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India: Political Development and Legitimacy

A Modern State in a Traditional Society

by

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(ABSTRACT)

The conventional theoretical and analytical debate surrounding Third World development emphasizes economic development within the interaction of First and Third World. This thesis takes a different approach, not arguing about the correctness or falseness of these approaches, but concentrating on the historical inheritance of political and social values which influence a society. This concept within India highlights the limitation on both economic and political development through traditional fragmentation. This persistence of tradition, such as religion, caste organization, etc., was characterized by persisting traditional forms of political legitimacy. The theoretical concept of political legitimacy serves as analytical tool to examine, how the traditional values persisted in Indian society, and why these values were obstacles to a modern political structure, and therefore hindered adequate political and economic development.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Third World, here used for lesser developed countries, in general is characterized by economic and political problems. Most of these countries in the Third World show signs of overpopulation, malnutrition, inequalities in income distribution, severe poverty, high levels of foreign debt, and balance of payments deficits. In addition to these economic factors; politics are characterized by corruption, political violence, and overall domestic instability, which jeopardized the attempted development programs.

The theoretical discussion of Third World development is dominated by the focus on economic issues. Modernization theory embodies a liberal economic orientation, such as Adam Smith's emphasis of free trade, etc., assuming that a unilinear process of growth will occur in the Third World countries, due to commerce with developed countries.¹ The same progressive capitalist development experienced by the industrialized countries is expected in the Third World. Politics and economics are assumed to be separate. The free market principle stresses growth of an independent economy without governmental control, not providing any basis for

¹ Cooper in: Frieden/Lake(eds.), 1987, pp.18-30.

political conflict, and therefore beneficial for any country's overall development.

Neoimperialist theories stress the hierarchical structures of control upon the lesser developed countries, imposed by international capital. This Marxist class-based approach emerged as criticism of the free market theory.² The developed nations are seen as the core of the world economy, the Third World as the periphery. According to Hymer, exploitation exists, as extraction of surplus from the national economies of the periphery. The dependent status of the periphery on the core nations is seen as having led to development of underdevelopment, from the Marxist economic based view of underdevelopment, with the extraction of surplus value as the key dynamic.

Another strand of neoimperialist theory, dependency theory, is associated with H.Cardoso and E.Falletto.³ This Latin American view of development realizes that capitalist development leads in many countries to increases in industrial and agricultural outputs, gross national products, and aggregate national incomes. But the dependency on the core countries remains because the Third World economies do not produce their own capital goods or technologies. This structural incompleteness is seen as the result of the domination of the

² Hymer in Frieden/Lake(eds.), 1987, pp.31-46.

³ Cardoso/Falletto, 1979.

world economy by transnational corporations. The local elites are identified as collaborating class, which serves the foreign investors in order to establish a stable bourgeois-democratic political order.⁴

Postimperialism as a theoretical approach arose in response to dependency. It does not assume that capitalist expansion is necessarily imperialist, but that development is possible when the Third World countries use their bargaining power. This new role of the Third World in the world economy is based on a shift of industrialization from the core to the periphery and therefore on an increasing political and economic power of the periphery which the core can not ignore. D.G.Becker and R.L.Sklar explain postimperialism as a theory of change in the nature of relationships between the First and the Third World, assuming that the kind of relationship can be complementary. Becker/Sklar stress a power based class analysis in contrast to economist conception of class around the ownership of the means of production.⁵

The case of India shows parts of all these theories have had some relevance during her historical political process. The influence of British colonial rule for almost two centuries, international economic assistance after independence, a high debt ratio, etc.; indicate justifications for several

⁴ Frank, 1975.

⁵ Becker/Sklar(eds.), 1987.

theories. All these approaches emphasize the interaction of the First and Third World in economic development. In this thesis I am not intending to analyze the correctness or the falseness of these theoretical approaches. I want to focus on political change and development in India, by concentrating on the historical inheritance of social and political values, as they relate to the country's overall development.

According to Barrington Moore Jr., domestic politics are far more important than external reasons in the Indian case after independence because of the continuing political and social power of the indigenous ruling elite. This does not mean that foreign influence should be neglected, but that the analytical emphasis should be put on the influence of traditional political and cultural values, and their impact on the overall development in India.⁶ Gunnar Myrdal mentioned that the most important changes must be introduced by the underdeveloped countries themselves, and that these crucial changes concern the institutional structure of these countries for realizing greater equality and at the same time higher productivity of land and labor.⁷

In focusing on the evolution of the domestic politics in India, I refer to the theoretical concept of legitimacy. I use legitimacy as an analytical tool to examine key factors

⁶ Moore, 1966, pp.385-389.

⁷ Myrdal, 1970, p.138.

which conditioned political development in India. My emphasis is to show how traditional values persisted to legitimize Indian political leadership, assuming that these traditional inheritance had disturbing affects on the economic and political development of modern India.

"Legitimacy is the foundation of such governmental power as is exercised both with consciousness on the government's part that it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of that right."⁸

My first two chapters will concentrate on the historical, cultural roots and legitimacy in India, as they relate to the country's overall development. A crisis in political legitimacy played a considerable role in the downfall of the British colonial rule, as the Indian elites could manage to form a widespread national movement against the British imperial rule. The British used coercion, rather than relying upon mass-based legitimacy, to maintain their position. The national movement, emerging under this oppressive political system, managed to create a situation of civil unrest where the British had to leave and turn over power to the Indians.

India was a hierarchically based society already before British colonial rule, with its political legitimacy drawn from traditional values, such as sanctity, caste, etc.. Her dominating religion was Hinduism, with its hierarchical caste organizations. During colonial rule, legitimacy was replaced

⁸ Sternberger, 1968, p.244.

by authoritarianism, with a limited legitimate basis among the governed. The national movement created a mass-based political system with its legitimacy based on cultural, especially religious traditions, and the charismatic leadership of Mahatma Gandhi.⁹ The dominating political party at the time of independence was the Congress Party, which installed a parliamentary political system inherited from the British example. This so-called democracy was in fact a one-party system. In theory, however, it drew its legitimacy from the large uneducated masses, who did not know the principles of the western democratic processes. Nehru continued the charismatic nature of political leadership. Charismatic leaders "often claimed nonpersonal sources for their title to rule, but followers, hypnotized by ideological propaganda, may perceive their title to rule in terms of their personal charisma."¹⁰

To further support my argument of the remaining upper-class domination and its influence on the poor status of India's overall development, I analyzed the role of political institutions and their ideological background in chapters three and four. The Indian government was legitimized by illusions of economic and social improvements based on a democratization of the society. Despite the "democratic" and

⁹ Weber in: Nordlinger(ed.), pp.35-37.

¹⁰ Herz, 1977, p.319.

"socialist" ideology, the old hierarchical social structure remained in function, in legitimizing the new, elected leaders. Combined with the charismatic qualities of the leaders in the first thirty years of independence, the ruling party established a monopoly of political power, which was not accountable to the masses. In addition, it did not reflect the interests of the masses, and did not improve their severe conditions of poverty, malnutrition, etc.. The real interest of the leading elite, that of creating a strong industry with high financial incentives for themselves was masked by the party propaganda, which officially embraced socialism, as ideology was used to mask the true goal of domination.

Chapter five addresses the most recent stages of political and economic development, considering the before analyzed historical, cultural and institutional impacts. After the charismatic qualities of the leaders faded, the old cultural cleavages reappeared, and the so-called democracy could not provide the legitimizing background for political leadership because it was not rooted in the masses. Fragmentation was aggravated by an increase in ethnic tension, based on economic failure of the development strategies and a failure of the Indian government to create national unity.

My studies about the influence of legitimacy and legitimizing forces in India suggest :

- nationalism did not overcome cultural cleavages

- legitimacy was still in large part based on traditional roots
- domination by the small economic and political elite remained
- democracy was not rooted within cultural tradition
- the ideology of democracy marked the nature of political domination
- legitimacy problems in the form of political instability or civil unrest characterize the time after charisma faded

My theoretical basis for the concept of legitimacy lies in the works of Max Weber, Seymour Martin Lipset, Samuel P. Huntington, and Clement H. Moore. The most influential modern discussion about legitimacy is Max Weber's elaboration of the three types of legitimizing norms for political power, especially interesting in the Indian case, where a combination of traditional and charismatic norms dominated, even under a modern political superstructure.

- rational/legal

- traditional
- charismatic

"In the case of legal authority, obedience is owed to legally established impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising the authority of office under it only by virtue of the formal legality of their commands and only within the scope of authority of the office. In the case of traditional authority, obedience is owed to the person of the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority and who is bound by traditions. But here obligation of obedience is not based on the impersonal order, but is a matter of personal loyalty within the area of accustomed obligations. In the case of charismatic authority, it is the charismatically qualified leader as such who is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in him and his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary qualities so far as they fall within the scope of individual's belief in his charisma..."¹¹

In contemporary political science, Seymour Martin Lipset set the distinction between effectiveness of political systems, which relates to their performance in achieving modernization goals, and their legitimacy. Legitimacy is an evaluative criterion and refers to a perception by their public of their appropriateness..¹²

"The stability of any given democracy depends not only on economic development but also on the effectiveness and the legitimacy of its political system. Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for a society. The extent to which contemporary political systems are

¹¹ Weber in: Nordlinger(ed.), 1970, pp.35-44.

¹² Rothschild in: Denitch(ed.), 1979, pp.38-41.

legitimate depends in large measure upon the ways in which the key issues which have historically divided the society have been resolved."¹³

Institutions will be considered appropriate, if they satisfy the needs of the members of that society. Almond and Powell are dealing with legitimacy and democracy in explaining the contrast between "participant", "subject", and "parochial" political cultures in stressing the authoritarian legacy of the colonial past. Populations under colonial rule are by legal definition subjects of the state; rule is reserved to the alien bureaucracy, and little or no participation is tolerated. The rise of nationalism created a historical moment when participation reached remarkably high levels. After independence, opportunities for participation dwindled, as single-party states appeared. "Participant" political cultures could hardly be consolidated in this setting.¹⁴ (see chapters one and two)

Given the influence of the Congress Party in India, the single-party-issue deserves considerable attention. Moore stresses that one-party systems are not very likely to achieve political legitimacy, without referring to other sources of legitimacy, especially charismatic leadership.¹⁵ There was no real single-party system existing in India, se-

¹³ Lipset in: Connolly(ed.), 1984, p.88.

¹⁴ Almond/Powell, 1988, p.511.

¹⁵ Moore in: Huntington/Moore, 1970, p.49.

veral parties did emerge after independence, but the dominant character of the Congress Party and its personalization of strategic power and authority to one person (Mahatma Gandhi, and later Nehru) serve to justify this approach.¹⁶ (see chapters three and four)

Huntington refers to legitimacy of the political system under the prerequisite of an overwhelming consensus among the people about legitimacy, and a sharing of visions of the public interest of the society between leaders and citizens. In most modernizing countries, a majority of the population lives in rural areas and works in agriculture. Only a small percentage of the population lives in urban areas. The result is a gap between political attitudes and behavior of the urban elites and the majority of the population. But stability of the political system and its government can only be reached with support from the countryside. The political system is dependent on the perception of its legitimacy by the rural masses.¹⁷ In India the masses were the main supporter of the Congress Party, but rural areas were characterized by a lack of economic development. Legitimization from the masses was not reached by improving their poor existence, but by masking the elitist politics by a socialist ideology, which made the uneducated masses believe that the

¹⁶ Maheshwari, 1984, p.63.

¹⁷ Huntington, 1968, p.441.

government cared about their critical situation. (see chapters four and five)

My first chapter will address the historical context of political development and legitimacy in India. Starting from the time before independence and British colonialism, the emphasis will be on the political and cultural fragmentation of society. Legitimization processes and legitimizing political actors are highlighted through history, from colonialism, over rising nationalism, independence, up to modern times. Fragmentation in the Indian society remained as a main obstacle to legitimacy and development.

Chapter two refers to political culture and socialization, to clarify and analyze the interactions between the political system and its culture. In the context of legitimacy and the case study of India, political culture is of exceptional value because it addresses the roots of political behavior. Traditional values, religious influences, structure of the society, are factors which influence the individual in perceiving leadership. It has a major impact on the judgement of legitimacy, and it characterizes a country's political development. Democratic values never trickled down to the masses, and the strong influence of tradition and the lack of education left the majority of the population trusting traditional values. In addition these values were used by the elite-run government, to legitimize their political power in a so-called "democratic" political environment.

Chapter three is an attempt to analyze the political structure of the Indian political system. Especially the domination of the Congress Party, the social strata of the party elites, the emerging party ideology will be analyzed. In addition I will examine the influence of political opposition, bureaucracy, and military as an attempt to back my theory of the lack of political legitimacy, by showing that the political structure helped to keep the masses under control, without being accountable for its actions.

Chapter four will address party ideology, by analyzing the attempts of the government to achieve legitimacy. I will especially refer to policy issues; like the democratic organization of the political system, the notion of socialist politics, and other aspects of domestic politics in India. Ideology was used to mask the poor economic status of the masses. This failure to achieve economic development showed a crisis in accountability, and the illusionary use of modern ideologies to legitimize traditional political authority.

Chapter five is assigned to show a crisis of legitimacy in more recent times, focusing on the time after the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984 and the political leadership of her son Rajiv. The crisis in ethnic relations suggests that the cultural and political fragmentation did not disappear with the so-called democracy, threatening political stability and national unity in India.

Finally, the concluding chapter links together my observations about legitimacy and its influence on political and economic development in India, in order to make suggestions of comparative theoretical value.

2.0 POLITICAL HISTORY AND FRAGMENTATION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The India we refer to today had its roots in the political and cultural fragmentation that existed long before 1947. Religious and linguistic differences characterized the partition of the Indian subcontinent in numerous small states, mostly kingdoms. Hinduism was the dominant religion, with its hierarchical caste system. Islam and Buddhism were very influential religious minorities. Political and cultural leadership was based on the traditional privileges of a mostly religious elite. In addition, language was a major subdivision of Indian culture, with several hundred languages and dialects were spoken side by side.¹⁸ This diversity is one reason that English still remains as the most common language in education.¹⁹

This cultural and political fragmentation has posed problems regarding national identity and unity in India. These problems continued into the present. Ch. Andrain states that "...the main problem for political leaders [throughout the Third World] has centered around a creation of a modern state

¹⁸ Raghavan, 1983, pp.121-125.

¹⁹ Verba/Ahmed/Bhatt, 1971, p.15.

and a new national identity in a traditional society."²⁰ Therefore, the overcoming of this division in Indian society is of great importance for establishing and maintaining political legitimacy.

2.2 BRITISH COLONIALISM

The British played on this traditional fragmentation in their system of "indirect" colonial rule.²¹ The British colonial government divided the Indian subcontinent into British India and the Princely States. British India consisted of eleven provinces and six territories, in which the British established their own administration. This area was directly ruled by the British, using native British administrators and military personnel. The 570 Princely States were left with the traditional aristocratic leaders in power, as administrators of British law.²² The old aristocratic power structure remained basically unchanged in the mostly rural areas where the Indian elites were left in their traditional political and cultural roles.²³ Officially, the old

²⁰ Andrain, 1974, p.264.

²¹ Sankaran, 1986, p.37.

²² Premi, 1982, p.1 lists 570 States, whereas Palmer, 1961, p.38 lists only 562 States.

²³ Palmer, 1961, pp.39-41.

"warlord"-aristocracy had been replaced by the British bureaucratic-military establishment. Practically, the change did not trickle down into the organizational structure of the society, for the majority of the Indian population, the visible political leaders were the same persons and families as before the British colonial legacy.²⁴

This highly fragmented social system integrated several mutually hostile ethnic groups, divided by religious belief, language, and cultural habits.²⁵ In following Max Weber's elaboration of the three types of legitimizing norms for political power, the Indian case could easily be addressed by reference to traditional legitimizing norms.²⁶ The political legitimacy of the ethnic leaders in India was drawn from traditional privileges and sanctity. Contrary to that, the British colonial legacy was based on coercion, using extensive military forces to maintain the political status quo.

In taking Sternberger's definition of legitimacy into account, the British were not the legitimate political leaders in India because the Indians did not recognize their right to govern as the colonial legacy was perceived as pure imperialism.²⁷ By welding the many States into an empire, the

²⁴ Maddison, 1971, p.35.

²⁵ Pork/DeMesquita, 1979, p.15, and map in appendix.

²⁶ Weber, in: Nordlinger(ed.), 1970, pp.35-44.

²⁷ Sternberger, 1968, p.244.

British brought considerable administrative unity to this region. But colonial rule, with its alien bureaucracy allowed little or no public participation. The British coercion created a rise in Indian nationalism as the Indian upper-class, mostly educated in Western schools, demanded a stronger Indian voice in the colonial government. The British colonial government was in danger of losing touch with the Indian people.²⁸ In the 1880s the very ability of the men produced by the system of English education to mobilize the Indian masses, around issues of cultural and religious nationalism, forced the British to make some concessions to the Indian educated elite.²⁹

2.3 RISING NATIONALISM

Threatened by the emerging nationalism, the British agreed to give the Indian leaders limited participation in the legislative and executive organs of the colonial government.³⁰ The British hoped to satisfy the Indian political elite by allowing them to establish some degree of political representation. Finally, the Indian National Congress (INC) was founded in 1885 as the main nationalist party, marking the

²⁸ Raghavan, 1983, p.56.

²⁹ Kulke/Rothermund, 1986, p.271.

³⁰ Gunther, 1939, p.486.

beginning of an organized expression of self-respect. After suffering from the longtime domination by the British, this was considered as "steps toward self-government", and created the roots for the postindependence government.³¹ The Indian political elite then consisted of the urban upper-middle-class, usually traditional Indian aristocracy, and the new emergent industrial middle-class, mostly high caste members. Mahatma Gandhi emerged out of this social strata, a political leader who was supported because of his charisma and a perception of him as a saintly religious leader. Under his leadership, emerging nationalism in India led to large-scale popular agitation against the British colonial rule. Gandhi brought the Congress close to the rural masses, popular symbols of folk religion served the purpose of mobilizing the masses against the imperialist British rule.³² The non-violent civil disobedience which Gandhi proclaimed found support in a massive nationalist movement.³³ But the cultural pluralist society proved to be a serious obstacle to creating legitimate representation in India. Especially the Muslim minority and its leaders became more and more suspicious of the Hindu-dominated INC and the leadership of the popular Hindu Gandhi. This Muslim minority founded the All-Indian

³¹ Palmer, 1961, pp.44+45; and table in appendix.

³² Kulke/Rothermund, 1986, pp.279+280.

³³ Raghavan, 1983, p.62.

Muslim League in 1906, which established an opposition party to the INC.³⁴ The time before independence was characterized by serious differences between the two dominating cultural groups. In the end, the emerging nationalism was strong enough to force the British to withdraw from India, but it was not strong enough to overcome the cultural division. With the independence-act in 1947, the Indian subcontinent underwent partition into a Muslim State (Pakistan), and a Hindu State (India).³⁵

"Apart from the carnage at the time of partition, the transfer of power was a peaceful affair,..., the institutional heritage of British India was taken over as a going concern."³⁶

The partition in India and Pakistan did not solve the problems stemming from cultural pluralism as the actual political constellation continued to provide the basis for political unrest and instability. In India, Mahatma Gandhi was perceived as a national hero for bringing independence to India. Due to his "sanctity" and the highly religious Indian population, Gandhi could manage for the most part to keep the masses non-violent. The trust in his personality and his leadership generally overrode the remaining cultural divides. The legitimization of the Indian political leadership was not

³⁴ Kulke/Rothermund, 1986, p.307.

³⁵ Watson, 1974, p.152.

³⁶ Kulke/Rothermund, 1986, p.313.

based as much on common political consensus as on tradition and charisma.

2.4 INDEPENDENCE

Despite the lack of political legitimacy, the two centuries of colonial legacy had a great impact on the political development in India, creating the political environment which was to characterize India in the future. Palmer speaks about the

"particular value in an understanding of how India was governed by the British, because the system developed by the British has been in large measure continued by the Indians themselves since independence."³⁷

The major heritage of the time of the freedom movement was the National Congress itself. Gandhi was planning to dissolve the INC, replacing it with multiple political parties. Despite his concerns, the INC survived as a large centrist party, though other parties did emerge. The Muslim League, which has been responsible for the establishment of independent Pakistan became increasingly unstable, and lost its major opposition role of the pre-independence time. Continuing Hindu-Muslim struggles were the background of the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, whereafter Jawaharlal

³⁷ Palmer, 1961, p.39.

Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel took over the leadership of the INC.³⁸

2.5 THE NEHRU-GANDHI DYNASTY

The drafting of free India's constitution was proceeding apace.

"On completion of essential tasks of ensuring the unity, stability and security of the country, the constitution of the Indian Republic came into force on January 26, 1950 - exactly twenty years after the Indian National Congress had dedicated itself to the objective of complete independence."³⁹

India's professed constitutional goals were to

"secure to all its citizens...JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and opportunity; and to promote among all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation."⁴⁰

The Indian constitution drew heavily on many sources, ideas of many systems and philosophies can be found; but despite these various influences, the structure of the Indian society remained dominated by the traditional elite, now running the Congress Party. India had several political parties, but the National Congress Party held a near monopoly on government

³⁸ Watson, 1974, pp.157-159.

³⁹ Raghavan, 1983, p.78.

⁴⁰ Wolpert, 1977, p.358.

offices for many years after independence. Theoretically and ideologically the so-called parliamentary democracy drew its political legitimacy in the wake of the nationalist independence struggle from public support of the new political system. Practically, the legitimizing processes continued to rely on traditional hierarchical values, and the charisma of the brilliant politician Nehru.⁴¹ The majority of the population was uneducated, not understanding the theoretical concept of democracy. They supported the party which led the struggle for independence, and which was the only political organization with branches in every major city and town.⁴² Yet despite the popular notion of a democratic system, the Indian society continued to be dominated by the traditional elites. When Nehru died in 1964, the country showed a vast gap between a rich minority and the poor majority. The Indian State faced increasing difficulties in fulfilling its function of protection as well as that of insuring a minimum of welfare to its people. The population-growth jeopardized development efforts in agriculture, there was a strong need for economic and agricultural development strategies, which were able to serve the needs of the masses.⁴³ In addition to that, the old Hindu-Muslim opposition led to the India-

⁴¹ Watson, 1974, p.164.

⁴² Kublin, 1968, p.179.

⁴³ Seligson, 1984, p.15.

Pakistan war in 1965-66, and to conflicts between some of the Muslim-dominated States in the North and the Indian Government. Nehru could base his political power and legitimization processes on the inheritance of Mahatma Gandhi's political success and personal charisma. By the end of his rule, the fragmentation in the Indian society, religious divides, the stage of severe poverty for the majority of the population, etc., seemed to threaten the political legitimacy of the Congress Party. Global social and economic issues remained unsolved, and the Indian political opposition grew heavily.⁴⁴

Indira Gandhi, the next prime minister and a daughter of Nehru, had to react to these serious problems. Due to the fading popular support, she created a new socialist party ideology, stressing 'Gharibi Hatao' ('Beat Poverty') programs. Huntington saw the support from the masses in the countryside as essential for political legitimacy in Third World countries.⁴⁵ The introduction of the "Green Revolution" and the planned improvement in industrial development were legitimization processes, at least ideologically, to regain public support. The development strategies did not lead to improvements for the poor masses, and there was no change in the hierarchical social structure. Therefore, In-

⁴⁴ Wolpert, 1977, p.391.

⁴⁵ Huntington, 1968, pp.433-444.

dian domestic politics, according to David Selbourne, were used to mask the real nature of the conditions of the people; socialist rhetoric was used by the elite to continue to dominate the masses.⁴⁶ Indira Gandhi chose this popular ideology on purpose, to regain political legitimacy for the struggling Congress Party. "We spoke about socialism because that was what went down well with the masses."⁴⁷ The Government under Indira Gandhi faced increasing industrial problems, leading to an increasing distrust of population and opposition in her domestic politics. In 1975, Indira Gandhi was accused of inappropriate use of governmental facilities in her last election campaign. As a result of the investigation, her victory had been declared invalid. In order to avoid resignation from her political office, she made the President declare a national emergency, the official reason was the bad economic situation. The emergency period led to a loss of civil liberties, such as press freedom, etc. which dated back to efforts of the nationalist movement before independence.⁴⁸ This political crisis led to general protest movements against the emergency regime. By 1976, Indira Gandhi had most opposition leaders arrested, and postponed the next election to 1977. The real intention of the emer-

⁴⁶ Selbourne, 1979, p.32.

⁴⁷ quoted in: Lifschultz, 1981, p.7.

⁴⁸ Palmer, 1976, p.95.

gency period became more obvious, as the opposition leaders were released from prison a few weeks before the election date. They should not have enough time to organize their campaigns.⁴⁹ To the surprise of almost anybody, the opposition won the election in 1977. The new ruling party (Janata Party) was formed in 1977 to contest the post-emergency elections, as a coalition of dissident Congress members. Morarji Desai, the former leader of the Congress right, was nominated as Prime Minister. Very soon, the Janata Party showed strong internal disorder and a basic incompatibility of the parties which had only superficially merged their identity. After only one year in office, Desai resigned, a minority government ruled the country until elections were finally held in January 1980. This disordered coalition, and the politics of the Janata Party which worsened the economic situation of the poor masses, greatly supported the comeback of Indira Gandhi and her newly organized Congress Party. In addition, being the daughter of the very popular Nehru, and her personal charismatic appearance persuaded the masses who suffered from absolute poverty and food deficits.⁵⁰ Shortly after the Congress Party had reestablished its political domination, minority problems worsened, as in addition to the already existing Muslim-Hindu con-

⁴⁹ Kulke/Rothermund, 1986, p.325.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, pp.326-328.

flicts, a newly emerging Sikh separatism challenged the national unity. The Sikh problems were a particularly serious challenge to the national government, as the federal State of Punjab was shaken by terrorist attacks against Indian citizens and government institutions. Threatened by India's religious and ethnic minorities and their occasional militant attacks on Hindus, Indira Gandhi reacted by focusing even stronger on a pro-Hindu nationalist rhetoric.⁵¹ The deterioration of the Hindu-Sikh relationships led to the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984, who was shot to death by two of her own bodyguards, both Sikhs.

Her son Rajiv Gandhi was chosen to be her successor; after him becoming prime minister, the dynasty of the Nehru-Gandhis was firmly established.⁵² "Rajiv Gandhi did not possess his mother's overwhelming personality, nor her charisma and probably not her ruthlessness."⁵³ But because of the unstable political situation, he was considered to be the best choice. The turbulences in India, like the Sikh separatism in Punjab, the Muslim dissatisfaction in Kashmir, and the tribal discord in Assam, needed a populist-type leader at the top to maintain contact with the masses.⁵⁴ Rajiv undoubtedly had con-

⁵¹ Malik in: Malik/Vajpeyi, 1988, p.16.

⁵² Ali, 1985, p.220.

⁵³ Gupte, 1985, p.32.

⁵⁴ Ali, 1985, pp.297-302.

siderable success with his reforms in industry and agriculture, but the problems of overpopulation, malnutrition, poverty, etc., remained almost unimproved for the vast majority of the 755 million Indians.⁵⁵ Politically, the first years of Rajiv Gandhi's rule showed even more strains. The Punjab remained highly volatile and the terrorist movement among the Sikhs remained very strong. India under Rajiv Gandhi showed everything but stability, as numerous conflicts, stemming from the traditional cultural fragmentation were aggravated during his rule.⁵⁶ Considering the constellation of the dominant Congress Party, the hierarchical social structure, and the increasing lack of public support for the government, political stability faded because a lack of political legitimacy of the Congress government.⁵⁷ The population demanded more recognition of the important social and economic issues, "...whatever the degree of manipulation, ...cultural inertia, ...state repression, ...or family, or caste, or religion, there is nothing illusionary about food, clothing and shelter."⁵⁸ Legitimacy was not attained, because the key issues, which have histor-

⁵⁵ Country Profile, 1987, p.5.

⁵⁶ Wariavwalla, 1988, p.119.

⁵⁷ Huntington, 1968, p.73 and p.441; and Moore in: Huntington/Moore, 1970, p.49.

⁵⁸ Selbourne, 1979, p.37.

ically divided the Indian society, have not been solved, and insufficient economic development has aggravated social conflict.⁵⁹

2.6 CONCLUSION

The historical political development of India showed that despite the dramatic change from a colonial imperialist rule to a so-called parliamentary democracy, traditional cultural influences, which fragmented the society, remained dominant. Despite institutional changes, cultural fragmentation continues to characterize Indian society. Political legitimacy is as always heavily based on hierarchical status, religious sanctity, and the charisma of the political leaders. History has shown that political legitimacy deteriorated when charisma started to fade. In the end of Indira Gandhi's, and during Rajiv Gandhi's rule, where political instability emerged, traditional differentiations in the Indian society regained a dominant role. The old cultural divide still threatens the unity of the Indian State and its political system because the various problems of the fragmented society, such as religious differences have never been solved.

⁵⁹ Lipset in: Connolly(ed.), 1984, p.88.

3.0 POLITICAL CULTURE AND SOCIALIZATION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The concept of political culture provides important insights in analyzing legitimacy and legitimizing processes. Both legitimacy and political culture refer to people's cognitions in evaluating and affecting political systems. In India, political culture has been particularly important because of the fragmentation of its society, causing problems concerning national unity and political stability. In addition, the concept of political culture allowed for continuity of traditional values, such as religion, the caste system, etc.. Within the context of political change and modernity, these traditional values were used to legitimize the new emergent political leaders.⁶⁰

3.2 THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Pye and Verba state:

"The distinction between political culture and the more general cultural system is an analytical one. Poli-

⁶⁰ Park/DeMesquita, 1979, p.44.

tical culture is an integral aspect of the more general culture,.."⁶¹

A more distinct definition of political culture is offered by Almond and Powell:

"A political culture is a particular distribution of political attitudes, values, feelings, informations, and skills. As people's attitudes affect what they will do, a nation's political culture affects the conduct of its citizens and leaders throughout the political system."⁶²

The political culture approach tries to clarify and analyze the interactions between the political system and its culture, to show the roots of political legitimacy and the ability for change. This approach provides a link between individual behavior and the survival and performance of political systems. It shows the overall distribution of citizens' orientations toward political objects.⁶³ For example, it explains India's inability to operate "democratic" institutions, stressing the anti-democratic consequences of the hierarchical social structure in India.⁶⁴ Kavanagh was following Almond and Verba, drawing on the cognitive, affective and evaluative dimensions of attitudes about the political objects to develop a typology of ideal political cultures;

⁶¹ Verba/Pye, 1963, p.521.

⁶² Almond/Powell, 1988, p.34.

⁶³ Kavanagh, 1972, p.12.

⁶⁴ Verba/Pye, 1963, pp.131+132.

participant, subject and parochial.⁶⁵ Where orientations were positive to all objects, they suggested that the political culture was participant(e.g.: Britain and Scandinavia). Where citizens assumed a passive or obedient relationship to the system, perceiving themselves as hardly affecting the system, though being affected by it, they regarded the political culture as a subject one. Finally, where the individual hardly related himself to the political system at all and had only a dim awareness and knowledge of it, they classified the political culture as parochial. Almond and Powell referred to a parochial society in calling it a democratic preindustrial one. Their example was India, because of its predominantly rural, illiterate population whose knowledge of and involvement with the public sector would be minimal.⁶⁶ According to Huntington's emphasis on mass mobilization and mass consensus as a prerequisite for legitimacy, the existence of a parochial political culture leads to the assumption of a weak base in legitimacy.

Associated with the concept of political culture is the notion of political socialization. The nature of politics is determined by political behavior, political behavior being dependent upon norms and consciences. Norms and consciences are hereditary elements based on education, family, parties,

⁶⁵ Kavanagh, 1972, p.11.

⁶⁶ Almond/Powell, 1988, p.42.

communication, etc..⁶⁷ Rosenbaum referred to political behavior as learned behavior. Learning through socialization was considered a continuous process throughout an individual's life. This process sheds light on the ability to change a political culture. Political socialization may help adjust people's attitudes toward political institutions, which in turn may facilitate political legitimacy in changing contexts.⁶⁸ In India, however, socialization processes favored traditional values, not allowing "modern" political norms to take root among the masses, and not allowing legal and rational forms of political legitimacy to establish.⁶⁹

3.3 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The political culture of India is imbedded in a history that extends over several thousand years. Due to the historical division of the Indian subcontinent, India showed an enormous diversity of social groups. Social cleavages were based on ethnicity and language, race, religion, caste, and regionalism. The Indian society has mostly been caste-based and hierarchical. This social fragmentation and stratification was most visible in rural areas, where tradi-

⁶⁷ Jaros, 1973, p.7.

⁶⁸ Rosenbaum, 1975, p.13.

⁶⁹ Weber in: Nordlinger(ed.), 1970, pp.35-44.

tional influences remained stronger than in urban areas.⁷⁰ The dominant political organization was based around a hierarchical leader, who drew his position of power from religion and caste.

The British colonial empire did not change the cultural roots of the population although the Indian leaders had to obey the British authorities, their cultural assimilation remained incomplete. After independence, even the villages appeared to face political modernity. With the notion of democratic politics, the impression was spread that there would be a secularization of political power, accompanied by dispersion and decentralization. Because of the vast majority of the population being poor and illiterate, and the existence of a parochial political culture, only a very small segment of the population did take part in democratic politics.⁷¹ This very small group were the beneficiaries of the Western education system, introduced first by the British, consisting of upper-caste Indian elites, and middle-caste landowners which turned out to be the dominant group in villages. Therefore the privileged of the old system remained the privileged of the new system, drawing their support from historical, cultural roots. In describing the dominant political institution of the post-independence period, the Con-

⁷⁰ Kothari, 1970, p.251.

⁷¹ Kavanagh, 1972, p.12.

gress Party, as a middle-class organization, Mehta stressed that this class was largely a product of the British power in India.⁷²

Socialization processes were responsible for this continuity. The main actor in providing essential and political norms and consciences was the family. The mass of the Indian population lived in rural areas (ca. 80 per cent), which were characterized by a considerable lack of mobility.⁷³ Social and geographical distances between communities were great, while illiteracy, and regional and linguistic differences further lessened communication. Socialization processes thus confirmed to operate primarily on a parochial, personalistic basis.

"The primary form of communication with the masses is still personal contact. ...The personality of leaders...continue to play an outsized role in Indian politics... ."74

A key figure of the personalistic orientation of political culture in India related to political charisma. The leadership principle has been particularly strong in India, reinforced by the traditional aspects of Indian life and social organization. Charisma, based on personal appearance and the saintly status of the Nehru-Gandhi family, proved to be a

72 Mehta, 1979, p.166.

73 Sharma, 1978, p.351.

74 Palmer, 1961, p.10.

principal source of political legitimacy in India. In Weber's terms, a combination of traditional and charismatic norms characterized the legitimization of political leadership.⁷⁵

3.4 CULTURAL ROOTS (EARLY YEARS)

Over many centuries, a number of centralizing governments have sought to establish themselves and to expand their control over parts or all of India. At the same time, a variety of religious faiths have sought to root their beliefs in Indian tradition and then to expand their spiritual mandate. These thrusts and the interaction between them have produced extraordinary experiences. Religion has been a powerful political force in India. All major religions in India, Hinduism, Islam, and Buddhism were involved in legitimating political power through religious sanction.⁷⁶ Hinduism was the dominant religion, with the adherence of about 80 per cent of the Indian population (in 1986), and had been of strongest influence on Indian political culture.⁷⁷

Hindu practice granted those of the Brahman caste a monopoly over ritual and mediation between gods and humans.

⁷⁵ Weber in: Nordlinger(ed.), 1970, p.35.

⁷⁶ Buultjens, 1986, p.94.

⁷⁷ Country Profile, 1987, p.2.

The Brahmans, the most prestigious caste in the Hindu social hierarchy, acquired an advisory political role and a high level of patronage. Both Hinduism and Islam saw the rulers rule in accordance with the divine will. Therefore rulers were for the most parts unlimited in their authority, they were born to rule.⁷⁸ Connected with the view of the divine ruler, the powerful man should also be the morally good man. Political leadership combined the saintly personal life with justice. "The political docility and quietism of the masses were ensured through the doctrine of karma and transcendentalism."⁷⁹ The status of the political leader was formed in the authoritarian patterns which have prevailed throughout centuries. The rigidly structured rural society strongly reflected religious practices and groupings. Due to extreme localism, the cultural heritage remained unchanged and stable. This heritage did give the political leader a very high social status and integrity.

India's culture-structure did in parts undergo a transformation under British rule, but the persistence of tradition in India, in form of religious values, caste organizations, etc., was one of the remarkable character-

⁷⁸ Park/DeMesquita, 1979, pp.38+39.

⁷⁹ Pantham, 1979, p.446.

istics of its political culture, legitimizing the political system and its leaders.⁸⁰

3.5 BRITISH IMPERIALISM

The gradual takeover of assorted Indian kingdoms and their incorporation into a unified British Indian empire was finally completed in the middle of the nineteenth century.⁸¹ The role of the Indian religions, especially Hinduism and Islam, underwent a dramatic change. The new position of Hindu and Muslim rulers owed their existence to British authority, not to any local religious authority.⁸² Accountability was upwards to the British authorities, not downwards to the Indian population. The old warlord-aristocracy had been replaced by the British bureaucratic-military establishment.

The new Indian elite was educated in British schools as the English language was installed as official language of governance. The British set up a system of government hitherto unknown to India, but the occurring changes in the Indian society were almost only influencing the indigenous

⁸⁰ Park/DeMesquita, 1979, p.44.

⁸¹ In August 1858, Queen Victoria signed the Government of India Act, by which the government of India was fully assumed by the British crown.

⁸² Buultjens, 1986, p.97.

elite; as far as the mass of the population was concerned, colonial rule brought only a few significant changes. Religious practices, social behavior, etc., had remained virtually unchanged. Therefore it was not very surprising that even the emerging Indian leaders tried to mobilize the masses with traditional values. The influence of the British colonial rule created an environment for the emergence of a new brand of "modern" politicians, the English educated Indians increasingly articulated their interests.⁸³ The Indian National Congress was an outcome of the increasing Indian demand for self-government. Its future leader, Mahatma Gandhi mobilized the Indian masses by appealing to a nationalism that incorporated economic, spiritual and social values in politics.

"A large part of his hold on these masses, especially on the Hindu majority, derived from their perception of him as a religious or semireligious sage."⁸⁴

The very title Mahatma ("Great Soul") implied this. In appearance, behavior, speech, and public persona, Gandhi was very much a Hindu incarnation. Mahatma Gandhi was a master in using nonpolitical methods to achieve political ends. He proclaimed an intimate relationship of religion and politics, and often applied ethical concepts to political action. His

⁸³ Maheshwari, 1984, p.11.

⁸⁴ Buultjens, 1986, p.99.

politics of consensus, non-violence, tolerance, etc., were religiously based, and allowed the emergence of a mass-movement in a largely diverse society. A new stage of Indian politics emerged, and demands for self-governance and independence used traditional roots in their propaganda to persuade the masses. Modernization processes strongly focused on cultural and religious traditions in legitimizing the actions of political development in India.

3.6 INDEPENDENCE AND POLITICAL CHANGE

The ideology of nationalism was meant to create national unity, one of the strongest problems the highly fragmented Indian society faced, in order to reach national and political independence.⁸⁵ Independence came to India in August 1947. The new state, united a large part of the subcontinent under an Indian government. The division of the region into modern India and Pakistan drastically altered the religious mix of the territory that remained as India. India was left predominantly Hindu, although significant minorities remained within the boundaries of the new India.⁸⁶ The selection of democracy as the political system of India initiated a new method of legitimizing the authority of the

⁸⁵ Andrain, 1974, pp.268-270.

⁸⁶ Buultjens, 1986, pp.100-102.

state that reflected the legacy of western colonialism. Governments and various agents of the state were now to be elected by universal balloting. No longer was religious or any other sanction required. Prime Minister Nehru declared in 1950:

"The government of a country like India, with many religions that have secured great and devoted followings for generations, can never function satisfactorily in the modern age except on a secular basis."⁸⁷

The Indian secularism was based on the freedom of all religions to coexist. This notion was developed because of various religious disputes in the past, which led to the partition of the subcontinent. The new so-called democratic government gave priority to strengthening the Indian national unity.

Despite the formal effort made in the Constitution of India to embrace the notion of egalitarianism, the elitist traditional structure of the society remained intact. The Congress Party was dominated by the upper middle-class, British educated Indians, who usually belonged to high castes. Nehru, for example, the first Prime Minister of the Indian Republic, was a member of the most prestigious Brahman caste. Another reason why modernity did not spread among the masses of the population was the poor standard of education, the lack of educational roots the power-elite received in

⁸⁷ quoted in: Buultjens, 1986, p.101.

British schools. Through socialization processes, the traditional values of the Hindu religion, such as morality, obedience to the leader, etc., remained dominating in India's society. This led to an almost "magical belief in the power of superior authority."⁸⁸ The new political concepts were in part the products of British influence and education, and with the vast amount of the people being illiterate, only a very small section of the Indian population could take part in democratic politics. The penetration of the new, state and the new system of education into the old society had generated a dual political culture. Traditions remained dominant in rural areas, whereas beliefs associated with modernization were introduced to the new urban centers. This dual culture has been described by W.H.Morris-Jones:

"The contrast between modern and traditional language [i.e., political cultures]...is a contrast between the political institutions of a nation state and the structure of an ancient society, and...the key to Indian politics to-day is the meeting of these two as strangers. Political system and social structure, so far from having grown up together, have only just been introduced to each other."⁸⁹

Political change and modernity were characterized by an emphasis on industrial development, economic growth, and adaptation of Western lifestyle. The most visible changes could be observed in the emergence of modern technology, especially

⁸⁸ Kothari, 1970, p.272.

⁸⁹ quoted in: Pantham, 1979, p.440.

on the urban level where the economic development within the democratization process was considered successful. On the other hand, village politics had undergone only limited transformation and democratization. In industry, the average annual growth rate in 1960-81 was about 4.9 per cent, whereas in agriculture it was only about 1.9 per cent.⁹⁰ About 80 per cent of the Indian population were working in agriculture, who had to support about 90 per cent of the economically active people in 1980, a fact which weighs the poor agricultural development even stronger.⁹¹ The process of change from a system of hereditary social and economic status, to one based on democratic election, has not been completed. Even where the hereditary status of village leadership was officially changed through democratic elections, political legitimization was drawn from traditional privileges. "...the dominance, by and large, continued to stay with the Haves, and the Have-nots were simply treated by them as cogs in the machine."⁹²

Despite the new context of political democracy, caste remained a central element in Indian society. Caste provided channels of communication and the basis of leadership and social organization, enabling those still submerged in the

⁹⁰ Ray, 1987, p.17.

⁹¹ Kurian, 1984, p.453.

⁹² Baral, 1981, p.32.

traditional society and culture to transcend the technical political illiteracy which would otherwise handicap their ability to participate in democratic politics. The influence of traditional caste organizations on political culture was indisputable. Caste was a part of Hindu society, its meaning as a social institution rooted in the values of Hindu society. In this sense, all castes shared a common culture, purpose and identity.

Yet due to modernization processes, such as the transition from feudalism to capitalism and from colonialism to "democracy", the caste system itself gradually underwent some change.⁹³ The caste association was no longer a natural association in the sense in which caste was. Membership was not purely ascriptive; birth in the caste was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for membership. One had also to show some degree of identification, voting, membership dues, etc.. The discriminating aspects of the caste organization had been officially abandoned by state law, but continued to influencing Indian society heavily.⁹⁴ The caste association tried to introduce democratic politics to Indian villages, using the familiar and accepted institution of caste as social and political center. But the caste association differed from the other natural associations found in India -

⁹³ Blostroem/Hettne, 1984, p.20.

⁹⁴ Rudolph/Rudolph in: Nordlinger(ed.), 1970, pp.251-253.

tribal, linguistic and religious - in its relationship to the political community. Tribal, religious, and linguistic groups on the Indian scene represented potential political communities, which claimed a separate political identity. Caste, and its political expression, the caste association, had no such aspiration. As the notion of class got more and more imbedded with caste, caste associations represented the varying economic demands of the poor masses, but prevented the underprivileged from being unified.

"The poor were an easy victim of political parties which were guided more by their partisan interests than by the genuine interests of the poor."⁹⁵

Political change integrated diverse social forces in the political process. The key actor was the Congress Party which linked together caste organizations under the democratic superstructure, as traditional values were knowingly used to legitimize the democratic system and its leaders.

3.7 CONCLUSION

Political culture and socialization in India remain heavily steeped in traditional values, with the roots of political behavior still strongly linked to religious influences. Despite the substantial changes involved with colonialization

⁹⁵ Baral, 1981, p.41.

and political and social independence, the traditional cultural heritage remains vibrant as democratic values never trickled down to the masses. The Indian culture structure has certainly undergone changes over time, but tradition remains the dominant factor in Indian political culture today. Traditional institutions, like the caste system, may have been nominally altered to legitimize the new, so-called democratic system, but the basis for political legitimacy is still India's historical political tradition of religious and cultural values, questioning the constitutional democratic ideology of the Indian government.

4.0 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Fragmentation and the heritage of traditional cultural values were characteristics of the Indian social and political system after independence. Considering these very factors, the stability of the Indian political system was remarkable in the first three decades. This chapter tries to show the influence of the modern political institutions (political parties, bureaucracy, and military) on political and cultural change in a predominantly traditional society.

"Socio-historical changes come about through changes in the relationship between political culture and political structure. The stability of a polity depends to a great extent on its regime's legitimacy, which in turn is the result of the congruence between the people's orientations, beliefs and values on the one hand and the structure of power...on the other. The problem of congruence/incongruence is of particular importance to the ex-colonial countries, where a modern state has been transplanted on to the indigenous society, having its own tradition of culturally sanctioned political values and norms."⁹⁶

In India, political institutions were of special interest because they showed this imposition of a modern state, namely the British parliamentary system, onto the Indian traditional

⁹⁶ Pantham, 1979, p.432.

society. These traditional cultural values outlived institutional changes, as governmental centralization, etc., and no serious effort of breaking with the past was undertaken by the ruling elite. Culturally sanctioned political orientations, especially the caste system, were used by vested interests for the preservation of power and privilege.⁹⁷ Despite the legal banning of social inequalities, such as caste differentiations, caste was still a major legitimizing factor for the political and economic elite, because traditional values remained strong even after institutional changes. This development within the parochial political culture indicates that the political legitimacy of Indian Government and ruling elite was still based on traditional norms, instead of legal institutional norms, which normally exist in democratic societies.⁹⁸

4.2 THE PARTY SYSTEM

India since 1947 has been in the process of developing a Western-style political system. Constitutionally, the Republic of India is a federation with certain powers reserved in the 21 states and nine union territories. The central Government is dominated by the parliament and cabinet, a

⁹⁷ Pantham, 1979, pp.434+435.

⁹⁸ Almond/Powell, 1988, p.42.

pattern which is repeated in the states.⁹⁹ Nominally, the system in effect was of a multi-party variety. The major political parties of India were aligned ideologically from the Communist Party on the left, through the Congress Party in the "democratic socialist" center, to the more conservative Hindu parties, as the Jan Sangh. The rest of India's numerous parties can be placed along this political spectrum. Practically, the dominance of the Congress Party led many to believe that India had developed a one-party or one-party dominant political system.¹⁰⁰ The Congress Party has been an important integrating force in India, since it was the nationalist party in pre-independence days, and its leaders claimed the right to carry on as the big nationalist party. Congress was the only party which had a nationwide political organization at time of independence. The reputation of being the party which brought national unity to India, combined with the majority election system, inherited from the British, favored the broad middle-of-the-road Congress Party. The election results in general showed the dominant Congress position, which was partly created by this election system.¹⁰¹ For example, the Congress Party usually received between 42 to 48 per cent of the popular vote, but captured

⁹⁹ Country Profile, 1987, p.4.

¹⁰⁰ Park, 1967, pp.65-67.

¹⁰¹ Maheshwari, 1984, p.80.

65 to 75 per cent of the seats in the Parliament.¹⁰² The Congress Party must receive special notice for it is this party which has been steering the ship of the state since 1947 with only a brief interruption, as the Janata Party was in power between 1977 and 1980.¹⁰³

It is difficult for one-party or one-party dominant systems to achieve political legitimacy without referring to other sources of legitimacy.¹⁰⁴ The Congress Party based its legitimacy on traditional values, enforced by charismatic leaders, and the first thirty years of the Indian Republic were characterized by the personalization of authority to the charismatic leaders such as M.Gandhi, J.Nehru, and I.Gandhi. Considering the institutionalization of the one-party rule in India, Huntington and Moore concluded that

"legitimacy derives more from the structure than from the achievements of valued goals. The party develops sacrosanct procedures, and it is these that legitimate policies and leaders, not the ideological 'correctness' of their decisions."¹⁰⁵

In Hindu-religion, the leaders were considered to be moral, and their actions were not to be questioned by the "normal" persons.

¹⁰² Kulke/Rothermund, 1986, p.319.

¹⁰³ Maheshwari, 1984, p.61.

¹⁰⁴ Moore in: Huntington/Moore(eds.), 1970, p.49.

¹⁰⁵ Huntington/Moore(eds.), 1970, p.513.

The organization of the Congress as political party and national movement helped to include within itself, at all stages, groups and individuals of diverse political persuasions and commitments. Consistently, it became very difficult to unseat Congress with the help of any specific ideology.¹⁰⁶ Alongside with the institutionalization of one-party domination, the opposition, referring to all non-Congress parties, remained highly fragmented and weak. Their structures were very unorganized, usually focusing on single ideologies.¹⁰⁷ There existed no commonly accepted framework of how the party-system had to function. Because of the splintering of the opposition into numerous and ineffective strands, Congress leadership was not threatened.¹⁰⁸

Despite the formal effort made in the Constitution of India to bring a spirit of egalitarianism to the whole country, the recruitment of political party leaders has showed strong elitism and helped sustain existing social relations.

"A political system which guarantees constitutional rights for groups to organize in defence of their interests is almost bound to favour the privileged at the expense of the disprivileged. The former will always have greater organizing capacities and facilities than

¹⁰⁶ Somjee, 1979, pp.146-152.

¹⁰⁷ Maheshwari, 1984, pp.79+80.

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.*, pp.65-71.

the latter, such that the competition for rewards between different classes is never an equal contest."¹⁰⁹

The dominating Congress Party, for example, recruited its leaders from the ranks of the western-educated upper-middle-class, which adapted to "modern" political activities, in order to defend their elitist status. India therefore was ruled in social, political, and economic spheres by a small urban, educated elite of less than five million persons, (out of a population of ca.650 million people at that time).¹¹⁰ One could play the game of so-called democratic politics only if one had the necessary training to play, and was aware of the rules of the game. With the "vast majority being poor, illiterate, and ignorant, the game was played only by a very small segment of the population. Those who were already privileged in the old system had just to wear a mask so as to fit into the new system."¹¹¹

According to Lipset, political institutions will be considered appropriate if they satisfy the needs of the members of that society. In addition, he noted that key issues which had historically divided the society had to be resolved in order to maintain political legitimacy.¹¹² The Indian poli-

¹⁰⁹ Michie, 1979, p.381.

¹¹⁰ Park/DeMesquita, 1979, p.42.

¹¹¹ Baral, 1981, p.32.

¹¹² Lipset in: Connolly(ed.), 1984, pp.88-92.

tical structure with its persistence of elite-domination led to satisfactory results only for the elite minority. For example, the highest five per cent of the Indian households received ca.25 per cent of the total national income, whereas the lowest 20 per cent households received only ca. seven per cent of the national income.¹¹³ Considering the constitutional rights, this economic inequality questions the basis of political legitimacy in the Indian context. The institutionalization of the "modern" political structure did not change the traditional elite dominance, it actually served to stabilize their position through recruitment of elites in the important Indian Civil Service. Yet despite the lack of legal forms of political legitimacy, the political system was surprisingly stable.

4.3 BUREAUCRACY

But political stability also required strong and distinct institutions to perform both the "input" and the "output" function of politics.¹¹⁴ These institutions were the public services, especially the bureaucracy. The public services were in all countries some of the most important instruments through which the policies of government were converted into

¹¹³ World Tables Vol.II, 1984, p.42.

¹¹⁴ Huntington, 1968, p.84.

fact, the access to central governmental goods was dependent on the patronage of the civil service.

"The less advanced the country, socially and economically, the less the likelihood of the nonofficial playing a leading part in carrying out of policy and the more significant the role of the public services."¹¹⁵

The bureaucratic system dated back to the early nineteenth century, the time of British colonialism. The British used mainly Indian upper-class members to create Indian Civil Service, a very well organized administrative institution. The elitism in the tradition of British public services was magnified by the historical hierarchy in Indian society. Inequality was already built into society, and despite the egalitarian democratic spirit after independence, this did not change.¹¹⁶ The emerging parliamentary system after independence kept the same privileged administrative elite in office. Through this elite-structure of the bureaucracy, its commitment to modernity has not been very deep and widespread, as the hold of traditional parochial norms in administration have introduced a resistance to reform in the larger political system. The one-party system which has been a striking characteristic of the years since independence has had general effect on politicizing the bureaucracy. The bu-

¹¹⁵ Gorwala in: Park/Tinker(eds.), 1959, p.329.

¹¹⁶ Sadasivan, 1981, pp.42-51.

reaucratic elite has allowed itself to become increasingly subservient to the ruling political party, and to become a tool for furthering the interests of those under whom they serve.¹¹⁷

"The ideology of a socialist pattern of society has been used to legitimize the transfer of income from the poor to the rich through the instrumentality of the public sector. ...[the practices of the power-elite, like] social parasitism, mindless consumption, bureaucratic insensitivity, parochialism, ...arrogant elitism of the political and intellectual elites, softness toward the vested interests and sternness toward the helpless masses - these are fast becoming 'styles' or 'idioms' of operating India's formally democratic political structures."¹¹⁸

4.4 MILITARY

Independence in 1947 was accompanied by the inheritance of a large military complex, stemming from the legacy of the British Indian Army. Like in the Indian bureaucracy, the Indian military leadership consisted of highly educated officers, thoroughly trained for public service.

"The organization of the British Indian Army was particularly subject to criticism during preindependence years, and was regarded...as hopelessly feudal, inegalitarian, and caste bound."¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Maheshwari, 1978, p.344.

¹¹⁸ Pantham, 1979, pp.454+455.

¹¹⁹ Cohen, 1971, pp.169+170.

Partition ushered a period of permanent Indian-Pakistani hostility, complicated after 1959 by the presence of China as a major threat to Indian national security.¹²⁰ The effect of these hostilities was to postpone necessary change in the organizational structure of the Indian military, because troops were needed for active defense. The limited contact of politicians with the military before 1947 reinforced their suspicion of the motives and loyalties of those who had voluntarily served under the British. The military was seen as threat to the stability of the young parliamentary political system, therefore it was thoroughly indoctrinated with the principle of civilian control. In exchange for their loyal position to the political leadership, the professional Indian military was provided with socially and economically privileged positions.¹²¹ In providing support for the government, the Indian military had to be characterized as another critical institution, which served to stabilize the elite-domination in Indian politics and society, and was regarded as anachronistic and dangerous to Indian democracy.¹²²

¹²⁰ Park, 1967, p.95.

¹²¹ *ibid.*, p.74.

¹²² Cohen, 1971, p.170.

4.5 CONCLUSION

The focus on tradition in India's political culture rendered it more difficult to develop rational and legal norms of legitimacy. Instead of legal norms, the coexistence of traditional and charismatic leadership, even under the modern political structure, did not allow to create mass-based political legitimacy under a modern superstructure. The so-called democratic system kept the old traditional elite in a dominant position. This elite, an educated upper-middle-class, led the dominant Congress Party, and strongly influenced other political parties, public administration, and military. The parochial culture of the Indian society, with the vast majority of the Indian population being poor and illiterate, based the political legitimacy in India mainly on traditional values, ideologies, etc., but not on Western-style democratic ideals.

The Indian polity showed a sharp dichotomization into a small, powerful, organized sector of the political efficacious on the one hand, and a large, unorganized sector of the politically illiterate and inefficacious on the other. The institutions tended to reinforce this division. The majority of the Indian people was fed on empty, populist slogans, like democratic and socialist ideologies within the Government. The influence of ideologies on legitimacy and

legitimizing processes in India will be analyzed in depth in the next chapter.

5.0 IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Until the emergence of the modern mass society, most leaders justified their authority by claiming traditional legitimacy, governing according to past beliefs. Traditional legitimacy alone has since declined, and ideological legitimacy has become a more important justification for the right to rule.¹²³ Ideologies are a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group community.¹²⁴ Ideology justifies either the status quo, or attempts to change it.¹²⁵ Ideologies are also important to politics in that they are used to mobilize political support among the masses. A. Gouldner's analysis of ideology sees the age of ideology presuming literacy on the part of substantial publics that might be mobilized, communication and critical analysis are necessary for understanding ideologies. Ideology in this context "is both: false consciousness and rational discourse."¹²⁶

¹²³ Andrain, 1974, p.154.

¹²⁴ Plamenatz, 1970, p.15.

¹²⁵ Rodee et al., 1983, pp.76+77.

¹²⁶ Gouldner, 1976, pp.38-40.

Ideology is of substantial importance in the Indian context. The preceding chapters show the survival of the traditional class society in India, despite the formal ideologies of "democracy" and "socialism". This stratified society is dominated by a combination of feudal and capitalist vested interests in the countryside and mercantile and industrial bourgeoisie in the cities, all of them riding on the backs of hundreds of millions. The enormous gulf between Indian political illusion and Indian material reality shows the ideological complexity of political practice in India. D.Selbourne sees the disparity and disjunction between what it really is and the appearance it displays to its subjugated and exploited members, illusions, as crucial element in a class society.¹²⁷ The principal ideological props based around "tradition", "independence", "democracy", and "socialism" have served in a structure of Indian illusion which has helped to sustain a social order rooted in economic exploitation and political inequality.¹²⁸ The elite structures served to promote ideologies at the expense of polity, creating a crisis in political legitimacy.¹²⁹ This situation was exacerbated by the adult literacy rate of only 36 per

¹²⁷ Selbourne, 1979, p.29.

¹²⁸ *ibid.*, p.29.

¹²⁹ Denitch, 1979, p.34.

cent (in 1981) which did not allow rational discourse about complex political institutions and principles.¹³⁰

5.2 TRADITION

The persistence of tradition in India is one of the remarkable characteristics of its political culture; religious practices, social behavior, agricultural methods, and private and public ceremonies have changed little for hundreds of years.¹³¹

"Tradition is plucked, created, and shaped to present needs and aspirations in a given historical situation. Men refer to aspects of the past as tradition in grounding their present actions in some legitimizing principle. In this fashion tradition becomes an ideology."¹³²

The ideological framework of historical cultural and religious values has always been the basic referent of the political system in India: it acquired legitimation through priests and renouncers.¹³³ Remarkable in this respect was the convergence of the traditional Brahminic and the modern secular images in the leaders of contemporary politics. The political elite constitutes the new priesthood of modern

¹³⁰ World Tables Vol.II, 1984, p.42.

¹³¹ Park/DeMesquita, 1979, p.44.

¹³² Pantham, 1979, p.436.

¹³³ Mehta, 1983, p.224.

India, at least partly because of the exemplary and saintly styles of political leaders like Gandhi and Nehru. Traditional symbolism both legitimized the bearers of the culture's traditions and new political elites, such as members of high castes, business elites, etc.. In Indian culture high ideals have always been stressed; especially in Hindu religion, its ideological stance has always been moral. The politician was expected to be a moral man, and the masses were expected to obey the authority of their leaders. The illusion of a religiously moral life was more important than social equity and accountable political actions.¹³⁴ The governing elite maintained its domination through the manipulation of culturally sanctioned values and orientations.¹³⁵ Gandhi for example used his position as a saintly person to overshadow fragmentations in Indian society, leading the national movement which resulted in independence from the British colonial rule. In the long run, without his charisma, fragmentation caused considerable constraints to national unity and legitimacy. Later on, the dominant Congress Party under Nehru used independence and its connection to Gandhi as ideological backup to justify their power position.

¹³⁴ Kothari, 1970, pp.265+266.

¹³⁵ Pantham, 1979, p.436.

"While it has been possible for the elites of modern India to utilize the ambivalences of Indian traditionality for legitimizing new ideals and institutions, many antecedent traditions and orientations managed to survive in the modern period, and in some cases find a new lease on life."¹³⁶

The most persistent trait of Indian traditionality was the tendency in Hindu faith towards hierarchical segmentation. Therefore the caste system never really disappeared, despite its formal banning through the Indian Constitution. This cultural heritage led to the emergence of a mass culture in politics which was inevitably traditional.¹³⁷ Since the power-elite or the ruling class was shielded by the ideological use of the traditions of political culture in India, they established an ideological and cultural hegemony over the civil society.¹³⁸ This was one of the reasons why the Congress Party and the political elites continued to win the popular vote while pursuing policies that primarily benefited the upper-middle and upper classes.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ Kothari, 1970, pp.288+289.

¹³⁷ Mehta, 1983, p.224.

¹³⁸ Pantham, 1979, p.437.

¹³⁹ Lifschultz, 1981, pp.6+7.

5.3 DEMOCRACY

In all political systems, there is an attempt to justify and legitimize rule in terms of political values. In a parliamentary democracy, regimes are considered legitimate because they derive their powers from the consent of the government.¹⁴⁰

"Democracy...exists to the degree that there is an 'open society' in which the relation between the governors and the relation between the governors and the governed is consistent with the principle that the State is at the service of the citizens and not the citizens of the State, that the government exists for the people, not vice versa."¹⁴¹

The concept of "democracy" emerged, was observed and investigated in the capitalist "Western" industrial societies, with similar cultural roots and historical development, where the transitions from traditional types of political legitimacy to "democratic" ones occurred over long time periods.

"Bobbio, Ingrao, and Poulantzas all agree, ...[that democracy] is the result of class-struggle, of working class pushing for the extension and deepening of liberties..."¹⁴²

"Liberal democracy" as a concept embraces both a set of political institutions (popular elections, accountable govern-

¹⁴⁰ Macridis/Brown, 1968, p.147.

¹⁴¹ Sartori, 1965, p.26.

¹⁴² Carnoy, 1984, pp.170+171.

ment, majoritarian decisions, etc.), and a set of principles (civil liberties, legal equality, rule of law, etc.), which the institutions embody. The concept has thus not simply a descriptive, but also a normative function; both touch upon the relationship between a citizenry and the government.¹⁴³ The traditional definition of "democracy" with its focus on Western societies did not address the political and economical situations in the underdeveloped countries appropriately. P.Chabal and R.S.Sklar stressed the need for social equality because of the "dictatorship of material poverty", which could be observed in many of the so-called democracies in the Third World.¹⁴⁴ Participation of the masses was seen as a logical way to reach this goal. A prerequisite for participation and social and economic improvements was political legitimacy of the system. "Good government" and "democratic" participation were only possible where the political establishment was accountable for its actions. Chabal described accountability as a political concept in a system in which "the governors are institutionally held to account to those who have elected them and over whom they rule."¹⁴⁵ Accountability describes the relationship between state and civil society, therefore it helps in analyzing the Indian

¹⁴³ Thakur, 1982, p.334.

¹⁴⁴ Sklar in Chabal(ed.), 1986, p.29.

¹⁴⁵ Chabal, 1986, p.12.

society in the historical context, where the concept of "democracy" alone lacks in analytical value.

In India, "democracy" was an inheritance of British colonial rule. The struggle for independence led to the formation of a mass movement with remarkably high participatory levels, and a dominant aggregative Congress Party. With independence, opportunities for participation dwindled, and the ruling elite established a one-party-dominant state.¹⁴⁶ In addition, through the rigid hereditization of positions of political power, economic gain and intellectual pursuits, the caste system hampered political and economic modernization.¹⁴⁷

"Because of its [the government's] concern to secure electoral victory, ..., it has entered into a series of compromises with the landed interests, defeating its original objective of distributive justice. ... It has created a cleavage between rural India, where about eighty per cent of the population still lives, and the India which the urban centres represent, between a small group of people who control land and capital and those who live by them."¹⁴⁸

Therefore, the Indian political system has failed to create an economic infrastructure for democracy. It served to build

¹⁴⁶ Almond/Powell, 1988, p.511.

¹⁴⁷ Pantham, 1979, p.446.

¹⁴⁸ Mehta, 1983, p.223.

a gap between rich and poor, the specific gap between Indian "democratic" illusion and reality.¹⁴⁹ More precisely, it was

"...a gap which is governed by the objective political necessity to feed the hungry with the promise of fulfillment, and with the ideological forms which will pacify their sense of outrage. ...[The] 'ideological state apparatus' must carry out such complex tasks of political manipulation, distraction, and containment in order to maintain the stability of the Indian state and its monstrous social system."¹⁵⁰

The failure to achieve satisfactory economic development led to a crisis of political accountability, as economic failings undermined political legitimacy in India.¹⁵¹ As Lipset noted, the keystones for stability in any given democracy were political legitimacy and economic development.¹⁵²

In January 1975, as India commemorated the 25th anniversary of the Indian Republic, and Indira Gandhi began her 10th year as Prime Minister, the stability of the Indian state was threatened by "intra-class and inter-class conflicts", above all by economic crisis. The increasing number of peasant uprisings since the 70s and various disturbances due to ethnic differences proved these conflicts to be vibrant in modern India. The ongoing violence between opponents and supporters of the politics of the ruling Congress(I) under

¹⁴⁹ Seligson, 1984, p.15.

¹⁵⁰ Selbourne, 1979, p.30.

¹⁵¹ Chabal, 1986, p.12.

¹⁵² Lipset in: Connolly(ed.), 1984, p.88.

Indira Gandhi, resulted in the first assassination of an Indian cabinet member since independence in 1947. The government's response to this threat to political stability and law and order was the proclamation of a national emergency in January 1975.¹⁵³ In this context, N.D.Palmer perceived a "crisis of deterioration, and a crisis of democracy" in India, in which political opponents of the existing regime were resorting increasingly to extra-constitutional methods. With the proclamation of a national emergency, Indian democracy entered into a state of eclipse.¹⁵⁴ Prime Minister Indira Gandhi explained the state of emergency in a radio broadcast:

"The president has proclaimed an emergency. This is nothing to worry about. I am sure you are conscious of the deep and widespread conspiracy which has been brewing ever since I began to introduce certain progressive measures of benefit to the common man and woman of India. In the name of democracy it has been sought to negate the very functioning of democracy....How can any government worth the name stand by and allow the country's stability to be imperilled?"¹⁵⁵

But the state of emergency emergency was used to completely stifle political opposition and dissent - all civil political rights were suspended. In addition, widespread arrests without legal remedies, press censorship, and the use of the

¹⁵³ Selbourne, 1979, p.30.

¹⁵⁴ Palmer, 1976, p.95-100.

¹⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p.100.

Constitution to support the draconian measures that have been taken showed the real extent of democratic political culture in Indian politics.¹⁵⁶ Democratic ideology was used as necessary illusion by a tiny ruling-class clique, a dynastic faction, to claim the right to rulership over an industrializing society, the second largest civil society in the world.¹⁵⁷

The Indian emergency lasted four years and resulted in the only period in Indian modern history where the Congress Party did not achieve the majority in popular elections. In 1979, the Janata Party came to power, but could not establish a strong government because it could not remain united for long. "It was a thinly disguised coalition of five parties, each pulling in a different direction. The Janata Party got divided in 1979, ..., necessitating the holding of a fresh general election in 1980."¹⁵⁸ The Congress Party under Indira Gandhi took over again in 1980. The dynastic role of the Congress Party was apparently stronger than the perspective of a party which installed emergency five years ago, and the Congress Party was the only real alternative as the Janata Party failed to strengthen its influence. Indian democracy was on trial several times again since emergency in 1975, in

¹⁵⁶ Thakur, 1982, p.338.

¹⁵⁷ Selbourne, 1979, p.31.

¹⁵⁸ Maheshwari, 1984, p.60.

1984 when Indira Gandhi was assassinated, religious fanaticism threatened national unity and political stability. The rising violent opposition against the Indian government proved a disturbed relationship between the state and the civil society, a lack in political accountability.¹⁵⁹ Legitimate political representation was increasingly questioned under Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister. Beside the nation's prime concern of political stability and national unity, the integrity of the government and of friends and colleagues of the Prime Minister were in doubt in public mind. The scandals about purchasing of defense material combined with government corruption, discredited the ruling party and Indian democracy.¹⁶⁰

5.4 SOCIALISM

Socialism as a politico-economic doctrine had its origin in the West. The term "socialism" is the least specific of all labels in politics, and sometimes used to designate every ideology to the left of liberalism and conservatism.¹⁶¹ Therefore Indian "socialism" drew its characteristics from various socialist ideologies. Indian socialism of the early

¹⁵⁹ Chabal, 1986, p.13.

¹⁶⁰ Warjivwalla, 1988, pp.119-125.

¹⁶¹ Rodee et al., 1983, p.82.

20th century was characterized by Indian leadership, such as Mahatma Gandhi, who led the national movement against British imperialism and exploitation of the Indian masses.¹⁶² Thus, the socio-economic ideas of Mahatma Gandhi have considerably influenced Indian thought. He advocated "non-violent socialism" which was founded on morality and religion. He pleaded and strove for securing justice and human treatment to the poor and the downtrodden, and was against glaring social and economic inequalities.¹⁶³ Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India was fascinated by western liberal democratic traditions and influenced by Gandhi's ethical and moral principles, he stood for the ideals of democracy and socialism. To him, socialism was the economic and social aspect of democracy, and he passionately strove for the establishment of "democratic socialism" in India. It was under his influence that the Congress Party adopted the goal of democratic socialism.¹⁶⁴

At the Annual Session of the Congress Party in January 1955, the establishment of a "Socialist Pattern of Society" was officially been proclaimed the objective of the Government of India. It declared that

¹⁶² Advani, 1975, pp.1-7.

¹⁶³ *ibid.*, p.19.

¹⁶⁴ *ibid.*, p.22.

"planning should take place with the view to the establishment of a socialistic pattern of society, where the principal means of production are under social ownership and control, production is progressively speeded up and there is equitable distribution of national wealth."¹⁶⁵

But the economic and social development in India indicated that Nehru's ideology never succeeded in bringing benefits for the masses. By contrast, it created a substantial, elite-dominated "black economy" in providing economic incentives for the privileged, which has become a massive private sector wholly unregulated by the government.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, the four decades of development in India since independence were not much of "politically guided" development, and did not help to alleviate India's biggest problem, rural poverty.¹⁶⁷

One aspect of the so-called socialist ideology was the introduction of Green Revolution, which was designed to solve the poverty problems.¹⁶⁸ The impacts of the Green Revolution, the introduction of high yielding variety of seeds, revolutionized the production of food crops in India. The production of foodgrains increased from 83.71 million tons in

¹⁶⁵ Palmer, 1961, p.161.

¹⁶⁶ Pye, 1985, p.322.

¹⁶⁷ Kohli, 1983/84, p.649.

¹⁶⁸ Ray, 1987, p.97.

1961-62 to 108.42 million tons in 1970-71.¹⁶⁹ But because of high costs involved, small farmers could not afford to buy enough fertilizer and have therefore not been able to take advantage of the Green Revolution. The economic gap between the few and many remained unabridged, the Green Revolution tended to make the rich richer, and the poor poorer.¹⁷⁰

Poverty has been defined as the inadequate access to the basic needs, as minimum nutritional needs, and minimum income needs to buy food.¹⁷¹ This definition of poverty was based on data by the U.N. on minimum consumption to survive (in 1984). The data showed that the absolute number of poor has increased over the years, and even the percentage of population below the poverty line has not decreased. The total number of people below the poverty line increased from 302.76 million in 1977-78 to 316.84 million in 1979-80. Thus, 50 per cent of the Indian population has been living below the poverty line continuously over a long period.¹⁷² The long-term trend in population growth in India, about 2,5 per cent annually indicate a need for efficient governmental policies to fight the socioeconomic problems.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ *ibid.*, p.120.

¹⁷⁰ Baral, 1981, pp.37-39.

¹⁷¹ Cutler, 1984, p.1119.

¹⁷² Bhargava, 1987, p.23.

¹⁷³ Ray, 1987, pp.51-53.

"The existence of poverty is incompatible with the vision of an advanced, prosperous, democratic, egalitarian and just society implied in the concept of a socialist pattern of development. In fact, it holds a potential threat to the unity, integrity and independence of the country."¹⁷⁴

Between 1961 and 1971 the number of landless laborers in the country went up by 81 per cent, from 17.3 million to 31.3 million, creating a "nation within a nation".¹⁷⁵ The rural poverty on the one side, and the rapid growth of the industrial urban areas led to a dual Indian economy and society. Most of the financial and political support was put into industrial development as the main goal of overall development. The actual development showed increased industrial and economic growth, but the expected trickle-down effects did not occur. With about 80 per cent of the population still living in rural areas, and the unequal distribution of wealth and income, the gap between urban prosperity and rural poverty weighs even stronger.¹⁷⁶

An analysis of the agrarian and industrial policies that characterized India since independence showed the "spurious socialism" which played so large a part in the rhetoric of the ruling class of India. D.Selbourne talks about

¹⁷⁴ *ibid.*, p.22.

¹⁷⁵ Lifschultz, 1981, p.9.

¹⁷⁶ Bigsten, 1983, pp.70-75.

"a bastard mutation, this 'socialism' of ruling class interests in India [as] a mutant form of any truly egalitarian and fraternal ideology."¹⁷⁷

The rhetoric, but not the practice of "socialism" was used by sections of the ruling class as an instrument of ideological class domination over the oppressed masses of the people. As Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's cynical observation indicated. She told an interviewer in 1969:

"We spoke about socialism because that was what went down well with the masses....As long as we beat the drum of socialism, we'll always be in power."¹⁷⁸

The ruling class has tried to seize from the people the "weapon of theory", turning the two-edged weapon of socialism against precisely those suffering millions in whose interests it was first forged as their own instrument of struggle.¹⁷⁹

5.5 CONCLUSION

The modern ideologies of "democracy" and "socialism" which have been used by India's leaders to legitimize their political actions were characteristics of the Indian political culture after independence. Despite the rhetoric of social change, egalitarianism, etc., India's main problem, poverty

¹⁷⁷ Selbourne, 1979, p.32.

¹⁷⁸ quoted in: Lifschultz, 1981, p.7.

¹⁷⁹ Selbourne, 1979, p.32.

of the masses, did not improve. The coexistence of forms of parliamentary, and liberal democracy and socialism, with extremes of authoritarianism and violence showed that the colonial state was characteristically imbedded in the postcolonial. Tradition and modernity existed side by side. The manipulation of political docility, political parochialism and false consciousness of the masses indicated a modern version of the old political culture, highlighting the change-resisting role of India's tradition of political culture. As illusion about the real interests of the Government began to fade, political stability and national unity was at stake.

6.0 INDIA AFTER INDIRA GANDHI (1984 - TODAY)

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Despite the development of a so-called "democratic" and "socialist" political ideology, the social behavior of the majority of Indians is determined in many ways by the impact of religion, caste, and more recently ethno-national relations.¹⁸⁰

The very traditional forms of political culture with its hierarchical social structure led to the domination of the top 20 per cent of the population over the majority.¹⁸¹ Economically, this constellation of a privileged few left the vast amount of the Indian population under severe conditions of poverty, malnutrition, etc.. Intensive poverty is concentrated among backward classes, low castes, etc. mostly in rural areas, while about 10 to 15 per cent of the total population usurps most of the GDP.¹⁸² Economic alienation of many has been the source of agrarian unrest in village India. Peasant uprisings have mostly been economic in origin; sometimes economic demands have been mixed up with social causes

¹⁸⁰ Kotovsky, 1984, p.1140.

¹⁸¹ Bhagavan, 1987, p.56.

¹⁸² Ray, 1987, p.503.

like the demand for the improvement in the living conditions of the members of the scheduled castes, etc..¹⁸³

Especially after Rajiv Gandhi became Prime Minister in 1984, there was a great deal of turbulence in the country. The various cases of economic, cultural, and ethnic based unrest indicate a threat to modern India's political stability and national unity.¹⁸⁴

6.2 STATE POLICY, POVERTY AND POLITICAL STABILITY

The problem of poverty is severe in India and has existed for a considerable period of time. Three decades of planned economic development have failed to improve the living conditions of India's poor.

"The paradox of deep-seated poverty in India amid all the din about economic growth is not difficult to fathom. (1) The rate of economic growth is estimated in absolute terms. Weighed against inflationary and demographic pressures, this gets diluted in real terms to less than a half. (2) With investment heavily in favour of capital-intensive industries, not much of the resources can be made available for use in consumption goods/wage goods industries. ... It appears as if poverty has been built into the growth strategy itself."¹⁸⁵

¹⁸³ Baral, 1981, p.39.

¹⁸⁴ Ali, 1985, p.300.

¹⁸⁵ Ray, 1987, pp.501+502, and table in appendix.

All political attempts to improve lower-class economic conditions affected the distribution of valued social goods. The nationalist political elite have wielded power through a dominant party in control of a "democratic" regime.¹⁸⁶ Higher growth rates, and therefore higher per capita income were not sufficient to change this situation for the poor. Because economic growth alone did not solve the severe problems of poverty in India, the more fundamental issue concerned the role of the public authorities in economic development.¹⁸⁷ Poverty has long been considered a significant political issue in India. Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru, for example, were, at last ideologically always committed to the cause of the poor. Indira Gandhi also made garibi hatao ("eradicate poverty") a central slogan in her mobilization strategy, which Rajiv Gandhi carried on.¹⁸⁸ The growth rate in real per capita GNP (average growth rate between 1961-1981) in India was at 1.4 per cent, whereas population growth figures indicate 2.5 per cent (average growth rate between 1971-1981).¹⁸⁹ Income distribution figures showed that the highest 10 per cent of the population shared about 35 per cent of the total income, the higher 20 per cent of the population shared about

¹⁸⁶ Kohli, 1987, p.8.

¹⁸⁷ *ibid.*, p.1.

¹⁸⁸ *ibid.*, p.3.

¹⁸⁹ Ray, 1987, p.54 + p.499.

50 per cent of the total income (in 1975-76); therefore the gap between rich and poor and class contradictions underlie the country's entire political life.¹⁹⁰

The state's role in India's poverty problems was significant in the four decades of "democratically"-guided development. It has taken and kept the lead in setting priorities and in formulating and implementing policies, but two of the largest sectors - agriculture and internal trade - together constituting the major part of the Indian economy, have been allowed to remain outside state control.¹⁹¹ One reason that the poor situation of the masses remained a dominating factor in Indian society was the partnership of the public and private sectors in controlling and running India's so-called mixed economy has been consistent over the last four decades. This partnership of dominant political, economical and social actors

"consisted of the rich farmers, the middle peasantry, the industrial and financial capitalists, the top layers of the state bureaucracy (including the officers in the armed forces), This dominating collection of social and economic forces represents the interests of the middle and upper classes, ... - a conglomeration of about 150 million people forming the top 20 percent of the total population. These groups have formed the support base of not only the Congress Party, which has ruled India at the center and in most of the 22 states of the federal union for more than 35 years, but also of several other non-Communist parties which have been

¹⁹⁰ *ibid.*, p.25 and table in appendix.

¹⁹¹ Bhagavan, 1987, p.56.

in government for brief periods at the center and in the states. In this sense of sharing power ... this collection acts as a loose defacto coalition. ... The rich and middle farmers control the rural votes (75 percent of India's population is still rural); the industrial and financial capitalists, ... finance the parties; the white-collar workers and the high-wage organized blue-collar workers, ... can halt the state machinery and modern infrastructure"192

In this ruling coalition, the state has played the role of mediator and arbitrator, thus ensuring for itself the dominant position.

The social behavior of the majority of Indians was heavily determined by traditional values like caste, religion, and ethnical differences. Thus caste and religious affiliation was widely used by bourgeois politicians as an important tool to win election votes. Caste stratification coincided with class stratification, providing regulation of the social behavior of the masses.

As the poverty problems continued unabated, the economic and "democratic" arrangements of the political authorities which buttressed their legitimacy began to fade. Conflicts frequently come to the surface mediated by "traditional" social conflicts.¹⁹³ In recent years there have been eruptions of killings, expressing socioeconomic and class contradictions, and traditional, ideological contradictions. Especially the Sikh uprisings in the Punjab threatened the

¹⁹² *ibid.*, p.57.

¹⁹³ Kotovsky, 1987, pp.1140+1141.

political stability, for example, after Indira Gandhi had been assassinated by Sikh terrorists in 1984, conflicts between Hindus and Sikhs became increasingly violent. The genesis of the Sikh-Hindu polarization of the 1980s dated back to British colonial times. The British created the differences among Sikhs (a special group inside the Hindu religion) and normal Hindus. After the partition of India in 1947, when Pakistan was carved out of India, the Sikhs in the Punjab were the worst losers. The Sikhs had to work especially hard to develop economically, because of land losses etc.. Political decisions, as for example arbitrary border lining, under Indira Gandhi led to emerging Sikh separatism and anti-Hindu propaganda. After her assassination, as the Hindu-Sikh violence reached a peak, the Indian Army was heavily involved in trying to stabilize this critical area.¹⁹⁴ As S.P. Huntington mentioned, the stability of a political system is dependent on the perception of its legitimacy by the masses.¹⁹⁵ The increasing number of violent outbreaks showed that rhetorical promises and repressive exclusion from politics lost their illusionary power and led to a variety of conflicts threatening India's political stability and national unity.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ Gupte, 1985, pp.111-143.

¹⁹⁵ Huntington, 1968, p.441.

¹⁹⁶ Bhagavan, 1987, p.58.

6.3 REGIONAL CONFLICTS, STABILITY AND NATIONAL UNITY

Agrarian unrest, economically based, has never reached the stage of mobilization where the unity of the entire country was threatened, unlike the regional conflicts in Punjab, Kashmir, etc. which had more ethnic and ideological reasoning. In 1985, troops were brought into the western state of Gujarat to maintain law and order following riots to protest food, job and education quotas for disadvantaged castes and tribes. Scores of people died in the ugly confrontation of troops and demonstrators.¹⁹⁷ In some parts of India, mainly in the northeast and Punjab, ethnic subnationalism has given rise to violent movements.¹⁹⁸ R. Kothari wrote:

"We have entered a period in this country where there is what I have called a negative deadlock between the state and the people. A deadlock caused by the breakdown in notions of institution, institutions of democracy, institutions that had something to do with social justice like our commitment to socialism, such institutions as would bring about greater national integration which was however sensitive to the great diversity of the country."¹⁹⁹

1987 witnessed increasingly violent assertions for autonomy by ethnic and religious minorities and by the poor. Violence

¹⁹⁷ Gupte, 1985, p.38.

¹⁹⁸ Rubin, 1987, p.385.

¹⁹⁹ quoted in: Rubin, 1987, p.388.

in the Punjab was on the rise, while Nepali-speaking Indians, and "tribal" movements in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Kashmir were fighting for autonomy.²⁰⁰ The whole Indian subcontinent showed signs of increasing conflict, in the Punjab(northwest), the Sikhs fought for greater autonomy; in Kashmir (north), local Muslims were desirous for independence from India; in Assam (east), local tribes massacred Muslims; in Andra Pradesh (south), a regional ethnic party was clamoring for greater state rights; and in Maharashtra (west), Hindus and Muslims had murdered one another.²⁰¹

Rajiv Gandhi's rule was characterized by an escalation in Sikh terrorism, spreading in border regions of the Punjab, and creating a severe problem for national security and political stability, aggravated by several violent uprisings like in the above mentioned regions. The political legitimacy of the Indian Government was at stake, as the national unity was threatened by various groups all over India.²⁰²

6.4 CONCLUSION

Within the context of continuing poverty, during Rajiv Gandhi's rule, the masses reacted with increasing opposition.

²⁰⁰ Wariavwalla, 1988, p.122.

²⁰¹ Gupte, 1985, p.146.

²⁰² Andrain, 1981, p.268.

The illusory character of so-called "democratic" and "socialist" politics lost its meaning. The mediating structures of representation that could provide means for conflict resolution have broken down, for example the Congress system, etc., so that conflict takes the form of direct confrontation to which the state responds with violence. State violence, a fading national unity and political stability are signs of a lack in political legitimacy of the Indian Government. Therefore, it is very likely that political changes will occur in the near future. Changes, such as a loss of the Congress Party in the next national elections in 1989, or a new emergency period, to stop the separation movements in several states, etc..

7.0 CONCLUSION

India, like other countries in Asia and Africa, is mainly an old society in a new state. Before World War II most non-Western territories were under colonial domination. The traditional rulers, who still exercised dominant power at the local level, were usually allied with the colonial civil servants. As a result two institutional forms, traditional and colonial, jointly governed these areas. The twentieth-century nationalist movements in Asia, Africa, etc. were directed by the indigenous peoples themselves. Most national leaders lived in old societies and strove through their independence movements to establish new administrative institutions. Many of these regimes which received political independence have not yet realized a strong sense of national identity. Thus the main problem for political leaders throughout Asia, Africa, etc. has centered around the creation of a modern state and a new national identity in a traditional society. The historical political development of India reflected this scenario almost identically. In particular, the question of national identity was of great importance in India, considering its highly fragmented society.

The main objective of this work is to show the impact of the persisting traditional political and social values under a modern political superstructure.

In chapters one and two, I tried to prove that traditional values remained vibrant in legitimizing political leadership in India, and that "democracy" was not rooted within its cultural tradition. My analysis finds that, despite the dramatic change from colonial imperialist rule of the British to a modern so-called parliamentary democracy after independence in 1947, political culture and socialization processes remained heavily steeped in traditional values. Political leaders, in and outside the dominant party, based their political legitimacy strongly on historical values as religion, caste, etc.. Particularly, Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Indira Gandhi received their public support mainly because of saintly and charismatic values. This focus on tradition in India's political culture rendered it more difficult to develop rational and legal forms of legitimacy. Instead of legal norms the coexistence of traditional and charismatic leadership did not allow the creation of mass-based political legitimacy. Tradition and modernity existed side by side, but the modern political institutions did not lead to a change in India's political culture. Traditional values still legitimize the political leaders, and are used by them to keep the status quo of political, economic and social inequality.

In chapters three and four, I tried to prove the persisting domination of the masses by the small economic and political elite, all within the context of political change, and

modern ideologies, such as "democracy" and "socialism". The following conclusions can be made. Over the last four decades India has been ruled by an alliance of a nationalist political elite with entrepreneurial classes capable of stimulating economic growth. With a single dominant party in control of a so-called democratic regime, redistributive goals have not been followed appropriately. Profits have accrued only to a small minority of middle and upper-middle classes; despite institutional changes, cultural fragmentation continued to dominate India's social and political life. Coercion and economic incentives were important resources for socio-economic development in India. The ruling alliance between political authorities and the more dynamic, propertied classes provided economic incentives to propertied groups to buttress its own political support. On the other hand, this alliance of privileged groups created a situation where the government was not accountable for its actions, and where political legitimacy was questioned by the persisting poor economic situation for the masses.

In chapter five, I tried to prove that the persistence of traditional values, dominating political and social life in India, would not allow the creation of national unity, and served to cause a crisis in political legitimacy. The crisis of legitimacy, within the context of ethnic and economic problems, threatened political stability in India. The analysis revealed that this coexistence of economic, social

and political inequality, poverty, malnutrition, etc., and forms of parliamentary and liberal democracy and socialism showed the illusory character of the modern political ideology and was the reason for the inefficiency of the Indian development strategies. The persistence of traditional political legitimacy served to keep the masses under control of the old hierarchical order. But the poor economic situation for the majority of the Indian population led to an aggravation of old ethnic and religious conflicts, which had not been solved for centuries.

The modern state was not able to create the necessary national identity. The increase of peasant uprisings in several states, ethnic based violent fightings, especially in the Punjab, indicate a threat to political stability and national unity. The domination of the traditional hierarchy persists until today. Within this domination, the problems of poverty, malnutrition, population growth, etc. can not be addressed appropriately to benefit the masses. The first thirty years after independence proved that traditional and ideological values were able to overshadow the failures of the government to provide political and economic equality. In more recent years, legitimacy was increasingly questioned, as the illusory character of the "democratic" and "socialist" ideology became more visible.

The increasing number of violent conflicts, especially on ethnic and religious basis, such as in Punjab and Kashmir,

show severe strains to political stability in India. Considering the upcoming elections in 1989, India's actual government under Rajiv Gandhi will face problems to stay in power. In addition, several federal states requested autonomy from India, which could lead to a splitting of India's national unity.

The value of my findings is definitely limited. On the one hand, I can surely conclude that the persistence of traditional social and political values in the Indian society served as obstacles for political and social development. In addition, the concept of political legitimacy proved to be useful, but is surely not the only possible and appropriate analytical tool in the context of development in India.

On the other hand, predictions are very difficult from the basis of a literature analysis, and because of the numerous variables influencing development. Another weak point of this kind of research is, that it does not provide exact measures, or concrete answers, which could lead to more satisfying results.

For future studies about development in India, I would suggest to focus on some of the newer opposition parties, as for example the Communist Party (CPI) which rules in the state of West Bengal since 1977. This left-of-center regime did actually penetrate the power-structures of the traditional rural societies. Research on this area is so far not sufficient, but improvements in the socioeconomic conditions

of the masses indicate that efforts were undertaken to improve the distribution of valued goods. Future studies would have to find out whether this political constellation was a possible alternative for India in general.

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APPENDIX A. APPENDIX

A.1 BASIC DATA ON INDIA

BASIC DATA: INDIA

LAND AREA: 3,287,590 km²; including 54 per cent agricultural and 20 per cent forests

POPULATION: 683 mn (March 1981 census); 755 mn (mid-1986 estimate)

MAIN TOWNS: Population in mn, 1981

Calcutta	9.2	Madras	4.3
Bombay	8.2	Bangalore	2.9
Delhi	5.7	Hyderabad	2.5

CLIMATE: Tropical; cool in highlands and mild in winter

WEATHER IN NEW DELHI (altitude 218 m): hottest month, May, 26-41°C (average daily minimum and maximum); coldest month, January, 7-21°C; driest month, November, 3 mm average monthly rainfall; wettest month, July, 180 mm

LANGUAGES: Hindi and English are the most widely used, but there are many others

RELIGIONS: Hindu (83 per cent); Moslem (11 per cent); Christian (3 per cent); Sikh (2 per cent); Buddhist (1 per cent)

PUBLIC HOLIDAYS: January 1 and 26; Good Friday; Easter Monday; August 15; October 2; December 25, 26, 31

MEASURES: Metric system. Numbers are frequently written in lakhs (one hundred thousand) and crore (10 mn)

CURRENCY: Rupees (Rs) = 100 paisa. Annual average exchange rate 1986: \$1 = Rs12.6


FISCAL YEAR: April 1-March 31

TIME: 5 hours 30 minutes ahead of GMT

²⁰³ source: Country Profile, 1987, p.2.

A.2 INDIA BEFORE THE PARTITION IN 1947

204



204 source: Park/DeMesquita, 1979, p.15.

A.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN BRITISH INDIA


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* The Development of Self-Government in British India			
	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT		
	EXECUTIVE	LEGISLATURE	
1861 <small>Indian Councils Act</small>	<small>Viceroy Council of 5 all British</small>	<small>Legislative Council 12 government officials, British 6 non-officials, appointed, British & Indian</small>	1861 <small>Indian Councils Act</small>
1909 <small>Morley-Minto Reforms</small>	<small>Viceroy Council of 7 1 Indian 6 British</small>	<small>Legislative Council 27 elected members, Indian 36 government officials, British 3 non-officials, appointed, Indian</small>	1909 <small>Morley-Minto Reforms</small>
1919 <small>Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms</small>	<small>Viceroy Council of 7 3 Indians 4 British <small>(The provisions of the 1935 Act, which would have federated British India with the Indian States ruled by the Princes, never came into force.)</small></small>	<small>Council of State (Upper House) 34 elected members: 12 Indian, 2 British 20 government officials: 3 Indian, 17 British 6 non-officials: 5 Indian, 1 British</small>	1919 <small>Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms</small>
1935 <small>Government of India Act</small>		<small>Legislative Assembly (Lower House) 105 elected members: 97 Indian, 8 British 26 govt. officials: 5-10 Indian, 21-16 British 14 non-officials: Indian</small>	1935 <small>Government of India Act</small>
1946 <small>First All-Indian Viceroy's Council</small>	<small>Viceroy Council of 14 all Indian, representing major Indian parties</small>	<small>Council of State and Legislative Assembly (practically as above)</small>	1946 <small>First All-Indian Viceroy's Council</small>
1947		INDIAN INDEPENDENCE ACT	1947

205 source: Palmer, 1961, pp.44+45.

A.4 INDIA AFTER THE PARTITION IN 1947

206



206 source: Palmer, 1961, pp.140+141.

A.5 RELIGIONS

207

At the 1971 Census the population of the major religious communities was as follows:

Hindus	453,292,086	(82.72%)
Muslims	61,417,934	(11.21%)
Christians	14,223,382	(2.60%)
Sikhs	10,378,797	(1.89%)
Buddhists	3,812,325	(0.70%)
Jains	2,604,646	(0.47%)
Others	2,220,639	(0.41%)
<hr/>		
Total	547,949,809	
<hr/>		

207 source: Raghavan, 1976, p.125.

A.6 LANGUAGES

208

The fifteen languages of India listed in Schedule VIII of the Constitution, with the number of speakers as ascertained in the 1971 Census, are as follows:

(1) Hindi	162.57 million
(2) Bengali	44.79 "
(3) Telugu	44.75 "
(4) Marathi	42.25 "
(5) Tamil	37.69 "
(6) Urdu	28.60 "
(7) Gujarati	25.87 "
(8) Malayalam	21.94 "
(9) Kannada	21.70 "
(10) Oriya	19.85 "
(11) Punjabi	16.44 "
(12) Assamese	8.95 "
(13) Kashmiri	2.43 "
(14) Sindhi	1.67 "
(15) Sanskrit	2212 persons

208 source: Raghavan, 1976, p.123.

A.7 PER CAPITA REAL NATIONAL INCOME

209

(Revised series at 1970-71 prices)

Year	Rupees	Index (base: 1950-51 = 100)	Percent change
1950-51	466.0	100.0	—
1951-52	468.1	100.5	0.5
1952-53	475.8	102.1	1.6
1953-54	497.5	106.8	4.6
1954-55	500.7	107.4	0.6
1955-56	507.7	108.9	1.4
1956-57	524.8	112.6	3.4
1957-58	503.3	108.0	-4.1
1958-59	534.2	114.6	6.1
1959-60	532.3	114.2	-0.3
1960-61	558.8	119.9	5.0
1961-62	563.9	121.0	0.9
1962-63	559.8	120.1	-0.7
1963-64	576.4	123.7	3.0
1964-65	607.8	130.4	5.4
1965-66	558.8	119.9	-8.1
1966-67	551.5	118.3	-1.3
1967-68	587.3	126.0	6.5
1968-69	589.1	126.4	0.3
1969-70	612.6	131.5	4.0
1970-71	632.8	135.8	3.3
1971-72	626.6	134.5	-1.0
1972-73	604.1	129.6	-3.6
1973-74	621.2	133.3	2.8
1974-75	617.6	132.5	-0.6
1975-76	661.1	141.9	7.1
1976-77	649.5	139.4	-1.8
1977-78	693.2	148.8	6.7
1978-79	715.8	153.6	3.2
1979-80	662.5	142.2	-7.4
1980-81	696.8	149.5	5.2
1981-82	715.3	153.5	2.7
1982-83*	712.1	152.8	-0.4
1983-84+	748.4	160.6	5.1

Annual percentage growth between:

1950-51 and 1960-61 ... 1.8

1960-61 and 1970-71 ... 1.2

1970-71 and 1983-84 ... 1.4

1950-51 and 1983-84 ... 1.4

209 source: Ray, 1987, p.501.

A.8 INCOME DISTRIBUTION

210

INCOME DISTRIBUTION

Year	Percentage share of household income, by percentile groups of households					
	Lowest 20%	Second quintile	Third quintile	Fourth quintile	Higher 20%	Highest 10%
1975-76	7.0	9.2	13.9	20.5	49.4	33.6

210 source: Ray, 1987, p.25.

A.9 CURRENCY (RUPEES PER US DOLLAR)

211

Rupees per US Dollar
(period average)


	<u>Calendar year</u>	<u>Fiscal year^a</u>		<u>Calendar year</u>	<u>Fiscal year^a</u>
1976	8.960	8.653	1982	9.455	8.929
1977	8.739	8.939	1983	10.099	9.629
1978	8.193	8.562	1984	11.363	10.312
1979	8.126	8.206	1985	12.369	11.862
1980	7.863	8.076	1986	12.611	12.235
1981	8.659	7.893	1987	...	12.786

^a Ending March 31 of year stated.

211 source: Country Profile, 1987, p.10.

A.10 INDIA: COMPARATIVE SIZE OF POPULATION


212



212 source: Ray, 1987, p.5.

A.11 INDIA AND WORLD DEMOGRAPHY

213



213 source: Ray, 1987, p.43.

VITA

Markus Wolfram Brombacher was born in Loerrach, West-Germany on the 11th of April 1964. After attending Hans-Thoma-Gymnasium in Loerrach, he graduated with the German equivalent of a bachelor's degree in Public Administration and Political Science from the Konstanz University in 1985. He continued two more years toward the completion of the Diploma in the same department. After starting his studies in the United States, he fulfilled the requirements for a Master's degree in Political Science at VPI&SU in the Fall of 1988.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Markus Brombacher". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned centrally below the typed text.