

REDISCOVERING THE CLASSICAL ROOTS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTION: COMTE, PARETO, AND DURKHEIM

by

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
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
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


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ABSTRACT

Rediscovering the Classical Roots in the Sociology of Emotion: Comte, Pareto, and Durkheim

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This study details the extent to which classical scholars -- Comte, Pareto, and Durkheim -- conceptualized emotion as reflected in their respective works. This interpretive work seeks to further substantiate a classical grounding for the sociology of emotions, that is, to show that there is a breadth of material in the classical repertoire that has gone untapped by contemporary scholars of emotion, and further, that this neglected material may inform current discussions of emotions.

It is clear from the review of the three theorist's works that each maintained a conceptualization of emotion, and considered emotion to be a central concept in the discipline. Pareto's conceptualization of emotion most clearly resembles an organismic account. Comte's conceptualization of emotion is both an organismic and an interactive account, and Durkheim's conceptualization of emotion most clearly resembles an interactive account. Comte's career in particular is characterized by a shift from a theory that holds no place for emotion to a theory that is clearly dependent on the conceptualization of emotion.

Each of the three theorists reviewed conceptualized emotion as a source of motivation for action. In addition, Comte and Durkheim, viewed emotion as an integral part of the process of social cohesion, as instrumental in the integration of individuals into the various institutions that comprise society.

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CHAPTER 1

THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTION'S IGNORANCE OF CLASSICAL THEORY

One of the shortcomings in the development of the sociology of emotions has been the neglect of classical theory. It is important to detail to what extent classical theory enhances a sociology of emotions, especially when reflecting on the resistance with which this sub-discipline has been met. Classical theory, it will be shown, is capable of lending support and legitimizing this sub-discipline. The sociology of emotions, has for too long, been a reaction to psychology or biology, and has neglected to embrace its classical roots. The sociology of emotions should not be regarded as a fad, but rather, an integral area in which we may come to understand how sentiments and emotions are socially constructed, influenced by a social structure, and come to transform social realities. It is the focus of this dissertation to provide a classical foundation for the sociology of emotions.

If it is in the interest of sociology to systematically study the nature of all that is social, emotions, sentiments, and language cannot be ignored as they are inseparable elements in the reality that emerges out of social interaction. Emotion is inextricably linked with the social act, as both a source of motivation and as a consequence of social interaction, in that, it may constitute a sense of consummation. Our expression is laden with emotion even as emotion is given birth in the context of interaction that individuals engage in daily, there is no conviction without it, no meaning in its absence. It rests in our interpretation, our perception, in our labeling, and in our defense.

Despite the fact that scholars aspiring to work in this sub-discipline tread suspiciously in intellectual waters shared by psychologists, there is still a

considerable interest in the sociology of emotions. However, as is the case with any relatively new area of study, the sub-discipline is a bit of a conceptual mess. Scholars who have emotions as a research interest in sociology are faced with huge gaps in the conceptual fiber of this field. There is even little agreement on the definition of emotion itself. Now is the time, in the sociology of emotions, to highlight the work of the classical theorists in order to assess their contributions to the theoretical framework of this sub-discipline.

Many of the theoretical or conceptual problems in the sociology of emotions have to do with its continued reliance on other disciplines for its starting point. This failure to embrace the classical tradition in sociology may also be cited as a reason why the sociology of emotions is situated on the margins of the greater sociological community, that is, it might do the sociology of emotions a great service to uncover some tradition or history within the discipline, to further substantiate its claims and garner more respect. Instead of the sociology of emotions being a reaction to psychology, philosophy, or biology, the sub-discipline should more strongly ally itself with its parent discipline, sociology.

I am suggesting that the sociology of emotions can gain more support and in-house credibility by re-embracing its classical roots, that is, contrary to the findings of Thorp (1983), the phenomena of emotion was not neglected by classical theorists and there is a large literature that may be extracted from those classical texts to support this notion. It is not the case that classical theorists ignored the concept of emotion, rather, it is the case that the sociology of emotions has ignored the classical theorists.

To the sub-discipline's credit, Durkheim often has been noted or cited (Fisher & Chon 1989) in various works dealing with the sociology of

emotions, and even has been referred to as the architect of the social construction of emotions. However, classical theorists such as Comte and Pareto have been ignored completely, although both wrote hundreds of pages devoted to the discussion of emotion or sentiment. So, while there are scattered references to classical theorists in the work of these contemporary scholars, there has been no marked attempt to incorporate classical theory into the sociology of emotions. It is the aim of this work to do so.

It appears that the success of other areas of sociology have been dependent on the incorporation of some classical theoretical tradition. The sociology of deviance has incorporated Durkheim's notion of anomie (Merton), while the sociology of music has incorporated the work of Weber (Atali). I am suggesting that the sociology of emotions is lacking in this regard. The problem is clear and the solution, only a matter of researching the classical texts for this much needed support and substantiation.

Writers working within the sociology of emotions (Shott, 1979, Harre, 1986, Coulter, 1979) often have used other disciplines as building blocks for a sociological analysis of emotions. These writers (Kemper, 1978, Scheff, 1979, Franks, 1987) have used psychological and physiological explanations of emotion as an invitation for sociologists to offer an explanation of a particular intimate aspect of social behavior. I argue that there is a neglected literature in sociology with regard to emotion. Mainly, the work of both Comte and Pareto has been overlooked, while only portions of Durkheim's prodigious work has been integrated into the literature which constitutes the sub-discipline.

The most serious work in the sociology of emotions appears to have been done by those referred to as social constructionists. Social constructionists have promoted the idea that emotion like race, gender and

deviance is not simply given in nature, rather it is a social construction, given its rise through social interaction and language. At first glance, the social constructionist view of emotion looks to be a reaction to psychological and biological explanations that have enjoyed popularity for most of this century. "A social constructivist view of emotions does not envision a completely plastic organism, the proverbial blank slate on which experience can write unhindered," (Averill, 1986:101). Gordon (1981) argues that there are socially emergent properties of emotion that transcend physiological and psychological explanation. These contemporary scholars (Hochschild, 1983, Franks, 1987, Lofland, 1985) argue that the phenomenon of emotion maintains several social characteristics, that such a phenomenon cannot possibly be reduced to biology nor psychology.

Social constructionists in particular, and scholars working in the sociology of emotions, in general, have contributed works that imply some theoretical perspectives, and recently Smith-Lovin (1995) has attempted to outline a theoretical framework that might serve as a foundation for this sub-discipline.

Smith-Lovin (1995) provides a much needed discussion of the terms that are central to the sociology of emotions. She highlights the distinctions between affect, emotion, sentiment, and mood. "Affect is the most general term; it refers to any evaluative (positive or negative) orientation toward an object" (Smith-Lovin 1995:118). She continues, "Emotion is a subset of affect, but its boundaries are not clear" (Smith-Lovin 1995:118). Thoits (1989) proposed four components of emotion which include situation appraisals, sensations, gestures, and cultural meanings.

Smith-Lovin relies on Gordon's (1981) definition of sentiment. "I define sentiment as a socially constructed pattern of sensations, expressive

gestures, and cultural meanings organized around a relationship to a social object, usually another person” (Gordon 1981:566). Sentiments have more endurance than emotions, in addition, they are more likely to be socially constructed and be less sensation oriented. Smith-Lovin concludes, “In general, we can think of emotions as more situationally determined and sentiments as more enduring, culturally given elements of relationships, identities, or other social elements” (Smith-Lovin 1995:119).

Moods, Smith-Lovin contends, are more particular to individuals and may appear constant across situations. Smith-Lovin argues, “Perhaps because of their transituational nature, moods have not been studied extensively by sociologists” (Smith-Lovin 1995:119).

In addition to Smith-Lovin’s working glossary for the sociology of emotions we might add the terms sensation and feeling. These terms are synonymous in that, one is said to feel sensations, or more simply, feelings. Sensation refers to the perception of some stimulation of the sense organs. The importance of sensation in reference to emotion is the source of some debate. Socio-biologists generally hold a higher regard for sensation in their work than do social constructionists.

Smith-Lovin’s latest work is also helpful in outlining some of the general theoretical approaches pursued in the sociology of emotions thus far. On classic theory, Smith-Lovin writes, “Although seldom considered as a distinct topic, emotions occupied a central place in the works of the theorists who defined sociology as a discipline: Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Simmel” (Smith-Lovin 1995:121). Marx, Weber, and Durkheim were concerned with the relationship between macro structural components and emotional response. Simmel, Mead, and Cooley are concerned with the role interaction in the emotional experience. The author cites Cooley (1922) as being one of

the first to distinguish biological emotions from social sentiments. It will be shown later that, in fact, Comte was aware of such a distinction several decades prior to Cooley's work.

Smith-Lovin also credits the interactionists with laying the theoretical groundwork for modern theories of emotion.

However, the interactionists provided a basis for a modern theory of emotion with their emphasis on the uniquely human capacity for symbolization and language. From an interactionist point of view, the problem with the organismic orientation was that it viewed emotional response as a peripheral byproduct rather than an integral element in social interaction. An organismic view failed to note the key difference between animals and humans: humans can symbolize and consciously express an orientation through emotional gestures (Smith-Lovin 1995:121).

Modern Theories of Emotion

Smith-Lovin focuses on the following approaches: emotion culture, interactionist, structuralist, psychodynamic, and phenomenological. Emotion culture refers to the work of Hochschild (1979). The concepts of feeling rules and emotion work are central to this approach. Feeling rules are emotional norms, whereas emotion work refers to an attempt to change in degree or quality an emotion to fit the feeling rule (Hochschild 1979). Such topics as emotion management and emotional deviance are of interest in this approach. Emotional socialization is also integral to this approach.

Hochschild (1983) also argued that under the structure of capitalism emotion is commoditized and individuals engage in emotional labor, and thus risk alienation from their own emotions since they are subject to malformation in the work place.

Gordon (1981) discusses emotion culture in his work, focusing mainly on emotion vocabularies. Emotion vocabularies are constituted by emotion words which we employ to ponder, label, express, as well as, understand emotions.

Other symbolic interactionist approaches are characterized by the work of Shott (1979) and Stryker (1987). These approaches tend to emphasize, ...the active role of the individual in role taking. These approaches gave less attention to the structurally determined epidemiology of emotional experience and placed more emphasis on the motivational aspects of emotions as they impacted the self. These more generative, processual theories argued that emotional reaction depended on the actor's definitions of the situation and the meanings that grow out of these definitions (Smith-Lovin 1995:128).

Shott distinguished reflexive emotions from empathic emotions. Reflexive emotions are those directed toward the self that require viewing oneself as an object whereas, empathic emotions are those directed toward others that require putting oneself in the position of others (Shott 1979).

In Stryker's identity theory the self is conceptualized as a hierarchy of identities and identities represent social obligations or roles. For Stryker, emotions serve as motivation to engage in roles. Emotions also are generated through satisfactory or unsatisfactory role performance.

Smith-Lovin concludes,

Emotions are constructed from ongoing experience using the cultural vocabularies and emotion norms that have built up through social interaction--this is where the cultural and interactionist schools connect. Most important, emotions motivate action since they serve as signals to the social actor about the self-relevance of

events (an idea developed by both Hochschild and Shott) (Smith-Lovin 1995:128).

The structuralist approach is characterized by the work of Kemper (1978). Kemper's work is based on notions of status and power. The relative position on these two dimensions determined the emotional character of a relationship. Thus, changes in position on these dimensions were associated with certain emotional outcomes. Smith-Lovin wrote of Kemper,

He argued that emotional outcomes from status and power changes would depend on the perceived source of the change and, in some cases, whether or not the other person in the interaction was liked or disliked (Smith-Lovin 1995:130).

Kemper has argued that relationships characterized by status and power are linked to specific emotions by way of certain physiological responses. This raises some speculation as to the extent to which Kemper incorporates elements of specificity theory in his work, that is, the idea that emotions may be specifically matched with physiological sensations. Collins (1981) is also credited with contributing to a structural theory of emotion evidenced by his work highlighting the intersection of macro-micro levels of sociology.

The psychodynamic approach has been best exemplified in the work of Scheff (1979). Much of Scheff's work focuses on the idea of emotion distancing formulated in his theory of catharsis and ritual. Scheff's idea is that we seek acceptable modes of emotional discharge through ritual, drama, and sport. Ritual or the theater allows us to afford an "aesthetic distance" from the sources of stress as opposed to being under distanced or over distanced.

Finally, of interest is the phenomenological approach purported by Denzin. Among Denzin's main claims the most important is the idea that emotion should be studied as lived experience (Denzin 1984). Emotional experience enables an individual to know the self and others by means of sympathy, empathy, and other emotions. In this approach it is paramount that emotion not be abstracted from the lived experience or the context in which it is believed to exist.

Franks (1987:219) notes sociology's "new claim" in the field of emotion, "...emotions have been freed from their previous typecasting as solely intraindividual, self-contained phenomenon and given wide-ranging roles in the maintenance and change of transindividual social structures." Franks is alluding to the fact that throughout the twentieth century emotions have been viewed as strictly self-contained, psychological phenomena. However, now with sociologists engaged in the research and theorizing about emotion, the concept is given to social forces, that we may realize that emotion is not contained in the self, rather, that it lives in the interaction between individuals. Emotion is subject to social structure and authored by the structure of language. Depression is no longer to be viewed as an innate phenomena, it is brought on by social causes and will bear social consequences. In the case of depression, this indoctrination of emotions into the house of sociology bears importance, for the reason that, in the absence of this type of work, it is clear the term has been medicalized by other fields (e.g. Physiology, Biology, Psychology, Psychiatry). Thus, depressed individuals are encouraged by psychiatrists to give their pain to Prozac as opposed to actually coming to terms with the source of their condition, a social condition, and not merely a psychological phenomena.

Sociology has been slow to come to these conclusions, almost fearful of treading where another "science" might have laid its claim. Gordon (1981) notes that although sociology has neglected emotion as a "generic dimension" several writers (e.g. Simmel, 1950 & Goffman, 1956) have embarked on an analysis of specific emotions. He also argues that as of late, sociologists have shown an increased interest in constructing a coherent, comprehensive theory of social processes specific to the various emotional experiences. It is my aim in this work to show, that contrary to the recent grand interest in emotion by sociologists, emotion has long been in the interest of sociological thinkers, that there is evidence of a conceptualization of emotion embedded in classical theory. In addition, I shall seek to further the development of theory in the sociology of emotions, by showing how specific classical texts may be used in the substantiation of contemporary theoretical paradigms.

Why the Sociology of Emotion?

This section concerns itself with the question, "What interest does sociology have in the phenomena of emotions?" If one of the fundamental aims in sociology is to study and explain social relationships, the relationship between self and society, and the nature of social interaction, we must, as students of the social mind, engage ourselves in the conceptualization of emotion, as it is integral to the human experience. "The study of emotion lies at the heart of those social, anthropological, psychological, and humanistic disciplines that intend a deeper understanding of the phenomenon called person" (Denzin, 1984:1). As sociologists we intend to understand, describe, and analyze society, and thus all things social. In order to understand society we must seek knowledge of its components, which

includes people, and to understand people we must know something of their motives for action, namely emotions. Kemper, remarking on the lack of attention given emotions prior to 1980 writes, "This is astonishing, because in most cases the actions of others toward us, or our actions toward them, have instigated our joy, sadness, anger or despair" (Kemper, 1978:1). The preceding quote reflects an apparent relationship between emotions and actions. Insofar as the social act is a traditional unit of analysis in sociology, emotions must be given consideration by sociologists as evidenced by contemporary sociologists such as Hochschild (1983), Gordon (1981), Franks (1987), Kemper (1978), Denzin (1984), Scheff (1979), Swidler (1980), Lofland (1985), and Coulter (1979). A sociology of emotions should concern itself with how prominently social arrangements define the personal experience of emotion, that is, that social arrangements, to an extent, define our subjective feeling states, (Lofland, 1985). That is to say, we are interested in how social structure, social relationships, and definitions of the situation, shape the individual experience of emotion. Social factors such as power, status, and ritual are instrumental in the arousal of emotion in individuals.

The study of emotions may lie at the intersection of micro and macro sociology, that is, emotions may provide us with the conceptual ground where social structure meets self. Empirical research may provide us with the details of this relationship. Hochschild (1983), realizing this, has written extensively on the interrelationship among social structure, feeling rules, and emotion work. Collins (1984), another scholar convinced of this relationship, in his commentary on Goffman's model of social performances, writes that this link, that between the micro and macro, is important in regard to analyzing, "...the negotiation of bonds of sociability and intimacy that knit together social class and endow them with a status and a group

culture” (Collins, 1984:242). Emotion may be thought to function as an adhesive and thus maintain social structure by maintaining class bonds.

Both Denzin (1987) and Collins (1987) have debated the future of a sociology of emotions. Collins argued that in the mid 1980s the sociology of emotions, once an interesting and promising field, had become stagnant. This stagnation was perceived to be due to restating the same polemic over and over again. Collins thinks we should explore the micro-macro relationship with regard to emotion. Denzin, on the other hand, defends the symbolic interactionists and is critical of Collins’ view.

The very terms micro-macro are of course suspect. Once we grasp the fact that society is interaction, built on the bedrock of scarcity, human need, desire, and emotionality, the utility of micro-macro conceptions disappears. They are replaced by more “experience-near” formulations that lie at the heart of the interpretive, phenomenological sociologies Collins finds so suspect (Denzin 1987:178).

Emotions, nevertheless, seem an appropriate topic for both positivists and those who opt out of empiricism, in favor of interpretive work. And, a sociology of emotions should make room for a variety of methodological and theoretical viewpoints.

Most lay persons today would find it implausible that the very concept of emotion contains beliefs, that may be subject to study, that people share, similar to the beliefs about God, that are subject to study, beliefs that vary from group to group. It is elementary to the nature of sociology that while most, if not all, social scientists cannot study God, they fruitfully can study people’s beliefs about God. The same may be said about emotions. God and emotion do not lend themselves to direct observation, and so are considered to be abstracts. In fact, Hochschild (1983) contends that individual’s beliefs about emotions figure into their experiences of those particular emotions.

Among students of emotion there seems to be some disagreement on the question concerning the reification of emotion. That is, some writers (Plutchick, 1980, Izard, 1971) have set out to study emotion as if it were a thing observable in nature, abstracted from social relationships; while other writers (Gordon, 1981) have begun their inquiry into the study of emotion by means of studying emotion vocabularies. Regardless of which conceptualization one chooses to employ in the study of emotion, the subject has become a more popular topic of study in academia.

Even across disciplines there is little agreement on fundamental issues, for example, the definition of emotion, (Epstein, 1984). Some writers, so rattled by the confusion have argued that the term "emotion" should not even be used. Many writers have stated that emotions evolved in humans as part of their biologically adaptive nature instrumental in preparing the individual for action in significant situations throughout the life course (Darwin, 1872, Cannon, 1929).

Averill (1986) has argued that emotions can be defined as socially constructed syndromes which may include an individual's perception of the situation and are usually interpreted as passions, instead of actions. The term syndrome refers to a set of interrelated response elements such as, physiological changes, expressive reactions, instrumental responses, and subjective experiences. Averill (1986) notes that while some of the component responses may be biologically based, the way in which these components are organized into coherent syndromes is predicted by social evolution and not biological evolution. Emotions are transitory social roles. The concept of emotion, in cognitive terms, may be defined as a belief system or schema that guides the appraisal of situations, the organization of

responses, and the self-monitoring (interpretation) of behavior (Averill, 1986).

Since emotions are linked with the impetus for action, and the social act is central to the discipline of sociology, sociology should take an interest in that which moves human beings to action, namely emotions. Emotions are both cause and consequence of the social act, at the crux of an individual's experience of reality.

Classical Theory and the Sociology of Emotions

Denzin (1984) has outlined evidence for an interest in emotions by some of the premier classical theorists in sociology. He argues that, "Contrary to the observations of Scheff (1979) and Hochschild (1983), the emotions and emotionality do occupy a significant position in the works of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Simmel" (Denzin, 1984:32). C.E. Palmer (1991) has also discussed the use of classic concepts with regard to the sociology of emotions, focusing mainly on "looking glass self," "definition of the situation," and "generalized other."

In regard to Marx on emotion, Denzin mainly focuses on Marx's conceptualization of alienation and estrangement from the social and material world. Denzin (1984) argues that Marx, employing his dialectical perspective, encompasses the relation between the individual's sensuous being and material world, and thus had some understanding, or at least pondered the concept of emotionality. From Marxist philosophy, the case is made by Denzin (1984), that some conceptualization of emotion can be inferred.

In regard to Weber's work and the concept of emotion, Denzin (1984) argues that the theorist based his entire analysis of capitalism on the idea that

it was grounded in strongly held religious convictions and emotional attitudes. Denzin (1984) makes the case that Weber's notion of rationality excludes human emotion, and in regard to capitalism, emotion is something to be controlled or managed, that perhaps, emotion would be relegated to the irrational. Weber argued that with infusion of capitalism into bureaucracy there occurs the dehumanizing of individuals, that capitalism strives to succeed "in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation" (Weber, 1946:216).

Simmel (1924) is cited (Gerhards 1986) for his analyses of intimacy, isolation, and the emotional instability of dyads. "The perception of another, via the senses, gives rise to the emotional and cognitive interpretations that serve as a predisposition to interaction" (Simmel, 1924:357). Denzin (1984) suggests that Simmel understood that emotions, such as coquetry, hostility, disdain, and sorrow all serve as emotional definitions of the situation that are communicated through body language, or visual interaction. Much like contemporary psychologists, Ekman (1980) and Izard (1977), Simmel was interested in the human face as a medium for the expression of emotion and even as a barometer for inner emotional experience. Denzin writes, "One's emotional life, for Simmel, is always changing, always lodged in the interaction process, and always somewhat at a distance from one's true, inner feelings" (Denzin 1984:38).

Denzin (1984) argues that for Durkheim, emotions and emotional experience are social facts. These social facts manifest themselves as pressures against the individual. Emotions are not private, nor are they the product of an individual construction. Hammond (1983) suggests that Durkheim's work provides the foundation for a sociological theory of emotions. Hammond's

work is based on what he infers from Durkheim's Primitive Classification and The Division of Labor in Society. Hammond (1983) finds in Durkheim a model for the sociology of emotions based on four general principles: 1) That the strongest and most meaningful bonds are based on intense affective arousal; 2) That emotions have an unlimited generality of object...anything can become a focus for emotive expression; 3) That the intense interaction with such affective tools creates reified hierarchical classifications with social distance between possible objects for affective focusing; and 4) That the nature of this distance varies according to social density.

The evidence for Durkheim supporting a sociology of emotions is the most plausible. But, perhaps a more exhaustive analysis of his work would shed more light on his ideas concerning emotion.

Contemporary scholars have focused on some of Durkheim's most well known works such as Suicide and Division of Labor. However, with regard to Durkheim, this dissertation will bring to light several other works which have not been included in any contemporary discussion of emotions. Hopefully we may make more of a case for Durkheim in the sociology of emotions by including these other neglected works, that is, those works that have not received attention in the sociology of emotions.

Statement of the Purpose

It is the aim of this work to research classical theorists' conceptualizations of emotion, as articulated in the works of Durkheim, Comte, and Pareto. The reasons for choosing Durkheim lie in the fact that he is, perhaps, the most cited classical theorist in articles concerning emotions or sentiments (Hochschild, 1983). The emotion literature contains many references to Durkheim, most of which are confined to one or two works.

Comte and Pareto have been completely ignored, save for three or four articles (Mongardini, 1989, Frick, 1988, Bono, 1979) that have not been sufficiently integrated into the sociology of emotion. This is interesting because both thinkers, based a great deal of their thought on sentiment or emotion. Comte spoke frequently of "social sympathy" and the need to reward "social feelings" more than "self feelings." Pareto regarded emotion in terms of "derivations" and "residues." Both of these writers were chosen because they spent considerable time discussing emotion at various points in their intellectual careers, and have been rarely cited in recent literature. In Denzin's (1984) Chapter on classical and contemporary theories of emotion neither theorist is mentioned.

Mead, Marx, Weber, and Simmel have all been referenced to some extent for their work regarding emotion, (Gerhards 1986). The reason these theorists were not included in this dissertation is not because they lack any substantive contributions to the area, it is rather, that these great writers at least have been acknowledged, in some measure, in either Denzin's (1984) work or in scattered journal articles mentioned above. Of all the classic scholars Durkheim, is perhaps cited the most in the literature on emotion.

However, the inclusion of his work for this review was based on the fact that much of his work has been neglected in this regard, that is, there is a breadth of material in reference to the social aspects of emotion outside of Division of Labor, Suicide, and The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.

By conducting an exhaustive review of each theorist's major works, a strong foundation, grounded in classical theory, for studying the sociology of emotions may be provided. By these means a tradition may be uncovered in the discipline of sociology in regard to the study of sentiments and emotions. Students of sociology who have an interest in studying emotion may find a breadth of sources within their own discipline instead of appealing to other disciplines as a starting block for embarking on research into the sociology of emotions. Aside from simply acknowledging that these classical theorists entertained notions with regard to emotion, this dissertation will maintain that emotion, was more than a peripheral concern in the theory that these scholars espoused.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

I intend to employ a qualitative interpretive account as a means to study the conceptualization of emotions and sentiments by classical thinkers. It is important to note that the sociology of emotions focuses both on emotions and sentiments. Emotions, as mentioned previously, are considered to be more universal, more organismic in nature, whereas sentiments are more likely to be particular to a society, more social in nature, (Gordon 1981). Emotions are episodic, fleeting in nature, whereas sentiments are chronic, enduring in nature. This distinction has not been noted by all, and many of us tend to use the terms interchangeably. More attention should be given to this distinction by those who are involved in the production of literature in this sub-discipline.

By reviewing all of the major works published by Durkheim, Comte, and Pareto I may provide the discipline with grounds for a strong foundation in the study of the sociology of emotions. Each work published by the respective authors will be reviewed and analyzed with the aim of exposing, in what manner the theorist thought of emotions or sentiments. Did the author initially have any conceptualization of emotions or sentiments? How prominently did the concept of emotion play in the theories that each scholar proposed? If the theorist had any such conceptualization of emotion or sentiment, was their conceptualization organismic in nature or interactive? These are some of the questions that the forthcoming study will address.

It is important to exhaust all of the major works by the aforementioned authors insofar as it will allow me to chart the course of their

conceptualization, or their ideas about emotion. In some instances, it may be the case that the theorist changed his conceptualization of emotion, or the degree of importance it bears on social life, over the course of his career. It could be the case that throughout the career of the theorist, he might change from an organic orientation to an interactive account of emotion. If so, it is my interest to find out what took place in the thinking of the man to bring about this change.

It is also important in this study to take into consideration the role of history and the state of “knowledge” that prevailed in the day of these thinkers. The sociology of emotions would do well to incorporate history as a variable when conceptualizing emotion, just as Baumeister (1986) has done in conceptualizing identity. Baumeister (1986) has shown how our modern conceptualizations of identity are products of history, that is, ideas about the self have changed over the course of history. Baumeister accounted for these changes by framing the self in different eras (e.g. Romantic, Transcendental, Modern). I am suggesting that, perhaps, in acknowledging the historical influence of social structures on the self, we can determine how history has influenced the evolution of emotion in individuals. The way people think about emotion has had an impact on their experience of emotions. In the historical period in which the three theorists wrote it was the fashion to define emotions in terms of biology, to promote an organic account of emotion, and it may be advantageous to consider the state of knowledge with regard to emotion in the respective historical periods of the theorists.

What Constitutes Conceptualization of Emotion?

When reviewing the works of the three classical theorists several key words will be highlighted to indicate any reference to emotion. However, the

author's interest is not in counting how many times these words are used in the text, for that may be misleading in terms of how prominent the concept figured into the thought of the theorist. I am more interested in highlighting themes in the theorist's work that allude to the concept of emotion or sentiment, and going about the business of seeing how emotionally-laden themes relate to that particular work, and then to the theorist's career writings in general.

However, highlighting key words may afford the review of literature good clues as to emerging themes in the work. Such key words are: emotion, sentiment, feeling, sensation, affect, passion, sensuality, impulse, and sensitivity. In addition to descriptive words such as those previously listed, special attention will also be given to specific emotions or sentiments mentioned in the texts of the works such as sympathy, remorse, love, sadness, joy, hate, grief, and resentment, to name a few.

Once it can be determined whether or not the theorist has any considerable interest in emotion conceptually, evidenced by means of repetitive themes, it will be the aim of this work to determine whether or not the theorist maintained an organic conceptualization of emotion or an interactive conceptualization of emotion, the interactive account of emotion being the more social of the two. Through an interpretative analysis of these works by Durkheim, Comte, and Pareto it should become clear whether or not classical theorists held any firm notions about emotions, and thus whether or not they are well suited to provide a classical grounding for the sociology of emotion.

As a guide to interpreting classical theorists' conceptualizations regarding emotions, it is helpful to distinguish between two popular contemporary accounts of emotion, the organismic and the interactive. The

division among scholars on the current state of emotions, is perhaps best characterized by sociobiologists, who argue that emotion is innate, biologically determined and given rise by impulse, and social constructionists, who argue that emotion is socially constructed, given rise by social interaction. In the following section two accounts of emotion will be addressed, the organismic and the interactive.

Two Contemporary Accounts of Emotion

Concerning the study of emotions there are usually given two rival accounts, the “organismic account” and the “interactive” (Hochschild, 1979). The organismic account, wherein emotion is given to instinct or biological impulse, that is, the idea that emotion is a biological fact, has enjoyed great popularity in psychology, biology, and sociobiology. Freud, Darwin, and James are arguably the fathers of an organismic view of emotion.

The interactive account of emotion focuses on the idea of emotion as an emergent of social interaction, “the self as emotion manager.” Gordon, Kemper, and Goffman emphasize the social nature of sentiments.

Sociology has placed more emphasis on the study of emotion in the last twenty years, using the writings of William James and George H. Mead as a starting point. The social constructionists have debated James’s (1894) specificity theory, contesting that not every emotion word has a corresponding feeling state, that emotion is given rise in human relationships and not in sensation.

James defines emotion in terms of sensations, in fact, sensation appears to be the most definitive component in the emotional process.

The bodily disturbances are said to be the 'manifestation' of these several emotions, their 'expression' or 'natural language;' and these emotions themselves, being so strongly characterised both from within and without, may be called the standard emotions (James 1922:12-13).

James holds that prior to his work it was commonly thought that the perception of some fact stimulates the "mental affection", or the emotion, which then generates the bodily feeling. James offers a thesis to the contrary,

My thesis on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion (James 1922:13).

It is then clear that James places a great emphasis on sensation in the experience of emotion. James also contends that sensations may be coupled with specific emotions.

That the heart-beats and the rhythm of breathing play a leading part in all emotions whatsoever, is a matter too notorious for proof. And what is really equally prominent, but less likely to be admitted until special attention is drawn to the fact, is the continuous cooperation of the voluntary muscles in our emotional states. Even when no change of outward attitude is produced, their inward tension alters to suit each varying mood, and is felt as a difference of tone or of strain. In depression the flexors tend to prevail; in elation or belligerent excitement the extensors take the lead. And the various permutations and combinations of which these organic activities are susceptible make it abstractly possible that no shade of emotion, however slight, should be without a bodily reverberation as unique, when taken in its totality, as is the mental mood itself (James 1922:15).

It is for these reasons that James is credited with being the originator of specificity theory. James concludes that,

If the reader has never paid attention to this matter, he will be both interested and astonished to learn how many different local bodily feelings he can detect in himself as characteristic of his various emotional moods (James 1922:16).

Two Models of Emotion: The Bases of Interpretation

1) The Organismic Account of Emotion

Sociobiologists often borrow from the philosophy of William James and the writings of Charles Darwin. From Darwin sociobiologists take the notion that emotions evolved in animals as an adaptive function in dealing with important life situations. Sociobiologists pay particular attention to James's specificity theory concerning emotions. The specificity argument has enjoyed a rather rich tradition for the past century based on James' argument that individuals only experience emotions at the point of consciousness of certain visceral-physiological processes and somatic processes. James argued that an individual's perception of physiological events will yield her recognition of her emotion. Thus James argued that we are sad because we cry, not that we cry because we are sad.

The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful as the case may be (James 1922:13).

James cites Sir Charles Bell's work regarding respiratory changes which vary in correspondence with emotions. He also made mention of Darwin

who explored the study of visceral agents more thoroughly in connection with emotions. James' work seems to capitalize on this exploratory work with regard to the relation of sensation to emotion. He makes the case that,

If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no 'mind-stuff' out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains (James 1922:17).

Hochschild (1979) has offered that the organismic account is mainly concerned with the relation of emotion to the biological facts of instinct and impulse. The assumption implicit in the organismic account is that we are "pre-wired" for emotion, and further, that emotion is biologically charged.

To begin with, readers of the Journal do not need to be reminded that the nervous system of every living thing is but a bundle of predispositions to react in particular ways upon the contact of particular features of the environment...The neural machinery is but a hyphen between determinate arrangements of matter outside the body and determinate impulses to inhibition or discharge within its organs...The labours of Darwin and his successors are only just beginning to reveal the universal parasitism of each special creature upon other special things, and the way in which each creature brings the signature of its special relations stamped on its nervous system with it upon the scene (James 1922:13-14).

Sociobiologists have embraced this notion of biological determinism when questioned about emotion. Some variation exists in the organismic camp, although most will acknowledge that the phenomena of emotion is essentially confined to the organism.

2) The Interactive Account of Emotion

Recent evidence gathered by cultural anthropologists and social historians demonstrates that people's beliefs about specific emotions, and about emotions in general, vary in time and place and are thus researchable phenomena. Current interactional theories of emotion argue that one's beliefs about emotions enter into the very formation of those emotions, (Hochschild, 1983, Gordon, 1981, Harre, 1986, Averill, 1986).

Errol Bedford (1956) coined the term, "traditional view of emotion," referring to the everyday popular conception of emotion as synonymous with feeling, as an experience which derives from an inner physiological sensation, much like the conceptions of those proponents of the organismic account of emotion. Crucial to the traditional view is the assumption that each word describing a separate emotion corresponds to a qualitatively distinct inner experience which may or may not find its expression in outward behavior. Bedford writes,

According to this view an emotion is a feeling, or at least an experience of a special type which involves a feeling. Logically, this amounts to regarding emotion words as the names of feelings. It is assumed that to each word there corresponds a qualitatively distinct experience which may, although it need not, find expression in outward behaviour. If it does, this behaviour entitles us to infer the existence of the inner feeling, and therefore to assert, with some degree of probability, statements of the form 'He is angry.' Looked at in this way, emotions naturally come to be thought of as inner forces that move us, in combination with, or in opposition to other forces, to act as we do (Bedford 1956:15).

Bedford claims that this view is characteristic of the early psychology textbooks. Bedford cites Russell (1921) as espousing a view of that genre, that is, the idea the emotions involve specific bodily movements.

An emotion--rage, for example--will be a certain kind of process, consisting of perceptions and (in general) bodily movements. The desires and pleasures and pains involved are properties of this process, not separate items in the stuff of which the emotion is composed. The ingredients of an emotion are only sensations and images and bodily movements succeeding each other according to a certain pattern (Russell 1921:284).

Bedford offered a more critical view of emotions that Kemper (1978) and Harre (1986) identify as the "social constructionist" school of thought. Social constructionists suggest that emotions have their source in linguistically constructed emergents of social interaction rather than emanating from some self-contained inner force lying in the self like potatoes in a sack, (Baumeister, 1986).

Coulter (1979), arguing that emotions must not be reduced to simple biological impulses, suggests that there has been a fundamental mistake of the missassimilation of emotions to sensation. Affective states are not synonymous with feeling states. Central to this reduction of emotion to sensation is the everyday use of the word "feeling" to mean both physiological sensation and emotion.

Bedford (1956) argues against the scientific adequacy of this view of emotion as sensation, noting that two different emotions may lead a person to experience the same subjective feeling, (e.g. indignation and annoyance). Bedford states, "I certainly find no feeling, nor class of feelings, that marks off indignation from annoyance, and enables me to distinguish them one from another. The distinction is of a different sort than this." Bedford argues that

the distinction in emotions exists in the context of language rather than in actual inner physiological states, that is, the emotions indignation and annoyance are not identified by any feeling state. Therefore emotions might be said to be linguistically constructed, thus implying an interactive account of emotion.

In the review of literature the distinction between interactive and organismic accounts of emotion will be of concern. The following will serve as a review and interpretation of the literature concerning Comte, Pareto, and Durkheim with respect to the concept of emotion.

This dissertation is characterized by an interpretive account of three classical theorists' conceptualization of emotions or sentiments. An exhaustive review of each theorist's work will lend insight into providing a historical basis for the sociology of emotions. Of interest will be statements or sections of each theorist's work which reflect any pondering, conceptualization, or shift in thought concerning the phenomena of emotion, affect, or sentiment. As mentioned previously, key words will supply the basis for this inference, although the words themselves are not of any great significance, rather the words will be used to denote emerging themes in each theorist's work. Passages will be included that appear to represent repetitive themes in the various works. Special consideration will be given to discerning whether each theorist's work is more oriented toward an organismic or interactive approach.

CHAPTER 3

AUGUSTE COMTE (1798-1857)

Comte, generally regarded as the father of sociology, wrote extensively on the subject of emotion and in fact, is one theorist in which we can observe a shift in perspective concerning emotion, throughout his scholarly career. Comte, at the outset did not consider emotion to be integral to his grand theory regarding society. If he held any perspective at all, one might argue it had its basis in the organic. However, Comte is of extreme importance with regard to a classical grounding of the sociology of emotions because of the dramatic shift in the role of emotion as assigned in his grand theory. In fact, in his later work, emotion is made to be central.

Throughout this Chapter it will become evident the extent to which Comte conceptualized emotion. It will also be made clear that his move toward an interactive account of emotion characterized this shift, a shift that should be of interest to contemporary scholars in light of current discussions on emotion. The three works of interest here are Positive Philosophy, A General View of Positivism and System of Positive Polity.

All references in this chapter will be to Comte's work unless otherwise noted.

Positive Philosophy

Concerning Comte's major intellectual work Positive Philosophy, he does not spend as much time conceptualizing sentiment as he does in System of Positive Polity, rather he calls for work to be done in that regard, ever

critical of Psychology for not addressing the affective character as well as the intellectual when focusing on the subject as a unit of analysis. "As to the doctrine, the first glance shows a radical fault in it, common to all sects,--a false estimate of the general relations between the affective and the intellectual faculties" (1875, vol. i:462). Comte argues that, in his day, budding scholars of the mind or individual were overly absorbed by the mysteries of the intellect and were negligent in matters that involved sentiments or emotions.

The Positive Philosophy preceded System of Positive Polity. Positive Philosophy is a treatise outlining a discipline which would come to be known as sociology. It is clear in reviewing this work that Comte's position had not always placed such theoretical importance on emotion, that is, in this first major work he downplays the role of emotion while in his later work he glorifies the concept. However, there are glimpses, foreshadowing of what would come in his work, emotion, a concept that initially was of marginal interest soon to be thrust to the forefront of his post-romantic ideology.

In Positive Philosophy it is also apparent that Comte was in conjunction with most social thinkers, biased against the concept of emotion, perhaps initially viewing affect as the perennial dark force that moves through human nature. This is evident in some of the writing that characterizes his first major work. In his call for the best minds to come forward and take on the study of social phenomena Comte urges them to value the intellect above the emotions that might taint their work.

It is no easy matter to study social phenomena in the only right way, viewing each element in the light of the whole system. It is no easy matter to exercise such vigilance as that no one of the number of contemporary aspects shall be lost sight of. But it is the right and the only way; and

we may perceive in it a clear suggestion that this lofty study should be reserved for the highest order of scientific minds, better prepared than others, by wise educational discipline, for sustained speculative efforts, aided by an habitual subordination of the passions to the reasons (1853, vol. ii:81).

Emotions in this context are to be viewed as things to suppress, in fact, it is odd to not recognize that scientific study in itself might constitute or rather be fueled by, a passion. In this, Comte's first major work, there lies a good bit of ambiguity concerning emotion. There are points in Positive Philosophy wherein emotion is devalued, and conversely, points in System of Positive Polity wherein emotion is given significant importance in the author's trilogy of Logic. Even in Positive Philosophy Comte on occasion directs attention toward emotion and hints at its importance in the lives of individuals.

Of all questions, there are none which have so much claim as social problems to be consigned to a small number of choice minds which shall have been prepared by a high order of discipline and instruction for the investigation of questions so complex and so mixed up with human passions (1853, vol. ii:28).

On the subject of gender and emotion, Positive Philosophy offers insight into Comte's ideas concerning the relation between the sexes. First, it is made clear that the author's ideas concerning women are at least patriarchal, not uncharacteristic of several male scholars of that time period, John Stuart Mill notwithstanding. His justification lies in some notion of natural roles.

Sociology will prove that the equality of the sexes, of which so much is said, is incompatible with all social existence, by showing that each sex has special and permanent functions which it must fulfill in the natural economy of the human

family, and which concur in a common end by different ways, the welfare which results being in no degree injured by the necessary subordination, since the happiness of every being depends on the wise development of its proper nature (1853, vol. ii:136).

It appears that Comte offers the standard patriarchal view with regard to the function of gender. He offers that the female's role is one of sympathy and action fueled by affect, whereas the role of man is to expound on his reason. This is interesting because it echoes the traditional false dichotomy of emotion versus reason, that is the man, the superior and dominant sex, is associated with reason, that which is sound and practical, while the woman, the inferior and subordinate sex, is associated with affect, sentiment, and that which is whimsical and irrational. In the course of history there has been a bias against emotion.

Comte, affording women the attribute of affect makes the claim, much like Pareto, that women are more adept in affairs regarding emotion, whereas men have the intellectual edge.

Again, we have seen that, in the affective life of Man, the personal instincts overrule the sympathetic or social, which last can, and do, only modify the direction decided by the first, without becoming the habitual moving powers of practical existence. Here again, by a comparative examination, we can estimate the happy social position appropriated to the female sex. It is indisputable that women are, in general, as superior to men in a spontaneous expansion of sympathy and sociality, as they are inferior to men in understanding and reason (1853, vol. ii:136).

While we may fault Comte for his sexist ideology we must acknowledge his observation of the distinct emotional patterns that run through men and women. However, we may find substantive differences

where the genesis of these patterns is concerned, that they originate in the social construction of gender and not the biology of sex.

Finally, on the subject of gender, Comte writes, "Their function in the economy of the family, and consequently of society, must therefore be to modify by the excitement of the social instinct the general direction necessarily originated by the cold and rough reason which is distinctive of Man" (1853, vol. ii:137). For Comte, the world is to be bound by the reason of men, but it must be women who direct that reason toward good, and by affective means.

Perhaps, in the case of Comte, it is most interesting to note, with regard to a sociology of emotions, that his philosophy concerning the role of affect, emotion, or sentiment, changed over the course of his academic career. His later work is more involved with the concept of emotion, more eager to integrate this all too important aspect of human life into his grand theory. Some may view this as progress, certainly those advocates of a sociology of emotion would view this evolution of thought as grounds for the genesis of a sub-discipline, others, detractors might offer that the scholar was simply mad, irrational, overly emotional.

Comte is diligent in his claim that emotions, or the "affections," are paramount in the motivation of individuals in action.

...for daily experience shows that the affections, the propensities, the passions, are the great springs of human life; and that, so far from resulting from intelligence, their spontaneous and independent impulse is indispensable to the first awakening and continuous development of the various intellectual faculties, by assigning to them a permanent end, without which--to say nothing of the vagueness of their general direction--they would remain dormant in the majority of men (1875, vol. i:463).

He argued, that which is base and animal in man is also that which is most influential and potent as far as behavior is concerned. He appears to allude to that which is base as having some emotional locus.

It is even but too certain that the least noble and most animal propensities are habitually the most energetic, and therefore the most influential. The whole of human nature is thus very unfaithfully represented by these futile systems, which, if noticing the affective faculties at all, have vaguely connected them with one single principle, sympathy, and, above all, self-consciousness, always supposed to be directed by the intellect. Thus it is that, contrary to evidence, Man has been represented as essentially a reasoning being, continually carrying on, unconsciously, a multitude of imperceptible calculations, with scarcely any spontaneity of action, from infancy upwards (1875, vol. i:463).

In this passage Comte echoes Pareto, that behavior is, in general, not grounded in rational thought, rather we impose rationality on behavior, as is the same in literature, we impose meaning on the text.

Comte seems to imply that behavior is not always given to reason and well thought out plans of action, that, much like the Pragmatism endorsed by Mead, thought, or the intellect may serve the self generally in the reflective, that action is primary, and thought, reflexive. Is it so that action springs from a well of sentiment or emotion rather than from a schedule of so-called facts an individual may weigh before making some commitment? Perhaps it is not so strange after all, to assert that men and women are motivated by sentiment and emotion and we merely try to impose rationality on whatever sequence of events has transpired. Much like the deconstructionist argue that we impose structure, order, and meaning on a text, the idea is put forth that in the reflexive we impose order, reason, and meaning on our lives, but that we act out always with regard to sentiment or emotion.

It is clear from reviewing the text in Positive Philosophy that Comte is more concerned with establishing a hierarchy of sciences than constructing any true conceptualization of emotion. He mentions emotion sporadically, and frequently relegates the concept to the irrational, employing the traditional bias against sentiment. Whatever conceptualization of emotion that is made by Comte in Positive Philosophy, would have to be considered organic in nature. It is after this first seminal work in sociology that Comte begins to develop some theory with regard to emotion, namely, in System of Positive Philosophy.

A General View of Positivism

The transition in thought, that is, thought with respect to emotion, from Positive Philosophy to System of Positive Philosophy is mediated through A General View of Positivism. Much of the text, in fact, contains material that is more systematically arranged in the latter book. However, this text is important in that it represents Comte's attempt to embrace emotion as premier concept in positivism, in particular, and sociology, in general.

For Comte, emotion is functional in that it serves as the foundation of unity. It is in this text that Comte first ponders the great synthesis. Positivism must hold emotion above the intellect and the social act in the hierarchy of human phenomena.

The necessity of assigning with exact truth the place occupied by the intellect and by the heart in the organization of human nature and of society, leads to the decision that Affection must be the central point of the synthesis. In the treatment of social questions Positive science will be found utterly to discard those proud illusions of the supremacy of reason, to which it had been liable during its preliminary stages. Ratifying, in this respect, the common experience of men even more forcibly than Catholicism, it teaches us that individual happiness and public welfare are far more dependent upon the heart than upon the intellect. But, independently of this, the question of co-ordinating the faculties of our nature will convince us that the only basis on which they can be brought into harmonious union, is the preponderance of Affection over Reason, and even over Activity (1865:15).

Comte is adamant about this subordination of the intellect to feeling. This idea is, of course, further developed in Comte's later work. Other ideas that appear to have been first explored in this text that are elaborated on in later work, include the conceptual distinction between self feelings and social sympathy.

Self-love is deeply implanted in it, and when left to itself is far stronger than Social Sympathy. The social instincts would never gain the mastery were they not sustained and called into constant exercise by the economy of the external world, an influence which at the same time checks the power of the selfish instincts (1865:25).

Comte recognizes the consequences that social structure bears for sentiments, that sentiments are collective and subject to the order facilitated by social structure.

The right understanding of this order is the principal subject of our thoughts; its preponderating influence determines the general course of our feelings; its gradual improvement is the constant object of our actions...Men have, it is true, been for a long time ignorant of this Order. Nevertheless we have been always subject to it, and its influence has always tended, though without our knowledge, to control our whole being; our actions first, and subsequently our thoughts, and even our affections (1865:29).

A General View of Positivism may be viewed as a transitional work, where many of the concepts that are introduced are more fully developed in System of Positive Polity. The text serves as a watershed in the intellectual career of Comte, a time wherein he embraces emotion as a sociological concept and also a time wherein the scholar expands the role of the women in his grand theory. These two changes seem to parallel each other as women are valued for their emotional expertise.

System of Positive Polity

Comte's most major work with regard to the sociology of emotions is System of Positive Polity, wherein we are witness to the shift that occurs in his conceptualization of emotion. It is in this work that emotions come to play a significant role in his grand theory, rather than just being a peripheral interest of the scholar.

Perhaps one of Comte's greatest contributions in the realm of the sociology of emotions is his distinction between "personal feelings" and "social feelings." Comte's analysis of sentiment and its characterization as the central focus in the lives of individuals bears importance in that "social feelings," sympathy and other-directed feelings, are given preference over self-directed feelings, pride and other self-indulgent sentiments.

Comte devotes several passages with regard to the ideals of egoism and altruism and his discourse on emotion is found in the juxtaposition of these two ideals.

To subordinate egoism to altruism--such is in its integrity the problem for man to solve, and its solution is seen on inspection to depend principally on the right use of intelligence. His activity is in all cases neutral, does not distinguish, that is, between good and evil; has no aim beyond itself; and as such may be led to prefer the service of our social feelings as offering a wider field than the personal. The intellect has less energy, and would willingly limit itself to the efforts imposed on it by our personal wants; it shrinks from the greater exertion demanded by the service of society (1875, vol. iv:142).

In his discussion of the two said ideals, it is made clear that the role of intellect is distinct from the role of emotion, an idea that is grounded in the

notion of emotion as an attribute of biology, and is evident in Comte's work by his insistent use of the word "feeling" to denote emotion.

The tendency to reduce emotion to feeling has been a concern with those scholars endorsing a social construction of emotion. Coulter (1979) has laboriously gone about the task, in his work, to distinguish feeling from sentiment. In his work "The Missassimilation of Emotion to Sensation", Coulter argues that it is basically a problem of language, that is, in everyday conversation we use the word "feeling" in place of emotion, and this misnomer contributes to the confusion often made between sensation and sentiment. In everyday language there is a confusion regarding these terms. Feeling is synonymous with sensation, whereas emotion entails much more than mere sensation. By practicing the missassimilation of emotion to sensation we ignore the cognitive element of emotion.

Sociology: The New Age of Religion

Common knowledge to any student of Comte is the idea that society, or the worship of society would replace conventional religion. Therefore individuals would answer to, and should abide by, society's agenda instead of any spiritual agenda. This type of thought is an outgrowth of the Enlightenment period, where science replaces God as the source of explanation for behavior. If the age of Rationalism can be said to have robbed individuals of their emotions, then the age of Enlightenment can be said to have robbed individuals of their spirituality.

So, Comte was enamored of the notion that individual should be committed to society and that the role of sociability, or the cultivation of social feelings should serve that end. Perhaps the most important of these sentiments, as Cooley noted years later, is that of sympathy. "...Preserved

from the impulses of selfishness by having his wants supplied by the providence of others, he is so placed as to be able directly to appreciate the value of the sympathetic instincts, and to feel deeply their natural connection with the habits of synthesis" (1875, vol. iv:143).

It is through these notions of cultivating social feelings or "sympathetic instincts" that Comte feels a unity may be derived in society and he feels that this quest for unity should be the aim of intellect. "It will be felt that the great aim of our intellectual existence is the establishment of a more and more complete unity, for the individual as for the society, and the means, the strengthening the sympathetic instincts, which are the source of unity, by the synthetical conceptions which are its basis" (1875, vol. iv:143).

It should be noted that at the outset Comte speaks of sentiments and emotions as feelings, and these feelings are distinct from cognition, and idea contrary to the social construction of emotions. Of course, the social constructionists view emotion as being comprised of both cognition and affect, and ultimately we may find that Comte grants emotion more of an intellectual bent than he leads on at first. But first, we must review how Comte formulates his ideas on emotion and in what context he does so.

Comte's Positivism

In the first volume of System of Positive Polity, Comte reiterates the positivist motto, "...Love, Order, Progress,... they lead us to the conception of Humanity, which implicitly involves and gives new force to each of them" (1875, vol. i:5). He wishes to view Positivism in its totality, to use Positivism as a frame with which to comprehend all aspects of human life, and thus to chart the course of progress, which is the end goal of his "new religion."

It is apparent that Comte, in his view of Positivism, considers Love to be integral, reflecting a significant place for sentiment in the constitution of his theoretical construct. Love, the sentiment that must provide the unity for the great society, is made to be central in Comte's grand theory. As will be made clear, sentiment is inextricable from reason, and more importantly, the social act. Here is evidence of a classical conceptualization regarding emotion and its role, or function with regard to the equilibrium in society.

In fact, Comte argues that emotion, along with thought and action, characterizes the life of an individual. In his discussion of the intellectual character of Positivism Comte notes that, "The object of all true Philosophy is to frame a system which shall comprehend human life under every aspect, social as well as individual. It embraces, therefore, the three kinds of phenomena of which our life consists, Thoughts, Feelings, and Actions" (1875, vol. i:6). Here it is clear that Comte has distinguished, or will attempt to distinguish between cognition, affect, and the social act. Comte also emphasizes, after citing the three different spheres of human existence, the synthesis of these elements, which is the goal of any great philosopher, that is, to integrate the separate elements into a coherent whole.

To begin his treatise, Comte notes that the two primary functions of the macro-social organism are philosophy and politics, the two are bound and at the same time distinguished by morality. "Natural morality, that is to say, the various emotions of our moral nature, will, as I have shown in my previous work, always govern the speculation of the one and the operations of the other" (1875, vol. i:7). Further, he notes the coming of age of philosophy into positivism and presents a case for positivism as an alternative to theology, which long enjoyed popular acceptance as a means of explaining phenomena. Ultimately, Comte argues that theology has failed in providing an acceptable

synthesis of the three different types of phenomena that color the human experience.

Comte argues that theology is too heavily grounded in affect and thus suffers ultimately in its attempt at the synthesis the three different types of phenomena. "The Theological synthesis depended exclusively upon our affective nature; and to this is owing its original supremacy and its ultimate decline. For a long time its influence over all our highest speculations was paramount. This was especially the case in the Polytheistic period, when Imagination and Feeling still retained their sway under very slight restraint from the reasoning faculties" (1875, vol. i:7). One of the accomplishments of the new positivism should be to properly synthesize these elements of the human and social character.

The False Dichotomy: Reason vs. Emotion

Comte suggests that during this period a synthetic view of human nature was made impossible for the curious reason that individual's intellect was impelled by feeling, or emotion. This notion was long held among scholars, dating back to the ancient Greeks, the idea that reason and emotion represented opposite ends of a continuum, that emotion was something of which to be suspect because it interfered with clear thinking. Such is the bias against emotion as Franks (1987) has noted. It is on this point that social constructionists have challenged the history of knowledge that speaks to the constitution of emotion and reason. Social constructionists have offered that emotion and reason represent a false dichotomy, that is, we stand more to gain by seeking to understand how these two things are intertwined as opposed to focusing on them as distinct entities.

Emotions, or sentiments, do not manifest themselves devoid of reason. Each emotion has an object. I experience anger because I have been violated. I experience guilt because I have violated my own set of morals. I experience shame because I have offended the morals of the generalized other. Individuals do not act devoid of emotion or sentiment, in fact, emotion may serve as the motivation for action. So to say emotion clouds one's reason is misguided, for emotion is not entirely separate from thought.

Nevertheless, Comte came of age in the school that sought to separate the intellect and the emotive, which is not to say he has not contributed to, or impaired the sociology of emotions. His ideas reflect the intellectual climate in which he lived. Pareto and Durkheim, also seem affected by this traditional bias against emotion. These scholars are to be commended for being among the first to posit theories which highlighted the social aspect of emotion, when all of those who had come before, as well as, their contemporaries could only think of emotion in terms of sensation and biology. Such was the state of knowledge in the Post-Romantic period.

Comte would eventually propose that early renditions of Positivism, begun as a reaction toward this overly affective view of phenomena, ignored the affective and thus is no better off at achieving any synthesis.

The antagonism which, since the close of the Middle Ages, has arisen between Reason and Feeling, was an anomalous though inevitable condition. It is now for ever at an end; and the only system which can really satisfy the wants of our nature, individually or collectively, is therefore ready for our acceptance. As long as the antagonism existed it was hopeless to expect that Social Sympathy could do much to modify the preponderance of self-love in the affairs of life. But the case is different as soon as reason and sympathy are brought into active co-operation. Separately, their

influence in our imperfect organization is very feeble; but combined it may extend indefinitely (1957:41).

Comte would appear to overcome this traditional bias against emotion and move toward some synthesis of emotion, reason, and action in his treatise. He would be among the first of scholars to treat emotion as a serious phenomena not only in the self, but in society at large.

The Synthesis of Emotion, Reason, and Action

In his work Comte seeks to provide some synthesis between emotion, reason, and action. The notion of social sympathy becomes paramount and in fact serves as the underlying theme in this four volume work. "But, independently of this, the question of co-ordinating the faculties of our nature will convince us that the only basis on which they can be brought into harmonious union, is the preponderance of Affection over Reason, and even over Activity" (1875, vol. i:11). Comte argues that it is necessary for the intellect to submit to feelings of social sympathy in order for progress to be recorded, that intellect, in and of itself, is futile and may even lead to grave misfortune. "Even with the individual, it is impossible to establish permanent harmony between our various impulses, except by giving complete supremacy to the feeling which prompts the sincere and habitual desire of doing good" (1875, vol. i:11).

Comte is very particular about establishing a hierarchical order among feeling, the intellect, and action that is best suited for synthesis.

This feeling is, no doubt, like the rest, in itself blind; it has to learn from reason the right means of obtaining satisfaction; and our active faculties are then called into requisition to apply those means. But common experience proves that after all the principal condition of right action is the benevolent impulse; with the ordinary amount of intellect

and activity that is found in men this stimulus, is enough to direct our thoughts and energies to a good result. Without this habitual spring of action they would inevitably waste themselves in barren or incoherent efforts, and speedily relapse into their original torpor (1875, vol. i:12).

Intellect and activity must submit to affection so as to achieve unity in our moral nature.

Comte, is perhaps, one of the first to recognize the false dichotomy between reason and emotion, and in fact, as social constructionists would argue 130 years later, emotion is beneficial to reason or thought. Comte offers that emotion is as important as reason in the scope of his synthesis. "The influence of true feeling is as favourable to sound thought as to wise activity" (1875, vol. i:16).

Social Structure and Sentiment

For Comte social structure acts so as to provide a check on self-directed instincts, which is somewhat ironic understanding that our post-modern conception of social structure encourages selfish aims given our economy.

...we have to consider the exceeding imperfection of our nature. Self-love is deeply implanted in it, and when left to itself is far stronger than Social Sympathy. The social instincts would never gain the mastery were they not sustained and called into constant exercise by the economy of the external world, an influence which at the same time checks the power of the selfish instincts (1875, vol. i:18).

Comte argues that the possibility of attaining moral unity in the case of the individual, or of the larger society, rests in the necessity of coming to the awareness that we are subject to external forces.

By this means our self-regarding instincts are rendered susceptible of discipline. In themselves they are strong

enough to neutralize all sympathetic tendencies, were it not for the support that the latter find in this External Order. Its discovery is due to the intellect; which is thus enlisted in the service of feeling, with the ultimate purpose of regulating action (1875, vol. i:18).

Ignored by contemporary scholars of emotion, Comte pre-dates Durkheim, recognizing the influence of social structure on emotion. In this way sentiments may be socially constructed, that is, they are shaped by social structure.

Art and the Expression of Sentiment

Comte, may also be cited as one of the first scholars to take up, what would later be called, the sociology of art. In his analysis of Art is the realization that emotion is the subject externalized in the artistic process of expression, Art being the active end of a process that has its origin in feeling. He argues that it is in the institution of Art that we find a unity of human nature, through its complete and natural representation. Comte also finds a direct relation between Art and the three orders of phenomena which color human phenomena, those being, of course, feelings, thoughts, and actions. "It (Art) originates in Feeling; even more obviously than is the case with Philosophy and Polity. It has its basis in Thought, and its end in Action" (1875, vol. i:231).

Comte figures that Art is tied into the human's offering of benevolence, that is it bears the potential of good influence extended to others. Art, as it was constituted in Comte's day, was not of vain will, the author's person should remain absent from the text. "Art invites the thinker to leave his abstractions for the study of real life; it elevates the practical man into a region of thought where self-love has no place" (1875, vol. 1:231).

It would be interesting to account for the state of Art, circa 1995, and observe the vain trend that the institution appears to lean toward. Noting Baumeister's (1986) observation of the shift in identity from being grounded in other-directedness to self-directedness, paralleling Comte's dichotomy of social sympathy and self-love, I would suggest that people have become vain in their Art, and pose the question as to what extent does Art submit to the artist.

Comte offers that Art represents the genuine synthesis of the affective and the cognitive, it bears the badge of coalescence.

By its intermediate position it promotes the mutual reaction of Affection and Reason. It stimulates feeling in those who are too much engrossed with intellectual questions; it strengthens the contemplative faculty in natures whose sympathy predominates. It has been said of Art that its province is to hold a mirror to nature. The saying is usually applied to social life where its truth is most apparent. But is no less true of every aspect of our existence; for under every aspect it may be a source of Art, and may be represented and modified by it (1875, vol. i:231).

Art is also instrumental in the expressive element of emotion or sentiments. Hochschild (1983), in her work on the relationship between social structure, feeling rules, and emotion work, discusses emotion work, that work which we do in order to comply with the emotive normative order, as being comprised of three elements, the cognitive, the bodily, and the expressive. Expression is central to the emotive experience and Comte has identified Art as an institution which may either serve to express emotion or serve to evoke it, that is, an artist may call out an emotion in others using the object of Art as a point of reference. In this way Art functions as a source of catharsis for the individual (Scheff 1984).

In their origin all our faculties of expression had an esthetic character; the only expressions being those that resulted from strong internal experience. Feeling had, in primitive times at all events, far more to do with these faculties than Thought, being a far stronger stimulant to external demonstration...The final result is always more dependent on feeling than on reason, even in times like these, when the intellect has risen in revolt against the heart. Song, therefore, comes before speech; Painting before Writing; because the first things we express are those which move our feelings most (1875, vol. i:233).

The preceding passage is most interesting in that it lends insight to Comte's notion of the relationship between the cognitive and the affective, the effect of language on feeling, and the idea that feeling comes first, an idea that is not exactly in line with those precepts represented in the social construction of emotions. Harre (1986) has argued, in conjunction with other social constructionists, that language is a cue for emotion, that is, the emotion word serves as a prompt for the feeling.

Comte's notion is somewhat akin to William James (1922) idea concerning specificity theory, that is, language is not a cue for emotion, rather, language is only the descriptive element of emotion. James (1922) argued that "I am sad because I cry," rather than "I cry because I am sad." James argued that we feel and then search for symbols with which to express or label our feeling. Perhaps the distinction lies in the notion that Comte feels that cognition shapes feeling, granted that feeling is the initial impetus in the process of emotion, but thought consummates this process. This notion of emotion is much more given to the affective element in the construct, whereas, the social constructionists are more given to the cognitive element in emotion. The social constructionist argues that the emotion word must

serve as a cue for emotion because the individual must be equipped with the language in order to create meaning, or make sense out of sensation. For instance, I must know and understand the word "indignation" before I can be indignant. The idea is fundamentally that language provides the boundary for experience and as we acquire language we may expand our range of feeling.

Advocates of specificity theory such as James, and perhaps Comte, as evidenced by his frequent employment of "the heart" to represent the chamber of feeling, argue that certain emotions may be identified as manifesting themselves in specific locations in the body, or that certain emotions may be associated with the secretion of specific forms of adrenaline. Social constructionists (e.g. Harre, Coulter) have taken a position in opposition to that precept, that is, emotion words do not correspond directly with inner feeling states. In fact, an emotion may give rise to more than one feeling state, or a certain feeling state may be associated with more than one emotion. For instance, the act of crying, the sensation that gives rise to crying, may be the result of happiness or sadness. The feelings associated with embarrassment and shame are virtually indistinguishable, however the difference in emotional experience is manifested in some specific moral order. Upon "feeling" embarrassed, as well as ashamed, my face may turn red and I may experience a discomfort in the stomach region. The emotions are distinguished not by the sensations associated with them, rather they are distinguished by the cognitive, or moral element. Shame implies that the actor has violated some moral code, the actor has not lived up to the expectations of society in respect to his/her conduct. Embarrassment implies no moral violation, rather that the actor has simply breached some social

norm in a way that has caused no direct harm to anyone save the individual's pride.

The social constructionists recognize that the "feeling" or sensation associated with emotion, is not the emotion proper, rather it is the physiological reverberation, or response to the said emotion. The cognitive element of emotion is that which lends substance to the construct, and since the sensation is the most recognizable attribute of emotion individuals are more inclined to treat the sensation as being synonymous with the emotion.

Comte, reflecting the intellectual climate of his day, wrestles with his conceptualization of emotion, but tends toward a synthesis of thought and feeling. And so, it is perhaps more important to note his attention to the concept instead of faulting him for a conceptualization that is not wholly interactive.

Love, Sympathy, Egoism, and Altruism

In Comte's depiction of Positivism, the third and proposed, final state of knowledge, the writer is once again given to moral appeal rather than intellectual appeal. "This central point of Positivism is even more moral than intellectual in character; it represents the principle of Love upon which the whole system rests" (1875, vol. i:264). Comte, throughout his academic career would put forth the idea that society had replaced God as the "Great Being" and its existence rested supremely on the idea that Love serve as the means to intertwine and maintain the various elements therein. "The calculations of self-interest can never be substituted as a combining influence for the sympathetic instincts" (1875, vol. i:264).

Comte conceptualized Love, not in the sexual tradition, rather he thought of Love in an aesthetic light, completely other-directed. This is to say

that Comte's notion of Love is not a vain love given to self-interest, rather it is more akin to the notion of benevolence and good will toward one's fellows. One could easily label Comte a humanitarian aspiring toward the welfare of all individuals, and the suppression of self-interest.

Although Comte focused heavily on "feeling" in his conceptualization of Positivism, it does not appear that he ignores the cognitive element therein, or at least he does not deny that reason is altogether without presence in the construct. "Yet the belief in Humanity while stimulating Sympathy, at the same time enlarges the scope and vigour of the Intellect...Reason, then has its part in this central dogma as well as Love. It enlarges and completes our conception of the Supreme Being, by revealing to us the external and internal conditions of its existence" (1875, vol. i:264).

Comte also writes at length concerning the subordination of egoism to altruism, that is the self yielding to the other. "To subordinate egoism to altruism--such is in its integrity the problem for man to solve, and its solution is seen on inspection to depend principally on the right use of the intelligence" (1875, vol. i:142). Here again, we see Comte depict his notion of the relationships involving action, intellect, and emotion. Action is viewed as neutral, whereas, the intellect must be subordinate to the sentiment of benevolence, or Love.

His activity is in all cases neutral, does not distinguish between good and evil; has no aim beyond itself; and as such may be led to prefer the service of our social feelings as offering a wider field than the personal. The intellect has less energy, and would willingly limit itself to the efforts imposed on it by our personal wants; it shrinks from greater exertion demanded by the service of society (1875, vol. iv:142).

Comte bears his Romantic badge in his appeal to the idea that all good things, and all things good for a society, must spring forth from a highly

esteemed will of Love. "It is on this ground that the love of the beautiful must guide us in our search after the true, quite as much as in our attainment of the good. The ideal rests ever upon the real, but does not therefore require an analytical knowledge of the real; the synthetical conception is sufficient" (1875, vol. iv:142). Comte's commitment is to the synthesis of these three elements, thought, emotion, and action, in order to achieve progress in society. Love or sympathy, underlies this synthesis. It is sympathy for others that will unite society and make it whole.

For Comte this synthesis is the primary goal in the development of his religion based on the worship of society. Individuals in his proposed religion would, through "worship" come to understand the importance of deferring selfish instincts to those of the "Great Being." Comte warns against the practice of engaging in self-interest where emotion is concerned, and argues that it is, in fact, in the nature of emotion to surrender to order, to submit.

The regular development of the emotional nature has cultivated the taste for, and the instinct of, order, by making us feel its power to confirm love by submission; submission alone being able to preserve love from the mutability consequent on the multiplicity of impressions. That this state of mind prevail--this should be the result of the arrangement I have definitively adopted for the three parts of the Positive religion (1875, vol. iv:143).

By submitting to this passion for order, Comte argues that the "young disciple" learns to respect and even love the "laws" that are beyond his control, laws that govern the nature of man's institution, or society.

Preserved from the impulses of selfishness by having his wants supplied by the providence of others, he is so placed as to be able directly to appreciate the value of the sympathetic instincts, and to feel deeply their natural connection with the habits of synthesis (1875, vol. iv:143).

It is social feelings that bear importance in this synthesis, and while self-feelings may be organic in nature, these social feelings appear to be socially constructed, learned in the context of interaction. So, Comte, much like Durkheim, holds both organic and interactive conceptualizations of emotion, the latter bearing more importance for the unity in society, than the former.

It is in the interest of humanity that Comte draws on this notion of "social sympathy," this unspoken trust that in providing for someone else you may be provided for in the end. Comte seems to hint at the idea that emotion is somehow infused with a governor of reciprocity, that perhaps, even with regard to emotion there is a sense of equilibrium to be maintained. It is true in most social relationships that there exist some norm of reciprocity, that social interaction is based on a given normative order to balance between the giving and the taking of favors, attention, and affection.

It is interesting in Comte's Romantic idealism how he ascribes to somewhat of a belief in a just world, this functionalist notion that equilibrium will be maintained and that good will can only bear good will in return. Comte puts forth the idea that if we act in the interest of others at all times, than someone or some group will act in the interest of us, for we are conceptualized as "other" in another individual's construct.

If we view emotions as that which emerges out of social interaction, the way in which they are usually conceptualized in the sociology of emotions, then those sentiments such as love can be viewed as emerging through behavior and the exchange of gifts under the guidance of a norm of reciprocity. Further this notion of reciprocity in regard to emotion, also lends support to the idea that emotions, as Comte seems to imply, are grounded in a moral order, that is, the reason invested in emotion is bound in moral

codes which serve as guides by which we may live. In this way, Comte exhibits an interactive account of sentiment.

Religion, Family, Language, and Social Organization

In the second volume of *System of Positive Polity*, Comte outlines his theories concerning Religion, the Family, Language, and Social Organization, among others. However, these specific domains have much to do with emotional constructs, which is the focus of this work.

For Comte, Religion serves to regulate individual lives, while at the same time serving to unify collective lives, that is, to serve as a moral governor of individual lives and serving to bring about social cohesion within in the community, a cohesion spiritually grounded. "Intellectually, that which can regulate the phases of one mind, can combine the ideas of many minds" (1875, vol. ii:9).

Comte also argues that the institution of Religion serves to provide a basis for individuals to defer their personal emotions toward those of the larger society, to defer to social sympathy. "Morally, unity in the individual is only secured by the ascendancy of a social instinct over the personal instincts" (1875, vol. ii:10). Comte argues that the institution of Religion has more to do with Feeling than Thought, that is, the effect of Religion becomes more evident in one's sentiment than in one's intellect. To feel the presence of God is much more than to think the presence of God in terms of belief. "... Religion is used to express that state of complete harmony peculiar to human life, in its collective as well as in its individual form, when all the parts of Life are ordered in their natural relations to each other" (1875, vol. ii:8).

Comte warns against ignoring the emotive element in constructing a theory of moral unity and a prescription for progress.

Treating exclusively of the Intelligence and the Activity, it would seem to leave no place in the doctrine for the Emotion, the one true stimulus of our entire life. If this great want were not supplied, human Unity would become impossible, for there would be no adequate combination between its two necessary conditions: Belief, and Affection...Nothing can take the place of a special and sustained cultivation of Universal Affection, the only internal spring of true Religion (1875, vol. ii:42).

Comte appears concerned with achieving the proper combination between the intellect, emotion, and action (behavior). In fact, this appeal for combinations lies at the root of Comte's grand theory. Concerning the hierarchy of his Positive doctrine he posits,

These evils ... (moral disaffection due to intellectual bias offsetting the balance of the combinations)... both in theory and in practice, can only be corrected, when Religion supplies some systematic stimulus to the benevolent affections. The Positive Doctrine must therefore directly fulfill this sacred duty. We first laid down that it must regulate the Intellect; secondly that it must guide the Activity; it must lastly show its power to give unison to the Emotions. This last attribute of Religion, the one which most truly characterises its nature, is at once seen to belong to it, when we give its full and proper extension to our idea of Positive Doctrine (1875, vol. ii:42).

Comte considers Affection and Belief to be the two fundamental attributes of Religion. However, he argues that the two attributes develop independent of one another, each of their own accord. "We shall more clearly understand the leading idea, if we remember that the object is not by any means to base Affection on Belief. On the true theory of human nature, these two great conditions of Religion are wholly independent of each other..." (1875, vol. ii:43). In this passage it appears that Comte is not beyond

abstracting emotion, that is, to speak of affection, with a capital "a," is to reify emotion. Several writers within the sociology of emotions (e.g. Coulter, 1979, Harre, 1986) would note the danger in the reification of emotion while explaining how such abstractions are constructed.

First, in detailing the processes involved in the reification of emotion, one must acknowledge the nature of the conceptualization of emotion from the social constructionist's perspective. A sentiment, or emotion, much like family or society, is an idea, an abstract that we treat as if it were concrete. In the conceptualization of emotion there is the synthesis of the cognitive with the affective. Throughout history, there has been a bias against emotion, as if it were the counterpart to reason, based on the assumption that emotion is grounded in sensation, ignoring the cognitive element (Franks, 1987).

Emotion is an active process, a process of self, an emergent of social interaction, and individuals are active participants in the construction of their own emotional experience. The intellectual error in conceptualizing emotion as an entity unto its own, a thing and not a process, is that ultimately, in this construct individuals will be deemed passive, and thus, subject to no active will of self, rather subject to the "will of emotion." Further, if we acknowledge that emotion is separate, and distinct in nature from self, than we also relieve individuals of responsibility in their action. For instance, the rapist who argues, "I could not help myself...I was overcome with lust..." This defense, or defenses of this nature are given in court and deemed legitimate. Such a defense acknowledges the common belief that emotion is a thing unto its own and individuals are only partially responsible for their actions.

If we acknowledge emotion as an active process, a process of self, individuals are then responsible for their own emotional experience, more

specifically, are responsible for their action motivated by emotion. Emotion is socially constructed, and individuals act as the agents of emotion, the creator the host, and the interactant.

Comte, not unlike many scholars of his day, held this Romantic notion of emotion as existing in the abstract. The idea is again exhibited in his correlations regarding the motto of the Positive doctrine, "Love, Order, and Progress." "At every phase or mode of existence, individual or social, we should always apply the honoured motto of our religion:---The Principle, Love: the Base, Order: the End, Progress" (1875, vol. ii:58). The unity which Comte seeks is only actualized in the religion of Humanity. These three ideas provide a synthesis with which to achieve moral unity.

Everything being referred to Humanity, these three general ideas necessarily tend to fuse in one. For Love craves Order, and instigates Progress: Order again gives consistency to Love, and direction to Progress: lastly, Progress is the development of Order, and the renewal of Love. Thus affection, speculation, and action, tend equally to the constant service of that Great Being, of which each individual may become a perpetual organ, (1875, vol. ii:58).

Following this quote in the second volume of System of Positive Polity, Comte claims to have provided the only system of balances sufficient to achieve human unity. "I have now adequately set forth the only system of human Unity which thoroughly fulfills all its conditions," (1875, vol. ii:58). This statement is indicative of how grand a scope of the realm of human things Comte aspired to hold, how Romantic, how embedded with idealism was his search for truth.

Despite his Romantic inclinations, Comte still affords emotion a legitimate position in his grand theory, even if he is guilty of abstracting the

phenomena. The evidence clearly shows emotion played an integral role in Comte's theory and his work should not be ignored with regard to a sociology of emotion.

Comte on the Effect of Language on Emotion

Comte also considers language in the second volume of System of Positive Polity. He supposes that any theory of language must derive from some branch of sociology, language is a function of the collective, of history, and not abstracted in the individual. Comte also puts forth the idea that there is somewhat of a dialectical relationship between language and feeling.

According to my Theory of the human Brain (vol. i. p. 543), Language forms in fact one of the five intellectual functions, although more than the other four, it is subject to the influence of Feeling. Thus its reaction on Feeling in turn, however powerful, is essentially determined by its mental character; and this must be in the first instance examined (1875, vol. ii:200).

Comte, in his discourse on language, alludes to what he calls the Logic of Feeling, "...the art of assisting the combination of ideas by resorting to the connection between the corresponding emotions" (1875, vol. ii:200). Comte declares that emotion serves as a well of inspiration for intelligence, and that the "Emotional organs," are more energetic than the "Intellectual organs." It is unclear, here, what cerebral law Comte is referring to and what "organs" he thinks are associated with the emanation of emotion.

He further discusses the relationship between Emotions and the Intellect, and concludes that the correspondence between them is vague at best, never clearly defined. "We are not capable of reproducing, exactly as we wish it, the Emotions which are fittest to stimulate our various Thoughts." (1875, vol. ii:201). In addition, our intellect is more multi-faceted than

feelings, according to Comte, and this, too, contributes to the vague translation between the two constructs.

He speaks of the Logic of Feeling and not the Logic of Emotion. His word choice is no doubt a symptom of the Romantic times in which he wrote and is altogether not a hindrance to the further understanding of emotion. Rather it may serve as a necessary step in the conceptualization of the nature of emotion, so as to lead to further, revised, rethought conceptualizations of emotion which would later include and afford credibility to emotion as an attribute of cognition as well as the affect.

In addition to his notion of the Logic of Feeling, Comte puts forth a Logic of Images which works in relation to the Thought, Feeling, and Language.

In fact the reproduction of Images is much more under control than that of Feelings, and besides it admits a far higher degree of complexity. It is therefore much easier for us to associate each notion with an Image than with a Feeling; and thus we can better promote the natural combination of Thoughts (1875, vol. ii:201).

It appears that Comte is also of the notion that "Feeling" or emotion is more based toward human nature than image, that emotion is second nature, and the individual is not at such great liberty to exercise control as she is where images are concerned. I, however would submit that if there be a difference, it is little, for images pass through my head freely and seemingly not of my own volition. In some respects I am the television set who knows not the program, nor do I know the inner workings, or mechanics that serve my medium.

Comte seems to argue that since emotion is more intricately tied to the nature of the individual, that it is less complex and more powerful than the

influence of the image. "Hence, this second Logic, that of Images, though more available and more precise than that of Feeling, has less power" (1875, vol. ii:201).

To complete his trilogy of Logic, Comte declares a Logic of Language, or the logical function of language.

Hence comes the Logical function of Language,...that is to say, it completes...our general means of mental combination by converting into a practical instrument those impressions which are the most entirely under control, as well as most varied. Signs are far from possessing that close and natural correspondence with Thoughts which Feelings, and even Images have. But when the association between Signs and Thoughts has been sufficiently confirmed by mature exercise, the facility with which we can reproduce and multiply Signs is such as to render the work of speculation both more rapid as well as more exact (1875, vol. ii:201).

Comte is critical of those thinkers before him who had sought to conceptualize language separate from a general theory of expression. Comte argues that such an abstraction would contribute to the tendency to overlook two other modes of logic, that of images as well as feelings. Here again, one notes his affinity for combinations and synthesis.

We may disregard these pretentious authorities, the effect of which would reduce the reasoning faculty of man to mere Language; for the immutable laws of our nature have invariably given to the instrument of Feelings and of Images, a higher logical value than to that of Signs. The great use of the third form of Logic consists in fact in its assisting the second, just as this assists the first form of Logic; so that Signs facilitate the combination of Images, as Images aid the association of Feelings (1875, vol. ii:202).

Language assists us in the expression and consummation of emotion. Perhaps, even before Gordon (1981) noted the importance of "emotion vocabularies," Comte had hinted at the relationship between emotion and language.

Comte appears to be of the notion that there is some generalized correspondence between words, feelings, and images. He also intends to develop this concept of "within" in reference to emotional experience. This idea of "within" is comparable to Baumeister's (1986) spatial metaphor or hidden self, a self, real, but not in public view, a space within the body wherein an individual may believe their emotions to be located. At times we can infer from Comte's text a germ of specificity theory (James 1922), speaking to this general correspondence between feelings, emotion words, and images, in his attempt at achieving the proper combinations, the emotions contained in a subjective space, inside the body.

We ought therefore to look on our logical instrument taken in its highest form, and it as yet almost in its germ, as consisting in the happy combination of these three general processes: that each Word should recall as far as possible an Image, and each Image a Feeling. We shall then have called in the Order of nature without, to complete the work of our development within; for we shall thus connect our Emotions, which are essentially subjective, with Signs, which are principally objective, the instrument being Images, objective in their origin, and subjective in their seat (1875, vol. ii:202).

In Comte's trilogy of Logic he refers consistently to emotions as feelings, feelings being sensation, subjective, a physiological response to an idea or image. I would suggest, per a social constructionist argument, that emotion proper, is comprised of both the feeling and the thought or image, as well as the emotion word. All of these elements are contained in the

emotional experience. The emotion word may act as cue for the emotion, that is, I must have some grasp of the language in order to experience sentiment. Language provides the boundary of experience and I can't very well be indignant about something if I do not know the word indignation.

Emotion is both cognitive and affective. What we call feeling is merely a physiological response to an idea that has some relation to self. My face becomes flush, a churning in my gut, adrenaline pumping, I feel anger, but the sensation is not the anger, I am angry because you stole my wallet, you violated me. It is an idea that provokes the sensation, and the language, the word, serves as a vehicle for meaning.

The image or idea that is the substance which mediates between language and feeling is contingent on moral codes, or a normative order concerning the nature and expression of sentiment. I am angry for a reason, sad for a reason, ashamed for a reason. Sentiments manifest themselves in accordance with an emotional order. I am angry because you violate my person. I am sad because the affair did not live up to the expectations I had constructed. I am ashamed because I did not live up to the expectations set forth by my fellow human beings.

For Comte, as well as, most writers working in the sociology of emotions, sentiments are in reference to a moral order. Responses to our actions and declarations, as well as, the perception of our actions and declarations, are judged against a moral code acquired by the self through the socialization process. Depending on where an individual's moral baseline is set we may begin to gauge at what point the individual will be pleased or offended. This principle is somewhat akin to the notion of relative deprivation, applied to the vocabulary of sentiments employed by the individual.

Comte asserts that Language has dominion over both thought and feeling. "In studying both sides we must steadily keep in view the Social purpose, the special mark of Language, the communication from man to man of Feelings and Thoughts" (1875, vol. ii:203). Comte also argues that in the expression of emotions that they are strengthened. "Besides, we express our feelings, for the most part in order better to satisfy them, by procuring the assistance of our fellows. If therefore, on every ground Expression be the result of Feeling, it must tend in its turn to develop and strengthen Feeling" (1875, vol. ii:203). So, Comte like Pareto, argues that the expression of emotion via language reinforces that emotion.

It is here that Comte makes clear the interactive nature of emotion, that is, that emotion is bound in the interplay of individuals, that the sentiments of one individual bear consequences for the sentiments of another individual.

For as they (emotions) find free vent they produce around us in others new emotions adapted to stimulate us in the best way; and the process of alternate reaction is continued almost indefinitely. At the same time Expression never forms the most powerful means of awakening Affection, for this is always strengthened far more by the Action which Affection suggests (1875, vol. ii:204).

Comte also argues, like the social constructionists, that language, or the emotion word, is a cue for feeling. This also suggests evidence for the idea that the sensation is merely a physiological response, and clearly not the emotion proper. "...Language becomes certainly the best general stimulus to Feeling. All the preliminary forms of religion, and especially Catholicism, understood profoundly though in an unsystematic way, this precious faculty of our nature, when in order to perfect the moral culture they resorted to the

regular exercise of Prayer" (1875, vol. ii:204). Comte seems to be of the mind that prayer, the calling up of emotion words, was and is a prompt for appropriate religious sentiments.

Comte is primarily interested in the influence that language bears on "feeling" or what we will call sentiment. He compares three general forms of communication and the varying degrees of influence that they maintain on sentiments.

The influence which Language by its nature has upon Feeling becomes in the case of every emotion, but especially any benevolent emotion, both more lively as well as more deep, according as the expression is more complete and more vigorous. The varying degrees of this influence may be very clearly seen by comparing the three general forms of communication between man and man: Gesture, Speech, and Writing (1875, vol. ii:204).

Gesture

Gesture, Comte argues, has the least effect on the individual committing the act, regardless how much affect is conferred upon the preceptors. The spoken word, Comte argues, has far more profound an effect on the agent, than say, the gesture. "Expression by voice, especially when freely accompanied with the appropriate gestures and attitudes, has a far higher moral effect; and this has been recognised at all times in religious prayer" (1875, vol. ii:204). Communication by voice or expression of sentiment in the spoken word form, Comte argues, allows for the most interchange or interaction between actors. The opportunity for immediate reaction or reply is mainly present in vocal communication and the effect on both conversants is more egalitarian than in the case of gesturing or writing. The point is that regardless of the form of expression of emotion, that

expression will reinforce that emotion and may call that emotion out in the other.

Writing

In writing, the greatest effect appears to fall on the agent on the writer as opposed to the recipient or reader.

But expression in writing, in spite of being carried on in silence and solitude, affects the agent far more keenly, when it results from a spontaneous act. The mental effort involved becomes a new source wherefrom to kindle the affections, provided that it does not absorb the intelligence. Besides writing alone admits of all the fullness and precision that expression requires. Thus the letters of two lovers are usually, if they deserve the name, more tender even than their conversation (1875, vol. ii:204).

Writing, in contrast to speaking, distances the author from the audience. We mainly write letters to lovers or friends, not for the sake of their own well-being, rather we write them for ourselves, to settle on our own affections in question. In the realm of literary criticism writers, such as Eagleton (1983) have offered the emergence of Deconstruction or Post-Structuralism as evidence that language, itself, is only one agent in the shaping of meaning and therefore the communication of emotion. Writers such as Derrida (1978) have argued that language, or texts, do not have centers of meaning as the school of structuralism has offered. Deconstruction does not refer to the practice of dismantling a text, rather deconstruction is the demonstration that the text has dismantled itself.

This notion has to do with the fact that words are not the things that they name, they are cues for meaning, and so are emotion words cues for

emotion. The meaning of words only emerges in their relation to other words, that is, just as an object, a word has no meaning inherent in itself, and so emotion only fosters meaning in its relation to others.

Perhaps writing, or a speech, is one of the few mediums wherein a case may be stated, a situation defined, and affections expressed, without interruption. The written word, essay, poem, or novel affords the author the opportunity to frame her ideas, or construct her argument in such a way as she may refer back to it, cite it, without further explanation, unlike a conversation wherein the conversants are at once projectors and receptors, and are perhaps equally insufficient at both tasks. The words flow out, without any permanence and are heard in a wash competing with other sounds and sights for attention, whereas, the writer's position is clear and captured in the externalization process, the reader devoted to the text when reading and not when listening. Therefore the effect of the written medium on the sentiments of the writer is most profound, solidifying and externalizing that which once was amorphous and fleeting.

However, the Post-Structuralist raise an interesting point in regard to emotion, or the construction of sentiment, that is the notion of the Deconstruction of emotion, if you will. If an emotion word serves as a cue or prompt for emotion, that is, the more finely discriminated the sentiment, the more dependent the sentiment becomes on the acquisition of the proper emotion vocabulary. Then the Post-structuralist idea, somewhat similar in onus to the symbolic interactionist idea, that a word is not what it signifies, that there is no clear meaning inherent in a single word, that a word only has meaning as it is perceived in relation to other words, suggests that there is no inherent meaning in an emotion word or sentiment, that meaning is arbitrated through the attribution of perception, that an emotion only has

meaning in relation to the object of a preposition, and is vague and amorphous and in the abstract. This issue of the deconstruction of emotion will be taken up later in the text.

Art

Finally, Comte in his discussion of the relationship between language and its influence on emotion, takes up again the topic of Art and the notion that artistic expression somehow enhances emotion. His writing at this point is classic Comte, romanticized and in the abstract,

...we constantly see in the influence of religious ceremonies and works of art over spectators, who stand aloof from any part in them. Advantage is too often taken of this tendency for the purpose of stimulating artificial emotions, by the use of formulas and compositions addressed to feelings still dormant. When I come to treat of moral training, I shall take great care to bring out carefully the practical importance of the normal rule, that Expression must always be subordinate to Affection. But, whilst Expression must never anticipate Feeling, it may be used, though with very great moderation, to give a fitting encouragement to the flow of the higher sentiments at the moment of formation (1875, vol. ii:205).

In the previous passage, Comte, hints at the agenda of his "religion" speaking to "moral training" and the importance of expression taking a cognitive back seat to emotion, separating the two concepts as if they might exist of their own volition, distancing us from the notion that expression, or emotion words are cues for emotion.

Comte's fear is that by randomly employing an emotion vocabulary that is not grounded in "feeling", however amorphous that may sound, one

might use such a vocabulary to conjure up emotion that is not "true" in nature. "...Expression coming before Feeling often leads to the serious danger of preparing the way for an affectation whereby true emotion becomes ever afterwards impossible" (1875, vol. ii:206). It is unclear what truth there is in emotion, or what qualifies for emotion in the pure.

Comte, while serving as one of the first social thinkers to speak to the possibilities of the relationships between emotion and language, and while serving as evidence that such issues as the study of sentiments is suitable for sociological scholarship, is at times a victim of his grandiose romantic vision and his trademark exercises in abstraction, viewing such things as emotion and morality as things that exist independent and divorced from individuals. As a scholar he was largely concerned with sentiment as a motivating factor in the actions of individuals and his scholarship, though at times misleading in the conceptualization of emotion, is at the same time a marvel in the discourse of emotion as a power in the lives of individuals.

It is clear that, for Comte, language is inseparable from emotion. Comte also concludes that the expression of a sentiment reinforces that sentiment, and that sentiments are bound up in moral codes. So, language is as important to the concept of emotion as is affect. Emotion is the marriage of cognition and affect.

Analytical Summary

In review of Comte's work it is perhaps most important to note the shift from a theory ignorant of emotion to one wherein emotion figures prominently. At the outset, in Positive Philosophy, Comte has only a peripheral interest in emotions. In fact, at some juncture Comte reveals a bias against emotion, a common scholarly bias of that time in history.

Emotions are not unlike dark forces, that need be overcome. Throughout the work Comte seems to wrestle with an ambiguity concerning sentiment referring to the “subordination of the passions to the reasons” while at the same time citing emotion as a motivating factor in explaining action, and consequently calling for more work to be done in that regard.

Comte does make some interesting remarks, if unknowingly, regarding emotional socialization. In concordance with Pareto, Comte believed that sentiment, more naturally, manifested itself in women, as opposed to, men. In addition, Comte also seemed to relegate emotion to the realm of the irrational.

Comte, in Positive Philosophy, reflecting the intellectual climate of his era, often positioned emotion and reason at opposite ends of the continuum. This idea, referred to as the false dichotomy of emotion versus reason, a function of the historical bias against emotion, is particularly unpopular in the social constructionist camp. It was common for intellectuals in the Romantic era to separate emotion and reason. However, in the case of Comte, his views concerning the dichotomy of emotion versus reason changed by the time he wrote System of Positive Polity as evidenced by the following quote, “The influence of true feeling is as favourable to sound thought as to wise activity” (1875, vol. i:16).

Regarding gender Comte seems to reflect the patriarchal sentiment of his day. His comments in Positive Philosophy echo of traditional functionalism, citing natural functions for both men and women, as well as crediting women with superior ability in matters to do with emotion, and crediting men with superior ability in the faculties of reason.

In reading System of Positive Polity it is clear that the scholar is significantly more interested in emotion as integral part of the social

experience. One of the main themes that emerges in Comte's work is the duality between personal feelings and social feelings. Throughout this work Comte emphasizes the need for social sympathy to overcome selfish feelings in individuals. Much of this work is characterized by this duality of egoism and altruism. These feelings of social sympathy, Comte argues, form the bonds that hold society together, social feelings provide the cohesion for unity.

Sentiment is not only highlighted in Comte's positivist motto, it is integral, that is, the idea of altruistic love or benevolence, that which will act as the cohesive force in society. Comte argues that it is the aim of the new philosophy to construct a system whereby all aspects of the human experience may be analyzed. Comte argues that our lives consist of three types of phenomena, thought, feeling, and action. Therefore emotion must figure prominently in the scholars work, which marks a significant change considering his first work.

In Comte's hierarchy of the three types of phenomena that characterize human life emotion is placed above both the intellect and action. This work is aimed at the synthesis of these three phenomena. The ideal of social sympathy underlies the whole of this work.

Comte's discussion of art is insightful for it is the consummation of feeling. Art represents the expression of sentiments. Comte, like Pareto was of the mind that sentiment warrants expression, and so expression is an integral part of the emotional experience. The expression of sentiment acts so as to reinforce the sentiment. In this way language is instrumental in the emotional experience.

Concerning the popular conviction in the social constructionist school, that is, the idea that words contained in one's emotion vocabulary serve as

cues for emotion, it is unclear in Comte's work. At one point Comte argues, that sensation precedes thought, "... (feeling) ..being a far stronger stimulant to external demonstration...(than reason)," and at another juncture he seems to argue that emotion words precede the emotion, "Language becomes certainly the best general stimulus to Feeling" (1875, vol. ii:204). Nevertheless, his work is of great interest to any conceptualization of a sociology of emotions.

Comte, much like Durkheim, entertains both organismic and interactive accounts of emotion. His early work reflects an organismic perspective, while his later work reflects a tendency toward an interactive perspective. However, the most noteworthy element of Comte's work lies in the shift in his perspective which highlighted emotion as not only an interest, but as integral part of his theory.

CHAPTER 4

VILFREDO PARETO (1848-1923)

Pareto was perhaps the most prolific writer in regard to the phenomena of sentiment of the three classical theorists analyzed in this dissertation. Pareto's pronounced interest in the realm of irrationality served as a foundation for his writing about emotions. In his texts he is primarily concerned with individuals irrational aptitude in regard to the social act. Pareto thought that many of our actions do spring from a well of irrationality and that we attempt to rationalize our actions after the fact. Originally, a student of economics, Pareto became frustrated with the ability to analyze human behavior with the conceptual tools indigenous to that discipline. For Pareto, economics was lacking conceptually because it only regarded the logical, rational element in humans. It offered no explanation of behavior that failed logic and for Pareto, most behavior failed logic and for Pareto, most behavior failed logical explanation. He referred to non-logical action as residual. Sentiments were then known as residuals, the deep seated beliefs that led individuals into action.

Pareto designated human sentiment as the basic source of non-logical action. He also claimed that sentiment can only be inferred and therefore not directly observable. This point is noteworthy in that a basic premise in the sociology of emotions centers on the notion that emotions in the abstract cannot be analyzed. For instance we cannot study love, rather we study people's beliefs about love.

Pareto was not interested in sentiments for their own sake. He was interested in sentiments insofar as they influence individual behavior. For

Pareto, it was not likely that the social act might be separated from the sentiments that precipitate such action. He could not ignore the substantive conceptual weight of this construct and so afforded many pages in Mind and Society to this end.

Although Pareto's work on sentiments is more pronounced in Mind and Society there is some discussion of sentiments in Manual of Political Economy.

All references in this chapter will be to Pareto's work unless otherwise noted.

Manual of Political Economy

There is still discussion of sentiment in this work, allowing that the notion of sentiment fits into every part of the individual's life and does not just exist in some abstract vacuum. Pareto, very early in this work, speaks to the false dichotomy of emotion and reason.

It is a common view, implicit or explicit, that men are guided solely by reason and that as a result all their sentiments are linked in a logical fashion; but that is a false view contradicted by countless facts, which make us tend toward another extreme viewpoint, just as false however, namely that man is guided by his sentiments alone and not by reason. These sentiments originate in the nature of man together with the circumstances in which he has lived, and we cannot assert a priori that there is a logical link between them (1971:42).

Pareto also notes in this work the importance of knowing how sentiments emerge and change, as well as, knowing their origins. Pareto argues that writers play an important role in influencing the sentiment of the

people who constitute their audience, that is, that writers have the power to influence public sentiment, sentiment concerning the political economy in specific. Pareto is also of the belief that writers rarely write in a search for truth, rather, that they seek arguments for their beliefs, defenses for their own mental agenda, rationalizations for their own sentiments. These arguments pose as derivations for their residual beliefs.

Pareto argues that preconceptions and a priori ideas which in part rest on the authority of religion, morality, and nationalism are likely to cloud our judgment on social matters in a scientific fashion. To cite a historical example Pareto writes,

...the Jacobins seriously believe that 'kings and priests' are the cause of all the ills of humanity, and they see all history through these distorted glasses. Many of them imagine that Socrates was the victim of the 'priests,' whereas the priests had absolutely no part at all in the death of Socrates. For many socialists any misfortune, small or large, which can befall man is clearly the result of 'capitalism.' Mr. Roosevelt is persuaded that the American people are vastly superior to other peoples; and he does not see how ridiculous it is to cite Washington in order to show the world that 'the most certain way to have peace is to be prepared for war.' We poor Europeans thought that, quite some time prior to Washington, certain inhabitants of a little country called Latium had already said, in their own idiom: *si vis pacem, et cetera*; but it seems that we have been deceived, the Latins undoubtedly copied Washington and repeated what he first said (1971:85).

Apparently Pareto was not without humor in his sentimental critique.

The point Pareto tries to drive home in this section of his work is that it is most difficult for us to refrain from judging the actions of others divorced

from our own preconceived sentiment. "Faith alone strongly moves men to act; and so it is not desirable for the good of society that the bulk of men, or even many of them, deal with social matters scientifically. There is an antagonism between the conditions for action and those for knowledge" (1971:86). Here Pareto speaks to those students of epistemology, or the social construction of knowledge particularly. "Here we have an additional argument which shows us how little wisdom is displayed by those who want to make everyone, indiscriminately and without distinction, participate in knowledge. It is true that the evil which that could entail is partially offset by the fact that what they call knowledge is simply a particular form of sectarian faith; and we would have to be concerned less with the evils which skepticism entails than with those which result from faith" (1971:86).

Pareto frequently speaks to the contradiction between the conditions necessary for action and those necessary for knowledge. He even hints at a notion of what Hochschild (1983) has called "feeling rules," emotional norms that set the tone for emotional protocol and ultimately emotional experience.

For example, among a warlike people mores are favorable to warlike sentiments. If it is accepted that this people should remain warlike, then it is useful for individual activity to be in accord with these sentiments, at least within certain limits. Thus it is right, always within these limits, to judge a given activity to be harmful solely because it is in opposition to these sentiments. But that conclusion is no longer valid if the inquiry is concerned with whether it is good for this people to be warlike or peaceful (1971:87).

These ideas of norms about the expression and even the experience of sentiments lend themselves to the thesis that emotions or sentiments are socially constructed, and thus particular to cultures.

Pareto, in this work, Manual of Political Economy, further examines the role that reason , or rational thinking, plays in the experience of emotion. Sentiment, whether it be individual or manifested in the group, may curtail the use of reason along the logical path of thinking on some given social matters, or at least so writes Pareto. "Among many peoples, reasoning on social matters stops where it appears that certain facts are, or are not, in agreement with religious sentiments. At the present time among civilized peoples, this point is found where the facts do, or do not accord with humanitarian sentiments; and no one would dream of examining these sentiments themselves, as he would have to do to be scientific" (1971:89). Today in speaking with Christians on the issue of creation and evolution, one may observe that however liberal the Christian, at some point faith will override logical thought. Lovers will also abandon reason at some juncture in their interaction, and the love will be called upon to explain one's action, to justify that which otherwise seems ridiculous or not in the best interest of one or both parties involved.

In another example Pareto employs the humanitarian virtue of equality as text to attest to logic that at best is questionable. He first points out that a society of individuals is heterogeneous and people vary according to size, sex, intelligence, morals, strength, and health among other characteristics. "The assertion that men are objectively equal is so absurd that it does not even merit being refuted. On the other hand, the subjective idea of the equality of men is a fact of great importance, and which operates powerfully to determine the changes which society undergoes" (1971:90). We see in Pareto's argument the classical bias against sentiment in regard reasoning, still a popular notion among laymen, that emotion is in opposition to reason.

It is in these first hundred pages of the Manual of Political Economy that Pareto discusses sentiments and the relation of sentiment to reasoning on social matters. The remainder of the text focuses on, as one might imagine, the political economy, the notion of economic equilibrium, and the study of economic phenomenon, much of what is only of marginal interest as far as the dissertation is concerned.

Mind and Society

Pareto argued that individuals often fail to act logically and attempt to rationalize their behavior as if their actions followed from a set of logical, coherent belief system. Pareto theorized that individuals employed what he termed “derivations,” the theories or belief systems that serve to justify or rationalize non-logical action. Pareto used the term derivation to refer to cognitive systems of rationalization invoked by those individuals in the need of explaining some illogical behavior, either to themselves or someone else. Much of Pareto’s work in Mind and Society relies on these two concepts “residue” and “derivation.”

Residues and Derivations

Pareto conceptualized residues as the manifestations of sentiments that have some correspondence with that which we call instinct. Derivations simply refer to the unscientific pseudo-theories that individuals use in the rationalization of their behavior. Residues act as the intermediary between sentiments that are unknowable directly, and belief systems, as well as the social act, which can be directly observed and analyzed.

The element 'a' (residue) corresponds, we may guess, to certain instincts of man, or more exactly, men, because 'a' has no objective existence and differs in different individuals (here Pareto hints at the interactive nature of emotions, an idea currently popular in the sociology of emotions); and it is probably because of its correspondence to instincts that it is virtually constant in social phenomena. The element "b" (derivation) represents the work of the mind in accounting for "a." That is why "b" is much more variable, as reflecting the play of imagination (1935:501).

Pareto goes on in the same passage to state that residues do not cover all human instincts, since he is only privy to those instincts that lend themselves to rationalization. "But if the element "a" corresponds to certain instincts, it is far from reflecting them all; and that is evident from the very manner in which we found it. We analyzed specimens of thinking on the look-out for a constant element. We may therefore have found only the instincts that underlay those reasonings. There was no chance of our meeting along the road instincts which were not so logicalized. Unaccounted for still would be simple appetites, tastes, inclinations, and in social relationships that very important class called interests" (1935:502). An individual's sex drive does not necessarily interest Pareto, the instinct for sex does not fall into the category of residues. However if an individual proposed some theory of why a certain sexual practice was superior to another, then Pareto might be interested in the residues underlying the elaboration of such a rationalization.

Pareto proposes a means by which he can distinguish between residues and derivations. First, he concerns himself with the investigation of doctrine that is associated with the social act, or behavior. Secondly, it is his aim to

separate those elements which correspond to the standards of logico-experimental science from non-logical elements. Finally, he separates the non-scientific elements into constants and variables, that is, residues and derivations. For Pareto, derivations only emerge when there is reasoning, debate, and ideological justification. When derivations emerge then Pareto is given to the search for relatively constant elements, residues, hidden under the cover of action.

As a social thinker Pareto was interested in the highly elaborate nature of some systems of derivation that individuals indulge themselves in to explain their positions or more importantly, their actions. Pareto subjects an array of metaphysical theories, religious systems, and moral structures to destructive analysis and discerns, to his own taste, that the pretensions of such theories and systems have nothing in common with what we call science. It is of no great surprise that Pareto gave no credence to such concepts as "liberty", "equality", and "progress." He claimed that such concepts were vacuous.

Pareto was not afraid to inject his analysis with his own politics, The weakness of the humanitarian religion does not lie in the logico-experimental deficiencies of its derivations. From that standpoint they are no better and no worse than the derivations of other religions. But some of these contain residues beneficial to individuals and society, whereas the humanitarian religion is sadly lacking in such residues. But how can a religion that has the good of humanity solely at heart...be so destitute in residues correlated with social welfare?...The principles from which humanitarian doctrine is logically derived in no way correspond with the facts. They merely express in objective form of sentiment of asceticism. The intent of sincere humanitarianism is to do good to society, just as

the intent of the child who kills a bird by too much fondling is to do good to the bird. We are not...forgetting that humanitarian has had some socially desirable effects...But...humanitarianism is worthless from the logico-experimental point of view...And so for the democratic religion in general. The many varieties of Socialism, Radicalism, Tolstoyism, pacifism, humanitarianism, Solidarism, and so on, form a sum that may be said to belong to the democratic religion, much as there was a sum of numberless sects in the early days of the Christian religion. We are now witnessing the rise and dominance of the democratic religion just as the men of the first centuries of our era witnessed the rise of the Christian religion and the beginnings of its dominion. The two phenomena present many significant analogies. To get at their substance we have to brush derivations aside and reach down to residues. The social value of both those two religions lies not in the least in their respective theologies, but in the sentiments that they express. As regards determining the social value of Marxism, to know whether Marx's theory of "surplus value" is false or true is about as important as knowing whether and how baptism eradicates sin in trying to determine the social value of Christianity--and that is of no importance at all (1935:1294).

In this passage Pareto is critical of modern religion for not providing an impetus toward residues that would promote social welfare when, in fact, this is what humanitarian religion purports to do. It is through the correspondence of derivations and residues that Pareto judges a society and its structuring of sentiment.

Pareto seems to afford no trust whatsoever to the words, billed as theories, that people put forth. The "theories" are only masks for the

emotions that motivate individuals into action. Pareto wrote in his *Treatise, Mind and Society,*

A politician is inspired to champion the theory of 'solidarity' by an ambition to obtain money, power, distinctions...If the politicians were to say, 'Believe in solidarity because if you do it means more money for me,'" they would get many laughs and few votes. He therefore has to take his stand on principles that are acceptable to his prospective constituents...Oftentimes the person who would persuade others begins by persuading himself; and even if he is moved in the beginning by the thoughts of personal advantage, he comes eventually to believe that his real interest is the welfare of others (1935:854).

In this case, the residue, or sentiment, would be self-interest, while the derivation would be one with democratic ambitions. Theoretically, a derivation is important, in that it provides individuals with a conceptual tool with which to negotiate the relationship between illusion and well-being, that is, by maintaining the illusion of solidarity, the politician may fancy that their sentiments are in accordance with some moral order while at the same time obtain a class status that ultimately distances her from her constituents.

The Six Classes of Residues

Pareto argued that there were six classes of residues that have remained relatively constant throughout Western history. Individuals have employed countless numbers of derivations to rationalize their action, but for the most part, Pareto suggests that we can assign all sentiments to one of six residual categories. It is somewhat ambiguous as to how closely these residues are related to human instincts. However, it is of great significance in the interest of this dissertation that Pareto's thought was so centered on sentiment that he was compelled to assign them an organization in his text. A review of the

various classes of residues will support the claim that Pareto seriously thought about emotion and the concept held a significant position in his work. The six classes of residues are an instinct for combinations, group persistences, a need for expressing sentiments by external acts, those residues connected with sociality, the integrity of the individual and his appurtenances, and finally the sex residue.

Instinct for Combinations

The residue referred to as the Instinct for Combination is reflected in the notion that individuals are impelled toward system making, that is, to elaborate pseudo-logical combinations of ideas.

The scientist in his laboratory makes combinations according to certain norms, certain purposes, certain hypotheses, for the most part rational (at times he combines at random). His activity is primarily logical. The ignorant person makes combinations in view of analogies that are mostly fantastic, absurd, childish (and often also by chance). In any event they are in large part non-logical acts. There is an instinct that prompts to combinations in general, for reasons which are fleeting, momentary, undetectable (1935:519).

In regard to Class I Pareto notes that one should be aware that individuals have a propensity for combinations, that individuals seek out those combinations that are deemed best, and finally, that individuals have a propensity to believe that these loosely constructed belief systems operate as they expect them to in the course of life events.

Pareto notes both passive and active elements with regard to the self which is prompted toward combinations. The self is a paramount concept with regard to any theory of emotion, in that self is the medium through

which emotion is manifested. Hochschild (1983) has argued that individuals are actively engaged in the construction of their own emotional experience, that the self is not a blank slate for emotion, rather the self is integral in the birth of emotion. With this in mind, it is of interest how the theorist conceptualizes self and its relation to self. Pareto writes, "On the passive side the human being is subject to them (combinations); on the active side he interprets, controls, or produces them. The propensity, too, is a vague generic sentiment that operates passively and actively" (1935:520). It appears at this point that Pareto is affording the individual some active participation in the construction of their own emotional experience, insofar as individuals are involved in the production and interpretation of these synthesized belief systems.

In regard to this class of residues Pareto employs a notion akin to Thomas's concept of the "definition of the situation," when discussing the propensity to believe combinations do what is expected of them.

There the quest for the best possible combinations is conspicuous and eager...One might compare the situation to a building...The instinct for combinations, the quest for the best possible one, the faith in its efficacy, provide the materials...Persistence of association gives stability to the structure; it is the cement that holds it together...Then faith in the efficacy of combinations again interposes to incline people to use the building...In many phenomena, especially among civilized peoples, one notes mixtures: logical actions, scientific inferences, non-logical actions, effects of sentiment (1935:521).

It is clear in this passage that Pareto is at times prone to profess a dichotomy between emotion and reason. The belief in the separateness between emotion and reason was common given the intellectual climate of his day, a belief that is now rejected in the social constructionist camp.

This particular residue, the instinct for combinations, is apparent in several normative institutions which in theory, are grounded in a “traditional” sense of morality. We can think of the instinct for combinations with respect to medicine, religion, education, government, morality, and parenthood. All belief systems are incorporating different theories, literatures, sciences, and even experiences. In regard to the vast number of combinations that have been employed throughout history in the treatment of disease Pareto refers us to Pilny’s Natural History. “Then boar’s testicles, wild bores’ (sic) urine,...hog’s testicles dried, triurated and beaten in sow’s milk...In all, nineteen combinations in the paragraph--not counting gladiator’s blood” (1935:522). One might argue that medicine has been the history of the trial and error of various and asundry combinations.

Pareto appears to be concerned that some may find such an array of things, both fantastic and absurd, unfit for study. However, Pareto convinces the reader that these derivations must be the subject of analysis if they, in fact, influence the behavior and belief systems of individuals. “The instinct for combinations is among the major forces determining the social equilibrium; and if it sometimes manifests itself in ridiculous and absurd ways, that fact detracts no whit from its importance” (1935:523).

In the preceding section we are made aware that Pareto, at least on some level, had ideas that approached an interactive account of emotion, and at the same time the author makes allusions to individuals playing an active role in the construction of their own emotional experience. This bears importance insofar as social constructionists are concerned, however several of Pareto’s ideas would not fall within that realm of thought. For instance his judgment that emotion, albeit an important part of one’s life, is without reason, and associated with the irrational.

Nevertheless, these residues are important in Pareto's account of sentiment because it is through these residues that he recognizes emotion, an apparent elaboration of instinct. Concerning the instinct for combinations it may be deduced that in an individual's propensity toward system making, that sentiments themselves can be thought of in a context, or pre-disposition toward making such combinations. For example, in an individual's attempt to construct a reality that lends her the illusion of the centrality of subject, sentiments play an active role in determining what she will select as the objects which will surround her, that is the objects or beliefs that will lend her the illusion of centrality.

Group Persistences

The second class of residues is referred to as the Group Persistences, the persistence of aggregates. Pareto writes that once the group has been comprised an instinct emerges, one of varying energy, in order "...to prevent the things so combined from being disjoined, and which, if disintegration cannot be avoided, strives to dissemble it by preserving the outer physiognomy of the aggregate" (1935:598). Pareto charges that this particular instinct is analogous to mechanical inertia, in that it resists the movement imparted by other instincts. It is of particular interest, that it is thought the instinct (emotion/sentiment) emerges and is not innate, that is, this residue is a product of interaction within the group and so not organic, an interactive conceptualization of sentiment.

In this class of residue Pareto is concerned with the permanence of groups of sentiment, or sensations as he refers to them. Pareto writes, "The residue originates in the permanence until there is a clash with some obstacle that disintegrates or modifies the group. It is a question of a series of actions

and reactions” (1935:610). In the previous quote Pareto addresses the notion that group sentiment, or those sentiments ascribed to groups, may change over time, and the idea that sentiment is involved in the constitution and stability of the group. However, Pareto is critical of any theory that attempts to establish a direct causal relationship between sentiments and facts, while not at all denying a relationship between action and sentiment.

Erroneous the idealistic theory that regards the residue as the cause of the facts. Likewise erroneous, but at times less so, is the materialistic theory that regards the facts as the cause of the residue. In reality the facts re-enforce the residue, and the residue the facts. Changes occur because new forces come into play to affect either the facts or the residue or both facts and residues--new circumstances occasion changes in modes of life (1935:611).

Here Pareto hints at a dialectical relationship between sentiment and action, citing that each influences the other.

Throughout the rest of his discussion concerning the maintenance of the group Pareto speaks to the persistence of various relationships between individuals, places, objects, and spirits that are somehow grounded in sentiment. The first of these he discusses involve the persistence of the relationships between individuals. Pareto remarks to an interest of sociobiologists that these residues may be common to both humans and animals. Pareto writes, “It is said that certain animals have a sense of property, which is just a way of saying that they have a permanent sentiment attaching them to places and things. Also persistent in them is a sentiment attaching them to people and other animals” (1935:611). He presents the argument that dogs “know” their masters and other individuals and animals common to the house. He also alludes to the notion of protection, the dog protecting his master and his house, perhaps chasing away a strange cat or

intruder. He also asserts that specific human sentiments are of the same nature,

In a case I have in mind, a number of cocks hatched in the same brood and kept together did not fight. One of them was taken away and kept apart for six days. It was taken for granted that he could be put back with the others as a matter of course, but he was immediately attacked and killed. The same thing happened with two male cats that were born together and lived peacefully. They were separated for a short time. When they were again brought together they went at each other furiously. The human sentiments of family, so called, of property, patriotism, love for the mother-tongue, for the ancestral religion, for friends, and so on, are of just that character, except that the human being dresses his sentiments up with diversions and logical explanations that sometimes conceal the residue" (1935:612).

Pareto writes extensively on the nature of familial relationships and notes the sentiments involved in the persistence of such relationships. Here he makes some distinctions between human sentiment and animal instinct concerning the rearing of children, noting the fact that the familial relationship is usually prolonged in humans because of the degree of dependency human children have on their parents. Pareto argues that familial residues correspond to the norms prevalent in the given country, society, and they also work so as to reinforce such familial norms.

In regard to gender he notes that the only literature we have of "civilized" people reflects a patriarchal family system. Therefore the residues that we have become familiar with are those that correspond to patriarchy. He notes that they are most prevalent in the Bible, China, India, what was called Persia, and all throughout Graeco-Roman antiquity.

Those good souls who dreamed of a "natural law" did not fail to conclude that the patriarchal family was part of that

law. But the day came when it was discovered, to the extreme astonishment of the learned world, that not only were other types of family extant among uncivilized or barbarous peoples, but that these may have played a part in the family organization of our own prehistoric ancestors, leaving traces still discernible in historic times (1935:613).

Finally, Pareto, put forth a hypothesis he claims surpasses others in regard to the social facts related to family, "It considers the groups as natural formations growing up about a nucleus which is generally the family, with appendages of one sort or another, and the permanence of such groups in time engenders or strengthens certain sentiments that, in their turn, render the groups more compact, more stable, better able to endure" (1935:615).

Next, Pareto considers sentiments in regard to "relations with places." He argues that these residues are likely to blend with the residues of the family and group type, as well as, with the residues associated with the living and the dead.

Looking at things superficially, one might imagine that patriotism of the modern type is a matter of territory, since the modern nations take their names from the territories they occupy. But looking a little more closely, one perceives that in awakening sentiments of patriotism the territorial name suggests a sum of sentiments, language, religion, traditions, history, and so on. In reality patriotism cannot be exactly defined, any more than religion, morality, justice, the good, the beautiful, can be exactly defined (1935:622).

This mode of thinking is in line with the current social constructionist perspective which puts forth the idea that emotion, or sentiments, are abstract reifications and cannot be studied in the same way as sensations. The latter can be measured, and are often conceptually substituted with sensation, as is the case in studies of nor epinephrine and epinephrine which are done in

support of specificity theory. The nature of these sentiments is going to be relative to cultural definition and relative circumstances.

Pareto also discusses in his section on Group Persistences, the relationships of social classes. He argues that the categorization of individuals in certain groups gives rise to common beliefs, and ways of thinking that become particular to the said groups.

The residues corresponding to them (classes) have in the past often assumed the forms of residues of family relationships. It has been imagined that social classes and even nations were so many lineages each with some common ancestor, real or mythical, and each indeed with its own gods, who were enemies of the gods of other groups. But the latter is a mere derivation, and among modern peoples it has fallen into desuetude (a state of being not in practice) (1935:623).

On the subject of race, Pareto hints at a social constructionist notion, that,

A number of traits observable in the Jews of our time, and which are ordinarily ascribed to race, are mere manifestations of residues produced by long centuries of oppression. And the proof is easy; one need only compare a Russian Jew with an English Jew. The Russian Jew is readily distinguished from his Christian neighbours; not at all so the English Jew. And then there are the intermediary types, corresponding to the longer or shorter duration of the oppression (1935:623).

The idea is that perhaps sentiments are transformed in the individual through the mediums of social class or race, that is, sentiments of a social class or race serve to distinguish them from others.

Pareto is also concerned with the sentiments surrounding death. On the subject of the persistence of relations between the living and the dead, Pareto is long-winded. Pareto makes the claim that the totality of relations

between individuals persists, in abstraction, through the absence of either one of the individuals or after the death of either one of the individuals.

Sentiments to be regarded in combination with the those of this type are sentiments particular to family, caste, and religion. Such sentiments become known through complicated rituals that might include, honoring the dead, worshipping the dead, feast, sacrifice, or other funeral-like commemorations.

In regard to the numerous derivations connected with such residues that focus on relations between the living and the dead, Pareto writes,

Those who will have logical explanations for all human beliefs imagine that such phenomena presuppose belief in the immortality of the soul, for without such a postulate they would not be logical. To refute that notion, one need merely observe, ignoring countless other proofs, that among the people right about us, materialists are not less punctilious than others in honoring their dead, in spite of their philosophy; and that in London and Paris, to say nothing of other cities, there are cemeteries for dogs where such pets are buried by people who certainly do not credit the dog with an immortal soul (1935:629).

Pareto speaking on the persistence of the beliefs concerning ghosts, apparitions of good and evil spirits, and other such fancy, makes some interesting comments with regard to the conceptualization of self, raising the question on whether or not there is something in self that remains constant over the life course.

It is apparent, on close scrutiny, that the concept of the survival of the dead is at bottom merely the extension of another notion which is very powerful in the human being, the notion that the individuality of a person is a unit over the course of the years. In reality both the physical and psychic elements in the human being change. Neither materially nor morally is an aged man identical with the child he was. And yet we feel that in him there is something

which endures the same. Overstepping the experimental field, people call it a "soul," without being able to explain very clearly what becomes of such a soul in lunacy, for example, or in "second childhood," or just when, between the time when the human egg is fertilized and the first cry of the new-born babe, such a soul finds its way into the body (1935:630).

Pareto also mentions residues which focus on the persistence of relations between a dead person and those things that were possessions in life. "The relations of a man to the things once belonging to him endure in the minds of the living after his death. Hence the widely prevalent custom of burying or burning such objects with a corpse, or otherwise destroying them, and that of killing his wives, his slaves, his animals" (1935:630). It has often been the case that things were buried with the dead so that they may have them in the after-life. Pareto argues that there are many such derivations surrounding the one residue, that is, the persistence of the relations between the dead person and the possessions he held in life.

Pareto then turns to the persistence of abstractions, uniformities, and sentiments which are transformed into objective realities. In regard to the persistence of abstractions, Pareto argues that residues of this sort underlie much of theology and metaphysics. On the notion of the persistence of uniformities, Pareto writes, "An important instance of the persistence of abstractions is the common procedure of generalizing a particular uniformity or even a single isolated fact. A fact is observed. It is stated in abstract language. The abstraction persists and becomes a general rule" (1935:635). The preceding excerpt reflects Pareto's knowledge of what is known today as the notion of the social construction of reality, that is, the idea of society as human product, society as objective reality, and finally, humans as social

product. In short, uniformity is maintained through the repeated reification of abstractions.

In a similar fashion, Pareto makes mention of the notion that sentiments are transformed into objective realities. Pareto writes, "The introspection of the metaphysicist, the "inner experience" of the Christian and other similar manners of thinking, all involve transformations of sentiments into objective realities" (1935:636). Here, Pareto is pointing out that as sentiments are externalized, labeled, given a name, for instance we will call the combination of this particular sensation and this particular cognition "depression," and after being externalized, the repeated reference to "depression" will result in objectification, the birth of an independent entity that has its own character and will. Traditionally individuals have had a tendency to reify and objectify emotions and treat them as if they come and go of their own volition, emotions akin to some sort of virus that happens to people, instead of conceptualizing emotion as an emergent of interaction, instead of granting individuals a place in the construction of their own emotional experience. In this manner, Pareto, once again, puts forth some very social constructionist type views.

Finally, Pareto concludes his section on Group Persistences commenting on personifications and the need to create new abstractions.

The lowest degree of personification lies in the naming of an abstraction, a uniformity, or a sentiment, and so transforming them into objective individualities. Thence, step by step, we mount to the highest degree, where the personification is complete and we get anthropomorphism. Bringing in the sex residue we get male and female principles, or divinities in every respect similar to men and women. Places and things may also be personified, without there being on that account any deification. Such

personifications arise spontaneously in the mind independently of any process of reasoning (1935:636).

He cites language as being very instrumental in regard to lending some sense of continuity to such groups, as well as being responsible for personifying them. One need only lend a name to a set of abstractions to catapult such things into objective reality.

In regard to the evolution of abstractions, Pareto writes, "Abstractions become outworn or untenable for one reason or another; they disappear or lose their appeal. But the need for them endures and new abstractions are required to take the places of those which disappear or weaken" (1935:645). He notes a need in the individual for these abstractions and declares that there is some evolution of abstractions, wherein some die out and others are modified, but always there will exist some sum of abstractions in the minds of individuals.

Residues Associated with Activity

In this class of residues Pareto discusses the sentiments that surround the notion of the social act, and sociability in general. The first residue of this sort he discusses is the “need of expressing sentiments by external act.” Pareto writes, “Powerful sentiments are for the most part accompanied by certain acts that may have no direct relation to the sentiments but do satisfy a need for action” (1935:647). He notes similar behavior in animals. It is unclear what Pareto’s position is in regard to emotional experience within animals other than humans. In many instances, such as this one, he seems to infer some emotional experience from the behavior of animals (e.g. a dog wags its tail upon greeting its master).

Pareto makes reference to Lyall’s book Asiatic Studies, wherein the author makes note of a shrewd and fairly educated Hindu officer who devoted many hours a day to the worship of five small pebbles which the author claims the officer had appointed to stand as his symbol for Omnipotence. Pareto writes, “Notable in that is not merely the need for the symbol, but the need for “doing something,” acting, moving the limbs, fixing the attention on something concrete--escaping in a word, from a state of passive abstraction” (1935:647).

Pareto makes the claim that the act of expressing sentiments reinforces those sentiments and may even have cause to arouse those sentiments in other individuals who are not in the experience of them. It is here that Pareto makes an interesting remark concerning the relationship of sentiments to sensations, perhaps addressing the question of whether or not emotion words are the cues for emotional experience or if instead, whether sensations are the cues for the experience of sentiments. Pareto writes, “It is a

well known psychological fact that if an emotion finds expression in a certain physical attitude, an individual putting himself in that attitude may come to feel the corresponding emotion“ (1935:647).

As evidence of this one might look to the profession of the theater, wherein actors and actresses conjure up the appropriate emotion for the character in context, and, at the same time, attempt to arouse that sentiment in the members of the audience. Hochschild (1983) refers to a similar practice in her discussion of emotion work, the practice of changing in degree or quality an emotion or the expression of emotion. Individuals engage in emotion work when their emotions do not fit the situation or the feeling rules as dictated by the normative order. Hochschild notes three different techniques that are employed in the practice of emotion work, they are the cognitive, the expressive, and the bodily. The cognitive technique refers to the changing of an image, thought, idea, or perhaps language in order to conform to the feeling rules. The expressive technique refers to the changing of outward gestures, facial expressions, or gesticulations in order to conform to the feeling rules. The bodily techniques refers to the notion of changing a physical symptom of emotion or a sensation, so perhaps the inappropriate emotion will be terminated or the appropriate one may emerge. This in fact raises the question, one of great importance for the sociology of emotions, that is, whether emotion words or sensations serve as cues for emotion.

Pareto also includes the phenomena of religious ecstasies in this class of residues.

One may feel a calm and thoughtful need for “doing something.” But that sentiment may rise in intensity to the point of exaltation, exhilaration, delirium...Religious chants, contortions, dances, mutilations performed in states of delirium, belong to the (Religious ecstasies variety. However

mutilations and more generally, voluntary sufferings often involve another kind of residues--the ascetic type of which we shall speak hereafter (1935:648).

Residues Associated with Sociality

Residues that are connected with sociality are comprised by those sentiments that relate to life within society. Here Pareto speaks to the notion of discipline in society. "On the other hand society is impossible without some sort of discipline, and therefore the social structure and the disciplinary structure necessarily have certain points of contact" (1935:659).

Pareto concedes that humans are social animals and that they have inbred a need for social relations among themselves. Some relations are directed at amusement, some at security, sex, art, money, and various other objects of interest. Again in this section Pareto remarks about the tenuous nature of derivations, and the static nature of residues, "That is just another of the many instances in which forms are seen to change, substances remaining the same: derivations vary, the residue endures. The sentiments that prompt human beings to organize in particular societies are to be kept distinct from the sentiments which develop inside such societies..." (1935:660).

On this subject of voluntary conformity Pareto states that imitation is paramount in this regard, that imitation serves as a basic form of behavior. This social phenomena may be seen in religion, politics, fashion, art, music, literature, the ways in which the sexes interact, violence, and several other behaviors. Pareto also argues that similarities might be the result of similar environments, and that imitation may serve to strengthen similarities.

The imitation may have some purpose: to attain some result that is beneficial, or is deemed beneficial, by means which

have been seen to yield those results when used by others. Such an imitation would be a logical action. But oftentimes no such purpose exists, at least no conscious purpose; and we then get non-logical actions, which, as usual, come to be tinted with logical colourings (1935:661).

In regard to the notion of uniformity enforced upon others, Pareto writes, "The human being not only imitates to become like others; he wants others to do likewise. If a person departs from the uniform rule, his conduct seems to jar, and produces, quite apart from any reasoning, a sense of discomfort in the persons associated with him. An effort is made to eliminate the jar, now by persuasion, more often by censure, more often still by force" (1935:664). Pareto offers that there are afforded logical explanations for this use of force but they are not so much explanations of dissent over this deviant behavior, rather these explanations are, in part, colored with a sentiment of hostility in response to the deviance, and this hostile sentiment is the re-enforced by ascetic sentiments and other such sentiments.

Pareto then turns to a discussion of two sentiments, pity and cruelty.

These contrary sentiments are better taken together. As we observed some distance back, the opposite of the two would be indifference. It is not easy to distinguish the sentiment of pity from many others that ape its forms. Undeniable the fact that for a century or more past the punishment of crime has grown progressively milder. Hardly a year goes by but new laws are passed in favour of criminals, while existing laws are applied by courts and juries with greater and greater leniency. It would therefore seem as though pity for criminals were increasing, and pity for their victims decreasing (1935:671).

In the preceding passage Pareto notes that while residues appear to remain constant throughout history, they are subject to change in intensity, degree, or direction. Pareto suggests that perhaps it is the case that the capacity

for pity, in general, is increasing, and that it might be that people can only have pity for the ones that stand before them. In many cases the victim is absent from trial, the victim gone, gone where pity will do them no good. Pareto cites an example borrowed from the Chinese writer Meng-Tseu, another analogy involving the animal kingdom, "A king sees an ox that is being led to sacrifice. He is stirred to pity for it, and orders that a sheep be used (in) its stead. He confesses that he did that because he could see the ox, but not the sheep" (1935:671).

Pareto then enters into the boundary of individual sentiments and raises an interesting notion in light of the sociology of emotions.

In individuals, sentiments are always more or less complex, sometimes very much so. In making scientific analysis, therefore, we have to fix our main attention on sentiments, not on individuals. Examining the complex of sentiments involved in pity for criminals, one is led to breaking it up along the following lines: I. The sex residue. It figures in nearly all judgements on crimes of passion, so called. 2. Residues of sectarian, patriotic, and other group sentiments. We are inclined to great indulgence towards persons belonging to our "set." We are indifferent, when not actually hostile, to persons not of our "set." 3. Residues of Class II (group persistences). Religious and political convictions tend to make us indulgent towards those who share them with us, ill-disposed towards those who do not (1935:674).

What is of particular interest in the preceding excerpt is the claim that Pareto makes with regard to the analysis of sentiments, that is, he proposes that sentiments may be abstracted in order to make them amenable to analysis. This claim would definitely be a point of contention for social constructionists, if not most individuals writing in the sociology of emotions. It has been an assumption of those inclined in the interactive perspective,

that sentiments exist only in situations inhabited by individuals and emerge through interaction. To abstract an emotion, divorce it from the situation, and fancy some analysis is to miss the point, for the sentiment does not exist in the abstract, something that moves in and out of individuals, rather sentiments are given life only in situations created by individuals.

Pareto, in his section on the residues connected with sociality, takes up the discussion of various sentiments, the first of which is self-pity extended to others.

If people are unhappy and are inclined to lay blame for their woes on the environment in which they live, on "society," they are apt to view all who suffer with a benevolent eye. That is not a logical reasoning; it is a sequence of sensations. If we try to state them in rational form we deprive them of the very thing that gave them force and efficacy--their indefiniteness...Something more or less of the kind figures in the humanitarianism of our time. People in poor economic circumstances are convinced that "society" is to blame. By analogy, the crimes of thieves and murderers are also felt to be chargeable to "society." So thieves and murderers come to look like comrades in misfortune worthy of benevolence and pity. "Intellectuals" are convinced that they are not playing a sufficiently important role in the social hierarchy; they envy people of wealth, army officers, prelates, in short all others in the higher social rankings. They imagine that criminals and the poor are also victims of the same classes. They feel in that respect they are like them and therefore feel benevolence and pity for them (1935:675).

Pareto speaks then to a sort of derivation commonly held in modern society, "the right to happiness." Pareto claims that the residues associated with this derivation may instill in the individual the compulsion to rebel and even in some cases murder. Individuals may excuse their behavior with a defense that rests on the notion that they had been wronged or cheated, or

that it is the ill will of society and not the individual that brings about such horror. Pareto writes, "Attempts upon the lives of kings, presidents, or other eminent men are largely the work of unhappy individuals, more or less out of their heads, who vent their feelings by striking out haphazard at the first person of note who crosses their path" (1935:675). Many of these individuals while claiming to be doing work for the good of "society" are engaged in this violence seeking their own advantage.

He then takes up the sentiment with regard to the instinctive repugnance to suffering. This sentiment is grounded in the reaction of disgust when presented with any amount of suffering, whether it be of any benefit or not. Note Pareto's bias in his description, "The sentiment is often observable in weak, submissive, spineless individuals. If they chance to succeed in overcoming it, they are likely to show themselves exceedingly cruel. That explains the remark one sometimes hears to the effect that women are more tender-hearted and at the same time more cruel than men" (1935:677).

He then turns to the residues connected with reasoned repugnance to useless sufferings. Again Pareto attempts to associate particular personality types with the expression and experience of various sentiments.

This sentiment is characteristic in strong, energetic people, who know what they want and are able to stop at the exact point that they consider it desirable to attain. In judging its government, a people instinctively understands the difference between this sort of pity and pity of the preceding type. They respect, they esteem, they love the pity of a strong government; they ridicule and scorn the pity of a weak government (1935:679).

The latter in this instance, they will interpret as cowardice, while the former will be regarded as generosity.

In regard to self-sacrifice for the good of others Pareto observes, in society, a general tendency for individuals to operate on a norm of reciprocity with regard to basic welfare. Again Pareto refers to the animal kingdom for analogy and example. In both realms the human and the animal beings are joined together in mutual assistance and common defense, in short, an individual may give themselves to suffering for the greater good of others.

All known facts incline one to the belief that the sentiment which prompts a man to help and protect his family and the group to which he belongs is, in part at least, similar to the sentiment observable in animals. The difference lies in the fact that the human being cloaks such conduct with a logical varnish. Very beautiful theories have been evolved to show that a man ought to love his country. However, the effect of such theories is virtually nil. It is insignificant at any rate as compared with the influence of the non-logical sentiment that inspires patriotism (1935:680).

Pareto also speaks to the issue of risking one's life for the preservation of another, noting that individuals often put their lives in grave danger for the sake of the sociality residue, or rather in respect for the importance they regard the other's esteem. Again, Pareto draws an analogy to the animal kingdom. He notes that the males of several species of animal defend the females, citing such as examples as the bull defending "his" cows. Again there is evidence in Pareto's analogy, of a gender bias. Nevertheless, it is worthy to note that animals who live in close proximity act to protect those they share housing or territory with, as is the case with a dog defending a house cat, or a cat defending a puppy.

Sharing is a social act embedded in sentiment. Pareto discusses the issue of sharing one's property with other individuals. He writes, "There are any number of shadings between the state of mind where one gives up one's

life and this milder form of sentiment where there is a mere renunciation of certain enjoyments for the benefit of other individuals" (1935:682). Adults, as well as children are given to the practice of sharing food, toys, and even money.

It is in his discussion of the residues pertaining to sociality, that Pareto mentions sentiments of social ranking, sentiments of superiors, and sentiments of inferiors. Pareto claims that no complex society is maintained without some degree of social hierarchy. "With sentiments of social ranking we may class the sentiment of deference the individual feels for the group of which he is a part, or for other groups, and his desire to have their approval or admiration" (1935:686).

In the class regarding sentiments of superiors, Pareto includes patronage, benevolence, and pride. He also suggests that these sentiments, especially pride, may coexist with sentiments of humility, for instance one may be very self content in the pride over being humbler than other individuals.

In regard to sentiments of inferiors Pareto writes, "They are sentiments of subordination, affection, reverence, fear. They are indispensable to the constitution of animal societies, to the domestication of animals, to the ordering of human societies" (1935:687). In the following excerpt Pareto, again, exhibits some gender bias but does speak to the issue of class. "It is common to accept the authority of a person who has, or presumes to have, some real or imaginary symbol of superiority. Hence the reverence of the young for the old, of the novice for the expert; in a day gone by, of the illiterate for the learned, of the plebeian for the noble--in our day, of the non-union worker and many people of the bourgeoisie for the union man, of the weak for the strong, of the man of one race for the man of another regarded as

superior, of the woman for the man (when special circumstances do not make her the dominant party)...” (1935:687). It is of particular interest to note that Pareto is aware of how well the illusion of “strength” or “intelligence” is often times just as efficient at evoking sentiment that cloaks relationships of inferiority/superiority. He even hints, in the preceding quote, at a social construction of race, noting that sentiments of inferiority are the result of engaging the belief that one race is superior to another, whichever race is so defined by those individuals equipped with power enough to define the situation for the rest.

Pareto then turns to a discussion of the sentiment that is characterized by the need for group approbation.

The need that the individual feels for being well regarded by his group, for winning its approval, is a very powerful sentiment. On it human society may be said to rest. But it works in silence, oftentimes without being expressed. Indeed the person who most desires admiration--glory--from his group pretends to be indifferent to it. Strange as it may seem, he may really be indifferent to it, and then again unwittingly allow himself to be guided by the approbation or admiration of others (1935:690).

I may point out an example of the young angry punk rocker (e.g. Nirvana) who insults his audience, acts generally indifferent to crowd response, while at the same time relying on and craving their support. Pareto also notes that in general, the approbation afforded by or the censure of the group reinforces a sentiment already present in the individual.

Pareto then notes a sentiment connected with sociality that has no counterpart in the animal kingdom, that is, the sentiment of asceticism. “They are sentiments that prompt the human being to seek sufferings or abstain from pleasures without design of personal advantage, to go counter to

the instinct that impels living creatures to seek pleasurable things and avoid painful things. They constitute the controlling nucleus in the phenomena known as asceticism" (1935:691). He takes up the notion of penance, an individual acts not in his own interests, or faces the consequences befallen him due to his sin, and hopes to make amends with God by doing so. The religious feeling serves as the residue while penance is the consequential derivation.

He also writes of other instances of asceticism as with the Spartans and the Buddhists.

And there stands the Spartans, who practised asceticism as a means of maintaining strict discipline; and the Buddhists, who turned ascetics in order to stultify all vital energies. Among our own contemporaries we find ascetics in the name of the goddess Science who abstain, from the use of alcoholic beverages; other ascetics who dare not look at a pretty girl in the name of a sex morality of their own, which who can guess why?--regards the sexual act as the worst of crimes; others who cannot endure light literature; still others who make war on dramatic productions that are not altogether dull and fail to 'solve some social problem.' It is therefore apparent that the constant element is the self-infliction of sufferings, the variable element the reasons they have--or say they have--for doing so (1935:692).

Individual Integrity

This class of residues is said to compliment the residues associated with sociality. The first sentiment Pareto discusses in this section regards the integrity of the individual according with his/her values, principles, attitudes, beliefs, and possessions. Pareto argues that to defend one's possessions and to aspire to increase their quantity are two behaviors that

may occur concurrently. "The sum of sentiments called interests is of the same nature as the sentiments to which the residues of the present variety correspond; hence sentiments of 'interest' ought strictly to be put in it. But they are of such great intrinsic importance in the social equilibrium that they are best considered apart from residues" (1935:727).

For Pareto, sentiments play an integral role with regard to the stability of the social equilibrium, the sense of balance that characterizes society.

The forces (or sentiments) that come into play when the social equilibrium is disturbed are nearly always perceived by the individual members of that society under some special form. Needless to say, they, as individuals, know nothing about any equilibrium. Those are just names which we as scientists, apply to what is going on. They are conscious of an unpleasant disturbance--it may sometimes be painful, and very painful indeed--of their integrity as it was when the state of equilibrium was still being maintained. Ordinarily such sensations belong to the vague categories known as the "just" or "unjust." When a person says: "That thing is unjust," what he means is that the thing is offensive to his sentiments as his sentiments stand in the state of social equilibrium to which he is accustomed (1935:728).

Pareto also addresses the sentiments of equality in inferiors. "This sentiment is often a defense of integrity on the part of an individual belonging to a lower class and a means of lifting him to a higher. That takes place without any awareness, on the part of the individual experiencing the sentiment, of the difference between his real and his apparent purposes. He talks of the interest of his social class instead of his own personal interest simply because that is a fashionable mode of expression" (1935:732). It is interesting to note, in the preceding passage, Pareto implies that the individual experiences the sentiment and is unconscious of it, or at least it is

suggested that somehow in this emotional experience, the intentions of the individual are clouded. There is an element of self-deception involved in this experience of emotion, which is reflective of the classical or more traditional conceptualizations, namely, that there is a dichotomy between emotion and reason, that emotion is of an irrational nature.

On the subject of integrity, Pareto argues that it is among the most powerful sentiments, and at its root is the instinct for self-preservation. Pareto argues that "remorse" is simply, a manifestation of the concept of altered integrity.

The person who violates a certain norm that it has been his habit to observe feels ill at ease from that very fact. He is conscious of being somehow less than he was before. To escape from that painful state of mind, he looks about for some means of removing the stain, of restoring his former integrity; he finds it and he uses it (1935:743).

In regard to sex and those sentiments associated with the act, Pareto seems concerned with the derivations surrounding this notion of moral purity; namely, the transition in human thought from a material uncleanness to a moral impurity.

Commerce between a man and a woman, whether legitimate or not, was considered a cause of impurity among the ancient Greeks as well as among other peoples. Here too we have a transition from a purely material uncleanness to a moral impurity. Theano, a woman of the Pythagorean sect, was once asked: 'How many days after commerce with a man may a woman be considered pure?' and she answered, 'If with her husband, at once; if with some other man, never (1935:757).

Pareto also cites the woman's menstruation, as a symbolic discharge of the impure. The process of giving birth is regarded by many as invoking impurity. Newborns in Greece and Rome were purified. Impurity is also to

be associated with death. Originally part of the funeral rites were aimed at purification. "Countless the forms of impurity, but they all correspond to a single sentiment, real or imaginary, of alteration in personal integrity; and they were remedied by appropriate ceremonies of purification" (1935:758).

Throughout the discussion of the various derivations directed at the cleanliness sentiment, Pareto alludes to the invitation to neurosis given the familiar and abundant sources of impurity. It also should be noted that the obsessive-compulsive individual who is given to washing his hands ten times an hour is perhaps just the logical extension of the classical individual going about his ritual of cleansing. One could suggest that since the post-modern world is inundated with impurities far beyond what our fathers could have fathomed the need for cleansing is greater, and in some individuals this need is manifested in neurotic behavior that would qualify for Pareto's definition of derivation. Pareto cites several historical examples of individual cases that by today's standard would qualify the individual for a bonafide mental illness.

In such a plethora of dreaded impurities the superstitious soul was afraid of everything. Theophrastus shows one such leaving the temple after washing his hands and sprinkling himself with lustral waters and walking about all day long with a laurel-leaf between his lips. Ever so often he purifies his house...He goes down to the sea-shore for a sprinkling with sea-water. If he chance to encounter something reputed to be of evil omen, he purifies himself by pouring water on his head, and having someone carry a shrimp and a puppy in a circle around him...Juvenal ridicules the purifications of a superstitious woman who in early morning in midwinter goes to Tiber, breaks the ice, plunges in three times, and shivering washes her head in eddying current (1935:759).

Continuing his discussion of integrity Pareto alludes to the now popular notion of transference, noting that the family, the basic and fundamental social unit, may be instrumental in the transference of integrity among individuals. "When the family is felt to be the social unit it follows that any altercation of integrity in one of its members extends to the family as a whole, in space and time, much as a wound inflicted on one part of the body of a living being affects the body as a whole" (1935:760).

Pareto also speaks to the sentiments associated with the restoration of integrity by acts pertaining to the offender. He speaks to the sentiment of revenge.

There is a sentiment that impels animals and human beings to hurt those who have hurt them, to return evil for evil. Until this has been done a person experiences a sense of discomfort, as if something were wrong with him. His integrity has been altered, and it does not recover its original state until he has performed certain acts pertaining to his aggressor. Typical are the sentiments underlying vendettas or duels (1935:798).

Pareto writes that the relatives or friends of the victim, may feel as though the offense was done to them. In effect, that it was their integrity that has been altered, for there may be no integrity left of the victim. So the inspiration for revenge comes from the need to restore integrity to the victimized individual or, in fact, to those affected by association to the victim. These residues may also be in combination with those associated with the social equilibrium residue. A modern example may be seen in the petty wars that litter this planet yearly, countries taking offense at one another, defending neighbors or special interests and such. To continue in the vein of revenge, Pareto writes,

The sum of sentiments designated by the term 'hatred' may be at least partially classed with this variety. Fear very often lies at the bottom of hatred both in men and in animals. In many cases when the fear goes, hatred turns to contempt. In general terms, hatred arises from a desire to repel an attack on one's integrity. Vigorous conviction is an element in integrity, and that explains the violence of theological hatreds. Hatred wanes when faith wanes, or when the individual no longer considers the faith an essential part of his personality. The artists, the writer, the poet, are led not only by vanity, but also by a profound feeling for their arts, to see an offense to their individual integrity in any contrary expression of opinion, or even in mere silence. Oftentimes any change in the existing state of things is deemed an offense and is repelled by attachment to tradition--neophobia (1935:799).

An interesting case of the impact of such sentiment is noted in Pareto's text citing one, Tatiana Leontiev, who suffered the slightest penalty although she committed murder, a rather haphazard one at that. Through this example Pareto alludes to the "irrational" nature of emotion. Writing of Tatiana Leontiev,

...She had killed an unlucky individual by the name of Muller, mistaking him for the Russian minister Durnovo, upon whose person the heroine had intended, so she averred, to wreak vengeance for the mistreatment of Socialists in Russia. Asked by the court whether she were not sorry for her mistake, she replied in the negative: 'Anyhow, this Mr. Muller was a burjui too!' The harpy's reasoning--it was accepted, notice, by those kind-hearted jurymen--may be stated as follows: A bourgeois, Durnovo, had offended the Russian Socialists. It was therefore 'just' to kill a Mr. Muller who had not the remotest share in the doings of Durnovo, but was, however a bourgeois (1935:800).

Pareto is quick to point out, that, "...From the logical standpoint the reasoning is idiotic. But it gets its force not from its logic but from the sentiments that it expresses--and they correspond to residues of restoration of integrity" (1935:800). Perhaps of more particular interest here is the notion of whether the sentiments associated with integrity emerge with or without reason. I believe acknowledging the cognitive component in the conceptualization of emotion, a social constructionist would argue that although the expression of sentiment does not warrant the harm and endangerment of others, it does emerge through interaction, and does not emerge without reason. So, while the young woman's excuse for her behavior is regarded as unacceptable, her sentiment, which Pareto fancies led her to such an act, is not without reason, that reason, the injustice to "her people." It just so happens Ms. Leontiev is from a prominent bourgeois family herself, and so Pareto again declares, "...it is altogether idle to look for logical reasons for non-logical conduct" (1935:801).

In regard to offenses to integrity, and the notion of restoration manifested in the sentiments associated with revenge, Pareto discusses an interesting social psychological phenomena, that is, the imaginary or abstract offender. "This residue is clearly apparent in cases where people pick quarrels with their fetish, or with some saint, spiritual being, or god" (1935:803). He argues that individuals treat imaginary beings as real beings, that is, imaginary beings are reified. The being is praised, glorified, damned, blamed, negotiated with, threatened, insulted, and worshipped. Pareto also notes that, "...These simple associations of ideas and the non-logical actions corresponding to them are subsequently explained and justified by derivations" (1935:803).

The Sex Residue

The end of this, the second volume, of Pareto's Mind and Society attention is directed toward the sentiments associated with sex, not merely the appetite for sex, rather it is of interest how sex influences modes of thinking. Pareto goes to great length to relate a composite history of sexual attitudes beginning with the ancient Greeks. "Graeco-Roman antiquity thought of the sexual act as satisfying a bodily need, on a par with eating, drinking, adorning one's person, and the like; and all such things the ancients regarded with indifference, generally condemning abuses, and less frequently excessive refinements, in pleasures" (Pareto 1935:807).

Pareto notes that throughout history the sex residue has been constant, however the forms have changed, and what was indecent and taboo changes, that is, the derivations are bound to variance. Pareto points out that the sex residue is still strong in those who appeal to some sexless identity, or at least those who are opposed to those who choose to find some piece of their identity in sexual matters. "The sex residue is active not only in mental states looking to unions of the sexes or lingering on recollections of such things, but also in mental states that evince censure, repugnance, or hatred towards matters of sex. Strange as it may seem, there are data a-plenty for showing that the very thought of chastity when it assumes any prominent position in the mind, may have an underlying sex residue, and many individuals have been led over the road of purity to solitary vices" (1935:817).

Pareto, perhaps not as emphatically as Freud, argues that the sex residue underlies all behavior and is just as instrumental in the lives of the chaste as it is in the lives of the promiscuous, and there in between. Pareto's

text concerning the sex residue is filled with discussion of various forms of fetishism and religions based on the worship of sexual organs.

It is in this text that Pareto makes himself vulnerable to attack on the issue of gender.

The cult of woman figures explicitly or implicitly, openly or thinly veiled, in many religions...One should not forget that many genealogies of divine beings that all show a sex residue, nor allegories and personifications, male or female, of abstractions or other fantastic aggregates. All such things go to show how at all times thoughts of sex crowd into the human mind. Certain it is that forced chastity, especially when it is scrupulously observed, tends to introduce amorous sentiments into situations where there is, and can be, no question of erotic relations...Cut off from men, a woman oftentimes entertains for a pet sentiments that have--an erotic element. Other women, in the same circumstances, devote themselves to charities, social agitation, or religious activities. The so-called feminist is often just a hysterical woman in want of a mate (1935:841).

One is not hard put to imagine the implicit patriarchal influence in Pareto's thought. Considering our contemporary academic environment, such comments would be met with the harshest criticism today.

All things considered, the preceding comment provides some insight as to how Pareto might be given to conceptualize emotion or sentiment in women. It seems implicit in his comment that he would agree with Comte that women are more given to hysteria, that perhaps, women are more given to emotion than men, and in that the classical interpretation of emotion was that it was of an irrational nature, than it follows that in traditional thought it was often argued that women were more irrational than men.

This classical notion of emotion as being conceptualized as containing a irrational element is evidenced in Franks (1987) work on the bias against emotion. Franks argued that since the times of the ancient Greeks there has persisted a false dichotomy between reason and emotion, a bias against emotion that has influenced Western thought. The social constructionist combat this idea based on the notion that we stand to gain more by understanding how there exists emotion in reason and reason in emotion. In short, emotion and reason are inseparable. However, it might be granted that due to gender socialization processes, women are encouraged to be more expressive in regard to sentiment.

Further in Pareto's discussion of the sex residue he entertains the sentiments envy and jealousy, sentiments, he argues, that are to be associated with the sex residue. Again, he asserts that individuals may experience these sentiments without the knowledge of the relations of these things, or rather, the motivations that underlie these sentiments. "All this may happen quite apart from any perception on the individual's part that the sex residue is influencing his conduct. So envy may be so intimately blended with the sex residue as to be indistinguishable from it even by the person who is experiencing the complex sentiment" (1935:843).

Pareto points out the distinction between the Christian tradition, wherein sex has typically been associated with evil while at the same time dependent on the practice of the act to fulfill one of the fundamental tenets of the religion, that is, to multiply and inhabit the earth, and an individual such as Xenophon, who wrote "Memorable Sayings of Socrates", wherein he considers sex as any other physical need (e.g. eating, sleeping) not subject to condemnation except if it is practiced in excess. The distinction is enhanced by noting the difference in the way sex is thought about by each "group."

Even though the Church Fathers are constantly condemning sex their minds are obsessed with it, whereas when it is treated as just another physical need, by Xenophon, it is thought of no more than one should think of food or sleep.

The changes in religious thought over the course of history, as well as the changes in attitudes and acceptable means of sexual expression are evidence of Pareto's general thesis, that is, that while the residue remains constant in individuals throughout history, the derivations vary. The sex residue has remained constant while norms about sex and the means of expression and the sanctioning of such means has changed and will continue to change.

In other volumes of Pareto's Mind and Society, the writer is not as concerned with specific emotions or sentiments as he was in the second volume of the aforementioned work, but he does still, throughout his work, focus on the relationship between residues and derivations in the abstract. Pareto uses human's record of history to again illustrate this relationship. "We have seen that the compositions which go under the name of "history" are as a rule compounds of factual observations of one kind or another supplemented by derivations and ethical considerations, without any distinctions being drawn between ideals, myths,...and real facts. In general one may say that history has so far been a history of derivations rather than of residues, a history of concepts, rather than of the forces of which those concepts are but manifestations" (1935:1501). Here Pareto hints at a bias in the presentation and or the conceptualization of the past, that is, there is much attention given to the acts and abstract concepts that result from the well of emotion, but very little attention given to the history of sentiment, that which leads men and women into action.

Pareto, of course, would argue that there is little attention given to that which has remained constant, and that all of the focus has been on the different manifestations of these constants in human expression. "That is all well enough when history is more or less a composition designed to influence the sentiments of human beings when preaching is more or less interwoven with experimental observation; but it is not only not beneficial, it is positively harmful, when the purpose of history is to describe real facts and the relations between them" (1935:1501).

In the four volumes of Pareto's Mind and Society he is mainly concerned with studying non-logical behavior, claiming that most behavior one observes is non-logical. He asserts that humans go about the business of rationalizing their non-logical behavior so as to render their lives meaningful and to secure some faith in experience, as well as to validate action.

Residues denote the major sentiments that run constant throughout the course of human history. Derivations denote the social need to validate or express these sentiments, and these derivations are subject to vary.

It is in this work, Mind and Society that Pareto details his conceptualization of emotions and sentiments. In other works which will be discussed the theme of sentiment is noticeable, but nowhere is it as obvious and as well articulated as in Mind and Society.

Analytical Summary

It is clear that Pareto, as a social thinker, was concerned with the phenomena of emotion. For Pareto, sentiments were to fall under the auspices of residuals, they served as the deep seated beliefs that led individuals into action. He was therefore, interested in sentiments in that they influenced the behavior of individuals.

His conceptualization of emotion held traits of both the organismic and the interactive approach. He posited some belief that the well of human sentiment provided a basic source for non-logical action. He also claimed that sentiments, as manifested in the various residues, were some extrapolation of instinct. He even makes the claim that certain residues may be common to both humans and animals. These ideas reflect an organismic approach to the conceptualization of emotion, that is, the idea that emotion is given to instinct or biological impulse.

In his discussion on the Instinct for Combinations Pareto lends some credence to the individual as an active participant in the construction of her own emotional experience, an idea that reflects an interactive approach to the conceptualization of emotion. Pareto implies that the individual is active in this construction, insofar as the individual is involved in the production and interpretation of the said synthesized belief systems.

Regarding Group Persistences, Pareto offers that sentiments are functional in that they are instrumental in the constitution or stability of the aforementioned group. It is in this section, as well, that Pareto presents a dialectical relationship between sentiment and action. He speaks to the relationship between sentiment and action, that is, he argues that, "In reality

the facts re-enforce the residue, and the residue the facts," and accounts for social change, "Changes occur because new forces come into play to affect either the facts or the residue or both facts and residue--new circumstances occasion changes in modes of life" (1935:611).

Throughout his discussion of the six classes of residues he speaks to the persistence of various relationships that remain salient between people, places, things, and spirits, relationships that are grounded in sentiment. He also puts forth the idea that sentiments, such as patriotism, cannot exactly be defined, which reflects the social constructionist perspective regarding the nature of emotions, that they do not lend themselves to measurement as sensations may. Rather, they are abstracted reifications, relative to cultural definition.

In his discussion of the persistence of abstractions, Pareto remarks on sentiments that are transformed into objective realities. In this section it is clear that his ideas parallel the basic ideas of externalization, objectification, and internalization put forth in the social construction of reality, from which the social construction of emotions is inferred.

Perhaps, one of the highlights in Pareto's work, as far as students of emotion are concerned, is his discussion on the class of residues referred to as Activity and Sociability. He speaks to the "need of expressing sentiments by external acts." The idea is that the act may not have any direct correlation to the sentiment, but just the same, sentiment demands some externalization and is manifested in action. Further, he argues that the expression of sentiment reinforces that particular sentiment, and has some potential as far as calling out that sentiment in others.

He notes the constant nature of residues, and the fleeting nature of derivations; and that these fundamental sentiments remain constant

throughout time. The forms may change, yet the substance is the same. He does appear to grant sentiments an existence of their own, which is an idea contrary to those espoused in the social construction of emotion. He implies the separation of sentiment and individual, "In individual's sentiments are always more or less complex, sometimes very much so. In making scientific analysis, therefore, we have to fix our main attention on sentiments, not on individuals" (1935:674).

Throughout his text Pareto discusses several sentiments which include: pity, cruelty, benevolence, patriotism, deference, and pride. In his discussion of deference we gain some insight as to his reflections on race, class, and gender. He writes, "It is common to accept the authority of a person who has, or presumes to have, some real or imaginary symbol of superiority" (1935:687). He refers to women as subordinate, except in the case that the situation dictates that they be dominant. One race, and one class is regarded as inferior to another. In this section we can infer a social construction of race, for these positions in society are fixed by belief and not any natural law.

However, much of Pareto's work, as much of the work of that period is laden with a gender bias, specifically in his discussion of the cult of woman, wherein he refers to feminists as women moved to hysterical anger out of being deprived of a man to suit as a mate (Pareto 1935). Perhaps, as a functionalist, evident in his concern for sentiments directed at a social equilibrium, Pareto implies a natural function for women, namely, to seek after and serve men. Frequently, throughout his text women are characterized as submissive and subordinate to men.

And since Pareto is of the mind that emotion springs from a well of irrationality, and he is prone to place women in the realm of the hysterical, he concludes that sentiment manifests itself in women more than in men,

that they are more consumed by feeling, more likely to be creatures of passion.

In conclusion, Pareto writes a great deal on several different sentiments specifically, and with regard to their function toward a social equilibrium in general. He entertained largely an organismic perspective consistent throughout his work, condemning emotion to the realm of the irrational. Yet, at the same time he seems to purport a certain social significance to emotion and even hints at the idea of emotional norms at one instance. There are glimpses of an interactive perspective in his work. He does grant the individual some responsibility in the construction of sentiment, and reflects social constructionist ideas when discussing the definition of specific sentiments. His work is full of anecdotes regarding sentiments and his ideas about emotions as residuals is significant for the sociology of emotion, in that sentiments, themselves, act as motivation for action.

CHAPTER 5

EMILE DURKHEIM (1858-1917)

Durkheim, of all the scholars at issue here, is perhaps the most well known, for his monumental work on suicide and for initiating what has become known as the Sociology of Religion. Durkheim also published works dealing with the sociological method and perhaps more importantly, for the purposes of this work, a book dealing with the nature of taboos, taboos being in reference to morals, morals lying at the root of sentiment.

Sentiments are derived from a normative moral order. Morality, one's constitution of right and wrong, lies at the root of sentiment. One feels and expresses sentiment as a reaction upon some moral question, sympathy for one who is in dire straits, contempt for one who has violated your person, and gratitude for someone who has made you a beneficiary. Morality is associated with sentiment.

All references in this chapter will be to Durkheim's work unless otherwise noted.

In his discussion of the evolution of incest, Durkheim notes the emergence of the "law of exogamy" in clans.

We shall call a clan a group of individuals who consider themselves related to each other, but who recognize this relationship in only one manner; namely, by the very specific sign that they are bearers of the same totem. The totem itself is a being, animate or inanimate, and generally a plant or an animal, from which the group is reputed to be descended, and which serves the members as both an emblem and a collective name (1963a:15).

The clan members, in turn, believe they are endowed with some of the traits manifested in the character of the animal or plant signified by the totem. For instance, if the bear was declared the totem for a particular clan, the clans people would, more than likely, believe that they have bear-like traits, and it may be possible, then, that the clans people might associate particular sentiments or the exhibition of emotion with certain said totems and thus manifest those emotions in themselves.

It is easy to bear witness to W. I. Thomas's (1923) concept of the definition of the situation at this juncture. For, based on the premise that if an individual defines a situation as real, it is then real in its consequences, if the clans person believes that he or she is at some point descended from a lion, then he or she will also believe that they themselves carry traits of the lion, and if it so that they believe they have these traits, at some point they must show evidence of this, or at least attribution is made in that regard. Concerning emotion, it has already been noted that by way of Hochschild (1983) individual's beliefs about emotions figure into their experience of emotions, in short, what you believe frames your subjective experience.

It is also interesting to note with regard to the clans people that those people who unite under the same totem are not necessarily family in the biological sense. Their unity, or allusions of kinship are mediated through symbols, and they carry the same traits (emotionality) not as those related by blood, but rather they carry the same as those bound to them through symbolism.

Durkheim has been credited with providing some ideological foreground for the substantiation of the social construction of emotions (Fisher & Chon, 1989). In an article entitled "Durkheim and the Social Construction of Emotions," 1989, Fisher cites a few instances where

Durkheim has profoundly been referred to as the architect of the social construction of emotions. Durkheim never wrote directly about a social constructionist conceptualization of emotions, and much of the arguments made in that regard rely on inference. Durkheim (1915) argued that society is created and recreated by the "intense arousal" that infuses gatherings and meetings of community.

It is clear from Durkheim's writing that as much as he may have hinted at a social construction of emotions he also held a place for biologically constituted emotions in his theory of social solidarity. Scholars, such as Hammond (1983), argue that the division of labor yields a social construction of emotions, both numerous and diverse in character. This is made so, seemingly, by directing or attaching primary emotions to social objects. Examples of such social direction are provided in Durkheim's (1951) discussion of the depression and anger that motivate the individual toward suicide.

Fisher & Chon (1989) has also argued that for Durkheim the collective interpretation, or definition of the situation with regard for the emergence of emotions is paramount. "In, addition, the role of the collective (rather than individual) interpretation in the social causation of emotions is stressed. The cult of the individual, an effect of the division of labor, accounts for the present need for the individual management of emotions" (Fisher & Chon 1989:1). As the division of labor demands bureaucracy and specialization with regard to work, there grows a tendency toward the isolation of the individual wherein "personality" is developed, or rather identity becomes something more discriminatory. As the concept of identity is expanded and yields more depth, there becomes more concern with the inner life, what Baumeister (1986) calls the spatial metaphor, or the hidden self. A spatial metaphor is

that space in the body wherein an individual believes their emotions to be located.

Baumeister has argued that our extensive emotion vocabulary is indicative of our heightened interest in the quality of inner life over the past four hundred years. As one's vocabulary grows so grows one's range for experience. As noted earlier, the emotion word is the cue for the emotion. I must know the word indignation in order to be indignant about something. Our emotion vocabulary has grown manifold since the appearance of the word, emotion, in the English dictionary some four hundred years ago. So, the argument follows that the division of labor made possible the enhancement of identity, yielding the cult of the individual, a cult in which it's members are overwhelmed by the possibility of feeling, and often despair in their lack of feeling, as is the case with Richard Sennet's (1982) subject in The Public Fall of Man. These individuals are given to hyper-introspection and are made prisoners to that which they believe sets them free, feeling.

The Nature and Source of Emotion in Durkheim

Durkheim's conceptualization of emotion, his ideas with regard to the role and status of emotion, in society may be best organized in his work concerning suicide. His book Suicide, will be further analyzed at length, later in this dissertation. However, now our attention will focus on the conceptualization of emotion that the scholar detailed in the work.

Durkheim makes the claim that the general cohesion of a society rests on its ability to arouse collective sentiments in its members. The arousal of such sentiments ensures a propensity toward the strong integration of individual into the greater whole. It is for this reason that nations covertly invite the challenges of war and unrest,

...that great social disturbances and great popular wars rouse collective sentiments, stimulate partisan spirit and patriotism, political and national faith, alike, and concentrating activity toward a single end, at least temporarily cause a stronger integration of society. The salutary influence which we have just shown to exist is due not to the crisis but to the struggles it occasions. As they force men to close ranks and confront the common danger, the individual thinks less of himself and more of the common cause. Besides, it is comprehensible that this integration may not be purely momentary but may sometimes outlive its immediate causes, especially when it is intense (1951:208).

Durkheim's notion with regard to emotion is somewhat like that of Comte, in that he notes a duality between personal feelings, or individual sentiment, and social feelings, or sentiment in favor of the collective. Two types of suicide may be contextualized in the relationship between self feelings and social feelings, namely egoistic suicide and altruistic suicide. Egoistic suicide results from an over indulgence of self feelings, whereas, altruistic suicide results from an over indulgence of social feelings. The former is a function of the lack of integration into the whole, whereas, the latter is a function of an excessive integration into the whole. Suicide aside, emotion or sentiment is that which motivates individuals to act.

It is clear that Durkheim's importance in the sociology of emotions is marked by his attention to the portent of collective sentiments in the maintenance of society. For Durkheim, the fostering of collective sentiments may have some prophylactic effect with regard to personal feelings of despair. Durkheim on egoistic suicide,

So far as they are the admitted masters of their destinies, it is their privilege to end their lives. They, on their part, have no reason to endure life's sufferings patiently. For

they cling to life more resolutely when belonging to a group they love, so as not to betray interests they put before their own. The bond that unites them with the common cause attaches them to life and the lofty goal they envisage prevents their feeling personal troubles so deeply (1951:210).

Durkheim argues that much of our lives are devoted to arenas divorced from the organic, separated from the simple tasks of physical maintenance, that as men and women have satisfied their needs with regard to nature, they have become consumed by the needs of the social world. It is out of this social arena that many sentiments arise and in this way sentiments are socially constructed.

In so far as he has no other needs, he is therefore self-sufficient and can live happily with no other objective than living. This is not the case, however, with the civilized adult. He has many ideas, feelings, and practices unrelated to organic needs. The roles of art, morality, religion, political faith, science itself are not to repair organic exhaustion nor to provide sound functioning of the organs. All this supra-physical life is built and expanded not because of the demands of the cosmic environment but because of the demands of the social environment. The influence of society is what has aroused in us the sentiments of sympathy and solidarity drawing us toward others; it is society which, fashioning us in its image, fills us with religious, political and moral beliefs that control our actions (1951:212).

Durkheim is adamant about the importance of understanding the social nature of sentiments, that emotion is not merely organic, but maintains some social constitution. "There is a collective as well as an individual humor inclining peoples to sadness or cheerfulness, making them see things in bright or sombre lights" (1951:213).

Not only does Durkheim note the preference of social feelings over personal feelings with regard to maintaining a sense of equilibrium, he literally posits that society itself is capable of manifesting sentiments.

Because society is the end on which our better selves depend, it cannot feel us escaping it without a simultaneous realization that our activity is purposeless. Since we are its handiwork, society cannot be conscious of its own decadence without the feeling that henceforth this work is of no value. Thence are formed currents of depression and disillusionment emanating from no particular individual but expressing society's state of disintegration. They reflect the relaxation of social bonds, a sort of collective asthenia, or social malaise, just as individual sadness, when chronic, in its way reflects the poor organic state of the individual (1951:214).

Durkheim claims that individual's own sense of distress may thus be amplified by the larger, more global distress manifested in society.

As these currents are collective, they have, by virtue of their origin, an authority which they impose upon the individual and they drive him more vigorously on the way to which he is already inclined by the state of moral distress directly aroused in him by the disintegration of society....However individualized a man may be, there is always something collective remaining---the very depression and melancholy resulting from this same exaggerated individualism. He effects communion through sadness when he no longer has anything else with which to achieve it (1951:214).

It is clear that Durkheim is conscious of the significance of emotion in the social lives of individuals. It is also clear that he recognizes how this integral part of human life is socially constructed and subject to social regulation. Durkheim, much like Comte, interprets some part of emotion to have its genesis in the organism but is given its form by social structure. "But

society is not only something attracting the sentiments and activities of individuals with unequal force. It is also a power controlling them" (1951:241).

Durkheim argues that the individual is inept in matters with regard to the limitation of desires and feelings, and it is the function of social structure, or society, to regulate the emotions that characterize the lives of individuals. In this way sentiment can be thought of as being subject to social shaping. "It is not human nature which can assign the variable limits necessary to our needs. They are thus unlimited so far as they depend on the individual alone. Irrespective of any external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling is in itself an insatiable and bottomless abyss" (1951:247).

Emotion is an extremely potent force in society, but a force that must be harnessed. If emotion is that which has the potential to direct the currents of individuals lives, then it is society that sets the tides. Social structure provides the individual with a mode of regulation by which emotions may be directed, perhaps evolving some form of emotional normative order. Without this direction the individual may suffer the injury caused by over zealous affect.

To achieve any other result, the passions first must be limited. Only then can they be harmonized with the faculties and satisfied. But since the individual has no way of limiting them, this must be done by some force exterior to him. A regulative force must play the same role for moral needs which the organism plays for physical needs. This means that force can only be moral (1951:248).

So, while many have looked to Durkheim and highlighted his work with regard to social structure and other such macro-processes, another

dimension has been ignored, that is the role of sentiment in his grand theory. It appears that there is a sense of equilibrium, even in Durkheim.

Sentiment as Subject in Sociology

In the definitive Rules of the Sociological Method (1938), Durkheim is concerned with that which constitutes the subject matter of sociology, that is, what serves as the unit of analysis. For Durkheim, the unit of analysis is the social fact.

A social fact is to be recognized by the power of external coercion which it exercises or is capable of exercising over individuals, and the presence of this power may be recognized in its turn either by the existence of some specific sanction or by the resistance offered against every individual effort that tends to violate it. One can, however, define it also by its diffusion within the group, provided that, in conformity with our previous remarks, one takes care to add as a second and essential characteristic that its own existence is independent of the individual forms it assumes in its diffusion (1938:10).

It is important to the endurance of the discipline that we establish sociological phenomena as distinct from psychological phenomena and that of biology. Social facts are particular to society and expressed through all individuals in that society, whereas a psychological fact is a fact of the individual and may be common to individuals the world over. So, for Durkheim, it seems sentiments may either be individual or collective. Some types of emotions seem universal, whereas others certainly are collective, and perhaps, more importantly, more intense.

Perhaps Durkheim is not concerned with individual emotions as sociological phenomena, this is not to say that these emotions should be excluded from consideration. Surely several symbolic interactionists would

be interested in these emotions as well as those of collective origin. For instance, even seemingly universal emotions are going to be experienced or expressed with some degree of differentiation, as the result of how the individual has been socialized with respect to that particular culture. It is unclear, whether or not, Durkheim feels that these individual emotions should be the business of sociology. However, it is clear that Durkheim feels that collective sentiments are central to sociology.

As for their individual manifestations, these are indeed, to a certain extent, social, since they partly reproduce a social model. Each of them also depends, and to a large extent, on the organopsychological constitution of the individual and on the particular circumstances in which he is placed. Thus they are not sociological phenomena in the strict sense of the word. They belong to two realms at once; one could call the sociopsychological. They interest the sociologist without constituting the immediate subject matter of sociology...A collective emotion which bursts forth suddenly and violently in a crowd does not express merely what all the individual sentiments had in common; it is something entirely different, as we have shown. It results from their being together, a product of the actions and reactions which take place between individual consciousnesses; and if each individual consciousness echoes the collective sentiment, it is by virtue of the special energy resident in its collective origin (1938:9).

Finally, Durkheim warns against a science based on an appeal to sentiments. He argues that sentiments are historical products and not transcendental cues that shed light on the nature of reality. A passionate argument is not simply a good one based on what sentiments it evokes, it is good argument only if it reflects the reality that is present. "Sentiment is a subject for scientific study, not the criterion of scientific truth" (1938:34).

Durkheim: Architect of the Social Construction of Emotions

Several scholars have made the case for Durkheim being the principal thinker that has provided a framework for such a thing as the social construction of emotions, (Scheff 1979; Hammond 1983; Fisher & Chon 1989). Concerning the division of labor, Durkheim (1897) argued that mechanical solidarity is made cohesive by an instinctive affective response, specifically that of choler as a reaction to the violation of normative sentiments, these sentiments are as shared symbols in the development of society. Concerning the etymology of Choler, a relic of a sentiment, it is believed that originally this term referred to bile, a stomach acid used in the digestion of food. In the middle ages this jaundice colored substance was considered to be the source of anger and irritability. Such is the expression, "...to get one's choler up..."

It is interesting to note that as far as the social construction of emotion is concerned, this particular emotion is played out to be biologically based. Anger and irritability are thought to be a function of some over zealous bodily fluid, in short, biological process. The social construction of emotion has not allowed much room for the biological genesis of emotion as I understand it. In fact, the belief in a spatial metaphor is thought to be in opposition to the social constructionist agenda.

Such a sentiment that might stand for example is the ancient taboo of incest, of which Durkheim (1963) wrote. In the age of clans there was a strict normative order concerning sexual relations of the members of distinct and separate clans and members of the same clans.

If these sentiments are violated, a terrible emotional reaction by others in the collective is unleashed. The response, embodied in penal law in organized societies, can be described only as vengeance seeking expression,

despite attempts to define it as a preventive deterrent. Durkheim describes the emotion behind the penal response as *choler*, an ancient label for anger, hostility, and even rage. He insists that despite widespread social disapproval of this motive, our attempts to redefine it as merely cosmetic (Fisher & Chon 1989:4).

This would suggest that emotions, or perhaps sentiments are given to particular times, and more importantly, places, by virtue of language. This point is made in reference to its importance for the social construction of emotion, emotions or sentiments, based on an account of the sociology of knowledge and unique socially constructed emotion vocabularies.

In this one instance it is clear that Durkheim is both a proponent of the social construction of emotions as well as, an endorser of a biological genesis of emotion. However, Fisher & Chon (1989) have argued that in Durkheim's description of mechanical solidarity he makes no case for the social construction of emotions.

These feelings are described as welling up instinctively from man's biological nature, even resisting attempts to redefine or suppress them. At best, the feelings about dealing with norm violations show attempts at social regulation, but in a way that appears to mask the feelings which are actually at work (Fisher & Chon 1989:4).

I submit that despite Durkheim's notion that individuals believe the source of their emotion to be biologically founded, this emotion, *choler*, as it is described is particular to an ancient culture, and while we may have other sentiments that approximate it in modernity, the sentiment is social in that it is a function of history and the expression or behavior.

In regard to Organic solidarity and its consequences for the sociology of emotions, it is clear that the division of labor imposes emotional stress on individuals. "The constraint imposed by the division of labor is a source of

stress and fatigue, which require some form of compensation. Humans are rewarded for their efforts by further division of labor, leading to the development of the individual self" (Fisher & Chon 1989:5). What Fisher & Chon (1989) refer to here is the emergence of the cult of the individual.

The cult of the individual is somewhat parallel to Baumeister's (1986) change in the shift of identity. The effect of this cult of the individual or Baumeister's (1986) "hidden self" is that there grows a larger range of psychological space, more a space for the cultivation of emotion, sentiments, and all that clutters one's inner life.

It is likely that during this period the collective emotion vocabulary is expanded and thus the possibility for more widely varied emotional experience. Fisher & Chon (1989) note that, "With the advance of organic solidarity, a number of new psychic entities emerge, including certain (but unspecified) emotions" (Fisher & Chon 1989:5). And the study of such phenomena might be..."dependent on another positive science that might be called socio-psychology" (1951:286). These phenomena are thought to be similar in traits to other psychological facts, yet they are emergent from social causes.

Fisher & Chon (1989) cite a couple of examples wherein Durkheim makes claims for a socially constructed conceptualization of emotion. The example given is "...the social organisation of kinship relationships that has determined respectively the sentiments between parents and children. These sentiments would have been completely different if the social structure had been different" (1951:287). Durkheim also uses sympathy as an example of an emotion that may be organic in nature, yet is strengthened upon integration into the social structure. "Individuals always have a distinct organic life, and

this is sufficient to give rise to...sympathy, although it becomes stronger when the personality is more highly developed" (1951:125, note 49).

The construct of sympathy is of interest to Durkheim because he proposes this "instinctive sentiment" is amplified later in life as individuals become more aware of their ultimate separation and therefore the importance of their social relationships. Perhaps, the reason for this increased awareness of individuals for the plights of their neighbors, is a function of the learned ability to engage in role taking, to put one's self in the role of the other, an ability that is cultivated throughout the socialization process, that is, in Mead's (1934) third stage of self.

Cooley (1966) also wrote that sympathy was the fundamental human sentiment, that sympathy lay at the crux of interpersonal relations. Sympathy, I would submit, is the quintessential socially constructed sentiment, disagreeing with Durkheim that sympathy emanates out of some organic nature. Sympathy is learned, chronic, enduring, as opposed to a fleeting sensation born of arousal. An infant must learn that she is an object as well as subject in order to distinguish herself from others and view them as objects, objects that will bear the consequences of her words and actions, thus, the child learns that we are dependent upon one another for our well-being, and thereby are deemed responsible and cultivate the feeling of concern for others.

A significant part of the sociology of emotions has concerned itself with "feeling rules" and "emotion work," (Hochschild 1979). Feeling rules, emotional norms, represent some informal emotional normative order, whereas emotion work refers to the act of trying to change an emotion or feeling in quality or degree by either employing bodily, cognitive, or expressive techniques. An individual in breach of these norms becomes

subject to ridicule and condemnation by those who engage in the collective enforcement of the appropriate emotional behavior.

It is clear that social influence is felt in the arena of the exhibition and expression of emotion, insofar as the behavior is encouraged into conformity to behavioral norms which may have an element of emotionality invested in their constructs. Moreover, it is of keen interest how that social influence is manifested in the psychology of the individual, and therefore, in the construction of the various emotions themselves. So, as one learns the sentiment sympathy, one not only learns the context in which it is to be expressed, but also the context in which it should be experienced.

When Fisher and Chon (1989) make the case for Durkheim authoring a social construction of emotion they turn to his work concerning the rituals involved with mourning the dead among the Australian aborigines. The ritual mandates that the mourner scrapes himself, cut himself, as well as beat himself in the act of mourning. Durkheim argues that the ritual is aimed at solidifying the group, to encourage a rebirth of community, it is a rite of re-enactment.

It, too, is made up out of collective ceremonies which produce a state of effervescence among those who take part in them. The sentiments aroused are different; but the arousal is the same...Not only do the relatives, who are affected the most directly, bring their own personal sorrow to the assembly, but the society exercises a moral pressure over its members to put their sentiments in harmony with the situation (1915:445).

Lyn Lofland (1985) makes the case for a social construction of grief arguing that several social factors figure into someone's experience of grief, that these social factors bear psychological and physiological consequences for the host. Factors such as the definition of the situation surrounding the death

of the loved one, whether it was sudden or expected, figure into one's acute experience of grief. In addition, one must consider the degree of intimacy that one shared with the deceased as an antecedent to the experience of grief, as well as, what lot of social interaction is affordable to the bereaved individual post-funeral.

The more sudden and unexpected the death, the more intimate the subject was with the deceased, and the less opportunity for social interaction thereafter, the more intense the subject's experience of grief. In this way grief is socially constructed.

Sentiments and Ritual

The relationship between sentiments and rituals are best exemplified in Durkheim's classic Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912). It is in this landmark work that Durkheim submits that collective sentiments are an integral part of the social experience, and further, that the collective expression, of these sentiments, through ritual reinforces and affirms such sentiments. Durkheim provides us with an example characterizing a tribal mourning ritual,

We have seen elsewhere how human sentiments are intensified when affirmed collectively. Sorrow, like joy, becomes exalted and amplified when leaping from mind to mind, and therefore expresses itself outwardly in the form of exuberant and violent movements. But these are no longer expressive of the joyful agitation which observed before; they are shrieks and cries of pain. Each is carried along by the others; a veritable panic of sorrow results. When pain reaches this degree of intensity, it is mixed with a sort of anger and exasperation. One feels the need of breaking something, of destroying something. He takes this out either upon himself or others...If every

death is attributed to some magic charm, and for this reason it is believed that the dead man ought to be avenged, it is because men must find a victim at any price, upon whom the collective pain and anger may be discharged. Naturally this victim is sought outside the group; a stranger is a subject minoris resistentice; as he is not protected by the sentiments of sympathy inspired by a relative or neighbor, there is nothing in him which subdues and neutralizes the evil and destructive sentiments aroused by the death (1915:400).

This particular work, Elementary Forms of Religious Life, is laden with references to sentiments. In the analysis of this text it is clear that Durkheim had tendencies toward a social construction of emotion, despite other evidence which betrays such a position. In the following passage one may observe the intellectual precedent for such concepts as Hochschild's "feeling rules" and "emotion work."

One initial fact is constant: mourning is not the spontaneous expression of individual emotions. If the relations weep, lament, mutilate themselves, it is not because they feel themselves personally affected by the death of their kinsman. Of course, it may be that in certain particular cases, the chagrin expressed is really felt. But it is more generally the case that there is no connection between the sentiments felt and the gestures made by the actors in the rite. If, at the very moment when the weepers seem the most overcome by their grief, some one speaks to them of some temporal interest, it frequently happens that they change their features and tone at once, take on a laughing air and converse in the gayest fashion imaginable. Mourning is not a natural movement of private feelings wounded by a cruel loss; it is a duty imposed by the group (1915:397).

Durkheim, of course, is suggesting that sentiment is socially constructed, that sentiment is subject to a normative order, and given an emotional definition of the situation we are encouraged to feel and express the appropriate sentiment with regard to that particular situation. The arousal of sentiment and the regulation of the expression of sentiment is a collective matter subject to social definitions as opposed to personal whim.

Durkheim appears to have considered the collective phenomena of sentiment to be fundamentally related with the religious life. It is the arousal of social sentiment that lies at the center of religion, sentiment that is so salient in the lives of individuals, is given rise through the practice of rituals.

The general conclusion of the book which the reader has before him is that religion is something eminently social. Religious representations are collective representations which express collective realities; the rites are a manner of acting which take rise in the midst of the assembled groups and which are destined to excite, maintain or recreate certain mental states in these groups (1915:10).

One might infer that the "mental states" such as Durkheim discusses, those that are given rise in assembly, are sentiments. By the end of the text it is clear that mourning is one such state. Discussing some of the sentiments involved in the rituals of Australian tribal folk Durkheim claims:

Sadness is not the only sentiment expressed during these ceremonies; a sort of anger is generally mixed with it. The relatives feel a need of avenging the death in some way or other. They are to be seen throwing themselves upon one another and trying to wound each other. Sometimes the attack is real; sometimes it is only pretended. There are even cases when these peculiar combats are organized (1915:393).

It is interesting to note that Durkheim uses the term, mental states, to seemingly refer to sentiments because most writers of that time, James and Cannon included, ignored the cognitive element in emotion and as has been the case throughout history, chose to frame emotion mainly in terms of sensation. Durkheim appears to recognize the cognitive element in emotion, a knowledge or an account that grounds the charge it is given by affect. Durkheim so beautifully describes such a knowledge in this passage depicting further detail of the mutilation and self-mortification that plays a prominent role in some of the tribal rituals regarding mourning:

We see that this explanation of mourning completely leaves aside all ideas of souls and spirits. The only forces which are really active are of a wholly impersonal nature: they are the emotions aroused in the group by the death of one of its members. But the primitive does not know the psychical mechanism from which these practices result. So when he tries to account for them, he is obliged to forge a wholly different explanation. All he knows is that he must painfully mortify himself. As every obligation suggests the notion of a will which obliges, he looks about him to see whence this constraint which he feels may come. Now, there is one moral power, of whose reality he is assured and which seems designated for this role: this is the soul which the death has liberated. For what could have a greater interest than it in the effects which its own death has on the living? So they imagine that is these latter inflict an unnatural treatment upon themselves, it is to conform to its exigencies. It was thus that the idea of the soul must have intervened at a later date into the mythology of mourning. But also, since it is thus endowed with inhuman exigencies, it must be supposed that in leaving the body which it animated, the soul lays aside every human sentiment. Hence the metamorphosis which makes a dreaded enemy out of the relative of

yesterday. This transformation is not the origin of mourning; it is rather the consequence. It translates a change which has come over the affective state of the group: men do not weep for the dead because they fear them; they fear them because they weep for them (1915:401).

Even further, the preceding passage is of interest because it contains elements of both an organic and a social account of emotion. In large part, Durkheim's work reflects this ambiguity, or rather the synthesis of the organic and the social with regard to emotion. On the one hand Durkheim is dealing with rituals, accounts, explanations, roles, and knowledge, while on the other hand he reflects the logic endowed in James's specificity theory, the notion that sensation is the cue for emotion as opposed to the emotion word being a cue for emotion.

Despite his organic tendencies Durkheim still is credited with presenting one of the early accounts regarding the sociological nature of sentiments. Durkheim's ideas relating rituals to sentiments are first observed in an essay entitled "On the Definition of Religious Phenomena" (1899:23):

The state of perpetual dependence in which we are towards [society] inspires us with a sentiment of religious respect for it. It is therefore it which prescribes to the believer the dogmas he must believe and the rites he must observe; and if this is so, it is because the rites and dogmas are its creation.

It was in this essay that Durkheim argued that it should be the task of the sociology of religion to analyze these 'social forces' that pervade in the minds of men and women. For Durkheim (1899:24) these forces are given rise through the arousal of collective sentiments:

What are these sentiments, what are the social causes that have awakened them and have determined their

expression in this or that form, to what social ends does the social organization which thus arises respond?

One may conclude from Durkheim's work regarding religion that sentiments play a significant role in the collective life and the scholar clearly regarded the concept as maintaining social attributes. Sentiments give rise to and are transformed by ritual. We might even suggest that the notion of collective sentiments may lie at the center of social organization, in that sentiments move individuals to action, and, that sentiments themselves, are the products of social interaction.

Stratification and the Sociology of Emotions

Michael Hammond (1983) adds considerably to the move to reconsider the work of classical theorists with regard to the sociology of emotions in his article "The Sociology of emotions and the history of Social Differentiation." In this article Hammond (1983) makes it clear how Durkheim envisioned the role of affectivity with regard to the structure of social constructions, paying special attention to the elements of stratification and social differentiation. In the article Hammond (1983) focuses mainly on Durkheim's Primitive Classification, the work wherein the classical theorist comes closest to presenting an affective theory to be employed in sociology. Hammond (1983) also gives special attention to Durkheim's Division of Labor in Society, in which he sees Durkheim's original affective model as a theoretical tool.

Hammond's agenda is largely to enhance the theoretical bounds of the sociology of emotions by offering evidence of how affectivity is empowered with the capacity to influence the character of human social constructions. For Hammond, affectivity represents the physiological potential to generate emotion. Here, emotion is granted a biological foundation and the sociology comes after the fact, that is, sociology, the sociology of emotions, should also be concerned with the social consequences that emotions bear on social constructions, and on relationships that bind individuals to one another. This argument differs from the claims we have witnessed prior to this point in that emphasis is not on the conceptualization of emotion proper, rather it is on those social facts that bear the influence of emotion or sentiment.

As mentioned previously, in the introduction, Hammond (1983) outlined four general principles, substantiating a sociology of emotions, that comprise Durkheim's work. First, is the idea that the meaning and

significance of social bonds is a function of intense affective arousal. Hence, individuals are bound to generate social realities that nurture this arousal.

Hammond continues,

Second, emotions have a potentially unlimited generality of object, such that virtually anything can become a focus for emotive expression. Individual affective resources are limited, however, since prolonged intense arousal is physiologically debilitating and eventually destructive. Thus people can provide affective additions to only a small range of the possible objects for affective focusing (Hammond 1983:91).

Hammond then argues that such intense interaction manifested through significant levels of emotionality gives rise to reified hierarchical distinctions, creating social distance between potential objects that might be the focus of sentiment or emotion. Hammond writes, "This distance is a universal feature of human social structures" (Hammond 1983:91).

Finally, it is stated that the nature of this distance will vary given differential social density. "The greater the density, the greater the likelihood that people will seek to differentiate themselves and stratify these differences" (Hammond 1983:91). In conclusion, Hammond offers, "This creates a pattern in human history moving from the sacred/profane division of the natural world in hunting and gathering societies to the stratified division of the social world through economic differentiation in contemporary industrial cultures" (Hammond 1983:91). It is in this way that Hammond theorizes that emotion bears consequences for social stratification in human society.

In Primitive Classification, Durkheim makes it clear that emotion or sentiment gives rise to social structural classification among individuals. The affective forces given rise in the social nature of humans yields the

classification and categorization of life, "...the same sentiments which are the basis of domestic, social, and other kinds of organization have been effective in this logical division of things also" (1963b:85). There exist shared symbols among classes, symbols of affluence or poverty, symbols, which evoke common sentimentality in individuals.

They are merged as members of the same family are merged by common sentiment. That some are subordinate to others is analogous in every respect to the fact that an object possessed appears inferior to its owner, and likewise the subject to his master. It is thus, states of the collective mind (ame) which gave birth to these groupings, and these states moreover are manifestly affective. There are sentimental affinities between things as between individuals, and they are classed according to these affinities (1963b:85).

One might posit from this that social structure, in turn, encourages individuals to interact, emotionally, and influences individuals to be socialized emotionally according to their class. Emotional expression as well as the actual manifestation of certain sentiments may be a result of the reigning social structure.

It is also clear from Durkheim's work that affectivity is somehow instrumental in the fabric of social constructions. As Hammond argues, Furthermore, it is argued that affectivity, classifications of nature, and social density are related: As groups grow in size, differentiation occurs along the lines of these classifications. Durkheim is therefore claiming that there is something about human affectivity that shapes the very structure of social constructions and the pattern in which these fabrications change (Hammond 1983:92).

Unfortunately, most of Durkheim's work is filtered down to us by way of Talcott Parsons, who made it a point to focus solely on the classical

theorist's functionalist macro sociology, while a good deal of his work with regard to our immediate interests has gone ignored. Hammond, in his attempt to rediscover Durkheim writes,

Durkheim does not only argue that social structures must find a way to arouse the affective capacities of their members in order to reinforce their commitment. Affectivity does act as social glue, but is also shapes the scaffolding of these structures. For Durkheim, the most enduring social constructions are reified hierarchical classifications, and it is affectivity that constructs such creations (Hammond 1983:93).

Yet, there are detractors from this theoretical posturing of emotion as being integral to social cohesion that rests between individuals given their institutions and relationships. Consider, even in the introduction of the English translation of Primitive Classification, Needham (1963b) finds that it is "difficult not to recoil in dismay from this unevidenced and unreasoned resort to sentiment as the ultimate explanation for the complexities of social and symbolic classification" (Needham 1963b:xxiv).

Needham (1963) claims that this work was included in a series of translations of French sociological classics, "because (it is) a particular combination of theoretical significance and relative academic neglect" (Needham 1963b:ix). His criticism of the work is based on the grounds of empirical negligence, a fear of that which is not quantifiable, yet another symptom, of the inferiority disease that sociology has grown to suffer, and subsequently has tried to ensure its status as a science.

What is clear is that Durkheim followed by a host of others is trying to establish the idea that no longer should we view emotions as dark forces, that emotion must be both a consequence and a cause, and we, as sociologists, should not view the study of such phenomena as taboo because the unit of

analysis may not necessarily lend itself to our conventional means of empiricism.

The argument concerning the role of affectivity can be traced back through a review of some general ideas Durkheim had regarding the functioning of the species. Durkheim believed that throughout the course of evolution the human species acquired an expanded realm of cognitive capabilities at the expense of a decreased tendency toward instinctual patterns of behavior (Durkheim 1893). It is perhaps at this juncture that we can talk about the emergence of sentiment or emotion, that which is comprised by both affective and cognitive elements. Durkheim also thought that cognitive structures were in no way innate, and that therefore there were no innate structures regarding social worlds, thus opening up the possibilities for a socially constructed reality, and therefore, emotions that are socially constructed, yet privately experienced.

However, all social structures involve a reduction of behavioral alternatives in an attempt at reality construction.

The reduction of behavioral alternatives is accomplished by the creation of social distance between alternatives. Durkheim does not argue that social structures themselves have the power to create this distance...Instead, it is affective interaction that is the initial basis for this distance so crucial to a species without innate guidelines to fabricate a social universe. From this perspective, there is an equation between social distance and meaning, for it is through the creation of distance that meaning enters the world (Hammond 1983:94).

Included in this argument is Durkheim's well known distinction between the sacred and the profane, that is, involved in this distancing process certain objects are given to classification, some of which become the

focus of intense arousal whereas others are ignored. Hammond explains, "Since this sacred/profane spacing is tied to distancing rankings among behavior, ideas, individuals, and places, the same classificatory principle structures other parts of the social universe. Classifications thereby take on extrinsic reality and become social facts" (Hammond 1983:94). Durkheim argues that the distinction between the sacred and profane is a function of such a prolonged arousal. Such an intense pattern of arousal is responsible for giving rise to the differential evaluation of behavior. "Durkheim believes that there is no sacredness intrinsic in objects, ideas, or idols; it is the 'intrinsic intensity' of affective interaction that becomes identified with such objects that is the true source of this sacredness" (Hammond 1983:94).

Hammond agreeing with Durkheim, grants us that affective forces are physiologically grounded, and thus limited, that is, too much or a prolonged exposure to intense arousal may yield a physiological breakdown, or what we commonly know as stress. What is of keen interest here is that although the physiological component is credited here, the framework has also been afforded for the exploration of cognitive potential with regard to emotion.

Concerning affectivity and reified hierarchical classifications, Hammond stresses that types of behavior are ranked and classified, and that affective behavior is to be considered superior to other actions. This idea is not unlike Comte's idea concerning the hierarchy of emotion, the intellect, and action.

The link between hierarchical classification and affectivity clarifies Durkheim's equation between social structures and hierarchical classifications. Durkheim argues that these classifications are not inherent in nature, nor instinctual in humanity, yet this pattern always emerges in some form from social interaction. Affectivity provides the missing link in his argument. If

social structures are based on affective bonds, and if affective interaction creates a hierarchical classification of behavior, then social structures will be hierarchical classification (Hammond 1983:96).

In addition, Durkheim argues that emotional intensity is greatest among individuals as opposed to being within individuals, and it is for this reason that individuals seek expression in collective contexts, in marriages, churches, bands, theater, institutions, and organizations. The classical theorist also points out that in these contexts the arousal or affective experience may be so great that it appears to originate from beyond the individual. It is then easy to understand from the preceding passage how individuals come to view emotions as dark forces, divorced from their selves, and how individuals come to believe in spatial metaphors.

Since it is understood that social bonds are not given to instinct it follows that their maintenance must be a function of emotionally fueled reinforcement.

The necessity of periodic affective arousal leads to a tendency to ritualize affective interaction...Once again, rituals do not cause themselves to come into existence; they represent instead a formalization of the original affective bonds linking individuals together. Rituals embody a reified division of the world and moreover, conceal the origins of this division (Hammond 1983:96).

Thus, the role of affectivity in the area of stratification can be seen as such, "If intense affective arousal is crucial to human social structures, and if there are physiological constraints on human affective capacities, then as social density increases, there is a greater likelihood that individuals will seek to differentiate themselves and stratify those differences" (Hammond 1983:97).

Hammond claims that similar ideas are expressed in Division of Labor in Society (1893), however they must be teased out of the work. Hammond, comparing the work with Primitive Classification, contends,

In both cases, as populations not only become larger in volume but, more important, become concentrated in larger settlements such as cities, individuals inexorably 'lean towards distinguishing themselves from others' (1893:265). In industrial societies, with their comparatively abundant 'dynamic density' of population concentration and interaction, the ever more complex division of labor comes to play the same role as primitive classification in providing a framework for social differentiation (Hammond 1983:99).

Affectivity becomes the focus in generating the phenomena of social differentiation and stratification. It is through the use of affective tools that reality is constructed and social structures are maintained or dissolved.

Hammond claims that affectivity is the "ghost in the theoretical machine of Division of Labor in Society (Hammond 1983:109). Perhaps a reinterpretation of this work will lend new insight in the area of social stratification. Affectivity, has been something, that we as sociologists have often balked at when it has been offered as a plausible explanation in the analysis of the social world. Now that it is clear that several classical theorists entertained ideas about the role of emotion in social behavior, we may be more willing to use what resources they have offered as a foundation.

Sentiments and the Division of Labor

This work, in particular, is a riddle of sorts for those purporting a sociology of emotions. Although there is evidence of substantial conceptual

weight given to sentiment in this work, most of it is inferred, that is, there are references made with regard to sentiment by the scholar in this work, but we piece together as many more. Perhaps in the preface to the English translation there is some hint of this aforementioned trait, that is, this notion is reflected in Simpson's editorial choices regarding the work.

Mention should be made of my translation of terms peculiar to Durkheim's sociology. The French word "conscience" I have translated as conscience; the usual translation of Durkheim's term, consciousness, seems to me to be a gross misinterpretation of Durkheim's meaning. A conscience for Durkheim (although never expressly defined) is pre-eminently the organ of sentiments and representations; it is not the rational organ that the term "consciousness" would imply. The qualities possessed by a conscience whether collective or individual are not those generally imputed to consciousness in German, English, and American epistemology. Moreover, the moral character of the sentiments and representations in a conscience would seem to render my translation more in the spirit, as well as the letter, of the original (Simpson 1933:ix).

In the preceding passage several items are of interest. First, the conceptual importance of sentiment is evidenced in the translator's interpretation of the term conscience, taken to mean that which relates to sentiments and representations. Secondly, implicit in the translator's distinction of the terms conscience and consciousness, is the assumption, of an organic persuasion, that sentiment is given as distinct from or perhaps even opposite of reason, the "rational organ." It is interesting that the translator notes the importance of sentiment in the so-called spirit of the text, yet, at the same time relegates sentiment to some organic housing.

In Durkheim's discussion of mechanical solidarity there is much attention given to the definition of crime and the evolution of law in society, in general. Reading this text with an awareness and sensitivity toward sentiment it is made clear that Durkheim positions the concept at the center of morality, that is, sentiments correspond not to sensations, but rather toward a moral code. Our notions about morality are also notions with regard to sentiment, based on a knowledge that is socially inspired from generation to generation. Crime is that which offends the sentiments. It is not the case that we are offended by something that is deemed criminal, rather, it is the case that because we are offended something is made to be criminal.

In effect, the only common characteristic of all crimes is that they consist...in acts universally disapproved of by members of each society...Thus, the reality of the fact that we have just established is not contestable; that is, that crime shocks sentiments which, for a given social system, are found in all healthy consciences (1933:73).

Sentiments, that is, collective sentiments appear to play a rather significant role in the notions of law and morality. In many instances the violation of these sentiments is the inclination toward punishment. These sentiments are sources of motivation with regard to the social act. They are instilled in us and are a part of our social inheritance.

The collective sentiments to which crime corresponds must, therefore, singularize themselves from others by some distinctive property; they must have a certain average intensity. Not only are they engraven in all consciences, but they are strongly engraven. They are not hesitant and superficial desires, but emotions and tendencies which are strongly ingrained in us (1933:78).

It is then possible, that sentiments are products of socialization and are given to change only as society is changed. Sentiments are mediated through the social structure. They are social facts. We are socialized in an emotional sense, that is, we are instilled with sentiments that derive from and contribute to a normative moral order.

The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society forms a determinate system which has its own life; one may call it the collective or common conscience. No doubt, it has not a specific organ as a substratum; it is, by definition, diffuse in every reach of society. Nevertheless, it has specific characteristics which make it a distinct reality. It is, in effect, independent of the particular conditions in which individuals are placed; they pass on and it remains (1933:80).

This idea of the permanence, or rather, the persistence of sentiments in society throughout history is not unlike Pareto's conceptualization of sentiments as residuals, those that hold constant while the derivations, rationalizations, beliefs and ideas change with the climate of society. Aside from recognizing this transcendent quality of sentiments, Durkheim, much to the chagrin of the interactionist camp, also seems to imply some reification of emotion, that is, the idea that emotion is a thing unto its own, divorced from those that may have authored it. So, while those who work in the sociology of emotions are content to see the subject of their study legitimized by a classicist, they are perhaps, not content with the implied conceptualization of that subject. This is not to say that Durkheim's conceptualization of emotion is not at all sociological. On the contrary, it is felt that Durkheim affords us this opportunity, this starting point in thinking about emotion.

In Durkheim's discussion of organic solidarity he speaks to the varied experience of sentiments with respect to history, that is, how the division of labor has brought about a difference with regard to the experience of sentiments. This change also has to do with the shift in identity, or the constitution of self as a product of the division of labor. As society becomes less uniform, those sentiments that were constant throughout history become weaker, except in the case that those sentiments relate to the individual as an object.

Thus, viewed in the large, the common conscience consists less and less of strong, determined sentiments. Thus it comes about that the average intensity and mean degree of determination of collective states are always diminishing, as we have stated. Even the very restrained growth that we have just observed only serves to confirm this result. It is indeed, remarkable that the only collective sentiments that have become more intense are those which have for their object, not social affairs, but the individual. For this to be so, the individual personality must have become a much more important element in the life of society, and in order for it to have acquired this importance, it is not enough for the personal conscience of each to have grown in absolute value, but also to have grown more than the common conscience. It must have been emancipated from the yoke of the latter, and consequently, the latter must have fallen from its throne and lost the determinate power that it originally used to exercise. In short, if the relation between these two had remained the same, if both had developed in volume and vitality in the same proportions, the collective sentiments which relate to the individual would themselves also have remained the same. Above all, they would not be the only ones that had grown. For they depend uniquely on the social value of the individual factor, and that, in its

turn, is determined, not by the absolute development of this factor, but by the relative extent of the part which relates to it in the totality of social phenomena (1933:168).

In hindsight, perhaps this shift with regard to the salience of the idea of the individual in society is responsible for allowing for the great expansion of the general emotion vocabulary. As the individual has become more and more valued, social-psychological space has grown to foster an environment where such subtle distinctions may be made with regard to sentiments, that is, as vocabulary has expanded, as we have acquired more words to describe emotional experience, our capacity for discriminating between sentiments has become more acute. Sentiments are derived from these subtle distinctions. As individuals have become more concerned with the so called inner life, we have employed more words to distinguish sentiments. This allows for individuals to experience or discriminate only between those sentiments for which they have the language.

One final interest with regard to sentiments as discussed in Division of Labor in Society, is the attention that is given to the notion of happiness and its potential in a society characterized by such a division of labor. Durkheim addresses the question as to whether or not happiness increases as individuals advance or specialize. His ideas regarding this question are aimed at the notion of happiness as a moderate state of satisfaction, an individual equilibrium, of sorts, maintained by exposure to an agreeable amount of stimuli. If it is the case that the division of labor has afforded men and women more opportunity for pleasure, an element of happiness, it is not the case that more alternatives renders one more happiness, rather one appreciates things according to their tastes which are cultivated in that given society. In this way happiness is not an absolute happiness, rather it is a

relative happiness, relative to the social conditions that prevail and the development of the individuals and their capacity for stimuli.

At each moment of history, our thirst for science, art, and well-being is defined as are our appetites, and all that goes beyond this standard leaves us indifferent or causes us suffering. That is too often forgotten in comparing the happiness of our ancestors with our own. We reason as if all our pleasures could have been theirs. Then, thinking of all the refinements of civilization enjoyed by us and which they knew nothing about, we are inclined to pity their lot. We forget they were not qualified to enjoy them. If they were so greatly tormented by the desire to increase the productive power of work, it was not to achieve goods without value to them. To appreciate these goods, they would have had to contract tastes and habits they did not have, which is to say, to change their nature (1933:240).

Durkheim also notes the dialectic that characterizes pain and pleasure. If the division of labor yields more opportunity for pleasure, then, so does it yield more opportunity for pain. But, pleasure is only an element of happiness, that is, for Durkheim, pleasure is more akin to Gordon's (1981) notion of emotion, something transient, fleeting, episodic, whereas happiness seems to correspond more directly to the notion of sentiment, that which is enduring, global, and chronic.

But it appears fairly certain that happiness is something besides a sum of pleasures. It is a general and constant state accompanying the regular activity of all our organic and psychical functions. Thus, continuous activities, as those of respiration and circulation, do not yield positive enjoyment. But our good humor and spirits depend especially upon them. All pleasure is a sort of crisis; it is born, lasts a moment, and dies...In short, what happiness expresses is not the momentary state of a particular function, but the health of physical and moral life in its

entirety...happiness rests in permanent dispositions
(1933:243).

Durkheim concludes that it is of little significance to discuss the comparative happiness of past societies with that of the present, and that, perhaps, to pursue some notion of happiness is absurd, that individual's "instinct" for this is insatiable, and that true happiness is perhaps only the residual of work and good health. The two following quotes seem to characterize the trend of ambiguity that marks Durkheim's work concerning sentiment.

First, an organic interpretation:

Finally, we must not forget that this need is intrinsically indeterminate. It attaches us to nothing precise, since it is a need of something which does not exist. It is then only half-constituted, for a complete need comprises two terms: a tension of the will and certain object. As the object is not given without, it can have no other reality than that which imagination lends it (1933:255).

Secondly, an interactive, or social interpretation:

It has not miraculously descended from heaven into our hearts, but it has had to be formed, as all sentiments, within the action of the facts (1933:245)

On the one hand, sentiment seems to have some relation to instinct, something intrinsic, while on the other, it appears to be socially constructed. However, this ambiguity does not discourage a sociology of emotions, rather it inspires and challenges us to think of sentiments in sociological terms. Once again, Durkheim, like Comte, emphasizing the social aspects of sentiments, called into question the purely biological definitions of sentiments, which were popular at that time in history.

Suicide

In looking at the phenomena of suicide Durkheim further details a social construction of emotion. "Although suicide is an individual behavior, and although Durkheim is especially interested in showing that it springs from problems within the larger collectivity, he makes it clear that the process involves socially elicited feelings of sadness and anger" (Fisher & Chon, 1989:6). The two main forms of suicide we are concerned with in the contemporary period are egoistic and anomic suicide.

The first type, egoistic suicide, is believed to be an outcome of the individual's apparent lack of integration in society, an alienation of the individual from his or her social world. "Society cannot disintegrate without the individual simultaneously detaching himself from social life, without his own goals becoming preponderant over those of the community, in a word without his personality tending to surmount the collective personality" (1951:209). They suffer from an acute egoism in that their own self-serving personality has usurped that of the community.

Society no longer provides a barrier against such self-destructive behavior, no longer does the individual allow himself to be subject to the authority exercised through integration. And being isolated the individual is not likely to suffer life's pains with much patience. Individuals that have membership groups "cling to life more resolutely...so as not to betray interests they put before their own. The bond that unites them with the common cause attaches them to life and the lofty goal they envisage prevents their feeling personal troubles so deeply" (1951:209-210).

Fisher & Chon (1989) argue that, "In this respect, socially constructed emotions--particularly reverence, which creates the sense of obligation--serve as a barrier against the effects of other emotions, especially sadness, which would be induced organically" (Fisher & Chon 1989:7). I am curious to know what sadness is induced organically. A chemical secretion of sadness? The virus sadness? Sadness I would argue is itself an emergent of social interaction, or the outcome of unfulfilled expectations. Regardless, sadness is born out of human relationships, and thus social. Sensations may be felt in response to sadness, but those sensations are physiological responses and not the sadness itself, that is, sadness has more to do with language and the appraisal against some baseline of expectations, rather than with sensation. Moreover, meaning is not derived from physiological sensations, rather meaning is generated in social definitions of situations.

Egoistic suicide is, then, a problem of self-obsession, of hyper-individualism. Durkheim writes, "Excessive individualism not only results in favoring the action of suicidogenic causes, but it is itself such a cause. It not only frees man's inclination to do away with himself from a protective obstacle, but creates this inclination out of whole cloth" (1951:211). It is the collective experience that generates feelings of solidarity which binds individuals to social life, and if such an experience is demised or hindered, "whatever is social in us is deprived of all objective foundation, and we are left bereft of reasons for existence" (1951:213). Durkheim continues, "in such a state of confusion the last cause of discouragement may easily give birth to desperate resolutions. If life is not worth the trouble of being lived, everything becomes a pretext to rid ourselves of it" (1951:213).

Durkheim also theorized that religion or philosophy may encourage the act of suicide by somehow reinforcing the sentiments which lead to

suicide. Durkheim theorized that "metaphysical and religious systems spring up which, by reducing these obscure sentiments (of depression and disillusionment) to formulate, attempt to prove to men the senselessness of life and that it is self-deception to believe that it has purpose" (1951:214). These doctrines, such as Nihilism and other forms of existentialism, either embrace the idea of suicide or sanction minimalist existence which may, at some point, yield such an act as suicide. Fisher & Chon (1989) write that, "the collective authority of these currents reinforces the individual's inclination toward self-destruction" (Fisher & Chon 1989:7). Durkheim suggests that in the act of suicide there is some twist of irony, for, "Thus, at the very moment that, with excessive zeal he frees himself from the social environment, he still submits to its influence" (1951:214).

Fisher & Chon (1989), distinguish anomic suicide from egoistic suicide by the differentiation of sentiments which lead to the specific types of suicide. "Anomic suicide arises from a breakdown in the regulatory forces of society" (Fisher & Chon 1989:7). Both anomic and egoistic suicide result from the lack of presence of society in individuals. However, egoistic suicide is believed to be encouraged by "melancholic languor," whereas, anomic suicide is encouraged by "anger and all the emotions customarily associated with disappointment" (1951:284).

Anomie is instrumental in breaking down the solidarity felt by individuals in the community, solidarity that affords individuals a sense of belonging and renders meaning to their lives. Durkheim argued that anomie would allow individuals to experience feelings of estrangement and disillusionment which may, in turn, encourage one in desperation to end his or her life.

Anomy, whether progressive or regressive, by allowing requirements to exceed appropriate limits throws open the door to disillusionment and consequently to disappointment. A man abruptly cast down below his accustomed status cannot avoid exasperation naturally revolts against the cause, whether real or imaginary, to which he attributes his ruin (1951:285).

In conclusion, Fisher & Chon (1989) argue that Durkheim held both organic and socially constructed conceptualizations of emotions. "It is important to know the organic components of emotion because they form the substrate of socially constructed emotions" (Fisher & Chon 1989:8). It is unclear which emotions are of an "organic nature" and exactly how they are organic in composition, or more importantly how they avoid the a social constructionist conceptualization. Perhaps, it is now necessary to establish specific criteria as to what qualifies as an organic emotion and what qualifies as a socially constructed emotion. "Durkheim argues that society is defined by groups, not by interactions. If certain emotions have social causes, it is because groups provide definitions of the situation for its members and because groups determine the feeling rules" (Fisher & Chon 1989:8).

Fisher & Chon (1989) insist that "For Durkheim, social causation of emotions appears to consist in linking biologically given emotions to an ever-increasing range of social situations, and in eliciting, intensifying, or suppressing the emotions that have been linked in this way" (Fisher & Chon 1989:8). It appears that the perspective that Durkheim endorses, purports that we, as students of emotion, should first identify the few primary emotions that we inherit biologically and then investigate the methods by which social components interplay with these emotions (e.g. language, emotion

vocabulary) so as to make further, more and more subtle emotional distinctions, whereby expanding the realm of emotional experience.

Ethics and the Sociology of Morals

Sentiments, according to Durkheim, have much to do with morality. And so, in a discussion of morality we are likely to find text that highlights the notion of sentiment. In fact, Durkheim argues that society, in part, rests on emotion, an element of sentiment.

The majority of moral and social institutions therefore, are due not to reason or calculation but to obscure causes, to subconscious feeling, and to motives which have no relationship to the effects they produce and which, consequently, they cannot explain (1993:73).

It appears that Durkheim recognizes some difference between emotion and sentiment. While both concepts may be important to sociology, it seems that too often we attempt to use them synonymously. The “subconscious feeling” that Durkheim refers to in the preceding passage is not the same as the collective sentiment that he theorizes about in other passages. Sentiments, of course, seem more social in nature, whereas many might argue that emotion is more organic in nature, social constructionists notwithstanding. It is clear that this distinction between sentiment and emotion needs to be explored further to assess the implications for sociology. Since Gordon (1981) made the distinction between sentiment and emotion there has been very little acknowledgment in related work.

One concern in the sociology of emotions, as noted earlier, is that emotions or sentiments cease to be viewed as abstracts, and although Durkheim conceptualizes sentiments as social facts, abstractions of sorts, he

does appear to locate sentiments in the context of interactive patterns in the following quote.

Morality is not a system of abstract rules that people find inscribed in their consciences or that the moral philosopher deduces in the privacy of his or her office. It is a social function or even more, a system of functions which is formed and consolidated under the pressure of collective needs. Love in general, the abstract tendency toward unselfishness, does not exist. What actually exists is love in marriage and in the family, the free devotion of friendship, civic pride, patriotism, the love of humanity; and all these feelings are products of history. These are the facts that constitute the substance of morality (1993:75).

Sentiments are not simply abstractions, they emerge in patterns of social interaction. They are not ahistorical, divorced from the social conditions which foster them. Sentiments, above all else, are given to social beginnings, maintained and transformed in and by the collective.

Of further interest in this text are several reiterations of ideas we have witnessed in other texts. One such reiteration is a notion made familiar regarding the relationship between collective sentiments and the division of labor.

At first one and the same sentiment unites all the members of a tribe (Stammgefühl), and consequently there is just one morality that is common to all--a morality which is as simple or as inconsistent as the society it represents. But when the family begins to emerge from the body of this homogeneous mass, domestic feelings develop and simultaneously domestic morality. Then states are born, classes and casts are organized, inequalities multiply, and collective sentiments as well as morality become diversified in accordance with social conditions (1993:100).

In conclusion, Durkheim argues that morality is transformed through sentiments, that is, sentiments are at the root of morality. Given a sociology of morals, a sociology of sentiments should follow, that is, given the conceptual weight Durkheim affords sentiment, we can infer and should develop in earnest, a sociology of sentiment.

In fact we have seen that the whole moral life was transformed by two great tendencies: the inclination toward sympathy and the sentiment of respect (die Ehrfurchts- und die Neigungsgefühle). The second of these sentiments comes from religious beliefs; the first from social life (1993:102).

In a related work, Professional Ethics and Civil Morals, Durkheim comments further with regard to the role of sentiments in moral life and mildly suggests that different organizations embrace different emotional orders, that is, in the life of work an individual is subject to a particular moral code that is based on collective sentiments, but only collective with reference to those of that occupation.

A tax collector who commits some unscrupulous action is treated as any other perpetrator of such actions; but a book-keeper who is complacent about the rules of scrupulous accounting, or an official who as a rule lacks energy in carrying out his duties, does not give the impression of a guilty person, although he is treated as such in the organization to which he belongs. The fact of not honouring one's signature is a disgrace, almost the supreme shameful act, in business. Elsewhere it is looked on with a very different eye (1957:6).

In this work Durkheim is critical of his contemporaries in business and trading. He argues that this group, or rather their profession, lacks integrity and should be subject to the same system of morality all other professions are made to follow. In Durkheim, we can always sense the struggle between the

individual passion and the passion of society. It is much the same with Comte, personal feelings versus social sympathy. And so, in a time before the sociology of emotions was recognized Durkheim knew something of Hochschild's "emotion work," that the private is always relinquished for the sake of the public. In this light, Durkheim viewed the businessmen, as a lot that had not cultivated the collective sentiments needed to make their profession respectable, to make it morally sound.

Durkheim's discussion of professional ethics also includes some material highlighted by a reference to the relationship between sentiment and meaning. Albeit, this reference does not detail an explicit relationship, we can gather that sentiments are used to substantiate a variety of things, in this way sentiments lend meaning to our lives. Pareto, also, thought that sentiments were used in the rationalization of our lives. In this case, Durkheim argues that sentiments reinforce codes of morality, which in part is comprised of sentiment itself.

But beneath the letter lies the spirit that animates it:
there are the ties of all kinds binding the individual to
the group he is part of and to all that concerns that group;
there are all these social sentiments, all these collective
aspirations, these traditions we hold to and respect,
giving sense and life to the rule and lighting up the way
in which it is applied by individual (1957:29).

This passage also reflects the notion that sentiments are also a source of social cohesion, and integration, both integral concepts to Durkheimian sociology. And so, it is clear that in Durkheim's work regarding the sociology of moral and ethics, sentiments figure prominently and seem as important as any other social fact.

Education and Sentiments

Durkheim devoted much of his scholarly life to the subject of pedagogy. He authored the original work in the sociology of education. Education, Durkheim theorized, is characterized by the influence that the elder generation maintains over the younger generation.

Education is the influence exercised by adult generations on those that are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to arouse and to develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states which are demanded of him by both the political society as a whole and the special milieu for which he is specifically destined (1956:71).

In light of prior discussions with regard to the relationship between morality and sentiments we can infer from the preceding quote that moral states are in reference to sentiments. Incorporating such an understanding it seems likely that one of the functions of education is to contribute to the socialization of individuals with regard to sentiments.

There is no people among whom there is not a certain number of ideas, sentiments and practices which education must inculcate in all children indiscriminately, to whatever social category they belong (1956:69).

The responsibility of socializing the young, then falls upon the teacher. The teacher, in Durkheim's view, is responsible to the State, and so the State, then, must be sure the teacher is sensitive to the whatever sentiments or ideas are necessary to the adjustment of the child to the society in which he or she lives.

It is, then, up to the State to remind the teacher constantly of the ideas, the sentiments that must be impressed upon

the child to adjust him to the milieu in which he must live (1956:79).

It is clear, according to Durkheim, that the construction of sentiments is crucial to the development of individuals, that is, to the development of a society. This is not to say that the sentiments of individuals are of any grand importance, but rather that sentiments are particular to cultures. Societies are characterized by the sentiments that pervade in them, and these sentiments are socially maintained.

In the same way, we are immersed in an atmosphere of collective ideas and sentiments which we cannot voluntarily modify; and it is on ideas and sentiments of this kind that educational practices rest (1956:95).

With regard to the conceptualization of sentiments Durkheim recognized the importance of language, that sentiments are differentiated by words. It is this fact alone that allows for sentiments to be particular to cultures. Sensation has always remained constant in individuals, it is the language that has changed and this is how the evolution of the emotion vocabulary has emerged. In this way sentiments are truly social.

It is language, then, that has allowed us to raise ourselves above pure sensation; and it is not necessary to demonstrate that language is, in the first degree, a social thing (1956:77).

In his discussion of education, Durkheim is definitely concerned with sentiment as a variable in the social milieu. More significantly, this work in particular, reflects the notion that sentiment is socially constructed as opposed to being a biological fact.

The other is a system of ideas, sentiments, and practices which express in us, not our personality, but the group or different groups of which we are part; these are religious beliefs, moral beliefs and practices, national or

occupational traditions, collective opinions of every kind.
Their totality forms the social being (1956:124).

At one point, near the end of this text, Durkheim appears to call for some study with regard to sentiments, that some such understanding may enhance the educational process that tends to shape character. Later he suggests, probably as a result of his own education, that perhaps this endeavor should be the job of psychology, perhaps, without realizing how he might have laid the groundwork.

We shall know all the better how to shape the moral sensibility of our pupils in one or the other direction, when we shall have more complete and more precise notions about the totality of phenomena that are called tendencies, habits, desires, emotions, etc., of the divers conditions on which they depend, of the form that they take in the child (1956:130).

Sociology and Philosophy

In this text there is little we can extract to serve our purposes with regard to the conceptualization of sentiment, or the extent to which Durkheim held a place for sentiment in his grand theory. In these essays Durkheim concentrates on some of the philosophical abstracts that play a role in sociology, and how sociology serves a function that surpasses that of psychology, that society is something distinct, not simply the culmination of individuals. So as society is not the summation of individuals, collective sentiments are not the summation of individual sentiments. The following passage indicates the theorist's interest in developing the distinction.

No doubt in the making of the whole each contributes his part, but private sentiments do not become social except by combination under the action of the sui generis forces

developed in association. In such a combination, with the mutual alterations involved, they become something else...It is in the whole as it is by the whole. In this sense it is exterior to the individuals...In order to understand it as it is one must take the aggregate in its totality into consideration. It is that which thinks, feels, wishes, even though it can neither wish, feel, nor act except through individual minds. We can see here also how it is that society does not depend upon the nature of the individual personality (1953:26).

We can infer from Durkheim that collective sentiments are a different lot than subjective sentiments, and so are suitable for subject matter in sociology. Collective sentiments are social facts and persist through time and are not given to the whim of individuals. This interpretation of sentiment is somewhat different than that of some symbolic interactionists, who claim that even subjective sentiment is a legitimate topic for sociology because subjective sentiment is still the product of social interaction.

One of the other instances wherein Durkheim makes an assertion about the influence of sentiment is in reference to Kant's discussion regarding the fundamental characteristics of the moral rule. Durkheim agrees with Kant that the sentiment, obligation suffices for one of these fundamental characteristics. However, Durkheim amends Kant's criteria by introducing the notion that other sentiments may constitute another such characteristic.

In opposition to Kant, however, we shall show that the notion of duty does not exhaust the concept of morality. It is impossible for us to carry out an act simply because we are ordered to do so and without consideration of its content. For us to become the agents of an act it must interest our sensibility to a certain extent and appear to us as, in some way, desirable. Obligation or duty only expresses one aspect abstracted from morality. A certain

degree of desirability is another characteristic no less important than the first (1953:36).

Durkheim further expresses the idea that these sentiments are collective in nature. This notion parallels Comte's idea regarding "social feelings," that sentiments are not always directed toward, contained in, and given their genesis in the self.

The elan, even the enthusiasm, with which we perform a moral act takes us outside ourselves and above our nature, and this is not achieved without difficulty and inner conflict. It is this *sui generis* desirability which is commonly called good (1953:36).

In the last few pages of this text, Durkheim again distinguishes between the sentiments of the collective and those of the individual, and asserts, much like Comte, that collective sentiments are the strongest and more deeply rooted than those subjective sentiments. Durkheim emphasizes the importance of these collective sentiments as being qualitatively distinguished from subjective sentiments.

When individual minds are not isolated but enter into close relation with and work upon each other, from their synthesis arises a new kind of psychic life. It is clearly distinguished by its peculiar intensity from that led by the solitary individual. Sentiments born and developed in the group have a greater energy than purely individual sentiments. A man who experiences such sentiments feels himself dominated by outside forces that lead him and pervade his milieu. He feels himself in a world quite distinct from that of his own private existence. This is a world not only more intense but also qualitatively different. Following the collectivity, the individual forgets himself for the common end and his conduct is orientated in terms of a standard outside himself (1953:91).

Socialism, Saint-Simon, and Sentiment

In Durkheim's discussion of socialism there is some attention given to the sentiment construct. It appears that this work does not offer any great conceptualization of sentiment except to relate it rather intimately to morality. However, there is much evidence in the text that supports the idea that Durkheim viewed emotion as significant in the social arena. In Socialism, we have another example of the ambiguity that surrounds sentiment in the work of the classical scholars. In the introduction to this particular work, Gouldner writes:

The trouble was that Durkheim never clearly worked out an explicit analytic distinction between patterns of social interaction, or social structures, and patterns of moral beliefs or sentiments, the "collective conscience" (Gouldner 1958:25).

In this work, sentiment seems to characterize the movement with regard to socialism. Sentiment provides the impetus for such an ideology, that is, the movement is inspired by the offense of a deeply rooted sentiment in the collective, one that is associated with equality and justice.

It is fervor that has been the inspiration of all these systems; what gave them life and strength is a thirst for a more perfect justice, pity for the misery of the working classes, a vague sympathy for the travail of contemporary societies, etc. Socialism is not a science, a sociology in miniature--it is a cry of grief, sometimes of anger, uttered by men who feel most keenly our collective malaise (1958:41).

It is clear in the preceding passage that Durkheim affords the notion of sentiment significant importance with regard to the development of

ideologies and perhaps, as a motivation for action. According to Durkheim, the sentiments that inspire socialism and communism are similar, these systems are distinguished in form, the former to regulate notions of property, the latter to abolish it altogether.

It arises from a double feeling: pity for the wretched, and fear of the antisocial greed and hate which the spectacle of wealth can rouse in their hearts. Under its most noble form, it expresses a movement of love and sympathy (1958:89).

Durkheim, like Pareto, maintains that some sentiments appear to persist throughout history, and during certain social conditions these sentiments are made manifest more than in others. During these times at which such sentiments are either offended or made manifest is when we witness the rise in popularity of communist ideals.

The sentiments that are at the roots of communism, being of all times, are also of ours. It is true they do not express themselves in each epoch under doctrinal form. But they do not disappear completely just because they are not vigorous enough to give birth to a system which states them methodically. Besides, it is clear that the times when such sentiments are in the best possible condition to manifest themselves are those when, for whatever reasons, they particularly draw attention to the fate of the suffering classes (1958:90).

Durkheim devotes the second half of this work to a discussion of the impact that Saint-Simon's work has had in the development of socialist doctrine and ideology. Durkheim argues that Saint-Simon is one of the earliest thinkers to capture the spirit of socialist ideals. A unique characteristic of socialism, according to Durkheim, is its passion for the revolutionary or radical, that is, the sentiments associated with socialism are of a different ilk than those associated with capitalism.

Almost all say there is complete incompatibility between what ought to be and what is, and that the existing order must disappear to give place to a new...We have just seen--through example of Saint-Simon--where this subversive spirit comes from. It is due to the integral character their demands assume. Feeling very keenly the new needs which trouble society, they no longer share the sentiments of others. Fascinated by the goal they pursue, they believe they must realize it in all its purity, without any alloy to corrupt it. Therefore it is necessary that societies be organized completely--from top to bottom--so as to assure this integral realization (1958:171).

It is then evident that, according to Durkheim, the impetus for changing any system must rest in the sentiments that individuals harbor. What may account for change in a belief system is that the sentiments of the group no longer correspond with the former belief system, that is their sentiments are offended by the realities that the system fosters and so social change is in order.

Durkheim further discusses Saint-Simon, calling attention to the sentiments that seem characterize his work. Saint-Simon's concern is one of equality among the members of society. However, equality is only made an issue because of the sentiments that are aroused by inequality. In this way we can think of the degree to which a social problem is salient in a society as a reflection of the intensity of the sentiments that it arouses. In the following passage, note the use of emotion words that Durkheim employs to describe Saint-Simon's work.

He gives an important place in his system to the question of the rich and poor. The feeling which inspires this entire portion of the doctrine is compassion for the unfortunate, along with a fear of their dangers to the social order. It is a deep sympathy for those who suffer

most from social inequalities, along with a dread of the hatreds and danger that can rise in their hearts and make them enemies of society. Thus we are finding here sentiments which are the basis of communism. As we previously said, socialism while distinguished from ancient communism--inherits the motives which gave rise to it (1958:210).

These "motives" appear, in fact, to be sentiments, supporting the notion that sentiments have the potential to move individuals or collectives to action. It also is clear that it is possible to define a so-called rational system by the sentiments that serve as its inspiration.

In summary, Durkheim points to a shift in the work of Saint-Simon, a shift that seems mirrored in the work of Comte, the latter being forever reluctant to admit the influence of the former. The shift has to do with the infusion of the religious element into the system of both thinkers, an infusion that is characterized once again, by sentiment. In the following passage Durkheim provides us with such an analysis of the work of Saint-Simon.

In the former, the scientific character of his doctrine is predominant, the religious character quite obliterated, whereas beginning with the *SYSTEME INDUSTRIEL*, and especially in the *NOUVEAU CHRISTIANISME*, the idea of God--until then somewhat eclipsed by the idea of law--comes into the foreground. How does this change--which is interesting and unquestionable--come about? It is a result of what we noted above, namely that he was led to attribute a more and more important role to purely moral sentiments (1958:227).

Montesquieu and Rousseau

This text, in a sense, is a tribute to a couple of eighteenth century philosophers that Durkheim feels are integral to the foundation of the sociological discipline. Therefore, it is in the interest of Durkheim to make arguments with regard to the “classification of societies” and the “state of nature” that hint toward some constitution of the new science. Sentiments are not discussed at any great length in this text, rather they are mentioned peripherally and not systematically developed as concepts of great weight.

However, we can find some excerpts wherein Durkheim does seem persistent in drawing the distinction between collective sentiments and personal sentiments, the former being of great value to the constitution of society, the latter being a source of unpredictability and something to be controlled.

Even in abstract questions, no doubt, our ideas spring from the heart, for the heart is the source of our entire life. But if our feelings are not to run away with us, they must be governed by reason. Reason must be set above the accidents and contingencies of life, for otherwise, having less force than the desires of all kinds that animate us, it will inevitably take the direction they impose (1960:7).

Durkheim, in contrast to Comte, places reason above sentiment. However, it is a feeling of “social sympathy” that Comte exalts and “personal feeling” that Durkheim’s reason eclipses. Another note of interest in the preceding passage is that Durkheim does seem to hint at some dichotomy of reason and emotion which is, of course, disturbing for those who ascribe to a social construction of emotion.

However, in his discussion of Rousseau, Durkheim muddles the theoretical canvas with regard to the social construction of sentiments. In the following passage concerning the quest to find Rousseau's "natural man" Durkheim implies that society is responsible for culturing sentiment in individuals.

But in order to arrive at this natural man, we must put aside everything within us that is a product of social existence. Otherwise, we should find ourselves in a vicious circle, for we should be justifying society on the basis of society, that is, of the ideas and feelings society has implanted in us (1960:68).

Analytical Summary

It is clear Durkheim held fairly substantial beliefs in regard to sentiment and its relation to the social structure. He is, in some circles, indeed known as the architect of the social construction of emotions. His ideas have provided a foundation or genesis for this theoretical construct. Fisher & Chon (1989) have convincingly exhibited that such is the case. However, it is also clear that Durkheim held ideas that are in opposition to the said school as well. In his work concerning social solidarity he hints at a social construction of emotions, while at the same time holding some place for an organic conception of emotion.

Hammond has argued that a social construction of emotion is yielded by a division of labor. Hammond (1983) finds Durkheim's work paramount in the analysis of social stratification and the sociology of emotion. As the division of labor results in bureaucracy and specialization with regard to work, the consequent isolation of individuals yields a more complicated identity which in its increased depth there lies the cult of feeling.

In addition, Durkheim wrote of a normative order regarding sentiments, the intellectual precedent for Hochschild's "feeling rules." Sentiments were to be regarded as shared symbols that make up the fabric of society. In the shift from organic solidarity to mechanical solidarity it is clear that with the development of the cult of the individual various sentiments and emotions emerge. Emotion vocabularies are of import in this development. Durkheim, claiming that much of psychological phenomena does not result from organic causes, implying social causes of such

phenomena, in fact, does predict a new science to emerge called “socio-psychology.” It is in this branch of sociology that emotions are most salient.

Durkheim is ever mindful of the relationship between social structure and sentiments, and thus of the social construction of emotion. The example cited previously is “...the social organisation of kinship relationships that has determined respectively the sentiments between parents and children. These sentiments would have been completely different if the social structure had been different” (1951:287).

And in the same work Durkheim gives evidence of an organic conceptualization of emotion, that the sentiment of sympathy may be organic in nature, yet is given strength by integration in the social structure. “Individuals always have a distinct organic life, and this is sufficient to give rise to...sympathy, although it becomes stronger when the personality is more highly developed” (1951:125, note 49).

Hammond finds considerable evidence of Durkheim’s thoughts concerning sentiments in both Primitive Classification and Division of Labor in Society. Hammond makes clear his argument that in the former, the scholar presented an affective model to be employed in sociology, whereas, in the latter, the scholar makes an application of said model. For Durkheim, the affective forces given rise in the social nature of humans yields the classification and categorization of life. Shared symbols among classes evoke a common sentiment in the individuals that comprise those classes. In this way, and by the means of emotional expression, social structure is linked to sentiment.

Affectivity is integral to the constitution of social constructions. Hammond echoes Durkheim,

...affectivity, classifications of nature, and social density are related: As groups grow in size, differentiation occurs along the lines of these classifications. Durkheim is therefore claiming that there is something about human affectivity that shapes the very structure of social constructions and the pattern in which these fabrications change (Hammond 1983:92).

As Pareto speaks to the dialectical relationship between sentiment and action, so does Durkheim imply the dialectical relationship between affectivity and social structure. Durkheim theorizes that social structure influences sentiment, in that individuals comply to emotional normative orders, and that affectivity, or sentiment influences social structure in that, affectivity shapes the scaffolding of such structures. Perhaps the main function of sentiment lies in the idea that it acts as a form of social glue, it is a cohesive force in the lives of individuals, perhaps, it is what makes individuals human, and hence, social beings.

It is clear that Durkheim, despite his critics, is interested in pushing sentiment to the fore in sociological theory. Durkheim, even despite granting emotion some physiological basis, argues that we should stand to gain by highlighting the cognitive, and social bases, and not look upon this phenomena as if it were akin to some virus, some dark force, something outside the realm of this discipline.

Durkheim, in addition to his conceptualization of sentiment, which entertains both interactive and organic perspectives, lends insight into the phenomena of collective expression. He argues that, contrary to many purely psychological theories of emotion, emotional intensity is greatest among individuals and not within individuals, and thus individuals seek expression in collective contexts, in marriages, churches, bands, theater, institutions, and

organizations. He lends insight into the maintenance of social bonds, that is, the idea that social bonds are reinforced by sentiments.

Durkheim's work is of further interest to the sociology of emotions in book on suicide. He details the emotions or sentiments that might potentially influence one in such a direction. Such an act is related to the disintegration of social bonds that act to maintain life. It is possible that suicide is the ultimate rejection of the normative order regarding emotion. There are sentiments that encourage such an act and sentiments that do the converse, the maintenance of individual life is dependent on which sentiments are encourage by the social structure.

For Durkheim, emotion is incredibly relevant in the practice of sociology. In some cases the social constructionist school is seen as, most importantly, a reaction to biological or psychological theories of emotion. However, rediscovering Durkheim's work one is witness to both the biological and sociological relevance regarding emotion. It just so happens that much of the emphasis on emotion has been in the arena of the physiological, or organic, and not the social, or interactive.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

In large part, the sociology of emotions has not employed the groundwork and insight of classical theorists. Comte and Pareto have all but been ignored in the pursuit of a sociology of emotions, while Durkheim is given marginal credit for laying the foundation for such a sub-discipline, by such scholars as Fisher & Chon (1989), Hammond (1983), and Hochschild (1983). The research carried out and detailed in this dissertation supports the thesis that these classical theorists did, in fact, labor over questions that concern the contemporary sociologist studying emotion. These theorists attempted to explain or at least raised thought evoking questions concerning the role that emotion plays in the motivation of action and in the human experience in general, that is, in each case the aforementioned theorists felt emotion played a large role in the fabric of social life, whether it be as a source of cohesion (e.g. social control) or as, both a cause and a consequence of action.

All of the theorists detailed conceptualized notions of emotions, and incorporated the concept in their theoretical framework. All of them have contributed to the historical weight of this concept. Comte, especially, noted the importance of language in any conceptualization of emotion. Durkheim noted the concept's importance even in the realm of social structure. Pareto offered that emotion could very well be the genesis for behavior.

It is also true that the different works of the distinct theorists may reflect varied conceptions and the relative importance of the concept. The Comte we read in Positive Philosophy is quite different than the Comte we read in System of Positive Polity. His view and theoretical concerns shifted

even as his view of sentiment changed. Durkheim often, especially in Elementary Forms of Religious Life and Primitive Classification, implies the importance of emotion and rituals of sentiment. It is clear after reviewing these works by the respective authors that emotion, the sociology of sentiment, may claim as its history, a few thousand pages in the archive that is classical sociology. New scholars of sociology that work in the areas of emotion and sentiment, need not habitually look outside of their discipline for foundation and precedence. Sociology is rich with a history of work focusing on the role of emotion, the consequence and the cause. Pareto, Durkheim, and Comte have all provided us with the initial ponderings, that went for so long neglected in the discipline, and now it should be recognized, the theoretical significance of this work.

Most of the analysis with regard to Pareto's work focused on Mind and Society, for the reason that, as a text it included many more discussions of sentiment than did Manual of Political Economy. A similar statement may be made with regard to Comte's work. That is, the analysis focused a great deal more on System of Positive Polity because as a text, System indulged the concept of emotion to a much greater extent than did Positive Philosophy. As far as Durkheim is concerned, the focus of analysis is spread throughout his entire works, to show, for the first time, that sentiment is in fact, a concept of grand importance in the scope of his work.

Pareto

Pareto was interested in sentiments as providing the motivation for individual behavior. Pareto also offers insight into the composition of human emotional experience in his discussion of residues and derivations,

residues acting as an intermediary between sentiments, belief systems and the social act. Throughout his discussion of the six classes of residues it is clear that sentiments are at the crux of his scholarship. These sentiments, or classes of sentiments, have endured throughout history but are subject to change, not by the means of the individual, but rather, by the means of society. These residues are evidently central to the lives of individuals.

Pareto also denoted a relationship between action and sentiment, that is, individuals reinforce sentiments by expressing themselves in some external act. Regarding the individual's role in the construction of emotions, Pareto argued that the self was both active and passive in this phenomenon.

Pareto held elements of both organismic and interactive perspectives with regard to the conceptualization of emotion. Regarding the organismic conceptualization, he often referred to emotions as instincts and some of the residues corresponded to emotional needs of the individual as if the capacity for such things was innate. However, he does imply that there exists some dialectic between sentiment and action. He also claims that individuals are, to some degree, active participants in the construction of their own emotional experience, an idea consistent with the interactive perspective.

He even goes so far as to discuss individual sentiments (e.g., pity and cruelty). Concerning his discussion of the sex residue he writes of envy and jealousy. For Pareto, the actions of men and women are inextricably intertwined with sentiment. It is out of feeling that individuals act and not reason. For Pareto, reason, or derivations are used to impose rationality on social acts, after the fact. Pareto also designates an importance to the notion of how emotions or sentiments emerge, a theme consistent in the social construction of emotions today. In addition, Pareto also alludes to concepts

that precede Hochschild's "feeling rules," that norms, emotional norms in particular, are products of cultures, relative to those indigenous peoples.

Of the three theorists considered, Pareto favors the organismic approach the most. His views on the constitution of emotion vary to some extent, although he seems more intent on characterizing emotion as emanating from inside the self. However, his view should not be discarded, rather incorporated into the sociology of emotions. His insight concerning the role of sentiment in society is noteworthy, as well as his distinction between residues and derivations.

Only one article makes mention of Pareto's treatment of emotion. Mongardini's (1989) review of Moscovici's La Machine a Faire des Dieux (1988) suggests that in his "history of sociology," Moscovici ignored Pareto's observations with regard to the non-logical features of social interactions, namely the importance of emotion in the social arena.

Comte

Comte wrote extensively about emotions, distinguishing between "personal feelings" and "social feelings." He goes to great lengths to outline the relationships between emotion, the intellect, and action. Comte felt that social feelings, or a universal sympathy might serve as a type of social glue aiming at the cohesion of society. Comte, much like Durkheim, thought that socially constructed, collective sentiments function toward an integration of the individual into society, these sentiments, themselves, may be oriented toward an equilibrium in society.

Comte also speaks to the relationship between Art and the human emotional experience. He argued that Art represents the genuine synthesis of

the affective and the cognitive. In addition, emotion plays a huge role in his proposed religion, affection being one of the main attributes, that benevolence should reign supreme and individuals should subordinate selfish feelings to those that might benefit the social welfare of the greater society.

In addition, Comte offers us ideas concerning the effect of language on emotion, a prevalent idea in the sociology of emotions (i.e. Gordon's emotion vocabulary). Comte postulates a dialectic between language and feeling, language being one of the "five intellectual functions" of the brain wherein it is subject to the influence of feeling and in turn, feeling is made subject to the effect of language. In addition, concerning Comte's trilogy of Logic, there is a Logic of Emotion, as well as, a Logic of Language, the two constructs are intimately related. The image or idea is said to mediate between language and feeling.

In Comte, we see a foreshadowing of James's specificity theory. Comte offers us the notion of "within," a concept incongruent with the social construction of emotions, but in reference to the concept of emotion nonetheless.

Comte, much like Durkheim, thought emotion contained both organic and interactive elements. Emotion is organic in that it is given its intensity by an affective nature. Comte's deference to a spatial metaphor is also evidence of an organic slant.

Of the three theorists considered, Comte's scholarly career is mostly characterized by a shift from a view that did not incorporate emotion to one that indeed rested upon the very notion. Along with Durkheim, he recognizes the distinction between collective sentiments and individual's emotions.

Comte alludes to the interactive, and moral element of sentiments. He argued that the sentiments of one individual bears consequences for other individuals and figures into the constitution of any resultant emotion. It is social structure that lends form and direction to affect. He argues that emotion, or sentiment, is a prime motivator in the actions of individuals. Emotions serve as the stimuli in prompting action, or meeting some end.

Perhaps, most important in Comte, is the shift we find from his early work, where emotion is relatively devalued, toward his later work, where emotion holds a significant position in the hierarchy of his theory. In Positive Philosophy, the role of emotion was downplayed, whereas in System of Positive Polity emotion was granted a higher status as a concept that became integral to the scholar's grand theory. In a rare article relating Comte to emotion, Frick (1988) argues "Though he opposed conventional democratic institutions, Comte suggested a form of social control based on positive knowledge (as rendered by sociology) and triggered by social emotion" (Frick 1988:273).

In another rare article, Bono (1979) defends Comte against claims that he is an anti-feminist. She also points toward the shift in the conceptualization of emotion which we witness in Comte.

In Cours he places reason above emotion; in Systeme he values emotions and morals above reason as the foundations of social systems. In Italy today, Cours is greatly studied, while Systeme is almost forgotten. Although Cours has made Comte a father of sociology, it is in Systeme that he treats the question of women and positivism...Comte has been considered an antifeminist because he gives men the central place in society; however, women are of central importance to Comte because they determine how men will behave in society. He explains that society's morals are a result of socialization in the

home; mothers are the basis of the moral structure of society (Bono 1979:114).

Durkheim

Durkheim, of the three theorists discussed in this work, is most noted for his work regarding sentiment. For Durkheim, sentiments are derived from a normative moral order. Morality is at the crux of sentiment formation. Hammond (1983) has argued that Durkheim's conceptualization of the division of labor makes possible a social construction of emotion, but Durkheim also harbored a biological notion of emotion, as well.

For Durkheim, emotions may have their genesis in the organic, but are given shape, constitution, and direction by social structure. Durkheim even mentions that societies themselves harbor sentiments, socially constructed sentiments.

Several scholars have noted the importance of emotion in Durkheim's work, although there appears to be some reservation of including the classical scholar in current discussions of emotions. Harris (1992) writes, "For Durkheim, the central aspect of development is to be realized in emotion. Moral development is promoted through the motivational qualities of emotion. Benevolence, altruism, sympathy, and solidarity are terms Durkheim employs to not only denote emotion but to convey moral maturity as well" (Harris 1992:189).

On several occasions Durkheim refers to the impact of social structure on the constitution of sentimental experience. He is also credited with providing the groundwork for what we might call a normative emotional order, a cue from which Hochschild (1983) has conceptualized "feeling rules"

and the responsive "emotion work." Social structure is instrumental in organizing the emotional norms by which we are encouraged to abide.

Durkheim is given to discussing emotions or sentiments in particular, such as his references to the sentiments of sympathy and grief or mourning among the Australian aborigines. In addition, Durkheim makes references to specific sentiments in his work on suicide, particularly anger and sadness. Society or the social structure, in some cases may be instrumental in reinforcing sentiments that encourage one in the act of suicide. Finally, it may be inferred from Durkheim's work that, as students of emotion, we should, even in the case of biologically constituted emotion, seek out the sociological factors which figure into the expression and consequences of those emotions as they are manifested. We should come to understand how emotions are socially constructed, even taking into consideration their biological elements.

Durkheim's sociology of emotions rests upon the idea of the collective, that even as emotions manifest themselves in individuals, they may be collective in nature, given birth by the group, and ultimately transformed by the group.

But society is different; it is above all a composition of ideas, beliefs and sentiments of all sorts which realize themselves through individuals (Durkheim 1953:59).

Durkheim, like Comte and Pareto, entertains an organismic and an interactive perspective. However, it is clear that Durkheim's work is of great consequence for current discussions of emotion, for emotion, as Vester (1987) has argued, plays an important role in Durkheim's work.

In Emile Durkheim's sociology, emotions play an important but ambivalent part: on the one hand, emotional attitudes are the origin of conceptual classification and are basic to social life; on the other, emotions are the outcome of social organization. While

conceiving emotions as social facts, Durkheim points to the necessity of investigating their social contexts. The core element of Durkheim's sociology of emotions is his theory of collective consciousness, which entails a semiotic understanding of emotion. Durkheim shows how emotions are sanctified in religious rituals. While in modern society religion tends to be secularized, the holy character of emotions is preserved. This becomes apparent in times of collective conflict (e.g., in Durkheim's times, the Dreyfus affair or the outbreak of WWI.) Durkheim's contribution to the sociology of emotions should be considered as a point of departure appropriate for the analysis of emotions in contemporary times (Vester 1987:1).

It is clear through this dissertation that all three of the theorists discussed in this work have made invaluable contributions to a sociological understanding of emotion. Further, many of the texts reviewed provide an adequate starting point for contemporary scholars of emotion, that is, students of emotion, in sociology, need not venture outside of their discipline (e.g. psychology, philosophy) to find classical work. These classical theorists provide us with a breadth of scholarship regarding the role of emotion in individual's lives and have all but been ignored by the lot of students working within the sociology of emotion. Due to a bias in the discipline against social psychological work, specifically emotion related work, much of the work of these classical theorists has been ignored and thus, students have been encouraged to seek references outside of the discipline. It is time we, as sociologists, accept the construct of emotion as a viable topic of study and access the resources that have been provided for us by scholars that founded this discipline originally.

A Case for the Sociology of Emotions

Based on the work of these founding fathers of sociology there is a wealth of evidence to support a sociology of emotions. For all the theorists, regardless of their substantive differences with respect to conceptualizations, emotion is a salient feature in their work. This dissertation should have served to make clear the importance of such a sub-discipline. That is, if sociology is concerned with social structure, it is also concerned with sentiment, and if sociology is concerned with the social act, it also concerned with emotion. Emotion is functional in terms of providing the basis for social cohesion in society, as well, as being the central motivating factor in action.

Any question about the validity of a sociology of emotions, should be settled by a review of the literature cited in this work. If the classical scholars who founded this discipline concluded that sentiment was integral to the social experience, that such relations between social structure, language, action, and emotion were of substantial import, then we, as the purveyors of sociological discourse, should include emotion or sentiment in our discussions and lend it credence in our academic endeavors. If sentiment did indeed occupy the minds of these seminal theorists, to the point where it was included in each of their theoretical perspectives, then we should not be suspect of such a sub-discipline. We should expound upon this phenomena and accept it as a justifiable area of study to undertake.

Classical Sociology's Contribution to the Sociology of Emotion

All three theorists make notable contributions to the conceptualization of a sociology of emotions. Of the three scholars surveyed, Durkheim had a more developed theory where emotion is concerned. The degree of

sophistication is marked. It is within reason to argue that Durkheim's ideas concerning the relationship between social structure and sentiment, his ideas concerning a normative order regarding sentiment has made possible Hochschild's (1979) analysis of emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. Durkheim has even been called the "architect" of the social construction of emotions.

As Collins (1987) has pointed out, we need to search our past for those things that may have been neglected, while at the same time move forward to escape stagnation. He writes,

...we should be aware of--and still using and citing--the theories and findings, from whatever date, that constitute important parts of our stock of sociological knowledge. We still need to go on buried-treasure expeditions, to dig up accomplishments that have been lost in the shuffle (Collins 1987:180).

I hope this dissertation has been one such expedition. I hope, in this dissertation, I have contributed a work that has rescued what has been lost, or neglected, in the chance that it might be used to further the theoretical foundation of the sub-discipline.

Durkheim's ideas concerning the transference of affect to social objects is meaningful, in that emotions have this kind of relationship with symbols. In the clans people who were subjects Durkheim found this tendency, that they might associate specific sentiments or the exhibition of emotion with certain totems and thereby manifest those emotions in themselves. Symbols are used in the expression of sentiment and also in an attempt to evoke the appropriate sentiments given the definition of the situation. This is also significant for the sub-discipline because it provides a basis for Hochschild's

(1983) claim that individuals' beliefs about emotions figure into their experience of them.

Durkheim is also relevant to the sociology of emotions in that he was among the first to posit the belief that the very foundation of society was maintained by the social cohesion of sentiment. Durkheim (1915) argued that society is created and recreated by the "intense arousal" that infuses gatherings and meetings of community. Sentiment lies at the root of solidarity.

His ideas concerning the relationship between the division of labor and the discrimination with regard to an increased volume of sentiments are particularly useful for the sociology of emotions, in that we may infer much about emotion vocabularies and the importance of the relationship between language and feeling.

Hammond (1983) made clear Durkheim's importance regarding social stratification and the sociology of emotions. He speaks to the sentiments of different social classes as they are manifested in shared symbols that differentiate the one class from the other. He argues that social structure bears emotional consequences for individuals and also that sentiments bear consequences for the fabric of society and thus, the social structure around which that society is organized.

Perhaps most importantly, Durkheim tries to establish the idea that emotions can no longer be viewed as the inexplicable dark forces that defy reason. Emotion is both consequence and cause and is inextricable from the subject of sociology. Durkheim's contributions in this matter are never overstated. As a premiere scholar in the field his contributions have not been completely ignored, as there is some attempt to integrate his ideas in the sociology of emotions; but his work is rarely noted for his conceptions

regarding emotion or sentiment. We have every reason to include his work in current discussions regarding emotion.

Comte and Pareto, unlike Durkheim, are more similar in their scholarship. More grand, and more abstract, they are completely ignored as far as the sociology of emotions is concerned, and unjustifiably so. While the two were more verbose and grand in their respective theories, they warrant some acknowledgment by the sociology of emotions for their pertinent work.

Pareto and Comte both make significant contributions in that they both share the idea that emotion or sentiment serves as motivation for the social act. In this way emotions or sentiments are central in the human social experience.

Pareto also implies that individuals are active participants in the construction of their own experience of emotion, an idea currently espoused in the social construction of emotions. He is also highlighted for his ideas concerning the dialectical relationship between the sentiment and the act. Residues reinforce action, as action reinforces residues.

Comte's contributions are characterized by his implications regarding emotional socialization, a current interest in the sociology of emotion, accounting for a significant differences between men and women. The influence of social structure on this process is inferred and thus, some emotional normative order has the potential to emerge.

Another contribution of Comte's concerns his ideas about social sympathy and the place that it should hold in society, that social feelings must always overcome personal feelings. Comte was very obsessed with attaining the proper synthesis between the intellect, action, and emotion. This synthesis, he writes, in itself is worthy of mention in various discussions with regard to the sociology of emotion.

Perhaps Comte's most significant contribution lies in the shift in his thought which occurs from Positive Philosophy to System of Positive Polity. Highlighted in this shift in ideological perspective is emotion. The concept of emotion is pushed to the fore of his theories regarding society, the idea that it is emotion that provides the basis of cohesion within the structure. This shift is important for social constructionist in particular, and the sociology of emotion in general, because it represents an evolution in thought, that the author, considering the pervading historical bias, and the intellectual climate during that era, would move to such conclusions, granting emotion such a status in the study of society. His work lends us direction and invites our inquiries regarding the affective.

Thorp (1983:1) argues, "The findings showed that emotion has been neglected by the classical theorists. Preoccupied with rationality and with demonstrating the overall influence of society on the individual, this group acknowledges emotions but fails to treat them systematically." Yet it is clear from this dissertation that not only did Comte, Pareto, and Durkheim acknowledge emotion, but in addition, emotion played a significant role in their theories regarding the constitution and transformation of society. While it is true that each of them held concerns with regard to rationality, and society's influence over the individual, it is not true that they ignored emotion.

Included in this work is a table generally comparing the different theorists in different areas which comprised the focus of this study. It is not only clear that these classical scholars present enough evidence to support a sociology of emotion, they also provide the discipline with an intellectual precedent in these matters. Further, they should all be included in current discussions regarding the sociology of emotions since by and large, they have

been neglected in this area and we need not waste these valuable resources. Perhaps further study of the writings of classical social theorists will uncover other contributions, perspectives, or ideas, that are relevant for the sociology of emotion, and give us insights into the socially understated phenomena of emotion.

GLOSSARY

- *Affect: General term, refers to evaluative orientation toward an object
 - *Emotion: Subset of affect, boundaries unclear, fleeting, involves appraisals, sensations, gestures, and cultural meanings
 - Feeling: Perception of sensation, affective state of consciousness
 - *Mood: Refers to an emotional state that appears to endure across situations
 - Sensation: Physical sensibility, perception of stimuli in reference to sensory organs
 - *Sentiment: Socially constructed, of greater endurance than emotion, latent tendencies to respond in an emotional manner given the context of a social relationship
- * As cited in Smith-Lovin (1995).

TABLE 1: A COMPARATIVE TABLE OF THREE CLASSICAL THEORISTS ON EMOTION

	conceptualization of emotion	emotions as functional	social structure and emotions	specific emotions
<u>Pareto</u>	interactive < organic irrational instinct motivation demands expression emergent dialectic between action and sentiment	motive for action historical continuity	normative order gender class	pity envy revenge hatred
<u>Comte</u>	interactive > organic "shift" irrational motivation synthesis: cognitive & affective social cohesion language & feeling expression	social unity	normative order gender class social feeling self feeling	love benevolence sympathy
<u>Durkheim</u>	interactive > organic language & feeling expression social construction cognitive & affective transference collective sentiments	integration and social cohesion	normative order division of labor & sentiment class emotional norms sentiments and ritual	anger sadness grief

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- Recorded for Compilation Compact Disc "Dixie Flatline"
- Both the Compact Disc and One of the 7-inch Records Were Picked up for Distribution both Nationally and Internationally.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Charles R. Holt". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with some loops and flourishes.