From Mazes to Labyrinths: An Evolutionary Window for Public Administration: A New Ontology

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Abstract

Public administration is struggling with its identity at a time when cultural events would indicate that it has failed to do its job. However, the chaos of the current context of society marks an evolutionary window for both public administration and the American culture. Public administration can either decide to make one more adaptation to the historical dialectics of economic dialogue, or it can choose to embrace a new identity -- one more in line with its democratic and constitutional roots. However, to demand that public administration become more aware of its democratic responsibilities, also requires that public administration be given a new voice with which to speak -- one different from the management paradigm within which it has spoken in this century. What is called the Ontology of Neo-Darwinism has created a consciousness among public administrators which limits what they feel they can do and what they can talk about to the boundaries of that consciousness. In particular, the consciousness has come to appear like a state which can not be exceeded, despite its undemocratic tendencies, because of limitations which are perceived to define the nature of human relationships. It is proposed here that an Evolutionary ontology is more appropriate for the tasks of public administration. It is an ontology which views relationship

and responsibility as the basis of human process, rather than fear and blame. The philosophical roots of the Ontology of Neo-Darwinism are described and the Evolutionary ontology defined.

Acknowledgements

In writing about chaos, it soon becomes evident that the world is a vibrant source of ideas much more easily acquired through the quality of our relationships than through books and numbers. Many of the thoughts in this work are the result of the generative presence of my friends and mentors at Virginia Tech and of the faculty and students at Western Michigan University. They are also the result of the boundless inspiration coming from the joyful and creative chaos of my children -- Rebecca and Mac. This dissertation in dedicated to all of them -- but in particular to Maxwell Perkins.

FIGURES IN TEXT



REGRESSIVE HISTORICAL DIALECTICS

Figure I: CHAPTER FOUR



DEMOCRACY AS THE PROCESS OF IDENTITY FORMATION
Figure I: CHAPTER FIVE

Relational	Stratified	Darwinistic	Monistic
			
Anaximander Solan	Plato & Aristotle	Descartes, Malthus, & Darwin	Talcott, Parson, & Herbert Simon

DISPOSITIONS:

EQUALITY

Everything on equal footing	Some things are more important than others	All things are vulnerable to extinction	Everyone can be classifie according to motives

LEGITIMACY

Inherent legitimacy of all things	Legitimacy of some things are questioned	Legitimacy comes in the ability to complete	Legitimacy in effectiv efficient methodology

RESPONSIBILITY

Guilt/innocence are not the issues but relationship/ responsibility are	Responsibility is to the ideal rather than the other.	Responsibility to personal survival	Responsibility to objective method.

ORDER

Order derives from chaos	Order is imposed on chaos.	Natural order- survival of the fittest	Order in imposition of scientific method

CONFLICT

Conflict is purposeful to evolution	Conflict is for power and legitimacy.	Conflict is for survival.	Conflict is in efficient

Figure I: CHAPTER SIX

	Certainty Potentiality	Connected disconnected	Passive engaged	Paternalistic relational	
	Disposition	Relationship	Attitude	Space	Mode of Interaction
Relational	Potentiality	Connected	Engaged	Relational	Dialogical ritual
Stratified	Certitude	Connection by role	Partially engaged	Paternalistic	Rhetorical
Darwinistic	Certitude	Connected by function	Partially engaged	Paternalistic	Methodological domination
Monistic	Certitude	Disconnected	Disconnected	Paternalistic	Information processing

Social space



Rearrangement of mechanical parts to
achieve artificial equilibrium

Effect: Homogenization

NEWTONIAN GEOMETRY
FIGURE I: CHAPTER SEVEN



Dynamic forms which maintain intrinsic character
in interaction with environment

Effect: Enhancement

GENERATIVE FORMS
Figure II: CHAPTER SEVEN

Preface

When I was 14, or maybe fifteen, it was my practice to sit in the early morning and then again in the evening at the crest of a particular Aspen-laden hill to watch the sun play on the Snake River. Because it was Idaho and had a full sky I could see the sun rise in the East and set again in the West from the same spot. I could see the Snake where it still bounded like a wild river and I could see it settle out along the irrigated desert of potato country. The stones I kicked loose with my toes from the volcanic dirt had the particular color of the season, like the rocks along the river that one knew to be Idaho rocks, not because of their names, but because their color reflected the sky, the Tetons, the water, the foliage and the animals in some agreed upon symmetry. The seasons came clearly and without hesitation to that spot on the mountainside. One knew when winter had come and one knew when it was Spring by the change in the density of the air if nothing else and because, when it warmed, the same mother grouse, or her successors, chased me from her nest at the same place in the timber grass year after year. Once as I sat there in my spot, my knees drawn up to my chin, listening to the quakenaspen bring up an evening breeze, a fully crested buck deer flew over the top of me on his way to water. He was so close in that moment I wondered if he was smelling me or if it

was I who had smelled him in the second that my heart stopped.

It has, I think, sometimes been difficult for me to imagine the world as a divided place or to understand the more precise methods of human measurement. When I think of it, its a bit comical, really, that much of my adult life has been spent trying to learn to understand the more detached categories of thought about the nature of things, and now I am trying to regain enough of the insight I had at fifteen to explain an inter-related world. In all these carefully crafted words there is still not the feeling of being with that buck.

Linda Dennard

December, 1992

Introduction

This dissertation prescribes a seemingly formidable task -- that of an evolutionary move to a new identity for public administration by way of a new ontological understanding of social process. Proposing a new identity for public administration may seem to be a daunting challenge, and perhaps not just a little naive. This is so because the management consciousness is so entrenched in the field -- among both academics and practitioners. Indeed, much of the debate in the field is limited to how to make theory fit the practical imperatives of management. It seems little concerned with questioning the management identity of public administration altogether.

Even if a need for change is recognized, however, the hold of the management identity of public administration is such that only incremental change would be possible -- like rearranging our clothing instead of shedding our skins for something completely different. It is difficult to imagine that we might embrace a new ontology, because our management mentalities lead us to think us we must first instrumentally peal off the layers that have accumulated in the historical circumstances of our field's development. The management further leads us to believe that once we reach the "bottom," then we would have to reconstruct the field -- with clear guidelines for development -

- like we were building a ship or a drawbridge.

It is this burden of the rationale comprehensive model, incrementalism and satisficing which has encouraged the field of public administration to simply add more and more layers to its thick "management skin", instead of addressing directly the more urgent issues of democratic process and democratic governance.

Yet, it may be that a change in the identity of public administration is as simple as making a choice. The choice is the abandonment of the idea that administration is only about the management of details disconnected from the broader reality of human interaction and meaning. Details may be better served, in fact, by placing their execution within the reality of social process. The choice to assume a new identity can be seen as an inversion of the belief that the country can be managed by understanding only its parts and pieces without recognizing that the parts and pieces "flow" in a social process which exceeds, and has always exceeded, the categories, programs and problems with which public administration has traditionally defined social process.

However, the choice to take on a new, broader identity, has some urgency to it beyond the need to improve management. For in defining our nation by its parts, we have to create a divisiveness among citizens, which prevents their clearly seeing their responsibility in relationship to one another. Public administration is thus contributing to a national shift in

consciousness which not only threatens the social order, but takes us further and further away from our ability to recover. It is rapidly becoming more and more difficult to make statements like those of Democritus: "That there is only one space." (Hicks, 1959). Democritus meant that the divisions with which we describe our space, do not necessarily define the whole space except as we come to believe it to be so.

The reluctance to consider questions of human purpose and evolution above questions of efficiency and economic stability draws its strength from a long line of historical arguments about the character of nature and about our relationship with nature. The Reformist agenda, and that of the Progressives, and all change movements that followed, expressed a particularly hostile relationship with nature, one which could only see human purpose as mimicking a mechanical universe for the purpose of mastering it. This view was an attempt to flee what appeared to be the determinism of natural law -- by either succeeding in mastering its techniques or by discounting it all together as Marx did. Other options have not been apparent because, since at least Plato, nature has been conceived of as a prior, and thus, lesser evolution -- one which could not control its own power, one which placed humans hopelessly at the will of their earth-bound senses and emotions. As such, "a dialogue with nature" as a means of moving the human project forward, has been viewed as inconceivable and unproductive.

This is so despite a dramatic change in how "science" has come to understand natural processes in this century. Public administrators still cling to their comfort in the mechanics of Newtonian natural law. This is so, because of the old battle with nature, one in which it appeared that a submission to determinism was the only alternative to an angry and distanced relationship with nature. Yet, a relationship with the physical world is an important recognition of human roots and the physics which humans share with all other things in the universe. It is not deterministic. Determinism comes from an adversarial disposition toward nature which makes all actions simply reactions to a nature we are trying to avoid. A ***relationship,*** on the other hand, requires responsible action and thus lends itself to an existential freedom -- one dependent on the ability to make judgments, love, forgive and exist within and as part of the larger plenum.[1]

It is more appropriate to the human enterprise for public administrators to question the premises of mechanistic natural law than to reject nature altogether. It is clear we cannot reject the physical world without artificially separating humans

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[1] Plenum refers to "space filled with matter," and here is used to describe a universe which is not a vacuum, but alive and renewing.

from those processes within which they operate as beings on the planet.

The legacy of Thomas Hobbes, in particular, has created a public administration consciousness in which it appears that there is no social process except that which is put in motion by organizational intent. This has produced system dysfunctions which perpetuate a negative society. [2] For example, diversity is perceived to be an anomaly, because it cannot always to traced to some rationally, intended action. The result is that our attitude towards diversity is quite often negative as public administrators seek to categorize and explain rather than accept diversity -- a disposition which would change if it was recognized that diversity is a innate condition of a universe which is dynamic and creative.

The continued focus on particularism in public administration also makes it appear that the "richer" aspects of human existence, especially those associated with relationships, art, music, and other expressions of humanity, are somehow irrelevant or at best simply functional to the market which can package and sell them. As such, we are not "making" [3] much with our time which would allow the human project to evolve from

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[2] Negative society is a term first used by the anti-Federalists to describe their fears concerning a centralized society -- one in which relationships could not be nurtured (Jefferson, 1984).

[3] Time as a concept is explored more in Chapter 11.

more than a dreary and homogenized state. Public administration as a management technology, one especially influenced by the Darwinistic imperatives of the market, exists therefore within the ungenerative boundaries of a negative identity, instead of a proactive and vital one.

Ironically, perhaps, given the disposition of public administration towards cataloguing human action rather than participating in it, the American Constitution, embodies a process which allows, rather than prescribes, the social order. The social order can remain stable because the Separation of Powers doctrine requires a process orientation that involves cooperation and a blending of powers. Public administration has largely seen itself disconnected from the generative principles of this Constitutional Order, however.

Social evolution is traditionally seen by public administration as an incremental improvement to a perceived higher state. Yet social evolution is, in reality, a less linear and one-dimensional process, and can be expressed more as the formation of identity through repeated social interactions by related and interdependent "levels of meaning" (Wamsley, 1992). American character for example, is currently, evolving into a negative state of self-loathing and decline because it is organizing around the divisive presumptions of the market. However, because the relational processes of human interaction can always exceed the roles assigned by the market there is

always hope that at the emerging point of entropy, the negative social order will dissipate and develop a new identity which is more positive.

It is this evolutionary potential to reconfigure at a point of decline, rather than die at a point of entropy, which makes it possible for public administration to form a new identity without an historical dig into its past. A world understood from the ontology of the New Physics is a relational world. A relational world for humans is dialogic -- speech and language being unique manifestations of the human state of consciousness. If our concern is further evolution for human beings, the basic purpose of human action, then dialogue is connected in the most basic way to the project of evolution. We can talk about what kind of social order we want and have it happen, by a change in our disposition, by a change in our consciousness.

Indeed, the state of our culture now demands the public administration make a choice to be concerned about human purpose and human evolution, so that the public's business has something to do with meaningful social process. Public administration does not yet see itself connected with these grander pursuits of human purpose. It would, it seems, most often like to pass off any connection to the broader purposes of human evolution to the legislature and the executive, once again denying its own existence within the plenum as a related social phenomenon.

Yet, public administration, as the creation of the dynamics

of the separation of powers doctrine, is perhaps the most logical place to focus attention on revitalizing the democratic spirit in America as the metaphor for positive evolutionary process. It is the place in which the dynamics of political relationships play out and where citizens do with government in personal and dialogic ways. Public administration cannot deny the role it plays in the development of American character and must now engage itself in coming to terms with the identity crisis created by the ontology which gives rise to the management consciousness.

One conceptual step towards a new identity may be to stop thinking of social process and work processes as mazes we must struggle through in a search for safety and security; responsible only for getting to the end. Instead, it is perhaps more helpful to think of such processes as part of the larger labyrinth of life, which is risky, uncertain and full of suffering, but which also offers countless opportunities for personal and societal growth -- if individuals in and out of government are willing to assume the responsibility of the relationship implied by an interdependent polity. A change in identity from a problem-oriented management tool allows public administration to discover its place in the social order and contribute to the meaningful purpose of human evolution.

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Literature Review: Vitalizing the Refounding

Dwight Waldo has said that American public administration has been formed by, and continues to struggle with, the tension between its democratic roots in the Greek tradition and its authoritarian roots in the Roman tradition. The dissertation proposes the question as to whether public administration should continue the struggle, or whether it should begin to define itself as something other than what can be bargained for in the tension between those traditions.

The premises of this dissertation partially arose from a "going back to go forward" idea which is the theme of the emerging paradigm of evolution and chaos. The theme states that evolutionary movement is produced by system disequilibrium which is generated by environmental change, but that both existing and new social phenomenon are involved in the process; the result being that both the old and the new in the system take a new form in relationship to the original generative structures. The effect is that the entire system changes, not just selected parts. In this process structures -- and by extensions groups, nations and individuals -- renewed their identity and participated in evolutionary development.

The theme of evolution, as understood by the New Physics and New Evolutionary theory, seems to begin to address the

tensions created for public administration by the idea of democratic government. If evolution did indeed describe democratic process -- that process whereby individuals' participation in the creation of their own evolution -- as it seems to, then much of what public administration did to suppress disequilibrium was clearly undemocratic and perhaps at the heart of public administration's long-standing discomfort with citizen participation and dialogue.

I have always seen the effort to develop a normative theory of public administration by the scholars at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University as an attempt to reconcile the management identity of public administration with more democratic ideals. The Blacksburg Manifesto [1] written by that group, has come to appear to me to be a general set of organizing principles which both destabilizes conventional wisdom about public administration and also serves as the organizing principles for a new dialogue about the purposes of the field. However, initially my desire to move one iterative generation beyond the normative claims of the Manifesto and the work of the "Refounding" public

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1 The Blacksburg Manifesto refers to *The Public administration and the governance process: Refocusing the American dialogue,* which earned its name as the call for a normatively based public administration by a number of the intellectual leaders of the field. The piece was written first in 1983 and has been reprinted in several forms since.

administration efforts of the scholars at Virginia Tech seemed a bit futile.

No way seemed to exist to unearth the ideals of the Blacksburg Manifesto from the grounding in the Modernist tradition (as has been described by Orion White and Gary Marshall, (1990). However, sincerely the Manifesto spoke of a new path for public administration -- one whose focus was dialogue and citizenship involvement, there seemed to be little in its reliance on value-orientations and a return to community to separate it from the similar, but failed, plans of the Reformists or Progressives. What was to save the Blacksburg Manifesto from being "just one more theory" floating in the sea of post-modern relativity (Jameson, 1991).

The issues surrounding the dialogue which created the Blacksburg Manifesto and the subsequent Refounding Public Administration volume appeared to be too important to the profession to simply dismiss as unaddressable, however. They involved a nation which had lost its ability to talk to itself in any but a hostile voice. Too, the Manifesto prompted American public administration to take seriously its implied role of governance in a country which needed a new and more relevant exercise of authority than that which interest group politics seemed to be providing (Bellah, 1985, 1989; Lowi, 1978). The issues in the Manifesto which are addressed and expanded upon in this dissertation are those of primarily of

dialogue, hierarchy, community and authority -- all of which have had considerable attention in recent years in public administration literature (Bellah, 1989; Selznick, 1992; White, 1990). The dissertation extends these areas, however, by considering them in light of a new ontology.

The initial question, however, was why the Manifesto, despite its seeming urgency, could not offer more in the current environment. Clearly, the historical context in which the Manifesto appeared could not be blamed without the Manifesto taking on the tone of yet another critique of the system -- a reform effort likely to go the way of all reform in a public administration highly skilled at adapting reform to meet its own imperatives (Moe, 1989); Seidman, 1986). Too, the democratic premises of the Manifesto seemed to say that, to govern, public administration could not turn its back on anyone; that indeed it must somehow "rise above the fray." If postmodernism -- in all its complex manifestations -- is the condition of the country, then, for the issue of governance to be very relevant it must address things as they are, for better or for worse, rather than relying on a somewhat nostalgic sense of what used to be upon which to rest its arguments for change.

Yet, how could a country be governed democratically on the premises of community, common interest, and commitment when its disposition was one which fostered division and non-

commitment as symbols of freedom, individualism and identity? Indeed, in the face of such a disposition, the Manifesto seemed quixotic at worst and at best romantic.

Ironically perhaps, the catalyst for finding a way in which the Manifesto might actually serve to transform those elements of the Modernist tradition which defied the self-organizing nature of democracy was provided by Herbert Simon. I read his autobiography, *Models of My Life* (1992), at the same time I read Eric Janstch's *Self-Organizing Universe* (1979). Simon's account of how he arrived at his ideas about decision-making and rationality which reflects, and perhaps hgelps create, a particular consciousness among public administrators and tells much about how the bureaucratic personality arises and why the ambiguities of democracy are so threatening to it.

It was Simon's discussions with the poet Jorges Luis Borges, and the fractal geometrist B.B. Mandlebrot which were particularly enlightening. The disturbing clarity of the disposition of the "rational man" who had, by choice, disconnected himself from the flow of natural events, prompted the thought that the problem with the Manifesto was that it was still written somewhat from the position of an observer; that, ontologically, it still spoke in the voice of Simon...from a position of control and also a position of safety. Unlike Borges who "stayed in the night wind," Simon

strategically calculated each interaction and each relationship.

Knowing the male authors of the Manifesto as men who valued relationships and took pride in their own highly developed, personal "culture." it seemed paradoxical that they should also seem to write from a Simonesque ontological box. I remembered, however, that Cam Stivers was asked to join as a member of the enterprise somewhat as an afterthought when she reminded them that they had not considered relational issues like dialogue and citizenship. But then, these men also possessed a highly developed sense of responsibility and pride in public service which seemed to order their emotional responses to public duty in a classically paternalistic way; muchin the manner that Simon assumes in necessary to correct what's wrong in the world without participating in the change himself.

Recall that Simon came from the Modernist tradition and was trained in behavioral sciences -- as several of the authors of the Manifesto were. And consider that what Simon is responsible to, and for, is something quite different from the premises of democracy. Simon, is quite simply trying to maintain an equilibrium and to make the world completely secure from conflict, not attempting to revive democracy. In his autobiography, he describes himself as a liberal concerned with issues of race and social justice -- but interested from

a distance where he seems to feel he can manipulate outcomes more successfully.

It is likely that the authors of the Manifesto shared this same sense of responsibility to the maintenance of equilibrium and security -- it is a prevalent consciousness which has been created by the Neo-Darwinism of the post-industrial age (Marshall & White, 1990). It is a consciousness which could not entirely be shed by "Refounding" public administration on the premises of the Constitution -- though ultimately this dissertation comes back to the Constitution as a generative source of organizing principles for the American society. But it is a consciousness which values maintaining a distance from emotional themes as the way in which conflict is avoided.

Wamsley recounts that the Blacksburg Manifesto was a group project generated by an emotional response to the bureaucrat bashing of the Reagan years (1987). Only it seems the relational process of the origins of the Refounding of Public Administration [2] was somehow seen as different from the prescriptions of the text. This is evident mainly by the author's predisposition towards the "inculcation and infusing of values", apparently as an instrumental act of an academic

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2 Refounding Public Administration was the follow-up book to the Manifesto which expanded on many of the themes of that work.

authority somewhat removed from the relational process. Although, the document itself emerged from a process involving community values and a positive disposition towards authority, these qualities apparently did not emerge from a relational process but were formulated in advance and conceivably would be passed on by some method of inculcation (1987).

It became apparent that the problem with the Manifesto was that an incongruence existed between the premises of its construction and the outcomes it proposed. Perhaps the answer then was to study the nature of this disconnection and realign the Manifesto's premises with its prescriptions as an integrated document -- one which could remain in process rather than dying as soon as it was shown that it could not address social problems any better than the next theory.

In the process of considering the Manifesto in light of White and Marshall's arguments in particular, a broader concept took shape in my mind: that of the need for a new ontology which addressed the disunities and imperatives of the ontology which has prevailed in the organizational episteme for over a century and which was evident in the discontinuities of the Blacksburg Manifesto.

Going back to go forward involved two steps (1) identifying the dispositions of the prevailing management paradigm, its historical development and its effect of public administration and (2) conceptually some of the aspects of a

new ontology, one which directed the responsibility of public administration towards something other than the need to maintain equilibrium; an artificial equilibrium which, on the face of it, seemed to deny basic human process, which, it was sensed, lay at the core of democratic principles.

However far we may think we have come from the Hobbesian idea of the Leviathan state reinforced by the principles of natural selection, it appears that public administration still operates with the consciousness that Plato and Descartes created and which was formalized into organizational theory by thinkers from Hobbes to Simon (Wolin, 1960; 1990; Simon, 1992). It is a consciousness which is concerned most with states of personal security and equilibrium, states which require a conflict free and homogeneous environment.

The explication of this Neo-Darwinistic ontology was arrived at by studying various works by communitarians and postmodernists as well as original works of Neo-darwinists such as Simon and Western philosophers from Plato to Darwin. Because of the change in the collective conscious which has occurred because of Neo-Darwinism and the attendant social events promulgated by it, we are not dealing simply with an epistemology alone or a paradigmatic phenomenon.

In particular, the work of Charles Taylor (1989), David Collins (1985), Dario Melossi (1990), and Sheldon Wolin's recent work on Thomas Hobbes (1990) were helpful as well as

Orion White and Cynthia McSwain's work on technicism (1989). Also, evolutionary biologists Mae Wan Ho, Peter Saunders, and Sidney Fox (1984, 1986) and Eric Janstch (1975, 1979, 1982) provided detailed descriptions of the limits of the theory of natural selection, suggesting that other potentialities for human relationships were possible than those usually imagined.

However, this dissertation is perhaps most influenced in regards to a critique of Neo-Darwinism by post-Marxist thinkers like Rudolf Bahro of the Green Movement and the Hungarian dissident George Konrad (Boggs, 1986) and Rudolf Bahro (1984, 1986), as well as liberation theorists like Dorothee Soelle, of the Frankfurt School (1984, 1990), George Tinker (1992), and Paulo Friere (1974) and others. The influence comes because of the non-adversarial, post-dialectic approach of these thinkers which seems to embody an understanding of how to avoid becoming what we hate -- as a consequence of power struggles suited to the equilibrium needs of the market. Essentially their mutual point is that it is only by moving away from oppression rather than adapting to it that change occurs -- or as Ghandi said -- "There is no way to peace, peace is the way." Bahro, a founder of the Green Party in Europe, has disavowed himself of those parties' politics because they have adapted to the market-style political action which reinforces the premises of the economic system, for example.

The other aspect of liberation theory and post-marxist thinking which is important to this work is that it is concerned most with a revival of humanity as having an intrinsic and meaningful existence within the larger evolutionary processes we associate with nature. Its critique of technology in particular echoes that of an early liberation theorist Solan, the Greek, who dispensed with peoples debts because the concern for money interfered with the act of being human (Woodhouse, 1965). Anthropologist and physicist J.T. Fraser has said that the linear development of technology has outstripped the capacity of non-linear social evolution (1982, 1990). The behaviorist tradition of trying to mold people to keep up with the technology as it runs the market is simply inhuman and should be abandoned as a meaningful human enterprise.

Emerging theories of chaos and evolution are drawn upon because they provide new metaphors for the human endeavor which are more aligned with the kind of shared responsibility implicit in the prescriptions of the Refounding effort than the prevailing ontological stance from which management consciousness in derived (Briggs & Peat, 1984, Briggs, 1988; Prigonine & Stengers, 1984). "Chaos" as a social and spiritual metaphor is also examined for what it can tell us about the development of the current ontological consciousness of management.

New evolutionary theory differs from evolutionary theory described by B.F. Skinner as "evolution by consequence" (1981). New evolutionary theory states that life is involved in "evolution by process" (Ho, 1984, Jantsch, 1979). The implications are that human beings, in particular, have both the responsibility and the capability to do more than just react to their environment.

New evolutionary theory and chaos theory compliment each other. Evolutionary theory describes an inter-related and-interdependent life process while chaos theory describes the dynamics, the physics which enlivens the process (Arygros, 1991).

The dynamics of chaos theory have attracted increasing attention in organizational theory because they seem to account for the dynamics behind the principles of movements like Total Quality Management and the idea of a self-renewing environment (Deming, 1982, 1986).

Chaos theory is based on several principles, the most compelling of which are that systems self-organize based on a sensitivity to initial conditions and that they self-organize around a strange attractor or what is called here a set of stable organizing principles (Senge, 1992). These two principles are used as the basis for describing the nature of the Constitutional Order -- that is a self-organizing system which disassembles in an inter-active and dynamic system and

reassembles in new form around the organizing principles of the Constitution. It is this metaphor of dynamic, self-organizing system, which may explain how a society maintains its order, while simultaneousy encouraging and allowing self-organizing among its citizens. These dissipative structures, for example, appear to be similar to Wamsley and Zald's policy subsystems (1973). Also, they begin to give form to the working principles of the Traditionalists of public administration as described by McSwain & White (1990).

Self-organizing dynamics were described very well by Mary Parker Follett in The New State (1965) Follett stated that the process was what was important to a self-organizing system, not the outcomes -- that the outcomes represented points of order which were spontaneously created by the self-organizing. This dissertation begins to suggest an ontology to support Follett's intuition about a self-organizing democracy.

Progressives like Herbert Mead and John Dewey expressed an understanding of the self-organizing nature of human relationships as well. However, they saw the purpose of the organizing as the avoidance of consequence (Dewey, 1920, 1927,1939; Mead, 1915, 1925, 1934). Unlike Follett, however, they expressed a basic Neo-Darwinistic belief that evolution occurs only as a result of a consequence -- either reward or punishment, and not as part of a process of evolution.

Evolution by process, rather than by consequence, is the

basic tenet of the emerging evolutionary ontology which is distinguished from the Neo-Darwinistic ontology of evolution by adaptation. The new ontology has two basic themes: (1) that systems do not need achieve balance by natural selection or through the avoidance of consequence and (2) that Darwinism is a self-fulfilling historical phenomenon which is only deterministic if other potentialities for human relations are not explored (Ho & Saunders, 1984).

The above is important here because it reduces the need for social control and begins to suggest another role for authority than the maintenance of security and equilibrium. The argument about the historical basis of Darwinism begins to defuse the importance of historical dialectics as prescriptions for social action. Also, evolution by process implies that all errors are both potentialities and also the products of shared responsibility, an idea which was planted early on in my thinking by an article by McSwain and White entitled "The Case for Lying, Cheating and Stealing" (1987), in which the issue of shared responsibility is explored.

This work is also heavily influenced by McSwain and White's explorations into the implications of the Goddess culture on contemporary consciousness. The dissertation, however, describes social dynamics, like those implicit in maternalistic cultures, from an understanding of New Physics and New Evolutionary theory -- both of which suggest a

relational and rhythmic space in which human beings interact. A dependence on historical dialectics to understand human dynamics, rather than this broader, interactive and interdependent social space, confines human consciousness to a very limited playing field. In essence, historical dialectics establish and reinforce bi-polar dialogue in which it appears that there are only two possible outcomes -- usually involving a win or a lose, or at best a compromise. This dissertation thus attempts to move beyond historical dialectics as a basis for either social critique or social reform.

In fact, historical dialectics, as the basis of predicting human endeavor, begin to appear dysfunctional, when the concepts of an inter-related and interdependent society are accepted. These concepts found in chaos and evolutionary theory are not new, however. Although they are being brought into the contemporary environment through the language of modern science, the ideas presented here are quite old, appearing in both the early Greek traditions and in ancient maternalistic societies (Hatab, 1990; Gadon, 1989). The concepts of interrelatedness pose a different kind of ethics and prescribe different approaches to the problems of thought and action than that of the Neo-Darwinistic ontology. The presumption of a shared responsibility in all things is an inherent condition of a world sensitive to intial conditions

and therefore capable of easily producing great complexity (Hicks, 1959).

This inherently shared responsibility lends support to such renascent ideas as the public interest and the common good. These concepts are felt concepts, however, rather than simply mental constructs. Indeed, the role of emotions in formulating our ideas about the public good is profound. This is so because emotions allow us to connect to Others and also increase the nuances which give rise to creative thought is formed (Briggs, 1988; LaViolette, 1979, 1980). In fact, chaos research into the nature of brain activity suggests that connections to a sense of the common good and the ability to formulate new thought are simply not possible without both sensory and emotional input (Bateson, 1972; Gray, 1979).

This would begin to suggest, for example, that the kinds of emotional states which produced the Blacksburg Manifesto are also the conditions by which community is realized and change in old, static patterns of thought occur.

In the mixing of emotions and thought, people self-organize; that is, as Mary Parker Follett understood and chaos theorists, (or disequilibrium systems theorists), posit, groups are able to achieve their own balance if states of disequilibrium are able to play out. Mary Parker Follett, though she did not articulate a broader ontology to support her understanding, did recognize this new point of balance as

the "law of the situation," but without the benefit of a broader ontology to support her understanding. A large body of literature concerned with self-organizing of citizens, including a strain of "anti-politics" has emerged in this line (Boggs, 1984; 1986; Salusinszky, 1987; Walzer, 1988).

What is of concern to public administration is how to allow for self-organizing within a constitutional and democratic system. As Michael Walzer says, self-organizing isn't enough (1991). Citizens, who self-organize in the market in relation to its organizing principles may simultaenously negate democratic principles and thereby discourage diversity and individual growth. To avoid this it is suggested here that public administrators should encourage self-organization around the organizing principles of the Constitution -- the Constitution representing the principles of democracy formulated initially in human relationships. In this regard, the dissertation extends the work of John Rohr (1986) and Brian Cook (1992), especially in relation to the generative nature of the separation of powers doctrine. These works are extended to show that the Constitution and the blending of powers doctrine -- whatever the historical intent -- established relationships of cooperation which generated evolutionary development in the government and the related polity.

Generally, the Constitution is treated in this text as

the embodiment of the organizational principles of democratic relationships, relationships built on cooperation and acceptance. The Constitution is seen as a living myth which is manifested in an organic and intrinsic relationship with citizens and constitutional officers. As such its influence exists without the need for historical or instrumental application of its principles.

This idea draws from the work of Jacob Liszka (1989) and his interpretation of the generative nature of mythology, as well as the work of others, like Lawrence Hatub, for example (1990).

The Constitution is seen as a "living" document but also one which paradoxically exists as an origin or founding. This concept of the Constitution accomodates multiple approaches to the idea of authority in public administration. For example, in current literature of "conservator" posited by Larry Terry (1990) accomodated because the constitutional officer is involved in maintaining the life of institutions within a Constitutional regime and thereby the Constitution. In a similar vein, the view of stewardship proposed by Henry Kass is accomodated as well (1990). It seems to accommodate best, however, Gary Wamsley's "agential authority" -- authority which preserves the process but also submits values to change on a regular basis so that evolutionary change continues while the polity remains stable (1990). Likewise, the notion of

hierarchy, in an evolutionary view, accommodates the existence of a top-down structure but understands the relationships within that structure differently. Authority neither simply flows from the top down or the bottom up but emerges from and participates in a dialogue among interdepdent and inter-related levels (Jantsch, 1978).

In general, this dissertation presents an ontology which presents a "third view", that there are potentialities which exist in excess of most bi-polar dialogue. These potentialities are realized through affective relationships, like those which produced the Blacksburg Manifesto, which are generative and which connect individuals to the organizing principles of democracy.

Public administration, if it is to revitalize the positive tension between democracy and authority, must assume a new ontology and therefore different dispositions. That means a whole new identity, one less concerned with security and equilibrium and one more in tune with the natural turbulent processes of human relationships.

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Overview

Part I

The Ontology of Neo-Darwinism

The Management Identity of Public Administration

There is a point, Timothy Byrne, says when science simply quits being an option and becomes a tradition; when choices are seldom made as to whether or not scientific method should be employed in selected research but instead is assumed as the appropriate model for interpretation of social events. Science, he says, becomes an ingrained disposition towards almost anything -- a tradition, rather than a choice (Byrne, 1992).

Likewise, public administration has developed a management perspective toward its environment which is not employed selectively, but which is used more as a template to be laid over all situations, whether or not it is always appropriate. The dispositions of this perspective blind public administration to all but those potentialities which seem to serve those dispositions. This consciousness no longer exists simply as operating guidelines, methodological principles or epistemological variations on management themes, but as a state of mind. In this regard the management paradigm, which defines the identity of public administration at multiple levels of meaning, is really an ontology. This management consciousness will be defined here as the ***Ontology of Neo-Darwinism.*** The ontology is viewed as a continuum of social thought which has reinforced selective attitudes most suited to management

perspectives.

The text of Part I explores the development of the Ontology from Plato to Herbert Simon as the management perspective has been created and then moved from a methodological and epistemological phenomenon to an ontological shift in societal and public administration consciousness.

The negative social phenomenon created by the management consciousness are also described in this section, particularly as they have effected the development of American character especially as that character has come to express itself in the aberrations of dysfunctional guilt -- a guilt which reduces the social space in which democracy and positive human relationships can occur. The reduction of social space, as the place in which citizens connect with the broader community, is perpetuated by an ingrained belief in the inevitability of historical dialectics and a failure to recognize that human purpose is not necessarily the adversarial pursuit of self-interest but instead lies in the evolutionary development of identity.

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Chapter One

The Ontology of Neo-Darwinism

Historical Development

If American public administration is imagined historically it appears as a linear progression of ideas, but in reality it exists more as a sequence of adaptations to a political environment perceived to be hostile -- a process which both prescribes administrative action and defines its successes and failures.

Public administration generally emerged as an adaptation to the corruption of the spoils system and the growing demands for services and governmental accountability at the turn of the century, not necessarily as the product of a vision of what administration should be beyond that limited historical context (Van Riper, 1987). The fact that public administrative has not been grounded in anything more than management theory has left public administration with few intellectual and emotional resources to draw upon concerning questions associated with democracy and human purpose. Instead, the identity of public administration, dominated by a management consciousness, has become the cure for whatever is seemingly wrong in the system. The focus of mainstream public administration has always been to compensate for what appeared

to be lacking in the political order; treating equality, for example, as a mathematical problem to be solved by juggling the formula for the division of resources in some detached procedure for equity, rather than as an intrinsic issue of human relationship. (Webster, 1992, Carter, 1990). In this regard, public administration, as a field, has been largely engaged in reactive adaptation to consequences rather than as a purposeful agent in the evolutionary development of the polity. As such it has formed and consistently reinforced a negative identity for itself as the consummate chameleon.(Kaufman, 1985; Moe, 1988, Shubert, 1990). Public administration has been adaptive, not only for purposes of agency survival, but adaptive as a way to be accountable to the public and the three branches of government. In fact, in the absence of a clearer connection to the responsibilities derivative from the Constitution, being adaptive has historically been considered a positive practice of public agencies because it has been associated with ***responsiveness*** and therefore with the legitimacy of the agency which extends from that response. The template of the Reformists, for example, was a standard retinue of action and reaction; an incremental tinkering with what had come before as a way to remain responsive in the management of the public's business. Changes in public policy were (and still are for the most part) proposed in response to what was not working in the

system; what defects remained in a procedure or method as judged by the prevailing management standards (O,Toole, 1984, Seidman, 1988, Wamsley, 1992) In this regard, the Reformists seemed to be extending the premises of social contract philosophy by maintaining a bounded set of premises from which to develop social theory -- primarily a perceived need to control social process along the lines of the original premises of the contract. Control is necessary, in this view, in order to reduce the risk of conflict involved in allowing more autonomous and experimental processes (O'Toole). The Reformists believed that constant narrowing of the margin of error by correcting past errors, while maintaining a single vision of perfection, could conceivably create the kind of "well-behaved" social order needed to effect the Hobbesian state (O'Toole).

The Progressives later widened the circle of public administration thought by questioning the despotic premises of natural law as understood by Thomas Hobbes. The Progressives proposed a more "democratic" society which addressed social problems in experimental ways and rejected the Newtonian premise that humans could not be proactive agents for change because they were perceived to be passive cogs in larger machine, one driven by universalistic and deterministic purposes(Melossi, 1990). However, the efforts of the Progressives to break the mold failed and their agenda

ultimately had the impact of a brief historical episode. This seems to be so because the Progressive vision of a society organizing itself in response to consequence was still, ontologically, a purely adaptive society, rather than a visionary one. The failure of the Progressives, however, may have been because they rejected mechanical natural law, yet they failed to replace it with a process ontology which would create and support the self-organizing society they envisioned (McSwain & White, 1990). Instead they relied on the incremental and reductive methodology of the Reformists to develop a behaviorist science. This approach, of course, fit well and reinforced, once again, the management disposition of public administration.

Public Administration adapted well also in the New Deal to the calls for experimental action...an approach made possible by the ontological break from deterministic science made by the Progressives (Melossi). The New Deal was also a call for ways to measure and catalogue a society (through WPA prokects, for example) which was in the process of redefining itself -- a response which would, as it had before, ultimately expedite administrative adaptation to changes in social and political demands (Karl, 1963; Levine, 1988).

Under the New Deal, public administration was, as before, created largely as a reaction to the dire emergencies of the time. Likewise, the Brownlow Commission's administrative

reorganization of 1937 was largely a reaction to criticism of Roosevelt's reforms and an attempt to preserve them from a conservative backlash. As B.C. Karl says, the Brownlow Commission used public administration in the manner Dewey used "science" to deal with social problems. Public administration was:

> ***the method by which the Jacksonian concern for the relation between the individual and his government could be made consistent with the demands of modern technology and specialized knowledge (O'Toole, p. 154)***

In this regard, the conservative reaction to the New Deal in the 1950's was perhaps also a further unthoughtful adaptation by a society concerned with defining itself in the absence of deterministic natural law -- but without the aid of a different ontology than that created by the disposition of the Hobbesian treatise. The purpose of social political interactions appeared still to be those of making everything "fit" within the confines of the social contract and the universal American economic dream. Yet without a clearly articulated broader purpose which a new ontology may have provided, public agencies quickly became dependent on the ontologically barren limits of behaviorism to create the Good Society (Giddens, 1990; Ackoff, 1958; Simon, 1950, 1957; Melossi, 1990).

Adaptation continued to define both political and social process into the 1960's and 1970's. The community empowerment

movements of those years criticized public agencies for not adapting their practices and programs to the needs, largely economic, of the citizens. The themes of the New Public Administration articulated at the Minnowbrook I conference in 1968, for example, asked public administrators to adopt new methodological approaches as part of a concern for more normative matters. This once again reinforced public administration's already deeply entrenched tendency to react and accommodate in accordance with methodology, but not necessarily to make judgments (Marini, 1971; Giddens, 1990).

What might be called the public action movement, [1] which followed Minnowbrook, was concerned with more direct citizen participation and agency responsiveness. Yet, what appeared to be the massive democratic, social reforms which came from this era, were, in reality, nothing of the kind. Programmatic changes during these years have emerged in retrospect as largely incremental, reformist efforts which have alienated large segments of the population and produced little change in how government does business with the public (Moe).

The public action movement failed to even put a dent in the growing social problems of poverty and cultural decline

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[1] The post-Minnowbrook era is often referred to as "The New Public Administration." However, ingrained reformist and incrementalist disposition of New PA has made the term ironic at best.

solved. This wide-spread perception fueled the bureaucrat bashing of the 1980's which began to make it appear that public administration's adaptive ability was for purposes of self-survival rather than community good (Lowi, 1978; Bloom, 1987). At the same time, however, the bashing provoked a sometimes angry discussion about the academic study and professionalism of public administration. The ability to adapt no longer seemed to provide a universal sense of professional purpose and offered little to attract desperately needed new talent to the field (Wamsley, et al, 1987) This debate, which continues, signals the beginnings of an ontological shift in public administration which will redefine the identity and legitimacy of public administration in the 90's and beyond.

For the most part, however, the legitimacy of public administration, is still measured by its strained connection to the classic democratic idea of citizen participation.[1] Yet, given the current ontological consciousness of public administration, citizen participation is incompatible with the culture of management. Indeed, the democratic aspect of citizen participation has been distorted to fit management -- especially the economic aspects of the management format. Citizen participation has become commodified. It is measured as a manageable quantity -- the number of people who support government action. Public administration then earns that

support by its ability to "respond" to citizen demands.[2] Citizens and government remain in a detached, business relationship which requires little active involvement by either.

In reality, citizen participation in public administration always has been like trying to place a round peg in a square hole. Public administration has never had the ontological foundation with which it could see itself as a part of the polity, a democratic and dialogic partner in charting the evolutionary course of the society. It has been much more comfortable claiming that it was simply being told what to do (Lowi, 1978) From the view of many "practical" public administrators, citizen participation poses the deceptively mundane but crucial questions: "Where is the door in public administration that citizens walk through, and what do they do when they get there that isn't already the responsibility of public administrators to know and do?

The public action era made the dilemma of citizen participation appear easy to resolve for public administration because the movement relied so heavily on methodology, cataloging and market logic -- all of which could easily accommodate the adaptive tendencies of bureaucracy. Accommodating the demands for more citizen participation came to mean simply that public administration teach citizens how to adapt to the imperatives of bureaucratic life. As a

result, the public action approach has not resulted in great changes in administrative behavior, or in a clear maturation of citizenship (Lawson, 1991; Fussell, 1990; Hughes, 1992; Bloom, 1987). Yet, the current contrivance of "consumer citizens," simply promises more of the same.

What has become the market view of the field logically leads to the idea of consumer citizens and a public service anxious about the quality, convenience and timeliness of its response as it relates to keeping customers. [3] The purpose of the citizenship, in this market adaptation, is to be good consumers and to push the administrative system to meet consumer demands in an efficient manner. The responsiveness of the public service has then become a matter of how quickly an agency can respond -- either giving the customers what they want or mediating conflict until some equilibrium resolves the dispute so there is a semblance of social order and productivity -- no matter how unfortunate the results of the artificial equilibrium may be in the long run.

This kind of market-style responsiveness is seen in public institutions of higher learning, for example. Students are given what they want as paying customers of the system rather than administration developing a curriculum which meets the broader needs of society and contributes to both the evolution of the individual and the social order. In this regard, the creation of marketable "niches" to fill enrollment

quotas has increasingly replaced a more thoughtful curriculum development. Paul Fussell in a caustic critique of American public education notes that in a trade off with students, whom market analysts say prefer not to work very hard, college degrees now measure "not the development of the intellect but the rude command of techniques likely to fit the recipients uncritically into the ready-made niches of American middle-class society." (Fussell, 1990; p. 46) Perhaps a more telling example of the dysfunctional adaptive behavior of public administration, however, are the inadequacies and "savage inequalities," as Jonathan Kozal refers to them, in elementary and secondary education nation-wide. The dilemma of public education policy, Kozal recounts, is that in order to keep residents of prosperous neighborhoods, sharing a school district with poor neighborhoods, from taking flight, the demands of the more prosperous school patrons must be met, even at a high cost to poorer neighborhoods. Such a strategy is an unimaginative and cruel concession to circumstances as they are, instead of a courageous attempt to imagine something else. It is a less than subtle adaptation to economics as usual. As Kozal

says:

> *So it is a loser's strategy: Favor the most fortunate among us or they'll leave us too. Then we will have even fewer neighbors who can win political attention for our children (1991 p. 186).*

It is dilemmas like those described by Kozal, which, in the decades which have followed the social movements, have cast the ability of public agencies to adapt to their environment in a negative light. In fact, the ability of public agencies to adapt to the contingencies of circumstances has come to seem less of a desirable quality than a curse. The more pathological manifestations of interest group liberalism have reconfigured the classic idea of public participation in the political process from the idea of an active and creative individual citizenship to one of a passive but demanding consumership acting on a narrow range of predictable potentialities through well-organized and well-financed interest groups. In turn, agency responsiveness, as adaptation to environmental demands, has come to be reactive, cautious and centered on manipulative bargaining among unequal interests in which the purpose of action appears to be less important than the reduction of conflict (Lowi; Morgan & Kass). Adaptation seems even less to be a simple matter of an agency responding to the needs of the community in a proactive way, but has become the symbol of a weak-kneed bureaucracy frantically trying to negotiate safe ground for its programs amongst warring, predatory factions in the political swamp. Further, in cases like those in the Chicago or Washington D.C. school districts described by Kozal, the role of public administration seems to be even less a matter of mediating

sides and seeking compromise as it is producing economic equilibirum by reducing the uncertainty of the outcomes of conflict by picking the sure winner up front.

Public administration -- and government in general -- has simply reached the effective limits of adaptive behavior. The seeming impotence of governmental leaders to accomplish anything and the disdain in which many citizens hold government seems to indicate that the ability of government to survive by mediating the Hobbesian jungle like a manipulative street-fighter does not legitimate government make.

But the solutions to the problem of adaptation -- solutions which would encourage a proactive democratic public administration, one which values its ability to use creative judgment with and on the behalf of community more than its ability to achieve compromise -- is not a simple matter of admonishing public administration for undemocratic action. For the most part, public administration is likely doing what it collectively feels -- at a very gut level -- is its responsibility to the society as it understands its own identity. The emergence of that identity has taken a very long time and the tenacity of its hold on the field is reflective of the web of adaptive dispositions which have developed and been reinforced historically.

These epistemological and methodological dispositions express a broader ontology which can be described as Neo-

Darwinistic but which is generated by the vestiges of an entrenched body of Western philosophy, literature, social and economic theory which extends beyond and before Darwin. The project here is to reconstruct this ontology which forms the basis of the management dispositions in public administration. The Ontology itself is considered to be an evolutionary process, one which has created and recreated itself in interaction with its own principles.

To begin with the Ontology of Neo-Darwinism might be stated as being: A collection of epistemological and methodological dispositions which reinforce a management consciousness. A management consciousness is that attitude and understanding of universal life processes which manifests in the following dispositions:

1. A disposition toward framing issues as polar opposites.[4]

2. A disposition toward the need for certainty as it relates to the need for societal security.[5]

3. A disposition toward particularization...breaking down ideas and conflict into manageable parts and identifiable categories...programs, projects, policies and other objectifications of social process A related disposition towards breaking social process into groups, classes and interests and for defining history in terms of these categories rather than in terms of social process.[6]

4. A disposition toward adaptation and reactive behavior, defining change as reform of what is wrong in the system, and to value this adaptive capacity as being primary to its identity as a profession (Lindbloom, 1965; 1978; Seidman & Gilmour, 1986.)

5. A disposition to defer to expertise and to organizational

hierarchy as part of the identity of public administration as a manager of resources and conflict (Kaufman, 1960; Morrow, 1975; Selznick, 1951).

6. A disposition toward emotional distance as defining objective action and as insuring equal treatment of competing interests (Barnard, 1938).

7. A disposition toward containing human development within current conceptual boundaries through design, planning and methodology as reflective of the belief that order is imposed not discovered (Karl, 1963; Solamon, 1981).

8. A disposition toward technology--both mechanical and behavioral--as being appropriate to the management of the "artificial" environment of public works and public institutions created by human intent (Ackoff, 1958, Etzioni, 1964; Perrow, 1978; Simon, 1950).

9. A disposition toward the assumption of conflict as problematic and as occurring among un-related opposites who share only their fear and distrust of each other...and the subsequent reliance on mediation and conflict resolution as formats for public debate (Tullock, 1965; Wilson, 1974).

10. A disposition toward framing all issues in terms of resource allocation and market impact as a further concern for equilibrium (Downs, 1957; Frederick, 1965).

11. A disposition toward promotion of social homogeneity as the way in which the conflicts over limited resources are resolved and unity of purpose is maintained (Goodnow, 1967; Lindbloom, 1965).

12. A disposition towards time as a limited commodity (Wilson 1925-27).

Historical Development of the Neo-Darwinian Ontology

For purposes here the development of the Ontology of Neo-Darwinism is associated with four ***overlapping and related***

historical episodes:

1. The Villianization of The World of Mythology
2. Descartian Geometry, Hobbesian Social Theory and Darwinism
3. The Fixation on Market Equilibrium
4. The Development of Behavioralist Technology

The Villianization of the World Of Mythology

The disposition of public administration towards adaptation can be expressed as a kind of self-induced myopia. Public administration's attention to detail, programs and problems would give the impression that nothing else exists in the universe which is worthy of attention. In particular, natural physical processes and related social processes seem to be generally beyond the grasp of technocratic administrative analysis. This condition, however, expresses a deeply rooted ontological detachment from the natural world which marks management thinking.

This detachment is perhaps best expressed in the American "orthodoxy of reform" as Laurence O'Toole calls it. O'Toole describes the reform movement as being "afraid of commitment" and as maintaining a detached focus on "particularism" as a reaction against the formalism of natural law (1984). That is

to say, that many of the principles of the reform movement express a reaction against the formalism as much as they prescribe administrative action. The reaction does not entail a reconsideration of the premises of mechanical natural law, however, but simply, once again, a rejection of natural law altogether. Because of a reluctance to re-engage in a dialogue with nature, the Reformist is forced to focus on historical details. For example, while a formalist defines problems by recourse to the logic of the system the reformer sees problems at a low level of abstraction (1984).

In other words, the solutions to social problems, have always taken a back seat to the war between the natural world and human consciousness. The elaborate logic of the reform movement and the later "political science" of the Progressives seems to bend over backwards to avoid opening a dialogue with Nature for fear of losing the upper hand. One can only wonder at how different the identity of American public administration would have been had this ontological disposition been different, or if public administration would have emerged at all.

The beginnings of the Ontology of Neo-Darwinism, as it ultimately affects public administration, finds its early roots with Plato and in particular in Plato's relationship with the natural world. Nature and the natural world will refer here to the physical structures and processes of the

universe.

Plato's disposition towards nature is expressed in his relationship to mythology, a mythology which existed as a stylized dialogue with nature. As such, early mythology served humans as the communicative link with the processes of the physical world (Hatub, 1990). Although Plato used mythology in an allegorical way to describe his philosophy, his basic attitude toward the natural world, which was given expression through mythology, was one of antagonism. [43] This is significant because, although Plato chronicled an emerging self-consciousness in humans which was different from the blurry distinctions between humans and the rest of the natural world which characterized mythology, he served to set that new consciousness in opposition to the older evolutionary processes from which it emerged. Plato's philosophy might be characterized as the first adaptive theory because much of what he postulated was a negative response to the natural physical world, in particular the more sensory and emotive aspects of human beings which formed a connection with nature.

Plato was not promoting the evolvement of human consciousness onto new ground by engaging this new cognition in a dialogue with natural evolutionary processes, but he was instead negotiating for space in the universe for a separate enterprise. It was the dawn of an uneasy relationship between

human consciousness and the rest of the unconscious universe; one which first defined the affective dimensions of human consciousness as being an impediment to human moral development because of the deep connection of emotions and the physical world. Ultimately this affective dimension was reduced in Western thinking to its value in "figuring out" with rational certainty how to exceed nature. As philosopher Lawrence Hatub describes it, the Platonian relationship with nature was one built on the need for certainty in a complex and turbulent world:

> *"Rational certainty requires a ground above and beyond temporal plurality; personal salvation requires some notion of immortality to resolve tragic fatalism; justice requires an extratemporal reward as an incentive in the face of the world's inequities and the frequent impunity of wickedness and moral responsibility requires an autonomous self to overcome the existential immediacy of myth, where affective dimensions of experience appeared as overwhelming invasions of the conscious self."* [44]

It was as though by rationally rejecting the natural world of mythology -- by intervening between nature and the sensory/emotive self with his new found "technology" of cognitive reasoning -- Plato could, in effect, kill nature and thereby eliminate the threat it appeared to present to the new consciousness. This new consciousness might be described as one in which it became known to humans that they could impact

-- make choices -- about the way in which they evolved. They were no longer simply at the mercy of unpredictable natural forces but could conceive -- imagine -- different futures than those which might befall them as more passive and unconscious beings. However, by rejecting nature, Plato created an early definition of human consciousness as a weapon against outside forces. By rejecting the mythical dialogue with nature, Plato was, in essence, forced to pick a path for human evolution which was merely an adaptation to the perceived need to exceed nature. Humans were no more free from constraint in the use of their consciousness than before. Consciousness indeed became the cure for what appeared to be wrong with nature and nothing more.

Through time, Plato thought, right-acting individuals could exceed the passions of their natural state and gain a place in a unified and ideal order which superseded nature. At one level of meaning, humans simply traded an unpredicatable and therefore frightening master (nature) for what was perceived as a more benign one because of its rational predictability Ithe mind).

The idea was introduced thereby that there exists a hierarchy which could prescribe behavior in the detached manner of moral experts. Right behavior was to have a homogenizing effect on human identity so that the chaos of nature and "lower evolutions" were filtered out in order to

make the journey towards this unified order possible. Two dispositions of public administration begin to take shape from the thinking of Plato:

1. The idea of a hierarchy of experts

2. The idea that the good is only had by diminishing complexity in a incremental and controlled move towards unity.

Human consciousness, however, has never existed separate from its roots in nature and its very ability to know and conceive is linked to the sensory connections to nature which have been largely rejected and occassionally romanticized in Western philosophy.[46] In this regard it is not Plato's recognition and support of this new consciousness that creates the problems associated with adaptation. It is the manner in which Plato chose to move the human project forward. Plato's one-sided monologue with nature was made human-specific in his student Aristotle's move to dualism of mind and body. The sensory body was conceptualized as increasingly inferior because of its physical links to the natural world.

As such, much of Western thought and American administrative thought, conveys a sense of antagonism to what came before. It is, in fact, antagonism to all but that which fits the schemata for right living as Plato defined it. There is not the acceptance -- as there often is in Eastern thought -- that what is *now* emerged from what *was* so the current consciousness is not superior to prior states of consciousness

for it cannot divorce its own being from those prior states -- states which still exist in some form (Fraser, 1982).

This disposition again finds home in the reform movement which is largely predicated on the belief that right administrative behavior is in the cautious act of correcting or rejecting what is wrong with what came before. Cause and effect relationships are assigned to events which appear to happen in a temporal order and somewhat in a vaccuum disconnected from both social process and a wider physical reality (Solamon, 1981). The reformist disposition is a negative disposition in this regard because, in order to avoid the ambiguities of a broader dialogue, public administration turns its attention time and again to picking at its own wounds. Reformism is also a lonely disposition because it views systems only in parts, rather than as wholes. As such it promotes isolation of thought from human interaction. Mainly, Reformism is a narrow disposition towards dealing only with the known and seemingly predictable.

By contrast, in the mythical world, or the so-called primitive world, humans were still communicating with nature in a way that the myths themselves now only suggest to us. Further, there was not a separation between the physical world and the social world in the way society has come to be viewed, as something distinct and different from physics or other processes connected -- in our minds -- more with the natural

world. Mythological dialogue was a largely sensory one in which human beings were made aware of the effects of the larger nature through sensory experience. It was this sensuality that Plato rejected and which has been at the basis of attempts by political and management theorists of the 20th century to weed out the troubling complexity of the dialogue that it produces. It is ironic, in this sense, that science is often seen as the attempt by human beings to find out more about the universe, when much of the Western science rejects the potential of the powerful "tool" of the human body as nature's own communicative link. [7]

Perhaps Plato's grievous error in regards to human evolution was to define our relationship with nature as adversarial; a legacy that infuses the Western tradition, economics and public management without giving us a clue about how to achieve our potential as conscious human beings in alliance with the more basic processes of life which impact our every breath. In fact, Plato made it difficult to conduct a ***dialogue with nature*** as Nobel Prize winning physicist Prigonine phrases it; moving us further way from a true understanding of the nature of our own being. Instead variations on a theme have been created: How do we escape the nature which created us? To put it in modern administrative terms: How do we manage the vagaries and ambiguities of an irrational world in a manner which keeps us in control?

Perhaps a more dramatic development is that, in divorcing humans from their "roots" in the physical world, it has been made difficult for the American administrative culture to grasp the meaning of community. If much of administrative thought springs from the premise that humans beings are rivals with each other, it may be because a sense of the commonality of our origins in the natural world has been traded for the defense of consciousness and because the divisive assumption that what happens in the world is purely of human intent has been almost universally accepted (Simon, 1957; Skinner, 1979).

Descartes and Darwin: Disengaging and Dividing

Contemporary neuro-physicists like Walter Freeman, Linda Scarva, Paul Rapp, Paul LaViolette and William Gray now tell us that the way in which humans reason is by reflecting on the chaotic influx of "nuances" from the sensory world which arrive through the older evolutionary limbic portions of the brain. The more human beings focus on maintaining specific formats of thinking -- like those which are assumed to be necessary for rational decision-making, for example -- the more they are capable of diminishing the number of nuances which break through to consciousness by way of our neo-cortex/cognitive abilities. What is typically called "thinking" is thus a process of containment; a reduction of

the number of sensory data which reaches consciousness. Reasoning of the kind which results in creative thought occurs when an individual remains open to sensory nuance long enough for a new insight into the context at hand to occur. Chaos researchers describe a physics of thought which requires the integrated functioning of the entire sensory being of an individual, not simply the mechanical operation of the rationalizing neo-cortex.

"My physics," as Descartes proclaimed, however, "is nothing but geometry." This simple phrase has had a profound effect on human relationships and the evolution of human consciousness. It is not only that Descartes *Cogito* made the universe a "man-made" reality and therefore put humans "in the driver's seat", but that in order to make this assumption of power and control true, Descartes had to purge the universe of its troubling nuances (Merchant, 1980; Taylor, 1989). This was accomplished by reversing the order in which sensory data and emotions appeared. As Arthur Collins explains it:

> *Why are we supposed to agree that physics is just geometry? Nothing sensuous is allowed to characterize "outer" spatial, material reality. All sensuous characteristics like color, sound and heat..so-called "secondary" qualities are not really out there.; they exist only in the play of mental states and perceptions in our minds...Contact with outer things is causally responsible for the generation of ideas with sensuous features, but material things do not have such features themselves (1985, p. 27).*

The mechanized universe attributed to Descartian thought is a universe void of true feeling; one in which emotion and sensation are assigned the meaning allowed them by rational thought. Sensations and emotions which come to consciousness in the individual are automatically standardized so they conform to an existing thought pattern which produces a kind of mental and emotional equilibrium. The point of equilibrium in the Descartian view is when conflict has come to rest. The conflict is not necessarily resolved by the appearance of a transcending understanding, but instead resolution appears to occur when the senses have been *conquered* by the pre-conceived thought framework. The existing framework then survives by a kind of natural selection based on the premises with which the interpretation of senses and emotions occurs (Ho & Fox, 1988). In this fashion, Descartes provides the key disposition for scientific inquiry as the ability to limit the playing field of inquiry to what fits the scientific model. As Collins says:

> *Sometimes Descartes writes as though the chief intellectual job of Science is completed when substantial forms and teleological explanations are dropped, so that the material world can be understood and be a matter of moving and colliding particles....Descartes and others are convinced that scientific understanding becomes possible only when we manage to delete the unmanageable, subjective, sensuous aspect of those things and then characterize the subject matter of science exclusively in the vocabulary of abstract mathematics. (p. 28).*

The consequence of Descartes scientific reasoning, as it

has culminated with Herbert Simon and his emphatic belief in the efficacy of Artificial Intelligence, is that what is believed to be human consciousness is what has come to be associated with the disscriminating, selection-making abilities of the cortex as they relate to the ability to screen out all but what reaffirms existing frameworks of reference (Penrose, 1989). Modern people have come to value only the data processing portion of the brain as it exists separate from the larger environment. Senses and the emotions, in fact, generally have been considered to be problematic in the public world because of their potential to upset conventional wisdom and produce chaos. As Democritus declared, "the emotions are glorious when they stay in the depths, but not when they come forth into the day and wish to become of the essence of rule", (Arendt, 1981, p. 11).

Our misunderstanding of the nature of our senses and emotions is exaserbated further by the Descartian mentality that emotions are not only problematic, but that they can be completely under individual control at the same time. The individual must then look upon an aspect of his or her nature as being deficient at best, and unholy and ill-conceived at worst. However, Descartes proposes to give us hope by saying that emotions can be controlled because they exist only as we would have them exist, rather than stemming from the environment from which chaos theorists now posit that they are

activated. This means that what does not fit the emotional model acceptable to the mind can be banned from the human system, or more accurately it can be reinterpreted to fit the original referent point of the brain. For passions to have any legitimacy at all, according to Descartian logic, they must then have some purpose connected to the needs of rationality.

As Charles Taylor says, Descartes sees emotions not as subjective expressions but as ***functional*** devices that "the Creator has designed for us to help keep body and soul together." Emotions -- passions -- are as mechanical as the rest of the universe to Descartes, and serve the minimalist purpose of warning the body of danger or of its maintenance needs, so that the superior mind has a safe place to reside. Emotions and physical sensation are confused in this manner as being the same thing reduced to its survival utility. "Reason rules the passions when it can hold them to their normal instrumental functions," (Taylor, 1989, p. 150) This functionality allowed Descartes to explain why even rational people seem to express emotion:

> ***great souls...whose reasoning powers are so strong and powerful, that although they also have passions, and often more violent than is common, nonetheless their reason remains sovereign (p. 150).***

Once reason has gained control, Descartes sees no need, as the Stoics did, for example, to eliminate all passion (Taylor). As long as an individual can keep his or her

distance from them, remain objective, they make interesting and sometimes challenging companions to the mind. Indeed, the stronger the emotion, the more opportunity the individual has to develop reason:

> ***The true function of reason, then, in the conduct of life is to examine and consider without passion the value of all of perfection of body and soul that can be acquired by our conduct, so that since we are commonly obliged to deprive ourselves of some goods in order to acquire others, we shall always choose the better...It is enough to subject one's passions to reason; and once they are thus tamed they are sometimes useful precisely to the degree that they tend to excess (Taylor, p. 151).***

In Descartes' world, sensory signals from the environment must be routinely analyzed and related to an existing framework -- a pre-conceived notion of right behavior or action. This suppression is done in the manner of combat as Descartes associates most passions, and the sensations which evoke them, with violence or the need to control violence (Taylor).

Sheldon Wolin, for example, critiques Hobbesian philosophy as a kind of romanticized ***despotism*** and a rationale for

organizational control; a rationale which has historically formed the basic disposition of public administration toward behavioral management. The contract is little concerned with democracy, Wolin says. It has little to do with individual freedom as much as with individualized interests which

contribute to the collective scheme for universal security and power.

In administrative theory, for example, Chester Barnard paints a somewhat romantic notion of the moral executive who helps employees adjust to the inevitability of organizational life. His answer to the human problem is to define the organization as the final haven from the vagaries of the natural world. Organizations are depersonalized in the sense that the organizational personality -- that which is concerned most with organizational goals -- replaces the individual's personality (Barnard, 38; Brian Fry, 1989). As Hobbes would say, the individual "gives himself over." In this way it appears that the conflict of importance is no longer between the individual and the broader natural environment. Indeed those concerns are relegated more systematically to philosophers (Simon, 1957, 1992). The tensions inherent in the evolution of human consciousness is now entirely defined by its relationship to the organization.

The organization both defines the conflict and prescribes its resolution in terms of the accomplishment of organizational goals through the use of behavioral controls. In Barnard's formulation, in particular, the particularism of the reformists is transformed into social theory.

It is the Hobbesian disposition, however, which influences most the Reformists and the early behavioralists like Barnard.

Barnard shares the Hobbesian view that individuals are limited in their capacity to deal with a universe of endless potentiality and that individuals exist separate from each other as they are separate and hostile towards nature (Fry). Survival depends on a collective strength regulated by government. Regulation is a modification of the more pernicious tendencies of human behavior -- emotional tendencies which would be increased if humans were accepted as more social and relational beings. As Hobbes put it:

> ***For the use of Lawes is not to bind the people from a all voluntary action; but to direct and keep them is such a motion as not to hurt themselves by their impetuous desires, rashness or indiscretion...as Hedges set, not to stop travellers, but to keep them in the way (Wolin, 1990).***

Government -- and by extension management structures like organizations -- in Hobbes' description, is the answer to the problem of freedom in a competitive and dangerous world. Government insures freedom. Indeed government creates freedom, which presumably does not exist elsewhere, by regulating those passions which limit the capability of humans to function rationally. In fact, it is Hobbes stated purpose to reconstruct humans in the form of the more powerful and less irrational state.

> ***A Commonwealth, or State, in Latin Civitas, which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended (Hobbes, Wolin).***

Public management theory has taken shape in relation to

the Hobbesian notion of a secure society, "free" to pursue its individualized interests by giving up self-governance to the artificial state which exists in contemporary society as the rationalized organization. The interests, of course, are those which fit the needs of the state -- mainly those created by the market. Security here is not meant to describe a public service interested only in securing its tenure. It is meant to describe one which sees its responsibilities almost purely in relation to the idea of a secure society as the prerequisite to a free state; the free state being that which provides ***certainty as freedom***.

Managers have come to see their key responsibility to be the manipulation of the environment in relation to guaranteeing this security by pursuing certainty. Security serves as the referent point to all action, not the actual perceived, sense and felt need existing in the moment. The methodological modification of human behavior has developed as the ***technology*** for achieving this security (McSwain and White, 1989). As such, much administrative behavior is reactive but not reflective or truly responsive. The context is read first for threats to security which might be characterized as:

1. How does this set of facts affect social equilibrium?

2. What can be corrected in the context in order to reintroduce equilibrium?

3. How might the context be reduced to a manageable,predictable set of facts which minimizes the chance of both error and conflict
both now and in the future?

The questions, of course, frame the answers so that what develops is not necessarily a response to an actual need in the context -- like the need for food -- as much as a response to the need for security. It is this ontological need for security which makes it difficult to respond directly to hunger and suffering but instead requires the prior question: " What are the causes of hunger?" and anticipates the subsequent question: "How do the facts in this context relate to the ideal state of equilibrium as defined by the successful members of society?" The context is then defined by its deficiencies, or the behavioral deficiencies of its participants, which appear to threaten the chances of achieving equilibrium. Diversity is the most apparent "deficiency" which is seen a Priori as a threat to homogeneous equilibrium when viewed from this paradigm. The problem of diversity was, of course resolved by Hobbes, by requiring all people to be equalized by their promise to submit to a common authority, a solution that was dependent upon this authority having the *power* to enforce the promise.[73]

However, the American disdain for state power has tempered routine overt violence against citizens in the name of social control. Instead, regulation of social

relationships has been transferred to the competitive arena of the market. In fact it has come to be so widely believed that the market is the most predictable instrument for achieving social equilibrium that it is nearly impossible to propose a solution to a social problem without first asking how it affects the market. The market has become both the measure of security and the cure for social ailments because of its ability to reduce human diversity -- and therefore potential conflict -- to one manageable and measurable market identity personified in the American Dream.

It is perhaps the emphasis on the need for security and the implied promise that some expert has the right method to protect us from our own violent impulses that has created the negative society of postmodern times. Citizenship trained to passively accept directives from expert voices and contained in Hobbesian hedges -- safe but uninspired -- cannot be expected to take on the freedom implicit in the fearful task of being the artists of their own evolution; especially if the development of distinct identities is discouraged as a threat to the survival of the social order. Because public administration has, for most of its history, been locked into its own ambiguous identity as the adaptive, security-minded manager of an economic environment, it has not found a clearly articulated way to be anything but the ***technology*** for providing expedient answers to short-term questions of

adaptation and control.

The conflict between management practitioners and those theorists concerned with broadening the identity of public administration seems routinely to reduce itself to a concern about how to make theory more relevant to the practical reality of everyday public administration. This reduction of the dialogue about the identity of public administration to a concern over practical management, however, seems to occur because of two compelling perceptions:

1. That government is doing its "job" if it is protecting the population from risk, i.e. making it secure from violence and conflict, and

2. That challenging citizens to takes risks and seek evolution is an abdication of the public duty to secure society because of the uncertainty and conflict such activity may foster.

Yet an identity crisis among public administrators comes about because in the most often earnest and good faith pursuit of competency, expediency and efficiency, public administrators have failed to create a better society. Indeed, a failure to move beyond the management persona has helped create a growing body of citizens who act remarkably like adolescents (Lawsom, 1991). But this has happened not by any lack of diligence on the part of public administration in the pursuit of its perceived responsibilities. It has

happened because the pursuit has been disconnected from more than the adaptive imperatives of historical expediency. These imperatives, like the imperatives associated with the growing dependence on technology to support the market, continually re-enforce themselves and serve to strengthen the management identity of public administration in the absence of a clear choice to consider other possibilities.

The Fixation on Market Equilibrium

If the line of reasoning from Plato to Darwin is followed, then the industrial revolution and the rise of the capitalistic state are cause and effect manifestations of the bias towards maintaining social equilibrium as a measure of security. Indeed, market competition was found to be a rewarding way to sublimate violence and create the appearance of equilibrium and progressive evolution through the emergence of technology and wealth (Reid, 1990; Wolin, 1960, 1990; Wislon, 1925-27).

The fallacy of this view of social evolution is well documented by Marx as well as by our growing exposure to economic inequality in our own country, which suggests that market equilibrium is only maintained at great expense to community and the well-being of a increasing number of its members. Perhaps it needs no further description here. In fact, late Capitalism has reached the state that some

observers say the conditions are pending for a true Marxian revolution (Meister, 1990). The commodification of individual lives, the recurring recessions, the erosion of the middle class, the export of the market to the fallen Soviet Union...all represent conditions Marx identified as signaling the ultimate class struggle (Meister). Yet, given that public administration has come to frame its identity in terms of the management of a competitive environment, it would seem almost that economic class revolution would be less problematic for the bureaucracy than the idea of purposeful social evolution. Revolution is essentially the violent adaptation of one class to the demands of another -- a realignment of power (Arendt, 1963). The public administration would conceivably adjust to whomever was in power or to whomever wasn't. In either case, this ability to adapt would help recreate the prior equilibrium which would ultimately only make the revolution a change in leadership and not a change in social conditions or government -- if the history of the participation movement in public administration is any indication (Moe, 1989).

Yet, even a critique of the impact of the market on public administration adapts easily to the linearity of market logic and therefore serves little purpose except to extend the life of the market as the mediator of social dialogue. Marx, for example, considered himself a "scientific" man who could exceed the determinism of natural law with cause and effect

rationality (Tucker, 1972). However, his descriptions perhaps have helped re-create class turmoil by not abandoning market-style social dialogue. Indeed, it would appear that adaptation to historical consequence, simply no longer serves any evolutionary purpose and has become instead the method by which we maintain the present.

But perhaps current social circumstances do signal a point of extreme ***social dissonance***. which, in conventional wisdom, would indicate the need for a revolution or the potential of revolution. Such a period of social turbulence appears at a time when social process, as a means by which the turbulence is translated into social evolution, is in an entropic state; creating an almost unbearable tension between the need for social change and the inability to make it. However, with a different disposition, such turbulence may also signal conditions ripe for an ***evolutionary change*** which is not adversarial but a truly progressive leap for human consciousness. The attitude of public administration in relation to current cultural conditions is extremely important if this is the case. For the opportunity exists -- ***an evolutionary window*** -- either to participate in another adaptive historical episode in which the human project becomes even more entrenched in adaptive/reactive patterns or to help lead the project into a new, more hopeful state of consciousness. Public administration cannot do that, however,

without a new ontological perspective which allows for a shift of consciousness in another direction than that of economic management.

Evolution and General Motors

To Rudolf Bahro and other Post-Marxists thinkers, human evolution began to go astray with the industrial revolution when Descartes' separation from nature was made complete by the abdication of human meaning and purpose to the creations of technology and the market (Bahro, 1984; 1986). A kind of slavery of the human spirit has developed when, as sociologist Paulo Freire says, we begin to worship the oppressor and define right behavior by the imperatives of the technology that was meant to serve us (Friere, 1974). This is perhaps nowhere more clear than in the relationship of citizens with big corporations like General Motors. General Motors has routinely abandoned communities and the people who live there as if their only responsibility was to a board of directors.

The public response to the actions of General Motors, however, has routinely been for politicians and citizens to clamor for ways to lure them back. In 1992, for example, General Motors announced that it would close its plant in Ipsilanti, Michigan by 1995. The town cried foul play and has sued GM for breach of an implied contract, seeking injunction

of its plans to move the plant to Texas (Newsweek, March, 1992). GM had originally cut a deal with the Ipsilanti local government that it would locate in the town in exchange for massive tax breaks. The town badly eroded its own tax base for such things as education and infrastructure maintenance in hopes of hanging on to GM jobs.

The public seemed to categorically assume that the technology of GM was the answer to both economic and social problems. It therefore abdicated responsibility for its own future for the sake of what appeared to be at least short term security. They apparently found it difficult or even naive to ask the question: Would we be better off without them? Do we have other choices? What kind of life can General Motors offer our citizens? The situation is made more difficult because no one in government has wanted to ask those questions. This is so because the identity of public administration is tethered to the management ontology which the market reflects. As such it seems irresponsible to those who define themselves as "managers" to ask questions about human evolution when its appears we must limit our questions to those related to the economy in order to keep the social structure from falling apart.

What is meant by questions about human evolution? It means simply that people have choices to make in their lives which necessarily involve risks, but which allow them to

develop their own identities in a broader environment then the market can conjure up. It is *not* to say that economic disparities go unmet but instead they are addressed directly as they relate to human needs rather than because their solution contributes to market equilibrium and the reduction of conflict.

It is the reluctant suggestion, however, of sociologist Alexander Argyros that if evolution cannot be put on a different course soon (and he feels it can) that social philosophers need to accept the market as perhaps an inevitable stage in the development of human identity and to do so with compassion and grace for the sake of our shared humanity. He says such understanding and acceptance is itself a step out of the adversarial mire (Arygros, 1991). The need for this possibility exists because of what anthropologist J.T. Fraser says: that in living as we have -- in competition and disengaged from nature -- we ***have already evolved*** into a different kind of consciousness; one with little resemblance to what we may have hoped for when we had the chance. Fraser defines this as "business time" and he says it is an evolutionary move towards extinction. This is so because our attempts at conserving time for purposes of security and efficient production -- rather than engaging in pursuits which would expand human consciousness and thereby increase time as a product of these pursuits -- have deadened the social world.

For example:

> ***Social time is growing more and more homogenous. Two primary causes...are the bomb and the computer. Nuclear weaponry requires the global present to be kept in as narrow a space as communication techniques permit, so as to help each nation better safeguard itself against attack by another. The result is industrial and economic concentration and the regimentation and scheduling of private life. Computers lead to a homogenization of thought and a reduction of the range of ideas flowing through culture because they demand a way of talking to them, which carries with it a way of thinking:this communicates itself to peoples' assessments of the nature of reality and to the scale of value (1982, 1990).***

Fraser suggests that time is collapsing because its evolution has been removed from the live world from which it emerged as a human idea and put to work as a technology for securing an arrested state of consciousness development. Fraser, Bahro and Argyros generate a sense of urgency about our public enterprise because, if Fraser's description of evolutionary change is correct, we may be achieving a state when we no longer remember at all that there is a natural world which exceeds our being.

Human evolution has come to the point that everything appears to be simply an adaptation to everything else (Jameson, 1991), yet we seem to fear taking the risks which would change this reality. Instead we become increasingly concerned with maintaining the economic present. Thoughts, art, literature and our individual identities are seemingly meaningless except for what they can garner in the market as

some symbol of their efficacy.

Because it is difficult to imagine anything else, it seems the empirical evidence of our existence supports an ontologically barren view of the human project. Works of beauty, public debates, the things we create with our time, do not always inspire us because we must first question why they exist -- what is their value in the political or consumer market -- before we can respond at the emotional and inspirational level to the individual consciousness they are expressing. It is at that level of inspiration that we reconnect with our humanness and realign evolution with hope instead of despair and self-loathing.

Yet reform, rather than evolution, remains at the heart of the public administration dialogue about social process. Reform, is a market disposition; a political cousin to the idea of "new and improved products." Reform is most often an adaptation to what was wrong with the last reform. This is so because the social order is essentially adapting and changing in relation to its perceived failures instead of taking any new steps into uncharted territory. Further, it is doing so without consciously gauging the impact that such negativeness has on the nature of citizenship and therefore the nature of the human condition.

It is simply not possible to escape the effects of competition and adversarial relationships and embrace the

market as the model for social order at the same time. Public administration is different from management and market sector formulas. It must be different. This difference is not likely to manifest itself in any positive way unless the public administration wrestles more with its own identity.

Behaviorism: Tools for a Reactive Public Consciousness

Behaviorism provides the methodology whereby the ontological belief in the premises of the social contract are maintained and reinforced through organizational containment of human behavior in the pursuit of market equilibrium. The technology regulates human behavior in relation to the standard of certainty. The premises of the behaviorist technology, (or "human relations technology" as White and McSwain call it), are -- as they relate to the purpose of this text:

> 1. That it is possible to create an artificial environment in which human activity can be regulated without interference from the physical world through the modification and control of human behavior.
>
> 2. That human behavior is responsible for all movement within organizations and therefore is also responsible...by conscious intent...for all errors, accidents and anomalies in a system; that blame can be clearly assigned to specific behavior. To assign any other meaning to "accidents" is to admit that cognitive consciousness is not in complete control.
>
> 3. That by reasons of their physical/sensual being, humans are perceived as being potentially subversive. The most difficult thing to control is the emotional/sensory nature of humans and it is this nature which continually threatens to upset the equilibrium and expose the fragility of the artificial world of organizations.
>
> 4. That the issue of the evolution of human

> consciousness is settled and any improvements are a matter of fine-tuning the organizational model.

The chief behavioralist tool is the "decision," because it reinforces a narrow range of rationality which serves the management epistome. Herbert Simon's idea of bounded rationality, which he uses as a rationale for decision-making, for example, might be understood in two ways (Simon, 1992).

1. As an insightful recognition of the limits of human sensory and cognitive abilities in mastering an infinitely complex universe at its current stage or

2. A fatalistic description for the end product of the human endeavor.

Simon, in describing the limits of human capacity for problem solving in a complex environment, could have been recognizing a state of human evolution in which our sensory abilities were not fully capable of conversing with a complex and unknown nature. Fraser, for example, sees technology as being the attempt by human beings to extend their sensory abilities in order to have a dialogue with nature and to understand more our place and purpose in the order of things. But Fraser holds the human spirit in higher regard than does Simon. Simon does say that he sees human beings as being part of nature but in the manner of Descartes and Hobbes as the "human machine" operating in accordance with the simplest of universal laws:

> ***For my money, to show that something whose behavior looks very complex and erratic is really built from the combinatorics of very simple components is beautiful not demeaning. It would seem to me that every scientists would have to think so, for the whole purpose of science is to find meaningful simplicity in the midst of disorderly complexity (1992, p. 275).***

Human consciousness then only mimics the universe, it is not really physically part of nature in this understanding. Simon is concerned not with engaging the universe in an on-going dialogue for the purpose of human development as Fraser and Prigonine propose, but in replicating the universe for purposes of mastering it. Human consciousness then is reduced to Simon's bounded rationality. As he says:

> ***The best rhetoric comes from building and testing models and running experiments. Let philosophers weave webs of words; such webs break easily (p. 272).***

Simon is looking for certainty and containment and achieves it partly by diminishing the importance of human affective interaction. He prefers instead to frame relationships as the exchange of information for the purpose of moving the individual expediently through the "maze" of existence. This information, further, is more accurately conveyed through the written text than through actual human communication. For example, Simon in recounting a trip to Sweden, in which he encounters opposition to his political views, says:

> *...I had learned much more about the Swedish New Left from my preparatory reading than from my visit. And the information in my books was probably more reliable than the oral testimony. But I had a couple of lovely weeks in Sweden, a beautiful country with most attractive people, to which I return from time to time with great pleasure (p.313).*

For Simon, the debate he engaged in while in Sweden only was meaningful for what it might tell him about the Swedish New Left, information which he could then convey to other experts who would use it to predict political activity. There is a conspicuous absence of relationship between Simon and the objects of his observations and analysis. Simon maintains the semblance of the simplicity of human cognitive processes by disengaging from those human encounters which might *generate* complexity. In fact, he dismisses such encounters as simply irrational. For example, in explaining why he found a long exchange between himself and fractal mathematician B.B. Mandlebrot ultimately unproductive Simon notes:

> *The most that can be said in such an exchange is to persuade readers that there is something to be said on both sides -- and both disputants will receive about the same credit, Is this a reason for engaging in debates or for avoiding them (p. 276)?*

The underlying assumption seems to be that the simplicity of the human project is uninspiring and emotionally disengaged by design.

Descartes, while trying to disengage human

consciousness from the natural world, still saw the mind as being part of the human body and even if it was at odds with its sensory capacities it was still at least troubled by them (Taylor). Simon not only has disengaged from nature but has disembodied the human project preferring to give it the functional identity of a computer capable of solving the problems it creates for itself in the exchange of information. Simon, for example, laments that the logic of the following analysis -- which implies that it is irrational to say that human "thinking" and computer thinking aren't similar -- is almost always contested:

> ***...Computers are machines; machines cannot think; hence computers cannot think. It is not regarded as an adequate riposte to say: Human beings are also (biological) machines; therefore, if machines cannot think, human beings cannot think (p.272).***

The rationale for this reduction of human capacity and spirit is that the natural world no longer exists except as the physical environment within which humans move or as a ***model*** of what life used to be, in Simon's work. The failure of those who did not immediately "grasp" the truth of the comparison between the computer and the human mind, in Simon's assessment, represents a problem of "bounded rationality," rationality alone being the measure of human consciousness (1957, 1982, 1992). Artificial Intelligence is the supreme evolution for human consciousness from Simon's understanding,

not just because it appears to be a triumphant break from past evolutions, but because it appears that the end of evolution has been reached. It would seem that "man" has taken complete control of "creation central" in his own artificial world as a more perfect replica of the natural world. In essence, questions about how best to proceed with human development are moot and any evolutions now have to do with tinkering with the components of the mental processes (1992).

Simon took his insight about the state of human consciousness and used it as a justification for the further ontological movement towards an artificial world, free of the constraints of the chaos of the natural world, rather than recognizing that it is the separation from the natural world which causes the narrowing of consciousness and which threatens our future evolution. Simon's artificial world, which might best be described as ***Simon's Box*** is best understood by principles which match the purposes for which the invention was made -- goals, programs, objectives. The chief obstacle to this effort -- which Simon says will be overcome in time -- has been that the human mind is derivative of natural process and still exists within a physical environment. In order to convert it to an artificial environment it must be freed from its more earthy components -- emotions and sensory abilities.

This is accomplished, in part, by defining emotions in

environment. In order to convert it to an artificial environment it must be freed from its more earthy components -- emotions and sensory abilities.

This is accomplished, in part, by defining emotions in relation to their contribution to the process of thinking. Emotions are imagined by Simon to exist as bytes of information about the environment which can be related to the already established thought format or -- in Simon's other explanatory view -- they are relevant only to non-rational functions like family life or pleasure trips (1992). But the most expedient way to resolve the problem of the complexity generated by emotions and sensory input is to remove the mind from the sensory body altogether and place it into a machine (1992).

Behaviorism, in the Simon tradition, is the technology for aligning human behavior with the seemingly simple laws of equilibrium by way of diminishing the chaotic effects of the emotional/sensory state of the human body. This rationalizing has been extremely effective in producing the organizational/administrative mindset, with its sense of isolation, its obsession with maintaining distance from affective influences, and its need to analyze and interpret every human encounter in terms of the quality of information conveyed.

Simon's emotional data is assigned meaning in relation

process described by current chaos physicists who describe a relational process between stored memory and new sensory input which is mediated by emotions in the creation of new thought (Briggs, 1988).

Simon's artificial world simply reaffirms its own identity by denying its connection to a broader reality through the process of decision-making. Simon's now abandoned ***General Problem Solver*** is perhaps the perfect metaphor for the kind of computer consciousness with which Simon would permanently saddle us (1992). It depicts consciousness as a tool for gingerly picking our way through the maze of life and arriving at the other end unscathed and unchanged.

Theologian and political philosopher Dorothee Soelle makes the observation, however, that the Western penchant for detached observation and analysis has made a pathology of our ability to feel any compassion for human suffering. In the adaptive/competitive rationale of the market coupled with its attendant behavioral technology, human culture has stagnated in the space between those who are alienated and those who are apathetic. Those not suffering often no longer respond at the felt level of compassion for those in need, but instead first look for the behavior which created the circumstances. Those in need are alienated because it is not always clear to them what personal behavior ***did*** put them in those circumstances Soelle, 1990).

This pathology is generated, Soelle says, by the belief that the world can be made free of suffering, a belief that is at the core of attempts like Simon's to rid the world of its emotional uncertainties. This belief, she says, makes us focus our attention on finding the right method for achieving this certainty and making promises we can't keep in a universe which does not operate entirely according to our intent. Soelle suggests a more compassionate and perhaps more effective approach. It is to recognize that suffering is a part of an uncertain world and address it with the intent of easing it as it occurs not with the intent of trying to predict and control it; an intent, which has led us to blame each other endlessly and intensify suffering needlessly (Soelle, 1984). In the act of suffering with others -- rather than explaining their circumstance as a way to avoid our own sense of that suffering -- our own development is enhanced, Soelle says, and the action is given a richer, more purposive meaning then simple generosity or problem solving behavior.

An Uneasy Relationship with Chaos

Plato, Descartes, Hobbes, Darwin and Simon employ their descriptions of the natural world as prescriptions for human action which may not be inaccurate as much as incomplete and abortive of the human project. At one evolutionary level the universe is a very linear place. what Fraser calls the

eotemporal unwelt, [2] in that its connections and interactions -- its physics -- does follow a kind of patterned behavior. However, it is not derivative of human intent or cognizant of human history or time because time exists in a different, human, unwelt. Because these prior and extant evolutions are not entirely within our control, the natural world may indeed seem frightening.

It would certainly seem, from this perspective of fear, that selective adaptation would be necessary to the survival of species identity. Yet, many cultures, present and past have not been aware of the defensive choice-making we associate with rationality. They have accepted death, the change of seasons, and disasters as they engage in an active, non-violent and personal relationship with nature and with each other (Gadon, 1989). But the Western view of nature casts the physical world as both a dangerous villainess and an inferior evolutionary state. For Simon and others, this nature does not align easily with rational/cognitive human intent. It is thereby seen as a threat to the very survival of the ability to intend and to the maintenance of a distinctive human identity.

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[2] By unwelt Fraser refers to an evolutionary episode which is identified by a particular state of consciousness. These states do not abandon the universe when other states appear but co-exist and contribute to the continued evolution of new states.

Because of the original disposition towards nature posited by Plato, by the time the idea of evolution emerged with Darwin, consciousness was made to appear to exist only as a reactive adaptation or move up the hierarchical ladder -- a separation justified by the perceived inferiority of the natural state. To the management theorists who applied Darwin's thesis to the organizational world, the natural world was indeed the "brutish", mean place of "kill or be eaten," "change or die," that Thomas Hobbes described (Hobbes, 1958).

It is ironic, of course, that these foul descriptions of the natural world also provide the foundation for basic economic/public choice thinking as a harmonious balancing of interests and resources (Buchanan, 1978, 1989). If the natural world is such a horrible place why does it stand to reason that humans should apply its principles to the social context especially if humans possess superior reasoning abilities? It would seem, that even by economic standards, this is a misuse of consciousness. But our's is an old and addictive struggle with the natural world. Our reasoning abilities remain locked in the battle in which Plato first engaged us. If the natural world were treated as brutish, the best humans could ever be would be the negative, adaptive reflection of that state of being. By projecting human fears of nature onto the rest of the universe, in particular the fear of death as the death of

consciousness, humans began to create their world in relation to that fear and not to the more positive choices which were the potential of their new consciousness. The so-called savage passions which may have linked us, through our senses, to a more harmonious understanding of that nature; which would have allowed us to keep a sense of our relationship to each other and to participate actively in choosing the course of our evolution, have been routinely and savagely exploited and diminished as the problem of human nature to be eradicated or controlled by the cognitive processes.

Descartes, and then Darwin, wrote a self-fulling prescription for interest-group liberalism and postmodern culture as a replication of the competitive natural world as they perceived it -- unequal, unrelated and dispassionate interests vying for position in the social order and controlled by government which maintained its legitimacy from the suspect role of equalizer. The prescription for the failure of government as the guardian of social evolution was therefore also written. If public administration appears to have lapsed, with the rest of government, into a permanent state of receding entropy, it is because mediation among competing interests can achieve equilibrium at best and equilibrium is impasse. Equilibrium is secured by limiting choices to those which realize its existence through selective adaptation. Evolution, however, is another matter which

requires more of government and more of citizens.

Government in a Vital World

Why is the distinction between a dead, mechanized real world and a vital chaotic one so important to the understanding of public administration and governance? Among the primary things learned about public administration processes in this century is that they exist in a dynamic environment, one especially sensitive to changes in environmental conditions (Wamsley & Zald, 1973). The response to this turbulence has been, however, and continues to be, primarily negative because it is seen as a continuing threat to equilibrium and the ability to control and predict behavior for the purpose of efficient goal achievement. Turbulence is seen as a management problem, not as the sign of creative evolutionary movement. But the empirical evidence of the decline of our culture and the persistence of poverty and other social problems seems to indicate the need for a different assessment of the nature of social process.

It may no longer be a matter of whether we want to accept the challenge of who we are as conscious public administrators and human beings, rather than accepting the lesser role of mechanical machines. It may be that we now must accept the challenge if we are to retain consciousness at all. But whether or not we are destroying ourselves by ecological

degradation or reducing the meaning of existence to sound bytes and market role-playing without ever experiencing true freedom of choice, we are troubled in our public world by the results of where our cognitive abilities have taken us so far -- the homelessness, the hunger and the general malaise that belies our still fond hopes for the human project. It is not all that certain that we have lost all ability to feel or imagine something different then endless historical dialectic. The current call for a revival of citizenship and governance, for example, seems to be a plea for a time-out while we reassess the meaning and potential of our beings as humans.

As the center place in the constitutional order where people connect with each other and the order itself, public administration has a responsibility to generate dialogue about and participate in this reassessment. The processes, programs, and politics of public administration are the manifestation of social relationships in the public arena. Can we then move beyond a technocratic, competitive and violent consciousness without a change in the response from administrative government? Can government change its response from adaptation to context without an understanding of its ***identity*** in the broader order?

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Endnotes

1. The recent campaign of Ross Perot illustrates this point. Perot continues to campaign on the idea of access to government -- provoking the image that government is an adversary of the people, one which would just as soon carry on its business behind closed doors and in defiance of democracy. Access, or the denial of it, is what makes government legitimate or illigetimate in this view. Democracy is the right to have demands met by government, which has been "hired" by the people to do a job.

2. Henry Kass and Douglas Morgan speak of "interest group pluralism" as having created three dialogical elements in the American administrative ethos. The first is the empowerment of groups without access, the second is the mediated of conflict interests in order to facilitate the accomplishment of goals in an equitable way. The third language they propose is one of stewardship, in which a form of ethical reasoning which exceeds the conflict at hand is practiced by the administrator. (Kass and Morgan, 1992).

3. For a broader discussion of how the economy has come to define both culture and government see H.G. Reid (1990) *American liberalism, authority, and the corporate state: a critical interpretation.* See also, the essays by Habermas's former student's at the Frankfurt school in *Observations on the spiritual situation of the age, 1984.* Also see the essays in Carl Bogg's (1986) *Social movements and political power: emerging forms of radicalism in the west.*

4. For example see Woodrow Wilson (1898); Paul Van Riper (1987) and Lawrence O'Toole (1987). The politics-administration dichotomy, for example, has framed much of public administration discourse. O'Toole suggests, however, that resolving it has been less important to the field than engaging the dichotomy as a structure for discourse about the nature of the field of public administration. Indeed, he says, the identity of public administration has developed in the process of that discourse.

5. The critique of social control as a form of domination has been chronicled best by Denhardt, 1981, Hummell, 1977. The bottom line of this need for security is decribed by Denhardt as a fear of death. This realization is scoffed at in earlier works by Becker (1973), who saw the inevitability of death as the need to do everything possible to avoid it -- rather than understanding death as a renewal point, as it is in the rest of nature. The issue for public administration seems to be to be, however, not the avoidance of death, but the engagement of the human project.

6. See for example, the classic case study in public administration of G.T. Allison (1971) The Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missle crisis; also C. Barnard (1938). The Functions of an Executive; A. Downs, (1957). Bureaucraticc structure and decision-making; F. Fiedler (1967). A theory of leadership effectiveness; L.H. Gulick and L. Urwick (1937). Papers on the science of admininistration.

7. Recently Bill Moyers has taken his everyman innocence on a journey to explore the mind/body connection on PBS. The series is a painful discovery of how difficult it is to imagine that the body and mind are one entity which functions as one entity and which has amazing capabilities for integrating the physical world into its being through senses and emotions.

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"In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture on earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building, no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no art; not letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."

Thomas Hobbes
The Leviathan (1946, p. 82)

"To many great civilizations past and present, the unity of nature is a fact of immediate experience that needs no special pleading. In the West, however, much of the history of science is concerned with separating and reducing this unity into ever smaller and smaller fragments out of which nature has somehow to be glued back together."

Mae-Wan Ho & Fox (1986, p. 117)

"We have two kinds of politics in this country...the politics of greed and the politics of guilt. We have to create the politics of convergence."

Sen. William Bradley
D-New Jersey
April, 1992

Chapter Two

Negative Democracy and the Distortion of American Character

The need for a new identity for public administration makes itself apparent in the crisis of culture. We are a nation which believes that its character embodies democratic

ideals. Yet we are reminded daily of the desperate inequalities of people within our borders; while at the same time we experience the seeming impotence of democratic government to do anything about it. Democracy seems to have lost its way. It has done so largely because government has chosen to allow community, and the democratic processes it embodies, to drift into the competition, distrust, and irresponsibility which are both fostered and reaffirmed by the market. Further, government has not yet chosen to assume responsibility for changing this state of affairs which distorts the development of citizen character. Instead, it has chosen to adapt to the problem by mediating among the tensions which arise over an unequal distribution of resources -- giving credence to the belief that the nature of citizenship is basically competitive and self-serving. In doing so public administration, as a fundamental part of government, has contributed to the negation of genuine egalitarianism in favor of a programmed "homogeneity" which seems to reduce conflict in the market but which erodes the possibilities of community -- possibilities which are dependent on the acceptance of diversity and conflict for their realization.

For example, the key disposition of the market mentality appears to be that all individuals are in "natural" competition for supremacy and what government must do is

mediate among them to reduce the threat of violence. However, this disposition is not merely a consequence of the anticipation of social violence but also *creates* a culture in which violence, which presumably boils just below the surface of all conflict, is assumed to be the primary mediator of human relationships (Bellah; 1985; Fussell, 1991; harrington, 1983; Kozal, 1991; Postman; 1986).

This disposition also serves as a self-perpetuating rationale for the coercion used by government to maintain a supposedly secure society. A tragic example of this ethic was provided by the 1992 Los Angeles riots when our democratic ideals were juxtaposed with our underlying fear of violence and the undemocratic character traits that fear fosters.

In the aftermath of violence in Los Angeles, when National Guard troops were patrolling the streets following the acquittal of four policeman accused of beating Rodney King, people said it was like "being in Beirut." The analogy, however, described more than the climate of violence. It also provided an uncomfortable comparison of Lebanese and American governments. A government which can only react to consequences rather than act on what is right, is often forced by those consequences to be oppressive rather than democratic. The beating was simply wrong--whatever the facts; it was wrong in so many ways and not the least of which was that it was wrong for what it reinforced in the American character. It was too

late once the first Rodney King verdict was passed down to talk about what was right or what was the common ground among victims of violence and the perpetrators. The underlying cultural presumptions of competition and power struggle were reinforced first with the failure of government to respond earlier to both the beating and the conditions of urban poverty, secondly with the verdict and finally by the riots. Cultural violence and the need to suppress it was all that was left; both of which further reinforced the feeling that Darwin was right -- that the principle of natural selection is omnipresent or as Tennyson put it more chillingly "Nature is red in tooth and claw."

The tragedy of the King episode embodies the key fallacy of American ideological democracy as it is often manifested in the practices of public administration...that democratic principles can remain viable without reinforcement; indeed it is often believed that democracy is best regulated by the "free" market because it allows for the pursuit of individual gain while sublimating the competitive and violent tendencies of the population in productive pursuits (Galbraith, 1976, pp. 1-33; Rousseau, 1915; 1968). But whole populations have been allowed to fall through the social cracks by this kind of logic. Yet even after the riots in Los Angeles, there are many who persist in the dogmatic belief that the competitive and divisive market can cure, not only urban blight, but the

demise of the American culture (Green, 1991; Kemp, 1992).

However, public administration has a more positive role to play in the development of American character and the revival of culture than that of manager of the political market. Indeed, the management role has done more to erode the development of American character than assist it. Instead a broader, more appropriate role of ***governance*** is proposed here; one which puts the development of character as the first priority of public administration rather than the after thought of a management mentality. This change does not necessarily require structural reform in public institutions or a dismantling of the market, but instead calls for a commitment to a changed disposition among public officials regarding the purposes of government and the potentialities of human relationship. It is this changed disposition which will allow social relationships to play out in more positive ways then is currently the case. It is proposed that it is the initial disposition toward the process of democracy which creates either positive or negative social relationships. Further, it is these relationships -- not the perceived structure within which they appear -- that are primarily responsible for creating and recreating society.

Democracy as Paradox

If public administration is to correct the social climate

that manifested itself in Los Angeles it must first recognize the impact of its own disposition towards democracy. As it now stands a paradox exists in what we believe democracy to be as compared to how we put it into practice in the public sector. On the one hand, democracy is supposed to be the acceptance of difference and the allowance of individuality (Dahl, 1989; Dunn, 1992). But, on the other hand, this same ideology of acceptance can be seen as an apologia for savage economic and social inequities (Gould, 1984; Kelly, 1984; Mansbridge, 1980), however, is not without merit. A struggle with its existence may help flush out the premises on which public administration is based in the hopes of generating a new, purposiveful identity for the field -- in much the way the politics/administration dichotomy has served to generate debate in the public sector since its inception (O'Toole, 1987).

The roots of this paradox, it seems, are manifested in the open, rapacious, and violent competition which is considered to be "natural" within society. They also lie in the assumption --reinforced by government -- that membership in the democratic community is not intrinsic but rather must be earned in a battle among economic interests (Galbraith). The democratic paradox, however, has deep roots in social and political theory which believes that democracy is a state which must be created and then maintained, often by

undemocratic coercion (Mansbridge). It is this reduction of democracy to an instrumentally imposed ideology, seemingly unrelated to the communal processes with which it interacts, that has produced the paradox. Because public administration does not generally believe that democracy is generated in the relationships of citizens, but instead that it is something which must be built in an instrumental way (Mansbridge, Dunn) the best that can happen is that the principles of democracy and the historical context adapt to each other as opposing forces. The principles are not transforming in this regard, they simply are reduced to what can be made to work in the climate in which they are placed. In the absence of the recognition that democracy grows from positive communal relationships, such adaptations are likely to continue to follow the imperatives of the all-powerful market.

Perhaps it is thus understandable that democracy, since the Industrial Revolution, the rise of Capitalism and the subsequent development of the Administrative State, has come to be equated with the maintenance of safe boundaries for a free market economy. In fact, it seems that democracy and democratic dialogue have so adapted to consumer capitalism that the two are indistinguishable in our rhetoric. The fall of the Soviet Union, for example, has been heralded by Americans as simultaneously a victory for capitalism and democracy; as though Big Macs and free elections are symbiotic

(Meister, 1990; Marx, 1964).

The effects of the premises of the market are pervasive. They have led to our equating democratic dialogue with conflict resolution which expedites short term goal achievement. This kind of "market dialogue" generally does not accept diversity among people, only diversity of products. Nor does it nurture individuality but insists upon a functional, organizational rationality which serves the efficiency needs of the market and which prescribes social relationships which assist the management of economic outcomes rather than individual development. Market dialogue fosters public debate that is not a debate of differences about the common good, but rather a debate among differences struggling for survival and supremacy; a debate that is inherently negative (Souza, 1991; Wamsley, 1990). The irony is, that despite the negative effects of market dialogue, it is the ability to successfully operate within the market, and in the interest group politics which it entails, which is promoted by government as the way individuals *earn* membership in the community. The citizen empowerment efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, for example, were most concerned with "equalizing" the ability of interest groups to compete in the political arena (Radin & Cooper, 1992). But this attempt to create equality is a distortion of a truly democratic ideal of acceptance of all individuals regardless of their ability to compete in the

market or the political arena. Community is distorted by market dialogue as well. It becomes a bounded artifice for the purpose of maintaining social control and market equilibrium,rather than a freely evolving, dynamic and enduring process from which true individuality emerges and adds to the evolving texture of the community (Merchant, 1980; Pippen, 1991).

Despite the pathologies of market dialogue, however, the ideals of democratic rhetoric persist in our collective thinking. Democratic concerns are only distorted by market dialogue in the way a mix in a chemical solution clouds and recolors the original intrinsic element. Like an irreducible element, however, democracy is not eradicated by the distortion. It continues to "live" in communal relationships and is, therefore, not simply a disembodied prescription for human action. These enduring democratic concerns are labeled variously as values, constitutional ethics, regime values and principles, among other concepts which imply that the larger community has a shared sense of their importance, if not a shared sense of their proper manifestation in any given context. For example, equality, tolerance, and choice have emerged overtime as enduring principles of the democratic process (Dahl; Lapham, 1992; Rohr, 1986). These principles also describe the evolutionary processes from which individuality emerges in the active engagement of the

individual with the environment. These three qualities are used in this text to describe the relational nature of democracy and are not meant to preclude other qualities or principles associated with democracy. For purposes of this text, ***equality*** describes the state of unconditional membership in community. ***Tolerance*** describes the state in which individuals are aware of their relationship and inter-dependence. ***Choice*** is the responsibility and opportunity to actively participate in and create one's evolution. The three principles are the inter-related, inter-dependent and generative aspects of democratic process. They endure largely because of their neutral disposition; that is they do not make rational judgments about who is more worthy than others of democracy and therefore they create divisions in the community which would make the presumption of equality a question for debate. Instead, they provide the "structural" disposition by which diverse elements of the social order create and recreate that order by the choices made in relation to the democratic framework (Dewey, 1954; Ryn, 1990).

If these principles are intrinsic, however; if they are shared and struggled with time and again in public debate, why has oppression and denial of equality been the result of democracy in practice? It may be that in the earnest belief that the purpose of government is to secure the populace against imminent violence by members of society -- who

supposedly share nothing but their concern for security -- public administration has helped arrest the development of American character at the point of competitiveness, distrust and animosity and has distorted the meaning of those shared democratic principles.

Yet, because the strains of democracy endure in our public debates despite the distortions(Rohr, Cook, 1992), it behooves us to consider that democracy persists, not because it is a stagnant ideology or as a methodological formula for behavioral management, but because it is an intrinsic process of human relationship, one most naturally aligned with the dynamic life of collective community. That is to say, that democracy is the manifestation of those positive communal relationships which breed acceptance and encourage individual involvement in the processes of development. It is "natural" in the sense that it is aligned with the evolutionary tendencies of life which initially derive from biological and physiological human bonds. It is argued here that society does not exist separate from those life processes which provide meaning and purpose for human action...often as it is reflected in the evolutionary development of character (Argyros, 1991; Fraser, 1982; Budzizewski, 1986; Lodi, 1989; Vickers, 1973; Waldo, 1987; Walsh, 1990).

The evolutionary processes of human beings are unique from other life forms because they are tied to the development

of "character" as well as to survival imperatives. Character, as it is understood here, is not a prescription of virtues which can be taught or adapted to, but a process of maturation which occurs when an individual authentically engages his or her community. Indeed, human evolution, as Martin Buber says, is not possible without the engagement of positive relationships that are the potential of the intrinsic community; a potential which not only pre-dates but lives on in the constructed community of the social contract, despite efforts to eradicate it (Buber, 1970; Kazantzakis, 1960). "Positive" relationships in this context do not mean "conflict free" relationships. They mean "purposeful" as it relates to the acceptance and engagement of citizens in the development of character. The relationships of intrinsic community, however, are not free of the need for authority but instead require authority which stops the drift of community relationships into formats -- like the market dialogue -- which deny intrinsic human bonds and block the more developmental possibilities of the evolutionary process.

The classic American case study of administrative behavior, *Dumping $2.6 Million on Bakersfield by Michael Aron*, illustrates how public administration can distort the potential of community by the premises with which it implements public policy (Aron, 1976). In Bakersfield, the need for a migrant health clinic presented an opportunity for

government, not only to help a needy population, but to change the disposition of American character towards migrants and minorities in general. The opportunity did not go un-noticed by HEW officials who tried, with pressure from Senator Walter Mondale, to create a window for participation for minorities. But the process became distorted and the opportunity lost. Not only did it come to appear that money was wasted but that the divisions among minority groups, and among minorities and the larger community, were intensified so that it also appeared that the project was under siege from "competing" groups of interest. The agencies involved created this unproductive social climate by not articulating the broader social goals involved, by conducting public dialogue primarily on the basis of market efficiencies and by addressing democratic issues -- like who should participate in decision-making -- with market principles rather than democratic ones. All this was done presumably in an attempt to reduce conflict and expedite an efficient implementation of the health program (Aron). However, the disposition of public administrators toward the existing community seemed to assume that the conflict inherent in the situation would interfere with the completion of the project. The more underlying premise, however, was that the purpose of government was to avoid such conflict in the interest of the security of the society. But by not struggling with these assumptions, the public administrators in the

Bakersfield case missed a democratic opportunity. If they had promoted the belief that communal membership was unconditional, rather than up for grabs, the conflict, however inefficient, presented the potential of an evolutionary change in racial attitudes. The administrators seemed to have assumed, however, that the distrust and competition among players in the political arena was unresolvable -- an attitude which became self-fulfilling. In essence, the narrow market disposition of public administration fragmented the Bakersfield community at a point when an opportunity existed, not only to meet an immediate program need, but to renew and enhance the community.

The foremost problem of American democracy and the practice of public management is the failure to recognize the relationship between positive community, democratic ideals and the development of character. What is needed to correct the systemic illnesses created by market dialogue is not more management, however,... not reform, reorganization or even revolution and the despair those divisive and backward looking movements foster. What is needed is a positive moral authority which can actively affect democracy in each new historical context. This is not possible, however, without recognizing that citizens, and citizens and government, exist in relation to each other; that to bifurcate and polarize segments of the community, is to set the community, as in Los Angeles and

Bakersfield, at war with itself.

Adaptive Management and Democratic Governance

Public policy, as it has emerged from the politics of interest group liberalism and social contract theory, appears to be based on four presumptions, the roots of which will be explored here:

1. That community does not exist "naturally"; that is it must be created by social contract.

2. That diversity is problematic to the creation of community because it presents the potential for conflict which the social contract seeks to avoid.

3. That community is maintained by identifying and reinforcing common interests rather than by allowing the naturally existing community to renew and recreate itself through the positive relationships of its members.

4. That the community operating within the structure of the market will regulate itself in a positive democratic manner even though the premises of the market are negative and undemocratic.

In contrast democratic premises may look like these:

1. That democracy is the process which occurs among and between members of a natural--not constructed--community. Community is a given in this view, and is not easily separated from democratic ideals of acceptance and engagement.

2. That democracy is the process which fosters and recreates communal relationships and also is supported and nurtured by those relationships. It is these relationships which contribute to the evolutionary development of individuals. Democracy manifests itself as potentialities for human development--which

require citizens to make choices and be actively engaged in their own evolution--rather than manifesting itself in ideologic absolutes which foster passivity.

3. That the process of democracy itself is neutral; that is it exhibits neither a predisposition towards competition or toward conflict. But it is a common process of relationship, one in which all members can engage. This basic human connection cannot be destroyed by market practices only distorted and encouraged to competition.

4. That the premises from which public administration addresses its responsibilities can either assist the democratic process in the development of human character or it can distort it by failing to recognize the intrinsic relationship between community, democracy and government. The exercise of conscious moral authority is therefore imperative to the evolutionary development of the character of citizenship.

These two views might be called respectively...***adaptive management*** and ***democratic governance***. Democratic governance, as it is defined here, fosters social relationships which reflect basic human connections and which are aligned with the evolutionary processes of development which are distinctly human. The democratic process embraced by democratic governance pre-exists and supersedes historical ideology. It cannot be destroyed only "bent" for periods of time because it exists in the naturally occurring and re-occurring interconnections of human beings. That is, as a neutral process, democracy can become authoritarianism, or totalitarianism or any other ideology unless there is

authority present which is capable of reaffirming the more egalitarian processes associated with community relationships.

For example, democratic governance accepts and promotes two main metaphors historically associated with democracy and ***also*** with community...***acceptance*** of all members of humanity in a continuing process of the creation of the social world and ***engagement*** of all members in that continuing process of creation. These metaphors also distinguish evolutionary democracy from adaptive ideological democracy...negative democracy...which preaches acceptance and engagement but breeds exclusion and individual passivity. Unfortunately, the process of evolutionary democracy is easily distorted by those management, market and political attitudes which seek to reify ideologic principles; principles which require that the behavior of individuals be modified and restricted to what fits the functional needs of the accompanying ideology. Most specifically, an imperative for homogeneity develops as diversity becomes a problem to be solved rather than being the basic tenet of democracy.

Unlike adaptive management, which is a function of competitive market dialogue, democratic governance expresses itself in the form of dialogue based on the presumption of communal relationship. As a related whole, the community allows its diverse humanity to exist in the dynamic, even chaotic, interactions of an ever-changing context through the

democratic process of dialogue. Unlike market dialogue, the passionate dialogue of democratic governance is not the means for controlling conflict to facilitate the completion of outcomes and the way by which the community adapts to perceived environmental consequences (Argyros, pp. 281-287). Instead, it is the means by which the sense of community, shared purpose and the expression of individuality -- which nurture evolution and human development -- are amplified.

In this regard, conflict is not a problem to be avoided in public dialogue, but something to be anticipated and allowed because it has meaning for the process of evolution. Conflict does not always signal violence but more often it introduces the opportunity for the mix of community, culture and individuality to come together in the dynamic creation of some new understanding or some positive shift in the collective conscious which, because it is generated by the community, represents an intrinsic consensus about how values have been manifested. James Liszka explains this phenomenon in relation to mythology, which, because of its ambiguous, neutral text often generates confusion and conflict about its meaning...a condition replicated in complex public dialogue:

> ***The ambivalence of myth serves to create struggle and conflict so that, in the end, the goodness of rules and values must stand on their own worth. In that way they become legitimate; otherwise they become the monotone of dogma (Liszka, 1989).***

Widespread social violence, as in Los Angeles, is more

likely to be the result of conflict which has been repressed or channelled into linear formats -- like the market -- which appropriate it to fuel the competitive imperative of economics without abandoning the basic assumption that violence is normal. Conflict is often seen as a problem in Western culture, because to lose the battle implied in the conflict is to risk losing membership in the community (Freire, 1974; Soelle, 1990). The underclass in America is composed of people who have lost membership in the larger community simply by virtue of having lost the ability to compete in the economy. However, if the risk of lost membership is removed by a moral authority which asserts -- time and again --the ***unconditionality*** of communal membership by including everyone and their potential in the considerations of the dialogue, the social conflict is likely to be more productive than violent.

To activate this more positive dialogue, however, legitimate public administration must come to see itself as being more aligned with democratic relationships which serve to renew community rather than primarily with the achievement of economic and political outcomes -- which serve only the historical expediency of ideology. Indeed, it must come to see its **primary** responsibility as the renewal of positive social relationships. This change in role, however, is not something which necessarily can be created by programs and projects. It is more the need for a new professional identity beyond that

of technocratic management, one which recognizes that human relationships are both regulating and generative and that true social progress is not possible without the enhancement of positive community interaction. This new identity does not mean that government does not act to effect economic and political conditions, however. Quite the contrary, government acts purposefully. But it does so in a manner which does not lead to a "fraying" of social relationships and a loss of their democratic potential (Hughes, 1992) This reconfiguration of the identity of public administration marks the distinction between management and governance and defines a more democratic public service which serves to enhance the development of American character not impede it.

The potentiality of community and the development of American character is further distorted by the implied presumption of this negative democracy that there is always someone -- another person, the government -- who wants to deprive the individual of his or her rights as they are defined by the social contract. The negative democracy which emerges from this frightened view of community defines freedom as the ability to defend contract rights (Melossi, 1990, pp. 104-105). The acceptance of diversity then is problematic because it represents a potentially violent threat to this freedom. Diversity means more claims on rights; more conflict to mediate; more potential for loss.

Sheldon Wolin remarks in his studies of Thomas Hobbes, for example, that the Hobbesian view of equality was more the consequence of a "methodological need rather than a normative claim," for the promotion of ***power*** through equal treatment. That is to say that by adapting the behavior of citizens to meet the needs of the social order, the Hobbesian government could maintain the semblance of equality by producing standards for equal treatment. Equality in this view is synonymous with homogeneity and cultural homogeneity simply makes the exercise of power and the accomplishment of social goals easier because it avoids the conflict and inefficiencies associated with diversity (Wolin, 1990, pp. 9-36). Since Hobbes, the market has served as referent point for what homogeneity should look like...a reduction of interests, cultures and individuality to the common equation of the American economic dream. The perceived need for security from the violence and social chaos serves as a continuing and reinforcing rationale for this reduction of human potential and relationship to a functional market equation.

Homogeneity is created and controlled in the Hobbesian social agreement by prescribed rules of behavior -- because presumably citizens who are at each other's throats cannot be trusted to regulate themselves. These rules exist as minimal norms of social behavior to control for the violence and aggression, and to give the semblance of equality through

equal treatment. But they also serve to enhance the power of those individuals who, because of the accepted premise of natural selection of superior ability, can manipulate those rules to their competitive advantage and be considered successful. These artificial norms produce an imperative for power, as Wolin says (1990). They also produce a passivity among citizens who are not encouraged to make independent judgments, but who are instead led to believe that security comes from relying on governmental experts to prescribe action or from reaffirming and mimicking the behavior of those who have successfully manipulated the system (Friere; Wamsley, et al, 1990).

It has come to be that the organization appears to provide the individual with the ultimately secure environment; so secure, in Simon's thesis, that the "outside" environment routinely can be adapted to the premises of the organization through the process of decision-making. Human relationship does not mediate the development of citizen character in this view, in fact relationships are problematic to the process of decision-making because they introduce the opportunity for unpredictability and change (Simon, 1957; 1992). Decision-making, in Simon's view, is necessarily lonely -- and although the organizational environment is secure, because its existence is premised on fear and anxiety it is not a comfortable security, but one to which the individual must

sacrifice both a sense of community and personal efficacy for the freedom from conflict and ambiguity.

Neo-Darwinism, as reflected in Simon's work, and its separation of the real world of the organization from the so-called metaphysical natural world, has made it difficult to argue that community exists, not by construction, but as a phenomenon which occurs because of the intrinsic bonds between humans. Yet efforts to create community from the basis of Neo-Darwinistic logic has meant that community has been seen as achievable only by successive moves towards an ideal which exists separate from the "normal" life of community. These "models" for community are themselves a conceptual reinforcement of the belief that nature and society are separate. The acceptance of such logic also perpetuates the belief that social and political life is an on-going and dismal struggle of accommodating the ideal world to the "real" world; of managing outcomes to stay in control. For example, "enterprise zones" appear to be government's answer to the need for community in the aftermath of the Los Angeles riots -- as if we can reweave the tattered social fabric and resolve racism by simply stepping up the competition among community members by the imposition of a new economic structure.

The argument here, however, is that a positive communal consciousness is active and alive in each historical context but must be continually nurtured by positive authority to

remain viable. The evolutionary and democratic ideal is a continuing, extant, process of discovery and creativity occurring in relationship among connected and purposeful individuals. If it is not, then Herbert Simon would unfortunately have to be right. Without an awareness of a related, present community, the empirical world does appear to be a clutter of seemingly disconnected and threatening phenomenon about which survival decisions must be made.

The most insidious thing about Simon's work, however, is that his description of the bounded rationality of human beings...much like the argument for competitive natural selection...becomes self-fulfilling. Bounded rationality can only produce more of the same without a vision that ***other*** potentialities are present and desirable even if not immediately discernable. Simon's prescription, however, is to remove humanity from the active -- albeit uncertain -- stream of life which might generate a broader consciousness and put it in the redundant formats of computer logic. Bounded rationality may also be defined as the inability to recognize the connections between individual human action and community processes. Simon misses the potential of human relationships because he tries to preserve and computerize a historical point in the evolution of the human ***mind.*** He does not stop human evolution, however, but distorts it to fit the decision-making model...a model which has been the cornerstone of

management activity in the public sector for more than 35 years (Harmon, 1992).

The logic of Neo-Darwinism also has been hard to dispel in public administration because of the power arrangements which have emerged from the hierarchies of control implicit in social contract theory. Such power-arrangements feed the natural selection myth by both reaffirming it in the continued success of the more powerful and in the belief that such power arrangements are the "natural" state of human affairs and therefore beyond our ability to correct (Ho & Fox, 1986).

Yet it is not the argument here that the hierarchy of bureaucracy and bureaucratic politics needs to be dismantled per se. Any structural configuration, whether it be a hierarchy, a family, or the market, can be distorted by initial premises. That is to say that the most democratic of structures, as many revolutions in other parts of the world have shown us, can easily transform to become oppressive tools of social management if they do not initially reconfigure and then reinforce the premises on which government is based. Instead of "retooling" the public administration to adapt to changes in the power structure or technology, the answer may be instead to encourage the exercise of a moral authority that rejects the paradigm of competition and violence instead of adapting to meet its imperatives.

Public administration, as the heart of the polity where

people interact with government, must recognize that the metaphor of natural selection is self-defeating as a model for social and political relationships. Further, that natural selection occurs in large part because we fail to recognize and nurture other potentialities not because it is the definitive "natural" model for human relationship.

The long-term result of theory and practice premised on the idea of natural selection has been the fragmentation of power among competing elements of society in a struggle for political survival. Also, the belief has developed among public administrators that "reality" *is* the Hobbesian jungle, which has made it difficult to even discuss those potentialities which might deny or alter that reality. Indeed, this presumption often has limited debate in the public sector to possibilities which fit three distinct premises of adaptive management

1. That communal membership is earned not generic therefore citizens must be "equalized" in their struggle to earn political recognition.

2. That equilibrium, whatever the cost to communal relationships, is the best possible state because it appears to reduce conflict, improve security and support the achievement of organizational goals and

3. That maintaining equilibrium is dependent on the existence of a hierarchy of power and expertise and upon the compliance of citizens to models for political action and social behavior. [44]

These premises constitute a fear that if public administrators "let go" of the presumption of natural selection a chaos will ensue which will destroy the social order. This fear is best expressed by Willa Bruce in a response to an argument by Orion White and Cythnia McSwain about the nature of techocratic organizations:

> ***When Pandora opened her box, demons were released in the world. If we do away with our "hierarchical purposive organizations" that "separate, alienate, and formalize categories of people in their relation to each other," is it not possible that we will unleash the demons that these organizations and their rules for interaction attempt to control for the improvement of society? Could we not arrive at a Hobbesian Jungle, where each in the pursuit of self-interest, destroys others in that same pursuit (Bruce, 1992)?***

That our belief in the principles of natural selection have produced social divisiveness, an ill-defined and passive citizenry and increased hardship, especially among the poor, has not seemed to weaken the hold of this darwinistic paradigm on public administration. Although the life sciences have begun to reject competition and survival of the fittest as accurate explanations of life in the natural world, the social sciences, and in particular the sciences of government and public institutions still cling to notions of power which derive from and which have re-created Darwin's historical conception of the nature -- perhaps for fear of letting go. In the final analysis, however, we have traded the development of

character -- as it occurs in the struggle to make right choices -- for the false security of an environment we imagine must be made free of conflict and the need for choice.

Evolutionary Community and Legitimate Public Administration

The distinction between adaptation to consequence and the evolution of character manifests itself in the idea of community. In the mechanized world of Darwin and Hobbes living things are reduced to essences and parts and genes. The political community, in this conception, is built from parts; primarily citizens grouped together in some recognizable configuration and bound together by rules or interests (Bellah, Ryn). Community exists by agreement which implies that some members do not agree or that agreement is a pre-requisite to membership. In an adaptive democracy, premised on market dispositions, agreement to membership also carries with it the presumption of effective participation in the economy. Those seeking membership must adapt to the demands of the market or be excluded from community. The metaphor of survival of the fittest energizes the competitive market, so it is not possible that everyone could be members of the economic community and still have the metaphor hold true.

Places, like East St. Louis, Illinois, that are environmentally toxic, with minimal and sub-standard housing, education and health care, spawn generations of people unable

to compete in the more "civilized jungle" of the free-market economy. Such places exist as alien cultures within national boundaries. The people living there are categorized by their lack of power, not by their potential. They are viewed not as citizens who need help but citizens who need help because they have failed to be successful in the adaptive democracy of the market (Kozal, Chpt. 1). The solution to their dilemma therefore appears to be to give them the ability to compete so that they might earn membership in the larger community. The implication is that it is the political and economic behavior of the residents...both the have and have-nots...that needs to be addressed not the actual problem of poverty and waste. Action to clean up the waste, hire good teachers, and build hospitals is diffused and filtered through the debate over how to manage behavior, economic feasibility and the proper evaluation of outcomes. Ultimately, action is reduced to what appears to be the most equitable power distribution which meets the demands of social equilibrium; a distribution which is made among citizens who will never be equal because the economic format is premised on the presumption of natural selection of superior ability. Although there may be short term change, in the long run, there is only adaptation to the competition and inequality which created the problems in the first place (Friere, Soelle).

In our system, all interests seek to adapt to the more

powerful market -- largely because it is assumed they must in order to survive. Those who cannot or don't are confined to ghettos like East St. Louis; "illegal aliens" who have not earned membership in the economic community and who have been made painfully and repeatedly aware of their economic inadequacies and led to believe, by the actions of public administrators, that they are inadequacies born of individual differences.

Diversity is always a dilemma for the administrator seeking to create community while still believing in the premises of natural selection. Presumably the threat of conflict and social disequilibrium is less if resources can be distributed among like-thinking people who share basic cultural values. Social programs of the past 30 years have tried to produce this functional homogeneity under the guise of community by rearranging economic and political power structures as if they were lifeless appendages or pieces of a puzzle (Heller & Freher). When it doesn't work we abandon those among us who have seemingly failed to meet the standards created by our models.

The struggle to discover the right formula for "building" viable community seldom seems to recognize the natural dynamics of social interaction which supersede our models. For example, the current political struggle to bring back family values presents another window of opportunity for community

evolution. Yet at the same time, it has the potential of deepening the wounds in our culture. This debate will only be productive if those who feel they have the definitive list of family values can allow democratic dialogue to generate a new understanding of those values which allows for the inclusion of all citizens. The alternative is to use an ideological list of principles to further define who belongs in community and who doesn't. This alternative is not only despotic, it misses the point that our communal bonds exist and play out in the environment whether or not we accept each other. But whether these bonds manifest themselves in alienation or in evolutionary development depends on our awareness and disposition towards their existence.

To borrow a thought from evolutionary biologists, Neo-Darwinists make the false assumption that we have a universe of pure numbers devoid of the influence of physics and chemistry (Ho & Fox). To put it another way, in Western thought nature, and by extension community, is put into motion only by governmental intentions and further, that community should submit passively to those ideologic intentions. The persistence of monumental social problems, however, despite our good intentions, is a stark indication that by ***building*** community on the belief in natural selection rather than ***allowing*** positive relationships to generate community from basic human bonds, we cannot serve our sense of democratic

equity and justice.

The role of democratic governance in enhancing community might be illustrated by comparing it briefly to the social contract community of Rousseau. Although, Rousseau believed that government must seek to "unify" and "civilize" its citizens, these acts are ultimately reductions of individual potential and of cultural differences to the "common" goals of the community (Ryn). But to an evolutionary community the goals themselves are not problematic. What is problematic is that the tasks to be accomplished ultimately define the full potential of community members and begin to shape its character -- if the underlying developmental processes intrinsic in a democratic community are not legitimized. To put it another way community, and the intrinsic democratic values there, no longer regulate the maturation of its members when "who we are" is defined simply as "what we do."

But for Rousseau membership in community isn't a given, so some artificial mediator must exist to keep the social order together. Belonging to community, according to Rousseau, costs something initially. It is not that one assumes responsibility as a citizen because of the relatedness to other human beings but that one agrees to follow minimal rules and play the "part" of citizen because of some bargain that has been struck which compels the citizen to act in his or her own interest. That is to say, that the individual is "reduced

to" a citizen rather than enhanced by the act of citizenship (Pippen, pp. 151-156).

The relationship of government with this kind of community is a hostile one, primarily because government is seen as extraneous to the interests of the individual rather than as the symbol of the community which serves to generate dialogue about the nature of social evolution. In Rousseau's "continuous revolution" violence and suppression are preconditions to freedom as citizens must fight to keep their distance from a government which threatens their natural rights (Pippen).

By contrast, democratic government should assume its own legitimacy, not defend it. This not a prescription for the arrogant assumption of power, but instead is the call for public administration to take responsibility for its existence. A government which must question its legitimacy must also question its relationship with community. The nature of the evolutionary community is that all that is created by it cannot easily be divorced from it...that is, in essence, the public administration can be seen as legitimate simply because it has appeared as a manifestation of inclusive communal processes. Because of its intrinsic connections to community as the social action component of government, public administration -- in its defensive attempts to build a rationale for its legitimacy apart from its existence -- is

likely to produce divisive ripples in the community and reconfirm the basic assumptions of competition and power struggle. The more devastating effect of this adaptive reaction to Rousseau's "continuous revolution", as it has played out in interest groups politics, is that public administration ultimately cannot act to further the evolutionary development of the community because it is so over-burdened by the demands of competing citizens (Lowi, 1978). The failure to accept the unity of community and public administration and act for the whole is, in essence, an abdication of responsibility.

The inherent legitimacy of public administration carries with it an implied responsibility to the community from which it emerges. The well-being of the public administration is reflective of the well-being of the nation...an idea which has its roots in the Traditionalist school of public administration described by White and Mcswain:

> ***This view (Traditonalist) produced a faith that those in agencies could regard the well-being, even the growth, of their agency as equivalent to the public weal. That is in order to produce the kind of process of choice and action that this way of government depended on for effective operation, the agency had to participate actively as a member with full status in the policy-making system (1990).***

This implicit relationship between public administration and citizens suggests that a more productive view of change in government may be "renewal" or "reconstitutiveness", as Hannah

Arendt would call it, instead of revolution (Arendt, 1963). In evolutionary democracy the community and its government generate change and recreate *each other*.

For this to be true, however, is must be articulated that community membership is not the issue in public debate. If it is, evolution becomes distorted in the battle among competing interests...one of which is government. We may change nationalities, we may change ideologies, we may change jobs, but the democratic responsibilities we have toward each other do not ultimately derive from these things, but derive instead from our basic connections as human beings. In many ways, the failure to embrace the responsibilities and struggles that this consciousness would require has reduced social and political life to a sometimes dreary task to be accomplished or something to be "survived" because the meaning for human action intrinsic in the evolutionary process has been suppressed.

Simon views social life as a maze, for example, a problem to be solved (1992, pp. 175-188). Individuals enter at a certain point and exit at a designated point. The rational person...the survivor...knows how to avoid barriers in the search for the path of least resistance. The underlying implication is that the maze is a dead structure and does not interact with the person traveling through it except by posing barriers. The rational individual can learn to become "maze-

smart" and maneuver the maze without ever encountering its barriers in a swift, painless and lonely dash to the finish line.

Evolutionary democracy, and the community which embraces it, however, may be likened more to the mythical labyrinth than a maze. The labyrinth has no clear beginning or end. Attitude is everything with life in the labyrinth...as poet Luis Jorges Borges portrays it (Borges, 1967, 1978). The ***method*** for traveling through the labyrinth is less important than one's ***relationship*** with the labyrinth. A hostile relationship, one of avoidance, manipulation or violence creates a prison for the individual. The labyrinth is sensitive to environmental conditions -- it is alive -- and reflects the disposition of whatever passes through it. A relationship of openness and engagement results in renewal of the labyrinth ***and*** the individual. Such a relationship also fosters a sense of freedom because the labyrinth responds to anyone and allows countless opportunities -- choices -- for renewal from whatever position, framework, age or state of being it encounters... as long as there is recognition of the relationship (Bohm, 1987; Briggs & Peat, 1984).

The evolutionary nature of a democratic community is further illustrated by the Greek notion of "related opposites." Theseus and the Minotaur are not necessarily battling for primacy in the labyrinth, for example. Because

they are related, connected in the intertwining of all of nature, their battle takes on a different purpose. What affects one will affect the other, and since they both struggle, it is likely that something new will emerge...new maturity in the hero, a better growing season for crops; some new evolution of the human enterprise in relationship with nature. To win the battle without renewal insures the death, not only of the monster, but of the hero. Without this awareness of community, which democratic government creates and maintains, we can easily set maze-like traps for ourselves (Hatab, 1990, pp.160-161).

Democratic Choice and Adaptation

Whether we live in mazes or engage the labyrinth is a matter of choice. To participate in the evolution of one's self and one's community, however, also requires the assumption of responsibility. In the adaptive community -- the maze -- the individual is only responsible for following the rules and government is really only responsible for enforcing the rule (Bellah, 1985; 1989). In an evolutionary community individual responsibilities are much more profound and government action must be more concerned with the development of citizens who are comfortable making choices in an ambiguous and free world.

Yet, Neo-Darwinism, as it has often been put into

practice by public administration, assumes cause and effect and historical linearity...that is that choices are only a matter of avoiding predictable consequences not a matter of evolutionary development. The significance of this to a democracy is that social choices appear to be limited to those things which congeal from the logical sequence of events. Overtime, it begins to appear that the only choices we have are those which are a reaction to our last choice. In essence, adaptation carries forward a modification of what was wrong in previous reforms rather than exploring the possibilities which exist beyond the linear sequence of programs and events. This happens, in part, not only because of the imperatives of linear decision-making, but because the generative dialogue of a diverse community which might produce other potentialities is avoided in favor of dialogue which reduces conflict to expedite achievement of these linear choices (Seidman & Gilmour, 1987) Decisions which are mediated by the needs of short term goals discourage system maintenance, as Deming might put it -- the renewal of those communal relationships, which although often not seemingly cost-effective, contribute to the long-term development of the community and its ability to generate new options for action (Deming, 1992).

For example, the issue of poverty should be addressed by considering the possibilities for human development ***existing*** in a given context not necessarily considering first how the

context can be corrected to achieve market equilibrium or the reduction of conflict. Democratic governance implies as well that the individual be involved in making the choices inherent in his or her own development. This may suggest the desireablity of citizen education and efforts to improve citizen access, but more, it suggests that the role of government is ***first*** the acceptance of the individual as he or she is -- regardless of what they "should" be in relation to the market model. Then, ***secondly,*** it should support the individual in development in ways which the individual has helped design. It is this acceptance (unconditional love some may say) and the opportunity to be the architect of one's own evolution which is democratic and which encourages the assumption of responsibility by the individual.

Democratic choice, however, is co-terminus with a responsibility to community. Choice is the existential realization that personal development and individuation are married to the evolutionary processes of an inter-related universe...to community. If one seeks to achieve a broader consciousness, one takes the community along. If one chooses self-denial and alienation one drags the community down. If one chooses to deny community, community denies the individual. Responsibility is the realization that every choice is a moral one because it impacts a much broader system in countless ways and because it impacts each individual's

purposeful maturation. The same holds true for government.

But further, it is the role of democratic government, as moral authority, to legitimize the struggle of citizens to evolve by allowing the ***opportunity*** to engage in evolutionary development. This is a different task then "protecting" citizens from the dangers of other citizens. This necessarily means that government must shift its focus from technocratic/behavioral management to those pursuits...including the development of culture through art, music, ritual, rhetoric and relationship...which assist citizens in their evolutionary pursuits (Goodsell, 1989, 1992). But it also means that government must address directly basic human needs like housing, food and health care ***as they relate to the developmental needs of citizens <u>not</u> as they serve to produce market equilibrium and the reduction of conflict.***

Democratic Governance: The Evolution of Public Administration

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The ability of public administration to adapt to its environment is well-established and is most often seen as a virtue (Seidman & Gilmour). But adaptation is no longer a meaningful rationale for institutional legitimacy. If public administration is to assume a purposeful role in the evolution

of our culture, it must recognize that by its failure to exercise moral authority in the name of community, it is enabling the nation to remain at an arrested and negative state of evolution. The condition of American culture and American character would suggest that the time has come for public administration to make an evolutionary leap from adaptive management to democratic governance.

To make this leap possible, however, public administration must first recognize that it does not exist apart from community anymore than the principles of democracy do, but instead it must assume the same kind of responsibility for making democratic choices that it must expect from citizens. Democratic governance, unlike management, is a reflection of the democratic process in which equality, tolerance and choice create and recreate the community through the positive relationships of its members. It raises to a conscious level, the relationship of all individuals of the community, not just to one another, or group to group, but also of individuals and groups to the collectivity. It thus creates and maintains an awareness of the unconditional nature of membership in a democracy.

Public dialogue, as distinct from competitive market dialogue, produces this *continuing* consciousness and encourages citizens to expose themselves to new conditions and new debate, which might open up new possibilities of

evolution. Governance is that dialogic process which encourages citizens to make judgments about their own futures rather than insulating them from "wrong" decisions by perpetuating the myth that short term outcomes are always more important than the long term process of self-discovery and creativity. In doing so, government can reflect and participate in the creative aspects of human potential rather than being the oppressor. Government then evolves "immanent to the process and simultaneous with it," (Ho & Fox, p. 118).

This is different than the Hegelian view that government is legitimized by participation from individuals who, according to Rousseau, exercise freedom by revolting against despotic government when it no longer serves their interests. From an evolutionary view, government is not simply the sum of the collective will as expressed in the majority vote, so that when the majority is dissatisfied, government must fall and presumably it can fall independent of any corresponding change in citizenship (Brown, 1992). Government exists, instead, as a dynamic, generative artifact of the interactive, sometimes conflict ridden processes of democracy; the focal point of the process of creation and maturation in which citizens engage each other (Cook, 1992).

The discipline we, as citizens and public administrators, need in this crucial time in the development of American character, is to avoid perpetuating the pathologies of Neo-

Darwinism by adapting to them. The evil of competition and distrust that was the Hobbesian rationale for creating the safe haven of society, has become our most identifiable character trait as Americans. The emphasis on selfishness and the struggle for existence has had an insidious confirmatory effects on the American mind (Bateson, 1985). This self-fulfilling adaptation is *not* the result of natural selection in community but the result of community members unconsciously adapting to the negative manifestations of market competition. It is not natural and it is certainly not democratic.

Yet, if we are dealing with a sickness of the system as a whole, one which dates to the industrial revolution, it is clearly unproductive to divide up the collective illness between good achievements and bad achievements as Rudolf Bahro says (1985; Boggs, 1986). Blame, guilt, reform, and endless critique -- even of government -- give energy to the presumption of natural selection and competition. They imply that someone should have had the perfect answer; that a superior someone exists; that someone had access to more universal knowledge than anyone else; that we do not share responsibility and therefore we do not share community. The nature of adaptation is that the more strenuous our resistance; the more we struggle for power, the stronger the imperative for winning power becomes.

We must begin instead by accepting where we are and

choosing to move beyond the more disheartening aspects of its context. This cannot be done by finding someone to blame but by recognizing that in an inter-related world, in which we all share some responsibility, blame is ultimately self-defeating. We simply cannot move forward unless we take everyone with us. Change is a matter of having the courage to choose to move beyond the dilemma and to engage in the evolutionary processes of community which would make the change meaningful.

For example, if government assumes the role of empowering those who are without political access it must seek ways that do not simply result in citizens adapting to the demands of current power arrangements, agency procedures or market imperatives (Moe, 1989). Simply teaching victims how to adapt to a dysfunctional system ultimately corrupts the community and is a cruel denial of our basic humanity. It is like dressing a soldier up for war, giving him the latest technology so he can go to battle with a better chance of winning. The technology, the marketing skills, do not make the battle anymore meaningful or the destruction of life, community and environment anymore palatable.

Democratic governance is harder than that. It requires that choices be made about the nature of our evolution and requires that government foster those dispositions which allow us to believe that we are capable of making those choices, rather than settling for the security that adaptation to the

threat of uncomfortable consequences might bring. We must begin in government, ***one relationship*** at a time, ***one dialogue*** at a time to renew our sense of democratic community and therefore the ability to generate the evolutionary development of American character.

However, first we must begin to understand the cultural dynamics which reinforce a passive citizenry, one disinclined to participate in evolutionary change...one trapped in the behavioralist conception of functional guilt.

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This then, is the order of all organic nature. When once we are in any portion of the course, we find ourselves running in a circular groove, as endless as the course of a blind horse in a mill.

Phillip Henry Gosse
Omphalas 1857 (Gould, 1985, p 102).

Chapter Three

The Guilty Society

In recent years the much maligned decline of the American culture has come to be increasingly associated with the inability of government to act to affect social change. The causes of social unrest and social inequalities are interchangeability linked to the failure of somebody to do something. Yet, despite nearly a century of social reforms the indicators of failure bombard us -- rising infant mortality, increased homelessness, inner-city blight and a disenchanted and mean-spirited citizenry. Yet it seems that the best that can be done is what has always done -- seeking someone or something to blame for the problem and attack it or them, instead of addressing the problem itself.

This regressive practice has stifled the role of government as a proactive force in the development of American society. Indeed, the treatment of errors in administrative judgment has become a key reference point for determining administrative accountability (Landau, 1992). As such errors,

or the potential of error, mediate dialogue in the public sector, as if being responsive to the public is a simple matter of delivering zero-defect goods to a demanding consumer population -- one increasingly concerned with consistency, while at the same time lamenting bureaucratic red tape.

In a conventional sense, accountability is at least the willingness to accept that errors are made and the willingness to correct them (Landau). The modern tendency, however, is a reduction of even this minimalist understanding of both the potential of errors and the issue of accountability. The tendency now is to look for someone to blame as part of the trade-off made in the concern for certainty. By demanding certainty, American society has come to believe that it can actually have it. It seems we are continually disappointed in American Society by our errors -- not in wonder of them -- but distressed by their appearance (Huges, 1991; Blumfield, 1991). It would seem this social disposition toward the need for final perfection derives, in part, from our reliance on experts to make the world a certain place, free of the guesswork that comes from experimentation.

It is the hallmark of public administrators to rely on the public's belief in their expertise as the method by which they keep a firm handle on the Truth as it exists in current knowledge (Wilson, 1925-1927; Gullick & Urwick, 1937). Social evolution, however, even at the program level, is stymied by

this attitude. If errors occur, which might bring expertise into question in the policy arena, they are often hidden or passed off to some extraneous cause, usually to the vague and ready cause of "politics".

Errors are seldom welcomed -- in the spirit of experimentalism -- as doorways to new lines of thought which might serve to enhance the evolutionary potential of the social order. They are more often seen as threats to the political image of an agency or its ability to garner funding. Errors, in a political system which demands certainty and frowns upon inconsistency, become bargaining chips by which existing power arrangements are secured as agencies and individuals redistribute blame. Accountability, in this narrow view, is simply the ability to find out who's to blame for mistakes and seek retribution. As Martin Landau says:

> ***When we investigate, more often than not the search is for a villain. There are villains, and finding them may be good for the soul. But such discovery does not erase the fact that calamitous and catastrophic errors derive from an absence of knowledge, a misuse of knowledge, and a general failure to hold ourselves empirically accountable (p. 218).***

It is not Landau's point, however, that bureaucracy "should have known" or that it can always know in advance what is going to work and what isn't, but that it must reconnect to the reality of empirical events in which errors happen. Landau's point is more that public administration should recognize its errors when they occur and address them, rather

than distort the political process by trying to camouflage errors to avoid guilt and its political ramifications (p. 218). The distortions occur when creative energy is used to search for perpetrators and avoid responsibility -- the assumption of responsibility for error being the truer measure of administrative accountability than the ability to find the guilty party (Finer, 1965; Gawthrope, 1993). It is more responsible, in this view, to recognize errors and move beyond them through modification of actions -- whatever the cause -- than to seek to retribution (White & McSwain, 1987).

An evolutionary ontology would add another level to Landau's view of the responsibility in acknowledging errors. The possibility exists that errors are not mistakes as much as meaningful "accidents" which present new potentialities which have not been apparent before (Aziz, 1990; Jung, 1973). In this way, errors may broaden the space in which creative thought can be generated and more broadly serve the evolutionary purposes of a democracy. Responsible action then would not simply be to correct errors but to explore the potentialities presented by their existence.

Reform, however, is as deeply rooted a political practice as passing the buck. The imperative for reform emerges from the cultural expectation that all error, or perceived failure, must be fixed as quickly as possible by a reorganization or a reform based on what appears to be missing or incomplete from

the blueprint design that has been imagined (Seidman & Gilmour, 1986). Yet, administrators seek the final repair of a systemic machine which is still in the process of its own creation. This cultural fixation with the maintenance of a static environment is manifested in the now conventional understanding of the act of being guilty, especially as it relates to democratic accountability and the nature and purpose of social relationships.

On Guilt and Responsibility

"One who acts always becomes guilty," Goethe said. Heidigger explains this potentiality by stating that "actualizing a single possibility, at one stroke kills all the others among which to choose...every commitment entails a number of defaults.(Arendt,p 125). Asterion, the Minotaur in poet Luis Jorges Borges, metaphor of the Labyrinth, for example, was aware of this risk of acting in an inner-connected world -- that one could never make a clean cut between right and wrong because one could never be sure of cause. But the issue for Asterion was not one of the guilt or innocence of his actions. His saw his only real choice to be whether he was engaged or not as a participant in creation (Borges, 1978; Wheelock, 1989). No errors existed in Asterion's relational universe, only new thought which occurred only in the absence of rational intent. In other

words creativity usually happened by accident.

The idea of guilt or innocence in a complex world is paradoxical. Not making a choice, as Martin Buber would understand it, carries with it as much guilt as making one because one has denied the creative potentiality of the choices one *could* have made, in the same way other choices are eliminated by action (Buber, 1970). Yet, to assign guilt, for either action or inaction, is to say that the processes by which the world renews itself have stopped at some artificial and historical point so that we might have a stable reference from which to assign blame and recreate events in some certain way. It is as if to say that in 1945 or 1822 or even five minutes ago the world simply died and is now only a replica of itself as it existed at the moment of its death. In reality, the processes which may have created the error in the first place cannot be replicated because the chaotic dynamics of a complex system have long since intermingled to obscure the original cause. This understanding, however, is only possible if "cause" is seen as something which is shared by multiple aspects of the universal system, not simply the rationally monitored behavior of an individual (Jantsch, 1979).

It does not necessarily follow, however, that in the absence of universal guilt, there is universal innocence. To assume universal innocence is to deny what is essentially human -- the ability, as aware beings, to participate in the

active creation of the universe. As Asterion understands, existence in a relational world carries with it a kind of implied responsibility to submit to the chaos of uncertainty and act, for it is in the uncertainty that the potentialities for creative thought exist. The guilt or innocence of such a submission to the creative process is not at issue. At one level of meaning it is simply impossible -- and thereby irrelevant -- in the complex intercedings of a completely related universe to unravel an original cause or be so certain of one's method that error is eliminated. Yet, perhaps the more relevant point here is that any attempt to reduce the universe to an error-free maze is really an immoral act because of the potentialities for human thought such action eliminates (Prigonine & Stengers, 1984).

The obvious no-win dilemma of this ontological understanding, however, is not half as frightening if the purpose of human action and thought is understood as being in alignment with that of nature itself -- in particular the creative evolutionary drive of its physics. But if, instead, the purpose of human action is to be secure and always be right, this sense of universal physics is simply overwhelming in its prospects. Ironically, however, it is this broader ontological understanding which offers the best hope for actually achieving a peaceful, secure co-existence among diverse beings in a naturally complex world.

Anaximander, who was among the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, defined the existence of being conscious as having an awareness of difference -- the ability to discern opposites, like hot and cold, in a universe which was otherwise unified (Hatub, 1990; Frankel, 1975, p. 262-263). This consciousness, however, was not necessarily an evolution to a higher state of being but instead was simply a differentiation from other already existing states. Further, this differentiation derived from and remained in relationship with the unified natural world and would ultimately, through death, return to it (Hatub; Frankel). The guilt of being able to recognize opposites is that the need for choice implicit in that ability always means the elimination of other potentialities in the universe. How the individual resolved this dilemma was to recognize that personal act ion occurred within a larger inter-related system to which the individual is responsible (Frankel).

The responsible use of individual consciousness was a measure of what was put back into the system as a whole at the time of death (Frankel). In this way, the new consciousness of human beings contributed -- in a purposeful way -- to the overall balance and renewal of the natural world (Hatub). Specifically, one meaningfully engaged in conflict contributed

to a balancing of opposites. Since the opposites emerged from a unified form, their regulation -- so that one did not dominate the other --helped perpetuate the life process. Justice for example, in Anaximander's view, was less an instrumental application of common law, as a harmonization of opposites through the process of conflict (Hatub, Hicks). This new consciousness further served the basic life process by developing new iterations from the original unified form which enriched and renewed the process. The choices of a responsible person, then, were simply the ones which served the purposes of universal renewal.

In other words, as evolutionary theorist Erich Jantsch describes it, morality is a manifestation of consciousness (1979). In Anaximander's view, at the time of negation of consciousness -- at death -- the individual enriched the basic evolutionary process from which he or she emerged by what he or she had become. The quest for personal development was not a selfish act which one committed against the social order, but a responsibility one assumed on behalf of the larger order of which society was a part (Hatub, Frankel, Hicks).

More recently, Sir Geoffrey Vickers has said that the acceptance of ethical responsibility implies a creative ***participation*** in the design of the world. This idea is challenges to the predominant American notion of ethics as the exercise of individualized rights. Vickers views rights as

static and defensive structure-oriented concepts (Vickers, 1970, 1973). Because they are static, rights then impede the evolutionary flow of human activity or as Eric Jantsch says:

> ***What is the Western World we call ethics is a behavioural code at the social level which is primarily geared to ensure the free unfoldment of the individual. This is the reason why there is so much talk of rights, of basic human rights as well as rights of particular groups, minorities, priveledged and unpriveledged people -- and almost never of responsibility (1978, p 265).***

Jantsch's point is that in a world composed of multi-levels of evolutionary reality such individualistic ethics is no ethics at all. Morality, Jantsch says, is the ***direct experience*** of an ethics inherent in the dynamics of evolution. Such a morality includes the acceptance of the main principles of evolution, according to Janstch, such as openness, non-equilibrium, the positive role of fluctuations, engagement and non-attachment to static states of thought (p 265). These principles were evident in Anaximander's philosophy which required the individual to remain open to the world. Indeed, the feeling of guilt allowed the individual to connect in an emotional way to the broader universe if the individual remained in tune with it.

Anaximander's issue of self-responsibility to the whole --or ***evolutionary ethics*** as Jantsch calls it now -- as an answer to the guilt implicit in choice-making -- was echoed by the ancient Greek poet Solon. Solon, however, was concerned

most with the effects of greed on the balance of things.[1] The ability of the universe to regenerate was not assisted by the accumulation of money but instead required the steady and purposeful engagement of the individual in developmental creation as it existed in earthly reality. That is to say, that "men" could not pass off the responsibility of their consciousness to the gods and spend their time pursuing money and security alone (Woodhouse). It is people, then, and not gods who must exercise their consciousness responsibly; that to make a fortune meant more than the accumulation of wealth, but instead was the personal stewardship of one's life in a relational world.

> ***Equally rich is the man who has gold and silver aplenty, acres of golden wheat ripening in the rich plain. horses and oxen; and he who counts as his only possessions something to eat; clothing for his back, and hoes for his feet, joy when season comes, in beauty of youth or of maiden, pleasures in which our youth may takes it delight. This is true wealth for a man; whoever has more to his portion leaves all the surplus behind when he does down to the shades. No man buys himself from death or painful diseases, and a bribe will not turn back age in its silent approach (Frankel, p. 230).***

For both Anaximander and Solon, the feeling of guilt was synonymous with a positive personal responsibility for

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[1] Solon was known as Solon The Liberator because he instituted laws which simply relieved people of their financial debts. He was concerned with addressing the "heart" of the problem of the liberation of the human spirit. He felt that simply trying to change the behavior of the debtor missed the point (Woodhouse, 1965).

furthering the creative regeneration of the universe, not in the felt need for negative retribution merely at the social level (Frankel, p. 230). The guilty act of consciousness had already been committed at birth, in their view, what was left was to have the consciousness serve the purposes of the evolutionary process from which it emerged. Indeed, the fact of consciousness would seem to make the denial of it a failure to take responsibility for its development.

Blame then does not seem to serve the purposes of evolution as much as forgiveness does in this understanding. Blame seeks certainty and finitude and thereby is the ***strategic*** and intentional elimination of potentialities (Sullivan, 1982). The recognition of an emerging self-consciousness in Pre-Platonic, shaministic, thinking did not assume that the purpose of consciousness was to eliminate all potentialities except those which fit a predictable mental model for perfection as modern decision-making practices do. Instead the elimination of potential was seen an unavoidable result of choice-making, but one for which the individual was still responsible. The problem of eliminating potentialities always remained as a regulating tension in the choice-making of the responsible person (Woodhouse).

Forgiveness, unlike blame, recognizes that doubt and uncertainty are the components of responsible choice-making which carries with it the burden of remaining open to as many

potentialities as possible. Forgiveness -- unlike blame -- brings social interaction to a resting point from which creative evolution can continue rather than turning social action inward away from the potentialities that still exist for creation (Soelle, 1984; Tavuchis, 1991). In this way, forgiveness allows the creative point at which error occurs to be developmental rather than essentially meaningless and regressive (McSwain and White, 1987).

Guilt, Redemption, Error and Social Space

Hannah Arendt's response to Heidegger's proclamation of universal guilt is helpful in framing the issue here. "If everyone is guilty, then no one is guilty...all are innocent?" (Arendt, 1981, p. 11). In an evolutionary ontology, as Anaximander likely would understand it, the human condition is not really one of either innocence or guilt, but of ***responsibility and relationship.*** Perhaps a condition of universal innocence allows for positive evolutionary movement because it does not create defensive relationships among people, who would otherwise need to construct immobile defenses against blame. But universal innocence also implies that human beings are simply the passive recipients of whatever befalls them with no responsibility to act or to consider the impact of their actions. As Solon said, to be conscious implies a

responsibility for the nature of that consciousness (Frankel, Woodhouse). But it is a different -- and perhaps more profoundly difficult responsibility -- than the assumption of causal guilt or the perfect assignation of blame. It requires a responsible attitude towards a relational world. One cannot pass the buck because it will only come back. Further, when it returns it will have strengthened the error it sought to avoid -- rather than moving beyond it (von Franz, 1987).

But also, the inappropriate assumption of guilt, which compels an individual to over-correct for perceived mistakes, is equally as damaging to the evolutionary process. In a state of hyper-consciousness the individual is essentially adapting all behavior to what was done "wrong" to avoid the feeling of guilt so that all future behavior is a variation on a distortion rather than any new evolutionary movement. In a relational view of the world, admitting one's mistakes, but not admitting that one cannot always correct them in accordance to a pre-conceived and static mental model, is a failure to recognize that not everything happens because of individual rational intent, but instead may be the result of a broader field of interactions of which the

individual is not aware.[2] Further, a negative relationship with the error --that it must be simply corrected rather than engaged -- is not always productive. The error can serve as a point of reflection which broadens the ***space*** [3] for thought to occur. It does not always signal that something has been done wrong, more than it may signal that there is simply more to be known. An error -- especially one accompanied by a feeling of guilt -- might thus be seen as a chaos-producing event -- one which stops thought from prematurely settling into a pattern and which thereby allows for the development of the individual or the agency (von Franz, Edinger, 1973) This idea is illustrated by the Native American view of redemption as George Tinker expresses it:

> ***We (Native Americans) understand repentance as a call to be liberated from our perceived need to be God and instead to assume our rightful place in the world as humble human beings in the circle of creation with all the other created (Tinker, 1992, p. 16-17).***

Repentance, in this understanding, does not come as much in the correction of error but in the recognition that in a relational world the essence of being human -- as opposed to God-like -- is to make mistakes. The greatest

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[2] As Dorothee Soelle says " To learn to suffer without being a martyr means to live conscious of our oneness with the whole of life," (1990 p. 140).

[3] The terms space and social space in this text refer to the sense of connectedness to a broader field of thought and action than that suggested by the parameters of the perceived problem or error. Space is increased by developing a sense of Others.

guilt comes from assuming that we know everything, not in the mistakes themselves. Further, the assumption of certainty denies that Others exist in the same social space. For certainty to remain certain the efficacy of Others to act independently must be put into question or even openly repressed (Schoomkler, 1988). Errors, if properly addressed, allow room for other possibilities which both accommodate Others and give access to a broader range of nuance data from which creative thought can emerge.

The act of being guilty is really a ***process*** by which we come to recognize our errors as they present themselves to us -- often as troubling, annoying, frustrating, painful, embarrassing, signals that more is going on in existence then we can imagine at the moment. Errors can be approached as a threat to certainty and security and abolished, or they can be considered for what they mean to the development of the individual, agency or thought in process of creation (McSwain & White, 1987).

The old ethical dilemma which asks the question: "If a known-murderer stops you in an alley and wants to know if your friend was at home, would you tell him?" is illustrative here. The modern individual is likely to say: "Of course not", or "I'd tell him my friend was not at home or went somewhere else." In a finite world where everything happens in a linear, intended way -- where the activity can

be narrowed to the superficial space between the murderer and the rational individual -- that may well be the ethical response, if one's purpose is to protect the friend from danger. In a relational world, the situation becomes more complicated. By so informing the murderer, an individual may be closing out other existing possibilities which would protect the friend more -- the implication being that more may be happening in the situation than we can consciously discern from the basis of modern rationality (what Solon and Socrates would call "unseen measures.") (Arendt,1981, p. 164-167). A lie, in fact, may so distort the inter-related contingencies of the situation as to increase the chances that the murderer will find the friend. The ethical stance in a relational world would be -- at a minimum -- to be aware that other potentialities exist and not act arbitrarily, while recognizing the need to act even when one can never be sure that the action will produce the effect intended.

The most difficult thing for the rationalized being, however, is to recognize one's relationship to the murderer. That is, by trying to figure out the "right thing to do," one must consider that the murderer exists in the same ***relational space*** as the friend. This implies that one must consider the impact of the actions one takes on the ***entire space*** of human existence, not just that space in which the

perceived danger to the friend seems to occur. Lying to the murderer may impact the larger community in ways which are difficult to imagine but which nonetheless exist.

The dilemma is that one cannot act simply to escape the potential of guilt for contributing to the demise of a friend -- that is an ***anticipated contingency*** cannot dictate the action to be taken. This is so because action based on an anticipated contingency narrows potentialities immediately to those which would serve the imperatives of the contingency. That is to say, that intentionality is divorced from its evolutionary purposes and made strategic and therefore immoral. Instead, the responsible individual must engage the moment and its expanse of potentialities. In that engagement, the individual can bring to bear history, collective memory, and a sense of the immediate circumstances to create a new response in the moment (Briggs, 1988).

Further, one cannot necessarily assume personal guilt which requires redemption if the murderer succeeds in his quest because one cannot assume that, because of a lack of perfect knowledge, one is to blame. What one can do, however, is grieve and console those who grieve for the loss of the murdered friend or be joyful in the friend's escape and wonder at one's part in the turn of events.

But this difference in the understanding of guilt is

dependent on an ontological view of the world in which human beings are still part of nature and still participating in creation. In this view, one must question both the belief that any one person can make anything certain and also the belief that desiring such certitude is at all appropriate in a relational world. This view also requires the assumption of positive personal responsibility, as a conscious human being, for the processes of creation shared with the rest of the universe. It is this ability to actively ***wonder*** about and engage the world -- without organizing it prematurely into rational thought -- that may be the essence of innocence, not passive inaction or irresponsibility for one's own conscious development. Being part of the natural world requires a sense of self-responsibility, but one which clearly exceeds our ability to correct errors in rational judgment. It requires a broader sense of the social space within which human activity occurs. As Tinker says:

> ***If I imagine myself as a vital part of a community, indeed as a part of many communities, it becomes more difficult for me to act in ways that are destructive of these communities. The desire or perceived necessity for exerting social, political, economic or spiritual control over each other gives way to mutual respect, not just for individuals, but for our culturally distinct communities (1992, p. 17).***

The point is made also by philosopher Alvaro Vieira Pinto

who describes consciousness as a method for reaching the outer world, rather than as a tool for limiting its impact:

> ***The method is, in fact, the external form of consciousness manifest in acts, which takes on the fundamental property of consciousness-its intentionality. The essence of consciousness is being with the world, and this behavior is permanent and unavoidable. Accordingly, consciousness is in essence a 'way towards' something apart from itself, outside itself, which surrounds to and which it apprehends by means of its ideational capacity. Consciousness is thus by definition a method, in the most general sense of the word (Friere, 1974, p. 56).***

The kind of intentionality of which Pinto speaks is the state most denied by the view of guilt as purely reactive behavior to a pre-conceived consequence. The essence of being conscious is having a direct connection to the world -- not a only to mental constructs and anticipated outcomes. ***Guilt, like other emotions, may be viewed as a communicative link between the individual and the larger existence.*** Pinto helps to further illustrate this point with the idea of ***limit-situations*** -- those places in which we encounter error or blockage. Limit situations, in his view, are not "the impassable boundaries where possibilities end, but the real boundaries where all possibilities begin,"; they are not "the frontier which separates being from nothingness, but the frontier which separates being from being more."(p. 284).

Tinker and Pinto express what is perhaps the point exactly of an evolutionary ontology -- that in a relational world our responsibilities are antithetical to the purposes

of blame; that we must accept responsibility for our actions by intentionally looking for the new potentialities presented by error, while also accepting that in a universe still in process, moral actions are never complete or without error. But it is a point which is difficult to make in our society of "finger-pointers and cry-babies," as Lance Morrows terms us:

> ***The busybody and the crybaby are getting to be the most conspicuous children on the American playground. The busybody is the bully with the ayatollah shone in his eyes, gauleiter of correctness, who barges around telling the other kids they cannot smoke, be fat, drink booze, wear furs, eat meat or otherwise nonconform to the new tribal rules now taking shape. The crybaby, on the other hand, is the abject, manipulative little devil with the lawyer and, so to speak, the actionable diaper rash. He is a mayor in Washington, arrested (and captured on video-tape) as he smokes crack in a hotel room with a woman not his wife. He pronounces himself a victim of the woman, of white injustice, of the universe. Whatever.*** (Morrow, 1991, p. 1).

It seems trivial for us to be wasting our creative abilities on the likes of Morrow's sandbox squabbles. However, these negative social interactions are the logical conclusion of the Cartesian world of plain geometry...lifeless and un-related bodies colliding for no purpose other than renegotiating limited space and resources (Collins, 1985). The mechanical view of emotions, which derives from Cartesian thought, profoundly effects our cultural disposition towards guilt and social responsibility. As an emotion, guilt is made functional to

rationality and thereby looses its potential to generate new, developmental thought. Both Freud and Nieztche, for example, explained the feeling of guilt as a kind of mechanical, "morbid inwardness," one which occurs largely as a knee-jerk reaction to the fear of punishment (Westphal, 1984, pp. 69-89). B. F. Skinner called this Darwinian survival imperative ***evolution by consequence (Skinner, 1981).*** In this view, human change does not occur by any process of higher reason which might assign a meaning to self-conscious human behavior, but instead limits its potential to what can be bargained in the presence of punishment or reward. Guilt, as the response to a consequence, is a regressive emotion, one which leads the person inward to some fault for which he or she accepts the need for punishment rather than outward to the broader whole as Pinto would understand it. Once the need for punishment is accepted the individual must correct the fault if his or her self-esteem is to remain in tact (Westphal). Guilt is reduced to a form of social control in this respect as rewards and punishments are meted out as an appeal to the individual's desire to avoid punishment.

Freud, for example, associates guilt with both fear of punishment and with aggression. Freudian guilt is simply the inward turning of outward aggression (Westphal). As with most instrumental reasoning, Freud thought does not take

into account the active self-consciousness which Anaximander would have said created the guilt in the first place. Without the intentional self-consciousness, guilt is simply an un-reflexive *reaction* to the threat of punishment. As such, it precludes the sense of responsible relationship to Others in the sense that Anaximander would have understood it. Instead, the fear of punishment creates a defensive reaction to the Other; one meant to reduce potentialities by re-establishing the view one holds of himself as a point of equilibrium (Fromm, 1966). It is a model for human relationship which has been institutionalized in American public schools.

Behaviorism and Functional Guilt

American public schools enthusiastically embraced behaviorism in the 1960's as a way to regain control of the classroom and work on student self-esteem. The typical behavior-modification program in public schools is to incrementally reward students for completed work and in particular for "good" behavior--that which is in conformity to minimal rules of conduct in the classroom. Students who do not conform, in particular those who are disruptive, are punished, usually by a denial of privilege. The final increment in the punishment schedule is most often separation from the group, or in some cases a requirement of

having the "bad" student watch other students receive their rewards for right behavior (Narr, 1984; Senge,1992; Souza,1991; Trusty,1971).

A basic tenet of humanistic behavior modification is to separate the behavior from the student, so that it is, ostensibility at least, the behavior that is being addressed, not the student's sense of self. The rationale is that there are no "good" or "bad" children only good or bad behavior (Trusty). This is essentially an extension of the instrumental view of human emotions -- that they are functional, predictable and controllable "parts" of the larger machine which can be fixed or replaced, like changing batteries.

Behavioral management is meant to regulate student behavior within a narrow range of alternative possibilities for the immediate and narrow purpose of gaining and maintaining control in the classroom. Further, it somewhat naively assumes that in addressing the behavior of the student, teachers are also building character -- despite the behavioralist belief that behavior exists somehow separate from a person. That is to say, that character is simply built by modifying those aspects of a students behavior which are deviant so that they fit the established minimal norms of conduct. Character-development then is simply a matter of correcting error in relation to a monistic model

as a means of producing an ideal, albeit, passive citizen. But behaviorism is not really about character-development. It is about control.

Control appears to be necessary so that the teacher is able to convey a certain quantity of "knowledge" to the students within a given time frame. It is assumed that knowledge is not necessarily created in the interaction between students and teacher but exists only in the data which is conveyed (Gilligan, 1982). Behaviorism is designed to minimize conflict which would interfere with this goal achievement by removing the struggle that would normally occur between a teacher and a student in the process of relationship building. Instead, the teacher-student relationship is mediated by the presence of rewards and punishments. By maintaining control, the teacher can insure that she is accountable for the efficient distribution of learning. The teacher's role, then, appears to be to regulate a certain level of guilt in the students, which is then used to mold appropriate behavior. The student's ability to be reflexive is then limited to the ability to anticipate consequences.

Further, because direct relationship-building is discouraged, students are taught to view authority as merely the distributing agent for rewards and punishments. Students are also encouraged to adapt to only minimal norms of

behavior which may require added incentives to maintain as they grow older. Those who defend such training say that over time right behavior becomes a habit with the student (Skinner, 1979, 1987).

It is perhaps most ironic that behaviorism, or social marketing, is used to train students about the evils of drugs habits or addiction. Students are often rewarded for their participation in these programs with t-shirts, pencils, hats, and other incentives. It would seem that this perpetuates the kind of passivity, dependency and lack of a sense of personal efficacy which experts say fosters drug use in the first place.

In an absence of a more positive relationship with authority than that fostered by behavioralism, however, it is really no wonder that "cry-babies" and "finger-pointers" appear to be the norm. It is an emerging tenet of our culture that self-esteem, as the modern corollary for character, comes, not from the engagement of our more difficult emotions, such as guilt, in a developmental struggle with Others, but in avoiding guilt or fixing it by immediate rewards for right behavior (Skinner), 1981). It is like the television commercial where the teenager is talking to herself and builds herself into a kind of fury because she can't find her favorite cereal "I gotta have my Pops!!," she shouts. About the time it appears that the

teenager is going to scream at the small child she is baby-sitting for presumably hiding the cereal -- or even do him violence -- the coveted box comes to view and the teenager responds to the child in a gentle and endearing voice. The commercial leaves the viewer wondering what the teenager would have done to the child if the box hadn't appeared to ease the tension. The teenager's behavior in relation to the other child appears to be totally mediated by the reward she is seeking.

In the commercial, the child is only a medium through which the girl expresses her frustration...and therefore very vulnerable. But the commercial appears to suggest that it is actually the reward which saves the child by modifying the girls' potentially violent behavior, not any regulating character trait of the teenager herself. Neither the small child or the teenager are actually engaged as self-conscious individuals in the scenario. Both the girl and the child appear as victims whose plight is mediated entirely by the presence or absence of a box of cereal.

The child appears to be the only one who is really guilty having, potentially, hidden the box; not the girl for being so greedy she threatens the well-being of the child. The guilt is relieved, however, and the child is saved as the narcissistic teenager finds what she so desperately "needs."

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the behavioralist approach to education, however, is that by "functionalizing" guilt in an environment that discourages interactive relationship, the student is encouraged -- indeed trained -- to manipulate the system in order to maintain a positive self-image of himself/herself as he/she exists in relation to the reward system, not in relationship to Others. This phenomenon is manifested in a kind of social narcissism, as Erich Fromm would describe it. The growing self-importance of individualized interests in the political arena who relate to the outer world only through the importance of their own ideology represents this social necrophilia as Fromm would further describe it -- the obsessive relationship with static thought rather than the engagement of the live world (Fromm, pp. 64-84).

The politics of interest group liberalism and political correctness -- which have generated a growing divisiveness among citizens and government -- display the characteristics of narcissistic behavior (Lowi, 1978; Will; 1983). Wounded narcissism -- the damaging of the self-image of an individual or group -- often results, according to Fromm, in an explosive rage generated by criticism. Alternatively, it can result in a depression and morbidness that precludes action as the narcissistic individual encounters a view of himself/herself which doesn't fit the person's established

image.

The key point here, however, is that the response to an event which begins to distort the group's view of itself is not treated as a developmental point but instead the narcissism drives the group to do whatever it takes to repair the old self-image. As Fromm says:

> *Group narcissism needs satisfaction just as individual narcissism does. On one level this satisfaction is provided by the common ideology of the superiority of one's group, and the inferiority of others...If the narcissism of a group is wounded, then we find the same reaction of rage which we have discussed in connection with individual narcissism There are many historical examples for the fact that the disparagement of the symbols of group narcissism has often produced rage verging on insanity. Violation of the flag; insults against one's own God, emperor, leader, the loss of a war and of territory--these have often led to violent mass feelings of vengeance. The wounded narcissism can be healed only if the offender is crushed and the insult to one's narcissism is undone. Revenge, individual and national, is often based on wounded narcissism and the need to "cure" the wound by the annihilation of the offender (pp. 85-87).*

This *functional guilt* then does not serve to expand the space within which public dialogue can occur, but instead serves as a weapon by which the narcissistic group or individual reaffirms an old reality. Functional guilt is expressed in conflict as repressed anger and the need for retribution against the Other rather than as the beginning point of an expanded dialogue (Fromm, p 86).

In the current social setting outward aggression is often understood as repressed anger about something which

has been left undone by Other's. The corollary is that the anger and aggression is also indicative of some guilt or punishment which the individual is seeking to avoid. The social space which is defined by functional guilt then is defensive, divisive and blame-seeking, not relational. Indeed, the tangle of negative social relationships created by functional guilt has a devastating effect on our ability to affect social change.

Sociologist Paulo Friere, for example, says that those we want to help in society are also those to which we assign the blame for their condition. The need to maintain an untarnished view of the efficacy and supremacy of the free market system, he says, requires government, for example, to view as inadequate all those who have not successfully maneuvered the market in the manner of those who have been successful. The threat to the image of capitalism is addressed by seeking ways to encourage and help oppressed individuals in society adapt to the system -- the same competitive system which produced the oppression in the first place. In this way, Friere says, the dominant class maintains its self-image by expressing this prescriptive "generosity" as the reaction to guilt. The prescription itself assigns a kind of guilty-inadequacy to indqividuals who have failed to meet its requirements. As Friere says:

One of the basic elements of the relationship between

> *oppressor and oppressed is prescription. Every prescription represents the imposition of one man's choice upon another, transforming the consciousness of the man prescribed to into one that conforms with the prescriber's consciousness. Thus, the behavior of the oppressed is prescribed behavior, following, as it does the guidelines of the oppressor (p. 31).*

Class struggle then is not really the generation of a new order through creative conflict, in this view, as much as a reaffirmation of the formula for Capitalism -- a reaffirmation which is dependent on the assumption of guilt by those segments of the population who have not met its imperatives as a way to relieve the guilt of those who have.

The guilty cycle is only broken if guilt itself is allowed to be more than merely a functional tool for effecting social generosity as a means of maintaining existing power arrangements. Instead, guilt should be the process by which our responsibility and relationship with those who are oppressed is recognized. In this expansion a generative dialogue occurs from which new scenarios are created which reconfigure old patterns of power. As Friere says:

> *In the process of oppression, the elites subsist on the "living dead" of the oppressed and find their authentication in the vertical relationship between themselves and the latter.; in the revolutionary process there is only one way for the emerging leaders to achieve authenticity; they must "die," in order to be reborn through and with the oppressed (p. 27).*

What Friere suggests, as well as other liberation theorists like Rudolf Bahro and Dorothee Soelle, is that social change can't come if the conscience, which is awakened by guilt, is used simply to reaffirm existing realities. If it is, then it is a false consciousness, one which seeks to perpetuate oppression while easing the pain of guilt with false generosity (Friere, Soelle, 1984, Rorty, 1989.) Guilt, in the presence of those in need, should, instead, be an awakening in which the individual, or government, recognizes its intrinsic human relationship with the poor. We must see them as our own. Indeed change cannot occur without an authentic engagement of those who seem to be outside the system and who therefore know a different social space than the market.

This seems to be a nearly impossible task, however, when our public dialogue increasingly is limited to the narrow, narcissistic space between whether action is "good for the economy or bad for the economy," without the nature of human relationships the economy fosters even being brought into question (Thurow, 1992). Public dialogue is burdened and distorted by the economic-behavioralist model to which it is tied. It appears that the only solution to social problems is to first discover what is lacking, in accordance with the economic model, in those who have not achieved economic stability and then correct the deficiency

by reinforcing right behavior as it exists in the self-image of the market. This view presents only the minimalist opportunity for the perpetuation of the inadequacies of the system which, in turn, perpetuate the perceived inadequacies of the individual.

Our collective sense of guilt in regard to the homeless, for example, should require us to embrace those individuals for what we can learn from their suffering, not prescribe to what we see as their defects (Soelle, 1984). Our inability to do so has created an unproductive dichotomy in citizenship which is hard to enliven. On the one hand, as Dorothee Soelle says, are those who do not suffer who must blame others for their failure to "make-it" if the non-suffering reality is to be kept in tact. "Exploitation needs a certain amount of apathy to run its course smoothly", Soelle says (1984, p. 128). On the other hand exists the alienation of those who must accept the blame as the "designated sufferers"-- as Scott Peck would call them (Peck, 1978).Those Soelle says who can't "fix" the system for which they must assume the guilt and therefore feel perpetually inadequate and negatively distinct from the larger population (Soelle, 1984).

Yet, the task of ***managing life*** -- as it is defined in American economic terms --rather than living it, requires just this ability to assign blame in a disengaged struggle

to maintain power. Our efforts at generating new solutions to social problems are minimized by the false and unauthentic nature of the economic dialogue which occurs around social problems.

Suffering

However, guilt (and its modern corollary fear), as it has come to manifest itself as the most telling American character trait, is more complex than simply placing blame for perceived wrong-doing. The United States has become a nation of victims, afraid to act, in any other way than along certain paths of legal righteousness (Rohr, 1978). We express continual and unrelenting disappointment in the perceived failure of almost anything and anyone to meet our expectations of perfection. This manifestation of an emerging American character was displayed most graphically during the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in the summer of 1992. The search for who to blame for the pain and suffering began even before the hurricane had made its last pass through Louisiana. The cacophony of reports of wrong-doing by government agencies -- in particular FEMA -- and their failure to act in sufficient haste was only exceeded by the testimony of hundreds of hurricane victims that they deserved more then what they were getting from government in the wake of the disaster. There were more than subtle

implications that the government had failed to adequately predict the hurricane, and some hint that it may have caused the disaster outright (Newsweek, 1992).

It has simply become impossible for government to respond on the basis of simple need and compassion even to an event like a hurricane which has never been under the control of the rational mind. In our current culture, government must first respond to the failure of "someone" for allowing it to happen at all, so that the suffering is intensified. But it is more than the added anguish created by defensive relationships among people who are already experiencing despair and grief which is the problem here. It is that the potentialities of the *act* of suffering -- like the potential of guilt -- is reduced and made negative. The individual grief of those who lost their homes and experienced the frightening force of the hurricane is made essentially meaningless, because by modern, liberal accounts, it should not have happened at all.

Grief, then, is really only appropriately expressed as anger in a society which generally believes that the world can be made free of suffering. To feel grief would mean that one must accept what had happened as being out of the control of anyone. As Dorothee Soelle has explained it:

> *If Capitalism tries to make people believe that all affliction they encounter is their personal concern, is their tough luck to be endured by them, things are no*

> *different with a socialism that asserts the opposite. The concrete powerlessness then is left to those who today suffer wrongly in a distorted society. The expressions "to abolish" takes suffering, which is an activity, an experience that people are involved in, and makes it a marketable commodity that one can acquire and get rid of (1984, p. 105).*

However, it is the treatment of the act of suffering which seems most to fuel the kind of banal malaise described by Lance Morrow. The sense that the world is infinitely "rearrangeable," makes it appear possible, and even desirable, for a suffering-free utopia to exist. Further, that experts with access to certain and immutable knowledge can create utopia for us, and more, protect us from the suffering inherent in a complex world. Indeed, it seems to be assumed that the reduction of human potential is a fair trade-off for the achievement of certainty.

A world free of suffering is largely unachievable. With our best intentions to eradicate it, we often increase suffering and in turn have produced a gridlocked society which vacillates between a kind of apathetic "let them eat cake" arrogance and an ineffectual and guilt-ridden social conscience (Soelle, 1984, 1990). Such gridlock comes in the rationalizing of our inter-relational and moral emotions such as those connected with the processes of guilt and suffering. As such, anger has become our best and most respected emotion. *The Etiology of Functional Social Guilt*

To summarize, the etiology of functional social guilt is broken down in this manner:

1. A minimalist sense of social space.

a. that some things in the universe are not related to other things.

b. that responsibility is responsibility for a narcissistic "self" as it exists separate from Others not as it exists in relationship.

c. that emotions are merely functional tools for social control and not communicative links to the broader reality.

2. The perceived imperative for certainty

a. that all actions can be reduced to their effects within a controlled sphere of activity

b. that the rational mind can create and thereby control all phenomenon

c. that equilibrium, as a static and definable social space is a desirable state

A Minimalist Sense of Social Space

The history of public administration theory as it has proceeded from a mechanistic line of reasoning has been one in which the idea of social space is narrowed in attempts to control for the contingencies apparent in a broader realm of reality. Social space is used to describe the field in which evolutionary relationships and dialogue can move. Social space is a felt sense of relationship and potentiality.

However, the so-called real world of social space has

come to exist only as it has been created by the social contract. By contract, individuals have agreed to see the social world as distinct from nature -- indeed that society exists only as a negative and adaptive reaction to the chaotic turbulence of the natural world (Hobbes, 1958; Pippen, 1991). Further, that the mechanistic parts of the social world can be divided into clear functions which serve the needs of the artificial society. Love belongs in the family; authority serves the purposes of protection and regulation; the organization serves to rationalize, civilize and direct citizens in the pursuit of organizational goals (Taylor, 1989). The reference point is always a reductive one -- how any new contingencies in the "out-there" relate to the conceived social model which exists within an individualized mental framework. Guilt is the ballast by which the individual and the society maintains its equilibrated self-image in accordance with the framework. Social space then is not simply narrow, it is narrowing as survival battles intensify and recreate old patterns of social behavior.

Social interactions have the flavor of business arrangements, subtle negotiations which make secure our conceptions of the world. Particularly in the more technological efforts to make the world secure from uncertainty in both knowledge or human relations -- like

computer-information systems and nuclear bombs -- humans have made themselves vulnerable to a dependence on homogeneity to survive in a world which in naturally diverse.

Soelle says that, for example, the idea of peace has been badly confused with the idea of security, for example:

> ***The illusion of bourgeois concepts of security lie, I think, in the expectation that peace can come from business dealings, from rational agreement. Behind this idea lies a rationalistic optimism that flies in the face of the genuine despair of peoples subjected to the ideology of security. ...it (peace) doesn't happen without risk. Life that excludes and protects itself against death protects itself to death. if the "window of vulnerability, " as it is called in military language, is finally closed and walled up, the supposedly secure people inside the fortresses will die for lack of light and air. Only life that opens itself to the other, life that risks being wounded or killed, contains promise. Those who arm themselves are not only killers, they are already dead (1990, p. 7).***

The vulnerability that Soelle speaks of comes in a submission to relationship with other people -- in a reaching out, rather than a closing off. It is a vulnerability which allows a dialogue with the only other beings in our world which share our consciousness.

Vulnerability, however, involves taking social risks and participating in a broader sense of social space. Soelle tells of a trip to North Viet Nam during the Viet Nam War, for example. It was at the end of the Lyndon Johnson era when 400 transmitter radios -- which only received the Voice

of America -- were air dropped as free-market bribes for fishermen who were asked to disavow Ho Chi Minh. The fishermen smashed the radios and threw them away. The act, Soelle says, was a reaffirmation of a belief in purposeful suffering as the way in which succeeding generations participated in the evolutionary processes begun by their ancestors. The teaching of Ho Chi Minh that "Nothing is so precious as freedom and independence" meant something to the fisherman who seized the moment, in a risky defiance of power, to reaffirm their cultural solidarity in the evolutionary movement towards liberation -- a movement that was centuries old. The teachings of Ho Chi Minh helped maintain a sense of extended cultural space in which suffering has always led the Vietnamese people to a change.

> ***Their(Vietnamese) connection with tradition preserves earlier suffering in the present suffering; earlier struggles in the present struggle...their common history is understood as a process of liberation. Suffering leads not to apathy and submission but rather to productivity. Hatred and pain are transformed...(1984, p 59).***

Implicit in Soelle's observations is a sense that social space is much broader than the conflict at the moment; that the moment ***contains*** the traces of tradition which brings meaning to the struggle. A similar situation existed at Wounded Knee during the civil war among the Plains Indians in the 1970's. The struggle between the traditionalists and the moderns was a struggle for identity

and freedom which was not entirely related to the government's attempts to keep the peace at that moment in time. A multi-million offer by the government to buy Indian lands in the Dakotas was turned down by moderns and traditionalists alike to the confusion of agency officials (Deloria, 1985). The issues of identity and struggle could not simply be solved in one easy step by a rational attempt at resource reallocation. The American Indians were working in a larger relational space then agency officials --one in which tradition (as expressed in the active relationship to the land) and an emerging tribal identity existed in a generative and positive relationship to the struggle in which they were engaged (Tinker).

The expansion of social space to allow for generative activity necessarily requires risk-taking and a different sense of time then moderns can normally endure. Our modern social conscience tells us that we must fix things which appear to be at odds with the prevailing model of a secure society at the moment. In our rational attempts at quick-fix the potentialities for social self-repair and regeneration are reduced. These potentialities exist only in the larger social space in which relationships between people can exist in a broader connection to tradition, culture and not-yet realized possibilities. By narrowing social space to what can be controlled and predicted we threaten the development

of the identity of those peoples which are "fixed" and also increase the chances of meaningless and undevelopmental suffering and violence. As such, passivity is encouraged as people are discouraged from actively engaging in a struggle for their own development.

The Imperative For Certainty: Pragmatism, Realism and Social Control

The idea of social space has been wrestled with by many authors in the course of this century. However, the dialogue is often limited by the initial presumption that the purposes of government are solely in the regulation of human behavior in accordance with pre-conceived goals and objectives, not in nurturing evolution.

For example, pragmatists like Herbert Mead and John Dewey declared that "Hobbes was passe," by the 1930's; that the idea that government was essentially despotic and imposed limits on social behavior was no longer strictly functional. Instead, Mead theorized government maintains its power and affects social control through a "dialogue" with others. The pragmatists thereby shifted the focus of the Cartesian "I" from its self-creation of the political world, so that the world was now a product of the conversation that takes place between the I and the Other. In this respect, social space was

expanded by the work of Dewey and Mead, who both rejected the idea that social control came only from natural and social conditions which pressure the "I" from every side (Dewey, 1920; 1927; Mead, 1925).

Mead maintained instead, for example, that social control varied with the "degree to which individuals in society are able to assume the attitudes of the others who are involved with them in common endeavor" (Mead, 1925, p. 291). Mead believed that the "problem" of a generalized other required a successful construction of a general perspective based on communication, and the *creation* of "a common object", which will control their common conduct (p. 292). Both social control and self-control, in this view, are developed around "an adequate social object." According to Mead, the problem of social control is

> *"is not that of becoming acquainted with the indefinite number of acts that are involved in social behavior, but that of so overcoming the distances in space and time, and the barriers of language and convention and social status, that we can converse with ourselves in the role of those who are involved with us in the common undertaking of life...Any self is a social self, but it is restricted to the group whose roles it assumes and it will never abandon this self until it finds itself entering into the larger society and maintaining itself there (p. 292).*

In Mead's view, the process of communication is one which is more universal than that even of universal religion or universal economic process. Communication serves them both. This is true because religion and the economy are specific

instances of cooperative activity, which, in general, "lie back of the process of discourse." Mead saw democratic government resting on this larger more universal attitude (Melossi, 1990).

Mead's advocacy of larger and larger "audiences" or "universes of discourse" also allowed for a critique of the narrower circles of practice and language in which the Self had previously been embedded. That is to say that the society came to regulate its own members from positions of multiple control which occurred in social interaction. The regulation was imbedded in commonly shared laws and rules which served as "guiding principles for action" (Melossi).

A corresponding development to the pragmatism which emerged in the 1930's and 1940's was the concept of "legal realism." Legal realism essentially divorced law from the idea of natural law instead created a "certain" law by which social control was more easily affected. As legal realist Jerome Frank explained certainty of the law: "it provided mature men with a defense against angst" (Melossi, p. 133). The certainty of the law, however, was not necessarily meant to create an ethical monism. It was still seen to be regulated by the more democratic controls from which it emerged. In the writings of John Dewey and Herbert Mead, for example, a distinction remained between social controls as the democratic ***products*** of interactions between members of society and social

control through law as a ***function*** of the public domain. As such there was still room for democratic dialogue, creative thought and "deviance" as Dario Melossi describes it -- a condition which was later blurred in Talcott Parson's influential work: ***The Social System***. The parameters of social guilt as a knee-jerk reaction to clear consequences were bounded in Parsons work as deviance became defined as: "non-rational factors and mechanisms in the more intimate microsocial processes of interaction." In other words whatever did not fall into the legal-rational framework of the perceived social structure exhibited in psycho-sociological norms, was irrational deviance. Parsons effected a marriage, then, between the "oneness of the normative system and the oneness of social rationality" that presided over it (Melossi, p. 137). As Melossi says:

> ***Dewey and Mead's world was still a world in which it was possible to conceive of "deviance" as the product of plural social controls. In Parsons' world, deviance was essentially the absence of social control (p. 138).***

Melossi further observes that Parson's monistic theory coincided with the rigid structuring of the American public which took place between the end of the New Deal and the 1950's. Those years, he says, were better served by Parsons's emphasis on cognitive and normative monism, than by risk-taking and democratic inspiration of pragmatism and legal realism.

It is the premise here, however, that Dewey and Mead's understanding of the existence of a broader social space and the ability of citizens to self-regulate became distorted because of the initial premises of social control and the perceived need for ultimate certainty still implicit in their work. In rejecting Descartesian "natural law" in favor of the "realistic" law which emerged from the interactions of the polity, Dewey and Mead did not, however, also reject the assumptions which Descartes and Hobbes made about human nature and human relationships.

By adapting to the imperative of social control Mead and Dewey seem to perpetuate the assumption that the purpose of human activity is simply to be secure and that individual behavior, although not entirely regulated by the state, can be regulated largely by historical consequence. For example Dewy says:

> *Individuals still do the thinking, desiring, proposing, but what they think of is the consequences of their behavior upon that of others and that of others upon themselves... What (man) believes, hopes for, aims at is the outcome of association and intercourse (Melossi, p. 122).*

Dewey displays another Descartesian tendency, that of considering the polity as a sum of its parts, rather than the interactive creation of social process it is understood to be here. For example, Dewey describes the state as a mediator of interests:

Those indirectly and seriously affected for good or for evil form a group distinctive enough to require recognition and a name. The name selected is The Public. This public is organized and made effective by means of representatives who as guardians of customs, as legislators, as executives, judges, etc. care for its especial interests by methods intended to regulate the conjoint actions of individuals and groups. Then and in so far, association adds to itself political organization, and something which may be government comes into beings: the public is the political state (p. 123).

The distinction between the ontology of the pragmatists and

an evolutionary ontology is a very subtle but profound one. Implicit is Dewey's description of how the polity is organized is the idea that it organizes itself. But it does so in a cumulative, rational way based on perceived needs, interests or consequences. Dewey and Mead are essentially rationalizing democracy for historical purposes. Pragmatism fit well the imperatives of the New Deal, for example, which needed to make a clear break from the "natural" regulation of Laizzae Faire economics.

Dewey's polity organizes in purely historical social space without what Roscoe Pound would say was a transcending "foundation." Without such a foundation Pound speculated any regime would become a mere "regime of force." That is to say that the polity would essentially be a power struggle (as indeed the legal realist Marx described it) among competing interests (Pound, 1940, p. 15). As Pound said:

Theories of what is have marked effect upon ideas of what

> *ought to be..It is a paradox, no doubt, but so it is; absolute ideas of justice have made for free government, and skeptical ideas of justice have gone with autocracy. Idealism puts something above the ruler or ruling body; something by which to judge them and by which they are held to rule...Skeptical realism puts nothing above the ruler or the ruling body (p. 15).*

It is the nature of that "foundation" which is of interest to a new ontology. The foundation, however, is not an explicit set of ethical rules, which Pound might seem to suggest, from which clear admonitions of guilt for wrong behavior can be dispensed. Instead, a regulating foundation is more the belief in a fundamental *purpose* for human action which exceeds the more historical mandate of evolution by consequence. This purpose is aligned with the unbounded process of evolution in an inter-related world and requires a foundational disposition towards the uncertainty and acceptance which are the basic requirements of a democracy.

oooooooooooo

One fine Sunday some of us stopped going to Mass, not because Catholic dogma seemed to us, all of a sudden, false, but because the people who went began to bore us and we were drawn to the company of those who stayed away...What characterized our revolt was the choice of comrades. Outside our village church stood the landless peasants. It was not their psychology we were drawn to; it was their plight.

Ignacio Silone
The Choice of Comrades

Chapter Four

Dialectics: The Limits of Historical Dialogue

In retrospect, the works of John Dewey and Herbert Mead, combined with the historical circumstances presented by the chaotic disruption of the Great Depression, represented an evolutionary window for public administration -- one, however, which was slammed shut in the conservative backlash of the 1950's and early 1960's. The evolutionary potential of these works to move public administration into a flow of democratic governance was confined, not only by the conservative reaction to New Deal programs however, but also by the shared disposition of the pragmatists and the behaviorists that democracy was ultimately simply the functional vehicle for social control (Dewey, 1920, 1927; Mead, 1925, 1934).

Correction of Deviance as Social Equality

It was during the 1950s and 1960s that Public Administration experienced its golden era. It had the support of the public and had comfortably aligned itself with the presidency (Van Riper, 1987). It's propensity for routines, schedules and rationality fit well the concerns of a society which seemed to be most alarmed by the possibility of deviance and one which believed that utopia was possible through the methodical and incremental modification of behavior and programs over time in relation to a universal ideal (Seidman & Gilmour). This support began to erode, however, as public pressure mounted to deal with the deviance in society -- but not just the deviance in the perceived violation of norms and rules which led to such aberrations as the McCarthy hearings, for example. The concern in the late 60's and 70's was a concern for the deviance which existed in the inequality of races, sexes and economic conditions.

We don't often think of the concern for civil rights and economic equality as the recognition of social "deviance". Yet, in reality, most public dialogue about inequality begins from the presumption of inequality as deviance from a universal economic standard (Friere, 1974; Pinto, 1974). Social dialogue in this century has largely been about correcting deviance from the norm and not about the more

democratic and positive presumption of acceptance of difference and proactive social evolution which both allows for individual identity and addresses basic human needs. Economic classes, which support the idea of deviance from a norm, serve, in an efficient way, to identify those individuals and groups in need of correction in the modern liberal view(Rorty, 1989). The creation of the "underclass," for example, can be seen as the result of classifying people according to their deficiencies in relation to middle class norms (West, 1991 p. 222). Classes exist according to some standard which forces dialogue to flux within a narrow range of alternatives keyed to financial success. That is to say, that classes serve to perpetuate the belief that there exists one preferred lifestyle or ideology which is equated with the American economic dream. This limited flux maintains an equilibrium which encourages the social structure to rearrange its power relationships only slightly to accommodate more people -- people who must be willing to adapt to the conventional wisdom in order to be accepted. Thus a liberated woman of the 1980's was said to be more like the successful corporate man -- aggressive, rational, and goal-driven. Allowing women to be "like men" was accepted as the norm for equality rather than equality being the true acceptance and valuing of the difference of more feminine traits. Perhaps more to the point, equality as the right to struggle with at

a uniquely individual point in individual without losing a sense of social legitimacy and equality remained undervalued (Pateman, 1989).

The limited fluxuation of economic dialectics are illustrated in ***Figure I*** as the tendency of social thought to return to an incomplete attractor; in this case to the presumed need of social control, which is based on several negative projections about the potential of human nature rather than on more democratic foundations. In the illustration, the more narrow attractor (B) which is also associated with the management paradigm attempts to stop short the flow of social activity at the point which satisfies the perceived needs of social control which also reinforces the negative premises on which the projection is made (A). Line (C) repesents the evolutionary flow of human activity which is distorted by the regression of social control. The premises of social control are reinforced by the assumptions of technology and behaviorism (D).

Insert Figure I Here

The needs of social control are described here as those states which affect a predictable and therefore supposedly controllable equilibrium which reaffirms existing mentally

constructed social arrangements. To put it another way, social control is the attempt to reduce or eliminate the fluctuations in social interaction to those which reaffirm a particular, historical mindset. A "flattening" of social activity occurs as it is disconnected from the flow of democratic evolution.

Government agencies responded to the social movements of 30 years ago from this disposition by application of the techno-management episteme to new demands on the system. The result was the efficient homogenization of individuals into groups--through classes, programs, project, and method -- according to their perceived deficiencies rather than fostering acceptance of both their basic humanity and of their human -- rather than economic -- differences. The idea that those who did not fit

the economic norm were not simply poor and in need of assistance but were personally deficient in some way, fueled a generation of liberals who felt that equality meant simply making people more able to compete in the free market system. This was so despite the fact that it was the free market system which was defining the deficiencies of the poor (Cooper & Radin, 1992). This was expressed in the utilitarian ethics of John Rawls, for example, whose theory for "equalizing" segments of the population in deviation from the norm required first that there be a cohesive idea of what people were to which a model of justice could be applied. Rawls believed

that he could identity a single unified conception of the person "which exists as an undeniable and intransient reality from which to direct action" (Rawls, 1971, p. 28). Rawls sought to standardize a sense of the people as the only way a common process could be ***applied*** in action. He also assumed a narrow self-interest when he said "anxiety, bias and pre-occupation with their own affairs is part of man's natural situation." Rawl's ***Rules of Justice*** were therefore needed for the "peaceful distribution of primary goods." The aim of philosophy, then, according to Rawls "should be to derive a set of rules that have the certainty of moral geometry"(Rawls, p. 121).

This instrumental view of social relationships -- like Descartian geometry -- assumes a lack of potentiality and spontaneity in human relationships and expresses more the view that change must be "kick-started" by some expert. Rawl's "physics" of public life assumes a passive and pre-occupied citizenry in need of expert guidance -- a view that fits well public administration's well-established belief in the capacity of its own expert knowledge (Bailey & Mayer, 1991). Simplification of complex social interactions by standardization simply made the task of instrumental and passive public learning appear to be easier. Yet, the propensity of government agencies to categorize and classify people not only according to their deficiencies, but also in

accordance with the needs of the program to be implemented, has had the astounding effect of recreating what it sought to avoid -- inequality and vast disparities between those who have and those who do not have economic security (Moe, 1989).

Adaptation as Distorted Dialogue

The perpetuation and reinforcement of a system of inadequacies is so, however, not only because of the classification but because the classification becomes the framework within which adaptation to agency routine, information needs and the quest for political equilibrium is structured. Terry Moe, for example, describes much of the politics in public administration as structural politics -- that is as a kind of on-going game in which the agency negotiates rules, procedures and access as a way to counter the uncertainty that democratic politics represents for the bureaucracy. Structural dialogue is really a struggle over procedural formats, Moe says, rather than a dialogue over political issues in the interest of community. In essence, in order to win a policy advantage, interest groups must adapt their ideas and demands to the procedural formulas of the agency. As Moe describes the outcomes of policy frays in the Occupational Health and Safety Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency in the 1970's and 1980's:

> ***...The policies were never explicitly fought over. They were broadly popular among the electorate, and political elites of all stripes...All this was symbolic. The real battles over policy took place within an arcane realm of politics remote from the concerns of citizens; the politics of structural choice. The struggles of genuine consequence were about bureaucratic arrangements, about powers and procedures and criteria. These were choices that would not determine anything at all in practice. Interest groups speaking for the consumer, labor, and environmental movements were counted as victorious, not because they committed government to laudable social goals, but because they won most of the battles over structure (pp.267-239).***

A similar situation exists for the United States Forest Service with the added phenomenon of interest groups directly serving the information needs of the agency -- information which allows the agency to retain its power base while co-opting the interest group. In particular, powerful environmental groups like the Sierra Club learned early on that if they could fill the gaps in the agency's understanding of environmental issues they could retain the ear of key agency officials. The tension between the Sierra Club and the Forest Service which might generate environmental change is, in reality, minimal.

The dialogue is premised on the exchange relationships of the management paradigm so that the agency will respond to the Sierra Club if it complies with agency rules and if it serves as a kind of "sub-agency" which provides expertise to supplement the old, more narrow, expertise of the agency. The classic disposition of the Forest Service that its legitimacy

and power is based on its expertise is simply reinforced (Frederick,1965; Gawthrop,1971; 1993; Kaufman, 1960; Kennedy, 1988).

A similar scenario has been described for "new" programs for the homeless. For example, a survey of 161 service providers in the northeast showed that there were not new services as much as incremental extensions of established programs (Pattalo & Benda, 1992).

These political maneuvers then do not represent any kind of true change or evolutionary movement in the understanding of social issues but instead encourage an adaptation to how the political game is played. The discussion of social efforts is still limited to the format which produced them as change is measured by how well an individual or group has honed its game-playing skills or how "maze-smart" it has become. The discussion of social issues may involve more people of different opinions but what they are talking about is the same thing (Moe). This adaptive process carries a number of presumptions about the nature of public dialogue as it relates to agency structure and policy implementation:

1. That they are for the purpose of maintaining social equilibrium.

2. That they are the means by which limited power and resources are negotiated.

3. That they are a legally structured historical process rather than an intrinsic relational process.

4. That the purpose of the public administration is not the proactive participation in social change but, instead, is in controlling the impact of environmental pressure on system equilibrium.

Because of its historical reliance on expertise and instrumental science, public administration has often found itself at odds, not only with its own social causes, but also with democracy. The purposes of democracy are distinctly different from those of the state which re-creates itself, not from a democratic disposition but from the dispositions which emerge from the perception that social control. Democracy, in this view, is either imposed by an expert authority or is produced by the regulation of behaviorally managed relationships within society.

The irony of the fraying culture which has emerged from this non-democratic disposition, however, has been particularily frustrating to the liberal conscience, which believes in equitable social change, but does not extend its belief to changing the disposition about how that change occurs.

New Public Administration and the social movements which spawned it, for example, proceeded generally from a negative and reformist stance which sought to use two principles of social control to force social change (1) that power is a limited commodity which is acquired competitively (2) that social change comes about by empowering weaker links in the

economic chain by improving their competitive skills (Merchant, 1980; Ophals, 1977). Democratic principles related to participation and access were thereby used as a functional rationale for marketing liberal social agendas within the existing power structure, rather democracy than being understood as an intrinsic process of human relationship from which new power configurations -- and therefore new solutions -- might emerge. As largely rational and instrumental endeavors, social movements have often depended on predictable class identities which serve as rationale for the power struggles involved. Indeed, human process itself -- whether democratic or not -- exists largely secondary to its function in many cases. For example, Terry Cooper and Beryl Radin have described the action perspective of social movements as:

> ***Psychological, social, political and economic processes are of concern, not as ends in themselves, not because of some inherent value in process, but as mean to ends. Social outcomes such as a fairer distribution of goods and services, access to mainstream society, better educated human beings, a healthier population, cleaner ai and the development of artistic talent are but some of the goals that are to be achieved through appropriate process (1992, p.9).***

Cooper and Radin, however, express a firm belief in the efficacy of the citizen to be involved in forcing these changes in a political "game", as they describe it, which relies heavily on an understanding of political swordsmanship and the ability to negotiate and mediate. However, since the

liberal social agenda exists prior to citizen involvement, citizens are themselves simply functional to that agenda and no more free from the assumed expertise of bureaucratic dominance. For example Radin and Cooper say:

> ***Our assumption...is that citizens are to be taken seriously as a part of the political community whose knowledge and judgment are at least co-equal in value with the professional knowledge of the public administrator. In fact, we tend to view the most essential expertise of the public administrator as political skill and knowledge which facilitate the melding of technical knowledge with "public" knowledge and judgment in the process of forming public policy (p. 11).***

However, they then also say:

> ***A corollary of our concern with change and consequences has been our struggle to focus on some end product, rather than a preoccupation with process (1992, p. 12).***

The belief of the public action approach in the efficacy of citizen knowledge appears to be less a faith in human beings as a faith in the ability to organize human beings in a methodological way around a specific agenda. The "value" of public knowledge then is still not an acceptance of the intrinsic efficacy of citizens but of citizens' ability to contribute to winning the policy debate. The question arises whether access and participation are valid only for the ability of citizens to compete effectively in the games of politics or whether there is a legitimacy in human relationship which precedes and exceeds that which is needed to affect an established social agenda.

The distortions of the public action approach have less affected social conditions (Kozal,1991; Long, 1983; Reich, 1987) than they have reinforced the negative and undemocratic premises of organizational management. The extreme has become the idea of "social marketing" as the way in which bureaucratic organizations, citizens and presidents sell their social agendas to a public now seemingly enamored with market dialogue (Radin & Cooper).

There is an implied fear in the social marketing approach, however, whether it is employed by citizens pushing their agendas or by public administrators protecting their equilibrium. It is the fear that unless humanistic -- but nonetheless undemocratic -- behaviorism is employed that adaptation to the program will not happen and change will not occur (Bruce, 1992). At one level of consciousness that fear is expressed as an anxiety over the welfare of those citizens whose needs require immediate attention even though behaviorist intervention has not seemed to lessen social problems.

But even though short term solutions have not seemed to produce positive change, the ever-present immediacy of social suffering seems to foster a "we need a quick-fix" attitude which further seems to justify using democracy as a means, rather than an end. There is another implied fear exhibited in the adaptive phenomenon which Moe describes as happening

between interest groups and government agencies. That fear seems to be that submitting to actual democracy puts our view of what social structure is and the roles various classes play in it in such jeoprody that the "fixers" themselves will have to change in significant ways.

The purpose of this analysis is to turn attention to a different disposition, one concerned with the nature of democratic relationships and not necessarily on a critique of whether the implementation of a social agenda has been successful or not. If it is assumed that democratic process is instinsic and not simply that it has intrinsic "value" as a method for short-term goal achievement then it cannot be argued that democracy is a better "method" than the political gamesmanship that the public action method promotes. Rather, it is recognized, that as an intrinsic and vital process, democracy can be distorted by both method and ideology (Mansbridge; 1980). It is not a given then that democratic process per se will result in better program results or in the easier implementation of community demands. It is more a given that without an awareness of the existence of democratic process as social process, democratic values are easily made meaningless so that social action begins to appear as only the strategic implementation of alternative plans and the social fabric is indeed frayed.

The genuine, but inadequately defined, concern for

citizen participation in the public action approach narrows what participation is to effective competition in the political system, so that individuals eventually must meet the standards of a power-driven format which is required to win the policy battle. At this stage in public dialogue the moral issue is certainly no longer a question of whether the policy debate is controlled only by expertise or by a combination of expertise and "public" knowledge but the issue is who has outsmarted the other guy in political showmanship. The adaptation which occurs through the mediation and negotiations in the political arena, according to rules of the game, only rearranges existing power structures to accommodate those who know how to shuffle the cards.

The problem as it is understood here, however, is not so much that everybody involved in a policy issue is interested in acquiring and attaining power -- it is not helpful to this argument to question motive in that way. The system lends itself to that because it is built on the premises of power as a commodity. The greater point is that it is difficult to imagine that there are any other alternatives to the abatement of social suffering than "playing the power game." It is this change --the change from power politics -- which is most urgent. We must stop teaching people to play and participate in a game which has brought upon inequality in the first place. But this broader change requires a different kind of

consciousness than that which seeks to reinforce existing structural arrangements -- one which is quite simply open to other possibilities.

Imagining other possibilities to old and corrupt social arrangements, however, is not the same as thinking about new plans of action. Imagination itself emerges from the dynamics of democratic relationships and does not exist solely in the minds of social scientists who are wandering along the worn paths of method (Follett, 1924, 1965). First, imagination requires that a conscious choice be made to be democratic and to participate in the uncertainty which is endemic to democracy. This reversal to democracy necessitates a preoccupation with relationship which would make most outcomes marvels of creation instead of strategically calculated alternatives.

Historical Dialectics: The Narrow Space of Liberal Dialogue

The tenacity of social problems and the demise of American public life are indicative of not only the failure of a greedy market, but also represents a failed socialism which exists as a reaction to the market. As accurate and prophetic as liberal Marxist thinking is about the inequalities of the

capitalist system and the alienation and violence which follows (Galbraith, 1976; Harrington, 1976, Marx, 1964.), the reified prescription of limited historical dialectics -- moving in a predictable way towards a final resolution -- misses the potential for democracy which always exists in social relationships whatever the economic or structural circumstances (Boggs, 1984; Mansbridge; 1980; Merchant, 1992).

In the historical attempts to address the very real issues of poverty and economic inequality, democracy has been placed secondary to the need to group, classify and address people as problems to be solved (Tinker, 1992). In this way social space has been minimized to that which can affect a social ideology. Poverty becomes not only an economic condition but a despised and often meaningless identity...one suited to the instrumental application of programs and ideology.

Marx's Dialogic Rut:

A historical-Marxist perspective on social relationships has contributed to a belief in the need for a homogenization of individual identities in response to collective phenomenon. In the work of Latin American Marxist, Gustavo Gutierrez, for example, the ***non-person,*** who exists in an alienated state of poverty, is recognized as a person, but then is assigned an

identity associated almost exclusively with his poverty as it exists in relation to the larger system at a given point in time (Friere, p. 83). However correct the assessment of the state of individuals in comparison to the prevailing systems of power is, such classification still denies them an intrinsic identity beyond that afforded by their classification (Crocker, 1983; Lenin, 1966; Levine, 1988; Lukacs, 1971, 1972; Tinker.). The existing power arrangements are not changed in any transformational way by the classification because new input from diverse understandings is reduced to the identity which fits the predictions of the ideologic methodology. As a result a redundant and potentially entropic dialogue begins which denies the evolutionary purpose of identity formation intrinsic in democratic process.

Marxist thought fits well the same format which has produced the management paradigm in public administration...a hyper-rationalized scientific method for calculating human relationships. In part, this occurs because Marxian thought really added nothing new to the work of either Malthus or Ricardo and the Darwinists who influenced Hobbes, as John Kenneth Galbraith notes in ***The Affluent Society*** (Galbraith, p. 64). The difference has been, Galbraith says, in the passion with which Marx deployed his thoughts.

...Marx's conception of capitalism was no more gloomy

> *than that of Ricardo and Malthus. Marx's mission was to identify fault, place blame, urge change and, above all, enlist disciplined belief. In the latter his success exceeded that of any man since Mohammed (p. 67).*

For example, in Das *Capital* Marx comments about the advancement of art and the accumulation of capital:

> *...(they)..mutilate the labourer into a fragment of a man, degrade him to the level of appendage of a machine, destroy every remnant of charm in his work, and turn it into hated toil..drag his wife and child beneath the Juggernaut..(they bring) misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance and mental degradation (Marx, 1918, p. 660-661).*

However, the impact of that emotional response to poverty and human despair is ultimately limited to how it might serve an ideological agenda. Emotions became utilitarian to the political battle, not the catalysts for a reconfiguration of human understanding. Emotions are to be used, once again, not to be felt. As Lionel Trilling says:

> *Contemporary liberalism does not depreciate emotion in the abstract, and in the abstract it sets great store by variousness and possibility. Yet, as is true of any other human entity, the conscious and the unconscious life of liberalism are not always in accord. So far as liberalism is active and positive, so far, that is, as it moves toward organization, it tends to select the emotions and qualities that are most susceptible of organization. As it carries out its active and positive ends it unconsciously limits its view of the world to what it can deal with, and it unconsciously tends to develop theories and principles, particularly in relation to the nature of the human mind, that justify its limitation (Kariel, 1977, p. 52).*

The direct experience of emotional empathy felt by individuals in the sight of social suffering is filtered

through a desensitizing *rationale* for social action. As a result the response never is directly to the problem, but more to the problem as it exists in relation to a rational mindset often expressed as economic self-interest or class structure. It has often been difficult therefore to separate the identity of those who suffer, and even the nature of human purpose, from the classist mindset which accompanies Marxist thinking. It is difficult, for example, to see members of the "underclass," as related to other classes in some broader sense way but instead they are often seen as potentialy dangerous adversaries, who, as Marxists dialectics play out, will logically become violent.

Marx, as a scientific scholar, integrated multiple aspects of the human experience into one woven theory of class struggle based on economics. He offered the explanation for social phenomenon in a capitalistic system and brought to consciousness a class structure in America which was not fully recognized before his work (Galbraith, p. 70-71). Too, because Marx advanced his work as a "science," ostensibly free of the ambiguities of more theoretical or philosophical work, it has often been taken as an empirical account of reality and human nature (Harrington,p.76). The effect of Marx's work on our perceptions about social relationships and social change has been nothing less than profound as Galbraith notes:

In a world but little removed from poverty, and where

> *great store was put on wealth, it was inevitable the most conflict would have an economic cause. Nothing else was nearly so worth quarrelling about. Even when there was some other ostensible cause-love, honor, patriotism, or religion -- a more penetrating and cynical view would be expected to discern some economic motive. This in simple outline was Marx's materialistic conception of history....It is something that the modern businessman accepts as a matter of course. When he sees someone agitating for change, either at home or abroad, he inquires almost automatically: "What is there in it for him?" He suspects that the moral crusades of reformers, do-gooders, liberal politicians, and public servants, all their noble protestations notwithstanding, are based ultimately on self-interest (pp. 70-71).*

Herbert Simon, and other behavioral Neo-Darwinists, were able to take a Marxist disposition towards human physics and create the science by which the mechanics of self-interest and detached, critical relationships have been institutionalized in the public sector. Minimizing the direct experience of suffering by filtering it through a pre-conceived format and methodological framework like decisionmaking, has, in essence, reinforced social problems, because they are to adapted to and become part of the rational framework of social organizations (Moe).

In further reducing social dialogue to what can be bargained for in class struggle, the capitalistic system is reinforced even more as repeating generations of classes continue the presumptions of competitive economy itself (Merchant, 1992; Pateman, 1970; 1989). The rich simply get richer and poor get poorer as the prophetic saying goes. The rich, with their resources, are able to increasingly survive

the recessions and fluxes in the market by strategically eliminating most competition so that the only "solution" which remains for the poorer classes appears to be violence and revolution (Harrington, 1977; Reich, 1987). The violence in turn, however, reinforces the presumptive need for more social control, so that the dialectic is one simply of rearranging power distribution without any actual change in the condition of human beings.

The problems of these limited dialectics for public dialogue is not simply the corrupting nature of the capitalistic system which seems to require groups and individuals to adapt to each other in order to survive. It is more that to pose all solutions to the excesses of the market as reactions to those excesses -- rather than as movement away from them -- is to perpetuate the reformist attitude that equality can be "created" by simply making people more competitive, whatever the cost to their identity or to democratic principles. This presumption makes conflict meaningless and unrelated to the development of the individual. It does produce a scenario for which a limited number of possible outcomes can be predicted, the best response to which is to place your money on the winning ticket.

What is of concern here, however, is not that Marx was in anyway wrong about the effects and consequences of capitalism

or the oscillations which occur in the struggle between competing groups over self-interest, or that his historical model does not have some relevance in the current social context. He has been alarmingly correct (Meister, 1990). It is more that in confining dialogue to the linear and cumulative view of history which he affords, the narrow fluctuations of social discourse are perpetuated so that violence and economic despair is indeed predictable because nothing else can be imagined. Mae Wan Ho makes the important point, for example, that Darwinists -- like Ricardo and later Marx -- were limited in their perceptions of the natural world by the vitalism and Fundamentalism of their times so that they could see no real alternative to the mechanical determinism manifested in the theories of natural selection (Ho and Saunders, pp. 4-5). Marx's historical materialism is an angry machine which creates and recreates itself to our continual amazement -- so that each time his predictions come true we respond in some way to reaffirm the truth of what it says -- instead of trying to move out of the cycle.

To view social space and the dynamics of social process in a purely historical way confines human action to one of adapting to circumstance. The problem of Marxism is that it scientifically confines iterations of human relationships to an economic model, one with clear and delineated boundaries. This strategic elimination of other possibilities is described

in another vein by Jim Chapin in "*Symptoms of Decline.*"

> ***Anti-Marxism remains the best defense of capitalism, a negative defense indeed one that rests on the old Condorcet principle that the job of conservatives is to "enlist nature in the service of inequality." In other words, the best defense of capitalism is a denial of other possibilities (1991, p. 181).***

In either view -- pro-Marxism or Anti-Marxism--the result is the same -- possibilities for social thought and evolutionary movement are narrowed to the dialectics between the two. The issue is not easily sorted out, however, without a broader understanding of democracy and democratic dialogue then that afforded by the adversarial politics of interest group liberalism.

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I, who have been so many men, have never been
The one in whose embrace Matlide Urbach swooned

The Regret of Heraclutis

Chapter Five

Identity: What Economic Dialectics Miss

Historical dialectics tend to describe not only human action as it relates to an economic consequence but it also defines and reifies individual and cultural identity in relation to an economic norm. A key relational presumption of democracy -- that of acceptance -- is dramatically distorted as well. George Tinker describes the phenomenon created by this dialogue -- which fluxes from an the incomplete attractor of economics and social control -- as it has effected Native Americans:

> *Native Americans resist categorization in terms of class structure. Instead, we insist on being recognized as "peoples", even nations, with a claim to national sovereignty based on ancient title to our land. Classifications such as "working class" or the "poor," continues the erosion of the cultural integrity and national agenda. As such, capitalistic structures--including the church (missionaries) and the academy (anthropologists)-have reduced Native American peoples to non-personhood, so too the Marxist agenda fails finally to recognize our distinct personhood (Tinker, p. 14).*

Allowing for and nurturing distinct personhood is at

the core of an evolutionary ontology. It requires, however, a different kind of dialogue than that afforded by the historical dialectics of economics. The initial premise of an evolutionary dialogue is not that one human identity can be found to which a science or theory can be applied but rather, that a common process, intrinsic to the evolutionary scheme of life, can be recognized. However, the purpose of recognizing a common process is not to devise a way to direct social traffic but to acknowledge the responsiblity and relationship which the process suggests, and create an operational disposition which allows it to generate continued evolutionary movement. It is a more pro-active view of the ability of human nature to move itself beyond distortions in the evolutionary process than a Marxist perspective which confines the movement to a rational methodology applied to human relationships.

This proactive view is based on a different sense of order than Marx or Engels had; a different sense of social physics and social dialogue. The order in an evolutionary view is not achieved by the resolution of conflict among competing groups whose reference point is class structure. More, it is not achieved by the instrumental and strategic elimination of opposition -- in a related environment it is meaningless and self-destructive to be strategic.

One might think of evolutionary dialogue as more of a

regeneration of human relationships. There is perhaps no better way to describe the order which comes from the chaotic exchanges of complex public life than what Mary Parker Follett has called "the law of the situation" (1925). The order itself exists in the premises of democratic relationships. If public dialogue is continually allowed to return to democratic principles a regeneration of social thought and the development of individual identity will occur. The regeneration occurs because the principles of democracy, in particular equality, tolerance and choice, are such that they allow "deviance," accept diversity and encourage personal engagement of the environment.

In turn, the formation of identity, as well as a sense of the Other, are key to an evolutionary onotology because they represent both the purpose of an evolutionary process and the process by which the purpose is realized in relationship with Others. Movement away from a historical reification -- like economic dialectics -- is possible only with the existence of multiple identities other than those which support the norms established by the reification. That is to say, that new avenues to address social conditions do not arise, and a change in social attitudes do not come, without different dispositions towards the idea of economics and power than those which assume that an industrialized work force is the only preferred lifestyle and that public dialogue is

essentially about how to bring more people into that system.

Yet beyond this rather functional purpose of diversity -- as the means to an expanded public dialogue -- remains the ideal concept that the basic process principles of democracy support the formation of identity as being meaningful and purposeful to Human Beings. George Tinker again provides an example:

Reducing our nationness to classness imposes upon us a particular culture of poverty and especially a culture of labor. It begs the question as to whether indigenous peoples desire production in the modern economic sense in the first place. To put the means of production into the hands of the poor eventually make the poor exploiters of indigenous peoples and their natural resources. Finally it seriously risks violating the very spiritual values that hold an indigenous cultural group together as a people (p. 15).

Identity Formation as Democratic Process

The issue of *identity* -- both cultural and individual -- rests at the heart of any discussion of meaningful public dialogue. More it might be said that this identity formation is at the core of what we mean by citizenship and the process of citizenship in a diverse society. Further, the process of identity-making is what makes citizenship and public life meaningful. The passive-reactive state of current citizenship. which has been much maligned in recent literature is a reflection of a management need to narrow, not just involvement, but identity to what can be programmed (Bellah, 1985, 1989; Blake, 1990; Reynolds & Norman, 1988).

Yet a programmed citizenry is by definition passive and more bland than the ideal of an active, informed, involved citizenship (Long, 1983). Further, the social control model may see citizenship as a rational model to which citizens conform. A more democratic approach, however, reverses the supposition that there is a "model citizen" and instead raises the prospect of a model democratic process of continuous identity development, in which citizens of all kinds participate in multiple ways. The process itself is strengthened and renewed by the diversity of both types and styles of citizenship (Mansbridge, 1980; Merchant, 1980).

The generative principles of democracy, however, have been distorted by a reified imbalance at different points in human history which have come to be exemplified by the public service and the interest group politics it supports. Public dialogue in this model must vacillate between individualistic excesses and the search for a common interest among those excesses. Other space for dialogue appears to be unlikely or non-existent. Further, it is the ***anticipation*** of interest, which keeps the cycle in its backward and deadly motion. The anticipation and accommodation of the idea of economic interest in public dialogue creates the ***space of interest*** as the parameters for social discourse. Dialogue is basically repetitive because it must cover the same ground over and over again in order to preserve its space. It is the premise of an

evolutionary ontology that keeping the dialectical boundaries intact requires a great deal of maintenance; maintenance which must ultimately become coercive because the nature of dynamic human relationships is to stretch boundaries.

Economic self-interest, as the basis on which we have primarily come to recognize other human beings, is a common identity imposed on the children of a Hobbesian culture, but it is not the final word on what human identity is or can be. In this paper, identity is defined differently in that it is not only what regulates dialogue in the manner that self-interest does, but it is also the purpose of dialogue. Further, self-interest itself is not simply material interest, in the view of this ontology, but the interest of individuals is in identity formation as the evolutionary process endemic to human life. Interest then is an ***active principle*** rather than an objective agenda. As the interest which promulgates social dialogue, identity formation provides more meaning to social conflict then that afforded by the disputes over limited resources because it involves the ***being*** of the individual. This view of self-interest necessarily incorporates the Other, because it is in relationship that the self-interest of identity formation is realized. Even in disputes over limited resources, identity formation is taking place. Competitive dialogue associated with that format, however, tends to make the basic relational process

illegitimate and therefore most identity formation negative, defensive and regressive.

An evolutionary ontology embraces these concerns about identity:

1. That identity is a matter of self-interest but not the narrow and ultimately passive self-interest of economics but the self-interest of an individual engaged as an architect of his/her own evolution.

2. That identity is not a matter of determination or simply rearrangement or accumulation of historical circumstances but involves a broad and continuing integration of evolutionary levels.

3. That the democratic principles of equality, acceptance and tolerance are intrinsic to human relationships which foster continued evolution and continued identity-formation.

4. That the engagement of process in the development of individual identity is the catalyst for change in community and culture.

This view of the efficacy of identity is somewhat contrary to a purely historical self, largely because it is based on an understanding of time and evolution which precedes and exceeds cultural history. It is not a universalistic view, however, that holds that human identity is predestined and necessarily unfolds in linear time. Indeed it is the critique of Marxism that it requires such a narrow interpretation of identity. The view of identity, which will be proposed here, accepts the idea of an intrinsic form of self but one which, if fully engaged in evolutionary development, "shares with all

of evolution the characteristic of provisionality" as Alexander Agryos describes it (p. 225).

Identity exists more as a product of an ***existing and continuing*** relationship with what J.T, Fraser and Erich Janstsch describe more as a "bottom up hierarchy." The Self is both ***structure and process*** in this regard -- it both creates and is the created -- in a continuing evolutionary process (Aziz, 1990; Edinger, 1973; Fraser, 1990; Jantsch, 1979). At any one point the Self is the accumulation of the whole which has preceded it but also interacts autonomously with its environment to create a new iteration of the whole. This self-referential hierarchy exists between levels of evolution -- which both bind human beings to a "past" which exists outside of conscious time and also provides them with the process which makes the continuation of evolution -- as an identity forming process -- possible.

That is to say, that the hierarchy is not one in which a new identity emerges and divorces itself from past identities --or evolutionary stages -- but instead one which integrates all stages as it proceeds to produce a fuller expression of identity. For example, the identity of the feminine or the masculine might be said to proceed from an archetype, but an archetype which is still engaged in the evolutionary processes of identity formation. The prior evolutionary understanding of the feminine or masculine provides a tension for the

development of the next (Colley, 1992). Jantsch provides another view:

> ***What then is the difference between a more highly developed creature, such as man, and a less highly developed? That image that man has climbed to a hierarchically higher level would be wrong. The correct image recognizes that man includes many autopoetic levels of microevolution and, by way of the neural mind, also levels of macroevolution (Jantsch, 1987, p. 239).***

For example, Jantsch lays out what he sees of the basic structure of humans:

Self-Image

Self-reflexive mentation (gestalt perception)

Organism/organismic mentation

Cells (eukaryotes)

Organelles (prokaryotes)

Dissipative Structures (intracellular processes)

Jantsch's model represents an exceedingly complex structure because each level has it own interactions...its own identity, so to speak, in which evolution occurs somewhat independently from other levels. That is to say that this hierarchy is not a strict control hierarchy -- in that the bottom or top levels necessarily dictate in a linear way what happens at another level -- but that each level interacts with the environment in somewhat autonomous and personal ways while being related to the whole. As Janstch describes it:

> *Until recently, the dynamics of life has been misunderstood so thoroughly that in system theory the notion of an "organismic system" was synonymous with the synonym for control hierarchy. In a living system, each autopoetic level may interact and communicate with the total environment ...Each level has its own self-organizing dynamics which gives rise to specific environmental relations (Jantsch, p. 248).*

Identity in this view is not simply a rearrangement of historical circumstances or value-choices nor is it pre-destined, it is more the continuous integration of a being which shares a developmental process with many levels of evolution. It is a being both physical and mental, both connected to social time and to the space which precedes and exceeds it.

Jantsch provides an example which is illustrative of this idea of an integrated hierarchy--which he notes is not in anyway a new idea. The Hindu system of the seven chakras, for example, defines a correspondence between the levels at which man enters into relationship with his environment, on one hand, and certain body structures which are arranged along the spine, on the other hand. In these chakras, "kundalini" energy is supposed to manifest itself in a focused way. The structures of the body are viewed as opening toward the front of the body like funnels and penetrating the body. The seven chakras are characterized as (1) Crotch; physical survival (2) Pelvis, sexuality (3) Solar plexus; power over the environment and other people

(4) Heart; transpersonal love, connectedness with whole mankind (5) Throat; seeking God (6) "third Eye: on the forehead; wisdom (7) "Crown" above the head; unity with the divine principle. Most people live according to the three lowest chakras. The ideal, as Jantsch says, however, is not just to climb to higher steps, but to activate and harmonize as many chakras as possible at the same time (p. 240).

A Western view of a chakras phenomenon might be expressed by Michael Walzer's description of the "social being."

> *The phrase "social being" describes men and women who are citizens, producers, consumers, members of the nation, and much else besides--and none of these by nature or because it is the best thing to be. The associational life of civil society is the actual ground where all versions of the good are worked out and tested...and proved to be partial, incomplete, ultimately unsatisfying. It can't be the case that living on this ground is good in itself; there isn't any other place to live. What is true is that the quality of our political and economic activity and of our national culture is intimately connected to the strength and vitality of our associations (Walzer, 1992, p. 298).*

Mary Parker Follett presents another view...one of democracy which is closest to the evolutionary view put forth here:

> *Democracy is an infinitely including spirit. We have an instinct for democracy because we have an instinct for wholeness; we get wholeness only through reciprical relations, through infinitely expanding reciprocol relations. Democracy is really neither excluding nor including merely, but creating wholes (1965, p. 157).*

An integrated hierarchy then perhaps looks more like **Figure II** than the conventional top-down hierarchy. The elipse on the right preceds the one just to itts left; each emerging elipse has its own identity and interacts with its environment in semi-autonomous ways, yet continued evolution is premised on a relationship among the components of each elipse and further to a relationship to the process itself represented by democratic principles.

Insert Figure II Here

The Western mind, however, tends to limit the field of what can be discussed in relation to integration and human identity. In the work of Abraham Maslow, for example, a hierarchy of needs exists which defines identity in three main bottom-up aspects (1) physical values (physiological needs, physical security); (2) social values (belonging, esteem) and (3) spiritual values (self-fulfillment) (Maslow, 1943 p. 370-396). The troubling thing about Maslow's work is that is makes it appear that the human being is not an integrated, proactive entity but instead must choose among different levels of behavior which are forced upon it by its environment. It seems to imply that individuals move from one "lower" state of being to a higher one, so that anyone

who has not achieved stability at the first rung is not likely to become spiritual or moral.

The implications of Maslow's view for citizenship and the public service are as bleak as they are for meaningful identity formation. It is seldom possible to suggest in public dialogue that we not begin from the reductive premises of Maslow's hierarchy when discussing human potentential (Mosher,1976). Citizenship, by way of the Maslow model, is a climb up a ladder -- which social programs must expedite by getting people off the first rung. In the meantime, the lack of true citizenship enables a materialistic and socially disconnected lifestyle.

Yet Maslow's hierarchy can be vitalized perhaps more easily than we might imagine -- because it requires not a gutting of the traditional view of hierarchy as much as a recognition that an integrated hierarchy exists within the more stratified hierarchy. The integrated hierarchy is in correspondence to the enduring principles of human relationship which the idea of democracy represents. For example, governance, as it is defined by Gary Wamsley and the authors of ***The Blacksburg Manifesto*** would take a more integrative approach than Maslow's, one which would align the individual citizen and public administrator with the potential of a broader identity so that each action, at

whatever rung of the ladder, served in a moral way the social good -- as well as the developmental potential of the citizen. This is also expressed in Wamsley's view of professionalism in the public service which he describes as a "supervening profession"--one which envelopes and guides the expertise of the public administrator towards a view of the public good (Wamsley, Green & Keller, 1993).

For example, if Jantsch's model was applied to the public sector something like Wamsley's "Five Levels of Meaning Attribution" might occur. Wamsley describes the policy process as a different phenomenon depending on who the viewer is and the point from which they are viewing -- thus the viewer and the point attribute a certain meaning to the phenomenon. Wamsley's hierarchy of policy or management processes looks like this:

1. Societal: a level of class interaction; a political economy level.

2. Partisan Political: a level of party electoral warfare--party struggle that often is expressed between branches of government.

3. Institutional/Organizational: The perspective usually taken when speaking of organizational and interorganizational politics, or of policy subsystems.

4. Managerial: the perspective taken in thinking of budgets as a management process; an instrument of the Chief Executive Officer for affecting, economy, efficiency and effectiveness

5. Operations/Technical--the nitty gritty

> perspective taken in program planning--Which expenditures come first etc (1990).

Wamsley argues that no level is an isolated or impermeable level, that the levels interrelate. But Wamsley's point, which is perhaps most relevant here, is that public decision-making can not be comprehended from a single perspective or level of meaning attribution in pareticular, management decisions at one level are not independent of decisions at other levels, nor can efforts to achieve organizational or group goals be seen as precluding efforts to find the good of the whole. Drawing from the Blackburg Perspective Wamsley says:

> ***The Blacksburg Perspective would...insist that instead of thinking of those levels as variation on management, or of all of them as part of some general process called management, we should think of them as aspects of the process of governance (1987, p. 12).***

What Wamsley seems to be saying is that the hierarchy posed by the five levels of meaning is really a hierarchy of meaning which is ***integrated*** under the umbrella of governance for the purpose of advancing the individual, group and public good. It becomes, then, not simply a disconnected tower of babel among mutually exclusive or competing views of a single process but instead incorporates several aspects, understandings, competencies and identities which can share a common purpose. In the way the enlightened

individual activates as many chakras as possible, the governing agent in the public service recognizes the levels as distinct and equally meaningful identities within the public service and activates them fully for the broader purpose of the public good and the development of citizenship. Efficiency, for example, is not simply efficiency as an isolated action but efficiency for the purposes of the common weal.

From Jantsch's and Wamsley's work it is possible to begin to see how different identities might co-exist and indeed thrive in democracy. However, the distinction between Wamsley's levels and those of Jantsch is that the "lower" three of Jantsch's model change more slowly than the upper two, because the upper two are involved in conscious dialogue with the environment. Wamsley's all involve actors who share human evolutionary patterns and purpose in the realm of social action. Further, they are not levels which have necessarily evolved into each other but which ***involve*** each other at the same perceptual time. As Janstch and other evolutionary theorists note, at the social level, change occurs much more rapidly because of the human capacity for social interchange. The importance of this distinction is that the formation of identity among citizens, interacting in the social arena, is essentially a ***dialogic process*** because it involves a distinctly human level of

consciousness.

If for example, we borrow from Jantsch and Wamsley and develop a third model for human beings -- one which represents the tensions between the individual described in Jantsch and the social process described by Wamsley we may begin to get at the nature of public dialogue and its relationship to identity formation. Since each level of meaning or evolution responds ***autonomously*** to its environment there are multi-levels of meaning emerging from each level. However, the rhythm which might be said to regulate all movement is the evolutionary process which is fully contained in each dialogic interaction among and between levels. It is important to note that the process is not divisable, but is contained -- as potential --in its entirety in each action. Further, the complexity expresses a common underlying purpose related to the formation of identity and the attendant maturation of citizenship -- one which, in this text, is equally associated with the process tenets of democracy.

A concern for identity, as it is related to public administration, might be summarized according to these principles:

1. Individual identity and cultural, societal and national identity are co-created in the same process.

2. That an autonomous self-organizing

potential exists among multiple identities in society.

3. That the autopoetic referents for identity formation include both the historical context and the broad, complex evolutionary spectrum from which the identity emerges, not simply a disembodied interest.

4. That the purpose of public administration is to maintain the democratic rythm among emerging/self-organizing identities as they exist in relation to the democratic whole.

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I know little -- or nothing of my own forebears;
The Borges back in Portugal; vague folk
That is my flesh, obscurely still evoke
Their customs, and their firmness and fears.
As slight as if they'd never lived in the sun
And free from any trafficking from art,
They form an indecipherable part
Of time, of earth, and of oblivion.
And better so. For now their labors past,
They're Portugal, they are that famous race
Who forced the shining ramparts of the East,
And launched on seas, and seas of sand as wide.
The king they are in mystic desert place,
Once lost; they're one who swears he has not died.

The Borges
Jorges Luis Borges, 1974

Chapter 6

Community: A Sense of Broader Social Space

The evolution of identity co-exists with the idea of community. Yet, the current concern over the rebirth of community as the balancing agent for excessive economic self-interest is both hopeful and troubling.[1] It is hopeful because certainly the individualistic excesses of the Reagan legacy do not reflect even our meanest concerns for basic humanity. It is also hopeful because at least part of the community rhetoric is concerned with inclusion and diversity. However, what is troubling about some of the community rhetoric is that it calls for the reintroduction of model family values or the inculcation of community

standards or the imposition of common interest (Bellah, 1989). This is troubling because this kind of dialogue does not leave behind the social control model which has brought us to the state we are in now. Regulating hyper-individualized interest with the idea of community interest, as it has emerged from the disposition of social control, perpetuates a dialectic which only assures that a few social iterations down the line individualistic behavior will again be a problem or community will be so strong that it is dampening individuality as it did in the 1950's. In the meantime, what has been produced is a temporary and uneasy equilibrium and not anything which is particularly generative -- in a manner which would produce needed social change or encourage meaningful citizen activity. A dialectic, which is premised on the idea of an adversarial regulation of excess, forces an adpatation to that excess...as when individualism becomes too concerned with individualistic concerns then community must respond in kind. Dialogue is confined to a negative dialectic between two historical episodes. What is maintained is the dialectic while the human project is simply equalibrized.

However, a new ontology would recognize that a ***balancing*** should occur. Indeed, the current "uncontrolled growth of the mind" (as Frazer calls it) needs to be tempered by more attention to other aspects of human

existence -- in particular emotional life (Fraser, 1979; Penrose, 1989). The balancing, however, is perhaps less strategic than the exchange of one ideologial view of the community/individual tension for another. It involves instead the unblocking of creative energy which has been log-jammed by the ideological reification which produced the imbalance in the first place. Indeed, it is not likely that a community which integrates diverse cultures and allows for the pursuit of individual identity will emerge simply from packaging the debate as a problem between too much individualistic behavior and not enough community...particularily if one side is seen as an interest in competition with the collective interest. The problem is more one of how to reintroduce the legitimacy of relationhip in social process as the agent by which evolutionary flow enlivens stagnant dialectics.

Mead and Dewey understood that individualistic interests are regulated in social interactions. They understood the regulation to be premised on the avoidance of consequence (Melossi, 1990 p. 45). Mary Parker Follett understood that positive human relationship -- rather than competitive posturing -- had purpose in the production of meaning which served both the individual and the community simultaneously. Communities and individuals co-create each other in Follett's thought. Indeed, the state itself is a

creation of individuals and therefore not separate from it..except as we imagine it to be. This ***continuous co-creation***, however, is distorted by a failure to understand the deep inter-dependence of individuals and their community which exists irrespective of economic consequence.

> **The people are the integration of every development, of every genius, with everything else that our complex and interacting life brings about. But the method of such integration can never be brought through crowd association. We may come to think that vox populi is vox Dei but not until it is the group voice, not until it is found by some more intimate process than listening to the shout or counting the votes in a ballot box (1965, p. 220).**

Further she says:

> ***We see that to obey a group which we have helped to create is to be free because we are obeying ourselves. Ideally the state is such a group, actually it is not, but it depends upon us to make it more and more so. The state must be no external authority which restrains and regulates me, but it must be myself acting as the state in every smallest detail of life. Expression not restraint, is always the motive of an ideal state (p. 138).***

To envision community as existing as something separate from the individual and employing administrative forces to re-implement it -- like a piece of missing furniture -- places public administration again -- not as an embodiment of a democratic people who are working out some evolving notion of community through relationship, but as a regulating, disembodied, superior, Hobbesian mediator of human action. Public administrators, acting in the heart of

the polity, can and should legitimize positive relationships ***by participating in them*** as a means of unleashing the creative flow of activity among individuals in our society.

A Sense of Community

Despite the limits of historical dialectics, a sense of community ***does*** play a clear part in the formation of identity as both a past and extant ***awareness*** of the Other. It is through Others that the uniquely human consciousness is experienced, a tension engaged and its potentialities realized. It is in a continuous dialogue between the emerging self and the Other in which social creation occurs, and diversity is allowed. As Alexander Agyros says:

> ***There is a long tradition which suggests that the needs of society and the desires of the indiviudal are in an eternal zero-sum struggle. Although its is certainly true that there is an essential conflict between self and society, between the needs of one and the needs of the many, what is often overlooked is that a well-coordinated social group is a precondition to a sharply defined individual*** *(p. 159).*

As Agryos says it is a paradox, but one essential to evolution, that that which a self rebels against--a shared sense of Being -- is the condition for the creation of the self in the first place (p. 149).

However, the conflict implicit in the rebellion that Agryos speaks of is perhaps more of a conscientious dialogue with the Other. To be in dialogue with the Other does not

require grand scale organization in this regard, or necessarily even violence (McSwain & White, 1990). Indeed, as the historical mission changes from the resolution of class conflict to the continuation of evolutionary movement in a shared space of relationship and responsibility, the need for domination diminishes(McSwain & White,1990).

As a ***sense of the Other*** --- that sense of shared space --community can be enacted in a conversation with one person, in silence, and in ritual as easily as it can be enacted in a consciously organized organization. The Viet Nam Memorial in Washington D.C. daily activates a collective sense of shared history and mourning, for example. The key is that the individual(s) recognize the legitimacy of the dialogue and the concept of inter-relationship which allows the conversant to be directly and intimately connected to the broader whole at an emotional and intuitive level (Stiver, 1991; Tannen & Troike, 1985). This is achieved in public dialogue by reference to the symbol of the public good and by acting in compliance with democratic principles which recognize relationship and inter-dependence.

Community is understood in several ways, however--four of which are listed here.

1. Community is the place from which individuals come; it is the storehouse of traditional values and mores known from memory. Through association it is the regulator of individual behavior.

2. Community is a crowd, a collection of people drawn together for some purpose outside themselves; for protection or the promotion of an interest.

3: Community is an intrinsic part of the individual something he carries with him and whose values he integrates and reflects.

4: Community is the opposite of the individual. It provides a tension with which the individual reflects.

None of these definitions need to be rejected by the current argument. Each of them carry some sense that an Other exists in some relationship to the Self and perhaps have meaning to the individual who understands community in one way or the other. If all are accepted, however, then how might one define a loss of community? It is defined here as a loss of the sense of *social space.* A loss of social space is understood here as a loss of a sense of relationship which, in public life, is achieved most often through dialogue. A loss of social space is the reduction of what can be talked about; it is a loss -- often strategically executed--of potentiality.

Civil society, as Michael Walzer notes, is sometimes defined as that "space for uncoerced association and also the set of relational networks formed for the sake of family, father, interest and ideology that fill that space" (Walzer, 1991, p. 295). Social space for the evolutionary ontology would stop the definition at that "space for uncoerced association and the also the set of relational

networks.." The difference being that space and relationship exist in ***potentiality*** and what both "fills", creates and maintains them is the interaction -- the dialogue -- itself, not necessarily the anticipation of interest or ideology. The loss of social space is, in fact, the narrowing by such interests or outlooks of the potentialities inherent in relationships. This point is illustrated by the following development of the management paradigm in Public Administration from its roots in Platonic thought illustrated in ***Figure III***.

Insert Figure III Here

In the first figure entitled ***Relational***--the Pre-Platonic, shamanistic world is represented in which there is not a division between physics and metaphysics. In this configuration superior and inferior as rungs on the social ladder are not issues but relationship and responsibility are. Social space is infinite in the sense that each interaction impacts that whole, while at the same time each interaction produces some new renewed aspect of the whole.

In the second figure entitled ***Stratified Hierarchy*** the implications of Plato's hierarchy on social space are exemplified. By the imposition of a ladder of roles onto a

relational world Plato introduced the idea of power, elitism and legitimacy and death. Social space is reduced to a dialogue about how and who achieves the ideal. A concern for time limits on social action also develops which was not apparent to a world premised on the idea of renewal rather than death. Dialogue begins to reaffirm the suppositions of the ideal rather than seeking renewal of a related whole.

In the third figure entitled ***Darwinistic*** the effects of Descartian physics and Darwinian philosophy on social space is drawn. The emotive-relational world is reduced to a defeated state in a dialogue about how to survive by the avoidance of consequence and by remaining competitive.

In the fourth figure entitled ***Monistic,*** the social control model reduces social space to the dialogue between what is deviant and what isn't.

Further social space might be described in the following matrix. At the level of relational social space, the space itself is evolving in the generative interactions of those who interact with it. While, in other modes social space is seen as finite and thereby not generative but only negotiable.

In the regression from a relational world, the social space in which one can become aware and interact with the Other is continually reduced until a "total disengagement"

Insert Figure IV Here

From the Other, as Locke may have preferred to call it, has been affected (Taylor, 1989).

This kind of disengagement is perpetuated in our society by the liberal and conservative belief that deviance in the social order results from an unequal distribution of goods and is cured by either New Deal kinds of strategies or free-market solutions. As a result, deeper democratic issues of human relations are ignored As Cornel West writes about the liberal response to the Afro-American underclass. [1]

> ***The liberal structuralists fail to grapple with this threat (nihilism in the underclass)...Their focus on structural restraints relates almost exclusively to the economy and politics. They show no understanding of the structural character of culture. Why? Because they tend to view people in egoistic and rationalist terms according to which they are motivated primarily by self-interest and self-preservation. Needless to say this is partly true about most of us. Yet, people, especially degraded and oppressed people, are also hungry for identity, meaning and self-worth (1992, p. 222).***

[1] Herbert J. Gans makes the point in the "War on the Poor" *(Dissent, Spring, 1991)* that the use of the term "underclass" itself is a denial that poor people are a part of our society. He asks how is it possible that a class exists "under" society?

Yet, West writes the conservative-behavioralist response is only a variation on the same liberal theme--the social space for dialogue is a narrow dialectic between two options both regulated by a view of economics and politics which tends to reinforce itself. Conservatives and liberals alike are afraid to talk of other things because of the threat it poses to current institutional arrangements. Either that, West says, or they simply associate the plight of individuals with their personal identity -- without recognizing the basic fallacies of the system which override more meaningful issues of identity and human purpose. For example West says:

> ***If there is a hidden taboo among liberals it is to resist talking about values too much because it takes the focus away from structures, especially the positive role of the government. But this failure leaves the existential and psychological reality of black people in a lurch. In this way liberal structuralists neglect battered identities rampant in black America (p. 222).***

West says that this failure to talk too deeply about things by liberals -- and a corresponding conservative belief that the impoverished can improve their condition with a bit more middle class enterprise -- occurs without an acknowledgment of the deeper issues of racism and classism. This superficial dialogue, he says, has produced a dangerous and disheartening nihilism among the black underclass:

> ***Nihilism is to be understood not as a philosophic doctrine that there are no rational grounds for legitimate standards of authority; it is, far***

> *more, the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness. This usually results in a numbing detachment from others and a self-destructive disposition toward the world. Life without meaning, hope and love breeds a coldhearted, mean-spirited outlook that destroys both the individual and others (p. 223).*

However, most public dialogue falls far short of addressing the deeper issues of democracy--partly because it ignores the social space which exists beyond the dialectic. For example, Alan Wolfe describes the limits of economic dialogue which fails to take into account the broader social space--beyond the narrow and exclusionary space of methodology--in which most people are "situated." He uses as an example the economist's favorite game: "The Prisoner's Dilemma" described in Chapter 1.

Resolution of the dilemma involves a game-like strategy and a reductive logic which ignores the relational field in which most people play which may make either option meaningless. As Wolfe says, however:

> *Modern people do not live in a tightly bound world of unalterable ties that characterized traditional society, but they do live in situations nonetheless. When people make decisions, they tend to look not at a mathematical formula to determine what is to their best advantage, but to what others do, to what they have traditionally done, or to what they think others think they ought to do. As with the prisoner's-dilemma game, a theory of moral obligation can either ask people to recognize the situations in which they find themselves and to develop their morals rules accordingly, or it can insist that they act out principles that deny the limits imposed by situations (Wolfe, 1989, p. 67).*

The limits that Wolfe described as "situated freedom," however, are not limiting in the manner a methodological approach to decision-making is -- for the simple reason that they occur in association, and associative relationships are generative of, not only moral constraints, but also of meaning and a continued tension between the Self and Others necessary for identity formation. These generative aspects of perceived social constraints are what is strategically avoided in most economic methodology which seeks both a moral and technical certainty valuable only to continued entropy.

The methodological exclusion of categories of people from a sense of belonging to the whole has made issues of poverty also issues of repatriation. Not only have individual's own "situated cultural space", as Wolfe would describe it, been delegitimized by a methdological definition of a "normal" space, but individuals have also been set aside; removed from relationship with the culture the methodology favors. Pockets of people -- in East St. Louis, or Watts, or a hundred other places -- are not seen as "our own" but as "underclass" alien cultures worthy mainly of fear (Kozal, 1991).

Any talk of community must call for an end to social dialogue which seeks only an inhumane, instrumental and detached correction of deviance from the norm. Broadening

social space is done most effectively by a reconnection between people at the level of humanity; by repatriation of our own. West is worth another quotation is this regard:

> ***Nihilism is not overcome by arguments or analyses; it is tamed by love and care. Any disease of the soul must be conquered by a turning of one's soul. This turning is done by one's own affirmation of one's worth. This is why a love ethic must be at the center of a politics of conversion (p. 225).***

Whether we still have the ability to love in the way West calls for seems questionable. It seems we have simply lost the ability to feel for each other, not simply in fear, familiarity, sentimentality or critique, but to know each other as related beings in an intimate way. This disconnection has made most of our more technological attempts at feeling secure dysfunctional. We are frightened by our differences to the extent that what little social space exists is being reduced by security barriers which reduce the space even more both conceptually and physically (McSwain & White, 1989). By contrast, the primitive man moved in a different and broader communal space as described by Richard Leaky in *The People in the Lake:*

> ***An alternative explanation for this heretical un-Western behavior (primitive man not ammassing food and possessions) is that they (primitives) have a firm security about their way of life. As Rodney Needham has said, their behavior suggests that gatherer-hunters "have a confidence in the capacity of the environment to support them, and in their own ability to extract their livelihood from it." Life for most hunter-gatherers is a steady rhythm of work, leisure and socializing.***

> ***They move with an easy nonchalance from camp to camp, not with a fatalistic resignation, but with a confident assurance that stems from a true intimacy with nature (Malone & Malone, 1987, p. 251).***

In an evolutionary ontology, closeness, and the balancing and development which occurs in what Malone and Malone call "intimate risking" is considered to be a core life dimension (Malone & Malone; Gruter, 1992; Ho & Fox, 1986). Closeness is not just being nice to your neighbor, or fullfilling an obligation, or seeking cooperation but an engagement of the life structure of human beings who live in relationship with Others and their environment (Tinker, 1992). The entropy which marks our public institutions and the broader culture can be attributed most directly to the decline of relationship and association in our culture. In this regard, the re-engaement of relationship and social space is a practical, conservative approach to the problems of social decline because it addresses the basic level the human process.

Recovering Social Space

Community, as the sense we have of the Other, is activated in a space which allows for relationship, dialogue and love. The Anti-Federalists were concerned that this space existed only in small-agrarian communities (Finer, 1965; Jefferson, 1984). It is a concern which is shared by

many Post-Marxists [2] thinkers who lament the continued erosion of civilized social space by Capitalism and the socialist response to Capitalism (Bahro, 1984, 1986; Boggs, 1986; Dahl, 1989; Kelly, 1984; Salusinszky; 1987).

It is argued here, however, that although many dispositions endemic in modern society need to be abandoned, that community can be enacted in places other than small, rural settings in which people can experience and maintain a face to face relationship. The complexity which marks modern society, if realigned with democratic process, can be seen as a meaningful enactment of a vital and caring society. The reasoning is that the technology, the noise, the automobiles, the pollution, the methdology, and the power games which seem to clutter social space are simply that--clutter. It is not the clutter which itself is the problem. The relational space in which people can make choices about their future still exists -- and is often acted upon -- in potential. The same process, however, which created the clutter -- if set free from the current disposition towards methdologiocal social control will still create complexity by the dynamics of its very associations. Small towns only

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[2] Dorothee Soelle makes the point in ***A Political Spirituality*** that Post-Marxist dialogue cannot really be post-marxist because it recognizes that Marx was right about the desparages of Capatalism but recognizes the need to move beyond his classest understanding of a resolution of the problems.

stay simple by stopping the flow of activity again in non-democratic and paternalistic ways (McSwain & White, 1989; Nicholson, 1986). The difference may be that when social space is recovered, human beings re-enage as active participants in the process and perhaps choices will be made more in line with our relational nature.

The process itself, however,-- apart from the clutter it produces -- must first be recognized and legitimized as a relational process premised on a shared evolutionary plenum.

Ironically, perhaps community is enlivened most amidst the cacophony of a vital and complex culture by silence -- not only as it is expressed in solitiude but as it is experienced in rituals and acts of forgiveness. Silence, in one understanding is effective because it allows relationships to play out and identity to express itself before it is prematurely directed or redirected in accordance with some dominating norm. Diversity is allowed to be heard and to contribute to national identity before it is categorized and adapted to the dominating norm. In another understanding, it is helpful to think of silence as potentiality -- the broader space than that which we can imagine. "We all need a little more white space in our brains," as Rudolf Bahro says. It is in the white space that doubt and wonder have room to exist. It is in the white space that current understandings generate new meanings --

not in the exhange of data which is not understood to have a generative ability, only a space-filling ability. In yet another understanding, silence is the medium in which we connect with the intrinsic relationship with Others that exists apart from the historical clutter. As Martin Buber has described silence as it relates to his own identity:

> ***Martin Buber is for me the symbol of continually renewed decision. He does not shut the mystery away in his individuality, but rather from out of the basic ground of the mystery itself he seeks binding with other persons. He lets a soft tone sound and swell in himself and listens for the echo from the other side. Thus he receives the direction to the other and thus in dialogue he finds the otehr as his partner. And in this meeting he consciously allows all of his individuality to enter...for the sake of the need and the meaning of the world** (Friedman, 1991).*

To talk of silence, however, and the mysteries of our deeper connections to each other seems to violate some public administration norm which is more basic even than the need for "empirical" evidence. It is a discomfort which is reflective of a societal discomfort with talking about emotive, spiritual and personal things. Our society is in desperate need of legitimzing public rituals. Even more it is in need of exploring what it means to talk of rituals. In the public administration episteme, rituals seem confined to the familiar corners of an overstuffed box by the dialectics which are employed like biblical text to address social problems and maintain class structure.

The first step to recovering the *sense* of social space is a broader disposition towards the purposes of social action than those suggested by the dialectics of economic self-interest and the security of social control. A disposition primary to that recovery is one which embraces the idea that the evolution of identity is what provides social meaning and generates social change not simply the avoidance or pursuit of consequence.

The Brutish Politics of Dialogue by Consequence

If public dialogue is conducted on the premises that those engaged in it are simply seeking to avoid a consequence or effect some consequential end, the broader and more meaningful purpose of identity formation is suppressed or distorted into the maintenance of market roles. Further, forcing dialogue to continually refer to the narrow premises of economic interest limits conflict to the resolution of class structure and economic disparity or to a kind of "satsificing" to affect personal and organizational equilibrium. Such minimalistic dialogue suppresses the conflict -- and often intensifies it. The conflict itself must have meaning apart from its anticipated consequences for it to be evolutionary.

Conflict -- as the engaged dialogue of citizens -- has a particularily important role to play in the formation of

identity. It is from conflict which change occurs -- but not the prescribed and narrow change of Marxist dialectics. Instead it is change which is a continuous, creative and meaningful engagement of evolutionary process. Each integrated and co-existing level -- whether it be an individual or an emerging culture -- has a conflict which is meaningful specifically to it and which is by and large unresolvable. We often misunderstand cultural conflicts because we see them as historically specific, time-bound disputes, when, in fact, they may represent a long process of identity formation and cultural renewal (Soelle, 1990). As Fraser explains:

> ***By unresolvable is meant that, by means indigenous to an integrative level, its conflicts may only be maintained (and thereby the continued integrity of the level secured) or else eliminated (and thereby collapsed into the one beneath it). If the conflicts vanish, so does the integrative level. However, the unresovable conflicts of each level can and do provide the motive force for the emrgence of a new level. But a new unwelt from its very inception, may once again be identified with certain unresolvable conflicts of its own (1978, p. 26).***

What Fraser says that is relevant to public administration is that any long term or short term ***solutions*** to the problems of conflict are likely to produce greater and less meaningful, conflict. The efficient reduction of conflict by mediation -- which assumes that people are seeking the avoidance or actualization of a consequence --

has produceed more conflict among interests who form into more intensely advesarial camps to make their case. It has also produced a population which is more and more legalistic about the defense of its "rights" (Bellah, 1989; Blumfield, 1991; Brown, 1992; Fussell, 1990; Hughes, 1992).

Conflict has become divorced from democratic principles and its primary purpose of identity formation, because dialogue is twisted into the marketing of a particular ideological format which has been removed from the evolutionary flow. Most conflict resolution misses the point in this regard. It is less important to resolve the conflict than it is to enhance it in ways which revitalize the democractic process (Argyris, 1980; Arnett, 1986; Griffith, 1939). The implications of an evolutionary understanding of public dialogue -- as evolutionary conflict -- are that it is a complex and continuing process, not one which lends its self to clear points where alternative consequences can be mediated.

The distinction to be made here is between what B.F. Skinner described as ***evolution by consequence*** and what biologist Mae Wan Ho refers to an ***evolution by process*** *(Skinner, 1981; Ho & Fox, 1986)*. The first assumption of evolution by process is that the purpose of dialogue is not simply the avoidance of a consequence. Instead evolution by process is premised on the belief that change occurs because

of the engagement of individuals with their environment for the ***proactive*** purpose of continued evolution. Involved in that process is a degree of maintenance which seeks to avoid the extinction of the species -- especially at the human level where active choice is involved.

However, survival itself proceeds from a broader assumption that the being is actively engaged in the whole of its environment not simply in the small space indicated by the avoidance of an immediate or anticipated consequence. This concern is similar to what Orion White and Cynthia McSwain have attributed to the Traditionalists in public administration (1990). The Traditionalists, they say, expressed the belief that what was good for the public agency was good for the public weal. The underlying premise seems to be first that the public and the public agency are inter-related in the whole and secondly that, in being concerned with the survival of the agency, the Traditionalists were expressing a concern for the long-term constitutional process in which the agency was involved for the benefit of the people. Mae Wan Hoe expresses this idea in another genre:

> ***Evolution by process is premised on the unity and rationality of nature. Organism and environment are interconnected from the genes to the sociocultural domain. Through these interconnections, the organism registers formative imprints of its experience, and at the same time actively creates and structures its environment.***

> *In other words, organism and environment engage in continual mutual transformation. The processes of transformation are neither random nor arbitrary. Instead they proceed according to organization principles which apply equally to the living and non-living realm (1986, p. 141).*

The democratic process, expressed in dialogue preserves the process by strengthening it, but it also renews it and the people who participate in it. However, a submission to the process implicit in democratic principles requires as well an acceptance of uncertainty about outcomes, because well-defined and immutable goals must be orchestrated to the exclusion of indentities and potentialities. In a sense, to embrace democratic principles in any meaningful way means to commit to a life of responsibility and relationship and thereby the rejection of strategic interventions. Indeed, silence and ritual become part of the moral life as both allow for a connection to the collective and an allowance for the space of Others.

Evolution Not Reform

The Hungarian dissident George Konrad advocated living alongside a totalitarian state with "one's back turned against it" (Walzer, 1992 p. 331). He urged other citizens not to engage in seizing or sharing power but to devote their energies to religious, cultural, economic and professioal associations (p. 330). Konrad's reasoning was

that by not giving the state any more power --not participating in the routines of relationship which sustained the premises of the state, the state would collapse by reason of its own corruption (Walzer, 1992, p. 331). The more leftist authors of the Green Movement have been saying the same thing about Capitalism. The schism in the Green Party currently is between those who wish to "play the power game" and those who wish not to fuel the premises of the capitalistic system (Fritjof & Spretnak, 1984). As Rudolf Bahro says:

> ***Human evolution began to go wrong with the English Industrial Revolution. Therefore it would be mistaken to try to build upon the progressive features of industrialization because if in the whole historical process of civilization...the destructive tendency clearly wins the upper hand, if we're headed for self-destruction, then we are dealing with the sickness of the totality. It is clearly wrong to try to divide it up between good achievements and bad achievements (1984, p. 212-213).***

From the premises of an evolutionary ontology, however government itself cannot really be rejected without a corresponding rejection of the people because the social order is infinitely inter-related. The malaise of our culture *is* a systemic problem, one which cannot be confined in a cause and effect manner to one part of the system. There is no point at which a back can really be turned without a denial of self.

The argument, however, is not really about the legitimacy of government. The legitimacy is simply assumed -- faults and all -- because it is a created part of the whole. It is assumed, however, that just as the process legitimizes government, government must legitimize the process to re-enliven it. Government is understood as a reflection of (or a shadow cast) of the people. Neither is the support of government merely because of its functionality. Michael Walzer takes issue with anti-politics (or post-marxist rhetoric), for example, by saying that the presumption made by Konrad and others that a self-organizing citizenry will sustain itself is inadequate. Further, he says that to have the state collapse as it did in Eastern Europe only makes the state more available to citizens who have chosen a "civil society." It does not destroy the need for it, in Walzer's view, or it's machinary (1992, p. 302).

The question for an evolutionary ontology, however, really is, not who has the power to do things, necessarily, but how we can sustain and reflect a generative democratic society, one which is connected at some level of meaning with all its diverse members. Those aspects of government which do not accomplish this should be abandoned.

The deeper question becomes, however, how does change occur in government and in the citizenry which would allow for a democratic state? It is here that Konrad's work is

helpful -- even if the demise of the administrative state is not the aim. Attempts at seizing power in order to affect change, reorganization and reform *do* only perpetuate what is wrong with the system and, in particular continue, to support the negative and space-eating disposition that social relationships are inherently competitive. Also the adaptive reaction of reorganization and reform creates and recreates states of being which are divorced from identity formation -- both collective and individual -- as a meaningful process of evolution (Chubb, 1989; Hamby, 1973; Karl; 1963; O'Toole, 1984; Solamon, 1981; Wamsley, 1993). Instead, social space is reduced to a correction of error.

Errors as the basis for public dialogue have potential only if viewed as experimental avenues for further discussion and development -- not if they are seen as mistakes, not only of judgment, but technical mistakes which must and can be corrected and accounted for without the presumption of shared responsibility or even of relationship (White & McSwain, 1987). For example as Yahron Ezrahi says in his support of a technogical democracy:

> ***Technicalizing actions, in the sense of rendering them impersonal, disciplined means to designated ends, has generated ways not only to purify public action from personalized uses of political power but also to enhance it as "representative." As a method for alienating actions from their agents, for making actions detachable from persons, instrumentalism has given support to the claim that individuals can be trusted agents "acting for" other persons, that***

individual actors can generate public action (1990, p. 41).

The assumption again of Ezrahi's formulation is that citizens are seeking to effect a consequence not secure a relationship in the matters of trust and accountability. We trust people on the basis of "our confidence in the reliability of the person," as Anthony Giddens says (1990). However, the technological reduction of issues of trust and reliability to the levels of certainty sought in Ezrahi's conception have had the ironic effect of reducing our faith in almost everything, but perhaps most our faith in our own intuitive judgment. As one citizen laments:

> *I heard ads for one judge bad-mouthing the other. Then, a little later, the other gets on with his spiel, knocking the first guy. I don't know who to trust. I have to judge who comes across the best on radio or television. And I don't know enough to figure out what is the truth. I kind of throw my hands up in the air and say there's no hope (Toner, 1990).*

It is not, however, the premise of a new ontology that the complexity of modern life be reduced to that of an agrarian state so that we might be able to trust each other--that is only one of many possibilities. It is more that a recognition needs to be made at the state level that issues of security and trust are *relational issues* not ones which can be addressed effectively by technological and abstract means or even by the dutiful correction of error. In the 60 years since the Hawthorne Studies it seems we are still

struggling with the lessons of that work. The fact that the workers responded most to the relationship with authority and not necessarily even to the consequences of that relationship is still confused with the idea of behavioral incentives (Coleman, 1992; Buchanan, 1978; 1989). It might have been the relationship with authority itself -- the recognition of one human being by another that was important. It is in relationship that the potential lies for exceeding -- whatever the possible risks -- the calculated and strategic manipulation of relationships for the purpose of avoiding or affecting a consequence.

Anti-politics is helpful in this regard in that it suggests that some things do not have to be engaged any longer. Strategic politics which are aimed at exclusion and division do not have to be engaged, for example. In truth, to engage in the strategic elimination of possibilities is a denial of democratic thinking and shows a greater concern for perpetuating the power configurations which limit social space than with the purposes of humanity. Empowerment in this sense may be a move away from the blocked system in acts of relationship and caring -- by both public administrators and citizens -- rather than pounding on its doors asking for a piece of a corrupt game (Bahro, 1986). As Post-Marxist Andre Gortz says:

There are times when, because the social order is

> *collapsing, realism consists not of trying to manage what exists but of imagining, anticipating and initiating the potential transformation inscribed in the present change* (Boggs, 1986, p. 87).

Beyond Historical Dialectics: Evolutionary Dialogue

By definition a dialectic is the art or practice of examining opinions or ideas logically, often by the method of question and answer so as to determine their validity (Webster's, 1950). As adapted by Marx and Engel dialectics are based on the principle that an idea or event generates its opposite which ultimately leads to a reconciliation of opposites. Analysis and criticism were the methodological tools primary to their understanding of social relationships. It is this disconnection and the necessary resolution of opposites which makes the notion of dialectics largely incompatible with evolutionary dialogue because it denies both the democratic process and the potentiality of relationship. The maintenance of an *evolutionary dialogue -- one which allows the expression of as many potentialities as possible while preserving the process itself* -- is perhaps the key responsibility of democratic government. *Evolutionary dialogue forms a synthesis between the human process of identity formation and the ability to imagine alternative social configurations which may indeed result in change* It is the most legitimate function of a government

which professes to share power with and derive power from the general population. It is the mark of despotic governments to confine dialogic relationships to what maintains the power of the state and to that which forestalls the development of other possibilities.

Evolutionary dialogue embodies the processes of human relationship which are intrinsic and which precede and supercede historical explanations or behavioral methodology. Evolutionary dialogue would seem to require a faith in the process and in the ability of human beings to generate conditions and potentitalities which are purposeful and meaningful additions to the existing integrated social hierarchy.

The principles of evolutionary dialogue begin from the assumption that non-strategic conflict allows citizens to engage in the process of individuation which contributes to the formation of an emerging national identity. It is recognized that many legitimate layers of identities exist--and are needed -- which contribute to the formation of national identity -- that the existing national identity and the emerging identities of cultures and individuals will co-create a renewed identity and that this process is infinite. The continuing process, integrated in the shared disposition towards democratic action, allows different identities to co-exist without the nececessity of "melting" them into one

manageable identity.

It is also a principle of evolutionary dialogue that the dialogue is a metaphor for the democratic process as it is played out, not only in political life, but in all other arenas including economics. Dialogue does not exist soley as the formalized public hearings or structured debates over limited political alternatives. Evolutionary dialogue, as it relates to public administration, is conducted on the premises of democracy and a shared sense of inter-dependence and relationship. In summary, the principles of evolutionary dialogue might be outlined as encompassing the following purposes:

1. To allow as many potentialities as possible by accepting uncertainty and ambiguity

2. To allow as many opportunities as possible for citizen development to occur by fostering purposeful conflict.

3. To create a kind of soft chaos -- through wonder and doubt, and forgiveness -- as the way in which opportunities and potentialities are created and a way in which stereotypes and/or stagnant equilibrium is avoided.

4. To accept "hard" chaos as those events which are not, cannot be and should not be under control of the rational mind, and thereby not intensify or distort their effects and not create divisions among those who think they can control everything and those who can't.

5. Generally, to act in self-conscious ways which maintain the viability and capacity for the public organization to renew, including the regeneration of values, tradition, ritual and ethical practice.

6. To engage citizens as individuals and accept without condition their difference.

7. To legitimize purposive conflict, love, forgiveness and other actions which are progressive rather than regressive.

8. To embrace the suffering of citizens and to love them unconditionally.

9. To generate a sense of relationship and responsibility among citizens by the practice of democratic principles.

Yet, the ability of public administration to envision and incorporate evolutionary dialogue, a broad communal space and the evolutionary purpose of identity formation into its own sense of being, depends on a deeper understanding of what might be termed the physics of human relationships.

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Overview

Part II
The Evolutionary Ontology

A new identity for American public administration will require more than a continuation of the epistemological battles between normative theorists and quantitative practitioners. For the most part, both current theory and practice are deeply rooted on the shared ontological consciousness of Neo-Darwinism. What has been generated in the dialogue between theory and practice has been limited to the creation of an historical dialectical struggle among competitive interests, rather than in real evolutionary change for society or the field.

New Physics and the New Evolutionary Paradigm lend themselves to the development of an ontological consciousness which is more suited to a public administration operating within a democratic and constitutional system than that of Neo-Darwinism. In Part II the basic principles of these new disciplines are discussed and contrasted with historical Neo-Darwinism, especially as it is displayed so graphically in the works of Herbert Simon. Simon presents himself as an archetype of a social control disposition, one which rationalizes all action without the benefit of an engaged relationship with the environment. His work, especially the personal revelations and stories of his autobiography, paint a vivid and disturbing portrait of the isolated rational manager who contrasts

proposed here. His work is discussed for the limits it imposes on evolutionary development.

Chaos, as the generative physics behind evolution, is discussed as we have come to understand it historically, and as it is understood in current physics.

Further, a contrast is drawn between the Neo-Darwinistic understanding of the mind and the creation of thought and judgment and the understanding of these matters by recent chaos theorists. The argument is made that the mind/ body split in classic philosophic dualism has made it difficult for public administrators to understand the nature of judgment and the role of emotions and senses in that judgment. The proposed new ontology for public administration suggests judgment and ethical "thinking" require the involvement of the entire "being" of an individual, not simply the detached neo-cortex. It suggests, in fact, that what is uniquely human about us, is not only our neo-cortex and language processing skills, but our highly complex emotional structure -- an related to the specific and meaningful evolutionary purposes. It is here that Simon's work is most instructive.

Key to this new ontological argument is a distinction between "evolution by consequence," and "evolution by process." Evolution by consequence describes evolution as linear and cumulative adaptations to the environment in reaction to some perceived harm, punishment or reward.

Evolution by consequence describes best reformist management dispositions of public administration.

On the other hand, evolution by process, implies that choices are made which exceed the contextual circumstances and which are made with a felt understanding of relationship and responsibility in an interdependent environment. The sublimation of management principles for more human principles of forgiveness and love are considered for their evolutionary potential.

The metaphors of the maze and the labyrinth, which are provided by Herbert Simon in his autobiography, are used to further explain the difference between these two understandings of social evolution.

What is meant by reality? It would seen to be something very erratic, very undependable-now to be found in a dusty road, now in a scrap of newspaper in the street, now a daffodil in the sun. It lights up a group in a room and stamps some casual saying. It overwhelms one walking home beneath the stars and makes the silent world more real than the world of speech-and then there it is again in an omnibus in the uproar of Picadilly. Sometimes, too, it seems to dwell in shapes too far away to discern what their nature is.

Virginia Woolf
A Room of One's Own (1977)

In crowded marketplaces or at the foot of a mountain whose uncertain peak might be inhabited by satyrs, he had listened to complicated tales which he accepted, as he accepted reality, without asking whether they were true or false..."

Jorges Luis Borges.

The Maker (1964)

Ouf! What a relief! Now for something primordial and savage, even though it were as bad as an Armenian massacre, to set the balance straight again. This order is too tame, this culture too second-rate, this goodness too uninspiring. This human drama without a villain or pang; this community so refined that ice-cream soda water is the utmost offering it can make to the brute animal in man; this city simmering in the tepid lakeside sun; this atrocious harmlessness of all things-I cannot abide with them. Let me take my chances again in the big outside worldly wilderness with qall of its sins and sufferings.

William James
Varieties of Religious Experience.

Chapter Seven

Chaos and Evolution: Rediscovering Social Order in the Physical World

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What passes for political reality in public administration is often a narrow representation of the public world, one defined by the maintenance of an uneasy economic

equilibrium. ***Chaos*** in this narrow realm is to be avoided and order is something which is imposed on an unruly nation and a deviant citizenry. Further, public policy and social interaction is most often dictated by the sometimes subtle belief that not only resources are limited but so is human potential. Yet, there are different understandings of chaos and the human potential it harbors. Such new understandings could broaden the space in which public administration operates and would encourage the profession to discard its protective -- but often reductive and cynical -- view of social relationships in favor of an expansive and generative evolutionary view.

What chaos is, however, is not a matter of a simple definition. Our understanding of chaos -- whether it be that expansive sense of space that Virginia Woolf had or the sense of potentiality that William James sometimes harbored -- is often tied to a personal sense of relationship with the universe. Most often, however, chaos is understood as the opposite, and perhaps darker side, of order.

The conventional sense of the chaos as disorder, for example, has been shaped in good part by the cosmos of Milton's ***Paradise Lost***:

> ***A dark***
> ***Illimitable Ocean, without bound***
> ***Without dimension, where length, breadth and height,***
> ***And time and place are lost; where eldest Night***

And Chaos, Ancestors of Nature, hold
Eternal Anarchy, amidst the noise
Of endless wars, and by confusion stand.(Paradise Lost, Lines 891-897).

This view was reinforced by Ovid's ***"rudis indigestaque moles,"*** or "rough, unordered mass"...which is especially disordered and which causes tumult, confusion and discord(Metamorphoses Book IU, Lines 2-10.) Generally chaos is hostile and destructive in these views. Indeed, Frederic Ruf, says in ***The Creation of Chaos***, Satan himself would have perished in the Abyss if Chaos had not embraced him for his disposition towards "havoc and spoil and ruin" (Ruf, 1991, p. 45)

A Webster's Dictionary definition of chaos is that of a chasm abyss or space; the confused state of primordial matter before the creation of orderly forms; any confused collection or state of things; complete disorder (Webster's, 1950, p. 139). But the derivation of the word chaos is Greek and means to yawn, or a gaping yawn; it refers to opening the mouth wide with the mental attitude of wonder or stupidity (Buck, 1949, p. 31).

In general, however, chaos seems to be defined by what it is understood not to be (Buck, p. 9). Most usually this is the lack of order --both in the cosmos and in earthly manifestations -- as when Shakespeare describes it in Troilus and Cressida. "When the planets/In evil mixture to disorder

wander." The result, Ruf comments, is not only plagues, storms and earthquakes of nature but mutiny, patricide, and injustice (Ruf, p.9).

Pascal brought chaos even further out of the cosmos and internalized it as a personal lack of order:

> ***What a chimera then is man! What a novelty! What a monster, what a chaos, what a contradiction, what a prodigy! Judge of all things, imbecile worm of the earth; depository of truth, a sink of uncertainty and error; the pride and refuse of the universe (Ruf, p. 9).***

Chaos is often seen as a monster and the source of fear and wonder, like Tiamut the great dragon, for example. Monsters are all those forces that interrupt serenity and threaten to overwhelm human beings. Captain Ahab in ***Moby Dick*** and Kutz in Conrad's ***Heart of Darkness*** go mad...becoming the monster of chaos they set out to destroy (Ruf, p. 10).

Monsters, however, may symbolize chaos, but not necessarily evil. They are often instead the repositories of primal energy (Lowry, 1978, p. 179, 198). Before the more abstract concepts of good and evil emerged, supernatural beings personified the powers of chaotic nature both helpful and harmful. Paired monsters guarded the source of life (Lowry, p. 198). The snake, which was to become the symbol of evil in latter Christian theology, was originally linked with the tree of life, with knowledge and with trickery but not necessarily with evil (Lowry, p. 199). Tricksters were admired

in the Greek Tradition, in the Old Testament and in many other religions because of their ability to unsettle static patterns of thought and introduce pathways to new thought (Lowry, p. 207).

It is also in chaos, however, that the makings of the universe seem to be contained. James Joyce in Finnegan's Wake refers to a "chaosmos," that is that every chaos is a cosmos (Ruf, p. 8) Henry Adams noted that "chaos often breeds life, when order breeds habit (Ruf, p. 11). Chaos in these understandings, however, is simply the lack of order whether it breeds confusion or produces life (Ruf, p. 207).

But there is chaos and then there is chaos. Initially, chaos can be understood as a place...the container of potentialities. It is in silence that chaos is best expressed in this regard. It is what is unspoken, or unthought or unrealized (Denhauer, 1990; Tannen & Troike, 1985). Chaos may also be the place in which the inter-connectiveness and relationship of all things is realized by bonds conveyed through the senses and the emotions (Denhauer, Tannen & Troike). It is this latter definition which is particularly important to the understanding of an evolutionary ontology.

But also, chaos is a metaphor for a kind of "energy" which activates relationships and which, as the Nobel physicist Prigonine says, is sensitive to initial conditions so that an effect on one part of the system is felt by other

parts of the system. Perhaps this might be described as Wakanda, as the Dakota Indians understood it...as a magic potency which is both an objective force in the outer world and a subjective state in the inner being of the individual. It is associated with the sense of "aliveness." Among the Iroquois it is called "oki"; among the Algonquins is known as "manitu." "Churing" means the same for the Australian Aborigines (von, Franz, 1987, p. 60). It is the primordial idea of power and the source of power or pneuma (von Franz, p. 60).

In early Christian thought, the idea of Spermatic Words may have also represented this chaotic energy. Spermatic Words were seedlike forces which as soon as they were shot into matter began to germinate and assume shapes (Gaskell, p. 332).

The Greeks had an understanding of chaos, as well, which is helpful to the project here. For the Greeks, Chaos was the first god to emerge, then Gaia (earth) and then Eros. Chaos brought forth Darkness and Night, who united through the power of Eros and to bring forth Aether (Night) and Day. Earth brings forth Uranus (Sky) and Pontus (Sea),Hatub, p. 64). Chaos does not signify anything like disorder in this myth. It derives from the verb *chaino* which means to yawn or gape, most specifically a "yawning gape (Hatub, p. 64). As Lawrence Hatub notes, however:

> ***When we examine some of the first philosophers, we will see that this primal separation, which creates the distinction among forms, has some connection with chaos in later usage. This is evident as long as we realize that chaos will not refer to a kind of anarchistic confusion of forms (i,e, disorder), but rather to a primal indeterminacy preceding the demarcation of forms as such (p. 64).***

For the Greeks the beginnings which were described in the chaos myth were not simply chronological events but ***origins.*** As such they did not cease to exist in succeeding generations, but instead remained an active and live part of the progeny and were responsible for the maintenance of these later generations. Again as Hatub notes:

> ***The Greek word embodying this point is arche, which can mean origin or beginning, but also sovereignty, dominion, and rule. Consequently, the precedence of the negative world would also be constitutive of the positive in some way...we hear of a great empty gulf (in Hesiod's Theogony) (chasma, related in meaning to chaos) in which no direction or bearing can be found, but which gives the "springs and limits" of all things (p. 65).***

Hatub refers to this as the existence of a "negative limit which allows, by contrast, the boundaries of forms to take shape." In Greek thought the implicit negativity of limit, of finitude as such, is given the sacred image of an origin (spring),(p. 65).

Further, the powers of the origin are not unlimited per se but exist in a balance as a primal tension between heaven and earth after their separation (p. 66).

The Greek myth provides a metaphorical understanding of

the ability of a chaotic natural world to generate and sustain forms through the maintenance of a tension between the characteristics of heaven and earth (or between the authority of self-organizing principles and the self-organization of emotive human relationships). Further, it corrects the prevalent assumption that chaos *is* the feminine as expressed in the emotive and sensory nature of human beings.

Chaos as a Woman

The disorder of nature which was so disturbing to Thomas Hobbes, for example, and which prompted him to seek an ordered unity as a defense against nature, often presents itself as a disruption of the normal course of things. In mythology Venus drops a nymph in on some unsuspecting mortal and creates some new sequence of events -- both unintended by mortal man and not often welcome. Love, for the Greeks, was considered to be a loss or disorder of the conscious self and was thought to come from "beyond" (Hatub, p. 60).

Indeed, the association of women with chaos came to represent the idea of formlessness or random and illogical thought in Western philosophy. Plato and later Kant developed the concept that the form of the "Good" is only experienced through prior existing thoughts not through the sensory and emotional nature -- which is most often associated with the feminine (Guindan, 1989).

The Goddess Lilith was an early incarnation of the concept of chaos. As Adam's first wife, Lilith refused to submit to the order imposed on her by Yahweh and was cast out from paradise. She is often portrayed as part snake and wearing wings -- "the winding serpent which is Lilith." Lilith was blamed by Yahweh for having tempted Eve to reveal and initiate Adam into the mysteries of the Garden of Eden. In essence Lilith is accused of creating "altered states" in which rational intent was forced to give way to more complex natural process. She is accused, for example, of creating chaos by way of eating children at night and breeding with devils -- among other things which would cast her as the negative side of reality (Guindan).

The rejection of Lilith, however, is more than the rejection of a deviant wife or a statement of the supremacy of patriarchal and monogamous marriages, but is also a rejection of a way of life -- one more in line with a human disposition which integrated rather than rejected chaos. Lilith represented the ancient Cannanite worship of Astarte-Asherah, and also Ishtar of Babylon. She shares a relationship to the very old Snake and Bird Goddess -- mythologies of peaceful cultures which were not paternalistic but maternalistic and which operated on principles of cooperation and relationship as the way in which a balance was achieved between human consciousness and the largely unconscious natural world (White

and McSwain, 1990).

However, chaos in ancient mythologies is most often personified as being androgenous -- not strictly feminine. It is mainly in western cultures that chaos is portrayed as the feminine(Gaskalls). The story of the Phoenix, for example, is a story of the operation of the birth, death and renewal cycle of chaos.

The fear of Lilith, however, was not really her femininity but her "contingency and the pull of unity." as R. M. Jones has said in ***Mystical Religion***:

> ***The world that is thus uttered into being has two faces, one turned out toward differentiation and multiplicity, and the other turned inward toward God and if God drew back his own into himself, all the creatures would be nothing at all (Gaskell, p. 572).***

Lilith provoked so much fear, Jones says, because she posed the question of how to recover the natural world without dissolving consciousness -- that is she came to represent the unconscious unity which conscious "man" was trying to escape. God is not female in the mystic Christian tradition, but female represents the soul. And, as the ancient alchemist Hermes wrote, "But the chief of all the mysteries...was apparently the Sacred Marriage, the mystic union of the soul of female, with God, as male" (Gaskell, p. 572).

The villianization of Lilith and the Goddess culture, is more than a villianization of the feminine by a paternalistic society, but also expresses a deep fear -- one

institutionalized by the Western rejection of the affective and the perceived need to master the emotions. Quite simply, relationship and cooperation have been viewed as threats to the continued consciousness of human beings (Taylor). Cooperation and relationship with the feminine came to be seen in Western cultures, in particular, as a concession to reunification of heaven and earth and thereby a loss of the conscious human form (Gaskell). That is to say that reality has come to be understood largely in the masculine. Reality exists, in this understanding, only in the tangible artifacts of human relationships, not in the relationships themselves. Indeed, it has been feared, that relationships, because they are not easily measured and controlled by man-made standards, may deny the existence of human consciousness altogether. The masculine, disconnected from the mediating effects of the feminine -- which remains united with nature in this view and set in opposition to the masculine -- must carve out a place in existence by denying nature; a nature which seems to exist only to deny him that consciousness (Gaskell, Taylor).

Chaos then has come to be associated, not necessarily with the gaping yawn of potential generative forms that the Greeks perceived it as, but rather the immeasurable, and not always friendly, uncertainty brought about by the influence of emotions and senses (Von Franz; Ruf).

From Plato to Herbert Simon, the political and

philosophical project has been to remove human beings from nature in an increasingly narrow reliance on behavioral engineering and social control which minimizes the effects of the emotional nature of human beings. But it is the broader understanding of chaos, as a regulating tension, which is at the basis of the Constitutional Order which will be explored latter in this text. This creative tension is ***dependent*** upon relationships which are ***maintained*** through the emotions and senses. Further, it is only through the continuance of the tension that the human project does not reduce itself to a permanently entropic state.

Chaos as Physics

Considerable literature is emerging which applies the chaos theory -- developed most notably by Prigonine, Feigenbaum, and Mandlebrot -- to social systems (Bohm, 1987; Briggs & Peat, 1984; Gleick, 1987; Prigonine & Stengers, 1984). In the emerging discipline of chaos theory, the turbulence which has annoyed and frightened human beings for centuries is taking on another character, one which is delightfully paradoxical. It is one which affords some new metaphors for the dynamics of human relationships in public life (Argyros, 1991; Bateson, 1972,1985; Corcoran, 1991; Jantsch, 1975, 1979, 1982; Kiel, 1989). As E.C. Zeeman says:

The understanding of chaos and strange attractors

> ***is one of the most exciting areas of mathematics today. It is a question of how the asymptotic behavior of deterministic systems can exhibit unpredictability and apparent chaos, due to sensitive dependence on initial conditions, and yet, at the same time, preserve a coherent global structure (Argyros, 1991, p. 245).***

To put it in other words, somehow, nature manages to create recognizable patterns amidst the turbulence activated and maintained by a universe extremely sensitive to itself(Glieck). Another way to put it, as Otto Roseller does, is that "...nature does something against its own will and, by self-entanglement, produces beauty(Argyros; Glieck). Beauty is a symmetry or order -- as in the structure of a leaf or in the arrangement of a self-renewing forest. A more mundane example may be the apparent chaos of a subway station, which if viewed at random would appear to be just people running back and forth aimlessly. However, if the chaos was watched long enough a pattern would emerge of people going to identifiable places at regular times.

The Greeks may have understood this new physics as the science of the negative and regulating limits of chaos in which forms were created by the movement back to the origins. The ancient philosopher Zoroaster referred to what he called "divine allurements" in chaos, which might easily be associated with the idea of "strange attractor--" that is the limit to which chaotic patterns return and maintain their boundaries(Hatub). An attractor is defined by Alexander

Agryros as "simply a region representing the equilibrium point of the behavior of the system"(p. 250). Nature, Agryros says likes to take a conservative approach, preferring to create dynamical systems which have some kind of regular pattern (p.250).

Perhaps the most fundamental importance of this theory to public administration is that the binary opposition of anything, as between order and randomness, is made irrelevant. Chaotic systems have the ability to transcend -- as Hegel may have calculated better than Marx -- the opposition between order and randomness (Agryros, p. 248). Historical dialectics as the basis of public dialogue in this regard ignores the fundamental workings of a natural system which exceeds the dialectics. So much of public dialogue is conducted on the basis of the reconciliation of opposites through incremental bargaining. This is a philosophic view supported by a long history of science. For example, population ecologists, as Gleick points out, have often seen the "order" in population studies in two distinctly opposite ways:

> *Some read the message of the world to be orderly: population are regulated and steady--with exceptions. Others read the opposite message: populations fluctuate erratically--with exceptions. By no coincidence, these opposing camps also divided over the application of hard mathematics to messy biological questions. Those who believed that populations were steady argued that they must be regulated by some deterministic mechanisms. Those who believed that populations were erratic argued that they must be bounced around by*

unpredictable environmental factors, wiping out whatever deterministic signal might exist. Either deterministic mathematics produced steady behavior or random external noise produced random behavior. That was the choice (Glieck, p.78-79).

The continuing debate over praxis in public administration presents two similar and seemingly exclusive choices trying to find common ground -- those between administrative practice and administrative theory. It is possible, given an understanding of the dynamics of chaos, that there is a third choice. It may be inappropriate to attempt a resolution of that dichotomy instead of clarifying the tension, but in relation to guiding democratic principles, in the hopes that it creates something new.

Because Western reasoning has been based for so long on the idea of the resolution of polar opposites, it might appear that chaos theory only presents a determinism to counter the indeterminism of postmodern dialogue. Yet, what appears to be complete determinism in the principles of chaos theory -- simply that all motion out will return to an attractor as the organizing point for a form -- is not. Nonlinear systems are not purely deterministic because they are sensitive to initial conditions and initial conditions can never be specified in any absolute accuracy. So, in effect, chaotic systems are deterministic and unpredictable at the same time. As Paul Davies describes dynamic systems:

The emerging paradigm...recognizes that the

> *collective and holistic properties of physical systems can display new and unforseen modes of behavior that are not captured by Newtonian and thermodynamic approaches. There arises the possibility of self-organization in which systems suddenly and spontaneously leap into more elaborate forms. These forms are characterized by greater complexity, by cooperative behavior and global coherence, by the appearance of spatial patterns and temporal rhythms, and by the general unpredictability of their final forms (Davies, 1988, p.197-198).*

Davies sorts out an important distinction between predeterminism and predisposition or predestiny. The distinction is important because much of social and political philosophy in the 20th Century has been in the avoidance of a determinism -- as when Marx disavows a universalistic plan in favor of the reality of historical events or the pragmatic realists of the reformist era disavow anything but the contextual facts. What Davies says is this:

> *Predestiny -- or predisposition -- must not be confused with predeterminism. It is entirely possible that the properties of matter are such that it does not indeed have a propensity to self-organize as far as life, given the right conditions. This is not to say, however, that any particular life form is inevitable. In other words predeterminism (of the old Newtonian sort) held that everything in detail was laid down from time immemorial. Predestiny merely says that nature has a predisposition along the general lines it has. It therefore leaves open the essential unknowability of the future, the possibility for real creativity and endless novelty. In particular it leaves room for human free will (p. 201).*

Because of the ability of dynamical/non-linear systems to (1) transcend polar opposition and (2) create novelty while

remaining stable, they also can incorporate change and increase complexity with amazing ease in the act of creation. In essence, this means that natural systems can accommodate stability and order and self-organizing freedom at the same time. This differs profoundly from the public management assumption that what is created in public dialogue is simply a meshing of interests or a negotiated compromise.

If, for example, one would imagine the number of conditions which exist in a room with five people sitting around a table -- the air, the light, the personal histories and memories of the individuals, how they are feeling, what colors they are wearing, how they are sitting in relation to other people, the issue at hand, the emotions with which they enter the room, the texture of the wood on the table etc.-- the potential for something new to emerge from the dialogue is always astounding. But what gives form to the dialogue is a set of organizing principles to which the chaos returns.

The creative dialogue, however, which emerges from the interaction of an attractor and the conditions of the context is something quite different than a negotiated settlement among polar opposites. One illustrative example is provided by Goethe, who in the 13th century identified something he called ***Urpflanze***, which in the current paradigm would make reference to the self-similarity of forms. ***That is to say that in all***

diversity there is a commonality from which more diversity is generated. If one looks closely at any flower, for example, one will see a similar pattern of stamen and pestle but the varieties of flowers and the potential for more varieties is really infinite (Bohm, 1987). This is also illustrative of the difference between Newtonian geometry and fractal geometry as discovered by B.B. Mandlebrot. For example, in ***Figure I*** the geometric forms appear as though they must be manipulated in order for anything to happen. There is a sense, in the ontology which accompanies this view, that because the forms appear to be ungenerative, energy can be saved (in a world presumably destined to entropy and death) by rearranging the forms and minimizing conflict or differences. This view lends itself to a concern for homogeneity which requires that differences -- as a source of conflict -- be reduced in order to save energy.

In ***Figure II***, however, the forms are seen as generative and responsive to the environment. As such, their original form is both enhanced and maintained -- even though the natural state is one which prefers disequilibrium to equilibrium. Further, the forms are enhanced without a reduction or appropriation of other forms(Bohm). These ***fractals*** represent the ability of natural non-linear structures to renew and to integrate new aspects of the system without reduction of the original form.

Further, this generative order -- that both is and isn't deterministic -- is based on an evolutionary hierarchy of the same nature.

Evolution and Chaos: The Excitable Hierarchy

The evolutionary paradigm which is emerging to complement the mathematics of chaos theory dispenses with many of the presumptions of social darwinism. Most importantly it lays aside the assumption that evolution occurs as an "adaptation to a consequence" as B.F. Skinner would say (Skinner, 1981, p.54). Instead, it proposes that evolution at the human level is more a matter of choice and is part of an evolutionary ***process*** which has both meaning and purpose to human beings. As evolutionary theorist Mae Wan Ho describes the new paradigm:

> ***The result is a transcendence of the predominately Aristotelian framework of Neo-Darwinism--in which organisms are explained in terms of essences or genes --to the post-Galilean world view in which relation and process are primary (Ho and Saunders, 1984, p. 5).***

Insert Figure I here.

Insert Figure II here.

The new paradigm states that organisms exist in a naturally ordered hierarchy -- but it is not either a deterministic nor top-down command structure. Instead, as Eric Janstch says, the hierarchy exists as a multi-level, integrated of different stages of evolution (1979). As such, the different levels do not evolve ***away*** from prior levels, but instead evolve out of them and continue to exist in relationship to them. Further, continued evolution is dependent upon the cooperation and relationship among all levels. The levels themselves, however, still evolve somewhat autonomously and not in any linear fashion -- so that each maintains a separate identity while remaining dependent on the whole. Such a dynamic integration indicates that complexity in a social system is the natural state of the public world, one created in the dynamic relationships among human beings.

Perhaps, however, the idea that evolutionary theory is anything new may be difficult to perceive. The new evolutionary paradigm, however, owes more to physics and pre-Socratic philosophy than to Darwin. It has been difficult, however, to separate the idea of evolution from the notion of Darwinian adaptation to context in political and administrative thinking. As such, democracy, as evolutionary process, seems at times an impractical and idealistic dogma to management because democracy places choice above adaptation as a fundamental precept of human evolution.

Evolution, for the most part, is treated in administrative texts as the accumulation of adaptations over time; a linear (and perhaps random) process which can treated as a logical sequence of cause and effect events in reaction to a consequence.(Kaufman, 1985, Shubert, 1991). Public administration and its concern for reformism in historical contexts fits well the adaptive pattern suggested by this view of evolution. Yet, it is this narrow understanding of human evolution which is at the heart of the identity crisis which public administration now faces.

The conceptual problem here for public administration is the difficulty in distinguishing between ***social evolution*** and ***political adaptation*** and, more, a failure by public administration to acknowledge the primary purposes of government in relation to adaptation and evolution...a relationship which should not be grounded in specific programs and projects but in the underlying social processes from which the programs and projects appear.

Yet, it has often been the case that to discuss any but the more mundane and technocratic purposes of public administration is to be accused of placing the bureaucracy above the legislature and the executive branch in importance and therefore to incur the disdain of those who still believe that the United States government is a kind of top-down hierarchy. To make the claim that public administration has an intrinsic part to play

in the development of citizenship and community as they contribute to the purpose of human evolution seems to infer both a responsibility and a level of consciousness in public administration that few have recognized as being part of the Founding intent. Further, there is a conceptual assumption that lower administrative levels act (or react) only to higher edicts, as if they exist ***only*** in the cause and effect relationships spawned by higher-ups and not in relation to the workings of more intrinsic common values and social process (Lowi,1979).

However, a problem of such top-down arguments has always been that they prescribe a kind of passivity for the lower realms of the chain of command which disconnect the actions of public administration from the active responsibility required of constitutional officers or makes the more discretionary judgments of public administration appear to be subversive (Lowi; Siedman & Gilmour; 1986).

That public administration behaves and exists in a much more fluid and dynamic environment than that conceived of by the conventional hierarchical view, and that it seldom acts exclusively on command, however, is not news(Wamsley and Zald, 1973). However, this reality has been seen, for the most part, as an aberration which needs constant monitoring and regulation to keep the bureaucracy in line with its perceived role in the organizational structure of hierarchy(Lowi). Likewise, public

administration's role in the development of citizenship is seen as existing in relation to its role as the recipient of ideas from the higher command centers of government, not in relation to public administration action itself (Lowi). To imagine public administration from these perspective is to imagine a shallow shell through which things pass without interaction, only reaction -- and therefore without change, only adaptation. It is not simply a view imposed on public administration rather it is also how the field has seen itself and defined its responsibilities.

Yet as microbiologist Mae-Wan Ho describes it.."nature works by process not by consequence. Organisms evolve in unison with nature through processes nested in space and time, and not as the consequence of natural selection" (Ho and Saunders, p.6) Current theorists in evolutionary dynamics, in fact, portray Darwin's theories of competition and struggle for survival as products of the time in which he lived, rather than the true experience of the natural world (Ho and Saunders; Ho and Fox, 1986). Darwin's metaphor of natural selection supported Thomas Hobbes' rationale for a rule-based society to counter the violent tendencies of the relationships which emerged from that natural selection. But these theories were most likely adaptations to the philosophical arguments of Darwin's context in which Descartes mechanical physics were applied to emerging social problems (Ho and Fox).

For example, the problem of how adaptation could be explained naturalistically was answered by Darwin with the metaphor of "selection," which was supported by Malthus's law that human population has a natural tendency to increase geometrically while food supply increases arithmetically. Malthus's law was a primary step in a series of developments which dispelled the belief that humans and their environment are in harmony. By generalizing this law of natural selection to all of nature, Darwin synthesized the problem of adaptation and the problem of social conflict inherent in Malthus's theory and produced a theory that both ***explains and produces*** adaptation.[43] A self-perpetuating rationale also emerged for the organizational ethic...adaptation by decision to environmental pressures to facilitate achievement of organizational goals in a hostile environment.

A broader identity for public administration is made more tenable by the work of John Rohr (1986). He assigns the bureaucracy a clear place in the legitimate and accountable constitutional order by a careful analysis of the framers intent as expressed in the Federalists and Anti-Federalists debates. To put it another way, in a system of shared or blended powers, as John Rohr describes it, administration exists in relation to the values from which it emerges, rather than solely in relation to the consequences of organizational power structures (1978).

Placing public administration within the constitutional

hierarchy of purpose, rather than as the sometimes rebellious employee of a command structure, gives it a clearer historical identity, a positive identity associated with the more normative purposes of the Constitution.

Public Administration, because of its technocratic/managerial disposition has come to represent and foster a Neo-Darwinistic distortion of human evolution as being merely adaptation to consequence. By the same token, however, because of its place in the constitutional order of blended powers (as distinct from the persistently prescribed place in the organizational-style hierarchy) and because of its proximity to the interactive social world rather than the staged world of media politics, public administration is perhaps the only place left in which human evolution in the United States can be nurtured as something more than adaptation to a hostile environment. It is this irony which represents the evolutionary potential existing in the current plenum of social activity. An evolutionary shift in the consciousness of public administration, however, will require, not more regulation of the public sector, but a broader sense of public professionalism by administrators themselves than is currently the case; one less dependent on artificial reasoning and "bounded rationality" and one more aware of how administrative actions relate to the clarification of human identity and the nurturing of human development.

The implications of the evolutionary paradigm for public administration involve its emphasis on process and the natural cooperation and relationship shared by human beings. When combined with the generative dynamics of chaos theory, evolutionary theory begins to provide a better metaphor for discussing the role of public administration in democratic government than those provided by management based on the tenets of Neo-Darwinism.

The implications of the New Physics and New Evolutionary paradigm for public administration in a time of social crisis are:

1. That it is possible to transcend the divisive and reductive politics which is based on the resolution of opposites by accepting diversity as a naturally existing state.

2. That a natural world sensitive to initial conditions is one which is also dependent on a sense of relationship, inter-connectedness and cooperation.

3. That choice-making about organizing principles is imperative for human beings because self-organizing systems are not highly selective.

4. That authority which is concerned with the maintenance of the evolutionary process, rather than with the production of outcomes is crucial to achieving human purpose.

5. That the revival of the legitimacy of relationships and emotional sensory knowledge is also crucial to evolutionary development of the social order.

There is nothing less real than realism
Georgia O'Keeffe

Chapter Eight

Re-defining Mentalism: The Integration of Mind and Body in Social Thought

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The conventional understanding of evolution derives from the ontological dualism which places the "mind" as a construct in charge of undoing the mischief that the undirected "body" gets itself into. The body is made to be a "prior evolution" to the most recent evolution -- the neo-cortex, in this understanding. The adversarial relationship of human beings with the natural world which was first defined by Plato, made it appear that prior evolutions were to be left behind or, at a minimum, modified to correct flaws which were perceived by the new evolution.

Darwin's work, despite its limitations, was an important step towards reintegration of the mind and body because it introduced the idea that the mind was involved in a process of development -- it was not a new part added to the human machinery at some arbitrary point in time. Rather that the "higher" functions of the mind were derivative of so-called lower functions. However, because of the historical presumptions which suited the natural selection premise of Darwin's work, the identity of this new state of consciousness was reaffirmed as a tool for survival in an unrelated and

disconnected world. In other words, the human mind appeared to have emerged simply in response to environmental consequence (Ho & Saunders, 1984). Prior evolutions, in the distortion of Darwin's original observations, were seen as dysfunctional, and it was assumed that these evolutions ceased to exist or at least ceased to have any functional purpose (Darwin, 1984; Spencer, 1967).

This understanding of the mind, as a tool, and not as a new ***state of consciousness*** experienced by the ***being*** of an individual, has had limiting effects on our ability to perceive that choice-making and diversity are positive and practical elements of life in a naturally complex world. Instead, the mind has been perceived as the guardian ***against*** the influx of potentialities from a vast and unknown space. "If we were conscious of everything that was going on around us, we'd go crazy, " is the common response to the suggestion that more is "out there" than meets the eye. The implication is that the mind can rationalize only a small amount of data comfortably, but more, that it exists as a minimizer of data, not a facilitator of new discoveries and new knowledge. Rationality, in this regard is a negative process, not a positive manifestation which both reflects and continues the evolutionary process.

This negative identity of human consciousness is reinforced by the presumption that the body -- as it is

represented by its senses and emotions -- is largely disconnected from the "operation" of the mind. The logic of the human system, as it interacts with its environment -- as part of the environment -- is denied by a clumsy counter-intuitive logic which says that the human system is merely an assembly of parts which aren't engineered very well.

The dysfunctions which have resulted from this logic are represented in public administration's sense of reform as the act by which prior evolutions are exceeded. Yet, perhaps more importantly this logic has become a way of perceiving the world and defining action. This state of affairs is best represented by the decision-making model and our dependence on certainty and unambiguous texts and circumstance to define social action. Herbert Simon provides the best metaphorical examples in his autobiography ***Models of My Life*** **(1992).**

The Travel Theorem

Over the years, Herbert Simon has engaged in frequent exchanges with mathematician B.B. Mandlebrot. The competitive exchanges, in Simon's view, produced only deadlock (p.276). It may appear that way to Simon because Mandlebrot, who is credited with discovering chaotic "fractals," has a more than a paradigmatic misunderstanding with Simon, it is an ontological one. Mandlebrot's ideas are not, therefore, easily adapted to the ontological framework to which Simon relates

them. Whereas Simon uses mathematics instrumentally to design an artificially ordered world from his understanding of "real" world mechanics, Mandlebrot uses mathematics to discover the design already present in a natural chaotic order. It is this ontological inversion which is of interest to the evolutionary movement of public administration.

It is not really the intention here to paint Herbert Simon as a villain. It is more that the strength of his convictions about the nature of rationality produces a clear and well-defined *identity* of the ontology of Neo-Darwinism which can be contrasted with the emerging ontological view of evolution and chaos. The consciousness of Public administration has been profoundly effected by Herbert Simon. In fact, although many new theories exist which rival Simon's epistemology, the effect of his decision-making methodology on the consciousness of administration remains because it reinforces the continuing disposition of adaptive public administration (Ford, 1992).

The stories in Simon's autobiography, unlike his more impersonal works, allow the reader to understand the integration of Simon's thought with his individual understanding of the nature of the universe.

Simon views the creation of an "artificial" world of bounded rationality as an act with meaning and purpose for human beings; one which seeks to reduce suffering and conflict

in the world (1992, p. 126-129). This artificial world is ***created*** expressly to avoid the chaos and uncertainties that exist in the broader reality; a reality that is openly embraced by the new ontology of evolution and chaos. While the new ontology seeks to "open up" avenues for evolutionary movement, Simon narrows the referent points for human action to the boundaries of a pre-existing mindset. This artificial world, as he perceives it, is not renewed with interaction in the environment but rather ***reinforced*** at a given, presumably predictable and controllable, historical point. That is to say, that the risks to equilibrium and control -- inherent particularly in emotional human relationships -- are minimized by having a pre-conceived "attractor" from which to relate to all "environmental" conditions (Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon, 1982).

The intake and prioritization of information in Simon's view is done by the computer mind; there is no implication that information comes from sources other than the parameters of rationality...the reception set is an ego-centric closed-circuit. For example, Simon's ***Travel theorem (1992, pp. 306-308,312,313)*** offers a "practical" disposition for people wanting to conduct efficient business trips. It begins from the reductive premise that there isn't much new in the world, at least not much which can't be more efficiently learned through the reading of authoritative texts. By his own

account, Simon's travels are structured by the understandings acquired through reading books; books which, for him, carry more legitimacy and more promise of certainty than lived experience. For Simon, books ultimately provide the only legitimate framework within which to gather factual and utilitarian information about a country or culture (pp.306,307).

For example, Simon journeyed to China in 1989 as a management consultant and was thrown into the dramatic events of Tiananmen Square. Although he confesses to being moved by what he saw, Simon chooses not to connect those feelings in any way to the purposes of his trip to China. The passions he encountered existed as extraneous ***accidents*** to the purposes of his information gathering journey. They were interesting, perhaps historically significant, and a source of sentimentality, but not especially useful (p.313). Simon thereby presupposes that portions of human experience can be allocated to certain "accidental" categories; that is to say that some things can be said to be unrelated to others.

The 1989 trip to China is only one of the many business trips which Simon describes in his autobiography. Each trip seems to confirm his theory that little of ***value*** is acquired when one travels. The Taj Mahal by moonlight, for example, is a cliche, according to Simon, who relates what he sees and feels first to what he's read and thereby avoids the direct

experience of the phenomena which might distort his original premise (p.). In this way, each encounter is only an affirmation of the original idea, not an engagement of the moment. Further, the experience -- as a flat arrangement of facts, structure, color and smell -- can likely be replicated elsewhere given the same materials. The experience has no intrinsic value, only a kind of functionality connected to the significance it has been given in literature or history as Simon explains:

> *Anyone who espouses the travel theorem becomes the target of constant gibes if he traveled or plans to travel anywhere. One way to defend against these gibes is to plan your travel itineraries in such a way as to guarantee that you will not learn anything new. Our first trip to Europe in the summer of 1965, will provide an example. We resolved that we would not see anything on that trip that we did not know better already from books and pictures...We took as our targets Paul Cezanne and Maurice Utrillo among painters....Coming out of Switzerland we followed the route of Napoleon (known from our history books) down to Aix-en-Provence. There we stayed at the inn at Meyrargues, situated in an old castle, with a view of a Roman aqueduct from the window and a three-star chef. We spent our days visiting every spot we could find where Cezanne had stood when he painted Mont Ste. Victoire. (We had studies the book of Loran (1943), who had photographed all of these places.) Not only did we find the sites, but it was easy to determine within three feet exactly where Cezanne's easel had stood. And when we stood on those spots, the mountain looked exactly as it had on Cezanne's glowing canvasses: the literalness of his landscapes is almost beyond belief. We learned nothing new; we had already seen the paintings (p. 309).*

Simon doesn't say whether or not it was thrilling to

stand at the spot where the painter he admired stood. It was perhaps, but the point to be made here is that the thrill is unrelated to the experience of the mountain. Instead, the mountain graciously reinforced Simon's pre-conception about it, a conception which had been created by Cezanne's paintings and the interpretation of those paintings by historians and other artists. The mountain itself, is only a reflection of what he imagines it to be. In fact, Simon quotes Oscar Wilde in this context, "Where were the fogs of London before Turner painted them?" "Nature, as usual, Simon adds in a footnote, "imitating art" (p. 309).

The direct experience, however, is more than just extraneous and irrelevant to the information-gathering process; it also seems to be problematic. Simon cautions against the distortions of peasants speaking the native language and conveying their versions of culture, for example. Responding to an implied question that bilinguals in a foreign country might help the traveler with the more subtle nuances of culture, Simon remarks:

> ***But local bilinguals can tell you about them, can't they? Yes indeed, but so can books. And with books you can exercise some quality control over the information. You can make sure that their authors are qualified as experts and interpreters of the language...If you are unsure how to make up such reading lists for efficient learning, librarians are always glad to help (p. 308).***

Simon's work certainly recognizes the existence of

contingencies -- not everything can be planned for -- but one is more prepared for such "accidents" if one already has an authoritative framework from which to interpret them. The accidents themselves exist only as they can be related to his already conceived framework; so that traveling becomes the process of bringing cultural contingencies in line with the already existing "objective" point of reference...one created and bounded by prior factual interpretations existing in books and the opinions of recognized experts.

Ironically for Simon, traveling is a traditional metaphor for the more esoteric life journeys which produce dramatic personal changes whether or not they have "practical" value. The journey from childhood to death, the hero's journey, John Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress; Exodus; the biblical journeys into the wilderness; Homer's Odyssey... each metaphorical journey is marked by ***conflict, emotion and uncertainty***. The hero or heroine is personally engaged in numerous struggles with opposing forces for the purpose of refining personal qualities in the move towards individuation and towards finding the deeper relationship of the individual with the collective whole (Driver, 1991; Frankel, 1975; Hatab, 1990). Quite often there isn't a clear rational purpose in even the descriptive facts of the epic journey. Achilles does not risk death and torture to steal the cur dog from Hades because he is necessarily trying to even the score with evil or improve

his stock options. Ultimately he simply returns the animal to Hades...not a rational act for someone who has just risked life and limb to obtain the beast. It is the journey and the danger that attract Achilles. He is seeking transformation not information for the reaffirmation of a mindset (Hatab).

Yet, even in the midst of a major historical struggle, like the violent suppression of a democratic movement in China, Simon could clearly separate his emotions from the purposes of the trip and only wonder at the intensity of his own response to tragic events. He was a passive observer of history not a participant. His confessed feeling of "great sadness" does not carry with it a clear connection between himself and the events there. He could declare, despite the sadness, that on his trip to China, he still had learned nothing new (p. 355). Unlike the epic heroes, Simon does not engage the life forces he encounters but simply analyzes them. For Simon to have "learned" anything new from his near adventure in Tiananmen Square, for example, he would have had to feel that change occurs in relationship with an event or a person which cannot always be anticipated and controlled. Perhaps, more, however, he would have to feel that there was purpose to this kind of change and that the danger and uncertainty of the relationship was worth the trouble.

The reductive processes of the brain, which Simon describes and prescribes, are also described as ***Neuro-Darwinism*** by physicist Matthew Bergstrom. Neuro-Darwinism refers to the process by which the neo-cortex selects and interprets sensory data coming from the brain stem. It is the way the human mind creates and reinforces "realities" (Briggs, 1988). When the random fields of neuroelectric impulse from the brain stem meet the information-packed impulses from the cortex, a selection process takes place, according to Bergstrom. The random bursts from the brain stem "mix up" some of the information coming from the cortex and from the memory retrieving limbic systems. What results is new information, new angles of seeing, new thoughts and the possibility of new behavior. Bergstrom calls this a ***possibility cloud*** which contains mutations, variants and errors which "struggle" with the old firing patterns of the sympatic system. The strongest signals in relation to the whole context of signals at that instance will survive. A signal's survival is "like the survival of a variant animal most suited to the environment at the moment." (Briggs, p. 45).

Simon's work, characterized by his travel theorem, appears to refine this action of the cortex as "rational decision-making." That is to say, that only those signals which can easily be reinforced by limbic memory are allowed to survive. The result is that a frame of reference is

continually reinforced and begins to appear to be reality...much like his view of the Taj Mahal or Mount Ste. Victiore. It becomes reality because any other signals which might distort it are suppressed by the increasingly strong signals which the cortex "chooses" from the limbic system.

Simon's work, however, also appears to reduce human consciousness to an adaptive and redundant mental narcissism. In fact, the "limits of rationality" is what Simon uses to describe the inability of administrators to neatly separate rational fact and emotional subjective values. This deficiency clouds the decision-making process because it disrupts the "thinking" which results in a decision about right action, in Simon's understanding (Harmon, 1989, 1992). What must happen to correct this supposed dysfunction of human nature is for values to be "objectified" -- in much the manner that Simon attempts to strip language of its emotional power.

The idea of "satisficing, for example, which was central to Simon's early book, ***Models of Man,*** defines human purpose as a Darwinian struggle for survival and nothing more (1992, p.274-275). On reflection, in his autobiography 35 years later, Simon equates satisficing with a kind of "it'll do," natural selection.

> ***Bracketing satisficing with Darwinism may appear contradictory, for evolutionists sometimes talk about survival of the fittest. But in fact,***

> ***natural selection only predicts that survivors will be fit enough, that is fitter than their losing competitors; its postulates satisficing not optimizing (p.166).***

The prescription for right-decision making is to select among those nuances which allow individuals to compete with the opposition. What becomes "competitive" is repeatedly reinforced in the interactions of human beings, all of whom who share the minimalist purpose of "satisficing." Satisficing is thereby made a reality by the process of decision-making; one which re-creates itself by its accommodation to satisficing and one which can be duplicated in the programming of computers (Simon, 1957). Simon's interest in artificial intelligence seems really to be a radical attempt to move the rationalizing functions of the cortex away from the threat to certainty posed by the sensory nuances which bombard the physical body. By placing the neo-cortex in a computer the disengaged "mind" is free to create its models of reality and achieve perfection in relation to those models without interference.

A Broader Consciousness

The broader consciousness which is being suppressed by the decision-making process is composed of what neuro-physicists William Gray and Paul LaViolette call ***nuances* and *feeling tones*.** Thoughts themselves, LaViolette says, are

stereotyped or simplified emotional themes (LaViolette,1979, 1980; Gray, 1979) When we form thoughts we abstract from the complexity of sensory nuances brought to us through the evolutionary older brain stem. Raw sensory data (nuance) passes through the thalamus into the limbic system where it circulates around in what is called the Papez Circuit...a closed loop network of neurons connecting the limbic organs of the mammalian brain. There they trigger what Gray and LaViolette call an ***emotional theme***. Similar to a musical theme which is composed of an organized pattern of musical notes, the emotional theme is composed of an organized pattern of feeling tones or "themata". LaViolette proposes that sensory nuances and emotional themes are manifested in neuroelectrical waveforms (p. 1979, p. 20). This is supported by the work of Linda Scarva, Walter Freeman and Paul Rapp (Freeman & Scarva, 1991; Paul Rapp, 1987).

As these waveforms circulate through the Papez Circuit they call up long-term memories which have similar nuance characteristics. These memories become part of the evolving theme. Wondering is an essential aspect of emotional nuances as they seek out cognitions (thoughts) to organize. There is always a sense of wondering and incompleteness, Gray says, but in the normal course of events this wondering and incompleteness is obscured by the transformation of the theme into an organization of thought...an emotional cognitive

structure. Once these structures are formed they are changed with great difficulty and particularly so if the decisive "thinking" which creates them is practiced religiously (Briggs, p. 48).

The further implication of the understanding of chaos in the brain is that decision-making holds the potential of inhibiting the sensory signals from developing into "mature" emotional themes as chaos theorists understand it. Decisions made without an awareness of the role of senses and emotions in the creation of thought, then, not only stereotype whatever sensory information comes in, but also impoverish the potential premises of decision-making even about stereotypes. The result is a "flat" system of thought, as physicist Paul Rapp would term it, which inhibits the individual's ability to produce new solutions to old problems (Rapp, 1991).

Once thoughts are formed they shape the way we perceive the world. When we look at a tree, for example, we are filtering the stream of sense data through a stereotyped thought pattern...the pattern we're used to. As a result, LaViolette says, there's a lot of "data" that is never allowed to come to our consciousness:

> *It is good to tune into feelings before they get abstracted into thought," LaViolette says, "People who can do this are able to directly tune into data of far greater complexity. Such sensitivity fosters creativity and the ability to see things in new ways (1979, p. 20).*

For example, one might speculate on the nature of nostalgia in this context. If nostalgia is "thought" to be an attachment to a particular set of historical circumstances -- like middle class "family values" -- and that thought is consciously used to filter out any new feelings, a stereotype of what the good-old-days of family-values were is likely to be reinforced; therefore creating a disposition which rejects change and provides no avenue for the values to be renewed. However, if nostalgia is "felt" in relation to a broad-range of nuance and allowed to circulate freely in the brain, it is possible that a new "feeling thought" will emerge which integrates the old with the new context and allows the individual to mature without having to reject an old and treasured memory.

It is perhaps ironic that it is the cortex which is responsible for reducing sensory data to what fits pre-existing models of thought but which *also* houses the human capability for intentionality and choice (Briggs, Argyros, 1991). That is to say, that whether or not we limit our consciousness to a bounded set is really a choice we make about the purposes of human action -- a choice that is too often avoided in the public arena where the importance of "listening" to emotional signals is minimized by the imperatives of decision-making and conflict management. The result has been the reduction of public dialogue to a sterile,

self-condemning and defensive exchange of information for the purposes of winning policy arguments (Blake, 1990; Giddens, 1990). By contrast, Charles Bergstrom describes what ***could be*** the creating disposition for a more generative and amicable relationship between citizens and their political environment:

> ***A sensitive mind will always acknowledge the pleasures it receives from the luxuriant prospect of nature; the beautiful mingling and graduations of color, the delicate perspective, the ravishing effect of light and shade, and the fascinating variety and grace of the outline, must be seen to be felt; for expressions can never convey the ecstatic joy they give the imagination, or the benevolent feeling they create in the mind. There is no boundary, there is no restraint 'til reasons draws the rein (Briggs, 1988, p. 49).***

What might be called the "regulation" of nuance is a conscious act well within the capability of the individual aware of the relationship between nuance and the creation of new thought. Bergstrom says that "keeping up the chaos" to allow as many nuance to filter through the system as possible without creating confusion is indeed a "high wire" act -- it is not as simple as decision-making and infinitely more risky (Briggs, 1988). What is implied, however, is that the nature of the "product" of a chaotic process is infinitely more rich than that of a simple decision. This more textured creation of the ***open brain***, as John Briggs calls it (Chapt. 4), may well be what we have historically meant as a "judgment."

Judgment, as opposed to decision-making, may really be a sense of knowing the appropriate time to "reign in" the

emotional themes. Judgment is not simply comparing the facts of a context to an existing value framework. Instead judgment may be the process of absorbing as many nuances as possible existing in the context and allowing them free interplay with the forms of existing value stored in memory. In this way the "law of the situation" as Mary Parker Follett would call it may emerge (1965) rather than a narrow and redundant reinterpretation of the past. This point of rest in the chaotic mental processes may be a point of natural order to which the individual arrives by a chaotic path, as the work of Paul Rapp indicates (1987, 1991). The decision-making process is different from the creative judgment described here, largely because it does not allow for the chaotic influx of nuance. Instead, nuance is reduced to the utilitarian needs of the moment as defined by already existing thoughts. Nor does decision-making allow for the sense of completion of thought that judgment does. Rather, it stops short of creating something new which would produce that feeling, in favor of the "sufficiency" of what fits a "programmed" model of expectations. This may be the "evil" which Martin Buber warns occurs when decisions are made without the "whole being" responding to the context (Friedman, 1991). The evil comes from the individual's failed responsibility to a relational universe which "speaks" through the entire being of the individual, not simply the rational mind. A co-existing evil

exists, according to Buber, when the creative point of order is reached without a decision being made to take action (p. 131). It is a dual responsibility of not-acting to close off the thought producing process prematurely but acting "decisively" once the thought is apparent.

Decision-making then, in this new ontological understanding, is clearly not the same thing as "thinking," or "reasoning." Reasoning -- arriving at judgments -- is the process of ***thought formation***. It is not the methodological adaptation of the current context to old thought patterns but the creative generation of new thought. But once the new thought is apparent, it may well carry a compulsion to act. In this way, the sense of having arrived at a "judgment," is exactly that -- a feeling of completion of a cycle of dynamic activity from which a renewed structure emerges which can be acted upon -- not of thought against thought -- but of new emotional themata "dancing" with old thought for the purposes of regeneration and renewal.

The judgment, then, in this ontological view, is a multi-dimensional, complex creation which would seem to require a well-defined ***awareness*** of the nature of old thought patterns and their history, as well as an equally intense sensory absorption in the current context. The awareness of old patterns of thought -- such as values -- for example, is not for the purpose of being able to better defend them from the

onslaught of environmental challenges. That is to say, that awareness is not necessarily the same as "thinking about" the values -- values are not arrived at by trying to figure out what they are in relation to the current context so, conceivably, one might be able to make a "case" for their continued existence. It is more that they are simply "known," and thereby accepted as previously created structures...in the way we might know what a painting we have just finished looks like. Their meaning, however, is never quite the same in each new view of them even as their intrinsic structure endures. Values are much like Mte. Vitiore for Herbert Simon -- once you remove them from the dynamics of the natural world they cease to exist as live objects and become only reflections of a memory.

Values, as remembered thought patterns, *do* have parameters and boundaries which we can know and recognize, however these parameters only remain ungenerative if the values are not consciously submitted to the process of regeneration.

There are two implied evolutionary purposes for the awareness of value (1) the awareness allows for a continuity and stability of the evolutionary advances which have been made which serve to generate new change (2) awareness makes available well-defined values with which to fully engage each new context in order to maximize the evolutionary potential of

the generative process of thought formation.

The first purpose is the one to which we are most accustomed. It is the idea of "preservation," and the retention of old and treasured values which seem to have served the culture well to date. Unfortunately, much of the debate about the nature of judgment seems to stop at this one purpose. So the debate is limited to whether preservation fosters resistance to diversity and change or whether it gives us the unifying values from which to dictate future change. This narrow debate is unfortunate because it demands either the rejection or negative critique of those old values -- which are afterall "creations" of the human enterprise and therefore not illegitimate for simply being "old." Further, they are not necessarily illegitimate because they are inadequate for the current moment of time. To say they are inadequate is to say that the nuances and circumstances which were present in their creation can be replicated or exist currently as the "cause" of the formation. They can only be inadequate according to the their own standards or by the circumstances of their creation in that regard. Therefore they appear to be "relative" to the individual and seem to lose their legitimacy as "intrinsic" truths to be followed. They must be defended and in the defense their identity are made stronger despite their inappropriateness to the current context.

However, values are only inadequate, in fact, if they are not allowed to renew in the new context but instead are considered to be something which must be "defended". It is the preservation of old "dead" values which creates the pathologies associated with "clinging to the past," not the values themselves. Indeed, these values, however philosophically inadequate for the current context, are still important to the evolutionary process. If disposed towards the purposes of human evolution, they can serve to generate new creative movement even as -- or perhaps because -- they disagree with newer thought patterns emerging in other individuals. Further, the values are more likely to survive the complexity and rapid change of the modern world if they are "brought" along in renewal rather than being made subject to the laws of natural selection by means of their defense. Values become intrinsic by nature of their evolutionary potential not by their identity at any one resting point in evolution.

Perhaps it is the preservation of the process by which values remain alive and generative which is more appropriate to the purposes of human evolution than preservation of values themselves. Attacking or defending the "old values" does not address the process by which they were derived and by which they will be changed. It only intensifies the feeling that the individual must defend -- and thereby reify -- the values

which are "his" by way of his own creative process.

This kind of adversarial debate about values exasperates Simon because he says there appears to be no purpose to the dispute (1992, p. 276). Of course, he is right in this regard, because such defensive dialogue is not productive of anything but more divisions which produce even less certainty about right thought. However, because Simon sees no other purpose related to development, his remedy is not to address the process from which the competitive conflict emerges. Instead, he chooses to instrumentally objectify the values by making them functional to the decision-making process, thereby simply disengaging from the debate and getting on with the business of being rational.

Seeing values as being in-animate thoughts to be defended is unfortunate also because it reduces the potential of the dialogue -- once again -- to a narrow space that can be bargained between the old and the new.

The second purpose of awareness -- as providing for the clear identity of values which make full engagement of the old with the new possible -- enlivens the preservation debate, however. If the identity of the old values is clearly framed with each encounter of the environment, we can, as conscious human beings, make space in the universe for future generations by our acts of creation, while at the same time renewing our ability to continue to do so. Part of our ability

to continue to renew is our skill in "taking everyone with us," that is by not promoting social divisions which distort evolution. It is the passionate, yet unifying, engagement of the old and the new which produces positive evolutionary change, rather than negative-adaptive "satisficing."

Understanding the dynamics of the chaotic brain may also shed some light on the idea of "reflexivity." Much debate in recent years has centered on the term "reflexivity" as it relates to the ability of the public administrator to make moral and professional judgments (Arendt, 1981). But the process of reflexivity often seems to be bound to ontological presumptions of a purely mechanical mind, incapable of more than comparing facts upon reflection. Here, reflexivity may be described as a conscious "open-ness" and a sense of responsibility to a inter-related world (Woodhouse, 1965).

The chaotic view of the physical thought process, for example, would seem to require that responsible individuals be in tune with their own dispositions toward human purpose and that they cultivate the ability to make judgments based on a mingling of nuance and established thought patterns. A broader understanding of the nature of evolution as something other than a progression from an inferior form to a superior form is also needed. Unless it is realized that the cortex evolved from the processes of pre-existing brain layers like the brain stem -- but did not supplant their purpose, it is too easy to

assume that the rationalizing capabilities of the cortex are superior and omnipotent.

The danger in this assumption, however, is that the cortex is removed from its life source and "re-training" it to accept nuance is no easy task. One might, for example, as Simon did, choose to structure and control nuance so that "nothing new is learned" and be quite successful at it because the neo-cortex has become so adept at that kind of filtering. Likewise, an individual may choose to reject this bounded rationality, in search of a broader consciousness and new possibilities. Of course, to choose to engage nature means that conflict between the rationalizing forces of the neo-cortex and the new thoughts pushing to be formed is simply inevitable and no doubt uncomfortable. Those judgments which require us to step outside the conventional wisdom on the basis of some felt need, or on the basis of our relationship to others, are often those which seem painful, and which seemingly require the most courage to follow through.

These judgments also often seem to be irrational by the standards of our neo-cortex, which in the modern identity is certain it is already in control of the sources of knowledge. As John Locke described:

> ***For, I think, we may as rationally hope to see with other Mens Eyes, as to know by other Men's Understandings. So much as we our selves consider and comprehend of Truth and Reason, so much we possess of real and true Knowledge. The floating of other Mens Opinions in our***

> ***brains makes us not a jot more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was Science, is in us but Opinatrety, whilst we give up our assent to reverand Names, and do not, as they did, employ our own Reason to understand those Truths, which gave them reputation...In the Sciences, every one has so much, as he really knows and comprehends: What he believes only, and takes upon trust, are but shreds (Taylor, 1989, p. 167-168).***

But, as Locke implies, it is not that this "bounded rationality" is a ***fact*** of human mental capability but instead that it is a ***choice*** we make about the nature of our evolution. Further, the choice is implicitly connected to our understanding of the ***purpose*** of human action. Decision-making and choice do not appear to be the same thing once the ***initial*** choice about the purposes of human intent is made. For example, if the purpose is simply to evade the complexity of the nuance-laden universe in a search for certainty, then rational decision-making seems appropriate because it seems to provide the certainty the universe lacks and continually threatens. Simon adapts to the thinking of Descartes -- that a self-made universe is infinitely superior to the natural one because by designing outcomes human beings can guarantee right action. These designs must -- by design -- limit choice to decisions about acceptable alternatives. As Heidegger says of Descartes recipe for certitude:

> ***But the cogito also justifies the (sup)position of the newly declared freedom that certitude is grounded in and by man himself, so that it is self-certitude. In the first place, it implies a decision as to what is human knowing, for knowing,***

too, is included in "thinking" of which Descartes speaks. Like "thinking", knowing too must be a process of objectivising...Secondly it implies a decision as to what is humanly knowable. For the sense of cogito is expanded to include the whole gamut of man's relationships. The terms of these relationships are op-posed to him and therefore pro-posed by him...The humanly knowable becomes understood as whatever could be a term of this pro-posing--therefore any "object." Finally, it implies a decision as to what is certitude. For it suggests that conformity of knowing to known can be gained by controlling, at once, both the knower and known...Certitude, then, comes to be understood not only as truth that is guaranteed, but as truth whose guarantee is an exact calculation (Hiedigger, p.322-323).

On the other hand, if human purpose is perceived as the ***engagement of complexity*** for the purposes of further evolution, Simon's prescriptions appear to be despotic in their attempts to both deny and contain this broader purpose. Indeed, the choice to deny a broader purpose seems to be a moral one. Decision-making, while minimizing the risks inherent in the "real" uncontrolled world, limits the opportunity for true change and evolutionary movement by disconnecting human thought from the generative emotional nuances which are derivative from the environment.

The specific implications of Bergstrom's and other work in brain dynamics are:

(1) That there are *no* new thoughts without feelings;

(2) That thought patterns only become cumulative and linear if we allow them to and

(3) That by over-developing the decision-making

> capacity of the cortex (the uncontrolled growth of the mind as J.T. Fraser calls it) we are, in essence, creating and reaffirming "bounded rationality" as natural selection.

Anthropologist J.T. Fraser warns that this trend in reductive "thinking" is altering the collective conscious at a rapid rate and reducing its capacity for true evolution. He says that computers, in particular, have led to a homogenization of thought and a reduction of the range of ideas flowing through the culture because they demand a way of talking to them, which carries with it a way of thinking; this communicates itself to peoples' assessment of the nature of reality and values, he says (1990). It would presumably be difficult to argue this point with Simon, however, because he has narrowed human purpose to achieving "certitude" so that the achievement of Artificial Intelligence appears to be the highest and best state of evolution. Likewise, public administration's continuing concern for certainty, simplicity and equilibrium deny the broader capacity of human consciousness.

oooooooooooo

"There is always danger of falling behind with the system,"

Macon Leary
The Accidental Toursist

Chapter Nine

Of Mazes and Labyrinths: Creative Order Through Relationship

Neuro-Darwinism is most reductive in what it has done to the nature of human relationships. The creative dynamics natural to human relationship are assigned to the process of "competition" when the idea of natural selection and the drive for survival are used as the initial points of reference in analyzing human purpose.

Competition, as Erich Jantsch says, is the only "life" in Darwinism. It is the drive to survive that is characterized by competition which generates change in an environment in the view of Neo-Darwinists (1979). This, perhaps, reflects the basic assumption of the free market economy that competition is the way by which new, better products are created (and by extension new and *stronger* people) and therefore it is competition which must be preserved and fostered. In the increasing move towards commodification of the public sector this has translated into competitive politics which, despite its limiting effects on the nature of public dialogue and community, is considered to be practically sacred (Morrow,

1975; Wilson, 1989).

Competition, however, is really only a functional explanation for what happens in the interactions between people in a cultural setting not necessarily a pre-destined "reality." The reality is that other potentialities exist which will emerge depending on our initial dispositions towards the purpose of human action. But the explanation becomes the reality when the initial disposition of natural selection and competition is unconsciously reinforced.

Dynamic processes *do* exist in the conflict ridden interactions between people but whether or not they are "competitive" is a mentally constructed disposition. It is a disposition which can be altered by allowing the "possibility clouds" created by affective nuance more play in the brain than Simon or other Neo-Darwinists are willing to tolerate.

Fraser says its almost too late to worry about the effects of an omnipotent "mind," that much of western culture, in particular, has already shifted to a new consciousness, one which ironically threatens both the security and survival of the race -- because it no longer acknowledges its dependence on and relationship to a natural world. It is this extant natural world which houses the process by which evolutionary movement takes place ((1982). It is certain that a tempering of the growth of the power of the neo-cortex will not come in a competitive battle. Hyper-rationality becomes stronger in

competition. Human consciousness will only reconfigure itself at accidental points when nature can break through to consciousness and when the pursuit of identity (rather than security) is legitimized and nurtured by a mediating authority.

The Accidental Tourist: Out of Control

The uncontrolled growth of the mind is paradoxically accomplished by controlling its capacity to be creative...that is the cortex remains in control by limiting its own playing field. For example, like Macon Leary in Anne Tyler's novel, ***The Accidental Tourist***, Simon's traveling manager arms himself with books and avoids direct engagement with people in order to affect an illusion of order and certainty (Tyler, 1985).

Tyler's book is rich in metaphors which portray the "rational" individual trying to stay in charge in a dynamic environment. Leary, her main character, writes guidebooks for business travelers and "people like him who are terrified of the world." He buries himself in detail as a way of avoiding the accidents looming in his universe.

"Bring only what fits in a carry-on bag," Leary tells his travelers, "Add several travel size packets of detergent. Also bring a book as a protection against strangers."

When a particularly irrational and unpredictable accident does happen -- the violent death of his son and the subsequent

separation from his wife -- Leary turns more and more to the "system" as a hedge against more accidents. He limits his contact even further with the world...going out for groceries only on Thursdays "when the supermarkets are less crowded with human beings." He increasingly reduces his awareness of his emotional state (the nuances) in detailed-intensive routines designed to make efficient use of his time...like sewing sheets together so he won't be bothered with tucking them in at the corners.

But "chaos" overtakes his effort to control his environment. Leary trips over a laundry basket he has fastened to a skateboard -- one of his many Tayloresque methods for perfecting minimalist chores -- and breaks his leg. His artificial chain of activity has been broken and Leary becomes vulnerable to other "accidents." In trying to accommodate the demands of his broken leg, he meets an "irrational" woman who navigates the rough and unpredictable waters of life without a "how-to" book and with an eccentric effectiveness that both befuddles and enlivens him (Voelker, 1988).

Unlike Simon's rational, book-toting manager, however, who travels only for information not for relationship, Leary ultimately chooses the real adventure -- pain and all. He is transformed by his accidental relationships which present him with the potentialities for breaking from the box of limited consciousness Simon would prescribe for more one-dimensional

travelers. Simon's rational man not only ***seeks*** certainty he ***avoids*** danger and creativity. The rational man lives in isolation from creation, lost in a maze of complexity with only a calculative computermind to help him wind his way through and get things done.

For example, after completing *Rational choice and the structure of the environment* in 1956, Simon says, in his autobiography, that he was so pleased with the work that he felt compelled to write a short story about it (p. 175). This compulsion was enlivened with the outcome of an unlikely interview with Argentinean poet Jorge Luis Borges years later. Simon had asked for the interview during a trip to Argentina in 1970 where Simon was giving a management lecture. He was interested in Borges use of mazes and labyrinths as a central theme of his prose . Simon wondered if his own attempts to understand human behavior by means of mathematical models might somehow be reinforced by Borges understanding of labyrinths (p. 175-176).

Simon did not appear to seek a relationship with Borges which might enhance his understanding of mazes and human thought, but instead sought to find out what about Borges work might reinforce what Simon seemed to already know about artificial intelligence. Simon projected that Borges' use of mazes as a metaphor in his stories gave support to Simon's belief that human beings spend their existence working their

way through mazes in an effort to accomplish goals. However, despite Simon's attempts to engage Borges in a discussion on the nature of decision-making; Borges resisted a categorization of his work as an explanation for anything, that it was only only some aspect of his soul which demanded expression in his works Simon seemed to conclude that Borges was suffering from a kind of limited consciousness which did not allow him to recognize the "models" implicit in his own work.

> ***So Borges denied that there was an abstract model underlying The Library of Babel or The Garden of Paths that Fork. He wrote stories; he did not initiate models. He was a teller of tales (p. 179).***

Because Borges' response had been inadequate, i.e. it did not meet the preconceptions Simon brought to the conversation, Simon's response was to rationalize the labyrinth myth by writing his own short story to explain his theories of decision-making. The story then was not a personal creation of Simon's so much as a negative response to an unsatisfactory interview with Borges (pp. 179-188).

The Apple is a recount of the life of the functionalist "Hugo." Hugo is forced by an initial need to eat and by the labyrinth structure of his castle to develop tastes for certain foods...his choices being determined at first by which door he chooses and the types of food on the table and the degree of his hunger. To cut down on the time searching for

the food he has come to prefer, he keeps records. When the records do not increase the efficiency of finding the foods he enjoys, Hugo begins to notice more things in his environment which might be affecting his taste...a particular painting in a particular room, for example.

> ***Now he (Hugo) felt the burden of choice-choice for the present and for the future. While the largest part of his mind was enjoying its leisure-playing with his thoughts or examining the murals-another small part of it was holding the half-suppressed memory of aspirations to be satisfied, of plans to be made, of the need for rationing his leisure to leave time for his work. It would not be fair to call him unhappy, not accurate to say that he was satisfied, for the rising and falling tides of his aspirations always kept a close synchrony with the level of the attainable and the possible. Above all, he realized that he would never again be free from care (p. 184).***

The rational, ordinary man is mainly anxious...about things left undone, about survival, about meeting the imperatives of his goals. Like Macon Leary, he is trying to avoid the dangers of life by focusing on responding to the imperatives of the details of "the system." The system, as Simon portrays it, is separate from people and separate from a hero's journey that might assign meaning to the complexity Hugo unconsciously avoids. The rational/ordinary man is alone in his maze without the benefit of a spirited guide and without a moral purpose that might ease the anxiety. Simon writes:

> ***The story provides no heroics, no Theseus to seek out some fearsome Minotaur at its center and then escape by following the thread given by Ariadner. Its central***

> *figure is not Theseus but Hugo, an ordinary man. The story describes Hugo's life, much like every human life, as search through a maze. In doing so it strips the mathematical wrapping from the technical paper that provided the metaphor. (p. 175).*

Like the archetypal senex...the unredeemed old man of mythology who fears change and the unknown, Simon has cut Hugo off from the flow of life. The senex retreats into a rigid posture in which all definitions and values have become finally established. Anything that does not correspond with these definitions is excluded. There is no give and take (Larsen, 1988).

Hugo is the Accidental Tourist operating from Simon's Box and from the assumption that his choices are limited and frightening. Simon tries to make the "out-there" less frightening by first making it appear to be only a creation of the ego -- like telling a child that the monstrous shadow on the wall of a darkened room is really only the child's face. Secondly, Simon makes the presumption that human beings have a limited desire to do more than accommodate their environment by relating it to a frame of reference. In fact, Hugo -- until he is *forced* by the demands of efficiency and hunger to take into account his environment -- resists any urge to expand his horizons or tackle the ambiguities implicit in the order of his castle. His limited consciousness remains fixed on the outcomes which are likely to be no more inspiring than a

satisfactory meal taken from a limited menu. Even leisure time is an expressionless and lonely task of "playing with his thoughts."

> ***...Fortunately for him (Hugo), he found these pictures and his own thoughts sufficiently pleasant and of sufficient interest to guard him from boredom, and he had become so accustomed to the solitary life that he was not bothered by loneliness...(p. 177).***

Irrational Love: Competition, Knowledge and Relationship

In the Greek version of the Minotaur myth, Theseus seeks to slay the Minotaur as an act of renewal. His purpose is not necessarily to survive the Minotaur but instead to risk death in order to develop his own qualities in the tradition of the great hero (Hatab).

The decisiveness of Theseus and other Greek characters, however, differs from the decisiveness applauded by Herbert Simon. The decisiveness of the ancient Greeks was not predicated on the need to guarantee certainty of outcomes by the rational calculation of a limited set of alternatives. It was not action taken and decisions made for the purposes of the efficient accomplishment of short term goals. Action was for the purpose of engaging the elements in all their fury because of the potential they offered to the process of individuation. A calculation of outcome would limit the intensity of the experience to what could be "managed" to produce that outcome. Therefore, ambiguity provided more

opportunities for right action than certainty. In fact, clear circumstances lacked the challenge necessary to the development of spirit so that the engagement of uncertainty *was* right action regardless of the outcome. The hero's willingness to take on the quest was the essential measure of his character. Strength, courage, integrity and ultimately an all-encompassing love developed from the authentic journey, with each episodic battle enhancing one quality or another (Hatab, Frankel).

The larger presumption though is that the hero (heroine) does not act in isolation but in relationship with the elements and phenomenon encountered. *Engagement* is this idea of relationship -- in order to make the journey productive the hero must engage the elements as they exist as a related part of his world.

The heros tradition, however, is not confined to the early Greeks, however. Nor does it always involve a violent battle or only the development of the male. For example, in the first Arthurian Romance of Chretien de Troyes, ***Erec and Enide***, the hero's journey plays out the mythic theme of the royal marriage (1990). The romance of hero and heroine involves three episodes. The episodes may be seen as a fractal, or a dissipative "structure" -- that is fluctuations occur around the organizing principles of the journey from which emerges a changed identity for Eric and Enide.

Arthur's search for the White Stag is related to Eric's search for the Sparrowhawk because the marriage and maturation of Eric and Enide is vital to the general social order, as all actions of Arthurian knights are inter-related with the good of the whole (p.1-40). The journey is not an isolated act for ego-gratification alone. It is more a ***responsibility which exists by reason of being human;*** a responsibility ***legitimized*** by the actions of Arthur. The relationship between Eric and Enide, as it is mediated by their love, has two purposes: (1) the process by which the male and female individuate and (2) the process by which the communal "body" is renewed in their individuations. The two purposes are not antithetical but intertwined by the demands of the uniquely human evolutionary process they represent in which the development of identity is dependent on the nature of the relationship with Others (p. 1-40).

It is important to consider that the relationship between Eric and Enide is not mediated by competition between the feminine and masculine in a rivals match. Descartes would pose such a battle so that Eric would always have to win for virtue to survive. Yet, from an evolutionary view, competitive relationships are essentially "dead" relationships because they serve only the purpose of reifying projections, not renewing identities. The persistent practice of competition between opposites forms a "habit" in which each adapts to its

opponent in order to "win," in the way armies must learn the strategy of their adversaries. In competition, the differences between the two lose their tension. It is the tension which is the "life" of such struggles and ***generates*** new ***identity*** without reducing the original form. In the romance of Eric and Enide, the identity of the masculine and the feminine remains in evolutionary process from an original form.

Romance has fallen in disrepute in post-modern culture; it has lost its energy. Romance has come to be equated with either the manipulation of someone's emotional state to guarantee some behavior in the way advertisers train us to like toothpaste. Likewise is has come to be cynically associated with "nostalgic" feelings which are used to reaffirm a belief in historical theories or ideologies for purposes of resisting change. These developments reflect the Descartian problem of "using" feelings rather than "feeling" them. Romance has fallen prey to the reductive behaviorism of Neo-Darwinists, as well. It can be "modeled" and assigned a rationality associated with the pure intent of the individual. In an age characterized most by its fear, romance is a calculated search for an acceptable partner who meets minimal standards of safety.

The romance described here, however, differs from the sophilistic "romanticism" associated with the longing for the perfection of a given set of virtues which exist in the

metaphysical, and which have been assigned as the "logical" outcome of many heroic tales. In romanticism the individual is disengaged from the moment and relates to the "ideal" rather than the Other. Simon is a "romantic" in this sense. However, in ancient texts romance is associated less with this kind of romantic despair as it is with the idea of ***adventure*** (Webster's, 1950).

The tension between the masculine and feminine is made non-competitive by the existence of love as a mediating point of reference. Love as Hannah Arendt says collapses time (1981); that is to say, love keeps the relationship from "settling" into static, historical patterns of interaction which no longer contribute to development. Love, in this respect, is both unifying and generative. It both secures the relationship from the entropy producing effects of competition ***and*** keeps it in a state of ***instability*** which allows for more opportunities for transformation to emerge.

The courting of Enide and Eric is not the romance. The romance is the journey in which they both engage; a journey which places the tension between chivalry and married life to play in various, emotion-laden circumstances. It might even be said that the alinear and spontaneous circumstances which the pair often find themselves may well be the synchronistic "creations", of that tension. As Jung has said, synchronistic events are "acts of creation in time" (1973). These events are

"projections" but not in the way Simon would project the mind's memorized *interpretation* of events onto the world. Instead they are more the physical *creation* of the tensions inherent in the situation -- a tension which exists in the inter-related world both within and outside the minds of the human actors. For example, in the course of their adventures Eric and Enide confront robbers and thieves, lecherous counts and jealous nobility. The circumstances often seem irrational and disconnected from any sequence of events as when the nobleman Guivret suddenly appears and injures a weakened and weary Eric. Enide comes to Eric's rescue. The scenario becomes a messy tangle of revelations about friendship, chivalry (especially as it relates to the feminine), courage, loyalty, forgiveness and love.

The implication of the romance, however, is that the two must be ***emotionally engaged*** in the struggle in order for transforming events to occur -- they must not simply be trying to manipulate a safe environment or be trying to reaffirm their projections of each other (p. 1-40). They must choose the adventure. The fear, hate, jealously and countless other emotional themes they encounter serve the purpose of provoking new thought about the nature of their relationship and their individual identities.

The personal transformations which come in struggling with these emotions give purpose to the conflict which far exceeds

survival or "winning."

Love, in an Arthurian Romance, is an irreducible essence; it cannot be separated and divided among players competing for it. Love is unconditional, all inclusive and generative. It can be renewed without being reduced and it binds the two lovers and the community in a mutual evolutionary quest rather than dividing them.

In their search for evolutionary knowledge, Eric and Enide have developed an understanding that all are related; connected in the common, "joyful" band of humanity. This love is extended even to those whom they have fought, because the battles are not for the purpose of establishing supremacy, but for the purpose of individuation. The perceived enemy is to be thanked -- rather than vanquished -- for his or her part in that process.

Upon their return to Arthur and the Roundtable, Eric and Enide are deemed worthy of their role as rulers of Outer Wales and are crowned, while the whole society rejoices. Chivalry and married life remain in tension, but in a new order that has enhanced the entire society (41-80).

Conflict and Competition: Evolution in Community

Eric and Enide's journey illustrates the aspect of human development which escapes the rational man who seeks isolation and the certainty of knowledge as a way to maintain control of

his environment. The development of community necessarily follows the emergence of the self-conscious individual. The individual, in this respect, cannot separate the two tasks without creating an "artificial" environment within which to fend off human connections. Individuation, for example, coincides with the formulation of the Greek polis...a community of individuals ***not*** a faceless mass. The purposes of individuals and their historical communities are related and coterminous (Hatab, Frankel). Therefore, the risky journeys of individuals in self-discovery can only be of benefit to the community. Likewise, the individual who chooses to deny evolutionary purposes in favor of "security," not only denies the community an opportunity for growth but assists in moving the community out of the evolutionary life stream into a reified and entropic state.

This sense of related wholeness is expressed in ***noos*** which originally refers to the human mind ***aware*** of its relationship to the broader world. This awareness, however, is not without tension. But it is the disposition towards the tension which has produced a Neo-Darwinian society as opposed to an evolutionary one.

Greek philosopher Solon (640-560 B.C.)recognized that a uniquely ***human*** identity exists but is exists ***within*** nature. But because of the unique consciousness of human beings it was they, not intervening gods, who were responsible for their

conduct and the course of their lives. Key to that responsibility was ***awareness*** of relatedness (Woodhouse). Solon, then, did not equate survival with disengagement from the broader chaotic reality, but instead equated it with the responsibility for relationship in nature. Such relationship required that the individual accept the ambiguity of the natural world -- the uncertainty -- as that state which allows for the diverse and positive workings of an inter-relational universe.

Further, it appears that it is the conflict inherent in the relationship which is more productive and creative then those moments which are free of strive. For example, Alexander Argyros says:

> ***Their is a long tradition that suggests that the needs of society and the desires of the individual are in an eternal zero-sum struggle. Although it is certainly true that there is an essential conflict between the self and society, between the needs of the one and the needs of the many, what is often overlooked is that a well-coordinated social group is a precondition for sharply defined individuals. In other words, such inventions as kinship, ritual, corporate action, symbolic communications, and shared histories, simultaneously create a self and its conflict from the group. Paradoxically, that which a self rebels against, its shared Being with others, is precisely the evolutionary condition for the creation of a self in the first place (p. 159).***

But limiting the creative potential of conflict by channeling it into competitive pursuits presumes an unrelated social order; that the individuals involved in the competition

can safely repress or even destroy one another and not have it effect anyone but them. This assumption plays out in American culture as economic liberalism, which reduces the purposes of human action to "delivering the goods," as historian Louis Hartz would explain it. Human potential in this fashion can be accomplished by meeting certain "needs," which are, in large part created by the market (Sullivan, 1982, p.185). As William Sullivan explains the liberal relationship of competition to human purpose:

> ***This implies that human needs and satisfaction can always be dealt with as individual preferences that have a minimal impact on the preferences and fulfillments of others (p. 186).***

Sullivan remarks that this competitive scenario was not unpredicted by Constitutional Founders, in particular Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton argued that the certain result of unrestrained commercial development, for example, was the development of large economic organizations, disparities in wealth and international competition for markets. The role of the state necessarily became a Leviathan, which regulated the positive and negative aspects of this emerging reality. As Sullivan explains Hamilton's view:

> ***This Hamiltonian understanding of liberal capitalism and the modern state emphasized that competitive action is strategic, aiming at besting other competitors. Hamilton saw that once social relations are lived as being instrumental to competitive success, as they are in liberal society, the public realm becomes the scene of a power struggle (p. 187).***

Sullivan says that the more "benign" view of competition which precedes this "strategically intentional competition," and which appears to legitimate it, is that competition "naturally" regulates the excesses of human passions -- sublimating them towards productive ends (p. 187). Competition then is conceived as being intrinsically true to human nature as a functional tool of natural regulation. The gathering of "information" then is for the express reason of promoting competition which serves this purpose. Knowledge, in this understanding, then serves to "individualize" and divide society rather than unify it.

The idea of a regulating competition, however is a deficient one for purposes of human evolution. Further, its viability is suspect because it has no way of assuming itself, and therefore has no way of defending its reality ***unless it is in competition.*** That is to say that competition exists only by virtue of competition and not as an instrinic form of human relationship.

Further, competition implies reducibility rather than enhancement because it arbitrarily places opposites against each other, the way one would place chairs across from each other in a vacant room. It thereby narrows how the two sides can be understood to the interaction between them. Further, because it assumes the contest is for supremacy rather than development, one or the other must either give up some aspect

of identity or lose it altogether. The best that can be hoped for is a kind of "win-win" equilibrium in which current identities are simply renegotiated. In this way identity can only emerge in relation to the opposite -- but there is no movement in the relationship which would allow the creation of some new aspects of identity in the engagement. The identity of two competitors is likely to be an adaptation to the narrow understanding the Other has of itself (von Franz, 1987).

A competitive relationship only becomes generative when a "third" mediator is present. But it is the awareness of what that mediating disposition is that begins to produce an understanding of why our good intentions so often become distortions of our intent in the competitive arena of public policy, for example.

Mediating disposition does not mean simply a point of view or an interest or even a value, but a specific and inclusive ontological consciousness. The market and by extension American culture, for example, is mediated by the Darwinistic assumptions of the natural selection.

Natural selection generates ***something*** but it is manifested positively only as "products" and negatively as divisive, power-driven and undevelopmental human relationship. Further, the negative is often seen as a "necessary evil" for the realization of the good. This narrow disposition creates and recreates itself and begins to dissolve other

possibilities for the original relationship as the imperative for competition appears to continually reaffirm itself. Competitive conflict, then, is conflict with a ***negative*** premise -- one which assumes divisiveness and therefore creates it.

Conflict itself, however -- as an intrinsic form of human relationship -- is not necessarily competitive. As in the case of Eric and Enide, when conflict occurs from the premise of a unifying mediator -- like love -- it can be developmental. However, reconfiguring negative social relationships does not appear to be simply a matter of selecting a ***different*** premise from which to begin social process. For example, beginning public debate from the premise of "family values" and reinforcing that premises with un-renewed "old" knowledge does not mean that a cohesive family oriented-community will necessarily ensue. It is just as likely that an ideological attempt to "unify" the cultural rifts in society will mean that non-believers will be excluded so that more divisions occur. Another example of the limits of ideological premises in reconfiguring social patterns is the defensive debates over political correctness in which the emerging identity of many groups is a primal issue.

Yet, it is difficult -- because of the norms for competitive politics -- to make a distinction between the victims of repression and the perpetrators or as D'Souza says:

The rejection of authority can sometimes result, paradoxically, in an embrace of authoritarianism. Indeed it can happen with insidious ease (1991) In this competitive and Darwinistic way, an ill-defined authority and an opposition struggling to create an identity in the more-powerful-dominant culture are not likely to produce anything developmental or even to clarify each other's existing identities, only "melt" or even potentially destroy each other. What will be gained seems to be more the kind of identity that Andy Warhol is said to have catalogued; "Everyone can be famous in this country for 15 minutes."

The intrinsic nature of the mediating disposition or "attractor" is what is of most importance to changing negative social relationships -- not the ideological premises of the debate. Love does not mediate in the way natural selection does. The competition implicit in natural selection requires the individual to acquire specific knowledge in order to adapt to a format of predictable behavior which allows him to win a contest. The individual's search for developmental knowledge, then, is limited by competition to a kind of functional, ideology-driven menu. Love, on the other hand, maintains the generative relationship while keeping the "lovers" out of ideological formats and on the path of development. Love itself is irreducible; it is all-accepting and thereby objective and so seems to maintain a kind of serene focus on

the life process itself rather than on the "details" of outcomes. (Malone & Malone, 1987).

Competition, therefore, might be described as an ***equilibrium*** attractor because it produces a static and redundant individual identity (like that of the "rational man,") while love might be described as a ***disequilibrium*** attractor because it maintains the process of evolutionary development. The paradox, of course, is that the competitive equilibrium attractor produces a social disposition towards violence and disorder; while the disequilibrium attractor produces social "order" while encouraging and allowing developmental conflict. Love, then, in a generative and creative manner, produces social order ***through conflict.***

Labyrinths and Mazes: The Web of Life

It is no small thing that Simon chose to rationalize the myth of the Minotaur in short story ***The Apple.*** It is the hero's journey in that myth and the angst of creativity implicit in Borges' stories of the labyrinth which most threaten the idea of artificial intelligence (Gudon, 1989). Unlike the Greek heroes who engage their adversaries, Simon has chosen to slay the mythic Minotaur of chaos by pretending it doesn't exist, or more precisely, by declaring that it is out of the reach of ordinary people like himself.

However, Borges' struggle with the Minotaur provides a deeper cut on the idea of purpose in human action and the limits of rational thought in affecting that broader purpose. Borges concerns his work with the Minotaur and his paradoxical life in the labyrinth of the great architect Daedalus.

The Minotaur, whom Borges names Asterion, is the illegitimate offspring of the great queen Pasiphae and a bull. He has been placed in the labyrinth by the political leader Minos. Minos is the husband of Pasiphae. To satisfy the ravenous bull's needs, seven young women and men (the archetypes for renewal through creativity and youth) are sent into the labyrinth every nine years. All but Theseus are consumed.

It is perhaps ironic that Simon, the champion of the written word and detailed decision-making, should feel any allegiance with Borges. Borges' tales of the labyrinth are of Asterion's struggles with the details of existence.."annoying and troubling details have no place in my spirit which is made for grander things," Asterion, writes (Wheelock,1989).

The labyrinth may well be serve as a metaphor for the mind but the mind as it is part of a connected universe not as the utilitarian, isolated computer of Simon's tales. It is a mind whose function is to create; a function which requires freedom and assumes the absence of final truths. The universe is not a limited box of safe alternatives, in this metaphor,

but a "mythic universe pregnant with unformulated ideas" (Wheelock.)

Finding truth is not the goal of thought in Borges' works. Distraction and creation are themselves the goals, according to Charles Wheelock. For Asterion to be creative he must live within the labyrinth away from the objective reality that the rational man strives diligently to maintain. Asterion, knows he cannot leave his labyrinth. The great paradox of labyrinths is that they can be at once a prison or a sanctuary. Daedalus built the labyrinth to protect the Minotaur from those who would destroy him, but also to ensnare human sacrifices. Asterion is protected from the morbid details of objective reality, but he also cannot escape the nature of his existence (Chap. 1).

Yet in his "trap" of complexity Asterion's existence is much grander than the one Simon affords the rational man in his lonely castle. Unlike Simon's Hugo, Asterion is conscious of the responsibility implicit in having the capability to create his own identity, Wheelock says, and has accepted the challenge. As Asterion says:

> ***I know they accuse me of pride and perhaps misanthropy and perhaps madness...It is true I do not leave my house, but it is also true that its doors are open..Let whoever will come in. (Here it is) quiet and solitude...Another ridiculous idea is that I, Asterion, am a prisoner....The fact is that I am unique...***(p.).

Asterion suffers more in this consciousness then the

satisficing anti-hero Hugo, whom Simon describes as being only threatened by the potential of boredom and a kind of inarticulated malaise.(1992, p. 177). Being responsible for one's own development is a painful burden...."an existential terror which befalls the ego-centered man as he awakes to the preceding. The terror arises from the uncertainty of an existence which is in constant renewal.

Simon's Rational Man, by contrast, is the quintessential modern liberal, who in Richard Rorty's view, seeks to avoid the pain and cruelty of the contingent human existence (Rorty, 1989). The moralism with which Simon addresses his work; his willingness to shift responsibility from individuals to the concept of a computer-mind, perhaps reflects his liberal desire to stop the discomfort inherent in the human condition. Yet in doing so, he also denies individuals the potential of creative action and personal development which is the purpose of the uniquely human evolutionary process.

The labyrinth as a mythic symbol in Borges' work is perhaps far more complicated even than the maze of complexity Simon envisions. The chief characteristic of the labyrinth is not its rigidity but its dynamics. Like the patterns in fractal geometry, it is both structure and process; both representational (e.g. as a maze) and symbolic (of the path of the hero's journey and the implications for human endeavor e.g.). At one level of meaning, for example, the Minotaur is

also the labyrinth...the two have created each other and continue to interact in a creative, if painful, creation of each other's identity. Therefore, to deny the complexity of the labyrinth, or to reduce it to an immutable form, is to deny the existence of the Minotaur as ***related*** self as well as the efficacy of the self's potential for creativity.

The complexity of the labyrinth only becomes a problem for the Minotaur when it looses its dynamics -- when it is somehow made lifeless. In Borges' work the dynamics are maintained, not by the ceaseless adaptations of whatever already exists within the labyrinth, but through the creative interaction of the relational and extant universe which is the maze. This creative interaction expresses itself as a ***vulnerability or the ability to remain open to events as one would in a state of wonder.***

When dynamic transformations cease the labyrinth becomes a prison rather than the challenging fractal of a master builder which both leads to the being into nature and presents the artifacts of creation.

Ironically, Asterion ultimately longs for a "redeemer" (like Simon perhaps); a Zahir who will bring a final order to the chaos and relieve the Minotaur of his painful responsibility which comes from being aware of the infinite possibilities in the universe (Borges, 1978). The Zahir takes the form of Theseus in Borges' myth. Theseus is able to slay

the Minotaur because the bull has submitted to the death of consciousness. It is perhaps a more glorious death than to be slayed involuntarily by a the broad strokes of a Descartes or Simon who, by decree, reduce human purpose to the achievement of certainty. Asterion is slain after self-discovery and renewal and does not thereby suffer the meaningless fate of the unredeemed senex.

The Zahir is an archetype for Borges. To be afflicted with a Zahir prevents one from releasing a hypostat, an idea, a theory, once it has served its purpose. It is the misguided striving in an infinite universe for all-inclusivity. The person afflicted with Zahir practices automatism...the use and reuse of fixed categories; a practice which Borges does not equate with thought. The automated thinker is concerned more with perfection than with beauty (Borges, 1972, 1978). It is to the Zahir that the Minotaur finally submits; knowing that once he has submitted to objective reality that renewal will stop and death will ensue.

Two other aspects of the Minotaur tales of Borges provide points of reflection in regards to a human evolutionary ontology. The first is that Asterion is not alone in the labyrinth, at least in the way Simon's Hugo is alone in his castle. Asterion, who lives in solitude to avoid the objective life derives creative energy from his visitors...the young men and women he devours. He feels connected, not only

to his victims, but to the labyrinth and thereby to the universe. Asterion is unique and his uniqueness intensifies in his interactions with others with whom he is related (Wheelock).

Like Martin Buber's solitary self, the Minotaur, discovers the self's basic connection to all of humanity by practicing solitude (Buber, 1970). In solitude, away from the distractions of objective details and social power arrangements, Asterion submits to the contingencies that are inevitable when everything has equal status in the universe. Everything is interconnected and therefore self and community are equally responsible for action. Asterion, in his self-realization, knows he is not alone but knows that consciousness is only possible through the acceptance of the ***responsibility*** inherent in an inter-related universe. He does not avoid relationship but avoids the historic artifacts that become models for existence and are therefore inherently entropic and lead one to death without renewal.

A second additional aspect of the Minotaur myths which seems relevant here is the archetype of the Aleph -- one afflicted with a condition whereby (s)he cannot focus on any details at all; where creativity dominates the individual's life so that near madness or madness ensues (Borges, 1978). The formation of identity is a process of maintaining the tension between Zahir and Aleph in Borges work -- the male and

female aspects of human nature, eros and logos. For Simon's Hugo, the positive conflict between Aleph and Zahir is artificially resolved by ignoring it; by rejecting creativity and relationship; by appropriating any new contingencies by pulling them into Simon's Box to adapt to whatever already exists there. In this way, Simon's maze of decision-making becomes not an avenue to greater knowledge, or even the freedom from worry, but a four-walled prison which becomes smaller each time its occupant fearfully ventures forth.

Public Administration at the Heart of the Labyrinth

Social and political complexity is of our own making; both how we become what we are and the embodiment of what we become. If we can't call it our own then we suffer from self-denial and despair. But if we cling too tightly to our new creations, at any point in their emerging identity, we deny the endless possibilities of our existence and the dynamic nature of those creations...their ability to interact with the unified whole and produce new things and new meaning. Likewise, if we cannot recognize any dynamics beyond those which exist empirically; our creativity is limited to variations of what we create.

Political culture has become negative, competitive and pathological because more than exchange relationships are denied. Like, Macon Leary, it seems that to avoid the pain of

discovery we become increasingly concerned with the details of the system. But it is most certainly only a pain that will be intensified by muffling it. In the center of Borges' Labyrinth is the Minotaur who struggles with the seductiveness of oblivion and who recognizes the tensions between creativity and the demands of social existence. His strength, his character, comes from his willingness to come to consciousness.

If there is a center to the social labyrinth which exists in the complexity of modern life it must be public administration...public administration as both the created and the creator of society; government as the fractal of creative process in relationship. If government seeks certainty and exoneration it disconnects the relationships among members of the polity by fostering competition and retaliation. Without the connections in the unified form of community, renewal of the political community is not possible and a meaningless and ignoble death is pending.. one most undemocratic.

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Overview

Part III

The Constitutional Order

A New Identity for Public Administration

An evolutionary government can be said to be primarily dialogic -- that is it is engaged in generating a dialogue which enhances aspects of human relationship associated with democratic process. It is primarily concerned with the relationship between structure and process as a flow of evolutionary activity set in motion and maintained by an open and continuing dialogue among citizens who are accepted and loved for their differences.

Yet dialogue, in the conventional wisdom, is an afterthought; not the purpose of public administration. Dialogue is treated as an accommodation of the democratic process, an a attempt to set right the less representational and non-relational manifestations of bureaucratic procedure.

In Part III, the new ontology of evolution is placed in the Constitutional system. The Constitution is seen as a generative document, traces of which still produce change and promote interactions in the polity. The Constitutional Order is defined as the natural fluctuations which stem from the democratic principles of relationship manifested in the Constitution. The

Order creates and recreates itself from the foundation of these active principles as states of disequilibrium are achieved in which the system can reassemble in response to changes in the environment.

These principles of relationship are said to stem from the different consciousness existing at the time of the Founding -- one said to be more attuned to ideas of responsibility and relationship than the business consciousness of today.

The idea of a Constitutional Order suggests a particular role for public administration and the need for a dialogic authority within public administration to express that role. The field can no longer be concerned only with efficiency divorced from a broader concept of human purpose, but must take up its part in furthering the evolution of citizens. Indeed, the state of the culture has reached such a point, that for public administration to fail to make an evolutionary leap to a new and more democratic identity is to practice a false consciousness -- one which must be strategically, and therefore immorally, maintained.

It was so in the old days that when the weavers would weave long yards of cloth many people would work at the task. The weaver at the beginning of the cloth knew the pattern and would pass it down to the next. But when a mistake was made it was not possible to change the entire cloth to correct it. In this way, the weaver making the mistake was responsible for making something beautiful of it, so that in the end the finished cloth was a rich tapestry of form and color somehow different from the original pattern and somehow the same.

Hebrew Tale

Chapter Ten

The Constitutional Order

The complex nature of the political order in United States does not have to be seen as a maze to be worked through and survived. It may well be seen as creative product of the Founding. Like the labyrinth, the social order may recreate itself around the organizing principles of the country.

The Constitution, for example, may be seen as a set of organizing principles from which the social order is generated. The concept of a *Constitutional Order* suggests, however, not only a self-organizing social system, but also a dynamic system which is inter-related and inter-dependent.

Indeed, the Constitution is an intricate piece of art and physics. In the troubling silence of its ambiguities a nation has been created and recreated and has enfolded endless

difference and plurality. Its critics have despaired over its vague delineation of responsibilities (Wilson, 1925-27; Van Riper, 1987). They have picked apart the historical context to reveal economic motives which would discredit its more egalitarian words (Beard, 1936). They have called it a "fluke," an accident in time which by all rational explanations should not have worked so well (Crospey, 1963) . Its language has been used to reify economic rights and as a weapon in ideological battles. It may be however, that the Constitution exists not simply as a legal document but as a national myth, one complete with designated rituals and a metaphorical character based on the democratic principles intrinsic to human relationships. It is a myth which has generative powers...that is the social order emanates from it so that all of the many interactions among citizens ultimately ground in it and are composed of traces of its influence. In this view, the Constitution has been given life by its engagement in the activities of the social order. It is not possible then to separate the original Constitution from the political order which has emerged from it.

In this regard, the Constitution is not so much a historical document written in the 18th Century as one which lives as a structural metaphor for democratic process in the social order which has emerged from its basic form. One does not dig to the bottom of the historical heap to find its meaning, but ***experiences*** it in the relationships of the polity which have

emerged and are emerging in the process engendered by its structure (Cook, 1992; Finer, 1960).

This Constitutional Order is not characterized by the instrumental application of laws and judicial interpretation, but rather by the generative nature of its social interactions which are catalyzed by its democratic principles. The social order creates and recreates itself around the organizing principles of the Constitution. However, whether or not this generative activity produces an enhancement of the evolutionary capability of the citizens depends on the disposition of the government which sits at the heart of the order and which initiates most activity and debate which set the interactions in motion. If the disposition is one which attempts to confine the premises of the Constitution to those which would seek security, equilibrium and homogeneity, the Order is set at odds with its own generative nature and the evolution of citizenship will decline. This is so because the natural disposition of the Constitutional Order appears to be towards disequilibrium and diversity...if the complexity of modern society is any indication of how it operates. If, however, the disposition of the government at the heart of the Order, is in alignment with the organizing principles of the Constitution, it will seek to further evolution of citizenship, not impede it.

It is not the intent of the Founders, specifically, that necessarily gives the Constitution its durability -- intent is

never a simple matter of cause and effect. All creations are subject to multiple sources and intentions (Gould, 1985). But it is perhaps the Constitution's ability to be all things to all people that has allowed the Nation to generate the degree of complexity, diversity and conflict that currently exists and still...for the most part...stay together. Several aspects of the Constitution are germane to this argument:

1. The non-specificity of the Constitution beyond designating initial forms so that the forms of government were free to generate new identities in changing contexts.

2. The Separation of Powers Doctrine and the "blending of powers" rather than clear "separation" of powers along hierarchical lines which allowed for cooperative and generative interaction among players in the emerging Order.

3. The non-linear nature of judicial decisions involving constitutional interpretation of the Constitution. The myth of stare decisis has been questioned by many legal scholars who have noted the way in which the Constitution is brought to bear on the current context, so that the development of precedent is not so much a historical accumulation of law but a new response to changing and diverse situations.

4. A strong Federalist system which seemed to recognize that the Constitution, did and would create, a Constitutional Order which would require a political center of gravity. Implicit in this is the idea that Community is at least in part derivative from the Constitution so that the Constitution exists not so much to protect citizens from each other but to serve as a connecting point for their shared humanity.

Calling the Constitution a metaphor or a mythological

framework, however, might seem demeaning or an attempt to reduce its importance to something fleeting and intangible. In this argument, however, quite the reverse is true. A mythology might be considered the conveyor of the original forms of the Constitution and therefore the way which the "feeling tones," as John Briggs would call them (Briggs, 1988; May, 1991) are conveyed from one context to the another without over-prescribing action which might stop the flow of evolutionary activity. Mythologies are essentially generative metaphors which serve to set in motion a dialogue which -- whatever the circumstances -- grounds that dialogue in the framework of the mythology. The particular narrative form of the Constitution -- transferred through dialogue -- contributes to its ability to become part of the culture which it has helped create. For example as James Liska says in *The Semiology of Myth*

> ***What one witnesses in a myth is a displacement of the rules and values that constitute the culture into the creations of the imagination (1989, p. 216).***

As a living framework, the Constitution does not prescribe the outcomes of the dialogue but instead allows the dialogue, and the context in which it appears, to interact freely with the original forms of the mythology in a continuing process of renewal through evaluation, as Liska would describe it. What emerges is some reconfiguration -- but one which is inextricably part of the original framework. As Liska says:

Myth should be seen as a prologue to discourse;

> *discourse can be viewed as reasoned elaboration of the values and rules found in the myth. Where myth no longer generates discourse, it becomes the static repetition of dogma, where discourse fails to avail itself of myth and fable, it loses the chance to regenerate itself, and severs the tie to community (p. 218).*

It is common to think of the Constitution as a symbol existing as an expression of society which supports what has historically been created in the political and social arena. But as merely an historical symbol -- disconnected from current social process -- the Constitution is thereby seen as "supportive of" or the "affirmation of" social events, not constitutive of them in the sense that the Constitution is the actual source of those events and relations. The symbol then is an "ideal" rather than a real center of social process (Edleman, 1971).

To put it another way, the Constitution is secondary to social process as a symbol rather than part of it. If the complexity of public administration, and the social order in general, seems puzzling it may be because we fail to recognize that the Constitution *generates* the complexity, it does not simply affirm specific actions which are in accordance with its more clear legal precepts.

The Constitution generates the complexity by setting in motion a dialogue around its original forms -- a dialogue which is maintained by carrying forward the form of mythology which generates and regenerates new dialogue among ever-changing

circumstances while retaining both the original form and successive evolutionary manifestations -- each of which can interact with the environment. However, conceivably each of the manifestations which are generated, however diverse, are connected with the democratic principles suggested by the Constitution.

In this regard, however, as mythological framework, the Constitution requires that it be engaged and that the framework be known for the dialogue to be generative. For example, a symbol is capable of generating a specific feeling...say patriotism...which may stir an individual to action but it does not require an engagement of that individual in much more than a reactionary manner. Symbols -- at least in the conventional understanding, also, seem to be affirming rather than generative. That is, they serve to reinforce existing patterns of thought. It is not to say that symbols -- and in particular the emotions associated with them -- cannot provoke thought about their meaning but it is not the same provocation that engages an individual in a dialogue about their own evolution.

The reason this may be so is because the Constitution, by its ambiguous nature -- does not prescribe action for most circumstances. It allows for dialogue to occur around its forms in an endless and diverse field of potentialities. This might be illustrated by borrowing an analogy from biologist Stephen Jay Gould about genetic determinacy. When people hear that

something is genetically inherited they often assume than means "inevitable", he says (1985) But that is not the case.

> ***Genes do not make specific bits and pieces of a body; they code for a range of forms under an array of environmental conditions. (p.33)***

If we think of the Constitution as the kind of "genetic code" for the political/social order, Gould's work might help explain its generative nature.

> ***How the complex genetic code expresses itself is variable, depending upon the interaction of a great many genes and the way the genes are pushed and pulled into expressing themselves by the environment (p. 33).***

The evolution of civil rights law, for example, has been anything but linear or deterministic. It is regulated by a continued dialogue with the general principles of the Constitution (Rohr, 1986). In other areas constitutional principles have interacted with environmental and technological phenonmenon hardly imagined by the Founders which have created new manifestations of the Constitutional Order.

But how does a "genetic code" avoid being simply reactive/adaptive? It would seem to require a certain consciousness about the nature of the genetic forms and a sense of purpose in regards to evolution would be necessary. This might be compared in our analogy to Constitutional Literacy (Volcker, 1987). The importance of such literacy is not necessarily that it allows citizens to manipulate the Constitution to further specific ideologic ends, rather that

such literacy constitutes a conscious engagement of the democratic forms of the Constitution which exist within the culture. The Constitution is not then simply a tool or a technology for winning a policy argument or rationalizing state action, but is a generative source of evolutionary dialogue and development.

Further, the Constitution -- because of the possibilities available for evolution within its framework -- seems to require that citizens make choices about the nature of that evolution. For example, it is not possible, or productive, to reduce the Constitution to one specific myth. It would be easy enough to make a case for the predominance of the Promethean myth in the social contract theory which influenced the Founders and which expresses itself in our market culture (Tucker, 1972). The adversarial disposition towards nature and the drive towards a man-made world so explicit in Herbert Simon's influence on Public Administration, for example, are imbedded in the Promethean defiance of absolutes and the perceived supremacy of the human mind over nature. It is this myth which perhaps clouds the perception of the Constitution as generative -- because such generation implies that the Constitution, although human-made, has taken on a life of its own and is itself therefore a threat to the domination myth.

The Promethean myth threatens to suppress all other aspects of the Constitutional Order in our current culture because of

its self-affirming rationality. The drive to maintain the supremacy and isolation of the human mind through behavioral technology has suppressed those affective and sensory processes which would allow for other myths to be generated within the Order. Most political action has become simply adaptive to the market model which is suited to the adversarial Promethean myth.

This is especially evident in the increasing belief in the manager-president, one who uses the democratic process to market specific ideological agendas in a hyper-rational way rather than govern as the "first among equals" in a democratic process (Hamilton, et al, 1961; Seidman & Gilmour, 1986). The instrumentalism of the use of the democratic process to effect ideologic ends denies that the system exists as an inseparable whole -- so that, although the reductive acts of any part of the system affects the entire system, it is not recognized as such. Instead, dialogue focuses on blame and critique which furthers the reduction until the entire system winds down into a self-blaming state of self-imposed despair.

It may be helpful to compare the Constitution and the idea of an emerging Constitutional Order to the myth of the Philosopher's Stone. The alchemists based their work:

> ***on the belief that the universe is a unity. The alchemists found a principle of unity and order in the substance called First Matter, which remains unchanged behind all diversity. First Matter is not matter in any normal sense of the term, but the possibility of matter (Briggs, 1988, p. 46).***

Once First Matter had been distilled and its spark of life released, First Matter and spark were then recombined into a Philosopher's Stone from which new and amazing properties were said to emerge. At this stage, according to physicist John Briggs, the prima materia possessed the ability to produce new elements, convey immortality and ascend to the power of what alchemists called "multiplication or augmentation"...the ability to produce more of itself (p.47).

The key property of the Philosopher's Stone is that it is both the "object sought and its own raw material" (p.47). That is to say, in our analogy, the Constitution is both the created and the creator and as such it lives in and enhances the social relations of its creations. Further, the process of alchemy and achieving the Philosopher's Stone, is not a passive one but requires active engagement of the prima materia, work and choices by the alchemists (p.47).

It can be argued, for example, that not only was the Founding constitutive of public administration, as John Rohr has detailed, but that the "constitutiveness" continues on in the day to day practices of those bodies, including public administration, which were conceived at the Founding. Brian Cook, drawing from John Burke, offers this example when he describes what he calls constitutive public administration:

> ***Here the special quality of the bureaucracy as an institution -- expertise -- comes into play, for public organizations can employ their expertise to***

> *"discover" the objective interests of the community, study them and determine how they fit into the interest of the whole -- the regime. Administrative agencies thus represent ideas or rational constructs, which are as much a part of what constitutes the American regime as citizens, their representatives, and the institutions of government. Agencies represent, or give organized existence to, "the environment," or "the economy" and define how citizens are able to relate to one another in environmentally or economically rational ways. In their capacity as implementors, agencies " enable political formations to develop and change (1992, p. 50).*

Public administration was given birth by the operation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, as Cook describes it, and therefore is continuous with the intent of the Founding Fathers as John Rohr carefully documents in his reading of the Federalist and Anti-Federalist papers. However, public administration is therefore also continuous with the living "spirit" of the Constitution as it exists in the relational environment of political and social life.

The Constitution is not purely a rational document in this regard -- although it accommodates an expression of modernist rationality. The document endures not by an understanding of the historical context in which it was conceived as much as by an understanding of the dynamics which keep the document "in process" in *any* historical context. That is to say that the Constitution, as with all mythology, can be understood in a number of dimensions.

It is possible, for example, to say that the Constitution and the Separation of Powers doctrine was intended to answer the

Hobbesian concerns about the avarice among men and the perceived historical need to be free of the tyranny of individuals.. a view which would support how history has unfolded before, and since, the Founding (Fredrerich, 1968; Ryn, 1990; Wright, 1958). It is also possible to say, however, that the structure of the Separation of Powers doctrine can the ***potential*** of providing the continued flow of creative energy in an order created and maintained by the dynamics of the Constitution. This is so if the negative historical understanding of human relationships which has dominated the management paradigm to this point can be altered.

It is only through the affective, however -- and not through linear, historical or legal understandings -- that we can reconnect with the potential always existing in the organizing principles of the Constitution, whatever the historical explanation. The logic of this is that diverse elements of society -- each seeking the formation of identity -- share space in the intrinsic relationship with the Constitution itself. The implied responsibility to the whole which exists in this relationship, however, is activated only through affective relationships in which the shared sense of connectedness is felt. The affective is timeless in this sense, and can only be made a servant to historical and linear rationality if it is reduced to its functionality by management. It might be said, therefore, that the special quality of public administration --

that of expertise -- must carry with it a particular ***affective*** connection to the polity for the representation to be truly constitutive as Brain Cook perceives it.

A "refounding" of public administration through its constitutional roots as proposed by the John Rohr, Gary Wamsley and the Blacksburg Group (1990), is important, not necessarily because it devises a new rational and historical argument for the legitimacy of public administration, but because it makes a compelling case for reconnecting the purposes of public administration with the original organizing principles of the constitution and thereby dislodges the discipline from its current quagmire. In this regard, the proposed professional emphasis on Constitutional Literacy may be important, not just as an understanding of the legal basis of public administration, but because it reconnects publicc administration to the Constitution as a point of reflection in coming to terms with a collective shared relationship and responsibility to the whole.

This implies an intrinsic legitimacy -- as opposed to a historical legitimacy -- of public administration. The legitimacy derives from its existence as a continuing expression of the Constitutional Order, one expressed and experienced most clearly in public administration's relationships among the polity. To understand this relational legitimacy of Public Administration, it helps to consider the state of evolutionary consciousness existing among the Founders. Such a consciousness

-- as an ontological disposition -- is understood as being different from the intent of the Founders in relation to their historical context. Instead, it has to do with the Founders sense of social space as it existed before the achievement of a monistic society.

A Different Consciousness

It is not simple to define the intent of the Founders of the Constitution. Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson alone represent two complex understandings of the meaning of the process in which they were engaged, not to mention the multifarious other personalities and dispositions associated with the production of that document.

What might be speculated upon, however, is that the Founders lived in a time of different evolutionary consciousness -- one in which the collective had not yet been conditioned by the paradigm of management and the technology which supports it. Joe Cropsey has said that America is Modernism working itself out (1963). This suggests the premise here, that the social move to another unwelt as anthropologist J.T. Fraser would call it, one in which relationships are not yet broken apart by the premises of the management paradigm, had not yet been accomplished. Other possibilities were still imaginable -- including those associated with the ability of the nation to renew itself through its political interactions (Fraser, 1982).

This difference manifests itself most in the Separation of Powers doctrine.

Until the work of John Rohr, John Burke, Brian Cook and others, the conventional wisdom about the separation of powers doctrine was that "separation of powers" meant just that. The three branches of government had clear lines of authority which were "checked" by watch-dog style measures by the other, conceptually "separate" branches of government. Government itself appeared to be disjointed, existing in three different realms and inter-acting only in a negative and defensive way. The metaphor for government which was suggested was one of adversarial and distrustful politicians constantly vying for their share of power.

Who should have control has been a constant topic of constitutional debate. Woodrow Wilson, for example, complained that the delineation of executive power was not clear enough for the purposes of scientific management and considered (before he thought better of its impact on the balance of the system) proposing a constitutional amendment which would have corrected the deficiency (Van Riper, 1987). The ambiguities about the Separation of Powers doctrine, however, serve the purpose of allowing the system to renew itself in the continuing battles over its meaning, while remaining stable, in changing conditions (Rohr, 1978, 1986).

John Rohr, however, has suggested, that the doctrine really

represents less a separation of powers, as a "blending of powers (1986). This concept produces a dramatic change in the view of the relationship among the members of government. Rick Green explains this as illustrating that the doctrine was an invitation to ***cooperation*** rather than a curb against the excesses of competitors (Green, 1988). [1] In this regard government self-organizes, not in opposition to itself, but in accordance with the organizing principles of the Constitution based on democratic process. Indeed, one branch of government cannot get anything done without the cooperation of the other two so that government takes on the "high-tone" suggested by Alexander Hamilton (1961).

Cooperation was perhaps the theme of the Federalists and Anti-Federalist debates which were about how active relationships could be maintained with citizens through appropriate regulation of government (Syrett, Vol. I. p. 88; Cousins, 1958). The Anti-Federalists were concerned about "negative democracy" developing among people who could not maintain the kind of face to face relationships possible in small, de-centralized communities (Jefferson, 1984). Hamilton was concerned more with maintaining a centralized sense of national identity from which social activity could be regulated (Syrett, Vol. 4) Hamilton's understanding of "centralized" may

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[1]. James Madison, of course, clearly saw it as a hedge against unruly competition.

have expressed a concern for relationships based on the need of a clear attachment to the organizing principles of the polity rather than simply an argument for a strong central government, one which was well-administered (Green). It seems this is expressed most in Hamilton's concern for diversity and the proliferation of variety in the commerce sector, or what he termed a commercial republic (Syrett, Vol. 1, 4,5 ; Wills, 1981). [2]

This state of diversity was not likely to exist without conflict, however. But it is argued here that Hamilton's argument was not necessarily a Hobbesian one, or a Madisonian one -- that government was there to regulate and mediate unruly interests. Instead it might be interpreted as more that central government -- as the keeper of the organizing principles -- allowed and fostered a plurality which wasn't possible without that common bond (Syrett, I.). It is a more positive role than that of conflict management and sanctions the government's role in increasing the complexity and therefore the evolution of the society.

For example, the "natural democracy" which reigned in the period of Jeffersonian republicanism in this country depended on a very homogeneous social, racial and religious base. American society was essentially white, male, Protestant and composed of

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[2] For a more complete description of Hamilton's dispositions see the work of Richard Green.

small proprietors (Melossi, p. 1990, p. 105). These demographics, of course, changed after the Civil War and with the rise of industrialism. It is possible that commerce became a failed project in our society for diversity and democracy as the result of the failed alignment between Jeffersonian democracy and the organizing principles of a central government after the Founding.

The Jeffersonian view of plebestitory democracy -- in which the will of the people at any one time expresses the common good -- (Ryn, p. 180) and the Hamiltonian support of a "high-toned" central government are often seen as opposites which achieved a compromise in the federalist system (Mee, 1987; Friedrich, 1968; Wright, 1958). Historically, this is, of course, true. However, from a different ontological dispositions the two views appear to be related opposites. The Constitution as a paradox of structure and process expresses this positive interaction of the two (and perhaps) more understandings incorporated in the Federalist and Anti-Federalist tensions.

That is to say that the fluctuations of a free and active populace -- but one connected to the organizing principles of the Constitution -- could create and recreate the social order, while maintaining its original form and stability. Further, that a common grounding of the population in the shared principles of the Constitution could serve to mediate differences in a manner which did not discredit the differences, as much as promote a

proliferation of difference. From this ontological perspective Hamilton may not have seen commerce itself as goal so much as commerce was seen a generative and inclusive means by which differences, as they were understood by the Founders, might proliferate within a Constitutional Order. But the Commerial Republic as Hamilton envisioned it and as it has come to be associated with capitalism and the industrial/techical state, of course, has been a failed project for diversity (Dunn, 1992; Harrington, 1983; Heller & Feher, 1991; Merchant, 1992; Miles, 1985; Pippen, 1991; Reid, 1990).

The natural law which seemed at first to lead Hamilton, in particular, to recognize natural relationships which were likely to be cooperative in a commercial setting, later became the rationale for Manifest Destiny -- a masculine distortion of the idea of relationship with nature in which the divine relationship became a divine right to rule nature (Merchant, 1960; Heller & Feher). It is the idea of relationship, shared responsibility and cooperation implicit in the Founding consciousness which was lost by this distortion. The industrial revolution and the management paradigm further shifted the original evolutionary consciousness of the Founders, until, in the current context, it is hard to imagine a relational consciousness at all.

The Constitution as Dissipative Structure

The Separation of Powers Doctrine displays qualities which are more amenable to dissipative structures. In the analogy used here dissipative structures are those which operate at a level of conflict and confrontation and which disassemble and reassemble around the organizing principles of the Constitution in a process of self-renewal. They contrast with more stratified and rigid hierarchies usually associated with management models of organizations. The stability of government, which was a concern of the Founders, was achieved by a flexibility in structure -- one which allowed relationships to self-regulate in a democratic manner but within the Order implied by constitutional principles. An analogy might be made to what Ikujiro Nonaka describes as organizational self-renewal. What sets the "chaos" into motion in the constitutional metaphor are the operation of democratic principles:

> ***The universal process at the basis of order formation can be described as follows. In a system condition, an element fluctuates. It acts on the neighboring elements one after another or competes with them, and the fluctuations begins to be amplified. When a macroscopic pattern begins to emerge from such a dynamic cooperative phenomenon, a feedback to each element takes place, reinforcing the dynamic cooperation. Thus, a definite order is formed spontaneously and a definite function is performed forming a stable order. When the order becomes fixed, the organic system again carries on a similar process irreversibly (1988, p. 4).***

The Separation of Powers doctrine might clearly be described as a "positive feedback" system -- one which creates energy rather than depletes it (Senge, 1992). The Founders were

obviously without the benefit of chaos theory, however. Yet, Jefferson described a "spontaneity" among human beings which attracted people to each other and created an intrinsic desire to come help those in need. The spontaneity was not prescribed by government but enacted out of the "instinct" of the people (Ryn). He also spoke of the idea of a "continuous revolution" -- one premised on the idea that change was the natural state of human affairs rather than stagnation (Ryn).

Hamilton, on the other hand, appeared less concerned with preserving the spontaneity itself as preserving the order in which the spontaneity was allowed to occur (Syrett, Vol. 1,4, & 5).

The important aspect here of Hamilton's and Jefferson's dispositions, however, is that neither saw the kind of narrow and mean social space that Hobbes did. Hamilton, in ***The Farmer Refuted,*** sharply criticizes The Farmer for his reputed support of the Hobbesian principle that there exists no moral relationship among human beings prior to the introduction of the social contract (Syrett, Vol. 1, p.86). As Hamilton says:

> ***Good and wise men in all ages, have embraced a very dissimilar theory. They have supposed, that the deity, from the relations, we stand in, to himself and to each other, has constituted an eternal and immutable law, which is, indispensably, obligatory upon all mankind, prior to any human institution whatever (p. 86).***

It is in the state of nature, Hamilton said, where all humans exist in relationship to a shared law as the expression

of a shared origin.

> ***Hence, in a state of nature, no man has any moral power to deprive another of his life, limbs, property or liberty; nor the least authority to command, or exact obedience from him; except that which arose from the ties of consanguinity (p. 88).***

For Hamilton, government was simply the extension of this natural order, "modified for civil society" (p. 88). What emerges in the dispositions of the two men, which is of importance here, however, is a shared sense of the interconnected nature of human relationship. Further, that the relationship is an inherently contentious one because government without conflict is simply despotic, not democratic (Walzer, 1991). Hamilton describes how that relationship is formalized and maintained through the existence and extension of natural law and Jefferson describes the process by which the association remains vital and renewing based on an instinctual "knowing" among people. The balance which is achieved between the self-organizing of citizens and the maintenance of the broader order by government itself, involves a continuing relationship between structure and process -- enlivened by a belief in the viability of human relationship itself. The continual interplay of these principles is the civil society which Hamilton spoke of -- one in which multiple meanings and activities of life co-exist as a clear separation between structure and process fades. As Michael Walzer notes:

> ***Only the democratic state can create a democratic***

civil society; only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state (1991, p. 302).

It is Walzer's further point that the purpose of government in an "associative" democracy is that it does not simply exist as a dead structure within which various scenarios play out, presumably in a democratic fashion. It is more of a co-creator of what happens in society. As he says:

> ***But the state can never be what it appears to be in liberal theory, a mere framework for civil society. It is also the instrument of the struggle, used to give a particular shape to the common life (p. 302)***

It is this cooperative and interdependent relationship which seems to be at the basis of Founding thought and which represents an associational consciousness which has been suppressed by the modernist management paradigm. The constitutional design which emerged from the Federalist and Anti-Federalist debates exhibits this consciousness. The different consciousness is exhibited most in features of the Separation of Powers doctrine which seem to express an understanding of the relational and inter-dependent nature of a democracy.

For example, the doctrine:

1. Allows the three branches to realign as the environment requires them to, but around the organizing principles of the Constitutional Order so that a general governmental identity and stability remains.

2. Allows The Three Branches to maintain their intrinsic identity despite periodic shifts in allocations of responsibility.

3. Allows the Three branches, as a system, to generate complexity which is "constitutive of" the democratic premises of the organizing principles.

4. Allows the Constitutional Order to be inclusive of changes in the environment through the operation of the Public Administration.

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Of Exactitude in Science

...In that Empire, the craft of Cartography attained such Perfection that the Map of a Single province covered the space of an entire City, and the Map of the Empire itself an entire Province. In the course of Time, these Extensive maps were found somewhat wanting, and so the College of Cartographers evolved a Map of the Empire that was of the same Scale as the Empire and that coincided with it point for point. Less attentive to the Study of Cartography, succeeding generations came to judge a map of such Magnitude cumbersome, and, not without Irreverence, they abandoned it to the Rigors of Sun and Rain. In the western Deserts, tattered Fragments of the Map are still to be found, Sheltering an occasional Beast or Beggar; in the whole Nation, no other relic is left of the Discipline of Geography.

From Travels of Praiseworthy Men (1658)
J.A. Cereus Miranda

There are all kinds of inefficiencies:
Dwight Waldo,
The Administrative State, 1948

Chapter Eleven

Efficiency and Effectiveness in the Constitutional Order: Getting the Horse Before the Cart

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To many, proposing that public administration be concerned

with the broader purposes of human evolution ignores the fact that welfare checks have to mailed on time and roads have to be paved within the constraints of budgets. To them public

administration is first and foremost the tool of government responsible for such matters. In this way, more normative concerns must first meet the needs of efficiency. The state of the culture would indicate that an inversion of that formula is in order.

An evolutionary ontology, however, does not necessarily divorce public administration from its need to be efficient. Being aware of the necessity of promoting relationship and responsibility does not discredit efficiency, only places it back within the realm of human, rather than technical, activity. The question does need to be asked: why are we being efficient?

If efficiency can't be realized without denying democratic ideals, is efficiency accomplishing anything in the long run? What is efficient about divisive social relationships and the failure of community brought on, partly, by the timely meeting of consumer demands? What does efficiency create for the future?

It is only possible for public administration to decline to answer these questions if it continues to see itself as an observer in the social labyrinth, rather than a participating member of the polity.

From the perspective of the management ontology, efficiency might be defined as the conservation of time and resources through the reduction of conflict and diversity.

Efficiency from this ontological view is a negative process because it blocks human evolutionary process. It does this in part by precluding all conversation except that which serves to further the argument for efficiency. As Dwight Waldo describes, what he calls the "Gospel of Efficiency" in ***The Administrative State*** in 1948:

> ***Every era...has a few words that epitomize its world-view and that are fixed points by which all else can be measured. In the Middle Ages they were such words as faith, grace, and God; in the eighteenth century they were such words as reason, nature, and rights; during the past fifty years in America they have been such words as cause, reaction, scientific, expert, progress -- and efficient (1984, p. 20).***

Public administration, Waldo says, accepted the state of affairs in science and industry described by Woodrow Wilson in 1901, that "a new era has come upon us era has come upon us like a sudden vision of things unprophesized, and for which not polity has yet been prepared" (p. 20). Public administration, Waldo says, set about preparing the polity to be efficient.

Efficiency, however, as a lifestyle, inhibits the ability for even "unprophezied" changes to occur, because unlike discussions of faith, or nature or values, efficiency does not suggest that anything exists beyond the moment with which we should be concerned. Efficiency has become tied inextricably with the preservation of time in the present as it is defined by the accomplishment of goals, problem solving, and resource

allocation, rather than the expansion of time through wonder, history and the acceptance of ambiguity.

As Waldo says, however, the purposes of human evolution were bypassed when efficiency began to rule modern thought. The concern was primarily, he says, "to adjust old conceptions and traditional institutions to the requirements of machine technology, and efficiency came to symbolize the ideal of reconciliation" (p. 20). By its initial premises, then, efficiency is less concerned with human evolution than with adapting that process to the imperatives of technology.

Too Little, Too Late: Collapsing Time and Culture

An evolutionary ontology begins from the premise, that although quantities of certain commodities may be limited as we perceive them existing in relation to present managerial goals, that the processes by which things are created are infinitely renewing and renewable (Jantsch, 1979). Further, time and evolutionary process are linked, rather than time being a limited commodity existing separate from evolutionary process. For example, fossil fuels may be in limited supply because of an overuse, but the processes by which fossil fuels are created still exist, though perhaps they have been directed by events towards the creation of something different. Also, in the Midwest, where farms and ranches are

diminishing and the growth of suburbs have declined, the prairie is reclaiming large portions of the landscape in a process of renewal which both exceeds and is extant with the processes used to develop the prairie (NPR, 1992).

The dynamics of evolutionary process of life on this planet supersede those phenomenon which occur within humanly constructed time. To put it another way, most of the universe, not operating in the human unwelt of consciousness, does not keep time as humans understand it Fraser, 1982). Chemistry and physics can be made to adapt to human rhythms which we understand in terms of cycles, but the processes themselves exceed the cycles and merely accommodate the rhythms (Arygros, 1991; Fraser, 1990).

At the cultural level, according to Fraser, phenomenon occurs, however, in relation to a human sense of time. Time is how we map out history and create a space for human existence in the unconscious world. Public Administration, however, has seldom had the opportunity to discuss the nature of time, despite the fact that it has been given the ponderous task of "saving" it. The management response to the problem of time is to treat it as a commodity, in much the way money is treated -- something to save, to sell or to steal. Yet the effect of this assumption about the nature of time is threatening our ability to get a sense of ourselves as existing in more than the present.

Efficiency: Preserving the Present

The connection between dysfunctional social relationships and the choices made in the name of efficiency are not always discerned -- perhaps because it is difficult for the modern mind to recognize that both the products of disaffective relationships and the relationships themselves are generative...but only of more disaffective and disabled relationships (Miles, 1985). For example, it is not uncommon for public agencies to use voice mail to handle the many demanding calls which the agency receives each day. Presumably, the computerized answering allows the agency to hire fewer people to answer the telephones by directing the caller exactly to who he/she wants to talk to or by answering routine questions about hours or forms. It also avoids the conflict which might arise through the interpretation of events likely in actual contact with clients (Miles, 1985). Technology is used by agencies as diverse as district courts and human services agencies which handle crisis calls. Citizen complaints about not being able to talk to a "live" person are often answered with the question "If you had your choice, would you take lower taxes or the right to talk to a live person?"

The underlying presumption, of course, is the reductive one that efficiency and avoidance of messy human contact are

the same thing. It is the old Modernist assumption that human beings generally are problematic because you can't keep them on course -- they want to talk of other things. In an evolutionary view, however, denying human contact is infinitely more inefficient because it distorts the creative energy which exists between people and, further, it stifles the affective connections from which shared relationship and responsibility is realized.

The over-concern about technological efficiency represents a kind of social morbidity, in fact. It represents a collective need to maintain the present and not give-way to the risks of evolutionary change. Instead this fixation on efficiency insists on controlling the outcomes of all circumstances. This is a "business present" as Fraser calls it -- one in which only lip service is paid to the past and future and the evolutionary tensions associated with the existence of a past, present and future are removed. It is a concern with time as a regulated "commodity." As Fraser explains:

> ***From the 16th century on the clockwork became the bourgeois, later the communist ideal, a quasi-religious object for both, and the paradigm of praiseworthy conduct. The history of the machine civilization which culminated in technological man, and of which the clock is such a distinguished citizen,is the story of a powerful efferent adaptive pressure by man upon his environment (1990, p. 377).***

To accept time as a commodity -- something which is bought, sold, traded and of short supply, is to create a mindset which forces a change in the nature of relationships among people and the sense of identity of what it means to be a person, according to Fraser. An over concern with the efficiency of the present simply represents a continued erosion of the organic, unmediated human relationship; as such the richness which exists in human potential is denied.

> ***Some time during the nineteenth century in the industrialized nations of the West, the use of the Worker's time on the one hand and, on the other hand, his individual identity in time came to be seen as separate issues. Considering that in the same nations almost everyone is a worker of some sort, this amounted to a cleavage between what people do and what they are (p. 378).***

For the modern self, Fraser says, time has lost its aspect of representing the evolutionary "becoming" of human identity --that it no longer appears as the manifestation of social process. Rather, the fear of the unknown and the unknowable has been repressed while an "arrogant" certainty about man's powers to control fate has changed time from an "arena of conflict" to one of commodity. It is not really possible to talk of responsibility, relationship or action in the name of the community good, he says, because an affective relationship which would make the realization of community good cannot be sustained with a commodity beyond that required for its efficient and effective delivery. A social order based

on the exchange of commodities can not maintain the emotional depth required for ssuch enterprises, as Fraser says:

> ***But commodities are bought and sold and not heroically given or withheld; consequently, heroism has lost its value because it cannot be traded. Thus, for example, although instances of courage in the civil rights movement and space exploration are plentiful in contemporary America, the power of the imagination that would change bravery to heroism, and the generosity of acknowledgement that would change individual action into collective feats, have all but vanished. Being a hero -- other than the overnight variety -- has become comparable to the thankless task of being a soldier in a forgotten war (p. 416).***

An Evolutionary View of Efficiency

Public Administration's responsibility in regards to time is to somehow invert its current treatment of time as a commodity to seeing time as evolutionary movement. Public administration, as the Administrative State, is responsible for the continuation and renewal of the political system...a responsibility seldom expressed (Chandler, 1992). Yet, if the culture seems to be declining and politics have reached an impasse, it would appear that what might be called a state of morbid equilibrium has been reached. To put it another way, time is standing still. The physics of things would dictate that history, as the embodiment of human time, will thus decline because nothing exists which connects the past, present and future in a political order concerned most with

the efficient response to historical and economic consequence.

For example, in John Rohr's recent work on the French constitutional system, he notes that the Fourth Republic in France came about in a time of great divisions and dissent produced mainly by the war in Algiers. The task of writing the new constitution was given to the public administration which provided continuity and a sense of a broader more inclusive order which bound the various factions together and made the transition to a new republic effective (Rohr, 1992). The administration, in this regard, was not saving time, but creating it by extending and connecting French history.

It is interesting to compare the French experience to the situation in Yugoslavia. Marshall Tito has been credited with keeping the minority factions in Yugoslavia in line during his reign. However, when he died in 1981, the stage was set for the current upheaval, especially as Soviet Bloc disintegrated (McCrae, 1993; Momcilovich, 1993). Tito did not have a bureaucracy, except the Communist Party bureaucracy,and depended mainly on the army to provide a sense of a broader national authority to which all minorities answered. There was no administrative state to speak of, in this regard. The consequence, as Eastern European scholar Barbara McCrae has said, is that the factions had only each other to fight in a competitive battle for supremacy (1993). One might say that time has collapsed in the former Yugoslavia and all that is

left is to fight over the scraps of what is there now (Arygros). This is so perhaps because there is not,(if there ever has been in the long and violent history of the Baltic countries), a sense of state which would exceed the conflict (Momcilovich).[1] If conflict, once again, is seen as having the potential of being meaningful in the development of identity, then perhaps the lack of an administrative state in the former Yugoslavia, has made it difficult to fulfill that purpose. What it means to be a Yugoslavian (for lack of a more general referent point) may be impaired by the lack of a continuous and unifying state which allows diversity to exist and contribute to the state identity through episodic, non-violent conflict.

Conflict as Human Evolutionary Process

An evolutionary social system is one in which conflict is necessarily presumed as diverse elements of society interact with each other and, in the argument here, imbedded constitutional principles. For example, the initial and most powerful premise of chaos theory is that all things are

1 This would seem to make all the more crucial that we export more than business management techniques to help rebuild the country when the conflict does end. It seems it would benefit most from lessons in "state building" rather than economics.

subject to initial conditions. It is the "excited" geometry that Alfred Einstein made reference to (Jung, 1973) but it is probably also at the basis of the "spontaneity" of which Thomas Jefferson wrote (1984). It is understood best metaphorically. If one throws a stone in a pool, for example, the shape of the pool reconfigures to accommodate the stone, but its basic "shape" -- that of water -- remains the same. In social settings the reconfiguration is more often less serene. Yet, it is perhaps as simple.

However, we have become used to thinking of social change as nothing less than laborious and often impossible or dangerous. The satificing of Herbert Simon is almost a resignation to what seems to be an endless process of negotiation to eke out small gains along a well-worn path. Ironically, however, we also marvel at the rapid growth of social institutions and the constant fluctuations and deviance from established policy. This change has often been seen as a problem of discretion among public administrators (Lowi, 1978). Yet, it is simply not likely, without extensive coercion, that social turbulence can be stopped once it is put into motion. Human relationships are naturally generative, regardless of legislative or administrative intent. A conversation at a water cooler can put into effect an understanding which results in a complete reconfiguration of an idea or even a policy. This is so because human

understandings do not change purely by an accumulation of rational argument and linear intent, but are fluid and sensitive to suggestions. Difference provides a creative tension which destabilizes the system and produces a state of disequilibrium. Indeed, it is more difficult to try and keep an idea in place -- to take it out of the stream of evolution. As Alfred White Northhead says: "Nature will not be held still" (Ho & Fox, p. 8). It can only be done by the minimization of difference and dialogue.

It is not the pressure to change that is difficult and which seems to produce meaningless conflict, but the instrumental management of change to meet a specific agenda. Coerced change defies the natural flow of human relationships. Yet, it has been the ontological belief in the need to manage conflict in order to achieve short-term goals, however, which makes most public agencies behave in undemocratic ways while at the same time they are trying to impose or uphold democratic ideals.

This unfortunate error on the part of administrators denies the basic connection to the Constitution which enlivens society and allows for multiple levels of meaning to co-exist from the generative principles of democracy. Quite literally, administrators must put themselves in the position of trying to stop the flow of democracy in order to reduce conflict. But in doing so, administrators convey the sense that the conflict

and the complex diversity it spawns are a negative burden. Indeed, social relations appear to be overwhelming as multi-cultural elements of a society become divisive factions competing for the small space allowed for humanity by management.

Citizen participation, for example, is not simply one of allowing more people into government. Allowing more people into government quickly becomes a management problem and thereby subject to the rules of efficiency (Carter, 1991; Webster, 1992). For example, the "problem" of having multiple minorities demanding recognition in a university setting is often addressed by dividing up funds for minority programs proportionately among different groups according to their numbers in the university population (Carter). This creates tensions among the minorities, who come to see themselves in competition with other minorities for limited funds. The value of having diverse voices in the university setting is placed secondary to the efficient management of resources and the reduction of conflict. The conflict, of course, is only re-directed, so the groups are fighting among themselves instead of interfering with the work flow of the university (Carter).

It is not the associations to which people belong which bring about social change, but the dynamics of the ***associativeness,*** *as Michael Walzer phrases it (1991),* of human

relationship which produces change. It is unfortunate, in this sense, that minority programs are often seen as the means for placating the demands on resources by minority groups, rather than the way by which the identity of a university is transformed by integration of diverse elements of the culture.

Reconfiguration: Change Through Relationship:

A different disposition in government -- one which firmly embraces democracy as a process of evolutionary renewal, one to be practiced on a day to day, person to person basis, can do much to reconfigure the entire social system.

Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg address provides an eloquent example of the simplicity of transforming social thought. Gary Wills (1992) writes that Lincoln departed from Gettysburg, having reconfigured the nation's view of itself and its constitution in a few simple and forgiving words -- exemplifying the nature of the renewal process in which both the nation and the Constitution evolved. Equality was now an issue in democratic America.

> ***Lincoln was here to cleanse the infected atmosphere of American history itself, tainted with official sins and inherited guilt. He would cleanse the Constitution -- not as William Lloyd Garrison had, by burning an instrument that countenanced slavery. He altered the document from within, by appeal from his letter to the spirit, subtly changing the recalcitrant stuff of that legal compromise, bringing it to its own indictment. By implicitly***

> ***doing this, he performed one of the most daring sleight-of-hand ever witnessed by the unsuspecting. Everyone in the vast throng thousands was having his or her intellectual pocket picked. The crowd departed with a new thing in its ideological luggage, the new Constitution Lincoln had substituted for the one they had brought there with them. They walked off from those curving graves on the hillside, under a changed sky, into a different America. Lincoln had revolutionized the Revolution, giving people a new past to live with that would change their future indefinitely (p. 6).***

Lincoln's disposition -- which both forgave what had passed before and looked on to the future -- allowed for change because he moved from the potentialities which existed in the moment at Gettysburg to unify the country. He ***chose*** not to be divisive, or reformist, or to place blame but to move forward in the path provided by the shared emotional strength of the country he perceived existing at that moment. In doing so he was able to do no less than change the country and to make a long and bloody conflict reflect an expression of evolutionary meaning.

A disposition towards democratic principles can result in no less of a reconfiguration in contemporary settings. The beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles may not have happened if a disposition towards acceptance of diversity had been conveyed to the police force on a daily basis by the Los Angeles police chief. Likewise, the tragedy in Waco, Texas may not have occurred if the over-riding concern of the federal agencies involved wasn't to complete the task as efficiently

as possible without a clear dialogue about the appropriateness of the action in the first place.

A disposition, however, is more than a matter of charismatic speeches. In public agencies it involves the continuing practice of democratic process by individuals and a conveyance of importance of that process to all members of the organization. The ideas of acceptance, equality and choice embody a practical disposition towards forgiveness and moving with the positive potential present in relationships at any one moment, rather than simply the correction of error. As such, democratic process puts in question most punitive or critical practices which do not open new paths for human development in organizations (McSwain & White, 1979). Certainly democratic process exceeds the vestiges of economic efficiency.

For example, teachers at the Malcom X school in Washington D.C's. crime-ridden seventh police district have taken what might be called an ***affective realist*** approach to the problems of their school district. The teachers and administrators at the school have accepted that there will be no short term miracles or no major funding to transform the lives of the students markedt by the violence of a drug culture. Yet there is a feeling that there are ***points of entry*** at which individual lives can be reconfigured -- moved into other patterns than those which keep them tied to their

demographics and family history. The children are more accepted than analyzed -- and are not used for the fulfillment of a social agenda. There exists for the children a positive relationship with the system -- not an adversarial one, or a passive one, but one which recognizes their own being in the shared polity. Many times it is in individual and unconventional actions that the pattern moves, but more it seems to be a disposition simply of caring, as Jefferson would understand it, while maintaining a close and firm ties to the central "order" of the school, as Hamilton would understand it.

The connection that is made between the administrator and the student is not an objective one -- but one in which an order is realized through relationship which is activated by affection. The sense of social space is increased in the relationship and with it the sense of time. It would seem therefore that diminishing human interaction in the name of efficiency simply destroys our best hopes for a civil society and the extension of human evolution.

In an evolutionary ontology, time is viewed not as a commodity maintained by action in the present. The present exists in relationship both to a past and an extant future both of which exist in the integrated levels of hierarchical evolution. To put it another way, time is concerned with both being and becoming -- most specifically through relationship

which connects humans to the process by which evolution continues. In this regard, time, as Fraser says, is to be celebrated, not sold, because our sense of it represents what we have created in our relationships which mark its existence. As such, the evolutionary ontology holds that those actions which maintain relationships and a sense of democratic process, as human process, actually contribute to the creation of time.

Art, literature, architecture, music, friendships and a sense of community are all expansive and generative ways in which an integrated hierarchy expands -- not the limitation of these phenomenon for purposes of economic efficiency.

Self-organizing Relationships

How relationship, or other aspects of human enterprise, generate creative change, however, is not in any instrumental way, but is more a ***ordre mouvant*** (mobile order) as Robbe Grillett explained "nouveau roman" novels in the 1960s. That is to say that the value of relationship in generating movement in the Constitutional Order may be both the aesthetics of its high-toned principles and its self-organizing physics. As Eric Jantsch says, order is not established a priori in any action. Order is always a matter of relationship (Jantsch, 1979, p. 286).

To use the writing of a novel as an example of this relationship reveals much about the nature of the Constitutional Order and the process of dialogue which sustains it. At the start of writing a novel, for example, non-equilibrium and polarization occur, that is the phenomenon is one in which a disequilibrium process creates sentences as equilibrium structures which, in turn, create disequilibrium states allowing further creation. Most important to the creative process, however, is that the relationship between the reader and the novel. The novel does not transfer meaning. Meaning emerges from the interaction of the work of art with the reader. As Grillett says, the artist is a best a catalyst -- in the manner the organizing principles of the Constitution serve as a catalyst for public dialogue (Jantsch, p. 287).

Yet, the self-organizing actions of the coming to be of a novel and its becoming in the relationship with the reader does not happen in a vacuum. It occurs paradoxically as a boundless process within the boundaries of the structure of the novel. Music provides perhaps even a better example. Once the structure of a Beethoven Sonata is known or felt, it is possible for an infinite number of variations in the work to occur (Knapp, 1988). It is this idea of form, which both is and is becoming, which is used here to further explain the idea of the Constitutional Order as it exists in relation to the concept of time (Briggs, 1988).

It is inadequate in this regard to call for a government which simply allows for the self-organizing of its citizens in an efficient manner or to call for citizens to turn their back on government in order to be free to self-organize. The mix that the Federalists and Anti-Federalists seem to have worked out in the Separation of Powers Doctrine perhaps provides a better solution to the problems of a government which appears to be so fully opposed to the very human state of disequilibrium. This is true because self-organizing will occur whatever the structure. Citizens will organize around interests as easily as they will organize around democratic principles. The best example of this is the proliferation of the bureaucracy and of the interest groups which organize around it.

Self-organizing is not something which is stopped -- or has been stopped -- but which is distorted by the choices made by both government and citizens. What is lacking in the self-organizing politics in our current culture is a shared sense that evolutionary process is more important than economic efficiency. This seems to be because the relationships by which the process is experienced are under-valued in our society. It is not that there needs to exist an homogenized commonality among citizens to sustain an idea of an efficient order, but rather that the multiple aspects and representations of society can co-exist without reduction

because of the common bond of relationship and responsibility which is recognized by all Walzer, 1991). Further, it is not government's purpose to impose an order or inculcate values, but, instead, to maintain democratic relationships while encouraging conflict as the way in which values are renewed in relation to the Constitutional Order.

The Order exists in the manner Liska says myths do -- as a tension -- a way to evaluate the current change. The order is not deterministic in that sense, but generative of newness. It allows us to talk time after time about the organizing principles by way of the process which renews itself in the dialogue.

What this describes, however, is a continuing relationship between what seems to be a conservative older structure and an emerging one. It is the tension between the two -- as democratic process -- which will result in an evolutionary change, and which is not connected to the historical context of either structure, but which is conveyed in the relationship between the two. The Constitution can be seen as existing providing the basis for a ritualistic dialogue, one in which the organizing principles are conveyed and renewed and members of the polity are linked, one to the other.

Fraser says it is in the relationship between the conservative ritual and the energetic and optimistic will to

change, that time is created. If voice mail is considered again in this light, as the embodiment of the concern with saving time through efficiency in our society, perhaps we can begin to see how such management practices have eroded the ability of citizens to experience a meaningful tension between old structures and emerging ones. Voice mail, and similar technological mediators like television and computers, create an artificial block on the becoming aspect of evolutionary growth by maintaining a disposition towards equilibrium and a recreation of the present which has become detached from a more engendering process (Postman, 1986). No ritual, per se, exists which engages people with each other, only rituals which engage people with the technology -- thus the emergence of a technological consciousness, rather than one concerned with human purpose.

The evolutionary ontology considered here would invert the efficiency view of time by simply stating that time is what we create in the dynamic conflict between older structures and newer emerging ones (Fraser, 1979, p. 157). Time is an act of creation and as such can be exhibited in what we create. What emerges is a rather conservative view of social process and work. It is a view which encompasses the idea of artisanship as an expression of individual identity (Goodsell, 1992). Efficiency is simply less important than artful craftsmanship and endurability of our work and our

relationships.

The issue of quality of service, for example, in most public agencies is always conditioned on the efficiency of service without recognizing that inefficiency is often perceived by the citizen as the inability to make a human connection in an agency rather than the amount of time a task takes. This should not be surprising because technology, and the efficiency it requires, are not connected to human evolutionary purpose. One positive connection with an individual broadens the social space and creates an expansive sense of relationship which speed of delivery simple cannot create (Miles).

Further, the issue of quality of service is often severed from the individual public administrator because of the imposition of impersonal standards of quality -- instead of the development of a sense of personal quality which comes from a feeling of artisanship (Goodsell, 1992). Artisanship is denied when work is supplanted by the imperatives of a machine or made meaningless because it becomes separate from the evolutionary drive of the individual. As Dorothee Soelle in ***To Work and Love*** says:

> ***Yet relationship under Capitalism is a commodity. Our instincts and passions are largely excluded from social intercourse in capitalistic society. We work for exchange value, even though money cannot satisfy real needs and so the craving for money becomes endless...Because the real aims of our wishes and instincts are not met, we remain***

> ***unsatisfied. Hence the compulsion to repeat the past is inevitable (1984, p. 116).***

As Eric Jantsch says "technological processes are not life processes...at best they can play an auxiliary role in the unfolding of life" 1979, p. 280). Yet, a reconfiguration of the system which would allow for a more meaningful expression of work, artisanship and relationship is often reduced to the above question: "would you prefer to speak to a live person or would you like keep your taxes low?"

However, it is at this point that citizens should be able to make democratic choices in order to move the human project forward. Is the question better posed, for example, does computerization further our intentions as a democratic people? If the answer is no, then it should be abandoned or altered so that it does? A citizenry which cannot ask this question, or even imagine it as a viable one, is a victim of a pernicious disposition of government which fears change and avoids creative disequilibrium.

An evolutionary ontology requires an understanding of time and relationships from which generative choices become apparent and are acted upon. It is necessarily a view that demands an active and involved citizenship and a government which creates the environment in which choices can be made which move the project forward.

First of all, I am aware of a constant play of furtherances and hindrances in my thinking, of checks and releases, tendencies which run with desire, and tendencies which run the other way. Among the matters, I think of, some range themselves on the side of the thought's interests whilst others play an unfriendly part thereto. The mutual inconsistencies and agreements, reinforcements and obstructions, which obtain amongst these objective matters reverberate backwards and produce what seem to be incessant reactions of my spontaneity upon them, welcoming or opposing, appropriating or disowning, striving with or against, saying yes or no.

William James , The Varieties of Religious Experience 1985

Chapter Twelve

Dialogic Authority: Generating the Constitutional Order

Relational democracy is maintained through evolutionary dialogue (Boggs, 1986; Warren, 1989, 1990). Evolutionary dialogue is the engagement of the immediate environment while maintaining a connection to the community which exists beyond the present moment -- a paradox. How is it possible, that is, to be in the historical present while maintaining a connection to a process which is

alinear and extra-historical? By definition a paradox is a statement or condition which appears self-contradictory. However, two (or more) outcomes are possible from the meeting of the sides of a paradox, depending on the disposition which is attached to their existence (Holmberg, 1989; Kiel, 1989; Jaki,

1969; Jaynes, 1976; Stanley, 1992.)

In one view, the sides are seen as variations of each other which exist in relation to a more encompassing whole, and which cannot, and which should not be resolved. In the other view, the sides to any conflict are seen as oppositional and in need of resolution by conflict management (Azar, 1990; Lindbloom, 1965; Ophuls; 1977; Serres, 1982; Weeks, 1992).

Attempted resolution of a paradox, however, never occurs, as the method of resolution is only likely to produce another iteration of paradox. For example, the instrumentallly precise technology of Desert Storm did not resolve the differences between east and west, but instead created a new generation of ecological and social problems (Time, July, 1992). Further, this disposition towards the need for resolution suggests that conflict only exists to be reduced or eliminated rather than for evolutionary purposes.

Resolution of paradox, or conflict management, represents the distorted dialogue of historical dialectic. For example, the current dialogue about health care centers around a perceived paradox which exists between those who have health insurance and those who don't. It appears paradoxical, for example, that the more we improve health care technology and are able to save lives, the fewer people can avail themselves of those advancements. It was not uncommon in the 1980's, for example, for public hospitals, trying to maintain a marketing edge with

"paying customers," to invest heavily in state-of-the art equipment like MRIs. Hospitals would create markets for segments of the population, women, for example, and produce products to serve them -- like hot tubs in birthing rooms. The same hospitals, on the basis of cost efficiency, turned away the uninsured who came to their emergency rooms for even the most basic pre-natal care. [1] Public dialogue about health care has most often centered around resolving the disparity between those two extremes. The inter-play of the economic injustice of extreme poverty with the wastefulness of economic privilege is expected to produce some resolution -- usually by means of resource re-allocation -- of the disparities in the system. The dialogue itself plays out in the small space provided by the disparities which take the form of adversarial class interests, although presumably everyone involved in the dialogue shares a concern for justice and equality (Marmor, Schlesinger & Smithey, 1984). Ultimately, however, everyone seems compelled to settle for what can be bargained and the system continues as it was -- having realigned itself at some different but equilibrated point of resolution (Marmor, et al). This point often represents, not

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[1] This is known from personal experience working with the health-care systems which existed across boundaries between Southern New Mexico and El Paso, Texas in the 1980s. A keen competition developed after the introduction of DRGS between public and not-for-profit hospitals for "paying" customers. The problems were intensified by the existence of a large migrant population for which a right to care has still not been clearly established.

a change in the system, as much as the lowest common denominator reached in negotiations.

An evolutionary ontology is concerned less with equilibrium as with a process by which a system continues, is inclusive and creates. Equilibrium is not the goal of a such a dynamic system which operates in accordance with the self-organizing principles of described by New physics and the generative focus of democratic choice. Points of equilibrium appear briefly in this process, but what drives the system is the creative process of states of disequilibrium which allow the system to incorporate more and more of its environment and tranform it into matter.

This is perhaps explained best by comparing the view of traditional systems theorists with that of chaos theorist Ilya Prigonine. The conventional wisdom is that all systems increase in entropy -- lose energy to their environment -- and die (von Bertalanffy, 1968; Kaufman, 1985; Shubert, 1991). Sources of energy loss are then problematic because they appear to speed up the impending death of the system. This understanding of system dynamics has had a profound effect on what can be talked about in public organizations. Most dialogue is an attempt to reduce conflict, not a opportunity for creative change. Little talk is encouraged about how energy is renewed and generated in a system, only about how it is saved by the reduction of conflict (Bohm, 1987; Corcoran, 1991;Davies, 1983; Gruter, 1992; Marti, 1991; Schneder, 1991).

Prigonine recognized, however, that complex systems do not have to break down and die when they increase in entropy. Rather, he says, they dissipate and re-organize into new structures that can better transfer entropy back into the environment. These reorganized systems are called dissipative structures (Prigonine & Stengers, 1984).

One experiment to demonstrate dissipative structures suggested by chaos theorists is this: Take a stove, a pot of water, and spaghetti. Boil the water. The bubbles will appear random. Put in the spaghetti and wait for it to soften. When it is softened, the strands will start spinning around randomly. But the random movement will be structured into a doughnut shape, with randomly swirling strands making up the shape. Now, take a fork and mix up the spaghetti. Once the fork is taken away, the donut shape will immediately reform. This is an example of a dissipative structure. As Prigonine says:

> ***Such self-organization appears in all aspects of nature from the fractal structure of plants to the developmental process of human births. It is the generative process of the ever expanding universe which clumps into matter, stars, solar systems and eventually life. And it appears within social systems as they organize into communities, cultures and countries (Chaos network, 1992, p. 3).***

States of equilibrium, unlike states of disequilibrium, are achieved by negative feedback. As Peter Senge suggests, negative feedback is information which tells a system that it is functioning outside preset parameters and further tells the

system what it needs to return to those parameters. As Senge notes, negative feedback is the kind of feedback used in a thermostat (1992). It is the premise here as well that negative feedback has been the basis of the reformist disposition in public administration which seeks to correct system deviance in accordance with a model, rather than by interacting positively with the system. The feedback minimizes the impact of changes in the system's environment (Senge). This might be compared, for example, to the effects of Herbert Simon's "satisficing" model, for example. Satisficing involves movement on the basis of an already existing referent point, one which is returned to time and again, but not with the same effect as a strange attractor. The referent point does not serve to enliven the interaction between the individual and the environment but to deaden it. This is so, because the purpose of the satisficing referent point is to reaffirm a prescribed equilibrium between the individual and the environment, not seek a *new* balance Simon, 1957; 1992).

A new balance would require submission to disequilibrium which would result in a reconfiguration of the system to the environment within the structure of the original organizing principles without reference to the original point of equilibrium. This is "positive feedback," as Senge says, and it is additive or iterative in nature. It informs the system of changes which have occurred in its own state of being while

letting the system continue to function. Clearly, Senge says, a system operating too heavily on negative feedback will insulate itself from its environment, so much that it will lead to periods of catastrophe or death because, in essence, it has removed itself from the active environment and therefore is not dealing with reality, only -- in the case of human systems -- a mentally constructed model of reality (1992).

The response to the innovative Oregon health insurance program may be one example of the current political system's reliance of negative feedback to address public policy issues. Despite the fact that the program addressed directly the problem of the uninsured, asked that the risks be spread across the system and reemphasized a preventive approach to health care, it met with grave resistance from those in public administration who seemed to feel that it introduced too much uncertainty and risk of conflict in the system...that is the program potentially upset the equilibrium of the system dependent on economic formulas for its stability.

The key resistance to the Oregon Plan, however, came because it introduced the potential for a policy-sanctioned rationing of health care. This of course is an ironic criticism, considering the system currently rations health care in rather dramatic ways. There still seems to be a wide-spread belief, however, that somehow the general system can be made to catch up with its technology -- so that state of the art health care is

available to everyone and without tax increases or clear policy mandates.

The linear development of technology, however, has simply out-stripped the natural limitations of a system in which the more crucial health care is still that of basic maintenance and prevention. That is to say, that the system is forced to organize around the extreme points of market-driven technological development, rather than around its more stable and continuing needs of primary health care and preventative medicine. Yet, the health care system clearly needs less technology at the moment and more capacity to administer primary care to more people (Miles, 1985).

However, both maintenance and preventive medicine are processes -- often relational, emotional and spiritual, which cannot be instrumentally applied or rationally allocated in the manner technology can. That is to say, they are alinear processes to which the principles of dissipative structures are more relevant than the linear logic of the market which drives the development of technology. By dragging the system along in an attempt to keep up with technology, the system isn't meeting its most basic imperatives -- those which allow it to achieve both an equitable and effective balance between technology and primary care.

The push to make the health care system something which meets the imperatives of the economy rather than those suggested

by the fundamental logic of health care has threatened to destroy the system in general and has increased the disparities in health care delivery. One answer to the health care crisis may be simply to rethink the government's role in generating change. One approach is to stop driving the system by the rational principles of economics which encourage technological innovation as the basis of competition. Instead, the government should generate a dialogue which would allow the system to reorganize in accordance with democratic principles and its own needs.

In this manner technology could be ***integrated*** into a system whose organizing principles exist in a well-articulated national policy that reflects our aspiratons rather than one which is a collection of programs and specifics. Such an aspirational policy would generate a continuing dialogue about health care based on the system's own predisposition towards the delivery of basic care. That is, technology should not define the boundaries of the system, the system, as an integrated whole, would define its own boundaries. The current political system realigns itself, however, with what might be termed an incomplete attractor or set of organizing principles, principles which treat the opposite sides of the paradox in health care as being un-related and purely competitive. Attractor is a physics term and here refers to a set of organizing principles around which dissapative structures organize and reorganize. An incomplete

attractor is one which allows equilibrium to develop around a partial set of organizing principles like technology economics -- one disconnected from a broader sense of the social process. As such, any dialogical dispute is mediated more by the rules of conflict negotiation than the principles of equality and acceptance (Moe, 1989).

What a political system, which generates dialogue on the basis of a clearly articulated policy, seeks, however, is not equilibrium but inclusion. As such, dialogue could result in a a new manifestation of the social order in response to an environmental change while allowing the system itself to continue (Webster's, 1988, p. 174).

Parties to such a dialogue would be encouraged to respond to the organizing principles -- not to each other as defenders of extreme and unrelated aspects of the debate. As such the dialogue could move beyond the limits of equilibrium management and allow the system to actually change rather than to simply adjust to change.

The principles of equality and acceptance, as they would be expressed in public policy debate, rather than economics, would generate an adjustment of the entire health system by maintaining a state of disequilibrium until such time as a new balance would emerge from the debate -- that is democratic principles would provide both the organizing principles and the generative catalyst for chaotic disequilibrium so that the

system, in its entirety, might renew around the principles as they relate to the change in the current context (Nonaka, 1988) This phenomenon simply would not be possible with the economic model which seeks, and most often achieves, simply a modified equilibrium in relation to the problem at hand, while the inequitable system remains the same.

For a political paradox to be productive in a system seeking renewal, rather than equilibrium. It must exist among *related* opposites, not simply competing ones. Paradoxes in this sense provide a social metaphor for those tensions in dissapative structures which encourage the disequilibrium that leads to organization and reorganization. The relationship in a paradox, however, is one in which a responsibility to the whole is recognized, not as an obligation imposed by an outside mediator, but as a *felt* connection to a shared relationship.

Relationship and Responsibility: The Intrinsic Bond

Anaximander described the ground of all being as ***aperion***...that is "boundless", but boundless in the paradoxical sense that there was an encircling of separate existences which participated in a shared process of continuous renewal. An evolutionary ontology builds upon this view by stressing that interconnection as a felt responsibility among multiple levels of evolution in an on-going process of renewal connected to what

Prigonine refers to as intrinsic and regulating forms (1984). In the ***Constitutional Order*** considered here, an order of forms exists. These forms, identified here as equality, acceptance and choice, are initially expressed in the constitutional process -- though not specifically. That is to say that they have come to be known by the engagement of the Constitution. The Constitution serves as a myth by which the forms are identified, transferred and made subject to dialogue. The forms were not necessarily created by the Constitution, but more likely exist as the embodiment of that process which is intrinsic to human relationship in an interconnected and dynamic world. These forms exist on the ordered premises of relationship and responsibility -- which in turn create order through a chaotic process of evolutionary renewal based on the dynamics of human relationship.

The order -- or sense of relationship and responsibility -- is not imposed by authority or dogma but is intrinsic and known to the individual who exists in relationship to Others in the plenum. In this regard, the Order is less concerned with the ideology of democracy as with the relationships which might engender democratic behavior. The felt responsibility, however, is not really to the Others but to the whole, as Mary Parker Follett says (1965) Metaphorically, the whole is represented by the process of renewal through relationship, defined by the organizing principles of the Constitution, which sustains and

expands the social order through evolutionary process.

Being responsible simply to Others makes it appear as if the "interests" are still competing, but that they are tolerating each other by either a kind of moral relativism, or on the basis of functional exchange relationships, or by the lethargic indecisiveness of gridlock (Pound, 1922). Responsibility in an evolutionary political order is not a responsibility only to make room for other interests, but a responsibility to the process itself which inherently allows and demands diversity. It is a responsibility which requires an existential engagement of the individual in choice-making about his or her own existence. It is a process that, when engaged, encourages acceptance of Others, because it is a process and purpose shared by an interdependent humanity.

This understanding of relationship is what is missing from public policy dialogue centered on a historically dialectal understanding of class conflict. In the mediation of interests based on negative conflict, the whole -- as the democratic process of renewal -- is simply forgotten or discounted because of its metaphorical nature. This is so largely because human relationships are often not seen as generative -- but as static and defined by predictable models of behavior. Indeed, models of behavior appear to allow individuals to seek and maintain states of equilibrium.

However, the dynamic relationship which would make a social

conflict meaningful and transformational is distorted by the strategically adversarial nature of economic dialogue -- that is dialogue which seeks to reduce or eliminate Others based on the premises of behaviorism. It is in this strategy that the connection with the whole is broken through a loss of the affective and it is through emotional states that the relational process is transmitted, felt and known. Yet, the more strategic methods of decision-making and calculation of human relationship make it difficult to call upon a shared sense of responsibility in response to social problems. The feeling has simply been diminished and delegitimized in our current society by an avaristic economy and by an uncourageous government which has opted to forsake humanity for the certainty of methodology. This is so even at the same time there is a call for the imposition of community order (Etzioni, 1992; Selznick, 1988, 1992).

The role of public administration in the recovery of community dialogue is crucial -- but it does not involve programs, extensive planning or behavioral management as much as a commitment to democratic action. It is not government's role in an evolutionary ontology, for example, to mediate conflict in order to reduce it, but instead to sustain a sense of the democratic process through dialogue in which the conflict is meaningful and generative of new potential (Wamsley, et al, 1987). Further, the work of government is to maintain human

relationships as the way by which the process is transmitted -- often by allowing the dynamics of paradoxical conflict to play out as the way in which multiple meanings co-exist.

To focus governmental efforts on the resolution of the paradoxes which arise in a complex and diverse society, requires the strategic and calculated limitation of potentiality and a reduction of the meaning in human conflict associated with evolutionary identity formation. It also requires a divisive and disconnected citizenry to implement and sustain it.

Public agenices must begin to look for brief points of order which emerge from an uncoerced dialogue from which to take action -- what Mary Parker Follett would call the law of the situation. A dialogue which allows such points to emerge is one free of attempts at resolution and goal-setting -- or it is what Habermas may describe as a consensus arrived at "without deception" (Habermas, 1984). Such a dialogue is one necessarily free from those boundaries needed to maintain equilibrium. If it is assumed that an uncoerced dialogue will find a order among diverse voices, no need exists to control conflict and perhaps there are occasions in which conflict should be induced in order to create a disequilibrium which may reconfigure the system (Nonanka). Seeking to achieve an uncoerced dialogue -- or to allow system disequilibrium as a commitment to evolutionary change -- withdraws governmental support for the confused dialogue which continues to block the evolutionary flow of human

relationships. It stops those undemocratic actions which continue an illness of the system such as the vestiges of economic dialectics.

For example, to return to the case of the health care debate, attempting to frame the dialogue simply as the resolution of extreme disparities within the system lends support to the inequitable principles of economics which brought about the disparities. Such a debate begins first with the presumption that those who do not have adequate health care are not simply impoverished but deviant and inadequate in relation to economic norms. Further, because they are perceived as inadequate or deviant they appear to have little to offer in terms of how to reconfigure the system -- indeed reconfiguration is seen as a threat to a system seeking historical equilibrium.

However, it is the system itself which must reconfigure in a manner which allows it to be infinitely more inclusive and evolutionary and not simply critical of deviance. This does not suggest that the economy be dismantled. It exists as part of the whole as much as anything else. But it cannot continue to be treated as being the entire whole.

A reconfiguration of the health care system is accomplished, not by conflict resolution and negotiations which seem to re-enforce the economic system by seeking a mediated equilibrium while the disparities become worse. Instead, more risks need to be taken. First public agencies must allow a

feeling of shared responsibility -- which is more than a common interest -- to play out in an act of creation. This is done most by disavowing the idea of "interests" altogether in the health care debate...or any other social debate...interests which exist apart from the democratic process itself. Each voice must be seen as first relating to the community and therefore equally responsible for the maintenance of the process as the means to evolutionary change.

The Generative Paradox of Structure and Process

Underlying all issues of dialogue is the relationship which maintains and expresses evolutionary flow -- that which exists between structure and process. Structure and process exist in a paradoxical relationship with each other -- not necessarily a dialectical or dichotomous one. They co-create each other, not simply oppose each other. That is to say, that structure never exists as a terminal point which can be divorced from process itself. It is not possible, for example, ultimately to separate the technologies of health care from the economic processes which created them. Although technology appears to run the health care market, a change in the system won't occur simply with a change in policy about technology as a structural manifestation of the illness of the system. Change must occur at the process level as well -- in the way we talk to each other about health care (Miles).

Another example of the co-creation of structure and process -- one which seems to be especially divorced from the idea of interest is the Viet Nam War Memorial which is a structure crafted from stone, but which, in turn, generates a process of reflection among those who visit it. Further, the process generated by the stone reaffirms and reidentifies the stone as a social structure. It is the contention here that the Viet Nam Memorial is not simply a symbol of patriotism but exists as a living metaphor which has reconfigured how we understood the Viet Nam War. Debate over national issues -- like health care -- must have the same generative abilities as the Viet Nam Memorial. That is to say that public dialogue must -- to be both meaningful and productive -- be a catalyst for deep and personal reflection among all citizens. Public debate, in order to foster the growth of citizenship and the nation, must do more than encourage a marketing mentality among political savvy interests.

Perhaps this need is met best by the idea of national policy -- one which provides a generative framework from which a rich discussion might emerge -- one which exists in relation to democratic principles as the attractors which both generate discussion and help form the final pattern of the policy (McSwain & White, 1990).

The idea of a national policy is paradoxical itself when used in relationship with the concept of democratic choice. How

is it possible, that is, to have a national policy and then encourage the self-organizing of citizens? Does not the policy then dictate programs and preclude democratic action? National policy, however, demonstrates how a self-organizing system remains both stable and renewing. The organizing principles of the policy serves as the attractor by which social patterns are generated and a social order maintained in a non-coercive way. National policy, itself, is arrived at through the democratic process of consensus building, so it serves as a generative model for future policy discussions. Further, it does not dictate programs in any instrumental way but instead provokes dialogue which is infinitely more inclusive and rich than any linear model could be.

This suggests that the introduction of the ***whole*** -- as the guiding principles of policy process -- be made first rather than public agencies participating only in the incremental building of an imagined whole. Incrementalism is the resignation to the linear determinism of an artificial utopia -- one which requires coercion and exclusion to realize. Instead, public administrators must support a system of continuous renewal. Such a system is generated and kept vital by a set of guiding principles and a faith that the principles can serve to stimulate an ongoing public debate which serves the evolutionary needs of the individual and the social order (McSwain & White, 1990; Warren, 1990).

However, it appears that it is still Thomas Hobbes, who provides the extreme and dramatic picture of chaos and evolution which has modeled the concern for order of the American public administration. Chaos -- as the disorderly and irrational nature -- justifies the social contract, not dialogue. When Hobbes condemns a Commonwealth founded on some basis other than God's sovereignty he says: "by this means destroying all laws, both divine and humane, reduce all Order, Government and Society to the first Chaos of Violence, and Civil warre" (Hobbes, 1935, p. 232).

From this extreme view of social dynamics develops the now entrenched belief that there must be a rational containment of human behavior as defense against the fearful influence of citizens who fall prey to chaotic dispositions (Bruce, 1992).

Leviathan is the name Hobbes borrows from the book of Job to describe a state which, according to the Bible, ***"there is no power on earth which can oppose it."*** (Job 41:24). Hobbes dismisses, in page after page of the ***Leviathan,*** the notion that either virtue or fortune are the successful ground for establishing a state. The ***Leviathan*** is really a personification of the idea of unity and power as the best defense against the disorder of chaos (1935).

Hobbes, as Dario Melossi notes, developed the doctrine of

state so that eventually social unity and the state came to be one and the same (1990, p. 19), or as Hobbes says:

> ***This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such a manner, as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up the right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather to speak more reverently, of that mortal god, to which we owe under the immortal god, our peace and defence (1935, p. 132).***

Hobbes' order, though ostensibly established by the free will of men, was, however, constructed and maintained by the state. It was the state itself -- by means of its rules and institutions -- which led citizens toward an acceptance and understanding of the rationality of the state. The state itself kept a defensive distance from the natural relationships of citizens which threatened to disrupt its mechanical progress. This differs from the evolutionary constitutional order suggested here, in that the homogenized unity which the social contract seems to require is seen as dysfunctional. The response, however, is not to reject the Administrative State as interfering with the self-organizing of a diverse population. Instead, the response is to broaden the identity of public administration so it may allow and promote that diversity through the engagement of the positive Administrative State.

The social contract and the notion of the Leviathan State as the way to control chaos was never fully adopted by the Founders, however. The American experience has been one -- at least in theory -- of consensus building rather than despotism (Melossi, p. 19). Public administration, however, has remained closest to the claims of social control -- largely because the current identity of public administration has emerged from the organizational paradigm which derives its roots from the social contract (Wolin, 1990). The somewhat sour taste of the need for an imposed social control has remained in public administration through the deeply entrenched management practice of behavioral engineering or through what Roscoe Pound critically called in 1942 ***Mechanical jurisprudence*** .(Pound, 1922).

Pound was among those who dismissed social engineering as the means for reaching policy goals. He instead advocated law as an expression of a cohesive public whose opinion was solidly formed around issues to be decided and acted upon (1922, p. 99). Further, Pound spoke of a certainty in the law which, although not dictative of outcomes in all specific circumstances, provided a clear ***normative*** framework which guides the exercise of law.

> ***Theories of what is have marked effect upon ideas of what ought to be...It is a paradox, no doubt, but so it is: absolute ideas of justice have made for free government and skeptical ideas of justice have gone with autocracy. Idealism puts something above the ruler or ruling body; something by which to judge them and by which they are held to rule...Skeptical realism***

> ***puts nothing above the ruler or ruling body (1922, p. 34).***

This is a understanding which is similar to a more recent view of Gary Wamsley who advocates an ***agential perspective*** for public administration -- one based on a normative foundation of guiding principles:

> ***Clearly this normative guide should not be something that suggests that public administrators should be anything more than a subordinate of other actors in the governance process. The guide should be something that conceptualizes the public administrator as an agent acting on behalf of others, yet doing so in a vigorous and thoughtful manner. It should build an autonomous agential role based on unique claims for a special role in governance. These claims should include: (1) expertise in operationalizing policy in the form of specific programs; (2) expertise in creating and sustaining processes and dialogue that results in the broadest possible definition of the public interest; (3) skills in community-building politics and the fostering of active citizenship; and (4) guardianship (along with other constitutional officers) of the Constitution and constitutional process (Wamsley, et al, 1987, p. 115).***

Wamsley, and his colleagues at Virginia Tech, are concerned with a revival of idealism in the public service, one which is expressed most in a return to a value orientation for the public service, unearthing constitutional principles, a broad sense of public duty -- and, in particular, a call for a "fuller appreciation of the positive role of authority in administration." (1990).

The paradox in Wamsley's thinking is that it seeks to avoid the trap of historical dogma -- to move beyond technicism -- while at the same time seeking to discover a foundation from

which policy is generated which maintains both the stability and the viability of political order (Pound, 1931; Wamsley et al, 1991). It would appear from the basis of the conventional ontology that such an order would ultimately have to regulate social behavior and be concerned most with legitimizing the existence and power of the state (Boggs, 1986). The perceived need for security has served to rationalize these purposes well to this point.

The inherent problem in the foundation of guiding principles -- as proposed by Pound and Wamsley et al -- is related to the tendency of the system of public administration to force adaptation to the imperatives of management, whatever the original ideal. That is to say, that without an ontologically different understanding of the evolutionary nature of human relationships that a new -- but no more responsible -- dogma will be generated by normative principles, one which is not likely to maintain the kind of democratic process, that Wamsley, in particular, advocates.

The fear is still too great that "all chaos will break loose" if the public service dismisses behavioral management and focuses its energies instead on maintaining the process by which self-organizing occurs in relation to democratic principles.

However, there does exist another, less-cynical, view of authority possible -- one less defensive and more engaged with citizens in a mutual process of co-creation. It emerges in the

open relationship between government and its people which emerges when fear is removed as the major premise for their association. Such a view would allow for a self-organizing of individuals, but in accordance with principles which exceed any one individual and bond all individuals in a manner which supports idealistic notions of equality, acceptance and choice.

Authority, in this evolutionary view, would be primarily dialogic -- that is it would participate actively in the maintenance of social relationships which allow the natural self-organizing of human beings to occur. It would serve, in this way, as the embodiment of a democratic strange attractor; the center stage from which democratic dialogue both emanates and returns.

The acceptance of chaos -- in all of its human manifestations -- as part of the whole, rather than something to be defended against, ultimately allows for idealism that a cynical view of nature -- and the place of humans in it -- does not. It is not, however, that accepting the turbulence of the world as meaningful to human evolution implies that human nature is infinitely good. Indeed, notions of good and evil are not germane to a discussion of an inter-related world operating on the joint principles of relationship and responsibility. Human nature exists in potential and requires conscious choice-making to engage it in more than reactive adaptation. People must choose to practice the relationship and responsibility which

brings about further evolution. Public administration must play its role in legitimizing this practice.

The role of government, and in particular public administration, has historically been defined narrowly and negatively -- as a tool for the implementation of the social contract A different and more positively democratic disposition than that imposed by the leftovers of social contract theory requires a different ontology than one which draws its legitimacy from a hostile relationship with nature and with each other.

The dilemma of Wamsley's et al idealism occurs at a time when it appears the culture of our nation is falling apart, that the mode of relationship among citizens is largely adversarial, cynical and often violent. Indeed, Wamsley and the Blacksburg Group were prompted to write their prescriptions for public administration by the historical decline and demoralizing of public institutions. As they say:

> ***Much of the denigration of bureaucracy has been a natural outgrowth of our politics. Jacksonian democracy was heavily weighted with negativism toward government because new groups wanted both access to it and control of it. Even thought the Progressive movement ran counter to this, the residual negativism has been amplified by contemporary conservatism and by political actors from interest group liberalism but that are blamed on government or, synonymously, bureaucracy. Thus our political culture has come to include a pernicious mythology concerning the public sector and public administrators which needs to be corrected before the American dialogue can enter a new and meaningful phase (Wamsley et al, p. 33).***

Public administration does exist at a crucial phase, an ***evolutionary window.*** It is a window of opportunity which can easily be slammed shut by a lack of consciousness about the nature of the management paradigm and its continuing influence on the choices made in public administration.

Dialogic Authority

Public administration exists at the heart of the Constitutional Order. In an evolutionary ontology, public administration is the place at which and in which democratic principles can and should be experienced -- those principles which seek the enhancement of individual potential. It is also the place from which a disposition towards democratic process emanates and is identified, articulated and legitimized. It is the place where the generative dialogue of social interactions are set into motion and the disequilibrium of social conflict is given an arena.

Governance in this regard is primarily dialogic. It functions at the very human level of communication in which affect is transmitted as substance and ideas are allowed a free flow in a chaotic and sometimes joyful rhetoric. The rhetoric, as well, is a source of understanding the nature of the profession. As Wamsley, Larry Keller and Richard Green say:

> ***If public administrators continue to seek professionalization, and we think they will, then***

> ***there personnel structure, roles, associations, and education need reorientation -- away from techne and toward the phonesis to be found in rhetorical praxis...Attention to the rhetorical aspects of our developing profession will provide important insights into the relationships between power, discretion, values and morality. This will lead to personnel policies and professional education and training quite different from those that have grown out of management science and its intellectual descendants (1992).***

The sense of authority which emerges from this dialogic view of government is one which is aligned clearly with the purposes of human evolution...purposes which are expressed by a sense of wonder, experimentation and the joy of creativity and diversity which marks human existence.

The authority exists in relationship. In particular it develops as an iteration of the Constitutional Order and is itself in the process of evolutionary development. Dialogic authority cannot be specifically eradicated or dispensed with at any given point, but exists as a continuing reflection of the society.

Vitalizing government is not as simple (or as difficult) as overturning government, in this regard. For example, revolution, as an historical episode. fails to recognize the embedded relationship among the government, the Constitution, and the people. Revolution demands a change of only one side of the social mirror, so that ultimately the social order is no better off because evolutionary growth has been bypassed for short term resolution of conflict.

An evolutionary view assumes that there is only one space in which people exist -- that they cannot be separated into people in government and people out of government -- and that they are related in that space and so share a responsibility for maintaining the process which keeps them together and evolving. Because government, in an evolutionary view, exists in continual and infinite relationship with the people it can change only by active choices to follow new paths. Accountability in this regard is a joint function of both administrators and citizens -- one which is maintained through the continued flow of creative dialogue not the narrow concerns of economic efficiency.

This democratic and dialogical authority is one which requires a professional commitment to the well-being of the society and a particular love for human-beings. The particular tragedy of this authority occurs when it fails to acknowledge the manifestation of its own diminished character in the despair and cynicism of the polity. When that state of being is recognized, it is the responsibility of democratic authority to unblock the creative flow and set the population back into the evolutionary stream.

The difficulty of an evolutionary view of authority is that it assumes that administrators will, can and must keep what Fraser calls an existential tension in their work.[1] The administrator must be cognizant up front of the nature of his or

her responsibility and how that responsibility exists in relationship to the polity, not merely be concerned with efficiencies confined to present circumstances. Then an administrator must self-regulate to keep himself or herself engaged with constitutional principles in changing contexts -- doing those things which maintain the Order but which also serve the purposes of evolution. This necessarily requires a sense of professionalism which is different from the technical education most public administrators receive.

The public administrator who can function in a chaotic environment and love the people whom he or she serves for their diversity and their potential has a different disposition towards the world in general than one concerned most with method and equilibrium...a disposition which is perhaps exemplified most by the idea of the renaissance person. A renaissance person is more inclusive in their approach to life, seeking diversity and valuing the quality of wonder. As William James described such a person:

> ***All narrow people intrench their Me, they retract it-from the region of what they cannot securely possess...Sympathetic people, on the contrary, proceed from the entirely opposite way of expansion and inclusion (Ruf, 1991, p. 37)***

The only good indicator of reliable government and legitimately acting authority is this profound sense of the Other and of the democratic process. By acting upon these senses government legitimizes them for the rest of the polity and

transfigures the nature of the human project by reason of its authority.

Dispositions of Dialogic Authority

The dispositions of a dialogic authority as they compare with those of the Neo-Darwinistic Ontology are addressed below. They appear beneath the disposition they seek to renew. The specific dispositions of an evolutionary ontology express a common disposition towards maintaining and fostering positive social relationships for the more general purpose of continuing the evolutionary flow:

1. *A disposition towards framing issues dichotomously and toward defining change as reform of what went wrong.*

Looking for fundamental unities and existing order as it emerges in the current context from which to define change.

2. *A disposition toward the need for certainty as it relates to societal security.*

Recognition that the coercion that accompanies actions which are designed to make things certain and thereby secure not only detain the human project but cause meaningless suffering, loss of human identity and ultimately create the conditions for the death of the project as the final certainty.

3. *A disposition towards fragmenting, breaking down ideas and conflict into manageable parts and identifiable categories. A related disposition towards breaking social process into groups, interests, and classes.*

Maintaining the focus on the shared humanity of all individuals as the reference point for action rather

than basing policy decisions on perceived deficiencies specific to homogenized groupings.

4. *Disposition towards adaptation and reactive behavior and to value its adaptive capacity as being primary to its identity as a profession.*

Being conscious of the ease with which adaptation occurs and to expand the identity of public administration to include the purpose of human development rather than simply the maintenance of equilibrium and the achievement of certainty and to adapt only when it serves this broader purpose.

5. *A disposition to defer to expertise and to organizational hierarchy as part of the identity of public administration as a management organization*

To employ expertise in the purposes of the broader identity of public administration and to recognize the interdependency of the hierarchical Constitutional Order.

6. *Disposition toward emotional distance as defining objective action and as insuring equal treatment of competing interests.*

Recognizing that emotions are how people connect with their values and with their community and further emotions allow for the creation of new thought and values; embracing conflict as less threatening because of the assumption of a shared humanity which cannot be lost or bargained away, and retreating from increased interventions in affective relationships in our culture and politics; re-emphasizing the legitimacy of relationship.

7. *A disposition toward containing human development through design, planning and methodology.*

Employing design, planning and methodology for the broader evolutionary purposes of public administration with the attitude that we are not trying to make the world a less complex, more manageable place but we're trying to participate in our evolution as it is dependent upon complexity and that we do it with joy

instead of fear.

8. *A disposition toward technology -- both mechanical and behavioral -- as being appropriate to the management of the artificial environment of public institutions created by public intent.*

A recognition that the division between the artificial world and the natural world is an imagined one; that organizations exist in and are subject to the physical world; a wholesale scraping of the idea of "behavioral management" as a means to goal achievement and the reintroduction of relationships mediated by other relationships...including authority and spiritual relationships...instead of by technology. A realignment of the place of technology as both an expression of our consciousness and a way to lead it forward...not as a tool for preserving historical turf.

9. *A disposition toward the assumption of conflict as always problematic, and as occurring among unrelated opposites who share only their fear and distrust of each other...and the subsequent reliance on mediation and conflict resolution as formats for public debate.*

A recognition, in addition to 8 above, that most violent conflict, especially in the political arena, is probably a response to repression, alienation, fear and distrust which could be ameliorated by a less adversarial approach to human relations including an abandonment of the market as a model for human process and human worth.

10. *A disposition toward framing all issues in terms of resource allocation and market impact as a further concern for equilibrium.*

A recognition that equilibrium is a state of no activity and therefore precedes the death or collapse of a system, but more it signals a barren project with no generative activity. Equilibrium as a response to scarce resources is a guarantee that resources will remain scarce and in fact decline because equilibrium

is not a condition in which they can renew.

11. A disposition toward promotion of social homogeneity as the way in which the conflicts over limited resources are resolved and unity of purpose is maintained.

A recognition that homogeneity is also a state of equilibrium...but one always subject to the dynamics of social process -- which if repressed emerges violently, negatively or self-destructively; efforts to correct the disequilibrium caused by this movement (more laws, tougher cops) will only intensify the reaction. Homogeneity is an *un-natural* state because the universe is characteristically diverse. Further, it is the search for *identity* that is at the heart of the human evolution, not homogeneity; that the evolutionary process allows, promotes, fosters, nurtures, diversity and it is in encountering diversity that identity becomes stronger. This is contrary to the common Western fear that we will "lose ourselves" in the melting pot by adaptation.

12. A disposition towards time as a limited commodity.

A recognition of time as being of human creation and thereby an expression of our state of consciousness. Time therefore expands as our consciousness expands. It is self-destructive to manipulate time as if it were a commodity to bargain with, to sell, to hoard, or to fill. The most efficient use of time is those pursuits that expand human consciousness...art, music, literature, debate, architecture, relationships, spiritual exploration and time spent in silence. Time is not an expendable "thing" in this regard but a benchmark of the human relationship with nature.

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Rieux rose. He suddenly appeared very tired.

"...there's no question of heroism in all this. It's a matter of common decency. That's an idea which may make some people, smile, but the only means of fighting a plague is -- common decency.

"What do you mean by 'common decency' ?" Rambert's tone was grave.

"I don't know what it means for other people. But in my case I know that is consists in doing my job."

Camus
The Plague
(1948)

CONCLUSION

From Leviathan to Labyrinth: A New Identity for Public Administration

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It would be difficult to imagine an institution or organization which has undergone more scrutiny, criticism, soul-searching, reorganization, and reform in one century than public administration (Wilson, 1989). It is hard to imagine anything which has experimented so much, absorbed so much new methodology, looked for new ways of doing things, subjected its practitioners to so many periodic shake downs, searched for so much expert knowledge -- and then told itself it needed to look again so often (Goodsell, 1983).

Yet, we in the field are still not satisfied with

ourselves, especially now when all our methods have not changed the realities of soaring deficits and entrenched social problems. The two seem, in fact, to increase in intensity, as though ironically linked by a linear logic. Social programs removed from human relationships have become conditioned responses to funding levels as if their life depended on it -- as it does. Those social problems which can be cured only by an non-instrumental, non-programmatic engagement of the suffering at hand, remain largely unaddressed, except that they have been given the meaningless status of "problem." All the while, the general culture seems to reflect a state of despair and self-loathing.

Surely, this has never been the intent of public administration. The implied and often specified intent of the long line of reformers has been that suffering in society should and could be eliminated. But our expectation seemed to be that as the rate of technological change and the number and range of market goods increased, the populace could be pulled along; that the rational formula of more jobs, better pay, a better standard of living would somehow set its own course. But for this artificial scheme of things to work, human beings had to be changed to fit the program. The rapid rate of the linear evolution of technology and market goods, not tied to any regulating principles other than a belief in their continued growth and expansion, has left out most of the non-

linear process which is intrinsic to human relationships. Technology quite simply has outstripped the capacity of its human environment to achieve a balance which would result in the kind of community we seem to long for. Instead, technology is dragging us along, making us forget that we had some ideas of our own about where we wanted to go and what we wanted to be like.

What might be the dream of American Public Administration for this country? It seems that question is hard answer in an age when we can't even clearly define the purposes of government. Our efforts at achieving a nation free of suffering, one both powerful and just, one with an acceptable standard of living for everyone; one whose's students are the best and the brightest, whose citizens are informed and vital, one which is free -- have never quite succeeded. Instead we are reminded daily of our failures; with each deficit report, with each report of unemployment and homelessness. Perhaps the answer is that we can't get there from here. The road is simply not wide enough.

A Society of Potentialities; A Society of Suffering

The Founders never adopted the attitude of the cynical Rochefoucaults and Montaignes "that fourteen out of fifteen men are rogues" -- as Thomas Jefferson remarks in a letter to

a friend in 1795 (1984). Instead, they offered a pragmatic solution to the problem of how liberty and authority could be reconciled in a world where good and evil existed in equal measure.

> ***It is rather the view of Publius that there is no wisdom, and less safeguard for freedom, in postulating aims or objectives obtainable only if men are angelic and could live in Utopia (Hamilton, et al, 1961, p. 85).***

What constitutional scholar Benjamin Wright (1958; Hamilton, et al, 1961) says about the Founding provides the beginning point for broadening the road of possibilities for public administration. There is no free world which is also free of suffering. The ironic paradox of a creative and turbulent environment is that suffering is a part of living. Strategically eliminating one perceived source of suffering is most likely to increase the suffering is some connected aspect of the plenum somewhere else. Freedom, then, is not necessarily freedom from suffering but, as with consciousness, carries with it an implied sense of relationship and responsibility. The implications of an evolutionary ontology is that freedom and suffering are intertwined in the respect that the freedom to be the architect of one's own evolution requires an engagement of the plenum in a relational and responsible manner.

There is suffering, of course, and then there is meaningful suffering. The distinction between the two is

remanifest in the disposition of public administration towards its citizens. Is suffering something which should be addressed instrumentally and eradicated as if it existed apart from the individual and collective experience, or is there a process by which administrators intimately engage the lives of fellow human beings, suffering and all, and in the process, change occurs...including change in the immediate condition. The difference in the dispositions towards suffering really is that the instrumental one creates the illusion that an inter-related world can be made free of suffering at the same time our attempts to be impartial and our intrumental approach intensifies the suffering.

The second view of suffering sees improvement in the human condition coming from the act of suffering itself. It is a reconnection between human beings and the natural evolutionary processes of which they are still a part. Suffering has a meaning which gives a person purpose and sets him or her or a course of personal liberation, as Dorothee Soelle says (1984).

Meaningless suffering, however, has another dimension which is particularly relevant to the purposes of public administration. The frightening and violent alienation of what seems to be a growing number of American citizens comes partly from a government which has allowed the suffering of these citizens to become a marker of deviance and inadequacy. In a public environment, in which all actions are subject to the

turbulence of initial conditions, responsibility is, by default, mutual in all matters, as cause is the result of multiple and most-often unrepeatable conditions. Yet, public administration persists in the negative and useless habit of looking for political causes of poverty; seeking to assign blame and "to fix." In the process, it has disconnected large segments of the population from the broader community as aliens -- people who have not proven their value as human beings by the standards of the market, who are therefore not as deserving of our compassion. Public administration has not addressed the poverty directly, only indirectly in methodology, as if methods could align the deviant conditions with the purposes of the rational economy. This is true except for the individual efforts of administrators whose compassion leads them to act despite a lack of funding, or program incentives.

Rebuilding of personal relationships between administrators and citizens is the only way by which the frayed social fabric can not just be mended but enlivened with new purpose. This often takes a open commitment to feeling and emotional involvement. It has been difficult to justify becoming involved with individual clients because of the belief is that only those programs which can be administered through programs are equitable. The reality has always been, however, that change comes one person at a time; but that

indeed an entire system can be reconfigured by the changed disposition of one administrator who recognizes potential and acts upon it. This is different than programmed incrementalism which is removed from the generative dynamics of relationship.

The first movement by public administration out of technologically safe but emotionally sterile corners of Simon's Box should be an "about face," one which turns us back to the people we serve -- not just in better, more efficient service but in more felt compassion. We must engage people from a disposition of love and shared humanity, not from the safe distance of instrumental or critical thinking. It is a compassion for our shared suffering as human beings which may reunite this country and cure the alienation that has stagnated the potential of so much of its population.

Those who attended the Minnowbrook I Conference in 1968 and gave form to the "New Public Administration" expressed similar concerns (Marini, 1971). It was their belief, also, that public administration should be more connected to the reality of the life of citizens. Yet, two things may be improved upon from that first evolutionary move. The first is that the market/instrumental model, as it has been used to organize community groups and interests in response to social problems, is not the appropriate model for human relationships. Citizens have been encouraged to self-organize

under the banner of empowerment but the organizing principles have not been those of democracy or the constitution but of the market.

The experience of recent liberalism is that the marketing of social interests has reinforced the tendency of public administration to force adaptations to its game rules so that true change doesn't occur. Instead, the system is reinforced at an old -- and inadequate --equilibrium. Further, marketing requires that citizens be used as foot-soldiers in a the marketing effort, not engaged. Yet, the marketing of social agendas is simply less effective and meaningful in a democracy than non-strategic dialogue. The strategic dialogue of the economic format eliminates all potentialities except those which meet the needs of the agenda -- including those related to the development of positive social relationships. Further the empowerment of citizens by improving their marketing skills is meaningless if it only re-enforces the manner in which an inadequate system remains inadequate.

Also, a new balance needs to be sought between technology, the market and human evolution. New Public Administration tried to match emerging technologies -- especially methodological means of creating equality -- with human process. As a result, the marketing style of politics emerged which required citizens to be both adversarial with their government and disconnected from each other in a

struggle to find someone who could make up the gaps in the standards set by the methodology.

A change is perhaps accomplished through broad-based aspirational national policy which takes into account democratic as well as quality-of-life issues which might bring the market and technology back in line with human process. Such policy would serve to generate dialogue about social issues from which the society could create its own natural balance without the need for armed camps who must win the battle over, programatic aspects of what policy should be -- or lose their identity. That is, that the organizing principles around which social patterns are formed need to consciously be made broader. Mainly, the principles need to be expanded from the Darwinistic ones of the market and realigned with the more generative principles of the Constitution.

Most generally public administration needs to return to speaking and acting not just for the most powerful, or even for community. It must learn to speak and act with community, as a participating member. But first public administration must internalize and understand the idea of inter-connectedness. Public administration itself must see those amongst us who are in need as citizens, as our own -- and not as expatriated deviants. It would seem that this is done most effectively by participating in the evolutionary process -- by Public administration's engagement of suffering rather than

simply describing it.

Inversion: Going Back to Go Forward

A new identity for public administration is formed also by a connection to different set of organizing principles then those offered by the management paradigm. It is ironic that public administration worries at all about democracy because, for the most part, it has seen itself as being organized around the despotic principles of the social contract, as Wolin would describe them. Yet, the organizing principles of the Constitution exist in the current complex plenum of public administration as well. It is by way, however, of a kind of "constitutional literacy," as Paul Volcker might call it, that public administrators reconnect with these organizing principles and thereby re-configure their field. This connection is vital to the productive life of public administration and the citizens it serves.

The management paradigm -- because of its one-dimensional linearity and is lack of connection to basic human purpose -- is not generative of positive human relationships in the manner of the Constitution. Public Administration's most enduring connection to the principles of democracy is through the Constitution which is also the source of its ability to generate change and evolutionary movement in society. It is a matter then, as the Greeks would understand it, of going back

to go forward. Public administration must make the choice to enliven the Constitution in the current context as the way by which human process is once again put into positive motion and by which the whole -- the common good -- is known.

In this regard, the idea, as put forth by John Rohr, that public administrators are also Constitutional Officers is a powerful one. It suggests that the connection clearly exists with the original organizing principles of this country and that public administrators must choose to recognize that connection and interact with it by acknowledging their personal role as "constitutional officers." Further, the officer must act from the basis of a constitutional grounding in each context not
simply those which appear to be matters of constitutional law.

It is not John Rohr's thought, but in an evolutionary ontology, his approach to constitutionalism would mean that the whole -- as embodied in the interaction of the historical context with the organizing principles -- is always represented. This is because the whole -- or what we've come to think of as the public interest -- represents the process by which the democratic principles of human relationships are carried forward, whatever the context. It is in this process also that basic human evolutionary purposes are realized. Further, a disposition from this understanding of the whole allows contextual changes -- including technology and

economics -- to keep balance with non-linear human evolution.

An identity change for public administrators then suggests that the profession reconsider its own sense of purpose in relation to that of other human beings. The long entrenched assumption that public administration is concerned most with stability and with the maintenance of an historical equilibrium denies a broader potentiality. It is in states of disequilibrium and intrinsically cooperative relationships that the human project moves forward.

From Behavioral Engineer to Constitutional Officer.

The world view fostered by Descartes and the Darwinists who followed, created a consciousness in which society no longer exists as a related whole but as groups of carefully delineated categories. For public administration, constructed in this century with neo-darwinistic principles, this has meant a professional pre-occupation with seeing the parts of the American culture, rather than its entirety. The methodology used to study the culture, of course, added to this predisposition towards adding and subtracting pieces to make wholes, instead of beginning policy discussion from a broader sense of what the whole already was.

Categories -- races, classes, interests -- made it easier to predict those circumstances which would enable them to

create order in the system. Likewise, it made it easier to predict how the system might be returned to a state of equilibrium should it become unstable. Key to this methodology was the ability to control conflict as the most threatening source of disequilibrium.

Social dialogue from a neo-Darwinistic ontology is orchestrated to achieve some artificial balance between the imperatives of preconceived goals and a nagging reminder that this professes to be a democratic government. Mediation, conflict resolution and negotiation are highly stylized methods for accomplishing this end. For the most part the public administrator is an observer of the dialogue but the one who sets the rules.

Dialogue, from the perspective of an evolutionary ontology, however, would be considerably different. To begin with, the administrator would be less concerned with reducing or minimizing conflict than creating a generative form of it. It would be a case of what Frederick Ruf calls "domesticated chaos" or " soft chaos" (1991). The purpose would be to throw the dialogue -- or context -- into a state of disequilibrium from which it might re-organize. This is perhaps most effectively done by an administrator who is, herself or himself, involved in the debate as a participant, rather than as an observer. Such involvement would be the clear articulation of the values at hand which would serve as a

catalyst for evolutionary movement. Secondly, the administrator would represent, by his or her presence, the democratic organizing principles for the dialogue and by his engagement he connects with their sufffering.

The professionalism that is required of an administrator who participates in dialogue is more profound than that of one who is skilled in mediation. The administrator must both understand and accept that by infusing the dialogue with a sense of the whole as expressed through democratic principles, he or she is submitting the values which have been expressed to evaluation and likely change. It is in this way that the administrator becomes part of the process -- by not seeking to preserve certain states but to clarify and submit them for further evolution. It is once again the idea of going back to go forward. In accomplishing this paradoxical task the administrator is maintaining the evolutionary flow of democratic process.

Further, by establishing the organizing principles and submitting them to dialogue the administrator can set into motion the process by which a regeneration can be achieved which incorporates the current context without reference to categories. That is to say, the dialogue is allowed to discover the "law of the situation" from which an administrator might act with some certainty that a new integration has been struck.

The crucial difference between the behavioral tool of mediation and the maintenance of dialogic flow proposed here is that the dialogue is allowed to play out to its own sense completion. The importance of this is that such a dialogue also builds the capacity of citizens to actively participate in the design of their own evolution in a meaningful way. The administrator has a different role than mediator/problem solver in this context. He or she becomes a positive authority with which the citizen can interact and struggle with issues of personal development. This, of course, requires that public administration see its identity intertwined with that of the human project, and not somehow distant from it.

This really suggests, once again, that public administrators -- as constitutional officers -- must remove the distance between themselves and citizens and be courageous enough to express values, engage suffering, and submit to process. This requires a conscious choice by administrators to do something other than make calculated decisions.

From Reform to Reconfiguration

The incrementalism by which most public policy is addressed sees the political process as a machine which can be tinkered with and improved without ever addressing the relatededness of the political process to evolutionary process. Behaviorism expresses the same belief when it

commends practitioners to "address the behavior and not the person." Incrementalism and "satisficing" remove the policy debate from the dynamics of the larger system.

Incrementalism, however, appears to exist only because a sense of the inter-related system cannot be imagined or because of a fear that national policy, in particular, will result in a kind of determinism which itself seems despotic.

For some time now, however, public administration has found it difficult to maintain the identity as the mere implementor of public policy. Yet it has not fully confronted the implications of its role as a legitimate participant in the policy and governance process either. Incremental changes, corrections, reforms can be seen as a means to equilibrate the system not change it. This occurs partly because public dialogue is seen as only an ancillary function of the policy process once it reaches the administrative stage -- something to add a bit of democratic patina of comestic legitimation. Yet, the conduct of an on-going public debate of a more general but more value-laden national policy is an appropriate role for public administration and one it must assume if government and culture is to be revived.

This suggestion is partly a recognition that our society has changed so dramatically since the Founding that citizens realistically can't access government except through public agencies. Yet, the isolation from citizens and the gridlock

which has come to be identified with government in general would suggest that real engagement with the public is less comfortable for public administration than incremental and isntrumental mediation. Again, the conflict that is inherent in interchanges with citizens seems to deny the old identity of public administration as the keeper of the equilibrium.

It is the main point here, however, that public administration should take its dialogic role seriously. Indeed, dialogue is seen as the most legitimate function of public administration. This really doesn't require, however, anything more than what the public administration already has in terms of structure or authority. Public administration need not be reorganized to accommodate broad-based public debate, for example.

The idea of reconfiguration is that individual agency personnel can recognize points of entry at both the institutional and public level which can serve as opportunities to talk about national policy in an aspirational way or to affect change in accordance with constitutional principles. In many ways the complex debates that take place in policy subsystems serve this role, already. Part of the problem is that the complexity is seen as a negative manifestation of "politics." Research into the dialogic processes of policy subsystems might reveal that issues really don't emerge until a balance has been achieved in the tussling

among actors in the subsystem. The speculation here, however, is that a great deal of artful dodging takes place -- that is, administrators avoid the process in order to achieve short-term goals -- because the process is under-valued by public administrators themselves.

It is under-valued no doubt because the general system does not value it, but finds it an impediment to the efficiency of government. The price for this has been gridlock -- the lining up of bipolar opposites in a system which cannot figure out any more productive way to talk about its conflicts. Dialogue has to be seen as primary to the functioning of government, not simply an add-on.

From an evolutionary view, the political system needs to periodically reconfigure itself -- not simply reform its parts or incrementally add new ones. This cannot occur without a clear set of organizing principles which serves as a catalyst for dialogue, and the structure by which the debate formulates new policy more effectively in the current context. Nor can it occur without an authority which is willing to represent those principles and submit those values to periodic evaluation.

Mainly, however, agency heads must begin to see their role as one more connected to the whole of the political process rather than simply to programmatic goal-setting and achievement (Wamsley, et al, 1990, Chpt. 4). Agency heads must serve to articulate the organizing principles of the

Constitution as the way by which a sense of the whole -- or public interest -- is conveyed from one context to the next. They must express and convey values and national policy and submit them to the process for evaluation. Agency heads must also legitimize the dialogic process and discourage those who would bypass it.

From Evolution by Consequence to Evolution by Process

The ability of dialogue to transform a system is severely limited by the disposition of an administrator towards change itself. The neo-Darwinistic assumption that change occurs only as a result of consequence flavors public dialogue with cynicism. Evolution by consequence implies too easily that dialogue is simply a matter of bargaining about how to avoid punishment and gain reward. Cooperation in this context becomes bargaining over interests -- rather than the integration of understandings for the purpose of serving the public good.

By contrast, evolution by process makes the consequence secondary to both the maintenance of the process and participation in the process as an on-going meaningful act of creation and relationship. The participant in an evolutionary dialogue is less concerned with method or marketing than with the authentic -- and perhaps passionate -- submission of his or her ideas to the process at hand. The cooperation of

evolution by process is not conflict free, but instead assumes that the conflict adds to or has some meaning for the process itself. Indeed each participant has a responsibility to clearly articulate their own feelings, values and ideas as they understand them at that moment in order to maintain the flow of the process.

The difference perhaps, however, is best expressed by the idea of strategic dialogue in contrast to engaged dialogue. Strategic dialogue seeks to remove the insecurity and risk associated with engaging other citizens in debate by planning in advance how the dialogue should proceed and removing oneself -- by way of expertise or critique -- from the risk of being changed. Engaged dialogue, on the other hand, is one in which no member of the dialogue has distanced him or herself from the struggle inherent in conflict, or the suffering of citizens and no one's position is immune to change.

Evolution by consequence does carry with it a great deal of baggage which impedes the evolution of public administration. The idea of survival of the fittest lends itself to narrow formulations of what it means to be "fit." Natural selection generally locks public administration dialogue into a hostile environment -- one in which to change as a result of a dialogue is tantamount to losing identity. Further, it reduces the idea of choice to one which realizes either the avoidance of a loss or the production of a gain.

Choice, as a moral dilemma, or as an act of freedom, would seem to require a different focus, however, one which recognizes the responsibility and relationship shared with the rest of the plenum. Further, it is an active choice which involves the being of the individual rather than the rather disengaged mental choice of choosing among alternatives based on perceived consequences. It suggests that there are other potentialities to be considered than those which are apparent.

Further, the idea of adaptation to consequence as evolution only feeds public administration's inadequate conception of public public dialogue as incrementalism. Evolution, as it is understood here, requires a reconfiguration of systems which integrate change in ways which provides a new identity for the system...not simply an adjustment.

The Hierarchy that Isn't

There is perhaps no debate among public administration theorists which has been more heated than that among those who condemn the bureaucratic hierarchy and those who defend it (Denhardt, 1981; Hummel, 1977; Thayer, 1978; Goodsell, 1983). An evolutionary ontology provides a third possibility for considering hierarchy one which neither rejects or accepts it in the manner of traditional Public administration debate.

Hierarchies appear and reappear both in nature and in the social order. This does not mean, however, that nature favors a top-down command structure. It instead is composed of integrated dimensions which are inter-related and inter-dependent while at the same time exist as separate and self-organizing systems (Jantsch, 1975, 1979).

The key evolutionary disposition which is relevant to the debate over hierarchy in Public administration is that, because of the interdependence of each of the levels of a hierarchy, one cannot assume that one level is superior to another. A policy subsystem, as Wamsley describes it, perhaps best represents this kind of multi-dimensionality as it relates to public administration. It is not possible to say that technocratic functions of an agency are more important than normative ones or that the input of an expert is more important than the input of a citizen. They are simply different. However for the agency to function and evolve it must integrate all aspects within its natural hierarchy, not only ***towards*** a common aim, but also ***from*** common organizing principles. For the quality of government to be a vital one, all "levels" must be activated from the basis of their full potential.

The problem of a top-down hierarchy, in this view, really becomes, not a structural problem, so much as a problem with the disposition of the agency director, as well as the

individual administrator. The structure itself is only potentially autocratic. The problems of human repression, described by Hummel and others, are not problems which can be eliminated by tearing apart the structure of government. A new structure is just as likely to become repressive without a different ontology for public administration -- and therefore a different understanding of human process by individual administrators. The potential of the hierarchy to work "with all its lights on" can be had only with a change in disposition by public administrators.

In this regard, the expertise of public administration, with which it most identifies, must be seen to exist within the system as a whole. The expertise is important, and efficiency is important, but they are important only as they relate and interact with other aspects of a different ontology which include a deeply integrated sense of constitutional principles and democratic process.

A Different Sense of Time

Yet, efficiency has become a rationale for the existence of public administration. It is a near neurotic concern with saving time as the way in which money is saved. There is an attendant concern with quality as it relates to efficiency -- that what we do should meet agreed upon standards and meet the needs of those which we serve. But most generally standards of

efficiency have been imposed on public agencies rather than agencies finding their own efficiency. The closest thing to this idea of course is the concept of agency culture -- that a rhythm develops among individuals working in an agency over a period of time which represents the balance that an agency has achieved in its relationships, one which allows it to get things done in an efficient manner.

Agency culture, however, carries a different sense of time than that attached to the clock. Because it is built on human relationships it is constructed and maintained by a nonlinear process which cannot be measured by temporal standards. There are two aspects of this sense of time: (1) that it manifests itself as an established rhythm among people which comes from knowing each other in a shared space for a shared task and (2) that a self-organizing culture forms a structure which is uniquely suited to the task at hand. Efficiency doesn't exist until the culture has self-organized in relation to the task at hand and that any attempts to bypass this process will result in dual dysfunctional efficiencies -- those which happen because the system hasn't "gelled" yet and those which happen because the imposition is distorting the natural process of self-organizing.

The role of what Wamsley calls "agential authority" -- in this conception of time -- would be to keep the organization at an appropriate level of chaos insuring that it was

organizing in relation to constitutional principles and that it was in a state of disequilibrium frequently enough to reconfigure around changes and demands in the environment. This is dramatically different from an agency structured and then re-organized on the basis of an imposed plan.

A new identity for public administration from this perspective is one in which the agency appreciates its own ability to formulate responses to the policy environment. This appreciation would take the form of a respect for agency culture and a recognition that self-reconfiguration rather than re-organization is probably more effective and efficient in the long run. But mainly, it represents an identity that places great store in the efficacy of personal relationships.

From Technician to Renaissance Person

A new ontology suggests a particular kind of professionalism for the public service -- one aligned with human purpose and one which is principally dialogic. That is to say that a public administrator cannot merely be a technician but must be a technician and statesperson at the same time.

It is not enough in this regard to teach students of public administration only method or even administrative theory. Students must develop and integrate a sense of the

dynamics of the polity they will come to represent and, in particular, must be self-ware enough to be able to engage the process in a meaningful way. They must possess a kind of confidence which allows them to take the risk of engaging the polity without wanting to bring the process to some premature closure for the sake of certainty. In this regard a quality of a public administrator is the ability to make active choices rather than to simply passively adapt to a positive and negative consequence.

If we are concerned about neutrality in public administration it should be expressed as a concern for allowing the democratic process to bring itself to closure at the risk of loss of personal gain. A public administrator must possess a kind of "evolutionary ethics" in this regard which encourage him or her to embrace the turbulence and complexity of the social environment with a sense of purpose rather than a sense of fear. This sense should also take the form of an intrinsic love for the people served -- a transcending love which accepts them unconditionally for their differences without reference to their deviance from economic or social norms implied by their suffering.

There is perhaps a *calling* for public administration as Jim Wolf and Larry Lane suggest (1990).It is questionable whether there should be people in the public service who do not care for citizens or who fear the complexity and

uncertainty in which democracy finds room to play. It seems, however, that there is much to be done before public administration can attract those who would serve it as a calling. First, however, students of public administration must get more than a view of method or even theory. Since much of public administration theory is premised on the neo-darwinistic ontology it is difficult to imagine that those who would possess an evolutionary ethics would be especially attracted to the field. Public administration must begin to see itself in broader terms so that those who would serve it can as well.

The possibilities of enriching the public administration curriculum embracing a new ontology are exciting and diverse. They range from political philosophy, cultural studies, New physics, an appreciation of the arts to field studies which connect students with citizens and explorations in ways of understanding -- indeed all things which represent themselves as human endeavors are appropriate for a profession which itself is supposed to represent the diverse nature of our culture. Above all, students should acquire a sense of being involved in the society from more than the distancing standpoint of a critic, theoretician, manager, mediator, or judge. In this regard, emotions and feelings should be allowed back into the classroom as students reconnect with Others.

Public administration does not need to be seen as the place where fully integrated individuals rule like philosopher kings in a paternalistic way. The notion of a Renaissance person is one who remains engaged and in development while contributing to the evolution of Others. Renaissance itself means a new birth or revival, and as such it fits well the evolutionary view of a process in constant renewal. It is this identity for public administrators which most fits an evolutionary ontology...a profession in constant and vigorous renewal.

Public administration is at a window of evolutionary renewal, one brought on by its own disposition towards self-assessment and by the crucial need for a governing authority who will assume responsibility for moving the society out of its current state of regressive despair. This window is a narrow one -- as all windows in a turbulent world are. It is realized by a conscious choice to broaden the identity of public administration and stop the endless redundancy of historical adaptation which limits the potential of the social order.

From Leviathan to Labyrinth

Public administration has remained connected to social contract dogma through the organizational/management

paradigm despite its inapplicability to democracy. The identity of Public administration has thereby been one associated with the manager who keeps the bureaucratic maze of the powerful and distant Leviathan intact. This is true, not necessarily because of any particular despotic intent on the part of public administrators, but because the purpose of administration has been seen to be that of maintaining stability and seeking equilibrium. This identity has simply put public administration at odds with a society which is naturally dependent on a relational process of disequilibrium and conflict for its creativity and vitality.

If public administration appears to be distant from and even hostile towards the citizens it serves, it is because it is avoiding the conflict which is inherent in human relationships -- and which creates states of disequilibrium which appear to threaten the societal security which public administration sees itself -- at a very gut level -- as protecting. In this regard, public administration, has been more over protective than incompetent or unconcerned. It is a lonely identity.

For this condition to change, public administrators must make a conscious choice to desert the mean-spirited Hobbesian disposition towards social isolation and distrust. It must make peace with constitutional principles. It must become secure enough about its place in community -- to become

vulnerable enough to participate in the great, messy, turbulent, unpredictable and creative labyrinth of the Constitutional Order.

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

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