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**Crisis at the Crossroads: The Conjunction of Internal and
External Impediments to Development in Sudan**

by

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
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(ABSTRACT)

The conventional theoretical and analytical debate surrounding contemporary African underdevelopment attempts to classify or label the impediments to development primarily within an internal-external dichotomy. This thesis questions the internal-external approach in that it may limit the opportunity to examine the situation more in terms of a single process, blending the forces that hinder political and economic growth. The case of the Sudan illustrates this 'holistic' concept in that certain fundamental constraints within the Sudan combined with specific external factors place severe limitations on both the economic and political development of the country. The traditional disunity and absence of a legitimate political authority within the Sudan, combined with the Sudan's integration into the world economic system, has created a situation that is detrimental to development. Rather than place the blame or responsibility for underdevelopment on any particular set of forces, I have examined how these forces have intertwined to create the pres-

ent conditions in the Sudan, perhaps highlighting similar situations throughout other Third World nations as well.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Third World is characterized by severe balance of payments deficits, worsening income inequality, widening poverty, and a decline in domestically grown agricultural produce. In addition to these economic handicaps, political decay, widespread corruption, political violence and overall instability have compounded the decline in the living standards of the people of the developing nations. The theoretical analysis and debate surrounding this underdevelopment of Third World nations has been carried out primarily in terms of a dichotomy between external and internal forces. The conventional internal-external dichotomy is used in opposing paradigms to make assumptions about what factors create opportunities and constraints for economic and political development and what degree of control various actors have over those factors. Dependency assumes that constraints on development are a function of external factors controlled by external actors.¹ Modernization assumes constraints on development are basically internal and can be overcome by internal actors in alliance with external capital.² Post-

¹ See Andre Frank, On Capitalist Underdevelopment (London: Oxford University Press, 1975).

² See W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-

imperialism assumes that development is possible when internal actors use their bargaining power to create a relationship of alliance with external actors to replace quasi-colonial dominance by external actors.³ Each of these models suggests that if the appropriate actor or set of actors pursues the proper strategy, development can be achieved. The case study of the Sudan suggests that the interactions between internal and external factors are not easily controlled by any single actor, and these interactions may serve to reverse the development process. Ironically, the attempt to gain control of the domestic politics by the Sudanese Government has even compounded the problems of development. The political instability and overall weakness of the state has prevented Sudanese government officials from implementing strategies that pursue long-term, balanced development. The absence of legitimacy the government experiences has prevented it from being able to quell internal unrest and suffering and, consequently, from positively bargaining for a more equitable position in the world capitalist system. Until the Sudanese Government can obtain some sense of consensual support by the Sudanese population, the domes-

Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.)

³ David G. Becker et al, Postimperialism: International Capitalism and Development in the Late Twentieth Century (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987.)

tic political instability will prevent government officials from effectively focusing on external pressures and influences.

Sudan's situation has been analyzed in the same light as the broader African crisis. As a whole, Africa's underdevelopment is often characterized by its increasing food deficit. Michael Lofchie explains that in attempting to analyze the causes behind the famines and general underdevelopment within Africa, the various disciplines have aligned themselves in fairly predictable ways.⁴ First, political scientists have generally focused on the international aid perspective by assessing the various assistance strategies adopted by the different donor nations and agencies. Second, sociologists have looked primarily at the internal demographic consequences such as the enormous rural-urban migration that has become so dominant in the developing nations. Finally, anthropologists have examined the deterioration of traditional institutions and cultural practices among the areas plagued by food deficits. These general approaches help illustrate the internal-external dichotomy in the analysis of underdevelopment. Lofchie maintains that despite their wide range of disciplinary and ideological viewpoints, these perspectives on African underdevelopment

⁴ Michael F. Lofchie, "Political and Economic Origins of African Hunger." The Journal of Modern African Studies, 13, 1975, pp.551-553.

and hunger share the basic premise that the diminishing food supply is a direct result of drought. "In doing so, they have foregone an opportunity to broaden their understanding of the causes of the current predicament to include political and economic factors....The political and economic arrangements, far more than changes in climate and rainfall, are at the base of human suffering and deprivation."⁵

This paper provides a case study of the Sudan in light of the increased, post-independence, international intervention into that country and the internal responses that have evolved. An explanation will be sought as to why a nation which has relied historically on agriculture as the primary livelihood for its population is presently experiencing hunger and a growing need to import foodstuffs. The central hypothesis of this thesis is that certain fundamental constraints within the Sudan combined with specific external factors to place severe limitations on both the economic and political development of the country. The traditional disunity and absence of a legitimate political authority within the Sudan combined with the Sudan's integration into the world economic system has created a situation that is detrimental to development. The point of this thesis is not to place the blame or responsibility for underdevelopment on any particular set of forces, but to examine how these forces

⁵ Lofchie, p. 553.

have intertwined to create the present conditions in the Sudan and, therefore, perhaps shed some light on what is occurring in other Third World nations as well.

Even though many of Sudan's problems may be attributed to internal circumstances such as widespread hunger, violence, civil war, and corruption as illustrated through the rise and fall of the Nimeiry regime, many problems may also be traced to the Sudan's integration into a 'world system.'⁶ Inequitable international exchanges dominate as benefits are unequally distributed with a bias against the poor countries.⁷ Amin argues that the superior productivity of the center enables it to force the periphery into a secondary role of providing raw materials and cheap labor to the center. From this perspective, Third World nations become an integral part of the world order through their relations of dependency and unequal exchange. As a colony of Britain, the Sudan provided not only sources of inexpensive raw materials and foodstuffs for the United Kingdom, but it also provided markets for the manufactured goods produced from these raw materials.⁸ This pattern of exchange has created problems in capital accumu-

⁶ See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

⁷ See Samir Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formation of Peripheral Capitalism, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977).

⁸ See Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914, (New York: Methuen Press, 1981).

lation in the Sudan. The nation's economy does not produce enough capital for reinvestment purposes and, therefore, cannot grow or expand economically. Africa cannot develop like Europe, Japan, or the USA. Instead, they must try to compete in world markets already dominated by technologically sophisticated transnational corporations.⁹ The resulting disparity in international economic exchanges leaves the Sudan little negotiating power for better deals. For example, in an attempt to begin to satisfy the need for foreign exchange, the Sudanese Government promoted the production of cotton for export by investing in grand agricultural schemes created solely for growing cotton. This narrow focus on a single raw material for export set the stage for developing an enormous vulnerability in the Sudanese economy. Obviously, a poor crop or a drop in world market prices could drastically reduce the influx of foreign capital into the country. Once this happens, the nation is left without cotton and without incoming revenue. The country is left with little to bargain with in order to begin to reverse the situation.

Having to rely on such a biased and unbalanced system of exchange has helped keep the Sudan from rising above its Third World status. These external conditions that have been

⁹ Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 21-23.

thrust upon developing nations like the Sudan have certainly heavily influenced the direction of development policies within these countries. But, external forces do not determine internal responses or the consequences that follow. External forces are not solely responsible for the present conditions in the developing world. While these external factors do set constraints on internal responses, the specific responses within these constraints are determined by numerous other variables such as the previously mentioned interaction of factors, the degree of control various actors have over these factors, as well as specific, traditional cultural and geographical dynamics which cannot justifiably be overlooked. By omitting the potential importance of all of these variables and their interactions, the external-internal dichotomy is denying the opportunity to broaden the understanding of the current situation in Third World countries.

One way to begin this 'broadening' could be to examine the idea that inequitable international exchanges are difficult to overcome given the weakness of the state. In Sudan, this weakness largely stems from a lack of political legitimacy which is illustrated by frequent riots, coups d'etat, and official repression. Michael Hudson states that the central problem of government in the Arab world today is political legitimacy.

Arab politics today are not just unstable, although instability remains a prominent feature, they are also unpredictable to participants and observers alike. Fed by rumor, misinformation, and lack of information, the Arab political process is cloaked in obscurity and Arab politicians are beset by insecurity and fear of the unknown.¹⁰

Hudson refers to Weber's argument that,

without legitimacy, a ruler, regime, or governmental system is hard-pressed to attain the conflict-management capability essential for long-run stability and good government. While the stability of an order may be maintained for a time through fear or expediency or custom, the optimal or most harmonious relationship between the ruler and the ruled is that in which the ruled accept the rightness of the ruler's superior power.¹¹

Internally, Sudan's political order suffers from lack of political legitimacy, a problem which has historical roots.

...The territories created by imperialism were, in a dual sense, artificial entities, and this has produced severe problems in state building. First, their political forms at independence had not evolved organically out of local traditions. Instead, colonial powers transferred Western models of state organization to Africa. These imports might have taken root in local political cultures, given an extended germination period. However, colonialism was an almost fleeting experience in most of Africa, too transitory to institutionalize alien political structures and norms. Secondly, the colonies and protectorates were artificial in the sense that late nineteenth-century European imperialists paid no heed to cultural and linguistic criteria in carving out national boundaries. Diverse and sometimes hostile peoples were grouped within common borders. These differences were exacerbated, albeit unintentionally., by colonial-induced social, economic and political change. The legitimacy crisis and ethnic tensions that bedevil postcolonial politics

¹⁰ Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy, Yale University Press, 1977, p. 2.

¹¹ Hudson, p. 1.

must be understood in the context of the colonial epoch.¹²

The case of the Sudan certainly illustrates this scenario. One can address the problems of traditional disunity in the Sudan through an examination of the effects of the vast geographical differences as well as the lasting influences of colonization and the overall political history of the region. As the people of the Sudan have historically relied on agriculture as a means of survival, geographical differences often created extensive differences in the lifestyles and values of the people within the region as a whole. This extreme diversity and political decentralization has helped sustain the absence of a legitimate national authority.

Most of the countries created by colonialism contained several traditional societies, most of which valued its own political traditions, myths, and symbols. This complicated state-building, since it was impossible to draw upon a single, traditional model in devising the modern state's institutions. A government's decision to adopt the indigenous political institutions of one community would be a virtual declaration of war against the excluded groups.¹³

Postcolonial rulers have not been able to fall back on the legitimizing force of traditional institutions as Sudan's present political institutions were primarily created from external origins. As a foreign creation and imposition, the national political system started from a position of

¹² Sandbrook, p. 42.

¹³ Sandbrook, p. 45.

illegitimacy, a problem that has plagued the nation since that time. When British colonial rule ended in Sudan, it was replaced by predominantly Arab rule from Khartoum. This served as the, 'indigenous political institution and tradition of one community,' (Northern Sudan) that Sandbrook mentioned in the previous quotation and established a threat to the excluded diverse groups within the rest of the nation. The conflict of interest that erupted from this exclusion eventually culminated into violence and finally a civil war which still continues today. Obviously, such widespread unrest makes governing even more difficult and perpetuates the overall weakness of the state.

The general lack of consensus that plays such a crucial role in the legitimacy crisis has been characterized by a political system of personal rule based chiefly upon personal loyalty, patron-client linkages and coercion.

...Personal rule... is a form of patrimonialism that arises when rulers have no constitutional, charismatic-revolutionary or traditional legitimacy. A chief strongman emerges and rules on the basis of material incentives and personal control of his administration and armed forces. Fear and personal loyalties are the mainstays of a personalistic government untrammelled by traditional or modern constitutional limitations.¹⁴

Sandbrook points out, however, that the greater a regime's dependence upon favors, promises, and coercion, the greater is its vulnerability to disaffection in the event of an eco-

¹⁴ Sandbrook, p. 89.

conomic downturn. This scenario precisely describes what has occurred in the Sudan. As the economic conditions within Sudan plummeted, Nimeiry's popular support also dropped. The lack of stability and a legitimate set of governmental institutions promoted the desire for Nimeiry to turn to greater and greater reliance on foreign assistance in an attempt to create at least an illusion of political stability and maintain control of his regime. It was at this point that Sudan's political difficulties and economic crisis became increasingly internationalized.

According to Sandbrook's arguments, if the developing states are strong (i.e. considered legitimate and supported by the majority of the population) they can work with the international capitalist powers in finding a more equitable means of exchange and, therefore, pursue more positive national goals. He explains that the state must be able to exploit its own country's potential in part by finding a niche for the local economy in the highly competitive global market. If a strong state exists, "consistent and shrewd policy can mitigate the inequalities of the world economy or even capitalize them."¹⁵

David Becker and Richard Sklar's alternative thesis of postimperialism expands on this general premise. Refuting the assumption that all international capitalist expansion

¹⁵ Sandbrook, p. 29.

is necessarily imperialist, the postimperialist viewpoint suggests that a 'mutuality of interest' may exist between the developed and developing countries. "At the deepest level, their interests are not fundamentally antagonistic and do not entail automatically the intensified domination of the less developed countries by the more developed."¹⁶ Those members of society within the developing nations that stand to benefit from foreign economic integration work in cooperation with foreign investors by emitting a desire to establish stable relationships with them. These include a group Sklar has termed the 'managerial bourgeoisie' of entrepreneurial elite, managers of firms, senior state functionaries, leading politicians, members of the learned professions, and persons of similar standing in all spheres of society.¹⁷ The autonomy exercised by this group through their international bargaining powers and the formation and implementation of government policies can help create a relationship of alliance with external actors and, therefore, produce both domestic and international benefits.

The problem with this analysis in the Sudanese case, however, begins with Sandbrook's explanation that the existence of a strong state is needed to help overcome the international economic biases. In the Sudan, this has yet to be

¹⁶ David G. Becker et al, p. 6.

¹⁷ Becker, p. 7.

accomplished. A strong state depends upon consensus, predictability, security, and stability. This paper will look at why these characteristics have not developed within the Sudan as well as other Third World nations. The internal difficulties discussed in the preceding paragraphs have played a large role in deterring the development of these characteristics and the strong political institutions that accompany them. Weak governments invite foreign penetration as they provide foreign powers with a chance to extend their influence and advance their geopolitical goals and safeguard investments. Extensive international intervention, mainly in the form of large-scale foreign assistance, enhances the degree of vulnerability towards varying political and economic conditions by the donor nations. "The weak legitimacy of African governments is further undermined by the manifest and abject dependence of various strongmen upon foreign patrons who play the tune to which these leaders play."¹⁸ Dependency theorists look at this vulnerability as evidence of exploitation of the less developed countries by imperial powers. The postimperialist viewpoint would stress that domestic circumstances also played a key role in creating the present situation where cooperation of the 'managerial bourgeoisie' was forestalled by their cooptation. One could argue that Nimeiry facilitated extensive external inter-

¹⁸ Sandbrook, p. 111.

vention into the Sudan in exchange for which the Sudan received assistance aimed only at sustaining the survival of his regime. These policies included exploiting the country's potential to produce cotton for export. This weakness of the Sudanese state has encouraged the governing elites to desire greater foreign economic integration. Certainly those in the policy-making positions who stand to benefit from these exchanges encourage its existence. A massive influx of foreign investment and development loans provides not only the potential to gain personal monetary profits but also could serve to support patron-client networks.

The key point to note in the Sudanese case is that although the Sudanese elites are willing to facilitate foreign integration, the disparity in the international economic exchanges leaves them little bargaining power for more equitable deals. It is now clear that this approach has served to ultimately undermine equitable domestic growth for the country. The focus on cotton production for export has at best shown mixed results. Not only have cotton revenue declined due to uncontrollable forces (helping create an enormous deficit for Sudan), but the production of foodstuffs for domestic use was decreased as a result of the vast shift to cotton production. This type of political and economic arrangement helped set the stage for the famines that have ensued. The internationalization of Sudan's situation has led governments to conform to certain patterns and policies which

have not managed to solve the fundamental obstacles confronting development and national unity. The effects of internal disarray and foreign interference combined with uncontrollable factors such as world recession are mutually-reinforcing as they perpetuate the deterioration of Sudanese society.

This paper analyses the intricate combination of forces that influence the contemporary difficulties the Sudan is experiencing. Chapter One begins to look at Sudan's internal structure by dealing with the problems of traditional disunity within the country through an examination of the effects of the vast geographical differences as well as the lasting influences of colonialization and the overall political history of the region. These internal cultural and historical factors, although influenced by external factors, play a crucial role in the formation of Sudan's contemporary situation. Understanding some of these factors is crucial in analyzing the country's responses to the various problems it faces and the policy-making decisions that it adopts.

Chapter Two illustrates the vulnerability of a personal rule, lacking in legitimacy, in the event of an economic downturn by examining the long-lasting effects of the 16-year rule of Jaafar Mohammed Nimeiry which lasted from 1969-85. Nimeiry obtained a hero-like status in the first years of his rule as the economy soared and the Addis Ababa Agreement officially ended the civil war that had raged for seventeen

years. But, mistakes were made, and as prosperity began to falter, the President was unable to maintain his popularity. As Nimeiry struggled to stay in power, his regime became more and more dependent on coercion and growing amounts of foreign assistance. Ironically, it undermines legitimacy to have a stagnant economy but at the same time, it is extremely hard for a weak political order to withstand the strains of modernization.¹⁹ The internal decisions that were made, prompted by external circumstances and pressures along with the desire to stay in power regardless of the costs for the country as a whole, fuelled the degradation of the Sudanese existence. Nimeiry's regime exemplifies the difficulties any ruling power faces as it attempts to lessen domestic suffering while cooperating with the world system.

Chapter Three looks at the economic conditions within the Sudan that erupted into the financial crisis that Sudan presently faces. The internal failure of external investments during the 1970's prompted even greater international intervention in the 1980's as foreign investors and donors attempt to reclaim their losses and steer the Sudan in varying directions in hopes of future gains. The costs of joining the global scene have often been enormous for many developing countries like the Sudan. The weak internal

¹⁹ See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1968).

structure of these countries has not been conducive toward obtaining equality in the world system.

Finally, Chapters Four and Five look at how Sudan's present Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, has dealt with the culmination of difficulties the Sudan has faced following the overthrow of the Nimeiry regime. Domestically, Mahdi has not been successful in easing the tensions that continue to fuel the civil war in the South. Internationally, in an effort to maintain huge amounts of foreign assistance, the Sudanese Government has had to attempt to manage a delicate balance of foreign relations. Once again, the intricate combination of internal and external forces compound Sudan's problems of development. Watching and analyzing how one Third World nation approaches and responds to its crisis of development may help us understand what is occurring in other developing nations as well.

The future of the Sudan and other Third World countries will be largely determined by how contemporary elites, both external and internal, respond to and approach the intricate web of forces that undermine development. Actions taken by these elites do influence the direction of the Sudanese existence. Leaders must recognize that their specific internal structure combined with varying external forces of the world produce a unique position for them in the international scene. At the same time, however, generalizations of their plights can be seen across the globe. Perhaps through an

appreciation of this perspective, new insight will allow actors to approach the predicament of the developing nations in ways that will lead to a more equitable existence for the people of these nations.

2.0 TRADITIONAL DISUNITY

2.1 GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISIONS

In order to analyze the difficulties Sudan faces as it faces the challenges of development, it is essential to understand the region's background of disunity. Historically, modern Sudan has never been truly united. Being the largest country in Africa and bordering eight Arab and African nations, Sudan is subject to a number of divisive forces. In terms of its physical geography, the country is very heterogeneous. The land is divided into clearly differentiated regions which include deserts, tropical rain forests, grasslands, and mountains. These defined regions served to successfully limit interaction between the agrarian peoples of the differing areas. Briefly, the north and north-west are predominantly low rain areas. The center and west are primarily desert and the south is characterized by tropical rains throughout the year. A tropical rainbelt moves northward during summer and then retreats in the fall. Even so, this rain sometimes fails, and areas are left drought-stricken for years at a time. Such extensive droughts are, in part, responsible for the widespread famines that have intermittently plagued the region. This unpredictability

emphasizes the importance of the more dependable water source of the Nile.

The White Nile flows through the southern border from its origin in Uganda northward toward the capital of Khartoum. Here, it joins the Blue Nile which enters the country from Ethiopia. The united Nile then continues northward passing through the border into Egypt. This river is enormously important to Sudan as it provides the major source of water for agriculture in an otherwise semi-arid environment. Agricultural development, both in terms of plant and animal production, has traditionally been the foundation of the national economy in its entirety, and the development of all other sectors is closely linked to agricultural expansion.²⁰ The Sudanese population as a whole is still essentially agrarian, largely consisting of cattle herdsman, farmers, migrant laborers, and fishermen who survive through traditional subsistence modes. Hence, clearly defined differences in climate and topography have helped produce clearly different means of survival.

It is evident that corresponding to the vast natural divisions within this territory, distinct peoples developed with differing social, cultural, political and ultimately different value systems. The northern and eastern regions

²⁰ John Waterbury, Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1979), p. 174.

developed more rapidly than the far West and deep South as the former benefitted from more favorable agricultural conditions, a better suited terrain for transportation, and a proximity to Port Sudan and the Arab nations. This area consists of

...fine heavy clay soils deposited by the Blue Nile, the Atbara, and their tributaries...These soils are highly suitable for irrigation, especially in the triangle south of Khartoum formed by the junction of the White and Blue Niles, both of which are tapped for irrigation water. No other region of the Sudan can boast this combination of good soils and available water.²¹

Meanwhile, John Waterbury explains that about ninety per cent of the inhabitants of the South are considered to be pastoralists, combining animal husbandry with subsistence agriculture. The Southern tribes move their herds according to the rainy season to take advantage of pasture lands. This area is not as suitable for agriculture due to flooding during the rainy season from early summer through autumn and a lack of rain during the dry season of the winter months. Therefore, favorable conditions in the North and East have allowed the production of agricultural surpluses and a means to transport these surpluses. Consequently, this area developed merchant trading groups as well as the political and administrative atmosphere that is now the capital city of Khartoum. The area attracted commercial investments from neighboring Arab countries while the South, separated by vast

²¹ Waterbury, p. 195.

flood plains of central Sudan, continued to rely on a subsistence level of living. Hence, the North was largely inundated with various influences of the Middle East while the South remained relatively isolated. Simplistically, the most distinct division has been between the North which is primarily Arab Muslim, and the South which is African with both Christian and individual tribal religions. Although Arabic is the official language, in reality, over 115 languages are spoken throughout the nation. Added to this are numerous complex linguistic variations and close to 20 ethnic groups. The geographical differentiations have certainly been substantially reflected through the social divisions that have emerged within Sudan.

2.2 POLITICAL HISTORY

In addition to the divisions that result from geographical differences, Sudan's past has also played a major role in keeping the people of the region from uniting. It is helpful to acquire a brief understanding of historical factors that are so much a part of the problems the country is now facing.

Modern Sudanese society largely reflects the legacy of the Ottoman-Egyptian administration maintained by Egypt between




Figure 1. Provincial Boundaries of the Sudan. Source: Waterbury, p. 182.

1821 and 1885.²² Prior to their conquest of the Sudan, the northern region of the country was ruled by numerous, independent Christian kingdoms.

In A.D. 641 Arabs began to penetrate the North from Egypt, Arabia (across the Red Sea), and the Maghrib. The invading Arabs systematically destroyed the Christian kingdoms and established their hegemony. Thus by the beginning of the sixteenth century, most of the indigenous peoples of the North had been absorbed into Arab culture and fully embraced the Islamic faith.²³

These invasions eventually culminated in the occupation of the Northern Sudan by the Arabs. Under Ottoman-Egyptian rule, the area was expanded to include Sudan's present borders.²⁴ The country grew to stretch from the Red Sea in the east to the Chad border in the west. The southern border was extended to Uganda. This expansion into the South was largely the result of expeditions which attempted to find the source of the White Nile. The gradual penetration into the southern region uncovered an area of enormous economic reward. Ivory, gold, and especially African slaves were among the most sought after commodities. "The opening of the White Nile as a commercial avenue became a turning point in the

²² Peter Woodward, Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism (London, England: Rex Collings, 1979), p. xiv.

²³ Wai, p. 26.

²⁴ Francis A. Lees and Hugh C. Brooks, The Economic and Political Development of the Sudan (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), p. 8.

life history of the Southern Sudan."²⁵ The people of the region were not prepared for this intrusion. They had been isolated for centuries from their neighbors and in no way shared in their lifestyles or values.

"The goal of the ivory and slave traders was to maximize profits. Thus, they saw no need to set up a government...No effective administrative posts were established, and the slave trade continued to flourish unabated."²⁶ Dunstan Wai explains that the situation in the Southern Sudan deteriorated into anarchy. Tribes retreated to the swamps and refused to have any relations with foreigners. This era of intensive slave raiding and plundering helps mark the genesis of tension that remains so salient between the North and the South today as it helped establish the initial stages of British and later Arab Sudanese domination over the southern region. "It was the first time that an attempt was made to certify a geographical entity known as the Sudan."²⁷ Following a brief rule by Muhammad Ahmad al Mahdi, a joint Anglo-Egyptian military force gained control of the majority of Northern Sudan. By 1899, an Anglo-Egyptian government was

²⁵ Wai. p. 29.

²⁶ Wai, pp. 28-29.

²⁷ Wai, p. 30.

proclaimed over the entire country.²⁸ Although theoretically this was intended to be a joint-rule, the British clearly dominated. The new administration was established through an agreement between the British and the Egyptian governments which gave the Sudan a separate political status. Robert O. Collins explains that the government of the Sudan was invested in a governor-general who was appointed by the Egyptians but nominated by the British.²⁹ Collins' summary of this era describes how the principal task facing the Anglo-Egyptian forces would be the pacification of the plains of the Sudan beyond the rivers. This meant the pacification of Southern Sudan. Expeditions into the Bahr al-Ghazal were begun in an attempt to extend the British administration. British officers constructed a network of government posts which were garrisoned by Sudanese troops and managed by British officials. For the first twenty-five years of British rule in the Southern Sudan, the district officials were usually military officers. These officers closely identified with the people they ruled and gradually overcame many of the Southerner's suspicions and fears of foreign intruders.

²⁸ Dunstan M. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1981), p. 33.

²⁹ Robert O. Collins, et al, The British in the Sudan, 1898-1956 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), pp. 11-13.

Although the purpose of the presence of the British officers was to establish the authority of the Sudan Government, an indifference on the part of the central authorities resulted in few attempts to develop and modernize the area. Meanwhile, in Northern Sudan, the aim of the administration was modernization rather than simple pacification. Over time, technical and primary schools were begun in the North. Development was focused on better communications, railways, and telegraph services. Through an exposure to Western education, gradually, a Sudanese elite began to form. Confronted with the cultural and political values of Great Britain which included ideas about independence and liberal democracy, this group began to show some of the first signs of Sudanese nationalism.

Eventually, the central administration realized that once the Southern Sudan was brought more or less under British control, it could no longer be ignored. The administration recognized the fundamental differences between the Northern and Southern Sudanese. In an effort to encourage indigenous growth by eradicating Northern Sudanese, Moslem, and Arab influences, the British authorities adopted what became known as the **Southern Policy**.

This policy was based on two premises: (1) the Negroid Africans of the South are culturally and, to some extent, racially distinct from the Northern Arab Sudanese; and (2) that the Southern provinces could either develop eventually as a separate territorial and

political entity or be integrated into what was then British East Africa.³⁰

Therefore, steps were begun to separate the North from the South. Christian missionary work in the South attempted to eliminate Arab influence in the area. Examples of this can be seen by the fact that the use of the English language was encouraged while the use of Arabic was forbidden. It is important to note that the exclusion of the Northern Sudanese from the South came at a time when the growth in the number of educated Sudanese continued. With support from Egypt, this 'extremist' minority pushed for a unification of the Nile Valley. "To the Northern Sudanese nationalists the Southern Policy appeared to be a typical Machiavellian plot by which the British were to divide and rule, and further, a scheme to sever the South from the North to create for the former a different, if not separate, status."³¹ At the same time, however, many Southerners supported British efforts to withdraw from Northern influences. "From the Southern Sudanese point of view, prohibiting the Northerners from entering the South meant protection of the region from the Arab slave raids..³² It is important at this point to realize

³⁰ Wai, p. 35.

³¹ Robert O. Collins and Francis M. Deng, The British in the Sudan, 1898-1956 (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 25.

³² Wai. p. 38.

that although this policy served to maintain a substantial division between the North and South, a separation had already traditionally existed. No previous unification had ever occurred other than the extension of boundaries to include the South within the borders of a political entity known as the Sudan. While the Southern Policy may have served to prevent Arab influence into South, it did encourage an influx of Western culture. Hence, this process did not create a separate status between the peoples of the two regions: disunity as well as fear and hostility toward Northern Sudan already had deep roots dating back to the original geographical differences and the exploitation of the South that occurred during the Ottoman-Egyptian rule a century before.³³

As Britain pressed to promote strategies that would keep the regions separate, Northerners, Egyptians, and even some British officials began to criticize the situation. Northern Sudanese politicians exerted pressure on the colonial administration to allow self-rule and eventual independence of the 'whole' Sudan, including the South as part of it. The Egyptians pressed Britain not to keep the South as a separate entity from the North in the hope that one day the whole of the Sudan might be united with Egypt. This was largely due to the fact that Egypt's economic livelihood depended upon

³³ Wai, p. 37.

the Nile Valley. They did not intend to surrender absolute control of this vital territory to anyone. Finally, partly as a response to the growing pressures against the Southern Policy, the British administration in East Africa said that it was no longer interested in closer links with Southern Sudan. Thus, as the British strategy became the subject of greater and greater debate and criticism, the British backed off. Eventually, the policy was reversed and plans were made to merge the two regions.

At this point, it is important to note the fundamentally different approaches the British took in colonizing the two areas. The imperial regime concentrated on the economic and educational development of the North while they attempted to civilize the South by introducing concepts of law and order, division and rule, education, and Christian passivism in order to more efficiently exploit resources...³⁴ One consequence of this was that the South was excluded from taking part in the decision-making which surrounded its future status.

For the Southern Sudanese, the end of British colonialism in their land meant the beginning of Arab domination and colonialism. That was unacceptable and needed to be challenged in order to preserve Southern Sudanese identity and to gain their self-determination. For the Northern Sudanese, the British withdrawal meant assumption of political power and it also meant gaining of sovereign status by the Sudan which, in their view,

³⁴ Robert Riddell, Regional Development Policy (New York: St. Martin's press, 1985), p. 9.

included the South as well. Any challenge to the political and constitutional arrangements worked out with the departing imperial power by any group, such as the Southern Sudanese, was viewed by the North as treason.³⁵

The South was divided over whether or not it should become independent or part of a united Sudan. Southerners were not well prepared for the rapid political transition to self-government. As preparations for self-government and self-determination were made, Southern concerns were largely ignored.

The competent but paternal British administrators left, their places taken by inexperienced and frequently intolerant Northerners. Offended, confused, and misunderstood by Northern politicians, the Southern Sudanese soon erupted, first in a mutiny by the Equatorial Corps, then in disorder and rebellion throughout the Province.³⁶

This divided uncertainty eventually erupted into violence and ultimately a civil war which would last seventeen years.

Ironically, even as Sudan was being proclaimed a united nation, deep historical roots were still tearing it apart. The Sudan provided a classic example of a divided nation. The North and South were two different areas geographically, culturally, religiously, and to some extent racially.³⁷ Colonial policy had encouraged the expansion of wide disparities between the two regions. When self-government was

³⁵ Wai, p. 2.

³⁶ Collins, p. 26.

³⁷ Wai, p. 51.

proclaimed in the Sudan, there was, to a large extent, an absence of national belonging on the part of the Southern Sudanese. Collins points out, however, that the British officers found the Sudan as one and turned it over to the Sudanese as one. Thus, the concept of national unity does exist among the dissimilar cultures and divergent resources. From the first interactions that occurred between the North and the region now known as Southern Sudan, the task of overcoming massive differences has dominated. Today, it remains a prominent goal for the Sudanese Government as it attempts to reconcile the violence that continues.

2.3 POST-INDEPENDENCE

Since independence, Sudan has had a past of inconsistent development plans. The continuing political instability the nation has experienced in its thirty years of independence has greatly contributed to this dilemma. An examination of the character of the various regimes that have dominated the country provides a more complete picture of the circumstances surrounding the country today. In the fourteen years following independence, Sudan has been ruled by eight different governments. The forms of rule during these transitional years ranged from parliamentary rule to military regimes. None of these governments were successful in resolving the overwhelming problem involving the relationship between the

North and the South or the task of creating substantial economic growth. The nation has suffered from an overall lack of consensual rule. As a result, the period between 1956 and 1969 is often referred to as the **wasted years**. Political rivalry, instability, economic stagnation, and civil war repudiated any attempts to achieve national unity or economic progress.

As mentioned earlier, the South was excluded from negotiations for Sudan's independence. This neglect was largely responsible for the initiation of the civil war that followed. The neglect continued as Sudan prepared for self-government. Conferences were held in Cairo to organize the transition to independence. Here, again, the Southerners were excluded from the negotiations. "The destiny of the Southern Sudanese was decided behind their backs just as the union of the North and South was unilaterally decided upon by the Civil Secretary with the support and pressure from the North, but without prior consultation or the blessing of the South."³⁸ These pre-self-government negotiations included elections for a Parliament. Wai explains that this parliamentary system was intended to be a temporary arrangement to aid in the transition to independence. However, leaders did not stand for periodic elections as specified and a permanent constitution was not agreed upon until 1973. Instead, Par-

³⁸ Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, p. 47.

liament appointed a National Constitutional Committee of forty-six members which included three from the South. These three members pushed for a federal constitution. The other members called for a strong, centralized, and unitary system of government. When the federal issue was rejected, the Southern members boycotted the rest of the negotiations by the Committee. The rejection by the North of a federal structure of government further alienated the Southern Sudanese. In addition to the fundamental hostilities that had prevailed for so long, now renewed fears and uncertainties were dominant factors influencing the attitudes in the Southern region. It was this combination of fear and mistrust that triggered the violence of the civil war that would prevail into the present.³⁹

One reason why the civil war continued for so many years was the fact that efforts to end the violence were virtually ignored as various political factions competed for control of the government. According to Gurdon, the political scene was dominated by the competition between two major groups: the Umma Party and the National Unionist Party (NUP) which represent the oldest and most dominant political groups in Sudan. The Umma Party is primarily nationalistic while the NUP is more closely aligned with Egypt. Originally, the NUP were advocates of uniting with Egypt. Other smaller parties

³⁹ Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, pp. 70-71.

also contributed to the struggle for government control. These included the National Islamic Front (NIF) which espoused Islamic fundamentalism, the Sudanese Communist Party, and other small ethnic parties. Gurdon also points out that a similar struggle for power ensued in the South as various groups, all claiming to represent Southern goals, fought for control. While these groups competed for power, the war in the South intensified. Southern soldiers and policemen joined to form the Anya-Nya guerrilla army movement which was founded to conduct attacks against the Northern Army in the South. The main goal of the Anya Nya was complete independence for the South.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, successive governments gained control through coups, revolution, and pseudo-elections held in the North without representation from Southern politicians. These governments continued in their attempts to repress the South through mass arrests, the burning of whole villages, and the abuse of laws.⁴¹ Each government believed it could militarily defeat the Anya Nya. But, the governments were unable to succeed in crushing the South through the use of force. Instead, the Anya Nya united under Joseph Lagu and became an effective military force as the war progressed. Gurdon explains that one reason for the increased effectiveness of the

⁴⁰ Gurdon, pp.7-8.

⁴¹ Gurdon, Sudan at the Crossroads, p. 15.

Southern Army was the result of Israeli assistance in the later years of the war. Israel wanted to ensure that the national army would not join the other Arab nations as a force against them and, therefore, attempted to keep them preoccupied with their own domestic violence in the South. Thus, they supplied arms and training for the South. The Sudanese government, however, received support primarily from Egypt and the Soviet Union. This aid increased as the war continued.

As a whole, the transition into independence was unsuccessful in creating a united Sudan. This traditional internal disunity has been a crucial ingredient in creating the political instability the country is still experiencing. Wai eloquently summarizes the post-independence situation by explaining that,

...raw power struggles ensued, mainly as a result of the absence of stable institutions for channeling and ordering politics. The Sudan witnessed not only the lack of bases for authority and legitimacy but also the breakdown of elite unity. Political leadership was so divided that it failed to give form to governmental institutions.⁴²

⁴² Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan p. 122.

2.4 ECONOMIC DISPARITY

2.4.1 Internal

The influence of economic factors that enhance the inherent divisions within the borders of Sudan is also a major consideration. A primitive infrastructure continues to plague the potential for balanced development efforts. In any nation as large as the Sudan, adequate transportation and communication are essential for creating unity. Yet, hard-surfaced roads are still limited mainly to the vicinity of Khartoum and railroad capacity is quite inadequate.⁴³ As discussed in section 2.1, partly as a consequence of the traditional superiority of authority and development in the North, the infrastructure is more advanced in that part of the country. The focus toward improved communication and transport facilities has consistently revolved around the northern and eastern regions primarily so that export crops could be more easily moved. Consequently, the southern and western peripheral regions of Sudan have experienced few improvements. The disparities in the development of transportation facilities have become acutely visible with the onslaught of the recent famines. "The dilapidation of the

⁴³ Lloyd G. Reynolds, Economic Growth in the Third World: 1850-1980 (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 373.

Sudanese railway system has recently been highlighted by the problems of transporting emergency aid from Port Sudan to the West."⁴⁴ Although river transport is important, the facilities needed for this type of transportation are also underdeveloped. Air travel is unreliable and the telephone and telex systems are in their infancy.⁴⁵ "Electric-power output is the smallest of all the Arab countries, despite a large hydroelectric potential. Human capital is also underdeveloped. There is a high illiteracy rate, a small educational establishment, and severe shortages of every kind of skilled and technical manpower."⁴⁶ Once again, however, the severity of these inadequacies with the infrastructure increases enormously in the South and the West. This disparity inhibits attempts to unify the nation. Indeed, one of the principle reasons why the North-South rift continues is precisely because of this inequality in economic development between the two regions.⁴⁷ Richard Sandbrook points out that primordial identities were extended and intensified by uneven development and group competition in the new territorial areas.⁴⁸ Ethnicity and tribalism only became salient when

⁴⁴ Gurdon, p. 9.

⁴⁵ Gurdon, p. 10.

⁴⁶ Reynolds, p. 373.

⁴⁷ Gurdon, p. 11.

⁴⁸ Sandbrook, p. 39.

aggravated by uneven development and political competition. Sandbrook discusses the uneven regional impact of modernization in the following quotation.

Some regions developed cash crops and prospered; others did not. Railway construction spurred agricultural development in areas the line traversed. Towns, and hence urban employment, emerged in the homelands of certain groups, thus favoring their economic advance. The establishment of mission schools in certain regions, usually adjacent to the coast, gave local ethnic groups an enviable headstart with Western education. Consequently, some people benefitted from these opportunities for upward mobility, whereas others were regarded as backward. Uneven development thereby stimulated ethnic consciousness: those holding the advantage strove to retain it, whereas others clamored for their fair share of the pie.⁴⁹

2.4.2 External

Overall, the poor infrastructure is particularly frustrating due to the overwhelming potential that exists for Sudan. The country has enormous potential in the fields of agriculture, forestry, and livestock, but equally enormous problems blocking the way to translating this potential into achievement.⁵⁰ Comprehending this potential provides essential information needed in order to attempt to understand some of the problems and possibilities Sudan is now con-

⁴⁹ Sandbrook, p. 50.

⁵⁰ Yusif A. Sayigh, The Economies of the Arab World: Development Since 1945 (London, England: Croom Helm Ltd., 1978), p. 377.

fronting. It has already been stated that the economy of Sudan is primarily dependent upon agriculture and livestock. Much of the country's land, however, is not exhausted and could provide very fertile areas for cultivation in the future. Presently, only about eight per cent is utilized with only about two per cent under irrigation. Agriculture directly accounts for 28 per cent of the nation's Gross Domestic Product and more than 90 per cent of its exports, while supporting over 70 per cent of the total population.⁵¹ "Sudan has the scope for a vast expansion in production of agricultural foodstuffs and produce for industrial purposes. The country has a potential for a threefold expansion in irrigated area, and an even vaster potential for rain-fed agriculture."⁵² From this perspective, one can easily appreciate the enormous expectations that existed, both internally and eventually externally, to exploit and profit from this economic potential. It helps to explain why Sudan has become so important internationally within the past two decades as foreign investors perceived the opportunity to take advantage of an almost untapped resource, agriculture.

Cotton is presently the main cash crop. The Gezira Scheme, an irrigation project, built by the British in the

⁵¹ Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Profile" Sudan, (London, England: The Economist Publications Ltd., 1987-88), p. 19.

⁵² Sayigh, p. 411.

1920's, is the largest cooperative farm in the world consisting of over two million acres of cotton-producing land. "As recently as 1979, cotton accounted for 65 per cent of export revenue and in 1985-86 it accounted for 42.8 per cent..."⁵³ The mass production of this crop exemplifies some of the difficulties a number of other African nations similar to the Sudan have experienced in their efforts to pursue their apparent comparative advantage.

By pursuing an over-emphasis on a single export crop, contemporary Africa continues to supply mainly primary products to the world market. Thus, international exchanges are inequitable as benefits are unequally distributed with a bias against the poor countries. Sandbrook explains that the colonial powers secured sources of inexpensive raw materials, foodstuffs, as well as markets for their manufactured goods throughout Africa. He maintains that this system of exchange still dominates today.⁵⁴ Amin sees this exploitative nature of trading relations as the primary cause of underdevelopment.⁵⁵ Although this type of trading relations certainly does perpetuate inequalities, it may be more appropriate to step back even further and analyze the problems of underde-

⁵³ Country Profile, p. 13.

⁵⁴ Sandbrook, p. 20.

⁵⁵ For a more detailed explanation of this analysis, see Samir Amin's Unequal Development.

velopment through an examination of the productive sphere. It has already been noted that Sudan, like other Third World nations, has placed an enormous emphasis on the production of a single export crop. One could argue that it is here that the problems of unequal integration into the world capitalist economy should be attacked. That is, perhaps by altering the dependence of the nation's productive sphere away from a single primary product, countries like the Sudan would not be so vulnerable to inequitable terms of trade. Unfortunately, implementing policies that encourage a move in this direction involves a whole new set of problems, some of which will be explored later in this thesis.⁵⁶ At this point, however, it is important to comprehend the fact that the Sudan does experience the bottom end of unequal international exchanges. This disadvantage helps keep the Sudan from rising above its Third World status as it causes problems in capital accumulation. The unequal system of exchange does not provide enough capital for the Sudan to invest toward expanding production and increasing assets. Thus, the country is una-

⁵⁶ It is not the purpose of this paper to propose solutions to the problems which involve such enormous complexities as those that Third World nations confront today. Rather, I attempt only to examine some of the major factors that have intertwined to contribute to the contemporary difficulties that exist and explore how some of the theoretical debates surrounding development may apply or contradict the Sudanese example.

ble to experience any substantial degree of growth in its economic sector.

Another problem with this overwhelming emphasis on a single crop is that it concentrates development efforts on the areas of the country that are most suitable for cotton production. Again, in the Sudan, this area includes the northern and eastern regions of the nation. Sudan has not been very successful in diversifying its economy. Consequently, not only does it remain highly vulnerable to fluctuations in the world market, but whole segments of the population have been ignored as emphasis has consistently been placed on the export potential. This selective interest and the regionally uneven development that results has helped create the legitimacy crisis the various regimes have experienced. By choosing such an unbalanced development strategy, the Sudanese government has alienated the large majority of the population that still struggles to survive through traditional subsistence modes.

Must they be driven from these modes, and, if so, in whose or what interests? The leaders of the independent Sudanese republic have taken the view that to build a modern nation state, founded on a cohesive national identity, requires that all Sudanese reduce parochial loyalties which are sustained by subsistence patterns, and participate economically and politically in the emerging state system.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Waterbury, p. 174.

But, the Sudanese government cannot assume the sole responsibility for this attitude.

...it is not only the bureaucratic elites of Khartoum, the merchant trading groups, and the intelligentsia that wish to see the emergence of an all-embracing national market system but the Sudan's Arab neighbors as well. Poor states such as Egypt in search of reliable food supplies to meet their growing deficits, and the rich but agriculturally deprived states of the Gulf that would like to meet the soaring domestic demands for imported foodstuffs have all turned their attention to the Sudan.⁵⁸

Externally, the Western world has encouraged the Sudan to become an agricultural export nation as well. For example, it has already been stated that colonial Britain established the Gezira Scheme to produce cotton that could be exported to the United Kingdom. From the beginning, the establishment of this farm was not for the development of the Sudanese economy, but, rather, to enhance the British economy. In the years prior to the first world war, the British textile industry was facing rapidly increasing competition from Europe, the USA, and the Far East.⁵⁹ The decline of the British cotton industry was, therefore, a major factor in the establishment of the Gezira Scheme. The documentary, The Politics of Food, describes how the US Public Law 480, which has accounted for a substantial amount of American financial aid to the Sudan, extends long term easy credit to the country

⁵⁸ Waterbury, p. 175.

⁵⁹ Tony Barnett, The Gezira Scheme (London, England: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1977), p. 4.

so it can buy US grain. A policy such as this damages the Sudan's prospects to feed itself as it undermines the local farmers. When US grain prices are cheaper for the consumer, local Sudanese farmers lose sales and, consequently, the incentive to grow foodstuffs. Therefore, they turn to producing export crops in the hope of obtaining higher prices for their efforts.⁶⁰ Here again, the policy is in the best interest of the USA over that of the Sudan. The USA benefits from the terms of a loan agreement and being able to sell its surplus grain at the expense of local farmers in Sudan.

2.4.3 Summary

Situations such as these help illustrate the fact that many of Sudan's problems may be traced to its integration into the 'world system'. Beginning with the colonial era, the impact of this integration has played a large role in creating some of the problems of legitimacy that presently exist for the central government in Sudan. The government is ultimately held accountable for the plight of the peasants in Sudan. If the extreme economic disparities appear to result from government policies, consensual support for the central authorities cannot be created. Until these divisions and problems can be overcome, legitimacy will never be ob-

⁶⁰ The Politics of Food, Yorkshire Television, Ltd., 1987.

tained no matter what government or ideology is in control of Khartoum. The internal decisions that were made in compliance with the influence of external investment helped create the foundations for the development crisis that would eventually follow in the Sudan as well as other Third World nations. Colonialism exacerbated the traditional disunity by providing the impetus for regionally uneven development. As disparities intensified, a crisis of legitimacy ensued. Coupled with the post-independence power struggle that ensued, support for an ordered form of political institutions has yet to be created. Today, the turmoil that stems from the lack of consensual support for central authorities in Khartoum constrains the government's abilities to attempt to balance the situation. The instability that exists does not allow the government to focus on promoting internal cooperation and development as well as ways to adapt and deal with the external forces that intervene. This paper will continue to explore this theme as the specifics of Sudan's development crisis are uncovered.

3.0 THE NIMEIRY YEARS 1969-85

3.1 ESTABLISHING POWER

One of the critical reasons behind the stagnation and decline of the Sudanese economy and its inability to achieve unity had been the relative absence of stability. No political system has evolved enough to generate legitimate, working governmental institutions. As long as varying factions simply compete for control rather than attempting to arrive at some form of consensual agreement as to what problems need to be addressed, the turmoil the country has been experiencing will continue.

Samuel Huntington looks at the development of political institutions by examining the extent to which a nation's politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, effectiveness, and stability.⁶¹ Huntington explains that in order to achieve consensus among the people toward the legitimacy of the political system, the citizens and their leaders must share a vision of the public interest of the society and of the traditions and principles upon which the community is based. He maintains that the creation of political stability

⁶¹ Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 1.

requires an alliance between some urban groups and the masses of the population in the countryside. At some point, this entails the inauguration of the rural masses into national politics or what Huntington refers to as 'rural mobilization.' He claims that the key to political stability is the extent to which the rural masses are mobilized into politics within the existing political system rather than against the system. Once independence is achieved, the problem for the nationalist leaders is to organize and sustain this rural participation and support.⁶²

In the Sudan, the traditional internal diversities discussed in chapter One have undermined the potential for 'rural mobilization.' It has not been possible to develop a consensus among the divergent masses or the political leaders and especially not among the sum of the two groups together. For example, the biased interest toward creating greater development in Northern Sudan creates a dichotomy in the 'vision of the public interest' between the North and the South. As long as the overall goals of the people and the administration continue to differ so dramatically for the two regions, it will be almost impossible to develop the consensus that is needed for the development of a coherent political institution supported by the majority of the population. Huntington discusses the idea that two groups which see each

⁶² Huntington, pp.74-75.

other as archenemies cannot form the basis of a community until those mutual perceptions change. There must be some compatibility of interests among the groups that comprise the society.⁶³ As long as the civil war rages on in Southern Sudan, little sense of a community is likely to form in the eyes of the Sudanese people. As time passes and no reconciliation is reached and the economic situation continues to deteriorate, perceptions of the Sudanese Government will be that it is weak and ineffective. The lack of political legitimacy that is created by these perceptions will continue to undermine political authority, and therefore, to fuel the overall instability of the system. This circles back to the theme that the general weakness of the state does not allow it to effectively deal with the problems that confront it. A weak government is not able to mobilize support internally in order to pursue domestic concerns nor is it able to effectively bargain with external forces in order to pursue more equitable position in the global system.

As instability has increased in the Sudan, the various regimes have increased their reliance on coercion and reliance upon international intervention as a means to sustain their survival as long as possible. Without sufficient political institutionalization, the Sudan is not able to develop any substantial sense of autonomy within the world system.

⁶³ Huntington, pp. 9-10.

Already, despite radical changes in regimes, Sudan's political difficulties and its crisis of development have become increasingly internationalized.

The 16-year rule of President Jaafar Mohammed Nimeiry initially showed some tendency to strive in the direction of establishing a coherent, political system. As both internal and external difficulties increased, however, this regime, like those before it, began to focus on its own survival at the expense of progress for the country as a whole. As a result, the Nimeiry regime is now often blamed for the declining conditions within Sudan's borders and a new government is faced with attempting to solve more devastating problems added to those that remained unsolved from previous rules.

Nimeiry seized power in a bloodless coup on May 25, 1969.

The army officers who staged the coup were revolutionaries of the Nasser-Egyptian type. They gave the impression that they were a group determined to see the Sudan transformed, Arab unity pursued, corruption rooted out, and socialism introduced. Radicals of leftist political persuasion, and communists supposedly uncorrupted by previous access to power, were co-opted by the members of the May Revolutionary Council into their regime to serve as Cabinet Ministers.⁶⁴

This leftward shift was partly the result of the fact that Nimeiry had fought in the South and was aware that the problem could not be solved through force. Nimeiry acknowledged

⁶⁴ Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, p. 144.

the presence of communists in the government who had been long supporters of regional autonomy for the South. The President announced that he would seek a peaceful, political solution to the conflict. Thus, he could benefit from relying on Communist Party support. Furthermore, at the time, government policy in the South was largely dictated by a Communist Southerner, Joseph Garang.⁶⁵ These factors helped create a favorable public opinion in the South.

An interesting point to note here is that the very existence of even a limited favorable public opinion in the South illustrates the fact that the potential for unity was, and perhaps still is, present. Since independence, Khartoum has controlled the allocation of money throughout Sudan. Therefore, the South has continually been aware of the fact that cooperation with the North could ultimately benefit them. Even so, as this paper has begun to illustrate, the divisions have remained deep and the obstacles have remained high. Unity will not come easily in the Sudan.

As a result of the initial leftward shift, the Soviet Union became a major source of economic and military aid for Sudan. The Soviets extended soft loans of more than 25 million Sudanese pounds and provided technical assistance for development. Cotton trade increased between the two nations while the total trade with Eastern Europe rose to one-quarter

⁶⁵ Country Profile, 1987-88, p. 3.

of Sudan's exports and 18 per cent of its imports.⁶⁶ The communists within the Sudan saw this shift as an opportunity to influence national politics. "While Communist Party support gave the new regime a degree of mass support that it desperately needed, it also meant that the party had a disproportionate degree of control over its policies."⁶⁷ The new regime introduced a widespread nationalization program and the State gained more and more power as properties were confiscated and businesses destroyed. It became apparent that eventually, if policies continued in this direction, the Communist Party would continue gaining power and influence within the regime. Nimeiry perceived this as a threat to his position, and therefore, began to change directions. A split developed within the regime as hardliners pushed for stronger pro-Soviet relations and the more moderate leaders advocated greater independence. When the threat of Communist control continued to rise, Nimeiry banned the Sudan Communist Party and removed all Communists from government positions. Those that had been ousted organized a successful coup against the regime in July, 1971. However, with help from Egypt and Libya, a counter-coup reinstated Nimeiry within a few days. These events provided the basis for a complete reversal of

⁶⁶ Wai, Dunstan M. "The Sudan: Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations under Nimeiry", African Affairs. Vol. 78, No. 312, July 1979. pp. 300-301.

⁶⁷ Gurdon, p. 14.

Sudan's foreign policy. Soviet-Sudanese relations immediately deteriorated. Those who led the coup were hanged. This included Joseph Garang who had dominated government policy in the South.

As Nimeiry turned away from Soviet influence, his criticism of the West naturally softened. Domestically, the President focused his attention on the civil war. Wai points out that internal peace at home required a change in policy abroad.⁶⁸ Nimeiry realized that in order to heavily invest political capital in creating peace in the South, he would need enormous amounts of monetary aid. It was at this time that Sudan turned to the West for help.

This radical shift away from the left serves to further illustrate the idea that a stable political institution was yet to be created for Sudan. One could argue that if Nimeiry had allowed Soviet influence to continue growing in Khartoum, perhaps a sense of unity and stability would have evolved. It has already been stated that the Communist Party advocated a policy of regional autonomy for the South. It will be shown later that this concept has provided the only successful path toward true unity and peace for Sudan. "Throughout the post-independence period, the Communist Party stood alone as the only Northern party to advocate a political settlement for the Southern conflict, based on regional autonomy....it

⁶⁸ Wai, 1979, p. 306.

was the only political party which came out of the 1955-69 multi-party period with any degree of credit."⁶⁹ The Communist Party offered the Sudan a chance to obtain some sense of the legitimacy that it has struggled to obtain. One view has already argued that Sudan needed a strong, decisive leadership in order to provide the basis for forming a permanent, working political system. Gurdon continues to argue that a strong, central government and political stability are essential preconditions for successful economic development in Africa. If this is true, perhaps the strength and stability the Communist Party was achieving could have provided the basis for the genesis of a united, developing Sudan. But, it did not happen this way. Instead, when Nimeiry perceived that his personal control was threatened, he quickly stripped the growing force of the Communist Party of its power and turned in the opposite direction. Again, perhaps the desire to maintain control outweighed the need to focus on problems such as creating stability and continuity for the nation. Again, this lack of institution-building continued to deter political progress for the Sudan. Nimeiry wanted to suppress all opposition to his regime by the traditional parties.

Following the suppression of all political opposition to the right and the left, Nimeiry sought to expand his power base, since it had proved so fragile. To achieve

⁶⁹ Gurdon, p. 83.

this and to legitimize his regime, he declared the formation of the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) and proscribed all other political parties...Given his popular support after putting down an unpopular coup attempt and ending the traditional party squabbles, his election as president on October 12, 1971, was a genuine reflection of public support...In short, at the end of 1971 Nimeiry had become the president of a single party state and enjoyed the overwhelming support of the majority of the population.⁷⁰

Amid this popularity, Nimeiry was able to negotiate a peace agreement with the South that would last more than a decade. Negotiations with the Anya Nya guerrilla movement began in Addis Ababa in the early part of 1972. By March, an agreement was signed and the civil war was officially announced as being over. The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 instituted the Southern region as an autonomous area within a united Sudan.

The three Southern provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile were to be administered by a Higher Executive Council (HEC) from Juba, the new capital. The new tier of government would control most aspects of life in the Southern Region except for national issues such as defense, foreign affairs, nationality and immigration, economic and social planning, currency, communications and transport. The legislative powers of the People's Regional Assembly (parliament) were the preservation of public order, internal security, efficient administration and the development of the Southern Region in cultural, economic and social fields. While the national government would still provide funds from the national treasury, the Southern Region would be able to raise direct and indirect taxes. The Anya Nya was to be integrated into the national armed forces, the police and the prison centers were to be established at border crossing points to process and resettle the one million persons

⁷⁰ Gurdon, p. 17.

who had fled abroad or into the bush because of the war.⁷¹

At the time, this agreement was seen as a monumental achievement for the nation as a whole. It provided a degree of self-determination for the South which would hopefully help ensure that it was not exploited by a dominant Muslim Arab majority. At the same time, it would provide national support for a war-ravaged, underdeveloped area. Unfortunately, this positive trend did not endure. It can be argued that although the violence did stop for a time, it provided a way to reduce the expense of the war for the North and enabled the national government to ignore the South's needs more than ever. This argument may become more clear as Nimeiry's decline is discussed. First, it is important to see the initial progress that developed during the 1970's.

3.2 ECONOMIC GROWTH

As a result of assessments of its agricultural potential, Sudan became the focus of plans to create an Arab breadbasket. The governmental shift away from Soviet influence following the 1971 communist coup attempt opened up doors for United States investments to accompany the push for agricultural growth. Simultaneously, due to the oil price

⁷¹ Gurdon, Sudan in Transition, p. 19.

rises in the 1970's, the oil-rich Middle East countries looked at Sudan as an ideal region for agricultural investments. All of this investment opportunity occurred at a time when the government of Sudan, under Nimeiry, had pledged to focus on increased development for the nation. The government's development strategy was primarily aimed at creating a large agricultural surplus through increased acreage and production. Hence, an enormous amount of aid was directed at creating numerous development projects. "The production of the most important food and export crops such as medium staple cotton, sorghum, wheat, millet, and groundnuts was intended to increase between 11 and 25 per cent a year. By massive investment in the country's infrastructure, the government hoped to improve the transport system and thus facilitate the export of surplus crops."⁷²

In the first few years of the Nimeiry regime, substantial development did occur. In terms of infrastructure, vital bridges and asphalt roads were built. The telephone and telex communications systems were improved along with improvements in the power supply for the nation. One must remember, however, the previously dismal condition of the infrastructure. So, even as enormous improvements were made, a great deal more needed to be created for Sudan to achieve

⁷² Charles Gurdon, Sudan at the Crossroads (Cambridgeshire, England: Menas Press Ltd., 1984), p. 38.

its potential. Transportation is still limited, electrical power is minimal, and communication with the peripheral areas is scarce. Regardless, the country did experience massive increases in food production.

This was part of the much publicized plan to turn Sudan into the "breadbasket of the Arab world"--using Arab finance, Western technology and Sudanese land, water and labor. Although the policy is now discredited in the eyes of many critics, particularly when they see Sudan suffering from famine, they have misunderstood the underlying reality. The policy failed in the end, primarily because of external factors but, in the first few years, the development of the food crop sector was remarkable.⁷³

There was a substantial increase in the area under production. Mechanized farming in the rainfed area increased 2,656,242 acres and 311,400 acres in the irrigated sector between 1970-77. The production of dura (sorghum), which is the country's principal food crop, increased by 72 per cent to over two million tons during the same period. The production of groundnuts rose from 385,000 tons to 930,000 tons while the wheat crop, which is important for producing white flour for the urban markets, also increased substantially.⁷⁴ However, while the area under cultivation increased substantially, yields fell and eventually overall production levels

⁷³ Gurdon, Sudan in Transition, p. 21.

⁷⁴ Gurdon, Sudan in Transition, p. 55. The following summary and set of statistics are derived from Gurdon's explanation of how Sudan was able to become self-sufficient in food production but was unable to maintain this ability and, instead, presently suffers from contemporary shortages of food.

did as well, particularly in the essential cotton sector. The reason for this related to environmental and social considerations. In the newly cultivated rainfed areas, shortages of water, chemicals, tractors, fuel, and labor developed, reducing the effect of the horizontal expansion. In the irrigated sector, schemes were allowed to fall into disrepair. At the same time, the relationship between the government, the Gezira Board, and the farmers did not provide sufficient incentives to increase cotton production. Farmers preferred to grow food crops, especially vegetables, which could be sold at relatively high prices to urban areas. Unlike cotton, such crops were less prone to low world market prices and ensured that farmers received a relatively stable and high income.

Despite these setbacks, however, by 1978 the Sudan was in the position of being totally self-sufficient in all its basic food crops. In addition to creating emergency buffer stocks, it was able to export over 300,000 tons of sorghum, 100,000 ton of groundnuts, 120,000 of groundnut cake and meal, as well as over 500,000 sheep and goats. At the same time, however, the production and export of cotton fell dramatically. By 1981-82, Sudan only exported 260,000 tons compared with 960,000 tons in 1979-80. Consequently, when the IMF negotiated a new financial package for Sudan, one of the conditions was that cotton production and exports had to be increased, even at the expense of food crops. In terms

of cotton production, the rehabilitation project which followed was highly successful. Production rose from about 518,000 million bales (each of 420 pounds) in 1981-82 to 1.2 million bales in 1983-84. Export revenues from cotton rose from 60 million Sudanese pounds to 447 million Sudanese pounds during the same period.

But, the costs of increasing cotton production resulted in a decline in food production. From 1981-82 to 1983-84, the area under sorghum fell from 9.2 million feddans, and production from 3.35 million tons. While this was partially due to drought in rainfed areas--which produce the vast majority of Sudan's food requirements while the irrigated sector produces export crops--there were also other factors. The area under food crops in the irrigated sector was reduced as land was turned over to cotton. Investment and agricultural inputs were concentrated on the cotton crop and production incentives were increased. The result of these agricultural policies was that Sudan changed from having a large food surplus, part of which was exported, to being forced by economic circumstances to concentrate once again on export oriented monoculture. Section 2.4 has already pointed out that by placing too much emphasis on a single export crop, a nation is vulnerable to not only climatic circumstances but also fluctuations in the world market. The effects of the overconcentration on cotton were disastrous when the drought struck Sudan a few years later accompanied

by high interest rates and a world recession triggered by the tremendous hike in oil prices. The fact that the price of imported crude oil skyrocketed was significant for Sudan. The following excerpt illustrates the severe impact the price hikes had on Sudan.

In 1970 Sudan imported about nine million Sudanese pounds worth of crude oil and petroleum products. By 1981 this had increased to 146.5 million pounds, which represents an increase of 1218.7 per cent in import costs. Since the volume of oil that Sudan imports has only increased by 33.6 per cent it illustrates the devastating effect of the oil price rises in 1973-74 and 1980-81.⁷⁵

Thus, what initially appeared to signal the genesis of a period of economic growth and prosperity quickly deteriorated due to the unrealistic, over-ambitious goals, improper planning, and the less controllable impact of climatic conditions and the world capitalist market system. Within a short period, Sudan began to develop budget deficits and debt problems began to accrue. Today, the nation's external debt is over ten billion dollars. This short period of growth followed by severe economic decay played a crucial role in the political decline of President Nimeiry.⁷⁶ The next section looks at the circumstances surrounding the fall of the Nimeiry regime.

⁷⁵ Gurdon, Sudan at the Crossroads, p. 53.

⁷⁶ Details of the economic conditions will be more fully examined in Chapter Four.

3.3 POLITICAL DECLINE

Sandbrook's analytical view of Africa's economic stagnation includes the assumption that political legitimacy exists when there is a conviction among bureaucrats and citizens that they are under an obligation to obey those occupying authority positions.⁷⁷ That is, consensual support for a regime exists as long as the people believe their interests are being pursued. The traditional diversities within the Sudan that were intensified by uneven regional development strategies and extensive political competition have prevented the masses from seeing the state as representing their interests. "Instead, the masses see the state as representing the interests of one dominant tribe or ethnic coalition."⁷⁸ Sandbrook argues that through this initial absence of legitimacy, personal rule emerges building support with the use of favors, promises, and patronage. He explains, however, that this support is vulnerable to disaffection if the promises are not fulfilled and/or the economy deteriorates. When this happens, the governments often turn to coercion, usually with the use of police or some type of military force. The instability that results also opens the doors to foreign intervention as the struggling leader turns

⁷⁷ Sandbrook, p. 83.

⁷⁸ Sandbrook, p. 80.

to external sources of support to maintain his rule. A growing dependence on foreign influences further enhances the nation's inequitable position in the world system and, therefore, further undermines any chance to gain a sense of legitimacy from within. Sandbrook contends that this situation of economic decline and state decay is self-perpetuating. Breaking the 'downward spiral' is a difficult task to be sure.⁷⁹

The idea that the political weakness of the Sudan is largely responsible for its lack of development is illustrated further when one examines the last years of the Nimeiry regime. The period of peace and initial prosperity was already fragile due to the fact that Nimeiry created a number of enemies by stamping out all the traditional political parties. Hence, throughout the 1970's, numerous coup plots and attempts occurred. One coup attempt in 1976 was especially dangerous for Nimeiry as it was close to being successful. Briefly, it was led by some of the traditional political parties supported by Libya. Qadhafi's support for Nimeiry declined when the Sudan reversed its foreign policy from the left and adopted more pro-Western policies. Ironically, the leaders of the coup included Sadiq al-Mahdi who is currently the prime minister of Sudan.

⁷⁹ Sandbrook, p. 144.

Within a year after this nearly successful coup attempt, Nimeiry shocked Sudan by announcing the adoption of a policy of National Reconciliation. This policy pardoned all who had plotted against his regime since 1969. This included inviting Sadiq al-Mahdi to return from exile to the country. The policy was designed to reconcile old political party leaders with military leaders and, therefore diffuse a potential threat. Peter Woodward explains that the groups that returned were anxious for reform yet they found resistance and discontent instead.⁸⁰ Upon joining the SSU, a vocal opposition evolved within the government itself.

During this time, corruption began to play a more dominant role in Sudanese politics. "Corruption increased as many tried to make as much personal profit as they could before the next elections, since they knew that they might not be nominated again. At the same time, some of Nimeiry's closest aides were involved in large scale corruption which gravely damaged the economy."⁸¹ Gurdon makes an interesting comment concerning corruption in Sudan. He discusses the fact that corruption is endemic throughout Sudan and most of Africa. Due to low government salaries and the traditional system of

⁸⁰ Peter Woodward. "Sudan: Treats to Stability", Conflict Studies No. 173, April 1985, p. 6.

⁸¹ Country Profile, p. 5.

tribal patronage, nepotism and corruption are often commonplace.⁸²

Regardless, the SSU began to decline quickly as it failed to select official candidates for elections. Instead, Nimeiry continued to appoint leaders and surround himself with loyal supporters. Once again, the focus of the government shifts to maintaining the possession of power over addressing the critical issues that surround the Sudan as a nation. As the popularity of the SSU declined in the late 1970's and early 1980's, Nimeiry began to concentrate more and more power in his own hands.

As the only capable force in the face of the SSU failure, he appeared to run Sudan single handedly in the latter years. Presidential decrees and vetoes on decisions made in the National Assembly became common. He appeared to have little or no regard for the opinions of any other individual or group. Any attack, no matter how mild, was seen as tantamount to treason. Anyone who expressed an alternative opinion was almost automatically dismissed.⁸³

As a result, Nimeiry made some crucial decisions that ultimately led to his demise. These primarily included:

- redivision of the Southern region
- introduction of Islamic Sharia law

⁸² Gurdon, 1986, p. 27.

⁸³ Gurdon, Sudan in Transition, p. 28.

The former decision redivided the single entity of the South into the three old provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile. This policy was highly criticized by the South because they believed the unity and autonomy they had recently acquired from the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 was a necessary strength in dealing with the national government. Nimeiry saw it as a means of reducing the potential for even greater unified opposition from the South. The latter decision to introduce Sharia law was seen by some as reflecting the influence and pressures of Northern Islamic Fundamentalist Groups on Nimeiry's power. Others saw it as a means for the President to regain leadership in Muslim circles, and still others saw it as a ploy to attract further assistance from Saudi Arabia. It did serve to provide the only legitimacy which could be found for a major security crackdown and to effectively divert attention away from the deteriorating living conditions which many Sudanese were facing. Tradition is a source of legitimacy. "Rulers can anticipate willing compliance if they govern in accordance with specific norms usually sanctioned by religion."⁸⁴ Earlier in this paper, it was pointed out that postcolonial rulers have not been able to fall back on the legitimizing force of traditional institutions as Sudan's political institutions were primarily created from external origins.

⁸⁴ Sandbrook, p.88.

Implementing Islamization was an attempt by Nimeiry to use the 'legitimacy' of religion to deter the growing instability of his regime. The program of thorough and literalist Islamization aroused a wide-range of opposition from non-Muslims as well as Muslims. Even those who had long advocated a more direct and active Islamic role in Sudanese politics were shocked at such a harsh, sudden imposition. Open conflict arose over the role of Islam among the Sudanese Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Tensions between the South and the Government in Khartoum were renewed. As the situation intensified, Nimeiry introduced a state of emergency throughout the country. During this time, the military were given extreme powers which included the use of violent arrests and harsh punishments. Coupled with the declining living conditions that were reflected by the failing economy, an almost united opposition evolved.

Eventually, in response to the pressures from Western donors and the IMF, in March of 1985, Nimeiry lifted all subsidies on oil and foodstuffs. Almost immediately, riots ensued. The army seized control of the government on April 6, 1985. Nimeiry's rule had ended but his influence would be felt for years to come.

3.3.1 Summary

The Nimeiry example closely exemplifies Sandbrook's description of personal rule. The lack of consensual support that existed toward central authorities in Khartoum provided the opportunity for Nimeiry to take control. Using the benefits of the limited but widespread degree of support for the Communist Party that existed combined with promises of peace and prosperity, Nimeiry initially gained popularity. When the President perceived his power was threatened by the growing strength of the Communist Party, he changed directions politically toward the West. His popularity survived this move as the massive influx of foreign aid helped create short-term growth in the country's economy. But, when the agricultural policies began to falter, the people held Nimeiry responsible for their increasing hardships. In response to the growing degree of social unrest, Nimeiry began to rely on increasing amounts of foreign assistance in attempts to provide some sense of stability. When conditions continued to worsen, the regime turned toward the use of forced compliance as a means of maintaining control. Eventually, this, too, became futile as Nimeiry's legitimacy completely deteriorated and he was overthrown.

The Nimeiry years help illustrate the vulnerability of personal rule and the consequences that can occur through its existence. The weaknesses that stem from the absence of le-

gitimacy influence the internal decisions that are made as well as extent of external integration that occurs. For example, Nimeiry's drastic change in his political direction, his implementation of Islamic Sharia law, and his increasing request for greater amounts of foreign aid all directly reflect the growing disaffection for his rule and his weakening control over the regime. The internal historical and cultural factors that helped create this instability cannot be omitted from the complex list of ingredients that have culminated in underdevelopment today. At the same time, the extensive influence of external forces remain essential in piecing together the road to economic stagnation. The next chapter will help illustrate the external influences that exacerbated the internal difficulties that abound.

4.0 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

4.1 INSTABILITY

It has become clear that one factor that has fueled the continuing political instability in the Sudan has been the troubled economic conditions that have continually plagued the nation. John Voll argues that the more prominent social unrest which began in the urban areas primarily in the form of protests, riots, and eventually coup attempts, as largely the result of the widespread beliefs that leaders had mismanaged the economy. The extent of corruption had appeared to be increasing as a new visible wealthy class emerged amongst the waning economic climate of the nation in the late 1970's and early 1980's. "The distribution of wealth was creating a real and visible gap between the rich, who seemed to be benefitting despite all the problems, and the poor, who were apparently increasing in numbers and misery."⁸⁵ As the Sudanese governments appeared to be unable to check the severity of this type of imbalance, it became more difficult for that government to acquire legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Once again, in the Sudanese case, the country

⁸⁵ John O. Voll, "The Sudan After Nimeiry," Current History, (May 1986), p. 216.

has failed to create a stable institutional system of government. In the history of independent Sudan, no government has been successful in establishing a sense of consensual continuity within the political arena. Without the general support of the population, progress, as defined by the developed world, is deterred.

In Chapter Two, it was shown that Nimeiry did attempt to create political stability through economic progress. Apparently, he had hoped to accomplish this with the use of extensive amounts of foreign aid. Concerned over the increasing communist influence, Nimeiry drastically changed the overall political direction of his government. Consequently, by turning to the West, he was able to acquire the extensive aid he would need to begin massive development programs. Later, when development plans began to falter, however, the President needed even greater amounts of aid in attempts to bail him out. The external economic and political goals of Western capitalists easily provided the impetus for donors to comply with Sudan's pleas for help. Through the massive influx of capital, Nimeiry's regime was able to emit short-term illusions of political order and control. This cycle eventually resulted in massive debt problems which have served to cripple the country's economy even further. Thus, the Sudan has had to rely heavily on large-scale foreign assistance since 1980. This dependency on foreign assistance has, in turn, made Sudan vulnerable to succumbing to varying

political and economic influences by the donor nations. The impact of international intervention has intensified as foreign powers have attempted to redirect and implement the country's domestic policies in ways that will secure foreign interests there. This will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.

4.2 POLICY PROBLEMS

As Richard Brown summarizes, the agricultural sector is the backbone of the Sudanese economy as it accounts for virtually all of the country's exports. Therefore, any substantial change in the amount of goods exported can drastically affect the nation's economy. Table 1 illustrates the paramount importance of agricultural exports for Sudan's economy. These figures illustrate the general rise followed by the decline in the amounts of export revenue.

In 1984-85, agriculture accounted for 28.2 per cent of the GDP, having declined continually from 57 per cent soon after independence and 40 per cent in 1971.⁸⁶ As mentioned before, cotton has traditionally been the main export. During the 1970's, it was responsible for over half of all exports. In the decade from 1970-80, this crop contributed an average of 52.5 per cent of export revenue. However, it fell to 23.2

⁸⁶ Country Profile, (1987-88), p. 16.

Table 1. Main Agricultural Exports; Sudanese Pounds
(millions)

	<u>1981-82</u>	<u>1982-83</u>	<u>1983-84</u>	<u>1984-85</u>	<u>1985-86</u>
Cotton	60.1	201.7	447.5	417.8	337.1
Gum arabic	37.0	54.7	83.9	77.8	67.1
Groundnuts	42.1	18.5	21.5	21.7	12.2
Sesame	36.9	59.7	87.9	80.8	90.4
Livestock	43.5	82.6	91.2	124.0	124.1
Dura	57.0	98.5	41.1	--	1.4
Cake/Meal	30.0	19.0	22.4	17.7	8.5
Total	346.0	606.8	893.5	847.3	786.7

Source: Bank of Sudan, printed in the 1987-88
Country Profile, Economist Publications.

per cent in 1981 when production fell equally dramatically.⁸⁷ The fall was due to international market conditions and mistakes made in the Sudan, including a lack of incentives for the tenant farmers in the Gezira scheme.

Although factors such as drought and fluctuations in international terms of trade must be given their due credit, it is becoming clear that government policies are the principal factors contributing to the food deficits. Pricing policies, marketing boards, exchange rates, taxation practices, and provision of credit and inputs are the central ways in which African governments have intervened in the process of food production.... The intervention of African governments into food production has generally been characterized by low prices, inefficient parastatals, currency over-evaluation, and adverse taxation and trade practices.⁸⁸

That these policies serve to keep the cost of living within the reach of many of Sudan's poor, helps to explain why this type of government intervention has been so commonly pursued in so many African nations. But, one could certainly argue that much of the blame for the devastating economic conditions within Sudan can be placed upon the global persuasion that has often heavily influenced the direction of the Sudan's government policies. The impact of extensive international intervention into the Sudan and elsewhere has inherently forced nations to adopt policies that have

⁸⁷ Country Profile, (1987-88) p. 21.

⁸⁸ Rhys Payne, "Food Deficits and Political Legitimacy: The Case of Morocco," From Stephen K. Commins, Michael F. Lofchie, and Rhys Payne, Africa's Agrarian Crisis: The Roots of Famine (Boulder, Co. Lynne Rienner, Pubs. Inc., 1986), p. 156.

ultimately served to undermine balanced domestic growth for the countries. Although now, in light of the increased food imports and the enormous growth in external debts, international donors denounce such policies, it was largely international pressures that drove developing nations to pursue these policies in the first place. These pressures existed primarily in the pursuit of both economic and political gains. The internal consequences resulted in the fact that,

...(g)overnment planners have discriminated against the food sector because they believe that the creation of more efficient industrial sectors is the quickest way to modernization. The disdain for the vast peasant sector is further motivated by the interests of urban-based political and social forces that include the government elite itself. The planners may hope to appropriate the agricultural surplus for investment in industry, while the dominant social forces are more likely to use it, if they can, for their own immediate consumption.⁸⁹

In efforts to maintain or create political stability amid short-term modernization techniques, governments such as those of the Sudan have attempted to keep policies that would provide the population with affordable food. This type of strategy, however, has not helped create the conditions necessary for long-term balanced development. Political legitimacy cannot exist if whole segments of a population are suffering while a small elite prospers.

In the early 1970's, Nimeiry's government experienced some growth in legitimacy through his success in creating the

⁸⁹ Payne, p. 159.

Addis Abbaba Agreement, initiating numerous extensive development programs, and improving the extremely poor infrastructure. One ultimate goal was to use these large-scale projects to make Sudan the primary source of agricultural products for the Arab countries. Surplus petro-dollars would be the major source of financial resources. According to neoimperialist theories, in this process, the less developed countries are compelled by economic necessity to become dependent on the import of capital and technology by foreign suppliers, financial institutions, and transnational corporations.⁹⁰ Dependency theorists would agree, perhaps adding that inasmuch as these economies do not produce their own capital goods or techniques, they are 'structurally incomplete,' and must maintain a 'dependent articulation' with a world economy dominated by transnational corporations to survive at all.⁹¹ This paper argues that an equally important factor to consider includes the idea that the developed countries are compelled by **political** necessity to become dependent on foreign intervention. These countries are 'structurally incomplete' in that they suffer from an absence of legitimate political institutions. It is this political

⁹⁰ Becker, et al, p. 3.

⁹¹ See F.H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

weakness that enhances these countries' inequitable position in the global economic scene.

Regardless of theoretical implications, as a consequence of the influx of available capital, between 1973-77, over \$3 billion in foreign loans was committed for investment with the intention of using the Sudan to supply agricultural products to the developed world. The government's development expenditure rose from 17 million Sudanese pounds in 1970-71 (two per cent of the GDP) to 186 million Sudanese pounds in 1977-78 (six per cent of the GDP).⁹² In the midst of this extensive investment expenditure, however, oil prices began to decline. Consequently, Arab aid and financing also declined. This loss of capital made it impossible for Sudan to continue with its ambitious development plans. Combined with the world recession and high interest rates, a serious balance of payments problem emerged. It was at this time that the Sudan began to depend so heavily upon the United States for assistance.

Wai explains that before Nimeiry's radical shift to the West in the early 1970's, US aid to the Sudan was only a trickle (under \$20 million per year). Even so, the perceived Soviet threat in the Horn of Africa pushed Washington into adopting a more generous policy of assistance to Sudan.

⁹² Richard Brown, "International Responses to Sudan's Economic Crisis: 1978 to the April 1985 Coup d'Etat," Development and Change Vol. 17, No. 3. (July 1986), p. 488.

Reversal of nationalization policies opened the way for foreign investments, attracting US companies. Chevron, Texaco, Chase Manhattan Bank, Tenneco, Inc., the Northern Electric Co. of Johnson City, Tennessee, and Allis-Chalmers are a few examples of US businesses that invested in the Sudan during the 1970's.⁹³ As one can see from an examination of Table 2, US interest in the area drastically increased as the trickle of US aid became a flood in the 1980's. The level of bilateral aid fluctuates sharply from year to year, reflecting the political and economic strings attached. The rise in US aid reflected the growing political ties with the Nimeiry regime.⁹⁴

By 1978 a crisis had clearly developed. Almost all available investment had been channelled into capital-intensive projects. Instability in the form of social unrest grew as the debt crisis worsened, the cost of living skyrocketed, and living conditions plummeted. Sudan was forced to turn to the IMF to negotiate a First Credit Agreement and the first stages of a Stabilization Program.⁹⁵

⁹³ Wai, 1979, p. 307.

⁹⁴ Country Profile, 1986-87 and 1987-88, pp. 40-41.

⁹⁵ Brown, p. 493.

Table 2. Gross Official Development Assistance (\$mn):
Disbursements.

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>
Bilateral	463.5	537.0	800.	431.2	866.3
USA	64.0	131.0	158.0	122.0	347.0
West Germany	71.4	56.8	67.8	51.0	71.4
Italy	--	15.4	26.9	11.3	66.8
UK	66.2	68.7	48.8	36.4	54.8
Japan	7.6	9.9	25.5	28.8	25.8
Netherlands	34.8	26.3	34.4	28.0	27.8
Opec	--	176.4	361.0	117.0	215.3

SOURCE: OECD DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE,
printed in the 1987-88 Country Profile, Economist
Intelligence Publications.

4.3 IMF INTERVENTION

The main objectives under these first stages of the IMF stabilization plan were in the form of an Economic Recovery Program which sought:

- the restructuring of agricultural incentives to promote exports
- financial stabilization which included cuts in subsidies, a moratorium on new projects, and restriction of new credits
- the settlement of external debt and arrears

These goals were to be achieved primarily through a combination of liberalization of the foreign exchange regime, restrictive monetary and fiscal policies and the promotion of the country's traditional agricultural exports such as cotton. This was to be accomplished by reforming the production system and inducing price incentives.⁹⁶ Needless to say, combining financial stabilization with investment and growth is an extraordinarily difficult task requiring a considerable time lag before any progress can be noted if it will occur at all.

⁹⁶ Brown, p. 493.

Undertaking the necessary structural adjustments while servicing debt equal to nearly ten times current export earnings, with imports running at nearly three times export, with a current account deficit well over 10 per cent of GDP, with a population growth of 3 per cent per annum and while supporting over half a million refugees from neighboring countries, will be a major challenge...⁹⁷

The initial IMF monetary and fiscal policy targets for the nation were not met. In fact, the programs that were initiated are now labeled as failures. The IMF itself has recognized that cancelations are linked with the political inability to meet program requirements.⁹⁸ Haggard explains that,

...the issue of food subsidies proved a crucial sticking point...ill-timed and poorly implemented subsidy cuts provoked food riots...The Sudanese government, like many of its counterparts, faced historically strong unions in state-owned enterprises. Labor responded quickly to the first round of austerities and the failure to deliver promised pay increases. The strikes were political, directed against the government rather than local management. The government put the army on alert, but it also made critical concessions, rescinding increases in the price of petrol and promising pay raises and price controls on basic commodities.⁹⁹

Hence, the Sudanese government did attempt to take the steps needed to meet the IMF conditions. Due to the political instability these steps provoked, however, authorities were forced to reverse these actions. Such a weak governmental

⁹⁷ Brown, p. 494.

⁹⁸ Haggard, p. 506.

⁹⁹ Haggard, p. 518.

institution is unable to withstand the stress of the radical, fundamental changes needed to implement economic stabilization programs. Brown sums up the economic picture for the period from 1977-78 to 1983-84 with the following points:

(a) in relation to balance of payments:

- (i) the current account deficit increased from 6 per cent of GDP in 1977-78 to 11 per cent in 1983-84;
- (ii) officially estimated total foreign debt increased from US\$2bn (1978) to US\$8bn (1984);
- (iii) the debt service ration rose from 19 per cent (1978) to over 150 per cent (1984);
- (iv) the Sudanese pound depreciated to 27 per cent of its pre-1978 value;

(b) in the domestic economy, between 1977-78 and 1983-84:

- (i) GDP declined by 5 per cent in real terms, and GDP per capita fell from US\$468 to US\$288;
- (ii) gross national saving became negative, falling from about 2 per cent of GNP to -0.3 per cent in 1982-83;
- (iii) the growth of the money supply barely changed, remaining around an average annual rate of about 40 per cent, in comparison with less than 30 per cent before 1978;
- (iv) the government's budgetary recurrent deficit rose, albeit from 5 to 7 per cent of GDP;
- (v) the annual rate of inflation rose from 20 per cent to over 40 per cent in 1982-83 (officially estimated--it is widely believed that the actual rate is much higher).¹⁰⁰

A number of articles have been written in attempts to explain the reasons behind the failure of the IMF's programs and the crisis that has ensued. It is true that a number of factors had detrimental effects on the economy as these pro-

¹⁰⁰ Brown, p. 499.

grams were launched. Many of these factors have already been mentioned in this paper. Brown lists, for example:

- the human resource drain due to the migration to the Gulf states
- the three successive years of drought which helped create famine in 1984-85
- widespread corruption
- misappropriation of funds for foreign exchange and general mismanagement

One must ask whether or not these considerations can reap the sole responsibility for the recovery programs being unable to obtain their goals. It is ironic that Sudan's economy was eroding most rapidly at a time when the nation was receiving enormous amounts of foreign aid. As Brown points out, "...generous external support is not a sufficient condition for economic recovery, and the IMF-type macroeconomic targeting is no substitute for the deeper structural reforms necessary to engender the conditions for recovery in the real economy."¹⁰¹ Sudan needs stability first. Although the goals of IMF policy prescriptions may be to reverse the economic deterioration within the Sudan, they have also served to disrupt efforts to obtain political stability and legitimacy

¹⁰¹ Brown, p. 501.

in an incredibly diverse region. One may wonder how autonomous the Sudanese government really is in a world that virtually dictates much of its economic and, consequently, political policies. It is certainly valid to ask just how much the domestic situation within Sudan is influenced or even controlled by international powers. It cannot be ignored that, regardless of intention, extensive international intervention has had stark social impacts on the Sudanese existence. Although present policies are attempting to reverse the degradation on economic grounds, other detrimental aspects continue to be ignored. These concerns involve the general welfare of the Sudanese population.

How much suffering is justifiable in efforts to change economic policy? One factor is becoming increasingly more evident. The Sudan must be able to produce its own food. As long as hunger is rampant throughout the population, obtaining any degree of stability and legitimacy will be virtually impossible. The fact remains that during the 1970's, Sudan was able to produce not only enough food to feed its population, but it also created enough for a surplus. In an interview for the documentary, The Politics of Food, aired in December, 1987, Charles Gurdon explains that when global prices for cotton dropped in the 1970's, the Sudanese shifted the emphasis of cotton production on its two million acre

Gezira Scheme to greater food production.¹⁰² Even so, Gurdon explains that foreign investors such as the World Bank and the IMF intervened by arguing that cotton was still the best suited and most profitable crop for the Gezira Scheme. Food production did not create a substantial return for these financial organizations. It did not create the right outcome for a capitalist world economy. Although food was being produced in abundance and people were being fed, huge debts to foreign investors were also being produced. Hence, the Gezira Scheme was returned to a primary focus on producing the single crop of cotton. A prejudice against the economic inefficiency of food production ultimately controls the destiny of thousands of Sudanese lives. One can see that the resources exist to feed Sudan. The problem is one of access to these resources which is controlled by governments and international organizations.

This situation circles back to the Sudan's crisis in political legitimacy. The Sudanese government is ultimately held accountable if affordable food cannot be obtained. Government revenue depends on the country's agrarian export base. The costs of this dependency ultimately are borne by the peasants whose very livelihood has been undermined. When

¹⁰² The Politics of Food documentary looks at why there is widespread hunger in the midst of sufficient food supplies and plentiful monetary aid. The program examined Brazil, Bangladesh, India, the Sudan, and the United States.

central authorities exercised the control that was necessary to initiate the transition to an export oriented economy, resentment among the traditional sector flared. This resentment has been a major ingredient in the crisis of legitimacy the Sudan experiences today. The strategies employed by foreign intervention coupled with those of the Sudanese government undermine prospects of correcting the situation.

4.4 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

One must realize, when examining the impact and consequences of the various IMF programs on Sudan, that both the economy and the political atmosphere are affected. Stephen Haggard discusses the idea that the Sudan exhibits the political complications of stabilization and adjustment in countries with weak institutions and large religious and ethnic diversities.¹⁰³ Out of a sample of thirty Extended Fund facility adjustment programs begun between 1978-86, sixteen were formally canceled by the IMF for noncompliance. The Sudan example is one of these sixteen. In the Sudan, internal political instability increased in part as a result of the IMF programs. It can be argued that this may be because the nature of the IMF conditions carry high economic

¹⁰³ Haggard, Stephen. "The Political of Adjustment: Lessons from the IMF's Extended Fund Facility," International Organization. Vol. 39, No. 3, Summer 1985. p. 517.

costs. The policy measures used are most often intended to be quick acting, like a shock treatment, and are concerned solely with macroeconomic adjustments to the neglect of societal effects.¹⁰⁴ The fact that the adjustment program does have societal as well as economic effects, however, helps establish the idea that the economic adjustments can, indeed, be quite political.

According to Haggard, the IMF's Extended Fund Facility included policy reform regarding prices, taxes, subsidies, interest rates and even wages. The programs often called for fundamental shifts in policy, such as liberalization of trade, decontrol of prices, and restructuring of public-sector corporations.¹⁰⁵ In many extremely low-income countries such as the Sudan, implementing these types of adjustments depends on reducing the role of the central government and therefore often become politically ambitious. "Economic factors may force changes in policy, but politics drives elite perceptions of acceptable economic advice and thus shapes the path to adjustment."¹⁰⁶ The encroachment of government control over the country's economic resources has meant greater hardships for the majority of the population. The process of political centralization in the countryside

¹⁰⁴ Brown, p. 502.

¹⁰⁵ Haggard, pp. 506-508.

¹⁰⁶ Haggard, p. 508.

has already served to threaten and undermine the basic well-being of the traditional sector as a whole. The Sudanese Government has been unable to successfully respond to the needs of a population that has been forced to become more integrated into the national political system. Hence, more concentration of power in the form of new policy shifts in line with the wishes of international agencies such as the IMF are met with more hostility, fear, and distrust which continue to undermine the existence of political legitimacy.

In the Sudanese case, the lifting of food subsidies was a critical condition to the IMF's goals of fiscal reform. This particular adjustment became politically relevant as it had salient distributional effects on the population. For example, allowing food prices to rise may have benefitted the agricultural sector (which would primarily include the few successfully operated irrigation schemes run by a minority elite) while hurting the urban population and the working class. This eventually helped provoke food riots which began as student disturbances. As unrest and opposition to the government increased in 1981, Nimeiry turned to the army for support. By militarily breaking the strikes, the government instituted a more repressive approach to the public discontent. From this example, one can see some political consequences of economic stabilization.

The Sudan typifies a similar set of dilemmas in the African context. Haggard's explanation (using the previously

mentioned sample) of the situations that have often resulted from IMF intervention in developing countries parallels the Sudanese situation in a number of ways. He explains that the maintenance of political authority through clientelism is most likely where governments are weakly institutionalized or where societies are ethnically divided. Establishing a semblance of political order in these weak authoritarian regimes relies on favors, ties, and access to state funds by those in power. "The rationalization associated with adjustment and stabilization is thus, in an immediate sense, politically irrational."¹⁰⁷ Haggard continues to explain that,

officials start by manipulating macroeconomic policy for political ends, producing large fiscal deficits, rapid monetary growth, and an overvalued exchange rate. Governments then postpone or resist stabilization policies in anticipation of hostile reactions from key constituents that may also be organized along patron-client lines. Losers receive compensation that undermines adjustment. Forces opposed to stabilization use democratic channels or independent organizational resources to block or undermine reforms.¹⁰⁸

As in the Nimeiry example, the sample showed that repression became apparent in the weakly institutionalized, low-income authoritarian countries in which already authoritarian regimes began to use more coercive methods to maintain political control. Coercion was usually used when economic

¹⁰⁷ Haggard, p. 511.

¹⁰⁸ Haggard, p. 512.

protest went hand in hand with more general opposition to the government in a context of low political legitimacy. In the end, the use of military force is not capable of solving the problems that erupt from these monetary adjustments.

Haggard's description supports Sandbrook's analysis that the vulnerabilities inherent within a government dominated by personal rule eventually requires a reliance on foreign aid and finally coercion as a last resort to maintain political control. Chapter Two has already identified this general chain of events through the Nimeiry experience. Nimeiry's inability to manage this situation culminated in his loss of power. Any new government or regime, however, is ultimately faced with the same problems. Internally, the strategies that are employed are largely determined as consequences of the weaknesses of the state which is illustrated by the absence of legitimacy. This weakness culminates in the loss of the ability to bargain with the developed world for a more equitable position in the world system. In the Sudan, this was seen through the nation's relationship with the IMF. Although IMF policies promoted political instability, Sudanese officials were unable to negotiate alternative strategies. As a result, the Nimeiry regime ignored many of the IMF's policies for economic recovery in an effort to prolong his political control. From this perspective, one might conclude that although the state is not a mere puppet of foreign interests, neither is it fully sovereign. The

weak status of Third World governments cannot be excluded as a primary cause of the development crisis in Third World countries. Chapter Four will examine how Sudan's new Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, has attempted to approach these obstacles.

5.0 SADIQ AL-MAHDI: A NEW APPROACH?

5.1 THE TRANSITION

The 1985 coup replaced the Nimeiry regime with a Transitional Military Council (TMC) which promised to allow democratic elections to occur after one year. At this time, the newly elected government would take control of Sudanese affairs. During the one-year transitional period, the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) was abolished along with the State Security Organization (SSO). Political prisoners were released, freedom of the press was restored, and food price subsidies were reintroduced. Other than these basic reforms, however, little else changed. The fighting continued in the South and the economy continued to deteriorate. As mentioned previously, an agreement with the IMF and other creditors relied on lifting price subsidies which had already proven to create violent reactions from the populace. Hence, no agreement appeared possible with major donors on these terms in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the southern opposition pushed to abolish the implementation of Islamic Sharia law as this had been a major contributing factor to Nimeiry's fall. When this did not occur, the fighting continued and even escalated.

Since Sudan is a very heterogeneous country and one in which the dominance of any single religion is totally unacceptable to the majority of the population, the use of Islamic law ran completely counter to the assumptions of diversity on which the Sudanese state is based. The government argued that its introduction was merely a continuation of a policy which had begun at independence, and it is true that there had been a very gradual return to some Islamic elements in the constitution and legal system, although they were relatively minor. After the national reconciliation policy had brought the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic Fundamentalist groups back to Sudan, the trend towards Islamization had accelerated. The Iranian revolution and the resurgence of Islam in the Middle East also had an effect. However, none of this was relevant to the South and the imposition of uniform Islamic Sharia law seemed to many the beginning of the end for Southern autonomy.¹⁰⁹

In April, 1986, exactly one year after the coup, a form of general elections did occur. Participation was primarily in the North in that, "...because of the civil war, elections were postponed in 37 seats in southern Sudan. While about 73 per cent of the voters registered in Northern Sudan, the total number of registered voters in the South was equal to only two northern constituencies."¹¹⁰ Nonetheless, Gurdon explains that results show that Sadiq al-Mahdi's Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the Fundamentalist Islamic Front (NIF) won over 70 per cent of the votes. The remainder went to regional parties of the peripheral regions with Communist Party support appearing relatively poor. Furthermore, Gurdon mentions his interpretation of the voting

¹⁰⁹ Gurdon, Sudan in Transition, p. 30.

¹¹⁰ Gurdon, p. 9.

patterns as reflecting the large rural-urban migration that had occurred in the last decade in that the Greater Khartoum area gained 31 constituencies compared to 13 in the 1968 elections. This reflection supports the idea that fundamental changes in the lifestyles of the Sudanese people were occurring as the country was attempting to adjust to the radically different circumstances that had become so prevalent since independence thirty years before. A country that for centuries had existed within a divided system of tribal regions surviving through traditional agricultural and herding techniques was thrust into a world which included an economy that was to be based on a mechanized irrigation systems approach to agricultural development for export and a political scene which included the use of general elections to select a centralized government to control areas that had traditionally experienced a relatively autonomous existence. Although the various governments since 1956 had attempted to act as though a substantial consensual attitude existed throughout the nation and that the Sudanese population as a whole would even consider supporting any centralized unitary form of power, it is yet to be seen that this has been possible. The divisiveness goes beyond the geographical, ethnic, racial, and religious differences to fundamentally different conceptions of natural unity. The notion of a unified Sudan is still somewhat alien to many of the region's people. Even so, the fact that Sudan is now indebted to the

point of being dictated to by organizations such as the IMF and other creditors locks them into striving in this direction of a centralized governmental institution more than ever. That is, in order to continue to receive the monies that have become vital to maintaining a control over the government, these creditors have required that a central form of authority dictate certain basic fiscal and monetary changes in the economy. Naturally, this type of reform is going to create instability and disruption among a large portion of the population. Hence, not only will any new government or regime have to deal with the important issues of the conflict in the South, the role of Islam in the Sudanese society, the economy, and the enormous debt problem, but it will need to begin to attempt to construct an institutional system that would allow the various regions to at least negotiate cooperation and solutions to the devastating problems the country faces. Even this cannot be accomplished until some sense of legitimacy is instilled in the general population regarding the Sudanese government.

It appears evident that the original goals of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 represented a change in this direction. Even though some argue that the Southern region's autonomy was somewhat symbolic in nature, it was at least a vital gesture that the diverse areas of the Sudan could peacefully coexist. It is unrealistic to expect the Southern peoples to automatically accept the introduction of a cen-

tralized system of rule without resistance. To most Southern Sudanese, the transition represents a radically different perspective of their existence which has brought with it enormous hardships. If the present means continue to be pursued, the condition of the Sudanese people will certainly continue to deteriorate before any progress will be apparent. This has already become reality.

Elected as prime minister by the constituent assembly, Sadiq al-Mahdi has tried to articulate a foreign policy of non-alignment by criticizing Nimeiry's former alignment with the USA as inviting attack from pro-Soviet neighbors and restricting Sudan's diplomatic freedom.¹¹¹ Within a year he and a few of his key cabinet members had visited all the major donor countries and the surrounding Arab and African capitals. Lesch describes how through these travels, the new government hoped to emphasize Sudan's neutrality in regional conflicts and noninvolvement in the superpower rivalry. Mahdi stressed the idea that Sudan would not be a client state.

The complications involved in balancing relations with mutually antagonistic countries are particularly evident with the US, Libya, and Egypt, but also with Iran and Iraq. The reapproachment with Libya, for example, worries Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the US; contacts with Tehran concern the major Arab capitals at this critical period in the Iran-Iraq war. Some Sudanese fear that

¹¹¹ Lesch, Ann Mosely, "A View from Khartoum," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 4, Spring, 1987, p. 812.

Mahdi's attempt to be friends with everyone may result in his being friends with no one.¹¹²

Furthermore, it has been argued that partially as a consequence of the extensive amount of time the prime minister has spent abroad trying to restore Sudan's credibility in the Arab world and replace Nimeiry's bias towards the USA with a more neutral foreign policy, domestic matters were somewhat ignored.¹¹³ By not attempting to provide solutions to the central issues affecting Sudan, the government avoided immediate opposition and, therefore, helped ensure its initial survival. But, dealing with domestic issues could not continue to be postponed as the economy was suffering more than ever because of a failure to reach a rescheduling agreement with the IMF. And, the fighting in the South remained a dominant feature in Sudanese affairs.

5.2 THE CIVIL WAR

The transitional government failed to realize that united opposition to Nimeiry did not provide a basis for an effective consensus. Although a brief ceasefire was proclaimed by the SPLM after the 1985 overthrow, the TMC did not fulfill the conditions laid down by Garang. These demands included

¹¹² Lesch, p. 819.

¹¹³ Gurdon, p. 11.

the cancellation of the Islamization laws and the organization of a national conference to discuss the Sudan's problems and restructure the national institutions rather than simply the issues of the South. Hence, fighting soon ignited once again.

When Mahdi took office, he immediately articulated a three-prong approach to end the war. He planned to, "...deal with the fundamental issues underlying the rebellion by convening a constitutional conference, while simultaneously strengthening the armed forces and seeking an agreement with Ethiopia to persuade the SPLM to negotiate. In essence, he would offer the carrot of negotiations and the stick of military and diplomatic pressure in order to convince the SPLM to talk."¹¹⁴ Lesch continues to explain that the war cannot be won by either side as the army is unable to successfully overpower the guerrilla forces in the swamps and forests in the South and the SPLM cannot attack and maintain control of the larger towns. In addition to the obvious turmoil the violence creates for the country, it is also a heavy drain on the national budget. The 1986-87 budget allocated 30 per cent of current expenditure for defense and security.¹¹⁵ At this point, it is important to add that in addition to the divisive forces behind the civil war that have been repeated

¹¹⁴ Lesch, p. 814,

¹¹⁵ Lesch, p. 814.

throughout this paper, the South accuses the Northern government of attempting to use the region's natural resources to benefit the North at the expense of the South. These resources primarily involves the Jonglei Canal and the oil export pipeline. The Jonglei Canal is planned to provide four billion cubic meters of water for irrigated agricultural schemes for Northern Sudan and Egypt.¹¹⁶ However, Southerners feel the water is a Southern resource and should not be used to benefit the North. Furthermore, some believe that such a massive project could produce major climatic changes in the South. Since desertification is already a problem in the North, Southerners fear a similar situation could occur in the South. Another principal objection to the scheme is that the canals already begun do not grant local cattle access to water as hundreds have been killed when they plunged over the steep banks.¹¹⁷ This example simply serves to emphasize the belief that the South's needs are often ignored as the North's objectives are pursued.

Oil and gas were discovered in commercial quantities in Sudan in the 1970's. By 1975, Chevron Oil Corporation entered into a production agreement with the Central Government of the nation.¹¹⁸ Since then, there has been a great deal

¹¹⁶ Gurdon, p. 60.

¹¹⁷ Gurdon, p. 60.

¹¹⁸ United States Hearing before the subcommittee on Africa.

of speculation as to the potential effects this discovery could have on the nation's economy. By August of 1980, official estimates stated that the discovered levels could sustain production of 50,000 barrels per day over a production period of 18 years.¹¹⁹

These estimates of economic return are based on a very conservative production schedule in which oil production drops from 50,000 barrels per day after the first five years and only lasts for eighteen years. As already seen it is very likely that there will be considerably more oil and therefore the returns will be even greater. It is also not unrealistic to expect oil prices to rise before the end of the century making the figures even more attractive. In the more optimistic calculation it is assumed that the price of crude oil increases from \$31 in 1986 to \$41 per barrel in 1995 (1983 dollars) and remains constant for the rest of the project. In that case, the economic rate of return would be 30.4 per cent and Sudan could earn \$1,209 million in foreign currency, or \$138 million per year. If, on the other hand, the price of oil fell to \$25 barrel throughout the life of the project, the figures are still encouraging. The economic rate of return would be 20.6 per cent and the value of foreign exchange earnings \$722 million, or \$82 million per year....Alternatively, if there were a throughout peak of 190,000 barrels per day for two years and oil prices were high, over four billion dollars would be earned in foreign exchange during the life of the project....There is therefore little doubt that if the pipeline project is completed, there will be substantial benefits from oil for the Sudanese economy.¹²⁰

"Sudan: Problems and Prospects." (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1985), March 28, 1984, p. 62.

¹¹⁹ Economist Intelligence Unit, "Quarterly Economic Review of Sudan," Annual Supplement, (London, England: The Economist Publications Ltd., 1984), p. 20.

¹²⁰ Gurdon, Sudan at the Crossroads, p. 82.

Since the South feels it has traditionally suffered from domination by the North, it rejoiced at the thought of benefiting from this discovery. However, the central government decided to build a pipeline to the more northern Red Sea coast rather than refine it in the South where it was found. This decision made it obvious to the South that the revenues earned from oil exports were not to be reinvested in the South at all. Instead, they would be dispersed at the discretion of the government in Khartoum. For the North, the oil symbolizes development. Southerners see it as the chief symptom's of Khartoum's ignorance and neglect of the southern region's needs.¹²¹ This struggle over the use of Sudan's abundant resources is yet further evidence of the inability of the Sudanese people to reach consensual agreements over matters that concern the nation as a whole.

Another approach to understanding the civil war can be appreciated by looking at regional politics and the role Ethiopia has played in the situation.

Ethiopia's Mengistu originally backed the SPLA for three major reasons:

- in retaliation for Sudanese support for Eritrean rebels

¹²¹ Wilson, Adam, "Sudan: The Road to Confrontation," African Business, August, 1984, p. 17.

- as a means to destabilize Nimeiry's regime
- as part of the radical alignment's opposition to the Egypt-Sudan-USA axis¹²²

The Ethiopian assistance to the SPLA has been substantial as it supplies logistical support, sophisticated arms, military training, and a political headquarters in Addis Ababa. In July, 1986, Mengistu arranged a meeting between Mahdi and Garang in Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa, in hopes that it would lead toward a settlement. Little was accomplished as the two were unable to come to terms regarding the role of Islamic law. Garang firmly believes that any religiously based legal system is unacceptable as it perpetuates religious discrimination and inequality. On the other hand, it appears that Mahdi feels that canceling the Islamic decrees would create critical opposition from his Muslim supporters as undermining Islam and would, therefore threaten his control of the government. When no progress was obtained, Mahdi reportedly accused Mengistu of seeking to set up a Communist regime in Sudan. He stated that he was now actively supporting Eritrean rebel groups. Hence, some believe that Mengistu will block peace efforts unless the Sudan establishes a simultaneous accord on Eritrea. But, even if Ethiopian support were withdrawn, the guerrilla fighting

¹²² Lesch, p. 813.

would most certainly continue throughout the South. The fact remains that the causes of the war are internal to Sudan. Solutions to the fight will need to address the causes behind the violence. Mahdi has not been able to confront the issue of the legal basis of rule. Because Mahdi has been unable to resolve the fundamental issues underlying the rebellion, his credibility has been damaged.¹²³ Once again, the recurring theme of a lack of legitimacy undermines any move toward progress for Sudan. As long as whole regions of the country are filled with groups who feel that they are being forced to accept Islamic law against their wills, and that their land is being exploited for its natural resources by the Northern government, mistrust and hostility will continue to dominate. Under these conditions, it is almost impossible to create acceptable ruling institutions for the country.

5.3 CONTINUING ECONOMIC TROUBLES

As Mahdi has attempted to display a sense of neutrality in the international arena, the Sudan has had to accept further economic adjustments. The bleak situation requires that the government seek international monetary and food aid as well as oil to keep the limited infrastructure working. After Nimeiry was ousted, major Arab assistance and bilateral

¹²³ Lesch, pp. 814-816.

donors resumed loans and rescheduled debt payments in order to give the new regime a chance to begin solving the nation's problems. Difficulties with the IMF continue as Mahdi has tried to resist IMF prescriptions for economic reform based on lifting critical subsidies and devaluing the Sudanese pound. Nevertheless, the IMF continues to demand an end to these subsidies before it will provide assistance. In October, 1987, Mahdi's stance against the IMF's strategies began to weaken as the government announced it had reached an agreement with the organization which would release \$4,854 million in credits over the next four years. As Sudan's arrears to the IMF are over \$600 million, the organization is unable to announce a formal agreement with Sudan.¹²⁴ However, this gesture suggests that the IMF is exercising flexibility in an effort to provide more time for Sudan to work on its problems.

The new plan included a 44 per cent currency devaluation, removal of sugar and petrol quotas, and an increase in regional taxes. Immediately, sugar prices rose 66 per cent, petrol prices 25 per cent, and the pound fell from a value of 2.5 to 4.5 per dollar.¹²⁵ Although Mahdi attempted to retain subsidies on some basic items, students rioted in

¹²⁴ Middle East Economic Survey October, 12, 1987.

¹²⁵ "War and Hunger: Sudan: Of Law and Disorder" Africa News, November, 1987, p. 10.

Khartoum and unrest spread into other provinces. This situation represents a repeat of the events that led to Nimeiry's downfall. One might easily conclude that Mahdi's approaches have been no more successful than his predecessors. In fact, not only had Mahdi failed to relieve any of the major problems he faced when he was elected, the situation in Sudan has continued to deteriorate. Since most aid is tied to political considerations, he has created doubts on the part of aid donor nations who have been supplying aid to Sudan. Mahdi's claim of neutrality has distanced former strong allies. This will be more closely examined in the next section.

5.4 FOREIGN RELATIONS

In the past decade, Sudan's diplomatic relations have been heavily influenced by the nation's need for various forms of economic assistance. This overwhelming factor exemplifies the extraordinary impact international interaction has had on this region. Pressures from Western international powers are not alone in their influences on the future status of the Sudan. Regional politics have also swayed the direction of Sudan's domestic policies. The country must carefully balance its regional politics so that it does not damage its favorable position with the USA and other Western powers. At the same time, the Sudan must try to balance its regional

politics in ways that will not alienate any of its immediate neighbors which could create added threats to its already unstable political situation.

Mahdi's attempt to express neutrality in regional conflicts has altered Sudan's position in the eyes of its neighbors as well as its ties to the West. The prime minister's efforts are complicated by the absence of a coherent foreign policy making process enhanced by the fundamental disagreements between the Umma and the DUP over regional alignments. For example, Lesch describes how Egypt apparently hoped that the DUP would carry the Sudanese elections since its policy toward Cairo had advocated friendly ties with Egypt. On the other hand, the Umma Party had traditionally been critical of special relations with Cairo. During Nimeiry's regime, political cooperation with Egypt had flourished. In fact, Nimeiry was the only Arab leader to endorse Egypt's concessions at Camp David leading to a separate Egyptian peace with Israel. Furthermore, the Nile waters make Sudan vitally important to Egypt. Ever since modern technology has made it possible to control the allocation of the Nile's water supply, close cooperation between the two nations has been especially important to Egypt. Even so, Mubarak's support for Nimeiry began to decline as a result of the implementation of Islamic law, which could have encouraged fundamentalists in Egypt, and Nimeiry's policies toward the South which helped halt the work on the Jonglei

Canal.¹²⁶ This project was expected to greatly enhance Egypt's agricultural water supply. Naturally, relations continued to cool as Mahdi stressed international neutrality. However, in February, 1987, Mahdi met with Mubarak in Cairo and signed a Brotherhood Charter, which is meant to supersede and replace the integration accords undertaken by Nimeiry.¹²⁷ It is apparent that both sides are ultimately in favor of mutual cooperation. One can see that the impact of international integration includes considerations and influences by Sudan's neighbors as well as the influence of Western powers. The effects of the 'world system' do not exclude regional political concerns.

The situation becomes even more complex in light of the fact that the plan for obtaining neutrality also included efforts to reestablish relations with Libya. "Qaddafi was quick to take advantage of the shift; he was the first head of state to visit Khartoum after Nimeiry's fall. He stopped aiding the SPLA, shipped free oil to Port Sudan, and promised emergency and development assistance, particularly to the western province of Darfur that adjoins Libya and Chad."¹²⁸ Sudanese officials were then forced to respond to the impact of this sudden, persistent, Libyan support. Obviously, no

¹²⁶ Woodward, p. 16.

¹²⁷ Lesch, p. 824.

¹²⁸ Lesch, p. 822.

new Sudanese government can switch allegiances to the Libyan suitor without provoking the combined wrath of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.¹²⁹ Hence, as Qaddafi continued to push and publicize this growing Libyan-Sudanese union, Mahdi had to insist that Libya withdraw most of its forces from Darfur and repudiate Libyan objectives in Chad, instead supporting the unity of Chad under Hissane Habre.¹³⁰ The situation is obviously delicate as the Sudanese government needs to maintain Qaddafi's friendship in order to prevent him from reverting to support for the SPLA and to continue receiving a substantial supply of oil. At the same time, however, Mahdi must balance the consequences of provoking those who oppose ties with Libya.

All of these regional factors may be viewed in light of Sudan's delicate situation within the global context. Sudan's cooperation in the international arena is vital for maintaining continued international assistance from countries surrounding the Sudan as well as those from the West. Relations with Egypt are important in that historically Egypt has had enormous influence over the Sudan. Khartoum has provided Egypt with a rear base for its air force and the

¹²⁹ Clement Henry Moore, "The Northeastern Triangle: Libya, Egypt, and the Sudan", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: International Affairs in Africa Vol. 489, January, 1987, p. 37.

¹³⁰ Lesch, p. 822.

guarantee of a friendly regime on the vital Nile and Red Sea.¹³¹ Good relations with Egypt is necessary to show the USA the Sudan's willingness to support its foreign policy goals. Tactics such as this certainly influence the USA's decisions in providing extensive assistance to developing nations. The USA is much more likely to extend aid to those countries that are both strategically important and friendly.

Contact with the Gulf states helps further illustrate Sudan's vulnerability to changing political relationships. As discussed earlier, Arab influence changed dramatically after 1973 when oil profits began to flourish for the Arab states who had wished to expand reliable sources of food supplies through large amounts of capital investment in the Sudan. Woodward explains that Saudi Arabia's interest in the Sudan was also strategic in light of the isolation of Egypt and the need for Saudi Arabia to attempt to fill the resulting political vacuum in the Arab world. Sudan's importance to Egypt has already been emphasized. Added to the facts that Sudan was seated along the Red Sea as well being adjacent to Marxist Ethiopia, Sudan became a prime recipient of concern by moderate Arab states.¹³² Although Sudan's troubled economy has been assisted financially and with oil by the Gulf states, the drop in oil prices combined with Sudan's

¹³¹ Lesch, pp. 809-810.

¹³² Woodward, p. 18-19.

failure to provide any substantial return for the aid in the form of successful agricultural exports or complimentary political commitments has resulted in a more cautious approach by Arab donors. For example, Gurdon describes that when Sudan opted to support the Camp David Agreement, the flow of Arab aid slowed and disbursements failed to match promised levels. The Arab countries were punishing Sudan for being the first country to condone a policy that had been expressly condemned by the Arab world. Arab aid had typically been characterized by being turned on and off to force Sudan to follow specific policy lines. This type of action had sometimes severe short term economic consequences. An illustration of this can be seen by the fact that following the 1973 oil price explosion, OPEC members provided its products at reduced rates to the poorest developing countries as well as increased aid to those countries. Since Sudan was Arab and strategically important to the Gulf states, it was given priority status and received relatively cheap oil during the 1970's. Thus, when oil and aid were intermittently withdrawn, the Sudanese economy was quite vulnerable and suffered.

It was partly because of the decreased amounts and unreliability of Arab aid that Sudan turned to the IMF and World Bank organizations in the late 1970's. The Sudan country officer at the World Bank, Mr. Newter, explains that the enormous increase in US interest in the Sudan was largely

initiated by this move toward IMF/World Bank support. Russ Trowdrige of the US State Department, adds that the fact that Nimeiry did not break with Egypt after the Camp David Accords provided the main impetus for increasing US assistance for Sudan.¹³³ Regional politics are certainly a vital part of the impact the broader international integration has had on the Sudan over the years. The next chapter will examine the specific role of US involvement in Sudan more closely.

¹³³ Interviews with Newter and Trowdrige, December 14, 1987.

6.0 US/SUDANESE RELATIONS

Sudan's domestic problems as well as its external relations are serious concerns to the United States. Strategically, it has been shown that the nation is of importance to two of America's allies, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In addition, Soviet support and influence in Ethiopia and Libyan adventurism provide further concerns for the USA. As discussed in Chapter Two, the USA had strongly supported the Nimeiry regime. In return for advancing American interests in the Arab world, the country received substantial military and economic assistance. Like the Arab assistance, US aid was not free of conditions. For example, through USAID, the US provided balance-of-payments assistance totaling \$506 million under the Economic Support Program to Sudan from 1980-85.¹³⁴ This assistance was in the form of cash transfers and/or commodity import financing, which included specific allocations for petroleum imports. As the Sudanese economy continued to deteriorate and the government failed to undertake economic reforms, the US began to set conditions in an attempt to reverse the situation. The USA was determined that its huge monetary support and investments in the

¹³⁴ US General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Sudan: Conditions on US Economic Aid, Washington, D.C., June 2, 1986.

Sudan would not be in vain. The following excerpt from a recent GAO publication illustrates the American desire to control the direction of the Sudanese economy.

The 1980 and 1981 ESF agreements between AID and the Sudanese government contained no specific conditions for economic policy reforms. However, AID required Sudan to take all steps necessary to make at least 50 per cent of the Commodity imports provided by ESF available to the private sector.

The 1982 and 1983 agreements contained general statements of support for reforms the government had negotiated with the IMF and had proposed its 3-year development plan. A side letter to the 1982 US-Sudan agreement included a government pledge to comply with the IMF arrangement and to:

1. improve the efficiency of parastatals in the agricultural sector
2. make progress in parastatal divestiture
3. encourage private savings and investment
4. implement a new investment code

AID conditioned its assistance on government compliance with the IMF program because it did not at that time have the in-house expertise to perform the economic reforms needed in the country.

ESF conditions in the 1984 and 1985 agreements defined the microeconomic strategies (e.g. increase exports) sought in the earlier agreements. They were also greater in number, more specifically defined, and sectoral in scope. For example, the petroleum initiatives targeted reforms within the General Petroleum Corporation (GPC) and the National Electricity Corporation (NEC). AID also addressed the need for exchange rate adjustments and improved GPC procurement procedures and NEC management and revenue collection.

AID also included provisions calling for joint AID-government studies aimed at getting government officials to understand the pressing need for reforms.¹³⁵

Goals set by AID have aimed at five major objectives:

¹³⁵ Sudan: Conditions on US Economic Aid, pp.5-6.

- strengthen the role of the private sector
- reduce the role of parastatal (public sector) companies and the subsidies the government provides to them
- increase foreign exchange generation and improve the government's ability to manage it
- increase the domestic revenue generation and resource mobilization
- improve the management of the public utilities including the General Petroleum Corporation

Overall, AID reports that the Sudanese government has not complied with AID's conditions to assist the private sector. For example, they did not allow private-sector representation on government committee meetings which concerned commodity allocations thereby denying that sector a voice in the decisions. Furthermore, government policies that include price and production controls, profit margins, overvalued exchange rates, and high labor costs have hampered US efforts to strengthen the private sector. Next, it is reported that while parastatals account for 50 per cent of the GDP, they operate at only 50 per cent of productive capacity and their chronic losses have led to indebtedness of over \$250 million. AID conditions call for a government review of the management of these parastatals. But, one must realize that Sudanese officials are quite aware of these problems. As mentioned before, correcting these situations on strictly economic

terms can and has had devastating social and political effects. The governments of Sudan view their policies and parastatals as means of control by which they can negate or modify the impact of economic problems on certain groups. The government is primarily concerned with maintaining stability and preventing loss of power. In addition, many officials have vested interests in the parastatals which would be lost if they pursued AID plans. Therefore, politically, government officials feel they simply cannot succumb to many of the conditions imposed on them. According to AID, Sudanese officials generally do not see the relationship between poor government policies and the country's economic problems nor do they support the need for reforms. The dichotomy of interests here is certainly a factor in hindering any plans for an economic recovery. Obviously, the domestic objectives differ greatly from foreign goals. If the ultimate objective, both internally and externally, is long-term equitable economic growth, strategies for obtaining that objective do not represent such a shared viewpoint. The dream that emerged in the 1950's and 1960's to develop Africa with Western capital, technology, ideology and even Western values has long since become a nightmare for the people of Africa. Simply, development has not worked. Who is to say that the implementation of contemporary Western 'remedies' will not also prove to be an overwhelming failure? It is no wonder

that countries like the Sudan are wary of continued external integration.

Another major drawback for compliance with both IMF and US conditional terms has been the introduction of Islamic law. The law resulted in the introduction of a Zakat "wealth" tax to replace some of the traditional taxes. Substitution of the Zakat, an obligatory Islamic tax, for traditional taxes resulted in less revenue generation for the government and caused major disruption in the banking and private sectors.

From April 1984, the implementation of the Islamization program was stepped up under martial law shortly before the IMF and Sudanese authorities began consultations on the terms and conditions of the 1984-85 Stand-By Agreement that was to have become operative on May 31, 1984. At the same time, the government was preparing its 1984-85 budget, which together with the implications of Islamization was to be the main subject of the IMF's final review before approving the Stand-By Agreement. Unexpectedly, the authorities announced that there would be no regular budget for the 1984-85 year. The first Islamic budget was actually presented at the end of August. A pre-announced main feature of this was the abolition of all profits and income taxes (as well as some direct taxes) to be replaced by Zakat (the compulsory alms payment), the precise details of which were still to have been worked out. What was decided, however, was that the Zakat Fund would not be pooled with the other revenues of the central government's budget, but would be managed independently. This amounted to a reduction of an estimated 250 million Sudanese pounds from the central government's 1984-85 revenues--about 20 per cent of anticipated 1984-85 tax revenues. Each of these changes, and in particular, Zakat, were contrary to the main objectives and spirit of the Economic Recovery Program, and at the same time they made it virtually impossible for the IMF to project changes of key macroeconomic targets in the

years to come and to stipulate precise performance criteria.¹³⁶

As already discussed, another major consequence of the implementation of the Islamization program was that it further fueled Southern discontent and, therefore, the civil war in the South. This led to a greater diversion of the resources of the central government and the disruption of oil operations in the South. Other reasons for non-compliance include the societal impacts of the 1984 drought which disrupted agricultural production, reduced exports, and further restrained government resources. Finally, the 1985 coup created enormous uncertainty and resulted in the interim government reimposing price subsidies to subsidize the cost of living of the lower classes.

The GAO report adds that most US officials consistently emphasized the political importance of assistance to Sudan and the fact that the Nimeiry regime had been extremely pro-American. In fact, some AID officials stated that economic support payments were viewed as support for a friendly government rather than as a vehicle for initiating economic reforms. US assistance was used to prevent Soviet and Libyan influence in the region during the Nimeiry regime. Since his overthrow, the aid has aimed at retaining some influence and balancing that of the Libyans. A hearing before the subcom-

¹³⁶ Brown, p. 505.

mittee on Africa of the House Committee of Foreign Affairs on March 28, 1984 explained that Sudan is a country of significant strategic importance to the US, particularly to US interests in the Near East and Southwest Asia. That is, the Nimeiry regime shared major US objectives of countering Soviet influence in the Arab world and Africa, achieving a Middle East settlement with guarantees for Israel's security, and facilitating operational flexibility of US military forces in the region.¹³⁷ As the USA depends on a stable and friendly Sudan for vital strategic support, the Sudan looks to the USA to help with its critical economic and security needs. Although the situation in Sudan has changed under the new prime minister, these comments serve to illustrate the strategic importance of the country over any humanitarian interests America might hold for the Sudanese people. Rather than stressing indigenous growth and reform for the people of the country itself, the US government focuses on concern for its own military maneuvers in the area, repayment of debts owed to the United States, and the survival of American firms in Sudan.

There is also some question as to the impact of US foreign policy on the Sudan's domestic conflict. One could argue that some of the security monies are used to militarily

¹³⁷ Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa, "Sudan: Problems and Prospects," March 28, 1984, p. 21.

smother the Southern discontent. Noel Koch, deputy assistant secretary of defense, explains that the American regulations state that there is to be no military assistance for police purposes or for any internal repression of civilians. James Bishop, deputy assistant secretary for African Affairs, contradicts this by saying that the text of our military assistance agreement with Sudan authorizes the use of American military equipment for self-defense and for the maintenance of internal security.¹³⁸ In a similar subcommittee hearing on Africa concerning foreign assistance legislation for fiscal years 1986-87, Howard Wolpe, chairman, points out that given the importance of the Southern situation in the economic and military crisis in Sudan, it is surprising that the USA has not suspended its military aid program. In fact, Wolpe states that although the US administration has strongly urged President Nimeiry to pursue a political rather than a military solution to the southern problem, he sees no evidence that the continued provision of military assistance has done anything but encourage the effort to seek a military solution to the southern conflict.¹³⁹ On the other hand, some argue that the Sudanese government is not pursuing a military victory in the South. Rather, the USA has provided

¹³⁸ "Sudan: Problems and Prospects," pp. 39-40.

¹³⁹ Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 5, 7, and 19, 1985, p. 115.

Sudan with certain types of equipment to be used in Sudan's external defense. The external threats are from Libya and from intrusions and interference from Ethiopia in the other direction. This viewpoint contends that the USA has made it very clear that the use of American military equipment in the South, for which it is not adapted nor appropriate, would be a matter to cause the US to reconsider the program.¹⁴⁰

In an interview with Russ Trowdrige of the US State Department, Trowdrige explained that it is difficult to channel US military assistance directly for specific US goals. US military aid to Sudan is primarily intended to secure the nation's Western border. Even as Mahdi has attempted to re-establish relations with Qaddafi, the American government still views Libya as a destabilizing force in the region and intends to aid in securing Sudan's capabilities to protect itself.¹⁴¹ Mr. Newter of the World Bank adds that although he believes that American assistance is primarily used as it is intended, any support for the government of Sudan is inherently support against the Southern cause. Since the government ultimately controls the allocation of its resources, it would not be unlikely that some of its revenues are diverted for uses other than those specified. Thus, like the

¹⁴⁰ "Foreign Assistance Legislation For Fiscal years 1986-87, (Part 7)," pp.115-116.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Trowdrige, December 14, 1987.

IMF stabilization programs, although the intentions of much of the international intervention into Sudan may be positive in the eyes of the power that intervenes, the actual domestic consequences may differ dramatically.

At this point, one may want to ask why the United States would want to help militarily suppress uprisings in Southern Sudan in the first place. First, one must remember that the SPLA has been consistently aided by Communist Ethiopia and intermittently by the Libyans. Furthermore, the USA has important interests in the oil and gas discoveries, as already discussed. Added to the fact that Nimeiry's government has been so supportive of Western political interests, it would appear clear that repressing the South's demands might be in the best interest of the American government.

What impact has the enormous amount of US intervention had on the Sudan? To begin, Mr. Newter of the World Bank, explains that in light of the extensive mechanization of the agriculture that exists primarily in the Eastern part of Sudan, the environmental degradation has been enormous. He continues that in this predominantly rain-fed area, tractors are used to produce sorghum, the main food staple for the country. Although the area experiences low yields on large expanses of land, the overall production rate for the area has increased and has resulted in profits for the growers. Yet, since the farmers are experiencing some short-term profits, they may not always be compelled to follow the more

difficult farming techniques that would ensure a positive environmental balance in the future. As a result, long-term damage, primarily in the form of erosion, ensues. One reason why this has happened is that the Sudanese government, with encouragement from international donors, has given priority to the potential export crops in the irrigated sectors over food production in the rainfed areas. In the long run, the success of farming in the rain-fed sectors will rely on greater government intervention to reverse the destruction of these once fertile lands so that they can be used to produce Sudan's food supply. Mr. Newter explains that the irrigated sectors have not suffered from the problems that the rain-fed areas have experienced. Partly as a result of closer government involvement, there has been no degradation of the soils. Overall, this sector has experienced a much higher success rate. Again, this reflects the fact that the irrigated agricultural schemes are largely used for producing crops that can provide export revenue for the country and, therefore, capture greater government involvement.

A statement by Bona Malwal, senior research associate of the Institute of African Studies at Columbia, reflects on the impact on American aid on the Sudan. He states that,

One cannot see how American aid can be effectively used in the Sudan under the prevailing circumstances in that country. The central government has already suspended aid to Southern Sudan under the pretext of insecurity. Even food which the USA and other governments are providing for the famine in the Sudan does not reach the South. The regime of President Nimeiry has found it a

convenient weapon in its war arsenal with which to starve the population in the South. American military aid is already being used in the civil war in the South. Any new program will undoubtedly be used against the South. The economic aid, even if it were properly used will be spent only in the North. By providing the North now with both the economic and military aid, the US will effectively contribute to the political and military problems of the Sudan. The only chance for the Sudan becoming a strong and reliable ally of the US or any other country lies in a regime in Khartoum which looks at Southern and Northern Sudan as coalition components of one diverse country which must recognize and balance these diversities in a secular system of government...The US would be using its aid resources to perpetuate the division of the Sudan and prevent the coming together of its people in a compromise since the present regime will have no incentive to negotiate while it enjoys the military and economic support of the US.¹⁴²

In respect to these arguments, Malwal stated that although the people of Sudan desperately need aid, and would benefit from it a great deal under different circumstances, the suspension of American aid, whether it was economic or political, would have been the best decision for the moment. He argued that this would have brought Nimeiry to realize that even his own allies, including the USA, would not support him without him effecting reforms that would bring the people of Sudan into greater political participation within their own country. The President would have had to go to the people, seek reconciliation, seek politics of consensus, bring at least the majority of the people of the country into the limelight of the political arena of the country, and there-

¹⁴² "Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1986-87," (Part 7), pp. 179-180.

fore, come to the USA supported by the country as he did before. From these arguments, one may question whether or not extensive international intervention into the Sudan has been beneficial for the country as a whole.

Mr. Newter of the World Bank supports international assistance to Sudan by explaining that by the time a country like Sudan turns to institutions like the IMF, World Bank, or the US government, the situation is already desperate. The currency is overvalued, inflation is high, there is extreme government expenditure, and import levels are too high. This only represents a few of many major structural problems within the economy. Recovery programs are designed to reverse the situation. Although parts of the program are painful for many of the Sudanese population, Newter explains that this pain is part of the process of creating an impact on the economy. Without attempting any reform, the devastation would be worse than the remedy. It is too simple to say that the program designs hurt the urban poor. It is much more complex than that. Newter continues that institutions like the IMF have already been exceptionally flexible. During the summer of 1987, the organization agreed to allow some subsidies as concessions to the consumers in light of the delicate political situation in Sudan. It is yet to be seen if this is good or bad. It may serve to damage the underlying purposes of the program. Ultimately, it appears that success is determined from the perspective of the judge. Are the

recovery programs aimed at preserving certain levels of economic and social development for the people of Sudan or are they meant to change the structure of the Sudanese economy to fit the economic environment of the international scenario? Even further, does this dichotomy have to exist?

Chapter Three has shown that despite massive amounts of American aid, the Sudanese economy continued to deteriorate. After the fall of Nimeiry, the new government has attempted to maintain the supply of essential US aid while simultaneously backing away from its former status as a client state of the USA. This move primarily took the form of establishing a distance from the military dimensions of the relationship. Sudan proclaimed that it would not provide military bases for the USA or participate in the joint military maneuvers that had been scheduled for the summer of 1985. Combined with the resurgence of Sudanese-Libyan relations and the distancing from Egypt, the American government began to question the extensive degree of assistance being provided to such a politically inconsistent nation. After US bombings of Libya in April, 1986, anti-American demonstrations began in Khartoum and much of the staff at the American embassy was evacuated.¹⁴³ It appeared that US-Sudanese relations were certainly threatened. As soon as Mahdi became prime minister, however, he attempted to resume more positive re-

¹⁴³ Lesch, p. 819.

lations between the two countries. "Nevertheless, the 1986 level of aid turned out to be \$126 million, only a third that of the previous year; military support funds were reduced from \$45 million to \$19 million. The reduction reflected in part the end of the famine and in part the cool bilateral relationship."¹⁴⁴ Lesch describes how Mahdi visited Washington in October, 1986 and stressed the idea that Sudan shared American political values. He maintained that continued US support was necessary to help establish firm democratic institutions within the country. The USA responded with promises for new assistance programs.

Even so, in 1987, the new Sudanese government was allocated only \$5 million in military aid and about \$65 million in economic aid. This represents two-thirds of the 1986 level which had only been a third of the 1985 level. Projections for 1988 appear to call for similar amounts. When committee chairman, Wolpe, inquired about the reasons behind this drop in aid levels in the March, 1985 subcommittee hearings, Frank Wisner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, responded that the US was in the process of working with the Sudanese government to put together an economic package that would permit economic stabilization in the Sudan and a reasonable resumption of economic growth. He continued to state that, "when the con-

¹⁴⁴ Lesch, p. 321.

ditions present, which have been made very clear and discussed in depth with the Sudanese government, take full shape, it will be possible for us to expend the funds that we have in mind for the Sudan." Mark Edelman, assistant administrator for Africa, USAID, adds that, "...all of our aid for ESF...have conditions present that must be met before we can disburse them...These are agreements that we reached, that we signed, with the Sudanese Government...And when they meet those conditions, we will disburse those funds." When asked to describe what conditions were at issue, Edelman responded that, "in the case of petroleum, they had to come up with a certain amount of money. They had to agree to reform diesel prices. They had to change some of their marketing procedures...they need to devalue their currency and get a hold of their budget deficit, among other features."¹⁴⁵

This information helps illustrate the idea that US aid is indeed tied to the political aspirations of the recipient country. Compliance with both economic and political conditions are necessary for the US to continue allocating large amounts of assistance to the Sudan. The recent trend to decrease and withhold the American assistance supports the idea that unless the Sudanese government cooperates with the conditions placed on the distribution of the aid, it will be

¹⁴⁵ Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years, 1986-87, (Part 7), pp. 113-114.

withdrawn. The USA will not justify allocating greater amounts of assistance until Mahdi can illustrate a coherent economic strategy that would include lifting some state controls, altering the exchange rate, and reducing the rate inflation. These measures are in accord with conditions set by the IMF. As mentioned in Chapter Four, these enormous pressures from international intervention by powerful institutions and foreign governments to accept these conditions have persuaded Mahdi to begin to conform even at the risk of undermining his somewhat shaky political control. Once again, the internal political weaknesses of the Sudan have undermined any opportunity to acquire legitimacy, domestically or internationally. The overwhelming lack of traditional unity within the Sudan still plagues the nation by hindering its ability to successfully function in the world system.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The conventional theoretical and analytical debate surrounding the causes of underdevelopment attempts to classify or label those causes primarily within an internal-external dichotomy. Although these approaches do highlight the forces that contribute toward underdevelopment, they tend to limit the opportunity to broaden the understanding to include the blend or combination of forces that prevent political and economic growth. In questioning the internal-external approach to analyzing Third World development, one may instead examine the situation more in terms of a single process where interactions among both internal and external factors create opportunities as well as constraints for economic and political development.

In the Sudan example, the emergence of the overwhelming degree of international intervention has had an enormous impact on the standard of living of the Sudanese people. Primarily beginning in colonial times, "...the economic interests of the European powers led them to structure agricultural production so as to maximize their colonies' foreign-exchange earning capacity. Only this way could they assure European investors a satisfactory return on their capital, and guarantee that the colonial territory would be able to become involved in European trade on a self-financing

basis."¹⁴⁶ Since that time, massive investment from the Arab world and eventually the Western powers has continued to influence the direction of the development of the Sudanese economy.

Internally, in an effort to quickly modernize, government planners have concentrated on the development of the export sector at the expense of the economically impoverished peasant, food-producing sector. Partly as a result of this aim, famines developed and became widespread and the overall standard of living of the majority of the Sudanese people deteriorated. Consequently, an overwhelming sense of social unrest quickly became prominent, adding to the already existing instability. Held accountable for these deteriorating living conditions, the Sudanese Government has suffered an enormous legitimacy crisis illustrated primarily through coups, coup attempts, riots, and protests against those in power. This lack of consensual support has led the government to be characterized by a political system of personal rule based on favors, promises, personal loyalties, and coercion. This type of power is ultimately subject to disaffection in the event of economic decline. In efforts to prevent this disaffection, the regime has adopted policies that at least give the the illusion of economic stability.

¹⁴⁶ Michael F. Lofchie, "Political and Economic Origins of African Hunger," The Journal of Modern African Studies, (1975), Vol. 13, No. 4, p.557.

"Pricing policies, marketing boards, exchange rates, taxation practices, and provision of credit and inputs are the central ways in which African governments have intervened."¹⁴⁷ The use of subsidies, for example, placed enormous demands on the already limited government revenue. Faced with increasing budget deficits, the government then turned to a reliance on increasing amounts of foreign aid in an effort to survive. The dependency that resulted has made the Sudan vulnerable to various political and economic conditions set by the major donors. As long as the survival of those in power in the Sudan continues to rely on external aid, Sudanese leaders will not be able to bargain for a more equitable position in the world system. From this perspective, one can see that internal weaknesses combined with external influences have largely been responsible for the declining living conditions of the majority of the Sudanese people.

Obtaining some sense of internal legitimacy could begin to reduce the number of overwhelming constraints the Sudan presently faces. That is, with the support of the majority of the population behind them, Sudanese leaders could possess greater leverage in negotiating with world powers. Presently, however, the external influence over the direction of a number of Sudan's domestic policies continues to undermine the development of legitimacy within the government. The

¹⁴⁷ Payne, p. 156.

instability that results has become more apparent as the use of repressive force by the government increases in order to maintain some degree of political control. Until these underlying fundamental problems are addressed more directly, the situation in the Sudan and other African countries facing similar dilemmas is likely to continue to decline.

The external conditions, such as the reliance on a biased, unbalanced system of international exchange, that have been thrust upon developing nations like the Sudan, have certainly heavily influenced the direction of development policies within these countries. But, again, external forces do not determine internal responses or the consequences that follow. Major internal factors, such as the vast geographical differences within the region, have helped deter Sudan's struggle to develop both politically and economically. Because subsistence agriculture has traditionally been the source of livelihood for the majority of the population, the geographical separation has largely been responsible for the evolution of the cultural differences that have ensued. It is difficult to achieve a sense of unity and nationalism among such extensively diverse groups of people. Often, attempts to integrate these diverse groups are met with hostility and resentment. In the Sudanese case, the geological and cultural differences were greatly responsible for the regionally unbalanced growth that eventually occurred. The social unrest that grew as regional disparities became more dominant

eventually helped ignite the civil war. The emergence of this violence has served to complicate an already difficult situation as it helps obstruct the growth of a political system that could possibly participate more equitably in the international scene.

I have shown that Nimeiry attempted to unify and develop the Sudan through ambitious development projects funded by external investors. When these efforts failed, he turned to foreign assistance as a means of political survival. The economic crisis that followed required still more international intervention. Today, Prime Minister Mahdi is struggling to balance this international integration in ways that will ensure the continuing influx of assistance without succumbing to conditions that threaten his already weakened political stability. Thus far, Mahdi has not been very successful in implementing any new approach to the dilemma. Instead, he, like Nimeiry, has had to continue to follow the direction dictated by the world system. The fact remains that the Sudanese Government has not been capable of successfully handling the transition into the global arena. As domestic problems accrued, the Sudan experienced greater internationalization of its crisis. The institutional weaknesses and the lack of political legitimacy have led the country to turn to powerful international actors such as the USA, IMF, and World Bank to help maintain some degree of political order.

The success of this strategy is yet to be determined. The future for Sudan does not look promising as the economy continues to deteriorate and the political situation remains shaky. The circumstances are self-perpetuating in that as social unrest grows and legitimacy declines, reliance on foreign assistance increases in efforts by Sudanese leaders to stay in power. Yet, as reliance on foreign powers increases, legitimacy decreases further still. It is not likely that any leaders will turn away foreign assistance, especially in light of their present debt crisis. Hence, the Sudan will continue to rely on extensive amounts of international assistance as long as it is available. Western foreign donors will most likely continue to supply the Sudan with aid for fear of even greater economic losses from their investments as well as the fear that opposing political powers may attempt to use the Sudan's vulnerabilities to politically intervene from the left. "There is no escaping the inevitable entanglement of the IMF and the World Bank in the bureaucratic and larger political milieus in which they operate."¹⁴⁸ Ironically, although it is partly the result of internationalization that led the Sudan to its present demise, the Sudan will largely depend on continued international support to direct it towards recovery.

¹⁴⁸ Haggard, p. 534.

Like with any research project, one might end with question marks. It is certainly questionable whether or not external strategies such as those prescribed by the IMF and World Bank will work. Approaching the Third World predicament from a strictly economic perspective ignores the unlimited, often detrimental, social consequences that occur. On the other hand, according to Western analysts, it is also questionable whether or not the internal approaches are appropriate for long-term economic growth. Domestically, however, they are seen as necessary in the eyes of government officials in order to prevent utter chaos within their nation's borders. So many complex, varied, and evolving phenomena exist which have equally as many economic, social, and political effects and implications, it is impossible to determine with precision the outcome of any strategies. Regardless of these assumptions, the future of the Sudan and other Third World countries will be largely determined by how contemporary elites, both internal and external, respond to and approach the intricate web of forces that undermine development. Therefore, it is vital that the crisis of underdevelopment be understood in its entirety, as a single process, rather than papered over with simplistic internal-external labels, in order that we appreciate the costs and benefits of growing economic integration and its distribution.

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