

**THE STRATEGY & POLITICS OF EXPANSIONISM:
United States Foreign Policy Toward Cuba and the Philippines in 1898**

by

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
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
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Department of Political Science

(ABSTRACT)

The study of Great Power behavior is a relevant and timeless pursuit, as the major powers can impact economies, societies, and lives around the world. Be it war, trade, or other assertions of interests abroad, such activities affect the global political landscape significantly. Important questions raised in the current literature revolve around issues such as: Why do Great Powers overexpand? And why do they expand at some points in time but not in others? This study asks, *Why does a power expand differently in two similar situations at the same point in time?*

To probe such a question I explore McKinley's policy choices toward Cuba and the Philippines in 1898, the latter territory being annexed while the former not. Each case is presented against three competing explanations derived from recent expansionist literature. Propositions from each perspective--offensive realism, defensive realism and domestic coalition logrolling--are introduced in a structured, focused manner in each case.

Despite the shortcomings of realism as a progressive paradigm for international relations inquiry, this study hints that a variant of realism--offensive--could be a persuasive "first cut" theory at understanding foreign policy expansionism. At least, it is not apparent here that realism should be displaced by a domestic politics paradigm.

Practically, what follows reveals the ability of Great Powers to expand is not necessarily thwarted due to internal characteristics (democratic, pluralist, "weak" state), whether they have popular support or not. The findings also suggest that it is out of confidence and opportunity that expansionism occurs in these cases, rather than out of insecurity.

DEDICATION

To Stella Israel and Shirley Shannon:

History bears the gift of wisdom.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Humbly, I would like to thank the following for helping me endure and for enduring me...

Edward Weisband for stepping in as chair and providing wisdom and guidance at all the right times;

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Best wishes and thanks to you all.

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To probe such a question I explore McKinley's policy choices toward Cuba and the Philippines in 1898, the latter territory being annexed while the former not. Each case is presented against three competing explanations derived from recent expansionist literature. Propositions from each perspective--offensive realism, defensive realism and domestic coalition logrolling--are introduced in a structured, focused manner in each case.

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CHAPTER ONE.

Introduction

What is expansionism? Why do rising powers expand? Why do they *not*? These questions have received much attention in the study of international politics. The debates which spawns from this attention range from the behavior of states over time, to the behavior of states as "rising" or "falling" powers, to differences which state structure impose on state behavior. For instance, is the United States as an institutionally fragmented, federated and democratic state less apt to engage in imperialist policies; more apt to be relatively benign? The study introduced below enters this ongoing dialogue on the dynamics of expansionism, with a focus on foreign policy choice rather than international outcomes.

Introducing the Study

What follows is a study building off current scholarship attempting to integrate domestic and international/systemic factors of foreign policy decision-making. I explore United States foreign policy *choice* toward Cuba and the Philippines, comparatively, in 1898. Specifically, I ask why President William McKinley decide to annex the Philippines but not Cuba at the conclusion of a successful war over each territory's then-ruler, Spain. This is a dual case study, with each policy choice examined individually as

well as compared in a structured, focused theoretical analysis of variation in policy decisions.

ORGANIZING FRAMEWORK

Since this is a study of decisions, and since decisions are made by individuals whose choices require "compliance or even enthusiasm from" constituents,⁰ the relevant actors will be the chief decision-makers in the Executive (in this case, U.S. president William McKinley and his circle of advisers), members of Congress (which also affects policy and ratifies treaties) and societal groups with interests in either case or expansionism in general. Two variations of realist thought, called here defensive and offensive realism, are represented by the existence of threats to, or opportunities for, the state which prompt the state to expand abroad. Systemic threats or opportunities will be assessed through how McKinley and his advisers perceived and interpreted them. Any "threat" or "opportunity" existing outside the United States is only such if the chief decision-makers of the state perceived and interpreted reality in those terms. I choose this phenomenological approach under the assumption that a nation-state is not "a distinct social entity" which is "a unity unto itself" but rather a "group of individuals operating within an institutional framework" who must perceive and interpret events before making a decision.¹ In the case of the third theoretical approach used below, domestic political

⁰Gourevitch, Politics In Hard Times, Cornell U. Press: Ithaca and London (1986), p 20.

¹Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," p. 82.

coalitions and ideology, groups need to be identified as do their interests in the issues and politics in the policy debate.

Realist Explanations for Expansionism

Realists contend that the principal objective of states is the maintenance and promotion of power, influence and security.² Two types of realism emerge from this assumption in explaining foreign policy decisions--that which focuses on promoting influence and power actively (**offensive realism**) and that which centers on promoting security in the face of perceived threats (**defensive realism**).

According to offensive realism, as a state grows in relative power in an anarchic world system, it may seek to exert influence abroad so to advance political, economic or security interests.³ This "aggressive realism"⁴ follows the logic that "a principal objective of states has been the conquest of territory" or to "increase their influence over the behavior of other states" in order to advance economic and security interests.⁵ These interests are defined by the decision-making elite in a given time and place. Thus, the existence of expansionism may be attributed to the simple fact that "it pays."⁶ This is the foundation of the "test" of offensive realism:

Did the perception of external opportunity to expand lead McKinley to choose expansionist policies? And did variance in such perceived

²Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, pp.23-25, discusses the state interests in advancing influence and security through conquest and power; Snyder, pp 10-13 and 21-26 discuss the premium on security.

³Gilpin, pp. xi, 9, 23-25.

⁴This term is used by Snyder in his Myths of Empire. It is also similar to Zakaria's "state-centered realism;" see Rise of a Great Power, p5.

⁵Gilpin, pp.23-24.

⁶Snyder, p 10.

opportunities lead to variance in policy choice toward Cuban and the Philippines? A focus on McKinley and his advisers' conceptions of national economic and security interests is key to explanation of either threat or opportunity. If McKinley perceived an opportunity to conquer the territory and people of the Philippines, he would do so if such an act furthers his idea of commercial, political or security gains. Did this perception not exist with regard to Cuba, thus accounting for the difference in policy choice?

Alternatively, defensive realism asserts that if a decision-maker perceives the intentions and capabilities of a foreign element to be aggressive and formidable vis-à-vis her/his conception of national interest, s/he is likely to respond defensively to secure those commercial or security interests.⁷ The questions to be answered here are: ***Did McKinley perceive a threat to security and/or economic interests in the Philippines that led him to annex the archipelago? Were similar such threats absent in Cuba?***

Domestic Political Explanation: Coalitions and Ideology

Gilpin, who focuses largely on systemic factors in foreign policy, understands that the interests belong not to states but to individuals and coalitions of individuals, and that determination of political objectives is a "coalition process."⁸ But some who are attempting to explain expansionsism (Snyder among the most articulate and contemporary) place great weight on such coalitions in the fate Great Power decisions to expand. In such a framework, there must exist at the time of policy choice the

⁷See Snyder p.12; Walt, Origins of Alliance, pp.25-26; and Zakaria, The Rise of a Great Power, pp.6-7, 31-35.

⁸Gilpin, pp. 18-19.

following conditions:

1. Narrow imperialist interests gaining control over national policy by joining in logrolled coalitions, trading favors so that each group gets what it wants most;
2. By capturing the state (ties with the state as part of the coalition or by being overrepresented in the organs of state power already), groups in the imperial coalition harness its propaganda resources... selling myths using the instruments and credibility of the state...self-serving strategic arguments become less traceable to the parochial interests that benefit from them.⁹

Not only do these criteria need to be met, but they need to be met differentially based on the cases (Cuba and the Philippines). Did a coalition favoring annexation of the Philippines and/or opposing annexation of Cuba exist in the manner described above? Is this a case of "offensive détente" where imperialists logrolling with anti-imperialist factions caused the variation in policy toward Cuba and the Philippines?

Also, McKinley's perceptions and subsequent interpretations as they are linked with his actions should be assessed. Did McKinley endorse separate strategies because of his knowledge and accordance with, or participation in, these coalition forces and beliefs? Did he *have* a choice, making his preferences and perceptions important? Was he constrained by

⁹Snyder, p17 and 38.

issues of separation of powers? The three theoretical perspectives are elaborated and tied more explicitly to propositions in Chapter Two.

Case Selection

The cases of policy toward Cuba and the Philippines have similar features and different outcomes in terms of policy choices, conditions conducive to a structured, focused comparison of policy variation. Both were ripe for the taking following the United States's lopsided war with Spain. Both had internal insurrections fighting for independence, be it from Spain or the United States. Both consisted of populations quite dissimilar from the demographic make-up of the contemporary United States. The policy decisions came at the same time and at the same point of American capability and power, 1898, as well as the same distribution of world military and economic power and political configurations. The same decision-makers interpreted events and made policy surrounding both cases.

Ideally, Puerto Rico would have made a good rival case for Cuba, allowing me to control for geographic location (though at the expense of the existence of an internal insurrection and significant independence movement). But a feasibility probe found little documentation revealing the processes of decision-making regarding Puerto Rico. The Philippine decision process, on the other hand, is a well-documented case. And it may be enough that Puerto Rico was annexed--with seemingly little consideration or hesitancy--to quell speculation that the different policies directed at Cuba and the Philippines can be attributed *solely* to their different geographic locations. That is, if Cuba did not have to be taken

because it was safely within the sphere of influence of the United States, then why did the United States take Puerto Rico; conversely, if the Philippines *had* to be taken because they were well out of the United States' sphere of influence and thus vulnerable, why did Puerto Rico have to be taken?

Raison d'être

Why does it matter? Is territorial conquest at the hands of Great Powers not an artifact of another time, outmoded in terms of international norms of behavior? While this may be (for the time being), it is as irrelevant as it is true. Territorial acquisition was the contemporary realization of Great Power status and behavioral expectation of the time, rightly or wrongly. The following, then, provides case studies of a Great Power response to the structure and norms of a given time (latter 19th century) when territorial acquisition was part of the "accepted and successful practices" to which nations conformed in competition and socialization if they were to "rise to the top and...stay there," as Waltz suggests.¹⁰ This was a time in history when the system was dominated by Great Powers of European origins whose fundamental assumptions at the time included (1) a lack of faith in the ability of non-European, non-"white" societies to govern themselves (at least at a level meeting the Euro-centric expectations of governance) and (2) that territory was finite and, as such, part of a zero-sum game, such that land which one country possesses

¹⁰See Waltz's Theory of International Politics, reprinted in Keohane (ed.), pp.63-67, 86-87, and 128. He discusses the structural pressures to compete and conform to "common international practices" which reward Great Powers that obey and punishes (or "selects against") those which do not.

is that much more which other countries do not). The two are related in that the skepticism of "native" governance mattered to a Great Power to the extent that they would see the natives' territory vulnerable to the exploits of its (the Great Power's) competitors.

Nevertheless, conclusions drawn from this research should be seen as indicative of Great Power behavior generally, as a rising power becomes socialized into the system and its norms within a given spatio-temporal context. It could be useful in exposing the general behavior of a rising power today by exploring the domestic and international threats and opportunities which affect the behavior of states. That is the goal and rationale for this research.

OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

Chapter Two will discuss the theoretical basis for the debate on expansionism as well as methodological and procedural issues involved in the research.

Chapter Three involves decision-making regarding the Philippines, circa 1898. It begins with a brief historical introduction and follows with the Domestic politics, defensive realist and offensive realist approaches to explaining the United States foreign policy decision to take the Philippines.

Chapter Four follows the pattern of chapter three, though the context here is the process of deciding U.S. policy toward Cuba during the same time period as above.

The concluding chapter summarizes and analyzes the results of these two cases in the context of the questions posed in the study. It also offers limits to the study as well as implications and suggestions for further work.

CONCLUSION

This study investigates whether perceptions of opportunity or threat bring about Great Power expansionism, or whether domestic coalitions form to influence policy choices of expansionism. The findings below suggest that McKinley and his advisers saw an opportunity to acquire new influence in the Pacific, establish coaling stations and a more authoritative say in the world dealings in the China Market as a result. Defensive, or security, issues played a role only in deciding to retain the *entire* archipelago (as opposed to just part) after the United States, for strictly ambitious, "offensive" designs, opted to retain Luzon--the Philippine island holding Manila and Manila Bay.

Cuba likewise was sought for opportunistic reasons, yet its taking was denied in part by factors of domestic politics and structure (though not due to the coercion or co-opting of McKinley by some Snyderian coalition)--pointing to the importance of domestic politics in the understanding of foreign policy and validating the use of the State-Centric approach. Yet McKinley and the expansionists ultimately got their way by an early defeat of recognizing Cuban independence and, later, through the enactment of the Platt Amendment. This suggests that, despite domestic obstacles (such as

the Teller amendment), the chief of state can accomplish his/her goals, even if *by different means*. In the case of Cuba, where the public was fervently for Cuban independence, it also shows how a "benign public" can be thwarted by the assertion of leadership by their elected executive. This does not settle the debate on whether democracies are more benign than other forms of government, but it strongly cautions against early dismissals of democracies as capable of carrying out ambitious, expansive policies--with or without the initial support of the public.

Domestic coalition logrolling seemed to be marginal if ever existent in these cases, suggesting that there may be a worthy distinction between the roots of "overexpansion" and general "expansion" on empirical grounds; although again, logically the distinction is flawed in the neglect of systemic factors and focus on international outcome which decides what is overexpansionism in the first place.

Despite the shortcomings of realism as a progressive paradigm for international relations inquiry in the Lakatosian sense, this study hints that a variant of realism--offensive--could provide a persuasive "first cut" at understanding foreign policy expansionism, a conclusion similarly reached by Zakaria.¹¹ At the least, it is not apparent here that realism should be displaced by a domestic politics paradigm such as that advanced by Snyder and included in the study below.

¹¹See The Rise of a Great Power (1993).

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CHAPTER TWO. Theory and Method

Inquiry into the behavior of Great Powers is by no means a new endeavor; great attention is understandably devoted to it, as the activities of Great Powers impact the contours of international relations and possibly the lives of all (in the case of war). Some have focused on the rise, others the fall, of them; while others are interested in the policies of these powers: both outcomes and formulation. This is the study of the latter. That is, the focus below is on the initial formulation and articulation of United States policy decisions; not the outcome of implementing such policies.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The dependent variable in this thesis is the foreign policy choice made by United States decision-making elites toward Cuba and the Philippines in 1898, as consummated by the Treaty of Paris ending the war with Spain. Three different perspectives are used below in an attempt to explain variation in choice of expansionist policies: why the Philippines were annexed and why Cuba was not. Two of the perspectives carry with them the independent variable of decision-makers' perceptions (of threats or

opportunities). A third framework focusing on domestic politics has as its independent variable the existence of domestic imperialist coalitions influencing the outcome of policy choice toward Cuba and the Philippines. How each of these variables is defined and operationalized will be discussed below.

The focus on foreign policy choice below can be clarified by a survey of the competing explanatory approaches that are brought to bear in the study of expansionism. Below is such a survey, offering the breadth of approaches to be used in this study. After a discussion of realism and its challengers in the context of paradigmatic research and efforts at progress in international relations, the rest of the chapter is devoted to alternative explanatory possibilities and their controls, as well as technical issues of case selection and procedures of data collection and analysis.

EXPANSIONISM DEBATED

Expansionism is the key concept of this debate; it refers to the expansion of a nation-state's influence and interests abroad. In this case, the question is about territorial expansionism and why it occurred in one place but not the other during the same time frame? I will define **territorial expansionism as the establishment of sovereign control over territory previously not under the sovereign control of the state in question.** This is a case about the **choice** to expand territorily, not the actual act of expansionism itself.

Expansionist tendencies may stem from many factors, from Lenin's contention of imperialism as the "highest stage of capitalism"¹² to some realists who see it as a natural outgrowth of increased state power in an anarchic, self-help system. Still others may see such policies as the result of domestic coalitions advancing parochial interests under the cloak of national policy (a proposition, in fact, not necessarily incompatible with the Marxist thesis). *American* expansionism, more specifically, has been studied intensely for the "roots" of such behavior at the end of the 19th century. The imperialism of this period is deemed "the great aberration" in American diplomatic history as it marks a departure from traditional practices of isolationism and avoiding the domination of foreign lands and peoples. Different studies point to different reasons for this "departure": among them are (1) the extension of Manifest Destiny abroad once the frontier was settled, (2) the ascendancy of social Darwinist thought and its assumption of survival of the fittest (state), (3) the rise of big business interests and their quest for resources and markets, and (4) the "emotional root" stemming from turmoil of depression and the country's "psychic crisis" with hard times.¹³ These various factors in reality no doubt overlap, some of them necessary but not sufficient causes, others more compelling than some. What they have in common is the focus: why did the United States expand at that time?

Though these are important issues to address, the following thesis

¹²Lenin, V.I. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. International Publishers: New York. 1916/39.

¹³These are from a myriad sources but are all summarized and critiqued in Ernest May's American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay, pp. 7-14. See also Leopold, pp. 122-129, for a discussion of the economic and emotional roots of expansionism, and LaFeber's The New Empire for an extensive discussion of the economic roots of American imperialism.

demands more than "why does a Great Power expand?"--a topic which has been subject to a wealth of debate and research. I ask why a Great Power--the United States--simultaneously engaged in *different* policies surrounding similar cases. Zakaria states that a theory of foreign policy should explain why "the same state at different times in history" have different intentions, goals, or preferences in foreign policy.¹⁴ This study suggests that a theory of foreign policy expansion needs also to consider such differences given the same state **and the same time** in history. The competing explanatory approaches used below derive from some aspects of current expansionist literature, including Zakaria and Snyder. The approaches are realism--with its defensive and offensive offshoots--and domestic coalition politics. Other possible explanations are discussed at the end of the chapter as to how they are controlled for or why they are not explored in more detail.

Realism

Realism is consensually understood by international relations scholars to be, for good or ill, the dominant paradigm guiding international relations inquiry since the end of World War II.¹⁵ Despite its seemingly hegemonic reign, realism is criticized by some for its poor record in adding to the progress of the discipline with new and insightful discoveries. As a knowledge-builder, its theories and hypotheses have failed "over time to produce a significant number of findings," Vasquez implies in his

¹⁴p. 17.

¹⁵The obvious has been put to extensive, systematic "testing" with supportive results. See Vasquez, especially Chapters 4-6.

introductory chapter, suggesting that such a paradigm may be "inadequate" and in need of rejection.¹⁶ He reaches such conclusions after analyzing the record of realist hypotheses using a narrow, strict interpretation of realism. Reduced to its fundamental, traditional assumptions, his analysis of hypotheses excluded any work not specifically focused on the nation-state (as opposed to the chief decision-maker therein, for example) and dealing only with topics of conflict and power; ignoring domestic politics and non-power issues.¹⁷ With this narrow definition, derived from Morgenthau, his findings reveal the lackluster record already mentioned. Yet rejection of a paradigm, albeit after several decades of testing and poor performance (based on a strict interpretation of realism such as that which Vasquez proffers) may be a harsh sentence, especially in the absence of a superior rival paradigm. As Lakatos states, "There is no falsification before the emergence of a better theory."¹⁸

Nevertheless, defenders and detractors alike have recognized and responded to the inadequacies of realism as realized in the volume of anomalies to realist expectations in post-war research. The defenders commence with *ad hoc* auxiliary hypotheses to explain away such anomalies--the degree of their success determining whether they are progressive or degenerative in contributing to the "continuous growth" of the research program embedded in the paradigm.¹⁹ Such auxiliaries are excluded from the Vasquez analysis, contributing to the appearance of inadequacy within realism. This thesis, as with Zakaria, preserves realist

¹⁶See pp.12 and 223-227.

¹⁷See Vasquez, pp. 18, 26-37.

¹⁸p. 119.

¹⁹*ibid.*, p.118.

assumptions while attempting to incorporate domestic aspects for potentially richer analysis (see below). Critics, meanwhile, seize on the "poor" record to advance alternative theories and hypotheses altogether--some stemming from the post-structuralist movement as well as 2nd-Image theorists like Snyder, looking within the state for explanations of state behavior.

This thesis takes a Lakatosian approach to analyzing the research questions posed below. Creating a set of principles to be used for comparing theories, Lakatos expected such rules to help guide the basis on which one might decide to follow one research program or another: (1) that the rival theory (T1) predict facts improbable or forbidden by theory T; (2) that T1 explains all the unrefuted content of T; and (3) that some of the excess content of T1 is corroborated.²⁰ While these immense issues will not be solved here by any means, what the following provides is the rival play of alternative propositions grounded in alternative theoretical assumptions: two within the realist paradigm, and one outside. These rivals will battle for the high ground of explanation of these two cases and the underlying link between them, with the purpose of adding to the expansionist debate some clues as to why a Great Power expands differently in a given time and space. This is merely following Snyder and Zakaria in approach (though Zakaria does not allow for a domestic politics approach in his work), and in doing so I hope to keep the language and dialogue on as similar of grounds as possible, keeping concepts and structure analogous whenever plausible.

As this is a study of foreign policy choice rather than international political outcomes, the realism to be explored here is more toward the

²⁰ibid., p.116.

classical vein as opposed to the structural, "neo-realist," type. The latter addresses international outcomes in a system dominated by competing states and an anarchical environment.²¹ The general conclusion is that, in a self-help world, states with competing interests ultimately engage in balances of power to prevent one or more powerful states from threatening the interests of others.

Classical Realism²² is state-centered and focuses on the interests of states as well as the desire for power (and thus influence) so to further state interests in an anarchic universe of sovereign states. Translating to the understanding of foreign policy choice, the realist asks "How does this policy affect the power of the nation?"²³ Conversely, it is equally plausible to ask how power affects the policy of a nation. Gilpin, for instance, hypothesizes that a state attempts to expand its interests abroad²⁴ "in response to developments that increase its relative power or decrease the costs of modifying political arrangements."²⁵ One dilemma arising out of the realist school is how exactly to interpret the vague nature of its principles. Two variants of realism reflect different interpretations of the assumptions of realism. The "defensive realist" sees the pursuit of interests in terms of power as a minimalist response to the insecure nature of the international environment. At the other extreme, what I call the "offensive realist" would predict, as Gilpin does, that a self-interested state will pursue interests as actively and extensively as the international environment permits

²¹The current seminal defense of neo-realism is Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics.

²²Whose chief defense is best presented by Hans J. Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations.

²³Morgenthau, p. 12.

²⁴or "change the political system"

²⁵p. xi.

or is perceived by the decision-making élite to permit. I will explore both in turn.

Defensive Realism

Among defensive realism's champions is Jack Snyder. Though his study's goal is to show the domestic politics behind expansionism, he notes that his arguments are "fully consistent with the defensive version of realism."²⁶ Defensive realism sees foreign policy chiefly as the reaction by a state to international anarchy. The need for security drives policies, including expansionist policies. "States balance against threats," says Walt, amending the balance-of-power assumption of Waltz; thus, states that are seen as aggressive or threatening are "likely to provoke others to balance against them."²⁷ Defensive realism is modest in its policies, expanding only as much as is needed to be secure against international threats. It is modest because of its assumption that offensive action is counterproductive to security, either by causing the state to overextend itself and its resources (imperial overstretch) or by provoking a balancing coalition of rival powers (self-encirclement)--both of which undermine the interests of the expanding state.

Snyder claims his logic is "consistent with defensive realism" because he attributes the counterproductive outcomes of "overexpansion" to the state being too aggressive. However, the cause of this overaggressive nature which he has found in all Great Powers in modern times is not attributed to offensive realism. Rather, Snyder insists that only the "capturing of the

²⁶p. 12.

²⁷See Walt, p. 5 and p. 25.

state" by parochial, imperial, domestic interests can account for "aggressive behavior" grounded in the "myth" that "offensive action often contributes to security."²⁸ Rather than assume that states should know not to expand for offensive advantages, as Snyder does, I leave it as an empirical question of whether or not states do expand for offensive advantages or for defensive security, or for the pleasure of domestic interests.

Defensive realism, then, proposes that the state expands when state decision-makers perceive a threat to its security.²⁹ In terms of this study, this translates into the following proposition: **McKinley decided to annex the Philippines but not Cuba because he perceived a threat to U.S. interests in the Philippines but not Cuba.**

Offensive Realism

Another variant of realism is what I call offensive realism (or what Snyder calls "aggressive realism"). As opposed to the reactive minimalist policies of defensive realism, offensive realism is based on the chief of state's perception of opportunities to expand interests and influence abroad. For an opportunity to exist, the decision-maker must perceive external conditions as ripe for the advancement of state interests *and* conducive to state action. Broadly, state interests and objectives include (1) the enlargement of control (however defined) over an increasing amount of

²⁸pp. 1-2, 12. As mentioned in the introduction, Zakaria addresses the weaknesses of this aspect of Myths of Empire in a compelling fashion, stating that "Defensive Realists have confused the effects of the international system on states with the lessons that they believe states should learn...By smuggling in normative assumptions about state behavior, Defensive Realism ends up regarding much foreign policy behavior as abnormal and then explaining it by attributing abnormality to guilty parties." See pp. 57-58.

²⁹Something similar to this is found in Zakaria, pp.33 & 74.

territory composing of the international system, (2) increasing influence over the behavior of other states [so as to] create an international political environment and rules of the system that will be conducive to the fulfillment of its political, economic and ideological interests, and (3) influence over the world economy or international division of labor.³⁰

Among the "offensive" policies at the disposal of states in the pursuit of extended power and influence abroad is imperialism and, within it, territorial annexation. Imperialism is defined by Morgenthau as a policy that aims at the overthrow of the status quo, at a reversal of the power relations between two or more nations.³¹ With regard to this study, the reversal of power relations could be with Spain, specifically as it applies to the Spanish possessions of Cuba and the Philippines. In fact, one of the inducements to imperialism Morgenthau cites is "victorious war." He states:

the nation which anticipates victory will pursue a policy that seeks a permanent change of the power relations with the defeated enemy...regardless of what the objectives were at the outbreak of the war. It is the objective of this policy of change to transform the relation between victor and vanquished which happens to exist at the end of the war into the new status quo of the peace settlement.³²

³⁰Gilpin, pp. 23-25.

³¹Morgenthau, p. 49.

³²ibid., p. 57.

As will be seen, this parallels the actual events of the United States and Spain (and her possessions) in the late 1890s.

What interests are important and how they are prioritized are matters of the governing individuals of that time and place. However defined, the bottom line for offensive realism is that a state will attempt to expand as its relative power increases and it expects the benefits to outweigh expected costs.³³ In other words, offensive action pays from this perspective; a notion contrary to defensive realism.

This focus on the decision-maker should not be lost, nor should the coupling of perceived increase in state power with perceived opportunities abroad. A nation-state level of analysis looking only at relative power increases to explain expansionism is "easily falsifiable" in that "whenever a nation that grows in power does not expand its political interests abroad, there exists a discrepancy between the crude Realist prediction and reality."³⁴ But if the analysis is of the chief of state, rather than the nation-state, one benefits from the contextualities of perceptions, both of state power and of external opportunities. The Offensive Realist suggests that a state expands when the state decision-makers perceive the opportunity and capability to promote interests abroad. For this study, capabilities of the United States are the same for both cases, so the following may serve as a working proposition: **McKinley decided to annex the Philippines but not Cuba because he perceived an opportunity to expand interests in the Philippines that was not present in Cuba.**

³³Gilpin, pp. 187 and 10.

³⁴Zakaria (1993), p. 59.

The Case For A State-Centered Approach

I have placed each perspective in a state-centered approach, where the state is not the nation-state but the national government; for the United States, the focus is on the President as chief of state in the making of foreign policy choices. In his work, Zakaria modifies Classical Realism into "State Centered Realism," which focuses on the perceptions of foreign policy decision-makers and the simultaneous constraints and opportunities afforded by the international system *and the domestic state structure*.³⁵ This latter aspect is an important, integrative point to make at a time when the nexus of domestic and international politics is receiving increased attention.³⁶ By incorporating state structure and focusing on *state* power instead of national power, Zakaria maintains the realist logic while assigning more explanatory power to the causes of foreign policy behavior. State power is defined as "the central government's ability to extract resources from society and the ease with which central decision-makers can implement their preferences."³⁷ State structure involves notions of "strong" versus "weak" states, or the degree of centralization of state power exists in the nation-state. The more decentralized, the more diffuse the power, and the more opportunities for domestic constraint exist. Essentially, this focus allows for domestic constraints on the ability of the chief of state to act; or, the degree to which "national power" can be

³⁵ibid., pp. 67 and 70-71.

³⁶Aside from Snyder himself, see also Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games" (*International Organization* 42,3, Summer 1988, pp. 427-460), and Michael Mastanduno, David Lake and G. John Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action" (*International Studies Quarterly* 33, 1989, pp. 457-474).

³⁷Zakaria, p. 7.

converted into "state power."³⁸

As for this study, though state structure *per se* is the same for both cases (the United States is largely characterized as having a decentralized domestic structure³⁹), the existence of *potential* domestic constraints imposed by state mechanisms opens a new realm of inquiry. That is, I suggest that the impact of Congress, among other actors, on state power in the hands of the chief of state is not static but likely varies issue to issue. Congress may act to constrain the President on one issue and not another. Incorporating the state-centered approach, which I do, brings richer opportunity for explanation. For offensive realism, then, a new proposition could be that **McKinley perceived opportunities to advance interests by annexing both the Philippines and Cuba, but could not annex Cuba because of constraints imposed by state structure.**

The problem I have with Zakaria's work is not that he generated the State-Centered realist approach but that he denied its added explanatory potential to Defensive Realism. Here, I apply the state-centered approach equitably, meaning that a chief of state perceives threats from abroad also while under the constraints of state structure. A fourth hypothesis becomes: **McKinley perceived threats to U.S. interests in both the Philippines and Cuba which justified annexation of both, but could not annex Cuba because of constraints imposed by state structure.**

Within the state apparatus of foreign policy decision-making in the United States, the President (McKinley in these instances) is chief. Yet

³⁸ibid., p. 71.

³⁹Thomas Risse-Kappen, among others, makes this argument in "Masses and Leaders: Public Opinion, Domestic Structures, and Foreign Policy," in David Deese, ed., The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, pp. 238-261. On the U.S., see specifically pp. 241-242.

McKinley does not make a decision alone and in a vacuum. Advisers, information sources and other elements shape the debate within which McKinley's decision is made. Because of this, the relevant actors for analysis of perceptions (the independent variable for the two realist frameworks) are the decision-making élite (DME), with the focus primarily but not exclusively on McKinley. The DME consists of McKinley and those advisers involved in matters of policy choice toward the Philippines and Cuba. The "advisers" are liberally defined to include all persons who offered counsel on the Philippine issue to the President prior to decision and who has been recorded as such. McKinley's cabinet and his appointed peace commissioners are central, as are the likes of Henry Cabot Lodge, Admirals Mahan and Dewey (promoted after his wildly publicized and hyped victory in Manila), and Theodore Roosevelt.

Domestic Coalitions and Ideology

According to Snyder, imperialist societal groups "hijack the state" by logrolling with state elites who rationalize expansionist policies as serving the national interest so that the costs of expansion born upon the masses will be supported.⁴⁰ Snyder places great weight on domestic coalitions in the fate of expansionist Great Powers. In his framework, beyond conceptions of national interest held by the decision-makers in power, the following conditions need to exist at the time of policy choice:

⁴⁰Snyder, pp 31-49.

1. Narrow imperialist interests gaining control over national policy by joining in logrolled coalitions, trading favors so that each group gets what it wants most;
2. By capturing the state (ties with the state as part of the coalition or by being overrepresented in the organs of state power already), groups in the imperial coalition harness its propaganda resources...selling myths using the instruments and credibility of the state...self-serving strategic arguments become less traceable to the parochial interests that benefit from them.⁴¹

Not only do these criteria need to be met; they need to be met differentially based on different cases of expansion (Cuba and the Philippines). Did a coalition favoring annexation of the Philippines and/or opposing annexation of Cuba exist in the manner described above? Is this a case of "offensive détente," defined by Snyder as imperialists logrolling with anti-imperialist factions caused the variation in policy toward Cuba and the Philippines?

Also, the perceptions of McKinley as linked to policy choice should be assessed. Did McKinley endorse separate strategies because of his knowledge and accordance with, or participation in, these coalition forces and beliefs? Did he *have* a choice, making his preferences and perceptions important? Was he constrained by issues of separation of powers? A proposition in line with the domestic coalitions and ideology approach

⁴¹Snyder, p17 and 38.

would argue that McKinley perceived no threat to, nor opportunity to expand, U.S. interests in the Philippines nor Cuba, but annexed the Philippines because of the logrolling of domestic interests in favor of such a move convincing him to do so on the basis of political or ideological persuasion.

Other Possible Explanations?

Many of the alternative explanations for policy variation in general are controlled for in this study. First, system structure is the same for both cases. To expand, states need to have an international system conducive to such expansionism. The distribution of power and alliances can affect the ability to expand without provoking a counterproductive response.

Second, national power is important. To expand, states need raw capabilities to carry out such feats. The control for time period insures that in both cases the U.S. *could* expand--whether it wanted to or not--with equal state capabilities in each case, should state capability be the determining factor.

Another realm of study which generates propositions regarding the expansion of (capitalist) great powers is Marxist theory, including world systems theory. Imperialism, for these theorists, is the product of capitalism and the need of capitalists for "markets for their products and sufficient investments for their capital."⁴² Territorial acquisition is a means for ensuring both for capitalist interests. Though no explicitly Marxist

⁴²Morgenthau, p. 52.

propositions are included in the study (at the peril of offending its champions), I feel that their contentions can be subsumed within two of the three perspectives that are included.

Cox notes that Marxists are divided between those who see the state as the mere expression of the particular interests in civil society and those who see the state as an autonomous force expressing some kind of general interest.⁴³ The former would contend that domestic capitalist interests essentially pull the strings of state action, capturing the decision-making apparatus and its propaganda resources for their own particular gains. One may see that the domestic politics perspective included below is elastic enough to encompass such behavior. Not to peg Snyder and others as Marxists, the perspective nonetheless attributes foreign policy behavior to the greedy, particular, "parochial" interest of domestic actors. Thus, in examining the cases of Cuba and the Philippines under this lens, I would be able to discover if such behavior occurred and, if so, whether the domestic groups were all capitalist interests searching for new markets and investments.

The latter perspective of Marxism--as outlined by Cox--provides for an autonomous state representing the "general interest of capitalism as distinct from the particular interests of capitalists."⁴⁴ In such a case, a nation-state with liberalism under its repertoire of values may promote policies abroad which can coincide with the interests of capitalism without it being the result of being "hijacked" by specific domestic elements. Again, I suggest that a comparable notion can be represented from the

⁴³Cox, p. 216, in Neorealism and Its Critics.

⁴⁴ibid.

offensive realist perspective. Offensive realism, as I have outlined it, lends itself to imperialist policies--when it pays. Morgenthau concedes without apology that states will engage in opportunistic policies to enhance state interests and that such policies include imperialism. He parts with Marxists by distinguishing between "economic policies that are undertaken for their own sake and economic policies that are the instruments of a political policy--a policy...whose economic purpose is but the means to the end of controlling the policies of another nation."⁴⁵ Offensive realism allows for the U.S. to decide policies of territorial annexation based on greater economic control abroad, but as a means for greater state power generally. Whether this is compatible with Marxists or not--and, thus, whether I have wrongfully slighted Marxists in excluding their perspective explicitly from the framework--surely will be a point of contention.⁴⁶

Fourth, by focusing on the United States alone, state structure is controlled. Likewise, given the fixed time period, the same set of decision-making elites, from McKinley to Congress, exist for each case. This annuls the explanatory variable of "generational change"--where ideas based on age cohorts and experience influence perceptions and inclinations to act. For instance, annexation of foreign lands with non-Anglo peoples and culture may not have even been considered desirable by earlier leaders rooted in traditional beliefs of isolationism.

⁴⁵Morgenthau, p. 34.

⁴⁶An argument can be made, for instance, that by subsuming Marxist theory under realist power politics, and by having "realist" propositions for two of the three perspectives included below, I have "stacked the deck" in favor of realism. Also, one has said, if realism covers that much ground--that is, if it explains "everything"--does it explain anything?

Snyder's hat-tipping to cognitive explanations was brief and based on patterns of learning, incorporating lessons into decision-making. Given the same leader dealing with both cases at the same time, any lessons were likely uniform (under one cognitive roof--McKinley's) and were available or learned at the same time for both cases, not allowing for difference in lessons applied to policy choice. As will be seen below, the use of cognitive indicators of decision-maker perceptions is included below to the extent that it serves to validate inferences of such perceptions found in the main body of analysis.

The same can be said for advisory circles. If advisory circles pushed different policies for different cases, it would be reflective of different perceptions of opportunities, threats or domestic parochial concerns, all of which are covered by the above framework.

Policy windows/policy failures are other variables which may determine policy variation. Perceived failures in policy provide an opportunity for new policy ideas and techniques to be introduced to replace the "failed" policy of the status quo. In the study below, this being the time of precedent (in terms of annexing foreign distant lands with dissimilar populations and cultures) there was no experience with failure at colonial rule to impact a reformulation of decision between the cases. As an example, if the Filipino rebellion against American rule would have preceded the decision regarding Cuba in history, and the rebellion was deemed a deterrent for ever acquiring foreign lands again, it could explain a great deal of why Cuba was not annexed. This, however, was not the case, as the decision about both occurred at approximately the same time

(October 1898).

Finally, winning coalitions, associated with the notion of the "win-set,"⁴⁷ is accounted for with the introduction of state-centered analysis. The ability to get a ratifying coalition of elites to support a policy is influential in policy choice. Both the Cuban and Philippine issues decided upon by McKinley were subject to ratification by the U.S. Senate. The absence of a winning coalition, or the presence of an obstacle to state power, may determine the direction of policy taken by the chief of state.

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

The following methods and procedures illuminate the framework of my endeavors, and provide a logic behind the selection of cases as well as a nod to the scientificity of the process.

Testing Competing Explanations

To explain policy choices, Gourevitch contends, such choices need to be linked to politics; also, "explanatory approaches must have some way of accounting for the connection between policy and choice--between what could be done and the various factors that shape what decision-makers actually choose to do."⁴⁸ For the realist explanations especially, McKinley's perceptions and interpretations of his nation's internal and external environments affected policy choice. Each case--Cuba and the

⁴⁷Putnam, pp. 435-452.

⁴⁸p.54.

Philippines--provides evidence to be held up to the competing propositions outlined above: broadly, realist and domestic politics. Events will be examined from each argument's point of view to assess, through comparison, which is more consistent with the data and/or more supportable by available generalizations,⁴⁹ as well as show any relationship among the arguments.⁵⁰ By testing covariation among the cases and explanatory frameworks, I hope to gain insight into the relative utility of each perspective regarding expansionism and choice while holding other variables constant.⁵¹

Measuring the Causal Variables

Realism

Process-tracing is required to determine the evolution of McKinley's thoughts regarding U.S. interests, opportunities to advance them (Offensive Realism) or threats to them (Defensive Realism), and policy options relating to the Philippines and Cuba. Coupling primary sources of documentation (presidential papers as well as public and private statements and speeches) with secondary historical accounts, I observe the decision process to see what, if any, threats or opportunities McKinley--and the advisers with which he had contact--perceived in each case, whether there was an evolution in these perceptions over time and, if so, why. The use of

⁴⁹George, p.57-58.

⁵⁰Gourevitch, p. 66.

⁵¹Snyder, p. 60.

multiple sources of documentation assists in enhancing the validity of the data based on corroboration. Of course, some interpretation is required of histories that have foci distinct from each other as well as from mine.

To assist the analysis of decision-maker perceptions of threat and opportunity with some degree of consistency, I borrow from Herrmann's framework for identifying and operationalizing indicators of the "state as Defender" versus "state as Imperialist." Herrmann's research goal has been to "develop a theory about the effects of a perceived threat and opportunity on image formation and...use the patterns in imagery that this theory specifies to indicate whether a subject perceives threat or opportunity."⁵² Toward that end, he borrows from psychological theory--specifically, *cognitive balance theory*. As discussed by Fritz Heider (1958), cognitive balance refers to a person's sentiments toward a person or object being balanced with her or his cognitive picture of that person or object. Negative images would be associated with a disliked person/object; positive images would reflect the perceivers liking of a person/object. The argument continues that the stronger the emotions attached (degree of like and dislike), the more the imagery applies. The theory, and perceptions generally, are "about the self" in that the object/subject of judgment is judged likable or not based on the state of the judge. The assumption is that the perceiver/judge has a positive view of self; that is, the self and accompanying values are "normal" and "good."⁵³

Herrmann seeks to extend the tenets of cognitive balance theory to

⁵²Herrman, "The Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution," p. 182.

⁵³See Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, John Wiley and Sons: New York, 1958, pp. 176-177; 183, 210. This material is summarized in Herrmann (1988), pp. 182-183.

infer perceptions from images produced in the texts of decision-makers. Arguing that perceived threat and perceived opportunity are analogous to Heider's concepts of dislike and like, Herrmann says that

perceived threats and perceived opportunities both incline a subject (read: decision-maker) to act, and put pressure on the cognitive processes related to defining the situation. The result is a tendency to construct an image of the situation for personal and public consumption that releases the subject from moral inhibitions and allows the subject to deal with the threat or opportunity without restraint.⁵⁴

The assumption is that state leaders--as judges--have a positive "self-image" about their own state and perceive threats or opportunities (or, dislikes/likes) based on the degree of conflict between the beliefs of the judged country/group and their own.⁵⁵ With a positive self-image, which includes moral restrictions deeming foreign domination and exploitation as well as killing to be illegitimate, such actions as conquest and war need to be justified in the manner just discussed for reasons just explained.⁵⁶

The "Defender" model reflects the perceptual pattern of the decision-maker from which foreign policy decisions are based on a response to a perceived external challenge to the preferred values and interests of the state as seen by the chief of state. The "Imperialist" model reflects the chief of

⁵⁴Herrmann (1988), p. 183.

⁵⁵The insights of Robert Jervis (*Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton U. Press, 1976, p. 121) are utilized here by Herrmann. See Herrmann (1988), p. 183.

⁵⁶*ibid.*, p. 183.

state's perception of the opportunity to foster preferred values and interests abroad in an environment "seen to have less capability and an inferior culture."⁵⁷

To deduce a set of indicators to measure these competing perceptual concepts Herrmann suggests inferring perceptions based on the invocation of image-based stereotypical descriptions of the countries in question. From these images, the "postulated perceptual patterns" can be evaluated by examining the "predictions of each model with the actual actions of a subject." Herrmann concludes that such an approach puts a premium on the candid and private expressions of decision-makers, though consonance between public and private statements adds reliability to the results.⁵⁸

Suggested operational indicators of the Defender and Imperialist models, which are followed in this study, focus on perceptions of **motivation, capability and decision processes** of the country in question. The Defender model evokes what Herrmann calls the "enemy stereotype." The observed actor's **motivation** is represented as aggressive, expansionist, "evil" and unjustified, and generally inimical to the perceiver state's interests. **Capabilities** are treated as deriving strength from the perceiver state's weakness and inaction; strong opposition to these capabilities would expose the "enemy" as "an inherently weak paper tiger." The **decision processes** of the "enemy" are described as monolithic and conspiratorial, "being able to plot" and execute complex and sinister plans against the interests of the perceiver state.⁵⁹ Herrmann assigns this language only to

⁵⁷Herrmann, "Perceptions and Foreign Policy Analysis," pp. 28-31, 33.

⁵⁸ibid., p. 33.

⁵⁹ibid., p. 34-35.

"enemies" seen to be of "similar capability and a culture of comparable quality,"⁶⁰ such as Germany or Japan at the time of decision in 1898.

Alternatively, the Imperialist Model is linked to the "Child stereotype" and refers to the opportunities afforded by the "inferior status" of the observed actors. Here, the language concerning the **motivation** of an observed actor emphasizes a distinction between those willing to cooperate with the perceiver state and those who are not (insurgency movements in this case). The former are characterized as "responsible officials"; the latter, as "irresponsible agitators and radicals." In terms of **capability**, cultural inferiority or backwardness are cited for the inability of the indigenous people to govern themselves, handle advanced technology, or master sophisticated administrative techniques without the constant guidance of advisors. **Decision processes** likewise are seen as "plagued with incompetence," justifying the imposition of order so to modernize the people and governance system of the observed country. This effort is characterized as "just" and those non-cooperative elements are described as despotic extremists interfering with progress.⁶¹

Herrmann sees this as a model of opportunity, presumably because the power vacuum based on indigenous "incompetence" tempts the perceiver state to assert its values and interests to fill the void. But, so as to not be confined to Herrmann's parameters, it is important to note that insurgents within the observed states of Cuba and the Philippines may also provoke a response to perceived threatened interests, raising security concerns for the perceiver state resulting in imperial behavior for essentially

⁶⁰ibid., p. 33.

⁶¹ibid., pp. 37-38.

defensive purposes. Thus, in disentangling the perceptions of decision-makers in the Imperialist Model, *how much* stress on general incompetence and power vacuums as opposed to stress on insurgent threats to interests becomes the tool by which offensive realist and defensive realist propositions are examined.

With such attention to perceived opportunities and threats, it seems a compatible device for bringing some additional confidence to the results of this thesis. This entails the analysis of the content of private and public statements by McKinley and his advisers from the first available word found on the issues through the decisions and beyond (generally, from 1896 through 1899).⁶² I examine statements after the decisions as a validity check on the statements made prior to the decisions. Validity should be enhanced to the degree that public and private statements converge, as well as to the degree that statements before and after the decision converge.

The degree to which opportunities are mentioned more than threats, and to which imperialist indicators are referenced more than defender indicators points to the degree to which offensive realism is considered the stronger "first cut" explanation for policy. Obviously, the converse is as true. This will require a frequency count of indicators (to explore manifest content) as well as assessments of whole texts and their themes for their deeper meaning (latent content). The former provides *reliability* in results, as anyone could find and count the frequency with which McKinley invokes phrases of "opportunity," "fruits of war," "security" or "protect property" as well as enemy/child-stereotype indicators such as "threatening,"

⁶²From McKinley's election to his last words on each topic.

"imperialist," or "misguided Filipinos," "helpless," "help the oppressed people," and so on.⁶³

Where manifest content analysis lacks in validity (is the tallying of words an accurate measure of the meaning of the message and messenger solely in its own right?), an evaluation of the latent content incorporates and transcends the frequency counts to tap the underlying meaning of the messages as a whole. Treating each "item" (read: observation) as a unit of analysis, I examine its overall characteristics to see if the message in context conveys a theme of responding to threats or opportunities, of defending interests against an aggressive rival power or of seizing upon the duty of uplifting and guiding lesser, alien peoples incapable of helping themselves. Such assessments alone may not be very reliable--as others could interpret texts differently--so a combination of both analytical techniques will be included to best promote valid and reliable results.⁶⁴

In terms of sampling a population of speeches and statements for analysis, I was handicapped somewhat by McKinley's unwillingness to wax verbose publicly or privately about his intentions and feelings on the issues.⁶⁵ Chiefly I relied on the transcribed speeches collected in a volume from 1897-1900, his presidential papers, and quotations from myriad secondary sources with myriad different sentiments toward McKinley, hoping that--between the bashers and admirers--they would provide a rich spectrum of quotables from which I could study were they not found in the

⁶³The defining indicators for each stereotype appear with the primary records in the Appendix.

⁶⁴As is the suggestion of Babbie, p. 318. See also Manheim and Rich, 154-156.

⁶⁵Biographer Lewis L. Gould warns the student of William McKinley that he "lacks the rambling, dictated effusions that Theodore Roosevelt provided," requiring the accumulation of whatever evidence does exist, "small clues, some inference, and a close knowledge of his working habits" in order to reconstruct his thought processes. See p. 2.

primary sources. Because I am interested primarily in the *relative* occurrence of themes and phrases indicating opportunity versus threat, the total N population of speeches (which I cannot provide) is not so important as the total occurrences of one type of speech or another, and of one set of indicators relative to another within those speeches. This I have done, and to the degree that my sample is exhaustive of his public and private utterances in the years 1897-1899, the findings should be more confidently generalizable (that is, a reduction in sampling error should accompany the high proportion of sample:population of statements⁶⁶) to account for decision-maker perceptions toward annexation of the Philippines and Cuba.

The hope is that the close examination of manifest and latent content, accompanying a structured, focused comparison of decision-making--employing standardized questions, techniques and propositions to each case dealing with certain aspects of these historical events⁶⁷--can aid each other in providing results that suffer minimally from problems of validity and reliability.

Domestic Coalitions and Ideology

The same process of observation is applied to see if a coalition of domestic actors (e.g., interest groups, members of Congress, advisers, bureaucrats, newspaper editors) formed and bargained for their interests in the guise of national interest. McKinley becomes the conduit for these "parochial interests⁶⁸" by implementing such policies in accordance with

⁶⁶This thought largely represented in Manheim and Rich, p. 154).

⁶⁷George, pp. 61-62.

⁶⁸A term used religiously by Snyder.

them. This may be done because of his own interests (political or private) in such policies, because of the strategic beliefs generated which capture McKinley's imagination, or because he is forced to act in step with the rhetoric generated by the logrolling process. The use of economic and other histories again serves to assess the level of cartelization of these group interests; exploring the concentration of group assets in particular relevant sectors, their access to policymakers during the decision-making process, and whether these groups act as they would in a cartelized system (ie. logroll).⁶⁹

POSSIBLE FINDINGS

Given the three competing explanatory frameworks, I find six plausible alternative findings which may emerge from the study. Two offer support to offensive (state-centered) realism, two to defensive (state-centered) realism, and two to Snyder's domestic politics approach. These will be discussed in the concluding chapter of the thesis, which synthesizes the results of the two case studies advanced in Chapters Three and Four.

Offensive Realism: Possible Findings

1. The U.S. decision-making elite (DME) perceived an opportunity to expand U.S. interests by acquiring the Philippines, and found no opportunity to do so by acquiring Cuba.

⁶⁹This is consistent with Snyder's measuring techniques of domestic coalition formation; see p. 61.

2. The U.S. DME perceived an opportunity to expand U.S. interests by acquiring both the Philippines and Cuba, but the ability to acquire Cuba was blocked by the constraints of state power structure.

Defensive Realism: Possible Findings

3. The U.S. DME perceived a threat to U.S. interests in the Philippines--posed either by a third party power or by insurgents--requiring annexation, and perceived no similar threat with regard to Cuba.

4. The U.S. DME perceived a threat to U.S. interests in the Philippines and in Cuba, but the ability to annex Cuba was blocked by the constraints of state power structure.

Domestic Coalitions: Possible Findings

5. The U.S. DME perceived no threat to U.S. interests in the Philippines or Cuba, yet annexed the Philippines due to coalition logrolling of domestic interests which convinced them to do so.

6. The U.S. DME perceived no opportunity to expand U.S. interests in the Philippines or Cuba, yet annexed the Philippines due to coalition logrolling of domestic interests which convinced them to do so.

These potential findings each reflect a synthesis of each case study below. Individually, the case of the Philippines and the case of Cuba have alternative possible findings also derived from the three perspectives outlined above. It is from these findings that any inference can be made about the findings for the general question of difference in policy choice

(the six propositions listed above). As such, the following catalog of propositions will be examined below in Chapters Three and Four:

Regarding the Philippines,

PROPOSITION ONE

Domestic Coalitions and Politics: *McKinley Decided to Annex the Philippines Because of the Logrolling of Domestic Parochial Interests In Favor of Such a Move; Convincing Him to do so on the Basis of Political and/or Ideological Persuasion.*

PROPOSITIONS TWO

Defensive Realism: *McKinley Decided to Annex the Philippines Because He Perceived a Threat to United States Interests in the Philippines.*

PROPOSITION THREE:

Offensive Realism: *McKinley Decided to Annex the Philippines Because He Perceived an Opportunity to Advance United States Interests by so Doing⁷⁰.*

Regarding Cuba, where the decision not to annex lends to more complexity in applying the theoretical perspectives, there are six plausible alternative propositions:

⁷⁰Note: The following content analysis procedure and sample is identical for both the offensive and defensive propositions. This being the case, the two sections are combined here for convenience to reader and researcher alike.

PROPOSITIONS ONE and TWO

Domestic Coalitions and Ideology:

1. *McKinley Did Not Annex Cuba Because of the Logrolling of Domestic Parochial Interests In Opposition To Annexation Convinced Him Not to on the Basis of Political or Ideological Persuasion.*

OR

2. *McKinley Did Not Annex Cuba Because of the Absence of an Imperialist Coalition of Domestic Parochial Interests To Convince Him To Do So on the Basis of Political or Ideological Persuasion.*

PROPOSITIONS THREE and FOUR

Defensive Realism:

3. *McKinley Decided Not To Annex Cuba Because He Perceived No Threat to United States Interests in Cuba.*

OR

4. *McKinley Decided Not To Annex Cuba Because, Though He Perceived A Threat to United States Interests in Cuba, His Ability To Annex Cuba was Blocked by the Constraints of the State Power Structure.*

PROPOSITIONS FIVE and SIX

Offensive Realism:

5. *McKinley Did Not Annex Cuba Because He Perceived No Opportunity To Advance United States Interests There.*

OR

6. McKinley Did Not Annex Cuba Because, Though He Perceived An Opportunity To Advance United States Interests There, His Ability To Annex Cuba is Blocked by the Constraints of the State Power Structure.

Each of the next two chapters will open with a section on historical background, and follow with a section dedicated to each of the three perspectives: in order of appearance, domestic politics, defensive realism and offensive realism. Another section discusses the analysis of content derived from public and private statements of the U.S. decision-making circle. From the analysis of these propositions in Chapters Three and Four, a discussion of the propositions guiding the overarching question of difference in policy choice can be facilitated in the concluding chapter.

CONCLUSION

With the framework provided above, I can now explore the decision processes which led McKinley to annex the Philippines and not Cuba. Each case has intrinsic value. The Philippines case is a contribution to the dialogue on why nations expand, offering a detailed case of the evolution of policy using a state-centered decision-making approach. The Cuban case helps to discern the equally important question of why nations do not expand, or why they expand differently. If circumstances shape whether a power will be aggressive, or by what means, then knowing something about such circumstances is useful knowledge for those confronting rising great

powers today. Will their domestic structures keep them relatively benign? Or will they be assertive through more subtle means? Together, the cases distinguish between policy choice given a controlled environment of international distribution of power, state power and leadership, and time. Variation in policy choice under such circumstances begs why such a variation exists. It is to these questions that I now turn.

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CHAPTER THREE.
The Philippines: "Trade Follows The Flag"

We have good money, we have ample revenues, we have unquestioned national credit; but we want new markets, and as trade follows the flag, it looks very much as if we were going to have new markets.

--U.S. President William McKinley,
October 13, 1898⁷¹

By the end of the nineteenth century, the United States had been transformed from an agrarian and insular nation to a global power with flags planted in non-contiguous foreign lands under American rule. Among the new possessions were Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines--all annexed by the United States in 1898, the latter three wrested from Spain in the "splendid little war" of that year. What accounts for this burst of land-grabbing, of subjecting foreign, non-European peoples under American code and guard? And, interestingly, why was Cuba--the source of conflict between the United States and Spain in the latter 1890s and a long-prized treasure of American statesmen dating back to Adams and

⁷¹The Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley, 1897-1900, p. 109, to a crowd in Hastings, Iowa while on a speaking tour through the mid-west.

Jefferson--not included on this distinguished role call of American possessions? This second question is reserved for the following chapter. Now, I wish to explore the former--focusing on the case of the Philippines for insight into factors influencing the tendency to expand territorily. The following shows that U.S. leaders experienced a new confidence in American power at the end of the century, especially relative to declining rival power, Spain. The war between them, lopsided as it was, presents opportunities for U.S. expansion which are perceived and acted on, not out of insecurity nor the domestic coercion of interest groups, but by the designs of decision-makers to expand U.S. influence abroad.

A brief history of relevant events frames the rest of the chapter where decision-maker perceptions and historical analysis guide the inquiry into motive. A section is reserved for each of the contending propositions to be examined. Each section explores the roles of domestic coalition logrolling, perceptions of opportunity and perceptions of threat, respectively, in influencing McKinley's final decision to retain the entire archipelago.

SETTING THE STAGE

The Philippines lay an ocean away, unknown to most late nineteenth-century Americans and, some historians and biographers claim, elusive even to the President of the United States in 1897, William McKinley⁷². A

⁷²Some accounts, taking McKinley at face value, cite his insistence that--until Dewey's victory in Manila, McKinley "couldn't find the Philippines on a map" and, prior to the war, "professed to having given not a thought to the Philippines." See Barnet, p. 135.

collection of Pacific islands clustered off the Asian mainland and under Spanish rule for centuries, the Philippines emerged in mass and elite circles as the most critical subject by the end of the short-lived Spanish-American war. The controversy: what to do with the archipelago, whose capital was seized and occupied by American soldiers during the war. The options to the public, the same that McKinley faced, were (1) give the islands back to Spain; (2) turn them over to a third power; (3) grant them independence; or (4) retain them. As it turned out, the fourth option received the greatest enthusiasm and support among the American public as well as in Washington. McKinley chose this course and ordered it into the treaty of peace hammered out in the fall of 1898. On February 6, 1899, the U.S. Senate approved the treaty, sealing the fate of the Philippines for almost five decades as an American dependency.

The war which made this series of events possible began over a different issue: Cuba. As the Cuban insurgent revolution against their Spanish rulers waged on, having begun in 1895, American interests inevitably were affected adversely. American exports to Cuba, for example, fell from \$60,000,000 in 1895 to \$15,000,000 in 1896 as a result of the "physical destruction and economic dislocation" which prevailed at the time⁷³. Popular support and sympathy for the Cuban cause heightened over the years, and so mirrored Congressional opinion. Presidents Cleveland and McKinley were both deliberate, cautious and firm in resisting early war against Spain (seen to be the "cause" of the agitation in Cuba). Diplomatic efforts to bring peace to the island spilled from one

⁷³Pratt, p.41; Gardner, p. 243. See Chapter four below for a much more extensive discussion of U.S. interests in Cuba as well as the effects of the ongoing revolution on American trade and investment there.

administration to the other, but as evidence of Spanish ineffectiveness in pacifying the Cuban insurgents mounted month after month, year after year, contingencies needed to be considered: contingencies of war.

And so, at many levels, American strategists and officials kicked around plans and molded to fit a scenario of an American-Spanish war. Naval department strategies contemplating an attack upon the Spanish base at Manila as early as 1873 were revived at the end of Cleveland's second tenure⁷⁴. One significant document drafted by the Navy Department in 1895, dubbed the Kimball Plan⁷⁵, suggested that, if at war with Spain, an American squadron attempt to (1) destroy the Spanish warships in Philippine waters and then (2) capture Manila. The purpose behind this effort would be to "deprive the Spanish of Manila as a naval base and...source of revenue" so that "it could serve as a hostage and offer assurances that a monetary war indemnity could be...arranged."⁷⁶

Revised somewhat in 1896, a war board convening on June 30, 1897, altered the plans again, restoring the "essentials" of Kimball's plan so that the attack on Manila returned, but with recommended additional military operations to accompany the naval action⁷⁷. These plans were relayed to Commodore Dewey, commander of the American Asiatic squadron, and were available as well to Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt. And it is through Roosevelt that President McKinley received his first education on United States contingency plans toward Spain as well as the existence and value of the Philippines--*seven months before hostilities*

⁷⁴Miller, pp. 9-10.

⁷⁵after Naval Lieutenant William Wirt Kimball, who prepared the final draft of this document.

⁷⁶Welch, p.4. See also Grenville and Young, pp. 271-275.

⁷⁷Grenville and Young, p. 276.

*began*⁷⁸. In the form of a memo, TR's recommendations to McKinley suggested that, in the event of war, the Asiatic squadron "should blockade and, if possible, take Manila,⁷⁹" much along the lines of the Kimball plan. On February 25, 1898, acting Secretary Roosevelt wired Dewey official contingency orders to attack the Spanish fleet in Manila should war break out⁸⁰.

In the end, however, as commander-in-chief it was McKinley's decision to attack at Manila when war commenced in April. The navy advised Long that "we should strike at once at the Spanish fleet in the Philippines"; the orders were prepared by the Bureau of Navigation, with Long's approval, and McKinley read, studied, approved and signed the orders on April 24⁸¹. This decision, on strategic grounds in a war about Cuba, promised to draw the distant archipelago onto center stage, presenting itself as an opportunity for American expansionism into the Pacific. For Dewey won an historic battle in Manila Bay on the first of May, destroying the Spanish fleet without the loss of man or vessel. Following orders, American forces sent by McKinley took the city from Spanish rule, leaving the United States suddenly in control of a precious harbor and real estate in

⁷⁸Emphasis mine, suggesting that McKinley's claims of ignorance regarding the whereabouts of the Philippines may be dubious. Roosevelt's early contact with McKinley went beyond the departmental memo. In September, 1897, several "extensive private conversations" took place through which TR educated McKinley on "preparedness, and the necessity for grasping the initiative in an attack on Cuba, on the coast of Spain and in the Pacific." Biographer Leech adds that the president had at this time been "emphatically advised that, on the outbreak of hostilities with Spain, the Asiatic squadron should blockade and, if possible, take Manila." See pp. 161-162.

⁷⁹McCormick, p. 107.

⁸⁰an event some note with almost horror as an ambitious expansionist overstepping his bounds by dispatching such orders in the absence of vacationing Naval Secretary Long. In fact, the orders, as documented above, were standard operating procedure in contingency of war with Spain within the department for years by then. Secretary Long made no attempt to recind Roosevelt's actions, nor did McKinley for that matter; at most, it seems, TR was enjoying his power as temporary head of the department by dispatching orders which merely reflected department policy.

⁸¹Gould, p. 61.

the Pacific. Of course, the short war (lasting only a few months) was followed by peace talks establishing the fate of, among other things, the Philippines. As stated, in the end the U.S. demanded and received full possession of the Philippines. Why was it so wished? Having explained how the Philippines became salient in a conflict against a European power over a Caribbean island, it is time to probe the reasons for the complete annexation of the Philippines.

PROPOSITION ONE

Domestic Coalitions and Politics: *McKinley Decided to Annex the Philippines Because of the Logrolling of Domestic Parochial Interests In Favor of Such a Move; Convincing Him to do so on the Basis of Political and/or Ideological Persuasion.*

Was there a "meeting of minds" among domestic interests within the United States to see the Philippines come under the American flag? Could these interests impart their wishes upon the president of the United States, in the form of strategic rationalizations to which McKinley would subscribe, or in the form of domestic political pressures which McKinley could not resist?

Such a measure of influence would have to reveal a few things empirically: evidence of a networking of interests, evidence of attempts to co-opt or pressure the chief decision-maker in some form, and evidence that the president's choice was one he would not have taken in the absence of such influence. Pertaining to this last point, the domestic politics thesis

articulated by Snyder is premised on the illogic of expanding for rational, realist reasons. So there must be evidence pointing to an absurdity within annexation based on the realist framework, leaving only internal reasons as plausible motives for expansion. Remember Lakatos's call for T1 to be able to explain events which T does not sufficiently or logically cover (see Chapter Two). These criteria of influence are applied to the analysis of McKinley's policy toward the Philippines below.

Parochial Interests of the 1890s: Big Business and the "Gunpowder Gospel"

Several historians and students of United States expansionism of 1898 have attempted to make the domestic link in accounting for this "aberration" in the American experience. Much like Snyder's work and premises, the behavior being explained is characterized as both "bad" and abnormal. And, much as Snyder attempted, authors such as La Feber, Campbell and McCormick use these assumptions as grounds for a search for the guilty party--those domestic elements responsible for the bad behavior. Finally, as with Snyder, the links they make to these domestic culprits are tenuous, circumstantial and largely inadequate as explanations for American expansionism. Spurious relationships are formed between the business community's general interest in annexation and the McKinley administration's decision to annex the Philippines. Though they show that business interests and religious missionaries favored annexation, that these

elements transmitted their opinions to McKinley, and McKinley ultimately annexed the Philippines, the connections among them ultimately rely more on normatively biased inferences surrounding the assumptions of "badness" and secret influence rather than empirical support, the pitfall of élite theory.

What needs to be demonstrated is evidence of coalition building among domestic interests--in this case, the business and religious communities, as well as government leaders in favor of a "large policy"--in an effort to make McKinley take the Philippines. Secondly, McKinley's decision must be shown to be the result of such efforts; something against the logic of his beliefs and of realism. There is some support for the former and much less for the latter.

Much of business and industry, and many American missionaries, converged on common ground in their public and private support for the annexation of the Philippines. American trade in the rich markets of the Orient appealed to the businesses struggling to recover from the depression of the 1890s and the supply glut which hindered prosperity, many suggested. The "consensus on overproduction" extended throughout business and industry circles to include domestic merchants, bankers, manufacturers as well as conservative political leaders, including President McKinley himself. The belief--which there is evidence McKinley accepted before a coordinated domestic effort to persuade him ever occurred⁸²--was that the domestic market was saturated and the solution to the over-production problem was market expansion abroad and overseas. As the New York State Bankers' Association argued,

⁸²Gould discusses McKinley's early foreign policy beliefs in Chapter One.

Our capacity to produce far exceeds our capacity to consume. The home market can no longer keep furnaces in blast or looms in action. That capital may earn its increment and labor be employed, enterprise must contend in the markets of the world, for the sale of our surplus products.⁸³

One of the perceived greatest markets to penetrate was the "fabled China market," home to hundreds of millions of potential consumers of Western food, clothes, iron and steel.

United States exports to China generally rose in the last decade of the century, from \$7,385,362 in 1890 to \$17,984, 472 in 1897.⁸⁴ Chief among the industries thriving from access to the China market was cotton. Exports for the cotton industries cashed in at \$1,252,859 in 1890 while bringing home \$7,489,141 in 1897.⁸⁵ Domestic depression and over-all business failures in the United States in these years made the "oriental consumer" increasingly important to the point where the cotton goods industries, as well as kerosene, wheat flour, iron and steel, were said to have become dependent on Asian consumers.⁸⁶

In the contemporary climate, the China market was increasingly threatened by European and Japanese posturing. With every year that passed a new segment of China seemed to fall under the control of rival powers. There was England's "monopolistic approach" to developing the

⁸³May, *American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay*, pp. 193-194.

⁸⁴Campbell, pp.10-11.

⁸⁵Campbell, p. 19; La Feber, p. 354.

⁸⁶La Feber, p. 354.

Yangtze Valley as well as control over Hong Kong⁸⁷. Germany, France and Japan likewise fought for spheres of influence and economic concessions from the weakened Chinese, following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95⁸⁸. And there were rumors that Russia was going to close China's Talienwan to foreign commerce, asserting its southern Manchurian leases to be "integral portions of Russian territory;" all of which threatened to leave American policy in China, in McCormick's words, "diplomatically isolated."⁸⁹

The American business community naturally was cognizant of the threat to their interests in China. When the Germans seized the port of Kiaochow, threatening the ability of American exports to reach the Chinese and marking another sign of European attempts to carve out exclusive spheres of influence, business interests and journals began speaking out in the form of petitions from various prominent Chambers of Commerce (Boston, New York, Cleveland and San Francisco) and the Philadelphia Board of Trade sent to the Department of State.⁹⁰ The call for the country's "important commercial interests" in China to be "duly and promptly safeguarded" was supplemented with various business journal editorials nationwide calling for a stronger stand in Asia.⁹¹

As a backdrop to the Philippines debate, then, the China market played a formative role in the business community. When the question of annexation arose, general business opinion tended to favor it. In a survey of trade journals, the *Chicago Inter-Ocean* claimed to have found unanimity

⁸⁷ibid.

⁸⁸Campbell, p. 15.

⁸⁹McCormick, p. 111. See later section on U.S. policy regarding China.

⁹⁰Campbell, p. 34; La Feber, pp. 355-357.

⁹¹ibid.

in their advocacy of full retention of the archipelago.⁹² The journal *Railway World* claimed, "One way of opening a market is to conquer it," while a southern publication claimed the Philippines to be an "indispensable base" for trade with Asia.⁹³

Commercial and industrial organizations made their presence known as well. The American Asiatic Association deemed annexation essential to the "commercial interests of our citizens in the Far East;" at the same time, McKinley's own *Ohio Times-Herald* reported the mid-west's business-minded to be keen on keeping the Philippines.⁹⁴ Some groups went straight to the White House in expressing their opinions. The San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, the Merchants' Association, the Manufacturers' and Producers' Association (also of San Francisco), joined the Seattle Chamber of Commerce in petitioning McKinley to retain the Philippines in order to strengthen American-Asian trade relations.⁹⁵ The United States Export Association likewise petitioned the president in the form of an open letter, pushing for annexation (as means to "widen the market for American products) by way of analogy: "The Koran says 'Every man is entitled to as many wives as his right hand can take and hold,' and the nations of the earth are now acting on this principle."⁹⁶

With this chorus of expansionist views, coupled with a paucity of countervailing viewpoints (the anti-imperialist movement was new, weak

⁹²McCormick, p. 118.

⁹³Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898*, p. 277.

⁹⁴Campbell, p. 16.

⁹⁵ibid.

⁹⁶Presidential Papers of William McKinley, Series 12, Reel 98, Vols. 27-34, an open letter in the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, July 19, 1898. Note: this principle is consistent with the offensive realist model, and this text appears as one of the "advisory" statements analyzed below.

and largely consisting of the opposition party), it is not difficult to accept that such actions influenced McKinley in his decision-making. Yet there were even other domestic elements making the case for annexation. The American missionaries saw in annexation the chance to "guide less fortunate peoples and bestow on them the enlightenment" of the Christian gospel.⁹⁷ For some years they had worked overseas in this capacity. New opportunities provided the missionaries with continued purpose. They had served to create awareness of atrocities and injustices abroad--including those of Spain upon its subjects--and after war with Spain had begun, religious groups campaigned for overseas territory as an assertion of the responsibility of "the powerful to lift up the weak."⁹⁸ The religious element proved a persuasive ally in the annexation debate.

And there were at least circumstantial ties between the two groups, suggesting minimally an informal "coalition" of parochial interests. Business and "churchmen" desired access to the Orient: one for markets and the other to "spread the gospel of salvation."⁹⁹ For the missionaries, funding was an important aspect of their programs. As for American business, the China market would "become much greater as all Chinese adopted western food, clothes, and customs, as well as spiritual values." The missionaries in China, La Feber contends, dispensed all four and, in doing so, attracted the support of industrialists and financiers.¹⁰⁰ In this way each fed the others' interests. Each also aided the other's cause in the shared rhetoric surrounding duty in helping the "less fortunate" Filipinos

⁹⁷Leech, p. 324.

⁹⁸Leopold, p. 125.

⁹⁹Leech, p. 324.

¹⁰⁰p. 307.

become enlightened by American culture and institutions.

This is the extent of collaboration which I could find domestically in influencing policy toward the Philippines, except to note that all were constituents of the party in power, the Republican party. Some contend that McKinley was at the "mercy of circumstances" and "clay in the hands of" members of the "imperial party--" the likes of Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt.¹⁰¹ This is unfair in its relegation of McKinley's role to that of puppet or pushover. True, Republicans within his administration were plentiful, and most were in favor of the "large policy" of American expansionism. And party lines were clearly drawn in 1896 to leave Democrats the party which rejected Hawaiian annexation and only endorsed the Monroe Doctrine in the party platform, while Republicans called for increased naval power, possession of Hawaii, a canal in Nicaragua and "a proper and much-needed naval station in the West Indies," ending with hopes for an "eventual withdrawal of the European powers from this hemisphere."¹⁰²

But the flaw is the assumption that McKinley would not have annexed the Philippines in the absence of these converging pressures. The evidence, however, does not support that such pressures were orchestrated by the individual groups, nor does it seem that McKinley lacked the beliefs and logical justifications grounded in realism to carry such a policy regardless of such domestic efforts. As will be seen, McKinley came to reason on his own why Manila, then Luzon, then the entire archipelago, should be kept under American auspices. Just because his own constituency

¹⁰¹See Pratt, Expansionists of 1898, pp. 326-327.

¹⁰²Pratt, America's Colonial Experiment, pp. 32-33.

favored such a policy does not mean he was "captured" by the interests which advised him. There was no evidence of threats, bribes, or coercion; save the potential "revolt at the ballot box" which could follow McKinley's rejection of a policy favored by a segment of his political base. But McKinley demonstrated independence in action, cautious leadership in the face of such pressures, which makes it unlikely to think he was either coerced or a convert to domestic pressures which, in their absence, would have allowed for a different policy outcome.

PROPOSITIONS TWO

Defensive Realism: *McKinley Decided to Annex the Philippines Because He Perceived a Threat to United States Interests in the Philippines.*

Alternatively, perhaps, the president and his advisers beheld in the Philippines a danger, a threat, to established American interests which compelled them to seek annexation. This sort of expansion out of insecurity is at the core of the defensive realist argument. A state expands when insecure, when threatened, in an effort to defend against the threat. This carries a preventive tenor, as well as a grudging move from normalcy on behalf of the expanding power, as it is almost forced to expand in order to protect itself. In the absence of the threat, such a move would be unnecessary and not taken.

Does the United States case regarding the Philippines fit this mold? Did the Philippines, directly or indirectly, pose a threat to American commercial or security interests, as seen by McKinley and his advisers?

Two elements appear to have concerned U.S. decision-makers in terms of security issues. However, the issues were linked only to defense of the Philippine territory--possessions they were intent on keeping for reasons of opportunity--and which necessarily precede the defensive concerns.

Rebel, Rebel

As with Cuba, the Philippines were a Spanish possession with a large segment of the native population disgruntled with the colonial rule which was imposed upon them. The rebel leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, residing in Hong Kong with 800,000 pesos (received from Spain in exchange for his agreement to "go abroad" and cease and denounce the insurgency¹⁰³), intended one day to return and fight for Philippine independence. May 24, 1898, was such a day. On that day, a month into the Spanish-American War, the returning Aguinaldo announced the formation of a native government with himself as head and took to arms against the Spanish even as American forces sailed to battle on the islands themselves. Within a month Aguinaldo's forces had defeated a Spanish column, taken 4,000 prisoners, won control of much of the island of Luzon, laid siege to Manila and proclaimed the independence of the Philippines.¹⁰⁴ The emergence and subsequent successes of this internal rebellion challenged American designs and contributed to the modification of any inclination to leave the islands, apart from Manila, to others to rule.

Actually, there was early contact between the American government and the revolutionaries. On November 3, 1897, a representative of the

¹⁰³Karnow, p. 77.

¹⁰⁴Leopold, pp. 182-183.

Filipino rebels, Felipe Agoncillo, met with the U.S. Consul in Hong Kong, Rounseville Wildman to discuss a possible alliance in case of war against Spain.¹⁰⁵ Wildman relayed the content of that meeting to the State Department in search of instructions for how to respond. Aside from offering "on behalf of his government" an alliance with the United States should war come, Agoncillo requested that the United States send them 20,000 stand of arms and 200,000 rounds of ammunition "for the use of his government, to be paid for on the recognition of his government by the United States."¹⁰⁶

The State Department response of December 5 was signed by 3rd Assistant Secretary Thomas W. Cridler and stated the Administration's policy in response to the rebels' overture:

The government of the United States does not negotiate such treaties...You shouldn't encourage any advances on the part of Mr. Agoncillo, and should courteously decline to communicate with the Department further regarding his alleged mission.¹⁰⁷

At this stage, with war and peace with Spain in the balance, the United States expressed no desire to support the insurgency cause, nor to legitimate their "government" with arms and provoke a confrontation with Spain which McKinley genuinely tried to avert up until the end. It may also be that McKinley, as with Cuba, sought a free hand in the future dealings with

¹⁰⁵Pomeroy, pp. 38-39.

¹⁰⁶ibid.

¹⁰⁷Olcott, p. 144.

Spain's territory should war come; the recognition of independence--in the Philippines or Cuba--meant depriving himself of options, of binding the free hand.

Once the rebels emerged again as a legitimate force, McKinley found a new rival in the struggle for supremacy of authority in Manila, Luzon and possibly the entire archipelago. As General Merritt descended upon Manila, the city was also surrounded by insurgent forces. Merritt's order from the President himself was to "establish supreme political control" over the inhabitants of the islands.¹⁰⁸ The United States, which was working with the insurgents in the battle against Spain on the islands, became convinced that McKinley's orders were on a collision course with Aguinaldo's intentions. Dewey characterized Aguinaldo as "threatening towards our army" in a report from overseas, cautioning against having a "political alliance with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future."¹⁰⁹ McKinley's original draft protocol proposed Spanish retention of all the Philippines save Manila. In his words, he altered that proposal because the insurgents had "become an important factor in the situation and must have just consideration in any terms of settlement."¹¹⁰

"Just consideration" meant that the rebels needed to be seen as a possible wrench in the plans for American dominance in Manila, if not the entire archipelago. The strength and effectiveness of the rebel army against the Spanish demonstrated that such a native force "might refuse to yield

¹⁰⁸Leopold, p. 183.

¹⁰⁹Leopold, p. 183; May, p. 248.

¹¹⁰May, p. 248.

obedience to the American army of occupation" and may even beat the Americans to Manila itself.¹¹¹ This was intolerable to the administration. The United States actually circumvented the rebel threat to Manila by working out a deal with the Spanish forces under siege. Allowing for American rule (preferable to Filipino rule in the eyes of the Spanish for reasons not excluding racism) in exchange for an honorable defeat, the American and Spanish forces, without informing the Filipinos at the perimeter, staged a battle to take Manila. This permitted Spanish General Fermin Jaudenes to claim defeat in a brave fight against an honorable opponent, rather than merely surrendering to the U.S. or, worse, to the rebel Filipino "niggers."¹¹²

Relations between the United States and the rebels deteriorated throughout the summer and into the peace process, as was expected when the interests and goals of each were found to be increasingly in conflict with the other. Ambiguous diplomacy gave way finally to the clarity of U.S. purposes in October: to deny the Philippines their independence and, instead, purchase the islands and govern them with supreme authority.

Anything less than total annexation would provide the rebels--seen as "unfit for self-government" (consistent with Herrmann's imperialist model: see next section)--with territory from which to foment anti-American activities. That is, if part of the Philippines were taken and the rest left, the future security of American interests just established there would be in possible jeopardy because of the existence of the insurgent movement. Such "defensive" reasoning factored into the decision to take "all" instead

¹¹¹Leech, p. 283.

¹¹²Jaudenes's words were that he might cede "to white people, never to niggers." See Karnow, p. 123.

of just "some" of the Philippines. But it was a measure to defend and secure a *status quo* environment (that is, territory already taken) rather than an imperialist measure to alter the status quo.

Were there any "defensive" factors which initiated annexation rather than merely aid the security of a new American domain of influence?

"Contingent Necessity"

Strategists meeting with the president provided insights into the defensibility of their new possession in contingency situations. The conclusion was that the port of Manila, separate from control of the rest of Luzon, was "indefensible;" that it would be a "source of weakness rather than strength in wartime."¹¹³ The assumption was that, if the United States did not take the territory of Luzon, some other power--be it Spain, Germany, Japan--would eventually. Where there are rival powers with rival interests in close proximity, the argument goes, the more the chance for conflict. Without the rest of Luzon, Manila would be a vulnerable and isolated area. This scenario, of "submitting" to living with "dangerous neighbors," was a situation Naval Chief R.B. Bradford warned to "be avoided, if feasible."¹¹⁴ In July, even as armistice demands stated only the intention to hold on to Manila, the president was found declaring "I am in favor now of keeping Luzon and fortifying Manila."¹¹⁵

Did such a threat exist? In theory, of course, it was tenable. But

¹¹³Karnow, p. 127; Leech, P. 327.

¹¹⁴Leech, pp. 340-341.

¹¹⁵Literally in the same breath, he continues, "that which we do know makes it very doubtful if there would be any advantage to be derived from holding it all." This shows the escalation of demands as gradual and his thoughts evolutionary. See Grenville and Young, pp. 285.

there were also real signals at the time that Germany, Japan and Russia, at least, had designs in the Philippines to some degree or another. Japan had communicated an interest through official channels in acquiring the islands, should the United States wax uninterested in their retention. Russia was also reported to be on the lookout for a naval base in the archipelago. But the truest challenger to American possession was Germany¹¹⁶.

As early as May 1, several nations sent naval contingents to the Philippines to guard their respective interests there. Germany, however, reportedly sent a grossly disproportionate "detachment...which equaled in firepower and exceeded in armor that of the United States."¹¹⁷ German Kaiser Wilhelm was responding to rumors that the Filipinos were contemplating independence and the creation of a monarchy, and that the natives might accept as their king a German prince. He also sought to maintain a strong presence in hopes of acquiring a Philippine base should the islands be carved up. American Ambassador to Germany Andrew White relayed word of Berlin's intentions in mid-June: that Germany hoped to use the expected "anarchy, confusion and insecurity under a 'Philippine Republic'" as an excuse "to secure a stronghold and centre of influence in that region."¹¹⁸ In July the Germans informed both White and Hay that they expected "a few coaling stations" and "a naval base in the Philippines" along with boasts of expected "predominant influence" in other areas such as Samoa and the Carolines.¹¹⁹ The State Department concluded that if the

¹¹⁶Please refer to Footnote 20 on p. 6 above (Chapter One) regarding Zakaria's early dismissal of the "German threat" in his study. The following responds to it.

¹¹⁷Leopold, p. 182, and Karnow, p. 125, tell the story recreated here and below.

¹¹⁸McCormick, pp. 110-111.

¹¹⁹ibid.

United States failed to take all of the Philippines, Germany had "every intention to establish a foothold there."¹²⁰ This came to be known as the "theory of contingent necessity¹²¹" and it weighed heavy in the minds of strategists and the President alike.

At the same time, the German Ambassador told Hay that Germany had no "disposition to interfere with, or deprive" the United States of the rights of conquest. A July 7th incident involving German evacuations of Spanish women and children in the Philippines--in violation of the American blockade--caused Dewey to board and search the vessels over the protests of the German fleet Admiral Otto von Diederichs. The near-crisis prompted a re-evaluation of prospects in the Philippines, of American intentions. In August the German fleet departed Philippine waters, the Kaiser "having concluded that his prospects in the Philippines were dim."¹²² This suggested to U.S. decision-makers--with the other evidence of the time--that total annexation could be achieved "without danger of disturbing the equilibrium of the world" while any other course could see Germans filling the vacuum in an area of new vital interest to the United States.¹²³

McKinley referenced the threat of other powers in a few of his remarks justifying why the Philippines could not be separated. To Day he wrote that "the interdependency of the several islands, their close relations with Luzon, *the very grave problem of what will become of the part we do not take...*" led him to believe that "duty required that we should take the

¹²⁰ibid.

¹²¹Karnow, p. 125.

¹²²Karnow

¹²³McCormick, p. 110.

archipelago."¹²⁴ To the Methodist clergymen the following year he indicated that, one night after praying "Almighty God for light and guidance" it "came to me" that turning the Philippines over to France or Germany--"our commercial rivals in the Orient"--would be "bad business and discreditable."¹²⁵ Welch, whose conclusion is supported above, summarizes it as follows: that "international rivalries did not determine his [McKinley's] decision to acquire territory in the Pacific. They were...significant in determining the amount of territory."¹²⁶

In sum, there are minimally two "defensive" influences on the decision to acquire all, rather than just some, of the Philippines. One was the insurgency movement which, if left to grow in the hinterlands, could threaten American interests newly established in the archipelago. Another factor was the posturing of rival powers, especially the Germans, abroad. In the end, neither preceded imperial expansion, they merely reflected U.S. concern with sustaining their new global reach.

PROPOSITION THREE:

Offensive Realism: *McKinley Decided to Annex the Philippines Because He Perceived an Opportunity to Advance United States Interests by so Doing*¹²⁷.

¹²⁴Brands, p. 26.

¹²⁵May, pp. 252-253.

¹²⁶p. 9.

¹²⁷Note: The following content analysis procedure and sample is identical for both the offensive and defensive propositions. This being the case, the two sections are combined here for convenience to reader and researcher alike.

From this perspective, it is that state which recognizes its power to influence abroad, and is quite secure, that emboldens itself through more assertive policies aimed at taking advantage of opportunities for enhancing power and interests. Is this characteristic of the late nineteenth century United States? Did the Philippines offer the U.S. a chance to expand its interests and influence abroad, laying vulnerable to the increasing power and confidence of the young nation?

May-June, 1898: War & Establishing Demands Abroad

While we are conducting war and until its conclusion, we must keep all we get...

--President McKinley, May 1898¹²⁸

Having ordered the attack on the Manila fleet, McKinley moved in preparation for the next phase of the plan. Prior to official word of Dewey's May 1st victory, America was already alive with debate. The Tuesday, May 3 edition of *The Mail and Express* headlined, "THE FATE OF THE PHILIPPINES" and discussed what "shall we do with the Philippines," reporting this subject to be of "lively discussion in Congressional and administration circles."¹²⁹ The day before, McKinley had already determined to send an army of occupation to Manila, issuing a

¹²⁸This personal note to himself shortly after Dewey's victory, is found in several sources, including Leech, p. 238, and Karnow, p. 108. Note that the quote continues in the next section on "Peace and Decision."

¹²⁹*Presidential Papers of William McKinley*, Reel 97, Series 12, Vol. 20-26, May 3, 1898. See also Leech, p. 209, for a discussion of the early assumption in America that Dewey had "taken" the Philippines.

call for volunteers for an army force of "not less than 20,000 men" on the fourth of May, three days prior to "authoritative word" of American victory in Manila Bay¹³⁰. It seems McKinley indeed had an early opinion about the Philippines; the opinion seemed in line with American contingency plans for war with Spain.

Early clues to McKinley's thinking exist beyond these decisions. For instance, the White House leaked a story to the New York Tribune that McKinley's position was that there would be "time enough to discuss the sale, barter or retention of the islands when Spain has been driven to abandon Cuba and sue for conditions of a general peace."¹³¹ If a valid measure of his true opinion--and it is consistent with the pattern of decisions, reflecting the Naval Department plans to hold the Philippines as a bargaining chip--this indicates that McKinley kept his options open early. He was neither ignorant of the Philippines, as apologists argue, nor seemingly the rabid expansionist who planned to take all the islands from the start, as some skeptics and critics claim¹³². Still, he was sowing the seeds for the ultimate retention of the islands and doing so with great deliberation. And the seeds were grounded in perceived opportunities to expand American influence into the Pacific and into the Orient.

On May 11, McKinley approved a State Department memo which clarified his intentions and goals regarding the war. Relevant to the Philippines issue was a section calling for the Spanish cession of a "suitable

¹³⁰McCormick, p. 108.

¹³¹Karnow, p. 108.

¹³²Refer to footnote 84 for an example of the former; Morgan's "McKinley Got What He Wanted," is an example of the latter, suggesting that "from the very first, McKinley inclined toward retaining all the Philippines." See p. 116.

coaling station" (presumably Manila) to the United States¹³³. This is a war aim not very germane to stopping the disruption in Cuba, nor to defend against the Spanish Pacific threat which was removed ten days prior. No statements nor evidence show that the United States made such a demand out of insecurity against another power either. Such an aim is germane to the establishment of tangible power and influence abroad. In the era of coal-powered naval vessels, coaling stations were valuable commodities allowing for the expansion of influence abroad due to the new reach such stations provided fleet ships. The Naval War Board recommended such stations and naval bases as integral to a plan premised on the establishment of "supremacy" in the Caribbean and the Pacific¹³⁴.

McKinley's instructions of May 22 to General Merritt, in charge of the departing force heading to Manila, enforced the "offensive" intentions of the United States, in terms of exploiting an opportunity to enhance power abroad. The stated purpose for the mission, Merritt was told, was the "severance of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power;" to replace Spanish power in the Philippines with American "order and security...during their possession by the United States.¹³⁵" By the end of a month of hostilities, then, McKinley had committed to permanent possession of a portion of the Philippines (Manila and its Bay), as well as at least temporary "possession by the United States" of all the islands. As a sign of the expansionist times, by June 3rd

¹³³McCormick, pp. 108-109.

¹³⁴Grenville and Young, p. 295. McCormick adds that when it "became apparent that the great distance between Manila and Honolulu demanded an intermediate coaling and cable station, the President broadened the American position to include 'an island in the Cadrones' (Marianas)," which turned out to be Guam--seized that summer by the U.S. Navy. See p.109.

¹³⁵Olcott, pp. 166-168. Also McCormick, p. 109; Leech, p. 211.

McKinley's demands extended to cover the cession of Puerto Rico "in lieu of an indemnity," as well as one island in the Marianas with a harbor suitable for a coaling station¹³⁶. And at the time Spain agreed to a cease fire to negotiate peace (July 26, 1898) these demands, along with the requirement that Spain withdraw from Cuba and the rest of the Hemisphere, were stipulated as conditions of an armistice signed in Washington on August 12, 1898.

The United States, quite deliberately, was taking advantage of its position vis-à-vis the weaker, overstretched Spain in soliciting demands for new and far-flung possessions which would serve to shore up American power and influence abroad. Lopsided as the war was and isolated and rich as the United States was, insecurity was not at the heart of these decisions. Confidence brimmed from the rising power, something noted by Americans and foreign powers alike. In no documents or speeches or statements up to these decisions are there references to insecurity, threats and enemies. America was on the offensive.

July-October: Peace & Decision—All or Some ?

"...When the war's over we must keep what we want."

--McKinley, 1898

With a foothold in the Philippines and the intention to stay there, McKinley turned to the issues of peace with Spain. With the armistice in

¹³⁶Leopold, pp. 181-182. See also footnote 109.

place, both sides agreed to meet in Paris starting October 1st to work out the terms of a permanent peace. The president established a commission of five men, Senators Cushman Davis, William P. Frye, and George Gray, as well as Secretary of State Day and vocal expansionist editor of the *Tribune* and McKinley friend, Whitelaw Reid. This commission is interesting in two respects. First, taken as a whole, the group was "decidedly weighted on the side of retaining the whole archipelago.¹³⁷" In fact, it is George Gray alone who is coded "against" any annexation of the Philippines in the above section on advisor perceptions. This is interesting because it is this team which is sent to hear "expert testimony," negotiate with the Spaniards and make a recommendation based on both as to what *they* would do with the Philippines. This advice is relayed to the president for consideration.

The second intriguing aspect of this commission is the fact that three members were current United States senators. Serving on a commission which was appointed while Congress was out of session and which "completed its labors before the lawmakers reassembled," this tactic raised the ire of (Democratic) senators condemning the move as a violation of the separation of powers.¹³⁸ The tactic did serve as the first strike toward ratification, having three senators formalize a treaty to be sent to a Senate with a Republican majority. McKinley shows political cunning steering his preferences through the separation of powers, a skill also evident in the case of Cuba (see Chapter four).

McKinley's September 16th instructions to his departing commission were clear and revealing. The capture of Manila had imposed on the United

¹³⁷Dobson, p. 113.

¹³⁸Leopold, p.113.

States:

New duties and responsibilities, which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation...Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the *commercial opportunity* to which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent." (We would accept nothing less than) "the cession in full right and sovereignty" (of Luzon)¹³⁹.

Luzon, the island on which Manila resides, had become the new, non-negotiable prize; the president citing (in manifest and latent terms) opportunity to justify the decision. The opportunity to which he referred extended beyond the Filipino market to encompass the emerging policy the United States wished to see implemented regarding the China market: an "Open Door" policy.

In the same instructions to the commissioners that 16th of September lay the opening shot in what would be one of McKinley's great campaigns for one of McKinley's most significant accomplishments, the opening of the China market to free and fair trade and an end to Great Power partitioning and monopolizing various quarters of the Chinese mainland. In McKinley's words,

It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the *open door* for ourselves,

¹³⁹Emphasis mine. Quote is pieced together from Karnow, p. 127, and Miller, p. 127.

we are ready to accord the open door to others.¹⁴⁰

The policy which emerged in the Open Door notes of 1899 was a response to the spheres of influence and mainland leases being established in China in the last decade of the 19th century, actions which jeopardized American competition in the fabled market. The United States, politically incapable of such blatant territorial aggrandizement as was displayed by the European powers, was also wrestling with a Depression and perceived production glut in the 1890s. The answer for many seemed obvious: expanded markets abroad. This combination of factors made McKinley handicapped yet desperate in trying to compete in Asia. A firm presence in the Philippines, in the form of a naval base, coaling station and merchant marine port-of-call, provided the United States with the opportunity to extend its influence into Asia, an opportunity to open the doors of the China market and its hundreds of millions of potential consumers to American goods and services.

Further, any impasse over the future of the Philippines in the American debate was seen by some as a risk "of letting American hopes in China go by default."¹⁴¹ There was incentive to gain a foothold in the Philippines, as it provided new advantages intrinsically and in the form of a new hand in the competition for the China market.

McKinley naturally felt out opinions and advice preceding the peace conference, at one point inviting his cabinet on a Potomac cruise for four days. Again, sentiment was largely for the "large policy" of annexation.

¹⁴⁰Emphasis mine. See Gould, pp. 132-133.

¹⁴¹McCormick, p. 111. See discussion of European activities in China earlier in chapter.

And the reasons were consistent with the child-stereotype indicators and notions of imperialism, opportunity and the offensive realist model. Attorney General John Griggs and Secretary of Interior Cornelius Bliss cited the reputed commercial advantages of annexation; Agriculture Secretary James Wilson favored the move on the grounds of more paternalist reasons congruent with the child-stereotype imagery (seeing the Philippines as a semi-barbaric "field ripe for evangelical endeavor"¹⁴²). Secretary of State Day voiced dissent in taking the entire island cluster, saying America was not suited to rule "eight or nine millions of absolutely ignorant and many degraded" Filipinos, instead insisting on a naval base only, an opinion which was consistent in his remarks of July through October.¹⁴³

The peace talks persisted throughout the month of October, first dealing with the Cuban question (see Chapter four) and, later, the Philippines. Meanwhile, as mentioned, the president embarked on a two-week long speaking tour of the midwest, partly for domestic political reasons and definitely to sound out public opinion on the possibility of taking the entire island group in the Pacific. It is here that McKinley's consistent message of advantage, opportunity and American "aspirations" are linked with references to the helpless, childlike natives in the selling of annexation, directly or indirectly (see next section and Appendix for details pertaining to McKinley's speeches on this trip and elsewhere).¹⁴⁴ The tour

¹⁴²I quote Karnow in reference to Wilson rather than Wilson directly. See p. 126 for the extent of Cabinet opinion in the summer of 1898. The opinions were consistent through the fall. By October, Dobson notes, cabinet, as well as public and official, opinion "clearly favored annexation (p. 113)."

¹⁴³ibid.; also Olcott, pp. 62-63.

¹⁴⁴I stress that the tour focused on the Philippine issue; as Congressional elections approached and the treaty was still being hammered out. "indirect references" to annexation include mentioning the treaty and

was wildly popular and McKinley returned home confident that there would be support for his decision to annex all of the Philippines. He cabled Paris, asking for the commissioners' final opinions, reading them and letting his intentions be known.

There is much to show that McKinley, despite this action, had already made his decision alone. A compelling fact is that the same day that the commissioners telegraphed their viewpoints, October 26, recently appointed Secretary of State John Hay had cabled Day (who resigned as Secretary of State to head the commission to Paris) that the President reached the conclusion that the

...cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands to Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future contention, cannot be justified on political, commercial or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the former must therefore be required.¹⁴⁵

The "political" grounds supposedly refers to the popularity of annexation in the United States, the "humanitarian" being a real or constructed justification to save the Filipinos from other powers as well as themselves, and the "commercial" presumably indicates the American interest in retaining predominance of the Philippine market as well as preserving its

"duties and responsibilities" from the war and to be "written into peace"...As Ernest May explains, "In the course of each speech, McKinley said something that could be interpreted as referring to the Philippines (see p. 258)." Pomeroy concurs that the trip was meant to "sound out popular sentiment" regarding annexation (p. 51). I stress this point so that the reader understands that coding of speeches occurred with inference to the annexation issue even when it was not mentioned in name.

¹⁴⁵*Presidential Papers of William McKinley*, Series 3, Reel 63 (10/13/98--November, 1898).

presence off the Asian mainland so to strengthen its hand in the China market scramble.

The independence option ("leaving the rest...to be subject of future contention") was never considered likely. Most commentators, born and raised in a Euro-centric culture, saw non-white, non-Christian peoples as inferior, "semi-barbaric" and in need of rule (such was the "White Man's Burden," as Kipling wrote at the time to persuade the U.S. to accept the role of Great Power). John Foreman (the Englishman considered the "foremost expert on the islands"), in his July, 1898, article in the *Contemporary Review*--of which McKinley obtained a copy and read--concluded it to be an "utter impossibility" for the Philippine Islands to remain "one year peaceful under an independent native government."¹⁴⁶ Also as previously mentioned, McKinley heard little to contradict such a perspective, yet heard much which resonated with it.¹⁴⁷

So, consistent with the imperialist model, which employs the "child stereotype" in inferring perceptions of decision-makers, the decision to rule the Philippines was justified in the language of paternalism. McKinley informed the delegation of Methodist clergy that

We could not leave them to themselves--they were unfit for self-government--and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was...there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and

¹⁴⁶May, p. 254.

¹⁴⁷That summer the Japanese foreign minister advised McKinley as well that the Filipinos were incapable of governing themselves. See May, p. 254.

Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died.¹⁴⁸

So American policy in Paris demanded that the United States acquire the entire archipelago.

The exploits of American power in the Philippines, seizing the advantage of the moment to expand into Asia with its promise of new markets and new influence in international affairs, came to be rationalized frequently in terms of the child-like Filipinos. Such language--reflecting beliefs, whether true or false--is strikingly consistent with the Herrmann's imperialist model, thus providing more support for the proposition that offensive considerations of ambition and exploit drove the decision to take the Philippines. McKinley, as Herrmann suggested, brought "cognitive balance" into his decision by couching his intentions in terms of humanitarian missions to help a lesser people. In this way he "convinced himself that he was right" and, so doing, could proceed "to seize the opportunity with full vigor and without any moral inhibitions."¹⁴⁹

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTIONS

Reality offers nothing so neat as an either/or explanation. However, the available evidence tends to support one explanation over another; one viewpoint, proposition, perception over another, and hints at what may be

¹⁴⁸May, p. 253.

¹⁴⁹May, p. 244; Herrmann, "Foreign Policy Analysis," p. 36.

deemed "superior" as an explanatory device of expansionism. In the case of the American annexation of the Philippines the short of it is: defensive motives exist to explain partially why all of the Philippines was taken, as opposed to part, but this insecurity fundamentally is bred out of the new power and opportunism which landed the American flag on Luzon in the first place. Such a conclusion has been detailed with supporting evidence above. To enhance the reliability of such results, however, I also conducted a content analysis of the texts of pertinent decision-makers surrounding, and inclusive of, President McKinley.

The above conclusion is supported with this procedure. I sought the perceptions of McKinley and his advisers regarding the Philippine situation from the earliest assessments within the Naval Department through post-annexation speeches reflecting on the decision itself. The following content analysis, based in part on Herrmann's framework for inferring perceptions from imagery conjured in the public and private statements of leaders (outlined in Chapter Two above), consists of frequency counts of indicative phrases and words consistent with stereotypical images of "enemy" and "child" as well as analysis of the latent content of statements to assess their possible underlying meaning (that is, whether the message conveyed is one of perceived threat from an enemy, or of an opportunity from a "childlike" or lesser people, or neither or both). Table 3.1 below provides the key words and phrases referenced to indicate perceptions of opportunity, threat, and of "child" and "enemy" stereotypes (refer to Chapter Two for a detailed account behind the image construction of "enemy" and "child" stereotypes). The lists consist of pre-chosen words/phrases derived from Herrmann,

explicit references (e.g., "opportunity" for the "opportunity" category and "threat" and "security" for the "threat" category), as well as those which appeared in the texts deemed associated with one of the categories and, thus, added. Some coded speeches and statements defy simple categorization in words and instead were analyzed thematically and coded accordingly. It is partly from this exercise which allowed me to judge texts as offensive, defensive, both or neither¹⁵⁰.

The following is broken down in terms of McKinley's public speeches, his private statements, and advisory statements. The first two will be analyzed for continuity: the more consistent the message in McKinley's public and private statements, the more confidently I can infer his true perceptions. I also remain cognizant of, and compare, statements before and after the decision to annex the Philippines. Again, the degree of consistency between the two will point to the validity of the results.

The advisers' statements are studied as well to see in what context McKinley made his decision. Did he go with or against the general sentiment of the inner circle from which he sought counsel? What viewpoints did he and did he not hear? These questions are interesting in light of recent reconceptualizations of decision-making from the cognitive to the discursive by some scholars who suggest that discourses have the "power to delegate what are considered policy options" and in such a way "become dominant" over other discourses/policy options.¹⁵¹ Though

¹⁵⁰Note that the Table, formed to show the relative appearance frequency of indicative words, phrases and themes, excludes phrases, words, and such which was not related to offensive opportunity, defensive threat, and child and enemy stereotypes (eg. anti-annexationist phrases, ambiguous or unrelated phrases such as references to God and Providence).

¹⁵¹See Shapiro, Bonham and Heradstveit, "A Discursive Practices Approach to Collective Decision-Making," pp. 398-399.

TABLE 3.1. Content Analysis: Operational Indicators and Frequency of Appearance

Word/Phrase	PRES: Public	PRES: Private	ADVISERS
<u>OFFENSIVE</u>			
Advance (nation/race)	0	0	1
Advantage	0	3	3
Benefits	1	0	0
Blessings	1	0	0
Commercial/Business	0	2	3
Common Good	0	1	0
Conquering Race	0	0	1
Destiny	1	0	0
Duty As a Great Nation	0	1	2
Establish Supremacy	0	0	1
Exact Indemnity	0	0	1
Fruits (of war)	2	0	0
Fulfill...Aspirations	1	0	0
Future Expansion	0	0	1
(Fidelity to our)			
Interests	1	1	0
Keep What We Want	0	1	0
Large Policy	0	1	1
New Markets	1	0	2
Opportunity (-ies)	1	1	0
Prestige	1	0	0
Promote (our own)	1	0	0
Reward	1	0	0
(Have a) Right	1	1	1
Territory, Ought have/			
Must not reject	2	0	2
Trade (Open)	3	1	0
Triumphs of War	2	0	0
World...Accords us	1	0	0
Value	0	0	1
Total References	21	13	20

<u>CHILD STEREOTYPE</u>	<u>PRES: Public</u>	<u>PRES: Private</u>	<u>ADVISERS</u>
Alien People			
Require Guidance	1	0	0
Require Protection	1	1	0
Beneficent/Holy/Mission	1	2	0
Benevolent Assimilation	0	2	0
Benighted/Ignorant/Childlike	0	0	3
Bestow Blessings/Benefits	1	1	0
Conscience/Moral Obligation	1	0	0
(Uplift and) Christianize	1	1	1
Civilization	3	0	2
Help Oppressed People/Duty	1	1	0
Helpless/In Our Hands	2	0	0
(Interests of) Humanity	3	2	1
(Interests of) Those Brought within sphere of influence	2	0	0
Justice/Just	1	2	0
Leader is...			
Ambitious	2	0	0
Cruel/Despotic	1	0	2
Misguided (Natives)	3	0	0
(U.S.) Not for Oppression	1	0	0
Progress	1	1	0
Semi-Barbarous	0	0	2
Unfit for Self-Rule/Self-Govt	0	1	1
Unrepresentative/Fraction	2	0	1

Total References	29	15	13

<u>DEFENSIVE</u>	<u>PRES: Public</u>	<u>PRES: Private</u>	<u>ADVISERS</u>
Danger	0	0	2
Defend/Defense	0	0	1
Naval Mistake	0	0	2
Preserve Peace	1	0	0
Problem (of what will become of the part we do not take)	0	1	0
Protect (Life and Property)	2	0	0
Relations to other nations	1	1	0
Repress Disturbances	0	1	0
Secure; (In-) Security	1	0	0
Threat/threatening	0	0	1
Welfare of Future	0	1	0

Total References	5	5	6

ENEMY STEREOTYPE

Aggressive/Aggressor	0	0	0
Ambition/Ambitious (Nation)	0	0	0
Bullying (Nations)	0	0	1
Conquering	0	0	0
Enemy	0	0	1
Evil	0	0	0
(Must) Have the Will	0	0	0
Neighbor (Dangerous/Troublesome)	0	0	2
Rival(s)	0	0	1
(Must) Show Resolve	0	0	0
Unjust	0	0	0
Unjustified	0	0	0

Total References	0	0	5

their focus is on collective decision-making and the "perception"--or, the acceptance of an "articulation" of a point of view¹⁵²--as the *dependent* variable, I thought it worthwhile to explore to which articulations McKinley was or was not exposed. For, whatever my conclusions below, a logically plausible next step would be to inquire into the origins of the perceptions which I treated as the *independent* variable for this study (at least for now, I am not so much concerned with *why* McKinley saw a threat or opportunity; only whether or not he saw one or the other, neither or both).

I culled statements from as many and as different of sources as possible in constructing my sample (also discussed in Chapter Two).¹⁵³ Out of my efforts I found and coded thirty public statements by McKinley regarding (directly or indirectly) the question of annexing the Philippines. Seventeen were made prior to final decision¹⁵⁴ (between March 1897 and October 21, 1898), mostly taken from an October 1898 speaking tour through the mid-west. The other thirteen occur after final decision, between December 15, 1898, and October 18, 1899.

McKinley's private statements on the matter were fewer and farther between. I found nineteen which I could justify as relevant, spanning from July 1898 to a famous post-hoc justification of the decision, purported to be grounded in divine revelation, to a collection of Methodist priests in early 1899. In terms of advisers' statements, I found fifty-six messages either

¹⁵² *ibid.*, p. 398.

¹⁵³ See the Appendix for the detailed primary records of the following summary.

¹⁵⁴ I am calling "final decision" that time when McKinley first officially states his intention to retain the entire archipelago, which I ascertained to be on October 25, 1898. He may or may not have made up his mind "really" prior to this date. Leopold suggests that McKinley had made up his mind upon his return from his mid-west tour on October 22, a date which does not conflict with the categorization in my sample (see Leopold, p. 187).

directly or indirectly heard or read by McKinley from some twenty-nine sources.

As for the results (summarized in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below), much of the language in all three sets of texts--private president, public president and advisers--articulated themes associated with the offensive model of perceiving opportunity and the child stereotype. Of the 30 public statements made by McKinley, I coded 23 (76.7% of the sample) as "offensive"--defined as tapping indicators related to perceptions of opportunity and of the "child stereotype" set forth by Herrmann. None were coded entirely "defensive"--defined as reflecting indicators related to perceptions of threat and of the "enemy stereotype," though three (10%) were coded as having both qualities in the same speech or text. The remaining four were coded "other" for the sake of conservatism in results. Four of the five refer repeatedly to "God," "Providence," "Duty" and "Responsibility" in justifying the action in the Philippines. Arguments could be made either way (eg. is there a *duty* to secure the state from a threat or a *duty* to seize an opportunity that advances U.S. interests?). In the absence of other, clearer indicators, it seems fairest to leave them out.

There was continuity in McKinley's public statements made before and after the decision. Of the seventeen statements made prior to October 25, fifteen (88.2%) were coded "offensive," with one coded "both" and another coded "neither." Eight of the thirteen (61.5%) speeches made after the decision were coded "offensive", while two were coded "both" and three coded "neither." Though a small sample from which to determine significantly valid inferences, my concern here, again, is for the relative

TABLE 3.2. TEXT CLASSIFICATIONS--Presidential

	N	Offensive	Defensive	Both	Neither
Pres/Public					
Before 10/25/98 =	17	15 (88.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (05.9%)	1 (05.9%)
After 10/25/98 =	13	08 (61.5%)	0 (0%)	2 (15.4%)	3 (23.1%)
Total =	30	23 (76.7%)	0 (0%)	3 (10.0%)	4 (13.3%)
Pres/Private					
Before =	15	11 (73.3%)	1 (6.67%)	1 (6.67%)	2 (13.3%)
After =	03	02 (66.7%)	0 (0.00%)	1 (33.3%)	0 (00.0%)
Total =	18	13 (72.2%)	1 (5.55%)	2 (11.1%)	2 (11.1%)

TABLE 3.3. ADVISER CLASSIFICATIONS

N (total number of "advisers")	=	29 (100.0%)
Pro-Annexation (all or part)	=	23 (79.3%)
Annex All	=	13 (44.8%)
Annex Some	=	06 (20.7%)
Annex (Amount Unknown)	=	04 (13.8%)
Against Annexation (any)	=	03 (10.3%)
Unknown/Not Applicable	=	03 (10.3%)

appearance of offensive to defensive themes, words and phrases. As far as I could find in the records of his speeches, McKinley never once referred to defensive, security issues regarding the Philippines without likewise referring to offensive advantages. As is evidenced above, even these cases were few.

Lest public statements be taken too seriously, as they may be mere legitimizing tools used to curry support of the target audience,¹⁵⁵ it is important to cross-check the conclusions above with a look at McKinley's private thoughts and statements, as recorded by friends, advisers, or for his own sake. Of the eighteen which I found relevant (again, defined as making direct or indirect references to the issue of annexing the Philippines), thirteen (72.2%) are coded "offensive", one (5.55%) is coded "defensive," two are coded "both," and the remaining two as "neither." There were only three cases occurring after the decision, two of which were coded "offensive" and the other--the famous speech to the Methodist clergy delegation--I consider including "both."

It appears from a reading of both McKinley's public and private statements that his mind may have been on the opportunities which annexation brought, and to the "childlike" nature of the Filipinos which indicates an imperialist model where annexation is justified in the "helplessness" of the natives. This language pervades McKinley's but also

¹⁵⁵I found very interesting, as a student of American foreign policy, the tenor of the public speeches in this case. If the latter 20th century were the standard, I would have expected the public speeches to be filled with strategic rationalizations about security, as so often modern presidents feel compelled to do so in order to carry out foreign policy objectives. Yet McKinley was very blatant and boastful (especially by today's standards) in touting the desire to expand, seize lands and grow as a nation. Often, of course, such "destinies" were accompanied by references to duty or Providence, certainly legitimating phrases which can bring the leader and masses into "cognitive balance" whereby they can feel good about the conquests they undergo.

most of his advisors' remarks. Based on the comments which I found each of them make to each other and to the president, I found only three persons clearly opposed to any annexation at all (Commissioner Gray, Andrew Carnegie and Republican Senator George Hoar). Another three were sufficiently vague (or not applicable) in their advising to be left "unknown,"¹⁵⁶ leaving 23 (82.1%) in favor of retention of at least part of the Philippines. If policy choice is merely the "acceptance of an articulation of a point of view," the annexationist discourse tended to dominate the chorus of opinions, as did images and beliefs of the Filipinos as incompetent and incapable of self-rule.

A telling example of the dominance of expansionist information sources over others available to the president is the following. Dewey sent Paymaster W.B. Wilcox and Cadet L.R. Sargent on a survey of Luzon for two months to ascertain the sentiments of the natives and their capabilities. Their findings were that Filipino rebel leader Emilio Aguinaldo enjoyed wide support, that Filipinos "overwhelmingly desired independence" and believed that "whatever America may have done for them, it has not gained the right to annex them." Dewey called the report the "most complete and reliable available." The report was delayed weeks before being sent to Washington, where it found itself relegated to Navy Department archives, never to be seen by the president.¹⁵⁷ At the same time, one General Greene--"champion of U.S. expansionism"--enjoyed several conversations with McKinley, and dispatched a memo calling Aguinaldo a "potential

¹⁵⁶Again, another aim at conservatism, as the list of "unknowns" includes Dewey himself. The reason is that he flip-flopped a few times in his opinions, which were hard to pin down. However, the case could be made that, ultimately, he was for some degree of annexation.

¹⁵⁷Karnow, pp. 128-129.

despot." A contemporary article by British "Philippines expert" John Foreman, widely circulated in leadership circles, claimed Aguinaldo's movement to be limited and predicted that internal "squabbles" would reduce an independent Philippines to anarchy and make it vulnerable to other powers, such as Germany or Japan.¹⁵⁸

While McKinley is generally credited as having been rather independent in his final decisions,¹⁵⁹ this provides clues into what policy options are even considered in such a situation. When reports of Filipino capability and desire for self-rule are buried and volumes of reports on Filipinos as "little else" than children who should be "coerced...when gentle means of bringing them to reason has failed" inundate the Oval Office¹⁶⁰, some options--the independence option--never reach the table.

Among the twenty-three "annexationists," thirteen were clearly for taking the entire group of islands, while six tended to favor a plan for keeping only part of the archipelago. Another four were sufficiently vague so as to elude categorization. This last point leads to an interesting aspect of the Philippines case: the existence of a debate, a divide, not over whether or not to take the Philippines but *how much to take*.

¹⁵⁸ibid.

¹⁵⁹Dobson, p. 37, and Morgan's William McKinley and His America, p. 411, discuss this viewpoint. I agree with this assessment; that is, that McKinley was not a pushover solely coddling to public opinion and business interests, as other interpretations have suggested (See Ernest May's Imperial Democracy and Barnet's Rockets' Red Glare, among others).

¹⁶⁰The opinion of Dewey in a dispatch from Manila; see Roosevelt, p. 138.

CONCLUSION

How are the rival propositions judged based on the evidence above? In the end, while opportunism and advantage provided the foothold of American influence and territorial possession in the Philippines, there is a definite presence of insecurity issues which made the decision between "some" and "all" of the Philippines favor the latter.

The United States took advantage of a perceived opportunity to expand its power and influence abroad. Consistent with Herrmann's imperialist model, McKinley's decision was couched in terms of opportunity as well as the paternalistic language of the "child stereotype." He, and his advisors, used multiple references to the Filipino inability to rule themselves, and to the humanitarian nature of the American mission to "uplift and Christianize them." McKinley achieved the "cognitive balance" by which he had "convinced himself that he was right," allowing him to "seize the opportunity with full vigor and without any moral inhibitions."¹⁶¹

It is only after McKinley perceived the opportunity domestically and internationally to expand American influence into the Orient by dethroning Spanish rule and replacing it with an American plan for an enhanced naval and merchant presence, that defensive measures emerged. The Great Power, in this case, expanded into new areas consistent with the offensive model; only then does it see new threats based on the newly expanded lines of defense. This suggests that the power expands based on opportunities to improve its position vis-à-vis other states, then, once expanded, seeks to

¹⁶¹May, p. 244; Herrmann, p. 36.

preserve its new gains, a proposition found elsewhere in the literature, especially Gilpin.

As for domestic politics as an alternative model, little evidence presented itself to suggest that realism be displaced by a theory of coalition logrolling. Domestic groups surely wanted to annex the Philippines, and much of the governing circles were "expansionist-minded." However, I was unable to produce evidence suggesting McKinley would have acted any different in the absence of these domestic groups. I also could not find evidence of logrolling to the degree postulated by the theory, where disparate interests coalesce in a campaign to influence policy, though this may be just a problem of available data and sources. Domestic politics did make McKinley's decision easier: annexation was supported overwhelmingly by his party, his constituents' business interests as well as the mass public. Yet, as the next chapter reveals, it is not always necessary for a president to have such support in order to further the policy s/he desires.

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CHAPTER FOUR.
Cuba: Expansion By Any Other Name

There are laws of political as well as physical gravitation... and if an apple, severed by a tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her from its bosom.

--J.Q. Adams, 1823¹⁶²

The exploration of the United States policy toward Cuba in the late 1890s is perhaps the more interesting case in the study as it serves as the anomaly of the time period in which the United States engaged in unparalleled land-grabbing. Lands and peoples near and far from America's shores were incorporated into a system of United States territorial governance. Why, then, was Cuba--considered an "apple" ripe for the taking by John Quincy Adams some seventy years before--spared the annexationist tide of the 1890s? The results reflect the conclusions of the previous chapter, with a notable exception. That is, McKinley and many advisers perceived an opportunity to capitalize on the power vacuum caused by declinist Spain's hold on Cuba by annexing the island. Thus, the absence of threats and domestic coalitions as catalysts for annexation are not strong

¹⁶²Pérez, *Ties of Singular Intimacy* (1990), p. 38.

explanations for the U.S. passing on the annexation option. Rather (this being the notable exception to Chapter Three), McKinley's perceptions of the lack of domestic opportunity to annex Cuba--a politically unpopular move--which brought into question the utility of such a policy choice, especially when McKinley found he could accomplish his goals by other means.

As with the previous chapter, a brief history precedes the analysis below to establish the setting for United States decision-making. The same framework and methods are applied here as was used in Chapter Three in an attempt to provide continuity and structure to the comparative study.

SETTING THE STAGE

The impetus for American war against Spain in 1898 was the Cuban revolutionary uprising of 1895. This was the second such rebellion against the ruling Spanish in thirty years. The first had its impact on creating the second and on bringing American interest in the island much closer than had been the case. The 1868 rebellion, led by a provisional government of property-owning Cubans, differed from its later counterpart in that the former was a fight for independence only as a step to American annexation. Seeking admission to the Union, with all the protections and benefits envisioned by such a move, the insurgents petitioned then Secretary of State William Seward to consider it; explicitly proclaiming annexation as the

purpose of the rebellion.¹⁶³ Later petitioning efforts included an appeal to President Grant for the recognition of belligerency as a prelude to admission and eventual statehood in the United States of America.¹⁶⁴

American opinion at the time was not at all for a Cuban state in the union. Such appeals made by the provisional government fell on deaf and/or reluctant ears. However, not wanting "little brown brothers" admitted into the union, for whatever reasons, did not preclude American interest in territorial gain and the establishment of supremacy in the hemisphere. At several points during the insurgency, the Grant administration explored purchasing the island from Spain, ultimately seeking the sovereignty which the rebels offered without the racial mixing of the union and tariff-free Cuban sugar. Grant's overtures proved fruitless as Spain intended to hold on to her Caribbean prize. In that case, U.S. policy was to deny Cuban independence and permit continued Spanish sovereignty in the island.¹⁶⁵ The uprising was put down at last.

The effects of this rebellion were significant to the fate of Cuba, failed as it was. Years of conflict created a postwar economic crisis on the island which stirred the wealthy and poor alike. So the first effect was that the landowning class of wealthy indigenous "whites" and (mostly) *peninsulares* of Spanish origin sought American aid and investment to rescue their own dying interests. The price was exchanging property ownership for U.S. corporate stock ownership: a transfer of property which was accompanied by a "transfer of nationality."¹⁶⁶ There was a notable

¹⁶³Pérez, 1990, pp. 50-51.

¹⁶⁴*ibid.*

¹⁶⁵Pérez, 1990, pp. 53-54.

¹⁶⁶Pérez, 1990, pp. 57-58.

increase, in fact, of petitions for American citizenship and naturalization in the post-war years. As Pérez suggests, this brought with it "the support of the North American government in the defense of local privileges and property...(they were now) in a position to request reparation and receive indemnification for property losses resulting from political disorders."¹⁶⁷ The roots for increased American involvement in, and concern with, Cuban affairs are strengthened here,¹⁶⁸ with the floodgates opening for an influx of American capital, investment and ownership.

More than \$33,000,000 in investments from the United States were secured in Cuba after 1878, forging the ties which bound the two neighbors more every year.¹⁶⁹ U.S. merchants, bankers and shippers set up commercial houses in Cuba's main port cities; trade companies followed with trade houses and representatives established in Havana and elsewhere. Revitalizing the Cuban economy with much needed credit and capital, the local economy became saturated with U.S. operations and ownership of sugar and tobacco plantations, coffee farms, iron and copper mines--all of which were export-based and American controlled.¹⁷⁰ Since these exports were coincidentally popular in the United States, the end of the civil conflict also allowed for the resumption of heavy trade between the two. "In good years"--excluding civil wars and depressions--trade amounted to as much as

¹⁶⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ I say strengthened because American interests in, and penetration of, the Cuban society and economy date back to before the Civil War. In fact, America's bloodiest conflict spawned a postwar wave of ex-confederate officers, politicians and their families and personal slaves moving to Cuba and establishing residence as planters, merchants and other professions linked to commerce, shipping, trade and production. Americans numbered 2,500 in 1862; many marrying into prominent families and acquiring prominent status in Cuban trade and manufactures. See Pérez, pp. 19-21.

¹⁶⁹ La Feber, p. 334.

¹⁷⁰ Pratt, *America's Colonial Experiment*, p. 41; Pérez, p. 18.

\$100,000,000 annually; American consumers relishing Cuban sugar while Cuban markets absorbed items such as flour and industrial goods.¹⁷¹

The first effect of this earlier insurrection, then, was the postwar impetus it gave for increased American involvement in the Cuban economy and the conversion of many indigenous landowners from Cuban to American citizenship, forfeiting land for seats on corporate boards and accepting Spanish sovereignty while looking to the United States for protection of their interests and promotion of their prosperity. The second effect was on that of the lower-class "proletariat." The insurrection had given them hopes of a better future as well, one out from under the yoke of Spanish oppression, which was perhaps more severe on them, owing to the generally lower status and darker skin of the median Cuban. It was apparent that the landowning, Creole-descended Cubans and *peninsulares* were fighting for interests dissimilar from those who essentially served under them. While the former sought independence as a stepping-stone to American rule and incorporation, the latter sought true "Cuba Libre"--free from foreign domination, Spanish or American.

It was not until the end of the early insurrection that this second societal force gained voice and strength. The emerging ideological leader of this movement was José Martí. A political activist who fled to New York in 1880, Martí recruited from the population of "émigré proletariat" to organize a party whose goal was "independence, full and complete sovereignty from both Spain and the United States."¹⁷² In 1892 Martí

¹⁷¹Pratt, p. 41; La Feber, p. 334.

¹⁷²As suggested here, the numbers seeking naturalization into the United States were not merely the propertied privileged class. Even those remaining in Cuba made the efforts, from all classes. In 1881, of the 2,492 U.S. citizens registered with the American consulate in Havana, 1,502 were born in Cuba. See

founded the Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC) in Tampa. "Cuba Libre" now had a leader and an organized structure. It also had a growing constituency, hailing from the economically, politically and socially destitute and disadvantaged in Cuba and the states. The new movement created a new hope for them, as the intentions of the PRC became clear: to promote "common revolutionary action" to liberate Cuba and organize all Cubans for war.¹⁷³ The new movement was on a collision course with the interests of those it considered "obstacles" to independence, Spain, the planters and *peninsulares* of Cuba, and--as it turned out--William McKinley's United States.

So when time came for the second uprising in Cuba, in 1895, lines were already drawn--explicitly for the internal parties and Spain, more subtly yet predictably for the United States. This revolt, more so than the previous one, was sparked by the lower class, and its leader was insurgent General Máximo Gómez (Martí having died in the intervening months since the formation of the PRC). The goals of the rebellion mimicked the intentions of the PRC and the Cuba Libre movement. To that end, Gómez proclaimed in July 1895 a moratorium on all economic activity. Further, any estate found violating this ban would be destroyed and its owner tried for treason. Pledging to redistribute all properties belonging to those who supported Spanish rule (all property owners at that point, including Americans), Gómez set out first to weaken the landowners by depriving them of their crops and, thus, their revenues. "All sugar plantations will be destroyed, the standing cane set fire and the factory buildings and railroads

Pérez, pp. 59 and 77-78.

¹⁷³Pérez, 1990, pp. 77, 79.

destroyed," he vowed.¹⁷⁴ Given the prevalence of naturalized Americans in positions of economic power in Cuba at the time, not to mention the levels of American trade and investment which existed at the time of rebellion, it is not hard to see that the United States would take interest in the internal affairs of the island of Cuba in the last decade of the nineteenth century.

Spain's ineffectiveness in pacifying the rebellion added to the urgency of American intervention. For three years on the Caribbean island, American trade and investments (estimated at about \$50,000,000 by Cleveland himself at the time of conflict¹⁷⁵) suffered at the hands of both sides in the conflict, ruling Spain and ruled Cuba. The Cuban sugar crop dropped from 1,050,000 tons in 1894 to only 200,000 tons in 1896; tobacco from 450,000 to 50,000 bales. Exports fell from \$60,000,000 in 1895 to \$15,000,000 in 1896.¹⁷⁶ Spain showed no sign of progress in the campaign to end the insurgency and restore peace to Cuba, something the United States under Cleveland and McKinley had been patiently allowing for. By July 16, 1897, the State Department had concluded that Spain was incapable of achieving pacification of the island, and issued a call to halt the revolution because

the chronic condition of trouble and violent derangement...keeps up a continuous irritation within our borders, injuriously affects the normal functions of business, and tends to delay the condition of prosperity to which this country is entitled.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴Much above can be found in Pérez, pp. 82-83.

¹⁷⁵Gardner, et al., p. 243.

¹⁷⁶Pratt, p. 41.

¹⁷⁷La Feber, pp. 335-336.

The damage to trade and "prosperity" was seen as especially cruel as the United States coped concurrently with the aftermath of economic Depression and the perception of a domestic supply glut in need of foreign markets (see Chapter Three).

But the Cuban insurrection transcended commercial considerations into the realm of American public opinion. "Yellow press" war coverage accentuated Spanish atrocities and harsh treatment of the Cubans before and especially during the rebellion (coverage of Cuban cruelties toward the Spanish received no such attention). The reports of such Spanish measures as concentration camps, coupled with the underdog image of Cuba in the face of a European imperial power, broadly invoked the sympathies of the public of the United States to the Cuban cause (this, despite the fact that the rebels targeted American properties among others in their campaign for a free Cuba). The publicity of the de Lôme letter and the sinking of the *U.S.S. Maine* in early 1898 cinched public hostility toward the Spanish and brought the clamor for action to fever pitch.¹⁷⁸

When war did come, a dilemma presented itself to McKinley as to what war to fight. The public, and Congress with it, was largely arguing for, and expecting, a war for Cuban liberation. Yet McKinley, cognizant of the damage to interests incurred on behalf of both Spain and the insurgent Cubans, was driven by the desire to quell the hostilities and restore the

¹⁷⁸The former, penned by the Spanish Minister in Washington at the time, insults McKinley as "weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd", considered by the *New York Journal* the following day (February 9, 1898) as the "WORST INSULT TO THE U.S. IN ITS HISTORY." As for the *Maine* explosion, the ship sank in Cuban waters, killing all aboard. While speculation abounded as to who was responsible, and the later finding of an investigating commission attributed probable cause to a sea mine, Spanish in origin but considered accidental, the public largely pointed the finger at Spain from the start. Newspapers immediately attributed the cause to "Spanish treachery" based on rumors and speculation, giving the public fury its fuel. See Morgan, p. 356 and Wilkerson, p. 107.

island to conditions amicable to American prosperity and well-being. He did *not* desire or seek an independent Cuba.

What emerged as policy is what I call the "two-sided war": the public war, to punish Spain and give Cubans a better life, and McKinley's war, to restore order and trade in such a way as to prevent similar disruptions from happening again. This latter perspective was incompatible with an independent Cuba, McKinley decided. It required the expulsion of Spain from the island and the assertion of new order, order under the auspices of the United States. When war came, declared by Congress on April 25, 1898, retroactively to the 21st of April, America's victories were swift and one-sided. As mentioned in chapter three, armistice came within a few months, the agreement to which involved the cession of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba. The Cuban "apple" was "severed by a tempest" from Spain, and was potentially vulnerable to United States annexation. Yet it did not come. The reasons for this "non-action" on the part of the United States--deciding *not* to annex Cuba--is the subject of this inquiry.

There is the "easy" answer as to why McKinley did not do with Cuba what he did within the same treaty of peace with the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Guam, and what he did within the same months with Hawaii. This answer is the existence of the Teller Amendment, the congressional measure written into the war resolution stating that the "United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over (Cuba)...except for the pacification thereof..."¹⁷⁹ In "forbidding" the U.S. from annexing Cuba from the start,

¹⁷⁹Chadwick, p. 585. The entire text of the resolution is printed on pp. 584-585.

one could argue that the option simply vanished from McKinley's menu of choice. But does this simple answer truly answer the question, and the questions posed in this study?

For instance, does it reveal whether McKinley sought to annex Cuba or not? Would he have annexed it if it were not for the Teller amendment?: this is a significant question. If so, would it be because of a perceived threat to American commercial and/or security interests that he would be induced to take such a measure? Would it be the perceived opportunity to expand American power and influence into a new realm, a vacuum due to the exiting of Spain?

Moreover, was it a reluctant decision not to annex--attributable to a hands-are-tied situation due to the assertion by Congress of state structural obstacles to presidential action? Or was it a decision willingly arrived at due to McKinley's co-option into a coalition of domestic parochial interests logrolling their efforts to prevent annexation (for whatever reason)? Different answers to these sometimes subtly different questions have implications theoretically and practically which have been discussed and will be again in the concluding chapter.

So it is not enough to look to the Teller amendment. Besides, evidence shows that the issue of annexation not only long preceded the declaration of war but also surpassed it, even as late as the peace talks in Paris in October, 1898. McKinley's final decision was against annexation, that is known. But the simple fact that he made the decision, months after the Teller amendment was passed, shows that the matter was not settled in the separation of powers in April. And so we ask, *why?*

PROPOSITIONS ONE and TWO

Domestic Coalitions and Ideology:

1. *McKinley Did Not Annex Cuba Because of the Logrolling of Domestic Parochial Interests In Opposition To Annexation Convinced Him Not to on the Basis of Political or Ideological Persuasion.*

OR

2. *McKinley Did Not Annex Cuba Because of the Absence of an Imperialist Coalition of Domestic Parochial Interests To Convince Him To Do So on the Basis of Political or Ideological Persuasion.*

Snyder never claimed the existence of anti-imperialist coalitions or the existence of imperialist coalitions at the origins of non-expansionism (territorial). In analyzing the non-annexation of Cuba, I attempt to retain the logic of the domestic coalitions perspective, inferring that if such imperialist coalitions are responsible for expansionism, the absence of the latter signifies either the absence or the failure of the former, or the existence of another domestic force, the anti-imperialist coalition. Snyder's only glimpse into this contingency is his reference to the phenomenon he calls "offensive détente." He suggests that in some circumstances bargaining between imperialist and anti-imperialist domestic coalitions produces the "awkward" result of simultaneous aggression and passivity on the part of the state's policy.¹⁸⁰ This ultimately auxiliary proposition, created to explain anomalies outside the reach of the original theory, can be explored within these pages in a comparative context. Relevant to this

¹⁸⁰See Snyder, pp. 46-47. Refer also to footnote 13 in Chapter one above, p. 4, as well as to Zakaria's "Realism and Domestic Politics," p. 182.

chapter, is there evidence of anti-imperialist and imperialist coalitions bargaining a "deal" whereby, in exchange for perhaps the Philippines (or Guam, Puerto Rico, or Hawaii), Cuba is "allowed" to remain free of American annexation?

Another plausible proposition consistent with the domestic politics perspective would simply state that there existed no coalition to force the issue of annexation upon the people and McKinley. This does imply that, as with the Philippines case, McKinley--and realism--could not justify or embrace Cuban annexation on their own; rather, both needed an impetus to expand.

Before I turn to McKinley's perceptions, what of the domestic political field in the 1890s? In fact, as intimated earlier, the Cuba issue became quite salient in the United States, grabbing the attention of "masses" and leaders alike. Reasons for this--introduced above--include (1) the formation of domestic groups founded to promote a pro-Cuban policy in the United States; (2) the proliferation of "yellow journalism" throughout the country, newspapers advancing a decidedly pro-Cuban image of reality within their often sensationalized pages; (3) the existence of American lives, property and capital investments in harm's way in Cuba, all of which fed a growing feeling of restlessness in the United States as it struggled out of depression. Did the groups emerging with a stake in the fate of Cuba act singularly, or in collaboration for or against annexation? Who were these groups?

Proposition two suggests that the absence of annexationist domestic coalitions would explain why McKinley did not "take" Cuba. It implies

that McKinley would have no interest or logic to support annexation in the absence of such a coalition logrolling process.

Much evidence to the contrary exists and will be explicated in the following sections. As for the existence of an imperialist coalition on the Cuban issue, it does not appear that there was a concerted effort on the part of interested parties to pressure an acquisition of the island.

McKinley *was* intensely and extensively lobbied by various business and expansionist voices to put an end to the strife which occupied Cuba. Economic entrepreneurs "acting on narrow interest-conscious motives" wanted their property protected, wanted an end to their "tremendous losses," and wanted restored "a most valuable commercial field."¹⁸¹ A group of importers, exporters, bankers, manufacturers, and steamship and vessel owners with ties to Cuban trade and investment, petitioned McKinley in February, 1898, demanding a termination of the revolution which, they claimed, created a loss of \$100 million annually in business with the island, in addition to the destruction and damage to property on the island.¹⁸² None of this ever amounts to an insistence on annexation, however, merely an end to the destruction and disruption. Annexation would not be required to quell the fighting between Spain and Cuba; "neutral intervention"--the course chosen by the administration--sufficed in achieving that goal. But the establishment of American control and governance over the island could be a tempting objective when a rising Great Power sees a power vacuum resulting from war over an island populated by largely non-white,

¹⁸¹Williams, 1962, pp. 33-36.

¹⁸²La Feber, pp. 387-388.

"backward" natives.¹⁸³

So there is no blatant annexationist coalition of interests in the United States in the latter 1890s to push McKinley into seizing Cuba for posterity. Does this validate proposition two? As stated above, the absence of such a phenomenon is only sufficient if the president were not predisposed to annex the island for other reasons. As it turns out, such a predisposition existed; this will be elaborated later. For now, what of proposition one?

On behalf of Cubans fighting for independence, thus against domination by any power--Spain or the United States--two significant groups emerged at the time of the uprising. One, organized and operated by Cubans in the United States, was the Cuban Junta. Headquartered in New York, the Junta represented the views of the Cuban Provisional Government established in the spring of 1895. This "government", having no seaports, no real authority, no ships, no Congress, and no great regard on the island, established in secret the Cuban Republic around which to direct their cause for independence.¹⁸⁴ The foreign minister of this shadow republic--Tomás Estrada Palma--was selected to head the Junta office at 42 Broadway with the chief goals of disseminating favorable Cuban information/propaganda and obtain the recognition of Cuban belligerency in the United States.¹⁸⁵ The second group, an American organization called the Cuban League, was founded to conduct pro-Cuban activities within the United States, sympathetic to the cause of independence.

Together, these two groups proved effective in getting their messages

¹⁸³For the ringing of familiar bells, see Chapter three.

¹⁸⁴Wisn, pp. 58-59.

¹⁸⁵This recognition was sought in the face of official American neutrality over the years and extending into the war between Spain and the U.S.A. See Hernández, p. 30.

out. As a scholar of war propaganda prior to and during the Spanish-American conflict contends, both the Junta and Cuban League worked "directly through and in cooperation with the press" and were "instrumental in arousing sympathy for the rebels."¹⁸⁶ Another study concludes that, from March of 1895 to April of 1898, fewer than twenty days went by without reference to the Cuban situation in the day's news--with most coverage's "heaviest guns booming for 'Cuba Libre'."¹⁸⁷ In such a time when the direct experience of "newsworthy" events--be it through personal observance or the surrogate eyes of television--was practically non-existent, much of the average American's "news" came from the newspaper and the hearsay it spawned. Considering the content of such journals to be the chief source of information which guided public opinion at the time,¹⁸⁸ it is important to ascertain whether such a medium was used by parochial domestic interests trying to "capture the state" and proliferate myths which advance their respective causes in the public and policy spheres.

Barnet cites the rise of the mass-circulation presses and photography as contributors to a journalistic shift from a focus on information and "political persuasion" to a mass-market oriented focus on "adventure and fantasy" in the 1890s.¹⁸⁹ This seems also to be the argument of those studying the impact of the "yellow press" on public opinion toward the Cuban situation, suggesting that the convergence of pro-Cuban interest

¹⁸⁶Wilkerson, p. 56.

¹⁸⁷Wisan, p. 460.

¹⁸⁸More generally, the argument is made that decisions made by people are based on the information available to them and that such information is provided primarily by the news media. See Rachlin, p. 2; also Herbert J. Altschull, Agents of Power: The Role of the News Media in Human Affairs, Longman: White Plains, New York, 1984--the main source of Rachlin's particular discussion.

¹⁸⁹See pp. 129-130.

groups and increasingly sensationalist journalistic code was a persuasive collusion in the proliferation of each of their interests. Gardner, et al., speak of Americans "taking their cue from the headlines and political cartoons of newspapers that catered to the barely literate" and developing a "romantic, vicarious identification with the Cuban rebels."¹⁹⁰ As this happened, sentiment for intervention in the Spanish-Cuban unrest increased--intervention on behalf of the Cubans and Cuban independence.

Sentiment translated into action for many Americans. At this time, people congregated in meetings nationwide to discuss the aid of the rebels, through raising money and petitioning representatives for intervention in the island. In 1896, The American Volunteer Legion formed in twenty states to prepare men for battle in the Cuban cause. They were trained and were able to depart for Cuba on 24 hours' notice as "individuals" so as to evade the neutrality laws. These activities, Wilkerson suggests, were "evidently the direct or indirect result of newspaper propaganda."¹⁹¹

Lest we forget the main sources of the newspapers' coverage of the Cuban crisis, what were groups like the Junta and Cuban League doing to advance their cause of an independent Cuba? Aside from providing a "barrage" of favorable press releases to be picked up by all newspapers, sensationalist or not, the Junta supplemented this with direct action toward the people, including enlistment drives, not only into the organization but into the Cuban army! In violation of the neutrality laws which the United States applied to the Spanish and Cuban conflict, increasing reports around the country cited recruitments for service in the Cuban rebellion against

¹⁹⁰pp. 243-244.

¹⁹¹pp. 54, 60.

Spain. 106 men in Butte, Montana; a company in Arkansas City, two in Denver, several in Ohio and Illinois; and 800 men within 24 hours in New York City enlisted sometime in 1896. Enlisted by the Cuban Junta, it reached a point where the group could not receive any more volunteers with the resources available to them; yet nation-wide enlistments continued, without the Junta, regardless.¹⁹²

Congress, as the collective embodiment of the will of the people (in theory), not surprisingly took up the Cuban cause in their debates and activities. Receiving multiple petitions for action from the Junta, the Cuban League and, more recently, the American Friends of Cuba (founded in New York in 1896 to aid the Cubans), Congress responded with several votes between 1896 and 1898 on the recognition of belligerency status for Cuba. The votes varied in outcome as did the text of each resolution. A Senate resolution favoring the recognition of Cuban belligerency (a step which allowed for official aid and an end to neutrality) passed early in McKinley's tenure, May 20, 1897, by a vote of 41-14. Only House inaction prevented an early challenge to McKinley's policy of cautious diplomacy.¹⁹³

In the wake of the de Lôme letter and the sinking of the *Maine*, Congress introduced new waves of resolutions varying from recognition of belligerency to recognition of the Cuban provisional government as the head of an independent Cuba. Nothing binding ever passed in these years (for reasons explored below), yet it shows the extent to which congressional

¹⁹²Such as the activities of the American Volunteer Legion. Dobson, p. 59, speaks of the "barrage" of press releases; Wilkerson, pp. 59-60, lists these and other recruitment numbers and activities in the United States in 1896-1897.

¹⁹³For a discussion of the American Friends of Cuba, see Wilkerson, p. 58; a laundry-list of resolutions are documented in Chadwick, p. 491.

opinion was on board with the pro-Cuba movement. The largely Republican Congress had more or less been "co-opted" (to use Snyder's language) by the domestic logrolling occurring between the various interests. Sympathy for Cuba came out of personal convictions, party affiliations (Democrats used the issue to challenge McKinley's position), deference to the will of their constituents, or to satisfy domestic actors with a stake in Cuban independence. In April, 1898, for example, the Junta freely distributed Cuban bonds valued at \$50 million to "persons of influence and position" in Congress, *redeemable only at the time of the island's independence*.¹⁹⁴ And Henry M. Teller himself, the Colorado Senator who authored the self-denying amendment to the war resolution, had a rapidly developing beet sugar industry in his home state which compelled him to switch from his 1894 pledge "in favor of the annexation of Cuba" to denying the country such an action in 1898 due to the threat it would pose to domestic sugar interests.¹⁹⁵ In such a climate of public opinion and interest-group politics, most in Congress pushed hard for the goals of Cuban independence in the debate over the language of the war resolution of April, 1898.

McKinley Against the Tide

If all these forces were converging in a stand which was decidedly for Cuban independence, why did it not occur? The final text of the war resolution said nothing of the independence of Cuba; Cuban independence did not come in April, nor at the end of the Spanish-American War. I have

¹⁹⁴Pérez, *Cuba Between Empires* (1983), pp. 186-187.

¹⁹⁵*ibid.* The threat would come in the form of reduced tariffs on the import of Cuban sugar.

seen a fairly strong case for the existence of a domestic coalition pushing *for* independence (and *against* annexation). These interests lobbied hard and received a wide audience. Yet there was an element of the state which they had to convince in order to see their interests met in official U.S. policy: the commander-in-chief, the President of the United States, William McKinley. For proposition one (above) to carry much weight, the coalition must not only exist but it must also "capture" the decision-making leadership and convince them to pursue policies congruent to the designs of the coalition. McKinley and a core set of allies in the Executive branch and Congress, resisted such a course of events, committed instead to their own visions of sound policy toward Cuba.

Returning to the May 20, 1897 resolution (known as the Morgan resolution), House Speaker Reed, a Republican ally of the president, held up the House version which would have embarrassed the fledgling administration. Responding to the clamorings in Congress, McKinley explained to his envoy to Madrid, Stewart Woodford, that "our citizens" were concerned with the plight of the Cubans, and that the "chronic condition" of events on the island "causes disturbance in the social and political condition of our own people. It keeps up continuous irritation within our own borders, injuriously affects the normal functions of business, and tends to delay the condition of prosperity to which this country is entitled."¹⁹⁶ McKinley not only was acknowledging the pulse of American opinion in this and other like statements, he was expressing what would be his grounds justifying future intervention: the need for domestic

¹⁹⁶Chadwick, p. 509. Much of this statement, you will find, is taken verbatim from the State Department memo of July, 1897 (see p. 88 above).

stability and for prosperity through trade.

But McKinley never once supported, in word or policy, the will of the domestic coalition which amassed in favor of (1) the recognition of belligerency status for Cuba, as a means to eventual (2) Cuban independence. Again, amidst the flurry of popular Congressional resolutions in February, 1898, and after, McKinley and his allies stood firm. His supporters in Congress (a core of Republicans) thwarted the legislative initiatives on each occasion, but indicated to the president at one point that "each victory proved more difficult than the one before."¹⁹⁷

The final "battle" between the pro-Cuba coalition and the reluctant administration came over the terms of war in April, 1898. Again, it was only a McKinley ally in the House who saved the president the political damage¹⁹⁸ of the Turpie Amendment, which called for Cuban independence. With twenty-four Republicans joining the Democratic minority, the measure passed in the Senate, 51-37, over the will of the president (who privately threatened to veto any measure which called for Cuban independence). House Speaker Reed squelched the House equivalent of the amendment. In private political meetings, McKinley used "all the vast presidential power at his disposal" to persuade enough Republican senators of the "political safety of abstention" so that a second round of voting on the measure eliminated the stipulations of the Turpie amendment

¹⁹⁷Pérez, 1983, p. 173.

¹⁹⁸The political damage and embarrassment would be due to the fact that these measures were all challenges to and rejections of McKinley's public arguments for neutral intervention and against belligerency status and Cuban independence, stated as recently as his April 11 "war" address. Insult to injury was the fact that the Congress which verged on humiliating McKinley was dominated by Republicans.

by a vote of 41-35.¹⁹⁹

In conference, April 19, a compromise joint resolution was forged without a demand for immediate recognition of independence. However, it did include a provision prohibiting the United States ever from acquiring permanent sovereignty over the territory and people of Cuba: the Teller amendment. The resolution was passed by the Senate, 42-35, and by the House, 311-6. It demanded that Spain relinquish its authority and government in Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces; directed the President to "use the entire land and naval forces of the United States...to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect;" and disclaimed

any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people.²⁰⁰

This final wording, and the entire effort to deny America the opportunity to seize Cuba as it fell from the tree of Spanish rule, is partly credited to the Junta efforts "behind the scenes" to secure an eventual American withdrawal, a bind making McKinley "distinctly unhappy."²⁰¹ Nevertheless, this was a compromise which McKinley could live with; he signed the resolution April 20th, Spain declared war four days later, and the

¹⁹⁹Morgan, 1963, P. 378; Gardner, et al., pp. 249-250.

²⁰⁰Chadwick, pp. 584-585.

²⁰¹Dobson, p. 72. See also Hernández, p. 32.

United States responded in kind the next day.

The Teller amendment, while implying eventual independence, allowed the United States to determine *when* that could happen. McKinley's reluctance to be confined by the self-denying clause is evidence that he was not part of the coalition, that he in fact fought in the face of political popularity. The context of McKinley's decision-making was being shaped before he even took office by the pro-Cuban interests and the public and Congressional tide it helped create which was decidedly sympathetic to Cuban freedom and independence. The Teller compromise allowed McKinley to pursue his goals--the assertion of American control and influence in Cuban--*in spite of* the domestic mood and the coalition of forces against him. Also, consideration of annexation continued within McKinley's circle beyond April, suggesting that it was an option still on the table, as far as the administration was concerned.

I cannot conclude, then, that McKinley was convinced not to annex Cuba solely by the existence of logrolling of interests with his own. He was neither politically pressured nor ideologically sold on the virtue of Cuban independence or non-annexation. He gave audience to the Cuban League secretary, giving "careful consideration" to the arguments proffered in defense of an independent Cuba.²⁰² The Junta as well had written McKinley on occasion, pushing for the recognition of belligerency and of the provisional government as the legitimate government of Cuba. They meanwhile assured the president the full cooperation of the Cuban army in the forthcoming campaigns against Spain. The Junta learned, as did the

²⁰²McKinley, *Presidential Papers*, series 12, volume 21, reel 97, December 2, 1897.

others, that McKinley was not interested in pursuing their goals. The Junta's own "fact-finding" mission in May, 1898, in fact, uncovered that the organization's "failure...to win the battle of Cuba's recognition was due to the refusal of the McKinley administration to tolerate any interference with its Cuban policy."²⁰³ As Gardner concludes, McKinley, when he found war necessary, "went into it on his own terms--not those of the rebel sympathizers--and for reasons wholly antithetical to theirs."²⁰⁴

Just what was his Cuban policy, specifically? This is where I now turn. It is one thing to establish that McKinley was against Cuban independence; it is another to know whether he was for Cuban annexation. Did he perceive an opportunity to expand American influence into the Caribbean island through annexation? Did he perceive a threat from abroad to the interests of the United States which made annexation necessary? Or did he not have a desire at all to grab the turf as he had Hawaii, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Philippines? Since domestic coalition logrolling and ideology did not determine his decision not to annex Cuba, what did?

To get at these questions, I will note now, will depend more on an analysis of historical events and documents--both primary and secondary--than an analysis of the texts of those in the leadership circle. Interestingly, very few public or private statements were discovered, coming from either McKinley or his advisory circle (see Content Analysis of Perceptions below). The dearth of statements, especially public, speaks to the different nature of the Cuban question. Showing that a non-finding is still a finding, the absence of public pronouncements concerning the annexation of Cuba

²⁰³Hernández, p. 33.

²⁰⁴Gardner, et al., p. 247.

reveals the domestic sentiment at the time which differed greatly from the Philippines issue. For McKinley to proclaim to audiences that Cuba was "rightly ours" and "justly accorded us" as "fruits of war" (as he had said of the Philippines) was politically untenable. The question is whether the same was true for the policy of annexation, should he have cared to implement it.

PROPOSITIONS THREE and FOUR

Defensive Realism:

3. McKinley Decided Not To Annex Cuba Because He Perceived No Threat to United States Interests in Cuba.

OR

4. McKinley Decided Not To Annex Cuba Because, Though He Perceived A Threat to United States Interests in Cuba, His Ability To Annex Cuba was Blocked by the Constraints of the State Power Structure.

Defensive realism would acknowledge state expansion as a response to a threat to perceived state interests. In such a world, annexation occurs at a time of vulnerability, in grudging reaction to a state's survival instincts. What needs to be ascertained is the degree to which the United States-- McKinley and his advisers--felt such a threat relative to another sensation, that of confidence, assertiveness and the ambition to promote interests abroad by accruing new influence in new corners of the world. The absence of perceived threats would be sufficient for the defensive realist to explain why Cuba did not "need" to be taken. However, if there were

perceived threats which McKinley would deem worthy of action to annex Cuba, and he did not, there could be an explanation still consistent with a state-centered defensive realist. State structure can play an intervening role in the policy process; thus it is plausible that McKinley's desires could be overruled by obstacles of the separation of powers and domestic politics (very plausible, indeed, given the tale just told regarding Congress and public opinion and the Cuban issue). That is, there may not be the domestic opportunity to summon and apply necessary resources to apply to policy responding to an international threat.

The case for a defensive reason for annexation is weak indeed. In terms of international rivals, the Monroe Doctrine had largely dismissed any cause for concern with any future threats in the Hemisphere; Spain, the only predominant "Old World" power left in Latin America, was on its way out by means of the thrashing given by the United States and the subsequent protocol of peace. The British, with whom the United States had recently come to terms with over Venezuela, had commercial and business relations with Cuba which they sought to protect. But U.S. Ambassador to Britain (in 1897) John Hay was told by London that they "accepted as inevitable" that Cuba would come under the control of the United States eventually and that the British government would do "only what it might deem necessary to protect the commercial and financial interests of British subjects in Cuba." In sum, if U.S. annexation of Cuba came as the "natural and logical result of success" in the affairs unfolding with Spain, Britain would not protest nor challenge the act.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁵From a letter to McKinley from Woolford, August 10, 1897, after consulting Ambassador Hay on the British position. Presidential Papers of William McKinley, Series 1, Reel 2, February 23, 1897--December

The only other country which received much due attention was, again, Germany. There had been growing concern about German penetration into Latin America in the past decade. This stemmed in part from a December, 1897, incident where Germany gave Haiti eight hours to pay an indemnity for the arrest of a German citizen there, with the threats of "gunboat diplomacy" backing them up.²⁰⁶ U.S. Navy admiral Arment S. Crowninshield predicted "that before many years have passed, Germany will succeed in acquiring one or more territorial possessions in the Western Hemisphere."²⁰⁷ Given American designs in the hemisphere--which included the construction of a trans-oceanic canal in either Nicaragua or Panama--there was a need for "security" of this growing sphere of influence. The U.S. concerns with German designs were somewhat validated by the Germans themselves (whether Americans had access to these documents at the time or not is unknown, however). Some German naval propagandists asserted the need for agricultural colonies in South America and a navy in order to get them. Others saw the expanding German overseas commerce as requiring additional naval protection, especially in light of increased American competition.²⁰⁸

All of the above attests merely to broad concerns over possible future threats somewhere in the hemisphere. Nothing specific about German designs on Cuba, as was clearly found in the case of the Philippines, could be ascertained from the material examined for this case. As for the attempt to use "security" and "defense" as the legitimation of expansionism,

23, 1897.

²⁰⁶See La Feber, p. 323; Gould, p. 32.

²⁰⁷Gould, p. 32.

²⁰⁸May, 1961, p. 187.

Williams rightly cautions against the tendency to apply the terms to justify offensive opportunistic policies. Such applications of the defense logic, he writes, "must be evaluated on the basis of the intention, as well as the capability, of the ostensible enemies. Otherwise the definition of security becomes control of the world."²⁰⁹ Thus, Admiral Mahan's defense of linking together a single system of Cuba, Panama and Hawaii as "vital to American security"--a statement of defensive necessity--disguises the expansionist tendencies of a growing power which, upon expanding its influence (territorially and otherwise), reassesses the perimeters of defense to include new and far-flung entities never deemed "vital" prior to expansion.²¹⁰

Of course, here the concern is not so much whether perceptions of threat within the decision-making circle should be seen as such or not; rather it is whether the perceptions existed, existed abundantly, and whether they drove policy. The "need" to possess Cuba, or control it, for defensive reasons did not appear in the statements of the president or his advisers other than Mahan. Even the natives and insurgents, as with the Philippines, were referred to little as threats to interests; they were seen instead, predictably, as unfit to rule themselves.

There is not a compelling case for the existence of threatening reasons to justify U.S. annexation of Cuba. Thus, proposition four carries

²⁰⁹Williams, 1980, p. 117.

²¹⁰Mahan's strategic assessments are recorded in The Interest of America In Sea Power. Present and Future. Mahan was well-respected and widely read in policy circles in the 1890s, advocating expansionist policies modeled after the British ascendancy in world politics. See Leopold, pp. 120-121. Another example is from the words of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a Republican, expansionist adviser to the president. In 1895, he wrote of the need for "but one flag and one country" from the "Rio Grande to the Arctic Ocean...in the interests of our commerce and of our fullest development we should build the Nicaraguan canal, and for the protection of that canal...we should control the Hawaiian islands and maintain our influence in Samoa" (Dobson, p. 7).

little weight. As for proposition three, if the argument is that McKinley perceived no threat in Cuba which compelled him to annex it, it would be simple to conclude that this is why he did not annex it. On the contrary, if it were unpopular domestically and illogical internationally (for, under defensive realism, if there are no threatening situations warranting a response, it is counterproductive to act in such a manner), it would be the act of an incompetent! There is some logical support for this proposition. Empirically, however, the abundance of evidence suggests that annexation was desirable--at least for a time--and for reasons not embedded in incompetence (alone, anyway) but in perceptions of opportunity to expand American power and influence abroad.

PROPOSITIONS FIVE and SIX

Offensive Realism:

5. McKinley Did Not Annex Cuba Because He Perceived No Opportunity To Advance United States Interests There.

OR

6. McKinley Did Not Annex Cuba Because, Though He Perceived An Opportunity To Advance United States Interests There, His Ability To Annex Cuba is Blocked by the Constraints of the State Power Structure.

The offensive, state-centered realist believes that a state aware of its own capabilities, and cognizant of the opportunity internationally to apply them abroad so to enhance its interests will do so--provided the opportunity exists as well domestically. It is akin to Gilpin's assumption that:

a state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.²¹¹

The reference to costs and benefits is applicable to the decision-maker's perception of which actions are either impossible or not "worth it" in terms of the potential for international force-response and/or *domestic* political blow back or preventive obstacles.

Early Annexationists

There is an historical tradition in American 19th century strategic thought of coveting the "apple" of Cuba. The value to the United States, the inevitability of annexation, were themes stressed by the likes of J.Q. Adams, Jefferson, Polk and others. Jefferson thought the addition of Cuba to be "exactly what is wanted to round our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest." Adams, quoted earlier, also remarked that the annexation of Cuba "will be indispensable to the integrity and continuance of the Union..."²¹² Polk offered \$100 million to Spain for Cuba in 1848, Pierce upped the ante to \$130 million in 1854; each offer, obviously, was refused. That same year, U.S. ministers to the major European countries issued the "Ostend Manifesto" urging the sale of the island to the United States and claiming "by every law, human and divine" to be justified in

²¹¹p. 10 and chapter three--"Growth and Expansion"--on pp. 106-155.

²¹²*Presidential Papers of William McKinley*, Series 12, reel 98, volumes 27-34.

forcibly taking Cuba from the Spanish, "if we possess the power."²¹³

Still later, President Buchanan argued that the possession of Cuba offered unlimited trade possibilities as well as some measure of "security of our commerce"--in the hemisphere, presumably.²¹⁴ U.S. Grant's efforts have already been recorded above. Essentially, the consistency of the century of U.S. Cuban policy revolved around the desire to expand America's sphere of influence within the hemisphere by possessing the island, the Spanish refusal to part with it peacefully, and the American distaste and fear of forceful acquisition. Such a move risked war with at least Spain, if not England, and was probably not within American menu of choice culturally; forceful annexation being a European game which offended a "moralistic" America. So, despite the popularity among U.S. statesmen as well as exiled Cuban property owners, businessmen and intellectuals (who lobbied congressional representatives and disseminated annexationist propaganda as early as the mid-century), the perceived lack of opportunity--internationally and domestically--to annex Cuba kept American policy at bay and in cautious pursuit of justifiable alternatives to unprovoked force.²¹⁵

Window of Opportunity?

Then there was the uprising of 1895. For the rest of the Cleveland administration, and early into the McKinley tenure, U.S. policy--despite official neutrality--persisted much as it had throughout the century: a

²¹³Pérez, 1990, pp. 43-45.

²¹⁴ibid., p. 39.

²¹⁵ibid., pp. 38-45.

commitment to Spanish rule of the island as the best guarantor of American prosperity on the island short of American control itself.²¹⁶ As the years wore on without signs that Spain could, in fact, guarantee the promotion of American interests in Cuba (through the imposition of peace and order-- i.e., a definitive and lasting defeat of the uprising), the tones of diplomacy between Spain and the U.S. grew increasingly tense. Veiled and not-so-subtle threats surfaced in private and public statements of top American officials. By the time of McKinley's inaugural, March of 1897, he publicly intimated that, reluctantly, American intervention may become necessary in the future. In classic language of the "imperialist model," McKinley warned that, should the U.S. intervene by force, it must be because of "*obligation to ourselves...and humanity*" and with the "approval of the *civilized world*" (emphasis mine).²¹⁷ In justifying "neutral" intervention in his so-called "war speech" of April 11, 1898, he cited the "cause of humanity" which drove him to put an "end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation and horrible miseries...which the *parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop*..."²¹⁸

Confidence in the ability of Spain to restore the order--to stop that which delayed the "condition of prosperity" McKinley sought for his country--evaporated in the intervening year. The consensus came to be as the State Department argued in the summer of 1897: that Spain was incapable of pacifying the island and, thus, predictably, it would lose sovereign control of Cuba. The conversion to this viewpoint was

²¹⁶*ibid.*, p. 43.

²¹⁷Leopold, p. 170.

²¹⁸Emphasis mine. See Miller, p. 97.

significantly attributed to the fact-finding mission of Illinois Republican William J. Calhoun. Sent to the island by McKinley for almost a month, his June 22 report held out "little hope that Spain could re-establish its hold."²¹⁹ With this loss of confidence came the desire to fill the political void which the ousting of Spain would cause in Cuba. There was, from the perspective of the administration, an opportunity to implement a policy in which the United States could fill that vacuum in Cuba and restore American prosperity while enhancing American power abroad.

Secret diplomacy regarding the transfer of the sovereignty of Cuba began in the summer of 1897 between the United States and Spain. The prominent proposal, given the climate of American public and congressional opinion, was a purchasing scheme, which could possibly help legitimate the grab through the appearance of legalistic and peaceful means.²²⁰ The summer overtures to Spain met with little support; unlike the Americans, Spain still held the belief that sovereignty could be retained over the Caribbean island. For the time being, the purchasing option was tabled, the Spanish grip on Cuba continued to loosen, and domestic sentiment in the United States increasingly favored pro-Cuban intervention in the conflict for the purpose of Cuban independence.

McKinley would have none of that. What Pérez calls the "specter of Cuban independence" haunted McKinley and his policy circle, as well as Spain and the Cuban property owners and *peninsulares*. An independent Cuba was undesirable to the latter for reasons raised in earlier sections: as

²¹⁹Gould, pp. 27-28.

²²⁰Of course, it is partly because of the domestic climate of the time that such diplomacy was carried out in secret. McKinley informed only a handful of Senate loyalists (such as Lodge) of his endeavors.

the spokesman for a commission of Cuban peninsulares and businessmen decreed, "if left to the insurgents, our property is lost." This was part of the rationale for seeking American assistance and annexation; the rest is summed up here: "The Mother country (Spain) cannot protect us...Therefore, we want the United States to save us."²²¹ And the McKinley administration wanted to "save" them, and their American counterparts with investments in Cuba. The specter of Cuban independence for the United States was the specter of continued inhibition of American growth and prosperity.

The Cubans were seen by McKinley's circle much as the Filipinos had been. Calhoun's fact-finding mission concluded, beyond what was mentioned above, that independence for Cuba would not be feasible, based on the perception of the insurgents, their conduct and the natives generally.²²² Woodford, the U.S. Minister to Spain and a reluctant expansionist, agreed that the population of Cuba was not "to-day fit for self-government" and that the "only certainty of peace" in the "madhouse" of Cuba would be "under our flag." He continued, "I am, thus, reluctantly, slowly, but entirely a convert to the early American ownership and occupation of the island."²²³ Lodge, much less reluctant and in no need of conversion, urged McKinley in 1897 that he simply declare war on Spain and annex Cuba. A year before that, McKinley friend and future peace commission appointee Whitelaw Reid, suggested to the president-elect that "some day we will have Cuba" and that for McKinley to take the island

²²¹Pérez, 1990, pp. 89, 91.

²²²Gould, p. 28.

²²³Pérez, 1983, p. 171.

would put his administration "beside Jefferson's in popular mind, and ahead in history."²²⁴

The continuing deterioration of events in Cuba plus the increasing domestic pressure to go to war (and to go on terms inimicable to McKinley's policy goals of controlling the fate of Cuba) combined to force McKinley to take the initiative again in early 1898. In January, McKinley appointed Reid to undertake private negotiations with the Spanish in an effort to settle the Cuban issue diplomatically and peacefully. His instructions, which McKinley revealed a month later to ranking members of the Senate, were to open a dialogue with Madrid and attempt to purchase the island.²²⁵ At the same time he pursued plausible alternative governmental arrangements for Cuba, alternatives which remained consistent with the desired goals of political stability on the island and, subsequently, restored trade, business and prosperity.²²⁶ The "autonomy" alternative was an early favorite. Under this plan, Spain would retain ultimate sovereignty over Cuba, while the Cubans would cease the destruction of properties, lay down their arms and inherit some local governing powers. As independence was not an option for Spain (or the United States, as it happened), so was the autonomy option insufficient for the increasingly confident rebels, who ultimately would accept "nothing short of" complete independence.²²⁷

As the autonomy option "drifting toward failure," the purchasing

²²⁴*ibid.*, pp. 141-142. Given American sympathies with Cuba and the rebels, I would think Reid may have misread what the public assessment of McKinley would be if he were to take it.

²²⁵Pérez, 1983, pp. 170-171, and 1990, p. 91.

²²⁶Gould, pp. 37-38.

²²⁷*Presidential Papers of William McKinley*, series 12, reel 97, vol. 21. Quoted from Junta Representative, Señor Gonzales Quesada in the March 22, 1898, edition of the Eagle Correspondent.

scheme gained more credence in the administration--"peaking," in Dobson's assessment, in March of 1898.²²⁸ Colonel John J. McCook, the head of a banking syndicate and another Friend of Bill, indicated to the president on March 1 that the rebels might be willing to contribute to the sum of a purchase if it would get the Spanish "off their necks," a belief not supported by the words or deeds of the rebels before or after the claim.²²⁹ The rebels unwilling in the end to go along, the option still remained open. A purchasing scheme over the control of the dependency that was Cuba need only have the consent of the two powers interested in its control, Spain and the United States. As it happened, the former turned out to be as reluctant as the Cubans.

Woodford, working across the Atlantic on behalf of the purchasing plan, informed McKinley in mid-March that the transfer of the island had to be consummated as soon as possible, lest forces in Madrid and America beat the negotiators out of peace through a declaration of war. "Some way must be found," he reported on March 17, "by which Spain can part with Cuba without loss of self-respect and with certainty of American control..."²³⁰ The United States' offer to pay a fixed sum for the island was doomed by the continued pride, honor, and unrealistic hopes of the Spanish that Cuba could be retained, as would the honor of the Queen. The offer of \$300 million was rejected.²³¹

Spain ultimately had to wrestle with the domestic issue of pride which faced the declining European power, still in denial. The decline of a

²²⁸See p. 62.

²²⁹ibid.

²³⁰Pérez, 1983, pp. 170-171; also 1990, p. 91.

²³¹Pérez, 1990, p. 92; Dobson, p. 62.

power is not often easily or willingly accepted by that power, as Kennedy and Gilpin (among others) argue. Unlike the Soviet Union of a century later, Spain needed to be shown that its days as a global imperial power were over through a final conflict over control of its possessions. The United States, the rising power seeking to challenge the system and expand its influence in the world, won the battle for supremacy in the short-lived Spanish-American War.

McKinley had his own domestic imperatives which made war inevitable upon the collapse of the diplomatic efforts. He sought to avoid war, risked political capital by avoiding war long after Congress and the public demanded it, but he would choose war at last when the alternative was the political humiliation of a Congressional declaration of war over his head; a declaration of war for Cuban independence rather than for McKinley's policy aim of expanded American control over the territory of Cuba, by whatever means domestically possible.

Interestingly, the Teller amendment did not put an end to the annexationist option or the debate of such an option. Though the domestic environment constrained McKinley, through the Congressional assertion of power in the form of the Teller amendment, McKinley and his peace commissioners seemingly considered the act non-binding or negotiable. While American forces marched on Santiago and pummeled the Spanish fleets in the Caribbean and Pacific, McKinley pushed *his* vision of American policy into the language of the peace protocol and, later, into the treaty of Paris. He had already won a victory in the defeat of the Turpie amendment and any move to recognize Cuban independence over his

wishes. He defied the popular tide and stated explicitly his grounds on which to conduct the war, arguing that recognition of Cuban belligerency and independence would

accomplish nothing toward the one end for which we labor--the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery that afflicts the island...to commit this country now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation toward the organization so recognized.²³²

And he seemed prepared to take whatever action he deemed necessary to achieve his goals, which extended beyond his public platitudes (above) to include the imposition of American control over the fate and direction of Cuban affairs to insure that such affairs remained consonant with American interests. When a nation imposes such rule abroad for such reasons, it is an offensive measure--taking advantage of a power vacuum left by a declining competitor power in a territory occupied by a weaker, subordinate native population.

He was even prepared to write annexation into the treaty of Paris, a move which would rebuke the earlier Congressional decision and provoke an even tougher fight for ratification. In his September 16 meeting with the departing peace commissioners, McKinley admitted that the "acquisition of territory was naturally attractive" with regards to Cuba, though he

²³²From his April 11th "war address;" see Gould, p. 48.

continued to predict that it would become less so "later on, when the difficulties, expense and loss of life which it entailed, became more manifest."²³³ This phrase is quite telling in light of the final decision. Unlike with the Philippines, McKinley decided that, with Cuba, America did not require the "difficulties, expense and loss of life" accompanying annexation. Facing domestic challenges and constraints resulting from the build-up of popular sympathies to the Cuban cause within his borders, McKinley found such threats sufficient to dissuade him of the benefits of annexation.

To the domestic pressures of (1) a pro-Cuba public and Congress, (2) the political weight of the Teller amendment and (3) the need for treaty ratification back in the states, add the Spanish attempt to push Cuba onto the U.S. along with the debt which had been accumulated by the Spanish authorities on the island. Now defeated, Spain went to Paris eager to write into binding treaty American responsibility for the sovereignty of Cuba and the debt of over \$400 million, most of which had been incurred in the attempt to crush the recent rebellion.²³⁴ This was an early point of contention, preceding the debate on the Philippines. The commission reported their opinions to McKinley and the State Department, a majority of which opposed the "deal" offered by Spain. McKinley replied on October 7 that "we must carry out the spirit and letter of the resolution of Congress" and never moved from that position again.²³⁵

Times being what they were, McKinley chose the safer route of

²³³Morgan, 1965, p. 30. Recounted by Whitelaw Reid in his diary.

²³⁴Bailey, p. 471.

²³⁵Morgan, 1965, p. 69; Gould, p. 106. The "resolution" to which he refers is the one including the Teller amendment.

temporary military occupation. Outlined in his State of the Union, December 1898, he sought the pacification of Cuba and the creation of a stable, pro-American regime: "Until there is complete tranquillity in the island and a stable government inaugurated, military government will continue."²³⁶ In Herrmann's imperial-model language, McKinley spoke privately of the unquestioned supremacy of American rule of the "conquered territory," as is the "right of the conqueror." Displaying language akin to the child stereotype, McKinley offered to the natives who, "either by active aid or *by honest submission*, cooperate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this *beneficent purpose...the reward of its support and protection*."²³⁷

The final victory for McKinley and the expansionists would come in 1901. Knowing the U.S. presence could not continue indefinitely, efforts began to promote pro-American parties throughout the U.S.-built electoral system in Cuba. Attempts to place these hand-picked candidates in positions of power failed by-and-large. Even with the support of the occupation government and appealing to a relatively exclusive electorate, the pro-American candidates fared poorly at the polls, and were expected to do worse after the American withdrawal from the island. Pérez, perhaps, summarizes it best:

Unable to prolong the military occupation interminably, but unwilling to relinquish the government of the island to the

²³⁶Gould, p. 97.

²³⁷*Presidential Papers of William McKinley*, Series 3, Reel 61, 4/20/98--8/21/98. Memo of general orders from McKinley to the Secretary of War, July 13, 1898.

"ultra-radical" Cubans immediately, Washington settled on... (conceding) to Cubans self-government but (denying) them sovereignty.²³⁸

This settlement was the handiwork of McKinley and a nucleus of expansionist senators in the Republican party. Senator Orville H. Platt of Connecticut, sitting on the committee on Cuban relations, drafted a memo in late January, 1901, which McKinley approved February 8, saying "that is exactly what I want."²³⁹ The memo's language was incorporated into the army appropriations bill three days later, which passed in the House on March 1.

The famous Platt amendment, forced upon the Cuban constitutional convention convening in June--thus becoming law in the soon-"free" Cuba--allowed for the United States to "intervene" at any time to prevent domestic disruption of, or outside intrusion into Cuban affairs. It gave America final say over any of Cuba's dealings with foreign powers, while relegating most day to day domestic governance to the Cubans. McKinley consummated into Cuban law that which he had fought for over the earlier temperaments of the public and Congress. Perhaps even better than annexation--in his mind--the Platt amendment insured a *de facto* dominance of Cuba by the United States that would last beyond McKinley's assassination.²⁴⁰

²³⁸1983, p. 322.

²³⁹Gould, pp. 128-129.

²⁴⁰ibid.

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTIONS

As with the case of the Philippines in Chapter Three, the conclusion that offensive, imperialist motives drove expansionist desires is aided here with an analysis of the content of public and private statements of the U.S. decision-making élite. As mentioned previously, the case of Cuba offers far fewer statements with which to work, thus the support of the following analysis are necessarily more tentative. Nevertheless, similar patterns emerge which are consistent with the offensive explanation.

Table 4.1 reveals the frequency with which key words or phrases associated with offensive and defensive images appear in the observed texts (See Chapters Two and Three for details surrounding the analysis procedures). Although all categories are relatively sparse in comparison to the Philippines case, the themes of offensive and imperialist images appear thirteen times compared to two references to defense and the defender image. These observations, taken from a mere nine statements²⁴¹ and, thus, speculative insights at best, are consistent with the earlier conclusion that the decision-making circle, if it sought annexation, did so for reasons of offense and opportunity, not insecurity and threat. The one adviser's text which is labelled "defensive," in fact, is Mahan's questionable invocation of "American security" to justify absorbing many territories (discussed earlier, see p. 102). No references to images of the "enemy stereotype" are found in any documents in the wealth of sources I searched.

²⁴¹There are fifteen statements in the appendix which referred in some way to Cuban annexation (three presidential public statements, four presidential private statements, and eight advisers' statements. Only the nine (one presidential public, two presidential private, and six advisory) which were in favor of annexation are included here, as those opposed made no references to perceived threats or opportunities.

TABLE 4.1. Content Analysis: Operational Indicators and Frequency of Appearance

Word/Phrase	PRES: Public	PRES: Private	ADVISERS
<u>OFFENSIVE</u>			
Commerce	0	0	1
Establish Supremacy	0	0	1
Glory	0	0	1
Right of the Conqueror	0	1	0
Take It (as an end of itself)	0	0	1
Total References	0	1	4
<u>CHILD STEREOTYPE</u>			
Beneficent Purpose	0	1	0
Enlightened Practice	0	1	0
(island is a) Madhouse	0	0	1
Protect (Natives)	0	2	0
Reward (Natives)	0	1	0
(Natives need)			
Stable Gov't	1	0	0
Support (Natives)	0	1	0
Total References	1	6	1
<u>DEFENSIVE</u>			
(Need) Tranquility			
On the Island	1	0	0
Vital to Am. Security	0	0	1
Total References	1	0	1
<u>ENEMY STEREOTYPE</u>			
Total References	0	0	0

Tables 4.2 and 4.3 reveal exactly how many texts were found and how they were classified (Pro annexation or con; if pro--was it for offensive or defensive reasons, or both or neither). Note the appearance of statements against annexation as well as for it, within McKinley's text classifications. Given the above analysis, we know that McKinley was genuinely for it, at least for some time. The statements labelled "con" (see Appendix) mostly are public platitudes reflecting American aversion to "forcible annexation," the heresay of a newspaper (which turned out to be invalid, claiming on reliable sources that McKinley in fact desired Cuban independence!) or reflecting the ultimate decision to follow the "spirit and letter" of the Teller amendment.

Of the pro-annexation texts, McKinley's three statements are coded either offensive (two of them, or 66.7%) or "both" (one of them, or 33.3%). In no case is insecurity the sole consideration for annexation *in this sample*. As for the advisers, there were those opposed to annexation and those in favor; of the latter, all but Mahan are classified offensive given the content of their reasoning.

While there is reason to take these results with a grain of salt, it is noteworthy that they are consistent with the conclusions in earlier sections of the chapter and, thus, complement the analysis well, offering cautious validation for the findings.

TABLE 4.2. TEXT CLASSIFICATIONS--Presidential

	N	Pro/Con	Offensive	Defensive	Both/None
PRES: Public	3	1/2	0	0	1/0
PRES: Private	4	2/2	2	0	0/0
TOTAL	7	3/4	2	0	1/0

TABLE 4.3. ADVISER CLASSIFICATIONS

N (total number of "advisers") = 6 (100%)

Pro-Annexation	6
Offensive	6
Defensive	5
Both	0
Neither	0
Against Annexation	2
Unknown/N.A.	0

CONCLUSION

As it turned out, McKinley did not need to annex Cuba formally to accomplish his policy goals. Annexation was a temptation to him, as it was for many of his predecessors. Yet domestic constraints made the administration think creatively. He was not required to carry out the "spirit and letter" of the Teller amendment; if he were, it would not have been a point of debate after April 20, 1898. Yet it was. So it was by choice that he opted against annexation.

That choice, however, was heavily influenced by domestic factors. The pluralist, American system places political survival in the hands of the people. Separation of powers gives the U.S. Congress a special influence on foreign policy which other countries' leaders need not fear. Not only did the Senate actively constrain the president via the Teller amendment (binding or not in practice, it was a potent public weapon that would be difficult to bypass and sell such an action to the people) it also had the more subtle constraining power inherent within the separation of powers: the power to ratify treaties negotiated by the executive branch. McKinley would have faced an irate Congress if he were to rebuke Teller. What's more, he would then have to submit the Treaty of Paris to the U.S. Senate for their approval!

State structure can play a definite role in the foreign policy choice: this is not a new idea, nor is the support here for such an idea new. It is the conceptualization of state-centeredness in foreign policy analysis which is undergoing re inspection. Realists, offensive or defensive, would miss the

explanation for not taking Cuba in the absence of the study of domestic politics and the constraining role of state structure which grants or denies the chief of state certain opportunities. It does not mean that such constraints cannot be circumvented, however. McKinley showed one way where, when the costs of annexation outweighed the benefits of such a move, expansion of influence abroad can still be achieved with the same effects, by other means.

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CHAPTER FIVE.

Conclusion: Realism, Domestic Politics and Expansionism

This study reaches several conclusions: regarding United States policy towards the Philippines and towards Cuba at the end of the 19th century; as well as about the variation between these two policies given the same time frame, same decision leaders, same national capability and same international setting.

The over-arching and general goal of this thesis, synthesizing the material from each individual case, was to answer the following question: *Why were different methods of imperial expansionism carried out in these two cases?* In analyzing the findings above in the following chapter, I reveal the scope and limits of the study and its conclusions, as well as implications for the future study and practice of foreign policy.

INTERPRETING THE FINDINGS

What I found, to answer my most general question, was that the United States decided to take the Philippines but not Cuba because, though President McKinley and his closest advisers saw an opportunity in each case to assert American power to fill a vacuum left by the exit of a declining power (Spain), the costs of pursuing that level of expansionism--territorial

annexation--were too costly domestically in the Cuban case. Annexation would have potentially rebuked the masses on which his political life depended, definitely would have raised the ire of the Congress which set the constraints of the Teller amendment, and would have jeopardized the passage of the entire treaty and all it stood for. Domestic factors were not the sole dissuading elements to the decision. Internationally, facing the possibility of legal binds to the Spanish debt in Cuba was a deterrent as well--especially considering that an alternative policy option existed through which McKinley could achieve the same ends. Moreover, the existence of an alternative vehicle by which the United States could assert de facto sovereignty over the island made overt annexation less compelling.

To which theoretical perspective do these conclusions adhere to best?

Domestic Coalition Politics

Domestic coalition logrolling seemed to be marginal if existent in these cases. There was domestic support for annexation, and this support was at times realized in an organized manner and expressing their wishes to the President of the United States. Yet, the existence of "interests" does not a conspiracy make. First, elements opposed to annexation reached McKinley's desk as well. Second, the domestic interests did not fulfill Snyder's requirements of capturing the state and convincing the political leaders of that which they would not do otherwise. Nor were the interests shown to be "logrolling" and orchestrating collaborative pressures toward that end. As it happened, McKinley and his advisers had their eyes on the Philippines prior to and during the domestic clamoring. Thus, while

domestic support for annexation made McKinley's choice easier, it does not qualify as the compelling "cause" of expansion, which should not occur in the absence of such a coalition because such behavior is deemed irrational and "aberrant" much along the lines of defensive realism (see below).²⁴²

A domestic coalition appeared in considerable force in the Cuban case. This *anti*-imperialist coalition, however, did not co-opt the vital decision-making élite, the explanatory proposition of the domestic politics model. Nor was there any evidence of "offensive détente." It was plausible that an unusual bargaining situation--perhaps in the ratification process or before--could have emerged between imperialists seeking the annexation of the Philippines and anti-imperialists seeking a free Cuba. There simply was no empirical support for this proposition. The domestic impact of the coalition fits in with a state-centered realist approach without necessitating evidence of conspiratorial internal designs. Domestic politics *can* operate that way, but it can also influence or constrain policy without meeting the requirements of the Snyderian model.

The domestic politics perspective, as articulated by Snyder, carries implications about "regime type" which deserve elaboration in the context of this study. For instance, the United States, as a federalized, pluralist democracy is argued to be relatively "benign" and less prone to expansionism. The theoretical basis for this conclusion is that an open, democratic society will prevent policies from occurring which will not appeal to the median voter. This assumes that median voters are peace-loving or, at least, less predisposed to expansion than decision-makers. Put

²⁴²Snyder is a defensive realist and argues its tenets to show that expansionism can only be explained by domestic forces. See Snyder, p. 1-2; also Chapter Two above.

another way, Waltz recounts the Liberal argument that "giving a direct voice to those who suffer most in war would drastically reduce its incidence."²⁴³

Empirically, in Myths of Empire, Snyder attempts to show that the United States containment policy involving Korea and Vietnam was the product of domestic coalitions which "hijacked" the state and promoted the goals of containment which lent the state to "overexpand." The case shows, for Snyder, the "self-corrective" nature of democracies--preventing them from "overexpanding" *too* much. Snyder's use of this case as exemplary of American expansion is problematic to me; it is not compelling to consider the wars in Korea and Vietnam cases of U.S. expansionism (much less "overexpansionism") defined as Snyder does as aggression, imperialism, conquest and "predatory behavior."²⁴⁴ Nevertheless, his conclusions regarding the "benign" populace reeling in its aggressive leaders (de-escalation) fit his assumptions of democratic states well.

From this highly questionable case Snyder extrapolates (implicitly anyway) the larger notion of peaceful democracy based on the benign nature of the median voter. I offer, then, my study as a cautionary tale as to Snyder's conclusion that democracy acontextually and ahistorically compels moderation in behavior and quasi-pacifism in its people. The caution is aimed at three assumptions already mentioned: (1) that the "people" are benign due to bearing the brunt of expansion via their lives and taxes; (2) that the leaders are passive respondents to the will of the majority; and (3) that the attributes of democracies in the realm of peace is

²⁴³Waltz, Man, The State, and War (1959), pp. 101-102.

²⁴⁴See Snyder, pp. 2-3, 6-11, 21-26, and 51.

somehow constant across issues and time.

As for the "benign public" debate, Chapter Three revealed that the public was ahead of McKinley for war with Spain, and overwhelmingly supportive of Philippine (and Puerto Rican and Hawaiian, for that matter) annexation. Thus it can be that a democratic populace clamor for war and exult in expansionism abroad, to the point of enduring a lengthy civil conflict with native insurgents to maintain the newly achieved status as a world power. In the case of Cuba, where the public was fervently for Cuban independence, it also shows how a "benign public" can be thwarted, and later co-opted, by the assertion of leadership by their elected executive. Decidedly sympathetic to an independent Cuba in early 1898, by 1899 there was a "strong undercurrent of opinion" that felt McKinley was right in resisting Cuban independence and, in fact, some were now in favor of annexation of Cuba.

This does not settle the debate on whether democracies are more benign than other forms of government,²⁴⁵ but it strongly cautions against early dismissals of democracies as capable of carrying out ambitious, expansive policies--with or without the initial support of the public. Thus, it is a caution against acontextual generalizations. Analyses should continue to explore under what circumstances different behaviors of democracies occur, as is happening in the debate on the "democratic peace" (ie., hypothesizing democracies will not fight each other). This thesis is merely a springboard for such endeavors.

²⁴⁵separation of powers can constrain the tactics of a democracy's executive action—thus more prohibitive than an authoritarian system—though only if the legislative branch wants to and can.

Defensive Realism

The defensive realist perspective, viewing the state's goal as maintenance of its security and position in the state system, allows for expansionism only as a "balance of threat"--only in response to a perceived compelling threat from the environment. Already discussed was the logical flaw of assuming that this prescription for rational moderation is inherent within decision-makers, that they "know" that expansion is against their interests in the long run. Perhaps one reason leaders fail to learn the defensive realist prescription is that it often is not true. Expansionism is no aberration; states have "gotten away with" great territorial gains without prompting "balancing coalitions" or overstressing their resources.

The case of the Philippines shows this point. U.S. decision leaders expressed great enthusiasm to "fill the vacuum" of the receding Spanish empire; it was no product of insecurity and perceived outside threats. The only reference to security came after the expansionist offensive was underway. *Given the expansion into the archipelago*, the question of how to preserve the new American gains against possible challenges from insurgents or external powers such as Germany compelled McKinley to choose taking all over some of the islands. The defensive realist could not account for annexation, as it stemmed not from insecurity. As for Cuba, the absence of a threat would again indicate, for a defensive realist, no interest in annexing the island. And, in fact, I found an absence of such perceived threats in the texts of decision leaders. Though U.S. decision-makers chose not to annex Cuba outright, seemingly in accordance with defensive realism, I also found that there was an interest in annexation, that

there remained an interest extending U.S. control and influence over the island even after annexation was a tabled option. This is evidence of a desire to expand in the absence of a threat, thus deflating the explanatory power of defensive realism. This is a case where, in the absence of a study of the decision-making processes and perceptions of the decision leaders, defensive realism would provide a correlation and a prediction of outcome (ie., in the absence of a threat, states do not expand), but not a valid explanation.

Offensive Realism

The perspective which remains consistent with the findings above is offensive realism. The offensive realist allows the state to go beyond mere security and the maintenance of its relative position in the system of states. The state that perceives the opportunity to expand its influence in world affairs will do so if deemed acceptable vis-à-vis the possible costs perceived associated with such a move. For the offensive realist, the decision leaders perceive and weigh such odds but cannot forecast them; thus, unlike defensive realist tenets, decision leaders can "go too far," can overextend and provoke balancing coalitions from such miscalculations of the systemic outcome of their foreign policy decision. Alternatively, if the perceived costs--externally or internally--are deemed to outweigh the benefits of expansion, the decision leader will choose against expansion or find another route to achieve her/his desired goals.

McKinley and his advisers saw an opportunity to acquire new

influence in the Pacific, establish coaling stations and a more authoritative say in the world dealings in the China Market as a result. Security issues played a role in deciding to retain the entire archipelago, but only after the United States, for strictly ambitious designs, opted to retain Luzon--the Philippine island holding Manila and Manila Bay. Likewise, Cuba was sought for opportunistic reasons, yet its taking was denied by domestic obstacles, pointing to the importance of domestic structure in the understanding of foreign policy, and validating the use of the State-Centric approach. Nevertheless, McKinley and the expansionists ultimately got their way by an early defeat of recognizing Cuban independence and, later, through the enactment of the Platt Amendment. This suggests that, despite domestic obstacles (such as the Teller amendment) the chief of state can accomplish his/her goals, even if *by different means*.

LIMITS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

This thesis has its parameters, like any other work. Elucidating them can both reveal the limits of this study as well as indicate future directions for other work. I have mentioned much of this already, but a consolidated summary may bring focus to important points.

First, this is a study about *choice*, not outcome. As such, much provocative material surrounding these cases fall outside the realm of the thesis. One could explore, as some have, the implementation of American colonial administration in the context of international relations theory.

Snyder's study, for example, was a study *over time*--which is obviously more conducive to questions of the "self-corrective" behavior of democracies. Fighting Filipino insurgents in a guerilla war is somewhat parallel to the future Asian conflict in which the U.S. got embroiled in Vietnam: one could investigate the differences in the permissiveness of the "median voter" in each case.

Second, in controlling for time and nation-state and focusing on policy differences, I admittedly skirt the issues and implications of American expansionism and the "colonial experiment" to which it gave birth. As mentioned in Chapter Two, this has been done in great detail and with superior skill by others. In confining my study, I do not mean to ignore, nor apologize for, U.S. policies which were undeniably imperialist. What this means varies person to person.

My study indicates that such policies were the act of a rising great power filling the "gap" left by Spain upon its defeat in war.²⁴⁶ Though McKinley sought to fill these "voids" so to enhance the American position in world politics and trade, there is the underlying notion that if the U.S. had not annexed them, somebody would have. The system compelled McKinley to do it, from his perspective. Territory is finite. At the time, a zero-sum-game competition for land possessions meant that one's gain over the share of land, resources and markets (not to mention the native, indigenous peoples deemed "barbaric" and incapable of self-government, at least of self-defense against the exploits of a great power) was another's

²⁴⁶Wolfer's horse-track analogy discusses the compulsion of opportunity for gain as follows: At a racetrack, in a crowd of individuals unable to see a horserace clearly because of the crowd in front of them, if an opening suddenly occurs in front of them, "it would be reasonable to expect and predict that a rush to fill the gap would ensue." See p. 14 in Discord and Collaboration.

loss. In this context, the U.S. decided to take the Philippines and Cuba under its wing so to preserve access to trade and investment as well as put each on the path to self-governance, Western style.

Of course, a counter-argument would ask why the U.S. did not allow both to be independent under a protectorate system? This would shield the vulnerable territories from other aggressive powers while avoiding the imposition of undemocratic rule over foreign peoples. The consensus among biographers and historians alike indicates that the U.S. would not bear the "burden" of a protectorate without the "benefits" which come from expanded bases and presence abroad, as well as from the direct access to the government, land and peoples of these bastions of capital investment and trade. With such control, future instabilities could be avoided, prestige could be enhanced, an increased influence over world events could be expected, and America could be left to prosper again.

This question of motive leads to the next limitation to the study. As discussed in Chapter Two, I have excluded Marxist perspectives explicitly from the study. One could point to the influence of the capitalist nature of the U.S. in directing the policies chosen toward the Philippines and Cuba and cry "Foul!" at my theoretical choices. I again defend my decision on two grounds: (1) Empires and territorial annexation, foreign subjugation and conquest, all precede the rise of capitalism; likewise, non-capitalist states such as the U.S.S.R. have engaged in this behavior. Thus, to me it is not fruitful to blame capitalists on the one hand (Marxist domestic politics), nor capitalism in general (Marxist systems theory) on the other. (2) Despite this, I feel such Marxist propositions as are offered by these two

perspectives would be elucidated under the existing framework of my thesis (see Chapter Two).

But capitalist interests did not capture the state, and economic considerations of trade and investment were subsumed under notions of state power--absolute, but especially relative to other states. It was not capitalism alone but capitalism as an aspect of American national interest and power that was on the mind of McKinley. Power was the underlying motive: the opportunity to enhance U.S. influence abroad, gain prestige, territory, bases and market access where before there was little. Competition with other states in an anarchic system compels a state to insure its own interests by various means. Thus trade issues are national issues, and the state is in competition with other states for the welfare of the state--capitalist or not (Most, if not all, states trade regardless of the labels assigned to them). It was not sole economics for economics' sake which had driven the decision leaders' concept of "national interest" but economics as a means for a healthier, stronger, more prosperous state. Gilpin explains late-19th century colonialism this way:

The purpose of these overseas empires was less to plunder and exploit (though both occurred) than to provide a stable legal and political framework for trade and investment...What the colonial powers most frequently desired was to have exclusive commercial rights or, alternatively, to prevent other nations from excluding their traders and investors from potential markets.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁷Gilpin, p. 140.

There was also the desire to plant new coaling stations abroad, and to extend the reach of American naval power. Just as there was more to Soviet and Roman expansionism than the "capitalist imperative"--so too can be said of the American "aberration" of 1898.

Also, since I discuss the need for contextuality above, a study of late 19th-century expansionism may or may not have relevance today. Certainly the practice of territorial conquest is suspended, if not past. I argue that, despite this, the general notion of increased confidence within a rising great power and perceptions of opportunities to assert additional influence abroad so to favor its interests better explains such activities based on insecurity and threats. The practical realization of such behavior in late 20th-century world politics may take more subtle forms than annexation of territory; it does not change the need to observe and mitigate future possible conflicts based on future rising powers' desire to alter the status quo.

A final, related caveat is the notion that realism, so encompassing of what are "national interests," may ensure its explanatory superiority while making its explanatory power less useful. The familiar phrase, "if it explains everything, it explains nothing," comes to mind. I have tried to delineate offensive from defensive realism as a way to hone in on the driving forces behind expansionism. Perhaps, in doing so, I have merely increased the odds that *some* form of realism wins. That certainly was not my intention; I cannot speak for others using the taxonomy in similar expansionism studies. I used perceptions to get at decision-makers' concept of national interest, rather than impose them as exogenous givens for a unitary, rational actor. I offered a counter-theory which is circulating

within the debate on expansionism--that of domestic political coalitions. Finally, I provided explanations for the exclusion of other possible propositions.

CONCLUSION

Realism, with all of its weaknesses and problems as an overarching paradigm for the study of international relations, holds up fairly well as a first-cut theory of foreign policy expansion. In placing this study in a petry dish of competitive propositions, I conclude offensive realism to be the most useful starting point for analysis. It answers the question which Zakaria states, "if you wanted to predict the behavior of a rising power what one factor would you begin with [sic]?"²⁴⁸ Focusing on decision-maker perceptions may be more useful in ascertaining why a "state" acts as it does. Herrmann's work in deriving indicators for perceptions--though meant for psychological and cognitive studies of foreign policy in response to the inadequacies of realism--was useful for me as a tool to strengthen my argument. The Philippines case, especially, allowed for a rich analysis of the texts of chief decision-makers: Cuba, less so.

The notion that domestic politics matters is not new, though some realists wish to deny or downplay the effects of it. Some commit the same argument of domestic politics that Snyder does with expansionism: the occurrence of such effects are unnatural, anomalous and bad. Quite the

²⁴⁸Zakaria (1993), p. 75.

contrary, domestic politics is quite natural, and integral, to the decision-making process. Recent efforts to highlight this point are abundant.²⁴⁹ Current conventional wisdom regarding domestic politics is that its effect on foreign policy is not on the overall direction of policy but typically involves the "relatively narrow matters of how policy is implemented."²⁵⁰ The significance of domestic political processes is seen in the effects they have in diminishing or amplifying the "propensity to incur commitments and take risks internationally."²⁵¹ The above study provides ample evidence in support of these and other like propositions. The study of the decision-making nexus, where the chief(s) of state simultaneously deals with domestic and international variables in constructing policy, is a trend which should be continued, in part in light of the evidence above.

This is by no means the final word on the issue of expansion, even in these two cases. There is room to probe beyond the "first-cut" analysis, if one so desired. One avenue of exploration was alluded to above (see Chapter Three): the discursive approach to collective decision-making. Whereas I treated perceptions as the independent variable to see how such perceptions affected the decision to expand, one could explore the ideas as the currency of politics to see which discourses came to dominate others, why, and at what expense. Would things have gone differently if McKinley were not surrounded by a troop of hungry expansionists? Why was the discourse of Filipino competence suppressed or absent, denying as a serious policy option the granting of independence to the Philippines?

²⁴⁹Among them are Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action" (1990) and Robert Putnam, "The Logic of Two-Level Games" (1988).

²⁵⁰Hagan, p. 133.

²⁵¹ibid., p. 134.

I defend my work as one not concerned with the means by which somebody reached a perception. There is much interesting work out there to tap personality, discourse, learning and so on. My work was concerned, instead, with which kind of perception--however arrived at--affects which kind of foreign policy expansionist decision. This may serve as a useful companion to the larger study of American expansionism penned by Fareed Zakaria. I offer in-depth case studies to complement his forty-year history of the rise of American power. Both conclude essentially that states expand out of confidence and perceived opportunities to enhance their interests abroad--conclusions hailing back to Gilpin and, to some extent, the classical realists before him. Additionally, domestic politics and a focus on decision-maker perceptions, rather than the billiard-ball state, adds to the richness of results while maintaining the relative elegance of realism.

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APPENDIX

Primary Records--Content Analysis

(NOTE: Except where noted, the sources for each item below is NOT included; reasons for this stem from time constraints associated with the exercise coupled with the diffusion of sources in which these items are found--ie., all the sources are included below. For specific notes and their sources when not given, please contact me--through 1998--at The Ohio State University Department of Political Science, Columbus, Ohio, as I do have the raw data preserved and will be glad to help any interested person).

I. PHILIPPINES

President

Public

- 01 OCT 30, 97. Cincinnati. Offensive. "Settled purpose to open trade where we can."²⁵²
- 02 OCT 11, 98. Tama, Ia. Offensive. "Glorious fulfillment of...aspirations of...Am. people."
- 03 " " " Ames, Ia. ? . "Responsibility put upon us by...war...duty."
- 04 " " " Boone, Ia. Offensive. "Triumphs of war not yet written in peace."
- 05 " " " Carroll, Ia. Offensive. "Opportunities...honor and duty."
- 06 OCT 12, 98 Omaha, Neb. Both. "Responsibilities...promote and secure the general good."
- 07 OCT 13, 98 Hastings, Ia. Offensive. "New markets...Trade follows the flag."
- 08 " " " Chariton, Ia. Offensive. "Civilization...holy...benefits all."
- 09 " " " Monmouth, Ill. Offensive. "our interests...(&) those brought within our influence."
- 10 " " " Galesburg, Ill. Offensive. "Fruits of this great war."
- 11 OCT 15, 98 Terre Haute, Ind. Offensive. "Just fruits...shall not be lost."
- 12 " " " Springfield, Ill. Offensive. "Interests of Humanity."
- 13 " " " Chicago, Ill. Offensive. "destiny"

²⁵²Items 01-30 are found in chronological order in the Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley, from March 1, 1897 to May 30, 1900. New York, 1900.

- 14 OCT 21, 98 Tipton, Ill. Offensive. "help oppressed people...within our sphere."
- 15 " " " Hamilton, Oh. Offensive. "Justice...right...humanity"
- 16 " " " Washington Court-House, Oh. Offensive. "Justly, fairly won...triumphs."
- 17 " " " Columbus, Oh. Offensive. "Accept trust of civilization."
- 18 DEC 15, 98 Atlanta, Ga. Offensive. "Reward...call of conscience."
- 19 DEC 17, 98 Savannah, Ga. Offensive. "Alien people requires our guidance...protection...helpless without government..."
- 20 FEB 16, 99 Boston, Mass. Offensive. "intrusted under Providence of God in...name of progress and civilization...concern for people whose interests and destiny...put in our hands...moral obligation... misguided Filipinos."
- 21 AUG 28, 99 Pittsburgh, Pa. Offensive. "misguided, cruel, unrepresentative...cruel leaders (with) ambitious designs."
- 22 OCT 10, 99 Chicago, Ill. Both. "Trade...go where flag goes...relations to other nations by reason of our new possessions make duty more commanding."
- 23 OCT 13, 99 Wadena, Minn. Offensive. "Flag not for oppression."
- 24 " " " Fargo, N.D. Offensive. "misguided men under orders of...ambitious leader."
- 25 OCT 14, 99 Redfield, S.D. Offensive. "Add character, prestige to the American name...planted flag because we had a right to do so!"
- 26 OCT 16, 99 Iowa Falls. ? . "God...Providence"
- 27 " " " Mt. Horeb, Wisc. ? . "In the Providence of God...we did not seek it."
- 28 OCT 18, 99 Warren, Oh. Both. "Conquest...duty...protect life and property and preserve peace."
- 29 " " " Youngstown, Oh., I. ? . "Providence of God."
- 30 " " " Youngstown, Oh., II. Offensive. "fraction of a tribe"

Private

- 01 SEPT 16, 98 Instructions to Commissioner. Both. "common good...demands of civilization...welfare in the future...new duties and responsibilities...as becomes a Great Nation on whose growth...commercial opportunity...just use...enlargement of American trade...open door...present interests...just, moral, humane purpose...rights of protection and trade."
- 02 MAY 1898 Lodge to TR paraphrasing McK. Offensive. "fully committed (to) Large policy"
- 03 JULY 1898 Lodge paraphrasing McK. Offensive. "convinced (of large policy)."
- 04 SEPT 98 McKinley. ? . "felt people demanded full retention."

- 05 OCT 22, 98 McKinley. ? . People demanded it.
- 06 JULY 26, 98 McKinley memo. Offensive. "With propriety and advantage."
- 07 OCT 26, 98 Hay to Day, paraphrasing McK. Offensive. "cession of Luzon alone cannot be justified on political, commercial or humanitarian grounds."
- 08 ??????? 98 McKinley to French Amb. Offensive. "Obtain...advantage from our...victories"
- 09 ??????? 98 McKinley, note. Offensive. "duty...to residents and strangers and the progress of affairs."
- 10 JUNE 1898 McK. draft peace terms. Offensive. "port and necessary appurtenances"
- 11 SUMMER 98 To William Laffan. Offensive. "advantage...favor...holding on to what we got...if...desirable that we...retain all, we will certainly do it."
- 12 MAY 19, 98 To Sec of War. Offensive. "all...(who) cooperate to give effect to this beneficent purpose witll receive reward of support and protection."
- 13 MAY, 98 Jotted policy note. Offensive. Keep what we get...keep what we want."
- 14 ??????? 98 Cable to Hay. Offensive. "cede Puerto Rico and a port in the Philippines...island in the Ladrones with a harbor for a coaling station."
- 15 OCT 25, 98 To Day. Defensive. "Interdependence of...islands...and...problem of what will become of the part we do not take."
- 16 ??????? 99 To Clergy. Both. "commercial rivals...bad business...unfit for self-gov't...would soon have anarchy and misrule...uplift and christianize them."
- 17 DEC ? 98 Benevolent Assimilation Remarks. Offensive. "Benevolent assimilation"
- 18 DEC 21, 98 Orders to Gen. Otis. Offensive. "benevolent assimilation...high mission...bestowal of blessings of good and stable gov't...win confidence, respect and affection of inhabitants."

Advisers Audience Date Pro/Con Annex//all, some? Off/Def/Both/?

- 01 MERRITT --To Commission--Oct 98--Pro/all--Offensive.
- 02 H.C. LODGE--To T.R. ????? --Pro/all--Offensive. "large policy"
 --??????? ?????--Pro/all--Offensive. "must not let islands go."
 --Congress speech ??? 99--Pro/all-Offensive. "value to this country is almost beyond imagination."
 --Article 1895-- N/A --Offensive. "Great nations for future expansion and present defense all the "waste places" of the

earth...civilization...advancement of the race...as a great nation...must not fall out of the line"

03 DAY --To McK Oct 25--Pro/some--Offensive.
 "inhabitants unfit for self-govt."
 --To McK Nov 11--Pro/some--Offensive.
 "obligations...advantage is a...base"
 --To McK Sept 30--N/A--"no European intervention"
 --To McK July 29--Pro/some--Offensive.
 "naval base only."

04 FRYE --To McK Oct 25--Pro/all--Both--"naval, political, and commercial mistake to divide."
 --To McK Nov 11--Pro/some?--Offensive.
 "trade..."
 --To McK Sept 16--Pro/all--Offensive.
 "morality"

05 GRAY --To McK Oct 25--Con.
 --To McK Nov 11--Con.

06 REID --To McK Oct 25--Pro/all--Both--see Frye.
 --To McK Nov 11--Pro/all--offensive.
 "indemnity"

07 DAVIS --To McK Oct 25--Pro/all--both--see Frye.
 --To McK Nov 11--Pro/all--?.
 --To McK ??????--Pro/?--Offensive.
 "trade...ought to have a territory in the Asiatic Pacific"

08 US EXPORT ASSOC. --To McK July 22--Pro/all--Offensive.
 "ignorant and semi-barbaric peoples... strategic advantage"

09 VISAY --To Hay (McK) Oct 25--Pro/all--see Frye.

10 T.R. --To HCL June--Pro/all--Offensive.

11 DEWEY --Dispatch ?????--Pro/all--offensive.
 "Filipinos=children"
 --????????? ?????--Con-"our govt is not fitted for colonies"
 --????????? ?????--Pro/all--Offensive. "the natives appear unable to govern."

- ????????? June--Con--"People...far superior...
capable of self-govt."
- 12 SPENCER
BORDEN --Letter to McK July 27--Pro/all--Both--"bullying
nations...benefits of Christian civilization"
- 13 MAHAN --To HCL July 27--Pro/some--offensive.
"advantage"
- 14 Sec.WILSON--To McK July 29--Pro/all--offensive.
"evangelizing"
- To McK ??????--Pro/all--offensive. "ripe"
15 BLISS--To McK " " --Pro/all-offensive.
"commercial opportunity"
- To McK ??????--See above.
16 GRIGGS --To McK July 29--See Bliss.
--To McK ??????--See Bliss.
- 17 GAGE --To McK July 29--Pro/some--offensive.
- 18 LONG --To McK July 29--See Gage.²⁵³
- 19 BRADFORD--To Commission October--Pro/all--Defensive. "(do
not) submit to dangerous neighbors if
feasible...Germany as troublesome a
neighbor as we could get."
--????????????? ??????--Pro/all--Defensive.
"(Manila w/o Luzon would be a) weakness
...danger of grave complication with other
European powers."
- 20 BEVERIDGE--Congress ??? 99--Pro/all-Offensive. "we are
a conquering race...benighted made bright."
- 21 Gen.GREENE--To McK ??????--Pro/all--Offensive.
- 22 J. FOREMAN--Article ??????--Pro/all--both. "Aguinaldo
movement limited...prey to Japan,Germany"
- 23 AMB. WHITE--?????? June--Pro/all--Both. "anarchy...
Germany...secure a stronhold and centre of
influence"
- 24 STATE DEPT--To Pres May 11--Pro/some--Offensive.
"way station to the Orient"
--????????????? October--N/A--Defensive.
"Germany had every intention to establish a

²⁵³Long's comparison to Gage, as well as Griggs's comparison to Bliss, are discussed without verbatim transcripts in Leech, esp. p. 285. Similarly, the Wilson quotes are of Leech discussing Wilson, rather than his own words.

- foothold"
- 25 NAVAL WAR BOARD --To Pres Aug. 98--Pro/some--Offensive.
"establish supremacy"
- 26 KIMBALL --War Plan 1895--Pro/all (temporary). ?
"bargaining chip"
- 27 GEORGE HOAR --Congress 1899--Con.
- 28 CARNEGIE--To McK/Article ??98--Con.
- 29 HAY --To Day Oct 26--Pro/all--Offensive.
"(Luzon only) not justified on political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds..."
--To McK July 14--Pro/?--?. "(no) danger of disturbing the equilibrium of the world"

II. CUBA

President

Public

- 01 DEC.6, 1897. Con. "must not speak of forcible annexation ...that by our code of morality would be criminal aggression."
- 02 MAY 13, 1898. Con. "favors recognition of the independence..."
- 03 DEC., '98. Pro/Both. "until there is complete tranquility...a stable government"

Private

- 01 ???? 1898. Pro/Off. "independence...not due...until the danger of its being again subjugated by the parent state has passed."
- 02 ???? 1898. Con. "wouldn't know what to do with them."

- 03** JULY 13, '98. Pro/Off. "come to protect them...all who... cooperate...to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of the support and protection (of the US)...enlightened practice...right of the conqueror..."
- 04** OCT 13, '98. Con. "Must carry out the spirit and letter of the resolution of Congress."

<i>Advisers</i>	<i>Audience</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Pro/Con</i>	<i>Off/Def/Both/Neither?</i>
01	Lodge	To McKinley	1897--Pro--Off--	"take it!"
02	Mahan	In Writings	1890s--Pro--Def--	"vital to American security"
03	Naval War Board	To McK	Aug. '98--Pro--Off--	"establish US
04	Reid	To McK	Dec. '96--Pro--Off--	"glory..."
05	Sherman	To McK	??--Pro--Off--	"commerce over
06	Woodford	To McK	Mar. '98--Pro--Off--	"madhouse..."
07	Junta	Letter To McK	1898--Con.	
08	Cuban League	To McK	1898--Con.	

Sources

Leech, Margaret. In The Days of McKinley. Harper and Brothers: New York. 1959.

McKinley, William. Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley, from March 1, 1897 to May 30, 1900. New York, 1900.

VITA

Vaughn P. Shannon was born in Cleveland, Ohio in 1971. He received a B.A. in political science at Ohio University in 1993 before coming to Virginia Tech for his M.A. in political science, which he received in 1995. From there he moved on to Ohio State University where he is pursuing his PhD, also in political science. His subjects of interest are international relations and the Middle East. He is interested in teaching and research, as well as politics, as possible career paths.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "V.P. Shannon". The signature is stylized and written in a cursive-like font.