# Political Subcultures in Germany

by

Norbert Walz

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Political Science

APPROVED:

_____
Richard Shingles

_____   _____
Richard Rich   Charles Taylor

February 24, 1988

Blacksburg, Virginia

Political Subcultures in Germany

by

Norbert Walz

Richard Shingles

Political Science

(ABSTRACT)

West Germany's political culture has been intensively studied
during the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany.
However, most studies explore The West German Political Cul-
ture as a whole. They do not take into account that Germany
is a country which consists of different regions with their
own history and tradition. This paper is essentially an ef-
fort to rectify this situation by attempting to determine if
there are any distiguishable political subcultures in
Germany.

The assumption is, that historical phenomena are important
in explaining the present political culture of West Germany.
In order to determine whether the historical development of
West German political culture led to different present poli-
tical subcultures two approaches were used. First, a qual-
itative approach, that is a socio-historical library-based
analysis, was used. From this analysis propositions for the
present West German political subcultures were derived. They

were tested with an empirical analysis of survey data from a 1975 sample of West Germans. Suggestions based on the socio-historical analysis accounting for differences in contemporary political culture only partly hold true in the empirical analysis. This paper is a preliminary examination of West German political subcultures offering suggestions and direction for future research.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all the author wishes to thank Dr. Richard Rich for giving him the opportunity to take part in the program.

The author wishes to express his deepest gratitude to Dr. Richard Shingles, for his unselfish efforts and guidance towards the completion of this research project. He would also like to thank the other members of the committee, Dr. Richard Rich, Dr. Charles Taylor, and Dr. Michael Keating, for their patience and advice.

In addition the author would like to acknowledge the other members of the Political Science Department for their help and understanding.

Finally this thesis is dedicated to my fiancee Petra Burger, without her sacrifices, support and continual encouragement the the opportunity to accomplish this research would never have arisen. Moreover, I would like to acknowledge my brilliant friends Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, Vikas Singhal, and Karen Mcleod who have given me support when I needed help and who have made the completion of this project more enjoyable.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

LIST OF TABLES

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In the beginning of the 1950's Almond used the term political culture for the first time in his classical article: "Comparative Political Systems".[1] Since then the term has been widely used by political scientists. "It was endorsed and used by many eminent scholars of the day, including Pye, Ward, Rose, La Palombara and Barghoorn."[2] The concept of political culture offers an useful approach for understanding variations in political structures and levels and types of political behavior in different regions or nations. Generally political culture is treated as independent, explanatory variable that causes political structure and political behavior. The concept consists of both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. The concept was developed in order to bridge a growing gap in the behavioral approach between the level of microanalysis, which is based on the psychological interpretations of the individual's political behavior, and the level of macroanalysis, based on the variables common to political sociology. Thus political culture forms an important link between the events of politics and the behavior and feelings of individuals in reaction

---

[1]   Gabriel A. Almond, 1956, pp.391-409.

[2]   Hanson, 1980 ,p.18.

to those events.[3] Political culture helps, for example, to explain why people in different regions or nations differ in their orientations toward politics and public policy. Moreover, the significance of the study of political culture and subculture also stems from a growing recognition of the need to take into account historical experiences of nations and regions in order to explain the extent and character of political participation, national and regional cohesion and, patterns of political participation. However, political culture explanations are limited in so far as they represent only one aspect of politics. One has to consider many other aspects as well, for example, structural and institutional explanations. However, political culture is a useful additional explanatory tool for understanding the process of politics in a nation or region and represents an advance in the direction of integrating psychology, sociology , and history with political science. In the United States the most extensive examination of political culture was conducted by Daniel J. Elazar who asserted that the political culture of the United States consists of three major subcultures.[4]

---

[3]   Verba and Nye, 1965, p.516.

[4]   Elazar, 1972.

He labels these subcultures moralistic, traditionalistic, and individualistic.[5]

The aim of this study is to determine whether distinguishable political subcultures also exist in Germany.

It is suggested in the Areahandbook of the Federal Republic of Germany that there are distinguishable political cultures in the Federal Republic of Germany. "Nevertheless the original cultural and linguistic distinctions of several groupings are still evident in the Federal Republic and form the basis of a regional differentiation of which Germans are very conscious. A great many Germans, rural and urban, consider themselves Bavarians or Rhinelanders first and Germans Second, even if they no longer live in their region of origin.[6]

People from Hamburg obviously differ from people living in Bavaria with regard to language, clothes, customs, traditions, and their view of politics.[7] However, there has been little effort to systematically examine the political culture

---

[5] See Ibid., pp.93-102 for a fuller description of the subcultures.

[6] Areahandbook of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1975, p.107.

[7] Wehling, 1984, p.149.

of the different states (called Laender) in the Federal Republic of Germany.

This is an attempt to rectify this situation. I will proceed in two steps.

The first part entails a discussion and definition of the the concepts of "Culture" and "Political Culture".

The second part examines whether there were differences in the historical development of the Laender which should have led to the creation of diverse political subcultures.

2.0 CULTURE

Among anthropologists, Culture Is regarded as "..the man-made part of the human environment. A culture is the way of life of a specific group."[8] Although the concept is a central concept in anthropology it is also widely employed in psychology, psychiatry, sociology, philosophy, economics, politics, and biology and other subjects dealing with people and their environment.[9] In everyday conversation the concept usually refers to activities in such fields as literature, art, and music.

The contemporary scientific use of the concept derives from the British anthropologist Edward B. Tylor who introduced it in 1871. Tylor defined culture as "..that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."[10] This broad definition includes three very important characteristics of culture

---

[8] Cluckhohn cited in Friedman, 1986, 558.

[9] For the use of the concept in history, politics, economics, and anthropology see: Bonjean J. and W. Schneider, 1973.

[10] Tylor E.B.. 1871 vol.1 p.1.

1. Culture is _acquired_ by people

Folsom states: "The bulk of our human behavior is acquired or learned rather than inborn."[11] People have a social heredity as well as a biological heredity. However Culture is acquired by people because it consists of learned patterns of behavior rather than biologically determined ones, that is, "Culture is learned rather than transmitted by genes which pass on biological inheritance from the two parents."[12]

2. Culture is acquired by a person as a _member of society._

Human beings never simply react in a vacuum to situations or internal stimulations (e.g.hunger and thirst, anxiety, panic). They respond to a certain stimulus or situation as it is defined and interpreted by members of a specific culture. Culture determines what people do and how they react in certain circumstances. It is therefore understandable, for example, when foreign workers have problems adapting to the life style in an alien culture. Social interactions can only be successful when the

---

[11] Folsom, 1929, p.34.

[12] Kluckhohn, p.558.

practices and reactions of members of a society are shared by all.

3. Culture is a <u>complex whole</u> which can be broken down

    According to P.Bohannan, social scientists can break down Culture into simple units called <u>cultural traits.</u>[13] A trait might be a custom, such as a celebration of a marriage; a gesture, such as a handshake; or an idea, such as democracy. A related number of such traits is called a culture pattern or culture complex. Examples include the related customs of dating and marriage and child bearing customs. Most large groups have cultural traits. One can find them in nations, most tribes and even in some villages. Cultural traits are often found within subgroups of nations. For example, Mexican Americans have their own subculture and are also part of American culture.

Tylor's concept of culture is still the basis of most modern anthropological theories of culture. However, the concept has been developed in different directions. Two major rival anthropological theories developed: the theory of "culture patterns" best represented by Kroeber and Kluckhohn, and the

---

[13] Bohannan, 1975, p.943.

theory of "social structures," represented by Radcliffe Brown.

- ### The pattern theory of culture

    In their book, Culture, A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (1952), A.L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn concluded that there are six definitions of culture.[14]

    1. Culture as a comprehensive totality. This definition is clarified by Franz Boas who explains: "Culture embraces all manifestations of social habits of a community, the reactions of the individual as affected by the habits of the group in which he lives, and the products of human activities as determined by these habits.

    2. The second definition emphasizes the social inheritance. Ralph Linton states: "As a general term, culture means the total heredity of mankind , while as a specific term, a culture means a particular strain of social heredity."

---

[14] See Kluckhohn in Friedman, 1986, p.559 for a summary of the definitions.

3. The third stresses that culture is a _rule or way of life_. The biologist Sears states: "The way in which the people in any group do things, make and use tools, get along with one another and with other groups, the words they use and the way they use them to express thoughts."

4. The fourth focuses on _psychological aspects of culture_. Thus processes such as adjustment, learning ,and habit are singled out. As Ralph Piddington explains: "The culture of a people may be defined as the sum total of the material and intellectual equipment whereby they satisfy their biological and social needs and adapt themselves to their environment."

5. The fifth example emphasizes the _patterning or organization of culture._ The following definition is given by John Gillin: "Culture consists of patterned and functionally interrelated customs common to specifiable human beings composing specifiable social groups or categories."

6. The last definition focuses on culture as a _product of group life._ Kimball Young speaks of a "precipitate of man's social life."

For a general concept of culture Kroeber and Kluckhohn provide a composite formulation of these six types: "Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e.historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand , be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action."[15]

Their text is a significant document with regard to pattern theory. Essentially the theory emphasizes the study of pattern, form, structure, and organization in culture rather than discrete cultural traits and culture content. The simplest patterns are the patterns of behavior expressed in customs of dress, diet, salutation etc.. Then there are more complex patterns underlying social, political, and economic organization and the systems of religion, law, philosophy, science and the arts. The theory is applicable to any kind of culture. There are no absolute units or boundaries for cultural studies. "the lines of demarcation of any cultural unit chosen for

_____

[15] Kroeber and Kluckhohn cited in Singer, 1968, p. 528.

description and analysis are in large part a matter of level of abstraction and of convenience for the problem at hand. Occidental culture, Graeco-Roman culture, nineteenth-century European culture, German culture, Swabian culture, the peasant culture of the Black Forest in 1900-these are all equally legitimate abstractions if carefully defined."[16]

- ## The social structure as theory of culture

The theory of social structure was first developed by Radcliffe Brown. He defines social structure as a network or system of social relations including persistent social groups and differentiated social classes and social roles. It is assumed that each structural system is a functional unity in which all the component parts contribute to its existence and continuity. All kinds of social phenomena - morals, law, religion, government, economics - need to be studied not in "abstraction or isolation , but in their direct and indirect relations to social structure. i.e. with reference to the way they depend upon, or affect the social relations between persons and groups of persons."[17]

---

[16] Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, p.185.

[17] Radcliffe-Brown 1952, p.195 cited in Singer 1968 p.530.

Radcliffe-Brown avoids the term "culture". This is based on the view that social anthropology studies social structure, not culture. However, Singer states "the theory of social structure both explicitly and implicitly incorporates a concept of culture."[18]

He refers to Forte who asserts that social structure and social organization are not "just an aspect of culture but the entire culture of a given people handled in a special frame of theory."[19] The fundamental basis of the social structure theory is the concept of culture as a set of rules of standardized behavior and thought. As Singer asserts: "It is now clear why the theory of social structure can dispense with the word "culture": it has incorporated the culture concept into the core of the theory, for the theory of social structure deals with social relations not simply as concrete actually existing objects of observations, but as institutionalized and standardized modes of behavior and thought whose normal forms are socially recognized in explicit or implicit rules to which the members of a given society tend to conform."[20]

---

[18] Singer, 1968, p.531.

[19] Fortes cited in Singer, 1968, p.531.

[20] Singer, 1968, p.532.

Despite differences between the two theories concerning the the connection between culture and social structure within explanatory systems there is a clear similarity. Singer states "there is a striking formal parallelism between the theory of culture patterns and the theory of social structure. Both are holistic theories in the sense that they try to cover all aspects of society and culture-law, politics ,economy, technology, kinship and social organization, art, literature, language, religion, philosophy, science and so on."[21] Each theory seeks to explain all aspects of culture within a single framework. Both theories apply that framework to societies and cultures of any kind.

I would suggest that an empirical and analytical distinction between social structure and pattern theory is not necessary since both are complementary abstractions. The social structure theory must make a place for the concept of culture pattern while the theory of culture pattern must make a place for the concept of social structure. Both theories incorporate the central concept of the other, but not on an equal basis. While the pattern theory subordinates the social

---

[21] Singer 1968, p.532.

structure of culture, the structural theory subordinates culture patterns.

3.0 THE POLITICAL CULTURE CONCEPT

3.1 POLITICAL CULTURE IN POLITICAL THEORY

Kincaid states:[22] "In one form or another, concepts of culture and political culture have been used in political science, at least since the ancient Greeks and Hebrews."[23] The Greeks regarded regimes basically as products of character, chance, and circumstance. In order to function a regime requires a standard of justice, an ability to estimate public action, and a tailoring of the constitutional embodiments of principles of justice to the values and traditions of the inhabitants. According to Aristotle the goal of political life is not only to live, but to live well. Every culture consists of certain implicit and explicit conceptions of justice which can have an impact on political life independent of chance and circumstance. Therefore the ancients regarded the formation of character and civic virtue through public education as fundamental to a just polity. Political thinkers such as Cicero, Montesquieu, Machiavelli, Rousseau,

---

[22] The following section is a summary of Kincaids Section "Political Culture in Political Theory" from his article "Political Cultures of the American Compound Republic." 1980, pp.2-4.

[23] Kincaid, 1980 ,p. 2.

Jefferson and Toqueville regarded culture as the principal raw material of political life.

In the 16th century the new science of politics, which had its origin in the work of Machiavelli and Montaigne and which was perfected by Hobbes and Locke a century later, turned their interest to chance and circumstance. This new political science tried to solve political problems not by looking at some immanent law for a standard of culture, but by looking at the biology of human nature through observation of egoistic human beings in a pre cultural state of nature. Thus observations, rather than culture, became the focus of the new political science.

Since the beginning of the 1950's the study of culture has been used extensively in comparative political research. More recently, the term political culture has been widely used among political scientists.[24] According to Kincaid, it has become necessary to look at cultural variables when addressing political questions because people do not enter social contracts as atomistic individuals that flee a state

---

[24] Sharkansky, 1969, pp. 66-83. White S., 1984, p. 351. Elazar, Zikmund, 1975. Patterson, 1968, pp.187-209. Lovrich, Daynes and Ginger, 1980 p.111-126. Almond and Verba, 1963. Almond, Verba et. al., 1980. Joslyn, R., 1980, pp.37-58. Kincaid J., 1980, pp.1-15. Conradt, 1974. Baker, Dalton and Hildenbrandt, 1981.

of nature. "They enter as culture-bearing beings and members of groups rationally seeking to accommodate their interests with others."[25]

Having described the general concept of culture it is now necessary to explain how the concept of political culture has emerged. Is the concept of political culture derived from the general concept of culture or has it its own origin? As already described in the previous section the general concept of culture includes almost all aspects of society. Undoubtedly politics is one aspect.

Pye and Verba state "The distinction between political culture and the more general cultural system is an analytical one. Political culture is an integral aspect of the more general culture,.."[26] Kavanagh[27] and Lehmann[28] support their opinion. Although the statements show that political culture is closely connected with the general cultural system, it is useful to make a distinction between political culture and general culture in order to be able to focus on areas that are relevant for politics.

---

[25] Kincaid, 1980, p.4.

[26] Verba and Pye, 1963, p.521.

[27] Kavanagh, 1972, p.12.

[28] Lehmann, 1975, p.364.

3.2 DEFINITION AND CAVEATS OF THE CONCEPT

There are many definitions of the complex concept political culture. Pye suggests "Political culture is the set of at- titudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying as- sumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity.[29] According to Pye a political culture is the product of two factors: (1.)The collective history of a political system and (2.)the life histories of the members of that system.

Macridis sees political culture as the "commonly shared goals and commonly accepted rules."[30]

Daniel Elazar regards political culture as "the particular pattern of orientation to political action in which each political system is embedded."[31]

According to Almond and Verba, the "Political Culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orien-

---

[29] Pye, 1968, p.218.

[30] Macridis, 1961, p.40.

[31] Elazar, 1984, p.109.

<u>tations toward political objects</u> among the members of the nation."[32]

The various definitions show that there is a consensus regarding the proper components of political culture. The definitions focus on culture as <u>shared beliefs</u> of one sort or another.

Most of the critiques of the concept center around its indiscriminate use. Most authors warned that the concept might become a category casually used to explain anything that cannot be explained by more precise and concrete factors.[33] As Kavanagh states concisely "The fatal attractiveness of the political culture approach is that it may be made to explain too much. It has been used to cover so many disparate phenomena that it is easily used as a residual factor.[34]

In order to avoid such criticisms, the concept must be defined carefully. In the following section I will present my working definition of the concept.

---

[32] Almond and Verba, 1965, p.14.

[33] Verba,Pye, 1965, p.513-517. Kincaid, 1980, p.5. Lehmann, 1975, p.361. Elkins and Simeon, 1979, p. 127.

[34] Kavanagh, 1972, p.55.

3.3 WORKING DEFINITION AND UNIT OF ANALYSIS

I will use the definition provided by Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba in "The Civic Culture". Like others they refer basically to political culture as shared beliefs. According to them, political culture of a nation is the "particular distribution of patterns of orientations toward political objects among the members of the nation."[35] These orientations consist of cognitive, affective and evaluational orientations - beliefs, feelings and values.

1. The cognitive dimension refers to knowledge and information about government and politics,

2. the affective dimension refers to feelings toward political objects,

3. the evaluative dimension refers to judgements about political objects which combine cognitive and affective elements.[36]

In this project all three dimensions are taken into consideration, since they are useful in differentiating political

_____

[35] Almond and Verba, 1965, p.14.

[36] Almond and Verba, 1963 p.15.

culture in Germany. However, this definition must be modified in one regard. The word nation in the definition is misleadingly broad since one can apply the term political culture to any group of people on the national, regional and, even communal level; that is, one can study "subcultures".

Kavanagh makes this distinction: "A nations's political culture is really a metaphor, and may conceal marked variations in the orientations to politics of different groups of the population. The term is probably as amorphous as 'public opinion'; in reality we should speak of the opinions of sections of the public. These different group orientations, which may or may not result in an integrated and coherent culture, we call 'subculture'.[37]

Eulau also suggests that it is useful to think of an aggregate rather than of 'whole' cultures.[38]

3.4 GERMAN POLITICAL CULTURE

West Germany's political culture has been intensively studied

---

[37] Kavanagh, 1972, p.20.

[38] Eulau cited in Kavanagh, 1972, p.20.

during the Republic's existence.[39] However, most empirical studies are limited for present purposes in that they explore The West German Political Culture as a whole.[40] They do not take into account that Germany is a country which consists of different regions with their own history and tradition. I agree with Kavanagh who stated "..it was the virtual ignorance of the cultural differences within the five nations that led the authors of the Civic Culture study to present simply views of the respective national cultures."[41]

Unlike most European peoples, the Germans found it difficult to achieve political unity and to establish more or less stable boundaries. The result has been a culturally shifting scene full of contradictions, accompanied by cultural, and linguistic distinctions of which Germans are usually very conscious. Many Germans consider themselves Bavarians, Hamburgers or Rhinelaenders first and Germans second. A look at the historical maps reveals that Germany's boundaries during the past two centuries changed several times.

---

[39] Conradt, 1983, page 19.

[40] Conradt, 1983. Dahrendorf, 1967. Noelle-Neumann 1981. Conradt in Almond and Verba, 1980 pp. 212-273. Baker, Dalton and Hildenbrandt 1981.

[41] Kavanagh, 1972, p.67.

In 1815 the Congress of Vienna united thirty-nine states in the German Confederation. This number was reduced to the twenty-five states which all became members of the German Empire in 1871 The Weimar Republic which came into existence in 1918 consisted of the same twenty-five states. At the end of the Weimar period in 1933 the number of states in Germany was reduced to seventeen Laender and three city states. The destruction of the Reich in 1945 left West Germany without a cohesive political community and political system. For some years American, British, and French military governments divided West Germany in different occupation zones which were in 1949 transformed into the Federal Republic. The Basic Law of 1949 reversed the trend toward centralization in Germany and granted considerable power to the Laender: Bavaria, Baden Wuerttemberg, Rhineland Palatinate, Saarland, Hesse, North Rhine Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Bremen, Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein (Appendix A).

Sontheimer summarizes this development concisely: "German political culture is not homogeneous. It is not determined by a block of common convictions which can be brought about by the existence of successful political institutions. German political history of the past two centuries is characterized by such drastic breaks with traditions and such an abrupt change of its political institutions that a uniform

political culture has not been able to develop."[42] Several authors[43] agree with him.

This development suggests that it is necessary to focus on political culture studies which emphasize the different Laender rather than the whole nation.

In order to distinguish subcultures, it is necessary to specify geographical units within the state. There are two ways to categorize the Laender into meaningful subcultures:

1. North German versus South German political subculture

   Some authors stress the idea that Germany can be divided in two parts: a Prussian North and a non-Prussian South.[44] This raises the question of whether the political culture of the northern Laender of the Federal Republic (Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, North Rhine Westfalia, Lower Saxony) is different from the political

---

[42] Sontheimer, 1972, p.65.

[43] Elkins, 1972, p. 16,17. Wehling, 1984, p. 197. Peck, 1969. Area Handbook of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1975, p. 107.

[44] Stirk, 1969,p.16.

culture of the southern Laender (Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saar, Bavaria).

2. Subcultures in the different Laender

In spite of the fact that the present political bounda-
ries may not entirely coincide with the political sub-
cultures, it is convenient to choose the Laender as units
of analysis. Wells suggests "The German Laender are of
both historical and contemporary interest."[45] They have
existed for almost fourty years which means that one can
even speak of a "history of the Laender".[46] For example,
the city state of Hamburg might have a markedly different
subculture than Bavaria.

---

[45] Wells, 1953, p.84.

[46] Sante, 1971.

4.0 THE SUBCULTURE HYPOTHESIS

My working hypothesis runs as follows:

The historical development in the Laender led to different subcultures which differ in their beliefs, feelings and values toward political objects. I have assumed that there is a relationship between the <u>historical development</u> of West Germany and its various <u>political subcultures</u>.

My approach is different from Almond and Verba's approach in their "Civic Culture" study.[47] They use social structure as independent, political culture as intermediate, and democratic stability as dependent variables. In order to examine whether the socio-historical development in the Laender led to the development of distinguishable subcultures, I will use the <u>socio-historical development</u> as the <u>independent variable</u> and <u>political culture</u> as the <u>dependent variable</u>.

---

[47] Almond and Verba 1963.

5.0 ALTERNATIVE RIVAL HYPOTHESIS

Critics could assert that differences in political culture of the Laender might be the the spurious product of urbanization, age, income, gender, and education. Therefore, a controlling for these variables seems to be necessary. If my regions and my dependent variables vary together because they are both influenced by age, education, gender, income, and urbanization and they would not covary in the absence of these control variables I have a spurious relationship. The control for spurious relationships will be profoundly explained in my quantitative analysis.

6.0 DATA AND METHODS

As I assume that historical phenomena are important for understanding the present political culture in West Germany, I will use the following two approaches in my project:

1. STEP 1

    For my <u>independent variable</u> , socio-historical development, I will use a <u>qualitative approach</u>, that is a <u>socio-historical library-based analysis</u>. From this analysis I will derive propositions that I will test with an empirical analysis in STEP 2.

2. STEP 2

    For my dependent variable, political subculture, I will use a <u>quantitative approach</u>, that is an <u>analysis of survey data</u> from a 1975 sample of West Germans.

6.1 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE - HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

I am using social historical forces as my independent variable. I assume that the different historical conditions in

the Laender has led to the development of diverse subcultures.

Almond states "..that one cannot explain culture propensities without reference to historical experience.."[48] Lovrich, Byron and Ginger stress the importance of history in political science.[49] Yet much contemporary behavioral research - including Almond and Verba's "Civic Culture study"[50] and the "Political Action" study of Barnes and Kaase[51] - is ahistorical. Much of the literature focuses primarily on quantitative methods which study recent behavior at the expense of a close analysis of the of the influence of history (customs, traditions etc.). Samuel Beer indicated how important historical phenomena are for the understanding of past and present political processes. He claims "that the study of history as duration will make political science aware of the extended present of an event-such as a policy decision and of the interdependence of an event's past and present parts."[52] Past events and the socio-political his-

---

[48] Almond, 1983, p.127.

[49] Lovrich, Ginger and Daynes, 1980, p.111-125.

[50] Almond and Verba, 1963.

[51] Barnes and Kaase, 1979

[52] Ibid,. p.113.

torical circumstances can have an important effect on contemporary policy phenomena.

The impact of history on contemporary political culture may be seen in the work of Daniel J. Elazar. He classifies the American political culture into three categories consisting of traditionalistic, moralistic and individualistic orientations.[53] He uses historical-cultural patterns of migration and settlement which underlie such orientations to determine the pattern of political action within different states of the U.S.. Alford and Lee concluded in an analysis of voting turnout in America: "...The operations and functions of a political "ethos" or political culture at the local level may be best understood through a historical perspective of the continuity of social and political structures and norms of behavior which they enforce, rather than through the current attitudes (or socioeconomic conditions) of social groups in a community."[54] Tilly also uses a socio-historical approach to explain political violence and repression in Italy, France and Germany.[55]

---

[53] see Elazar, 1972, pp.193-102 for a description of the subcultures.

[54] Robert Alford and Eugene Lee cited in Lovrich, Daynes and Ginger, 1980, p.125.

[55] Tilly, 1975.

6.2 THE GERMAN CASE

Because of their unstable historical development Germans found it particularly difficult to achieve political unity and to agree on who should form the German people.[56]

Political scientists such as Kurt Sontheimer,[57] Lewis J. Edinger,[58] and Hans Georg Wehling[59] agree that the use of historical phenomena for understanding the past and present political culture in Germany is very important. As Karl Deutsch and D. Brent Smith state concisely: "Any Study of West German political culture and political attitudes must take into account the unique cultural heritage of Germany's past."[60] Thus socio-historical phenomena have been viewed as be important in explaining present political culture.

6.2.1 SOCIOHISTORICAL ANALYSIS

I will mainly look for and read on the following socio-historical forces:

---

[56] See page 20,21, and Appendix A - D.

[57] Sontheimer, 1972, p.67.

[58] Edinger, 1986, p.72.

[59] Wehling, 1984, p.151.

[60] Deutsch K. and D. Brent Smith, 1987, p.217.

1. Outstanding Political Experiences and Events

I suggest that different outstanding political experiences in the past such as wars, revolutions, and violent events have an impact on the present political culture of West Germany. These events were often unique for a particular region or locality. Therefore, they may have led to different subcultures.

2. Political Parties

"Western political parties are important in giving electoral cues to supporters, more obviously in evaluating policies and leaders. However, they also play a role in coloring values."[61] I will read on the historical development of the different parties in the Laender.

3. Educative Efforts of Institutions

Institutions like the military, the bureaucracy, the unions and the church played an important role in the history of the different West German Laender. M. Inglehart found that the historical influence of the Prussian army and the church had an enduring impact on the political

---

[61] Kavanagh, 1972, p.32.

interest of West German women.[62] I assume that different institutions existed in the different Laender , for example, a strong military and bureaucracy in Prussia, which led to differences in the political culture in Germany.

4. Political Leadership

Occasionally charismatic political leaders and regimes have influenced the shared beliefs of the people toward political objects.

6.3 DEPENDENT VARIABLE

My dependent variable is quantitative indicators of contemporary political culture of Germany. As already mentioned, I will use the definition of Almond and Verba which refers to political culture as shared beliefs toward political objects.

The data come from the eight-nation collaborative study of political action.[63] The fieldwork for this study was completed during 1974 and 1975. Interviews were conducted with

---

[62] Inglehart M., 1981 pp.299-326.

[63] Barnes et al., 1979.

representative cross-sections of the adult population.[64] The sample size for West Germany was 2307. The eight-nation data provides a good source to test my hypothesis because the data set consists of psychological variables that are convenient to operationalize political culture. The data should still be valid, since cultural beliefs are unlikely to change within a short period of 12 years.

I will operationalize political culture in terms of the following three variables:

6.3.1 Ideology

Converse defines an ideological mode of thought as a coherent world view, a comprehensive system of political beliefs in in which political ideas are central.[65] To measure Ideology I will use the left-right self placement scale found in the Political Action study.[66] Lipset defines left-right thinking as follows: "By Left shall we mean advocating social change in the direction of greater equality political, economic, or social; by Right we shall mean supporting a traditional,

---

[64] for a Description of the sample see Barnes et al., 1979, p. 589,590.

[65] Converse cited in Barnes,Kaase, 1979, p.205.

[66] Barnes and Kaase, 1979, p.206.

more or less hierarchical social order and opposing change toward greater equality."[67]

Barnes and Kaase measure the left-right dimension with the following question: Many people think of political attitudes as being on the "left " or the "right". When you think of your own political attitudes, where would you put yourself? The scale runs from 1=left to 10=right. Though many people do not know what these dimensions really mean, the political action study revealed that the Germans have the highest level of comprehension.[68] That is, people who put themselves more left are more likely to support social change and greater political, social, and economic equality, whereas people who put themselves more right support an hierarchical order and oppose change toward greater equality.

6.3.2 Repression Potential

Barnes and Kaase conceptualized repression potential as the "tendency to grant authorities increasingly severe instruments of control to contain correspondingly severe challenges by protesters, strikers, or other unorthodox activists."[69]

---

[67] Lipset et al., 1954, p.135.

[68] Barnes and Kaase, 1979, p.229.

[69] Barnes and Kaase, 1979, p.87.

Barnes and Kaase label repression potential as superorthodox political behavior. The political repression index measures the belief about whether political protest should be tolerated or repressed by government. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they approved or disapproved of four forms of government repression:

1. The courts giving severe sentences to protesters who disregard the police;

2. The police using force against demonstrators;

3. The government using troops to break strikes;

4. The government passing laws to forbid all demonstrations

The repression potential scale combines answers to these questions in a Guttman scale. The range of the scale runs from 0 to 4, with 0=no approval (= low repression potential) and 4=strong approval (= high repression potential).[70]

6.3.3 Relative Importance of Democratic Values

The goals which measure democratic values on Ingleharts

---

[70] Barnes and Kaase, 1979, p.557.

postmaterial/material scale[71] were used to create a new measure of democratic values. The respondents had to choose the priority of the following democratic values:

- Giving people more say in government decisions.

- Protecting freedom of expression.

- Give people more say in how things are decided at work and in their country

Conditional transformations in SPSSX were used to create a new variable 'relative importance of democratic values'. I assigned the lowest value 1 to respondents who gave top priority to all three democratic values (=strong supporter of democratic values). Then I assigned the value 2 to respondents who choose 2 democratic values as first choice and 1 democratic value as second choice. I continued this procedure until I reached those respondents who regarded all democratic values as least important (=weak supporters of democratic values) to whom I assigned the value 17. The range of the democratic value scale runs from 1 to 17, with 1=strong supporter of democratic values and 17=weak supporter

---

[71] Barnes and Kaase, 1979, p.564.

of democratic values. I will use this measure in my quanti-

tative analysis.

7.0 SOCIO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

According to the Areahandbook of the Federal Republic of Germany, Germans divide the country into regional groups that generally distinguish the Swabians, The Rhinelanders, the Bavarians and the north Germans (Prussians)."[72]

Other authors stress the west, the south, and the north as the main geographic subdivisions in Germany. My suggestions for geographic subdivisions run as follows:

1. North Germany

   The first North Germany includes Bremen, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Schleswig-Holstein which were all former Prussian provices. I do not include Hamburg because it is unique among the other northern states. Hamburg opposed Prussian rule and always fought for its independence. It is reasonable to assume therefore, that it may have a different political culture.

2. South Germany

---

[72] Areahandbook of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1975, p. 107.

The southern states often opposed Prussification because they did not believe in the power of the state and its military. Moreover, the majority of the people of the southern states were Catholics (Appendix B) who had a completely different view of the state than the Prussian population. The southern states consist of Bavaria, Baden, Wuerttemberg, and the Rhineland.

3. Hesse with its city Frankfurt has been the center of liberalism and 'laissez faire' capitalism since the nineteenth century and thus is distinct from other regions.

8.0 HAMBURG/HESSE

Hamburg and Hesse were unique among the other German states. Both opposed Prussian rule and emphasized their independence from the rest of Germany. The concept of political freedom and the demand of political participation always played a central role in Hamburg. The same holds true for Hesse which has been the center of liberalism since the nineteenth century.[73]

History may, therefore, reveal that the Hessian population like that of Hamburg is likely to be receptive to social change and tends towards the left of the political spectrum, that is people support social change in the direction of greater political equality. It also follows that the early demand of participatory rights led to a political culture which should be tolerant of political participation, that is protest should not be repressed by government and democratic values should be supported.

Hamburg is West Germany's biggest port and its second biggest city (1,800,000) after West-Berlin. Like Bremen, it is a city-state within the federal republic. Hamburg has always

---

[73] Postel, 1984, p.158. Schissler, 1984, p.187.

been a commercial center. Hamburg's harbor occupies about 15% of the total area of the city. The city-state is often named "the Gate to the World" which gives an indication of its urban and metropolitan character. The people have always participated in the management of their own affairs and the industry have never been controlled or limited by the German national government. Whereas Bremen was loyal to the empire, Hamburg emphasized its independence from the rest of Germany.[74] The rapid economic development led in 1932 (as illustrated in Figure 1) to the highest per capita income (except Berlin) in Germany.

Moreover, from 1800 to 1900 the population of Hamburg grew from 130,000 to 700,000.[75]

Hamburg had compared to the rest of Germany a relatively strong democratic tradition.

The leading political and social classes in both cities in the 19th century were the merchants. The Rat (city council) consisted predominantly of merchants.[76] The Rat was the main governing body and, since the reformation, the leading in-

---

[74] Postel, 1984, p.154.

[75] Klose, 1976, p.91.

[76] Postel, 1984, p.159.

```
                         YEAR
                 1928           1934
STATE

Bavaria         1,041            733
Baden           1,135            778
Prussia         1,174            794
Wuerttemberg    1,183            918
Hamburg         1,754          1,110

Source:Brecht, 1971, p.58

Figure 1.   Average per capita Income in some sections of
            Germany
```

stitution of the church. Moreover, it had power over the judiciary and the administration. The French revolution found the most sympathetic echo in the free city of Hamburg.[77]. Georg Heinrich, a Hanseatic merchant prince, arranged a public celebration of the first anniversary of the French revolution. The censorship was relatively mild compared to that of the rest of Germany.[78] Prussians who traveled to Hamburg observed that its citizens were strongly involved in politics[79] and Heinrich Heine who had negative experience with the censorship in Germany wrote in 1831: "Indeed, it is a free state where one can find a great deal of freedom. The citizens can do whatever they want to do and the senate can also do what it wants to do. Everyone is his own master. It is a republic.[80] The motive of freedom always played a central role in the mind of the people. There was always a strong desire for independence from the rest of Germany. In spite of the incorporation into the German Empire in 1880, Hamburg insisted on independence with regard to matters of trade and politics.[81]

---

[77] Pinson, 1961, p.26.

[78] See pages   12 and 16.

[79] Lindtke and Maas cited in Postel, 1984, p.155.

[80] Heine cited in Postel, 1984, p. 155.

[81] Kellenbenz, 1971. p.633.

Hamburg was the first state where the right to vote for all citizens was established (in 1917). While there were social differences in Hamburg, the social classes were not generally impermeable. It was not rare that a stranger or a person from a lower social class made a political career. This helped to create a population which demanded an expansion of its political rights earlier than it was the case with regard to the people in the rest of Germany.[82] Hamburg was also distinctive in that the Communists who strongly favored social change and opposed the idea of the National Socialist Party, Hitler's party, gained more than 20% of all the votes in 1932.[83] This may also reveal the special character of the people of Hamburg.

The Land Hesse was established in its present form following World War 2. It consists of three units, namely, the original Land Hesse and the Prussian provinces of Nassau and Kurhessen. However, it can be seen historically as one unit.[84] The population of Nassau and Kurhessen opposed the incorporation into Prussia and fought on the Austrian side against Prussia in 1867.

---

[82] Postel, 1984 p. 158.

[83] Brecht, 1945, p.38.

[84] Sante, 1971, p.16.

The most important factor in Hessian history was the economy. The Rhein-Main, area where about 50% of the population lives today, was the most important city in 1874 with regard to transportation and economy. "Laissez faire capitalism" has been the dominant factor in this area. Economic individualism, the motive of self interest and competition were the leading principles. Because of its strategic position and accessibility it became a powerful industrial center. For example, in 1863 the Hoechst Werke one of the biggest German drug and chemical company's was founded. In 1912 Hoechst already had more than 9000 workers. Another example revealing Hesse's industrial importance was the establishment in 1938 of the OPEL Werke which became the biggest car producer in Europe.[85] Rapid industrial development was followed by rapid population growth. Thus, the population in the province Hessen grew from 1871 1,400,494 in 1871 to 2,070,052 in 1905.[86]

Dominant political party in Hessen-Nassau were the Social Democrats which was a democratic party that represented the interest of the workers.[87] However, economic liberalism failed to provide industrial workers with protection from

_____

[85]   Demandt, 1971, p.490.

[86]   Ibid., p.491.

[87]   Ibid., p.493.

exploitation. This may account for the large number of vio-
lent events in this period. The data reveal that Hessen
suffered 132 violent events between 1815 and 1913. Evidently
the Hessian population tended more to use violence against
repressive forces more so than other states.

For example, the July Revolution in 1830 caused considerable
unrest in Hesse. Many people refused to pay taxes.[88] In 1868
a great Prussian-Hessian military conflict occurred and the
Hessian military was required to support Prussia in the war
against Austria. Despite Prussian threats, the Hessians de-
layed in giving support to Prussia.

Frankfurt, the capital of Hessen, has long been a center of
liberalism and took the lead in resisting the attempts of the
Prussian monarchy to unite Germany under its own crown. The
July revolution in 1830 and the revolution of 1848 found
considerable support in Frankfurt. Despite the fact that
liberal supporters of the July revolution were threatened by
highly repressive actions of the police, a number of students
and Frankfurt patriots undertook the Frankfurt Putsch. Two
detachments of Frankfurt police were captured by the pro-

---

[88] Veil, 1946, p.389.

```
                  VIOLENT EVENTS
REGION

Prussia               162
Hanse cities           39
Rhineland             122
Hessen provinces      132
Wuerttemberg           21
Baden                  52
Bavaria                92

SOURCE: Tilly, 1975, p.210. Table 15

Figure 2.  Regional distribution of violent  events  be-
           tween 1816 and 1913
```

testers. The results of the protest was nine killed, twenty-four wounded, and thirty students taken prisoner.[89] In 1866 Frankfurt was occupied by Prussian troops and incorporated into Prussia. However, Frankfurt has been consistently opposed Prussian rule.

After 1945 Hesse became the most advanced Land in Germany. Its first constitution included the famous <u>Article 41</u> . This article stated that the basic industries should be socialized. The majority of the Hessian population voted in 1946 for the introduction of this article.[90] Tradition and Christian ideology which dominated in Bavaria have always been missing in the more secular Hesse. Hesse has remained a progressive liberal force within German society dominated by liberal values.[91]

History reveals that there prevailed a tolerant atmosphere for citizen participation in Hesse and Hamburg. The largest number of violent events occurred in Hesse. With regard to my quantitative analysis it is likely that the political subcultures of Hamburg and Hesse are more receptive to social

---

[89] Henderson,1906, p.338.

[90] Schissler, 1984, p.187.

[91] Ibid, p189.

change and tend towards the left of the political spectrum, that is people support social change in the direction of greater political equality. It also follows that people of Hamburg and Hesse may belief that political participation should not be repressed by government, that is the repression potential is likely to be lower than in the other German regions. People of Hamburg and Hesse have always tended to support democratic values. Thus, there should be a tendency towards the support of democratic values.

9.0 NORTH GERMANY

North Germany has been influenced by Prussia. Militarism, officialism, coercive discipline, and mechanical obedience to the state were the characteristic features of Prussia. It is my contention that the present political culture of North Germany has been influenced by former Prussian ideology and values. It appears that Prussia impressed upon Northern Germany a set of values, traditions, and ideals that are still evident today. The long period of obedience and discipline, demanded by the Prussian state its strong army, bureaucracy and the supremacy of its military over the civilian population might have led to a political subculture which opposes social change towards greater equality and is more intolerant towards political participation and democratic values than the rest of Germany.

The present states of Northern Germany, namely, Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein and Bremen are formed from regions which were once Prussian provinces. North Rhine Westphalia was formed from the provinces of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia which from the end of the Napoleonic wars (1800) were in the hand of Prussia. Lower Saxony includes the former Prussian provinces of Oldenburg, Schaumburg-Lippe and Hanover which were annexed by Prussia

in 1866.   In order to understand the Prussian influence upon the northern states it is necessary to examine the historical forces which led to the dominance of the Prussian spirit within these regions.

The foundations of Prussia go back to the Order of the Teutonic knights which was founded in 1198.   This Order was responsible for Christianization and Germanization in 1226.

Treitschke in 1886 cited the dominant values and ideals as follows: The

> Rules, Laws, and Customs" of the order shows us even today how highly developed was there the art of dominating men and using them.   A man became a member of the order by taking the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. ... And received in return from the order a sword, a piece of bread and an old garment.   He was forbidden to wear the coat of arms of his family, to lodge with secular people, to frequent the luxurious cities, to ride out alone, to read or write letters. Four times during the night the brethren, who slept half-clad with their swords by their side, were summoned to choir by the sound of a bell , and four times to the prayers during the day. Every Friday they were subjected to the monastic discipline. .. If a member was guilty of any misdeed, the secret chapter was convened, which began with a mass and ended with a prayer.   The culprit was often assigned to eat at the table of the servants or condemned to receive the discipline. .. In this terrible discipline, in a word which always revealed the order as grand and illustrious but the individual as insignificant and poor, there developed the spirit of selfless dedication.[92]

---

[92] Treitschke in Pinson 1961, p.7

In 1525, after the triumph of Protestantism, the order was secularized and its territory became the fief of the Hohenzollerns. Through the process of the secularization of the order the extreme obedience and the ascetic discipline once attached to the religious life now became the values of the political state, that is, the code of behavior of the teutonic knights became the code of the Prussian officers' corps.

Another important aspect of the process of Prussianization is the important role played by the Prussian "Junkers". In former times they were violent and greedy adventurers. Having settled down they became engaged in large scale capitalist agriculture and developed an oligarchy which occupied important offices in German diplomacy, bureaucracy and military. They became the chief agents in the Prussification of Germany.[93] This group has been a dominant force in German history and its spirit has contributed to the formation of Prussian institutions and policies.

9.1 PRUSSIA AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The French revolution found no support in Prussia. The Prussian envoy von Stein reported to Frederick William II on

---

[93] Pinson, 1961, p.7.

July 23, 1791 that Germany was flooded with revolutionary propaganda. In Saxony the government imposed strict censorship over revolutionary literature and pro-French travellers were hindered from entering the country. Prince Hardenberg, one of the Prussian leaders, wrote in 1807 to Frederick William III:

> Your majesty   We must do from above what the French have done from below... Thus our guiding principle must be a revolution in the better sense, a revolution leading directly to the great goal, the elevation of humanity through the wisdom of those in authority and not through a violent impulsion from within or without. Democratic rules of conduct in a monarchical administration, such is the formula...[94]

Leading Prussians like Gneisenau and Stein drew lessons from the French Revolution. However, they were not the ideals of liberty, but the totalitarian and authoritarian aspects of French nationalism. They admired the nation in arms, and the subordination of the individual to the state.

9.2 PRUSSIA DURING THE RESTORATION 1815-1848

Prussian opposition to the ideas of the French revolution established the reactionary pattern of this period. The core of Prussian conservatism was the idea of the social stability of organized society and predominance of the state. The protection of this order was more paramount. Censorship was

---

[94] Hardenberg in Pinson, 1961, p.33.

rigidly imposed and the country was controlled by a network of police. The slightest trace of liberalism was immediately suppressed. Letters, even from Prussian leaders like Stein were systematically opened and examined. Liberal publications like Fichte's Addresses to the German nation were prohibited.[95]

Karl Ludwig Haller and Julius Stahl were the central figures who influenced Frederick William III and later on Fredrick William IV of Prussia and their courts. According to them rights and duties were supposedly derived, not from popular will, natural law, or a constitution, but from old traditions and customs. According to Haller the state was a structure which consisted of families and corporations. Like the father was head of the family, the sovereign was the head of all families making up the 'patrimonial state'.[96] The monarch was neither representative nor servant of an abstract concept of the state but was the owner of the state which belonged to him. He rejected the idea of a constitutional state and condemned revolutionary principles of the French revolution. Like Haller, Stahl attacked the ideas of the French revolution and claimed that revolution was a sin. According to him what gave the state its legitimacy was its divine char-

---

[95]   Veit, 1946, p.378.

[96]   Koch, 1981, p.213.

acter. The purpose of the state was religious and ethical. The state existed for the service of god. The true state was the Christian state, paternalistic and absolute in character. These ideas were found to be particularly convenient for the Prussian ruling classes and became their ideological instruments to fight against the constitutionalism and liberalism which appeared in the south of Germany.

9.3 THE REVOLUTION OF 1848

When Frederick William IV came to the throne in 1840 hopes for political reform were raised. But the new king, too, was strongly anti- democratic. When he established a kind of parliament which only had the power to consult he opened the first session with the following words: "You have been called together to represent rights-the rights of your estates and those of the throne. It is not your task to represent opinions."[97]

The revolution of 1848 failed because of insufficient popular support and the crushing power of the state. The power of reactionary Prussia was too strong. Erich Brandenburg states: "The movement of 1848 came to ruin because of the power of the larger individual states, above all the two

---

[97] Pinson, 1961, p.82.

great powers (Prussia and Austria)."[98] In Prussia new laws were established which were completely reactionary. One particular law destroyed the independence of the courts since it stated that judges could be transferred or pensioned against their will. Another law that established the political superiority of the landowners was that which restored the old manorial courts and the old provincial diets. Professors and teachers were controlled by the supervision of the clergy. Friedrich Julius Stahl, a professor of constitutional law, stated: "Scholarship must turn back, Authority, not majority."[99]

9.4 THE ERA OF BISMARCK

One man, more than any other, dominated the political scene in Germany during the second half of the nineteenth century: Bismarck.[100]

Undoubtedly, Bismarck had a formative influence on the Prussian state. In Bismarck's view the world and its orders were created by God. He believed that not only were the existing political institutions not made by men, but that they

---

[98] Brandenburg in Pinson, 1961, p.107.

[99] Veil, 1946, p. 435.

[100] Seinberg, 1945, p. 177.

could not be altered or influenced by of human reason. The exercise of power was not for personal ends but to preserve the natural order of things and in the service of the state. Bismarck accepted preventive wars as a mean for accomplishing his political goals. His attitude is evident in the following passages taken from his speech to the budget commission of the Prussian Landtag on 29 September 1862:

> ...there are in the country too many subversive elements who have an interest in revolutionary change. This may sound paradoxical, but it goes to show how difficult it is in Prussia to carry on a constitutional existence...We are too ardent, we like to carry too heavy weight of amour for our fragile bodies: but we should make use of it. <u>Germany doesn't look to Prussia's liberalism, but to its power.</u> Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden can indulge in liberalism, but no one will expect them to undertake Prussia's role; Prussia must gather and consolidate her strength in readiness for the favorable moment, which has been already missed several times; Prussia's boundaries according to the treaties are not favorable to a healthy political life; not by means of <u>speeches and majority verdicts</u> will great decisions of the time be made- that was a great mistake of 1848 and 1849 - but by <u>iron and blood</u>.[101]

Bismarck's Second Reich was the product of three wars: the Danish war of 1864, the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, and the Franco-Prussian war of 1871. The monarchy and the traditional class society, with the Prussian junkers as the dominant social group was, in his eyes the God given order of things and its maintenance at all costs, the unquestionable duty of the state. He stated:

---

[101] Williamson, 1986, pp. 89,90.

> I am first and foremost a royalist, everything else
> comes after that. I may call him names and, as a
> junker, I can even conceive of rebelling against him.
> I take the king in my own way, I influence him, trust
> him, guide him, but he is the central point of all my
> thinking and all my action.[102]

Liberalism, which in his opinion arose from the ideas of the American and French revolutions, was the the enemy of political life since it attempted to replace historically developed forms by a system of man-made institutions. Bismarck opposed the development of parties because they were likely to weaken the authority of the state. While talking to an American liberal democrat he mentioned "I am not a democrat, and cannot be one."[103] His major goal was the preservation of the Prussian military monarchy. As he once said to Napoleon III: "Only kings make revolutions in Prussia."

9.5 THE ROLE OF THE ARMY

The Prussian army played a major role in the formation of the Prussian state and its political culture. This army was governed by laws passed on September 3, 1814, and November 21, 1815. These laws focused on the principle of universal military service. In 1815 there were 40,788 recruits taken

---

[102] Pinson, 1961, p. 127.

[103] Snyder, 1967, p.168.

annually. Napoleon's treaty of Tilsit limited the Prussian army to this size. To avoid this limitation, the so called Kruempersystem was invented. It allowed every company to release three to five men per month who were then replaced by the same number of Kruempers, as the recruits were called. Thus 60 additional recruits were trained annually who were then available in case of mobilization.[104] Discipline and obedience were the two main rules within the army. The slightest breach of discipline led to severe punishment. Henderson described one sort of punishment, the running the gauntlet which made obedient those who received and those who witnessed it:

> With his hands bound so that he could do no harm, with
> his feet ironed so that he should proceed slowly with
> a ball of lead in his mouth that he might not bite off
> his tongue for agony, the culprit was driven again and
> again down the line of two hundred men, who beat him
> with rods of birch or hazel that had been steeped in
> salt When too weak to proceed he was bound to a
> stake and the whipping continued, and not rarely but
> frequently, the punishment proved fatal."[105]

The military values influenced the whole society. As Craig explains:

> Military values permeated the world of business,
> producing a breed of industrialists who ran their
> businesses as if they were fortress commanders, and the
> university community, where the student corporations
> and the vices of garrison life and tried to emulate the

---

[104] Koch, 1978, p.184.

[105] Henderson, 1906, p. 280.

style of the Prussian lieutenant. In the age of William II, the wealthy bourgeoisie sought to advance itself socially by seeking husbands for its daughters in the aristocratic officer corps...[106]

In 1868 The military expenses constituted <u>99% of the total budget.</u> The total of all ordinary expenditures amounted to 207,500,000 marks, of which 206,225,000 were allocated to army and navy.[107] The entire social structure of Prussia became thoroughly militarized. The peasants were organized to serve the recruitment needs of the army, and the landowning nobility was transformed into an officer corps. The military was not subject to constitutional requirements and was completely beyond the control of the civilian constitution. For example, in 1860, the conservative minister of war Albert von Roon proposed to increase the peacetime strength of the army from 150,000 to 213,000. Moreover, he suggested enforcing the legal three-years period of compulsory service and he proposed to diminish total liability for service from nineteen to sixteen years, placing men on active duty for three years with the line forces, then four years in the stand-by reserve, followed by nine years in the <u>Landwehr</u> - an emergency reserve force.[108] However a majority of liberals and moderates in the lower chamber voted down the proposals. In

---

[106] Craig, 1982, p. 239.

[107] Maehl, 1979, p. 403.

[108] Rhodes, 1964, p.343.

1861 the same proposals were repeated. When the proposals were rejected again Roon requested Bismarck to lead the struggle against the parliament. Finally he supported Roon in the proposed army reforms <u>without parliamentary approval</u>. Because of his success in foreign affairs the public did not criticize his treatment of the parliament. <u>"The army was the core of the Prussian state,</u> it was not 'a state within the state', it was <u>the state</u> within the state."[109]

9.6 PRUSSIA AND THE SECOND REICH 1871 - 1918

The constitution of the second Reich was not established by a constitutional convention but by the work of Bismarck after his victorious wars against the Danish in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1870/71. The constitution of the new Reich consisted of the constitution of the North German Confederation supplemented by treaties with the South German states. This constitution governed the German Reich until 1917. However, it was far from being typical of a constitution (Scheinkostitutonalismus = appearance of constitutionalism) since it dictated matters to do with such things as customs, commerce, railways, and so on. Nothing was said regarding individual rights, fundamental guarantees

---

[109] Pinson, 1961, p. 162.

and human principles.   Attempts to introduce some liberal elements into the constitution were voted down in 1867.

The King of Prussia was head of the Reich. He had absolute power over parliament and represented the Reich in all matters. He dictated foreign affairs and appointed all the imperial officials from chancellor down. He could also dismiss them at will. He was first commander of the army and the navy. The Reichtag, in contrast had no say at all over foreign policy or the military. It could only veto the budget but even this could be overridden. Ministers were responsible not to the Reichstag but the emperor. Furthermore, there was no cabinet in the German Reich, there was only one minister, the Reich chancellor Bismarck. He appointed the heads of departments of state, who were merely responsible to the him.

The statements of Heinrich von Treitschke, a former Prussian professor characterizes the Prussian state and the Prussian monarchy concisely:

> The state is a moral community, which is called upon
> to educate the human race by positive achievement. Its
> ultimate object is that a nation should develop in it,
> a nation distinguished by real national character. To
> achieve this state is the highest moral duty for nation
> and individual alike. All private quarrels must be
> forgotten when the state is in danger. ...The most im-
> portant possession of a state, its be-all and end-all,
> is power. He who is not man enough to look this truth
> in the face should not meddle in politics. Power must
> justify itself by being applied for the greatest good

of mankind. It is the highest moral duty of the state
to increase its power. ...The will of the state is ,
in a monarchy, the expression of the will of one man
who wears the crown by the virtue of the historic right
of a certain family.[110]

In 1888 William II came to the throne as a young man of
twenty-nine. He was like all the former Prussian kings
violently opposed to constitutionalism and to political par-
ties. His Calvinistic tutor, Georg Ernst Hinzepeter, had a
strong influence on him. He taught him that he was appointed
by god to lead his people to great deeds. William accepted
this view of "divine calling" and was convinced of his royal
powers. In 1891 he declared: "There is only one master in
the Reich and that is I." and to young recruits he said "When
your emperor commands you to do so you must shoot at your
mothers and fathers."[111] The structure of Prussia under
William II thus remained the same as it had been under
Bismarck. Foreign policy took precedence over domestic pol-
icy under William II. The main goal was to annex colonies
and become a World power. This policy contributed to the
outbreak of World War I. However, it is not my intention to
go into detail about the World Wars here.

---

[110] Snyder, 1975, pp. 260,261.

[111] Pinson, 1961, p. 278.

9.7 PRUSSIA AND HITLER

Many authors emphasize the connection between <u>Prussianism</u> and <u>Hitlerism</u>.

Ludwig asserts that Hitler was an absolutely Prussian phenomenon. Everything he said and the way he said it was typically Prussian and for that reason is nowhere so completely understood as in Prussia.[112] Eden declared in 1939 that Hitler was not unique at all. He only was a expression of the Prussian spirit of military domination. G. Ward raised the question in one of his articles for the English paper the Daily Mail: "How is that the German, often so likeable as an individual, behaves so detestably in the mass?" His answer ran: I think one must distinguish between the Prussians and the rest.... Germany has been so thoroughly Prussianized, especially under the Nazi regime,... .[113] The statesman Sir Neville Henderson wrote in 1940 :"It is no coincidence that in the last war it was the Prussians rather than the Germans whom we regarded as our real enemies. ...it is the Prussian ideology, and particularly their methods, which are no less

---

[112] Ludwig in Stirk, 1969, p. 25.

[113] Price in Stirk, 1969, p.18.

dominant today in Germany than they were in 1914 or in 1870.[114]

Excerpts of Hitler's speeches confirm that his ideas were closely connected with Prussian ideology. On February 20, 1938 he declared with regard to the National Socialist Government:

> The future of the German Reich was first assured at the moment when the Reich became the sovereign and sole representative of the German nation. It was not only the political parties which had to disappear. The abolition of the state diets had long been overdue. There can be only one sovereign power in the German Reich....It is precisely in our negation of the principle of parliamentary democracy that we strike the strongest blow for the right of the nation to the self-determination of its own life....Every successful attempt to put into practice the claim to unlimited freedom leads to anarchy. The grouping of individuals, however, by means of the limitation of the freedom of the individual in favor of the organization of a bigger community leads to the state. Thus the sine qua non for, and basis of , the State is, and always will be, the authority embodied in the will to the maintenance of the state. Democracy is the intellectual cause of anarchy and, indeed, the intellectual basis of anarchy in every shape.[115]

Regarding the army he said on May 21, 1935:

> The introduction of universal military service and the promulgation of the law for the establishment of the new Germany army were nothing else than the restoration to Germany of a status of equal rights which threatens nobody but rather guarantees Germany security." In front of the Nationalist-Socialist Party he said: "But

---

[114] Ibid., p. 19.

[115] Moennig, 1938, p.42-45.

this army is the army of the National-Socialist State.
It is our <u>proudest</u> and <u>most precious</u> possession. <u>It
is no new army</u>. It is that glorious German army which
can rightly claim to be the guardian and depository of
a unique tradition.[116]

The close connection between Prussianism and Hitlerism can
further be demonstrated by Hitler's admiration for Bismarck
and Frederick the Great.   Their photographs appeared in all
schools, shops and public places.   According to Stirk it is
a fact that in Hitler's private room in the head quarters of
the Nazi Party house at Munich two portraits of Fredrick the
Great adorned the walls and a death mask of the greatest
Prussian king stood on Hitler's desk.

The similarity between Hitlerism and Prussianism can be best
characterized by a speech of Hitler's chief henchman
Goehring.   Goehring declared on June, 18 ,1934:

> It is clearly apparent that the <u>old Prussian concept
> of the state has already merged into the Reich,</u> that
> is to say, that Prussia no longer has any task to per-
> form as a sovereign state as formerly. <u>But the eternal
> ethics of Prussianism remain....</u> Prussia is known as a
> country that has produced fewer artists; but it has
> given The German Reich the statesmen who were necessary
> to create the conditions that today at least enable an
> Adolf Hitler to satisfy the longing of the German peo-
> ple... <u>I know no more genuine Prussian than the
> Fuehrer.</u>[117]

---

[116] Ibid., p.14,15.

[117] Goehring in Stirk, 1969, p.139.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the North Germans supported Hitler in whom they saw a spiritual and political ally. Appendix C shows the election results for the NAZI party in July 31, 1932. The map reveals that Adolf Hitlers National Socialist Party were dominant in most parts of Prussia.

9.8 IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL CULTURE IN NORTH GERMANY

The section about Prussia reveals that the Prussian principles of militarism, officialism, coercive discipline, and mechanical obedience to the state have exercised an enormous influence on the minds and values of the Prussian population. It is likely that these principles are still inherent in the present political culture in Germany. With regard to my quantitative analysis, I propose that one can still find the Prussian influence in the North of Germany. It is likely that the long period of discipline and mechanical obedience, demanded by the Prussian state led to a political culture which intolerant of grass roots political participation. Therefore, people in North Germany are likely to have a political culture which is more repressive than those in the south and less tolerant of the various forms of political participation measured by Barnes and Kaase s repression scale. Equally likely is that they lean to the right on the left-right self

placement scale that is, that they support a traditional, more or less hierarchical social order and oppose change toward greater equality. The historical dominance of anti democratic values in Prussia also suggests that the north Germans do not support democratic values on my measure of relative importance of democratic values.

10.0 SOUTH GERMANY

South Germany basically opposed Prussian ideas. Whereas political conservatism, which supported an authoritarian and militaristic state, prevailed in Prussia, the southern states of Bavaria, Baden, Wuerttemberg, Hesse and the Rhineland generally rejected the Prussian ideas and provided more fertile ground for liberalism and Catholic doctrines. People demanded elective parliaments and a free press and rejected the Prussian principles of mechanical obedience and militarism. with regard to my quantitative analysis it is likely that South Germans are more tolerant towards citizen participation in politics, that is they have a lower repression potential and a higher tendency to favor democratic values than the North. These people also are more likely to be receptive to social change and, therefore, may tend to the left of the political spectrum.

The southern states were influenced by the ideas of Kant and Humboldt. Kant's notion of the state was of a community of free, equal and self dependent citizens. According to his vision men could be free in society because they lived under the law which was provided and determined by themselves. Such laws would not be imposed, but grow out of the conflict between sociable and unsociable qualities in an individual.

He did not consider that the monarchy should be abolished, again provided, that the citizens were constantly involved in establishing the parameters of socially acceptable behavior. He believed that, having determined for themselves the differences between wrong and right, people would act upon such knowledge. Humboldt elaborated and improved Kant's ideas, namely, the view that the function of the state should be limited to the enforcement of the law. As a result the liberals stressed the importance of participation in government self dependence. They demanded elective parliaments, a free press, and trial by jury.[118] This liberal view was particularly strong in Baden, Wuerttemberg, and the Rhineland and was reinforced by the influence of the French Revolution. Due to geographical and historical influences, people in the Rhineland have often shown certain similarities with Latin civilization. They exhibited greater aversion to authoritarian Prussian government than other people elsewhere in Prussia.

The Rhineland and Hesse were the first areas to achieve significant industrial and urban populations. During the wars of 1813 the Rhineland was freed from Napoleonic rule and the northern part was given to Prussia. However Prussian rule was not popular within the people of the Rhineland because

---

[118] Pasley, 1972, p.233.

of its authoritarian character and its Protestant and anti-Catholic policies. Appendix B reveals that the Rhineland population was mainly catholic. The role of Catholicism will be described in section 5.3. However, Catholics were subject to discrimination and, therefore, demanded autonomy. The large number of 122 violent events in the Rhineland between 1818 and 1913 (Figure 2) serves as an additional indicator that the people were willing to fight for their rights.

The southern states of Bavaria, Wuerttemberg and, Baden obtained constitutions in 1818 and 1819. None of the constitutions were democratic and all focused on the prerogatives of the crown. Despite the fact that they were not derived from the will of the people, they had a positive liberal function as Valentin states "... all this did not alter the fact that they did exist. They made some slight degree of outspokenness and criticism possible, kept attentiveness toward public affairs astir, and spread some information about political problems."[119] Another event which outlines the unique position of the southern states was the creation of the confederation of the rhine in 1806. The confederation consisted of Bavaria, Baden, Wuerttemberg and Heese-Darmstadt. The main goal of the confederation which was es-

_____

[119] Valentin, 1946, p.382.

tablished by Napoleon was to balance the power between Prussia and Austria.

10.1 THE REVOLUTION OF 1848

The revolution of 1848 started in the southern part of Germany. In Baden, the most liberal German state, people burned mansions and threatened aristocrats. On September 12, 1847 in Offenburg, Baden, a group of southern radicals listed on a platform some of the following demands: A German parliament freely elected by the people, freedom of press, freedom of religion and teaching etc.[120]Liberals from Wuerttemberg, Baden, and Hesse met near Frankfurt and demanded a constitutional monarchy for Germany in 1847. The South German Radicals organized a network of political clubs all over the country. Their main demand was for a democratic republic. One of the events in South Germany which illustrates the radical aspects of the movement occurred in Baden. Friedrich Hecker and Gustav Struve organized an army of the repressed population to achieve a republic for Germany. However the army was completely defeated by government troops.[121]

---

[120] Pinson, 1961, p.81.

[121] Dill, 1970, p.108.

These events reveal that it was mainly in South Germany where the revolution started.

10.2 VIOLENT EVENTS IN SOUTH GERMANY 1815 - 1913

Figure 3 reveals that the Southern Germans were more likely to use violence against repressive forces than the Prussians. Whereas in the former part of West Germany that belonged to Prussia only 162 violent events occurred, there were at the same time 282 violent events in South Germany. This demonstrates again that revolutionary events occurred primarily in South Germany.

10.3 THE ROLE OF CATHOLICISM

Unlike most of the European countries, which were either predominantly Catholic or Protestant, Germany remained divided between the two faiths. Appendix B reveals that the Catholics were concentrated in the south of Germany (especially in Bavaria) and the Rhineland.

Protestants regarded religion as merely one aspect of life and were therefore willing to accept the institutions of the state. By contrast, the Catholic population was basically anti-etatist. Catholic political theory which was based on the thoughts of St. Thomas of Aquinas was not sympathetic to

REGION	NUMBER OF EVENTS
North Germany (former Prussian provinces of West Germany)	162
South Germany (Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Rhineland, Baden)	287
Hessen provinces	132

SOURCE: Tilly, 1975, p.210. Table 15

Figure 3.   Regional distribution of violent events between 1816 and 1913

the claims of the state. The theory asserted that earthly and temporal existence must be ordered with respect to otherwordly goals. Therefore the state is not sacrosanct but must be subject to the moral order. Thus, not only does God impose restrictions upon state power, the state does not have the right to intervene in the areas of personal affairs. State power, therefore, has no control over rights of private property, these falling within the domain of man's personal life. According to this doctrine each family had the right to provide the education of its children. Whereas in Protestant Prussia the state dominated in all areas of life, state education, according to the catholic doctrine had always to conform with the will of the parents. The church was independent of state power and the state had to help the church to exercise its rights. This anti-etatism was combined with a strong anti-Prussian feeling especially after 1871.(see section 5.5)

Nationalism was another enemy of Catholicism. Whereas Protestantism was able to adjust itself to nationalism, Catholicism intended to reject nationalism in so far as it rejected the absolute power of the state evident in the examples above. Therefore Constitutionalism with its demand for fundamental rights became part of the political programs of German Catholics. However, Catholicism also focused on aspects which were completely conservative in character.

(1.) Catholicism focused on <u>tradition.</u> It focused on old traditions and customs closely linked to eternal values. In its opposition to the novel and progressive it also tended towards conservatism. (2.) Catholicism has always been in favor of <u>authority</u> Its own church is structured hierarchically. According to its doctrine all power derives from God. Thus, it was not against Catholic doctrine to engage in revolutionary action when power is abused. Nevertheless, in general it was considered the duty of the subject to submit to the authority of the ruler. A good summary of Catholic politics was presented by F.J. Buss,[122] a catholic publicist in 1851.

1. Catholicism supports liberty and strives for it, but all liberty is limited by morality.

2. Catholicism honors order, not the order of a police state, but one having its origin in the innermost essence of human society and formed after the divine pattern - an order consisting of family, church , the school, and the state.

---

[122] Buss in Pinson, 1961, p.179.

3. Catholicism rejects revolutions. It does not make them but it accepts them as natural self punishment for overwheening tyranny.

4. Catholicism wants the free development and responsible participation of the citizens in the affairs of the state.

5. Catholicism is eager to further the peculiar and individual fashioning of public conditions and relationships; it favors the autonomy of corporate bodies and is opposed to enforced uniformity.

6. Catholicism stands for a universal outlook but also recognizes the validity of separate nations.

7. Catholicism strives for the simplification of public administration, the easing of state burdens, and the granting of the most feasible degree of liberty to the people.[123]

According to Pinson the concrete political demands of German Catholicism in the nineteenth century were: (1.) anti-centralization (2.) autonomy of the church, and (3.) freedom

---

[123] Pinson, 1961, p.179.

for religious education.[124] Moreover, Catholics rejected economic liberalism because it failed to protect workers from capitalist exploitation. The Catholics were organized in the Catholic Center party which was officially constituted on December 13, 1870. The first program, which was established in 1877, and demanded among others the introduction of democratic rights. chapter. Pinson summarizes the entire history of the Center party "As one surveys the entire history of the Center party one cannot help concluding that basically it remained conservative, and in crucial decisions between conservative and liberal elements it tipped the scales in favor of the former."[125] However, after World War II the Christian Democratic Party which is the heir of the Center party became a comprehensive party appealing to all people, seeking their electoral support among both of Germany's two major creeds, Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. Inevitably this transformation into a Volkspartei or 'catch all' party meant that the former focus on ideology and religious divisions disappeared and made place for political pragmatism.[126]This movement was established as an effect to bridge former political and social divisions. This development led to a retreat from former ideological rigidity. Moreover, it is important that

---

[124] Pinson, 1961, p.180.

[125] Pinson, 1961, p.193.

[126] Johnson, 1983, p.34.

the former gap between Catholicism and Protestantism almost disappeared. In a 1967 survey in West Germany respondents were asked if they would favor or oppose the existence of only one Christian church in the future.[127] 60% of the Protestants favored and 14% opposed the idea of one church. The percentage for Catholics were: favor=71%, Oppose=17%. The rest of the respondents were undecided. Therefore, no propositions with regard to contemporary political culture will be derived from the historical development of Catholicism.

10.4 PARTY DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH GERMANY

Hans Fenske who studied the democratic traditions of Baden and Wuerttemberg concluded that these two regions played the most important role in the development of liberal and democratic ideas.[128] He partly supports his position with election results. Between 1871 and 1912 51% of the votes were won by either democrats or liberals.[129]

The Bavarian patriotic Party which remained a consistent supporter of the conservative Catholic doctrines and opposed

---

[127] Noelle-Neumann, 1981, p.237.

[128] Fenske, 1981, p.11.

[129] Fenske, 1981, p.176.

an extension of the political power of Prussia was the dominant party in Bavaria from 1869 to 1932 and represented in the main the religious conservative part of the population. Figure 4 demonstrates that a leftist or liberal movement never had a chance to win. It was not until 1893 that the Social Democrats won seats for the first time. As Brecht points out: "Not even in the eastern part of Bavaria had the three democratic parties a majority at any time during the twenties or thereafter.[130] Not surprisingly the Bavarian patriotic party, which pursued its policy with a leaning toward monarchical and authoritarian traditions was in opposition to democratic and liberal ideas.

This development has continued up to the present time. Thus, largest right wing party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), has been dominant since 1945. In the federal election in 1982 they gained 59% of the votes.[131]

10.5 BISMARCK AND THE SOUTH STATES

When Bismarck came to power he had no intention of permitting the southern states use their independence against Prussia.

---

[130] Brecht,1971,p.34.

[131] Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung, 1984, p.28.

		PARTY	
YEAR	Bavarian Patriotic Party	Democrats	Social Democrats
1869	80	4	–
1887	81	1	–
1893	74	1	5
1905	102	2	12
1920	65	13	26
1932	45	–	20

SOURCE: DEUERLEIN 1971, p.381 and 394

Figure 4.   Party development in Bavaria.

He thought he could receive support from the southern states. However, he was mistaken, since anti-Prussian feeling was on the increase. The sacrifices required by the military of Prussia made it unpopular in the southern states. The following statement of a Prussian agent in Wuerttemberg sums up this resentment against the Prussian military state: He reported that people were saying the constitution of Prussia contained only three articles: 1. pay, 2. be a soldier, 3. keep your mouth shut.[132] Bismarck considered the Catholic South and the Rhineland as an essentially alien society, not be easily integrated into the mainly Protestant North. After the foundation of the German empire in 1871 he attempted to subordinate the Roman Catholic church to the New imperial government.

This attempt led to a conflict between Bismarck and the Catholic church which was called Kulturkampf (battle of cultures).[133] The conflict started in 1864 when Pope Pius IX proclaimed that civil marriage and secular education were unacceptable. The Vatican council supported his opinion and announced that the Pope was infallible when speaking on matters of morals. Bismarck rejected these proclamations but decided not to react immediately since he needed the military

---

[132] Craig, 1978, p. 19.

[133] Snyder, 1958, p.231,232.

support of the Catholic South and the Rhineland against France. Once the German Empire was established in 1871 the struggle against the Catholic church began. The first step undertaken was to expel the Jesuits from Germany. Next he passed the May laws through the Prussian diet. These laws were strongly anti-catholic and increased government control over education and marriage. The government had the right to control all clerical education, to sanction church appointments, and to restrict the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts. Church property was confiscated and the Catholic press was strictly censored. Finally, all Catholic religious orders were abolished and some priests were persecuted. This conflict led to strong opposition against Bismarck and Prussia in Catholic South Germany and the Rhineland.

10.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL CULTURE IN SOUTH GERMANY

It is difficult to draw conclusions from the historical development of the South of Germany regarding its present political culture. However, there was the strong historical force of liberalism in the south, characterized by greater demand for elective parliaments, a free press and trial by jury. Liberalism, rejected the Prussian principles of

coercive discipline, mechanical obedience and militarism. In regard to my quantitative analysis it is likely that the long period of opposition towards the Prussian state and the support of liberal and democratic ideas led to a political culture which is _less repressive_ than those in the north and more tolerant of the various forms of grass roots political involvement measured by Barnes and Kaase with their repression potential scale. The French revolution, and the German revolutions in 1830 and 1848 started and mainly took place in southern Germany. I would, therefore, suggest that the people in South Germany are more opposed to the government's use of repression of political protest. For the reasons given above it is also likely that South Germans tend more to favor democratic values than North Germans.

Bavaria may be a deviant case. I would suggest that the repression potential may be very high because of the importance of monarchical and authoritarian traditions, reflected in a conservative party development. The conservative party development indicates further, that people of this region are less likely favor democratic values and tend towards the right of the political spectrum.

11.0 PROPOSITIONAL INVENTORY

This short section will present propositions with regard to the quantitative analysis. The propositions are derived from the analysis of socio-historical forces in the different German regions that I described in the previous part. This analysis suggests that there are the following five regions with different political subcultures in Germany:

- NORTH GERMANY

    I suggest that the present political culture in northern Germany is likely to have a higher average repression potential than the south of Germany and Hamburg/Hesse. Moreover it is likely that the north Germans tend towards the right of the political spectrum and do not prefer democratic values.

- SOUTH GERMANY

    In contrast to northern Germany and Hamburg/Hesse, Southern Germans should have a lower average repression potential. Moreover, South Germans are more likely to favor democratic values than north Germans.

- HAMBURG AND HESSE

I believe that Hamburg and Hesse are more tolerant of political participation. Therefore, they may have a lower average repression potential than the rest of Germany and lean to the left on the left-right self placement scale. The preference for democratic values is likely to be higher than in the rest of Germany.

- BAVARIA

Bavarians with their historical leaning towards monarchical and authoritarian traditions are likely to have a higher repression potential than the rest of Germany. Moreover, I suggest that Bavarians tend more towards the right of the political spectrum and have a higher tendency to be less supportive of democratic values.

12.0 QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY

The quantitative data come from the eight-nation collaborative study of political action.[134] The fieldwork for this study was completed during 1974 and 1975. Interviews were conducted with a representative sample of 2307 West German adults.[135] The sample size for West Germany was 2307.

The first step that was undertaken, was to run a SPSSX frequency distribution of all my variables. Based on this frequency distribution some of the variables were recoded so that all dependent variables scored in the same direction with higher scores indicating more conservative thinking. That is, the highest scores on the scales are attributed to people who are most likely to identify themselves as "rightist", place the least emphasis on democratic values and have the highest repression potential. The scales of the variables run as follows:

1. Ideology

---

[134] Barnes et al., 1979.

[135] for a Description of the sample see Barnes et al., 1979, p. 589,590.

The original variable from the political study was used, which runs from 1=left to 10=right.

2. Relative Importance of Democratic Values

I use my seventeen point version of the Democratic value index. The scale runs from 1 to 17 with 1=strong supporter of democratic values and 17=weak supporter of democratic values.

3. Repression Potential

The range of the repression potential scale runs from 0 to 4, with 0=no approval (= low repression potential) and 4=strong approval (= high repression potential).

4. Region

According to my socio-historical analysis I recoded German political subcultures into 5 regions which are: 1=North Germany, 2=Hamburg, 3=Hesse, 4=South Germany and 5=Bavaria.

In the next step the multiple classification procedure in the ANOVA command was used to calculate the unadjusted average deviations from the "grand mean" of the whole sample. This

calculates average standardized scores for my dependent variables for each region (Table 1).

12.1 FINDINGS WITHOUT CONTROL

12.1.1 Ideology

Table 1 compares average standardized left-right ideology scores across regions. The data reveal that there were not big differences between South (0.01) and North Germany (-0.05). Both deviate only slightly from the grand mean. of cases (N=around 1000) and therefore it primarily defines the grand mean. Thus, it is not astonishing that north Germans show small deviations from the average left-right score for all Germans. However, it is surprising that south Germans tend slightly more to the right than north Germans. Still these differences are too small to be of any interest. As expected the Bavarians are the people with the highest tendency towards the right political spectrum (0.32) while the people of Hesse (-0.28) and Hamburg (-0.18) regard themselves more on the left. The results are statistically sig-

Table 1. Average Scores on selected Attitudes by Region

	Left-Right Scale	Repression Potential	Democratic Values
Hamburg	-0.18 (69)	-0.45 (75)	-0.69 (75)
Hesse	-0.28 (221)	-0.25 (222)	-0.25 (201)
North Germany	-0.05 (980)	-0.05 (1032)	0.08 (961)
South Germany	0.01 (478)	0.10 (482)	0.10 (431)
Bavaria	0.32 (359)	0.24 (377)	0.13 (313)
Level of Significance	0.007	0.000	0.000
ETA square	0.0066	0.0125	0.0154

Number of respondents in parentheses

nificant (0.007). However, the variable region explains only a tiny fraction of the overall variance in left-right thinking (ETA square=0.01).

12.1.2 Repression potential

It is important to consider that north Germany has the highest number

As the socio-historical analysis suggested, the people of Hamburg (-0.45) and Hesse (-0.25) have a significantly lower repression potential than the rest of the German states. Again the average deviations from the grand mean in South (0.10) and North Germany (-0.05) are minimal. Once again, it is surprising that North Germany revealed a slightly lower repression potential than south Germany, but these differences are too small to be meaningful. Consistent with my expectations, Bavarians have the highest repression potential (0.24) in Germany. The results are statistically significant (0.000). The variable region only explains about 1% of the variance in repression potential (ETA square=0.0125).

12.1.3 Relative Importance of Democratic Values

The socio-historical analysis suggests that Hamburg and Hesse are more likely to be in favor of democratic values. The data

confirm this suggestion. Hamburg's (-0.69) and Hesse's (-0.25) average deviations from the grand mean indicate that their people favor democratic values more than Germans in other states. The rest of Germany scores around the grand mean, (North Germany 0.08, South Germany 0.16, Bavaria 0.13). Again, the results are statistically significant. However, the variable region explains only 1% (ETA square=0.0154) of the variance in the democratic value variable.

The data reveal the expected patterns for Hamburg, Hesse, and Bavaria. Hamburg and Hesse have a lower average repression potential and lean more to the left on the left-right self placement scale than the rest of Germany. Moreover, the people living in these regions have a higher tendency to favor democratic values than other Germans. In contrast to Hamburg/Hesse, Bavarians have a higher repression potential and reveal greater materialism than the other regions. Moreover, Bavarians tend more to the right of the political spectrum than the rest of Germany.

The socio-historical analysis suggested, that there might be a significant difference between Northern and Southern Germany. However, the data reveal that the South and the North are quite similar on the quantitative indicators of contemporary political culture. It is hardly surprising that

North Germany's average deviations from the grand mean of all three variables are not significant, since it has the highest number of cases, and therefore, largely defines the grand mean. However, it is surprising that the socio-historical suggestions for South Germany (that is, lower repression potential, more tendency towards the left, and higher tendency to favor democratic values than the north) did not hold true.

12.2 CONTROL FOR OTHER VARIABLES

Thus the data reveal that Hamburg and Hesse have more liberal and democratic political cultures. However, these regional differences might be the _spurious_ product of other variables. If my independent variable region and my dependent variables (ideology, level of repression potential, and level of importance of democratic values) vary together because they are both caused by other factors and they would not covary in the absence of these factors the relationship between region and my independent variables would be spurious. Factors which are likely to explain variation in my regions, as well as in my dependent variables might be income, education, age, gender, and urbanization.

Table 2. Difference of means of control variables in regions

	Education	Age	Income	urban	sex
North Germany	-0.06	0.05	-0.05	0.22	0.08
Hamburg	-0.26	0.12	0.03	1.44	0.15
Hesse	0.22	-0.21	0.14	-0.06	-0.17
South Germany	-0.08	-0.04	-0.01	-0.40	0.04
Bavaria	0.11	-0.11	-0.06	-0.33	-0.11
Level of Significance	0.000	0.003	0.2224	0.000	01078
ETA sq	0.0133	0.009	0.0028	0.1518	0.0033

12.2.1 Relationship between Independent Variable and Control Variables

In this section the relationship between the control variables and my regions will be examined, that is, it will be determined if the subsamples in the regions are significantly different in level of income, level of education, age, gender, and level of urbanization. If the regions do not differ significantly in these variables it is more likely that the differences in variation in my dependent variables are due to cultural factors. Table 2 reveals that the subsamples from the five regions do not differ significantly in gender (p=0.1078) and income (p=0.2254). Thus, a control for these variables is inappropriate. However, the regions differ significantly in age (0.003) education (p=0.000), and urbanization (p=0.000). Whereas age (ETA square=0.0028) and education (ETA square=0.0133) explain almost no variance in region, urbanization (ETA square=0.15) accounts for the largest variance in region. Hamburg with an standardized average deviation from the mean of 1.44 is the most urbanized, while South Germany (-0.40) and Bavaria (-0.33) are the least urbanized areas. The results suggests that a control for age, education, and urbanization seems to be appropriate. However, I will first examine the relationship between my dependent variables and the control variables.

12.2.2 Relationship between Dependent and Control Variables

In this section the relationship between my control variables and my dependent variables is examined. Before a control for age, education, and urbanization is appropriate, it is essential to provide plausible theoretical or empirical reasons why age, education and urbanization are likely to have an impact on my dependent variables.

1. Urbanization

    SPSSX was used to calculate Pearson r correlations coefficients which indicate the positive or negative association between urbanization and my dependent variables. The data reveal that there is a negative correlation between urbanization and repression potential (-0.19) and ideology (-0.11); that is, people in more urbanized areas are more likely to tend to the left and to have a lower repression potential. The results were statistically significant (p=0.000). Moreover, studies show that urban living as compared to rural is associated with higher involvement in politics.[136] Since repression potential measures the extent to which respondents approve repres-

---

[136] Campell, 1962, and Berelson, Lazarsfeld & Mcphee, 1954, cited in Milbrath, 1976, p.106.

sive acts against political participants, namely pro-
testers, it is likely that urban dwellers tend to reject
repressive acts towards protesters, that is, they are
likely to have a lower repression potential. The dis-
cussion revealed that urbanization has an impact on the
level of repression potential and on ideology. Therefore
a control of <u>urbanization</u> seems to be appropriate.

2. Education

Protho and Grigg showed that higher educated people show
a higher tendency to support democratic values.[137] As
expected, Pearson r reveals a negative association be-
tween level of the devaluation of democratic values and
education (pearson r=-0.24, p=0.000). A widely docu-
mented research finding is that <u>education</u> is an important
independent variable for explaining citizen involvement
in politics. People with higher levels of education tend
to participate at a higher level than those with less
education.[138] Therefore is it likely that more highly

---

[137] Protho & Grigg, 1960.

[138] Verba, Nie & Kim, 1971; Rosenau, 1974; Mattews and
Protho, 1966; Almond & Verba, 1963; cited in Milbrath,
1976, p.98.

educated people are more likely to reject repressive acts of the governments towards political protest, which is a form of political participation. Pearson r which, indicates a negative association between repression potential and education (pearson r=-0.20, p=0.000) supports this finding. Thus the analysis and discussion show that there is a significant relationship between education and my dependent variables level of repression potential and level of democratic support.

3. Age

Pearson r reveals that there is a positive relationship between age and repression potential (pearson r=0.24, p=0.000), that is older people are more likely to favor repressive acts towards protesters, less likely to value democratic ideas (pearson r=0.27, p=0.000) and lean to the right on Ideology (pearson r=0,16, p=0.000). Older people are more likely to regard democratic values as less important and are more likely to favor the right on the left-right spectrum than younger people .

The discussion revealed that my control variables education, age, and urbanization are likely to have an impact on my dependent variables. Since the subsamples in my regions also differ significantly in age, urbanization, and education it

is likely that the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is spurious. In the next section ANOVA is used to control for age, education and urbanization.

12.2.3 Methodology

The Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) of SPSSX ANOVA is used to determine whether urbanization, age, and education have an impact on the relationship between my dependent variables and region. MCA performs analysis of variance for factorial designs with covariates. First MCA establishes the unadjusted deviations from the grand mean (Table 1). In order to control for the degree of urbanization (V 295 in the political action study), age (=V 147), and education (V 256) MCA regresses ideology, repression potential and democratic values on these control variables and saves the residual variance that is not explained by them. Then it uses the residuals to recalculate the average deviations from the grand mean for each region (adjusted deviation). A difference between the unadjusted and adjusted deviations indicates the effects of the control variables on the political culture - region relationship. Table 3 displays the adjusted scores.

Table 3.   Average adjusted Scores on selected Attitudes
           by Region

controlling for Urbanization, Age, and Gender

	Left-Right Scale = Ideology	Repression Potential	Democratic Values
Hamburg	0.11 (N=69)	-0.04 (N=75)	-0.53 (N=75)
Hesse	-0.22 (N=221)	-0.17 (N=222)	-0.18 (N=201)
North Germany	-0.01 (N=980)	-0.01 (N=1032)	0.07 (N=961)
South Germany	-0.10 (N=478)	-0.06 (N=482)	0.10 (N=431)
Bavaria	0.30 (N=359)	0.20 (N=377)	-0.11 (N=313)
Level of Significance	0.007	0.000	0.000
ETA square	0.0066	0.0124	0.0154

Number of respondents in parentheses

12.3 FINDINGS WITH CONTROL

Because of the size of North Germany the effects of my con-
trol variables are likely to be greater for the smaller re-
gions of Bavaria, Hesse, South Germany and Hamburg. This is
hardly surprising since North Germany is larger in size.
Therefore, it is likely that, for example, urban and rural
effects cancel out each other. However, the effects of my
control variables are quite different in the smaller regions.

The biggest change occurred in Hamburg. A comparison of Ta-
ble 2 and Table 1 reveals that the unadjusted deviation from
the grand mean of repression potential (-0.45) disappears
after the control for age, education, and urbanization
(-0.04). The same holds true for ideology. After control-
ling, the positive unadjusted average deviation of ideology
(0.11) changes into a negative adjusted average deviation
(-0.18). The original unadjusted average deviations were
apparently due to the impact of the control variables. A
comparison of Hesse's unadjusted and adjusted scores on all
three dependent variables reveals only tiny differences. The
unadjusted average scores for the left-right dimension
(-0.28), repression potential (-0.25), and democratic values
(-0.15) are not different from the adjusted average scores
in Table 2 with left-right scale (-0.22), repression poten-
tial (-0.17), and democratic values (-0.09). The same holds

true for Bavaria. The original deviations from the grand mean on ideology (0.32), repression potential (0.24), and democratic values (0.13) do not change after controlling for age, education and urbanization (adjusted scores: ideology=0.30, repression potential=0.20, democratic values=0.11). This implies that the original deviations from the grand mean are not due to the impact of the control variables. A comparison of unadjusted and adjusted average scores in South Germany reveal a difference in ideology (unadj dev=0.01, adj dev=-0.10) and repression potential (unadj dev=0.10, adj dev=-0.06).

The results reveal that the original unadjusted deviations from the grand mean of repression potential and ideology in Hamburg and South Germany were partly due to the impact of the control variables. The results for the other regions reveal that the control variables do not have a striking influence on the association between region and political culture.

Finally it seems appropriate to examine which of the control variables has the most impact on the dependent variables. Separate controls for age, education and urbanization indicate that the whole differences between unadjusted deviations and adjusted deviations of Hamburg and South Germany in the

level of repression potential and ideology are due to the impact of urbanization.

The results show that most of the unadjusted deviation from the grand mean of repression potential and ideology in Hamburg is due to the impact of urbanization. The same holds true for South Germany, however to a smaller extent. In the other regions appear no differences between the unadjusted and adjusted deviations in the dependent variables, after controlling for age, education, and urbanization.

The control for the variables leads to the conclusion that, in absence of other additional plausible rival hypotheses, the different political cultures in Germany are due to regional differences, that is, there is a relation between regions and political cultures. It is likely that there are other factors which could have an impact on my dependent and independent variables. It is the task of future research to examine these factors. The analysis suggests that the socio-historical development has an impact on the dependent variables in all regions except Hamburg, and to a smaller extent South Germany, where the difference between unadjusted and the adjusted deviations in ideology and repression potential indicate that the impact of urbanization on political culture outweighs the influence of regional history.

13.0 CONCLUSION

The concept of political culture offers an useful approach for understanding variations in political structures and levels and types of political behavior in different regions or nations.

The goal of this study was to determine whether the historical development of former German regions have led to the creation of distinguishable contemporary subcultures in West Germany. The qualitative socio-historical analysis suggested that there were mainly five regions which were different in their historical development: Hamburg, Hesse, Bavaria, South and North Germany.

However, quantitative differences in contemporary political culture appeared only in Hamburg, Hesse and Bavaria. The political cultures of Hamburg and Hesse are more tolerant of political protest and tend more to the left of the political spectrum. There is also a greater focus on democratic values than in the rest of Germany. However statistical controls indicate that the deviant political culture in Hamburg is mainly due to the impact of urbanization. In contrast to the rest of Germany, Bavarians have a political culture which is less tolerant of the various forms of political protest than

the rest of Germany and tends more to the right on the left-right scale. However, the differences were not significant. This may be due to the fact that political subculture explanations are limited in so far as they represent only one aspect of politics. One has to consider many other aspects as well, for example, structural and institutional explanations.

Suggestions based on the qualitative historical analysis accounting for differences in contemporary political culture in North and South Germany are not upheld by the quantitative data. There may be many theoretical reasons, which explain why historical differences between North and South Germany are not upheld by the data.

Since World War II West Germany rapidly developed into an advanced industrial society. Advanced industrial societies are likely to lose the historical consciousness associated with early industrial societies. The development of communication networks, elaborated forms of mass media, and improved migration conditions are likely to obscure former cultural boundaries. Another factor that may have accounted for the existence of a more general political culture is the greater emphasis on a general political education in Germany after 1945, which in turn possibly contributed to a broader development of shared attitudes and beliefs towards the political system. The development of new parties and the emer-

gence of new identities for old parties led to the establishment of parties based on popular support (Volksparteien) which rely on support from broader sectors of the electorate. The existence of these parties may help account for the overcoming of the former cultural boundaries that divided Germany, and therefore, might contribute to a more general political culture.

As well as providing these theoretical statements I would like to offer some methodological suggestions for future research of political culture concerning the selection of new and appropriate historical indicators. In order to examine the influence of historical forces on contemporary political culture I would suggest the inclusion of indicators in future surveys of political attitudes that measure attitudes and beliefs towards history. Specific questions about the respondents experiences and attitudes towards the past, for example in Germany, attitudes toward Prussia and the Third Reich, would enable future researchers to examine quantitatively, whether there is a relationship between past and contemporary political culture. In any case, political subculture study is a useful additional explanatory tool for understanding the process of politics in Germany and represents an advance in the direction of integrating psychology, sociology , and history with political science.

14.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allerbeck, K., Kaase M. (1979) . "Political Ideologie, Political Participation, and political socialization", Politische Vierteljahresschrift, No. : 89 - 97.

Almond, Gabriel A. (1956). "Comparative Political Systems." Journal of Politics 18: 391-409.

------- (1983). "Communism and Political Culture Theory." Comparative Politics 15: 127-139.

Almond, G.A. and S.Verba (1963) The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: University Press.

Almond, G.A. and S. Verba ed. (1980). The Civic Culture Revisited: An analytic study.. Boston: Little Brown and Company.

Baker K.L., Dalton Russel J. and Hildebrandt K. (1981). Germany Transformed-Political Culture and the New Politics. Cambridge Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press.

Balfour, Michael (1982). West Germany. A Contemporary History. New York: St, Martin's Press.

Barnes, S. H. and M. Kaase et al. (1979). Political action: Mass Participation in Five Nations. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Boeltken, F. (1985). "In an Environment of Insecurity: Postmaterialism in the European Community, 1970-1980," Comparative Political Studies, 4: 453-484.

Bonjean, Charles M. and Louis Schneider ed. (1973). The Idea of Culture in the Social Sciences. London: Cambridge University Press.

Bosl, Karl (1965). Zur Geschichte der Bayern. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Brecht, Arnold (1945). Federalism and Regionalism in Germany New York: Russel and Russel.

Bruening, Kurt and Heinrich Schmidt eds. (1976). Handbuch der historischen Staetten Deutschlands Band 2. Niedersachsen und Bremen. Stuttgart: Alfred Kroener Verlag.

Bunting, James (1972). Bavaria. New York: Hastings House.

Burdick Charles, Jacobsen Hans-Adolf and Winfried Kudszus (eds.) (1984). Contemporary Germany: Politics and Culture. London: Westview Press.

Carbonell, A. Aurora, "Research on Participation: A Methodological Critique", Phillipine Journal of Public Administration, No. 4, 1976, p.193 - 200.

Carr, William (1979). A History of Germany 1815-1945 London: Ewald Arnold.

Conradt, David P. (1974). "West-Germany: A Remade Political Culture?" Comparative Political Studies, No. 7: 222-239.

------- (1980). "Changing German Political Culture." in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba The Civic Culture Revisited. Boston: Little Brown and Company.

------- (1981). "Political Culture, Legitimacy, and Participation", West European Politics, 4: 19 - 33.

Craig, Gordon A. (1978). Germany 1866-1945. New York: Oxford University Press.

------- (1982). The Germans. New York: G.P. Putnam's and Sons.

Deutsch, Karl W. and D. Brent Smith (1987). "The Federal Republic of Germany-West Germany." in Roy C. Macridis, ed.. Modern Political Systems 6th ed.. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Dill, Marshall JR. (1970). Germany, a Modern History Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.

Dobson D.L., Scioli F.P., Stern L.N. (1973). "On the Dimensions of Political Cultures-A New Perspective." Comparative Political Studies 5: 493-506.

Doenhoff, Marion (1981). Von Gestern nach uebermorgen-Zur Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Hamburg: Albrecht Knaus.

Dyson, K. (1979). "The Ambiguous Politics of Western Germany: Politicization in a 'State' society." _European Journal of Political Research_, 7: 375-396.

Edinger, Lewis J. (1986). _West German Politics_. New York: Columbia University Press.

Elazar Daniel J. (1972). _American Federalism: A View From the States_. 2d ed.. New York: Crowell.

------- (1980). "Afterword: Steps in the Study of American Political Culture." _Publius_ Spring: 127-139.

Elkins, T.H. (1972). _Germany_. London: Chatto & Windus

Elkins, D.J. and Richard E.B. Simeon (1979). "A Cause of its Effect, or What does Political Culture Explain." _Comparative Politics_ 2: 127-145.

Erdmann, Dietrich (1982). _Preussen: Seine Wirkung auf die deutsche Geschichte_. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag.

Evans, Richard J. (1981). "Rethinking the German Past." _West European Politics_ 4: 19-33.

Fenske, Hans (1981). _Der liberale Suedwesten_. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Franke, E. (1983). _Facts about Germany_ Guetersloh: Bertelsmann Verlag.

Gabriel, W. Oscar, "Politische Kultur - Zu einem Schlagwort deformiert?" _Politische Vierteljahresschrift_22, 1981, p.205 - 209.

Hanson, Russell (1980). "Political Culture, Interparty Competition and Political Efficacy in the American States." _Publius_ Spring: 17-39.

Harvey, William (1979). _Germany in Western Civilization_. Alabama: University of Alabama Press.

Henderson, Ernest (1906). _A Short History of Germany_. New York: Macmillan Company.

Holborn, Hajo (1970). _Germany and Europe_. New York: Doubleday and Company Inc..

Inglehart, M.L. (1981). "Political Interest in West European Woman", _Comparative Political Studies_, No. 3: 299-326.

Inglehart, Roland (1977). "Political Dissatisfaction and Mass Support for Social Change in Advanced Industrial Society." <u>Comparative Political Studies,</u>" No. 3: 455-473.

----- (1983) "The persistence of materialist and post-materialist value orientations," <u>European J. of Pol. Research</u> 11: 81-91.

----- (1982) "Changing values in Japan and the West." <u>Comparative Political Studies</u> 14: 445-479.

-----(1981) "Post-Materialism in an environment of insecurity." <u>American Political Science Review</u> 75:880-900.

----- (1971) <u>The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles in Western Publics</u>. Princeton, New York: Univsity Press.

----- (1971) "The silent revolution in Europe: Intergenerational change in postindustrial societies." <u>Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.</u> 65: 991-1017.

Johnson, Nevil (1983). <u>State and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany</u>. 2nd ed. New York: Pergamon Press.

Joslyn Richard A. (1980). "Manifestations of Elazar's Political Subcultures: State Public Opinion and the Content of Political Campaign Advertising." <u>Publius</u> Spring: 37-58.

Katzenstein Peter J. (1987). <u>Policy and Politics in West Germany</u>. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Kalaycioglu, E. (1981). "Measuring Political Participation." <u>Comparative Political Studies,</u> No. 1: 123-135.

Kavanagh, Denis (1972). <u>Political Culture</u>. New York: Macmillan.

Keefe, Eugene K. (1975). <u>Areahandbook for the Federal Republic of Germany</u>. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Kincaid, John (1980). "Political Cultures of The American Compound Republic." <u>Publius</u> Spring: 1-15.

------- (1980). "Political Culture and the Quality of Urban Life." <u>Publius</u> Spring: 89-105.

Klose, Olaf, ed. (1976). <u>Schleswig-Holstein und Hamburg</u>. 3rd ed.. Stuttgart: Alfred Kroener.

Kloss, Guenther (1976). <u>West Germany, an Introduction</u>.
London, New York: Macmillam Press.

Kuehr, Herbert (1984). "Das Ruhrgebiet in Schwarz und Rot."
in Hans Georg Wehling ed. <u>Buerger im Staat</u> 1984 34.
Jahrgang. Heft 3:167-173.

Krejci, Jaroslav (1976). <u>Social Structure in divided
Germany</u>. London: Croom Helm.

Krewer B., Momper M., Eckensberger H. (1984). "Das Saarland
war zumeist objekt der Geschichte." in Hans-Georg Wehling
ed. <u>Der Buerger im Staat</u> 1984 34. JG. Heft 3: 178-187.

Laitin David D. (1978). "Religion, Political Culture, and the
Weberian Tradition." <u>World Politics</u> 30: 561-592.

Landeszentrale fuer Politische Bildung (1979). <u>Badische
Geschichte</u>. Stuttgart: Konrad Theiss Verlag.

Lehman, Edward W. (1972). "On the Concept of Political Cul-
ture: A Theoretical Reassessment." <u>Social Forces</u> 50:
361-370.

Leonhardt, Rudolf W. (xxxx). <u>X Mal Deutschland</u>. Muenchen:
R. Piper and Co..

Lipjhart, Arend (1971). "Cultural Diversity and Theories of
Political Integration." <u>Canadian Journal of Political
Science</u> 4: 1-15.

Litchfield, Edward H. (1953). <u>Governing Postwar Germany</u>. New
York: Cornell University Press.

Lovrich N.P. Jr., Daynes B.W., Ginger L. (1980). "Public
Policy and the Effects of Historical-Cultural Phenomena:
The Case of Indiana." <u>Publius</u> Spring: 111-125.

Macridis, Roy C. and Robert E. Ward eds (1987). <u>Modern Poli-
tical Systems</u>. 6th ed.. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Maehl, William (1979). <u>Germany in Western Civilization</u>.
Alabama: University of Alabama Press.

Maslow, A. (1970) <u>Motivation and personality.</u>. New York:
Harper and Row.

Milbrath, Lester W. and M.L. Goel (1977). <u>Political
Participation-How and Why Do People Get Involved in Poli-
tics?</u>. 2d ed.. New York: University Press of America.

Mintzel, Alf (1984)."Das Traditionsbewusste und staatlich selbstbewusste Bayern." in Hans Georg Wehling ed. <u>Der Buerger im Staat</u> 1984 34. Jahrgang Heft 3: 197-203.

Moennig, Richard (1938). <u>Adolf Hitler - From Speeches 1933 - 1938</u>. Berlin: Terramare Office.

Nassmacher, Karl-Heinz (1984). "Hie Welf, hie Freisinn. Regionale Traditionen im nordwestlichen Westfalen." in Hans Georg Wehling ed. <u>Buerger im Staat</u> 1984 34. JG. Heft 34: 160-167.

Nelson, Dale C. (xxxx). "Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status as Sources of Participation: The Case for Ethic Political Culture." <u>American Political Science Review</u> 73: 1024-1038.

Noelle-Neumann, E. (1981). <u>The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967 - 1980.</u> Westport, Conneticut: Greenwood Press.

Nohlen D. (1984) <u>European Community: Problems, Institutions, Politics and Data.</u> Muenchen: Piper.

Pasley, Malcolm ed. (1972). <u>Germany-a Companion to German Studies</u>. London: Methuen and Co Ltd.

Passant, E.J. (1969). <u>A short History of Germany 1815 - 1945</u> . Cambridge: University Press.

Pateman, C. (1970). <u>Participation and Democracy,</u> New York: Cambridge University Press.

Peck, Reginald (1969). <u>The West Germans-How they live and work</u>. New York, Washington: Praeger Publishers.

Petri Franz, Droege Georg and Klaus Flink ed. (1970). <u>Handbuch der Historischen Staetten Deutschlands Band 3. Nordrhein-Westfalen</u>. Stuttgart: Alfred Kroener Verlag.

Petry, Ludwig ed. (1976). <u>Handbuch der Historischen Staetten Deutschlands Band 5. Rheinland Pfalz und Saarland</u>. 3rd edn. Stuttgart: Alfred Kroener.

Pinson, Koppel (1961). <u>Modern Germany</u>. New York: Macmillan Company.

Postel, Rainer (1984). "Hanseaten." in Hans-Georg Wehling ed., <u>Buerger im Staat</u>. 1984 34. Jahrgang Heft 3: 153-160.

Pye Lucian W. (1972). "Culture and Political Science: Problem in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture." Social Science Quarterly 53: 283-296.

Reynolds, R.K. (1984). "A Cross - Cultural Study of Values of Germans and Americans", International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 269-278.

Rhodes, John E. (1964). Germany: A history. New York Holt, Rinehart, Winston.

------- (1971). The quest for unity, Modern Germany 1848-1970. N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc.

Roberts, G.K. (1984). " 'Normal' or 'critical'? Progress Reports on the Condition of West Germany's Political Culture," European Journal of Political Research, 12: 423 - 431.

Rosenbaum, Walter A. (1975). Political Culture. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Sante, Georg Wilhelm (1971). Geschichte der Deutschen Laender Vol. 2. Wuerzburg: A.G. Ploetz Verlag.

------- ed. (1976). Handbuch der Historischen Staetten Deutschlands Band 5. Hessen. Stuttgart: Alfred Kroener Verlag.

Savage, R.L. and R.J. Gallagher (1977). "Politicocultural Regions in a Southern State: An Empirical Typology of Arkansas Counties." Publius 7: 91-106.

Schissler, Jakob (1984). "Der Mythos: Hessen Vorn." in Hans-Georg Wehling ed. Der Buerger im Staat 1984 34. Jahrgang Heft 3: 187-192.

Schmidt, M. (1978). "Die Politik der inneren Reformen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1969 - 1970" Politische Vierteljahresschrift, No. 2: 196 - 234.

Schoonmaker, D. (1971). German Politics. Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company.

Settel, Arthur ed. (1950). This is Germany. New York: William Sloane Associates.

Sharkansky, I. (1969). "The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture." Polity 2:66-83.

Singer, Milton (1968). "The Concept of Culture." in <u>International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences</u> Sills David ed.. Crowwell: Macmillan Inc..

Sontheimer, Kurt (1972). <u>The Government and Politics of West Germany</u>. London: Hutchison University Library. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Snyder, Louis L. (1975). <u>Documents Of German History</u>. Westport:Greenwood Press.

Spotts, Frederic (1973). <u>The Churches and Politics in Germany</u>. Middletown, Conneticut: Wesleyan University Press.

Steinbach, Peter. (1980) "Die Deutschen: Gedanken zur politischen Kultur und historisch gepraegten Identitaet der Deutschen" <u>Politische Vierteljahresschrift,</u> 2: 123 -135.

Steinberg, S.H. (1945). <u>A short History of Germany</u>. New York: Macmillan Company.

Stirk, S.D. (1979). <u>The Prussian Spirit</u>. Washington, N.Y.: Kermicat Press.

Tilford, R. (1981). "The State, University Reform and the Berufsverbot," <u>West European Politics.</u> No. 2: 148-165.

Triandis, Harry C. (1973). <u>The Analysis of Subjective Culture</u> . New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc..

Valentin, Veit (1946). <u>The German People</u>. New York: Alfred Knopf.

Verba, Sidney and Lucian W. Pye eds. (1963). <u>Political Culture and Political Development</u>. Princeton: Priceton University Press.

Von Beyme, Klaus (1983). <u>The Political System of the Federal Republic of Germany</u>. New York: St. Martins Press.

------ (1980). "Political Culture and Electoral Behavior in West Germany." <u>German Studies Review</u> 3: 415-433.

Wehling, Hans-Georg (1984). "Regionale Politische Kultur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland." in Hans Georg Wehling ed. <u>Der Buerger im Staat</u> 1984 34. Jahrgang Heft 3: 150-153.

-------- (1984). "Barock-Bauerliches Oberschwaben." in Hans-Georg Wehling <u>Der Burger im Staat</u> 1984 34. Jahrgang Heft 3:192-197.

Wehling, Rosemarie (1984). "Der Pfaelzer-Sehnsucht nach Harmonie und Einheit." in Hans-Georg Wehling ed. <u>Der Buerger Im Staat</u> 1984 34. Jahrgang Heft 3: 173-178.

Wells, Roger H. (1953). "State Government" in Edward H. Litchfield ed.. <u>Governing Postwar Germany</u>. New York: Cayuga Press.

Williamson, D.G. (1986). <u>Bismarck and Germany 1862-1890</u>. London, New York: Longman.

Windell, George (1954). <u>The Catholics and German Unity</u>. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press.

States of the Federal Republic of Germany

☐	bis 30%
▨	bis 40%
■	bis 50%
■	über 50%

Appendix C. Percentage of votes for the
National-Socialists in 1932   119

VITA

Norbert Walz was born March 24, 1960, in Stuttgart Bad-Canstatt, West-Germany. He graduated from the University of Stuttgart in November, 1983 with a Master of Urban Affairs. Moreover, he graduated from the University of Konstanz in Juli, 1986 with a BA in Administration Science.

He entered the Political Science Department at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in September, 1986. In February, 1988 he completed the requirements for the degree of Master of Political Science.