DISCOURSES OF DANGER:
ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPE, GEOPOLITICS
AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1939-1961

by

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ABSTRACT

In the early 1940s Robert Strausz-Hupe was at the forefront of popularising the term 'geopolitics' and establishing a geopolitical approach to international relations in the United States. Despite this very he is a figure virtually ignored within the field of geography. Using the 'methods' of the newly emerging post structuralist inspired field of Critical Geopolitics this thesis seeks to document his life and work in the years 1939 to 1961. In particular it focuses on three principle concerns. 1) It seeks to document and illustrate the important role Strausz-Hupe had in developing geopolitics in the United States. Through discussing his activities in these years it argues that he has been a central, but forgotten figure within the field. 2) Through an analysis of his texts it explicates and critiques his particular notion of geopolitical theory and how this assists in the making of foreign policy as an approach to international relations. 3) It argues that in the period under study he used geopolitical theory to construct first Germany and then the Soviet Union as threats to US national security, and that the construction of these threats were
fundamentally important to the United States’ ability move from an isolationist to internationalist foreign policy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1980s there has been a reemerging interest in geopolitics and political geography. This has seen a re-interpretation and accommodation of its tainted history and a re-evaluation of the role geopolitical theories had in structuring Cold War foreign policy. However, through its integration of post structuralist concerns into geographic theory, the emergent field of critical geopolitics presents a radical challenge to the epistemological and ontological grounds upon which traditional geopolitical theory is based.

Ó Tuathail (1994d) has outlined three dimensions to the critical geopolitics project. Firstly, there has been a reevaluation of the histories and roles of key intellectuals within the discipline. Through integrating post structuralist ‘methodologies’ into historiography, critical geopolitics has sought to deconstruct the presentation of the 'geopolitical tradition' and analyse how geopolitics emerged as a mode of analysis in the late nineteenth century (Livingstone, 1993; Ó Tuathail, 1992b; 1994b). Secondly, critical geopolitics has engaged in the practise of statecraft through documenting and deconstructing the discursive spatialisation of international politics by certain intellectuals and foreign policy think tanks (Dalby, 1990; Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). Thirdly, the very limits of our understanding of place and politics have been placed in
question through a displacement of our understanding of the geographical in global politics (Ó Tuathail, 1994).

Through examining the work of Robert Strausz-Hupé this thesis spans the first two of these dimensions. It should be noted, however, that in the first dimension Ó Tuathail outlines, he is referring to the geopolitical tradition as it emerged in Europe, and this thesis covers a later period, namely, the emergence of geopolitics in the United States in the early 1940s.

Robert Strausz-Hupé was one of the first advocates of geopolitics in the United States. In 1942, he published a book by that name, and was instrumental in establishing geopolitics as a method of approaching international relations in government. In the Cold War he wrote extensively on the Soviet Union and US foreign policy, encouraging policy makers to pay closer attention to the influence of geography on international relations. Despite his importance to the development of geopolitics in the United States, he has been a figure virtually ignored in the field of geography. This thesis, therefore, seeks to document and deconstruct his work, its relationship to geography, and its influence on United States foreign policy in the years 1939 to 1961.

Chapter 2 begins by situating the emergence of critical geopolitics within broader debates taking place within International Relations. It outlines some theoretical issues raised by critical geopolitics and discusses the post-structuralist 'methods' as they apply to a study of foreign policy discourse. It argues that rather than reflect and explain
international politics foreign policy discourse is a constitutive aspect of the realm it purports to study. It argues that foreign policy is dependent upon the production of Others, which, represented as threats and dangers, have fundamental implications for domestic politics. Finally, it outlines three key concerns that this study of Robert Strausz-Hupé's work explores.

Chapter 3 begins with a brief biographical outline of Strausz-Hupé's life before he entered academia and then discusses his role in the emergence of geopolitics as an approach to international politics within the United States. It analyses in detail his first major book Geopolitics: the Struggle for Space and Power (1942), and illustrates how Strausz-Hupé used his discussion of Geopolitik to construct Germany as a threat to the United States and help foster support for US entry into World War II.

Chapter 4 discusses the role Strausz-Hupé played in establishing geopolitics as a method of analysis in US government and as an integral aspect of military education. It then discusses the development of his particular geopolitical philosophy in The Balance of Tomorrow (1945) and illustrates how he used this method to suggest that the Soviet Union would be the US's primary enemy in the immediate future.

Finally, Chapter 5 discusses Strausz-Hupé's work during the 1950s. It describes the institutionalisation of his approach to international relations at the University of Pennsylvania and how, through his efforts to educate members of the military at the National War College, he became implicated in the 'military memorandum' political
storm involving Senator James Fulbright in 1961. It then examines in detail his work during the 1950s and argues that he used geopolitics to represent the Soviet Union as a threat to the United States and that his discourse helped sustain the Truman doctrine, a global US foreign policy commitment, and the massive militarisation of the US economy.
CHAPTER 2
CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS

In the mid 1980s a number of theorists in International Relations began a series of methodological debates that challenged and undermined many preconceived notions upon which their discipline was based (see, for example, Ashley, 1987; Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989). Drawing inspiration from a variety of contemporary French philosophers such as Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Jean Baudrillard, post-structuralist concerns regarding the role language and discourse play in mediating our understanding of the world were integrated into international relations theory. Coming loosely under the label ‘Dissident International Relations Theory’, the fundamental challenge to existing disciplinary methodologies came with their departure from a modernist tradition premised on the notion of a stable and independent 'reality' existing outside of society and language. In contrast, post-structuralist inspired theorist argue that rather than having a self-evident quality that presents itself for objective enquiry, the way we know and experience the world is dependent on the language and discourse we employ to speak about it. Discourses are not seen simply as sets of neutral representational linguistic practices, but are viewed as politicised plays of power through which the world is made meaningful. As such, the socio-linguistical imposition of meaning on 'reality' is seen as the process which creates and recreates that 'reality'.

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The ontological shift - from viewing writing practices as simply reflecting, or mirroring, reality, to viewing writing practices as constitutive of reality - had radical implications for the study of international relations. Firstly, it precipitated a critical re-reading of foundational disciplinary texts, arguing that the normalised interpretations of these texts which formed the basis of 'the tradition of international relations theory' were little more than justifications for political realism and ideological expressions of the nation state. As Walker (1993: 6) argues:

Theories of international politics are more interesting as aspects of contemporary world politics that need to be explained than as explanations of contemporary world politics. As such, they may be read as a constitutive discourse of the modern state and as a constitutive practice whose effects can be traced in the remotest interstices of everyday life.

Secondly, beyond challenging the disciplinary tradition, post structuralist theorists shifted their concern to analysing the texts of international politics (Dalby, 1991). Texts produced by 'foreign policy experts', academics, the media, and the like, became implicated in the maintenance of a narrow perspective on international politics, reproducing such taken for granted imaginary structures such as the nation state. In short, dissident international relations theorists were engaging in international relations as political theory (Walker, 1993). It was not long before these debates spilled over the disciplinary boundary into the closely related field of political geography.
Critical Geopolitics

Informed with a post-modern sensibility and drawing on Foucaultian concerns of the power/knowledge nexus in discourse, the emerging body of literature coming under the heading critical geopolitics represents an attempt to integrate post structuralist concerns into political geography.

Traditionally, political geographers have cast themselves in the role of ‘advisors to the prince’, arguing that the production of geopolitical knowledge facilitates an informed practice of statecraft. Geopolitics, it was believed, operated outside of ideology, allowing the world to be seen and represented accurately and objectively. It made possible the unravelling of foreign policy complexities and the ordering and organising of space.

Critical geopolitics problematises the assumption that self evident realities exist outside of the language we use to discuss them. Concerned with issues of representation, critical geopolitics makes the discursive practices that write the world the object of enquiry. If geopolitics is traditionally about knowing the world, critical geopolitics studies the practices structuring how we know the world. Ó’Tuathail (1989, 1990) argues that a critical geopolitics focuses on the writing of worlds, what he terms as the construction of geographs, or more literally, earth descriptions, and how these geographs function in structuring political discourse (Dalby, 1991). The production of geographs is not confined to ‘practitioners of statecraft’, but occurs at a multiplicity of sites throughout
culture. As Ó’Tuathail (1992: 195) argues, "[F]rom the classroom to the living room, the newspaper office to the studio, the pulpit to the presidential office, geographical knowledge about a world is being produced, reproduced, and modified". A critical geopolitics recognises that to merely speak about the world is to engage in a political writing process privileging one description of reality over others. Distinctions such as East/West, North/South, Occident/Orient, are all discursive geographical creations, or writings, that have inherent political connotations in their creation and operation. By revealing how these taken for granted distinctions are constantly being reproduced, the assumptions upon which they are based can be questioned, and their political power drawn out.

More recently, Ó’Tuathail (1994: 530) argued that the term 'geograph' suggests a fixed and stable image of the world and should be replaced with 'geo-graph'. In the second term the hyphen signifies the indeterminacy of meaning inherent in any representation of the world.

Radicalizing our understanding of the 'graph' in this way encourages a resurrection of the deadened sense of geography as geo-graphing, an open-ended inscribing, delimiting, and engraving of the earth/globe/world. To study geo-graph-y, then, is to study the projections of geo-graphs striving for signification; it is to study the graphing/weaving/writing of a geo/world/system. Geo-graphing can be viewed as an indeterminable tracing without ends or limits, a writing that never reaches closure, that never totally maps.
Because of critical geopolitics' concern with studying the production of meaning in
discourse, it is instructive to introduce some theoretical issues raised in study of
discourse, and, for the purposes of this thesis, how these relate to studying foreign policy.

**Discourse, Otherness, Identity**

In his studies of medicine and penalogy, Foucault argued that discourses delineate
their field of study in relation to an Other. The explosion of discourses on madness in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries created insanity as an Other, designating a group of
people, seen previously as merely eccentric, as different and a danger to society. Around
their confinement developed a whole host of psychiatric practices analysing, breaking
down, and subdividing 'insanity'. Studying insanity and its definition as 'abnormal' was
reciprocally linked to constituting the 'norm' and defining 'what is sane'. Through
designating madness as an Other, there followed a series of interventions and correctional
programs designed to normalise and reconstitute the 'mad' individuals subjectivity. The
central feature of these programs was the exclusion of the 'mad' individual from society
in hospitals or clinics, until they have been made normal, and no pose a societal threat.

Foucault's concerns regarding the discursive constitution of the subject have been
incorporated into Critical Geopolitics and Dissident International Relations theory.
Firstly, Shapiro (1988: 100) argues that the specification of Otherness is central to foreign
policy, terming this the process of "making foreign".

This implicit level of "policy" is the process of making foreign or exotic,
and thus different from the self, someone or thing. Given the usual esteem
within which the self is constituted, the exoticising of the Other almost invariably amounts to the constitution of that Other as a less than equal subject (Shapiro, 1988: 109).

Once the Other is constituted in such terms then the practice of intervention can be legitimated. Furthermore, Shapiro illustrates that merely referring to the place ‘Guatemala’ is a political act that inserts ‘Guatemala’ within a particular geopolitical code and results in a forgetting of the historical struggles and contested nature of the region.

Secondly, David Campbell (1992) argues that the themes of Otherness, difference, and danger have a crucial function in maintaining and securing the legitimacy and identity of the nation state. Referring to America as the "imagined community par excellence" Campbell reads different junctures in American history illustrating how the construction of dangerous Others has been central to the constitution of an American identity, and the ability for the state to project itself over its territory. Campbell illustrates how the boundaries between the inside and outside are blurred whereby the 'dangers' of the outside are articulated to secure the identity on the inside. For example, he argues that for the Puritans the resecuring of a British identity was fundamental to their concept of being civilised. Thus, despite having to resort to cannibalism, the early settlers attempted to recreate the old and restore their civilised identity, against which the barbarism of the Indians, outside, could be juxtaposed. This involved practices such as the importation of prefabricated houses from England, despite the abundance of forested
areas, and the demarcation of boundaries with fences, hedges, and walls. These boundaries distinguished the inside from the outside, the civilised from the barbarian.

The strategy of the settlers was thus to contain the barbarianism within by the constant declaration of civility among themselves in contradistinction to the perceived primitivism without. To this end, the settlers affirmed a fictitious identity based upon an idealised and abstracted understanding of what it was to be English and civilised. Given the gap between this understanding and their experience, this required not only the reproduction of the past but also the suppression of resistances in the present, such that there could be a distinct boundary between the self and other (Campbell, 1992: 127).

The Puritans and their demarcation of inside/outside, civilised/barbarian, provides Campbell with one example illustrating how the specification and exclusion of Otherness on the outside, facilitates constituting identity on the inside. This discussion leads Campbell to retheorise what it means to practise foreign policy. Concerned with the processes through which the identity of the state is constituted, he reads foreign policy as a discourse specifying Otherness upon which the state as an institution is dependent.

Foreign policy shifts from a concern of relations between states which take place across ahistorical, frozen and pregiven boundaries, to a concern with the establishment of the boundaries that constitute, at one and the same time, the 'state' and 'the international system' (Campbell, 1992: 69).

This leads to a dual understanding of foreign policy. There is foreign policy (understood as ‘making foreign’) which provides a discursive economy upon which, Foreign Policy, as it conventionally understood, operates, its actions reproducing and containing challenges to the identity scripted by foreign policy.
Whilst theoretically important, Cambell's theorising on the production of United States political identity is not an issue explored in this thesis. However, the blurring of the distinction between the inside and outside and illustration of how external threats are articulated internally is a key innovation. Rather than focus on how Others are used to secure identity, part of this thesis examines how the creation of external threats allowed the domestic suppression of certain political groups and legitimised a particular form of political organisation. The distinction is, of course, somewhat problematic, but was necessary for this thesis to remain a manageable project.

**Reading Security Discourse**

The reconceptualisation of geopolitics as discourse allows an investigation of the role foreign policy texts play in spatialising international politics in specific forms, and representing threats and dangers to the international system. However, critical geopolitics does not merely argue that Others are discursively created in order to legitimise certain forms of foreign policy, but seeks to investigate how these threats are created and represented through discourse. Two fundamental concepts facilitate this investigation.

The first of these is the adoption of the concept of the script. In his investigation of the operation of scripts in US foreign policy toward South Africa during the Reagan era, Ó'Tuathail (1992: 156) defines the term script as "a set of representations, a collection of descriptions, scenarios and attributes, which are deemed relevant and
appropriate to defining a place in foreign policy." He argues that scripts are an operation of the hyperreal, whereby they precede the events they describe and insert them into already dominant scripts that marginalise alternative interpretations of the same events. The operation of scripts, therefore, reduces the complexity of events to a narrative that has already been decided upon, and often results in the meaning of events to the their actual participants being ignored. For example, discussing the apartheid script that structured US policy toward South Africa, Ó’Tuathail (1992: 157) argues:

A riot in a township or a mass strike by coal miners, for example, is immediately read as an element in the drama of apartheid and the tragedy of South Africa. A similar strike in a place such as Poland, for example, becomes a scene in a different script, the popular contemporary script concerning the 'historic failure' of communism.

Scripts operate, therefore, in a politicised fashion. They construct meaning in events that can be used to justify the enactment of certain policies and place alternatives beyond consideration. A critical geopolitics investigates the construction and operation of scripts in foreign policy discourse, and studies how they constitute the realities faced by foreign policy makers. Foreign policy decisions are then made within the frameworks scripted by discourse.

A second concept allowing the investigation of how Others are created as threats is the notion of intertextuality. This refers to the study of how meaning is created in texts through the refashioning of cultural symbols, concepts, and language. Levi-Strauss' (1962: 17) concept of the bricoleur helps explain the intertextuality of all writings.
(the *bricoleur's*) universe of instruments is closed and the rules of the game are always to make do with "whatever is at hand", that is to say with a set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to the current project, or indeed any particular project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or deconstructions.

In other words, the language and symbols foreign policy texts use to construct meaning cannot be separated from the meanings inscribed in these symbols in all other texts, in all other occasions of use, in all of culture. Particularly important is the illustration of metaphors used to represent places and actors as threats in international politics. In our society there exists a stock of signs which foreign policy writers draw upon to construct Others as threats. These include, for example, the use sexual metaphors which construct the Other as a potential rapist; medical metaphors which construct the Other as a disease; religious metaphors that construct the Other as an enemy of God; and metaphors of flooding which construct the Other as relentless expansionist. Foreign policy scripts are sustained through their ability to represent the enemy through these metaphors. Recognition of the way in which meaning is created allows the simplistic nature through which Others are created to be undermined and the political implications of these representations questioned. As Der Derian (1989: 6) argues:

An intertextual strategy attempts to understand the placement and displacement of theories, how one theory comes to stand above and silence other theories, but also how theory as a knowledge practice has been historically and often arbitrarily separated from "events", that is, the materially inspired practices comprising the international society.
This thesis, therefore, draws upon the post-structuralist inspired concerns of critical geopolitics and dissident international relations theory to study the work of Robert Strausz-Hupé. In particular, it addresses three sets of issues.

1. It will establish Strausz-Hupé as an important figure in the development of geopolitics in the United States. The recently produced *Dictionary of Geopolitics* (1994) does not include an entry for Strausz-Hupé. Through illustrating the important role Strausz-Hupé played in popularising geopolitics in public and strategic discourse in the early 1940s; in establishing a geopolitical 'method of analysis' in government and in military education institutes in the mid and late 1940s; and through his continuing and successful concern in the 1950s to educate the US public and policy makers on the importance of paying attention to geography in foreign policy, it will argue that this was an oversight. Strausz-Hupé, has, in fact, been at the centre of geopolitical developments in the United States.

2. Through an analysis of Strausz-Hupé's texts it explicates his particular notion of geopolitics and the importance he places on geography as a factor in international relations. It investigates the role he ascribes to the geopolitician in understanding the complexities of international relations, identifying foreign policy issues, and making foreign policies that deal with these issues. Further to a textual analysis of Strausz-Hupé's work, it seeks to place his thoughts and beliefs within the context of crucial events that influenced his life, and help explain the development of his particular approach to international relations. A key text in this regard, and one that is drawn on heavily, has
been his autobiography *In My Time* (1965). Using this text makes possible an investigation of his early life in Austria and assists in understanding the formational influences on his philosophical outlook. However, a precautionary note should be added. Biographies are written after the fact, after choices have been made and paths followed, and should be read with a sensitivity to how, in writing his biography, he may read meaning into events in order to justify his later work and political standpoint. In addition to his autobiography, another key source in this respect was an interview I conducted with him on 15 May 1995.

3. Finally, this thesis argues that in the 1940s and 1950s Strausz-Hupé used geopolitical theory and the 'geopolitical method' to represent firstly, Germany, and secondly, the Soviet Union, as threats to the United States. Enquiry is directed at how he utilised geopolitical theory to create meaning in the sphere of international relations, and how the international sphere became constituted and understood. Drawing on geopolitics he constructed a script that assisted in the movement of United States foreign policy from a position of isolationism, to developing a global conception of security that justified an internationalist policy of intervention, the militarisation of the US economy, and the maintenance of a particular form of domestic political organisation. The scripts he developed acted as discourses of danger constructing threatening Others and marginalised alternative ways of thinking and acting in the international political arena. An important aspect of this argument is the contextualisation of Strausz-Hupé's discourse within
broader societal and domestic political debates. This allows an investigating how his particular scripting of reality and imposition of meaning on events marginalised alternative interpretations, trajectories, and policy options.

The concern with investigating Strauszn-Hupé's effect on domestic political discourse influenced the texts I chose to analyse. Strauszn-Hupé wrote on such a broad variety of issues that for reasons of scope it was impossible to cover all his writings in the period under study. Therefore, I selected texts which I felt received the greatest readership among the public and policy makers, and, therefore, had the greatest impact on public political discourse. To this end, I covered books that received reviews in broad sheet newspapers, and the majority of his articles appearing in newspapers, magazines, and journals. However, in order to deepen some arguments it was necessary, at times, to draw on less widely read material.
CHAPTER 3

BETTER THE DEVIL YOU KNOW: LEARNING GEOPOLITICS

Robert Strausz-Hupé was born in Austria, Vienna in 1903. He spent his early years living in a politically unstable Europe transforming itself through nationalism, war, and revolution. Born into a relatively wealthy family in the upper middle class of Austrian society, from an early age Strausz-Hupé was groomed for a career in the diplomatic service or military because of the social prestige attached to these professions and access they provided to aristocratic circles. If not entirely enthused by the prospect, the financial standing of his family promised a secure future in the diplomatic service or otherwise.

I could travel abroad, explore remote places, coast along tropical seas, sample exotic philosophies and return to Austria, a polished cosmopolite with an aura of adventurous exploits...the century was still young and my family fortune, depleted as it was by paternal extravagance, was still large enough to support a life of judicious leisure and studious travel (Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 16).

However, the financial strains put on Europe's middle classes by the dislocating effects of World War One and collapse of the European monarchy fundamentally transformed Strausz-Hupé's life. Having invested their wealth in government bonds, Strausz-Hupé's family was bankrupted when the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed in the aftermath of World War I. In 1919, he moved to Munich with his mother where he witnessed the fighting between Communist revolutionaries and the Freikorps guards. Although short lived, Strausz-Hupé believed that bearing witness to the conflict in Munich informed his
philosophy with three fundamental concerns. He carried these throughout the course of his career. Firstly, he came to abhor social revolution which, he argues, “mocks the one common aspiration of mankind this century: security” (Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 20).

Secondly, the conflict alerted Strausz-Hupé to the ‘total’ nature of modern warfare; where the battle for peoples’ minds is an integral component of military strategy. Thirdly, writing on this period in his autobiography his prose is replete with references to the importance of organisation, planning, professionalism, and single-mindedness in times of war. The failed Communist revolution, he argues, was “not master minded by seasoned professionals”, the Communist leaders being “neither organization men nor practical operators”. To the contrary:

Unlike this unorganized militancy in Munich, the Communist risings in Berlin and Budapest were fomented and lead by seasoned professionals, civilian and militancy, bent single-mindedly upon the bloody liquidation of the opposition and thus upon committing their followers irrevocably to the cause of the revolution...Though letter perfect in Marxist-Leninist dialectics, they were, first and foremost, efficiency experts in the making of revolution and the allied arts of conspiracy, guerrilla warfare, assignation, liquidation, and propaganda (Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 24-25).

In October 1923, Strausz-Hupé left the turmoil and disintegration of Europe behind him and emigrated to the United States. It was, in fact, quite accidental that Strausz-Hupé chose to travel to the US. Entrusted by a member of the Bavarian aristocracy to take care of his wayward son, it had been arranged that the two would travel from Amsterdam to the East Indies, to train and serve as rubber plantation managers. The Bavarian count hoped his son would become more responsible if taught a
trade, and wanted him out of the country after he had recently married and divorced in the same week. Upon arrival in Amsterdam, Strausz-Hupé noticed a poster of the Holland-America line and decided that “since we were launched upon distant adventure, we might as well seek it North America, a country that, by common agreement, was new and fraught with unlimited opportunities” (Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 56)

Upon arrival they found work in a Chicago department store but the following spring they moved to New York and parted company. Living in America at the onset of the depression Strausz-Hupé was fortunate in that he offered prospective employers one great advantage - he spoke the financial languages of Europe. Fluent in German, French, and English, he found employment as a foreign investments liquidator for a Wall Street banking firm. In this position he frequently travelled to Europe, where witnessing the rise of fascism and totalitarianism he began to develop an interest in world affairs (Kinter and Pflatzgraff, 1973). In the late 1930s, he began writing on the European political situation for Current History, a small New York based magazine affiliated to the New York Times. By April 1941, he had been promoted to associate editor, and from this position he became a prominent figure in public political discourse concerned with Nazi foreign policy and German geopolitics. Detached from, but driven by, the spectacular events in Europe, by 1942 Strausz-Hupé had published two books, numerous articles and reviews, and had embarked on a strenuous lecture tour alerting the public intelligentsia to the threat Nazi Germany posed to the United States.
According to Karl (1987), discussions of Nazi Germany in the media were crucial in persuading the American public to support involvement in another European war. Intervention in the First World War had been a major departure from their traditional isolationism and the pervading opinion in the late 1930s was that “the nation’s best interests lay in remaining outside any future conflict” (Karl, 1987: 187). Although the US had emerged as the undisputed victor of World War One - moving from debtor to creditor nation status, its economy booming in an expanding global economy - it was unwilling to fulfil the aspirations of President Wilson and take a leading role within the newly founded League of Nations. Following the war, the traditional American mistrust of centralised federal power required a relaxation of state economic regulation at home, and the rejection of a leading role in international politics. With the onset of a depression perceived by economic nationalists to result from America's increased dependence on an unstable global economy, the 1930s saw Congress pass a number of neutrality laws designed to prevent US involvement in future wars by placing restrictions on US companies' ability to trade with belligerent powers. Economic internationalists, whose views prevailed in President Roosevelt administration, saw the depression’s causes in economic nationalism, and the erection of tariffs and trade barriers that fragmented the world economy into small inefficient production units. They believed that the prevention of another depression depended on an assertion of American global leadership encouraging low tariffs, free currency convertibility, and abolishing capital controls.
(McCormick 1989; Agnew 1993). However, in order for American precipitation of such international economic restructuring, the American economy needed to be rebuilt to act as a model for others to emulate, and they favoured a short term withdrawal from international affairs while the most devastating domestic problems caused by the depression were tackled. Thus, in the late 1930s, with war looming in Europe, US policy makers were primarily concerned with domestic issues.

Like other New Dealers, Roosevelt initially distanced himself from Europe's political upheavals. However, he slowly moved toward intervention. In a speech in Chicago in 1937 “he spoke of ‘aggressor nations’ and the need for ‘peace-loving nations' to band together to protect themselves” (Karl, 1987: 187). This early endorsement of intervention by Roosevelt did little to mobilise support for intervention and Roosevelt chose not to elaborate on his Chicago speech when it became clear that French and British policy makers were unwilling to take action. Because of strong public and congressional opposition, Roosevelt remained publicly silent on intervention until Pearl Harbour. Although he was able to lay the initial foundations of a war industry by contracting war production to private corporations and locating government war plants in the unemployment stricken South, his inability to take a public stance meant that he was unable to prepare the American public for the coming war. However, if Roosevelt was unable to take an outright stance, Karl (1987: 199) argues that by the late 1930s and early
1940s, “it was increasingly clear that articulate spokesmen in the press and the 
intellectual world were willing to do for the President what he could not do for himself”.

**Hitler and the US Media**

Hitler’s ascent to power in Germany was widely reported in the US media. 
Reports on the NSDAP appeared as early as 1923 which were concurrent with the earliest 
reporting of Hitler’s activities in the major German newspapers (Zalampas, 1989). Initial 
coverage was scornful of Hitler’s chances of gaining control of the German state, and 
he was generally depicted as “a reactionary demagogue hired by German capitalists as a 
tool against communism” (Zalampas, 1989: 214). His attacks on Jews were interpreted 
merely as ideological and political tools designed to win the support of the German 
masses, and it was widely believed that he would moderate his policies after gaining 
control of the Chancellery. Because Hitler was overwhelmingly defined as a Jewish and 
German problem in the early 1930s, the US response to events within Germany was 
confined to calls for economic sanctions and boycotts. However, Zalampas (1989) 
argues a decisive shift in American perceptions of the nature and implications of events 
in Europe occurred following the 1938 November pogrom, that made it abundantly clear 
to the majority of the American media that the appeasement policy of Chamberlain and 
Daladier had failed.

Although outright calls to abandon an isolationist policy were limited, there was a 
growing realisation that war in Europe was inevitable, and when it came US interests
would be affected. On 2 January 1939, *Time* magazine named Hitler their man of the
class. However, *Time* stressed that the controversial selection was based on importance
rather than moral standing (Karl, 1987) and descriptions of Hitler as “Handsome Adolf”
(*Time*, 6 October 1930, p.23), or defence of the Munich agreement were certainly no
longer in favour. Rather, he was described as “the greatest threatening force that the
democratic, freedom-loving world faces today”, and the accompanying cover illustration
depicted Hitler sitting in a medieval cathedral at an organ console above which turned a
catherine wheel draped with naked bodies (Zalampas, 1989: 171). Although the media
now identified Hitler as the primary threat to peace in Europe, the question remained
whether America, protected from events by two oceans, was itself in any great danger.
Important in persuading Americans of the threat posed by Nazi Germany were media
discussions of German foreign policy and geopolitics.

**US Geopolitical Discourse in the 1940s**

It was in late 1939 that the term ‘geopolitics’ “forced its way into the ordinary
language of American political culture” (Ó’Tuathail, 1994a: 2). Following the dramatic
events in Europe which had seen the German absorption of Austria in 1938; take-over
and subsequent conquest of Czechoslovakia in 1939; invasion of Poland in late 1939; and
the blitzkrieg of France and Norway in 1940; the US media quickly became fascinated
with geopolitics because it was seen as “the hidden logic behind Nazi foreign policy”,
and the key to understanding “just what it was Herr Hitler and the Nazis were up to”
(Ó’Tuathail, 1994a: 2). A hitherto little known term outside of American geographical circles, geopolitics became, in the words of *Life* magazine, “a five dollar term”, whose usage and meaning multiplied in a plethora of books, and newspaper and magazine articles discussing geopolitics and Nazi foreign policy.

Following Ó’Tuathail (1994a), the readings of geopolitics in the 1940s can be divided into two different but not mutually exclusive narratives. The first to appear was the “popular narrative” composed of articles published in mass-circulation newspapers and magazines such as *Life*, *New Republic*, and *Readers Digest*. Ó’Tuathail (1994a, 6) terms the second genre of geopolitical discussion the “middle brow policy narrative” encapturing “those works addressed to the mass market book buying general public, the public intelligentsia” (books published by non university presses and reviewed in magazines such as *Time* or *Newsweek*). These two genres were supplemented in the late 1940s by a number of specialised academic studies of German geopolitics. These specialist works, however, reached a limited audience and “had a limited impact on shaping the popular conception of geopolitics in the United States, a conceptual space that was already defined by 1944,” (Ó’Tuathail, 1994a, 38). The meanings of geopolitics and its place in US strategic culture had been firmly established by the explosion of geopolitical discourse in the early 1940s.

The immediate discussion will be limited to the ‘popular’ and ‘middle-brow’ narratives of geopolitics and focus primarily on Robert Strausz-Hupé’s work that can be
situated within the ‘middle brow’ genre. Although Strausz-Hupé figured prominently within the middle brow narrative it is important to briefly discuss the representation of geopolitics found in the mass media because it was the site where geopolitics was first introduced to the American public, and where certain myths and meanings of geopolitics developed. Populist readings of geopolitics were largely false but they constructed a ‘regime of truth’ about geopolitics that was not fully repudiated by middle brow readings, and provided an imagery ‘serious’ analysts could draw on to persuade the public that Nazi Germany presented a very real threat to America.

The Popular Narrative

An article that appeared in *Life* magazine on 20 November 1939 entitled “Germany’s Brain Truster Produces Nazi War Aims” provides an exemplary early example of readings of German geopolitics published in the mass media. Coogan (1991) argues that this article’s publication marked the real breakthrough for geopolitics in the US. It was the first discussion of geopolitics to appear in a mainstream, mass circulation publication. Preceding this, articles on geopolitics appeared in *The Commonweal* in April 1939, and *The Washington Evening Star* on 1 October 1937.

The *Life* article introduces “Professor Major General Karl E. Nikolaus Haushofer” as “the inexhaustible idea man for Hitler” - a super scientist who drafts Nazi foreign policy from his geopolitical brain trust in Munich. The article describes the emergence of a sinister new science in Germany - geopolitics; a science “invented” by Karl Haushofer.
that has given the Nazi's a blueprint for world conquest (*Life*, 20 November 1939: 62).

Furthermore, Ó'Tuathail (1994a: 7-8) notes the establishment of an iconography of geopolitics in the pictures and illustrations accompanying this article.

The photographs evoke a system of signs that soon become standard elements of the iconography of geopolitics: a younger Albrecht Haushofer with atlas in hand gazing at a globe while a picture of Rudolf Hess hangs on the wall; an imposing but partly obscured photograph of an impressive neo-classical building labelled the “great German Academy in Munich”; the country house of Karl Haushofer “scholarly plotter of German world domination...Here come Haushofer's geopolitical disciples and sometimes No. 3 Nazi Hess, Haushofer's greatest defender and admirer”; a map of where Haushofer sends his German Academy books; a family shot of the Haushofer's from World War showing the dominating presence of Karl in full military uniform; a picture of Haushofer's desk with bust of Napoleon and two detailed shots, one of an inkwell in the form of a globe (from Albrecht's desk) and another of small photo's of Albrecht with Hitler and of Hess in profile (Karl's desk). The grey eminence, buildings where secret plots are hatched, the globe gazing/conquering fetish, the militarist tradition and personal influence are key archetypes in the German geopolitics story.

According to Ó'Tuathail (1994a), the readings of geopolitics found in the mass media have three central characteristics. Firstly, geopolitics is seen to be the key to understanding Nazi foreign policy objectives; it is understood as providing the scientific basis behind the Nazi's “grand strategy”. A second related script concerns Karl Haushofer; he is seen as the super brain behind the new science, and is attributed with mystical skills of prediction as a panoptic observer who directs Hitler's foreign policy. A third characteristic of this genre is its propagandistic, sensational, and largely fictional nature. Perhaps most famously was the invention of a German Geopolitical Institute in
Munich that supposedly acts as an institutionalised think tank and planning centre for German world conquest. Introduced in the *Life* article as Haushofer's "German Academy in Munich", the Institute myth became firmly established in an article by Sonders in *Current History*, later reprinted in *Readers Digest*, entitled "The Thousand Scientists Behind Hitler". According to Sonders (1941: 24), the institute is the central node of a vast German observational system whose "thousand economists, military strategists, psychologists, meteorologists, physicists, geographers and other specialists" are, under the direction of Haushofer, collating a "Strategic Index - a geopolitical map of the world," to direct and plan the next German conquest. For Sonders, the Institute's work is fundamental to the direction of Hitler's foreign policy. He argues, "their ideas, their charts, maps, statistics, information and plans have dictated Hitler's moves from the very beginning," (Sonders, 1941: 23) and that it was Haushofer who taught Hitler - "the hysterical, planless agitator" - to "think in terms of continents and empires", while he "dictated the famous Chapter XVI of Mein Kampf which outlined the foreign policy Hitler has since followed to the letter" (Sonders, 1941: 24).

Although largely false (Bassin, 1987; Heske, 1987), popular readings invested the term geopolitics with a multiplicity of dark sinister meanings; it was described variously as a "formula of destruction", an "organisation for conquest" (Sonders, 1941: 23), and a dogma that "guarantees the Nazi machine will not stop short of world control" (Sonders, 1941: 24). Geopolitics was generally conceived of as a super science enabling efficient
planning and ruthless execution. No piece of information was deemed too small or insignificant to Nazi planners, who educated in geopolitics were able to foresee all eventualities. In short, as Ó’Tuathail (1994, 10) argues, in the popular press the story of geopolitics was “the story of a super efficient modernity gone wrong”.

**Robert Strausz-Hupé and The Middle Brow Narrative**

The sensationalist readings of German geopolitics found in the mass media were redressed by a number of more considered book length studies that began appearing in 1941 and 1942 (Ó’Tuathail, 1994a). Prominent writers in this genre included Hans Weigart, author of *Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics*; Anders Dorpalen, author of *The World of General Haushofer*; Derwent Whittlesey, who authored *German Strategy of World Conquest*; and Robert Strausz-Hupé.

The myths presented in the popular press created a problem for the more serious analysts. Much time was spent debunking myths, particularly the omnipotent superman status achieved by Haushofer and that of his geopolitical institute (Coogan, 1991). However, Ó’Tuathail argues that the myths were not fully repudiated, a common characteristic of the middle-brow genre being a “disavowal yet reinscription”.

Whereas the populist narrative’s dominant form is one of drama and conspiracy, the middle brow narrative form is given over to serious imperative policy pontification, a what-needs-to-be-done form that does not necessarily reject the poetics of the dramatic and the conspirational genre so much as give it a serious gloss and integrate it into its imperatives (Ó’Tuathail, 1994a: 12).
Significantly, the bulk of American writings on geopolitics came from European émigrés. The policy of isolationism belonged to an American tradition that equated security with geographical distance and saw the United States as a nation built by refugees eager to escape the political structures of Europe (Sloan, 1988). Washington’s farewell address in 1796 warned of the dangers of entangling alliances and emphasised the geographical isolation of the United States from Europe. The tradition of isolationism was upheld, albeit in a different form, with the Monroe Doctrine and Good Neighbour Policy which both sought to exclude European powers from the Western Hemisphere. However, as Coogan (1991, 157) argues, the geopolitical tradition of European émigrés “had developed in a very different direction from that of their American counterparts. The Eurasian heartland and the maintenance of a global balance of power were not abstractions to them. During the early years of the Second World War, these refugee scholars significantly influenced the popularisation of geopolitics in the United States.”

Strausz-Hupé’s overarching purpose in this period was to argue for a rejection of isolationism and intervention in the war against threat posed by the Axis powers. At this stage in his career Strausz-Hupé did not have any academic training. However, growing up in the turbulence of post-World War One Europe, seeing the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and witnessing street fighting in Munich, led him to believe that what mattered in politics was not law, but power. He felt that American’s failed to recognise that basing foreign policy on questions of law and morality was no longer relevant in
international politics. Motivated by a sense of threat to his new found freedom he took
his message to the American public.

Up to World War Two the US could choose what it wanted to choose and
not choose what it didn't want to choose. We were “not interested in
power politics” - we were interested in trade and international law. The
great names of foreign policy were lawyers and people interested in
international law and the moral aspect of international politics...I, being
European, had a somewhat different orientation. I felt it in my gut, that
somehow things had profoundly shifted for America. The American's
were not going to stand up to Hitler, or Stalin, who one way or the other
were going to take over the world...I had settled in America chiefly
because I wanted to live a free and rewarding life of my own, and I
[therefore] didn't like the idea of the world being conquered (Interview

The earliest article I have found published by Strausz-Hupé was a piece
speculating on the possible return of monarchical rule to France (Strausz-Hupé, 1939a).

At this time he marketed himself as “a special authority on French Politics” (Current
History, June 1939: 19) and “a specialist on international banking and finance” (Current
History, March 1939: 1), but as the Nazis marched through Europe he turned his attention
to German foreign policy. While working for Current History he conducted a series of
lectures under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Association. Unfortunately, I have been
unable to uncover any information on the this Association, the only reference to it is
found in Current History, June 1939, page 19. However, Strausz-Hupé’s lectures were
aimed at middle class audiences who “stood in the Great Centre of American politics”
(Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 178) and whose support for intervention in Europe was essential.

Billed as “an American journalist of Austrian birth” he gave his inaugural lecture on “The
Rape of Austria” at a civic forum in Boston. After this initial venture he continued to lecture and after speaking to a group of students and teachers at the University of Pennsylvania he was offered the position of part time instructor in Political Science.

Strausz-Hupé’s first published article on Nazi Germany appeared in Current History in June 1939. Surprisingly, he discussed not German conquests in Europe but the economic policy of autarky pursued by Germany. Concerned with the re-emergence of trade by barter and its acceptance in the United States (which was negotiating an exchange of rubber and tin for wheat and cotton with Great Britain) he argued that barter threatened the Capitalist system and, by implication, the United States whose prosperity was dependent upon an open world economy. Strausz-Hupé argued that barter is “an abnormal method of trading which the conservative democracies [are] supposed to abhor”; it is “outdated” and “prehistoric” and its adoption is a throwback to the caveman; it is an irrational “indication of world confusion” and its adoption indicates that the democracies “might be forced to play the game according to totalitarian rules”. Why then, Strausz-Hupé asks, are we “returning to this ancient and outmoded method of commerce?”

The answer is that we are living in an abnormal economic society, in which the return to barter may be a symptom of the decline of the capitalistic system. Perhaps, amid the fear and imminence of war, we are seeing the initiation of a system that will supplant capitalism. (Wolfe and Strausz-Hupé, 1939, 19).
Through arguing that barter threatens the capitalist system Strausz-Hupé alerts America to the threat posed by Germany’s economic policies. Furthermore, within this article Strausz-Hupé develops the argument for an abandonment of isolationist policies. He attacks not only the re-emergence of barter but more generally the abandonment of free trade and the erection of tariffs, quotas, and commerce restrictions which “block the arteries of business” (Wolfe and Strausz-Hupé, 1939: 20). His warning is clear - the Nazi policies of autarky attack the heart of modern and desirable Capitalism.

Before discussing Strausz-Hupé’s work on geopolitics it is necessary to further examine his early articles and his first book *Axis America: Hitler Plans Our Future* (1941). It was while researching this book, which is a rather laboured analysis of German and Italian propaganda, that he came across geopolitics and the work of the German geopoliticians (Interview with Robert Strausz-Hupé, 15 May 1995). Although Strausz-Hupé himself considers his second book *Geopolitics The Struggle for Space and Power* (1942) to be his first substantial piece, he makes a number of important arguments in his preceding publications. Firstly, Strausz-Hupé clearly states the fundamental premise behind most of his work in the 1940s - that German writings and propaganda are worthy of study because they illuminate German thinking and strategy. Strausz-Hupé’s position is somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, he is concerned with the exposition of German propaganda - based, by definition, on falsity or exaggeration - while, on the
other hand, he professes “the writings of these Nazi and Fascist publicists [to be] dead give-aways of German and Italian intentions” (Strausz-Hupé, 1941b: 41).

A second argument in *Axis America* is the representation of Germany as a military threat not only to Europe but to the United States. This is achieved through two different narratives. The first of these illustrates the place of the United States as enemy in Nazi thought and writings. He argues that the Nazi’s view the US as “race biologically retarded”, as “the very embodiment of the forces opposed to Germany” (Strausz-Hupé, 1941d: 33), and that “the United States has long been regarded as an enemy by the Nazi High Command” (Strausz-Hupé 1941d: 40).

Through the employment of sexual metaphors the second narrative writes Germany as a dangerous enemy to the United States and more generally to Western democracies. An article in *Current History* described the eastward expansion of Germany as the fulfilment of a historical impulsion - “the Urge to Drive Eastward”. “Hitler’s drive to the east”, he argues, results from a “traditional impulse” (Strausz-Hupé, 1941d: 41), a “craving” for eastward expansion that “enjoys the same, broad popular approval” under Hitler as under the Kaiser. Moreover, in discussing Nazi policy toward the US, Strausz-Hupé uses images of penetration, thrusts, and emotional urges that represent the US as a potential rape victim.

Do the young Germans of Hitler’s Third Reich - the backbone of the Nazi Party - either fear or respect the United States? They do not. They believe America to be a feminist country, its manhood gone (Strausz-Hupé, 1941c: 69).
Nazi strategy consists of “the simultaneous penetration of the enemy by numerous units of relatively small size, but of great mobility, striking through widely separated points of attack”. The textual metaphors, employed by Strausz-Hupé, write the Germans as rapists but also suggest a latent impotency. The “small size” of the enemy units are not necessarily overwhelming, and if Americas can regain their manhood, “their might will shield the republic and overwhelm its enemies” (Strausz-Hupé, 1941c: 259).

Strausz-Hupé’s most important work before World War Two was undoubtedly his second book Geopolitics: The Struggle For Space and Power. Although Geopolitics was not the first book to address German geopolitics it was the first to receive widespread national attention; Strausz-Hupé appeared on the cover of The Saturday Evening Post on 27 June 1942 and the book became a “minor bestseller” firmly establishing his name within the community of scholars writing on geopolitics.

Strausz-Hupé makes three central arguments in Geopolitics which address a number of issues raised in popular narrations of geopolitics. Firstly, he seeks to explicate the link between geopolitics and Nazi foreign policy; secondly, through a genealogical exploration of geopolitical theory he judges the ‘scientific merit’ of German geopolitics; and thirdly, he argues for the adoption of geopolitics by foreign policy makers in the United States. The first two arguments are important in representing Germany as a threat to the United States while the third has longer term implications in establishing a place for geopolitics in US strategic culture.
Geopolitics and Nazi Foreign Policy

For Strausz-Hupé, geopolitics is fundamental to German foreign policy and war strategy. He argues that following their defeat in World War One, the Germans realised that “failure to work out a grand scheme of political strategy had been the prime cause of their defeat” (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: vii). When planning the current conquest, however, geopolitics provided the global strategy the Germans required. “Geopolitics is the master plan that tells what and why to conquer, guiding the military strategist along the easiest path to conquest. Thus the key to Hitler’s global mind is German geopolitics” (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: vii).

The central position geopolitics has in Nazi policy is given a conspirational gloss with Strausz-Hupé’s suggestion that the Nazis have sought to camouflage, disguise, and downplay the importance of their new science (Ó’Tuathail, 1994a). According to Strausz-Hupé, the camouflaging of geopolitics has been achieved through the production of a vast quantity of “indigestible texts” consisting of obscure, disjointed and jumbled prose which “serves to make their writings appear to the non-German reader more innocuous than they really are” (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 72).

As with the popular narrative, Strausz-Hupé claims “Major General Professor Doktor Karl Haushofer” is the key figure in German geopolitics. However, although he notes that “his advice is said to have inspired Chapter XIV of Mein Kampf, which defines the aims of Nazi foreign policy and gives Hitler’s own understanding of
"Lebensraum" (Strausz-Hupé, 1941: 111), Strausz-Hupé downplays the personal significance of Haushofer in Nazi policy. He argues, instead, that Haushofer’s importance lies in the provision of a set of rules or principles that can be applied by policy makers to a multiplicity of situations and always ensure that the correct decisions are taken.

Haushofer’s teachings were intended not as a fixed plan of action but as a set of principles that would enable Germany’s rulers always to choose the right course. In this sense geopolitics is the working basis of German foreign policy (Strausz-Hupé, 1941: 114; 1942: 71).

Furthermore, Haushofer’s work as a propagandist of geopolitics, disseminating his teachings throughout German society has ensured that the “‘geopolitical method of observation’ [has] become second nature to some of the most powerful men in Germany” (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 77). From Strausz-Hupé’s perspective, geopolitics is a doctrine that transcends the importance of any individual. It is a flexible method of approaching international affairs allowing policy changes to be made in accordance with clearly defined objectives, and its very flexibility ensures policy changes do not affect the validity of the geopolitical method. Thus, Hitler’s decision to break with the Russo-German pact, an agreement “held to be the consummation of the teachings of Geopolitik” (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 78) did not signal Haushofer’s fall from grace as some interpreters had claimed. Rather, Strausz-Hupé argues that:

Hitler’s attempt to conquer Russia may be as good a means toward the same end as was his earlier attempt to gain control of it by allying himself with its de facto tenants. For all Haushofer cared this attempt to conquer
might, if unsuccessful, again be followed by a period of diplomatic
"courtship". There is no reason to believe that Hitler consulted Haushofer
when making his monumental decisions. He did not need to. Geopolitik
is Nazi foreign policy (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 79).

Thus, Geopolitik has given the Germans a master plan of action. Directly linking
Geopolitik to Nazi war aims allows Strausz-Hupé, through an explication of geopolitical
theory, to project sinister scripts of global conquest into Nazi foreign policy. Revisionist
work on German geopolitics has shown that there was never much linkage between
Geopolitik and Nazi policy (Bassin, 1987; Heske, 1987). In fact, there were fundamental
tensions between the two philosophies. This is an important point and will be returned to
shortly. For now, it is sufficient to note that although Haushofer certainly had
connections with the Nazi leadership, for the most part through Rudolf Hess (a close
friend and one of his ex students), he was never a Nazi party member. Furthermore, after
Hess flew to Scotland in 1941, Heske (1987: 142) argues that “Haushofer lost his
political influence totally”.

From Science to Religion

With the new science of geopolitics forming the basis for Nazi foreign policy,
Strausz-Hupé addresses the scientific validity of German geopolitical doctrines. The bulk
of his text provides a long genealogy of geopolitics which firstly, destabilises the notion
that geopolitics is a new science, and secondly, makes the argument that German
geopolitics has become nothing more than “the servant of a morbid German craving for
world power” (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: x). In critiquing geopolitics he seeks to redress some
the sensationalist accounts found in the popular press, accounts which Hans Weigart argued had the negative effect of overestimating the superiority of the enemy and fostering a defeatist attitude at home (Ó Tuathail 1994a).

There is, Strausz-Hupé argues, “little in Haushofer’s books which, even by the standards of Geopolitik is genuinely new” (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 75). Geopolitik is, for Strausz-Hupé, a “portmanteau science” (Strausz-Hupé: 1942: 86) that has blindly appropriated long existing theories in political geography and amalgamated them to produce a doctrine of war. Strausz-Hupé’s genealogy serves to highlight key theorists from whom Haushofer has stolen his ideas and illustrates the key points where their ‘science’ comes off the rails becoming nothing more than irrational dogma. It is important to note that although Strausz-Hupé’s principal purpose in Geopolitics is to critique the ‘new’ German science he is himself an advocate of the importance of geography in international relations. Geopolitik, however, is an aberration; a fallen geopolitics that has become uprooted from its sound scientific base. Central to Strausz-Hupé’s critique is his extensive use of religious metaphors in distinguishing between ‘good’ geopolitics and Geopolitik.

The metaphors Strausz-Hupé uses to describe Geopolitik as a pseudo religion have a number of important implications. Firstly, the metaphors remove Geopolitik from the realm of science and rationality, and place it into a mystical realm with fanatical followers blindly adhering to its dogma. Secondly, although these metaphors undermine
the scientific validity of *Geopolitik* and its presumed effectiveness as scientific warfare, there is something darker, more sinister, and more dangerous in the concept of *Geopolitik* as religion; the Germans made a pact with the devil and were given *Geopolitik*. Thirdly, representing *Geopolitik* as a morbid irrational religion construct the German Geopolitikers as enemies of God whereby “[T]he enemy is not merely flesh and blood but devil, demon, agent of the dark forces” (Keen, 1986: 27). Moreover, the representation of *Geopolitik* in religious terms builds on already existing images in US public discourse such as the *Time* illustration of Hitler in 1939. Interestingly, when reporting Haushofer’s death on 25 March 1946, *Time* magazine printed his photograph with just a two word caption - “the devil” (*Time*, 25 March 1946: 35).

In his genealogy Strausz-Hupé identifies four principal themes in Haushofer’s work. The first concerns the importance of space and the associated desire for *Lebensraum*, or living space. However, Strausz-Hupé notes that the primacy given to space has long been a guiding axiom of political geography in Germany. Its importance was appreciated by Ritter, Ratzel and Kjellen, but Strausz-Hupé argues that the appreciation of space as a political force and the theory of *Lebensraum* was actually brought to Germany from America by Fredrich List. Strausz-Hupé recognises that List did not actually coin the term *Lebensraum*, but argues that the “theory behind it is his” (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 11). According to Strausz-Hupé, after working as a journalist in the US in late 1820s, List returned to Germany with “the vision of a vigorous nation
possessed of vast space. Only a few years before, President Monroe had expressed his magnificent concern with whole continents while List's countrymen were still haggling over the rival claims of petty principalities no larger than a county in Rhode Island”. In his book *The National System of Political Economy* (1842) List argued that to achieve economic prosperity Germany needed “an extended and conveniently bounded territory reaching from the North and Baltic seas to the Black Seas and the Adriatic” (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 11). Thus, Strausz-Hupé argues, originated the theory of *lebensraum* and the basing of economic policy, rather than on international exchange, on the physical domination of space.

The second critical concept in Haushofer’s work is the organic state. Strausz-Hupé traces this to Karl Ritter who conceptualised geography as the “science of the living globe”. Through his belief that topography and climate play fundamental roles in the history of nations, Ritter argued that “geography can furnish the directives of political life as a whole” (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 23). Although Ritter did not fully pursue his organic analogy, his ideas were taken up by Friedrich Ratzel, who, influenced by Haeckel, Treitschke, and crucially, Darwin, amalgamated the concepts of space consciousness and the organic state. Strausz-Hupé argues that under Ratzel “the urge to territorial expansion is [thus] seen as the manifestation of a natural law, and the population pressure of a growing nation as culminating in a struggle for existence as brutal and lawless as is,
according to the theory of evolution, the struggle for survival in nature”(Strausz-Hupé: 1942: 25).

Although it was Rudolf Kjellen who projected Ratzel’s theories into political science and coined the term “geopolitics”, it was Ratzel’s search for ahistorical laws governing the spatial growth of states that “broke the trail for the scientific investigation of Lebensraum”. Strausz-Hupé quotes Ratzel at length to convey the “almost religious fervour with which Ratzel served his dreams”(Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 32). Ratzel is the intellectual “father” of Geopolitik who “set the pace - as regards both ideas and style - for the literary work of German Geopolitik”. And, he continues, “this new science was bound to retain the essence of the spirit with which Ratzel had imbued it. It was the spirit of imperialistic conquest, the deification of world power”(Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 32).

Strausz-Hupé is somewhat vague regarding the specific relationship between Ratzel’s theories and those of Haushofer. Through arguing that “Ratzel was a better geographer than most of his disciples”, it appears that Strausz-Hupé believes Ratzel was the watershed between the practice of political geography, (where geographic factors are deemed influential to the practice of statecraft) and Geopolitik (where geography is attributed with a determining role). Strausz-Hupé argues that when Haushofer referred to Ratzel’s statement - “A large space maintains life” - as “the state biological rule of life put in classic form”, Haushofer, with is flair for publicity, transported the slogans of “living space” and “greater areas” into the vocabulary of the Nazi party. “It is at this
point”, Strausz-Hupé argues, “that political geography becomes the crucible into which expansionist aspirations are poured to emerge rationalized into scientific dogmas. It is at this point that the “natural” right of the state to space becomes an article of faith” (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 25).

Strausz-Hupé’s discussion of Lebensraum and the organic state construct the Nazis as a threat through representing Germany as a state that disregards international law and established state boundaries in its quest for increased power. Normal methods for improving a state’s power or well being - i.e. through international trade - are rejected in favour of lawless territorial expansion. Furthermore, their are no limits on the extent of German expansion. Backed by its questionable geopolitical theories it will continue to wage war until forcibly stopped.

In addition to the conceptualisation of the state in organic terms with a need for life giving space, Strausz-Hupé identifies two further themes in Haushofer’s work. The first of these is that of “pan-ideas” and “pan-regions”. According to Haushofer, pan-ideas “are supernational, all englobing ideas seeking to manifest themselves in space.” They are, Strausz-Hupé explains, Haushofer’s designation for ideology and are found in the Pan-Asiatic, Pan-American, and Pan-European movements. Strausz-Hupé argues that:

Debatable as is the existence of pan-ideas and pointless as may seem Haushofer’s acrobatics on the philosophic trapeze, the conclusions reached are stark simplicity: a new world order takes shape around three regional nucleuses: the U.S. as the leading power of the Americas (Pan-

Haushofer cannot even take credit for his flawed theorising on pan-regions; the concept was inspired by the Monroe Doctrine. Strausz-Hupé argues that the US presents a strange paradox for Nazi policy makers. According to Strausz-Hupé, Haushofer believes that under the Monroe doctrine US foreign policy was “pure geopolitics”, but when the US “attempted to prop up the British Empire, it was casting aside the sound principles of political geography” and Haushofer was presented with the dilemma of “how to reconcile the actual policies of the one geopolitically adjusted power with what these policies should be according to the theories of his science (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 66).

Strausz-Hupé uses his discussion to situate the Monroe doctrine within Nazi war plans and attacks isolationists as proponents, albeit unwittingly, of Nazi war strategy.

Concepts with the unmistakable flavor of Geopolitik have seeped into the American discussion of world policy and served as ammunition to a goodly number of isolationist spokesmen. So circuitous is the route by which ideas travel that the great majority of these authors may be assumed to have no first hand knowledge of the German originals. But among arguments put forward in defense of “hemispheric isolation” and against American participation in an “imperialist war”, some bear a striking resemblance to Haushofer’s “regional living spaces” and his doomsday theory of the British Empire (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 130).

Strausz-Hupé argues that pan regions threaten the US because they close and divide space into economic zones. In his earlier article “Bargains by Barter”, Strausz-
Hupé expressed his distaste at the prevention of commerce and international trade because long term US prosperity depended on an open global economy.

The final critical theme in Haushofer's work - the quest for control of the "heartland" - was reputedly stolen from British geographer Halford Mackinder. When Mackinder warned of the dangers of a single power controlling the "heartland" he did so believing this region was sufficiently protected from invasion and contained the resources necessary for world mastery. Strausz-Hupé argues that:

Mackinder held that Germany was strategically better placed than any other European power in the contest for the domination of the "Heartland". By virtue of her central location she enjoyed the advantage of interior lines in Europe, just as the Macedonians in the root of the Balkan Peninsula and the Romans, at the centre of the Mediterranean region, had been strategically located for imperial conquest. Mackinder stressed the inaccessibility of the Heartland to naval action. But Mackinder, as has often been mistakenly asserted, did not deprecate the importance of seapower as such. He was indeed pessimistic as to the ability of British sea-power to prevent a German raid on the Heartland. But Germany, he believed, once in possession of the Heartland, could by means of seapower undertake the conquest of the world, having first mustered sufficient resources to build herself the world's largest army (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 58-59).

Strausz-Hupé uses Mackinder's concept of the heartland to expand the threat posed by Germany to Europe, to a threat encompassing the whole world. He points out that Haushofer, a well known admirer of Mackinder, simply utilised Mackinder's theory to the German standpoint and concluded that the path to German world power lay in the control of the Heartland. To Haushofer the Heartland represents:
...a strategic area containing all the advantages indispensable for a Germany at war against any great power or combination of powers. It is a gigantic citadel reaching from "the Elbe to the Amur". It is the deep base from which Germany’s military forces can strike in all directions while her vital war industries can be withdrawn to remote inner regions. It is - with the riches of the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the Urals - the nearest thing to the ideal state of German economic self-sufficiency. It is also, in some of Haushofer's more cloudy passages, the mystical cradle of world conquerors (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 60).

In addition to establishing Haushofer’s propensity for borrowing from other theorists these passages imply that the United States is under threat from German attempts to conquer the heartland. Although Strausz-Hupé reveres Mackinder’s work, he questions the validity of his theory illustrating the impact of technological changes on the heartland’s presumed impenetrability from attack. There is a clear tension in Strausz-Hupé’s work. On the one hand, he is critical of Mackinder’s theories, whilst on the other hand, he uses Mackinder’s theories to insert Nazi foreign policy within a script of world conquest. Furthermore, through religious metaphors, Strausz-Hupé suggests that Haushofer’s quest for world mastery is unquestioned within Germany. For German geopoliticians he argues, “the theory of the Eurasian Heartland is an article of faith”. Haushofer’s whole thesis rests on the belief that “world mastery can be attained through the mastery of the heartland”. And although this is somewhat questionable (perhaps Strausz-Hupé did not want to overstress Germany’s potential power), in Germany “Haushofer’s teachings have now become sacrosanct - part of that select body of political literature that is beyond criticism” (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 166).
Strausz-Hupé’s genealogy of Geopolitik undermines the notion that the German’s have a truly scientific method behind their foreign policy, but replaces this script with one more sinister. Geopolitik is a religion. It is an evil, unquestioned theory, followed with a fanaticism that leads to world mastery. However, although Geopolitik comes from the devil, Strausz-Hupé believes that ‘better the devil you know’, arguing that geopolitics is a theory that can greatly assist the war effort if learnt by US policy makers.

Geopolitics and the United States.

According to Ó’Tuathail (1994: 12), a common concern within middle brow narrations of German geopolitics was “the argument that study of Geopolitics not only provides insight into the thinking behind Nazi foreign policy but, purified of its Nazism, is a powerful practise that allies would do well to cultivate”. The argument for American adoption of ‘the geopolitical approach’ is an important sub text in Strausz-Hupé’s book but is stated most clearly in a review written for The Saturday Review of Literature entitled “It’s Smart to be Geopolitical”. Despite providing an extended critique of geopolitical theory, Strausz-Hupé clearly believes that the geographical approach to world affairs is an important one. In spite of its questionable scientific status Geopolitik is fundamental to the successes achieved by the Germans and has given them a strategic advantage in the power game.

Even without the aid of lush interpretation, the Geopolitikers are shown as remarkably prescient diagnosticians of international politics...Their conclusions as to future trends in certain areas - particularly the British
Empire and the Far East - are too closely born out by subsequent events to be brushed aside as lucky guesses. (Strausz-Hupé, 1943: 5).

Strausz-Hupé argues that Geopolitik is a fallen geopolitics that "under political pressure...slipped one by one [from] the moorings which held it to the firm ground of political geography." Of central importance is the geographical determinism of Haushofer’s brand of Geopolitik and his lack of faith in the individual. Strausz-Hupé argues that although "geography is the most permanent factor in international relations" it is an influencing rather than determining factor. "Geography", he argues, "does not make history; it only determines where history is made." The key factor in history is man, and his ability to modify the effects of the environment. Through his glorification of the state Haushofer has failed to see the important role of man in shaping history. "It is here that we recognize the fallacy of German Geopolitik, it is here that we must draw the line between geopolitics - as applied science - and a new kind of geographic determinism" (Strausz-Hupé, 1943: 21).

Stressing the importance of the individual could be seen as an attempt by Strausz-Hupé to tailor geopolitics to his American audience. It is, after all, only Haushofer who supposedly has fallen into the trap of geographical determinism, Mackinder and other geopoliticians were quick to realise the importance of man. Thus, if cleansed of its deterministic outlook geopolitics is a fundamental aid to the American war effort. As a reviewer of Strausz-Hupé’s book noted, the Germans have "formulated an applied science of intercontinental power politics and global war which, for all its facade of
mumbo-jumbo, is as of much use to all players of the power game as is Culbertson’s system to all bridge players” (Schuman, 1942: 3). This is an argument pushed by Strausz-Hupé in Geopolitics when he concludes:

It is late, but not too late to profit by the lessons of Geopolitik. With their vast space and power potential, the United Nations have only to organize, by planned and concerted effort, their space and power to win the Second World War (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 264).

In the late 1930s and early 1940s Strausz-Hupé’s career path radically changed. In the space of a few years he went from working as a foreign investments liquidator on Wall Street to become a leading figure in US discussions of geopolitics and Nazi foreign policy. He was as much a product of this discourse as a participant, having little knowledge of geopolitics before stumbling across Mackinder’s work while researching Axis America. It is, however, not surprising that Strausz-Hupé was attracted to geopolitics. His experience in Munich in 1919 supposedly taught him the importance of planning and organisation in times of war, and in geopolitics he found a system of thought that urged policy makers to gather information and develop clearly defined war plans. Having discovered geopolitics he became a leading critic of that specifically German brand - Geopolitik - a critique that he used to attack isolationists, represent the Germans in a manner threatening to the US, and urge Americans to support intervention in another European war. However, much of his analysis was false. When Strausz-Hupé critiqued Haushofer for forgetting the importance of man, he did not question the link he
established between Geopolitik and Nazi foreign policy. It was this direct linkage upon which his arguments were based.

It is in the conflict between geographical determinism and man that the philosophy of the Geopolitikers and the National Socialist Party fundamentally diverged. Influenced by Ratzel and Ritter, Geopolitik was, as Strausz-Hupé correctly establishes, environmentally determinist. It believed in the existence of natural laws that governed political events. The purpose of Geopolitik was, therefore, to scientifically discover and study these laws allowing the prediction of future events. In contrast, the primary influence on National Socialism came from the mid-nineteenth century ‘Volkish’ movement. This movement was generally anti science and anti Enlightenment, and believed that truth lay in human emotions and intuition. Thus, National Socialism privileged race, national character, and genetic qualities in explaining political events, while Geopolitik explained concepts such as ‘national character’ with reference to the environment rather than genetics (Bassin, 1987). Although sharing many concerns such as the need for Lebensraum, and opposition to the Versaille Treaty, the conflict between race and environment was fundamental. This resulted in the Nazis viewing Geopolitik with suspicion, and the movement as conceived by Haushofer was certainly not coveted.

As Bassin (1987, 130) argues:

After the Nazis came to power in 1933 these divergencies in perspective became increasingly problematic, and resulted in official attacks upon geopolitics and the loss of whatever significance is may have had. To be sure, the term Geopolitik continued to be quite popular, but as practised by
those closer in spirit to the Nazis it had little in common with the actual
tradition of the discipline, developed from Ratzel through Kjellen to
Haussofer and his colleagues. It was only by altering its essence that it
would continue to appear useful.

Paradoxically, Strausz-Hupé’s first book analysed Nazi propaganda and his
second, through attempting to mobilise support for US entry into the war by linking
Geopolitik directly to Nazi foreign policy, produced US propaganda. However, his
reading of Geopolitik was not uncommon. It served as a vehicle to write the Germans as
a threat to the United States and bury isolationism. It also allowed Strausz-Hupé to
embark on a new career. Writing on geopolitics at the time he did proved most beneficial
to Strausz-Hupé. In 1943 Strausz-Hupé declared “It’s smart to be geopolitical” and as
Ó’Tuathail (1994: 3-4) notes, “for Strausz-Hupé and the class of specific geopolitical
intellectuals like him whose careers were made by World War II and the subsequent Cold
War, it was indeed smart to be geopolitical”. 
CHAPTER 4

GEOPOLITICS IN GOVERNMENT AND THE PLANS FOR PEACE

By the time the US entered the war in 1942, interest in geopolitics had extended well beyond media and literary circles. Business leaders began to study how knowledge of geopolitics could inform investment decisions and a number of government agencies looked at how geopolitical theories could assist with the war effort. On 1 August 1942, the editors of Business Week used a discussion of Strausz-Hupé’s Geopolitics to put the case for the formation of an American Geopolitical Institute. Convinced that “the German Army’s thorough training in geopolitics” underlay their wartime successes, the editorial concluded, “it is plain now that the United States is gradually taking over the leadership of this war. This demands that we define our long term needs and objectives, tighten up all our planning organizations, and objectively co-ordinate all our activities” (Business Week, August 1, 1942: 68). Calls for those charged with planning and co-ordinating the war effort to embrace geopolitical theory were not ignored in Washington. In the early 1940s, a number of government agencies experimented with geopolitics.

Geopolitics in Government

One of the earliest attempts to use geopolitical theories in government took place in the War Department. In July 1940, Eric Archdeacon had called for the establishment of an American Geopolitical Institute similar in function to Haushofer’s mythical institute in Munich, and he encouraged business community assistance in developing such a
project. However, Archdeacon’s plans for a “private institute that would co-operate with businesses, the State Department, and the General Staff” (Coogan, 1991: 197) ultimately failed to materialise because of security considerations and fears that an independent institute would not focus exclusively on research essential to the war effort (Coogan, 1991). Nevertheless, his lobbying and the debates surrounding the proposal raised considerable interest in the War Department, and on 8 June 1942, a Geopolitical Section was established in the Military Intelligence Service. The section’s objectives were “to study physical, economic, political, and ethnological geography in order to advise on measures of national security and assurance of continued peace in the post-war world, as well as to conduct such studies as may be demanded for the immediate prosecution of the war” (Colonel T. E. Roderick, Executive Officer, G-2--MIS, Memorandum No. 61 Geopolitical Section, Military Intelligence Service, 18 June 1942. Quoted in Coogan, 1991: 202). However, the Geopolitical section was eventually abolished on 10 June 1943, after problems arising from the appointment of an excessively enthusiastic Lieutenant Colonel William S. Culbertson as manager. Culbertson massively extended the Section’s activities beyond its directive, cultivating contacts with business, private research institutes, and using contacts in the press to launch public relations campaigns whenever policy diverted from that suggested by the Geopolitical Section. Finally, in an attempt to further broaden its scope and appeal, and cast off the negative baggage of Geopolitik, Culbertson changed the Section’s name to Analysis Section (Coogan, 1991).
According to Coogan (1991), geopolitics was used most successfully in civilian departments who paid less attention to the day to day administration of the war effort, and spent more time making plans for the peace. Interest in geopolitics was further stimulated through the employment of a large number of academics with geopolitical backgrounds. Among those employed in civilian government agencies during the war were Isaiah Bowman, Harold Sprout, Richard Hartshorne, Anders Dorpalen, Sigmund Neumann, and Robert Strausz-Hupé.

The largest employer of International Relations specialists was the Office of Strategic Services whose Research and Analysis branch was particularly important in developing geopolitical views in government. The branch’s principal tasks were to collect and analyse the type of data used in ‘geopolitical studies’ (manpower, mineral resources, strategic location studies), but they were also important in propagating a ‘geopolitical world view’ through the production of numerous maps, charts, and globes (Coogan, 1991). Coogan (1991: 249) argues, however, that beyond creating a “precedent for the utilization of academic talent, including geographers, in a standing intelligence organization, and expos[ing] many decision makers to the importance of long range strategic thinking” the R & A Branch had little immediate impact on developing geopolitical methods in government.

Another office to make important contributions to geopolitics and the war effort was a highly secret intelligence and research division established by President Roosevelt
in February 1941. Under the direction of journalist John Franklin Carter, the office collected geographical data and produced numerous intelligence reports, but its most significant involvement with geopolitics came with the establishment of what became known as ‘M’ Project. Headed by Isaiah Bowman and anthropologist Henry Field, ‘M’ project proposed “a series of ‘Studies of Migration and Settlement’ on a worldwide basis to assist in the relocation of the millions of people displaced by World War II and unable to return to their homes” (Bowser, 1963). With a staff only of Field, Bowman, and Ales Hrdlicka, ‘M’ Project initially limited itself to studying South and Central America. However, Roosevelt eventually agreed to the project’s expansion, and looking to add two more staff members, Bowman, who was impressed with the recently released Geopolitics, recruited Strausz-Hupé as chief of the research staff. Surprisingly, it was not an appointment Strausz-Hupé particularly relished.

After working for Current History, I got a job in government in the study of migration settlement. Mr. Isaiah Bowman recruited me for this position and I was stuck pretty much with it until the end of the war. I wanted very much to go in the war, to have a good time - seeing the world - but Mr. Bowman decided I should stay because it was the wish of the President (Interview with Robert Strausz-Hupé, 15 May 1995).

Along with Strausz-Hupé, Bowman recruited another Austrian émigré, Stefan Possony, to work on the project. Possony, who was born in Vienna in 1913, fled Austria for Paris following the Nazi anchluss in 1938, and after the invasion of France in 1940 he moved to the US. Before working on ‘M’ Project, Possony was employed in the Psychological Warfare Department of the Office of Naval Intelligence, broadcasting
propaganda messages to Austria over short wave radio. Strausz-Hupé’s partnership with Posorny, which began on ‘M’ Project, would extend beyond World War II and into the 1960s.

With Strausz-Hupé’s background in geopolitics, ‘M’ project certainly conceived of itself as engaging in ‘geopolitical study’. Area studies generally consisted of “extensive comments on physical conditions, especially the availability of arable land and water, current population density and demographic patterns, economic trends, and political conditions” (Coogan, 1991: 255). Moreover, reports composed by ‘M’ Project staff received a wide circulation within the offices of power. ‘Geopolitical information’ was distributed to the office of the President; departments of State, Agriculture, and Commerce; the Library of Congress; the OSS; Herman Buekema at the Army Specialized Training Division; and Hardy Dillard at the School of Military Government at Charlottesville. Furthermore, occasional reports were requested by William Culbertson, the Bureau of Aeronautics, the Medical Field Service School, and Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace (Coogan 1991: 255).

According to Bowser (1963: 12), ‘M’ Project aroused great enthusiasm in Roosevelt and inspired him to outline some extremely ambitious post war plans.

When the “M” Project studies of Brazil, Australia, North Africa, Canada and other areas began to arrive on his desk, FDR was jubilant. He saw in them the solution not only of the immediate refugee problem, but of all displaced-persons emergencies that might arise in future decades.
“I want to make North Africa the granary of Europe” FDR told Dr. Field, “just as it was in Roman days. We can pump desalinated water from the Mediterranean for irrigation and build air conditioned cities in the desert. Technicians will be recruited from among the displaced persons...Although this will be expensive it will be far better than the dole - just handing out billions for doing nothing” (Bowser, 1963: 12).

Unfortunately, little was made of ‘M’ Project findings and the project did not survive Roosevelt’s death. However, Bowman and others involved in the project felt that it had been a worthwhile enterprise. In a letter Henry Field sent to Roosevelt on 13 March 1944, he reported that Bowman believed “M’ Project had more than justified itself, if only for the incidental material it had turned up for the benefit of other Government agencies, and...that it ought to be continued right through the Peace Conference” (Letter from John Franklin Carter to Roosevelt, 13 March 1944).

Further to studying the displaced peoples, Roosevelt enlisted ‘M’ project staff to assist in his preparation for the Tehran Conference with Churchill and Stalin. In an article titled “How F.D.R. Did His Homework”, Henry Field (1961: 9) recalls the meticulous care Roosevelt went to in preparing for conferences, which he likened to grand chess exchanges where “to disconcert an opponent was a major ploy.”

During a heated pause, one of the grand masters would employ a supercharged diversionary move, throwing in a totally irrelevant question, one designed to provoke one of the principals into an argument - the bitterer the better. Then he would move quickly back to the item on the agenda with the hope of a rash statement.

Anticipating a question from Stalin on the US’s ‘Negro problem’, Roosevelt did not want to be placed in a defensive position that would allow Stalin to follow by
inquiring into lynchings in the South. He requested from Field some ‘ammunition’ to prevent such follow up questions. In particular, he asked for “examples of serious minority problems within Soviet Central Asia with nationalities involved, specific localities, dates, and the resultant population transfers,” and information and maps on Soviet land reforestation and reclamation projects of the Kara Kum Desert. Roosevelt specifically requested that the staff of ‘M’ Project, at the time studying Soviet agriculture in Siberia and Central Asia, undertake the task. With little warning much frenzied activity was required to compile the report before the President’s departure.

In the Library of Congress Annex I immediately held a conference with our two chief “M” Project researchers and analysts, Dr. Sergei Yakobson and Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé. Our staff, numbering a dozen other specialists and six secretaries, began its search for material in the Library of Congress and the libraries of the Federal Reserve Board, Department of Commerce, and Department of Agriculture. Within a few hours, telephoned reports were coming on my private line in Study Room 115 of the Library of Congress annex (Field, 1963: 10).

In preparing the final surveys, a key message of earlier geopolitical discourse - that one can learn from the enemy - was enthusiastically embraced when “one analyst, fluent in German as well as five other languages...searched the geopolitical writings of Haushofer and his specialists on the Caucasus and Soviet Central Asia” (Field, 1963: 10). There is little knowledge of what was made of information furnished to Roosevelt by ‘M’ Project staff, but a few days after the conference Grace Roosevelt telephoned Field to report that: “The Boss asked me to tell you that your black book proved most helpful on one occasion” (Field, 1963: 46).
Schools for Statesmen

After fourteen months employment on ‘M’ Project, Strausz-Hupé became involved in attempts to increase the amount of ‘geopolitical’ training received by members of the armed forces. Most vociferous in calling for geopolitical education in the services was Colonel Herman Beukema, who headed the Department of Economics, Government, and History at West Point from 1930 to 1947. Like many geopolitical commentators in the 1940s, Beukema believed geopolitics was the key behind Nazi success and he argued strongly for its adoption in US military training schools. Beukema believed that US success in forging a lasting peace after the war would depend on the calibre and geopolitical understanding of its military leaders. He proposed the establishment of a ‘School for Statesmen’, aimed at cultivating highly specialised experts in fields ranging from world mineral supplies, to military, air, and naval tactics, and strategy (Beukema, 1943). Beukema’s plans bore fruition in the development of an Army Specialised Training Division program in geography, developed in tandem with Bowman, Whittelsey, and John K. Wright, the president of the American Geographical Society.

Attempts to furnish geopolitical education to members of the army was mirrored in the Navy. Navy Undersecretary James Forrestal, an old acquaintance of Strausz-Hupé from his days on Wall Street, was a leading proponent for the maintainance of a strong US Navy after the war. He became interested in extending Navy education programs because it assisted in his project of retaining experienced reservists, improving
the quality of reserve officers, and, more generally, strengthening the Navy and preventing rapid demobilisation. Under his direction, Strausz-Hupé collaborated with Edward Mead Earle, Harold and Margaret Sprout, and Isaiah Bowman in developing Navy V-12 course outlines which aimed to broaden the recruits’ education beyond the use of military hardware into questions of power, national strategy, and enemy objectives.

Forrestal asked me to assist the Bureau of Personnel of the Navy Department in the preparation of course outlines to be used in the training of midshipmen. For the war had brought to light some alarming gaps in civic and military education; though firmly grounded in the use of hardware, the young reservists entertained but the vaguest notions about the purposes of national policy, means and uses of national power, and the resources and objectives of their country’s allies and enemies (Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 210).

Harold Sprout opened the course to fifty trainees at Princeton University in March 1944 and by November 1945 the course had expanded to Northwestern, Yale Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Berkeley, and had become a required course for all ROTC students (Coogan, 1991: 227). Forrestal was wary of using the term ‘geopolitics’ in the course title, to avoid the negative image of Geopolitik, but according to Coogan (1991: 228) the contents of the course would fit with any definition of geopolitics.

After opening with a quotation from Mackinder’s “Geographical Pivot of History”, the syllabus covered both the theories and the individual elements of geopolitics. Reading packets drew heavily from the Army Field Manual on Geographical Foundations of National Power, and contained excerpts from Mackinder, Mahan, Haushofe, Spykman, Strausz-Hupé, Whittelsey, Earle, and many other theoreticians and commentators on geopolitics.
In addition to assisting in curriculum development, Strausz-Hupé was involved in a lecture series designed to train instructors for the Navy V-12 course lecturing on Geopolitik and on the general influence of geographic factors in international relations (Coogan, 1991). Having been a prominent voice in arguments for developing a geopolitical world view in the early 1940s, Strausz-Hupé thus became, in the mid 1940s, a prominent figure in the use of geopolitics in government and in the development of education curricula for military personnel. The effects of these programs on US strategic thinking should not be understated. As Coogan (1991: 230) argues:

Although the Army Specialized Training Division and the Navy V-12 program contributed only marginally to the war effort and were severely curtailed in 1944 due to manpower shortages, their efforts brought the language and literature of geopolitics into the classrooms on over fifty American colleges and universities. Wartime graduates of these programs who received even a passing familiarity with geopolitics included a future secretary of defense (Melvin Laird), a future secretary of the navy (J. William Middendorf), and ten future senators (including Robert Kennedy, Howard Baker, Jeremiah Denton, and Daniel Moynihan). Thirty-five wartime V-12s reached flag rank in the Navy, while 15 more achieved field rank in the Marine Corps.

Geopolitics and the Plans for Peace

In the early 1940s, government interest in geopolitics was primarily concerned with the short term execution of the war effort and with tackling the immediate problems the war had caused. However, attempts to establish a geopolitical curriculum linked geopolitics to the long term success of the United States in its foreign policy.
Geopolitical knowledge was deemed essential if a secure and prosperous peace was to be achieved, and many argued that the peace should be planned around geopolitical concepts. The burgeoning governmental interest in geopolitics as a tool for winning the peace was mirrored in literary and media geopolitical discourse. An early example of the move away from a focus on Germany to considerations of the shape of things to come was George Renner’s notoriously haphazard division of continents in “Maps for a New World”, which appeared in *Colliers* on 6 June 1942. In addition to magazine articles, a number of books were published outlining an American foreign policy based on geopolitics. Particularly important was Nicholas Spykman’s *American Strategy in World Politics* (1942) and his follow up *Geography of the Peace* (1944). Geopolitical theories, particularly the Mackinderesque spectre of a single nation controlling the heartland remained important in discussions of the post war world. However, the principal threat to the heartland now stemmed from a victorious Soviet Union rather than from Germany.

**The Balance of Tomorrow**

While working in Washington on “M” Project, Strausz-Hupé completed his third book, *The Balance of Tomorrow* (1945), in which he analysed the emerging post war order. Besides the conclusions he draws regarding the shape of the post war world, *The Balance of Tomorrow* is an important book because it sees a refinement of Strausz-Hupé’s approach to international politics, and the relationship of this to geopolitics. Early in his study Strausz-Hupé eschews any approach concerned with developing
blueprints for the provision of security in the post war world, because he believes there are too many intangible factors influencing foreign policy for it ever to be based on a purely ‘scientific’ approach. Nevertheless, he identifies one guiding axiom that can assist foreign policy makers; the most important factor influencing a nation’s foreign policy is power. Pure power transcends the importance of plans, blueprints, or grand designs because, he argues, “security and peace cannot be planned; they have to be won everyday” (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 3). However, although exact predictions are not possible, some knowledge of a nation’s power-political position is fundamental to the successful practice of foreign policy.

There are no exact methods for unravelling that complex of geographical certainties and human vagaries called international politics. The statesman must cast his lines into the future, and foreign policy deals mainly in probabilities...Rough measurements are better than no measurements at all. Although the tools of analytical research into the nature of power are crude, they are better than mere intuition. Once the facts and figures of state power are recognized as indices of extremely volatile matter, they can be used to great advantage in the workshop of foreign policy (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 7).

Thus, Strausz-Hupé distinguishes between the two aspects of geopolitics that were the center of controversy during the war. The sinister science script of blueprints and world mastery is rejected, while that aspect of geopolitics which deals with knowledge and the gathering of information is embraced. Geopolitics is attractive because it “provides a rigorous analysis of power politics and thus of the harsh realities facing all makers of foreign policy, be they lofty idealists or rugged realists”. It recognises that “moral
convictions and reliance on treaties alone do not guarantee the survival of a nation and that the strength of a nation is determined mainly by the location, size, topography, and raw-material resources of its territory and the size of its population; i.e., its ‘power position”” (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 5). Therefore, rather than reject geopolitics, Strausz-Hupé refines geopolitics, emphasising the importance of studying the individual geographic components of national power, rather than the production of grand strategies.

This conceptualisation of geopolitics as the study of a nation’s ‘power position’ is consistent with Strausz-Hupé’s earlier work. He is attracted to geopolitics because it allows the minimisation, but not eradication, of factors of chance in international politics. Geopolitics is concerned with the production of knowledge, with panoptic surveys, and with the calculation of relative strengths, weaknesses and probabilities. International politics might be inherently unstable, rife with change and uncertainties, but geopolitical study gives valuable insight into the fundamental forces that effect change. Foreign policy, Strausz-Hupé argues, is not a science but an art - “the art of the possible” - and geopolitics is essential if what is possible can be known (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 11).

*The Balance of Tomorrow* was written at a politically sensitive time with the US unsure of its role and identity in the post war world. The book was published in the immediate aftermath of the Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks Conferences, which had seen the nominal resurrection of a balance of power system and the division of the world into three ‘spheres’. Article 51 of the UN charter secured for the United States regional domination
over the Western Hemisphere, but the US acquiesced in Russian control over Poland and much of Eastern Europe. Resembling Haushofer’s ‘pan-regions’, the Yalta system was a far cry from the open world system demanded by US businesses. For Strausz-Hupé, the Yalta system, based on the extension of tenuous war-time alliances into peace-time cooperation, was doomed to failure and his fundamental argument was to push for greater US leadership in building the post-war world. His analytical method involves an inventory of the world’s resources and a demonstration that the US has sufficient ‘chips’ to play the power game with all and sundry. He argues that the US should finally reject hemispheric isolation, because it has the ‘power potential’ to take a leading role in international affairs and build a better order for all of mankind. In an attack on isolationists, he concedes that in the nineteenth century the geographical isolation of the US and its friendly relations with Great Britain dispensed of the need for a foreign policy. However:

This condition, almost everyone agrees, no longer obtains. Yet the idea that the United States for its own sake and safety, not for the sake of humanity at large, should seek firm and durable alliances is thought preposterous by the great majority of the American people. And the idea that the American pile of chips is no longer big enough to play the game of power against all players is to a greater majority sheer heresy. Is it? It will be argued here that it is not (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 4).

The factors Strausz-Hupé analyses as components of national power are population, raw materials, political organisation, and geography. He does not believe these factors to be exhaustive of the components determining national power, but, of the
factors that can be ‘scientifically’ analysed, these are the most important. As above, there is a continuity between Geopolitics and The Balance of Tomorrow in the choice of these factors. Strausz-Hupé criticised Geopolitik for its deterministic outlook and for not paying sufficient attention to man’s impact on foreign policy. It is interesting, therefore, that he begins his analysis with population, arguing that the “dynamic use of population is the most important single phenomenon of modern power politics” (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 16). Raw materials and political organisation are important because of Strausz-Hupé’s reduction of international politics to the question of power. Strategic raw materials such as coal and iron, are fundamental to a nation’s military might, and the form of political organisation determines the efficiency of resource use. Finally, geographical location is important because it determines access to raw materials and has strategic implications in areas such as vulnerability to attack.

According to one reviewer, The Balance of Tomorrow was “the best attempt I have yet seen to calculate power on the adding machine and to forecast history by mathematical computation” (Harris, 1945: 30). Strausz-Hupé’s inventory of the world’s resources - his ‘Geopolitical Index’ - demonstrates firstly, the great power potential of the United States, and secondly, speculates on the emergence of other great powers. The conclusions he draws are extremely important because they represent the Soviet Union in a manner threatening to US globalist ambitions. Strausz-Hupé firmly believes that the United States rose to great power status because of the ‘unparalleled freedom of
movement of persons, goods, and capital” (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 26) in the nineteenth century. His conclusions of an emerging power mass in Russia and a more distant one in India,² construct a world with only two immediate great powers, and posit the US and USSR in direct competition. However, it is interesting that his representation of the Soviet Union as a threat is much more moderate than in later texts. In 1945 debates in US strategic culture had not firmly established a policy toward the Soviet Union, and Truman’s policy oscillated widely between outright hostility - his ‘get tough approach’ - and acquiescence to Russian demands. It was not until George Kennan’s Long Telegram that the Soviet Union became firmly established in US strategic culture as threatening to US ambitions and security. The Balance of Tomorrow is, therefore, extremely interesting because it was written at a time when the nature of the Soviet Union and its relationship to the United States was under contestation, and a script for interpreting Soviet actions had yet to be developed. It is worth examining Strausz-Hupé’s arguments in some detail because of the uses he makes of geopolitical theory in constructing the Soviet Union as a potential threat to the United States. Although Strausz-Hupé had previously critiqued the notion of timeless truths in geopolitical theory, the concept of the heartland as the pivot of world history is crucial to his analyses and conclusions.

**Population and Power**

Strausz-Hupé begins his analysis of the emerging world order by discussing the implications of world population dynamics for the distribution of power. Although he
predicts an increase of one fifth for the US population between 1940 and 1970, the issue of central importance is how this growth compares with other nations because a relative loss \textit{vis a vis} an opposing nation constitutes a loss in power. In Europe he finds the only country with a potential for substantial population growth is Russia, predicting an increase from 174 million in 1940, to 251 million in 1970. This estimate is based on Russia’s 1939 borders, and is revised to 285m if the boundaries of 1941 are restored. Through implication, Strausz-Hupé alerts policy makers to dangers inherent in peace settlements generous to the Soviet Union. By 1970, Russia could possess sufficient numbers of men to overrun Europe.

If this projection comes close to what Russia’s population will be in fact, then there will be in 1970 more Russians than all of western and central Europeans combined, including Germany, Great Britain and France, the Great Powers of the nineteenth century (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 76).

Strausz-Hupé’s finding - that the US population is growing at a slower rate to that of Russia - leads him to call for a ‘demographic rearmament’ and the management of the US population based on the dictates of state power.

The linkage Strausz-Hupé makes between a nation’s power and knowledge of its population’s demographic characteristics, raises an interesting theoretical issue concerning the operation of power in society. According to Foucault (1978), large scale regulation and study of population first emerged in the early eighteenth century as part of a shift from juridical power to disciplinary power. Juridical power manifested itself in the sovereign’s right to exercise authority over the life and death of his subjects. In this
sense, power “was essentially a right of seizure: of things, times, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it” (Foucault, 1978: 136). However, in the early eighteenth century and with the development of capitalism, studies of population were crucial in constituting a new relationship between the state and its citizenship. Juridical power, was supplanted by a disciplinary power, based on “the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life”. Population studies were important for “achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of ‘bio-power’” (Foucault, 1978: 140). In essence, Strausz-Hupé is calling for a disciplining of the population to tailor their reproductive patterns to further the ability of the state to wage war. He is attempting to alert policy makers to the necessities of encouraging population growth, and managing population characteristics to serve the dictates of state power.

**Raw Materials and Power**

The reduction of foreign policy to military power, leads Strausz-Hupé’s discussion of raw materials to concern itself only with resources useful to the military. His inventorisation of the world’s resources geopolitically defines space only in terms of access to coal and iron because:

only those countries will retain Great Power status which either possess ample deposits of iron and coal, or are richly endowed with one and enjoy strategic access to the other (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 122).
Strausz-Hupé notes that with large concentrations of coal found in only a few areas, only a small number of nations are significant coal producers. In peacetime the US produced 40 per cent of the world’s coal, and along with Britain, Germany, and Russia, accounted for four fifths of world coal production. Although Russian coal production is currently behind the US and Germany, Strausz-Hupé argues that “a great expansion of Russian coal output is virtually certain while no substantial increase elsewhere is in sight” (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 123). With little qualification Strausz-Hupé expects Russia, alone among world nations, to increase coal production. Moreover, because the geographical distribution of coal in Western Europe between the Ruhr Valley, Saar Basin, Holland, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Northern France, ensures no single state controls extremely large quantities, his estimate of Russia’s coal resources at “a stupendous 1000 billion tons” suggests an immense Russian power potential looming menacingly over individually weak European nations. This image would later be utilised in debates pushing for the formation of multilateral defence organisations and a permanent US military presence in Europe. In fact, Strausz-Hupé argues that it is strategically important to integrate the Ruhr industrial region into a single West European industrial system. This would, he argues, solve the ‘German question’ by removing Germany’s monopoly over this resource rich region, but, “it does not answer as a matter of course the question of the economic future of eastern Europe. It is this, not the German question, which poses the future problem of Europe” (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 163).
In terms of access to iron ore, only the US and Russia can be considered major powers. In 1937, Russia was third in world production of iron ores, but Strausz-Hupé warns that through using American and German technology it is rapidly developing “a vast autonomous industrial system in Russian Asia” (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 130). He catalogues the achievements of numerous Russian industrial complexes and highlights the Magnitogorsk steel plant which “resembles the Carnegie Illinois plant at Gary, Ind., and when completed is designed to outproduce the Gary plant” (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 131). The imagery of the Russians taking American ideas, tools, designs, and improving on them, preparing a more powerful system than the blueprints they borrowed, is provocative. Furthermore, Strausz-Hupé suggests the Russians are hiding their achievements and secretly building a huge military capability:

No exact figures of the capacity and output of the combine have been released...The Soviet government has made available photographs, facts, and figures descriptive of individual plants and townships. But when these data are compared with the detailed information available for American or British economic activities of all kinds, the striking fact is brought home how little concrete knowledge the outside world possesses about a development designed on so gigantic a scale. The picture of the whole development is far from complete (original emphasis) (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 131).

Strausz-Hupé subsequently warns that:

Russia has lavished prodigious energies upon her arsenal of military power in Eastern Asia thus activating the potentials of that region which in Sir Halford Mackinder’s prophetic metaphor is the ‘heartland’ of Asia and the ‘pivot of world history’ (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 132).
Strausz-Hupé constructs an image of Russia which is secretly and rapidly developing an “arsenal of military power”. Moreover, he uses Mackinder’s heartland theory to raise the possibility that Russia’s vast resources, coupled with its strategic location, could lead to control of the ‘heartland’ - the key to global domination.

**Political Organisation and Power**

Strausz-Hupé’s discussion of political organisation and power has important implications for US domestic politics. Distancing himself from New Deal ideologies he questions the need for greater governmental control and centralised planning of the economy and public life.

Only by central planning, it is said, can the problems of modern industrialization be dealt with efficiently. The validity of this assertion need be examined only in so far as it concerns the external power of the state, which includes the power to wage peace as well as war (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 175).

By only addressing the external power of the state, Strausz-Hupé’s search for a form of political organisation is concerned exclusively with military power, and social questions are placed beyond immediate consideration. He argues that advances in military technology can radically alter the power balance, and therefore, national security requires the form of political organisation most conducive to technological progress. Historically, free market capitalism has been the driving force behind technological advancement, and from Strausz-Hupé’s perspective, the government should not get directly involved in the market place because it is the entrepreneur, driven by profit and competition, who is best

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suited to decide what to produce, when, and how much. The role of the government is to provide a free capitalistic framework within which these decisions can be made. However, because the belief exists that a planned economy is more conducive to technological progress, Strausz-Hupé addresses the ‘facts’. The ‘evidence’ of technological progress under a centralised economy is compared with technological progress under decentralised economy. The indices he chooses as indicative of technological progress are the growth in National Income and the number of patents issued by year. By simplistically reducing technological progress to a comparison of two factors, he ignores the conditions under which progress was made, and excludes from consideration potential for future increase.

Furthermore, according to Strausz-Hupé, only Russia can provide an example of centralised planning. The economic progress of Germany under the highly interventionist authoritarian Nazi government does not provide a relevant comparison. Strausz-Hupé points out that within Nazi Germany the “capitalist system was far from abolished” (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 183). This logic conveniently effaces the legitimacy of any argument seeking to look at progress under a wartime economy as an example of governmental intervention and planning. The comparison is invalid on the grounds that the planners were conditioned by capitalism. Similarly, the gains made in Russia can also be explained as emanating from an inherited bourgeois mentality. The revolutionists fell “heir to an invaluable legacy of bourgeois know-how and a bourgeois trained work force”
(Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 189). This interpretative framework allows all technological progress to be seen as the product of a capitalistic system. He argues that capitalism and its decentralised free economy is the only system conducive to technological progress, from which stems military power and security.

The emphasis he places on technological progress, its importance to the military, and the stifling effects of governmental control, can be placed in the context of domestic political debates within the US. In contrast to Strausz-Hupé’s view stressing the stifling effects of centralised planning in the economy, in 1945 there was widespread pressure on government from unions and labour groups for the development of a national planning effort. In the fall and winter of 1945 the US experienced a wave of strikes and union activity concerned with developing strategies for preventing the onset of depression.

Although the strikes caused massive loss in worker-production hours, Nathanson (1988: 453) argues:

At issue was the shape of collective bargaining and the nature of postwar unionism. In the forefront of labor thinking was a “national planning effort” that would make labor “a co-equal with management” with the government serving as an “arbiter” between them...By extending the scope of bargaining to prices and profits, union leaders hoped to show that they were not a “special interest” but rather a force of “republican virtue” working for the “common good”.

In response to these concerns the government passed a full employment bill that provided for government planning, curtailing monopolistic practises, and the redistribution of wealth. Indeed, in 1944 and 1945 it seemed that New Deal style policies
were set to continue (Nathonson, 1988). Strausz-Hupé saw this movement, and in
general the New Deal years, as dangerously close to revolutionary change. Discussing the
New Deal in his biography, Strausz-Hupé (1965: 127-128) remarks:

Perhaps it was the memories of my Mid-European youth that slanted my
views on bold social experiments, for in my most impressionable years I
had had my fill of revolutionary politics...when faced with choice between
ostentatious wealth and ostentatious social consciousness, I would
unhesitatingly choose the former, for its exponents are politically less
dangerous and, in general, more pleasant to live with.

His ideas can be seen as part of the discourse challenging the left, and advocating a move
away from New Deal style governmental planning and its concerns with social welfare.

By linking governmental organisation to issues of power, and therefore ultimately to
security, advocates of increased governmental planning have their position marginalised.

A centralised economy stifles technological progress which will threaten security.

**Toward the Future**

The book ends where it began with America at the crossroads of foreign policy.

Having demonstrated that the US has sufficient ‘chips’ to play the power game, Strausz-
Hupé clearly advocates an active foreign policy. In the short term, he envisages a future
bi-polar world with only two major powers - the United States and the Soviet Union.

Although Strausz-Hupé notes that “there was and is no major conflict between
the United States and Russia” (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 267), he later argues that “the
ideological truce between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies was imposed by
the exigencies of coalition warfare” (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 268). With the coalition now
coming to an end, peaceful coexistence is out of the question because “the ideological conflict between communism and democracy is fundamental” (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 268).

It is this ideological alternative offered by Communism that threatens Western civilisation. If the democratic nations fail to provide solutions to their problems and those of the ‘backward countries’:

then the pull of the ideological pole Moscow will become irresistible - not because the Soviet Union has solved these problems better but because the division of the world along one single line of ideological cleavage offers no other alternative (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 270).

Strausz-Hupé’s vision of an active foreign policy therefore incorporates promoting Western style capitalistic democracy throughout the world to prevent the spread of Communism. The dangers inherent in not doing this are expressed explicitly in geopolitical terms:

Sir Halford Mackinder’s concept of the “heartland” is today no less relevant than when it was first presented in 1904, the fundamental axiom of world politics. If domination of the land locked plains of European Russia is joined to the domination of East Central Europe between the Baltic, Adriatic and Aegean, then the condition obtains to which Sir Halford conceived as the final step to the mastery of Europe. If the control of Siberia and central Asia is joined to the control of North China, Manchuria, and Korea, then the monsoon countries will be bracketed by the power which, in Sir Halford’s metaphor, controls the “pivot of world history”, and the “world island” will be dominated by a single master, the final step to mastery of the globe (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 262).

Russia’s geographical location affords her the potential position of global domination.

Continuing to push the geopolitical theme and the dangers of spreading Communism, Strausz-Hupé warns:
If India and the Far East were to enter the Soviet power sphere, the greatest and most populous land empire in history would have become a reality surpassing the creation of Ghengis Kahn and the vision of Lenin (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 265).

In these passages Strausz-Hupé use Mackinder’s theories to argue that it is imperative that the US undertake an internationalist foreign policy. His argument subtly scripts a future bi-polar world that posits the US and USSR in direct competition. The writing of the Soviet Union as a threat is not overly explicit, but is alluded to and is stressed in geopolitical terms. Despite critiquing Mackinder’s theories in Geopolitics, Strausz-Hupé resurrects the spectre of a nation controlling the ‘pivot of world history’ in order to attack those advocating a return to pre-war isolationism. With his analysis of the factors underlying state power, Strausz-Hupé believes that the West can prevent the spread of Communism, but it is interesting to note that Strausz-Hupé seems reluctant to warn of Soviet expansionism. He does highlight the fact that the Soviets may have a taste for victory and have been an expansionist power in the past, but the emphasis in his analysis is put on Western action to prevent countries being drawn to Communism. This assertion stresses the importance of an international role for the US, being the West’s most powerful nation, and marginalises isolationists because Strausz-Hupé has demonstrated that Russia has great power potential and only an internationalist foreign policy can prevent this being realised.

During the Second World War Strausz-Hupé used his surprising entrance into academia in the early 1940s to further his standing as a commentator on foreign policy
and an expert in the field of geopolitics. In addition to cultivating influential contacts in Washington, Strausz-Hupé became heavily involved in the expansion of geopolitics in government and in the development of geopolitical curricula in the armed services. With the end of the war Strausz-Hupé decided to commit himself to a career in academia and looked forward to his return to Pennsylvania. As he had suggested in *The Balance of Tomorrow*, the future was uncertain for the US, but whatever shape it took Strausz-Hupé believed his was an important view for the public and policy makers to consider.

I harboured the unshakeable belief, so necessary to the writer and so presumptuous to all around him, that I had unique insights to put on paper and that a multitude of readers waited for my revelations. Indeed, without a quota of such vanity, most books, even some great ones, would never have been written (Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 215-216).

Before returning to Pennsylvania however, after a request from James Forrestal, Strausz-Hupé left the uncertainty and strategic debates of the post war behind him and went on a fact finding trip to China. The US that he would return to in late 1947 would be remarkably different to the one he had left.

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1 Coogan (1991: 254) notes that an interim report describes the information collected and distributed by “M” Project is described as “Geopolitical Information”.

2 Strausz-Hupe’s discussion of emerging powers does not focus exclusively on the United States an the Soviet Union but is a wide ranging study encompassing most areas of the globe. For reasons of scope only his writing with respect to the Soviet Union is discussed here because Strausz-Hupe believed the Soviets were the nation most likely to challenge the US in the short term. However, in the long run he believed Asian nations and in particular India would emerge as great powers. The task for the United States, he argued, was to bring these newly emerging nations into the American ‘orbit’, or lose them to the Soviet Union.
CHAPTER 5

PROTRACTING CONFLICT

When Harry Truman announced the Truman Doctrine on 12 March 1947, it was becoming widely accepted in US strategic culture that the Soviet Union represented a threat to US national security. Although the Soviet Union had been consistently articulated as a threat to the US since the 1917 revolution, the war time alliance and the huge Soviet wartime sacrifices had seen antipathy toward the Soviets subside in Washington, particularly in New Deal circles, and, more generally, across the US (Nathanson, 1988). In 1945, there was certainly a measure of support in Washington for cooperation and accommodation with the Soviets, yet by 1947 they had moved from being an ally of the US to its primary enemy. “Uncle Joe” of the interwar years was quickly replaced in the US popular imagination by an image of Stalin as a ruthless, authoritarian dictator, bent on the destruction of the capitalist world, and, by implication, of the United States.

Washington’s relationship to the Soviet Union in the years immediately preceding the Truman doctrine was characterised by extreme uncertainty and ambiguity, partly a result of confusion regarding Soviet post war objectives. Although the Soviets possessed massive military numerical advantage over other allied troops stationed in Europe, a number of US intelligence reports argued that the Soviets posed no direct military threat to Europe or the US. A Joint Intelligence Staff report on 9 November 1945 concluded

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that because the Soviets lacked modern equipment (half the transport of the Soviet standing army was horse drawn until 1950), skilled technicians, and were extremely vulnerable to air attack, they would be unlikely to risk a major war for fifteen years. This view was subsequently supported by CIA reports in 1947, 1948, and 1949, and by comments from high ranking foreign observers (Evangelista, 1982; Campbell, 1992). Moreover, there were signs that Stalin was willing to compromise over the status of political regimes in Eastern Europe. The general belief was that Soviets were primarily concerned with security on their borders and although Stalin desired a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe he did not necessarily require these nations to be Communist. As Nathanson (1988: 444) argues, “the name of the game in Washington in 1945 was still mutual accommodation through negotiation. However reluctant some US policy makers were to play that game, they were compelled to do so until they could find a way to define another”.

Central to explaining the sharp shift in US perceptions of the Soviet Union is the arrival on 22 February 1946 of George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” from Moscow, and its subsequent publication in 1947 under the pseudonym “Mr. X”. These two articles are widely accredited with providing the rationale behind the Truman Doctrine, which was essentially presented as a reaction to a presumed threat of Communist expansion. Nathanson (1988: 445) argues that in Kennan’s Long Telegram, policy makers “found a new language or script, for interpreting the meaning of Soviet behaviour, and for guiding
their responses to it in a manner that might satisfy their own institutional interests and ambitions”. Moreover, according to Ó’Tuathail and Agnew (1992, 199), the reasoning found in the “Mr. X” article “helped codify and constitute central elements of what became Cold War discourse”.

Strausz-Hupé’s work on the Cold War did not begin until his return from Europe in late 1947, and, as such, it should be read within the discursive and interpretative framework established by Kennan in 1946. Many of Strausz-Hupé’s Cold War writings reproduced the view established in the Long Telegram. However, this should not belittle the importance of Strausz-Hupé’s work because in order for Kennan’s view to remain predominant the script required the Soviet threat’s continual reproduction: (Nathonson, 1988). Before discussing the fundamentally important arguments in Kennan’s Long Telegram and exploring Strausz-Hupé’s Cold War discourse, it is instructive to examine first some key concerns of US leaders, policy makers, and business elites, which help explain why Kennan’s view of world events in 1947 was so readily accepted.

**Origins of the Cold War**

With the end of the Second World War in Europe and Japan, the United States found itself in a globally pre-eminent position. In 1945 the United States controlled over half the world’s GNP, most of its food resources, and while its wartime allies lay in economic devastation the war had stimulated a huge expansion of US industrial
production (Cox, 1990). Moreover, with sole possession of the atomic bomb and the demonstrated will to use it, the United States was the world’s foremost military power.

There was a widespread belief within the Roosevelt and Truman administrations that continued US prosperity depended on the creation of an open global economy free from the tariffs and protectionism that characterised the pre-war era (Agnew, 1993). In the short run, US success in avoiding depression during the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy depended on a $15 bn export trade, but the inability of an economically devastated Europe to purchase American manufactures seriously threatened the US’s staggering recovery (LaFeber, 1993). In the long run, it was feared that economic stagnation in Europe could become a breeding ground for socialism and Communism, and without a quick economic recovery Europe may forge closer ties with the Soviet Union. After the war there was a discernible trend to the left in European politics with the politically organised working classes pressuring their governments to return to pre-war protectionism to allow for the enactment of social welfare problems.

There was, therefore, a fear that Europe would increasingly lean to Socialist policies, and forge closer links with the Soviet Union leaving the United States isolated from the Eurasian continent. From the US perspective, economic recovery required a massive capital investment to reconstruct the devastated economies of Western Europe and orientate them toward the United States. This would reestablish a market for US goods, dampen protectionist tendencies, and proclinate a liberal capitalist ideology.
isolating the European left and the Soviet Union. However, the problem for policy makers in 1946 was the lack of a pretext for intervention because the US public was unlikely to sanction massive economic aid to Europe while experiencing their own domestic problems.

Two events radically changed US policy. Firstly, on 21 February 1946 the British informed the US that it was no longer able to keep sending aid to Greece and requested assistance fighting Communist insurgency. The request amounted to an abdication of British power in the Mediterranean and an open invitation for US intervention. Secondly, on 22 February George Kennan sent his famous Long Telegram giving Truman a Cold War script that would justify massive US economic aid to Europe in the form of the Marshall Plan, the closing of Western Europe to the Soviets through the creation of NATO, and the permanent presence of US troops, and, through a rabid anti-communism, a clamp down on union and labour activity at home.

Furthermore, fears of the Soviet threat allowed the Democrats to forge a new political coalition that would shape US politics for most of the Cold War (Wolfe, 1981). In the immediate aftermath of World War Two, isolationism began to reemerge in the Republican party and Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition was falling apart. According to Wolfe (1987: 67), “to stay in power, the Democrats needed a theme that would simultaneously give them a conservative tinge and thereby protect them from the Right, while also enabling them to rationalize domestic spending and retain the loyalty of the
electoral groups on the left”. The creation of a Soviet threat and the conceptual emergence of ‘national security’ defined in global terms allowed Truman to forge a new political coalition under the rubric of ‘Cold War liberalism’. Unified through a commitment to a ‘politics of growth’ and through appeals to national security, Cold War liberalism could seek growth at home through military Keynesianism, and growth overseas through empire. Wolfe (1979: 34) argues that this coalition “could never have been achieved without one essential ingredient: the fear of the Soviet threat”.

The Long Telegram

There are two crucial features to the arguments Kennan put forward in the Long Telegram and Mr. X article. Firstly, through three different sets of textual metaphors he produced powerful images of a Soviet Union that was untrustworthy, dangerous, and relentlessly expansionist. Ó’Tuathail and Agnew (1992) illustrate that in his text Kennan represented the Soviets as Oriental, as emanating from an Other world with a different value system to ‘us’ in the West; as potential rapists, against which “the United States was able to act as the tough masculine guardian of Western Europe (Ó’Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 200); and through the image of “the Red Flood”, he described the nature of the Soviet threat in a language that utilised images of flows, relentless pressure, and the possibility of flood if the dam of containment is breached.

Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, towards a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these
philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal (Kennan, 1947: 575).

Secondly, Kennan based his analysis of Soviet conduct on official Soviet sources. He emphasised the Soviet fear of “capitalist encirclement” and their belief that, in the long run, peaceful coexistence between Communism and capitalism was impossible.

Moreover, he argued that:

If the Soviet Government occasionally sets its signature to documents that would indicate to the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical manoeuvre permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of *caveat emptor* (Kennan, 1947: 572).

Kennan developed a script that allowed Soviet actions, whether ‘reconciliatory’ or ‘aggressive’, to be interpreted as threatening. Referring to the Long Telegram, Nathanson (1988: 462) argues that in the years the Soviet Union moved from being an ally to constituting a dangerous threat “what had changed was not Soviet behaviour but the US method of interpreting it”.

Kennan’s discourse provided policy makers with a script that legitimised the Truman doctrine of containment, which would dominate US foreign policy until the mid 1960s. The textual strategies he used constructed the Soviets as dangerous Others, and inserted them into an interpretative framework from which they could not escape. However, in order for the US to continually justify an extremely expensive military commitment to Europe, and expand this to a global military commitment, Cold War discourse needed to continually recreate the Soviet threat.
Robert Strausz-Hupé and Cold War Discourse

Strausz-Hupé's writing during the Cold War can be tentatively divided into three periods, each characterised by a particular set of concerns. The first of these covers the period 1948 to 1952 when the US possessed Atomic superiority (absolute supremacy prior to 22 September 1949) and, not beset by internal problems on the scale of the Soviet Union was clearly the most 'powerful' nation. During this period Strausz-Hupé was principally concerned with Europe believing the US could use its power supremacy to impose a favourable settlement on the Soviet Union. It was also a period where, professionally, Strausz-Hupé consolidated his position within the Political Science Department at the University of Pennsylvania, and within the newly emerging field of International Relations. In 1950, along with Stefan Possony - who worked with Strausz-Hupé on 'M' Project and would later become famous for his book The Strategy of Technology Winning the Decisive War (1970) that inspired Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" program in the 1980s - he published his 'disciplinary text' International Relations: In the Age of Conflict Between Democracy and Dictatorship. This text served as the basis for the graduate courses Strausz-Hupé taught until he departed the University in 1969.

The second period concerns the years 1954 to 1957 when the focus of the Cold War shifted away from Europe to include the Middle East and Asia. Strausz-Hupé's principal concern was the Soviet expansion of influence among the 'uncommitted peoples' and their simultaneous consolidation of power over Eastern Europe. During this
period Strausz-Hupé also worked to institutionalise his particular approach to international relations and extend its influence over policy makers. In 1955, with a grant from the North Carolina based Richardson Foundation, he founded the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) at the University of Pennsylvania. The Institute hoped to produce a number of basic studies “which will be of value in the formulation of future American policies”, and to develop “methods appropriate to basic research in international relations (Orbis editors, 1957: 3). In addition to book length studies, the FPRI established a quarterly journal, Orbis, to allow the publication of short articles and invite contributions from outside of the Institute. Among its founder members the FPRI included Stefan Possony; Hans Kohn author of The Idea of Nationalism (1944) and, ironically, given the arguments Strausz-Hupé made in the 1940s, a contributor in the 1930s to The Journal of Geopolitics founded by Haushofer in 1924 (Bassin, 1987); Henry Kissinger, a rising star of geopolitical discourse in the 1950s; and Colonel William Kinter, an army officer who like Strausz-Hupé wrote on German Geopolitics during the 1940s. Not surprisingly, in addition to the studying US foreign policy the FPRI sought to promote the attention paid to geography by policy makers.

My friends and I felt that the American people and American academia had not paid sufficient attention to developments abroad and new developments in the uses of geography. Very specifically, we believed that the foreign policies of the great powers were rooted in geography, even if they themselves did not understand it. You cannot argue with geography. It doesn’t pay (Interview with Robert Strausz-Hupé, 15 May 1995).
The final, and most controversial period of Strausz-Hupé’s work on the Cold War covers the period 1957 to 1961. In 1959, the FPRI released an extremely influential study of Soviet strategy entitled *Protracted Conflict*, that substantially raised the profile and influence of the FPRI and saw Strausz-Hupé become implicated in a political storm in Washington and in the University of Pennsylvania. At the centre of the controversy was a memo sent from Senator James Fulbright, a leading critic of US Cold War foreign policy and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to President Kennedy and Defence Secretary Robert S. MacNamara. In the memo Fulbright raised concern over abuse by certain military leaders of a 1958 National Security Directive, and more generally over military participation in radical right wing seminars conducted by the FPRI and the Institute for American Strategy (IAS). Both of these institutes were financed by the Richardson Foundation.

Fulbright had legitimate cause for concern. The Richardson Foundation was a well financed right wing organisation bankrolled by Vicks Chemical Company which in 1958 had assets totalling over $13 million. Because the Richardson Foundation does not publish an annual report it has proved difficult to investigate its institutional and financial interests. However, according to Lyons and Morton (1961), the Foundation’s interest in foreign affairs largely resulted from the appointment of Frank Barnett as research director. Before joining the Foundation, Barnett, a former Rhodes scholar, had a history of anti-Communist activity. He was president of the American Friends of Russian Freedom, a
committee formed to assist the escape of White Russians from the Soviet Union and in 1951 in an article in *The Congressional Record* he requested $100 000 000 from Congress, proposing the formation of a foreign legion for refugees from Communism (Hans and Neff, 1960).

In his position as director of research at the Foundation, Barnett directed funds into the establishment of two research institutes the FPRI and IAS which received $153 000 and $108 000 respectively, from the Foundation in 1958, 1959, and 1960. Although marketed as ‘independent,’ the IAS had clear institutional links with the military, corporate elites, and industrial-military conglomerates.

The Institute for American Strategy originally grew out of a symposium on the utilization of technical and scientific manpower, held in Chicago in March 1955, and sponsored by the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, the Society of American Military Engineers, the Illinois Institute of Technology, and various branches of the armed forces. Called the National Military-Industrial Conference, the symposium brought together leaders of industry and government and enjoyed sponsorship of some of the largest corporations in the country (Lyons and Morton, 1961: 105).

Moreover, the figure of Barnett provides a close personal link between the IAS and the FPRI. Lyons and Morton (1961) argue that the two institutes were essentially formed to publicise Barnett’s anti-Communist message and program of action. The work of the FPRI formed the rational for Barnett’s message, while the IAS, through the organisation of meetings and seminars, acted as a public relations unit.

In 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff invited the double institute Richardson Foundation to take over key teaching functions at the National War College, which,
according to Cook (1962: 594) “is one of the most important idea-formulating agencies of
the federal government”. Strausz-Hupé was charged with curricula development and he
imported his own staff from the FPRI for teaching duties. In effect, as Lyon and Morton
(1961: 106) argue, the double Institute Richardson foundation “took over from the
services the responsibility for training reserve officers on active duty, even though the
National War College, whose facilities were used, had been giving courses on strategy to
senior officers on three services as well as civilians for the past ten years”. The impact on
influential establishment figures was substantial. Attending each seminar were two
hundred and twelve reserve officers, three congressmen, seventy educators, and over forty
members of the media from newspapers, radio, and television (Hahn and Neff, 1960).
Moreover, following the Washington seminars numerous regional seminars were organised
- in New York, Chicago, Cleveland, New Orleans, Wilmington, California, Massachusetts,
and Texas. According to Hans and Neff (1960), the seminars reached out to tens of
thousands of Americans, the principle audience drawn from business, financial,
educational, industrial, and military leaders. It should be noted that Hans and Neff are
members of the IAS and the above figure seems hyperbolic, but the intention behind the
seminar series is clear. This astonishingly rapid expansion of the FPRI’s and IAS’s
influence over national strategy led Cook (1962: 595) to comment that “the speed with
which Strausz-Hupé, Kinter and Possony have moved into a position of commanding
influence as foreign policy oracles was in itself so remarkable as to suggest that somebody up there decidedly must have liked them”.

Fulbright’s memo was initially prompted by an article in the New York Times that reported the repremand of Major General Edwin A. Walker for indoctrinating troops and civilians with radical political theories “resembling those of the John Birch Society” (Phillps, 1961: 1). Walker took his actions under a 1958 National Security Council Directive urging the “mobilization of all arms of government - military, diplomatic, civilian - in the ‘cold war’ struggle” (Phillips, 1961: 56). The Security Council Directive, Fulbright argued, had resulted in a profligation of military sponsored seminars that “made use of extremely radical right-wing speakers and/or materials, with the probable net result of condemning foreign and domestic politics of the [Kennedy] administration in the public mind” (Fulbright, 1961: 224). At issue, Fulbright argued, was military subordination to civilian control, because “military officers are not elected by the people, and they have no responsibility for the formation of policies other than military policies” (Fulbright, 1961: 222).

Fulbright’s concern with the Richardson Foundation activities centred on the extreme right wing message being taught to military officers and more importantly its sponsorship by government authorities that gave a false legitimacy to Barnett’s program. Moreover, attaching the Lyons and Morton article “School for Strategy” to his memorandum he expressed concern over the impartiality of these organisations given their
close connections with the military. Finally, Fulbright (1961: 225) argued that after Kennedy referred to “the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out” in his inaugural Presidential address, the US was in a period of history where “the menace of the Cold War” had great appeal to both the public and military. With this social climate, the impressionability of military offers, military attempts to ‘educate’ the public, and the fact that “there are numerous military ‘fingers on the trigger’” (Fulbright, 1961: 227), Fulbright foresaw severe dangers in Strausz-Hupé’s strategy seminars.

The radicalism of the right can be expected to have mass appeal during such periods. It offers the simple solution, easily understood: scouring the devils within the body politic or, in the extreme, lashing out at the enemy.

If the military is infected with this virus of right-wing radicalism, the danger is worthy of attention. If it believes the public is, the danger is enhanced. If, by the process of the military “educating” the public, the fevers of both groups are raised, the danger is great indeed (Fulbright, 1961: 226-227).

In response to these dangers Fulbright made a number of recommendations to Kennedy and McNamara. These included reconsidering the National Security Directive; reestablishing the broad principle of civilian control over the military; reviewing the organisation, mission, and operation of the National War College; exposing military officers to broader education opportunities; review by a civilian committee of troop education activities; and,

The relationships between the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Institute for American Strategy, the Richardson Foundation, the National War College, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be re-examined, from the standpoint of whether these relationships do not amount to official
support for a viewpoint at variance with that of the administration. These relationships may give one particularly aggressive view a more direct and commanding influence upon military and civilian concepts of strategy than is desirable (Fulbright, 1961: 229).

Fulbright’s memo resulted in a political storm in Washington and precipitated a heated exchange between Fulbright and Senator J. Strom Thurman. Thurman charged that the memo amounted to an attempt to “muzzle anti-Communist comment” (NYT 28 Aug 1961: 14) and accused columnists writing about the memo of falling into a “Red Trap” (NYT, 29 August 1961: 3). Moreover, Senator Olin D. Johnson, a South Carolina colleague of Thurman, without mentioning Fulbright by name, charged “that Communists are attempting to destroy anti-Communist movements and elements with smear tactics and organized propaganda” (NYT 19 August 1961: 8). Ironically, as will become evident, the ease with which Fulbright and other critics could be branded ‘Communist’ partly resulted from Strausz-Hupé’s analysis of Soviet strategy in *Protracted Conflict*.

The political controversy in Washington spilled over to the campus of the University of Pennsylvania when a faculty committee publicly disassociated the views of the FPRI from the University. Speaking for eleven faculty members Dr. Elizabeth Flower stated that “the FPRI misrepresents my view as a teacher and as a representative of the University, I don’t want them to speak for me” (Bargenllini, 1962: 1). Further to Flower’s statement, both Strausz-Hupé and University Provost Dr. David Goddard disassociated the University from views put forward by the FPRI.
By the mid 1960s Strausz-Hupé’s writing on the Cold War became less frequent. In 1964 his career entered another phase when he moved into politics working as an adviser for Barry Goldwater during his campaign for the Republican Presidential nomination. In 1969 he entered the diplomatic service as ambassador to Sri Lanka and the 1970s and 1980s saw him work variously as ambassador to Belgium, Sweden, NATO, and Turkey.

To give one a sense of Strausz-Hupé’s arguments, let us consider in more detail his work in each of the three historical periods mentioned earlier.

**The Cold War in Europe: 1948 - 1952**

In a reference to Kennan’s “Mr. X” article, Strausz-Hupé expressed his puzzlement over the debate on the “sources of Soviet conduct” (Strausz-Hupé, 1948b). For him, Soviet motivations, objectives, and strategies were clear. Like Kennan he believed they were self-evident in Soviet, and more specifically, Lenin’s, writings, deriving their significance primarily from Communist ideology and its stated objective to overthrow capitalism. As Strausz-Hupé explains, “Lenin wrote that ‘it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue for a long period side by side with imperialist states; ultimately one or the other must conquer’; and this sentiment received the sanction of Stalin’s unqualified approval in his own *Essays on Leninism*” (Strausz-Hupé, 1948b: 54). Thus, as in his analysis of Nazi propaganda in 1941, Strausz-Hupé read Soviet writings as fixed, unproblematic, and transparent statements of policy.
Strausz-Hupé repeated a further message of World War Two discourse with his revelation that the Soviets had developed a plan for global conquest. The grand strategy he exposes emphasised not a military threat but the Soviet “policy of penetration” (Strausz-Hupé, 1948b: 54) and the threat to Western democracies of economic collapse and internal subversion.

Long before he undertook, in 1917, to turn the police state of the czars into the police state of the Bolsheviks Lenin formulated Soviet grand strategy against the Western democracies. His scheme called for the exploitation by revolutionary methods of the economic difficulties which he foresaw would plague Europe and America as a result of a World War. The execution of the scheme he assigned to the communist parties in the advanced industrial - Western - countries (Strausz-Hupé, 1950a: 12).

While the Soviets had developed a global grand strategy, Strausz-Hupé lamented the lack of a coherent Western strategy. Writing in 1948 before the Russian Atomic bomb test, Strausz-Hupé argued that the superiority of US power should be used to impose its own will on Europe (Strausz-Hupé, 1948b). Even after Russia's successful Atomic Bomb test this was still a line he pushed, because he believed Russia would welcome “the release from an armament race she cannot win” (Strausz-Hupé, 1950b: 12). However, confusion and ambiguity over policy objectives prevented the successful consummation of US power. He argued that, “today we have a diplomatic big stick, a public opinion ready to use it, but no precise understanding of what we want to get by diplomacy and what we are prepared to concede” (Strausz-Hupé, 1951: 12). Strausz-Hupé ambitiously
suggested a peace settlement requiring Russian withdrawal from Eastern Germany, Austria, Western Poland, Hungary, the Balkans, and Manchuria.

Strausz-Hupé based his recommendations on geopolitical considerations and on the belief that a European balance of power should be re-established. These concessions, he argued, would reduce “Russia’s capacity for waging aggressive war” because “were the Soviet Union confined to its 1939 borders it would matter comparatively little whether Stalin would or would not ‘work for peace’ or what his ambitions for communist world conquest were” (Strausz-Hupé, 1950b: 12). Restoring Russia’s 1939 borders was alluded to in the Balance of Tomorrow because of power considerations and the implication Soviet territorial expansion had for Soviet population size. Withdrawal from Eastern Europe emphasised those nations whose geographical formulation made them historically important invasion routes to Europe. He believed the buffer states of Eastern Europe initially acted as a cordon sanitaire preventing the Bolshevization of Germany, but now served as “defensive outposts of Russia, if not as Russian approaches to central Europe” (Strausz-Hupé and Possony, 1950: 47). Finally, the strategic mineral resources found in Manchuria underlay his insistence on a Russian withdrawal. In fact, Russia did not occupy Manchuria, the area was controlled by Chinese Communists. However, this misrepresentation illustrates a central characteristic of Strausz-Hupé’s Cold War discourse, namely, the assumption of a singular identity between Russian and other national Communist movements. This allowed him to exaggerate the scale of the Soviet
threat because they became automatically involved in Communist/Nationalist/Neutralist movements anywhere in the world.

The second aspect of Strausz-Hupé’s strategy for the US - the restoration of a European balance of power - is also based on geopolitical and power considerations. Fundamental to the restoration of a power to balance the Soviet Union is the unification of Western European economies, and the full integration of Germany into NATO and the Western alliance.

Strausz-Hupé, who highlighted the importance of Germany’s coal and iron ore deposits in *The Balance of Tomorrow*, repeated this message in stressing the importance of a Western oriented Germany.

The geological formation of northwestern Europe, the juxtaposition of Rhineland coal and Lorraine iron ore meshes the heavy industries of Germany, France, Belgium, and Holland into an economic unity. (Strausz-Hupé and Posony, 1950: 900).

The importance of the Rhur/Rhine industrial region to European and Western recovery was a fact well recognised by US policy makers. According to McCormick (1989: 38), during the Allied liberation of Germany the US rejected British plans to beat the Russians to Berlin, and followed a strategy that ensured Western control of Germany’s primary industrial region after the war.

The rejection was perfectly in keeping with American war aims. Berlin, as the German capital was symbolically important, but of little strategic or economic importance...What was important, strategically and economically, was the Rhur-Rhine industrial core, the Germany that stretched from Stuttgart to Cologne.
The Truman administration approved German integration into NATO and rearmament as early as April 1950 because full integration was deemed essential for European emergence as a viable economic unit in the global economy (McCormick, 1989). However, in the early 1950s, the French, encouraged in part by the Soviet Union, objected to German rearmament fearing a rejuvenation of German power on the continent. Strausz-Hupé believed these objections were misplaced. Presuming that the Soviets threatened Europe he argued that Germany was now France’s natural ally.

Every solution of the German problem entails great dangers but the security and well being of Western Europe must be planned against the primary threat which comes from Moscow and not from Berlin, let alone Bonn. (Strausz-Hupé and Possony, 1950: 904).

In contrast to American plans - to integrate Western Germany into NATO, thus solidifying the East-West division - the Russian’s repeatedly proposed an alternative of a reunified, but demilitarised, Germany. In March 1952, Stalin extended this offer to a proposal that would allow a unified Germany to keep a national army under the stipulation that “a unified and independent Germany” would “be neutralized and all foreign troops withdrawn” (quoted in McCormick, 1989: 108). These proposals met with disdain from Strausz-Hupé. He argued that the “promise of a free Germany under Russian sponsorship is an empty one” because “Stalin knows that a free Germany, cut loose from the Soviet satellite system would line up with the West” (Strausz-Hupé, 1952: 99).
10). This argument was not entirely accurate. According to McCormick (1989: 106) a major concern of US policy makers in the early 1950s was that:

Unintegrated, West Germany might well entertain notions of détente with Russia and neutralism in the Cold War, provided the rewards were reunification of the two Germanys into a single German state and an economic entree into Eastern Europe. Such an opening to the East would be especially likely if the German Social Democrats ever triumphed electorally over the Christian Democrats, for the former not only stressed the reunification issue but clearly favored the state capitalist road of planned production and regulated trade.

Strausz-Hupé’s consistent refusal to grant legitimacy to any Soviet proposal provided ammunition to US policy makers with institutional interests in perpetuating the division. It was based on the assumption that the Communists were inherently expansionist, and if a power vacuum was created in West Germany it would inevitably be filled by Russia. Furthermore, the strategic resources found in Germany meant that the whole defence of the West depended on its participation in the Western Alliance. “West Germany”, he argued, “cannot be left to dangle in a no man’s land between the NATO countries and the Soviet bloc. With ‘Western Germany in our orbit’ we can defend Europe from the Baltic to the Alps. Without Western Germany, defence of the West would be impossible” (Strausz-Hupé, 1952: 10).

Crisis in the Middle East: 1954 - 1957

After the Geneva conference of 1955, the focus of the Cold War shifted away from Europe to the third world, most significantly to the Middle East. The momentum behind this shift was largely provided by the Soviet Union through the abandonment of
Although the Soviet Union had very little involvement in the Suez crisis, the conflict resulting from “America’s heavy-handed manipulation of the Aswan Dam enterprise, first to reward and then to punish Egypt” (McCormick, 1989: 124), Strausz-Hupé read the crisis as a direct result of a “profound change in the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union” (Strausz-Hupé, 1956a: 113). In a number of articles and an extended essay on the Western Alliance, Strausz-Hupé interpreted the crisis in terms that would allow a reinscription of the Soviet threat - just months after the Soviet leadership had dissolved Cominform and “announced that the two camp approach, the belief that war was inevitable, and the fear of ‘capitalist encirclement’ were all unsound doctrines” (LaFeber, 1993: 183). Far from suggesting a greater Russian flexibility and willingness for peaceful coexistence, Strausz-Hupé argued that Russia’s new policy was directed at moving the conflict away from Europe where it was most vulnerable, to the third world where the West had no unified policy or command structure. The purpose of this was threefold. Firstly, diversion of Western attention allowed Russia to consolidate its position in Eastern Europe; secondly, taking the conflict to the third world and ex colonial territories sort to split the Western alliance because of conflicting interests between NATO’s member states in these areas, and thus weakening NATO’s effectiveness in Europe; and thirdly, far from being contained, the Soviets were seeking to encircle the capitalist powers and deprive them of vital raw materials. In response to these tactics,
Strausz-Hupé called for increased military spending, expansion of NATO’s defence mandate, and the enactment of ‘preventative strikes’.

Strausz-Hupé’s exposition of Soviet strategy employs a number of sexual metaphors which construct the Soviets as rapists, and also stress the weakness of the West and the need for a reararmament program. He argues that in the past the West’s military superiority contained Soviet “probing” into Korea and Asia, and argues that “the Soviets would have pressed home these thrusts had they encountered less vigorous opposition...The creation of NATO closed Western Europe not only to whatever military adventures along the Elbe or in the Mediterranean the Soviets might have contemplated, but also to Communist political warfare on the Czechoslovak model” (Strausz-Hupé, 1956a: 112). However, the new Soviet strategy is one of “penetrating areas not explicitly included in the defensive arrangements of NATO. The restriction of NATO’s defensive arrangement to Europe meant that with crisis in the Middle East it proved “a sterile instrument for the preservation of British and French possessions overseas” (Strausz-Hupé, 1956c: 29). Finally, Soviet success in dividing the West and moving the conflict away from Soviet borders meant that the “the Western Alliance was reduced to impotence at the very moment when the Battle of Hungary offered a magnificent opportunity for exploiting a Soviet setback.” (Strausz-Hupé, 1956b: 167).

In response to these tactics Strausz-Hupé argued the area coming under NATO’s defence mandate should be extended giving the West a clear and unified policy in former
colonial areas. He called for greater US leadership in unifying Western resolve and developing a coherent, integrated, Western strategy to deal with the new Soviet tactics. Furthermore, the Soviet consolidation in Eastern Europe required a new round of defence spending aimed at developing the capacity for fighting ‘limited wars’, in addition ‘massive retaliation’.

Protracting Conflict: 1957 - 1961

The FPRI published Protracted Conflict in May 1959 hoping that it would “help to establish a conceptual consensus among American policy groups and opinion elites on the protean nature of the Communist challenge” (Strausz-Hupé et al, 1959: xiv). In addition to providing the theoretical framework for the ‘national strategy seminars’, the book’s thesis received a wide audience prior to publication.

Protracted Conflict actually resulted from a series of FPRI studies dating back to 1955. During its four year preparation, Strausz-Hupé and other Institute members visited and discussed their thesis with top American political and military personnel in a number of different nations affected by the Cold War. In April 1958, five members of the Institute held a series of seminars with staff and faculty of the Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, before drafting the final manuscript in late 1958. Because of the study’s long preparation time a number of its arguments are evident in Strausz-Hupé’s articles written in 1956 and 1957. However, because of the book’s high profile and influential nature I feel it is important to discuss it in its entirety. Moreover, the fixed
and repetitious nature of Strausz-Hupé’s discourse is an issue in itself. At its base, is the assumption that Soviet actions were driven solely by his particular reading of Communist ideology and therefore unable to change. This gross simplification allowed the constant reproduction of the Soviet threat without recognising changes in the international political arena or inside the Soviet Union.

On the original cover of *Protracted Conflict*, Henry Kissinger proclaimed that “It should be read by everyone who wishes to understand the nature of our danger.” The book had extended extracts published in *Reader’s Digest* in January and April 1961, and in the months immediately preceding and following publication Strausz-Hupé pushed the study’s fundamental themes in numerous magazines and journals. Finally, in an address to the Onondaga County Bar Association, Anthony Bouscaren, associate Professor of Political Science, Le Moyne College, Syracuse, referred to it as “one of the most important books of 1959” (Bouscaren, 1960: 603), and gave an extended synopsis of the books arguments to his audience. Let us now examine the fundamental themes Strausz-Hupé argued lay behind Soviet strategy.

**Protracted Conflict Strategy**

*Protracted Conflict* takes its name from Mao’s *On the Protracted War*, a discursive move that reinforces the notion of a monolithic Communist campaign for global domination and over rides the significance of the late 1950s Sino-Soviet split. Its fundamental argument is that the Communists, in their presumed quest for world
revolution, have developed a different view of conflict to the West. Strausz-Hupé argues that Communists take a very long term view of conflict seeing themselves in a perpetual state of revolutionary war whereas the West tends to view war only in terms of ‘battles’. Thus, in periods the West conceptualises as peaceful, the Soviet Union is still, if not explicitly, engaged in revolutionary warfare. Furthermore, protracted conflict strategy is one that utilises all aspects of social, political, psychological, and economical warfare to gain a strategic advantage over the enemy. It is a total view of warfare, the revolutionary doctrine dominates all aspects of society.

Our society does not subordinate all its aspirations to considerations of power; communist dominated societies do. And the struggle being what it is, namely a revolutionary one, communism presses all men and all things into the service of one cause: the overthrow of the existing social order and the establishment of a communist society. It is only within this context that we can read the real meaning of the communist threat and not merely seek to fill the breach opened by the latest communist thrust (Strausz-Hupé, 1959: 13)

In this passage Strausz-Hupé writes the Communists as different and dangerous Others. Unlike ‘us’ in the West they are subsumed by their desire for power and world revolution. Because the West does not understand the true nature of the threat, Western policy is reduced to reacting to each Communist ‘thrust’. Strausz-Hupé’s exposition of protracted conflict strategy is, therefore, intended to illustrate to policy makers the real Communist challenge. In this quest, Strausz-Hupé identifies four inter related principles of protracted conflict strategy; the indirect approach, deception and distraction, monopoly of the initiative, and attrition.
1. The Indirect Approach

The strategy of protracted conflict is one which postpones the decisive battle until the balance of power has swung to the side of the revolutionaries and victory is assured. Thus, Strausz-Hupé argues, when in a position of military weakness the Communists will back away from direct warfare if their incursions are met with a display of force. This was the operating principle behind Soviet withdrawal from Iran in 1946, from South Korea in 1953, and explains Communist reluctance to see the Berlin crisis in 1948 expand into outright war. However, the Communists do not reject military tactics they merely shift to subtler, irregular, and indirect methods. Key aspects of this indirect approach include, using the “gradual approach”, shifting conflict to “gray areas” (Strausz-Hupé et al, 1959: 53), and conducting “war by proxies” (Strausz-Hupé et al, 1959: 56).

Building on his analysis of the Middle East crisis Strausz-Hupé argues that because of Western strength in Europe, the Communists tactic is one of moving the conflict into gray areas which have proved favourable regions for mounting a gradual challenge. Gray areas are those parts of the world not covered by the Western security system, such as Asia and Africa, and where existing national liberation movements serve as useful vehicles for gradual Communist infiltration. The purpose this approach is to localise conflict and not present the West with an overt challenge. Lacking a clear Communist threat and without a unified security system in these areas, the West is
thrown into confusion. Uncertain of the challenge’s authenticity they delay taking action until the situation can no longer be controlled.

Although ‘proxies’ such as nationalist movements are used to conduct war in the third world, Strausz-Hupé is principally concerned with the use national Communist parties to wage war inside the Western alliance. Through national Communist parties he argues that “the Soviet leaders are able to carry out an exasperating daily intervention in the political life of western and neutral states” (Strausz-Hupé et al, 1959: 57). He accentuates the Communist threat inside by warning that in many Western democracies the Communist party holds the parliamentary balance of power, thus controlling many major decisions on domestic and foreign policy. Furthermore:

No one can seriously question the fact, for example, that the hard core of western Communist parties would, in the event of a general conflict, transform itself into a fifth column at the disposal of the Communist high command (Strausz-Hupé et al, 1959: 59).

Because Strausz-Hupé assumes that all Communist parties are directly controlled from Moscow he is able to label Western Communists as threats to our democracy and freedom. Through invoking this supposed international chain of Communist proxies Strausz-Hupé dramatically broadens the geographical threat posed by the Soviet Union. The Soviets become implicated in all expressions of anti-Western sentiment and local conflicts are inserted into a broader conception of conflict encompassing the entire globe.
2. Deception and Distraction

According to Strausz-Hupé, the Communists have two primary methods of deception - policy shifts and exaggerations. He provides three examples of dramatic Soviet policy shifts, which, although he notes were primarily designed for domestic consumption, had the corollary effect of playing on Western hopes for a peaceful world and undermined Western resolve to confront the Communist challenge.

The examples Strausz-Hupé gives are Lenin’s New Economic Policy of 1921 that, he argues, suggested to Western observers that the Soviets were moving toward a halfway house between Socialism and Capitalism; Stalin’s appeals to nationalist sentiments in the mid 1930s that suggested an abandonment of hardline Communism; and the more recent de-stalinization campaign instigated by Krushchev.

Discussing destalinization Strausz-Hupé argues that the Communists recognised their hardline policies had built unity in the West and in order to undermine this unity they projected an image of changing their ways. Moreover, he suggests that “Stalin himself, master opportunist, set the stage for de-stalinization” (Strausz-Hupé et al, 1959: 70). This implication, coupled with the other historical examples of the same policy technique, draws a line of continuity in Soviet strategy denying the existence of internal political power struggles and changes of policy. It marginalises those sympathetic to Soviet reforms because they fail to understand the true nature of the threat. Those who believe the Soviets are changing are simply being fooled by their clever and subtle tactics.
The second method of deception - exaggerations - concerns Soviet economic and military data falsification. Deliberate statistical deception was an argument Strausz-Hupé first made in the *Balance of Tomorrow* in his discussion of the Magnitogorsk industrial complex. Interestingly, Strausz-Hupé apportions blame for the escalating arms race on this Soviet tactic, rather than on paranoid analyses of Soviet intentions, such as Strausz-Hupé’s work, and on institutional interests perpetuating a military build up.

The Soviet distraction technique elaborates on Strausz-Hupé’s analysis of the Middle East crisis and on ‘the indirect approach’ by providing a rationale behind the Soviet method of conflict by proxy. He argues that if the West’s attention is diverted and resources are spent containing ‘conflicts by proxy’, the Soviets stronghold on Eastern Europe can be fully consolidated. Moreover, challenges to freedom in other parts of the world are not merely random attempts to occupy the West’s attention. Rather he warns the Soviets are attempting to:

...deprive it (the West) of its sources of strategic raw materials and markets and to encircle it via Asia, the Middle East and Africa, until the West, its economic roots having withered, will fall under its own weight (Strausz-Hupé et al, 1959: 24)

The importance given to strategic raw materials and the idea of encirclement are all common geopolitical themes. Strausz-Hupé’s exposition of distraction once again extends the Cold War’s geographical scope by raising the possibility that the West is under threat even if there is no direct attack on them. Strausz-Hupé’s understanding of geopolitics
allows him to foresee the dangers of gradual Soviet expansion, draining the West of the resources it needs to continue the fight.

3. Monopoly of the Initiative

According to Strausz-Hupé, success in the protracted conflict is dependent on keeping the enemy in a defensive and reactive frame of mind. To this end the Communists subtly play on Western moral and legalistic principles through demarcating a Cold War “peace zone” and “war zone”. The Communists, Strausz-Hupé argues, have succeeded in gaining Western acceptance that the Cold War is fought outside of Communist controlled territory in Europe. He finds a classic result of this strategy in the Truman Doctrine.

...the “containment policy” which furnished the official framework for the Truman Doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey and subsequent U.S. foreign and security policies, rested on the “war zone, peace zone” assumption. Under the containment theory, the United States was to pursue a reactive policy, by applying counter-pressure against the Soviet Empire along “a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy.” In other words, the sites of the conflict were to be chosen by the Communists (Strausz-Hupé et al, 1959: 86).

Strausz-Hupé’s fundamental concern with the containment doctrine is that the West only ever fights to maintain the status quo. In conflict’s where the West is unsuccessful, such as losing control over the Suez canal, power shifts in favour of the Soviet Union. Behind his analysis of the “war zone/ peace zone” division is the highly questionable assumption that Moscow directs all Communist/ Nationalist movements outside the Soviet bloc in the
so called “war zone”. From Strausz-Hupé’s perspective, over time the containment
doctrine can only result in increased Soviet power. Unless the West takes the conflict
into Soviet territory, the balance of power will eventually shift so decisively in the
Soviet’s favour that they will be in a position to mount the final decisive battle.

4. Attrition

There are two main techniques behind the Communist strategy of attrition. The
first pushes the internal Communist threat theme. Strausz-Hupé argues the Communists
utilise the freedom of speech in Western Society to cultivate Western guilt complexes and
increase opposition to Cold War policies. He is principally referring to Soviet charges of
Western imperialism aimed at inducing ‘pangs of conscience’. However, Strausz-Hupé
believes these charges are false, the West has little to be ashamed of, and he quotes ‘a
noted historian’ on the Western crisis of conscience to bury Soviet accusations.

Though the brief period of Western imperialism has witnessed many
injustices and cruelties, which however were in no way worse than the
normal happenings in Asia and Africa before the advent of the white man,
it has been on the whole a period of which the West, and especially
Britain, has not to be ashamed (Strausz-Hupé et al, 1959: 101).

It transpires that the ‘noted historian’ Strausz-Hupé quotes is, in fact, Hans Kohn, a
founder member of the FPRI, and a collaborator in the production of Protracted Conflict -
hardly likely to undermine the FPRI’s position.

The second aim of Soviet attrition is to achieve “a piecemeal, yet ultimately
decisive, shift in the balance of power” (Strausz-Hupé et al, 1959: 96) through offering
peace and neutralisation discussions especially over the status of Germany and the
demilitarisation of Central Europe. Thus, Kruschev’s consistent appeals for summit talks
in 1958 are interpreted as nothing more than part of Soviet military strategy.

They were missiles of propaganda warfare rather than notes of diplomacy
and aimed at public opinion outside of the communist bloc. Since the
communist rulers do not tolerate free discussion at home, their propaganda
campaign for a ‘summit’ conference is being waged like all ‘cold war’
battles upon the territory of the free world (Strausz-Hupé et al, 1959: 102).

If the West succumbs to these tactics, and considers a peace settlement in Europe,
then Strausz-Hupé raises the spectre of a Soviet sweep into the neutralised territories and
a Europe under Communist control.

The purpose of the Soviet neutrality campaign in Europe, waged with
increasing vehemence and subtlety since Stalin’s death, is the dissolution
of the Western system of alliances; secondly, the withdrawal of American
and British forces from the European Continent; and finally, the creation
of broad demilitarized regions in Central Europe which, exposed to
Russian pressure unmatched by American power, would ultimately
succumb to the Soviet Union (Strausz-Hupé et al, 1959: 97).

Strausz-Hupé’s discourse reinscribes the notion that the Soviets have designs on Eastern
Europe even though they repeatedly offered peace proposals. Those hoping for peace
and a deescalation of US forces in Europe are marginalised because, similar to Kennan’s
interpretative framework, peace proposals are part of Communist weaponry.

*Protracted Conflict* was published toward the end of Eisenhower’s second
presidential term which had seen a relaxation in US-Soviet tensions (Wolfe 1979).

Eisenhower’s ‘new look’ military strategy was cloaked in anti-Communist rhetoric but
was primarily concerned with achieving stability in military expenditures. Eisenhower did nothing when Soviet tanks rolled into Hungary in 1956 and Hungarians pleaded for assistance. Looking to balance the federal budget in the face of recession and an increasing dollar drain from the US economy, Eisenhower refused to increase military expenditure following the Soviet launch of Sputnik, and he ‘pigeon holed’ the top secret Gaither Report which warned of a looming ‘missile gap’ and urged “an immediate return to high defence budgets and an effort to indoctrinate the public into a crisis mentality” (Wolfe, 1979: 21). Furthermore, in 1958 Secretary of State John Dulles explored “the idea of partial military disengagement in Europe and seemed to endorse a reduction in tensions with the Russians” (Wolfe, 1979: 21). In the years immediately preceding the publication of *Protracted Conflict* the Soviet threat was losing its persuasive force among US foreign policy makers.

However, published into this political context *Protracted Conflict* formed part of a larger discursive economy emanating principally from right wing security intellectuals reinscribing the Soviet threat and advocating increased military expenditure (McCormick, 1989). The text worked to reconstruct the Soviets as a threat largely through the interpretative framework it established that allowed Soviet influence to be geographically expanded into nationalist and neutralist movements in the third world. Although purporting to promote the attention paid to geography by US policy makers, this key FPRI text is fundamentally anti-geographical. It reduces the complexities of international
politics to one dominant script - the global expansion of Communism. Localised conflict becomes part of a global interpretative framework that effaces the significance of local conditions and the meaning of conflict in the locality.

Further to the geographical expansion of the American understanding of the Cold War, *Protracted Conflict* alerts policy makers to a temporal dimension. It argues that Soviet policy changes and peace initiatives are merely part of a long term strategy designed to erode Western power and unity. From Strausz-Hupé’s perspective, Soviet objectives were established by Lenin in 1917 and are unalterable. This assumed permanence in the Soviet’s revolutionary mission subordinates their policy changes to an interpretative framework that reads them merely as screens that hide a transcendent ulterior motive. Strausz-Hupé’s attempt to illustrate the full temporal dimension of conflict, therefore, is anti-temporal because it freezes Soviet objectives in 1917 and refuses to situate their policies within their historical and political context.

The geographical and temporal dimension imposed on Soviet policy allow Eisenhower’s attempts to reduce the military budget to be interpreted as a policy that assists Soviet strategy. According to Strausz-Hupé, cutting military expenditure shifts the balance of power in the Soviet’s favour and places Western security in danger. Given the close links between the FPRI, the IAS, and military and industrial leaders, Strausz-Hupé is hardly innocent in pushing this simplistic line of argument. Moreover, an interesting feature to *Protracted Conflict* is the emphasis placed on the internal
Communist threat. Coded as threatening and assisting Soviet strategy are Western Communist parties, advocates of military reductions, groups interested in peace negotiations, and, Strausz-Hupé argues, “ethnic minorities and indigenous rebel groups within the territory of the Free World - indeed anybody who is prepared to undercut Western policies” (Strausz-Hupé et al, 1959: 57).

Once again, the FPRI members had institutional interests in pushing this particular theme. Although by 1959 the McCarthyite anti-red scares had subsided, the late 1950s had seen the establishment of a number of extreme anti-red organisations, most notoriously the John Birch Society in 1957. Another such organisation was the American Security Council (ASC) formed in 1955 by a group of ex FBI members and bankrolled by over 3200 American companies. According to Cook (1962: 592) the ASC was formed to “ferret out ‘Communist and other statist activities’” and specialised in investigating employee loyalty for American corporations. On the board of the ASC sat Stefan Possony, a founder member of the FPRI and a clear personal link between ASC activities and the opinions of the FPRI.

In the 1950s, Strausz-Hupé's work formed an important aspect of a discursive economy that sustained the idea of the Soviet threat within the United States. His early work during the Cold War was confined to Europe where he helped justify US sponsorship of European reconstruction by highlighting Europe’s geopolitical importance to Western security. In the mid and late 1950s by explicating a supposed
global and multifaceted nature of Soviet strategy he assisted in protracting the 'protracted conflict' by keeping the spectre of Soviet world conquest alive at a time the Soviets rejected their most hardline policies, dissolved Cominform, and made numerous attempts to instigate peace negotiations. This period also marked an increasing fanaticism within Strausz-Hupé's rhetoric as he became institutionally interested in sustaining the massive militarisation of the US economy witnessed during Cold War. Although characterised by Fulbright as a pervader of a dangerous extreme right wing ideology, by the mid 1960s the views Strausz-Hupé put forward were becoming more widely accepted and part of mainstream Cold War discourse. The acceptance of Strausz-Hupé's position was part of a more general heightened sense of the Soviet threat in the early years of the Kennedy administration. While Eisenhower had attempted to cut military expenditure, Kennedy made the supposed 'missile gap' an issue in the 1960s election, and after his victory increased military expenditure by forty per cent to $56bn. Obviously this heightened sense of threat cannot be separated from Strausz-Hupé's representations of Soviet strategy and the more general increase in right wing security intellectual discourse. However, through his well orchestrated strategy seminar series Strausz-Hupé was a leading voice urging the remilitarisation of the economy and furthering the interests of military industrial conglomerates. His high profile amongst right wing groups and connections with Henry Kissinger would lead, in 1969, with Nixon elected president, to a new phase in his career - entry into the diplomatic establishment.
1 The countries visited were Japan, Korea, Formosa, Okinawa, Hong Kong, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Burma, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Israel, Cyprus, Egypt, the Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, France, Greece, Germany, Austria, Finland and Sweden (Strausz-Hupe et al, 1959: xiii).
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

In Chapter 2, I outlined three principle concerns this thesis addresses. Briefly stated these were to establish Strausz-Hupé as an important figure in the development of geopolitics in the United States; to explicate his particular notion of geopolitical theory and how this assists in the making of foreign policy; and to address how he used geopolitical theory to write Germany and the Soviet Union as threats to the United States, and discuss the impact these writings had on the US political debates and policy. This final chapter, therefore, is organised around these three concerns. Divided into three sections each offers some concluding remarks and ties together the arguments developed throughout the preceding chapters.

A Forgotten Figure

The absence of writings on Strausz-Hupé is not restricted to geography. With the exception of a book *Strategy and Values: Selected Writings of Robert Strausz-Hupé* (1973) and the dedication of the Fall 1973 edition of *Orbis* to his philosophical method of political analysis, there exists very little written about him. In contrast, there are volumes of books and articles written by him. It is instructive to note that the two exceptions mentioned above were produced by members of the FPRI which suggests recognition of his work is limited to the circle of security and policy intellectuals in which he worked. In geography, with the exception of Ó’Tuathail (1994a) he is a figure
completely ignored. Thus, one of my primary aims was to illustrate the important role Strausz-Hupé has played in the development of geopolitics as a method of analysis in the US, and in stressing the importance of the geographical in international politics. This concluding section, therefore, provides a brief synopsis of his work in promoting geopolitics in US strategic discourse.

Strausz-Hupé shot to prominence in 1942 with the publication of his book *Geopolitics: the Struggle for Space and Power*. Published shortly after geopolitics had become a popular term in the media, the book's success obviously owes much to the opportunistic timing of its release. Although he critiqued *Geopolitik*, Strausz-Hupé's voice was prominent in discussions urging the development of an American geopolitics. During World War II he was heavily involved in the movement of geopolitics from a topic of media discourse to a method of government. Working on ‘M’ project, Strausz-Hupé used his background in geopolitics to undertake sweeping surveys of the world's resources and develop ambitious plans for refugee migration settlement. Moreover, through preparing Roosevelt's 'ammunition' for the Tehran conference he had an impact, albeit unknown, on the peace settlement. During his time in Washington he was instrumental in establishing geopolitics in the curriculum taught to Navy reserves, suggesting that his work had a long term influence on the making of political and military policy during the Cold War. Working with Strausz-Hupé in this endeavour was James Forrestal, an extremely important figure in the early years of the Cold War and
vociferous in resisting defence expenditure cuts and demobilisation after the war.

Strausz-Hupé’s third book *The Balance of Tomorrow*, through his analysis of emerging centres on power in international politics supported Forrestal’s position.

In the 1950s, after his return to the University of Pennsylvania, Strausz-Hupé worked to institutionalise his approach to studying international relations with the establishment of a small but influential foreign policy think tank. Although the term 'geopolitics' virtually, but not entirely, disappeared from his texts in the 1950s, his approach was still focused on geography. That the term was used less frequently is hardly surprising given its negative associations with *Geopolitik* and a number of writers have argued that during the Cold War geopolitical concepts and theories were fundamental to policy even if they were not explicitly recognised as such (Dalby, 1990a).

In the FPRI he worked closely with extremely influential foreign policy figures; Henry Kissenger, who brought the term 'geopolitics' back into public discourse in the 1960s and 1970s (Ó’Tuathail, 1994b); and Stefan Possony, the figure widely regarded as the 'brains' behind Reagan's Star Wars project. Moreover, the activities of the FPRI in the 1950s and early 1960s, disseminating an extremely anti-Communist right wing view in the US's premier military education institute dramatically raised Strausz-Hupé’s profile and influence over US domestic and foreign policy. The influence was so great, and to Senator Fulbright so dangerous, that it prompted what Meyer (1963: 221) refers to as
"easily the most controversial, the least read and most influential of the Senators major utterances".

Having established Strausz-Hupé as an important and influential figure using and writing on geopolitics, let us now offer some concluding thoughts on the role he ascribed to geography in international politics and the role he constructed for the geopoliticalist.

**Robert Strausz-Hupé and Geopolitics**

The first fundamental point that must be stressed is that Strausz-Hupé began his career as critic of *Geopolitik* and more generally geopolitics. However, he was not attacking the important influence geography has on international politics, but was attacking geographical determinism and the notion that geopolitical theories offered timeless truths explaining the past and future development of international relations.

This rejection of permanence in international politics was developed in *The Balance of Tomorrow* where he explicitly rejected the idea that a permanent peace can be planned. However, he did outline one fundamental truth of international relations when he argued that a nation's foreign policy depends on its power. In this respect it can be argued that political realism lies at the foundation of Strausz-Hupé's political philosophy.

Deliberating the confusing intricacies of international politics in 1950, he argued that:

...the confusion ends if it is recognized that the behaviour of governments is regulated, though sometimes unconsciously, by a rarely avowed principle: the principle of power accumulation. Foreign policy aims at the acquisition of the optimum - and sometimes maximum - power, the attainment of power is the supreme political goal (Strausz-Hupé and Possony, 1950: 2).
Nevertheless, Strausz-Hupe believed geography was the most permanent factor in international politics and his work exhibits three geopolitical concepts. Firstly, is his focus on the influence of the physical environment on a nation's foreign policy. Geographical knowledge, he argues, illustrates where a nation is most vulnerable to attack and, conversely, suggests the best routes for invasion. For example, in the early years of the Cold War he wrote on the role Eastern Europe played as buffer states and expressed concern that these states whose physical configuration has made them historically the best routes for invasion from both East and West were now under Soviet control. In this sense, knowledge of geographic features alerts policy makers to vulnerable areas in a nation’s defences.

...in the geography of every country can be found adverse features, avenues of invasion through which it may be attacked. Foreign policy should aim at closing off these avenues (Strausz-Hupe and Possony, 1950: 41).

Thus, although geography establishes certain facts, they are not immune from the modifying influence of man. A second feature of his concern with the physical environment, and one intrinsically linked to his privileging of power, is his focus on the geographical distribution of resources. Certain areas are endowed with strategically important resources that gives them a greater strategic value. For example, in 1951 he argued for ‘Soviet’ withdrawal from Manchuria in China, and a major concern from The Balance of Tomorrow through much of work on the Cold War was maintenance of
Western control over Germany's Rhur/Rhine industrial region. The geography of resources establishes a hierarchy of strategically important regions, geography tells what and why to conquer.

Though the lessons of geography are not as simple as the best maps suggest and the interpretation of maps involves considerable technical and philosophical difficulties, the study of international politics is wedded to the study of geography. History is inseparable from its geographical setting. The scene and prize of international politics is the earth (Strausz-Hupé and Possony, 1950: 40).

The second geopolitical aspect to Strausz-Hupé's work can be termed the utilisation of a 'geopolitical method'. Strausz-Hupé's method in *The Balance of Tomorrow* is panoptic survey, an inventory of the world's resources, and an investment of space with strategic meaning. The geopolitical method stresses planning, organisation, and clarity of objectives. Although in *The Balance of Tomorrow* Strausz-Hupé eschewed planning, it was not planning *per se* that he rejected, but the idea that a stable and enduring *peace* can be planned. In times of war, however, planning is essential. Thus, as the US prepared to enter World War II Strausz-Hupé called for the adoption of geopolitics. The hierarchy of space it establishes allows campaigns to be efficiently planned. He called for leadership, organisation of resources and the development of clearly stated objectives. In the Cold War, which he regularly referred to as World War III, he urged the US to assume a position of Western leadership, organising the resources of the West to confront the Communist challenge. He believed, initially, that if the West developed clear terms for peace and offered these to the Soviets, the threat of Soviet
power would be dramatically reduced. Strausz-Hupé, therefore, saw geopolitics as a disciplining force.

The third aspect of Strausz-Hupé's philosophy linking him to geopolitics concerns the subject position he ascribes to himself. Traditionally, it is believed that geopoliticians cast themselves in the role of 'advisors to the prince' producing geopolitical knowledge to assist the practise of statecraft. Although Strausz-Hupé clearly sees himself in this role, Ó'Tuathail (1994b) argues that this is a narrow and inadequate definition of the geopoliticians role and subject position. He argues instead that the production of geopolitics as knowledge "is dependent upon the practise of privileging a transcendent, seeing man as the authoritative seer of global political reality" (Ó'Tuathail, 1994b: 260).

Strausz-Hupé certainly situates himself in this subject position. His work in the period under study purports to provide a 'total' view of international politics; a view where all the complexities and vagaries of the international political arena are revealed as inter related aspects of an all encompassing military struggle. His 'total' view operates around three inter related axis.

Firstly, he provides a total view of the enemy's war strategy. Strausz-Hupé sees military strategy in its broadest possible sense encompassing economic, political, and psychological techniques. This view was evident in his first article addressing Nazi Germany when he argued that they used barter as an economic weapon to undermine the strength of those nations conducting trade in the 'normal' manner. It informed his work
on Nazi propaganda in *Axis America* and in addressing the Soviet method of protracted conflict that, he argued, utilised all tools in the power game as instruments of warfare. For example, according to Strausz-Hupé, Soviet released propagandistic statements against Western imperialism as part of their strategy to undermine the unity of Western purpose. Through seeing these attacks as propaganda and situating them within a military strategy, Strausz-Hupé positions himself as the revealer and defender of truth.

Secondly, Strausz-Hupé’s total view reveals the temporal dimension of conflict. In his work immediately preceding World War II and during the Cold War, he argued that the enemy has a long term strategy of conquest. Most clearly evident in *Protracted Conflict*, a book whose very title implants time into Soviet strategy, it was also evident in *Geopolitics*. In his discussion of *Geopolitik* he argued that the Germans had a global plan of conquest, a long term outlook that governed their actions. His analysis of the Nazi-Soviet pact has remarkable similarities to his later analysis of the Soviet attrition technique, in both cases he argued that peace treaties were used to consolidate their position in Europe and allow vital resources to be diverted elsewhere. Interestingly, according to Strausz-Hupé, this pact served both Nazi and Soviet objectives who were simultaneously on a campaign of global domination. For neither nation was the pact driven by purely defensive considerations but both had ulterior motives. As argued in my discussion of *Protracted Conflict*, Strausz-Hupé’s philosophy was actually anti-temporal because it denied changes in enemy objectives.

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Thirdly, Strausz-Hupé’s total view reveals the geographical dimension of conflict. Preceding World War II, Strausz-Hupé argued for a geographical expansion of the US’s conception of security. He illustrated the global nature of German foreign policy, how they quested for global conquest, and how the US, therefore, would inevitably be affected. In the Balance of Tomorrow he provided panoptic survey of the earth’s resources, illustrating the strategically most important geographical regions.

In the mid 1950s, beginning with the Middle East crisis Strausz-Hupé geographically expanded the Cold War battleground beyond its primary focus on Europe. With Protracted Conflict it was further expanded to encompass the entire globe. The Communists, he argued, were everywhere. They were inside the West and active in Asia, Africa, and South America. Once again, as I argued in the preceding chapter, Strausz-Hupé’s attempts to explain the geographic entirety of conflict were anti-geographical.

There are, therefore, three principle dimensions to Strausz-Hupé’s geopolitical philosophy. He emphasises the physical environment's geographical configuration; he employs a 'geopolitical method' emphasising planning and organisation; and his subject position is one in which he purports to understand conflict in its totality. Believing that he had unique insights to offer and that he was able to understand the realities of international politics, Strausz-Hupé worked hard to orchestrate US foreign policy in accordance with these realities. It is instructive to look into his class background to explain why he took this upon himself and why he chose to enter academia.
Strausz-Hupé belonged to the upper levels of Europe's middle classes and aspired for influence in the aristocracy. It was a generation whose childhood was untroubled but was then thrown into devastation by World War I and its after effects. Strausz-Hupé's family went bankrupt and he was forced to make his own way in life. As he recalls in his autobiography:

My generation was the last whose childhood was cradled by the certainties of the Long Peace and Gold Standard. We had been raised as little gentlemen; circumstance drove us into the street to measure ourselves with the sons of the great migration, uninhibited by, and hilariously contemptuous of, our code and more often than not, more nimble than we (Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 42).

In his autobiography, Strausz-Hupé holds onto a romanticised vision of the past. He spent his childhood on his father's country estate in Temesvat (now Timisoar). He spent his days learning to ride, shooting pheasants, and his evenings listening to gypsy music in a house full of guests. This was a time before large scale industrialisation, before "[T]he enclosed monotony of the factory and anonymity and dispersion of the city" (Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 40) transplanted the quiet ordinariness of village life. The effects of industrialisation saw the "masses become conscious of themselves, and out of this consciousness emerged new sets of values...[that were] everything but gentlemanly" (Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 41). Strausz-Hupé hankers after a time when society was ruled by a responsible elite; the aristocratic class to which he aspired.

These values help explain Strausz-Hupé's chosen career path. He sees his role as an academic and foreign policy oracle as part of a new aristocratic class, who should be
responsible for the making of foreign policy without pandering to the misplaced
grievances of the masses. Strausz-Hupé had been groomed for diplomatic service and
access to the aristocracy, but his life took him into academia. However, under his
conception the two are not too dissimilar.

The process that began in World War II has been completed in the age of
the Cold War. The academic has been fully integrated in American
society. From integration he has gone to the plateaus of political and
economic power... The entry of the academic expert constitutes the most
revolutionary development of our times, destined to transform our
haphazard society into an orderly society of merit and rank (Strausz-Hupé,

Through a career in academia Strausz-Hupé was able to gain influence and access among
the elites of US society. As a foreign policy academic, as a geopolitical, he believed he
was in a position to organise, order, and discipline the making of US foreign policy. Yet
Strausz-Hupé’s particular conception of international politics and its articulation in
strategic discourse had fundamental effects on the US domestic and international political
economy.

Discourses of Danger

Strausz-Hupé’s comments on the post World War II “entry of the academic
expert” raises an interesting issue regarding the role of the intellectual in society.

According to Foucault (1984), following World War II Western society has seen the
emergence of the “specific” intellectual. Preceding this intellectuals were thought of as
“universal” and derived from the figure of the jurist, the man of law, possessing a

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universal consciousness and bearing universal values. However, since the war
intellectuals have worked in more specific sectors dealing with “non-universal”
problems, and are derived not from the jurist but from the savant or expert who occupies
a specific position in the functioning of truth.

It seems to me that what must now be taken into account in the intellectual
is not the “bearer of universal values”. Rather, its the person occupying a
specific position - but whose specificity is linked, in a society like ours, to
the general functioning of an apparatus of truth (Foucault, 1984: 73).

Foucault argues that each society has its own “regime of truth” which refers, not to what
is in fact ‘true’, but to the types of discourses a given society accepts and makes function
as true. The specific intellectual, therefore, occupies a specific position in relation to the
production of truth, and is able to battle over the status of truth and the political and
economic functions it serves.

Although I characterised Strausz-Hupé above as “a transcendent seeing man” this
should not suggest his characterisation as a universal intellectual. Rather, Strausz-Hupé
occupies a position of an all knowing expert within a particular speciality - international
relations. Reading Strausz-Hupé in this way, as a specific intellectual, opens an avenue
for investigating the impact of his work on the US political economy. It allows a broader
discussion of the effects of the regime of truth which he helped produce and sustain,
without necessarily attributing intentionality on his part. In his discourse Strausz-Hupé
engages in the production of and battle over truth of international politics which “is
linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to
effects of power which extends it” (Foucault, 1984: 74). Thus, in the 1940s and 1950s Strausz-Hupé’s strategic discourse contributed to a larger discursive realm that represented Germany and the Soviet Union as threats to the US, and circulating around these representations were certain institutional, political, and economic interests that effected fundamental changes in the US political economy.

In the early 1940s, the US was a nation predominantly isolationist in its foreign policy. Its conception of security belonged to a geopolitical tradition that stressed the US’s geographical distance from the political struggles on the European continent and the protection provided by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Although Hitler was recognised as a threat to Europe, the American public were not convinced that he posed a direct threat to the US. The mood of isolation was recognised by economic internationalists within the Roosevelt administration who were unable to mobilise support for a global interventionist foreign policy in pursuit of their vision of a US led open capitalistic world economy. However, media discussions of geopolitics in the early 1940s were important in promoting a more global conception of security, through directly linking US interests to the political transformations in Europe. It was a discursive economy in which Strausz-Hupé figured prominently. In Geopolitics he linked Nazi foreign policy to Haushofer’s school of Geopolitik and used an exposition of geopolitical theories to construct Germany as a nation with a fanatic plan for global conquest. The images invoked in discussions of geopolitics were instrumental in mobilising support for US entry into the war, but
geopolitical discussions were also important in installing in US policy makers the importance of developing a strategy for the peace. Moreover, it was the economic internationalist conception of peace that was dominant in the Roosevelt administrations vision of the post war order. According to McCormick (1989: 33), US policy makers fought the war “not simply to vanquish their enemies, but to create the geopolitical basis for a postwar world order that they would both build and lead”.

Following the war, the US found itself in a globally preeminent position. However, political debates were still dominated by a split between isolationists, who sought military demobilisation and a partial withdrawal from international politics, and internationalists who recognised the unprecedented opportunity for the creation of a US sponsored liberal capitalist world economy and US empire. Central to the ability for policy makers to legitimate and give direction to an active internationalist role for the US was the creation of a Soviet threat. Moreover, the creation and widespread acceptance of the Soviet threat was instrumental in the reconfiguration of US domestic politics (Wolfe, 1979). In the Roosevelt administration the dominant political coalition was one based on a commitment to the provision of social welfare, but this was supplanted in the early 1950s by a coalition committed to economic growth through military Keynesianism and sustained through reference to the Soviet threat.

Although Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ provided the initial script for the massive military and economic commitment to Europe, the script required the continual
reproduction of the Soviet threat in order to allow the institutionalisation of the US policy of containment. In the 1950s, Strausz-Hupé figured prominently in the discursive economy reproducing the Soviet threat and marginalising alternative and dissenting voices. Firstly, he helped foster support for the Marshall Plan, NATO, and a permanent US military presence in Europe by emphasising the strategic importance of Germany and the geographical proximity of the Soviet Union to this heartland of industry. Secondly, when Soviet policies suggested a relaxation of US-Soviet tensions, he exposed the new look Soviet strategy as simply a technique in its long term global plan of conquest.

In the mid and late 1950s Strausz-Hupé’s institutional link to the military industrial complex saw him become more vociferous in his advocacy of high military expenditures. Moreover, in this period he was extremely successful in disseminating his extreme right wing views, labelling all groups opposed to militaristic policies as agents of Communist strategy. Importantly, although Strausz-Hupé’s views were branded extremist at the time, they preceded a shift to the right in US politics and by the late 1960s these views were mainstream. Although Strausz-Hupé arguably reached the pinnacle of his direct influence over business elites, military, political, and industrial leaders during the early 1960s in his controversial strategy seminar’s, it is possible to discern a longer term influence Strausz-Hupé had on US politics. Many of his concerns and methods were later articulated in government by Henry Kissinger in the Nixon and Ford administrations. Although Kissinger is not one of the accredited authors of
Protracted Conflict, as a member of the FPRI he was closely involved in the project over its four year preparation. His proclamation on the book’s front cover, illustrates the importance he placed on the study and much of the conceptual framework and vocabulary of Protracted Conflict is found in Kissinger’s work. Kissinger brought a particular geopolitical philosophy to his position as special assistant for national security affairs in the Nixon administration that bears many similarities to that pushed by Strausz-Hupé in the mid and late 1950s. Specifically, Kissinger’s philosophy was one which recognised the protracted nature of the Communist challenge and illustrated the supposed linkage of events around the globe as aspects of the Cold War. He argued that the Soviets had a strategy of ambiguity, that they avoided the decisive showdown, shifted conflict to “grey areas”, and they gradually sort to bring about the attrition of the enemy (Cleva, 1989). I do not wish to argue that Kissinger was merely a mouthpiece of Strausz-Hupé, their working relationship was, no doubt, reciprocal. Nevertheless, many of Strausz-Hupé’s extreme views, were later articulated in government by Kissinger and directly influenced the making of US foreign policy.

In addition to his views finding expression in the figure of Kissinger, Strausz-Hupé was involved in the beginning of a radical power shift in American politics away from the North Eastern establishment to the Southern Rim. This shift of political power had its genesis in Barry Goldwater’s campaign for the Republican Party presidential nomination. Although unsuccessful, Goldwater was one of the earliest campaigners to
utilise a wide team of advisors (including Strausz-Hupé), drawn from conservative think tanks and study groups, in formulating his policies. The conjunction between Goldwater’s policies (high defence expenditure, restrictions on civil rights and federal power) and conservative think tanks spawned a dramatic increase in business, particularly in the defence and oil sectors, bankrolling of such policy centres. By the 1980s, the ability of conservative think tanks in the Southern Rim (such as the Hoover Institution) to empower, influence, and give legitimacy to politicians, had dramatically changed American politics. The FPRI was one of the earliest research institutes funded by southern businesses and remains an important and respected institution within, in Saloma’s (1984) terms, “the new Conservative labyrinth”.

This thesis has, therefore, demonstrated that Strausz-Hupé is an extremely important figure for geopolitics within the United States and that he obtained a significant influence over US foreign policy in both the short and long term. Confined for the most part to a study of his more popular texts it is by no means exhaustive of Strausz-Hupé’s work or philosophical position. Furthermore, his movement into the diplomatic establishment in 1969 and actual engagement in conducting foreign policy presents an extremely interesting area for further enquiry. Most recently, at the age of 92, he has published *Democracy and American Foreign Policy* (1995) and is currently working on a second instalment to his autobiography. Given that *In My Time* only covers his life up to
1947, it is a book that I, and hopefully other members of the Geographical discipline, eagerly anticipate.

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