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APPRAISAL

An Investigation of Behavioral Accuracy
and Leniency: The Roles of Aberrant Self-Promotion,
Accountability, and Opportunity for Personal Recognition

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Abstract

A sample of aberrant self-promoters (ASPs) was identified through their pattern of answers on a 179-item questionnaire. A group of comparison participants who did not exhibit the ASP pattern was also identified. The participants viewed a videotape of a lecture and rated the lecturer's performance. Half of the participants were told that they were required to provide face-to-face feedback to the lecturer (the accountability condition); the other half were not given these instructions (non-accountability condition). Also, half of the participants were told that there may be an opportunity for them to appear on a training video for graduate student instructors (opportunity for personal recognition condition); the other half were not told of this opportunity (no opportunity condition). This study attempted to identify the roles of aberrant self-promotion, accountability, and opportunity for personal recognition in rater accuracy and rater leniency.

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An Investigation of Behavioral Accuracy and Leniency:
The Roles of Aberrant Self-Promotion, Accountability, and
Opportunity
for Personal Recognition

Recent research by Gustafson and colleagues (Gustafson & Ritzer, 1995; Gustafson, in press; Russell & Gustafson, 1999; Russell, 1996; Holloway, 1995) has identified a personality profile of individuals who are believed to be destructive in organizations. Most recently, these individuals, known as aberrant self-promoters (ASPs) have been shown to be ineffective group members, engaging in such destructive behavior as lying to and manipulating other members of the group (Russell, 1996). However, previous ASP research has focused on the behavior of ASPs, as opposed to their reactions to and judgments of others. In contrast, the current study attempts to extend research on ASPs to the realm of performance appraisal. Because evaluating the performance of others is an important component of supervisory and management positions and because ASPs are likely to seek such positions (Gustafson, 1997), it is important to determine whether or not ASPs are systematically susceptible to distorting performance ratings in particular ways.

Aberrant Self-Promoters (ASPs)

Aberrant self-promotion has its origins in the two-factor conceptualization of psychopathy developed by Hare and colleagues (Hare, 1993; Harpur, Hakstian, & Hare, 1989; see Appendix A). The

first factor comprises personality characteristics (e.g. superficial charm, egocentricity, shallow affect) which reflect a global narcissism. The second factor reflects exhibition of antisocial behavior (e.g. promiscuous sexual behavior, lying, cheating).

To this point, it has been difficult to study psychopaths in organizations. Not only does the rarity of psychopaths make nomothetic research impractical, but psychopaths are quite accomplished at "putting their best foot forward." They are skilled at impression management and may escape detection for quite some time (Hare, 1993). However, Gustafson & Ritzer (1995) have identified and delineated a sub-clinical psychopathy construct, called aberrant self-promotion. Aberrant self-promoters (ASPs) reflect the same pattern of personality variables as psychopaths; the difference is one of degree, not kind. Thus, ASPs, like their psychopathic counterparts, are characterized by glibness, egocentricity, lack of empathy, lack of guilt, and a willingness to engage in antisocial behavior such as lying, cheating, and manipulating others.

Gustafson and Ritzer (1995) theoretically defined ASPs based on a personality profile which is consistent with Hare's (1993) conceptualization of psychopaths. For two samples of undergraduate students, they obtained responses to 179 items comprising five scales used to measure components of the ASP profile: the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin &

Hall, 1979), the Socialization subscale of the CPI (Gough, 1987), the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), a self-esteem subscale of the Organizational Climate Questionnaire, and the Self-Report of Psychopathy II (SRPII; Harpur & Hare, 1989). Aberrant self-promoters were defined as individuals who scored high on the narcissism scale, the self-esteem scale, and the psychopathy scale and scored low on the socialization and social desirability scales. The prevalence of the ASP profile was then determined using cluster analysis, factor analysis of the items, and factor analysis of the subjects. Each of the three methods identified virtually the same people as ASPs (92 percent convergence in the first sample and 94 percent convergence in the second sample). Gustafson and Ritzer (1995) also noted that the proportion of ASPs in Samples 1 and 2 were 11 and six per cent, respectively. Because aberrant self-promotion is a less extreme syndrome than psychopathy, this proportion is substantially higher than Cleckley's (1976) two percent estimate of clinical psychopaths in the population.

In a second study, Gustafson and Ritzer (1995) compared ASPs and non-ASP with respect to their scores on the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, Harpur, & Hakstian, 1990). The PCL-R is a structured interview used to assess twenty dimensions of psychopathy. The non-ASP used in the study were a comparison group who exhibited high self-esteem, average social desirability, and low levels of narcissism, self-reported psychopathy, and

antisocial behavior. As expected, ASPs scored significantly higher than non-ASPs on the PCL-R, although they fell short of the psychopathy cutoff score. Significant differences also existed between ASPs and non-ASPs with regard to external behavioral criteria such as grade point average, admission of illegal acts, parking violations, and university judicial reprimands.

Subsequent research has determined that high self-esteem scores are not a necessary component of the ASP profile (Gustafson, in press; Holloway, 1995). A possible interpretation of this finding is that, although ASPs are extremely narcissistic, they may score low on certain self-esteem items which tap current satisfaction with life. Gustafson (in press) has suggested that ASPs will score low on such items because they are "dissatisfied with the extent to which their self-perceived superiority has not been acknowledged and rewarded by others"(p. 9).

Further, Russell (1996) has found clear support for a distinction between ASPs and Machiavellians. In a legislative game, "Machs" demonstrated that they were capable of achieving goals without behaving destructively. Aberrant self-promoters, on the other hand, lied to those with whom they should have cooperated and were rated significantly lower on a liking scale at the end of the exercise. Such results support the contention that aberrant self-promoters are undesirable members of organizations. In line with this belief, the current study is an attempt to demonstrate the destructive role ASPs may play in evaluating the

performance of others.

Due to ASPs' inherent narcissism and selfishness, it seems reasonable to assume that they would value any opportunity to set themselves apart from others or to be the center of attention. In addition to being the center of attention, any opportunity to disseminate information regarding their self-perceived superiority is expected to be an even greater incentive for ASPs. Thus, it is expected that ASPs will distort information in return for an opportunity to gain positive recognition. However, they are expected to focus greater attention if successful performance on a task is linked to an opportunity for recognition.

Performance Rating Distortion and Aberrant Self-Promotion

Performance appraisal is an integral part of organizational functioning. An effective performance appraisal system serves a myriad of purposes, such as making salary decisions, providing performance feedback, determining training deficiencies, reinforcing the authority hierarchy, providing criteria for personnel decision validation, and providing information regarding necessary person-power (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995). Although each of these purposes of performance appraisal represents an important goal of many organizations, performance appraisal is primarily used in making administrative decisions (e.g. salary decisions) and providing developmental feedback to employees (Murphy and Cleveland, 1995).

In order to use performance appraisal information

successfully to achieve organizational goals, it is imperative that the appraisal results themselves be accurate. Operationally, evaluation accuracy is assessed through directly comparing performance ratings with a standard that represents true performance levels (Cardy and Dobbins, 1994). The larger the discrepancy between ratings and true scores, the greater the inaccuracy of the ratings. Although evaluation accuracy has been used as a criterion in performance appraisal literature, Foti and Hauenstein (1993) have suggested that evaluation accuracy may not be an appropriate criterion variable when attempting to study information processing aspects of performance appraisal. Therefore, no hypotheses regarding aberrant self-promotion and evaluation accuracy are postulated here. However, a measure of evaluation accuracy will be included for exploratory purposes.

Evaluation accuracy requires global judgments of performance. However, accuracy can also be viewed as the ability to successfully recall information regarding a situation or a person's behavior in a situation, that is, as behavioral accuracy. Behavioral accuracy has been shown to be related to but distinct from evaluation accuracy, in that greater accuracy in recalling performance-related information is related to more accurate evaluations (Murphy, Garcia, Kerkar, Martin, & Balzer, 1982; Sanchez & De La Torre, 1996). Murphy (1991) has suggested that behavioral and evaluation accuracy may be useful in different situations and serve different purposes.

Behavioral accuracy may be most appropriate when testing models of cognitive processing. Behavioral accuracy is an index of the process of recalling information. No information on ASPs (or psychopaths) would suggest that they lack the ability to process and recall information; however, ASPs are expected to lack the motivation to focus their attention on tasks and accurately recall information. More specifically, because ASPs implicitly believe that they have a special destiny and are vastly superior to others (Gustafson, in press), they are expected to view "normal" tasks as unworthy of their attention. Aberrant self-promoters' lack of a sense of responsibility towards others suggests that their disinterest in what they view as mundane tasks would even extend to tasks that may have a meaningful impact on others. Therefore, in the absence of motivating factors, ASPs are expected to be less behaviorally accurate than non-ASPs.

Behavioral and evaluation inaccuracy are not the only forms of distortion that may affect performance ratings. Rater error, which represents another form of distortion in performance ratings, is the tendency of a rater to bias his or her ratings across ratees (Cardy & Dobbins, 1994). Rater errors differ from general evaluation inaccuracy in that they bias ratings in a systematic pattern. Leniency (or severity) and halo represent the primary forms of rater error. Based on aberrant-self promoters' lack of empathy, they are expected to provide more severe (deflated) ratings than non-ASPs.

The Influence of Motivation on Performance Appraisal

Another perspective to consider with regard to performance appraisal distortion is rater motivation. The rater's cognitive ability to make accurate judgments regarding performance does not necessarily imply that the rater will actually produce accurate performance ratings. Raters must be motivated to provide accurate ratings. From a motivational perspective the most prevalent problem is inflation of ratings (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995). Several researchers (DeCotiis & Petit, 1978; Mohrman & Lawler, 1983; Murphy & Cleveland, 1995) have used a simple model of motivation to explain why raters supply either accurate or distorted (inflated) performance ratings. Mohrman and Lawler (1983), employing an expectancy theory framework, have suggested that raters identify the desired outcomes associated with accurate and inaccurate ratings and the expectancy of achieving those outcomes. If the motivational force (value X expectancy) is greater for distorted ratings than for accurate ratings, distortion will occur. Murphy and Cleveland (1995) note that few rewards exist for accurate performance appraisal. However, two of the undesirable consequences that exist for accurate (non-lenient) ratings are relevant to the manner in which aberrant self-promoters are expected to rate others.

First, negative ratings may well lead to negative consequences for the ratee. A great deal of research has shown

that raters are more lenient when their ratings are used for administrative purposes as opposed to developmental purposes (Reilly & Balzer, 1988; Bernardin, Orban, & Carlyle, 1981; Zedeck & Cascio, 1982). In general, raters appear unwilling to provide poor ratings if doing so may negatively affect the future of the ratee in the organization. Aberrant self-promoters, however, are not expected to care about the well-being of the ratee. Therefore, unless the ratee can reciprocate the inflated rating with something of value to the rater, ASP raters would not be expected to inflate ratings.

Second, raters may inflate ratings to avoid unpleasant interactions with displeased ratees. Murphy and Cleveland (1995) have suggested that negative performance ratings may lead to a stressful work environment for the rater. Raters tend to inflate ratings when they believe they will have to provide face-to-face feedback to ratees (Klimoski & Inks, 1990; Landy & Farr, 1983). Villanova, Bernardin, Dahmus, and Sims (1993) used the Performance Appraisal Discomfort Scale (PADS) to demonstrate a relationship between leniency of ratings and raters' relative discomfort in disseminating negative performance information and justifying ratings. It appears that inflation of ratings can provide a more harmonious work environment. As stated above, ASPs would only be expected to inflate ratings if ratees could provide something in return. Due to their unemotional nature and their lack of empathy, ASPs would not be expected to be troubled by unpleasant

work environments or displeased ratees.

Performance Appraisal, Accountability, and Aberrant Self-Promotion

However, one context that might give rise to unpleasant work environments and displeased employees is a requirement that raters provide face-to-face feedback to ratees regarding their performance evaluations. Requiring feedback and justification for decisions invokes the pressure of accountability. Accountability refers to "pressures to justify one's opinions to others" (p.74, Tetlock, 1983). The pressure of accountability motivates people to avoid embarrassing situations such as reaching an erroneous decision. Tetlock (1985) suggested that accountability puts pressure on people through three fundamental sources of motivation. First, people are motivated to preserve and augment their social identity. Alternatively stated, people attempt to maximize favorable evaluations by others through justifying their decisions and avoiding embarrassment. Second, people are motivated to guard and improve their self-image; they strive for the approval of others in an attempt to reinforce their perceptions of self-importance. Third, people are motivated to gain access to valuable resources. In reference to people in organizations, Tetlock (1985) referred to this motive as "tactical maneuver[ing] designed to legitimize their claims to scarce resources" (p. 309).

Recent research has directly applied the concept of

accountability to performance appraisal (Mero & Motowidlo, 1995; Antonioni, 1994; Klimoski & Inks, 1990). Klimoski and Inks (1990) have suggested that accountability forces are greater when raters must provide face-to-face feedback than when feedback is provided in other ways (e.g. written feedback). Klimoski and Inks (1990) manipulated expected feedback (no feedback, written feedback, or face-to-face feedback) and information concerning the ratees' beliefs about their own performance (high, low, and no self-assessment). They found significant main effects for both accountability and ratees' beliefs. Subjects who were told they would have to provide face-to-face feedback to those they rated provided higher ratings than did subjects in the no feedback condition. Also, participants who were told that the person they were rating had rated themselves as high performers provided higher ratings than did participants whose ratees had rated themselves as poor performers. A significant accountability by information interaction also emerged. Klimoski and Inks' (1990) results thus support the influence of accountability on inflation of ratings.

Antonioni (1994) has observed similar results in an organizational sample. Antonioni (1994) found that subordinates provided lower ratings of their supervisors when the evaluations were anonymous than when the subordinates were accountable to the supervisors for their ratings. Although these findings support the conclusions reached by other researchers (Klimoski & Inks,

1990; Mero & Motowidlo, 1995), the use of an upward appraisal system may have amplified the results. The greater fear of retribution or other negative outcomes associated with the negative evaluation of someone in a position of power may have augmented the inflation of ratings. Nevertheless, unlike more representative raters, aberrant self-promoters demonstrate little concern for the consequences of their action, on themselves or on others. Therefore, taken alone, accountability to the ratee would not be expected to distort an ASP's ratings.

Additionally, Hauenstein (1992) has provided evidence for a relationship between motivational context (expectation of providing feedback) and behavioral in identifying and recalling positive performance incidents. Specifically, raters who were told prior to viewing a videotape of a graduate student lecturing, that they would have to provide feedback to the instructor, were more accurate in recalling positive incidents of performance than were raters who were told after watching the videotape that they would have to provide feedback and raters with no feedback expectations. Therefore, whereas expectations of providing feedback would be expected to increase behavioral accuracy for normal raters, ASPs would not be expected to be influenced by expectations of providing feedback.

Additionally, it is expected that ASPs will distort performance ratings in return for an opportunity to gain positive recognition. However, they are expected to focus greater

attention if successful performance on the task is linked to an opportunity for recognition. Therefore, if success at rating performance is linked to an opportunity for recognition, ASPs are expected to pay more attention to the task and thus exhibit greater accuracy at recalling performance-related information. Additionally, if the opportunity for recognition is linked to the provision of non-lenient or harsh ratings ASPs are expected to provide more severe (less lenient) ratings than non-ASPs.

Hypotheses

Due to ASPs' general lack of empathy, their impulsive, non-reflective nature, and the inability of ratees to provide them with anything they value, the following hypotheses are posited:

Hypothesis 1: ASPs will rate more severely than non-ASPs will.

Hypothesis 2: ASPs will be less accurate than non-ASPs at recalling performance-related information.

Hypothesis 3: Accountability will not have a significant impact on leniency error exhibited by ASP raters; however, non-ASP raters in the accountability conditions will be more lenient than will non-accountable, non-ASP raters.

Hypothesis 4: Accountability will not have a significant impact on the behavioral accuracy of ASP raters; however, non-ASP raters in the accountability condition will exhibit

greater behavioral accuracy than non-accountable non-ASP raters.

Hypothesis 5: A significant attribute by treatment interaction will exist between the ASPs (and non-ASPs) and the recognition (and no-recognition) conditions; ASPs who are provided incentives for non-lenient ratings (recognition condition) will rate more severely than will all other raters.

Hypothesis 6: Opportunity for recognition will not have a significant impact on the behavioral accuracy of non-ASP raters; however, ASPs in the no-recognition condition will be less behaviorally accurate than ASPs in the recognition condition.

No three-way interactions are proposed because accountability is not expected to influence ASP raters and opportunity for recognition is not expected to influence non-ASP raters.

Study 1

Method

Participants

Initial participants were 455 undergraduate students from undergraduate psychology, biology, chemistry, and economics courses. Psychology students were given extra credit for their participation. All other students were entered in a lottery in

which they had the opportunity to win monetary prizes. Forty aberrant self-promoters were identified using cluster analysis. A same-size, non-ASP comparison group exhibiting average to high self-esteem, average social desirability, low narcissism, low levels of self-reported psychopathy, and low antisocial behavior was also selected.

Measures

The same scales used by Gustafson & Ritzer (1995) to identify ASPs and non-ASPs were used in the present study. The instruments were (1) the 40 item Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979), (2) the 54 item Socialization subscale of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI; Gough, 1987), (3) the 10 item version (Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972) of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), (4) the 11 item self-esteem subscale of the Organizational Climate Questionnaire (OCQ; Jones & James, 1979), and (5) the 58 item Self-Report of Psychopathy II (SRP II; Harpur & Hare, 1989). The sample (n=455) means and standard deviations for the five personality measures are reported in Table 1.

Results

Using the SLEIPNER pattern analysis program, two clusters, the centroids of which resemble the ASP profile, were identified (see Table 1 for cluster means and standard deviations). Because certain members of the clusters did not exhibit the correct ASP profile across the four personality measures, only a subset of

members were selected. Specifically, participants were only selected as ASPs if their scores on the four personality measures were at least one-half of a standard deviation beyond the overall sample (n=455) means in the direction indicative of the ASP profile. To identify further ASP participants, this criterion was reduced to one-third of a standard deviation. That is, additional participants were selected as ASPs if their scores on the four personality measures were at least one-third of a standard deviation beyond the overall sample means in the direction indicative of the ASP profile.

Self-esteem scores were not used to identify ASPs, but were used to select control participants (i.e. control group members' self-esteem scores were at or above the overall sample mean). Gustafson (in press) had previously determined that self-esteem scores are not an essential component of the ASP profile. Specifically, Gustafson (in press) had found no significant differences on the PCL-R (Hare, 1991) between low, moderate, and high self-esteem ASPs (i.e., individuals who fit the ASP profile with regard to the other personality measures). The PCL-R (Hare, 1991) is a structured interview used to assess psychopathy. Although self-esteem scores are not an important element of the ASP profile, self-esteem scores were used to identify the non-ASP comparison group so that this group would represent a "well-adjusted" sample. Table 2 includes the means and standard deviations on the personality measures for the ASP and non-ASP

comparison participants actually used in Study 2.

Study 2

Method

Participants

A power analysis was conducted to determine the minimum necessary sample size for Study 2. The following power analysis components were set at the following values in order to determine the necessary sample size: effect size (ES) = .40, significance criterion or alpha (α) = .10 (due to the exploratory nature of the study and the difficulty in obtaining a large sample), power (1 - β) = .80, degrees of freedom of the numerator of the F-ratio (u) = 1. The u component is equal to $(k-1)(r-1)$ where k and r represent the number of levels of independent variables. The results of the power analysis indicated that each cell required 20 participants. Because no three-way interactions were hypothesized, only ten participant were required per cell (participants were always collapsed over the third variable doubling the cell sizes).

Therefore, Study 2 (the primary study), used forty ASPs and forty non-ASPs identified in Study 1. Gender and year in school information is presented in Table 3. All participants were included in a monetary lottery. Also, participants in psychology courses were given extra credit for their participation.

Stimulus Materials

Participants viewed an updated version of a videotaped

lecture constructed by Hauenstein and Alexander (1991). The lecture was given by a male graduate student and addressed the subject of consumer perceptions of buying behavior. A male lecturer was used because if a female lecturer had been used, ASPs' potential sexism would be confounded with their responses to the manipulations. The tape was approximately 13 minutes in length. Included in the lecture are 16 behavioral incidents (see Appendix B) which coincide with the four performance dimensions presented on the rating form that the participants completed. The lecture portrayed on the videotape is considered to represent average performance and includes twelve positive behaviors and four negative behaviors. Positive and negative behaviors presented in equal frequency tend to represent negative performance, hence the choice of a 3:1 ratio of positive to negative behaviors (personal communication, Hauenstein, November 1997).

Independent variables

Accountability. Prior to viewing the videotape, half of the ASPs and non-ASPs (randomly assigned) were told that upon completion of the evaluation, they would be providing feedback to the actual lecturer, who would be arriving shortly (accountable condition); the other half of the participants received no such instructions (unaccountable condition).

Opportunity for Recognition Condition. Accountable versus unaccountable conditions were crossed with the recognition versus

no-recognition conditions. Prior to viewing the videotape, half of the ASPs and non-ASPs (randomly assigned), were told that if they were able to provide accurate (non-lenient) ratings, they might have an opportunity to discuss their evaluation process on a video tape that would be shown to all graduate student instructors during the following semester's training session (recognition condition). The remaining participants were not informed of an opportunity to appear on a training video (no-recognition condition). The instructions read to the participants are presented in Appendixes C, D, E, and F.

True Score Development

Dimensional and overall true scores were developed through the use of expert raters. Ten graduate students were used as raters. The experience of graduate students as both students and instructors had shown them to be effective raters of teaching performance in the past (Walker, 1989). Using aspects of Walker's (1989) procedure, the raters first viewed the videotape without any instructions or evaluation forms. Second, the researchers discussed the dimensions of performance to be rated. Third, the researchers informed the raters about rater errors which they should attempt to avoid (e.g. leniency, halo, central tendency). Fourth, raters were given an opportunity to ask questions regarding the scale and/or dimensions. Finally, the raters viewed the videotape again and actually completed the behavioral and evaluatory ratings. True scores were calculated as the average

rating across all ten expert raters for each of the judgmental performance dimensions (see Table 4). These true scores were used to calculate both dimensional accuracy and leniency scores for each research participant.

Dependent measures

A 32-item behavioral rating scale was used for assessing the recognition of behaviors exhibited by the instructor on the videotape (see Appendix G). A list of behaviors, half of which the instructor did exhibit and half of which he did not, are listed on the rating form. The participants simply marked "Yes" if they remembered the instructor exhibiting the behavior and "No" if they did not remember the instructor exhibiting the behavior.

Sanchez and De La Torre's (1996) index of behavioral accuracy, which considers a respondent's tendency to answer positively or negatively, was used. Lord (1985) introduced the use of signal detection theory (SDT) for operationalizing accuracy as a criterion. According to Lord (1985), signal strength and noise level both influence the accuracy with which people recall information. Behavioral accuracy is operationalized as the hit rate (HR; the proportion of behaviors which occurred and were identified as occurring) minus the false-alarm rate (FAR; the proportion of behaviors which did not occur but were identified as occurring) (Lord, 1985, Sanchez & De La Torre, 1996). HR and FAR represent operational definitions of signal plus noise strength and noise alone, respectively (Lord, 1985). This index of

behavioral accuracy indicates the extent to which raters can accurately retrieve information regarding the behavior of a target individual.

Behavioral accuracy is operationalized as follows:

$$P_r = HR - FAR, \quad (1)$$

where HR (hit rate) refers to the proportion of observed behaviors marked "yes" to the total number of observed behaviors; FAR (false-alarm rate) refers to the number of unobserved behaviors marked "yes" to the total number of unobserved behaviors. This behavioral accuracy index can range from -1 to 1.

Leniency (or severity) bias is the tendency of a rater to rate all ratees high (or low) across one or more dimensions (Cardy & Dobbins, 1994). Leniency bias was initially conceptualized (Guilford, 1954) and empirically supported (Kane, Bernardin, Villanova, & Peyrefitte, 1995) as a stable tendency of certain raters over time. Because it is possible that any given individual may, in fact, perform well (or poorly) across performance dimensions, it is important to compare ratings to true scores. Although controlled experiments allow dimensional true scores to be manipulated (and therefore measured) to allow for identification of leniency (or severity) bias (e.g. McIntyre, Smith, & Hassett, 1984; Hauenstein & Alexander, 1991), non-

experimental research requires the use of less robust error measures which are not based on true scores (e.g., Alliger & Williams, 1989).

Distinct from leniency (or severity), halo is the tendency to rate an individual similarly across separate dimensions of performance. Halo differs from leniency in that ratings may be high, low, or anywhere in between. Sulsky and Balzer (1988) distinguish between "true halo" and "illusory halo," suggesting that true halo represents the correlation of dimensional ratings when actual performance on those dimensions is, indeed, strongly correlated. For example, if employee A is truly above average across the dimensions of his job, it would not be surprising for his performance rating dimension scores to be highly correlated. In this case, the dimensions would represent true halo. Illusory halo, on the other hand, is defined as giving similar ratings across dimensions on which true performance levels vary.

However, evidence suggests that leniency and halo may be confounded. Alliger and Williams (1989), using simulated data, demonstrated the non-orthogonal nature of leniency and halo. Leniency, when operationalized as the distance of ratings above the scale median, was negatively related to halo, when halo was operationalized as the mean dimension intercorrelation. As leniency increased, the variance of the ratings decreased, thus attenuating the intercorrelations of the dimensional ratings (Alliger & Williams, 1989). However, when halo was

operationalized as the average standard deviation of ratings across all dimensions within each ratee, leniency and halo were positively related: Greater leniency reduced the variance within the ratings, thus resulting in greater halo.

A simpler example of the confounded nature of halo and leniency can be demonstrated in the single ratee case. Because both leniency and halo are defined as rater errors, they are viewed as systematic distortions in ratings which raters make across ratees (Cardy & Dobbins, 1994). In the case of a single ratee study, it may be impossible to determine whether ratings which are high and similar across dimensions reflect a rater's tendency to provide ratings which are lenient, "haloed", or both. The use of multiple ratees allows for a more thorough examination of these forms of rater distortion. Nevertheless, due to the difficulties in distinguishing between leniency and halo in the single-ratee case, only leniency error will be addressed in the current study.

Leniency (severity) bias was computed using McIntyre et al.'s (1984) index of leniency. Using McIntyre et al.'s (1984) index is advantageous because it is based on deviations from the true score not from the scale median thus providing an index of leniency bias, (i.e., true leniency). McIntyre et al. (1984) operationalized leniency as follows:

$$\text{Leniency}_k = \frac{\sum(T_{ij} - R_{ijk})}{d} \quad (2)$$

where d = the number of items on the scale, the k subscript = the k th rater, R = the observed score, and T = the true score. Positive values reflect severity while negative values reflect leniency.

Graphic rating scales, scored on a 7-point Likert scale, were used for evaluating performance on six dimensions (see Appendix H). The four dimensions of performance included on the rating scale are (1) delivery, (2) organization, (3) relevance, and (4) knowledge. The final two scales represent ratings of overall lecturing performance and overall success as a college instructor.

Hauenstein and Alexander's (1991) dimensional accuracy (DA) was used as the index of performance evaluation accuracy. This index, which is used for single ratees, is analogous to Cronbach's (1955) differential accuracy (used with multiple ratees), which is a measure of accuracy of a rater on each dimension. Dimensional accuracy is operationalized as follows:

$$DA^2 = 1/n \sum [(x_j - x_{.}) - (t_j - t_{.})]^2 \quad (3)$$

where x_j =observed rating on dimension j , $x_{.}$ =observed mean rating over all dimensions, t_j =true score on dimension j , and $t_{.}$ =true mean score over all dimensions.

Procedure

Participants reported to the lab individually. Prior to viewing the videotape half of the ASPs and half of the non-ASPs

were assigned to the accountable condition; half to the non-accountable condition. Also prior to viewing the videotape, half of the ASPs and half of the non-ASPs were assigned to the recognition condition and half to the no-recognition condition. All participants were told that the psychology department was interested in obtaining evaluations of graduate student instructors from undergraduate students. The participants were also told that these evaluations would be used in determining teaching assignments for the following fall semester. All participants were cautioned against being too lenient in their ratings and were asked to do their best to be fair and accurate. All participants watched the videotape of the graduate student instructor. Following the videotaped lecture, they rated the lecturer's performance using the behavioral recognition scale and the performance evaluation scale.

Upon completion of the rating forms, participants were given a debriefing statement which explained the true purpose of the study. Participants were given an opportunity to ask and questions and were then excused.

Results

Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations of the dependent variables are presented in Table 5. As expected, behavioral accuracy was significantly related to hit rate ($r = .52$, $p < .001$), and false-alarm rate ($r = -.66$, $p < .001$). Dimensional accuracy and leniency were also significantly correlated ($r = .27$,

$p < .05$). Interestingly, hit rate was correlated with both dimensional accuracy ($r = -.24$, $p < .05$) and leniency ($r = -.29$, $p < .01$). Additionally, cell means (and standard deviations) and marginal means (and standard deviations) are presented for all groups on each dependent variable in Tables 6-15.

Aberrant Self-Promotion

Although an omnibus MANOVA was not required to test for a priori group differences, it was nonetheless conducted to provide a summary overview of the main effects on the hypothesized dependent variables. Behavioral accuracy and leniency were entered as the dependent variables. The omnibus MANOVA was significant, $F(2, 77) = 3.15$, $p < .05$ (see Table 16). Univariate F -tests were then conducted on both dependent variables (see Table 17). ASPs were hypothesized to rate more severely than non-ASPs (Hypothesis 1). Also, ASPs were hypothesized to be less accurate in recalling information regarding the behaviors performed by the lecturer on the videotape (Hypothesis 2). Regarding Hypothesis 1, aberrant self-promotion was not significantly related to leniency in performance evaluations, $F(1, 78) = .79$, $p > .10$. However, aberrant self-promotion was significantly related to behavioral accuracy, $F(1, 78) = 5.96$, $p < .05$, thereby supporting Hypothesis 2. As predicted, the ASP group ($M = .43$) was less behaviorally accurate than the non-ASP group ($M = .51$). T -tests were conducted on both hit rate (HR) and false-alarm rate (FAR) in order to determine which component (or whether both components) of

behavioral accuracy was contributing to the observed group differences. Aberrant self-promotion was not significantly related to hit rate, $t = -.753$, $p > .05$. However, aberrant self-promotion was significantly related to false-alarm rate, $t = 2.02$, $p < .05$ (see Table 18). The ASP group ($M = .28$) exhibited a higher false-alarm rate than the non-ASP group ($M = .23$) (see Table 17). Therefore, ASPs incorrectly identified more behaviors as occurring that did not actually occur than non-ASPs.

Aberrant Self-Promotion and Accountability

Aberrant self-promotion was expected to interact with the accountability condition, such that non-ASP raters would be affected by the accountability condition (those in the accountability condition would be more lenient), whereas ASP raters would be unaffected by the accountability manipulation (Hypothesis 3). An ANOVA was conducted to test for an interactive effect on leniency between aberrant self-promotion and the accountability manipulation. The omnibus ANOVA was not significant, $F(3, 76) = .76$, $p > .10$ (see Tables 6 and 19). Fisher's Least Significant Difference test was used to determine if the cell means were significantly different from one another, as hypothesized, even though the omnibus test was not significant. No significant differences existed between the groups. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was unsupported.

Aberrant self-promotion was also expected to interact with the accountability manipulation, such that non-ASP raters would be

affected by the accountability condition (those in the accountability condition would be more behaviorally accurate), whereas ASP raters would be unaffected by the accountability manipulation (Hypothesis 4). An ANOVA was conducted to test for the interaction between aberrant self-promotion and the accountability manipulation on behavioral accuracy. The omnibus ANOVA was significant, $F(3, 76) = 2.85$, $p < .05$ (see Table 19). In addition, Fisher's Least Significant Difference test indicated that the unaccountable ASP group ($M = .40$) was significantly lower on behavioral accuracy than were both the unaccountable non-ASP group ($M = .51$) and the accountable non-ASP group ($M = .51$) (see Table 7 for cell and marginal means). These results partially supported Hypothesis 4 (see Figure 1).

In order to determine whether the observed aberrant self-promotion by accountability interaction was due to differences in hit rate, false-alarm rate, or both, each of these variables was entered into a subsequent ANOVA. With regard to hit rate, the aberrant self-promotion by accountability interaction was non-significant, $F(3, 76) = .49$, $p > .05$ (see Tables 8 and 19). In addition, Fisher's Least Significant Difference test indicated no significant group differences.

With regard to false-alarm rate, the omnibus ANOVA was non-significant, $F(3, 76) = 2.37$, $p > .05$ (see Table 18). However, Fisher's Least Significant Difference test indicated that the unaccountable ASP group ($M = .31$) demonstrated a significantly

higher false-alarm rate than the accountable non-ASP group ($M = .21$) (see Table 9). These results suggest that "unmotivated" ASPs were more likely to identify behaviors as occurring (when said behaviors actually did not occur) than were "motivated" non-ASPs.

For exploratory purposes, an omnibus ANOVA was conducted to test the interaction between aberrant self-promotion and the accountability manipulation on dimensional accuracy. The omnibus ANOVA was not significant, $F(3, 76) = .28, p > .10$ (see Tables 10 and 18). Fisher's Least Significant Difference test was used to determine whether any contrasts were significant. No significant differences in dimensional accuracy were observed between the groups.

Aberrant Self-Promotion and Opportunity for Recognition

Hypothesis 5 stated that ASPs in the recognition condition would provide more severe ratings than would all other raters. An ANOVA was conducted to test for the interaction between aberrant self-promotion and the recognition manipulation with respect to leniency. The omnibus ANOVA was not significant, $F(3, 76) = .40, p > .10$ (see Tables 11 and 20). The LSD test was used in order to determine whether support for the hypothesis existed, regardless of the omnibus test. No significant differences existed between the groups with regard to leniency. Therefore, no support for Hypothesis 5 was found.

Aberrant self-promoters in the no-recognition condition were hypothesized to exhibit less behavioral accuracy than all other

raters (hypothesis 6). An ANOVA was conducted to test for the interaction between aberrant self-promotion and the recognition manipulation on behavioral accuracy. The omnibus ANOVA was significant, $F(3, 76) = 2.47, p < .05$ (see Table 20). The no-recognition ASP group had the lowest mean of the four groups. The LSD test revealed that the no-recognition ASP group ($M = .40$) was significantly less accurate than both the no-recognition non-ASP group ($M = .50$) and the recognition non-ASP group ($M = .52$) (see Table 12). That is, the no-recognition ASP group was significantly lower than both of the non-ASP comparison groups. The no-recognition ASP group was not significantly lower than the recognition ASP group ($M = .47$), with regard to behavioral accuracy (see Figure 2). Therefore, Hypothesis 6 was supported. In other words, the lack of a motivational factor (i.e., accountability or opportunity for recognition) was not detrimental to the behavioral accuracy of the non-ASP group; however, the absence of a motivational factor led ASPs to be less behaviorally accurate.

In order to determine whether the observed aberrant self-promotion by recognition interaction was due to differences in hit rate, false-alarm rate, or both, these variables were entered into subsequent ANOVAs. With regard to hit rate, the aberrant self-promotion by recognition interaction was not significant, $F(3, 76) = .61, p > .05$ (see Tables 13 and 20). In addition, Fisher's Least Significant Difference test indicated no significant group

differences. With regard to false-alarm rate, the omnibus ANOVA was not significant, $F(3, 76) = 1.55$, $p > .05$ (see Tables 14 and 20). Fisher's Least Significant Difference test indicated no significant group differences. Therefore the difference observed in behavioral accuracy could not be solely attributed to either hit rate or false-alarm rate.

For exploratory purposes, an omnibus ANOVA was conducted in order to test for an interaction effect between aberrant self-promotion and opportunity for recognition on dimensional accuracy. The ANOVA that was conducted to test for the interaction was not significant, $F(3, 76) = .05$, $p > .10$ (see Tables 15 and 20). Fisher's LSD test identified no significant differences between the groups with regard to dimensional accuracy.

Exploratory analyses-of-variance were conducted to test all three-way interactions on each dependent variable. None of the three-way interactions were statistically significant.

Discussion

A relationship between the selected personality profiles (ASP vs. non-ASP comparison group) and behavioral accuracy was supported. The aberrant self-promoters were less accurate than the non-ASPs at recalling performance-related information. Also, the false-alarm rates of the ASP and non-ASP group were significantly different, suggesting a possible acquiescence effect, in which the ASPs were likely to mark "Yes" to most behaviors as occurring, consequently leading to high hit rates and

false-alarm rates. It is possible that ASPs' narcissism led to a general apathy towards the task at hand. Aberrant self-promoters may have been unwilling to devote any time or energy towards what they perceived as the mundane task of paying attention to someone besides themselves. In contrast, the comparison group behaved as psychological research participants often do—obediently. That is, the comparison group members appeared to take the instructions of the researcher at face value and devoted adequate attention to the task.

Nor could the differences between the ASPs and the comparison group with regard to behavioral accuracy be attributed to differences in ability. Within certain motivational contexts, the ASPs were nearly as capable as the comparison participants at recalling the desired information. First, as expected, ASPs who were provided the incentive of an opportunity to "exude their expertise" (recognition condition) were able to recall information nearly as well as the comparison groups. However, in the absence of this incentive (no-recognition condition), the ASPs were substantially less accurate at recalling the information. Therefore, whereas the presence or absence of the opportunity for recognition was irrelevant to the comparison group, the presence of the opportunity for recognition motivated ASP raters to accurately recall the performance-related information.

Second, ASPs who were not held accountable (i.e. were not told they would have to provide face-to-face feedback to the

instructor) were significantly less accurate than were the comparison participants at recalling the performance-related information. Although an ASP by accountability interaction was hypothesized, the ordering of the groups was unexpected. More specifically, the accountability manipulation affected the ASPs instead of the non-ASPs. The recognition and accountability variables were designed to motivate participants differentially. Unexpectedly, however, accountability provided a motivating force for ASPs. In the absence of either recognition or accountability, ASPs did not recall information accurately, whereas the absence of such factors had no effect on the comparison group. The lack of a significant effect of accountability on the non-ASP participants may be due to a ceiling effect. The delay between the viewing of the video and the administration of the behavioral recognition measure was minimal. The participants began completing the recognition measure immediately upon completion of the video. Without a substantial delay or distracter (such as another task), the non-ASPs may have found it quite easy to accurately recall the performance-related information from the video. The mean levels of behavioral accuracy, hit rate, and false-alarm rate for the non-ASP group in the current study exceeded the mean levels reported by Hauenstein (1992), who used the same stimulus material and behavioral recognition measure. Hauenstein provided a one-week delay between the viewing of the video and the completion of the behavioral recognition measure. The lack of a delay or

distracter in the current study may have made the recognition of behaviors too easy, thus resulting in a ceiling effect that explains a lack of effect for accountability on the non-ASP participants.

The unexpected accountability effect on the ASPs may be attributed to the way in which they interpreted this manipulation. Although it seems unlikely that ASPs would feel anxious about providing face-to-face feedback, they may have viewed the situation as an opportunity to "tell the instructor how it is." The lack of a significant aberrant self-promotion by accountability interaction with regard to leniency suggests that this effect is not related to the severity or leniency of the ratings. That is, ASPs perceived accountability as an opportunity to be in control of the feedback situation. The ASPs could use this opportunity to explain to the instructor why he is inferior (i.e., to express the bias of superiority) or to provide positive performance-related information (i.e., to render an "ASP blessing"). In order to provide specific information (positive or negative) to the instructor, the ASPs were motivated to pay more careful attention to the videotaped lecture.

Tetlock and colleagues (Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989) have suggested that accountability for opinions or decisions can lead down one of two paths. First, if individuals know the beliefs of the party to which they are accountable, they will make decisions that are

consistent with that party's beliefs. This attitudinal shift idea supports viewing people as cognitive misers, a view which suggests that individuals will choose the least effortful solution to making a decision (Taylor & Fiske, 1978). However, according to Tetlock's theory of accountability, people only shift their attitudes if they have adequate information regarding the target person's views. If information regarding the target person's beliefs is inadequate, then people will engage in a second, "more complex and multidimensional" form of thinking (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). Under these conditions, individuals will take more information into account in making a decision. Assuming the information available is relevant to the situation, more accurate decisions should be reached.

With regard to the first part of this argument, ASPs would not be expected to shift their views to agree with anyone. However, they might well be expected to engage in "more complex and multidimensional" thinking in an effort to demonstrate their own competence. Therefore, in this investigation, the effect of accountability and recognition may have been the same—both provided an arena for ASPs to demonstrate their superiority. Whether that arena takes the form of a training video or an opportunity to provide the instructor with "feedback" may be inconsequential. The important point is that both manipulations motivated the ASPs to pay closer attention to the task at hand. The absence of these motivating factors led to less attention

focused on the task. In addition to the current findings, Russell (199?) found cognitive ability to be normally distributed in a group of ASP participants, suggesting that ASPs are not lacking in cognitive skills relative to their non-ASP counterparts. Also, no evidence exists within the psychopathy literature to suggest that psychopaths differ from "normal" people with regard to cognitive ability. Therefore, the current results appear to be properly interpreted as representing differential reactions to motivators, not differences in ability.

None of the hypotheses regarding dimensional accuracy or leniency were statistically significant. However, in lieu of the discussion of the motivational manipulations (accountability and recognition), this is not entirely surprising. First, the lack of attention displayed by the unmotivated ASPs may explain their lack of leniency/severity. That is, the ASP raters did not exhibit a severity bias because such a bias is systematic. It would appear that the ASPs did not focus enough attention on the task to make any systematic errors. Second, all groups of raters, across all conditions, were severe raters. That is, no group of raters averaged rating the instructor above the estimated true scores. This tendency may reflect a general bias in the sample, a flaw in the true score development process, or instructional demand characteristics. With respect to this third possibility, for example, the recognition condition was an attempt to link "accurate and non-lenient" ratings with the reward of appearing on

a training video. However, the use of the phrase "non-lenient" may not have clearly established this link. The raters may simply have paid closer attention in an effort to provide more accurate, although not necessarily more severe, ratings.

With regard to dimensional accuracy, two possible explanations of the lack of significant results will be discussed. First, it is possible that the use of an accuracy index based on deviations from "true scores" may contain excessive within group variance. That is, large amounts of "noise" may have masked any real differences between the groups in terms of actual performance judgments. Second, it may be that the ASPs and non-ASPs simply did not differ with regard to dimensional accuracy. Aberrant self-promoters may reach similar judgments through a substantially different process. The group differences in behavioral accuracy indicate that the ASPs were substantially less accurate at recalling performance-related information than the non-ASPs. However, the two groups were very similar with regard to the accuracy with which they made their performance evaluations. Therefore, the ASPs may have made more spontaneous judgments based on less information, whereas the non-ASPs may have based their judgments more on the performance-related information. Thus, markedly different strategies would yield similar results.

Murphy and Cleveland (1995) have provided a model of rater motivation that includes the counteracting forces of motivation to distort ratings and motivation to provide accurate ratings. These

motivational forces are based on rewards (and the probability of receiving these rewards) associated with accurate and distorted ratings. The constructs of accurate and distorted ratings in Murphy and Cleveland's (1995) model appear consistent with Cronbach's (1955) operational definitions of accuracy and the standard operational definitions of rater errors (Cardy & Dobbins, 1994). Such a motivational model assumes raters are capable of providing accurate ratings.

However, the results of the current study suggest that aberrant self-promoters require motivation at an earlier stage in the performance appraisal process. Using a two-stage framework of performance appraisal based on (1) processing performance-related information and (2) making performance evaluations, unmotivated ASPs appear not to process information as accurately as non-ASPs do.

Murphy and Cleveland (1995) have also provided a basic model of cognitive processing in performance appraisal that includes the following stages: (1) observing behavior, (2) encode behavior-related information, (3) storing information, (4) retrieving information, and (5) integrating information. Results from the current study tentatively suggest that ASPs (who are unmotivated) manifest a deficiency at the information processing stage, not at the performance evaluation stage, of performance appraisal.

Moreover, it appears that a classic person by situation

interaction (Lewin, 1938) exists between aberrant self-promotion and the motivational context. However, as stated above, the reason for the interaction appears to be attributable to differential interpretation of the manipulations. That is, ASPs perceived the opportunity for recognition as a reward, whereas the non-ASPs did not. Although not in the expected direction, the same phenomenon was observed with the accountability manipulation: the ASPs perceived accountability as an incentive, whereas the non-ASPs did not.

Berkowitz and Donnerstein (1982) have used the perceived "meaning of a situation" (p. 249) as the critical factor that determines the generalizability of behavior. According to Berkowitz and Donnerstein (1982), "the meaning the subjects assign to the situation they are in and the behavior they are carrying out plays a greater part in determining the generalizability of an experiment's outcome than does the sample's demographic representativeness or the setting's surface realism (p. 249)." The results of the current study echo the importance of the meaning subjects assign to the situation (i.e., the manipulation). Using Berkowitz and Donnerstein's (1982) logic, ASPs and non-ASPs differed in the responses to the manipulations because they attributed different meanings to the manipulations.

Several implications were identified based on the results of the current study. Although baseline differences existed between ASPs and the non-ASP comparison participants with regard to

behavioral accuracy, these differences should not be attributed to ability. Clearly motivational context played an important role in the inability of ASPs to accurately recall information. However, ASPs' behavior in the real world may not be consistent with the behavior of the ASP participants in the current study.

Accountability as manipulated in this investigation may not represent accountability as it functions in the workplace. That is, the research participants knew they would have an opportunity to provide the instructor with feedback and then would never have to interact with him again.

In contrast, accountability in the workplace is an ongoing process in which employees are expected to interact on a regular basis. The behavior of ASPs should be less predictable in an environment with multiple incentives and censures attached to behavior. In the workplace, aberrant self-promoters should be expected to act the way Babiak (1995) describes psychopaths as acting. That is, ASPs should be expected to do whatever is in their own best interest, including undermining some employees (those whom they perceive as a threat), promoting and "befriending" others (those who possess valuable resources or information), and ignoring still others (those who are neither a threat nor useful). The perceived utility of fellow employees is likely to determine the general attitude taken by ASPs and influence more specific behavior, such as the performance appraisal process.

The current study suffered from two primary limitations. First, due to the similar effects of the two motivational manipulations, the manipulations were probably not completely independent. Unfortunately, no meaningful way of conducting a manipulation check was possible. Aberrant self-promoters could not be trusted to answer manipulation check items truthfully because they would never admit to being "duped" by a researcher.

Second, the manipulations used in the current study did not hold any true stakes for the participants. The opportunity for recognition manipulation was somewhat ambiguous and may not have painted a clear enough picture of the "glory that awaited the participants". Given higher stakes (e.g., an opportunity to rid oneself of a competitor or gain an ally in the work place) ASPs' behavior might be far more aberrant.

The current findings suggest several future directions for research on aberrant self-promotion. Gustafson (in press), is currently developing a short, efficient measure of aberrant self-promotion. This instrument is expected to replace the current, 200-item personality battery used to identify ASPs. The new 20-item instrument will significantly shorten the process of identifying ASPs and will facilitate field research of aberrant self-promoters. The use of field samples is necessary to fully understand the conditions under which ASPs destructive behavior is most likely to be triggered (i.e., to determine the real stakes).

However, the continued use of experimental studies conducted with student samples will provide invaluable information regarding ASPs. The laboratory provides a unique (and controlled) environment for studying aberrant self-promoters' behaviors and cognitions. First, studies designed to identify other motivational variables that trigger ASPs' destructive behavior should be conducted. More specifically, the effects of counteracting motivational forces could be investigated. That is, the presence of both positive and negative outcomes linked to the same behavior could be studied. Second, the effects of immediate and delayed rewards on behavior should be directly investigated. Due to ASPs' impulsive nature, it would be expected that if this condition were specifically manipulated, the influence of immediate rewards would be stronger than the influence of delayed rewards. Third, differences between ASPs and non-ASPs with regard to information-processing, attention, and impression formation should be investigated. Aberrant self-promoters' impulsive nature may lead them to form quick or spontaneous impressions.

Finally, experimental manipulation studies should be conducted to more fully understand differences between ASPs and non-ASPs with regard to their interpretations of different manipulations of motivational variables. The current results indicate that ASPs may not only react differently to certain manipulations, but may in fact interpret such manipulations differently. Further investigation of aberrant self-promoters and

their reactions to different motivational contexts will provide a further framework for predicting ASPs' behavior in a variety of organizational contexts.

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Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations of Personality Measures for Study 1

Scale	Full(n=455)		ASP Cluster1		ASP Cluster2	
	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>
CPI	35.81	5.87	31.41	5.18	29.70	2.75
SD	4.32	1.92	3.78	1.08	3.90	1.39
SRP-II	175.83	19.37	210.56	11.36	189.92	9.52
NPI	14.55	7.42	27.41	4.46	19.44	3.65

Note. CPI = Socialization subscale of the California Personality Inventory; SD = Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale; SRP-II = Self-Report of Psychopathy; NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory.

Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations of Personality Measures for Study 2
ASPs and non-ASPs

Scale	ASPs (n=40)		non-ASPs (n=40)	
	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>
CPI	29.76	4.75	39.20	5.41
SD	2.73	.92	5.02	1.78
SRP-II	199.27	14.34	162.40	10.13
NPI	22.93	5.08	9.53	3.11
SE	43.02	6.31	46.40	3.69

Note. CPI = Socialization subscale of the California Personality Inventory; SD = Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale; SRP-II = Self-Report of Psychopathy; SE = Self-Esteem subscale of the Organizational Climate Questionnaire; NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory.

Table 3

Year in School and Gender Percentages for ASPs and non-ASPs

	ASPs (n=40)	non-ASPs (n=40)	Total (n=80)
<u>Year in School</u>			
Freshman	47.5%	20.0%	33.75%
Sophomore	25.0	22.5	23.75
Junior	17.5	40.0	28.75
Senior	10.0	17.5	13.75
<u>Gender</u>			
Male	37.5%	10.0%	23.75%
Female	62.5	90.0	76.25%

Table 4

Means and Standard Deviations for Rating Form Target Scores

	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>
Knowledge	5.00	1.28
Delivery	3.42	1.16
Relevance	4.17	1.27
Organization	5.25	1.06

Note: N=12

Table 5

Intercorrelations Between and Means and Standard Deviations of
Dependent Variables

Variable	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	1	2	3	4	5
1. Behavioral Accuracy	.47	.14	--	.52***	-.66***	-.19	-.12
2. Hit Rate	.73	.11	--	--	.30*	-.24*	.29**
3. False-Alarm Rate	.25	.13	--	--	--	.01	-.12
4. Dimensional Accuracy	1.06	.82	--	--	--	--	.27*
5. Leniency	1.26	.94	--	--	--	--	--

Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 6

Cell Means and Marginal Means of Aberrant Self-Promotion and
Accountability for Leniency

	ASPs		non-ASPs		marginal means	
Accountable	1.17	(.90)	1.05	(1.03)	1.11	(.97)
Unaccountable	1.49	(.94)	1.24	(.91)	1.37	(.91)
marginal means	1.33	(.92)	1.15	(.97)		

Note: Means followed by standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 7

Cell Means and Marginal Means of Aberrant Self-Promotion and
Accountability for Behavioral Accuracy

	ASPs	non-ASPs	marginal means
Accountable	.47 (.17)	.51 (.10)	.49 (.14)
Unaccountable	.40 (.11)	.51 (.15)	.46 (.13)
marginal means	.44 (.14)	.51 (.13)	

Note: Means followed by standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 8

Cell Means and Marginal Means of Aberrant Self-Promotion and
Accountability for Hit Rate

	ASPs	non-ASPs	marginal means
Accountable	.72 (.12)	.72 (.10)	.72 (.11)
Unaccountable	.71 (.13)	.75 (.09)	.73 (.11)
marginal means	.72 (.13)	.74 (.10)	

Note: Means followed by standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 9

Cell Means and Marginal Means of Aberrant Self-Promotion and
Accountability for False-Alarm Rate

	ASPs	non-ASPs	marginal means
Accountable	.25 (.14)	.21 (.10)	.23 (.12)
Unaccountable	.31 (.15)	.24 (.10)	.28 (.13)
marginal means	.28 (.15)	.23 (.10)	

Note: Means followed by standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 10

Cell Means and Marginal Means of Aberrant Self-Promotion and Accountability for Dimensional Accuracy

	ASPs		non-ASPs		marginal means	
Accountable	1.10	(.76)	.98	(.74)	1.04	(.75)
Unaccountable	.99	(.63)	1.19	(1.10)	1.09	(.87)
marginal means	1.05	(.70)	1.09	(.92)		

Note: Means followed by standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 11

Cell Means and Marginal Means of Aberrant Self-Promotion and Opportunity for Recognition for Leniency

	ASPs		non-ASPs		marginal means	
Recognition	1.25	(1.07)	1.20	(1.05)	1.23	(1.06)
No-recognition	1.41	(.76)	1.09	(.89)	1.25	(.83)
marginal means	1.33	(.92)	1.15	(.97)		

Note: Means followed by standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 12

Cell Means and Marginal Means of Aberrant Self-Promotion and Opportunity for Recognition for Behavioral Accuracy

	ASPs	non-ASPs	marginal means
Recognition	.47 (.13)	.52 (.15)	.50 (.14)
No-recognition	.40 (.16)	.50 (.10)	.45 (.13)
marginal means	.44 (.15)	.51 (.13)	

Note: Means followed by standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 13

Cell Means and Marginal Means of Aberrant Self-Promotion and Opportunity for Recognition for Hit Rate

	ASPs	non-ASPs	marginal means
Recognition	.73 (.12)	.75 (.11)	.74 (.12)
No-recognition	.70 (.13)	.72 (.09)	.71 (.11)
marginal means	.72 (.13)	.74 (.10)	

Note: Means followed by standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 14

Cell Means and Marginal Means of Aberrant Self-Promotion and Opportunity for Recognition for False-Alarm Rate

	ASPs	non-ASPs	marginal means
Recognition	.27 (.13)	.23 (.10)	.25 (.12)
No-recognition	.30 (.16)	.22 (.11)	.26 (.14)
marginal means	.29 (.15)	.23 (.11)	

Note: Means followed by standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 15

Cell Means and Marginal Means of Aberrant Self-Promotion and Opportunity for Recognition for Dimensional Accuracy

	ASPs		non-ASPs		marginal means	
Recognition	1.08	(.58)	1.10	(.84)	1.09	(.71)
No-recognition	1.01	(.80)	1.06	(1.04)	1.04	(.92)
marginal means	1.05	(.69)	1.08	(.94)		

Note: Means followed by standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 16

Omnibus MANOVA for the Effects of Aberrant Self-Promotion on
Leniency and Behavioral Accuracy

Test	Value	F	Hypoth. DF	Error DF	Sig. of F
Pillai- Bartlett	.076	3.15	2	77	.048

Table 17

Univariate F-tests for the Effect of Aberrant Self-Promotion on
Leniency and Behavioral Accuracy

Variable	Within SS	Between SS	Within MS	Between MS	F	p
Leniency	.70	68.00	.70	.88	.79	.38
BA	.11	1.47	.11	.02	5.96	.02

Table 18

T-tests for the Effects of Aberrant Self-Promotion on Hit Rate and False-Alarm Rate

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Mean Difference</u>	<u>t</u>	<u>df</u>	<u>p</u>
Hit Rate	-.019	-.75	78	.454
False-Alarm Rate	-.056	2.02	78	.047

Table 19

Omnibus ANOVAs for the Interactive Effect of Aberrant Self-Promotion and the Accountability Manipulation on Leniency, Behavioral Accuracy, Hit Rate, False-Alarm Rate, and Dimensional Accuracy

Variable	Within SS	Between SS	Within MS	Between MS	F	p
Leniency	67.67	2.03	.89	.68	.76	.52
BA	1.43	.16	.02	.05	2.85	.043
Hit Rate	.96	.02	.013	.006	.49	.692
False-Alarm Rate	1.16	1.09	.015	.036	2.37	.077
DA	52.19	.58	.69	.19	.28	.84

Table 20

Omnibus ANOVA for the Interactive Effect of Aberrant Self-Promotion and the Recognition Manipulation on Leniency, Behavioral Accuracy, Hit Rate, False-Alarm Rate, and Dimensional Accuracy

Variable	Within SS	Between SS	Within MS	Between MS	F	p
Leniency	68.61	1.09	.90	.37	.40	.75
BA	1.43	.16	.02	.05	2.75	.048
Hit Rate	.95	.023	.013	.008	.61	.61
False-Alarm Rate	1.20	.073	.016	.024	1.55	.21
DA	52.67	.09	.69	.03	.05	.99




Figure 1. Behavioral accuracy means for ASP and non-ASP groups in accountable and non-accountable conditions.




Figure 2. Behavioral accuracy means for ASP and non-ASP groups in recognition and no-recognition conditions.

Appendix A

Dimensions of Psychopathy Construct

1. Glibness/Superficial Charm
2. Grandiose Sense of Self Worth
3. Need for Stimulation/Proneness to Boredom
4. Pathological Lying
5. Conning/Manipulative
6. Lack of Remorse or Guilt
7. Shallow Affect
8. Callous/Lack of Empathy
9. Parasitic Lifestyle
10. Poor Behavioral Controls
11. Promiscuous Sexual Behavior
12. Early Behavioral Problems
13. Lack of Realistic, Long-term Goals
14. Impulsivity
15. Irresponsibility
16. Failure to Accept Responsibility for Own Actions
17. Many Short-term Marital Relationships
18. Juvenile Delinquency*
19. Revocation of Conditional Release*
20. Criminal Versatility*

* not used in the current assessment of ASPs

Appendix B

Behavioral Incidents of the Videotaped Lecture

Dimension 1: Organization

1. Lecturer ties in the present day's lecture with the previous days lecture.
2. Lecturer presents to the class a daily outline of the topics to be covered in the lecture.
3. Lecturer concludes by summarizing the day's and introducing the next day's topic.
4. Lecturer discusses each topic in the same order as was presented in the lecture outline.

Dimension 2: Depth of Knowledge

5. Lecturer is familiar with research critiquing Law of Demand.
6. Lecturer presents multiple citations concerning the effect of price on purchasing behavior.
7. Lecturer presents results of personal research.
8. Lecturer states that he possesses in depth knowledge of the Theory of Absolute Price Thresholds because of his future intentions of research in the area.

Dimension 3: Relevance

9. Lecturer explains the law of demand in an environment familiar to his audience (a supermarket).
10. Lecturer explains how price affects product choice using products familiar to his audience (household goods and products).
11. Lecturer explains the difference between lay person and expert shopper by using an example which confuses rather than elucidates his point (choosing a book by different authors based on the physical construction of the books).
12. Lecturer discusses upper and lower price thresholds using prices of a product meaningless to his audience (the price of a diamond ring in old French francs).

Dimension 4: Delivery

13. Initially, lecturer speaks from lectern or at the blackboard; refrains from pacing.
14. Lecturer writes legibly when using the blackboard to report the results of his single cue study.
15. Midway through the lecture, the lecturer begins pacing.
16. Lecturer does not label or explain this graph of the Demand Curve.

Appendix C

Instructions 1

(not accountable, no opportunity for recognition)

The current project is known as the Teacher Evaluation Project and will take approximately 20 to 25 minutes. You will be rating the teaching performance of a graduate student instructor. These ratings will be used in determining teaching assignments for psychology graduate students for the upcoming year. The psychology department feels that undergraduate students provide an important and unique perspective on teaching and therefore would appreciate your input as an objective evaluator. Each of the graduate students who will be teaching next fall have prepared a videotape of a lecture. You will watch one such graduate student and be asked to evaluate his or her performance on a variety of dimensions. Once you have finished watching the videotaped lecture, you will be given the evaluation forms.

Finally, it is important that you do your best to provide fair and accurate ratings of the graduate instructor. It is common for people to be too lenient when rating someone else's performance.

Appendix D

Instructions 2

(not accountable, opportunity for recognition)

The current project is known as the Teacher Evaluation Project and will take approximately 20 to 25 minutes. You will be rating the teaching performance of a graduate student instructor. These ratings will be used in determining teaching assignments for psychology graduate students for the upcoming year. The psychology department feels that undergraduate students provide an important and unique perspective on teaching and therefore would appreciate your input as an objective evaluator. Each of the graduate students who will be teaching next fall have prepared a videotape of a lecture. You will watch one such graduate student and be asked to evaluate his or her performance on a variety of dimensions. Once you have finished watching the videotaped lecture, you will be given the evaluation forms.

Finally, it is important that you do your best to provide fair and accurate ratings of the graduate instructor. It is common for people to be too lenient when rating someone else's performance. If you are successful in providing accurate evaluations, you may be asked to participate in a teacher training video, in which you would discuss the process by which you reached the ratings that you did. This video would be used as a training instrument for all incoming graduate students and new instructors. Hopefully, providing graduate student instructors with information regarding good and poor performance will give them a greater understanding of teaching and improve their instructional skills.

Appendix E

Instructions 3

(accountable, no opportunity for recognition)

The current project is known as the Teacher Evaluation Project and will take approximately 20 to 25 minutes. You will be rating the teaching performance of a graduate student instructor. These ratings will be used in determining teaching assignments for psychology graduate students for the upcoming year. The psychology department feels that undergraduate students provide an important and unique perspective on teaching and therefore would appreciate your input as an objective evaluator. Each of the graduate students who will be teaching next fall have prepared a videotape of a lecture. You will watch one such graduate student and be asked to evaluate his or her performance on a variety of dimensions. Once you have finished watching the videotaped lecture, you will be given the evaluation forms.

In addition, we would like you to provide developmental feedback to the graduate student on the tape. Prior research has shown that feedback is most effective when the evaluator and the person being evaluated sit down and discuss the ratings. Therefore, the graduate student will be arriving shortly and you will provide him or her with face-to-face feedback. Please review your evaluation and provide the graduate student with justifications for your ratings.

Finally, it is important that you do your best to provide fair and accurate ratings of the graduate instructor. It is common for people to be too lenient when rating someone else's performance.

Appendix F

Instructions 4
(accountable, opportunity for recognition)

The current project is known as the Teacher Evaluation Project and will take approximately 20 to 25 minutes. You will be rating the teaching performance of a graduate student instructor. These ratings will be used in determining teaching assignments for psychology graduate students for the upcoming year. The psychology department feels that undergraduate students provide an important and unique perspective on teaching and therefore would appreciate your input as an objective evaluator. Each of the graduate students who will be teaching next fall have prepared a videotape of a lecture. You will watch one such graduate student and be asked to evaluate his or her performance on a variety of dimensions. Once you have finished watching the videotaped lecture, you will be given the evaluation forms.

In addition, we would like you to provide developmental feedback to the graduate student on the tape. Prior research has shown that feedback is most effective when the evaluator and the person being evaluated sit down and discuss the ratings. Therefore, the graduate student will be arriving shortly and you will provide him or her with face-to-face feedback. Please review your evaluation and provide the graduate student with justifications for your ratings.

Finally, it is important that you do your best to provide fair and accurate ratings of the graduate instructor. It is common for people to be too lenient when rating someone else's performance. If you are successful in providing accurate evaluations, you may be asked to participate in a teacher training video, in which you would discuss the process by which you reached the ratings that you did. This video would be used as a training instrument for all incoming graduate students and new instructors. Hopefully, providing graduate student instructors with information regarding good and poor performance will give them a greater understanding of teaching and improve their instructional skills.

Appendix G

Behavioral Recognition Measure

The following is a list of behaviors that the lecturer in the videotape may or may not have performed. For each item, circle Y for "yes" if you remember the lecturer performing that behavior and N for "no" if you do not remember that behavior being performed.

- Y N 1. Instructor ended by summarizing current lecture and introducing the next topic.
- Y N 2. Instructor was very familiar with research on how brand names affect purchasing decisions.
- Y N 3. Instructor explained the Law of Demand in a familiar situation (i.e. buying meat at the supermarket).
- Y N 4. Instructor used overheads.
- Y N 5. Instructor drew diagrams on the blackboard before the lecture began.
- Y N 6. Instructor knew the author of an article critical of the Law of Demand.
- Y N 7. Instructor used a product popular with students (beer) to explain how price affects perceptions of quality.
- Y N 8. Instructor wrote legibly on the board.
- Y N 9. Instructor tied the current lecture into the previous lecture.
- Y N 10. Instructor clarified a confusing part in the textbook on supply and demand during his lecture.
- Y N 11. Instructor used an example of choosing a book by different authors based on the physical construction of the book.
- Y N 12. Instructor spoke to softly.
- Y N 13. Instructor brought chalk with him to the TV studio in case none was available.
- Y N 14. Instructor discussed his research in detail to illustrate a point in the lecture.
- Y N 15. Instructor used an example involving the purchase of drugs.
- Y N 16. The instructor paced during the lecture.
- Y N 17. Instructor put an outline of the day's lecture on the board.
- Y N 18. Instructor presented multiple examples of research studies illustrating the Theory of Absolute Price Threshold.
- Y N 19. Instructor illustrated how price affects perceptions of quality using various products (e.g. motor oil, shaving cream, razor blades) as examples.
- Y N 20. Instructor had handouts available for certain lecture topics.
- Y N 21. Instructor had handouts available outlining the material covered in lecture.

- Y N 22. Instructor mentioned many different articles concerning the effect of behavior.
- Y N 23. To show the effects of brand names on perception of quality, the instructor used designer jeans as an example.
- Y N 24. Instructor used chalkboard appropriately.
- Y N 25. Instructor discussed each topic in the same order as was presented in the lecture outline.
- Y N 26. Instructor was involved in a research project with an important figure in the area of consumer psychology.
- Y N 27. Instructor used an example of how many francs people in France were willing to spend on a diamond.
- Y N 28. Instructor had a distracting habit of removing his glasses and pinching the bridge of his nose.
- Y N 29. Prior to the lecture, instructor had set-up all necessary audio-visual equipment for presenting the lecture.
- Y N 30. Instructor was familiar with a body of research because of his intention to do future research in the area.
- Y N 31. Instructor used unrealistic price levels when presenting examples of consumer purchasing decisions (i.e. buying a stereo for \$50.00).
- Y N 32. Instructor did not label or explain his graph of the demand curve.

* Correct responses are underlined

Appendix H

Performance Rating Scale

Below is a list of rating dimensions on which to evaluate the lecturer. Read the definition of the dimension to be sure you understand exactly what you are evaluating; then rate the lecturer on each dimension by circling the number which most closely reflects your evaluation of the lecturer.

1. Depth of Knowledge: The instructor's mastery of the subject matter. This includes how well he knows the literature and the research he reports.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Low		Medium			High	

2. Delivery: The instructor's manner of speaking and the extent to which he uses the blackboard to clarify and emphasize important points of his lecture.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Poor		Average			Excellent	

3. Relevance: The instructor's choice of examples used in conveying information; the extent to which examples are important and meaningful to the audience.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Poor		Average			Excellent	

4. Organization: The instructor's arrangement of the lecture; the extent to which the instructor leads the class through a logical and orderly sequence of the material.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Poor		Average			Excellent	

5. Overall Evaluation of Lecture Performance: Your general impression of the instructor's overall performance in the lecture.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Poor		Average			Excellent	

6. Overall Success: How successful would you expect this instructor to be as a college professor?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Unsuccessful			Average			Successful

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PROFESSIONAL PAPERS

LeBreton, D.L. & Gustafson, S.B. (1999, April). ADA implications of measuring personality. In J.M. LeBreton and J.F. Binning (Co-Chairs), Recent Issues and Innovations in Personality Assessment. Symposium conducted at the annual conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Atlanta, GA.

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