ARCHITECTURE AS CREATIVE WILL
IN THE A-TECTONIC AESTHETIC ORDER
(AN ARCHITECTURE-THEORETICAL INQUIRY ACCORDING
TO FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE'S CONCEPT OF ORDER)

BY

MARKUS BREITSCHMID

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APPROVED:

MICHAEL J. O'BRIEN, CHAIRMAN
RON W. DANIEL
H. SCOTT GARTNER

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COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN: MICHAEL O'BRIEN
ARCHITECTURE

(ABSTRACT)

The thesis participates in the critical evaluation of the modernist concept of 'homogenizing of cultural differences', and in the narrower architectural context against the idea of the type, module, and system.

Although the thesis is as such a part of the post modernist demand for an emphasis of cultural heterogeneity which is characterized by a newly understood responsibility of creative acting and 'otherness', the inquiry suggests an opposed approach to the handling of such creative tension and propounds that the pantheistic and deterministic culture can be interrupted actively by an concept of order according to competitive individual expression.

Pertaining to architecture, the deep suspicion towards systematization and rationalization is expressed in the rejection of the 'type in architecture' which leads to a critique of an architecture which has its essence in structure.

The thesis recognizes the materialist tectonic principle as a manifestation which tries to find its justification in the oneness of man with nature; moreover, such an architectural understanding tends to make the various individual forces evolve to a norm.

The thesis dismisses such a motivation and argues that man aims towards the expression of architectural symbols which spring immediately from the creator's character and manifest man's image of his values and his place in the universe.

The thesis further argues that the a-tectonic 'will to form' acts through the contest of individuals and that the creation of architecture is supported by the 'Dionysian' cognitive qualities of the architectural material space.
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

In the 19th century, Europe was subject to very heterogeneous influences. The intellectual discourse of architectural theory in Europe came into prominence during the same period.

While the range of architectural inquiry had encompassed matters of civil architecture, the normative theories of orders, and investigations on geometry, the historical and philosophical discourse from the nineteenth century on has taken, in a intensity never seen before, a stand on architecture and perpetrated a lasting impact on the theories.

Of course, the previous century had far reaching consequences for this occurrence and makes the threshold from the 18th to the 19th century arbitrary. After recovering from the effects of warfare and revolutionary turmoil the cultural circle of the western and central European countries began to develop the features characteristic of modernism: the adaptation of the ethics of the Protestant reformation, the increasingly mechanistic interpretation of the world, and a change in casting the social hierarchies.

In the scholarly realm, the forces of the intellectual discourse led away from Christianity to an investigation of first order causes, and the birth of scientific history and of modern aesthetics.

The quest of nature and origin of architecture were taken up in the philosophical work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant and the historical inquiry of Johann Joachim Winkelmann.

With the publication of Alexander Baumgarten’s ‘Aesthetica’ in 1750, the theory of the arts claimed an autonomous position as a branch of philosophy. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe opened the discussion of multi-cultural issues surrounding
the understanding of architecture with the publication of his essay 'Ueber Deutsche Baukunst' in 1792.

In the 19th century, thinkers in the various academic fields of literature, religion, philosophy, history, sociology and politics took a lively part in the architectural discussion. At the beginning of the new century, most prominently, von Schelling, Hegel, and Arthur Schopenhauer contributed to the understanding of architecture in a world of expanding epistemological sources. Romanticism, aesthetically, became the rebellion against the 'institutionalized' understanding of art. In the mid nineteenth century, the onto-theological world had to face the biggest disappointments in history since Copernicus' revolution. Darwin shook the biological 'Weltbild' in bringing evidence that there is no cardinal difference between man and the lower species. Apart from an increased activity in the sciences and in politics, the modern 'Weltbild' had to face the theological and psychological disappointment: a never before experienced secularization swept over the enlightened world, followed by the recognition that man is a 'animalia irrationalia' (Sigmund Freud). Whether Darwin and Freud's scientific discoveries were really the essentials which lead the world change in a very rapid manner may well be doubted. Nonetheless, both occurrences are symbolic landmarks and responsible for the popularization of a changing understanding of man and his understanding and, thus, they must be seen at least as the driving forces behind a movement which was able to suspend the homogeneity of the modern world within few years. These achievements show, on one hand, in an impressive manner the process of becoming mature, of enlightenment but, on the other hand, also the loss of 'center conceptuality', of 'innocence', and of 'security'.

1) Textbook 'Erkenntnis und Sein II - Ontologie', p.12
The Scope of this Study

The goal of this thesis is to examine the assemblage of criteria which constitute the architectural discourse, both, in practice and theory in the late 20th century. The study participates in the critical discourse opposing the modernist 'homogenizing of culture' and evaluating the means for casting a world of an increased heterogeneity.

Thus the thesis is a part of the post modernist discussion, it distances itself clearly from all positions held by any of the current position. As indicated, the thesis holds a deep suspicion against the 'heterogenizing of culture' as proposed, and in many part largely achieved, by all the proponents of an 'everything goes' and 'everything is of equal validity' mentality.

The thesis makes the argument that despite the resolution of the modern project, our culture should not devaluate or even annihilate the very striving of man: the drive to master .....the curiosity to know.

The thesis is concerned with the fact that the post modernist critic legitimizes exactly the worst part of its ancestor: the sterilization of values. The thesis opposes the 'disinterested' and 'ascetic' moralities. The thesis takes a very critical look at the increasingly celebrated relationship of man with the environment which shouldn't be estimated as a model for the man-made. This investigation shows that our liberal conception of order fragments meaning and the good inherently and can be considered at best as a ethical conception of second-rate. The thesis proposes a conception of order which not intentionally imposes a set mode on anybody based in the ethics of Friedrich Nietzsche's 'Homer's Contest' which is yielding, not to Christian ethics but to the Greek understanding of life.
The inquirer argues that the creation of values and the shaping of one's own character is the essential means not only to experience a love for life but also to create great architecture. Exactly because the shaping of one's own character is of greatest importance, and architecture is a means to it, the creation is more than the post modernist representation of a sign - it is a symbol of the architect's metaphysical concept. The goal of architecture is the objectified expression of the architect's character .....to elevate the 'metaphysical' worth of life.

This choice will lead us to consider the writings of Nietzsche on the identity of art and the ethical foundation of the artistic creation as a part of a greater discourse on the modern and postmodern condition of life in the late twentieth century. Since Nietzsche’s writings touch deeply on the issues concerning the identity of architecture, this study is organized around the examination of his questioning of several key areas of the foundation of ‘being in the world’ - the ethical condition of man and his ‘metaphysical’ value-judgments.

The discipline of architecture does not stay apart from these broad cultural considerations pertaining to the relationship between man and man and nature. The thesis draws and criticizes heavily the 'moralized' understanding of modern architecture. Once one focuses on the ‘moralities of life’, it takes very little imagination to see architecture as the objectified mirror of the condition of our life. The constant systematization and rationalization can be expressed easily in architectural terminology: repetition, system, module, pattern, type, element. The rejection of 'type in architecture' leads to a deep suspicion towards an architecture which has the tendency to evaluate its essence as lying in the structure of constraints and influences (utilitarian purpose, material, technique). The weakness of an architecture focusing on the structural approach to architecture is often mentioned in
the critical inquiries of architects. The obvious lack is the focus on the content of architecture, and I do mean this literally. While we look at a photograph of a spatial configuration there is 'no content' but in the reality of architecture content undoubtedly exists. The content of architecture is the architectural space in which man lives and moves. All their actions, indeed their whole physical, psychological and spiritual life as it takes place within is the content of architecture. I think that the best expression, perhaps with greater clarity than any other writers have shown, is but this one paragraph of the English theorist Geoffrey Scott's discourse of the supremacy of space as the tool for creating great architecture:

'... and here is the very centre of architecture..... architecture has much that it holds in common with sculpture, and more that it shares with music. But it has also its peculiar province and a pleasure which is typically its own. It has the monopoly of space. Architecture alone of the arts can give space its full value..... but architecture deals with space directly; it uses space as a material and sets us in the midst.....'

'.....Criticism has singularly failed to recognize this supremacy in architecture of spatial values. The tradition of criticism is practical. The habits of our mind are fixed on matter.... space comes. Space is 'nothing' - a mere negation of the solid. And thus we come to overlook it.

But though we may overlook it, space affects us and can control our spirit; and a large part of the pleasure we obtain from architecture..... to enclose a space is the object of building..... and all architecture springs from that necessity. But aesthetically space is even more supreme. The architect models in space as a sculptor in clay. He designs his space as a work of art; that is, he attempts through its means to excite a certain mood in those who enter it..... once again his appeal is to movement. Space, in fact, is liberty of movement....'

Geoffrey Scott, 'Architecture of Humanism'
Indeed, the fixity on matter in architecture leads to an opposition between type and design (Gestaltung). The modernist idea that one still may design the type countered Goethe already two hundred years ago as he indicated that 'multiplied littleness does not make greatness'.

2) The tendency that the individual idea is in defense in an architectural understanding of the unity and harmony of nature, men, and God is plain. It is a fact that the tectonic principle is seen as an a-personal expression of pantheistic being and finds its justification in the oneness of man with nature.

Consequently, in the tectonic understanding of architecture the various individual forces must be evolve to a norm. I dismiss such a motivation: the type is never the goal, man aims towards the expression of architectural symbols which are the images of man's highest specimens ....eternally.

The counter force to the 'Dionysian' pantheism of the tectonic is the indeterministic 'will to form' which acts through contest of individuals as the a-tectonic principle in which the various empowered and talented individuals hesitate the formation of a 'common design'.

2) Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 'Ueber deutsche Baukunst', 1832

3) Remark: This understanding is partly taken from Alois Riegl's theory of the 'Kunstwollen' which is explained shortly later in the footnotes.
THE WILLFUL MUSE

On the following pages, before making the defense of my hypothesis, I'd like to
give some more general thoughts to architecture which make up a considerable part
of my architectural position but do not belong to the main argument of this thesis.

Since we all have read at least the first ten pages of Marcus Vitruvius Pollio's
discourse, everyone conceives of the wide spectrum the discipline of architecture is
encompassing. 4 To justify Vitruvius' ideal of an architect, one needs to be
something similar to an 'uomo universale'. The conclusion of such a quest of
embodiment for an architect is letting us assume that architecture, independent of a
certain time and place, always has been understood as a very complex discipline.
No one seriously doubts that architecture is a phenomena interdependent on a
cultural background of various influences. A history of architecture can be
understood as a sequence of contra dictionary, but more or less regular processes. A
discourse which would like to justify just the most important of the numerous
relations of architecture needs to analyze its various interpretations such as political,
philosophical, religious, scientific, economic, social, materialist, technical,
psychological, and formalist considerations. I do not at all dismiss a 'roundabout'
approach to architectural understanding, in fact, I would advocate 'the widest
possible spectrum towards architecture'. On the other hand, I recognize the
importance of not forgetting that the above mentioned disciplines are architecture-
extern fields and have their own rules. Architecture possesses its own rules too.

4) Marcus Vitruvius Pollio, 'Baukunst', Chapter one, p.13
To be knowledgeable about all architectural affiliations does not secure for the architect that his object will be of high quality.

This shall not be some sort of mysticism enhancing the already foggy landscape of the architect's designing desk, but the confident indication that the discipline of architecture has its own provinces.
ARCHITECTURE AS SUCH

Architecture is not primarily an expression of all the presuppositions and influences. Architecture is not essentially an expression of its own history, the development in the last few thousand years; not of its own theory; not of its place. First of all, architecture is a own discipline with its own inherent legitimacy. Theselegimates are space and form. Interestingly enough, the architectural discourse - the making of architecture as well as the reflection of architecture - has not been held in terms of these essential attributes of the discipline. As Geoffrey Scott states correctly, we are not accustomed to thinking in terms of space, and because scholars of architecture have failed to apply or not even noticed the studying of buildings from a spatial point of view.

Everyone who has thought even casually about the subject knows that the specific property of architecture consists in its working with a three-dimensional vocabulary. Painting, sketches, films, even computer animation function in two dimensions, even if it is able to suggest three or more. Sculpture has to some degrees similarities to architecture thus it has three dimensions, but most sculpture let man remain apart, looking on from the outside. Architecture, like sculpture has an outer space, however, it is like a great hollowed-out sculpture which man enters and apprehends by moving about within it.

When you commission a building, the architect usually shows you some configuration of black lines on white paper; in other words, he represents the architectural volume by breaking it down into planes which enclose and divide it. The plan of a building, has reality only on paper and its only justification is the
necessity of measuring the distances between the various elements of the
construction for the practical execution of the work.
Not only does architecture not consist in the sum of its dimensions of the structural
elements, even more, its essential feature is not the structure which encloses space,
but in the void itself, the space in which man lives and moves.
SOME DISTINCTIONS

We have to clarify some misguiders. The claim that the two chief legitimates of architecture are dependent on material, dependent on construction, and dependent on function can not be taken as a necessity.

If we are concerned with the relationship of these features to the aesthetic quality of architecture, one can even deny any first-hand connection. The architectural form (void and solid) has priority over morality and structure; architecture is no function of nature, order, geometry and module.

The material of which architecture is made is not necessarily a form-giving factor. We have countless examples around the world that the 'logical' relation breaks between material and space/form. The architectural vocabulary has not changed rapidly over time, conversely, nobody will seriously claim that for concerns of material. What the architect is dealing with is much more a morphological principle than the following of exact rules according to a certain material. The radical division of space/form with material does not hinder architectural quality at all.

'Constructive logic' and created space/form have no need to build up a coalition. The predictability and visibility of the constructive principle may in certain cases help to underlay the beauty of a building, but the congruity of space/form and construction is not, even in one of the masterpieces, the essential criteria what accounts for it as a masterpiece. Certain scholars value certain buildings just because the fulfillment of the predictability of its constructive logic is a fact of a fragmented view towards the art of building. Ideologically, these scholars are not interested in priority in architecture but in sociological aspects of our society. Many masterpieces of architecture, actually, turn the 'constructive logic' on its head and create in 'the unconsciousness of constructive principles' (Michelangelo's 'Bibliotheca
Laurenziana's history-making element is the double-column which has no static function at all; and even Mies van der Rohe's, who is so famous for developing his architectural forms from the methods of industrial production and construction to dismantle their own aesthetics, disregards that fact in his masterpiece in Barcelona. If there is no direct causal connection between material and space/form or construction and space/form, so this also counts for the relationship of functionality of architecture and the spatial configuration of architecture. Functions are usually of such a complexity, especially since they emerge in bundles, that they are not translatable into design in a linear manner. Also here, we can value functionalism as not more than a metaphorical principle (most of the buildings which is part of the movement we celebrate today as 'Functionalism' are not functionalist as such e.g. Le Corbusier, Luckhardt & Anker). 5

On the other hand, we all admire Andrea Palladio's 'Villa Rotonda' which is not developed out of the functions which are of importance in the inside. While perhaps the 'Bauhaus' in Dessau is the formulation of its immediate program, Aldo Rossi or Hans Hollein do not follow the 'functionalist logic'.

There is another underlying force on which architecture is constructed: Space & form is the projection of the creative ego into the architectural object. The creator's essential tool is his character which is formed by constraints and influences. In that way the individual creator is in immediate control of the forces which influence his architecture.

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5) Juhani Pallasmaa: 'From Metaphorical to Ecological Functionalism', A + U 1993, vol.6, p. 77
The configuration of space & form is beyond its coherence of material, construction, and function. The combination of 'basis-column-capital' survives as abstract principle through all changes of history. There is also no necessary expression of a social order in architecture: Charles Fourier has translated for his revolutionary social-utopic 'Phalanstère' the schema of the absolutist-monarchic castle of Versailles; the Utopia of the socialist society related exactly to what it sought to overcome.
THE TRAITS OF ARCHITECTURE

'The Goal of Architecture is the objectified expression of the architect's character into a symbol created according to the a-tectonic principle.... to elevate the metaphysical worth of one's own life'.

To achieve a common ground, let me begin with something on which we all should agree: creation is an individual act. It is an intellectual error to believe that an addition of minds leads to a more elevated result. It is impossible to conceptualize such a thing like a collective mind. Supposing Michelangelo would participate in a competition for an architectural object, and Michelangelo himself would be challenged by a group constituted of all the professors and students in architecture of a certain school, Michelangelo still would win the competition as long there is not another single mind which is qualitatively better than Michelangelo's. Creation is not a quest of quantity but of quality.

First Remark: Architecture is a generator of values and as such a means to an end - the End is Life itself

If the actual act of creation is the supreme means to fulfill the metaphysical worth of life, I add immediately that creation is not a process but the complementary force of the irreducible duality of the ego and the many (all other human beings). While the 'Dionysian axis', governed by the cognitive faculties of sensation and perception, tends to incorporate customs by fortuity within the structure of life (process) and aims to achieve a norm or a type, the complementary 'Apollinian axis', governed by the cognitive faculty of conceptualization, aims to create values by a 'seclusion', by
a removal of the structure of life (the a-tectonic principle) ....to attain an end and achieves its goal by control and design in the creation of symbols and the highest specimen. The nature of creation, under all its lesser aspects, is the creation of values and symbols.

Second Remark: Architecture is a means to life, but the creative act always must attain the end

Architecture/Art gives man that symbol. It gives him the experience of seeking the full, immediate concreteness of his goals. The object of creation gives man a moment, a period of time in which he can experience the sense of his completed task, the sense of living in a universe which his values have been successfully achieved.

It is like 'a moment of rest', a moment to take a 'breath' to move further.

Architecture gives man that 'breath'; the pleasure of contemplating of one's own 'idea of life'.

The importance of the experience is not in what man learns from it (process), but in that he experiences it (the end attained).

The 'breath' is not a theoretical principle, not a didactic message but the life-giving force of experiencing a moment of 'metaphysical joy' - a moment of elevated love for existence, a moment of elevated love for life.

The life-giving force is the actual shaping of one's own character (the 'principium individuationis'). If one does not experience these moments, life becomes meaningless - an endless process and an endless waiting for redemption.
Third Remark: Architecture springs from the architect’s character

This is architecture in its highest form. Architecture is the a-tectonic projection of the creative ego into an architectural object. The architect’s essential tool is his character which is previously formed by constraints and influences. The ‘creative act itself’ is the a-tectonic force to organize and control its elements, an act of mastery driven by the will of mastery. Only in that way the creator is in immediate control of his creative force and can rule out the fortuities of everyday life.

Forth Remark: Architecture is created for the architect himself

By priority, architecture/art/creation, under all its lesser aspects, is produced for the artist himself. Architecture is the means to bring man’s concept into object-reality, in such a way that the work reflects the architect’s values. Architecture is, thus, also a indispensable medium for the communication of his ideas..... to hold up to men a concretized work of art (a symbol) of his nature and his place in the universe. 6

Fifth Remark: Architecture is apart from nature

Architecture is the anti-thesis of nature. It is true that all life, in one way or the other, springs from nature. But the potentiality of the cognitive faculty of conceptualization which is the sole justification of man’s 'Sonderstellung' (the exceptional position of man in the universe), subdivides nature, which is everything, into the concept of nature and the concept of the man-made.... artificiality. It is also true that nature

produces order but the order is unconscious. Nature is no model for man. The quality and quantity of the order that arises naturally is so imperfect that it is impossible for man to live according to it. The motivation of seeking the principles of architecture in nature would diminish, at least metaphorically since it has not really the means to do it, man's potentiality of the power of creation. *Art*/*Architecture* is the distinction from nature not its imitation - whether in form nor as structural principle. 7

**Conclusion of the Problem:** All these remarks have in common their empowerment of the self. Only the *ego* has the potentiality to add quality to life. Only the ego by itself can create the values needful for an addition of quality.... this is the Ethics of Self-Realization (to build up character). Artistic creation is the supreme means for the overcoming of oneself and to gain more control. If the artistic creative act is not governed by the 'Apollinian' force which finally overcomes Dionysus, if artistic creation would be a process not leading to an end, if there would be a continuous play of outside forces during the creation, the artist never could gain control which would lead to chaos and fortuity.

The source of architecture lies in the fact that man's most sophisticated cognitive faculty is conceptual: man creates values, acquires knowledge and guides his actions, not by means of single, isolated precepts, but by means of abstractions. This

7) Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Die Frohliche Wissenschaft' ('The Gay Science'), Aphorism #80:

'Abweichung von der Natur ist vielleicht die angenehmste Mahlzeit fuer den Stolz des Menschen; ihretwegen ueberhaupt liebt er die Kunst... schoene Unnatuerlichkeit...'. ('The alternation of nature is the reason of the proudness of men; because of that he loves the arts at all.... beautiful artificiality...')
is the fundamental difference between architecture and 'building a place to stay'. To build a 'place to stay', man does not need to incorporate his synthetic expression. But man aims higher. The works of architecture are abstractions of the architect's character: symbols.
PART ONE

ON THE ART OF LIFE
ON THE ART OF LIFE

THE PROBLEM OF MORAL

Undoubtedly, the word ‘moral’ evokes a problem. Beyond the small area of certainty that the nature of moral is in some way related to ethics..... everything else is quite problematic. If one claims to be an ‘immoralist’, as for example Friedrich Nietzsche does, one seems to suggest a particularly extreme sort of doctrine. But that, as I try to show in this thesis, would be a hasty call: to claim to be an ‘immoralist’ does above all mean that in one way or other one is a critic of morality. The ‘ethics of self-realization’ is a sort of moral which can be ascribed to Friedrich Nietzsche; and in fact underlies more or less his entire ‘opus vitæ’.

If I say that this thesis is a critique of modernist societal rationalization, the only thing, then, I indicate is that this is some sort of critique of a movement, which very generally speaking, aims towards ‘the homogenization of cultural differences’. An anti-thesis to such a ‘homogenizing’ must conclude in its complementary .....in ‘heterogenizing’.

In showing an interest in the ‘heterogenizing of life’, I am in the midst of the controversy of the critical theories of the ontological and ethical dimensions of post modernism. Why rely then on Nietzsche? One could argue that the present post modernist discourse has left behind its intellectual grandfathers and that today’s antagonists would be the proponents of ‘The Frankfurt School’ (Habermas, Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse), the successors of 'The Marburg School' (the line of Cassirer), the tradition of linguistic analysis going back to the research of the
Swiss de Saussure, and most recently ‘The French’ (Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard and
Martin Heidegger in the background).

If one investigates the post modernist critique towards the ‘modernist homogenizing
of all cultural differences’, one is surrounded by a controversy which suggests in its
very heart a new sense of responsibility. The post modernist critique is
characterized, on one hand, by a responsibility of acting, and by the other, by a
responsibility of otherness. What is in common within the post modernist
movements is the idea of a creative tension. So far the call for Nietzsche’s help does
not seem to be needed. But if I claim that the post modernist notion of ‘creative
tension’ leads to a more or less desperate interventionism which makes no qualitative
addition to the ‘unbearable heaviness of care’ of the modern social idea, from that
moment on, I suggest one should desperately yield to Nietzsche. There is a decisive
difference in the grandfather’s position in terms of the association of creativity and
quality which is overlooked.

While Nietzsche’s concept of creativity is relying on the concept of order through the
notion of competitiveness and can be defined as an ‘active concept of interruption
of rationalization’, Martin Heidegger’s and today’s post modernist proponent’s
concept does not have this ‘drive to master’ or ‘drive to transform’ - and can be best
defined as ‘a passive or reactive interruption of rationalization’. In the end the
making and creating of post modernist critique in the Heideggerian tradition is for its
own sake: acting, otherness, and newness without any higher aspiration. The

1) F.Nietzsche, ‘Homer’s Contest’: Compare the concept of order proposed by Nietzsche with the liberal
concept of order (see chapter ‘Competitiveness’, footnote 53 on Emerson’s liberal concept). The anti-
liberal hailed Nietzsche exposes that our liberal concept of order of the 19th and 20th centuries is in fact
not as liberal one likes to assume. Compare also with Lester H. Hunt’s ‘Nietzsche and the Origin of
Virtue’, chapter on ‘Nature and Chaos’. 
essence of 'being in the world' is then nothing more than stoic existence (status quo
being, 'Dasein' as the passive essence of existence).

To be clear, the position of this thesis is between the two broad ideas of modernism
and 'reactive post modernism': it participates in the critique against the modernist
sterilization of all cultural differences, and in the narrower architectural context
against the idea of the type, module, repetition. collective unity and is as such a part
of the post-modemist critic, a critic which happens timely after modernism, but the
thesis suggests a different approach to the handling of creation and acknowledges
the very anti-post modernist conception of quality as the essential key for the support
of 'heterogenizing life'.
MORALITIES AND ARCHITECTURE

Today, the profession of architecture is obsessed with following a certain set of moralities. Of course, we all know that our generation is not the first ‘poisoned’ by such a problem. The first time architecture got moralized in the ‘grand style’ was two hundred years ago.

It is symptomatic that the inventor of an architectural understanding according to moral categories is not an architect but a member of the clergy. Such notions go hand in hand with a progressed interest of philosophical reasoning of first order causes in the 18th century. Once the thinking of a normative theory of architecture was not anymore in need to defend, the demand for ‘truth’ in architecture became the all encompassing motivation. Early on in the past two centuries, ‘essential beauty’ is seen as independent of experience and conventions; beauty is now be found in the simple nature where one can find all the rules: the principles of architecture are found in the imitation of the processes of nature. The search for happiness of mankind is imagined as reached, if man would accept his integration into primitive nature. It is a small step from the imitation of nature to the conclusion to have found an ‘inner’ constructive logic in nature which must be applied to architecture. The postulate of constructive logic, which is understood as the principle of nature, became the definition for ‘true’ and ‘good’ architecture. This is the early formulation of the new conception of functionalism and as such the foundation of the discussion of functionalism in the 19th and 20th century. 2

The chapter ‘truth in architecture’ became enlarged constantly and in the middle of the 19th century the theoreticians actually warn in their writings of ‘architectural

lies'. I do not intend to go deeper into all the obedience's and 'dangers' the creator of architecture 'had to recognize', but the obsession of the use of material must be mentioned here. 3 Circling around the threefold functionality, constructive logic, and materiality, architecture increasingly became associated with collective societal missions: the search for type, system, structure, module, nature. From the mid 20th century on, functionalism was understood in the satisfaction of needs which usually is described as the expression of human desires. Interesting is the demand that architecture is not anymore the satisfaction of needs according to individuality but to a 'form of life' of the epoch. 4

Another remarkable notion of the discipline of architecture is its search for a 'metaphysical justification' of itself. All through Western history, architecture has always stood in a puzzled relationship to reason, or more specifically to the application of reason. The modern world, despite a secularization in all realms of the environment, is intrinsically penetrated by all sorts of metaphysical concepts. Moreover, it is precisely the modern culture with its penchant for the new and its appreciation of the unstable which has a great affinity for the idea of a metaphysical presence. This is not at all an attack against metaphysics as such, but the recognition that the means become elevated, while in the same time the end is nihilated. Metaphysical concepts always served as the foundation for systems of thought; the concepts are the very basis of the thought. The validity lies upon the assumption that the 'origin' is based on insights that are seemingly truth. Man seems to inherit the ability to build up an apparatus to which he subordinates and adapts life through a kind of pre-established harmony. In other words, man develops a system in which

3) Hanno-Walter Krüft, 'Die Geschichte der Architekturtheorie', pp.380
4) Hanno-Walter Krüft, 'Die Geschichte der Architekturtheorie', p.503
his future - rather pre-determined future - has to fit under all circumstances. These basic principles on which these structures are based are always of a metaphysical nature like substance, essence or existence. The quest for systematization of life and, in our narrower case we can add architecture to it, usually becomes reality in the form of an idealization and in the same process of a simplification. The search for an origin based on metaphysical justification appears as clear, simple, pure and unquestionable so that from these premises the various derivations can be considered.

All ontology-based thinking in the Western tradition from Plato to Rousseau to Husserl is proceeds in the same way. While ‘Socratic rationalism’ may have saved the Greek civilization from chaos, the same rationalism became a ‘closed’ and ‘blind’ rationalism and is the threat of modern culture. The mythology of the dominance of man solely through a force of reason is a self-destroying determination of man. In the realm of architecture, the process of systematization goes hand in hand with a moral according to ‘values of descent’ (origin-centered belief). The dynamic of rationalization and functionality in architecture has reached an even further reaching ‘crash’ in recent years; just in this way can be explained the current obsession of the architect’s profession with planning, community and environmental integrity. Remaining with the problem of systematization and type in architecture, one easily ‘feels’ that the unbearable heaviness of the burden of the ‘social mission’ of architecture with its call for truth all of the time fragments comprehensive meaning into even smaller sense-particles. The fragmentation leads in the practicality of designing architecture to an exercise of behaviorism. No form, no syntax, no hierarchy: those kind of architectural object have no character, are unidentifiable and

5) F.Nietzsche, ‘Die Geburt der Tragoedie im Geiste der Musik’, #15
unreadable. The form of ‘metaphysical’ idealization of this position can be found easily in the moralization of nature. Consequently, the ideal can be achieved in terms of the ‘correct’ activities; the escape into sociology and behaviorism makes us believe that architecture is a measurable object which has the sole purpose to satisfy man’s purely physical needs. In its willessness, it is an expression of a pessimistic outlook of being, contained in the Hegelian notion of self-knowledge. On the other side, the attempt to reconstruct from the fragments of the disintegrating world leads to a expression of pure geometrical forms. There is a long tradition of Euclidean geometrical forms as the physical embodiment of that which forms immediacy, first cause and center conceptually expression. In order to be true and essential, the forms have to be formally simple, pure, intact and, above all, irreducible: the elementary Euclidean forms become transfigured into the metaphysical realm. So here, too, we have a strategic return in the form of an idealization.

Both just described architectural position are current derivations of the moralized myth of origin inherent in the ethical understanding of Christianity. But the effects of such an ethics are recognizable much stronger in its larger extent since the beginning of the project of the modern world with the development of the features characteristic of modernism: the adaptation of the ethics of the Protestant reformation, the increasingly mechanistic interpretation of the world, and, above all, in the change in casting the social hierarchies.
MORAL VERSUS MORALITIES - A DISTINCTION

The opposition taken in this thesis, supported considerably by Nietzsche, yields towards the type of man that 'has so far been considered supreme: the good, the benevolent and the beneficent.... Christian Morality'. 6 Hunt argues that 'this apparently means that he (Nietzsche) is opposed to the idea that being a good person is the same thing as trying to have beneficial effects on other people'. 7 So far this claim can not be seen as very extreme especially since we all know about similar notions in Hume, Goethe, and Thoreau. In the quote from 'Ecce Homo', one can take the clear indication that there must be different kinds of morals since he does not say that moral in general is a worthless concept. Indeed, Nietzsche tried from the very beginning of his career to bring a standard into all questions of moral: life. 8 This appears to be a fairly simple consideration to distinguish a 'natural' moral from an 'anti-natural moral' or 'denaturalized moral' or 'ascetic moral' - moralities which show no 'regard for the concerns of life'. 'Natural' or 'naturalistic' moral (consider the difference that in the proposed sense of moral, moral has no plural!), on the other hand, do show this sort of concern. 9

6) F.Nietzsche, 'Ecce Homo', Chapter 4, #4: 'Im Grunde sind es zwei Verneinungen, die mein Wort Immoralitaet in sich schliesst. Ich vererne einmal einen Typus Mensch, der bisher als der hoechste galt, die Guten, die Wohlwollenden, Wohltatigen; ich vererne andererseits eine Art Moral, welche als Moral an sich in Geltung und Hertschaft gekommen ist - die decadence Moral...... die christliche Moral......'. Later in the section he attacks the idea that 'all should become “good human beings”, herd animals, blue-eyed, benevolent...... to say it in plain ethical terms: altruistic.


8) Compare with F.Nietzsche's Essay 'Of the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life'

9) F.Nietzsche, 'Der Wille zur Macht', #298/299
THE MORAL OF RESPONSIBILITY: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

OR ‘VALUES OF DESCENT’ VERSUS ‘FIRST CAUSE VALUES’

There is probably no better way to introduce Nietzschean morality (or immorality, if seen in the historic aspect or seen as concept in the continuum of the history of philosophy) than the example of ‘responsibility’ of a specific act of a certain person. Nietzsche argues in ‘Beyond Good and Evil’ that ‘human history knows three different ways to evaluate human conduct and ways of life’. He distinguishes the “pre-moral” world-order, the “moral” world-order, and the “extra-moral” (aussermoralisch) conduct. According to this paragraph, ‘in the pre-moral period men evaluated the value or the disvalue of an action from its consequences’. An act is valued as good if the results turned out to be good, and bad if the results turn out to be bad. The value of the results is the cause of the value of an act. ‘In the last ten thousand years.... in some large region in the world.... this has changed in so far.... that not anymore the cause but the descent of an act is determining its value.’ The moral period is ruled by the idea that the value of an act was produced by the value of its origin. Conversely to the prior pre-moral era, it is not any more the result that makes an act more valid than another but the intention of the act... ‘the value of an action lays in the value of intention’.

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10) F.Nietzsche, ‘Jenseits von Gut und Boese’, # 32
12) F.Nietzsche, ‘Jenseits von Gut und Boese’, # 32
13) F.Nietzsche, ‘Jenseits von Gut und Boese’, # 32
with the value of its source. It is important to notice that the value in the moral world-order remains unknown until the value of its source is known. Friedrich Nietzsche recognizes in such a method of evaluation some very serious problems - in saying that ‘such an understanding of responsibility is juxtaposed on the naive psychology that the only cause of an action is will (Guter Wille)’. 14

It is plain in what direction the Nietzschean critic is leading: assuming that one is practicing the described moral way of life, a life where one is following a certain set of moralities, it is not enough if one’s conscious intention is just one efficacious link in a chain of causes leading to the action - at least nobody can really claim to be in control of the value of the action one is pursuing and, thus, one can not claim to be a responsible person because our judgments of goodness or badness of our actions is beyond our reach. But exactly this is happening by accepting ‘a set of given moralities’. The ‘belief of descent’ lacks in the immediacy between the creation of the value of an action and the action itself. If one does not supervise the creation of the value of an act and the following act, the creator looses control over its action. But the more common problem is the other way around. If one acts without having a first-hand creation, one is not in control of his own action because one does not know what one is doing exactly, one does not know the worth of one’s action. In the practicality of life, this is the common case. The moral order of life implies that ‘the value of my intention may derive from something which is anterior to it, something which is not an act of my will at all. In that case, even though my intention is among the factors which produce my act, the value of an act will not be in my control’. 15

14) F.Nietzsche, ‘Jenseits von Gut und Boese’, #34
To justify the idea of responsibility, a much more ‘immediate’ version of free will is needed. Free will requires ‘first cause values’. A pure first cause value is a value that may produce others but is not itself produced by anything.

This means that a responsible human being must try continuously not to be interrupted by the chain from the self-produced first cause value and its ancestors. This is what Nietzsche calls “extra-moral”. Similar to the entire conception of self-overcoming (sich selbst ueberwinden), one could say that the extra-moral is the self-overcoming of morality.

To summarize the criticism on the moral world-order, let us consider again the fact that the principle of the ‘belief in descent’ implies that the value of an act is not known until the original source of its value is known. Since we all know that our knowledge of the ancestry of an act usually does not go back very far, Nietzsche is right in claiming that our acts are a ‘murk of the unconscious’ and in “The Will to Power” he states that ‘we do not know nearly enough to be able to be in control of the values of our actions’. 16

Consequently, our understanding of the value of our actions is a relatively rare occurrence. In the moral way of life this problem is ‘solved’ by placing the original source of the value of the action in the agent’s consciousness. This means, what Nietzsche calls ‘slave morality’, that we design our life according to patterns outside of our self-produced values of our ego. But it also means that ‘there must be one person on earth, at least, who has access to ‘pure’ knowledge of the value of the act - namely, the agent.’ While living in the moral order means that ‘all the rest of mankind can hope to know the same thing by whatever means we use to find out

16) F. Nietzsche, ‘Der Wille zur Macht’, # 247
what is in someone else’s mind’, the ‘extra-moral’ idea calls us to be the agent - the agent of our own life and of our own decisions. 17 The “extra-moral”, thus, is the overcoming of moralities and is as such the essential message of the Enlightenment (Sapere aude!). 18


18) Remark: ‘This gives a historiographic account pertaining to the development of the individual’s relationship to his mind. It confronts the reader with the fundamental understanding and intellectual condition which prompted the idea of the ‘free individual’. The Modern World, in this summary understood as beginning in the 15th century, has had different approaches to the question to formulate the principle which is operative in your judgments. Every person is using such principles to authorize judgments on conduct, on character, on institutions, on laws, on costumes. We say, of a given act, that it is right or wrong; of a type of character, that it is the right type or the wrong; of a custom, that is right or wrong. The development of the ethical problem present in this thesis is not which particular act is correct. The problem is the more general one: First, on what presuppositions do we guide our life and, second, which are the presuppositions in the Modern World, by which I mean the post-enlightenment world.

Within the development culminating in the Modern world, there are different sets of imperatives one can guide his life. The first set argues that right means ‘according to the will of God’. The way of grounding morality in theology is the heritage of Christianity. In the second period of Greek philosophy (the period of the universal systems of science), there emerged the first idealistic systems (the opposition of the ideal and the real world).

The third period, the Hellenistic Age, is often already called the theological period and marks the transition from philosophy to theosophy (patristic philosophy: identification of the dogmas of belief such as gnosticism, movement of fantastic mysticism). In other words, the general ethical understanding removed from the man-centered ethics of the earlier Greeks to a ethics of a ‘second’ or ‘another’ world - some supernatural ‘beyond’ quite different to the man-made Greek deities. The Enlightenment is a culmination point of ‘the liberation of the mind’. The moving force behind the ‘liberation of the mind’ was the re-discovery of imagination. Immanuel Kant’s understanding of the imagination as the prime root of human cognition was not without precedent. Several thinkers of the Western tradition served as intermediate stages between the reign of the scholastic paradigm and the Kantian paradigm at the climax of the enlightenment. Beginning with the late-renaissance, thinkers like Paracelsus (common name for the German Theophratus Bombastus von Hohenheim) and Giordano Bruno made up a significant body of ideas towards the transformative powers of the mind. Paracelsus anticipated the modern tendency to
emphasize the radically 'anthropological' nature of creativity. The alchemists changed the epistemological system which had located reality as beyond man's grasp. The power of the mind was now hailed as divine flame within man. The discovery of the alchemists is comparable with the one of Thales of Milet who calculated eclipses. Like Thales' prediction which led to the weakened form of awe to the Olympian gods, the alchemists re-discovery marks an attempt to recapture man's confidence in his intellectual abilities as the source of universal power and is an early affirmation of the primacy of subjectivity in human creativity. Bruno is another pioneering figure in the establishment of the independence of the mind and to substitute a metaphysics of transcendence. Bruno, according to Stoerig, 'Geschichte der Philosophie', p.299, believed, shared with the Renaissance Gnostics, that the imagination is the primary vehicle of the holy spirit on earth. Bruno saw the imagination as the generator of both reason and the body. In the Renaissance movement imagination is conceived as living and personal the first time and valued as the positive essence of art. The theory of Bruno is a sort of 'humanist platonic notion' with the crucial difference, of course, that the power of the mind is now a property of the individual man rather than of the divine.

In the period of the great rationalist systems, Descartes' theory of the 'cogito' signaled a major change in Western understanding in 'that it located the source of meaning in human subjectivity rather in the objective world of reality or transcendent being' (Marias, 'History of Philosophy', p.213) The most decisive contribution is Rene Descartes' 'I think therefore I am', of course. The individual's human mind is given priority over the antiquity and scholastic paradigm of objective being and over an 'outside' voice. If we look upon Baruch Spinoza's 'On the improvement of the understanding' (tractatus de intellectus emendatione), we see that the Dutch-Spanish rationalist thinker supports to the development of the power of the mind; conversely, he is at unease with imaginary ideas as such. Also Leibniz hesitates to support the idea of 'synthetic creativiy' in his essay 'Neue Versuche ueber den Menschenlichen Verstand'. He states that 'imagination always falls short of reason and is also lacking in true being'. This rationalist view was shared by many other thinkers of the late renaissance and early Enlightenment. 'Even the aesthetic theories of Wolff and Baumgarten disregard the creative potential of the mind' (Kruft, 'Die Geschichte der Theorie der Architektur', p.211). In this reaction one is able to conceive of the very problem of modernity: relativism. On what grounds can mankind base its reasoning? Do have Spinoza and Leibniz recognized of the disastrous consequences of having no divine foundation for life? The doubts of certain rationalist thinkers did not stop the devaluation of God as an all wise value-giver. Leibniz itself contributed with his 'Theodicy' and the statement that 'Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel' ('The Outcome justifies the Means') to an acceleration of a 'secular' understanding of the world. Another major transitional movement in the development of the notion of the power of the mind from scholasticism to modernism can be found in the empiricist school of thinking. Hume, as the culminating empiricist, aimed
to conceive how knowledge could be liberated from all its appeal to transcendent beings and deities. Hume found out that once one divests reason of its ontological basis and seeks to find it on purely empirical grounds that the very idea of rationalism collapses into an arbitrariness. Hume declared that 'all human knowledge was derived from the association of image ideas'. The cognitive process was no longer to be considered in terms of metaphysical laws. For Hume, without 'metaphysical universal' the cognitive process was reduced to a series of purely psychological regularities (i.e. resemblance, contiguity and causality) governing the connection between image-ideas. For Hume, the rational self is devoid of substantial identity. The external world loses its independent existence.

The actual achievement of the paradigm shift belongs to Immanuel Kant. Kant’s radical revision removed the human mind from its peripheral role and place it at the very center of the universe. In his ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, Kant states 'that imagination is the common 'unknown root' of the two stems of human cognition - understanding and sensation and that nothing could be known about the world unless it was first performed and transformed by the synthetic power of mind (Einbildungskraft). Kant’s 'Copernican Revolution' gave rise to the modern conviction that being is not first and foremost some transcendent deity which produces human meaning but is rather a product of man’s own ability to reason. The main message of enlightenment-philosophy is SAPERE AUDE! (Immanuel Kant, ‘What is Enlightenment?’)... the liberation of the mind by granting him the potentiality for individual thought.

This is the essential message of the Enlightenment: not the mechanistic notion of encyclopedic knowledge but the notion of ‘be yourself!’... of having full responsibility over one’s own actions ‘(Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Third Untimely Meditation’, Preface). This should be the essential philosophical content of the movement which is defined as the 'Modern World' (post-enlightenment). On that account, all the important thinkers are arguing on common ground: more than anything else, the empowerment of 'being yourself!' is an assignment, a task for every 'single one alone for himself' (in Kant’s words: 'Es ist uns aufgegeben.').

34
THE CASE AGAINST MORALITIES

Arguing about moral and moralities, I may now take the route to the specialty of creation. Two characteristics of moralities (in the upper-sense of the concept of moral: those who disregard life) seem to be especially close to the creative realm: Asceticism and Disinterestedness.

Nietzsche writes in ‘Genealogy of Morals’ an entire chapter titled ‘What is the meaning of ascetic ideals?’. Hunt summarizes, very generally, that ‘by “ascetic ideals” is meant any ideal that requires one to frustrate the basic needs of the human organism, such as the desire for material well-being, the desire to feel good about oneself, and the sex instinct’. Nietzsche says that asceticism is a way of life which disregards and condemns life as such. Comparing what we previously called anti-natural morality, we now call it asceticism but I understand them as being identical. We will investigate why ‘ascetic life’ means negating life.

One of the criterion’s of a moral action is its disinterestedness, the other would be its universal validity. It is easy to imagine that Nietzsche, and everybody who values life in the same supreme manner, does not believe in disinterestedness. He objects to the thesis that people sometimes actually do things because they believe that these things are right for everyone to do. He says that no one acts ‘disinterestedly’. As we will see, it also is impossible for him to accept the Kantian distinction of ‘different kind of interests’. He argues in a late note of his ‘Nachlass’ that ‘those


20) F.Nietzsche, ‘Der Wille zur Macht’, # 349
who say they are fighting for their rights because they are rights of everybody do so because it is 'under the banner of 'for others' that they can most prudently put forward their own little private separatism; by claiming to represent the rights of all 'they transfigure' themselves in the eyes of those who believe in disinterestedness and heroism'. 21

Nietzsche's objection of 'disinterestedness', which is the underlying function of morality of the idealist conception, requires a deep look into the conception of human action and are of psychological nature. In 'The Will to Power' #372 and in 'The Gay Science' #333 as well as in 'Beyond Good and Evil' #220, he exposes to us why sometimes it appears to us that our own actions seem to be disinterested, even though they are not. 22 He disagrees with the notion of 'disinterested' actions and claims that actions and judgments are always done on the basis of 'inclinations'.

21) Lester H. Hunt, 'Nietzsche and the Origin of the Virtue', p.20

22) F. Nietzsche, 'Der Wille zur Macht', #372, 'Die Froehliche Wissenschaft', #333: 'Disinterestedness could refer to actions which do not aim at the agent's self-interest, actions which are not based on prudence. The self includes a great many of drives each of which, 'in as much as it is active, sacrifices force and other drives' to satisfy itself. Each must meet some resistance somewhere, 'otherwise it would destroy everything through its excessiveness'. The drives that are part of the self all have their own separate interests: the only sort of behavior that would serve the interest of the self itself, so to speak, would be that which maximizes the satisfaction of the whole system of drives, on balance. Unegoistic behavior would be that which does not do this. But in this sense, the 'unegoistic', self-sacrificing, imprudent, is nothing special - it is common to all the drives - they do not consider the advantage of the whole ego (because they do not consider at all). Second, disinterestedness might refer to action in which one does not respond to the prompting of any of these drives, in which one is not lured or repelled by the emotional charges with which they invest their various objects: one is moved simply by one's understanding of the rightness of what one is doing. But understanding does never move us to act in that way. Of what we think of as understanding is simply 'the form in which we come to feel' several different drives at once, including at least the 'desires to laugh, lament, and curse'. Each of our drives presents us
with a view of the facts, a one-sided view in each case, and understanding occurs when the conflict between several different passionate prejudices 'result in a mean'. Then 'one grows calm... and there is a kind of justice and a contract. Then, action that is based on understanding cannot be disinterested because understanding itself is not disinterested. It merely seems that it is, because 'only the last scenes of reconciliation' between one's passions 'rise to our consciousness'. 
ASCETICISM

Nietzsche regards the concepts of guilt, of sin, and of damnation as the most typical examples of ascetic moral.

With this broad definition in mind, he goes on to show us one striking characteristic that ascetic ideals have in common. This is the fact that they all have strong effects on the personality of those who accept them and take them seriously. He considers two general categories of effects.

Some ascetic notions seem to have a hypnotic effect on the human mind and body. If carried far enough, their effect is to reduce activity to the minimum metabolism at which life will still subsist without really entering consciousness. 23 Examples of such notions include selflessness, sanctification, various ‘petty pleasures’ such as the pleasures of giving, and ‘mechanical activity’ e.g. the ‘blessings of work’. As formerly living examples, one is reminded of religious extremists like the Shakers and other religious fanatics. But the spread out of ascetic morals should not be regarded as belonging only to those sort of cults. Perhaps never taken to the same extreme level, one must clearly recognize that all religion or other institutions claiming instrumental power such as the state, church, political parties have the innate characteristic just described above.

Other ascetic notions have virtually the opposite effect; they tend to cause intensive paroxysms of emotion. ‘One of the most spectacular examples is guilt, which brings with it a whole series of emotional disturbances, including ‘extreme fear, the agony

23) F. Nietzsche, ‘Genealogie der Moral’, Chapter III, #17
of the tortured heart, convulsions of an unknown happiness, the cry for
redemption’. 24 Psychologically, the effects of ascetic concepts resemble those of
psychoactive drugs. They are, in various ways, means of resisting a chronic feeling
of displeasure.

Why can ascetic moral survive? Having an ascetic moral is a desperate method
which is needed because one suffers from some other hidden failure in one’s
functioning as a living organism. People taking on an ascetic moral do it because
they are already, before being finally corrupted by anti-natural morality, a less than
perfect example of what human beings at their best can be. So, people most affected,
and people in most dangerous positions are likely to become affected, these are
beings who are already inflicted with some kind of pain. Ascetic morality, than, is a
technique for solving a certain problem. Nietzsche does not deny that there is a
problem, nor does he deny that, considered in its own terms, the technique may be a
success. However, although one must admit that the technique may bring some
success and in many cases achieves its aim, one can also think that it does not aim
very high.

Ascetic or anti-natural morality solves a problem of a very particular sort: without it,
its adherents might not want to go on with living, and it prevents that catastrophe
from happening. It does this merely by directly altering one’s consciousness; more
precisely, it merely blocks one’s awareness of the cause of one’s problem. The
cause is left untouched. Still worse, the realm that ascetic morality does not aim to
change for the better is precisely one’s character, which determines the value of
one’s life and actions.

24) F. Nietzsche, ‘Genealogie der Moral’, Chapter III, #20
DISINTERESTEDNESS

I'd like to begin the exposition of the problem of creation and disinterestedness in the traditional manner: by recounting on Immanuel Kant's conclusion of the first 'moment' in his 'Critique of Judgment' of 1781. 25

The conclusion of the first 'moment' of Kant does not express that there is no interest in the beautiful object. If one is considering paragraph 42 of the 'Kritik der Urteilskraft' titled 'Vom Intellektuellen Interesse am Schoenen' ('Of the Intellectual Interest on the Beautiful'), it becomes plain that Immanuel Kant's concern is 'to express that the interest is not based on the actual existence of an aesthetic object'. That seems to be all that Kant gives in his too often over interpreted first five paragraphs. It is noteworthy that in the relevant passages only the receptive experience (the spectator's perception) is considered and no reference is made to the creation of works of art.

If one recognizes that Kant's 'Intellectual Interest' is a symbol of morality, of Kant's 'metaphysics', it becomes plain that the difference to Nietzsche's 'Interest for the sake of Life', Nietzsche's 'metaphysics' lies essentially in their different basis of their metaphysical foundation.

While Kantian philosophy is based on a duty-based supernatural moral world-order, Nietzsche's 'Will to Power' is a state of being. As already mentioned, Nietzsche's

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25) Immanuel Kant, 'Kritik der Urteilskraft', Conclusion Momentum 1-5, p.79: 'Geschmack ist des Beurteilungsvermogen eines Gegenstandes oder einer Vorstellungsart durch ein Wohlgfalen, oder Missfallen, ohne alles Interesse. Der Gegenstand eines solchen Wohlgfalens heisst schoen'. ('Taste is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or aversion from any interest. The estimation of such a delight is called beauty'.)
metaphysical principle is 'non-traditional': his metaphysics lies not in some 'beyond' but his 'will' is with man.

Despite their metaphysical differences, Nietzsche and Kant appear to share the conviction that the formal aspect of the beautiful is the most significant. For both, almost identically, beauty is the power to organize, to arrange, to exert control. Nietzsche and Kant differ so far that Kant's separation of 'Intellectual Interest' from the 'more general interest in the realm of the practical' is not acceptable for Nietzsche.

If one turns to the issue of disinterestedness in creative work of art, one has to distinguish between the initial Kantian formulation and its subsequent reception by the romantics and modernists. It is crucial to understand that the modern theories of art are distorted Kantian ideas. The fine distinction between the aesthetic object (which became equal with the actual work of art in theories after Kant) on the one hand and the realm of the practical (e.g. desire).

Young states that 'Schopenhauer ignores the subtle difference between 'Intellektuellem Interesse' and 'Desire' in favor of the more simple distinction of willing and non-willing'. 26

Consequently, the entire aesthetic realm is maneuvered into the fallacy of non-willing. The metaphysical significance devoid of all volition is of crucial importance for a comprehensive understanding of the modern condition.

Following the modernist development further, one finds the idea of art pursued to its most extreme conclusion in the 'l'art pour l'art' movement. Modern art became emptied from any moral content.

26) Young, 'Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art', pp.5
In the ‘On Genealogy of Morals’ Nietzsche criticizes modernist’s subscription to the idea of a will-less aesthetics as self-defeating, ‘since the aesthetics is used with a particular function which enmeshes it within the system of means and ends’. Further he demands that ‘the entire notion of will-less aesthetics experience in Schopenhauer’s philosophy is an aesthetics that equals the Christian ethics of self-sacrifice and must be questioned mercilessly and put on trail’.

In memory of his concept of volition, it is plain that Nietzsche does not advocate disinterestedness in any aspect of life. As mentioned prior to this chapter, he firmly disagrees with Kant’s separation of interest. Nietzsche counters the desire of modernism to see life and art liberated of values and hence render it ‘goal-less’.

‘Art is the great stimulant to life: how could one conceive of it as without purpose, as goal-less, as containing no values’.

Nietzsche, ‘Goetterdaemmerung’

Nietzsche opposes the proclamation that ‘Language speaks itself’. He argues that ‘the use of rhythm in poetry originates in the ancient conviction that its use could soften the power of the gods’. The significance of this observation is not whether it is historically correct and it really softened the gods but that the rhythm, a primitive kind of art, became converted to a means to control the world and, thus, was bound up to desire. It is evident that Nietzsche values the use of rhythm as a ‘Will to Power’. For him, the act of creation is always a means to an end - creator do nothing else - all those

27) F.Nietzsche, ‘Genealogie der Moral’, Dritte Abhandlung, # 6
28) F.Nietzsche, ‘Die Froehliche Wissenschaft’, Volume 2, # 84
situations when the creator alters a certain condition.... that is an expression to enhance his own life. Nietzsche binds the notion of life, which is the end, and artistic creativity, which is a mere means to the end, to desire and willing. 29 Nietzsche’s explanation in which he seeks to outline how knowledge is shaped by an organic process is well known. On the basis of such an understanding of the organic (e.g. even leaves on a tree change the direction towards the sun...), it is clear that art must be motivated not only by desire but also by interpretative power which is knowledge. The idea that one needs to have knowledge goes along with the classical understanding of art but is in fierce opposition to modern theory.

Beauty, consequently, is that what enhances the feeling of power, that which best interprets and organizes the world. Beauty represents a supreme act of organization and control over its elements, an act of mastery driven by the will of mastery.

If the beautiful is an exemplification of interpretative will (knowledge), it requires no great leap of intuition to see the preference of understanding the creative act as bound up to interest. 30

Nietzsche instead sees aesthetic interest as an analog of desire, and artistic beauty as an analog of the will to power. Art is driven by a ‘compulsion-to-transform’ (verwandelnmuessen) the world, but governed by the interpretative ability of reason.

29) F.Nietzsche, ‘Nachlass’ (Assets), Gesamtausgabe von H.Schlechta, Volume III, p.924: ‘The Genesis of Art: It is the same will to power - the want of art and beauty and the desire for sex. It is our state of being. The will to power is the metaphysical force of all life. It is man’s task to interpret this will and to shape one’s own life. Man’s superiority over other organisms lies in that his potentiality of interpretation of the will is higher. Knowledge is the interpretative will to power’.


Und nun gar das ganze sozialistische Ideal: nichts als ein toelpeshaftes Missverstaendnis jenes christlichen Moral-Ideals".

(The paragraph above is entitled 'Even more Hidden Forms of the Cult of the Christian Ideal of Moral': It attacks the 'cowardly' and 'female' idea of the notions of nature (Rousseau), human beings (Comte and Mill), and art (sorrowfulness for the sufferer and the discrimination by their own choice). He states that the whole attitude now is overpowered by the socialist ideal which is nothing more than an awkward misunderstanding of the Christian ideal of moral).

He then further writes 'in order to be classical one must posses all the strong, apparently contra dictionary gifts and desires: but such that they go together beneath the one yoke. While in contrast one of the weaknesses of romanticism is its lack of organizing power. Romanticism has the will to unity.... but the inability to let it exercise tyranny in the most important thing, namely with regard to the work itself. Romanticism and its derivation - modernism - is a sign of enfeebled will to power'.
On the other end of the spectrum, for Nietzsche, aesthetic judgment functions as the criterion according to which the will to power interprets the world in one way and not in another, hence any goal of a systematic-mechanistic, scientific world understanding will always already be pre-empted by the demands of aesthetic sensibility.
AUTONOMY AND IMMORALISM

PART ONE: NIETZSCHE'S IMMORALISM

We now have a fairly large collection of ethical criticism which we will direct against an architectural understanding rooted exactly in these 'moral' properties opposed. As one could just see, the attempted critic has its nature in metaphysical and even psychological theories. This is in no way a new approach to get to the 'roots of architecture', but a 'must'. Too often are 'we architects' confronted with superficial argumentation. Most especially, the writings of rather famous 'star-architects' exemplify the intellectually disastrous consequences of reasoning by non-essentials - and an example of the penalty one pays for a non-philosophical approach to cultural phenomena.

Finally, one can see that there is no inconsistency in having moral while attacking morality as such. To possess moral, is not the same as 'living according to moralities'. The difference lays in the ego of the human being and is, so to speak, the quest of whether one does possess the 'power of creativity' or one does not. But as mentioned in the section 'The Problem of Moral', an 'action-ism' for the sake of action leads to creativity which is not bound up to quality. Again, I support the opposition against the modernist tendency to homogenize differences, but these must make a 'qualitative leap' to be justified in any way.

Around this issue emerges the critique of post modernist ideology: the neglect of any 'positive' force; post modernism seems to have no interest in the 'drive to master' - its goal is mere existence.
For Nietzsche, the two fundamental aspects of man's life, existence and consciousness are both functions of the faculty of volition. Man is a being of conscious volition with a volitional consciousness. According to all biological knowledge we have, man is fully integrated in nature but he is the most sophisticated being. Man's consciousness is constituted by sensation, perception and conception. Some lower organism share with man the first two stages. Sensations seem integrated into perception by instinct (the lower levels of will) both in the brain of man and animal. But to integrate perceptions into conceptions by a process of abstraction is a might man may possess in the highest form. All that happens on one scale and is conceivable in the degree of will. The amount of Nietzsche's 'will to power' a man uses in his life is his free will - it is by his choice. Choice, however, is not chance. Volition is not an exemption to the law of causality; it is a type of causation. Schopenhauer's 'mechanistic will', to give a counter example, is not free. For him, will is a mechanistic process, the connections of life are made by instinct. Schopenhauer's will is on the pre-conceptual level of consciousness and thus is 'non-volitional' or volitional in a lower level than Nietzsche's conception. A being of volitional consciousness has no automatic course of behavior. He needs a code of values to guide his actions.

The ethic of self-realization requires an emphasis of qualititative creation. Nietzsche understood that everything man needs or desires has to be learned, discovered and produced by him - by his own choice, by his own effort, by his own mind. The use or misuse of his cognitive faculty determines a man's choice of values, which determine his emotions and his character. It is in this sense that Nietzsche talks about 'overcoming oneself' and of 'the human life as a work of art'. Man has to discover the rules of thought, the laws of logic, to direct his thinking and than to act
and create.... ‘improvement moral’ from the outside would not enhance man’s strive to ‘become yourself’. 31

INTERLUDE: ON VITALISM

Nietzsche is using life as a standard of value. Concerning the sort of morality he approves, he says that morality must stand in relation to life as means to an end. 32 If a means to life itself becomes a standard of life, instead of discovering the standard in the highest enhancement of life itself, one should object to these sort of moralities. According to Nietzsche, one commits an error of transforming a mere means into a sovereign standard when one treats anything other than life as an end in itself. 33 Life is the only thing that is good in itself, and is the standard by which the value of everything else is to evaluated.

This sort of value towards life is important to the understanding of aesthetics, of epistemology, and ethics; or in other words, to the view how we value the beautiful, the true as well as the good.

As early as in his second ‘Untimely Meditation: Of the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life’, Nietzsche tries to attempt to justify this idea. He says that life is even higher valued than knowledge. If knowledge would be valued higher than life it follows that knowledge would somehow pose a threat to the continued existence of life, and this would be absurd because knowledge requires life in order to exist.

Don’t get me wrong. I do not say that Nietzsche thinks knowledge is not important, in fact, he thinks it is most important but it is not possible to conceptualize that

33) F.Nietzsche, ‘Der Wille zur Macht’, # 298
knowledge presupposes life. The essence of this argument is to show that a wrong ordering of one’s values can seem to justify choices which are actually not justifiable. The superiority of the value ‘life’ above all else is summarized by Hunt that ‘any good that is properly valued at least as highly as life could justify the annihilation of life. And any good produced by human action that justified the annihilation of life would thereby justify its own annihilation. But no good could conceivably justify its own annihilation - since anything the annihilation of which is justified is not good. Consequently, no good that is produced by human action is properly valued as much as life. The idea that all other goods are in some way means to life is apparently an important aspect of Nietzsche’s vitalism’. 34 This argumentation does show us, in general, of the importance not to confuse the order of importance in our human actions e.g. in the act of creation. The creator must know what is the end and what are its means. Between means and end must be a distinction - means never should become the end in itself.

PART TWO: NIETZSCHE’S IMMORALISM

To ‘be yourself’ (himself), man does need to have values. The creation of such values must be the primary concern of all men. Even more difficult than the quest for values is the question, on what grounds one could base one’s values. The Christian heritage finds the rightness of an act to depend upon its agreement with ‘the will of God’. Kant denied that the rightness of an act depended upon anything, asserting that an act, if right, is so categorically, without reference to anything outside of itself.

As we have seen the 'categorical imperative' appears to be a problem in the practicality of life - of being in the world. 35 Nietzsche counters 'the moral way to gain knowledge' in his 'Genealogy of Morals', saying 'that experience teaches us what are the qualities to which it owes its continued existence in spite of gods and men...... these qualities are called virtues, and these virtues alone develop man to maturity'. 36

The making of ourselves cannot be accomplished for us by another, whether man or god or the state. The question Nietzsche raises essentially is the question of the Enlightenment: 'Die Frage an den Einzelnen' ('The Question for the Single One Alone for Himself'). 37

So to speak, one can say that a virtuous being is the antithesis of a moral being. 38

For some reader this claim may be rather foreign, since the terms virtue and moral are used often in a very imprecise manner, often even interchangeable. It is one of

35) Walter Kaufmann, 'Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist', p.103: 'Kant seems never to have questioned the existence of the moral law as a synthetic judgment a priori - i.e., as a proposition which is neither tautological nor dependent on empirical observation, and yet knowable by, and binding on, all rational beings. On the basis of this moral law, Kant sought to establish the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God and the moral world-order - all the while assuming the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori as an unquestioned premise. Kant's problem was only how such judgments are possible. Thus he skipped the very question with which Nietzsche's thinking about moral values started. This is the clue to Nietzsche's polemics against Kant.'

36) F.Nietzsche, in 'Die Genealogy der Moral' in 'Introduction to Modern Philosophy' (The Ethical Problem), Albury Castell, p.305

37) Martin Buber, 'Between Man and Man', pp.148

38) F.Nietzsche, 'Jenseits von Gut und Boese', #...Hitherto all moralists, with a pedantic and ridiculous seriousness, have wanted to give 'basis' to morality, and each has believed that he has given this 'basis' to morality. Morality itself, however, has been regarded as something 'given'. That which moralists have called 'giving a basis to morality', has proved merely a learned form of good faith in prevailing morality, a new means of expressing prevailing morality, a sort of denial that it is lawful for this particular
morality to be called in question. In no case has the attempt to 'provide a basis for morality' ever involved a testing, analyzing, doubting, and vivisecting of a prevailing moral faith. The philosophical workers, after the pattern of Kant and Hegel, have to fix and systematize some existing body of valuations, that is to say, creations of value which have become prevalent and are for a time called 'truth'. It is for these thinkers to make conspicuous, conceivable, intelligible, manageable what has happened and been esteemed hitherto. There are systems of morals which are meant to justify their author in the eyes of other people; systems which are meant to tranquilize him and make him self-satisfied.
the major arguments of this thesis to manifest that the idea of the virtuous being should be the very concept of man of the post-enlightenment.

First of all, I would like to remain as closely as possible to explaining the difference between virtue and moral and, ever more, substantiate the above phrased claim that a virtuous being is the antithesis of a moral being. In saying that, the statement claims that a virtuous being is an immoral being.

The following explanation supports this view: According to the German ‘Universal’ dictionary the word virtue (Tugend) can also be understood as value (Wert), preference (Vorzug), power (Kraft), operation/action (Wirksamkeit). The word virtue/virtuous is rooted in the Greek word ‘virtu’ which means the alternation of a thought/article/object and is bound up to the qualities of perfection and mastery. The many meanings of morality/moral can be best translated with the very general German word ‘Lehre’ which can stand for the English terms of teaching, doctrine, theory, system, module, pattern or centering. One of the distinguishing features is that if one talks about a virtuous being, one is yielding to the single one, while moralities incorporates the many or at least the inclination that one’s own values are true for somebody else. The German word ‘Tugendrichter’ (moralist) marks the exact point of transition from virtue to morality. ‘Tugendrichter’ means literally translated ‘The Judgment of Virtue’ - the judgment of virtue is moralism, while the word ‘Tugend’ alone means virtue. Another difference is laying in the characteristic of this two terms.

The idea of virtue/value/preference/power/action inhabits a ‘operative’ quality, while morality appears to be ‘in-operative’. Using Prof.Morris Weitz differentiation of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ in his article ‘The Role of Theory in Aesthetics’, it further appears that the whole concept of virtue may be ‘open’..... you put it together
as you go along, the concept is open to revision, amendment, extension'. 39 One 'studies the field', modifying your concept where you have to, retaining it where you can. Here you don't stipulate the concept; you form it and style it. In contrast, a 'closed' concept is fixed. It is 'closed' when one is not entertaining the possibility of amending it, extending it, revising it. If cases occur which seem as though they ought to be included but don't exactly fit, you close them out. If cases occur which seem as though they ought not to be included yet they do exactly fit, you rule them in. In proceeding thus you are, or may be, deliberately arbitrary. Suppose you are a teacher and you stipulate that an A student shall be one who has a photographic memory, writes legibly, and never fails to show appreciation of your lectures; and you hold to this concept than you have a 'closed' concept and you are using a categorical imperative. If you have an 'open' concept and you are still a teacher, you won't have exactly what constitutes of an A student: you are open to what the field may produce.

Having an 'open' concept does not at all mean to have no concept..... it does not at all mean that one should have a 'vacant' mind on the question of judgment. But there is a fine and distinctive line between the concept of life according to mere 'rightness' or to the higher quality achieved through competitiveness whose result I may call 'good'. The question which needs to be raised is whether one makes judgments on the 'metaphysical' concept of 'goodness/competitiveness' which is timeless, 'beyond' history, and includes 'rightness' innately and has the additional quality of 'supra-history' or whether one justifies ones decision on the account of being right which is a relative concept.... a value for a certain time and place.

39) Morris Weitz, 'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics', American Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

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Again, Nietzsche looks at the 'single one' and argues correctly that an individual who creates his set of values has to do this independently. Such an individual has to evaluate all the factors and make his own decisions. A being raised as a 'moral being' does not yield to himself but takes for granted any given set of values and standards of any given human beings, churches, states and so on. It is correct to assume that society is participating from the beginning of every creative act but society is not making the standard for the creative act. People may participate but they do not set any standard. The standard of a certain value is solely given by the individual creator through his creation: it is the excellence of styling, shaping and playing with the chosen media which sets the standard. It is impossible to legislate excellence, because excellence is only possible in an open concept where the legislator can not predict exactly what the field will produce. Excellence can not be legitimized by voting, universal judgment, or democratic values.

On the other hand, standards which emerge over time are not governed by fortuity or mere chance. There are cultures in our world who have recognized and encouraged excellence and there are cultures who do not recognize excellence and do not encourage it. A 'healthy culture' who recognizes excellence does not make exact standards, such a culture operates with an open concept. An 'unhealthy culture' usually creates set standards and operates with a closed concept and tries to legislate its achievements by some kind of instrument as for example the judeo-christian God or by democratic majority voting.

If Nietzsche is called an 'immoralist', this does only underlays that a given person is thinking and acting according to free will and virtue. Nietzsche's concept of competitiveness can be best imagined as similar to the Greek ethics during the period of the transition from the archaic age to classical age (prior to Socrates).
NIETZSCHE’S CONCEPT OF ORDER

‘RANGORDNUNG’ VERSUS ‘GOOD AND EVIL’

Finally, I have to introduce Nietzsche’s concept of order: his concept of ‘Rangordnung’ (order according to rank). The proposal of ‘Rangordnung’ indicates that we are concerned with the complementary forms of order and chaos. It is plain that all the arguments made in this paper so far show a deep suspicion towards fortuity in human affairs. The question we are dealing with is, then, the quest of order: more precisely, how is it possible to have a valid concept of order without ‘framing’ or even ‘freezing’ a certain reached condition?

The basis for this idea goes far back to the very beginning of his career. In the early 1870, he wrote the essay ‘Homer’s Contest’ which, symptomatically, not even was published during his lifetime.

Nietzsche argues that ‘it is naive to judge values just in terms of their rightness and states that they must be ranked along a continuum of degrees of goodness’ because the evaluation of values in ‘opposite values’ has the innate tendency to hinder the reach of full quality or non-quality of a value. In other words, Nietzsche thinks that the motivation of being ‘right as such’ is a rather poor motivation for one’s life. Not only is the boundary of being right or wrong often relative and differing in time and place, but it also equalizes the values within of those who are categorized as being ‘right’. Nietzsche thinks that being ‘right’ is not good enough.

Another point one could make seems to be the understanding of relativism. While it may appear at first that Nietzsche’s conception is very ‘loose’ and appears to be relative because he does not give a list of traits one has to fulfill to be a ‘good’
person, one recognizes that at the very bottom it is not at all. While in fact 'opposite values' (the conception of 'good or evil') may be of relativist conception, the idea of the 'ethics of competitiveness' is not. Let me give one example. One realm left in which the Greek notion of competitiveness is still unchallenged is in the realm of sport. But one can recognize certain disciplines which epitomize human achievements in a way other human activities do not.

Throughout the discussion of and about aesthetic creation, various philosophers classified the arts into different categories. Most close chronologically to Nietzsche, we discover such a classification in the writings of Hegel and Schopenhauer. For Hegel each of the individual arts is specifically suited to the expression of one of the art stages: symbolic (architecture), classic (sculpture), and romantic (painting, music, poetry). For Schopenhauer, the work of art is a peculiar power which enables its possessor to leave his own interest and thereby free himself to create a world of imagination. But the arts, for Schopenhauer too, are not all equally successful in bringing us to the truth. For Schopenhauer, architecture expresses the truth most primitively, while music which expresses his 'metaphysical will' directly and is, thus, most developed. Between them occur sculpture, painting, and literature. For Schopenhauer, only music, which 'leaves the world behind', is able to realize the innermost nature of reality.

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, in writing 'The Birth of Tragedy', is on that account, the specialty of music, in a similar position. In the section 'On the Creation of Architecture', I have exposed Nietzsche's key conception of the Apollinian and the Dionysian forces. Even if the particularities of Greek tragedy are quite different from 'pure' music, we still recognize that Nietzsche too values the specialty of music as a 'special' medium of experience and creation.
Where does music differ of all the other individual arts? I will endeavor to give some account of the specialness of music to draw the parallels with architectural experience of embodied space which gives man the most immediate and powerful experience of architecture.

If the experience itself is most important to attain the 'metaphysical joy' as claimed, it is correct to rely on those cognitive faculties which give man the possibility of experiencing this joy.

The fundamental difference between music and the other arts lies in the fact that music is experienced in the 'reversed cognitive process by man' than in the other arts.

If one is looking at a sculpture, or one is reading a novel the cognitive process goes from the perception of the creation to the conceptual understanding, to an evaluation in term's of one's own 'idea of life' to a consequent emotion. If one is listen into music, for example to Bruckner's ninth symphony, the pattern involved is reversed: from the perception of the creation, to emotion, to evaluation, to conceptual understanding. Music is experienced as if it had the power to reach man's emotions directly.

As in the case of all emotions, the cognitive process in response to music is subconscious and is experienced as a single, instantaneous reaction, faster than one can identify its components. Music evokes subconscious material - images, actions, scenes, fantasies, dreams, actual or imaginary experiences.

It is induced by deliberately suspending one's conceptual thoughts and surrendering to the guidance of one's own subconscious. One's subconscious knowledge has to flow because no single image can capture the meaning of the musical experience, or in our case of a great architectural experience, the mind needs a succession of images.
and creates an emotional abstraction. Emotional abstractions are an indispensable part for the experience of an architectural configuration of form and void.

The character that man acquires in his life, becomes over time a pre-conceptual equivalent one could call 'metaphysics'. Now, it is a subconsciously integrated evaluation of man and of his existence. It is in terms of this fundamental 'metaphysics', acquired by man throughout his life, that he responds to music and to architectural space.

One may conclude that a creator seeks to express his creative will in some media which has the required resources and that not every media has the same resources on which the will can be expressed. For instance, it is a fact that not every language has the same amount of resources to express poetry and that fingerpainting has more limited resources than oilpainting to exercise one's will. It is plain that sound in sequence (music) has enormous resources while smell has in comparison little resources (a 'symphony of smell' does not evoke the same emotions in our senses as music).

The creator seeks a media which has the best potentiality to arouse man's senses. This is in dependency to the biological construct of man, according to man's cognitive faculties. Such a relation is neither a mere assumption nor a universal law but an assertion of greatest certainty.

Likewise in architecture: one can find the most resources in the configuration of space & form. Architectural space has almost the same expressive power as music. The configuration of the specific architectural legitimacies space and form have by far the most resources to evoke man's emotions. This is the highest value of architecture. The joy of experiencing architecture happens through experience of the architectural object itself.
One may make the following conclusion of the importance of the media the will is expressed on: different media have different amount of resources to evoke man’s cognitive faculties. Consequently, one can make the claim that the creation of great architecture of Brunelleschi, or the creation of a symphony of Mozart are more highly valued cultural expression of man than the creation of a great chair by Philippe Stark or even the best dinner by Paul Bocuse.

The obvious objection that one does not know for what one should compete is countered. As a matter of empirical fact, the number of disciplines with appropriate resources to express man’s will is very limited.

Nietzsche defends the universality of his ‘metaphysical’ principle of ‘goodness /competitiveness’ somehow like this: the ‘will to power’ (the interest and desire in life for goodness) is the most basic projection of the force of life. For Nietzsche, organic life is of conscious volition, which is a universal necessity, with a volitional consciousness which is a potentiality, optional and achieved in degree. This leads Nietzsche to the notion of ‘interpretative will’ (Wille zur Erkenntnis) which is distinguished from ‘will’ by its inherit quality of a strive for knowledge. Nietzsche counters moral relativism by arguing that ‘all men have in common’:

‘A table of virtues hangs over every people. Behold, it is the table of its ‘Ueberwindungen’ (not exactly translated with overcoming); behold, it is the voice of its will to power. Praiseworthy is whatever seems difficult to a people; whatever seems indispensable and difficult is called good.’

Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Also sprach Zarathustra’
In this aphorism, Nietzsche defines the universal principle: ‘Goodness’ is here defined as the supreme quality to overcome oneself (sich selbst ueberwinden). Nietzsche was not ready to set his ‘metaphysics’ in any divine ground. That, however, did not prevent him from conceiving of the ‘will to power’ as a universal feature of the human constitution, whose fictions must be considered necessary because they are not subjective: they leave no leeway for individual differences between one man’s motivation of thinking and another’s. As above mentioned, this is the universality of the recognition that all organic beings have a potentiality of interpretative volition. On the other hand, one must see that the degree to which this potentiality of interpretation itself is used is volitional.

A being of volitional consciousness has no automatic course of behavior. He needs a code of values to guide his actions. It is in this sense that Nietzsche talks about overcoming oneself and of ‘The Human Life as a Work of Art’. Nature gives him no guarantee of the efficacy of his mental effort. Here, Nietzsche talks about this effort of a ‘second nature.... or giving style to life.... or of an improved physis.’ ‘One may find a certain plausibility to Nietzsche’s thought, though it is dynamite. He maintains in effect that the gulf separating Plato from the average man is greater than the cleft between the average man and a chimpanzee. While Nietzsche agrees with Christianity, Kant, and Hegel in ascribing infinite worth to the individual human soul, Nietzsche does not ascribe this worth to every man as such, but only to some men. There is no cardinal difference between man and other creatures’. 40 The ‘Sonderstellung’, his unique position, in the cosmos, is distinguished only by a difference in degrees, a potentiality. Thus, Nietzsche yielded to pre-platonic Greek culture and it occurred to him ‘that the contest (agon) is the most fruitful concept to

analyze Greek culture and the Greek’s enormous achievements. He reminds us in this aphorism with the rivalry of the ancient dramatists, the Olympic games, the gymnasium, Plato’s effort to outdo the sophists and the poets by composing more beautiful myths, speeches, and dialogues than they had ever conceived, and of the Socratic dialectic’. 41 For everyone who is familiar with Greek culture knows that the spirit of the entire culture was competitive in the highest form. All writers and thinkers give in length account of that essential characteristic of the Greeks (e.g. Homer). It occurs to Nietzsche in the same aphorism ‘that the contest itself is the manifestation of the will or desire or interest’.

41) F. Nietzsche, 'Moergenroete', #360
THE 'IMPROVED PHYISIS' VERSUS NATURE AND CHAOS

After I have introduced a solution given of Nietzsche very early in his life, one needs to look somewhat closer at the conception of order and to the objection of 'nature as a model for man'. This also is of particular interest for our architectural discussion in so far that the here proposed case against nature is of fundamental importance for the critique that architecture is above all else the dealing with structure (an architectural understanding that estimates the structure as the 'positive' elements of architecture and, thus, yields towards the argument that structure itself is the essence of architecture). 42

The phrase 'improved physis' does explain the understanding of the difference between man and nature and emphasizes the organic conception of life. 43 This means that one should attribute to nature that nature does have order. But nature, understood as the opposite of the man-made, is a tendency toward order that is not guided by consciousness. For Nietzsche, the 'Zufälligkeit' (fortuity) of nature, the lack of consciousness, leads to the notion that nature is not by any means a norm to

42) Carl Boetticher, 'Tektonik der Hellenen': 'For Boetticher, the design principles of the tectonic are distinguished between 'Werkform' (form of structure) and 'Kunstform' (form of the cladding). The 'Kunstform' has the task to 'visualize' the construction and structure and is to understand, according to Boetticher, as an 'explainable cladding'. Although Boetticher does not state that the 'outside' needs to be identical to the 'inside', he does indicate that the 'outside form' should visualize the 'inside function'.

Boetticher's ideal stands in the tradition of Rousseau and Idealistic philosophy which later on in history also has had influenced Semper. Gottfried Semper himself is influenced by the notion of architectural 'Uform' which can be found not only in Boetticher's theory but as well in Laugier's and other theoretician's of the idealistic tradition. Semper also draws on the distinction of the 'Werkform' and 'Kunstform' and develops his own theory of the 'Bekleidungstheorie'.

43) Walter Kaufmann, 'Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ', p.177
be trusted and followed, that it actually should have something like the opposite significance for us. 44

In 'Twilight of the Idols', he remarks that 'nature, estimated artistically, is no model. It exaggerates, it distorts, it leaves gaps. Nature is chance (Zufall). The study 'according to nature' seems to me a bad sign: it dismantles tutelage, weakness, fatalism.... To see what is - that does belong to another species: to the anti-artistic ones, to the naturalists. One ought to know who one is...'. 45 This quote familiarizes us with the deep suspicion of Nietzsche toward everything which does not occurs by design. For him, the idea of chaos, or mere disorder, is both a great evil and a permanent possibility for human life. Nietzsche acknowledges that order, at least the order of the quality he estimates as belonging to man, is something men have to fight for for all the time. If a person is reasonable this does not guarantee that this person will be reasonable in twenty years. Hunt paraphrases Nietzsche in explaining that 'the greatest danger that always hovered over humanity and still hovers over it is the eruption of 'Irrsinn' (madness) - which means the eruption of arbitrariness in feeling, seeing, and hearing, the enjoyment of the mind's lack of discipline, the joy in human unreason'. 46

44) F.Nietzsche, 'Third Untimely Meditation', #5
45) F.Nietzsche, 'Goetterdaemmerung oder Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophiert', chapter IX, #7:
46) Lester H.Hunt, 'Nietzsche and the Origin of the Virtue' paraphrasing F.Nietzsche from the 'Die froehliche Wissenschaft', #76 Remark: Interesting for the modern understanding of art may be the phrase 'arbitrariness of feeling'. Nietzsche explicitly indicates that feeling is a consequence of a value and not the other way around.
Again, there is a order which arises naturally and there is the order that exists by design. The argument is not that a world in which no attempt was made to control would be a world without order at all. The doubts against taking nature as a model for man is the quality and quantity of the order that arises naturally. This sort of order is so imperfect that the good it does is nearly accidental. At best, what it produces is a degraded sort of order, or a diluted kind of chaos. The claim made here is, even if nature does produce a desirable sort of order, it does so in a highly inefficient and unreliable way. Nature is not good at producing human greatness.
THE ORDER OF EXCELLENCE

In ‘Homer’s contest’, Nietzsche claims that ‘it is wrong to say that conflict, as such, is evil’. He says that ‘there is a bad and a good side in the notion of conflict. The good side of conflict is that jealousy, resentment, and envy spurs men to activity: not to the activity of fights of annihilation but to the activity of fights which are contests’.

‘Jealousy, resentment, and envy are good because of the quality of the activity which they are able to inspire. The circumstances that enable this to happen were created by a shared belief that the Greeks held, that all life is a contest and that ‘every talent must unfold itself in fighting. Once accepted, the principle created a social system in which everyone is a constant in a struggle, not to undo, but to outdo others’. In this context, it takes the form of negating the value of the achievements of others by doing something even better oneself. This is an important part of the reason why outstanding excellence was so widespread in Greek culture. Nietzsche claims that one of the most important characteristics of the Greeks was the ‘Vernichtungslust’ (lust to annihilate). The Greek’s solution of the new evaluation of this fact in the transition of the Homeric world to their later more highly developed stages of their culture ring in the ears of 20th century participant of the Western culture rather strangely: ‘The Greek’s, after thinking as much as possible, tolerated the terrible presence of ‘Vernichtungslust’ and considered it justified’. Accepting the ‘Vernichtungslust’, the individual’s potentially destructive urge is turned toward constructive forms of expression by the vivid presence of other individuals who have achieved something excellent; one feels oneself in need of proving oneself against them. Thus ‘the Hellenic notion of the contest demands, as a protection

47, 48, 49) F. Nietzsche, ‘Homer’s Wettkampf’
against the genius, another genius’. If one sees no one who is comparable to oneself, then one is no longer challenged by the excellence of others, in which case one no longer has the only reason the system gives for acting in constructive rather than destructive manner. Nietzsche claims that the historical record shows that when a Greek was ‘removed from the contest by an extraordinarily brilliant deed’ the result was ‘almost without exception a terrifying one’. One can see what Nietzsche is saying here, in the context of a entire culture, applied today, is a problem we recognize in our day: of the misery of ‘the new idol’ - the heaviness of unchallenged greatness of the modern state.

Nietzsche has presented us with a model which, among the most important results, is one which actually tends to defeat the intentions of the individual participants. As individuals contend with one another, they present each other with more and more difficult challenges to be overcome, and consequently with greater and greater reasons to achieve more and more. Thus they help, together, to ensure that excellence is relatively widespread in their community. But this result is in tension with the individual’s own purpose, which is to be the best. Nietzsche attributes another result to the system, one that is even more important than this one. By changing the ‘terrible force in the roots of life’ (Zeus) into something which is powerfully and visibly good, it makes possible the Hellenic love of life which was the greatest and unsucceeded achievement of Greek civilization. It is obvious by now that Nietzsche’s model is an instance of what one could call ‘the liberal conception of order’. In fact, the considered ‘anti-liberal’ Nietzsche is

50, 51) F.Nietzsche, ‘Homer’s Wettkampf”
one of the thinker whose ordering concept is most free of all. 52

Nietzsche’s model represents a conception of behavior that tends to generate a desirable sort of order which is not intentionally imposed by anyone. But the model also attributes to the system a characteristic which is not to be found in all the traditional versions of liberal conception: the spontaneous creation of character. In pursuing the sort of activity which the system supports - in contending with one another in the pursuit of excellence - the individuals within it are working to change themselves. They are trying to become more excellent individuals. 53

52) Remark: ‘The following claim may in fact not to be easy to understand. One could see in the last section that Nietzsche made a very energetic case for freedom: because that is the essence to be liberated from the ‘lower’ rules of nature - man’s freedom to acting. The concept of nature, what ever it manifested over time, is truly the most powerful force in hindering man to act. If we remember the quote from the ‘Twilight of the Idols’ mentioned earlier on, we recognize that freedom is valuable in that it is an absolute pre-requisite for advances in human development where the motivation of man is described with ‘one ought to know who one is....’. The post modernist critics want to achieve freedom in the sense of autonomy as a counter force to the homogeneity of modernism. The question than is: freedom for what? - since the post modernist understanding hesitates to acknowledge the concepts of value and quality and is satisfied to achieve a mere ‘status quo being’ (stoic existence). As we learned earlier, freedom for the sake of freedom is a sense-less goal. If one does not ascribe to the ‘drive to master’, as a very general defined aim, one does not need freedom. This leads to the conclusion that freedom should be valued as a potentiality but not as a ‘right’ needful for everybody. Freedom is valuable because it is an indispensable good for people who are ready to undergo certain characterological transformation (by characterological transformation is meant the concept of ‘sich selbst ueberwinden’ (overcoming oneself) and to develop ones own character). This is the reason why Nietzsche is called an ‘anti-liberal’ and ‘anti-democrat’. He does not think that freedom is a quality one has to have as a eternal ‘right’ - he thinks to have the potentiality to freedom is sufficient.

53) Lester H.Hunt, ‘Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue’, pp. 56: ‘Let consider another example of a liberal conception of order: Ralph Waldo Emerson’s defense of what might be called pluralistic communities. Emerson’s argument begins with the claim that we are all subject to a certain serious danger which follows from the human inclination to imitate others, and from the even stronger desire to be imitated by others. These drives create a ‘perpetual tendency to set mode’. ‘each man.... is a tyrant in tendency, because he
would impose his idea on others.' Fortunately, this dynamic runs up against 'Nature, who... has set heart on breaking up all styles and tricks'. In a society in which people are free to adopt and express their own point of view, those who would impose their idea on others become opposed to each other in something like a public debate, and although 'no one of them hears much that another says,.... the audience, who have only to hear and not to speak, judge very wisely and superiorly how wrongheaded and unskilful is each of the debaters to his own affair'. Such a community 'is morose, and runs to anarchy, but... it is indispensable to resist the consolidation of all men into a few men.

In that example, the beneficial effect is said to arise from a social system and not from individuals as individuals. Emerson’s liberal conception of order does not assume that individuals have a reliable innate consensus toward the ideal. Throughout the nineteenth and the late eighteenth centuries, the liberal program was to abolish various institutional systems - including monarchy, the landed aristocracy, the church - on the ground that such systems have precisely the opposite sort of tendency. The liberals wanted to replace them with ones which would bring out what is best in people, whether those people are in themselves good, bad, or indifferent. Their conception of social order enabled them to hope that people would behave well without relying on the natural goodheartedness of the human race without setting up wise leaders to tell people what to do.

What reason might Nietzsche have had for rejecting the liberal conception? Most of the examples of liberal order promote ends which are too modest for Nietzsche. Few would claim that markets, courts, and elections breed business people, lawyers, and party leaders who are examples of genuine virtue. It can easily be argued that they do the very opposite. Perhaps they produce their valuable social effects at the sacrifice of individual character. But the development of character is the only thing that Nietzsche is interested in. It looks as though he has good reason for rejecting the liberal conception of order.

This impression is reinforced if we take a second look at Emerson’s account of pluralistic communities. At first glance, it looks promising because one might expect a certain appeal to the importance of character. But on a closer inspection we can see that it appeals to a concern for character which is very different from the sort of concern which guides Nietzsche. Emerson is describing a system that prevents something bad from happening - namely, that all human beings become absorbed into one-character-type; he is not claiming that it makes any existing type good in some positive way. Indeed, given what he says, it may well be that he should not make such a claim. What he says, essentially, is that a community should be a sort of debating society in which the claims that individuals make to present the good life are subjects of dispute. People who participate in public debates are typically driven further apart by the heat of the argument. Rather than bringing them together, the debate preserves their differences. In that case, the good would tend to be fragmented, in that probably no one would represent it whole and intact. Emerson would not mind this result because he is convinced that no one could possibly
embody the whole of human perfection anyway. For him, the impression that we have that some people
do embody the whole of the good is for him something like a optical illusion: ‘All persons exist to
society by some shining trait of beauty or utility which they have. We borrow the proportions of the man
from one fine feature, and finish the portrait symmetrically; which is false, for the rest of his body is
small or deformed’. (Emerson, ‘Selected Writings’, p.436). So, Emerson does not think that the all good
man is possible. Emerson accepts the prospect of living in a world in which the most outstanding human
beings, like the ‘representative men’ he writes about elsewhere, are excellent in only one way because he
thinks it is the only possible world.
Nietzsche agrees that this is the way the world is - this is a naturalistic account of a certain situation. But
we see the different the ethical understanding underlying Nietzsche’s and the Greek’s ‘forward looking
sense of life’ and Emerson’s and the Modern world’s ‘malevolent sense of life’. Nietzsche apparently does
not think that Emerson’s world is the only possible world. Certainly, he has reason to reject a system hat
seems to miss the ‘drive to mastery’, that seems to help preserve the incompleteness of the individual,
and supports the fragmentation of human being as we see it in the world around us.
It seems a fairly safe generalization to say that the liberal conception of order, as we know it so far, does
not answer to Nietzsche’s needs. As a matter of historical fact, its proponents have used it in such a way
that Nietzsche would regard them as having committed themselves to an ethically second-rate sort of
world, in which greatness is sacrificed to mediocrity.
KURIERE


Franz Kafka

COURIERS

They were offered the choice between becoming kings or the couriers of kings. The way children would, they all wanted to be couriers. Therefore there are only couriers who hurry about the world, shouting to each other - since there are no kings - messages that have become meaningless. They would like to put an end to this miserable life of theirs but they dare not because of their oaths of service.

Franz Kafka
PART TWO

ON THE ART OF ARCHITECTURE
ON THE ART OF ARCHITECTURE

'In architectural works, man's pride, man's triumph over the forces of nature, man's will to power assume visible form. Architecture is a veritable oratory of power made by form.'

Friedrich Nietzsche

OF THE USE OF ARCHITECTURE

Architecture, is above everything else, man's symbols of his presence. Artistic creation, and thus architecture, is the supreme means to fulfill the 'metaphysical' worth of life. Architecture is of passionately intense importance and profoundly personal concern to all men. Architecture is a constant in all civilizations, thus with various appreciations as a bearer of cultural manifestation; it has existed in every known culture, accompanying man's steps from the early hours of his 'dawn' - earlier than the birth of written language, perhaps earlier than the spoken language. And architecture, historically, should never be seen as a merely utilitarian product: architecture as long as we have architecture was bound up to the notion of power.

In 'The Birth of Tragedy', Nietzsche maintains that 'only as an aesthetic phenomena are life and the world justified eternally' 1 and in 'The Case of Wagner' he states that 'the highest possible transformation of the will to power is into artistic creativity'. 2 Assessing these thoughts and the observations of our cultural goods, one, consequently, may state that architecture is a means for the enhancement of life..... what the creation of architecture expresses, fundamentally, under all its lesser aspects: This is what life means to me... and this is life as I imagine it.

1) F.Nietzsche, 'Die Geburt der Tragoedie im Geiste der Musik', #5
2) F.Nietzsche, 'Der Fall Wagner', #6
There are some essential characteristics of the creative work which are much more important than commonly assumed: one of the distinguished characteristics of creation is that it serves primarily no practical, material end, but is an end in itself: the purpose of art is contemplation. Second, creation belongs to a non-socializable aspect of reality, which is universal but non-collective: to the nature of man's consciousness. Third, 'Art is a human action; there is no human action without interest'. Creation does have a purpose and does serve a human need; only it is not a material need. Architecture/art is inextricably tied to man's survival - not to his physical need, but to that on which his physical survival depends: to the preservation and survival of his consciousness.

The source of architecture lies in the fact that man's cognitive faculty is conceptual: man creates values, acquires knowledge and guides his action, not by means of single, isolated precepts, but by means of abstractions. This is the fundamental difference between architecture and 'building a place to stay'. Animals build 'a place to stay' according to their faculties of sensation and perception. Man aims higher. Man has a greater potentiality; his 'goal is to reach the highest specimens'. The works of architecture are abstractions of the architect's character: symbols. One should recognize that the quest for symbols of one's character is a crucial difference to the post modernist theme of 'creating signs'.

The difference between the creation of a sign and a symbol lies in the 'metaphysical' foundation of the architect. To create a symbol man must first know what he is

3) F.Nietzsche, 'Jenseits von Gut und Boese', #23
4) F.Nietzsche, Second Untimely Meditation, 'Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie' # 9: 'Das Ziel der Menschheit kann nicht am Ende liegen, sondern nur in ihren hoechsten Exemplaren'. ('The goal of man cannot lie in the end but only in its highest specimens')
5) Robert Venturi, compare with 'Learning from Las Vegas'
(what is his nature) and where he is (the nature of the universe where he acts): these are 'metaphysical' questions, but the creator of architecture has to find his answer, because the answers to these questions determine the ethics a creator will accept in his life.

In 'Human all too Human' we find a critique of acts not based in the deeper context of life. Nietzsche is saying that 'every creation does need a metaphysical basis'. He criticizes the common modern man 'as superficial and suggests that although the way for a creation may take longer, the result in the end will be more successfully... only if one is going back to the very source where the energy is active, only there one can create powerful'. A man without 'metaphysical' foundation is not able to guide his own life because there is no ground on which he can integrate his values (e.g. his emotions). In response to Leibniz' functionalist principle with his hidden remark that 'Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel' (The outcome justifies the means) Nietzsche counters that 'in the arts, the outcome does not justify the means. Thus,

6) F. Nietzsche, 'Menschliches allzu Menschliches', Volume I, #273: 'Zurueckgegangen, nicht zurueckgeblieben:.... Wer seine Entwicklung auf 'innere' Werte abstuetzet, der hat sich ein gutes Stueck zurueckbegeben und beginnt sein Wetttreiben mit anderen modernen Menschen unter unguenstigen Voraussetzungen: er verliert scheinbar Zeit und Raum. Aber dadurch er sich in jenen Bereichen aufheilt, wo Glut und Energie entfesselt werden.... kommt er dann.... um so schneller vorwaerts. Er hat sich nur zurueckgezogen, um seinem Sprunge genuegenden Raum zu haben...'

7) Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, 'Die Theodizee': 'Creation is the art of the best possible. That's why God must let the evil happen. We have evil, because God can do no better'. For the comprehensive understanding of the modern condition of life, one should yield to three major transformation: the Protestant ethic, the changed historical understanding (Hegelian historical knowledge), and the conception of functionalism. Leibniz writes the last letter of defense of the goodness of god in his essay 'Die Theodizee' in 1710. With Leibniz, men go to court with God the first time in Christianity. In previous theodizee's the creation is good but God had to agree with man-made evil, so that human beings had the free will for decisions. The way people solved these problems ruled over their goodness. With
Leibniz the argumentation changes: God's creation is not anymore the best of all worlds, but the art of the best possible. As mentioned above in the text, the hidden principle is the remark that the outcome justifies the means which is by itself of functionalist nature. In 1755, the earthquake of Lisbon ends this view of creation. The following secular version knows no God at all. The new theodicy states that if, first, the outcome justifies the means and, second, there should be no evil for a good outcome and, third, the outcome should be good, we have the consequence that bad means serve a bad outcome and good means serve a good outcome. In short, the means itself have to be justified. The outcome, the value of service, the functionality justifies the formal and material means. 'Form follows function' means then that the means have to be justified. For example, the form has to be according to the material that the good outcome can happen. The program of functionalism and rationalism, not only in architecture, is the program after God's death and postulates: less evil in the world through good means of the goodness of God. The good means are now the education of men.
justified means may justify the outcome. 8 Nietzsche's position of what 'good means' can do for the outcome is more cautious than the belief of most of the post-enlightenment thinkers, who wanted to make 'good means' available to everyone. Towards the positivist attitude of his own age, he reasoned with argument which encompass superficiality and, of course, an entire lack of original values. Further on he criticizes their way of finding knowledge (Erkenntnis). Consciously or subconsciously, man knows that he needs a comprehensive view of existence (a metaphysical foundation) to integrate his values, to choose his goals, to maintain the unity and coherence of his life..... and that his 'metaphysical' values are envolved in every moment of his life, in every choice, decision and action. In another aphorism in the same work, one finds what the arts want essentially: 'philosophy wants the same as art: to give our life the best possible depth and meaning. To give depth means to give 'episteme' (Erkenntnis). In that point all creation is optimistic, all men are tyrannized by the same logic'. 9 In other words, architecture is then a selective enhancement of man's own nature according to his own values..... the work of architecture is the symbol of the architect's character and as such the communication with the outside world.... the object of architecture is a symbol of the architect's character.... to hold up to man a concretized work of his ego... of his nature and his place in the universe and coming back to the difference of architecture and a 'nest'

8) F.Nietzsche, 'Menschliches allzu Menschliches', Volume II, #136: 'Mittel und Zweck: In der Kunst heiligt der Zweck die Mittel nicht: aber heilige Mittel koennen den Zweck heiligen'. We have seen (section 'On vitalism') in that Nietzsche accepts in the system of means and end just one single end (Zweck): life. There is nothing else which can be estimated as high as life. In that context, the good means really improve one's life but the means as such will be not available to everyone. The individual has to create the means by himself.

9) F.Nietzsche, 'Menschliches allzu Menschliches', #6
(a mere place to stay) is that architecture is in contest with oneself, each work of architecture, pushed by its architect who is trying to overcome himself, to such a degree that it arouses its neighbors awe and envy.

What is the purpose of architecture? Architecture is nothing less than the concretization of the architects 'metaphysics' to create aesthetic values (e.g. an object of architecture) and using these aesthetic values for the selective enhancement of the his own nature.
ON THE CREATION OF ARCHITECTURE

'Der Architekt stellt weder einen dionysischen, noch einen apollinischen Zustand dar: hier ist es der grosse Willensakt, der Wille, der Berge versetzt, der Rausch des grossen Willens, der zur Kunst verlangt......'.

Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Götzen-Dämmerung
oder wie man mit dem Hammer philosophiert' 10

In the discussion of creation, the Western culture has, in general, two concepts. One has its root in the pagan culture of the antiquity of the Greeks, the other is the concept of the supernatural creation in Christianity. Having read the previous theoretical part of this thesis, it will be plain to which of the two concepts we now will yield to. Apart of the support of Friedrich Nietzsche, my argument in this section is partly accompanied by ideas which can be found in the writings of the Viennese art historian Alois Riegl 11, the two Germans Theodor Lipps 12 and Wilhelm Worringer 13, as well as the theorists Bruno Zevi and Geoffrey Scott. 14

10) F. Nietzsche, 'Goetterdaemmerung' ('Twilight of the Idols'), # 11
11) Alois Riegl, 'Stilfragen': Riegl was the first to introduce into the method of art historical investigation the concept of 'Kunstwollen' ('artistic volition'). Riegl's approach regards the history of the evolution of art as history of volition, proceeding from the psychological pre-assumption that ability is only a secondary consequence of volition.
12) Theodor Lipps, 'Classics in Psychology': Lipps is best known for his aesthetics in which he developed the concept of empathy. According to this view, one apprehends another person or an object by 'feeling oneself' into that other. Lipps also did pioneering work at the intersection of psychology and philosophy. He saw consciousness as the consequence of the interactions between older experiences residing in subconscious state and newly entering sensations or apperceptions.
13) Wilhelm Woringer, 'Abstraktion und Einfuehlung': 'Woringer's work is a contribution to the aesthetics of the work of art. Woringer synthesized the Greek concept of two irreducible forces which vaguely aspiring to individual freedom and the other to superabundance and pantheistic expression. The antagonistic cultural model suggests the impulse towards the emphatic expression of vital psychic states, and on the other the tendency towards achieving transcendence through abstraction'. (Summary taken from K.Frampton, 'Modern Architecture')

14) Bruno Zevi, 'Architecture as Space' & Geoffrey Scott, 'The Architecture of Humanism': Zevi's sub-title of this book is 'How to look at architecture'. Although the book does not directly address questions concerning the creation of architecture, Zevi's interpretation of architecture, which comes to quite different conclusion's as for example Siegfried Giedion, is a valid continuation of the more penetrating works of the above mentioned thinkers. Geoffrey Scott is a 'must' for everyone interested in a non-materialistic approach to architecture. Like Zevi, Scott does not have a 'creation-theory' but his 'fallacies' help to formulate a position against the tendency to explain and create architecture out of non-architectural criteria.
The secular ancient Greek conception of creation is constituted by an irreducible duality of two complementary forces. In Greek mythology these two forces are symbolized by the Olympian gods Apollo and Dionysus. In 1872, Nietzsche published his first work entitled 'Die Geburt der Tragoedie im Geiste der Musik' (The Birth of Tragedy from the outset of Music). 'The Birth of Tragedy' is not a work whose primary concern is to provide a historically accurate account of the Greeks. Nietzsche's concern lies, rather, with man and his culture. But Nietzsche must have conceived particularities of his superb knowledge of Greek culture which for him were applicable as a timeless allegory of the problem of creative volition. However, it is a historical fact that 'Greek Tragedy' remains one of the greatest achievements of mankind. 15 'The Birth of Tragedy' is a revolutionary statement that has had a profound effects in both classical studies and philosophy. 16 Nietzsche is the first to look penetratingly at Greek irrationality; he sees that the origins of art and all human creativity are to be found in the dual aspects of human nature. He develops than his well-known concept of the Apollinian and the Dionysian forces. Apollo is the representation of the 'classical Greek man' rediscovered by Joachim Winkelmann and the 'classical' Wolfgang von Goethe after his Italian journey. The Apollinian force is the metaphor of the power of man to create harmonious and measured beauty. Furthermore, Apollo's characteristics are

15) Remark: 'The tragedies written by Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides were one of the most important contributions to enable the Greeks achieved such incredible heights in their culture. The themes were taken mostly from myth's of the heroic age written by Homer. The art form of tragedy appeared around the year 500 B.C. (Aeschylus) and disappeared in the Classical period with Euripides around the year 400 B.C. Most of the plays were destroyed by the early Christians because the content of the tragedies were of pagan nature.

16) Albert Hofstadttler & Richard Kuhns, 'Art & Beauty', p.496
the strength to shape one's own character as well as work of art. In other words, it is the very principle of individuation - the 'form-giving' force which according to Nietzsche reached its climax in Greek sculpture.

On the contrary, Dionysus is the symbol of the frenzy and destructive force which threatens to destroy all forms and codes and can be imagined best in the 'low-consciousness' under the influence of drunkenness by dance and music. The thesis of the 'Birth' is that it takes the dual aspect of both forces to make art possible. 17 The Dionysian element is the 'pantheistic' expression of the group which has lost all sense of individual identity, rank or distinction, and the participants felt themselves to be inspired by the instinctual forces of nature (the participant 'consumes' pure sensation and perception). Hence, the Dionysian element of tragedy is that which questions and dissolves the fixed boundaries between men, and between men and nature. In this way it achieves an intensification of existence, as the individual feels to be in direct influence of primitive energies of nature (sensation and perception without concept).

Without the restraining hand of Apollo, however, the release of such energies would probably lead to complete chaos and disorder, and the utter breakdown of the individual entity of life (as for instance the folk epidemics of the middle ages, when people danced themselves into total self-abandonment). In the ancient Greek understanding, Apollo, the deity of reason and 'form-giving', preserves the individual participant as an individual while allowing him to participate in the Dionysian ecstasy. This is the empowerment of the individual: though he is saved

17) F.Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', #21: 'The intricate relation of the Apollinian and Dionysian in tragedy may really be symbolized by a fraternal union of the two deities: Dionysus speaks the language of Apollo; and Apollo, finally the language of Dionysus; and so the highest goal of tragedy and of all art is attained'.
from dissolution by Apollo (the cognitive faculty of conceptualization, which all man possesses as a potentiality) he is able to share the energies of Dionysus without experiencing the constraint of ordinary forms and conventions. Hence, the duality of reason (faculty of conception) which leads to control and order on one hand and chance (faculties of sensation and perception), which leads to chaos and disorder on the other, effects the continual enhancement of the individual volition. The provoked will, and this is crucial, must constantly challenge the fixity of its own selfish determinations, and, therefore, is in continual ‘fight’ against the Dionysian force. Only through the continual expression of its own individual autonomy can the individual behold his independence. Here we meet, in the practical approach of creation, the difference of ‘first cause values’ and ‘values of descent’ as discussed in the previous chapter. This is the fullest vision of the ‘principium individuationis’, the constitutive movement of individual sovereignty in its highest form and the provision which directs the individual towards the highest possibility of art.

Having the dual force of life in mind, one now understands the claim that ‘architecture is a means to life, but that the creative act of architecture itself always must attain an end’. Architecture in its highest form is the controlled power of the ego towards his object. Such creation never can be a process, it must be an end. The ego is irreducibly integrated into the ‘context of life’ (the ego is part of the universe e.g. he lives with other people). This flow of life is the ‘Dionysian axis’. During his life in the context with the universe the ego is confronted with uncountable constraints and influences. The assessment of these constraints and influences build up the ego’s character. But the shaping of one’s own character does not happen on the ‘Dionisian axis’ but on its complementary, the ‘Apollinian axis’. The ‘Apollinian axis’ is the force of conceptualization and is the sole work of the individual, since man’s consciousness is a non-collective faculty. The ego has to ‘step out’ from the
eternal 'flow of life'. This 'seclusion' aims to assess the constraints and influences which up to the present were just perceived but not conceptualized. The ego, in our case the architect, creates his object... and thus shapes his character. The 'seclusion' from the 'Dionysian axis' is of importance because the ego is in sole control only on the 'Apollinian axis'. Only on the 'Apollinian axis' the ego can rule out fortuity. In that stage all concentration lies between the ego and the object. The constraints and influences prior to the 'turn' to the 'Apollinian axis' become asset in the ego's character through the creation. Metaphorically, the ego will add the new values into his character. Again, it is the difference between the creative concepts of 'the end' and 'the process' that 'the concept of the end attained' aims to achieve its goals by control and design, while the 'creation by process' as to acquire continuously influences by fortuity which leads to chaos and disorder. The nature of creation, under all its lesser aspects, is the drive to transform towards the creation of values and symbols.

Since man lives by re-shaping his physical background to serve his life, since he must create his values - man needs a generator for these values: the work of art. 18 Architecture gives man that symbol. It gives him the experience of seeking the full, immediate, concreteness of his goals. Since man's will is unlimited, since his striving for excellence and the achievement of his goals is a lifelong work - and the higher the values, the harder the 'overcoming oneself' (sich selbst ueberwinden) - he needs a moment, a period of time in which he can experience the sense of his completed task. The making of architecture gives the architect the chance to experience his own ego transformed into his object. The object than is the symbol of his values and he experiences the joy that his values have been successfully

18) F.Nietzsche, 'Goetterdaemmerung', #9: 'Art is the transformation into perfection'.

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achieved. This is the ‘moment of rest’, the experiencing of a moment of
‘metaphysical joy’ - a moment of elevated love for existence.

The primary importance of the experience is not in what man learns from it
(process), but in that he experiences it (the end attained). 19 If a human being does
not experience these elevated moments - ‘the joy of life’ - life itself, even if it is still
the highest good man possesses, becomes a meaningless burden and an endless
process of waiting for redemption. 20

The same principle applies to a reactive man (men who wait for redemption), though
in different terms, according to his different views and responses. For a reactive
man, Schopenhauer and Rousseau, for example, the concretized projection of his
malevolent 'sense of life' serves, not as 'breath' and imagination to move forward,
but as permission to stand still (compare to Oswald Spengler's macro-history 'The
Decline of the West' or to return to primitivity (as suggested by Rousseau in his
'Sur les Discourse de la Art et Sciences'): it declares that values are unattainable,
that the will is futile, that fear, guilt, pain and failure are mankind's predestined end -
and that man is helplessly against it. Or on a still lower level of reaction against life,
the concretized projection of a malignant sense of life provides a man with an image
of triumphant malice, of hatred for existence, of vengeance against life's best
exponents, of the defeat and destruction of all human values; his kind of art gives
him a moment's illusion that he is right - that evil is 'metaphysically' potent. Art is
man's 'metaphysical' mirror; what an active creator seeks to see is a celebration of

19) F.Nietzsche, 'Unimely Meditation: Of the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life': ‘...The
'historical man' has faith in his process towards the future, while the "supra-historical" is the one who
does not envisage salvation in the process but for whom the life is real today and the world is finished in
every single moment and its end attained'.

20) F.Nietzsche, 'Assets', Karl Schlechta, Volume III, p.533: 'Pessimism is the ancestor of nihilism.'
life; what a reactive man seeks to see is a justification - even if only a justification of his depravity, as a last convulsion of his betrayed self-esteem......

Man's volition, thus, is to be understood that latent demand which exists per se, entirely independent of the object and of the mode of creation. Like the potentiality to reason, everyone possesses the potentiality to volition. The use of one's own potentiality of volition, like the one of reason, is volitional. It is crucial to understand that man's volition is the primary factor in all creation and, in its innermost essence, every work of art, of architecture is simply on objectification of this a priori existent absolute volition.

Viewing volition as the primary force of man's action, that understanding opposes the modernist-materialist method which sees in the work of art a product of three main factors: utilitarian purpose, raw material, and technique. For modernist-materialist theory, the history of art is, in the last analysis, a history of ability. But this is a wrong assumption. The history of creation is the history of volition. At best, one may claim that ability is a consequence of volition. Consequently, the stylistic peculiarities of the past epochs are, therefore, not explained by a lack of ability in the first order, but by a lack of volition.

The crucial factor is that volition is merely modified by the other factors of utilitarian purpose, material, and technique. These constraints are not given that positive creative role assigned to them by the materialist theory according to which modern theory and modern architecture is proceeded (e.g. Hegel, the underlaying force of Semper's theoretical discourse, Viollet-Le-Duc, Structuralism, Muthesius, certain chapters of the Bauhaus tradition, Dutch tradition in the 20th century).

One is able to estimate a difference in the resources of the constraints. It is correct that better instruments may change the outcome of the music or that reinforced
concrete may enhance the opportunities in architecture, but it is also a fact that nobody can claim just because one possesses the better instruments, one can play or compose better music. The individual will masters the constraints. Better constraints (more resources) give the creator a greater potentiality to exercise his will but this is all what constraints can do - they are mere modifiers. Constraints have not the power to hinder one's ideas: man's mind is prior to the constraints. Modern-materialist architecture, essentially, works with a constraint based concept which means that the constraints (e.g. planning, constructive logic, material, environmental factors, functionality, community planning) are given the positive creative role. This has lead to an architectural understanding that estimates these constraints as the positive form-giving elements of architecture, as the standard of architecture and, finally, yields towards the tendency that structure (matter) itself is the sole 'material' of architecture.

Furthermore, the modernist-materialist approach suggests an architecture which has lead to the architectural and ethical dispute of the concept of the type versus the concept of individual design. The concept of the type is the expression of the idea of systems, pattern, module, element, and the repetition of such elements. The ethical and architectural characteristics of this position can easily found in the philosophy of Rousseau with his association of man and nature, in Laugier's 'Urform'- theory of constructive logic, in the philosophy of German idealism, American transcendentalism and in many architectural theories of the mid and late nineteenth century.

In the A-tectonic approach, constraints are not given that positive role, instead they are assumed to play an inhibiting, negative one: they represent the coefficients of friction within the 'Gesamtkunstwerk'.
If ability (technique) is not anymore the primary lack to produce 'beautiful work of art', the modernist-materialist and socialist claim that if one would educate all people with the same quality that everyone could produce 'beautiful work of art' is wrong. Society is participating from the beginning of every creative act but it does this in a passive manner. Society never creates, it is always a single individual who synthesizes constraints and influences and creates something new. Creation is the shaping, styling, organizing and controlling of a single individual mind.

In opposition to the tectonic approach, the architectural concept of design or 'will-to-form' views structure and constraints as not more than modifier of the expressed artistic volition of the architect. Consequently, the concept of individual design is a rejection of the ethical idea of the 'value of descent' I have spoken earlier. Only the individual will-to-form can develop a permanent creative tension to annihilate architectural determinism.
MEMORY AND FORGETFULLNESS

As we know, the problem of history and knowledge is the essential key-conception of the theory of life and the idea of creation in the modern era. Even after taking into consideration the industrial and technological changes in the Modern world, it is possible to explain the essence of modernism in terms of its relationship to historicism. Modernity seeks to articulate and manifest the present. 'Absolute modernity' insists on meaning as the realization of the immediate through a transcendence of the past; history is rejected in the name of the present. Affirmation is supposedly possible outside the continuum of history. One of the leading modernist critics, Paul de Man, states that 'absolute history must be un historical', and he recognizes the following as the essential underlying desire of modernity: The goal of modernity is to achieve the tabula rasa. Modernity exists in the form of a desire to wipe out whatever came earlier, in the hope of reaching at last a point that could be called the true present, a point of origin that marks a new departure. Thus

21) Remark: 'In 1874, Nietzsche published an essay titled 'Vom Gebrauch und Nachteil der Historie fuer das Leben', his second 'Unzeitgemaess Betrachtungen'. For Nietzsche, perhaps as for no other philosopher before, philosophy must be, in his own words, 'Um des Lebens willen' ('For the sake of life'). Nietzsche's concept of creativity as a supreme means for the elevation of life would probably described, by a person who believes in Christian asceticism, as being hedonistic. Nietzsche disagrees with the idea which seems to be innate in Christian morality that we are disinterested in life. Life, for him, is not 'ein Wartessal' ('a waiting hall') for the redemption towards another world. Even if the above mentioned essay is considered to be of somewhat lesser philosophical content (by scholars), it is valued as one of the most influential works written in the 19th century. Although Nietzsche was in his epistemological studies not at his best (quote W.Kaufmann), it gives to the student of Nietzsche a marvelous insight regarding knowledge, the creation of knowledge as well as the use of it and what it does for and against our life.
defined, modernity and history are diametrically opposed'. 22 Antonin Artaud, another advocate of the modernist idea, justified such attempts as 'being necessitated by the obvious bankruptcy of history.' 23 Furthermore, he states in that 'one of the reasons for the asphyxiating atmosphere in which we live without possible escape or remedy...is our respect for what has been written, formulated, or painted, what has been given form, as if all expression were not at last exhausted, were not at a point where things must break apart if they are to start anew and begin fresh.'

This is one side of the understanding of the modern world in which Nietzsche sees an obvious problem. I would like to express the concept with which Nietzsche seeks meaning through a critical reconciliation with history. Nietzsche asks: 'How is one to be modern, that is, of the present, and be reconciled with history, that is the past?' Nietzsche seeks to establish an affirmation within the continuum of history.

Nietzsche's essay is even more a polemic against the 'education' of his own age that tells man more about the past than he can possibly digest and calls his era an excess of a wrongly understood history, the hypertrophy of the historical sense in our life. Ackermann guesses correctly when he states that 'Hegel and Hegelian philosophy is probably the target of Nietzsche. Hegelian history attempts to subsume everything worth knowing into a historical system. This looses the lightness of impact that history should have to advantage life and violates the stricture against the weight of the past. Scientific history is directed by the modern subjective goal of mastery by an intellectual system according to an unscientific method'. 24

22) Paul de Man, Essay 'Literary History and Literary Modernity' in 'Blindness and Insight: Essay in the Rethoric of Contemporary Criticism'

23) Antonin Artaud, 'No more Masterpieces', p.74

24) Robert J. Ackermann, 'Nietzsche', p.66
Hegelian historians are interested in understanding other cultures as the progressive unfolding of various ideas, hoping to achieve a systematic integration of historical detail by organizing details around ideas. Historian critics of Hegel had insisted that insufficient detail could be accommodated within such a scheme for a sufficiently rich understanding of history. Each period had to be understood in itself through the presentation of all the relevant detail. Other historians argued for understanding through motivation, so that we come to understand other periods in the same way that we understand other human beings, through imaginative projection. Once again, Nietzsche stands virtually alone, opposed to this onslaught. Nietzsche denies the pretensions of other historians to have achieved scientific understanding.

The German word 'Geschichte' (history) explains by its own meaning the extent, how Hegelian and later marxist-materialist and positivist history violates the proper understanding of history. 'Geschichte' means literally the horizontal layering of occurrences. If one is imagining that all these occurrences are, let us say, three feet long horizontal, the idea of scientific knowledge is a vertical cut through all the layers. It is easy to imagine that up to our time, there is little possibility of getting an accurate, sufficient understanding of history, at least not sufficient enough that it could be called scientific.

Sir Karl Popper argues that 'modernism is a doctrine of the kind we call now historiographic-scientific knowledge, and that scientific knowledge is an intellectual error.' 25 Popper uses the word 'historiographic' to characterize the modernist theory about the course of historical development. Popper defines historical knowledge as an approach of the social sciences (e.g. anthropology, sociology, ethnology, genealogy, archeology) which assumes that 'historical prediction is their principal

aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 'rhythms' or the 'patterns', the 'laws' or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of history. To say that modernism is historicist is to say that it sees artistic developments in the modern era as growing out of each other in accordance with rhythms, patterns, laws or trends.' With the upcoming of modernism the understanding of history has changed fundamentally and rapidly. In Hegel's philosophy there arises the 'collective-singular' "the history". Until to Hegel and Hegelian philosopher's the term history was in the form of a plural. There was not one history, there were uncountable histories. In Hegelian, and later in marxist-materialist and utilitarian-positivist ideology, history aims to tell all the histories of the world in one scientifically analyzed absolute body of knowledge. While Hegel intended to embody the 'end of knowledge', the socialist ambitions are programmatic. The new goal of history is to explain the whole of reality in its entire complexity of earthly life. Post-Hegelian history does not anymore mean a story about something or somebody, but history now will explain the world. History itself became philosophy.

This is what is called 'the hypertrophy of historical knowledge'. Nietzsche accuses Hegel by saying that the Swabian philosopher did not understand the value of the enlightenment to its full extent, and he blames him for the acceleration of the downfall of human individuality and self-development. Historical understanding, for Nietzsche, proceeds out of the insights of the historian whose perspective can not be made universal by methodology.

Kathleen Higgins paraphrases in her paper 'Nietzsche and Postmodern Subjectivity' an account of Nietzsche's critique of historical knowledge. 26

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26) Kathleen Higgen's quoting N. in 'Nietzsche and Postmodern Subjectivity' in 'Nietzsche as Post Modernist', Chapter 10, pp.194: 'The modern historical awareness has extremely harmful effects for the human being. Historical consciousness nullifies the individual's sense of joy in the present. The ocean of
historical facts of which the modern human being is made aware contextualizes his or her understanding of the present. Whatever one encounters in the present appears as just another episode, whose genuine significance is determined by this larger span of events. The result is that the individual is rendered increasingly incapable of appreciating the present as an occasion of self-sufficient happiness.

Modern historical consciousness inhibits the individual's creative activity. By diminishing the prominence of the present in the oceanic sweep of history, the modern historical perspective impairs the individual's conviction that action in the present can effectively transform the inheritance of the past. Healthy life, for both the individuals and their culture, depends on what Nietzsche calls 'the plastic power' of the person, namely 'the power distinctively to grow out of itself, transforming and assimilating (overcoming oneself) everything past and alien, to heal wounds, replace what is lost and reshape broken forms out of itself. Modern human beings, however, tend to be so overpowered by the diverse collection of things past and alien that the conviction that one can master and reshape them is extinguished.

Modern historical awareness creates chaos in the inner human being and generally weakens one's sense that this inner being is connected to the larger world. In order not to disintegrate, the individual resigns himself to the war within. But a consequence of this war is the individual's loss of confidence in the inner person's ability to guide his action. External behavior becomes more and more a matter of conforming to convention. Thus the inner being and external behavior become increasingly out of touch with one another, and the inner person comes to take the actual (external) world less and less seriously.

The modern historical consciousness increasingly renders the individual a non-subject. A being, according to Nietzsche, is a subject only in so far as it is affected by objects. But modern people, too attentive to knowledge of history, have become distant from the actual, present world to be affected or moved by anything. The modern individual easily becomes indifferent to virtually everything that is in the present. In addition, historical knowledge teaches one that 'things were different in all ages, it does not matter how you are.' This relativism further encourages the attitude that the actual situation in the present need not deeply concern one. The jading influence of historical knowledge uproots the future as well as the present. For in order to act with the hope of creating a future, one needs the unconditional faith in something perfect and righteous and imagination that fosters unconditional love - the modern approach kills imagination.

Modern historical knowledge renders individuals ironic, even cynical, about their own roles in the world. Made aware of how many possibilities have been actualized, they see themselves as latecomers. Their own lives appear to them almost as historical afterthoughts, 'episodes' in which nothing radically new or significant can be accomplished. The modern individual suffers from an 'inborn grayheadedness' whose chief symptoms are paralysis and a sense of personal impotence. Everything that the individual attempts is attempted with the self-ironic sense that nothing much will come of it.
Nietzsche fights the vision that 'we are captives of history', incapable of surmounting its determining flood of influences. In his essay, Nietzsche provides a framework for a historical understanding as well as a strategy for addressing the aporia generated by historical excess. His famous conception is the threefold of 'monumentalistic' (historical), 'antiquarian' (un historical), and 'critical' (supra-historical).

In Kaufmann's 'Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ', one finds a condensed explanation of the three different modes (quote): 'Monumentalistic' history is the emphasized heroism and the effort to derive comfort and inspiration from the fact that man is capable of greatness, contemporary mediocrity notwithstanding. 'Antiquarian' history is the conservation of our knowledge of the past which is of worth for humanity just of its age. 'Critical' history forces us to make a judgment of the past occurrences without preoccupation. From the question of whether now the 'un historical' or the 'historical' is of greater value for life, Nietzsche points out that both are equally important. The 'historical', in the form of memory, is necessary for life, and this is its value. If man would remember everything, however, if he were only historical and not able to forget, he would be incapacitated for life. On the other hand, a complete lack of memory would also not be suitable. Both are necessary. People without the ability to forget would be unable to make decisions, to act and to be creative. People with absolutely no memory of their past would be unable to govern themselves successfully.

The un historical and the historical are equally needed for the health of an individual, a people, and a culture. . . . . . . men must know how to forget at the right time as well as how to remember at the right time.' 27

How can the notion of the 'supra-historical' to be understood? In his investigations, Nietzsche conceives that 'the historical' man believes that the meaning of existence will come progressively in course of its process. Drawn from that belief, the culminating goal of existence of the historical man lies in some future. The 'supra-historical' man, conversely, does not envisage salvation in the process. Nietzsche values both the 'historical' and the 'un historical', but only the 'supra-historical' which may be described as 'knowledge' or 'wisdom' creates a value helpful for man and is useful for life. The 'supra-historical' is the activity of creating values. For Nietzsche, history is only useful by a juxtaposition to life. The 'historical man' has faith in his process towards the future, while the 'supra-historical man' is the one 'who does not envisage salvation in the process but for whom the life is real today and the world is finished in every single moment and its end attained'. Nietzsche is with such a view of an 'active' history close to Aristotel's insight that history as such does not have value for life but is rather a series of symbols and monuments. History gives no assurance for greatness or progress but one may say that people taking on the role of certain creative acts like architecture or music as media of great importance as their cultural manifestation and achievements.

History happens whether entire randomly nor is history a sequence of progress. A creative act reflects previous achievements but is not the direct result of it. Besides the thought of what history is best for life, Nietzsche critiques the blind admiration of positivist-materialist 'Erscheinungen'. If we remember that Nietzsche is interested in whether values are possible without supernatural sanction, so the relation of the 'historical' and the 'supra-historical' involves the problem of the relativity of values. Here emerges the question of whether values are genuinely supra-historical values or
just merely historical phenomena which are valid only in a certain place and time. 28

28) Walter Kaufmann, 'Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ', p. 148: 'Nietzsche's moral values in the 'Birth of Tragedy' don't seem to be 'supra-historical', while aesthetic values appear to be. He respects aesthetic values independent of historical change. What we conceive to be beautiful is not beneath historical change but above it. If the beauty of the Greeks is still beauty to us, is not its independence of time rather different from that of the human anatomy? Is there not a decisive difference between biological data and works of art? One can hardly fail to see Nietzsche's conclusion that a work of art elicits a response fundamentally different from anything the human organism produces through its more usual physiological processes. It is plain that Nietzsche does not look at history as sequences of naturalistic biological facts, but instead he looks at history as a work of art.'

In his attack against the influence of Hegel, Nietzsche denounces the philosophy of history and the 'idolatry of the factual' as leading to a yes to 'every power, be it a government, public opinion, or a majority of numbers.' History does not reveal values in the sense that what succeeds is thereby proven to be valuable; and Nietzsche explicitly disagrees with the 'shallow optimism' of all the Hegelians and Darwinists - what comes later is not always more valuable. Nietzsche proposes a kind of 'aristocratic ethics without aristocracy' (philosopher-tyrants as different to Plato's philosopher kings) and is his opposition against the pessimistic and negativist conception of the modern era in socialism and democracy which has two main inherent characteristics: the equalization of all people and, consequently, the dismissal of excellence and the acceptance of mediocrity (Alexis de Tocqueville, 'Democracy in America').

What does it mean to say that 'the goal of humanity cannot lie in the end but only in its highest specimens?' In a quote of Kaufmann, 'Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ, pp.149, we see the coherence of Nietzsche's thought from the very beginnings to his later inquiries: 'In the highest specimens of humanity we envisage the meaning of life and history: what can an additional ten or twenty centuries bring to light that we could not find in contemplating Aeschylus and Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, or Spinoza, in Leonardo and Michelangelo, Shakespeare and Goethe, Caesar and Napoleon? In them the events of history have truly been 'intensified into symbols'. On what, however, does Nietzsche base his position? This can be understood only if one keeps in mind his initial nihilism. When God and any supernatural sanction of our values are questioned, the bottom falls out of our values, and they have no basis any more. If the teaching of evolution is correct and man is not essentially different from the apes; if he is, as all appearances seem to indicate, more similar to the monkeys than these are to the 'lower' animals; if he is just another of the primates; then it would follow, Nietzsche thinks, that the mass of mankind lack any essential dignity or worth other than other organisms. No quantitative addition,
either of more and more human beings or of more and more intelligence (which man is supposed to share with the chimpanzee, though he has more of it), can give man the unique dignity which the Western tradition has generally conceded him. What is worthless to start with, cannot acquire value by multiplication. If man's value is zero, no addition of such zeros will ever lead to any value. A steady increase of intelligence through history, even if it could be demonstrated, would not change this picture. If man is to have any worth, there must be a 'qualitative leap'. His statement that 'the goal of humanity cannot lie in the end' is thus explained; and so is the addition that, if there is any goal, it can be found only in what he calls 'the highest specimens'.

Nietzsche looked upon history empirically. He juxtaposed the personalities in the periods in history that he knew best with those of his own contemporaries. How did his contemporaries fare in any comparison with the ancient Greeks or the men of the Renaissance? Being primarily interested in art and philosophy, Nietzsche found that asking the mere question amounted to a condemnation of his contemporaries and a repudiation of any belief that history is always a story of progress. What philosophers are living today whom one could even compare to Plato, Aristotle, or Spinoza; and what artist, whom one could seriously juxtapose to Michaelangelo or Leonardo? Has the worth of man increased? Nietzsche concluded that what comes later in time is not necessarily more valuable. Then Nietzsche looked at the production of the great artists and philosophers. Would he gauge the worth of these men by the mass of their productions, by the average excellence of their works - or by their greatest works? Again, the answer cannot be in doubt.

Leonardo has left fewer paintings than have most painters; but nobody will judge him as a poor painter on that account. We value everybody by their 'master-pieces'. We say that if Beethoven had just written some one great symphony which we consider his best, then he still would be one of the greatest composer who has ever lived, even if he had never written anything else.

There is thus a certain plausibility to Nietzsche's thought, though it is dynamite. He maintains in effect that the gulf separating Plato from the average man is greater than the chasm between the average man and a chimpanzee. While Nietzsche agrees with Christianity, as Simmel insists, in ascribing infinite worth to the individual human soul, Nietzsche does not ascribe this worth to every man as such, but only to some men. Nietzsche agrees with the Christian tradition and such thinkers as Kant and Hegel that the worth of man must consist in a feature he does not share with any other animal. He believes that the worth of man, and thus the value of his life, his creations, and his acts, depend on his 'Sonderstellung', his unique position, in the cosmos. Darwinism, however, instead of infusing him with optimism, convinces him that empirical facts do not bear out the prevalent view that all men, as such, occupy a unique position in the cosmos. Most men are essentially animals, not basically different from chimpanzees - distinguished only by a potentiality that few of them realize: they can, but rarely do, rise above the beasts. Every man can transcend his animal nature and become a 'no-longer-animal' and a 'truly human being'. Hell is, so to
speak, and this is in coherence with the Christian tradition, man's natural state: only by a supreme effort can he ascend into the 'heavens'..... Nietzsche's highest specimens. Nietzsche does not look at history as a process but as a timeless allegory. The Greeks, in the beginning of their history, were in danger of being completely overwhelmed by a chaotic flood of most diverse concepts and forms: their early religion was a veritable arena in which the gods of the orient fought each other. Yet the Greeks, imbued with the Apollinian spirit, learned to 'organize the chaos'. Suddenly one realizes that already 'the Birth of Tragedy' had already envisaged history from a supra-historical point of view and that Nietzsche, from his first book to his last, considered historical events and figures less with an eye to literal accuracy or correctness than 'to circumscribe....an everyday melody....to elevate it, to intensify it into a comprehensive symbol'. 'The Birth of Tragedy', Dionysus and Apollo, Socrates and Goethe become, in Nietzsche's vision symbols of timeless themes. The conception of 'organizing the chaos' (how to use knowledge) turns out to be of the utmost significance: introduced in an apparently historical account as the essence of the Apollinian genius, it remains one of the persistent motifs of Nietzsche's thought - the association of Dionysus with the very power of self-discipline to 'organize the chaos and, thus, the overcoming of oneself'.
NEW ABERRATIONS OF ARCHITECTURE

In his famous publication 'The Case for the Tectonics', Kenneth Frampton states that he does not stress the prerequisite of architecture which he describes as the spatial enclosure. 29 My paper, on the other hand, draws exactly on this prerequisite. The physical embodiment of architecture, as a product of creation of the architect's character just described in the sections one and two in the second part of the thesis, is, at the very bottom, the configuration of space. Our focus will draw on the control and organization of space or as Geoffrey Scott states '...all other factors - count in the judgment of a building according to how well they accentuate, coincide or interfere with the spatial value'. 30

Before I will argue that the 'a-tectonic' material space has greater innate resources for the making of great architecture than the focusing on the 'tectonic' matter, I'd like to distinguish some very contemporary 'traits' which I think that are of greatest importance. The reader might be reminded by Scott's 'fallacies' and Johnson's 'crutches' and 'shibboleths'. This is intended since these critiques were forward-looking to such an extent that the contemporary architect or student discovers still some 'wisdom' one might think about. 31 The main problem seems to be an ethical one; and I already have given the fundamental weaknesses in the first part. In the section 'Moralities and Architecture', I stated that the problem of systematization, rationalization, and type in architecture comes partly from the moralized understanding of architecture with its demand for 'truth all of the time'

29) Kenneth Frampton, 'The Case for the Tectonic', p.1
31) Remark: Robert Stern and Peter Eisenmann in their book of Philip Johnson: About the 'Seven Crutches of Modern Architecture': '...still the best and wittiest of the plight of architectural theory in a
pluralist and existentialist society'. (Philip Johnson, Writings, p.136) Hanno-Walter Krutz, 'Die Geschichte der Architektur-Theorie', p.394: About Geoffrey Scott's 'The Architecture of Humanism': '....the most intelligent and sharpest account on an architectural understanding which takes architecture as an instrument for non-architectural interest'.
which leads to the tendency of a fragmentation of comprehensive architectural thinking. In different context, we find our problem expressed beautifully in the 'Baukunst' of Goethe when the former romanticist came a converted classicist after his trip to Italy: 'Leider suchten alle nordischen Kirchenverziehrer ihre Groesse nur in der multiplizierten Kleinheit' (Unfortunately, all Nordic ornamentalists of churches sought their greatness only in multiplied littleness). 32 'Multiplied littleness' instead of a straight forward greatness appears to me as a perfect characterization of the malevolent behavior underlying architecture in many cases these days. By 'malevolent behavior', I refer to the section on 'The Case against Moralities' which describes the ascetic and disinterested character of modern day life.

The question of concern that can be raised now may be how the Nietzschean ethics does influence architecture? Of course, there is not a bit of faith that the formula of 'multiplied littleness' could grow into greatness. On the other hand, if I refer to the concept of order we find in the 'Homer's Contest', we have quite some evidence that a lot of individual greatness leads also to an elevated culture.

Taking up Scott's and Johnson's tradition leads me to three areas particularly important to many architects practicing today which are not compatible with my architectural position: the obsession of planning, community, and environmental design. 33 Taking one-self seriously, supported by the cast of today's structure of

32) Wolfgang von Goethe, 'Baukunst' - 'Schriften zur Bildenden Kunst I' - Volume 19, p.75
33) Remark: Scott's 'fallacies' are: The romantic fallacy, the mechanical fallacy, the ethical fallacy, and the biological fallacy. Johnson's 'Crutches' and 'Shibboleths' are: history, pretty drawings, utility, comfort, cheapness, serving the client, structure as well as again utility, economy, material progress, social progress, and democracy.
hierarchies of the people, and underlined by the 'drive to mastery', it is better that
the design of architecture does not acknowledge the profession's current obsession
with planning. I would agree that every intervention brings a certain responsibility
with it, in our case a 'responsibility to the street' but today's belief that planning is a
useful instrument to enhance quality is on more than shaky foundation and by no
means justified. 34 But Rossi is correct in indicating the tendency that if one wants
to have a 'beautiful' city, the client should commission a city to one architect who is
in charge (Sixtus V., Von Klenze, Haussmann) It is indispensable: creation is the
work of an individual or did you ever here of a 'Team Le Corbusier' or a 'Team
Wright'? If an architect is commissioned for one object, his concern must be, under
all the lesser aspects, that the object itself is of excellence. Form over structure: the
architect has better focus on the quality of his object than of something which is
beyond his control. I do not claim that out of a collection of objects a city-structure
magically grows like the one in Paris, Rome, Bath, or Washington. But nobody will
seriously claim that today's planning conditions of a city are even similar to the ones
in these four cases by which I especially yield to the difference of the organization of
the power structure.

The sentiment towards the beautiful Italian city is understandable. But I do not think
that we should allow our habits of life go backwards to a social order in which was
allowed such drastic measures to achieve such great expression of man in the

34) Remark: The most influential contribution in Urbanism seems to be Aldo Rossi's 'L'Architettura della
Citta'. Although he speaks against a pure functionalist city-planning, his proposed return to aesthetic and
monumental categories letting us feel of the socialistic backbone pre required for this kind of
intervention. The anti-individual approach can not be uphold in a world which has experienced
heterogeneity. Nihilism and chaos must be fought in terms of a 'qualitative leap' of individuality and not
on a 'return' in what ever form (socialist or monarchic).
old way in the nearer future. Man's great expression has to come from within the individual himself. There are several reasons which I will not mention now which lead me to think that we are confronted with an urbanism of the territory in its totality. The code word of the future is discontinuity; the architect's chance is to search for the qualities of the discontinuity and he shouldn't see it as a bad phenomena. That would be to stick one's own head in the sand.

I do not want this to be understood as a pragmatist position but as an position which has 'to let go a for a moment' to discover anew the logic in the seemingly disordered territory. I see in the current anachronism towards our cities the chance to annihilate the very idea of 19th and 20th century urbanism: the idea of the concept of planning. Planning is the symbol of the 'values of descent' spoken about earlier. The urbanism of the last two centuries can not be explained without the mentioning of the concept of planning which substituted the concept of design; and the concept of urban planning is the idea of ideologists: it is the idea of the rationalization by the means.... the elimination of all the unforeseen and the establishment of a definite, crystalline and pretentious order. Everything leads to the assumption that the failure of the idea of the planning is the failure of the determinist-holistic and materialist-positivist vision of means and the goals. This vision's failure is its inability to act according to the 'open' concept described earlier. Not to obey planning is by no means an architectural sin; contrary, it is the wisdom not to participate in a bankrupt vision of mediocrity of the old utopian idea of the sterilization of all cultural expression and differences and a hatred for the excellent.

Secondly, I would not suggest that the architect should ignore the issues of community entirely. But the notion that the architect should serve the community must be looked at a little bit more closely. Today's idea of community is equal to Emerson's vision of the liberal concept of order I have described in the footnotes at
the end of the first part. In the terminology of architecture, it idealizes the idea that
the art of architecture should speak to the values, aspirations and yearnings of a
larger community from which it springs. This means that there is some
understanding that architecture is a 'communal expression' and that the expression
is, at best, a second-rate interpretation of something already existent: naturalism. But
man aims higher. According to the concept of 'The Homer's Contest', architecture is
doing much better as the heroic vision of an individual artist. Yes, that would be a
truly romantic work: but it is an understanding of the enlightened sort of
romanticism. The true sense is the fact that the primacy of values in human life is
not an irreducible primary, that it rests on man's faculty of volition, and therefore,
that the 'true' romanticist, philosophically, should be the champion of volition
(which is the root of values) and not of emotion, as often described of belonging to
romanticism (which are merely the consequences). 35 Architecture is the work of
the individual 'Kunstwollen' - the 'will to form'.

35) Remark: 'Romanticism is often hailed as the first 'modern movement'. Whether this is true or not is
not of major concern here. My concerns are the qualities inherent, or those that should be inherent, in the
notion of romanticism and in modern movement such as impressionism, fauvism, cubism,
expressionism, or symbolism. The most romanticist artist did not understand the principles of
romanticism (the task the enlightenment has giving up to men). The romanticist artists picked their
sense of life out of the cultural atmosphere: it was an atmosphere of men intoxicated by the discovery of
freedom, with all the ancient strongholds of tyranny - of church, state, monarchy, and feudalism -
crumbling around them, with unlimited opportunities in all directions. It was an atmosphere best
expressed by that century's naive, exuberant and tragically blind belief that the achieved qualities, from
here on, were to be irresistible and automatic. Aesthetically (technical), the romanticists were the great
rebels and innovators of the nineteenth century. But, in their conscious convictions, they were for the
most part not of the nature of the people who liberated the masses by validating the power of the human
mind. Most of them were leaning toward a kind of wild, free-wheeling mysticism. That free-wheeling
rousseauianism does not mean freedom, that fact, was recognized by very few of them. They did not see
their own rebellion in fundamental terms; they were rebelling - in the name of the individual artist's freedom - not against determinism, but much more superficially, against the aesthetic 'establishment' of the time: against classicism. Classicism was a school that had devised a set of arbitrary, concretely detailed rules purporting to represent the final and absolute criteria's. Even though the classicist had no answer to why their rules were to be accepted as valid (expect the usual appeal to tradition, to scholarship and to the prestige of antiquity: a especially good example of an 'monumentalistic' idea of history), this school was regarded as the representative of reason! The modernist idea opposes the notion of art as mimetic, or imitative, of outward arrearance. Immanuel Kant's 'Copernican revolution' or 'modernist rebellion' meant to be the liberation of life from its supernatural foundation, although Kant re-invented it with the notion of its 'transcendental imagination'. But the essential message of the enlightenment was plain: not the 'mechanistic' notion of encyclopedic knowledge which 'romanticism' rejected with so much energy but the notion of 'be yourself!'; of 'sapere aude!', of having full responsibility over one's own actions was its essential philosophical content...... and, consequently, the creation of values to guide one's own actions. In the practicality, modernism fails because it advocates nihilism. Modernism never acknowledged the importance of the idea of volition or it reversed the entire notion as in the case of Rousseau and Schopenhauer. Thus, Rousseau ethically-politically as well as Schopenhauer ethically-artistically-metaphysically, are the main forces in shaping the very premises for the comprehensive understanding of the pessimist-negativist modernity. The modernist's believe that only 'undisturbed' nature is good, in source a Rousseauian notion which can be found in his 'Discourse sur les Arts et Sciences', does not allow one to be active, since all alternation is seen as essentially evil. The will of man, all his desires are seen as an objection to a harmonious order of the natural world. The difference of the relation of art and nature in Nietzsche's thinking can be best conceived by reading the 80th aphorism in his 'Die Froehliche Wissenschaft' ('The Gay Science') where he in length celebrates the 'Abweichung von der Natur ist vielleicht die angenehmste Mahlzeit fuer den Stolz des Menschen; ihretwegen ueberhaupt liebt er die Kunst......schoene Unnatuerlichkeit......' (The alteration of nature is the reason why man loves the arts......beautiful artificiality......)

According to modernist belief, men should not even try to grasp the world by rational means and, consequently the supreme stage of man is in his complete willessness. Just in this stage, according to romantist-modernist theory, is man's existence in the world justified at the artistic level, romantist-modernist theory has taken certain metaphor's to manifest the 'closeness' to nature.

This is one of the strangest ironies in cultural history: the attempts to define the nature of romanticism/ modernism declared it to be an aesthetic school based on the primacy of emotions !!! In various forms, this definition has persisted to our day. It is a major example of the intellectually disastrous consequences of definitions by non-essentials.
What the actual modernist idea ('sapere aude!', of course) brought to life was the primacy of values. In daily life, values and value-judgment are the source of emotions - for sure not the other way around. The emotional element in romanticist art was the most easily perceivable characteristic of the movement and it was taken as its defining characteristic, without deeper inquiry. Such issues like the fact that the primacy of values in human life is not an irreducible primary, that it rests on man's faculty of volition, and, therefore, that the modernist, philosophically, should be the champions of volition (which is the root of values) and not of emotions (which are merely the consequences) - were issues to be recognized, but who defaulted in regard to aesthetics as they did in regard to every other crucial aspect of modernism. The still deeper issue, the fact that the faculty of reason is the faculty of volition, seems to have been not known at the time, and the various theories of free will were for the most part, and still are, of anti-rational character, thus reinforcing the association of volition with mysticism. The romanticist saw their cause primarily as a battle for their right to artistic individuality and - unable to grasp the deepest metaphysical justification of their cause, unable to identify their values in terms of reason - they fought for individuality, and a lot of people still do, in terms of feelings, surrendering the banner of reason to their enemies (or friends?) in the marxist-materialist school.
CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have shown that the modern and post modern cultures work with two different ethical conception. Both are governed by an altruistic behaviour of its participants. If you relay on these two you may choose between a type oriented standard culture which does operate with a deterministic ideal or you may choose the entire relativistic culture of post modernism which tries to operate with no standard at all.

My thesis proposes the conduct of virtue and excellence based on the competitive notion. Contrary to all contemporary theories, my thesis, supported greatly by Greek and Nietzschean thinking, shows that excellence is in fact a valid possibility. I have shown that the operation according to excellence needs a transparent open creative concept in which the individual creator is not hindered by any set mode or collective interruption like voting or the like.

I have shown that architecture is a supreme medium to exercise the individual creative volition.

Within the realm of architecture, I have shown that the a-tectonic principle operating with the two chief legitimacies space & form has inherent the greatest resources to arouse man's cognition. In the particular controversy of the concept of the type versus the concept of the individual 'will-to-form', the thesis suggests to recognize that architecture, like any other creative activity, is not a constraint based activity. Architecture, under all its lesser aspects, is expressed volition.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

MARKUS BREITSCHMID, BORN IN LUCERNE, SWITZERLAND, APRIL 1966, HAS STUDIED ARCHITECTURE AT THE CENTRAL SWISS STATE COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE, AND COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.


HE HAS PRACTICED IN ARCHITECTURE STUDIOS IN SWITZERLAND. HE ALSO HELD A TEACHING ASSISTANTSHIP IN ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN IN THE STUDIO OF PROF. RON DANIEL AT VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE.

MARKUS BREITSCHMID RECEIVED EDUCATIONAL SCHOLARSHIPS FROM THE STATE OF LUCERNE, SWITZERLAND, AND FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, USA.

THE AUTHOR WAS AWARDED WITH THE 'AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS HENRY ADAMS GOLD MEDAL 1994' FOR HIS ACHIEVEMENTS IN HIS GRADUATE STUDIES.

M. BREITSCHMID