AN EDUCATIONAL REFORM COMMISSION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: CASE STUDY OF THE POLICIES, POLITICS, AND PROCESSES OF THE KNIGHT FOUNDATION COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS

by

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in Educational Research

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Educational Research

(ABSTRACT)

Motivated by concerns posed by college athletics and questions about 
the effectiveness of educational reform commissions, this study centered on 
two questions: specifically, How did the Knight Commission function to bring 
policy reform to college sports?; and, generally, How does an independent, 
temporary commission influence organizational change? Grounded in the 
reform commission literature and a conceptual framework developed from 
political science, policy science, and organizational change theories, the 
research design employed two approaches--one inductive and one deductive--to 
focus on five areas of inquiry.

Political processes were pivotal in bringing change. A "policy window"
developed from the confluence of new, supportive key actors, public opinion 
favorable to reform, and threats of Congressional intervention. The 
Commission’s empowerment created a choice opportunity for long-involved 
stakeholders to reauthorize athletic governance reform. Prior to empowerment, 
key actors reached consensus on core values and reform approach.
The Knight Commission's operation enhanced the authority of key actors with standing as policy makers. Although intellectual undertakings supported an image of objective rationality, the Commission served more as an inter-organizational governance tool. Cross-fertilization, resulting from Commissioners who served as "linking pins" (Likert, 1967) between political systems, united a broad coalition on a single plan. A reform model that buttressed higher education values and was embedded in long-accepted principles of governance manipulated the "policy space" in athletics to focus debate on its issues.

Other Commission activities served to enhance its "subjective authority" (Barnard, 1938)—acceptance at the bottom of the organization. The study process utilized "partisan policy analysis" (Lindblom, 1968) to persuade operational-level stakeholders. The report recommendations advanced the largest perceived increment of policy change that would not threaten its "acceptance." The extensive publicity surrounding report release served to inform and prepare the bottom layer of involved organizations and the public for change suggested by a representative group of eminent policy leaders. With enhanced authority and concordance on reform agenda, cross-boundary members successfully initiated policy reform. The still-intact Knight Commission supported internal policy makers and became accepted as a legitimate provider of policy influence.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my family. Their love and support provided me with motive and footing. My sons, Trevor and Torrey, understood that "Dad’s book" took precedence over rough-housing and play time. Still they participated. At one, Torrey’s fascination with the computer led to many--thwarted--revision attempts. Holding him provided ballast as I hit this document’s last key stroke. Trevor--at four--kept me company playing around my desk for hours. As the printer began to whir with the last of the final draft, it was Trevor who, unprompted, shouted: "Daddy’s done, Daddy’s done."

My parents--both role models, mentors, and best friends--bring a magnificent quality to their endeavors. My mother, Paula, who built my self confidence from childhood, helped me believe I could do anything, including a doctorate. During this arduous process, she always found the time and energy to provide conceptual and emotional support. My father, Richard, with his dignity and compassion as a professor, role modeled the merits of higher learning. As a stanchion of support and wisdom, he furnished direction and stability every step of the way.

A special part of this dedication goes to my wife, Nancy. Two names should appear on the dissertation; this endeavor required her full effort as well. Her unconditional love, support, and friendship provided the foundation for my achievement. She has been my best friend. She is my love.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Reciprocal (adj): returning the same way, alternating, irregular.

Reciprocal in human relations remains one of my fascinations with life. Pursuing a higher degree requires monumental self-interest. The support, encouragement, and love that I received from others was of greater measure than my ability to return in kind. This irregularity elevates my enchantment with human kindness to bewitchment. It is from the shadow of their forbearance that I acknowledge the efforts and care I realized while achieving a long-held dream. May their good will return to them.

The Knight Commissioners, their consultants, Congressional staff, NCAA Presidents Commissioners, ACE, and media gave generously of their time and memories, enlightened the interviewer, and personalized the research process. The Commission staff, "Kit" Morris, Maureen Devlin, and Bryan Skelton, facilitated the interviews, made available extensive information, and generally encouraged my work. Finally, the sample of NCAA "policy experts" reinforced the quality of this project with their participation.

The Virginia Tech Research Division supported this study with a research grant. In particular, Gary Hooper encouraged this project from its inception, contributing both institutional and personal support. Although its funding facilitated my travels, the Research Division's most valuable resource was the
time and grant-writing efforts of Sue Downey. Sue encouraged, listened, and supported my interests in many ways that smoothed the project planning. Sue believed in this study at times when I did not.

My dissertation reflects a product influenced by distinguished Co-Chairmen. David Alexander and Jimmie Fortune—mentors both—supplied all manner of support. David lead me to the idea of studying the Knight Commission. With an uncanny deftness, he mixed intellectual space with direction. His counsel always has been on target. Jimmie reveled in the challenge of designing the research. His brilliance in that regard was matched only by his concern for my well-being.

My doctoral committee supplied a wealth of experience, resources, and support. Kern Alexander lent his knowledge on university presidents and politics, commissions, and policy. Lawrence Cross provided my edification in research and statistics, making certain I took policy analysis courses. Bud Robertson focused the study’s purpose and provided the knowledge of an historian and former faculty athletic representative. Wayne Worner was a reflective listener and dedicated editor, who invariably pointed me in productive directions.

I also benefitted from a "closet committee" comprised of David Parks and Jim Garrison. Both professors—friends, mentors, and extraordinary teachers—supplied unequivocal personal support. Dave "thought through" many difficult issues within the planning and data analysis. His ideas permeate the study.
Jim believed in me as a writer spending time to ensure my self-recognition. He also supplied a philosophic basis for understanding the dialogue within the Knight Commission's process.

Rich resources came from within my family as well. My mother, Dr. Paula Franklin, a survey researcher by vocation, counseled me on designing the questionnaire and data tables. My father, Dr. Richard Franklin, an ardent writer, edited the manuscript, providing both substantive and technical assistance. Finally, Nancy Franklin, my wife, listened, reflected, and edited my work.

The dissertation became a document because Paulette Gardner, David Norton, and Tamara Smith provided greatly appreciated technical support.

Course work, professors, and friendships gird the dissertation process per se. The transfer of knowledge and approaches for its pursuit define an education. I benefitted generally from enlightened and enthusiastic teaching, but six professors went beyond the norm with an ability to bring their subject to life: David Alexander, "Higher Education Law;" Jim Bohland, "Policy Analysis;" Lawrence Cross, "Experimental Design" and "Advanced Statistics;" Jim Garrison, "Analysis of Educational Concepts;" Jim Herndon, "Seminar in Constitutional Law;" and David Parks, "Theories of Educational Administration." Each is a great educator.

Less formal interactions with faculty and staff stimulated my interests and provided grounding for my thoughts. Loyd Andrew mixed his sincere
support with constructive criticism to shape my standards for writing and presentation. Bob Stalcup encouraged my interest in athletic governance supplying crucial insights. Steve Horton and David Braine lent their expertise in NCAA policy and athletic matters. Larry Weber contributed valuable expertise by validating the final survey form, as well as an enthusiasm for my project. Dan Vogler "towed" me out of a couple of conceptual swamps. John Burton reflected and debated my ideas leaving them improved, as well as my own sense of quality.

Many friendships enriched my years as a doctoral student, more than space permits. Cheryl Chambliss, Mary Jane Guy, Debbie Harris, Claressa Morton, John Muffo, John O’Neil, Adrienne Robinson, Gary Seever, and Jim Zhao shared my interest in higher education administration. Aubrey Price possessed a keen intellect for all manner of discussion. Two friends, in particular, helped shape my beliefs about myself in academe. Scott Horner, my stats partner and close companion, was a gifted student, a thoughtful listener, and a kindred spirit. I will enjoy his graduation as much as my own. Joe McKinney, who loves to "freely associate" ideas as much as I do, dedicated himself to the professorate in a way that influenced my own thinking. Joe’s love of learning and the processes of scholarship made both more attractive.

Indeed my education at Virginia Tech has been rich with mentors and friends. I remain eternally grateful.
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction to the Study

Chapter Overview

This chapter provides an introduction to the research study. The chapter is divided into nine major sections: Introduction, Background: Knight Commission and the NCAA, Statement of the Problem, Purpose, Overview of the Research Approach and Research Questions, Need for the Study, Delimitations, Limitations, and Organization of the Study.

Introduction

 Debate concerning the appropriate role that competitive sports should play in campus life can be traced from the latter part of the 19th century (Rudolph, 1962). The release in March, 1991 of the Knight Commission report, Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete: A New Model for Intercollegiate Athletics, added to the discussion. In 1989, scandals occurring in college athletics placed the integrity of higher education at risk. In response to growing public skepticism about the universities' and colleges' ability to manage athletic reform, plus the threat of governmental intrusion, the Knight Foundation created a commission "to examine the growing abuses in college sports and propose a reform agenda" (Black, 1991, p.IV).
The twenty-two commissioners, representing a cross-section of societal interests, heard public testimony from experts, reviewed literature, and deliberated in private executive sessions before releasing their findings. The report acknowledged that abuses have occurred. It proposed reforms intended to restore a model of college athletics that reflects the values of higher education and mitigates the possibility of future transgressions. The recommendations were organized into a "one-plus-three model." Increased presidential control, "the one," was emphasized over "three" general areas: academic integrity, financial integrity, and a certification process through which the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) accredits each respective institution. The Commission's report also contained specific recommendations, principles and advice to affected constituents.

The condition of college athletics during the 1970s and 1980s spawned efforts by the NCAA's Presidents Commission, two American Council on Education (ACE) ad hoc reform committees (1982-4 & 1985-6), the Conference of Conferences (a committee of conference commissioners), the United States Congress, and internal NCAA committees--among others--to reform some aspect of the administration of these programs. The perception that colleges and universities have compromised the integrity of higher education in their pursuit of a winning team was not unfounded. In 1989, public opinion surveys indicated that more than three-quarters of those polled thought big-time college sports were "out of control" (Harris, 1989). Easy access to renown and
revenue led to big-time athletics programs best described as major entertainment enterprises (Knight Foundation [KF], 1991). NCAA rules, expansive in non-academic areas, provided little academic constraint on the student-athlete (KF). Indeed, athletes received special admission six times more frequently than other students (Lederman, 1991a). Anecdotes abound illustrating the grueling demands made on the student-athlete, the quality of education they receive, and the manner in which they have been recruited. During the 1980s, fifty-seven percent of the 106 NCAA Division I-A institutions received censure, probation, or reprimand (Lederman, 1990a).

Commercialization accompanying college sports’ extensive popularity directs concern at the financial integrity of higher education. The Federal Trade Commission subpoenaed documents from Division I universities in an effort to prove that big-time football is sponsored primarily for commercial and not educational purposes (Lederman, 1991b). College sports television contracts have continued to grow; coaches’ salaries often exceed presidents’ and governors’ salaries (Thelin & Wiseman, 1989); and when a university’s athletic interests conflict with its academic interests, the power struggle often results in the university president losing his or her job (Davidson, 1990).

Restoring the predominance of educational values over entertainment values in college sports was central to the Knight Commission’s findings. The Commission’s model intended to point the way to policy changes that place emphasis back on the healthy participation by student-athletes in extra-
curricular education. Yet, a preliminary study of the report’s reception within athletic departments found that the Commission’s findings might be overly vague and its recommendations too ambitious and costly (Franklin, 1991). Full implementation of the "new model" will be difficult, according to the interviews conducted in this preliminary study.

These early responses are not uncommon reactions to the findings of reform commissions in general. Research indicates that a commission's recommendations do not usually result in specific changes to existing policy (Ginsberg & Wimpelberg, 1988). Among factors that limit the effectiveness of a reform commission are: (1) the manner in which the findings of a commission are reported; (2) the political interests tied to the issues addressed by the commission; (3) inadequate staffing; (4) a preset focus by the commissioners leading to an unscientific approach to studying the problem; and (5) the process by which the commission members deliberate and decide on specific areas of concern (Ginsberg & Wimpelberg). Reports by commissions often have been characterized as exaggerating the scope of problems, providing overly broad general objectives and recommendations, failing to address details necessary for the proposals that they forward, seldom calling for institutional reorganization, poorly documenting the value of the proposed solution, and proposing recommendations that cost too much (Peterson, 1985).

Reform commissions are not always ineffective, however. Timely publication of a commission’s findings can serve to focus public attention, to
develop consensus, to legitimize an agenda which include bold policy initiatives, and to garner support for changes (Johnson & Marcus, 1986). Educational reform commissions can effectively revitalize the spirit of educational administrators (Deal, 1985) by stating broad goals for education in generally agreeable terms. As a symbolic instrument, their report can focus attention on replacing the old with the new, as well as providing impetus for the process of self-renewal (Slater & Warren, 1985). When action on an issue is necessary, a commission’s report can provide a calm, reasoned, and expert answer to decision-makers responsible for formulating change (Johnson & Marcus). Within an organization, commissions have been used by chief executive officers (CEOs) either to mollify an over-active political faction (Wolanin, 1975) or to generate organizational momentum legitimizing a mandate for internal reform.

Background: The NCAA and the Knight Commission

The two organizations of primary interest in this study were the Knight Commission and the NCAA. This section provides background about their relationship from an organizational or system perspective. The Knight Commission and the NCAA were discrete organizations with separate political systems. The NCAA is a voluntary association that serves as a legislative body with formal constitutional authority to govern its members’ intercollegiate sports programs (see NCAA Manual, 1991). At its annual conventions, NCAA institutions gather, in a form of congress, to make and amend rules that guide
and order its members' actions and interactions (see Official Minutes of 1992 NCAA Convention, 1992). Each member's president has constitutional control of the institution's vote.

Between conventions, a committee structure—political subsystems—makes or executes association policy as surrogates of the full NCAA. Three of these committees, the NCAA Presidents Commission, the NCAA Council, and the NCAA Executive Committee, possess the greatest amounts of responsibility and authority (NCAA Manual, 1991).

The Knight Commission's formal organization was external to the NCAA. Both organizations operated as separate political systems. The Knight Commission, as a reform commission, possessed no constitutional capability for authoritative action within the NCAA or its member institutions. The Commission's report was issued to persuade NCAA policy makers to change. It served as an external stressor to the NCAA's governance system. By studying, investigating, advising, and recommending, its report was intended to influence policy by presenting a preferred course of action for those controlling intercollegiate athletics. In this sense, it was a political system attempting to allocate values to the NCAA and allied interests involved in college sports.

Although the NCAA and Knight Commission were discrete political systems from an organizational perspective, the independence of the Knight Commission's authority and offices from the NCAA remains less clear when
viewed at the subsystem or individual level. In 1989, ten of the Knight Commissioners were college or university presidents with control of their institution's NCAA convention vote (Knight Foundation [KF], 1991). Four of these Knight Commissioners were also members of the NCAA's Presidents Commission. One Knight Commissioner was the Executive Director of the NCAA. Of the twenty-two commissioners, nineteen were or had been connected with the NCAA as a professional--twelve worked for the NCAA or an NCAA institution, four were former NCAA presidents, and three were trustees at NCAA universities. This cross fertilization illuminates Dahl's (1984) point that an organization's actors may be a part of two political subsystems--in the same or different systems--at the same time. Therefore, the Knight Commission interacted with the NCAA in a complex political process influenced by each political system's internal interactions, stressors--such as policy recommendations or situational feedback--from each's environment, and the political actors with membership in both systems.

Statement of the Problem

The problem addressed by this study was formed by the persistence of problems in college athletics, the magnitude of the Knight Foundation's reform effort, and the choice of commission-led reform as the instrument of organizational change. Two questions served to focus this study's problem: How does an independent, external, temporary commission operate to influence
the governance, decision making, and policies of a standing organization? and, What functions did the Knight Commission serve in bringing organizational change or policy reform to college sports?

**Purpose**

The purpose of this study was to provide an explanation of an educational reform commission’s entire process. The life cycle of one commission--its antecedents, operation, and outcomes--was described in order to explicate the potential influence of commission-led reform. In a general sense, this study’s purpose was to describe how one educational reform commission formed, conceived reform, and influenced organizational change. Specifically, this dissertation was intended to provide a case study of the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics’ attempts to reform college athletics.

In order to accomplish this purpose, the study: (1) described the stakeholders and political elements on the Knight Commission and within its target environment; (2) identified the policy recommendations advanced by the Knight Commission and compared them with the opinions of policy experts for inclusiveness and significance; (3) described the outcomes of the Knight Commission in terms of NCAA governance and policy; (4) described the operation of the Knight Commission; and, (5) described connections between the operations and outcomes of the Knight Commission.
Overview of the Research Approach and Research Questions

Information about the Knight Commission from a variety of primary and secondary sources supplied this case study's basis. The research design employed two approaches in data collection and analysis. The deductive approach investigated the policy antecedents and outcomes of the Commission. The inductive strategy reconstructed the political and structural processes of the Commission's beginnings and operation. The research effort obtained data from interviews with Knight Commissioners, their staff, and other key actors, a review of meeting transcripts from Commission and NCAA meetings, an analysis of NCAA and Commission documents and related literature, news articles, and a survey of NCAA "policy experts" to validate the relevance and significance of the Knight Commission's findings, recommendations, and impact. Data analysis occurred on three levels: (1) by stakeholder, (2) by policy, and (3) by process.

The research methods employed both quantitative and qualitative techniques. Relevant concepts in the political science, policy analysis, administrative theory, organizational change, and reform commission literatures formed a conceptual framework and theoretical background to facilitate the description of the commission's process. The results were intended to provide insight into the issues addressed by the Knight Commission, to describe its operation and outcomes, and to reflect upon the commission process itself.
Five overarching research questions addressed the general and specific purposes of this study. These questions provide five foci of inquiry. More specific research questions were subordinated to these research interests. Chapter III contains a complete list of research questions. The five overarching research questions were: (1) Who were the stakeholders and political elements involved with the Knight Commission’s antecedents, operation, and outcomes?; (2) How were the antecedents to reform addressed by the Knight Commission’s findings and recommendations?; (3) How did NCAA governance and policy outcomes relate to the Knight Commission’s reform recommendations?; (4) How did the Knight Commission operate to bring reform?; and, (5) What connections exist between the Knight Commission’s operation and NCAA governance and policy outcomes?

Need for the Study

The present study was intended to contribute to the literature on reform commissions and the body of knowledge about athletic reform. The need for this study was motivated specifically by the magnitude of the Knight Commission’s reform effort, and generally by contradictory explanations about the purpose, operation, and outcomes of reform commissions.

The Knight Foundation’s charge to the Knight Commission encompassed issues whose scope and significance were portrayed as critical to the well-being of the institution of higher education. The Knight Foundation created the
Commission to study intercollegiate athletics, in the belief that its excesses were eroding the integrity of colleges and universities--in effect, distorting their basic purpose (KF, 1989). These sports programs have systemic problems (KF, 1991), dating to the last century (Rudolph, 1962). The purpose of the Knight Commission was to provide recommendations for policy change that would result in the reformed administration of college sports.

The magnitude of the problem, as characterized by the Knight Commission, directs attention to the reform process. The Commission was intended to be an instrument for organizational change. Equivocal reports about past educational reform commissions raise questions about the Knight Foundation’s reform approach. Did the Knight Commission propose anything new, or did it just have a chance to say more eloquently what has been said all along? How were the Commissioners chosen? Did the composition of the Commission membership affect its findings and recommendations? Can their recommendations be implemented? To what degree will the NCAA adopt the proposed "one-plus-three model"? How did the Commission operate to influence change? What outcomes resulted from the Knight Commission’s efforts? These questions were at the heart of the specific need for this study.

While the substantive issues addressed by the Knight Commission commingled with the commission’s operation, the larger interest remained with the reform commission phenomenon. The complexity of commissions and the analytic intractability of research about them is evident from the literature.
Ginsberg and Wimpelberg (1987) concluded that commissions have little specific effect while observing that the commission approach to educational change perseveres despite minimal research on its process. Yet, the frequent use of commission-led reform indicates that practitioners perceive the technique to be effective. The more than $2 million invested by the Knight Foundation to fund the Knight Commission makes this popularity self-evident. A review of the extant reform commission literature indicates a need for a description of a single reform commission to provide explication of the change process.

The need to provide explication of commissions in general, originates from the complexity of the commission enterprise and the disparate conclusions at which commission scholars arrive. Analytic and conceptual intractability characterize the extant research. It is generally agreed that commissions are intended to bring change. What type of change makes for an effective commission is less clear. Also understood is the commission’s independence from the formal organizational governance, its formation to address a specific problem, its fixed duration of existence, and its use of persuasion to influence its target. What magnitude and form the commission’s impact made on its target and the temporal dimension in which to measure impact are less defined. It is generally accepted that the final report generated by the commission provides the primary instrument of analysis and recommendation. Other purposes for, functions of, and outcomes influenced by a commission are less explicit.
Scholars writing on the subject offer incongruent conclusions about a commission's impact. For instance, in observing that the 1983 report, *A Nation at Risk*, had directed the nation's concern to the quality of education for the first time since Russia launched Sputnik, Johnson and Marcus (1986) concluded: "Without a doubt, the [National] Commission on Excellence [in Education (NCEE)] is responsible for this concern" (p. 3).

In contrast, after comparing eight Twentieth Century educational reform commissions, including NCEE, Ginsberg and Wimpelberg (1987) concluded that the popularity of the commission process "cannot be due to its effectiveness as a diagnostic and prescriptive procedure for educational reform" (p. 345).

The disparate characterizations of commissions undoubtedly can be explained in part by differences between commissions, and scholarly interpretations, with regard to issues, resources, and operation. Yet incongruent conclusions, when interpreting the impact of the same commission, reveal conceptual and methodological constraints. These limitations invite a more general set of questions about the functions and persistence of reform commissions. Why then do commissions persist? If commissions do not result in specific change, what do they accomplish? What outcomes are identifiable? Which outcomes are verifiable and which are less visible? How do they operate to effect change? Do individuals or organizations that sponsor national commissions intend specific results?
Ginsberg and Wimpelberg (1987) noted the paucity of systematic analysis on educational reform commissions that utilize concepts of political science and policy analysis. The two authors asked rhetorically if the persistence of the reform commission process might result from a lack of understanding about commissions. They depict commission impact as "trickle down reform."

The disparity between the practical preference for commission-led reform and coherent explanations by scholars of commission impact may result from the inability of current research approaches to capture indirect, or "loose," cause and effect relationships. Weick's (1976) characterization of educational organizations as "loosely coupled systems" (commissions are temporary organizations comprised of professionals that have standing in other organizations) identified "major problems for the researcher because he is trained and equipped to decipher predictable, tightly coupled worlds" (p. 16). One methodological priority Weick suggested to combat this problem and permit "seeing" loosely coupled worlds is collecting thorough, concrete descriptions of the coupling patterns in actual educational organizations. Hence, the conceptual intractability about the organizational processes of an educational reform commission directs the need for a descriptive study.

In summary, the need for the present study was identified at a general level relating to the literature on reform commissions and on a specific level relating to the literature about athletic reform. On the theoretical strata, the
need for a descriptive case study explicating elements that affect the antecedents, operation, and outcomes of a reform commission originated from the conceptual and analytical intractability found in the reform commission literature. An inquiry into the process and effects of a single commission provided additional explanations about the commission’s role in the change process.

In the particularized sense, the Knight Commission’s mission and its perceived importance to the institution of higher education motivated the need to study its work. Bringing reform to athletics by defining the terms under which these sports are conducted in the university’s name (KF, 1991) was fundamental to the Commission’s stated purpose. The disparate interests and values present in college athletics made the stakeholders, the policies, and the political processes of the Knight Commission an important focus. The Knight Commission’s operation and outcomes, and their effect on athletic governance, possessed relevance to the condition of college athletics. This study provided a description of the Knight Commission’s process and the outcomes of their reform efforts.

Organization of the Study

The present study addresses the policies, politics, and processes of one educational reform commission, the Knight Commission. The organization of
this inquiry reflects the breadth of its topic and purpose. At a general level, this dissertation has four major parts.

Chapters One, Two, and Three examine the concepts considered and methods utilized. Together with Chapter Nine, these two parts attempt to place this single, in-depth investigation within a theoretical continua with other research on governance and institutional change. Chapters Four, Five, and Six comprise an investigation of the Knight Commission's effectiveness at identifying valid problems and stimulating policy implementation. Using a deductive model, this part focuses on policy information and impact. Chapters Seven and Eight, the inductive design, reconstruct a case history of the Commission's political and structural processes. As a whole, this study considers one reform commission and integrates the political, policy, structural, and theoretical perspectives in a description of its activities and processes.

The first major part--Chapters One, Two, and Three--provides the study's theoretical and methodological foundation. Chapter Two critiques the national-level educational reform commission literature, describes commission operation and processes from literature on other reform commissions, reviews the methodology of three reform commission case studies, and develops a conceptual framework with which to view various commission elements.

Chapter Three organizes the present study's methodology into four major sections: focus of inquiry, study approach, delimitations and limitations, and research design and methodology.
This study's second major part, the deductive approach--Chapters Four, Five, and Six, investigates the policy antecedents, outcomes, and problem structure of the Commission. Chapter Four analyzes Knight Commission documents, particularly the 1991 report, to explicate the issue areas, problem structure and values of the Commission. Chapter Five compares the Knight Commission's findings to the survey responses from a sample of NCAA "policy experts" in an attempt to validate each issue's presence as an antecedent condition. Chapter Six compares the Knight Commission's policy recommendations with NCAA rule changes that occurred between 1990 and 1992 to illuminate the Commission's impact on reform. For the reader, Chapter Four may supply helpful background to Chapters Five and Six.

The third major part, the inductive approach--Chapters Seven and Eight, reconstructs the Commission's beginnings and operation. Chapter Seven provides a narrative history of the formation of the Knight Commission, as well as antecedent events. It covers early attempts to reform athletic governance, organizational relationships, and the conception, initiation, and empowerment of the Knight Commission.

Chapter Eight is divided into two sections that concern the Knight Commission's operation. The first section continues the narrative history from Chapter Seven and presents the structural processes of the Commission's pre-study planning, problem study, decision making, report writing and release. The second section analyzes thematically the political processes of
Commissions operation. It describes the interactions within the Commission, the Commission’s exchanges with and feedback from its environment, and responses and persistence behavior by the Knight Commission and NCAA.

Finally, Chapter Nine discusses the investigation, draws conclusions, and develops recommendations for future research. The discussion synthesizes this study’s findings within the structure of its five overarching research questions. Conclusions are drawn about the Knight Commission per se and about the commission process in general. Finally, suggestions for additional research are advanced.
CHAPTER TWO

Review of Literature and Conceptual Framework

Chapter Overview

This chapter reviews literature about reform commissions and develops a conceptual framework with which to view them. The chapter is organized into four sections: (1) commission effectiveness: conceptual and analytic intractability; (2) descriptions of reform commissions; (3) research studies and methods; and (4) conceptual framework. The first section provides a critique identifying issues and difficulties in understanding reform commissions from the current research on national-level educational reform commissions. The second uses the research on presidential, state, and local level reform commissions to provide a description of their antecedents, operation, outcomes, and connections between operation and outcomes. The third reviews the methods and findings of three case studies and a scholarly article that support this study's research design. Finally, the fourth section presents theoretical concepts that underlie this study's research design, data collection, and data analysis.

Commission Effectiveness: Conceptual and Analytic Intractability

Commission effectiveness has been a central research interest for scholarly work on national-level educational reform commissions. Ginsberg and
Wimpelberg (1988) asked rhetorically why educational reform commissions remain a popular process when historical evidence proves them to be of little effect in bringing specific reforms. Their answer was: "One way to understand the commissions' persistence is to observe that until recently commission organizers have had no comprehensive and analytical studies of the commission process to inform them" (p. 64). This conclusion implies that the commission sponsor knows little of the effects of commissions. An antithetical deduction might inquire as to whether the commission researchers know what effects to measure. A review of literature reveals analytical and conceptual intractability in scholarly efforts to understand the effectiveness of national-level reform commissions.

The contradictory explanations about the value of reform commissions stem from different understandings about their capability to effect change. Reform commissions, in general, form to address issues, often politically sensitive (Mitchell, 1977; Wolanin, 1975); that evade, foil, or impair existing systems or organizations--at least in the perception of the commission sponsor. "Blue ribbon commissions are intended to make news...to make things happen" (Johnson & Marcus, 1986, p. 3). Change, though, occurs in many ways--organizational, political, cultural, behavioral, policy, and so on--(see Schein, 1985; House, 1974, 1981; Bolman & Deal, 1991) providing multiple dimensions (Fullan, 1982) with which to understand the effects of a reform commission.
Scholarly work on national-level reform commissions, though, has compared commissions to one another using post hoc analyses (see Ginsberg & Wimpelberg, 1988; Slater & Warren, 1985; Deal, 1985; and Wolanin, 1975) in order to identify common traits about commissions. The research methods employed, however, tend to characterize commissions as unitary entities (Wolanin's and Deal's work are notable exceptions). The persuasive qualities of a commission's report were chosen as a primary measure to assess a commission's influence or effect. The relationships and possible interactions between commissioners, problem context, policies, and political processes were not investigated.

By focusing on effects with regard to one dimension of change--policy, these studies disregard sources of variance other than the commission report. Conclusions regarding commission impact develop by comparing evidence from two questions: What policy alternatives were posed by the commission's report?; and, which of those policies have been implemented? Assessing a commission's effect by measuring policy change stemming from its report is a unidimensional, rational approach. Implicit in this approach rests the assumptions that the commission expresses its entire influence in its report and that organizational reactions to those findings and recommendations--in the form of changed policies and practices--encompass the entire effect on the target organization.
Mitchell (1977), though, reported that the implementation of the Rosenberg Commission's plan for Maryland higher education was most influenced by members still serving in the state legislature. The effect of cross-fertilization by individual commissioners with positions in other organizations made the commission's influence far greater than the effects of the report observed in isolation. Mitchell's findings suggest the assumptions supporting a limited, rational approach to measure commission effects may be inappropriate.

Wolanin (1975) indicated that a presidential commission's study process more closely resembles policy analysis than a rational-comprehensive analytic approach. Policy analysis is frequently used as a political resource (Jenkins-Smith, 1990) and differs markedly from a decisionist, rational approach (Majone, 1989). The interconnectedness of policy and politics is evident in de Leon's (1988) observation that: "Policy is a manifestation of the political process and therefore must be embedded in the political process; ergo, it will surely and undoubtedly be affected by political events" (p. 53).

The following examples from the literature on commission effectiveness illustrate the complexity of commissions and the disparate approaches scholars have used to understand commissions. In evaluating the NCEE's (National Commission on Excellence in Education) efforts, Peterson (1985), Marcus and Johnson (1986), Ginsberg and Wimpelberg (1988) and Deal (1985) identified: the "profound effect [NCEE had] on national education debate" (Peterson, p.
126); the elevated "concern for the quality of education [that] captured the nation's attention" resulting from NCEE's report (Johnson & Marcus, p. 3); that their report, *A Nation At Risk*, "clearly helped spur national interest in school reform" (Ginsberg & Wimpelberg, p. 59); and, the important ceremony of "experts and policy makers...consolidat[ing] diverse inputs into a symbol, [their report], that would represent their collective sentiments" (Deal, p. 152). Each acknowledges a positive effect of NCEE on dimensions such as commanding national attention, inspiring a commitment to reform, or elevating the authority of the report through the symbolism of the commission's activity.

Yet, commission effectiveness critiques use differing concepts and measures. Peterson (1985) focuses "on the reports themselves" (p. 126) to posit that, "If we judge them by the standards ordinarily used to evaluate a policy analysis...they simply do not measure up" (p. 126-7, emphasis added). Ginsberg and Wimpelberg (1987), on the other hand, "discern...the apparently limited direct impact--in terms of specific recommendations being put into practice--that commission activity has had on school system and classroom behavior" (p. 345). Peterson measured a commission's effect by its report conforming to standards of policy analysis. In contrast, Ginsberg and Wimpelberg's examination of implementation evaluated changed policies or practices. Dunn's (1981) observation illustrates the difference in the two criteria, "Policy analysis is essentially a cognitive process, while policy making
is a political one" (p. 46). Clearly, Peterson and Ginsberg and Wimpelberg have analyzed commission effectiveness on different dimensions.

With yet a third set of criteria, Deal (1985) accentuated the symbolic interpretation of commissions by suggesting that their recommendations had organizational implications on four dimensions: individual, structural, political, and cultural. Deal concluded that commissions are effective as symbols--ceremonies--indicating the need to change.

The conceptual and analytical intractability found in the literature on national-level educational reform commissions limits insight into the practical capabilities or functions that explain their popularity. The "impoverished images" applied by researchers to organizational settings led Weick (1976) to comment, "If researchers start stalking the elusive loosely coupled system with imperfect language and concepts, they will perpetuate the blandness of organizational theory" (p. 16). Gathering a commission of administrative "elites" with standing positions in other governing bodies evokes images of a loosely confederated organization.

To understand "loosely coupled systems," Weick (1976) called for "adequate descriptions...to know how [the practitioner’s] influence attempts will spread and with what intensity" (p. 17). The absence of literature to describe change catalyzed by commissions invites an analysis of case studies about a reform commission’s antecedents, operation, outcomes, and
connections between operation and outcomes to identify additional explanations about the change process.

**Descriptions of Reform Commissions**

A review of case studies about state or local level educational reform commissions and literature on presidential commissions provides a general description of the commission process. The studies are examined regarding the antecedents, operation, outcomes, and connections between operation and outcomes to develop themes about reform commissions.

**Antecedents**

Purposive by nature, commissions form to effect some type of change. The purpose of the commission depends upon the antecedent conditions it is called to address (Wolanin, 1975). The capabilities of a reform commission appear to be consistent with their aims and objectives (Wolanin). The antecedents causing a reform commission’s formation range from a political actor’s motive to organizational conditions—internal or external—that require a response. Who calls a reform commission becomes an important consideration because of the commission’s political qualities and processes. Commissions often assume the responsibility for resolving politically sensitive issues for governors (Mitchell, 1977), presidents (Wolanin; Flitner, 1986), or heads of policy making organizations. The motives of these political actors for
transferring this responsibility is an important consideration in understanding the antecedents that result in the commission’s formation. The hope may be that the issue goes away or an impression of support for the issue disguises policy maker inaction (Wolanin; Flitner). Wolanin, though, argued that the largest number of presidential commissions are initiated to formulate innovative policies and facilitate their adoption.

The literature on reform commissions provides a variety of reasons for their appointment. A brief review reveals that their primary purpose more often is politically motivated than to search for rational-comprehensive policy alternatives. The purposes commissions are formed to address fall into six categories: (1) policy analysis, (2) persuasion, (3) education of elite policy makers, (4) organizational tool, (5) symbolic reassurance/crisis response, and (6) issue management or delay (see Wolanin, 1975; Flitner, 1986).

Each category of purpose relates to specific capabilities that reform commissions possess. Two frequent purposes for reform commissions are policy analysis and persuasion (Wolanin, 1975; Mitchell, 1977; Flitner, 1986; and, Johnson & Marcus, 1986). The popularity of commission-led reform is tied to its capacity to analyze problems and educate various publics to the prudence of the commission’s findings and recommendations (Wolanin). Commission’s can provide fresh, new ideas when needed (Johnson & Marcus). Gubernatorial study commissions perform policy analysis and recommend policy alternatives to the governor and general assembly on sensitive issues (Mitchell).
Commissions whose purpose is persuasion are intended to develop public support by placing an issue on the public agenda. Wolanin (1975) suggested that commissions are used as persuaders to sell various publics on proposals to which the President is already committed. Commissions garner publicity during their process and often command extensive public attention (Wolanin). Educational study commissions in Maryland have provided "a mechanism for encouraging broad input into the policy making process" (Lawrence, 1991, p. 223). The purpose of this type of commission is either to "begin a long range support-building effort for solving a problem...or to elevate a problem to a prominent position on the national agenda" (Wolanin, p. 20).

Reform commissions can serve the purpose of creating a forum in which high-level policy makers and elite administrators are educated (Wolanin, 1975). A commission with a cross section of eminent individuals can dignify and persuasively advocate policy change while reducing accusations of political bias. The commission process becomes a forum in which an elite consensus can develop around issues that previously lacked unanimity (Wolanin). Commissions can be forums in which extreme views are aired which redefine the issues and permit moderate change to occur (Lawrence, 1991). By developing a consensus among a group of eminent individuals, their collective prestige serves to facilitate resolving complex problems (Johnson & Marcus, 1986). Wolanin suggested that this capability provides the President, for
example, with a "powerful educational and persuasive tool" with which to reduce resistance in Congress, with bureau heads, or with the public.

As an organizational tool, reform commissions have the purpose to overcome organizational complexities (Flitner, 1986). A commission provides the circumstance by which a divided, intra-conflicted organization can bring together internal constituencies (Johnson & Marcus, 1986) to redevelop a common purpose. In addition, if the organization does not conform with societal expectations (Johnson & Marcus), or no single organization has the power to effect a desirable change (Wolanin, 1975; Johnson & Marcus), the commission allows the organization to hear from its constituents or to cooperate with external groups.

The category of commissions whose purpose is symbolic (reassurance/crisis response) are created as a way to satisfy a public expectation for policy-maker action (Wolanin, 1975; Flitner, 1986). Commissions give the appearance of an immediate response to pressing issues, thereby reducing the uncertainty of the individuals connected to the policy system (Johnson & Marcus, 1986).

Similarly, the issue management/delay purpose stems from the need to create an appearance of action or to provide an opportunity to reshape the "policy space" or to delay debate on an issue until a favorable "policy window" opens (Flitner, 1986; Wolanin, 1975). Wolanin reported that presidential advisory commissions, at times, attempt to mollify a restless constituency.
During the period required for the commission's investigation, the hope was that the problem will disappear.

**Operation**

In describing the operation of a reform commission, several assumptions are reported that influence the manner in which a commission operates. Commissions whose purpose is policy analysis carry with them a number of expectations (Wolanin, 1975). The commission is presented with a number of questions or a problem (Wolanin; Mitchell, 1977; Pendleton, 1989). The expectation holds that the commission will respond by recommending some form of solution (Wolanin).

The nature of the commission's solution, however, is not expected or often found to be a rational-comprehensive solution. One of the reasons that revolutionary proposals are not advanced is that commissions members see their role as achieving a common consensus about the issue they are studying (Pendleton, 1989). The task of devising solutions that can be implemented is intellectually challenging and politically divisive (Peterson, 1985). The commissions are expected to evaluate the alternative solution packages and make a recommendation for one solution based on some measure of public value (Wolanin, 1975). The nature of this solution package is not expected to be "new solutions in the sense of wholly original," but come from the "already established array of options" (p. 14-15).
The second expectation accompanying commissions formed to analyze policy surrounds the need to justify their existence. Commissions are expected to find the problem of enough significance to require the policy making system's action (Wolanin, 1975). The implication of calling a commission is that there is a problem that needs attention (Wolanin).

The final expectation is that commissions are not expected to recommend radical changes or suggest fundamental critiques in political, economic or social order (Wolanin, 1975). The commission serves as a forum in which extreme views are discussed and rejected in favor of more moderate change (Lawrence, 1991). "They are expected to suggest proposals for ameliorating and reforming the status quo" (p. 15).

Wolanin (1975) puts the commissions formed to analyze policy in the middle of the policy-making process. They occur after problem recognition and before organizational response. The impact that commissions can have on the policy making process through policy analysis is discussed later in this chapter.

The composition of national commissions infers that the administrative elites (Ginsberg & Wimpelberg, 1988) who generally comprise them are capable of understanding the complex antecedents to reform, formulating effective solutions, and persuading the target to accept their reform measures. Each member brings to the group his or her unique past and perceptual filter for interpreting the proceedings (Pendleton, 1989). Commissions comprised of individuals sharing many values simplify the task of structuring problems and
agreeing upon solutions to propose. Commissions composed of members with a common culture and background can approach problem solving from a common set of assumptions (Pendleton). One potential negative result of this like-mindedness is "groupthink" (Janis, 1975). Wharton (1982) reports that the Rosenberg Commission findings were poorly received by the higher education community, in part because it had given little credence to the public testimony as well as the findings of its own staff.

Strong leadership facilitates the operation of a reform commission (Johnson & Marcus, 1986). A normative consensus can occur between the Commission leader and its members (Pendleton, 1989). The result can prove to have a deleterious effect if the commission leader is out of touch with the commission's target. Wharton (1982) notes that the personal magnetism of the Rosenberg Commission chairman cultivated the support of the Commission and resulted in the release of an unacceptable report.

The group decision making of a reform commission is best described as political (Villanti, 1991; Mitchell, 1985; and Wharton, 1982). The political framework appears to exert the most significant influence on the Commission's deliberations (Villanti). The political influences, in order of relative importance, are (1) member influences on issues, (2) external political factors such as choices narrowed by the Governor or the Legislature, the higher education community, or economic conditions, and (3) the leadership dynamics within the Commission (Villanti).
During the study process, the commissioners positions on specific issues are influenced, in order of relative influence, by (1) their personal experiences, (2) the witnesses at public hearings, (3) their constituents, (4) other commissioners, (5) the commission staff, (6) presentations before the commission, (7) consultants to the commission, and (8) the potential financial impact (Mitchell, 1977).

Rational processes influence a reform commission’s report less than the political considerations (Vilanti, 1991). Information is the most significant element influencing decision making from a rational perspective, but it exerts less influence than political factors (Vilanti). The commission’s decision making does not use a rational-comprehensive decision making model for reasons ranging from limits on time and resources to staff who are not trained in scientific approaches (Wolanin, 1975).

The major issues addressed by commissions studying a similar domain for a common sponsor often deal with the same issue areas. Post World War II higher education commissions in Maryland focused on financing, governance and structure, relationship between public and private institutions, and access or equal opportunity (Lawrence, 1991). The expectations that a commission’s proposed solutions will come from existing ideas combines with the political framework with which commission make decisions to indicate that reform commissions suggest incremental policy making (Lindblom, 1968) with their report.
Outcomes

Commissions often are effective in influencing policy development and reform (Wolanin, 1975; Mitchell, 1977; and, Johnson & Marcus, 1986). Commissions have played a significant role in shaping higher educational policy in Maryland (Lawrence, 1991). The clarity of a commission’s stated purpose enhances its operation (Johnson & Marcus) as well as providing an effectiveness measure against which its success can be determined. The types of outcomes commissions produce relate directly to the purposes for which a commission is formed. Policy analysis, persuasion, elite education, and symbolic reassurance provide a variety of effectiveness measures against which a commission’s performance can be evaluated.

It is noteworthy that no commission has been reported to have policy making authority. Commissions develop legitimacy by way of their independence from and association with a policy making system (Wolanin, 1975), but their authority--based on charisma (Weber, 1947) or expertise (French & Raven, 1959) rather than on legitimate standing within a political system--in no way explains reasons why their policy alternatives will be chosen over competing options (Wolanin). Other political actors undoubtedly are promoting different policy positions, substituting alternative problem structures, and attempting to manipulate the values shaping the analytic policy space (Jenkins-Smith, 1990).
Successful outcomes in policy reform appear to be connected to the contemporary political environment, group dynamics, the commission's linkages with the policy making system, while avoiding overstepping their authority as policy analysts. Lawrence (1991) concludes that a commission's success relates to a number of factors. The support, in this case, of a strong governor, the personalities and personal relations among commissioners, the appointment of key legislators and educational leaders, and a commission report vague on details—especially about politically sensitive topics, are all identified as important variables to commission's success.

Timing also is important in the effectiveness of a commission (Lawrence, 1991) suggesting that a preferred "policy window" exists for release of the commission's findings and recommendations. Lawrence noted that change "requires a confluence of the right leadership, the right issues, the willingness of the educational establishment to accept modifications and reform, and a public climate that supports the change" (p. 344).

The reform commission's failure to effect policy actions—the product of policy making over which a commission has no authority—is a central theme of commission critiques (Peterson, 1985; Ginsberg & Wimpelberg, 1987). The implementation of policy alternatives, or lack thereof, remains the central concern in these studies.

Cross fertilization, though, appears to be an effective means of introducing a commission's preferred policy option into the policy making
system. Interestingly, the implementation of a gubernatorial commission’s plan is most influenced by those commission members still serving in the state legislature (Mitchell, 1977). These legislators can effectively influence their colleagues on matters before respective legislative bodies (Mitchell). By virtue of their interest and experience on the Commission, these individuals become internal experts (Mitchell). In addition, implementation is affected by the political organization head: President (Wolanin, 1975; Flitner, 1986), Governor (Mitchell; Wharton, 1982; Lawrence, 1991), or policy system CEO (Pendleton, 1989). Bureau and organization heads with a vested interest in the commission’s work also influence the reception given to the commission’s recommendations (Mitchell; Wolanin).

The commission process becomes a forum in which an elite consensus can develop around issues that are highly sensitive (Lawrence, 1991; Mitchell, 1977) or previously lacked unanimity (Wolanin, 1975; Pendleton, 1989). This capability provides the policy system head or commission sponsor with an educational and persuasive tool with which to reduce resistance in constituencies critical to implementation or change (Wolanin). Participation in decision making by constituent groups fosters awareness and assists in developing ownership of common goals (Pendleton).

Implementation problems occur when the commission does not respond to the political environment, the political links into the policy making system are weak, or the commission’s purpose is unclear. In cases where a commission’s
plan is not supported by the target group, that constituency’s concerns often have not been sufficiently regarded (Wharton, 1982).

In a case--Maryland’s Rosenberg Commission on higher education policy concerns--in which the final report characterized the higher education community as uncooperative and uncoordinated, the implementation of the commission’s plan was difficult. The target higher education group’s input had been disregarded during the public hearings and in the final recommendations (Wharton, 1982). The plan reflected the Rosenberg Commission chairman’s and staff director’s views and the Commission’s desire to break with past patterns (Wharton), but failed to accommodate any of the higher education community’s concerns or problems. In this case, the Rosenberg Commission’s plan also was ineffective in being implemented because the Governor had given little attention to the Commission’s deliberations and never made clear his intentions.

The effectiveness of the commission as a forum in which to develop consensus appears to depend upon the commission listening to constituents and making "mutual adjustments" (Lindblom, 1968) in their policy recommendations. The target organization’s or constituency’s ownership of the commission’s plan results from a perception that their interests have been heard and considered (Pendleton, 1989). The commission’s authority hinges on the commission’s ability to manage and adjust to the interests involved in the implementation of their plan. Lindblom (1968) called authority the rule of
obedience, noting that it is the subordinate who chooses to obey the authority. In connecting authority to leadership, Barnard (1938) noted an "executive’s" responsibility is to satisfactorily manage the followers’ various interests that are important to the collective well-being.

Connections Between Operation and Outcomes

Several unique characteristics attributed to commissions are applicable to a description of reform commissions in general. These characteristics contribute to the commissions’ capabilities (Wolanin, 1975). In some instances, these characteristics are used to define effectiveness criteria for an educational reform commission (Johnson & Marcus, 1986; Lawrence, 1991). These qualities develop from connections between the reform commission’s operation and its potential outcomes.

Six general characteristics are attributed to reform commissions that enhance its ability to accomplish the intended purpose. These qualities relate to the commission members and staff or the commission’s process:

First, commissions are made up of members and staff who are "competent and qualified" because of their technical expertise, their general wisdom, or their experience as practitioners (Wolanin, 1975).

Second, commissions are "representative" of the major interests or areas of knowledge under consideration (Wolanin, 1975; Johnson & Marcus, 1986).
Third, the eminent citizens that serve contribute to the prestige of the commission (Johnson & Marcus, 1986). As a result, commissions are "prestigious" because of the administrative elites or high status experts who are "in effect public symbols of their field of knowledge or their constituency" (Wolanin, 1975, p. 30).

Fourth, commissions are highly "visible" permitting the sponsor to treat a problem in a public way (Wolanin, 1975).

Fifth, commission are "ad hoc." In contrast to other governing organizations, they are characterized by their impermanence and benefit from the advantages of a temporary existence (Wolanin, 1975).

Finally, these qualities taken in combination comprise what Wolanin (1975) calls "the most important special attributes of commissions, their independence and objectivity" (p. 31).

Wolanin (1975) concluded that these characteristics permit the presidential commission to have three kinds of general advantages or capabilities:

They have a unique ability to engage in policy analysis and to formulate innovative recommendations. They have an unusual capacity to persuade other political actors to adopt their recommendations and agree with their findings. And they are effective as forum in which their members can be educated and thereby form a consensus or be brought into closer agreement with the policies of the President. (p. 31-32)
The connections between a commission's purpose, its capabilities, and its outcomes seem to provide consistent evidence about its nature.

Public perceptions regarding the study process also enhance a commission's capabilities to influence policy change. Wolanin (1975) suggested that there is a public ideal against which the actions of policy makers are measured. The process that generates the preferred policy option, and its conformity with this public ideal, dictates the policy's level of acceptance. Wolanin identified the two elements of the public ideal--one procedural and one epistemological--as, (1) arriving at a policy in a "fair" or "democratic" way by hearing all involved parties and interests, and (2) using a version of the rational-comprehensive method to make an "objective" and "expert" decision. Wolanin concluded:

Thus if the findings and recommendations of a commission are reached in this legitimate way, they are more likely to be accepted as authoritative. Or perhaps more accurately, reaching findings and recommendations in this way, or at least giving the appearance of doing so, is minimal condition for their acceptance. (p. 38)

Arriving at conclusions according to the public ideal does not insure that a commission's definition of a problem, or its solutions, will be accepted, but it increases the likelihood (Wolanin). Competition with other providers of analysis who have "similar legitimacy and their own communication and prestige advantages" (p.39) can result in the selection of alternative policies.
Wolanin's (1975) point, nonetheless, appears to explain the attention that educational reform commissions place on the selection of commissioners who have prestige and represent the affected constituencies, along with the commission hearings and study process, and the promotion given to the final report. The acceptance of the report depends upon capturing the public's attention and giving the appearance of a fair and democratic process that rationally devises a plan. Hence, each element of its operation increases the authority attached to the commission's findings and recommendations.

**Research Studies**

The following summarizes three case studies emphasizing a political framework to reform commission research. It likewise reviews Weick's research priorities for identifying "loosely-coupled" systems. These authors provide a foundation for the present study's research design.

Mitchell's (1985) study of an ad hoc education policy advisory commission integrated organization and policy paradigms from several theoretical models to develop frames of reference. Mitchell utilized these four conceptual frames to examine the structure and nature of a single state commission. The four frames: (1) natural selection-structural—the organization and policies of commissions are the product of the larger political, economic, and social environment; (2) system structural-functional—commissions as a formal organization created to perform policy analysis; (3) collective action-
exchange--commissions as marketplaces or political systems in which the organization and policies are the product of negotiation, compromise, and mutual adjustment between stakeholders; and (4) strategic choice-interaction--the organization and policies of the commission are the product of shared constructions of reality.

Mitchell (1985) applied the four frames to discover which of the policy paradigms best describe the processes of commissions. Mitchell concluded that each is a valid approach to "see" a commission. The strategic choice-interaction frame provides the lowest and most complicated level of analysis in studying organizations, but suffers from its own complexity. The system structural-functional frame explains the commissions structure and function as an organization engaging in rational policy analysis, but had "blind spots" with regard the personal policy preferences of the involved participants. The natural selection-structural frame explains the environments effect on the commission, but lacks detail about the commission’s decision-making process. Finally, the collective action-exchange frame provides "the broadest and deepest understandings" of how a commission is created and functions. Mitchell found that a commission "provided a structured forum for the marketing of diverse desires and ideas" (p. 248). The "natural liaison [of] political entities and events" is captured with this frame. Mitchell’s caveat about the collective action-exchange paradigm is that it overlooks the study of the individual actor.
Villanti (1991) studied a state level higher education reform commission using an ethnographic methodology. Villanti’s data analysis compared Allison’s (1971) rational process model and political process model. Villanti concluded that the "political framework appeared to exert the most significant influence on the Commission’s deliberations" (p. 158). Her finding that information was the most influential element from the rational process model is not surprising, but she ranked information below membership, politics, and group/leadership dynamics in its overall degree of influence on the Commission.

Wharton (1982) studied the Rosenberg Commission in Maryland, a gubernatorial, higher education reform commission, using a political model for data analysis. Wharton selected Easton’s (1965a, 1965b, 1981) political systems theory framework for her conceptual model because it "permits treatments of complexities" (Wharton, p. 35). After using Easton’s framework, Wharton concluded that "events will not fit precisely into the model...it must be remembered that a theoretical model is only that--a model of reality, and not reality itself" (p. 197). She noted, though, that a model permits the researcher to simplify reality and identify significant relationships.

The case study method has been used effectively in these studies and others to examine the work of a reform commission (see for example E. Mitchell, 1977; Hugstad, 1990; Lawrence, 1991; Pendleton, 1989; and Petrock, 1978). The three reform commission studies reviewed above show that a political framework serves as an appropriate conceptual approach.
Mitchell’s work pinpoints that the individual--motives and constructions of reality--as the element that is not explained using a political framework. The present study uses a political model but attempts to build upon these findings by developing a methodology that examines the individual as a research element.

Weick (1976) advanced a set of priorities for examining organizations as loosely coupled systems that support the case study and policy science approaches. Five of these priorities are germane to this study’s data analysis approach. Weick’s priorities: (1) develop conceptual tools capable of preserving loosely coupled systems; (2) explicate what elements are available in educational organizations for coupling; (3) develop contextual methodology; (4) promote the collection of thorough, concrete descriptions of the coupling patterns in actual educational organizations; (5) specify the nature of core technology in educational organizations.

The Conceptual Framework

The Conceptual Framework section presents the theoretical concepts that inform this study’s research design and that were central to data collection and analysis.

Wolanin’s (1975) findings about the capabilities of presidential commissions were instructive in developing a conceptual framework. Wolanin argued that, "The two most important capabilities of commissions are to
engage in policy analysis and to persuade others to accept their findings and recommendations" (p. 41). Wolanin’s point suggests the development of a conceptual orientation that is capable of analyzing the commission’s policies and understanding the political process in which those policies are "sold."

The conceptual framework for this study is derived from research conducted on educational reform commissions and studies which focus on the political process of policy-making groups. A conceptual framework simplifies identification of significant variables in a complex research task. Five models are used to represent different aspects of the commission-led reform process: a political systems framework, a power structure framework, an organizational change framework, a commission life cycle framework, and a policy process framework.

First, Easton’s (1965a, 1965b, 1981) political systems theory represents the relationship of the Knight Commission with the NCAA. Easton’s model permits description of political behavior occurring within and between these two political systems.

Second, Edgar Schein’s (1969) mechanisms for personal change are adapted to represent organizational change.

Third, Hunter’s (1953) study identifies formal and informal power structures involved in a political process.
Fourth, Ginsberg and Wimpelberg’s (1988) seven research questions provide a framework of the reform commission’s life cycle. Each of these models is described in relation to the Knight Commission.

Finally, de Leon (1988), Lasswell (1956), Dunn (1981), and Jenkins-Smith (1990) distinguish policy analysis from policy making and supply elements and concepts with which to look at the policy making process.

**Political Systems Theory Framework**

Easton (1965a, 1965b, 1981) developed the theory that political life can be viewed as "a system of behavior embedded in an environment to the influences of which the political system is exposed and reacts" (1965a, p. 18). Easton (1965a) defined a political system as being a set of interactions primarily concerned with the authoritative allocation of values to a society. To persist, the persons or organizations oriented to the system--for example the NCAA’s member institutions--must consider themselves bound by the values. Policy represents one type of authoritative allocation of values. It is a web of decisions that dictates one type of behavior over another. Applying Easton’s model, the Knight Commission and the NCAA each operate as separate political systems when viewed from their formal political authority, process and impact.

As an educational reform body, the Knight Commission attempted to influence the policy development of the NCAA. The Knight Commission, though, was not legally capable of authoritative action within the NCAA. By
studying, investigating, advising, and recommending, its report was intended to influence policy by presenting a preferred course of action for those making policy for intercollegiate athletics. In this sense, it was a political system attempting to allocate values to the NCAA and allied interests involved in college sports. In contrast, the NCAA is a legislative body with formal constitutional authority to make rules that maintain order for its members’ interactions.

Easton (1965a) distinguished the political system from the environment in which it exists. Easton’s basic units of analysis are interactions which occur within the political system or exchanges which occur between a system and its environment. Variations in the structures or processes within a system, known as response, take place as the members of the system attempt to regulate stress from within or without, or to process feedback. The persistence of the system depends on the presence and nature of information and other influences that return to it from the environment, known as feedback.

Disturbances from the environment, either political or contextual, that prevent the political system from operating in its normal way are known as stressors (Easton, 1965a). Stress can occur from output failure--failure to respond to demands resulting in discontent or loss of support, input overload--conflicting or rapid presentation of demands, or the regular pressures of political life. The demands and supports comprise the input into the political system. The system in turn converts these inputs into decisions and actions, which are
outputs for those individuals or organizations bound to the system's values. Figure 1 shows a simplified version of Easton's political system model.

The Knight Commission was external to the NCAA and therefore part of its environment. The Commission's report served as an external demand, or stressor, intended to alter the internal processes of the NCAA, as well as its policies. Similarly, the NCAA was external to the Knight Commission and part of its environment. Yet, these boundaries were not clear cut in reality. A majority of the Knight Commissioners had formal positions within the NCAA, including four of the Knight Commissioners who were also members of the NCAA's Presidents Commission and Richard Schultz who was the Executive Director of the NCAA. Therefore, the impact of the Knight Commission's findings on the NCAA was a complex political process influenced by each political system's internal interactions, stressors from its environment, and the political actors with membership in both systems.

Organizational Change Framework

Schein's (1969) "Mechanisms of Change" provided a conceptual scheme to describe "changes in beliefs, attitudes, and values" within an individual (p. 98). The definitions Schein furthered for the human personality system, though, coalesce with Easton's political system's theory to apply to organizational change (Easton's parallel terms appear in parenthesis). The concept of dynamic equilibrium (system persistence), a central idea to systems
Figure 1: A Simplified Model of a Political System
Note: From A Systems Analysis of Political Life by D. Easton, 1965, p. 112.
theories in general, expresses the relative stability of behavior resulting from the balance between driving forces (demands) and restraining forces (supports). In the absence of stress, no motivation exists to reform behavior (policies).

The change process (response) begins with an unfreezing of the system caused by a disequilibrium between driving and restraining forces. The resultant motivation to change (stressor) initiates a changing process in which new responses are developed based on new information (feedback). The individual (political system) seeks new information either through identification with a single source or scanning multiple sources. The individual (system) refreezes by integrating the changes into new behaviors (policies). The stability accompanying the new behaviors (policies) results in a new dynamic equilibrium (Schein, 1969).

The Knight Commission was a stressor to the NCAA's political process. Viewing the political system with Schein's definitions permits conceiving a direction and magnitude to policy change. While causal relations between outcomes in the NCAA's governance and policies and the Knight Commission's influence were avoided, this conceptual framework permitted description of the direction and magnitude of NCAA reform in relation to the values underlying the Knight Commission's recommendations. Figure 2 applies Schein's model to the NCAA and the Knight Commission.
Figure 2: The Change Process

Note: The broken line represents the relationship between the NCAA and Member Universities—the political system's policies subscribed to by members. The Knight Commission exchanges and report also influenced the Member Institution, U. S. Congress, and the American Public, but were not the focus of this study.
The Informal Power Structure

Easton’s model focuses on power that is legitimate (Graham, 1971), using the authoritative allocation of values as the unit of analysis. Hunter’s (1953) study of the political process of a mid-sized city government, though, challenged the assumptions, validity, and conceptual completeness of a strictly formal power structure approach to the study of political systems (See Table 1). Hunter found that the predominant power to decide policy was not held by the legitimate policy-makers but by industrial, commercial, and financial owners and top executives of large enterprises. Power was held and wielded by an informal structure of power elites who utilized a power pyramid to influence public policy. Four levels of leaders were identified in the informal power structure. The first level leaders, the power elite, rarely attended formal meetings; rather, choosing to affect policy decisions through second, third, or fourth-level leaders. Identification of these key influencers who operate behind the scenes becomes an important aspect to the political process.

The key actors--formal power structure--and key influencers--informal power structure--are examined to determine their goals and power resources as applied to the governance process. The goals of the formal and informal power structures’ discrepant interests constitute the public agenda (formal) and the latent agenda (informal). Differences between the two are explained by a divergence between the formal and informal interests. Members within the
Table 1: Two Antithetical Sets of Assumptions about Organizational Power Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>FORMAL POWER</strong></th>
<th><strong>INFORMAL POWER</strong></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Predominant Power is in the Political system as provided by its constitution or Mission.</td>
<td>1. Predominant power is held by commercial and financial owners and executives of large corporations, not the legitimate policy-holders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The greatest source of unofficial influence comes from formal special interest groups (i.e. NCAA comms., faculty, coaches, admin.)</td>
<td>2. Power is held and wielded by an informal structure of power elites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Interaction between official power holders and special interest groups determines policy.</td>
<td>3. The most influential power elites rarely attend formal meetings, but use lower level reps. to affect policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Policy is established at formal meeting by the political groups.</td>
<td>4. Policy Decisions are made in private.</td>
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Note: Adapted from Political Power and Educational Decision-Making by R. B. Kimbrough, 1966.
political system "put a good face" on the latent motives and desires of those influencing the political system from its environment.

The cross-fertilization between the NCAA and Knight Commission occurred openly with members who hold formal positions in both systems. Less apparent were the influences that result from informal relations between members of the two systems or their environments. Since Easton’s theory focuses on the legitimate, or formal, power structures, Hunter’s concept provided a conceptual framework for examining the informal political processes of the Knight Commission.

The Reform Commission Life Cycle

The reform commission is, by definition, a temporary organization. Ginsberg and Wimpelberg (1988) used seven research questions in their study of national-level, educational reform commissions. To identify a framework with which to examine the full sentence of a commission, these questions were modified to identify major elements in the commission’s life cycle (see Figure 3). The seven stages: (1) Antecedents--the antecedents which caused the formation of the commission; (2) Commission Empowerment--the organization which initiated the study and empowered the commission; (3) Commissioner Selection--the selection and biography of the commissioners who served on the commission; (4) Study Process--the process in which the study was conducted; (5) Decision-Making Process--the decision-making process
Figure 3: The Life Cycle of a Reform Commission

Note: Adapted from the seven research questions used in "Assessment of Twentieth-Century Commission Reports on Educational Reform" by R. Ginsberg and R. K. Winkelberg, 1988.
which determined the issues receiving the greatest attention; (6) **Findings and Recommendations**—the principal findings and recommendations forwarded in the commission’s report; and, (7) **Commission Impact**—the impact the report had on reforms to policy and governance. This conceptualization provided a framework to understand how commissions are initiated, chosen, executed, and evaluated.


As Easton’s political systems theory identifies, policies constitute one product of a political system. de Leon (1988) advanced a methodological hierarchy that elevates policy science to the top of the disciplinary pyramid. The policy sciences are a broad approach that examine "societally critical problems." Policy analysis, on the other hand, is a subset of tools and methodologies from the policy sciences. According to de Leon—who draws these categories from Lasswell (1951, 1971)—the policy sciences "are problem-oriented and contextual in nature, multidisciplinary in approach, and explicitly normative in perspective" (p. 7, emphasis added).

Lasswell (1970) observed that the policy making process consists of "knowledge of the policy process and knowledge in the policy process" (p. 3). Applying this concept to reform commissions, **policy analysis**—the intellectual process of issue analysis—is separated from **policy making**—the political process used to develop consensus and advance the reforms suggested by the
commission's report. The problem structuring, findings, and recommendations—both general and specific—comprise the substantive issues and policy alternatives that form the policy analysis. The Knight Commission's operation contains the political process that shaped its policy making.

Dunn (1981) identified the elements of the policy making system: (1) policies—which are formulated in issue areas that result from conflicting definitions of a policy problem, (2) policy stakeholders—who are individuals that affect or are affected by policy decisions, and (3) policy environment—which is the specific context that surrounds the policy making process. Dunn noted that the processes of a policy system are dialectical in nature. The policies, stakeholders, and environment both determine and are determined by one another. Because of the dialectical nature of the policy system, policy analysts and policy actors "are both the creators and products of policy systems" (p. 47). As a result, the policies of the Knight Commission and the politics of athletic reform are interconnected with the stakeholders who conceive their structure and attempt to influence their acceptance.

Conceptions of the policy process provide a framework with which to analyze the interrelationships between policy analysis and policy making. Dunn (1981) suggested an integrated framework with which to view elements of the policy process (see Figure 4). Six policy analytic methods transform five policy-relevant information components from one type of information into another. The five policy-relevant information components are conceived as: (1) policy
Figure 4: Dunn's Integrated Framework Describing the Process of Policy Analysis

Figure 5: Dunn's Five Types of Policy-Relevant Information

Note: Figure 4 and 5 are from An Introduction: Public Policy Analysis by W. Dunn, 1981.
problems—an unrealized value, need, or opportunity; (2) policy alternatives—a potential course of action that may resolve a policy problem; (3) policy actions—the political process guided by the policy alternatives that is designed to achieve valued outcomes; (4) policy outcomes—a consequence of policy actions; and (5) policy performance—the degree to which the policy outcomes result in the attainment of values (pp. 44-45). Figure 5 illustrates the five policy-relevant information components.

Of Dunn’s (1981) six policy analytic methods, the metamethod of problem structuring is relevant to this framework. Problems rarely appear fully defined. Lindblom (1968) commented that "policy makers are not faced with a given problem. Instead they have to identify and formulate their problem" (p. 13). Political actors and policy analysts structure the issues into problems through formal or informal analysis.

Problem structuring involves all the other policy-analytic methods and "functions as a kind of central regulator of the overall process of policy analysis" (p. 40). Dunn noted that policy problems are seldom "solved." Lindblom (1968, 1965) characterized the policy process as a "never ending" series of incremental policy adjustments. More often they are resolved, reformulated, or unsolved (Dunn). As a result, the policy process often provides a "methodology for problem structuring and not a means to ‘solve’ problems" (p. 45).
Hence, the policy analysis process often defines the problems it addresses and determines the values with which the policy alternatives are measured. The relationship of norm setting to problem structuring in policy analysis has drawn increasing attention from the policy sciences. Majone (1989) commented that "the most important function both of public deliberation and of policy making is defining the norms that determine when certain conditions are to be regarded as policy problems" (p. 23-24). In the rational policy process determining values precedes selecting the best policy alternative to address the stated problem. Majone continued: "In the decisionist view, rational policy analysis can begin only after the relevant values have been authoritatively determined. In fact, these values are neither given nor constant, but are themselves a function of the policy-making process that they are supposed to guide" (p.24).

In the ideal situation, the benefits and costs of different policy options could be measured on a single dimension of value and collapsed onto a single criterion of choice (Jenkins-Smith, 1990). However, the outcomes of policy choices rarely are commensurate. Analysis "tends to present multiple dimensions of value that makes straightforward decision making rules" difficult (Jenkins-Smith, p. 85). Wolanin (1975) commented that presidential commissions did not utilize a rational-comprehensive study approach. One reason for this choice: because their invariants are "the broadest and most basic patterns of social behavior and attitudes...[that] constitute the
assumptions and conceptual ‘paradigm’ that guide and circumscribe inquiry rather than being the subject of inquiry" (p. 103).

Multiple dimensions of value create what Jenkins-Smith (1990) called the "analytical policy space." This policy space "provides a conceptual framework from which to compare the merits of policies across various incommensurable classes of outcomes" (p. 85). Members of separate subsystems that have differing "policy belief systems" utilize the analysis process to point out the connections between the means and ends/benefits and costs of the policy-making decision (Jenkins-Smith). The Knight Commission’s mission statement provided such a link by noting the negative effect athletic abuses have on the integrity of higher education.

The analytic policy space defines the boundaries of the policy debate. Continued analysis and learning by the policy actors shapes and reshapes the policy space to provide the cognitive basis for changes in policy beliefs and choice of policy options. Wolanin’s (1975) "conceptual paradigm" parallels the concept of policy space. Both provide the image of a complex matrix of value continua and attitudes within which the policy making decision is formulated.

Jenkins-Smith (1990) commented on the political resource policy analysis provides in the struggle to adopt a preferred policy option. "among adversarial providers of analysis, the primary struggle is over manipulation of the shape and content of the policy space in ways designed to improve the chances for adoption of the analyst’s preferred policy choice" (p. 86). Jenkins-Smith
identified that those political actors in a position to demand analysis are also capable to use it as a political resource. The role of values in structuring policy problems and the opportunity for politics to attempt to manipulate the policy space are aspects of policy analysis that become important concepts with which to study reform commissions.

The Conceptual Framework Summarized

In summary, the conceptual framework provides a means to simplify identification of the significant variables in this study. Using a political systems theory model modified to examine both formal and informal power structure permitted identifying the interaction between individuals, ideas, institutions, and interests. The life cycle of the reform commission supplied a framework to examine the operation of a single commission. The characterization and definition of the policy process distinguished policy making and policy analysis. The policy process model identified informational and analytic stages of policy development. Finally, the model of organizational change provided a scheme to assess governance and policy change within the target organization and to speculate about the impact of the Commission.
CHAPTER THREE

Focus of Inquiry, Study Approach, and Research Design and Methodology

Chapter Overview

The methods and design that guided this study are now considered. The chapter is organized into four major sections: focus of inquiry, study approach, delimitations and limitations, and research design and methodology.

The Focus of Inquiry section identifies the five foci of inquiry and associated research questions that direct the study. The next section provides a rationale for the present research approach, as well as background information on the case study method. The third section supplies the delimitations and limitations. Finally, the Research Design and Methodology section is divided into the three subsections. Its first subsection, research design, explains the deductive and inductive models used to obtain data around the five overarching research questions. The next subsection, data collection, describes the research methods and sample groups from which data were collected. And last, the data analysis subsection identifies the techniques used to analyze the data.

Focus of Inquiry

Commissions are unique organizations. They are ad hoc. They are sponsored by both private organizations and public governing bodies. They
have no constitutional powers yet derive authority from their independence from and association with their sponsoring organization (Wolanin, 1975). They are capable of policy analysis and political persuasion, yet their study process externally appears to conform to the ideals of a rational-comprehensive approach. They are comprised of "elites" who concurrently hold standing in other organizations or governing bodies. They issue a final report, yet attempt to garner public attention and direct influence in other notable ways. In short, the reform commission presents many dimensions of analysis for the researcher.

This study centered on the process of one educational reform commission. It described the Knight Commission's antecedents, operation, and outcomes in order to investigate how one educational reform commission formed, conceived reform, and influenced organizational change. Five foci of inquiry were developed in order to explicate the potential influence of commission-led reform and address this study's two central questions--how does an independent, external, temporary commission operate in order to influence the governance, decision making, and policies of a standing educational organization?, and what functions did the Knight Commission serve in bringing organizational change or policy reform to college sports? In addition, within each focus, data analysis took place on three levels: (1) by stakeholder, (2) by policy, and (3) by process.
The initial focus of inquiry described the stakeholders and political elements on the Knight Commission and within its target environment. This thrust looked at the diverse interests and values, the different kinds and amounts of resources, and the various constructions of the issues possessed by the individuals and organizations that comprised the Knight Commission’s policy-making system.

The second focus of inquiry identified the policy recommendations the Knight Commission advanced in its March 1991 report and compared them with the antecedent conditions existing in college athletics. Using Easton’s political systems model, an output (the report) of the Knight Commission political system was compared to identifiable inputs--antecedent stressors and supports (see Figure 6). The surveyed opinions of "policy experts" attempted to verify the antecedent issues. These opinions were compared to the Commission’s findings and recommendations to validate the central elements of the 1991 report.

The third focus of inquiry described the outcomes of the Knight Commission in terms of NCAA governance and policy. Using Easton’s model (see Figure 7), outputs--policy recommendations, problem structuring, and political exchanges--from the Knight Commission’s political system provided inputs into the NCAA political system. These Knight Commission-generated stressors and supports were compared to the outputs from the NCAA. The surveyed opinions of policy experts identify the significance of each NCAA
Figure 6: Research Design for Validating the Antecedent Issues
Figure 7: Research Design to Assess Knight Commission Impact on NCAA Policy Outcomes
reform. Although drawing causal relations between the Knight Commission’s influence and the NCAA’s response is fraught with spurious conclusions, this focal point attempted to examine the Knight Commission’s impact, direct or indirect, on its target by assessing the direction and magnitude of NCAA policy and governance reforms in relation to Commission recommendations and values.

The fourth focus of inquiry described the operation of the Knight Commission. This focal point examined the structural and political processes that constituted the Knight Commission’s life cycle.

The fifth focus of inquiry described connections between the operations and outcomes of the Knight Commission. Relationships between the motives, contexts, processes, actions, and results of the Knight Commission are discussed, using concepts from the political science, policy science, administrative science, organizational change, and reform commission literatures.

These five foci are intended to provide insight into the issues addressed by the Knight Commission, to describe its operation, and to reflect upon the commission process itself. Five sets of research questions deal directly with the five focal points of inquiry. These questions guided the study and provided the framework for description and analysis of the commission-led reform process:
1. Who were the Stakeholders and Political Elements involved with the Knight Commission’s antecedents, operation, and outcomes?

- Who were the Knight Foundation, the Knight Commissioners, and their staff?
- How and by whom were they selected?
- Why were they selected?
- Is there evidence from their biographical data to indicate previous positions or values on issues that were studied by the Knight Commission?
- Who were the other stakeholders that influenced the Knight Commission’s process?
- What was the Knight Foundation’s purpose in sponsoring a commission to study college sports?
- What were the purposes of the other key actors who were involved in initiating the Knight Commission?

2. How were the Antecedents to Reform addressed by the Knight Commission’s findings and recommendations?

- What major issues in college athletics were perceived as needing reform?
- How were the major issues in college athletics structured into problems by the Knight Commission?
- What contextual factors affected the nature and impact of the Knight Commission’s March, 1991 report?
- Whose values were represented by the Commission’s 1991 report?
- Which values were in conflict?
- Which values were represented by the policy alternatives in the Knight Commission’s findings and recommendations?
- Did the Knight Commission’s findings and recommendations address the major issues confronting the administration of college athletic programs?

3. How did NCAA Governance and Policy Outcomes relate to the Knight Commission’s reform recommendations?

- What major issues addressed by the Knight Commission’s 1991 report were subject to NCAA rule change?
- What other policy outcomes resulted from the Knight Commission’s reform process?
• What other non-policy outcomes did the Knight Commission play a role in changing?

4. How did the Knight Commission Operate? (Knight Commission Operation)

• How was the Knight Commission empowered?
• How was the Knight Commission structured? How did it operate?
• What approach did the Knight Commission choose to study the issues which they addressed?
• Was the approach capable of informing the Commissioners with data that led to the findings of the Commission?
• What influence did the Commission leadership and staff have on the information and issues addressed by the Commission?
• How did the Knight Commission’s political system operate?
• What internal political and decision-making processes influenced the Knight Commission’s findings and recommendations?
• What contextual issues or stressors from the Knight Commission’s external environment influenced their final report?
• How were the Knight Commission’s findings and recommendations reported?
• How was the final report written, discussed, and agreed upon?

5. What Connections existed between the Knight Commission’s Operation and NCAA Governance and Policy Outcomes?

• What political processes shaped the outcomes of the Knight Commission’s reform efforts?
• How did the Knight Commission interact with its target environment--external organizations--to exchange information and influence?
• Did the manner in which they were reported affect their impact on policy development?
• What influence on the NCAA’s response did the Commissioners have who were members of both the NCAA and Knight Commission political systems?
• What theoretical concepts from the reform commission, political science, policy science, administrative science, and organizational change literatures describe the Knight Commission’s process?
• Why does the target organization respond to a commission’s report?
• What processes influence the commission’s impact on the target organization?
• What distinguishes the Knight Commission’s process from descriptions of other reform commissions?

Research Approach

Rationale for Research Approach

This study’s design was eclectic in nature and enabled research into questions that relate to a multidimensional view of the complex organizations that commissions are described to be. Douglas (1976) divided social research into two general approaches: controlled, experimental, quantitative research; and field research. Douglas’ belief in a "problematic, multiperspectival conception of truth" suggests that "our choice of methods must always be made in light of the degree of reliable truth we are seeking and the problems we face in the concrete settings we are studying" (p. 4). Similarly, Graham (1971) advised the researcher that when selecting a research orientation, "the basic rule to follow...is to choose the alternative which is most fruitful for dealing with the problem of interest" (p. 6).

Erickson (1984) suggested a research design that employs both qualitative and quantitative approaches, as well as inductive and deductive reasoning. Fieldwork of this type permits analyzing the behavior and meaning of routine social interactions and placing the interaction within the broader
social, political, and economic context in which it occurs. The advantage of using both induction and deduction is that,

As a result, the research pursues deliberate line of inquiry while in the field, even though the specific terms of inquiry may change in response to the distinctive character of events in the field setting. The specific terms of inquiry may also be reconstructed in response to changes in the fieldworker’s perceptions and understandings of events and their organization during the time spent in the field. (Erickson, p. 8-9)

The previous studies about reform commissions and policy making, discussed in Chapter Two, support the multi-perspective approach this study uses. Paradigms and methodologies from sociology, political science, policy science, and administrative science provide the conceptual tools and methods with which to examine the operation, influence, policy, and human behavior of a reform commission.

The Case Study Method

The case study method provides a general methodological description of the qualitative and quantitative data analysis. A case study is an "in depth examination of a particular instance of something" (Hofferbert, 1974, p. 89). Descriptive in nature, the case study is an intensive and longitudinal analysis of a past event that notes change and development over the life cycle of the case (Best, 1970).
Hofferbert (1974) offers a description of the format commonly used in case studies about policy decisions. A set of decisions is isolated for study and the relevant history and context of the situation is discussed. The description of the case attempts to identify the actors and their motives, the influence the actors exert on the development of the policy outcomes, and the elements operating during the policy-making process. The present study analyzed three levels of information which correspond with Hofferbert’s description: the stakeholders, the policies, and the political processes of the Knight Commission.

The strength of the case study is the emphasis placed on the human dimension of the policy making process (Hofferbert, 1974). Hofferbert concluded that,

The primary virtue of the case approach is the richness of detail and the lucidity it can offer in illuminating the dynamics of policy-making. Further, the case approach has occasioned a number of important hypotheses that can be tested individually in many contexts. (p. 138) Hence, the case study method permits close examination of the individual an element to which Mitchell (1985) brings attention.

The weakness of the case study method rests in its confinement to a single research setting. Because analysis is unable to compare phenomena across settings, the generalization of results is limited to the case that is studied. In addition, the inductive reasoning frequently employed in case
studies also opens the study to claims of researcher bias or produces a non-theoretical description of the results. Geertz (1973) countered the former criticism by noting that generality is achieved through the "delicacy of distinctions" and not with a "sweep of abstractions." The objective is to generalize within cases using rich, intensive description rather than across cases by "codify[ing] abstract regularities" (p. 26). Geertz concludes that, "A study is an advance if it is more incisive...than those that preceded it, but it less stands on their shoulders than, challenged and challenging, runs by their side" (p. 25).

**Delimitations and Limitations**

The study had the following delimitations and limitations that were necessary or developed because of its expansive topic.

**Delimitations**

This study's broad scope sought to understand the political process of an educational reform commission by studying the commission from the antecedents leading to its formation to the impact on its target political system's response. The research project required certain delimitations in order to maintain the study's feasibility.

First, this study did not attempt to review the history of athletic participation in higher education or problems related to that history other than
the issues pertinent to the antecedents, recommendations, or impact of the Knight Commission’s findings.

Second, this study systematically examined the impact of the Knight Commission and its report in relation to NCAA policy response. Other Commission outcomes are noted when evidence was available, although the impact of the Knight Commission at the NCAA institutional level or in other athletic, academic, or governmental organizations was not the primary focus of this study. Other athletics, academic, or governmental regulatory organizations undoubtedly have responded or are responding to the call to reform, but the NCAA and its member institutions’ collective actions provided a manageable research focus. In addition, other stressors from the NCAA’s environment, not generated by or related to the Knight Commission or its report, are reported only as the data became relevant to the findings of this study.

Third, despite the Knight Commission’s plans to operate through Spring, 1993, this study investigated the process resulting in the March 1991 Knight Commission report, *Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete: A New Model for Intercollegiate Athletics*, and assessed the early impact of the Knight Commission’s findings and recommendations on NCAA rules through the period ending with the 1992 NCAA Convention.
Limitations

Limitations with regard to the methods employed in this study or resources available to the research placed constraints on this research.

First, this study focused on the political processes of the Knight Commission at each of the seven stages of an educational reform commission's life cycle: antecedents to commission formation, commission empowerment, selection of commissioners, the study process of the commission, the decision-making process determining issues the commission would address, the findings and recommendations of the report, and the policy impact of the report. The conceptual structure these stages provided also may have introduced prospection to the data collection.

Second, this study attempted to validate the antecedent conditions in college sports which led to the commission's formation. A survey which sampled national "experts" on athletic policy during the winter/spring of 1992 enhanced the validity of conclusions regarding the accuracy of the report's findings and the impact of the Commission's report. However, the context of the environment addressed by the Knight Commission in 1989 was not possible to measure reliably.

Third, the data on the private deliberations of the Commission were reconstructed using the interviews, since the minutes of the Knight Commission's executive sessions were not available to the researcher. The overt nature of the research approach may have "impose[d] the social meanings
of research upon the situation" (Douglas, 1976) and altered the interviewee’s depiction of events.

Fourth, the specific impact of the Knight Commission’s report was assessed by measuring NCAA policy change during the 1990-1992 NCAA Conventions. The policy changes within institutions, conferences, or other higher education governing bodies comprise a crucial element of the Commission’s impact but were not the focus of this study.

Research Design and Methodology

The research design provides a strategy with which to collect, organize, and analyze the data oriented to each research question. The research methodology provides a description of the specific procedures used to collect and analyze the data. The first section presents the inductive and deductive research designs for this study organized by each research question. The second section describes the specific information about the study’s subjects, data collection, and data analysis procedures.

Research Design

The research design in this study was a combination of two approaches directed at the five overarching research questions. The first layer of analysis concerned the policies of the Knight Commission. The second developed the events composing the antecedents and operation around themes related to the
processes and politics of the Commission. For ease of discrimination, the former was referred to as the deductive approach (although no hypotheses were tested) and the latter the inductive approach.

The Deductive and Inductive Approaches

The deductive approach centered on the policies of Knight Commission concern. Two general interests underlie this method: what input affected the Commission’s policy-making system?; and what effect did their output have on the policies of their target?

Figure 8 illustrates the model used in the deductive approach. Because Wolanin (1975), Jenkins-Smith (1990), and Majone (1989) argued that the invariants addressed by a commission or policy-making body “constitute the assumptions and conceptual ‘paradigm’ that guide and circumscribe inquiry rather than being the subject of inquiry” (Wolanin, p. 103), the model was grounded in the findings, recommendations, and values of its documented output, primarily the 1991 report.

The Commission’s normative foundations were made explicit by analyzing its problem structure and policy space (see Chapter Four). From these foundations, the environment, either input or output, could be oriented and tested in relation to the Knight Commission’s paradigm. In other words, does the environment validate the Commission’s work?, rather than, does the
Figure 8: The Research Design: The Deductive Approach
Commission's report represent the environment? With this subject, the environment presented too many values from which to validate.

With the bases established, the survey of policy experts and NCAA policy outcomes were compared to the Knight Commission's report. The Commission's findings about its warrants for study, mission, core values, and central problem issues were posed to sample for verification (see Figure 6). The environmental inputs that affected the Knight Commission were deduced from these results.

Similarly, the Commission's recommendations were compared to the NCAA policy outcomes from 1990-92 (see Figure 7). Again, the survey sample contributed environmental verification to establish a perceived significance of each proposal. The magnitude and direction of policy change comprised the impact of Knight Commission. Its effectiveness in producing reforms (impact) was deduced from the number and significance of the policy changes that were directed at the Knight Commission's values and problem structure.

The inductive approach centered on the structural and political processes of the Knight Commission. This layer of interest pertained to the question: how was the Commission conceived and operated to influence reform? This analysis supplied data that addressed the larger concern: why use a reform commission?

Figure 9 illustrates the model used for the inductive approach. The seven stages of the commission's life style, commission research, political theory,
Reconstruction of the Knight Commission's Structural and Political Processes During its Life Cycle.

Figure 9: The Research Design: The Inductive Approach

Note: Adapted from the seven research questions used in "Assessment of Twentieth-Century Commission Reports on Educational Reform" by R. Ginsberg and R. K. Winzelberg, 1988.
policy science paradigms, and other literature about organizations, administration, and governance oriented the interview instrument and document analysis around processes and politics related to the Knight Commission. This conceptual framework provided the theoretical basis for the researcher to "pursue [a] deliberate line of inquiry while in the field" (Erickson, 1984, p. 8).

As Erickson (1984) noted, though, the specific terms of the research were "reconstructed in response to changes in the fieldworker’s perceptions and understandings" (p. 9). Chapters Seven and Eight develop general themes from particular information that pertained to the Knight Commission’s antecedent events and the structural and political processes (Bolman & Deal, 1991) of its operation. The specific and generic theses about the manner in which the Knight Commission operated, and why, in general, commissions are employed, were induced from this field research.

**Research Question 1:** Who were the stakeholders and political elements involved with Knight Commission’s antecedents, operation, and outcomes?

This question relates to identifying and defining the people and organizations that affected or were affected by the Knight Commission. The stakeholders are the formal actors or informal influencers involved in the political processes of the Knight Commission’s life cycle. The research interest was to identify the major stakeholders influencing the commission process.
Once identified, the diverse interests and values, the different kinds and amounts of political resources, and the individual construction of the issues attached to each relevant stakeholder became important.

The information relating to this question was pursued through the interviews and document analysis. Douglas’ (1976) approach to investigative social research, described in the next section, provided the basic method to determine the values, resources, and issue construction of the primary actors and to identify stakeholders outside of formal organizational positions. In addition, many of the relevant stakeholders were on record in the popular media, in the Knight Commission meeting transcripts, or in other correspondence or reports obtained in this study.

The data were analyzed for each stakeholder by corroborating conflicting information through triangulation. As previously mentioned, the foci in data analysis center on three levels of analysis: stakeholders, policies, and political process. This research question directs primary attention to the stakeholder, but identifies specific policy alternatives that a stakeholder sponsored or previous roles an actor or influencer has played in college sports reform that affected the Knight Commission’s process.
Research Question 2: How were the antecedents to reform addressed by the Knight Commission’s Findings and Recommendations?

This question evoked an interest in the various processes that resulted in the Knight Commission’s 1991 report. Both inductive and deductive methods describe the Knight Commission’s policy process. The research design inductively examined the context of the policy environment and identified conflicting values and motives represented in the policy alternatives. The research design also deductively assessed the degree to which the Commission’s findings and recommendations were valid as issues reflecting conditions present in college sports (see Figure 6).

The areas of concern, problem structure, and core values were determined from an analysis of Commission documents, primarily its 1991 report. This analysis is reported in Chapter Four. Additional data about the context of the policy environment and values represented by the central policy alternatives were summarized in Chapters Seven and Eight. This information was obtained from transcripts of Knight Commission meetings and NCAA conventions, literature on college sports reform, other Commission documents, open-ended survey questions, and interview data. This approach made explicit the value vectors being manipulated to recreate and compose the analytic policy space of college athletics.

The validity of the Commission’s report was deduced by comparing commission outputs to perceived inputs. The interest pertained to the degree
that the antecedent issues motivating reform were addressed by the Commission's report. The Commission's reaction to the policy environment that spawned it provided insight into their principal mission and, subsequently, reflected on the strategic objectives for their report.

Survey responses--see the next subsection for more detail--obtained from a stratified sample of NCAA "policy experts" verified the athletic policy areas the Knight Commission identified in need of "reform." The issues that received the highest percentage of response indicating the perceived need for reform were compared to the Knight Commission's 1991 report (see Figure 6). This attempted to validate the Commission's study and decision making processes.

Easton's (1965a) simplified model (see Figure 1) and the life cycle of a reform commission (see Figure 3) both provide a direct means to illustrate this research design. Using Easton's model, the inputs into the Knight Commission's political system resulted in output in the form of findings and recommendations. Figures 6 and 8 provide an illustration of this aspect. Similarly, in the reform commission life cycle, the antecedents to a reform commission precede and, to a degree, influence the findings and recommendations.

The central thrust for this research question concerned policy data--analyzing the issue areas, problem structuring, and values developed in the Knight Commissions findings and recommendations. The primary policy issues that represented the values held by specific stakeholders are identified. In
addition, the political processes affecting problem structuring and issue
selection are discussed when relevant.

**Research Question 3:** How did NCAA governance and policy
outcomes relate to the Knight Commission’s reform recommendations?

This question evoked an interest in the effects—direct or indirect—of the
Knight Commission’s reform effort on outcomes in the NCAA’s governance and
policies. While effects, or impact, were the interest, outcomes were the focus.

The deductive approach (see Figure 8) was the primary means used to
analyze the outcomes information. However, the inductive field research
provided governance and administrative processes that were altered during the
Commission’s work as well. These findings are presented within other
operation-oriented themes in Chapters Seven and Eight. The study delimited
the specific concern with outcomes to NCAA policy changes that related to the
Knight Commission’s recommendations.

NCAA outcomes in the governance of college sports were identified that
indicated a change in the direction called for by the Knight Commission’s
model. The significance of each reform was determined from the NCAA "policy
expert’s" survey responses. The impact that the Knight Commission effected
or may have effected on its target policy-making system was deduced by
comparing the number and significance of NCAA rules changes with the
Commission’s report (see Figure 7).
Both Easton’s simplified political systems model (Figure 1) and the model for organizational change (Figure 2)—modified from Schein (1969)—provide a direct means to illustrate the research design used to pursue an understanding of this question. Using Easton’s model (see Figure 8), the outputs from the Knight Commission’s political system became inputs for the NCAA’s political system. The output from the NCAA’s policy system, in the form of changed NCAA rules, was then compared to the Knight Commission’s recommendations.

Using the organizational change model, the stress caused by the Knight Commission’s reform recommendations produced a change in the NCAA’s policies. The magnitude and direction of the NCAA’s changes were compared to the core values represented in the Commission’s model for reform and explicited in Chapter Four. The impact of the Knight Commission on NCAA could be assessed by analyzing the direction and significance of NCAA reform in relation to the Commission’s proposed policies.

The central thrust for this research question concerned policy data—analyzing the number and significance of the NCAA policy outcomes—that reflected the impact of the Knight Commission’s findings and recommendations on college sports reform. The data collected were analyzed by stakeholder, policy, and process. Stakeholders holding values underlying policy options or influencing specific policy alternatives were identified. In addition, the
governance outcomes relating to structural and political processes are discussed as well.

**Research Question 4: How did the Knight Commission Operate?**

This question related to the political and structural processes of the Knight Commission. The manner in which the Commission was formed, how it conceived reform, and influenced organizational change was the central focus for this research thrust.

The reform commission life cycle (Figure 3) along with Easton’s (1965a) political theory, Hunter’s (1953) informal power structure, and the policy science concepts described in Chapter Two provided the conceptual framework for this question. The Knight Commission’s operation was reconstructed from transcripts of Knight Commission meetings, other Commission documents, and the key actor interviews. NCAA convention minutes, NCAA Presidents Commission, Executive Committee, and Council minutes, literature on college sports reform, and open-ended survey questions supplied secondary sources of data (see Figure 9).

The data analysis was an inductive process in which themes emerged. The data were reported in narrative form, describing corroborated events in the manner of a case history. The seven stages of the reform commission served as guideposts, although the scope broadened to include themes or events that the life cycle framework omits. The focal point dealt with the political and
structural processes of the Knight Commission as an organization. In addition, stakeholder actions, motives, and values that influenced the Commission’s operation are noted. Instances in which college sports’ policy analysis or policy making influenced the operation of the Knight Commission are specified.

**Research Question 5: What Connections Exist Between the Knight Commission’s Operation and the Outcomes to NCAA Governance and Policy?**

This research interest concerned the coupling mechanisms between the Knight Commission’s influence efforts and the outcomes in its target, the NCAA. The inquiry intended to identify governance or policy effects that were directly or indirectly a result of the Knight Commission’s method of operation. The political, symbolic, and structural (Bolman & Deal, 1991) connections between elements from the first four research questions were examined. Relationships between the motives, contexts, processes, actions, and results of the Knight Commission are discussed using the description of commissions, conceptual framework, and other ideas developed in Chapter 2. The purpose was to identify evidence that better explains the forms of commission influence that underlie the persistence of the commission-led reform process, at least in this single instance.

The data were analyzed by stakeholder, policy, and process. The emergent themes induced from such research interests as the cross-fertilization of stakeholders with standing in two organizations are reported. The policy
analysis and problem structuring emanating from the Commission’s study process are explicated along with stakeholder or interest group values that influenced passage of their preferred policies alternatives.

Research Methodology

The procedures for data collection included interviews, a survey of outside (non-Knight Commission) NCAA "policy experts," review of Commission meeting transcripts, Commission briefing booklets and NCAA Convention transcripts, document and record analysis, as well as analysis of external descriptions and assessments such as related literature, news articles, and radio and television media. The interviews and "policy expert" survey are discussed in depth.

Interview

A major portion of the data for this study was gathered in personal interviews. Thirty-four people were interviewed one or more times each. The initial interview was in person in every case but one. Follow-up interviews were frequently by phone although not in every instance. Eighteen Knight Commissioners, a Knight Commissioner’s surrogate, four Knight Commission staff members, two Knight Commission consultants, three key congressional staffers, and the head of a higher education organization contributed their thoughts and memories. Three NCAA Presidents Commission members and
two conference commissioners also contributed information regarding this study. In addition, many situational conversations with university and athletic administrators, coaches, and media representatives contributed background to this study.

Field research methodologies provided the approach to the interviews. Both Douglas (1976) and Schatzman & Strauss (1973) presented fieldwork approaches that informed the data collection techniques. Douglas noted that "field research includes all forms of study of society in natural situations by means of natural (relatively uncontrolled) social interaction" (p. 16).

Douglas (1976) suggested two paradigms for field research studies. The first, the traditional approach, is rational and cooperative in its premise, assuming that subjects will be truthful and natural when being studied. The conflict paradigm, the second type, used in investigative social research assumes that the field researcher confronts misinformation, evasions, lies, and fronts when studying a contentious public issue. The recency of the Knight Commission’s report and their ongoing work (The Knight Commission was funded to continue its work and monitor its recommendations through the Spring of 1993 more than a year after these data were collected) made the conflict paradigm the more plausible in this research setting.

The major tactics of investigative research include: (1) infiltrating the setting, (2) building friendly trust, (3) getting interviewee to open up by putting the subject in a friendly and trusting situation, (4) using adversary, oppositional,
or "discombobulating" tactics, (5) drawing out the informant and (6) phasing in assertions (Douglas, 1976). Each method was relevant in some instance; but, gaining access to the setting, building friendly trust, drawing out the interviewee, and phasing in assertions were the most useful tactics. A limitation on these investigative techniques: the current study was overt in nature and to a degree "impose[d] the social meanings of research upon the situation" (p. 17). Yet, every attempt was made to reduce suspicion of the researcher’s motives, to develop trust, to minimize the informants potential exposure for revealing information.

Both structured interviews and situational conversations (Schatzman & Strauss, 1973) were employed to gather the data. Douglas (1976) defines the category of pre-arranged interview practiced in this study as "in-depth, conversational interviews (or discussions) in which the only pre-programming would be the use of a flexible checklist of questions" (p. 16).

The interview guide in this study was developed from a review of the reform commission, athletic policy, and other relevant literatures, pilot interviews with athletic and higher education policy makers, and a synthesis of this input with interview techniques explained in Douglas (1976, 1985), Johnson (1975), Schatzman & Strauss (1973), and Douglas, et al (1977). The interview guide was reviewed by members of this dissertation’s doctoral committee. Each interview checklist was individually tailored to address issue areas of which the interviewee had knowledge (See Appendix C for the
question checklist that served as primary source for the individual interview guides).

The interviews often resulted in informal discussions rather than formal question and answer dialogue. Schatzman & Strauss (1973) offered interviewing techniques that were frequently employed during these conversational interviews: (1) the devil’s advocate question, (2) the hypothetical question, (3) posing the ideal, and (4) offering interpretations or testing propositions on informants. The prearranged interviews were taped. The information obtained in situational conversations was recorded in field notes or on tape at the first available opportunity in order to facilitate complete reconstruction.

The Survey Questionnaire

Using methods described in Tull & Album (1973) and Oppenheim (1966), a mail questionnaire was constructed, pretested, and employed in this study to survey NCAA "policy experts." The criteria defining a policy expert were constructed to limit the sample to individuals who have in-depth knowledge of the issues addressed by the Knight Commission and a professional position capable of informing their opinions with first-hand experience. The sample selection used a reputational basis to identify participants. The contributors who returned completed questionnaires are listed in Appendix B.
The thrust of the questionnaire was to obtain a separate perspective, from the interview group, on the issues and policy alternatives existing in college sports. The questionnaire was constructed from an intensive review of literature, pilot interviews, and NCAA Convention programs. This review identified and developed into survey items the most prevalent issues from the environment that were antecedent to the Knight Commission’s empowerment. From similar sources, a second set of survey items were constructed from the policy reform options that had been suggested or passed during the Knight Commission’s operation.

Although not exhaustive, both the antecedent issue and policy option items included issues from sources other than the Knight Commission. Each list, though, contained the Knight Commission’s findings and recommendations interspersed with other points of view.

The questionnaire was validated through expert review and tryouts. Three separate review processes gathered the input of athletic administrators attending the 1992 NCAA convention, a group of Virginia Tech educational research, educational administration, and physical education professors, and a survey research expert. The prototype questionnaire was pretested by a group of Virginia Tech graduate students, professors, and athletic administrators. A copy of the questionnaire appears in Appendix B.

Seventy-one individuals in seven groups, who had indicated a willingness to participate, were sent questionnaires. Fifty-eight of these responded to the
questionnaires, an eighty-two percent response rate. The correspondence with the sample appears in Appendix B.

Because of the diverse interests and values held by NCAA and higher education constituencies, a stratified sample of "policy experts" was selected. The population included individuals who had been in a policy-making position or covering the policy-making process in college sports at some point from the Knight Commission's inception until the administration of the survey, 1989-1992. Because the Knight Commission focused its attention on "big time sports," the populations of interest were major college athletics policy experts. However, a small number of Division II and III presidents made up the final sample to provide some input from other NCAA divisions. The sample strata included the following populations:

1. College or university presidents serving on the NCAA Presidents Commission;

2. Division I athletic administrators serving on the NCAA Council or Executive Committee;

3. NCAA Division I conference commissioners;

4. Division I faculty athletics representatives (FAR) serving on the NCAA Council or Executive Committee;

5. Policy leaders of higher education or athletics organizations;

6. Media representatives covering NCAA policy making; and,
7. Division I football and basketball coaches serving on the boards of the American Football Coaches Association or National Basketball Coaches Association.

These sample pools of individuals in policy-making positions were further reduced by reputation to identify "experts." At the 1992 NCAA Convention, athletic administrators, university presidents, and media representatives who were active in policy matters were solicited to indicate "policy experts" from lists of individuals meeting the above criteria. From these responses, the groups were selected. The field researcher asked 15-20 of the sample to participate in person at the 1992 NCAA convention. Although the populations were small in some instances, attempts were made to balance the groups by considering NCAA division affiliation, conference type, public and private institution, sex, and race of the individual. The sample was intended to solicit a broad spectrum of opinions. The total sample solicited to participate is listed in Appendix B.

**Meeting Transcripts, Briefing Booklets, Records, and Documents**

The transcriptions of the Knight Commission's public meetings and the briefing books compiled by the Commission staff to update and educate the Commissioners were analyzed. In addition, other records of Commissioner communication, reports written for the Commission, and documents relating to the Knight Commission were obtained during the data collection process. The
contents of these sources were summarized and compared to the interview data as a means of verifying evidence. The transcripts provided a rich resource for the context, climate, and values at play during the meetings. The briefing booklets contained a record of the common information with which all the Knight Commissioners were operating. The records and documents supplied a rich, stable, and rewarding source of information.

External Descriptions and Assessments

The policy environment surrounding the Knight Commissioners and their target, the NCAA, was not mute during their deliberation. Public Knight Commission meetings were open to the press. Neither political system operated in a vacuum. The Knight Commission staff estimates that over 5000 articles concerning their reform efforts had been written by March 1992. The subject of college sports reform has been the topic of untold other articles, books, news documentaries, and scholarly efforts. These sources provided a rich resource to assess the context in which the Knight Commission operated, the various issues, policy problems, and policy options that existed, along with the values and motives of external stakeholders attempting to manipulate the "policy space." Within the boundaries of time and resource, these sources were reviewed by major stakeholder, central policy issue, and process event.
**Data Analysis**

Erickson's (1984) description of interpretive fieldwork is apt in describing the overall data analysis process used in this study. The conceptual framework provided a deliberate line of inquiry to pursue while in the field. Yet, the specific terms of inquiry were reconstructed "in response to changes in the fieldworker's perceptions and understandings of events and their organization during the time spent in the field" (p. 8-9). During the data collection process, themes emerged that had not been described in the initial conceptual framework regarding the policy process. After the initial round of interviews, the literature review and conceptual framework in Chapter 2 were enhanced to provide a theoretical basis for discussion of these themes. Subsequent data analysis was performed after this review had furnished a framework for this fieldworker's changed perceptions and understandings.

In the descriptions of the research design and data collection, specific tactics, to focus inquiry upon certain data, were noted. In many instances, the conceptual framework and review of literature specified patterns to identify during analysis. Descriptive statistics on the survey responses provided a means to sort out the quantitative data. In coping with the qualitative analysis, data were transformed from the specific to the general by using McCracken's (1988) five stages of analysis: (1) judging individual utterance, (2) making observations, (3) expanding observations by relating one to another, (4) judging themes, and (5) transforming themes into thesis. Each *represents a
higher level of generality" (p. 4). Using these various techniques, variables of interest and patterns of relationships between variables were identified in the data. Conclusions were developed from these patterns and relationships.

Two problematic issues in this type of study were identified prior to data collection and analysis: (1) analytic bias and (2) verification of conclusions. Miles and Huberman (1984) distinguish two types of analytic bias, **holistic fallacy**—observed events are interpreted as more patterned than they actually are—and **elite bias**—too much emphasis is placed on data obtained from articulate, knowledgeable elite interviewees and too little on less articulate, lower status informants. Establishing clear procedures provided a means to minimize spurious conclusions attributable to analytic bias.

Spurious results also occur by failing to verify conclusions. Once a conclusion was drawn, its validity was determined by triangulating, or corroborating, it with other data sources. The process of triangulating implies that two different data sources have corroborated the same conclusion; if incongruent data emerge about an event or relationship between variables, a second piece of evidence was utilized that verified one of the two conclusions. In addition to triangulating data sources, conclusions were verified by systematically following and documenting research steps in order to build a coherent chain of evidence. This permitted review of the process by which a particular conclusion was developed.
CHAPTER FOUR

Problem Structuring:

The Knight Commission’s Mission, Values, and Reform Model

Chapter Overview

The Knight Commission’s mission, values, and reform model are the focus of this chapter. The Commission’s normative foundations are made explicit by analyzing its problem structure and policy space. In summarizing elements and issues, identifying values and value conflicts, and discussing problem definition rationale from the Knight Commission report, the analysis addresses Research Question 2--How were the antecedents to reform addressed by the Knight Commission’s Findings and Recommendations?

In addition, these data and discussion provide stress vectors with which to orient the magnitude and direction of NCAA changes in relation to the Commission’s 1991 report. This information relates to Research Question 3--How did NCAA governance and policy outcomes relate to the Knight Commission’s reform recommendations?

The chapter is organized into nine major sections: (1) the Commission’s mission, (2) the Commission’s central values, (3) three warrants supporting the need for a reform commission, (4) the Commission’s overarching finding, (5) the Commission’s overarching recommendation, (6) three primary findings
supporting the Commission’s central finding, (7) other main issues, (8) subordinate issues, and (9) omitted or emergent issues.

Research Note on Commission Reports

The Knight Commission report served the dual function of representing the environment’s beliefs about relevant reform concepts and determining relevant values for a new model. Because the values themselves are the elements of contention in a policy debate, the validity of a rational-comprehensive approach, where values are generally predetermined, is transitory. The rhetoric of the document posits a framework structuring conditions into problems and outlining a reform agenda necessary to restore balance. Jenkins-Smith’s (1990) concept of the "policy space" is appropriate; the Commission report was an attempt to manipulate the values that defined the policy argument.

The following analysis attempts to preserve the form of the Knight Commission’s values, rationale, and argument. The study establishes validity by comparing each issue to the external evidence. The results of the survey of policy experts, however, conducted one year after the 1991 Knight Commission report, tried to measure ex post facto conditions in the Knight Commission’s environment. These results reflect both the degree to which the Knight Commission reacted to stressors in the environment and the degree to
which the Knight Commission determined the relevant values for the environment.

The research problem became complex because the findings advance cause and effect relations between issues, subordinate some problems as symptoms of larger ones, identify goals to achieve, and delineate measures with which to assess reform. The salient values precede the issues and policies that operationalized them. Each finding or recommendation represents an issue that varied in its proximity to the core values. No two recommendations possess an equal weight in relation to the core purpose of the reform effort. Therefore, this study verifies each issue with respect to the structure of the Knight Commission report.

**The Knight Commission’s Mission**

Three documents expressly address the mission of the Knight Commission. The "Statement of Purpose" issued as part of a press release on October 17, 1989, asserted that the "Knight Foundation has established this Commission because it believes that excesses in intercollegiate athletics are seriously eroding the integrity of colleges and universities and distorting the basic purposes for which these institutions were chartered" (Knight Foundation [KF], 1989, p. 1). In recognizing these abuses, "the Knight Foundation, through this Commission, commits itself to help restore institutional integrity
and renew the well-being of intercollegiate sports as a wholesome part of the academic community" (KF, p. 1).

In the March, 1991, report, a letter introducing "Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete," Knight Foundation president, Creed C. Black, reflected that: As an outgrowth of its program supporting higher education, Knight Foundation in 1989 created a Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics. Its mission was to examine growing abuses in college sports and propose a reform agenda. (p. IV, emphasis added)

The "Letter of Transmittal" from Knight Commission Co-Chairman William C. Friday and Theodore M. Hesburgh summarized the purpose of the March 1991 report:

We have attempted to define the problems as we understand them and to suggest solutions, not search for scapegoats. This report addresses what we consider to be the main issues and does not attempt to treat subordinate matters in any detail. Even in respect to what we see as the major issues, we place less emphasis on specific solutions than on proposing a structure through which these issues--and others arising in the future--can be addressed by the responsible administrators. (KF, p. VI, emphasis added)

The 1989 "Statement of Purpose" and 1991 Knight Commission report frame the period from Commission empowerment to the release of their findings and recommendations.
Core Values of the Knight Commission

The documents produced by the Knight Commission and its leadership indicate two core values from which their findings and recommendations develop: institutional integrity and the educational value of athletics. Each might be described as a matrix of associated values and each is exhibited using interchangeable terms and subordinate or related values. Regardless, statements such as: "The first chapter introduces the core of our interest: the place of athletics on our campuses and the imperative to place the well-being of the student-athlete at the forefront of our concerns" (Friday & Hesburgh, KF, 1991, p. V, emphasis added); and, "Judging by the tone of recent NCAA conventions, concern for the university's good name and the welfare of the student-athlete--irrespective of gender, race or sport--will be the centerpiece of athletics administration as we approach a new century" (KF, 1991, p. 4, emphasis added) indicate the centrality of these values (Figure 10 illustrates the values the Knight Commission projected into the analytic policy space).

The term integrity--as used in the Knight Commission's concept of "institutional integrity"--has a two-fold meaning in this context. First, it refers to the university performing the function for which it was founded and through which it maintains society's support. Second, from an organizational context, it was interpreted to denote persistence behavior with which to maintain the system of higher education's form, structures, and boundaries. Institutional integrity includes an honesty in fulfilling the educational purpose of the
Figure 10: Analytic Policy Space: Over-Arching Recommendation: Tighter Coupling with the University
university, sponsoring programs that are educational *per se*, and maintaining a unity to the management systems.

The American system of higher education stands unique in sponsoring athletic teams and requiring athletes to be students as well (Michener, 1976). The "educational value of athletics" at its core supports the concept of the student-athlete. As the "Introduction" to the 1991 report stated: "The Knight Commission believes that intercollegiate athletics, kept in perspective, are an important part of college life" (KF, p. VII). The body of the report posits that:

Games and sports are educational in the best sense of that word because they teach the participant and the observer new truths about testing oneself and others, about the enduring values of challenge and response, about teamwork, discipline, and perseverance. (p. 3)

Values associated with this core are the concepts of gender equity, the well-being of the student-athlete, and the integration of the student-athlete into a student body.

In a real sense this value might be classified as a subordinate value of institutional integrity for it relates to the purpose of the institution. Many of the proposals to reform college athletics, though, conflict with the student-athlete model--paying the athletes, making college teams semi-professional, requiring lower, if any, academic standards for student-athletes, or abandoning college sponsorship of athletic teams out of principal or to make way for professional

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minor league teams. For purposes of explication, "institutional integrity" and "educational value of athletics" are discussed as separate core values.

**Three Warrants for Commission Study**

Three primary warrants supported the Knight Commission leadership’s belief that a reform agenda was needed and should be acted upon: (1) growing public concern existed about abuses in college sports, (2) the threat of governmental intervention into the governance of college athletics could result in the loss of control by university and athletic administrators, and (3) abuse, without controls imposed to curb them, undermined the integrity of the institution of higher education. The "Introduction" of the 1991 report stated that "the clamor for reform and the disturbing signals of governmental intrusion confirm the need to rethink the management and fundamental premises of intercollegiate athletics" (KF, p. VII). In the "Letter of Transmittal," Co-Chairs Friday and Hesburgh added cynicism to the growing public concern about abuse they claimed accompanies the athletics enterprise:

The public appears ready to believe that many institutions achieve their athletic goals not through honest effort but through equivocation, not by hard work but by hook or by crook. If the public’s perception is correct, both the educational aims of athletics and the institutions’ integrity are called in to question. (KF, p. V)
The body of the 1991 report contained additional references advancing and supporting these warrants.

**Values In Play**

The value of "institutional integrity" becomes evident in two ways. First, the concern about governmental intrusion into athletic governance raises the specter of a loss of decision-making autonomy for the institution of higher education. Second, the abuses in college sports heighten concern about how well the universities are performing their primary mission of providing educational experiences for their students. The latter question also implies values associated with the "educational aims of athletics."

**The Rationale for the Knight Commission Finding: Discussion**

The Knight Commission structured its warrants for commission study and subsequent reform agenda in a noteworthy manner (see Figure 11). By connecting the public's cynicism about college athletics with the institution of higher education ("If the public's perception is correct, both the educational aims of athletics and the institutions' integrity are called into question" [KF, p. V].), the Commission established a key linkage between the central warrants for reform and the core values of the Commission: institutional integrity and the educational aims of athletics. In doing so, the logic places intercollegiate
Figure 11: Knight Commission Problem Structure: "Systemic" Problems in College Sports
athletics into a clear, and subordinate, relation to the institution of higher education.

**The Overarching Problem: Semi-Autonomous Athletic Programs**

The Knight Commission’s central finding held that “systemic” problems in "big-time" college athletics result in athletic programs that are semi-autonomous to the university’s purpose, as well as "out of control." In the 1991 report, the Commission noted:

At the root of the problem is a great reversal of ends and means. Increasingly, the team, the game, the season and "the program"—all intended as expressions of the university’s larger purposes—gain ascendancy over the ends that created and nurtured them...As the educational context for athletics competition is pushed aside, what remains is, too often, a self-justifying enterprise whose connection with learning is tainted by commercialism and incipient cynicism. (KF, p. 6)

As a result, higher education institutions do not possess the authority to maintain adherence to their core values or to exert control while administering athletic programs. "Above all, the fragile institution of the university often finds itself unable to stand up against the commitment, the energy and the passion underlying modern intercollegiate athletics" (p. 6).

The effect of semi-autonomous athletic departments results in a migration away from the educational values of the university. In the short
term, the student-athlete suffers, in terms of their own educational experience, from the "patterns of abuse"—"institutional indifference, presidential neglect, and the growing commercialization of sport combined with the urge to win at all costs" (KF, 1991, p. 3-4). This permits the "ascendancy" of commercial priorities. But, the institution of higher education, and society in general pay the highest price for no longer being a "model of ethical behavior" (p. 6). Hence, semi-autonomous athletic departments "threaten to overwhelm the universities in whose name they were established and to undermine the integrity of...higher education" (p. VII).

**Values In Play**

The value, "institutional integrity," becomes evident in the concern for the loss of administrative control exercised over a program operating in the "university’s good name." This results in the "educational value of college sports" being of poor quality. The "ultimate cost" (KF, 1991, p. 6), of course, is to the institution’s integrity.

**The Rationale for the Knight Commission Finding: Discussion**

The Knight Commission structured the central problem (see Figure 11 for a graphic depiction) to link the integrity of higher education with the difficulties created by the structures, motives, and forces that fuel modern college athletics. Semi-autonomy of athletics programs poses a threat not only to
athletics itself but to the institution of higher education. In an effort to manipulate the policy space to include their core values and exclude the commercialism claimed to be present in college sports, the problem structure develops a conflict between the values supporting institution’s well-being and the values operating in too many athletic departments ("growing commercialization of sport combined with the urge to win at all costs" [KF, 1991, p.4]). Repeatedly, and in multiple forms, the rhetoric connects "the fragile institution of the university"..."against the commitment, the energy and the passion underlying modern intercollegiate athletics" (p. 6). The logic of this argument directs policy initiative away from values perpetuating the athletic status quo toward attempts to bring these programs into congruence with the university’s educational premise.

The Overarching Recommendation: The "One-Plus-Three" Model

To control the activities of the semi-autonomous athletic departments, the Knight Commission’s central recommendation calls for a "new structure" that possesses tighter coupling between university and athletics. The suggested reforms take the shape of a "one-plus-three" model. In order "to strengthen the bonds that connect student, sport and higher learning" (KF, 1991, p. IX), the "Introduction" to the 1991 report advocated "a new structure of reform in which the ‘one’--presidential control--is directed toward the ‘three’--
-academic integrity, financial integrity, and independent certification" (p. VII, emphasis added).

Within the Knight Commission's model, "university presidents are the key to successful reform" (KF, 1991, p. VII). The intention of the "one-plus-three" model is to permit competition in athletics, yet alters their structure to bring them closer to educational values.

This model is fully consistent with the university as a context for vigorous and exciting intercollegiate competition. It also serves to bond athletics to the purposes of the university in a way that provides a new framework for their conduct. (p. 11)

The Knight Commission’s model is offered to precipitate reform; a solution must include a "commitment to a fundamental concept: intercollegiate athletics must reflect the values of the university. Where the realities of intercollegiate competition challenge those values, the university must prevail" (KF, 1991, p. 11).

Values In Play

"Institutional integrity" in the form of "institutional control" becomes the premise upon which the "one-plus-three" model is grounded. Proposing a revised internal structure--tighter coupling--precludes any loss of autonomy for the institution of higher education to external policy making systems. At the same time, the new model reinforces the educational purposes of athletics by
addressing patterns of abuse within the system’s structures linked with the semi-autonomous athletic operations.

The Rationale for the Knight Commission Finding: Discussion

The potential acceptance by policy makers makes relevant the concepts that comprise the "new structure" of athletic administration. In the words of a member of the Knight Commission leadership: "Who can argue with academic integrity and financial integrity" (personal communication [PC], January, 1992).

The four pillars of the Knight Commission’s model possess an inherent legitimacy emanating from their legacy within organizations. In essence, three primary coupling mechanisms within organizations (Weick, 1976) are the major focal points for the "one-plus-three" model--authority of office (presidential control), the organization’s technical core (academic integrity), and budgetary relationships (financial integrity). Authority of office and budgetary relationships exist in the vast majority of organizations, if not all of them. The university’s technical core is its academic program. The "independent certification" element provides a formal accounting system to assess the other three structural components.

The four concepts at the center of the "new structure" contain little of substance that is contentious. Yet, they reflect an influence whose bases of authority (Weber, 1947) are both legitimate and traditional.
Primary Findings Supporting the Overarching Problem

1. Commercialization of College Sport

The Knight Commission’s 1991 report explained a complex dynamic that has resulted in the commercialization of college sport. As the following two sections detail, the commercial interests of the athletic department lead to their semi-autonomous operation and precipitate authority of office and value conflicts with the university.

The Knight Commission findings elaborated the problem of commercialism in college sports in the following manner:

[Athletic programs] promise a quick route to revenue, recognition and renown for the university, [but in] promot[ing] their extra-institutional goals, [they] take on a life of their own. Their intrinsic educational value...becomes engulfed by the revenue stream they generate and overwhelmed by the accompanying publicity. The program shifts from providing an exciting avenue of expression and enjoyment for the athletes and their fans to maximizing the revenue and institutional prestige that can be generated by a handful of highly-visible teams. (KF, 1991, p. 5)

The power and autonomy of athletic directors and coaches develop from the outside interests that accompany the revenue stream and the publicity. The result is that "within the last decade, big-time athletics programs have
taken on all of the trappings of a major entertainment enterprise" (KF, 1991, p. 5). This venture, however, "represents fools' gold," because "expenses are driven by the search for revenues and the revenue stream is consumed, at most institutions, in building up the program to maintain the revenue" (p. 5).

Institutional support for intercollegiate athletics is an additional issue not mentioned in the central portion of the Knight Commission's problem structure. The "conviction" that student-athletes "occupy a legitimate place as students on our campuses" (KF, 1991, p. 7) received attention as an assertion of value and an explanation for a specific recommendation. In advocating the use of institutional funds to support college sports, the 1991 report reasons:

There is an inherent contradiction in insisting on the one hand that athletics are an important part of the university while arguing, on the other, that spending institutional funds for them is somehow improper (KF, p. 21).

This comment clearly questions the value the institution places on these programs. The Knight Commission, did not explain the causal role this issue plays in the overall condition of college sports.

Values In Play

The values of "institutional integrity" and the "educational value of athletics" are advanced by these findings. Figure 12 represents the prevalent
Figure 12: Pre-Knight Commission Analytic Policy Space: Prevalent Values
values in the pre-Knight Commission policy space. Figure 13 portrays the policy space following the Knight Commission’s 1991 report.

The value of "program expansion"--as depicted in the "fools gold" comment--appears to be in conflict with the Knight Commission’s core values. Indirectly, the values of "competitive equity" and "financial solvency" become involved in the struggle for "program expansion." Policies to reduce "program expansion" must consider the dynamic that supports it. To compete fairly with other institutions, programs generally have comparable resources and facilities. If rivals expand, "competitive equity" suffers if an institution does not follow suit. This escalating spiral--"keeping up with the Jones’"--pressures an athletic program to expand in order to compete for revenues that are necessary to remain "financially solvent."

Discussion of the Rationale for the Knight Commission Finding

The Knight Commission provided an explanation of how commercialism influences athletic departments and develops programs that are semi-autonomous to the university’s values and line of authority. The logic mandates reforms that reduce commercialism, strengthen the central university’s authority, and reinforce educational values. In this way, the findings link the problem with a policy direction that supports the Knight Commission’s core values.
Figure 13: Post-Knight Commission Analytic Policy Space: Prevalent Values
Perhaps the most noteworthy logic involves the issue omitted from the 1991 report’s problem structure. Although stating that the report intended no blame, the Knight Commission structured the problem as originating at the operational levels of the athletic department. Commercial interests have become entrenched as a result of the athletic program’s pursuit of revenues and publicity, yielding the president and faculty unable to control them.

Requiring athletic departments to be self-supporting presents an internal contradiction that the Knight Commission acknowledges. Yet, the Knight Commission’s central findings omit the effect this university value--the semi-autonomous budgetary relationship that results from the failure to recognize athletics as educational--has on the athletic department. (Figure 14 illustrates an alternative problem structure that includes the educational legitimacy of athletics reinforced by institutional financial support.) If the effect of requiring financial self-support by athletic programs is placed in the causal chain, the rationale for operating as a business is its own financial solvency. Once an athletic department is placed in the position of self-support, it becomes a business; an enterprise free to reinvest profits in its own growth. The athletic department sells its valued commodities to produce revenue for its own support.

This line of reasoning explains the commercial behavior of sports in universities that do not financially support them as educational programs. According to this depiction, the university’s values and strategic-level decisions
Figure 14: Alternative Problem Structure: Self Funding Athletic Departments: Maintaining the Authority to Lead
are called into account as the cause for the operation of college athletics—the culpability of current faculty and university administrators is restricted to an unquestioning acceptance of the traditional role assumed by those occupying them. According to Rudolph (1962), institutional indifference to athletics has existed from the beginnings of intercollegiate competition in the mid to late nineteenth century. While it is merely conjecture to speculate about the rationale for the Knight Commission’s choice in problem structure, placing fault, of any kind, on the strategic-level policy makers—which includes the majority of the Knight Commission—would appear to erode the mandate for university-led reform and undermine the authority with which to accomplish it.

2. Authority of Office

The 1991 Knight Commission report observed that "athletic programs are given special, often unique, status within the university" (KF, p. 4). The report identified institutional indifference and presidential neglect as two patterns of abuse, yet these factors are placed as effects of "the growing commercialization of sport" (p. 4). As a result of the complex dynamic supporting commercialism, "faculty members, presidents and other administrators, unable to control the enterprise, stand by as it [athletics] undermines the institution’s goals in the name of values alien to the best the university represents" (p. 4-5).
Factors contributing to these authority-of-office problems involve the need to generate a revenue stream and publicity. The impact of an athletic enterprise on the local economy enhances the athletic director's power. The "burgeoning population of fans who live and die with the team's fortunes" allows "the 'power coach' [to enjoy] greater recognition throughout the state than most elected officials" (KF, 1991, p. 5). "The best coaches receive an income many times that of most full professors" (p. 4). To pay for these salaries, coaches receive contracts from outside commercial concerns, thus introducing an external interest into university personnel decisions. Outside stakeholders possessing an interest in a team or sport include advertising interests such as television networks, corporations, and local businesses, boosters, and local economies.

Although not directly mentioned in the 1991 report, the role of the board of trustees in reacting to external political pressures is signalled by general statements such as "[presidents] must be in charge--and be understood to be in charge--on campuses, in conferences and in the decision-making councils of the NCAA" (p. VII.), and "trustees should explicitly endorse and reaffirm presidential authority..." (p.12).

Values In Play

The central value evident in this finding is "institutional integrity" in the form of "institutional control."
The Rationale for the Knight Commission’s Finding: Discussion

The university president is chief executive officer of the organization. As such, the Knight Commission utilized the symbolism of the president’s role to accomplish two objectives. First, by identifying the president’s lack of legitimacy as institutional athletic policy maker, the problem structure provides evidence that the salient values determining behavior in athletics are different than those of the university. Outside commercial interests intervene pulling the athletic department away from the university. The focus on the president’s authority connects college sports more tightly with the purposes of the university and reinforces the educational aims of athletics.

Secondly, the president’s and faculty’s inability to control the institution’s athletic program provides a warrant for recommendations that enhance the president’s governing authority and move athletics toward educational values.

3. Welfare of the Student-Athlete

As the previous two sections have demonstrated, commercialism in college sports introduces values and behaviors that undermine the educational goals of the university. The Knight Commission’s "first principle" asserted that "intercollegiate athletics exist first and foremost for the student-athletes who participate" regardless of their sex, race, or popularity of sport (KF, 1991, p.
Although not directly linked with its findings, the report identifies two areas in which this value erosion is evident.

First, the educational value of athletic participation is overwhelmed by the commercialism of the athletic enterprise. In the words of the 1991 report: "...the program shifts from providing an exciting avenue of expression and enjoyment for the athletes and their fans to maximizing...revenue and institutional prestige..." (p. 5). Likewise, the "well-being of the student-athlete" includes the time demands placed on the participants and their integration into the student life of the institution.

Second, the academic standards applied to "student-athlete as a student" have been overlooked by the NCAA in making non-academic regulations. Citing the lack of procedures for the institution to assess the admissibility of a recruit or to regulate continuing eligibility requirements, the Commission report stated that: "It is hard to avoid the conclusion that there are few academic constraints on the student-athlete" (p. 7). In addition, at the institutional level, the Knight Commission described academic abuses in admissions, academic progress, and graduation rates. The two areas, the well-being of the student-athlete and the student-athlete as student, become merged in the term student-athlete. As indicated by the Knight Commission report's title, "Keeping Faith With the Student-Athlete" includes "restoring credibility and dignity to term 'student-athlete’" (p. 3) as a first priority.
Values In Play

The value of "institutional integrity" underlies the findings regarding academic standards. This value takes the form of academic "elitism" because the standards are raised and the number of qualified students presumably reduced.

Two values conflict with "institutional integrity" on these issues. The Knight Commission's findings point up the loss of "institutional autonomy" in setting academic standards. With higher initial eligibility standards, member institutions lose autonomy in setting their own admissions policies.

The second competing value concerns the effect higher academic standards will have on "competitive equity." Coaches at schools with less prestigious academic reputations may suffer if higher standards restrict the recruiting pool. This latter concern relates directly to the politics of athletic reform.

Competitive equity, an oxymoron, means that each athletic program has a roughly equal opportunity to field a team capable of beating one's opponents. As a result, mechanisms must be present that allow a particular program to migrate along the hierarchy of successful programs. Athletic talent remains a primary ingredient to building a dominant team. Limiting the available talent pool with higher academic standards favors the academically prestigious institutions--with equivalent athletic programs--by maintaining their traditional talent pool while restricting academically-borderline prospects. Thus, the less
academically prestigious institutions become disadvantaged with respect to one means of building a winning program.

The "educational value of athletics" is supported by the Knight Commission’s findings on the well-being of the student-athlete. This value conflicts with the "win at all costs," "program expansion" and "institutional prestige" values related to the commercialism in college sports.

The Rationale for the Knight Commission Finding: Discussion

This set of findings directly supports the Knight Commission’s core values: "institutional integrity" and "educational value of athletics." With academic concerns presented on two separate levels, the institution and student, the rhetoric of the 1991 report chose to highlight and centralize these concerns in the concept of the student-athlete. In choosing between abuses that injure both institution and student, clearly the student-athlete receives the more sympathetic treatment from the public. As an argumentative element, the student-athlete’s plight is more tangible and persuasive.

Other Main Issues: Controlling Costs and Monitoring Revenues

As noted in previous sections, the Knight Commission targeted the corrosive effects of commercialism centrally in its definition of the overall problem. It held that the search for revenue introduces outside stakeholders and consumes the revenue stream "in building up the program to maintain the
revenues" (KF, 1991, p.5). Two Commission findings concern the need to control costs and involve university administrators in relations with outside revenue sources. In introducing the former issue, the 1991 report notes that "educational and athletics leaders face the challenge of controlling costs..." (p. 3) and cites evidence that Division I-A institutions "barely break even" (p. 19).

The second issue develops because "big-time sports programs are economic magnets" (p. 19). Business and entertainment opportunities present the university not only a "public showcase," but also "potential pitfalls...because of the money involved" (p. 19). Lack of vigilance by central university administrators in dealing with "the larger economic environment surrounding college sports...explains many of the financial scandals that have tarnished college athletics" (p. 19).

**Values In Play**

The value of "institutional integrity" in the form of "financial integrity" is supported by both issues in this Knight Commission finding. The text of the 1991 report asserts that:

an institution of higher education has an abiding obligation to be a responsible steward of all the resources that support its activities--whether in the form of taxpayers’ dollars, the hard-earned payments of students and their parents, the contributions of alumni, or the revenue stream generated by athletics programs (KF, p. 18).
The concept of controlling costs competes with the upward spiral of finances when dominated by the intertwined values of "competitive equity," "program expansion," and "financial solvency"--in other words, keeping up with the Jones'.

The Rationale for the Knight Commission Finding: Discussion

The Knight Commission relied on three principles--presidential discipline, uniform NCAA cost reductions, and institutional financial support--to remedy the effects of commercialism on college sports (Figure 14 illustrates this relationship). Failure to introduce alternative revenue sources, or cost reduction measures which do not conflict with "competitive equity," only exacerbates the competition between "financial integrity" and "financial solvency." Herein lies a fundamental battleground in the reform effort. The athletic system cannot persist without financial solvency. Hence, the three reform principles advance the value of "institutional integrity" by providing a means for the system to persist.
Subordinate Issues

1. Restraining Recruiting

The 1991 report acknowledges that "restraining recruiting" remains a "challenge" faced by educational and athletics leaders. Yet, "recruiting policies" are identified later in the report as a "subordinate issue."

Two difficulties with regard to recruiting relate to the Knight Commission's primary findings. First, the high cost of recruiting was acknowledged. "The cost of recruiting a handful of basketball players each year exceeds, on some campuses, the cost of recruiting the rest of the freshman class" (KF, 1991, p. 4). Second, recruiting abuses contribute to the public perception that college sports are "out of control." The "public humiliation of sanctions brought on by rules violations" (KF, p. 6) occurs because "recruiting abuses are the most frequent cause of punitive action by the NCAA" (p. 4).

Values In Play

The value of "institutional integrity" in the form of "financial integrity" and maintaining public support is supported by this finding. Recruiting affects the ability to control costs and, too often, is the source of bad publicity.

The values that conflict with this finding are "program expansion," "competitive equity," and "financial solvency." Recruiting enters the "keeping
up with the Jones" upward spiral by supplying the athletic talent upon which winning athletic teams are developed. The rationale of this escalation trend: better players mean more wins leading to greater revenues with which to build a bigger program in order to attract better players.

The Rationale for the Knight Commission Finding: Discussion

The Knight Commission portrayed recruiting as the byproduct of the systemic problems the "one-plus-three" model is intended to correct. In the words of the 1991 report, "[T]he real problem is not one of curbing particular abuses. It is a more central need to have academic administrators define the terms under which athletics will be conducted in the university’s name" (KF, p. 11). Hence, if commercialism and authority of office issues are corrected by a tighter coupling between an institution and its athletics program, then recruiting abuses will abate.

2. The Influence of Commercial Television

The Knight Commission's findings regard the role of commercial television, in the abuses of college sports, as a new symptom of an old problem: "the underlying problems existed long before the advent of television" (KF, 1991, p. 6).

Television takes the form of a powerful peripheral factor that the ever present commercialism dynamic has permitted to encroach upon the institution.
The Co-Chairs' noted that a "confluence of new factors" including "the growth of television combined with the demand for sports programming" makes administering college sports "more difficult today" ("Letter of Transmittal," KF, 1991, p. V). Yet, it is an "oversimplification to blame today's problems on television alone. Even so, the lure of television dollars has unquestionably added a new dimension to the problem and must be addressed" (p. 6). While ambivalence may be one conclusion, the finding appears to put television in a similar category as monitoring revenues from other outside commercial interests.

**Values In Play**

The values of "institutional integrity" in the form of "financial integrity," "financial solvency," "program expansion," and "institutional prestige" encompass the boundaries of this issue's policy space. The Knight Commission's finding appears to support the concept that if the appropriate university administrators set the terms of the relationship, then television's influence can be measured. The revenue ("financial solvency") and publicity ("institutional prestige") afforded by television provide the materials for "program expansion."
Rationale for the Knight Commission Finding: Discussion

The Commission’s approach to television’s influence raises the issue without eviscerating a significant revenue source. By portraying television as a symptom rather than a cause, the Commission’s problem structure develops no mandate to alter significantly the current relationship, only to bring university administrators into a controlling or negotiating position. The logic holds that by treating the athletics department television revenues in a manner similar to other university departments’ outside income, institutional integrity can be reclaimed.

The interviews (Chapter 7 & 8) and survey responses (Chapters 5 & 6) indicated that television’s influence is a high-conflict issue. Arguments advanced the idea that "financial solvency," not university budgetary norms, motivate the casting of television as a symptom. The authority-of-office issues such as the "power coach" who "enjoy[s] greater recognition throughout the state than most elected officials" and university presidents, "the burgeoning population of fans who live and die with the team’s fortunes," athletic directors "who become the CEO of a fair-sized corporation," and "boosters living vicariously through the team’s success" (KF, 1991, p. 5), all feed off the publicity or resulting economic potential that television affords. Figure 15 depicts the causal role these factors exert in reducing presidential control over athletics.
Figure 15: Alternative Problem Structure: Commercial Television: Core Value Conflicts With Financial Solvency
In this alternative problem formulation, television’s influence becomes a cause rather than symptom. The severe financial impact on "big-time" college sports of moving strongly against television is a policy issue of interest in analyzing the Knight Commission’s political process. One Knight Commissioner remarked in the general context of the Commission’s reform approach: "It was our intention to treat the patient without killing the patient" (PC, March, 1992).

Omitted and Emergent Issues

1. **Omitted Issue: Freshman Eligibility**

   The 1991 Knight Commission report mentions freshman eligibility only to identify it as a "subordinate issue." This issue was listed among the agenda items included in the "Joint Statement of the Co-Chairman" released on October 17, 1989 with the Knight Foundation’s "Statement of Purpose." It has been identified as an agenda item by the NCAA Presidents Commission during the mid-1980s and the topic of a 1990 NCAA Convention debate between Knight and Presidents Commissioners Thomas Hearn and Charles Young.

**Values In Play**

Four values play a role in the debate over freshman eligibility. "Institutional integrity" concerns whether the new students are able to meet
the academic demands of college before being permitted to represent the institution. "Educational value of athletics" becomes relevant with regard to student issues of maturity and the inherent pressures of college competition. "Financial solvency" becomes an issue when more scholarship athletes are required if 20-25% of an athletic team are declared ineligible. Finally, "competitive equity" also enters the debate. Private colleges and universities bear a greater financial burden if scholarship limits are increased because their tuition remains higher in the absence of direct state support (obviously, all eligible institutions receive support from financial aid programs).

**Rationale for the Knight Commission Finding: Discussion**

As the fact that two Knight Commissioners were pitted on opposite sides of a public debate might indicate, freshman eligibility is a high conflict issue. Two core values of the Knight Commission clash with one another when finances are at stake. The well-being of the student-athlete--"educational value of athletics"--becomes unattainable under conditions of financial exigency. With the Knight Commission’s model, the concern for institutional integrity is addressed by toughening initial eligibility standards.

Interviews indicated that the Knight Commission dropped freshman eligibility because no consensus was possible. In the current policy space, it appears that "institutional integrity" and "financial solvency" are given greater
weight than "the well-being of the student-athlete." In addition, "competitive equity" is less visible but lies beneath much of this issue's level of conflict.

Although this analysis relies on the volunteered opinions of interviewees, it does raise the question of whether the "well-being of the student-athlete" is a peripheral or core value in relation to "financial solvency" and "competitive equity."

2. Emergent Issue: Gender Equity

The "Introduction" to the 1991 Knight Commission report advanced the value that "all athletes--men or women, majority or minority, in revenue-producing and non-revenue sports--should be treated equitably" (KF, p. IX). Its "first principles" include the university's obligation to educate all athletes: "Intercollegiate athletics exist first and foremost for the student-athletes who participate, whether male or female..." Within its recommendation that "presidents should commit their institutions to equity," "the Commission emphasizes that continued inattention to the requirements of Title IX...represents a major stain on institutional integrity" (p. 14). The "great reversal of ends and means" in college sports results in "women's program[s] tak[ing] a back seat" (p. 6).

The 1991 report endorsed gender equity as a value and explained the origins of its neglect as a result of the central problems occurring in college sports. Yet the executive summary ("Introduction") omitted gender equity and
Title IX compliance as recommendations. The issue appears to represent a core value, but not a central part of the Knight Commission’s problem structuring or reform model.

Values In Play

The "educational value of athletics" in the form of "gender equity" is supported by the Knight Commission’s finding that athletic participation exists for the all student-athletes. The prevalence of "gender equity" in American society as a whole calls into question "institutional integrity" if the universities do not act fairly on this issue. The high costs and associated reductions in men’s sports budgets make "gender equity" conflict directly with "financial solvency" and "program expansion" values. In addition, change of any kind raises concerns related to "competitive equity."

Rationale for the Knight Commission Finding: Discussion

The Commission finding equivocates between asserting gender equity as a value and casting it as a peripheral issue in its problem structure and recommendations. From their findings to their recommendations, the Knight Commissioners projected the value of gender equity into the policy space. Yet the connections made with the central problem depicted by their findings provide minimal grounds to reform.
As the discussion of the values in play shows, gender equity is a high conflict issue. Interview data and meeting transcripts indicate that the Commission leadership rejected gender equity as a major component in a "one-plus-four" reform model. Several Commissioners noted that it did not fit cleanly into the "one-plus-three" model. Yet, the issue was an emerging issue that could not be left out. An NCAA study and a Congressional hearing on gender equity in the Spring of 1992 vaulted the issue into the center of public dialogue on reform in college sports. The gender equity value, projected into the policy space by the Knight Commission, promises to be a powerful catalyst for athletic policy reform in the 1990s.

The next chapter will focus on the responses of the "policy experts" to these elements of Knight Commission's report.
CHAPTER FIVE

Verifying The Knight Commission’s Findings

Chapter Overview

The research interest in this chapter pertains to the validity of the Knight Commission’s findings. Items reflecting the 1991 report were posed to the sample of NCAA "policy experts." This analysis compares their responses to the Commission’s warrants for study, mission, core values, and central problems discussed in Chapter Four. The text and tables direct an inquiry to address Research Question 2--How were the antecedents to reform addressed by the Knight Commission’s Findings and Recommendations?

The data presented in this chapter’s analysis attempt to preserve the Knight Commission’s problem structure. The validity of this overall formulation, as well as the individual issues, comprise the six chapter sections. The twelve researched components--identified here--were not exhaustive; rather, they comprise a representative list of the most relevant topics. The six major sections are: (1) three warrants supporting the need for a reform commission, (2) the overarching problem, (3) three primary findings supporting the overarching problem, (4) other main issues, (5) subordinate issues, and (6) omitted or emergent issues.

The survey data presented in Tables 2 through 9 were responses to the question of whether an issue was "of a magnitude of concern to merit reform"
at the appropriate policy-making level. An arbitrary level, 70% of the policy experts affirming that an issue "merits reform," provided a guideline for verifying support for the Knight Commission findings. Because the Knight Commission report called for a shift in policy-making responsibility and authority from operational to strategic level decision makers, when issues are not validated by the total sample, patterns of response associated with job classification are identified.

Three Warrants for Commission Study

The three warrants expressed by Knight Commission documents indicate the critical state of affairs in college athletics, as well as support the need for a reform commission study. These reasons include a negative public perception of college sports, the possibility of governmental intervention into policy-making, and the impact of athletic scandals on public support for the institution of higher education. The evidence, presented in Table 2, supports each of these arguments that an independent study was warranted.

The Overarching Problem: Semi-Autonomous Athletic Programs

According to the Knight Commission, the autonomy of a big-time athletic program, whose method of operation separates it from rest of the university, confronts college sports as the central issue. The evidence presented in Table 3 strongly supports the three assumptions girding the Knight Commission’s
## Table 2 - Three Warrants for Commission Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knight Commission Finding</th>
<th>Merits Reform</th>
<th>Job Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Issue</td>
<td>Part II</td>
<td>≥75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Question</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **PUBLIC PERCEPTION**
   - Public Concern
     - 1989 Harris Poll
     - 78% N/A
     - 3*: 85.7%
     - 4*: 77.8%
     - 7*: 80.0%
     - 1*: 75.0%

2. **GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION**
   - Threat of Intrusion
     - #34
     - 75% 42-14
     - 3*: 85.7%
     - 4*: 77.8%
     - 7*: 80.0%
     - 1*: 75.0%

3. **INTEGRITY OF HIGHER EDUCATION**
   - Abuses Undermine
     - #33
     - 78.6% 44-12
     - 1*: 100%
     - 7*: 100%
     - 5*: 85.7%
     - 6*: 77.8%
     - 4*: 77.8%

---

**Job Classifications**

1. Presidents (n=12)
2. Athletic Directors (n=8)
3. Conference Commissioners (n=7)
4. Faculty Athletic Representatives (n=9)
5. Athletics and Higher Ed. Organization Leaders (n=7)
6. Media (n=9)
7. Basketball and Football Coaches (n=6)
### Table 3 - The Overarching Problem: Semi-Autonomous Athletic Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knight Commission Finding</th>
<th>Merits Reform</th>
<th>Job Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Issue</td>
<td>Part II</td>
<td>In yes-no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Question</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Athletic Department Operation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Semi-Autonomous</td>
<td>#31</td>
<td>80.7% 46-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6* - 100% 9-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3* - 85.7% 6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1* - 83.3% 10-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>Athletic Program Values</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Differ from University</td>
<td>#32</td>
<td>75.4% 43-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3* - 85.7% 6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1* - 83.3% 10-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <strong>Integrity of Higher Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Abuses Undermine</td>
<td>#33</td>
<td>78.6% 44-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7* - 100% 5-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5* - 85.7% 6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6* - 77.8% 7-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4* - 77.8% 7-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Job Classifications**

1. Presidents (n=12)
2. Athletic Directors (n=8)
3. Conference Commissioners (n=7)
4. Faculty Athletic Representatives (n=9)
5. Athletics and Higher Ed. Organization Leaders (n=7)
6. Media (n=9)
7. Basketball and Football Coaches (n=6)
structure of the overarching problem: (1) athletic departments have become semi-autonomous (80.7% affirming); (2) the values evident in college sports do not reflect those of the university (75.4%); and, (3) the effect of the athletic department autonomy and values result in abuses that undermine the integrity of the university (78.6%).

**Primary Findings Supporting the Overarching Problem**

1. **Commercialization of College Sport**

   The Knight Commission found that "the intrinsic educational value [of college sports]...becomes engulfed" in commercial interests. In their pursuit of an ever-larger revenue stream, the athletic program "takes on a life of its own." As a result, college athletics have "taken on all the trappings of a major entertainment enterprise" (Knight Foundation [KF], 1991, p. 5). The effect of the commercialism dynamic (see Table 4) received moderate support (64.9%) from the sample of "policy experts." Three contributing causal factors addressed in the 1991 report also were moderately supported: (1) an NCAA television revenue sharing plan based on tournament success (67.2%); (2) requirements that athletic departments be self-supporting (64.9%); and, (3) the pressure to generate revenues (67.2%).

   The support for the sub-issues making up this Knight Commission finding becomes stronger when the responses of athletic directors and faculty athletic
# Table 4 - Commercialization of College Sports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knight Commission Finding</th>
<th>Merits Reform</th>
<th>Job Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Part II</td>
<td>≥75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>yes-no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Athletic Department Operation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- As Entertainment Business</td>
<td>#21</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[totals excluding groups 2* and 4*]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[72.5%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. NCAA Revenue Sharing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Based on Winning</td>
<td>#16</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[totals excluding groups 2* and 4*]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[78.0%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. University Financial Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Self Supporting Athletic Depts.</td>
<td>#14</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[totals excluding groups 2* and 4*]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[80.0%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pressure to Generate Funds</td>
<td>#15</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[totals excluding groups 2* and 4*]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[78.0%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Sub-Issue Aggregate #14-16, 21</td>
<td></td>
<td>93.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidents</td>
<td>82.1%</td>
<td>23-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Leaders</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>20-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference Commissioners</td>
<td></td>
<td>84.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Classifications*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Presidents (n=12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Athletic Directors (n=8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Conference Commissioners (n=7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
representatives (FARs) were omitted. These two job classes have traditionally been responsible—in different domains—for the operational (vs. strategic) policy-making in college sports. The remaining five job classes supported the Knight Commission’s finding about the issue of commercialism: (1) big-time sports as an entertainment business (72.5%), (2) revenue sharing based on tournament success (78%), (3) self-supporting athletic departments (80%), and (4) the pressure to generate revenues (78%).

The strategic-level policy experts appear to validate the Knight Commission’s finding about commercialism. The support among presidents for these four issues, when aggregated, was overwhelming (93.6%). Almost as strong in their support were the top administrators from higher education and athletic organizations (82.1%). When conference commissioners (71.4%)—who have both strategic and operational policy responsibilities in college athletics—were combined with the other two groups, the support by strategic-level policy-makers is 84.5%.

2. Authority of Office

The 1991 report suggested that the complex dynamic supporting commercialism in college sports results in interests outside the university becoming involved in the athletic department. The effect of this involvement is loss of control by the administration and faculty. Table 5 shows that the policy experts clearly support two findings related to external financial
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knight Commission Finding</th>
<th>Part II Survey Question</th>
<th>Merits Reform Agreement</th>
<th>≥75%</th>
<th>Job Classification ≤50%</th>
<th>Job Classification yes-no</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Outside Commercial Interests</td>
<td>- Threaten University Control</td>
<td>#23</td>
<td>80.7% 46-11</td>
<td>6* - 100%</td>
<td>9-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Outside Coaching Income</td>
<td>#24</td>
<td>82.5% 47-10</td>
<td>1* - 100%</td>
<td>12-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6* - 100%</td>
<td>7* - 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4* - 100%</td>
<td>1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5* - 100%</td>
<td>6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Presidential Authority</td>
<td>- Pres./Inst. Indifference</td>
<td>#19</td>
<td>64.9% 37-20</td>
<td>6* - 88.9%</td>
<td>2* - 25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3* - 85.9%</td>
<td>4* - 33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1* - 75.0%</td>
<td>7* - 40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[totals excluding groups 2* and 4*]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[77.5%] [31-9]</td>
<td>1* - 75.0%</td>
<td>2-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Challenges from Coaches/A.D.</td>
<td>#20</td>
<td>61.4% 35-22</td>
<td>6* - 88.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1* - 83.3%</td>
<td>4* - 37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2* - 44.4%</td>
<td>5* - 85.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7* - 40.0%</td>
<td>6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[totals excluding groups 2* and 4*]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[72.5%] [29-11]</td>
<td>1* - 75.0%</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Boards Role in Athletics</td>
<td>- Board Intervention</td>
<td>#18</td>
<td>66.7% 38-19</td>
<td>6* - 88.9%</td>
<td>2-7</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1* - 83.3%</td>
<td>4* - 22.2%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5* - 85.7%</td>
<td>6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[totals excluding groups 2* and 4*]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[80.0%] [32-8]</td>
<td>1* - 83.3%</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Job Classifications:
1. Presidents (n=12)
2. Athletic Directors (n=8)
3. Conference Commissioners (n=7)
4. Faculty Athletic Representatives (n=9)
5. Athletics and Higher Ed. Organization Leaders (n=7)
6. Media (n=9)
7. Basketball and Football Coaches (n=6)
relationships: (1) outside interests threaten university control (80.7%) and (2) coaches and athletic administrator salary enhancements provided by contracts with outside commercial interests (82.5%).

Two effects (see Table 5) on authority of office within the higher education institution, resulting from commercialism, received moderate support from the policy experts. According to the Knight Commission, loss of control over internal decisions causes presidential neglect and institutional indifference (64.9%). Furthermore, outsider interest in athletics provides the "power" coach or athletic administrator a political base with which to challenge presidential control (61.4%). As with the findings on commercialism, when operation-level policy maker's--athletic directors and faculty athletic representatives--responses were removed, the remainder of the sample support both issues: (1) presidential neglect/institutional indifference (77.5%) and (2) athletic personnel that challenge presidential control (72.5%).

The level of control that the board of trustees maintains over institutional athletic matters receives indirect mention in the 1991 report’s problem definition, not as a finding but as a recommendation. The issue of the board’s role received moderate support from the total sample of policy experts (66.7%). With the athletic directors and faculty athletic representatives removed, the need for reform by the governing board in institutional athletic policy matters received clear support (80%) from the remaining role classifications.
3. Welfare of the Student-Athlete

As discussed in the overarching finding, the Knight Commission identified the fact that athletic programs do not reflect the values of the university. Value erosion has occurred in two areas: (1) the educational value of athletic participation and (2) academic standards regarding the student-athlete as a student. Table 6 indicates that each of the six sub-issues concerning the student-athlete as a student received support from the policy experts (ranging from 83.9% to 69.6%). The aggregate total of the six sub-issues (77.5%, 266-77 affirming, N=58) indicated clear support for the Knight Commission findings about low academic standards.

Table 6 indicates that two issues related to the educational value of athletic participation received different levels of support. The issue of time demands on student-athletes was clearly supported by the policy experts (82.8%). The issue of television games that interfere with the academic life of the student-athlete, though, rated only moderate support (60.3%). The latter issue, nonetheless, received support (69.4%) from four job classes--presidents, athletic directors, organization heads, and media. Commissioners and coaches, two groups with direct involvement in television, were joined by faculty athletic representatives in their equivocal responses about this issue (43.5%).
### Table 6 - Welfare of the Student-Athlete

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knight Commission Finding</th>
<th>Merits Reform</th>
<th>Job Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Agreement</td>
<td>≥75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes-no</td>
<td>yes-no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Educational Value of Athletic Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Time Demands</td>
<td>#11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>48-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- TV Games Hurt Academics</td>
<td>#13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60.3%</td>
<td>35-23</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[total of groups 1*, 2*, 5* and 6*]</td>
<td>[69.4%] [25-11]</td>
<td>[45.5%] [10-12]</td>
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<tr>
<td>[total of groups 3*, 4* and 7*]</td>
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<td>2. Student-Athlete as a Student</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Special Admission</td>
<td>#1</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Initial Eligibility</td>
<td>#2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>75.9%</td>
<td>44-14</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Job Classifications

1. Presidents (n=12)
2. Athletic Directors (n=8)
3. Conference Commissioners (n=7)
4. Faculty Athletic Representatives (n=9)
5. Athletics and Higher Ed. Organization Leaders (n=7)
6. Media (n=9)
7. Basketball and Football Coaches (n=6)
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knight Commission Finding</th>
<th>Merits Reform</th>
<th>Job Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Part II</td>
<td>In yes-no</td>
</tr>
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<td>Survey</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
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<td>Question</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4-8-1</td>
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<td>5-8-5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2-8-5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Continuing Eligibility</td>
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<td>82.8% 48-10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Graduation Rates</td>
<td>#6</td>
<td>77.6% 45-13</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCAA Standards</td>
<td>#8</td>
<td>75.4% 43-14</td>
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<tr>
<td>J.C. Initial Eligibility</td>
<td>#4</td>
<td>69.6% 39-17</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Academic Standards

| Aggregate                      | #1, 2, 4-6, 8 | 77.5% | 266-77 |

### Job Classifications

- 1 Presidents (n=12)
- 2 Athletic Directors (n=8)
- 3 Conference Commissioners (n=7)
- 4 Faculty Athletic Representatives (n=9)
- 5 Athletics and Higher Ed. Organization Leaders (n=7)
- 6 Media (n=9)
- 7 Basketball and Football Coaches (n=6)
Other Main Issues

1. Controlling Costs

The Knight Commission found that the search for revenues to fund athletic programs drove costs into an inflationary spiral that consumed the entire revenue stream. The result: a fiscal imbalance between costs and revenues. The policy experts (see Table 7) clearly supported the finding about costs exceeding revenues (86%).

2. Monitoring Revenues

The 1991 report indicated that "many of the financial scandals that have tarnished athletics" (KF, p.19) resulted from a lack of vigilance by central university administrators. As mentioned above (see Table 7), the sub-issues of presidential neglect (77.5%, omitting athletic administrators and FARs) and the potential pitfalls stemming from the relations with outside economic interests (80.7%) were supported by the policy experts.

Subordinate Issues

1. Restraining Recruiting

The Knight Commission report identified recruiting policies as a subordinate issue to its central finding, at the same time acknowledging that
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knight Commission Finding</th>
<th>Part II Survey Question</th>
<th>Merits Reform</th>
<th>Job Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. CONTROLLING COSTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Cost Exceeding Revenues</td>
<td>#12</td>
<td>86.0% 49-8</td>
<td>3* - 100% 7-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6* - 100% 9-0</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1* - 91.7% 11-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5* - 85.7% 6-1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7* - 80.0% 4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4* - 77.8% 7-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. MONITORING REVENUES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Pres./Inst. Neglect</td>
<td>#19</td>
<td>64.9% 37-20</td>
<td>6* - 88.9% 8-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3* - 85.9% 6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1* - 75.0% 9-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[77.5%]</td>
<td>[31-9]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[excluding groups 2* and 4*]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Comm. Interests Threaten Control</td>
<td>#23</td>
<td>80.7% 46-11</td>
<td>6* - 100% 9-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1* - 91.7% 11-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5* - 85.7% 6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2* - 75.0% 6-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Job Classifications

- 1 Presidents (n=12)
- 2 Athletic Directors (n=8)
- 3 Conference Commissioners (n=7)
- 4 Faculty Athletic Representatives (n=9)
- 5 Athletics and Higher Ed. Organization Leaders (n=7)
- 6 Media (n=9)
- 7 Basketball and Football Coaches (n=6)
the recruiting issue presents a challenge to athletic policy-makers. The Knight Commission’s problem structure places recruiting as an effect of the commercialism dynamic. Although the survey made no distinction between primary and secondary issues, 72.4% of the policy experts responded that recruiting practices merit policy reform (see Table 8). The policy experts supported the need for restraint, regardless of its cause.

2. Influence of Commercial Television

The Knight Commission report identified television as a new factor entering into the long-present commercialism dynamic. The Knight Commission’s ambivalence regarding the issue of television’s influence on college sports radiates from its problem structure (see Chapter 4 for explanation). The report acknowledged the power of commercial television’s influence but down-played its role as a causal element. The responses of the policy experts (see Table 8) reflected the equivocal nature of this issue. The public perception that television money controls college sports received moderate support (61.4%) as an issue that merits reform from the total sample.

The job classes, however, were sharply divided. Presidents and coaches clearly supported this issue (94.1%). Yet the remaining sample--athletic directors, conference commissioners, faculty athletic representatives, organization heads, and media--did not support the issue (47.5%).
### Table 8 - Subordinate Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knight Commission Finding</th>
<th>Part II Survey Question</th>
<th>Merits Reform In Agreement</th>
<th>≥75%</th>
<th>Job Classification ≤50%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Restraining Recruiting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Recruiting Practices</td>
<td>#9</td>
<td>72.4% 42-16</td>
<td>5* - 85.7% 6-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1* - 83.3% 10-2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7* - 83.3% 5-1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6* - 77.8% 7-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Television’s Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- TV Money Controls Colleges</td>
<td>#22</td>
<td>61.4% 35-22</td>
<td>7* - 100% 5-0</td>
<td>2* - 37.5% 3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1* - 91.7% 11-1</td>
<td>3* - 42.9% 3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5* - 42.9% 3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[total of groups 1* and 7*]</td>
<td>[94.1%] [16-1]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[total excluding groups 1* and 7*]</td>
<td>[47.5%] [19-21]</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Job Classifications:

1. Presidents (n=12)
2. Athletic Directors (n=8)
3. Conference Commissioners (n=7)
4. Faculty Athletic Representatives (n=9)
5. Athletics and Higher Ed. Organization Leaders (n=7)
6. Media (n=9)
7. Basketball and Football Coaches (n=6)
Omitted or Emergent Issues

1. **Omitted Issue: Freshman Eligibility**

   A comparison between the Knight Commission’s initial agenda--proposed by the Co-Chairs in their 1989 "Joint Statement"--and the 1991 report indicates that freshman eligibility was omitted as a topic. An NCAA rule changed in the mid-1970s to allow freshman to play on varsity teams, since then the issue has received considerable mention in books and media editorials--89% of the media sub-sample responded that the issue merits reform (see Table 9). The prevalence of the issue in public dialogue raised the question of whether the Knight Commission miscalculated in omitting it from their reform model. The policy experts, though, clearly supported the Knight Commission’s treatment of the freshman eligibility issue. Less than half (44.8% of the total sample and 36.7% omitting media responses) indicated that freshman eligibility was an issue that merits policy reform.

2. **Emergent Issue: Gender Equity**

   The Knight Commission introduced gender equity as an important value for athletic programs to pursue in their operation. Yet, gender equity and Title IX compliance received mention in the 1991 report more as a value addressed by a recommendation than as an aspect of the problems reported in the Commission’s findings. Policy-maker attention to gender equity as a problem
## Table 9 - Omitted or Emergent Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knight Commission Finding</th>
<th>Part II Survey Question</th>
<th>Merits Reform Agreement</th>
<th>≥75%</th>
<th>Job Classification ≤50%</th>
<th>yes-no</th>
<th>yes-no</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. OMITTED ISSUE</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Freshman Eligibility</td>
<td>#3</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>26-32</td>
<td>6* - 88.9%</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>4* - 22.2%</td>
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<td>2* - 25.0%</td>
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<td>3* - 28.6%</td>
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<td>1* - 41.7%</td>
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<td>7* - 50.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>[total excluding group 6*]</td>
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<td>[36.7%]</td>
<td>[18-31]</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. EMERGENT ISSUE</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Gender Equity</td>
<td>#29</td>
<td>73.2%</td>
<td>41-15</td>
<td>6* - 88.9%</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7* - 40.0%</td>
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<td>1* - 83.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Presidents (n=12)</td>
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<td>2 Athletic Directors (n=8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Conference Commissioners (n=7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Faculty Athletic Representatives (n=9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Athletics and Higher Ed. Organization Leaders (n=7)</td>
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<td>6 Media (n=9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Basketball and Football Coaches (n=6)</td>
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has increased since the March 1991 release of the Knight Commission report, conferring emergent issue status. In Table 9, the policy experts supported (73.2%) the Knight Commission’s finding that the equity for opportunity of women in college sports was an issue that merits policy reform.

The gender equity issue provides an example of the Knight Commission report—along with other policy analysts and political entities—acting as a stressor upon the NCAA’s political system. For purposes of explication, if the report were the sole influence on subsequent policy analysis, it served to manipulate the values making up the policy space by inserting gender equity. The Commission found little about gender equity as a "problem" contributing to the conditions in big-time sports. In the time since the report’s release, though, the policies and practices of college athletics, measured against this new value, have been found inadequate. The conditions relative to gender equity have not changed appreciably, only the terms of the policy debate.

In the next chapter, focus will be on the recommendations comprising the Knight Commission’s reform model. The significance of each recommendation in bringing reform and the NCAA outcomes related to them are presented.
CHAPTER SIX

Recommendations: Significance and NCAA Outcomes

Chapter Overview

Now for the data, primarily from a survey of NCAA "policy experts," that compares each Knight Commission recommendation to outcomes in NCAA policy from 1990 to 1992. The analysis addressed Research Question 3--How did NCAA governance and policy outcomes relate to the Knight Commission's reform recommendations? The chapter includes the following sections: a contextual note on the contemporary policy influence of the NCAA Presidents Commission, the significance of the Knight Commission's reform recommendations, NCAA outcomes, political undercurrents, recommendation structure and feasibility, and an impact/outcome summary.

The research interest pertains to the impact of the Knight Commission's recommendations. The magnitude and direction of policy change embodied the impact of Knight Commission. Yet, the research scope was confined to connecting recommendation and NCAA policy outcome. Again, the survey sample contributed environmental verification to establish a perceived significance of each proposal. The Commission's effectiveness in producing reforms (impact) was deduced from the number and significance of the policy changes reflecting the its values and problem structure.
The data address the number of recommendations resulting in NCAA outcomes and the quality of those measures according to their "impact as solutions to the issues confronting college athletics." Amended or new NCAA rules and the proposal sponsor were identified for each recommendation that underwent policy action. Recommendations not resulting in NCAA policy action or pertaining to institutional or conference issues were also specified. Each recommendation from the Knight Commission’s "One-Plus-Three" model was compared with the "policy expert’s" rating of the proposal’s significance in bringing reform.

The recommendation structure and feasibility provide additional data about the approach and viability of the 1991 report. The recommendation’s form was placed onto a nominal scale of policy-relevant information components--problem structuring, policy alternative, policy action, policy outcome, policy performance, or a goal statement directing policy makers--devised from Dunn’s (1981) model of the policy cycle described in the conceptual framework (see Chapter Two). The language of the recommendation and its supporting text were rated for their specificity--high, moderate, or low. Finally, policy proposals considered "unworkable" or "too costly" from the "policy experts” responses were reported.
Contextual Note: The Policy Influence of the Presidents Commission

The political strength of the NCAA Presidents Commission at the 1991 and 1992 NCAA conventions provides a context in which to evaluate the effects of Knight Commission recommendations proposed for the 1993 convention or under study for 1994. The Presidents Commission has employed a practice in which a resolution is passed that mandates an issue be studied, undergo a hearing process, and have legislation prepared for a specified convention. Examples include 1991 proposals 58 (academic requirements/1992) and 1992 proposals 35 (presidential authority and institutional responsibility/1993) (see Appendix G for an explanation of NCAA proposals). The predominant pattern ends with legislation jointly sponsored by the Presidents Commission and the NCAA Council. The strong policy-making influence resulting from this practice was evidenced with the 1991 and 1992 convention successes. The Presidents Commission identified two themes for the 1991 convention: (1) limiting time demands on the student-athlete and (2) cost reduction. The 1992 convention focused on academic standards for initial and continuing eligibility. In 1991 and 1992, twenty-two of the 25 proposals (over forty roll call votes) sponsored by the Presidents Commission passed receiving more than 90% of the membership vote.

In the fall of 1991, the Presidents Commission’s Subcommittee for Strategic Planning, chaired by Knight Commissioner and Wake Forest University President Thomas Hearn, received the full Commission’s approval for the first
of a rolling three-year plan (see Appendix H for a copy of that report). The emphasis for the 1993 convention was identified to be presidential authority, institutional responsibility, and certification of athletics programs. The Presidents Commission’s agenda for the 1994 convention was planned to be financial conditions and issues in college sports. Finally, the focus for the 1995 convention returns to issues concerning the welfare of the student-athlete. Future convention outcomes are a matter of conjecture but the leadership role of the Presidents Commission in NCAA policy-making and agenda-setting is supported by the recent past.

The Significance of the Knight Commission’s Recommendations

Table 10--Knight Commission Reform Model Summary--provides significance ratings for 27 Knight Commission recommendations in the "One-Plus-Three" model’s four categories (see Appendix F for the list of Knight Commission recommendations and Appendix G for a key to the tables in this chapter). The sample of NCAA "policy experts" rated ten recommendations (see Table 11--10 Most Significant Proposals) with a mean above 3.0 (the survey used a four-point scale rating the significance of each proposal’s impact as a solution to athletic issues: 1 = not at all, 2 = slightly significant, 3 = significant, 4 = essential): four recommendations from "financial integrity," three from "presidential control," two from "academic integrity," and one from "certification." Four proposals were identified as "essential" by over 50% of
### Table 10 - Knight Commission Reform Model Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>NCAA Outcome</th>
<th>Recommendation Type</th>
<th>% with Questions re: Feasibility (f)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Board Affirmation**</td>
<td>3.23 1.053</td>
<td>5 N/A</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>policy alternative problem structuring 6.9% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Control Conferences**</td>
<td>no question</td>
<td>3a 1993</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>problem structuring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Resolution to Study</td>
<td>2.526 1.02*</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Control NCAA**</td>
<td></td>
<td>3a 1993</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>problem structuring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Resolution to Study</td>
<td>2.526* 1.02*</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Gender Equity**</td>
<td>3.017 1.00</td>
<td>3b 1994</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>goal statement problem structuring 6.9% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. TV Involvement**</td>
<td>2.73 1.213</td>
<td>3b 1994</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>problem structuring 13.9% (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. ACADEMIC INTEGRITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Initial Eligibility**</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Core Curriculum**</td>
<td>3.09* .689*</td>
<td>1 1992</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>policy alternative policy alternative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Campus Visit**</td>
<td>2.79* .921*</td>
<td>1 1992</td>
<td>high</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significance is directed at the specific NCAA proposal representing the Knight Commission recommendations.

**Knight Commission recommendation

1–implemented in substance
2–partial implementation
3a–legislation proposed
3b–under study
4–no action
5–institutional or conference issue
6–failed legislation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>NCAA Outcome</th>
<th>Recommendation Type</th>
<th>% with Questions re: Feasibility (f)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. ACADEMIC INTEGRITY (CONTINUED)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. J.C. Proposition 48**</td>
<td>#8</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Admissions Formula**</td>
<td>no question</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Letter of Intent**</td>
<td>no question</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 5-year Scholarships**</td>
<td>#18</td>
<td>2.204</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Continuing Eligibility**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Check each Semester**</td>
<td>#5</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Progress to Degree**</td>
<td>#6</td>
<td>3.155*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Meet Inst. Standards**</td>
<td>no question</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Emphasize Graduation Rates**</td>
<td>#31</td>
<td>2.965</td>
<td>3a</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significance is directed at the specific NCAA proposal representing the Knight Commission recommendations

**Knight Commission recommendation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative Process†</th>
<th>1-implemented in substance</th>
<th>2-partial implementation</th>
<th>3a-legislation proposed</th>
<th>3b-under study</th>
<th>4-no action</th>
<th>5-institutional or conference issue</th>
<th>6-failed legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Table 10 (continued) - Knight Commission Reform Model Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Part II Survey Question</th>
<th>Significance Mean SD</th>
<th>NCAA Outcome Legislative Process†</th>
<th>Recommendation Type Specificity Form % with Questions re: Feasibility (f)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III. Financial Integrity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Reduce Costs**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. 10% Scholarship Reduction</td>
<td>#17</td>
<td>2.316* 1.12*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1991 moderate goal statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cost of Attendance**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. $1700 Pell Grant</td>
<td>#35</td>
<td>2.93* 1.05*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1990 high policy alternative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Fiscal Control**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Curb Boosters**</td>
<td>#25</td>
<td>3.4 .955</td>
<td>3b</td>
<td>1994 high policy alternative 10.3% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Centralize Rev. and Budget**</td>
<td>#26</td>
<td>3.32 1.011</td>
<td>3b</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Resolution to Study</td>
<td>#32</td>
<td>2.655* 1.163*</td>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Review Revenue Sharing**</td>
<td>#20</td>
<td>2.855 1.193</td>
<td>3b</td>
<td>1994 moderate-low problem structuring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Outside Coaching Income**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Prior Approval**</td>
<td>#21</td>
<td>3.054* .961*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1992 high policy alternative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Ban Shoe Contracts**</td>
<td>#23</td>
<td>2.72 1.044</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significance is directed at the specific NCAA proposal representing the Knight Commission recommendations

**Knight Commission recommendation

Legislative Process†

1-implemented in substance
2-partial implementation
3a-legislation proposed
3b-under study
4-no action
5-institutional or conference issue
6-failed legislation
### Table 10 (continued) - Knight Commission Reform Model Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Part II Survey Question</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>NCAA Outcome</th>
<th>Recommendation Type</th>
<th>% with Questions re: Feasibility (f)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Legislative Process†</td>
<td>Specificity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Convention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Financial Integrity (continued)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Long-term Coaching Contracts**</td>
<td>#22</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.977</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Inst. Funds to Athletics**</td>
<td>#27</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>1.0011</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Certification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Mandatory Certification**</td>
<td>#31</td>
<td>2.965</td>
<td>.906</td>
<td>3a</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Resolution to Study</td>
<td>#30</td>
<td>2.772*</td>
<td>1.069*</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Annual Policy Audits**</td>
<td>#28</td>
<td>3.368</td>
<td>.899</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Knight Commission Principles**</td>
<td>no question</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3a</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significance is directed at the specific NCAA proposal representing the Knight Commission recommendations

**Knight Commission recommendation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative Process†</th>
<th>1-implemented in substance</th>
<th>2-partial implementation</th>
<th>3a-legislation proposed</th>
<th>3b-under study</th>
<th>4-no action</th>
<th>5-institutional or conference issue</th>
<th>6-failed legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-implemented in substance</td>
<td>2-partial implementation</td>
<td>3a-legislation proposed</td>
<td>3b-under study</td>
<td>4-no action</td>
<td>5-institutional or conference issue</td>
<td>6-failed legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td>Part II Survey Question</td>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>Job Classification</td>
<td>NCAA Outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Significant %</td>
<td>Essential %</td>
<td>Mean Significant ≤ 2.5</td>
<td>≤ 50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>III.3.a. Curb Boosters</td>
<td>#25</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>.955</td>
<td>85.5%</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.2. Annual Policy Audit</td>
<td>#28</td>
<td>3.368</td>
<td>.899</td>
<td>82.4%</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.3.b. Centralize Rev. and Budget</td>
<td>#26</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>1.011</td>
<td>82.1%</td>
<td>60.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.1. Board Affirmation</td>
<td>#24</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>1.053</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>7*</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.4. Progress to Degree</td>
<td>#6</td>
<td>3.155</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.7. Inst. Funds to Athletes</td>
<td>#27</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>1.011</td>
<td>78.0%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.1. Core Curriculum</td>
<td>#2</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>.689</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.5.a Prior Approval</td>
<td>#21</td>
<td>3.054</td>
<td>.961</td>
<td>83.9%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>7*</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.3.a Exer. Pres. Comm. Powers</td>
<td>#33</td>
<td>3.053</td>
<td>1.059</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>7*</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.4. Gender Equity</td>
<td>#36</td>
<td>3.017</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Knight Commission encouraged presidents to use President's Commission powers (Prop. 36-1984). Prop. 35-1992 study proposes legislation to increase presidential control of NCAA.**
the "policy experts" and rated above 3.2: two from "financial integrity" and one each from "presidential control" and "certification." Two proposals received over 60% "essential" responses; both were "financial integrity" issues.

The two most significant proposals in the overall model and from the category of "financial integrity" stemmed from a single Knight Commission recommendation concerning fiscal control of athletics programs. The 1991 report called for "the independence of athletics foundations and booster clubs [to] be curbed" (KF, p. 20): (1) by eliminating their involvement in operational aspects of athletics, and (2) by "channel[ing] all funds into the university’s financial system and subject[ing] athletic programs to the same budgetary procedures applied to similarly structured departments and programs" (p.20). The former was rated as 3.4 on the 4 point scale with 63.6% identifying it as essential to reform (4.0) and 85.5% citing it as significant or essential (responses of 3.0 or 4.0). The latter proposal was rated 3.32 with 60.7% listing it as essential and 82.1% as at least significant. These data reinforce the Knight Commission’s finding that commercialism in college sports is a central causal factor to the overarching problem.

The two other proposals from the "financial integrity" area that were among the 10 most significant Knight Commission recommendations also relate to the financial coupling mechanisms between the university and the athletic department. The recommendation calling for "institutional support...for intercollegiate athletics" was rated as 3.12 with 42% citing it as essential and
78% as significant or essential. In addition, the recommendation requiring coaches to obtain presidential approval for all athletics-related income was scaled as 3.05 with 39.3% identifying it as essential and 83.9% as significant or essential.

Two of the three most significant Knight Commission recommendations from the "presidential control" category concern presidential authority at the institutional and NCAA levels of governance. The first proposal, calling for governing boards to "explicitly endorse and reaffirm presidential authority in all matters of athletic governance," was rated 3.23 with 56.1% identifying it as essential and 78.9% as significant or essential. The second asserted that the presidents "should control the NCAA." The recommendation that this goal be accomplished by using the Presidents Commission powers was scaled at 3.05 with 45.6% citing it as essential and 84.2% as significant or essential.

The third recommendation among the three most significant proposals from the "presidential control" area directed the presidents to use their authority to insure operational facilitation of gender equity. It was rated 3.02 with 39.7% listing it as essential and 82.8% as significant or essential.

The two most significant Knight Commission recommendations from the "academic integrity" area concern raising academic standards for initial and continuing eligibility. The Knight Commission recommendation--operationalized as an NCAA rule by 1992 proposition 21--that "athletics eligibility should depend on progress toward a degree" was rated at 3.15 with 36.2% listing it
as essential to reform and 81.0% as significant or essential. The Knight Commission's recommendation--operationalized as an NCAA rule by 1992 proposition 14—that to be eligible as a freshman the "prospective student-athlete should present 15 core units of high school academic work" (1992 prop. 14 calls for 13 core units because an NCAA survey found that several states could not provide 15 core units with their high school curriculums) was scaled at 3.09 with 24.6% citing it as essential to reform and 87.8% as significant or essential.

The most significant Knight Commission recommendation from the "certification" area pertained to athletic program accountability to the university for academic and governance policy practices. The proposal calls for required, comprehensive, annual policy audits in financial, academic, and athletics governance areas. It highlights the role of accounting information as a coupling mechanism. This proposal was rated as 3.37 with 59.6% citing it as essential to reform and 82.4% as significant or essential.

**NCAA Outcomes and Legislative Sponsors**

Table 12--NCAA Outcomes Summary--provides the NCAA outcomes related to each of the 27 Knight Commission recommendations. Table 13--Impact/Outcome Summary--aggregates the recommendations into seven categories by the policy action associated with each proposal. Seventeen of the 27 recommendations, or 63%, have been addressed in some manner by an
### Table 12 - NCAA Outcomes Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>NCAA Policy Action</th>
<th>Knight Commission Recommendation</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>Failed</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Board Affirmation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Control Conferences</td>
<td>1992-Prop. 35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Control NCAA</td>
<td>1992-Prop. 35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Gender Equity</td>
<td>NCAA Task Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. TV Involvement</td>
<td>1992-Prop. 36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. ACADEMIC INTEGRITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Initial Eligibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Campus Visits</td>
<td>1992-Prop. 18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. J.C. Proposition 48</td>
<td>1992-Props. 19, 20, 21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Admission Formula</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Letter of Intent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 5-year Scholarships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Continuing Eligibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Check each Semester</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Progress to Degree</td>
<td>1992-Props. 19, 20, 21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Meet Institutional Standards</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
### Table 12 (continued) - NCAA Outcomes Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>NCAA Policy Action</th>
<th>Knight Commission Recommendation</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. Financial Integrity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Reduce Costs</td>
<td>1991–Prop. 40</td>
<td></td>
<td>$\chi$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cost of Attendance</td>
<td>1990–Prop. 37 1991 NCAA Loan Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td>$\chi$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Fiscal Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Outside Coaching Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Prior Approval</td>
<td>1992–Prop. 28</td>
<td></td>
<td>$\chi$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Ban Shoe Contracts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$\chi$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Long-term Coaching Contracts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Institutional Funds to Athletes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. Certification</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Annual Policy Audits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$\chi$</td>
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</table>
Table 13 - Impact/Outcome Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NCAA Legislative Process</th>
<th>Table #3 Summary List</th>
<th>Table #2 10 Most Sign. Recs.</th>
<th>Table #5 President's Top 10</th>
<th>Table #6 8 Least Sign. Recs.</th>
<th>Table #7 11 Specific Policy Alternatives</th>
<th>Table #8 11 with Questions re: Feasibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Implemented in Substance</td>
<td>6* (22.2%)</td>
<td>3 (30%)</td>
<td>1 (10%)</td>
<td>3* (37.5%)</td>
<td>4* (36.4%)</td>
<td>2* (18.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Partial Implementation</td>
<td>1 (3.7%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (9.1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Resolution to Study</td>
<td>10 (37%)</td>
<td>4 (40%)</td>
<td>6 (60%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>2 (18.2%)</td>
<td>4 (36.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive NCAA Action (subtotal)</strong></td>
<td>17 (63%)</td>
<td>7 (70%)</td>
<td>7 (70%)</td>
<td>5 (63%)</td>
<td>7 (63.3%)</td>
<td>6 (54.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. No NCAA Outcome</td>
<td>5 (18.5%)</td>
<td>1 (10%)</td>
<td>1 (10%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>3 (27.3%)</td>
<td>3 (27.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Inst./Conf. Issue</td>
<td>5 (18.5%)</td>
<td>2 (20%)</td>
<td>2 (20%)</td>
<td>1 (12.5%)</td>
<td>1 (9.1%)</td>
<td>2 (18.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Failed Legislation</td>
<td>1* (3.7%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1* (12.5%)</td>
<td>1* (9.1%)</td>
<td>6 (54.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Recommendations</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*II.1.c: J.C. Prop. 48 is counted twice:
- Prop. 26 - 1992 which was specified to K.C. Rec. failed
- Props. 19, 20, 21 - 1992 address K.C. Rec. in substance and passed
NCAA policy or legislative action. Of the Knight Commissions 27 recommendations:

1. six have been fully implemented in substance.

2. one has been partially implemented.

3. four have had NCAA legislation proposed for 1993.

4. six have had NCAA legislation passed calling for study of implementation means and mandating legislation for the 1994 convention.

5. one has failed as NCAA legislation

6. five have not received NCAA policy action.

7. five of the issues fall into the governance domain of conferences or institutions.

Three of the ten most significant Commission recommendations became fully implemented in substance with their passage at the 1992 NCAA convention. These were initial and continuing eligibility recommendations (see Appendix F for Recommendations and Appendix G for NCAA proposals) from the "academic integrity" category and the requirement that coaches receive

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1 The Knight Commission recommendation calling for junior college transfers not meeting Proposition 48 as high school seniors to be ineligible their first year at an NCAA institution failed as Proposition 26 (treating the problem as an initial eligibility issue) at the 1992 convention. The substance of the recommendation, though, is contained in the continuing eligibility rules passed as Propositions 19, 20, and 21 at the same convention. This recommendation is tallied in both the "implemented in substance" and "failed legislation" categories.
prior approval for athletics-related income. All three were sponsored by the NCAA Presidents Commission or co-sponsored with the NCAA Council.

Of the four Knight Commission recommendations proposed as legislation for the 1993 NCAA convention, only presidential authority within the NCAA is among the ten most noteworthy. Regardless, the issue of an NCAA certification program (2.97 significance rating, 29.8% essential, and 75.4% as significant or essential) is among the four principles of the Knight Commission reform model. The concept of certification was first introduced to the NCAA Presidents Commission and Council in April, 1989 by NCAA Executive Director and Knight Commissioner Richard Schultz—although George Hanford (1974) proposed a similar measure in his 1974 "Inquiry." The legislation addressing presidential authority within the NCAA evolved from 1992 Proposal 35—a resolution to study presidential authority—sponsored by the Presidents Commission Strategic Planning Sub-Committee. Each the four Knight Commission recommendations with legislation proposed for 1993 will be sponsored by either the NCAA Presidents Commission or Council, or both.

Six recommendations are currently (in late 1992) under NCAA study in order to prepare legislation for the 1994 NCAA convention. Two of the three most essential issues to the Knight Commission reform model—eliminating athletics foundations and boosters clubs from operational aspects of athletic programs and centralizing the revenues and budgets for athletic departments—are among this group. Proposition 36 of 1992, mandating 1994 legislation to
address fiscal control measures, was sponsored by the Presidents Commission Strategic Planning Sub-Committee.

Gender equity, among the 10 most significant Knight Commission recommendations, is currently under study by a special NCAA-sponsored task force. In March of 1992, the NCAA task force was created by NCAA Executive Director (and Knight Commissioner) Richard Schultz in response to an NCAA-sponsored study that identified inequities in opportunities and funding for women in college sports. Gender equity and Title IX compliance in the NCAA were the subject of congressional hearings in April, 1992. The task force has been requested to recommend legislation and policy changes, expected to be acted upon by the 1994 convention.

Each of the seven Knight Commission recommendations that has received NCAA attention was sponsored in some way by the Presidents Commission, its Strategic Planning Subcommittee, or Richard Schultz--through his role with the NCAA Council. Of the ten most significant Knight Commission recommendations, only "required, comprehensive, annual policy audits" has received no NCAA legislative attention. Two recommendations--"governing boards affirming presidential authority" and "universities providing institutional funds for athletics"--are institutional issues.
Presidential Responses

Table 14--10 Most Significant Recommendations to Presidents--provides the responses from the sub-sample of "policy experts" who are or were presidents (n = 12). Nine of the ten consist of recommendations that would directly enhance presidential authority by increasing the legitimate powers of the office or providing improved information for financial, academic, or governance accountability. Only the proposal to provide institutional funds to athletics was the exception. Even this proposal could be argued to enhance presidential authority. As head of the educational institution, the president’s legitimate authority over athletics should increase by legitimizing, with institutional funds, athletics as an educational program.

Seven of the ten recommendations were consistent with the overall sample’s most significant recommendations listed in Table 11. The three proposals that held greater importance to the presidents were: (1) reviewing the revenue sharing plan for distributing television profits for NCAA tournaments in order to reduce the emphasis placed on winning; (2) having the president control the institution’s involvement with commercial television; and, (3) developing a mandatory athletics certification program. In all ten cases, the presidents considered the Knight Commission recommendation as more significant to reform than the sample as a whole.

Only one of the ten, annual policy audits, has had no NCAA policy attention. Both board affirmation of presidential authority and providing
## Table 14 - 10 Most Significant Recommendations to Presidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Part II Survey Question</th>
<th>Significance To Presidents (n=12)</th>
<th>Overall Sample (n=58)</th>
<th>NCAA Outcome</th>
<th>Legislative Process†</th>
<th>Convention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean (Essential %)</td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.3.b. Centralize Revenue, Budget</td>
<td>#26</td>
<td>3.73 (81.8%)</td>
<td>3.32 (1.011)</td>
<td>3b</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.4. Review Revenue Sharing</td>
<td>#20</td>
<td>3.66 (66.7%)</td>
<td>2.855 (1.193)</td>
<td>3b</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.1. Board Affirmation</td>
<td>#24</td>
<td>3.58 (75.0%)</td>
<td>3.23 (1.053)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.2. Annual Policy Audit</td>
<td>#28</td>
<td>3.5 (66.7%)</td>
<td>3.368 (.899)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.5. TV Involvement</td>
<td>#19</td>
<td>3.5 (75.0%)</td>
<td>2.73 (1.213)</td>
<td>3b</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.3.a. Curb Boosters</td>
<td>#25</td>
<td>3.45 (63.6%)</td>
<td>3.4 (.955)</td>
<td>3b</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.3.a Exer. Pres. Comm. Powers</td>
<td>#33</td>
<td>3.42 (75.0%)</td>
<td>3.053 (1.059)</td>
<td>3a,1</td>
<td>1993,1984</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.5.a. Prior Approval - Outside Income</td>
<td>#21</td>
<td>3.42 (50.0%)</td>
<td>3.054 (.961)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.7. Institutional Funds to Athletics</td>
<td>#27</td>
<td>3.36 (45.5%)</td>
<td>3.12 (1.011)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.1 Mandatory Certification</td>
<td>#31</td>
<td>3.36 (54.5%)</td>
<td>2.965 (.906)</td>
<td>3a</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legislative Process†

1—implemented in substance  
2—partial implementation  
3a—legislation proposal  
3b—under study  
4—no action  
5—institutional or conference issue  
6—failed legislation
institutional funds to athletics are institutional issues. The other seven have had NCAA legislation passed, proposed, or under mandated study.

**Political Undercurrents**

As discussed in the Chapter 2 literature review, high conflict issues are important in policy-making. Although the present study did not identify these issues directly in the survey of "policy experts," disparate ratings of proposals by separate job categories may indicate conflict. At the very least, these provide evidence of different conceptions of the policies making up a reform model. Table 11 and Table 15--8 Least Significant Proposals--identify job class significance ratings and frequencies. In Table 11, those in roles which rated a recommendation below 2.5, or with fewer than 50% significant responses, were listed. In Table 15, those job classes above 3.0 or 75%, or below 2.0 or 40% were named.

The issues of compensation and authority appear to be two themes that underlie the disparate responses. One group’s gain is another’s loss. The Knight Commission recommendations calling for (1) the "NCAA to ban shoe equipment contracts with individual coaches" and (2) long-term contracts for coaches elicited noteworthy responses about the employment relationship between athletic coach and university. With the former issue, the presidents (3.33, 10-2) and media (3.25, 6-2) identified it as a significant issue, while coaches (2.0, 1-3) and athletic directors (2.11, 1-6), by a large majority, rated
Table 15 - 8 Least Significant Proposals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Significant Mean</th>
<th>Significant SD</th>
<th>Significant Essential %</th>
<th>Significant Essential Mean</th>
<th>Significant Essential SD</th>
<th>Significant Essential 3%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II.3.</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.1.</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.1.c</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.6.</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.5.</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.5.b</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.5.c</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Presidents (n=4)  
2. Athletic Directors (n=5)  
3. Conference Commissioners (n=7)  
4. Faculty Athletic Representatives (n=9)  
5. Athletic and Higher Ed. Organization Leaders (n=7)  
6. Media (n=5)  
7. Basketball and Football Coaches (n=6)
it as slightly significant or less. In the latter case, coaches (3.4, 4-1), higher education athletic organization leaders (3.17, 5-1), and presidents (2.92, 9-3) felt the issue was significant to reform, while faculty athletic representatives (2.22, 2-7) and athletic directors (2.11, 2-5) did not.

The Knight Commission recommendation urging presidents to control their institution’s involvement with commercial television was rated as significant by presidents (3.33, 10-2) and media (3.11, 6-3) but as less than slightly significant by conference commissioners (1.57, 2-5). Commercial television relations traditionally have been handled by the various conference offices.

Three Knight Commission recommendations increasing presidential authority were rated as slightly significant or less by a majority of the coaches surveyed. The coaches’ responses to board affirmation of presidential authority (1.6, 1-4), prior presidential approval for all athletics-related coaching income (1.75, 1-3), and presidential control of the NCAA (2.33, 2-3) reveal a departure from the Knight Commission’s emphasis on presidential control.

**Recommendation Structure and Feasibility**

The Knight Commission recommendations were identified in Table 10 by the form of their statement and the specificity of their language. The research interest pertains to differing effects that may have resulted from the structure of recommendations in the report. Fourteen recommendations were stated as
policy alternatives. Eleven of these 14 recommendations were stated with a high degree of specificity. The remaining three were moderately specific. Two of the three moderately-specific recommendations were institutional issues with the language allowing latitude for institutional differences.

Three recommendations could not be placed in Dunn’s (1981) categories of policy-relevant information, instead, taking the form of a goal statement directed to policy-makers. All three of these recommendations concern enforcing or maintaining policies or powers that existed when the 1991 report was written.

Some recommendations stop short of being a specific policy alternative. Ten of the 27 recommendations took the form of problem structuring or problem definition in which the important values to be included in a reform policy were identified by the 1991 report. Each of these ten recommendations employed a moderate or low degree of specificity in stating the preferred policy action. Ten Knight Commission recommendations structured the priorities of a potential policy without presenting a policy alternative. Nine of these currently are under mandated NCAA study or are institutional issues. This practice appears to permit the policy maker to formulate the specific policy alternative within the policy space defined by the Knight Commission.

The specific policy alternatives (see Table 16) were greater in the area of "academic integrity" (8 of 10 policy alternative, 6 of 10 high specificity). Table 13 shows that four of the high specificity recommendations have been
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Part II Survey Question</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>NCAA Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.3.a. Curb Boosters</td>
<td>#25</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>.955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.3.b. Centralize Revenue, Budget</td>
<td>#26</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>1.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.1.a. Core Curriculum</td>
<td>#2</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>.689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.5.a. Prior Approval - Outside Income</td>
<td>#21</td>
<td>3.054</td>
<td>.961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.4.a. Check Each Semester</td>
<td>#5</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>.934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.2. Cost of Attendance</td>
<td>#35</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.5.b. Ban Shoe Contracts</td>
<td>#23</td>
<td>2.792</td>
<td>1.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.1.b. Campus Visits</td>
<td>#15</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>.921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.1.c J.C. Proposition 48</td>
<td>#8</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>1.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.3. 5-year Scholarships</td>
<td>#18</td>
<td>2.204</td>
<td>.979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.2. Letter of Intent</td>
<td>no question</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Proposal specific to the Knight Commission recommendation either failed or was not moved. Alternative proposal passed implementing Knight Commission Recommendation in substance.

Legislative Process†
1—implemented in substance
2—partial implementation
3—a—legislation proposed
3b—under study
4—no action
5—institutional or conference issue
6—failed legislation
implemented in substance (37.5%) which is somewhat greater than the frequency for the total list (22.2%). In addition, the Knight Commission’s continuing eligibility recommendation, not listed as high in specificity, was implemented in substance. Interestingly, the frequency of highly specific policy alternatives was greatest in the area that headed the Presidents Commission’s 1992 convention agenda.

Table 17 lists the 11 Knight Commission recommendations in which more than 10% of the sample identified feasibility concerns. In six of the seven recommendations with the greatest number of concerns, the proposal has experienced no NCAA policy action or is primarily a conference or institutional issue. Of these eleven recommendations, six have been addressed by some NCAA policy action. The frequency of policy outcomes listed in Table 13 appears to be similar to the total list of recommendations.

**Impact/Outcome Summary**

Table 13 lists the frequency of outcomes by category for the total list of recommendations as well as five subordinate lists. The frequency of outcome in each sub-category paralleled the total list in outcome pattern. Little difference appears to exist in Table 13 that would explain why recommendations were acted upon.

The summary list in Table 13 indicates the overall NCAA outcome percentages by category. Sixty-three percent of the Knight Commission’s 27
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Part II Survey Question</th>
<th>Feasibility (n=58)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>NCAA Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency % of n</td>
<td>Mean SD</td>
<td>Legislative Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.3. 5-year Scholarships</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13 22.4%</td>
<td>2.204 .979</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.1.a 15 Core Courses</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12 20.7%</td>
<td>2.537 .926</td>
<td>1* 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.6. Long-term Coaching Contracts</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11 19.0%</td>
<td>2.63 .977</td>
<td>5 N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.5.a. Check Each Semester</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10 17.2%</td>
<td>2.96 .934</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.7. Institutional Funds to Athletes</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9 15.5%</td>
<td>3.12 .94</td>
<td>5 N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.5.b. Ban Shoe Contracts</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8 13.8%</td>
<td>2.792 1.044</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.5. TV Involvement</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8 13.8%</td>
<td>2.73 1.213</td>
<td>3b 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.5. Emphasize Graduation Rates</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7 12.1%</td>
<td>2.965 .906</td>
<td>3a 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.4. Review Revenue Sharing</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7 12.1%</td>
<td>2.855 1.193</td>
<td>3b 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.3.a. Curb Boosters</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6 10.3%</td>
<td>3.4 .955</td>
<td>3b 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.1.c. J.C. Proposition 48</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6 10.3%</td>
<td>2.48 1.096</td>
<td>1*.6 1992, 1992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Proposal specific to the Knight Commission recommendation either failed or was not moved. Alternative proposal passed implementing Knight Commission Recommendation in substance.

**Legislative Process**
1-implemented in substance 4-no action
2-partial implementation 5-institutional or conference issue
3a-legislation proposed 6-failed legislation
3b-under study
recommendations have been addressed by some form of NCAA policy action. Only 18.5% of the recommendations have had no action. On its face, this represents an impact worth noting. Yet, 37% of the Knight Commission recommendations are yet to be implemented in substance. Both 1993 and 1994 NCAA conventions contain issues that were rated as significant to full implementation of the reform model. In 1994, particularly, two of the top three recommendations (fiscal control) and four of the presidents top ten will be addressed. In addition, two of the top six recommendations are institutional issues (board affirmation and institutional funds to athletics).

The focus in the next chapter will be on the Knight Commission's formation.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Knight Commission Beginnings:

Contextual History, Stakeholders, and Formation

Chapter Overview

This historical narrative reconstructs the Knight Commission’s beginnings. The portion of the Commission’s life cycle covered in this chapter reviews the policy and political issues confronted by the Knight Commission, describes the Commission’s beginnings, and reflects upon the Commission’s purpose, reform approach, and composition. Data from the field research interviews and Knight Commission meeting transcripts and documents were analyzed, validated, and organized to address aspects within three of this study’s foci: (1) stakeholders and political elements, (2) contextual antecedents to reform, and (3) Knight Commission formation (operation).

These research interests are organized into four major sections: (1) previous athletic reform efforts, (2) the seeds of the Knight Commission, (3) Commission concept, compromise, and coalition, and (4) formation: reform approach, empowerment, and composition. Data concerning stakeholders and political elements are introduced at the point in which they become relevant. Each section orients information thematically within the life cycle of the Knight Commission. Priority is given to thematic relevance over temporal integrity.
Events within these sections appear in chronological order when appropriate to each theme, but overlap in event sequence occurs between sections.

**Previous Athletic Reform Efforts**

The relevant interactions among individual and organizational stakeholders provide a context for the beginnings of the Knight Commission. Three organizations—primary stakeholders in athletic governance—were involved, at some point, in efforts to make or reform intercollegiate athletic policy in the 85-year period prior to October, 1989, when the Knight Commission was formed. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the NCAA’s Presidents Commission, and the American Council on Education, along with their executives, formed the political elements that the Knight Foundation encountered when making the decision to empower the Knight Commission.

Knight Commission writer James Harvey summarized the early history of governance in college sports in a paper prepared for the Commission, then circulated in the Commission’s briefing books prior to the first full meeting of the Commission in January, 1990. Table 18 provides an overview of major attempts by the NCAA, ACE, and the Presidents Commission to control intercollegiate sports.

Events leading to the showdown between the ACE’s "Presidents Board" concept (Proposition 35) and the NCAA Select Committee’s "Presidents
Table 18: Selected Efforts by the NCAA, ACE, and NCAA Presidents Commission to Govern Intercollegiate Athletics

1905 President Theodore Roosevelt calls for an end to the brutality in college football.

1906 The organization that evolves into the NCAA is founded providing an amateur eligibility code for college sports.

1929 The Carnegie Foundation issues the Savage Report describing a corrupt athletic system and calling on presidents and faculty to act on their responsibility to uphold the "intellectual integrity" of the university.

1952 The NCAA membership enforce the first sanctions against rule violators when the University of Kentucky and Bradley University are placed on probation for the 1952-53 year.

1953 ACE convenes a presidential committee that calls for the abolition of spring football practice and bowl games.

1979 The Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics releases its report. ACE created the Commission with support from the Ford Foundation.

1982 ACE convenes an ad hoc Alliance of Presidents that develops Proposition 48 with the College Football Association and proposes an independent "Presidents Board."

1983 Proposition 48 enacted. NCAA Select Committee releases report calling for an NCAA "Presidents Commission."

1984 The Select Committee’s Presidents Commission proposal chosen over ACE’s "Presidents Board." ACE forms an Ad Hoc Committee to review Presidents Commission activities and advise on agenda.

1985 Presidents-sponsored "death penalty" approved.

1987 Presidents’ cost cutting proposals defeated.

1989 Proposition 42 enacted, but held in abeyance. Knight Foundation sponsors a Commission on Intercollegiate athletics.
1990  Prop. 42 revised; drug-testing approved; the publication of graduation rates approved; spring football and basketball season shortened. NCAA Executive Director Richard Schultz delivers "New Model" speech.

1991  Weekly time demands and season lengths regulated and reduced; cost cutting proposals enacted; some recruiting practices curtailed.

1992  Initial and continuing academic eligibility rules strengthened; prior approval of outside coaching income required; academic criteria applied to paid campus visit for recruits.

Note. Adapted from "The Search for a Clean and Level Playing Field: Efforts to Control Abuses in Intercollegiate Athletics" by James Harvey, 1990.
Commission" counterproposal (Proposition 36) at the 1984 NCAA convention delineate the earlier organizational history. The ACE’s proposal included greater authority for the presidents group than the NCAA’s—the power to veto, modify, or impose rules versus the current ability to propose legislation, order the agenda, commission studies, review Association activities, and advise the NCAA Council (NCAA, 1984; Sperber, 1990). The NCAA’s plan also kept their version within the NCAA structure maintaining control over staffing responsibilities. Antagonistic relationships and mistrust resulting from the decision (by NCAA paddle vote) to create the Presidents Commission instead of the Presidents Board remained in 1989. The exchanges between the leaders of the NCAA, Presidents Commission, and ACE bore immediate relevance to the seeds of the Knight Commission, the development of its purpose, and the selection of its Commissioners.

Both proposals were an effort to provide the presidents with greater control over athletic policy-making within an NCAA, which had become an "athletic directors’ organization" (personal communication [PC], March, 1992). In theory,

the NCAA is a president’s organization. I [the president] have to sign off and pay the bills, but it is the one organization that nobody bothered with. The history of bad relations goes back to [former NCAA Executive Director] Walter Byers...[who] kept the educators out of it...by running
a byzantine empire too complex for any outside group to understand. Therefore, the inside group could maintain control. (PC, January, 1992) The result was "athletics programs [that] operated almost independently of the institution" (PC, January, 1992).

The ACE initiated its ad hoc reform committee, the Alliance of Presidents, during a Capitol Hill conversation (c. 1981-2) between University of North Carolina president William Friday--later to be Knight Commission co-Chair--and Harvard University president Derek Bok. Friday said to Bok, "We're going to have to start paying attention to intercollegiate sports again" (PC, March, 1992). Friday's concern was energized by a Sunday Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) basketball game which started, in his opinion, too close to the end of church. Both presidents got in touch with then-ACE President Jack Pelkerson who initiated the process that formed the Alliance of Presidents.

Prior to the 1984 defeat of their "Presidents Board" concept, the Alliance of Presidents succeeded in teaming with the College Football Association (CFA) in 1983 to gain enactment of the highly controversial Proposition 48 that significantly increased initial eligibility standards. Indeed the NCAA Presidents Commission itself, formed in 1984, was a partial victory for the ACE's presidents group. Although their original proposal (1984-Proposition 35) was not adopted, a structure was developed to increase presidential authority within the NCAA. With their defeat on the Presidents Board concept and the formation of an NCAA Presidents Commission (with the ratification of
Proposition 36), the Alliance of Presidents disbanded after the 1984 NCAA convention. In addition to Friday, three other Knight Commissioners served on that ACE committee: Notre Dame President and Knight Commission co-Chair Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) Chancellor Charles E. Young, and Penn State University President Bryce Jordan.

The interests of Robert H. Atwell, who assumed the office of ACE president during the Alliance of Presidents period, became increasingly important to ACE-NCAA relations following the 1984 NCAA convention. Atwell "was very, very supportive of a [Presidents Board] Commission that would have veto power over committees and that sort of thing in the NCAA" (PC, January, 1992). As a result, the NCAA Presidents Commission, which did not have veto power, was not highly favored by Atwell or the ACE. In addition, the ACE’s 1979 Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics study process provided then-ACE Vice President Atwell with material for a monograph, *The Money Game: Financing of Collegiate Athletics* (co-authored with Bruce Grimes and Donna A. Lopiano), that raised issues of financial integrity.

In 1985, after the first year of the NCAA Presidents Commission, ACE initiated another ad hoc committee to review the Presidents Commission work and advise them on reform matters. Chancellor Young chaired this committee. In a Kansas City meeting after the 1985 special convention, Young, Atwell, and others proposed an agenda for the Presidents Commission urging more active
reform. "ACE felt the Presidents Commission wasn’t getting the job done" (PC, January, 1992).

Attempts by the ACE political system to bring change within the NCAA’s policy-making auspices were poorly received. Little evidence exists that the NCAA or its Presidents Commission heeded the advice. As one Knight Commissioner stated: "At one time there was a general feeling that ACE was trying to get involved beyond its scope in athletics and that might be better left to the NCAA to handle alone" (PC, January, 1992). The result: loss of authority by the ACE with regard to NCAA matters. Another Knight Commissioner said: "[The NCAA] felt, with good reason, that there was a fair amount of resentment within the NCAA of the ACE’s role, that the ACE was trying to take over the NCAA" (PC, January, 1992). In the mid to late 1980s, Bob Atwell and ACE retreated from formal attempts to influence athletic policy-making.

One result of this history was the creation of two camps of reform-minded presidents and organization administrators, each defined by its support for the 1984 Presidents Commission decision. By 1987, the uneven fortunes--Prop 48 and "death penalty" successes tempered by defeat at 1987 special convention on cost-cutting proposals--of the Presidents Commission exacerbated a feeling of inter-organizational conflict--"a harking back to [the 1984 defeat]"--among "those who lost out on the [ACE’s Presidents Board]. Communication between NCAA and ACE was bad. People in NCAA had some
pretty clear ideas that ACE was bad and people in ACE had equally clear ideas that NCAA was bad" (PC, January, 1992). The ACE camp envisioned greater presidential control. The NCAA leadership, though, supported its Presidents Commission despite the fact that "it was difficult to get enough presidents interested and in many institutions, the board of control [trustees] got involved so the president really didn’t have the proper authority to do the things that needed to be done" (PC, January, 1992).

In this context were the seeds of the Knight Commission sown. The Commission’s strategy and composition bear a direct relationship to these previous reform efforts.

The Seeds of the Knight Commission

Events occurring in the 2-3 year period prior to the empowerment of the Knight Commission in Fall 1989 provided the seeds for the Commission’s mission, composition, strategy, and, ultimately, its impact. The confluence of people, values, solutions, problem definition, and decision opportunities tilted the balance away from the status quo in college sports policy-making. The mix of participants changed within the NCAA, ACE, and the Presidents Commission--thus, altering the character of the political landscape and providing a "policy window" within which reform might be possible. It was only upon identifying these ingredients for change that the Knight Foundation committed $2 million and the Knight Commission was born.
The rational image of a reform commission would suggest that an antecedent condition, a stressor, from the environment would cause the need for study by an independent group. The purpose of the commission would be to identify optimal policy options for implementation. While this perspective might be applied to the precursors of the Knight Commission, it does not address the central question of timing. If the problems in college athletics had been identified repeatedly during the past 100 years, why, in 1989, empower a commission to cure the problems of this system? A simplified cause-effect explanation would blur the convergence of significant factors and serve more as a post hoc rationalization than explanation. This subsection addresses the exchanges and interactions that together made the time right for a reform commission.

New participants became important within the NCAA, ACE, and Presidents Commission. Perhaps no change was more dramatic than with the leadership shift of the NCAA. In 1987, Richard Schultz—a Knight Commissioner—replaced Walter Byers as NCAA Executive Director. Schultz brought an awareness of the presidents’ agenda, professional experience at universities that stressed the primacy of academics over athletics, and a proactive managerial approach. One Presidents Commissioner attributed to Schultz the accelerated pace of reform and increased viability of the Presidents Commission during the four years prior to 1991. "There has been a
fundamental shift in the NCAA’s political process...Dick Schultz is the key to all this [change]" (PC, August, 1991).

The Presidents Commission had veto power over the selection of Byers’ successor. Schultz had been athletic director at the University of Virginia, an institution that Gilley and Hickey (1985) cited as having an exemplary athletic program, with a tradition of institutional control. His two positions before Virginia: Athletic Director at Cornell University and Assistant to the President at the University of Iowa. He valued institutional integrity for both higher education entities and the NCAA. Indeed, at 58, he brought a leadership approach to the NCAA that was described by a Knight Commission leader:

He wanted the job only as long as he could do some good for the [organization]...When we first talked, I thought, ‘Here is a courageous, enlightened guy who wanted to do the right thing’...He has a tough damn job, a lot of constituencies to balance and bring along. He can’t get too far out in front or he won’t have his job. (PC, January, 1992)

In the wake of Schultz’s hire, the NCAA bureaucracy had started to develop a gentle momentum in contrast to the torpidity of the Byers’ years.

Within the Presidents Commission, the composition of the membership began to change. During the Byers era, the selection of Presidents Commissioners in 1984 had omitted some of the Alliance of Presidents most visible members, notably North Carolina’s President Friday and UCLA’s Chancellor Young. Under Schultz, 1987-88, new members brought renewed
interest, vigor, and resolve to a presidents group that had been defeated in the 1987 special convention in Dallas. Nebraska Chancellor Martin Massengale--a Knight Commissioner--replaced Maryland's John Slaughter as the Presidents Commission Chair. Among the newer members were subsequent Knight Commissioners Young, Wake Forest President Thomas K. Hearn, and Utah President Chase N. Peterson. Each of these four valued institutional integrity and a reformed athletic system that included academic integrity and institutional control.

Under Massengale's leadership, in 1989 and 1990, the Presidents Commission developed a new agenda and addressed policy issues such as initial eligibility standards, graduation rates, and the length of the basketball season and spring football practice. This renewed activity, although not readily apparent in early 1989, indicated that the Presidents Commission was developing the technical understanding of its constitutional powers within the NCAA to reemerge from the Dallas defeat as an effective force for reform.

The final new participant emerged from the ACE. In 1988, Ithaca College President James J. Whalen--a subsequent Knight Commissioner--became the Chair of ACE's Board of Directors after serving on the Board for six years. Whalen had special knowledge of the three organizations--ACE, NCAA, and NCAA Presidents Commission. He knew the NCAA as a charter member and Division III chair of the Presidents Commission.
Whalen’s vision was to close the gap between academics and athletics by moving the NCAA into the circle of higher education organizations—which includes ACE—in Washington. Along with Auburn University President Wilford Bailey, Whalen regarded Schultz’s emergence as NCAA Executive Director as an opportunity for change, a chance to bring the NCAA into the higher education establishment. In 1987, a luncheon, arranged by Whalen and hosted by Bailey, included Atwell, Schultz, and Slaughter. The agenda was to "set a new foundation between the NCAA and ACE for mutual effort." The meeting "led to more productive times" (PC, January, 1992). In 1988, Schultz spoke at the ACE convention and Atwell at the NCAA convention. The process to include the NCAA in regular meetings of academic organizations had been initiated.

Despite the closer relationship developing between the NCAA and ACE, the problems in college sports still dominated reform progress in the view of the national media, the public, and many in higher education. When assessing the effectiveness of the Presidents Commission, the number of scandals, public opinion, and the posture of university presidents seemed to be signs the status quo still held. Systemic problems existed and the situation was "out of control" (Harris, 1989).

In early 1989 little evidence existed that effective reform would be possible through the NCAA or the Presidents Commission. Proposition 42 (restricting athletic aid to Prop 48 partial and non-qualifiers) provided the only
positive indication of the Presidents Commission’s influence; though, even this was highly controversial. The vociferous opposition of Georgetown’s John Thompson and Temple’s John Chaney resulted in the passage of revised version at the 1990 NCAA convention.

Recruiting and academic scandals were occurring and being reported in the media at an alarming rate. The Chronicle of Higher Education noted that over 50% of the 106 Division I-A institutions had been sanctioned, reprimanded, or censured during the 1980s (Lederman, 1990a). As one Knight Commissioner stated: “Watching the Chronicle, you couldn’t help but notice how many universities were getting involved [in scandals] and who they were” (PC, March, 1992). The NCAA’s policy of stiffer penalties for rules violations was applied not just to renegade programs, but to major state and private universities such as Maryland, Georgia, Southern Methodist, Kansas, Southern California, and Kentucky.

The problem for the university administrator was exacerbated by the popularity of college sports. The economy of "big-time" college athletic programs depended upon the entertainment revenues produced from gate receipts, television, and booster donations. Media exposure built a legion of college sports consumers whose interest in higher education started with the entertainment it provided. Conventional wisdom held that this public interest would be turned on a president who threatened to scale down the entertainment aspect of the athletic enterprise. "People who sell short [exploit]
the student-athletes count on the idea that the public was interested in sports" (PC, March, 1992). Presidential neglect, in part, stemmed from the impotence of the central administration in the face of this threat. As one former president and Knight Commissioner noted: "Public opinion is a very powerful thing" (PC, March, 1992).

**Commission Concept, Compromise, and Coalition**

These problems, decision opportunities, and stakeholder relationships provided the context in which the concept for the Knight Commission was cultivated. The development of the idea for the Knight Commission, the organization of the political and financial resources, and the compromise and creation of a coalition between the primary stakeholders--ACE, NCAA, and NCAA Presidents Commission (The validity of treating the latter two as separate stakeholders is supported by the central thrust of athletic governance reform: getting the president into legitimate control of college sports. As mentioned, the NCAA was considered an athletic administrator’s organization, unaffected by presidential interests.)--indicate an evolution in the organizational climates that invigorated athletic reform efforts. This evolution in climate, though, occurred through a conscious attempt to build a coalition. The activities and concerns of the three organizations provide a context to better understand their eventual compromise and alliance.
In early 1989, ten years after the ACE-created Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics and seven years after Bill Friday, Derek Bok, and ACE initiated the Alliance of Presidents, no consensus on athletic governance reform existed among the NCAA, NCAA Presidents Commission, and ACE. The relationships among, and the policy beliefs held within, the three organizations were influenced by the political histories discussed in the earlier sections.

In 1988-89, Dick Schultz was characterizing the problems in intercollegiate sports as a public relations problem resulting from a few "bad apples." Schultz’s 1990 "New Model" speech, which marked change in NCAA posture--and introduced several reform recommendations that were later included in the Knight Commission report--was not delivered until the eve of the first Knight Commission meeting.

During that period, the Presidents Commission’s concerns revolved around developing a workable agenda and consolidating the power to implement it. Any outside group which opposed the Presidents Commission’s efforts was perceived as a threat by diluting the presidents’ limited focus and attention.

In contrast to Schultz’s position of 1988-89, Bob Atwell and ACE still perceived the problems in college athletics as systemic. The solution required a significant adjustment to its system of governance, one beyond the Presidents Commission’s capacity.
The commission-as-solution concept developed informally within the old ACE presidents group. North Carolina's Bill Friday, as with the Alliance of Presidents, is credited with the idea, set in motion the action to form a reform commission, and then assembled the political and financial resources to insure its operation.

The concept of an independent commission to study intercollegiate athletics was developed further by Friday and Atwell during monthly informal telephone conversations that had taken place since the early 1980s. During one or more of those phone calls in early 1989, Friday discussed the idea of an independent commission with Bob Atwell. As an early participant reflected: "If there was a father to this [commission], it was Bill Friday. Friday and Atwell were involved from the beginning" (PC, March, 1992).

The commission concept became a new approach to act on an old motive: "There was no force talking to the disciplining of intercollegiate athletics...[ACE] didn't have any way to get anything done...there was too much animosity out there...that is why [ACE] went outside" (PC, March 1992). Another interviewee concurred: "My guess is that Bob Atwell would say, 'We wanted to, by an indirect method, launch something that would serve that purpose [outsider reform influence] without the ACE being out there directly involved in carrying the ACE flag'" (PC, January, 1992). This individual included the Knight Commission--with the two ACE ad hoc reform committees led by Bok and Young--as an ACE sponsored reform activity. The commission-
as-solution provided Friday and Atwell with new choice opportunities (Cohen & March, 1974) in which to air their issues and concerns.

The independent commission approach became a solution looking for a sponsor. The conversations between Friday and Atwell, at some point, led to ACE’s work in estimating a projected commission budget. The degree to which the commission-as-solution approach had been developed is reinforced by the fact that the budget for the proposed project had been estimated prior to or shortly after the initial contact with the Knight Foundation. In addition, the Ford Foundation was approached informally as a potential sponsor prior to Knight Foundation. The amount of forethought given to the commission concept by the Friday and Atwell suggests that an evolving concept included project size and scope while being marketed to foundations.

During the same time period in early 1989, Friday engaged pollster Louis Harris in a long discussion about the state of intercollegiate athletics. Harris, an old friend, an avid sports fan, was a North Carolina alumnus. Friday introduced Harris to his idea of a commission to study intercollegiate athletics. Harris, like Friday, believed that college sports were "out of control" (Harris’ term) and that the lack of academic qualifications so apparent in many high profile student-athletes reflected negatively upon institutional integrity.

Harris’ subsequent actions redefined the problem configuration, permitting greater presidential activism in leading reform. Prior to Harris’ involvement, presidents, athletic personnel, and boosters interpreted the
significant public interest in college sports as a mandate for bolstering their operations without regard to their discipline. In a poll, Harris’ (1989) results reflected a far different public perception. He found that the vast majority of people felt that college sports were out of control, that scandals undermined institutional integrity, and that colleges and universities were not prepared to fix the problems.

Harris’ data engendered a profound effect upon strategic-level administrators and changed the reform landscape. The poll was interpreted in two ways that raised the ardor of the university presidents and heightened interest in a reform commission. First, the poll revealed that public opinion about athletics revolved around entertainment and integrity. The interest in the entertainment feature of the game existed independent of the belief that college sports operated with integrity. This discovery subsequently provided a mandate to address the causes of the scandals. Second, the results linked the operation of college sports directly to the integrity of higher education as an institution. Flagging public support translated into declining public funds which, in turn, threatened the institution itself. Persistence behavior, to preserve public support for higher education in general, explained the activism this conclusion produced.

At that point, Bill Friday, employing another political resource, turned to the Knight Foundation’s Education Advisory Board, of which he was a member. The Knight Foundation, founded in 1950 by newspaper magnates John S. and
James L. Knight, had in 1990 assets of almost $600 million from which grants of $23.5 million had been extended. It provides financial resources for four major programs: (1) the Cities Program supports cultural programs in cities in which Knight-Ridder owns newspapers; (2) the Journalism program underwrites activities that advance a free press; (3) the Higher Education program makes challenge grants to independent liberal arts colleges; and, (4) the Arts and Culture program encourages creativity and innovation. The Foundation’s interest in intercollegiate athletics evolved from its interest in Higher Education.

In 1988, Creed Black assumed the position of Knight Foundation President. Black’s experiences as publisher of the Lexington (Ky.) Herald-Leader provided an intimate knowledge of the scandals occurring in college sports. Under his tenure, the newspaper won a Pulitzer Prize for a series of articles on abuses in the University of Kentucky’s men’s basketball program. The passion with which those articles were received—Black received death threats—and other national stories helped to shape his belief that athletics had become a national scandal threatening the integrity of higher education.

After an early 1989 meeting of his Educational Advisory Board, Black discussed the “terrible scandals in college athletics” with Friday. Friday suggested that a foundation like Knight could perform a real service by studying the issues and proposing a reform agenda. Because of Black’s experience in Lexington, Kentucky, his interest was aroused.
During the next half year, Black "spent a good deal of time" to determine whether it warranted a $2 million expenditure. Black discussed the possibility with many educational and athletic leaders. He was concerned about whether a commission could accomplish anything. Yet much evidence indicated that the timing was right. The common response: "If it was 4 years ago [I] would have told you that you were foolish, but now [the commission] is needed" (PC, March, 1992).

Black collected names for possible commissioners and, more importantly, appraised the elements of reform coalition. "Creed Black did a very fine job of talking to a lot of people before selecting people to that commission. It was clear people were being honest with him about who was in what camp [ACE or NCAA]. He picked people who were willing to have a balanced point of view...The way he put people together...it helped Bob [Atwell (ACE)], it helped the Presidents Commission, and it helped NCAA to feel more comfortable that it was going to be a study, not a group that was going to challenge the Presidents Commission" (PC, January, 1992).

The most important meeting in which consensus was developed on an independent reform commission’s purpose occurred in ACE’s 1 DuPont Circle offices in June of 1989. Jim Whalen called the meeting because of his desire to develop commonality between the NCAA, Presidents Commission, and the ACE. In addition, "there was no trust there [between the groups]" because of earlier ACE reform attempts (PC, January, 1992). "People don’t have
information and suddenly hear there is going to be a commission. They think, ‘What for? Atwell is behind that,’ and if Atwell is behind it, then NCAA is going to get paranoid” (PC, January, 1992). Concern existed in the NCAA that ACE might be on a divergent path. "Whalen wanted more harmony and unanimity between the groups than was there, and it looked like they could be going in different directions. So, he thought we should get together” (PC, January, 1992).

The meeting at ACE began the process of cross-fertilization between reform-minded organizations and reduced the existing tensions between political systems. "Jim Whalen was very key in bringing together in an appropriate way [the right people] so that, if a commission came together, the direction it would take [would be clear]” (PC, January, 1992). Attending the meeting were NCAA representatives Dick Schultz and Albert Witte, then NCAA President and long-time University of Arkansas Faculty Athletic Representative; Massengale from the Presidents Commission; Whalen and Atwell from ACE; and Friday and Black from the Knight Foundation. "It was interesting that everybody showed. I guess it was one of those meeting where you couldn’t afford not to be there” (PC, January, 1992). Whalen chaired the meeting and put forward two concerns: (1) the need to understand the intention to form a commission and (2) the intended goals and working strategy of the commission, particularly with respect to the NCAA Presidents Commission.
"The group pulled together to discuss the idea...[They] left the meeting with increased trust and understanding...People of good will saying they had no intention of [challenging the Presidents Commission]...It was a very important meeting" (PC, January, 1992). The meeting covered the Lou Harris study and the Chronicle of Higher Education articles about Division I-A programs receiving NCAA disciplinary action. "Everybody realized that something had to be done...what [the NCAA] was fearful of was who would do it" (PC, March, 1992). Bill Friday and Creed Black, nonetheless, had standing credibility with Schultz and Massengale. An understanding was reached that if the Knight Foundation funded the commission, "it would be a good composition" (PC, January, 1992). Friday assured the two NCAA groups that the intention was to be helpful and work with the NCAA. Black and Friday's recognition that an independent group lacked legitimate authority supported the need for cooperation: "'This commission in itself, and of itself, doesn't have the authority to do anything’" (PC, January, 1992).

In a follow-up meeting among Schultz, Witte, and Black in Akron, Black revealed more detail about his purpose for the commission. The commission could come up with recommendations, build public support by calling some attention to the problem, "create the kind of climate where some things could happen [by] strengthen[ing] the hands of the people [the NCAA and Presidents Commission] who are trying to do something about this" (PC, January, 1992). Black made it clear that a Knight Commission would attempt to develop and
increase authority for a reform agenda within the NCAA’s policy-making system and had no interest in going into business in opposition to the NCAA. By the end of the meeting, Schultz provided suggestions for commissioners including some who were on the Presidents Commission. Of greater import, Black obtained Schultz’s commitment to be a Commissioner.

The Knight Foundation, through Creed Black’s efforts and the involvement of participants—mostly new representatives since 1984—from the NCAA, Presidents Commission and ACE, provided a new umbrella under which old adversaries could coexist and compromise. The three central stakeholders began to develop a coalition around a set of common understandings. The consensus formed around these four core beliefs:

1. recognizing that the problems in intercollegiate athletics needed attention;
2. affirming the NCAA as the policy-making body for athletics;
3. committing to uphold the student-athlete concept; and,
4. acknowledging the core value of institutional integrity and the belief that the athletic program is a part of the university.

**Formation: Reform Approach, Empowerment, and Composition**

With a coalition of reform-minded organizations beginning to form around shared understandings and values, Black shifted his attention to obtaining the Knight Foundation Board’s authorization. This process spanned two board meetings and three months. The second half of Black’s meetings to assess the
timing and potential effectiveness of a commission occurred in the intervening time period. The judgements resulting from this stage in the Knight Commission's life cycle directly affected the Commission's impact. These judgements determined or influenced the commission leadership, political change strategy, commission composition, commission scope, study approach, staff functions and quality, and the structure of the reform model proposed by the Knight Commission. Many of the visible actions of the Commission owe their genesis to the strategy developed in this time span.

Once Black began to work on the commission concept, he sounded out the idea with Knight Foundation staff familiar to and trusted by Board Chairman James L. Knight. Following the watershed meeting at ACE, Black invited Friday and Atwell to the June meeting of the Knight Foundation Board. They presented the problems in college sports as well as the purpose and scope of the proposed commission. Black was authorized to investigate the idea in greater depth and make a recommendation at the Board's next meeting in September.

Finding the right leadership for the commission was Black's next agenda. The names of Bill Friday and Father Ted Hesburgh kept coming up in Black's early conversations. Both were "elder statesmen" who had long and honored tenures as presidents at universities with reputations for athletic success and institutional integrity. North Carolina, during Friday's 30 years, had arguably the finest big-time basketball program. Notre Dame, during Hesburgh's 35
years, had arguably the most esteemed major college football program. Friday had been involved from the beginning, but Hesburgh was still to be recruited.

Black flew to South Bend to meet with Father Hesburgh. Hesburgh supported the idea of a commission but initially declined the invitation to be a leader and participant. He had other interests and commitments that held higher priorities. Yet, "what he said early on was prescient and has guided the Commission since" (PC, March, 1992). Hesburgh related his experience on the Civil Rights Commission (CRC). He attributed part of the CRC’s success, in terms of its recommendations being implemented, to its continued existence as a commission after its report was released. The dialogue about college athletics between Black and Hesburgh reportedly focused on the elements of academic integrity, financial integrity, certification, and the importance of presidential control. Finally, while taking Black to the airport, after a three-hour-plus meeting, Hesburgh agreed to be the commission chair "because it meant so much to him" (PC, January, 1992). After spending his entire life in an academic institution, the integrity of the academic institution concerned him.

Although this study uncovered equivocal or incomplete evidence about a projected budget’s detail, the structure, activities and costs of the commission plans were coming into focus by the end of the series of meetings that included the one at ACE in Washington, DC; Schultz and Witte in Akron; Atwell, Friday and Black in Miami; and Hesburgh and Black in South Bend. The budgeted figure of $2 million included: (1) operating expenses for the
commission and staff that would extend a year beyond the publication of their findings and recommendations; (2) hiring the highest quality consultants to write the report (James Harvey, author of many commission reports including *A Nation at Risk*), to publicize the findings (the Manhattan public relations firm of Hill and Knowlton), and to study the constituents’ and public’s opinions (Lou Harris); and, (3) the cost to put out a first class report, to ensure it gained public attention.

With Bill Friday’s, Ted Hesburgh’s, and Dick Schultz’s commitments, Creed Black went back to the Knight Foundation Board. He recommended that they empower the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics. The Board approved. The mission statement, written by Creed Black, developed from the Board’s empowerment and conversations with Board Chairman Jim Knight. Mr. Knight made it clear that the Commission’s purpose was not to oppose college sports: The Knight Foundation believed sports had a place within higher education. The mission of the Knight Commission would be to attempt to put college sports back in balance.

The scope included investigating ways to reform college athletics *within* the existing organizational structures. From its very beginning, the Knight Commission narrowed its investigation to directions that did not call for radical restructuring of the system.

When the Knight Foundation’s financial backing became official, the leadership triumvirate (henceforth referred to as the Commission leadership)--
Hesburgh, Friday, and Black--refined the Knight Commission’s focus and problem structure. In essence, these men focused their attention on ways to manipulate the policy space (see definitions in Appendix A) to include higher education values. When interviewing a Commission staffer (when specificity is not required the full-time Commission staff and the Commission’s consultants are referred to as "staff" to protect their anonymity), Black and Hesburgh made it clear that: "The Commission was going to be an effort to reconcile the values of higher education with the practices and activities of college sports" (PC, March, 1992). "The key was to come up with a clear concept, keep it simple, and away from peripheral issues" (PC, February, 1992).

The Harris data provided the first element of the problem structure by establishing a negative relationship between the problems in college sports and the institutional integrity of colleges and universities. The second element, the core principles of the 1 + 3 model that was subsequently recommended by the Commission (see Appendix E for the executive summary of the 1991 report), was created by Father Hesburgh and revised by both Friday and Black. "The early vision for the Commission, although not as concrete as it would later become, included the whole 1 + 3 model. It conceptually was already there in Father Hesburgh’s mind. That was the vision also embraced by Creed Black and Bill Friday but their view of things might have been a little wider ranging. They weren’t quite as focused or set in stone, but quite comfortable with using that as a beginning framework" (PC, March, 1992).
The principles of academic integrity, financial integrity, and certification appeared in Hesburgh and Friday's Joint Statement (see Appendix D for full text) released at the October 1989 press conference announcing the Knight Commission. Father Hesburgh's philosophy about the endeavor, expressed publicly in his opening comments of the Commission's first meeting, was captured in the Latin phrase he quoted: "prima in intensioni ultima inexactichoni," meaning "where you'd like to get or where you're going to get at the end of the whole exercise somehow has to be in your mind at the beginning of the exercise" (KF, 1990, p. 6). The degree to which this philosophy and these principles operated in the planning, operation, and outcomes was an important element in the Knight Commission's endeavors.

The Commission leadership hired its staff, plus consultants, in the period surrounding the press conference. The "ideology of the Commission was to drive the staff and not vice versa" (PC, March, 1992). Christopher Morris came aboard as Staff Director by agreeing to this criterion. As described by a Commission leader, Morris was "confident, intelligent, committed to this [project] with good experience in the field...the very best you could find" (PC, February, 1992). Morris's background included athletic administration work in institutions--such as Davidson, Yale, and Harvard--with a reputation of institutional control regarding athletics. Hesburgh also appointed Roger Valdeserri to be his assistant. Valdeserri, as a long time Notre Dame athletic
administrator, possessed far-reaching contacts in the intercollegiate athletic world.

Morris then hired Maureen Devlin as Assistant Staff Director. Devlin had worked previously in the NCAA. She brought many contacts within that bureaucracy that proved useful. As a Harvard alumnae, Devlin knew Morris previously. Jim Harvey, who had worked on an earlier higher education commission with Bill Friday, was hired as the Staff Writer. Lou Harris, who knew Creed Black and Bill Friday, was retained to do a study prior to the release of the final report. Finally, the professional staff was completed by contracting the services of Hill and Knowiton to handle publicity and the release of the report.

The Commission composition and the political strategy to implement the Commission recommendations interacted with one another. Black, Friday, and Hesburgh worked together to select Commissioners. The Commission leadership agreed that:

If the [university] president [is] going to be in control, then you had to have presidents on the Commission...[we] needed to get [university] presidents involved if we were going to do anything about the problem...the first consensus was that there would be 11 or 12 college presidents [who] had the problem. (PC, February, 1992)

The assumption was that since the problems were occurring in Division I-A institutions, the presidents should come from those schools. "We had to
build the Commission around people who knew something about this problem and were close to it" (PC, January, 1992). "We only put on the Commission people who had [knowledge of the] problem, unless they had another connection or quality...such as ACE, AGB (Association of Governing Boards), advertising, [or] trustee...All were carefully chosen" (PC, February, 1992).

The political strategy included appointing Commissioners who had standing in other policy-making organizations. These cross-boundary members represented Division I-A conferences (the Division I-A presidents), NCAA Presidents Commission (Massengale, Hearn, Peterson, and Young), ACE (Whalen), AGB (Huck), NAAE (National Association of Alumni Executives) (Dibbert), Congress (McMillan), and the U.S. Olympic Committee (Walker). The higher education secretariat was represented by Commissioners who were active in NASULGC (National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges), AAU (American Association of Universities), NAICU (National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities) and other higher education organizations. Knight Commissioners Dibbert, Young, and Whalen held board positions for NAAE, AAU, and NAICU, respectively, and Commissioner DiBiaggio was recognized within NASUCLGC. The leadership tried
to put people of influence on the Commission who could have some impact in seeing some of these things [recommendations] implemented.

A [college] president on the Presidents Commission would be a person
who was someone with stature who represented a major constituency...someone from the Big 10, Pac 10, ACC. Individuals [were selected] from other spheres of influence...[to] try to impact those [spheres]. (PC, January, 1992)

This "cross-fertilization" strategy served several purposes beyond insuring effective implementation. This approach was believed to--and eventually did--promote acceptance by and communication with the different groups. The wariness of the Presidents Commission about the Knight Commission provides an example:

Including a number of Presidents Commission members alleviated [their] concern and was a very good strategy. [It was] why the Presidents Commission was able to be comfortable with them and work with them to a very high level. (PC, January, 1992)

The approach lent the Commission a mantle of credibility; the "people on the Commission...because of their presence, demanded the respect of their peers" (PC, January, 1992). The selection strategy was summarized by one Commissioner: "He [Black] reached the conclusion that if you get the right people with impeccable integrity and fixed in some political power in higher education...it was worth spending the money" (PC, January, 1992).

The leadership also made good on the commitment to include "broad representation of people, either directly or indirectly involved in college athletics" (PC, January, 1992). The Knight Commission's composition included
representatives from the camps representing the old ACE-NCAA rivalry; whose boundaries had been blurred by time, changing participants, and individual beliefs. Although the two principals, Atwell and Byers, were not included, the Commission did include Whalen from ACE, Young, Friday, Hesburgh, and Jordan from Bok’s Alliance of Presidents. The Presidents Commission and NCAA also had members included, Schultz, Massengale, Hearn, Young, and Peterson.

This representation also "[made] sure we didn’t have a Commission made up of all white males. We wanted some blacks and women" (PC, January, 1992). Clifton Wharton (TIAA-CREF), LeRoy Walker (U. S. Olympic Committee), Donna Shalala (University of Wisconsin-Madison), and Jane Pfeiffer (NBC) provided a measure of diversity.

Beyond the considerations of political representation, the Knight Commission composition included four unifying characteristics. Each Commissioner: (1) was known to one of the leadership group, (2) considered the situation in college athletics to be a problem, (3) believed that college athletics should be maintained, and (4) believed in institutional integrity with athletics being placed in an appropriate role within the educational institution.

The longevity and high quality of the relationships between the leadership and Knight Commissioners and among Commissioners was an important contributor to the Commission’s success. This characteristic was explained by a Commissioner:
In any institutional context, there are those who say [there is a] good old boy network, but it is something that is beyond that frequently. When there are issues, problems, [etcetera], that one wants to address, you inevitably will reach out to those you know who will participate and make a contribution. If you have been in previous settings with them in similar circumstances, you feel positive about what they have done, you naturally think about involving them. It is a very natural thing...[Friday was on one of my projects]...Why? I knew Bill Friday. I knew what Bill would bring to the party. I knew exactly what he would share. (PC, March, 1992)

The composition of the Knight Commission did not include constituencies at the operational level: athletic directors, faculty athletic representatives (FAR), coaches, student-athletes, conference commissioners, or faculty senate members. The decision to have a series of hearings with most of these groups "was an alternative way to get representation...There is always someone left off. It depends on what you want to achieve and how fast" (PC, March, 1992). "We considered having an advisory committee of different groups, but [it was] too bureaucratic and cumbersome. Instead, we called the groups in..." (PC, January, 1992).

These hearings, in turn, became the study process discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Knight Commission Operation: Processes and Politics

Chapter Overview

This chapter provides insight into the issues addressed by the Knight Commission, describes its activities and procedures, and offers linkages between operation and result. It is organized into two major sections: (I.) structural processes and (II.) political processes. General interests included Commission organization, problem study approaches, influence and political behaviors, decision making, communication, and report writing and release. The events comprising Knight Commission's processes and politics were organized to address the Commission's operation and to provide connections between operation and outcomes--two of this study's five foci.

The data about the Knight Commission's operation were analyzed and validated from the field research interviews (anonymity was a precondition for the interview) and Knight Commission meeting transcripts and documents. Data concerning stakeholders and political elements appeared in Chapter 7. Additional information is introduced when necessary.

The major sections divide the Knight Commission's operation into two processes to explicate and clarify the considerable amount of information. The purpose was to provide meaningful explanation, not insure complete independence of one process from another. In addition, sub-sections orient
data thematically within the life cycle of the Knight Commission. Priority was given to thematic relevance over temporal integrity. Events within these subsections were presented in chronological order when appropriate, but event sequence overlap occurs between subsections. Tables 19 and 20, which follow, present a chronological depiction of major events during the Knight Commission’s first two years and the report writing process.

I. Structural Processes

Section Overview

The structural processes section divides into three subsections: pre-study planning by the Knight Commission leadership, the problem study, decision making, report writing, and release. Giving a tangible set of activities within which the other types of processes occur is one purpose of this section.

Pre-Study Planning by the Knight Commission Leadership

The Knight Commission leadership--Creed Black, Bill Friday, and Ted Hesburgh--made eight decisions, either explicitly or tacitly, about the Commission’s operation, during a series of meetings in October/November of 1989. They become important because of their effect on the Commission’s work and because they were made before the Commission began deliberations. The first four relate to strategic direction--goals, focus, and approach--of the
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Commission. The second four reflect operational plans. These resolves shaped many of the subsequent Commission processes and outcomes.

First, the purpose of the Knight Commission was "to set out to restore the integrity of higher education and [address] the problems being created by the abuses and scandals" (PC, January, 1992). The crucial measure of this "integrity" was public opinion. "Most [Commissioners] were terribly concerned about public opinion" (PC, March, 1992).

The activities of the Commission were directed toward making symbolic impact—to affect public opinion—and were intended to create choice opportunities, as well as solutions, (Cohen and March, 1974) for reform-minded policy makers. The source of public cynicism was traced to "big-time" Division 1-A athletic programs. "Early on we decided that football and basketball were the problem" (PC, February, 1992). "So we didn’t try to touch on everything in schools and colleges that could be done to improve athletic programs" (PC, March, 1992). The "goal was not to get specific remedy for each problem, but to develop a climate where reform can happen" (PC, January, 1992).

Second, the scope of the issues would "focus on what the important problems were" (PC, February, 1992). "Keep it very simple and something everyone would understand...We could have written a book this big (hand gesture indicates a thick volume) on one of these [issues]. [The leaders had] learned from being on commissions to pick 2-3 issues and really substantiate
them and then quit talking because people will quit listening" (PC, March, 1992).

Third, to keep a "simple, easy to understand" focus, the 1 + 3 model (at this point the 3 and presidential control were not yet packaged in a model) supplied the intellectual framework to structure the "important problems."

If we come out with 35 or 78 recommendations, everybody would lose the ball in the sun. If we come out with the 1 + 3, first, it is easy to understand and, second, it is comprehensive enough to cover most of the core, essential, basic problem...You don’t have to be a genius or Rhodes Scholar to be able to understand 1 + 3. (PC, February, 1992)

The comprehensive qualities of the 1 + 3 model combine with its simplicity to create a forceful intellectual concept. In the words of one Commissioner:

Father Ted had a framework, right from the very beginning, that he wanted to stick with...it was modified in some interesting ways without doing violence to his structure. But the existence of a structure which contained in it the key fundamentals of causality and influence or leverage was vital because it recognized the reality. (PC, March, 1992)

Fourth, the Knight Commission "need[ed] to talk about solutions" (PC, January, 1992). "People know there is a problem" (PC, January, 1992). "Coming up the solutions was the difficult thing, not identifying the problem" (PC, March, 1992). This dynamic was recognized by the leadership and
expressed well by one of the Commissioners: "I have been on enough commissions in my life. I didn’t want to come here with five problems that I know exist and leave with nine; and, nobody has talked about how to address the nine" (PC, March, 1992).

Fifth, the Knight Commission’s focus, problem structure, and solution orientation led to the decision to develop the study process around hearings with athletic constituent groups. The leaders asked rhetorically, "Why have other commissions failed?" "Prior presidential commissions had been criticized for not doing this [hearing from athletic people], working in a vacuum" (PC, January, 1992). "It was then that we said we are going to listen" (PC, March, 1992). "We don’t need to wool-gather and talk to ourselves. We need to talk to people and listen" (PC, January, 1992).

Sixth, the hearing process would be conducted in an open forum with the Knight Commission’s meetings open to the press. One reason: the source of the Knight Foundation’s endowment had been earned in the newspaper business and Creed Black felt uncomfortable not making the hearings open. The second reason, perhaps unintended, was the public scrutiny and education that open hearings provide. In retrospect, one Commission leader said: "I think that [the Commission’s openness] is the value of the Knight Commission. It held this thing up to the public light. It did it decently and fairly..."

Seventh, the decision to keep the Knight Commission together for a year after the release of the March, 1991 report (this subsequently was extended
to March of 1993) developed in order to facilitate recommendation implementation.

You learn something being on commissions. The important things are not only to study the problem, to be sure of the facts, and to have a ring of reality in the recommendations, but to stay with it until implementation...follow up on the recommendations. (PC, February, 1992)

Finally, the Knight Commission's goal to address public cynicism led to the decision to engender maximum publicity for the report's release. The political resources of the leadership simplified two primary efforts put in place by the first meeting of the full Commission in January, 1990. Hill and Knowlton, a leading New York public relations firm whose president was a Notre Dame alumnus, managed the 1991 report's press release and press conference. The release was to be coordinated with television exposure of the problems and the Commission's recommendations (Appendix H contains a list of media appearances and speaking engagements by Commissioners or staff). Friday contacted his friend Bill Moyers of PBS. Moyers agreed to produce a documentary on problems in college sports. The documentary preceded a round-table of Knight Commissioners and others, hosted by Moyers, that appeared on the evening of the 1991 report's release.

When the Knight Commissioners gathered in January of 1990 to "help restore institutional integrity and renew the well-being of intercollegiate
athletics," the Commission’s structure from both strategic and operational perspectives largely had been determined (KF, 1989, p. 1). As Father Hesburgh told them in opening that meeting: "Prima in intensioni, it’s first in your mind, but it’s the last thing you accomplish" (KF, 1990a, p. 6-7).

The Problem Study

The issues in this subsection relate to five thematic areas: (1) the hearings, (2) elite education, (3) leadership meetings, (4) staff work, and (5) information and briefing materials.

The Hearings

The Knight Commission’s hearings included six multi-session meetings during the first six months of 1990 (see Table 19 for a chronology of Commission meetings). The Commissioners shared their perceptions of the problems and methods for working toward solutions with each other during the January meeting and the first session of the March meeting. For the remaining 4 and 1/2 meetings, groups representing athletic constituencies--conference commissioners, football and basketball coaches, athletic directors, faculty athletic representatives, student-athletes and others (see Appendix E for a complete list individual appearances)--came before the Commission.

During their three sessions together, the Knight Commissioners expressed consensus for the broad principles of academic integrity, financial
integrity, and certification. The emphasis given to the need for presidential leadership elevated a fourth principle, presidential control. There was agreement that the time was right for reform. Lou Harris reported on his poll. The Commissioners requested that Creed Black and the Knight Foundation Board invite Arthur Ashe, author and retired tennis star, onto the Commission. The solutions orientation of the study phase received support. Finally, several Commissioners articulated the desire for unanimity in advancing a hard-hitting report.

The meeting format for the identified groups followed a fairly similar pattern. The visiting group would be provided a separate meeting room to discuss their issues and prepare for the hearing with the Knight Commission. Then the Commission would gather with the visiting group for a meal to be followed, either that afternoon or next morning, by the open hearing. Valdeserri met with the visiting groups when they gathered for their internal discussion, presented the 1 + 3 model as a format to organize their presentation around, and provided an overview of what to expect in the hearing.

The hearings contained strong elements of "partisan policy analysis" (Lindblom, 1968). "All this listening we were doing, we made them do it through the filter of [1 + 3]--the president being in control, academics being above board, and no financial monkey business (PC, February, 1992). "We brought them in...and said here is the 1 + 3 plan. Talk about it for a day and then come in and...let’s hammer at it" (PC, March, 1992).
Lindblom (1968) identified a method of policy analysis in which partisan interest groups gather to discuss policy alternatives to an issue at hand. "Partisan policy analysis" becomes an effective persuasive technique since it "requires that [proximate policy makers (operation-level decision makers)] look realistically into the merits of alternative policies...because their opponents will be armed with it" (p. 65). In doing so, the policy maker must look at the policy implications in terms of their own values and attitudes.

The hearings provided a two-way education process. The visiting groups became accustomed to the 1 + 3 model by looking at the problems through those principles. The Knight Commission received information both on the source of the problems and possible solutions from the athletic groups. As one Commissioner described the study process, after the Commissioners agreed the situation required fundamental change:

How do you do the surgery? We came up with the 1 + 3 [as] the critical issues. If that was the plan, then [it was decided that] we can't sit in an ivory tower...Let's get the constituencies in here and deal with this subject. Let's see if we can get the constituencies to understand what we are talking about; and, if they understand it, let's see what suggestions they have. (PC, March, 1992)
Elite Education

With twenty-two Knight Commissioners possessing unique and individual backgrounds at the beginning of the process, the task of characterizing the influences from the study process that affected them becomes onerous. This depiction attempts to provide a range of education received at the two extremes and median of the continuum.

In addition, the topic here is restricted to the Commissioners themselves. The education of elite administrators in associated political systems is dealt with in the political process section. Clearly the issue of education includes the degree to which all parties--from Commissioners to the general public--subscribed to Knight Commission's reform agenda as exemplified by the 1 + 3 model.

The range of athletic policy knowledge varied. Many Commissioners appeared to rely upon their own experiences and background in developing the findings. "Most of what I heard was a reaffirmation of what I already knew was the situation. Not much was new" (PC, January, 1992). Still "some people [Commissioners] needed to be educated" (PC, January, 1992). Yet even Commissioners experienced in reform found value in the study process: "I had done a lot of thinking about...what does a reformed system look like?...what really is the problem? The Knight Commission's study process really clarified that for me" (PC, January, 1992).
Three methods provided useful means for the Commissioner's edification. First, the hearing process "helped illuminate a wide range of issues, especially for those of us who do not have the opportunity to wrestle with them day to day" (PC, March, 1992). Second, the research presented in the briefing books assembled by the Commission staff: "The printed material was very helpful...there was lots of it" (PC, March, 1992). Third, the discussion within the Commission provided insights and reshaped ideas. "There were some specific insights from some of the college presidents that I had never had before" (PC, January, 1992).

The synthesis of the Commission's aggregate experience and with the study process was described by a staffer: "The value of the [Commissioners] was in their analytical ability and their wisdom from their experience to listen to 90 witnesses and to synthesize that and produce a report" (PC, February, 1992).

Leadership Meetings

The direction of the study process emanated from the Knight Commission leadership. Its approach was to provide "marching orders" to the staff, while being accessible to the Commissioners. In both instances "directive" was used, at times, to describe the leadership's approach, although not in a pejorative manner. An indication of this willfulness was demonstrated in one Commission leader’s statement: "The key was, one, you needed to
know where you want to get to; and, two, be relentless in pursuing it" (PC, February, 1992).

Once the study process began, the leadership, staff, and consultants met before and after each session. The Knight Commission’s direction originated in these meetings.

Everything we talked about [in the leadership meetings] eventually came up in materials we put out, articles we wrote, in contacts we made. If it wasn’t deemed important enough, it didn’t come up at those meetings.

They were our real strategizing sessions. (PC, February, 1992)

The staff generated the primary material for the agenda, but the Commission leadership would make additions. "Based on what transpired at the last meeting and some notes the staff would bring, [we] would set the agenda...[the leaders] would always add to the agenda" (PC, February, 1992).

"Before every single Commission meeting, we always met and planned it. We knew exactly where we wanted to go before we got in the meeting. We worked well as a group" (PC, February, 1992).

The post-session leadership meetings focused on distilling themes from the meeting and providing direction to the staff. "After [Commission] meetings, [in the] leadership meetings, [the staff] was given marching orders and themes to pursue" (PC, February, 1992).

The leadership and staff kept in close contact between meetings. From the themes identified by the Knight Commission leadership, the meeting
transcripts, and input from Kit Morris and Jim Harvey, staffer Maureen Devlin prepared a "Summary of Themes." "The summary of themes synthesized [the Commissioner’s] comments--’a sense of hearing them speak’...the leadership trio were just stars at distilling what they heard." (PC, February, 1992). The leaders’ influence was transparent to a degree in this regard. "The staff came back with what they heard from the Commission and what they researched in deciding what topics to focus on for each meeting" (PC, January, 1992).

The summary of themes was a primary means of developing consensus on the Commission’s feelings and direction. A summary of themes would be sent to the Commissioners who would be free to address any disparities at the following meeting. "Several times the staff misinterpreted the feelings of the Commission. There were several times that the Knight Commission revisited an item [when] there was a difference" (PC, January, 1992). Yet, outside of their direct contact, the summary of themes provided a fundamental tool of communication for the Commission leaders and staff with the Commissioners.

**Staff Work**

The Knight Commission staff and consultants served an influential, albeit subordinate, role in the group’s operation. The information, expertise, communication, and organization that they supplied furnished the operational firmament for the Commission. As one Commissioner reflected:
Kit knows what he is doing...You’ve got these outside professionals starting with Bill Moyers, the writer [Jim Harvey], the opinion gathers [Lou Harris], the PR outfit [Hill and Knowlton]...it really made a difference. (PC, March, 1992)

The staff performed a significant amount of primary and secondary research. The information generally was presented in briefing books distributed before each meeting, although assorted books or papers were suggested or distributed in separate mailings. The staff also would get calls from and respond to Commissioners who might be interested in a particular issue. "Credit the staff with providing us the right information. They made it easy" (PC, January, 1992).

The staff kept the Commission leaders informed in some very specific ways. Valdeserri met with Hesburgh the night before the outside groups arrived to provide information about who the people were, plus a context for the issues that might be discussed. The staff also provided current knowledge of the environment. "Maureen [Devlin] and Kit [Morris] maintained great liaison with the NCAA and other educational groups, such as ACE...Maureen was always up-to-date about what issues confronted the NCAA and what issues were going to be brought to the NCAA by some other groups...They could bring back good information to the leadership from these other groups" (PC, February, 1992).
After the release of the 1991 report, Morris and Devlin prepared a
detailed follow-through document. The Commission leadership approved the
plan which included a series of activities directed at implementation; such as:

(1) appearance opportunities, (2) which organizations to hone in on in
the Higher Education Secretariat, (3) what to do about Congress, and (4)
[follow-up with our] academic recommendations...to work with the
NCAA academic Requirements Committee...to lobby through them. A
lot of decisions were made there that directed our activities [since the

In addition to the above tasks, the staff (excluding consultants), with Jim
Harvey:

1. strategized the types of people to invite to the hearings;

2. arranged the Commission meetings;

3. summarized the themes of the Commission meetings; and,

4. developed the outline for the final report.

Information and Briefing Materials

No attempt was made to catalog the materials or information the Knight
Commissioners received during the study process. It was voluminous. The
types and sources of briefing material, though, are relevant and manageable.
Three categories summarize their nature: (1) primary research, (2) secondary
research, and (3) expert opinion and speeches.
The Knight Commission staff performed three pieces of primary research. The Division I-A conferences were questioned to assess rules governing presidential control of conferences. A survey determined laws that restricted the spending of state funds on athletic programs. Finally, Commissioner Hearn and Valdeserri visited NBC and ESPN to evaluate aspects of commercial television’s influence. Harris’ polls were presented to the Commission as well.

The secondary research included scholarly studies or books by others, popular literature on athletic reform, NCAA legislative materials and records, Title IX legal code, and articles and studies done by the print media. The Government Accounting Office (GAO), NCAA, CFA, American Institute of Research (AIR), and Mitchell Raiborn of Bradley University had collected primary data that came under review by the Knight Commission. In addition, Commissioners received the studies and essays of Thelin and Wiseman (1989), Richard Lapchick, and others who had investigated aspects of the problem. Finally, The Chronicle of Higher Education, NCAA News, USA Today, Washington Post, and Des Moines Register, to name a few, were newspapers represented in the briefing booklets.

The Knight Commission received expert opinions outside of the formal hearing process. Dinner speakers, such as Frank DeFord or representatives from NBC, CBS, and ABC sports offered diverse views on issues in college and high school sports. "The outside speakers were a good idea. They [the leaders] didn’t get people who would preach to the choir" (PC, March, 1992).
Second-hand information was communicated through the Commission staff from personal contacts with congressional staffers, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR), NCAA committees and offices, and each of the six regional accrediting agencies. Speeches from Knight Commissioners and others were reproduced and included in Commission briefing booklets, including Schultz' "New Model Speech." The Commission likewise received correspondence from a variety of athletic and higher education interest groups.

**Decision Making, Report Writing, and Release**

One goal of the Knight Commission was to obtain maximum publicity for its 1991 report. The deliberations of any reform commission eventually must be transformed into findings and recommendations. These conclusions inevitably are revealed in a report subsequently released.

This subsection is divided into four themes: (1) the executive sessions, (2) the effect of the 1 + 3 model on decision, (3) report writing, and (4) report release. Although divided thematically, the report writing and decision-making on recommendations were two processes occurring concurrently.

**The Executive Sessions**

After six open meetings and hearing more than 90 witnesses, the Knight Commission cloistered in executive session to reach agreement on specific recommendations. Four Commission meetings conducted from September
1990 until March 1991 provided the twenty-two Commissioners, their staff, and consultants with privacy in which to work toward consensus on the report. "It was the first time without the press and gave us the opportunity to be more relaxed" (PC, March, 1992). The agenda moved from the general to the specific. With this evolution of forum and focus, the decisions received intense scrutiny within the Commission.

The purpose of the executive sessions was to provide the Knight Commission's writer, Jim Harvey, with an indication of the Commissioner's feelings about the report. The September meeting in Palm Beach (FL) differed from the meetings that followed, for it contained a substantial number of decisions about which recommendations would be advocated. "[In Palm Beach], we really put together the basic structure of the recommendations" (PC, January, 1992). "Palm Beach was really decisive about what's in and what's out" (PC, January, 1992). By contrast, the subsequent meetings focused on editing the tenor and writing style of report drafts. "After Palm Beach...there were many drafts and we were working on the language" (PC, January, 1992).

Preparing for the three day gathering required greater planning by the staff and included three important preparatory activities. First, in the period between the June meeting and Palm Beach, Harvey and the leadership produced a working outline of the report. Second, Morris, Devlin, and Harvey gathered briefing materials that covered a wide number of potential
recommendations from the study process. Third, the staff polled the Commissioners about their opinions regarding these recommendations.

The Palm Beach meeting included three substantive presentations by the Commission staff and consultants, as well as two group processes involving the Commission. As previously noted, during the first and second meetings (January and February, 1990), the Commission agreed to use the 1+3 model as both a structure and a boundary for their report. Morris and Devlin presented a summary of all the recent NCAA legislation and ideas for possible recommendations concerning the four principles. Devlin reported the unanimous viewpoints from the internal poll. The divided votes were left to discuss in the group processes.

Harvey briefed the Commission in greater depth on what was known about each of the 1+3 topics. These subjects included instruction with regard to such issues as graduation rates under academic integrity or the different models of certification that were being considered. Harvey then presented a continuum of reform models as options for the Commission. The extremes received no support, with the large majority of Commissioners clustering around the middle of the scale. The effect of these choices "kind of threw them to the 'New Model'" (PC, January, 1992).

The interviews revealed six of the seven paradigms (listed from conservative to radical) surrounding the problems in college sports which:

1. are all a PR problem;
2. require tinkering around the edges;
3. (no data);
4. need a new model;
5. should be addressed with an Ivy League/Division III model;
6. should be addressed by professionalizing; and,
7. are a cesspool and necessitate dropping athletics.

The third substantive piece was a report by Lou Harris on his polling data. Harris reported that the public thought these were "terrible, dreadful problems" and that they had expressed a great deal of cynicism about the ability of colleges and universities to correct the problems (PC, January, 1992). In effect, Harris provided motivation encouraging the Commission to act boldly to address the issues.

The Commission broke into for small groups that included a cross section of Commissioners and staff—for example, presidents and private business people were mixed within sub-groups. The purpose of the break-out groups was to narrow the staff’s list of proposals and to develop the wording for those recommendations. Each group dealt with one principle from the 1+3 model although considerable overlap existed. Each group appointed a discussion leader to report their resolutions back to the Commission-as-a-whole.

The smaller groups provided an opportunity to determine the recommendation’s specifics. "In the smaller sessions, we dissected and argued points" (PC, January, 1992). "We were fleshing out the details of what the
important recommendations were going to be...how they were going to fit into the 1 + 3...what categories they go into and what had to be eliminated" (PC, January, 1992). Although in some instances the "groups started to get too specific" (PC, January, 1992), "the process worked very well...we got a lot accomplished in the small groups" (PC, January, 1992).

The entire Commission then heard the report of each sub-group. Disagreements about each proposal, if any existed, were raised at this point. Votes were taken in some instances but few were necessary. "At that point [after Palm Beach], we were close to consensus...on those key recommendations...I don’t remember any problems after that" (PC, January, 1992).

The Palm Beach meeting provided Harvey input from the Commission needed to produce a draft report. Near the end, Harvey spontaneously gave an outline of the final report synthesized from listening to the discussions. The process of the meeting received descriptions ranging from "chaotic" and being "all over the place" to "almost mystical" and "it just flowed." The results, though, were hailed as exemplary. As one normally reserved Commissioner reported: "[We needed] excellent working sessions to develop the type of report we did. [It] was the best meeting I’ve ever been a part of" (PC, January, 1992).
The Effect of the 1 + 3 Model on Decision

The 1 + 3 model's adoption as the Knight Commission's fundamental framework resulted in consequences that influenced its decision-making. The rationale for the 1 + 3 model originated in the belief that the impact of the report would be increased by narrowing the scope of study. The upshot of this strategy is categorized into three interrelated effects: boundary, consensus, and exclusion. The 1 + 3 framework provided a boundary for issues of concern. This simplified finding consensus, but also served to exclude relevant matters.

The 1 + 3 model, by limiting the scope of the issues under consideration, improved decision-making efficiency. Tacit boundaries developed. "There were a lot of specific things that were new that fit within [the 1 + 3], but we were always within a nice clear channel without any shoals, without any distractions" (PC, January, 1992). "The problem with the [visiting] groups was that they would bring a new problem in from left field, but [the Commission] stuck to the 1 + 3 and kept their focus" (PC, February, 1992).

The 1 + 3 model also facilitated the consensual process when developing the final recommendations. "Once the core was agreed upon, the rest came together without much controversy" (PC, January, 1992). "[With] the 1 + 3 model from the outset, we were within a channel, or a frame, of a result, finding, or a conclusion" (PC, January, 1992).

With the advantages of a narrow scope and defined boundaries came limitations in the issues considered. "There was the implicit notion that you
couldn’t force feed everything into that [the 1 + 3] and stay within that structure" (PC, January, 1992). "[Father Hesburgh] suggested that [the 1 + 3] was flexible; it really wasn’t. He was insistent that we...stay on that course" (PC, January, 1992). "If it didn’t neatly fit in the 1 + 3, then it didn’t belong in what we were doing. We had to go through this rather tortuous rationalization to get things in there--which clearly had to be there..." (PC, January, 1992).

**Report Writing**

Two sub-processes occurred within the overall development of the 1991 Commission report. Table 20 presents a chronology of meetings during the report writing process. The refinement of the recommendations preceded the development of the findings and the unity of the report. The December 1990 meeting in Atlanta provides the marker between the two foci. The small meetings in Dallas, Chicago and New York served to refine language in the recommendations produced in Palm Beach. In Atlanta, decisions about the report expanded from the recommendations to the entirety of the first draft.

The Commission’s report comprised the instrument by which it publicly communicated its decisions. Although rather obvious, the report became the nexus of decision inasmuch as it represented the Commissioners’ joint expression. From the substance, tone, style, or length, each element of the report reflected the Commission’s conclusions and affected its reception. Each
Commissioner’s concerns were bared. The early drafts became a tangible object over which decisions were debated.

By necessity, to accommodate this intersection of interests, the report writing consisted of an interactive process between writer Jim Harvey, the leadership, and the Commissioners. "There was a very strong editing process that virtually everyone was involved with" (PC, January, 1992). Some of the university presidents on the Commission circulated drafts to their "AD, VP for that area, and Faculty Rep. and asked for comments...on the conclusions as well as style...When I sent my ideas in [to the leaders] they had been thought through and I felt they would be listened to" (PC, January, 1992).

The first draft received considerable criticism by the Knight Commissioners at the Atlanta meeting. Many of them rewrote sections that elicited their concern. Harvey, leadership, and staff considered these revision suggestions in the metamorphosis that led to the final draft. For instance, Commissioner Doug Dibbert (North Carolina Alumni Director) suggested that Chapter Three include messages to the constituency groups, to improve on the delivery of the report’s contents. The result was an altered report with the most contentious chapter dropped entirely. "If you think of the first draft as 100%, the revision was 60% and 10% [of it] was new" (PC, January, 1992).

The central difficulties appeared to be two-fold. First, an earlier Chapter Two, "was written in a scathing way" (PC, January, 1992). Specific examples of good and bad athletic programs were held up as models to be embraced or
rejected. It was dropped because "everyone knows the problems...we didn’t need to tell you that the examples we give are such and such school. We didn’t need to embarrass an individual institution" (PC, January, 1992). Second, the writing style manifested a pejorative tone that included disputable facts and assertions. The first draft was "too negative, [and included] too much scandal, [too many] unsupportable assertions, and general high rhetoric (PC, January, 1992).

The desire to produce a hard-hitting report that included more than platitudes led to the adoption of the "CED approach" (from the Commission for Economic Development and suggested by Clifton Wharton).

The CED approach...allows an individual or group to provide a dissenting footnote if the majority favors a particular recommendation. This permits stronger recommendations to be advanced so [the commission does not] have to dilute it to accommodate the dissenting view; but, the dissenting view is in there so that everybody knows...It didn’t prove necessary. (PC, March, 1992)

Congressman Tom McMillan (D-Md.), not withstanding, added three footnotes to the final report. Interestingly, these dissenting views appeared after the final draft gained approval in January 1991. "Those of us who read the draft had no idea they were going to be in there" (PC, January, 1992).

The final result of the writing process was a report with which the Commissioners were satisfied and could support. "The final report came out
well. I was comfortable with it. Everything was in that needed to be in" (PC, January, 1992).

Report Release

The report’s release attempted to marshall extensive public attention. "We aggressively tried to get the world to know about this" (PC, January, 1992). "Creed [Black] understood what you had to do to get out to the public. Here is a professional newsman with a very high professional standing. He knew what you had to do and persuaded his board to do that" (PC, March, 1992).

The Knight Commission perceived persuasion as one of their primary means of influence.

We had no power except the power of moral-suasion...and the visibility that a couple million bucks and very good professional press representation brings. And it has certainly done that. We have had marvelous media representation. (PC, March, 1992)

The implication suggests that impact required both a credible report and broad public awareness of it.

Early on [the Commission leaders] began to talk about how to implement it so it wasn’t a report that went on a desk--which happened in 1929 and 1979. So they brought in Lou Harris and Hill and Knowlton and they said this has got to be sold just like so many Coca Cola bottles...So the
pros started to advise us on what to do and how to structure it. It became apparent that it was well orchestrated...Naively you think that a good idea will fly because it is a good idea; but no, the wine has got to be served and people have to be called. (PC, January, 1992)

Four major elements comprised a strategy that distributed over 2500 1991 Knight Commission reports. It produced more than 5000 newspaper articles. First, "One to two weeks before the Knight Commission’s release, at Harris’ [March 6th] press conference, he released his [new] survey findings to whet everyone’s appetite" (PC, January, 1992).

Second, the press release corresponding with distribution of the report occurred during the NCAA’s basketball tournament, "because the press would be hungry for news" (PC, January, 1992). The March 19th press conference, attended by the entire Knight Commission, took place in the Crystal Room of the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C across the street from the National Press Club. "Even without a PR firm it would have been covered, but it was no accident we got coverage...200 people and 12 TV cameras...[the Commission leaders] called the [Washington] Post editorial board and the Miami Herald editorial board, and others called editorial boards" (PC, January, 1992).

Third, a three-hour television event on Public Broadcasting developed through Bill Friday’s contact with Bill Moyers. The show, broadcast on the evening of March 19, included a documentary, "Sports For Sale," on the problems in college sports, a round table discussion with Commission members-
-Friday, Hesburgh, Wharton, and Schultz—and other guests, and a viewer call-in show with the same panel. "That [TV show] had been planned from day one. Moyers told us at the first meeting that he would get a date, and once he got a day, we had to guarantee to produce [the report] on that day" (PC, January, 1992).

Fourth, the Commission developed a video tape directed at college and university presidents, emphasizing their findings and recommendations. The Commission staff distributed the tape with a Commission report to each NCAA member institution.

The result of the publicity effort was name recognition for the Knight Commission.

It is amazing how quickly the name Knight Commission has made its way into the lexicon of the sports pages. Reporters refer to it without the editor feeling obliged to say what the Knight Commission was. (PC, January, 1992)

II. Political Processes

Section Overview

This political processes section is divided into three sub-sections: interactions within the Commission political system; the Knight Commission’s
environment: exchanges and feedback; and the Commission and NCAA: responses and system persistence.

**Interactions Within the Knight Commission Political System**

The interactions within the twenty-two member Knight Commission—as they are apt to with any reform commission—were directed at achieving unanimity. The unifying purpose of the Commission’s report amplified consensual mechanisms and minimized defining ideological boundaries.

Unlike governmental politicians who establish disparate policy positions to reflect the diverse values of their constituencies, the timely delivery of the Commission’s report depended upon creative compromise. Little political benefit seemed to emanate from developing adversarial positions. While acknowledging that individual commissioners represented particular constituent interests or held differing policy points of view, the motive for these administrative elites—who succeed by effectively addressing a widely acknowledged problem—distinguished the Knight Commission’s political behavior from a partisan body such as Congress. The Commission’s ideological adversaries, once their common values were identified, existed in their external environment.

The themes in this sub-section are the group’s dynamic, consensus, positioning the report for constituent acceptance, and individual influence.
Group Dynamic

The development of a group dynamic beneficial to the Commission emanated from the Commissioner's participation in the meetings, from the composition of the group, the personal traits of the Commissioners, the sublimation of particular interest to general interest, and subscription to a shared set of values. Much of the evidence of a group dynamic on the Knight Commission came in a negative reference. The exception was Congressman Tom McMillan (who believed that the Commission avoided attacking the most important elements of the entrenched athletic power structure). "The only one outside the group was Tom McMillan" (PC, March, 1992).

Regular participation in the Commission meetings influenced the development of a shared purpose and belief system. "McMillan didn't get to participate in the group process enough. He wasn't able to be a part of the deliberative process. There is a group dynamic in which people buy in and they buy in because they were there" (PC, January, 1992).

Most of what you are doing [in the meetings] is letting [the Commission] assume ownership over the project...Almost all of the meetings are a process of getting [the Commissioners] comfortable with the issues and getting them comfortable with each other--so they trust each other--so, when the report comes out, they say, 'Yes, we're behind it.' (PC, January, 1992)
The composition of the Knight Commission and its interpersonal relationships and qualities contributed to the development of a group dynamic. There were people of substance across the board...A lot of us were close friends. It turned out that the other people were very compatible; who in the discussion were very civil...who were willing to listen and modify their position to come up with consensus. (PC, February, 1992)

"They did get a damn good representation of big-time athletics there" (PC, March, 1992).

Many of the people on the Commission have known each other...that helped build and maintain a sense of...not quite collegiality, but we knew each other. We had talked about the things before. It was not something we had to develop de novo...The group had a very high level of mutual respect. There was no posturing. There were no blocks, no side caucuses. (PC, March, 1992)

The technical skills of strategic leadership distinguished the Commissioners from constituencies representing the operation-level positions. Their behavior supported the selection process and facilitated the Commission reaching consensus on a report. "People didn’t bring their political representation and interests to their work on the Knight Commission. People were open and candid and spoke from the heart with regard to their work" (PC, January, 1992).

One staffer provided a more detailed explanation:
[The Commissioners] are masters of compromise...If we hadn't have had people at [the strategic] level, [consensus] would not have been achieved. This is not to knock AD's or Faculty Reps, but people closer to it would have had entrenched interests and not been able to move along with the give and take, and make progress. An AD can look at the big picture; but someone like Don Keough, who is not involved directly in any athletic department, his interests are much larger than that and he can sit back from it instead of thinking: 'If we do this, how will it affect the competitiveness of my team.' (PC, February, 1992)

The belief in subordinating particular interest to general interest produced a boundary around the group's development. "This group believes in the old saw that there is no limit to what you can accomplish if you don't care who gets credit" (PC, January, 1992). "This whole experience has been worthwhile because a group of people would act in the public's interest to tame a situation that badly needed some discipline" (PC, March, 1992).

By comparison, McMillan's interests were perceived to be directed at serving his political interests at the expense of consensus. "Most of the Commission felt that he had his own political agenda and never took time or effort to understand the bigger picture" (PC, January, 1992).

The Commission's shared values--in this instance the belief in working toward reform through the NCAA structure--also served as a demarcation for group inclusion. McMillan possessed several extreme policy beliefs--relative to
the Commission—that were outside the Commission’s shared values outlined above (McMillan’s footnotes concerned requiring institutional changes to insure greater presidential control of NCAA policy making, restructuring the NCAA plan for distribution of its revenues from commercial television, and focusing reform efforts on the NCAA enforcement process).

McMillan made some radical governance suggestions about the NCAA structure. He has no faith in the NCAA, but these views must be moderated by knowledge that NCAA came down with both feet on the University of Maryland while the Commission was sitting. (PC, March, 1992)

McMillan’s reform positions reveal that the group dynamic developed from a shared set of values.

**Consensus**

Consensus developed because unanimity was considered critical to the impact of the report. The 1+3 model provided a conceptual model that narrowed the scope of the relevant issues. When Commissioners held disparate policy views, the result was a process in which high conflict issues were deferred or made less specific, thus, reducing the total number of issues. The time to reach resolution became a critical standard in the "winnowing down" process. Decision-making consisted of individual Commissioners raising
issues that received support from others. The process of compromise involved highly developed skills of reciprocal concession.

As discussed in the previous section, the 1+3 model limited the scope of issues under consideration. This strategy also facilitated reaching a consensus. "We were able to siphon off the problems that would be divisive and split the group; but, we got them to agree to the 1+3. With that done we could elaborate on what we meant by it" (PC, February, 1992).

You must get agreement on the basic thrust. There are so many alley ways to go down that you had to get agreement on the basic points of emphasis...The first thing was, ‘we are going to limit ourselves to these things.’ This is where the 1+3 came in...Once the core was agreed upon the rest came together without much controversy. (PC, January, 1992)

The consensual process on the issues of concern was described as a winnowing down process. The specificity of the Commission’s recommendations was perceived to affect the process of compromise as well as relating to the anticipated reception of their report.

We wanted to have as much unanimity as possible. We didn’t want a report that was wandering all over the place. Too much detail gives skeptics an area to criticize. Well, the same is true of the Commissioners. The more detail, the more you are going to have disagreement. We took a lot of votes. When it was close, if it wasn’t
essential, then we said, 'we don’t need to do that. Let’s keep our eye on the 1 + 3. Everyone has agreed to that.’ A winnowing down process is an accurate description. We had some issues that weren’t addressed and [we had] less specificity on some issues. (PC, January, 1992)
The unresolved issues were dropped because of the time required to develop creative solutions.
Some of those [heavily debated subjects] were very thoroughly knotty issues that could not really have been subsumed into the report easily without spending another six to eight months on it...The length of time an issue was discussed was a function of the relative ease with which one could come forward with resolutions. (PC, March, 1992)
"There are some issues in which there was no way we could reach agreement; and, there was enough wrong that we could aim our effort in areas where there was agreement" (PC, January, 1992).
Specific interests of individual Commissioners required the support of others to remain viable in the discussion. "Individual members would have areas that they would champion. As much as they could develop support from one of the other members that [topic] would hang out there as one of the issues" (PC, January, 1992). "We went around the room and everyone waxed eloquent, but when that was all through, you could pick out 4-5 recurring themes. Some far out ideas fell out" (PC, January, 1992). "As you can imagine in a group that diverse, there were those who wanted to further more
specific recommendations...and those who thought we were going too far. The report...was a pretty good compromise” (PC, January, 1992).

The process of compromise itself was described by a staffer:

This process was a real education in how to get things done. There was a lot of give and take, and to take you had to give. A few times someone pressed a little hard but that was rare. They would know that if someone else didn’t speak up to drop it. Some would be quiet on issues they supported because they had just shot a bullet on something else. That is how we got 22 signatures. If each had written a report we would have had 22 similar but different documents. But they knew we had to come together on one. (PC, February, 1992)

**Positioning the Report**

The Knight Commission report suggested significant change but not radical restructuring. It packaged proposals within a unique, though simple, set of principles—the 1 + 3 model reasserted the primacy of academic values and institutional integrity—previously proposed but not implemented. "What we were doing was giving some broad guidelines that people had heard before” (PC, January, 1992). Its positioning—with respect to constituent acceptance—revolved around the purpose of its length and style, the rationale for its recommendations, and the specificity of its recommendations.
The purpose of the report: to convey its message in a manner so that it would be received by its target. Several criteria appeared to position its development. "The first thing was that report needed to be simple" (PC, February, 1992). "If we had tried to put absolutely every good idea in there, it could have been discredited by NCAA constituencies as not being feasible" (PC, January, 1992).

The goal of report acceptance dominated planning for its presentation and contents. "To have credibility and the report accepted, you needed to be very factual and not anecdotal. It must be reliable...It had to be accepted, believable and direct" (PC, January, 1992). "If [the report] had been too radical, we would not have been taken as seriously" (PC, February, 1992). "It was pragmatic in its approach and therefore it was accepted" (PC, February, 1992).

The report was written in the form of an argument. In contrast to a scholarly paper that emphasizes objectivity and documented claims, it presented only enough information to substantiate the major assertions that were contestable. "One of the things we did not do, because it was not our job, was to educate the American public about what they had produced with all this pressure" (PC, March, 1992).

The report was more directive than explanatory...Rhetorically, you have to start with a debatable question: 'a nation at risk' or 'athletics is out of control'...In your [report], you go into as much depth as your
enterprise requires. Then you come back and lay out a proposal that will respond to the enterprise...I don’t think there was much debate about whether this [collegiate athletics] was a problem. (PC, January, 1992)

The specificity of the recommendations accommodated the autonomy of policy making authority. "We decided we weren’t going to make [highly] specific recommendations. We laid out a model that allowed for a level of institutional autonomy, but demanded some level of institutional integrity" (PC, February, 1992). "The report was a pretty good balance between being specific, but not so specific that it would appear to have written answers to problems before they had been adequately studied [by the policy making body]" (PC, January, 1992).

One Commissioner related the specificity of the recommendations to the recognition that the legitimate authority to make policy resided in the NCAA. All of us were looking for that middle ground, large enough to cover the relevant topics and subjects so that we really studied reform and not just tinkering; and, at the same time, recognizing that whatever we recommended would have to be enacted by somebody else who had legislative authority, and so leaving sufficient room to the Presidents Commission, to Dick Schultz, and the leadership of NCAA to take this report as a road map, and not as a blueprint...kind of a direction and set of goals. (PC, January, 1992)
Influencers

The dimensions of group dynamic and consensus invite the question of relative power and influence on the Knight Commission. The data presented here, because of its highly subjective nature, was evidenced in more than five interviews in response to questions about influence or leadership on the Commission. Only the most relevant themes are considered. The influences that developed from the consultants or staff, while germane, are described elsewhere.

To broach the subject from a general perspective, the leadership’s strategy of appointing Commissioners who were Division 1-A presidents or representatives with standing in a policy making system manifested itself directly in the interests represented within the Commission. It was a commission comprised largely of presidents or former presidents (n = 14) and trustees (n = 3). It also convened representatives of the NCAA and the Presidents Commission with those associated with ACE’s long-term interest in athletic reform. The relevance of this strategy rested with the responsibility to lead the reform process. As one Commissioner (neither a president nor trustee) commented:

[The report reflects] largely the college presidents who were the main body of the Knight Commission, and are being asked to make the certain the findings and recommendations of the Knight Commission are carried
out. It is a president's document. It is a president's approach. (PC, January, 1992)

The concerns reflected in the 1991 report, as detailed in Chapter 4, are those of the president: institutional integrity. "[The report served the needs of] people who were interested in seeing some reform take place in the NCAA" (PC, January, 1992). As one Commissioner/president observed: "Despite what it says about being for the student-athlete, the integrity of the institution is most served by the report...The number of recommendations are fewer for the student-athlete" (PC, January, 1992). Another said: "The report served the interests of people running universities" (PC, February, 1992).

The 1 + 3 framework was modified to elevate the welfare of the student-athlete. "The group felt that establishing the primacy of the student-athlete [was important]. That was not quite in the original construct, the way Father Ted had put it together" (PC, March, 1992).

The evidence from this study process suggests that the Commissioners employed a rational approach to their participation in the Knight Commission's work. Their "strong-willed" nature, combined with the professional stature and integrity each possessed, acted to minimize influence not based in an individual's expertise, legitimate standing, logic, or information. Each Commissioner enjoyed a moderate to significant endowment of each. "Only a small handful [of Commissioners] who didn't have a lot of influence" (PC, February, 1992). The result was that "nobody had enough influence to sway
the Knight Commission" (PC, March. 1992). "Nothing got in because someone was a bulldog about it and pushed to get it in" (PC, January, 1992).

Although a volume of evidence does indicate that Commissioners were influenced by other Commissioners, the degree to which authority was exercised in these interactions limits their bases to expertise, information, and legitimacy (French & Raven, 1959; Collins & Raven, 1969). Neither referential, coercive, nor reward power appeared to have been effective, if attempted at all. The individual Commissioners or blocks of interest (i.e. Presidents Commissioners) whose contributions most influenced the Knight Commission’s deliberations are described with an apt quotation (They are presented in no specific order):

**Friday and Hesburgh** - "Father Ted brought people back to the 1 + 3" (PC, March, 1992). "[The leadership] were thoughtful, cautious monitors who spoke up if [the Commission] got off track or was crowding the Presidents Commission" (PC, January, 1992).

Father Ted and Bill Friday did a magnificent job of guiding, directing, and leading the group. Certainly not everything came from them, but they were able to put in priority and perspective the input of the Knight Commission and those from outside the Commission. (PC, January, 1992)
"Ted Hesburgh was very important in coming up with a simple formula from which the major issues in intercollegiate athletics could be approached from" (PC, January, 1992).

**Black** - Creed Black started as an ex officio member—not voting. Father Ted urged him to serve. He became a very powerful member of the Commission. He wasn't embarrassed to speak up. He saw the big picture. He didn't have the blinders on of the athletic community. (PC, January, 1992)

As "president of the Knight Foundation [he had] the capacity to shape the focus [of the Commission]" (PC, March, 1992). "[Black] stood on the outside and he kept pushing it along...kicking it along. He spoke up...he was heard and expected to be heard--partly because he paying for it and partly because he had good things to say" (PC, January, 1992). "I give alot of credit to Creed Black. As an old newspaper man, he knew which way the wind was blowing in this alot more than we [the presidents] did" (PC, February, 1992).

**The College and University Presidents** - "The Division I presidents had more to say; the Division I guys because the issues they were talking about were affecting them. They were dealing with them all the time" (PC, January, 1992). "All the college presidents were strong influences because they come from a position of knowledge, experience, and practicality" (PC, January, 1992). "The presidents had a lot of knowledge and probably [influenced the Commission]" (PC, March, 1992).
Dick Schultz - "He played a very careful and very intelligent role...He was a leader by raising questions and not trying to dominate. He would have been unsuccessful in that. He didn’t need to, he is so well respected (PC, January, 1992). "A copy of the ["New Model"] speech was circulated before hand and it was a speech that was widely accepted...presidents accepted it" (PC, January, 1992).

[Schultz] was key. If he had taken an adversarial view, this whole business could have been much less constructive. Dick decided that the work of NCAA could be furthered by an independent objective commission. He contributed a thorough understanding of the functioning of the NCAA. (PC, January, 1992)

"It is conceivable that, absent a Dick Schultz, we could have taken on some issues and exploded into some great cause and totally been without credibility by not being current with the 450 page [NCAA] manual (PC, March, 1992).

In addition, Cliff Wharton, LeRoy Walker, Dick Kazmaier, and Don Keough were frequently cited as effective Commissioners.

The Knight Commission’s Environment: Exchanges and Feedback

The Knight Commission’s hearings provided an opportunity to receive input from external groups. This process contributed feedback that influenced the Commission’s report. Conversely, without formal authority to make policy, its impact in bringing reform to athletic governance depended upon its influence.

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or persuasiveness (output) with legitimate policy making organizations. Commission-generated feedback that returned to the NCAA and cultivated response becomes of particular interest. This subsection centers on four themes: (1) external influences, (2) cross-boundary members, (3) elite consensus/coordination of reform, and (4) developing subjective authority.

**External Influences**

During the hearings, several groups affected the Commission’s outlook with their rationale or attitude on the issues. The influences that produced an identifiable response are dealt with separately in the stressors sub-section. The subject here pertains to testimony that elicited a shift in the Commission’s belief structure. Three constituencies—faculty athletic representatives (FAR), coaches, and athletic directors—changed the Commissioner’s opinions about the athletic operations environment.

No subjective view received more consistent support than the Commissioners’ disdain for the group of faculty representatives who testified. Two-thirds of the interviews with Commission members produced unsolicited comments about their reaction. The faculty representative’s role, as a positive force for reform, was cast in doubt. "The most disappointingly weak group we talked to were the faculty athletic reps. They really didn’t know what was happening. They were captive to the process...You had no reason to expect anything to happen" (PC, March, 1992).
The interview with University of Arkansas' FAR Albert Witte made a particularly strong impression because, at the time, Witte was also President of the NCAA. In essence, Witte testified that the Knight Commission was not necessary because there were no problems in college sports. One Commissioner told of his reaction and the effect it might have had on the Commission:

The faculty reps made an absolute ass [of themselves], largely because of Al Witte. It had an impact because you had to wonder about the effectiveness of the NCAA to police itself if the president of NCAA had this view of the problem. Had Schultz not been there and had we not had the feeling that it was Schultz, not Witte, who represented the NCAA, it could have had the effect of sending the Knight Commission off on a tangent. Schultz stabilized the situation, not by what he said or did, but by the force of his personality. (PC, January, 1992)

The Commission came to believe that the FAR's had been coopted by athletic interests. "About 80% of the faculty reps represent their AD unless the president is there" (PC, January, 1992). "The faculty reps were in no way shape or form representative of the faculty...[because of this] the faculty has isolated themselves and are not involved" (PC, March, 1992). One Commissioner expressed concern for the faculty role in athletic governance in this way: "We must find some way for the faculty to have more say in
appointing the FAR...They need to be brought inside the tent" (PC, March, 1992).

The contrast between the faculty reps and the coaches and athletic directors provided an eye opener for the majority of the Commissioners. The three groups were compared by one Commissioner:

Both the coaches and athletic directors [influenced the Commission]. The faculty reps were a big disappointment...They were the weakest group...[the Commission] reacted negatively to them...[They thought the FAR’s] are not a part of the real world, archaic, and really resistant to any changes, while the AD’s and coaches were not only receptive to change but recommending dynamic change of their own...the presidents’ attitude toward college coaches changed because they found that coaches were in favor of reform" (PC, January, 1992).

Cross-Boundary Members

The Knight Commission’s cross-boundary members created a communication system that reached into relevant policy making systems. The exchanges produced by this network supplied the Commission with accurate feedback. Commission values and findings could be targeted through this reticulate governance system as well. Of direct relevance to recommendation implementation were the Commissioners with legitimate standing as policy makers who were able to influence the political process of their organizations.
This theme covers the grid of liaison that resulted from the cross-boundary Commissioners.

Reciprocal relationships with the President Commission, NCAA, Division 1-A Conferences, and Congress developed through cross fertilization with Knight Commissioners. The Commission relied on persuasion and cross-boundary commissioners because of its lack of legitimate authority. "The Knight Commission can only encourage. The NCAA and Presidents have to bring change" (PC, January, 1992). "As I told Schultz, we don’t have any power or authority, we have to work through them to try and strengthen their hand" (PC, January, 1992). "To a very considerable extent, that was a critical decision--they made the right decision to have overlap" (PC, January, 1992). "The NCAA is the nuclear core of this thing. You can have all the outside bodies, but if you can’t do something in the NCAA, you’re pretty much butting your head up against the wall" (PC, January, 1992).

Communication and trust between organizations resulted from the cross-boundary Commissioners. "Knight Commission members were asked to go back and make reports to the Presidents Commission" (PC, January, 1992). "We were asked to go back to our conferences and give reports to our conferences. That allowed the conference commissioner to be up on what was going on rather than reading about this threat in the newspaper" (PC, January, 1992). One Commissioner observed:
Those of us who were on both have brought to each what was happening in the other and have legitimized the role of the Knight Commission with regard to the Presidents Commission...and keep it from being viewed as competitive at best and antagonistic at worst. (PC, January, 1992)

"We worked very closely with the Presidents Commission and NCAA and took pains not to upstage them" (PC, January, 1992).

The feedback benefitted the Knight Commission, as well. "Dick [Schultz] played an important role in positioning the report so that it was feasible. Something we might actually accomplish" (PC, January, 1992).

The Presidents Commissioners on the Knight Commission kept some balance on [the Commission], because, if it hadn't been for those of us on the Presidents Commission, [the Knight Commission] would have drifted into trying to put in regulations that were specific. We had a feel of...what needed to be done...[and getting the Commission to] stay with [general] policy, because the NCAA is the enforcing arm--not the Knight Commission. (PC, January, 1992)

The Presidents Commission and Schultz exercised their standing to promote reform within the NCAA.

We would not be where we are in reform without Dick [Schultz]...Dick articulates the need for reform and he organizes that bureaucracy as best
he can to support reform. He played a crucial role in being sure that this collective empowerment was actually in place. (PC, January, 1992)

The Presidents Commission initiated its Strategic Planning Sub-Committee during early 1991 to develop a revolving three-year agenda. It is chaired by Knight Commissioner Thomas Hearn, joined by Commissioner Young.

If you look at the Strategic Planning Committee report over the course of this strategic planning cycle (1992-1994), all of the 1+3 topics are going to be addressed...You can see...the influence of the Knight Commission's report in what the Presidents Commission proposes to do. And that is not an accident. (PC, January, 1992)

The Knight Commission, in turn, supported or strengthened the positions of Schultz and the Presidents Commission in the NCAA. "The early public releases always made reference to the NCAA, to Dick Schultz, and the work of the Presidents Commission" (PC, January, 1992). With regard to Schultz's reform proposals unveiled in his January 1990 "New Model" speech:

The Knight Commission has been a very effective and strong support in seeing those [proposals] come into place, in following those [proposals], publicly supporting [them], and even, in some instances, lobbying for [them] when they came on the legislative calendar. (PC, January, 1992)

"One of the [Knight Commission's] contributions was to put a safety net under Dick [Schultz]. He couldn't have taken some of the positions [he did] if he
didn’t have the Knight Commission behind him. We’ve also strengthened the Presidents Commission" (PC, January, 1992).

The Knight Commission reinforced the resurgence of the Presidents Commission following the 1987 NCAA special convention debacle in Dallas. By the time the Knight Commission was mobilized…the Presidents Commission had already developed an agenda. It was clear that it was going to work toward cost cutting and time demands. The Knight Commission came in and helped it ride that curve up…and from then on, [it] began to provide some issues to adopt as its own…We accomplished much more because, gratuitously, the two were in a perfect place to support each other…like two locomotives pulling a lot bigger train together than they could individually. (PC, January, 1992)

The Knight Commission’s coordination, through its cross-boundary member, with Congress was less obvious. Tom McMillan differed openly with the Knight Commission on their reform approach. He stayed on the periphery of the group’s influence, but his actions served the Commission’s reform agenda. "[McMillan’s] function has been useful. My personal feeling is that Tom has been winking a lot of the way" (PC, March, 1992). "He created a situation [by being so radical] that he made it easy for us with the congressional hearings, because you knew they were going to have to come back towards you before it was all over" (PC, March, 1992).
Proposed legislation from McMillan, along with others in Congress, was unpopular with the Knight Commission; still, it has served to stimulate a Congressional hearing process on intercollegiate athletics that has increased public awareness and amplified the Commission’s recommendations. The Subcommittee on Commerce, Competitiveness, and Consumer Protection began its series of four hearings on June 9, 1991. In the words of a Congressional staffer:

The Knight Commission’s report served as a general basis for this Subcommittee to begin its series of investigative hearings...to take a closer look, a microscopic look, at these recommendations...The Subcommittee wanted to use its congressional clout...to put the flame to the feet of the NCAA...The Sub-Committee wanted the NCAA to view the Knight Commission and its recommendations as something serious. It wanted the NCAA to be cognizant of the fact that there was a body politic out there that could bring about changes if the NCAA did not. (PC, April, 1992)

Some evidence suggested that Congress has been the primary stressor in developing a response from the NCAA. The congressional hearings served as an external stimulus for those interests favoring reform. McMillan’s bill stimulated those congressional hearings although congressional staffers interviewed believed the bill had little chance of being passed. One Senate aide
speculated that Congress frequently uses hearings to elevate public awareness instead of acting on uncertain legislative solutions.

Although no evidence suggested complicity between the congressional hearings and the Knight Commission, both identified the need to publicly illuminate the need for reform. This shared concern became clear in one staffers comment:

[The purpose was to] provide a national forum for a national dialogue on these issues. So it became a natural for the Knight Commission and this Sub-Committee to work almost in tandem. And this is what has been happening...There was not a meeting of the minds...to carve out our areas...it was a very natural coming together, a natural marriage. (PC, April, 1992)

**Elite Consensus/Coordination of Reform**

The Knight Commission served as a forum in which values and an agenda were agreed upon by representatives of athletic and higher education organizations. The broad representation--by esteemed individuals--on the Commission transformed its belief structure into a "beacon" or "conscience" to which other groups adhered. The outputs, directed through the network of liaison, educated constituencies--leading to elite consensus--who could promote reform. The Commission’s reform agenda and staff implementation activities
acted as a catalyst for the coordination of reform by a variety of higher education organizations.

The cross-boundary Knight Commissioners, and the Commission staff, facilitated producing an elite consensus and coordination of reform. Alumni executives, trustees, and members of the higher education secretariat received reform updates through Commissioners who were representatives of the NAAE (National Association of Alumni Executives), AGB (Association of Governing Boards, and ACE, NASULGC (National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges), AAU (American Association of Universities), NAICU (National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities) and other higher education organizations.

Schultz’s speech, in 1991, to the NAAE meeting provides an example of the ripple effect of Knight Commission communication directed at professional organizations who lacked policy-making authority, but were influential with important constituencies.

[Schultz] kept those 100 [NAAE] people informed. As they got their own reports, I have seen resolutions passed at their alumni associations...The Knight Foundation and issues on reform in intercollegiate athletics have bubbled up to a level of visibility where the volunteer professional staffs see themselves as having something to contribute, as a vested interest, in coping with the problems. (PC, March, 1992)
The Commission staff's follow-up activities focused on coordinating their reform effort with the higher education secretariat. They directed considerable effort at not letting this thing [reform] drop when we went out of business. So a lot of work [has been done] with the national educational organizations in Washington, D.C....a lot of talking at first, a lot of exchange of information, personal meetings, publication of articles in their various journals, [helping them create] special subcommittees to look into issues, or assigning the issue to an appropriate committee...it all fits in with getting the NCAA to move up into the realm of being an educational organization instead of a sports organization. It is critical for reform that NCAA be respected [and] not be scrutinized" (PC, February, 1992).

The outcome has been a relatively coordinated effort across organizational boundaries directed at a similar goal: athletic reform. The consortium of the College Board, ACT (American College Testing), ACRO (American College Registrars Organization), and NACAC (National Association of College Admissions Counselors) "came out in support of the [Presidents Commissions] academic reform proposals right at the end of [1991]. That was real important to a lot of the presidents who backed the reform legislation" (PC, February, 1992).

AGB gave a small grant to run a pilot workshop for trustees in the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC). One Commissioner pointed out that the
reform outcomes have occurred as a result of mutual efforts across organizational boundaries:

There were a lot of people involved in getting these changes to take place: conferences, the Presidents Commission, ACE, and people in NCAA who worked on committees...We did a lot of networking to get word out and a lot out [through] the press. People paid a lot of attention to it...Somehow the Knight Commission became...a kind of conscience. It was a beacon. (PC, January, 1992)

Developing Subjective Authority

Barnard’s (1938) concept of subjective authority posits that the basis of authority rests with its acceptance at the bottom of the organization. Because choosing to be obedient to any direction is inherent to the follower, the crux of top down authority (objective) resides in convincing those subject to its rule to accept it.

Symbolic devices such as inaugurations, induction ceremonies, and press conferences for a commission report’s release dramatize the process by which objective authority (top down authority or that authority legitimately vested in an office) is accepted at the bottom of an organization (subjective authority). The ceremonies symbolize the authenticity of the authority and communicate organizational values directly to those attached to that policy system. This
recognition process serves to inculcate a "sense of organization" (Barnard, 1938, p. 180).

One primary purpose of the Knight Commission was to convey a symbolic impact. As one Commission leader stated: "The goal was not to get a specific remedy for each problem, but to develop a climate where reform can happen" (PC, January, 1992). "Climate" infers an environment in which reform measures are accepted. The policy system's constituents become inculcated with a sense of...the need and values for reform. The Commission's concern for subjective authority signals its importance to effective governance.

The Knight Commission's measured response to feedback—which included positioning its recommendations and preparing the environment for their reforms--led to a report that was accepted by the implementing constituencies. The Commission's operation included multiple devices to develop subjective authority. Its concern for partisan policy analysis, the positioning of its recommendations, the extensive publicity given its report release, the representative-but-elite Commission composition, and the decision to sit for two years after the 1991 report release--all provide germane examples of the Knight Commission's attempts to gain acceptance as an authority on reform.
The Commission’s acceptance as an authority was evident at the 1992 convention.\(^1\) The Commission’s influence was not restricted to policy recommendations, but included the values represented in its report.

Every time the reform movement is talked about the standard of reference is the Knight Commission report. They don’t always use the recommendation, but they explain it in terms of the Knight Commission...The notion is that we are in some way accountable to that [1 + 3] model. I think that view is widely held. (PC, January, 1992)

The best evidence of [the Commission’s impact] is how many times the Knight Commission was mentioned at the NCAA [1992 convention]. People are all getting up and talking about ‘This is supported by the NCAA Council, the Presidents Commission, and the Knight Commission.’ [People are treating it] like it is a part of the NCAA. (PC, January, 1992)

Data from the survey of policy experts--the majority of whom hold policy positions within the NCAA--supported this observation by the Knight Commissioners. A 76.4% majority agreed with the statement that: "The Knight Commission provides a legitimate voice in outlining an appropriate direction for intercollegiate athletics." Although by definition an independent, outside commission cannot have legitimate authority (that authority bestowed to an office holder within the formal organization), this finding reinforces the

\(^1\) Attended by the writer.
evidence that the Knight Commission developed subjective authority within the NCAA.

The Knight Commission report’s acceptance became an important ingredient in developing subjective authority. "[The Commission] has got credibility, and the report was well received, which gave it more credibility" (PC, January, 1992). One Commissioner, concerned about the Commission’s extensive publicity, attributes the prestige of the Knight Commissioners for the report’s acceptance: "I was concerned about too much hype and it would all fall down. What we were doing was giving some broad guidelines that people had heard before but it was a commission that had some stature" (PC, January, 1992).

The importance of the report’s acceptance was apparent in the cumulative effect of the objective authority (top down authority) that was delegated to the Knight Commission by those subscribing to its value positions. This effect and the Commission staying intact resulted in an organizational legitimacy.

The biggest value of the Knight Commission [is that] it gained some stature, and not just what the report said, but that the report was accepted. [Now] the Commission is able to endorse and support and provide another pressure point for [Schultz] and the Presidents Commission in moving some of these issues. They have become a
legitimate group with influence on people to make specific changes.

(PC, January, 1992)

Partisan policy analysis--used as a format for the Knight Commission's hearings--assisted in developing constituent acceptance. By forcing the groups testifying to evaluate the Commission's proposals through their own value system, resistance to those proposals diminished. One Commissioner commented on the purpose for this strategy:

We agreed we had to avoid [being] seen as a high-minded group. So we got the coaches, AD's, and others to come in. This gave us a base of information. It gave them a sense that they were being heard, because many of them were very suspicious of the whole thing. (PC, January, 1992)

Partisan policy analysis possessed qualities that were the subject of several observations. "The smartest thing we did was listen" (PC, March, 1992). "We think that the changes that came [at the 1992 NCAA convention], that so much resemble the things that we discussed, were because those constituencies heard it and found out it was workable" (PC, March, 1992). "The five presidents from the Presidents Commission saw that by listening...how much stronger the case was when you listened to people with the problems" (PC, January, 1992).

The strategy to develop subjective authority by listening and persuasion was articulated by a Commission leader:
What you learn in university administration is that you never give an order...Your success depends on one word: persuasion. You do that by giving an example of where you stand on these kinds of issues...and people will get with you. It is a difference in style. It takes longer but it certainly is more enduring. That is what we did here [with the Knight Commission]. This will last. (PC, March, 1992)

**Knight Commission and NCAA: Response and System Persistence**

The feedback returning from the environments of the Knight Commission and NCAA fomented stress on their policy systems that stimulated a response or galvanized the status quo (system persistence). The focus of this chapter has been with the Knight Commission's operation, but the responses also comprise non-policy outcomes (the present study's third focus). This and previous chapters contain many of the responses within the Knight Commission and NCAA. No effort to reconsider those subjects is attempted here. The two themes considered are: Knight Commission stressors and system persistence.

**Knight Commission Stressors**

The Commission's response to stress emerged in two forms: (1) with the creation of the Commission and its choice of operation and (2) in the positioning of its findings and recommendations. The four stressors which deserve amplification--the perception of a "policy window," the Harris polls, the
DiBiaggio-Perles affair, and Arthur Ashe’s dinner speech—effected one or both forms of response. Obviously, the form of response relates to when the feedback became apparent to the Commission and its leaders.

As Chapter 7 outlined, Creed Black became convinced the timing was right for the Knight Commission, as he evaluated the possibility of funding a reform commission. The changes in organizational leadership, the public perception of abuse which was confirmed by Harris’ poll, and the threat of governmental activity (discussed elsewhere in this study) provided three primary rationale for the Commission and its leadership to respond. "Sentiment was growing that something had to be done about it" (PC, January, 1992). "The time is right now [1989], the forces are out there. With the right group to corral them and move them along with its own agenda, we can capitalize on those forces and the time being right" (PC, February, 1992). The Knight Foundation acted on this window of opportunity by empowering the Commission.

A Knight Commissioner reflected post hoc on the affect the timing of its operation had on the Presidents Commission work:

I think it happened at the right time. If the Knight Commission had come along earlier it wouldn’t have worked. If it had come along a year later it would have been too late to have the kind of impact [it did on the Presidents Commission]. (PC, January, 1992)
In judging the impact of the Knight Commission one Commissioner noted the confluence of events that created a "policy window:"

If there has been a turn in the road, it has been due to the configuration of the constellations. So that you have, [one], the presidents becoming really active in the NCAA; [two], you had a new leader of NCAA who genuinely wants to make reform; and [three], you had the Knight Commission on the outside. Those three things together, plus, maybe a fourth, which was that the abuses had been so egregious. Those things put together are giving it a chance. If you just come out with a report and those other things weren’t there, it would be tougher. (PC, March, 1992)

The Knight Commission report per se became another opportunity to make fundamental policy decisions.

The influence--it was the feedback that catalyzed public concern as a stressor--of Harris’ first poll in June 1989 has been discussed elsewhere. His poll released in March of 1991 provided feedback that resulted in the alteration of the 1991 report. Gender equity, a highly debated, high conflict issue on the Commission, was determined to be out of the scope of the Commission’s purview. Several Commissioners--DiBiaggio, Shalaia, and Whalen were among the most vocal--had pressed for its inclusion in the findings and recommendations. Gender equity became the last change in the report because of feedback about public opinion.
The Harris poll showed that 88% [of the public] thought that gender equity was an issue...Here in the 90s, to leave women out, we would have looked like a bunch of old guys...The statements were put in there, but it didn’t rise up high enough to be a principle. (PC, January, 1992)

The DiBiaggio-Perles affair became an example that symbolized the lack of presidential authority over athletics. In the days immediately before the Commission’s first meeting in January 1990, the Michigan State Board of Trustees acted to install Head Football Coach George Perles as Athletic Director, as well. Perles assumed the second position over the protests of President DiBiaggio whose authority had been usurped by the Board. DiBiaggio, upon request, relayed the story at the Commission meeting. "It was just serendipity that [there was] the situation [at Michigan State] which was an example where there was no presidential control" (PC, February, 1992). The events reinforced the Commission’s concern about a president’s ability to manage athletics and effect reform.

Arthur Ashe’s dinner speech at the April 1990 Knight Commission meeting changed the perspectives of many Commissioners. Ashe’s comments were well received: "One of the high points of discussion was Arthur Ashe. Arthur Ashe was spectacular" (PC, January, 1992). Ashe’s argument struck a chord and led to the report’s emphasis on the welfare of the student-athlete. "Ashe was quite strong on the fact that we were using the kids in the process."
That was the genesis of the keeping faith with the student-athlete...not the term but the idea that the kids are what matters" (PC, January 1992).

**System Persistence**

The Knight Commission steered away from the issue of providing sports entertainment, particularly through commercial television. "It is a hypersensitive issue and it borders on asking the emperor if he has any clothes on. People shy away from that" (PC, March, 1992). The time required to address the topic and its entrenchment within the American culture presented obstacles that the Commission was not prepared to manage.

The overwhelming nature of the public’s identification and consumption of commercial television made it difficult to approach.

We had to accept some fundamental characteristics of the beast and go above that and do what we could. How can you begin to change the culture of America that just loves sports. Some things are just overwhelming. We couldn’t really get at them. (PC, February, 1992)

The issue of report acceptance and developing subjective authority also influenced the Knight Commission to accept television as a persistent part of the system.

The issue didn’t get addressed because there were people like Martin Massengale who would say, 'I do have to entertain people in Nebraska. That is a function of my state university. The Big Red are important to
people. [Its OK] as long as we do it in a clean way.' (PC, January, 1992)

Making a radical shift in the current policy seemed to threaten the authority of the Commission. "If we had gone much farther [than we did on commercial television], it would have [been an issue] of turning [the policy applecart] upside down" (PC, February, 1992).

The time to reach a workable resolution on commercial television appeared prohibitive, even if the Knight Commission had reached consensus and chosen to address the question of the appropriateness for an institution of higher learning to provide sports entertainment.

We knew it was something that would have taken an enormous amount of time to grapple with...you have got to try and make an impact...if you come out with something in this area...do you compromise the value of all the other recommendations? It is still a very central issue. (PC, March, 1992)
CHAPTER NINE

Synthesis, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Chapter Overview

To close the present study, this chapter's four sections: synthesize its findings around the central targets of inquiry, draw specific conclusions about the Knight Commission's influence on athletic governance reform, generalize these inferences to the reform commission process itself, and, finally, make recommendations for future research on commissions and athletic policy.

The purpose of this study, as noted before, was to provide a case history of an educational reform commission's entire process. The discussion to follow--the first section--blends the research findings around four of the five foci of inquiry: (1) stakeholders and political elements, (2) antecedents to reform, (3) NCAA governance and policy outcomes, and (4) Knight Commission operation.

The fifth focus, connections between operation and outcomes, becomes the centerpiece of the specific conclusions. This second section takes up the question: What functions did the Knight Commission serve in bringing organizational change or policy reform to college sports?

The broader interest serves to orient the present study's terminus around the question: How does an independent, external, temporary commission operate in order to influence the governance, decision making, and policies of
a standing policy-making organization? This third section attempts to reconcile the present study with the conceptual framework and the national educational reform literature.

Finally, the recommendations for further research supply ideas concerning research methodology, reform commission studies, and athletic policy investigations.

Discussion of the Findings

The discussion synthesizes the research findings around four research interests (see previous page). The literature review and research questions provide a structure for this section.

Stakeholders and Political Elements

The composition of the Knight Commission was prestigious. Prestige, by definition, refers to "standing or estimation in the eyes of people...commanding position in men's minds" (Webster, 1961, p. 674). Influence is its synonym. The Knight Commission mixed together top-level higher education and athletic administrators, held in esteem within the relevant constellations of interest in athletic governance. Their elite backgrounds intimate commonly-held values and assumptions about their work together that expedited a normative consensus. Moreover, the prestige and influence associated with their high rank outweighs bias in relating the composition of
the Commission to its operation and outcomes. Diverse organizational interests on the Commission precluded an incapacitating "group think" in composing its report.

The key to understanding the Knight Commission as a whole rests with the breadth of organizational representation. Eminent individuals from once-antagonistic political elements--two camps of presidents, supporters of NCAA Presidents Commission versus ACE's President Board advocates--agreed to utilize the Commission as a common forum. The ad hoc, independent nature of the group combined with the up-front integrity of the three Commission leaders to permit these disparate points of view to openly participate. Negotiation became less threatening under a third party flag, permitting consensus to develop on a set of core beliefs.

The Knight Commission convened an inter-organizational congress dominated by university presidents. Their solution-oriented approach portends a Commission whose purpose was more to facilitate adoption than innovate policy. Stakeholders with formal political standing in NCAA, NCAA Presidents Commission, Congress, ACE, all major Division I-A conferences, and other such organizations represented an alliance of elite, reform-minded administrators. In addition, credibility with various other segments of the public came through the participation of top corporate executives and an organizational image shaped by an effective staff, as well as consultants who included a famous pollster, the leading Washington, DC report writer, and a prestigious Fifth Avenue public
relations firm. Although possessing no formal authority, the political resources present on the Commission were considerable.

The purposes of the Knight Commission evolved as the coalition of stakeholders developed. The motives each key actor brought to the Commission indicated that it was perceived to serve multiple purposes. The Commission idea originated with Co-Chair Bill Friday, with ACE's Bob Atwell exercising some influence in the idea development. Both long-involved advocates of reform from the ACE's platform, their clear purpose was to reactivate the reform process. Persuasion was their tool.

Knight Foundation's Creed Black shared a personal conviction that reform was needed but had no preconceived approach about how to do it. Black wanted to develop a reform agenda and create a climate where reform could happen. Black and ACE's Jim Whalen focused the Commission on bringing about elite consensus. NCAA's Dick Schultz and the NCAA Presidents Commission envisioned the Knight Commission as providing symbolic reassurance to Congress and an organizational tool to reinforce their own reform agenda within the NCAA.

The belief that a policy window existed in which reform was possible was a universally-held perception influencing the Knight Foundation to empower the Commission and the stakeholders to invest in it. The central stakeholders brought a need to manage the reform issue because of their differing organizational interests. The convergence of these motives into a group
cohesion became a direct outgrowth of each participant’s willingness to utilize his or her unique political capital to advance the Knight Commission’s reforms. The Commission’s outcomes resulted from the ferment and cross-fertilization of this consensual process.

New participants--Congress, Dick Schultz, Martin Massengale, Jim Whalen, and Creed Black--changed the inter-organizational climate. The Knight Commission created a choice opportunity (Cohen & March, 1974) for these stakeholders to initiate reform, capitalizing on the favorable political conditions. These two streams of influence helped to create a favorable policy window. The confluence between a new point of decision (report release) and new stakeholders in critical positions supplied energy to seek resolution for the athletic problem areas.

Antecedents to Reform

The Knight Commission was a political instrument used in the governance process by strategic policy makers. From a policy standpoint, it manipulated the analytic policy space to incorporate higher education values. Controlling principles in the policy debate shifted from the spiraling interaction among competitive equity, program expansion, and financial solvency to the values of institutional integrity and educational value of athletics.

Much of the Commission's operation, including its problem structure, centered on processes to develop subjective authority--acceptance by
operational-level constituents--for its core values, as well as to increase the objective authority of the legitimate university leaders to make policy reflecting those beliefs. Those concerned with the integrity of higher education--notably university presidents--benefitted from this influence.

The Commission's problem structure placed intercollegiate athletics in a clear, subordinate relationship to the institution of higher education. While concern for the well-being of the student-athlete supplied a sympathetic and symbolic concern with which to generate support, the linkage between semi-autonomous athletic departments, and threats to higher education's integrity warranted policy reform in institutional governance.

Lou Harris' June 1989 poll reconfigured the problem structure in college athletics. His poll results separated the public interest in college sports from public concern about the effect of athletic abuses. Recognizing that public concerns existed, strategic-level policy makers acted to discipline the athletic system.

The Commission's "1 + 3 model" operationalized its institutional integrity value, providing for tighter coupling between the academic institution and athletic department. The four principles--presidential control, academic integrity, financial integrity, and certification--possess an inherent legitimacy and are traditional responses to issues of institutional control.

Three primary coupling mechanisms within an organization are authority of office (presidential control), budgetary relationships (financial control), and
the organization’s technical core (academic integrity) (Weick, 1976). Internal
and external accounting techniques (certification) generally exist to provide
independent authentication that the organizational mission is the focus of
effort. The four concepts contain little of substance that is contentious; yet,
they reflect an influence whose bases of authority (Weber, 1947) are both
legitimate and traditional.

The Knight Commission’s findings were generally validated as antecedent
conditions. The Commission’s three warrants for study—public concern, the
threat of governmental intervention, and athletic abuses undermining
institutional integrity—along with the issue areas of semi-autonomous athletic
operation, welfare of the student-athlete, and outside commercial interests
threatening university control received broad support from the sample of NCAA
policy experts.

The issues receiving equivocal responses as antecedents provide insight
into the Commission’s efforts to empower strategic-level policy makers while
still developing subjective authority with adherents. The sample supported the
remainder of the Commission’s problem structure, with the notable exception
of the operational-level positions of athletic director, faculty athletic
representative, and, in some instances, coaches. By putting semi-autonomous
athletic departments at the center of its problem structure, the Commission’s
findings tacitly assigned culpability at the operational level. This orientation
reinforced the mandate for reform directed by strategic-level policy makers and explains, in part, the resistance by athletic personnel.

Within this problem structure rests a paradox. The commercial ethic that pressures the athletic operation to embrace entertainment values—which adversely affect both student-athlete and institution—foreign to a university’s mission is created by the budgetary relationship in which the university requires an athletic department to be self-funding and, thus, a business. The Commission mentioned, but did not connect with its problem structure, the issues of the legitimacy of athletics as an educational program and institutional funding for athletics.

To provide reasons for this internal contradiction is speculative within the scope of this study. To do so questions the true core value of the Knight Commission. The concern for the integrity of higher education emanated from public opinion foreshadowing a loss of financial support for colleges and universities. Providing institutional funds for athletics augments the power of the purse, making for tighter coupling, thus permitting the university greater control in directing these programs as educational. Accounting mechanisms could be restructured to symbolically mirror the legitimacy of the educational value of sports.

However, this policy is radical for the reason that supporting the educational value of athletics adds a prohibitive cost within the current athletic system. No president could justify redirecting university funds from already
strapped academic programs. Given the history of athletics and the political context suggested by Harris' 1989 poll, such a decision would reinforce the public perception that the integrity of the institution was at question.

Implicitly the Knight Commission's 1991 report recognized this contradiction between this aspect of institutional integrity and the educational value of athletics. Indeed, it recommended institutional support for athletics and titled the report "Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete." Nonetheless, the problem structure and the values contained in the "1 + 3 model" reinforced institutional integrity, not the well-being of the student-athlete. To have done otherwise—and proposed reforms for athletic departments in the academic model—may well have upset the cart of apples (Lindblom, 1968). The level of anxiety created within policy system adherents may have eroded subjective authority, thus, obedience. This would have reduced the legitimacy of the Commission as an authoritative provider of values for the policy-making system.

In proposing a reform model that requires tighter coupling between the academic and athletic, the fundamentals should provide support for the educational value of athletics. The rationale: an educational institution operating with integrity offers programs that remain educational at their core. Yet the evidence showed that the Knight Commission approached these issues to insure report acceptance while providing a mandate for reform by strategic policy makers.
NCAA Governance and Policy Outcomes

The NCAA policy outcomes suggest that the Knight Commission’s early impact has been considerable. In less than a year, the NCAA acted positively on 63% of the Commission’s recommendations. The cross-fertilization among the Knight Commission, NCAA Presidents Commission, and the NCAA Executive Director provides an explanation for implementation effectiveness. Policy makers with legitimate authority initiated proposals that represented Knight Commission values. In addition, the Knight Commission enhanced the objective authority of its members and worked to prepare the organizational culture for reform (subjective authority).

The inherent elegance of the "1 + 3 model" has been discussed, but not the importance of its structure to the politics of implementation. The values represented in its reform model divide the NCAA constituents horizontally across job class, instead of vertically between institution types. The model did not attempt to redistribute resources or power among institutions (with the possible exception of advancing more restrictive academic standards which benefit elite institutions).

The institutional control issues appealed to presidents, regardless of school size or mission. The presidents in the sample strongly supported the Commission’s reform proposals. When resistance occurred, it came within the operational-level job classes. The inherent political force of this strategy is
obvious; in the NCAA governance structure, each president legitimately controls each institution’s vote.

A strict interpretation of the evidence concerning the effect of structure—form and specificity—(see Table 10 in Chapter Six) on each recommendation’s implementation was confounded by the Knight and Presidents Commissions’ cross-boundary members. Several of the proposals presented specifically as policy alternatives were adopted at the 1992 NCAA convention, leading to the conclusion that specific recommendations are more effective than general directives. On the contrary, interviews suggested that the 1992 Presidents Commission legislation was equally influenced by the Knight Commission and the agenda it developed prior to 1990. The specificity and early implementation of the academic integrity recommendations appear to have resulted from their headway within the policy cycle. With knowledge of a policy alternative’s progress, the Knight Commission could advance more specific proposals with assurance of acceptance.

When an issue was more sensitive politically, less defined intellectually, or required further study, the Knight Commission emphasized problem definition. It thereby shaped the values of the analytic policy space. Lawrence’s (1990) conclusion that commission recommendations need to be general in nature, appears to be tenable in the present study. The Knight Commission members on the Strategic Planning Sub-Committee added the constellation of certification, presidential control, and financial integrity issues
to future Presidents Commission agendas, but the Knight Commission recommendation, *per se*, left room for this legitimate policy-making body to structure the specific policy.

The exceptions to this observation about proposal structure were fiscal control (curbing booster involvement and centralizing revenues and budgets) and outside coaching income (prior presidential approval and banning shoe contracts) recommendations. Again, the degree of acceptance by the political system intervenes to confound conclusions that recommendation specificity enhances acceptance. The sample of NCAA policy experts rated each of these proposals among the most significant to reform. This evidence can be interpreted to indicate pre-existing support and acceptance of the policy as reflective of salient values in the policy space. Once again, the Knight Commission advanced specific recommendations when there was foreknowledge of policy acceptance.

**Knight Commission Operation**

Since the Knight Commission's antecedents and operation have discussed (in Chapters Seven and Eight), no attempt is made here to touch on every issue identified. Rather, the aim is to synthesize the broad themes.

Although the Commission engaged in the intellectual process of policy analysis, to a great degree, its activities represent a unique form of governance. Events that occurred prior to and immediately following empowerment
underscore an attempt to solve an inter-organizational governance problem. As an outgrowth of earlier ACE efforts that became allied with NCAA reform interests, the intent was political—to influence NCAA policy, as well as public opinion—and not intellectual. The purpose of its empowerment suggests that policy making—effected through policy analysis and persuasion—was its top agenda.

The evidence supports the political intentions of the Knight Commission. It descended directly from previous ACE reform attempts. The "solution" of an independent commission developed from participants related to the ACE's previous reform efforts. This was made possible by Knight Foundation funding. The major report from this commission "solution" provided a "choice opportunity" with which to effect athletic policy (Cohen and March, 1974).

The evolution of the Knight Commission's operation further pinpoints the dominance of political processes. The Knight Foundation's primary decision for empowerment came after assessing the existence of a "policy window" created, in part, by new political players. The Knight Commission leadership redefined the problem arriving at the elements of the "1+3" structure even prior to empowerment. The Commissioners were selected, in part, on the basis of their standing in associated policy-making organizations. Finally, the strategy for the investigative approach strongly considered implementation issues.
If this Commission were a rational, intellectual attempt to analyze the potential solutions, in order to identify the "best" policy recommendations, the expectation would be that problems, not solutions, would be identified prior to empowerment. Commissioners would be selected on the basis of their knowledge, and particular political concerns would be of minimal consequence in selecting a study approach. Instead, the participants who joined the Knight Commission developed a well-reasoned political approach to influence the NCAA’s policy-making system.

The internal processes of the Commission also reflected political and intellectual balance. Information, logical rationale, and expert opinion appeared to have had the greatest influence in altering individual Commissioner’s opinions. Each of these relates to an intellectual process. Yet, in most instances, this influence merely refined a Commissioner’s already formed belief structure. The strength of each Commissioner’s own convictions was moderated by a common set of values and assumptions about the Commission’s mission, thus serving to expedite decision making.

The two most influential group decision-making processes on the Knight Commission, though, were consensus and the cohesive effect of the "1+3 model." Both limited recommendations and issue areas in the Commission’s report.

The singular goal of consensus had a powerful affect on Knight Commission deliberations and decisions. Unlike other adversarial mechanisms
in a democratic society, the Commission held an implicit goal of reaching agreement on a report. When clear, stable opposition was identified on a subject, no advantage prevailed in contesting it— if resolution was not possible. As a result, the issue was dropped.

The "1 + 3 model" narrowed the scope of study and introduced a lever for leadership influence. When an issue strayed from these constraints, it required convincing rationale to be included. Failing this, it too was dropped.

**Connections Between Knight Commission Operation and NCAA Outcomes**

At this early assessment, the evidence supports the tentative conclusion that the Knight Commission has been an effective reform commission. This study, meantime, has been concerned with identifying "loose couplings" between cause and effect to better understand the commission process. How the Knight Commission functioned to bring about policy reform thereby provides the basis for identifying the obvious and less-than-obvious connections.

Through its formation, report, and reform model, the Knight Commission shifted the policy space in college sports to incorporate higher education values. Its primary mission was restoring public confidence in the intercollegiate athletic system as a result of policy reform. Although specific reforms are attributable to a variety of political actors or groups, preparing the "climate for reform" was the Knight Commission's unique contribution.

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The Commission made no fundamental policy reforms (shifting the purpose, basis of financial support, authority, structure, or visibility of these programs). It had no authority to make fundamental policy reforms. The significance of the Knight Commission's activities was that policy reforms became viable or will become possible within the policy space it created. Policy is an authoritative allocation of value. Manipulating the relevant values upon which policy is based becomes a powerful influence in the policy-making process.

The policy alternatives that the Commission advanced reiterated reform proposals innovated by others. The substantive product of their work tended to the conservative end of the reform continuum; although, it was packaged in a novel, hard-hitting manner (the "1 + 3 model"). What is distinctive about the Knight Commission is the process by which they readied constituent groups to accept reform (subjective authority). It was not its specific solutions, but the fact that it got them implemented.

Specific Conclusions

Its combined activities and widely communicated findings and recommendations permitted the Knight Commission to germinate subjective authority for its reform model, to empower legitimate policy makers with objective authority, and to shift the policy space to higher education values.
The following conclusions point to elements in the Knight Commission’s success:

1. The enthusiastic, constructive, and committed leadership of the Knight Foundation and its President provided a clear mission and substantial resources with which to facilitate the Knight Commission’s activities.

2. The leadership of the Co-Chairs promoted the Commission’s decision making by providing a clear vision of its purpose and scope.

3. The Commission was composed of eminent individuals of high integrity and professional stature.

4. The independence of the Commission supplied political deniability and permitted a union of key actors who represented former adversaries. The identification of a "policy window" and agreement on common, unifying values occurred before empowerment and provided a solid political basis for the Commission’s work. No constituency pressured a key actor to behave in any particular manner as a Knight Commissioner. If the report encountered a problem with a base constituency, the option to add minority footnotes provided an acceptable method of maintaining viability with their primary organization.

5. Cross-boundary Commissioners possessed legitimate political standing within policy-making organizations. In effect, the Commission report became advice that these members were giving to themselves.
6. The breadth of organizational representation permitted cross-fertilization, thus developing a temporary, inter-organizational advisory body. Although this "government" had no authority beyond "moral-suasion," it created a communication system that coordinated reform agendas and facilitated elite consensus. The metaphor of force-field analysis illuminates this process. The Commission served to align the vectors of external and internal groups so that their combined effect developed a critical mass to move the NCAA toward reform.

7. The Knight Commission's membership, report and follow-up activities further activated Congress, which exerted visible pressure on the NCAA—thereby reducing internal resistance to change. The Congressional hearings served to reinforce among interest groups within the NCAA that an outside body politic would intervene if reform did not occur within the organization.

8. The professional staff and consultants provided first class advice and credible information when called upon. The report's form, its release, the accurate substantive information that served as its basis, and knowledge of constituent and public opinion emanated from staff/consultant sources.

9. The hearing process provided a basis of information, as well as credibility with constituent groups by reinforcing an image of a rational, comprehensive study process. Listening to constituent groups (partisan policy analysis) proved useful in lowering resistance while persuading constituent groups to accept the Knight Commission's reform model.
10. The recommendations were simple, focused and structured within an intellectual framework grounded in higher education values.

11. The recommendations were posed in general form when acceptance of a specific policy alternative had not yet occurred. The Knight Commission was concerned with developing a road map more than specific proposals. This approach supported the manipulation of the policy space by keeping the emphasis on values underlying the general policy. It also diminished internal constituencies' questioning the feasibility of every recommendation.

14. The reform model, premised in traditional and legitimate organizational principles, was structured to appeal to university presidents with NCAA voting privileges. The "1+3 model" possessed an inherent legitimacy. It divided concerns horizontally across job class rather than vertically between NCAA member institutions.

15. The increment of recommended change and the tone of the report emphasized report acceptance. To the Commission, it advanced the largest increment of change without undermining its acceptance. It was concise, designed to be read and have an impact. It utilized a rhetorical style posing an argument favoring its problem structure and reform model.

16. The Commission "sold" its reforms to the "bottom" of the NCAA's organization and to the public through its open hearings and the publicity and symbolism of its report release.
17. By staying intact after its report release, the Knight Commission supported the efforts of internal policy makers who were initiating athletic reform. Moreover, the still-intact Commission, through a synthesis of the above activities, became a standard of reference for athletic reform and a "legitimate" provider of policy influence within the NCAA. The shift from an expert to legitimate basis of persuasive power (French & Raven, 1959) to promote acceptance of its recommendations represents a significant step in efficient and effective governance. Expert advice requires accurate information to reinforce it. Legitimacy, though, is supported by habitual response to an internal source of authority. The Knight Commission and their values became the standard of reference in athletic governance reform. In itself, it became a model for all manner of commissions.

Reform Commission Concepts and Analysis

In drawing to a close, reviewing the literature, the conceptual framework, and the present study’s conclusions permits theses-level inference. Like snowflakes, no two commissions are the same. But by placing this sample of one on the continua of previous studies and within theoretical concepts, common threads appear that provide a beginning place for each new study. For scholars to understand the motives of the practitioners who empower them, research must enrich these commission paradigms. The concepts and analysis issues discussed in this section attempt to enhance that exemplar.
Issues of Analysis

Commissions are described as purposive. The Knight Commission, certainly, exhibited considerable rationality. Its mission, though, was political, not social scientific, in nature. As a result, nothing in the present study suggested that the interest in commission effectiveness is misplaced. However, studies or articles, at times, have approached the effectiveness topic with a normative bias. Instances occur in which the evaluation of effects has centered on policy analysis or policy making in the absence of a clear determination of the mission of the commission. Evaluation should be done in relation to the purposes of each specific entity. This assessment of mission must also go beyond the written statement and investigate the purposes of the key actors and stakeholders who join them.

Easton’s (1965a) political systems theory provides a useful framework with which to conceive output in relation to input. The concept of impact or effects, however, is a measure of outcomes in relation to some baseline of activity within the context of the commission. The direct assessment of effectiveness in relation to a normative list from earlier research would appear to invite spurious conclusions. Outcomes should be measured and internal norms determined with effects induced or deduced from their comparison.

Explicitly determined values, although difficult to pin down, provide a stable point of analysis from which to measure outcomes. Schein’s (1969) change model, adjusted to organizations, was a useful conception of this
dynamic. If the reform commission, through its study process, report, or report release, unfreezes the commission’s target from its baseline behavior, how does the researcher know whether the effect of this stress shifts the new behavior toward the commission’s mission or values? By making explicit the reform commission’s core values, the reform outcomes can be analyzed in relation to those values.

**Reform Commission Concepts**

The reform commission life cycle provides an important concept with which to view a temporary organization. The seven stages (developed from Ginsberg & Wimpelberg, 1988) used in this study proved to interact with one another. Each stage served as an information bin but discrete definitions between each proved troublesome. For instance, the Knight Commission’s mission, key stakeholders, problem structure, and reform model—its formation—had been decided or introduced prior to empowerment. The open systems view (such as Easton’s political systems theory, 1965a) of antecedents (inputs), operation (throughput), and outcomes (output and effectiveness measures) supplied a model with fewer constraints. The seven life cycle stages, reinforced with other concepts—such as formation processes, problem structuring, and report release, provide threads of activity within the more global open systems categories.
The following concepts were useful in understanding and explaining the couplings, both tight and loose, of a reform commission (Weick, 1976). Here, theory merges with the present study to probe new ways to "see" a commission.

**Antecedents**

The issue of timing repeatedly cropped up in the present study. The specific events or problems in the environment provided no specific explanation of what made 1989 the time to form the Knight Commission. Cohen and March’s (1974) concept about the processes of choice holds that four relatively independent "streams" influence decision making. The confluence and interaction between each stream provides an explanation for the timing of the Commission. New participants emerged in NCAA, ACE, and Presidents Commission; Harris’ study restructured the problem; and the Knight Commission became a reform solution that created choice opportunities through its manufactured pressure points—such as the report release. Each stream supplies an important point of reference in understanding the "policy window" that girds any particular commission’s creation.

To Cohen and March’s (1974) four streams are added the variables that emerged from the present study. Their confluence as each emerged and receded explains the perception of a "policy window" favorable to reform. *Participants* brought values, personal history, problem structure, political
resources, and an interactive style. *Problems and problem structures* provide the manner in which relevant stakeholders constructed or interpreted the current environmental conditions into problems. The problem structure revealed core values. It was subject to reconstruction, and played an important role in developing the urgency for reform.

*Solutions* in the form of policy alternatives existed within and outside the political system of the target organization. The Commission's role in policy analysis and innovation was influenced by the evolution of existing policy alternatives. The Commission itself was a solution looking for a governance problem. *Choice opportunities* came in the form of new participants or environmental stress. The Commission's report provided a tangible period for policy decision. The present study revealed that the Commission itself introduced a series of choice opportunities for those who possessed the political resources to empower it.

**Operation**

The literature about the reform commission's role in the policy process supplied equivocal images. Some scholars looked at commissions in terms of the intellectual process of policy analysis, while others evaluated these reform groups by the specific policies they effected. Neither was useful in understanding the policy process of the Knight Commission. The present study revealed effects in the policy domain, as well as in the political and symbolic
domains. The capabilities of an inter-organizational government and the wide exposure given to the restructured problem definition must be added to the NCAA policy reforms as Commission impact.

Within the policy domain, Dunn’s (1981) model of the policy cycle proved useful by orienting policy development on a cyclical continuum. Dunn’s model is not unique in this respect, but it does provide a structure that explains commission activities. In Dunn’s (1981) terms, reform commissions focus their policy actions on developing a problem structure and defining specific problems—the top half of the model shown in Figure 4 in Chapter Two.

The Knight Commission restructured the problem definition, linking the athletic abuses with higher education’s integrity. In doing so, it manipulated the policy space to incorporate higher education values. Values represented in this problem structure come before and affect the development of policy alternatives. In the wake of the Commission’s report, the implementation of any specific policy alternative weathers policy debate with the acknowledged importance of presidential control, the well-being of the student-athlete, or institutional accountability.

Although the Commission report recommended specific policy alternatives, it had no authority to implement them. The NCAA, on the other hand, regularly develops policy alternatives and takes policy actions—the bottom half of the model in Figure 4. The presumption of policy-making authority by the Commission would have been counterproductive in persuading
the NCAA to accept the independent body's value system. As a result, The Commission aimed to shape the structure of policy dialogue in the period after its termination. It was politically expedient to focus efforts on shaping and manipulating the analytic policy space (Jenkins-Smith, 1990) rather than on getting too specific with policy recommendations.

Reform commissions, in general, influence the policy cycle with their problem structure and inherent values, as well as their policy recommendations. While manipulating the policy space is a less directive approach, the characterization of "trickle down" reform (Ginsberg & Wimpelberg, 1987) is explained. If the reform commission is successful in having its problem structure and values accepted, each organization develops policy ownership by studying and implementing specific policies that reflect these reform influences. The eminent members of a reform commission set general policy rather than specific policy because it was more likely to be accepted, thus providing some influence.

The reform commission's general policy focus implicates the force of the report's intellectual core and the breadth and success in communicating it to constituents. The rhetorical style of "A Nation At Risk" and "Keeping Faith With The Student-Athlete" argues, even dramatizes, to promote report acceptance. Extensive publicity accompanying the Knight Commission's study and report release served as a symbolic device communicating broadly the core values of the Commission to its target. With national reform commissions, this
target includes the public connected with the myriad target organizations prompting mass media techniques.

Acceptance of the reforms is the critical variable. Barnard (1938) suggested that "methods of making known," or "dramatizing," the appointment of authority was an "essential process to the creation of authority at the bottom, where only it can be fundamentally..." (p. 180). Policy-makers cannot make policy that is not accepted by those attached to the organization without threatening their own authority (Lindblom, 1968). As a result Schultz, the Presidents, and university presidents were hamstrung in forcing unacknowledged reforms. By altering the values and problem structure at the operation-level of NCAA through persuasive communication, the Knight Commission created a "climate for reform." With the policy system's adherents persuaded, NCAA policy-makers introduced reformed policies to which adherence could occur.

The priority placed on report acceptance explains the moderate degree of reform (short of fundamental reform) suggested by the Knight Commission and many other reform commission reports. The Commission's suggestion of existing policy alternatives, the concern for "positioning" the report reveal a powerful dynamic that makes policy innovation a secondary aim. Lindblom (1968) observed that most adherents to a policy system accept its authority through force of habit. This habitual response occurs within a "zone of indifference" (Barnard, 1938). For the policy system to sanction radical policy
raises adherent concern, interrupting habitual response, and reducing policy-maker authority. If the Knight Commission had called for the end to college sports on commercial television, fully substantiating their position, it likely would have lost all credibility within the NCAA and American public and, thus, its authority. Because, prior to its report, it possessed only expert (French & Raven, 1959) or charismatic (Weber, 1947) persuasion power, recommending unacceptable policies would threaten its only basis of authority.

The techniques to establish its authority went beyond policy activities. In this respect, the Commission’s top to bottom communication was explained, in part, by symbolic communication. Another was the hearing process. It provided a basis of information (bottom to top), but of equal importance credibility (acceptance) with constituent groups. The technique of partisan policy analysis permitted the Commissioners and potential adherents to engage in mutual persuasion. With its clearly defined purpose and intellectual core, the Commission maximized acceptance of its recommendations by asking constituents to interpret the reform structure through their own belief system. In the process of being listened to, the persuasive influence of what the operation-level people heard from the Commission was communicated directly. As a result, credibility and authority with the target increased.

The Commission’s lateral communication also played an important role in the persuasion process. Internal discussions of the issues also formed a partisan policy analysis for the Commissioners representing different policy
perspectives. As consensus developed within the Commission, however, the breadth of organizational representation influenced the degree of inter-organizational communication. The Commission represented the central stakeholders in athletic governance. By supplying an "overlapping group structure," it became an inter-organizational government (Likert, 1969). Each member established a "linking pin" between the otherwise independent organizations. During a period of institutional change, this facility increased coordination and control in reform activities.

**Outcomes**

Given the absence of legitimate authority, it can be concluded that the outcomes of any reform commission occur primarily through indirect influence and persuasion. Two direct methods of approaching policy implementation, in the case of the Knight Commission, resulted from cross-boundary members and the commission remaining intact. Both methods increased the Commission's legitimacy and reduced its perception as an independent outside body.

With the Knight Commission, cross-boundary members with legitimate standing in a policy-making organization transferred both the reform agenda and the authority to implement policy. Their legitimate authority enhanced the expertise of the Commission, as well as their own within the base constituents. As a result, these members contributed a powerful influence on their policy-making body, as well as within the Commission. As a result, the Commission’s
agenda was introduced into policy alternatives from within the policy-making body’s power structure. The Commissioners wearing two hats, in a sense, gave reform advice to themselves.

By staying intact following its initial report, the Commission increased its persuasive leverage. Many persuasive techniques utilized during its operation were repeated and focused after the initial report. More importantly, their potential remained. The most interesting result from this practice: the post-report capability of the Knight Commission to exert legitimate policy influence within the NCAA, its target. This elevated the basis of the Commission’s authority from expertise to legitimacy.

The cumulative effect of efforts to develop Commission authority resulted in this shift in the basis of power. The Commission’s acceptance was catalyzed by its report’s acceptance. By staying intact, the impact of the Commission became less questioned and more habitual for adherents of the athletic policy system. Although still without formal authority, the Commission became a legitimate influencer within the NCAA, as well as Congress. Combining cross-boundary Commissioners with legitimate policy roles increased the Knight Commission’s capability to implement its recommendations.

Why Use a Reform Commission?

The present study revealed that reform commissions provide a method to govern. Institutional change attributable to the Knight Commission resulted
from effective governance. A central issue in a democratic society concerns appropriate means to facilitate cooperative behavior. Moving groups of unique individuals in a coordinated effort contains inherent problems because of the difficulties related to engendering coaction. Knight Commission, however, effectively governed the reform process by relying upon individuals to accept core values that precipitated change.

A central question for developing cooperation concerns the locus of control for determining behavior. Knight Commission’s approach served to influence its organizational targets through the integration of its core values. The Commission’s bases of power for developing its authority were expertise, information, referential, and eventually some legitimate (Collins & Raven, 1969). Each occurs from its acceptance by adherent. These four types of power, versus coercion or reward, possess the advantage of developing an internal locus of control (French & Raven, 1959; Collins & Raven).

The Commission lacked the means and authority for external control. It avoided this type of approach because of concern that resistance would develop, thus, eroding subsequent cooperation. The alternative, internal control through acceptance, presented problems for those in charge of athletic governance because of differing value systems. The behavior of concern emanated from commercial versus educational motives. Transforming organizational culture precedes institutional reform (Schein, 1985). The Knight Commission chose to manipulate the shared beliefs, the culture, to collectively
influence the behavior of adherents through their uniform acceptance of a set of principles.

Now to the question: why use a reform commission? Easton’s definition for policy--an authoritative allocation of value--serves as a basis for explanation. An effective reform commission, such as Knight, operates to consolidate and centralize political power and resources. Its prerequisite for influence is the development of authority; particularly that which resides with acceptance at the bottom of the organization. The central theme of the Commission’s operation was the development of authority to lead reform. Its methods--partisan policy analysis, positioning the report, the prestigious composition, the publicity of report release, the image of a rational-comprehensive study approach, cross-fertilization, and cross-boundary members--signified a direct effort to gain policy acceptance, thus, obtaining the requisite authority that acceptance engenders.

Concurrently, the Knight Commission exercised its authority to manipulate the values in the policy space. Executive responsibility--governing--includes creating "moral codes" to resolve difficult or ambiguous situations for adherents (Barnard, 1938). The Commission’s operation and report were both determined by and determinant of its target’s organizational culture. Much of Knight’s internal deliberations focused on creating core values (1 + 3 model) and related recommendations that would be accepted by Commissioners and target. This present view posits the Commission operating to develop authority in order
to enhance acceptance of that code of behavior. This giving and receiving process required considerable dialogue.

The development of authority and acceptance of core values required extensive communication—allocation—to inculcate "a sense of organization" (Barnard, 1938). The Knight Commission effected new shared beliefs within the organizational culture of its target by being heard. Its methods—the symbolism of a prestigious group, the publicity of study and report release, being an inter-organizational government through cross-fertilization, and rhetorical devices within the report—communicated its core values to constituents prepared to accept them—the authoritative allocation of value.

In conclusion, reform commissions are tools of organizational governance. Their basis founded on democratic principles of governance: authority should emanate from the governed, thus revealing the solutions acceptable to the relevant interests. The misconception that a commission might aspire to the standards of social science in its policy study ignores its political nature. A scientific policy solution, no matter how correct, is no more than the hollow coercion of an authoritarian, if not enforced through acceptance. Conversely, the use of rhetoric and dialogue to determine "truth" spans the history of civilized humankind.

The reform commission's process involves developing acceptable, not ideal, policies that effect institutional change. In the words of one interviewee: "The art of politics is in the possible" (PC, July, 1991). An effective reform
commission’s unique quality exists in being a visible forum for dialogue between relevant stakeholders. In the absence of entrenched organizational power, the weight of decision rests with reason, logic and the ability to persuade. In this crucible, it becomes a gathering that reveals.

**Recommendations for Future Study**

Several factors in the section above establish foundations for future research, in terms of methodology and concepts. If this investigator were to recommend a future study based on this project alone, it would be to propose further investigation of policy implementation and additional case studies of national educational reform commissions.

The latter interest stems from the paucity of case studies of national-level educational reform commissions. The research reviewed in Chapter Two was not sensitive to contextual issues or political processes affected by the commissions of interest. Additional in-depth research on these factors would add to knowledge about the practical effects of reform commissions.

With regard to policy implementation, the present study did not look at the impact of the Knight Commission’s recommendations that were directed at the individual institution. Issues such as institutional funds for athletics, long-term coaching contracts, and board affirmation of presidential control are critical to a reformed athletic governance model. A survey or multi-institution
case study would supply further insights about the effects of the Knight Commission in these areas.

A follow-up investigation of the implementation of the Knight Commission's reform model should be done in five years to determine the Commission's longer-term impact. The present study provided early indications of Commission effects, but the 1993 and 1994 NCAA conventions, for example, will be critical to the model's full implementation. Mandatory certification, centralized revenues and budgets, and annual policy audits, in particular, are issues to track at the NCAA level. Of equal importance are the institutional movement toward board affirmation of presidential authority and institutional funds for athletics.

A corollary interest, although not related to the Commission's reform model, would be to investigate the faculty's role in athletic governance, particularly the method of appointing and rotating faculty athletic representatives. The faculty role in athletics emerged as an area of concern to the Knight Commissioners. The sample in this study, however, and the group heard by the Commission were too small with which to generalize.

This study has underscored for this writer the efficacy of the commission process. Reform commissions--such as Knight--can be useful in institutional change. It is hoped, moreover, that further study will prove as fruitful to the next investigator as it has to this one.
REFERENCE LIST AND SELECTED READINGS


Franklin, T. V. (1991). If you build it, will they come? The knight commission report: One athletic department’s reaction to the proposed "new model." Unpublished manuscript, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, College of Education, Blacksburg, VA.


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APPENDIX A

Definitions
Definitions

The following definitions (Barnard, 1938; Dunn, 1981; Easton, 1965a, 1965b & 1981; Ginsberg & Wimpelberg, 1988; Jenkins-Smith, 1990; Kimbrough, 1966; Lindblom, 1968; Wolanin, 1975) refer to terms as they are used in this study.

Analytic Intractability - The quality of policy analysis that does not permit policy outcomes to be measured on a common scale, which results in contradictory conclusions about the merits of any one policy alternative.

Analytic Policy Space - The configuration of analytically intractable (not possible to measure on a common scale) values present in a policy debate. The term "policy space" provides a "conceptual framework from which to compare the merits of policies across various incommensurable classes of outcomes" (Jenkins-Smith, 1990, p. 85).

Authoritative Allocation of Values - Providing direction to persons oriented toward the political system by choosing one type of behavior over another.

Behavioral Interaction/Exchanges - Interactions which relate to the feelings and motivations of the human actors in the system.

Boundary - The demarcation which distinguishes the internal structure of the political system from its environment.

Cross-Boundary Member - An individual with membership in two political systems.
Cross-Fertilization - The effect of communication between and within two organizations resulting from a cross-boundary member.

Educational Reform Commission - A group of high profile national figures convened for a finite period to study, analyze, recommend, and influence educational policy in an area of contention through advisory or symbolic rather than formal legal authority.

Environment - Everything that is outside the political system's internal structure which is distinguishable from it.

Exchanges - Interactions which occur between the internal system and the external environment.

Feedback - The information and other influences which return to the system's actors, influencers, and decision-makers.

Findings - Attributions and interrelationships in the commission report explaining the problem it has studied.

Formal Power Structure - Influences on/in the political system that are attributable to social power which is observable and subject to the formal control of legitimate leaders.

Groupthink - The like-mindedness that develops within a decision-making group in the absence of feedback from the environment outside the group.

Informal Power Structure - Influences on/in the political system that are attributable to social power, but which is not readily observable and
utilizes an informal structure of relationships to develop a power pyramid.

Interaction - The basic unit of analysis within a political system. Interactions can be situational, legal aspects inherent in the structure of the system, or behavioral, feelings and motivations of the human actors. Interactions differ from exchanges only in the location of their occurrence. Interactions are internal to the system while exchanges are external to the system.

Key Actors - Individuals within the political system or formal power structure who are responsible in whole or in part for a decision.

Key Influencers - Individuals from the environment or informal power structure who are responsible in whole or in part for a decision.

Latent Agenda - The goals and objectives of the informal power structure.

Legitimate Authority/Legitimacy - That domain of activities, decisions, or responsibilities, the authority over which has been assigned to an office, position, or role within a formal organization. Those connected to organization accept the authority, usually by habit, by nature of formal structure or rules.

Life Cycle for an Educational Reform Commission - The processes before, during, and after a commission's finite existence are conceived in seven stages: antecedents to commission formation, commission empowerment, selection of commissioners, the study process of the
commission, the decision-making process determining issues the commission will address, the findings and recommendations of the report, and the policy impact of the report.

Objective Authority - Top-down authority, often legitimate authority. That part of the authority relationship that rests with the superordinate who generates orders and directions for subordinates. According to Barnard (1938) objective authority is a largely a "myth" and non-binding unless accepted by those who are directed to comply. The "myth" is perpetuated by followers who delegate their subjective authority upward over decisions that an executive is best informed to make in the best interests of the organization, thereby protecting the collective well-being.

Partisan Policy Analysis - A technique of policy analysis in which partisan interest groups gather to discuss policy alternatives, forcing alternative providers of policy information to look realistically at the merits of the other group’s proposals.

Policy - One type of an authoritative allocation of values. It is a web of decisions which chooses one type of behavior or action over another.

Policy Analysis - The intellectual process of issue analysis.

Policy Making - The political process used to transform policy alternatives into policy actions.

Policy Space - See analytic policy space.

Policy Stakeholders - Individuals who affect or are affected by policy decisions.
Policy Window - The perceived time period in which a policy alternative would receive a favorable response from a policy-making body.

Political Interaction/Exchange - Interactions or exchanges which are oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values for a society.

Political System - Political life viewed as a system of behavior which is interdependent with all other social relations which relate to the system.

Problem Structuring - The process of defining a problem by identifying unacceptable conditions and formulating normative standards that are possible to address with policy decisions.

Public Agenda - The goals and objectives of the formal power structure.

Recommendations - Corrective suggestions furthered by a commission report which includes either specific and/or general courses of action for the target group.

Response - Changes in the structure or processes of the political system which are interpreted to be resulting from stressors in the environment or internal interactions within the political system.

Situational Interactions/Exchanges - Interactions which relate to the legal aspects inherent in the structure of the situation.

Stressor - Events which transform the system from either internal or external sources. This concept relates to the nature of the information and other influences received as feedback by the system's actors, influencers, and decision-makers.
Subjective Authority - That part of the authority relationship controlled by the subordinate by the nature of their choice of whether or not to be obedient. The basis of authority rests with its acceptance at the bottom of the organization.

System persistence - The capacity of a system to persist in the face of stress for it to change. This concept derives from the nature of the feedback received by the system’s actors, influencers, and decision-makers, and their lack of or negative response to the feedback.

Target Set - The population, political system, or individual intended to be influenced by the findings and recommendations of the commission report.
APPENDIX B

The Participating "Policy Experts"

The Survey Questionnaire with Results

Letters to the Sample
The Participating "Policy Experts"
REQUESTED PARTICIPANTS FOR SURVEY

Seventy-nine letters of request produced 71 willing respondents of which became 59 participants (indicated by X). Fifty-eight questionnaires were received and compiled in the summary statistics. One conference commissioner’s questionnaire was lost in the mail.

PRESIDENTS

X Dr. Bernard F. Sliger, President Emeritus, Florida State University
X Ltg. Dave R. Palmer, Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy
X Mr. Stanley O. Ikenberry, President, University of Illinois

Mr. William H. Cunningham, President, University of Texas
X Mr. Edward B. Fort, Chancellor, North Carolina A&T State University
X Mr. Ronald E. Beller, President, East Tennessee State University
X Mr. Dwight D. Vines, President, Northeast Louisiana University
X Mr. Gregory M. St. L. O’Brien, Chancellor, University of New Orleans

Mr. Lattie F. Coor, President, Arizona State University
X Dr. Margaret R. Preska, President, Mankato State University
X Mr. Asa N. Green, President, Livingstone University
X Mr. John W. Moore, President, California State University, Stanislaus
X Mr. David L. Warren, President, Ohio Wesleyan University

Ms. Alice Chandler, President, New Paltz State University College
X Mr. Edward G. Coll, President, Alfred University

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X Ms. Joan C. Cronan, Director of Women’s Athletics, University of Tennessee

Ms. Della Durant, Assistant Director of Athletics, Pennsylvania State University

X Mr. Charles S. Boone, Director of Athletics, University of Richmond
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X Ms. Charlotte West, Associate Director of Athletics, Southern Illinois University

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Mr. Roy Kramer, Commissioner, Southeastern Athletic Conference

X Mr. James Delaney, Commissioner, Big Ten Conference
X Mr. Craig Thompson, Commissioner, Sun Belt Conference

X Mr. Thomas E. Yeager, Commissioner, Colonial Athletic Association
Ms. Patricia Viverito, Commissioner, Gateway Collegiate Athletic Conference

Mr. Jeffrey H. Orleans, Executive Director, Council of Ivy Group Presidents

Mr. James Frank, Commissioner, Southwestern Athletic Conference

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Mr. Douglas S. Hobbs, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles

Mr. Charles Whitcomb, Professor of Recreation/Leisure Studies, San Jose State University

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Dr. Francis W. Bonner, Professor of English, Furman University

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Mr. Ted C. Tow, Associate Executive Director, National Collegiate Athletic Association
Mr. Stephen R. Morgan, Associate Executive Director, National Collegiate Athletic Association

Mr. Robert Atwell, President, American Council on Education

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Ms. Barbara Bergmann, Distinguished Professor of Economics, American University

Mr. Earnest L. Boyer, President, Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching

Mr. Thomas Ingram, President, Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges

Mr. George Hanford, President Emeritus, The College Board

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Mr. Bill Brill, Sports Columnist, Roanoke Times & World News

Mr. Douglas Lederman, Reporter, Chronicle of Higher Education

Mr. David Davidson, Sports Reporter, Atlanta Journal and Constitution

Mr. Tom Witosky, Sports Reporter, Des Moines Register

Mr. Ivan Maisel, Sports Reporter, Dallas Morning News

Mr. Ed Sherman, Sports Reporter, Chicago Tribune

Mr. Jerry McConnell, Sports Reporter, Daily Oklahoman

Mr. Jerry Linquist, Sports Reporter, Richmond Times-Dispatch

Mr. Murray Sperber, Author and Professor of English, Indiana University
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Mr. Mike Krzyzewski, Head Basketball Coach, Duke University

Mr. Gene Keady, Head Basketball Coach, Purdue University

Mr. Mike Jarvis, Head Basketball Coach, American University

Mr. George Raveling, Head Basketball Coach, University of Southern California

Mr. Denny Crum, Head Basketball Coach, University of Louisville

Mr. John Cooper, Head Football Coach, Ohio State University

Mr. Hayden Fry, Head Football Coach, University of Iowa

Mr. Grant Teaff, Head Football Coach, Baylor University

Mr. Fisher DeBerry, Head Football Coach, U.S. Air Force Academy

Mr. Don Nehlen, Head Football Coach, West Virginia University

Mr. Roy Kidd, Head Football Coach, Eastern Kentucky University

Mr. Terry Donahue, Head Football Coach, University of California, Los Angeles

Mr. Dick Sheridan, Head Football Coach, North Carolina State University
The Survey Questionnaire with Results
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Part 1. ISSUES IN ATHLETICS

For the following list, answer the following question for each issue by circling the (Y or N) in the appropriate column:

(1.) Within the past three years, is/was this issue of a magnitude of concern to merit reform at the institutional, state, or national level, or with conference or NCAA rules? For this question, reform reflects an actual shift in policy intent, purpose for a rule, or management practice versus minor changes ("finetuning") to an existing practice, rule or policy.

ISSUE

1) Special admissions allowing student-athletes who probably will not graduate to be admitted. Y (47) N (9)
2) Initial eligibility standard of 2.0 in 11 core classes. Y (44) N (14)
3) Freshman eligibility. Y (26) N (32)
4) Initial eligibility rules for junior college transfers. Y (39) N (17)
5) Student-athletes playing while not making reasonable progress toward a degree. Y (48) N (10)
6) Graduation rates of student-athletes participating in revenue sports. Y (45) N (13)
7) Special degree programs that enroll large percentages of student-athletes. Y (35) N (23)
8) The extent of NCAA regulation of academic requirements. Y (43) N (14)

B. Athletic Operations Issues
9) Recruiting practices. Y (42) N (16)
10) Drug use by student-athletes. Y (23) N (35)
11) Coaches and game schedules demanding too much time and energy from the student-athletes. Y (48) N (10)
12) Costs that exceed revenues needed to operate an athletic program. Y (49) N (8)

C. Entertainment-Oriented Issues
13) TV games scheduled at times that interfere with the academic life of the student-athlete. Y (35) N (23)
14) Requirements at many institutions that the athletic department be financially self-supporting. Y (37) N (20)
15) The pressure to generate revenues. Y (39) N (19)
16) Revenue sharing based on tournament success. Y (39) N (19)
17) Shifting the focus away from athletics providing education and enjoyment toward maximizing revenues and institutional prestige. Y (31) N (27)
D. Institutional Management Issues

18) University trustees maintaining and exercising authority over institutional athletic policy.  

19) Presidents, trustees, faculty, faculty athletic representatives, and other central university administrators being indifferent or inattentive to athletic governance.  

20) Athletic administrators and/or coaches challenging the president’s control of athletic policy at the institution.  

21) Commercial aspects related to big-time sports which make them more an entertainment business than an educational enterprise.  

22) Public perception that big-time sports are controlled by television money.  

23) Outside interests that challenge the university’s internal decisions regarding operation of its athletic program.  

24) Outside contracts that provide revenue directly to coaches or athletic administrators.  

25) Limited job security for coaches.  

E. Inter-Institutional Management Issues

26) The means established for the university presidents to influence or control policy at the conference and/or NCAA levels.  

27) NCAA enforcement procedures.  

28) Current provisions for an independent, outside audit designed to provide early notification of potential rules violations or internal control problems.  

F. Equity Issues

29) Equity of opportunity for women in college sports.  

30) Scholarship rules that do not provide the cost of attendance for the very needy.  

G. Higher Education Values and Integrity Issues

31) Athletic departments that have become semi-autonomous to the university’s purpose, mission, or control.  

32) Intercollegiate athletic programs that do not reflect the values of the university.  

33) Public perception of uncurbed rules violations undermining universities as places to learn ethics and integrity.  

34) Threat of governmental intrusion into athletic governance.  

35) Problems in high school sports.  

(II.) In the space below, write any additional other issues in college athletics which ought to be reformed.
Part 2. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

(1.) Please rate, using the scale provided, the following proposals according to their impact as solutions to the issues confronting college athletics at present or at the time that the proposal was implemented. (II.) Please indicate, with an (X) in the space provided, if the proposal's feasibility suggests, for any reason, an unworkable policy, or is too costly to implement. NOTE THAT NCAA LEGISLATION ON SEVERAL OF THESE PROPOSALS ALREADY HAS BEEN PASSED AT THE 1990, 1991, OR 1992 CONVENTIONS.

**KEY:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Significance</th>
<th>Proposal Feasibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 = Not at All</td>
<td>X = Unworkable to implement, or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = Slightly Significant</td>
<td>Too Costly to Implement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 = Significant</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4 = Essential</td>
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**PROPOSAL #**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(I.) SIGNIFICANCE (n=58)</th>
<th>(II.) FEASIBILITY</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(3or4) (1or2) X= n=</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Academic Proposals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Mandating disclosure by all NCAA member institutions admissions and graduation rate information for their student-athletes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Requiring 13 core courses for initial eligibility, an increase from 11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Increasing the minimum GPA in the core curriculum to 2.5 from 2.0 for initial eligibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Requiring 15 core classes for initial eligibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Requiring term-by-term certification of satisfactory progress toward a degree to maintain continuing eligibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) For continuing eligibility, requiring completion of a progressive percentage of courses required for graduation in the student-athletes specific degree (25, 50, &amp; 75% for eligibility in the 3rd, 4th, &amp; 5th years, respectively).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Limiting to 25% of the total, the number of credit hours taken during the summer that can be applied to continuing eligibility requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Requiring JC transfers who failed or were partial qualifiers under Prop 48 to sit out a year at the NCAA institution.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Athletic Operations Proposals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9) Banning athletic dormitories and making universities house student-athletes in dorms that are at least 50% occupied by the general student body.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Shortening the basketball season by starting practice 2 weeks later and games approximately 1 week later and reducing the number of practices to 15 for spring football.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Reducing the length of the playing season in team sports other than football and basketball from 26 to 22 weeks and to 24 weeks in individual sports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Limiting the time demands placed on the student-athlete by their sport to 20 hours per week.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) Mandating one day a week in season without team practice or meetings.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
31) Requiring independent certification of athletic departments every 5 years that assesses academic criteria comparing student-athletes, by sport, with rest of the student body.  

32) Passing a resolution directing the Presidents Commission to study elements affecting financial control and integrity of college athletics and to submit appropriate legislation.  

33) Maintaining presidential leadership in the NCAA through use of the powers vested in the Presidents Commission—drafting legislation, ordering the convention agenda, and identifying proposals in which a roll call vote is used.  

34) Linking scholarships to student-athlete graduation rather than exhaustion of athletic eligibility.  

F. Equity Proposals  
35) Increasing the permissible ceiling on Pell Grant assistance to $1700 above a full grant.  

36) Having presidents insure more participation opportunities for women and equity in terms of schedules, facilities, travel, and coaching through policies derived from an annual review of athletic participation by gender.  

G. Higher Education Values & Integrity Proposals  
37) Requiring independent certification of athletic departments every 5 years that assesses the department's performance on principles which insure the predominance of academic values.  

(III.) Are there proposals to improve college athletics which have not been covered or deserve further elaboration? Please indicate in the space provided.

Part 3. BACKGROUND

(1.) What do you perceive to be your primary occupational role in the college or university?  

(2.) Rate your degree of influence in establishing athletic policy at your institution?  

NONE  SLIGHT  MODERATE  CONSIDERABLE  
1  2  3  4

(3.) Rate your degree of influence in establishing athletic policy with your conference?  

NONE  SLIGHT  MODERATE  CONSIDERABLE  
1  2  3  4

(4.) Rate your degree of influence in establishing athletic policy at the NCAA level?  

NONE  SLIGHT  MODERATE  CONSIDERABLE  
1  2  3  4
(5.) Rules and policies governing college athletics should

a.) change to permit better competition for the entertainment dollar.

b.) return to the way they were in the 60’s and 70’s when there were fewer restrictions.

c.) continue changing in the way they have been.

d.) change quickly to ensure that the student-athlete’s education is primary to entertainment concerns.

(6.) Individuals in the position(s) of _______ are best qualified to provide direction for college athletics.

a.) U.S. Congresperson e.) Faculty

b.) College President f.) Athletic Board

c.) Athletic Director g.) Other_______

d.) Chairman of the Board of Trustees

(7.) Ultimate decision-making authority in college athletics should be held by

a.) College Presidents. d.) Boards of Trustees.

b.) Athletic Administrators. e.) Athletic Boards

c.) Interests outside of the institution, such as Congress.

(8.) Strategic direction in college athletics should be provided by

a.) College Presidents. d.) Boards of Trustees.

b.) Athletic Administrators. e.) Interests outside of the institution, such as Congress.

c.) College Presidents & Athletic Administrators f.) Athletic Boards

FOR THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS, CIRCLE THE RESPONSE THAT BEST DESCRIBES YOUR OPINION.

(9.) In 1989, a leadership vacuum existed in intercollegiate athletics in that higher education interests or organizations failed to provide discipline and direction to the interests that controlled NCAA policy.

- Strongly Agree (4)
- Agree (12)
- Strongly Disagree (10)
- Disagree (21)

mean & sD

\[ \overline{x} = 2.473 \quad s = 1.034 \]

(10.) The Knight Commission has provided leadership for intercollegiate athletics.

- Strongly Agree (6)
- Agree (27)
- Strongly Disagree (7)
- Disagree (15)

mean & sD

\[ \overline{x} = 2.382 \quad s = .854 \]

(11.) The Knight Commission provides a legitimate voice in outlining an appropriate direction for intercollegiate athletics.

- Strongly Agree (9)
- Agree (33)
- Strongly Disagree (8)
- Disagree (5)

mean & sD

\[ \overline{x} = 2.836 \quad s = 8.111 \]
Letters to the Sample
Dear F1, F3:

The role of athletics in higher education is an important issue to academe. Publication of the Knight Commission’s report has stirred the debate on the role of athletics in higher education. While it is too early to tell what long-term impact the Knight Commission will have, the symbolic impact is already apparent: some type of reform is inevitable.

We are conducting a study of the process by which the Knight Commission identified the issues of concern and developed its recommendations—the first scholarly look at their findings. We are particularly interested in exploring the problems confronting college sports when the Commission was formed and the potential effectiveness of the Commission’s proposed solutions. Our policy case history will investigate the way in which commissions are empowered, deliberate, reach agreement, and impact their target. In this case, the Knight Commission is the focal point. A two-tiered research approach will (1) assess the impact (direct or indirect) of the Knight Commission and (2) develop a case history of its study process. To develop the case history of the Knight Commission’s decision-making process leading to the March 1991 report, each member of the Commission and its staff, as well as informed participants, either has been or is scheduled to be interviewed.

Our study design calls for a stratified sample of "experts" to assess the issues antecedent to the Knight Commission’s formation and to judge the significance of the proposed solutions. The design calls for equal-sized samples representing the major stakeholders (presidents, athletic directors, higher education foundations, athletic associations, coaches, conference commissioners, faculty athletic representatives, and the media) in college sports and higher education. The sample was drawn by asking informed professionals to name "experts" in their field who were in policy making positions or associated with policy during the last three years. You were named multiple
times. As an acknowledged "policy expert," your participation will greatly enhance this study.

In soliciting your time to help with our study, we are compelled to be clear about the extent of our request. The questionnaire that will be faxed to you has been pretesting at 15 to 30 minutes in duration. Because it describes issues or proposed solutions, it is reading heavy and response light. Your willingness to participate can be indicated by returning the enclosed form with your fax number or mailing address. Upon receipt, we will send you a coded survey. Anonymity of response is guaranteed. We will categorize your answers by role or occupation type. In return, you will be sent a summary report of the study results. The validity of our findings, though, as they relate to "policy experts," requires that the questionnaire not be "staffed" out. Please return the enclosed form indicating that you decline our request if this presents an obstacle. Obviously, we hope you will participate.

The study proposed will be conducted by David Alexander, a professor of educational administration, and Timothy Franklin, a doctoral candidate in the College of Education. We have had an ongoing interest in higher education policy and the impact that athletic administration practices have had on educational institutions. Alexander received his Ed.D. in educational administration from Indiana University in 1969. He joined Virginia Tech in 1972 and has been a full professor since 1985. Alexander has co-authored four books that address legal issues in education, and has conducted studies for several federal and state agencies. Franklin received his B.S. degree, Magna Cum Laude, from Springfield College in 1977, and his M.A. degree from University of Southern California (USC) in 1983. Prior to returning for a doctorate in education, Franklin served as head basketball coach at San Francisco State University, and assistant basketball coach at Radford University, Old Dominion University, and USC. Biographical sketches of Alexander and Franklin are attached.

Additional information about the study is available upon request. We look forward to working with you.

Sincerely,

M. David Alexander  Timothy V. Franklin
Director  Field Researcher

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SURVEY PARTICIPATION RESPONSE SHEET

_______ Yes, I would willing to participate in the study of the Knight Commission by personally filling out a questionnaire.

NAME

FAX NUMBER

OFFICE PHONE

MAILING ADDRESS

_______ No, I cannot help you with the study you have described.

NAME

_______ Call and tell me more about the study. I might be interested.

NAME

PHONE

PLEASE RETURN THIS FORM TO:

M. David Alexander or Tim Franklin
Fax # 703-231-3717
March 12, 1992

^F2^  ^F3^  
^F4^  
^F5^  
^F6^  
^F7^  ^F8^  ^F9^  ^F11^  

Dear ^F1^  ^F3^:

In a February 24 letter, we requested your participation in a study we are conducting about the process by which the Knight Commission identified issues of concern and developed its recommendations—the first scholarly look at their findings. To develop a case history of the Knight Commission’s decision-making process leading to the March 1991 report, each member of the Commission and its staff either has been (21 of 27 currently) or is scheduled to be interviewed. To assess the Knight Commission’s study process, we are interested in obtaining your views about the problems confronting college sports when the Commission was formed and the potential effectiveness of solutions proposed by the Commission and other involved groups.

You were identified as an "expert" representing a specific population in a stratified sample of major stakeholders. We solicited your intentions with regard to participation in our previous correspondence. Because of the limited number of named "experts" in your population, in the absence of a negative response, we are proceeding with anticipation of your cooperation.

Please find enclosed a codad Survey Questionnaire. Anonymity of response is guaranteed. We will categorize your answers by role or occupation type. The validity of our findings, though, as they relate to "policy experts," requires that the questionnaire not be "staffed" out. In pretesting (n = 20), the questionnaire has taken between 15 and 30 minutes to complete with the average between 18 and 21 minutes. The scope of the Knight Commission’s mission demands a survey that has breadth on the issues addressed. Please return the completed questionnaire by mail or by FAX (#703-231-7845). In return for your participation, you will be sent a summary report of the study results. Obviously, we hope you will participate.

Additional information about the study is available upon request. We look forward to working with you.

Sincerely,

M. David Alexander  Timothy V. Franklin
Director  Field Researcher
March 12, 1992

Dear ^F1^ ^F3^:

In a February 24 letter, we requested your participation in a study we are conducting about the process by which the Knight Commission identified issues of concern and developed its recommendations—the first scholarly look at their findings. To develop a case history of the Knight Commission’s decision-making process leading to the March 1991 report, each member of the Commission and its staff either has been (21 of 27 currently) or is scheduled to be interviewed. To assess the Knight Commission’s study process, we are interested in obtaining your views about the problems confronting college sports when the Commission was formed and the potential effectiveness of solutions proposed by the Commission and other involved groups.

You were identified as an "expert" representing a specific population in a stratified sample of major stakeholders. Thank you for agreeing to participate. Because of the limited number of named "experts" in your population, your cooperation is greatly appreciated.

Please find enclosed a coded Survey Questionnaire. Anonymity of response is guaranteed. We will categorize your answers by role or occupation type. The validity of our findings, though, as they relate to "policy experts," requires that the questionnaire not be "staffed" out. In pretesting (n = 20), the questionnaire has taken between 15 and 30 minutes to complete with the average between 18 and 21 minutes. The scope of the Knight Commission’s mission demands a survey that has breadth on the issues addressed. Please return the completed questionnaire by mail or by FAX (#703-231-7845). In return for your participation, you will be sent a summary report of the study results. Obviously, your participation strengthens our results.

Additional information about the study is available upon request. We look forward to working with you.

Sincerely,

M. David Alexander
Director

Timothy V. Franklin
Field Researcher
March 12, 1992

Dear [Name]:

In a February 24 letter, as a follow up to Mr. Franklin’s conversation with you at the NCAA Convention, we reiterated his request for your participation in a study we are conducting about the process by which the Knight Commission identified issues of concern and developed its recommendations—the first scholarly look at their findings. To develop a case history of the Knight Commission’s decision-making process leading to the March 1991 report, each member of the Commission and its staff either has been (21 of 27 currently) or is scheduled to be interviewed. To assess the Knight Commission’s study process, we are interested in obtaining your views about the problems confronting college sports when the Commission was formed and the potential effectiveness of solutions proposed by the Commission and other involved groups.

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Additional information about the study is available upon request. We look forward to working with you.

Sincerely,

M. David Alexander
Director

Timothy V. Franklin
Field Researcher
Mailing #3, Reminder #2

April 22, 1992

In March a survey seeking your opinion about problems confronting college sports and the potential effectiveness of solutions proposed by the Knight Commission was mailed or FAXed to you. If you have already completed it and returned it to us, please accept our sincere thanks. If you have not, please take time to do so today.

Because of the limited number of named "experts" represented in your population, your cooperation is necessary for the study to accurately represent the opinions of your group. Your help is appreciated.

If you need additional information or another questionnaire, please contact us by phone (703-231-5111) or FAX (#703-231-7845). We look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

M. David Alexander
Director

Timothy V. Franklin
Field Researcher
Mailing #4, Reminder #1 on Re-request

April 22, 1992

Dear ^F1^ ^F3^:

On March 26, we mailed a survey questionnaire to you pertaining to a research project about the Knight Commission’s study process. The purpose of the survey is to obtain your views about the problems confronting college sports and the potential effectiveness of solutions proposed by the Commission and other involved groups. At this writing, we have not received your completed questionnaire and hope to reiterate the importance of your response.

You were identified as an "expert" representing, during the 1989-1992 period, a specific population in a stratified sample of major stakeholders. Without your participation, the point of view of ^F12^ will be poorly represented. Because of the limited number of named "experts" in your population, your cooperation is greatly appreciated and necessary to an unbiased study. In return for your contribution, a summary report of the study’s findings will be sent to you. Obviously, your participation strengthens our results.

Anonymity of response is guaranteed. We will categorize your answers by role or occupation type. The validity of our findings, though, as they relate to "policy experts," requires that the questionnaire not be "staffed" out. In pretesting (n = 20), the questionnaire has taken between 15 and 30 minutes to complete with the norm between 18 and 21 minutes. The scope of the Knight Commission’s mission demands a survey that has breadth on the issues addressed. Please return the completed questionnaire by mail or by FAX (#703-231-7845) before April 20.

If you have need additional information or another questionnaire, please contact us by phone or FAX. We look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

M. David Alexander
Director

Timothy V. Franklin
Field Researcher
April 22, 1992

Dear:

We are in receipt of your completed questionnaire. Thank you for the time and effort you invested in its completion. In return for your contribution, a summary report of the study’s findings will be sent to you. Obviously, your participation strengthens our results.

The data collection phase of the project should be finalized by early May. Expect the summary report sometime in the mid to late summer. If we can be of assistance to you in any way prior to that time, please contact us.

Once again, we sincerely appreciate your help with our research project.

With gratitude,

M. David Alexander
Director

Timothy V. Franklin
Field Researcher
APPENDIX C

Flexible Questionnaire Checklist

for Key Actor Interviews

and Letters to Key Actors
Flexible Questionnaire Checklist for Key Actor Interviews
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR

KNIGHT COMMISSION

I. Decision-Making Process Empowering the Commission:

A. Antecedents—Can you give some critical incidents that led to the formation of the Knight Commission? What specific events created the need/opportunity for such a "Blue Ribbon" review?

B. History—How did the Commission come into being? What events transpired prior to the official announcement of a Commission? What were the Pros and Cons of the decision? Who were the key actors in favor of concept? Against the concept?

C. Decision-Makers—Who developed the scope and nature of the Commission's charge? Who selected the Commissioners? Staff? How did the administrative framework (office, size of staff, location, etc.) develop? What additional people were consulted in decisions about the Commission's purpose, make-up, and structure?

D. Purpose—What was the purpose of having a Commission study college athletics? Some groups may say that the purpose was to advance an agenda supporting the Presidents' point-of-view; others might charge that it has been an effort to mollify the public while advancing ideas which are no real departure from the status quo. Who is right? What are other reasons? Who would know?
II. **Decision-Making Process for Selecting Commissioners:**

A. **Strategy**—What was the strategy behind the composition of the Knight Commission? Father Hesburgh brought a model for reform to the opening meeting citing the philosophy, *prima in intentioni ultima inexacthoni* or you have to know in your mind where you would like to get at the outset of an exercise. What was in mind at the outset that influenced the selection of the individual Commissioners? the composition of the Commission as a whole? What was the purpose of the Commission’s structure?

B. **Commission Make-Up**—Recognizing that the Knight Commission comprised this country’s administrative elite, what specific qualities did each of these Commissioners bring to the Commission? Why was each Commissioner chosen? (Run through a list of the Commissioner’s names, one by one)

C. **Omissions**—Who was considered for the Commission? Which constituencies or interests were considered and then not represented? Why? While it keeps my task from being harder than it is, why was 22 a magic number? It is already a large group, why not include the constituencies you just mentioned?

D. **Athletic Knowledge**—Why were no Athletic Directors of Faculty Athletic Representatives included as Commissioners?
III. Commissioner Biographies

A. Attribution— Why do you think you were chosen to serve in your capacity with the Commission? While I recognize that I am potentially straining your modesty, what stature or standing made you someone who needed to be included?

B. Philosophy— What about your philosophy makes you a part of the solution? What philosophies make you consistent with the Knight Foundation sponsors and the Co-Chairs?

C. Influence— What organizations or constituencies can you potentially influence or lead that are components of the potential solution?
IV. Choice of Study Approach

A. Decision-Making - How was the process to study this problem decided upon? What elements were seen as important steps in studying college athletics?

B. Focus - Father Hasburgh made early reference to past Commissions failing by getting bogged down in subsidiary problems, how did the Knight Commission's approach avoid this pitfall? Did the introduction of the proposed model at the first meeting, which was primarily intact in the final report, influence the scope of the Commission's study approach? In what ways did it restrict you?

C. Information - How did the Commissioners inform themselves? Which method of study was most informative? Learning from each other in group interactions? Interviews? Briefing booklets? Other experiences? Personal experience?

D. Influence - What substantive suggestions were incorporated from the study process? Can you give me specific examples? Which expert interview(s) had the most influence on the Commission's outlook? Can I find it in the final report? What information in the briefing booklets found its way into the final consensus? Recognizing that good politics is often the art of the possible and that who embraces your ideas creates possibilities, were the interviews more to inform the Commissioners or sell the unrepresented constituencies on their involvement in your plan?
5. Staff - Describe the adequacy of the information you received as a Commissioner? What else would you have liked to receive or be presented? How did the staff influence the issues studied? the interviews heard? the media exposure? the substantive content of the final report? the form of the final report? the announcement and media exposure of the final report? Can you give me any other examples or critical incidents describing the staff’s influence?
V. Decision-Making Process Selecting Issues Receiving the Greatest Attention:

A. Whose Issues—Which of the finding, recommendations, or principles for action can be attributed to a specific Commissioner or staffer, or an identifiable subgroup thereof? Can you describe for me where the influence—for instance, a particular Commissioner, staffer, or interviewee—came for each of the following [Ask about each of the 10 Principles for Action and other major findings and recommendations]? Is the assertion that the final report actually reflects the combined personal experiences of the Commissioners accurate?

B. 1990 Retreat—Can you describe how issues were raised, discussed, and decided upon when you were meeting at the September 1990 retreat? How were issues elevated to discussion level? What critical incidents stand out as moving the group toward consensus on overall approach? on specific findings or recommendations? Who were the actors involved in shaping these issues? What underlying understanding or philosophy provided the platform for reaching consensus? Which aspects of the deliberations resulted in the most significant consensus?

C. Final Report—How were issues agreed upon to be included in the final report? What constrained the choices in a widely divisive area? Clearly, there were voices on the Commission who disagreed. What was the decision-making process for reaching consensus? How did it occur? Who were the key players? What were the key issues? Would I be correct in guessing that many Commissioners bit their tongues and subscribed to the party line? Why this model vs. others?

D. Other Agenda—What outside influences affected the Commission’s decision-making? How did they influence the final report? In the entire process, what unspoken agenda items were behind the Commission’s deliberations or conclusions?
E. Commercial Status Quo-
The skeptic would point to your defense of the NCAA, with its rich TV contract, and the absence of any outright recommendations to move away from providing TV entertainment to the public to argue that the Knight Commission used rhetoric about academic values prevailing over entertainment values while actually protecting the commercial status quo. What agenda was at play in these decisions?
VI. The Findings and Recommendations in the Final Report

A. Purpose- What strategy was employed in issuing the final report? What form of stress on the target constituencies was planned to effect change? What specific impact was intended with the March 1991 report? What aspects of the NCAA's attention were intended to be focused on which issues? the public's? the media? other targets? Which were deemed critical to the successful reception of the report's model and recommended plan?

B. Whose Agenda- The literature on Commissions cites a concept which I will paraphrase as organizational momentum. Organizational leaders who want to establish an agenda for particular reforms use a Commission to advance them creating a mandate which pushes the organization in the direction the leader intended when forming the Commission. Whose political interests are reflected in the Commission's final report? Is the Knight Commission's report an effort to provide Dick Schultz or the Presidents Commission an expert answer to reformulate change in the NCAA?

C. The New Model- The systemic problems with college athletics probably has never been more concisely or thoroughly explained than in the Knight Commission's report. You call for a new structure for intercollegiate athletics, were more radical reforms considered, for example restructuring the organizational basis or curtailing the entertainment function? Why were they discarded? Which topics or issues were non-negotiable?

D. The Report- How is the value of Knight Commission's proposed model promoted in the report? By giving general recommendations, vs. specifics, what method is planned to ensure adoption of the Commission's model? Wouldn't specific rationale have provided a more clearly lit path for your targets? Were the costs of the proposed recommendations considered? How? What weight was given to this area in ensuring implementation?
VII. **Cross-Boundary Members—Formal Association in 2 Political Systems**

A. **President’s Commission**— Several of the Knight Commissioners are or have been on the NCAA’s President Commission. How have they influenced the Knight Commission? How have they influenced the President’s Commission?

B. **NCAA Staff**— Describe Dick Schultz’s influence on the Knight Commission. Please provide specific examples where possible. How has his work on the Knight Commission influenced his leadership of the NCAA? Has he had an opportunity to further the Knight Commission’s agenda?

C. **Congress**— Describe Tom McMillan’s influence on the Knight Commission. Please provide specific examples where possible. How has his work on the Knight Commission influenced his congressional activities? Has he had an opportunity to further the Knight Commission’s agenda?

D. **Business**— Several of the Knight Commissioners are members of commercial interests that have an interest in college athletics (TV, advertising). How have their concerns influenced the Knight Commission? Have they influenced an important outside constituency in any way? How?

E. **Regents & Alumni**— Commissioners Huck and Dibbert represent two important university constituencies, what points of view have they brought to the Knight Commission? How have they influenced the findings, recommendations, or scope of reform considered? Have they influenced an important outside constituency in any way? How?
F. Influences— From the universe of choices, which Knight Commission agendas have been most influenced by the Commissioners with outside membership? Which other agendas have overlapped and influenced the Knight Commission's findings and recommendations? Which of the Knight Commission's agenda have most influenced other groups? By what method?

VIII. Other Influencers

A. Key Influencers— Who were the most significant influencers who were not on the Commission? Who had the greatest unofficial influence on the Knight Commission's work and report?
Letters to Key Actors
November 27, 1991

Dear [Name]:

The role of athletics in higher education is an important issue to academe. As [Name], we imagine you agree with us. Publication of the Knight Commission's report has stirred the debate on the role of athletics in higher education. Other groups, whose members are less involved with the issues (e.g., federal government, state government, FIFE) are now proposing alternative remedies. While it is too early to tell what the long-term impact of the Knight Commission will be, the symbolic impact is already apparent: some type of reform is inevitable.

We are conducting a study of the process by which the Knight Commission identified the issues of concern and developed its recommendations. We are particularly interested in exploring the potential effectiveness of the Commission's proposed solutions. Our study will investigate the way in which commissions are empowered, deliberate, reach agreement, and impact their target. In this case, the Knight Commission is the focal point.

A two-tiered research approach will (1) assess the impact of the Knight Commission and (2) develop a case history of its study process. To develop the case history of the Knight Commission's decision-making process leading to the March 1991 report, each member of the Commission and its staff, as well as informed participants will be interviewed. Follow-up interviews will be conducted to validate accounts through triangulation. Previous studies of educational reform commissions have identified a seven-stage life cycle. The interview data will be used to reconstruct these seven stages as they relate to the Knight Commission. In this regard, your knowledge and recollections are important to a complete, unbiased academic assessment.

As the study's field researcher, Mr. Franklin will be contacting you to schedule an interview in early 1992. The NCAA Convention in Anaheim may provide a convenient interview time, if you are attending and your schedule permits. Regardless, your time and cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

The study proposed will be conducted by David Alexander, a professor of educational administration, and Timothy Franklin, a doctoral candidate in the College of Education.
Alexander and Franklin have had an ongoing interest in higher education policy and the impact that athletic administration practices have had on educational institutions. Alexander received his Ed.D. in educational administration from Indiana University in 1969. He joined Virginia Tech in 1972 and has been a full professor since 1985. Alexander has co-authored four books that address legal issues in education, and has conducted studies for several federal and state agencies. Franklin received his B.S. degree, Magna Cum Laude, from Springfield College in 1977, and his M.A. degree from University of Southern California (USC) in 1983. Prior to returning for a doctorate in education, Franklin served a head basketball coach at San Francisco State University, and assistant basketball coach at Radford University, Old Dominion University, and USC. Biographical sketches of Alexander and Franklin are attached.

Additional information about the study is available upon request. We look forward to working with you.

Sincerely,

M. David Alexander
Director

Timothy V. Franklin
Field Researcher
APPENDIX D

Knight Commission Statement of Purpose

Joint Statement of the Co-Chairmen
Knight Commission Statement of Purpose
KNIGHT FOUNDATION
COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS

Statement of Purpose

The Knight Foundation has established this Commission because it believes that excesses in intercollegiate athletics are seriously eroding the integrity of colleges and universities and distorting the basic purposes for which these institutions were chartered.

The Foundation also believes there is an important place for a properly administered program of intercollegiate athletics in American institutions of higher learning. Indeed, competitive sports have long been an integral part of campus life.

Regrettably, however, recent surveys show that a majority of citizens believe that flagrant rules violations, greed, fraud and hypocrisy now pervade intercollegiate sports. These surveys also reflect widespread public doubt that the universities and colleges can or indeed will take forceful action on their own to eradicate these distressing conditions.

These conditions can no longer remain unchallenged; we believe they can and must be eliminated.

Clearly, trustees, presidents and chancellors, faculty, students, alumni and sports fans generally must collectively gather the will to correct the problem before the intercollegiate sports programs we cherish and the institutions we respect and love are irreparably damaged.

The Knight Foundation, through this Commission, commits itself to help restore institutional integrity and renew the well-being of intercollegiate sports as a wholesome part of the academic community.

October 17, 1989
Joint Statement of the Co-Chairmen
JOINT STATEMENT OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN

It seemed fair, to both of us, that we indicate at the beginning of the Commission's work where we both stand on the issues. We do not do this to preclude in any way the input of the other Commissioners, but rather to let all of you know, briefly and clearly, where we are coming from.

First, as retired presidents of a public and a private institution for a combined service of 65 years, the last thing we needed was another difficult job in addition to the tasks in which we are both engaged. Why did we accept the Co-Chairmanship of the Knight Commission? Two reasons: First, we both cherish institutions of higher learning and are disgusted at the way their standing in the eyes of the American public is being seriously impugned by a long series of athletic and related academic scandals. Secondly, we both believe in the potential value of intercollegiate athletics when conducted with integrity. We both believe that if we can do something to insure that integrity and to restore the good name of universities, both public and private, it would be worth the effort involved.

The last thing we wish to co-chair is just another commission, the latest in a long series, that spins its wheels, emits pious platitudes, and finally reports and walks away leaving the problem a bit embellished with ambiguous solutions that never take root and, in reality, leave the festering problems still festering to the detriment of university integrity.

We admit from the onset that we are irrevocably committed to clear and simple principles that we believe go to the heart of the problem and will cure the inner cancer. We sincerely hope that our Commission colleagues, after critical and reasonable discussion, with no holds barred and nothing left unsaid or unconsidered, will be in agreement with these principles.

Our clear and simple principles are three:

1. **Academic Integrity.** This assumes that athletes are students and are not considered for enrollment at a university unless they give reasonable promise of being successful in an authentic course of university studies leading to an authentic academic degree. We assume that they will graduate in at least the same percentage as other students at the given university. This is a minimal standard that we think admits of no deviation without compromising the academic integrity of the institution.

2. **Financial Integrity.** Because money given and administered by outside agencies and persons below the highest authority in the university seems to be responsible for a majority of athletic scandals, we assume for financial integrity that no money whatever, from whatever source -- ticket sales, TV revenues, booster club contributions, etc. -- is received or administered for athletics outside the control of the president or another top financial officer of the institution appointed and supervised by the president.

3. **Ongoing Audit and Certification.** We believe that universities are in such low repute as to academic and financial integrity in the field of intercollegiate athletics today, that the public will believe and accept our adherence to the above two principles only if we invite an outside agency, such as the NCAA, to appoint responsible outside auditors to certify on an ongoing basis and with an annual public report that we are practicing the academic and fiscal integrity that we profess.

These auditors must be knowledgeable, well trained, and adequately compensated. They must operate as friends of the institutions and their athletic program, not as spies. They must have ready access to the president and the athletic program, and access as well to all athletic financial accounts and all relevant academic records, such as admissions, courses taken each semester with grades achieved and evidence of normal progress towards a degree in an authentic academic course of studies.
Any indication or allegation of irregularity, either fiscal or academic, would be immediately reported to the president and the athletic director for immediate investigation. This would be in the nature of preventive maintenance of academic and fiscal integrity.

The annual report to the president by an auditor would give public certification to the fact and reality of academic and fiscal integrity and should be published for public scrutiny, much as our annual financial audits of the whole university are published.

This third principle of ongoing audit is both essential and indispensable if our universities are to regain public acknowledgement of our professions of the academic and financial integrity of our athletic programs.

If this process is to be supervised by the NCAA, we would suggest that its cost would also be underwritten by monies from the NCAA TV income. Obviously, such a program as described in our third principle will require a director of the highest integrity and courage.

Will these three clear and simple principles solve the multitudinous problems we face? Let us say that we believe the problems will not have any possibility of solution without a serious and persistent commitment to these three principles. Nothing less is at stake than the inner integrity of universities. Without integrity, we are false to the promise of our universities and higher education as well.

We have one more profound conviction that we believe is essential to the success of the Knight Commission in avoiding the unsuccessfull record of past commissions: The president of the university is the key to the successful achievement of academic and financial integrity.

The membership of the Commission is largely presidential. Moreover, the presidents on the Commission are representatives of the kinds of institutions where the current problems are most acute. We believe that only these presidents can give the leadership required for a solution of these problems and the restoration of integrity. Only these presidents can effectively endorse these three principles and persuade their fellow presidents within their respective conferences to do likewise. While we place the primary responsibility for integrity on the president, we assume that he or she will receive complete support and backing from the board of trustees and the faculty. In fact boards of trustees should make very clear to all concerned that, by their delegation, the president is the governing authority on all athletic issues. There can be no exception to this policy.

We do suggest a sanction. If any president of any of the institutions involved (approximately 100 in football and 200 in basketball) is unwilling to endorse these principles for his or her institution, those of us who do endorse them should refuse to compete with those who do not believe in the same standards for all. In other words, we must demand a level playing field. In this crisis, unilateral action is not sufficient. All must act together or a solution is not possible.

The Commission will, of course, have to discuss a rather long list of subsidiary problems that are not as important as the three basic principles. This might include, but certainly would not be limited to, the following:

- Length of playing season
- Time devoted to athletic participation
- Freshman eligibility
- The impact of commercial television
- Integration of athletes in normal student life
- Tenure (3-5 years) for athletic directors and coaches, with "sudden death" for rules violations

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This is just a preliminary list of possible subjects of discussion. Our Commissioners will certainly think of many more.

Our strategy for success, it seems to us, should be first to address the basic three principles. Unless we have general agreement on them — not necessarily as stated here — but on substance of what they represent, we could get bogged down on a lot of subsidiary problems without getting to the heart of the real problem: academic and financial integrity with certification.

We believe that other similar commissions have failed because they only considered subsidiary problems, came up with unrealistic solutions, or were voted down by those whom they should be leading and directing.

We also recommend that the Commission seek the advice of conference commissioners, athletic directors, coaches and faculty members and that representatives of these groups be actively consulted on the work of the Commission.

Once we have a program to propose, it might be well to submit it to a representative group of nationally known former university athletes, for their comments and, we hope, endorsement.

All proposals or recommendations adopted by this Commission should, upon adoption, be individually communicated to the NCAA, appropriate conference officials, all institutional heads, trustees and the public generally. Further, one year after publication the Commission will re-convene to conduct an inventory of actions taken in response to our report by the NCAA, conferences, and individual institutions.

All of these matters will be open to discussion as we begin the work of our Commission. If we did not believe that this time, this Commission can make a difference and achieve a new integrity for our universities, we would not have accepted the invitation of the Knight Foundation to be Co-Chairmen. Each of you, fellow Commissioners, was chosen with real care because we both felt that you were the best for the task at hand.

We are personally committed to give this try our best and we are grateful to each of you for joining us and allowing us, at the very start of our common endeavor, to share with you our deep conviction of what the problem we face demands. If we can agree on the basic principles, however stated, we are confident of success where others have failed.

Mr. William C. Friday

Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh

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ADDENDUM

During the January 31 meeting of the Knight Commission, the membership expressed considerable enthusiasm for the ideas proposed in the Joint Statement. Thus, the original concept evolved into a "ONE-PLUS-THREE" model of fundamental principles, with "ONE" being presidential control and authority over athletics, and "THREE" representing academic integrity, fiscal integrity, and certification. The Commission is committed to a work plan which involves reviewing these fundamental principles, as well as other prospective reforms, with representatives of various constituent groups including conference commissioners, faculty athletics representatives, athletics directors, and coaches.
APPENDIX E

1991 Knight Commission Report,
Letter of Transmittal,
Executive Summary,
and List of Hearing Meeting Participants
KEEPING FAITH WITH THE STUDENT-ATHLETE

A New Model For Intercollegiate Athletics
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A New Model: "One-Plus-Three"

Putting Principles Into Action

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Letter Of Transmittal

Mr. Lee Hills
Vice Chairman
Board of Trustees
Knight Foundation
2 South Biscayne Boulevard
Miami, Florida 33131

Dear Mr. Hills,

On October 19, 1989, the Trustees of Knight Foundation created this Commission and directed it to propose a reform agenda for intercollegiate athletics. In doing so, they expressed concern that abuses in athletics had reached proportions threatening the very integrity of higher education, which is one of the principal program interests of the Foundation.

It has been our privilege to co-chair this endeavor and on behalf of the members of the Commission we are pleased to transmit this report, Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete: A New Model for Intercollegiate Athletics.

In developing its recommendations, the Commission spent more than a year in study and debate, and benefited from the advice and suggestions of more than 80 experts. During a series of public meetings, we heard from athletics administrators, coaches, student-athletes, scholars, journalists, leaders of professional leagues and others. Their names appear in Appendix B.

The demanding task of monitoring college sports is made all the more difficult today by a confluence of new factors. These include the perception that ethical behavior in the larger society has broken down, the public's insistence on winning local teams, and the growth of television combined with the demand for sports programming. Clearly, universities have not immunized themselves from these developments.

We sense that public concern about abuse is growing. The public appears ready to believe that many institutions achieve their athletic goals not through honest effort but through equivocation, not by hard work and sacrifice but by hook or by crook. If the public's perception is correct, both the educational aims of athletics and the institutions' integrity are called into question.
We have attempted to define the problems as we understand them and to suggest solutions, not search for scapegoats. This report addresses what we consider to be the main issues and does not attempt to treat subordinate matters in any detail. Even in respect to what we see as the major issues, we place less emphasis on specific solutions than on proposing a structure through which these issues — and others arising in the future — can be addressed by the responsible administrators.

The first chapter introduces the core of our interest: the place of athletics on our campuses and the imperative to place the well-being of the student-athlete at the forefront of our concerns. Chapter II presents our recommendations. It outlines a new structure for intercollegiate athletics in which the well-being of student-athletes, our overarching goal, is attained by what we call the "one-plus-three" model — presidential control directed toward academic integrity, financial integrity and independent certification. The third chapter calls for a nationwide effort, growing from our campuses outward, to put the "one-plus-three" model into effect and suggests appropriate roles for each of the major groups on campus.

The members of the Commission were straightforward in their discussions and are candid in this report regarding both the strengths and the weaknesses of intercollegiate athletics. Although individual members of the Commission have reservations about the details of some of these recommendations, they are unanimous in their support of the broad themes outlined in this document.

The Commission's commitment to the reform of college sport does not end with this report. We will follow through. We plan to monitor the progress in implementing the "one-plus-three" model. In twelve months we will revisit these issues and define what remains to be accomplished.

On a personal note, we want to express our deep sadness on learning, as this document went to press, of the death of a man who played a pivotal role in establishing the Commission, James L. Knight, Chairman of the Knight Foundation. We speak for the entire Commission in expressing our sympathy and our hope that this report keeps faith with Mr. Knight's vision of what intercollegiate sport can be at its best.

Respectfully,

William C. Friday
Co-Chairman
President
William R. Kenan, Jr. Fund

Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C.
Co-Chairman
President Emeritus
University of Notre Dame
Introduction

At their best, which is most of the time, intercollegiate athletics provide millions of people — athletes, undergraduates, alumni and the general public — with great pleasure, the spectacle of extraordinary effort and physical grace, the excitement of an outcome in doubt, and a shared unifying experience. Thousands of men and women in the United States are stronger adults because of the challenges they mastered as young athletes.

But at their worst, big-time college athletics appear to have lost their bearings. With increasing frequency they threaten to overwhelm the universities in whose name they were established and to undermine the integrity of one of our fundamental national institutions: higher education.

The Knight Commission believes that intercollegiate athletics, kept in perspective, are an important part of college life. We are encouraged by the energy of the reform movement now under way. But the clamor for reform and the disturbing signals of government intrusion confirm the need to rethink the management and fundamental premises of intercollegiate athletics.

The Commission’s bedrock conviction is that university presidents are the key to successful reform. They must be in charge — and be understood to be in charge — on campuses, in conferences and in the decision-making councils of the NCAA.

We propose what we call the “one-plus-three” model, a new structure of reform in which the “one” — presidential control — is directed toward the “three” — academic integrity, financial integrity and independent certification. With such a model in place, higher education can address all of the subordinate difficulties in college sports. Without such a model, athletics reform will continue in fits and starts, its energy squandered on symptoms, the underlying problems ignored.

This is how these recommendations can help change college sports:

**Presidential Control**

1. Trustees will delegate to the president — not reserve for the board or individual members of the board — the administrative authority to govern the athletics program.

2. Presidents will have the same degree of control over athletics that they exercise elsewhere in the university, including the authority to hire, evaluate
and terminate athletics directors and coaches, and to oversee all financial matters in their athletics departments.

3. The policy role of presidents will be enhanced throughout the decision-making structures of the NCAA.

4. Trustees, alumni and local boosters will defer to presidential control

**ACADEMIC INTEGRITY**

1. Cutting academic corners in order to admit athletes will not be tolerated. Student-athletes will not be admitted unless they are likely, in the judgment of academic officials, to graduate. Junior college transfers will be given no leeway in fulfilling eligibility requirements.

2. "No Pass, No Play" will be the byword of college sports in admissions, academic progress and graduation rates.

3. An athlete's eligibility each year, and each academic term will be based on continuous progress toward graduation within five years of enrollment.

4. Graduation rates of student-athletes in each sport will be similar to the graduation rates of other students who have spent comparable time as full-time students.

**FINANCIAL INTEGRITY**

1. Athletics departments will not operate as independent subsidiaries of the university. All funds raised and spent for athletics will go through the university's central financial controls and will be subject to the same oversight and scrutiny as funds in other departments. Athletics foundations and booster clubs will not be permitted to provide support for athletics programs outside the administration's direct control.

2. Contracts for athletics-related outside income of coaches and administrators, including shoe and equipment contracts, will be negotiated through the university.

3. Institutional funds can be spent on athletics programs. This will affirm the legitimate role of athletics on campus and can relieve some of the pressure on revenue-producing teams to support non-revenue sports.
CERTIFICATION

1. Each year, every NCAA institution will undergo a thorough, independent audit of all academic and financial matters related to athletics.

2. Universities will have to withstand the scrutiny of their peers. Each NCAA institution awarding athletics aid will be required to participate in a comprehensive certification program. This program will verify that the athletics department follows institutional goals, that its fiscal controls are sound, and that athletes in each sport resemble the rest of the student body in admissions, academic progress and graduation rates.

The reforms proposed above are designed to strengthen the bonds that connect student, sport and higher learning. Student-athletes should compete successfully in the classroom as well as on the playing field and, insofar as possible, should be indistinguishable from other undergraduates. All athletes — men or women, majority or minority, in revenue-producing and non-revenue sports — should be treated equitably.

In order to help presidents put the "one-plus-three" model into effect, the Commission proposes a statement of principles to be used as the basis for intensive discussion at each institution. Our hope is that this discussion will involve everyone on the campus with major responsibilities for college sports. These principles support the "one-plus-three" model and can be employed as a starting point on any campus wishing to take the recommendations of this document seriously. We recommend incorporating these principles into the NCAA's certification process and using that process as the foundation of a nationwide effort to advance athletics reform. Ideally, institutions will agree to schedule only those colleges and universities that have passed all aspects of the certification process. Institutions that refuse to correct deficiencies will find themselves isolated by the vast majority of administrators who support intercollegiate sports as an honorable tradition in college life.

Lamar Alexander  
President, University of Tennessee

Creed C. Black  
President, Knight Foundation, Ex-officio

Douglas S. Dibbert  
General Alumni Association, University of North Carolina

John A. DiBiaggio  
President, Michigan State University
woman on the street should be able to understand what the NCAA does, how it works, how it makes its decisions, and, in particular, how it determines its sanctions. As it stands, not only can the average citizen not answer those questions, but very few presidents, athletics directors, coaches or student-athletes can predict what it is likely to do in any given circumstance. This situation must be addressed.13

Principles For Action

It is clear that this nationwide effort must grow from our campuses. We have reduced the essence of our concerns to the “one-plus-three” model. We have expanded this model through the implementing recommendations that form the core of Chapter II. But the question remains, where to begin?

We believe that any institution wishing to take seriously the “one-plus-three” model would do well to start with the following statement of principles which recasts this report’s main themes. We urge presidents to make this statement the vehicle for serious discussions within their institutions and, in particular, with the members of the governing board. Each principle is significant. Each deserves a separate conversation. Together they can define what the university expects, and how it hopes to realize its expectations.

A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

Preamble: This institution is committed to a philosophy of firm institutional control of athletics, to the unquestioned academic and financial integrity of our athletics program, and to the accountability of the athletics department to the values and goals befitting higher education. In support of that commitment, the board, officers, faculty and staff of this institution have examined and agreed to the following general principles as a guide to our participation in intercollegiate athletics:

I. The educational values, practices and mission of this institution determine the standards by which we conduct our intercollegiate athletics program.

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13 Congresswoman McMillan refers to the following report. This report does not address any area of intercollegiate athletics in due need of investigation: the enforcement process. It has been forever outside of athletics circles, including government entities, to ensure that the NCAA and other intercollegiate athletic associations do not systematically enforce their own concept of justice without appropriate consideration of the due process rights of individuals and institutions. The NCAA has immense power to damage the reputation of institutions and devalue the American taxpayer’s investment in higher education. This power must be monitored and, if necessary, curtailed to conform with the larger imperative for fairness in a democratic society. [Note: In his 1995 State of the Association address, NCAA Executive Director Richard Schultz announced plans for the establishment of a special committee to review the Association’s enforcement process.]
II. The responsibility and authority for the administration of the athletics department, including all basic policies, personnel and finances, are vested in the president.

III. The welfare, health and safety of student-athletes are primary concerns of athletics administration on this campus. This institution will provide student-athletes with the opportunity for academic experiences as close as possible to the experiences of their classmates.

IV. Every student-athlete — male and female, majority and minority, in all sports — will receive equitable and fair treatment.

V. The admission of student-athletes — including junior college transfers — will be based on their showing reasonable promise of being successful in a course of study leading to an academic degree. That judgment will be made by admissions officials.

VI. Continuing eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics will be based on students being able to demonstrate each academic term that they will graduate within five years of their enrolling. Students who do not pass this test will not play.

VII. Student-athletes, in each sport, will be graduated in at least the same proportion as non-athletes who have spent comparable time as full-time students.

VIII. All funds raised and spent in connection with intercollegiate athletics programs will be channeled through the institution’s general treasury, not through independent groups, whether internal or external. The athletics department budget will be developed and monitored in accordance with general budgeting procedures on campus.

IX. All athletics-related income from non-university sources for coaches and athletics administrators will be reviewed and approved by the university. In cases where the income involves the university’s functions, facilities or name, contracts will be negotiated with the institution.

X. We will conduct annual academic and fiscal audits of the athletics program. Moreover, we intend to seek NCAA certification that our athletics program complies with the principles herein. We will promptly correct any
deficiencies and will conduct our athletics program in a manner worthy of this
distinction.

We believe these ten principles represent a statement around which our institu-
tions and the NCAA can rally. It is our hope that this statement of principles will be
incorporated into the Association's developing certification program. The Commission
believes that the success of the NCAA certification program must be judged on the
degree to which it advances these principles as the fundamental ends of intercollegiate
programs. Ideally, institutions will agree to schedule only those colleges and universi-
ties that have passed all aspects of the certification process. Institutions that refuse to
correct deficiencies will find themselves isolated by the vast majority of athletics admin-
istrators who support intercollegiate athletics as an honorable tradition in college life.

The members of the Knight Foundation Commission are convinced, as we
know most members of the public and of the athletic and academic worlds are
convinced, that changes are clearly required in intercollegiate athletics. Making these
changes will require courage, determination and perseverance on the part of us all. That
courage, determination and perseverance must be summoned. Without them, we
cannot move forward. But with them and the "one-plus-three" model we cannot be
held back. The combination makes it possible to keep faith with our student-athletes,
with our institutions, and with the public that wants the best for them both.
Appendix B: Meeting Participants

CONFERENCE COMMISSIONERS

Eugene Corrigan
Atlantic Coast Conference

James Frank
Southeastern Athletic Conference

Kenneth Free
Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference

Thomas Hauser
Pacific-10 Conference

Fred Jacobs
Southwest Conference

Carl James
Big Eight Conference

Joseph Komarek
Western Athletic Conference

Margie McDonald
High Country Athletic Conference

Charles Nexum
College Football Association

Ronald Stephens
Big Sky Athletic Conference

Patty Vicente
Gatame College. Collegiate Athletic Conference

Kern Weberg
Associate Commissioner

Big Ten Conference

FACULTY ATHLETICS REPRESENTATIVES

Oscar Butler
South Carolina State University

Richard Dunn
University of Washington

Nees Edney
Alcorn State University

Charles Elhardt
Florida State University

Daniel Gibbons
University of Oklahoma

Carla Hay
Marquette University

Jerry Kingston
Arizona State University

Daniel Regan
Villanova University

Billy Sew
Louisiana State University

B.J. Skilton
Clemson University

Yvonne Slatten
University of Iowa

Robert Suavay
Texas Technological University

Albert Wait
University of Arkansas
ATHLETICS DIRECTORS AND
SENIOR WOMEN ADMINISTRATORS

Richard Baer
University of Minnesota

Karen Fox
New Mexico State University

Christine Grant
University of Iowa

Kay Hix
Utah State University

Samuel Jankowski
University of Miami

C.M. Norton
University of Kentucky

Eugene Smith
Eastern Michigan University

Richard Tumby
University of Missouri

Janie Crown
University of Tennessee

William Flinn
Boston College

Charles Harris
Arizona State University

Judith Holland
University of California, Los Angeles

Jack Lengyel
U.S. Naval Academy

Marcia Smethurst
Washington State University

Glen Tuckett
Washington State University

Chris Veck
University of Minnesota

BASKETBALL COACHES

Dale Brown
Louisiana State University

Robert Knight
Indiana University

Richard Phillips
University of Notre Dame

George Raveling
University of Southern California

Vic Jan Stronger
University of Iowa

Ray Williams
University of Kansas

Jill Hutchinson
Illinois State University

Michael Krzyzewski
Duke University

Rene Portland
Pennsylvania State University

Dean Smith
University of North Carolina

John Thompson
Georgetown University

THIRTY-FIVE

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FOOTBALL COACHES

Terry Punch
University of California, Los Angeles

Richard Maxcy
Syracuse University

Joseph Paterno
Pennsylvania State University

Richard Sheridan
North Carolina State University

Denis Green
Stanford University

Thomas Osborne
University of Nebraska

Francis Peay
Northwestern University

STUDENT-ATHLETES

David Berkoff
Harvard University

Sheila Lynch
University of Texas, Austin

Susan Nines
Central Michigan University

Todd Sanderson
University of Mississippi

Henrietta Walls
University of North Carolina

Jason Wilkie
Central Michigan University

ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANTS

Arthur Ashe
Author

Barbara Beymann
American University

John Berry
Florida Bar Association

Robert Bradley
University of Kentucky

Charles Cook
New England Association of Schools and Colleges

Frank Deford
The National

Daniele Dutschke
National Collegiate Athletic Association

Paul Gatto
Kansas Association of School Boards

Russ Granik
National Basketball Association

Frank Haggard
Iowa State University

Gregg Harley
Athletic Footwear Association

David Knapp
National Collegiate Athletic Association

Richard Lapham
Center for the Study of Sport in Society

Bill Mauers
Public Affairs Television

John Moylan
De Mariste Catholic High School

Neal Pierson
CBS Sports
Appendix

Henry Sheller
U.S. Olympic Committee

Fred Struck
University of California, Los Angeles

John Thein
College of William and Mary

John Underwood
Author

Laverne Wiseman
College of William and Mary

Michael Sirow
Linde Thompson Law Firm

Paul Tagliabue
National Football League

Steven Twede
Oklahoma State University

Brenda Wear
National Collegiate Athletic Association
APPENDIX F

27 Knight Commission Recommendations
27 Knight Commission Recommendations

I. The "One": Presidential Control

1. Board Affirmation. Trustees should explicitly endorse and reaffirm presidential authority in all matters of athletic governance.

2. Control Conferences. Presidents should act on their obligation to control conferences.

3. Control NCAA. Presidents should control the NCAA.

4. Gender Equity. Presidents should commit their institutions to equity in all aspects of intercollegiate athletics.

5. TV Involvements. Presidents should control their institution’s involvement with commercial television.

II. The "Three": Academic Integrity

1. Initial Eligibility. The NCAA should strengthen initial eligibility requirements.
   a. Core Curriculum. By 1995 prospective student-athletes should present 15 units of high school academic work in order to be eligible to play in their first year.
   b. Campus Visits. A high school student-athlete should be ineligible for reimbursed campus visits or for signing a letter of intent until the admissions office indicates he or she shows reasonable promise of being able to meet the requirements for a degree.
   c. J. C. Proposition 48. Student-athletes transferring from junior colleges should meet the admissions requirement applied to other junior college students. Moreover, junior college transfers who did not meet NCAA Proposition 48 requirements when they graduated from high school should be required to sit out a year of competition after transfer.
   d. Admission Formula. Finally, we propose an NCAA study of the conditions under which colleges and universities admit athletes. This study should be designed to see if it is feasible to put in place admissions requirements to insure that the range of academic ability for incoming athletes, by
sport, would approximate the range of abilities for the institution's freshman class.

2. Letter of Intent. The letter of intent should serve the student as well as the athletics department. Incoming freshmen who have signed a letter of intent to attend a particular institution should be released from that obligation if the head coach who recruited them leaves the institution, or if the institution is put on probation by the NCAA, before they enroll.

3. Five-year Scholarships. Athletics scholarships should be offered for a five-year period.

4. Continuing Eligibility. Athletics eligibility should depend on progress toward a degree.
   a. Check Each Semester. In order to retain eligibility, enrolled athletes should be able to graduate within five years and to demonstrate progress toward that goal each semester.
   b. Progress Toward a Degree. At any time during the student-athlete's undergraduate years, the university should be able to demonstrate that the athlete can meet this test without unreasonable course loads.
   c. Meet Institutional Standards. Further, eligibility for participation should be restricted to students who meet the institution's published academic requirements, including a minimum grade point average when applicable.

5. Emphasize Graduation Rates. Graduation rates of athletes should be a criterion for NCAA certification.

III. The "Three": Financial Integrity

1. Reduce Costs. Athletics costs must be reduced.

2. Cost of Attendance. Athletics grants-in-aid should cover the full cost of attendance for the very needy.

3. Fiscal Control. The independence of athletics foundations and booster clubs must be curbed.
a. Curb Boosters. The Commission believes that no extra-institutional organization should be responsible for any operational aspect of an intercollegiate athletics program.

b. Centralize Revenue, Budget. All funds raised for athletics should be channeled into the university's financial system and subjected to the same budgeting procedures applied to similarly structured departments and programs.

4. Review Revenue Sharing. The NCAA formula for sharing television revenue from the national basketball championship must be reviewed by university presidents.

5. Outside Coaching Income. All athletics-related coaches' income should be reviewed and approved by the university.

   a. Prior Approval. The Commission believes that in considering non-coaching income for its coaches, universities should follow a well-established practice with all faculty members: If the outside income involves the university's functions, facilities or name, contracts for particular services should be negotiated with the university.

   b. Ban Shoe Contracts. As part of the effort to bring athletics-related income into the university, we recommend that the NCAA ban shoe and equipment contracts with individual coaches.


7. Institutional Funds to Athletics. Institutional support should be available for intercollegiate athletics.

IV. The "Three": Certification

1. Mandatory Certification. The NCAA should extend the certification process to all institutions granting athletics aid.

2. Annual Policy Audits. Universities should undertake comprehensive, annual policy audits of their athletics program. We urge extending the annual financial audit now required by the NCAA to incorporate academic issues and athletics governance.
3. Knight Commission Principles. The certification program should include the major themes put forth in this document.
APPENDIX G

Key to NCAA Proposals related to Knight Commission Recommendations
Listed in Chapter 6 Tables
Key to NCAA Proposals in Chapter 6 Tables

Summary of Legislative Proposals

1992 NCAA Convention

No. 14 - Core Curriculum Requirements - Increase, from 11 to 13, the minimum number of core-course credits for a qualifier.

No. 16 - Initial Eligibility Index - Establishes an Initial Eligibility Index based upon a core-curriculum GPA of 2.500 and a SAT of 700 or ACT of 17. The index slides to a 2.000 GPA with a 900 SAT or 21 ACT.

No. 18 - Official Visit Prior to Early Signing Period - Prohibits prospective student athletes who are non-qualifiers (based on 7 core courses) from accepting an official paid campus visit.

No. 19 - Satisfactory Progress - Mid-Year Transfer Students - Requires certification of min-year transfer students prior to the beginning of the next fall term in order to be eligible to compete.

No. 20 - Satisfactory Progress - Regular Academic Year - Specifies that 75% of semester or credit hours used to satisfy satisfactory progress requirements be earned during regular academic year.

No. 21 - Satisfactory Progress - Fulfillment of Degree Requirements and Minimum GPA - Requires minimum percentage of specific degree requirements be completed for continuing eligibility, starting in third year and progressing toward degree completion within 5 years. Also establishes minimum GPA.

No. 26 - Two-Year College Transfer Eligibility - Non Qualifier - Requires Non-Qualifiers who transfer from two-year institutions to complete a year of residence at the four-year institution to become eligible.

No. 28 - Coaches Athletically Related Income - Specifies that coaches must receive prior written approval from institution’s CEO for all athletically related compensation.

No. 35 - Resolution: Presidential Authority and Institutional Responsibility - Directs NCAA to conduct a study of several elements affecting
presidential authority and institutional responsibility and to submit legislation for action at the 1993 NCAA Convention.

No. 36 - Resolution: Financial Issues - Directs NCAA to conduct a study of several elements affecting financial control and financial integrity of college athletics and present legislation at the 1994 NCAA Convention.

1991 NCAA Convention

No. 40 - Maximum Awards - Division I-A and I-AA Football, Division I Basketball, and Division I Equivalency Sports - Reduces by 10% the number of permissible grants-in-aid.

No. 59 - Resolution: Athletics Certification - Directs NCAA to submit legislation at the 1993 NCAA Convention to establish mandatory certification.

1990 NCAA Convention

No. 37 - Maximum Pell Grant - Increases the maximum permissible Pell Grant award from $1400 to $1700.
APPENDIX H

Report and Recommendations
of the NCAA President’s Commission
Subcommittee on Strategic Planning,
September 1991

Summary of 1992 NCAA Convention Legislation
Recommended by Knight Commission and
President’s Commission

Knight’s Commission Speaking Engagements
and Media Appearances
Report and Recommendations of the NCAA President’s Commission Subcommittee on Strategic Planning, September 1991
Background

Plans to establish a strategic-planning process to guide the work of the Presidents Commission were first discussed in 1990, and the Commission officers agreed early in 1991 to appoint a Commission subcommittee to formulate that process. The intent has been to assure ongoing direction in the work of the Commission, rather than having it wait until the beginning of each year to identify its primary involvements for that year. Specifically, interest was expressed in the development of a three- to five-year program of work for the Commission.

In February 1991, Commission Chair R. Gerald Turner asked Thomas K. Hearn Jr., president of Wake Forest University, to chair a Commission subcommittee for this purpose. In the April 1991 Commission meeting, the Commission approved the establishment of such a subcommittee and asked for a preliminary report at the October 1991 meeting. The Division I subcommittee of the Commission offered several possible topics, and all members of the Commission were invited to submit possible topics for consideration by the subcommittee.

Initially appointed to serve with President Hearn (Division I-A) on the subcommittee were Ronald E. Beller, East Tennessee State University (Division I-AA); Edward G. Coll Jr., Alfred University (Division III); Robert Dickson, University of Northern Colorado (Division II); Gregory M. St. L. O'Brien, University of New Orleans (Division I-AAA); Margaret R. Preska, Mankato State University (Division II), and Charles E. Young, University of California, Los Angeles (Division I-A). Subsequently, Messrs. Beller and Dickson left their campus positions. President Oscar C. Page, Austin Peay State University, was appointed to replace Mr. Beller as the Division I-AA representative on the subcommittee; Mr. Dickson was not replaced inasmuch as President Preska represented Division II interests on the subcommittee.

The subcommittee met June 24, 1991, and reviewed the following materials:

* A summary of all topics considered by the Commission since its formation in 1984.

* The Presidents Commission Statement of Guiding Principles that was adopted by the Commission in January 1991.

* Submissions by Commission members Stanley O. Ikenberry, University of Illinois, and Samuel H. Magill, Monmouth College (New Jersey), and by Wilford S. Bailey, Auburn University, a consultant to the Commission and a former NCAA president.
A draft of this report was prepared for review by the subcommittee in its September 30, 1991, meeting and then submission to the full Commission the following day. Also reviewed in the September 30 meeting were these items:

* A document reviewing the role of the Presidents Commission, revisions in the legislative process recommended by President Lattie F. Coor when he was a member of the Commission, the Board of Presidents proposal that was defeated at the 1984 Convention, and a statement on vertical NCAA constituencies submitted early to the Commission by the NCAA Committee on Review and Planning.

* The printed report of the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics.

Conclusions

In addition to the specific recommendations in the final section of this report, the subcommittee arrived at the following conclusions that it believes should impact on the Commission's work, regardless of the specific topics to be considered in any given year:

* The Commission should continue its consultation regarding issues and reforms with appropriate constituent groups in athletics, especially athletics directors, conference commissioners, faculty athletics representatives and coaches, and should continue to invite representatives of various constituent groups to visit with the Commission in conjunction with its regular meetings.

* The Commission should continue to monitor issues involving the credibility of the NCAA with the general public, the news media, Congress and the NCAA membership itself.

* The Commission should continue to base its initiatives on reliable data, to the greatest extent possible; therefore, it is essential that the NCAA play a major role in research activities, including the longitudinal study of the American Institutes for Research student-athlete database, as recommended earlier by the Commission.

* The Commission should continue to consider the most effective means of communicating with and earning the support of all chief executive officers in the NCAA membership.

Recommendations

The subcommittee recommends that the Commission adopt a strategic-planning process that at all times will span at least three years (i.e., a period that includes at least three annual NCAA Conventions), with at least 18 months devoted to each identified issue before it is finally acted upon at an NCAA Convention. For each issue identified in the process, a predetermined calendar will set forth periods during which the issue will be defined or identified, refined, marketed, acted upon and monitored.
By the end of each calendar year, the Commission (or its strategic-planning subcommittee, if such a group is to remain in service) should identify the issue or issues for the next year in the strategic-planning period; i.e., the process would involve a rolling three-year (or longer) plan of work because it would be extended annually by at least a year.

It is the responsibility of the Commission or its strategic-planning subcommittee to insure that appropriate evaluation of earlier reform initiatives is implemented and that the results of such evaluations are reflected in future Commission actions.

In addition to the primary issues identified in the ongoing strategic-planning process, the Commission should recognize that ongoing, recurring or new topics might arise during the same time frame. While the Commission may on occasion want to insert such additional matters into its plan for a given time period, it should agree that the issues identified in the strategic-planning process would represent the major emphases in the work of the Commission in the indicated years.

The following initial topics and cycles are recommended:

1. Presidential authority and institutional responsibility.

Included in this issue would be the following subtopics:

* Certification, institutional self-regulation and/or accreditation of athletics programs, including the need for peer review in that procedure and including consideration of the relationship between certification and the institution's regional accreditation.

* The structure and authority of the Presidents Commission, including consideration of ways of strengthening its role and the role of institutional chief executive officers in the NCAA.

* The Association's legislative process, including means of simplifying or streamlining that process to assure that chief executive officers have the ability to determine broad policy governing college athletics.

* Institutional control and integrity and ways of strengthening the role of the chief executive officer in assuring such control and integrity at institutional and conference levels and in relation to booster organizations, foundations and governing boards.

* Means of strengthening the relationships between chief executive officers and other constituent groups in intercollegiate athletics.

The timetable for dealing with these issues would be as follows:

* June 1991 to January 1992: Define and identify the issues.
* Throughout 1993: Monitor implementation and effect of legislation.
2. Financial conditions and issues.

Included in this issue would be the following subtopics:

* The general financial condition of college athletics, including the matter of financial integrity as raised by the Knight Foundation Commission.

* Financial aid for student-athletes, including consideration of a system of need-based financial aid and the actual cost of attendance at an institution.

* Financial implications of providing equitable athletics programs for men and women.

* The activities and influence of athletics foundations and booster organizations.

* The influence and financial implications of media-related revenues.

* Coaches' compensation, including continuing consideration of means of assuring appropriate institutional control of all athletically related income received by the institution's coaches.

* The effects of the cost-containment and cost-reduction actions taken by the 1991 NCAA Convention and consideration of the need for additional such actions.

The timetable for handling these issues would be as follows:


3. Welfare of the student-athlete.

Included in this issue would be the following subtopics:

* A review of the effects of earlier legislation to reduce time demands on student-athletes.

* A review of the effects of earlier legislation to enhance the academic preparation of student-athletes, including academic progress and graduation rates.

* A review of progress toward gender and racial equity in college athletics.

* Safety, health and well-being of the student-athlete, including reduction of injuries, drug and substance abuse, and other unsafe practices.
Strategic-Planning Subcommittee Report
Page No. 5

* Appropriate institutional involvement in career and life planning by student-athletes.

* Appropriate opportunities for degree completion after athletics eligibility has been exhausted, including financial aid.

The timetable for dealing with these issues would be as follows:

* June 1992 to January 1993: Define and identify the issues.

The attached chart reflects the timetables suggested above. It should be noted that the full recommended process cannot be realized until the second cycle (financial conditions) due to the subcommittee's desire to begin the process immediately, with action in the areas of presidential control and institutional responsibility at the 1993 Convention.

NCAA PRESIDENTS COMMISSION
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC PLANNING
Edward G. Coll Jr.
Thomas K. Hearn Jr., chair
Gregory M. St. L. O'Brien
Oscar C. Page
Margaret R. Preska
Charles E. Young

The National Collegiate Athletic Association
September 30, 1991

413
Presidents Commission Consideration of Strategic Issues

Key
- Identify and define issues
- Formal study and development of legislative proposal(s)
- Market the proposal(s) and lobby for support
- Follow-up implementation and monitor results, refining as needed

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<th>Action:</th>
<th>Convention resolution to authorize study</th>
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<td>Convention resolution to mandate legislation next year</td>
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<td>Action:</td>
<td>Implementing legislation at Convention</td>
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<td>The Student-Athlete</td>
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Summary of 1992 NCAA Convention Legislation
Recommended by Knight Commission and
President's Commission
1992 NCAA Convention  
Summary of Recommended Legislative Actions

During its September 25 meeting, the Knight Commission reviewed a number legislative proposals submitted for consideration at the 1992 NCAA convention. As a result of its discussions, the Commission will recommend to CEO's of NCAA member institutions that they take specific action on 26 proposals.

To facilitate understanding of the Knight Commission’s recommendations in relation to those of the Presidents Commission and the NCAA Council, a chart and synopsis of proposals is attached.

LEGISLATION ENDORSED BY THE KNIGHT COMMISSION

The Knight Commission wholeheartedly endorses the 14 proposals sponsored by the Presidents Commission, of which all but one are co-sponsored by the Council. Additionally, the Commission supports eight proposals related to equity, academic requirements, student-athletes and summer basketball camps.

LEGISLATION OPPOSED BY THE KNIGHT COMMISSION

The Knight Commission expressed serious concern regarding proposed legislation which, if passed, would mitigate the considerable progress achieved at the 1991 NCAA convention. Thus, the Commission opposes four proposals in the areas of financial aid, spring practice and recruiting. The Presidents Commission has joined the Knight Commission in opposition to these proposals, while the Council has taken no action on them.

In addition to the proposals listed on the summary chart, the Presidents Commission opposes another 26, and the Council another 23 or so, that they feel would roll back reform progress. In keeping with its global approach to issues, the Knight Commission took no action on these additional proposals.
<table>
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<th>Legislation</th>
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<th>President Commission</th>
<th>NCAA Council</th>
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Shaded cell denotes sponsorship of proposal. Empty cell indicates no action. All proposal numbers correspond to those listed in the 1992 NCAA Convention Notice.

1 See attached synopsis for explanation of proposals.

2 Support as amended - delays effective date by one year.

3 Council has withdrawn this proposal.

4 Council formally requested President Commission to reconsider its opposition; supported by majority of Division I Steering Committee.
Knight's Commission Speaking Engagements and Media Appearances
Knight Commission

Speaking Engagements

The Knight Commission was represented at the following regional and national meetings, which have occurred since the March 19 release of the Commission's report. In addition to these appearances coordinated by the staff, undoubtedly several of you may have spoken for the Commission at meetings of which we are unaware.

- **National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (NAFEO)**, Washington, DC, March 22.
- **Women's Basketball Coaches Association (WBCA)**, New Orleans, March 31.
- **University Commissioners Association/Collegiate Commissioners Association (UCA/CCA)**, Indianapolis, March 31.
- **NCAA Presidents Commission**, San Diego, April 2-3.
- **Texas Ex-Students Association**, Austin, April 5
- **Atlantic Coast Conference** (Faculty representative meeting), Greensboro, NC, April 10.
- **American Association of College Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO)**, Honolulu, April 17.
- **Southern Regional Education Board (SREB)**, Lexington, KY, April 19.
- **Association of Governing Boards (AGB)**, Miami Beach, April 22.
- **National Sportswriters and Sportscasters Association (NSSC)**, Salisbury, NC, April 28.
- **National Association of Education Reporters and Writers (NAERW)**, San Diego, April 28.
- **University Commissioners Association/Collegiate Commissioners Association (UCA/CCA)**, Chicago, April 30.
- **Western Athletic Conference (WAC)**, Tucson, May 1.

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1 NOTE: It is assumed that Commissioners representing athletics conferences will speak for the Commission at their conference's spring meeting. President Peterson attended the Western Athletic Conference's spring meeting for athletics directors, senior women administrators and faculty athletics representatives, who convene separately from the conference presidents.
Discussions of the Commission's reform agenda have ranged from unqualified support to heated discussion concerning specific aspects of the Commission's recommendations. Main points of contention include the practicality and nature of annual audits, the effect of reform on minority access to higher education, and, most of all, attempting to limit special admissions for athletes to the level of those permitted for non-athletes.

Despite differences in regard to specifics, however, the Commission's "one-plus-three" model has been well-received. Organizations with whom the Commission has met generally are firm in their belief in the need for change and committed to becoming actively involved in the reform process with the guidance and support of the Knight Commission.

The following Knight Commission appearances have been scheduled as of this date through the month of July.

- NCAA Presidents Commission (hearings), Dallas, May 9.
- Big West Conference, San Jose, May 16.
- Association of Mid-Continental Universities (AMCU), Chicago, May 17.
- Southern Conference, Myrtle Beach, May 22.
- Southwest Athletic Conference (SWAC), New Orleans, May 23.
- Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference (MEAC), Greensboro, May 29.
- National Association for Academic Advisors for Athletics (N4A), Lexington, KY, June 6.
- National Association for Collegiate Directors of Athletics (NACDA) (keynote; Division I; Division I-A; Division III; five roundtables), San Diego, June 9-12.
- American Association of University Professors (AAUP), Washington, DC, June 14.
- NCAA Presidents Commission, Kansas City, June 25.
- Council for Advancement and Support of Education (CASE), Montreal, July 14-17.
- Institute for Education Management (Harvard University), Cambridge, MA, July.
Knight Commission

Media Appearances

Knight Commission members appeared on the following television and radio programs subsequent to the March 19 release of the Commission's report. It is quite possible that several of you made appearances of which the Commission office is not aware.

National Network and Cable Television

• ABC/Good Morning America. March 19. Exclusive advance interview, prior to press conference, with Father Hesburgh and Mr. Friday to discuss highlights of the press conference.


• ABC/This Week With David Brinkley. March 21. Mr. Friday was interviewed during a one-hour show discussing college sports. Other guests included Duke University basketball coach Mike Krzyzewski and UNLV president Robert Maxson.

• C-Span. 3/28. Forty-five minute interview with Mr. Black.

• NBC/A Closer Look. April 1. Interview with Congressman McMillen.

Appearances in Local Markets

Television

• KARO-TV, Seattle, March 29. Interview with President DiBiaggio on news program focused on college sports.

• WUNG-TV, Charlotte, April 15. "North Carolina People," hosted by Mr. Friday, featured Mr. Walker. Discussion included 1992 Olympics and Knight Commission report.

Radio

- KING, Seattle, March 21. Interview with Mr. Black.


Knight Commission: bes
May 7, 1991
EDUCATION AND HONORS

Ph.D. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; Educational Research/Higher Education Administration (Law & Policy); December 1992.

M.A. University of Southern California; Psychology of Sport; Administration; 1983.

Johns Hopkins University; Summer 1976, Fall 1978.

B.S. Springfield College; Physical Education; 1977.

Academic Honors:

Phi Kappa Phi - Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Academic Honor Fraternity.

Magna Cum Laude - Springfield College.

Professional Honors:

Meritorious Performance and Professional Promise Award - San Francisco State University.

Honorary Scarlet and Gray - Friends School.

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS

Academic Publications:


Franklin, Timothy V., and James W. Garrison, "When is Political Correctness Correct?" submitted to The American Educator, in review, April 1992.

Research:


Unpublished Papers:

Franklin, Timothy V., "If You Build It, Will We Come?" Qualitative research on reactions to the Knight Commission’s Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete. April, 1991.


Other Publications:


TEACHING AND PUBLIC SERVICE

Faculty:

Physical Education Instructor - San Francisco State University; 1985-88.

Physical Education Instructor - Virginia Military Institute; 1981-82.

Physical Education Teacher - Friends School, Baltimore, Maryland; 1977-79.

Coaching:

Head Basketball Coach - San Francisco State University; 1985-88.

Head Assistant Basketball Coach - Radford University; 1988-1990.

Assistant Basketball Coach - Old Dominion University; 1982-85.

Graduate Assistantships:

Graduate Teaching Assistant - Physical Education; Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; 1990-1992.

Graduate Teaching Assistant - Physical Education; University of Southern California; 1979-80.

Graduate Assistant Basketball Coach - University of Southern California; 1979-80.

Assistant Sub-Varsity Basketball Coach - Springfield College; 1976-77.
Non-Teaching Activities:

Seminars:


Special Projects:

Comprehensive Academic Program for the Men’s Basketball Team - San Francisco State University; 1985-88.

Coordinator, Morgan State University Teacher Intern Program - Friends School; Baltimore, Maryland; 1978-79.

International:

Basketball Recruiter - Student-Athletes from Yugoslavia, Puerto Rico, Australia, France and England; 1982-90.

Sponsor and Speaker - San Francisco State - Brisbane Bullets Basketball Game and Reception; 1987.

Clinic Director and Lecturer - Curacao Amateur Basketball Federation; Curacao, Netherland Antilles; 6/82.

Committee Work:

San Francisco State University:
Coaching Track Advisory Committee; Personnel; Spring 1986-87
Scholarship Committee; 1986-87
Department Operations Committee, Honors Coordinator; 1987-88
Ad Hoc Committee to Study Athletic Awards; 1986
Curriculum Sub-Committee on B.A., B.S., and Pre-PT; 1987-88
PE 104 Coordinator, Faculty Workshop; Fall 1986 and 1987

Professional and Academic Association Memberships:

National Organization on Legal Problems of Education
American Educational Research Association
Phi Delta Kappa
Toastmasters International
National Association of Basketball Coaches, 1983-91
Academic Committee, 1989-91
Membership Committee, 1987-89

Timothy V. Franklin