Foreigners and the Bio-Political State:  
Case Studies of Hungarian and Bosnian Refugees in Switzerland

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Abstract

In modern societies foreigners are implicated in the resolution of the problem of state sovereignty. This paper clarifies how foreign groups can be used by the state to reconstitute the nation in such a way that vulnerabilities are mended. Michel Foucault’s racism and bio-politics are used as conceptual tools to gain insight on how the perpetually open question of who belongs and who does not belong to the population might be settled. This theoretical problem is illustrated with the help of case studies on two significant “crisis moments” for the Swiss state: the arrival of the Hungarian refugees in the late 1950s and the arrival of the Bosnian refugees in the early to mid 1990s.
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CHAPTER ONE

MIGRATION AND THE SWISS STATE

Motivation

After having lived in the United States for nearly eight years, I returned to my home country of Switzerland in 2006. Upon arrival I was astonished to find in Switzerland a level of cultural diversity, which I had become familiar with as a central feature of the American “melting pot”. America has always defined itself as an immigrant nation - Switzerland, however, has never defined itself as such. My re-encounter with this multicultural and multiethnic Swiss society led me to wonder why it is that immigration seems to play no part in Switzerland’s self description. Switzerland seems to be highly concerned with protecting its national boundaries, culture and identity from outside elements. Yet, there is no indication that its large foreigner community has posed any real threat to its stability.

The transition from a foreign resident abroad to a citizen with a foreign background in my own country occurred around the time that I was first introduced to Michel Foucault in a political theory course. I was intrigued by Foucault’s idea of power’s diffused character and of its capacity to conceal itself in everyday arrangements and practices that we, power’s subjects, take for granted. Foucault’s critical analysis of the routine and self-evident influenced my re-evaluation of the solidity of my own nation and of its boundaries. Specifically, I developed an interest in the challenge posed by international migration on the stability of the international system of sovereign states and in conceptual strategies employed by sovereign states to manage the foreign on domestic territory.

This thesis begins with a discussion of the theoretical problem of migration and the protection of state power and a critique of the economic and political theories of migration (Chapter One). This is followed by a brief review of the historical period and geographical context of the case studies. Chapters Two and Three provide a deeper analysis of the Hungarian and Bosnian migration waves to Switzerland. These case studies will reveal pivotal differences between two very distinct migrant subject types which emerged out of specific historical, political and discursive contexts. Chapter Four analyzes the role that these migrants may have played for Switzerland and the impact
this role had on Swiss foreigner and asylum policy. The theoretical discussion explores the central idea that the Hungarian and Balkan subject, respectively, are implicated in the construction of the Swiss national identity during each historical period. This national identity is essential for justifying the integrating, marginalizing, discriminating, and other effects of power on individuals situated within the reach of state power. A Foucaultian perspective is applied in order to make visible conditions of state fragility and practices of state protection which ordinarily elude analysis when approached from conventional migration theory perspectives.¹

¹ Note: Unless otherwise indicated, all translations in this thesis text are the author’s
Overview of the Problem

The political-legal framework delineating territorial boundaries and defining citizenship exists in stark opposition to the real conditions experienced by international migrants. For nations with heterogeneous populations - this includes most nations in different ways - managing diversity is a crucial task of government. In democratic societies diversity management must proceed in line with basic principles of human rights and cannot utilize means of violence and coercion. In some cases this task may be facilitated by a spontaneous interest in peaceful coexistence, for instance due to shared historic experience of immigration. In other cases, the development of such a will to peaceful heterogeneous coexistence develops as part of a nation-building project.²

Geographic mobility and the extended geographic reach of individuals and groups have made diversity management a basic and routine task of government. Opinions critical to migration maintain that the arrival of large numbers of people from abroad with long-term settlement intentions poses a threat to the national order of stable democracies such as the one studied in this thesis. The nation is threatened because cultural visions, behaviors and expectations held by the migrants may not agree with those held by the native population - those around which the state has been constructed (Kofman 2005, 461). The stability of the nation, often a result of historic struggles to achieve the delicate balance of power between various native groups and interests, is at risk.³ Immigration receiving countries are forced to adopt strategies to deal with the extra elements of heterogeneity that foreigners bring to their population.

Because economic factors in the modern globalized environment, such as labor market demand, free movement of people and goods, require that they be transgressed, boundaries no longer work as effective gatekeepers in the modern environment. The economic logic of liberalism clashes with the political and legal logic of control (Hollifield 2004, 886).⁴ Boundaries have become porous and the territorial basis of national identity is disturbed. Residence within the national territory and within the state’s sphere of

² The project of nationalism and nation building as well as the development of exclusive communities is discussed by Benedict Anderson (1983)

³ Balance is an important factor for political stability in Switzerland. For a discussion of the fragile arrangement that developed historically along linguistic, religious and urban/rural lines in Switzerland see for example Gerald and Silvia Arlettaz (2004).

⁴ For a discussion of the “liberal paradox” see Hollifield 2004
control no longer coincides with membership of the nation. Not only citizens, but also foreigners living within the nation-state’s boundaries have a stake in that territory and make demands on its resources and on its future policies. Thus, the line between member and non-member - between citizen and foreigner - is blurred.

The porosity of boundaries and foreign claims to resources interfere with the self-evidence of the state and its citizens. The state is forced to reassert its self-evidence by other means. One important means is to reconstruct a national unit composed of elements of the population friendly to its power and existence and to expel those elements not supportive of this status. Given the complexity of the post-national system of nation-states, this does not mean that all foreigners are expelled and all natives are included. An important process of selection, which is referred to in this thesis by *integration*, incorporates members of the reconstructed national unit and marginalizes hostile elements. Integration utilizes the hostile foreigner and friendly foreigner to reinforce the nation by implementing a merit system and allocating resources based on decisions on membership.

Not all foreigners are treated as equal by the state and the native population. Depending on a number of factors which will be revealed in the case studies, foreigners are confronted with varying degrees of acceptance, which in turn is linked to varying degrees of access to opportunities and chances for incorporation into economic, social and cultural life. The result is that some foreigners are marginalized while others are given opportunities to gain full recognition in society. The task of the thesis is to identify the functional roots for this unequal treatment of foreigners by state power. From the Foucaultian perspective of bio-power state power can only be tolerated in the modern context of nation-states if the state positions itself as the defender of ‘the nation’. This, of course, requires that a ‘nation’ exists and that national identity is nurtured through actions of the state – actions which most importantly include statements and decisions on national membership.

The comparative analysis of the case studies will show that the state makes use of the foreign subject to counter the threat posed by migration and the modern environment of cross-national and international networks and loyalties. The examination of two groups of foreigners in the context of a refugee crisis will make visible the state’s concern with constructing and maintaining an intact and robust national identity in large part through the use of ‘others’. The theoretical discussion shows that integration is an important instrument for producing difference and a tool utilized by the state to shore up
its power and sovereignty.

Integration as a Bio-Political Problem

In contemporary Swiss migration politics, integration is commonly used in a positive sense to refer to measures taken by state and private actors to facilitate the incorporation (integration) of foreigners into various areas of social life with the objective of achieving equal conditions and opportunities between citizens and foreigners (FOM 2006, 5). These areas of social life may include education, occupational training, labor market, social security, health, language, housing, neighborhood, civic life, political participation and naturalization, religion and culture, and safety (FOM 2006, 4). As this thesis would like to show, integration does not only manifest itself in observable policies and measures, however. Integration also depends on the degree of openness of a population to particular foreigner groups in theoretical terms. In a closed society, for instance, integration may be practiced in a negative way, i.e. integration of the population against the outsider. On this level, integration can be seen as a crucial concern of the modern bio-political state.

The concept of integration as described above distinguishes itself from the common use of the term, as defined by a discourse on foreigners and migration. This discourse includes statements and concepts which structure the way that the foreigner’s role in Switzerland is thought about and responded to. This framework encompasses the idea that foreigners may become accepted members of society by exhibiting good behavior. In other words, foreigners can earn their success (i.e. political and social recognition, freedom to relocate, economic opportunities). Thus, the logic suggests, foreigners who are not successful and have no access to resources have not earned it. The discourse of integration makes reference to various requirements to be fulfilled by foreigners in order to gain a kind of moral entry into the society. By stipulating certain required characteristics and behaviors, the integration discourse contains pivotal rules and logics of differentiation by which nationals are distinguished from foreigners. This act of distinguishing the inside from the outside may be seen as a vital function of the state with which the state can legitimate itself in the face of weakened territorial authority.

However, integration chances are not entirely determined by individual behavior. As the case studies (Chapters Two and Three) and theoretical discussion (Chapter Four) will show, judgments on the utility of the foreigner can be and are frequently made
independently of his or her behavior and prior to his or her entry. These judgments may be made according to alleged needs of the nation. For example, the nation may seek to compensate for unpopular policies made in the past, it may wish to reinforce a particular national identity or virtue, or it may be concerned with tightening its border control. Obviously, it is not “the nation” per se who possesses these needs or feels these desires. Rather, the state as protector advances this need as a means to improve conditions - allegedly on behalf of all who live within its territory (Kofman 2005, 464). The discourse of integration, which links integration to individual behavior, masks this exercise of state power in migration politics.

From the theoretical perspective selected for the thesis, integration is seen as a crucial aspect of migration in which attempts of the state to re-manifest the nation and national identity are made visible. If immigration refers to the movement of individuals and groups across national boundaries into a new society, integration refers to judgments on foreigner membership in the national community and to expectations on the utility of the foreigner to the national population. The processes or integration programs through which foreigners can be made part of the nation are only developed in response to these basic assessments. It is at this point that differences between the migrant and the native citizen are articulated and managed by the state. Thus, contrary to what the integration discourse suggests, the chances for incorporation into a national population are determined to a large extent before the migrant arrives. These integration decisions and their effects are explored closely in the case studies.

From a Foucaultian perspective integration may be described as the site in which differentiation, as discussed in the later chapters of The History of Sexuality, Vol. One” (Foucault 1990), is articulated. A critical analysis of this site may therefore reveal the means by which the state seeks to re-manifest its sovereignty within the boundaries of the nation in the context of a changing world. Rather than eliminating categories in order to create a homogeneous whole, integration programs reproduce differentiation according to rules articulated by discourse and knowledge about foreigners and the nation. A new knowledge is created about the rules of differentiation between inside and outside; between member of the state and alien of the state.

The set of integration processes functions as a significant transfer point of power relations in the immigration context and as an important site for the construction of national identity. It is in the determination of rules by which foreigners are incorporated into a host society, where the nation’s notion of its self, of its boundaries, and of the
“other” is (re-)articulated. These rules reflect narratives of the nation’s past and present as well as explanations of migrants’ motivations and capacities to become full members of society. For this reason, the case studies will draw on contemporary theories of migration, official documentation, and institutional and media reports to reconstruct the discursive environment that existed during each period.

The analysis of integration in the context of the two case studies develops conclusions about the strength, or rather about the frailty, of the state in the modern environment. This frailty can be described as the tension between the legal and political framework of sovereign states and the individual and collective realities of mobile human beings. The findings of the case study comparison are used to show how integration management, i.e. the implementation of decisions of national membership, can be used to empower the nation and state.

Asylum

The case studies focus on two groups who fall into the migration category of “asylum seeker”. The integration of asylum seekers is particularly interesting because members of this category often arrive in a country in groups, which are homogenous with respect to origin. Certainly, certain groups of labor migrants, such as for instance the labor migrants from Italy in post war Switzerland, may also have constituted a relatively homogenous group. However, the concentration of asylum seekers to specific and limited historic periods - during acute migration crises - is usually not as pronounced for economic migrants.

Another reason why this study has chosen asylum groups as its units of analysis is that asylum seekers demand a unique type of response from the receiving state. Because labor and other migrants arrive over a longer time span than asylum seekers, the period for developing responses to the former is typically longer and more flexible than the latter. This response period is key for the theoretical problem of this thesis, as it is during this process of developing a response that rules of differentiation, exclusion and inclusion etc. are negotiated. In the asylum context, with its demand for a steadfast and rapid response, this moment is particularly intense and visible in media and official discourse. Thus, in the sense of demands placed on the host society, asylum can be said to represent an intensified and acute form of migration. The arrival of refugees from Hungary and Bosnia can be seen as two “crisis moments” for Swiss integration
management.

Despite the differences between forced migrants and migrants in general, asylum should not be treated as separate from migration. Fleeing has been accepted as a form of migration in conventional migration literature. An asylum seeker receives the status of refugee only after his or her request for asylum has been approved by the responsible authorities. Before such an approval is granted, the asylum seeker cannot be distinguished from the regular migrant. Further, the criteria for refugee status vary greatly from country to country and across historic periods. The determination of qualifications for the refugee status, though regulated by guidelines, is subjective and subject to the discretion of the permit-granting authorities. If the distinction between a refugee and “regular” migrant is not universal, then to speak of refugees as fundamentally different from all other migrating groups is meaningless. Certainly, motivations of refugees and other migrants may differ markedly. However, even refugees go through decision-making processes when deciding to leave their home and determining where to settle, based for instance on the existence of networks (Treibel 1999, 171). In the same light, not all “free” migration is voluntary (Petersen 1958, 263). Finally, as will be seen in both the Hungarian and Bosnian case studies, factors favoring or disfavoring the acceptance of labor migrants are often linked to the factors favoring or disfavoring the acceptance of asylum applicants. Thus migrants and refugees, while not subject to the same laws, are nonetheless confronted with the same discourse on foreigners.

Reconceptualizing the Migration Problem

The project documented in this thesis represents an effort to develop an alternative approach to conceptualizing the “immigration problem”. Images of riots in suburbs of Paris and Lyon between immigrants and French police in 2005 and recent campaigns of the Swiss right-wing, populist party serve as evidence for the weight of the immigration issue in media and public discourse. The significance of the “immigration problem”, or “foreigner problem”, is further shown by the construction of various new institutions emerging in Western states, whose role it is to manage migrants within national and transnational territories: Migration Offices, Alien’s Laws, immigration lawyers,

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6 Early migration scholar William Peterson included forced migration and impelled migration as categories of migration in "A General Typology of Migration" (Peterson 1958, 261-62).
“integration contracts”, fingerprint databases, free mobility zones (e.g. Schengen) etc.

Discourse is important because it establishes the framework within which the problem is explained and solutions developed. By framing reality in a certain way, a discourse has the power to create a certain condition. For example, before and following the First World War certain groups in Switzerland were influenced by a growing concern that Switzerland was being flooded by foreigners. In reality however, the numbers of foreigners actually decreased during this period (Independent Commission of Experts 2002, 71). The immigration problem can be conceived of in different ways. It may be positioned within a national security and terrorism debate, considered a question of economic justice debate, or find itself in the center of discussions on the nation’s cultural heritage. Depending on the context, the perceived causes and effects, alleged agents and victims of the immigration problem vary greatly. Thus, an analysis of a particular immigration problem may help to tell a greater story of the state’s anxieties and how it copes with these.

Conventional models of international migration, examined in a later section of this chapter, focus their attention on motives and patterns of migration from one country to another. Though conventional theory acknowledges the role of policy and political factors, these theories exempt an important element from their analysis, namely the basic principles of sovereignty and the nature of the state. A critical analysis of these commonly taken for granted concepts may show that it is the re-negotiation of these ideas in the contemporary world that drives the particular responses to and policies on immigration. A reassessment of integration from a Foucaultian perspective allows for new points of departure for understanding the problematical nature of the state and sovereignty on the one hand, and for devising more effective, far-reaching and sustainable integration programs on the other.

Further, the case studies explore not only the positive but also the negative impacts of the proliferation of integration programs, such as a possible connection with unintended marginalization and criminalization of foreign population groups within the host society. In such cases the foreigner is treated as a special case, as an abnormality. The development of foreigners into fully recognized members of society is heavily dependent on standards, norms and expectations of different foreigner groups. These standards, norms and expectations are reflected in almost all social contexts from public

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6 George Lakoff and Sam Ferguson (2006) observe that the framing of the “immigration problem” in the United States has limited the political debate on immigration to a narrow set of issues.
administration classification schemes, to classroom management, to urban planning to police statistics.

Political (state) and popular discourses on foreigners have immense power to increase or limit the chances of foreigners to become integrated. States have attempted to engineer peaceful coexistence by controlling population flows by a variety of political means, including national immigration policies, international asylum policies, bilateral treaties between sending and receiving countries, etc. Even integration itself has developed into a high value policy field of its own and has become a target of political programs. In Switzerland the 2008 Foreign Nationals Act established integration as an official state project, explicitly allocating integration responsibilities to government, citizens and newcomers.\(^7\)

While some policies may be ineffective in reaching their objectives, others may have unintended consequences that exacerbate tensions between population groups. Poststructural theories suggest that important structural and behavioral processes of subject formation operate beyond the citizen’s scope of observation and attention, which, though not normally visible and acknowledged, have the power to regulate the formation of subjects and to facilitate or hinder their peaceful coexistence. These processes are fundamental to the success or failure of integration and are vital to understanding how groups interact and how the state interacts with its citizens. When analyzed within the context of nation-states and in consideration of the frailty of modern state sovereignty, it becomes clear that the state is deeply implicated in the construction of a national identity which sets these structural and behavioral processes in motion.

Migration in Switzerland

Though not usually considered a classical immigration society, Switzerland has one of the highest percentages of foreigners in the world. With non-Swiss comprising around one-fifth of its resident population, Switzerland has three times more foreigners than France, and twice as many as Germany, Austria, and the United States (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006, 2). One quarter of the Swiss workforce has a foreign passport and

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\(^7\) Article 4 of the 2008 Foreign Nationals Act defines integration as the achievement of a coexistence between foreign and citizen populations based on constitutional values, mutual respect and tolerance. Through integration, foreign residents are expected to acquire tools (specifically proficiency in one of the national languages) and knowledge about their environment which are required for participating in the economic, social and cultural life of the community.
the contribution of migrants to population growth in Switzerland is higher than in any of the classical immigration countries (USA, Canada, Australia) (FOM 2007, 7).

The proportion of foreigners as compared to other receiving countries is not only a reflection of the absolute number of immigrants, but also of a low naturalization rate (1.4% in 1998). In fact, as of 2006 half of the 1.5 million foreigners living in Switzerland were either born and raised in the country or have lived there for more than fifteen years (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006, 2). This demonstrates the rigidity of the distinction that is maintained between Swiss and non-Swiss.

Widely utilized by the right-wing populists as a political tool, immigration has been the subject of heated discussions for many decades, in which the foreigner percentage has been deployed as an important “political-symbolic” figure (Münz and Ulrich 2003, 10). Even if integration has been assessed as largely successful in Switzerland, the persistence of an underlying xenophobic discourse since the late 19th century, even in times when foreigner numbers were low, is undeniable (FOM 2006, 4). Traces of this discourse can be seen in the selection of titles of federal popular initiatives, including initiatives "Against Überfremdung (1970), "Against Überfremdung and Overpopulation of Switzerland" (1974), "Against the Sellout of our Home", “Against the Mass Immigration of Foreigners and Asylum Seekers" (1991), etc. (Münz and Ulrich 2003, 11).8

The negative impact of this discourse on its targets can be and has been substantial. This negative impact, however, is not equally strong for all foreigner groups, as certain groups may be perceived as more or less foreign. For example, between 1940 and 1945 at least twenty-four thousand Jews were refused entry at the Swiss border (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006, 4). A number of these likely ended up in German concentration camps. During the same period of time, however, Switzerland continued to admit other foreign groups as refugees, including ten thousand Polish soldiers who had fought alongside of the French army (Koller 1996).

The case studies presented in Chapters Two and Three examine the discursive environment in which the Hungarian and Yugoslavian refugee groups arrived in Switzerland. This discursive environment is reconstructed with the help of official documents of the state, official legislation, political speeches and other forms of administrative documentation, and Swiss literature about these historic periods. The goal of these examinations is to reveal the unique characteristics of the foreign subject

8 The 1991 Initiative Against the Mass Immigration of Foreigners and Asylum Seekers failed at the signature collection stage (Münz and Ulrich 2003, 11)
produced through the discourses and reflecting the specific concerns of the nation-state. Criteria for membership in the Swiss state are unstable and contingent. A sound categorization scheme which defines lines of differentiation, can help to sustain the power of the state in a hostile environment.

The case studies focus on two “crisis moments” in Swiss history. The first case study examines the motives behind the Swiss government’s decision to grant permanent entry to a total of fourteen thousand Hungarian refugees between November 3, 1956 and January 22, 1957 (Stäheli 2006, 70). The second case study examines the implementation of temporary asylum and country-specific programs of Assisted Voluntary Return in Switzerland in response to the surge of Bosnian asylum applications that lasted from 1992 and 1996. Though each case study centers around one specific “crisis moment”, the general legal and institutional frameworks that existed before, during and after the crisis period to regulate integration are also considered. The studies follow the development of integration from a set of spontaneous practices in the mid 1950s to a formal apparatus managed by the state fifty years later.

As shown in Chapter Two, the granting of collective permanent asylum to the Hungarian refugees shows an intention to incorporate the foreigners from the beginning. In the Cold War environment, in the aftermath of the Second World War asylum policy failures and in the dynamic labor market conditions, the Hungarian refugee was cast by state and popular discourses as a positive addition to the Swiss population. Integration, though not formally conceived as such, was a national project. This is shown by the range of programs developed to help the newly arrived find jobs, housing and scholarships for university and vocational training. Indeed, over the course of the last fifty years many of the 12,500 refugees from Hungary and their descendants remain in Switzerland (Stäheli 2006, 2). A number of these have become naturalized (Stäheli 2006, 93).

In stark contrast to the 1950s, between 1990 and 2002 asylum was tied to exceptional need (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006, 12). Sixty-two thousand applicants for asylum from the Balkan Peninsula received only temporary or subsidiary protection (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006, 12). For these refugees integration was made a personal responsibility, not a national project. By the 1990s rising numbers of applications for asylum and changing demographics of asylum seekers as well as the absence of a clear political enemy, asylum had changed the functional role of asylum for the bio-political state. Asylum, it was feared, had become a new uncontrolled route into Swiss society. In
response, asylum institutions were transformed into enforcement organs of the state, in charge of deporting illegal migrants, facilitating voluntary returns and counseling refugees on reintegration into their native societies.

Though widely unacknowledged, migration has played a significant role in Switzerland’s history and identity for many centuries. Historically, foreigners have settled in Switzerland for ideological, political, economic and/or purely personal reasons (Pintér 1969, 5). Switzerland’s reputation as an island of peace and nation of domestic stability and prosperity as well as its geographical location in the heart of Europe and at the crossroads of important transport axes explains the historic role as refuge for many types of migrants (Pintér 1969, 5). German sociologist Richard Fritz Behrendt (1908-1973) referred to Switzerland in 1963 as “the most important immigration country in Europe” (quoted in Pintér 1969, 6). Despite its history, however, Switzerland remains reluctant to see itself as an immigration society.

Until the 19th century, Switzerland, a poor country lacking agricultural and mineral resources was mainly a nation of emigration (Vuilleumier 2007, 192-3; Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006, 5). Russia, North and South America as well as the neighboring countries of Italy, France and Germany attracted and became home to thousands of Swiss emigrants, mainly poor farmers and families of lower social classes. Place names, such as New Glarus in Wisconsin or Nova Friburgo in Brazil are evidence for the settlement of Swiss emigrants throughout the Americas (Vuilleumier 2007, 192). Until 1859, mercenaries also contributed significantly to emigration (Hoffman-Nowotny 2001, 11-12).

Around the first half of the 19th century two early waves of migration to Switzerland can be identified, the first comprising mainly German intellectuals, and the second workers from neighboring countries (Hoffman-Nowotny 2001, 14; Vuilleumier 2007, 194-95). In terms of numbers of immigrants these waves were relatively insignificant. In 1850 seventy-two thousand foreign residents, barely three percent of the general population, were recorded. By 1914 the percentage had risen to fifteen percent of the total population (Hoffmann-Nowotny 2001, 14). In 1888 a census recorded for the first time a higher number of migrants settling in than emigrating from Switzerland. With the exception of the period between the two world wars, the positive migration balance has been maintained since 1888 (Vuilleumier 2007, 195).

Even before the wars the main factor attracting migrants, most of whom arrived from neighboring Italy, France, Germany and Austria-Hungary, was the growing economy. The manual laborers, artisans and agricultural workers, who arrived early on,
were later replaced by factory workers, university students and intellectuals. Due to the existence of Swiss populations culturally and linguistically related to them (in the German, French and Italian speaking regions of Switzerland), these early migrants generally integrated into Swiss society with ease (Vuilleumier 2007, 198). Despite the overall peaceful integration, however, hostility against foreigners intermittently manifested itself. In July of 1896, for example, riots broke out in the city of Zurich, during which Italian cafes and restaurants were looted and Italians persecuted. Interestingly, German immigrants, not local Swiss, were among the instigators of these riots (Vuilleumier 2007, 198).

Switzerland’s neutrality during the two World Wars has been widely discussed and criticized. With regard to foreigners with an interest to settle permanently or temporarily in Switzerland, public attitudes and official response and policy were strongly divided. While immigration laws became more restrictive, temporary asylum was refused to very few refugees. Approximately seven hundred thousand people were granted temporary asylum during the First World War period (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006, 7). A number of Russian political refugees, who had settled in neighboring Germany and Austria-Hungary before the outbreak of World War I, were permitted to relocate to Switzerland to escape the political insecurity in their previous place of exile. Also, a policy initiated by the Red Cross, founded in 1863 by Swiss philanthropist Henri Dunant to take in wounded and sick prisoners of war from both sides, resulted in tens of thousands being treated in hotels of empty tourist resorts. At the same time, however, many deserting soldiers and other individuals were turned back at the border (Vuilleumier 2007, 199; Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006, 7; Aeschbach 1994, 221).

The General Strike of 1918, a response to economic depression, price increases, low wages and increasingly felt social differences, provoked for the first time widespread expressions of xenophobia and gave birth to the image of the foreigner as a threat to national order and national identity - an image resurrected again and again in political discourses over the last decades. The political elite, farmers, and urban individuals considered the unrest created by the General Strike to be a manifestation of weakened social and political order resulting from recent social changes. Their negative attitudes were directed not only at labor unions and socialists, but also at foreigners who were accused of infecting Swiss workers with their immoral behavior (Vuilleumier 2007, 199).

As a result of increasing notions of Überfremdung – a term referring to the threat
posed by excessive numbers of foreigners (literally translated: over-foreignization) - the liberal immigration policies of the end of the nineteenth century were abandoned. As Riaño and Wastl-Walter write, “from then on, the notion of foreigners, rather than that of immigrant was to prevail” (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006, 6, emphasis added) Between the wars domestic population controls restricting equally the mobility of both foreign and native residents between administrative districts (cantons), were replaced by entry restrictions to the country. The 1931 Federal Law on the Residence and Settlement of Foreigners (Foreign Nationals Act) constituted an attempt of the Swiss federal government to reduce the country’s appeal to refugees (Independent Commission of Experts 2002, 71). Paradoxically, the peak of Überfremdung occurred during a period when the foreign resident population was declining drastically. The percentage of foreigners in the total population fell from 15% in 1910 to 9% in 1930. By the end of the Second World War, the percentage had reached a century low of just over 5% (Independent Commission of Experts 2002, 71). Additionally, two thirds of foreigners living in Switzerland at the end of the 1920s had been living there for twenty years or more and were accordingly well integrated (Vuilleumier 2007, 199).

During the Second World War Überfremdung and anti-Semitic reactions in the population mixed with public demonstrations of solidarity with the refugees (Efionayi-Mäder 2003, 3). At least 65,000 foreigners received some type of permit during this period (Imboden and Lustenberger 1994, 282). However, as during the previous war, many foreigners applying for asylum were rejected. Estimates place these figures at around 20,000 foreign applicants (Independent Commission of Experts 2002, 118). A large majority of those rejected and receiving not even temporary asylum were Jewish (Ibid.). As concluded in the “Bergier Report”, the result of an investigation mandated by the Swiss government and written by a commission made up of Polish, American, Israeli and Swiss historians, Switzerland’s cooperation with some Nazi German policies can no longer be denied. Three points mentioned in the report are of particular interest to the topic of immigration.

First, the federal police and justice department acted according to the view that Jews fleeing from Germany were not political refugees (Pintér 1969, 7). This understanding developed in response to a new federal law passed in 1933 distinguishing between political and other refugees. In effect, according to the Federal Department of Justice and Police’s interpretation of the law, only “high state officials, leaders of left-wing parties and well-known authors” could be considered political refugees. All others
were subject to the 1931 Foreign Nationals Act, which regulated the rights of migrants in general (Independent Commission of Experts 2002, 107).

Second, anticipating high numbers of foreigners after the annexation of Austria, Switzerland and other European countries tried to find a way to keep refugee numbers under control. However, economic and political interests kept Switzerland from a complete closing of its borders to Germany. In 1938 Switzerland agreed to abandon the implementation of a policy that would have required visas for German citizens traveling across the border. Instead, it chose to focus its control measures on refugees only and agreed to comply with Germany’s policy of marking the passports of Non-Aryan Germans. The introduction of the “J” stamp for Jewish German passport holders led to border patrols turning back thousands of Jews fleeing the Nazi regime. Furthermore, with this stamp, the capacity of Jews to travel to third countries was severely limited (Independent Commission of Experts 2002, 108-9).

Third, in August 1942 Switzerland closed its borders to asylum seekers claiming refugee status on “racial grounds”. This created another legal obstacle for Jews seeking to flee Germany. As Swiss Federal Councillor von Steiger described the situation in 1942 prior to the implementation of this policy:

> A commander of a small, already crowded life-boat with limited capacity and equally limited supplies must appear cruel if, as thousands of shipwreck victims cry for help, he cannot let everyone on board. And yet it is humane if he warns against false hopes early enough and seeks to save at least those already accepted (quoted in Kreis 2002, 41).

This metaphor of the “full lifeboat” and reference to “limited supplies” would be deployed again and again in later years.

During and between the world wars, Switzerland saw itself as a transit nation and placed high priority on organizing the return of immigrants to their home country once conditions returned to normalcy. If this was impossible, efforts were made to pass immigrants on to host countries overseas. In order to keep unemployment at a minimum cantons began to limit numbers of residence and labor permits granted.⁹ A policy for permanent asylum did not establish itself until 1947. Among the first able to benefit from the new policy and the post-war humanitarian mentality were the Hungarians.

The early postwar period introduced a new form of migration politics to

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⁹ Reflecting the country’s strong federalist tradition, cantons were the administrative bodies responsible for population matters in Switzerland. They possessed considerable freedom with respect to how federal policy was implemented.
Switzerland. Given the largely intact economy of the small country in the midst of an economically shattered Europe, migration politics became an instrument to supply the ever-increasing demand for labor. Employment opportunities and high wages immediately attracted the first postwar labor migrants, who arrived from 1945 to 1948 mostly from Italy (Vuilleumier 2007, 200). For the purpose of cost efficiency and of slowing down wage growth, Swiss employers actively recruited foreign workers. Neighboring countries, such as Italy, were keen to support emigration to Switzerland as a means to reduce social and political tensions and costs at home. The Swiss state, eager to fill vacancies in the labor market, responded by making available high numbers of temporary permits for one season or year (Vuilleumier 2007, 200). During this period the federal state did not intervene in the recruitment of foreign labor and almost all foreigners with valid employment contracts received residency permits (Afonso 2005, 660). The proportion of foreigners in the resident population rose accordingly, beginning at its postwar low of 6% in 1950, and climbing to 10.8% a decade later (Banki and Späti 1994, 372).

In the two decades following the Second World War migration policy evolved into a regulatory mechanism balancing the industry demand, employment figures and “foreign surplus population” by means of a new quota system for labor and residence permits (Banki and Späti 1994, 373; Gross 2006, 6). The foreign population was seen as a variable that could be adjusted. Foreign laborers could be as easily and quickly disposed of as they could be acquired. Permits were granted and renewed in good times, and applications for new permits and renewals were rejected in poor economic times. This policy permitted the so-called “export of unemployment” (Afonso 2005, 654). In 1974, for instance, as a result of the oil crisis, the issuance of permits was frozen (Vuilleumier 2007, 201).

The permit system not only placed restrictions on entry to the country, but also placed limits on geographic, social and professional mobility. Relocation between cantons and change of employment were prohibited prior to consultation with the local offices (Afonso 2005, 657-58). Moreover, temporary permits prevented the development of identity ties to the host nation. For permit-holders residing in Switzerland for a period of a few months to maximally a few years, Switzerland possessed little meaning and significance beyond its role as place of employment (Hoffman-Nowotny 2001, 24). There was neither a basis upon which nor a reason to identify with the nation. As intended, the system succeeded in producing a transitory form of migration and maintaining optimal
numbers of transient migrants. Strict regulations on family reunification and other benefits varied in terms of migrants’ origin and economic and social conditions. This proved to be an effective instrument to fine-tune migration to domestic needs and adapt it to external pressures. As a result of bilateral agreements structural hierarchies began to develop within the immigrant population. In 1964, in response to demands from Italy, a new bilateral contract was signed which reduced restrictions with respect to family reunification and permit changes (Afonso 2005, 658). With time these benefits were granted to other western and central European sending countries as well (Vuilleumier 2007, 201; Afonso 2005, 659).

Aside from labor migration, the first twenty years following the end of the war were also characterized by a significant influx of asylum seekers. During the 1950s and 1960s Switzerland granted collective asylum to three groups of refugees from the communist world. The first group was composed of between 13,000 and 14,000 refugees from Hungary who fled their country following the failed revolution in 1956 (Lanz 1996, 3). The second group, the first non-European refugees admitted by Switzerland, comprised around 1,200 Tibetans, who arrived in Switzerland following the national uprising in Lhasa in 1959 (Oester 1985, 59; Banki and Späti 1994, 382-86). In 1968, following the Soviet and Warsaw pact member troops’ invasion of Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague Spring reform movement, more than 200,000 Czechs fled their home country. Between 12,000 and 14,000 were given asylum in Switzerland (Vuilleumier 2007, 203; Banki and Späti 1994, 390).

The Swiss asylum practice and openness of the Swiss people toward these three groups was exceptional (Banki and Späti 1994, 369). In contrast to the refugee waves of World War II and of the late 1990s, the Hungarian, Czech, and Tibetan refugee waves were not conceived of as mass migrations. These waves were sparked by concrete political crises and were concentrated to limited time periods (Banki and Späti 1994, 406). The reasons for this extraordinary response toward the Cold War migrants are explored in depth in the following chapter.

Though the rotation system worked efficiently throughout the 1960s, negative attitudes toward foreigners began to reappear in the mid 1960s. Two events in particular changed the economic and social context of migration to Switzerland during the mid to late 1960s. The integration of Europe, which began with the formation of the European Economic Community in 1957, began to take on a more concrete shape as legal rulings
helped to implement and realize provisions related to the free movement of workers among European Community countries, to which most of Switzerland’s neighbors belonged. As legal obstacles to entry, work and residence in Germany disappeared, and as the German economy began to take off, the appeal of Switzerland’s labor market among Italian workers decreased abruptly (Banki and Späti 1994, 373). In response to such external pressures Switzerland drew up agreements with the most important sending country, Italy, to guarantee Italian immigrants special benefits with regards to pension and social security and family reunification (Vuilleumier 2007, 201-2).

In order to offset the losses in Italian, German and French laborers Switzerland was forced to look beyond its immediate neighbors to recruit the labor necessary for maintaining the functionality and competitiveness of its large economy. As neighboring countries began to recover, Switzerland’s exclusive appeal to immigrant laborers could no longer be taken for granted. Thus Switzerland widened its recruiting scope to include new countries like Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey (Vuilleumier 2007, 20; Hoffmann-Nowotny 2001, 15).

As a result of new demands articulated by migrant sending countries as well as the new competition, the Swiss public authorities realized that migration policy reforms were needed to attract workers. The rotation system was gradually replaced by a new “integration system” (Vuilleumier 2007, 202). Foreigners, it was said, would have to be encouraged and enabled to integrate and establish themselves if society was to be kept intact. Increasingly, permits were issued which granted workers the right to work and live in Switzerland for several years. In some circumstances, even permanent residence was granted and the option of naturalization became increasingly discussed (Vuilleumier 2007, 202). Furthermore, important reforms in the area of family reunification took place. As women and children from abroad joined their family members in Switzerland, the foreign population increased dramatically. From 1969 to 1974 the number of C-permits (permanent residence) doubled (Vuilleumier 2007, 202). In this new environment the notion of transient foreigners could no longer be sustained. Despite this change in the general administrative discourse, certain groups intensified their efforts to resurrect the Überfremdung discourse and pushed for stricter regulations and controls. It was in this period that the “Schwarzenbach Initiative”, discussed shortly, was born.

Despite higher controls on first entry, family reunification considerably impacted the face of the migrant population in Switzerland. Not only did the effective number of foreigners increase, but the characteristics of the foreign population in terms of origin,
proportion of employed, length of stay, etc., changed dramatically as well. The demographic changes had numerous political, legal and social consequences in the 1970s. For the first time the population growth exceeded economic productivity growth. Increasing numbers of non-working foreigners placed a growing demand on housing and social institutions without immediately and visibly contributing to the population (Banki and Späti 1994, 373).

Already since 1963 the Swiss public authorities had become concerned with stabilizing, and later with reducing, the foreign population. Swiss firms found themselves faced with limitations on growth of foreign staff (Bankli and Späti 1994, 373). Later on, the government placed a general freeze on the hiring of foreign staff and even required Swiss businesses to reduce their foreign personnel. In 1970 a countrywide annual limit on permits granted was put in place. Despite these measures, however, and most significantly due to family reunification, the foreign population continued its steady growth until the oil crisis of 1974 (Banki and Späti 1994, 373). As a result of the availability of foreign workers in the industrial sector, significant shifts in the Swiss labor force took place. Swiss industrial workers, who remained in low-skilled professions, felt isolated and alienated, as they found themselves surrounded by foreign co-workers with whom they could not communicate. Additionally, these less advantaged Swiss found themselves directly impacted by housing, hospital and school shortages. It was among these circles that the fear of Überfremdung was most intensely felt (Banki and Späti 1994, 374).

First protests from these circles against the liberal migration policies became heard in 1960. Increasingly, popular initiatives for constitutional amendments proposing ceilings on numbers of foreigners were submitted. In 1970 the Swiss voting population turned out in record numbers to vote on the “Schwarzenbach Initiative”, which proposed to place a ceiling on the foreigner population to maximally 10% of the population of each canton. The initiative failed with a slight majority (54%) voting against it. Nonetheless, the unusually high turnout of just under 75% demonstrated the political weight of the issue at the time. Similar initiatives proposed in later years were rejected with larger majorities (Banki and Späti 1994, 374).

After the recession years from 1975 to 1978 and in 1983, the foreign population decreased, only to begin a steep rise again in the early 1990s. By 2003 the percentage of foreigners in relation to the overall population reached the 20% mark (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2009). Since the implementation of an agreement on the free
movement of persons with the EU/EFTA states in 2002, the number of foreign residents has grown to over 22%. In January 2008, a new federal law on foreigners went into effect, which replaces the 1931 law. Among other provisions, the 2008 law includes an explicit provision to advance the integration of foreigners. Coupled with EU/EFTA bilateral agreements, the current legal framework also creates a hierarchy between European and non-European foreigners, which is discussed in depth in Chapter Three.

In 1991 requests for asylum reached a peak of 41,500. Between 1990 and 2002, 146,500 applications were submitted by refugees from the war-torn Balkan states (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006, 12). In response, a completely revised asylum law came into force in 1999. This new legislation has been intensely criticized in foreign media and by international organizations for its restrictiveness and for its emphasis on abuse of asylum rights and efficiency rather than on the protection of refugees (UNHCR 2004). Recent policy developments are linked to the success of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), which has advanced a view of asylum seekers as “criminals and drug dealers”. Campaigning in part on its tough stance against the abuse of asylum benefits and against asylum seekers, who engage in criminal activity, the party won the biggest share of the parliamentary votes in an extraordinary 2003 general election (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006, 12). Following this victory, then leader of the SVP, Christoph Blocher, became Minister of Justice and Police, the office responsible for migration and asylum policy.

Review of Literature and Theory

Considering that migration is as old as mankind, migration theory is a relatively new field. The field of migration research is characterized by a collection of causal explanations for the question why people move where they move, and a disagreement over the appropriate level of analysis. With respect to causal explanations, migration theories may be categorized as structural and functional (Goss and Lindquist 1995). Structural theories tend to utilize a macroeconomic and macro-social view and generally suggest that migration is a consequence of “social and spatial structures, which produce necessary conditions for labor migration” (Goss and Lindquist 1995, 322). Thus

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10 The main points of concern include the requirement of valid identification documents for all asylum applications and the commitment to cooperate with countries of origin and third countries (i.e. data sharing)

11 British geographer E.G. Ravenstein is commonly cited as the earliest scholar of migration. His study presented to the Statistical Society of London was conducted in response to a remark by statistician William Farr (1807-1883) that “migration appeared to go on without any definite law” (Ravenstein 1885, 167)
differences across countries and regions in terms of wages, employment opportunities and physical security create certain currents of movement and streams of migration, into which individual migrants are drawn. Functional approaches explain migration on a microeconomic and psychological level and claim that migration is the result of rational evaluations of cost and return of migration decisions. Migration theories can also be classified as economic or political, depending upon the emphasis placed on market and economic factors versus political factors in driving population flows, including domestic foreigner policies and multilateral or supranational regulation systems.

Early migration theory, or classical migration theory evolved as a result of the availability of increasingly sophisticated aggregate data for predicting migration flows. Early migration models applied mechanical and physical models and laws to the migration process, making reference to concepts such as gravity (Zipf 1946) and equilibrium (Lewis 1954), to explain direction, size, and duration of migration flows. Basic models of neoclassical economic theory (see for example Ranis and Fey 1961, Harris and Todaro 1970 and Todaro 1969) portray migration as a process of economic development (Massey et al. 1994, 433). According to these models, migration is caused by and functions as an equilibrating mechanism between rural and urban wage differences. This theory suggests that governments can control migration by regulating labor markets in sending and receiving countries (Massey et al. 1994, 434). Dual labor market theory suggests that migrants are driven to industrialized labor markets because of the availability of jobs in the secondary sector (e.g. manufacturing). This theory was advanced by M. J. Priore (1979) and has been drawn on particularly to explain post-war migration in Europe (see for example Hoffman-Nowotny 1981; 2001).

With time neoclassical theory abandoned the exclusively macro-level perspective and began to discover micro-level landscapes of push and pull factors (see for example, Sjaastad 1962; Fischer et al.1997, Borjas 1990). Microeconomic theories claim that migration results from evaluations of investment and risk associated with various migration-related factors such as cost of traveling, probability of finding employment, risk of deportation, effort of learning a new language and culture, psychological costs of leaving old social networks, etc. Though migration is commonly seen a rational choice, the final rationality of the decision to migrate is challenged by some theories. Rationality, behavioralist theorists claim, is limited by an individual’s subjective evaluation of reality and by momentary standards (see for example, Wolpert 1965; De Jong and Fawcett 1981). The knowledge upon which a potential migrant bases his or her cost-benefit
calculations does not always correspond to perfect information standards, but is a reflection of an individual’s personal characteristics, life-stage, and variability of the environment. Some strains of conventional migration theory see migration as a consequence not only of dual national economies, but also as a consequence of a bifurcation of the world economic system into a developed (core) and a developing (peripheral) world. Rooted in the ideas of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) these theories consider specific structural consequences of colonialism and of capitalist expansion as responsible for dislocating and disrupting populations in developing countries.

Since the 1980s a movement has emerged, whose goal has been to reconcile the differences between structural and functional approaches and to develop an integrative view on migration (Goss and Lindquist 1995, 325-26). The New Economy of Labor Migration theory (NELM) has made significant contributions to post-war migration study.\footnote{This theory was developed by Oded Stark in the 1980s in cooperation with David Blom, Eliakim Katz, David Levhari, Robert Lucas, Mark Rosenzweig and J. Edwad Taylor (Hagen-Zanker 2008, 12)} This theory suggests that migration decisions are made not by individuals, but by households and families (Massey et al. 1994, 436). NELM holds that migration provides groups a means to overcome economic risks at home (e.g. harvest failure, crop price fluctuations, unemployment or disability) by diversifying their income to include economic activity abroad. Groups provide each other mutual support, when risks and costs are high and share income (through remittances or savings abroad), when returns increase.

The study of the transformation of migration over time has also produced useful theories. As Massey et al. argue, the factors responsible for causing migration are very different from factors, which perpetuate migration (Massey et al. 1994, 448). As more and more people follow similar migration paths and social relations and social capital are built up, migration becomes self-sustaining, less costly and less risky. Goss and Lindquist (1995) have further developed the concept of migrant network. Migrant networks and migration institutions, within which migrants live, make decisions and derive resources, play a significant role in shaping migration. It is in these institutions (e.g. people smuggler networks, recruiting agencies, humanitarian organizations, NGOS, etc.) that rules are articulated and constraints and opportunities to individual action are impacted (Goss and Lindquist 1995).

As newer migration literature points out, population flows across borders may be primarily impacted by political forces (Castles 2004, 854). Regardless of the market
pressures leading to one form of migration or another, “border control usually intervenes as a determinative factor” (Zolberg 1989, 405-6). Political conditions, legislation and processes within these nation states produce frameworks, which enable movement across certain paths and inhibit flows across other paths. Various methods for controlling migration have been studied such as individual national entry, naturalization and labor policies as well as multilateral or supranational regulation systems like the Schengen Agreement and the Amsterdam Treaty 1997 (see for example Hollifield 2004; Freeman 2004; Castles 2004).  

The Migration Theory Gap

The perception of migration as a threat to national identity and national security, as advanced by anti-immigration campaigns, is mirrored by claims in scientific literature that migration represents a challenge to state sovereignty (Kofman 2005, 460). Sovereignty requires a degree of territorial closure, which is no longer provided in a world of porous borders (Hollifield 2004, 887). “Borders are sacrosanct and they represent a fundamental organizational feature of the international system” (Andreas and Snyder, 2000 quoted in Hollifield 2004, 887). How then can state sovereignty be preserved if this organizational structure is being undermined?

A useful analysis of migration threat and perceived crisis of integration requires that precisely these basic elements of the international system be analyzed. Migration must be examined as part of a wider framework of population movement than in the limited context of national boundaries, state controls and citizenship. Additionally, since the process of migration does not take place at the border only, the focus of migration studies should include membership decision-making and integration measures as well.

Indeed, recent migration literature shows evidence of attempts to reconceptualize the framework of migration studies (see for example Castles 2004; Hollifield 2004; Sciortino 2000), “If we possess a conceptual framework, which helps us to understand the basic dynamics of contemporary international migrations, then it becomes easier to understand why certain policy approaches have failed” (Castles 2004, 870). Transnationalism, for example, a condition in which migrants sustain a presence in two

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13 The Schengen Agreement, implemented across Europe in 1995 and expanded to include Switzerland in 2008, provides for free movement of people across borders within the Schengen territory by means of an elimination of border checks and the requirement of a common visa. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 provides for a common asylum policy for all signatory states.
societies and cultures, is a new concept developed as part of the search for less rigid citizenship categories (Portes 2003, 834).

Despite this activity, the international scientific community has produced scant migration theory that critically analyses the basic elements of the international system and their role in developing integration policies. The structural framework provided by state, government and sovereignty is taken for granted, and its elements are treated as solid concepts, which possess natural legitimacy. This is not surprising, as the gatekeeper function of the state depends on clearly definable national bodies and populations. Joppke and Morawska observe that integration “assumes a society composed of domestic individuals and groups (as the antipode to ‘immigrants’) which are integrated normatively by a consensus and organizationally by a state” (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 3). The ability to define and delimit the national unit, however, becomes problematic when numbers of foreigners increase, when membership is not clearly with one nation or the other, and when citizenship in one state does not exclude the possibility of membership – even of citizenship - in another state.

As suggested in the theoretical overview, migration does not end with the entry into the receiving country. Unfortunately, the pre- and post-arrival phases of migration from the viewpoint of the receiving country seem to attract little scientific attention within the field of migration studies, even though interaction between migrants and nation during this phase is decisive for shaping legal and institutional frameworks, which will deal with future migration. Race and ethnic relations are studied in a field separate from migration policy. There is lack of clarity, coherence and effectiveness in the realm of integration programs among state governments (Freeman 2004, 945-46). This policy failure may be a function of the failure to connect the race and ethnic relations questions with population control practices in migration theory. In order to understand the immigration problem, which may be, as the thesis would like to suggest, a problem of the state and not a problem of the immigrant, it is necessary to probe precisely the above concepts of state, nation and sovereignty, instead of bracketing them. A close look at the management of integration process, or rather at integration decisions, may reveal a state in the attempt to shore up sovereignty.

Despite the attention given to the “foreigner problem” and “overforeignization”, or Überfremdung in political rhetoric, research on the impact of migration on societies and nation-states is limited. World systems and dependency theory is commonly considered to have a critical background. Yet, even these approaches are reluctant to venture beyond the framework of nation-states and national economies. The basic elements of
modern human society, i.e. the substance of nation, ethnicity and boundaries, remain largely untouched. This knowledge gap is not only of importance at an abstract theoretical level. The lack of theoretical knowledge on the problem limits the range of solutions available for responding to changes in migrant numbers and backgrounds. Solutions and institutions are designed only around a certain immigrant subject (Lakoff and Fergusson 2006). This thesis attempts to remedy the gap by employing critical theories to analyze processes of subject-making and the utility of these subjects to the bio-political state.

Because Switzerland is generally not considered a nation of immigrants, specific research on migration to Switzerland is limited. Current Swiss migration research focuses mainly on developments and reform in immigration and asylum policy as well as on the deployment of the “immigration problem” in domestic political debates (see for example Giugni and Passy 2006). Other research acknowledges structural constraints of policy formation and migrants’ opportunities (Afonso 2005).

The topics of migration and foreigners have been omnipresent in Swiss domestic politics for decades. Though informed political decision-making would depend on them, there is a considerable lack of objective studies on migration in Switzerland (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006, 2). Significant differences exist between immigrant groups in Switzerland with respect to degree of acceptance. These differences are the root of social tensions, yet research on the stratification of migrant groups is limited.14 Few comparative studies have been conducted on immigrant groups in Switzerland, which could provide the basis for developing a theoretical framework to explain differentiation.15

14 Eleonore Kofman argues that the classification, selection and stratification of foreigners (including labor migration, asylum and family reunification) in receiving states has emerged as a way to resolve the contradiction between universal principles of human rights and national interests (Kofman 2005, 457).
15 For an exception see Christopher McDowell’s (1996) case study of Sri Lankan asylum seekers in Switzerland (1996)
CHAPTER TWO

THE HUNGARIAN REFUGEES (1956 – 1958)

“It is with dismay that the Federal Council observes the events that are taking place in Hungary. The Federal Council is at one with the Swiss People in expressing its sorrow at the repression of independence, freedom and sovereignty of our Hungarian friends”

Official communiqué released on the evening of November 4, 1957

Historical Context

Revolution in Hungary 1956

The Hungarian refugee wave of the 1950s was limited to a fairly short time span of approximately six months. The refugee movement can be traced back to a clear and concrete event in Hungarian history, the 1956 Revolution. The international community, composed of western states, reacted immediately to calls for help from the neighboring countries of Austria and Yugoslavia, to which nearly two hundred thousand Hungarian people fled during this six-month period.

Toward the end of the Second World War Soviet forces sought and eventually obtained control of Hungary. In 1945 Hungary was occupied by the Soviet Red Army and was thereby placed under the authority of the Soviet Union. Hungary and the USSR entered into a pact of allegiance in 1948 and one year later the communist party took over the government of Hungary, led by dedicated pupil of Stalin, Mátyás Rákosi. On August 20, 1949 the People’s Democracy was proclaimed.

Under Rákosi, Hungary was ruled by an authoritarian Stalinist regime. The peak of the Rákosi era, lasting from 1949 to Stalin’s death in 1953 was characterized by continuous purges, show trials, personality cult, and mass parades. Collectivization, forced industrialization and Russification programs were implemented. The police terror used to implement the objectives of the party affected about one-tenth of the national population (Litván 1996, 19). The primary victims were peasants and workers. Nonetheless, the urban middle class suffered from resettlement, deportation and
internment (Litván 1996, 18-19; Alföldy 1997, 17). The severe Stalinization program imposed on the Hungarian people resulted in decreased productivity, social and political tensions and strikes (Litván 1996, 20). In 1955, two and a half years after Stalin’s death, first protests initiated by authors and intellectuals against the dictatorial regime began to be heard in Hungary. Inspired by this movement, a number of clubs were founded or reestablished, including the Petőfi-Club and the League of Hungarian University Students (MEFESZ) which served as important ideological sources for the revolution (Alföldy 1997, 20; Litván 1996, 52).

Further encouraged by news of apparently successful reforms in Poland in October 1956, student protests and demonstrations of solidarity to the new Polish Gomułka government intensified (Litván 1996, 51). On October 22 a gathering of several thousand students formed at the Technical University (Banki and Späti 1994, 375). During the course of the day, students compiled a list of sixteen demands which addressed on the one hand, educational and communist party concerns including independence and autonomy of the universities, and the abolition of compulsory education in Russian and Marxism-Leninism, and on the other hand, resolute democratic and nationalistic demands (Litván 1996, 53; Alföldy 1997, 9, Renschler 2006, 50). The latter included previously unheard of demands such as the retreat of all Soviet troops from Hungarian territory, the institution of a new government by reformist and former prime minister Imre Nagy, the introduction of free elections and a multiparty system, the advancement of individual freedom, and improvement of conditions for farmers and workers. After their efforts to broadcast their message by radio had failed, the Technical University and Budapest University students called for demonstrations (Litván 1996, 53; Alföldy 1997, 11).

The October 23 demonstrations were the first spontaneous mass demonstrations Hungary had seen in nearly a decade (Litván 1996, 54). As numbers of demonstrators grew to several tens of thousand and Stalin monuments were toppled, the authorities realized that they might lose control over the situation and used emergency prohibitions to break up the crowds (Litván 1996, 55). Imre Nagy, partly friendly to the idea of a return to power, but nervous about the reactions of the Party members, urged crowds to go home (Litván 1996, 57) – to no avail. Armed demonstrators stormed the radio station building, first gunfire was exchanged and the situation quickly deteriorated (Litván 1996, 58; Alföly 1997, 12).

Later that evening the Communist party leadership agreed to install Imre Nagy as
prime minister, in the hopes that the revolutionaries would see their main demand fulfilled (Litván 1996, 59). In addition, requests for Soviet military support were answered by an initially reluctant Khrushchev, who recognized that internal divisions within the Hungarian political leadership might have weakened the party-loyalty of the Hungarian People’s Army (Litván 1996, 63). The political changes and the anticipated arrival of the Soviet troops were announced on the radio on the morning of October 24 (Litván 1996, 59). However, the public, confident in the effectiveness of their resistance, responded with mass strikes and assemblies.

Soviet units arrived during the early morning of October 24. Initially they did not attack the civilians. Small groups of armed revolutionaries, in total around ten to fifteen thousand who had established bases throughout the city, tried fearlessly to stop the Soviet tanks and soldiers with Molotov cocktails and handguns. Several attempts by Nagy to calm the fighters by means of compromise offers had no effect (Litván 1996, 63-4).

On October 25, a peaceful demonstration in front of the parliament building was violently broken up by Soviet soldiers who fired onto the crowds from a number of surrounding rooftops (Litván 1996, 69). More than one hundred people died and were wounded in this incident alone. Across Hungary in towns such as Gyor, Miskolc, Zlaegerszeg and Esztergom similar events took place. Even airplanes of the Hungarian army were utilized to fire at demonstrators (Litván 1996, 70).

Nagy, who continued to search for a solution which would appease the people without provoking the wrath of the Soviets, proposed a ceasefire on October 28. In addition, he urged Soviet troops to return to their bases and the security forces to withdraw from the streets (Litván 1996, 72). In his radio announcement to the people that day he referred to the recent events as “a wide democratic movement”. The partly reshuffled government and liberalization of the press signaled that some changes in line with the early revolutionary demands had been achieved. Nagy publicly presented himself as willing to advance the democratic movement further. However, the changes of October 28 did not fully satisfy the revolutionaries, whose original demands had evolved into nationalistic demands (Litván 1996, 60). Final steps taken by Nagy, including the firm order that Soviet troops be removed immediately, a declaration of Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and a declaration of neutrality, finally persuaded the remaining fighters to put down their arms. During these days of freedom and political optimism, however, a new counter-government was being formed under the leadership
of Soviet-backed Janos Kádár (Litván 1996, 80-1).

During the night of November 3, sixteen Soviet divisions launched an attack on Budapest. Nagy immediately fled to the Yugoslavian Embassy, but was later arrested and sentenced to death. Unprepared to defend themselves against the powerful Soviet army, the Hungarian troops were quickly disarmed (Litván 1996, 101). The insurrectionist groups, acting mostly on their own with little mutual consultation, re-embarked on the struggle (Litván 1996, 65 and 101).

According to recently declassified Soviet documents 669 Soviet troops were reported dead, 1,450 wounded and 51 missing as a result of this second intervention (Litván 1996, 103). Official and unofficial counts of Hungarian losses between October 23 and November 11 range widely, estimating between 2,652 and at least 2,700 dead and between 20,000 and 270,000 injured (Litván 1996, 103; Alföldy 1997, 142).\(^{16}\) Budapest claimed by far the highest number of casualties, the majority of which were workers (Alföldy 1997, 142). Also among those killed in Budapest as a result of the armed confrontations were 44 students and 196 children under the age of fourteen years. It is generally agreed that the majority of the victims were young. One source reports that at least half of the casualties were younger than thirty years of age and over seventy percent of those sentenced to death were younger than thirty-four years of age (Alföldy 1997, 143). Unfortunately, reliable figures exist neither for casualties on the countryside, nor for people killed while trying to flee (Litván 1996, 103).

During the months that followed the revolution, the communist regime issued prison sentences to more than 20,000 people as well as 300 to 500 death sentences. Students, professors and other individuals were beaten by security forces (Alföldy 1997, 38). A number of revolutionaries who had fled Hungary returned in reaction to promises of amnesty issued by the Kádár government. These promises proved to be false, however. At least five individuals, including a twenty-year old female were immediately arrested upon return and sentenced to death (Alföldy 1997, 38, 132 and 134; Litván 1996, 104).

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\(^{16}\) One Austrian newspaper reported 65,000 Hungarians killed (Alföldy 1997, 142).
Flight from Hungary: The Refugee Crisis

The first people left Hungary immediately following the first intervention by the Soviets. This was a time when the political power was still in transition and the final result of the revolution was still unclear (Pintér 1969, 46). The majority of refugees, however, left the country after the attack on November 4. Once it was clear that the revolution had failed, more and more Hungarians made the decision to leave (Pintér 1969, 47).

For the first wave of Hungarian refugees the conditions for fleeing were relatively favorable. For the most part, the minefields of the Iron Curtain had been removed earlier in the year and the border police had been partly disbanded (Litván 1996, 103). Thus, from the end of October to late November the borders to Austria and Yugoslavia were practically open. The refugees reached the borders by train and/or by foot with little luggage, many covering long distances (Reinhart 1958, 53).

People living in western and southwestern Hungary helped to guide thousands to the border (Litván 1996, 103). As uniformed persons with special privileges, the railway employees and local police officers were able to help many people across the Soviet control posts (Pintér 1969, 47). Reports describe the Hungarian border corps as passive and, in part, even as supportive of the refugees. On the other side, Austrian farmers and border officers also provided assistance. Some farmers actively searched for fleeing refugees needing assistance and the main Austrian border posts were equipped with cots and blankets (Reinhart 1958, 53).

There are conflicting reports of the number of refugees who were captured, killed or injured while trying to cross the border. The common belief is that the number remained relatively low (Litván 1996, 103; Pintér 1969, 47). Whether or not crossing the border during the early weeks of the revolution was risky, the fleeing individuals could not anticipate how the newly organized border patrols and Soviet support troops would respond to their intentions to travel to the West. For this reason the decision to flee was probably not taken casually.

By April 1957 at least 120,000 Hungarians had fled over the Austrian border. Nearly 20,000 had traveled across the Yugoslavian border (Banki and Späti 1994, 376; Alföldy 1997, 132; Reinhart 1958, 9). At least 11,447 returned shortly thereafter (Alföldy
Austria received the largest and first wave of refugees and was immediately confronted with a refugee crisis. On certain days in November more than 5,000 people were reported crossing the border (Reinhart 1958, 9). Only recently freed from foreign occupation itself, Austria did not have the capacity and infrastructure to care for the masses of refugees who were arriving daily. Especially the lack of heated spaces and beds was a problem (Reinhart 1958, 21). Austria thus pleaded with the international community to support it in its relief efforts.

The Hungarian migration wave was the first large migration wave since the end of the Second World War. Like Austria, most countries were unprepared and unequipped for a mass migration of this scale (Litván 1996, 153). Given the Cold War context Eastern migrants were generally recognized as political refugees throughout western Europe. Still, not all European countries opened their borders to the Hungarians. Due to housing shortages and unstable economic conditions many governments were reluctant to take in refugees. If any were let in, they were carefully selected according to industry needs and recruited mainly for mining and metalworking jobs (ten Doesschate 2007, 1066). In many countries such as in the United Kingdom, the arrival and recruitment of Hungarian workers led to social tensions. Local workers feared that the hard working and non-demanding Hungarian workers would weaken the power of the labor unions (ten Doesschate 2007, 1066). A large number of highly skilled refugees in the medical and science fields were able to find suitable positions and jobs in the destination countries and hundreds of students and academics benefited from a wide range of scholarships and support programs. 17

From October 1956 to June 1957 10,521 Hungarian refugees came to Switzerland (Banki and Späti 1994, 375). After this period only individuals and small groups, many of whom had been traveling in western Europe and did want to return to Hungary sought asylum in Switzerland. Of all the countries providing asylum, Switzerland took in the fifth highest number of refugees, or 8% of the total refugee population. According to United Nations statistics of April 5, 1957, 24% of Hungarian refugees were taken in by South Africa, followed by England (16%), Canada (12.5%) and West Germany (9%) (Banki and Späti, 376). Relative to the native population, however, Switzerland’s quota was clearly the highest (Banki and Späti 1994, 376; Mihok

17 The Rockefeller Foundation was one of the prominent donors of scholarships, providing financial assistance to Hungarian students in refugee camps, donating funds to Austrian schools and universities and sponsoring Hungarian scientists and artists until the 1960s (Pallo 2001)
Crisis Moment: The Reception of Hungarian Refugees in Switzerland

Arrival in Switzerland

The 1956/57 Hungarian migration wave to Switzerland is characterized by a conscious effort by the Swiss authorities to remove bureaucratic obstacles to the reception and integration of Hungarians. Another characteristic feature is the massive and powerful grassroots movement, which developed among the private institutions and the Swiss population to assist the refugees in material and psychological ways. The media coverage of the first arrivals is another significant feature, which contributed to the public participation in this event (Lanz 1996, 83).

On November 5, one day after the second Soviet intervention in Budapest, the International Red Cross office in Vienna approached the Swiss office with an urgent request to transfer two thousand refugees to Switzerland (Reinhart 1958, 20). Dr. Hans Haug, secretary of the Swiss Red Cross, immediately approached the Swiss Federal Ministry of Justice and Police (EJPD) to discuss accommodation capacities and requirements associated with this request, including registration of refugees, organization of housing and oversight responsibilities (Reinhart 1958, 20-1). While these discussions were taking place at official levels, private citizens and organizations, having heard about the events in Hungary and the crisis in Austria, began to flood the Red Cross telephone lines with offers of vacant rooms and homes. The following day the Federal Council had already approved the EJPD request and train transportation for the first group of refugees was immediately organized (Reinhart 1958, 21).

In the refugee camps registration for transfer to Switzerland proceeded by own initiative (Reinhart 1958, 23). Registered individuals were taken by Swiss representatives on a first come, first serve basis. No selection criteria had been communicated from Swiss authorities and none were implemented by the offices involved (Reinhart 1958, 22). Since Austria had not been able to select the refugees, the Swiss authorities did not consider it fair to select only highly educated or young refugees either (Werenfels 1987, 63). In order to expedite relocation to Switzerland, the individual application process for asylum was waived and permanent asylum was granted (Mihok
and Wagner 2006; Werenfels 1987, 63; Ludwig 1957, 411).

The first 364 refugees arrived in Switzerland on November 9 via the border train station at Buchs, a small town next to the Liechtenstein and Austrian border. Three days later a second group followed (Pintér 1969, 63; Lanz 1996, 83; Reinhart 1958, 26). In the four-week period from November 9 to December 11 nineteen chartered trains had made the approximately seven hundred kilometer journey between the refugee camp in Traiskirchen, Austria and the reception camp in Buchs, Switzerland (Lanz 1991, 83, Reinhart 1958, 29).

Upon arrival in the reception center at a military barracks near Buchs, the refugees were medically examined and “disinfected”, which involved a delousing by a border sanitation team organized by the Swiss Red Cross (Reinhart 1958, 21; Pintér 1969, 64; Stäheli 2006, 83). To restore energy after their long journey, the refugees were also given a “first cup of warm soup”, chocolate and ham sandwiches (Pintér 1969, 63, Stäheli 2006, 84). A Women's Emergency Service company\(^{18}\) and a group of Red Cross nurses had been mobilized to treat the expected high numbers of injured and sick.\(^{19}\) Those in serious medical condition were transported to the military clinic in Lenk, a mountain village in central Switzerland, or to other hospitals and sanatoria (Reinhart 1957, 10; Ludwig 1957, 412). From the reception center the refugees were immediately sent by bus and car to the military barracks across the country, which would provide temporary care (Mihok and Wagner 2006; Stäheli 2006, 83; Reinhart 1958, 28). On average the refugees spent only about three to eight weeks in these initial quarters before moving on to more permanent locations (Stäheli 2006, 83).

November 12 correspondence between the Swiss Red Cross and its delegation in Vienna indicated that more relief was needed. The Austrians, who appreciated the Swiss authorities’ quick action and policy of non-selectivity, hoped that the Federal Council might consider taking in one or two more thousand refugees (Reinhart 1958, 35). A second request to the Federal Council concerning the entry of an additional two thousand Hungarian refugees from Austria was approved that evening (Lanz 1996, 132; Reinhart 1958, 36).

The individualized integration of the Hungarian migrants was costly and called for extensive human resources in addition to the donations and voluntary workforce made available by private citizens. The Swiss Red Cross was already operating at full capacity

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\(^{18}\) A paramilitary unit associated with the Swiss army.

\(^{19}\) The actual number of refugees needing medical attention was probably lower than expected (Pintér 1969, 63-4).
with the care of the first four thousand refugees and could offer no resources for any further refugee groups. Thus, when on November 27 the Federal Council approved a third EJPD request to take in six thousand more refugees was made, a new solution was needed (Ludwig 1957, 411).

The Red Cross requested the federal government to investigate options for military-led transition camps. Military department representatives, keen to restore their reputation lost due to grave mistakes made and incompetence shown during the war, enthusiastically supported this plan and reported capacities for ten thousand refugees. Military law only permitted the deployment of four hundred territorial support forces, however, and prohibited the utilization of active soldiers and officers for this type of operation. Thus, the Federal Council decided to delegate the support of up to six thousand refugees to the military. Twelve barracks, mainly in Herisau, Frauenfeld, Luzienstein and Walenstadt (Pintér 1969, 68) for 500 to 850 people each were furnished and equipped between November 29 and December 9, 1956. The Red Cross, though no longer responsible for housing and food, provided furnishing, clothing and a weekly allowance for the refugees (Lanz 1996, 86; Reinhart 1958, 45-6).

Contrary to the first two groups, the third group of 6,000 Hungarians initially entered on a temporary asylum status, though the individual application process continued to be waived (Reinhart 1958, 46). The intention of the federal government was to relieve the overcrowded Austrian camps and to provide temporary quarters to house refugees seeking to transfer to third countries. Indeed, many of these refugees had relatives and social connections in other countries and hoped to make arrangements to travel on, rather than stay in Switzerland (Zentralstelle 1958, 2). Beginning on November 28 chartered trains arrived in Switzerland daily with five hundred refugees mainly from Eisenstadt, which was experiencing the biggest crisis (Reinhart 1958, 45). Shortly after the last refugees of this group had arrived the Federal Council agreed to remove the departure deadline and to grant work permits. The initial plan to make arrangements abroad for six thousand refugees was simply not regarded as feasible (Werenfels 1987, 64).

The largest number of refugees arrived in Switzerland as part of the first three waves. As early as November 29, 1956 however, individuals with family members in Switzerland began approaching the Swiss authorities directly with requests for asylum (Reinhart 1958, 46). Thus, smaller groups including 500 refugees from Yugoslavia between April and September 1957 and a final group of 150 refugees from Austria in
July 1958 (Reinhart 1958, 77-8; Lanz 1996, 132) followed the previous mass entries. The Swiss government followed a policy of granting visa to individual entrees under two specific circumstances, namely for reasons of family reunification and for cases for whom integration costs were guaranteed by private donors (Reinhart 1958, 47). The individual processing of asylum applications on family reunification and private sponsorship grounds was difficult and time consuming. The Swiss Red Cross delegation in Vienna provided administrative support to the Swiss authorities and in many cases organized temporary housing (Zentralstelle 1958, 28).

Of the estimated 13,000 to 14,000 refugees who arrived in Switzerland between November 1956 and December 1959, between 3,000 and 5,000 traveled on to a third country or returned to Hungary (Pintér 1969, 20; EJPD 1959 in Zabratzky 2006, 199). Having lost 200,000 of its 9 million citizens, including a large proportion of its highly educated and skilled labor force, the Hungarian state made efforts to ensure that the option of return would remain possible for its citizens abroad. Radio Budapest, heard by many Hungarians in Switzerland, broadcast official messages guaranteeing those who returned before April 1st, 1957 complete impunity. Offers of general amnesty were repeated in 1963 and special “visit visas” were issued to allow refugees to travel to Hungary with refugee documents. Family members as well as friends tried to convince their kin and acquaintances to return. Some employers were reported to have held former employment positions vacant in the hopes that their workers would return (Pintér 1969, 67).

Nonetheless, only few refugees returned to Hungary, probably as a result of lost ties and opportunities back home as well as in reaction to the 1968 Prague Spring, which helped to suppress any optimism for change in the East (Mihok and Wagner 2003). Though many refugees had planned to return to Hungary as soon as the situation normalized, there was no mass remigration to Hungary after the end of the Cold War (ten Doesschate 1007, 1066; Stäheli 2006, 274).

Between 1956 and 1958 the Swiss Federal Council had approved the acceptance of approximately thirteen thousand persons as political refugees and had granted all of them permanent residence. This is significant not only because the number of asylum grants was high relative to the population of the small country. Most importantly, the Swiss policy toward the Hungarian migrants showed a drastic shift in response to foreigners since the previous refugee crisis following World War II. For comparison purposes, of the 115,000 foreign asylum seekers residing in Switzerland
following the war in the spring of 1945, only 251 people were officially recognized as political refugees (Pintér 1969). It can be assumed that the drastic shift in asylum policy over these twelve years has a great deal to do with the role that the Hungarian played for the Swiss nation.

Who Were the Migrants?

Though the violent crushing of the uprising, fear of further Soviet bombings, and fear of deportations were the impetus for setting off the refugee flow, the largest part of refugees probably did not flee Hungary because they were in direct danger of imprisonment or death (Banki and Späti 1994, 375). In fact only about ten percent of Hungarian refugees who fled had participated in the demonstrations or were otherwise closely affiliated with the revolution (Zentralstelle 1958, 7-11; Stäheli 2006, 66). The Hungarian migrants were a diverse group of people who traveled either individually, in families, or other small groups (Pintér 1969, 47). In fact, many of the active revolutionaries did not join the almost two hundred thousand people who left the country. Many of these individuals were arrested by the new police force (Alföldy 1997, 38).

Having said that, the uprising was not carried out by political activists alone. All social classes, workers in particular, were represented among the participants in the uprising (Pintér 1969, 45; 50). The armed fighters were mainly young people, including teenagers and girls. Most came from the poor worker and apprentice barracks of Budapest and were probably driven mostly by a general bitterness about their overall situation and less by political conviction (Pintér 1969, 45). Only a few older people and intellectuals actively participated in the street demonstrations and fighting. However, many of these politically engaged individuals or individuals with limited military experience emerged as leaders of the armed groups (Litván 1996, 65).

For the activists the direct risks of staying in Hungary were real and imminent. However, given that the directly participating groups were concentrated in Budapest and a few individual Hungarian cities, and that the composition of the people who fled came from many parts of the country, it can be concluded that persecution was not the primary motive for most refugees (Pintér 1969, 47-8; ZFH 1957, 4). It is more likely that a combination of a wide range of economic and political motives contributed to the decision of most refugees to leave Hungary. As one former refugee from southern Hungary recalls his reception in Switzerland, “We were celebrated like heroes, even
though we were none” (Stährli 2006, 81).

It is assumed that most of the Hungarian population, whether actively fighting on the streets or observing the events from their homes, disapproved of Stalinism and of the repressive government (Zentralstelle 1958, 4). The unrest and violence of October and November 1956 coupled with the example set by the first emigrants probably inspired many to seriously pursue the idea of moving abroad. Given the treatment of the events in Hungary by the radio and press, many Hungarians were probably under the impression that everyone was leaving (Zentralstelle 1958, 9). In addition, the uncertainty about how long borders would be open likely prompted many to take spontaneous and immediate action. In general, it can be said that the population of nine million who remained in Hungary had as much a reason to leave as the two hundred thousand people who left (Zentralstelle 1958, 8). Those who left probably had little to lose. They probably possessed less financial means, held less attractive jobs and were therefore confident that life abroad would be easier than life in Hungary (Zentralstelle, 11; Litván 1996, 103). The proximity of Hungary to the West was certainly another factor that contributed to the high numbers of migrants. Especially the regions of western Hungary, where fighting was limited only to Győr and Moson-Magyaróvar, were well represented in the refugee population (Pintér 1969, 47-8).

While there may have been an element of opportunism in the decision to flee Hungary in 1956 and 1957, it is unfair to state in retrospect that the Hungarians did not flee in fear. No one could know what kind of retaliatory measures would be taken in the “Peoples Democratic Restoration” of the country. In the end, the Soviets did not install a Stalinist leader and the first directions to the Kádár cabinet were relatively mild and conciliatory (Pintér 1969, 50). However, the presence of Soviet troops and the reorganization of the police, including the earlier secret police force, surely contributed to a repressed environment. Also, beatings and hundreds of prison and death sentences that were enforced following the new government’s takeover are evidence that a policy of terror was resurrected after the failed revolution.

No comprehensive data exists to give a clear picture of the gender, educational and professional characteristics of the refugees. Thus it is only possible to speculate on the variety of motives for fleeing to the West. Most historians assume that for most migrants the immediate reason for flight was the desire for change and expectations of a

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20 One relief worker in Switzerland describes the refugee population who fled West as composed in the following way: 10% active freedom fighters, 60% social migrants attracted by the high standard of living in the West, 27% “followers”, and 3% adventurers and travel-hungry adolescents (Zentralstelle 1958, 11).
better life in the West, an image fed by the limited information they received from outside the communist world (Pintér 1969, 47; ZFH 1957, 6). The prospect of more personal freedom, financial wellbeing, professional and educational development opportunities, and better quality of life were factors, which appealed to the migrants who had lived in isolation for a decade (Stäheli 2006, 65-67). According to a survey published in 2006, more than half of respondents indicated the desire to live in a free country as among their main motives for flight. Among males, half of the respondents said that fear of repercussions due to their active participation in the revolt was among the main reasons for flight (Zabratzky 2006, 117).

A large number of migrants held positions in technical professions and many migrants were very well educated and highly skilled individuals, including medical doctors, psychologists, or students in training (Pintér 1969, 20). Approximately 25.4% of the Hungarian refugee population worldwide were intellectuals and students. Data from the United States, where the Hungarian migrant population has been more closely studied, indicate that more than half of the refugees possessed a university degree, were skilled or semi-skilled workers (ten Doesschate 2007, 1067). As a result of the mass migration Hungary lost tens of thousands of its most qualified citizens and about a quarter of the Hungarian student population (Alföldy 1997, 132; ten Doesschate, 1067). Around ten thousand students received scholarships from governments and private donors that allowed them to continue their studies abroad (Litván 1997, 153). The number of refugees with an agricultural background was notably low (Pintér 1969, 20).

Purely personal motives and the opportunity to break with an old situation and to begin a new life certainly also played a role for some. This may have applied to the high number of separated and divorced individuals who left Hungary, many of whose children remained in Hungary (Banki and Späti, 376). Conflicts and ethnic discrimination in the workplace or in schools appear to have led others to flee (Stäheli 2006, 66). Some refugees, who had been forced to leave ethnic Hungarian regions of Czechoslovakia, Russia, Romania or Yugoslavia a few years earlier and who did not have strong ties to Hungary were also among the refugees in Switzerland (Pintér 1969, 55).

The number of children who arrived in Switzerland alone, often having left without the consent of their parents, was astonishingly high. These cases presented a special challenge to the relief organizations because the placement of individual youths without guardians was difficult (Stäheli 2006, 65; Zentralstelle 1958, 10). The Swiss Red Cross reported having cared for 250 youths between the ages of fifteen and seventeen
years (Reinhart 1958, 78-9). A home in the Swiss Alp resort town of Leysin was opened to accommodate the special needs of these young individuals. Here room and board, language courses, other preparatory classes, career advice and job and apprenticeship recruitment were offered (Reinhart 1958, 79).

**Integration Management: Assimilation into Swiss Society**

Due to their special status as refugees the Hungarian migrants received specific integration assistance benefits, which were not available for regular migrants (Oester 1985, 22). The integration of the Hungarian refugees was managed by a broad framework of public and private institutions, including the federal, cantonal and municipal governments, nongovernmental and religious organizations, private businesses and private citizens. The efforts of these various actors in the integration management program targeted primarily the areas of labor, education and welfare. The assistance measures such as work placement and housing allocation were designed to promote early day-to-day interaction opportunities between the migrants and the Swiss population. The objective of these measures was to accelerate the economic and social independence of the migrants. From the beginning, the authorities had determined that the refugees would be allowed to settle in Switzerland permanently. Thus, integration measures were designed with this long-term objective in mind. Influenced by a strong tendency toward assimilationism, the programs were oriented toward preparing and educating the migrants on cultural values and behavioral patterns of Swiss society. This socialization process was effectively managed by educational, labor and health/welfare institutions where social control could be optimally exercised (see Oester 1985, 23 and 29).

**Key Institutions**

In 1956 no national laws existed which would have anchored the special status of the Hungarian refugee. On a national level the rights of refugees were regulated only by the Foreign Nationals Act of 1931 and its amendments of 1948. In the absence of international norms, the refugees would have been subject to the same laws and responsibilities as other foreign migrants. In its response to the Hungarian refugee crisis the Swiss federal government chose a path, which opened up the existing national legal framework to incorporate key features of international norms. The experience of recent
asylum politics between 1945 and 1957 helped to push the Swiss state in this direction.

The United Nations Refugee Convention of July 1951, signed by Switzerland in December 14, 1954 serves as the basis for refugee protection under international law to this day. The convention defines the criteria for refugee status, the general rights of refugees and the specific rights of refugees to whom asylum or other special permits have been granted. The convention does not, however, regulate the conditions for granting asylum (Achermann and Hausammann 1990, 9). The decision-making framework for granting asylum is left up to the authority of each state.

The UN Convention of 1951 was drafted in reaction to the discrimination of individuals (especially Jews) seeking refuge in foreign states during and after the Second World War (Werenfels 1987, 48-9). De facto the convention applies only to persons fleeing “as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees Art. 1A, par 2). In 1967 a protocol removed the geographic and temporal limitations defined in the original agreement and extended the applicability beyond 1951 and beyond Europe. In the case of the Hungarians fleeing in 1956, however, the protocol did not yet apply. This meant that only persons fleeing on account of events that had taken place under the Soviet-sponsored Rákosi dictatorship of 1948 to 1951 would have normally qualified as refugees. However, the Swiss authorities argued that the communist regime, which served as the basis for the tensions in 1956 was already in office since 1948 and therefore also prior to 1951 (Werenfels 1987, 64).

A new provision issued in 1949 by the federal authorities concerning the enforcement of the 1931 Foreign Nationals Act specified that permanent asylum could be granted to persons suffering a “threat to life and limb” due to political and other reasons and having no other available means to escape this threat than to flee to Switzerland. 21 Only few Hungarians who were taken in by Switzerland in 1956/57 were at risk of this type of physical danger in their own county. Thus, most refugees met neither the temporal aspect nor the specific threat aspect. Though the Hungarian refugees fulfilled neither of these criteria, the Swiss state accepted them without hesitation as political refugees and immediately granted permanent asylum first to four thousand, and eventually to six thousand more.

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21 This provision is found in Art. 23 of the March 1, 1949 executive decree relating to the 1931 Foreign National Act
In many regards, the dramatic shift in asylum policy between 1945 and 1956 can be linked to criticism against the Swiss federal government’s actions in the Second World War. The 376-page “Ludwig Report” published in 1957 presented incriminating evidence for mismanagement of refugee camps and collaboration with the Nazi government on certain aspects. The report was initiated by the Federal Council’s request to investigate the background of the “J-stamp” policy, a question that had received a great deal of media attention. The report resulted in a significant increase in public awareness of the contradictions between state policies and national values, in particular humanitarianism and neutrality. The surprisingly coherent message which could be heard in media and official institutions’ responses was that similar mistakes would have to be avoided at all costs in the future (Hubacek 1994, 360).

The Hungarian refugee crisis presented an opportunity to compensate for these past mistakes and to resurrect the humanitarian image. The “threat to life and limb” condition of the 1949 executive decree was expanded to include a broader range of conflicts with state authorities in the country of origin. The Federal Council had realized the practical difficulty in convincingly proving a danger to “life and limb”. Thus, a new practice was introduced, which recognized additional “internal dilemmas of political, religious and similar nature” arising from life under a hostile regime as a legitimate reason for flight (Werenfels 1987, 64-5). This new claim for refugee protection was incorporated into asylum policy after 1956. Its applicability was confirmed a few years later by the reception of Czechoslovakians in 1968 (Pintér 1969, 65; Werenfels 1987, 66). Because of widespread public support for this practice, the general application of this provision, especially with respect to Eastern European migrants, remained unchallenged until 1982 and became anchored in the law in 1979 (Asylum Law of 1979, Art 3. par. 2; Werenfels 1987, 66).

Considering the liberal entry and residency rules that had regulated their initial integration, naturalization laws were surprisingly restrictive. According to the 1931 Foreign Nationals Act a foreign citizen must live in Switzerland for twelve years before he or she may apply for citizenship. For children between ten and twenty years of age and for foreigners married to Swiss women the residency requirement is reduced to six years. Hungarian women married to Swiss men were immediately permitted to apply for Swiss citizenship (Stäheli 2006, 95). This policy had been influenced by the desire to maintain Switzerland’s appeal as a destination country for workers from Southern European countries. It was designed to fill the demands of the Swiss labor market while
limiting permanent settlement and political rights of foreigners.

Swiss law places the responsibility for overseeing the asylum process (i.e. the entry, exit, sojourn and settlement of foreigners) with the federal government (Swiss Constitution, Art. 69). The direct responsibility for the enforcement of asylum matters (i.e. regulating residency) lies with the cantons, though the federal government has the final authority to make decisions in certain circumstances (Ibid.). The cantons however, through their level of willingness or reluctance to host refugees on their territory have a strong influence on asylum practice (Ludwig 1957, 23).

The Federal Ministry of Justice and Police (EJPD) is typically the most powerful institution within the federal government in the migration context. It is responsible for regulating and enforcing the acceptance and deportation of foreigners within the framework defined by the Foreign Nationals Act. It also has the function of overseeing the actions of the cantonal Foreigner Police forces, the main cantonal institution concerned with asylum seekers and other foreign migrants. Further, the Swiss military played an exceptionally active role in the integration of the Hungarian refugees. This was demonstrated in the military’s active pursuit of responsibility for the support of the third group of six thousand refugees in end of November 1956. It also provided vehicles for refugee transport and goods delivery in the initial refugee relief effort.

Compared to fifty years later, when Balkan migrants entered Switzerland, the organization for the administration of asylum-seekers was relatively weak. The scope of the official state integration framework was limited to the general authorities of only a handful of legal instruments, political organs and state enforcement organizations. Nonetheless, the implication of this framework in the integration of the Hungarians was central. Not only the favorable decisions of the Federal Council related to entry and asylum, but also the initiative of the EJPD to request these decisions were important events in the Hungarian refugee integration.

Swiss and international nongovernmental organizations including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Federation of Red Cross societies (IFRC) played a central role in the integration of Hungarian refugees in Switzerland. Their activities began with the immediate organization and mobilization of personnel and financial resources in response to media reports from Budapest. This relief effort, though not carried out on Swiss territory, was very significant to the integration program that developed in Switzerland because it helped to mobilize the Swiss population and authorities for the Hungarian cause. Only after the spontaneous
popular initiative had been set in motion, the federal authorities jumped in to coordinate the efforts (Lanz 1996, 94).

Upon hearing of the events in Hungary the ICRC, headquartered in Geneva, contacted the Hungarian Red Cross to inquire about medical and material needs of the Hungarian population. The information was passed on to various national Red Cross offices, including the Swiss Office in Berne (Reinhart 1958, 8). The IFRC coordinated the activities of the national offices in the humanitarian operation in Hungary and in the Austrian and Yugoslavian refugee camps (Reinhart 1958, 10). On a global level about fifty thousand tons of goods worth eighty million Swiss Francs were collected from all over the world by the summer of 1957 and were delivered by ICRC representatives mainly from Switzerland (Reinhart 1958, 9). For political reasons, the authorities in Budapest stipulated that all Red Cross workers operating in Hungary be Swiss citizens (Reinhart 1958, 33).

The Swiss Red Cross (SRC) office donated material goods worth approximately six million Swiss Francs to Austrian camps and to the Yugoslavian Red Cross, organized a blood drive to meet the specific demand for large amounts of blood plasma and delivered this along with medicine and dressings to Budapest by a chartered Swissair machine (Reinhart 1958, 8-9). Because the relief effort required not only monetary donations, the Swiss Red Cross also sent staff to support the care of refugees in four Austrian camps and to fill the large need in Hungarian hospitals (Reinhart 1958, 8).

In addition to medical staff and relief workers the SRC also helped to mobilize drivers and transport vehicles needed for the delivery of material goods sent to the SRC office by private individuals and organizations. These donations had been funded and collected mostly as part of the SRC initiated and administered “Hungary Relief Fund”. In the context of this relief fund a total of nearly 9 million Swiss Francs worth of goods came together and were allocated to Budapest (5,5 million Swiss Francs), Austria (1,1 million Swiss Francs), Yugoslavia (790,000 Swiss Francs) and Switzerland (77,000 Swiss Francs) (Reinhart 1958, 76).

The Swiss Red Cross was also active in negotiating entry for medical and supply convoys. The restriction of travel across the Hungarian border also made the delivery of goods, money and other relief material more difficult. Direct deliveries were intermittently discontinued on October 31, when Soviet troops surrounded the airport to interrupt the airlift, and on November 2, when the Vienna-Budapest road was blocked by Soviet troops (Reinhart 1958, 15-6). By November 11, the first large convoy of fifteen Red
Cross trucks with food, clothing and other items had received permission to enter Hungary after having waited for a few days at the border by Sopron. It was followed a few days later by a second convoy of 38 ambulances and trucks bringing 120 tons of food and medicine (Reinhart 1958, 32-3).

Need was felt not only in Hungary, but also very strongly in Austria. The Austrian camps were not equipped to quarter all the refugees who came. Woolen blankets, mattresses, bags of straw, linen and ovens had to be shipped from abroad (Reinhart 1958, 19-20). In response to calls for goods from Yugoslavia the SRC shipped three train wagons full of goods between March 27 and May 24 1957. The crisis in the Austrian and Yugoslavian refugee camps gradually subsided and Red Cross teams and ICRC delegations began to be called back between summer and autumn of 1957 (Reinhart 1958, 77).

As the Red Cross operation came to a close between January and February 1957, the responsibility for the care and supply of the refugees shifted to local cantonal organizations in those cantons where the concentrations of refugees were the highest. The main contributors during this phase were the national and cantonal Centers for Refugee Relief, specifically established to support the integration of the Hungarian refugees after the initial programs had been completed (Stäheli 2006, 84; Zentralstelle 1958, 1).

At this point many refugees had moved to more permanent residences, had taken on jobs and had entered Swiss social life. Consequently the issues with which these refugee relief offices were confronted were very different from the material and medical supply needs during the first three months of the crisis. Financial assistance was complemented by psychological and social counseling, employment services, conflict-resolution and translation services (Zentralstelle 1958, 2 and 39). These offices, which existed in most cantons, worked together with and acted liaisons for state authorities, the public and relief agencies, including the unemployment office, charitable and religious relief agencies (e.g. HEKS, Caritas), the federal police department, etc. in to help refugees in many aspects of day-to-day life. Subsidized partly by the state and funded partly by private donations, the offices were also active in organizing furniture, apartments and household goods for the refugees who arrived later, especially from Yugoslavia, when the initial solidarity wave and enthusiasm of the civic population had subsided (Zentralstelle 1958, 40).

The activities of individual persons and private organizations were tightly
integrated into the activities of the before-mentioned relief agencies. However, the extraordinarily high level of self-initiative exhibited by the civic population significantly contributed to the resources available for the more formally organized relief programs. A report of the Red Cross collection site in Zurich for example describes volunteers opening donation packages, sorting and repacking food and clothing and of schools providing storage space for processed relief packages prior to delivery as well as facilities for holding blood drives (Reinhart 1958, 32). School children from nearby schools were reported to have stopped by during their spare time to lend a hand in these collection centers. Various trade and manufacturing associations, such as the Food and Consumer Goods Association mobilized businesses to donate items. In response many manufacturing businesses donated brand new goods such as wool blankets, new clothes and household items. A painting business in Berne sent sixty painters to prepare the Red Cross convoy trucks with the trademark white and red SRC emblem, vehicles which had been donated by the Swiss Automobile Trust Association (Reinhart 1958, 34). Private citizens' associations such as the Union of Swiss Women’s Clubs sewed four thousand pajamas for refugees living in the camps, and material and monetary donations from individual citizens and families continued to fill the Red Cross supply centers (Reinhart 1957, 72 and 74). As the Red Cross writes in its 1957 log entries, many volunteers had to be turned away (Reinhard 1958, 48).

The SRC was frequently approached by citizens wanting to travel to Hungary, to sponsor a child in Hungary, or wishing to adopt Hungarian orphan children. The medical shipment of the SRC was supported in large part by the medicine and pharmacy students from the University of Zurich and by hospital doctors and staff, several of whom traveled to Hungary and Austria to help on site. In many university cities, such as Zurich, students and faculty sponsored families by paying for the living costs and offering their vacation homes (Lanz 1996, 82). One Zurich student association even arranged and sponsored a Swissair transport of five families from Vienna to Zurich (Student Relief 1957, 14).

Integration Focus Areas

The state and NGO integration programs were primarily directed at promoting economic independence and integration into the workforce. Work was not only seen as a means to financial security. The labor market was deemed an important site of contact
between Swiss and Hungarians (Stäheli 2006, 273). Fortunately, the Hungarian refugee crisis coincided with a healthy economic period. In large part, the Hungarians were seen as similarly “useful” as the other economic migrants who were being recruited from European countries and did not yet face the quotas on the foreign labor pool which began to appear in the late 1970s (Stahlei 2006, 274). Cantonal employment offices provided their services to help the relief agencies in the placement of workers. This process proceeded very smoothly (Zentralstelle 1958, 24). Some industries sent recruiting agents to the refugee camps to recruit workers and offered benefits such as housing and vocational training. In fact, most of the employable refugees, i.e. the refugees who had been employed in Hungary, were placed in a job within two to four weeks (Banki and Späti 1994, 378). Already by the end of November 1956 4,600 work and accommodation packages had been organized for the 7,200 refugees in Switzerland (Mihok and Wagner 2006).

Due to language problems and incompatibilities between professional titles, certificates, standards and educational curricula of the Hungarian and Swiss systems, many migrants were forced to take on jobs, which fell short of matching their qualifications. In some cases the refugees rejected job offers given to them (Pintér 1969, 69; Zentralstelle, 23). The centralized allocation of refugees to cantons was designed to distribute the numbers proportionally so as to spread the burden fairly. Though an effort was made to ensure that the labor market of each receiving canton could accommodate the allocated number of individuals, the system was not designed to take into full consideration the skills of each individual refugee (Stäheli 2006, 83). The refugees themselves had little to say in this process and merely supplied their personal evaluation of suitable job categories (Zentralstelle, 23). The cantonal coordination and integration offices such as the various Offices for Refugee Relief were faced with resolving the issues that arose as a result of this misallocation (Stäheli 2006, 84, Pintér 1969, 69). The Central Office for Refugee Relief was an association of the catholic “Caritas”, the relief Network of the Evangelical Churches HEKS, Swiss Workers Relief Organization, the Christian Peace Service and other smaller organizations (Reinhard 1958, 43).

Problems associated with differences between the Hungarian individuals’ employment expectations and the Swiss private labor market were not uncommon (Pintér 1969, 70). Some workers, having been socialized in socialist ideology, were irritated by the social differences between management and workers (Pintér 1969, 70). Some complained about the lack of facilities such as showers, buffets, libraries and
cultural centers within the factories and organizations. Tensions between Swiss and Hungarian workers also arose due to different working styles and mentality especially in relation to different emphases placed on productivity versus quality (Pintér 1969, 70; Zentralstelle, 30-1). Work processes, roles and responsibilities varied substantially between the small Swiss businesses and the large centralized organizations of the Hungarian industry that the refugees were accustomed to (Zentralstelle, 23).

A breakdown of the most common industries for job placements in the canton of Aargau gives a picture of the distribution of the Hungarian migrants on the Swiss labor market. According to the Aarau Central Office for Refugee Relief more that 25% of the refugees took on jobs in the metal working industry and 19% were placed in consumer goods. 15% of the refugee working population consisted of intellectuals who were placed in high-skill technical positions. 7% worked in the textile industry and 5% in construction (Zentralstelle, 30). Interestingly, as opposed to economic migrant groups, few to no refugees were placed in agricultural jobs or hired for housework. The high number of intellectuals and highly skilled workers was characteristic of the Hungarian refugee population and helped to give the Hungarian work force a good reputation (Zentralstelle, 31).

Education was a further central element for the integration of Hungarian refugees. This emphasis was probably a result of the high numbers of students and of technically and highly skilled individuals for whom Swiss businesses were willing to organize training. Though individuals with training in technical fields were able to transition into similar jobs as those they had given up in Hungary, a number of intellectuals of the non-technical fields were forced to take on unskilled labor positions with low income because they lacked language proficiency or compatible certificates (Zentralstelle, 31-33). For these individuals a small investment in additional training, especially in language could produce large returns for the Swiss labor pool.

Many students who arrived from Hungary were able to continue their studies at Swiss universities. 565 Hungarian students were given a slot in the universities, 191 of these at the ETH, the highly renowned federal technical institute (Mihok and Wagner 2006). A Hungary scholarship fund was created to which municipalities and private citizens could contribute for financial and housing needs of Hungarian students. For ten years a “Hungary Tuition Fund” was maintained into which every student at Swiss university paid 15 Swiss Francs at registration (Mihok and Wagner 2006). Preparatory and German classes were organized to help the Hungarian students pass the entrance
exams to certain university programs (Student Relief 1957, 19). Students also contributed to preparing living quarters for Hungarian students. As president of the Switzerland-Hungary Direct Relief organization recalls, a team of students and a school class in a Zurich suburb worked together to renovate a house donated by a private donor with the help of equipment and workers provided by private businesses and retail stores (Renschler 2006, 57).

The political authorities and relief agencies recognized the importance of language education for integrating the migrants into the workforce. Over 85% of the refugees settled in German speaking regions of Switzerland, but only few of the refugees had sufficient German skills (Zabratzky 2006, 200; Lanz 1996, 85). It is estimated that only about 10% of the refugees spoke one or more foreign languages (Pintér 1969, 80). According to some estimates, approximately 5% of refugees came from German-speaking border towns to Austria and spoke perfect German (Banki and Späti 1994, 377). However, because of its political isolation from western Europe only few Hungarians had had the opportunity to learn a foreign language outside of school. Some young professionals had learned German and English as part of their education but many academics and high school graduates had only been taught Russian and Latin (Banki and Späti 1994, 378; Pintér 1969, 79-80).

The majority of the migrants immediately received language courses in the receiving municipalities (Mihok and Wagner 2006). Language courses were to be established for school students and university students so that they would be able to pursue their studies. Private and relief organizations, such as the Zurich Translation School organized language teachers and facilities for adults and children (Lanz 1996, 85). A German-Hungarian vocabulary book was published and financed by a private publishing company to support communication between Swiss citizens and Hungarian refugees in daily situations (Lanz 1996, 85).

Intensive language study was not always effective, however. German was a difficult language for many Hungarians to learn. Despite the geographic proximity of Hungary to German speaking countries the German and Hungarian language have no linguistic relationship to each other. Furthermore, the effort placed in teaching High German neglected the fact the Swiss German dialect was more important in social and professional situations. Especially in the German speaking part of Switzerland, where

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22 Hungarian belongs to the groups of Uralic language related to Mansi and Khanty spoken in western Siberia. Hungarian is completely unrelated to the Indo-European languages, but ties between Uralic languages and Finnic languages (Finland) were discovered in the 1670s.
the difference between dialect and official language are most pronounced, the failure to communicate in dialect was an obstacle to naturalization because it indicated that one was not yet truly integrated (Pintér 1969, 85).

The education of the Hungarian refugee population in general aspects of life, i.e. the early socialization of refugees in the camp setting was another important aspect of integration. Newspapers and newsletters printed by relief organizations printed articles about current events in Hungary, in Austrian refugee camps and the world (Lanz 1996, 84). The "Svájci Magyar Hiradó", for example published between December 10, 1956 and July 1957 was available at no cost and contained informative reports on Swiss democracy and messages from various relief organizations. The newspaper also featured sections on women’s issues, sports, fiction, the radio program and language sections (phrases and vocabulary) (Lanz 1996, 84). After the migrants had moved into their permanent homes they were able to receive news from other Hungarian language media such as the “Uj Hiradó” (newspaper) and radio segments broadcast on Swiss radio station “Beromünster”.

The education emphasis continued into the late 1960s when a large part of the refugees began to apply for Swiss citizenship. This application usually involved a two-year procedure and required a relatively large financial investment of up to eight thousand Swiss Francs and a high level of knowledge about Switzerland and of the bureaucratic process (Stäheli 2006, 101-3). For these situations preparation courses were organized by private organizations, such as the “Committee for the Naturalization of Hungarian Refugees in Switzerland” (Stäheli 2006, 95).

In addition to labor and education, the concern of the authorities and relief organizations with the health and welfare of the refugee population was also remarkably high. This was reflected in the intensive and detail-oriented preparation of the reception camps, the strict guidelines concerning housing placement and the high awareness of and measures implemented to prevent negative psychological impacts of migration. This included in particular the phenomenon of camp psychosis (Zentralstelle 1958, 22-3). The experience of camp psychosis (“camp madness”) and other mental health problems that had been observed during wartime refugee experience significantly influenced the management of the Hungarian reception camps (Lanz 1996, 82; Reinhart 1958, 29; Pintér 1969, 68). In wartime camps, civil refugees had been kept isolated from the Swiss population and had had no direct contact with the relief agencies. The separation of work camps and non-work camps had resulted in the separation of family members. Living
and sanitary conditions and medical care had been poor to precarious, leading to
protests and even hunger strikes (Lanz 1996, 82-3, Ludwig 1957, 282-4). In sum, the
military had received a bad reputation for managing civil refugee camps during the war
and needed a new opportunity to demonstrate its competence (Lanz 1996, 86).

Especially in the military-led camps particular attention was paid to preventing an
“internment atmosphere” and to creating a friendly environment. The on-site military
force carried no weapons and barbed wire was intentionally banned. All language, which
might be interpreted as commanding, was prohibited and the use of numbers and labels,
aggregation and supervision were avoided as much as possible (Pintér 1969, 68). The
furnishing and equipment of the barracks were carefully chosen. Swiss flags, speakers,
cinema equipment and Hungarian goulash contributed to a homelike atmosphere (Mihok
and Wagner 2006).

The camp sojourns were kept short. After three to eight weeks the refugees had
left the camps with a fair expectation of at least minimal financial security (Pintér 1969,
68-69). In addition, media coverage of the camps was controlled so as to ensure that the
population would receive a positive image of the military relief operation. Direct contact
between press and refugees was generally prohibited. Recreation and leisure were an
important element of camp life. In each support camp, intentionally not referred to as
refugee camp, one officer was responsible for cultural support and recreation (Lanz
1996, 87). Refugees were given daily chores and expected to participate in activities
such as language courses, school lessons for children, film presentations, and
conferences on life in Switzerland offered (Lanz 1996, 88). In effect, the military camps
proved themselves as well managed and well regarded as the civilian camps managed
by the Red Cross (Lanz 1996, 88).

Because the Hungarian refugees had been taken in on permanent asylum, the
public authorities and charity organizations were intent on placing them in private
quarters as soon as possible (Lanz 1996, 81). As early as November 9, groups of
refugees were transferred from the barracks to homes and hotels (Reinhart 1958, 29).
Schools, churches, clubs, businesses and private citizens who supported the operation
with enormous enthusiasm, registered their vacation homes, hotel rooms, chalets and
private rooms with the Swiss Red Cross. By December 1956, 7,200 rooms were
available (Lanz 1996, 81). Some homes were offered free of charge. In other cases
room, allowance and other costs were reimbursed by the Swiss Red Cross via the
Hungary Relief Fund or by cantonal and municipal offices (Reinhart 1958, 29 and 38).
The rooms and homes had to be approved and owners were issued guidelines for registration, house rules, feeding and care, clothes, medical care, allowance policy, suggestions for recreation and entertainment and tips for later relocation and work placement (Reinhart 1958, 36).

As with work allocation, the housing placement program did not have perfect results. Due to significant variations in quality difference between living quarters tensions and envy among refugees was not uncommon. The main criteria for housing allocation was generally number of children and availability of work for the father (Zentralstelle 1958, 25). The availability of work did not always match the availability of vacant quarters, however. Vacant rooms were mainly offered in the tourist regions, where industry and high-skill jobs were scarce (Reinhart 1958, 29).

These living arrangements overseen by the Swiss Red Cross were made available until end of the SRC operation on February 15, 1957. In the meantime efforts were made on state and private levels to find permanent housing and permanent work and were largely completed by the time the Red Cross assignment ended (Reinhart 1958, 37). Most refugees settled in the large Swiss cities, with the highest numbers moving to Zurich followed by Berne, Geneva and Basle (Pintér 1969, 21). In order to permit refugees to establish themselves in the Swiss economy, lending conditions were relaxed for them (Mihok and Wagner 2006). Leaving the temporary quarters was not easy for all, since collective life in the camps and larger housing units had permitted ties to home to be kept intact and feelings of isolation at bay (Pintér 1969, 69). With time clubs, organizations and networks developed which provided forums to nurture the Hungarian heritage, and which helped to strengthen the confidence of the refugees within the host population (Mihok and Wagner; Stäheli 2006, 276). As the refugees became more independent, the special status of the Hungarian refugee weakened – the Hungarian refugee became just another foreigner (Stäheli 2006, 275).

Conclusion

The Hungarian refugee was an important subject for Swiss foreigner and integration politics. The Hungarians belonged to the Eastern European refugees, the most important and largest refugee group in Switzerland between the 1950s and 1970s (Oester 1985, 26-7). This group, to which the refugees from Czechoslovakia and Tibet also belonged, is often treated as a special case in Swiss migration history. In
comparison to other refugee groups of the twentieth century, this group received extraordinarily generous treatment by governments and populations in many receiving societies. Their integration has been characterized as generally very successful (Banki and Späti 1994, Oester 1985, ten Doesschate 2007).

The Swiss integration program for the Hungarian refugees can be analyzed not only in terms of its impact on the life opportunities of the refugees, but also in terms of its utility for the Swiss state. The resolution of the Hungarian refugee “crisis moment” tells an important story of a nation resurrecting an image destroyed during the Second World War. In 1956 Switzerland was on a quest to redefine its role in a new geopolitical environment dominated by the struggle between two superpowers. In addition, questions and suspicions raised with respect to Switzerland’s World War II refugee policy increased the need for a demonstration of integrity. Special attention was paid to promoting the image of a country with a very high humanitarian profile (Kreis 2002, 44). Political isolation was to be avoided at all costs and Switzerland needed to mark itself as a player and contributor to peace and democratic values, despite its neutrality and its absence in such organizations as NATO and United Nations. The granting of asylum was one important way to demonstrate its authority on the world stage. For Switzerland, “the right of asylum was the right of the state to grant asylum [more than] the right of the refugee to obtain asylum” (Kreis 2002, 44, emphasis added).

The Hungarian refugee was a useful subject for the mending of the history of the Swiss humanitarian and democratic state, a narrative which had lost credibility during the Second World War. On the one hand, the Hungarian was a moral brother, who had fought the same struggles for independence as the Swiss national heroes. On the other hand, the Hungarian brother was a victim in need, whose state had failed him and who depended on the help of a “superior” state. Accounts of Hungarian refugees as ill, childish, and nomadic are common in reports of relief efforts (see for example Pintér 1969, Zentralstelle 1958, Reinhard 1958, Student Relief 1957). The Swiss state enthusiastically embarked on the project of incorporating this “outsider” and transforming him from a deviant foreigner to an assimilated member of the Swiss population. The mastery of the Hungarian “crisis moment” fulfilled a vital bio-political function of this period. In the unstable climate of the Cold War and faced with the potential of future refugees crises, the Swiss state had demonstrated that it could protect, nurture and improve the population on whose behalf it governed.
CHAPTER THREE


The Federal Council is watching the development of this crisis with great concern and is particularly aware of the difficult situation for the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It believes, however, that [....] the suffering of the concerned population can only be appropriately met with immediate and concrete humanitarian assistance [....]. Under the current circumstances the Federal Council believes that support of the concerned people in relative proximity to their home and in a familiar cultural setting is more reasonable that the admission of a quota to Switzerland.

Federal Council response to parliamentary request to accept a Bosnian refugee quota (June 15, 1992)23

Historical Context

The scope of this thesis does not realistically allow for a comprehensive discussion of the war in the Balkans and of the dynamics and background of the ethnic conflict. Nor will this thesis cover the no less significant Kosovo refugee movement to Switzerland. The historical overview presented in this section seeks only to provide a basic chronology of the Bosnian War and an account, however superficial, of the events and conditions which generated the Bosnian migration wave to Switzerland and the response of the Swiss state to the asylum seekers.

The weakening of the Soviet Union and of communism toward the end of the Cold War, the loss of international interest in stability in the Balkans, and the death of President Josip Broz Tito damaged the political basis, which had held together the multinational and multiethnic Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) for almost forty years. After the Second World War Tito had deliberately carved out the six constituent republics of the SFRY (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) across ethnic lines so that the ethnic blocks of Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims in the various parts of the federation would be kept in check. The main target of this

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23 This response to the request submitted by Assembly Member Cécile Bühlmann is published in Curia Vista, the database for Swiss parliamentary proceedings (see reference Swiss Federal Assembly).
administrative design was the Serbian population, the largest ethic group in Yugoslavia and the one with the largest nationalist potential (O’Ballance 1995, 19). These changes produced an environment in which the conflicting Greater Serbia, Greater Croatian and Muslim “ethno-national blueprints” (Mahmutcehajic 2001, 133) for the territory of Bosnia could collide. Under the pretext of strengthening the state and putting an end to political stalemates Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic transferred power from the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina to Serbia and gained effective control over the parliament of the Yugoslav Federation (O’Ballance 1995, 23).

Demands for democratic change and autonomy appeared early in the republics of Slovenia and Croatia, both with considerably large Serb populations. Slovenia had been orienting itself toward western Europe and away from Belgrade for several years (O’Ballance 1995, 20). In 1989 the Slovenian Assembly held the first free elections, declared full sovereignty from Belgrade and seceded from the republic. After democratic elections won by the Croatian Democratic Union, Croatia also adopted its own constitution and declared independence in 1990 (O’Ballance 1995, 22). Contrary to Slovenia, whose secession had resulted in a ten-day military conflict, the secession of Croatia constituted a grave threat to the Greater Serbia project and led to a four-year violent war and a massive refugee wave (Burg and Shoup 1999, 88).

War in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1995

Within the already heterogeneous Yugoslavian state, the ethnic composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s population added an additional level of diversity to the former republic. As a result of internal migration in the postwar period, Bosnia and Herzegovina became the most ethnically diverse republic within Yugoslavia (Lukic and Nikitovic 2004, 88). By the early 1970s Muslims (Bosniaks) had become the largest ethnic group in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Lukic and Nikitovic 2004, 89). Nonetheless Serb (mostly orthodox Christian) and Croatian (mostly Catholic) minorities remained substantial, making up 33% and 19% percent respectively in 1991 (O’Ballance 1995, 2). The three groups were distributed in ethnic majority areas “that varied […] from nearly homogeneous to nearly evenly divided” (Burg and Shoup 1999, 25).

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24 Though high birth rates and low emigration of Muslims certainly played a large role, the higher level of identification of Muslims with their ethnic/religious group as compared to Serbian or Croatian Bosnians also contributed to their dominance (Lukic and Nikitovic 2004, 89).
After elections in Bosnia in 1990 a new multiparty government was formed out of the three winning parties, the Bosnian Party of Democratic Action, the Serbian Democratic Party and the Croatian Democratic Union. The leading political offices were distributed between the three ethnically based parties, placing the presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Bosnian hands, the presidency of the parliament in Serbian hands and delegating the office of Prime Minister to a Croatian. President Alija Izetbegovic had earned a reputation as a Muslim political activist, having written a treatise on Islam and modernization for which he had been imprisoned under the Tito regime (O’Ballance 1995, 3). The republishing of his “Islamic Declaration” in 1990 provoked intense criticism especially among Serbs. The work was a general treatise on Islam in modern society and politics and did not even address the Bosnian state, whose Muslim population of two million was “among the most secularized Muslim populations in the world” (Malcolm 1994, 219-20). Still, Serbian propagandists represented the document as a “blueprint for the transformation of Bosnia into a fundamentalist Islamic state” (Ibid.).

Encouraged by the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence, the Bosnian Assembly broke away from the central government in Belgrade in October 1991, causing Serb and Croatian members of parliament to proclaim new and independent ethnic communities within Bosnia. February 1992 ended with a Bosnian referendum on independence, which passed despite being boycotted by Serbs. Independence was declared on March 3, 1992 and in early April the new Bosnian state was recognized by the USA, the EU and Switzerland. Widespread international recognition, however, was not enough to sustain this new state in a hostile environment. Effectively supported only by the Bosnian Muslim community, and challenged by the militarily stronger Serbs and Croats, Bosnia’s independence stood on extremely shaky ground.

Serb forces immediately responded with military power to the declaration of independence, as they had done in Croatia. Mostly due to the well-armed and well-organized Yugoslavian People’s Army (JNA) under Serbian leadership and exclusive access to the arsenals located in Serb territory, the Serbs were highly superior to the Bosnian Muslims in terms of military power (O’Ballance 1995, 29). Furthermore, the United Nations arms embargo on Yugoslavia prevented the Bosnian Muslims from
acquiring arms even after the West had recognized Bosnia as an independent state (Malcolm 1994, 243).

Civilian casualties of the Bosnian War were of a scope and nature unheard of since the Second World War. Non-Serb civilians were attacked, captured and placed in detention centers and concentration camps. Houses were burned out and ransacked, and mosques were destroyed. Thousands fell victim to horrific massacres committed by both Serb and Croatian groups, and women and girls were systematically raped. The Bosnian Muslims were the largest victim group of the Bosnian war, though Croats also fell victim to ethnic cleansing campaigns to create an ethnically pure Serb state in Bosnia. At the same time, however, the Serb population of central Bosnia and Herzegovina, in places such as Sarajevo, was forced to migrate in high numbers to the Serb-held areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has issued estimates of 25,000 to 50,000 military and 20,000 civilian deaths as well as 30,000 disappearances. These figures coincide with the minimal estimates of the International Red Cross (Kenney 1999, 523). According to the Research Center in Sarajevo, the institute administering the "Bosnian Book of Dead" database, the number of casualties in Bosnia peaked in 1992 and again in 1995.

The European governments were shaken by the magnitude of the war in the Balkans and by its proximity to their countries. The location of the war and the media visibility of the atrocities being committed in their backyard impelled many western European governments to launch humanitarian assistance programs immediately after the outbreak of violence in the summer of 1991 (Meier 2006, 183). Humanitarian aid was delivered to Bosnia by many organizations including the Red Cross, the UNHCR, Medecins sans Frontiers, and countless small voluntary aid groups including Merhamet, the largest Muslim relief agency (O’Ballance 1995, 97; 227). Unfortunately, the humanitarian relief effort was hampered by political disputes and non-cooperation especially between the large international organizations and smaller ethnically based groups, and by the intervention of local militia (O’Ballance 1995, 227; Malcolm 1994, 247).

In contrast to the humanitarian response, the international community’s political and military response was weak (Malcolm 1994, 241). Appeals from Izetbegovic for UN intervention were unsuccessful (O’Ballance 1995, 28). Instead of the United Nations it was the European Community which initially took the lead in organizing an international
observation force (Meier 2006, 137). In June 1992 the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) expanded its activities into Bosnia. The main objective of the UNPROFOR operation was to protect the Sarajevo International Airport, to protect humanitarian aid convoys and to assist in the delivery of relief in Bosnia and Herzegovina (O’Ballance 1995, 98; Meier 2006, 132-33). On April 12, 1993 the NATO commenced Operation Deny Flight to enforce a no-fly zone. No ground troops were sent, however. Motivated by attacks in Srebrenica, which killed a number of civilians including children and whose images were broadcast by global media, UNPROFOR’s role was further extended in the spring of 1993 with a mission to protect he UN declared “safe areas” around Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Zepa and Bihac (Burg and Shoup 1999, 149).

Switzerland’s participation in the international operation in the conflict zones was modest. On the one hand, legal constraints and domestic pressure to protect Switzerland’s neutrality categorically made the deployment of armed troops impossible and the deployment of unarmed troops difficult. Precedence for Swiss military peacekeeping and support activities abroad had been set in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and the Middle East (UNTSO). However, these activities were not state-sponsored missions as envisioned by the proponents of a Swiss military deployment to the Balkans (Meier 2006, 138).  

On the other hand, Switzerland felt considerable political pressure to contribute in some substantial form to the international effort in order to maintain and promote its credibility and international reputation (Meier 2006, 137; 140). With four hundred thousand Yugoslavians living in Switzerland, the issue was also a matter of security and economic interest for the state (Meier 2006, 143). In anticipation of a United Nations request for military support, interdepartmental discussions were initiated between the Swiss Federal Offices for Development Aid and International Organizations and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense on November 29, 1991. The anticipated UN request arrived on January 7, 1992 (Meier 2006, 142).

The achievement of a legal basis for the deployment of Swiss UN peacekeeping force was not the only obstacle. As the military representatives stated, the Swiss military had few adequately trained soldiers available for this type of operation. The only properly trained military observation troops were stationed in Western Sahara as part of

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25 MINURSO, for example, was regulated by private contracts (Meier 2006, 138).
MINRUSO. Thanks to a planned deployment of the Swiss peacekeeping force (Blue Helmets) scheduled for 1994, an additional group of soldiers was confirmed as deployable only beginning 1995 and a second group could be trained during the course of the following year (Meier 2006, 141). As peacekeeping units, these troops would be authorized for operations only in neighboring regions or in secondary conflict zones, but not in the regions where fighting was taking place. Because the cantons could not put together a large enough force on short notice, a Swiss Civil Police Monitor force could not be provided (Meier 2006, 145).

The pool of medical personnel was also limited - no resources could be made available immediately. The Disaster Relief Corps had sufficient staff and logistical resources, but lacked sufficient funds to establish a medical center. A maximum of twenty people could be transferred from Western Sahara to the Balkans, but no earlier than February 20, 1992. The preparation and training of new medical staff would take a minimum of three months (Meier 2006, 141). By the summer of 1992 six Swiss military observers had been deployed to former Yugoslavia, the majority had been transferred from other missions in the Middle East and Western Sahara. Forty UNIMOG off-road vehicles had been donated and additional vehicles were also being supplied to the UN (Meier 2006, 147).

The humanitarian assistance delivered by Switzerland, led by the Office for Development and Humanitarian Assistance (DEH) in collaboration with the Swiss Disaster Relief Fund was extensive. The relief program for the victims of former Yugoslavia was the largest ever administered by Switzerland (Meier 2006, 186). The regular budget since the foundation of the DEH grew from year to year. In June 1991 the four-year budget rose to just above one billion Swiss Francs (Meier 2006, 188). The extent of the relief program is evidence for Switzerland’s interest in keeping the refugee flows to neighboring countries of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia by contributing to relief on site (Meier 2006, 188-89). This was further made clear by its decision to renew the visa requirement for all citizens of Yugoslavia after nearly thirty years of free travel between the two countries (Meier 2006, 188-9).

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26 This was in line with the Federal Council’s plan to allow Swiss peacekeepers to join UN operations. However, a referendum on this issue was rejected by 57% of Swiss voters in June 1994 (Federal Chancellery 2009).
Flight from Yugoslavia: The Refugee Crisis

The complex process of disintegration of the Yugoslavian state led to the largest refugee movement in Europe since the Second World War (Goeke 2007a, 578; Holzer et al 2000b, 1193; Lukic and Nikitovic 2004, 86). A total of 2.2 million people, amounting to more than half of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, are estimated to have been either internally or externally displaced by the war (Ghebali, 239; UNHCR 1998). Despite the scope of this crisis, the response of the receiving countries to accommodate the refugees was limited as the Balkan migration of the 1990s coincided with a period of major changes in asylum and migration politics in western Europe and many states were reluctant to open their doors.

Before the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia, European governments typically granted permanent protection to refugees, even though international law guarantees protection only until conditions suitable for a “return in safety and dignity” are restored (Kenney 1999, 531). However, with the arrival of the first Bosnians in 1991, many western European governments implemented an alternative temporary asylum status (Kumin 1999, 531). Severe scrutiny was applied in the definition of refugees according to Convention criteria, to the extent that very few Bosnians were actually admitted as recognized “convention refugees”. With the important exception of Germany, which kept its borders open to Bosnian asylum seekers, almost all western European states systematically applied new visa requirements for Bosnians (Kumin 1999, 531).

International law does not specifically cover the temporary refugee status and no consensus exists on whether or not temporary refugees are eligible for the rights guaranteed to refugees by Convention definition. This gap in the law gives large discretion to states to design the extent of protection granted to foreigners admitted under the temporary asylum status (Kumin 1999, 531). In most cases, this discretion was not exercised in favor of the Balkan refugees. In many countries the arrivals could choose between submitting a formal and individual application for asylum with a low chance of acceptance, or accepting the temporary protection status, which often disqualified them from the normal asylum process later on (Kumin 1999, 531).27

27 In Germany and Norway, for example, acceptance rates of ordinary asylum applications lay between 1 and 1.3% in the early 1990s (Kenney 1999, 531).
As of 2004, Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the leading countries of refugee origin in the world (Lukic and Nikitovic 2004, 86). Three weeks after the outbreak of war in April 1992, 300,000 Bosnians had crossed the border to Croatia, Serbia, or Montenegro. By June 1992 this number had risen to 750,000 - one month later to over 1 million (Vetter and Melcic 1999, 528). Between 1992 and 1995 over 1.2 million people are estimated to have left Bosnia Herzegovina and traveled abroad, including the successor states of former Yugoslavia (Vetter and Melcic 1999, 528). In 1994 the UNHCR reported 1.6 million recognized and humanitarian refugees from Bosnia Herzegovina (UNHCR 1994, Tables 5, Table 7). Over the course of the Bosnian crisis an estimated 600,000 to 800,000 Bosnians received some form of permanent or temporary asylum within western Europe (FOR 1996a, 11; Vetter and Melcic 1999, 528). Almost half of these refugees were taken in by Germany. Austria took in over 86,000 refugees and Sweden admitted over 60,000. 25,000 went to Switzerland, 24,000 to the Netherlands, approximately 20,000 to Denmark, 15,000 to France and over 12,000 were admitted by Norway. Outside of Europe, the United States admitted 42,000, Canada 38,000 and Australia 24,000 (Vetter and Melcic 1999, 528). Though usually excluded from reports of the Balkan refugee movement, the number of internally displaced within Bosnia was also immense. Around one million people fled within Bosnia Herzegovina (Vetter and Melcic 1999, 528). In November 1998, 860,000 of these Bosnians still had not returned home (Vetter and Melcic 1999, 529).

As opposed to the refugee wave generated by the Croatian war and earlier tensions in Kosovo, the Bosnian refugee crisis could not be contained within the Balkan region (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 72). Though a large part of the refugees were taken in by family members and friends, not all refugees could be provided for on a private basis. The immediate neighbors of the war-torn territories suffered from economic poverty and did not have the capacity to accommodate the massive refugee flows. The building of new housing units and the restoration of existing infrastructure depended on assistance from the international community, whose resources were also called upon for food, medical supplies and medical assistance. Though western European governments were better equipped than the immediate neighbors to provide the assistance needed, the response was sluggish. No government appeared to have anticipated the crisis and was

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28 These numbers only include people traveling outside of the borders of Yugoslavia. They do not include internally displaced within Bosnia, but do include Bosnians in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (UNHCR 1994).
prepared for the magnitude of the refugee movement. Evacuation and humanitarian assistance efforts were delayed by disagreements over the status of the refugees (Goeke 2007a, 583). It was even unclear whether the UNHCR, the leading international body representing the rights of refugees, would take on the responsibility of managing the Balkan refugee crisis (ibid.).

Migration from Yugoslavia to other parts of Europe was not a new phenomenon. Since the 1960s Yugoslavian workers had been migrating to countries of west, central and northern Europe for employment. Migrant networks developed in many European cities over the course of several decades. Because the earlier European recruitment of Yugoslavian workers during the 1960s and 1970s usually targeted certain areas of Yugoslavia, concentrations of ethnic groups developed in many European countries. These networks served as a valuable resource for the 1990s migrants, many of whom were able to join family members and acquaintances who had already established themselves in the host societies (Goeke 2007b, 733).

The weakness of statistical data on migration from an international perspective makes it difficult to give an accurate and comprehensive picture of the status of migration from former Yugoslavia since 1991. Demographic statistics and reporting vary significantly from country to country, making comparative analyses virtually impossible. In addition, the majority of Balkan migrants on the temporary asylum status were given permits, which did not distinguish them from other (economic) migrants. Further, most receiving states only record national membership and do not record ethnic background and do not provide data on specific origin within former Yugoslavia or ethnic or religious group membership (Goehke 2007a, 578).

As with any migrant or refugee population, reasons for migration and flight can only be surmised through anecdotal evidence. A number of studies have been conducted in Swiss institutes of higher education, which provide first-person accounts of specific phases of the Bosnia-Switzerland migration (see for example Sieber and Scholer 2001, Morlok and Jufer 1997, Walker 1997 and Kreis and Venzi 1998). According to these findings impulses for flight varied from loss of family members, break-up of families, lack of employment and education opportunities, future anticipation of employment and education crises, to destruction of infrastructure. For some individuals the war constituted a direct threat to physical life, for others the main motive was simply a fear of an escalation of violence (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 72). People of lower social
status generally fled within the borders of their republic or city, or sought refuge in neighboring countries. People with better social status and more resources tended to chose destinations abroad (UNHCR 1997, 5; Sieber and Scholer 2001, 73).

Social relationships were one of the most important resources for the refugees. Relocations to foreign destinations, especially in cases where there was no direct threat to life, could frequently be attributed simply to the availability of social ties abroad (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 73). Relocation often took place in several steps (UNHCR 1997, 5). The first leg of the journey was usually carefully planned and prepared for, only to be followed by a reluctant decision to embark on a further journey to unfamiliar foreign destinations (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 73).

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Accords) was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995 and created a new political and national organization of Bosnia Herzegovina under the auspices of the international community (effectively the NATO, UN and OCSE). Though military security was guaranteed by the agreement, the parties to the agreement continued to pursue their own incompatible interests by other means (Burg and Shoup 1999, 318). In effect the peace framework had limited power to enforce personal freedoms and to protect the lives of civilians and internally displaced people. The framework redrew the map of Bosnia, dividing the country into two separate ethnic territories, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which the majority of cantons were Muslim or Croatian dominated and the Republic of Srpska where Serb-dominated cantons constituted the majority. The creation of contiguous Serb, Muslim and Croat territories required a change of rule in a number of municipalities. This was regulated in such a way that for each municipality in which such a change of rule occurred, a corresponding municipality was made available for refugees of Serbian or Bosnian Muslim heritage to relocate, generating a type of “organized voluntary migration” (Lukic and Nikitovic 2004, 90).

Another form of “organized voluntary migration” was adopted in Europe following the signing of the Dayton Accords. Repatriation of refugees had been a central element of the peace negotiations and was supposed to serve as a basis for the future of the multiethnic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and for a reversal of ethnic cleansing (Goeke 2007a, 581; Sieber and Scholer 2001, 132). A timeline of restoration projects was fixed in order to create conditions suitable for return as early as 1996 and into 1997. It was expected that 200,000 to 800,000 Bosnians living in western Europe would be
repatriated (FOR 1996a, 11). Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands all planned to begin repatriation in 1996 (Goeke 2007a, 581).

When restoration failed to proceed as quickly as planned Austria, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands extended the return deadlines. Germany, which conducted the most rigorous repatriation campaign of the receiving states, extended its deadline only until October 1, 1996 (FOR 1996c, 13). Having admitted almost all asylum applicants who arrived at the German border, Germany was keen on implementing repatriation and completed its program already in 2001 (Goeke 2007a, 581; Rühl and Lederer 2001, 49). Three years after the signing of the Dayton Accords, almost one quarter of the internally and externally displaced Bosnians had returned to their previous homes in Bosnia Herzegovina (Vetter and Melcic 1999, 529).

Crisis Moment: The Integration of Bosnian Refugees in Switzerland

Arrival in Switzerland

The reception of the Balkan refugees of the 1990s, the largest migrant group to come to Switzerland since World War II was characterized by cautious openness. The Swiss state recognized the refugees’ plight and granted asylum to approximately thirty thousand refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina (FOR 1997b, 21). Significantly owing to the Balkan refugee wave, Switzerland has become one of the leading OECD countries in terms of asylum immigration per capita (UNHCR 2009, 9). However, it was made clear since the first submissions of applications from Bosnia that the protection and rights offered to these refugees would be temporary. Asylum was not supposed to evolve into long-term residence. This message was reconfirmed most forcefully in April 1996 when the Swiss Federal Council announced its return policy program.

The group referred to in this paper as the Bosnian refugees can be divided into three commonly used categories in Swiss asylum literature. The first group are the “quota refugees”, admitted under a group-specific asylum policy. These individuals are accepted collectively for humanitarian reasons because of their affiliation with a

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29 Reported numbers of Bosnian refugees vary widely by reporting institute. For example, the UNHCR reported 3,200 Yugoslavian refugees in Switzerland in 1994. The Swiss authorities, however, report 3,943 quota refugees in 1994, and 5,716 temporary refugees by individual application (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 88). UNHCR data typically refers only to the number of quota refugees, who receive temporary asylum as a collective group.
particular national, ethnic or religious group. The Bosnians were the first larger group to receive collective asylum in a scope comparable to the 1950s Hungarian refugees (Negele and Pfändler 1994, 429). Of course the important distinguishing factor between the Hungarians and the Bosnians was that the former were admitted as permanent residents and the latter received only temporary asylum. The second group are the asylum seekers who submitted individual applications for asylum. In the case of the Bosnian refugees, these individuals received the same temporary protection as the first group based on Switzerland’s Bosnia policy. The third group is the group of recognized refugees by international law definition, also referred to as “convention refugees”. These are asylum seekers, whose refugee status is recognized by Convention law and who receive permanent asylum. Not only new arrivals, but also a number of Bosnians already residing in Switzerland benefited at least temporarily from Switzerland’s Bosnia policy. For a number of Bosnian residents of Switzerland, whose permits expired between September 1992 and August 1996, return orders were temporarily revoked and were not reinstated until April 30, 1996 (Federal Office for Refugees 1996b, 11).

The arrival of Bosnian refugees in Switzerland occurred over the course of several years. Bosnian asylum applications were first submitted in 1991 and peaked in 1993 at almost 7,000 new individual applications. This made up over one third of the applications from the territories of former Yugoslavia and over one fourth of asylum applications overall (Federal Statistical Office). By the end of 1996 almost 23,000 Bosnians had received some type of asylum. Around 5,000 received long-term residence permits (recognized refugees) and around 16,000 received temporary permits (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 89). The proportion of Bosnian applicants for asylum among former Yugoslav applicants dropped sharply after 1995, when the Dayton Accords were reached and conflicts in Kosovo intensified. From 1991 to 1996 individuals from former Yugoslavia made up the largest group of asylum applicants, such that asylum trends in Switzerland were largely determined by this one group alone (Holzer et al. 2000a, 1192).

30 Since the late 1960s Switzerland has accepted a number of small quotas by own initiative and by UNHCR request. These include 200 handicapped and elderly individuals (1970), 216 Ugandan Asians (1976), 250 Chileans (1973), 1,000 Vietnamese (1975), 8000 Indochinese (partly Boat People) (1977-81) and 1,000 Poles in 1982 (Negele and Pfändler 1994, 427-28). Apart from the Balkan refugees, only small quotas of Ethiopians, Sudanese, Tunisians, Somalis, Iraqis and Iranians were accepted in the early 1990s.

31 In comparison, 12,268 applications were lodged during the same period for all other groups from former Yugoslavia, including Serbs, Croats and Kosovo Albanians. 24,739 applications were submitted overall. The next largest groups in 1993 were Somalis, Albanians, Sri Lankans and Turks.
The attractiveness of Switzerland to Balkan refugees can be explained by geographic proximity and by close ties between Yugoslavia and Switzerland as a result of decades of labor recruitment and networks that facilitated migration (Holzer et al. 2000, 1193). Between 1980 and 2000 the Yugoslavian population in Switzerland grew dramatically. In the seven years between 1990 and 1997 the number of residents from former Yugoslavian republics in Switzerland, including asylum seekers and family reunification migrants, grew by 124% to 350'300 (Federal Statistical Office 1997, 12). The Swiss permit system does not distinguish between temporary asylum seekers and other foreign temporary residents. However, it is estimated that within this Yugoslavian community refugees and asylum seekers made up at most 10% and that the main reason for this population growth continued to be economic migration (Federal Statistical Office 1997, 12). As a result of the legal framework and decades of migration between the two countries, the Balkan refugee of the 1990s and Balkan labor migrant since the 1960s have merged together in public and political discourse to create a large, coherent and very visible foreigner community of “Ex-Yugoslavians”.

Ties between Switzerland and Yugoslavia reach back into the late nineteenth century. An agreement between Switzerland and Yugoslavia concerning the free movement of people was first signed in 1888, effectively giving Yugoslavians equal rights as Swiss citizens outside of their canton of residence (Gross 2006, 7). Relations between Yugoslavia and Switzerland were very close, owing at first to exchanges in the cultural and scientific fields, especially in the university cities of Lausanne and Zurich (Mikic 2003, 159). Toward the late nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, relations in the medical and humanitarian fields intensified. Swiss medical professionals served actively in a number of Balkan military conflicts, including the Serbian-Turkish war (1876-1878), the Serb-Bulgarian War (1885-1886) and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913 and 1913) (Mikic 2003, 160). In exchange Serbia was one of the first states to sign the Red Cross Convention (Mikic 2003, 160). Switzerland also took in several thousands of Serb prisoners of war from Germany and Italy during the Second World War (Mikic 2003, 161). Nonetheless, Yugoslavia never achieved agreements with Switzerland for preferential treatment of its seasonal labor force which had been reached with Italy, Spain and Portugal (Gross 2006, 6).

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32 The terms “Ex-Yugoslavia” and Ex-Yugoslavian” have been declared as discriminatory by the Swiss Press Committee (Swiss Press Committee 2000). Still, their use persists.

33 This refers to the 1888 Settlement and Consular Agreement between Switzerland and Serbia
Prohibitions on emigration put an end to Yugoslavian migration to Switzerland shortly after the end Second World War. Emigrating citizens were considered as traitors by the authorities of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and only few were able to travel outside legally (Mikic 2003, 161). Sparked by rising unemployment, a policy shift began to take place in the early to mid 1960s. Actively recruiting Yugoslavian workers, Switzerland implemented a visa waiver program in 1968 (Gross 2006, 10). Economic crises in the 1980s and 1990s coupled with discriminatory policies against Kosovo Albanians in the 1980s drove thousands of Yugoslavians to Europe (Mikic 2003, 162). Though the majority of the Yugoslavian laborers in western Europe lived and worked in Germany and Austria, tens of thousands accepted employment in Switzerland (Gross 2006, 10). Money transfers in form of remittances constituted a significant source of revenue for Yugoslavia (Mikic 2003, 162). Close relations between Switzerland and Yugoslavia persisted into the 1980s. Yugoslavian migrants were appreciated and sought after as hardworking, well-educated and well-trained professionals. They were seen as easily integrated and drew little attention to themselves (Mikic 2003, 165; Boskovska 2000, 2647).

In 1970 between 23,000 and 25,000 Yugoslavian workers on short-term labor permits resided in Switzerland. This represented only 2.3% of the total foreign population (Gross 2006, 3; Mikic 2003, 165). However, these numbers began to climb dramatically in the 1980s and have continued to climb since. By 2003 the citizens from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro and Slovenia had surpassed the Italians as the largest foreign national group in Switzerland, accounting for almost one quarter of the total foreign population (Gross 2006, 9). The formerly invisible community of Yugoslavian workers, especially in comparison to the Italians and Southern Europeans, became a highly visible group, not only in terms of numbers, but also in terms of demographics. The Yugoslavians underwent a transformation from “model foreigners” into “one of the most unpopular foreigner groups in Switzerland” (Mikic 2003, 165).

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34 In 1973, of 1.1 million Yugoslavians living abroad, 900,000 lived in western Europe. Switzerland hosted 31,578 Yugoslavian workers as long-term residents (one-year or ten-year permits) and 3,362 as seasonal permit holders (Gross 2006, 10).

35 Around 200,000 Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia came to Switzerland in the late 1980s and 1990s. By 2000, almost 10% of the former population of Kosovo and Macedonia was living in Switzerland (Boskovska 2000, 2648).
Economic and political changes in Yugoslavia in the 1980s greatly impacted the demographics of the migrating population. With time, more and more people from the poorest parts of Yugoslavian and with low skill and education levels joined the migration to Switzerland (Mikic 2003, 167). By 1990 more than half of employed individuals in Switzerland with Yugoslavian origin were either low or semi-skilled laborers (Boskovska 2000, 2648). A considerable part of the growth of the Yugoslavian community can be attributed to family reunification. Many workers who had come to Switzerland in the 1980s became eligible for long-term permits and family reunification after their ten-year waiting period had passed. Especially in cities and surrounding municipalities, Swiss schools began to record dramatic rises in Yugoslavian students (Mikic 2003, 167). The overforeignization of classrooms was not only attributable to an increase in foreign children, but mostly to a decrease in Swiss children of school age (FOR 1997a, 4). By 1999 every ninth child in the Zurich public school system was from former Yugoslavia (Mikic 2003, 168).

The refugee flow from the Balkans in the early 1990s occurred during a period of transition in Switzerland’s migration history. Since the end of the Second World War and the arrival of Eastern refugees, asylum had been accepted by the public as a respectable charitable practice. Among the Swiss population acceptance toward quota policies was widespread until the mid 1980s (Negele and Pfändler 1994, 427). In fact, in many cases the public felt that the authorities did not do enough to accommodate people in need. The proportion of refugees or temporarily accepted asylum seekers to other foreigners was seen as neglectful.

A number of foreign labor-related initiatives were debated and voted on between 1970 and 1990, including the “Schwarzenbach Initiative” and “Überfremdung Initiative” in 1970 and 1974 respectively. All of these initiatives were rejected, indicating that the majority of the Swiss public agreed with the contemporary legislation and felt that government policy sufficiently controlled and stabilized foreigner migration and effectively prevented unemployment (Negele and Pfändler 1994, 428-29). However, the public was not as content about the state’s control over the asylum domain.

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36 Of all foreign students in Zurich City’s public schools in 1999/2000, 43% were from Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, among students unable to find employment or apprenticeships after completing their basic education, the number with Yugoslavian origin is also very high (Milcic, 168).

As a result of growing numbers of asylum seekers in the 1980s and the overwhelming backlog of pending cases, the federal authorities began to consider new asylum legislation (Negele and Pfändler 1994, 430). During the course of the 1980s, asylum had begun to move into the political spotlight and to climb higher on the urgency scale. In a 1989 public opinion poll conducted by GfS social research institute, 75% of Swiss respondents identified asylum as an “urgent policy problem” (Risi 1989). Not just the numbers, but also changing demographics made asylum a visible political issue in Switzerland. Until 1974, asylum seekers had come mainly from Eastern European countries including Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (Negele and Pfändler 1994, 417-454). Since the mid 1970s African, Asian, Latin American and Middle Eastern countries replaced the sending countries from the Eastern Bloc.

Since 1968 the Swiss state had been trying to better anchor the state's control and regulatory powers in asylum policy, especially with respect to the selectivity of refugees (Holzer 2000, 1184). Revisions of the Asylum Law in 1984, 1988 and 1990 and other reforms in the form of executive orders and urgent federal resolutions contributed to an acceleration of the asylum process, an expansion of the asylum institutions and placed various new restrictions related to employment of asylum seekers and refugees. Changes were also apparent in the discretion of the authorities. Until the 1970s asylum decisions had generally been made in favor of the foreigner (Negele and Pfändler 1994, 429). In this new climate however, rejection rates began to rise. After 1988 asylum seekers could no longer choose the canton where they would apply, but were placed according to a quota scheme which ensured an even distribution of asylum cases across the country (Holzer et al. 2000a, 259). For the first time, in 1983 more applications were rejected than accepted (Negele and Pfändler 1994, 429). Between 1987 and 1991 the acceptance rates dropped further from 10 percent to 3 percent (Holzer et al. 2000a, 253). The Swiss Bosnia policy brought the rates back up to 12 percent (Federal Statistical Office 1997, 60)

Integration Management: Facilitating Return

The arrival of the Bosnian refugees constitutes a “crisis moment” in Swiss migration politics because it forced a significant redefinition and realignment of asylum policy. The arrival of the Bosnian migrants also marked the beginning of a new phase of
integration management in Switzerland with a new temporary asylum status and the implementation of a comprehensive repatriation program.

Under the revised asylum policy of the 1990s most Bosnian refugees received residency permits for one year at a time. The duration of the conflict in the Balkans forced the Swiss authorities to extend the annual permits from year to year until the Dayton Accords politically justified the return of the refugees in 1996. Naturally, the temporary status produced immense insecurity for the refugees and created basic structural obstacles to integration (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 83). The establishment of roots in the host country was discouraged by the fact that asylum could be withdrawn at any time. In general, the course of integration experienced by migrants with long-term permits is not accessible to migrants on short-term permits. Hence it is structurally impossible for refugees and short-term migrants to achieve the level of integration expected of “well integrated immigrants”.

Timeline and central elements

On April 3, 1996 the federal government repealed its collective temporary acceptance of Bosnian refugees (Federal Council 1997, 742). The return of the individuals from Bosnia-Herzegovina was to proceed in two groups, according to civil status and family structure (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 133). Around 18,000 or around 78% of all Bosnians living in Switzerland were impacted by the return ruling (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 135). Beginning on April 30, 1996 – less than thirty days following the decision – temporary L and F permits of Bosnian individuals expired and were no longer extended. For families with children and unaccompanied minors permits were renewed for one year only, until April 30, 1997. As of the date of permit expiration, a three-month grace period is generally granted before a foreigner is subject to deportation. Thus, the effective deadlines for return were August 31, 1996 for individuals without children (affecting 8,000 people) and August 31, 1997 for individuals and couples with children and minors (affecting 10,000 people). In early summer 1996 the foreigner police and the Federal Office for Foreigners sent out notifications to Bosnians with certain permit categories (F, L and N) which stated the departure deadlines of August 31, 1996 and August 31, 1997 respectively, and encouraging them to contact the foreigner police for travel arrangements (Walker 1997, Appendix 2).
Only a few weeks later the repatriation timeline was adjusted. On June 26, 1996 in response to a planned Federal Council reassessment of the conditions with regards to the restoration of peace and order in Bosnia, the decision of April was repealed (FOR 1996a, 11). Statements from various institutions, including the Swiss Ministry of Justice and Police, suggested that conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina were not improving as quickly as expected and that most of the criteria defined by UNHCR as necessary for repatriation had not yet been fulfilled (FOR 1996a, 12). Though the military goals of the Dayton Agreement had been achieved, other matters including amnesty, the protection of human rights and the freedom of movement were not yet resolved (Lautenschütz 1996). Furthermore, not enough housing was available to accommodate all returnees. A trip by FOR director, Urs Scheidegger, confirmed these findings (FOR 1996a, 11-12). According to Federal Council member Arnold Koller, under the current circumstances, a return in “security and dignity” as stipulated by UNHCR was not deemed possible (FOR 1996a, 12). Unless a new assessment of the situation planned for March 1997 should indicate otherwise, a new deadline of April 30, 1997 would apply for individuals and couples without children.

Immediately after the signing of the Dayton Accords, a number of international organizations and human rights groups had warned about the risks of premature repatriation (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 134). Some relief organizations had proposed that the refugees abroad should be repatriated only after the internally displaced people had returned to their homes. Furthermore given the precarious conditions in some regions and cities even three years after Dayton, the return timelines should pay consideration to ethnic group and domicile (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 134-35). Leading representatives and local authorities in the Republic Srpska, for example, had clearly communicated to the UNHCR that there would be no repatriations of Bosniaks and Croats to their territory (Kumin 1999, 532).

Nonetheless, in January 1997 the Federal Council reconfirmed that conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina were safe for return (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 134). It was acknowledged that no one should be forced to return to areas where his or her ethnic group was in the minority, a problem which concerned a majority of Bosnians in Switzerland. According to various surveys conducted by charity organizations and return counseling offices, the majority of Bosnians living in Switzerland were originally from Serbian or Croatian dominated areas (Baumgartner 1997; Morlok and Jufer 1997, 24).
To resolve this dilemma, the federal authorities referred to the option of returning to a temporary domicile in the home country, an option which effectively reinforced the map created by ethnic cleaning and lead to continued internal displacement (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 134).

In the middle of April 1997, the Federal Council extended the deadline for the first returnees once more by three months (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 135). As the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* reported in 1997 the motives behind this decision were less of humanitarian than of administrative nature: the return enforcement process was being delayed first and foremost because of resource shortages in the responsible Swiss institutions (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 135).

The Bosnia repatriation program was one of the most extensive repatriation programs implemented in the receiving countries of western Europe and the most comprehensive country-specific program implemented in Switzerland (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 91). The Swiss program was widely recognized as a success within the international community, including Bosnian government authorities. By May 1997 2,300 Bosnians had returned under the program and 1,800 had registered for participation in the following year (FOR 1997b, 23).

Since the first arrivals of Bosnian refugees at the end of 1991 the legal basis for temporary collective asylum had already been largely developed (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 85). However, the incorporation of temporary collective asylum into the permit structure, including the legal status of refugees, had yet to be resolved. The first step to resolving this matter was the creation of the category of “humanitarian refugee”. This category made it possible to allocate rights to people fleeing war-type situations under the permit system, without giving them long-term access to labor market and settlement.

The classification scheme for foreigners in Switzerland in the 1990s was defined by the Foreign Nationals Act 1931. Most seasonal workers, the classical “guest-workers”, who typically held jobs in construction, tourism and low skilled professions, received A-permits. These permits were tied to a work contract, were issued by a specific canton and limited residence in Switzerland to a maximum of nine months. Annual quotas regulated the number of such permits issued per canton. The other short-term permit, the L-permit was granted for short-term stays of nine months or more and was originally intended for training and education or for long-term guest-worker contracts (FOR 1995, 3).
Long-term residence in Switzerland was regulated with B and C permits. The C-permit, the permanent settlement permit, gave the foreigner the same rights as Swiss citizens, with the exception of the right to vote. This permit could be granted to foreigners who had resided in Switzerland for ten or more years or to spouses of Swiss citizens with five or more years of residence. Foreign citizens who lived in Switzerland on a long-term basis, but did not yet qualify for settlement permits generally held B-permits. This residence permit was issued for one-year periods and could be extended annually. Such permits were subject to industrial regulations and cantonal quotas and limited job changes and relocation across cantons. Family reunification was permitted for B-permit holders after one year (FOR 1995, 3). Historically, the growth of the foreign population living in Switzerland has been directly regulated by the B-permit quota (Gross 2006, 6).38

Refugee-specific permits do not exist under Swiss law. Many Bosnians fleeing the war qualified for one of the before-mentioned permits, depending on their professional qualifications, relationship to long-term migrants in Switzerland (i.e. family reunification) and severity of their asylum claim. Refugees in Switzerland can fall into one of three legal categories or refugee types (Kälin and Achermann 1992).39 The first type is the legal refugee (“convention refugee”), as defined by the 1979 Swiss Asylum Law (Art. 3 and revisions) and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Art. 1A par 2).40 The second type is the so-called de-facto refugee, who is protected in international law by the principle of non-refoulement as defined in the 1951 Convention (Art. 33) and the 1974 European Convention on Human Rights. These refugees are not recognized refugees, either because no asylum application was made or because an asylum application was rejected. However, international law prohibits states from sending them back home because of severe threats in their home country.41 Legal refugees and de facto refugees are generally granted permanent residence permits (B

38 Quotas varied from year to year. From 1970 to 1990 overall quotas for one-year permits (B-permits) varied between 8,500 in the early 1980s and 21,000 in 1970. Seasonal permits varied between 90,000 in 1998 and 200,000 in 1970 (Gross 2006, 6).

39 These legal categories do not necessarily correspond to the before-mentioned refugee types (see quota, individual and convention refugees, pp 64-5).

40 According to this definition, an individual must be a foreigner, for whom protection of his own state is unavailable (for example in another part of the home country), who is suffering from a severe threat to life and limb or freedom or from measures which produce “unbearable psychological pressure”. Further, the person must be persecuted on the basis of race, religion, nationality of affiliation with a particular social or political group (Achermann and Hausammann 1990, 25).

41 These include torture, “inhumane treatment”, and long or harsh imprisonment for political reasons (Achermann and Hausammann 1990, 91-2).
and C) (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 12.2). The third group is the humanitarian refugee, who qualifies neither as legal nor as de-facto refugee. Humanitarian protection is given especially in cases in which asylum claims are deemed legitimate, but for which the specific and direct threat criteria as defined by the 1951 Convention is missing. In effect, the humanitarian refugee category applies especially to persons fleeing because of a general threat of conflict or because of civil war. In Switzerland humanitarian refugees are typically granted short-term permits (F or L-permits) and may be granted long-term permits (B-permits) in special circumstances (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 12.2).

The 1979 Swiss Asylum law states that people may be taken in on a temporary basis if preliminary screening shows that asylum cannot be given, but that return is not possible, not permitted or not reasonable (Art. 9, 1). However, the form of protection of the humanitarian refugee is not anchored and regulated in the law and the decision to protect people fleeing from war or violent conflict is a purely political matter. In 1990 a revision of the Foreigner Nationals law had introduced the concept of humanitarian protection of refugee groups to Swiss policy, giving the Federal Council the power to order protection of certain groups beyond the legal framework. In these cases the Federal Council may decide whether a specific group should be admitted on humanitarian grounds, must lay out the criteria, which define membership in this group and must consult with the UNHCR and other receiving states (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 87).

The Bosnian case represented a dilemma for the Swiss authorities, who saw no means to admit thousands of Bosnians as regular refugees, but who at the same time recognized the political and legal risks of withholding protection. In December 1991 the Federal Council decided that temporary group protection would be given to Bosnian citizens. F-permits were granted for one year and could be renewed on an annual basis, as long as the conditions justifying temporary asylum remained valid (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 88). Because of the general threat of war, repression and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia Herzegovina, the majority of the Bosnians arriving in the early to mid 1990s qualified for the humanitarian refugee status.

Collective temporary asylum was granted to Bosnians in one of two ways. Bosnian citizens who traveled to Switzerland on their own initiative submitted individual applications for asylum. After the Federal Council decision relating to the collective protection of Bosnian citizens, these asylum applications were incorporated into the
collective asylum program if their application was not accepted (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 88). The chance of receiving positive asylum decisions was low. Nonetheless Bosnians had far better acceptance rates than other foreigner asylum seekers during this period. In 1996 around 29% of Bosnian individual applications for regular asylum were accepted (Federal Statistical Office 1997, 60).

The second path to collective temporary asylum was recruitment by the Swiss authorities. According to quotas set by the Federal Council, a certain number of Bosnian citizens were admitted automatically without having to formally apply for asylum. These numbers ranged from 4,759 in 1995 to 336 in 1998 (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 88). For these quota refugees the individual asylum process was blocked until the temporary protected status was lifted for their group (as was the case in April 1996).

Because of the many different statuses and permits, the 1996 ruling impacted Bosnian refugees in varying ways. Obviously C-permit holders were not affected by the deadlines. B-permit holders could remain in Switzerland unless their B-permit renewal failed. Certain F-permit holders, especially deserters, refusers of military service and witnesses in The Hague War Tribunal, for whom safety in Bosnia especially in terms of protection from harsh and long-term imprisonment could not be guaranteed in 1996, remained exempt from the return deadlines until conditions improved (Federal Council 1997, 742-43). The return order concerned only short-term residents, or refugees with L and F-permits.

As described above, the Swiss migration management system is characterized by a rigid permit system and differential treatment of foreigners. During the early to mid 1990s Swiss authorities found themselves under great pressure to compensate for Switzerland’s non-involvement in the developing network of European states. The merging of the permit system with the new foreign relations priorities produced what became known as the Three-Circle policy, a policy which linked immigration privileges to a hierarchy of nations. This had significant impacts on Yugoslavians residing in Switzerland.

The Swiss government was concerned to maintain open relations with its European neighbors despite its non-participation in the European Community (Gross 2006, 5). One important aspect of open relations was the free movement of people, especially of labor. The Three-Circle model conceptually positioned the states of the world in one of three rings around Switzerland. The inner circle included the EC and
EFTA states (later EU and EFTA), with whom Switzerland hoped to achieve a zone of free mobility. The middle circle included states outside of the EC and EFTA zone with whom Switzerland had traditionally had close labor relations, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Yugoslavia. Though subject to quantitative limitations, immigration was to be made easier for citizens of these states and benefits were offered in order to attract skilled workers. The outside circle included all other countries. Except for special cases, such as highly skilled labor, citizens from these countries would be excluded from labor and residence in Switzerland. In effect this policy severely restricted immigration from almost all countries outside of western Europe (Gross 2006, 4).

Over the course of the 1990s the model gradually developed into reality. Despite the rejection by popular vote of Switzerland’s entry into the European Union, Switzerland was able to negotiate a quasi-member status in 1999 and 2002 with two sets of bilateral treaties. Realignments with respect to the middle circle also took place. In September 1991 the bilateral agreements with Yugoslavia, originally positioned within the second circle due to its traditional role as a labor sending state, were cancelled on the grounds of Yugoslavia’s human rights record (Gross 2006, 8). The visa requirement for Yugoslavian citizens, waived since 1968, was reinstituted. Except for highly qualified individuals, Yugoslavian workers were longer eligible for short-term permit renewals and were forced to leave Switzerland once their residence period had run out (FOR 1996b, 7).

The Three-Circle model has faced strong criticism nationally as well as internationally due to its preferential treatment of nationals of western European and Anglo-Saxon countries (FOR 1996b, 7). The inherent logic of this model suggests that the utility and quality of people decreases the further out they stand in the rings. The idea that cultural distance to Switzerland is a reliable indicator for foreigners’ capacity to integrate is seen again and again in the discourse on foreigners of the 1990s, especially with respect to the new migrants from Balkan, African and Asian regions. As history scholar and President of the Swiss Federal Commission Against Racism, Georg Kreis points out, the Three-Circle model does not reflect, but creates realities to correspond

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42 In November 1998 the Three Circle model was replaced by a dual system, which distinguishes only between EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA states. Citizens of EU/EFTA states are given complete freedom of movement and citizens of other states are restricted from immigration, with exceptions for highly qualified labor.
with this hierarchy of foreigners (FOR 1996b, 6). By granting different privileges to European migrants and migrants from outer circle states the model produces widely divergent courses of integration. With their demotion from second circle to third circle, Yugoslavians temporarily residing in Switzerland suddenly faced entirely new conditions.

The Bosnia Reintegration Program

The Swiss policy of assisted voluntary return was not unique in Europe. In fact it was developed within a larger international framework for refugee policy led by the UNHCR and the International Office for Migration. The Swiss Bosnia Repatriation Program was in line with recommendations made by these leading international organizations, with key provisions of the Dayton Accords, and with the polices of other western European countries. Switzerland’s participation in the global effort to develop solutions to the migration crisis helped to strengthen its position as a global actor.

Voluntary return policies are one element of the durable solutions framework to the refugee problem. This framework developed in the 1970s and implemented by the international organizations includes three solutions: (1) local integration in neighboring countries, (2) resettlement in countries geographically, culturally and socio-economically removed from the conflict zone, and (3) eventual repatriation after the conflict. These policy options have framed the debate on the refugee problem since the early 1970s (Robinson and Coleman 2000).

Since the 1970s western governments have typically demonstrated a preference for the first solution of local resettlement in neighboring countries. The mass exodus resulting from the Vietnam War during the period 1979 to 1982 caused a policy shift in many countries, which began to consider third country resettlement as a viable solution. During this period the global distribution of quota refugees has been practiced with vigor in some cases, mostly because adjacent countries were not able or willing to take in the refugees (Robinson and Coleman 2000, 1218). Critics began to question the impacts of this policy in the mid 1980s, arguing that “transplantation in alien cultures” was inhumane (Robinson and Coleman 2000, 1219-20). This debate coincided with a phase of restrictive asylum policy-making in many European countries, which benefited morally and politically from such argumentation. However, in response to the Balkan crisis and the inability of adjacent countries to handle the mass refugee movements, many countries, which had declared third-country resettlement to be unworkable, returned to it
in the 1990s (Robinson and Coleman 2000, 1220). This policy, of course, was later coupled with the third solution, repatriation.

Repatriation is seen as a durable solution because it helps to preserve capacities and resources for people in acute need and thereby protects the credibility of asylum regulations and regular migration (IOM 2004, 8-9). Assisted voluntary return (AVR) programs are the preferred instruments of repatriation. These policies help to stem irregular migration and asylum abuse because they provide means for individuals who want (or need) to return home, but who lack the means to do so and would normally slip into irregular migration. Migrants benefit from the “humane alternative to deportation” (IOM 2008, 1) because the logistics of repatriation and reintegration into their country of origin is supported to a certain extent by third parties (i.e. sending states and international organizations). For the receiving state AVR is more cost effective and administratively expedient than forced return (IOM 2008, 1). AVR advocates also argue that the return of refugees and migrants contributes to the restoration of the state in the aftermath of conflicts, an argument that was a central element in the Dayton Framework for Peace (IOM 2004, 7-8).

The earliest AVR program was implemented in 1979 by the German state in cooperation with IOM. This “Reintegration and Emigration for Asylum Seekers in Germany” (REAG) program was followed by the “Government Assisted Repatriation Program” (GARP) in 1989 (Niessen and Schibel 2004, 4). These programs have been carried out mainly in Europe. As of April 2008 more than 1.4 million migrants were returned through AVR programs to 160 origin countries (IOM 2008, 2). The popularity of AVR in international migration management suggests that the meaning of asylum has fundamentally changed since the days in which the Refugee Convention came into effect. Today, the key element in asylum is temporariness - those who no longer require protection should be offered return and reintegration assistance.

A number of assisted voluntary return programs were implemented in Switzerland for several temporarily accepted groups in the 1990s and continue to be implemented to this day. Besides Bosnians, Sri Lankan, Turkish and Kosovo Albanian migrants have returned to their homes within the framework of return assistance programs. Since the beginning of 1997 more than sixty-five thousand people have participated in the assisted return programs offered by the Federal Office for Migration (FOM 2007).
The basic concept for the voluntary return of rejected asylum applicants was first developed by the FOR in 1993 in response to the large numbers of temporary Bosnian refugees. The Federal Council mandated the “Bosnia Reintegration Program” in June 1996, whose goal was to increase the number of returns, lower asylum-related welfare costs, reduce illegal migration and protect the credibility of Switzerland’s asylum policy (FOR 1999). The support of voluntary returns was supposed to reduce the numbers of cost and time intensive forced returns.

Assisted voluntary return programs are generally available to all refugees. However, certain circumstances demand the implementation of return assistance programs for specific groups (national, labor, refugee type). For the adoption of group-specific returns, various criteria are considered, including number of asylum applications, political situation in the country of origin, current situation regarding the enforcement of removal orders and willingness of the authorities in the origin countries to cooperate with readmission. Group-specific programs usually cover a more extensive range of services than individual return programs, including structural aid, information dissemination (for example on housing and labor conditions in the home), counseling, travel arrangements, transport costs, and reintegration assistance (IOM 2008, 2-3).

The Swiss Bosnia country-specific return assistance program was developed jointly by the Federal Department for Development and Cooperation, the FOR and the International Office for Migration, Berne (FOR 1999, 3). The program whose budget was set at 97 million Swiss Francs for the three years from summer 1996 to summer 1999 was funded by the Swiss state through the Federal Office for Refugees, who was also the main organ responsible for the program, and responsible for all operations carried out in Switzerland. A number of operations associated with the program were carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as the payment of allowances to returnees and structural assistance projects. The Federal Department for Development and Cooperation, which ran offices in Bosnian cities, was responsible for carrying out these elements of the program. Administrative matters such as the registration of program participants, advising institutions on eligibility criteria, and dissemination of information on the program, were handled by the International Office for Migration. The primary contact point for refugees and program participants were the Returnee Counseling Offices. This network of counseling offices was developed and established by the Federal Office for Refugees in each Swiss canton.
The Bosnia Reintegration Program covered both voluntary and forced returns. The assistance measures offered for voluntary returns served as an incentive for refugees to participate. After the expiration of return deadlines, persons whose asylum application had been rejected and had neither left Switzerland nor registered for voluntary return were subject to forced return. Thus, only in contrast to the alternative of forced return, can the first phase be described as voluntary. Though the Federal Office for Refugees saw voluntary return as “the conclusion of a personal decision process to leave the receiving state and return to their state of origin”, the decision process was generally pushed by the authorities (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 133). It may be more appropriate, therefore to speak of two forms of forced return: one form with additional assistance benefits, and in some cases freedom to decide certain matters, and the other form without assistance benefits (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 133).

The Federal Office for Refugees, founded in 1990 as the central pillar of the new integration management system, was subordinate to the Federal Ministry of Justice and Police (EJPD). Its task was to enforce Swiss asylum law. The Federal Office for Refugees operated four refugee reception centers in the Swiss border cities of Chiasso, Basle, Geneva and Kreuzlingen. In these screening centers asylum papers were submitted, fingerprints were taken and asylum claims were heard. If no abuse was initially identified, the applicant was allocated to one of the twenty-six cantons for a detailed screening and temporary accommodation (Federal Office Refugees 1995, 8). Since 1988 the distribution of asylum seekers to the 26 cantons has been determined centrally according to population size. Cantonal quota range between 0.2% and 17.9% (Holzer et al. 2000a, 259). The care and support of recognized refugees, temporarily accepted asylum seekers and asylum applicants was funded by the Federal Office for Refugee budget. In 1994 85% of this budget, or 825 million Swiss Francs, was allocated for this purpose. Consequently, an efficient processing of asylum applications in the cantons was a crucial objective of the Office for Refugees.

The cantons were also important actors in migration policy. Though bound by the same Swiss Asylum Law, the cantons had considerable power to influence decisions ultimately made by the Federal Office for Refugees on refugee recognition, permit renewal and permit extension (Holzer et al. 2000a, 255). This power is shown by the wide variance in positive and negative asylum decisions across cantons for certain nationalities (Holzer et al. 2000a, 255-56). The cantons, as holders of the individual
asylum files, provide the federal authorities with documentation on which renewal or extension decisions are based. Depending on the canton’s judgment of a case and on their preparedness to provide residence to an individual, supporting material is forwarded to the federal authorities (Parini 1996, 172). The canton’s competence on the reception of asylum seekers, audition and preparation of final decision and expulsion of denied asylum seekers has been growing (Holzer et al. 2000a, 258). As Holzer et al. argue, this decentralization can lead to positive and negative discrimination of certain groups of refugees (Holzer et al. 2000a, 151).

Integration programs, which aimed at integrating Bosnians in Switzerland, were strongly impacted by a short-term orientation. Legal status, assistance and support were designed around the idea of return to Bosnia in the near future (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 90). Effort was placed mostly on motivating return, preserving cultural identity and promoting self-organization (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 90). The role of language instruction for Bosnian adults, for example, was an issue that was at the center of much debate. The federal authorities hoped to prevent Bosnians from utilizing vocational training programs such as language courses as a means to improve work and integration chances in Switzerland. As the Federal Office for Refugees described its view on vocational training of Bosnian refugees “especially integrative elements, in particular language courses in the Swiss national languages, should be avoided” (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 91).

In contrast special attention was paid to return-oriented education for Bosnians. As part of the Bosnian Reintegration program, return counseling services were offered nationwide by various cantonal offices and Red Cross offices (Kreis and Venzi 1998, 16). These offices were established in early 1997 to inform, advise and train staff working with migrants and to provide counseling services to asylum seekers (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 90). In these offices Bosnian refugees could obtain the latest information on the conditions at home as well as legal advice on various matters, including third country settlement to the United States or Australia. Educational opportunities were also offered. However, these opportunities were mostly in the form of return-oriented courses focusing on developing professional opportunities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kreis and Venzi 1998, 18).

Bosnian refugees of school age were probably the best integrated age group because they were subject to compulsory school attendance. Through their school
attendance. Children became the cultural brokers between parents and institutions (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 79). Immersed in the Swiss school system, Bosnian students were in direct contact with Swiss classmates, authority figures, and institutions. Along with the language skills acquired through school attendance, this contact gave children and young adults access to a society to which their parents generally did not have access. The reversal of roles between parents and children was known to have led to difficulties within some families (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 79). Later, as return programs were being enforced and residence permits expired, a number of cantonal organizations called attention to the problem of youth in education and training (Ihle 1998). Because apprenticeship programs did not exist in Bosnia, a number of youth in training were permitted to extend their permits until completion of their diploma (Meier, 1998).

Due to the permit structure, the Swiss labor market was closed to most Bosnian refugees. In the place of employment, the Bosnia Reintegration Program offered financial resources to its participants on two routes in order to encourage returns: return assistance for individuals, and structural aid in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Travel costs were covered fully by the Federal Office for Refugees through the cantonal authorities, including a travel allowance of 200 Swiss Francs per adult and 50 Swiss Francs per minor (Morlok and Jufer 1992, Appendix 2). In addition to travel assistance, the program participants could apply for reintegration and start-up assistance. Adults received 4,000 Swiss Francs and minors received 2,000 Swiss Francs per person. Start-up assistance to cover living expenses for three months of up to 1,000 Swiss Francs was given to families and single parent households and financial assistance and advice was available for home building and agricultural development (Morlok and Jufer 1997, Appendix 11). Five offices of the Swiss Office of Development and Cooperation (DEZA) were opened throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo, Banja Luca, Bihac, Mostar and Tuzla and were responsible for the payment of these contributions in two installments (Morlok and Jufer 1997, 11A; Sieber and Scholer 2001, 136).

Structural assistance was the second element of the program and accounted for 50% of the repatriation budget. The objective of these projects was to rebuild the local structures and to reduce the resentment of Bosnians who had stayed at home during the war (Kreis and Venzi 1998, 9). Structural assistance targeted primarily agricultural development, restoration of local infrastructure, and the rebuilding of homes (Morlok and Jufer 1997, 11B).
Conclusion

The integration of Bosnian refugees in 1990 occurred in a very different climate from the Hungarian integration. Integration in the 1950s had been oriented toward assimilation and the melting of foreigners into Swiss society. In the 1990s integration was oriented toward differentiation and repatriation. The permit system created a number of legal varieties for refugee admission, each with its own set of benefits and opportunities for integration into Swiss society. Few Bosnian refugees were granted permanent asylum. Only twenty-two percent held long-term B and C-permits in 1996 (Sieber and Scholer 2001, 88). The majority of Bosnian refugees, around seventy percent, had been granted short-term and temporary permits, either as humanitarian refugees or individual applicants (Ibid.).

In response to the large population of temporary residents, integration assistance emphasized measures that would facilitate departure from Switzerland rather than incorporation into Swiss society. The repatriation of Bosnians reflected integration decision-making by state authorities and can therefore be treated as an element of integration management. Controlling asylum numbers, it was argued, would improve capacities to integrate those foreigners most in need of protection and who had legitimate reasons to be in Switzerland.
CHAPTER FOUR
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

In his lectures delivered at the College de France in 1975 and 1976 Foucault describes an important form of power, which exists in modern societies, and which is inextricably linked to racism. Some Foucauldian scholars, citing Foucault’s final wishes, object to the publication of the lectures, and consider this content “unpublished” (Stone 2004, 77). However, the ideas elaborated in these lectures are immensely valuable for gaining a deeper understanding of many ideas articulated in Foucault’s later works, including *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*. Here such concepts as bio-power and race are only briefly mentioned and sketched out on the last pages of the text. Yet, the reader senses that they play a crucial role in modern societies, especially in relation to the problem of state sovereignty.

Bio-power is a form of power, concerned with augmenting, improving and protecting populations, which emerged with the growth of administrative institutions and the consolidation of state power over national populations beginning in the mid-eighteenth century. Because of its diffused form and multiple methods of operation, bio-power has the capacity to touch most aspects of modern social life, not least in the domains of immigration and integration. Race, as Foucault understands the term, is essential for the exercise of bio-power, because it provides a point of reference for settling the perpetually open question of who belongs and who does not belong to the population.

At first reading, Foucault’s language and choice of terms relating to bio-power can easily distract from his basic ideas. *Biological*, for example, as used in association with bio-power and bio-politics, refers to the idea of population as a living unit, threatened by unspecific internal and external agents (Kelly 2004, 61). Certainly, it is not accidental that this term also evokes Darwinist connotations. The aspect of “permanent purification” is certainly an element of the bio-political discourse (Foucault 2003, 62). However, for Foucault, the link of health and purity to racial and ethnic categories is but one specific form of bio-political reasoning. As Foucault writes, “[racism] is a way of establishing a biological-type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological
domain (Foucault 2003, 255 emphasis added). Bio-politics does not necessarily target racial and ethnic groups, but may just as well exclude the mentally ill, the elderly, the unemployed, etc. The prefix “bio” signifies the involvement of power in producing and nurturing life. Bio-political, then, refers to the idea that politics is conducted for the purpose of enhancing the “bios” by means of resolving political questions revolving around human life, i.e. how humans can live together, what is the value of human life, whose life is vital to the population, and so on.

Another example of the harsh language is Foucault’s recurring reference to death and murder in connection with (bio-)power. *Killing* is used by Foucault in both the literal sense (i.e. to take life, to murder) and the metaphorical sense. Symbolically speaking, *to kill* may also signify *to expel* or *to marginalize*. For example, Foucault asserts that bio-power (by means of the racist discourse) divides society into “those who may live and those who must die”, inverting the classical principle of sovereign right “to take life or to let die” (Foucault 1990, 136 and 138; Foucault 2003, 254). Here *death* may, in the most extreme cases, refer to the murder of certain people. Generally, however, death describes simply the exclusion of certain people from society. Foucault speaks of “indirect murder”, for example, meaning to allow some people, more than others, to be exposed to greater risks of “political death, expulsion, rejection and so on” (Foucault 2003, 256).

**Foucault and State Power**

Foucault was preoccupied with finding out where political authority of the king, of the church, of the state comes from (Mendieta 2002, 3). The state is a problematic and vulnerable entity in modern bio-power society. Therefore it must always be concerned with constructing and maintaining its position, authority and existence. As a result of social transformations, which discredited the figure of the sovereign ruler and weakened magico-juridical rituals, the legitimacy of the sovereign has become contested (Foucault 2003, 81). Because repression and laws have only limited effect in modern society, the state must utilize alternative means to protect its sovereignty and to control the population (Foucault 1991, 103-4). One such means is the development of a will of the population to empower the state to protect “the nation”.
According to Foucault, the state is not a primary source of power, nor does it hold power in the sense that it has an absolute and exclusive capacity to wield it on and withhold it from groups or institutions. Because of the way that power operates, it can be exercised and deployed through practices (discipline, regulation) but not held as such. Instruments of power can develop in many environments, such as in the family, in the sciences (medicine, psychiatry, geography), in the justice system, the education system, the workplace, or in public administration. The state does not have an inherent or special capacity to direct power any more than any other institution in society. Nonetheless, the state is still very significant in modern society. By means of certain strategies, and as a result of historic developments, the institutions of the state have been able to position themselves at the center of many important power relations associated with “governing”.

The state is not a unified apparatus. It is a network of institutions and practices. This network of state institutions has succeeded in harnessing certain “micro-fields of power” like sexuality, for example, which “permeate the body politic at large” (Stoler 1995, 28). “Major dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by [various] confrontations” (Foucault 1990, 94), i.e. between oppositions and power relations in various situations and contexts in social life. In a very rational way the state utilizes instruments of power that have developed independently. It adopts or “co-opts” knowledge systems and practices, such as discourses of degeneracy or race, and reforms and adapts these to serve its aims (Stoler 1995, 31). It endorses and uses discourses, which justify the organizational structure and hierarchy, and which position the state as necessary and vital for life, order, and the health of human populations. By organizing the framework of thinking and meaning in a particular way, discourses can make certain structures and hierarchies seem logical and natural.

Foucault’s historico-political conception of power recognizes that power is not tied to a natural law of sovereignty, as suggested by the philosophico-juridical discourse. This latter commonly accepted discourse which can be traced back to Hobbes and Machiavelli, conceives of power as emanating from a monarch or government and is tainted by a “history of power as told by power” (Foucault 2003, 133; Stone 2004, 80). The history told from the perspective of the sovereign justifies the claim of the ruler or ruling class to power (Stone 2004, 87). Foucault’s history sees power as circulating between dominant and subordinate groups in a continuous struggle, in which the state is merely one participant. This struggle is not a competition between classes for control of
the state apparatus in the Marxist sense, but a struggle for a role in the construction of knowledge and discourse - in the writing of history. Control over knowledge and history is of vital importance to Foucault. It is through a particular knowledge of historic developments, an awareness of processes that led to social change and through an understanding of the organization of society and government that individuals become capable of viewing power as acceptable and of making themselves receptive to its effects. Since the decline of feudalism and the fall of the sovereign monarch, science and the state have offered compelling - sometimes contradictory, sometimes complementary - forms of such knowledge to explain the meaning and organization of social life.

As Mills explains, “discourses do not exist in a vacuum but are in constant conflict with other discourses and other social practices which inform them over questions of truth and authority” (Mills 1997, 17). Ruling groups have always sought to establish and disperse a certain narrative of history, which explains and justifies their status and their exploitative, colonizing or killing practices. On the other side, subordinate groups have always sought to resurrect subjugated knowledges, discredited by the dominant discourses of the elites. History is an organization of the “past, events, rights, injustices, defeats and victories” around a certain subject (Foucault 2003, 133). Thus, historical knowledge can exist in many varieties and can be deployed as a political weapon in the interests of a group (Stoler 1995, 76). As Foucault notes, in the eighteenth century the state was anxious to participate in the development of knowledge, to manage the process of knowledge selection, valorization, disqualification and centralization and to reap the rewards of the power effect of knowledge (Foucault 2003, 180-81).

Groups may shift back and forth between dominant and subordinate positions within the framework of power relations. The state, advancing subjugated knowledge in opposition to monarchical rule in the French Revolution for instance, achieved its position as part of this historic process of war. It successfully transformed its knowledges and practices, such as the discourse of racism, into instruments of dominance (Foucault 2003, 81; 224-25). “Politics is war by other means,” says Foucault, inverting von Clausewitz’s aphorism which suggested the primacy of sovereign politics (Foucault 2003, 15). In modern democracies, the politics of the state has led, and continues to lead, to killing, exploitation and other repressive conduct. In order to maintain its
legitimacy and sovereignty nonetheless, the state must utilize discourses that justify this behavior. The discourse of racism turns the struggle into a war between the “super-race” and the “sub-race”, between the “one true race” and the inferior group or groups inside and outside of society (Stone 2004, 80; Foucault 2003, 61). Though the nation is rarely mentioned in Foucault’s writing, it is often implied in the treatment of societies as apparently “natural” entities.

According to Foucault’s early writings, discourse refers to “historically specific systems of meaning which form the identities of subjects and objects” (Foucault 1972, 49 in Howarth 2000, 9). Discursive structures or frameworks establish links between concepts. They classify and categorize concepts in a systematic way that is made acceptable and meaningful to people who utilize them. “Discourse is something which produces something else (an utterance, a concept, an effect) rather than something which exists in and of itself” (Mills 1997, 15). Because they are flexible and “mobile” (Stoler 1995, 32), they can be used in various contexts. According to Foucault’s post-structuralist writing, discourses determine not only speech or thought but also practice and action. Because of the link between discourse and action, power is inherently implicated in discourse. Particularly discourses that diffuse across society and across various groups have the potential to impact society in dramatic ways. Discursive frameworks hold together legal, political and cultural structures, which make certain regulating, inhibiting, and facilitating power effects appear as normal, necessary and logical.

As Foucault says, “power is tolerable only on the condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms” (Foucault 1990, 86). The most effective and far-reaching exercise of power is practiced away from society’s gaze and away from scrutiny. It forms a part of the routine, the daily and the banal. Discourses can transform offensive behavior into tolerable, even popular behavior. The public is generally sensitized toward repressive power, which coerces and hinders the exercise of free will. However, it is not generally aware of the type of positive, constructive power that Foucault contends is far more important in modern society than repressive or coercive measures of a state or monarch (Foucault 2003, 34).
Modern Power

Power circulates through society through the actions of individuals, groups and institutions and can operate in many forms or through “technologies”, to which individuals, groups and institutions make themselves receptive in social life. According to Foucault’s analysis of European history, power has undergone significant transformations since the great revolutions in England and France of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Up to this point, society had been primarily controlled by sovereign power, whose goal had been to “take life and let live” (Foucault 2003, 241). In order to protect himself and all who depended on his rule, the sovereign had the right and capacity to kill his subjects.

During Enlightenment two new technologies of power, bio-politics and discipline, began to appear. Power no longer was only inherent in the relationship between the sovereign and the people he controlled. In modernity, Foucault argued, power became implicated in the state’s task of nurturing productive and healthy bodies and populations (Foucault 2003, 242-43). “The welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of wealth, longevity, health, etc.” is the purpose of modern government (Foucault 1991, 100). Though their relative importance shifted as capitalist markets and liberal political and legal systems developed, new disciplinary and regulating power forms continued to exist side by side with, and did not fully replace, sovereign right (Foucault 2003, 81). As Foucault explains, in modernity “one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population and its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security” (Foucault 1991, 102).

Since the late seventeenth century, the use of disciplinary tactics have emerged in various sites of modern social life, such as in prisons, schools, sciences. Disciplinary tactics target individual bodies, seeking to maximize their productivity and make them accessible to control (Foucault 2003, 242). In Discipline and Punish Foucault writes that discipline “fixes; it arrests or regulates movements; it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of individuals wandering about the country in unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions” (Foucault 1995, 219). Discipline creates a predictable and visible population out of a nomadic population. Administrative practices, such as mapping, recording or architecture, which transformed the spaces where individual bodies could gather, and the possibilities to interact made it possible to
position members of society as visible and receptive to disciplinary power. This power is above all anti-sovereign and anti-judicial, relying not on law and right (Mendieta 2002, 2). Disciplinary power achieves control by determining a “horizon of action” for various situations in social life. It is diffused from many different institutions in society, including but not limited to the state, and is made possible because its subjects “live” it (Mendieta 2002, 2).

Individuals are not only meaningful as individual bodies, but also as parts of a population (Foucault 2003, 243). With the rise of the societies as populations bound by territorial boundaries, and the rise of the administrative apparatuses of the state in the modern age, a non-disciplinary power with a great capacity to effect and direct processes on a mass level also began to emerge. This power’s concern was not the individual body, but the human species as a whole, and it operated even more subtly than disciplinary tactics of rule and control. This regularizing bio-power sought to control and impact processes, such as birth rates, mortality, public health, etc., operating at the population level and with the objective to ensure stability and predictability, to produce a vigorous population, to minimize and even wipe out disease, and to control death or prevent “irregular death” (Foucault 2003, 243; Kelly 2004, 65).

Regularizing these processes required knowledge about them. Thus, new knowledge fields developed and gave access to the population from new angles and with new instruments, techniques, procedures, and levels of application. Modern bio-political societies are characterized by a concentration of knowledge about such processes and a collection of strategies to survey them in institutions associated with the state. In order to arrange and administer their citizens, states needed to acquire information about the population. Thus, the recording of death rates, birth rates and migration rates became a central administrative task, as did the management of climatologic, geographical and hydrographic risks, and the engineering of a life-conducive urban environment (Foucault 2003, 245). The coordination of medical care, public hygiene and safety, as well as education and literacy also developed into a concern and responsibility of the state (Foucault 2003, 244).

Because they are not concerned with the same subject and because they operate at different levels, bio-politics and disciplinary power can function simultaneously side-by-side and at times even complement each other (Foucault 2003, 242). This simultaneous operation is most evident in fields of knowledge useful to both disciplinary
and regulatory power such as sexuality and race, which give access to life as a body and life as species (Foucault 1990, 145-46).

Bio-Power and Integration

Bio-power’s goal is to foster life and to selectively expose to death (Foucault 1990, 136). However, it is not individual life, which must be protected, but the population as a whole biological unit. Thus, it can be seen as bio-politically just that individuals should die in the name of the general population. Racism attempts to answer the question of which individual life is superfluous and which life is necessary for the welfare of the population. The sovereign right to kill has not disappeared. For example, the state continues to wage wars, to use the death penalty, to distribute resources in unequal ways. In modern liberal societies, power must have a dividing function to clarify who must live and who may die. Regulating and disciplinary power bring about decisions on membership of the population in various contexts, knowledge fields and situations in social life. For example in public health, people who are not of interest to the objective of bio-politics, i.e. who can not contribute to the vigor of the population, are “incapacitated, put out of circuit or neutralized” by the discourse on hygiene (Foucault 2003, 244). The marginalized person is allocated a certain inferior subject position, as legitimated by the discourse.

Discourses use words and categories to organize the knowledge they produce. They draw lines and make connections between concepts in a certain way, so as to construct a framework of thinking, speaking and acting that is logical and sustainable. The bio-political discourse of the state, for example, utilizes particular classification systems developed in law (e.g. immigration law), science (e.g. political science, economy) or public administration (e.g. demographics, statistics), to mark members and non-members of the population according to certain criteria. These criteria are continuously being redefined, with the result that inclusion and exclusion decisions are attached to people only temporarily. What remains consistent, however, is the necessity to protect the population against the unspecified enemy. Bio-power’s concern with optimal population health leads to a division of society between health-promoting members and health-endangering members of the population. Bio-power not only performs a differentiating function, but also follows the principle that “the death of others makes one biologically stronger” (Foucault 2003, 255). A power focused on promoting
life may also use life reduction (death, disease, neglect) as a tactic (Foucault 203, 258). The question of whose life must be fostered and whose life can be neglected is never answered. The state, impelled to settle this matter, lays out the rules by which the decision of membership can be made.

Racism

The concepts of race and racism and their implications on social life are not fully clarified in most of Foucault's work. Foucault's discussions of sexuality in “History of Sexuality Vol. 1” and further developments of the concept of race in postcolonial literature (e.g. Ann Laura Stoler) have helped to fill this gap. In modern societies a number of categories of analysis, such as race or sexuality, have been shown to be effective transmitters of power. These concepts may be envisioned as heavily charged discursive fields - fields through which a number of currents of power flow. Serving as “dense transfer point[s] for relations of power” (Foucault 1990, 103) these categories of analysis serve as pivotal centers for framing thought and discussion and are thus able to draw the interest of any institution wanting to participate in flow of state power. Sexuality, for example, lends itself very well to disciplinary and regularizing power because it gives access to human subjects as bodies as well as human subjects as reproducing agents for the population. The same attribute applies to race. In modern societies there seems to have been an intensification of discourses bearing upon race. These discourses, which divide the population along lines attributable in any way to racial categories - be they imagined, projected, or real - have become an important channel of bio-power. During the course of history race has appeared as a useful marker to allow regulatory mechanisms to control the population and to defend society against its internal enemies (Moreton-Robinson 2006. 386).

Foucault distinguishes between a racist discourse (racism in Foucault’s sense) and ordinary or popular racisms. Ordinary racism, “the hatred of other races”, or an “ideological operation that allows one group to displace hostility toward a mythical adversary”, led to the crimes of the Nazi state (Foucault 2003, 258). This “orthodox” racism (Kelly 2004, 63) is clearly distinguished from the racist discourse, whose effects are far less visible and more subtle, but neither innocent nor harmless. Foucault argues with regards to modern society’s “formidable power of death” that, “it is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so
many wars, causing so many men to be killed” (Foucault 1990, 137). Foucault’s racism is “primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (Foucault 2003, 254). The population is divided between the ideal group, “one true race”, and its deviant components, the “sub-races” (Foucault 2003, 61-2). Depending on the penalty for deviance mandated by the discourse, the expulsion of the enemies of society can manifest itself in a wide range of ways.

Foucault’s racism, in the form of a racist discourse that discursively constitutes a normal and deviant population, and ordinary racism, in the form of discrimination of certain visibly marked groups, operate on different levels. However, ordinary racism and the racist discourse do not exclude each other. In fact, ordinary racism depends on the racist discourse for its concepts and logics. The racist discourse makes racially driven killing possible. Genocide, colonization, ethnic cleansing, the Holocaust, and institutional racism for example, are just some of the human catastrophes that have derived justification through the discourse of race struggle (Stone 2004, 90). Foucault suggests that these practices may be “the dream of modern powers” (Foucault 1990, 137). They are the epitome of the exercise of bio-power. Fortunately, however, bio-power only rarely develops this far.

Foucault writes further that, state racism “justifies the death-function” of bio-politics (Foucault 2003, 258). Without a racist discourse it would be impossible for the state to practice bio-politics. The emergence of bio-power inscribed modern racism in the mechanics of the normalizing state and has embedded itself deep into social life, with the result that our way of thinking about and conducting ourselves in the world is dictated by a racial framework which exists virtually unnoticed (Stoler 1995, 55). When applied to the international structure of nation-states, state racism marks unwanted citizens and residents, and excludes them from the collective resources of the nation. In bio-power societies the sovereign right to kill is only acceptable when practiced outside of the nation’s boundaries. Thus, internal enemies can be dealt with by discursively expelling them from the nation. 43

The racist discourse has been an exceptionally successful discourse, not least because it has been co-opted by the state. This discourse divides a democratic society

in a way that is understood and accepted by a majority of its members. Members of a society are depicted as its “natural” members, as “naturalized citizens” of a nation, rendering the question of boundaries between members and non-members irrelevant and unnecessary. As the “underlying grammar” for our contemporary social, political and economic order, Foucault’s racism leads to many types of inequality, exploitation, and subjugation. The racist discourse is mobile and flexible and can potentially be deployed to legitimate the discrimination of any subject type.

Foucault’s “discovery” of the racist discourse reveals a certain pragmatism behind his analysis of social life. A discourse has material effects. The endurance and omnipresence of a discourse indicates the existence of a significant power structure to nurture it. Without practices to support it, one discourse is quickly discredited and replaced by the next. The co-option of the racist discourse by the state was crucial to bio-political societies as we know them today. Without this structural framework, actions of the state, especially in situations of war, in the unequal distribution of privileges, or in immigration policies, could not be tolerated. “Race has become common sense” (Omi and Winant 2001, 376). This common sense protects the sovereignty of the state because state power is accepted as essential for defending society (the race) against its internal and external enemies (Foucault 2003, 81; Kelly 2004, 59). “The state was able to invest or take over the discourse of race struggle and reutilize it for its own strategy” (Kelly 2004, 59).

**Nation**

In modern bio-political societies the duty to defend the population against internal and external danger positions the state at the center of key power streams. Whereas some strategies of state power refer to populations which traverse national boundaries, a number of strategies benefit from a framing of the population in national terms. The state uses the category of race as a reference point to identify which elements of the population are deviant and potentially harmful. The racist discourse provides a widely understood and accepted framework for marking and responding to internal and external enemies of the population (Stoler 1995, 28). Ethnic and racist categories help to biologize the identity construction, to solidify the border and to render it impenetrable (Bugmann and Sarasin 2003, 61). The establishment of a clear boundary between “us” and “them” is essential in order to direct state administrative practices accordingly.
Under bio-power the defense of the state is framed as a defense of society. Foucault writes, “Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone” (Foucault 1990, 137). Here his use of “everyone” shows just how far the non-members are marginalized: they do not even exist in the consciousness of the state. The expulsion of enemies of the state is undertaken in the name of the national population. This implies that nation (national identity) is a crucial factor, which shapes the specific form of the racist discourse appropriate for a specific society at a specific historic moment. Within this population-state relationship, the field of immigration may be seized to supply substance for the racist discourse.

The identification of the enemy runs hand in hand with the construction of the nation. As Jacques Derrida argues, concepts are constituted equally by their inside and their outside. The outside is required for the definition of the dominant term itself (Howarth 2000, 37). Thus a nation is permanently constituting itself in relation to its outside, e.g. its geographical neighbors, its political counterparts, foreign populations, migrants, etc. The marking of the other, of the foreign, is also always accompanied by a self-identification. The dominant group, who has the power to label and categorize, defines what shall be marked as “normal” and what shall be marked as “deviant”. The “other” serves as the background against which the dominant group can be distinguished and from which the unity and the identity of the own group can be constructed. A “construction of a fictive ethnicity” takes place, allowing “societies and peoples, cultures, languages, genealogies [to be] constructed within a national framework (Balibar and Williams 2002, 76). The dangerousness of the other is not necessarily argued in terms of genetics or biology, but more on the cultural level. As Balibar (1991) writes, in modern societies, culture has replaced ethnicity by the “stigma of otherness” (quoted in Kelly 2004, 62).

The boundaries of a national population generally do not coincide with the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. The geographical space of the nation-state may encompass several national groups, or may divide one national group across nation-state boundaries. Of course this disjuncture between states and nations, the basic problem of nation-states, is as old as (or even older than) nation-states themselves. The quest to fulfill the nationalist dream “that [nations and states] were destined for each other” can lead to visible and virulent nationalist conflicts (Gellner 1983, 6). However,
“outbreaks of ‘hot’ nationalist passion, which arise in times of disruption and which are reflected in extreme social movements,” are only one form of articulation of nationalist frustration (Billig 1995, 44). Particularly in the established democracies of the West, nationalism is often articulated in a more “cool” fashion. Here, the nation is flagged so regularly that the flags practically “melt into the background” (Billig 1995, 50). The nation is so deeply ingrained in the grammar of our speech and imagination that it is articulated with every utterance and practice, even in the absence of conscious nationalist motives. Still state racism is often practiced with nationalistic ambitions, not nationalistic in the ethnic sense, but in the bio-political sense. State racism can be merely the idea that “one is either with America (good) or against America (evil)” (Kelly 2004, 58).

The racist discourse is not only articulated as a response to nationalist sentiment, whether in hot nationalist passion or in cool, banal manner. It also participates in the active drawing and redrawing of boundaries of the imagined community of the nation. As Benedict Anderson explains, nations must be imagined because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them (Anderson 1991, 6). There is a great deal of uncertainty as to who belongs and who does not belong to the community. Citizenship is a possible criterion, which has primary significance in the legal discourse. However, in a nation-state such as Switzerland, this criterion would immediately exclude more than one fifth of the people living and working within its boundaries. Especially from a bio-political perspective, where the society is understood as a healthy and vigorous living biological unit, citizenship is unlikely to be the primary reference point.

Foucault makes reference to the emerging nation of the eighteenth century when he speaks about “societies”, or “collections, societies, groupings of individuals who share a status, mores, customs and a certain particular law – in the sense of regulatory structures, rather than Statist laws” (Foucault 2003, 134; 142). He refutes the “Statist definition” of nation as the congruence between the territory of the state and the body of citizens, and considers nation as something “vague, fluid and shifting” (Foucault 2003, 142). Nation must therefore signify something more complex than citizenship. It is likely that a number of criteria are used to include and exclude people from a national community and that the boundaries between inside and outside shift according to discursive context.
Reflecting particular discursive contexts, immigrants may be viewed as welcome additions to the community. They may contribute to the health and vigorousness of a productive national population or, in Foucault’s words, to “the improvement of the species or race” (Foucault 2003, 256). Historic literature on Hungarians in Switzerland generally agrees that this was the case for the Hungarian refugees of 1956/57. Whereas the unskilled laborers filled labor shortages in industries, such as metalworking or consumer goods production, highly qualified individuals filled demands in medical and scientific fields. However, immigrants may also find themselves excluded from membership because they constitute a threat to the society. After 1992, for example, the new discursively constructed foreigner community of “Ex-Yugoslavians”, a group which had been living in Switzerland for decades, suddenly became viewed with apprehension. The public’s gaze moved toward them and began to see their potentially negative effects on society. Unlike the Hungarians, however, the Bosnians did not fit into an economic niche but personified that which threatened the stable national population.

Foucault’s discussions of bio-power and race imply that the government of diverse national communities must have been within his field of interest. Yet, Foucault makes almost no explicit mention of the bio-political entity of the nation-state (Stoler 1995, 93). Instead, he generally refers to “State” or “population”, neither of which has a specifically national character. Nation, rather, is usually used in the plural form to refer to classes or races challenging the absolute power of the monarchy. The nation, as featured in Society Must Be Defended, is a subject of history invented by the French nobility that appeared for the first time in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, which contested the terms of sovereign right, contemporary institutions, the monarchy and its lands (Foucault 2003, 133-34; 143). Previously, in the age of sovereign power, “nation” and “race” had referred to the sovereign, to the group of people and the lands under the power of the sovereign, as captured by Louis XVI’s phrase “L’Etat c’est moi” (Stone 2004, 87-8). The young “nation” of the eighteenth century existed separately from frontiers and institutions of the state (Foucault 2003, 134 and 142). In this age it became possible for multiple “nations”, for example the nobility and the bourgeoisie, to exist within the same geopolitical area or under the same sovereign (Stone 2004, 87). Of course, thanks to the racist discourse, these nations were soon re-conquered by the bio-political state in its apparent endeavor to end the war between classes, to keep away external enemies and to expel internal enemies.
Under state racism the discourse is no longer “we have to defend ourselves against society” but “we have to defend society against all biological threats posed by the other race, the sub-race, the counter-race that we are, despite ourselves, bringing into existence” (Foucault 2003, 61-62). As Foucault further describes it, State racism is “the internal racism of permanent purification” (Foucault 2003, 62). In western democracies the absence of war against an opposing country seems to indicate that a stable condition of peace has been achieved (Stone 2003, 89). However, Foucault suggests, this peace is merely a façade. The state continues to be concerned with losing its mandate as the rightful administrative authority and protector of the population against external threats. When foreigners change the identity of a nation and upset the predictability and homogeneousness of the citizen body, this also has potential implications on the assessment of the state and its sovereignty.

As Vivienne Jabri (2007) points out, there is no clarification on the distinct spatial location of power relations in Foucault’s writings. In most of his theoretical writing and historical analyses Foucault seems to pay little attention to cultural distinctness and to the idea that philosophies and practices may be specific to social formations. Bio-power seems to affect humanity at large and to operate at a micro-level of social and political life beneath any kind of real or imagined national community (Jabri 2007, 71). The spatial location of power seems to be bracketed out of Foucault’s analyses, which address western societies and liberal modes of government as if these were the norm. However, given that international relations of states comprise a field highly charged with articulations of power, the international domain must also be implicated in bio-power societies. Jabri notes that Foucault’s political discussions, for instance his articles and interviews on his visit to Iran during the revolution against the former Shah and Pahlavi dynasty, show that his awareness and understanding of specific cultures and nations is higher than his historical and theoretical analysis of power would suggest (Jabri 2007, 76).

Foucault has been widely criticized by postcolonialist thinkers, generally sympathetic to his ideas, for not including the international socio-political sphere in his analyses and writings despite its relevance to the workings of power globally and despite its effects on European power systems (Jabri 2007, 69; Stoler 1995, 7). Postcolonialists are particularly astonished by the absence of imperialism, practices of imperialism and modes of resistance against imperialism in Foucault’s genealogy of modern power.
systems. According to these scholars, power relations in Europe were significantly impacted by the workings of power in the colonies and the exchanges between metropole and colonies.

One explanation for the absence of the international in his analyses is that for Foucault, nations as specific, spatially bounded societies have no bearing on the local workings of power. From the historico-political view proposed by Foucault, power is always impacted by the same basic processes, regardless of specific geopolitical location (Jabri 2007, 71-2). His analyses treat population, community, neighborhoods, etc. as “generalized terrains”, existing beyond the grid of nation-states (Jabri 2007, 72). However, while humanity at large may be the society to be defended in representational terms, in material terms the defense of society is generally conducted within the boundaries of the nation-state (Jabri 2007, 73). In contemporary societies, the modern state is a key player in generating the compatibility between war (the power to kill) and bio-power (the power to give life) (Jabri 2007, 72).

As Kelly suggests, bio-politics as practiced within national boundaries might be described as bio-nationalism, a nationalism concerned with empowering the population by means of bio-politics, with the bio-political aim of regulating society within the framework of a nation state (Kelly 2004, 63-4). Within the framework of the modern nation-state, racism plays a central role in bio-politics. Using a racist logic, states make a distinction between those who are kept alive and those who are “killed”. States can keep people alive through welfare systems and healthcare services, for example (Kelly 2004, 61). They can kill by allowing certain groups to be exposed to more risks than others. They may also marginalize certain immigrant groups. Thanks to their admission as permanent refugees, Hungarian migrants arriving in the 1950s had access to the same labor and welfare resources as Swiss citizens. Further, the bio-political desire to immerse Hungarian workers into the Swiss labor population was high, and Hungarians of employment age were the targets of a wide range of vocational training programs and career counseling services.

For most Bosnian refugees, on the other hand, the Swiss Bosnia policy utilized integration assistance not to incorporate the refugees into Swiss society, but to create conditions that justified a departure from Switzerland. Because the needs of Bosnians were framed in terms of their return, it was deemed unnecessary for the refugees to attend language courses in the Swiss national languages. The Swiss labor market was
effectively closed to the largest part of the Bosnian refugees, who had received provisional F-permits, a residency type that allowed employment only in favorable market conditions and in industries where there was a shortage of Swiss workers (FOR 1995, 3). This practice led to a dependency of the Bosnian refugee on welfare services, high costs for the Swiss state, and constraints for the development of individual life courses (Kreis and Venzi 1998, 27; FOR 1995, 14).

Immigration

The “nation” is the product of a discourse that equates national citizenship with race. Keeping Foucault’s concept of race in mind, this race is not constituted by a self-evident ethnic group. Rather, the racially homogenous group must be constructed and continuously reproduced on a discursive level. The bounds of this racially homogeneous category are highly expandable, depending on whose membership is regarded as desirable during a certain historic moment. This is shown by the variance in entry policies toward refugees. The interplay of race in the broad sense, with nation in the statist sense, generates a dynamic form of bio-power in the immigration receiving countries of western Europe.

Immigration presents a particular challenge to the self-evidence of nations and national populations. However, immigration can also present a valuable occasion to craft the nation-state, as in the case of Switzerland and its Hungarian refugees. Immigration raises the question of where the boundaries of the nation end. Does the national population constitute all people who live in the nation? Does the national population constitute all people who possess citizenship of that nation? Does the national population constitute all people who behave in a loyal way toward the nation and who comply with the norms of that nation? There is a need to resolve the problem that territorial boundaries are clear and sharp, whereas national population boundaries are uncertain.

In terms of bio-power, whether immigration is seen as beneficial or threatening has to do with the degree to which it can be controlled. For a bio-political society, control of population movements is a crucial indication of secure power. As Kelly notes, today Australia invites many migrants from other nations and ethnicities (especially Asia) to live and work in its territory. The old ethnic racism that discriminated against people of similar origin in the past, no longer seems to apply to these recruited migrants (Kelly
In the new discursive context, immigration is recognized as beneficial to the population, a population, which includes second and third generation migrants as well as new migrants. Referring to a speech given by former Australian Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Philip Ruddock, Kelly explains that, “members of elites of other countries, the young, the talented and rich are often considered to improve the economic and demographic profile of the Australian nation” (Kelly 2004, 63). However, social changes can also quickly reduce appeal of migrants from a certain region of the world, as was the case with the Yugoslavians at the turn of the 1990s.

As Roger Schneeberger, speaker of the Federal Office for Refugees, recounted this shift at a panel discussion on the Kosovo refugee crisis in April 1999 (Ladurner 1999):

“In the 1960s we first recruited the Italians. Then they began to make salary demands. Recruitment activities were carried over to Spain and Portugal, where the same thing happened. And then we continued down the Balkan Peninsula, where we found people willing to peel carrots in restaurant kitchens for eight hundred Swiss Francs a month. That’s how the Kosovo Albanian community was brought to Switzerland. The Swiss people now wonder why refugees are suddenly coming from the same area. It is the most normal thing in the world that people go to where their relatives are”.

The Yugoslavian community in Switzerland had been considered beneficial to Switzerland throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This population of approximately one hundred and twenty thousand recruited workers had been sought after as hardworking, well-educated and well-trained professionals, had been considered easily integrated and had drawn little attention to itself. Toward the late 1980s, when less qualified workers began to arrive from Kosovo, and even more when the Bosnian refugees began to arrive, the Yugoslavians evolved from exemplary migrants to “Jugos”. The asylum seekers and labor migrants arriving from Kosovo and Bosnia had arrived uninvited – a controlled migration had changed into an uncontrolled migration.

The Hungarian refugee, though uninvited, was portrayed as useful for Switzerland. After 4,000 refugees had been accommodated, a further group of 6,000 Hungarians were admitted from Austrian camps in the end of November 1956 with few reservations. As Urs Hadorn, former director of the Office for Refugees explains, the Federal Council recognized that the relief funds of private and cantonal donors, which had supported the acceptance and integration of the first wave, would cease to flow,
once the initial excitement of the Swiss public wore off. At some point, the burden to provide for the refugees would fall entirely on the federal government (Hadorn 2006, 63). Therefore, the authorities initially admitted this last large group only temporarily, until the UNHCR could resettle these people in third states. Though this material argument against admitting the group of 6,000 had been voiced and could have been implemented, it was not seized upon. Instead, it was concluded that these refugees, “mostly young men, itching to be placed in an employment position as soon as possible”, deserved a space in Swiss society (Hadorn 2006, 65-6). For bio-political societies it is essential that population changes occur in a predictable and controlled manner. After all, it is the bio-political state’s duty to ensure that society is protected from people who do not contribute to the health and development of the population.

In 1931 the Swiss Foreigner Nationals Act institutionalized the foreigner issue, centralized the management of migration under the federal government, and created the Federal Foreigner Police. Until then, the cantons had possessed sole authority to regulate foreigner residence and labor. Though Swiss federalism required that cantons maintain enforcement powers, the overall responsibility for matters relating to foreigner policy was transferred to the national government (Kury 2003, 169). Until the 1970s the statistical recording of movements of refugees had been sporadic at best (Walther 2009, 164). This negligence quickly changed, when the number of asylum seekers from areas not “cleared” for membership, for ideological or labor-political reasons, began to grow in the 1970s period of Überfremdung anxieties. From 1974 on, the numbers of asylum applications lodged were meticulously recorded, indicating that an increased administrative need was felt to control the population movements that evaded regular foreign labor regulation. Urgent rulings in 1980s migration and asylum politics, which were sealed off from the normal democratic procedure, also demonstrate the importance attached to centralized control over the entry, departure and regulation of foreigner numbers. As the Neue Zürcher Zeitung wrote in a June 12, 1998 article entitled “Foreigners, Asylum and the Fear of the People”, the government is uncomfortable with direct democracy in areas concerning immigration. “Open even to discussion about taxes, the Sovereign is particularly emotional and not at all open to the opinion of the People when it comes to questions of foreigner and asylum politics”.

One way to control immigration is to carefully select and recruit those foreigners who are likely to make a positive contribution to the population. As legal advisor to the
Ministry of Justice and Police, Max Ruth explained in the 1930s, “The responsibility of the state is to ensure that the politics of incorporation and expulsion achieve an optimal selection of foreigners. The issue is not quantity of foreigners, but quality of foreigners” (Kury 2003, emphasis added). Because it links population membership to labor, the Swiss residence permit system for foreigners is a highly effective tool for selecting migrants and for stabilizing the foreigner population in an inoffensive and routine way. The permit system rigidly regulates the rights and privileges associated with the Swiss labor market, welfare resources, and housing market. In addition, the complexity, duration and costs of the naturalization process keep the number of foreigners, especially refugees, who eventually acquire full political rights, very low.

An effective way to control immigration is to prevent foreigners from settling long-term. As Carl Ludwig wrote about foreigner policy in the 1930s, “in order to reduce the burden on Switzerland by the presence of many foreigners as much as possible, the Swiss authorities tended to issue only short-term permits and to fix departure deadlines” (Ludwig 1957, 330; 340). The principle of Switzerland as a transit nation was accepted until the late war years, when the permanent asylum status was finally established in 1947. By the time the first Hungarian refugees arrived in Switzerland, the policy had changed to “whoever wants to come to Switzerland, shall be considered” (Ludwig 1957, 410).

Race is often deployed in the integration context to divide the foreign population into individuals whose values coincide with, and individuals who are culturally incompatible with “our system”. For example, no selection criteria were implemented by federal and private refugee offices in the Austrian camps when registering Hungarian refugees for travel to Switzerland. The immediate and indiscriminate admission of the Hungarians was justified by their obvious and shared victimization from communist rule. During this period it was generally understood in European receiving countries that “whoever wished to escape an inhumane communist regime, should be admitted to the “free world” (Walther 2009, 147). It appeared clear that the Hungarian refugee shared the interests of the Swiss - the Western – “race”.

Four decades later the Three-Circle policy was instituted. This policy linked immigration privileges to a hierarchy of nations, which effectively also impacted decisions on asylum. Asylum seekers generally came from countries located at the periphery of this model, whose distance to Switzerland was considered a reliable
indicator for the capacity of foreigners to integrate into Swiss society. The cessation of bilateral relations with Yugoslavia in September 1991 serves as strong evidence for the new bio-political need to draw solid lines between the Swiss system and system of nations beyond western Europe in the 1990s, and to clarify the position of Yugoslavia in relation to the West.

The migration of unqualified workers from Southeast Asia to Australia by boat (Kelly 2004, 63), or the arrival of Eritrean families in Switzerland via the green border, is uncontrolled and accompanied by considerable bio-political risk. At the heart of the Swiss bio-political response of the 1990s was the newly established Federal Office for Refugees, whose task it was to enforce the Swiss asylum law, which had developed in the tumultuous period between the mid 1970s and 1980s. Four refugee reception centers located in the main Swiss points of entry as well as at both international airports provided facilities for initial screening, identification and registration of asylum applicants in classical “disciplinary” fashion. A quota list determined the distribution of the admitted individuals to cantonal offices for further processing, secondary interviews, medical examination, vaccination and housing and welfare allocation. These extraordinary measures are not implemented for regular migrants, who are generally immersed into the labor system by default through their residence permits.

The Bosnia policy of the 1990s represented a solution to the dilemma between the political and legal risk of withholding protection of individuals in need, and the inability to accommodate large numbers of permanent refugees. The new category of humanitarian refugee provided an effective means to allocate rights to people fleeing war-type situations, without giving them long-term access to labor market, living and welfare resources. The temporary status and repatriation program gave the state the means to accelerate the deportation process for people with “illegitimate asylum claims” and to limit the benefits and rights given to people with legitimate asylum claims. However, the politically developed permit quota rarely corresponded to human need. For example, depending on when they arrived in Switzerland, the major part of the Bosnian refugees received either one-year B permits or short-term F-permits, between which there are significant differences in rights and opportunities. Once the B-permit quota limit had been reached, only F-permits were available. This had the result that refugees from

44 This period included the passage of a new foreigner law (1982), a revision of the foreigner law (1987), a revision of the asylum law (1987) and a popular initiative “for the restriction of immigration” (1988).
the same village, with the same ethnicity, and with the same needs, were treated differently under Swiss foreigner law.

The treatment of the Hungarian refugee by Swiss relief and health institutions, such as the Offices for Refugee Relief, Caritas, the Swiss Red Cross, etc., presented a valuable opportunity for bio-power and for the regularization of uncontrolled migration. It was the job of these institutions to help the Hungarian, whose heart was in the free world, to shed the baggage of ten years of communist rule and the destructive experience of two world wars (Zentralstelle 1958, 12). The Central Office for Refugee Relief in the canton of Aargau described the plight of the Hungarian refugee as follows:

“The tragic moment of Hungarian history is the fact that the Hungarian people lived in a semi-feudal system until the end of the second World War, while the peoples of Europe had liberated themselves from the shackles of feudalism by a more or less peaceful evolutionary process toward modern democracy after the Napoleonic wars. No ideological or material barricades existed to stop the communist conquest of Hungary in 1945. The Russians found only a leaderless, divided and poor society without ideals and without direction (Zentralstelle 1958, 13).

By no fault of his own, the discourse claimed, the Hungarian was stuck in primitive times and it was up to the Swiss people to help him to overcome this handicap. Swiss institutions would settle the nomad and educate him in the realities of modernity. As Ladislaus Mranz, a Hungarian citizen working for the Office for Refugee Relief in the canton of Aargau compared the Swiss and the Hungarian: “The Swiss are a settled people – the Hungarians are a nomadic people par excellence [...]. “The Swiss is the son of valleys and mountains,” whose land possesses limited natural resources, “who must fight for every success,” and who must carefully plan and contemplate his every move. The Hungarian is a son of wide and fertile plains, “as though the dear lord had wanted to console his people for their unfortunate destiny”. The Hungarian is carefree and feels no need to contemplate his actions, as “he feels confident that the sun will continue to shine and that the Hungarian soil will continue to provide for him” (Zentralstelle 1958, 32).

The desire of the Swiss institutions to mold the Bosnian in the 1990s was not as high as it had been for the Hungarians in the 1950s. It had been decided that the Bosnian would never become assimilated and that integration measures should concentrate on the post-return period. Thus resources of Swiss integration institutions
were transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where a handful of Swiss Federal Ministry of Development and Cooperation offices paid out allowances and operated structural assistance programs, as laid out in the Bosnia Reintegration Program. Counseling services, provided by various state and Red Cross offices in the cantons, did not address the problems and needs associated with life in Switzerland, or even issues arising from the difficult condition of waiting and uncertainty. Instead, these primary contact points for Bosnian refugees dealt mainly with issues having to do with return to and re-integration in Bosnian society.

Adolescents, who had completed their basic education and were unable to begin apprenticeship programs or take on employment due to their temporary status, were an important target group, which drew a great deal of media, political and institutional attention (“Waiting” 1995). One program supported financially by the Office for Refugees and cantonal and private institutions in the canton of Berne, offered six-month courses in various areas including communication, media, design, office administration, metal and wood working, clothing design and production, agriculture and gardening, and tourism and hospitality. The aim of these programs was to use the waiting period leading up to return, to prepare these young individuals for professional life in their country of origin.

Conclusion

This thesis has tried to show the significance of bio-power to the Swiss experience with Hungarian and Bosnian refugees during two distinct “crisis moments” in Swiss migration history. A close study of the Swiss state’s policy response toward them revealed markedly different treatment of both refugee groups by the law, with impacts on economic and social opportunities available to these foreigners to establish themselves as members in their host society. This policy response and integration management was not only meaningful to the migrant but also to the state, which is always concerned with protecting its sovereignty. The receptiveness of the population toward state power plays an important part in supporting state sovereignty and can be adjusted by regulating the flow of friendly and hostile people into and out of national space.

As pointed out in the introductory chapter, integration does not only involve visible measures (integration programs) implemented by the state and private institutions to increase interaction with citizens and institutions in the host society, as envisioned by
the 2008 Swiss Foreign Nationals law, for instance. It is also linked to a wide field of knowledge on life, population and risk. Integration is practiced most importantly on the discursive level, where questions involving membership, boundaries and defense are worked out. It is here that the openness of the nation to the foreigner is decided, where the utility and significance of the foreigner’s life to the population is established, and where the framework of co-existence between the “races” on national space is developed.

The different treatment of the Bosnian and the Hungarian refugees can be attributed to different bio-political concerns of the Swiss state during each “crisis moment” of acute uncontrolled migration. The Hungarian refugee arrived at a moment when the Swiss nation was being reconstituted in the changing postwar European geopolitical environment. Switzerland had also experienced the breakdown of its humanitarian tradition, on which the state relied heavily for its legitimacy within the western community of states. The Hungarian refugee, a casualty of communist rule, served as a convenient target for bio-power and was eagerly incorporated into the population. The refugee crisis that followed the revolt provided a canvas on which the values, morals and behavior of the Swiss population could be redrawn and accentuated.

The experience of the Second World War is ambiguously remembered in Swiss history. On the one hand, humanitarian aid and solidarity, as well as heroic deeds performed by Swiss citizens and state officials, were highly valued.\textsuperscript{45} During the early post war years, the Swiss government and media advanced a generally positive interpretation of Swiss asylum practices. This positive view of Switzerland’s wartime conduct prevailed well into the mid 1950s, when the release of new information and the articulation of suspicions in the foreign and domestic press channeled attention to significant breaches of principles of humanitarianism and neutrality (Lanz 1996, 54). The Ludwig Report was submitted to the Federal Council in September 1955, but was not released to the public until September 1957 (Lanz 1996, 52). Thus, the discussions and debates, first on allegations of the press in 1954 and later, on the findings of the report, took place in the middle of the hype over Hungary’s refugees. Seriously shaken by the revelations made in the report, the Swiss authorities felt anxious to make up for past

\textsuperscript{45} For example, Carl Lutz, Vice-Consul of Switzerland in Budapest from 1942-1945, and delegates to the International Red Cross, Friedrich Born and Robert Schirmer are credited with having saved at least 120,000 Hungarian Jews who would have been deported by the Germans after their arrival in Budapest (Lanz 1996, 63).
mistakes and to let these mistakes be erased from international memory. The Hungary relief effort gave Switzerland a valuable opportunity to clear its conscience and to rebuild international confidence in its humanitarian values, following the points of criticism of the Ludwig investigation (Lanz 1996, 59).

“Deportation from Switzerland represents the end of a dream for many foreigners,” writes the Federal Office for Refugees (FOR 1995, 10). The role of Switzerland as a receiving country of migration has been fundamental to its identity as a civilized and developed society to which people from less developed, conflict-ridden regions of the world flee. As renowned Swiss intellectual Werner Kägi wrote in 1956, “Switzerland possesses a wealthy heritage, which many suppressed peoples can only dream about. These include Swiss values of freedom, social justice, direct democracy, federalist order, and the rule of law” (Reformatio 11/12 1956, 600-612 in Lanz 1996, 90).

As a November 12, 1956 article in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* shows, the importance of advancing the image of Switzerland as a prosperous, modernized consumer society was evident in calls to donate “high quality agricultural products such as bacon and smoked meats to the Hungarian people” (Lanz 1996, 109). Especially during the Cold War the refugee served as a cherished symbol of the conflict between East and West. As head of the Refugee Section and Vice Director of the Ministry of Justice and Police, Reynold Tschäppat, claimed in a presentation to refugee relief agencies in March 1958, the communist refugee’s successful integration in Switzerland “is evidence that capitalism makes people happier than communism” (Lanz 1996, 101).

During the Hungarian integration project Switzerland celebrated the superiority of western “democracy from below,” as represented by the decentralized, improvised and spontaneous management of the refugee crisis by small and large relief agencies and by the different levels of government (Reformatio in Lanz 1996, 102; 104). Even the weak leadership exhibited by the International Red Cross was interpreted as a virtue of the western liberal democratic approach (Lanz 1996, 105). The vast participation of the population in the national relief effort seemed to prove the capacity of liberal democratic systems to mobilize their people. Not only classical political organizations but almost every larger association or club interested in political events even in the widest sense, including large political parties, labor unions, churches, women’s associations, author’s unions, youth clubs, boy scouts, etc., articulated their solidarity with the Hungarian
people in the form of resolutions, declarations of solidarity, speeches, and letters to the editor (Lanz 1996, 29-31).

From a western bio-power perspective, the events that followed the violent crushing of the Hungarian struggle for freedom represented a crisis that affected not just the Hungarian population, but humanity - the “Western race”. As a neutral nation, Switzerland faced limits to participation in international affairs. Nonetheless, as then president of the Federal Council, Markus Feldman, declared before the foreign press in December 1956, “to be neutral does not signify passive acceptance of world events. Switzerland can and must contribute solutions to burning international problems” (Lanz 1996, 90).

The use of military resources and facilities such as barracks to house the refugees, military vehicles to deliver food and medical supplies, and the use of military metaphors in reports of Swiss humanitarian groups, show that the Hungary relief effort was conceived of as an exercise of national defense. Especially, when neither the United States nor the United Nations took action against the Soviet intervention, Switzerland’s humanitarian contribution acquired immense importance and attracted international respect (Lanz 1996, 95 and 99). The actions of the International Red Cross, with which Switzerland felt closely attached and which served with “purely humanitarian weapons” […] “at the front of humanity” were also celebrated (Reinhard 1958, 31 and 35). “The rescue forces arrived not with weapons, but with relief goods collected from all over the world”, writes Marguerite Reinhard of the Swiss Red Cross (Reinhard 1958, 8-10). The Swiss teams felt like liberating armies. As President of the Switzerland-Hungary student relief organization, Walter Renschler, recalled in 1957, “From the Hungarian border to Budapest, the people waved and cheered for us. Wherever the convoy, decorated with Swiss flags, stopped, people would gather - rarely pleading for food, but usually only to greet us and express their joy: the small nation of Switzerland, the model of paradise on earth, had not failed the Hungarians” (Student Relief 1957, 7).

The Hungarian refugee was generally portrayed as spiritually related to and driven by the same values and the same history as the Swiss citizen. The Hungarian revolt represented the struggle of a small force against a monumental hostile aggressor, an event comparable to Switzerland’s struggle against the Habsburg occupation in the founding days of the confederation. On traditional commemoration days of historic battles and local events throughout the late 1950s in Switzerland, the theme of the
Hungarian Revolution was omnipresent. Many political speeches drew parallels between the Swiss historic struggle for independence and the events, which had taken place in Hungary (Lanz 1996, 31).

Student groups and young people felt particular solidarity with the Hungarian freedom fighters. After all, it had been “students, young people of our age, who [had] gathered peacefully, demanding rights, such as freedom of assembly and freedom of speech, which we consider as self-evident”, as former Federal Council member Elisabeth Kopp (1984–1989) recalls her impressions during the crisis period. “What could be done? What could I do?” was the question posed by many young people (Kopp 2006, 31). Solidarity was frequently expressed by the mimicking of events and behavior associated with the revolution. For example, student protests and torchlight processions of extraordinary size recalled the gatherings that took place in Budapest and in other Hungarian cities. Student politics experienced a revival (Lanz 1996, 107). The Berne Student Association went one step further and expressed their solidarity by assembling fifteen thousand Molotov Cocktails and sending them to community fire departments, high schools and private persons, urging the recipients to test the weapons. The objective of this “Never Forget Initiative”, was to stir up the complacent Swiss population and to mimic the struggles in Budapest, where street fighters had successfully disabled the Russian tanks with these homemade weapons (Lanz 1996, 28-9; Alföldy 1997, 25).

Thanks to the condition of the Swiss economy during the mid 1950s, the Hungarian refugees could immediately be placed in employment positions across the country. After initial reception, the Hungarians could be treated as a regular migrant group. The benefit to the population, thanks to the economic activity of the Hungarian workforce, was evident. This was not so for the Bosnians, who arrived during a period of economic recession. Compared to many neighboring countries, the Swiss economy was not healthy, and a responsible management of the Swiss productive force was crucial. Bio-politically, this meant that great care was needed in controlling population flows. When the Bosnian refugee arrived, the Swiss state was concerned with redrawing its boundaries in order to constitute Switzerland as a member of Europe. The Three-Circle model conceptually pushed the Yugoslavian migrant from inside the circle of welcome migrants to the outer circle of non-European “sub-races”. With this new problematization of cultural distance, the Balkan migrant became the target against whom the protective barrier walls of Fortress Europe were being raised.
One of the primary risks bearing on European space was asylum. For Switzerland, in particular, the meaning of asylum had changed markedly, as the control of the state over this domain weakened. From 1988 to 1995, the number of asylum seekers residing in Switzerland, not including recognized refugees, had risen from just over 15,000 to almost 100,000 (Wimmer 1996, 42). Asylum no longer required sporadic responses to exceptional crisis moments. Asylum had become a permanent problem of foreigner politics. An institutional apparatus to handle the new challenges of asylum was developed in 1990 with the founding of the Federal Office for Refugees.

As a result of growing concerns that asylum was turning into an alternative form of migration, which evaded normal migration controls, Swiss asylum policy began to turn its focus on differentiating between “real” and “false” refugees in the late 1980s. As the Federal Office for Refugees writes in its 1995 brochure “AsylSchweiz” (Asylum Switzerland), “fair asylum politics is only possible if enforcement instruments are applied consistently” (FOR 1995, 10). Asylum abuse became a central concern and led to multiple modifications and refinements of legislation in the 1980s and 1990s, which brought the enforcement of negative asylum decisions to the forefront of asylum management. The discourse on Bosnian integration was based on the assumption that the Bosnian refugees were only temporarily threatened and would therefore have to make room for future cases of real need. The assisted return policy was justified partly because it helped to remove the attractiveness of asylum abuse. The “Bosnia Reintegration Program” of June 1996 was developed to increase the number of voluntary returns and reduce the numbers of the cost-intensive and time-intensive forced returns.

References to Hungary have frequently been used as an effective way to demonstrate the difference between “real” and “false” refugees. The situation of the Hungarian refugees was portrayed by the discourse as an emergency and urgent situation. With its response to the Hungarian refugee crisis, former Federal Council member Christoph Blocher wrote in 2006 that, “Switzerland proved that it is very well capable of reacting generously to special crisis situations. The authorities were able to count on the support of the public, for there was no reason to doubt the sincerity and need of the refugees” (Zabratzky 2006, 10). The Bosnian refugee wave was not rated with the same level of urgency as the Hungarian wave.
Because of the high numbers of refugees who arrived in a relatively short timeframe, the arrival of the Bosnian refugees deeply challenged Swiss bio-power. The bio-political problem of the Bosnian refugee wave was solved by offering a limited quota of permanent asylum permits and establishing the practice of conditional and temporary protection by means of the new humanitarian refugee category, under which most Bosnians were taken in. This category served the bio-political purpose of preserving a means to expel these foreigners as soon as a reduced humanitarian need could be shown. Limited rights in terms of labor, housing, politics, education etc. prevented a full admission into the population. As a result, sixteen thousand Bosnians with F-permits or other temporary permits lived in Switzerland in a condition of limbo between immediate security and an imminent and threatened return. The external risk was kept at bay, even though this risk element physically lived within the bounds of Swiss state territory.

The Bosnian refugees were discursively defined as irregular and dangerous. As described in a preceding section, the once friendly image of the Yugoslavian in Switzerland was transformed with the insertion of the Bosnian refugee and other groups displaced by the Balkan conflict. Composed of people from Serbia-Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Croatia, these groups have merged into one highly visible and large community, making up 4.5% of the Swiss resident population (2006 data). Today, the linguistic group of speakers of Balkan languages, including Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Albanian is almost as large as the Italian-speaking Swiss community (Kämpf 2008, 96-7). Given the size of this group, it was clear that bio-political integration management would absorb this group into its field of assessment.

With four recognized national linguistic groups, two large national religions, a large urban and a significant rural population and twenty percent foreign residents, the population of Switzerland is highly diverse. The establishment of a balance between these potentially conflicting groups is seen as a cornerstone of the government of the Swiss state. The health of the population is impacted directly by the effectiveness of the framework, which holds the different cultural, religious and national groups together. Stability in Switzerland is portrayed as a fragile condition that must be protected against new and external intervening factors. As Christoph Wehrli wrote in an August 19 Neue Züricher Zeitung article in 1995 entitled “‘Yugoslavia’ – Between Aversion and Compassion”, “given the few means we have to “make” peace on the Balkan Peninsula, we must value and preserve the peaceful coexistence that currently exists in our
Switzerland reconciled the need to protect the fragile balance within the Swiss population with the need to provide humanitarian assistance by directing its relief efforts outside of Swiss territory. This strategy entailed cooperation with fifty states and over twenty-five international organizations in the largest reconstruction effort in Europe since the end of the Second World War (Hausmann, 1996). The burden and responsibility for rebuilding a safe living space in Bosnia was shared among several countries. By the 1990s, Switzerland, together with Sweden, had become one of the top two countries in Europe to be impacted by the global refugee problem (Wimmer 1996, 46). Following the principle of “people who build, have no time to shoot” (Koschnick quoted in Oplatka 1995), and given the alleged propensity for humanitarian crises in Eastern Europe and especially in the Balkans, it was important to the refugee receiving states that tensions be stifled and that new sources of potential uncontrolled migration be managed early on. As EU Administrator in Mostar, Hans Koschnick, put it at a talk in Zurich, should new tensions arise, “People would not flee to Vladivostock, but westward” (Oplatka 1995). In the case of the Bosnian migration, the necessity to protect the population from future uncontrolled entries of foreigners had become the most vital objective of bio-politics.
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