POLAND AFTER 1989:
A SHIFT TO POSTMATERIALISM OR A RISE OF THE UNDERCLASS?

by

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(ABSTRACT)

This study attempts to evaluate whether or not the theories of social change and conflict formulated in the United States and Western Europe can be applied to postcommunist societies. In particular, with Poland as a case study, the applicability of two theories has been examined. One is Ronald Inglehart's theory of a shift from materialist to postmaterialist values in postindustrial societies. The other one is Ralf Dahrendorf's theory of the modern social conflict and the emergence of the underclass in postindustrial societies.

The operationalization of Inglehart's theory has been based on the support given to political parties in the Polish parliamentary elections on September 19, 1993. The findings suggest that there is a value cleavage in Polish society between older and younger age cohorts. The conditions of the socioeconomic environment prevailing during the maturation period of each age cohort appear to be a main factor causing the differences in value orientation. Since older age cohorts experienced World War II and the subsequent economic hardships
they give priority to personal safety and economic security (materialist values). Younger age cohorts take their economic well-being for granted and are interested in problems like the condition of the natural environment or the sense of life (postmaterialist values).

The operationalization of Dahrendorf's theory has been based on statistical data from Poland. The findings suggest that although it is too early to talk about the existence of the underclass in Poland there are social and economic processes which may cause its emergence. These processes include the political and economic diversification of the working class, increasing unemployment, and exclusion of the economically disadvantaged groups of Polish society from the democratic political process.
Dissenting Report

May 13, 1994

Dr. Stephen White, Director of Political Science Graduate Program
Department of Political Science
VFISU

Dear Dr. White,

The purpose of this letter is to explain why I will not sign and give my approval to Rafal Paczkowski's thesis, "Poland After 1989: A Shift to Post-materialism or A Rise of the Underclass?". In my opinion to do so, would undermine the professional standard of our department and discipline.

The problem is not that the thesis is so bad that it cannot meet these standards or that Rafal does not have the capacity to write a defensible thesis. To the contrary, much of the thesis is acceptable. I believe that Rafal is a highly competent individual and that he is capable of writing a thesis that I could support. However, it is too late for that.

The problem is that Rafal has steadfastly refused to follow the unified advise of members of his committee as to how he might improve the thesis and thereby meet the minimal requirements for a Masters degree in Political Science. Rafal has repeatedly ignored constructive suggestions that Dr. Taylor and I repeatedly have made to him, at considerable cost to us in term of the time and energy required to thoughtfully read the thesis, write comments and to talk with him about our reservations.

My decision not to sign the thesis is based on an agreement that was made by the members of the thesis committee (the chair, Dr. Taylor, Arnold Schuetz and myself) at the conclusion of Rafal's formal defense. It is my firm impression that the committee found certain sections of the written thesis (primarily those dealing with theory and Rafal's analysis) less than satisfactory. Rafal's oral defense did not alleviate these concerns. After he was asked to leave the room his examiners agreed that, although the thesis was good enough to justify us signing his examination card, Dr. Taylor, would require Rafal to make certain changes in the final written document as a condition for us signing it. I believe there was consensus as to what those changes were. My opinion is based not only on the discussion at the defense, but on several earlier consultations between Dr. Taylor and myself, the substance of which had been forcibly communicated to Rafal before and during the defense.

Dr. Taylor communicated all, but one, of the required revisions to Rafal in the form of written comments on a typed draft of the thesis. Whether that one requirement was communicated in writing or orally after the defense is of no matter, because it was forcefully communicated to Rafal before and during the defense, and the committee explicitly agreed it would be required.

To use Dr. Taylor's words, Rafal "minimally" met the requirements Dr. Taylor had written on the typed draft. He did not respond at all to the unwritten requirement in question. He informed me yesterday that he was aware of that requirement, but that he disagree with it and so he had decided to ignore it.
Specifically, I am not signing the thesis for the following reasons:

Reservations not communicated in writing by Dr. Taylor to Rafal:
I believe the theory section is weak. I have two reservations.

1. I believe that Rafal creates a false dichotomy between Ronald Inglehart's and Ralph Dahrendorf's theories (one that could probably be avoided by an early incorporation of Robert Dahl's thinking on social cleavages). Specifically, the presentation of Inglehart's theory of a new and growing privileged class who disproportionately possess "post-material" values does not necessarily conflict with Dahrendorf's theory of a continued class division between "Haves" ad "Have-Not" - as is illustrated by the existence of both phenomena in the U.S.

2. More important, Rafal does not provide an adequate discussion of the difference between material and post-material values and why the latter should contribute to support for certain Polish reforms. Specifically, it is not clear which post-material values contribute to support for which reforms. I tried to help Rafal on the former question by suggesting the work of Abraham Maslow and (since he apparently did not understand Maslow), suggesting (during the oral exam) an additional book by Jeanne N. Knutson who interprets Maslow, showing the relevance of post-material values for political behavior and policy. It is up to Rafal to specify which reforms are most likely to be consistent with these values. Dr. Taylor did communicate in writing to Rafal the need to specify the reforms. In section 5.5 (p. 94), Rafal suggests that the materialists he has identified are less likely to support reforms currently supported by certain political parties. Dr. Taylor asked him to indicated which "reforms" (and by implication which parties support them and why). Rafal ignored the request.

Reservations communicated in writing by Dr. Taylor to Rafal:
1. The request by Dr. Taylor in section 3.4, for a clearer operational definition of "cleavages" is not adequately answered by the addition in the final draft of the criterion "inproportionally high concentrations of votes" for one of the parties. This only raises the question of what is "inproportionally high". In short, the reader is not told what data would constituted a falsification of the hypothesis.

2. The problem of vague, subjective criterion is repeated again in the analysis of Table 3.4. Here Rafal declares that the percentage differences in value orientations between cohorts - ranging from 3% to 5% - indicate inter-generational "cleavages". Even if we assume perfectly reliable data (i.e., with no random measurement error and no sampling error) few people would agree that differences of this magnitude constitute "cleavages", let alone substantively significant differences between cohorts. Rafal was so advised by both Dr. Taylor and myself. Yet he persists in saying they do and that they support his original hypothesis and conclusion that significant value cleavages exists across cohorts in Poland. The disagreement illustrates first that one cannot decide without a defensible, explicit definition what constitutes a "cleavage". Second it demonstrates a persistent tendency on the part of Rafal to ignore constructive advise from his committee.
3. The problem is further illustrated in section 3.10 where Rafal addresses the question of whether the "cleavages" he identifies are "stable". Rather than just admit that he does have the type of data to answer the question, he concludes "One can assume, however, that because the relationships indicating the existence of the cleavages are strong and stable, so should be the character of the materialist/post-materialist cleavage in Poland". In short, Rafal asserts (assumes) the relationships are stable in lieu of any logical or empirical support.

4. Finally, a disregard of the need for explicit operational indicators and direction from his committee is illustrated in chapter 4 in which Rafal ignores Dr. Taylor's request for clarification of the operational definition of "very low", "low", "medium" and "high" income groups in Poland. The reader is simply told the cutting points for these categories are based on "the real buying power of monthly salaries" without further clarification. Yet, as with the above data, how he defines "income groups" is critical to the determination of the outcome of the questions of whether there are significant income cleavages in Poland and their nature. The reader must rely on Rafal's unexplained impressions.

The matters listed above constitute only a portion of the problems I have with the final draft of Rafal's thesis. I had written down and given to Rafal a number of additional questions and concerns, which were intended as constructive comments to improve the final product. However, since we did not get to these during the defense, Rafal officially was under no formal obligation to address them.

I particularly regret this matter. As I stated, I believe Rafal is competent to adequately address every concern Dr. Taylor and I made to him. Rafal had excelled in my methods course which emphasized the importance of theory in directing research and clear conceptual and operational definitions of key variables. The problem is not ability, but attitude: a stubborn refusal to heed constructive suggestions. I therefore dissent from the majority of Rafal's thesis committee and decline to sign this final draft of "Poland After 1989: A Shift to Post-materialism or A Rise of the Underclass?".

Sincerely,

Richard D. Shingles

CC Richard Rich
Charles Taylor
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Prof. Charles Taylor for his advice, support and patience in the process of writing this thesis. Also I would like to thank Prof. Richard Shingles and Prof. Arnold Schuetz for their comments which significantly improved the first very imperfect drafts of this thesis.

I would also like to thank Maxine Riley, Kim Hedge and Terry Kingrea. I cannot imagine my study in Virginia Tech without their help for the last three years.

Special thanks to Noopur Pandey. Her friendship kept me going at times when very few things made sense in my life.

Thanks to my friends from Blacksburg and Virginia Tech: Mary Lee Hendrix, Ania Zajicek, David Rubinstein, Lenny Baer and Songbai He.

Finally I would like to thank my parents and my brother Remi. Without their support this thesis would not have been completed.
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Introduction.

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union have generated an unprecedented wave of democratization in the world. The societies of countries which had been ruled by communist regimes have got a chance to establish democratic political systems, some of them for the first time in their history. Few analysts predicted such developments, but even those who did were surprised that the collapse of the seemingly impregnable communist regimes was so swift.¹ As a result, there is lack of an analysis of the democratic transformations of the postcommunist societies in a broader theoretical perspective. So far, most studies have been restricted to historical descriptions of the events in individual countries prior and shortly after 1989.

The purpose of my thesis is to analyze changes in an Eastern European society after 1989 in a broader theoretical perspective. Specifically, I will address the question: What is the direction and character of changes in Polish society: an emergence of the underclass or a shift to postmaterialism?

To do this, I am going to use theories of social change which have been developed in Western Europe and the United

¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, former security adviser to president Carter, belongs to the few. His book The Grand Failure: the Birth and Death of Communism, published in 1989, outlined processes which three years later resulted in the demise of the Soviet Union.
States. I believe that the existing Western theories of social change can be useful in understanding social developments in postcommunist societies and may thereby help broaden their generalizability. Two theories will be applied. One is Ronald Inglehart's theory of the shift from materialist to postmaterialist values in industrial societies; the other one is Ralf Dahrendorf's theory of the modern social conflict. Both Inglehart and Dahrendorf argue that social class is not a main factor in determining social changes in postindustrial societies. It seems that this anti-Marxist stance is their only common point. They disagree on which factors should be considered as determinants and what is the direction of changes. Inglehart's theory assumes that as a result of the economic prosperity after World War II, social orientations shift from materialist to postmaterialist values and this process has a profound impact on the performance of Western democracies. In other words, people pay less attention to their material well being and more to other problems, such as the condition of the natural environment or the sense of their lives. Dahrendorf is definitely less optimistic. He contends that the modern economic development may have negative consequences for society by generating work-saving technological changes of production. This is because technological changes of production put certain social groups in the state of permanent unemployment. These groups are
'pushed outside' the structure of society and are not able to exercise their civil, political and social rights. They are likely to be transformed into an underclass whose members' behavior is not regulated by any generally accepted social norms. This, in turn, may be dangerous to the society as a whole.

Poland has been chosen as a case study for the two theories for several reasons. First, and the most important, is that although in a different political reality, Polish society experienced similar economic development as Western European societies. Certainly, the Polish development was not so outstanding as in the West and the standard of living in Poland is still much lower, but it did take place. This allows for an assumption that Inglehart's and Dahrendorf's theories are appropriate under Polish conditions and they should provide an explanation of changes in Polish society. Second, Poland is a representative of postcommunist countries implementing democratic reforms. A test of Western European theories in such an unconventional setting should help to expose their advantages as well disadvantages more clearly. Third, the present author being Polish has a unique knowledge about Poland; this knowledge will be helpful in interpretation of the findings.

The structure of my thesis is as follows. The first chapter outlines the two theories along with the Marxist
approach. In the second chapter I will explain my efforts to operationalize and test the two theories under Polish conditions. The third chapter discusses whether the Polish postwar economic development resulted in a value cleavage between materialists and postmaterialists; this is a test of Inglehart’s theory. The fourth chapter offers a discussion of the emergence of the underclass in Poland; this is a test of Dahrendorf’s approach.

The fifth, and final chapter is an attempt to discuss the findings from Chapters III and IV in a broader analytical framework, provided by Robert Dahl’s theory of social cleavages. This discussion will focus on several questions. First, what is the place of the materialist/postmaterialist cleavage in the current structure of social cleavages in Poland? Second, how does the diversification of society defined by Dahrendorf relate to the structure of social cleavages in Poland? Third, what are the mutual relations among materialist/postmaterialist cleavage, diversification of society and other types of cleavages? Finally, what is the influence of social cleavages on the political system in Poland?
1. Theories of Social Change.

1.1 Introduction.

This chapter introduces the two theories of social change which are instrumental in my analysis. The first one is Ronald Inglehart's theory of the shift from materialist to postmaterialist values in post-industrial societies. The principles of this theory and the findings based on it were presented by Inglehart in *The Silent Revolution* and *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies*.

The other theory, formulated by Ralf Dahrendorf in *The Modern Social Conflict*, explains social change in industrial societies in terms of the emergence of the underclass.

Since Inglehart and Dahrendorf very often stress that the traditional Marxist approach has lost its ability to explain transformations of industrial societies, this chapter also presents an outline of the Marxist theory in order to highlight the differences in the approaches.

1.2 The Marxist approach.

Although the existence of social classes is not questioned anymore, their role in society is still a major subject of theoretical discussions. Orthodox Marxists argue that both the existence of classes and their mutual relations are determined
by the development of forces of production in the base of the social structure. The development of forces of production causes the emergence, struggle, and in the end demise of social classes.

In the feudal period, the emerging bourgeoisie challenged the structures of feudal monarchies controlled by landlords because these structures restrained the development of industrial forms of production. The Great French Revolution of 1789 marked the victory of the bourgeoisie in its fight against the feudal landlords; only then could capitalism develop fully.

Capitalism is characterized by the dichotomous division of society between two antagonistic classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie owns and controls the means of production; the proletariat, having no property, is forced to sell its labor to the bourgeoisie to survive. The bourgeoisie protects its interests and maintains its domination through the control of the state.

Marxists assumed that the capitalist development of forces of production would increase the exploitation of the proletariat to an extent that would prompt a proletarian revolution. The revolution was expected to establish the proletarian control of the state and collective ownership of the means of production; only then could the development of a classless socialist society follow.
Critics of the Marxist theory indicated that in countries where a proletarian revolution did take place a classless society did not develop. Although capitalists ceased to exist as a social class, and very often as human beings, the proletariat was not able to take their place as the ruling class. Instead a new class, called the appartenants or nomenklatura, gained political power. This situation did not conform to any Marxist model of social development.

The highly industrialized capitalist societies did not follow the pattern predicted by the Marxist theory either. The economic development of the late 20th century did not increase the exploitation of the working class in these societies. On the contrary, the working class of Western Europe enjoyed an increasing share of the GNPs and it was obvious that in such a situation a proletarian revolution was rather a theoretical abstract than a real possibility.

The absence of highly antagonistic class conflicts in industrial societies, that is conflicts that would threaten the capitalist relations of production, left Marxists open to criticism that their theory lost its ability to explain social change. In fact, Inglehart and Dahrendorf based their theories on the findings that social conflicts/cleavages have not polarized industrial societies along the class lines.

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The following sections present Inglehart's and Dahrendorf's theories in more detail.

1.3 The change of values in industrial societies.

The nature of the change.

Ronald Inglehart's theory of the shift from materialist to postmaterialist values in industrial societies is based on two key hypotheses:

A scarcity hypothesis. An individual's priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment: one places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply.

A socialization hypothesis. The relationship between socioeconomic environment and value priorities is not one of immediate adjustment: a substantial time lag is involved, for to a large extent, one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's pre-adult years. ³

In other words, Inglehart's theory assumes that personal values are shaped by social and economic conditions of the period when a person reaches adulthood, and these values are only slightly modified later by a life cycle and period effects. For that reason, each generational cohort consists of two groups of people: those who grew up under conditions of economic scarcity and those whose basic needs were not

threatened. The first group tends to stress goals which are directly related to their economic and physical security, for example: stable economy, social order or strong military forces ("materialist" values). The other group, taking economic and physical security for granted, gives attention to such problems as the condition of the natural environment or life satisfaction ("postmaterialist" values).4

On the basis of the two hypotheses, Inglehart argued that because a majority of Western societies lived under conditions of economic scarcity in the past, materialists significantly outnumbered postmaterialists. But this situation has changed after World War II.

Western Europe has enjoyed a period of economic prosperity since the end of World War II, thus, according to the above hypotheses, the values of different birth cohorts should vary. Older cohorts which experienced the Great Depression and devastation of World War II should stress physical and economic security as the most important goals (that is materialist values). Younger cohorts, whose members achieved adulthood after World War II and were spared major disasters, should be oriented toward goals which are not directly related to their physical and economic security, such as life satisfaction, the quality of the natural environment

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4 Ibid., p. 70.
or a sense of community (shortly, postmaterialist values). The process of value change would take place because cohorts dominated by materialists are replaced by cohorts with greater number of postmaterialists (a simple result of deaths and births).\(^5\)

The two hypotheses were tested in a series of surveys (the Euro-Barometers) carried out in different West European countries in the 1970s and 1980s. In the surveys, respondents were presented with a set of political goals which reflected different kinds of needs, and asked to rank the goals according to their importance. The set consisted of the following goals:

A. Maintaining a high rate of economic growth.
B. Making sure that this country has strong defense forces.
C. Seeing that the people have more say in how things get decided at work and in their communities.
D. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.
E. Maintaining order in the nation.
F. Giving the people more say in important government decisions.
G. Fighting rising prices.
H. Protecting freedom of speech.
I. Maintain a stable economy.
J. Progress toward a less impersonal society.
K. The fight against crime.
L. Progress toward a society where ideas are more important than money.\(^6\)

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 70.

Responses C, D, F, H, J, L (bold print) were considered as postmaterialist because they were not directly related to the material well-being and physical security of respondents. According to the preferred goals, respondents were classified as materialists, postmaterialists or mixed types.

Findings of the surveys fully support Inglehart's theory. Values of young and old birth cohorts do vary and the number of postmaterialists in younger cohorts increases. This upward trend is modified by period and life cycle effects but nevertheless remains consistent.\(^7\)

Further studies examined how change in values influence political orientations, political behavior and their impact on the political system. The next sections explain these problems.

**Materialism/postmaterialism and political orientations.** In a situation where class relations reflected economic inequalities, class membership in turn, was a major factor influencing political orientations. The proprietors represented the pro-system right while the labor represented the anti-system left. Such a class-based approach was appropriate in explaining political orientations of the late 19th and early 20th century Western societies. However,

\(^7\) Jennings et al., *Continuities*, p. 76.
economic development after World War II has modified this approach. It not only produced physical security and larger GNPs but these GNPs were more equally distributed.\textsuperscript{8} Therefore, one of the major issues of class conflict, the distribution of wealth, has lost some of its prominence. It has been superseded by issues which have been produced by postmaterialist orientation: the role of religion, gender roles and sexual norms. Postmaterialists prefer secular orientation, advocate equal rights for women, and support the right to abortion and tolerance toward homosexuals. As these issues challenge established norms postmaterialists are defined as the Left (seeking change) and materialists as the Right (preserving the status quo). This new right-left division is very weakly related to social class because materialist/postmaterialist value orientations are class crosscutting.\textsuperscript{9}

\textbf{Materialism/postmaterialism and political behavior.}

The shift from materialist to postmaterialist values has had an impact on political behavior. The main hypothesis was that:


\textsuperscript{9} Inglehart, \textit{Culture Shift}, p. 300.
Postmaterialists have a larger amount of psychic energy available for politics; they are less supportive of the established social order; and subjectively they have less to lose from unconventional action than do Materialists.\textsuperscript{10}

In other words, people who do not fear for their safety are more likely to show their dissatisfaction with political environment than people who fear for their physical survival. The hypothesis was tested in a series of surveys which measured protest potential of materialists and postmaterialists on a seven-point Guttman scale.\textsuperscript{11} The scale included the following activities:

- Signing petitions;
- Lawful demonstrations;
- Boycotts;
- Rent strikes;
- Occupying buildings;
- Blocking traffic.\textsuperscript{12}

Results of the surveys supported the hypothesis: postmaterialists are more willing to engage in protest behavior than materialists.

This is another point where Inglehart's theory has demonstrated the inadequacy of the Marxist approach. Marxists argue that the most disadvantaged are the most willing to

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 311.

\textsuperscript{11} The first survey was carried out in 1974 as a part of the Euro-Barometers. It was repeated in 1980-81.

\textsuperscript{12} Inglehart, \textit{Culture Shift}, p. 311.
protest. This is obviously not the case. According to the findings the most disadvantaged are the least likely to protest; this is a result of both the feeling of insecurity and the absence of resources to act successfully.

**Materialism/postmaterialism and political systems.**
The materialist/postmaterialist shift of values have affected Western political systems through its impact on the performance of traditional political parties.

Historically, mass political parties developed in Western Europe in the second half of the 19th century. They formulated and expressed political interests of various social groups and mobilized support for these interests. Since class issues dominated political agendas at that time, they took priority in party activities, other problems were considered unimportant.

Despite changing economic conditions, namely the increasing affluence of Western societies, the concentration of traditional parties on class issues has continued through the present, with a result that the emerging postmaterialists, for whom class issues constituted secondary problems - if at all, could not find organizations expressing and representing their political interests.\(^{13}\)

\[^{13}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 333.}\]
Parties which represented the traditional left and were organized along the orthodox Marxist principles have lost the largest share of their supporters. As other parties were able to reform somewhat and regain part of their influence by addressing postmaterialist needs, Marxist parties have maintained their rigid view of capitalist society torn apart by class conflicts. It is obvious that parties which concentrate their activities on problems created by their ideology and not by real conditions cannot last long. The history of the French Communist Party is an example of an end of the Marxist orthodoxy; from a party which joined the socialist government in France in the 1980s, it dwindled to a party whose political power is nearly nonexistent.\textsuperscript{14}

Inglehart's conclusion was that:

\begin{quote}
The rise of Postmaterialism has placed existing party alignments under chronic stress, for in most countries these alignments do not correspond to either the social bases of support for change or to polarization over most heated issues.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

As a result of the inadequacy of traditional parties a new element has appeared in political systems of Western European countries: the New Social Movements (NSM), that is movements which address specific postmaterialist goals and find most of


\textsuperscript{15} Inglehart, \textit{Culture Shift}, p. 333.
their supporters among postmaterialists. The NSM include the environmental movement, the peace movement, the women's movement, the New Left and other 'alternative' movements.\textsuperscript{16}

Cognitive mobilization supported the emergence of the NSMs because it transformed elite-directed into elite-directing politics.\textsuperscript{17} Inglehart argues that politics of materialist societies was elite-directed. Few people had sufficient education and bureaucratic skills to manage large organizations (such as political parties) which were essential for the functioning of political systems. This situation changed because postmaterialists are both better educated and better prepared to deal with the politics of everyday life. Inglehart sums up the whole argument as follows:

Political participation remained dependent on permanently established organizations as long as most of the people with bureaucratic skills held positions within these institutions. But today ad hoc organizations can be brought into being more or less at will, because the public has an unprecedentedly large leavening of nonelite members with high levels of political skills.\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{17} Inglehart, \textit{Culture Shift}, pp. 333-338.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 340.
Materialist/postmaterialist values and Abraham Maslow's theory of human behavior.

It should be recognized that Inglehart's approach elaborates Abraham Maslow's theory of human behavior. According to Maslow, human activities are determined by an order of needs. The most urgent to satisfy are the needs which guarantee physical survival and security of an individual (physiological needs, or, as Maslow calls them, 'lower' needs). In simple terms, these are food and safety. They dominate everything else:

A person who is lacking food, safety, love and esteem would most probably long for food more strongly than for anything else.\(^{19}\)

And further:

All capacities [of an individual] are put into the service of hunger-satisfaction, and organization of these capacities is almost entirely determined by the one purpose of satisfying hunger.\(^{20}\)

When physiological needs are satisfied other needs become apparent: the need of love, self-esteem and self-actualization. Maslow defines them as 'higher' needs because


\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 37.
the satisfaction of the lower needs conditions their emergence. 21

Maslow defines people dominated by physiological needs as 'deficiency-motivated,' and those with higher needs as 'self-actualizing.' 22 In Inglehart's theory these are major qualities of materialists and postmaterialists.

The theory of the materialist/postmaterialist shift under Polish conditions.
Although Poland was ruled by a totalitarian communist regime, it was affected by similar processes as countries in Western Europe. The standard of living of the population has risen since World War II. 23 This rise was not so great and widespread as in the West but it has had at least one major effect: it secured the basic economic needs of the population.

Also, though Poland was an actor in the Cold War, the country has experienced relative political security for the last forty eight years (which is rather unusual considering the past course of Polish history). Consequently, Polish society should also consist of younger birth cohorts with postmaterialist values, and older birth cohorts which give

21 Ibid., p. 34.
22 Ibid., p. 34.
23 Rocznik Statystyczny, (Warszawa: PWN, 1992), passim.
priority to materialist values. A survey carried out in Poland in 1980 by Renata Siemienska supports such an assumption.\textsuperscript{24}

The process of democratization in Poland after 1989 has created a situation where the materialist/postmaterialist cleavage should be manifest. If so, the emergence of postmaterialism in Poland should be accompanied by support for political parties having postmaterialist goals on their agendas.

1.4 The modern social conflict.\textsuperscript{25}

Ralf Dahrendorf's theory of social change.

In The Modern Social Conflict, Ralf Dahrendorf argues that social change results from two distinct processes. One is the deep and slow transformation of social structure; the other one consists of rapid and often violent changes of ruling elites. Contrary to Marxists, Dahrendorf claims that though the two processes influence each other and may also happen

\textsuperscript{24} Inglehart, \emph{Culture Shift}, p. 160.

\textsuperscript{25} I borrowed the title of this section from Ralf Dahrendorf's book because the section presents the theory outlined in it.

In other words, Dahrendorf questions a basic Marxist axiom that the development of forces of production determines class relations and prompts revolutions (that is social changes in Marxist terms). Marx's theory of economic determinism was based on his analysis of the 18th century society but, as Dahrendorf stresses, it was the only time when the two processes coincided. Then, in fact, the development of industrial methods of production increased the power of the bourgeoisie and culminated in the French Revolution of 1789.

The developments of the 19th century did not follow the Marxist model. Dahrendorf indicates that the 19th century industrialization brought a deep transformation of social structures and resulted in a dramatic rise of the proletariat, but proletarian revolutions did not follow. Political changes during that period were weakly related to the rise of the proletariat and happened when they were the least expected. For example, recognition and legalization of socialist parties in Western political systems were initiated by conservative governments which, at that time, did not face any threat form
the proletariat. The introduction of health and pension insurance in Western Europe followed a similar pattern.\textsuperscript{27} Dahrendorf concludes rather frankly:

His [Marx's] Hegelian eyesight merged two different things into one. Reality was the victim.\textsuperscript{28}

Dahrendorf further argues that the second half of the 20th century put social development on tracks completely unpredicted by Marxists. The main reason for this, is the technological revolution of the late 20th century which has changed the character of work in industrial societies; highly automated methods of production eliminate manual labor and the working class becomes less numerous. The driving force of society is vanishing instead of promoting social change.

Dahrendorf claims that the changed character of work and the division for those who have work and those who do not, are the sources of the modern social conflict. The next section explains his assumptions with more detail.

\textbf{The nature of the modern social conflict.}

The modern social conflict is about attacking inequalities which restrict full civic participation by social, economic or political

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p. 51.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 6.
means, and establishing the entitlements which make up a rich and full status of citizenship.\textsuperscript{29}

The technological revolution of the late 20th century led to a situation where work has become a scarce good. Even those employed vary according to the quality of their jobs. Highly paid permanent jobs give a place in the privileged 'social elite' while poorly paid part-time jobs provide only for basic needs. If one adds the unemployed to those with low incomes, a new division of society emerges. There are 'Haves' on one side, and 'Have-nots' on the other.\textsuperscript{30} This new division has superseded class conflict because even the working class consists of workers with high salaries, who identify themselves with the 'Haves,' and workers with low incomes, who belong to the 'Have-nots.'

Dahrendorf argues that these economic inequalities are translated into political ones. People living in persistent poverty are not able to exercise their citizen rights, they are not able to influence the functioning of political systems. This leads to the final stages of alienation from

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p. 37.

\textsuperscript{30} Dahrendorf does not use terms like 'Haves' and 'Have-nots' but, being not class related, they reflect the central point of his argument.
society: the creation of the underclass and anomie.\textsuperscript{31} The underclass includes those who lost interest in the activities of society to which they do not actually belong; they are indifferent toward this society. This state of indifference creates anomie; that is:

Breakdown in the cultural structure which occurs when people are unable by virtue of their social position to comply with the values of their society.\textsuperscript{32}

Dahrendorf concludes that the modern social conflict is between those who exploit their privileged economic position to exercise their citizen rights, and those who having the rights are prevented by their economic plight to use them. That is:

The majority class protects its interests as other ruling classes have done before.\textsuperscript{33}

The number of people who can be classified as members of the underclass vary in Western Europe and the United States. The underclass is nonexistent in such countries as Sweden or

\textsuperscript{31} The original spelling is \textit{anomie} but Dahrendorf's version is \textit{anomy}. Since Dahrendorf's definition of this concept is discussed, his spelling is used.

\textsuperscript{32} Dahrendorf, \textit{The Modern Social Conflict}, p. 162.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 154.
Switzerland, and comprises about 8 percent of the American population.\textsuperscript{34}

The underclass and political system.

Institutions and organizations of contemporary political systems are not prepared to deal with the problems of the underclass because they are controlled by and provide for the 'Haves.' One example is the policy of trade unions. Though they pay lip service to the needs of the underclass their activities concentrate on those who have jobs and, in fact, belong to the 'Haves.'\textsuperscript{35} The underclass has been left in a state of social limbo.

The plight of the underclass reveals a new character of class relations in industrial societies. Technological changes created a situation where conflicts within classes are more intense than conflicts among them. This is because the well-off members of social classes view the less fortunate fellow class members as competitors for economic privileges (such as a secure job and a high salary).

In other words, the 'Haves' formed a class crosscutting alliance against the 'Have-nots' to make sure that potential

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 153.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 153.
reforms of political systems will not jeopardize their privileged economic position.

Inglehart versus Dahrendorf: a shift to postmaterialism or a rise of the underclass?

Dahrendorf's gloomy picture of industrial society contradicts the optimism of Inglehart's theory. A major point of disagreement seems to be over the nature of change in industrial societies. As Dahrendorf puts it:

Perhaps the 'postmaterialist' mood is not so much a new trend as a characteristic of the 1970s. It could be a symptom of the crisis of that decade rather than a sign of new directions.  

Generally, Dahrendorf's criticism is based on a different perspective on economic development. Inglehart assumes that all groups of society will benefit from economic development; the findings of the Euro-Barometers seem to support his view. Better economic conditions should create higher standards of living, better education and, what is most important, general political participation. According to Inglehart, politics in industrial society will not be restricted to an elite few (elite-directed politics) but will include all those people who have knowledge and education (elite-directing politics). General prosperity will create a new division of society: for

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36 Ibid., p. 139.
those who experienced economic scarcity (their number will decrease) and those who lived in an affluent economic environment (their number will increase).

Dahrendorf points out that the above scenario may not develop. Some social groups will not benefit at all from economic development and will be left behind by the advancing society. These groups, if alienated and transformed into the underclass, may not find the democratic system of government a viable perspective and would support a dictatorship.

**Dahrendorf's theory under Polish conditions.**

If Dahrendorf's theory is appropriate to explain the Polish situation, the following developments should be found. First, there should be high and persistent unemployment. Second, the Polish working class should be highly diversified. This diversification should appear as antagonistic groups of interests. Third, Polish society should consist of two groups: those having high incomes and relatively secure economic positions and those living in poverty.

The unemployed and the living in poverty will be potential members of the underclass, indifferent toward society and on the verge of anomy. The satisfied ones will be ready to block any reforms that could reduce their privileges.
1.5 Conclusion.

The primary question addressed in this study is about the direction of changes in Polish society after 1989. The two theories presented in this chapter provide alternative frameworks for an interpretation of these changes. Inglehart's theory explains social change in terms of a shift from materialist to postmaterialist values. Dahrendorf interprets change as the creation of the underclass. The next chapters of my study provide a proposition of operationalization of the two theories under Polish conditions and, based on this operationalization, the question about the character of changes in Polish society is discussed: Is it a shift to postmaterialism or a rise of the underclass?
2. Methodology.

2.1 Introduction.

The preceding chapter has outlined the two theories providing the framework in which the research question of the present study will be discussed. Since the theories were based on experiences of Western Democracies their operationalization under Polish conditions must consider specific features of the Polish social environment.

This chapter presents my proposition of operationalization of Inglehart's and Dahrendorf's theories under Polish conditions and explains expected relationships.

2.2 Operationalization of materialist/postmaterialist values under Polish conditions in previous studies.

In 1980 Renata Siemienska did a study of a shift from materialist to postmaterialist values in Polish society. Because Poland was a communist country the questions in the survey were appropriately modified.¹ The results followed the Western pattern: there was a shift in value priorities from materialism to postmaterialism. Materialists were more

¹ Some questions which indicated materialist orientation in Western Europe were not perceived as such by respondents living in a Communist economic system. For more details see Inglehart Culture Shift, p. 158.
numerous in older generational cohorts while postmaterialists were in younger ones.\(^2\) According to Siemieneka's findings, the rise of postmaterialism in Poland was not as great as in West European countries. This agrees with Inglehart's theory because the Polish economic development after World War II was less dynamic than in the West and postmaterialist values were less pronounced.

Further studies of Polish society could not be carried out because of the martial law in December 1981. General Jaruzelski's regime was not willing to approve studies which undermined the orthodox Marxist interpretation of social developments.

Under present conditions an operationalization of Inglehart's theory would require a survey similar to the Euro-Barometers. Unfortunately, despite some efforts to produce such a survey at this point of time it does not exist. The next section explains my alternative approach to the problem.

2.3 A proposition of operationalization of Inglehart's theory.

My operationalization of Inglehart's theory will be based on a classification of political parties. Parties which registered their candidates to the parliament in at least half 

\(^2\) Ibid., Appendix, p. 442.
of the electoral districts will be considered. This threshold enables us to make a distinction between parties which concentrate on local issues and parties addressing problems of Polish society as a whole. One of the regulations of the Polish electoral law makes this distinction possible. According to this regulation, candidates had to collect a number of citizen signatures in the district in which they wanted to be elected; the signatures confirmed a level of support for a candidate and permitted his/her official registration. It is therefore safe to assume that only parties addressing issues universal for the whole society managed to register their candidates in more than 50 percent of the districts.

Parties will be classified as:

a\ materialist
b\ mixed orientation
c\ postmaterialist

The results of the elections which took place September 19, 1993 should show which parties have found the largest support of the electorate. I assume that the simple act of voting, though criticized by many eminent scholars and philosophers, indicates both individual and general preferences.
The Euro-Barometers surveys and World Values surveys provide data about a shift from materialist to postmaterialist values in European and non-European countries. My operationalization of materialist/postmaterialist cleavage in Poland follows the patterns established in these surveys and should, therefore, allow for comparisons of results.

The classification of parties is based on three elements: officially published political programs, a survey made by the daily Rzeczpospolita just before the elections, and interviews with leaders of each party (published in Rzeczpospolita and other newspapers). Since the content of publications will be crucial in placing a party on the materialist/postmaterialist scale the substantive content analysis is the most appropriate technique of research. The exact rules of classification are presented below.

The battery of questions distributed in Western Europe asked about twelve political goals. Six of them were materialist and six postmaterialist. In my analysis I was looking for these particular goals. For each goal mentioned in

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3 The daily Rzeczpospolita is not affiliated with any political party. For this reason it can be considered as a relatively unbiased source of information.


5 See the previous chapter for the details.
the program, survey or interview a party received 1 point if a goal was postmaterialist, -1 if a goal was materialist or, 0 if a goal did not appear at all. Thus, a party could have received 18 or -18 points at the most. It was also possible that the program, the survey and interviews were inconsistent. That is, the program suggested postmaterialist values while the leaders talked about materialist goals. In such a case the points in my system of classification indicated an indecisive position since negative and positive numbers canceled each other.⁶

Publications with the following headings were considered as political programs: "Program," "declaration," "principles" etc. These publications had to be clearly identified as belonging to a political party: either by having the party's symbol or its full name included into the title of a document.

2.4 Reliability of the classification.

Reliability is a major problem of substantial content analysis. In the present study, a panel of three judges has assured reliability of the classification.⁷ Members of the panel individually reviewed the programs, survey and

⁶ See Appendix B.

⁷ Two Polish and one American student at Virginia Tech.
interviews. If there was a difference of opinions concerning the distribution of points (which happened quite often), points were given according to the majority of votes.

2.5 The problem of validity - traditional political parties in Inglehart's theory.

Inglehart contends that traditional multiparty political systems are not capable of dealing with issues produced by the materialist\postmaterialist shift. This is a result of both the process in which traditional parties were created and the way they operated. Both were very class oriented. Inglehart's conclusion is that party's agendas do not reflect current social priorities which are mainly based on the cleavage between materialists and postmaterialists. 8

However, this conclusion does not seem to be valid in Poland because of several reasons. In the first place, there were no independent political parties before 1989. Of the three existing parties at that time, the Polish United Worker's Party was in full control of the other two, and creation of alternative opposition parties was forbidden. All

8 Inglehart, Culture Shift, p. 273.
three 'old system' parties ceased to exist after 1989. One therefore cannot assume that parties created after 1989 have any kind of class or historical heritage which would constrain their agendas. In the second place, the elites of the new parties come from different birth cohorts; they were born before as well as after World War II. It will be natural that party goals will reflect their priorities. Finally, the new parties have few members and inefficient bureaucratic apparatus. Thus, they rely on the appeal of their political programs to get public support. For these reasons, political parties may be used as valid indicators of materialist/postmaterialist value orientation in Poland.

2.6 Materialist/postmaterialist value orientation of Polish society.

The results of the last elections should indicate what kinds of political goals have found the largest support. First, the general pattern of voting will be analyzed; that is, which group of parties (materialist or postmaterialist) has got what

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9 These were the Polish United Workers Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza), the United Peasant Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe) and the Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne). There were also some other political organizations which were even represented in the parliament but their political power was nonexistent. As the main three parties they ceased to exist after 1989.
per centage of votes. This should indicate the dimension of the materialist/postmaterialist cleavage in Poland. If the cleavage exists, the second step of the analysis will be more specific and explain the voting patterns of different birth cohorts. Materialist/postmaterialist cleavage of the type defined by Inglehart should be characterized not only by higher postmaterialism of younger cohorts but also by higher postmaterialism of people with higher socioeconomic status. Current socioeconomic status can be used as an indicator of the economic environment in which a person grew up because there have been relatively small inter-strata movement in Polish society. People with high socioeconomic status usually grew up in families with high socioeconomic status and therefore experienced less hardships.

In other words, one should expect to find the following relationships:

a/ the younger the birth cohort the greater the support for postmaterialist parties;

b/ the higher the socioeconomic status the greater the support for parties with postmaterialist political goals.
The level of education, occupation and place of living will be used as indicators of socioeconomic status. The results of the analysis will be presented in contingency tables.

In my study I will use the data gathered by INFAS–OBOP on the election day in a sample of 999 electoral commissions. The sample was representative for all electoral commissions in Poland. After voting, respondents answered a short survey which asked about their education, age, place of living, and, of course, which party they voted for. The results of the survey were published in Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita.

2.7 The problem of the ecological fallacy and the definition of the postmaterialist cleavage in Poland.

One important point should be made about the proposed operationalization of Inglehart's theory. Since the operationalization is based on aggregated data, it would be incorrect to argue that people who voted for postmaterialist

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10 INFAS is a German research institute specializing in election pools. OBOP (Center for Public Opinion Research) is a major Polish institute researching social attitudes.

parties necessarily have postmaterialist values. Such an argument would likely result in the ecological fallacy.\textsuperscript{12}

To avoid this problem, it should be stressed that materialists and postmaterialists in this study have been classified so because they voted for materialist or postmaterialist parties; it is not implied that their individual sets of values must reflect their way of voting.

2.8 Alternative rival hypotheses.

Two alternative rival hypotheses associated with the variable age should be considered when analyzing the influence of formative security on materialist/postmaterialist value priorities of birth cohorts.\textsuperscript{13} The first one is that changes in values result from life cycle effects. People tend to become more conservative with age and this is the reason that younger cohorts are less materialist than older ones; formative security has nothing to do with this process.

The other alternative rival hypothesis is that changes in values reflect period effects. In other words, personal values


\textsuperscript{13} Inglehart, \textit{Culture Shift}, p. 77.
reflect current socioeconomic conditions and change according to these conditions. A discussion whether one can eliminate the alternative rival hypotheses under Polish conditions is offered in the next chapter.

2.9 Is there the underclass in Poland? Indicators of social diversification.

According to Dahrendorf's definition of the underclass, several factors condition its emergence. First, there should be a high level of persistent unemployment concentrated in large cities. Second, the working class should be divided into two groups: a minority with high incomes and a majority with low incomes. Finally, certain groups of society (particularly minorities) would live under poverty level. Only the combined influence of all these factors results in the emergence of the underclass.\(^{14}\)

Following the logic of the definition, the proposed operationalization of Dahrendorf's theory is based on statistical data from Poland. The data are from Rocznik Statystyczny, an official publication of the Main Statistical Office.\(^{15}\) Three indicators will be examined: the number of


\(^{15}\) Rocznik Statystyczny 1992.
unemployed (as percentage of the working force and the degree of their concentration in large cities), the distribution of incomes of the working class and the number of people living under poverty level. I expect that these indicators reflect the concepts used in the definition of the underclass. The following results should indicate that the underclass is emerging in Poland:

a/ high level of unemployment with concentration in large cities;

b/ diversification of the working class: a small group with high incomes and a majority with low incomes;

c/ significant percentage of Polish society living under poverty level.

Findings based on the above operationalization are presented in chapter IV.

2.10 Conclusion.

This chapter explained operationalization of Inglehart's and Dahrendorf's theories under Polish conditions. The proposed operationalization takes into consideration the social
environment in Poland while providing tools to address the main research question: Is the postmaterialist shift of values taking place in Poland or, is the process of democratization more likely to produce the underclass?
3. Materialism and Postmaterialism in Poland.

3.1 Introduction.

This chapter presents findings based on the application of Inglehart's theory under Polish conditions. The main question addressed is whether there is a materialist/postmaterialist cleavage in Polish society and, if so, to what extent local conditions modify it.¹

3.2 Political parties in the elections.

A materialist/postmaterialist value classification of political parties is instrumental in the characterization of the potential materialist/postmaterialist cleavage in Poland. To make this classification, it was necessary to distinguish between parties which focused on local issues and had local support, and parties with programs endorsed by Polish society as a whole. As section 2.3 in Chapter II explains, a Polish electoral law has made such a distinction possible.

Out of the twenty-three parties which registered for the elections in Poland on September 19, 1993, fifteen managed to

¹ Since the data used in the present study do not allow for an estimation of the shift from materialist to postmaterialist values over time, this chapter deals with the problem of a value cleavage between materialists and postmaterialists in Polish society. A precise definition of a cleavage is provided in Chapter V.
register their candidates in more than half of the electoral districts.² Therefore, these parties can be considered as having proposed programs which concern Polish society as a whole and, what follows, electoral support for these parties should reflect the current priorities of Polish society. Table 3.1 lists these parties.

3.3 Political parties and materialist\postmaterialist value orientation.

A content analysis of the party programs, according to the rules explained in Chapter II, allowed a materialist/postmaterialist classification of the parties from Table 3.1.³ The results of this classification are presented in Table 3.2.

The first feature of the classification in Table 3.2 is that it shows the power of personal animosities among Polish political leaders because parties which are ardent adversaries on the political scene have been classified as having the same value orientation (and the same political goals).

The second feature is the absence of the New Social Movements. The NSMs do not find much support in Poland because

² The full list of parties which took part in the elections is presented in Appendix A.

³ The exact results of my classification are presented in Appendix B.
Table 3.1 Political parties in Poland which registered candidates to the parliament in more than half of the electoral districts on September 19, 1993.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Center Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Catholic Electoral Committee &quot;Fatherland&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Polish Peasant Party - People's Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Confederation for an Independent Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Polish Peasant Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Non-Party Block for the Support of Reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Labor Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Union of Real Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Coalition for the Polish Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Party &quot;X&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>&quot;Self-defense&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.2 Value classification of political parties in Poland based on their programs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Postmaterialist parties:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Liberal Democratic Congress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties with mixed orientation:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Non-Party Block for the Support of Reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Democratic Left Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Labor Union</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Materialist parties:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Center Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Catholic Electoral Committee &quot;Fatherland&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Polish Peasant Party - People's Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Confederation for an Independent Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Polish Peasant Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Coalition for the Polish Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Union of Real Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Party &quot;X&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. &quot;Self-defense&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See Appendix B.
they cannot claim, as they do in Western Europe, that they are an alternative for the traditional political parties. This is a result of the fact that political parties in Poland emerged in the last four years and their agendas are not restricted to some special areas but also include goals which in Western Democracies are 'reserved' for the NSMs.

Finally, the materialist group consists of parties which represent the political Right (except for Solidarity, the Polish Peasant Party and extremist 'Self-defense'). This is different from the situation in Western Europe where materialist/postmaterialist cleavage and the right/left division are crosscutting. The structures of Western political systems do not reflect the value cleavage because they had been created before that cleavage appeared. In contrast, representatives of different birth cohorts (materialists and postmaterialists) create the new political system in Poland. Moreover, to create the system they do not have to reform the old structures of power because such structures do not exist (1989 marked the end of the communist regime which formed the old structures of power). Therefore, it is likely that differences between materialists and postmaterialists will be translated into a new left/right political division.
3.4 The general pattern of voting in Poland.

The distribution of votes in the elections on September 19, 1993 is presented in Table 3.3. The general distribution of votes provides some support for the main hypothesis that a cleavage between materialists and postmaterialists does exist in Polish society. 50 percent of the electorate preferred parties with materialist goals while 14 percent voted for the parties with postmaterialist goals. Parties with programs of unclear preferences took the middle position with 33 percent.

As it had been expected, the support for materialist parties is much stronger than the support for postmaterialist ones: there are over four times more supporters of materialist parties than postmaterialist ones. The results also show that the elimination from the present study of parties which registered their candidates in less than half of the electoral districts has not distorted the results: less than 2 percent of voters supported these parties.

An inproportionally high concentration of votes in one of the categories would have suggested that the present approach to the examination of the value cleavage in Poland is inappropriate. The figures in table 3.3 suggest that such a situation has not occurred.

The general pattern of voting is not enough to explain the relationship between value orientation and socioeconomic
Table 3.3 The distribution of votes in the elections in Poland on September 19, 1993 based on value orientation of political parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value orientation</th>
<th>Percentage of the votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist Parties</td>
<td>14.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Orientation</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialist Parties</td>
<td>50.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on the official results published by the State Electoral Commission (results published in Rzeczpospolita).

* These are parties which registered their candidates in less than half of the electoral districts.
environment. It does suggest that there are supporters of materialists and postmaterialist parties in Polish society, but to establish whether the relationship is of the type predicted by Inglehart, one has to analyze the voting pattern of different birth cohorts, and groups with different level of education and occupational status. In Poland, also the place of living is an important indicator of one's value preferences. Because of different standards of living people living in the countryside should be more willing to support materialist parties than people living in the cities. The items: education, occupation and place of living are excellent indicators of the SES (Socioeconomic Status) in Poland.

If, in fact, the materialist\postmaterialist cleavage in Poland is determined by formative security two relationships should appear:

a/ younger birth cohorts are more likely to support parties with postmaterialist goals

b/ the higher the socioeconomic status the more likely the support for parties with postmaterialist political goals

The next sections present an analysis of these relationships with more detail.
3.5 Birth cohorts and the pattern of voting.

A basic finding of the Euro-Barometers which supported Inglehart's theory was that younger birth cohorts had more postmaterialists than older ones. These differences in value preferences resulted from differences in socioeconomic environment during the process of maturation. Younger cohorts grew up having the 'formative security'; their basic needs were not threatened.⁴

The rate of value change differed between highly and less developed countries. For example West Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium have more postmaterialists than Greece, Spain and Portugal. This is a result of differences in the pace of economic development after World War II.⁵

Table 3.4 presents how various birth cohorts in Polish society voted in the elections on September 19, 1993. The three cohorts in the table were established in respect to the social and economic conditions under which the members of these cohorts grew up.

The members of the oldest cohort (those 35-59 years old) grew up under relatively stable economic conditions between

⁴ Jennings et al., Continuities, p. 72.
⁵ Inglehart, Culture Shift, p. 90.
Table 3.4 Voting in the elections in Poland on September 19, 1993 by birth cohort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party orientation</th>
<th>Birth cohort (percent of votes)</th>
<th>18-24</th>
<th>25-34</th>
<th>35-59</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materialist</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adopted from the exit poll by INFAS (results published in Trybuna and Gazeta Wyborcza).
1950 and 1978; a slow but constant upward trend of standards of living in Poland characterizes that period.\(^6\)

The middle cohort (those 34-25 years old) includes those who grew up experiencing the economic and political crisis of the 1980s. Following 1978 Polish economy under communist management began falling apart, and for the next 11 years it was virtually stagnant; shortages of many goods were apparent.

The youngest cohort (those 18-24 years old) includes those who grew up in the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s; this period has completely different economic and political conditions. The communists gave up political power and the economy began its recovery under the new Solidarity government.

Table 3.4 shows that the changes in the social and economic environment of each cohort are reflected in its voting. The tendency to vote for materialist parties was greater in the older cohorts than in the younger ones (40 against 37 percent). These differences in preferences are also visible in the results of postmaterialist parties: 15 percent of the oldest cohort supported these parties while 20 percent of the youngest cohort did so.

The relatively small increase in the voting for postmaterialist parties (5 percent), and also small decrease

\(^6\) Rocznik Statystyczny, p. 25.
in the voting for materialist parties (3 percent), seem to reflect the economic and political crisis in Poland in the 1980s and the reforms of the 1990s. At that time, the major stimulus to produce the postmaterialist orientation was missing: economic growth.

On the whole, an analysis of voting of various birth cohorts suggests the existence of the materialist/postmaterialist cleavage in Polish society. The cleavage seems to be determined by social and economic conditions under which members of each birth cohort grew up.

To strengthen the argument, it will be examined in the next sections of this chapter whether there is a similar type of relationship between Socioeconomic Status and support for materialist/postmaterialist parties. Level of education, occupation and place of living have been used as indicators of SES in Poland.

3.6 Education and the pattern of voting.

According to the Political Action data the more educated are more likely to have postmaterialist values. This is another result of formative security.

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7 Ibid., p. 165.
Table 3.5 shows that a similar relationship exists in Poland. Over 50 percent (exactly 55%) of voters with less than high school education preferred parties with materialist goals, against 39 percent of voters with high school education and only 22 percent of voters with college education.

Postmaterialist parties were supported by only 9 percent of voters with less than high school education, 16 percent of voters with high school education, and as much as 32 percent of voters with college education.

Another way to see the strength of this relationship is to look at the ratio of supporters of materialist parties to supporters of postmaterialist parties for each educational level. Postmaterialists are outnumbered 1:6 among people with less than high school education, and 1:2.5 among people with high school education. But they are in significant majority among people with college education.

Inglehart indicates that a person's education reflects his/her formative security. This assumption is also very much true in the Polish case though at first it would not seem so. Before World War II primary education was mandatory in Poland, but only the most affluent could continue education in high schools and universities. There is not much discussion here that under such conditions socioeconomic environment influenced materialist/postmaterialist values in the way Inglehart predicted.
Table 3.5 Voting for materialist/postmaterialist parties by level of education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party orientation</th>
<th>Less than High School</th>
<th>High school</th>
<th>College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materialist</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Source: Adopted from the exit poll by INFAS (results published in Trybuna and Gazeta Wyborcza).
But there may be some doubts about the period after the war. The new communist regime set the increase of the general level of education as one of its primary goals. As a result, the number of students in high schools and universities dramatically increased. The state took the responsibility of financing all schools and universities and provided financial support for students. The regime wanted to make education at all levels independent of a person's socioeconomic background. In such a case the level of education should not reflect a person's formative security because the state guaranteed that it was the same for all.

At a closer look this explanation does not hold. Though the state managed to lower the cost of education it never eliminated the financial dependency of students on their parents. Only with outside financial support were students able to complete their education. Paradoxically, as some studies suggest, students in communist Poland were much more dependent on their parents to complete their education than their counterparts in Western Europe.

\textsuperscript{8} Roczник Statystyczny, p. xxxix.

\textsuperscript{9} The present author is also an example.

Generally, this section has supported the argument that Polish society consists of supporters of materialist and postmaterialist value orientations, and the differences among these groups are due to the differences in their socioeconomic environments.

However, the problem with education as an indicator of SES is that it may be correlated with age; that is younger cohorts have better education than older ones. Therefore, the relationship from Table 3.5 may turn up spurious if the influence of age is controlled. To deal with such a possibility, the relationship between SES and support for materialist or postmaterialist parties is examined with the help of two other indicators of SES: place of living and occupation.

3.7 Place of living and the pattern of voting.

Inglehart argues that the results of surveys measuring materialist/postmaterialist values should always be interpreted in a context of local cultural and historical conditions, for these conditions define which goals are postmaterialist, which are materialist, and which are pre-
materialist. For example, goals which are considered as materialist in Europe are postmaterialist in Japan.\textsuperscript{11}

This cultural and historical relativism under Polish conditions suggests the use of place of living of voters as an indicator of their SES. This is because the standard of living in the cities has been higher than the standard of living in the rural areas of Poland. The communist regime tried to change this situation but had no success.\textsuperscript{12}

The three categories of the place of living in table 3.6 have been established to reflect the differences in social and economic environment. If the assumptions about the existence of the materialist/postmaterialist cleavage are correct the place of living should condition political support: postmaterialist parties should have greater support in big cities than in small cities and in the countryside; support for materialist parties should be greater in the countryside than in the cities.

This is, in fact, what the results in table 3.6 show. The tendency to vote for materialist parties decreases as the place of living changes from the countryside to big cities (from 53 to 27 percent). Also, the tendency to vote for postmaterialist parties increases as the place of living

\textsuperscript{11} Inglehart, *Culture Shift*, p. 144.

Table 3.6 Voting for materialist/postmaterialist parties by place of living.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party orientation</th>
<th>Place of living (percent of votes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Countryside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialist</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Small cities: population between 100,000 and 10,000. Big cities: population more than 100,000.

Source: Adopted from the exit poll by INFAS (results published in Trybuna and Gazeta Wyborcza).
changes from the countryside to big cities (from 10 to 25 percent). These changes clearly reflect the differences in socioeconomic environment.

The ratio of voters supporting materialist parties to voters supporting postmaterialist parties for each category in table 3.6 strengthens the argument for the existence of the materialist/postmaterialist cleavage in Poland. While there are more than five times as many materialists as postmaterialists living in the countryside, the proportion drops to about 2:1 in small cities. But in big cities the numbers are nearly equal: 27 percent of materialists against 25 percent of postmaterialists.

3.8 Occupation and the pattern of voting.

The last indicator of Socioeconomic Status in the present study is occupation. According to the Euro-Barometers and World Values surveys, people in occupations with the lowest incomes and what follows, low economic security, tend to be the most materialistic.\(^\text{13}\)

Table 3.7 shows that a similar relationship occurs in Poland. The occupational groups in table 3.7 are listed with respect to their average yearly incomes. Supporters of

\(^{13}\) Inglehart, *Culture Shift*, p. 164.
Table 3.7 Voting for materialist/postmaterialist parties by occupation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party orientation</th>
<th>Farmers</th>
<th>Manual Workers</th>
<th>Professionals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materialist</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adopted from the exit poll by INFAS (results published in Trybuna and Gazeta Wyborcza).
materialist parties are the most numerous among farmers (68 percent); that is, in the group with the lowest economic security.\textsuperscript{14} Also within this group the number of supporters of postmaterialist parties is the smallest, only 4 percent.

In the other two occupational groups, higher income, and higher economic security, are accompanied by an increasing number of supporters of postmaterialist parties, and decreasing number of supporters of materialist parties.

In sum, the argument about the existence of the materialist/postmaterialist cleavage in Poland has been supported again; there is a clear relationship between SES and value orientation.

The question which occurs is why the relationship in table 3.7 is so strong: the change in support of materialist parties is as great as 40 percent (28 percent among the professionals and 68 among the farmers). The World Values surveys show that even in countries which have diversification of incomes larger than Poland this relationship is not so apparent.\textsuperscript{15}

An explanation of the Polish phenomenon seem to be in the operationalization of the concept of materialist/

\textsuperscript{14} The average yearly incomes for these groups have been calculated by the author on the basis of the data in Rocznik Statystyczny 1992.

\textsuperscript{15} Inglehart, Culture Shift, p. 165.
postmaterialist value orientation in the present study. Some of the parties which have been classified as materialist represent also interests of farmers (the Polish Peasant Party and Polish Peasant Party – People's Alliance), and there is a strong social tradition in the Polish countryside to support such parties. This support is an expression of 'peasant solidarity' which is not based on a rational political choice. This may be a reason of this inproportionally high percentage of supporters of materialist parties among farmers.

3.9 Who are the materialists and postmaterialists in Poland?

The analysis in the previous sections supports the argument that the materialist/postmaterialist cleavage exists in Poland. This analysis also produces an image of an average supporter of materialist and postmaterialist parties. Generally, Polish postmaterialists are likely to be young, well educated and having professional positions. They are also more likely to live in large cities (this last feature does not necessarily agree with the Western explanation). Polish materialists, on the other hand, are likely to be older, have blue collar jobs, have a low level of education, and live in the rural areas.

On the whole, except for the place of living, this characterization corresponds to the characterization of
materialists and postmaterialists in Western Europe provided by the Euro-Barometers.

3.10 Stability of materialist/postmaterialist value orientation in Poland.

Now that the argument about the existence of the materialist/postmaterialist cleavage has been supported, and average Polish materialists/postmaterialists have been characterized, the problem of the stability of the orientations should be addressed. In other words, the question is: Is the cleavage a temporary phenomenon, or is it a permanent feature of social development in Poland?

Unfortunately, with the data at hand, limited to only one election, it is not possible to answer fully this question. One can assume, however, that because the relationships indicating the existence of the cleavage are strong and stable, so should be the character of the materialist/postmaterialist cleavage in Poland.

3.11 Alternative rival hypotheses and critique of the approach.

Finally, alternative rival hypotheses have to be considered. The change of values revealed among younger cohorts may be a
result of either life cycle effect or period effect. The first one assumes that people become more conservative with age and this is the reason there are more materialists in older cohorts. The other hypothesis assumes that values reflect current socioeconomic conditions.\textsuperscript{16}

The data from Euro-Barometers allowed the elimination of both alternative rival hypotheses but it also showed that it is very difficult to distinguish between life cycle effects, period effects and cohort effects. Only very advanced techniques of analysis have allowed for that.\textsuperscript{17} Unfortunately, the current data from Poland cannot be processed in this way. For that reason, it will not be possible to estimate to what extent period effects and life cycle effects modify value orientations of Polish birth cohorts. One should assume that because economic crises in Poland were much deeper than their counterparts in the West, the impact of period effects should be significantly greater on materialist/postmaterialist value orientation.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 77.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 82.
3.12 The silent minority and the problem of validity.

It should be recognized that parties are not ideal indicators of value preferences. In the first place, their political agendas include many goals; hence, it is always open to discussion how precise and reliable the classification is. Secondly, the process of making a decision to vote for a party is not entirely determined by the party program. Other factors also influence this process. These factors include personalities in the party leadership, efficiency of the party administrative apparatus or, local political traditions. It is open to discussion which one of them is the most significant.

Another problem which should be pointed out is that the present study has been based only on a sample of people who voted. Considering the fact that only 51 percent of those eligible to vote took part in the elections one can talk about a silent minority whose preferences are still to be examined. This is one more disadvantage of using parties as indicators of social preferences. Nevertheless, at this point the data from the Euro-barometers for countries with comparable socioeconomic conditions, suggest that the measurement in the present study is highly valid.
3.13 Conclusion.

The findings presented in this chapter support the argument that there is the materialist/postmaterialist value cleavage in Polish society. And it seems that, as predicted by Inglehart, formative security and socioeconomic status are very much responsible for the emergence of this cleavage. Therefore, the main research question about the character of changes in Polish society has been addressed in its first part.

The next chapter is concerned with the second part of the main research question. It discusses changes in Poland in terms of Dahrendorf's theory of the modern social conflict.
4. The Underclass in Poland.

4.1 Introduction.

The preceding chapter demonstrated that Inglehart's theory can be applied under Polish conditions; there seems to appear a materialist/postmaterialist value cleavage in Polish society. Therefore, one can argue that the first part of the research question about the character of changes in Polish society has been answered.

This chapter is concerned with an alternative explanation of changes in Poland; that is the process of democratic transformation of Polish society leads to a rise of the underclass and risks of anomie. The argument is based on Dahrendorf's theory whose operationalization has been presented in Chapter II.

4.2 The structure of unemployment in Poland.

A first condition necessary for the development of the underclass is high and persistent unemployment. Table 4.1 presents data about the level of unemployment in Poland.

The year 1989 was the final year of the communist regime in Poland. The problem of unemployment was much talked about at that time but it was not a real challenge: only 1.5 percent of the working force could not find a job. The situation
Table 4.1 Unemployment in Poland since 1989 (number of unemployed as a percentage of the working force).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Level of unemployment (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For 1993 the figure is for six months.

changed in the following years. The percentage of unemployed shot up from 1.5 percent in 1989 to 15.2 percent in July 1993. Among Western European countries, only Spain surpasses Poland.\(^1\)

Analyses of the Polish economy suggest that the number of unemployed will increase in the future. Can one, therefore, conclude that a first condition for the creation of the underclass in Poland has been fulfilled? The numbers above suggest an affirmative answer but a closer look at the character of Polish unemployment should cast some doubts. Unemployment in Dahrendorf's definition is characterized not only by a high level but by concentration in large cities among disadvantaged, usually ethnic, groups of a society. The last feature does not seem to appear under Polish conditions. Though this is not shown in the table above, the most urbanized areas of the country have the lowest level of unemployment while the rural areas have the highest: respectively 7.1 to 9.8 percent and 23.4 to 27.9 percent of the local working force (absolute numbers are equal or slightly higher in the urbanized areas).\(^2\) Furthermore, while the level of unemployment remains the same, or even drops, in

\(^1\) Rocznik Statystyczny 1992.

\(^2\) July 1993, data from "Statystyka Polski" Rzeczpospolita, 3 September, 1993.
urbanized areas it increases in rural areas.\textsuperscript{3} Neither are some special groups of society disproportionately afflicted with unemployment. The burden seems to be fairly (if this adjective can be used in this context) distributed among different groups.\textsuperscript{4}

The final problem which should be addressed is the nature of unemployment in Poland. Dahrendorf argues that the persistence of unemployment in the United States and some countries in Western Europe results from technological revolution: the same industrial output is provided by fewer workers. Technology has gone so far that in some factories workers are not needed at all (and the number of these factories increases).\textsuperscript{5}

The nature of unemployment in Poland seems to be different. It is caused not so much by new technologies, though they have their share in the process, but by new structures of industrial production and economy. Many branches of the industry in Poland are being closed down because of the lack of demand for their production. The steel and mining industries provide an example of this. Under the communist regime, these industries were considered as strategic and

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{4} Rocznik Statystyczny, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{5} Dahrendorf, The Modern Social Conflict, p. 136.
prestigious and functioned by the rule "the more the better"; real market demand and cost efficiency did not matter. Since in the new economic reality the demand is much smaller than the oversized production of coal and steel, closures and layoffs follow.

However, in the meantime new branches of industry are being created or expanded, providing new jobs. The consequence of this 'reshuffling' of the labor force is that one cannot predict the future evolution of the nature of Polish unemployment. Certainly, when the new structure of the industry has been established, the level of unemployment will be more and more influenced by the factors defined by Dahrendorf. But, still, one does not know what will be the level of unemployment in Poland.

4.3 The diversification of the working class.

Another factor which entails a rise of the underclass is a diversification of the working class. Small groups of privileged workers with high salaries and secure jobs should be opposed by a majority with low incomes and uncertain jobs.

Table 4.2 presents the distribution of income of the working class in Poland. The assumption behind this indicator is that the income distribution reflects internal diversification.
Table 4.2 Income diversification of the working class in Poland.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Percentage of Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100.0

Note: income = monthly salary

The categories in Table 4.2 have been based on the real buying power of monthly salaries. The data indeed show diversification of the working class. Most workers have salaries classified as very low and low (respectively 14.4 percent and 61.5 percent). 19.6 percent of workers have medium salaries and only 4.5 percent high ones.

But again, the question is whether this is the type of diversification Dahrendorf predicted. Though the values of incomes in the Polish currency are not presented in Table 4.2, it can be calculated that the proportion of the average salary in the 'very low income' group to the average salary in the 'high income' group is 3:1; this does not appear a large proportion under Polish conditions. The price index indicates that this proportion is not reflected in very different standards of living. In fact, the standards are rather low.

The structure of jobs held by the working class in Poland also does not seem to conform to the structure outlined by Dahrendorf. He assumed that the small group of highly paid workers held the most secure positions as well. Unemployment will be a problem for those having temporary and easily expandable positions which are not crucial for the national economy.

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6 The categories do not show the exact figures in zlotys (the official currency in Poland) because these figures would not be very informative for an American reader.

7 Calculated on the basis of the data in Rocznik Statystyczny 1992.
economy as a whole. The most likely new members of the underclass are those who had lost their temporary positions and cannot find other jobs. This is not the pattern in Poland. Under current conditions no social or professional group can say that their positions are safer than the others.'

Of course, this conclusion applies to all professional positions in every capitalist country but the speed of structural changes in Poland makes it particularly appropriate. The group of workers with medium and high salaries is not concentrated in any particular branch of industry; they are equally distributed. They are in the new expanding branches as well as those declining. For that reason one cannot connect the level of income with security of a job. Moreover, majority of workers still held positions in traditional 'working class' industries: steel and coal mining. Since these industries are in decline, there is a shift of workers to the new branches, such as electronic and machine building. Part of the workers is indeed being shifted to positions classified as temporary which are in the service sector. But because this process is presently under way it is not possible to say what will be the proportion of jobs in the service sector to jobs in the industry and which of them will

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9 *Rocznik Statystyczny*, pp. 260-269.
be classified as temporary or secure. Neither is it possible to say what will be the proportion of incomes in these sectors.

In sum, the present section has demonstrated that although the process of the diversification of the working class is in progress in Poland it is too early to conclude that this process will lead to the emergence of the underclass.

4.4 The character of poverty in Polish society.

Dahrendorf argues that social groups living under the poverty level form an environment in which a transformation takes place: the transformation of members of a society into members of the underclass. Those who lost their jobs become a part of the environment in which they realize that society is not interested in their problems. The most vulnerable to this process are ethnic minorities whose social positions are usually the weakest.\(^{10}\) Living in poverty means less life

\(^{10}\) Dahrendorf, The Modern Social Conflict, p. 141.
chances or not having them at all.\textsuperscript{11} Can one say that a similar situation emerges in Poland?

It is always difficult to define poverty level. In the present study it has been assumed that the poverty level in Poland is equivalent to the individual minimum monthly income which covers basic needs (food, rent, clothing etc.).\textsuperscript{12}

Table 4.3 shows the distribution of individual incomes among the Polish population. The row 'poverty' shows the percentage of the Polish population having incomes equal to or less than the minimum income.

As much as 3 percent of the Polish population lives in poverty. It is definitely less than in the United States or Great Britain (according to Dahrendorf's estimations). But still the figure is significant; it makes about one million in absolute numbers. Most Poles have low and medium incomes (respectively 46 and 45 percent), and only small groups have high and very high incomes (respectively 5 and 1 percent). The first impression is that these figures provide some support for Dahrendorf's argument.

\textsuperscript{11} The idea of life chances is crucial for Dahrendorf's theory. It consists of two concepts: provisions (these are goods to be chosen) and entitlements (these are rights to choose). So far, in their process of development, societies have pursued either provisions or entitlements. Dahrendorf contends that modern societies should pursue both provisions and entitlements.

\textsuperscript{12} The minimum salary has been calculated by the Ministry of Social Welfare of the Polish government.
Table 4.3 Income diversification of the Polish population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Income</th>
<th>Percentage of the population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100

Note: The categories have been created on the basis of the real buying power of the incomes for 1993.

Source: Calculated by the author on the basis of the data from Rocznik Statystyczny (Zakład Wydawnictw Statystycznych: Warszawa, 1992) and Economist Intelligence Unit.
But again, as in the previous sections, a closer analysis gives some doubts. In the first place, the proportions of the upper borderline values of low and medium incomes to the minimal income are not very large: 2:1 and 4:1 respectively. The high rate of inflation continually changes these proportions. Thus, it is not possible to indicate any special groups of Polish society as living constantly under poverty level. These groups change because the differences between low and medium incomes on the one hand and the minimal income on the other are not large; it is very easy to slip from one group to another. In the second place, the poverty of certain social groups has been caused by structural changes necessary for a transformation of a communist style economy to a market one. Technological factors do play their role in this process but it is impossible to say how significant is their influence.

The problem of minorities should also be addressed in this place because they are usually the most threatened by the decline below poverty level. This is the situation in the United States and Great Britain where ethnic minorities are the majority of the underclass. Such a composition of the

\[13\] As it was mentioned earlier, the figures in zlotys (the official currency in Poland) are not presented in table 4.3 because they would not be informative for an American reader.

underclass in Poland is highly unlikely for a very simple reason: few ethnic minorities. This is a result of the changes of the borders as well as the resettlement action after World War II. Currently, the population of Poland is 98.7 percent Polish; Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Jews and Germans are the main groups in the remaining 1.3 percent.\textsuperscript{15} Conditions of life of the minorities are not much different from the rest of the population. In fact, the German minority is best organized, both economically and politically and this is reflected in their higher than the average standard of living.\textsuperscript{16}

Finally, Dahrendorf assumes that because poverty follows persistent unemployment it will also be concentrated in urban areas. There is an opposite pattern in Poland: urban areas have the lowest concentration of poverty.\textsuperscript{17} Generally, it seems that the distribution of poverty in Poland is much more influenced by historical development than by current process. Areas which belonged to Germany during the partitions of the country (in the 19th century) still have the highest standard of living and the lowest number of people living in poverty.\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{16} 'Kroll: Widze Niedostatki Traktatow,' \textit{Rzeczpospolita} September 1, 1993.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Rocznik Statystyczny} 1992, p.40.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., pp. xiii-lxii.
In sum, as in the previous sections, the findings are not conclusive. There are processes which result in poverty of certain social groups. These processes may even result in the emergence of the underclass in the future but the current character of poverty in Poland does not indicate the existence of the underclass.

4.5 Is there the underclass? Problems of evaluation.

Should one, therefore, say that the findings of the present study invalidate Dahrendorf's theory under Polish conditions? The answer is yes and no; yes for the present and no for the future. The level of unemployment, diversification of the working class and level of poverty, used as indicators in the present study, suggest that it is too early to conclude the existence of the underclass in Poland.

On the other hand, the indicators show processes which may lead to the creation of the underclass in the future. The working class is being diversified. Unemployment is high and certainly will not be eliminated. There are social groups which live under poverty level. Moreover, though a significant portion of the Polish population lives in rural areas, a process of urbanization is under way; it is not certain whether the influx will be absorbed by the new structure of
economy. The character of the cities may change if the levels of unemployment and poverty go up.

Again, an outcome of these processes is uncertain and for that reason Dahrendorf's theory cannot be evaluated as valid or invalid under Polish conditions.

Problems of evaluation are also a result of the short period of existence of Polish democracy and market economy. Dahrendorf's theory has been based on an analysis of societies which have been both capitalist and democratic for a long time. Where the underclass appeared its creation took many years. In Poland it has been only four years since the new system was established. As in Inglehart's theory, in which cohort effects are modified by period and life cycle effects, an evaluation of Dahrendorf's theory has to deal with effects of a transformation from command to market economy. Structural changes reflect this transformation as well as technological development. In highly developed capitalist countries two process are dependent: technological development generates structural changes. But this is not true in the former communist countries. Here, structural changes are generated not only by technological development but also by the necessity to remove the old communist organization of production which do not provide goods required by the new market. In fact, on the basis of the findings in the previous sections, one may even assume that the latter factor is
dominant in the period following the shift of power from communists to democratic forces. Further studies should explain when the influences of the two factors are equal and when the technological factor began to prevail.

4.6 The risks of anomie in Poland after 1989.

The main point made by Dahrendorf is that the process leading to the emergence of the underclass also results in anomie of its members. In a preaching style he concludes that:

Where God appears to have died, false gods are not very far away.

This is the real danger for society as well as for the members of the underclass themselves. The situation after World War I has shown what happens when the ligatures of premodern societies are destroyed and nothing is offered as their replacement:

Totalitarianism was tempting not to atomized modern masses (if such existed or exist anywhere) but to those who got stuck halfway between old and new, who had lost one without having found the other and then fell for the false promise of the best of

\[19\] For the definition of anomie see Chapter I.

both. Its ingredients are incomplete modernity.\textsuperscript{21}

Only ligatures created by open modern civil society can prevent 'false gods' from emerging.\textsuperscript{22}

The question is therefore: Are there ligatures in Polish society which can prevent anomy? At first, the question may seem out of context here because the findings in the previous sections suggest that it is too early to talk about the underclass under Polish conditions: there should be no risks of anomy. A closer look at Polish society as a whole suggest that the question is very much in place. This is because the society as a whole strives to transform not only its economy but also its ligatures. In fact, the phrase "creating ligatures" is much more appropriate because one has many reasons to doubt whether there were any before; the history of the communist regime in Poland explains the absence of any kind of ligatures.

Communism/socialism in Poland was not a system which provided guidance for Polish society at a time of change and confusion. In spite of the semi-dictatorial period before World War II, the postwar Polish society did not need another

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 82.

\textsuperscript{22} Dahrendorf defines ligatures as 'the coordinates which give choices meanings.' In other words, they allow each member of a society to evaluate his/her social position in terms of rights and duties toward this society.

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authoritarian regime because it had valid ligatures. Borrowing Dahrendorf's terminology, the ligatures of the postwar Polish society qualify as ligatures of open civic society.

This was due to the developments during the war. Unlike in many other countries, the war strengthened the authority of the Polish government in exile in London. The government created an underground administration of the country in which all the established prewar political parties had representation. There was an underground national parliament, also with representation of all the established prewar political parties. Despite the harsh German repressions these developments shaped the ligatures of Polish society. The people expected that the political system after World War II would be democratic and the allied victory did not put them at a loss (or the state of anomie).

The imposition of a communist regime in Poland by the Soviet Army eradicated the ligatures of open civil society in Poland, but the regime was unable to legitimize itself fully and was always perceived as totally dependent on the Soviet Union. To change the image of a Soviet puppet, throughout the period of the communist power there were efforts to create a substitute: 'the ligatures of socialist society.' They were even partially successful by organizing younger people in mass

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youth organizations. But society as a whole was controlled by a system of repressions.

After the communist regime collapsed there is a need for ligatures which would allow choices facing Polish society in the process of democratization. To return to the initial question: Are there such ligatures which can prevent anomy of Polish society? The answer appears negative.

It would seem that there is one source of ligatures recognized by a majority of society: the Catholic religion represented by the Church. But both the character of the Church organization and its teachings make this source inadequate. The Church proposes the ligatures of closed hierarchical society rather than the ligatures of open civil society advocated by Dahrendorf.

The new ligatures of open civil society will have to be created by Polish society itself simultaneously with a democratic political system. For that reason the process will be very sensitive to the influence of 'false gods.' So far, after four years, there is hope that the development has been going in the right direction: the extremist parties which question the whole process of democratization and propose solutions having very little in common with open society got a negligible number of votes in the last elections.

4.7 Conclusions: The modern social conflict in a postcommunist society.

The existence of the underclass characterizes societies where the modern social conflict takes place. Though the conflict is about economic privileges it is not between classes. The groups involved are those who can afford political activities and those who are prevented by their economic plight to express their opinions. Thus, social rights are the main problem in the conflict.

In other words, what should be the level of economic entitlements to enable every citizen equal participation in the political process? Social rights are, in Dahrendorf's terminology, a necessary condition of full citizenship. He argues that countries whose societies do not have (or do not accept) social rights have the largest underclass. Primary examples are the United States and Great Britain (with the Thatcherist social policy). Countries with the most extensive social rights do not have the underclass at all, for example Sweden or Switzerland.

25 Dahrendorf uses T.H. Marshal definition of social rights. They are 'the universal right to a real income which is not proportionate to the market value of the claimant.'

26 Civil and political rights are the other conditions.

The findings of the previous sections suggest that it is too early to talk about the existence of the underclass under Polish conditions. Should one therefore conclude that the modern social conflict is not taking place in Polish society? Such a conclusion would be too far reaching. It seems that the modern social conflict about economic entitlements is taking place in Polish society even without the underclass. This is because the former communist regime provided quite extensive social rights, and as Dahrendorf argues social rights are 'sticky.'¹²⁸ That not all these rights can be guaranteed in the new system is the main point of conflict.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 93.

5.1 Introduction.

The main research question of the present study is about the character of changes in Polish society during the democratic transformation. The findings presented in chapter III seem to provide support for Inglehart's theory that a materialist/postmaterialist value cleavage appears in Poland. Dahrendorf's theory has found less support: it is too early to talk about the existence of the underclass in Poland, but one can indicate processes which may lead to its emergence.

This chapter provides a general framework for an interpretation of these findings. Accordingly, the main point addressed is how the materialist/postmaterialist cleavage and the processes revealed on the basis of Dahrendorf's theory relate to the general pattern of cleavages in Polish society.

Since there is no agreement about what should be regarded as social cleavages the first sections of this chapter briefly outline major approaches to this problem (though the present author realizes that the problem of definition of social cleavages deserves a thesis of its own). The outline gives a perspective and justifies the author's choice of Robert Dahl's theory as providing the best framework for a final interpretation of the findings.
5.2 Problems of definition of social cleavages.

A review of literature shows that there is no agreement on what should be defined as social cleavages. Most authors take an ambiguous but very convenient approach and use the concept of social cleavages without providing its definition. One example is Stein Rokkan's study of the development of the party systems in Western Europe.¹

The authors who provide definitions of social cleavages seem to view them as conflicts on the national level. An example of this is Bingham Powell's definition of political cleavages as:

A set of attitudes that divides the nation's citizens into major political groups.²

However, Powell and others do not elaborate on their definitions. That is, except for the definitions that distinguish social cleavages, they provide no theoretical framework explaining the interactions of social cleavages and political systems.


5.3 Robert Dahl's theory of social cleavages.

Robert Dahl belongs to the group of authors viewing social cleavages as conflicts at the national level. But unlike the others, his approach is very comprehensive: he not only provides a definition of social cleavages but also classifies social cleavages according to their character and suggests what are their interactions with political systems. For these reasons his theory seems to be the most appropriate for the present study. Dahl defines social cleavages as conflicts involving:

[a]...more inclusive category of analysis such as class, religion, language, or race.³

Social cleavages are classified according to the composition of adversaries as reinforcing or crosscutting. If the composition of adversaries remains the same in all cleavages, these cleavages should be classified as reinforcing. If the composition of adversaries is not the same; that is, adversaries in one cleavage are allies in another, one can speak about crosscutting cleavages. Both types of cleavages may have intense or moderate level of antagonism.⁴

⁴ Ibid., p. 56.
It appears that Dahl does not assume any specific relationship between the level of antagonism of a cleavage and its significance in a society. Cleavages with intense levels of antagonism are not necessarily very prominent.

5.4 Sources of social cleavages in a postcommunist society.

The most common sources of social cleavages in Western societies are language, race, culture, class and religion. They may produce cleavages of different types: reinforcing and crosscutting, with moderate and intense level of antagonism, bipolar and multipolar. However, there is not an established scheme of their development. Under Polish conditions language, race and culture do not seem to have a great influence: Poland is a culturally homogeneous country with one language and no racial minorities. Class and religion, on the other hand, seem to have a stronger influence: the first one as a result of the diversification of Polish society following economic reforms, the second one as a result of the political role played by the Catholic Church in the history of Poland. The next sections deal with these problems in more detail.

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5 Powell, Contemporary Democracies, p. 42.
5.5 Social classes and the process of changes in Poland.

The class cleavage in Poland was prompted by the process of political and economic reforms after 1989. It was not very prominent before 1989 because of two reasons. First, those classes which were antagonistic toward the working class were eliminated by the communist regime after it took power in 1944. The elimination was done mainly by the nationalization of the industry and collectivization of the agriculture (only partly successful). The state replaced the former owners. Second, the regime strived to maintain a very rigid and consolidated structure of society which consisted of three major social groups with similar interests: the working class, peasants and the intelligentsia. Ultimately, the absence of antagonism between these groups in a Polish socialist state was supposed to lead to a classless society. In fact, the similarity of interests went further than communists expected and resulted in a cleavage between the PZWP apparatus and society at large. The point of conflict was the extent of

6 Though both the nationalization and collectivization were imposed by the regime with the help of the security apparatus they never resulted in such extreme outcomes as physical extermination of the former owners or 'kulaks.'

7 Taras, Poland: Socialist State, Rebellious Nation, p. 125.
control over society exercised by the party.  

The strikes of 1980 and the creation of 'Solidarity' showed the intensity of the conflict. It seems that never before or after the three groups (the workers, peasants and the intelligentsia) had so much in common. Applying Dahl's terminology, the party-society confrontation was an example of a reinforcing, bipolar cleavage with an intense level of antagonism. In Milovan Djilas' terms, the cleavage reflected the development of the New Class.

The process of democratic reforms following 1989 made it clear that common interests of the working class, peasants and the intelligentsia had been created by the strategy of the 'common enemy' and belonged to the past. The classes/groups have discovered that in the new economic and political reality their interests are contradictory: they have to compete with each other to maintain their economic and political positions. In addition, the reforms, particularly the process of privatization, have recreated social groups/classes which had been eliminated by the communists: the proprietors and

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8 Some authors argue that the communist monopoly of power was based on a bargain with Polish society: political control in exchange for economic goods. The strikes in 1981 broke out in the moment when the regime was not able to keep its part of the bargain. For more see A. Pravda, "Political Attitudes and activity," in J. Triska and C. Gati (eds.) Blue-Collar Workers in Eastern Europe (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1981).

9 Djilas, The New Class, passim.
managers. These new groups have begun pursuing their own specific interests: usually contradictory to the interests of the other classes/groups. For these reasons only after 1989 one can talk about a developed class cleavage in Polish society.

The cleavage, however, should not be characterized in terms of the traditional Marxist conflict between the working class and capitalists (or the new owners): the new groups/classes are still too weak socially and politically. The main issue dividing the classes/groups in Poland is the process of economic transformation and its results; namely, which class/group should bear the burden of economic reforms. So far, the working class and peasants have perceived themselves as suffering the most hardships. This perception is a result of structural changes which indeed affected the working class and peasants the most: many workers lost their jobs in closed down branches of the industry while small archaic family farms have to compete with the modern agriculture production of Western European countries.

Therefore, the working class and peasants form one group of antagonists in the class cleavage in Poland. They oppose a fast transformation of Polish society because they are afraid that this transformation will destroy their economic security. The group which supports the transformation includes all those whose positions will be strengthened by the democratic
reforms. These are the intelligentsia, managers, new proprietors, new middle class, etc.

The question is: How does the class cleavage relate to the materialist/postmaterialist value cleavage?

The findings in chapter III show that Polish postmaterialists are young, well educated professionals living in big cities, while materialists are more likely to be older, have low level of education and manual jobs, and live in the rural areas.

This characterization suggests that postmaterialists should be more willing than materialists to support the political and economic reforms for they are the ones who will benefit from these reforms. Materialists, on the other hand, are more likely to oppose the reforms (or changes in general) because these reforms seem to threaten their positions, which are already uncertain. This, in turn, leads to a situation where class cleavage, which is between groups/classes supporting and opposing the reforms, will be reinforced by value cleavage.

Another question is: How does the class cleavage relate to the findings from chapter IV. According to Dahrendorf, divisions of modern industrial societies are class-crosscutting.\(^\text{10}\) But it does not seem to be the situation in

\(^{10}\) Chapter I explains the details of his approach.
Poland. The data presented in chapter IV suggests that the working class and peasant are the most vulnerable to the risks of anomy because they are experiencing the most profound changes of their socioeconomic environment.

5.6 Religion and its place in modern Polish society.

Dahl argues that religious cleavages usually result from conflicts between different religions. The situation in Northern Ireland provides a classic example of a bipolar, reinforcing and intensely antagonistic religious cleavage.\textsuperscript{11} The question is whether there is a religious cleavage in Poland if 95 percent of society is Catholic and other religions have relatively small numbers of members. The following statistical data illustrate this point. There were 59 officially registered religions in Poland in 1991. The most numerous was the Catholic religion with over 35 million members; the Orthodox religion was the next most numerous one, but with only 550 thousand members. Other religions had several to several hundred members.\textsuperscript{12} Though there have been conflicts between religions they cannot be characterized as serious. The domination of Catholicism is overwhelming.

\textsuperscript{11} Dahl, Dilemmas, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{12} Rocznik Statystyczny 1992, p. 60.
But apart from rival religions, every religion has to face the process of secularization. Inglehart indicates three 'secular' factors influencing the position of religions in modern societies. First, rigid norms of behavior (which were provided by religion) are not necessary in a situation where physical survival is not at stake. Quite naturally, people are more willing to take risks if they feel secure.\(^{13}\) Secondly, religious norms do not regulate social activities to the extent they had done before. In the past, the survival and performance of many societies depended on certain types of behavior which could be warranted only by religious norms. In modern societies these types of behavior are not necessary and therefore the norms behind them become less prominent. Inglehart gives the example of the evolution of the role of family: Religion warranted stable family relations when the family constituted the basic unit responsible for the reproduction of society. The welfare state has taken many of these responsibilities and caused the decline of the religious family values. These values still exist but are not so prominent as they were before.\(^{14}\) Finally, the religious explanation of the world lost its validity. The knowledge produced by the scientific progress has reduced supernatural

\(^{13}\) Inglehart, *Culture Shift*, p. 177.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 178.
explanation of the Universe. God's will has been replaced by mathematical and physical formulas.\textsuperscript{15}

In Poland, the influence of these three secular factors undermines the position of the Catholic religion. Therefore, the central issue in the cleavage is not which religion will dominate in Poland (as explained before the position of Catholicism is unquestionable) but what should be the position of the Catholic Church in the new political system. The antagonists are divided between those who view the Church as an active political actor with its rights guaranteed in the new constitution, and those who prefer a complete separation of the state from all kinds of religious activities.

The question is: How does the materialist/postmaterialist value cleavage relate to the religious cleavage in Poland? The classification of political parties in table 3.1 in chapter III, is helpful in addressing these question. An analysis of party programs suggests that materialist parties view the Catholic religion and the Church organization as a central element of the new political system (with the rights of the Church guaranteed in the new constitution). In contrast, postmaterialist parties and parties with mixed orientation argue for a secular state. This kind of polarization leads to a situation where religious cleavage will be reinforced by

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 179.
materialist/postmaterialist value cleavage.

The findings in chapter IV indicate that the democratic transformation of Polish society causes its internal diversification. In time, this diversification may bring about the modern social conflict, as it was defined by Dahrendorf. The apparent question is: How does the religious cleavage influence the process of diversification?

It seems that those groups/classes which experience the largest changes of their social environment should perceive religion as an important element of the new system. Religious standards will be expected to provide for these groups/classes a kind of stabilizer and 'point of orientation' in the new economic and social reality which brings more threats than promises.

5.7 The character of social cleavages in Poland.

An analysis of the composition of adversaries in social cleavages in Poland should allow their classification according to the rules proposed by Dahl. A stable composition indicates reinforcing cleavages; a changing composition indicates crosscutting cleavages.

The previous sections suggest that the composition of adversaries is stable. Materialists are more numerous among the working class and peasants as well as among the
proponents of the incorporation of the Catholic religion into the political system. Postmaterialists prevail among white collar workers and among the proponents of the secularity of the state. Thus, cleavages in Poland should be classified as reinforcing and bipolar (because each cleavage is dominated by two groups of adversaries).

5.8 Antagonism of social cleavages in Poland.

Dahl did not elaborate on the method of estimating the level of antagonism of a cleavage. From the examples which he quoted in *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy* one can infer that deaths resulting from political activities indicate an intense level of antagonism (for example, in Northern Ireland). Therefore, by extension one should assume that the lack of violence connected with political activities indicate a moderate level of antagonism.

The developments in Poland have not caused much violence so far. The religious cleavage involves much discussion but little action. The class cleavage has not resulted in any serious clashes: the working class and peasants restricted themselves to parliamentary actions and strikes. It seems rational to conclude that social cleavages in Poland have a moderate level of antagonism.
5.9 Conclusions: the cleavages and the political system.

The final question of the present study which should be addressed is: What is the impact of the materialist/postmaterialist value cleavage in Polish society and processes revealed on the basis of Dahrendorf's theory on the new political system in Poland?

It has been demonstrated in the previous sections that these two cleavages reinforce the cleavages based on class and religion. Dahl argues that such bipolar reinforcing cleavages may, but do not have to, become intensely antagonistic and this in turn may lead to the destruction of a political system.

New Zealand provides an example of a country with bipolar, reinforcing cleavages but with a moderate level of antagonism. There is no sign that the state there is in crisis; on the contrary, it fulfills its tasks extremely well. On the other hand, there is the former Czecho-Slovakia: here, reinforcing cleavages (based on culture and language), though not intensely antagonistic, finished the federal state pretty quickly. There is also the former Yugoslavia where reinforcing cleavages based on religion, language and culture brought about the destruction of the political system followed

\[16\] Dahl, Dilemmas, p. 62.
by a civil war.

So far, there has been no indication that social cleavages in Poland may result in a crisis of the political system and the state. The system is relatively open and flexible and this seems to be the main reason of its good performance. In Rokkan's terms the Polish political system has low thresholds of political participation, and such systems are very efficient in dealing with political antagonisms.\(^\text{17}\)

5.10 Conclusion.

This chapter placed the findings of chapters III and IV in the broad framework provided by Robert Dahl's theory of social cleavages in industrial societies. The purpose of this was to demonstrate that the shift from materialist to postmaterialist values, and the potential emergence of the underclass, are directly related to other social developments: they influence

\(^{17}\) Rokkan indicated four main thresholds of political participation (this is his more scientific term for "locks"): thresholds of legitimation, incorporation, representation and executive power. The threshold of legitimation is crossed when rights to petition, criticism and demonstration against the regime are both legitimised and protected by this regime. The threshold of incorporation is achieved when formal rights of supporters of opposition movements equal the rights of supporters of the regime; in other words, this is the problem of suffrage. The threshold of representation is crossed when new movements do not face special legal barriers against their representation in the legislature. Finally, the threshold of executive power is overcome when parliamentary representation exercise control over executive decision-making.
these developments and are reciprocally influenced by them. Only such a whole picture should allow to explain the process of democratization in Poland.
APPENDIX A

The list of political parties officially registered for the elections in Poland on September 19, 1993.

1. Center Alliance
2. Catholic Electoral Committee "Fatherland"
3. Polish Peasant Party - People's Alliance
4. Confederation for an Independent Poland
5. Democratic Left Alliance
6. Polish Peasant Party
7. Liberal Democratic Congress
8. Solidarity
9. Democratic Union
10. Non-Party Block for the Support of Reforms
11. Labor Union
12. Union of Real Policy
13. Polish National Party
14. Beer Lover's Party
15. Coalition for the Polish Republic
16. German Cultural Society.
17. Party "X"
18. Open Campaign of Those Outside the System
19. "Self-defense"
20. "Fatherland - the Polish List"
21. Movement for the Autonomy of Silesia
22. Federation of Scientific and Technical Societies
23. Party of Polish Artisans
# APPENDIX B

## TABLE B-1 MATERIALIST/POSTMATERIALIST CLASSIFICATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN POLAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>PROGRAM</th>
<th>SURVEY</th>
<th>INTERVIEW</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Center Alliance</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Catholic Electoral Committee 'Fatherland'</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Polish Peasant Party - People's Alliance</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Confederation for an Independent Poland</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Democratic Left Alliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Polish Peasant Party</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Liberal Democratic Congress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Solidarity</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Democratic Union</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Non-Party Block for the Support of Reforms</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Labor Union</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Union of Real Policy</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Coalition for the Polish Republic</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Party 'X'</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. 'Self-defense'</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-17</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY


VITA

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