

Appendix B.

SRB Critical Items List ^{B-1}

^{B-1} Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, pp. 157-158.


SRB CRITICAL ITEMS LIST		Sheet <u>1</u> of <u>2</u>
Subsystem <u>SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER</u>	Criticality Category <u>1</u> Reaction Time <u>IMMEDIATE TO SEC.</u>	
Code <u>10-01-01</u> Case, P/N (See Retention Rationale) Item Name (Joint Assys, Factory P/N 1U50147 Field: 1U50747)	Page: <u>A-6A</u>	
No. Required: <u>1 (11 segments, 3 Field joints, 7 plant joints)</u>	Revision: _____	
FAEA Page No. <u>A-4</u> of MSFC-RPT-724	Date: <u>December 17, 1982</u>	
Critical Phases: <u>Boost</u>	Analyst: <u>Garber</u>	
Failure Modes & Causes: <u>Leakage at case assembly joints due to redundant O-ring seal failures or primary seal and leak check port O-ring failure.</u>	Approved: 	
NOTE: Leakage of the primary O-ring seal is classified as a single failure point due to possibility of loss of sealing at the secondary O-ring because of joint rotation after motor pressurization.		
Failure Effect Summary: <u>Actual Loss - Loss of mission, vehicle, and crew due to metal erosion, burnthrough, and probable case burst resulting in fire and deflagration.</u>		
RATIONALE FOR RETENTION		
Case, P/N 1U50129, 1U50131, 1U50130, 1U50185, 1U50147, 1U50715, 1U50716, 1U50717		
A. DESIGN		
<p>The SRM case joint design is common in the lightweight and regular weight cases having identical dimensions. The joint concept is basically the same as the single O-ring joint successfully employed on the Titan III solid rocket motor. The SRM joint uses centering clips which are installed in the gap between the tang O.D. and the outside clevis leg to compensate for the loss of concentricity due to gathering and to reduce the total clevis gap which has been provided for ease of assembly. On the shuttle SRM, the secondary O-ring was designed to provide redundancy and to permit a leak check, ensuring proper installation of the O-rings. Full redundancy exists at the moment of initial pressurization. However, test data shows that a phenomenon called joint rotation occurs as the pressure rises, opening up the O-ring extrusion gap and permitting the energized O-ring to protrude into the gap. This condition has been shown by test to be well within that required for safe primary O-ring sealing. This gap may, however, in some cases, increase sufficiently to cause the unenergized secondary O-ring to lose compression, raising question as to its ability to energize and seal if called upon to do so by primary seal failure. Since, under this latter condition only the single O-ring is sealing, a rationale for retention is provided for the simplex mode where only one O-ring is acting.</p>		
<p>The surface finish requirement for the O-ring grooves is 63 and the finish of the O-ring contacting portion of the tang, which slices across the O-ring during joint assembly, is 32. The joint design provides an CO for the O-ring installation, which facilitates retention during joint assembly. The tang has a large shallow angle chamfer on the tip to prevent the cutting of the O-ring at assembly. The design drawing specifies application of O-ring lubricant prior to the installation. The factory assembled joints have NBR rubber material vulcanized across the internal joint faying surfaces as a part of the case internal insulation subsystem.</p>		
<p>A small MS port leading to the annular cavity between the redundant seals permits a leak check of the seals immediately after joining segments. The MS plug, installed after leak test, has a retaining groove and compression face for its O-ring seal. A means to test the seal of the installed MS plug has not been established.</p>		
<p>The O-rings for the case joints are mold formed and ground to close tolerance and the O-rings for the test port are mold formed to net dimensions. Both O-rings are made for high temperature, low compression set fluorocarbon elastomer. The design permits five scarf joints for the case joint seal rings. The O-ring joint strength must equal or exceed 40% of the parent material strength.</p>		
B. TESTING		
<p>To date, eight static firings and five flights have resulted in 120 (54 field and 126 factory) joints tested with no evidence of leakage. The Titan III program using a similar joint concept has tested a total of 1076 joints successfully.</p>		

Figure B-1 – SRB CIL (page 1)

SRB CRITICAL ITEMS LIST		Sheet <u>2</u> of <u>2</u>
Subsystem: <u>SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER</u>	Criticality Category <u>1</u>	Immediate Reaction Time <u>10 Sec.</u>
Item Code: <u>10-01-01</u>	Page: <u>A-58</u>	
Item Name: <u>Case, P/N (See Retention Rationale) (Joint Assys. Factory P/N 1150247 Field: 1150737)</u>	Revision: _____	
RATIONALE FOR RETENTION (CONT'D)		
<p>A laboratory test program demonstrated the ability of the O-ring to operate successfully when extruded into gaps well over those encountered in this O-ring application. Uniform gaps of 1/8-inch and over (TWR-13486) successfully withstood pressures of 1600 psi. The Hydroburst Program (TWR-13664) and the Structural Test Program (STA-1) for the standard weight case (TWR-12051) and the Lightweight Case Joint Certification Test (TWR-12829) all have shown that the O-ring can withstand a minimum of four pressurizations before damage to the ring can permit any leakage.</p> <p>Further demonstration of the capability of joint sealing is found in the hydro-proof testing of new and refurbished case segments. Over 540 joints have been exposed to liquid pressurizations at levels exceeding motor MEPG with no leakage experienced past the primary O-ring. The only occasions where leakage was experienced was during refurbishment of STS-1 where two stiffener segments were severely damaged during cavity collapse at water impact.</p> <p>A more detailed description of SRM joint testing history is contained in TWR-13520, Revision A.</p>		
<p>C. INSPECTION</p> <p>The tang -A- diameter and clevis -C- diameter are measured and recorded. The depth, width and surface finish of the O-rings grooves are verified. The surface finish of the tang is also verified. Characteristics are inspected on each O-ring to assure conformance to the standards to include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Surface conditions o Mold flashing o Scarf joint mismatch or separation o Cross section o Circumference o Diameter <p>Each assembled joint seal is tested per STW-2747 via pressurizing the annular cavity between seals to 50 5 psi and monitoring for 10 minutes. A pressure decay of 1 psig or greater is not acceptable. Following seal verification by QC, the leak test port plug is installed with QC verifying installation and torquing.</p>		
<p>D. FAILURE HISTORY</p> <p>No failures have been experienced in the static firing of three qualification motors, five development motors and ten flight motors.</p>		

Figure B-2 - SRB CIL (page 2)