

**ORIENTATIONS TO MORAL REASONING AMONG
MEN AND WOMEN LEADERS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN TAIWAN**

by

Shao-Kuo Yeh

Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of


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
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
APPROVED:


Don G. Creamer, Chair


Marilyn V. Lichtman


Martin Gerstein


Rosemary Blieszner


Steven M. Janosik

September, 1993

Blacksburg, Virginia

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(ABSTRACT)

Kohlberg, Gilligan, and Mennuti differed in their explanation of a moral reasoning model in higher moral development levels. This study examined how moral orientations relate to gender, culture, and moral dilemma contexts.

Eighteen leaders of higher educational institutes in Taiwan, 9 males and 9 females, were interviewed concerning their real-life moral dilemmas in both their professional life and personal life. Forty three incidents were generated by the participants in both situations. The principle of full saturation and constant comparative analysis methods were used in sampling, data collection, and analysis. The types of incidents, the conflict focus, the primary considerations, final decisions, and self-evaluation of decisions and consequences in the process of moral reasoning resolution were examined.

The findings showed that dilemma situation factors were more important than gender factors in predominant types of conflict focus and types of moral considerations. Eight moral orientation models were identified from the full process of moral reasoning. Most moral orientation models were in combined forms. Single forms were rarely seen and there was only single-justice pattern. Justice focus mixed with either care or self shadow forms, or both, was the most predominant model found, especially in professional situations. Self-focus mixed with other shadow forms was the most predominant model in personal situations. There were slight gender differences in the distribution of moral orientation models. There were almost one third of incidents reasoned in justice, care, and self combinations with five different styles within the eight models.

A comparison among the findings in this study with those of Kohlberg, Gilligan, and Mennuti was conducted. The interactions among gender, culture, and dilemma contexts were discussed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is my honor and pleasure to acknowledge all the people who helped to make this dissertation become true. Love is an ultimate salvation, I believe, in this life. This has been proven during the entire period of my study in Blacksburg, VA.

I would like to give my deepest gratitude to the major advisor of my committee, Dr. Don G. Creamer. He has been like a father to me. He inspired me, supported me, and encouraged me throughout my study at V.P.I. Additionally, I would like to thank him for his instruction, advising, and his editing of my work.

Thanks to Dr. Martin Gerstin, Dr. Marilyn Lichtman, Dr. Rosemary Blieszner, and Dr. Steve Janosik. My committee members, because they offered authentic regard for me and precious opinions to my work as well as my study in V.P.I.

My deepest thanks must go to the 18 presidents or deans of colleges in Taiwan who participated in this study. Its success is due in large part to their willingness to risk sharing details of their lives. The generosity with which they shared their time and hospitality during interviews has made them collaborators with me in this research.

Additional thanks to Dr. Rick Swindall and Ms. Anita Haney. They are the best and most faithful proofreaders of my work. Without their help, I would not have felt

confident writing my thoughts. I also would like to thank Dr. Cindy Lin, Dr. Alice Lo, and Ph.D. candidate, Nina Xiang, for their help in translating some concise forms of interview transcripts into English so that I could save time and communicate effectively with my major advisor. And Ms. Kimberly Bell who helped me with typewriting. I am grateful to her for her kindness and patience.

I would especially like to thank my friends in Tamkang University; without their extra favors and help it would have been impossible for me to stay in Blacksburg during this time. Some of these friends offered support through international calls, whereas others offered their blessings from around this country.

My mother and siblings supported me with their regard and anything I need. My son and daughter graciously allowed their mother time alone to finish this work, while their grandmother took care of them during this period. They are all appreciated.

Ultimately, I praise God, my Lord. During this moment, the hardest time of my life, he has guided me, counseled me, and blessed me with his great strength and wisdom, and provided me with all of the wonderful persons aforementioned. He has blessed me with perseverance and endurance so that I could get through all difficulties. My honor comes from him and belongs to him ever and forever.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Importance and Necessity of the Study

Society's commitment to resolving its problems, such as ecological deterioration, war, hunger, social corruption, etc., illustrates the urgency of moral issues in human existence. For the most part, problems have not been the result of a lack of food, industrial pollution, or the absence of natural resources, but mainly from the unfair distribution of resources resulting from a disregard for the concern of others as well as one's own insatiable selfish desires. All societies have procedures for resolving conflicts to protect the general welfare of the citizenry. However, concrete problems (such as hunger) tend to be more threatening and more demanding of immediate remedies. In comparison, abstract moral problems are not seen as urgent, and tend to be considered a low priority item. In neglecting moral problems, however, societies usually invite further physical problems, because morality and resource management are interconnected.

Interpersonal interactions are also filled with the conflicts, ambivalence, and struggles we encounter in moral dilemmas in both professional life and personal life. These conflicts are magnified when the old social order fails and

changes to a new system of beliefs. The agony and pain of those involved in a moral dilemma during this period are far more apparent because they have no standard to follow.

In addition, one's moral interests and self-interests become more clearly defined and connected to each other after adolescence, so the moral attitude of an individual reveals hidden character related to self-identity (Damon, 1984; Erikson, 1968). Hence, even a minimally advanced understanding of a human's moral behavior is essential and encouraged in the promotion of the welfare of human beings.

Historically, women's experiences usually were excluded from the main stream of psychological studies. Women's development in their life span did not seem to fit existing models of human growth (Belenky, Clinchy & Goldberger, 1986; Gilligan 1977; Josselson, 1987). Some aspects of women's development were totally unknown or obscure. For example, Freud stated that the sexual life of women was a "dark continent" for psychology (Freud, 1926/1959) and was "still veiled in an impenetrable obscurity" (Freud, 1905/1953, p. 151). The result of this obscurity usually led researchers to assume that women's development was simply analogous to that of men. A similar attitude concerning women also occurred in the moral development domain.

In the 1970s, women in all fields began to challenge the tradition as demonstrated by the literature concerning

female development. Gilligan (1977) stated in her paper titled "In a Different Voice" that women in real-life perceive themselves, in relation to others, to be morally and ethically different from the males' as Kohlberg described as oriented toward justice and right. If women are different in their moral orientation, then Kohlberg's ideas are not applicable to all people. Hence, it causes a question of impartiality and inadequacy of currently educational application.

Current developmental theories which are primarily based on male children and adolescents also misrepresent what we actually know about adults and their moral development. Especially in the realm of moral development, Kohlberg's theory does not provide an adequate description of adult development after the age of 30 that has been proven to continue in both ethical and religious thinking (Fowler, 1981; Kohlberg, Levine & Hwer, 1983/1984; Kohlberg & Power, 1979/1981; Kohlberg & Higgin, 1983/1984). Additionally, Kohlberg's six-stage moral development model is still inadequate in clarifying the structure of moral reasoning in the post-conventional level, the most mature (differentiated and integrated) and principled form (Kohlberg, Levine & Hwer, 1983/1984).

In 1991, Mennuti and Creamer manifested self-concern in the process of resolution of real life moral dilemmas in a

morally mature group. Concern for justice and/or care concern are often combined with self-concern in the thinking of community college presidents while they attempt to resolve their moral dilemmas. So, the moral reasoning process in higher stages became more complicated and ambiguous than Gilligan had theorized.

The middle-aged leaders of higher education institutions ought to be more mature in their moral development in a given society. They often are confronted with both personal and professional dilemmas that require higher levels of moral judgment. Their concerns in the moral reasoning process are essential for exploring the truth of moral development in adulthood and in higher stages as well.

Moral universality is the most controversial topic among Kohlberg's discussions and those of his opponents. Therefore, their cross-cultural experiences are more valuable in enhancing an integrated understanding of the essence of moral development. Ultimately, this study is supposed to contribute to the knowledge of higher moral development in both sexes and to appropriate educational applications.

Background of the Study

Because they are essential to the survival of the individual and the maintenance of human groups, moral issues

have always been the main topic of philosophy in both the East and the West. The primary virtues of the individual and society which were stated by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle also were contemplated by Confucius and Mencius. Similarly, the origin of morality mentioned by Rousseau, Locke, and Kant also have been described by Mencius, Shuncius, Tung-Chun-Shu, and Wong-Yan-Ming in China. Contemporary sociologists and psycho-philosophers also have made some efforts to continue this tradition. In the psychological field, there are three approaches which have contributed the most useful concepts on this theme.

The first comprehensive theory of moral development was presented by Freud in 1923 to 1925. His psychoanalytic approach interpreted the origin of morality as following along three paths relating to the mental dynamic system. The first path was the ego, which differentiated from the id by controlling the unconscious impulses and dangerous wishes prohibited by reality so that one's behavior could follow the social norms or moral rules (Freud, 1923/1961). Secondly, parental discipline in each phase of ego development influences the shaping of an individual's moral character (Freud, 1908/1959). Finally, the most important concept related to the origin of morality is the formation of the super-ego (ego ideal), which corresponds to the

function of conscience and induces the consciousness of guilt in Freud's concept (Freud, 1925/1961).

Freud believed the super-ego was the end product of the ego strength that properly mastered the Oedipal conflicts during early childhood (phallic phase). In the Oedipus complex, the young boy desires to have his mother all to himself and feels hostile and rivalrous toward his father. These feelings are soon destroyed by the fear of castration, losing his parents' love, and being punished for his unacceptable desire. Through the ego-defense mechanism, the object-cathexes are given up and replaced by identifying with his father's characteristics and standards (same-sex parents). Thus, the authority of the father that reflects society's norm is interjected into the ego, and there forms the nucleus of the super-ego (Freud, 1924b/1961). As a child grows up, the parent is replaced by teachers, authorities, and/or self-chosen models. Their injunctions and prohibitions remain powerful in the ego ideal and continue in the form of conscience, to exercise moral censorship. The tension between the demands of conscience and the actual performances of the ego surfaces as a sense of guilt (Freud, 1923, 1924a, 1924b, 1925/1961).

However, for females, raised by same-sex parents, the Oedipus complex is a secondary formation. The operations of the Castration complex precede it due to the anatomical

distinction of women; they have no penis. As a result, the destruction of the Oedipus complex in women is lacking. Castration has already had its effect on encouraging femininity and forcing the girl into the situation of the Oedipus complex, which may continue to affect the women's normal mental life (Freud, 1925/1961). Consequently, Freud contended that this unresolved conflict resulted in a less well-developed superego, which accounted for women's inferiority when compared with men in the character traits, including a weaker sense of justice, poorer judgment making ability for which women are criticized in every epoch (Freud, 1925/1961). Such notions continue to appear in subsequent studies.

The Behavioristic approach considers moral behavior to be acquired through the same learning mechanisms of reinforcement and modeling as any other behavior (Bandura, 1970). According to the traditional operant conditioning view, the child's behavior in conformity with social norms will increase if adults follow it up with positive reinforcement in the form of approval, affection, and other rewards. Conversely, the child's behavior that violates normative standards will less likely occur if it is soon followed by punishment such as reproof and loss of privileges.

The social learning theorists assume that children learn to behave morally largely through observation and imitation of models that demonstrate socially acceptable behavior. But, once children acquire a pro-social response, reinforcement, especially given by a warm and nurturing adult, will enhance its expression (Berk, 1989, p. 508-511). Therefore, gender differences or cultural differences in moral or pro-social behaviors are the result of social modeling and differentiated reinforcement.

The cognitive-developmental perspective on morality was first presented by Piaget in 1932 and has continued to be highly influential in contemporary research. He studied moral development by observing children's attitudes toward the rules of marbles games and their judgment of right or wrong relative to the outcome of a behavioral pattern. In Piaget's conceptualization, respect of rules, a sense of justice, mutual respect, equality, and reciprocity are the definition of morality (Piaget, 1932/1965).

He first doubted that all morality was imposed by the group upon the individual and by the adult upon the child as psychoanalyst and behaviorist stated. He said if everything is originally heteronomous, we are unable to explain the genesis of personal conscience (Piaget, 1932/1965). Accordingly, he seems to believe that there is something morally proper a priori (Peter, 1981).

He assumes that the process of cognitive maturation causes the moral structure of children to undergo revision from a transcendental stage to a cooperational stage, both of which are types of respect for rules in correspondence with social relationships. At the transcendental stage, children, often under age 7 or 8, are accustomed to heteronomous morality. The rule appears to them as something external, sacred, and unalterable, created by adult authorities and accepted without question. Due to cognitive immaturity and egocentrism, they regard wrong-doing based on overt, physical, and objective consequences rather than the subjective intent to do harm (Piaget, 1932/1965).

As children grow older, peer experiences cause them to shift to a latter stage in which autonomous morality is predominant. They consider rules as flexible and changeable insofar as they are ratified by the collective will. The moral judgment increase the trend toward intentionality during the years of middle childhood. In this sense, the children becoming aware of moral reciprocity -- treating others as you yourself would wish to be treated--as the organizing principle of cooperative social relation is a critical factor underlying the attainment of autonomy (Edward, 1981; Piaget, 1932/1965).

Comparing the marble games of girls and boys Piaget found the gradual diminution of rule mysticism in both genders. The girls were less concerned with legal elaborations -- "a rule is good as long as the game repays it." "Little girls are extremely tolerant and it never occurs to them to introduce a "distinguo" (perceiving difference) and to codify the possible cases or even the very conditions of agreement" (p. 83). He thought this loosely-knit character of the game demonstrated the girls' actual mentality and he concluded that the girls were far less developed in their legal sense than the boys (Piaget, 1932/1965).

Since 1958, Piaget's scheme has been extended and elaborated by Kohlberg and his colleagues from a two-stage to a six-stage model, providing a more complete description of qualitative change in moral reasoning from childhood into adulthood. Hence, the cognitive-developmental perspective became a predominant approach in this study today (Berk, 1989; Edward, 1981).

Kohlberg confessed that his theory was rooted in the Hegelian philosophy of stages, the Darwinian concept of evolution and the ideas of some philosopher-psychologists, such as J. M. Baldwin, J. Dewey, and M. Mead who defined moral stages resulting from social interaction between a structured child and a structured social world as elaborated

by Piaget (Kohlberg, 1981, 1986). They believed that increasing cognitive maturity and social experience gradually leads children to gain a better understanding of social rules and regulates moral responsibility. This understanding evolves from a simple concrete one to a more abstract, comprehensive one.

Cognitive developmental perspectives emphasized that continual structural change resulted in qualitatively different stages which are characterized as structurally whole, invariant sequences, and that this development is a universal occurrence of development. Kohlberg asserted that his six-stage moral development model constituted a true stage system satisfying the requirements of the aforementioned characteristics (Kohlberg, 1969, 1984).

Kohlberg identified six moral stages by asking subjects to respond to hypothetical moral dilemmas in terms of three criteria: (a) what is right; (b) the reason for upholding the right; and (c) the social perspective behind each stage (1976, p. 33). His concise labels of the six stages are listed as follows:

Stage 1: Punishment and obedience

Stage 2: Instrumental exchange

Stage 3: Interpersonal conformity

Stage 4: Social system and conscience maintenance

Stage 5: Prior rights and social contract

Stage 6: Universal ethical principles

They are grouped into three major developmental levels from the meaning of social perspective.

The first is the preconventional level which includes the first two stages. It indicates that children are not able to really understand and uphold societal rules and expectations and are only concerned about their own interests and those of other individuals they care about. The second is the conventional level, including stages 3 and 4, and refers to a person who identifies with or has internalized rules and expectations of others. He or she is concerned about social approval and the welfare of others and society. The last is the postconventional level, which includes stages 5 and 6. It refers to an individual who has made moral commitments or holds the standards on which a good or just society must be based. In other words, an individual defines his or her moral values in terms of self-chosen principles (Kohlberg, 1976). Consequently, he stressed that any rational moral individual at this level would agree those principles can be universal. The advanced explanation of this level, extracted from his 1976 work (p. 35), is cited and paralleled with stage 4 as follows:

Level II, Stage 4: Social System and Conscience

1. What is right: Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in

extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.

2. Reasons for doing: To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system "if everyone did it," or the imperative of conscience to meet one's defined obligations. (Easily confused with Stage 3 belief in rules and authority; see text.)

3. Social perspective of state: Differentiates societal point of view from interpersonal agreement or motives. Takes the point of view of the system that defines roles and rules. Considers individual relations in terms of place in the system.

Level III, Stage 5: Social Contract or Utility and Individual Right

1. What is right: Being aware that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to your group. These relative rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some nonrelative values and rights like life and liberty, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion.

2. Reasons for doing right: A sense of obligation to law because of one's social contract to make and abide by laws for the welfare of all and for the protection of all

people's rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely entered upon, to family, friendship, trust, and work obligations. Concern that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility, "the greatest good for the greatest number."

3. Social perspective of state: Prior-to-society perspective. Perspective of a rational individual aware of values and rights prior to social attachments and contracts. Integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement, contract, objective impartiality, and due process. Considers moral and legal points of view; recognizes that they sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to integrate them.

Level III, Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principles

1. What is right: Following self-chosen ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice; the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.

2. Reasons for doing right: The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles, and a sense of personal commitment to them.

3. Social perspective of state: Perspective of a moral point of view from which social arrangements derive. Perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that persons are ends in themselves and must be treated as such.

Kohlberg's theory caused a great deal of argument as well as appreciation in the circle of psychology and education. Most importantly he claimed that the legitimacy of the six-stage model crosses gender and cultures, and highly moral individuals in different cultures follow the same ethical principle of justice to define their moral reasoning. Because his theory was initiated on the basis of the 20-year longitudinal interviews with 84 American male subjects (Colby & Kohlberg, 1983; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969), great controversies were aroused.

Recently, being in the target of much criticism and longitudinal cross-cultural studies, Kohlberg substantially modified his claims. Modifications include the attenuation of the 6th stage, weakening the claim of cross-cultural universality, adult development beyond post-conventional morality, and of his theory of the extension of the interpretation of justice, and of differentiation of the moral structure and content in his scoring system (Kohlberg, 1983/1984). However, the debates concerning issues of gender and culture have never been resolved.

The most prominent criticism has been presented by Gilligan (1977, 1981, 1982, 1988) and her colleagues. Gilligan pointed out that Kohlberg's system was inherited from traditional philosophy and psychology, basically focused on logical thinking, and emphasized the gradual detachment from relationships which is a necessary symptom of maturity. She indicated that this was the defect and bias of our culture due to the elimination of the women's experiences and concerns through history.

Furthermore, she found that Kohlberg's standard in the six-stage model and the orientation of justice orientation downscored the moral development of the women who are compassionate and sensitive to the needs of others. She suggested that pure male thinking and experiences could not be accepted as universal truths. For this reason she interviewed women and sought to recognize their concerns. Consequently, she asserted that meeting one's obligations and responsibilities to others, and being concerned about bringing no harm to others, etc., overrides the ideal of equality and justice as a major theme of women's moral concern (1977, 1982b). She labeled it as "the morality of care and responsibility" (Gilligan, 1977, p. 509). Briefly, women have a different moral orientation from men especially in the higher stage of moral development.

In addition, she found that the difference in moral orientation resulted from a fundamental difference in the understanding of relationships between self and others; women have a greater sense of connection and concern with relationships than with rules, justice, and equality (1982a, 1982b). Gilligan, Langdale, Lyons and Murphy (1982) tested the hypothesis and supported it, concluding that morality as justice and a conception of self as separate are predominantly male whereas morality as caring and a conception of self as connected are predominantly female. Those who are justice-oriented tend to have a separated-self definition, whereas those who are care-oriented tend to be a connected-self. Similar conclusions were also shown in the studies of Lyons (1983/1988), Johnston (1988), Gilligan and Attanucci (1988), Gilligan (1986/1988).

According to Gilligan's explanation, the connected-self individual sees "a world comprised of relationships rather than of people standing alone, a world that coheres through human connection rather than through systems of rules" (Gilligan, 1982a, p. 205). So, problem resolution relies on a process of communication and an awareness of care and responsibility. Accordingly, a solution to moral conflicts in real life always involves relationships and contextual relativisms. In contrast, the separated-self individuals "reason things out in a logical way, concern themselves

rather than relationships, free themselves from dependence on authority, allow them to find solutions of moral dilemma impersonally through systems of laws and logic" (Gilligan, 1982a, p. 203). For this reason, Gilligan concluded that Kohlberg's moral philosophy fails to hear women's concerns and detect women's logic in their responses. Especially, she asserted that Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemma induced less contextual concern and more abstract formal reasoning than real-life dilemma does. This is in favor of assessing men's moral development.

Kohlberg accepted part of Gilligan's perspective on morality as care and responsibility and admitted that this concept expanded and supplemented the original interpretation of morality of justice (Kohlberg, 1986, 1983a/1984). However, he attributed women's inferiority in moral development to the lack of opportunity of exposure to the moral-conflicts experienced in secondary institutions (Friedman, 1985; Kohlberg, 1969, 1976, 1983a/1984). Walker (1984) found that moral development in adults, which was higher in males than in females, was confounded with educational and occupational level.

Additionally, Kohlberg (1983a/1984) contended that the gender preference in moral orientation resulted from real-life moral dilemmas of women that often involved specific personal relationship requiring response and

caring. He also pointed out the weaknesses of Gilligan's moral stage construction and methodology (Kohlberg 1983b/1984).

Subsequentially, Walker and his colleagues conducted a series of studies using a quantitative approach to examine these arguments. The results consistently supported Kohlberg's situational determination and gender equality in moral concept and its assessment (Walker, 1986, 1989; Walker, deVries & Trerethan, 1987).

However, recently Mennuti and Creamer (1991) reached a different conclusion from interviews with community college presidents in their personal and professional moral dilemmas. In addition to gender differences in moral orientation, they proposed a tri-orientation model of morality, that self-concern tends to align with one or both of the justice and care orientations. The arguments seemed more complicated but may be closer to the truth.

Gilligan, Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger and Tarule (1986) found that women's ways of knowing were significantly different from that of men as described in Perry's scheme. Josselson (1987) found that intimacy was a prerequisite to identity formation among women. This statement is different from Erikson's stage theory of men in which identity formation is always supposed to occur before intimacy. It seems that women's studies promoting a

psychological modification and integration may not be too far off.

Moral development of women is merely one case subjected to cultural influence to some extent, as Simpson (1974) has said. From a broad review of cross-cultural studies in Kohlberg's conceptual system, Snarey (1985, 1987) concluded that some specific notions or principles of moral maturity in other cultures have never been included into Kohlberg's descriptions of higher stage moral reasoning, which were primarily based on Kant and other western philosophers. Perceiving the disadvantages of Kohlberg's model in higher stages, Ma (1988b) also proposed a revised Chinese form of moral development in stages 4, 5, and 6 as a supplement.

The aforementioned description of gender issues, cross-cultural issues, and situation factors all cover the moral orientation of higher stages of moral development. The need for advanced study is unquestionable.

Statement of the Problem

Since Gilligan proposed two orientations for a moral reasoning model (i.e., that women preferred a morality of care and responsibility whereas men preferred a morality of justice), Kohlberg still insisted that his single model was correct. He believed that justice is a primary virtue with all other virtues subordinated to it. He contended that the ethic of care was only able to resolve personal dilemmas and

not moral dilemmas independently. Additionally, Kohlberg stated that there may be a variety of moral orientations rather than the two orientations in Gilligan's model (Kohlberg 1983a/84).

Mennuti and Creamer's (1991) tri-orientation model found another dimension of morality--the concern of self. Both self-concern and care-concern have never functioned independently. They were often aligned with justice-concern separately or in combination of resolving real-life moral dilemmas.

What is the Chinese orientation model of moral reasoning? Except the model previous mentioned, will yet another new model emerge, or the previous model?

Gilligan and her colleagues, and Mennuti and Creamer, addressed the gender differences of moral reasoning in real-life moral dilemmas. Gilligan, et al. (1977,1982b) believed that Kohlberg's apparent gender bias could be attributed partially to his hypothetical dilemma situations that inhibited women's responses. Conversely, Kohlberg (1983/84) and Walker, et al. (1986, 1987, 1989) contended that there were no real gender differences in the moral reasoning stage and in moral judgment orientation. They also attributed Gilligan's biased speculation to the moral situational arousal, i.e., the real-life situation which elicited the dilemma content that decided the moral

orientation used. Hence, the moral dilemma was an important element to influence a person's orientation in moral reasoning.

Broad cross-cultural studies in Kohlberg's system revealed that the cross-cultural variability was key in the terminating of moral development, especially in folk societies where higher moral stages appeared less frequently (Snarey, 1985, 1987). Walker (1986) and Kohlberg (1979/1981) considered this to be a function of societal complexity and social experience. However, Snarey (1985) highlighted the possibility that the stage definitions and scoring manual may have been incomplete. Edwards (1981) and Berk (1989), suggested that a study should be conducted of the development of moral reasoning in societies that were just as complex as western industrialized nations, but guided by very different political, economic, and historical ideologies. China was suggested as the highest priority for study.

Educational level, occupational level, and relevant social-moral experiences were suggested as the dominant factors leading to moral maturity (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Kohlberg, 1976; Friedman, 1985; Walker, 1984, 1986; Walker, deVries & Trevethan, 1987). Furthermore, both Kohlberg's and Gilligan's theories have been studied and practiced primarily in educational settings. Additionally, the

presidents or deans of students in higher educational institutions, who are usually regarded as morally mature people in a society (especially in Chinese society), frequently are faced with professional and personal dilemmas that require a high level of moral competence. Accordingly, if we hope to enhance the comprehensive understanding of higher moral reasoning level in middle adulthood and its relevant phenomena, such as gender issues, moral dilemma situations, cultural issues and moral orientation models, the selection of this group of subjects was particularly appropriate.

Purpose of the Study

Kohlberg, Gilligan, and Mennuti differed in their explanation of a moral reasoning model in higher moral development levels. This study examined the moral orientations among men and women higher education leaders in Taiwan and how these moral orientations related to the content of moral dilemma. The main purpose of the study was to describe similarities and differences in orientations to moral reasoning in different moral situations among men and women in Taiwan and to conduct a post hoc comparison of the findings of Mennuti, Kohlberg, and Gilligan. In addition, with cross-cultural experiences, this study was expected to expand or elaborate the moral orientation models set by antecedent theorists.

Research Questions

The purpose of study was achieved by answering the following research questions:

1. What similarities and differences exist in orientations to moral reasoning and in the content of personal and professional moral dilemmas among men and women in Taiwan?
2. How do orientations to moral reasoning and the content of moral dilemmas among men and women in Taiwan compare with similar findings by Mennuti, Kohlberg, and Gilligan among men and women in the United States.

Definition of Terms

The professional terms and common terms used specifically for the purpose of this study are defined below:

Moral orientation. A conceptual framework that individuals may use to define moral content while they face or think about moral conflicts or moral problems.

Care orientation. The perspectives people take to consider their responsibilities toward the benefits or welfare of others in the process of solving moral conflicts or thinking about moral problems.

Justice orientation. The perspective people take in considering rules, rights, respect, justice, equality, and reciprocity, etc., in order to decide what one ought to do

in the process of solving moral conflicts or thinking about moral problems.

Self-orientation. A consideration of the primacy of self-value or self-respect in the higher stages of moral judgment.

Moral dilemma. A conflict situation that involves moral difficulty in making a choice between two or more equal alternatives; usually a decision has to be made in the conflict, but the competing result is difficult to anticipate or to compare (Harding, 1985).

Hypothetical moral dilemma. This refers to the moral dilemma constructed by the researcher or previous scholars. In this study, it refers to Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) standard narrative situation, used to elicit moral reasoning.

Real-life personal moral dilemma. The conflict situation that an individual spontaneously identifies as a moral dilemma arising from his or her personal life.

Real-life professional moral dilemma. The conflict situation that an individual spontaneously identifies as a moral dilemma arising from his or her role as a professional.

Personal moral conflict vs impersonal moral conflict. The former indicates a moral conflict situation involving a specific person or group of people with whom the subject has

a significant relationship; the latter is interpreted as one involving a person or group of people whom the subject does not know well (Walker, 1989).

Semi-structural interview. An interview, in which processes are guided by a series of questions that embed certain hypothesis. All questions remain open-ended and enhance the discovery of the informant's viewpoints and choices.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Two Perspectives of Morality

Morality is one of the central concerns in philosophical history. A great many scholars have discussed this topic with various perspectives and interpretations. Kohlberg (1976) grouped and divided morality according to its different references into four primary categories, so-called "moral orientations." They are:

1. Normative order: Identifying morality with the concept of following the rules and normative roles impartially;
2. Utility consequences: Considering the consequences of an action on the welfare of others and/or self;
3. Ideal self: Referring to the positive self-image of the actor or perfectionistic seeking of harmony or integrity of the self;
4. Justice or fairness: Orientation to liberty, equality, reciprocity and contracts between persons.

Kohlberg indicated that individuals may use one or all of these moral orientations, but a justice structure is the most essential one. In one sense, justice can refer to all four orientations. Sustaining law and order may be seen as justice and maximizing the welfare of the group may be seen

as justice because the core of justice is the distribution of rights and duties regulated by concepts of equality and reciprocity (Kohlberg, 1976). Basically Kohlberg (1970/1981) adopted the Socratic and Platonic claim that "virtue is not many, but one, and its name is justice" (p. 39). He asserted that justice is not a set of rules but a moral principle that is universal. He defined the moral orientation of justice as follows:

A moral obligation is an obligation to respect the rights or claims of another person. A moral principle is a principle for resolving competing claims. . . There is only one principled basis for resolving claims: justice or equality. (Kohlberg, 1970/1981, p. 39)

So he defined his moral developmental theory as a "justice reasoning theory," which centers on impartiality and universality (Kohlberg, 1978/1981; 1983/1984). In his theory, moral structure progresses in developmental stages as a universal occurrence (1969/1984).

According to the evidence of comprehensive cross-cultural studies, however, the lower stages, especially those from 1 to 3 or 3/4 were apparently universal, but the higher stages appeared less frequently and were scarcely even seen in some cultural groups (Edward, 1981; Gibbs, 1991; Snarey, 1985; Tietgen & Walk, 1985). In addition, concerning stage 4 Chinese perceptions might differ from that of English subjects (Hau & Lew, 1989; Ma, 1988a). The more reliable and pervasive explanations are:

(a) that the first three stages are determined by cognitive-developmental changes and are more pervasive cross-culturally, but that the higher stages are internalized through inductive discipline which are dependent upon individual societies and are far from universal (Edward, 1981; Gibbs, 1991; Snarey, 1985), and (b) that the definition of the higher moral stages and the interpretation of moral orientation in the scoring manual may inadequately represent true moral reasoning in principled or post-conventional levels cross-culturally (Snarey, 1985, 1987; Snarey & Keljo, 1991). Accordingly, Kohlberg's single moral orientation of justice in moral reasoning seems inadequate to account for varied moral concerns in various cultures or societies.

In the study of women, Gilligan (1977, 1982b) proposed a moral orientation of care and responsibility, which is a significant but neglected moral dimension in psychological theory. In this conception of morality, as Gilligan (1982b) described:

the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities rather than from competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract. This conception of morality as concerned with the activity of care centers moral development around the understanding of responsibility and relationship, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties moral development to the understanding of rights and rules. (p. 19)

It can be inferred that people who possess the ethic of care and responsibility often want to offer help and to promote a better life for people. They are sensitized to or care for the needs of other, do no harm, and give more consideration to contextual relationships in moral judgement.

Responding to the challenge from Gilligan, Kohlberg, Levine and Hewer (1983a/1984) replied that Kohlberg's definitions of morality as justice derived from the tradition of Socrates and Plato. Aristotle deemed justice as the primary and general moral virtue and as the only "other regarding" virtue. It included two forms-- distributive justice and commutative justice. The former focuses on a distribution of honors and goods among peoples equally or in proportion to their merit. Commutative justice implies proportionality in private transactions. So, his ideas of justice implied the notion of benevolence, a concern for maximizing the public good in political society as well as a concern for reciprocity and equity of distribution in private life. Kohlberg argued that both conceptions were covered in his theory.

But, Kohlberg admitted that the principle of altruism called charity, love, caring, and brotherhood which is emphasized by christian ethical teaching has not been fully represented in his theory and that his coding system should

have taken it into account. He considered that the ethic of care has usefully enlarged the moral domain and is seen as a supplement to justice solutions to the problems posed, because he attempted to assimilate the ethic of care into justice by claiming that benevolence (altruism) as a principle is a part of justice (Kohlberg, 1983a/1984). He explained:

judgements of justice presuppose 'caring' and 'sympathy'; only if the individual sympathizes with the good of others can the justice problem of how the good should be distributed become a problem for moral reasoning. Stated in different terms, justice (at the higher stages) centers on equal respect for human persons, treating others as ends not merely as means. (Kohlberg, 1986, p. 305)

He even insisted that the morality of care and the morality of justice "do not represent two different moral orientations existing at the same level of generality and validity" (Kohlberg, Levin & Hower, 1983a/1984, p. 232). Moreover, he suspected that Gilligan's ethic of care, which does not include the notion of impartiality and righteousness, cannot be an independent orientation adaptable to resolving justice problems.

In Kohlberg's opinion, Gilligan's consideration of care and responsibility often involved special relationships which he believed could be handled by a universalistic justice (Kohlberg, 1983a/1984). The question is whether justice can provide an acceptable view of caring and benevolence (altruism). In Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma, he

stated, "Heinz's care for his wife deepened his sense of obligation to respect her right to life" (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 229). Kohlberg suggested that Heinz should steal the drug from the druggist not only because of their special relationship but because of the obligation of justice. He believed that this sense of justice should be generalized to the stranger who has a right to life, so, the individual who is in the principled moral stage must steal the drug for the stranger. However, in this case, what is generalized (universalized) is possibly not justice, but benevolence, because it is not plausible to hold that justice or the right to life imposes a duty on anyone to steal the drug for a stranger. Properly speaking, it seems not a high level of justice reasoning but a broadening of the ethic of care to include strangers as well as intimates. It is likely that the ethic of care can be universalized more than ethic of justice.

Caring for others often exhibits a much more supportive response than would be expected from those who do only what justice requires of them such as duty or obligation. In common experience, when a relationship is involved with love and friendship, attention to rights, duties and obligations often creates tension in the relationship (Pritchard, 1991).

From Gilligan's (1981) perspective, an ideal human relationship is beyond good and bad or right and wrong when

people relate to one another as a human beings as an end in itself. She asserted that, "When one is beyond good and evil, you talk about human beings vis-a-vis other human beings rather than talking about right or wrong. . . . You have to judge that person's acts in the context of everybody else's acts" (p. 151). Accordingly, dilemmas might not exist or arise because the moral dilemma itself arises from a failure of response and caring as she asserted. So, she named her framework "contextual relativism" (Gilligan, 1980).

Otherwise, Pritchard (1991) indicated that Kohlberg's claim that benevolence as a principle is a part of justice is confusing. If that claim is true, it seems that morality and justice are simply being equated, thus reducing all universal moral principles to principles of justice. Pritchard (1991) points out that it "is a reversal of the classical utilitarian view that justice is but a part of utility" (p. 139). However, according to Kohlberg, Levine, and Hower's (1983a/1986) definition of the justice principle, doing no harm to others is the common ground between the perspectives of Kohlberg and Gilligan. But, this does not mean that the basis of those perspectives is identical. Though they stressed that care considerations and justice considerations are combined in the process of resolving moral dilemmas in a higher stage of moral

reasoning (Kohlberg, Levine & Hewer, 1983a, 1983b/1984), many take on responsibilities exceeding the ordinary requirements of obligation. What a person should do and what he or she actually would do are not always the same and there is not necessarily a moral imperative for anyone to do any benevolence because he or she "should". Both the orientation of care and the orientation of justice have their own moral domain and either may predominate in the resolution of moral dilemma.

Nunner-Winkler (1984) analyzed two perspectives of morality in terms of Kant's concept of perfect duties and imperfect duties. He indicated that the ethic of care and responsibility addressed by Gilligan is primarily oriented to imperfect duties, while the ethic of right and justice stressed by Kohlberg is primarily oriented to perfect duty, in which absolute rights are valid at all times and places and for all persons, and allow for no exception where imperfect duty does not. For this reason, perfect duties enjoy absolute priority over imperfect duties, while imperfect duties require situation specific knowledge which must assess who, when, and where to act. Thus, Gilligan's claim that the ethic of care is oriented to situational particularities which the ethic of rights will neglect is plausibly valid.

Nunner-Winkler (1984) pointed out that the justifiability of exceptions to rules is widely accepted in modern discussion. Rules are valid only under normal circumstances. However, if exceptions are allowed, concrete circumstances have to be taken into account in solving moral conflicts--be they hypothetical or actual conflicts.

From empirical study, Walker (1986, 1989) tried to fit the moral elements of normative order and of justice or fairness into Kohlberg's morality of justice and adapt moral elements of the ideal self and utility consequences to Gilligan's morality of care. The results show that this demarcation is not completely distinct. Age trends may relate to orientation. The normative order and utilitarianism, common in childhood, decreases with age, whereas fairness and perfectionism increases with age. From this point of view, Kohlberg's claim that moral orientation is not necessarily limited to working out final resolutions is understandable (Kohlberg, 1983a/1984).

Moral Orientation From Culture Perspectives

Kohlberg's single moral orientation of justice was criticized as being inherited from Western culture, a combination of predominant philosophy and Christian thought, that may not generalize to the moral development of women and people from other cultures (Dien, 1982; Edward, 1981;

Friedman, 1985; Simpson, 1974; Snarey, 1985, 1987; Snarey & Keljo, 1991).

In The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World (Adler & Gorman, 1952), the author wrote one chapter for justice specifically, but only dedicated a minimal portion to the concept of charity or benevolence under the chapter titled "love" (in the broad sense). Additionally, discussions or disputes about justice, as universal in scope and fundamental in character, recur again and again in the great books. In Western culture it is apparent that the conception of justice is more predominant than the conception of charity.

A. Moral Orientation From Western Culture

Philosophical tradition. The conception of justice, at the beginning, was extremely comprehensive. It implied rights and the keeping of valid covenants. It was often rooted in government, constitution, and law-abiding conduct in one sense. In the "Republic," justice is the organizing principle of Plato's ideal state. Aristotle described man, "when separated from law and justice," as the worst animal. According to his definition "justice is the lawful and the fair" whereas law is aiming at "the common advantage" (Alder & Gorman, 1952, p. 851, 853).

In another sense, justice is relevant to equal distribution in economic life. The principle of natural

justice, seemed to be an integral part of natural law, while justice is referred to as a moral virtue, it is defined as a fitting disposition or harmonious order in the soul and in the state. Justice implies the notion of duty or obligation, not injuring others, and rendering to every man his own. Fairness has to do with equality, according to Adler and Gorman's (1952) interpretation derived from Aristotle's thought.

Aquinas' thought (in the 13th century) tended to emphasize the ethic of caring and charity. He thought justice is necessary but insufficient precisely because it is a matter of duty and debt. He believed that charity instead of justice causes peace. He stressed that the bonds of love (charity) and friendship unite men where justice merely governs their interaction (Adler & Gorman, 1952).

The comparison or choice between the consideration of justice and right and the consideration of caring or charity is also found in other examples as well as in other philosophers' thinking. People questioned Aquinas about the function of charity after justice has been met. He answered by the citation of Augustine's verse "Love make all hard and repulsive tasks easy and next to nothing" (Aquinas, 1952, p. 373).

Euthyphro wanted to charge his father with murder in the court in order to fulfill the principle of justice, but

Socrates doubted the appropriateness of his action to a love relationship (Plato, 1952).

Even Aristotle indicated that when love is founded on virtue (charity, friendship, etc.), it goes further than justice. He said, "When men are friends, they have no need of justice" (Aristotle, 1952, p. 406).

Kant (1788/1961) followed the track of Greek philosophy to assume that there was a priori intuition of rational conscience inborn in all human beings. Only founded in this pure reason, morality can claim objectivity and universality. Furthermore, he claimed that moral law comes to man as a categorical imperative, which is experienced as an unconditioned duty, as an inner compulsion provided by pure reason. The duty (obligation) is "to extend the maxim of self-love to the happiness of others." At the heart of this notion is treating each person as an end, not as a means.

This categorical duty (obligation) was divided into two: the duty of virtue and the duty of justice. The latter is externally compelled by moral possibility whereas the former rests on free self-constraint, or the power to become master of one's inclinations. So, Kant explained that the fulfillment of the duty of virtue is meritorious whereas the conformity of actions to the duty of justice is not meritorious because it is a matter of debt (Kant, 1952).

So, Kant's moral standard is broadly defined.

In contrast, the philosophers of British "empiricist" utilitarianism had a totally different perspective on morality. They suggested that moral value is judged by the consequences of an action to others or to the self. Actions by the self or by others whose consequences to the self are harmful (painful) are naturally deemed bad and arouse anger or punitive tendencies, and actions whose consequences are beneficial (pleasant) are naturally deemed good and arouse affection or approving tendencies. They believed that because of human natural tendencies of empathy, social approval and generalization, acts are judged good (or bad) if their consequences to others are good (or bad), even if they do not help (or injure) the self. So their conclusion is that acting right is to do the greatest good for the greatest number (Kohlberg, 1986). Hence, justice and caring are both included in their definition of morality.

From this point, although Western philosophers are concerned with the principle of justice, few make a strict and narrow definition. Justice is defined as fairness, narrowing its connotation. Even when a moral dilemma is met, in real life, the final decision may be dominated by the principle of caring or charity. The moral orientation of caring and charity may be more advanced than the moral

orientation of justice and right in consideration of the human situation.

Christian tradition originates from the Scripture. Justice or righteousness and benevolence or charity are central concerns of biblical ethics. Based on the Scripture, a human being as a creation of God, endowed with free will, is an equal and independent individual. Justice is the principle that God rules over the secular world. The Old Testament showed the most important principle of justice was in the Ten Commandments and Moses' law. Death is the final punishment. "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth" (Exodus, 21:23-25, p. 81) is the principle used to establish the law that can prevent someone from doing injustice to others. The same principle was shown in Leviticus and Genesis, in how God punished the people who disobeyed or did unrighteousness.

However, the mighty God also demonstrated forgiveness and pleasure to whoever turned away from sin (Ezekiel, 18:21-23). Concerning the contradictions between the laws of justice and mercy, the Old Testament's teaching is caring and merciful predominantly.

"Do not say 'I'll pay you back for this wrong!' Wait for the Lord, and he will deliver you" (Proverb, 20:22).

"If your enemy is hungry, give him food to eat; if he is thirsty, give him water to drink" (Proverb, 25:21).

"Do not seek revenge or bear a grudge against one of your people, but love your neighbor as yourself" (Leviticus, 19:18).

God said to the prophet Zechariah: "Administer true justice; show mercy and compassion to one another" (Zechariah, 7:9). And to Micah he said, "To act justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with your God" (Micah, 6:8). Accordingly, it is seen that the moral principle of justice was not all that was required of man. Justice and caring (mercy) were parallel but different from each other. So we can conclude that, in biblical ethics, justice does not encompass benevolence, remain distinct. Furthermore, it implied that doing right should be the first step or fundamental step. Justice is a necessary but insufficient condition to fulfill God's expectation of his followers. Charity is important in dealing with the human situation. Judgement upon human justice belongs to God. In Abraham's story, Abraham chose to sacrifice his only son Isaac in order to fulfill his original promise to God. God's mercy resolves the conflict of Abraham between his duty to God (justice) and his love for his son (benevolence) (Genesis, 22:1-14).

The New Testament inherited the perspective of the Old Testament but weighted more on the principle of benevolence than on the principle of justice. Jesus taught:

For I tell you that unless your righteousness surpasses that of the Pharisees and the teachers of the law, you

will certainly not enter the kingdom of heaven.
(Matthew, 5:20)

This suggests that even the most "just" person is not acceptable to God without compassion and mercy. The God of the New Testament appreciates the merciful person. He taught: "Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, that you may be sons of your father in heaven" (Matthew, 5:38-48). The New Testament describes God's love as borderless and endless to people who are righteous as well as unrighteous, so we are expected to follow God's example. Similar ideas were repeated in Romans (12:17-21), I Peter (3:8-18), and Luke (6:27-37). Especially in Luke (6:27-31) Jesus revealed, "If someone strikes you on one cheek, turn to him the other . . . Do to others as you would have them do to you." The first sentence advocates mercy and forgiveness, but the latter encompasses the notion of reciprocity to the peak.

The greatest apostle, Paul, manifested Jesus' spirit by emphasis of love ("Agape" in Greek, indicating "love of charity"). He regarded love as the primary principle to bind all other virtues together into a perfect unity (Colossians, 3:12-14). He stated: "If I have a faith that can move mountains, but have not love, I am nothing" (I Corinthians, 13:2). He emphasized "the entire law is summed up in a single command: 'Love your neighbor as yourself'" (Galatians, 5:14, 15).

However, this perfect love, supernatural virtue of charity, should be bound up with loving God with the whole heart and soul and mind, and one's neighbors as oneself according to the interpretation of Augustine (Adler & Gorman, 1952).

From the aforementioned description, the consideration of caring, compassion, charity, or benevolence is continuous in both Western philosophy and Christian tradition, though it is deemed less fundamental and comprehensive than the consideration of right and justice in social life. According to Haste and Baddeley's (1991) assumption Western culture may be more pluralistic in its repertoires and available schemas for moral discourse. It offers more than the model of justice.

In modern philosophy and psychology. Piaget (1932/1965) studied moral reasoning of children in terms of a cognitive approach. He considered that justice referred to respecting law and rule, and do reciprocity and equality rather than to other emotional components. Following Kant's ideas he regarded the sense of justice as innate in human beings as well as in social relationships. To children, justice is identical to formulating rules. He believed the development of the sense of justice required nothing more than "mutual respect and solidarity among children" (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 199).

Rawls (1963, 1971) presented a theory of justice as fairness, advocating his idea of natural rights of the contractarian tradition. He regarded justice as the first virtue of a social institution. The principle of justice he set forth was that which free and rational persons would accept in an initial position of equality. In this hypothetical situation, no one knows his social identity and personal characteristic. Thus deliberating behind a veil of ignorance, men determine their rights and duties. Inherent in Kant's concept was a sense that justice is "no mere moral conception formed by the understanding alone, but a true sentiment of the heart enlightened by reason" (1963, p. 281).

However, when Rawls' theory was adopted and Piaget's theory was expanded and elaborated by Kohlberg to become a comprehensive moral developmental theory, that included universal claims and normative components (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Kohlberg, Levine & Hower, 1983/1984), the restricted definition of morality in terms of reasoning about justice became questionable. Peter (1971/1981) expressed his concern regarding moral theory as follows;

Much of moral philosophy in the past has been unconvincing because it has not dwelt sufficiently on the different views that can be taken about what is morally important. (p. 83)

It may well be that some generalizations have been established about certain aspects of moral development; but these may be peculiar to the limited range of

phenomena studied. It would be unfortunate if these generalizations were erected into a general theory of moral development without account being taken of the difference exhibited by the phenomena that have not been studied. (pp. 83-84)

He believed that the rational passions--virtue, habits, and affection (particularly caring)--are essential components to moral development (Peter, 1971/1981). Murdock (1970) also proclaimed: "We need a moral philosophy in which the concept of love, so rarely mentioned now . . . can once again be made central" (p. 46).

Blum (1980) and Hinman (1985) also assumed that the altruistic emotions--sympathy, compassion, and human concern--played an important and necessary role in moral development and moral education. Gilligan's concern for the morality of caring and responsibility represented this new trend which influenced the modification of moral theory and the expansion of moral domain. Kohlberg extended his interpretation of justice and adopted a broad view in his revised scoring manual (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) is one of the symptoms of this modification.

B. Moral Orientation From Other Cultures

At the level of the individual, morality is mainly regarded as an internalization process by which a set of culturally defined goals and rules are imposed as habits. However, the social norms and rules vary from culture to

culture. So the cultural framework will underlie different sensitivities and interpretations of elements in a given situation (Haste & Baddeley, 1991; Simpson, 1974). Simpson pointed out:

An adequate explanation of the concept of morality throughout humanity implies the examination of its meaning in the non-Western world as well. (p. 84)

Chinese cultural perspective. Morality, deemed as an absolute and universal principle, is prevalent both in Western and Chinese traditions. But in the West, this belief is based on the freedom and rationality that is considered to be innate in human nature (Kant, 1788/1961). They believe that man is an autonomous being, free to make choices and to determine destiny. As a moral agent, he or she has to take responsibility for his or her actions. In this cultural context we admire indomitable individuals who fulfill their human potentials by exercising their responsibility for making decisions according to their beliefs and principles (Dien, 1982).

In contrast, in Asia, specifically in China, Confucian thought has permeated the lives of the people over a long period of history. Morality is considered to depend on the innate mutual affection of mankind. For instance, Mancius said:

It is a feeling common to all mankind that they cannot bear to see a child about to fall into a well. Without exception they will immediately experience a feeling of alarm and distress. . . We may perceive that the feelings of commiseration is essential to man. . . The feeling of commiseration is the principle of benevolence. (Four Books, pp. 548-550)

The Confucians believe that there is a "common principle of order running through heaven, earth, and human society" (Munro, 1969, p. 39). Man is regarded as an integral part of an orderly universe and had better experience the natural law and act accordingly. Maintaining a harmonious social order and interpersonal relationship have been highly valued and operated in a hierarchical social life. Personal rights and values are often sacrificed due to the welfare of the majority of the group (Bond & Hwang, 1986; Dien, 1981; King, 1985; Ma, 1988/1983; Yang, 1986). This collectivistic orientation or holistic perception is totally different from Western individualistic orientation or analytic perception.

In addition, Chinese collectivistic social structure is based on an extended family network and five virtue principles--Jen (humanity or benevolence), Yi (justice or righteousness), Li (propriety), Chi (knowledge), Shing (fidelity), each taking charge in five specific ethical duties between sovereign and minister, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder brother and younger, and those belonging to friends (Four Books, pp.

384-385, 549-550).

According to Confucius, the Jen is the primary and fundamental moral principle rather than others. He viewed it as perfect virtue with which man subdues personal desire and returns to propriety (Confucian Analects, p. 112). According to Confucius, filial piety, an innate affection toward parents, is the root of "Jen" (Confucian Analects, p. 61). He believed that simply by being a good son and friendly to his brothers, a man can exert an influence upon government (p. 66). Hence, the principle of "Jen" rooted in filial piety extended to family kinship to all mankind. "Jen" as a primary moral principle is a more affectionate orientation that is less concerned by Kohlberg's theory. Kohlberg's just principle is parallel to the Confucian "Yi," which refers to the fulfillment of socially agreed obligations and "the doing of what is right in seeing that others get their right" (Ma, 1988b).

Hsuncius, another comparable to Mencius confucianism emphasized "Yi" or fairness. He believed it is part of natural law and is the best standard for public affairs (Hsuncius, 1964). But in the mainstream of Confucian culture, "Yi" was deemed secondary to "Jen." "Jen" is the a priori standard for regarding a behavior of "Yi." If a behavior violates the requirements of "Jen" it is usually seen as unjust (Huang, 1991). "Jen" in its realization, is

a kind of hierarchial love, with which we treat people in accordance with their social hierarchial status, social role, and the extent of relationship to us. To treat people of special relationship with special care is regarded as appropriate. Appropriateness is another implication of "Yi." Conversely, the higher status an individual has the greater benefits or broader social resources he or she should share with other people (Hsiao King, 500 B.C.).

Additionally, conventional Chinese believed that Li (reason) and Fa (law) are insufficient to make a just judgment in a conflict situation. Exception to rules occur frequently and are widely accepted, so the Ching (humanness) variable should be properly weighed in consideration of a unique context or a given case (Dien, 1982). "Fa (law) and Li (reason) are but Jen Ching (humanness)" is a Chinese proverb. Conflicts and inconsistencies are usually solved by reconciliation in a less institutionalized form or of collective decision. Eventually, "big conflicts are reconciled into small ones and small ones into none" is the best strategy (Bond & Hwang, 1986; Dien, 1982; Ma, 1988; Yang, 1986).

Accordingly, Chinese moral maturity may well mean an ability to make judgments based upon an insight into the intricate system of cultural norms of reciprocity, various available resources, and the complex network of

relationships in a given situation" (Dien, 1982). Such a strong tendency to care about relationship and emotional variable is characteristic of Chinese culture. The issues of right or wrong seem not so important as a good (harmonious) relationship.

Filiality in Chinese culture is a highly salient concept. It is a "categorical imperative" as well as a responsibility of the younger generation to their elder generation. It is also a concrete accomplishment to submerge individualism into the familistic ethic to fulfill collectivistic social life (King, 1985). In Hsiao King (500 B.C.), a classic book on filiality, Confucius' teaching prescribed the principle of filial piety from the son of heaven through common people. The implication of filiality varied according to social rank. The filial piety of an officer was prescribed as distinctly different from that of the common citizenry. In addition, Confucius' teaching always extended to an individual's moral duties and social responsibilities. The filial conducts were trivially and complicatedly registered in Liki (450 B.C.), a classic book on propriety. It gave instructions on how to serve the elder generation from morning till the night, both in ordinary days and in special festivals and ceremonies, and differentiated the proper role behavior of each family

member, such as the son, the daughter-in-law, and the grandson.

According to Yang's (1987) analysis from the classic book of the Confucians, the central concept of filial piety at least included (a) paying the living expenses of aged parents and caring for their needs, (b) respecting parents and obeying parents' teaching, (c) honoring the parent through an individual's deeds and achievements, (d) continuing the lineage (surname), and (e) fulfilling parents' or forefathers' unaccomplished will. The connotation of traditional filiality even goes beyond these. The Chinese proverb "a loyal officer must be elected (selected) from whoever is filial" implies that an individual's moral conduct and career promotion can be determined from his filial performance. Chinese filiality has a different meaning from the rather loose ties in the West (Haste & Baddeley, 1991). This cultural influence penetrates even to the current Chinese-American (Yu & Harburg, 1981). They found that the least acculturated Chinese still experienced more discomfort than the other more acculturated Chinese group when they were unable to follow Chinese filial responsibilities.

Accordingly, the Chinese social system and primary moral principle are basically different from Kohlberg's just principle, based on Western philosophy. Hence, the use of

Kohlberg's system to interpret the moral reasoning of Chinese subjects may cause biases. So, Dien (1982) questioned the adequacy of Kohlberg's hypothetical moral dilemma "Father and Joe" for use in Chinese culture. She said:

Under the Confucian precept regarding filial piety, the son is expected to obey parental orders and to make sacrifices for the happiness of his parents. What choice does the child in the story have? (p. 337)

Lei (1983) interviewed Chinese subjects in Taiwan with this story. He soon found that the subject changed his judgement over the course of the three questions. He could not determine the moral stage of this subject due to this change. On the other hand, Kohlberg's stage model and scoring manual did not encompass the relevant criteria to characterize subjects' concern for filial piety and collective utility after stage 3. Responding to the disadvantage of Kohlberg's model in higher stages, Ma (1988) proposed a Chinese form of moral reasoning in stages 4, 5, and 6, which were elaborated being based on the Confucian concept of "Jen" (benevolence). His example of stage 5 exhibited a deep and profound affection and altruism toward others and of stage 6 manifested the necessity of natural harmony among different rights of different parties.

Other cultural perspectives and conclusions. Rest and Thomas (1985), reviewed 20 cross-cultural studies by using a

"Defining Issues Test." They found that similarities between cultures were much more striking than the differences between them. They suspected that differences, what other researchers called cultural differences, were more often owing to the researcher's underestimation of the problems of translation and cultural adaptation. However, a growing number of cases of genuine moral judgements were shown to be unscorable in Kohlberg's moral orientation system. Snarey (1985) reviewed 45 previous studies, 38 cross-sectional and 7 longitudinal, that had been carried out in 27 countries (70% of which were non-European). The results supported the invariant sequence proposition, because stage skipping and stage regression were found to be rare and could have contributed to measurement error. Similar conclusions have also been found in Ma (1988a) and Tietjen and Walker (1985).

However, some specific notions or principle of moral maturity in other cultures (other than Kohlberg's descriptions of higher stage moral reasoning) have never been included in Kohlberg's scoring system. They are, for example, the rights to life of non-human beings in Hinduism, the value of collective equality and happiness in communalist society such as in Kibbutzism, in Papua New Guinea, and filial piety in China.

Logan, Snarey, and Schrader (1990) found that subjects of similar ages from the U.S., Turkey, Taiwan, and the Bahamas showed a lower percentage of Type B (Autonomous) reasoning at all ages than the Israeli subjects. Additionally, subjects from complex communities in the U.S. and Israel used Type B reasoning more frequently than did subjects from village communities in other countries. The Bahamians demonstrated a complete absence of Type B reasoning. Taiwanese, who had some of the highest mean stage scores in previous studies, had one of the lowest percentages of Type B reasoning in this study. Therefore, socio-cultural or cross-cultural difference is a most reliable interpretation (The Israeli culture greatly emphasized Type B moral value, while Chinese culture is more authoritarian, encouraging Type A (heteronomous) moral reasoning).

Snarey and Keljo (1991) re-examined cross-cultural data collected from 9 countries, 54 population groups. They found Stage 4/5 or 5 was present to some degree in 100% of the modern or urban samples, both Western and other (Finland, India, Israel, Poland, Taiwan, and the U.S.). In contrast, no members of 3 traditional folk societies (rural Kenya, Papua New Guinea village, and Turkish village), including leaders, used stage 4/5 or 5 reasoning. This fact suggested the additional possibility that the theory itself

is incomplete to cover some important moral domains universally.

They illustrated some responses of interviewees that are absent in Kohlberg's moral definition and are assumed to be evaluated at a post-conventional level of moral reasoning. Some examples are as follows:

Excerpt 1 (Kibbutz female)

People are not born equal genetically and it is not fair that one who is stronger physically should reach his happiness by whatever means at the expense of one who is weaker because the right to happiness is a basic human right of everyone, equal to all. (p. 408)

Excerpt 2 (India--Hindu)

All of life, human or nonhuman, is divine, sacred, and a manifestation of the Supreme reality. . . . One makes choices between many forms of life, but the overall guiding or spiritual principle should be that all forms of life are of value. . . . Spiritual consciousness is for enlightenment. It should propel one towards recognizing the unity of all life rather than selecting victims that are powerless. (p. 410)

Excerpt 3 (New Guinea)--a religious leader response to Heinz dilemma:

If I were the judge, I would give him only a light punishment because he asked everybody for help but nobody helped him. (p. 412)
(This leader placed blame for the dilemma on the entire community.)

Excerpt 4 (Turkey) responses to Joe Dilemma:

He should not give the money to his father; but I would give it. How could I refuse him? (p. 415)

The authors also drew some ideas from working class people in the U.S. The interviewee bonds himself with a service-providing agency instead of a profit-making business

and reflects intimate friendships sharing everything together. The authors also exemplified a downscored response of a Kenyan's leaders to Joe's dilemma.

Snarey and Keljo found that the difficult-to-score material was not random, but rather reflected particular cultural concepts. They attributed these anomalous judgements to the characteristics of a communitarian or Gemeinschaft-like voice as described in Tonnies' theory.

Gemeinschaft vs. Gesellschaft

relationships are construed as "real," "organic," and as "ends" in themselves

has to do with "all intimate private and exclusive living together

associated with language, folkways, and mores

"will" by feeling

rooted in the whole of humankind; it is the old, lasting, and genuine form of living together, likened to the living organism itself

relationships become "imaginary," "mechanical," and "means" to an end

involves public life

involves business, travel, science, and commerce

"will" by thought

based on co-existence; it is the new, urban transitory, and superficial mode of social existence, likened to a mechanical conglomeration

This type of post-conventional morality may be an alternative to the moral development of non-Western, non-urban, non-elite people in higher moral stage. However, Kohlberg's theory is patently Gesellschaft-like. Gemeinschaft voice is missing from current theory and scoring manuals. Several of Kohlberg's critics can be interpreted as accusing him of precisely this bias.

From a broad view of cross-cultural understanding, it is plausibly shown that Kohlberg's single moral orientation of justice is inadequate for generalizing about all the people in different cultural and social systems. Since 1983, Kohlberg seemed to soften his claim of cross-cultural universality and weaken his assertion of a single principle model. They (Kohlberg, Levine & Hower, 1983a/1984) said:

The search for moral universality implies the search for some minimal value conception(s) on which all persons could agree, regardless of personal differences in detailed aims or goals. (p. 248)

We cannot claim either that there is a single principle which we have found used at the current empirically highest stage, nor that that principle is the principle of justice or respect for persons. There may be other principles. . . such as "agape" or the utilitarian principle, could be included in a highest or sixth stage of moral judgement. Formalist philosopher such as Frankena (1973) believe that two principles of justices, the principle of benevolence/utility and the principle of justice, are both required for making an adequate moral decision. (p. 273)

In sum, the principles of justice and benevolence are universally valid; however, to define a behavior that is in accordance with principles of justice or benevolence or others may be varied from culture to culture. The judgement of what is right and wrong may change in different persons and in specific social contexts.

Gender difference in moral dilemmas and moral Orientation

Women are considered inadequate in their psychological quality and show less sense of justice than men according to

psychoanalytic theory (Freud, 1925/1961). Piaget observed children's game playing and found that girls were weaker in resolving conflict and in establishing and following rules than boys because they were far more sensitive and cared for the feeling of others (Piaget, 1932/1965). He chose boys as subjects to study moral development in order to exclude difficulties of interpretation.

Kohlberg and Kramer (1969, p. 108) applied single moral orientation of justice to participants and found that girls were more likely to remain at stage 3 of moral development whereas boys went on to achieve higher stages of development through their young adulthood. Stage 3 is "nice-girl" oriented, in which goodness is equated with helping and pleasing others. They exemplified women's judgment in this stage as their traditional role in the family.

Gilligan argued against this paradox "that traditionally defined the goodness of women who care for and are sensitive to others' needs are those that are marked as deficient in moral development" (1977, p. 481-484; 1982b, p. 7-9). She indicated that developmental theory had not given adequate expression to the concern and experience of women. She continually criticized the gender bias of Kohlberg's moral principle and his theoretical base, which was derived merely from males. She proposed "morality of care and responsibility" which emphasized no harm to others,

a major concern of women, in contrast to or as an alternative to Kohlberg's "morality of rights and rule," which is believed to be in favor of men. This women perspective is misrepresented by Kohlberg's model and is totally absent from Kohlberg's higher moral stages.

Moreover, Gilligan suspected that the research method of Kohlberg's use of hypothetical dilemmas posing conflicts of rightness and justice may inhibit the moral responses of women who are concerned with the contextual relationship and caring responsibility (1977, 1982a). Accordingly, she restructured the research process by interviewing subjects with actual moral conflicts that they faced, so called real-life moral dilemmas. From her interview with 29 women who were facing an abortion choice, she discovered that the concepts of responsibility and care were the central constructions of women's moral domain (1977). Strikingly, women often felt caught between caring for themselves and caring for others, and characterized their failures to care as failures to be "good" women (1982b). Gilligan suggested that concepts of self and morality might be intricately linked.

Lyons (1983/1988) used Gilligan's perspective and elaborated on coding schemes to test Gilligan's hypotheses. She interviewed 18 males and 18 females matched for age, education, and social class in order to draw out an

individual's perception of self and orientation toward morality. The results verified that (a) definition of self in relation to others, was found in both sexes at all ages although men and women may define it in different ways and (b) a morality of care was considered predominantly by women while a morality of justice was considered prevailingly by men. However, after age 27, women showed increased consideration of rights in their real-life moral choices and (c) the modes of self-definition and the modes of moral choice exist as an important factor regardless of sex. The connected-self is positively related to moral orientation of care and response, whereas the separated-self is more frequently related to the morality of rights and justice.

Johnston (1988) interviewed 60 boys and girls who were 11 and 15 years of age, with two fables. The results supported Gilligan's hypothesis that gender was related to the use of moral orientation. Although gender difference does not effect knowing both orientations, boys most often choose and prefer only the rights orientation, while girls choose and prefer both, while they are asked both in spontaneous solution and the best solution. But our unpredicted finding was interesting that 15 year old girls prefer to use moral orientation of right when they are asked the best solution to one of the fables. This implied that (a) older girls may be more aware of their cultural norms

and values; (b) older girls might respond to different situations or contexts more flexibly than the young girls and the boys did; and (c) the context of the problems may affect the use of moral orientation.

Similar findings are exposed in Gilligan and Attanucci's (1988) study where they interviewed 77 adolescents and young adults facing real life moral dilemmas. This study demonstrated that concerns about justice and care are both represented in people's thinking about real life moral dilemmas, but most women focus on care or both while men focus on justice. As a matter of fact, if women were eliminated from the study, the care focus would virtually disappear. Furthermore, most of the dilemmas described by women could be scored for justice consideration without reference to the consideration of care.

Hence, the selection of an all male sample for theory and test construction in moral judgement research is inherently problematic. Kohlberg's framework is male-biased because it excluded women from the samples and ignores the distinct difference of women's moral concern.

Conversely, Walker (1984) surveyed all the empirical 79 studies with sample ages from 5 to 65 which were supposed to have revealed sex differences in Kohlberg's moral scorings. He concluded that only a few inconsistent sex differences have been found in childhood and adolescence. Merely 4 out

of 21 studied samples in adulthood indicated that males show higher moral development than females. In these studies, however, male samples always have higher educational and occupational levels than those of the female samples, usually of spouse housewives. While these two factors are controlled, sex-differences may disappear in most studies. Subsequently, Baumerind (1986) argued that Walker's review procedure was flawed in several respects and reflected a bias against the finding of differences. Walker (1986) fiercely refuted that Baumerind's criticisms are without foundation. Walker defended (a) in comparison to the Mann-Whitney test (favored by Baumerind), the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is more powerful in detecting difference with small samples and differences other than central tendency, (b) in any event, adults reason at almost all stages (e.g. from stage 2 to 6). It is no bias to include the data of children, adolescents, and adults together in the review and meta analysis; (c) the differing sample sizes of the studies he reviewed has taken into account in the p level and Z scores but Baumerind mistook. (d) Baumerind was incorrect in claiming the negligence of early studies and Kohlberg's scoring system of the moral stage 6. Eventually, he maintained his previous conclusion.

Higher stage of moral development is influenced not only by cognitive prerequisites, but also by exposure to

sociomoral experiences such as participation in secondary institutions through education and complex work responsibility (Kohlberg, 1969, 1976, 1983/1984). This rule is equally appropriate to both genders. Kohlberg disagreed that his justice reasoning dilemmas and stages led to biased downscoring of the female's reasoning (1983b).

Since that time, the controversy between gender bias and moral maturity decreased, but gender preference in moral orientation and moral dilemmas eliciting different moral reasoning was still ambiguous.

In 1983, Kohlberg, et al., admitted that Gilligan's ethic of care has usefully broadened the definition of morality. Nevertheless, they also contended that different dilemmas invoked different types of moral consideration, not caused by gender difference. They pointed out that the real-life dilemmas initiated by women are often involved with specific persons that should give special care and response (Kohlberg, et al., 1983b/1984). They stressed that moral mature person in both gender often involved both orientation of justice and care together in order to resolve moral dilemma appropriately (Kohlberg, et al., 1983b/1984).

Controversies seemed endless; the methods and samples employed by Gilligan in building and verifying her theory are also criticized. Kohlberg, et al., (1983b) indicated that Lyon's scoring system, which dichotomously classifies

response, resulted in the statistically biased conclusion of sex difference in moral orientation. The fact that there were limited female subjects and no male subjects allowed to compare their reasoning is another weak point.

Gilligan's theory is still in progress, continued study in orientation is needed. Longitudinal evidence is especially needed to support or reconstruct the developmental stage in the caring orientation.

Walker and his colleagues did a series of studies to examine these arguments. Firstly, Walker (1986) went along with Kohlberg's definition of four moral orientations: Males were supposed to have a normative or fairness orientation while females tended to have a utilitarian or ideal self orientation, closely related to two perspectives of morality described by Gilligan. Standard moral dilemmas were applied to 62 adults. The results indicated that (a) cognitive development was a necessary but insufficient condition for moral development; (b) no sex differences occurred in their moral stage; and (c) the social experiences relating to moral maturity may differ slightly between sexes. Level of education and extent of joint household decision-making are the best predictors of moral maturity. The former is especially true for men while the latter is designated true for women; (d) Only 40% of the participants consistently used their modal orientation; (e)

sex-related orientation to morality as a predictor received little support. Kohlberg's description of four types of moral orientation may not adapt to Gilligan's dual orientation model.

Subsequently, Walker, deVries, and Trevethan (1987) became interested in and examined three issues: (a) relation between reasoning about hypothetical and real-life dilemmas; (b) the validity of Gilligan's notion of sex-related moral orientation (response vs. rights); and (c) the relation of moral orientation to moral stage. Eighty family triads (mother, father, and child, N = 240) were involved in individual interviews. Content analyses were equally conducted for the personally generated real-life dilemmas and hypothetical dilemmas. Moral orientations across different dilemmas were counted by Lyon's scoring manual. Highly valuable results indicated the following:

1. Hypothetical dilemmas (HD) elicited a slightly higher level of reasoning than the real-life dilemmas, but most (62.1%) of the participants evidenced the same moral stage for both types of dilemmas; in others, some were higher on HD, whereas others were lower. Sex differences were not found in the moral reasoning level.

2. Real-life dilemmas (RD) content varied from children to adults, from women to men. Adult women were

more likely to raise family related issues than men, whereas, men were more likely than women to raise work-related issues.

3. Only 40 (16.7%) participants consistently used a single moral orientation based on strict criteria. Only 90 (37.5%) participants used a single orientation counting on a more liberal criteria . Adults were more likely than children to use a mix of both orientations. Generally,

4. Females did not use care/response considerations more than males and RD did not elicit more care responses considerations than HD.

5. Particularly moral orientation became a function of the dilemma content. Only in 2 HD, out of 9 HD, females showed higher care/response scores than males. In RD, among adults, women were more likely to generate personal dilemmas, whereas, men tended to report impersonal ones. Regarding dilemma content, sex differences in moral orientation preference were evident as Gilligan's prediction. However, within either type of dilemma content, sex differences in moral orientation were no longer apparent, as Kohlberg's assumptions.

6. The individual at a higher level of moral maturity tended to use both orientations equally, as Kohlberg's notion.

This examination did not stop here. After a two year interval, the initial samples, except two family trials, were interviewed by Walker (1989) again. Longitudinal data as well as cross-sectional data, derived from large sample sizes (N=233), large age ranges, resulting from the same procedure and scoring methods as the initial one. The only exception was to add the moral orientation of Kohlberg's topology, which was scored according to Colby and Kohlberg's manual (1987). Gilligan's topology was scored as the initial one.

Results based on Gilligan topology, were in accordance with Walker's (1987, 1986) previous conclusions as follows:

1. Dilemma content within RD clearly relates to moral orientation preferences. When it held constant, there was no sex differences in orientation use.

2. Few people were consistent in the use of single orientation across dilemmas or over time. Half of the participants evidently changed their use of orientation after the two year interval.

3. Kohlberg's orientation topology is not synonymous with Gilligan's as Walker's finding in 1986.

Several new findings, based on Kohlberg's model, as follows:

4. HD evidently elicited right-type (normative and fairness) orientations, whereas, RD elicited response-type

orientations. This notion was supported in Kohlberg's categories though originally claimed by Gilligan.

5. Sex differences in orientation preference was not supported.

6. There seems to be a relation between moral stage and orientation. Higher stages are positively related to the use of fairness and perfectionism (Type B form) but negatively connected to normative and utilitarian concerns (Type A form). Gilligan's belief that Kohlberg's approach underscored the moral stage of people who were care/response oriented was not supported.

From both related studies summarized above, it is evident that Kohlberg's model gains more support than does Gilligan's moral orientation model. Soon Trevethan and Walker (1989) applied similar themes to psychopathic, delinquent male samples in comparison with normal high school students. He found that: (a) All groups would score lower on the real-life rather than the hypothetical dilemmas in reasoning level, parallel to the findings in Walker (1987) and (b) HD and RD elicited different moral orientation preference in the direction predicted by Walker (1989).

Accordingly, Walker claimed that real-life moral decisions required considerable self-sacrificing and commitment; in addition, the real-life dilemma tended to

elicit a focus on consequences to self and/or others. They are more relevant to our everyday living than the hypothetical ones so that they could better explain or examine an individual's moral reasoning level and moral behavior. Concerning hypothetical dilemmas, he thought it "may elicit and examine an individual's highest possible level of moral reasoning," (p. 100) as Kohlberg's original claim.

Walker's quantitative approach to study moral models consistently supports Kohlberg's theory. However, recently Mennuti and Creamer (1991) revealed different findings from interviews with 9 females and 7 male community college presidents with informants' personal life dilemmas and professional life dilemmas. Both men and women were of similar ages, educational levels, job responsibilities and length of service. The interview protocol was designed following Gilligan's and Lyons' interview model, but the results were stated or counted in a naturalistic way, neither scored by Lyons' scoring system nor by Colby and Kohlberg's MJI. They found:

1. That there was a tri-orientation model in the process of resolving moral conflicts reflect in neither Kohlberg's single justice model nor Gilligan's dual concerns of justice and care. The third dimension was labelled "Self-orientation."

2. That the combination forms of the three orientations to resolve moral conflicts were prevalent. Single justice orientation was only used twice and limited to professional dilemmas.

This combination form was implied in several antecedent studies such as Walker's (1987) mature adult pattern. Lyons' (1983/1988) women over 27 years of age, Johnston's (1988) adolescent girls, and Gilligan and Attanucci's (1988) women's pattern. It was also predicted by Kohlberg, Levine and Hewer (1983b/1984) after awareness of the weakness of single justice orientation. However, the authors presented it more confidently.

3. That self-orientation tends to align with one or both of justice and care orientation. It did not operate discretely from them. The authors stated "participants simply could not separate possible effects of their choices on self from their legitimate concerns for rights, principles, care and responsibility" (p. 245). Gilligan's suggestion and Lyons' findings about the relation between self and morality, are evident in this study.

4. That the gender differences were evident both in the dilemma resolution processes and their definition of a moral conflict, in both personal and professional situations.

In professional situations, females concerned themselves with the dictates of rules or duties as opposed to the other people involved, while males tended to view the conflict as a concern over the competing claims of people. In personal situations, women often felt in conflict between concern for oneself and concern for others, while men often took the perspective of personal principle and standards against the best situation for the self.

In the resolution process, both genders substantially used three orientation in an overlapping pattern. The justice orientation was apparently combined with either self concern or care concern and applied by both genders. Females did use the care orientation somewhat more often than did males, while men used the self orientation slightly more frequently than did women. Women use the justice/care pattern most frequently, but men never use it. Therefore, this study concurred with Gilligan's claim instead of Kohlberg's (1983b/1986) and Walker's (1987, 1989a).

5. The participants tended to be consistent in the use of a preferred moral orientation pattern, regardless of personal dilemmas or professional dilemmas. This result is contrary to Walker's conclusion (1987, 1989a) and Kohlberg's prediction (1983/1984).

It seems that the controversies have not ended. The

conclusions varied due to different methodologies, participants' backgrounds, and developmental status.

Self-concern and moral orientation

In Kohlberg's (1976) moral developmental stage theory, self concern is a characteristic of low-level moral development. An individual follows rules only when they are consistent with his immediate interests and needs. Right is to serve his own needs or interests. Self concern is not offered as a legitimate position is one's progression toward a higher level of moral development. However, Kohlberg discovered that the ideal-self category was paralleled to the normative order category, the fairness category, and utilitarian category from synthesizing the preceding philosophical discussions. Additionally, Kohlberg, et al. (1983a/1984) contended that there are more than the two moral orientations suggested by Gilligan (1977, 1982b, 1988). They proposed that "there is a dimension along which various moral dilemmas and orientations can be placed" (p. 232). But, self concern was suppressed in the higher level of moral reasoning in Kohlberg's theory.

Since Mennuti and Creamer's (1991) discovery of self orientation and overlapping orientation patterns, the inadequacy of Lyons' (1983/1988) dichotomous moral orientation coding scheme of justice and care has become more evident.

Mennuti (1987) mentioned that the theoretical basis of self-orientation was identified from the properties that were viewed as irrelevant in distinguishing the justice orientation from the care orientation in Lyons' coding scheme. Originally, Lyons (1983) specified five categories for determining whether the consideration was assigned to justice or care. The first category: an individual's concern for general effects to the self versus concern for general effects to others, was one of the criteria used to decide between the morality of justice and the morality of care and responsibility. However, Gilligan and Attanucci (1986/1988) asserted that this category and those in category 4 and 5 should serve to judge a person's level of moral development rather than serving as a basis for distinguishing between the orientations of justice and care. So concern for the self was eliminated from Gilligan and Attanucci's study. But considerations related to self do remain relevant to moral reasoning process. Concerns for self should not be dismissed as development only but should be seen as a basic trait of the reasoning process. It remains an integral part of the moral reasoning process and should be given serious attention as a perspective of equal importance.

Self-orientation was defined, according to Mennuti and Creamer, as "a consideration of the primacy of self-respect

in judgements of moral value," (p. 245) rather than focusing on egoistic needs. In the moral conflicts interview it was substantially expressed as (a) a concern for the effect on self, on one's status or achievement and on one's psychological and/or physical health; and (b) a concern for self-understanding, also called self-image, and one's attitudes, feelings, and expectations. Accordingly, the self-orientation in moral reasoning is partly analogous to the ideal-self orientation that was identified by Bradley, Royce, and Baldwin has been interpreted by Kohlberg (1976) as an orientation to an image of actor as a good self or as someone with conscience, and to the self's motives or virtues. Mennuti and Creamer's findings, derived from empirical data, demonstrated the ideal-self orientation in the more concrete psychological nature. However, the participants of the interview study were community college presidents in mid-life with doctoral degrees and high social status. That their concern for self is more likely oriented toward self-respect is a certainty. In contrast, there are a vast variety of people with different moral maturity and diverse concerns, from the physical, social, and psychological to the spiritual realm. Their concerns for self are not necessarily confined to their status, health, or perfect self images.

May (1985) contended that a concern for the self is the main feature of moral reasoning. A concern for the self is not incompatible with other principles of morality. The more morally mature people, e.g. those who are in moral development stage 5, value the principle of reciprocity in their reasoning, according to Kohlberg's theory. The stage 5 thinker recognizes that serving one's own interests requires that one show respect for others so that his own rights are respected and protected; whereas, the stage 2 thinker was only concerned about his immediate interests and needs but failed to relate his interests with those of others. So, the salient difference between stage 5 and stage 2 is that the stage 5 thinker is more integrated and concerned with a broader circle of individuals than stage 2 thinkers, but both seem to be motivated by the same disposition--a regard for self. In other words, having concern for self is not necessarily at odds with having concern for the rest of humanity.

Conscience, often deemed as moral principles internalized into one's own belief system, was spontaneously adopted as one's own guide for judging right or wrong (Mussen, Conger, Kagan & Huston, 1984). It involves strong affect in the form of guilt, shame, or anxiety when one violates his own moral standards. Kohlberg (1984) adopted Baldwin's theory and believed that the ideal-self,

constructed by a process of moral identification, equated to moral conscience. "These identifications rest on a sense of a shared self built up because the child feels he or she shares with the adult everything learned from the adult" (p. 103). While the admired quality of the modeling adult shifted from power and cleverness to moral goodness, these identifications are moral ones because the characteristics to be shared are a moral one and this model is morally good.

The construction of the ideal-self based on identifications generated in psychoanalytic theory has also been described by Blasi (1984). He stated: "By internalizing compliance to authority, the child gains a feeling of being loved, by identifying with the admired object, he can love and admire himself as he does the object" (p. 135). So, the formation of the ideal-self is guided by instinctual self-love and becomes a stable core rested in unconscious processes. According to his inference, moral standards in the best of cases are based on the ideal for the self, which is rooted in the most natural and vital of needs, the need to obtain love. From philosophical perspectives, May (1983) declared that conscience, unlike the virtues, is basically self-concerned and self-motivated for the self's inner harmony, rather than directed toward the proper end of human action. In seeking internal harmony we come to various insights which affect

our evaluation of our conduct towards others. Ultimately conscience leads to a concern about the world. So conscience which begins in egoistic concern, leads one out of self egoism, seemingly, not by internalized social rules but by making one aware of the value of harmony. Conscience places barriers for the self to discerning whatever causes internal disharmony for the self. Thus a concern for the self encompasses not only larger self-interest but reaches also to the level of ideal-self development.

The empirical evidence of the relationship between the self concept and morality was presented by Gilligan (1977, 1982) and Lyons (1983/1988). The interview data revealed that the individual's modes of self-definition are relevant to the modes of moral choice. Lyons states "regardless of sex, individuals who characterized themselves predominantly in connected terms more frequently use considerations of response in constructing and resolving real-life moral conflicts. Individuals who characterized themselves predominantly in separate/objective terms more frequently used considerations of rights" (p. 41). They also found that the modes of self definition are gender related; the male often described himself in terms of his abilities whereas the female often described herself in connection with others, seemingly in a circle of interdependent relationships.

Damon (1984) conducted a longitudinal study in the same arena but focused on developmental changes. He used two subject's protocols to illustrate this change--the relationship between self understanding and morality. He found that self-understanding and morality are separate conceptual systems during childhood. This split leads to opposition between the conceived interest of the self and conceived demands of morality. In a given situation, if it is possible, children will hedge their moral principles in favor of their self-interest. In the development of self-understanding during adolescence, "the self is viewed in the context of its social-interactional characteristics: I am how I act with others. A manner of social interaction generally has moral implications" (p. 117). This connection leads to the self becoming more defined in moral terms. In addition to the development of belief systems, fundamentally moral in nature, morality and the self become coordinated to form a more wholistic system of knowledge. These bases for integration establish increasing coherence and communication between the systems. His theory sets the cornerstone for understanding on how an individual develops his moral sense from seeing morality as antithetical to this interest up to seeing it as an essential ingredient in the fulfillment of the self.

In a brief review of the studies mentioned above, we would see that Mennuti's finding of self-concern as a moral orientation in an individual's moral decision making is not an unusual discovery. True self-love, according to John Locke "necessarily leads to love of neighbor" (Adler & Gorman, 1952, p. 1052). The relationship between self-concern and moral orientation or moral development is a topic worth striving to understand.

Summary

The researcher started the discussion from theoretical argument between Kohlberg's morality of justice and Gilligan's morality of care and response. Kohlberg asserted that the morality of justice refers to morality generally and that the other principles are subordinate to it. But Gilligan argued that the morality of care and response is a significant but neglected moral domain. It is parallel to and independent of the principle of justice. The argument resulted from a different understanding of the meaning of "love" embedded in the two perspectives.

Section 2 attempted to explore these two perspectives from the standpoint of Western ideas and those other cultures. The conception of justice was more frequently discussed than the conception of benevolence. But the principle of love was regarded as going further than justice in human situations generally. Another concept--Agape or

altruism--is important along with justice in Western philosophy and in Christian teaching. Based on cross-cultural studies, the principle of "Jen" (benevolence or humanity) is the first priority of all kind of virtues in Chinese society. Still other very dominant moral domains in other societies were not encompassed by Kohlberg's theory.

Section 3 explored the interaction of gender differences and moral dilemma content in moral orientation. Until now, some studies advocated gender differences in moral orientation. Women tended to orient to care and responsive concern while men tended to be concerned with justice. Other studies claimed that this difference was due to different real-life dilemmas encountered. There was not consistent conclusion.

Section 4 explored the relationship between self-concern and moral development or orientation. It was shown that self-concern is closely related to moral development but is not confined to self-interest only. Self-concern may change its central style for the sake of personal development. The concern for ideal-self and a concern for the effect on self also appear in the literature.

Chapter III

METHOD

The psychological study of moral reasoning and morality is just in the developing stage. The new conceptual framework may be derived from old traditions or cross-cultural experiences or personal-involvement experiences.

The purpose of this study was to examine the moral orientations among men and women leaders of higher education in Taiwan and to examine how these moral orientations related to the content of dilemma between men and women. The review of the literature indicated that the use of care, justice, and self-orientation in moral reasoning was evident in an adult's life. While the theories of Kohlberg, Gilligan, and Mennuti and Creamer served as the conceptual framework for understanding the moral reasoning process of Taiwan's educators, this research was designed to allow some new ideas or properties relating to orientation to emerge from first-hand cross-cultural data. Otherwise, a more expanded and more elaborate model was expected to be generated from the same procedure. This research also sought to understand gender issues and moral dilemma situations that had an impact on the moral reasoning process. For these research concerns, the qualitative approach method was employed, and a semi-structured

interview which allow for an in-depth, detailed investigation, was designed. A grounded theory of qualitative research was used as a guideline for sampling, data collection, and data analysis rather than being as a mandatory principle.

The Principle of Sampling and the Samples

The Principle of the Sampling

Qualitative interviewing, repeated face to face encounters between the researcher and informants, was directed toward understanding the informants' perspectives on their lives, experiences, or situations as expressed in their own words. This method allowed broader, more flexible and deeper exploration of the experiences of small populations.

The theoretical sampling, asserted by Glaser and Strauss (1967) was followed in this research. It was a process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collected, coded, and analyzed data and decided what data to collect next and where to find them. This process was controlled by the emerging theory, whether substantive or formal. In short, the criteria of sampling were those of theoretical purpose and relevance for furthering the development of emerging categories.

In contrast with statistical (random) sampling, the actual number of "cases" studied was relatively unimportant. What was important was the potential of each "case" to aid the researcher in developing theoretical insights into the area of the social life being studied (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). McCracken (1988) addressed the idea that "less is more" as the first principle. In this procedure, the sample size was not predetermined. The criterion for determining when to quit sampling is theoretical saturation, which was defined by Glaser and Strauss (1967), as follows:

Saturation means that no additional data are being found, whereby the sociologist can develop properties of the category. As he sees similar instances over and over again, the researcher becomes empirically confident that a category is saturated. (p. 61)

The sample was selected based on research purpose, accessibility, and willingness to participate. The educational leaders who were in the presidency of universities or four-year colleges in Taiwan were the first priority group to be chosen. The extension of this selection included the presidency of junior colleges, the deanship of a university or four-year college, and the department and program head of a university in priority order. The educational level and job status were examined.

Due to the fact that a limited number of women in Taiwan have participated in leadership in higher educational administration until today, the selection of the female

sample had to be very specific and purposeful. In principle, each female informant's selection should match with one male informant with similar educational level and job status so that the gender differences can be examined. Theoretically, the sampling and interviews were ended after full saturation. In Mennuti's (1987) experience, she had a sample pool with 32 participants; in fact, she interviewed 16 informants and felt full saturation in data collection. Her experience was used as a basic reference to plan the possible sample size.

Educational leaders are presumed to be in a higher morally mature group in Chinese society. In Snarey's (1991) study the morally mature adult in Taiwan's society was listed most in stage 4 or 4/5, as the reference of this research. From the perspective of Kohlberg's system, moral development at stage 4 or above highlights the question of different moral orientation.

The Practices of the Sampling

The sampling was conducted in Taiwan. At the beginning the names and telephone numbers of the presidents and deans included in this research were obtained from the University and College Directory of Taiwan Republic of China, 1992. The universities and colleges located in the Taipei area were the first choice. Those in the north-western area of Taiwan were the second. There were only nine female

presidents in the directory. Even the deanships were seldom accessible to the women. So, in the practical process, to gain access to the female presidents and deans was the primary goal in order to obtain appropriate informants.

The first informant was most difficult to obtain for a long interview, especially concerning the topic of moral reasoning, by which the participants had to generate their real-life experiences. After being rejected twice over the telephone, I felt discouraged and began to understand that this was an inappropriate way to approach my potential informants. So, I changed my strategy, on one hand, and used my personal relationships in the educational circles in order to know who was more accessible or more appropriate than the other to be a good informant. On the other hand, the personal relationship provided the starting point of the snowballing method. For example, a male friend, who was dean of students, agreed to be the first informant. Through him, I obtained the second informant, a female dean of students, whose recommendations led me to several other female presidents. The main difficulty was reduced by half.

However, matching females with males of the similar educational levels, job responsibilities and/or similar ages, was another barrier in reaching proper informants. For this reason, finally, I also asked for help from the

Ministry of Education, and went far beyond the Taipei area to select participants.

Each potential informant was called by telephone to request his or her participation. The study was fully explained and all questions were answered. The principle of confidentiality and anonymity were guaranteed over the telephone. If one agreed to participate, an individual interview was scheduled at the informant's convenience. Normally, most of the participants were too busy to schedule the time, so each appointment was often accompanied with several negotiations and postponements. Additionally, theoretical saturation was reached by joint collection and analysis of data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). So the sampling duration lasted from the beginning of November 1992 through April 1993. Twenty-two informants were interviewed, four of them were eliminated from the analysis because their data were incomplete or insufficient to make much sense in the topic. The 18 interviews were felt full saturation in data collection. Fifteen samples were selected in the Taipei area, two in Hsin-Chu, one in Taichung.

Characteristics of the Sample

The informants who volunteered for this study can be classified into four groups based on gender and job responsibilities. There were four female presidents matched with four male presidents. In Taiwan today only small or

medium sized four-year colleges or junior colleges have female presidents. For this reason, the male presidents were also selected from similarly sized colleges. Within 8 colleges, one is located in Taichung, one in Hsin-Chu, and the other 6 are located in the Taipei area. In the deanship and the department head group, there were five male deans matched with two female deans and three department heads. Most of them were selected from medium or large sized universities.

The characteristics of the 18 informants were summarized in Table 1. It included the number of years in their current position, age level, educational level, the size of the university, where the highest degree was obtained, and the major of study of the highest degree.

Except for the number of years in their current position, the male and female presidents were similar in their other demographic characteristics. The female presidents obviously had fewer years as president than their male counterparts. In Taiwan's society, women did not become presidents at the college level prior to 1970. The male presidents tended to remain in their first presidency much longer. The female president who stayed 9 years in presidency moved from other colleges within four years. Fourteen out of 18 informants possessed the highest degree, with males and females balanced. Nine out of 14 received

Table 1
 Characteristics of Interviewees

Demographics	Presidents		Deanships or Department Head	
	Female(N=4)	Male(N=4)	Female(N=5)	Male(N=5)
Age group				
41-45	0	0	2	2
46-50	2	1	2	2
51-55	2	2	1	1
56-60	0	1	0	0
Place obtained highest degree				
BS at Taiwan	1	1	0	0
MS at Taiwan	0	0	1	1
PhD at Taiwan	1	0	2	1
Japan	0	1	0	0
U.S.	2	1	2	1
EdD at U.S.	0	1	0	2
Size of institution by full time enrollment				
under 1000	0	0	0	1
1000-5000	3	3	2	1
5000-10000	1	1	0	0
10000-20000	0	0	2	1
20000-above	0	0	1	2
Years in current position				
3yrs - under	3	0	3	3
3-6yrs	0	1	2	2
6-10yrs	1	0	0	0
10-20yrs	0	2	0	0
22yrs	0	1	0	0
Total Subejcts	Total Female (N=9)		Total Male (N=9)	
major study of highest degree				
liberal arts		2		2
social science		3		3
natural science		1		2
agri & medical		2		1
engineering		1		1

their doctoral degree in the United States, one from Japan. There were three men with Ed.Ds, but no women with Ed.Ds. The informants' ages ranged from 43 to 57.

In summary, the eighteen informants in this study, when classified by gender, revealed more similarities than differences in their demographic characteristics.

Data Collection Strategies

Interview Method

Because of the nature of the research, the interview was planned as the most appropriate method to obtain information. The researcher cannot observe everything, just as we cannot directly observe how people organize their world and make meaning out of their experiences. The long interviews, according to McCracken (1988), "gave us the opportunity to step into the mind of another person, to see and experience the world as they do themselves" (p. 9).

The interviewing method has many forms. It varies from a highly structured format to a completely unstructured process. The interview used in this study was a semi-structured form. The interview protocol in the real-life moral dilemma situation followed Mennuti's (1987) design which was constructed and validated empirically by Lyons' real-life moral conflict and choice (Lyons, 1983/1988). The informants' responses and illustrations served as the basis

for analyzing and interpreting. The protocol for the Chinese form which has been tailored in Taiwanese society, is shown in Appendix A. The English version was translated by Nina Xiang, a FCD Ph.D. candidate at Virginia Tech, who has been a translator in mainland China and has studied in the United States for 6 years (See Appendix A₂).

This interview protocol served as a guideline to make sure that key topics were explored with all the informants. In the interview situation, the researcher decided how to phrase questions and when to ask them. The interview protocol served solely to remind the interviewer to ask about certain things but did not confine her to these things. The interviewer can decide automatically to expand questions or to revise the type of question.

The Practice of the Individual Interview

The interviews were held in Taiwan only. They were conducted by the researcher in an attempt to understand the moral reasoning process the volunteers employed when reflecting on real-life dilemmas of their choice.

At the beginning, an introduction to the interview and potential problems with the procedure were raised to communicate with the informant. When a fundamental trust relationship was established, the interview began. The informant's contribution was emphasized. The principle of anonymity and confidentiality and the informant's right to

read the draft prior to publication were again promised (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984).

The informant was asked to identify a moral dilemma which he/she experienced and resolved in his/her position. Both professional and personal arenas were asked, but the order of the discussion varied. Each dilemma the participant raised was discussed in detail regarding what they concerned and how the final decision was made to resolve the dilemma. The interview was terminated when the participant offered no further information.

To ensure the relevance of perspective on the topic, all participants were asked to explain their views regarding what constituted a moral dilemma to them in that specific case and how they defined a moral incident. For some informants, whose stories did not show an apparent relevance to their moral choices, they were asked "why do you think this case is moral-related"? Some informants were reluctant to define "morality" in an abstract form. So, this question was put at the end.

The interview protocol with typical questions (See Appendix A₁ and A₂) was used in this process to ensure the same questions for all informants. At the end of the interview, the informant was requested to complete a biographical information sheet (See Appendix B₁ and B₂).

Professional life and personal life are often interwoven or overlap in reality. Two informants offered moral dilemmas in their professional life where I asked for moral dilemmas in their personal life. They were pleased to schedule an extended interview. From practical experiences the informants could offer more examples of moral dilemmas incident in their professional life, but felt difficulty in providing examples of moral dilemmas in their personal life.

The full range of each actual interview lasted for approximately one hour to two and a half hours. On average, it took about one hour and a half for most informants. The full range of the interview was audio-taped and field notes were written as completely as possible. The women were interviewed in their offices or at their home, while the men were interviewed in their offices or in a restaurant. Chinese mandarin was the only language used in the interview. The duration of the interview process covered from December 1992 through April 1993.

Eighteen interviews were judged as an effective and successful sample. There were 42 moral dilemma incidents and discussions generated by the 18 informants. These were accessible in the data analysis. Table 2 shows the frequency of moral dilemma incidents both in the professional life as well as in the personal life.

Table 2
Moral Dilemma Incidents Provided by Informants (by Gender)

Incidents	Total	Female	Male
professional life	24	12	12
personal life	19	10	9
Total	43	22	21

Data Analysis (Rationale and Practices)

Theoretical Basis

Data collection and analysis go hand in hand. The basic concern is to make sense of descriptive data to achieve a perfect fit between the data and the explanations of research themes. Data analysis is a dynamic and creative process; insight is grounded and developed from data analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984).

Glaser and Strauss's (1967) constant comparative method was adapted as a principle to direct the data analysis instead of following the strict definition. Based on this method, the researcher simultaneously codes and analyzes data to develop concepts. Concepts are the basic building blocks of theory. Science could not exist without concepts. By continually comparing specific incidents in the data, the researcher can refine or expand these concepts, identify their properties, explore their relationships to one another, and integrate them into a coherent theory.

Glaser and Strauss stated: "The constant comparative method is concerned with generating and plausibly suggesting (but not provisionally testing) many categories, properties and hypotheses about general problems" (p. 104). This method is used to accompany theoretical sampling which requires only saturation of events and incidents for each category not consideration of a person per se (Strauss &

Corbin, 1990). The point of coding and analysis, which enhances the identification of categories and their respective properties, is to discover or elaborate theory, but is not hindered by existing theories or hypotheses.

The constant comparative method of data analysis was described in four stages by Glaser and Strauss (1967); (a) comparing incidents applicable to each category, (b) integrating categories and their properties, (c) delimiting the theory, and (d) writing the theory (p. 105). Each of these four stages is transformed from one another sequentially but earlier stages remain functional simultaneously throughout the analysis.

The first stage is started by coding each incident in the data into as many categories of analysis as possible. Coding is the analytic process by which concepts are identified and developed in terms of their properties and dimensions. The asking of questions about data and the making of comparisons for similarities and differences between each incident, event, and other instance of phenomena during coding procedures help to give the concepts in grounded theory their precision and specificity (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

The category and the property used follow the definition of Darkenwald (1980): "A category is the basic theoretical concept that enables the researcher to explain

and predict behavior. A property is a conceptual element of a category that serves to define or elaborate the meaning of the category" (p. 67).

The second stage of analysis is to draw comparisons of incidents with properties of the category that are identified in the initial round of analysis, comparing incident with incident. In this process, the constant comparison causes the accumulation of knowledge pertaining to a property of the category to readily become integrated.

In the third stage, the researcher sets out to delimit the theory or explanation that emerged. This occurs by clarifying the properties in each category, taking out non-relevant properties, integrating elaborate details of properties into major outlines of interrelated categories. Then, the researcher can formulate the theory with a small set of higher level concepts.

The final stage of data analysis entails the writing of theory, the ideas, and concepts which evolve to form a logical substantive theory.

This specific grounded theory method served as a theoretical basis in conducting data analysis.

Practice of Data Treatment and Analysis

Data collection from semi-structured interviews and data analysis were conducted hand in hand since the beginning of the fieldwork until data collection was

finished. Upon the completion of each interview, the tape was sent to be transcribed, field notes were reviewed, and code notes (a type of memo) reflecting on the data and interview in general were written. Because the transcribing often took time, the code note was often used as a reference to select the informants for the next several interviews especially in the later part of the fieldwork. Because the first ten informants were more often chosen by accessibility and their backgrounds, while the other informants were selected additionally by examining the fully saturated principle of data collection. The code notes written generally were based on informants' responses to the main questions.

Once the interview had been transcribed, systematic procedures were begun to analyze the data. At this time, the researcher started to code data into as many categories of analysis as possible. The researcher coded basically by paragraph and asked "What is the major idea brought out in this paragraph or response?" Coding is a process of translating the fact feature of the data into the abstract features. The names for concepts were borrowed from the professional reading on one hand and on the other hand, extracted from informants' words and phrases. The extent or intensity of a response was also noted.

When coding an incident into a category, it was necessary to compare each incident with the previous incidents in the same and different group codes, and also to compare this incident with another of a similar nature in previously collected data. Through the maintaining of constant comparison in the full process of coding, three orientations were integrated by several subcategories with many properties which persistently emerged. The justice, care, and self orientation in moral decisions were apparent but still other properties emerged in the same category which was not confined to the preceding definition. In addition, the moral orientation in combination showed more elaborate form in this study than that of Mennuti and Creamer's. The properties were labelled by participant's words while the name of categories were borrowed from literature.

The categories and their properties which emerged from raw data were listed and defined as follows:

1. The orientation of justice defined an individual as separate/objective in relation to others; see others as one would like to be seen by them in objectivity. One category was related to normative order such as laws, rules, regulations, policies, standards, social conventions, social role expectations, social reputations, maintenance of (social) school system, social norms, role of duty,

obligation, commitment, etc. The other category was related to principles of fairness or justice, such as equality, equity, reciprocity, mutual respect, human right and reason, righteousness, impartiality, ethical relationship, etc.

2. The orientation of care involved the interdependent perspectives in a relationship wherein an individual was defined as connected in relation to others. Maintenance of a relationship was the first category such as doing something to please someone, relative contextual consideration, or causing no discomfort. The other subcategory was concern for the benefit of others, such as promoting the welfare of others and responding to the need of others without care for one's own need and right.

3. The orientation of self involved how the informant thought about themselves in relation to the moral problem. A concern for the effect on self: The effect on self in career promotion, achievement, social prestige, reputation, health, and other self interest were major properties of this category. Self-respect factor: Self-evaluation, self-esteem, self-consistency in moral thinking and acting, self-constraint, valued self, self cultivation, self-actualization ideal self or conscience or inner peace and harmony, self competence and self-assertiveness were major properties of this subcategory.

Decision Rules

The Coding Criterion of Two Confusing Areas

Lyon's (1983/1988) coding scheme listed five corresponding criteria to distinguish justice considerations from care considerations. She believed that concern for the general effects to self versus general effect to others was one of these criteria. However, Gilligam and Attanucci (1986/1988) suggested that the telling of self from on others is invalid (ineffective) to determine justice and care orientation. While Mennutti and Creamer (1987) revealed a tri-orientation model, the concern for effect on self is a subcategory of self-orientation. This confusing point became more evident.

When an informant considered the effect of an incident or his/her decision on someone, it implied an orientation of moral regard. In this study, this confusing point was clarified as follows: (a) if an informant focused his/her regard to the effect on himself/herself it was coded in the self category; (b) if he/she focused most on the effect on a specific other or a small group of others, it was coded in the care category; (c) if he/she equally considered the effect on self, specific others, and someone unknown, it was coded in the justice category.

In addition, according to the literature review the justice concern and care concern overlapped in doing no

harm, a kind of love. So the researcher decided if a love was focused on a specific person relating to the participant, e.g., a student, a friend, or a family member, or a specific group of people, it was coded in the care category. If a love was shared by a lot of people equally, it was coded justice. If a love was centered on the self, it was coded in the self category as well.

Decision Rule of Moral Orientation

Finally, the researcher took an entire interview and asked "what seems to be going on here?" "What is the informant's model of moral orientation in this case?"

Moral orientation in each dilemma or incident was judged by the informant's thinking in constructing conflicts, primary concerns, final decisions, and the self-evaluation of their decisions. More often an informant's thinking switched from this category to another category several times over a process of moral dilemma resolution. The moral orientation in each dilemma or incident should have been weighed in one category or some categories in combined form. For this reason the researcher set the rules as follows to decide moral orientation model:

1. The informant's thinking which led to a final decision in moral dilemma was the fundamental importance for deciding relative moral orientation normally.

2. If there were still other significant considerations presented during the reasoning process, they were used as a supplement to refine a moral orientation model. Any new considerations emerged and the higher frequency of ideas mentioned were important indices to identify a participant's real concern.

3. Finally, if a participant's reasoning focused only in one orientation, such as justice; it was labelled orientation of justice only. If ones reasoning mainly focused on justice orientation but still considered a factor in another orientation, it was labelled orientation of justice predominant and other as a shadow. If his concerns balanced between two categories, the decision was a two-orientation balanced pattern. If ones concerns balanced among three orientations, it was decided as a multiple balanced orientation model.

In the full range of data analysis, the theoretical memos were written to record thought about codes and their relationships to describe conflicts and to capture theoretical notions that emerged from the data. These memos served to illustrate the idea and content behind the categories while presenting a theory or a discussion and interpretation.

Even based on the decision rule and the coding criterion, in reality, in a few cases it was difficult to

assign a clear-cut category or orientation. Sometimes, an individual's real concern was not shown in explicit verbal language but shown in the nonverbal context. The researcher had encountered two kinds of confusing cases. One was related to the caring of aged parent-in-law. The point was "is it appropriate to assign into the category of normative order (ethic of justice) or the category of care of others (ethic of care and response) when the care of other's welfare is an obligation culturally." The other case raised the issue "when the moral principle is mixed with the ideal self image, is it appropriate to assign it into the category of principled morality or the category of self-respect?"

These confusing cases were brought to discussion with the major advisor, then we made a mutual decision. For example, the first issue was decided by the participant's emotional involvement while the second issue was decided by the participant's self-conscious.

Sometimes the process of making the decision to assign the moral orientation model was as confused and conflicted as the participant's resolving moral dilemma. Some of the cases were easy, some of the cases were difficult. But in the most difficult cases, a decision was made with my major advisor about final assignment to categories or orientations.

The Role and the Preparation of the Investigator

In qualitative research, the investigator serves as a kind of instrument in the collection and analysis of data. An investigator cannot fulfill qualitative research objectives without using a broad range of his/her own experiences, imagination, and intellect in ways that are varied and unpredictable. Qualitative data normally are relatively messy and unorganized data. It demands techniques of observation that allows the investigator to sort the data, to search out a match in one's experience for ideas and actions that the informant has described in the interview (McCracken, 1988). However, this does not mean it can be transferred from the investigator's experience to that of the informant's.

Colby, Kohlberg and Kauffman (1987) indicated that the researcher must operate phenomenologically by looking at morality from the subject's viewpoint, understanding what the subject is saying in his/her own terms. . . . Thus, the study of moral development must consider the subject's own reasons and construction of moral meaning. (pp. 1-2)

The principle of unobtrusive and nondirective manner suggested by McCracken (1988) and adhering to the non-judgmental and sensitive attitude suggested by Taylor and Bogdan (1984) were followed during the interviews.

The researcher's experience is an essential element in determining the quality of a qualitative study. For this

reason, the researcher equipped herself to handle this study in several steps:

1. The researcher took a three credit course in 6614 Qualitative Methods in Educational Research that was offered by Dr. Lichtman at VPI & SU in the 1991 Fall Semester.

2. The researcher wrote two papers on the qualitative approach under the supervision of Dr. Lichtman (Yeh, 1991a; 1991b). The latter manuscript is currently in the process of publication.

3. The researcher constructed two focus groups separated by gender, and involved four doctoral and four masters degree students from mainland China and Taiwan to discuss Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemma "Father and Joe" as a pilot study (Yeh, 1992). The main purpose is to get a basic understanding of the Chinese perspective on this moral dilemma, especially in a higher educated group. A twenty page manuscript was written to analyze the differences in moral orientation between genders and to observe the specific cultural implications of this story.

4. For the sake of enhancing her interview skills and examining applicability of the interview protocol, the researcher rehearsed the interview.

Two higher education leaders, my colleagues in Tamkang University, Taipei, participated in the rehearsal about their real-life moral dilemmas both in their professional

life as well as personal life. These interviews provided the verification that individuals in higher education status would willingly articulate the moral dilemma experiences in their real life. Furthermore, these rehearsals led to an understanding of possible problems and difficulties of informant's feelings during the interview process, which offered an important reference to modify the illustration of the interview protocol and interview attitude.

The Limitations of the Study

The primary limitations of this study are focused on the interview methods used in the topic that relates to moral conflict in personal real-life experiences in Chinese society. Since the informants in this study are often regarded as a highly morally developed people and are deemed as models for the society, their articulation of their personal life experiences involving moral implications may be suppressed.

Another challenge comes from the difficulty in selecting a female sample from among higher education leaders because of the limited female population in this subgroup. The researcher was forced to downgrade the requirements of educational level and job status, in comparison with those in Mennuti's study.

The subtle climate during interaction and the rapport established and maintained between the interviewer and the

informants can influence the outcome of the data obtained. In addition, the semi-structured interview that allows the interviewer to expand the questions beyond the guidelines also provides some unpredictable variation in the results. The data analysis is more strongly dependent upon the interviewer's intelligence, competence, and experience or bias. Furthermore, all informants were chosen by volunteering for the study. Therefore, non-respondents might offer different perspectives on solving moral conflicts than did the respondents, but their experiences and thoughts were unknown. So, the application of the outcomes should be used prudently.

The real-life moral dilemma interview was based on informants' retrospection rather than immediate resolution. This nature should be seriously concerned in data analysis and explanation.

Chapter IV

MORAL CONCERNS OF THE INTERVIEWEES

Summary of Moral Reasoning Interview

The interview focused on discovering the reasoning process of leaders in higher education in Taiwan when they encountered a real-life moral dilemma. There were nine female and nine male participants in the individual interviews. Each participant was asked to describe specific events that constituted a moral dilemma to him or her. The event described then served as the basis for the inquiry. All of the participants were requested to share their experiences of moral dilemma both in their professional and personal lives. The questions used dealt primarily with (a) the moral-dilemma event, (b) the dilemma focus, (c) the primary concerns, and (d) the decision and the evaluation of the decision. Nearly everyone who agreed to be interviewed openly shared his or her thinking in the dilemma situation because confidentiality was guaranteed. Some expressed appreciation for the opportunity to reflect on such serious matters. Some were surprisingly unrestrained and discussed their poignant life experience in such a deeply private moment. However, some felt difficulty in presenting an appropriate event related to moral sense in personal life. It took time for them to generate a personal life dilemma

that was considered relevant to moral issues.

The interviews were conducted in Taiwan from December, 1992, through April. The complete interview process was audio-taped and transcribed. The real-life moral dilemma experiences provided in this chapter correspond to the questions listed in the interview protocol. The findings were abstracted from the interviewees' responses. All dialogues quoted in the following paragraphs was translated from the original Chinese.

Moral Dilemma Events

The relevant situations that led to moral conflicts were experienced and generated by the participants themselves. The main question asked by the researcher was "Have you ever had any problem in your life that you think is related to a moral dilemma? Can you give me any example which is still clear in your mind?" Overall, 43 events, 24 in professional life and 19 in personal life were described by the 18 leaders of higher education. They described a variety of situations, but most of them were particular cases that resulted in the moral dilemma rather than what happened in the pressures of daily operations of the institution and in their personal lives.

Eleven out of 23 events focused on personnel matters as the most prevalent type of event in the professional realm. Student conduct was the second most common professional

issue. The other issues were related to former president's conduct and the government's policies. There was no gender-specific type of concern in professional situations. Family matters were most frequently mentioned as cases in the personal situation. Peer issues and those concerning personal behavior proved to be less significant to the interviewees. The remaining issues were related to the neighborhood and to the relatives. It seemed that these issues were gender-specific. Only the females stated their concerns with respect to caring for aged parents; peer issues were predominant in the males' concerns, whereas personal behavior was predominantly mentioned by the females.

In the professional realm, personnel matters concerned mostly the unethical conduct of faculty and staff. These cases included accusations of embezzlement, forgery in order to obtain unwarranted privileges, ignorance of responsibility under contracts, unethical indebtedness in the lending cooperative, unethical recommendations to engage or promote faculty, and sexual harassment of students. Other types of events related to arguments between colleagues that potentially led to resignation or frustration, such as different opinions for budget distribution, unfair judgment in an argument, and resigning for student's submitting complaints to government. An

example of unethical conduct in personnel matters was stated as follows:

"During the time I went abroad, a department head who had signed a two-year contract with me, decided to go to another university for a one-year Alumnus chair position, for a better offer. He personally arranged someone to be interim department head. At that time our school was about to start . . . I was furious about the situation After that year, he came back to teach and asked to become the department head again. I angrily rejected him. But later in the summer when I was abroad, he asked my interim dean to sign an agreement document for him to get the position. The president did not even know the whole thing."

An example of an argument between or among colleagues was delineated as follows:

"As a dean of the academy, I am responsible for setting rules for a large university system. The institution and company coordinated projects should also function by its rules. Accordingly, if the school was asked to offer short-term training or classes to a company, the project coordinator was responsible for managing the whole thing, such as recruiting an instructor, scheduling time and location, etc. However, the Dean of business did not respect this rule. The college of business wanted to manage their own coordinated project because of an excellent bonus offer. I and the director of the project disagreed with them and prevented them from violating the rule. Once they rebuked me and labelled me a power-oriented person. Simultaneously, I was also frustrated by the president who used to know how urgent and how important it is to maintain these rules for a large campus. However, he was a coward; he compromised with them."

The second most predominant concern regarded student conduct, in which most cases related to student discipline with respect to academic issues. These included cheating on an exam, asking for a special favor to pass in a class, avoiding failure by asking for a grade change, skipping

classes, delinquent behavior, and student's romantic liaisons with another's spouse, etc. One exception was psychotic behavior that had nothing to do with discipline or school rules. An example was stated as follows:

"A senior student, who used to skip classes, failed in my class which was required for graduation. He tried to ask a special favor of me in order to pass. However, I believed that the goal of education is character cultivation rather than just acquiring a diploma. I could not please him at the critical moment because of my moral sense. Furthermore, he told me that his widowed mother had been waiting for this diploma for eight years. This strategy of convincing me was taught to him by his department head."

The other situations described by the participants were relevant to government. One case concerned the irresponsible attitude of a government minister toward the eligibility of a student to register due to ambiguous policies caused by misunderstanding and frustration toward a president of a junior college. The other case resulted from the inappropriate policy of grant utilization for a project received from the National Development and Science Council. An unusual case least mentioned by participants involved a former president who was unfaithful to his duty and caused danger to the school buildings.

In the realm of personal life, family matters were the most salient concerns. Seven out of 19 events were in this domain. These dilemmas could be divided into two parts basically, one for parents, the other for children. These include caring for aged parents, distribution of father's

inheritance, a son's severe injury in military training, a daughter's career plan and the unacceptable behavior of a son. Some examples of these types of events include:

"My father had married three times. Each of his wives has children, so it was very complicated to divide the inheritance. When my father was very sick, he had 14 million dollars N.T. (more than 0.5 million U.S. dollars) in the bank. At that time I had my father's seal so someone suggested to me to withdraw the money to escape paying inheritance taxes latter. I did not do so . . ."

"I was very troubled by my son because he did not have good habits. He always went to school without eating any breakfast. His room was always messy and he did not clean up his room. He did not put things back after he had used them. He was not serious in his study. . . He overemphasized his appearance. Girls always called him. Every time when I talked to him, he would be good for one or two days. When I tried to talk with him some more, he complained that I was nagging him and my ideas were old-fashioned. The more you (I) talked to him the more furious he became even to the point of showing hatred. . . "

Four events described concerned peer's asking for help or personal behavior matters as a concern of lesser importance in the realm of personal affairs. Three out of four events concerning peer interaction were presented by the male. One case described by a female was related to the husband's friend. The stories under this topic included investing money for a husband's friend to help his career development, a friend's wife asking for help with life insurance, a friend's asking to speak in favor of him, and avoiding extra tutoring for schoolmates. One example was described as follows:

"One of my college classmates died leaving two small children. . . In order to make a living, his wife got involved in insurance. She asked me to buy insurance. She also wanted me to get my relative to buy from her. It was a conflict to me . . . I had no good feelings toward the insurance business in Taiwan. . ."

Three out of four events in the realm of personal behavior were described by the female as their moral concerns. These matters focused on personal image off the job, the expression of personal opinions in a meeting, and a decision to meet a former boyfriend. One example was as follows:

"Before I became president, at times I like to call some colleagues and have them come over to my house for dinner or to do something together. Right now, I'll have to think twice . . . Sometimes I can hear people say something unpleasant someone would. . . Up till now I have been very persistent. While at work I'm the president. When I'm off, I'm myself. I can wear whatever I like. . ."

The other moral dilemma presented were relevant to neighborhood and relatives. The events were described as follows:

"Many other cars parking in our alley, taking over our parking spaces; I defended my neighbor's parking space."

"I was asked by a relative to be an endorser for his big loan from the bank."

All kinds of moral-dilemma events and relevant people in those events in personal life situations were summarized in Figure 1 and 2, leading to moral dilemmas reported by the participants. These events served as the basis for inquiry




Figure 1. Professional Situations Leading to a Moral Dilemma for the Leaders of Higher Education in Taiwan




Figure 2. Personal Situations Leading to a Moral Dilemma for the Leaders of Higher Education in Taiwan

to understand the participant's reasoning process as they committed to resolving moral dilemmas.

If we compare the type of moral dilemmas in this study with those in Mennuti's study, it can be seen that Taiwan's participants presented dilemma situations involving more varied types of relationships in their professional and personal lives. With respect to personal life, the sequence of frequently mentioned events was almost the same as that of Mennuti's study. But, there are evidently gender differences in the types of events mentioned as a source of moral dilemma in this study in contrast to Mennuti's study. This can be attributed to gender difference in the lives of individuals in Chinese society. In contrast, in the professional realm, the participants in Mennuti's study less often mentioned student conduct as their source of moral dilemmas than did the participants in this study. Additionally personnel matters in this study were more varied than those in Mennuti's. The job responsibilities were the principal source of moral dilemmas in this area.

However, this researcher did not support Walker, deVries, and Trevethan's (1987) finding that women were more likely to raise family related issues than men. The research also rejected their statement that women tended to generate personal dilemmas whereas men tended to report impersonal ones.

Moral Dilemma Focus

After describing each individual moral dilemma situation, the participant was asked "What made you feel that you had a moral conflict in that situation?" Thus, a dilemma focus was presented by the participant for each morally related event. Similar situations may have resulted in differently perceived moral conflicts for the persons involved. For example, two interviewees related similar situations in peer's asking for help, but each defined their actual conflict differently. One addressed his conflict as follows:

"Some other Chinese schoolmates often asked me to tutor them on my own time. It took me a lot of time that I can not offer. So I hid myself from them. I feel sorry for them, but my time was limited. I had to finish my study plan. I had my standpoint and special context. They should consider my status. However it may damage the relationship or it may be perceived as selfishness."

The other interviewees addressed his conflict this way:

"This friend asked me to help . . ., but I knew that if I did help I would have to face many difficulties. . . I might not achieve what needed to be achieved. . . However, I did not want to offend him so I promised carelessly. To speak in favor of him can induce moral concern."

The moral dilemmas were construed by the participants in many ways. To sum up all their descriptions and comparing the similarities and differences, several conflict patterns were identified as follows:

1. Regarding the dictates of rules or duties as

opposed to a concern toward people involved in this context, it is a conflict between normative order and welfare of the specific other.

2. A concern for rules, duties, or principles fairness as opposed to a concern of maintaining relationship. It is a conflict between the justice and relationship maintenance.

3. Regarding the accomplishment of fairness and mutual respect versus a concern for the effect on self.

4. Conflict between two opposing viewpoints about the application of duty, responsibility, or behavioral standards. It is a conflict in normative order.

5. A concern over a competing claim of needs or rights between two persons or two groups. It is a conflict in the principle of righteousness and equality.

6. The conflict between care for other's need and the needs or rights of the self. This is a conflict between the welfare of others and the effect on self.

7. The conflict between conforming to social conventions or expectations and adhering to personal principle or standard to maintain self-respect. It is a conflict between the normative order and the valued self.

8. The concern for self-interest versus concern over personal principle and standards for maintaining self-respect. It is a conflict between the effect on self and the ideal self.

The moral conflict patterns experienced by the participants are summarized in Table 3. Moreover, the frequency of each pattern with respect to gender in both the professional life situation and the personal life situation is shown in the Table. The three most frequently mentioned patterns among all cases were the conflict between the normative order and welfare of the others (pattern 1), conflict in the normative order (pattern 4), and the conflict between the welfare of other and the effect on self (pattern 6). The distribution of conflict patterns between genders was similar but between two situations was very different. It is very obvious that dilemma focus varied with the two life situations more than by gender, but some gender differences in prevalent patterns can also be identified.

The women most frequently described their moral dilemma as focusing on the dictates of rules or duties as opposed to concern toward people. This conflict pattern 1 was most evident in professional situations. This finding was the same as that in Mennuti's study. The second most predominant dilemma focused on the care of other's need as opposed to the care of the rights or the needs of self, as seen in pattern 6. This conflict was found mainly in personal situations. These two predominant patterns encompassed more than half of the dilemmas described by

Table 3
Moral Conflict Patterns Between Genders and Between Situations

Categorical Label	Moral Conflict Patterns Dilemma Events/Gender/ Frequencies emerged	Profess Events		Pers Events		Total Events			Total	
		M	F	M	F	Prof	Per	M		F
J_a vs C_b	(1) rules/duties/social orders vs concern for people involved	5	5	0	2	10	2	5	7	12
J_a/J_b vs C_a	(2) rules/duties/fairness vs relationship maintenance	0	2	1	0	2	1	1	2	3
J_b vs S_a	(3) principle of fairness, righteousness and mutual respect vs the effect on self or the best for self	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2
J_a vs J_a	(4) two opposing viewpoints about the application of duty and responsibility (conflicts in Normative order)	4	2	2	1	6	3	6	3	9
J_b vs J_b	(5) the competing claim of need and right between two persons or two groups (struggle with fairness)	1	2	0	0	3	0	1	2	3
C_b vs S_a	(6) care for other's needs vs. the best situation for self (the needs and rights of self)	1	1	3	4	2	7	4	5	9
J_a vs S_b	(7) social expectation/convention vs self respect personal principle and standard as a valued self	0	0	2	3	0	5	2	3	5
S_a vs S_b	(8) self interest, needs, rights vs. personal principle and standard/valued self	0	0	1	1	0	2	1	1	1
Note:		N=12	N=12	N=9	N=10	N=24	N=19	N=21	N=22	N=43
		N=24		N=19		N=43			N=43	

J_a = Normative order C_b = welfare of other
 J_b = principle of fairness S_a = effect on self
 C_a = relationship maintenance S_b = self respect

women. Pattern 1, the most predominant pattern, was identified as follows:

"Part of the ceiling in the dining hall fell down at 1:00 p.m., damaging the food serving area. I got so angry because it was merely one of a series of incidents due to the building's questionable structure. Student's safety was the first priority for which we cannot compensate. I decided to determine who was legally responsible. However, if I exposed these issues publicly. I would become a celebrity in the newspaper. Then, a lot of people including current or former staff would get involved, no matter who was innocent or who deserved it. Someone did it just for survival in his special context. It was harmful to the school reputation too. I believed that even the current minister did not want to reveal it. Someone said that the former president got cancer in the hospital. He was very sick now."

Pattern 6, the second most predominant pattern of women's concerns was illustrated thusly:

"It is troublesome . . . for example, if we want to go out to do something, we had to arrange for someone to stay at home to care for them. We could never really relax. In addition, my father was already 78 years old though I hired a nurse to care for my mother-in-law, the nurse could not make final decisions in case something happened. So, my father might think that it was his obligation to make a decision. . . It seemed that an additional burden was put on my father . . . Then, I felt guilty about this . . . However, in my family my husband and the children were busy all year. We would be happy to have a two-week break. We hope to have a vacation in which we can thoroughly relax."

The top two conflict patterns mentioned by the men were pattern 4, a concern of two opposing viewpoints, and pattern 1, a concern over normative order as opposed to a concern for the people involved. The men's responses in these two patterns constituted more than half the frequency of all moral conflicts in professional situations. Two opposing

viewpoints concerning the application of duty and responsibility or behavioral standards would cause the complaint and create psychological conflict, especially when the two persons were unequal in their status. This most predominant pattern in men was the same as in Mennuti's study. Typical illustration of pattern 4 was extracted from raw data as follows:

"Toward this event, the president and I had totally different viewpoints. He had a negative attitude and emphasized 'What should have been done?' and 'Who should be responsible?' From my perspective this was nothing to fret about since it would not affect our school's honor in the mind of the public, but the President considered it to be disastrous, blaming us for not taking responsible action. . . In fact, it resulted from many factors . . . I asked myself whether to continue working or to resign my job."

The conflict between the dictates of rules or duties and a concern for the people involved in that context, pattern 1, stated by the men was presented in this way:

"I stood there, thinking that the intention of wrongdoing was clear. I could not let them go just because they had shown regret for what they had done. . . I was feeling very sad. Why did I have to be there at that moment? . . . And, if I was not part of the office of the Dean of Students, I would not have this struggle either. . . If I stepped into the shoes of the instructor and let them go, then things would be great . . . It is because I am responsible for implementing the rules and regulations. I have to do things this way."

The conflicts presented by all participants concerning professional issues were very predominantly focused on pattern 1 and pattern 4. This tendency was parallel to that found in the men's distribution and also showed the same

pattern as Mennuti's study. About two thirds of the participants focused their dilemma in professional situations on either pattern 1 or pattern 4. The conflicts presented surrounding personal situations tended to be expressed in the form of pattern 6 and pattern 7. Almost two thirds of participants focused their dilemma in personal situation on either pattern 6 or pattern 7. This finding was different from that of Mennuti's which showed a prevalence of pattern 8, in which an individual felt ambivalent between his interest and his self-esteem. Care for other's needs as opposed to concern for the needs and rights of self, the characteristics of pattern 6, was identified in a male president's discussion as follows:

"My second cousin wanted to borrow 4 to 5 million U.S. dollar from the bank in order to develop his career. He asked me to be his endorser and put my real estate security to the bank. It is something I could do easily. I should trust him, getting the loan would be a big help to his business. Thus, I should help. But when I considered myself -- it may be selfish. If his business got any problems, the money to repay was out of my ability, then, we would have to suffer a lot. Besides I did not just suffer by myself, my family had to suffer too. . . On the other hand, if I did not do it, I was not at peace with my conscience, my morals and my emotions."

Pattern 7 presented a struggle with compromising to social expectation or social convention versus holding to one's principles and standards to maintain self-respect. This is a kind of conflict between social standards and individual standards. The moral dilemma exemplifying this

issue was illustrated by these remarks:

"When I'm not at work, can I wear clothes that I really want to wear, wear clothes that are comfortable, big and loose? Can I make people pay less attention to my make-up?"

"To refute other's opinion in public is deemed offensive and discouraged by our society. But if those participants are all reasonable, they could tolerate a different point of view. To offer another perspective may expand their thinking. Originally, I was invited to express opinions. Should I comply with the group's opinion? I would rather to be honest to my self. I had to tell the truth. This is always my approach to this conflict."

The other four patterns were less frequently mentioned by the interviewers. It can be observed in Table 3 that pattern 2 was addressed in three moral dilemma incidents. Its conflict involved concern for duty or the principles of fairness versus concern for preserving relationships. It was presented in the interview as follows:

"We were good friends in the beginning. He was also my colleague and I hired him in the first place. So, when I rejected his request, I felt it was difficult to say "no" . . . I do whatever is right. . . my decision. . . surely destroyed my personal relationship with this person."

Pattern 5 was also articulated in three dilemma incidents. The conflict was embedded in the concern of the competing claims of needs and rights between two persons or two groups. It was often a situation in which people struggled with fairness. It was described as follows:

". . . that piece of paper was really torn off from the exam. It was really not cheating. . . I did not want to convict her since she was innocent. I, of course, had to be fair. I also had to consider the teacher who

took charge of the exam since he had to admit . . . admit that he was wrong . . . that would embarrass him."

Pattern 3 and 8 were the least mentioned. In pattern 3, the conflict focused on accomplishing the principle of fairness as opposed to creating the best situation for self. For example, "as mutual respect did not exist any more, what is your strategy to protect your rights and needs?" Such a question was relevant to this conflict. In pattern 6, the conflict is basically from within rather than from outside. The parallel question is "Do I conform with my belief that is in the "should" category or I would rather do whatever I like?" This is a typically ambivalent situation from one's inner world.

In sum, the participants provided various moral conflict patterns in different real life situations. These conflicts were soon resolved in the subsequent inquiry.

Factors Considered Leading to Final Decisions

After the participants had explained their conflicts, the researcher's inquiry was shifted to explore the reasoning process that led to the resolution of the problem. Each participant was asked questions such as: "What were your primary concerns when you tried to resolve this?" "Did you have any other considerations? For example, people, events, or things. What else?" The purpose of this inquiry was to understand how many factors were under consideration

while the participant faced moral dilemma and attempted to resolve each of his or her moral dilemmas.

The participant's explanations revealed pondering over a problem and reasoning processes. Some ideas or factors were more salient for the majority of the interviewees than were others. Each interviewee often considered several factors that were encompassed within similar dimensions or in thoroughly different dimensions. To sum up interviewees' concerns, the researcher found that the factors which emerged in the process of moral reasoning could be classified into six moral categories and two procedural concern categories. They were normative order, principle morality, keeping relationships, other's welfare, self-interest, and self-respect in the moral concern category, and in procedural concern category: Priority of consideration and contextual background exploration. The researcher counted each factor (often the same meaning of ideas or concepts) addressed by the interviewees' moral reasoning, then assigned the factors into categories. If two different concerns were initiated in the same category, they were calculated two times in that category. For example, the individual's concerns were divided by its key concepts:

(1) To refute others' opinions in public is deemed offensive and discouraged by our society.

(2) But, if those participants are all reasonable, they could tolerate different opinions. To offer another point of view may expand their thinking. Originally I was invited to express opinions. Should I comply with the group's opinion?

(3) I would rather be honest to my self. I had to tell the truth.

The preceding paragraph labeled (1) concerns social conventions, paragraph (2) concerns role and duty or obligation. Both of them are in the normative order. Paragraph (3) concerns self-respect. Table 4 was based on this categorization so as to offer a summary of the overall tendency of the cumulative responses. Reality is actually far more complicated than this. The verbal interpretation extracted from the raw data illustrated the whole picture of the participants' considerations in the process of moral dilemma resolution.

The concern of normative order was most frequently mentioned by these leaders of higher education of both genders, especially in professional situations. In addition to the participant's concerns about principled morality, it is easy to assert that the ethic of justice was the most dominant consideration in the public world. Kohlberg's claim of universality thus gains support in this study. Concepts in the justice category even more frequently

Table 4
Factors Considered Leading to Final Decisions

Reasoning Category Situations/Gender/ Frequency of concern	Professional		Personal		Total				Total			
	M	F	M	F	M	%	F	%	Prof	%	Pers	%
A. Moral reasoning categories												
J _a : Normative order concern	13	16	5	8	18	28	24	38	29	39	13	23
J _b : Principled Morality concern	6	8	1	2	7	11	10	15	14	19	3	5
C _a : Relationship keeping concern	0	2	2	0	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	4
C _b : Other's welfare concern	9	6	4	5	13	20	11	17	15	20	9	16
S _a : Self interest concern	5	3	9	6	14	22	9	14	8	11	15	27
S _b : Self respect concern	4	3	7	7	11	17	10	15	7	9	14	15
Sum of frequency	37	38	28	28	65	100	66	100	75	100	56	100
B. Procedural thinking categories (counted by incidents)												
P _a : Priority of consideration	3	1	0	1	3		2		4		1	
P _b : Contextual background exploration	4	3	2	4	6		7		7		6	

J=ethic of justice S=ethic of self
C=ethic of care P=procedure

considered by the female than by the male. This finding was dissimilar to Gilligan's findings.

In the personal situation, self-concern was most frequently considered by both genders of leaders of higher education, but especially by the males. Care consideration was not specific either to females or to the personal situations as that study of Walker, deVries and Trevethan (1987). Neither Gilligan's (1977, 1982b) women preference in care consideration nor Kohlberg's (1984) personal situation specific in care consideration were supported by this study. In the professional situation the leaders of higher education expressed more a variety of moral ideas in their considerations in resolving problems than in personal situations.

With respect to normative order, the interviewees regarded the maintenance of the function of a system, e.g. the concept of rule, law, policy, reputation, morale, and social convention to fall within this theme. The other concern was related to the concept of duty, role, obligation, or responsibility, as a president, dean, teacher, parent, or child. Typical examples of participant's concerns of these categories in their professional situations were illustrated sequentially.

"I firmly believed that the most important thing in a school is rules and regulations. Some rules can be changed, but some are related to the long term philosophy of the school. And, I have to be

responsible to the whole student body and teachers. If you break the rules only once, then in the future you can not uphold your principles."

"The teacher's role and duty is not merely communicating knowledge but also for the modeling of character. We are in a teacher-student relationship. I was responsible for correcting his wrong-doing."

In the personal situation, concern for the normative order was shown as follows:

"Since I was somebody else's wife, besides, my husband was very good to me, and my children had very good academic records . . . I could not do this kind of thing, right?"

Participants concern over principled morality involved primarily such issues as the principle of fairness, righteousness, reciprocity, equality, mutual respect, individual's rights, educational ideal, and student developmental theories. This type of concern often involved people's rights. The example in the professional situation was:

"The dean of student's office, and both the faculty and students involved made their best effort to carry out this program, so I had to support them fully. However, there were budget constraints in the relevant categories, and the director of accounting was unwilling to offer sufficient money. It frustrated them and me. The educational goal should be fulfilled and my purpose was to help the student's development in their holistic personality. . . "

Examples in personal situations included:

"I demanded that all our six brothers and sisters would have divided the inheritance equally."

"If they asked me for extra tutoring in a higher level course, I would more like to discuss with them, because it involved some reciprocity so that I would benefit

from the discussion also."

Since self-concern was most predominant in the participant's personal life situations, responses were divided about equally between concern for self-interest and concern for self-respect. In the professional situation, this concern was reduced almost by half. Basically, this phenomenon was determined by the content of the moral dilemma. The participant's self-interest concern included assessing the best situation for self, considering the event's effect on self, the cost to self, consideration of his or her own future prospects, career promotion, reputation, psychological health, physical life, and other interests. The examples that emerged in personal situations included:

"I had an innate resistance to those things. . . One of my relatives, for sake of face-saving, bought the insurance and soon found that it was a burden . . . What was more important was that we didn't badly need to buy any other insurance at that time."

"I could not offer them extra tutoring. My time was very limited. I had to finish my course work, project, report and assistant teaching. I had no help to take care of so much."

The examples from the professional situations were:

"At that time, I also considered that this person in the future would try every means to be against me."

"That guy had been a former secret agent with a powerful personal background. This event might have a very bad effect on me. It might be that sometimes I might be killed, who knows? I had better protect myself."

The participants' attention to self-respect involved self-image, other's appraisal of self, self-consistency, self-competence, self-confidence and self-actualization, peace with conscience, and personal principle. The examples were identified as follows:

"It was also a challenge to myself. I believed that if I could not deal with this incident well, I would doubt my capacity in my presidency. I had to try my best in resolving this event in order to satisfy myself. . . Your perception of yourself is very important, so you (I) had to be confident in yourself (myself)."

"Several years ago, I had claimed that whoever loved his country should go back to serve his country in a Chinese public gathering. Now I carried out my assertion in my own career choice. I felt good about myself because I was consistent in my word and action, in my believing and my acting."

"You also considered after you make the decision, how others would view you. They may feel you are morally wrong, and difficult to deal with. . . The impact on myself refers to other's value of my fairness, ways of handling things and self image."

The ethic of caring was evident in the concern for other's welfare instead of the concern for maintaining relationships. A concern for other's welfare often implied that an individual did not count his or her own cost. This concern often resulted from the love or deep concern for the specific other's special need, difficulty, harm, his or her future prospects and so on. In this study, it appeared that this concern was not really more predominant in personal situations than in professional situations as in Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer's (1983a/1984) assumption and Walker,

deVries, and Trevethan's (1987) study. For example, a male president strongly suggested "Morality is love, if there is no love as our living standard, there is immorality." Some examples identified in this concern were illustrated as follows:

"Some people believe that a diploma absolutely cannot be sent to any individual, but I thought in an exceptional case it can be sent. If everything followed the rule you cannot do something meaningful. I believed that to save a person is more significant than to save a diploma . . . love is the first priority."

"I also understand that people are living their own lives and every family has its special features. You are not another person, so you don't have a right to judge them."

"But sometimes I thought that he is 86 years old, because of his weakness in hearing, he stays alone most of his time. I felt so sorry for him; sometimes I observed his loneliness and felt miserable, then I invited him to eat out or to do something else, in order to make him happy."

Keeping relationships was mentioned in very few cases and was usually subordinate to other more dominant concerns while the participants attempted to resolve moral dilemmas. For example, a dean said "While I was in the situation, many questions came to my mind, such as "Will I offend this person?" or "Will he think I am very stingy? However, I often do not care about other's opinion of me and am very decisive . . . my decision in this event surely destroyed my personal relationship with this person." Another dean said "Speaking in favor of him may not be the factor for

promotion. It is a very complicated situation. I did not tell him the truth because I don't want to offend him."

Generally speaking, the distribution of several factors considered has slight difference between genders, but has evident difference between two situations. In addition, the professional situation was accepted more frequent consideration points than was personal situation. It implied the professional context was more complicated than the personal context.

Except with respect to the concern for moral sense, concern for how to make the moral decision (procedural thinking) was also found in the participant's reasoning process. Some of them particularly mentioned their priority of consideration in dealing with moral incidents. Some especially emphasized the importance of exploring the contextual background of an event although most participants have strong tendency to describe the contextual information already in the resolution of moral dilemmas.

Some examples of the application of the comprehensive principle in the moral reasoning process were as follows:

"Reason should be our first concern, law should be the second, humanity is to reduce harm."

"The law is the first priority of concern as an administrator, but the law is to serve people, so use it flexibly."

The example of purposefully contextual background exploration was extracted from a case involving a staff

member in an unethical indebtedness situation in the lending cooperative so that several colleagues became victims. The president dealt with it. He said:

"Moral problems usually imply some romantic problem or innate greed or some . . . of the person concerned. Moral problems always come from intention rather than from negligence. So when I dealt with it, the first priority was to collect data such as when, what, how, who was involved in this event. After that, I asked him about his financial situation, his strategies to deal with his life incidents and budget management . . . his formal status . . . his child's sickness and need for therapy. Did he ask for help from any social resources? But from his words I know his child's sickness was only an excuse for this unethical indebtedness . . . At the same time, I surveyed his work attitude and performance, his capacity and character. I tried to understand his advantages and disadvantages. Had he done anything of special value for the school? Did he have any special talents? . . . Was he kind or wicked ordinarily? When I understood all of these things, then, I started to decide on the strategy to resolve the problem."

This president asserted that this was his general principle or normal step to face a moral incident.

All those considerations mentioned above coming up to the interviewee's reasoning process eventually set the foundation to make a final decision.

Self-Evaluation of Final Decision and Consequences

The primary moral considerations formed the basis for the interviewees to make a final decision and subsequent action. Leading to a moral dilemma resolution, the participant usually integrated the various factors and weighed all of his or her concerns over categories. A final

decision normally represented an individual's central moral concern in which a moral orientation was embedded in the context. Some of their preceding considerations were not accessed to the final decision. For this reason, a final decision, often influenced by the social context, is not always satisfying to the decision maker. Some of them were accompanied by unwanted consequences. But still some others basically have no real solution by its nature. An individual's perception toward his or her decision and consequences often reflected his or her real insight of the incidents. This also demonstrated an individual's basic moral concern.

In this study, three questions relating to the final decision, results and influences, and evaluation were applied to the interviewees. Most of them described their decision directly, unsurprisingly along with some of their preceding considerations; others also shared their thinking process again. These central concerns in the final decision making period formed the basis for understanding an individual's moral orientation in the resolution of a moral dilemma.

Most of the participants felt positive about their final decision and consequences such as "I felt very peaceful and happy . . . feeling as if I have saved a person again." "I think I've just done what I should do . . . If

the same thing happened again, I would still do it the same way." However, a few decisions got additional unwanted consequences. An example, "This person was very furious. In my term of being the Dean, he always took the opposition against me. He seemed to be my enemy. In the meeting, there was always a person who did not agree with me on purpose." or, "Some relatives were angry at me. They criticized me 'why pay tax so much?' Actually, these consequences were not totally out of their expectations; for example, "I thought I could tolerate her resentment. Maybe it was because I had thought through the consequence and felt that I could tolerate it so I paid the price." Some decisions were temporary by the nature of the incidents. Most of these were related to daily family relationships such as a child's training, or an aged parent's care. Some compromising solutions were guided by the failure to resist based on misled social reality. A female president in this study considered several factors in this category, then compromised in order to surrender her solution. An example of this kind was demonstrated as follows:

"If I insisted . . . might I act out like an administrator working in a private company? If not, I might create a very embarrassing situation. . . you put your whole image in jeopardy . . . She would say that a teacher's duty is just teaching . . . a teaching contract also covers other relevant activities, but, the contract like that has not been used properly because no one paid attention to it. . . But under current circumstances, we have to do it cautiously. . . every teacher . . . has some family or personal

problems to deal with. . . When all of them happen to have difficulties. . . Finally I asked for the dismissal of the duty from the school in charge of the exam. I felt so helpless, if I had any other options. . . I would consider the male teacher first . . . Emotionally, it's going to make efforts for some while for women to become independent. There are so many things that you must be very firm and insistent about or no one is going to support you."

The decision making in this kind of situation also illustrated the complexity of moral dilemma resolution. Table 5 summarized the participant's self-evaluation of their final decisions and consequences.

Moral Orientation Models in the Moral Reasoning Process

A moral orientation models appeared while interviewees reasoned through constructing their moral dilemma, considerations leading to final decisions, and their self-evaluation of the solution and consequences. The interviewees' concerns usually shifted over the categories during the full reasoning process, but under normal conditions the considerations leading to the final resolution highlighted the central concerns. Due to the limitations of strategies or special context, some important concerns may be deprived of the chance to merge into the decision. Additionally, the major concern responded in each question sometimes is by nature different from those in other questions. For example, an excerpt showed:

interviewer: Just now, you told me that you considered that it may influence your future prospects, didn't you?

Table 5
Self Evaluation of Final Decisions and Consequences

	Professional Moral Incidents N=24		Personal Moral Incidents N=19		Total Incidents N=43
	M	F	M	F	
Satisfying decision and good consequence	10	5	5	6	26
Appropriate decision but unwanted consequences	1	2	0	2	5
Compromising resolution due to social context	1	4	1	0	6
Temporary resolution (never ending)	0	1	3	2	6
Sum of incidents	12	12	9	10	43

interviewee: Right! but this point was considered in a previous period when I was in conflict. Since now I had to make decision, I merely focused on the other three main points. I didn't have to consider it anymore.

So, the determination of a moral orientation model should realize this phenomenon and weigh the importance contributing to the orientation model. Any new idea in the discussion was taken into considerations. Besides, if the final decision was satisfying to the interviewee, the considerations leading to the decision were the basis to determine the central orientation, then, the other considerations which appeared in the reasoning process provided the supplementary references to refine the orientation model. However, if the final decision was the product of social pressure as opposed to being based on the participant's free will, the interviewee often expressed his or her frustration or disappointment. Thus, considerations leading to the final decision were equally weighted with other considerations over the full range of the reasoning process.

If an interviewee's considerations were focused within only one category, it was called a single orientation form. If his or her considerations covered two or three categories, but with one predominantly weighted (75% or above of all considerations), it was labelled a one predominant form. If his or her considerations focused on

Table 6
Men's Moral Orientations in Moral Reasoning Process

Male Interviewees	Orientations in							
	Events	Professional Situations			Events	Personal Situations		
		Justice	Care	Self		Justice	Care	Self
Case 1	1	P ₃	Δ	Δ	1		B ₂	B ₂
Case 2	2	Δ	P ₂		1	Δ		P ₂
		Δ	P ₂					
Case 3	1	P ₂		Δ	1	Δ	P ₂	
Case 4	1	P ₂	Δ		1	P ₃	Δ	Δ
Case 5	2	P ₂	Δ		1	Δ	P ₂	
		P ₂	Δ					
Case 6	1	B ₃	B ₃	Δ	1		Δ	P ₂
Case 7	1	B ₂		B ₂	1	Δ	Δ	P ₂
Case 8	1	P ₂		Δ	1	P ₂		Δ
Case 9	2	P ₃	Δ	Δ	1	B ₂	Δ	B ₂
		B ₂		B ₂				
Sum of events	12				9			

Illustrations:

symbols

descriptors

O₁

one orientation only

two orientation mixed

P₂

one predominant, one shadow

B₂

two balanced

three orientations mixed

P₃

one predominant, others shadow

B₃

three balanced, or two balanced with one shadow

Δ

shadow

Table 7
Women's Moral Orientations in Moral Reasoning Process

Female Interviewees	Orientations in							
	Events	Professional Situations			Events	Personal Situations		
		Justice	Care	Self		Justice	Care	Self
Case 1	2	P ₂	Δ		1	B ₃	Δ	B ₃
		P ₃	Δ	Δ				
Case 2	1	B ₂	B ₂		1	Δ		P ₂
Case 3	2	P ₃	Δ	Δ	1	B ₃	B ₃	B ₃
		P ₂	Δ					
Case 4	1	B ₂		B ₂	1	Δ	P ₂	
Case 5	1	B ₃	B ₃	B ₃	1	Δ	Δ	P ₃
Case 6	1	B ₂	B ₂		1	P ₃	Δ	Δ
Case 7	1	P ₂	Δ		1	P ₂		Δ
Case 8	2	B ₂	B ₂		2	B ₃	B ₃	B ₃
		O ₁				O ₁		
Case 9	1	Δ		P ₂	1	Δ		P ₂
Sum of events	12				10			

Illustrations:

symbols

descriptors

O₁

one orientation only
two orientation mixed

P₂

one predominant, one shadow

B₂

two balanced

three orientations mixed

P₃

one predominant, others shadow

B₃

three balanced, or two balanced with one shadow

Δ

shadow

Table 8
 Concised Form of Moral Orientation Models in Reasoning Process

Moral Orientation Models	Professional Incidents		Personal Incidents		Total Incidents
	Female	Male	Female	Male	
Single J	1	0	1	0	2 (female)
J predominant	2(J+A _C +A _S) 3(J+A _C) 2(J+A _S)	2(J+A _C +A _S) 3(J+A _C) 2(J+A _S)	1(J+A _C +A _S) 1(J+A _S)	1(J+A _C +A _S) 1(J+A _S)	16
C predominant	0	2(C+A _J)	1(C+A _J)	2(C+A _J)	5
S predominant	1(S+A _J)	0	1(S+A _J +A _C) 2(S+A _J)	1(S+A _J +A _C) 1(S+A _J) 1(S+A _C)	7
J/C balanced	3	1(J+C+A _S)	0	0	4 (professional situation)
J/S balanced	1	2	1 (J+S+A _C)	1 (J+S+A _C)	5
C/S balanced	0	0	0	1	1 (male in personal)
J/C/S three balanced	1	0	2	0	3 (female)
Sum of events	N=12	N=12	N=10	N=9	N=43

J=Justice orientation
 C=Care orientation
 S=Self orientation

J/C/S combination form in five styles:
 6(J+A_C+A_S)
 2(S+A_C+A_S)
 1(J+C+A_S)
 2(J+S+A_C)
 3(J+C+S)

two categories which balanced with 3:7, 4:6, or 5:5 ratio. It was named a two balanced form. Finally, if three categories were considered almost equally, it was named a multiple balanced form. The other considerations out of the mainstream were the shadow factors which were often of little importance to the solution. According to the aforementioned principles, the participants' moral orientation models were determined as in Tables 6 and 7. The symbols used were also described on the bottom of Tables. A concise form of the findings is shown in Table 8.

Eight moral orientation models were identified in participants' responses to the questions. Most of the moral orientation models were in combined forms. Single forms were rarely seen and there was no single-self and single-care model. Justice-focus mixed with either care or self shadow, or both, was the most predominant model found, especially in professional situations. There was half of professional incidents reasoned by this model. Self-focus mixed with other shadow forms was the most predominant model in personal situations. There was one-third of personal incidents reasoned in this model. There were slight gender differences in the distribution of moral orientation models. Single-justice model and justice-care-self multiple balanced model were found only in females. Justice-care balanced pattern only emerged in professional situations while

justice-care balanced pattern was shared by both genders in both situations.

It was noteworthy that within eight orientation models there were 14 incidents reasoned in justice-care-self combinations with 5 different styles as shown in the legend block for Table 8. The moral orientation models found in this study were for more complicated and elaborated than those found in Mennuti's (1987) four orientation models and Gilligan and Attanucci's (1988) five orientation models and Lyons' (1988) three moral orientation patterns. However, they may be closer to the reality.

Moral dilemma situation was seen as more important than was gender element. This finding was close to Walker's (1989,1986) and Walker, deVries and Trevethan's (1987) conclusion that dilemma content within real life clearly related to moral orientation preferences; when it held constant, there was no sex differences in orientation use. Kohlberg, et al., (1983b/1984) and Langdale (1983) also suggested that concerns about justice and care arose from different kinds of moral problems.

There were three males and three females who used similar orientation models for reasoning both in their professional and personal moral dilemma incidents. It implied that one third of the participants consistently used similar orientation models in moral reasoning across the

dilemma situations. But 4 out of 6 of those interviewed provided two incidents in one situation, they also used very similar orientation models for reasoning between two incidents in one situation. Whereas in another dilemma situation, they reasoned by a totally different orientation model. It also implied that the dominant factor was attributed to dilemma situation factor instead of a personal favorite. There was no evident gender specific in the moral orientation model used. The above mentioned also can be scrutinized from Table 6 and 7.

Mennuti and Creamer's (1991) conclusion that participants seemed to have slightly favored patterns of orientation use and tended to use them similarly, regardless of the content, was partially supported. Walker, deVries and Trevethan's (1987) pointed out that only 37.5% participants in their study consistently used one orientation counting on a more liberal criteria. Walker (1989) again proved that few people were consistent in the use of one orientation across dilemma or over time. Their conclusions were supported.

Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to organize and describe the responses from interviews with 18 leaders of higher educational institutions in Taiwan as they discussed real life moral dilemmas. Figure 3 summarized the

participants' predominant moral conflict focus in the incidents encountered in their real life and their six consideration categories leading to the moral decisions. All this process has been illustrated in this chapter. A review of the findings as follows:

1. There are slight gender differences in generating the types of dilemma incidents in personal situations.

2. Dilemma situation factors were more important than gender factors in predominant types of conflict focus and categories of moral considerations though slight gender preference was found.

3. The consideration of justice, especially in the normative order category, was most predominant in professional situations whereas a consideration for the self was most prevalent in personal situations, especially with the males. The consideration of care showed no gender preference.

4. Contextual consideration was observed in most participants' moral reasoning process. Some of them even emphasized the necessity of contextual explorations.

5. Eight moral orientation models were identified from the participants' reasoning process. Most moral orientation models were in combined forms. Single orientation forms were rarely seen and there was only single justice orientation model.




Figure 3. Factors Leading to Final Decision in Moral Reasoning

6. Justice-focus mixed with either care or self shadow, or both, was the most predominant model found, especially in professional situations. Self-focus mixed with other shadows was the most predominant model in personal situations.

7. There were slight gender differences in the distribution of moral orientation models. No evidence showed the care orientation predominant to the women.

8. There were 14 incidents reasoned in justice, care, and self combinations with five styles within eight orientation models.

The aforementioned findings will serve as a foundation to extend the comparison, interpretation and discussion in the next chapter.

Chapter V

COMPARISON, INTERPRETATION, AND DISCUSSION

The major finding of this qualitative research revealed that leaders of higher education in Taiwan tended to use three moral orientations in combination in the moral reasoning process when they encountered a real moral dilemma in their professional or personal situation. In addition, conflict focus, factor considered, and moral orientation were slightly different between genders and evidently varied with the dilemma situation. Mennuti's discovery of the self orientation proved to be a prominent perspective in the moral reasoning process.

In this Chapter, previous findings are organized in order to relate them to the study purpose and research questions that were stated in Chapter 1. An overall comparison among the findings of Kohlberg, Gilligan, Mennuti, Walker and this study will be described. Some findings will be integrated to extract new insight from the research. Interpretation and discussion will follow. Main topics are:

1. Self orientation and three moral orientation models. In this section, justice, care, and self orientation and their properties, structure and function are discussed. Consistency of model use is also mentioned.

2. Moral orientation among men and women related to the content of dilemma situation. In this section, the comparison of several findings and the interpretation of contradictory information are provided. Dilemma situations and cultural factors are highlighted.

3. Contextual relativism and the moral decision. In this section, contextual considerations related to gender and moral orientation issue are investigated. Additionally moral reasoning and final decision in the context are also discussed.

Self Orientation and Three Orientation Models

At the beginning, the discussion and debate concerning moral orientation centered on either Kohlberg's single moral orientation which referred justice to morality, or Gilligan's dual moral orientation model which claimed the orientation of care to be parallel to the orientation of justice. Recently, Mennuti and Creamer presented a tri-moral orientation model including consideration of orientation toward self. Furthermore, my study supports the orientation toward self as a prominent perspective in the moral reasoning process. The researcher will discuss its nature, properties and function in this section, along with the justice and care orientations. Finally, the three-orientation model for the leaders of higher education institutes in Taiwan will be explained.

Self

The relationship of self to moral development was mentioned briefly in a considerable number of studies. From the point of view of Kohlberg and Gilligan, self is defined as "ego" with respect to levels of judgment embedded within the orientation of care and justice. Self orientation has been identified among the properties that were viewed as irrelevant to distinguish justice from the care in Lyon's coding scheme but still relevant to moral reasoning. Mennuti's discovery proved the self orientation operated substantially in the process of moral reasoning.

Self-concern is not confined to egoistic interest but to concern about how people actually viewed themselves in relation to the moral events. In Mennuti's study, the distinguishing characteristics of self orientation are a concern for the effect on self and concern for self understanding. They encompassed the effect on one's status or achievement, health, self image and an understanding of their own attitudes, feelings, and expectations to be accepted as a valued self. In my study, the same characteristics were also expressed by participants with the discovery of additional comprehensive properties. The researcher labelled them as self-interest concern and self-respect concern. The self-interest concern was more prominent in men than in women. It included a concern for

assessing the best situation for self, considering the event's effect on self, consideration of one's own future prospects, reputation, psychological health, and physical life. These properties were more closely related to social interest and psychological interest than to physical or substantial interests.

The self-respect category involved a consideration of self-image, self-consistency, self-competence, self-confidence, self-actualization, and peace with conscience. The properties and functions of the self orientation are very distinguishing. From the dialogue, the leaders of higher education revealed a strong sense of attempting to achieve perfect-self or ideal self. In Confucian teaching, self-cultivation was a requirements to achieve "self-realization" that referred to practicing the principle of "Jen" in order to be perfect in an individual's character (Hwang, 1992). This moral example, in addition to wealth and achievement are three bases resulting in social inequality in China (Bond, 1991) however.

The conflict that involved self concern had a special point in this study. It was aroused not only from the need to consider other's welfare or justice simultaneously, but also from within, a conflict between self-interest and the demand of perfect-self image. It was also called inner conflict. Self concern always mixed with other concerns to

some degree. It prevailed in personal situations. The self-interest consideration was more prevalent with men than by with women.

In both Mennuti's study and this study, not only did self statement play a prominent role in the moral reasoning process, but people also sought to understand themselves from conflict events and from other's viewpoints. Sometimes the participants sought such understanding of themselves in relation to events from their past and possible events in the future. In reality, the participants needed to adapt themselves to the situation in order to achieve harmony and a best sense of themselves.

As an individual developed, his or her self-concept developed and may have helped the individual to define himself or herself in moral terms. So, the researcher assumed that the orientation of self implied a developmental meaning and a vertical construction.

Justice

The nature of justice has been discussed at great length in the history of philosophy and psychology. Equality is an ideal and great strength of the orientation of justice. When it is impossible to satisfy various kinds of relationships or conflicting claims of individuals in relationships, the best solution is fairness, which rests on understanding relationships as reciprocity between separate

persons. However, fairness may not provide care sufficient for all the people involved.

The orientation of justice and its properties as shown in my study were evident and distinguishable in two ways. One was called the normative order, the other was principled morality in the sense of justice. With respect to normative order, the participants regarded the maintenance of a system as very important. It is the characteristic of stage 4 in Kohlberg's moral development scheme. It covered the concept of applying rule, law, policy, reputation, morale, and social convention to a given situation and the concept of duty, obligation or responsibility of conducting a social role. Concerning principled morality, the participant thought to apply the moral principle of righteousness, reciprocity, equality, mutual respect, individual's rights and educational ideal and development theories to a given situation. It is the characteristic of stage 5 or above in Kohlberg's moral development system.

In this study, moral conflicts resulted from the justice concern in several ways. Sometimes, a regulation or social convention was not in accord with the principle of equal opportunity. Sometimes, the people in different roles and with different perspectives had opposing views about the application of responsibility and duty.

Among the three orientations, justice was the most

prominent. It functioned independently or combined with other orientations. It prevailed in the public world especially when the incident was complicated and many people or groups were involved. Particularly, normative order was the most predominant considerations in the professional world. Also, the second most prevalent consideration in the personal world. According to Snarey's (1985) review, stage 4 moral reasoning was a typical type for Chinese moral mature adult in a collectivistic society. His perspective was proven to some extent with participants' response in this study.

Care

The orientation of care was based on one's connecting ones own response toward others. This perspective emphasized a concern for the needs of others along with maintaining harmony among people. Two categories were found in this study, one was a concern for other's welfare just for their sake, the other was concern for necessary maintaining relationships.

In my study, in the category of a concern for other's welfare, the participant expressed their love or care for a specific person's need, harm, difficulty, future prospect and so on. This category was evident but not a prevalent category in personal situation. But in professional situations, it was the second most predominant category.

Relationship maintenance, a characteristic of stage 3 of Kohlberg's theory, was rarely mentioned.

Caring for others may lead individuals to be unconcerned for their own needs and rights. To practice the orientation of care, the participants often paid the cost themselves or resulted in pain and struggle for themselves, especially in professional situations. The care for other's welfare often mixed with other considerations in different proportions.

Kohlberg (1983b/1984) believed that in his sixth stage, the principle of justice and principle of care integrated and formed a single moral principle. In this study, a college president emphasized that "the morality of love" was an example. However, the principle of care or love in Kohlberg's system was a general principle. But a special concern given to the kinship ties or overridden the universality of impartiality seemed unlikely as implied in Kohlberg's system.

Three Model Orientation Model

The moral orientation of self, justice, and care were used to resolve dilemma situations by a variety of combinations in this study. Single orientation form was rarely seen. There was no case of care only or self-concern only found in this study. Concern for justice only was found only in two incidents, originating from a female who

insisted on the principle of fairness. The participant's special care for their children or students usually mixed with concern about their role, duty, or the challenge of the regulations of the public system from the outside world. A care-predominant model mixed with justice shadow was observed but not a single case of care only. Mennuti did not find care only either. Kohlberg's (1983a/1984) claim that the orientation of care was unable to resolve moral problem independently may be reasonable.

The participant's self concern often met the challenge of social expectation, the principle of justice, or the need to care for others. So, when self concern was predominant, the others were shadows. This model was most predominant in the personal situation. Both care predominant and self predominant models actually reflect how participant adapted their concerns to reality.

In the professional situation, half of the dilemma incidents were reasoned out with justice as the predominant form mixed with shadows of other forms. It was the most prevalent model in the interview. The participant usually considered the long-term effect of their decision on the institution and then on the people. The care concern only served as a supplement to reduce harm to a specific person and the self concern only briefly combined with duty. Sometimes justice-concern was balanced with care-concern,

but only in the professional situation, while other times it was balanced with self-concern. These three models were used in almost all the reasoning processes in professional dilemmas. In personal situations, the distribution of eight moral orientations model was not evident as a tendency.

A justice-care-self multiple balance form was used only by women in three incidents. However, the combination of three orientations could be weighted its portion in several ways. In this study, five styles of construction were found. Nearly one third of the incidents were reasoned in these three combination styles, and within these styles, nearly half were justice predominant model mixed with shadow of both care and self concern. So, the researcher could conclude that the leaders of institutions of higher education use either the justice predominant model or the three orientation combination.

Consistency or Inconsistency of Orientation Model Use

Walker (1987) found that few people were consistent in the use of a single orientation across dilemmas or over time. Mennuti and Creamer (1991) found that community college presidents seemed to have slightly favored patterns of orientation. In my study, one-third of the leaders of institutes of higher education used their favorite model across the dilemma situations, some other leaders used a similar model for reasoning in two incidents of the same

situations but not for different dilemma situation. Still others never showed any consistency in orientation model use. This study covered both styles of flexibility and consistency.

This finding basically resulted from more elaborate data analysis. It was close to the description of the function of personality and also close to the observation of reality. Some people were more flexible than consistent in their behavior but others there were more consistent than flexible. They believed was no right or wrong, no good or evil.

However, when these two characteristics were expressed in a moral judgment they may be viewed in either a positive or negative way, depending on the context. Kreb, Vermeulen, Carpendale, and Denton (1991) stated "highly consistent individuals may seem rigid in situations where flexibility is required; inconsistent individuals may come across as adaptable in situations where different types of moral judgment are valued. Conversely, consistency may reflect moral integrity, and inconsistency hypocrisy in situations" (p. 169).

Moral Orientation Among Men and Women Related to the Content of Dilemma Situation

The question of moral orientation as it related to dilemma situations and genders was first raised by Gilligan

(1977, 1982a), because she suspected that Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemma may inhibit the responses of women who are concerned with their relationship and their responsibility to others. She and her colleagues addressed the gender preferences in moral orientation by conducting interviews of subject-generated real life moral dilemma (Gilligan, Langdale, Lyons & Murphy, 1982; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Lyons, 1983/1988; Johnston, 1988). Only Langdale (1983) suggested that concern about justice or care may arise from different kinds of moral problems.

Kohlberg, Levin, and Hewer (1983b/1984) pointed out that preferential orientation was largely a function of the type of moral problem defined and of the sociomoral atmosphere of the environment in which the dilemma occurs. This assumption was largely supported by Walker, deVries and Trevethan's (1987) and Walker's (1989) empirical studies.

In contrast, Mennuti and Creamer's (1991) analyses did not reveal any important differences in orientation in terms of different dilemma situation, but did show slight gender difference(s) in orientation. Female preferred care orientation while male preferred self orientation.

My study, by interviewing leaders of institute of higher education in Taiwan about real life dilemmas, showed that a slight gender difference existed. Self-interest consideration was more prominent in men than in women.

However, the dilemma situation was far more closely related to conflict focus, factor considered, and moral orientation. Kohlberg's assumptions and Walker's studies were fully supported in this point. However, Gilligan's assumption was not supported. Mennuti and Creamer's study was partially supported.

The consideration of justice, especially in the normative order category, was most frequently presented by the participant to resolve moral dilemma in their professional situation. Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer's (1983a/1984) assumption was that the principle of justice was an important component of decision making in the public world; for example, in workplace and in government, while care reasoning was supposed to be relevant solely to personal problems which often involved special relationship. However, my study did not show the orientation of care and response to be the most frequently mentioned in personal dilemma situations. Instead, within this orientation, the concern for other's welfare and needs was the next most prevalent category in professional situations. Conversely, the orientation toward self, either at the self-interest level or self-respect level, or both, was the most prominent in personal dilemma situations. Thus, Kohlberg's assumption, that the orientation of care was largely used in the personal world, was not supported.

Because of comparisons mentioned previously, two questions were raised. First, this study basically followed the Mennuti (1987) design in sampling, data collection and analysis. The demographic background of the samples were also similar. Why did she conclude that there were slight gender difference in moral orientation, while the researcher found that specific dilemma situations evidently determined the choices involving moral orientation? Second, why does the personal dilemma situation elicit the orientation of self, instead of care, while the professional situation elicits a consideration of other's welfare instead of principled morality, as the second predominant item? The researcher offered the following interpretation and discussion:

Question 1: Why did the similar design result in different findings which related to the dilemma situation between this study and Mennuti's study?

An examination of the dilemma incidents and conflicts focused upon in both studies was the first concern. The form of incidents generated in both studies was very similar. The only difference was that the incidents from this study included a greater variety of matters and relationships than Mennuti's. Gender difference in incidents generated was negligible.

Though the conflict focus in this study encompassed a greater variety of patterns than that Mennuti's, the most

predominant conflict pattern of either female or of male was the same. The distribution of various conflict patterns between genders was not different in this study but the distribution between two situations was evidently different (see Table 3). Mennuti's (1987) analysis did not go into so much detail. It was not clear whether this had something to do with the difference in results. Moral orientation use varied considerably between dilemma situations in this study, but no variations appeared in Mennuti's study. Perhaps this difference was the result of a cross-cultural factor, i.e. Chinese "situation-centeredness." It referred that "Chinese tend to mobilize their thought and action for the purpose of conforming to reality rather than making reality conform to him," according to Anthropologist Francis Hsu (1981, p. 13).

In Chinese society, the extended family rather than nuclear family is the primary social unit. Child rearing and discipline are practiced by the elder generation of the family-clan. Parents, grandparents, uncles and aunts are often the disciplinarians. Chinese parents have much less exclusive control over their children in comparison to American parents. Owing to the different opinions and standards of each care giver, the judgment of an action is often based on approval by the clan members rather than by the behavior itself. To maintain a harmonious relationship

within the clan, a child is trained to see the world in terms of a network of relationships. He not only has to submit to his parents, but also has little choice in his wider social world and what he individually wishes to do. So, he is led to be sensitive to his environment (Hsu, 1981; Tzen, 1971).

Confucius' teaching "Chungyung" (The doctrine of Golden Mean) was interpreted as: "A sage always acts at the right time, at the right place and with right manners; and always in harmony with the situation." Mean is the halfway between two extremes, without any bias (Four Books). This teaching is the best reflection of the need to be sensitive to the situation in Chinese culture. As Dien (1982) stated, it is a cultural ideal and social expectation toward people from sage to common citizen and from adult to child in Chinese society. Hence, that the leaders of higher education with different predominant moral orientations become reasonable and understandable.

Question 2: Why did personal dilemma situations elicited self-concern rather than care-concern as the most predominant concern, while professional dilemma elicited a concern for others rather than concern for principled morality as the second most prevalent item?

In the past, Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemma, which was deemed most appropriate to elicit an individual's highest possible level of moral reasoning, evoked judgment about imaginary characters and plots. It is obviously abbreviated

in detail description, and there is no clear context, no self-involvement, and no real consequence to the subjects (Friedman, 1985; Kreb, vermeulen, Carpendale, and Denton, 1991; Trevethan and Walker, 1989).

In contrast, a real-life moral dilemma usually takes place in a context that provides an abundance of information on the implications of decisions. Especially in a self-experienced moral dilemma situation, self-interest was often involved and/or also the interests of others related to the subject, so that the judgment and decision may have caused strong consequences to the subject or to other relevant people. For this reason, real-life moral dilemma may elicit an individual's sensitivity and extensive attention to many practical and situational considerations. So, Treventhan and Walker (1989) suggested that moral reasoning in real-life moral dilemma usually expressed at a lower level of development, implying more concern for self-interest than was involved in the hypothetical dilemma. A similar conclusion was also reported by Kreb and Vermeulen, et al. (1991).

The researcher examined the data in terms of original design and definition of the dilemma situation, but no possible answer was obtained. A new insight was inspired by the model of Walker, et al. (1987). He classified moral dilemmas into two categories: personal versus impersonal.

He said:

"a 'personal' moral conflict was interpreted as one involving a specific person or group of people with whom the subject has a significant relationship, defined generally as one of a continuing nature (e.g. a family member, friend. . .). An 'impersonal' moral conflict was interpreted as one involving a person or group of people whom the subject does not know well. . . or is not specified. . . , or as one involving institutions, . . . or involving an issue primarily intrinsic to self" (p. 847).

In this study, three personal incidents involving a son or daughter were apparently reasoned by caring as the predominant model (see Table 6 and 7, female case 4, male case 3 and 5). An example extracted from a president is as follows:

"Based on my intuition, I knew his (son's) life was in danger. I had to save his life, besides, I care nothing at that time. I cried. . . if he died, I could hardly live with myself any more."

Another four incidents, related to aged parents-in-law, relatives, or close friends, were explained using the care balanced model or care shadow. The other seven incidents involved remote relationships with people such as a friend's wife, neighbor, schoolmates, or the attendants of a meeting, were reasoned by a justice-predominant or self-predominate model. The orientation of care merely served a shadow or was completely eliminated.

The other five incidents, centered on personal behavior as opposed to behavior with general others (social convention), were reasoned by the self-predominant model.

From the examination of dilemma incidents and orientation use in personal situations, it is possible to identify a logic that along with a hierarchial order of relationships from kinship ties, pseudo-kinship ties to general society, the moral orientation model varied.

The care orientation model was closely related to this relationship order. The more closely the relationship of character in the incident was tied to the subjects, the heavier the subjects reasoned in care orientation, increasing the weight from care shadow, care balanced to care predominant. A president claimed how his consideration of relationship ties related to his decision to express caring concern, shown from an excerpt below:

"But if this relative was a very close to me, such as parents or children, or second close to me, such as siblings, I would do it without hesitation; if it was just related to money instead of reputation, I would do it. . . he was not a very close relative, (probably a second cousin)."

The characteristics of the Chinese rule of interpersonal interaction, with a hierarchial love based on the Confucian "Jen," appeared in this study. With respect to human nature, parents and children are an extension of our physical life and social life. Any adversity from them will cause empathy and suffering for all of us. So, we would rather pay the costs for their sake. Sometimes we placed their benefits or welfare above our own. For other relationship ties, it was largely uneasy to elicit such kind

of feeling or substantial responsibility.

Regarding the care orientation use in the professional situation, the interview transcriptions and Table 6 revealed that those incidents involved students as a source of conflict were always reasoned in the care-predominant or care-balanced model or care-shadow minimally. The proportion of cases as such is one-third of the incidents in the professional situation. Perhaps this is the reason that a concern for other's welfare was second prevalent in the professional situation. However, this phenomenon did not actually happen among any other relationships such as colleagues, Governors, or former presidents in the professional life.

Basically, China is a familialistic society. Family relationships were well-defined and dominated by an affectionate rule, but to those one did not know or know well, Confucianism did not provide ethical guidance (King, 1985). Usually, Chinese would extend kinship ties and rule to an interaction with a friend or neighbor or specific person to form a pseudo-kinship tie. Accordingly, the familial-like rule seemed to be extended to the teacher-student relationship but not to colleagues or other relationships in professional situations.

To this point, two possible reasons can be explored. One can be illustrated by two Chinese proverbs: "Teacher-

student relationship is compared to the father-child relationship" and "Once being a mentor, I fathered him all this life." This is representative of Chinese tradition. Another reason is derived from educational philosophy: "Education is love"; "to be a student is for learning, why can I not give him or her a chance?" Several participants who involved students in the conflict incident emphasized the same words.

Nevertheless, the use of orientation of care in the professional dilemma situation often caused pain and struggle for the subject. One of the participants illustrated this as follows:

"When I offered this extra favor to that student, if his family was very poor, that would be no problem. But if his family was rich, my moral conduct could have been questioned. Some might have suspected that I have received bribes more or less."

"If you want to carry out the morality of love, you have to devote many extra hours and energies. Sometimes you have to sacrifice yourself. Now I am getting old, and current society has changed its climate. It is difficult to fulfill the morality of love any longer. Sometime you might violate regulations, sometimes other administrators do not agree with what I do."

According to the interpretation and discussion aforementioned, a hierarchial order of personal relationships, based on this study and relevant inference, was classified as follows. The first level was nuclear family members, the second level was close relatives and close friends, specific students or mentors. The third

level was general colleagues, classmates, teachers, neighbors and group members. And the fourth level was people that one did not know or did not know well. Generally, self-concern may be embedded in a subject's central consideration. The closer the relationship level, the more predominant the care concern functioned and the less prevalent the justice concern applied and vice versa. Self-concern often was carefully balanced between the care and the justice orientations in accordance with the relationship levels.

This classification of relationship is somewhat different from that of Walker's, but probably more suitable to Chinese society. So, when it was stated that the dilemma situation related to moral orientation use, the most important consideration was the level of the relationship between the subject and those involved in the dilemma situation. Personal versus professional situation or personal versus impersonal situations was not the issue.

In Confucian relation-based system, besides the emphasis on the differentiation of the relationship, establishing or sustaining a relationship was emphasized. It is often seen that an individual violates law or justice principles to satisfy the need of relationship. However, only very few of participants in this study resolved their moral dilemmas focusing on relationship maintenance.

Perhaps part of the reason is that the participants are more westernized or modernized and the other part of the reason is that the participants are more mature in moral reasoning.

Contextual Consideration and Final Decision in Moral Reasoning Process

Contextual relativism

Murphy and Gilligan (1980) adopted Perry's scheme of cognitive and ethical development to illuminate women's moral development. "Contextual relativism," position 5 and above in Perry's scheme, was addressed as a more advanced level than the highest stage of Piaget (formal operation). It referred to the fact that no answer may be objectively right in the sense of being context-free. Gilligan (1981, 1982b) attributed it to a characteristic of women's moral judgment, that being sensitivity to the details of situations. This contrasted to Kohlberg's moral judgement, applying one principle in any situation.

Nonetheless, Kohlberg (1983a/1984) clarified this misunderstanding using Dewey's theory. He stated, "Our conception of a principle, like Dewey's, is not one of principle as a fixed rule; rather, we too understand a principle as a way of construing a concrete moral situation." "Principled reasoning is obviously historically and contextually relative" (p. 298).

Gilligan appeared to think that only people whose moral reasoning centered on care and relationships would be concerned with contextual detail. In fact, people expected to make a fair or right moral judgment should also be concerned with the contextual detail. Otherwise, a just judgment would not have resulted. This is not necessarily specific to women. Additionally, to make a rash judgment based on an abbreviated description is irresponsible behavior in real life.

In this study, a president described a professional incident related to a faculty member's ignorance of responsibility under contracts. She illustrated the historical background of this incident. Finally, her moral orientation model was categorized as a justice-predominant form. In her personal situation, she demonstrated the importance of contextual relativism to a moral decision. Afterward, she said "If my family were not so complicated, I would not guarantee that I would have done the same thing, obeying the law and paying so much tax." She emphasized:

"moral decision involves various situational considerations, emotionally, legally, and morally. At least, the discomfort in a moral sense often was accompanied with discomfort in a legal sense. Though a person has his moral standard, his decision in different situations may vary. A moral decision cannot be singled out from its contextual considerations unless it is made under a hypothetical situation."

Her moral orientation model in this case was assigned to a justice-self balanced form mixed with care shadow.

Some other male counterparts who emphasized the necessity of contextual consideration made less use of a care-related model. There was no evidence that the contextual consideration was more preferred by females or more characteristic of people who were concerned with care over the welfare of others. Among 43 incidents described, only a few did not include any description of context. Perhaps, this related to the Chinese predisposition toward perceiving stimuli as a whole rather than as a collection of parts (Bond, 1991).

Contextual consideration was merely a characteristic (symptom) of moral maturity or personal maturity. It was more likely a necessary condition for a mature and responsible moral judgement when an individual was faced with an irreversible reality on social experience. Because of the lack of a comparable study on this topic, this assumption needs further study.

In some cases, the social context has impeded the participants from making decisions according to his or her real concerns. This phenomenon illustrated the difficulty and complication of making a moral decision.

Moral Reasoning and the Final Decision in the Context

That context had a profound influence on the moral decision making for individuals in real life has been

emphasized by Friedman (1985), Kohlberg (1983a/1984), Kreb (1991), Rest (1984).

In my study, the researcher observed that in about one-third of the dilemma situations the final decision of the participants did not exactly reflect their considerations revealed in the reasoning process. The distribution for males was 6 incidents in the professional situation and 2 incidents in the personal situations, while for females there were 5 incidents in the professional situation and 3 in the personal situation. It was evident that this kind of issue was more prevalent in the professional situation.

Generally, these incidents could be classified into two groups. One was referred to as incidents in which decisions were based on the participant's free will, and the other was constrained by social context. For the first kind, the participants were often involved in a variety of considerations, but when they made a final decision, previous trivial consideration was filtered out and the final decision highlighted their central concern. It largely represented an assessing procedure of the conflicts and the situation although the results may have been satisfying or not satisfying. For example, a male president wanted to offer special care to a student. During the reasoning process, one idea flashed into his thinking. "As a president, I have no power to do so, because it is against

the regulations." Finally, he still made the decision to keep this student in school. In this case, the moral orientation was assigned to the care-predominant model with a justice shadow because it was based on the reasoning process. It could be assigned to the single-care model if it is the basis for the final decision.. The shadow elements were often dismissed in the final decision in most of the cases.

However, for the second group, the decisions were more driven by the social context than by the decision maker's willingness. Four incidents were in this group. Within them, three in the professional situation and one in the personal situation. In the professional case, a male participant felt conflict but soon inhibited his real concern and adjusted himself to the requirement of the social context in order to conform to other's expectation of his social role. The consequence was basically satisfying. But the other two incidents were forcefully driven by contextual considerations and social climates. The participants became very ambivalent and timid to make a decision. Two female presidents eventually made decisions that were against their real concern. Although the bad consequences were not evident immediately, the presidents did not feel good about themselves and society. This example was previously described at the end of Section 5, in

Chapter 4. The other president evaluated the incident and said furiously, "afterward, a great deal of people praised me for being generous and kind. It was a joke. There is no well developed idea of justice in this society." In these cases, they expressed the opinion that if the social context changed, they would make different choices. The participant in the personal dilemma felt helpless to his resolution because the minor concern should be excluded in final decision.

The moral reasoning largely led to the final decision but the social context in which the incidents occurred always led the direction of reasoning. Sometimes the situation would inhibit an individual from performing what they believed was moral. In addition to those mentioned above, still some examples were listed as follows:

- Example 1: "Because this situation could be manipulated flexibly, I could decide what I wanted to do without that person knowing what I had actually done."
- Example 2: "Since the whole world was full of unfairness, and the mutual respect was broken, I did what I did for survival and convenience."
- Example 3: "I want to fulfill my morality of love, but other administrators disagreed with me."

Usually, considerations in moral reasoning could be very diverse and comprehensive, but a final decision was a moral performance or action. The considerations had to be tailored to the situation because a moral decision in real

life was irreversible. Social context and incident situation influence on the moral decision were evident. It also revealed the difficulty and complexity of making a moral decision.

Summary

In this chapter, the research questions were answered. The leaders of institutes of higher education in Taiwan tended to use three moral orientations in combination. There were a variety of combination forms. Self-orientation was a prominent perspective in the moral reasoning process. The properties, structure, and function of self, care, and justice were discussed. The second part of the study showed that the specific dilemma situation was evidently related to choice of moral orientation. The most important element in dilemma situation that related to moral orientation was the relationship level between the character in the conflict incident and the subject. The Chinese characteristic of situation-centeredness was used to explain results different from those of Mennuti. The third part did not support contextual relativism related to gender and moral orientation use. Social context and incident situation also influenced moral decisions. The final decision often excluded some shadow elements and highlighted central concerns.

Chapter VI

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION

Kohlberg's theoretical framework of moral development based solely on logical reasoning about right, justice, and reciprocity remains the most widely accepted explanation of moral reasoning. Gilligan presented the orientation of care and response to highlight women's characteristic of moral reasoning, which provided evidence for a broader view of morality than Kohlberg's and has expanded the boundaries of research in moral development.

However, controversial issues still remained, e.g., the cultural universality of moral reasoning in either the principle of justice or principle of care, or both, or others. Gender issues and dilemma situation are also related to moral orientation. The question of self-interest appears to be characteristic of moral reasoning in the lower stage.

Since Mennuti discovered the orientation of self with the regard to self-respect, the interpretation of morality, especially in the higher developmental level, was broadened once more. The function and relationship among the orientations of justice, care, and self in moral reasoning and moral development was a more attractive topic. However, successive research, especially empirical study in other cultures, was needed to support, and to strengthen the

theoretical implications of the new findings.

Summary of the Study

This study was designed to investigate some of the previous issues by examining the process of moral dilemma resolution used by the leaders of higher education institutes in Taiwan. The presidents or deans of the universities or colleges were perceived as morally mature persons in Chinese society. They were believed to be in a sensitive role to handle moral dilemmas and the consequences of their decisions.

The primary interest of this study lay in dilemma definition and reasoning processes employed to resolve moral dilemmas in their professional and personal lives. A semi-structured protocol with open-ended questions was applied in the process of individual interviews. The conflict that the participants formulated served as the basis for further inquiry into the ideas processed as they attempted to achieve a resolution. Forty-three dilemma incidents were provided by 18 presidents or deans (9 males and 9 females) in colleges or universities. The subjects were selected based on a theoretical sampling method. The responses in the full range of interviews were audio-taped and transcribed and analyzed according to the constant comparative analysis suggested by Glaser and Strauss (1967).

Conclusion From the Findings and Discussions

1. Mennuti's tri-moral orientation model was revealed again in the moral reasoning process of the leaders of institutes of higher education in Taiwan. Self orientation, in addition to justice and care orientation, was a very distinguishing perspective functioning in the process of dilemma resolution. It is the most powerful orientation observed in the personal dilemma situation. In this study the properties of self-orientation could be divided into two categories, one was labelled self-interest, the other self-respect. The more extensive properties were found in both categories than in Mennuti's. The participant's interest in self was more centered on the social and psychological-self. Besides, the leaders of higher education institutes in Taiwan had a very strong sense of self perfection with respect to morality. Chinese culture expects highly educated people to strive for self-realization and this was revealed in the properties found in their concept of self-respect. This was also a characteristic of the people who were in the higher moral stage.

Furthermore, the orientation of justice could be divided into two categories -- one was normative order, the other was principled morality, i.e. justice. The leaders of institutes of higher education were most concerned about the maintenance of a school system and social order. So, the

consideration of normative order was the most predominant moral consideration in the process of professional dilemma resolution and also the second most predominant consideration in personal dilemma resolution. This was the characteristic of a morally mature person in a collectivistic society.

Regarding the orientation of care, two categories were also found. In contrast to the Chinese tradition, the category of sustaining a relationship was rarely used by the presidents or deans of colleges. The category of concern for the welfare of others just for the sake of that individual was the second most important consideration in the professional situation. Fulfilling the consideration for other's welfare when attempting to resolve moral dilemma often resulted in pain and struggle for the college presidents or university deans, especially in their professional situations.

According to the nature of the properties in the six categories discovered, from Kohlberg's perspective of moral development scheme, different moral stage sequences were probably hidden behind or embedded in the moral orientations. However, there was no clear evidence to support this. Further research was needed.

2. Three moral orientation models in a combination form were established in this study. When a college

president or a dean attempted to resolve a moral dilemma, they tended to use the orientation of justice, care, self in various combination forms. Eight types were identified from the interviews. A single orientation was rarely seen. Neither single-care nor single-self form was found. The justice-predominant form mixed with a care or self-shadow, or both, was the most prevalent model in the interviews. Half of the professional dilemmas were reasoned in this way.

Self-predominant model mixed with consideration of care or justice, or both, were most often seen in the personal dilemma situation. Care-predominant forms were less prevalent in both situations.

Three orientation multiple balanced forms were only used in three incidents. However, the combination of three orientations could be weighted in several ways. Five different styles of constructions were identified from 8 models. Nearly one-third of the incidents were resolved in these ways. As previously mentioned the resolution of a moral dilemma could use three orientations but weighted in a variety of ways in the reasoning process. Females and males showed little difference in moral orientation model use.

Some of the college presidents or deans had their favorite moral orientation model, some tended to flexibly adapt to situations. Generally speaking, orientations to moral reasoning were complicated, diverse and individualized.

3. Regarding the gender, dilemma situation and culture relevant to the moral orientation, this study revealed that dilemma situation were highly correlated to the moral orientation. No evidence showed that women preferred orientation of care or that women used the orientation of care more often than their counterparts. Kohlberg's assumption was supported but Gilligan's was not.

In the professional dilemma, in which more complicated plots and people were involved, the college president or dean more often used orientation of justice. The first priority of their concern was their duty or the effect of their decision on the school system or social order. The second priority was a concern for the specific person's need and welfare involved in the dilemma incident. The third was a concern for the principle of fairness or mutual respect. In personal situation, the first priority in resolution of moral dilemma was the self-interest consideration, there was their responsibility and duty as a parent, a child, etc. Part of the reason for this difference was the expectation of Chinese culture, "to be sensitive to any given situation."

There were slight gender difference in conflict focus and moral considerations. For example, the men preferred self-interest consideration than did women. However, there was not evidence that this difference was more important

than the individual difference because the basic tendency between men and women was similar. So, gender differences were not clearly related to moral orientation use.

In this study, the dilemma situations relating to moral orientation was actually determined by how closely the character involved in the conflict was connected to the subject. The closer the relationship to the subject, the more reliance the subject placed upon the consideration of care to resolve the dilemma. To people unknown or not well known, the consideration of self or justice was predominantly applied. This logic of interpersonal interaction was evident in the personal dilemma situation. But in the professional situation, this logic applied only to the teacher-student relationship. This discovery was in accordance with a characteristic of Chinese society, "relationship-level-centeredness."

Using "relationship-level-centeredness" to define the moral dilemma situation in other cultures should be done very conservatively, cultural differences should be considered.

4. The contextual exploration and description was very comprehensive and very popular among the college presidents and the deans in their reasoning to resolve moral dilemmas. It was proven that contextual considerations were not dependent upon gender or confined to whether one used the

orientation of care and response or not. Gilligan's assumption was not supported. It is perhaps merely a characteristic of mature moral reasoning leading to a responsible moral decision in irreversible real-life experiences.

5. Finally, this study discovered that some considerations in the moral reasoning process were shifted out of the final decision. Most of those filtered out were shadow-elements. It proved that the final decision highlighted an individual's central consideration. However, in some cases, the incident situation and social context factor inhibited the real concern of the college president or the dean in their attempts to resolve the moral dilemma. They had to sacrifice their ideas in order to conform to the reality. Though no immediate consequence was apparent, they felt dissatisfied with the social context or to themselves.

Theoretical Implication

1. The self orientation, a prominent perspective, discovered by Mennuti, was demonstrated and proven in the Chinese character again. When college presidents and the deans were interviewed, the researcher developed a better understanding of self-orientation with respect to its properties and categories. Additionally, the two category structure in each of the orientations of justice, care, and self implied a potential moral structure sequence when we

examined their natures from Kohlberg's perspective. Though further research was still needed, minimal discoveries could serve to elaborate or to refine moral developmental theory, especially in the higher moral level.

2. Three moral orientation models were supported by this study. Moreover, regarding the various types of three moral orientations combined with the different weights of each orientation portioned, this study provided a very elaborate analysis. This finding, on one hand, revealed the moral orientation models that were used by the leaders of higher education institutes in Taiwan. On the other hand, it increased the understanding of various forms of moral orientation used in reality when the morally mature people attempt to resolve the moral dilemmas in the different moral situations.

3. In this study, some characteristics of Chinese culture were discovered as an important element related to the moral orientation use. Relationship-level-centeredness and sensitivity to social context and incident situation were evident. However, sustaining the relationships as a main priority to resolve the moral dilemma was rarely seen in this study. This concern was usually emphasized by the traditionally Chinese. So the president or deans of colleges participated in this study seemed unlikely to follow the traditionally Chinese model. Probably, Taiwanese

society is changing because the western cultural trend provides a great challenge to the people, especially to those who are highly educated. Probably, the morally mature adult was less concerned for the relationship.

Additionally, in Gilligan's perspective, relationship concern and contextual relativism were the major characteristics of women's moral reasoning. It was also the main concern of common Chinese. Is this just a coincidence? Further studies are needed to clarify this assumption related to cultural characteristics in moral reasoning.

4. This study strongly supported Kohlberg's assumption, that the moral dilemma situation affected the moral orientation use. However, this study found some people were more consistent use of their favorite orientation model and that some were more flexible across situations. Gender differences in moral orientation use were not supported. Especially, the female deans or presidents did not use the orientation of care more often than their counterparts as Gilligan expected. These findings provided clear information from a different cultural perspective about the argument of gender, dilemma situations, and moral orientation use. They may prove helpful for clarifying the theoretical controversies.

5. Although this study showed that moral orientation was not clearly related to gender, we have to be very

prudent when inferring this result to average people because the participants were from a highly selective group. The women, especially, are not representative of average Chinese women. The social climate of Taiwan 30 years ago discouraged women from higher education. Only highly intelligent women originally from above-middle class families could possibly obtain the opportunity to achieve highest degree of education. Furthermore, when the majority of social resources and cultural perspectives were dominated and led by men, probably only highly educated women who were both competent and willing to conform to the social norm could gain access to the leadership of higher education. They are special and elite in Taiwan. This study even suggested that they probably considered normative-order more than men, but considered self-interest less than men, and considered other's welfare as frequently as their male counterparts. But, we do not know whether the average women in Taiwan has more concern for the ethic of care and less concern for the ethic of justice than the average men as Gilligan's suggestion.

Recommendation for Future Research

Although these findings are restricted to a specific group of people in Taiwan, the results certainly raise several important issues. First, the continued need for exploratory research in the investigation of moral

development seems justified. This should be investigated with other subgroups across the life span and in other settings and in other cultures. Such an approach could provide a more detailed understanding of the nature of the orientations in moral reasoning and moral development. The interpretation of moral development theory was expanded or refined, in terms of newly emerged categories and properties of moral orientation that was based real life experiences. Further study should still include female and male subjects. A more elaborate moral developmental theory can be expected to be achieved through successive contributions.

Second, the findings of this study suggested that future research should address the developmental nature of self orientation. A major concern in such an investigation should be how any developmental process of self orientation may be linked to existing knowledge related to identity and ego development. Additionally, how self-orientation expressed its properties in the developmental process and how it related to the care and justice orientation should be considered.

Third, there is need to examine the relationship between Gilligan's assumptions concerning women's moral reasoning and the characteristics of the Chinese style of moral reasoning. This should be investigated with other subgroups across the life span in Chinese society.

Finally, investigating the discrepancy of the moral considerations between reasoning and final decision in real life moral dilemmas was necessary in order to understand how incidents operate and influence moral decisions, situations, and the social context.

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Appendix A1

晤 談 大 綱

這個晤談的目的，主要是想了解您（做為一個教育行政領導人員）在面臨道德衝突的時候怎樣思考及處理問題的。

在談話中我會問您幾個問題，比如：當您提到「道德上的衝突」時，您的意思是指什麼？以及，當您面臨這類衝突時，您怎樣處理（解決）它。一般來說，處理問題的方式有很多，也很難分出怎樣纔是對的、怎樣纔是錯的。我想要了解的是：在處理過程中您是怎麼想的而不是您怎麼做的。

由於這個問題麻煩複雜，也許我會重複的問，也許我要您再想一想，或是要您告訴我為甚麼您要這麼說。這只是幫助我確實了解您的思想及做決定的過程。

今天這個晤談，是個私密性的談話。談話記錄上只有號碼，不記人名。晤談過程的錄音，只是幫助我記得討論的內容，發表時絕對不會有任何個人訊息出現。另外，在成稿發表以前您有權要求看稿以確定您的權益的確定已受到足夠的保障。

如果在談話中間，您覺得有些什麼問題，您可以儘管問我；如果有什麼讓您覺得不舒服或不妥當的地方，也請您讓我知道。現在請想想還有甚麼問題沒有？可以開始了嗎？

開始：

現在我要和您討論您曾經遇到過的，而且讓您覺得與道德問題有牽連的事件，這是指當您處理這事件時，您會覺得沒有明確的方針可循，卻必須做個判斷才能處理它，因此，您會感到心理矛盾、掙扎不安，覺得須要多想一下，比如說考慮到是非對錯、法規、權利、他人的處境、情感、自己的想法等等。這種不安與考慮也許只是一瞬間、或幾個小時、或持續幾天，但因大家處理問題的能力都很好，一但處理後就把它置之腦後了，我現在請您想的就是這一類的事件。我希望您能提兩件，一件是發生在您工作上的，另一件則是在您生活中碰到的，以便能討論您怎樣思考及處理它的過程。

晤談問題：

- 一、在您的人生經歷中，您是不是曾經遇到讓您覺得很矛盾而且是屬於「道德上的衝突」的事件？您能談談您碰到的一個例子嗎？
 - 二、在當時那個情境中，是什麼想法、人、事、物讓您感到衝突矛盾與不安）
 - 三、當您試著去解決的時候，當時最主要的考慮是什麼？還有其它方面的考慮嗎？比如一些人、事、物等因素。還有嗎？
 - 四、最後您決定怎麼做的？
 - 五、做了以後，有什麼結果或影響發生？
 - 六、事後想起來，您對於當時自己所做的決定，有什麼看法？
- 副題：為什麼您覺得這事件與道德有關呢？
- 七、您能不能再想想看在另外的情況下發生的例子？（前面若提工作的例子，現在引導他談個人生活上的例子；前面若提生活上的例子，現在引導他談工作上的例子；問話重覆第二到第六題）
 - 八、總的來說，您再想想看，還有沒有可以幫助我了解您怎麼處理道德衝突事件的事？
 - 九、您能不能界定一下什麼叫「道德」？
 - 十、您覺得什麼樣的情形會讓您感覺有「道德上的衝突」？

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

(Appendix A2)

The main purpose of this interview is to know how do you, as an education administrator, make decision when facing moral dilemmas.

During our interview, I am going to ask you several questions. For example, what do you refer to when you mention "moral dilemmas?" How would you deal with (or solve) those conflicts? Generally speaking, there are numerous ways to deal with those problems and there are not unambivalent ways to distinguish the right and wrong answers. What I intend to understand is: What you would think rather than what you would do during the problem-solving process.

Due to the complexities of the issues, I may repeat the same question so that you can ponder over the question and tell me why you would reply in a certain way. In so doing I may have a better understanding of your thinking and decision-making process.

This conversation is confidential and anonymous with only numbers recorded rather than personal names. What is being recorded here would be used only to help me understand the content of our discussion. None of the personal information will be released when the research is published. In addition, you have the privilege to look through the manuscripts before the publication if you want to have your human rights and privacy fully protected.

Whenever you have any questions during the interview, please feel free to ask me. Or, if you feel at odds with any questions I raise, please let me know.

Any other questions? May we start now?

Interview Questions

Now I am going to discuss with you some of the events in your life that you believe are related with moral conflicts. By "moral dilemmas," I am referring to an ambivalent situation that is struggling and frustrating when handling a life event. In such a situation, you are often given no clear guidelines to follow while you have to make a decision. You feel that you have to think twice before jumping into any conclusion because the problem is sensitive to the right or wrong, regulations, and human rights established by the society at large, or it is relevant to the practical circumstances, feelings and thoughts of other persons, and so on. The conflicts and mental efforts that you have invested may last only moments, or several hours, or a few days, depending on how well the problem is solved. You may forget it soon if it is well handled. Now, I would like you to recall any two of those occurrences you have experienced, one in your professional life and the other in your personal life, and then tell me how you think and deal with them at that time.

Question 1. Have you ever had any problem in your life that you think is related to moral dilemmas? Can you give me any example that you remember?

Question 2. What specifically made you feel that you had a moral conflict in that situation, thoughts, people, or some other things?

Question 3. What were your primary concern when you tried to solve it? Did you have any other considerations? For example, people, events, or things.

Question 4. What was your final decision?

Question 5. What were some of the consequences after the decision was made?

Question 6. How did you perceive the decision afterwards?

Supplementary Question: Why do you think that this case is moral-related?

Question 7. Can you think of any other example? (If the previously discussed example is a work case, lead the informant now to the life case and vice versa. Repeat questions 2 to 6).

Question 8. On the whole, can you think of any other experiences that can help me understand how you deal with moral dilemmas?

Question 9. Can you define what you mean by "morality"?

Question 10. Generally, what constitutes moral dilemma to you?

Closing

Let's stop our conversation today. Thank you for your time in offering me this opportunity to have such valuable information and insights. Thanks again for your help!

Translated by
Nina Xiang

Appendix B1

背 景 資 料

受訪者編號：

一. 職稱 _____

二. 性別 _____

三. 父親職業 (最近期的) _____

四. 母親職業 (最近期的) _____

五. 大學主修科系 _____

六. 最高學歷與科系學校 _____

七. 行政工作經歷及年限 _____

八. 擔任現職已有多久 _____

九. 年齡層： 36 - 40 _____ 41 - 45 _____ 46 - 50 _____
51 - 55 _____ 56 - 60 _____ 60 以上 _____

Biographical Information

(Appendix B2)

Informant Number _____

1. Job title _____

2. Sex _____

3. Mother's major occupation _____

4. Father's major occupation _____

5. Undergraduate major _____

6. Highest educational level and major _____

7. Administrative experiences and years _____

8. Years in present position _____

9. Age group: 36-40 _____, 41-45 _____, 46-50 _____,

51-55 _____, 56-60 _____, 61 and above _____.

VITA

Shao Kuo Yeh

Educational Background

- 1969-1973 B.A., Department of Education
National Taiwan Normal University, Taipei,
Taiwan R.O.C.
- 1975-1978 M.A., Graduate School of Education
National Taiwan Normal University, Taipei,
Taiwan R.O.C.
- 1989-1992 Study in Counselor Education and Student
Personnel Services
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, Blacksburg, Virginia
- 1993 Doctor of Philosophy in Counselor Education
and Student Personnel Services
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, Blacksburg, Virginia

Professional Experience

- 1973-1975 Teaching Assistant
Hsin-Chu Provincial Taiwan Normal College,
Hsin-Chu, Taiwan, R.O.C.
- 1978-1979 Technician in Occupational Assessment and
Training
Chien-Hsin Rehabilitation and Medical Center,
Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C.
- 1979-1985 Instructor in Psychology Course
Counselor in Student Counseling Center
Tamkang University, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C.
- 1985-1988 Associate Professor in Psychology
Director of Student Counseling Center
Tamkang University, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C.
- 1988-1992 Sabbatical Years from Tamkang University
- 1992-Present Associate Professor in General and Literal
Education Program
Tamkang University, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C.

Professional Award

1987 Prize Winner, the fifth Distinguished Student Personnel Services Award,
Chinese Student Affairs Association

Professional Main Publications

- Yeh, S.K. (1978). A Study on Imaginative Play of Preschool Children. Unpublished mater's thesis. National Taiwan Normal University, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C.
- Yeh, S.K. (1979). A Study on imaginative play of preschool children. Bulletin of Graduate Institute of Education, 21, 451-462.
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- Yeh, S.K. (1986). The evolution of attitude toward female role in Chinese society. Tamkang Journal, 24, 111-129, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C.
- Yeh, S.K. (1986). College student's attitudes toward female role and some related factors. Monograph #3, 91p. Population studies center: Women's Research Program. National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C.

Shao Kuo Yeh

Sept. 1993