6.74	-2.5	3.97	33.2
2003	4495	-7.38	8.558	26.96	3.377	-14.94
2004	4002	-10.97	9.306	8.74	3.117	-7.69
2005	3907	-2.4	10.36	11.31	2.15	-31
Total	68533	—	90.295	—	41.773	—

Source: Ministry of Commerce, PRC, <<http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lajmsj.htm>>.

Underlying these statistics is part of the economic regionalization. Since the late 1980s, many companies in Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan have moved their production to coastal China, taking advantage of mainland China's low wage rates and low land prices and targeting the US market. A cross-border production network has emerged among economies of Greater China, namely mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, with South Korea and Japan joining in increasingly in recent years. In this East Asian cross-border production network, mainland China—whose technological capabilities are behind those of the United States and Japan – is located at the end-stream of the production chain as a labor supplier.²⁶⁵ As a result, mainland China has replaced Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea as the major suppliers of footwear, toys and sporting goods in the US market. Moreover, it has replaced Taiwan and Japan to become

²⁶⁵ For more information about it, see Nicholas Lardy, *Integrating China into the Global Economy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution 2002).

the second largest producer of information technology hardware.²⁶⁶ Foreign direct investment has contributed to the majority of mainland China's export. And Taiwanese companies have played a significant role in it.

The cross-Strait antagonism has been the condition of possibility for the construction of Taiwanese national identity in Taiwan. The application of the logic of equivalence tends to create two homogeneous identities, Taiwan and China. A popular antagonism tends to relate all positive characteristics to Taiwan and all negative characteristics to China. Moreover, Taiwanese national identity tends to believe that the mere existence of China is the largest threat to the realization of a Taiwanese national identity. Similar to some Mexican nationalists who lamented, "We are too far from heaven and too close to the US," many Taiwanese nationalists also have the same feeling for mainland China. However, in an era of economic regionalization, geographical proximity can also mean an opportunity rather than insecurity. As a result of cross-Strait economic integration, the mutual understanding between people on both sides of the Strait and the intermingling between the two societies tend to disrupt the oversimplified image of mainland China as a threat. This helps disrupt the social antagonism between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

By pushing for cross-Strait integration across the Taiwan Strait, the CCP expands the relations of equivalence and disrupts the logic of difference between the two sides to the Taiwan Strait that has been constructed for over five decades. Meanwhile, by expanding the economic integration, both the KMT and the CPP value a realistic approach to develop cross-Strait relations and bring about economic benefits for people on both sides. Such terms as "win-win situation," "economic competitiveness," and "globalization" became important terms that create a contrast between pan-green and pan-blue, with one side focusing on ideology and the other on economic benefits, one side being emotional and the other rational, one side being closed and the other open, and one side being false and the other real. The deconstruction of the cross-Strait antagonism

²⁶⁶ Nicholas R. Lardy, "The Economic Rise of China: Threat or Opportunity?" *Economic Commentary (Cleveland)*, August 1, 2003.

to some extent also provides possibility to overturn the hierarchical opposition between pan green and pan blue.

Nonetheless, different discourses always interpret events differently so as to dominate the field of discursivity. While cross-Strait economic integration may help to disrupt mainland China's image as a threat and enhance the mutual understanding between people on both sides of the Strait, the Taiwanese nationalist discourse tends to interpret the cross-Strait economic integration differently or emphasize a different aspect of the same process so as to reinforce the two antagonisms that it rests upon. For example, as a labor provider, mainland China's economic growth poses a challenge to the manufacturing of labor-intensive goods in other economies including Taiwan. As Nicholas Lardy says:

Many, particularly in Asia, have adjusted by investing directly in China, with a resulting loss of employment at home. Taiwan and South Korea face the challenge of continuing to move up the technology ladder into the production of more technologically sophisticated, more capital-intensive goods.²⁶⁷

The DPP tends to interpret the cross-Strait economic integration as a process in which mainland China has drained Taiwan's capital, technology, and job opportunities. In this sense, for some Taiwanese, China is not only a military threat, but also an economic threat. Moreover, it not only reinforces the cross-Strait antagonism, but also the antagonism between pan green and pan blue. The cross-Strait economic integration has different effects on different classes, which has resulted in contrasting positions in Taiwan's political spectrum: while the pro-independence parties such as the DPP blame mainland China for absorbing Taiwan's money and draining Taiwan's talents, the pro-status quo parties such as the KMT are trying to push for more cross-Strait economic exchanges so as to maintain the competitiveness of Taiwan's economy.

²⁶⁷ Nicholas R. Lardy, "The Economic Rise of China: Threat or Opportunity?" *Economic Commentary* (Cleveland), August 1, 2003, 4.

As a matter of fact, the KMT gains solid support in the northern part of Taiwan, where *wai sheng ren* and *hakka* are more densely located and the income level is relative higher, and the DPP gains solid support in the southern part of Taiwan, where *hoklo* dominate the population and the levels of income are relatively low. While China is an opportunity for investors, it is a challenge to low-skilled workers. As a result, the cross-Strait economic integration could further reinforce the division regarding national identity issue in Taiwan.

III. Cross-Strait interactions

The political dialogues between mainland China and Taiwan did not start until the late 1980s and early 1990s, first secretly, then openly. In 1993, authorized top delegates, Wang Daohan of mainland China and Koo Chen-fu of Taiwan, held their first talk in Singapore and brought the two sides into the direction of dialogue and contact. However, after Lee Teng-hui visited the United States in 1995, mainland China conducted military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. While Wang and Koo met again in 1998, the cross-Strait political dialogues were frozen after Lee Teng-hui defined the relations between mainland China and Taiwan as “nation-to-nation, or at least special state-to-state ties” in July 1999. After Chen assumed his presidency in 2000, Beijing refused to talk to Chen’s government unless Chen accepted the one-China principle, or recognized the “1992 consensus.” However, freezing the cross-Strait dialogues has also stabilized Beijing’s role as a threat to Taiwan and reinforced the cross-Strait Taiwan/China antagonism.

In order to deconstruct this Taiwan/China antagonism, Beijing gradually changed its position from “one China, unification” representation to “one China, status quo” representation, no longer emphasizing “the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China” and refraining from threatening to use force. At the same time, Taiwan’s pro-status quo parties such as the KMT have responded positively to the CCP’s change of strategy by visiting mainland China and constructing their commonality with the CCP based on the “1992 Consensus.” In early 2005, Lien Chan, Chairman of the KMT, and James Soong, Chairman of the PFP visited mainland China, respectively. Both of them gave speeches in top universities in mainland China,

and met General Secretary of the CCP, Hu Jintao. The CCP signed joint announcements with both parties.

It is evident that part of the political foundation for their visits was the common stance between the CCP and both Taiwan's oppositional parties that both the mainland and Taiwan were parts of China, even though they might have controversy about the meaning of China. However, the more important part of the political foundation is that the KMT has renounced its claim to recover the mainland from the CCP's ruling, and the CCP also acknowledge Taiwan's autonomy and has no intention to incorporate Taiwan under the CCP's ruling in the near future as long as Taiwan does not become a *de jure* independent country. This political precondition greatly undermined the legitimacy and efficacy of the DPP's identity politics, because the DPP's identity politics depends on describing Beijing as a threat who aspires to invade Taiwan and put it under its authoritarian ruling.

In the joint announcement between Hu Jintao and Lien Chan, besides the emphasis on "1992 Consensus" and "Opposing 'Taiwan Independence'," the most significant concepts are "two-sides of the Strait" (*liangan*), which appears for 33 times in this document of 1234 Chinese characters, and "two parties" (*liangdang*), which appeared for 11 times.²⁶⁸ In the document, "*Zhongguo*" (a Chinese word meaning China or Chinese) appears twice, only because the titles of the two parties contain the word. "*Zhonghua*" (another Chinese word meaning China or Chinese) appears for three times, twice before the word "nation" and once before the "culture." There is even no explanation about the meaning of "1992 Consensus." The joint announcement between Hu Jintao and James Soong has 1736 Chinese characters.²⁶⁹ The word "two sides of the Strait" (*liangan*) appears for 47 times, "*Zhongguo*" appears 7 times, and "*Zhonghua*" appears 2 times. There is an explanation for "1992 Consensus", which is interpreted as "two sides of the strait are one China" (*liangan yizhong*). From these two documents, we can see: though

²⁶⁸ Xinhua Net, "Hu Jintao yu Lian Zhan huitan xinwen gongbao (quanwen) [The News Statement of the Hu Jintao – Lien Chan Talk (full text)]," April 29, 2005, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/taiwan/2005-04/29/content_2895784.htm>.

²⁶⁹ Zhongguo Xinwen Wang [China News Net], "Hu Jintao Soong Chu-yu huitan gongbao quanwen [The Full Text of the Pronouncement of the Talk between Hu Jintao and Soong Chu-yu]," Sina News Center, May 12, 2005, <<http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-05-12/17496624934.shtml>>.

the underlying precondition is that “the two sides of the strait are one China,” there is an important assumption that the CPP will be external to Taiwan, and the KMT and the PFP are external to the mainland. This is an important acknowledgement between the two sides. Moreover, according to James Song and Ma Ying-jeou, Hu Jintao has assured Lien Chan and James Soong that the CCP hoped to maintain the ROC regime in Taiwan.

In the joint announcement between Hu Jintao and Lien Chan, the CCP also showed good will to the people in Taiwan. According to the joint announcement, the two parties, the CCP and the KMT, agreed to push for ending the cross-Strait hostilities and reaching peace agreement, to push for comprehensive cross-Strait economic exchanges and establishing cross-Strait common market, to talk about increasing Taiwan’s participation in international activities, and to establish a platform for party-to-party communication.²⁷⁰ In addition, Beijing offered three goodwill gifts to Taiwan after Lien’s visit: the normalization of cross-Strait tourism, agricultural trade agreements to increase the sales of Taiwan’s agricultural produce to the mainland, and two pandas.

Identities depend on the construction of social antagonism that blames the Other for the blockage of the realization of the self. However, since the antagonism can never fully fix meaning, identities can never be fully constituted. They always face challenges from the discursive exterior, and the political frontier between inside and outside is usually unstable. While mainland China has been constructed as a threat to Taiwan for decades, the visits of Lien Chan and James Soong to mainland China actually deconstruct the antagonism between mainland China and Taiwan, and they redefined the political frontier across the Taiwan Strait. By inviting Lien Chan and James Soong to visit to mainland, Beijing successfully disrupted its image of threat and deconstructs the seemingly well-delineated “Taiwan domestic.”

When the Taiwanese/Chinese dichotomy and the independence/unification opposition are disrupted, the Taiwanese national identity becomes unstable. When the negative effect of Chen Shui-bian’s identity politics becomes increasingly obvious, and

²⁷⁰ Xinhua Net, “Hu Jintao yu Lian Zhan huitan xinwen gongbao (quanwen) [The News Statement of the Hu Jintao – Lien Chan Talk (full text)].”

mainland China's "one China, status quo" discourse gradually takes effect, the dichotomous discursive structure is disrupted. Mainland China has been trying not to be the "Other." Instead, it has been working with the pro-status quo parties in Taiwan to broaden the middle ground between unification and independence and tolerate ambiguity about the status of Taiwan.

In general, democracy, the performance of the DPP's ruling, and mainland China's actions are the three major challenges facing the Taiwanese national identity. The development of Taiwanese national identity has been full of contingency and unfixity. As a result of the developments of these challenges, there is a possibility that the "Taiwan independence" discourse may lose its momentum.

Chapter 10. Conclusions

This dissertation has examined the changes in the discursive formation and symbolic economy underlying the rise of Taiwanese national identity in Taiwan. From a social constructionist perspective, and on the basis of Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse, this dissertation analyzed in Chapter 4 the three nationalist discourses---the KMT's Chinese nationalism, the CCP's Chinese nationalism, and the DPP's Taiwanese nationalism---and the five representations ---the KMT's "one China, anti-communism" representation, the KMT's "one China, two equal political entities" representation, the CCP's "one China, unification" representation, the CCP's "one China, status quo" representation, and the DPP's "Taiwan independence" representation---that have been articulated by them. After examining Lee Teng-hui's "two Chinas" discursive regime and Chen Shui-bian's "one China, one Taiwan" discursive regime in Chapter 5, I examined the discursive mechanisms underlying the rise of Taiwanese national identity in Chapter 6. I argued that the rise of Taiwanese national identity has been an effect of an on-going contestation among the three major discourses of nationalism. More specifically, the Chinese national identity constructed by the KMT's Chinese nationalism is conditioned by a cross-Strait antagonism with mainland China being "communist bandits" harming the Chinese nation and Taiwan being a revival base for defenders of the Chinese culture. However, this Chinese nationalism characterized by anti-communism was disrupted by the re-Sinicization of mainland China since the 1970s, and it came to re-represent China as "one China, two equal political entities." Ironically, the hegemony of mainland China's "one China, unification" representation has squeezed the space for the "Republic of China," and it marginalized the KMT's "one China, two equal political entities" in the 1990s.

With the field of discursivity on Taiwan's national identity issue being polarized by politics, many people in Taiwan have been forced into a dilemma: they could either accept that Taiwan is a renegade province of China or accept Taiwan is an independent state. This has been the discursive structure underlying the rises of Taiwanese

nationalism and the independent Taiwanese national identity since the early 1990s. With the cross-Strait antagonism constructed by Chiang Kai-shek inherited by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, who transformed it to serve Taiwanese nationalism, many people in Taiwan came to identify themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese.

On the other hand, the construction of the Taiwanese national identity has appropriated many social resources from Taiwan's provincial origin issue, which I examined in Chapter 7. While the master narrative of the KMT's Chinese nationalism tends to put *waishengren* in an advantaged position, the master narrative of the DPP's Taiwanese nationalism empowers *benshengren*. Due to the tensions between *benshengren* and *waishengren* in the past few decades, the contestations between the KMT's Chinese nationalism and the DPP's Taiwanese nationalism have drawn on the provincial origin tension for resources and transform it into conflicts between a Chinese national identity and a Taiwanese national identity. In this process, Taiwanese nationalists have moved "Taiwanese" from a local identity of ethnic meaning into a national identity of civic meaning.

Taiwan's democratization has made such contestation possible and has provided an institutional basis for the national imagination. As a matter of fact, the contestation among nationalist discourses has interacted with democratization to propel the process of the rise of Taiwanese national identity. By comparing Taiwan and mainland China to examine the relations between nationalism and democratization, Chapter 8 of this dissertation demonstrates how nationalism has propelled democratization in Taiwan while being an obstacle to democratization in mainland China.

In Chapter 9, I examine the challenges facing the discursively constructed Taiwanese national identity. The construction of Taiwanese nationalism depends on two social antagonisms, one between Taiwan and mainland China, the other between the pan-green camp led by the DPP and the pan-blue camp led by the KMT. While constructing mainland China as the threat to Taiwan and linking the pan-blue to the negative identity of "China," the DPP has successfully moved Taiwanese nationalist discourse to a hegemonic position and promoted a Taiwanese nationalism. However, while

democratization has empowered the Taiwanese nationalist discourse, it has also posed challenges to the Taiwanese national identity and provided space for the Chinese national identity. The DPP's unsatisfactory governance and corruption in recent years have also been another challenge. The most important challenge is mainland China, which has changed its representation of Taiwan and mainland China and attempted to disrupt the cross-Strait social antagonism by pushing for cross-Strait economic integration as well as showing good will to Taiwan's opposition party and to Taiwanese people.

What does it mean to be a Taiwanese? And what does it mean to be a Chinese? Here, this dissertation shows that "Taiwaneseness" and "Chineseness" are contingent, fluid, and dynamic. The rise of Taiwanese national identity has involved the contestation among multiple nationalist discourses, and each of these discourses has involved practices of inclusion and exclusion. This dissertation has demonstrated that both the Chinese national identity dominant in Taiwan before the early 1990s and the Taiwanese national identity dominant in Taiwan since the early 1990s have been discursively constructed by differentiating Taiwan from mainland China. The former had been around the construction of a "free China"/"communist bandits" antagonism, and the latter around a Taiwan/China antagonism.

While the percentage of people in Taiwanese who identified themselves as only Taiwanese had increased dramatically. It has not been a sea change, only indicating the decline of a specific type of "Chineseness" or Chinese high culture advocated by the Chiangs' KMT. In fact, for a long time, there have been some differences between the identities of people in Taiwan and those of people on the mainland. The KMT-imposed Chinese national identity might not be the same as the CCP-imposed Chinese national identity on the mainland. The national identity of people in Taiwan has seemed to change significantly only because it is politicized by the competition among political parties in Taiwan. I argue that the changes in the self-identity of people in Taiwan have not been as significant as generally believed, and there are multiple possibilities for the development of Taiwan's identity politics.

By constructing China as the other, Taiwan has sought its own identity by emphasizing its differentiating from China. Yet, the constructed China is an oversimplified homogeneous one, with its complexity and diversity as a combination of a national culture and many local cultures ignored. By eliminating the Chinese symbols brought to Taiwan by the KMT, the DPP has promoted an independent Taiwanese national identity. Yet, on the other hand, it might become a localization that makes Taiwan more as a local politico-cultural entity. To some extent, while the DPP strives to resist Hong Kongization (*xiangganghua*) and “downgrading” (*aihua*), its political and cultural reconstructions may lead it closer to the status of Hong Kong.

This dissertation has employed a non-essentialist view of identity and attempts to demonstrate the contingency and fluidity of national identity. It shows the discursive construction of Taiwanese national identity, yet it does not negate the existence of Taiwanese national identity among a large part of Taiwan’s population. It does not mean that there is not such a thing as Taiwanese national identity. At present, the ties of economic integration across the Taiwan Strait, the CCP’s change of its Taiwan policy in recent years, and the visits of Taiwan’s opposition leaders to mainland China in 2005 have partly disrupted the Taiwanese/Chinese and independence/unification antagonisms, redrawing the political boundaries across the Taiwan Strait. In the future, as a result of economic regionalization and the further elapse of the Cold-War mindset, it is possible that people in Taiwan and mainland China would form certain political bloc. However, it would be based on the current status quo, and it is conditioned by the preservation of autonomy for both sides. As a matter of fact, the combination of Taiwan’s enterprises, Hong Kong’s financial service, and mainland China’s natural and human resources have already changed the economic landscape of East Asia. The social integration following the economic integration will generate a greater impact. This trend will gain new power if mainland China gradually opens its political market. Yet, there will always be opportunities for the Taiwanese nationalists to counter the deconstruction, just as the Taiwanese national identity has always been facing challenges from the discursive outside.

The rise of Taiwanese national identity has been the most important locus of antagonism that led to the security tension in the Taiwan Strait. While it has been constrained by the structure formed among the United States, mainland China, and Taiwan, it is currently still a challenge to East Asian security. Though policy-makers in mainland China may not be interested in Taiwan's national identity issue or avoid it for political reason, it is still an important issue, particularly as Hu Jintao has promised to "have hope for Taiwanese people" (*jiwang yu Taiwan renmin*). To some degree, dealing with Taiwan's national identity issue is an art of sameness and difference. Beijing should accept and connect to the ROC symbolic system so as to create sameness. At the same time, Beijing should also allow space for Taiwan to be different. A combination of sameness and difference is the best strategy for the CCP. Beijing should realize that recognizing the history of the existence of ROC regime in Taiwan can enable it to maintain its sovereignty claim that Taiwan is part of China. Imitating Ma Ying-jeou's term "first connect to Taiwan then have China" (*xian lianjie Taiwan ranhou you zhongguo*), the PRC should "first connect to ROC then have Taiwan" (*xian lianjie minguo ranhou you Taiwan*). The DPP must also recognize that only by maintaining the ROC system can it maintain Taiwan's imagination as a state and Taiwan's *de facto* independence. Moreover, the DPP's nation-building efforts may eventually be a process of localization and Hong Kongization. With a Chinese high culture imposed by the Chiangs being deliberately deemphasized and labeled as the culture of one of the four ethnic groups, *waishengren*, the DPP is transforming Taiwan from the seat of a Chinese state to more like a local Chinese society. I argue that maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait will be the best situation for all parties that have an interest in the region. However, how to interpret the status quo will also be a contestation among the different nationalist discourses.

To some degree, "Chineseness" is an empty signifier that can mean many things. It seems to be a piece of paper that different people can project different colors on it. After nearly three decades' "reforms and opening," maybe the dominant view of "Chineseness" in present day China is a desire for a strong state and a harmonious society and a pursuit for the revival of past glory. However, this imagination may also be a subjecting process

that constitutes many individuals as Chinese. Similarly, the “Taiwaneseness” is also a site of contestation, though currently it tends to be constructed as the counterpart of “Chineseness.” Whatsoever, we should never forget that there are always a possibility for multiple imaginations of China and Taiwan.

Since the mid-1980s, great efforts have been taken in the field of International Relations to “bring the politics back in” and to welcome “the return of culture.” This dissertation has analyzed the discursive construction of Taiwanese national identity by examining the contestation underlying the rise of the identity. Drawing on social constructionism and Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse, this dissertation may be a contribution to the literature on the relations between Taiwan and mainland China, which has been dominated by realist mindset for a long time. I also hope that it can help bring about thinking about the multiple possibilities for China and Chineseness.

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Appendix: Map of Taiwan



Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Vitae

Chengqiu Wu was born in a village in southern China in 1975, as the second of three sons of his parents. He has received education from Yinling Elementary School, No. 1 Middle-High School of Wuchuan, Fudan University, Western Michigan University, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. He received a BA in economics in 1997 and a Master of Economics in political economy in 2000, both from Fudan University. In 2000, He came to the United States and studied applied economics at Western Michigan University. Since fall 2001, he has been studying public and international affairs at Virginia Tech. En route to earning his Ph.D. in Planning, Governance, and Globalization, he received a MA in political science from Virginia Tech in 2003. He has published articles in *Dangdai Jingji Kexue* [Modern Economic Science] and *Journal of Chinese Political Science* as well as in an edited volume *Challenges Facing Chinese Political Development*. He has been teaching in Department of Political Science at Virginia Tech in the past two years. He is interested in international relations, international/comparative political economy, and comparative politics with a focus on China. Chengqiu Wu successfully defended this dissertation on May 18, 2007.