Political Culture in Italy
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(ABSTRACT)

This project is an attempt to define both culture and political culture, and thus enable Italian subcultures to be identified. The paper discusses the "meaning" of political subcultures regarding the levels and styles of political participation in Italy. It does so primarily from a socio-historical perspective. It also offers a critique of the methods of analysis commonly used in Political Science.

The aim of the first part is to offer a reliable theoretical background concerning the operationalization of the concept Culture.

In the second part of this paper, I describe and analyze the influences of state formation on Italian political culture and subcultures.

The third part of the paper is a quantitative analysis of the regional Italian subcultures. The statistical procedure is
interesting and confirms the conclusions drawn from the socio-historical analysis. It shows that socio-historical forces do have tenacious influences on the levels and styles of political participation in Italy.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this project is to provide an original approach towards establishing a better understanding of Italian political culture.

The main object of the research is to describe the main-streams of subcultures generally, and in Italy. It is an attempt to define both culture and political culture, and thus enable Italian subcultures to be identified.

The underlaying purpose of this paper is to re-emphasize the importance of socio-historical forces for the understanding of any country's political culture, preceding any quantita-tive political analysis. Beyond the study of subcultures in Italy, I argue, in the following, that the analysis of re-gional socio-historical forces is of great value for the study not only of political culture but also of political structure and political behavior.

The paper discusses the "meaning" of political subcultures regarding the levels and styles of political participation in Italy. It does so primarily from a socio-historical perspective. It also offers a critique of the methods of analysis commonly used in Political Science.
The aim of the first part is to offer a reliable theoretical background concerning the operationalization of the concept Culture. Political Culture is an analytic concept used by authors such as Almond and Verba. In the first part of this research I intend to criticize the commonly used classical definition of Political Culture. I shall then proceed to explain why it is appropriate to use anthropologists' and sociologists' approaches towards establishing a definition of the concept of Culture. First, I shall examine the anthropological approach. I intend to show that their broad definition of Culture is not conducive to valid operationalization of Culture but then I shall go on to explain how it clarifies our research. Secondly, using the Sociologist's approaches towards a definition of Culture, I intend to justify the variable, Religion, as a partial but relevant explanation of culture, using the Weber and Durkheim Religion-Culture theory. Thirdly, I shall present the socio-historical analysis which suggests that the variables Religion and Ideology are fundamental to the operationalization of Culture. Finally, I suggest a third variable for the definition of Culture - the level of integration of the "political apparatus" in Italian society. This analysis focuses on the accountability of elites, the multiplicity of cultural and functional elites enjoying relatively high degrees of autonomy, the multiplicity of the centers, and the degrees
of permeation of the periphery by the centers and impingement of the peripheries on the centers.

In the second part of this paper, I shall describe and analyze the influences of state formation on Italian political culture and subcultures. At the same time, this enables subcultures to be studied with a view to clarifying the levels and styles of political participation in Italy. The aim of the second part is to offer a reliable socio-historical analysis, to provide a qualitative description and explanation of contemporary Italian subcultures. It will also serve as the basis for understanding the quantitative research which follows (the final part of the paper) using the three following variables: the degree of religiosity, the relative incidence of left-right ideology, and repression potential (indicator for political apparatus integration).

Thus historical facts form the foundation of my analysis. First, the role of religion in the state genesis, and its declining importance will be emphasized. Secondly, I shall examine the growing complexity of the state and the ideological struggle within history. Thirdly, I shall present an analysis of the influence of the formation of the state on Italian political Culture and the "role of the citizen", in state institutionalization.
The third part of the paper, a quantitative analysis of the regional Italian subcultures, is a supplement to the Socio-Historical description. The observations and conclusions drawn from this analysis will provide the basis both for further critiques and the identification of Italian subcultures.
2.0 METHODS.

As indicated qualitative and quantitative variables form the basis of this research. In this analysis I am interested in the relation between historical forces - qualitative data - found in History, Sociology or Philosophy texts and the quantitative indicators of culture derived from the Barnes and Kaase 1974 eight-nation study.

2.1.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE.

The quantitative measures of Culture in this research are attitudes recorded in a 1974 national survey by Barnes and Kaase. They are part of an eight-nation collaborative study of political action. The sample size for Italy was 1778 interviews of a representative cross section of the adult population. This study is the most elaborate piece of work concerning political action today. It was selected due to its richness and depth. The following variables are considered to be principal components of Italian political culture - (1) Religion, (2) Ideology, and (3) Repression Potential. I shall justify this choice in the next section.
2.1.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES.

I assume a relationship between the socio-historical genesis of Italy, and contemporary political subcultures in the Italian Peninsula. The creation of the Italian state took a century, the south the north-east and the north-west remain different kingdoms for centuries. I argue that this socio-historical past continues to influence Italian political life. The socio-historical forces I shall examine in the second section of this analysis constitute the independent variable. I therefore, suggest that the socio-historical evolution of the European continent, and especially the slow formation of Italian culture and of the state of Italy are fundamental to an understanding of contemporary Italian subculture.

2.1.2.1 THE ALTERNATIVE RIVAL HYPOTHESIS

It is necessary to control for a few variables, other than historical events, which could account for different political subculture in Italy. I will control for the levels of urbanization of different regions in order to avoid possible spurious associations between variations in subcultures and historical events. A spurious relationship is (R. Rich 1986, p22) "...when (variables) A and B vary together because they are both caused by C and they would not covary in the absence
of C,.." Therefore, must be controlled for urbanization to rule out spurious explanation of political culture.
3.0 CULTURE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

In this chapter I shall describe and critique the various theories and approaches to the analysis of political culture that have been expounded in Political Science since the Second World War. These include the theories and definitions of the comparative approaches in political science and specifically definitions of political culture. It is my contention that the most recent work on culture in political science does not have a solid theoretical or historical foundation and does not usefully exploit the concept of culture to its full potential. Culture is reduced to quantitative indicators which do not fully operationalize the concept. First, I shall describe the historical context of the birth of these theories. Second, I shall develop a critique in three major arguments.

3.1.1 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH.

The historical context of the 1950's was one of the developmentalist preoccupation, i.e. the democratization of the world's nations, against the Fascism and Communism. At the end of the Second World War these preoccupations justified the study of democracy per se as well as its application in the new free nations which had replaced the colonialist...
regimes. Political scientists thought that the analysis of what constitutes a democratic nation could help to explain how a non-democratic nation might become a democracy. This is clear in Pye's work, (Pye 1965, p10-11)

"In applying the analysis of political culture to the question of political development, it is possible to throw light on the various combinations and constellations of values which may govern different patterns of development and which may be the prime causes of frustrations and disappointment over the prospects of national development. In societies the traditional political culture appears to have provided a ready basis for democratic evolution, while in others the tendencies have been more consistent with authoritarian ways. Hopefully, the analysis of different political cultures will provide us with a better understanding of the policies and necessary investments in various socializing agents which can best reduce desired changes in nation's politics."

Such an approach overlooks the cultural foundations of alternative types of political systems that are non-democratic as valid topics. The prerequisites of the democratic system have been studied because they are considered by western political scientists to be the "best," if not the only, "developed" political system. Given the historical context of the 1950's, the United States and Britain system were conceived as an example of development. Behind The United States, the leading country, the nations of the free world (mainly European nations) began the study and the installation of democracy in formerly fascist countries (Germany, Italy, and Japan) and in the emerging nations. This movement derived from a desire for the well being of the world The
United States invested fortunes in this great project. Techniques of analysis and of comparison of the "ideal" political system, democracy, were developed. I suggest here that in spite of the magnitude of this world wide democratic "evangelization", the authors neglect the fact that people have individual cultures, and that these cultures differ from each other and subsequently influence the political behaviors of those people. Moreover, they gave United Statesculture a high normative value and assumed that other cultures would "evolve" to this due cause. The error was ethnocentrism with a dose of cultural imperialism. They do not conceive of the fact that an analysis of the democratic system within a few western countries does not ensure its world wide development. Moreover, I argue that, in relying on conventional methods of analysis, many researchers have neglected cultural differences between the western countries they studied. Therefore, they have underestimated extensive differences between both the degree to which they can be democratic, their own cultures and political systems, and those of third world countries.

3.1.2 CRITIQUE OF THE COMPARATIVE APPROACHES

For the critique I will limit my analysis to Almond and Verba's, and Pye's works, as relevant examples of the comparative approaches.
In the comparative approach the researchers compare the culture of one country with others. However, I will argue culture itself, in their conception, is nothing more than a vague idea which does not play a significant role in the analysis. Since the purpose of this paper is to identify subcultures in Italy, it is important to clarify the definition of culture. Therefore I have based my analysis on a critique of the comparative approaches.

In this section, I shall argue first, that the authors convey information about different countries' cultures in terms of a few narrow concepts, neglecting the historical and institutional origins of political culture. Secondly, they have developed for this paradigm, very strong tools of analysis which to a certain extent restrict the analysis of individual political behavior to that which is immediately perceptible. They have, therefore, sought to compare politics in terms of the collective stability and instability of different constellations of attitudes and sentiments. Thirdly, they suggest that education can serve as a substitute for the gradual evolution of culture, underestimating the importance and tenacity of traditional culture.

CRITIQUE I: In "The Civic Culture" Almond and Verba (1963, p13) distinguish between different "Political Cultures". They state that
"the term political culture refers to the specific political orientations-attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system. We speak of a political culture just as we can speak of an economic culture or a religious culture. It is a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes."

A similar idea exists in Lucien Pye's work. He suggests that 'political culture' will provide us with a promising new theory that will bridge the behavioral approach "between the level of micro-analysis based on psychological interpretations of the individual's political behavior and the level of macroanalysis based on the variables common to political sociology" (Pye 1965, p8). Pye argues,

"Political culture is a recent term which seeks to make more explicit and systematic much of the understanding associated with such long-standing concepts as political ideology, national ethos and spirit, national political psychology, and the fundamental values of a people."

Such definitions are dictated, in part, by the necessity of quantitative operationalization in the behaviorist school. They tend to reduce the specific information about different countries to a few measurable concepts (e.g. civic culture) in an attempt to arrive at an understanding of the evolution of the political system. They have, therefore been led to compare politics in term of stability - which they use as a synonym for democracy- or instability. The performance of a political system has been directly related to basic political attitudes, indicators of levels of 'civic culture', as de-
fined by Almond and Verba in the "Civic Culture." This sets forth the idea that a "good" culture corresponds to a "good" 'civic culture' which corresponds to democracy. A country's political system should logically be the result of its culture or at least should be perfectly adapted to it.

CRITIQUE II. For Almond and Verba "the Civic Culture" is the summation of various measurable individual levels of behavior. This restricts the analysis to individual political behavior which is immediately perceivable. On one hand, this contributes to analytical and logical explanations of "what" changes, "how", and "why". On the other hand, it tends to overlook the importance of variables such as historical development, institutions, and social interaction. However, to reduce culture to a few measured individual level variables results in a serious loss of considerable explanatory power. This is a troublesome limitation of the approaches, since although the formation of democracy is the main interest of these projects, beyond this, the characteristics of culture have been ignored.

This narrow focus limits the utilization of culture as an explanatory concept. It makes culture, by definition irrelevant to a wide range of political behavior. Because the operationalization of culture does not exist in the behavioralist analysis. Moreover, since the study of democ-
racy is motivated by its development, it is even more difficult to understand democratic development in an unfamiliar culture. This is why I argue that the analysis of the socio-historical development of a country's culture is necessary before any quantitative comparative analysis between countries can be undertaken. The organization of the information in terms of a few narrow concepts does not facilitate the understanding of the evolution of a political system towards democracy. It does not help in the comparative analysis of any political system's development. It is therefore necessary to create new framework of analysis which assist in the understanding of political development, and thus in the analysis of the democratic development, any form of democracy, not only the United States democracy.

CRITIQUE III. Almond and Verba recognize that the process of developing a civic culture is long, necessitating a progressive evolution, ideally without any break. (Almond and Verba 1963, p498) The authors propose to replace gradual evolution of culture with education.

"This gradual, fusional growth of the civic culture has generally occurred in a political system whose problems have been spread over time...The problem in the new nations of the world is that such gradualness is not possible...Tremendous problems of social change must be faced all at once...A slow political development may foster a civic culture, but what the new nations of the world lack is the time for this gradual development." (Almond and Verba 1963, p501)
I argue that the education of a people may change their understanding of what a state is and may bring them to a certain degree of understanding of the civic culture, but it will not wipe out their traditional culture, their religion, their long held ideologies or notions of the state. It is a mistake to think that social communities in the world are all evolving in the same direction, that is, towards the democratization of their social structures and political organization. The importance of the historical way a nation evolves is not to be neglected and should occupy a important place in some analysis.
4.0 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND SPECIFIC MEASURES OF CULTURE.

4.1.1 CULTURE, A CONCEPT?

In this chapter I intend to define and operationalize the concept of culture. I shall then use the operationalization of the concept on which to base the analysis of the Italian political system. As the foregoing discussion suggests it is difficult to define. The authors I shall present do not succeed, but each approach brings forth a better understanding of what may be the correct operationalization.

First, I shall examine the relevant theoretical literature, specifically the anthropological and sociological definitions of culture. I shall discuss the relevance of these approaches and I intend to justify the holistic definition of the concept of culture as an interesting example of a broad concept of culture, but I emphasize that a global-definition has to include specific variables. There are variables that are more important than others because they are the roots of "culture", therefore they determine and clarify the concept of Culture. It should be clear that a holistic definition is not of itself of much use, nevertheless a broader and operationalized concept is of value. Secondly, therefore, I shall demonstrate that religious beliefs are at
the core of "culture." Thirdly, I will present the socio-historical method of analysis. The importance of ideology as a complementary variable is emphasized. Finally, it is my contention that the measure of the relationship between the state apparatus and the Italian people is important to the definition of Political Culture. This in turn points to the significance of the role of a third variable in the operationalization of the concept of Culture, the "repression potential."

4.1.2 TOWARDS A HOLISTIC DEFINITION.

It seems important to begin with the anthropological definitions of culture, because culture is fundamental to their discipline. It is a global-concept. I shall limit examples to the work of Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1948), Linton (1956), Kluckhohl and Kelly (1953), and Greets (in Badie 1986) as being of the most relevance.

Most of the Anthropological literature is based on a holistic concept of "culture," though individual authors take different approaches. Taking each author in turn I wish to show that any definition of "culture" is problematic, because it can include everything therefore rendering it useless. However, these authors' approaches are enumerative, they give greater importance to one, two, or more variables. Their
methods conflict with the idea of a holistic definition. How can a global-concept be enumeratively defined? The enumerative definition limits its subject because it does not include all the elements. By definition a holistic definition is global, and therefore should include all variables. For instance, Kroeber and Kluckhohn, define culture as an "ensemble" consisting of "the knowledge, beliefs, arts, laws, morals, customs, and other habits acquired by the society member, Man." This definition is immediately limited by what it does not include. Linton definition is less specific, and is divided into two variables; "social heredity" and "characteristics of a group." He says, "...in human beings the social heredity is called culture. The term is used in a double sense. As a general term, Culture means a particular strain of social heredity. Thus culture, as a whole, is composed of a vast number of cultures each of which is characteristic of a certain group of individuals." This definition is interesting because it brings forth the idea that culture is transmitted from generation to generation, in itself a cultural process of transmission of culture. It emphasizes the fact that the study of the evolution of culture should be related to the study of history. Thus, in order to analyse or operationalize Culture one has to refer to different stages of historical evolution. This point is significant, but it is not sufficiently refined. It is still
limited because it does not take into account the processes of creation of culture.

The most interesting definitions of culture given by anthropologists are abstract. They suggest that what has meaning for a human being can be pictured like a "spiders web". For instance, Kluckhohn and Kelly argue that culture is a "unifying logic." Greetz thinks that human beings are animals hanging in "signification webs" which are created by themselves. He says culture is a code, a network of meanings by which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge. Basically, at the individual level, if something does not mean anything to you but does to me, it may indicate Cultural differences between you and me. This abstract definition is very important. Culture is "shared meaning." This is the correct global-definition of culture. However although it gives us a broadened definiton of Culture, it does not answer the question, What is at the core of culture? Moreover, it does not allow any operationalization because it does not direct our attention to anything that can be observed.

The sociologist Weber's interest is the link between "what has meaning" and social "action". He argues with Durkheim that religion is at the core of culture. Moreover, in trying to understand what is the foundation of social action, they
have shown that there is a relation between individual action and a specific idea of the state. I shall now expand upon this idea in the following.

4.1.3 THE CORE OF CULTURE, RELIGION.

Weber is interested in the link between "action" and "shared meaning." He argues (Weber 1978, p4-28; 1965, p157) that individuals act rationally, but also points out that social actors deviate from this rationality.

He expands upon each of these points. On one hand, he says that because of social struggle the actors must be rational to succeed in their goals. They act as rationally as possible to obtain immediate successes. The author calls this process "the rational finality in immediacy." Their attitude's logic is their success's immediacy, their means, is rationality. On the other hand, he explains that when this social activity is brought to a certain level of organization the finality is obscured and the motivation for the activity may not always be found in a "rational finality in immediacy." But, it may be found in the "rational finality in value," which is not obvious, but which is justified by Religious beliefs. For Weber Religious beliefs have a rationality, they obey a specific logic which carries a specific meaning.
Weber's interpretation of the role of religion, stands as an explanation of "rational action in values." Actions which are motivated by the "rational finality in immediacy" are born from the basic mechanism of culture formation, the social struggle. But, the "rational finality in value" attitudes are dictated by religious beliefs. They do not obey the logic of immediacy, but conform to a different form of logic which causes different behavior. This theory of rational meaning is the foundation of Weber's work the "Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism". In this book, Weber shows how a specific rationality in value (ie, justified by a religious ethic) can influence an individual's conception of the state, and the economy of a country. (Weber 1964, P45-252) The author says that the attitudes of the Puritans were related to their behavior and to a certain conception of the state. In the Calvinist religion the meaning of human action is provided by religious beliefs. In the Catholic religion there is a distinction between "temporal" and "spiritual" actions. This difference between the temporal and spiritual is further differentiated by the various forms of power in the Catholic society. On one hand, Puritan society is characterised by individual actions which try to create the "city of God" on earth and to develop an individual economic rationality. On the other hand, the Christian society is hierarchical and develops a collective legal rationality which relies on a huge bureaucracy.

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This analysis helps us to understand how human action may be motivated by individual or collective rationality, yet its relation to the whole social structure remain unclear. Durkheim's description of the relation between culture and religion helps to determine the influence of the society as a totality, on individuals. It therefore leads to a clearer understanding of the process of culture formation.

4.1.4 RELIGION AND CULTURE.

Durkheim argues with Weber that religion is at the core of culture. He says (1964, p169) that slightly strong temporal convictions, when held by the same community of men, inevitably takes on a religious character. Moreover, he thinks these convictions inspire the same reverential respect as beliefs properly religious. He suggests that these convictions and religion correspond to a region equally central in the common conscience. He further emphasizes that history teaches us beyond doubt that culture tends to differentiate, that religion tends to embrace a smaller and smaller portion of social life. According, to Durkheim originally everything social is religious, then little by little, political, economic, scientific functions free themselves from the religious function, and standing apart take on an increasingly temporal character.
What is interesting about this idea is that everything comes from religion and that everything is developed with reference to religion. (Durkheim 1926, p418) "In summing up, then, it may be said that nearly all the great social institutions have been born of religion." But, despite that reference, there is more and more room for "the individual (to) become more a source of spontaneous activity." This can be explained by the fact that (p418) "if religion has given birth to all that is essential in society, it is because the idea of society is the soul of religion. Religious forces are therefore human forces, moral forces." Durkheim brings two different and new variables our understanding of nature and importance of all culture. The first is the relation between culture and action. Religion affects each individual's acts by directing these acts towards the social "common conscience." The second is the link in each society between Religion and Institutions.

Thus I hope to have shown that Religion is a critical component of all cultures. It should be the first variable in the operationalization of culture.

4.1.5 SPECIFIC MEASURE OF RELIGION.

In Italy, 90% of the Italians think of themselves as Catholic. But they practice their religion to different de-
degrees. The degree of religiosity, may vary from one region to the other as a result of different socio-historical processes. This should become apparent in the socio-historical study of these regions. Therefore I have chosen to find out "how religious" the Italian people are. Barnes and Kaase measure it as follows, "Generally speaking, would you consider yourself; very religious, somewhat religious, a little religious or not religious?" (1=not religious, ... , 4=very religious) Based off the work of Weber and of Durkheim, I hope to prove that regional variations in religiosity correspond to popular attitudes toward the distribution of power and of the nature of the State. Italy is known to be an unstable democracy, I hope to show that this instability is rooted in such differences.

4.1.6 IDEOLOGY AND CULTURE.

Weber and Durkheim have stated several principles which help to explain the evolution and transformation of cultures. The more recent work of Eisenstadt (1981, 155-181) concentrates on the origins of ideological politics, which he argues, rely on a long stretching period, the first millenium B.C., -which was named by Karl Jaspers as the Axial Break. During this period some of the major civilizations emerged. Ancient Israel, later on the Christian world; Ancient Greece institutionalized a conception of basic tension between the

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transcendental and the mundane orders. This was also the case later within Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. For Karl Jaspers, "People" as we see them today, came into being during this deepcut dividing line in history which was at the origin of the liberalization of human action and gave birth to ideology. Alfred Weber has advanced the hypothesis that this turning point in history was brought about by the Indo-European nations of horsemen which reached China, India, Europe and the Mediterranean prior to the first millenium. Back into the depths of the past, the ancient civilizations had been flourishing in closed self-sufficiency, the penetration of these Central-Asian charioteers and horsemen created a conflict between the unawakened matriarchal powers and the mobile liberating tendencies of the equestrian peoples, therefore, disturbing these societies' mythological and stable symbolization of order. (K.Jaspers 1953, p1-21) Karl Jaspers says that all this took place on reflection. The Greek, Indian and Chinese philosophers were unmythical in their decisive insights, as were the prophets in their ideas of God. The mythical Age with its tranquillity and self-evidence was at an end. Rationality and rationally clarified experience launched a struggle against the myth, Jaspers says "Logos against Mythos."

Moreover, David McLellan explains that the traditional and mythical religions concentrated on the relation between the
everyday life of individuals and the sacredness of "an other-worldly dimension". He states the myths of the past served mostly to promote values around which societies could integrate and continue as coherent entities. These myths were not in competition, whereas ideologies, the product of an increasingly pluralist society, were associated with rival groups whose specific interest they served. An ideology is the justifying of even an immoral means to achieve a political end. The birth of ideologies and their consequences changed the face of the world. Therefore, in the operationalization of Culture, the variable, ideology, is as significant as the variable, religion. In 20th century Italy, Christianity and Maxism have a great deal of influence on politics.

Nevertheless, these two variables are insufficient to operationalize culture thoroughly. The struggles for influence within the state apparatus—between the elites themselves, and between elites and the people are the result of the institutionalization of this tension between sacred and worldly orders. Thus, after the following description of the specific measure of ideology, I shall examine the patterns of coalescence between the elites and the people within the historical process of the state institutionalization.
4.1.7 SPECIFIC MEASURE OF IDEOLOGY.

I choose to define secular ideology in terms of a left-right dimension, because I think that it is a wide and flexible concept and it is a relevant approach to ideological orientation in Italy. It allows us to address the latent influences of the Marxist theory in the Italian case. Barnes and Kaase measure the left right dimension with the following question, (Barnes and Kaase 1979, pp229&454) " Many people think of political attitudes as being on the 'left' or on the 'right'. When you think of your own political attitudes, where would you put yourself?" Then they built a scale from 1 to 10, from left to right, where rightwing orientations receive the highest score. The weakness of the left-right dimension might be that for some, it is difficult to appreciate its exact meaning but the relative incidence of Italians that understand the concept is high compared with Germany, Great-Britain, or The United States. (Barnes 1984, p14)

4.1.8 STATE GENESIS AND CULTURE.

Eisenstadt explains that the differentiation between transcendental and mundane orders affected the elites and the institutions. He states that the institutionalization of these new perceptions transformed the various technical,
ritual, magical, and sacred activities of the former priests. They took on aspects or dimensions of the relatively autonomous construction of the cultural and social order. Their carriers were in the meanwhile charged into potentially autonomous "intellectuals" who tended to acquire a high degree of autonomy as well as extensive consciousness of their status.

Politics are conceived as an institutionalized area, centralized, organized around a monarch by a bureaucracy and intellectual elites. Further on the author states that what is crucial is not the elaboration and codification of different customs and laws, but the growing organizational and intellectual complexity of legal systems or the relatively specialized educational "formation" of legal cadres. (Eisenstadt 1981, p160)

The author suggests that the causes of such development can be found in Western Europe since they were due to a set of historical processes which have developed, within these countries. These processes are, first, a continuous interweaving of..."multiple institutional spheres"... political, economic or educational and, second, the continuous development of multiple autonomous elites and groups. These developments gave rise to several important characteristics of western European society, the most significant of which have been: first, multiplicity of centers; seconly, a high degree of permeation of the periphery by the centers, and an impingement of the periphery on the centers; and thirdly, a multiplicity of cultural and functional (economic and professional) elites. The latter enjoy a relatively high degree
of autonomy with close relationships with broader strata. They also imping on each other and carry different variations of combined this-and-other-worldly orientations. They have autonomous access to centre, although no one group monopolizes the centre. (Eisenstadt 1981, p174) This view is fundamental to the analysis of the formation of Italy. In 20th century Italy the role of the citizen and its answers to politics is very often explained in terms of "patterns of political attitudes." I believe such patterns are likely to be found in the study of Italian history and of the Italian state formation.

4.1.9 SPECIFIC MEASURE: REPRESSION POTENTIAL.

Of the various political attitudes, I am interested in the degree to which Italians support state repression. The repression potential is a measure of the degree to which democratic values are held a public. Barnes and Kaase say,

"...we have conceptualized repression potential as the tendency to grant authorities increasingly severe instruments of control to contain correspondingly severe challenges by protesters, strikers, or other unorthodox activists. Since allegiance to an authority figure is so obviously implied by such a tendency, we may say that, whereas protest is unorthodox political behavior and conventional participation is orthodox, repression potential is superorthodox political behavior." (1979 p57)

The four questionnaire items chosen to represent this tendency are the following:
• the courts giving severe sentences to protesters who disregard the police;

• the police using force against demonstrators;

• the government using troops to break strikes;

• the government passing laws to forbid all political demonstrations.

The respondents were asked to indicate to which extent they approved of each kind of events." (Barnes and Kaase 1979, p88) The result were dichotomized and submitted to a Guttman scale analysis (4=approve very much, ... , 1=disapprove very much). This variable is very interesting because it gives an evaluation of a feeling. The authors argue that it is the measure of beliefs, moreover I think that the questions are rather a measure of the populus appraisal of state repression. Thus, I am interested in this variable because it suggests a level of democracy of the political apparatus in the Italian society.
4.1.9.1 SUMMARY OF THE DIFFERENT VARIABLES.

The above theoretical analyses are important because they enlarge the concept of political Culture. They deal with the existence of specific religions and specific ideologies, and with the slow and continuous evolution, institutionalization of the state. The Catholic religion and the Marxist ideology are parts of contemporary Italian political culture. But they cannot be understood isolated from historical events. Religion and Ideologies, in turn, are important causes of other political attitudes. For instance the existence of other competitive influential religions in other nations, such as the Protestant or the Muslim religions, may be the cause of different conceptions of the state of society. Moreover, patterns of coalescence between centres and peripheries, institutions developments, and the differentiation of areas of power during the process of the state formation may have influenced attitudes toward state repression, ideology and even religion. Any worthy analysis of the Italian sub-cultures has to include references to these historical forces which reflect a broad conception of the state formation. In the following part, I shall use historical facts to describe the relevance of; "religion", "ideology", and "state apparatus' cultural integration" as the three explanatory variables of Italian subcultures.
5.0 SOCIO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS.

5.1.1 INTRODUCTION.

A difficulty in qualitative analysis lies in the problems involved in describing large and complex as historical forces. I have tried to focus as much as possible on a few conceptual ideas which I used in the first part of the paper. The aim of this part is to provide insight into, firstly the role of Religion in the genesis of the Italian state, and its declining importance, and secondly, to analyze the complex political and economic core areas which developed in the state as we know it today. In the previous part of this paper I argue that three variables (religion, left-right ideology, and repression potential) operationalize the concept of culture. The argumentation was theoretical. In the following paragraphs I intend to demonstrate that specific Historical forces have contributed to the development of contemporary Italian subcultures.

The periods of history that I have chosen to describe may be questioned. It has to be clear, however, that this study focus is on the tenacity of historical patterns. I believe that the framework of the analysis, and the socio-historical examples that I use are relevant, but not exclusive. Above
all, I wish to demonstrate the existence of real and persisting historical patterns. Thus, I do not describe History throughout time, instead I establish a series of analytical frameworks, and choose particular periods of time in identifying patterns. Most of the data are found in history, sociology or philosophy texts. Thus, the analysis is descriptive, and is based on a qualitative approach.

Particularly significant in the evolution of contemporary Italian political culture are the influence of Christendom, specific modes of production and social organization, and the Germanic Empire. Throughout history, ideologies arose as a result of divergence with religion. I suggest that the ideas of Christianity have always been overwhelmingly influential. The existence of the papal states, for example, is one of the reasons for the late formation of Italy. Italy was not completely unified before 1866. Nevertheless, the differentiation between religion and ideology was not the same all over Italy, and this was in part due to the discovery of Aristotle and the Machiavellian conception of the state which arose in northern Italy, and led to a democratization of the conceptions of the government. The influence of these ideas in turn was in part a function of the existence of the city- republics, in the north, which provided a favorable context for their development. In con-

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trast, the southern part of Italy remained under the direct domination of Christianity.

Thus, it is my contention that southern Italy today, political attitudes will show both a higher degree of religiosity, and a tendency towards the right on the left-right scale. The evidence in support of this assumption is born out in the quantitative analysis which forms the third part of this paper.

Further on, I argue that the development of particular modes of production gave birth to particular modes of social and political organization, which resulted in the development of a vast number of independent states of equal power ruled by autonomous elites. I believe that these patterns in the modes of production reveal political and social organisational differences. These also differentiated the northern part of the peninsula, from the southern. The political organization in the northern part of the country was characterized by a more liberal and democratic mode of production in comparison with the south. On the basis of these observations it can be hypothesised that, in northern Italy today, more tolerant political attitudes should be in evidence. In other words the score on the Barnes and Kaase's repression potential scale is likely to be low.

SOCIO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS.
Not only do patterns of clear differentiation between the north and south exist, but a differentiation appears between the northeast and the northwest of Italy. Foreign influences account for this distinction, since the northwestern part of the peninsula was under Imperial rule for few centuries, whereas the northwestern part developed autonomy early (IVth century). Therefore, in the northwest, the political participation patterns should be even more democratic. The contention that there is a low degree of religiosity, a tendency towards the left, and greater tolerance of grassroots politics (as measured by low repression potential scores) should be supported by the quantitative analysis.
6.0 CHRISTIANITY AND IDEOLOGY IN ITALY.

(The Slow Process of Differentiation) In the face of the disintegration of the Roman Empire, the encounter between two major forces - Barbarianism and Christianity - became responsible for re-modeling Europe after centuries of struggle. The main aim of this section is to provide a descriptive analysis of the slow process of differentiation which occurred between the temporal and spiritual conception of the commonwealth. The rise of Christianity and the barbarian invasions sealed the fate of the Roman Empire. It continued to disintegrate. The European continent was entering a violent period of great troubles. The Roman Empire was divided into the Empire of Orient, and the Empire of Occident. In the Orient Empire, the Byzantine church provided the cohesion necessary to avoid disintegration which nevertheless took place in the Occidental Empire.

In the first part of the discussion, the emphasis is on the early domination of the Church. The second part describes the growing importance of the Aristotelian conception of the state. The final part of the discussion documents the rise of ideologies characterised by their independence from Christian morality.
6.1.1 THE CHRISTIAN DOMINATION.

This section is concerned with the analysis of the influence of Christendom in western Europe during the early Middle Ages. The major arguments establish facts regarding - (1) European evangelisation (this not only emphasized the superiority of Christianity, but also Temporal-Spiritual duality), (2) the slow birth of ideology, as the justification of politics independent of religious morality.

It is a fact that the so called Barbarian invasion, not only terminated the Roman Empire, but also greatly aided the advance of the Christianity. J.B. Morrall in discussing this period, states that after the failure of the Byzantine reconquest under Justinian I (527-565) the church was brought face to face with the multiplicity of the new barbarian kingdoms. Further, he argues,

The new kings and kinglets felt less sure of their independent right vis-a-vis the Church than had the Empire, with its formidable legal tradition behind it. The papacy stood in a special relationship to the newly-converted barbarian kingdoms and its political support was not to be undervalued, as the Franks, conquering Gaul in the name of Catholicism, found. The church used its privileged position to try to persuade the new rulers of the west, whether Anglo-saxon, Frank or Visigoth that the political power they had forcibly acquired should be used for moral and religious purposes.
(1962 p23) The author cites Isidore of Seville, who in the 7th century, "spoke of the monarch as using the material force and terror at his disposal to ensure that his subjects follow a Christian way of life." This fact is very important, it indicates that the foundation of the political ideologies of the Middle Ages was based on Christian morality. From the breaking-up of the Roman Empire until the rediscoveries of pre-medieval political theories, Christianity dictated the consciousness of the kings and Emperors.

Nevertheless, the Barbarian invaders changed the political composition in decisive way. The Barbarian kings were warrior leaders chosen for their merit, seniority, experience and above all their military prowess. They were elected by acclamation. These electoral procedures were rudimentary and characterized by the elevation of the king on a shield. The Barbarians introduced personal and tribal customs which undermined the Roman idea of centralized government. Only Christianity remained to provide the west with unity. Medieval Europe entered a period in which it reorganized itself on a spiritual basis. Political life as it was known during the Roman Empire was disappearing. Instead, a new political principale was introduced by the Teutonic, and Frank tribes. This principle relied on a "person to person link," by which romanized subjects of a conquered territory were protected. All subjects were assured protection in return for a service.
This principle was based on two concepts - the vassalage and the benefice - which linked two individuals to each other on the basis of the possession of the land.

As the Roman Emperor became the head of the Christendom, the dichotomy between the invasions and the disintegration of the Roman Empire was catalyzed in a long lasting struggle of power that opposed the Papacy to the Head of the Germanic Empire. However, this conflict should not be conceived of as a struggle between the "Church" and the "State". The struggle, in the early Middle Ages was non-existent. It is clear that the conquering invaders greatly helped the development of Christianity in Western Europe. But soon, secularized episcopate, particularist interests, imperial power, and the papacy struggled for the control of these lands. The papacy, at that time, was the only form of government. It was the only real stable center of power. The elites were limited not only to the various kings, but also and essentially to the well-read ecclesiastics who, when they were not managing parts of the Church domain, assisted the kings in their governmental activities. J.B. Morrall suggests that throughout history there was a four cornered conflict between - (1) a secularized episcopate (anxious to preserve its customary perogatives against papal centralization), (2) particularist opponents against centralizing monarchy (the lombards towns, for example), (3) imperial power (which saw

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papal centralization as a menace to its own monarchical authority), and (4) the papacy (which saw centralization as the only way to a reformed and purified church). (Morrall, 1962 p28) Nevertheless, the author argues that this struggle was nothing else than a "dispute about government of a unified Christian society."

Clearly, because it was in charge of the souls of men "spiritual power" was comparatively greater than "temporal power." The symbolization of this pre-eminence was the oath - confirmation of the king. J.B. Morrall explains that the king's duty was to be the guardian of the law, but this promise had to be made in front of both the secular community of his subjects, and the church which confirmed it by way of the ceremony of religious oath. The popes had the "sacred autoritas". The royal power was the "potestas." This superiority, of the "sacred autoritas" over the "potestas", reached its peak in the thirteenth century when papal centralization was described as the "plenitude potestatis." During this period the papacy developed a bureaucracy that could deal with all the problems of the church. Papal officials were able to circulate freely all over Western Europe. The authority of the Pope was uncontested, he could control the clerical hierarchy from top to bottom. Two schools of thought justified the control of the Church over secular power. First, St Peter's key was the symbolization of the

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confirmation of the Emperor by the Pope. By contrast, the second school confirmed the popular derivation of the Imperial power. But, the papacy could excommunicate the emperor, indicating the withdrawal of all allegiance. Therefore, confirming the superiority of the spiritual on the temporal.

In the same period, the thirteenth century, the rediscovery of Aristotelian thought led to the development of a different conception of the Christian-commonwealth - an independent political society.

6.1.2 THE REDISCOVERY OF ARISTOTLE.

This discovery marked the beginning of the divergence between religious and ideological beliefs. For four centuries the Christian church fought against the rise of specific political ideas that - first, it made a clear distinction between temporal and spiritual, second, it contested the "spiritual" supremacy over the "temporal", and finally, claimed control of each power over its own affairs.

The thirteenth century was a period of legal and political discovery. The rising complexity of society forced the government to adjust. The feudal government had to modernize their administrations. As J.B. Morrall explains,
The transformation of the regnum into the state with its own autonomous functions was the logical outcome of the rediscovery of Roman law and Aristotle as well as of the economic and political changes brought about, by the rise of literate wealthy and administratively competent laity. The ages of clerical monopoly had passed and with their passing the close political link between the secular government and the ecclesiastical hierarchy tended to weaken.

(1962, p132)

The idea that politics could be a separate branch of knowledge was not completely unknown but "it was the direct influence of Aristotle's thought which enabled medieval political theory to come to age." (Morrall, 1962, p133)

Initially, these ideas came back translated from Moslem philosophers such as Avicenna (980-1037). Later in 1260 "Politics" was translated from the Greek by William Moerbeke. (Morrall, 1962 p69) For Aristotle, the political commonwealth was a creation of nature and man was by nature a political animal. Indeed, it was only by participation in the life of his political community that an individual man could fully participate in the good life the positive purpose for which the political community exists. (Morrall 1962 P70) The feudal conception of personal loyalty to the overlord was transmuted into a theory of loyalty to the community as a whole and of individuals' self effacement before the common good by thinkers such as - Peter of Auvergne (late XIIIth
century) in his commentary on Aristotle’s "Politics", or Dante's professor Remigio di Girolami (XIVth century).

Such discoveries were a threat to the papacy which made numerous attempts to prohibit the distribution of Aristotle's study. Following the rediscovery of Aristotle, which was a shock for Medieval society, the number of authors that discussed the role of both temporal or spiritual power increased. John de Paris (XIVth century) admitted that the sacerdotium was qualitatively superior to the regnum because it had the highest goal. Nevertheless he contended that this did not entitle the sacerdotium to claim supremacy in the regum's own sphere. Dante (XIVth century) in "Monarchia" and in "The Divine Comedy" attacked the Christian philosophical theory in which man's heavenly goal – eternal salvation – is the ultimate end to which the subsidiary goal, temporal happiness and earthly order, might be a useful aid. Dante was probably the first thinker to elevate the earthly destiny of man, in particular his political and philosophical development, into an end itself. Actually such developments were prohibited by the church until 1897. Progressively, the role of law, and of the government as a power able to enforce the law, grew. The idea of each power exerting exclusive control as well as spiritual autonomy over its own affairs was brought to political reality.
It is clear that the rediscovery of Aristotle was of great importance throughout Europe. But most of this influence was located in Italy in the northern region. The birth, in the thirteenth century of a few universities in northern Italian cities reawakens the intellectual vitality which characterized this time, and this area of the peninsula. The greatest law university was in Bologna but there were other universities in Modena, Padua. It is interesting to realize that this movement not only paralleled the development of the city-states, but it also opposed the Empire during the twelfth century. The rediscovery of Aristotle was at the root of the development of political turmoil, it was the driving force of change. Throughout his work the secular elite could revive to rationalize historical forces and therefore the autonomy of the secular state. The impact of which affected essentially the north of Italy. This rediscovery became political reality in the Italian city-republics. (In the following section I shall describe with more insight these city-states)

6.1.3 Towards the Machiavellian Conception of the State.

Progressively the basis for the spiritual autonomy of the "Regnum" was established. Most of the authors were Italians. They were, in the great Italian legal tradition, extremely
influenced by the mode of government of the Italian city republic, which I shall describe in the next section. Nevertheless, these authors, until the XVth century, could not conceive of the distinction between the church, the "Sacerdotium", and the budding modern state, the "Regnum". But all of them emphasized the importance of both - the law (its role as the body of the community's will), and sovereignty (the fact that the "legislator humanus" retains ultimate sovereignty).

Marsiglio of Padua (XIVth century) is probably the best example of such political discourses. In his book, "The Defensor Pacis", he drew the patterns of the causes of order and tranquility within the state. He tells us that tranquillity

...would be the good ordering of a city or kingdom by which any one of its parts would be able to carry out fully the activities which befit it according to reason and to the purpose for which it was instituted. (in J.B. Morrall 1962, p107)

The author explains that the primary role of government is to promulgate and enforce law. Further, he says that law is preferable to "any one man, however good" (in Morrall 1962, p111) because the "Law embodies the collective wisdom and experience of the whole community." The author argues that the "legislator Humanus" has the sovereignty; he elects the "pars principans" which have the power and duty to make the law and to execute it. Religious truth is not granted to the
papacy, but like the law it is determined by an elected council - the General Council. Marsiglio's theory was a real challenge, not only to the "sacerdotium" 's claims to temporal supremacy, but also to its own spiritual autonomy.

This transfer of power to the sovereign people marked the beginning of the end of the political role played by the Church in Western Europe since the collapse of the Roman Empire. The Christian church as a political or moral influence is still important in contemporary Italy. Nevertheless the church does not play a direct political role in the government of the country. Already in the fifteenth century most of the bilateral agreements between the church and the different European kingdoms reflected negotiation between equal sovereign powers rather than concordats between the Papacy and its spiritual sons. (J.B. Morrall 1962, p133) The political discourse of Machiavelli in "The Prince", written in 1532, is one of the best examples of the widening distinction between Religious morality and political ideology.

Thus it is always useful to apppear to be compassionate, faithful to one's world, humane, sincere, religious; and the prince should actually cultivate these qualities. But he must keep his mind so disposed that when it is necessary not to exercise them, you may be able and may know how to act in the opposite manner. And this must be understood that a prince -and especially a new prince-cannot cultivate all those qualities which cause men to be considered good; for he must frequently, in order to maintain his position, act against good faith, against charity, humanity and religion. And still he must have a soul disposed to accomodate itself, as the winds and vari-
ations of fortune commande. He must, as I have said, not desert the good, if he can abide by it, but must know how to enter upon the ways of evil if he must.

(Machiavellian ideas are striking evidence of the separation between ethics and politics. He assumes that politics possessed a set of laws of its own which need not coincide with those of ordinary mortals. According to the "raison d'etat" even immorality is justified to achieve a political end.

The Renaissance, in addition (XVth century) marked the disintegration of the medieval conception of a Christian commonwealth. It was a period of development of the administration, bureaucracy, and of autonomization and secularization of various forms of government in Europe. Italy at that time was divided into numerous autonomous kingdoms, including the Papal states. Their people were more Piemontesian, Lombardian, Tuscanian, and so on, than Italian. They were not nation-states, these people had very local local and personnelized attachments.

The following section will attempt to explain the formation of these autonomous social and political subcultures.

6.1.4 CONCLUSION.

In this section, the determining role of Religion on politics, and especially on the development of secular political

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ideology has been clarified. Ideology and religion are closely related because political ideology blossomed from a Christian conception of the state. Thus, the influence of religion on the politics of Italy today is understandable. Nevertheless, the differentiation between religion and ideology has not been the same all over Italy. The rediscovery of Aristotle and the Machiavellian conception of the state arose essentially in northern Italy. I have suggested here that not only did the influence of these ideas occur in a favorable political context, the northern city-republics, but also that the southern part of Italy remained under the direct domination of the Papal authority. Therefore the evidence of political attitudes in southern Italy today should reveal both a higher degree of religiosity, and tendency towards the right on the left-right scale. In contrast northern Italian patterns should reflect a lower degree of religiosity and a tendency towards the left on the left-right scale. The quantitative analysis will support this hypothesis.

The study of Italian subcultures would not be complete without the analysis of local patterns of production and of peculiar modes of social organization which also influenced the development of the Italian state. Moreover, religious morality, and political particularism alone would not reflect a clear picture of the history of the creation of the Italian Christianity and Ideology in Italy.
state. The few century long presence of the German Christian Empire, imprinted specific political patterns that are also significant.

In the following section, the development of local particularisms will be analyzed. The consequences of these particularisms on Italian political culture will be discussed.
7.0 PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION, AND THE FORMATION OF ITALIAN

POLITICAL SUBCULTURES.

An understanding of religious and ideological components of the historical evolution of Italy, as I have shown, is vital to an understanding of patterns of political development, but in itself it is not sufficient. This is why in this section of the analysis will concentrate on the growth of political and economic core-area. Perry Anderson explains

    Secular struggle between classes is ultimately resolved at the political - not at the economic or cultural level of society. In other words, it is the construction and destruction of states which seal the basic shifts in the relations of production, so long as classes subsist. (1974, p.11)

I shall therefore concentrate on the analysis of the basic movements in relation to production. Moreover, Marx explains, a mode of production is composed of two separate elements the "forces" of production and the "relations" of production. The following discussion, therefore, finally focuses on the description of changes in the forces and the relations which have effects at the political level, on production. Thus, the definition of a few specific modes of production and social organization, in the first part, will form the framework of the analysis.
It should help us, in the second part, to clarify the signif-
ificance of (1) autonomous and functional elites, (2) the
multiplicity of centers of power, and (3) the mechanisms of
permeation and impingement between centers and peripheries in
the socio-historical evolution of Italy. This description
should finally not only enable us to locate three distinct
Italian political subcultures, but also, it should permit us
to enumerate a few patterns regarding the level and style of
political participation which cause these regions to differ
from each other.

7.1.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.

The following section is concerned with, the description of
the theoretical framework of analysis - the modes of pro-
duction. Hechter and Brustein (M. Hechter and W. Brustein
1980, pp1061- 1094) argue that three modes of production and
of social organization were at the core of the development
of the major western European states. It was during the 12th
century, after eight centuries of instability and disinte-
gration, that the core of the European states began to de-
velop. Hechter and Brustein point out that three mode of
agricultural and social organization came into existence at
this time. They argue that to particular settlement patterns
(sedentary-pastoral, feudal, petty- commodity), correspond
(1) a specific legal system - Egalitarian inheritance,
unigeniture, patria potestas (respectively), and (2) particular class structures - the classless society, the hierarchically structured society - aristocrat-bourgeois-serf-, the republican society in which the citizen / non-citizen is the only class distinction, (3) a particular economic system.

The patterns of development of the Italian state will be studied following a discussion of the points above. It should enable us to focus firstly, on religious and Imperial influences, as well as on the main struggles of the autonomous kingdoms, marquisates, or dukedoms - and secondly, to describe the socio-economic and political pattern which explain these differences.

My aim, in the study of these modes of production, is to reveal the birth of various original core areas in Italy. I shall show that in the 12th century there were already different patterns of social, legal, and economic developments, in the Italian peninsula. It must be emphasized, however, that each of these modes of production is theoretical and does not correspond to current reality. Nevertheless, all historical evolution is a function of the combination of these types with one mode predominating. Observable patterns of predominance make it possible to locate areas where specific sociological and political organization prevailed. In
northern Italy (the Italian city-states), the petty-commodity zone was dominant. However, in the southern part, each mode of production was represented equally.

Having given a description of each mode of production's specific characteristics, I shall argue that the late unification of Italy was a result of the logical historical evolution of petty-commodity patterns. The socio-economic and political organization of this core area did not lead towards coalescence, rather it hindered the development of a centralized state. Moreover, I believe the petty-commodity mode of production leads to both more liberal values and democratic practices, and I shall explain why and how. These observations should therefore, enable us to hypothesise that in northern Italy today, more tolerant political attitudes should be in evidence. In other words the score on the Barnes and Kaase's repression potential scale is likely to be low.

7.1.2 DESCRIPTION OF THREE MODES OF PRODUCTION.

7.1.2.1 THE SEDENTARY PASTORAL ZONE.

The sedentary pastoral zone was located mainly in the strip of coastal territory stretching south from Norway to northwest Portugal. (see map appendix I) The major form of agricultural activity in these regions was that of pastoralism.
The existing arable land was divided between the infield, (richer soil) and poorer land surrounding the infield which together made up the enclosed pasture. Social life was organized by clan association where blood relationship was the central principal of consociation. The extent of social stratification in this zone was moderate, in fact, differences in wealth between chieftains and peasants were far less important than elsewhere in western Europe in this period. The mode of government was tribal. The chief of the tribe or clan could be chosen by election or could simply be the elder or the wealthiest, or the most powerful individual of the territory. This mode of production was not going to lead to the development of states. Moreover, it is not of specific relevance to this study because it did not expand very much in the Italian peninsula. In contrast, the petty-commodity zone and the feudal zone are pertinent.

7.1.2.2 THE FEUDAL ZONE.

The feudal zone is the best known because it is the basis of the modern state as we know it today. It arose between the Loire and the Rhine, in Burgundy, the south eastern and midland areas of England, in southern Italy and also in Lombardy. (see map appendix I) The main characteristic of this zone was the ordering of social life around the manor. The suzerain granted land to his vassal who was bound by
personal fealty. Bloch claimed these authority relations amounted to a parcelized sovereignty. (cited in Hechter and Brustein 1980, p1075) Moreover, Anderson argues that "political sovereignty was never focused in a single center. The functions of the State were disintegrated in a vertical allocation downward, at each level of which political and economic relations were, on the other hand integrated." (Anderson 1974, p148) In other words, this social organization was the result of a multitude of centers which were all hierarchically centralized. None of the Dukes or Marquis really possessed any land, the land was the kings' domain. Agriculture was organized through the manorial system. The manor was a fief that provided revenue by which the landlord and his tenants were supported. The manor was divided into two parts, the demesne or reserve, exploited by the owner, and the farms worked by the villains. The serf was attached to the land, and his labor was intense. He was, more than anywhere else, dependent upon his lord.

Another characteristic of the feudal system was the inheritance system. The legal system specified unigeniture. This, added to the lack of recognition of the concept of land ownership -since directly or indirectly the land was held by the king- led to both, social stability, and centralization. For a few centuries after the dissipation of the Roman Empire the feudal system lived in autarky. For few centuries social
structure was limited to serfs, lords and the ecclesiastics. The society was entirely oriented towards the construction of the temporal domain. The elites (Dukes and Marquis) did not have particular autonomous functions other than the practice of the law and the collection of the taxes for which most of the time they were assisted by ecclesiastic clerics. But soon, after the 12th century the development of urban economy led to a significant increase in the urban population. Also, with the changes in the relation between the temporal and spiritual order emerged a class of professional administrators, "minor barons and knights...willing to work a few years...In this way they could gain royal favors and increased income..". (Strayer 1970, p35)

Social relations, were to be complicated by the rise of the bourgeoisie and artisans autonomous cities', who were to disturb the stable order of feudal society. This point is of fundamental importance to this study because the conflictual dichotomy between the elites, i.e. aristocrats and bourgeois will favour the unification of territories, such as France or England, in Italy this phenomenon did not occur. (This will be explained in the last part of this section) Such political organization of the society leads towards centralization, bureaucracy and autocracy. Should socio-historical patterns be drawn from the analysis of the feudal model of production, I believe that the level of tolerance
of such an area would be low, thus high repression potential scores would be expected.

7.1.2.3 **THE PETTY COMMODITY ZONE.**

The petty commodity zone is of importance because it was the preponderant zone in Northern Italy. Firstly, the settlement pattern in the petty commodity zone consisted of the towns. They were the centers of political, economic, and social activity. The town was not only the administrative and legal center, the market place, but also the place of residence of the landlords, bourgeois (merchants) and artisans. Secondly, in this zone the legal system, very much influenced by Roman law, recognized the right to own land. Moreover, laws governing inheritance followed the rule of "patria potestas" which granted the father's wishes. He only, could bequeath all the land to one child or divide it among all his children. This system eventually led to the division of the land. There was more equality in the distribution of the wealth, more people could possess lands, and cultivate freely. Clearly it promoted the basis for a more democratic social organization. Thirdly, the economic organization of the zone led to "considerable social mobility" (Hechter and Brustein 1980, p1071). Possession of land was not exclusive to the king or local lord, and often the nobility was directly involved in trade activities. Moreover, most of the economic
activities were trade oriented. Agricultural production was relatively specialized—consisting of wheat, olive, oil and wine. It was both, market oriented, and long-distance trade oriented. This strongly influenced the fusion between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. Hechter and Burstein explain that:

An essential element of the petty commodity social structure was the fusion of noble and bourgeois: noble became bourgeois through business and bourgeois became enabled by law. (Hechter and Burstein 1980, p 1071)

In fact the basic class differentiation was limited to a distinction between citizen and non-citizen. Political power was in the hands of the citizens, who formed one political class.

The northern part of the Italian peninsula was divided between numerous wealthy and political autonomous city-states. They were dependent upon long distance trade and fought not only against each other, but also against the Papacy and the German Empire hegemonies for their autonomy. The elites were not divided by their relation to the means of production. There was no dichotomy or opposition between the two leading classes. The political organization of each city-state was republican, it was based on the principle of the election of the magistrates who were in charge of the administration of the city. The magistrates were elected by the "parlamento"
the assembly of all the citizens. The citizen, or "secondi milites", were the people living in the city (bourgeois, artisans, lords, ecclesiastics, even owners of a small amounts of land). The institutions of these city-state were based on corporative organizations which organized the citizens within various economic and "militari" corporations.

This social organization resulted in the existence of numerous and equally strong states which always struggled against the Imperial or Papal hegemonies. The so called "Guelfes" and "Gibelins" leagues, which were associations of cities, fought against each other during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and are good exemples of this opposition. The "Guelfs" league agreed with and recognized the principle of the Christian Germanic Empire. By contrast, the "Gibelins" opposed the Empire and refused the suzerainty of the Empire.

Thoughout history the Empire did not succeed in subjecting all these different states into one. Venice, Genoa, Turin, Pisa, Florence, Parma, were autonomous and democratic states. Throughout the centuries these patterns of political participations have not disappeared. While southern Italy, rather feudal, was directly under papal domination (Xth-XIIth centuries) or imperial rule (XIIIth century) successively, northeastern and northwestern Italy developed a more auton-
omous political system. These patterns reinforced the existence of subcultures within each autonomous kingdom.

These political patterns, I believe are extremely important. They certainly suggest, the existence not only of greater political practice of democracy in the city-republics, but also of a higher degree of tolerance. Therefore, in northern Italy today we should observe low repression potential scores.

7.1.3 CENTRALIZATION OR AUTONOMIZATION.

The superiority of the feudal mode of production became apparent in the 12th century. Yet, people of this period would have probably believed that the mode of production with the best chance of development, in western Europe, was that of the petty commodity, since the regions operating along these lines were more civilized and urbanized than the others. Nevertheless, the development of the feudal mode of production led to centralization and to the development of administrative techniques of government. This enabled a few countries, such as France and the England, to become more powerful and richer than those that were not centralized. Moreover, they unified later and became powerfully governed kingdoms.
The foregoing explanation of the superiority of the feudal mode of production enables us to understand why, in Italy, unification did not occur before the 19th century, whereas in other European countries this occurred during the 15th century. (France) It provides us with insight into regionalization and subcultures since the description of the historical processes which led to unification of countries, like France or the England, reveals what worked against unification in the Italian case.

In the following section I shall explain what in the feudal system of production led specifically to centralization. Then, I shall argue that, in the Italian peninsula, the dominant mode of production did not evolve towards centralization, rather, it led to autonomization of the Italian kingdoms.

How is it possible to explain the superiority of the feudal system? There are three reasons; (1) The legal system encouraged centralization of landholding. (2) the feudal countries benefited from the open field agrarian system, and the development of new techniques which improved the wealth of these countries. (3) Hechter and Brustein explain that,

Feudalism, was a sufficient condition of state formation in western European history; it was not, however, a necessary condition. If the lack of internal poli-
tical divisions in a social form proved fateful for subsequent state formation, this did not mean that modern states could under no circumstances emerge in the petty commodity of sedentary pastoral zones. ... While the non-feudal regions lagged behind in state formation, once the comparative superiority of the first modern states - Portugal, Spain, France, and England - became evident, the lords in many of these territories were compelled to establish centralized states in order to avoid being dominated. (Hechter and Brustein 1980, p 1087)

Competition between the bourgeoisie and the landowning aristocracy of these regions, provided a setting in which leading aristocrats found it expedient to surrender their individual power. It facilitated the reinforcement of the centralized state. (Hechter and Brustein 1980, p1087)

Firstly, the feudal mode of production relied on a customary law which was based on personal fealty. The allodial transfer could not abrogate it. Although the feudal king seemed to have a limited authority, he was, in principle, the only land owner. This theoretical supremacy led to the development of territorial concentration. In the two other modes of production this did not occur. The land could be divided easily through the inheritance process. The change in allodial ownership of lands was possible.

Secondly, the feudal mode had economical advantages. It was based on the open field system and this resulted in more
production. Few inventions such as the wheeled plow, which permitted better drainage of the fields, the triennial rotation, and the use of horses instead of oxes, contributed to higher productivity in northern Europe rather than in the south. A further reason for higher productivity was the plantation of vegetables. These constituted the majority of agricultural produce and allowed for better nutrition of the population. Thus by the 12th century, the northern regions of western Europe were much more populated than the southern.

The third and last reason for the superiority of the feudal mode of production was the existence of a specific class division that did not exist in the two other modes of production, i.e. the competition between the bourgeoisie and aristocracy. Hechter and Brustein argue that in the feudal system - "the development of strong states is aided by the existence of political divisions within a society and hindered by the absence of them." (Hechter and Brustein 1980, p 1086) The authors explain that the rise of towns was the result of an increasingly productive agriculture. The opposition arose from competing productive imperatives. The bourgeoisie was committed to production for exchange, whereas aristocrats were committed to production for use. The competition and the political opposition of these two groups served the development of the state. For the upholding of
the prevailing social order, the aristocracy was ready to
give up some of its powers, which, transmitted to the central
government, reinforced it more and more.

In contrast, the petty commodity mode of production was not
determined by these characteristics. No customary law for-
bade the change in alodial ownership of lands. Moreover,
the agriculture was market oriented, which justified spe-
cialization in the production for export. Furthermore, the
aristocracy lived in the cities, and was more interested in
business than in the development of their lands. These
cities were centers of transhipment and of production of
manufactures for exports. (Hechter and Brustein p1071) The
political system had to cope with a greater population of
artisans and bourgeoisie than in the other parts of Europe.
The bourgeoisie held the political monopoly. There was not
class opposition, but one social class which ruled that the
political system. During the 14th century in the feudal
zone, few areas tended to have a greater economic, political,
and, therefore, military cohesiveness. On the contrary, in
other places smaller kingdoms existed.
8.0 THE UNIQUENESS OF VENICE.

In the two previous sections, the descriptions reveal the socio-historical differentiation between the northern and the southern part of the Italian peninsula. My aim in the following section is to refine the analysis of the northern part. Therefore I shall describe in detail the formation of the republic of Venice, and its area of influence, compared to all the other northern Italian city-republics. The northeastern part of Italy stood apart from other areas since the republic of Venetie enjoyed a continuous period of autonomy, throughout history until 1797. The analysis of the history of the Venetie reveals that from the decline of the Roman Empire until the Napoleonic invasion, Venice went through periods of great wealth as well as periods of great power, and of decay, but it never suffered from invasion.

In 812, by treaty, Constantinople recognized the Frankish Empire of Charlemagne, but Venice stated its independent from the Empire and remained part of Byzance domain. By the 10th century the republic of Venice had become a powerful city which maintained good relations with the Empire as well as cultural, commercial, and political links with Constantinople. The power and the independence of the city was a function of its long distance trade. The city controlled the entire
Adriatic sea, Istria, Dalmatia, Cyrus and Crete. In the XIVth century its territorial possession included Verona and Padoua.

The political organization of Venice was unique. The city government was oligarchic, and the institutions evolved very slowly throughout time. They included the "Arengo" assembly of the people, "Il Maggior Consiglio" which was a legislative body and which nominated various magistrates and Doges, and the council of ten the highest political body, which was in charge of the government of the city. This political structure remained extremely stable throughout history and its organization relied on a secular tradition. The social organization of the city distinguished between the families whose names were in the "golden booklet", and who were the only ones to have access to the different magistracies, the "Mediocres" who were the bourgeoisie, businessmen, of limited wealth, and the "Minores" who were not originally citizens of Venice. The classes distinction was made basically according to citizenry and on family wealth.

The neutrality of the city reached its peak during the XVII-XVIII centuries. Although during the XVth to the XVII century the Italian peninsula was not only under Spanish then French but also partially Austrian domination, Venice always kept its autonomy and its neutrality.
Given the ideological influences that blossomed all over northern Italy (which I have described in the previous section) and the political organization of the city I believe that northeastern Italy today is characterized by liberal and democratic mode of production in contrast to that of the south. It can be hypothesized, however, that these patterns are not as strong as the one observed in northwestern part of the Italian peninsula. In other words the score on the Barnes and Kaase's repression potential scale is likely to be low, but probably not as low as the one observed for northwestern Italy. It can also be hypothesized that on the left-right scale the observed placement should tend towards the left but not as left as in the Northwestern part of Italy. Finally the level of religiosity should be low but not as low as in the northwestern part of the Italian peninsula.
9.0 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION.

9.1.1 INTRODUCTION.

In the previous section not only I have described and analyzed the slow differentiation process between religion and ideology, which took place after the collapse of the Roman empire throughout ten centuries, but I have also established the existence of the patterns of productions and of social organization that developed in western Europe, and particularly in the Italian peninsula. In the following I intend to demonstrate the historical tenacity of the described patterns throughout more recent history. I shall refer to a few historical forces, and event, which I believe are particularly relevant to this study.

I have shown that ideology blossomed from religion. In the following, my contention is to describe how the ideology become complex (legalized, codified, standardized) and differentiated, and how, ideology the basic justification of political action, becomes a theory of social and political organization (the role of the people in the political decision, the limitation of access to the political decision). The premise of this is found in the French revolution.
Firstly, I have shown that the differentiation between religion and ideology has not been the same all over Italy, particularly since the rediscovery of Aristotle and the Machiavellian conception of the state arose essentially in northern Italy. I have suggested here that not only did the influence of these ideas occur in a favorable political context, the city-republics, but also that the southern part of Italy remained under the direct domination of Christianity.

Secondly, I have argued that the study of Italian subcultures would not be complete without the analysis of local patterns of production and of peculiar modes of social organization which also influenced the development of the Italian state. Therefore the development of local particularisms have been analyzed. The consequences of these particularisms on Italian political culture have also been discussed.

An understanding of religious and ideological components of the historical evolution of Italy, as I have shown, is vital to an understanding of patterns of political development, but in itself it is insufficient. This is why in the following section the analysis will concentrate on the development of the political and economic patterns previously described. The following discussion, therefore, finally focuses on the description of the tenacity of these forces and the relations
which have effects on the few specific modes of production and social organizations that I described previously.

The question could be raised in the following terms; what is it that demonstrate that historical events of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries did not change the medieval patterns, which I described in the previous section? Historical forces of the eighteenth century such as the French revolution, the Industrial revolution, the Napoleonic invasion, and the unification of the peninsula must have had an impact, and may have modified these medieval patterns of regional subcultures.

I shall argue in this section that not only have these patterns have existed, and been reinforced, but also that an analysis becomes extremely difficult because of the cross-checking of socio-historical forces. Nevertheless, I intend to describe these socio-historical forces and analyze their significance with regards to this study -

Firstly, I shall analyze the significance of the development of secular ideology. The emphasis will be on the influence of the consequences of the French revolution: (1) the French occupation, (2) and the development, during the beginning of the twentieth century of the marxist movement ( I shall, particularly emphasize the interesting common links between
democratic patterns of the city-states and the particularism of the leftist movement.

Secondly, I shall show that the distinct patterns of production, that I have established, did not simply remain the same but became greater. Particular, I intend to demonstrate that the early northern patterns of market orientation and of diversification of the agriculture expanded in parallel with the cottage industry, and eventually was at the origin of the industrialization. In contrast, the feudal south is characterized by a lack of agrarian and commercial diversity, and by the lack of any industry.

Finally, I wish to conclude the description of the unification of the Italian peninsula by demonstrating, again how clearly defined was the atomization of the peninsula. Therefore, I hope to make clear what Carl Boggs describes in the following terms,

In Italy, ..., no hegemonic force had stirred the passions of the people enough to create a national community; the bourgeois revolution, presided over by an insular group of Piedmont industrialists, bankers, and intellectuals, never penetrated the old Papal strongholds, the Mezzogiorno, Sicily, or Sardinia. They had evolved no unified system of national beliefs, no nation-state in the full ethico-political sense, whereas in France the emergence of strong "positive elements" made patriotic rejuvenation a realizable goal. If in Italy liberalism never supplied the basis of a strong hegemony, in France the rise of an "audacious dauntless" Jacobinism expressed not only the momentary needs of the masses but the historical vision of a community. In France, as in England and the
United States, the modern state attained a nearly universal scope of legitimacy - the kind of ethical and cultural cohesion which Croce thought was central to historical progress. The impediments stemming from traditional residues made Italy somewhat unique in this respect. (C. Boggs 1984,p258)
10.0 THE POST RENAISSANCE HISTORICAL CONTEXT.

By the mid sixteenth century, the fundamental differences between the commercial agriculture (intensive farming with a certain degree of specialization) of the North and that of the south (extensive wheat and sheep farming) were already apparent.

The peace of Cateau Cambresis had established the Spanish hegemony in 1559. During the Spanish domination Italy witnessed a period of economic stagnation, regression of secular influence, and overwhelming development of the Church in the context of the counter reformation.

Spanish Italy was a country of rigid social stratification. Both the church and Spanish protocol encouraged and codified this Hierarchical division of the society....By the end of the seventeenth century, Italy had become a country of external pomp and ubiquitous poverty. Italian society had become rigidly hierarchical and passively conformist, concerned to uphold a static social order. Its more fortunate members had withdrawn into the pursuit of family fortune and honor, if necessary by employment of "honest dissimulation", to quote the title of a successful Italian pamphlet of 1641. But it was also a society, as the Scottish traveller Gilbert Burnet noted in 1685 "full of Beggars". (Stuart Woolf p25-26, 1979)

During the eighteenth century Italy faced a period of instability. For the Hasbourg as well as for the Bourbon the possession of the peninsula offered a dominant position in
the Mediterranean. It was a geographical area conceived not as a collection of separate states, but as a single piece on the chess-board of European international diplomacy. The French invasions of 1796-99 and 1802-15 changed the face of the Italian peninsula.

It is in this context that the great changes brought by the French revolution and the industrial revolution were going to affect the Italian peninsula.
In the eighteenth century, French as well as the American revolution had great effects in Europe. It started a period of political changes which promoted the democratization of political and social organization in the western world. The French revolution influenced the politics of the Italian peninsula because it exported the ideas of nationalism and of democratization. The Napoleonic invasion in particular was responsible for the influence of nationalism. It broke down the barriers between the different kingdoms and duchy borders', including them in the organization and administration of the Napoleonic Empire. The democratization of the political and social organization did not however have immediate influence. But during the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century the idea of the revolution arose and influenced the formation of Italian leftist parties. These striking influences are evinced in the writings of A. Gramsci which I shall describe and analyze in the historical context of the Italian peninsula.
11.1.1 THE FRENCH OCCUPATION OF THE ITALIAN PENINSULA.

11.1.1.1 THE ENLIGHTENMENT.

There were many aspects of political consequences. It was strongly rationalist, that is, man's reason rather than revelation or tradition was of paramount importance. It was believed during this period that solutions to social economic and political problems could be found, and that the lives of the mass of individuals could be made happier. Since the church was opposed to rational enquiry and supported tradition and ways for their own sake or blocked the way to political reform it opposed the ideas of the enlightenment. France was the leading country of the enlightenment.

The consequences of movement was to some extent artificial in the Italian peninsula. Its character varied from state to state according to the outlook of the leader. Only three states had been receptive to the ideas of the enlightenment, the duchy of Milan, the duchy of Parma and the Grand duchy of Tuscany Influence varied from one duchy to the other, one constant is that the rulers were generally working to strengthen their power and to increase their revenues. They opposed the influence of the church and of the nobility. The aim of their action was to foster agriculture, to remove the customs barriers, and to codify the laws.
Until 1793 the impact of the French revolution was peaceful, but Piedmont declared war on France. The governments had at first become alarmist reactionaries. The 1796 Napoleonic invasion of northern Italy was at the origin of great changes. In 1799 he conquered the whole Italy.

11.1.1.2 THE EFFECT OF THE FRENCH OCCUPATION

Firstly, in the context of the war with the British Empire the object of the French policy was to exploit Italian supplies of raw materials for the benefit of the French manufacture. Secondly, they built new roads across the Alps and the Apennines, and this has been, since then, noticed to be a notable contribution to the unification. Because, it changed the face of the internal communications, which were extremely poor, all over the peninsula.

The influence of the Napoleonic administration was not limited to the economy. It remodelled completely the legal system, and the political organisation and governmental institutions. The laws were standardized all over the Italian peninsula, and codified. Civil and commercial codes were introduced on the model of the French one. Moreover, not only representative governments were brought to every part of the mainland but also each area experienced the republic constitution which had been prepared by French aus-

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pices, modeled on the 1795 French constitution. These supreme laws established representative assemblies of two chambers with division of power. The political division of the peninsula was simplified into three parts between 1809 and 1814. A third was annexed to France (northwestern part), a third was the Kingdom of Italy (northeastern part), a third was the Kingdom of Naples (southern part). Finally, the use of the Italian language was fostered in the two Italian kingdoms.

11.1.1.3 CONCLUSION.

The main influence of the Napoleonic invasion concerned the emergence of, some aspects of Italian nationalism. However, this conclusion must be made reservedly. The Napoleonic invasion would have not been possible without the sympathy of the locals following the political reorganization of Italy (J. Breuilly 1985). Nevertheless, as the author states

I would only agree that the combination of an intellectual response against enlightenment rationalism and a political response against French success certainly did lead to the production of novel and authentically nationalistic ideas. But the principal concern here is with nationalism as effective politics, and from this angle nationalism appears much less important. The enlightenment ideas failed to develop any precise political objective. As a consequence their advocates had little in the way of political organization. (J. Breuilly 1985)

It is clear that the enlightenment and the Napoleonic invasions did not change the face of the Italian Peninsula in
a striking manner. This would actually confirm the hypothesis concerning the subcultures. Not only was the peninsula extremely autonomized but so were the political patterns that predominated within the local and personalized attachments. Nevertheless, this period of Italian history foreshadowed the beginning of the development of nationalist ideas in the Italian peninsula.

The relevance of the enlightenment to this study is particular marked since before 1814 the political unification of Italy had never been considered. It is interesting to determine whether the unification process modified the patterns of political and social organisation, and if such modifications can be identified, since their significance is of great importance to this study. In the following section I intend to show that political changes certainly developed, but I shall argue that the basic patterns of political participation and social organization remained the same.
12.0 FROM MACHIAVELLI'S TO GRAMSCI'S CONCEPTION OF THE STATE.

12.1.1 INTRODUCTION.

The second point of great significance regarding the French revolution is that it foreshadowed both the decline and the fall of the monarchies, and the development of the democratization of the political organizations in various European states. The major problem concerning the role of the people in political decision making arose during the French revolution. The Sans-Culottes' influence and political participation is probably the best expression in history of direct democratic government. However, the bloody Jacobean repression confirmed the role of the party as the only possible political leader, and thus the bourgeoisie monopoly of the political decision making process. In the following, I suggest that, in the Italian peninsula, these ideas developed extremely slowly throughout history. I argue that they developed in a peculiar historical context in which the patterns of political and social organization previously described in this study cannot be ignored. I intend to examine in particular the fact that not only did the Machiavellian conception of the state occurred in the favorable political context of the northern city republic, but
also that the leftist (Gramscinian) conception of the state developed in the political context of the urbanized and industrialized northern part of Italy. Moreover it is my contention that more important than the role of the French revolution, was the continuity of which characterizes the political and social organization of the northeastern Italian city-states. This analysis, I believe, reinforces the thesis that suggests that the northeastern part of Italy today should reflect a - lower degree of religiosity and a tendency towards the left on the left right scale. In contrast, on the contrary, the southern part of Italy today should reflect both a higher degree of religiosity, and a tendency towards the right on the left-right scale.

12.1.2 GRAMSCI'INFLUENCE ON CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS.

It was not before the end of the Second World War that Gramsci's conception of the state became reality, and this was only for the very short period of the 'resistance.' Carl Boggs suggests

The emphasis here must be placed upon synthesis. For Gramsci, socialist transformation involved more than simply the dissemination of new belief-systems and values by a visionary intellectual elite, as Croce believed, it also required mass participation, as well as structural definition. And it went deeper than the mere ascent to power by a great leader, as in the case of Machiavelli's "Prince", insofar as it meant full-scale reconstruction of the state through the intervention of a collective entity, the party. (1984)

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Thus, Gramsci's political discourse was a synthesis, because he used original ideas of past authors. He is known to be Marxist, but perhaps a more important influence on his political discourse of Machiavelli. Carl Boggs explains this very well in the following,

Interestingly enough, Gramsci's theory of revolution owed far more to Machiavelli an early sixteenth century thinker, than to Marx. The reason for this, of course, was that on matters of political organization and strategy Marx was either silent or rather obscure....The significant point is that Marx furnished no rigorous analysis of political movements, much less of the forms and processes that were expected to define socialist transformation. (C. Boggs 1984, P244)

Gramsci, influenced by leftist movements and Marxists ideas was nevertheless a member of a "traditional Italian school of thought" whose roots can be found, beyond Machiavelli, in the every day democratic government of the northern Italian city-republic, and which was characterized by the political participation of the people firstly, in political decision making (via election, delegation, organization in corporation) and secondly by way of their political responsibility (the milites). Gramsci was, primarily, concerned with "an organic linkage between elite and mass, the organized and the spontaneous, the planned and the vital impulse." (C. Boggs 1984, p256) Gramsci identified Machiavelli as the first Jacobin and "The modern prince" and he explains how Machiavelli brings together theory and politics in an attempt to build human community through political action.
According to Gramsci, Machiavelli was convinced that politics was the only terrain upon which the popular will could be mobilized. Personification in the prince was the vehicle for establishing this mobilization. However in the case of the Italian city-states this did not occur, and rather than experiencing political mobilization the city-states were characterized by continuous struggles. Gramsci looked to politics as a tool for motivating the masses to create a socialist community out of the myriad divisions of capitalist Society. Of course the modern embodiment of the Prince was the marxist revolutionary party. Gramsci's political discourse was deeply concerned with the mass-elite link, i.e. the necessity of the intervention of skilled leaders (giving rise therefore to the problem of the formation of an elite) in turn kept balance by democratic participation of the people in the political decision making within the institutions of the party. The link would be possible as soon as the elite educated and democratized the people. As a result, the people would become politically involved. C. Boggs clarifies this in the following,

Gramsci's thought was inspired by a concern for radical democracy; collective self-activity, worker's control, social renewal, the mass party. Democratization means not only destruction of the bourgeois state - not only the supersession of parliamentary democracy and bureaucratic instruments of repression - but the creation of new local organs of direct popular involvement. (1984)
This democratic movement, which went in various directions, is nevertheless characteristic of contemporary Italian marxism. The "class struggle" in twentieth century Italy has peculiarities of its own. I believe that the Italian political attitude, the participation of the people and their political involvement, has its roots, in the historical period which I have outlined here. The existence of an urbanized population in the north could account for the development of leftist ideology in this part of Italy today. An other reason, I believe, has to do with the historical and traditional pattern of democratic political participation, and people's involvement in politics within the city-state democratic social organisation.

An understanding of the development of new ideas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is fundamental to the study of contemporary Italian political sub-cultures. Nevertheless, it is also of importance an analysis of modes of productions. In the following section, I shall explain how the patterns of modes of production, which I have established in the description of the medieval state formation, remained unchanged.
13.0 INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION'S INFLUENCES.

13.1.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT.

The beginning of the nineteenth century witnessed an acceleration in the pace of economic development. Technical innovations, growth in population, vast increase in the length, speed and capacities of communications (roads, canals and railways), mobilization of capital and development of investment banking all contributed to the massive industrialization of England, Belgium and parts of France (S.Wooff 1979, p297). In England, with the abolition of the corn law of 1846, free trade was an economic necessity as well as an ideology. The economic struggle between the continental states, France and Austria, which had established protectionist barriers, blocked British penetration into the European market. But England which was ahead of all European states in the process of industrialization needed to develop markets. To counter the protectionism of the large states, the British policy concentrated on establishing bilateral commercial treaties with the states of secondary importance. All Italian states independent of the Austrian empire were involved.
13.1.2 Patterns of Production, The Reinforcement.

13.1.2.1 Introduction.

During the period of Spanish rule industrial and commercial activities declined all over the Italian peninsula. Moreover, its industry was dominated by its commercial outlets and commerce was controlled to a significant extent by foreign merchants.

Apart from the Geonese and Venitiens, it was usually the French, English, and the Dutch who possessed financial resources and commercial contacts. The English dominated the wine industry and the Geonese and French controlled much of the trade from Naples (S. Woolf 1979, p58).

The industrialists were only of real significance in certain cities of northern and central Italy, Milan, Pavia, Bergamo, Vicenza, Padua, Florence, Siena. In the south particularly, industrialization was backward. (J. Woolf 1979, p60) Merchants expanded their trade all over Italy in the south as well as the north, and in the ports as well as in the inland cities.

13.1.2.2 Wealth and Diversity in the North, Backwardness in the South.

Agrarian and Industrial Patterns: In eighteenth century Italy it was difficult to talk about a industrial revolution,
but modernization of the agriculture, and the transformation of the patterns of production fostered economic changes. It has to be clear that the various Italian kingdoms' wealth was dependent in the main on agriculture, and only partially on nascent industry. The development of wealth and the period of growth was function of exportations. Good business relation therefore existed with most of the greater European states such as Austria, England, France. (R.S. Eckaus 1961, pp295-328)

The medieval pattern of production that I have previously described - i.e. differentiation and greater division of the land, - and market or export oriented agriculture were secured two centuries later. One constant in the north, compared to the south, was the small size of the estates. In the north the estates were rarely greater than few hundred acres in size, whereas in the south the feudal concentration led to the development of estates which were often of more than a few thousand acres.

The farming organization also differed. In the po-valley and central Italy the great estates were often rented in small units, the fattoria', the coloni', and the mezzadro'. The Fattoria was unique in Tuscany and characterized by its administrative organization which divided the estates into small poderi' of less than 25 acres. Elsewhere in northern
and in central Italy the management of the farm was less co-ordinated. There was two modes of tenures. In the Coloni', the colona paid rent in money and was more independent in the use of the land than the Mezzadro' who cultivated the land under the supervision of the land lord and paid the rent in kind, an equal division of the crops.(S. Woolf 1979, pp 50-)

In contrast, in the south of the Peninsula, during the eighteenth century the nobles estates tended to become more concentrated, their size varied enormously. For instance in the kingdom of Naples only 15 out of 1500 titled families owned three quarters of all feudal land. The predominance of the latifondi was characterized by sheep farming and extensive grain cultivation and made as widespread use of hired labor.

Agriculture in the south depended on very few products; mainly wool, and wheat. In contrast, in the north the products were diverse as a result of intensive agriculture, and thus the differences between the two areas was striking.

Stuart Woolf explains this clearly

In the Lombard plain, where a capitalist form of agriculture already existed in embryo, there were significant developments which required fairly heavy investments and certain technical improvements. A new agrarian landscape was appearing. Despite the obstacles to trade presented by the pitiful system of communications and the survival of innumerable transit duties, a new commercial agriculture, responsive to the trends of international trade, established itself in areas of

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most of the Italian states in the later eighteenth century. (Stuart Woolf 1979,p52-53)

COMMERCIAL EMULATION IN THE NORTH, FEUDALISM IN THE SOUTH.: Piedmont in 1832 and 1846 lowered its custom barrier on the foreign grain and entered international competition by concluding 26 commercial treaties with European and American states (1832-46) Silk, wool and cotton industries, producing mostly semi-finished products for export, had been sufficiently developed and modernized to meet foreign competition in the 1840s. In contrast when Naples tried to become industrialized. It raised customs barriers. As soon as those were lowered in 1845-6 the absence of a strong supporting agriculture and the dependence of the Kingdom of the two Siciles on trade with Britain revealed the artificial character and backwardness of Neapolitan industry. (Stuart Woolf 1979)

It is clear that the south did not participate fully in industrial and commercial progress. "Naples, the largest city in the peninsula, was never an economic center of the same kind as Genoa or Venice had once been, where money was invested in trade and industry rather than in landed property." (H.C.Eckaus 1961, p295-328)
I believe that it is in the social and political patterns previously described that reason for this backwardness can be found. Naples was a place were "a court composed of large landowners gathered to spend their money." (S. Woolf 1979, p26) The money was unproductively spent, because these lords were attracting skilled craftsmen, and servant, and they were not attracting industrialists and businessmen. Moreover, the south did not provide a basis of consumption and saving necessary to produce or attract industrial investment. (the region was too close to the margin of subsistence.) Its population relied too much on its agricultural base to form a market for industrial products which could be sufficiently broad and able to develop to induce industrialization from the north. The savings of the southern middle and upper classes did not turn into industrial investments to supply such markets as did exist. (Richard S. Eckaus 1961, p285-317)

13.1.3 Conclusion.

Ideological considerations as well as patterns of production deeply influenced and transformed the social structure of the Italian peninsula. But, as I have shown the premises of democratic and political participation in the north contrast with the feudal system in the south. Moreover the agrarian
and commercial diversification of the north also contrasts with the backwardness of the south.

Nevertheless, I believe that the unification of Italy, which was completed by 1860, progressively modified these patterns to a greater extend than these three centuries of social and economic transformation. Today it is clear that differences between the north and the south of Italy should be less obvious than they were at the beginning of the century. The study of this clearly the subject of this paper. Thus it would be incomplete if discussion of the "unification" of the Italian peninsula is not included.

My contention in the following section is that the unification was, somehow an historical accident. The departure point of the unification was expansion of the Piedmontese hegemony over the north of the peninsula. The political diplomacy which used Cavour, the Piedmont first minister, led to a justification of this expansion with Nationalistic ideas. But in fact, unification was the result of two different ideologies - nationalism in the north - and democrats (socialists) in the south (which aim was foster mass involvement, the famous leader was Garibaldi.)
14.0 THE DIFFICULT UNIFICATION OF ITALY.

14.1.1 INTRODUCTION.

In 1815 Italy still consisted of eight separate states. In spite of Machiavelli's "Prince", the nationalist ideas did not begin to circulate around the country before the 19th century, as I have shown. The unification of Italy was extremely difficult. Not only was the first rising, in 1848, unsuccessful in each of the different Italian states, but unification did not occur before 1860. There was a lot of confusion, causes to fight for, or other goals operated against unifications since most of the time they aimed to serve local interests or answered local problems.

14.1.2 CULTURAL NATIONALISM.

14.1.2.1 INTELLECTUAL EMULATION.

Nationalist or republican ideas arose, after the French invasion. For instance by 1821, when an influential group of moderates became sufficiently well organized, the "Review Antologia", founded in Florence, spread literary ideas to a national audience. A few author were particularly influential, Goberti, for instance, in his book "Of the moral and..."
civil Primacy of the Italian" published in 1843 developed nationalist ideas. He believed that the risorgimento was the first step to the world hegemony of reformed church, and proposed a confederation of states under the pope's leadership, supported by Piedmont. Another author very well known, Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-72) wrote with one objective to free Italy from Austrian occupation. He wrote in 1832 "Giovine Italia" in which he develops three ideas. First, he states that Italian could make themselves into a nation state. Second, he emphasizes the idea of a united Italy in contrast to the localism of other movements. And finally, he recommends the "republic" as the only form of government which could secure the equality of people, in a new and unified country.

All these ideas developed mostly in northern Italy, and particularly in Piedmont or in Tuscany. They were representative of the development of new conception of the political geography of the Italian peninsula, and were a continuation of the democratic movement which was born during the French revolution. But in Italy it did not lead to the development of a strong sense of National identity. Rather, this took place, in a confused political atmosphere. Nationalism was related to national independence at the local level of the nine Italian kingdoms. It is clear for instance that "the resentment of Austrian domination was particularly strong (J.
Breuilly 1985, p70)." I shall therefore describe in the following section the localism which characterized the first wars of the Risorgimento.


During 1847 the ingredients for the revolution were created. The leadership seemed to be provided by the pope Pius IX, who seemed to be a liberal ready to support the ones who fought for independence from Austria. The catalyst for independence came, on January 9th 1848, from Palermo in Sicily. But by April 15 1949, the Sicilian rebels had refused to accept Ferdinand II concession of an island parliament. Palermo was back in the Bourbon hands. But by March 1848 a compromise between the absolutist monarch and moderates had calmed the agitation almost everywhere. In Venetia and in Lombardy some 70000 Austrian troops were massed to kept control over riots elsewhere in Italy. Each uprising was local in origin. For instance in Milan, Cattaneo assumed the political leadership, Milan started to fight the Austrian on March 18 and drove out the commander Radetzky who retired to Verona and Venetia which had not rid themselves of the occupier. June was spent in inactivity as the king of Piedmont, Charles Albert, awaited the results of the Lombards annexion plebiscite. On June 25th Radetzky's armies overwhelmed the Piemontese at the Battle of Custozza. On August 10th Charles
Albert announced the armistice with Austria. In Venetie, in January 1848 D. Manni (1804-57), a bourgeois republican with socialist ideas, petitioned that Lombardy and Venetia be truly national and called for Vienna to relinquish control of the army and the navy and of finances. Nevertheless, by August 19th 1849 after the collapse of the Hungarian revolution negotiations were opened at once and a week later the Austrian re-entered the Piazza san Marco. In Roma, the Pope accepted troops to be stationed on the frontier with Venetia to keep Austrian occupied. But by April 21-29 he withdrew announcing that he did not have any territorial ambitions. By September the situation in the papal states was tense, but Austria and France were both determined to restore the pope.

14.1.2.3 WHY DID THE REVOLUTION OF 1848-9 FAIL?

It failed firstly, because the power vacuum left by the Austrian was only temporary. The diplomatic and political situation in the Austrian Empire remained strong. It failed secondly, because the various revolts had been localist at the heart not nationalist. Charles Albert had fought for Piedmont, Cattaneo for Milan, Manim for Venice, the Roman for their Republic, and the Sicilian for their island. The revolutionaries were still politically divided.
14.1.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PIEDMONTSEHEGEMONY.

14.1.3.1 CAVOUR AND THE FOUNDATION OF PIEDMONT'S PREDOMINANCE.

Cavour was born in Turin, he was an expert on agricultural and commercial development. He entered the Piemontese government in October 1850 as minister of agriculture. Lombard businessmen became more interested in progress and economic development. Writing in Florence's Commercial journal on the 14 July 1847 Camillo Cavour, a future prime minister of Italy point out. "We are convinced that in working to lower the barriers that divides us, we are working for the intellectual and moral progress of Italy as well as for its material prosperity." The tariff barriers put up by a divided Italy were a political obstacle to economic development. Cavour broke down the protectionism by signing bilateral treaties with France, Britain and Belgium. He built up a solid economic foundation on which to base piemontese expansion.

In 1852, he met Napoleon III realizing that Piedmontese expansion must have outside support. He wrote in 1852 "our destiny depends above all on France." Napoleon III offered an alliance against Austrian in return for the marriage between his nephew and Victor Emmanuel's daughter. He also

THE DIFFICULT UNIFICATION OF ITALY.
wanted Nice and the Savoy to be given to France. The treaty was signed on January 26, 1859. Cavour knew that he had to justify his opportunism, he needed to woo Italian patriots (nationalist) away from republicanism and socialism. Giorgio Pallavicino worked to convert those who had taken part in 1848 to support the Piedmontese army. On 24th June 1859 the Austrians were defeated in simultaneous battles against the French at Solferino and the Piedmontese at San Martino. Napoleon III backed his diplomacy by plebiscits based on universal suffrage. In March 1860 at Tuscany and Emilia 98% of the votes were declared Piedmontese-Sardinians.

14.1.3.2 GARIBALDI AND SICILY.

On April 4th 1860 an insurrection started in Palermo, Garibaldi took the banner of independence. On May 13 Garibaldi announced that he was assuming the dictatorship of Sicily in the name of Victor Emmanuel II. On September 7th Garibaldi entered Naples to a rapturous reception, he announced that before annexation he intended to liberate Rome. On October 1 he defeated 30 000 Bourbons in the Battle of the Volturro. The mainland and the Sicilian voted for union on October 26th and Garibaldi handed the kingdom over to Victor Emmanuel II. Italy was unified. J. Breuilly analyzes the unification in the following;
pan-nationalism have played an important role as intellectual forerunners of territorial nationalism. They have remained important as way of co-ordination action against external enemies. But only one of two conditions can such movements lead to fundamental alteration in the internal arrangements of territorial states. The first is when one state achieves leadership over others while using nationalism to legitimize its role and to gain supporters in the other states. Most of the time the nationalistic ideology is not enough authority had to be imposed forcibly at least on two other states. The other is the existence of popular movements which accept the pan-nationalist position and can impose it on particular states from below, in Italy it is a contingent alliance between popular movements and nationalism which did subvert the kingdom of the two Siciles and made a major contribution to Italian unification.

The unification occurred following these two sets of circumstances, and the Italian parliamentary kingdom formally came to existence on 17 March 1861. It was proposed the country be divided into 8 regions and be placed under legislative and administrative unification in March 1965.

The unification of Italy was caused by numerous historical forces, the Austrian Empire was weakened, French supported the Piedmontese ambition. Nationalistic ideas predominated the political discourse and became a good catalyst for the unification.
Socio-historical analysis suggests that the greatest differences in the level and styles of political participation should be observed between northern and southern Italy. Therefore, I believe a high degree of religiosity, high score on the repression potential scale, and a tendency towards the right on the left-right scale is likely to exist in southern Italy. On the contrary, a low level of religiosity, a low score on the repression potential scale, and a tendency towards the left on the left-right scale is likely to exist in the northern part of Italy. Nevertheless, the results with regard to the northeastern part should not be as significant as the one found in northwestern Italy.
16.0 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS.

16.1.1 THE DATA, THE VARIABLES.

16.1.1.1 INTRODUCTION.

In the following section I present a quantitative test of the hypotheses derived from the socio-historical analysis.

The quantitative measures of culture in this research are attitudes recorded in a 1975 eight-nations survey, regarding the study of political action, by Barnes and Kaase. The sample size for Italy was 1778 interviews of a representative cross section of the adult population.

The following dependent variables are considered to be principal components of Italian political culture - (1) Religion, (2) Ideology, and (3) Repression Potential.

The regions defined by the socio-historical forces discussed in the qualitative analysis constitute the independent variable.

The following is a reminder of the different variables. Firstly, I state the hypothesis and the rival hypothesis, then
I recall each variables that have already be define in the first part of this paper.

16.1.1.2 HYPOTHESIS.

I hypothesize the socio-historical genesis of Italy has created unique political subcultures in the following regions (1) South, (2) Northeast, (3) Northwest. I assume it is likely these forces continues to influence contemporary Italian political life.

16.1.1.3 THE ALTERNATIVE RIVAL HYPOTHESIS

It may be necessary to control for other variables, which could account for different political subculture in Italy. I control for the levels of urbanization. Urbanization is an indicator of several important difference between the regions. In addition to population density, it implicitly includes variations in wealth, education and industrialization. Thus, I assume that urbanization is an instrumental variable. Therefore, by controlling for urbanization I control for possible spurious associations between variations in subcultures and region.
16.1.1.4 THE DEGREE OF RELIGIOSITY.

In Italy, 90% of the Italians think of themselves as Catholic. However, the degree of catholicism or of religiosity, is expected to vary from one region to the other as a result of different socio-historical processes. I have chosen to find out "how religious" the people of different Italian regions are.

16.1.1.5 THE LEFT RIGHT SCALE.

I define secular ideology in terms of a left-right dimension. The left-right dimension is appreciated according to the fact that Italians demonstrate a greater facility with, and understanding of, the concepts "left" and "right" than the population of Germany, Great-Britain, or The United States.

16.1.1.6 THE REPRESSION POTENTIAL.

I believe that the repression potential is a measure of popular support for democratic institutions, and specifically, for grass roots non-electoral participation. The components of the Repression Potential Index list the activities which produce most of its variance are unconventional.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS.
1.1.1.7 REGIONS.

I have collapsed all the Italian regions in three areas which were identified by the analysis of the socio-historical forces in Italy. The three areas are - the northeast (as defined by the territories of Trentino-alto-adige, Veneto, Fruili-Venezia-Guilia), the northwest (represented by Valle d'Aosta, Piedmont, Liguria, Lombardia, Emilia-Romogna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche), and the south (respectively Lazio, Abruzzi, Campania, Molise, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia).

1.1.2 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS.

1.1.2.1 Procedure.

First I used SPSSX frequencies to find out if I needed to recode all my variables in the same direction measuring conservatism - from Religious to Very Religious, from Left to Right, from Non Repressive to Very Repressive.

The variable "Religiosity" runs from 1 (low level of religiosity) to 4 (high level of religiosity).

The variable "Ideology" runs from 1 (left) to 10 (right).
The variable "Repression Potential" runs from 1 (low degree) to 4 (high degree).

Secondly, I used the SPSSX ANOVA procedure, i.e. Multiple classification Analysis, to compute the variance of the dependent variables across regions while controlling for the covariate urbanization. The ANOVA gives two results, the first one is the average standard deviation from the grand mean, for the entire sample. I have summarized the results in Table 1. The second result is the adjusted average deviation from the grand mean which controls for the impact of urbanization. It allows us to be certain that urbanisation does not have any effects on the association between the dependent variables and regions. Difference between the average deviation and the adjusted average deviation would reveals the influence of urbanization on the relationship. I have summarized the results which control for urbanisation in Table 2.

The analysis of the results in Tables One and Two should allow us to confirm the observation regarding the socio-historical analysis. The socio-historical analysis suggested different subcultures in the south of Italy, the northeast, and the northwest.
The south should be characterized by a high degree of religiosity, a placement towards the right on the left-right scale, and a relatively higher level of repression potential.

The northeastern area should be lower in religiosity, lower on the left-right scale, and also have a lower repression potential score.

Finally, I expect to find the greater difference between the northwest and the south. As it has been clarified in the previous section (2d part), the northwest early developed a democratic conception of the state, whereas the southern state remained feudal.

1.1.2.2 Results.

The results (Table 1) indicate first that Italian people regard themselves - first as very religious (the grand mean is 2.73). Secondly they are rather on the left (the grand mean is 4.38). Thirdly their average score on the repression potential scale is relatively low (the grand mean is 1.47).

The average deviations score from the mean indicates the expected regional differences (table 1). The people from the south have a higher degree of religiosity than people from the north, east or west. Southerners think of themselves as
more religious than people from the northeast, (.18 versus -.1). The northwesterners see themselves as the least religious (-.15).

The scores on the left-right scale indicate that people from the south locate themselves as more to the right whereas the northeasterners position themselves lower (.42 and .16). People from the northwest place themselves far to the left (-.42).

The repression potential scores show that southerners score are more likely to favor repression of nonelectoral behavior than people from the northeast and northwest. Easterners' average score is equal to the grand mean (.01). The clearest difference is between northwest and south (-.25 versus .25 respectively). The results are statistically significant.

Table two controls for urbanization. It allows us to find out if regional differences in political culture are spurious due to the relation between urbanization and the other variables. ANOVA runs two successive regressions, first it computes a regression and saves the variance that is not explained by urbanization (unadjusted deviation), then it runs a regression which residualizes each independent variable (adjusted deviation). Then it recomputes the average deviation score for each region. The difference between the

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS.
unadjusted and the adjusted deviation indicates the impact of urbanization on the association between dependent and independent variables.

The results in Table Two show that urbanization does not have any influence on the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The score do not change at all, moreover the difference between regional areas are rather emphasised. This result is not surprising because the three regions are big and each includes urbanized and rural areas, which would cancel all influences.

Nevertheless, this statistical procedure is interesting and confirms the conclusions drawn from the socio-historical analysis. It suggests that socio-historical forces do have tenacious influences on contemporary political culture in Italy.
Table 1. Average Scores on selected Attitudes by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Left-Right Scale</th>
<th>Repression Potential</th>
<th>Level of Religiosity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EASTERN ITALY</td>
<td>0.16 (158)</td>
<td>0.01 (171)</td>
<td>-0.10 (197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTERN ITALY</td>
<td>-0.42 (606)</td>
<td>-0.25 (696)</td>
<td>-0.15 (779)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHERN ITALY</td>
<td>0.41 (552)</td>
<td>0.25 (668)</td>
<td>0.18 (776)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND MEAN</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>0.1777</td>
<td>0.1934</td>
<td>0.1581</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Average adjusted Scores on selected ATTITUDES by REGION

controlling for URBANIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Left-Right Scale</th>
<th>Repression Potential</th>
<th>Level of Religiosity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EASTERN ITALY</td>
<td>0.09 (158)</td>
<td>-0.07 (171)</td>
<td>-0.14 (197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTERN ITALY</td>
<td>-0.41 (605)</td>
<td>-0.24 (696)</td>
<td>-0.14 (779)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>0.1777</td>
<td>0.1934</td>
<td>0.1581</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.0 CONCLUSION.

Comparative political scientists studied the prerequisites of a democratic political system because it was considered by western political scientists to be the "best," if not the only, "developed" political system. During the 1950's, following the lead of the United States, nations promoted the study and installation of democracy in formerly fascist countries (Germany, Italy for instance). My contention in this paper is that the authors have neglected the fact that different People have different individual cultures, and that these cultures differ from each other and subsequently influence the political behavior of those People. I therefore suggest that the authors (refering to the Behavioralist school) are not sufficiently aware of the fact that an analysis of the democratic system within a few western countries does not ensure its world wide development. Moreover, I believe that, in relying on conventional methods of analysis, many researchers have neglected, and underestimated extensive cultural differences between and within the western countries they studied.

In this paper I have developed an analysis of political culture, and specifically of subcultures in Italy, based on the analysis of past socio-historical forces. I believe that
these forces have had a tenacious influence on contemporary Italian modes and styles of political participation. The statistical analysis supplements the socio-historical study and supports the hypotheses.

In the socio-historical analysis I argue firstly that, Religion and Ideology are related, secondly, that specific modes of production correspond to specific modes of social and political organization. The analysis reveals the decreasing importance of religion in the state organization, the role of the elites and other competing social classes, and the importance of the development of the law.

The quantitative analysis tests the relations predicted by the socio-historical analysis, and is consistent with them.

The underlaying purpose of this paper is to re-emphasize the importance of considering the role of the socio-historical forces in the understanding of any country's political culture preceding any quantitative political analysis. It should be clear by now that the analysis of regional socio-historical forces is of great value for the study of political structure and political behavior. Further studies should therefore operationalize and rely on serious regional socio-historical research.
Contemporary political scientist argue that in today's world of mass communication, faster transportation, and greater social mobility, the analysis of history is irrelevant. I believe that the influence of history is more important in some areas of the world than in others, even fundamental. Crosier (1975) shows clearly that in Europe traditions have such overwhelming influence that they fetter modernization. The extensive study of politics in Europe should be increasingly based on the analysis of socio-historical forces.
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APPENDIX A. ITALIAN SOUTH, NORTHEAST, NORTHWEST AREA.

(The shaded area is the Northwest, the two other areas are respectively the Northeast and the South, these three areas are used in the quantitative analysis.)
APPENDIX C. ITALY IN THE XVTH CENTURY.
Appendix D. ITALY IN 1848.
Appendix E. ITALY IN 1918.
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