Global Social Disorganization:
Applying Social Disorganization Theory to the Study of Terrorist Organizations

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Abstract

The lack of a consistent theoretical framework for understanding the social context in which terrorist organizations emerge and operate stifles the systematic study of terrorism and inhibits the ability of the social sciences to influence international policy. To address this limitation, the present study begins by defining terrorism, and the related phenomena of terror, terrorist, and terrorist organization. As classification is necessary for any scientific investigation, typologies of terrorism currently found in the academic literature are reviewed next. Finally, a criminological framework is applied to the study of terrorist organizations and the environments in which they operate. The primary purpose of the present investigation is to determine whether a classic criminological theory, social disorganization theory, can be applied to the study of terrorist organizations. Drawing from several cross-national data sources, this study operationalizes Shaw and McKay's (1942; 1969) original measures of social disorganization, residential stability, ethnic heterogeneity, and socioeconomic status, at the macro-level of the nation-state. A curvilinear relationship between measures of social disorganization and the hosting of terrorist organizations in each nation-state is predicted. That is, terrorist organizations are expected to require some degree of social organization to operate but, beyond a certain point, social organization is predicted to have an inhibitive effect on the functioning of these organizations, as strong institutions emerge to control this and other forms of collective violence.

Dedication

To my Mother, my greatest supporter,
who has always encouraged me to push my ideas further.
And, to Rachel, who kept me grounded through it all.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The terrorist events of 11 September 2001 have drastically affected global politics. Over the past several years, governments have directed considerable attention toward counterterrorism efforts. For example, on 8 September 2006 UN member states adopted the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. This resolution outlined the plan of action for all member states and addressed the primary concerns of the UN general assembly, namely: the spread of terrorism, preventing and combating terrorism, building states' capacities to aid in this process, and protecting human rights (United Nations General Assembly 2006).

Additionally, national budgets have adjusted to reflect the security interests of the international community. As Lomborg and Sandler (2008: 1) point out, "global annual spending on homeland security has increased by about US$70 billion since 2001." Based on President Obama's budget plan, it does not seem likely that this trend will reverse anytime in the near future. The President's plan reflects U.S. interests in three ways: by providing "first-year funding for a multi-year counterterrorism and law enforcement assistance program;" by strengthening the National Intelligence Program (NIP); and by directly influencing the budgets

of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of State and the Environmental Protection Agency (United States Office of Management and Budget 2009).

However, the academic community has, for the most part, not responded in kind. Few serious efforts have been made in the social sciences to systematically study the phenomenon of terrorism (notable exceptions from recent academic literature include: Arce M. and Sandler 2005; Bergensen and Lizardo 2004; Black 2004; Hawdon and Ryan 2009; Lizardo and Bergesen 2002; Lizardo 2008; Oberschall 2004; Rosendorff and Sandler 2005; Sandler and Enders 2003). This lack of academic analysis of terrorism may largely be due to the lack of a consistent theoretical framework for understanding terrorism. This shortcoming stifles the systematic study of terrorism and limits the ability of the social sciences to influence international policy regarding terrorism. The current research provides a starting point for the systematic study of the environments in which terrorist organizations operate.

The purpose of the present study is to investigate whether a classic theory of crime, social disorganization theory, can be applied to the study of terrorist organizations. In their early investigation, Shaw and McKay (1942; 1969) identified three structural factors capable of explaining the distribution of "delinquency areas" across the city of Chicago: residential mobility, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, and poverty. They, along with other researchers (see Kornhauser 1978; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997), posited that these factors influence the ability of community members to act collectively and build strong institutions capable of meeting the needs of the particular community. These institutions serve to both provide legitimate opportunities for community members and control criminal activity, which is disruptive to the organizing process. The present investigation employs this same logic at the level of the nation-state to the study of terrorist organizations. It is predicted that the

relationship between the degree of social disorganization and the number of terrorist organizations, both domestic and international, operating in a nation-state will be curvilinear. The following data sources will be utilized to test the predicted relationship: Global Terrorism Database (GTD), Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs), World Index of Social Progress (WISP), CIA World Factbook, the UN World Migrant Stock (UNWMS), and the UN Demographic Yearbook (UNDYB).

If successful, the present study would offer support for an environment-oriented classification system that could potentially be derived from social-structural data, which is more objective and attainable than the information required by typologies of terrorism currently found in the academic literature. The actual formulation of an environment-oriented typology is, however, beyond the scope of the present study and will not be attempted herein. Though several typologies can be found in the literature, all suffer from at least one of the following setbacks: (1) the required data is impossible to ascertain, (2) the explanatory variables are non-quantifiable, (3) the categories are not exhaustive, and/or (4) the categories are not exclusive. As classification is necessary for the systematic study of any phenomenon, the purpose here is to highlight these limitations and provide insight toward a typology of terrorist organizations that can withstand empirical testing.

Nonetheless, several issues surrounding the study of terrorism, and related phenomena, must be addressed before the present investigation can proceed. For the most part, definitions found in the academic literature either muddle together the distinct but related concepts of terror, terrorism, terrorist, and terrorist organization or are avoided all together. Thus, the necessary first step in the present investigation is to derive definitions of each concept that can be applied to the systematic study of these phenomena.

Chapter 2

Defining Terror, Terrorism, Terrorist, and Terrorist Organization

One of the longstanding problems surrounding the systematic study of terror, terrorism, terrorist, and terrorist organization has been the lack of consistent definitions. The failure to construct a comprehensive definition of terrorism stems primarily from apprehension on the part of social scientists to address the concept (Gibbs 1989) and the failure of researchers, the media, and governments alike to meaningfully distinguish between the concepts of terror, terrorism, terrorist, and terrorist organization. These conceptual issues stifle the scientific study of terrorism, making it difficult to discuss terrorism in a meaningful way.

2.1   Avoiding Definitions

Laqueur (1977, 1987) suggests that a comprehensive definition of terrorism is unfeasible. Further, he claims a definition is not even necessary for studying terrorism. Unfortunately, this tradition of avoidance continues, resulting in countless examples where researchers discuss terrorism as if it exists in some abstract reality. In fact, less than 12.8% of scholarly articles with

the word terrorism or terrorist in their title appearing in peer-reviewed journals of the social sciences between 1964 and 2009 explicitly use the words define, defined, or definition anywhere in their text.[1] While many empirical studies rely solely on the definition provided in the dataset under investigation, and thus skirt the issue, the general discussion of terrorism continues to treat terrorism, and related phenomena, in abstract terms. In many cases, definitions of terror, terrorism, terrorist, or terrorist organization are avoided altogether. Such avoidance inhibits the ability to arrive at comprehensive definitions of these phenomena, which could reduce the heightened levels of bias currently found in the data collection process.

Many academic researchers concerned with terrorism, and related phenomena, utilize data, and thus also definitions, from four sources: International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, 1968-1977 (ITERATE 2), Global Terrorism Database 1.1, 1970-1997 (GTD1), Global Terrorism Database II (GTD2), and/or World Incidents Tracking System (WITS). Of these sources, ITERATE is the most methodologically rigorous, requiring multiple levels of independent confirmation for each terrorist incident. However, its utility is hindered by access restrictions for all years beyond 1977. Nonetheless, all of these data sources, including ITERATE, suffer from heavy reliance on media resources and government reports. Turk (2004: 271-272) emphasizes the importance of understanding that these media and government sources provide *interpretations* of real world events and that "these interpretations are not unbiased attempts to depict truth but rather conscious efforts to manipulate perceptions to promote certain interests at the expense of others." At the present, it is still necessary to continue utilizing these data sources. However, researchers should proceed with caution, especially where definitions of

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[1] Out of the 532 peer reviewed articles returned by Sociological Abstracts (Fall 1964 – Spring 2009) with the words "terrorism" or "terrorist" in their title, 68 also use the words "define", "definition", or "defined" anywhere in their text (Retrieved June 29, 2009).

terrorism, or related concepts, are concerned, as the data collection process used for many datasets tends to be federally funded and heavily derived from media sources. This may require the tedious manipulation of variables to meet the researchers own definitions.

This methodological impasse should not preclude future research on terrorism. Again, terrorism is a socially constructed phenomenon with real world manifestations that negatively affect human lives. It should be the goal of academic research on terrorism to improve our understanding of this phenomenon in an effort to help produce effective solutions. While researchers must continue relying on the currently available data, they can play a more active role in this process by generating definitions of terrorism, and its associated terms, capable of withstanding empirical tests. Subscribing to the definitions provided by the data sets under examination, or avoiding definitions all together, propagates the biases that currently dominate the data sources. The practice of avoidance also restricts the search for meaningful data not derived directly from incidents of terrorism, including the social, economic, and political contexts within which they occur. By addressing this deficiency, academic researchers can help guide future data collection efforts and improve methodological techniques, thus reducing bias. Such efforts can lead to meaningful results that may provide solutions, rather than conclusions that merely confirm the data from which they are derived.

2.2   Confusing Terminology

Avoiding definitions of terror, terrorism, terrorist, or terrorist organization compounds with the muddling of these concepts by encouraging discussion in abstract terms. As discussed above, there is a long history in the social sciences of discussing terrorism in this way. Such abstract treatment remained largely unnoticed and inconsequential until the events of 11

September 2001, when the terrorist organization, al-Qaida, demonstrated to the international community the potential magnitude of a terrorist attack on one of the world's most heavily armed and well-defended nation-states. Besides raising the demand for scholarly research in the field (Enders and Sandler 2006), these events provided an opportunity for media and government agents to reify the distinct concepts of terror, terrorism, terrorist, and terrorist organization in a manner that targeted enemies of the United States (Tilly 2004).

Rather than systematically linking these concepts, even when terrorists and terrorist organizations are defined solely by their position relative to the nation-state, this reification actually served to abstract the discussion of terrorism even further. That is, by muddling terminology and ascribing political characteristics to previously abstract concepts this process abstracted those concepts even further.

In the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001, it became imperative to distinguish between terror, terrorism, terrorist, and terrorist organization. However, the reification process, as it was carried out, inhibited this reality. The muddling of terminology, which this process entailed, promoted research that did not distinguish between terror, terrorism, terrorist, and terrorist organization. Rather, it facilitated discussion, both academically and generally, of each concept interchangeably. This undoubtedly contributed to the further abstraction of these terms. Beyond this, however, the reification process also put pressure on researchers to find solutions that would undermine the operations of political adversaries rather than providing incentives to distinguish between terrorism and related concepts in a systematic fashion, which could facilitate an understanding of the contexts in which these phenomena arise. Thus, while it became increasingly necessary to make these distinctions, it became increasingly difficult to do so, and previously abstract terms became abstracted even further. Academic researchers have played a

large role in this abstraction by avoiding definitions, and muddling related terminology, thereby increasing the difficulty of distinguishing between concepts in empirically meaningful ways. It is for these reasons that definitions of each concept, terror, terrorism, terrorist, and terrorist organization are provided next.

2.3   Terror

Generally, terror is an emotional state of intense fear that can afflict the well-being of a wide range of social actors, from individuals to entire nation-states. Because of the breadth of psychological phenomena that constitute terror, it is necessary for the purposes of the present study to define terror as it pertains to the study of terrorism.

Researchers in the field of terrorism tend to overlook the work of Ernest Becker (1973), who associated terror, as a psychological phenomenon, with the fear of death. He posited that institutions evolve in society to protect the human desire of self-preservation and promote the denial of death, even if only for the symbolic self. Arguably, this understanding of terror can be directly applied to the study of terror as it pertains to terrorism. It is from Becker's conceptualization that Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon (1986) derived Terror Management Theory (TMT). According to TMT, "cultures and their attendant worldviews serve to buffer anxiety (and prevent terror) arising from the thoughts humans invariably have about their own mortality" (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway 2003: 349). From this perspective, terror can be seen as heightened anxiety in regard to self-preservation. Further, TMT suggests that such anxiety will be intensified by attacks against the cultural elements and social institutions that safeguard society from terror.

The association between terror and existential anxiety, though rarely addressed explicitly, can be found throughout the terrorism literature. For instance, most discussions of terrorism describe terrorist attacks involving death, injury, or the loss of property as "random," "unimaginable," or "spectacular," what Lizardo (2008) refers to as "extranormal" violence, while attacks against the same elements of self-preservation by non-terrorist sources are generally discussed in more conventional terms. Undeniably, terrorists rely on this sort of portrayal, which they propagate by regularly changing the locations from which they attack, the locations that they target, and the methods that they use to attack. However, the media also plays a large role in this process by focusing on these uncertainties and presenting them in a fantastical light (Kupperman, van Opstal, and Williamson 1982). Given the findings of Feifel and Nagy (1981), that fear of death is significantly enhanced by depictions at the fantasy level, this portrayal by the media may have disturbing ramifications. Taken together, these findings suggest that *terror, as it pertains to terrorism, can be seen as heightened existential anxiety derived from uncertainties, such as source, target, and method*. These uncertainties weaken and undermine the ability of culture and social institutions to reduce existential anxiety in society.

2.4   Terrorism

Terrorism is the politico-military strategy of eliciting terror through the use of non-routine war tactics (Lizardo 2008). Again, it is the non-routine nature of terrorism, as opposed to the ritualized nature of war between nation-states (Giddens 1987), that societies are ill prepared to cope with. This combines with the use, or threat, of violence to heighten existential anxiety. Thus, the value of using non-routine war tactics comes from the challenge they pose to the norms of society. Such tactics shake the very foundation of society, its culture and institutions, making

it possible to elicit a social sense of terror. This social sense of terror is coercive. That is, terror is utilized to simultaneously intimidate target audiences (Stern 1999; Enders and Sandler 2002), and increase support from other audiences by highlighting grievances with the target (Smelser and Mitchell 2002). As such, the strategy of terrorism is a form of social control (Senechal de la Roche 1996), which "defines and responds to deviant behavior" (Black 2004b: 10) as needed to achieve ultimate political goals.

In sum, there are five key dimensions of terrorism: (1) Terrorism is a politico-military *strategy*; (2) Terrorism involves *non-routine* war tactics; (3) Terrorism generates a *social sense of terror*; (4) Terrorism is a form of *social control*; and (5) Terrorism is used to accomplish *ultimate political goals* that are beyond the immediate goal of terror. Thus, *terrorism is a politico-military strategy involving the use of non-routine war tactics to generate a social sense of terror, which facilitates the social control needed to accomplish ultimate political goals.* Defining terrorism as such avoids complete reification of the concept, which increases the propensity toward ideological and political bias (Tilly 2004; Turk 2004), while making it possible to systematically distinguish between terrorism and other politico-military strategies. This is crucial because notions of non-routine are likely to change with further globalization. Thus, it is the establishment of social control via the production of a social sense of terror that remains static, and it is his consistency that makes it possible to follow the progression of terrorism across time.

The definition of terrorism provided above assumes that it is possible to determine the use of this strategy as a function of the degree of terror, which is derived from the non-routine nature of the attack involved. As such, it is possible to contrive a scalable measure of *non-routineness* from attack variables, potentially source, target, and method. However, such

tabulation is beyond the scope of the present study. Therefore, it must suffice to say that, at least theoretically, it is possible to systematically determine whether or not an attack constitutes the use of terrorism, which could thus be measured as a *terrorist attack*. Additionally, this definition can assist in distinguishing the terrorist actor from other actors who are also engaged in conflict.

2.5　Terrorist

At the most basic level, the difference between terrorism and terrorist is extraordinarily simple. Terrorism is a politico-military strategy and *a terrorist is an actor who utilizes terrorism as a basic strategy for achieving ultimate political goals*. At first glance, this distinction may seem intuitive and perhaps even unnecessary, though its simplicity fails to explain why many continue to discuss the strategy of terrorism while their concern is over the actors who are terrorists. Nonetheless, it is necessary to make this distinction for three reasons: (1) to reduce biases found in current definitions of terrorism, (2) to distinguish between terrorists and actors who engage in other forms of collective violence, and (3) to distinguish between the legal and illegal use of terrorism.

The term "terrorism" carriers negative connotations. Unfortunately, these connotations have less to do with the social sense of terror that follows from the use of terrorism than they do the ideologies and political motives of the actors who use the strategy (Tilly 2004; Turk 2004). This condemnatory labeling of actors, on the grounds of their political ideals, introduces bias into definitions of terrorism (Rubenstein 1987; Gibbs 1989). It is not possible to liberate terrorism from all negative connotations, since it requires the use of non-routine war tactics to produce a social sense of terror. However, it is possible to understand how terrorism has been socially constructed. One of the goals of the present study is to deconstruct the concept of terrorism by

systematically distinguishing between terrorism, as a strategy, and terrorist, as an actor. Arguably, this can help reduce bias stemming from the attribution of political ideals held by individual actors, who may or may not be terrorists, to the concept of terrorism, which is nothing more than a politico-military strategy.

Researchers who study terrorists tend to fall into one of two categories, depending on their approach. One group, which includes proponents of social-movement theory, finds it difficult to distinguish between terrorism, guerilla warfare, civil war, and/or state violence, or as Bergesen and Lizardo (2004: 40) put it, "the brunt of the social-movement and political-violence literature tends to meld terrorist acts in with other forms of collective violence." The other group makes oversimplified distinctions between each, as seen in the behavior-oriented classification systems of Wilkinson (1977), Mozaffari (1988), and Schultz (1978) that are discussed below. Ganor's (2008) work provides a notable exception, though he errs in the direction of oversimplification elsewhere (Ganor 2002). Evidently, a great deal of ambiguity surrounds the concept of terrorist. This makes it all the more essential to distinguish the terrorist actor from other actors who are likewise engaged in political conflicts and other forms of collective violence. This distinction may also help resolve the issue of legality, which Gibbs (1989) discusses at length. Again, the principal characteristic that distinguishes the terrorist is the use of terrorism as a politico-military strategy for achieving ultimate political goals.

2.6   Terrorist Organization

The normalization of any deviant behavior is often attributed to the failure of social institutions, both formal and informal, to protect against anomie (Messner and Rosenfeld 2006). That is, weak institutions erode the dominant norms that allow society to operate most

efficiently. Often this process gives way to the formation of subcultures that compete with, and in many cases directly oppose, the dominant social order (Wolfgang and Ferratucci 1967). Such subcultural formation provides a social atmosphere suitable for the transmission of deviant motivations and techniques, which is generally understood as the social learning of deviant behavior. When institutional failure in this process is the primary focus, it is referred to as social disorganization (Shaw and McKay 1942; 1969). This is an important focus in the study of terrorism, in general, and of terrorist organizations, in particular, because institutional breakdown produces strain. Typically, this strain accumulates to the most socially disadvantaged groups within a nation-state, providing an impetus for deviant responses. Additionally, social disorganization theory allows for an ecological understanding of the social atmosphere where deviant subcultures form and where deviant actors are able to organize.

In most cases, though the individual terrorist is pinpointed as the primary focus of attention, the real concern is over the organization of terrorists. That is not to say that all participants of such organizations are terrorists, but that the efforts of terrorists are largely ineffective outside the organizational context. Alone, the terrorist can accomplish very little. Rather, the success of terrorist actors and the politico-military strategy of terrorism, in general, require the coordination of a wide range of actors, who are not always terrorists themselves. In this way, terrorist organizations function in accordance to the subculture of violence thesis. While only a handful of deviant actors commit the criminal actions that the strategy of terrorism entails, a large portion of society participates in the culture that enables a terrorist organization to operate.

Such participation stems largely from dissatisfaction with failing social institutions. The proper functioning of these social institutions is often interrupted by poverty, ethnic conflict,

population turnover, or rapid urbanization (Shaw and McKay 1942; 1969; Sampson and Groves 1989). Thus, the failing of these institutions produces objective strain felt by almost every member of the given society. That is, the social institutions fail to provide the means, or opportunity, for individuals, particularly the most socially disadvantaged, to meet the dominant goals of society. In the words of Merton (1938: 672), the strain produced by the particular alignment of the social structure "*exert(s) a definite pressure* upon certain persons in the society to engage in non-conformist rather than conformist conduct." Not only does this understanding of strain help explain why particular individuals choose to become terrorists but, combined with social disorganization theory, helps explain why certain societies are more tolerant of terrorists and terrorist organizations.

The theory of global social disorganization being proposed in the present study suggests that in response to the strain produced by the failure of social institutions, societies search for institutional alternatives that allow them to meet their goals. While legitimate social institutions are undoubtedly preferred by the vast majority of society, illegitimate alternatives, such as terrorist organization, are tolerated in their absence. There is strong reason to believe that the proper functioning of social institutions, particularly in nation-states known to host a disproportionate concentration of terrorist organizations, is inhibited further by weak political (Abadie 2006) and economic (de Soto 2002) institutions. For example, authoritarian governments or ineffective property rights make it difficult for social institutions, such as the family, educational system, or legal system, to meet the needs of the specific society. This is especially true if one believes that global society is dominated by competition between nation-states to accumulate wealth, what Wallerstein (1996) refers to as the world-system of capitalism.

As such, terrorist organizations are likely to form in nation-states with weak social, political, and economic institutions, where a substantial proportion of the society is aggrieved. As discussed above, this environment provides an opportunity for illegitimate institutional alternatives. Terrorists, who maintain particular political goals, are able to take advantage of this atmosphere and enlist the efforts of non-terrorist actors by emphasizing common grievances. While non-terrorist actors are likely to reject the means through which terrorists accomplish their political goals, they are able to relate to the ultimate political goals that terrorists frame as the source of their common grievances. In sum, *a terrorist organization consists of a core of terrorist actors that possess an ultimate political goal, as well as a wide array of non-terrorist actors providing various services, which are often not criminal in-and-of themselves, that possess reformatory goals for social, political, and economic institutions, which the terrorists frame as part of their own ultimate political goals.* Thus, it is weak or failed institutions that provide the common grievances that enable terrorists to carry out the strategy of terrorism to meet their ultimate political goals. Conversely, it is argued herein that institutional reform would likely deteriorate social support for, or if nothing else apathy towards, terrorist organizations by providing legitimate alternatives that more efficiently meet the needs and eliminate the grievances of the individuals living in the particular nation-state.

Chapter 3

Typologies of Terrorism

"Perhaps the most important and basic step in conducting any form of scientific inquiry involves the ordering, classification, or other grouping of the objects or phenomena under investigation" (Carper and Snizek 1980: 65). As such, the objective of a typology is to facilitate future research. However, the typologies of terrorism currently found in the academic literature suffer from limitations that prevent this.

Typologies of terrorism tend to be behavior-oriented, focusing primarily on the reactions of terrorist organizations, or ideology-oriented, focusing on the organizational goals and motives that distinguish terrorist groups. The works of Wilkinson (1977), Mozaffari (1988), Shultz (1978), and Ganor (2008) are considered behavior-oriented, while the works of Rapoport (2004), Kaplan (2007), and Masters (2008) are consider ideology-oriented. However, there has been a recent trend towards alternative classification systems. The works of Mishal and Rosenthal (2005), who focus on organizational structure, and Lizardo and Bergensen (2003), who apply a world-system perspective, exemplify this trend.

3.1   Behavior-Oriented Classification Systems

Wilkinson (1977) provides one of the first scholarly attempts at classifying terrorism. He focuses on what Mozaffari (1988) later refers to as "situational" attributes. These attributes are the product of terrorist actions and the contexts within which they occur. Wilkinson classifies terrorist organizations into four categories according to their motives and characteristics: revolutionary, sub-revolutionary, repressive, and epiphenomenal. Revolutionary terrorists seek to overthrow political regimes and are driven by the goal of political power. The goals of sub-revolutionary terrorists fall short of complete political revolution. In Wilkinson's view, these terrorists are prone to using terror primarily as a source of coercion or intimidation. Repressive terrorists operate similarly to sub-revolutionary terrorists, with the exception that they aim to repress particular individuals or groups. Repressive terrorists are commonly state actors. Epiphenomenal terrorists generally lack a specific goal. Wilkinson uses this category to classify all other terrorists. This classification system provides a theoretical understanding of the relations between organizational structure and goals. Ultimately, Wilkinson's typology is behavior-oriented. It relies heavily upon the actions of terrorist organizations.

However, Wilkinson's typology is not without weaknesses. The inclusion of the epiphenomenal category severely limits this classification system in terms of both exhaustivity and exclusivity. Actors without clearly explicit goals or a well-defined organizational structure fall into this category. Epiphenomenal serves as a catchall category for terrorist organizations that do not display rational behavior. As Schultz (1978) points out, terrorism is a rational, deviant response. The epiphenomenal category jeopardizes the exhaustivity of this typology because it is too vague. Terrorist organizations that fall into this category share few common characteristics. Further, the overall breadth of the epiphenomenal category draws into question

the exclusivity of Wilkinson's typology. Because organizations in this category are marked only by their lack of consistent organizational structures and/or goals, overlap between this category and others is likely to occur. For example, a terrorist organization could maintain revolutionary goals within an organizational structure that differs from those of other revolutionary groups. Both limitations are addressed in the works of Shultz (1978) and Mozaffari (1988) who attempt to rectify Wilkinson's original typology.

Mozaffari builds directly on Wilkinson's (1977) work. His typology also relies on organizational structure and goals of the terrorist group. However, Mozaffari's adaption loses the revolutionary and epiphenomenal categories and adds the independentist and international categories. This is perhaps an attempt to deal with the exhaustivity and exclusivity limitations of the original typology. In sum, Mozaffari's typology consists of four categories: sub-revolutionary, repressive, independentist, and international.

Mozaffari accomplishes two objectives by adapting Wilkinson's typology in this way. First, he provides a mechanism for delineating terrorist organizations previously classified as epiphenomenal into other categories. The independentist category accounts for organizations with little to no structure, while the international category accounts for organizations with global goals. Second, he reduces the overlap between categories. The independentist category has distinct meaning, as opposed to the epiphenomenal category. Additionally, the ambiguity between revolutionary and sub-revolutionary categories is eliminated by distinguishing between terrorist organizations that maintain international versus national political goals.

Despite these improvements, Mozaffari's typology also has limitations. Since introducing his typology, several phenomena have arisen to render the notion of international terrorism as a distinct category obsolete. The events of 11 September 2001, the hastening of

globalization, and rapid technological advance have all contributed to this process. Categorizing terrorist organizations as international or not has lost meaning (Tilly 2004; Turk 2004). It is now a matter of the *degree* to which terrorist organizations have internationalized their operations. Thus, Mozaffari's international category is incapacitated in the current social context, which limits the exhaustivity and exclusivity of his typology.

Another drawback to Wilkinson's and Mozaffari's typologies is their reliance on organizational structure. Information on the organizational structure of terrorist groups is difficult to ascertain, making it difficult to operationalize the explanatory variables. This fact significantly impairs the utility of both typologies. However, this is one of the concerns Shultz (1978) addresses in his adaption of Wilkinson's typology.

Shultz's typology includes three categories, two taken directly from Wilkinson, including: revolutionary, sub-revolutionary, and establishment terrorism. Establishment terrorism refers to terrorist acts committed by one nation-state to another nation-state. His typology is also behavior-oriented. Shultz's primary contribution is the isolation of variables explaining terrorist organization behavior. These seven variables include: causes, environment, goals, strategy, means, organization, and participation. By incorporating these variables, Shultz accomplishes two objectives. First, he produces a typology that can be utilized in academic research. Shultz's variables, though still difficult to measure, are more dynamic than organizational structures and goals. This reduces reliance on unknown information and allows for the use of proxy measurements. Second, he overcomes the limitations of exhaustivity and exclusivity in Wilkinson's typology discussed above. The delineation of behavior as a function of these variables means that terrorist organizations can be filtered into one of the three categories, meeting the requirements of exhaustivity. Further, classifying terrorist

organizations according to their combination of attributes means that overlap is less likely, meeting the requirements of exclusivity.

Shultz's typology significantly advances Wilkinson's work without the pitfalls of Mozaffari's later work. However, a major concern arises when all three are compared. The behavior-oriented categories used in all three cases are derived directly from the actions of terrorist organizations. This requires continual maintenance as new terrorist organizations emerge and old ones fail. Both Shultz and Mozaffari had to alter Wilkinson's original categories to account for this phenomenon. The problem is exacerbated by the reliance on organizational structures, since these too are likely to adapt to the changing strategies of terrorist organizations. Though Shultz makes significant improvements in this area, his variables require information as to the organizational structure of terrorist groups. However, these are deviant organizations operating outside the realm of international law and information as to their internal operations is elusive. Ganor (2008) recognizes this limitation and demonstrates how cumbersome a typology based on *all* organizational characteristics can become.

Ganor's typology is also behavior-oriented but instead focuses on variables influencing terrorist organizations' decisions to act. As such, Ganor classifies terrorist organizations according to motivation and operational capability. He delineates four categories:

> "The group of organizations that do not have the motivation to execute a terror attack at a given time (Group D); the group of organizations that do not have the operational capability to execute a terror attack at a given time (Group A); the group of organizations in which both variables—operational capability and motivation—do not prevent them from executing terror attacks, but the organizations have difficulty executing terror attacks on the scale that they would like because their motivation to execute attacks is greater than their operational capabilities at that time (Group B); and the group of organizations in which both factors—operational capability and motivation—do not prevent them from acting, but motivation is lower than capability at that time (Group C)." (Ganor 2008: 277-8)

Ganor's typology directs attention to the forces limiting terrorist activity, reducing the need for information on the organizational structure of terrorist groups. Additionally, it is both exclusive

and exhaustive, failing to include only groups that would be limited by both motivation and operational capability, which would no longer constitute terrorist organizations by definition.

However, despite these strengths, there are two significant limitations to utilizing Ganor's typology. First, he relies on operational capability as a primary determinant of terrorist activity. Though this measure is less problematic than measures of organizational structure, it is difficult to operationalize. Such information is difficult to ascertain, or as Tilly (2004: 7) puts it "any such definition has the disadvantage of requiring information on motivations and intentions; in fact, solid evidence on motivations and intentions rarely becomes available for collective violence." Second, it is impossible to test the external validity of Ganor's typology. Again, he relies on motivation and occupational capacity. Theoretically this means that terrorist organizations will commit acts of terror as long as they have both the desire and the means to do so. Thus, terrorist organizations can be categorized only after they act, and the information critical to this typology can be derived only from that act. This makes it impossible to test the external validity of Ganor's typology without information as to the motivations and occupational capabilities of terrorist organizations immediately prior to their terrorist acts. Paradoxically, such information could be used to eradicate terrorism, and thus eliminate the need for a typology of terrorist organizations.

3.2   Ideology-Oriented Classification Systems

While the behavior-oriented typologies discussed above rely indirectly on organizational ideologies to determine the structural characteristics, goals, and motivations of terrorist groups, the typologies discussed in this section focus on ideological differences as the distinguishing characteristic between terrorist organizations. Most attempts to classify terrorist organizations

along ideological lines are based on Rapoport's (2004) historical recount of the four waves of terrorism. Rapoport's discussion of modern terrorism begins in 1879 with the anarchist wave, continues through the anti-colonial and new left waves, and ends with the religious wave starting in 1979. In essence, he demonstrates that fluctuations in terrorist activity correspond with the changing global, political landscape. As such, Rapoport's typology provides a historical framework for understanding the social context within which modern terrorism has emerged.

Evidently, Rapoport's intent is not to provide a typology that is predictive, readily quantifiable, or that lends itself to policy formation. This may explain why his categories are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Rapoport's typology suffers from its reliance on historical periods, which require a certain degree of overlap. This makes it difficult to place some terrorist organizations into a single, exclusive category. Further, similar to the behavior-oriented typologies derived from Wilkinson's work, Rapoport's typology requires continual maintenance as new organizations with distinct ideologies emerge. This latter shortfall has already been realized in Kaplan's (2007) discussion of a fifth wave of terrorism, "the new tribalism." In general, Rapoport's typology, and the typologies that build upon it, do not lend themselves to empirical research.

The historical social context of terrorism found in Rapoport's work is typically lost in other ideology-oriented typologies, which tend to delineate terrorist organizations along political lines. Masters (2008) provides one of the most up-to-date accounts of this form of typology. He begins with "the traditional view of the terrorism universe assumes a three point model: Left-Wing (LW); Ethno-National (EN); Right-Wing/Religious (RWR)" (Masters 2008: 402). Masters adapts this typology by incorporating mixed ideological categories including EN-LW and EN-RWR and distinguishing between international and domestic terrorism.

Masters' classification system also suffers from the limitations of exhaustivity and exclusivity. His typology provides little room for incorporating terrorist organizations that do not maintain traditional political ideologies. This makes it difficult to classify every terrorist organization without expanding categorical definitions.   Additionally, Masters' mixed ideological categories exacerbate the problem of exclusivity. Within his typology, it is difficult to classify organizations that do not fall along strict ideological lines. The mixed categories that attempt to address this are even less distinct. Masters' typology also suffers from the fact that it provides no variables for delineating groups into one of the categories, making it impossible to operationalize.

In relation to the current study, there are two major drawbacks to ideology-oriented typologies. First, it is difficult to derive quantifiable variables from these typologies. Thus, ideology-oriented typologies are difficult to operationalize, reducing their utility in empirical research. Second, it is difficult to mesh out public policy based on group ideologies for two principal reasons. One, even if terrorism could be linked to certain ideologies, it is unethical to force ideologies, religions, or other moral sentiments on a person, organization, or nation-state. Two, there is reason to believe that terrorist organizations do display a strong moral component (Turk 2004), and that this moral component binds them to the societies in which they operate. Though this may generate support for the organizations in those societies, it is not a dysfunctional element of either the organizations or societies. As such, this factor may actually do more to limit the actions of terrorist organizations.

3.3   Alternative Classification Systems

Given the increased attention that terrorism has received in the media, academia, and politics following the events of 11 September 2001, it is unsurprising that social science scholars have begun devising alternatives typologies of terrorism. One such model relies entirely on the organizational structure of terrorist groups and focuses on the network between deviant individuals that emerges. This approach differs from behavior-oriented approaches because it relies solely on the internal components of terrorist organizations. It does not focus on acts of terror, which are outwardly directed. Mishal and Rosenthal's (2005) analysis of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization provides a leading example. In their study, they take this form of typology a step further by including the concept of a dune organization. A dune organization is elusive, relying more on rationale and motivation than organizational structure to operate. The researchers argue, "unlike other organizations, it may change in such a manner that leads to the relinquishing of most of its so-called organizational features" (Mishal and Rosenthal 2005: 16). Mishal and Rosenthal also include four additional categories: hierarchical organization, hub network, chain network, and multichannel network. The variables they use to delineate terrorist groups into one of these five categories are internal communication structure, degree of specialization, chain of command, and the organizations time definitions for carrying out plans.

Unlike the typologies discussed above, Mishal and Rosenthal's classification system does not suffer greatly from issues of exclusivity, and to a lesser degree exhaustivity. However, it is arguable that new organizational types are likely to arise, requiring the inclusion of new categories. More importantly, this typology requires the use of information that is difficult or impossible to acquire. Much of the data is qualitatively assessed and requires case studies for each organization, drawing into question the efficiency of this model.

Another approach, closely related to Rapoport's (2004) four waves theory discussed above, has been proposed by Lizardo and Bergensen (2003). Like Rapoport, these researchers focus on the interaction between structural location and ideology. However, Lizardo and Bergensen's typology is devised explicitly from a world-systems perspective. As such, their classification system includes three categories: Type 1—core actors attacking core governments, Type 2—periphery or semi-periphery actors attacking peripheral or semi-peripheral governments, and Type 3—periphery or semi-periphery actors originally attacking peripheral or semi-peripheral government but turned against core states. The ideological component of their model distinguishes between anarchic-nihilist, nationalist-separatist, and radical leftist variants. Through its inclusion of social structural positioning, this model provides a significant advantage over other ideology-oriented models. However, due to its classification schema it suffers from many of the same limitations as Masters' (2004) typology discussed above. Lizardo and Bergensen's (2003) typology is relatively undeveloped, providing little insight as to how to operationalize its components. As such, the utility of this model remains questionable.

Chapter 4

Social Disorganization Theory and the Study of Terrorism

There is reason to believe that the systematic study of terrorism could be advanced through the application of social disorganization theory. "In general terms, social disorganization refers to the inability of a community structure to realize the common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls" (Sampson and Groves 1989: 777). Modern social disorganization research traces its theoretical foundations back to the work of Shaw and McKay (1942; 1969).

From their study of delinquency in several communities around the Chicago area, Shaw and McKay concluded that traditions of crime were culturally transmitted through successive generations due to the failure of communal institutions to recognize the common interests and values of their residents. Their theory focused primarily on three sources of social disorganization: residential mobility, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, and poverty.

Shaw and McKay argued that increased residential mobility corresponded with an increase in social disorganization. Such mobility leads to the disruption of communal social networks (Kornhauser 1978). The premise of this argument relies on the notion that a high rate

of residential turnover generates a citizenry with less interest invested in the communities in which they live. That is, if one does not expect to live in a particular location for very long, they are less likely to invest their own time and resources in building the institutions and social relation networks necessary to promote social order.

As for racial/ethnic heterogeneity, Shaw and McKay posited that the more diverse the population, the greater the likelihood of social disorganization. Increased ethnic, racial, and cultural diversity, without the necessary institutions to delineate the common interests of the society, is likely to lead to cultural boundaries and ethnic isolation. Residents avoid interacting with each other and common interests are never established. Suttles (1968) has added to this argument by focusing on the role of fear and mistrust in the diversification process (also see Snell 2001). Again, it is the failure of institutions to properly order society and create a common basis to overcome these issues.

Shaw and McKay's argument for the role of poverty is more complex. In their view, poverty alone did not inherently lead to crime. Rather, poverty facilitates crime in that it corresponds with the lack of resources necessary to create the institutions needed by society to promote social order and thus control crime. They focused their attention on the prevalence of disease, the deterioration of society and its institutions, and the demoralization of the citizenry. This is more commonly understood as socioeconomic status (SES). Shaw and McKay's model implies that "low-socioeconomic-status communities will suffer from a weaker organizational base than higher-status communities" (Sampson and Groves 1989: 780).

The subsequent works of Sampson and Groves (1989) and Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) elaborate the basic social disorganization model. Specifically, Sampson and his associates introduced the notion of collective efficacy into social disorganization theory.

Collective efficacy is defined as "social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good" (Sampson et al. 1997: 918). These researchers successfully link increased collective efficacy to the reduction of violence. Collective efficacy captures the essence of social disorganization theory. This line of theorizing has quickly established a long list of empirical projects that support the overall claims of social disorganization theory and its recent revisions.

Recently, Hawdon and Ryan (2009) have demonstrated how this approach can be utilized in the study of terrorism at the community-level within the United States. Their study is based on the work of Black (2004), who utilized the concept of pure sociology to locate terrorism's position in social space. The focus in both works is on the role of society and its institutions in controlling terrorism.

This shift in the conceptualization of terrorism is important for two reasons. First, this redirects attention away from the psychology of terrorists, a point addressed in both works. This is crucial given the findings of Krueger and Maleckova (2003), who demonstrate that the profile of the typical terrorist is not what one may expect. They find that terrorists are often well educated and come from affluent family backgrounds. In addition, little is known about the "mind of the terrorist" (Victoroff 2005). According to a review conducted by the federal government, "there is no particular psychological attribute that can be used to describe the terrorist or any 'personality' that is distinctive of terrorists" (Hudson 1999: 43). Thus, focusing on the goals and decisions of the actual terrorists themselves may not be as advantageous in formulating a typology as posited above.

Second, as discussed above, data on the actual terrorist organizations is difficult, if not impossible to acquire (Tilly 2004; Turk 2004). This is the driving factor behind the present

study's attempt at formulating a typology based upon *the environments in which terrorist organizations operate.*

The present research is explanatory in nature. The intent here is to determine whether or not social disorganization theory can be successfully applied to the macro-level study of global terrorism. The unit of analysis in the present investigation is the nation-state. Contrary to what one might expect, it is posited herein that the relationship between social disorganization and the presence of terrorist organizations operating within a nation-state is curvilinear. This argument relies on the following premise. Conducting acts of terrorism requires a higher degree of organization than other forms of informal collective violence. As such, terrorism's operation requires at least a moderate degree of development in order to guarantee the institutional and infrastructural resources necessary to carry out acts of terrorism and to attract the attention of the international community. That is not to say that organized violence does not occur in the least developed countries. In fact, such violence is more common and widespread than terrorism; however, it is less organized and typically directed toward only domestic targets. Violence obviously occurs in the most developed countries as well. On the whole, however, these nation-states have greater institutional capacity to socially control terrorism and other forms of violence, when compared to the rest of the world. In sum, it is expected that societies with a moderate degree of institutional capacity will host more terrorist organizations than either the most or least developed societies.

Two recent findings support this prediction. In the development literature, Azam and Delacroix (2006) have recently demonstrated that aid successfully reduces the incidence of terrorism, when directed toward development efforts. They find that when the aid delegated directly to the fight against terrorism is controlled for, there is a negative relationship between

the total amount of aid received by a country and the presence of terrorism. Thus, the largest aid recipients appear to experience more incidents of terrorism. However, development, and subsequently institution building, successfully curbs terrorist activity.

Additionally, Abadie (2006) has recently demonstrated that a curvilinear relationship exists between political freedom and the incidence of terrorism. "Countries with intermediate levels of political freedom are shown to be more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly authoritarian regimes" (Abadie 2006: 51). Again, it is the intermediate level of development that explains terrorism. Countries in transition to democracy are likely to maintain a moderate degree of political institutions. This level of political institutionalism does not sufficiently address the concerns of dissident individuals or groups and is ineffective in controlling terrorist organizations. "Intermediate levels of political freedom are often experienced during times of political transition, when governments are weak, and political instability is elevated, so conditions are favorable for the appearance of terrorism" (Abadie 2006:54).

These findings are consistent with those of Shaw and McKay (1942; 1969) and other researchers from the Chicago School. This large body of research, conducted in the first half of the Twentieth Century, generally found that violence flourished in areas that were undergoing rapid social change. The terrorism research discussed above demonstrates a comparative relationship between terrorist activity, a particular form of violence, and rapid social change, which operates at the level of the nation-state.

Arguably, this evidence warrants a more in-depth investigation into the relationship between social disorganization and terrorism. The hypothesis tested herein is: *The relationship between social disorganization, as defined in the literature review, and the number of terrorist*

organizations, both domestic and international, operating in a nation-state is curvilinear. Specifically, in the most disadvantaged, socially disorganized nations and in the most advantaged, socially organized nations, there will be few functioning terrorist organizations. This hypothesis, if supported, could help form the foundation for an environment-oriented typology of terrorism.

Chapter 5

Data and Methodology

5.1   Sample

Most cross-national comparisons in the criminological literature are hampered by the limited availability of reliable measures of social and structural characteristics operating at the level of the nation-state (Altheimer 2008; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Pratt and Godsey 2002; Pratt and Godsey 2003). In many cases, these limitations result in small sample sizes comprised primarily of Western nations. However, this is largely due to the fact that many cross-national criminological studies focus on homicide rates. Obviously, homicide rates are the aggregation of many individual incidents, which are difficult to measure consistently and accurately. However, larger incidents of violence, such as civil wars or terrorist attacks, are certainly less tentative, owing to the fact that these events often draw the attention of the international community. For example, Lange and Dawson (2009) have recently demonstrated that reliable measures can be garnered to make cross-national comparisons of various forms of political violence resulting from colonial heritage.

The present study utilizes data drawn from several reliable, cross-national sources, discussed below, to maximize the sample size and overcome the constraints of previous studies. In total, the structural characteristics of 119 nation-states (*N*=119) are considered in the present study of terrorist organizations.[2] Again, the purpose of this study is to determine whether or not characteristics of the social structure, particularly those associated with social disorganization theory, explain why terrorist organizations tend to coalesce in some nation-states and not others.

5.2   Dependent Variables

Again, the purpose of the present study is to assess whether or not measures of social disorganization can explain variations in the number of terrorist organizations hosted in each nation-state. As such, three dependent measures of the number of terrorist organizations in each nation-state are included in this study, the number of domestic terrorist organizations, the number of international terrorist organizations and the total number of terrorist organizations hosted in each nation-state. As it pertains to the current study, international terrorist organizations are defined as having been hosted in more than one nation-state, having a recorded incident in a nation-state other than that which the terrorist organization was hosted in, and/or having recorded incidents in more than one nation-state.

Two related datasets provided by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism are used to derive these measures. The *Global Terrorism Database (GTD)* provides reliable information on the locations where terrorist incidents occur, as well as the organizations responsible for these incidents. However, this dataset does not provide detailed

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[2] A list of the 119 nation-states included in the sample can be found in Appendix A.

information as to where each organization is hosted.   This information is provided in the *Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs)* dataset.   However, TOPs does not provide detailed information on terrorist activities, and thus it is necessary to rely on a combination of these datasets to attain the number of terrorist organizations hosted in each nation-state.   Because of this combination, only terrorist organizations that are cross-listed in both datasets are considered. While in many cases this may be seen as a limitation, in the current study it provides an additional level of objectivity, as the definition of terrorism is often hindered by the subjectivity involved in recording and reporting on these events (Turk 2004).   An additional reason for using this combination of datasets was to determine what organizations were active during the years 2001 through 2005.[3]   As the independent measures are drawn primarily from 2000 data, this constraint helps to establish the causal order predicted by social disorganization theory.

5.3   Independent Variables

Measures of social disorganization are primarily derived from the work of Shaw and McKay (1942; 1969).   They argued that economic level indirectly affected social disorganization by influencing the ability to formulate institutions that could engage individuals, particularly delinquent youths, in meaningful activities.   In essence, Shaw and McKay argued that low SES at the community level results in higher levels of anomie and lower levels of collective efficacy (see Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997).   As such, SES is one of the mainstays in social disorganization that has consistently proven to be a significant indicator of crime and delinquency (Sampson and Groves 1989).   However, at the level of the nation-state, aggregated

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[3] A list of all terrorist organizations that were active between 2001 and 2005 is provided in Appendix B.

SES loses some of its meaning, as it smoothes out economic disparities in distribution and does not accurately depict the standard of living shared by all members of the nation-state. In recent years, Pratt and Godsey (2002; 2003) and Altheimer (2008) have successfully used the U.N.'s Human Development Index (HDI) as a measure of social support. Such measures more adequately address Shaw and McKay's (1942; 1969) implications regarding economic standing when applied to the level of nation-state. The current study employs a similar, but more rigorous, measure of living standards, Estes' (2003) *World Index of Social Progress (WISP)*. This scale has been "extensively pre-tested" (Estes 2007) and includes the following sub-indices: education, health status, women status, defense effort, economic, demographic, environmental, social chaos, cultural diversity, and welfare effort. This is an extremely dynamic measure of quality of life, which accounts for SES, as well as additional factors that do not overlap directly with other measures used in the present study. As such, the present study utilizes WISP rank for the year 2000.

Shaw and McKay (1942; 1969) also indicated ethnic heterogeneity as a primary indicator of social disorganization. That is, ethnic heterogeneity has been found to deteriorate a community's ability to organize itself in meaningful ways, resulting in more inter-group conflict. Both Suttles (1968) and Snell (2001) have argued that ethnic heterogeneity operates in this fashion through reducing trust. Obviously, with low levels of trust, collective efficacy will also be reduced. Though the effects of ethnic heterogeneity may somewhat be reduced at the level of the nation-state as this unit of analysis provides more room for the spatial dispersion of ethnic groups, this measure has been successfully used as a significant predictor of national homicide rates elsewhere (Altheimer 2008). Further, proxy measures of trust are generally lacking. For instance, the World Values Survey (WVS) is one of the few examples where this information is

collected cross-nationally. However, this proxy was not used in the present study, as it would have dramatically reduced the sample size due to missing data. As such, data on the different ethnic groups existing in each nation-state was taken from the *2000 CIA World Factbook*. As religion is often cited as important factor in the discussion of terrorism, data on the different religious groups operating in each-nation state was taken from the same source. The *CIA World Factbook* provides the fraction of the total population (pi) that each group represents. Blau's (1977) equation for calculating heterogeneity (1-Σpi^2) was employed to calculate indices of both ethnic and religious heterogeneity.

Shaw and McKay (1942; 1969) also indicated residential mobility as a source of social disorganization in their original model. High levels of residential mobility would deteriorate ties to the community and thus reduce collective efficacy. In their study of crime rates in several English communities, Sampson and Groves (1989: 784) operationalized residential stability as "the percentage of residents brought up in the area within a 15-minute walk from home." At the level of nation-state, this is conceptualized as the percentage of the population that is native born. Data were taken from the U.N. Population Division's *International Migrant Stock* for the year 2000. To calculate the percentage of the population who were native born, migrant stock as a percentage of the total population was subtracted from 100. Sampson and Groves also employ a measure of urbanization in their study of social disorganization. To capture this dimension at the level of the nation-state, data regarding the size of the urban population and the total population of each nation-state were taken from the U.N.'s *2000 Demographic Yearbook*. These data were used to calculate the percentage of the population of each-nation state living in urban areas.

5.4   Analytic Model

While most cross-national studies are hindered by intercorrelation between independent measures, heteroskedasticity was not a significant problem in the present study.[4] As a result, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to determine the explanatory power of the independent measures of social disorganization in determining the number of domestic, international, and total terrorist organizations operating in each nation-state. However, because of the hypothesized curvilinear relationship between social disorganization and the number of terrorist organizations hosted in each nation-state, several of the independent measures were transformed before the dependent measures could be regressed upon them.

In particular, it was predicted that WISP or, more generally the level of social development, would enable the formation of terrorist organizations up to a certain point, whereby the number of terrorist organizations would stabilize until a second critical point was reached. At this point, the number of terrorist organizations would begin to decline as WISP increased. The logic being that terrorist organization requires some degree of institutional structure and social control. When social organization is too low, it becomes difficult to organize even politically dissatisfied actors and as a result less organized forms of collective violence ensue, perhaps even to a higher degree. On the other hand, when social organization is high, strong institutions are often in place to control terrorist organizations and crime in general. In order to assess this relationship, WISP ranks, which were standardized around z-scores, were included along with squared and cubed terms.

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[4] Using White's Test of Heteroskedasticity, $p > .05$ for all three models.

Ethnic heterogeneity does not lend itself to the same form of transformation, because a squared term would effectively represent ethnic homogeneity. As such, only standardized scores for ethnic heterogeneity and a squared term were entered into the regression equations. Initial analyses indicated an inverse function of religious heterogeneity would provide the best fit in each model.

Square terms for the standardized percentage of the native population in each country as well as the standardized percentage of urban population in each country were also included in the original model. However, all measures involving native and urban populations were found to offer little predictive power to either model and were highly insignificant in both cases. Likely, the factors of residential stability and urbanization disappear at the macro-level of the nation-state. Such factors are often associated with the collective efficacy and social capital of specific communities, and as a result, smooth out at the aggregate level. Nonetheless, these measures were excluded from the final models.

In sum, the final OLS regressions for all models included the following independent measures: WISP, WISP-squared, WISP-cubed, ethnic heterogeneity, ethnic heterogeneity-squared, and religious heterogeneity (inverse). For all dependent measures, the model is represented by the following equation:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1(WISP)_i + \beta_2(WISP^2)_i + \beta_3(WISP^3)_i + \beta_4(EH)_i + \beta_5(EH^2)_i + \beta_6(RH)_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Chapter 6

Findings

The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 clearly demonstrate that terrorism is a generally rare phenomenon and that relatively few terrorist organizations are responsible for the majority of the recorded incidents of terrorism. Having no terrorist organizations, whether domestic or international, was the norm for each nation-state included in this sample. Evidently, the largest total number of terrorist organizations was 26, while the largest numbers of domestic and international terrorist organizations operating in any nation-state were 14 and 16, respectively.

The WISP scores were again ranked, and as such the range and distribution of this variable was to be as expected. Ethnic heterogeneity ranged from almost complete homogeneity to a near equal distribution of ethnic groups. Results for religious heterogeneity were similar, with a slightly smaller range tending towards homogeneity. Most nation-states maintained a large native population as a percentage of the total population. However, the percentage of the population living in urban areas varied greatly with a near normal distribution. Again, these final

two measures were not used in the final analyses due to their lack of explanatory power in any of

the final models.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Major Variables (Uncentered), 119 Nation-States

Variable	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max
Terrorist Organizations				
Domestic…………………………………….…	.51	1.75	.00	14.00
International…………………………………...	1.04	2.18	.00	16.00
Total………………………………………...	1.55	3.52	.00	26.00
Social Disorganization Measures				
WISP………………………………………....	79.47	44.14	4.00	163.00
Ethnic Heterogeneity………………………..	.42	.27	.00	.98
Religious Heterogeneity……………………..	.38	.22	.00	.81
Native Population…………………………....	94.09	8.02	60.00	100.00
Urban Population…………………………....	51.63	22.66	5.40	98.60

6.1   Regression Analyses[5]

The OLS regression results for all three models are represented in Table 2 below. These

analyses generally support the predicted relationship between social disorganization and the

number of terrorist organizations hosted in each nation-state. In particular, the hypothesized

curvilinear relationship between WISP rank scores and the numbers of terrorist organizations

hosted was significant and in the predicted direction in all three models. The relationship

resulting from the introduction of squared and cubed terms suggests that number of hosted

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[5] Supplementary analyses provided in Appendix C

terrorist organization increases with declining living standards until a critical point is reached. This is indicated by the significant effect produced by the standardized WISP rank ($B = .90$, 1.09, 1.99, respectively). Further, those in the mid range of social development are generally unaffected by small increases to their WISP rank, relative to hosting terrorist organizations. This is seen in the insignificant effect of the WISP-squared term. However, the significance of WISP-cubed, which is in the negative direction ($B = -.35, -.49, -.84$, respectively), indicates that a second critical point may follow the middle range of WISP ranks. This generally suggests that social development is positively associated with nation-states hosting terrorist organizations of any kind at the low-end of social development.

Table 2: OLS Regression Estimates of the Effects of Social Disorganization on the Number of Domestic, International, and Total Terrorist Organizations in 119 Nation-States

	Domestic Terrorist Organizations		International Terrorist Organizations		Total Terrorist Organizations	
	B	*t-ratio*	B	*t-ratio*	B	*t-ratio*
WISP…………………………………	.90	2.27**	1.09	2.23**	1.99	2.53**
WISP^2……………………………………..	.12	.61	.18	.78	.30	.79
WISP^3……………………………………..	-.35	-1.87*	-.49	-2.09**	-.84	-2.24**
Ethnic Heterogeneity………………..	-.04	-.22	.16	.51	.12	.30
Ethnic Heterogeneity^2………………..	-.47	-2.35**	-.54	-2.22**	-1.01	-2.57**
Religious Heterogeneity (Inverse)……..	.00	.07	.01	1.21	.01	.79
R^2………………………………………..	.07		.09		.10*	

* $P < .10$
** $P < .05$

Taken together, these findings suggest that some sort of social organization is necessary for terrorist organizations to operate, but that ultimately a high degree of social organization has an inhibitive effect on the formation and sustainability of these organizations. Importantly, this curvilinear relationship between WISP rank and the hosting of terrorist organizations is maintained across all three dependent measures. This provides compelling evidence that the operations of terrorist organizations are dependent to some degree upon elements of the social structure, particularly the level of social organization, regardless of whether or not their political dissatisfactions are internally or externally directed.

The results with respect to ethnic heterogeneity and its squared term were not as expected. Though the first order term of ethnic heterogeneity was not significant in any model, it was in the predicted direction for both international and total terrorist organizations. However, the squared term in this case was significant across all three models, but was not in the predicted direction. A significant, negative coefficient of the squared term for ethnic heterogeneity ($B = -.47, -.54, -1.01$, respectively) was demonstrated in all three cases. This finding suggests that the number of terrorist organizations, whether domestic or international, increases geometrically, rather than linearly, as ethnic heterogeneity *decreases*. Again, this held for the total number of terrorist organizations hosted in each nation-state as well.

Taken together, these findings suggest that multi-cultural interactions operate in a more complex fashion than predicted by social disorganization theory alone, and that measures of ethnic heterogeneity may not be as applicable to highly organized forms of crime, such as terrorism. That is, ethnic heterogeneity may inhibit a society's ability to organize members, even towards crime. While this was not the predicted relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and the number of hosted terrorist organizations, it does lend support to the notion that some level of

social organization is necessary for terrorist organizations to operate. Ethnic homogeneity may serve as an organizing factor in this situation. However, when combined with limited access to resources, this form of organization does not result in institutions that could improve the living standards of all members of the given society. That is, ethnic homogeneity alone is not enough to generate the collective efficacy necessary to formulate the social institutions necessary to overcome the strain produced by the political dissatisfactions of a society. In short, societies with this feature are likely to be moderately organized. The result is a phenomenon similar to Suttles' (1968) "defended neighborhood," whereby members of a marginalized group are able to rally support, owning to a common social characteristic, namely ethnic and cultural background, to protect their immediate social environment. Indeed, terrorist organizations, both domestic and international, often rely on this sort of unifying characteristic to generate the support necessary to carry out their operations.

The findings regarding the inverse of religious heterogeneity offer very limited support for or against the application of social disorganization theory to the study of terrorism. The results for this measure were not significant and contributed very little in the way of explanatory power to any of the three models. In short, neither religious heterogeneity nor homogeneity appeared to have any effect on the number of terrorist organizations, whether domestic or international, operating in a given nation-state.

The r-squared value (R^2 = .07, .09, .10, respectively) for all three models was somewhat lower than expected. Indeed, only the final model using the total number of terrorist organizations as its dependent measure proved to be significant. However, as all three models demonstrated similar results, it seems safe to conclude that the operations of both domestic and international terrorist organizations require a comparable degree of social organization. Likely,

the rarity of terrorist organizations is to blame for these results, as most nation-states were without any terrorist organizations whatsoever.

Chapter 7

Discussion

Generally, the results of these analyses support the hypothesized relationship between social disorganization and the operation of terrorist organizations. The most compelling results came from the strongest measure of social disorganization used in the present study, WISP rank. It was demonstrated that for nation-states at the low-end of social progress, increasing social development was associated with hosting more terrorist organizations. For those nation-states in the middle category of social progress the relationship was not significant, though increasing social development did appear to be associated with hosting fewer terrorist organizations to some extent. The relationship was, however, significant for nation-states at the high-end of social development. In this case, increasing social development was associated with hosting fewer terrorist organizations. Again, it is important to keep in mind that increasing social progress corresponds to a decrease in WISP rank, so that nation-states at the high-end of social progress ranked the lowest in terms of WISP rank while nation-states at the low-end of social progress ranked the highest in terms of WISP rank.

The theoretical curvilinear relationship between social progress and the hosting of terrorist organizations, which received support from the empirical evidence, is portrayed in Figure 1. The graph demonstrates that a nation-state's hosting of terrorist organizations is facilitated by increasing social development for those at the low-end of social progress. That is, terrorist organizations appear to require some degree of social organization to function. However, the graph also highlights a critical point at which increasing levels of social organization no longer benefit the operation of terrorist organizations. This trend begins with the nation-states falling in the mid-range of social progress and increases dramatically, becoming significant, for nation-states at the high-end of social progress. Ultimately, increasing levels of social organization, which requires both social and economic development, has an inhibitive effect on the hosting of terrorist organizations, as stronger institutions emerge to control this and other forms of collective violence.

Though the results for both ethnic heterogeneity and religious heterogeneity were not as supportive, they do have relevant implications. As discussed above, the fact that the number of terrorist organizations hosted was geometrically related to increasing ethnic homogeneity lends some support to the notion that common social characteristics, such as ethnicity, can lead to the defense of the culture as a whole. Likely, this is the result of interaction with socio-economic factors. As Shaw and McKay (1942; 1969) were quick to point out, socio-economic factors were not directly associated with crime. Rather, they determined the society's ability to form institutions necessary for overcoming the effects of social disorganization. Thus, ethnic homogeneity may be a strong enough organizational factor to explain the formation of informal organizations, such as terrorist organizations, but may not be strong enough to overcome the barriers to social organization that result from limited access to economic resources. Again, the

Figure 1: Theoretical Relationship between Level of Social Progress and the Hosting of Terrorist Organizations[*]

Social Progress of Nation-States

[*] Constructed using beta coefficients of each independent measure of social progress (WISP, WISP^2, WISP^3) with categories (Low, Middle, High) of social progress proportional to Estes' (2000) estimates.

point is that terrorist organizations, whether domestic or international, require some degree of organization to operate. However, when the degree of social organization is heightened, more formal institutions emerge to control criminal organizations, and provide more channels for expressing political dissatisfactions, thus undermining the legitimacy purported by the terrorist organizations themselves.

7.1   Implications for Further Investigation

It is critical that researchers in the social sciences continue to hone definitions of terror, terrorism, terrorist, and terrorist organization to advance the empirical study of these phenomena and reduce the biases that result from the use of these distinct concepts interchangeably. The current study has attempted to accomplish these goals by providing concise definitions along with a thorough theoretical discussion of each concept. Though the empirical investigation was constrained by reliance on available data, several steps were taken to clearly distinguish the terrorist organization from other related phenomena and reduce the biases involved in the data collection process. Namely, the use of cross-listed data, along with information that reflected the period under concern, produced a reliable list of terrorist organizations, both domestic and international, active between the years 2001-2005. While it is highly likely that these methodological procedures did not capture the activities of all organizations that would have been classified as a terrorist organization based on the definition provided above, they were necessary to ensure that organizations defined as terrorist simply due to their opposition to the nation-state were not overrepresented in the current study. As such, this has been one of the most rigorous attempts to both accurately define and objectively measure terrorist organization.

Despite these accomplishments, there is much room for improvement in the empirical model behind this theory. As Sampson, Raundenbush, and Earls (1997) have demonstrated, the factors associated with collective efficacy have a clear mediating effect on how elements of the social structure influence criminality. While structural data are more readily available for cross-national comparisons, there is a clear push towards expanding the availability of community-level data across nation-states. Sampson and Groves (1989) demonstrated that these factors have the potential to explain much of the variation seen in community-level crime once structural factors were controlled for. Access to such information would improve the current models dramatically, and would likely increase their explanatory power. Additionally, such data could lend itself to hierarchical models capable of assessing variation *between* communities within each nation-state. Thus, it would be possible to assess the properties of community structure that enable terrorist organizations' operation.

7.2   Implications for Typologies of Terrorism

Relevant to the current discussion, the findings provided above also have several implications with regard to terrorism typologies. As discussed above, behavior-oriented typologies often suffer due to the fact that they require intimate knowledge of the terrorist organizations, which is prohibitively difficult to collect, and need constant maintenance to account for the changing behaviors undertaken by terrorist organizations in response to technological advancements and official reactions to their behaviors. The current study demonstrates that elements of the social structure, operating at the macro-level of the world-system, can help explain where terrorist organizations operate and highlight the factors that are at the root of their grievances.

Similarly, ideology-oriented typologies also typically rely on information that is prohibitively difficult to collect. As a result, this sort of classification is prone to the subjective assessment of the operations of terrorist organizations, and may not accurately represent the structural factors that give rise to these organizations. The subjective nature of these typologies is highlighted in the current study, as it was demonstrated that little difference exists between the operations of domestic and international terrorist organizations, and that neither religious heterogeneity nor homogeneity offered significant explanatory power in any model.

Notable exceptions in the typologies of terrorism literature, discussed above, are the works of Rapoport (2004) and Lizardo and Bergensen (2003). Rapoport's reliance on broad historic periods for producing waves of terrorism does not readily lend itself to this empirical investigation. Rather, the typology's true value comes from the insight it provides as to the structural elements of the world-system that produce macro-level strains across time. Lizardo and Bergensen's work also provides valuable insight as to how nation-states at differing stages of development within the world-system respond to such pressures, but it tells us very little about what structural elements actually lead to the formation of terrorist organizations. Thus, it provides the "how" but fails to deliver on the "why."

The current study has been an effort to fill this void without abandoning the efforts of past research. As such, it draws heavily from the world-system literature, confirming that most terrorist organizations, both domestic and international, are hosted primarily in countries within the middle range of social development. Indeed, this is likely a function of both the level of social disorganization and position within the world-system. Such positioning within the world-system is necessary for understanding the pressures faced by and the responses of organized groups, but it is the elements of the nation's domestic social structure that explain why terrorist

organizations are able to form and operate in one locale but not another. Expanding this study to include more intricate measures of community disorganization and collective efficacy would provide a structural understanding of the environmental conditions necessary for terrorist organization. It is the differential social organization of communities within each nation-state, combined with positioning in the world system, which will lead to an empirically testable and objectively valid typology of terrorist organizations.

7.3   Implications for International Policy

The current research also highlights the need for intensifying international development efforts. Building on the work of Azam and Delacroix (2006), which demonstrated that increasing international aid has a negative effect on the number of terrorist incidents, the present investigation demonstrated that increased social development had a negative effect on the hosting of terrorist organizations at the high-end of the social development ladder. However, the current research also demonstrated that increasing social development had a positive effect on the hosting of terrorist organizations at the low-end of social development. While this finding may elicit a sense of cautiousness when it comes to the distribution of international funds, as it would seemingly suggest that development efforts could enable terrorist organization in extreme cases, it must be understood in context.

As a nation-state develops and becomes less socially disorganized, more opportunities and institutions will arise that are both legitimate and illegitimate. It is necessary to guide development in a way that promotes the selection of legitimate opportunities and institutions over those that are illegitimate. Doing so enables a society to not only meet its basic needs, but also to advance socially and economically through the formation of strong social institutions that

promote further development.   As this study demonstrates, economic factors that lead to improved living standards are crucial.   Thus it is necessary to ensure that aid allotted to development is distributed in the appropriate manner and goes toward promoting and maintaining strong social institutions capable of withstanding crises within the world-system. This process has been termed "sustainability" in the development literature.

It seems likely that sustainable development will rely heavily on the motivation of the actors involved, as terrorist organization demonstrates how such motivation can lead to external expressions of political discontent when not directed towards institution building.   As such, the present investigation calls for the advancement of international development projects that are motivated from *within* the community and that address the needs and dissatisfactions of those living in such socially disorganized neighborhoods across the globe.   However, as de Soto (2002) points out, this process will also require macro-level structural changes, such as establishing property rights and developing other legal institutions, to improve efficiency and ensure that resources are distributed equitably.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

The current investigation demonstrated how a classical theory of crime, social disorganization theory, could be applied to the study of terrorist organizations, both domestic and international. In doing so, the present study has contributed to both the criminological literature and the literature on terrorism in three primary ways.

First, through reviewing definitions of terrorism currently found in the academic literature, the present study helped clarify the terminology surrounding this and other related phenomena. Namely, the concepts of terror, terrorism, terrorist, and terrorist organization were disentangled from the muddled terminology often found in the discussion of terrorism. This was necessary to both reduce the subjectivity that results from using such terms interchangeably and to establish definitions of these related phenomena that could lend themselves to empirical research. While those who study terrorism and the related phenomena will likely continue to rely on the definitions employed by the datasets that they investigate, the definitions discussed above will hopefully contribute to the process of improving data collection and reducing subjectivity.

Second, the present investigation also demonstrated the inadequacy of terrorism typologies currently found in the academic literature. Again, these typologies often suffer from one or more of the following setbacks: (1) the required data is impossible to ascertain, (2) the explanatory variables are non-quantifiable, (3) the categories are not exhaustive, and/or (4) the categories are not exclusive. Because of these limitations, typologies of terrorism have been able to contribute very little to our understanding of this phenomenon. However, this is not to say that all of the typologies reviewed were without merit, rather most simply do not lend themselves to empirical research. There is a strong need for a typology of terrorist organizations that incorporates the structural factors that enable these organizations to form and operate. The present study has contributed to this process by highlighting some of these factors, such as living standards and ethnic composition, which could be employed in an environment-oriented typology.

Third, this investigation also demonstrated the utility of criminological theory beyond explaining traditional forms of crime, delinquency, and gang behavior. Criminological theories, such as social disorganization theory, have often been formulated to explain why deviant behavior emerges in particular social contexts. For example, Shaw and McKay (1942; 1969) were primarily concerned with explaining the prevalence of juvenile delinquency in several neighborhoods in the surrounding Chicago area. Despite their particular focus, they constructed a general theory of how the social structure can be arranged in such a way as to pressure some individuals to deviate from the norms of the overarching social system. Such ideas build upon the work of Durkheim (1897 [2006]), who attempted to explain how societies become anomic following periods of rapid social change. The result of this process is strain, or the pressure to deviate (see Merton 1938; Messner and Rosenfeld 2007). Thus, while these theories may not tell

us precisely which ways individuals and groups will decide to deviate, they highlight the structural and cultural conditions that give way to such deviation, and thus could be applied to a wide-range of deviant behaviors in a wide-range of social contexts. Additionally, such theories can also indicate how these processes are influenced by the immediate social environment, highlighting the need for stronger social institutions to improve collective efficacy (see Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997) and increase social capital (see Coleman 1988).

Though the present investigation has undoubtedly contributed to the systematic study of terrorism, and related phenomena, the need for further investigation and empirical research continues. Terrorism continues to garner the attention of the international community, and national-budgets continue to reflect the societies' concern with this phenomenon. Regardless of the high levels of subjectivity found in past studies, researchers must move beyond this theoretical impasse and realize the importance of protecting human rights from the continued threat of terrorism globally. There is a clear need for solutions that will improve living standards while facilitating more formal channels of legitimate political expression.

Appendix A: Nation-states (N=119) included in analyses

Afghanistan[a]
Albania
Algeria[a]
Argentina
Armenia
Australia[a]
Austria[a]
Azerbaijan
Bahrain[a]
Bangladesh[a]
Belarus
Belgium[a]
Belize
Benin
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil[a]
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada[a]
Central African Republic[a]
Chile
Colombia[a]
Costa Rica[a]
Côte d'Ivorie
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus[a]
Czech Republic

Democratic Republic of
   the Congo[a]
Dominican Republic[a]
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia[b]
Ethiopia
Fiji[a]
Finland
Gabon[ac]
Georgia
Ghana[a]
Greece[a]
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong[a]
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq[a]
Israel[d]
Jamaica
Japan[a]
Jordan[a]
Kazakhstan
Kenya[a]
Kyrgyzstan
Laos[a]
Lesotho[a]

Liberia
Libya[a]
Macedonia
Malaysia[b]
Mali[a]
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Montenegro and Serbia[bc]
Morocco
Mozambique[a]
Myanmar (Burma)[a]
Namibia[a]
Nepal[c]
New Zealand[a]
Nicaragua
Niger[a]
Nigeria[a]
Panama
Paraguay[a]
People's Republic of
   China[a]
Peru
Philippines[a]
Poland
Portugal[a]
Republic of Korea (South
   Korea)[a]
Romania
Rwanda[a]
Senegal

Sierra Leone[a]	Syria	Turkmenistan[a]
Slovakia	Tajikistan	Uganda
Slovenia	Tanzania[a]	United Kingdom[a]
South Africa	Thailand	United States[a]
Sri Lanka	The Bahamas[a]	Uruguay
Sudan	The Gambia[a]	Uzbekistan
Suriname	The Netherlands	Zambia
Swaziland	Tunisia	Zimbabwe[a]
Switzerland	Turkey	

[a] Urban population data for these nation-states were taken from UN Data
[b] Religious heterogeneity data for these nation-states was derived from the UN's *2000 Demographic Yearbook*
[c] Ethnic heterogeneity data for these nation-states was derived from the UN's *2000 Demographic Yearbook*
[d] Includes Occupied Palestinian Territories

Appendix B: Terrorist organizations active between 2001-2005[6]

1920 Revolution Brigades
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC)
Aden Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)
al-Ahwaz Arab People's Democratic Front
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
al-Arifeen
al-Badr
Albanian National Army (ANA)
al-Barq
al-Fatah
al-Haramayn Brigades
al-Intiqami al-Pakistani
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)
al-Madina
al-Mansoorain
al-Qaeda
al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP)
Al-Umar Mujahideen
Animal Liberation Front (ALF)
Ansar al-Din
Ansar al-Islam
Ansar al-Jihad
Ansar al-Sunnah Army
Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei for the
  Construction of the Fighting Communist
  Party
Arbav Martyrs of Khuzestan
Armata Corsa

Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)
Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Pattani
  (BRN)
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)
Black Widows
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)
Brigades of Imam al-Hassan al-Basri
Catholic Reaction Force (CRF)
Coalition to Save the Preserves (CSP)
Communist Party of India-Maoist
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist
Continuity Irish Republican Army
Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat
Democratic Front for the Liberation of
  Palestine (DFLP)
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)
DHKP/C
Earth Liberation Front (ELF)
Ethnocacerista
Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
Free Papua Movement (OPM)
Global Intifada
Hamas
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)
Hezbollah
Hizb-I-Islami
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)
Indigenous People's Federal Army (IPFA)
Informal Anarchist Federation

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[6] Terrorist organization names taken directly from Terrorist Organization Profiles.

Iparretarrak (IK)
Irish Republican Army (IRA)
Islamic Army in Iraq
Islamic Jihad Brigades
Islamic Jihad Group (Uzbekistan)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Jaish al-Taifa al-Mansoura
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM)
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
Jenin Martyr's Brigade
July 20th Brigade
Kach
Kamtapur Liberation Organization
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL)
Karenni National Progressive Party
Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA)
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET)
Lashkar-I-Omar
Laskar Jihad
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
Mahdi Army
Maoist Communist Center (MCC)
Mariano Moreno National Liberation
   Commando
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Movement for Democracy and Justice in
   Chad (MDJT)
Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK)
Mujahideen Army
Mujahideen Shura Council
Muslim United Army
Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)
National Democratic Front of Bodoland
   (NDFB)
National Liberation Army (Colombia)
National Liberation Front of Tripura
   (NLFT)
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-
   Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)

New People's Army (NPA)
New Revolutionary Popular Struggle
   (NELA)
Odua People's Congress
Omar bin al-Khattab Brigades
Orange Volunteers (OV)
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
Pattani United Liberation Organization
   (PULO)
People's Revolutionary Army (Colombia)
People's Revolutionary Militias
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak
   (PREPAK)
People's War Group (PWG)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
   –General Command (PFLP-GC)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
   (PFLP)
Popular Liberation Army
Popular Resistance
Popular Resistance Committees
Popular Revolutionary Action
Proletarian Nuclei for Communism
Purbo Banglar Communist Party (PBCP)
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)
Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
Resistenza Corsa
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
   (FARC)
Revolutionary Cells Animal Liberation
   Brigade
Revolutionary Front for Communism
Revolutionary Perspective
Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei
Revolutionary Struggle
Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade
Saif-ul-Muslimeen
Salafia Jihadia
Sardinian Autonomy Movement (MAS)
Save Kashmir Movement
Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe
Shining Path
Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordinating Board
   (CGSB)
Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)
South Londonderry Volunteers (SLV)

Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)
Sudan People's Liberation Army
Takfir wa Hijra
Taliban
Tanzim
Tawhid and Jihad
The Holders of the Black Banners
The Inevitables
TKP/ML-TIKKO
Tupamaro Revolutionary Movement – January 23
Turkish Hezbollah

Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)
United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)
Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors
White Legion
Young Liberators of Pattani
Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU)

Appendix C: Supplementary Analyses

OLS Regression Estimates of the Effects of First-Order Independent Variables on the Number of Domestic, International, and Total Terrorist Organizations in 119 Nation-States

	Domestic Terrorist Organizations		International Terrorist Organizations		Total Terrorist Organizations	
	B	*t-ratio*	*B*	*t-ratio*	*B*	*t-ratio*
WISP……………………………………	.36	1.40	-.07	-.23	.29	.55
Ethnic Heterogeneity…………………...	-.13	-.68	.12	.48	-.02	-.04
Religious Heterogeneity………………...	-.06	-.35	-.21	-.96	-.27	-.77
Native Population……………………….	.15	.85	-.12	-.50	.04	.11
Urban Population……………………….	.39	1.61	-.22	-.71	.17	.35
R^2………………………………………….	.03		.01		.01	

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