POLITICAL SCIENCE
QUESTS FOR IDENTITY, CONSTRUCTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

by

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As the professional identity of political scientists has changed, so have their constructions of political knowledge. Political scientists initially defined themselves in terms of their ability to aid a modernizing polity. By the 1970's, though, political knowledge was strongly affected by vocational necessity, i.e., by the need to conduct research in an increasingly competitive publication market. The discipline of political science has grown tremendously since its inception in the university. Political research and political knowledge have expanded apace. Through looking at the discipline's major attempts to establish a professional identity in the university one can begin to understand ways in which political scientists have constructed political knowledge in response to prevailing social and political phenomena. Through this lens we can assess the current state of the discipline and, based on a historical account of the discipline, perhaps begin to understand which direction the discipline may go in the future, especially in terms of the usefulness of political knowledge in society.
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INTRODUCTION

My purpose in this thesis is two-fold. First, I want to construct an account of the ways in which the discipline of political science has become professionalized. That is, I want to interpret the evolution of the professional identity of political scientists at various stages in the discipline’s history. The history of political science can be usefully interpreted through its members’ struggles to establish their professional identities in society and in the university. These struggles have often affected what political scientists do, which leads to the second part of my purpose.

Major attempts at establishing a professional identity for political scientists have tended to affect the ways in which political knowledge has been constructed. The second part of my purpose is to assess the construction of political knowledge during the various (major) attempts at professional identification that have occurred in the discipline. The parts of my purpose should converge to express recent constructions of political knowledge and professional identification.

Any history of political science could conceivably take a lifetime to complete. But, I think a history of the discipline can still be useful and interesting with a sharp focus. I want to forge my account by assessing professional
identity and political knowledge constructions at four stages in the history of the discipline (the establishment of the APSA, the science of politics movement, behavioralism and post-behavioralism); stages which I consider to be turning points of the discipline's professionalization. These turning points represent times when there were significant attempts by powerful (and/or numerous) members of the discipline to define what it is that political scientists should do.

The first stage I want to look at is the establishment of the discipline's professional association, the American Political Science Association (APSA). Political science, as a distinct area of study in the university, had been "founded" more than fifty years before the discipline vested its interests in the APSA. But, during the late 1800s and the early 1900s many prominent political scientists felt a need to establish their professional identity and the APSA became the accepted vehicle for this need. The APSA, though, only helped to establish the professional identity of political scientists at the societal level. That is, the APSA gave political scientists a common organization, but many were still unsure of a common identity within the university and it is at this level that I wish to concentrate in this thesis. The new political scientists knew that they wanted to help the government and its
citizens adapt to a rapidly changing world, but there was no consensus in terms of research and methodology.

The science of politics movement tried to develop such a consensus, and this is the second stage I want to discuss in this thesis. This movement, which was centered at the University of Chicago, took place between the two world wars. It represents the attempts of two very influential political scientists (Charles Merriam and Harold Lasswell) to define the science in political science. That is, they sought to systematize political research in order to develop a body of knowledge that could be applied to cure political ills. The science of politics movement started a trend in parts of the discipline toward establishing a scientific identity for political scientists. For many political scientists since, the proper professional identity has been that of "scientist".

During the behavioral era of the 1950s and 1960s, attempts to establish a scientific identity for political scientists became widespread. Political scholars of the behavioral persuasion sought to alter the definition of science in the discipline. They wanted to move away from applied science and toward a pure science of politics. The proper identity of political scientist was "pure scientist," modeled after natural science. A pure political scientist simply explained the workings of politics and offered her or
his work as a building block to "knowledge". Behavioralism threatened to become a hegemonic force in the discipline by the mid-1960's.

However, significant numbers of political scientists objected to the behavioral identity. They felt that this identity was too parochial and irrelevant to society. They wanted to move beyond behavioralism into post-behavioralism. Post-behavioralists wanted to expand the definition of political science. They opposed behavioral attempts to define a monolithic community of political scientists. Post-behavioralists were generally unwilling to shed the scientific aspect of their professional identity. But, they were interested in denying the possibility that political scientists could all be defined in the same way.

The post-behavioral movement helped to make many professional identities possible in political science. Debates about science and professional development continued to rage, but post-behavioralists made the discipline more open and diverse, at least in terms of research agendas. Professional identity formation retreated to the sub-fields and became more localized. Members of the discipline began identifying themselves less as "political scientists" and more as "specialists" within political science. These special divisions in terms of professional identity also divided political knowledge. People became to increasingly
define themselves as specialists in international relations, American politics, political theory, etc., during the post-behavioral era.

The specialties have since become microdisciplines within the discipline of political science. Specialists typically hold their own panels at APSA meetings and publish in their own journals. There is not much overlap amongst the microdisciplines; they do not often communicate intellectually with one another. Scholars routinely remain within their own microdisciplinary boundaries. It would be difficult, and probably foolish, to step outside of one’s microdiscipline. The amount of literature, the prevalence of jargon, and the reliance on technical expertise in the microdisciplines is enough (and often more) for one person to handle.

The format for this thesis, for this construction of the history of political science, is as follows. In chapter 1, I discuss the emergence of the APSA as the professional organization of the discipline. Chapter 2 covers the science of politics movement. Chapter 3 deals with behavioralism. Chapter 4 covers post-behavioralism. And in chapter 5, I address the emergence of the microdisciplines. In all of these chapters I will keep a keen eye trained on the establishment of professional identity and its relationship to the construction of political knowledge.
CHAPTER ONE
THE EMERGENCE OF THE PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE

We can accurately place the beginning of American political science as an organized discipline on December 30, 1903 when John Burgess, Frank Goodnow, Westel W. Willoughby and others founded the American Political Science Association (APSA). The Association's journal, the American Political Science Review (APSR), followed in 1906. Even though most schools still lacked separate political science departments, the appearance of the APSA, and eventually its journal, legitimated making a commitment to political science as an acceptable area of study. The APSA gave political scientists, in and out of the university, a feeling of purpose, and the APSR offered an outlet for original research and scholarly exposure. Political scientists found that

the APSR, and the APSA's conventions and committee activities, contributed enormously to a sense of shared endeavor for the new discipline's members. Publication in the former or delivering a paper to, or being elected an officer in, the latter clearly indicated who was capable of doing highly regarded research and therefore entitled to such esteem among his peers as to appear certified by

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the 'community of the competent' that presumably existed in every learned discipline.²

The discipline of political science was not initially focused in the university. In fact, in 1912 only 20% of the APSA membership were "professors and teachers."³ This university contingent of the APSA was extremely effective, though, at consistently dominating offices of the APSA and the editorial board of the APSR. And eventually, "the presidency [of the Association] was increasingly reserved for de facto professors, with non-academics rarely advancing beyond the rank of second vice-president."⁴ Eventually, the Association became increasingly populated by academicians which moved the discipline's focus to the university.

As the discipline moved through time, political scientists increasingly incorporated political knowledge as their peculiar domain. In other words, political scientists, after "authorizing" themselves through the creation of a discipline, began cordonning off political research as their area of study. They began to define themselves as holders and keepers of political knowledge. The study of politics was becoming a professional pursuit,

³Ricci, p. 64.
³Somit and Tanenhaus, p. 55.
⁴Ibid., pp. 55-56.
sanctioned by a professional association. This trend toward professionalism in the field of political research became more clear during the behavioral revolution's move to "pure" science.

This chapter describes the founding of the discipline, the beginnings of professionalization. The APSA functioned as an organizing entity during this stage of the discipline's history. It gave people with an interest in politics an organization that could address and define political issues. For university professors of political science, the APSA helped to define the profession of political science; it gave them professional identity in society. In the university, though, political scientists continued their struggle to establish an identity; a struggle that increasingly looked to science for legitimacy and authority.

1.1 The Study of Politics in American Colleges, 1636-1865

The study of politics underwent radical changes from 1636-1865. The curricula in American colleges during this period largely emphasized the production of responsible, loyal and well-behaved citizens. With a focus on theories of the state and normative considerations, natural and moral philosophy combined law, history, ethics and political economy to reach this goal. Educators concerned themselves with what ought to be rather than with what is. By 1865,
though, much had changed. The normative statist bias remained, but the nature of philosophy had been altered. Subject differentiation had occurred. That is, moral philosophy no longer concerned itself with politics. Its emphasis now lingered predominantly on ethics. Law, political economy and history had separated out of philosophy leaving only history still concerned with politics.

1.1.a Natural and Moral Philosophy, 1636-1800

Harvard University, founded in 1636, held only incidental interest in the teaching of politics in its early years. Politics appeared only within the branch of ethics. All accounts of its existence at Harvard suggest that politics was of minor importance at best. Such marginal interest in political issues also existed at the College of William and Mary, Yale, the College of New Jersey, and King's College well into the eighteenth century.

By the 1750s though, an interest in political questions began to crystallize. The College of Philadelphia taught natural philosophy (which included ethics, logic and rhetoric) in which "man was first considered in a state of nature and then as a member of society." Moral philosophy

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5 Haddow, pp. 3-5.

of the eighteenth century took this further by dealing
with the rights and obligations of man in his
individual and social capacity,—the philosophy of
man in relation to himself and his fellows, as
distinct from his relation to nature embodied in
natural philosophy, and that to his Creator
embodied in theology. Witherspoon termed it
that branch of science which treats of the
principles and laws of duty or morals, with two
great branches, ethics, which relate to personal
duties, and politics, which relates to the
constitution, government, and the rights of
societies.\(^7\)

The purpose of this moral philosophy "was to answer the
question what ought to be, but not necessarily what is."\(^8\)
Through an emphasis on discipline and hard work, the
colleges of this era wanted to teach students how they
should act as responsible citizens. The accent on the
education of classic culture broadened this objective.

\section*{1.1.b 1801-1865}

The normative focus was questioned as early as 1801.
In fact, the desire for a more scientific study of politics,
one based on facts, emerged in some students long before the
faculty embraced it as possible and necessary. Joseph
Watson, a student at William and Mary in 1801, wrote to his
brother David that a

\footnote{John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy (Princeton
University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1912), pp. 1 and 4.}
\footnote{Haddow, p. 19.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 19.}
man by reading the works of Rousseau, Locke, and Paine, may certainly acquire important ideas on the subject [of politics]. But here he is always obliged, in a measure, to take the [their?] ideas. On the contrary he who has a knowledge of history and has founded his ideas on fact, feels himself fixed upon a law which nothing can ever shake.\textsuperscript{10}

This sentiment, though, appeared sporadically at best. After all, the United States was still an agrarian society with a relatively limited vision of technology and science. And although the enlightenment had worked to de-emphasize the Church's role in politics, moral philosophy by 1850 still "stressed the fact that civil society is an institution of God. Society promised to protect the individual in the enjoyment of all his rights and to redress his wrongs. Freedom of person, intellect, and conscience remain untouched despite the existence of society."\textsuperscript{11} This was about to change with the influences of Charles Darwin, industrialization and Reconstruction.

By 1865, numerous changes had occurred in American education. College enrollment had increased, albeit slowly, while differentiations transpired in the subjects taught. Moral philosophy, which used to teach politics, had become more interested in ethics. The study of law disconnected from the study of philosophy and politics, becoming "a

\textsuperscript{10}Quoted in Haddow, p. 48.

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., p. 153.
technical and analytical study of American law, designed for the budding practitioner rather than the educated citizen." Political economy was losing interest in politics too and began focusing on "production, distribution, and consumption of economic goods." History, though, continued to attend to political and constitutional developments. These areas of study were separating out of moral philosophy and even appeared to be modernizing, excepting history (political studies inclusive), in response to the move toward industrialization on a broad scale. The preparation of responsible, loyal and well-behaved citizens for the world would not be enough for the approaching American society. Responsible, loyal and well-behaved citizens with practical knowledge would be required and it would be the colleges' role to provide such citizens.

1.2 The Discipline Emerges, 1865-1906

The study of politics had changed profoundly by 1865. It had been abandoned by moral philosophy, law and economics, but had retained its connection to history. Even within the study of history, political studies were beginning to assume their own distinct status as the ante-

\[^{12}\text{Ibid., p. 167.}\]

\[^{13}\text{Ibid., p. 167.}\]
bellum world "reconstructed" and industrialized. Political theory was differentiating and gaining status apart from moral philosophy. International law and constitutional history were given their own discrete course listings in many colleges. Ultimately, such developments provided the groundwork that would support the discipline of political science that arose at the turn of the twentieth century.

The era that gave rise to the discipline, 1865-1906, witnessed changes in the emphasis of undergraduate education away from the production of responsible citizens and toward the introduction of citizens with practical knowledge to the economy. "In an age of riches, business and science, organized learning was reconstructed along with other fields of activity. Increased knowledge through invention and scientific discovery compelled the college to broaden its program."¹⁵ Broaden it did, and political science grew along with it. In fact, by 1900 numerous courses were being offered under the separate listing of "government" or "political science".¹⁶ The colleges also began their turn toward scientific research. "American students returning

¹¹Ibid., p. 171.
¹⁵Ibid., p. 171.
¹⁶Ibid., p. 171.
from German universities had learned to respect scientific method and careful, thorough research." This was the case in political science too and the seeds were planted early.

William Watts Folwell of the University of Minnesota claimed, in 1869, that a multitude of political questions existed that increasingly required scientific answers. Folwell believed that "the state needs not merely intelligent voters [but eventually] requires experts in legislation, in the administration of public affairs, and for [its] military defense." Folwell recommended education for political careers rather than just for personal life.

This, of course, represented a sharp break from the past purpose of higher education, and by 1900 the preparation of students for political careers had become a career in itself. Political science had its own disciplinary framework in the APSA and APSR, occupied in part by a small but powerful group of university professors who were focused not only on teaching, but on research as well. The evolution of the changes that occurred in political science from 1865 to 1906 is complex and comprises

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"Ibid., p. 172.

"Ibid., p. 212."
social, political and scientific (which includes the rise of
the university) issues.

1.2.a The Industrial Revolution

The year 1865 marks a turning point in American
history. The United States ended the strife of the Civil
War and emerged in a radically changed society. Black
people had been "set free" and sought wage earning work.
Ultimately, though, they were faced with few opportunities,
with farmers resistant to such change and unwilling to hire
them, and with a complicit Freedmen’s Bureau. As a
result, many of these "free" blacks found themselves
sharecropping in conditions remarkably similar to when they
were enslaved. With time, blacks were able to organize
relations with their landlords and approximate operating a
farm of their own on land that was not theirs. Such "self-
sufficiency", however rudimentary, helped to spark fury in
many whites who were unprepared for this change.
Emancipation began the complication of postbellum life.

Other changes furthered the complexity. The South
remained relatively rural and agrarian, but the North
continued to industrialize at an increasing rate. The
railroad network, begun before the Civil War, increased

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3Blum, John M., William S. McFeely, Edward S. Morgan, et
al. The National Experience: A History of the United States
Since 1865, Part Two. (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers:
tremendously after 1865 to aid the process of industrialization by providing transportation for goods and resources. The steel industry experienced the most rapid expansion and surfaced as the world's largest producer of steel. Technologies of control and communication were necessary for the expanding railroads, industry and market.

Inventors rapidly rose to the occasion. The influential presence of inventors in this era of industrialization is evident in the number of patents issued per year in the 1850s (less than 2000) and the number issued per year in the 1880s and 1890s (more than 21,000). The use of electricity for light was introduced by Edison. Bell invented the telephone. And Sholes built the first typewriter. The work world was becoming extremely complex and unfamiliar to many. Technology increased through invention and farms and industry began to use machines to speed up and expand production. All of these developments combined with a growing population to augment the market for capital.

Economic concerns began to dominate society and politics. Leaders of the industrial revolution modified

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²By the turn of the century the United States had nearly 200,000 miles of railroad, up from 53,000 miles in the 1860s.

²Blum, McFeely, Morgan, et al., p. 462.

²Ibid., pp. 462-463.
traditional ethical, philosophical notions by presenting them with an economic twist as

[man became economic man, democracy was identified with capitalism, liberty with property and the use of it, equality with opportunity for gain, and progress with economic change and the accumulation of capital.]

The numbers of people with huge wealth multiplied and presented a new class to American society. A new class that felt a need to justify its position. Darwin's theory of natural selection was invoked, with the help of Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner, as a sort of apology for "unrestrained capitalism". Sumner claimed that the wealthy were merely "products of natural selection." He explained and condoned disparities of wealth by declaring that such inequities were beneficial to society as a whole.

Industrialization ushered in a complicated and radically different society compared to the antebellum era, and colleges experienced dramatic change as a result. Many colleges became "universities" as graduate programs were introduced—even in history and political science. American

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2Ibid., p. 464.
3Ibid., p. 465.

society had become so complex that scholars perceived that it needed to be studied in a more systematic and rigorous way and the professionalized university arose for this purpose.²⁶

1.2.b Professional Political Science

Higher education expanded profoundly after the Civil War and many factors combined to affect this expansion.²⁷ The Morrill Act of 1862 provided land endowments to each state to subsidize at least one college. These land-grant colleges were to emphasize agriculture and mechanical arts without excluding science and classical studies.²⁸ The Morrill Act strove to offer a "liberal and practical education [to] the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life."²⁹ That is, the land-grant colleges would provide practical knowledge to an increasing number of students in order to prepare them for careers in their area of interest. This, of course, served


²⁸Ricci, p. 33.

the market's purposes and attracted attention from the business world. "Philanthropic" capital poured in to aid in the establishment of Cornell, Johns Hopkins, and the Universities of Chicago and Stanford.\textsuperscript{10}

Attempts to reform the old system of colleges began in the early 1850's and continued through the founding of the land-grant colleges. These reforms attempted to usefully bring the colleges into the modernizing, industrializing period. In 1852, John Henry Newman expressed the need for "liberal education". By this he suggested that students "should study in a school where teachers, with generous respect for each other and for their respective fields of knowledge, strive to achieve a balanced view of the various realms of wisdom and an inspiring sense of how all parts relate to the whole.\textsuperscript{11}" This departed from the traditional emphasis on good conduct and loyal citizenship. Newman's suggestion focused on knowledge and intellectual pursuit. He argued, then, that enlarging and enriching the pursuits of the mind should be the purpose of liberal education.

F. H. Hedge furthered the discourse on educational reform in his article "On University Reforms, 1866."\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10}Ricci, pp. 33-34.

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., p. 32.

\textsuperscript{12}In Hofstadter and Smith, pp. 561-567.
According to Hedge, in order for a college to be considered a university, two important and consequential conditions must exist. First, the course of study must be secularized. He argued that

with the multiplication of religious sects, with the progress of secular culture, with the mental emancipation which followed the great convulsions of the eighteenth century, the maintenance of the ecclesiastical type originally impressed on the College ceased to be practicable,—ceased to be desirable.\(^3\)

Hedge still considered the Church and religion important, but he disagreed with their prominence in determining the curricula of higher education.

The second relevant condition for Hedge's notion of the university relates to the first. He believed that liberty must exist in the curriculum. He had two senses of liberty here. First, university teachers should not be "task-masters" who coerce students into acquiring what they consider to be acceptable knowledge. Second, students should be free to choose their own studies and teachers.\(^4\) This sort of liberty did not appear until 1883 when Charles William Eliot initiated the first "elective system" at

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\(^3\)Ibid., p. 562.

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 564.
Harvard. As national wealth grew and educational philanthropy became fashionable, the university system began to take hold and the above reforms were installed in various forms. A commitment to science accompanied the reformed university system as it emerged. This was true for political science too as political scientists strove to establish a scientific identity for themselves.

The initial impetus for more coherent, systematic, American studies of politics came with a Prussian immigrant, Francis Lieber. James Farr has called Lieber "the principal agent" in beginning the transformation of the study of politics "from a popular, pre-professional discourse in the science of republican principles to an institutionalized, academic discipline attentive to the expansion of the administrative state." Crick claims that Lieber liberated both history and politics from being a mere equipage to language, literature, philosophy, theology or law, and justified the status of political science on sound, specifically Aristotelian grounds, arguing that politics is the rational application of historical experience to

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the moral problems of ordering the priority of differing interests in one ever-changing society. In Farr's and Crick's view, Lieber began to systematize and organize political studies. His work and ideas marked the beginning of a German influence that greatly shaped the emerging political science discipline. Lieber died in 1872 after fifteen years as Chair of "History and Political Science" at Columbia. He was ultimately succeeded by John W. Burgess in 1876.

Burgess continued the German influence on political science. After getting his baccalaureate at Amherst and teaching at Knox College for two years, Burgess decided to pursue advanced training in law and government. To his dismay he was unable to pursue it in the United States; the United States lacked "adequate provisions". Burgess traveled to Germany in order to acquire advanced study. And he was profoundly impressed by the professors under whom he studied. The superiority of German scholarship, Burgess became convinced, stemmed from the intensive research training which was an integral aspect of German higher education. Failure to provide this training explained the inadequacy of American political science.

3Crick, p. 17.

3Smit and Tanenhaus, p. 17.

4Ibid., p. 17.
The German university committed itself to knowledge; "namely, the ardent, methodical, independent search after truth in any and all of its forms." In this system, teachers were free to teach whatever they chose and students were free to learn without "compulsory drill by recitation". It was with these three concepts in mind (knowledge as the search for truth, freedom of teaching, freedom of learning) that Burgess founded the School of Political Science at Columbia in 1880. Burgess' school became only the second institution in the United States to offer graduate education in history and political science. And it quickly became "firmly established as the leading Graduate Faculty and School in the University union."

The graduate programs at Columbia and Johns Hopkins began training the students in history and political science who would ultimately fill the faculties at other schools. Other strong graduate programs soon followed at the University of Michigan and the University of Chicago, two

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*Hofstadter and Smith, p. 571.


*Johns Hopkins was the other and also the first. It was founded in 1876 and it featured instruction at the graduate level.

*Quoted in Crick, p. 27.
schools that eventually became very important as "breeding grounds for political scientists." An interest in methodology was immediately apparent as political science became more coherent and systematic at these universities. The conception of science, though, was certainly not lucid.

As far as methodology was concerned, both Burgess at Columbia and Henry Baxter Adams at Hopkins emphasized the historical-comparative approach, which stressed a reliance on primary sources and formal written records in research. As expressed earlier in this chapter, political science was no stranger to the urge for science, and Burgess was its leading advocate in the early years. Burgess echoed the positivists (particularly Spencer and Sumner) in his belief "that political science should be studied by the method of inquiry which has been found so productive in the domain of Natural Science." He believed that a certain logic and set of laws governed "the growth and behavior of political institutions" that historical-comparative analysis could reveal. But, as in the antebellum years, the object of study remained at the

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45 Somit and Tanenhaus, p. 41.

46 This method descended directly from the German universities. See Somit and Tanenhaus, p. 31.

47 Ibid., p. 28.

48 Ibid., p. 28.
level of institutions. This, we will see, began its slow change with Arthur Bentley.

In the meantime, as Haskell explains, political science moved to establish authority in the realm of political discourse. The days of the amateur political scientist receded to the past and the professional political scientist arrived on the scene to interpret the intricate, interdependent American society where knowledge as truth hides in unfamiliar, veiled faces and narrow, dark places. The professional political scientist would, presumably, be able to dedicate her or his life to shedding light on and unveiling the face of interdependent causation to reveal the truth, or reality. In this context, according to Haskell, Ricci, Crick and Haddow, the APSA was founded in 1903 followed by the APSR in 1906.

1.3 Concluding Remarks

Although political science had disciplinary life and legitimacy by 1906, it remained connected to history departments in many universities up to World War II. In fact, some colleges exist, even today, that retain this link. But, this situation did not preclude political science from pursuing its own goals. The political science discipline had surfaced in the Progressive era. The United States’ economic structure had changed and grown tremendously in the previous fifty years with profound
political and social implications and consequences. The government was faced with the substantial task of extending its power, planning and regulating the economy, and delivering social services. The government and the society, still geared for the slower and more autonomous antebellum world, appeared to need quick and progressive change in order to catch up to the rapidly expanding economic and technologic markets.

Political scientists sought to aid this process. "Political science professionalism and a certain version of Progressive reform were thus coupled in a mutual effort to establish new and revised forms that expanded the role of the 'expert' in public affairs as rapidly as they expanded the government's regulatory functions within monopoly capitalism."9 Arthur Bentley attempted, in 1908, to "fashion a tool" towards this end. Chapter 2 will pick up the story from here. But first, I want to discuss the perceived need for authority in the study of public affairs. I am interested in aiding the explanation of this need.

Haskell's argument is useful in explaining this need, but there seems to be more involved here than he is ready to admit. Haskell argues that Darwin's theory of evolution

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inspired positivistic social theories. According to Darwin, natural selection did not occur on an individual level; rather, it involved a complex series of connections and combinations within the species. Species, therefore, are interdependent. Positivists, according to Haskell, related this interdependence (as well as natural selection) to humans. This is an intriguing argument, but it does not adequately assess the perceived shortcomings of Lieber's political science; the need for professional authority.

Accompanying interdependence in society was the rapid diversification of the market. The capitalist separation of labor from capital required people to sell their labor in order to make money to buy goods to aid survival. In this formulation, political scientists sought to sell their labor, and in order to guarantee a position in the market they needed to legitimate their work. Claiming authority over a body of knowledge that could help political structures adapt to the changing and complicating world created the market for their labor. The social sciences, then, specialized to adapt to the changing market.

Political science separated from the American Social Science Association to claim a body of knowledge over which it would wield authority in order to guarantee a place in the market for the work of political scientists. With their newly "found" authority, political scientists could stake a
claim on truth and then impart it to students and society. The newly disciplined political scientists believed that they could possess truth through systematic discovery. They identified themselves as "Progressive" scholars. They believed that their role was to bring the government and the people up to date in the rapidly changing society. As such, political knowledge had "progressive" aims. But, as I have already mentioned, there was still no clear consensus on the professional identity of political scientists in the university. They struggled to define and clarify their science. They knew that doing "science" was desirable, but they were unsure how to implement it in their research. The science of politics movement began to focus the systematic, scientific method for explanation in political science.

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The university, by the turn of the twentieth century, certainly did not look the way F. H. Hedge and John Henry Newman had envisioned it! See above, pp. 19-20.
CHAPTER TWO

THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS MOVEMENT

Although the creation of the professional discipline "legitimated" political science by sanctioning the pursuit of political "knowledge", the science in political science remained hazy and indeterminate. The modern university had committed itself to science and political scholars had necessarily followed suit. The "new" political scientists emphasized science and recognized the scientific need for a suitable and distinct methodology, but no evident consensus could be built concerning what, exactly, a science of politics entailed.

Political scientists believed that a scientific, disciplinary and professional identity depended on agreed upon and useful methodology to separate trained "political scientists" from the methodologically untrained amateurs.¹ Experts in political studies would then use the correct methods of research to engage "in a communal endeavor deserving recognition and respect for its original and valuable contributions to American society."² Scientific method would allow political scientists to arrive at a sort of objective, value-free truth (or truths) about a certain

¹Ricci, pp. 36-40.
²Ibid., p. 39.

Although Bentley was not an academic by trade, he did hold a sustained interest in the "epistemological problem of American pragmatism, and particularly with the idea of 'process' and its relationship to the social and natural sciences." Seidelman and Harpham report that Bentley "was the Progressive scholar most concerned with developing rigorous methods of social scientific investigation for the analysis of an American society in transformation." He also influenced subsequent generations of political scientists, especially those of the behavioralist tradition. After assessing Bentley's work, this chapter explicates its influence in the work of Charles Merriam and Harold Lasswell, the prime movers of the science of politics movement.

### 2.1 The Process of Government

It is clear, in *The Process of Government*, that Bentley

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4 Seidelman and Harpham, p. 67.

5 Ibid., p. 67.
wants to move away from the traditional positivist notions of scientific explanation in society as displayed in the work of Small, von Jhering and Weber. He sees political science as dead in its nineteenth century reliance on formalist studies of institutions. The "barren formalism" of political science needs to be touched up with the "glow of humanity" by studying social actors themselves "for what they are" and "for what they represent." Social scientists must deal with felt things, not with feelings, with intelligent life, not with idea ghosts. We must deal with felt facts and with thought facts, but not with feeling as reality or with thought as truth. We must find the only reality and the only truth in the proper functioning of the felt facts and the thought facts in the system to which they belong.

This is the sort of social science which Bentley wanted to "found" and he located it in the activities of groups.

According to Bentley, the "raw material" for the scientific study of government can not be found in one person. It must always be located in "something doing", in the activity of groups, in "the dispersal of one grouping of

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*Bentley, p. 162.

*Ibid., pp. 163-164.

*Ibid., p. 172, emphasis added.
forces by another grouping. And while these groups do consist of thinking and feeling persons, the social scientist knows "nothing of 'ideas' and 'feelings' except through the medium of actions." Government is a process which is forever in flux, and as such, it can never be described by lawbooks, law, essays, addresses or constitutional conventions. The "governmental process" can be found only "in the actually performed legislating-administering-adjudicating activities of the nation and in the streams and currents of activity that gather among the people and rush into these spheres." Language, too, must refer directly to activities. In order to be scientific, language must be defined, specific and operational. The "spooks" and "soul stuff" of popular psychological terminology did not offer scientific explanation of social and governmental processes. Social scientists "shall find that the forces and pressures at work are great masses, groups, of" people.

Bentley claims that the only possible way to scientifically treat the raw material of government (i.e., group activity) is to submit it to measurement. Measurement

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10 Ibid., pp. 175-176.
11 Ibid., pp. 179-180.
12 Ibid., p. 197.

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defeats chaos.\textsuperscript{13}

If a statement of social facts which lends itself better to measurement is offered, that characteristic entitles it to attention. Providing the statement does not otherwise distort the social facts, the capability of measurement will be decisive in its favor. The statement that takes us farthest along the road toward quantification estimates will inevitably be the best statement.\textsuperscript{14}

But, in order to reach quantitative measurement, Bentley finds it necessary to first determine what can be measured. For Bentley, group activity is (of course) measurable, but it must first be defined. First, "group and group activity are equivalent terms with just a little difference of emphasis."\textsuperscript{15} And second, the "group" and its "interest" are interchangeable. "There is no group without its interest."\textsuperscript{16} Interest, in the Bentleyan sense, is not solely economic. Rather, it is multiformed and combines with economic, social and political interest. This, then, allows people to be members of many different groups, all of which relate to each other in the social and governmental process; and all of which can be expressed (or measured) in

\textsuperscript{13}ibid., p. 200.

\textsuperscript{14}ibid., p. 201.

\textsuperscript{15}ibid., p. 211.

\textsuperscript{16}ibid., p. 211.
relation, or terms, with one another."

Bentley argues that social science, then, should be empirical, measurable, progressive and concerned with the interaction and activity of a complex and overlapping system of social, political and economic groupings. Such a social science could, in Bentley’s view, be objective and, as such, discover "knowledge". We will see most of these aspects again, in the science of politics movement of the 1920s and 1930s and in the behavioral political science that conquered the discipline by the late 1950s. The empirical, measurable, "progressive", and quantified behavioralist tradition gave political science the "scientific" identity it had sought since Bentley’s era.

Bentley, though, was never clear about how his science of politics would be implemented. Like many early philosophers of social science Bentley neglected to clearly explicate what a science of society or politics would entail. Instead his discussion spirals into abstraction with talk of objectivity in research without avoiding the more "human" and subjective aspects. In other words, "hard objectivity" is not an "excuse for setting up arbitrary, unreal subjective factors at the upper end of the

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"It is in this conceptual area, incidentally, where Bentley criticizes Marx’s "group concept". Marx and Engels’ class struggle theory places people in one group only, which Bentley considers arbitrary and abstract, not to mention unmeasurable."
interpretation." With the group interpretation Bentley hoped to "absorb" the "conditions" of social action into "action" and through this develop a social science.\textsuperscript{19} What, exactly, does this necessitate? Bentley never makes this clear and, consequently, his social science becomes difficult (if not impossible) to actualize.

Nevertheless, Bentley's \textit{Process of Government} still influenced subsequent generations of political scientists. Although, as James F. Ward reports,\textsuperscript{20} most political scientists probably misinterpreted Bentley's "tool", his attempt to devise an objective, value-free social science ignited a long process of scientific "identity-seeking" for political scientists, especially those of the behavioral persuasion. Charles Merriam continued this process and was also one of the first influential political scientists to explicitly focus on behavior in politics. I turn to him and to his student, Harold Lasswell, in the next section.

2.2 Merriam and Lasswell: The Science of Politics

The new era in political science which followed World

\textsuperscript{18}Bentley, p. 135.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., pp. 171-172. Also see Ward, James F. \textit{Language, Form and Inquiry: Arthur F. Bentley's Philosophy of Social Science}. (The University of Massachusetts Press: Amherst, 1984), pp. 74-75.

War I, like most new eras in the discipline, repudiated the previous era of political science. Progressive political science was condemned as invalid and partisan; not scientific enough. The new era, beginning with Charles Merriam, sought more detached, scientific, methodical and therapeutic reforms for what was perceived to be a democracy in crisis.

According to post-World War I political scientists, the United States' "liberal democracy" emerged badly shaken from the war. Political scientists had supported the war "for the usual reasons--it was supposed to end European autocracy and thus end war." Instead, emboldened and effective fascist and communist governments in Europe strengthened their abilities to motivate their populaces to act in accordance with government interests. Post-war political scientists in America noticed a peculiar lack of any such motivational ability in the United States, and their wrath fell on their immediate predecessors. Reform-minded Progressive political scientists had not adequately and systematically located receptive reform publics and their superficial and hasty analyses and proposals had consequently failed to be effective. In light of this,

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Seidelman and Harpham, p. 102.

Ibid., pp. 101-103.
political scientists of the new era saw the need for scholarly renovation. They renewed their dedication to establishing scientific inquiry in the hope that "scientific knowledge would emerge and contribute to improving the quality of public life in America." The professional identity of the political scientist became that of political "healer" and political knowledge was to be constructed toward this end. Political knowledge was to be implemented in the governmental system.

Political scientists such as Merriam and Lasswell saw themselves as social engineers whose purpose was the "rational" control of political actors to order and control political society.

Progressive political scientists had considered citizens to be "eager consumers of social science messages" whereas the "new" political scientists saw them as "objects of study and observation to be ‘educated’ and controlled." The ultimate question for the new political scientists became how to motivate public opinion to overwhelmingly support the purposive liberal democratic state. They operated on the presupposition that humankind was perfectible; that a reliance on "scientific" political

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2 Ricci, p. 77.

3 During the New Deal era political scientists played advisory roles in politics.

4 Seidelman and Harpham, p. 103.
knowledge would help to permanently cure societal and political ills. The "scientific" political scientist constructed political knowledge that could be applied in a practical way to governmental functions. I want to consult the work of the motivating forces behind the science of politics movement, Charles Merriam and Harold Lasswell.

2.2.a Charles Merriam

Lieber and Burgess established political science as an academic discipline, but Merriam molded it into a social science. Like his contemporary "Progressive" colleagues, Merriam was directly involved in electoral politics, and like his contemporary "scientists" after World War I he withdrew from direct involvement in electoral politics to cultivate a valid science of politics. He played a prominent role in the APSA's National Conferences on the

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2See Luke, Tim. "Scientific Politics and Political Science," Paper presented at the 1978 Western Political Science Association Meetings, (March 16-18, 1978, Los Angeles, California), pp. 1, 45. Luke argues that there is a difference between this applied "scientific politics" and political science. At the time, though, the practical application of such political knowledge to public affairs was political science. That is, this is how political scientists (especially those influenced by Merriam) identified themselves. They saw themselves as political therapists, political healers, whose professional identity revolved around the construction (they might say "discovery") of political knowledge that is applicable, useful and efficacious.

2Crick, p. 135.
Science of Politics in 1923, 1924 and 1925, and he presided over the Social Science Research Council that was founded in 1923.9

In his scholarly work he consistently demanded that political science become more rigorously scientific, but with an applied as opposed to a pure approach. He saw the development of a scientific technique and methodology for political science as a necessity to avoid "speculation and guesswork."10 Merriam viewed the physical sciences as attempts to benefit, preserve and perfect civilization, and he reserved a place for political science in this process. In other words, he viewed the proper role of science in the preservation and perfection of American society. He sought to consciously control the "evolution of intelligence" and human behavior, through civic education, to instill democratic values in citizens in the move towards the perfection of society and humankind.11

Merriam was always very vague about the nature of such (democratic?) control and about the implementation and ramifications of such a science in his own work (although his students were more clear and precise). Still though,
Merriam was extraordinarily influential as he broke the ground for later political, scientific excavation. He also helped to propel political science from obscurity into tentative legitimacy, at least in terms of federal funding and acceptance. This legitimacy was enhanced by the behavioral revolution of the 1950's.

Despite Merriam's post-war disgust with Progressive scholarship, his views on social science did not clash with Arthur Bentley's. In fact, Merriam praised Bentley's theoretical contributions to social science. Like Bentley, Merriam detested the formalism of previous social and political study where "government was thought to be a mechanism whose essential features were frozen in time, its workings distant from the 'real' lives of citizens." He sought to systematize the study of politics and focus it on the level of human behavior. Bentley also seemed to favor such a disposition in social science, but he was never as explicit about it as Merriam.

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3Seidelman and Harpham, p. 122.

Merriam believed that Progressive reform had been aiming in the wrong place. Reform could not begin with the institutions of government or with the middle class as a group; reform must begin at the individual level, at the level of citizen support and citizen action. As such, Merriam's science of politics rested upon the systematic, scientific study of human behavior. Such a science could be used to "democratically" control the behavior of citizens, through civic education, to fall in line with liberal, democratic interests.

To make this notion of science possible Merriam deemed it necessary to modernize the government by modernizing humankind. More precisely, Merriam argued that the fundamental crisis facing the post-World War I government was its anachronistic nature. That is, science and technology were advancing tremendously without a concomitant social advance. The progress of society and its science lagged according to Merriam. He claimed that the difficulties of mankind are caused chiefly by the lack of relationship between technical advance and social advance, between the mechanical reorganization of our affairs and the reorganization of the social system...progress is conditioned upon our ability to bring about a better adjustment of these fundamental factors in human life: machines and mankind.36

But again, Merriam did not wish to revive Progressivism, he

36Civic Education in the United States, p. 10.
wished to establish a sound "scientific" identity for political scientists.

Merriam argued that the means to updating the relationship between technology and government was to bring the views of citizens up to date. With this in mind, he organized an ambitious project to study and compare the education of citizens in eight countries (Italy, Russia, United States, Germany, France, Great Britain, Switzerland, and Austria-Hungary) in order to determine the different ways in which civic education had been developed and controlled. Eight volumes were presented, one for each country, by eight different scholars. Merriam's volume on The Making of Citizens "endeavored to gather together the threads of the eight volumes into a central interpretation."

In The Making of Citizens Merriam began the argument which he later applied to his recommendations for American civic training in Civic Education in the United States. Merriam claimed, in The Making of Citizens, that the world had become so complex as to require flexible and socially skilled citizens." The world was shrinking, in his view, due to the advancing technology in communications.

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3Ibid., p. 338.
transportation and economic organization. Increased mobility was bringing ethnic, religious and economic groups closer together geographically, thereby increasing social tensions.\textsuperscript{35} Social cohesion depended on the cooperation of these groups with each other and especially with the system of government. People's attitudes and views needed to be flexible and informed, and here is where most of the countries in the study fell short in their civic education practices. A civic education that relied on indoctrination (which produced a "stiff and inflexible type of citizen who finds difficulty in adjusting himself to the changing circumstances of life") was unacceptable in such a complex and dynamic world. Merriam saw a new generation emerging; one of science and industry where citizens were equipped with "standard skills" and with the means to discover new ones.\textsuperscript{40} The new system of civic education, it seems, would rely on science to emphasize invention and adaptability rather than tradition and indoctrination.\textsuperscript{41}

In \textit{Civic Education in the United States} Merriam's call for a more coherent science of politics based on human

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., pp. 294-249.

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., p. 338.

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., p. 338.

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., pp. 339-349.
behavior became explicit. He begins by re-stating his views from *The Making of Citizens* that technology is advancing while social advance lags behind. Merriam argues that "the spirit of science holds the key to education and social advancement." Intelligence and science will replace force, fear and magic as guides of social conduct.

The "new orientation" in civic education will utilize social science to deny traditional government and usher in a controlled, designed, planned government in its place. This new orientation around the spirit of science "will look to the utilization of experience for remolding the future and the present." Merriam specifically champions a "science of human behavior" as a key to "unlocking many possibilities of human control and human emancipation." And the social scene is sufficiently complex as to necessitate an integration of all social studies (politics, history, geography, sociology, etc.). According to Merriam, such a joint, cross-disciplinary endeavor can offer a more complete, and thus more useful, synthesis of political and

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"Ibid., p. 32. How one *remolds* the future, though, is not clear.

"Ibid., p. 129. Although it is unclear how control and emancipation can work together without contradiction."
social behavior.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 86-87, 98.}

Merriam also believed that the use of science and the scientific method in civic education will engender optimism about the benefits and possibilities of a democratic government.\footnote{Ibid., p. 170.} He concludes with an astounding display of his own optimism about the fruits of a "science" of society and politics. Merriam believed that the civic instruction which he condoned "may point to astounding possibilities that lie in the emerging control of man over his environment and over himself, in the democratic transition from passivity to creation and construction that characterizes modern life."\footnote{Ibid., p. 170. Also see pp. 185-186 for more talk of human mastery over nature for specifically human purposes.} Such possibilities, according to Merriam, may place the world in a "fairyland of human achievement" free from disease, hunger, toil and fear.\footnote{Ibid., p. 184.} The angel of science, it seems, "will bring life and light and healing on its wings."\footnote{Ibid., p. 184.}

Unfortunately though, like Bentley, Merriam never explicated how his science of politics would be implemented. The accompanying methodology is also not explained. In
fact, it is not apparent that Merriam himself clearly understood what he meant by his science of politics; he knew only that it was desirable. But, Merriam’s early insistence on a science of politics opened doors for federal and philanthropic funding which eventually helped to "legitimate" the identity of the political scientist during the behavioral era. Merriam questioned the science of politics by the end of his life, though, when he realized that it was not bringing the results he had anticipated.\footnote{See his \textit{Systematic Politics}. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1945.}

2.2.b Harold Lasswell

Harold Lasswell is probably considered Merriam’s greatest student, especially in terms of his prolific scholarly production. It is certainly clear that Merriam heavily influenced his work. Lasswell, too, emphasized the \textit{science} of politics and its methodology. He was often more clear and precise than Merriam in explicating his conception of a science of politics, and he eventually placed significant emphasis on quantification. Technological frameworks for data collection and statistical manipulation were just being developed though and consequently Lasswell could not adequately pursue his quantitative goals early in his career (this, of course, had changed by the 1950s).

Lasswell held primary interest in political behavior
and its control through "conceptual frameworks" of institutional and societal power. He was among the first of Merriam's students to argue that society consisted of irrational voters and leaders whose behavior must be scientifically studied in order to make it rational by seeking to control it. Obviously, Lasswell strode a fine conceptual line between democratic and coercive politics. In fact, he appears to often tumble over to the coercive side. His belief in popular irrationality immediately calls into question the possibility of "popular rule" that democracy purports to require. This clash between the scientific pursuit for human/societal perfection and democratic values illuminated a methodological contradiction that the discipline feared might subvert its commitment to democracy.

Lasswell's Psychopathology and Politics elucidates his early behavioral method and sets the tone for much of his work before World War II. I will concentrate generally on his pre-World War II work and specifically on his Psychopathology and Politics in this section. My dual purpose here is to clarify the scientific differences between Merriam and Lasswell in this era of political

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5 Crick, p. 177.

5 Ricci, pp. 94-96.
research, and to relate Lasswell's work to the behavioral revolution which followed World War II. Such a synthesis will usefully add, although indirectly, to the analysis of the behavioral revolution in political science.

In *Psychopathology and Politics* Lasswell makes an argument, based on certain aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis, that politics needs to be studied with an emphasis on psychology and its relation to the personal and political behavior of individuals. Lasswell was not as vehemently against formalism as Merriam and Bentley, but he does argue that institutional analysts frequently overlook (completely) "the 'personal' influences which modify the expected behavior of 'legislatures,' 'executives,' and 'judiciaries.'"

To assess these "personal influences" Lasswell draws on two aspects of Freud's psychology: free association and his psychology of the mind. He believed that Freud's method of "free fantasy," or free association, where the patient agrees to be completely open and honest about past life experiences, can usefully help explain the workings of the patient's mind. Lasswell's conception of Freud's psychology of the mind focuses on the "displacement of

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7See ibid., pp. 32-37, 261.
affects on to public objects. In the process of personal and social development the individual cultivates certain affects, or psychological conflicts. These conflicts generally exist as repressed inner impulses which, as the argument goes, are displaced onto certain people or experiences. This displacement, Lasswell claims, can manifest itself politically or non-politically. The "non-political man" may displace his affects onto political figures (he may kill a king who happens to insult his sister is Lasswell's example), but this displacement is not considered political until it becomes "a secondary elaboration...in terms of general interest"; until it is rationalized. When the personal displacement of affects is rationalized in terms of public action (such as when the person believes that her or his behavior is of public use) a politician is borne. A historical trend usually separates political people from non-political people. That is, as Lasswell argues, "[i]t is usually safe to predict that more politicians rise from families with political traditions than without them."

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55Ibid., pp. 65-77.

56Ibid., p. 76.

57Ibid., p. 77. See pp. 78-172 for accounts of the different types of political actors and their corresponding displaced affects.
According to Lasswell, politics had become the realm of the irrational. The irrational displacement of affects was brought into the open in the arena of politics. As such, political solutions are frequently not the best rational decisions, but are the best emotional ones. And irrelevancy accumulates in political symbols due to their emotional appeal. Consequently, Lasswell sees little use to democratic discussion as a means of dealing with political problems; if the individual is shown to be a poor judge of her or his needs and interests, how effective can discussion be in resolving issues of conflict? In response, Lasswell does not condone the resolution of conflicts; rather, he sanctions their prevention.

Certain "objective investigators", schooled in the fields of psychology, psychopathology, physiology, medicine and social science, will be able to "deal objectively" with themselves and with others in order to discover the "truth" of harmonious human relations and thereby obviate political conflicts. The interdisciplinary political scientist,

58Ibid., p. 184.

59Ibid., p. 185.


61Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 193, 196-197, 200-203.
then, will be able to discern the cultural patterns of individual/social conflict and function as therapist to prepare people to "objectively" manage their emotional conflict and thus make them and society more rational and purposive. Lasswell envisions a utopia; one where Marxist political action is not necessary or desired. Rather, the education and research of rational social scientists is offered as the cure for the irrational bases of society. In this way, a utopian society will emerge and flourish.⁶²

Lasswell, like Merriam, had noble and admirable goals in his pre-World War II work. He was also a talented and an innovative social theorist. Moreover, it is difficult to argue with his or with Merriam's desire to find the perfect society free from conflict and irrationality. Merriam and Lasswell simply wanted to install a professional identity for political scientists based on a science that was organized to aid the liberal, democratic state. As such, political knowledge was organized for the same purpose. And this is part of the reason why this formulation of science in political science caught on. It was constructed to correspond to the needs of society and therefore it became the accepted (and funded) identity for political

⁶²See Crick, p. 199.
scientists. But, after World War II, this identity began to crumble. Behavioralists wanted to purify scientific political knowledge.

\footnote{See Luke, pp. 3-4.}
CHAPTER THREE

BEHAVIORALISM

Numerous factors emerged to help establish behavioralism as a force in political science: political scientists perceived that they were not considered legitimate scientists and consequently had problems securing research grants; they believed that the other social sciences (particularly psychology) were making broad advances while political science lagged behind; the reformist, normative nature of the discipline was generally considered speculative and unscientific; research technology (survey techniques, statistical computations, computers) was becoming much more refined and available; and they pursued a "pure" science which operated on the presupposition that democracy is the best system of government due to its open and scientific qualities:

In short, post-World War II political scientists sought to define the science of politics from the standpoint that science should be pure. The science of politics should be interested in purely explaining the workings of American democracy in order to better understand the American system. Post-war political scientists believed that political crises remained because pre-World War II political scientists had

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1Somit and Tanenhaus, pp. 184-185.
let their reformist aims occlude their understanding of politics. Many post-war political scientists wanted to embark on the pure scientific project of analyzing the workings of the American system without tainting the analysis with speculative notions of reform. In those days of strict anti-formalism, the pure scientific project manifested itself as behavioralism.

Although it did ultimately become a driving force in political science, behavioralism did not begin as a coherent movement in the discipline. Rather, post-World War II political scientists began rejecting formalist, reformist, normative inquiry and relying more upon explaining the workings of the American political system. This phenomena is exemplified by David Truman's revival of Bentley's The Process of Government. And behavioralists like Heinz Eulau and David Easton furthered what ultimately became a movement by explicitly championing behavioral research. Still though, behavioralism assumed many faces. It was a broad enough phenomenon to allow several different pursuits. ²

Somit and Tanenhaus have been able to combine these numerous strands into what they term the "behavioral creed".

²Behavioralism was not manifested in only American research. That is, the study of American politics was not the only sub-field of political science to be affected by behavioralism. Behavioralist tendencies cropped up in and helped to create several sub-fields from systems analysis to decision theory, action theory, and so on.
I reproduce their creed here to both introduce and summarize the behavioral identity in political science. (1) Political science should search rigorously for regularities in political behavior in order to facilitate prediction and explanation. (2) Political science should concern itself with empirical political phenomena: that is, with the behavior of individuals and political groups. (3) Data should be quantifiable in order to aid predictive capabilities. (4) Research should be theory driven; in other words, research should begin with a theory that yields empirically testable hypotheses. (5) Political scientists should avoid applied (reform-minded) research in favor of pure scientific research. (6) Values such as democracy, equality and freedom cannot be scientifically established and should thus be avoided unless they can somehow be made empirically testable. (7) Political science should become more interdisciplinary, at least at the behavioral level. (8) Political science should place more emphasis on methodology and make better use of multivariate analysis, sample surveys, mathematical models and simulation.

The tenets of this "creed" did not necessarily break the behavioralist trail. Often, it seems, the practice of behavioralism reified these trends. Furthermore, many goals

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3See Somit and Tanenhaus, pp. 177-179.
of the behavioral era were organizational; for instance, they were intent on building a scientific community which was centered around behavioral inquiry. They could do this by further institutionalizing political knowledge. Therefore, the research skills that behavioral inquiry required served to exclude those who did not possess the proper training and to solidify the scientific identity of political scientists. Somit and Tanenhaus' "behavioral creed" provides a useful frame of reference for assessing the intellectual pursuits of behavioral research as I move on to explicate the work of some prominent political scientists of the behavioral persuasion. I begin with David Truman.

3.1 David Truman

David Truman is probably best known for his book The Governmental Process which revived Bentley's group process theory of government. Truman's argument, although less polemical, closely resembles Bentley's and is offered in response to the expanding role of interest groups in American politics and the public's growing fear of their influence. The Governmental Process, by Truman's own account, contributed to the "political behavior movement" in political science by increasing "the analytical strength and

usefulness of the discipline. It also triggered the growth of the study of interest groups in the United States and abroad. Like Bentley's work, The Governmental Process offers a tool for analysis; a theory to drive systematic behavioral research. It contains many "testable hypotheses" ranging from the political orientations of groups to the internal politics of the group process to the influence of groups on the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and elections. Research into these areas, with the group emphasis, has increased tremendously since the publication of The Governmental Process in 1951.

Truman's basic argument revolves around the notion that since every individual attempts to become an accepted participant in a group or a set of groups, it makes sense to study political behavior in terms of groups and group interactions. He argues that "the patterns of action and attitude among individuals will differ from one another in large measure according to the clusters of group affiliations that the individuals have." Individuals define their selves based on the opportunities that groups

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5Ibid., pp. xix-xx.
6Ibid., p. xxviii.
7Ibid., p. 18.
8Ibid., p. 16.
afford. In Truman's words, "it appears...that the group experiences and affiliations of an individual are the primary, though not the exclusive, means by which the individual knows, interprets, and reacts to the society in which he [sic] exists."^

Like Merriam, Truman believed that society had become sufficiently complex to necessitate an interdependent approach to the analysis of political behavior and government. In other words, any social or political action involves a complicated series of interactions, particularly at the group level, which affect individuals and the government. With this in mind, the purpose of Truman's book, he argued, was to rigorously analyze both the operations of representative government in the United States and the character of the groups' relationships with the governing process.

Truman's behavioral tendencies are clearly present in his emphasis on political behavior and in his purpose. He does not intend to offer any normative prescriptions for reform; rather, he seeks to offer an empirical and conceptual analysis of the group process in government in

^Ibid., p. 21.
^Ibid., p. 11.
^See ibid., pp. 45-52.
order to develop and provide an understanding of the operations of American representative democracy. He does not desire progressive reform; his research seeks "pure" explanation.

Truman begins his analysis by explaining the relationship between groups and government. He explains that groups represent the particular interests of their members. Their interests become political at various stages, so Truman focuses his analysis on the "associations" which become activated in response to "disturbances in the expected patterns of interaction." These "expected patterns" are "unorganized interests" or the "rules of the game". When the "rules of the game" have been disturbed by a group, or groups, the associations seek to report their grievances and have them met by the offending people. Often a "mediating institution" needs to become involved, and in the complex, modern, interdependent society this role is usually played by the government, and therefore, the groups become politicized, according to Truman.

Truman's assessment of the group process in government

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11Ibid., p. 12. Note the "givenness" of democracy.


13Ibid., p. 104.

14He also refers to these as "potential groups". See pp. 159, 512-516.
action concludes that while groups have become larger and more influential in the governmental process, their growth does not necessarily bode disaster. He does not, however, offer any predictions for the future. Before prediction is possible, he argues here and elsewhere, it is first necessary to discover and explain "regularities" in political behavior. In *The Governmental Process* he argues that regularities of political behavior revolve around the "rules of the game" or "potential groups". The relationship of organized groups to the potential groups will determine the health of the American political system. The crucial element in all factors of instability is the relationship of [organized] groups and of the established patterns of access to the widespread potential groups in the society. This relationship in each instance may become morbid either because the unorganized interests [potential groups] are inadequately activated or because recurrent and prolonged frustration of more restrictive claims leads to a rejection of a large segment of the 'rules of the game'.

Conversely, the political system will remain healthy, even with the existence of a multiplicity of organized groups, "so long as the 'rules of the game' remain meaningful guides

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to action.\textsuperscript{18} Truman declared that the American system was healthy despite the growing influence of interest groups.

The Governmental Process was Truman's most influential and noteworthy work. His commitment to a "pure" science of political behavior that sought to examine and explain the uniformities and regularities of politics helped touch off the broad emphasis on political behavior that distinguished the post-World War II research of political science. In his theories we can see expressions of four of the first five tenets of the "behavioral creed". The emphasis on quantified, value-free and methodologically sound research became clear later. I continue my expression of the behavioral revolution with the work of Heinz Eulau.

3.2 Heinz Eulau

Heinz Eulau openly criticized the reformist ("utopian") political science of the pre-World War II era.\textsuperscript{19} He argued that science can only function "in an environment that permits freedom of inquiry and freedom of speech."\textsuperscript{20} American liberal democracy allows such freedoms and thus is

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 524.


most suitable for scientific work. Political science can never undermine liberal democracy as Ricci reported pre-World War II political scientists feared. Political scientists assumed, then, that American democracy must be alive and well as they pursued the new, non-reformist, scientific goal of analyzing and explaining the ways that the American political system functioned.

Many coherent and explicit ideas were propounded about how this new science should operate by, among others, Heinz Eulau. Eulau claimed, based on his experiences with Harold Lasswell at the "Experimental Division for the Study of War Time Communications" during the war, that the task of science is to convert "belief" into "knowledge". Belief thrives on ignorance and the goal of systematic science was to remove as much ignorance as possible in order to expose knowledge. Ultimately, the goal of this science is causal explanation. In other words, tentative, "functional", "probabilistic" knowledge should eventually give way to causal knowledge. Causal knowledge, Eulau argues, is never attainable but scientific endeavors will always bring us

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2 Ricci, pp. 74-75.

2 Interestingly enough, David Truman also spent the war years here.

closer to the goal of perfect, universal, causal explanation. Such theoretical descriptions of science do not help much with implementation so Eulau, again following Lasswell, makes a practical argument based on "micro-macro political analysis".

From Eulau's view the traditional separation between the micro and macro levels of political analysis represented a problem that needed resolution. Macro level analysis aimed at institutions, while micro analysis focused on individuals. Typically, these two approaches operated dualistically; they were kept separate because political theorists had not built a conceptual link between them. But Lasswell, we remember from Psychopathology and Politics, attempted to conceptually combine the micro and macro levels of analysis to explain political action. Eulau saw this conceptual connection as vital to the science of politics. Eulau argued that these two levels of analysis can be merged through studying political behavior.

The study of political behavior focuses on individuals' attitudes, actions and psyches and on the political institutions which frame, affect and are affected by

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individuals' personal and political dispositions. Eulau found the science of politics in the study of political behavior that collapsed micro and macro level distinctions. Such a science would ideally be empirical and focused on finding uniformities and regularities in political behavior. The careful documentation of regular and uniform behavior would help explain and eventually predict institutional influences on behavior, and vice versa. And empirical methods which were theory-driven (that is, based upon testable hypotheses) give knowledge; it strips ignorance from belief and produces political knowledge.

But, reliable, productive, causal political knowledge would not be possible right away. This sort of science cannot assess large scale or conceptually difficult aspects of the political system all at once. Eulau relied on the "piecemeal accumulation of data" principle to assess regularities and move towards explaining and predicting some of the more numinous political questions. Of course, the

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2Eulau, "The Behavioral Movement in Political Science: A Personal Document", p. 390; Behavioralism in Political Science, pp. 8-9, 15-17; The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, pp. 9, 26, 34, 69.

2Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, pp. 9-10, 16.
piecemeal accumulation of data would encompass an extremely broad range of expertise (especially given the multiplication of the world's and the university's populations) and there was far too much research to be done and to be interpreted by one field or discipline. Therefore, Eulau argued, like those before him, that interdisciplinary research would be vital to the behavioral project. This would manifest itself as an informal, although important, division of labor. In other words, Eulau saw no problem with specialization in the disciplines; the specialists, of course, would communicate with one another in their common project of accumulating data and discovering "political knowledge".29

Political knowledge, according to Eulau, is necessarily "probabilistic". That is, political scientists are certain that their knowledge is probably correct. But, they seek to be certain that their knowledge is definitely correct. They seek certainty; "universal validity" for political knowledge. Eulau claims that this quest for certainty is implicit in empirical, behavioral methods. But, for now, political scientists must settle for probability until political knowledge progresses enough to allow for universal

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validity.  

Accompanying the quest for certainty and the self-conscious employment of methodology, is the separation of fact from value. In other words, political scientists must eschew values in their detached, scientific work. As such, political scientists seek "neutrality" toward their research. This neutrality can be guaranteed through the researcher's openness about her or his biases and by treating "latent" biases as "errors" which can be "isolated and discounted".  

Confessed and discounted biases contribute to the quest for certainty and so does quantification. According to Eulau, political scientists should seek to quantify their data and their results. Quantification, using the most advanced research technology, empirical methods and testable hypotheses, introduces exactitude and reliability to political knowledge.  


Eulau, "Values and Behavioral Science: Neutrality Revisited", pp. 366-369; The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, pp. 95, 137.  

Eulau, "From Utopia to Probability: Liberalism and Recent Science", pp. 361-362; The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, p. 122. This point has been echoed by many, including Evron M. Kirkpatrick in "The Impact of the Behavioral Approach on
allows political scientists to be more certain about the legitimacy of political knowledge.

"Political knowledge", realized through behavioral methods, emphasizes reason. It represents the belief that employing rational, rigorous methods of inquiry can help us discover the underlying, uniform and cosmic order of political things. For Eulau, political knowledge represents truth in a probabilistic sense, but its quest for certainty makes it valid and authoritative.

Because Eulau was so enamored with behavioral research, he was also concerned with its future success in political science. In 1962, Eulau claimed that the future success of behavioralism depends on six factors: (1) The construction of behaviorally oriented empirical theory must be realized. He later claimed (in 1968) that this theory had been developed;³ (2) Research technology (computers, statistics, survey techniques, etc.) must continue to progress; (3) Political science departments and the discipline as a whole must commit themselves to the proper training of students, especially those at the graduate level ("personnel"), in the skills of behavioral research; (4)

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The gap between the micro and macro levels of analysis must be closed. This, as we have already seen in some detail, was extremely important to Eulau; (5) Discrete and aggregated data must be used reciprocally in behavioral analysis in order to avoid generalizing about individual behavior based on aggregate data, and vice versa; (6) Finally, case analysis must be reconciled with systematic analysis. In other words, case studies can continue to be legitimately done, but only if they are systematized so that the same method is used each time.34

By 1968, Eulau was very optimistic about the success of behavioralism in political science. Many of his six recommendations had been met. For example, the use of computers and statistics was becoming more widespread, and political science departments were introducing courses in statistics and research methods to train graduate and undergraduate students.5 Also, the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) had been founded. He viewed the founding of the ICPSR as particularly favorable to ensuring the success of the behavioral study of politics. He called the ICPSR the "main

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3Somit and Tanenhaus, pp. 190-191.
stimulator of behavioral research" and "the single most important institutional vehicle for the study of political behavior."

Eulau was optimistic enough to claim, in 1968, that behavioralism occupied "the central place in political science as a whole." But, he noted that not all members of the discipline celebrated behavioralism's central place. In an era of social and political upheaval, political science was suffering a crisis of its own. But, I am anticipating chapter 4 before its time. First, I want to use the work of David Easton to conclude my account of the "behavioral era" and to introduce the emergence of the "post-behavioral era" in political science.

3.3 David Easton

David Easton explained the study of political behavior as a poorly defined movement that is easier to describe by "reference to its intellectual content than to its membership." In an effort to describe the behavioral

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movement, then, Easton devised a "behavioral credo". His expression of the "behavioral credo" looks remarkably similar to Somit and Tanenhaus'. In fact, the only part of Somit and Tanenhaus' creed which Easton's is not explicit about is the notion that political science should depend exclusively on empirical data. 

Easton viewed behavioralism as part of a linear movement toward scientific maturity for the social sciences. In other words, he believed that social science inevitably progressed from states of relative immaturity to states of relative maturity through the orderly, scientific progression of knowledge. As such, the behavioral era in political science marked an increased understanding of human involvement in politics, from Easton's perspective. Within the political science discipline itself, behavioralism represented a "change in mood in favor of scientific methodology, methods and techniques."

At the same time, behavioralism reflected "the inception in our discipline of a theoretical search for

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3Ibid., pp. 16-17.

4Although the importance of empirical data is obviously implicit.

4The Current Meaning of Behavioralism", pp. 18, 21.

4Ibid., p. 19.
stable units for understanding human behavior in its political aspects." In other words, behavioralism in political science not only ushered in an emphasis on scientific method and techniques, it also constructed a new political theory. This, at least, was Easton's view, and most of his work revolved around his view that constructing a new political theory which supported the new emphasis on rigorous, empirical research was vitally important. In fact, he devoted an entire book, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science, to formulating a critique of "old" political theory and establishing a "new" political theory.

In The Political System, Easton focused the discussion on the sixth tenet of his "behavioral credo" (or the fourth principle of Somit and Tanenhaus' "behavioral creed"); namely, that political research should be systematically directed by theory. The Political System was first published in 1953, and Easton argued that the political theory of that time was anachronistic. That is, he argued that in its approach to moral problems, political theory still operated on nineteenth century assumptions." As


such, political theory used a historical method. That is, it simply interpreted the present in light of the past without building a theory that might explain the present and predict the future. Easton argued that political theory should adopt a more "constructive approach"; an approach that built upon the present by assessing uniformities and regularities in political behavior to construct testable theories for empirical research.\textsuperscript{45} This constructive theory would work together with the science of politics, which Easton also viewed as deficient.

The science of politics in the 1950s, Easton claimed, was caught in a social mood of hostility toward the use of scientific method in social and political analysis.\textsuperscript{46} Those in this mood argued that scientific reasoning could not solve social and political problems because it could not be emotionally attached to spiritual ideals.\textsuperscript{47} Moreover, the conception of science in previous political research had deflected "attention from theory".\textsuperscript{48} In short, Easton argued that political science lacked reliable knowledge, and this deficiency flowed directly from the neglect of general

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., p. 265.

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., pp. 21-24.

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., p. 21.

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., p. 65.
theory as a directing force for political research.\textsuperscript{49}

Easton maintained that political science has always lacked a general theory based on a "set of generalizations that orders all kinds of facts we call political."\textsuperscript{50} In other words, political scientists had never clearly established the proper relationship between political theory and facts in their research. Easton continued by arguing that the failure of American political science to "identify the role that theory plays in the attainment of reliable knowledge has helped to imperil its attempts to understand the major problems of political life;" problems which Easton claimed had reached a crisis level.\textsuperscript{51} The state of the discipline in 1953, then, was hindering political progress due to the lack of a properly conceived notion of political science and its relation to political theory.

In \textit{The Political System}, Easton hoped to force political science to a higher level of development by introducing political theory as a "critical enabling instrument."\textsuperscript{52} Through "such a theory it would be possible to identify the significant political variables and describe

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., p. 47.
\textsuperscript{50}Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., pp. 3, 5.
\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., p. 60.
their mutual relations. With this in mind, Easton moved to develop a new orientation for political research that did not concentrate on the state (because there have been times when states did not and might not exist, and is thus "peculiar to certain historical traditions") or on power (because it focused on only one social formation within the entire political system).

The new orientation for political research, according to Easton, should revolve around the notion of the political system. Easton asserted that political systems are not peculiar to certain historical conditions; rather, they are pervasive. Also, they are all-encompassing. Researchers can look at several different levels of data. They can concentrate on the individual level of behavior, the group level of individual interaction, the situational level of group interdependence, and the system level

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5Ibid., p. 61.
6Ibid., p. 113.
55Ibid., p. 121.
6See Ibid., pp. 97, 128-129, 141.
58See Ibid., pp. 171-199.
5See Ibid., pp. 149-170.
itself." Accordingly, many theories can be developed to explain the interactions inside of and between the different levels of analysis. These theories, ultimately, can cohere into a general theory for the political system based on generalizations about the uniformities and regularities which emerge empirically. In this way, the "new" political theory can help to develop a "conceptual framework" which, Easton argued, was vital to the attainment of reliable political knowledge. In the absence of such a framework, "there would be no device for determining why a person should engage in one kind of research rather than another."1

But, by 1969 he appeared to have changed his tune. In his 1969 Presidential Address to the APSA he outlined a "new revolution in political science" called post-behavioralism.2 Post-behavioralists sought "relevance and action" in applied research. In light of the newest political crises, political science should, they argued,

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2The Political System, p. 317.

seek applied knowledge instead of theoretical (or pure) knowledge. Political science, Easton contended, needed to merge the science of behavioral inquiry with the relevance of post-behavioral research to force the discipline to yet a higher level of scientific maturity. This issue is the next chapter's topic, but first, I want to summarize and comment on this chapter.

3.4 Summary and Comments

We can now see that behavioral research played a prominent role in the formal discipline of political science through at least the 1960s. One of the earliest proponents of behavioral research, we remember from chapter 2, was Arthur Bentley. He championed empirical research which employed rigorous, operationalized language. Bentley asserted that political and social research should focus on group interactions. He also believed that social and political data should be measured (quantified) whenever possible. His ultimate goal was objective results; results that would somehow give the truth so that we can work for social and political progress based on legitimate understanding. He was never very clear, though, about how this scientific process would function.

Merriam and Lasswell attempted to clarify the role of science in political study. Merriam envisioned an interdisciplinary science of politics which sought to
educate and democratically control citizens. He believed that governments should be rationally planned and controlled by science. When science can be allowed to exercise control over the environment and the self, he argued, the perfect society could be realized.

Lasswell also believed that society could be perfected. For Lasswell, social ills (such as irrationality) could be prevented when political scientists became therapists. But knowledge needed to be organized first. Political scientists needed a broad, interdisciplinary education so that they could learn to be objective with themselves and others. When they achieved this objectivity, they would become political therapists, able to correct and ultimately prevent societal ills by removing affective behavior from the political realm.

Political scientists from the behavioral era failed to understand how pre-World War II political science was scientific. They claimed that attempts at political reform should not exist in political science qua science. In keeping with the newest trend in political science, Truman de-emphasized Bentley’s polemics in his revival of Bentley’s group interpretation of politics. Truman offered no normative prescriptions for reform. Rather, he sought only to develop an analytical understanding of American representative democracy. He wanted merely to track down
uniformities and regularities in political behavior. The "new" science of politics, which continued to refine the behavioral focus, chased pure knowledge instead of applied knowledge.

The goal of the new political science, as Eulau explained, was universal, causal explanation as a means to reaching a "pure" understanding of political systems. The process of reaching this "pure" understanding (or knowledge) was long and arduous. It involved the piecemeal accumulation of data and findings where certain conclusions and hypotheses are rejected (given empirical evidence) in the search for universal knowledge. Universal knowledge, of course, was not immediately attainable, but setting it as the goal of political inquiry, Eulau argued, verified political knowledge and made it more certain. The behavioral project, according to Eulau, stripped away biases, built upon its findings, and sought a "pure" analysis of political systems; an analysis that Eulau believed was ultimately attainable. In Eulau's work, we find arguments supporting every tenet in Somit and Tanenhaus' behavioral creed.

Easton, of course, offered his own behavioral credo (which was almost an exact replica of Somit and Tanenhaus'). But, Easton, unlike Eulau, focused his behavioral work on one main principle of his credo. Easton attempted to bring
political theory, which he viewed as anachronistic, up to date. He claimed that the main problem with previous political research was its lack of a guiding theory. This theory would define the significant political variables for research and explain the interactions between them. Easton hoped that this theory would act as a "critical enabling instrument" that would propel the discipline to a higher level of scientific maturity. In other words, Easton believed that the use of a guiding theory would introduce deductive and empirical rigor to political research and thus to political knowledge; political knowledge would continually "progress" (through building upon itself) as a result. The goal for Easton and other behavioralists was always pure political knowledge, as they defined it.

This sort of pure knowledge required empirical, verifiable theories that would explain political life. Ultimately, the behavioralists believed, confidence in the validity of theories would increase to the point where they could be applied to affect and improve political practices. Behavioralists believed that their methods and their "pure" knowledge strengthened the scientific identity of political scientists. They provided a scientific role for political knowledge in the governmental process. It is plain, though, albeit behavioralists never saw it this way, that this pure political knowledge was not discovered by behavioralists, it
was constructed by them. It was constructed in order to provide an updated professional identity for political scientists based on what they perceived their role as scientists should be in the post-World War II society. In fact, each professional identity which I have discussed thus far was constructed similarly. However, by the late 1960's the seeds of discontent had begun to sprout in the discipline, and a new process of professional identification was sure to follow.
CHAPTER FOUR

POST-BEHAVIORALISM

In 1967, the Caucus for a New Political Science organized in large part as a response to behavioral hegemony. Behavioral discourse, pro and con, dominated the discipline's mainstream by the mid 1960s in terms of method, language and research focus. Members of the Caucus lamented the limited scope of behavioral inquiry. Behavioralism, they argued, neglected too many possible points of view; it was too "parochial". The Caucus desired a more open and expansive discipline. In 1969, David Easton responded to the aims of the Caucus in his presidential address to the APSA. Easton coined the term "post-behavioralism" and made "relevance" and "action" its watchwords. Post-behavioralists, Easton argued, wanted to make political science more relevant to and active in society.

Ultimately, new areas of research were opened up within the discipline (for instance, the Vietnam War, race relations, poverty, women's rights), and the well-populated, university-centered, discipline became specialized. Political scientists increasingly carved up special areas of the discipline for themselves; areas with special languages and techniques that made communication with one another difficult and often without purpose. These sub-fields rapidly became self-contained entities within the field of
political science, which was a special field in the field of knowledge.

During this era of fragmentation, anti-behavioral forces obtained new voices. Research that was distinctly anti- or non-behavioral found legitimacy as the discipline's professional identity evolved away from its behavioral parochialism. The discipline became more tolerant of various perspectives on politics and political science during the post-behavioral era. For example, John Wahlke argued in 1978 that behavioral research was "pre-behavioral" because it neglected important bio-behavioral research and thus limited its validity; but, in the process of making his argument, Wahlke explicitly denied any indications that behavioral research should dominate the discipline. Rather, he was interested only in one part of the discipline, the study of political behavior. Wahlke wanted to add to his own field of behavioral research and for the discipline's benefit. Additionally, Charles

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3Ibid., p. 10.

4Ibid., p. 10.
Lindblom refused to label one commonly accepted approach to the study of politics "superior" to a more radical approach. He was able to see benefits to both approaches, and there are many other examples of similar sentiments that were expressed during the post-behavioral era. Essentially, as the discipline fragmented into its myriad sub-fields, members of the discipline became more open to, although frequently untrained in, other approaches to studying politics.

4.1 The Caucus For A New Political Science

The Caucus for a New Political Science was the discipline's first planned revolution. Previous movements had been random and inchoate, but the Caucus elected officers, established by-laws and developed a platform of operation. It rose, in part, out of America's political failures and the irrelevant definition of political science in relation to pressing political topics. As such, the

\[5\text{See Lindblom, Charles E. "Another State of Mind" in The American Political Science Review, vol. 76, No. 1, (March 1982), pp. 9-21. Lindblom focuses his discussion on two approaches to the study of politics: a conventional approach (behavioral/positivistic), and a radical approach (critical/neo-Marxist).}

\[6\text{For examples, see Meehan, Eugene J. "What Should Political Scientists Be Doing?" in Graham and Carey, pp. 54-70; Bay, Christian. "Thoughts on the Purposes of Political Science Education" in Graham and Carey, pp. 88-99; Sandoz, Ellis. "The Philosophical Science of Politics Beyond Behavioralism" in Graham and Carey, pp. 285-305.} \]
Caucus questioned the relationship between scholars and society. In other words, Caucus members wanted to determine what the impact of scholars should be on society. The Caucus' Manifesto of 1969 established its two major goals. First, its members wanted to "encourage and support new modes of political thought and action, social and intellectual criticism... (including the development of panels and research projects, re-examination of criteria for teaching, research, appointments and promotions in universities, and establishing publication programs)." And second, they wanted to "reform the APSA... especially its bureaucratic and undemocratic organization, its academic irrelevancy, and its establishmentarian political orientation." Accompanying these goals was the overriding desire to stimulate broader research.

The Caucus also struggled to define its role in the discipline. Members of the Caucus asserted that the APSA worked to uphold the status quo "and therefore [the Caucus]


*Quoted in Lowi, p. 15.

*Quoted in ibid., p. 15.
ran candidates for national office against scholars picked by the Association's nominating committee."¹⁰ Some of the Caucus' candidates eventually served on the national Executive Committee, "but no candidate backed solely by the Caucus won the office of APSA president."¹¹ The organizational preoccupation of the Caucus was enhanced by its interests in forcing the APSA "to create committees to deal with various rigidities inside the discipline itself."¹² Consequently, during the 1970's many active committees were founded "for studying the status of women, blacks and Chicanos in the profession, for formulating and administering professional ethics, and for assessing undergraduate instruction."¹³ The Caucus, it seems, was defining itself in terms of the society (of scholars) operating within the discipline in addition to defining itself in terms of the larger society. In other words, the Caucus sought to make the discipline more active towards and relevant to its own members.¹⁴ This influenced what Theodore Lowi has termed the " politicization of the

¹⁰Ricci, p. 188.
¹¹Ibid, p. 188.
¹²Ibid., p. 188.
¹³Ibid., p. 188, emphasis added.
¹⁴See Seidelman and Harpham, pp. 198-199.
discipline\textsuperscript{16} where the APSA was thought of as an interest group that compromised with groups of varying interests and incorporated them into the discipline.\textsuperscript{16} In 1969, for instance, David Easton's presidential address outlined a new trend in political science; he called it post-behavioralism. Basically, Easton's presidential address offered a compromise to the Caucus and the discipline, and ultimately the Caucus became a de facto member of the discipline.\textsuperscript{17}

4.2 David Easton Revisited

Theodore Lowi has convincingly argued that David Easton's 1969 presidential address to the APSA served the purpose of incorporating Caucus demands into the Association.\textsuperscript{18} Lowi claimed that the discipline had become politicized and the APSA responded to politicization by treating the discipline as though it was a political system. As such, the APSA resembled an interest group as it tried to "satisfy the largest number of Caucus members while at the

\textsuperscript{15}See Lowi's argument in "The Politics of Higher Education: Political Science as a Case Study", pp. 11-36.

\textsuperscript{16}Lowi opposed this development. For a supportive view see Alan Wolfe's "Practicing the Pluralism We Preach: Internal Processes in the American Political Science Association" in Antioch Review, (Fall 1969), pp. 353-374 and "Unthinking About the Thinkable: Reflections on the Failure of the Caucus for a New Political Science", pp. 393-406.

\textsuperscript{17}The Caucus has since become an official member of the APSA.

\textsuperscript{18}Lowi, pp. 19-24.
same time minimizing the impact of the Caucus on the Association." Easton's address, according to this argument, became the vehicle for the co-optation of the Caucus's agenda.

Seen in this light, Easton's apparent shift from behavioral research to post-behavioral research seems less significant than one might anticipate. Rather, his shift appears to be merely symbolic; an attempt to advance behavioral goals without causing a potentially malevolent division of the discipline. But, while the discipline did remain organizationally distinct in the APSA, behavioralism eventually lost its hold on the discipline; and the discipline's intellectual community broke down. In other words, a community of political scholars existed at the organizational level, but at the intellectual level, consensus waned as the discipline exploded into a collection of specialties and sub-specialties.

Post-behavioralism, according to Easton, emerged in response to behavioralism, which was limited in scope and irrelevant to society. Post-behavioralism did not "seek to return to some golden age of political research or to conserve or even to destroy a particular methodological

\[^{19}\text{Ibid., p. 19.}\]
Rather, post-behavioralism was "future oriented". It sought "new directions" for political research based on a "Credo of Relevance". The pure science of behavioralism had necessarily severed the discipline's identity from society as political scientists worked to build a solid, verified body of pure political knowledge through scientific process. The "Credo of Relevance" attempted to re-define the new acceptable role of intellectuals in society. It explained that a serious political crisis existed that required the "intellectual as scientist to put his [or her] knowledge to work." Easton's credo argued that the separation between pure and applied research typical of behavioral inquiry must be abolished; pure and applied research need to be merged and committed to the common aim of alleviating the pressing political crisis that Easton claimed to notice.

According to Easton, the new political crisis, which behavioralists had failed to predict, required immediate action. The knowledge that behavioralism had supposedly accrued needed to be made active in order to address the

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2 Ibid., pp. 1051-1052.

2 Ibid., p. 1052.
problems of poverty, race relations, and especially self-destruction (through nuclear war). As such, post-behavioralists who continued to place their hopes in behavioral science decided that political research must quickly become more relevant.\textsuperscript{23}

Behavioral research, then, needed to be extended into the realm of relevance and application from this post-behavioral view. The world was perceived to be changing radically, and pure behavioral inquiry had prevented political scientists from aiding the transition. As a result, the argument goes, elites and citizens alike had not been alerted to potential problems. Easton argued that professional associations needed "to take positions on public issues about which their competence may give them special knowledge."\textsuperscript{24} For an increasing number of political scientists, it was "no longer practical or morally tolerable to stand on the political sidelines when [their] expertise [alerted them] to disaster."\textsuperscript{25}

But to what sort of knowledge and expertise was Easton referring? He argued himself that political scientists had

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 1055.
\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p. 1060.
\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., p. 1060.
failed to see the political "crisis" (or "disaster") coming. The special knowledge and expertise to which Easton referred must be imminent in the post-behavioral future. Thus, even though behavioral inquiry had seemingly failed to predict, or help society avert, the newest political crisis, Easton was apparently attempting to retain a place for the work of political scientists in the university and in society by keeping the discipline (organizationally) together.

The Caucus' critique of the discipline had combined with the social forces engendered by the Vietnam War, poverty, racism, the threat of nuclear destruction (etc.) to open another crisis of identity for political science. And the Caucus' pressure for relevance and action, Easton's presidential address, and the opening of the discipline to more and broader areas of research all helped to address this new identity crisis. The discipline could not afford to be sacked from within.

The substantive goal of Easton's address, it seems to me, was not Easton's proclaimed purpose of forcing the discipline into a higher level of scientific maturity. Rather, its goal was compromise. Caucus members were dissatisfied with behavioral research and so were post-

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26 Ibid., p. 1053.
behavioralists. Caucus members were interested in making political research more relevant to society and so were post-behavioralists. In fact, the Caucus and the post-behavioralists appear to have much in common. Easton's address served the purpose of aligning the radical Caucus with a broader, more inchoate movement (post-behavioralism) that was rapidly consuming the discipline and seeking to alter its professional identity. Easton helped to preserve an organizational community for political scientists. This made it possible for subsequent events in the discipline, such as the ensuing fragmentation of the discipline's research agenda, to take hold and establish a new professional identity for political scientists.

4.3 Fragmentation

Any intellectual community that behavioralism constructed in the discipline of political science collapsed during the 1970s. The 1970s witnessed the fragmentation of the discipline's research agenda. This transpired for at least three reasons: (1) the Caucus for a New Political Science's effectiveness at forcing the field to open up to more research interests; (2) the population explosion that occurred in the discipline following the second World War which increased the competition for recognition among political scientists; (3) a not unrelated mood of openness which prevailed in the discipline following the closed and
parochial behavioral era.

A major effect of the Caucus’ efforts was the opening of the discipline to other points of view, to other approaches in the study of politics. In 1968 (one year after the Caucus organized) 86 panels convened at the APSA national convention. Only two years later, in 1970, 156 panel sessions were scheduled.27 Similarly, the number of subfields more than doubled between the years 1968 and 1973, from 27 in 1968 to more than sixty in 1973.28 The Caucus’ call for openness certainly contributed to this extraordinary increase in the range of topics considered appropriate for political inquiry by the APSA.

In addition, though, the number of scholars involved with the discipline had greatly increased since World War II.29 And since the structure of knowledge in the university required that scholars publish original research in an attempt to aid the "progression" of knowledge, competition necessarily increased in the discipline. This increased competition was a major contributor to the specialization that took place during the post-behavioral

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2Ricci, p. 188.

2Ibid., p. 222.

2According to Ricci, the APSA membership almost tripled between 1950 and 1970. The APSA numbered 5,126 in 1950 and more than 13,500 by 1970. See p. 133.
era.

Since political scholars were generally required to publish in order to advance the accumulation of knowledge that "scientific communities" necessitate, and since the range of suitable research topics was limited during the behavioral era while the population of the discipline was rapidly increasing, the discipline was quickly saturated. Political scientists sought new areas of expertise and the discipline opened up and afforded the creation of many new subfields. The topics covered by these new subfields were so diverse by 1977 that Nelson Polsby, the managing editor for the APSR at the time, "conceded that no editor could 'judge the quality of manuscripts over the full range of concerns that political scientists write about."

The discipline was rapidly becoming so complicated that even political scientists were unable to completely comprehend or become comfortable with its entire range of research. So much material was being published about increasingly narrow fields that political scholars found it difficult to keep up with their own subfields, much less understand and integrate other subfields. Specialties and sub-specialties continually emerged, and a broader base of expertise resulted. That is, each subfield churned out vast

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³Quoted in Ricci, pp. 222-223.
quantities of literature, and the literature from each subfield, taken together, was more than any one researcher could master. However, one researcher could become an "expert" in the work of one subfield. Therefore, the discipline not only consisted of "experts" in political knowledge (as invested in the APSA), but it consisted of "experts" in certain aspects of political knowledge. But, while political scientists from different subfields found communication difficult, the notion of a common purpose (the construction of a body of political knowledge) remained.

Finally, a general mood of openness prevailed in the discipline. That is, political scientists began to accept the fact that there were different ways of approaching the study of politics. The new professional identity for political scientists, then, was founded on the perceived need to make the work of political scientists (political knowledge as they defined it) more relevant and applicable to society.3 This new identity was also based upon openness and acceptance of new and various approaches to political inquiry. The discipline had fragmented and political scientists generally embraced this fragmentation; but, at the same time, they were united in the belief that

3In addition to Easton's 1969 Presidential Address, see Carey, George W. "Beyond Parochialism in Political Science"; and Meehan, Eugene J. "What Should Political Scientists Be Doing".
they had the "collective task" of building a broad, but effective, "stock of knowledge".32

4.4 Post-Behavioralism

Like each era in political science, post-behavioralism rose out of changing social and political phenomena. Behavioralism had rooted itself in the discipline during an era of national affluence and political complacency. The United States emerged from World War II in splendid economic shape. It was the only country involved which emerged with its infrastructure and its industrial capacity completely intact. This made the United States into the international economic power and the economic benefits reaped were tremendous. Additionally, the United States' political structure was celebrated. Americans after World War II were generally completely loyal to American politics and political leaders. These were glory days, and behavioralism had emerged in this era of extraordinary economic and political optimism. The situation had changed, though, by the mid-1960s and the backlash was formidable.

The 1960s witnessed the most impressive and widespread pessimism regarding American politics and society since perhaps the Civil War. The Vietnam War, student rebellions, the civil rights movement, feminism, urban riots, inflation,

32Wahlke, p. 10.
unemployment, and a host of other factors combined to raise many serious doubts and questions in the minds of many people concerning American democracy.³ People were becoming more critical of the government and society, and political scientists were not exceptions. Political scientists wanted to question and criticize American democracy too, and behavioralism provided no means to do so. As such, many members of the discipline began to explicitly denounce and move away from behavioral research. In the wake of these events, post-behavioralism was borne.

Post-behavioralism differed from behavioralism in several ways. If behavioralism was difficult to define, it was impossible to define post-behavioralism. No creed (or credo) could be accurately attached to post-behavioral research. Post-behavioralism was also never a research program. Those who endorsed "it" sought relevance, action, and openness in the discipline, but there certainly was no post-behavioral method to be followed nor was there any organized post-behavioral identity. Rather, the discipline fragmented into specialties; specialties which employed their own (often behavioral) methods. The discipline's research agenda (and political knowledge) expanded as more viewpoints and research areas were included. And, as the

³See Ricci, p. 176.
number of political scientists grew, the work of political scientists was increasingly formally divided.

The expansion of the division of labor in the discipline affected the professional identity of political scientists and the formation and content of political knowledge. Part of the logic behind the division of labor is to allow space for more and unique work. As such, the division of labor engenders expansion, but also contraction. In the case of political knowledge, political knowledge was expanded as the pursuit of it was divided; that is, more viewpoints were represented and more areas of interest were pursued as political knowledge. Concomitantly though, the breadth of any one researcher's work contracted as political scientists specialized. The content of political knowledge, then, expanded while its formation fragmented. Professional agendas affected by the expanding division of labor combined with predominant social and political happenings to alter the structure of political knowledge as post-behavioral interests surfaced in the discipline.
CHAPTER FIVE
NEW IDENTITIES

5.1 Summary

5.1.a Emergence of the Professional Discipline

Politics as a distinct area of study emerged following the Civil War. Political science emerged, it is safe to say, in a rapidly changing world. The industrial revolution was in full swing and the means of production and exchange were cohering into the capitalist market. Concomitantly, the university system grew out of the old college system. The universities, modelled after the German university system, emphasized science and original research while the colleges had focused on the humanities and classical research. The colleges had been interested in offering well-behaved and moral citizens to society while the new universities sensed the need to provide workers with special knowledge (technical and otherwise) to the expanding, business-oriented market. As such, the universities required teachers able to transmit special knowledge to their students. In other words, university professors needed to be authorities in their fields. As a result, specific fields of study separated out from what had previously been a broad and generalized field rooted in natural and moral philosophy. The study of politics (or political science) was one of the separate fields that
emerged in this educational revolution.

One of the main purposes of political science in the university was to train students to work in the expanding government as civil servants. These students would need to understand political processes and political organization. But they would also need to understand the changing world. The government, and therefore the people, was still geared for the simpler ante-bellum world. Political scientists, particularly during the Progressive era, believed that it was their duty to help the government and the citizens adapt to the complicated post-bellum world as they understood it. In other words, political scientists created themselves as authorities over a specific body of knowledge (political knowledge) which they believed they could implement for the good of society. The goals of the discipline's new professional association (the APSA), as explained by Theodore Lowi, usefully express this evaluation of the new political scientists.

The APSA was organized for the pursuit of at least the following goals: (1) identification of a coherent body of knowledge that would define political science as a specialized discipline; (2) recruitment and training of individuals in that knowledge, with certification by a Ph.D. signifying mastery of the literature coupled with an original contribution to it; (3) the formal organization of the discipline into a national, corporate group with a constitution, by-laws, officers, etc., in order to defend the interests of the members and to advance the status of the members within the class structure of the society.
at large.¹

The new political scientists were seeking security and the association helped them in this pursuit by providing organization and an institution to defend and legitimate it in the eyes of the university and society. In a way, the industrializing, capitalist society required political scientists to defend their work. Their work needed to offer something to society and to the market. And it did; it provided workers for the expanding, "progressing" government. But, even though political scientists could defend their work in this respect, they remained insecure about the validity of their body of knowledge. In other words, their identity as political scientists was framed in terms of their value to society and their value to the university. Their societal identity was tentatively secure, but it could become more secure if political scientists could defend their role in the university.

Political scientists, then, sought to place their knowledge on what they and the university considered to be more solid ground. They attempted to make their knowledge "scientific". Science would make their knowledge more valid and reliable in the eyes of the university. The history of political science can be seen in terms of this struggle to

¹Lowi, Theodore. "Foreword" in Seidelman and Harpham, p. X.
validate and verify political knowledge and a professional identity for political scientists. But, the discipline's original identity formation was fleeting because political scientists struggled to establish a coherent sense of science in the discipline.

5.1.b The Science of Politics Movement

Ever since the professional discipline began, then, political scholars had struggled to identify themselves as scientists. The work of both Merriam and Lasswell can be seen as offering a scientific identity for political scientists. Merriam and Lasswell saw a role for political scientists as therapists; as healers of society's ills. In their view, the work of political scientists was properly aimed at modernizing and reforming political action. Merriam focused on the civic education of citizens, and thus the education of (future) leaders. He believed that citizens were not being educated and trained effectively in their understanding of politics. An appropriate civic education, based on scientific knowledge, could teach people how to better structure and organize government. Such education, Merriam argued, could lead to the perfect society, free from disease, hunger and toil.

Lasswell claimed that political problems were rooted in popular irrationality. He argued that political actors displaced their personal and psychological affects onto
political action. As a result, political decisions were made based on emotions rather than reason. The proper role for political scientists, in this view, was as therapists. Political therapists, upon being sufficiently educated, would provide therapy to political actors to keep them from projecting their psychological affects onto their political actions. This, Lasswell argued, would make political decisions more rational. For Lasswell and for Merriam, a scientific identity for political scientists involved the formation of applied knowledge for political reform. Political scientists, then, had much to offer the government and its people.

5.1.c Behavioralism

Behavioralists believed that the services of previous political scientists were inadequate; they were not scientific due to their political agenda and thus they did not effectively assess political situations. Behavioral work was modelled after the natural sciences. Behavioralists believed that natural scientists were doing "science" and they sought to bring this sort of science to political science. This "naturalistic" political science was pure and objective in their view. It did not seek political reform as earlier political science had, rather, it sought analytical explanation and understanding of political processes.
According to behavioralists, the focus on a "pure" science of politics, a science which eschewed pursuits of political reform, would strengthen the scientific identity of political scientists. This science did not question or criticize political processes, it sought merely to explain them; it sought analytical explanation that would add to the body of political knowledge they assumed existed. Behavioralists wanted to make political scientists detached, scientific observers of political phenomena seen in behavioral terms.

Post-World War II political scientists sensed that political science had not been solving and averting political crises as it had promised. This was due to improper understandings of political phenomena and behavioralists placed the blame on a faulty understanding and implementation of science. They strove to strengthen scientific political knowledge by purifying it, by placing it on what they perceived was more stable ground, by modeling it after the more "legitimate" (in their eyes) natural sciences. Such a science, which would need to consume the discipline, would cure the newest identity crisis concerning what political scientists should be doing. But, the discipline's identity crisis had not been resolved. Many political scientists opposed behavioral hegemony.
5.1.d Post-behavioralism

The post-behavioral era witnessed the opening of the discipline to new areas of research. In the new disciplinary formation, the study of political behavior eventually became just another field of research. Post-behavioralism combined with an increasing number of political scientists to specialize political knowledge. The emergence of disciplines in the university had specialized the pursuit of knowledge, and the post-behavioral response to behavioralism helped to specialize political knowledge.

The labor of the numerous political scientists was divided up as they sought recognition in an increasingly competitive field. They wanted to be recognized because recognition brought job security and career advancement. As the population in the discipline increased, it became more difficult to master the abundant literature that was being produced. And recognition in the discipline and in the university is founded almost solely upon the amount (and the "quality") of research generated by the scholar. Therefore, it became easier to reap the fruits of recognition by pursuing new research areas. During the post-behavioral era, then, the discipline became populated by specialists. That is, the political knowledge that political scientists sought became specialized as the discipline divided into sub-fields.
The new professional identity was one of increased tolerance for other points of view, for other approaches. Political scientists wanted to move away from the limitations of behavioralism and consequently, they welcomed the discipline’s expansion and eventual divisions. That is, each researcher believed that she or he could not possibly master the accumulated work of the entire discipline, especially in its expanded form. It had become virtually impossible for there to be one identity for political scientists, this myth had been dismissed. There needed to be many identities among political scientists. Political knowledge, then, needed to be reconstructed; it needed to be broken down into component parts.

Political scientists specialized in one part of political knowledge. They could now identify themselves as political scientists and behavioralists, or political scientists and political theorists, or political scientists and power theorists, and so on. Behavioralism had been too parochial and too oppressive to allow for this expansion and division of identity and political knowledge. During the post-behavioral era, political scientists became comfortable with the notion of several identities existing in one discipline. This situation arose because there was considerable unrest within the growing discipline. Political scientists required the discipline to be open to
new research agendas and points of view in order to continue with their careers. Competition for recognition and the number of different viewpoints necessarily increased as the discipline itself grew. It only made sense, then, that the discipline open up to different approaches to studying politics. A divided identity and an expanded formulation of political knowledge necessarily followed. The newest construction of political knowledge allowed for a more expansive professional identity for political scientists so that they could conduct research in their areas of interest and also preserve their careers as academics.

5.2 The State of the Discipline

Political knowledge is still the special work of political scientists (who almost always possess Ph.D.s), but it consists of groupings of what Ricci has called "small conversations". Small conversations have become increasingly more exclusive (or inclusive, depending on how you choose to look at it), within the discipline. The discipline has reached the point where "each sub-specialty searches for its own unifying model." The era of post-behavioralism has demonstrated that a single paradigm for political research is simply not possible. This sentiment

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is especially clear in the debates over science in the discipline. At least two camps have emerged in these debates (those for science and those against it), and it is not likely that either side will emerge as the dominant (or single) viewpoint. Rather, an atmosphere of professional tolerance will prevail and the splendid isolation of sub-fields will probably also persist. Political scientists are more comfortable in and have more in common with their own sub-specialties. Sub-specialties frequently organize their own panels within the APSA or attend the conferences offered by other disciplines where they may find more peers. Sub-specialists also have their own journals "where they are more likely to be cited and where they may establish their national reputation more quickly."

Political science, as a coherent discipline, seems to be disappearing. In its place are numerous "microdisciplines" (sub-specialties as we now know them) that sometimes span the macrodiscipline. The

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'See Ibid., p. 114.

' Ibid., p. 115.

'For example, behavioral inquiry is not unique to political science. It exists in psychology and sociology too, and frequently behavioralists in these disciplines have similar methodological and intellectual interests that can be usefully discussed from their perspective.
microdisciplines increasingly also have their own journals in which they publish and they identify with separate panels in the APSA or with regional conferences which specifically address their interests.

In the future, these microdisciplines may formally separate out from the discipline of political science in much the same way that political science separated from the social sciences grouping at the end of the nineteenth century. It is certainly conceivable that political theorists, or American politics scholars, or comparative politics scholars, etc., may eventually create new identities for themselves outside of political science, new identities based on various constructions of knowledge that they deem suitable to their work and for society.

As the discipline of political science has grown and society has changed, political scientists have increasingly turned inward as far as professional identity and knowledge construction are concerned. Early forms of disciplinary identity revolved around the role political scientists would play in politics? The behavioral identity, though, began to remove the professional identity of political scientists from its relation to political society. Behavioralists

—Although, historically, it is unclear how influential political scientists have been in affecting or shaping political affairs.
sought a "pure" scientific identity for political scientists; an identity they believed was free from the biases that seeking political reform introduced to political research. The behavioral identity was not directly defined in terms of a political role for political scientists. Rather, it was defined in terms of a scientific (naturalistic) role for political scientists. Any political role would only come after a solid body of "reliable" and "valid" political knowledge had been established. The behavioral era, then, began to place political knowledge in the domain of the discipline rather than in the domain of society.

The post-behavioral era continued this shift inward as political scientists began defining themselves in terms of their careers. In other words, the post-behavioral era in political science allowed political scientists to dispense with previous myths concerning a monolithic identity for political scientists as therapists for and universal explicators of political society. Instead, political scientists came to identify themselves in terms of individual careers. They needed their work to be recognized in order to advance in their careers so, because the discipline had grown so tremendously since World War II, political scientists began to identify themselves less as political scientists per se and more as specialists in a
certain aspect of political science. This allowed them to conduct research that interested them, and that they often deemed useful to society, while also allowing them to gain the recognition that supported their careers.

Significantly, the discipline has opened itself to new approaches in the study of politics as a result of the changing constructions of professional identity and political knowledge. This openness has allowed for the explicit adoption of interesting viewpoints on politics and political knowledge by many members of the discipline. However, it is difficult to clearly determine the reasons for this openness. In this thesis, I have argued that the openness that political science has witnessed since post-behavioralism emerged has probably been caused, at least in part, by vocational necessity. That is, the discipline opened to new research agendas because the numerous political scientists needed to expand and diversify their research in order to make space for expanding interests in the growing profession: space that behavioralism would not allow. There also seems to have been some desire for, or mood of, openness among political scientists, but it is difficult to detach such a desire from vocational necessity.

Today, political science appears that it may dissolve
into its microdisciplines. And even if this dissolution never transpires, it seems certain that the discipline will never again have or seek a monolithic identity. The constitution of political knowledge has been altered. It has been organized, or structured, into its divided yet diverse form. I do not wish to comment on the desirability of the current formulation of political knowledge; that will have to wait for another related project.

Related research, I think, would wisely seek to explain the connection between political knowledge and academic careers. In other words, is political knowledge as it is currently formulated actually useful to or implemented in the existing politics of the larger society in any way? Or are political scientists merely carrying on a discourse with fellow academics in order to further their careers? These questions are already being discussed at the university level, but it could be very interesting to ask such questions at the disciplinary or microdisciplinary level in political science.

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^See Naomi Lynn's article in Ada W. Finifter's Political Science: The State of the Discipline, pp. 95-123.

5.3 Final Comments

Since the post-behavioral era began, the division of labor within the discipline of political science has expanded. However, today's social and political situation is quite different from the late 1960s and the early 1970s, and political science has been affected. The Reagan/Bush era (1981 to the present) has re-introduced complacency to American politics and society. Americans have been lulled back to a mood of loyalty to, and blind acceptance of, the government. The current situation is remarkably similar to post-World War II American society.

There are signs that this may change, though, in the wake of the Los Angeles riots. Among other things, electoral discontent is on the upswing, people are beginning to notice and complain about what appears to be rampant racism on the part of elected officials and the general population, and people are beginning to cry out about the unfair treatment of the poor by government and society. Reagan/Bush rhetoric appears to be collapsing in the face of an intractable reality, and critiques of American politics and society may be on the upswing. In political science, postmodernism (especially that strain which critiques modernity) is gaining favor in the discipline as a pointed critique of society, government and academe. It is quite possible that another revolution is brewing in American
society and in American political science, and the implications for the discipline and for the structure of the American polity may be profound indeed.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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