

**The Responses of South Korean Presidents Kim Dae Jung
and Roh Moo Hyun toward North Korean Threats (1998-
2006): A Comparative Case Study Analysis**

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ABSTRACT

There has been a long history of violence between North and South Korea since the end of the Korean War in 1953 and North Korea is still a current threat to the South due to their missile launches and naval clashes. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the interactions between North and South Korea from 1998 to 2006 and answer the question: What accounts for the difference in responses to North Korean threats by South Korean presidents from the same party with similar stands toward North Korea? Although South Korean Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun shared similar approaches to North Korea, why did they not always respond in the same way? To answer this question, I examine a case in which North Korea test-launched a rocket and a case in which North Korean vessels cross the Northern Limit Line during each administration. By comparing these cases, I explain why the presidents continued their engagement policy and refrained from condemning the North in all but the case of the 2006 missile test. I test a set of explanations made by experts for South Korean approaches to North Korea to see which explanation best fits each case. I argue that each response was due to a combination of explanations rather than one single explanation. Even though each explanation had some merit, some explanations were more applicable than the others. Both Kim and Roh expressed concern over North Korea due to security and economic concerns. However, as the years and threatening behavior went on the public and international community started to take a greater notice to North Korea's activity and wanted the South Korean government to take action. As a result, public opinion and international pressure partially influenced Roh to shift his responses towards North Korea and halt aid after the 2006 missile launch.

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List of Abbreviations

ACDPU	Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification
DMZ	Korean Demilitarized Zone
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KCIA	Korean Central Intelligence Agency
KCNA	North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency
KDJ	Kim Dae Jung
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
KOSPI	Korea Composite Stock Price Index
KPA	North Korean People's Army
MBCP	Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity
MDP	Millennium Democratic Party
MOU	Ministry of Unification
NLL	Northern Limit Line
NPT or NNPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
ROK	Republic of Korea (South Korea)
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
UN	United Nations
US	United States

Chapter 1

Introduction

Although the Korean War ended with a cease-fire armistice in 1953, there has been a long history of violence between North and South Korea with no end in sight. Over the decades North Korean agents have made assassination attempts on South Korea Presidents, killed South Korean cabinet members, and blown up a South Korean airliner killing 115 people. The North Korean government has launched several missiles, engaged in naval battles, performed an underground nuclear test, killed a tourist at Mt. Kumgang, and sunk a South Korean naval ship. Some of the main tensions between the two countries are over North Korea's nuclear program and disputed territory lines like the Northern Limit Line. Even after a nuclear missile launch in 1998 and bloody naval battles such as the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong in 2002 where six South Korean sailors were killed, President Kim Dae Jung continued to engage in friendly relations with North Korea rather than punish the North during his administration. Roh Moo Hyun also began his administration supporting Kim's Sunshine policy of cooperation but his responses to North Korea's threatening behavior began to shift later in his administration after a 2006 missile launch.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the interactions between North and South Korea from 1998 to 2006 and answer the question: What accounts for the difference in responses to North Korean threats by South Korean presidents from the same party with similar stands toward North Korea? Although both presidents shared similar approaches to North Korea, they did not always respond in the same way. Why not? To answer this question, I compare how South Korean Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun responded to similar cases of North Korean missile and naval threats. For each administration, I examine a case in which North

Korea test-launched a rocket and a case in which North Korean vessels crossed the Northern Limit Line and into South Korean waters. In particular, I seek to explain why President Roh responded differently to a 2006 missile launching compared to Kim Dae Jung's handling of North Korea's rocket launch in 1998. The time period 1998-2006 was chosen because some of the most serious nuclear threats, such as the nuclear missile test, occurred during the Kim and Roh administrations. In comparing the presidents' responses to threatening actions by North Korea, I test a set of explanations made by experts for South Korean approaches to North Korea to see which best applies. These explanations involve maintaining ideological consistency, international pressure, security reasons, public opinion and economic concerns. I believe that the approach taken towards North Korea was due to a combination of explanations rather than one single explanation. Roh Moo Hyun's response to the North Korean missile launch in 2006 was different from previous responses made by South Korean presidents in that he stopped aid to North Korea. In contrast to his response to the Northern Limit Line event, Roh's decision after the missile launch was not very consistent to his ideology and over time the lack of progress motivated Roh to try a new security approach that would not attract harsh retaliation from North Korea. Also, public opinion and international pressure had a greater influence on Roh's response than Kim's.

Significance of the Question

This research question is significant politically because understanding how and why previous presidents have responded to threats is important for learning how South Korea has tried to achieve a productive engagement policy despite North Korea's threatening behavior. North Korea is still a current threat to South Korea both in missile testing and naval clashes, yet sometimes South Korea has not adjusted its diplomatic approach in a way that seems to take

these actions into account. This thesis will contribute to understanding why South Korea has responded as it has. This research is also significant academically because there have been many different explanations given as to why South Korean presidents have responded the way they have to North Korean threats. The research evaluates the various explanations that have been made to determine which explanation best fits each case. Depending on the case, some explanations have greater applicability than others.

Statement of Main Findings

What explains the responses of South Korean Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun to similar North Korean threats? Why did Kim Dae Jung continue to respond with an approach of cooperation and reconciliation but Roh Moo Hyun shift from cooperation to withdrawing some forms of aid to North Korea? This thesis shows that the explanations that best influenced Kim Dae Jung's responses to the North Korean threats were ideological consistency, and concerns about security and the economy. Kim introduced his "Sunshine Policy," which supported cooperation with North Korea from the beginning of his administration. Despite the naval battles and rocket launches, Kim continued communication, trade, aid and joint projects with North Korea. Kim believed that joint cooperation would help the North Korean economy and prevent the fall of the North Korea government. Kim did not punish North Korea for their threatening actions out of fear of escalating tensions or even war breaking out between the North and South. I find that that public opinion and international pressure did not influence Kim's decision: although South Korean citizens and countries like the U.S. and Japan demanded that North Korea be punished for their actions, Kim did not act on those pressures.

Roh Moo Hyun began his administration similarly to Kim by supporting Kim's Sunshine Policy. He was consistent to his ideology and acted out of security concerns when he handled the

Northern Limit Line dispute in 2004 by continuing relations with the North without retaliating. However, Roh's response changed after the 2006 North Korean missile launch. Even though North Korea was still a threat, security concerns did not dominate Roh's responses to North Korean actions as they did in Kim's previous decisions. Roh's approach on how to protect South Korea's security changed in the 2006 case in a way that overcame his initial ideological position. Instead of following the Sunshine Policy, Roh stopped aid not only as a punishment for the missile test but in hopes of convincing North Korea to come back to the Six-Party Talks. Other factors that influenced his decision were public opinion and international pressure since many countries condemned and punished North Korea for their launch and the South Korean public had enough of North Korea's nuclear program. Ultimately, the responses by Kim and Roh were both the result of different combinations of factors.

Methodology

This thesis examines a set of parallel events that occurred under each president's administration and evaluates the reasons for each president's response. For each administration, I examine a case in which North Korea test-launched a rocket and a case in which North Korean vessels cross the Northern Limit Line and into South Korean waters. Although both presidents made relatively similar responses to confrontations with North Korean ships, their responses to the test-firing of missiles differed. The difference in responses posed a puzzle because Kim and Roh were from the same political party and ran on the same platform campaigning for president, yet their responses were not entirely the same. By comparing these cases, I explain why the presidents continued their engagement policy and refrained from condemning the North in all but the case of the 2006 missile test. In doing this, I evaluate the explanations made by specialists for why South Korean presidents have responded as they have to threats from North Korea.

Table 1.1: Cases for Analysis and Comparison

	North Korean Action	President's Response
Kim Dae Jung	1998-North Korea launches a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 rocket.	Continued with cooperation and aid with North Korea.
	2002-The Second Battle of Yeonpyeong	South Korea President Kim Dae Jung sacked his Minister of Defense and reshuffled his Cabinet. However, he continued with his cooperation with North Korea and only asked for an apology.
Roh Moo Hyun	2004- South Korean patrol boats fired on North Korean vessels after they crossed the NLL	Continued with cooperation and aid with North Korea.
	2006-North Korea test fires missiles including a long-range Taepodong 2(or Daepodong) rocket	South Korea punishes North Korea for conducting the tests by halting food and fertilizer assistance.

Table 1 shows the actions taken by North Korea and the responses by Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun. The responses made by both President Kim and Roh to naval events were similar. Each president continued his policy of reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea despite North Korean vessels crossing the Northern Limit Line (NLL) both in 2002 and 2004. The two Presidents also took the same stance on missile tests. In 1998, North Korea launched a three-stage rocket launch but Kim Dae Jung responded by downplaying the event and he continued the joint projects with the North. Soon after becoming president, Roh Moo Hyun responded in a similar way when North Korea test fired a land -to-sea anti-ship missile in 2003. However, when North Korea test-fired a missile in 2006, Roh responded differently by halting food and fertilizer assistance.

I chose examples of a nuclear test missile launch and a naval dispute from each administration because the nuclear program and NLL line dispute are two of the most dangerous threats that face South Korea. Although the research for the North Korean nuclear program

began in the early 1960s, some of the most serious nuclear threats, such as the nuclear missile test, occurred during the Kim and Roh administrations. Another major dispute between North and South Korea involved a territorial boundary, called the Northern Limit Line (NLL), which was created by the United Nations (UN) Command during the armistice talks in 1953. Because the territory is rich with fish and crab, the North Koreans regularly fish near the NLL and sometimes cross the line. Although there were many occasions when the Northern fishing boats crossed the NLL, two deadly events occurred during the Kim Dae-Jung administration. The shooting that erupted between North and South Korean boats resulted in the bloodiest confrontation between the two Koreas since the end of the War.

Some of the documentary sources that I use to answer questions concerning conditions in South Korea are opinion polls and surveys from Gallup Korea, *Chosun Ilbo*, *Dong-A Ilbo* and data collected by the Ministry of Unification. The data to answer what was said or done by each South Korean president come from sources such as magazine interviews, excerpts from inaugural speeches, papers from the Ministry of Unification, Korean newspapers such as the *Asia Times*, and academic journals like the *Asian Perspective*.

The study has a few limitations. The research only focuses on the South Korean presidents because there is limited data and information concerning North Korea, their official policies or public surveys, and how they interpreted South Korea's behavior. The North Korean data would have been helpful in explaining their true reasons for their nuclear missile testing. Another limitation is that I have limited the study to a specific time period. My focus was only on two South Korean administrations which spanned from 1998 to 2006, and only a small number of cases of North Korean threat. Looking at a longer time span and large number of cases might help in grasping a better explanation for why South Korea has responded as it has. In

addition, the language barrier was problematic. Since I am unable to read Korean, I could not analyze documents written in Korean which could have been useful to my research.

This thesis will proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide a historical background of North and South Korean relations and provide a list of threatening behavior made by North Korea. This chapter introduces background on the personalities and presidential careers of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun. Chapter 2 also provides a literature review of the explanations for South Korean responses to North Korea. These include ideological consistency, security reasons, economic concerns, public opinion and international pressure. In Chapter 3, I examine the threatening actions by North Korea and responses during the Kim Dae Jung administration. The cases discussed are the 1998 North Korea launching of a Taepo Dong 1 rocket and the 2002 Second Battle of Yeonpyeong. Chapter 4 examines similar events and responses during the Roh Moo Hyun administration. The cases discussed are the 2004 North Korea boats crossing the NLL and the 2006 North Korea missile launchings. Chapter 5 is a summary of my findings and a comparison of the responses of the two administrations. I also suggest further areas of research and study.

Chapter 2

Historical Background

Before we can understand what accounted for the difference in responses to North Korean threats by South Korean presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, it is important to understand the history and depth of the relationship between North and South Korea. The relationship between North and South Korea has changed much since the division of the peninsula in 1945. Both countries had to start from the beginning to form their own country and government, but these countries were engaged in a destructive war from 1950-53 that left much of the peninsula in ruins. Not only did North and South have to start reconstruction, they also had to worry about security and future threats since the Korean War never actually ended. This chapter will examine the separation of the Koreas, the history of their interaction with one another, and the policies of past leaders. I will look at how presidents before Kim and Roh engaged with North Korea and examine the reasons for their actions. The examination of the history of the two countries will help provide a clearer understanding of the reactions taken by Kim and Roh in the case studies. Finally, I will examine the explanations that have been made for the responses of Kim and Roh to North Korean provocation.

Korea has a long history of conflict, not just from Chinese and Japanese occupation, but also because of internal divisions on the Korean peninsula. After Japan's surrender to the Allies, the first division occurred when the Japanese followed an American proposal to have forces north of the 38th parallel surrender to the Soviet Union while the south surrendered to the Americans. "From 1945 to 1948 there were various efforts at unity, including a proposed five-year US-Soviet trusteeship that was rejected by Koreans, and elections sponsored by the newly

formed United Nations which were rejected by the community North.”¹ Finally in 1948, a split between North and South was solidified after United Nations (U.N) sponsored elections in the South. “About twenty parties and independents competed for 200 available in the National Assembly.”² Syngman Rhee was elected chairman during the first session of the National Assembly on May 31, 1948. “Rhee was a septuagenarian who had lived in the United States for nearly four decades, had a Ph.D. from Princeton, and had taken an Austrian wife; a patriot well known for devoting his life to Korean independence, he was also a willful man of legendary obstinacy and strong anticommunist belief.”³ A constitution was prepared and signed mid-July and on July 20 Syngman Rhee was elected president by a vote of 180 out of 196, with sixteen of the members voting for Kim Ku.

The creation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) came about differently. After the division in 1945, the Soviet Army took control of the northern part of the Korean peninsula and then established the Provisional People’s Committee for North Korea from 1946-48 which was led by Kim Il Sung who was a guerilla leader who had fought in the Soviet Army. While the Soviets remained in the background, “the communists sidelined moderate nationalists and began crushing religion . . . The labor camps began filling up. Christians, ex-landowners, and committed anti-communists began moving South.”⁴ The Provisional People’s Committee was dissolved when the DPRK was officially declared on September 9, 1948 and Kim Il Sung was announced as the premier without U.N involvement. Each side claimed to be the legitimate governing body of all Korea. After that division, several

¹ Breen, M. (1998). The Koreans: Who They Are, What They Want, Where Their Future Lies. United States of America, St. Martin’s Press. Pg. 116.

² Kim, C. N. (2007). The Korean Presidents: Leadership for Nation Building. Norwalk, CT, EastBridge.Pg.39.

³ Cumings, B. (1997). Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History. United States of America. Pg.195.

⁴ Breen, M. (1998). The Koreans: Who They Are, What They Want, Where Their Future Lies. United States of America, St. Martin’s Press. Pg. 118.

border clashes occurred until June 1950, when North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and attacked the South. This began the Korean War, which lasted until 1953. The Korean War never officially ended. Instead, on July 27, 1953, the two opposing sides, the North and the South, agreed to an armistice and compromised by dividing the peninsula along the 38th parallel, known as the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Despite the country being divided into two parts, there have been many discussions and different approaches concerning North- South relations and the possibility of a Korean reunification ever since the Korean War.

Since the time of the armistice, South Korean presidents have taken a number of approaches to relations with the North. The first South Korean President, Syngman Rhee (President from 1948-1960) had some resistance to the armistice and had actually adopted the *pukchin t'ongil* principle which translates to 'unification through march' into the North. Rhee thought absorption of the North to a democratic system was the only option for reunification and refused to work along with the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung. "In fact, he strenuously opposed a cease-fire in the Korean War after UN forces had pushed Communist troops above the thirty-eighth parallel in February 1951."⁵ Park Chung hee (president from 1963 to 1979) opposed the use of force against North Korea; he was the first South Korean president to accept that North and South Korea were both two legitimate governments. Park was focused on the construction and development in the economy and national strength in the South first and believed that this would in turn lead to unification at a later time.

The Roh Tae Woo administration (1988-93) both marked the change to South Korean democracy and took a different direction in relations with the North. This democratically elected

⁵ Matray, J. (2005). Korea Divided: The 38th Parallel and the Demilitarized Zone. United States of America, Chelsea House Publishers. Pg. 101.

government focused on democratic reforms rather than the repression of the civil society like the previous administrations; toward the North, Roh encouraged dialogue and followed a Nordpolitik policy of diplomatic relations with communist Eastern bloc countries as well as the North. South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Bum “called the policy Nordpolitik, after the West German Ostpolitik policy with East Germany . . . for the Nordpolitik policy to succeed, it was necessary to synchronize it with a more positive effort to negotiate with North Korea.”⁶ Roh Tae Woo encouraged exchanges and trade between the two countries, accepted North Korea as part of the national community, and helped North Korea in its efforts to improve ties with the U.S and Japan. Roh's reunification plan was called the Korean National Community Unification Formula.

When Kim Young Sam (president from 1993-1998) assumed power, he took a different approach to the North than his predecessors by limiting ties with the North in order to focus on the domestic problems that South Korea was facing. Since the previous presidential administrations were considered to be corrupt, Kim’s administration wanted to mainly focus on the economy as well as on reforming the government. Due to the nuclear crisis, President Kim Young-Sam refused to allow South Koreans to attend the funeral of Kim Il-sung and adopted a hard-line anti-communist policy again. He responded strongly against the protests of students who wanted to march to the North to discuss unifications with North Korean students.

Just as the approach taken by the South changed over time, the approaches taken by the North also changed, but with fewer leaders, there was greater continuity than in the South. While South Korea strived for a democratic state, North Korea took a different direction when Kim Il

⁶ Oberdorfer, D. (1997). The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. United States of America, Addison-Wesley. Pg.187.

Sung became the premier on September 9, 1948, and turned the country into a communist dictatorship. Kim had a long history of communist and military involvement. “Kim joined an underground Marxist group while still a high school student in Jilin, leading to his arrest and imprisonment for several months in 1929. After his release he joined up with a guerrilla group, and kept on fighting until October 1940.”⁷ During this time he changed his name from Kim Song-ju to Kim Il Sung. In September 1945, he returned to Korea and subsequently used both his guerrilla record and the support of Soviet occupation authorities to become the leader of North Korea.”⁸ In hopes of reunification of Korea, Kim Il Sung ordered the invasion of the Republic of Korea in 1950.

After the armistice in 1953, the whole peninsula was in ruins and North Korea received recovery assistance from China and the Soviet Union. “It was estimated that about 80 percent of the North Korea’s productive capacity was destroyed by the war.”⁹ North Korea was able to expand their economy with their profitable mining and steel industries with the help of the Soviet Union and China in the form of money, equipment and advisors until the 1970s, when North Korea’s economy slowed down due to the international market and their military expenditures. Instead of rebuilding the country’s infrastructure and factories, North Korea invested in weapon projects and building a large military force.

The research for the North Korean nuclear program began in the early 1960s, just a decade after the Korean War. A few years later, the North Koreans were able to create research reactors and supply fuel elements for them. With the building of a small nuclear reactor to

⁷ Cumings, B. (2004). North Korea: Another Country. New York, The New Press. Pg. 108.

⁸ Matray, J. (2005). Korea Divided: The 38th Parallel and the Demilitarized Zone. United States of America, Chelsea House Publishers. Pg. 76.

⁹ Nahm, A. (1988). A History of the Korean People: Korea Tradition & Transformation. Elizabeth, New Jersey, Hollym Corporation. Pg.387.

produce weapons-grade plutonium in 1986 along with 2 larger reactors, the “combined thermal output approaching 1,000 mega-watts would provide the theoretical capacity to produce as much as 250 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium each year of operation, enough material for fifty nuclear weapons.”¹⁰ The international community, in particular the U.S., noticed the building of North Korea’s nuclear program and decided to step in. Although North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT or NNPT) in 1985, inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) did not occur in 1992 because the North Korean government would not allow them. “By early 1993, the IAEA had identified discrepancies in the material inventory, which required further investigations to ensure that no material existed on DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) territory that had not been declared. In addition, information had also been provided to the IAEA indicating the existence of two undeclared sites that were suspected of being nuclear waste depositories.”¹¹ Therefore, the IAEA wished to have a special inspection but North Korean officials refused and this led to the announcement of North Korea’s intention to withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1993. However, North Korea did not withdraw and continued nuclear talks with the U.S.

In 1994, the U.S. and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework document with the purpose of stopping North Korea’s nuclear program. In the agreement, North Korea had to continue being a part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, allow for routine inspections by the IAEA, dispose existing nuclear fuel rods, and shut down reactors and plants as well as the construction of the new ones. In return, “the United States agreed to organize and arrange financing for the construction of two new light water reactors with a combined electrical power

¹⁰ Steinbruner, J. (2000). Principles of Global Security. Washington D.C, Brookings Institution. Pg.220-221.

¹¹ Baylis, J, and Steve Smith, eds. (2001). The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. New York, Oxford UP.

output of 2,000 megawatts- nearly eight times greater than the electricity-generating capacity of the reactors to be dismantled-but of a design much less suitable for producing plutonium.”¹²

Also, the agreement included provisions for removing the economic sanctions that the U.S put in place since the Korean War and supplying North Korea with 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.

Many complications arose soon after the Agreed Framework document was signed when the U.S Republican Party took control of Congress. The Republicans argued against the agreement and believed that North Korea should not receive rewards. Therefore, Congress did not provide the funding necessary to hold up the agreement. “Budget appropriations over the first four years provided less than half of the modest annual amount, about \$65 million, required to purchase the fuel oil the United States was obligated to deliver.”¹³ Also, the oil deliveries were very late; the building of the replacement reactors were behind the schedule and the U.S. did not fulfill its promise to remove the economic sanctions due to opposition from Congress. These complications led to the North Koreans warning the U.S. did not hold up their end of the bargain.

From the 1960s through the 1980s, Kim Il Sung also adopted guerilla warfare tactics and commando raids against South Korea in order to destabilize South Korea. These raids sometimes led to firefights along the DMZ and “the raids peaked in 1968, when more than 600 infiltrations were reported, including an unsuccessful commando attack on the South Korean presidential mansion by thirty-one members of North Korea’s 124th Army Unit.”¹⁴ The unit was stopped 500 meters short of the building but the event resulted in the deaths of 28 infiltrators and 37 South Koreans. Then on January 23, 1968, there was a failed assassination attempt on then-president of

¹² Steinbruner, J. (2000). Principles of Global Security. Washington D.C, Brookings Institution. Pg.221.

¹³ Steinbruner, J. (2000). Principles of Global Security. Washington D.C, Brookings Institution. Pg.222.

¹⁴ Arrigoni, G. (2004). Kim Il Sung Continues Attacks on South Korea. The World's Hot Spots: North Korea. D. A. Miller. Farmington Hills, MI, Greenhaven Press.Pg.33.

South Korea, Park Chung hee and another attempt occurred again in November 1970 when an infiltrator was killed while planting a bomb to kill him at the Seoul National Cemetery. On August 15, 1974, a North Korean agent in Seoul launched another unsuccessful assassination attempt on Park Chung hee, but succeeded in killing the first lady. On October 9, 1983, North Korean agents killed more than twenty people, including four South Korean cabinet ministers, during South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan's visit to Burma. On November 29, 1987, North Korean agents also blew up a South Korean civilian airliner which killed 115 people.

By the 1990s, North Korea was not only isolated from most of the world but their economy was collapsing because of the end of the Soviet Union in 1991; in this context, North Korea began to develop nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union had been North Korea's main source of economic aid, and North Korea's only main ally left was China. By 1995, "Per capita income was plummeting, from \$2,460 in 1991 to \$719 in 1995. North Korea's merchandise exports dropped from \$2 billion to about \$800 million."¹⁵ In March 1993, North Korea pulled out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to pursue the development of nuclear weapons. North Korea then began to reprocess plutonium from its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon by the next year. These events led the former U.S. president Jimmy Carter to visit Pyongyang in June 1994 and make a tentative agreement with Kim Il Sung to freeze the nuclear program in exchange for energy assistance. This meeting also resulted in an invitation from President Carter to South Korea's president, Kim Young Sam, to a summit meeting in Pyongyang between the leaders set for July 25, 1994. However, this important summit never took place. In early July, just two weeks before the summit, after inspecting a villa north of Pyongyang where he intended to host the summit, Kim Il Sung collapsed with a massive heart attack and died on July 8, 1994.

¹⁵ Demick, B. (2010). Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea. United States, Spiegel & Grau. Pg.115.

Kim Il Sung had publically appointed his son Kim Jong Il his heir in October 1980, and Kim Jong Il took office the day his father died.

Kim Jong Il's regime was marked with much turmoil and threatening behavior toward the South. North Korea has not only threatened the South with nuclear and naval actions, but its own people have suffered from malnutrition and have died from famines. Much of the North Korean population depends on international food aid in order to be fed. The North Korean famine began in the early 1990s due to severe flooding, limited farmland, and no fuel for agricultural machinery. A U.N. relief team reported that the floods in 1995 caused "\$15 billion worth of damage that affected 5.2 million people; that 96,348 homes had been damaged, displacing 500,000 people; and 1.9 million tons of crops had been lost."¹⁶ The North Korean government even launched a "Let's Eat Two Meals Per Day" campaign in an attempt to cut down food consumption. "By 1998, an estimated 600,000 to 2 million North Koreans had died as a result of the famine, as much as 10 percent of the population. Exact figures would be nearly impossible to tally since North Korean hospitals could not report starvation as a cause of death."¹⁷ Some countries like the U.S. and South Korea have used humanitarian aid to North Korea as a tactic to encourage talks concerning nuclear weapons or these countries have postponed aid as a form of punishment.

Even though Presidents like Roh Tae Woo, Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun wanted to increase cooperation and exchanges with North Korea, North Korea has become a major threat to South Korea since 1953. This has occurred both because of the build-up of their nuclear program and because of ongoing tensions over the Northern Limit Line (NLL), which is a maritime

¹⁶ Demick, B. (2010). Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea. United States, Spiegel & Grau. Pg.112.

¹⁷ Demick, B. (2010). Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea. United States, Spiegel & Grau. Pg.145.

demarcation line that separates the two Koreas. These threats have resulted in strained discussions between the North and South and battles that have resulted in deaths on both sides. The key historical events in this troubled relationship are summarized in Table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1. Key Events and Instances of Threatening Behavior by North Korea (1950-2006)

1950-June 25	North Korean People's Army (KPA) crosses the 38th parallel border and invades South Korea
1953-July 27	Cease-fire armistice is signed
1968- January 21	North Korean commandos launch a failed assassination attempt on the then president of South Korea, Park Chung-hee.
1974- August 15	A North Korean agent in Seoul launches an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Park Chung-hee; the first lady is killed.
1983- October 9	North Korean agents kill more than 20 people including 4 South Korean cabinet ministers during South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan's visit to Burma.
1987- November 29	North Korean agents blow up a South Korean civilian airliner, killing 115 people.
1990-1999	North Korea suffers from severe flooding and famine killing 600,000-2 million North Koreans.
1994- July 8	North Korean leader Kim Il Sung dies from a heart attack
1998- August 31	<i>North Korea launches a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 rocket.</i>
1999- June 9-15	The first battle of Yeonpyeong (naval skirmish).
2000- July	North Korea threatens to restart its nuclear program.
2002- June 29	<i>The Second battle of Yeonpyeong (naval skirmish).</i>
2003- March 10	North Korea test fires a land-to-sea anti-ship missile into the Sea of Japan.
2004- November 1	<i>South Korean patrol boats fires on North Korean vessels after they cross the NLL</i>
2006- July 4	<i>North Korea test fires missiles including a long-range Taepodong 2(or Daepodong) rocket which fails.</i>
2006- October 9	North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reports the country has performed a successful underground nuclear test.

2009- April 5	An Unha-2 rocket carrying a satellite is launched by North Korea.
2009- May 25	North Korea performs a second underground nuclear test.
2009-July	North Korea conducts missile tests over the Sea of Japan.
2009- November 10	The Battle of Daecheong (Naval skirmish)
2010- March 26	The South Korean naval ship, Cheonan, sinks in the yellow sea from what South Korean-led official investigators believe to be from a North Korean torpedo fired from a midget submarine.

Although both presidents shared similar approaches to North Korea, they did not always respond in the same way. Before I compare how South Korean Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun responded to similar cases of North Korean missile and naval threats, I will provide background on the life of each individual before becoming president to give some insights into their priorities as politicians. Then I will examine the initial policy direction of each president toward North Korea to help provide context for the responses made by Kim and Roh in the case studies.

Kim Dae Jung

Born in a poor region of South Korea, Kim Dae Jung was engaged in opposition politics from a young age; over the course of his lifetime he also developed an approach of reconciliation toward his enemies. He was born the second of four sons in a poor family on Huido, a remote island off the southwest Korean coast. There are conflicting reports on his exact birth date. Some report that his birth date was December 3, 1925 but other reports say he was actually born on January 6th in 1923 or 1924. One of the reasons for the different birthdates “was to present a somewhat youthful image. Another was that his father, Kim Yun Sik, was apparently not married to his mother at the time of his birth, and the couple may have wanted the record to show their

son was born after their marriage.”¹⁸ Kim started his political involvement in 1945 by joining a leftist political party known as the South Korean Workers’ Party and was involved in the Democratic Youth Alliance. While most of the young Korean men were fighting during the Korean War, Kim did not carry out the mandatory military service and instead he created a small marine business and published a local newspaper. After the war, he ran for a seat in the National Assembly in 1954 and 1958 but lost both times. He was married but Kim’s failures to get a seat in the Assembly reportedly led to his wife committing suicide. Kim was elected in 1961 into the Assembly but had to forfeit his seat when General Park Chung Hee led a military junta and dissolved the National Assembly. In 1973 Kim was elected to the National Assembly and became a committed democratic activist. After working his way up in the political ranks, he was nominated as the presidential candidate of the New Democratic Party in September 1970. Kim received 45 percent of the vote but lost to Park Chung Hee by a 7.9 percent margin.

Kim not only faced tough competition in his elections, he encountered near death experiences during his political career. “He repeatedly asserted that the Park government had attempted several times to kill him (the first attempt, he believes, was in 1971, when a truck plowed into his car leaving him with a permanent limp).”¹⁹ Early in President Park’s administration, Park imposed martial law, pushed a new Constitution giving him president power for life, and banned all political activities. Kim Dae Jung went to the U.S. and Japan to lead campaigns against Park. But during a trip to Tokyo in 1973, “in what appears to have been a murder plot designed to look as if it was committed by North Koreans,” Kim was kidnapped by

¹⁸ Kirk, D. (2009). Korea Betrayed: Kim Dae Jung and Sunshine. New York, NY, Palgrave Macmillian. Pg.2.

¹⁹ Kim, C. (2007). The Korean Presidents: Leadership for Nation Building. Norwalk, CT, EastBridge.Pg.313.

Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) agents.²⁰ The KCIA agents brought him back to Seoul and placed him under house arrest. However, even after his release Kim continued his movement and was arrested in March 1976 for starting a pro-democracy demonstration and was sentenced to 5 year in prison. He was released two years later but put into house arrest again.

While imprisoned, Kim deepened his approach to life and politics built around Christian principles. Kim Dae Jung was released from house arrest after the assassination of President Park. However, he was arrested once more for inciting riot in Kwangju, where demonstrators demanded the repeal of martial law in 1980. “After a show trial in 1980 found Kim Dae Jung guilty, his execution was pending when American pressure was brought to bear to keep him alive.”²¹ While in prison at this time, Kim wrote letters to his family concerning hospitality, love, and God. In one letter he wrote that “Love for our neighbors is no different. Our neighbors are all God’s children, whether they are Christians or not. It is only natural that we love those who are our brothers before God. To love especially those of our neighbors who need our care and encouragement is one of the most important of God’s commandments. And when we consider how much loving care we receive from others, in food shelter, clothing, education, health, and other ways, loving them is only fitting return for all the love they have given us.”²² To his daughter-in-law, he also wrote, “For this end, as children of God, we must dedicate ourselves to the twofold purpose of individual and social salvation; that is we must help our neighbors and devote ourselves to the betterment of society. We must synchronize and harmonize these two enterprises just like the two wheels of an ox-cart.”²³ These writings demonstrate the importance Kim placed on helping others and hospitality. In a sense, North Korea could be portrayed as

²⁰ Breen, M. (1998). The Koreans: Who They Are, What They Want, Where Their Future Lies. United States of America, St. Martin's Press.Pg.204.

²¹ Cumings, B. (1997). Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History. United States of America.Pg.378.

²² Kim, D. (1987). Prison Writings, Berkeley: University of California Press. Pg. 6.

²³ Kim, D. (1987). Prison Writings, Berkeley: University of California Press. Pg.21.

neighbors who according to Kim must be helped out of love in order to better society. From this perspective, Kim's strong Christian belief may have kept him devoted to his Sunshine Policy despite threatening behavior from North Korea.

Although still in prison, Kim continued his commitment to his political beliefs. Kim's prison sentence was later commuted to life in prison but it was suspended in 1982 so he could travel to the U.S. for medical attention. However, in the U.S. he took the time to go on speaking tours to gain political support. In 1987, Kim Dae Jung formed his own party but lost to Roh Tae Woo and lost again in 1992 to Kim Young-sam. However, Kim Dae Jung finally won the December 1997 presidential election and was sworn in as the President of South Korea on February 25, 1998. Kim's main focus during his presidency was North-South relations and his Sunshine policy. The major events involving North Korea during the Kim Dae Jung Administration (1998-2000) are summarized in Table 2.2 on the next page.

Table 2.2. Major Events Involving North Korea during the Kim Dae Jung Administration (1998-2002)

Event	Kim Dae Jung's Response
<p>In 1998: 31 August- North Korea launches a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 rocket.</p>	<p>In 1998: 18 November-The first cruise ship "The Kumgang" leaves for Mt. Kumgang. The launch did not cause any disruptions in South Korea.</p>
<p>In 1999: 9-15 June- The first battle of Yeongpyeong (naval skirmish)</p>	<p>In 1999: June- Cruise tour to Mt. Kumgang continues on a regular schedule as do other inter-Korean exchanges. It was business as usual in South Korea.</p>
<p>In 2000: July- North Korea threatens to restart its nuclear program if the U.S does not compensate for the loss of electricity caused by delays in building nuclear power plants.</p>	<p>In 2000: 15 June- Inter-Korean summit meeting takes place in Pyongyang, North Korea between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il, who sign a joint declaration.</p> <p>August and December- Family Reunion event takes place in which one hundred people from each side travel to the other nation to meet with relatives separated since the Korean War.</p>
<p>In 2002: 29 June- The Second battle of Yeonpyeong.</p> <p>12 December- North Korea states they are restarting its functional reactor and reopening the other nuclear facilities that were frozen under the Agreed Framework.</p> <p>26 December-An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) spokesman says that North Korea has started moving fresh fuel rods into the reactor.</p> <p>27 December- North Korea orders IAEA inspectors out of the country.</p>	<p>In 2002: 28 April-For the first time, an Inter-Korean reunion of Separated Families takes place at Mt. Kumgang</p> <p>8 July- Construction begins for a new building at the Settlement Support for Dislocated North Koreans.</p> <p>18 September- Construction begins on the joint North and South Korean reconnection of the Kyongi Line that links Seoul (close to the DMZ) with Shinuiji on the Chinese border.</p> <p>27 December- The Ministry of Unification approved Hyundai Korea Land Corporation as 'an economic joint venture'</p>

Kim's Sunshine policy

Kim Dae Jung, president from 1998-2003, focused his administration on Inter-Korean relations and developed the Sunshine Policy which encouraged reconciliation, cooperation and business contracts. The name of the policy came from the Aesop's fable, 'The North Wind and the Sun.' "In this fable, the North Wind and the Sun argue about who is able to remove a cloak from the traveler. The North Wind blows hard but fails to succeed, since the traveler wraps his cloak even more tightly to protect himself. The Sun, however, warms the air, thus forcing the traveler to remove the unnecessary cloak."²⁴ The policy sought to help the North organize social and economic reforms in order to gradually narrow the gaps between the two Koreas.

Kim stated that his three main points of his North Korea policy were that "first, by maintaining a strong security posture, we will never tolerate any attempt by North Korea to destroy the peace. Second, there is no intention of unifying the country by absorbing the North," and "instead, we will seek coexistence and co-prosperity with the North. Third, we will strive to improve and develop inter-Korean relations by actively pushing interaction and cooperation in many areas."²⁵ This approach towards North Korea led to the creation of the inter-Korean summit meeting in 2000.

On June 15, 2000, the leaders of North and South Korea, Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung met at an inter-Korean summit meeting held in Pyongyang. After the meeting, "slanders and criticisms along the DMZ by North Korea stopped and armed infiltration by North Korean spies disappeared. Moreover, to begin tours of Mt. Geumgang, North Korea opened Jangjeon Port,

²⁴ Lankov, A. (2008). "The Facts and Fables of a Unified Korea." [Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability](#). Pg.5.

²⁵ As quoted in The Korea Times, "President Kim Has Firm Belief in Nat'l Unification" 12/08/2000.

which is used to be its frontline naval port.”²⁶ Also, the Seoul-Sinuiju railway and highway reconnection was promoted as part of the cooperation efforts between the two countries.

On his way back from the inter-Korean summit, President Kim Dae-Jung made an important speech which stated, “The Pyongyang people are the same as us, the same nation sharing the same blood. Regardless of what they have been saying and acting outwardly, they have deep love and a longing for their compatriots in the South. If you talk with them, you notice that right away. That is quite natural because we have been a homogeneous nation for thousands of years. We lived as a unified nation for 1,300 years before we were divided 55 years ago against our will . . . Koreans of both South and North have the same behavior and life We must consider North Koreans as our brothers and sisters.”²⁷ This speech is significant since many South Koreans tended to regard the citizens in the North as strange and different. However, Kim Dae Jung addressed the strong connection between the North and South Korean people.

The meeting also produced the “June 15 South-North Joint Declaration,” which provided a framework for the future relations between the two countries. The declaration stated the intention to hold dialogue between different authorities; exchanges in different fields such as education, sports, arts, science; and visits between separated families caused by the war. After this, according to South Korea's Ministry of Unification (MOU), the total number of human exchanges between the two countries greatly increased. A chart created by the MOU on

²⁶ As quoted in The Ministry of Unification white papers, “Sunshine policy for Peace and Cooperation” 5/28/2002.

²⁷ Jung, Kim Dae Jung. (2000). "Remarks by President Kim Dae Jung on Returning Home from the Inter-Korean Summit in Pyongyang."

Exchanges and Cooperation showed there were 7,986 human exchanges solely in the year 2000 while there were only 11,958 total human exchanges in the 10 year span between 1989-1999.²⁸

Despite these efforts at constructive engagement, there were conflicts and challenges for Kim, who faced numerous criticisms for his policies toward North Korea and declining public approval. For example, an editorial of 2001 in the South Korean newspaper, The JoongAng Ilbo, contended that South Korea's policy of reaching out to the North had to be reexamined. The newspaper editors criticized South Korean president Kim Dae Jung's "Sunshine Policy" because of a controversial event that took place during the "National Unification Festival" in which hundreds of South Korean representatives traveled to the North on August 15, 2001, to observe Korea's anniversary of independence from Japan. Members of the group took part in ceremonies that praised former North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. "The political scandal resulted in a parliamentary no-confidence vote against South Korea's Unification Minister and a reshuffling of President Kim Dae Jung's cabinet."²⁹

The newspaper's editors also argued that the "Sunshine Policy" had been ineffective since it relied more on "carrots" rather than balancing rewards with "sticks"--punishments for bad behavior. Another problem discussed was that the Kim administration assumed that the North's behavior concerning the creation of weapons of mass destruction was due to insecurity, but JoongAng Ilbo suspected other political motivations such as an effort to extort benefits from the south. The article also noted other ineffectiveness since the June 15 summit, such as agreements that had not been met. During the summit, "North Korea had retracted its demand for the

²⁸ The Human Exchanges chart can be found at "Exchanges and Cooperation." Ministry of Unification, http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=AFFexchanges_gaeseong.

²⁹ JoongAng Ilbo (2001) as quoted in Dudley, W. (2003). *North and South Korea: Opposing Viewpoints*. San Diego, Greenhaven. Pg.152.

withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Korea” and “also promised to revise provisions of the Workers Party platform that called for fomenting revolution in the South.”³⁰ However, Kim Jong Il announced in August 2001 that his most pressing issue was U.S. troop withdrawal from the South.

In conclusion, despite Kim Dae Jung’s unsuccessful runs for elected office, near death experiences, and being kidnapped and imprisoned, he would eventually be elected as the president of South Korea. Kim’s personal life and experiences greatly influenced his desire for reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea. Kim was a Roman Catholic who often spoke of Christian values such as hospitality, forgiveness, cooperation and peace. In his prison papers he stressed the importance of helping those in need and helping neighbors. Kim’s campaign and administration was devoted to establishing a peaceful and cooperative relationship with North Korea, and his Sunshine policy won him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000.

Roh Moo Hyun

Like Kim, Roh Moo Hyun came from a poor family and devoted his life to human rights and the pro-democracy movement in Korea. However, despite their similar political views, Roh’s approach to North Korea differed from his predecessor’s, especially after 2006. Roh was born the son of a poor farmer on August 6, 1946, in a small village near Pusan, South Korea. Roh was the youngest of six children. After graduating high school he took a job working at a fishing net company. However, soon he began to teach himself law because he was unable to pay to attend law school. While it took him ten years to pass the bar, in 1981 Roh took an important case in which he defended several students of a book club who were tortured for almost two

³⁰ JoongAng Ilbo (2001) as quoted in Dudley, W. (2003). North and South Korea: Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego, Greenhaven. Pg.152.

months by the government for possessing banned literature; this is now known as the Burim incident. “His experience in the Burim cases fundamentally changed Roh, launching his career as a human rights lawyer, defending student protesters and striking workers.”³¹ Due to this case, Roh became dedicated to human rights.

A couple of years later, in 1985, Roh became an activist in the pro-democracy movement and joined the Democratic Citizens Council. A year later, Roh was baptized in the Catholic Church in 1986. Although Roh and his predecessor Kim were both Catholic, they had different religious upbringings and had drastically different beliefs towards religion. Kim Dae Jung was a faithful Christian who was very devout in his belief in God and in helping those in need. However, Roh’s aides said that during the presidential campaign “the late Cardinal Stephen Kim Sou-hwan asked Roh whether he believed in God or not during the presidential campaign and Roh answered ‘I believe vaguely.’ Kim again asked why he did not appear to believe absolutely and Roh answered that he was ‘wandering,’ indicating that he was not a believer in any particular religion.”³² Also, Roh grew up as a Buddhist with a Buddhist mother and eventually married a Buddhist. Therefore, Roh did not have as fixed a set of religious beliefs as Kim had, which may explain why Roh was not as absolutely determined to continue aid to North Korea after the 2006 missile test.

Roh became the director at the Pusan headquarters of the Citizens' Movement for a Democratic Constitution in 1987. The year 1987 was also important because Roh was involved in the protests at Daewoo Shipbuilding, where he was arrested and then imprisoned for three weeks for aiding and abetting the Daewoo workers who were on strike. As a consequence, Roh

³¹ Martin, G. (2003). "President Roh Muh-Hyun: Profile of the South Korean Leader." Online News Hour Report. from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june03/roh_bio_5-14.html.

³² Kwon, M. (2009) Roh's Funeral to be Imbued with Buddhism. The Korea Times.

lost his license to practice law, a situation that led him to seek political office. Roh won a seat in the National Assembly in 1988 in a pro-democracy party called the Unification Democratic Party, but only held the position for one term after quitting his party since he opposed a party merger. However, at this time “he also came to prominence that same year thanks to televised parliamentary hearings on government corruption and human-rights abuses, during which he relentlessly grilled discredited officials.”³³ He tried running again in 1992 under a new party but lost; and he lost in 1995 when he ran for mayor of Pusan. Roh was able to win a two-year term in the National Assembly in 1998 but lost in 2000. However, Roh won the 2002 presidential election as the underdog when he gained grassroots support due to his views on key issues at the time of the election. “South Korean President-elect Roh Moo Hyun won office in December by tapping into a rising tide of anti-Americanism. Just days before the close of the extremely tight race, candidate Roh said he might favor neutrality if a war ever broke out between North Korea and the U.S.”³⁴ Roh also supported taking a friendly approach towards North Korea which was the view shared by the majority of South Korean citizens. The key historical events and North Korean incidents during the Roh Moo Hyun administration (2003-2007) are summarized in Table 2.3 on the next page.

³³ "Roh Moo-hyun." from <http://www.notablebiographies.com/newsmakers2/2005-Pu-Z/Roh-Moo-hyun.html>.(2011)

³⁴ Spaeth, A. (2003). Roh Moo Hyun Takes Center Stage. Time Magazine. www.time.com, Time Magazine.

Table 2.3. Key Events and North Korean Incidents during the Roh Moo Hyun Administration (2003-2007)

Event	Roh Moo Hyun's response
<p>In 2003: 10 January- North Korea withdraws from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.</p> <p>27 February- The U.S says the North has reactivated its five-megawatt nuclear reactor at Youngbyon.</p> <p>March- North Korea test fires a land-to-sea anti-ship missile into the Sea of Japan.</p> <p>July- A U.S official says North Korea has begun reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods which suggests the country intending to produce nuclear weapons.</p> <p>6 November- North Korean ambassador tells Reuters that North Korea possesses a workable nuclear device.</p>	<p>In 2003: 30 June- The ground-breaking ceremony of Kaesong industrial complex is held. South Korea continued cooperation with North Korea despite North Korea's nuclear program.</p> <p>12 December: Establishment of the construction office of the Kaesong industrial complex. South Korea continued joint projects with North Korea.</p>
<p>In 2004: September- The six nation talks (consisting of the U.S, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia) are postponed indefinitely</p> <p>1 November- South Korean patrol boats fire on North Korean vessels after they crossed the NLL</p>	<p>In 2004: 29 January- An agreement is made on the comings and goings in the complex.</p> <p>30 June- Construction of the Kaesong industrial complex pilot park and its completion ceremony.</p> <p>15 December- Ceremony for making the first product in the Kaesong Industrial complex</p>
<p>In 2005: February- North Korea says it will "bolster its nuclear weapons arsenal."</p> <p>May- North Korea says it has finished extracting 8,000 fuel rods from its reactor at Yongbyon.</p> <p>June-North Korea says it has a stockpile of nuclear weapons and is building more.</p>	<p>In 2005: 5 September- Creation of the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Consultation Office. South Korea continued cooperation with North Korea despite North Korea's nuclear program.</p>
<p>In 2006: July- North Korea test fires missiles including a long-range Taepodong 2(or Daepodong) rocket which fails.</p>	<p>In 2006: July- South Korea punishes North Korea for conducting the tests by halting food and fertilizer assistance.</p>

<p>9 October-North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reports the country has performed a successful underground nuclear test.</p> <p>14 October- North Korea rejects the resolution from the U.N Security Council that imposes sanctions on the North for the nuclear weapons testing.</p>	
<p>In 2007: 13 February- North Korea agrees to take first steps toward nuclear disarmament and shut down its main reactor within 60 days and eventually dismantle its atomic weapons program after six-party talks.</p> <p>30 September- Agreement is signed at the six-party talks in Beijing, China and North Korea agrees to begin disabling its nuclear weapons facilities.</p>	<p>In 2007:28 February: The number of staff responsible for inter-Korean economic cooperation is increased; creation of the Unification Archives & Information Service Team.</p> <p>2 July- Extension of the term of Gaeseong Industrial Complex Project Bureau by one year.</p> <p>2-4 October-Kim Jong Il and Roh Moo-hyun participate in a summit in Pyongyang; North Korea to seek talks to formally end the Korean War and sign a peace declaration.</p>

Roh's Peace and Prosperity Policy

Roh Moo Hyun, president from 2003 to 2008, followed the Sunshine Policy that he inherited from the Kim Dae Jung administration and called it the 'Policy of Peace and Prosperity.' Roh's inaugural speech spoke about a broader goal than his predecessor who mainly focused on inter-Korean reconciliation. Roh's inaugural address focused on not only promoting peace with the North but also about making South Korea an economic powerhouse in Asia. In his speech, Roh also expressed great concern about North Korea's nuclear capabilities but stated, “global concern is rising over the North Korean nuclear issue. This is the time to make a determined effort to safeguard peace and have it firmly rooted on the peninsula.”³⁵ Roh's North

³⁵ Roh Moo Hyun's inauguration speech can be found at BBC News

Korea policy was broken down into four main principles in his speech: 1) resolve all pending issues with North Korea through dialogue; 2) build mutual trust; 3) seek active international cooperation on the premise that South and Korea are the two main actors in Inter-Korean relations; 4) enhance transparency, expand citizen participation, and secure bipartisan support.³⁶

To preserve inter-Korean relations, he sent supplies to the North that consisted of tons of rice and fertilizer. The Kaeseong³⁷ Industrial Complex, which broke ground in June 2003 after Roh was president, originated from the Sunshine policy. The Kaeseong complex is beneficial to both countries since it uses the technology and companies from the South and the North's land and labor. On June 15, 2005, both North and South Koreans celebrated the fifth anniversary of the historical inter-Korean summit. At the 10th inter-Korean economic cooperation talks in Seoul in July 2005, the two Koreas agreed on complementary economic development.

Like his predecessor, Roh Moo Hyun also held a summit meeting with Kim Jung Il. The second inter-Korean summit was held in Pyongyang from October 2-4, 2007. The meeting resulted in a “Declaration for Development in Inter-Korean Relations and Peace and Prosperity”. Some of the key points in this Declaration state that the two Koreas shall:

1. Uphold the June 15 Declaration.
2. Make inter-Korea relations one of mutual respect and trust.
3. Resolve issues through cooperation between the two countries.
4. End military hostilities/tension, keep the peace on the peninsula and implement the September 19 Joint Statement and the February 13 Agreement.

³⁶ Information found in Roh Moo Hyun's inaugural address on February 25, 2003: Ministry of Unification (2003). The Policy of Peace and Prosperity. <http://eng.unikorea.go.kr>.

³⁷ This is also spelled Gaeseong.

5. Create a cooperation zone in the West Sea and promote humanitarian joint projects.
6. Boost social exchanges and cooperation in fields such as history, science, technology, arts and sports.
7. Promote humanitarian cooperation projects such as reunions for separated families.
8. Promote the interests and rights of the Korean people and Koreans who are living abroad.
9. Agreed to hold prime ministers' talks for the implementation of the Declaration.
10. Authorities from both sides will meet to further advance relations.³⁸

Roh Moo Hyun also encountered numerous criticisms about his “Peace and Prosperity Policy,” which was an extension of Kim's Sunshine Policy. Scholar Choong Nam Kim, who served as an assistant for political affairs for three Korean presidents, argues that although the policy is good for the long term, it is not for the short term due to the complex issues concerning North Korea's nuclear situation. The author explains that although Roh benefited from having previous channels and groundwork put in by the Kim administration toward North Korean cooperation projects, there were also burdens. “Critics complain that the South has poured money into the North but the Northern Korean leader, Kim Jong Il has yet to make a return visit to Seoul” and “the disclosure of secret payments of \$500 million by the Kim Dae Jung government to Pyongyang and the revelation of North Korea's uranium enrichment program, which touched off a second North Korea nuclear crisis, have weakened domestic and international support for engagement with Pyongyang.”³⁹ Also, Hyundai made cash payments of around \$600 million to the North from 1999 to 2003 for the Mt. Kumgang project and two

³⁸ Information found in: United States Institute of Peace (2007) Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity. [Peace Agreements Digital Collection](#).

³⁹ Kim, C. (2005). "The Roh Moo Hyun Government's Policy Toward North Korea." [Politics, Governance, and Security Series](#) Pg.2.

others. "Washington believes that the Hyundai payment helped North Korea to accelerate the financing of its secret uranium enrichment nuclear weapons program."⁴⁰ The South Korean public became upset at the possibility that these funds and Kim's bribes helped purchase weapons or materials for them.

In conclusion, even though Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun had similar backgrounds like growing up in a poor family, having a career in human rights and participating in the pro-democracy movement, there were significant differences between the two men. Roh and Kim differed in personal beliefs. Kim was a devout Catholic, but Roh did not have the same deep religious commitment. Also, Kim believed that South Korea should lead in discussions with North Korea. Although Roh continued the cooperation with North Korea that was initiated by Kim, Roh was also focused on building relationships with other countries. Roh worked with other countries in dealing with the threats made by North Korea by joining the Six Party Talks. Roh initially responded similarly to Kim when it came to North Korean nuclear and naval threats, but his response changed after the 2006 missile test. In order to better understand the different response taken, we must look at various scholar opinions and literature.

Literature Review: Explanations for South Korean Responses to the North

Members of the academic community have contributed different explanations as to the reasons why President Kim and Roh responded as they did to events involving North Korea. These explanations include ideological consistency, security reasons, economic concerns, public opinion, and international pressure.

⁴⁰ Kim, C. (2005). "The Roh Moo Hyun Government's Policy Toward North Korea." Politics, Governance, and Security Series Pg.11.

Ideological Consistency

One explanation made is that the presidents were remaining faithful to their ideological positions. Kim Dae Jung's ideology is best laid out in "The Sunshine Policy," which he first launched in 1997. The policy sought to help the North organize social and economic reforms in order to gradually narrow the gaps between the two Koreas. Choong Nam Kim has argued that Kim Dae Jung was following his ideological position in responding to North Korean threats. Choong Nam Kim pointed out that Kim Dae Jung (KDJ) "seemed to believe that inter-Korean reconciliation and reunification were the project of his calling. He [KDJ] had advocated a progressive unification policy since 1971 when he ran for president," and "In March 1998, the government announced the principle of separating economics from politics in order to create a more favorable environment for the improvement of South-North relations."⁴¹ Kim Dae Jung stayed true to his ideology after a shootout between North Korean navy boats that crossed the Northern Limit Line (NLL) and South Korean warships; this incident resulted in the deaths of 30 North Koreans and the wounding of 9 South Koreans on June 9, 1999. Although the South Korean public expressed outrage over the incident, Kim continued his engagement policy with the North and did not let the event disrupt the shipment of fertilizer the day that was delivered to the North after the shootout.

The argument about ideological consistency could possibly explain some differences in approach between the two presidents. Although Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun were both members of the Millennium-Democratic Party and ran for President with a similar platform, their positions differed somewhat. Jongryn Mo has explained that Kim Dae Jung was a Liberal Nationalist, by which he means that Kim believed that South Korea should lead the policy of

⁴¹ Kim, C. (2007). The Korean Presidents: Leadership for Nation Building. Norwalk, CT, EastBridge. Pg. 331.

engagement against the North. “Liberal Nationalists believe that the two Koreas should determine the destiny of the Korean peninsula, and that inter-Korean cooperation (*minjok kongjo*) is the primary means for achieving security on the peninsula. Seoul must negotiate directly with Pyongyang in order to modify North Korea's behavior. Thus, it is not surprising that after the October 9 nuclear tests, many liberal nationalists, led by former president Kim Dae Jung, asked Roh Moo-hyun to meet and negotiate directly with North Korean leader Kim Jong-II.”⁴² Mo labeled Roh Moo Hyun as a Liberal Multi-Lateralist, which meant that Roh wanted South Korea to work with the U.S and China as equal partners in engaging the North. Following Mo's perspective, Roh was acting in a manner consistent with his ideology after the October 2006 testing. At that time, South Korea (under the Roh administration) along with other world nations punished North Korea for conducting the tests by halting food and fertilizer assistance. The stopping of food and fertilizer assistance was an important decision. Some scholars argued that the aid to North Korea was meant to repress the likelihood of a North Korean collapse which will be discussed further in the following paragraph.

Security Concerns

North Korea has been a major security threat on the Korean peninsula for decades, not just because of their nuclear program but also because of a potential collapse of North Korean government. Therefore, Seongho Sheen argues that security concerns are the main explanation for how the presidents responded to military threats. As the years have passed since the end of the Cold War, he argues that the sense of Korean brotherhood has been replaced with worries about North Korea's nuclear situation and human rights abuses. Sheen argues that Kim Dae Jung adopted the Sunshine policy and Roh accepted the 'no collapse and no absorption policy' less

⁴² Mo, J. (2007). "What Does South Korea Want?" *Policy Review* 142: 43-55.Pg. 47.

because of a possible military attack and more because of a possible collapse of North Korea. Instead of absorbing the North, “South Korea would help North Korea with economic recovery and reform so that North Korea could sustain itself in the long term.”⁴³ Therefore, Kim's response to the naval shootout in 1999 by continuing with fertilizer aid as well as joint projects is not surprising since he did not want to hurt the North's economy and stability.

Author Hyun-Wook Kim also agrees that Roh Moo Hyun's main concern was security and claims that President Roh Moo Hyun stated that the second nuclear crisis was caused by failing to let South Korea be involved in negotiations in the first nuclear crisis in 1994. Due to the concerns that North Korea would resort to nuclear weapons, South Korea participated in the Six Party talks with North Korea and Roh did not penalize North Korea when it continued its nuclear program despite the progress of the Six Party talks.

To support an explanation based on security concerns, Chung-in Moon points to a portion of Roh's policy on the North Korean nuclear program in his inaugural speech in which he states “I again emphasize that the North Korea nuclear problem should be resolved peacefully through dialogue. Military tension should not be heightened in any form. We will strengthen our cooperation with the United States and Japan to resolve it through dialogue.”⁴⁴ Roh rejected any military action against the North and opposed the U.S position of keeping “all options on the table,” an allusion to the possibility of using military action. Roh also rejected the option of removing Kim Jong Il from power and creating a new regime to solve the nuclear problem.

⁴³ Sheen, S. (2009). "To Be or Not to Be: South Korea's East Asia Security Strategy and the Unification Quandary." The International Spectator 44.2: 41-58. Pg. 52.

⁴⁴ As quoted in Moon, C. (2008). "Diplomacy of Defiance and Facilitation: The Six Party Talks and the Roh Moo Hyun Government." Asian Perspective 32.4: 71-105. Pg. 74.

As well, Roh Moo Hyun's fears of the U.S using military force were reinforced when he found out that during the first nuclear crisis in 1994 the Clinton administration had considered a surgical strike on the Yongbyon nuclear facilities in May 1994 but South Korean President Kim Young-sam was not aware of it. Roh was very worried that if a liberal leader like Clinton thought about military action, then “the Bush administration would have a greater probability of resorting to military action, as implied in Vice President Dick Cheney's remark, 'We don't negotiate with evil: we defeat it'.”⁴⁵

Economic Concerns

A further explanation for presidential choices is economic. Multiple economic explanations have been made, and in some interpretations the reason for South Korean investment in the North was to smooth the process for reunification. Seongho Sheen explained that Kim and Roh were also both worried about the economic difference between the two countries and both encouraged economic programs in hopes that the cooperation would lead to a gradual and peaceful unification.⁴⁶ The main projects of inter-Korean cooperation were “the construction of a South Korean industrial park in the North Korean border town of Kaeseong, expansion of cross-border transportation networks, tourism cooperation, agricultural cooperation, electric power cooperation, forestry and water resources cooperation and information technology cooperation.”⁴⁷ These projects would help narrow the economic gap between the two countries

⁴⁵ Moon, C. (2008). "Diplomacy of Defiance and Facilitation: The Six Party Talks and the Roh Moo Hyun Government." *Asian Perspective* 32.4: 71-105. Pg. 75.

⁴⁶ Sheen, S. (2009). "To Be or Not to Be: South Korea's East Asia Security Strategy and the Unification Quandary." *The International Spectator* 44.2: 41-58.

⁴⁷ Yang, U. (2006). "Costs of Korean Unification." *Korea Focus* 2(1).

and according to Sheen, Kim and Roh believed that “political unification would come after a long, gradual period of economic and cultural integration.”⁴⁸

Another economic explanation as to why South Korea continued to invest in the North overlaps with the security dimension. Some experts believe there was a fear of a sudden North Korean collapse which would have caused an influx of refugees as well as a large economic cost. Colonel David Coghlan has examined the potential economic consequences of the reunification of the two Koreas in the event of a North Korean collapse and contends that this is the main reason for the cooperation efforts taken by the Roh administration toward North Korea. One of the difficulties of coming up with a sound reunification plan is that uniting two countries with radically different economic and trade structure would have major economic ramifications. “Estimates of the cost of Korean reunification vary widely, normally lying in the range of \$25 billion to \$3.5 trillion, and usually concentrate on financial cost only.”⁴⁹ Coghlan argues that a primary reason for Seoul's approach of using cooperative projects to decrease the economic gap between the two countries is the enormous and potentially crippling cost that reunification would impose on South Korea, especially if it came about through a hard line scenario such as war or the collapse of North Korea.

Public Opinion

Another type of explanation that authors like Choong Nam Kim, Myoung-Kyu Park and Philo Kim have brought up along with economic concerns is public opinion. The approval ratings of each president followed a downward trend. According to Gallup Korea Surveys taken

⁴⁸ Sheen, S. (2009). "To Be or Not to Be: South Korea's East Asia Security Strategy and the Unification Quandary." *The International Spectator* 44.2: 41-58.

⁴⁹ Coghlan, D. (2008). Prospects from Korean Reunification. *Strategic Studies Institute*, United States War College.

from 1998-2003, Kim Dae Jung started his administration in March 1998 with a 70.7% approval rating but as the months passed, Kim's approval rating started to dwindle.⁵⁰ In September 2000, for the first time Kim Dae Jung's disapproval rating (40.3%) was greater than his approval rating (38.7%). Although South Koreans were happy with the June 2000 summit, in July 2000 North Korea threatened to restart its nuclear program if the U.S did not compensate the North for the loss of electricity caused by the delays in building nuclear power plants. The Gallup Surveys showed that the public were consistently unhappy with Kim's decisions and his disapproval ratings continued to be higher than his approval ratings during his entire presidency.

Like his predecessor, Roh Moo Hyun also suffered from dismal approval ratings during his presidency. "According to Gallup Korea surveys, the disapproval rating of Roh's performance as president surpassed the approval rating only two months after his inauguration. Since then, he has been very unpopular throughout his presidency."⁵¹ Around the time of the shift in approval rating in May 2003, (disapproval rating: 41.3% approval: 40.2%) North Korea had test fired a land-to-sea anti-ship missile into the Sea of Japan. Roh continued with the Sunshine policy and the public increasingly disapproved as the years went on.

Myoung-Kyu Park and Philo Kim provide an explanation as to why Kim Dae Jung's approval ratings fell. Park and Kim argue that public support for Kim's 'Sunshine Policy' diminished throughout the years because "during the decade of the Sunshine policy, ordinary people in the South came to understand the complexity involved in North Korean issues."⁵² The

⁵⁰ The Figure for the Approval Ratings of Kim Dae Jung from *Gallup Korea Surveys*, 1998-2003 can be found in: Kim, Choong Nam. *The Korean Presidents: Leadership for Nation Building*. Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2007. Print. Pg.357.

⁵¹ Kim, C. (2007). *The Korean Presidents: Leadership for Nation Building*. Norwalk, CT, EastBridge. Pg. 384.

⁵² Park, M. and P. Kim (2010). "Inter-Korean Relations in Nuclear Politics." *Asian Perspective* 34.1: 111-135. Pg.121.

authors consider the nuclear test in 2006 as the most significant event for creating strong tension over what approach to take toward the North. The public's lack of approval reflected their perception that the soft approach otherwise known as “The Sunshine Policy,” was not working in deterring the nuclear threat and that a more hard line approach was necessary. Park and Kim argue that this lack of support led Roh to halt food and fertilizer assistance in 2006. Other countries such as the U.S and Japan agreed with the South Korean citizens as to the need to punish North Korea for continuing with nuclear threats.

International Pressure

The final explanation offered by scholars is that the responses by the South Korean presidents were due to pressures from other countries. Although South Korea has held a dialogue with North Korea for two decades, other countries have also had their own policies towards North Korea. Scholar Choong Nam Kim argues that Kim Dae Jung believed South Korea should lead in the cooperative engagement with North Korea. However, Kim's Sunshine Policy was drastically different from U.S President George Bush's hard line policy towards North Korea. In President Bush's State of the Union address in 2002, Bush named North Korea as part of the “Axis of Evil,” along with Iran and Iraq. President Kim tried to continue friendly relations with the North despite the U.S.'s contrasting policy. “Kim Dae Jung had overseen the sharpest decline in relations between South Korea and the United States since the Korean War. American columnist Robert Novak wrote that Kim Dae Jung was 'the most anti-American president in Korean history.’⁵³

⁵³ Novak, Robert. “South Korea, A Time to Test Its Wings”, *Washington Post*, January 6, 2003.

In conclusion, scholars have suggested different explanations for the responses taken by Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun. Can all of the explanations previously discussed have merit? Do some explanations hold greater weight than others? The purpose of evaluating each set of explanations as applied to specific instances is to understand what shaped the decisions made by both South Korean presidents as they tried to respond to North Korea's threatening behavior.

Summary

This chapter has provided a historical background on the division of North and South Korea and their strained relationship since then. It also provided a basic profile on leaders Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun and their policies towards North Korea. It is vital to examine the initial policies toward North Korea in order to see if the responses taken by Kim or Roh swayed in any way. Various pieces of literature were also reviewed that reflect the different explanations made by experts for the responses taken by Kim and Roh.

Chapter 3

Kim Dae Jung

Kim Dae Jung sought to improve the relationship between North and South Korea and did so by being consistent to his Sunshine Policy of cooperative projects and dialogue with North Korea throughout his administration despite the threatening actions taken by North Korea. For the Kim administration, I will examine a case in which North Korea test-launched a rocket and a case in which North Korean vessels crossed the Northern Limit Line and into South Korean waters. I have chosen examples of a nuclear test missile launch and naval dispute from each administration because the nuclear program and Northern Limit Line (NLL) disputes are two of the most dangerous threats that face South Korea. The purpose of this chapter is to examine Kim Dae Jung's response to the 1998 missile test and 2002 naval skirmish.

North Korean Missiles

Although the research for the North Korean nuclear program began in the early 1960's, some of the most serious nuclear threats, such as the nuclear missile test, occurred during the Kim and Roh administrations. Kim Dae Jung was aware of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, but his policy toward North Korea in his election campaign and inauguration was focused on cooperation and reconciliation. Kim's Sunshine Policy was meant to help North Korea economically through joint programs and to build trust between the North and South so the North would feel secure enough to not resort to nuclear weapons. On August 31, 1998, about six months after Kim Dae Jung's inauguration, North Korea announced that they had launched a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 rocket which "consisted of a No Dong first stage, a Scud second stage,

and the payload a third rocket engine and satellite.”⁵⁴ North Korea claimed that this rocket carried a satellite that was going to orbit the earth. However, the three stage rocket “that had put a satellite in orbit--its photo in DPRK-aligned newspapers in Japan looked just like the small satellite China had first put into orbit in 1970” and U.S. intelligence experts a few weeks later concluded that “it was indeed a fireworks display. . . the satellite had failed to reach orbit.”⁵⁵ The mid-range missile flew 1,620 km over the Sea of Japan and demonstrated that North Korea had the ability to not only attack South Korea but Japan as well.

There were many things going on in the South-North relationship around the time of the launching. Two weeks before the launching, President Kim was planning to implement his Sunshine Policy and offered to send an envoy to Pyongyang to set up inter-Korean talks. However, on August 31, 1998, the same day as the missile launching, the North Koreans “officially rejected South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s reconciliatory offer of boosted dialogue, dismissing the peace overture as ‘fantastic, contradictory and deceptive.’”⁵⁶ The North Korean government maintained that the offer was not appropriate since there were still thousands of U.S. troops in South Korea. This launching also came just before the North Korean celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the regime which occurred on September 9.

At the time of the missile test, Kim Dae Jung was focused on the economic crisis that was occurring in South Korea at the time. Kim entered his first year of his presidency during a financial crisis and feared that the country might go bankrupt. During his inauguration on February 25, 1998, he addressed the economic situation and he called “the current economic

⁵⁴ Shanebrook, J. (2003) Halting Proliferation of Long-Range Ballistic Missiles. Bulletin of Science Technology & Society 23. Pg. 3.

⁵⁵ Cumings, B. (2004). North Korea: Another Country. New York, The New Press. Pg.79.

⁵⁶ (1998). N. Korea rejects South's proposal for reconciliation (Updates with details). Agence France-Presse, Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company.

crisis ‘the most serious national crisis since the Korean War.’”⁵⁷ In 1998, Kim was able to help create a tripartite committee consisting of business, government and labor representatives to focus on economic crisis management, received short term loans from international banks and pressured the largest business firms in South Korea to restructure their business groups. Even after the missile launching, Kim continued his engagement with North Korea while concentrating on the economic crisis occurring in South Korea. The missile launching had little effect on the South Korean stock market. In fact, The Korean Composite Stock Price Index was able to overcome initial concerns about the North Korean missile test and closed at 310.16, up 1.76 percent, or 5.37 points due to the anticipation of economy-boosting measures by the South Korean government.⁵⁸

Kim Dae Jung’s response to 1998 missile test

The missile test did not negatively affect Kim Dae Jung’s overall policy toward North Korea because Kim’s main focus was South Korea’s economic stability and continuing his Sunshine Policy. “South Korean officials minimized the missile, calling the firing a politically inspired device to build up Kim Jong Il before a meeting of the Supreme People’s Assembly.”⁵⁹ The day after the launching, You Jong Keun, the economic advisor to South Korean President Kim, explained that South Korea would stand by their pledge to pay for 70% of the light-water reactors promised to North Korea through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) despite the rocket launching. The economic advisor explained that reasoning behind the decision was partially due to economic fears. Although South Korea was in an economic crisis, You Jong Keun said that the economic cost of a North Korean collapse

⁵⁷ Kim, C. (2007). The Korean Presidents: Leadership for Nation Building. Norwalk, CT, EastBridge. Pg.318-319.

⁵⁸ Information found in: (1998). S. Korea stocks close stronger despite HK, N. Korea, Reuters Limited.

⁵⁹ Kirk, D. (2009). Korea Betrayed: Kim Dae Jung and Sunshine. New York, NY, Palgrave Macmillian. Pg. 152.

would be “unimaginable . . . If the North Korean regime collapses, this would be a disaster not only to North Korea but to South Korea. With our current economic crisis, there is no way that we can shoulder that burden . . . That’s why it is all the more important to have a dialogue and economic cooperation and exchanges with North Korea to induce a soft-landing.”⁶⁰ The Kim Dae Jung administration was concerned about South Korea’s economic security and decided to continue the Sunshine policy in order to minimize the risk of North Korea collapsing.

Almost a week after the missile launching, Kim Dae Jung made an announcement saying that the rocket launch would not affect his Sunshine Policy. Kim stated that “South Korea, the United States and Japan should not get wild, but cope with it calmly while maintaining close three-way cooperation” and that he would continue to support civil and economic cooperation despite political tension.⁶¹ On September 6, 1998, just a week after the missile test, Kim Dae Jung authorized Hyundai to ferry South Korean tourists to the Mt. Kumgang tourist resort in North Korea. The first Mt. Kumgang cruise ship left South Korea in November 1998. These cruises would provide North Korea a large amount of income, since 30% of the \$1000 per person cost of the five day tour would be paid to the North.

The missile test also unexpectedly spurred South Korea to focus on their rocket system. The South Korean public urged the government to improve the space program not for defensive reasons but more out of fear of being left behind by the North Koreans. On September 10, 1998, officials said that due to North Korea’s recent launch of an apparent missile “South Korea will accelerate developing its own scientific rocket system . . . Currently, South Korea has four satellite orbiting the Earth, but all of them were launched aboard foreign rockets . . . After the North Korean launch, we feel a public opinion growing that we should put a spur on our space

⁶⁰ (1998). Power plants likely to proceed ahead despite N Korea missile. Reuters News, Reuters Limited.

⁶¹ Chon, S. (1998). 'Sunshine Policy' Not Undermined by North Korea's Alleged Missile. The Korea Herald, The Korea Herald.

projects.”⁶² The development of South Korea’s rocket system was intended for exploration in order to put astronauts in space as well as monitor weather patterns in the oceans and atmosphere. Despite the missile launching, Kim Dae Jung refused to join the American Missile Defense programs. The South Korean Ministry of National Defense announced in March 1999 that South Korea would not join the Missile Defense programs due to the lack of economic resources and technological capabilities. President Kim Dae Jung also stated in May 1999 that he “openly expressed his objection to TMD [Theater Missile Defense], saying that it is of no use for defending his country, given the proximity of Seoul city to the Demilitarized Zone. He also stated that China and Russia were opposing this and, therefore, he could ill afford to antagonize these neighbouring great powers.”⁶³ Therefore, South Korea became more focused on prevention tactics such as continuing cooperation with North Korea in order to prevent further missile launches.

Although Kim Dae Jung downplayed the missile event, countries like Japan and the U.S. saw the missile test as a great security threat due to North Korea’s nuclear program and unpredictable actions. The Japanese government immediately responded to North Korea’s missile test by “withdrawing financial backing from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), an international agreement that funds peaceful nuclear technology and energy supplies for the beleaguered Communist regime.”⁶⁴ The Japanese government then approved plans to develop a missile defense system due to this event. Japan also filed a formal protest with the U.N. Security Council a couple of days after the launch due to the threat to

⁶² (1998). Stung By North, S. Korea Says Will Spur Rocket Development. Dow Jones International News, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.

⁶³ Ahn, B. (2005). "South Korea: 'Offensive Realism' vs. 'Wounded Nationalism'." Contemporary security policy 26(3): 686.

⁶⁴ Gittings, J. (1998). North Korea fires missile over Japan. The Guardian. www.guardian.co.uk/world, Guardian News and Media Limited.

security, peace, and stability of the Asian region but the letter to the Council president did not ask for any specific action against North Korea. The event led Japan and South Korea to come together to discuss security cooperation. In September 1998, the South Korean Defense Minister met with the Japanese Defense Minister to reach a joint agreement on policy and intelligence towards North Korea. Kim Dae Jung's visit to Japan in October 1998 resulted in the creation of the Korea-Japan Security Policy Coordination Council. At the same time, Kim Dae Jung wanted Japan to go back to supporting the KEDO project and its economic assistance to North Korea in order to normalize talks with North Korea and in hopes of continuing the Sunshine policy.

The U.S. initially responded to the missile test similarly to Japan by expressing great concern over the incident. The missile testing came at a time where the U.S. and North Korea were in the middle of conducting political talks in New York. Despite great concern over the launch, U.S. officials continued the political talks. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright responded to the test by stating, "We are concerned about it, as are the Japanese and the Russians and this is something that we will be raising with North Koreans in the talks that are currently going on (in New York today)."⁶⁵ Although the U.S. viewed the missile test as a serious concern, in a press briefing, Gary Samore, the Senior Director for Nonproliferation, explained that the U.S. knew about North Korea's developments and were not surprised. Samore explained that they would work with South Korea and Japan to coordinate an effort to convince North Korea that their missile program was a threat to stability in Asia and "persuade the North Koreans to restrain both their own missile development as well as their missile exports, which is a very serious concern -- in particular, North Korean missile exports to the Middle East, which we think

⁶⁵ (1998). N. Korea fires long-range missile into Sea of Japan. The Atlanta Journal, Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company.

is very destabilizing.”⁶⁶ However, two weeks after the August 31, 1998 launch, “the U.S. State Department retreated from its initial assessment that North Korea launched a two-stage ballistic missile Aug. 31.”⁶⁷ It was initially believed to be a two-stage missile since the first two parts were successful but it was in fact a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 rocket. However, a spokesman for the State Department said the third stage of the missile failed and it was not able to launch a satellite into orbit. The event still posed a security threat since it showed that North Korea had increased its capability to send weapons using rockets.

Although some U.S. officials were focused on talking with North Korea over the test, other members of Congress thought stronger action needed to be taken. The missile test was not only a threat to Asian countries but also threatening to the U.S. because the U.S. had about 50,000 troops based in Japan and about 37,000 troops in South Korea at the time of the test. The U.S. was also concerned because, according to U.S intelligence, North Korea had enough plutonium to create at least one nuclear weapon, a wide variety of chemical agents, and some biological weapons. Due to the threat, some members of Congress expressed the need to place strict conditions on delivering fuel to help North Koreans build new light water power reactors. The U.S. was a part of 1994 nuclear agreement with North Korea whereby the U.S. promised to ship half a million tons of heavy fuel for their energy needs each year if North Korea promised to dismantle their plutonium producing reactors and replace them with light water reactors. Just a few days after the missile launch “the Senate, in a 80-11 vote, endorsed an amendment to a foreign aid spending bill that would disallow an energy agreement with North Korea unless the president can certify that the isolated communist state is not pursuing a nuclear weapons

⁶⁶ (1998). Transcript of White House Press Briefing by Bell, Warner, Samore, Cagan. U.S. Newswire, U.S. Newswire, Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning.

⁶⁷ (1998). U.N. Security Council Scolds N. Korea for Satellite Launch. Dow Jones Energy Service, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.

capability and is not providing ballistic missiles to countries on the State Department terrorist list."⁶⁸ Senator John McCain, chief sponsor of the amendment explained, "I still believe that unless the North Koreans understand they have to pay a significant price, then they will continue in this most destabilizing activity." ⁶⁹ Some Democrats had worries over the amendment due to concerns that it could make the North Korea matter worse.

Despite the threat from the North Korea missile test, it seemed clear that the U.S. would refrain from using a military option against North Korea. A U.S. Defense Ministry official said, "The North's test-firing falls short of a crime that would call for the use of such force . . . It didn't directly hurt U.S. interests, nor did it cause any human or property damage. And it is very hard to prove that the missile violated Japanese air space."⁷⁰ There would also be a concern of a full-scale war if the U.S. decided to conduct limited-scale attacks on select targets. The U.S. would also have to consider what would happen to South Korea and Japan as well as the U.S. troops stationed there if there was a military engagement. North Korea also has a strong military presence with over a million soldiers. However, the U.S. warned North Korea not to fire another missile or the U.S. would change its policy with possibly serious consequences. The U.S. delegation to the United Nations also took the North Korean missile test issue to the U.N. Security Council. The U.N. Security Council responded two weeks after the missile test by scolding North Korea for attempting to launch a satellite last month without notifying other countries first. However, the Council asked other countries to refrain from actions or statements that might make tensions worse.

⁶⁸ Abrams, J. (1998). Senate Puts Conditions on N. Korea Ties After Missile Test. The Record, North Jersey Media Group Inc. Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning.

⁶⁹ Abrams, J. (1998). Senate Puts Conditions on N. Korea Ties After Missile Test. The Record, North Jersey Media Group Inc. Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning.

⁷⁰ (1998). Possible US Options Against NK Missile Test. Korea Times, hk internet Co. for the Korea Times.

Analysis

In conclusion, Kim Dae Jung's response to the missile launching could be explained by Kim's commitment to his Sunshine Policy which he started at the beginning of his administration and his security and economic concerns due to the fear of North Korea collapsing. During his inauguration in 1998, Kim first announced his Sunshine policy which sought to help the North with social and economic reforms. Kim stayed true to the idea of separating economics from politics in order to create a better environment for inter-Korean relations. Kim was not only concerned about maintaining economic stability in South Korea but also believed that it would take time for the North to open up and reform. Therefore, South Korea decided to continue economic assistance to the North even after the missile launch and also asked other countries to do the same. In a March 2000 speech in Berlin, Kim stated that South Korea wanted to coexist and help North Korea. "Whenever we witness the tragic sense of hungry North Koreans on TV, we are devastated. We want to help North Korea feed their citizens adequately. We want to help it recover from the deep economic slump and improve its standard of living . . . my administration is aggressively encouraging private sector cooperation and exchanges. We welcome and encourage all international efforts to increase exchanges with Pyongyang."⁷¹ Kim also restated his three goals that he had held since his inauguration that South Korea would not tolerate armed provocation from the North; South Korea did not want to harm or absorb the North; and both Koreas should cooperate and reconcile.

Another plausible explanation for Kim's response was the perceived threat to economic security, because South Korea was worried about the potential collapse of the North Korean

⁷¹ (2000) Address of President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea, Lessons of German Reunification and the Korean Peninsula. *Le Monde diplomatique*.

government. South Korea was also going through an economic crisis and was in no shape to handle the economic burden of a collapsed North Korea. Kim was focused on preventing South Korea from going bankrupt and on fixing the negative 5.8 percent growth rate when he took office in 1998. Kim also had to work to secure loans, reform government spending and restructure business programs during South Korea's worst financial crisis. In order to contribute to North Korea's economy South Korea continued plans to start Mt. Kumgang cruise tours just a couple of months after the missile launching as well as other joint programs and continue trade. Kim hoped that the economic project would help North Korea trust the South and eventually feel that developing nuclear weapons for security was not necessary.

Public opinion and international pressure do not seem to have been factors in Kim's response to the missile test. Kim did not have to handle public concerns since there was not much of a response by the South Korean public after the launching except to spur South Korea's rocket program to be used for putting up weather satellites and space exploration. International pressure would not be an explanation for his response since Kim responded differently to the test than the U.S. and Japan. The U.S. and Japan expressed great concern and addressed the North Korean incident to the U.N. Security Council. Japan withdrew funding to help North Korea with their light-water reactors and U.S. Congress members voted to place stricter conditions on the funding. In contrast, South Korea decided not only to continue their funding but asked the U.S. and Japan to continue cooperation with North Korea.

Northern Limit Line (NLL)

Another major dispute between North and South Korea involved a territorial boundary, called the Northern Limit Line (NLL), which was created by the United Nations (UN) Command

during the armistice talks in 1953. The line was drawn in order to prevent ships and planes from crossing over into the other country's territory. The area that is typically disputed is in the Yellow Sea near Yeonpyeong and a cluster of five islands. Yeonpyeong Island is a small island controlled and inhabited by South Korea with about 1,600 civilian residents as well as an island garrison of about 1,000 marines. "Though the island is just eight miles from the coast of North Korea, its only regular link to the rest of the South is a 66-mile, two-and-a-half-hour ferry ride."⁷² Since the territory is rich with fish and crab, the North Koreans regularly fish near the NLL and sometimes cross the line. The fishing industry is particularly important to the North. "The North Korean People's Army controls as much as one-third of the country's industry, including US \$20 million annual crab export trade. The North Korean military must raise its own money, and this situation results in a direct link between marine fishing activities and naval operations."⁷³

Although there were many occasions when the Northern fishing boats crossed the NLL, there were two deadly events during the Kim Dae-Jung administration. The first incident occurred on June 9, 1999, when North Korean fishing vessels and North Korean patrol boats passed the NLL. The South Korean Navy dispatched their patrol boats to control the situation and push the boats back over the border. North Korean boats repeatedly crossed the border from June 9 through June 15. On June 15, 1999, "Shooting erupted and resulted in the bloodiest confrontation between the two Koreas since the end of the War. In the shoot-out, the South Koreans sank one of the North Korean torpedo boats, and apparently all aboard, an estimated

⁷² Fackler, M. (2009). In Clash Between Koreas, Fishermen Feel First Bite. The New York Times, The New York Times Company.

⁷³ Schreurs, M. (2007). Regional Security and Cooperation in the Protection of Marine Environments in Northeast Asia. The Environmental Dimensions of Asian Security: Conflict and Cooperation over Energy, Resources, and Pollution. I.-T. Hyun and M. A. Schreurs. Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press. Pg.121.

thirty men, died.”⁷⁴ In addition, about 70 North Koreans were injured in this clash. The South Korean’s corvette and patrol boat had slight damage and about 9 South Koreans were wounded during the skirmish.

The South Korean public had mixed opinions about the incident. Some carried on with their day as though nothing happened while other “citizens groups issued statements urging a variety of actions on the part of the government, with many questioning whether or not Mount Kumgang tourism should be either completely rethought or stopped altogether.”⁷⁵ Despite the clash, the South Korean government seemed determined to go through with the Mt. Kumgang tourism and hold scheduled talks to discuss fertilizer shipments. Kim Dae Jung was able to continue an engagement policy without much protest since South Koreans did not feel gripped by a sense of crisis. “In contrast, during the nuclear crisis in 1994, a large number of South Koreans had panicked in anticipation of a war and stockpiled emergency supplies of food and daily necessities.”⁷⁶ Although some citizens questioned whether or not Mt. Kumgang tours should be stopped, a majority were actually in favor of the project. According to a survey conducted a couple months after the skirmish by the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification (ACDPU) stated that, “80.5 percent noted that the tourism project had contributed to the opening–up of North Korea and the improvement of inter-Korean relations.”⁷⁷ Furthermore, South Korean citizens went on the trips and the cruise tours were able to continue to the resort site uninterrupted; inter-Korean exchanges also continued. Kim's policy maintained

⁷⁴ Schreurs, M. (2007). Regional Security and Cooperation in the Protection of Marine Environments in Northeast Asia. The Environmental Dimensions of Asian Security: Conflict and Cooperation over Energy, Resources, and Pollution. I.-T. Hyun and M. A. Schreurs. Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press. Pg.121.

⁷⁵ Seo, B. (1999). Reactions Vary to Gun Battle Incident. The Chosun Ilbo. Chosun.com, The Chosun Ilbo.

⁷⁶ Son, K. (2006). South Korean engagement policies and North Korea: identities, norms and the sunshine policy. New York, Taylor & Francis. Pg.93.

⁷⁷ The Survey took place 20 August- 30 September 1999. Son, K.-y. (2006). South Korean engagement policies and North Korea: identities, norms and the sunshine policy. New York, Taylor & Francis. Pg.93.

that the best way to maintain peace was to improve the relations between the two Koreas and seek reconciliation and cooperation.

After this skirmish, the North tried to have the territorial boundaries redrawn. Just a few months after the first battle of Yeonpyeong in September 1999, the North Korean Army claimed that the Northern Limit Line was invalid and announced a new maritime demarcation line. In March 2000, the North Korea Navy command also “issued a communiqué stating that only two waterways could be used by U.S and South Korean military and civilian ships to access the islands and special zones it had recently established around the islands.”⁷⁸ North Korea ended up crossing the NLL 15 times in 2000, 12 times in 2001 and a dozen times in 2002 .

The 2002 Naval skirmish (Yeonpyeong)

On June 29, 2002, another confrontation took place at the NLL called the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong. A North Korean patrol boat crossed the NLL and was warned to turn around by a South Korean vessel. Soon after, a second North Korean patrol crossed the line and it was also warned to turn back. The two North Korean boats began to follow the South Korean vessels and attacked the two South Korean patrol boats with 85 mm guns directly on the wheelhouse of one of the boats. This attack led the South Koreans to retaliate with their guns and then the two sides openly exchanged fire. Soon two South Korean patrol boats and two corvettes reinforced the South Korean vessels. The North Korean vessels retreated back over the NLL. The clash resulted in the sinking of a South Korean patrol boat, with six South Koreans killed and eighteen wounded. The North Korean People's Navy estimated that about thirty North Koreans were

⁷⁸ Schreurs, M. (2007). Regional Security and Cooperation in the Protection of Marine Environments in Northeast Asia. The Environmental Dimensions of Asian Security: Conflict and Cooperation over Energy, Resources, and Pollution. I.-T. Hyun and M. A. Schreurs. Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press. Pg.121.

either killed or wounded.⁷⁹ There were also instances of North Korea patrol boats crossing the NLL on June 27 and June 28, just one and two days before the battle. At each of these times, the North Korean patrol boats turned back after South Korean patrol boats arrived at the scene. The event also occurred the day before the final match in the Soccer World Cup hosted by South Korea and Japan.

Although the true motivation for the attack is unclear, there have been a variety of explanations made for it. An article in the *Chosun Ilbo* quoted a Joint Chiefs of Staff official as saying that the attack “was almost impossible to be accidental because the first shot by the North’s warship hit the wheelhouse, the core part of the South Korean boat.”⁸⁰ The same article indicated that Professor Koh Yu-hwan thought that the incident was not an accident because the North wanted to repair their reputation after the 1999 Yeonpyeong Island incident in which South Korean boats sank a North Korean torpedo boat killing about 30 North Koreans and severely damaged five other Northern Korean boats that had crossed the NLL. The South Korean Grand National Party “speculated that North Korea was trying to disrupt the World Cup soccer tournament, which is being co-hosted by South Korea and Japan.”⁸¹ The attack occurred right before South Korea and Turkey were to play in Taegu, South Korea, but the game proceeded without disruption despite the incident.

The attack also occurred just a week after the U.S., South Korea, and Japan urged Pyongyang to allow U.N. watchdogs to inspect its suspected nuclear sites and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The director of the U.S. State Department's office

⁷⁹ Information on The Second Battle of Yeonpyeong: Ryoo, C. M. B. (2009). The Korean Armistice and the Islands. Strategy research project at the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army War College.

⁸⁰ Yu, Y. (2002). JCS Says NK Opened Fire First. *The Chosun Ilbo*, The Chosun Ilbo.

⁸¹ Taipei Times (2002) North Korea sinks Southern patrol boat, killing four in worst clash in three years.

of Korean affairs also met with representatives of the North Korean mission to the United Nations a couple days before the skirmish to discuss resuming a high-level dialogue after an 18 month break but arrangements were not agreed upon during the meeting. The purpose of the talks was to restore dialogue that had been suspended by President Bush in 2001. The U.S was concerned about North Korea's nuclear program, missile trade, food aid management and the forces on the 58th parallel. Despite U.S. calls for dialogue, North Korea was not eager for this since President Bush had considered North Korea as part of the "axis of evil" with Iran and Iraq in January 2002. On July 1, 2002, North Korea blamed the U.S. for coordinating the naval clash between the two Koreas. The North Korean Foreign Ministry said, "All facts clearly prove that the incident was orchestrated by the United States to drive a wedge between the North and South of Korea because it was displeased with the progress made in the inter-Korean relations."⁸² According to Yu Yong-won in an article for Reuters News, the naval event was not only expected to freeze U.S. and North Korea relations but "the incident can be translated into unwillingness to consider the current government as a dialogue partner."⁸³ The U.S. quickly responded to the June 29 naval skirmish by condemning the attack by North Korea and withdrew their offer of talks after the incident. The U.S. went on to express regret for the fatalities and injuries and offered condolences to the South Korean families. The South Korean Defense Minister and the top U.S. military commander in South Korea quickly held talks in order to create a stronger defensive plan. "The two sides agreed to boost cooperation in the areas of military monitoring and surveillance, information exchange and patrolling of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that bisects the Korean Peninsula and of the de facto maritime border between

⁸² (2002). UPDATE 1-N. Korea says U.S. staged North-South navy clash. Reuters News, Reuters Limited.

⁸³ Yu, Y. (2002). JCS Says NK Opened Fire First. The Chosun Ilbo, The Chosun Ilbo.

North and South Korea, known as the Northern Limit Line (NLL).”⁸⁴ However, North Korea has argued that the NLL is illegitimate since it was imposed by the United Nations. The North Korean Foreign Ministry also blamed the United States for the skirmish by claiming that "all facts clearly prove that the incident was orchestrated by the United States to drive a wedge between the North and South of Korea because it was displeased with progress made in the inter-Korean relations.”⁸⁵ Despite the event, a South Korean senior official expressed hope that dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea would resume, thus indicating a desire to continue Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy towards North Korea.

Kim Dae Jung’s Response to 2002 Naval Skirmish

Although North Korean boats have crossed the NLL dozens of times, the 2002 naval skirmish was a deadly battle that resulted in the loss of lives on both sides. After the incident, President Kim Dae Jung called an emergency meeting of the National Security Council in order to discuss the situation and the South Korean armed forces were put on high alert. An investigation of the incident immediately began by the Ministry of National Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to determine if the naval operation was conducted properly. Even though the South Korean boats followed protocol, the South Korean public voiced their concern that the South Korean navy was left vulnerable to attack because “according to the navy’s rules of engagement, southern ships are supposed to warn North Korean boats that have violated the Northern Limit Line. If the North’s boats continue to travel south, the navy’s next step is to block the North Korean ships with its boats but without using its guns. At this point, the two Koreas’ vessels end up facing each other, as close as 200 meters apart, allowing the North to take

⁸⁴ (2002). S. Korea, U.S. agree to boost vigilance against North. Kyodo News, Kyodo News International Inc.

⁸⁵ (2002). UPDATE 1-N. Korea says U.S. staged North-South navy clash. Reuters News, Reuters Limited.

initiative in an offensive.”⁸⁶ Therefore, the current rules only allowed the South Korean ships to block the intruding North Korean ships rather than use their weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff head Lee Nam-shin also explained that “we failed to open fire for fear the confrontation would expand to an all-out war even though the North Korean warship crossed the border.”⁸⁷ The South Korean government explained that the rules of engagement would be revised to better protect the navy.

The deaths of the South Korean sailors made many South Korean citizens question Kim’s strategy of engaging with the North. The public was outraged when about seven hours after the skirmish the minister of the Ministry of National Defense “only demanded an apology and a promise of non-recurrence for an incident that caused 24 killed and wounded and the loss of a patrol boat.”⁸⁸ The public wanted more punitive measures against North Korea since the attack violated the June 15 joint declaration. After the South Korean government stated the continuation of the engagement policy toward North Korea, “a wife of a fallen South Korean soldier, who was so distraught by ‘the country that neglects the heroes who lost their lives for the country’, left the country for the U.S. only to return . . . after hardline Lee became the president.”⁸⁹

The South Korean public had many doubts about the South Korean navy capabilities since a total of 8 South Korean warships failed to sink a North Korean patrol ship. “In fact, four armed fighters, including two KF-16 fighters capable of sinking the North Korean warship could have been dispatched to the scene, but navy chiefs did not send them for fear of serious war.

⁸⁶ (2002) Rules of engagement to change. Joins.com, Factiva, Inc.

⁸⁷ Choi, W. (2002). Blocking Tactics Cost Heavy Casualties. [The Chosun Ilbo](#). Chosun.com, The Chosun Ilbo.

⁸⁸ Lee, S. (2002). Tragedy Caused by Sunshine. [The Chosun Ilbo](#). english.chosun.com, Chosun Ilbo.

⁸⁹ Lee, S. (2008). South Korea’s Sunshine policy strikes back. [Asia Times](#). Asia Times online, Asia Times Online (Holdings), Ltd.

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) head Lee Nam-shin said in response to questions from the National Defense Committee of the National Assembly Saturday night, 'we failed to open fire for fear the confrontation would expand to an all-out war even though the North Korean warship crossed the border.'"⁹⁰ "When the two Koreas clashed in the seas off of Yeonpyeong Island three years ago, President Kim Dae Jung ordered the South Korean sailors to not attack first, protect the Northern Limit Line with their lives, prevent war and avoid expanding the conflict."⁹¹

Due to the public outcry over how the navy handled the skirmish, Kim Dae Jung fired his Minister of Defense and reshuffled his Cabinet. "Conservatives have used the battle to accuse Kim of being soft on Pyongyang and to trash the President's Sunshine Policy of North-South détente . . . The Sunshine Policy used to be a major asset for Kim and his allies," says Moon Chong In, an expert on Korean politics at Yonsei University. 'All of a sudden it has become a major liability.'"⁹² Even though he fired his Minister and reshuffled his Cabinet, Kim continued his support of the Sunshine policy. The second naval skirmish was resolved when North Korea expressed regret over the attack which led the North and South to continue their dialogue and family reunions. A few months after the second battle, construction began on the joint North and South Korean reconnection of the Kyongi Line that linked Seoul (close to the DMZ) with Shinuiji on the Chinese border.

Analysis

In conclusion, although the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong resulted in the death of South Korean soldiers, Kim continued with his Sunshine Policy. The explanations that appear to most account for this response are ideological consistency and security concerns. Even after previous naval battles, the South Korean navy was given orders not to attack but to try and block enemy

⁹⁰ Choi, W. (2002). Blocking Tactics Cost Heavy Casualties. The Chosun Ilbo. Chosun.com, The Chosun Ilbo.

⁹¹ (2002). Military says 1st strike allowed. Joins.com, Factiva, Inc.

⁹² Macintyre, D. (2002). Guns and Crustaceans. Time www.time.com, Time in Partnership with CNN.

ships that had already crossed the NLL and was specifically told to prevent war. Public opinion did not seem to be a factor since the only change Kim made was to fire his Minister of Defense and reshuffle his Cabinet, even though the South Korean public wanted more of a response. They wanted a change in the naval procedure towards North Korea which would allow the navy to fire first and for the Kim administration to take a firmer stance towards North Korea. Many citizens were unhappy that North Korea repeatedly crossed the Northern Limit Line without any repercussions. Kim only fired his Minister after an investigation of the naval battle and did not change his foreign policy toward North Korea. Another possible explanation that does not account for Kim's response is international pressure. The U.S. quickly responded to the naval skirmish by condemning the attack by North Korea and withdrawing their offer of talks with North Korea. However, just a couple days after the skirmish the South Korean government "expressed hope that Saturday's naval gun battle between the two Koreas would not affect the planned resumption of dialogue between the United States and North Korea" and Yim Sung-joon, senior presidential security for foreign affairs and national security said, "it is desirable for a U.S. special envoy to visit North Korea as scheduled."⁹³

In the end, Kim Dae Jung was consistent in his actions throughout his dealing with North Korea by not straying from his policy of cooperation and not punishing North Korea in any way. In the cases of the 1998 missile launching and 2002 naval skirmish, Kim would chose a position and response that did not aggravate the situation with North Korea. After the 1998 missile launching, Kim stood by South Korea's pledge to pay 70% of the light-water reactors for North Korea. Kim also encouraged other countries like the U.S. and Japan to continue dialogue and support to North Korea as well. After the 2002 naval skirmish, Kim only wanted an apology from the North and then continued aid as well as cruise tours to Mt. Kumgang resort. Thus, after

⁹³ Kim, J. (2002). Seoul hopes U.S-N.K talks will resume despite sea battle. The Korea Herald, The Korea Herald.

each threatening event there were no serious repercussions towards North Korea. Kim's successor, Roh Moo Hyun began his administration in the same manner as Kim Dae Jung but Roh's action began to change which will be further discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Roh Moo Hyun

Roh Moo Hyun, who was from the same political party as Kim Dae Jung, began his administration supporting Kim's Sunshine policy of cooperating with North Korea but his responses to North Korea soon began to shift. The purpose of this chapter is to examine Roh Moo Hyun's response to the 2004 naval encounter and 2006 missile launching.

Northern Limit Line (NLL)

Roh Moo Hyun began his administration differently than Kim Dae Jung by addressing the Northern Limit Line problem. The Northern Limit Line became a controversial topic after the June 2002 naval skirmish which resulted in the death of 6 South Korean sailors. Not only did the attack cause a public outcry, many conservative members of the government called for retaliation such as sanctions towards North Korea. When Roh Moo Hyun took office in 2003, he announced a continuation of Kim Dae Jung's policy of cooperation and called it "The Peace and Prosperity Policy." Just a month after Roh was inaugurated, two North Korean fishing boats crossed the NLL into South Korean water. Three South Korean ships investigated the situation in which the North Korean fishermen stated that they crossed the border accidentally because there was fog and they did not have any navigational equipment. The South Koreans not only returned the boats back to the North but they gave the fishermen a mug with a compass to direct them better. The North Korean government expressed gratitude towards Roh for taking care of the situation calmly. In this way, Roh began his administration by encouraging peaceful resolutions between the two countries concerning the border crossings rather than resorting to firing warning shots.

By June of 2003, North Korean fishing boats had already crossed the Northern Limit Line thirteen separate times, which caused alarm to South Korea's security forces. Roh recognized the threat of future naval skirmishes and stated that "special care was needed to prevent incursions by North Korean fishing boats from sparking another sea battle."⁹⁴ Despite government members urging Roh to halt rice aid due to these sea border crossings, members of Roh's political party, Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) explained that "it is not wise to deeply connect the humanitarian aid to political understandings."⁹⁵ The rice aid to North Korea served as a line of communication between the two Koreas and was meant to prevent threatening actions. North and South had been working on joint projects such as an inter-Korean railroad link and the Kaesong Industrial Complex, where products were manufactured on North Korea land using North Korea workers for South Korean companies; trade between the two Koreas was about \$800 million in 2004. According to the South Korean Unification Minister, continuing economic interaction with North Korea would lead to military cooperation and could lead to North Korea easing up on their tough military stance. Roh decided to follow his party's position and support cooperation with North Korea despite the Northern Limit Line dispute.

North and South Korea had been continuing working-level military talks since the 2000 Inter-Korean Summit. However, both countries agreed that it was time to make joint efforts in order to avoid accidental military clashes and build trust concerning security. "The seriousness of these clashes has led to unprecedented efforts between the two Koreas to find ways to prevent future battles at sea over fish and crabs. In May 2004, for the first time since the armistice talks

⁹⁴ (2003). North Korean boats violate sea border, fuel security concerns. Agence France Presse, Agence France Presse.

⁹⁵ (2003). Seoul to Tie Rice Aid to NLL Violations. Korea Times, hk internet Co. for the Korea Times.

in 1953, generals from both sides met to discuss how to prevent future naval clashes.”⁹⁶ The two Koreas agreed to share a radio frequency, set up a telephone hotline between the two navies, use unified signaling systems of flags and flash signals, and exchange information on illegal fishing around the Northern Limit Line.⁹⁷ North and South Korea also promised to stop propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts and take down propaganda billboards along the border between the two countries. South Korea had about 100 propaganda billboards along the border while North Korea had about 200 signs that honored their leader, praised communism, and denounced the U.S.⁹⁸ However, the two sides were not able to agree on the status of the Northern Limit Line. South Korean officials stated that the Northern Limit Line was created by the U.N. and should be kept while the Northern officials reiterated their position that the Northern Limit Line should be moved farther south.

Despite the agreement between the two Koreas concerning the prevention of naval skirmish, the South Korean military took a different position than President Roh Moo Hyun. President Roh emphasized the importance of increased communication between the two countries with the hotline, but the South Korean military emphasized the importance of defending the Northern Limit Line. The use of the hotline came into effect in June 2004 but a July 14, 2004 border conflict raised a lot of concerns since the hotline was used but the messages were ignored by a South Korean navy officer. A naval commander had told investigators that “he had not forwarded information on radio contacts with the North to his superiors because he feared that he would not be allowed to fire warning shots to drive the intruder away. The military investigators also told the National Assembly that the navy’s animosity toward North Korea was

⁹⁶ Hyun, I. and M. Schreurs (2007). The Environmental Dimension of Asian Security: Conflict and Cooperation over Energy, Resources, and Pollution. Washington D.C, United States Institute of Peace. Pg.122.

⁹⁷ Information found in: Xinhua News Agency (2004) Seoul, Pyongyang agree to set up hotline linking navies.

⁹⁸ Information found in: The Korea Times (2004) Two Koreas Start Removing Frontline Propaganda Loudspeakers.

one of the reasons for the commander's action."⁹⁹ The navy was still angry at North Korea for the deaths of the South Korean sailors who died in the 2002 naval skirmish. Military officials also believe that the hotline would not actually prevent clashes in the NLL unless the North recognized the NLL.

In order to prevent the Northern Limit Line crossings, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff revised rules concerning its operation rules in dealing with North Korean violations on the sea border in September 2004. "The new NLL operations regulations are aimed at staving off accidental armed clashes on the high-tension western sea border . . . Warning gunshots are now restrained in case of unintentional NLL intrusions by Northern boats during storms and other unavoidable circumstances."¹⁰⁰ The rules changed from three to five steps. The previous three steps were: 1) Maneuver; 2) Shoot a Warning Shot; 3) Direct shots. The new five step rules changed to: 1) Dispatch warning messages through the international communications frequency; 2) Flexible responses to the North's efforts to rescue own-country ships and chase third-country vessels; 3) Carefully counteract if northern vessels are not intentionally violating NLL 4) Warning gunshots; 5) Precision shooting. The previous rules involved a blocking technique whereby the South Korean boats would physically block and get close to North Korean boats. However, the new regulations allowed for more communication in case the crossing was accidental. The new NLL operation rules coincided with Roh's policy of increasing communication and cooperation with North Korea in order to prevent future naval disputes.

⁹⁹ Chae, B. (2004). 'Talk or fight' divides Roh and navy. Joins.com, Joins.com.

¹⁰⁰ (2004). Navy to Refrain from Firing at N. Korean Boats on West Sea Border. Yonhap English News, Yonhap News Agency.

The November 1, 2004 Naval Encounter and Roh Moo Hyun's response

On November 1, 2004, South Korean patrol boats fired on North Korean vessels after the vessels crossed the NLL on two separate occasions on the same day. The first occurred from 10:54 am to 11:40 am when two North Korean boats crossed the NLL. After South Korea issued a radio warning, South Korean patrol boats fired warning shots. The two North Korean boats retreated without firing a return shot and the standoff ended without casualties. One of the two ships crossed the NLL again a little after noon but returned back to the other side about seven minutes later after the South Korean navy fired four warning shots. However, the North Korean boats denied breaching the border and a North Korean patrol boat was reported to have said “We are not violating the border. We are in the middle of checking fishing boats from a third country.”¹⁰¹ The North Korean boats insisted that they were actually chasing foreign boats that were illegally fishing. However, the South Korean Joint Chief of Staff officials say that the boats intentionally violated the border and ignored radio warnings. A statement made by the Navy Command of the DPRK military stated that the patrol boats were on routine guard duty on their side of the water, accused the South Korean government of grave provocation, and called the firing a crime. On the same day, another North Korean boat crossed the NLL a mile farther at 11 am, about the same time, but returned back to the North around 11:25 am after they received radio warning messages from the South Korean navy.¹⁰²

This naval incident followed a series of incidents along the Korean border that threatened the security of South Korea. Just a week before the November 1, 2004, naval incident, “South

¹⁰¹ (2004). SKorea navy fires warning shots at NKorean vessels after border breach Update. Xinhua Financial Network (XFN) News, Xinhua Financial Network, Ltd.

¹⁰² (2004). SKorea navy fires warning shots at NKorean vessels after border breach Update. Xinhua Financial Network (XFN) News, Xinhua Financial Network, Ltd.

Korean guards found three holes in fences in the Demilitarized Zone. Two fishing boats strayed south before that--one on each coast--and the South also hunted in vain for two North Korean submarines off the south of the peninsula.”¹⁰³ Although the reasons for the incursion are unclear, South Koreans have suggested several theories. Some officials do not rule out the possibility that the boats truly crossed the line accidentally while pursuing illegal Chinese fishing boats since a statement by the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff said “there were about 80 Chinese fishing boats in the area at the time” and “diplomatic sources say the North could be carrying out training for special forces or testing Washington and the South's mettle ahead of Tuesday's U.S. presidential election.”¹⁰⁴ According to a Joint Chiefs of Staff official, “The North may have sent three boats nearly simultaneously to violate the NLL in an apparent scheme to examine the South Korean Navy's readiness" and another JCS officer said, "The violations are also seen as an intentional act to invalidate the NLL.”¹⁰⁵ Another theory mentioned in the same article that outlined those above connected the incursion to the U.S. presidential election, suggesting the North was trying to hurt President Bush’s campaign by drawing attention to the high military tension that still existed on the Korean Peninsula.

Although this naval incident was not as historic or serious as those in 1999 and 2002, this particular event was important because “it was the first time since the signing of the 1953 armistice which ended the Korean War that three North Korean military boats violated the NLL in a single day.”¹⁰⁶ Since the incident did not result in retaliation by the North Korean boats or casualties, there was not much of a public, international, or South Korean government response

¹⁰³ Rhee, S. (2004). Update 2- S. Korea fires warning shots over North incursion. Reuters News, Reuters Limited.

¹⁰⁴ Rhee, S. (2004). Update 2- S. Korea fires warning shots over North incursion. Reuters News, Reuters Limited.

¹⁰⁵ OANA (2004). Three North Korean Boats Violate Western Sea Border. OANA, Organisation of Asia-Pacific News Agencies.

¹⁰⁶ (2004). Korean analysts say North may be testing readiness of South's navy. BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, The British Broadcasting Corporation.

to the event. However, some South Korean citizens have questioned why the North Korean boats did not quickly retreat even after warning shots were fired. The South Korean government did not pursue the matter with North Korea and there were not any repercussions from the event.

Even after the November 1, 2004 incident, the Northern Limit Line dispute was not fully resolved and less than two months later on December 31, 2004 there was once again another naval conflict. A standoff occurred at 6:44 am when a North Korean patrol boat claimed that a South Korean naval ship crossed the NLL and using radio messages threatened to fire shots.¹⁰⁷ The confrontation lasted for nearly an hour with both sides threatening to shoot the other until the North Korean boat retreated. Despite the increased naval communication that was agreed upon earlier in 2004, the Northern Limit Line is not only an unresolved problem, but Roh Moo Hyun's position on it also continued to be different from that of many members of the South Korean military. In a meeting with party chiefs in 2007, Roh stated that "the NLL initially marked the limit of South Korean Navy operations. The truce line was agreed on by the two Koreas but the NLL was drawn unilaterally. So to call it the 'border' is misleading the public. Seoul's stance is to handle the issue in accordance with the 1992 South-North Basic Agreement."¹⁰⁸ President Roh's remarks angered many members of the military and family members who lost loved ones in the 2002 naval battles since the military has worked to protect and guard the Northern Limit Line.

¹⁰⁷ Information found in: Agence France Presse (2004). Two Koreas face off in Yellow Sea. Agence France Presse.

¹⁰⁸ KBS World (2007) The Northern Limit Line (NLL).http://rki.kbs.co.kr/news_print.htm?lang=e&No=108&Category=NewIssue 10/12/2007.

Analysis

In conclusion, President Roh recognized that the Northern Limit Line was a sensitive security issue that needed to be addressed and began his administration by supporting the idea of encouraging peace and dialogue between the North and South Korea Navy. Roh remained consistent to the ideology upheld by his political party to continue his predecessor's position towards North Korea and continue cooperation and refrain from starting a war over the NLL. In order to reduce future skirmishes and reduce security tension, generals from both sides agreed to increase communication by using the same radio frequency, the same signaling system of flags, setting up a telephone hotline between the two navies, and exchanging information on illegal fishing around the Northern Limit Line. Security concerns over the sea border were also addressed when the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff revised rules concerning its new operation rules in dealing with North Korean violations which aimed to preventing accidental armed clashes on the high-tension. The new rules included more communication efforts between the two countries rather than simply using blocking tactics. However, the hotline and increased communication have not been entirely successful since they have not completely prevented NLL crossings and North Korea still does not accept the NLL. Since the November 2004 naval dispute ended without any casualties and the North Korean boats retreated without firing back, there was not much of a response from the South Korean public or international community. Therefore, Roh did not find it necessary to bring a lot of attention to the incident and the South Korean navy followed the new procedure of delivering a radio warning first before firing. Roh's administration did not only encounter naval issues, it also had to react to the threat of North Korea's growing nuclear program.

Nuclear Program

The second North Korean nuclear crisis began in 2002 after the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly approached North Korea with U.S. intelligence data which showed that North Korea was trying to collect a large amount of high strength aluminum which is needed to build a facility to enrich uranium. North Korea went on to admit that they did in fact have a nuclear weapons program and enriched uranium. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) that was founded by the U.S., South Korea, and Japan to freeze North Korea's nuclear development responded by announcing in November 2002 that they would suspend fuel shipments to North Korea. "North Korea responded to the suspension of fuel-oil shipments by announcing its plan to bring the Yongbyon 5MW reactor back on line and to resume construction of its 50 MW and 200 MW reactors in order to generate electricity to compensate for the cessation of fuel shipments from KEDO."¹⁰⁹ North Korea also had the International Atomic Energy Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) take down surveillance cameras and North Korea removed the IAEA inspectors from the country.

A series of events occurred in 2003 in which North Korea made nuclear advances and dangerous decisions concerning their nuclear program; these led Roh Moo Hyun to start focusing on the nuclear issue even before his inauguration. On January 10, 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which is an international treaty meant to stop the development of nuclear weapons and weapons technology. Despite knowing that North Korea had withdrawn from the NPT, Roh still advocated dialogue and suggested a summit meeting with Kim Jong Il to discuss the nuclear crisis in January 2004. Roh stressed the

¹⁰⁹ Hyun, I. and M. Schreurs (2007). The Environmental Dimension of Asian Security: Conflict and Cooperation over Energy, Resources, and Pollution. Washington D.C, United States Institute of Peace. Pg.56.

importance of dialogue and explained that, "It is important to meet in person without any precondition to have dialogue . . . I will propose to meet with Chairman Kim Jong Il, even if I lose face in the eyes of my people," and he said that talking to the North Korea leader "will solve the difficult problem."¹¹⁰ In an interview just a few days before Roh's inauguration, Roh also stated that, "in the process of stopping North Korea from having nuclear weapons we should not cause war, and we're concerned about that possibility. I don't think there are any other credible alternatives to dialogue because sanctions and pressure tactics can cause war . . . This is not a moral evaluation or punishment problem but a cold, rational issue."¹¹¹ Roh Moo Hyun was inaugurated on February 25, 2004 and in his inaugural speech he addressed the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear development and the need to stop the program. However, he stressed that the nuclear issue needed to be resolved peacefully through dialogue. Roh explained that the U.S. and Japan need to be a part of resolving the issue but that all the countries must prevent increasing any military tension. This position differed from that of Kim Dae Jung, who believed it was an inter-Korean dilemma.

On February 27, 2003, the U.S. said that North Korea had reactivated its five-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Despite this news, Roh refused to join Washington in provoking Pyongyang. North Korea then test-fired a land-to-sea anti-ship missile into the Sea of Japan in March. However, the March test was not considered a violation of North Korea's ballistic missile flight test moratorium that was signed in 2002. In July 2003, a U.S. official said North Korea had begun reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods which suggested that the government intended to produce nuclear weapons. "In the summer of 2003, they said they had reprocessed the 8,000 fuel

¹¹⁰ Brooke, J. (2003). Threats and Responses: Korea; Be Patient with North, Seoul's Kim Urges the U.S. The New York Times. www.nytimes.com, The New York Times.

¹¹¹ (2003) Interview "I Will Do My Best to Remove the Differences". Time Asia.

rods that they recovered from the IAEA, but no one seemed clear on whether the rods were still encased in concrete casks or whether their reprocessing plant was up and running (the Bush team said yes, experts in Seoul and Washington said no).”¹¹² A couple of months later in November, a North Korean ambassador told Reuters News Agency that North Korea possessed a workable nuclear device. North Korea’s nuclear program did take a slight turn when North Korea agreed to six way talks in August 2003 with South Korea, the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia. However, the talks continued in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 without much of a breakthrough. Finally, in 2006 North Korea fired six missiles including a Taepodong 2.

The July 4, 2006 missile test and Roh Moo Hyun’s response

On July 4, 2006, North Korea test fired seven missiles; six were short-medium range and one long-range Taepodong 2 rocket. The six short-medium range missiles were all launched at the Kittaeryong location and were either Scud-C or Nodong A rockets. The long range Taepodong 2 rocket was launched at a different location at Taepodong/ Musudan-ri launch site but the launch was deemed a failure because it was only in the air for 42 seconds. All seven missiles landed in the Sea of Japan. Although the launch was not a total surprise for the international community, many called the action provocative and condemned the testing.

There were early reports a couple weeks before July 4, 2006 that warned of a possible North Korea missile launch. Satellite photographs taken by the U.S. showed a fueled and assembled missile on a launch site ready to go. Many countries such as the U.S, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and Australia voiced their concern upon hearing the news of the possible launch and urged North Korea to stop their plans. U.S. President George Bush said in a press

¹¹² Cumings, B. (2004). North Korea: Another Country. New York, The New Press. Pg.90.

conference on June 21, 2006, that "the North Koreans have made agreements with us in the past and we expect them to keep their agreements, for instance on test launches . . . This is not the way to do business in the world."¹¹³ The Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi warned that Japan would react harshly to another missile test such as sanctions since the missile could reach the Japanese vicinity. In preparation for the possible launching, the U.S. and Japan agreed to cooperate on a ballistic missile defense shield and Japan deployed high resolution radar in northern Japan that would detect incoming missiles. The U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan also expressed worry about the missile testing and hoped that North Korea would change its mind.

South Korean officials expressed some concern over the reports of a possible missile launching; dialogue was still the preferred method by the Roh administration in dealing with the North Korean threat. President Roh Moo Hyun explained that the Korean peninsula remained volatile due to the North Korean missile program. However, Roh also explained that South Korea would continue cooperation efforts with the North. Security concerns were the main reason for continuing dialogue with North Korea despite the threats. Roh stated, "I think building trust between South and North (Korea) would provide a strong foundation for preserving peace . . . We are managing South-North relations with the top priority on security and peace . . . That is why we continuously talk and expand cooperative exchanges even in difficult situations."¹¹⁴ In order to have a peaceful solution, Roh urged North Korea to return to the Six Party talks to help ease the concerns of the international community. However, despite all the international concerns and warnings, North Korea went ahead and launched their missiles.

¹¹³ (2006). North Korea must honor agreement not to test missiles--Bush. Agence France Presse, Agence France Presse.

¹¹⁴ (2006). S. Korea Pres: Peace Effort With North To Continue. Dow Jones International News, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.

The launches came on the day when Americans were celebrating Independence Day and it occurred minutes after the US space shuttle Discovery went into space from Cape Canaveral, Florida. After the launching, some of the world stock markets took a hit due to the news of the missile launchings. The Korea Composite Stock Price Index (Kospi) “plunged as much as 2.1 percent Wednesday after North Korea launched a half dozen missiles early in the day, but closed 0.5 percent lower for the day.”¹¹⁵ However, according to the same article, the drop was also not just due to fears of more North Korean missile tests but worries over higher oil prices and U.S. inflation. The Kospi also declined the next day on Thursday by 1.2 percent, and the South Korean won also declined against the U.S. dollar for a second day when the dollar traded at 949.5 won, compared to 946.7 won.¹¹⁶ South Korea’s sovereign A+ credit rating by Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services was not affected by the missile launches. The U.S. dollar was not affected on the day of the missile launch because the U.S. foreign exchange market was closed due to the Independence Day holiday. “The U.S. dollar rose against other major currencies on Wednesday amid geopolitical fears over North Korea’s missile tests and upbeat sentiment on the U.S. employment market” and the dollar also gained due to the hope positive news on the U.S. employment rate.¹¹⁷

After the missile launching, not only did the countries involved in the Six Party Talks (U.S., China, Russia, Japan and South Korea) voice their concern and outrage but so did many other countries such as Australia, Italy, Belgium, Thailand, New Zealand, Philippines, and even Kazakhstan. North Korea’s allies were not given a warning about the actual launchings and

¹¹⁵ (2006). South Korean stocks fall amid oil price surge, missile tension. Associated Press Newswires, The Associated Press.

¹¹⁶ Information found in (2006). South Korean stocks fall amid oil price surge, missile tension. Associated Press Newswires, The Associated Press.

¹¹⁷ (2006). US dollar gains on North Korea missile jitters. Platts Commodity News, Platts.

voiced concern over the decision. The Russian foreign ministry spokesman, Mikhail Kamynin stated that, "the missile launches that were carried out are clearly at odds with efforts to build trust in the region...And this type of action complicates the situation surrounding the Korean nuclear program."¹¹⁸ The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said he was seriously concerned about the situation and hoped that every side would remain calm and not escalate the situation. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1695 blocking member states from trading missile technology or any materials that can contribute to the North's weapons program with North Korea.¹¹⁹ The South Korean government supported the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1695 saying "it is in line with Seoul's consistent stance denouncing Pyongyang's recent missile launches."¹²⁰

South Korea gave mixed signals right after the missile testing by stopping aid but continuing engagement. Seoul condemned the launchings and said that South Korea would punish the North by halting planned shipment of rice and fertilizer to the North. A South Korean official stated, "We promised to ship 100,000 tonnes of fertiliser aid to the North but we will shelve it . . . We will also put off 500,000 tonnes of rice aid until any breakthrough is made in the missile issue."¹²¹ South Korea was the biggest food aid donor to the North besides China. "The liberal branch in the ruling party criticized the sanctions effort as they violated the principle of assistance for North Korea on humanitarian grounds."¹²² Members argued that many North Koreans depend on the aid given to the North to survive. However, Seoul stood behind their

¹¹⁸ (2006). Russia slams North Korea missile launches. Agence France Presse, Agence France-Presse.

¹¹⁹ (2006). US mulling "additional measures" against North Korea- spokesman. BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, The British Broadcasting Corporation.

¹²⁰ BBC (2006). South Korea supports UN Security Council resolution on North. BBC, The British Broadcasting Corporation.

¹²¹ (2006). S Korea suspends North food aid. BBC News. www.bbc.co.uk, BBC.

¹²² Kim, S. (2011) Identity Prevails in the End: North Korea's Nuclear Test and South Korea's Response in 2006. EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper.

decision to halt shipments since the Ministry of Unification, Lee Jong-suk, had already notified North Korea before the missile testing that rice and fertilizer assistance would not be given if North Korea launched missiles.¹²³ This was the first time in the Roh administration that sanctions were used with North Korea. The halting of the shipment of rice and fertilizer to the North resulted in the North Koreans ending high level talks, North-South family reunions, and construction on a multimillion dollar pavilion that was meant to host reunions. However, top officials stated that the South would continue their economic projects and exchanges with North and would continue dialogue since "the government judged that it's necessary to continue with dialogue efforts to resolve the current situation over the North's missile launch."¹²⁴ Also, Yoon Kwang-ung the South Korean defense minister said, "We are making efforts in the research and development of a cruise missile" and although he did not give details on the reasons for the action "it comes amid a general strengthening of the country's missile capabilities."¹²⁵ After Japan raised the possibility of a preemptive strike, President Roh indicated that it would be a bad decision and said "Japan's attitude ... has the potential to create a serious situation for peace in Northeast Asia."¹²⁶ North Korea threatened more launches if it felt pressured. Overall, North Korea's long history of nuclear development and actions caused unrest in South Korea and forced Roh to make a stronger stance to North Korea.

The South Korean public seemed to be split in regard to the nuclear threats made by North Korea. A Gallup World Poll conducted in South Korea in June 2006 right before the missile testing showed that about 53% of South Koreans did not feel seriously threatened by

¹²³ Information found in Foster-Carter, A. "North Korea-South Korea Relations: The Worm Turns." Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations.

¹²⁴ (2006) South Korea Cuts Food Aid to North Korea. Fox News.

¹²⁵ (2006). "North Korea forfeits aid after missile launches." The Guardian.

¹²⁶ (2006). South Korean president criticizes North Korea, Japan amid missile crisis. Associated Press Newswires, The Associated Press.

North Korean nuclear weapons, 43% of Korean felt seriously threatened by the North's claims of developing nuclear weapons and 4% had no opinion. "The same poll data show that the majority (69%) of the population also thinks North Korea already has nuclear weapons ready for use"...about 29% percent responded that North Korea does not have nuclear weapons and 11% did not know.¹²⁷ The South Korean public was also split on whether or not economic support is the key to the nuclear solution. The same Gallup World Poll also showed that 50% of South Koreans believed that providing economic support to the North was the solution, 43% said that economic supports was not the answer and 7% had no opinion. The Gallup Poll also showed that about 26% of South Koreans said the only solution to nuclear issues was strong economic and military sanctions against North Korea, 66% of South Koreans did not believe sanctions were the only solution and 8% had no opinion.¹²⁸ Therefore, a majority of South Koreans actually opposed taking a harder line approach towards the North. Roh's response to the North Korean threats was consistent with the majority of the public which focused on not just strict sanctions but looking at other options such as economic support.

The public opinion among Americans was a little similar to the South Koreans. In a Gallup Poll conducted on July 6-9, 2006, a couple of days after the missile launchings, Americans were asked to choose between different alternatives in dealing with North Korea. The choices were to exert diplomatic pressure and impose economic sanctions on North Korea, launch military air-strikes or missile attacks against North Korea, invade North Korea with ground troops from the U.S. and other countries, not do anything and no opinion. According to the poll, the most popular choice was: "1) Exert diplomatic pressure and impose economic

¹²⁷ Survey results found in: Lee, C. (2006). "Gallup World Poll: South Korea's Political Dilemma." Gallup News Services. from <http://www.gallup.com/poll/24679/Gallup-World-Poll-South-Koreas-Political-Dilemma.aspx>.

¹²⁸ Survey results found in: Lee, C. (2006). "Gallup World Poll: South Korea's Political Dilemma." Gallup News Services. from <http://www.gallup.com/poll/24679/Gallup-World-Poll-South-Koreas-Political-Dilemma.aspx>.

sanction- 72%; 2) Not do anything- 10%; 3) Launch air strikes/missile attacks- 9%; 4) No opinion- 6%; 5) Invade with ground troops-3%.”¹²⁹ Even though there was a lot of attention and international concern on the North Korean missile test “there has been almost no immediate change in Americans' views of North Korea, at least as of this past weekend. One out of five Americans say that North Korea is an immediate threat to the U.S., identical to the views of the American public back in November 2004.”¹³⁰ Similar to South Koreans, a majority of the public did not see North Korea as a huge threat despite having nuclear weapons.

The sanctions put on North Korea did not persuade them to stop their nuclear program. Instead, a couple months later on October 9, 2006, North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the country had performed a successful underground nuclear test. “After the October 9 nuclear tests, many liberal nationalists, led by former president Kim Dae Jung, asked Roh Moo-hyun to meet and negotiate directly with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il.”¹³¹ Kim Dae Jung continued to believe that South Korea had to negotiate and cooperate with North Korea in order to change the North’s actions. “In the most significant step to date, President Roh Moo Hyun—who had become South Korea’s leading voice for engagement—effectively acknowledged on Monday that the sunshine policy had failed.”¹³² After the test, Roh appeared in a nationally televised news conference and stated “The South Korean government at this point cannot continue to say that this engagement policy is effective . . . Ultimately, it is not something we should give up on, but objectively speaking the situation has changed. Being

¹²⁹ Information found in Newport, F. (2006). "Americans Favor Diplomacy With North Korea, Not Military Action." Gallup News Service. from <http://www.gallup.com/poll/23689/americans-favor-diplomacy-north-korea-military-action.aspx>.

¹³⁰ Newport, F. (2006). "Americans Favor Diplomacy With North Korea, Not Military Action." Gallup News Service. from <http://www.gallup.com/poll/23689/americans-favor-diplomacy-north-korea-military-action.aspx>.

¹³¹ Moon, C. (2008). "Diplomacy of Defiance and Facilitation: The Six Party Talks and the Roh Moo Hyun Government." Asian Perspective 32.4. Pg.47.

¹³² Faiola, A. and J. Cho (2006). North-South Relations Suffer a Sudden Chill. The Washington Post. www.washingtonpost.com, The Washington Post Company.

patient and accepting whatever North Korea does is no longer acceptable.”¹³³ The Roh administration responded to the test by supporting the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718 which imposed sanctions against North Korea. The resolution condemned the North Korean nuclear test and placed a ban on the import and export of weapons such as tanks, artillery systems, weapons technology, and missiles. In addition to supporting the U.N. Security Council position, humanitarian aid such as rice and fertilizer shipments from South Korea remained halted since the July 4, 2006 missile testing.

Analysis

In conclusion, the missile launchings by North Korea on July 4, 2006 not only caught the attention and concern of neighboring countries but countries around the world. Although President Roh Moo Hyun tried to stay consistent to his ‘Peace and Prosperity Policy’ which continued the cooperative efforts made by the previous president, Roh took a step in punishing North Korea by halting rice and fertilizer aid. However, he did not cut all ties with North Korea and did not stop economic projects such as the Mt. Kumgang tourism project or the Kaesong Industrial Project. Roh seemed to take a position midway between sanctions and cooperation towards North Korea by sending a message through suspending shipments while leaving the door open for dialogue. Over time the lack of progress motivated Roh to try a new security approach that would not provoke harsh retaliation from North Korea. This position seemed to be shared with the majority of the South Korean public. Only 26% of South Koreans wanted strong economic or military sanctions while the others wanted to look at other options. However, Yoon Kwang-ung the South Korean defense minister did announce South Korea was going to research and develop a cruise missile after the missile testing, perhaps as a response to the security threat.

¹³³ Faiola, A. and M. Fan (2006). North's neighbors turn sour. Chicago Tribune. www.chicagotribune.com, Chicago Tribune.

The Roh administration also supported some of the measures taken by members of the international community such as condemning the testing and participating in the resolutions taken against North Korea by the U.N. Security Council. Roh also urged the participation of other countries such as the U.S., Japan, China and Russia to once again come together with North Korea to discuss the nuclear issue. Roh's response was consistent with his ideology of working with the international community in dealing with North Korea. It was then announced on October 31, 2006 that the Six Party Talks would resume.

Roh began his administration supporting Kim's Sunshine Policy by encouraging dialogue and cooperative projects. Roh addressed the Northern Limit Line problem by increasing communication and having both sides agree to share a naval hotline, signals/flags and radio frequency in order to prevent clashes. As in the case of the 2004 naval dispute, Roh did not reprimand the North for once again crossing the border and did not address the problem. However, during the time that Roh was in office, North Korea's nuclear program changed in ways that forced him to change positions. North Korea launched missiles in 2006 despite warnings from South Korea and other countries which led these countries to halt aid and place sanctions. For the first time, South Korea stopped shipments of fertilizer and rice to North Korea. Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun had many similarities such as being from the same political party and sought to improve relations with North Korea despite North Korean threats. However, they each responded differently to these threats and they were each influenced by different factors which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

There has been tension between North and South Korea since their division in 1945 and North Korea is still a current threat to South Korea due to their missile launches and naval clashes. Throughout this thesis I examined the explanations as to why Kim Dae Jung continued an approach of cooperation and reconciliation to North Korea but Roh Moo Hyun shifted from cooperation to withdrawing some forms of aid to North Korea.

In order to see what accounted for the difference in responses to North Korean threats by Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, I examined a case in which North Korea test-launched a rocket and a case in which North Korean vessels crossed the Northern Limit Line during each administration. By comparing these cases, I explained why the presidents continued their engagement policy and refrained from condemning the North in all but the case of the 2006 missile test. I tested a set of explanations made by experts for South Korean approaches to North Korea to see which explanation best fit each case. These explanations involved maintaining ideological consistency, international pressure, security reasons, public opinion and economic concerns. I argued that each response was due to a combination of explanations rather than one single explanation. Even though each explanation had some merit, some explanations had greater influence than the others. Both Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun expressed concern over North Korea due to security and economic concerns. However, as the years and threatening behavior went on the public and international community started to take a greater notice to North Korea's activity and wanted the South Korean government to take action. As a result, public opinion and international pressure partially influenced Roh to shift his responses towards North Korea and halt aid after the 2006 missile launch.

The first case study was the August 31, 1998 missile launching by North Korea. Despite the security threat of North Korea launching another missile which could hit South Korea, Kim Dae Jung refused to join the American missile defense programs in order to prevent tension with North Korea. Kim Dae Jung stayed devoted to his Sunshine policy and South Korea became more focused on prevention tactics such as continuing cooperation with North Korea in order to prevent further missile launches. Economic concerns were a big explanation for Kim's responses since South Korea was worried about the potential collapse of the North Korean government. South Korea was also going through an economic crisis and was in no shape to handle the economic burden of a collapsed North Korea. In order to help North Korea's standard of living and economy, South Korea not only stood by their pledge to pay for their part for light-water reactors but South Korea continued trade and cooperation projects like the Mt. Kungang cruise tours that provided North Korea with a large amount of income. Kim also hoped that the economic projects would help North Korea trust the South and eventually feel that developing nuclear weapons was not necessary.

The thesis showed that public opinion and international pressure did not seem to have been factors in Kim's response to the missile test. The South Korean public was not deeply concerned and did not feel threatened by the missile test. Also, international pressure would not be an explanation for his response since Kim responded differently to the test than the U.S and Japan. The Japanese withdrew funding to help North Korea with their light-water reactors and U.S Congress members voted to place stricter conditions on the funding. However, South Korea not only decided to continue their funding for the light-water reactors, they asked the U.S and Japan to continue cooperation with North Korea as well.

The second case study during the Kim administration was the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong which occurred on June 29, 2002. President Kim Dae Jung was consistent with his ideology, stuck with his Sunshine Policy and did not reprimand North Korea over the incident. Also, joint projects like the construction of the North-South Korea railroad (Kyongi Line) began a few months after the incident in order to help the North's economy.

The South Korean public expressed a negative response toward the North over the attack due to the deaths of the South Korean sailors and the event made many South Korean citizens question Kim's strategy of engaging with the North. The public was outraged when the minister of the Ministry of National Defense "only demanded an apology and a promise of non-recurrence for an incident that caused 24 killed and wounded and the loss of a patrol boat."¹³⁴ Due to the public outcry over how the navy handled the skirmish, Kim Dae Jung did respond and fired his Minister of Defense and reshuffled his Cabinet. However, I do not believe public opinion was a major factor since the only change Kim made was internally. Kim only fired his Minister after an investigation of the naval battle and did not change his international policy toward North Korea. Another explanation that would not explain Kim's response would be international pressure. The U.S. quickly responded to the naval skirmish by condemning the attack by North Korea and withdrawing their offer of talks with North Korea. However, just a couple days after the skirmish the South Korean government "expressed hope that Saturday's naval gun battle between the two Koreas would not affect the planned resumption of dialogue between the United States and North Korea"¹³⁵

¹³⁴ Lee, S. (2002). Tragedy Caused by Sunshine. The Chosun Ilbo. english.chosun.com, Chosun Ilbo.

¹³⁵ Kim, J. (2002). Seoul hopes U.S-N.K talks will resume despite sea battle. The Korea Herald, The Korea Herald.

The first case examined during the Roh Moo Hyun administration was the November 1, 2004 naval skirmish. The naval rules previously stated that South Korean boats were only allowed to block enemy boats but the South Koreans followed the new guidelines under the Roh administration which involved giving a radio warning first and allowing the South Korean navy to fire first. There was not much of a public or international response to the event since there were no casualties or retaliation by the North Koreans. Since the event was considered minor Roh did not find it necessary to bring a lot of attention to the incident and continued cooperating with North Korea.

The second case that was discussed during the Roh administration occurred on July 4, 2006, when North Korea test fired seven missiles. Although President Roh Moo Hyun tried to stay consistent to his 'Peace and Prosperity Policy' which continued cooperative efforts made by his predecessor Kim Dae Jung, Roh did shift his policy by punishing North Korea by halting rice and fertilizer aid. This action went against Roh's political party which "criticized the sanctions effort as they violated the principle of assistance for North Korea on humanitarian grounds."¹³⁶ This was the first time in the Roh administration that sanctions were used against North Korea.

Despite Roh suspending shipments, Roh seemed to take a middle position towards North Korea in other aspects by leaving the door open for dialogue and cooperation. Roh did not cut all ties with North Korea and did not stop economic projects such as the Mt. Kumgang tourism project or the Kaesong Industrial Project. It does not seem that economic concerns played a big role during Roh's administration since South Korea was not in an economic crisis like it was during the Kim administration. Instead, the main reasons for continuing dialogue with North Korea despite the threats were due more to security concerns. Roh stated, "We are managing

¹³⁶ Kim, S. (2011) Identity Prevails in the End: North Korea's Nuclear Test and South Korea's Response in 2006. EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper.

South-North relations with the top priority on security and peace . . . That is why we continuously talk and expand cooperative exchanges even in difficult situations.”¹³⁷ Roh’s response to the North Korean threats seemed consistent with the majority of the public who focused not just strict sanctions but looking at other options such as economic support.

Roh Moo Hyun was not completely influenced by international pressure. Roh disagreed with Japan’s suggestion “that a pre-emptive strike might be needed to knock out the North’s missile bases” and said “Japan’s attitude . . . has the potential to create a serious situation for peace in Northeast Asia.”¹³⁸ However, Roh still urged the participation of other countries such as the U.S, Japan, China and Russia to once again come together with North Korea to discuss the nuclear issue. It was announced later that month on October 31, 2006 that the Six Party Talks would resume.

¹³⁷ (2006). S. Korea Pres: Peace Effort With North To Continue. Dow Jones International News, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.

¹³⁸ (2006). South Korean president criticizes North Korea, Japan amid missile crisis. Associated Press Newswires, The Associated Press.

Table 5.1: List of Explanations (Strong, Weak, No Influence) for Responses to Northern Limit Line and Missile Test Incidents

	NLL	Missile test
Kim	<p><u>Consistent Ideology</u>: Strong-. Kim continued with his Sunshine policy and did not reprimand North Korea.</p> <p><u>Security Concerns</u>: Strong- The South Korean navy was given orders not to attack but to block enemy ships that crossed the NLL.</p> <p><u>Economic Concerns</u>: Weak- Kim continued aid to North Korea to help their struggling economy.</p> <p><u>Public Opinion</u>: Weak- The public was outraged so Kim fired his Minister of Defense and reshuffled his cabinet but did not punish North Korea.</p> <p><u>International Pressure</u>: No- Kim encouraged the U.S. and Japan to continue dialogue and support for North Korea.</p>	<p><u>Consistent Ideology</u>: Strong- Missile test did not affect his Sunshine Policy and stood by South Korea’s pledge to pay most of the light water reactors for North Korea.</p> <p><u>Security Concerns</u>: Strong- Kim wanted to prevent tension/war with the North through cooperation rather than attacking or building up military defenses.</p> <p><u>Economic Concerns</u>: Strong- South Korea was in a financial crisis and would not be able to cope with the cost of the North Korean government collapsing.</p> <p><u>Public Opinion</u>: No- South Korean citizens were not concerned about the launch.</p> <p><u>International Pressure</u>: No- Kim refused to join the American missile defense program and encouraged the U.S. and Japan to continue talks with North Korea.</p>
Roh	<p><u>Consistent Ideology</u>: Strong- Roh continued communication, cooperation and did not reprimand North Korea.</p> <p><u>Security Concerns</u>: Strong- Roh pushed for more communication (hotlines and signals) between the two navies to prevent naval battles and war.</p> <p><u>Economic Concerns</u>: No- South Korea was not in a financial crisis like it was during the Kim administration.</p> <p><u>Public Opinion</u>: No- There wasn’t a public response to the event since the North Korean boats did not fire.</p> <p><u>International Pressure</u>: No- There wasn’t any international pressure since other countries did not respond or make remarks on the naval event.</p>	<p><u>Consistent Ideology</u>: Weak- Roh stopped aid but continued talks, joint projects and trade. Roh wanted North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks.</p> <p><u>Security Concerns</u>: Weak- Roh participated in sanctions against North Korea but continued communication with the North.</p> <p><u>Economic Concerns</u>: No- South Korea was not in a financial crisis at the time and Roh continued economic projects with the North.</p> <p><u>Public Opinion</u>: Weak- Roh’s response seemed consistent with most of the public who wanted other options such as economic support and not just strict sanctions.</p> <p><u>International Pressure</u>: Weak- Like many other countries, South Korea condemned the launch and stopped aid. But, Roh wanted the U.S. to continue talks with North Korea.</p>

Similarities and Differences between Kim and Roh

Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun had many similarities both in their personal background and their actions in office. Kim and Roh both came from poor families who devoted their younger years to the human rights and pro-democracy movement in Korea. Kim and Roh both ran for President under the same political party, the Millennium Democratic Party, with similar stances towards North Korea. When they became president they developed a cooperative policy towards North Korea which involved increased dialogue, projects, trade and aid. The responses made by both President Kim and Roh to naval events were fairly similar and were consistent with their ideology. Neither presidents wanted any tension to escalate with North Korea but they responded to the public outrage after the June 2002 battle of Yeonpyeong. Due to the public outcry in 2002, Kim fired his Minister of Defense, reshuffled his cabinet and the navy reexamined their rules of engagement procedure. However, Kim continued his policy of reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea despite North Korean vessels crossing the Northern Limit Line (NLL) several times during the administration.

Since the Northern Limit Line was still an issue when Roh took office in 2003, like Kim, Roh also had the navy reexamine the rules of engagement procedure which involved more communication and dialogue with the North Korean navy. However, there were changes made to the procedure which allowed the South Korean boats to fire rather than block. The change in procedure was a big difference because in 2002 (Kim's administration) the South Korean navy was only allowed to block and North Korea fired first which resulted in the deaths of the South Korean soldiers.

The two presidents also took the same stance on missile tests until North Korea's missile launch in 2006. In 1998, North Korea launched a three-stage rocket launch but Kim Dae Jung

responded by downplaying the event and he continued the joint projects with the North. Soon after becoming president, Roh Moo Hyun responded in a similar way when North Korea test fired a land -to-sea anti-ship missile in 2003. However, when North Korea test-fired a missile in 2006, Roh responded differently by halting food and fertilizer assistance. There were many differences between the 1998 (Kim administration) and 2006 (Roh administration) missile launch which explain the difference in response. Although both administrations had security concerns due to North Korea's nuclear program, the Kim administration was far more concerned about the South Korean economy. Kim was trying to keep South Korea from going bankrupt and was worried that South Korea would not be able to support the potential collapse of the North. Roh on the other hand was not worried about the economy which had bounced back from the economic crisis during the Kim administration and saw economic growth.

I believe that Jongryn Mo made valid points when he labeled Kim Dae Jung a Liberal Nationalist and Roh Moo Hyun a Liberal Multi-Lateralist because it seemed that Roh wanted South Korea to work with the U.S and China as equal partners in engaging the North. This was reflected in the Six Party talks, which involved North Korea, South Korea, U.S, Russia, China and Japan. Mo's points were also valid because after the 2006 missile launch Roh responded with other countries by halting humanitarian aid to North Korea until it agreed to return to the Six Party talks. However, a few months after the missile launch Kim Dae Jung was consistent to his label of being a Liberal Nationalist when he asked Roh Moo-hyun to "meet and negotiate directly with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il."¹³⁹ Kim Dae Jung continued to believe that South Korea had to negotiate and cooperate with North Korea in order to change the North's actions.

¹³⁹ Moon, C. (2008). "Diplomacy of Defiance and Facilitation: The Six Party Talks and the Roh Moo Hyun Government." *Asian Perspective* 32.4. Pg.47.

I also think Myoung-Kyu Park and Philo Kim had a valid argument in saying that public support for Kim's 'Sunshine Policy' diminished throughout the years because “during the decade of the Sunshine policy, ordinary people in the South came to understand complexity involved in North Korean issues.”¹⁴⁰ Therefore, Roh had to make a change, and he “effectively acknowledged . . . that the sunshine policy had failed.”¹⁴¹ After the test, Roh appeared in a nationally televised news conference and stated “The South Korean government at this point cannot continue to say that this engagement policy is effective . . . Ultimately, it is not something we should give up on, but objectively speaking the situation has changed. Being patient and accepting whatever North Korea does is no longer acceptable.”¹⁴² The public's lack of approval during the Kim and Roh reflected their perception that the soft approach otherwise known as “The Sunshine Policy” was not working in deterring the nuclear threat and that it required a more hard line approach. Other countries such as the U.S and Japan agreed with the South Korean citizens as to the need to punish North Korea for continuing with nuclear threats.

Recent Developments

The election of Lee Myung Bak as the new South Korean president marked a paradigm shift in policies concerning North Korea from the previous two administrations who were both from the opposition party. While Kim and Roh had cooperation as their policy with North Korea, Lee Myung Bak went in a different direction with his policies by enforcing a tougher policy to North Korea. The North Korean responded to Bak's policies by expelling South Korean officials

¹⁴⁰ Park, M. and P. Kim (2010). "Inter-Korean Relations in Nuclear Politics." Asian Perspective 34.1: 111-135. Pg.121.

¹⁴¹ Faiola, A. and J. Cho (2006). North-South Relations Suffer a Sudden Chill. The Washington Post. www.washingtonpost.com, The Washington Post Company.

¹⁴² Faiola, A. and M. Fan (2006). North's neighbors turn sour. Chicago Tribune. www.chicagotribune.com, Chicago Tribune.

from an inter-Korean industrial complex, deploying MIGs and army units close to the DMZ and launching naval missiles into the sea.

Lee Myung Bak not only had to face North Korea's nuclear program but the Northern Limit Line dispute has still not been resolved. The NLL dispute took a turn for the worse on May 24, 2010, when a South Korean Navy ship, the Cheonan, sank in the Yellow Sea near the NLL which resulted in the death of 46 sailors. A South Korean led investigation determined that the sinking was caused by a North Korean torpedo that was shot from a midget submarine. North Korea denied the allegation. After the sinking, Lee stated "we have always tolerated North Korea's brutality, time and again. We did so because we have always had a genuine longing for peace on the Korean Peninsula . . . But now things are different. North Korea will pay a price corresponding to its provocative acts . . . no North Korean ship will be allowed to make passage through any of the shipping lanes in the water under our control."¹⁴³ Lee also stopped trade with North Korea; the South Korean government also declared sanctions at Kaesong Industrial Park and the South Korean staff was cut in half at the park after the Cheonan sinking. Due to all the events and threats, there has not been any significant dialogue between the two Koreas and government cooperation such as exchanges between separated families have come to a complete stop.

There was not only a change in South Korean leaders but also in North Korea. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il died of a heart attack on December 17, 2011, and was succeeded by his youngest son Kim Jong Un. Even though the South Korean government "expressed its condolences to the North Korean people," it did not "send an official delegation to pay respects

¹⁴³ Pomfret, J. (2010). South Korea to halt all trade with North Korea over sinking of Cheonan warship. The Washington Post. www.washingtonpost.com.

to Kim Jong Il.”¹⁴⁴ At this writing, it remains unclear whether these two countries will be able to reconcile or continue not on speaking terms.

Future Research

This thesis opens the door for future research on Inter-Korean relations. It would be beneficial to expand the number of cases in order to better grasp the explanation for why South Korea has responded as it has. Also, my research only focused on a short time period which was South Korean administrations which spanned from 1998 to 2006. Future research could include the actions taken by other South Korean presidents such as Roh Tae Woo or Lee Myung Bak. If any of the readers were to embark on this research, within the North-South Korean foreign policy context or not, his or her contribution to political science would be noteworthy.

¹⁴⁴ Lee, J. (2011) South Korean delegation meets Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang. CNN.

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