Disciplinary Themes in Aristotle’s Political and Ethical Writings

By

Jeremy W. Hunsinger

Thesis submitted to the faculty of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Political Science

Timothy W. Luke
Mark Gifford
David Barzilai

December 15, 1998

Blacksburg Virginia

Keywords: Aristotle, Disciplinary Power

Copyright 1998, Jeremy W. Hunsinger
Abstract

Disciplinary Themes in Aristotle’s Political and Ethical Writings
By
Jeremy W. Hunsinger

This thesis is an exploratory study of the relationship between Foucault’s conception of disciplinary power and the philosophical ideas of ancient Greece as exemplified by Aristotle. Foucault claims that disciplinary power arose only in the 17th and 18th centuries. This thesis demonstrates that there are similarities and parallels between certain facets of Aristotle’s ethical and political theory and Foucault’s idea of disciplinary power—parallels and similarities sufficiently strong to weaken, if not contradict, Foucault’s description of the historical origin of disciplinary power.
Acknowledgments

I wish to thank foremost my committee who suffered far more than most would. Second, I wish to thank the Department of Political Science for allowing me the opportunity to become a part of its community of learning. Third, I wish to thank my family, in particular my Mom, and Nan and Pop; my grandparents, who are a constant inspiration to me. Finally, I wish to apologize to all those who earned my bloodshot and sometimes spiteful glare during my graduate studies, surely in the end it is forgivable. All errors and imprecision in this thesis are mine.
### Table of Contents

**Introduction** ........................................................................................................... 1

**Chapter 1 Power and Disciplinary Power** .......................................................... 4
  1.1 From Power to Bio-Power in One Fell Swoop ........................................... 4
  1.2 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 10

**Chapter 2 Disciplinary Power** ........................................................................... 11
  2.1 Disciplinary Power: A General Discussion ................................................ 11
  2.2 Operations of Disciplinary Power ............................................................... 16
  2.3 Technologies of the Self or Disciplines at Large ..................................... 18
    2.1.1 Surveillance or Hierarchical Observation ....................................... 20
    2.1.2 Normalization .................................................................................. 23
    2.1.3 Examination .................................................................................... 26
  2.2 Summary ......................................................................................................... 27
  2.3 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 28

**Chapter 3 Foucault’s Aristotle** ......................................................................... 29
  3.1 Foucault’s Project ......................................................................................... 29
  3.2 Themes of Greece and Aristotle in Foucault. ............................................ 31
  3.3 Technologies of the Self in History of Sexuality ....................................... 31
    3.2.2 Foucault’s Aristotle .......................................................................... 34
    3.2.3 Foucault’s Specificity ........................................................................ 37
  3.3 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 38

**Chapter 4 The Polis in Aristotle** ...................................................................... 40
  4.1 Aristotle’s Polis as Institution ..................................................................... 40
    4.1.1 Examination in the Polis as Institution .......................................... 41
  4.3 Classes and Hierarchies in Aristotle’s Polis .............................................. 42
  4.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 43

**Chapter 5 Habituation and Normalization** .................................................... 45
  5.1 Definition of Habituation ............................................................................ 45
  5.2 Habituation and Normalization .................................................................. 48
  5.3 Doctrine of the Mean .................................................................................. 48
    5.3.1 The Mean in the Polis ...................................................................... 49
  5.3 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 53

**Chapter 6 Friendship** ..................................................................................... 55
  6.1 Conceptions of Friendship in Aristotle ...................................................... 55
6.1.1 Types of Friendship ................................................................. 56

6.2 Friendship, Knowledge and Virtue ........................................... 58
  6.2.1 knowledge ....................................................................... 59
  6.2.2 Friendship and Virtue ....................................................... 59

6.3 Friendship in the Polis .......................................................... 60
  6.3.1 Unanimity and Concord ...................................................... 61
  6.3.2 Equality and Justice .......................................................... 62

6.5 Conclusion ............................................................................ 64

Chapter 7 Conclusion ................................................................. 65
Man, that inveterate dreamer, daily more discontent with his destiny, has trouble assessing the objects he has been led to use, objects that his nonchalance has brought his way, or that he has earned through his own efforts, almost always through his own efforts, he has agreed to work, at least he has not refused to try his luck (or what he calls luck!).

Andre Breton, 1924

**Introduction**

In *Discipline and Punish* and *History of Sexuality*, Foucault advances the thesis that disciplinary power did not exist before the 17th and 18th centuries. In this work, I will elucidate themes and ideas in Aristotle’s political and ethical thought are similar to those found in Foucault’s idea of disciplinary power. By establishing these themes, I argue that Foucault’s historical thesis is questionable.

In this thesis, I am not discussing how disciplinary power came into being in the modern world. That project is Foucault’s. I am assuming that it does exist in the modern world, and in that it exists; it has certain discernible operations. These operations constitute disciplinary power. Anywhere power operates this way, disciplinary power then exists.

I chose Aristotle’s works as the foundation for my argument because his thought does not arise from a vacuum, nor is it focused on the ideal world. Aristotle focuses his thought on practical solutions to the problems that exist in the world around him. Thus, Aristotle’s work is directly related to what
is actually happening in the world of his day though it is still theoretical in nature. Aristotle’s theoretical conception of the human and polis allows me to use the operations of disciplinary power and Aristotle’s conceptions of life in the polis to demonstrate that disciplinary power exists in the polis.

This thesis is in two parts. The first part deals with Foucault’s thought. In the first chapter, I discuss the differences between Foucault’s schema of power and other schemas of power. Once I establish the differences, I proceed in the second chapter to describe disciplinary power more in depth. Building of that description, I then reduce disciplinary power to it is fundamental operations. In the third chapter, I introduce Foucault’s considerations of ancient Greece and Aristotle to show that they do not apply as arguments against my comparison between Foucault and Aristotle’s thought.

The second part of the thesis deals with the comparison of Aristotle and Foucault. In chapter four, I argue two things. The first is that examination is possible in ancient Greece, but it is hard to identify in Aristotle. The second argument is that classes are described in Aristotle, therefore he recognizes hierarchies in ancient Greece. This fact combined with the later two chapters establishes hierarchization, which is one of the operations of disciplinary power. Chapter five argues that Aristotle’s conceptions of habituation, virtue and the mean is similar to and prefigures Foucault’s conception of normalization. Building on the arguments in the previous two chapters, in
chapter six, I establish similarities between Aristotle’s friendship and Foucault’s surveillance based on the necessity of knowledge in both systems. I then demonstrate that the outcomes of economic and governmental efficiency are promoted by Aristotle’s friendship, thus showing that the outcome of disciplinary power; efficiency, is the outcome of Aristotle’s system. In the final chapter, I conclude that there is strong evidence for doubting Foucault’s historical thesis because there are strong similarities, parallels and prefigurations to be found in Aristotle’s thought.
Chapter 1 Power and Disciplinary Power

This chapter explains how Foucault understands the origin, distinguishing features, and practices of power. In particular, this chapter distinguishes disciplinary power from other forms of power found in Foucault and elsewhere. I use Foucault’s schema of power as well as other ideas about power to show what disciplinary power is and is not. To begin this section, I will sketch Foucault’s conception of power as bio-power showing where disciplinary power fits into that conception.

1.1 From Power to Bio-Power in One Fell Swoop

Power is fundamentally that which causes change. Political power is thus that which causes some change in the formations and practices of the state. In its most potent form, this power is the ability to eradicate life from the earth, to remove a citizen from the body politic of the state. This harshest form of power is the sovereign power of the state. Disciplinary power is a type of political power, but as we will see it is not sovereign power.

If disciplinary power is not sovereign power then what power is it? It represents one part of Foucault’s comprehensive schema of power, called bio-power. Bio-power is the power over life and death at all of its levels, from the social body to the individual human body.
Bio-power is Foucault’s alternative to the liberal concept of power. “Foucault is trying to liberate power from liberal boundaries” (Dyrberg 1997, 86). He is trying to avoid the liberal categories of consent, rights, and freedoms in his description of power. The description of power that Foucault arrives at is profoundly different from traditional liberal models. Liberal models primarily analyze the justification of power. For Foucault, the justification of power does not rest in an analysis of whether it comes from legitimate sources. Rather, the justification of power depends on the use of power for whom and for what purpose thus for Foucault power lacks the characteristics necessary to justify its use. Liberal conceptions of justification require a prerequisite of legitimate use of power and for Foucault that legitimation is no more than another power relationship. Justification of power must come from some other feature internal to the use of power itself, and legitimacy, as an external standard, does not meet this requirement. By not using traditional liberal models that include consent, sovereignty, or legitimacy in the conception of power, Foucault describes power as historically contingent systems of domination.

Power in a system of domination for Foucault is diffuse and permeates the relationships between people and regimes. Power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in their sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization: as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations
find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or
on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which
isolate them from one another; and lastly as the
strategies in which they take effect, whose general design
or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state
apparatus, in the formation of the law, in the various
social hegemonies. (Foucault 1980, 92)

The model of power that Foucault offers here entails a rejection
of the attempt to answer the liberal question of legitimacy.
Power manifests itself in the relationships between people and
social institutions and can exist without consent or recognition
of any type of negotiated sovereignty such as lies at the center
of liberal frameworks. This systemic view of diffuse power is
not based on a notion of a sovereign, but on the idea of social
networks and their development, as we can see in the following
analysis of Foucault’s disciplinary power:

Foucault suggests that all power starts in the ‘smallest’
elements’ of the social body: ‘the family, sexual
relations, but also: residential relations, neighborhoods,
etc. As far as we go in the social network we always find
power as something that runs through it, that acts, that
brings about effects’. (Wickham 1986, 152)

Unlike Foucault, traditional liberal models of power relegate
those concerns to the area of the private in the public-private
dichotomy of social analysis. In as much as family relations use
the disciplinary technologies of the self, they are disciplinary
power. However, the analysis of private relations is not the
focus of Discipline and Punish. Because Foucault is playing the
role of the specific intellectual, focusing his work on a

\[1\] What I refer to as the body politic and Wickham refers to as the
social body are the same thing.
specific historical events and institutions. Because of that he ignores the possible exploration of disciplinary power outside of those specific historical contexts, this thesis is looking outside of Foucault’s theory and attempts to find a basis for disciplinary power where he says it should not be.

In the *History of Sexuality*, we get Foucault’s description of the relationship between bio-power (bio-politics), and the powers that constitute it; juridico-discursive power and disciplinary power, as historically contingent formations:

In concrete terms, starting in the seventeenth century, this power over life evolved in two basic forms; these forms were not antithetical, however; they constituted two poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations. One of these poles—the first to be formed, it seems—centered on the body as a machine: Its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that characterize the disciplines; an anatamo-politics of the human body. The second, formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis for biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expense and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the populations. The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed. The setting up, in the course of the classical age, of this great bipolar technology—anatomic and biologic, individualizing and specifying, directed toward the performances of the body with the attention to the processes of life—characterized a power whose highest level of function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life through and through. (Foucault 1980, 139)

We can see that in this lengthy and complicated description of the types of power, Foucault wants to clarify that these three
forms of powers focus on similar things; namely technologies and people.

The types of technologies that are applied to the people and how they are applied to either the individual or the body politic define the differences in the types of power that exist in the field of “governmentality”. Governmentality is for Foucault the knowledge-power relationship concerned with the governing of individuals and people. To describe the practices involved in governmentality is also to describe the aspects of bio-power. Bio-power is the power over life. It is not the power to remove life that was held by sovereign kings or queens, but bio-power does not permit life or death decisions; instead it is the power to “foster life or disallow it to the power of death,” (Foucault 1980, 138). This power is no longer held by any individual, but is held by all. It is administered by the state, but no longer by the state embodied as sovereign and his or her agents. This power of life and death is administered by bureaucracy; administering the state and as part of the body politic. Bio-power no longer has the force over its citizens that was possessed by a sovereign existing outside of the rule of law, because the citizens now hold sovereign power. They also hold it in relation to each other and to the whole of the body politic, thus balancing power relations more equitably.

Bio-power, as a whole, also needs legitimization to be accepted. It gains this through laws and codes that seem to the people to be natural or necessary for the proper functioning of
society. These laws and codes constitute one of the manifestations of bio-power. Foucault names it juridico-discursive power. It is the power to legislate, enforce morality, and organize society. It is the power to create the institutions of the state and society.

It would be incorrect to state that disciplinary power and juridico-discursive power are entirely separable. They are not. They are inseparable because the individuals involved in the practices of each of these two forms of power, may in fact be the same people. Those that govern may be the individuals that discipline. Juridico-discursive power performs a task in relation to disciplinary power. It masks disciplinary power, adds apparent legitimacy (Wickham 1986, 153). As the legitimacy of any power is suspect, this mixing and masking of the two types of power is not surprising. Rather, it is to be expected because power is a complex social relationship that overlaps and confuses the definitions and models with which many describe power in the state.

This thesis is concerned with the other type of bio-power. This type is the power that is exercised over the individual person—over a single body and soul; namely disciplinary power. Disciplinary power is the power to mold, to create individual subjectivities from the mass of people comprising the body politic.
1.2 Conclusion

Disciplinary power, thus, is only one type of bio-power. The other power mentioned earlier is the power of the species body--the power of regulation and control of the mass political body of humankind in the state. That type of lies outside the scope of this essay, however; our concern now is to develop a more precise explanation of disciplinary power.
Chapter 2 Disciplinary Power

Let us now begin to look at disciplinary power in greater depth by examining the aspect of Foucault’s account of it. In particular, I discuss in this chapter the operations of disciplinary power and on whom it operates. This chapter outlines the operations of disciplinary power that are required to later establish either parallels or prefigurations of it in Aristotle’s works.

2.1 Disciplinary Power: A General Discussion

The operation of disciplinary power and bio-power arose according to Foucault in the 17th and 18th centuries. They [technologies of the self] became attached to some of the great essential function: factory production, the transmission of knowledge, the diffusion of aptitudes and skills, the war-machine. Hence, too, the double tendency one sees developing throughout the eighteenth century to increase the number of disciplinary institutions and to discipline the existing apparatuses. (Foucault 1979, 211)

Though this text only claims an increase in disciplinary power, if we combine it with the long passage in Chapter One, it establishes that Foucault thinks that disciplinary power is only related to the historical contingencies of the 17th and 18th centuries.

For Foucault, disciplinary power arose with the birth and growth of certain practices, institutions and domains of knowledge, such as the bureaucracy of the church, the organization of trade and capitalism, and the spread of democracy which accompanied the growth of population. These practices and institutions developed into the technologies of the self, that I describe later in this chapter.
Discipline as a general formula of domination borrowed techniques from slavery, servitude, vassalage, and monasticism, but it is distinguished not only by its generality, but also by the fact that it requires and produces aptitude. (Shumway 1989, 124)

However, while Shumway’s list is interesting, it is not complete. It does not deal with the knowledge involved in disciplinary power. The domains of knowledge that disciplinary power arose from are probably best described as social sciences. These domains of knowledge are associated not only with the individual human being, such as psychology, but also with the body politic, such as political science. The institutions that are situated around these knowledges are most importantly prisons, militaries, cities, and factories. The practices that define disciplinary power are those practices that are found especially in institutions or systems of power such as those situated in these knowledges. These practices are at the same time the most important instances of technologies of the self that comprise disciplinary power. They deal with the construction of a person as subject and object, to be manipulated and to manipulate. This type of subjectification can be exemplified by the new subjectivity that arises in a factory worker after his or her body has been molded into a vital part of the machine -- the factory. His body and mind functions as part of that machine in order to produce the labor that is essential to the making of the product.
Looking at one of these specific institutions and generalizing it based on the theme of *Discipline and Punish*, Shumway notes:

The carceral society Foucault describes is one in which subjects are dominated by a power not their own. But that power cannot be associated with an individual tyrant or with a self-interested ruling class. Rather at the center of this power structure we find institutions with their architecture, their rules, and their discourses. These institutions do not exclude or repress; they reproduce, not only material commodities, but the disciplinary individual themselves (Shumway 1989, 139)

However, Shumway’s reading of Foucault is not completely correct. Because it is plain in Foucault that the subject must internalize disciplinary power and make it his or her own, Shumway’s assertion that the power that dominates the subject is not their own, is plainly false. It would have been better to say the power is not completely the subject’s own. I follow Ransom in asserting that the disciplines are instilled in the person. “Disciplines instill capacities and enhance the productivity of individuals while promoting docility. Disciplines are part of the answer to the question, how are all these people to be governed?” (Ransom 1997, 31). As they are associated with capacities, the disciplines are internal; the power is thus internal to the subject.

It is true, in another sense, that disciplinary power is also external to the subject. It operates in the body politic. This creates a problem for the identification of disciplinary power in its external operations. Especially after its historical development, disciplinary power is hard to separate
from other operations of the body politic. If individuals participate in disciplinary institutions, then they will be transformed into subjects that affect themselves with disciplinary power. However, disciplinary power is not primarily external, but is instead internal to the subject as brought about by the institutions and practices in which the subject participates.

On the whole, therefore, one can speak of the formation of disciplinary society in these movements that stretches from the enclosed disciplines, a sort of social ‘quarantine’, to an indefinitely generalizable mechanism of ‘panopticism’ Not only because the disciplinary modality of power has replaced all the others; by because it has infiltrated the others, sometimes undermining them, but serving as an intermediary between them, linking them together, extending them and above all making it possible to bring the effects of power to the most minute and distant elements. It assures an infinitesimal distribution of the power relations (Foucault 1979, 216)

Disciplinary power surrounds and encompasses much of our life, as do other forms of power, such as laws, rules, and other juridico-discursive constructs. Earlier in Chapter One, I established that disciplinary power does not manifest itself directly in the state, its institutions, laws, and codes. That it is a different kind of power.

Foucault gives us an idea of what the disciplines might be in the following:

Instead of bending its subjects into a single uniform mass, it separates, analyses, differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of necessary and sufficient single units. It ‘trains’ the moving confused, useless multitudes of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements – small, separate, sells, organic autonomies, genetic identities and
continuities, combinatory segments. Disciplines ‘make’ individuals. (Foucault 1979, 170)

While Foucault clears up the idea of disciplinary power as a set of practices or disciplines, in itself, this quote gives us an idea of what a discipline does. The question of legitimacy is not answered above; surely, this category of analysis is applicable to disciplinary power. However, as Ransom notes, “We might think of Foucault’s point this way: not all kinds of power can be described by the terms ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’, (Ransom 1997, 15). One can see that disciplinary power, in that it forms individuals from the body politic, is the very thing that makes a person capable of consenting. Before one is an individual, personal consent does not exist. Ransom illustrates this with an example:

To illustrate this idea of a form of power that escapes the consent-coercion duality of the social contract tradition, imagine a young man who agrees to enter a monastery. Through long periods of training this individual is “subjugated” to the monastic life. That is, he is molded into a “subject” of a certain kind—one very different from the subjectivity he possessed when first agreeing to enter the monastery. At the same time, he is “subject” to a strict set of “governmental” controls that both limit his options and develop him capacities, thus enabling him to participate competently in a structured existence that gives his life meaning. The powers of this individual are certainly developed, but only in a specific direction. In addition, the intent is that the powers the individual develops will be put at the service of the order. (Ransom 1997, 15)

While the monk in the brief description above consents in to the entry into the new life, the later changes can hardly be considered to be part of the initial consent-relationship, especially since owing to the changes in the man during his life
in the monastery, he is not the exact same man now as he was earlier (1997,15). Ransom argues that it is a new man, a different man. One who has never consented to his current position; for when he decided to become a monk, he could not fully comprehend the fact that he was to be a different man, and the older, changed man and the younger man do not hold the same considerations for consent. In other words, the older man because of his way of life and current knowledge has different conceptions as to what constitutes his life, than the young man possessed when he consented to become a monk. “It is only after one is `disciplined` in a certain way--only after one’s subjectivity has been shaped and certain power developed, while others are pushed to the side, that individuals can meaningfully give consent to what the structures of power will do to them.” (1997,15). The monk has been normalized by the institution, changed into a standard monk as opposed to what the man could have been or may have pictured becoming when he consented to participate.

2.2 Operations of Disciplinary Power

In this section, I will attempt to clarify the operations of disciplinary power in society. As we saw last section, disciplinary power makes individuals. However, it does not make stable individuals. Instead, it takes a human being’s mutable properties and makes them into new individual with other properties.
Disciplinary power, however, does not protect preexisting “properties” of the individual; rather it inserts such qualities into individuals. “Individuals do not precede disciplinary power--they are produced by it. (Ransom 1997, 17)

It does this by using the operations of disciplinary power. The operations according to Foucault are:

It [disciplinary power] beings five quite distinct operations into play: it refers individual actions to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation, and a principle of a rule to be followed. It differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of the following overall rule: that the rule to be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected or as an optimum toward which one must move. It measures in quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of values and the abilities the level, the ‘nature’ of individuals. Introduced through this ‘value giving’ measure, the constraint of a conformity that must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that will define differences in relation to all other difference, traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions, compares differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes. (Foucault 1979, 182-183)

The operations of disciplinary power can be reduced or analyzed into two central technologies of the self, one of which is surveillance and the other normalization. Disciplinary is really a combination of the two technologies. There is also a third technology, which I will describe later, but it is no more than an institutionalization through history of the other two. Foucault calls it “examination”.

Disciplinary power operates in so many situations, practices, and institutions that it would be impossible to document them all. In other words, there are many disciplines, and in each of those, disciplinary power manifests itself.
Moreover, an individual may be involved in many different
disciplines and these disciplines could each be recreating him
for entirely different roles—roles that are conflicting, and
overlapping in their application (Ransom 1997, 49).

The creation of roles creates a problem in that once a
person is created a certain way, it is harder to gain perspective
on one’s new self. This is one of the most problematic aspects
of disciplinary power; the lack of critique.

As products of the disciplines, persons are unable to
identify and thus incapable of criticizing or opposing
them. Far from opposing the disciplines, the individual
as one of the cogs in its wheels actually support their
operation. (Ransom 1997 35)

If we cannot critique any discipline from within, and we cannot
easily escape from disciplinary situations, it is impossible to
get the critical distance necessary to alter or modify the
operations of disciplinarily power. Thus, disciplinary power
generally acts without significant resistance in our society. As
we will see below, if disciplinary power worked in ancient
Greece, then it was near invisible and without significant
resistance.

2.3 Technologies of the Self or Disciplines at Large

Disciplines make individuals, but the question arises as to
how it does make them? Disciplinary makes individuals through
the technologies of the self. Disciplinary power is then
fundamentally different from juridico-discursive power, which
functions through the enforcement of laws and rules by the state
apparatus or through technologies of domination.
This technology is diffuse, rarely formulated in continuous systematic discourse; it is often made up of bits and pieces; it implants a disparate set of tools or methods. In spite of the coherence of its results, it is generally no more than a multiform instrumentation. Moreover, it cannot be localized in a particular type of institution or state apparatus.... In its mechanisms and its effects, it is situated at a quite different level. What the apparatuses and institutions appelle is, in a sense, a microphysics of power, whose field of validity is situated, in a sense, between these great functionings and the bodies themselves with their materiality and their forces. (Foucault 1979, 26)

According to Foucault, the practices and operations of a form of power distinguish it from other forms of power. Disciplinary power therefore can be made clearer by looking at its operations, namely the technologies of the self.

'Discipline' may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its excrete, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of applications, targets; it is a 'physics' or an 'anatomy' of power, a technology. (Foucault 1979, 215)

A technology is a tool of reason, a method, or a way of doing things. Most people think that technology is found as an objectified thing like a car, a computer, or a radio--something that is seemingly different from our subjective self. It does not have to be conceived of in such a way. All that is required to earn the label of technology is a causally related change of condition. For instance, taxation is a technology in that it changes the distribution of wealth as well as the behavior of certain citizens². A technology of the self must change

² Sin taxes on alcohol and tobacco products supposedly curb their use by the citizenry.
something too. It changes the person’s self. The self is the
mind and soul or psyche of the person. The self is that which
most closely is identified with the person.

Given this definition of technologies of the self, we can
proceed to the actual technologies of the self that relate to
disciplinary power as described by Foucault. The technologies of
the self that comprise disciplinary power are threefold. They
are hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and
examination. These technologies operate primarily through the
processes of surveillance and normalization as I noted above.
Foucault situates these technologies in history at the beginning
of the 17th century... (Smart 1983, 111).

2.1.1 Surveillance or Hierarchical Observation

Hierarchical observation is the core technology of
disciplinary power. Its goal is, “to permit an internal,
articulated and detailed control,” (Foucault 1979, 172). Since
the active nature of disciplinary power is the reformation of the
body and soul, there must first be way of determining the nature
of the body and soul before one can effect the transformation
that would recreate the aspects of their person to fit their new
purpose.

It was also organized as a multiple, automatic, and
anonymous power; for although surveillance rests on
individuals, its functioning is that of a network of
relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent
from bottom to top and laterally; this network ‘holds’ the
whole together and traverses it in its entirety with
effects of power that derive from one another:
 supervisors, perpetually supervised. (Foucault 1979, 177)
Surveillance constitutes a network of social relations that surrounds and engulfs the individual. It should not be thought of as a simple hierarchical organization. Nor should it be thought of as external to the subject. This is because the subject, through the process or normalization, internalizes the surveillance and makes it his or her own technique.

Foucault’s discussion of surveillance concerns not only external surveillance, but internal as well. Internal surveillance possesses two distinct references. First, it refers to surveillance internal to the society in which the person exists. We can picture a factory worker whose work is checked by not only his supervisor but also by the next few people on the assembly line to ensure he is performing to standards. Being watched and checked by one’s peers is internal surveillance as it is internal to the immediate community. Internal surveillance also refers to the person watching himself, having been trained to watch himself by the supervision from outside of himself, by either peers or superiors. In other words, internal surveillance entails making sure one performs according to the standards that are expected. The standards are what are normal.

Normality is the other key to understanding hierarchical observation. There must be standards by which to judge the action, and those standards are the norms of the practice. To not act normally is to be undesirable in that position and to require further disciplining to become more normal. Normal people are the ideal, as opposed to some aristocratic system in
which having the best people is ideal. Those that are superior or inferior to the standards are noticed and brought closer to the norm.

According to Foucault, surveillance provides “an internal, articulated, and detailed control--to render visible those who are inside it,” (Foucault 1979, 172). Surveillance makes the ‘not normal’ visible to us. Once we see them, we can pressure individuals in social and other ways into becoming normal. Surveillance is a continuous observation by ourselves as individuals and by others, where a single gaze can capture, can see everything all of the time, (1979, 173).

Foucault also answers the question of who gazes or surveys. He thinks there is a hierarchical framework that does the gazing. It is not an unstructured system. It is close to the structure of the bureaucracy, prison, or factory. Peers, parents, teachers, supervisors, and supervised all observe the actions of the individual to judge them. Observation is perhaps most closely tied to the economic regime of production. It is necessary for the proper functioning of that which is produced by the institutions of production. One must be observed to ensure the proper function of products made by the person. A person is integrated into the system of production as a part of the machine, which focuses on normal production and ensures the individual’s integration by constant hierarchical observation:

Hierarchized, contiguous, and functional surveillance may not be one of the great technical ‘inventions’ of the eighteenth century, but its insidious extension owed its importance to the mechanism of power that it brought with
it. By means of such surveillance, disciplinary power became an ‘integrated’ system. Linked from the inside to the economy and to the aims of the mechanism in which it was practice. (Foucault 1979, 176)

Surveillance is a technology of the self that has historical foundations. It arose according to Foucault in the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} century. Surveillance is one piece of the technologies that combine to form disciplinary power. It does not work independently from other technologies; instead, it works in conjunction with them—constantly watching. Because it works in conjunction with the other technologies of the self that comprise disciplinary power, surveillance is hard to separate from normalization.

Surveillance, then, consists in being watched by one’s peers, watching oneself, in this process one gathers and disseminates knowledge about people familiar and unfamiliar. Surveillance is founded on individuals, but it requires connections and networks between those individuals. We will see below that this aspect of disciplinary power has a prefiguration in Aristotle’s idea of friendship and the polis.

2.1.2 Normalization

Surveillance is in service of and intertwines with another technology—the technology of normalization. This technology is slightly different from surveillance since surveillance is more passive whereas normalization is more active in terms of how it changes individuals. Also, instead of the economic machine driving it, as is the case with surveillance, the pedagogical
machine is the driving institutional structure. Normalizing judgment is a "small penal mechanism," (1979, 177):

It [normalizing judgment] is opposed, therefore, term by term, to a judicial penalty whose essential function is to refer, not to a set of observable phenomena, but to a corpus of laws and texts that must be remembered; that operates not by differentiating individuals, but by specifying acts according to a number of general categories; not by hierarchizing, but quite simply by bringing into play the binary opposition of the permitted and the forbidden; not by homogenizing, but by operating the division, acquired once and for all, of condemnation. (1979, 183)

Normalization thus is penal, but not in the judicial sense. It is penal in the pedagogical sense, inasmuch as it functions by punishing those that are not normal. It is a pedagogical sense because it rewards attempts to become normal.

To be normal is to perform within the standards of the practice, and not to exceed them. The standards are set by the capabilities of a statistically normal practitioner. As for punishing people to become a normal practitioner, Foucault says, "The whole indefinite domain of the non-conforming is punishable," (1979, 178). As punishment is reserved for those who do not conform, conforming to the standards of the practice is rewarded in the context of the hierarchical institution. Whatever the institution, one can be sure that these normalizing judgments and the penal system assigned to it are completely different from the judicial system, (1979, 182). Normalizing judgment is not as formalized as the judicial system; it lacks the positive laws that form the backbone of the judicial system. Instead of by law, it operates by standards of practice. The
The pedagogical machine is a diffuse system of judgments that notes the not normal and acts to correct it using pedagogical methods instead of laws and penal institutions.

According to Foucault, “The perpetual penalty that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions, compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes, (1979, 183). In other words, normalizing judgment categorizes society into types of practitioners, and does this by providing standards of practice. It makes the body politic into an orderly system by normalizing the action of every member of every institution and practice:

In a sense, the power of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialties and to render the differences useful by fitting them to one another. (1979, 184)

This homogeneity brings about a more efficient means of providing for needs, and thus increases economic efficiency. Homogeneity of the populace also allows for standard of education as in high school or elementary. By measuring gaps, normalization discerns the differences among the individuals that are participating in the system, and by discerning the differences it allows the fixing of awards and punishments. In addition, by fixing differences, normalization allows the placement of individuals into groups that will take certain definite places in the economic world and in society. In short, normalization creates manageable classes of people--the classes of the normal:
Like surveillance and with it, normalization becomes one of the great instruments of power at the end of the classical age. For the marks that once indicated status, privilege and affiliation were increasingly replaced—or at least supplemented—by a whole range of degrees of normality indicating membership of a homogeneous social body but also playing a part in classification, hierarchization, and the distribution of rank. (1979, 184)

Normalization imposes homogeneity. It also differentiates hierarchies and differences through its pedagogical machinery. By doing that, it institutes structures in society. These structures are classes; those classes comprise a docile body politic that is economically efficient.

As we have seen before normalization is pedagogical in that it judges, rewards and punishes, both learning and certain actions in society. Below, I show that Aristotle’s concept of habituation does similar things to Foucault’s normalization.

2.1.3 Examination

Examination is the combination of hierarchical observation and normalization, (1979, 170). It is what happens when those two practices exist as physical institutions and operate over time. Examination is the documenting and keeping of records. It arose in part out of the pedagogical machine, but also out of the science machine. The examination is the means by which the external world attaches objective value to a person. Examination documents and keeps records of all an individual’s movements and changes in society. It manifests itself in the classroom and in the tests of high school and college, peer review in education, and reports in the business world. It combines the other
apparatuses of the other two technologies but goes beyond them by including certification by experts. This is the college accreditation board, or the guidance counselor, or the efficiency expert in a corporation. These experts give their respective system this credibility. They certify the “goodness” of the system. They tell you that other people checking your work is worthwhile and helps you. A person adapts to the social pressures, and melds to the practices.

The documentation that accompanies examination also provides a sense of memory to practices. It also provides a system of normalization for that memory. The experts hold the memory, recount the stories, and standardize them. They certify history, just as they certify the normality of people and the standards of practice. Their expertise lends authority.

Below, I do not provide much evidence that examination exists in Aristotle’s thought, but as examination is the combination of the two other processes in an institutional setting that documents them over time, I show that examination is likely in ancient Greece, even though it is not widespread in Aristotle.

2.2 Summary

The three technologies of the self, surveillance, normalization, and examination entwine with each other to form disciplinary power. However, the simplest definition of disciplinary power is basically: disciplines make individuals. It does this through the enforcement of standards, peer pressure,
hierarchical pressure, internal pressures, and the knowledge of how to improve the person so he will better fit the position for which he is needed.

Thus the ultimate effect of disciplinary power is the production of subjected and practiced bodies—‘docile’ bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience).

2.3 Conclusion

Power changes things. Disciplinary power changes people. Juridico-discursive power changes people through the laws and regulations in society. It governs the body politic. Disciplinary power does not govern the body politic; it governs individuals. Disciplinary power, in governing the creation of individuals, governs from the outside and from within. Juridico-discursive power, in contrast, is only external.

Disciplinary power inhabits the person. It changes the person. Disciplinary power manifests in three technologies of the self, such as surveillance, normalization, and examination.

Contrary to Foucault’s historical thesis, I intend to show that these three technologies are possibly at work in Aristotle’s political and ethical thought. In showing that they might exist, I allow for the possibility that disciplinary power exists in parallels, prefigurations, and themes of the premodern age.
Chapter 3 Foucault’s Aristotle

In the first two chapters, I clarified Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power. In this chapter, I am going to look at Foucault’s treatment of Aristotle. This is found for the most part in The History of Sexuality: Volume 2 entitled The Uses of Pleasure.

I am also going to highlight a problem. Foucault admits that he has little or no training in classical studies, (Foucault 1990, 7). This causes him to be unclear at times, especially when dealing with Aristotle, Plato, their contemporaries, and the thinkers he deals with in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. At other times, he asserts that all of these thinkers make very similar claims. In other words, Foucault has a tendency to lump together these ancient theorists and thus does not do them full justice. He does this because he is engaged in a certain type of project, and it does not require great accuracy in his work with the ancients.

3.1 Foucault’s Project

Foucault’s project in the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality is not to deal with power/knowledge relationship of domination and its associated technologies. The power of domination is found more in his other works. In these works, Foucault is dealing with the concept of truth and the construction of truth. In the following passage, he describes his project thusly,

After studying the games of truth (jeux de verite) in the interplay with one another, as exemplified by certain
empirical sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and then studying their interaction with power relations, as exemplified by punitive practices--I felt obliged to study the games of oneself as subject, taking as my domain of reference and field of investigation what might be called "the history of desiring man." (Foucault 1990, 6)

This is a different project than was undertaken in Discipline and Punish. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault focuses on how power from external to the person creates a set of standards that compel the person, both subjectively and objectively, to mold himself to fit the standards. In History of Sexuality, Foucault is arguing that the individual person creates himself. In comparison to disciplinary power, which is external and repressive in its origination, Foucault thinks that practices of the self can liberate the person. In other words, by engaging in these practices and performing them, a person can recreate oneself as a different person:

"What are the games of truth by which man proposes to think his own nature when he perceives himself to be mad; when he considers himself to be ill; when he conceives of himself as a living, speaking, laboring being; when he judges and punishes himself as a criminal?" (Foucault 1990, 7)

Foucault thinks that the practices involved in creating oneself are similar to those in disciplinary power. A person has to observe and examine himself and change. There is also a pedagogical machine involved. However, this machine need not ‘normalize’; it may individualize and differentiate more than a disciplinary machine would.
Because of the similarity in his approach and questions in *History of Sexuality*, that Foucault never began an analysis specifically of disciplinary power in those books. Instead, his focus is an analysis of “the care of the self” or the creation of the self as desiring human.

### 3.2 Themes of Greece and Aristotle in Foucault.

Turning from Foucault’s concept of the modern world to his conception of ancient Greece, we become aware that Foucault is perhaps describing ancient Greece appear to appear in a certain way in order to provide a foil for the modern society that he described in *Discipline and Punish*. For the society in that book is as much dystopian as the Greek society that Foucault portrays in *The Uses of Pleasure* is utopian. However, given that a comparison with *Discipline and Punish* is only one of many possible hermeneutics through which to approach this text in this way and that I think that it is obvious to most readers. I am not going to read *The History of Sexuality* in that light. Instead, I am going to break it down into three themes, which are not distinct, but bring out certain aspects in Foucault's treatment of Aristotle. Those themes are self-conduct, self-indulgence, and the relationship between pleasure and reason.

### 3.3 Technologies of the Self in *History of Sexuality*

The three themes that I am going talk about all fall under the idea of an art of existence. This is Foucault’s idea for a
technology of the self unrelated to domination. In other words, an art of existence is a technology of the self:

In The Care of the Self, Foucault points out that it is possible to conceive of other forms of Discipline—self-disciplines, as it were—and that these provide examples of the functioning of power, examples that do not show coercion over oneself or others. In addition, they have the merit of acting as potentially defensive barrier to the “techniques of domination” associated with the disciplines that Foucault surveyed in Discipline and Punish. (Ransom 1997, 139)

The difference between a technique of domination, and a technique of the self lies in their relation to either subjects or objects. A technique, practice, or technology of the self deals with the creation and change of the subject into a new subject and is usually perpetrated by the subject itself. A technique of domination is the transformation of the subject into an object of a power relationship in order to be manipulated by others. The relationship is primarily external in nature. Technologies of the self thus create selves from selves, and technologies of domination create objects from selves.

While Ransom assumes that the techniques of domination are the focus of Discipline and Punish, and techniques of the self are the focus of The History of Sexuality, this is not exactly clear. In fact, Foucault denies that these two can be considered distinct and opposed to one another. Both techniques appear in both works to various extents. What is clear, however is that ancient Greek practices are not viable candidates as opposition

---

3 In this chapter, I interchange the two terms freely.
or resistance to modern techniques of domination as they exist in modern day, (1997, 144).

Though one can see technologies of the self as methods of resistance, they are best seen instead as methods of self-conduct. Foucault is primarily concerned with sexual conduct in his analysis of ancient Greek philosophy and culture. However, although that is his focus, it is important that one notice that the ethics Foucault is trying to generate is one of the self, not one of the polis. Foucault borrows from Aristotle the idea that the good polis is composed of good men, and therefore an ethics based on practices of self-conduct, if practiced by all, would issue in a good polis:

Further, each of the three great arts of self-conduct, the three major techniques of the self, that were developed in Greek thought--dietetics, economics, and erotic--proposed, if not a particular sexual ethics then at least a singular modulation of sexual conduct. In this elaboration of the demands of austerity, not only did the Greeks not seek to define a code of conducts binding everyone, neither did they seek to organize sexual behavior as a domain governed in all its aspect by one and the same set of principles. (Foucault 1990, 251)

The three arts of the self--dietetics, economics, and erotics--deal specifically in the relations of the private in a public--private dichotomy. Dietetics deals with food. Economics deals with the relationship in the household, primarily that between a man and wife. Erotics, for Foucault, is concerned with relations of sexual conduct outside of marriage, primarily that of man-boy relations. Foucault treats the relation among these three technologies of the self, in terms of mastery and control. But he deals with their political dimensions as well. “The
obligation to keep the use of pleasure within the bounds of marriage was also, for Plato’s guardian, Isocrates’ leader, or Aristotle’s citizen, a way of exercising self-mastery, a mastery made necessary by one’s status or by the authority one had to exercise in the city,” (Foucault 1988, 184). Since self-control is important to the Greek man, it is also important to the city comprising such men:

It was thus viewed in the context of a battle for mastery over oneself and for the dominance of reason over passion. This “internal” battle had broad implication for the Greek citizen’s capacity for playing his role in the polis as a whole. (Ransom 1997, 92)

However, this battle for mastery arises not only in connection with the individual’s relations to the city, but also in relations to reality, the moral code, and the self. (Foucault 1990, 28) It would be strange to think that a person, who did not apprehend the reality of his situation, could formulate principles of action that would be hold good when confronting that reality. Likewise, it would be strange to think that such a person could escape the moral code, i.e. the actions considered normal within their society. Foucault recognizes and admits the influence of society over the individual's arts of existence.

3.2.2 Foucault's Aristotle

Although Foucault treats at length how and what the Greeks thought about the arts of existence, he deals with Aristotle directly only on two topics—self-indulgence and the relationship between pleasure and reason. Because it does not contradict my thesis, but is important to demonstrate that Foucault is not
doing work with Aristotle on disciplinary power, I will simply excerpt the passages in which Foucault deals with Aristotle. It will become immediately evident that Foucault is not offering any comprehensive study of Aristotle. What follows are sections of *History of Sexuality* that deal with Aristotle’s thought:

But when Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics* wants to determine exactly which people deserve to be called “self-indulgent” his definition is cautiously restrictive: self-indulgence—akolasia—relates only to the pleasures of the body; and among these the pleasures of sight, hearing, and smell must be excluded. (1990, 40)

Moreover, Aristotle remarks that it would be unjust to suspect self-indulgence in the case of certain pleasures experienced on the surface of the body, such as the noble pleasures that are produced by massages and heat in the gymnasium: “for the contact characteristic of the self-indulgent man does not affect the whole body but only certain parts.” (1990, 40)

Nature intended (for reasons we shall consider) that the performance of the act (copulation) be associated with pleasure and it was this pleasure that gave rise to epithumia, to desire, in a movement that was naturally directed toward what “gives pleasure,” according to a principle that Aristotle cites: desire is always “desire for the agreeable thing.” (1990, 41)

This idea that immorality in the pleasure of sex is always connected with exaggeration, surplus, and excess is found again in the third book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*: Aristotle explains that for the natural desires that are common to everyone, the only offenses that one can commit are quantitative in nature: they pertain to “the more” (to pleion); of that natural desire only consists of satisfying needs, “to eat or drink whatever offers itself till one is surfeited is to exceed the natural amount (toiplethei). It is true that Aristotle also makes allowances for the particular pleasures of certain individuals. (1990, 45)

But it should be remarked that in the practice of sexual pleasures two roles and two polls can be clearly distinguished, just as they can be distinguished in the reproductive function; these consisted of two positional
values: that of the subject and that of the object, that of the agent and that of the “patient”--as Aristotle says, “the female, as female, is passive, the male, as male, is active.” (1990, 46)

Aristotle is the first to distinguish systematically between sophrosune and enkrateia. (1990, 65)

Similarly, in Aristotle’s analysis, enkrateia, defined as mastery and victory, presupposes the presence of desires, and is all the more valuable as it manages to control those that are violent. Sophrosune itself, although defined by Aristotle as a state of virtue, did not imply the suppression of desires, but rather their control: Aristotle places it in an intermediary position between a self-indulgence in which one gladly abandons oneself to one’s pleasure and an insensitivity--extremely rare, it should be added--in which one feels no pleasure, the moderate individual is not one who has no desires but one who desires “only to a moderate degree, not more than he should now when he should not.” (1990, 70)

Generally speaking, anything that would contribute to the political education of a man as citizen would also contribute to his training in virtue… (1990, 76)

... [I]f it was necessary, as Aristotle thought, for desire to obey reason the way a child obeyed his tutor; if Aristippus himself advised that, while it was all right to “use” pleasures, one had to be careful not to be carried away by them. (1990, 50)

After reviewing these selections from Foucault, one sees that Foucault's project is very specific in nature when he deals with Aristotle. Foucault is primarily using Aristotle to establish a base line in ancient Greece that establishes a discussion of the arts of existence.

Foucault cites Aristotle on the topic of excesses of pleasure and common pleasure, such as eating, sex, and other pleasures that rise from our non-rational nature.
In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the three examples he gives of “common pleasures” are those of eating, drinking, and, for youths and vigorous men, the ‘pleasures of the bed.’ In these three forms of pleasure, he recognizes the same type of danger: that of exceeding what is necessary; he even identifies a physiological principle that they hold in common, noting pleasures for contact and touch in all three. (Foucault 1990,51)

In Aristotle, this topic arises in context of the doctrine of the mean. Aristotle’s mean could easily be interpreted as a social norm. Yet surely it is *nomos* (laws, norms) and not necessarily *phusis* (nature) which sets the mean for any given set of ends; for *nomos* constitutes what the culture holds as the points within which the mean is found. For example, is courage is a mean between bravado and timidity, or is it between prudence and heedlessness? Depending on the extreme ends of the spectrum; the idea of the mean and its corresponding extremes will change significantly. Because of the possibility that the idea of the mean is not constant, this opens up the possibility for Foucault to read much more significance into its construction as disciplinary power, but yet he does not. In that he never offers a discussion of disciplinary power in ancient Greece, he allows for the possibility of projects like this one.

### 3.2.3 Foucault's Specificity

Foucault defines his work with the texts very narrowly. He is not seeking to arrive at the truth behind the texts; instead, he is trying to use the ideas in the texts to elucidate his current project:
And for this (establishing the general formula for moral inquiry) we will need to consult texts that are radically different from one another—essentially those of Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle. I will attempt to restore, not the “doctrinal context” that might give each one its peculiar meaning and its deferential value, but rather the “field of problematization” that they had in common and that made each of them possible. (Foucault 1990, 36)

Because Foucault is not looking for a “doctrinal context” but instead for a series of problematizations, it is hard to say that Foucault has the best interpretation of Aristotle as his goal. Aristotle’s project is to provide encompassing theories that describe his world. Foucault is nipping away at the edges of those theories looking for the areas that Aristotle found interesting. He does this because his project requires the problematization of certain of Aristotle’s ideas. This again allows projects like mine to develop, because he never looks at other interpretations of Aristotle’s ideas then the ones necessary for his specific project.

3.3 Conclusion

Foucault is not attempting to aim at doing full justice to Aristotle’s thought, but is attempting to use Aristotle to establish a problem. Foucault is trying to use Aristotle to fit a model that he has preconceived. Because establishing the problem is his purpose, he ignores wider interpretations of Aristotle. This narrowness or specificity is the main reason he fails to see the themes of disciplinary power in Aristotle.
If one looks at the citations of Aristotle in Foucault; other than standard quotations such as “man is a political animal” and the like, Foucault does not range widely in the texts. It appears from his citations that he wants to focus on very specific areas of Aristotle. I do not begrudge him this as he is only doing the work he needs for his project. In focusing narrowly in the texts, Foucault's scant observations, however, open the possibility of further explanations and more expansive interpretations of Aristotle. In the remainder of this thesis, I am in part expanding Foucault's analysis by expanding the breadth of ancient ideas that are read in a Foucauldian fashion.
Chapter 4 The Polis in Aristotle

In the first two chapters of this thesis, I established that certain operations constitute disciplinary power. In this chapter and the next two, I argue that those operations of power exist in some form in the polis. In showing that the operations that constitute disciplinary power exist in a form in the polis, I am establishing that there is either disciplinary power in the polis, or minimally a prefiguration of disciplinary power in the polis. The operations of power that constitute disciplinary power are surveillance, hierarchization, normalization, and examination.

I focus the project of demonstrating these operations of power in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Chapter 5 deals with the comparison between habituation and normalization and Chapter 6 deals with the comparison of friendship and surveillance. However, before I deal with those two chapters, I need to establish a foundation of understanding about Aristotle’s polis. In this chapter, I am going to establish one of those operations of power existed. Specifically, hierarchical and class relations in the polis will be found in the polis thus providing one of the operations of power that constitute disciplinary power.

4.1 Aristotle’s Polis as Institution

In Foucault’s thought, various institutions are disciplinary in nature and these institutions provide a historical foundation and location for the operation of disciplinary power. The polis for Aristotle is the locus of
power and is in itself an agent in the creation of certain kinds of people. Disciplinary power is actualized through habituation and friendship within such an institution.

4.1.1 Examination in the Polis as Institution

The polis as an institution is also the place where examination could be found. However, as Aristotle does not deal much with examination, the support for its existence in ancient Greece needs to be found elsewhere. There is archeological evidence of documentation of a sort in ancient Greece. There are also histories of ancient Greece that we still have. The histories provide documentation of the events of that time and the actions of some men of that time. In Aristotle’s conception of the polis as institution there is only weak evidence to support that examination exists. Weak corollaries to examination may be his description of great or magnanimous men, or his description of oligarchies verses democracies. In either case, the evidence for establishing examination directly in Aristotle’s work is difficult at best.

On the other hand, as we see later, it is very likely that examination and documentation exist in ancient Greece. Aristotle was an expert, and thus one of the certifying individuals of the polis. Thus the need for expertise is met. There were schools and militaries. Both of those surely had some sort of meritocratic system involved that allowed for advancement or punishment. Records of events, such as Herodotus or Thucydides’ histories, we still possess; thus documentation exists. And
finally, as I show later, the two other technologies of the self that comprise examination—surveillance and normalization, both have parallels or strong similarities in Aristotle’s works. In the end, I think there is no reason to deny the existence of examination of a sort in the polis, even though it might not be exactly the same as otherwise.

4.3 Classes and Hierarchies in Aristotle’s Polis

The institutional framework that the polis provides is threefold. It provides first a place, second a government and third an economy. These three parts are necessary establishing hierarchy in the polis because they are the areas in which hierarchy is found. This is not as clear in the first part of the framework, place, but it is readily apparent in the government and economics. For in the government, there are the rulers and the ruled and in economics, there are the rich, the poor, and the middle class. As a place, the polis provides for hierarchy through providing for class-based neighborhoods and locations for government and business to happen. As Aristotle does not deal much with the aspect of space, I will not pursue it further. Instead, I will use the evidence of hierarchy based in the other two parts of the polis as institution.

Aristotle illustrates the concept of discussion when he introduced the varieties of constitution and their justification.

The reason why there are many different constitutions is to be found in the fact that every city has many different parts. In the first place, every city is obviously composed of households. Secondly, in this number there are bound to be some rich, some poor, and some in the middle, with the rich possessing and the poor being
without the equipment of the heavy-armed soldier. Thirdly, the common people were engaged partly in agriculture, partly in trade, and partly in menial jobs. Fourthly, there are also difference among the notables—differences based on their wealth and the amount of their property; and these differences appear, for example of keeping of horses. ([Politics, 1289b40])

Thus, there are three basic economic classes in the polis, the rich, the middle, and the poor. There are also the very rich which have other responsibilities. There are also differences in the middle class that some can afford to be in the heavy infantry and some cannot. Thus, we can see that Aristotle recognizes differences and hierarchy in the polis.

The hierarchy found in government is quite readily found in Aristotle’s work. Aristotle consistently discusses the rulers and the ruled. As we see in the following citation, the ruled and rulers have different excellences.

Ruler and ruled have indeed different excellences; but the fact remains that the good citizen must possess the knowledge and the capacity requisite for ruling as well as being ruled, and the excellence of a citizen by be defined as consisting in ‘a knowledge of rule over free men from both points of view’. ([Politics, 1276b12-15])

That they have different excellences should not be a problematic idea. However, it does establish that they have different types of people and in as much as you have different types of people.

4.4 Conclusion

Disciplinary power requires that there are hierarchies or that hierarchization occurs in the disciplinary institutions.

The polis is the institution in which hierarchies exist. As we
will see later in Chapter 6 there is also hierarchization going on the polis.
Chapter 5 Habituation and Normalization

This chapter describes Aristotle’s special conception of habituation. Once habituation is defined, I will be in a position to demonstrate that because habituation creates individuals to function a certain way in society, it constitutes a process similar to Foucault's normalization. This argument will be accomplished by elaborating on the nature of habituation and including a discussion of the doctrine of the mean.

5.1 Definition of Habituation

Habituation, for Aristotle, is the process that forms or modifies a disposition relationship to the passions. Passions, such as anger or fear, are affective psychic phenomena, as opposed to intellectual states, and human beings already have a natural capacity to experience them. We can think of habituation as the training of the non-rational aspect of human nature to force certain dispositions to be associated with certain passions. Habituation thus forms character. Character is the complex state of being disposed to feel passions in a certain way given certain situations. For instance, if we feel an inordinate amount of fear in our lives, we would be displaying our character, namely the character of a cowardly person. A virtue of character would be possessing the appropriate disposition toward the situation, in other words, being disposed to feel fear appropriately. As Aristotle says below:

This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and by being habituated to feel
fear or confidence, we become brace or cowardly. (NE, 1103b2-25)
In other words, it would be not be feeling fear in excessively or
deficiently (NE, 1104a10). Thus as virtue is the mean between
excess and defect, the habituation of virtue would be performing
those acts that are similar to virtuous actions.

Given Aristotle’s definition of habituation, it is possible
to move into Aristotle’s application of this concept. The first
thing that Aristotle does in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics is
to distinguish virtues of character and virtues of mind
(intellectual virtues). The first type of virtue comes about
through habituation. Intellectual virtue is developed through
teaching and experience, (NE, 1102a15). Though, the two types of
virtue both lead to and constitute the good life, they cannot be
arrived at through the same method.

One method that uses habituation is practice. Practice is
related to habituation, not teaching. This is because practice
gives one experience, and experience of situations combined with
the habituation of the proper affective states for those
situations, develops virtue of character. Practice associated
with teaching is visible, but habituation is internal, as both
the passions and dispositions are internal, and as such its
operation is invisible. An affective disposition toward a
certain situation is developed through habituation. However,
Aristotle goes on to note that habituation does not deal with a
purely natural states, because something purely natural cannot be
changed. Owing to the fact that we have the capacity to feel
pleasure and pain naturally, that capacity cannot be changed. However, that we feel pleasure and pain toward certain things and in certain amounts can be altered; it is a disposition.

Since pleasure and pain are associated with specific actions by habituation, they are associated with affective dispositions. The association of such states with the correct action would allow a person to perform an act for the sake of the pleasure or pain; rather than pleasure and pain merely being signals of the proper action as they are for the properly habituated. One who is virtuous will feel pain in seeing a vice perpetrated, or in perpetrating a vice. This is true because in habituating the correct dispositions, one associates pleasure and pain with them only secondarily. For example, if we look at the example of a child, at first, a child is forced to act virtuously, by being subjected to pain when caught acting viciously. Feeling pleasure when we perform virtue to please others is what occurs in a virtuous person. Thus, in the end, pleasure and pain are plainly associated with virtue and vice, but the person no longer relies on them to provide the reason to perform the actions. The virtuous person performs actions because they are the right actions for the situation and they have trained their non-rational soul to desire these right actions.

The key to developing a virtue of character is obtaining the correctly habituated dispositions of the non-rational parts of the soul. This is because the dispositions are not natural
states, but states able to change. Habituated states cannot, as they are non-rational, be taught, which is another reason habituation is the proper method. They can be practiced, but in earliest youth, they can only be habituated.

5.2 Habituation and Normalization

Habituation is the modification of subjectivity. It is a process of creating virtue in people. As noted above, habituation works on the dispositions of the person’s soul. It works to make the person virtuous. Virtue is about making the person that functions best in society. Creating a person that functions best is a process of creating new subjectivities. This starts during childhood, but continues throughout life.

Normalization is a process that functions both internal and external to the process to bring about capabilities in the person to make them more effective at what they need to do in society. Habituation is like normalization in that it changes the psyche so as not to inhibit proper functioning in society. Teaching creates the mental faculties that are necessary to fit in society. Habituation and teaching function in ways that disciplinary power seems to function, but disciplinary power has the aspect of normalization.

5.3 Doctrine of the Mean

Habituation instills virtue. Virtue for Aristotle is the proper functioning of man. "... [T]he virtue of man also will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well,” (NE,1106a22). Virtue has little to do
with extremes according to Aristotle. Instead, virtue, as we will see, has everything to do with being “normal” or being in the mean in respect to excessive or deficient states. This is easy enough to see in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: “[V]irtue is a kind of mean, since,..., it aims at what is intermediate,” (NE, 1106b29).

The mean is not absolute but defined in terms of two end points, which are relative to the community more than the individual. “Thus a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this--the intermediate not in the object, but relative to us” (NE, 1106b4). Since virtue is relative to us, and the “us” that Aristotle refers to is individuals in the polis, and the polis sets the norms and laws according to which individuals are then habituated, the citizen is habituated to be a certain way in the polis and this way is virtuous.

5.3.1 The Mean in the Polis

The virtuous way is the way that is the best for the self-sufficiency of the polis, which is in part economic efficiency. The best polis must also train its the citizens to be able to sit on juries, vote in the assembly, and perform other offices as required for its proper operation. The Greek polis *must make its citizens* in order for the polis to function. As Carnes Lord says, “The education in “habit” itself presupposes both a prior training or habituation designed to “prepare the road” for its reception and public institutions that will support and protect
it,” (Lord 1982, 43). The polis and its institutions are made to make men in a certain way.

Class and hierarchy are important aspects to be considered in the proper habituation of citizens. A citizen that was not raised to be virtuous would not be fit for duty in the military or in the political operations of the polis. Aristotle mentions this repeatedly. He not only notes the inappropriateness of the nature of slaves and women for those duties because in Aristotle’s thought they were not capable of being virtuous; he also notes the problems of those who are exceed the mean:

Those who have an excess of the goods of fortune—strength and wealth and friends and other things of such a sort—they do not wish nor know how to be ruled. This first begins at home when they are boys. And because of their luxury, they never develop a habit of being ruled at school either. But those who are in extreme need are very abject. The later thus do no know how to rule, but only how to be ruled as slaves are. But the former do not know how to be ruled at all but only how to rule as slave masters do. Therefore, a city of slaves and slave masters arises, not a city of free men, but one of envy and spite. (Politics, 1295b13-23)

A life of excess makes a person unwieldy toward being ruled, and in the polis, where some people must rule and some must follow, if it is to be a good polis, it must not have these kinds of inappropriately habituated individuals comprising it either in whole or in part. Not only does Aristotle discuss the mean in respect to the person, he also notes that the excessively rich and poor are detrimental to the polis attaining the good life.

In all cities, there are three parts of the city—those who are excessively rich, those who are excessively poor, and thirdly, those who have a mean between these. Since moderation and the mean are agreed to be best, obviously
moderation in the possession of the goods of fortune is best of all. For moderation easily obeys a principle. (Politics, 1295b1-6)

The economic and political stability afforded by a large middle class, and the tendency for a good polis to have a larger middle class is noted in Aristotle’s Politics. “Obeying a principle” means that the citizens are obeying a set of norms or standards, i.e. functioning well in the polis. The rich are more likely according to Aristotle to take over a polis, to steal the polis, establish a monarchy or oligarchy, and profit from it. Thus the rich and poor classes must be made more moderate or be normalized for the polis to work properly.

Mean states in the polis aid its proper functioning. For without mean states the polis will turn out criminal. Laws and norms are important to the proper functioning of the polis and Aristotle says that those without virtue, those who do not aim at the mean, will not respect the law. Though these are not the same means as the means in the doctrine of the mean, they are still moderate states and allude to a theme of normality in Aristotle’s Politics. They will become criminal in one way or another.

But superiority in handsomeness, strength, birth, or wealth and the opposites of these, inferiority in poverty or strength or excessive dishonor, has difficulty listening to principle. The former men turn licentious and become great criminals, the latter turn vicious and become petty criminals. (Politics, 1295b6-10)

The criminal possibility is ever present if a polis does not make their citizens virtuous and mean seeking from the beginning.
The more virtuous people a polis has the more people that it has that make it good. The mean as such must be something that everyone can have in one form or another. “If the happy life is the unimpeded life of virtue, and if virtue is a mean, as was rightly said in the Ethics, then the best life must be a mean—-a mean attainable by each man,” (Politics, 1295a35-39). Virtue has to be something that everyone is capable of. However, the education to gain intellectual virtue and become the most virtuous was still limited by natural tendencies and capacities; thus being the most virtuous was not possible for such a person.

Aristotle points toward the military to instill a particular kind of virtue that nearly all could possess, much as Foucault points toward the military as one of the first disciplinary regimes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

But the people have difficulty in attaining perfection in all virtue, though they can best attain military virtue, for this virtue arises in the masses. That is why those who fight in the heavy infantry possess the most sovereignty in accordance with their military virtue, and those who possess armor share in it. (Politics, 1279a40-1279b4)

Though the military life made people closer to the mean as courageous people, and thus more appropriate to the military needs of the polis, some other lifestyles do not lend themselves to gain even this mean. The life of superior wealth is one; however, others are the mechanical arts or manual labor. Aristotle does not think that people, who work every day for long periods, as a slave would, have the mental abilities to adapt themselves to be virtuous, (Politics, 1337b4-17). Working takes
these citizens out of the systems of knowledge that enable them to make wise decisions. This situation is not unlike how Foucault describes people under disciplinary regimes. They are focused on their economic productivity and their bodies’ function primarily for that respect, creating a docile populace.

5.3 Conclusion

There are many similarities between normalization and habituation. Both create individuals. Both aim toward a set or norms and standards that are based in the mean or normal state. Both possess a degree of penalty. Both are founded in the state or polis and in the military regimes. Normalization and habituation share so many of the same characteristics that habituation is close enough to normalization to be considered disciplinary in nature. Normalization imposes homogeneity and as does the polis in Aristotle. Habituation and teaching in Aristotle allows for the differentiation of hierarchies in people because some people can attain the highest virtue and some cannot and those people are recognized as such in the polis. In arguing for his particular political formation in which the most virtuous rule Aristotle institutes structures in society based upon those hierarchies. These structures are classes; those classes comprise a docile body politic that is economically efficient. Habituation rewards and punishes learning and certain actions in society while judging such actions to be virtuous or vicious. This constitutes normalization as I have described it in Chapter 2. Admittedly, it is a slightly different from Foucault’s idea,
but certainly, it parallels Foucault’s vision of normalization in many ways.
Chapter 6 Friendship

In this chapter, I will delineate the typology in Aristotle's typology of friendship, friendship's relationship to political power, and how it can be considered a form of surveillance.

For Foucault, knowledge is the key to surveillance. The purpose of surveillance is to gather knowledge. Also, it is to let the people know that they are being watched, measured and understood. Given the similarities between normalization and habituation discussed in the previous chapter, it is to be expected that there must be a constant and pervasive surveillance to ensure virtuous function of the polis. As we will see, in terms of gathering knowledge and knowing people, Aristotle's friendship has elements of Foucault's surveillance.

6.1 Conceptions of Friendship in Aristotle

Friendship in Aristotle, I claim, is the foundation for surveillance. This is because the relationship of friendship in Aristotle requires knowledge of each friend in the polis. In the good polis though, every citizen would be a friend of every other citizen, thus creating a knowledge base that permeates the relationships and later enables the friends to coerce, to change, to normalize, or to habituate the other person.
6.1.1 Types of Friendship

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of friendship. They correspond to the three objects of love, of which one is the highest form and two others, presenting a natural ordering of friendship in terms of love. The three objects of love are the good, the pleasant, and the useful (NE, 1155b20).

Political friendship is the lowest kind of friendship. It is the friendship of usefulness. However for Aristotle, no polis could exist without political friendship, because this relationship provides a cohesive force that is necessary for the polis to seek its own good. The goal held by all in the polis is the good for man or eudaimonia. Political friendship thus is useful because it provides cohesion, binding groups in the polis together to seek the common goal. The polis that only seeks the good as a whole is not the ideal polis, as the ideal polis also needs to satisfy the good for each man. The polis that only has political friendship cannot necessarily provide such a pluralism of goods, as each man has goods that he pursues that are not pursued collectively.

Political friendship is the primary relationship in the Greek assembly, which is the largest group of citizens in the polis. Though, it should be noted that friendships of virtue may exist in the assembly, they are not as predominant. Political friendships give that group its cohesiveness or identity. One of the other features of this friendship is that it does not require
a great deal of knowledge of the other person, as it does not
deal with that person’s needs. Political friendship does require
to some extent the knowledge of the person's place in society so
as one does not make such friends with slaves or metics.

There are two other kinds of friendship relating to two
other kinds of love for one’s fellow man. They are the
friendship of pleasure and the friendship of virtue.

The friendship of pleasure is one in which the friends
enjoy giving in the pleasure to their friends. An instance of
this would be going out to dinner with friends to share in
conversation and good food. This type of friendship requires
knowledge not only of the other person's existence and place in
society, but also what they like and dislike. It does not
require that we want the best for the other person, only that his
desires are somewhat satisfied by the relationship.

Pleasure friendships are not the highest form of
friendship. Friendships of virtue are the highest form.
Friendships of virtue promote virtue. The friendship of virtue
is the friendship that loves the good in a man. The good of a
man is virtue of character and of mind. The friends in this
paradigm respect and love each other because they are virtuous
and virtuous people love the virtuous qualities in other people.
The problem is that this takes in-depth knowledge of the person’s
caracter and actions. Accordingly, this type of friendship
cannot be foundation of the polis. Virtue friendships can only
work in small groups. It takes a strong commitment from the friends to maintain the virtue and become more virtuous.

Friendships based in the virtues are important because these are the best friendships, but it is the political friendship that is the foundation of the polis. They are also important because their presence inspires others to become virtuous. Friends form groups and these groups are noticed throughout society by their peers. This is part of the hierarchization process discussed in Chapter Four. People recognize virtue in other people and in their relationships with others thus providing some ground by which to judge themselves and others.

Thus to have a good polis one needs the knowledge found in the political friendship to be pervasive, but also one requires some virtuous people so as to give a paradigm for others to follow.

6.2 Friendship, Knowledge and Virtue

Friendship is generally about helping other people be better in some way or another for their own good (Politics, 1380b45). For this reason, one needs to have some knowledge of the good of that other person. In a friendship of utility, such as political friendship, you share a common good such as the good of the polis. Though this is important, both of the other friendships in the polis require more knowledge of the person and it is this knowledge of the person and of the person’s character
that forms the basis for the betterment of that person through habituation.

6.2.1 knowledge

The friendship of people requires knowledge of each other in all their roles: "Moreover, just as friends must have knowledge of each other, citizens must have some knowledge of one another if there is to be political friendship in the city," (Nichols 1992, 131).

However, if the polis becomes too large an individual cannot know every other individual in the polis, then you have to rely on reports of those unknown to you by friends that you and he share. Your compatriots in battle, his partners in economic venture and other things all share information on others in the polis. This shared information is a huge unwritten public record of who has done what to whom and when. This type of public record, while not the same as contemporary record keeping, at times was inscribed into various books and thus we have histories of famous people from that era.

Knowledge of the person is also important for the betterment of the person in society. Friends let friends know when they go wrong. Associating with bad people in the polis, according to Aristotle, will at times lead to bad outcomes, such as the loss of respect.

6.2.2 Friendship and Virtue

Friendship is a constructive tool in an association. It works in the following manner. Given a friendship between an
incontinent friend and a good or virtuous friend, both wanting good for the other, the virtuous person stays the same, because he knows the good, and the incontinent man becomes more continent on the way to virtuous. The incontinent friend will not lower the standards of the virtuous friend, if he tries the virtuous friend will either break the friendship or explain the error of the other individuals ways. In truth, if one looks at the idea of a paradigmatic individual in the polis, then a paradigmatic individual provides the idea of the good person for the polis and all attempt to mimic his behavior and to become better in that way. This is not unlike the idea of habituation discussed in the previous chapter.

Friendship keeps the young from error, (NE, 1155a15). Keeping the young from error and keeping the old from error is part of the proper functioning of the polis, though the young are more important and easier to change in their dispositions.

6.3 Friendship in the Polis

There are three primary relationships between humans on the social level in Aristotle: households, friendships, and politics. The first deals with the organization of the family, which is not relevant here. The second and third deal in part with the proper functioning of the polis. The best polis is founded on friendship in that friendship is the basis for unanimity in decisions, equality in justice, and the glue that holds the polis together. “[F]or Aristotle philia was the social bond par excellence,” (Hutter 1978, 155). In this section, I demonstrate
that friendship promotes for the efficient functioning of the polis is like what disciplinary power does for the nation-state.

6.3.1 Unanimity and Concord

Friendship provides one of the methods of arriving at a decision in the polis. If the polis is constituted of all friends and neighbors, they all share a common good, and the decision is about that good, then that good provides unanimity of action. If the decision is not about a single good shared by all, then the friendship allows for concord, for staying friends and thus keeping the polis together is a far greater good than each individual’s or subgroup’s interests. “Unanimity binds the citizens together and provides the psychological basis for political co-operation and mutual respect,” (Miller 1995, 136).

They types of decisions that unanimity comes into play are necessarily few. War declarations and ostracism come to mind immediately and Aristotle mentions the latter below:

Friendship seems also to hold the polis together, and lawgivers seem to be more concerned with it than justice; for unanimity seems to be similar in a way to friendship, and they aim at this most of all and they try to expel the faction. (NE, 1155a22-26)

In ostracism, a person is expelled from the polis. This was generally done for the security of the polis, to rid it of demagogues and other types.

Concord on the other hand concerns less important decisions as described below:

Concord also seems to be a friendly relation. For this reason it is not identity of opinion; for that might occur
even with people who do not know each other; nor do we say that people who have the same views on any and every subject are in accord, ... but we do say that a city is in accord when men have the same opinion about what is to their interest, and choose the same actions, and do what they have resolved in common. (NE,1167a20)

Concord is concerned with personal interests, but personal interests and even the interests of an organization are subordinate to the good of the polis and thus political friendship brings a resolution to the problem through concord for Aristotle. “The city may be heterogeneous, allowing private property and families, but it is a heterogeneous whole. Its wholeness, for Aristotle is based on the friendship or concord that emerges through political rule and that in turn maintains that rule,” (Nichols 1992, 131). This wholeness performs like surveillance does for Foucault; it holds society together. Concord also makes for a more efficient means of ruling society, because discord on some matters is ruled out and thus the political processes existing because discord exist can be used more efficiently.

6.3.2 Equality and Justice

The political functions of friendship are not limited to the decision making of groups of people. Friendship is a relationship between individuals at its heart and because of that it deals with the power, virtue, and money between people. Indeed, between true or virtuous friends justice never becomes an issue, because the relationship is just by its very nature and the nature of the people involved.
Aristotle says equality is friendship, (NE, 1168b8). All friendship for Aristotle deals in justice, equality, and the proper distribution of power, virtue, and wealth in the polis. Balancing these goods in one’s relations to others is the core of friendship. It is the same with the polis:

All constitutions are a particular form of justice; for a constitution is a community, and everything common is established through justice, so that however many forms of friendship there are, there are as many of justice and community; these all border on one another, and the forms of one have differences akin to those of the other. (Politics, 1241b13-17)

Justice and equality are not aspects of either friendship or the good polis but instead they reside in both. The good polis is just because it is founded on friendship and friendship involves justice. Friends are equals because to be called friendship the relationship must be balanced. One person may have more political power, and the other may have more virtue, yet their friendship is equal; and all friendships according to Aristotle exhibit this sort of balance.

Since equality and justice come from friendship, they provide for a more efficient operation of the polis for Aristotle. There would be no need for courts among virtuous men. This lack of courts would eliminate a great expense in time and political energy. Likewise, without concord and unanimity, without means of resolving disputes there would be civil war and a general breakdown of the polis. Aristotle in his ideal polis wants to prevent both of those situations from arising, so he
provides a way of making the system more efficient, which is one of the things that disciplinary institutions do.

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that Aristotle’s theory of friendship has many features of disciplinary power. In the last section, I argued that the efficiency of Aristotle’s polis is one aspect that aids in establishing the disciplinary power in Aristotle’s polis.

The argument that I sought to make is that the knowledge gained in friendship provides the same knowledge of the individual as surveillance would and though the similarities are somewhat sparse, they nonetheless exist. I also argued that there was a means of documentation, though again slightly different than Foucault's conception. Finally, I argued that friendship deals with the pressure of peers and hierarchies to change the individual to let them know that they are being observed. Hierarchical structures, gaining and disseminating knowledge, and perfecting the efficiency of the state are all parts of surveillance as I described it in chapter 2. Friendship contains the ideas necessary to establish that the practices that constitute surveillance exist in Aristotle’s works, and as such, we have a strong similarity between Foucault’s surveillance and Aristotle’s friendship.
Chapter 7 Conclusion

In the last three chapters, I reconstructed some ideas of Aristotle and interpreted them in a Foucauldian mode. These ideas are the polis, political friendship and habituation. They represent aspects of disciplinary power in that I argued that Aristotle’s idea of friendship can be seen as a type of surveillance and habituation can be seen to have the properties of normalization.

Specifically, in the first half of this thesis, I established that disciplinary power reduces to some basic fundamental operations. Those operations of power existing in any system, such as Aristotle’s polis, constitute disciplinary power. Building from that, after I consider and dismiss Foucault’s interpretation of Aristotle, in chapter four, I establish that hierarchization exists in Aristotle’s thought in the form of classes and organizations of government. Also in that chapter, I speculate that examination should exist in the polis, though the evidence in Aristotle is weak. Though, evidence of examination is weak, evidence of normalization is clearly portrayed in chapter five which deals with Aristotle’s habituation and doctrine of the mean. Once that is established, I argue that the important aspect of surveillance is the knowledge that it creates in the society. I then show that friendship in Aristotle constitutes a similar type of knowledge in society. Finally, I explore the relationship between the outcome of the technologies of the polis and the outcome of the
technologies of disciplinary power. As those two outcomes parallel each other, I believe that I have showed that Aristotle has themes and parallels that are quite similar to the ideas of Foucault.

Building on my evidence in those chapters, I have thrown significant doubt on the idea that disciplinary power arose in the 17th and 18th centuries. I have done this by establishing that there are themes in Aristotle that parallel the technologies of the self that constitute disciplinary power. The strength of this work does not lie in whether it demonstrates a factual claim against Foucault. Instead, it lies in the possibilities of further exploration and further reconceptions of the relationship between Foucault and ancient political theories.

To show that Foucault’s historical thesis is entirely false would require much more work and certainly a wider scope than I could present in this thesis. My work here is not intended to attempt to perform that monumental task. It is intended to add to a growing academic discourse focused around Foucault’s treatment of the Ancients, and some of this will certainly be focused on the question of disciplinary power in the ancient world. I firmly believe that one could show Foucault’s historical thesis false, but that such a project would have to include surveys of ancient Greek history, warfare, economic system, and other philosophical works beyond the evidence presented here.
Bibliography


Curriculum Vitae

Jeremy Hunsinger
Born: 10-25-72

Degrees:
1999 Pursuing Graduate Diploma in Internet Studies
   Curtin Institute of Technology, Perth Australia
1998 Master of Arts in Political Science
   Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
1996 Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy and Political Science
   Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Papers:
1998 Thesis: Disciplinary Themes in Aristotle’s Political and Ethical Theory

Employment:
1998-Present Director of VTOnline/Instructor of Political Science
   Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
1996-1998 Teaching Assistant Political Science
   Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Projects:
VTOnline (Virginia Tech Online)
A Virtual University
http://www.vto.vt.edu
Center for Digital Discourse and Culture
A research and publication location
http://www.cddc.vt.edu
Cyber Assistants Program
http://www.vtonline.vt.edu/cap
OLMA
An On-Line Masters Degree in Political Science
http://www.cyber.vt.edu/prsci/olma/olma.html