

An Analysis of American Foreign Policy:

A Case Study of the Pipeline

Sanctions against the Soviet Union

by

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(ABSTRACT)

This thesis focuses on the following questions: What accounts for U.S. foreign policy? Where is causation located in the foreign process? What changes have taken place in this process over the past 20 years and what are its present characteristics?

In providing answers to these questions I refer to James Rosenau's pretheory, a widely employed theoretical framework for the analysis of foreign policy. Rosenau identified five interrelated variable categories which together determine the foreign policy behavior of the United States. He assigned relative potencies to the variable categories thereby ranking them according to their explanatory power. In this thesis, an adapted version of Rosenau's pretheory was used for the analysis of the first major foreign policy crisis of the Reagan administration, the *Soviet pipeline sanctions*. This foreign policy episode proved to be an excellent illustration of how changes in the domestic and external environment have caused a transformation of U.S. foreign policy in the past two decades. It was found that the domestic foundation of U.S. foreign policy - congressional bipartisanship, executive branch unity, a supportive public and the backing of interest groups - has been replaced by a divided public, antagonist interest groups, a fragmented Executive, and an assertive Congress. These domestic changes were accompanied by external changes, especially the declining ability of the United States to control its ex-

ternal environment. These factors placed constraints on an independent U.S. foreign policy and most of them proved to promote continuity rather than change in the foreign policy behavior of the United States.

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1.0 Introduction

The objective of this study is twofold: First, it attempts to explain the behavior of the Reagan administration in its first major foreign policy crisis. Second, the work seeks to transcend the limited framework of this case study to derive a larger theory of the U.S. foreign policy process in the 1980s by evaluating the changes which have taken place in this process over the past two decades. Finally, I will offer a look at potential future developments and their ramifications on U.S. foreign policy in the coming years.

In December of 1981, international attention focused on Poland where the Polish government, under General Jaruzelski, made efforts to extinguish Solidarity's struggle for liberalism and democracy. Solidarity leader Lech Walensa and thousands of other Union members were arrested and martial law was imposed. President Reagan, faced with his first major foreign policy confrontation since assuming office in January of 1981, protested against these actions by imposing a variety of sanctions against the Polish government and the Soviet Union. The most important and potentially damaging of these punitive measures - the *Soviet pipeline embargo* - had been designed to disrupt a tremendous multi-billion dollar Soviet project, the building of a gas pipeline connecting the rich gas fields in Siberia with the consumer markets in Western Europe. This policy

was meant to punish the Soviets whom Reagan clearly identified as being responsible for the military crackdown. In November of 1982, however, the Reagan administration lifted the embargo in spite of the fact that the situation in Poland and the posture of the Soviet Union remained unchanged. Still, many members of Solidarity were detained; the political dialogue with the Polish Worker's Union had not been restored, and Warsaw was still governed under martial law. These actions represented three of Reagan's preconditions for the lifting of any sanctions.

Thus, this thesis sets out to explore and explain the dynamics of the processes which eventually culminated in this surprising reversal of U.S. foreign policy. To place the results of this case study into a larger context, this work has to rest upon an underlying theoretical framework. Selecting the most useful model, however, is a rather difficult endeavor for in the foreign policy literature we encounter an abundance of different theoretical frameworks designed to explain foreign policy behavior of nations. Though most of these models recognize the futility of any single-cause explanations and acknowledge the complexity of the foreign policy process shaped by a multitude of external and internal causal factors, few provide insights as to how these factors intermix and under which conditions certain factors predominate.

Eminent political scientist James Rosenau was among the first to address these problems. He attacked his colleagues for not working toward a more comprehensive, general theory of foreign policy and charged them with focusing too much on single-country, historical studies, while treating each country and situation as unique and nonrecurring. These tendencies, in his view, prevented the foreign policy field from moving toward higher levels of generalizations by rendering incomparable the empirical material and data yielded by their studies. Rosenau developed his famous pre-theory which since has served as a foundation for much social scientific research. Though pub-

lished in 1966, his approach is still the most useful and widely employed theoretical framework for the explanation of foreign policy.

Rosenau's pretheories are five-dimensional, with the five exhaustive and mutually exclusive variable categories labeled idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal, and external. He stated that for a scientific theory of foreign policy, one must assess the relative potencies of the five variable clusters. Rosenau did this in terms of distinctions between large and small countries, developed and underdeveloped economies, and open and closed political systems. For the United States, classified as large country/developed economy/open political system, he constructed the following rank order: the role variable proved to be the most powerful explanatory factor underlying U.S. foreign policy behavior while the societal, governmental, external and individual categories ranked second, third, fourth, and fifth respectively.

In this thesis I am going to apply Rosenau's pretheory to the case study of the Soviet pipeline sanctions. It will be very interesting to see how the rank order of the underlying causal factors compares to the one Rosenau used to describe the policy process twenty years earlier. In other words, I would like to find out which factors have become more significant and which variables have declined in importance over time. What other U.S. foreign policy actions show the same patterns and what general rules and observations can therefore be derived for the foreign policy process of the United States in the 1980s? What changes have occurred over the past two decades? These are the issues and questions around which this thesis revolves.

As to the basic organizational conception of this work: it is divided into four chapters. The first presents the relevant literature in the field with regard to the above mentioned five factors underlying American foreign policy. At the end of chapter I, the pieces of the mosaic are put together as a more thorough picture of Rosenau's arguments is presented.. Rosenau's pre-theoretical framework then will serve as a foundation

for the subsequent chapters. Chapter III will feature the research design which then is executed in chapter IV. Finally, the last chapter corresponds to the introductory chapter in that it contains the answers to the questions asked at the outset of this work and presents my conclusions. I now turn to a closer examination of the sources of American policy which organize the subsequent explanatory analysis.

2.0 A Framework for the Analysis of Foreign Policy: an Overview of the Sources of American Foreign Policy

2.1 Idiosyncratic Sources of Foreign Policy

Like the Carter Administration, the Reagan Administration has been highly personalized-almost anti-constitutional. In its early years, much of its foreign policy was set by the President's instincts, rhetoric and ideological conviction.

James Schlesinger (1985:957)

It might be suggested that a person's behavior is a function not of individual traits but rather of the office that he holds-and that the office is circumscribed by the larger demands of the national interest, rendering individuals inconsequential.

Thomas Paterson (1979:93)

Numerous studies have examined how the personalities of leaders impact on foreign policy, that is, how their instincts, personality traits, perceptions, attitudes, goals and belief systems affect the foreign policy behavior of a nation. Traditionally, this approach has enjoyed widespread popularity. Michael Sullivan argues "that man, being an

egoistic animal, sees himself as the center of the universe, and likes to think he is the cause of events around him.”¹ If politicians admitted that they are controlled by the “system”, they would lose their *raison d’être*, since it would not matter who was tossed around by external factors. Secondly, as Sullivan points out: “Man sees other individuals in action every day and therefore feels he understands behavior between people... He also feels behavior between nations can not be much different.”² Researchers are reluctant to view international behavior as something uncontrolled and unattached to the individual sphere. Individual level analysis facilitates their efforts to understand the complex patterns of interaction which can be observed in international relations.

2.1.1 The Need for Systematic Study of Personality and Politics.

At an early stage in the history of political science Walter Lippman wrote that “to talk about politics without reference to human beings .. is just the deepest error in our political thinking.”³ Though this is a very general statement it nevertheless illustrates that the focus of analysis has to be on the individual to find out the sources of his motivation to behave in one rather than another way. Richard Lazarus argues:

The source of man’s behavior are twofold: the external stimuli that impinge on him and the internal dispositions that result from the interaction between inherited physiological characteristics and experience with the world... Even as we recognize the dependency of behavior on outside stimuli we are also aware that it can not be accounted for on the basis of the external situation alone, but that in fact it must arise partly from personal characteristics.⁴

In other words, personal characteristics like instincts, personality traits, and beliefs make a difference. By ignoring the impact of these personal characteristics, one must assume

¹ Sullivan, 1976: 19.

² Sullivan, 1976: 20.

³ Lippman, 1943: 2.

⁴ Lazarus, 1961: 27-28.

that individuals would all react similarly to external stimuli. But human reactions differ due to the fact that they act according to how they *perceive* a situation. This point is presented by Kenneth Boulding:

We must recognize that the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the "objective" facts of the situation, whatever that may mean, but to their "image" of the situation. It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behavior.⁵

A lot of research has been done in the past decades to sort out the linkages between man's images and beliefs relative to his behavior in the international sphere, based on the assumptions that beliefs cause behavior and thus explain and predict human action. Unfortunately, this research has yielded inconsistent and discouraging results. Cohen, in the concluding chapter of his book "Attitude Change and Social Influence," states:

Most of the investigators whose work we have examined make the broad psychological assumption that since attitudes are evaluative predispositions, they have consequences for the way people act toward each other...Thus, attitudes are always seen as precursors of behavior, as determinants of how a person will actually behave in his daily affairs.⁶

Previous work by La Pierre offered evidence which seemed to contradict this statement. In the 1930s La Pierre tried to determine the validity of research findings which indicated strong anti-Chinese sentiments in the United States. Accompanied by a Chinese couple, he travelled extensively across the United States, closely observing how his fellow travellers were treated. To his surprise, he found that in most cases treatment was fair and correct. In only one place they were denied service. However, when La Pierre later surveyed the proprietors of businesses they had visited, he discovered that ninety percent of the respondents stated that they would not serve Chinese people.⁷ Nazli Choucri also found that the linkage between beliefs and action is not obvious. He analyzed the perceptions of both East and West by Nehru, Sukarno and Nasser. Though he came to the conclusion that the perceptions held by these three leaders were rather similar, there

⁵ Boulding, 1969: 423.

⁶ Cohen, 1964: 137-138.

⁷ La Pierre, 1935: 230-237.

actions vis-a-vis East and West differed considerably.⁸ Ole Holsti,⁹ in his analysis of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' perceptions of Communism, tried to establish a link between Dulles' belief system and U.S. foreign policy behavior during this period by content analyzing the documents authored by Dulles between 1953 and 1959. He found only a moderate correlation between beliefs and behavior. Campell¹⁰ later discovered that while it was true that the same "latent acquired behavioral dispositions" [attitudes, beliefs] mediate both verbal and overt behavioral responses, certain situational pressures act as intervening variables between attitudes and behavior.

Studies conducted by Alexander George, Glenn Stassen, Robert Bernstein/William Anthony, Joanne Luomba and Ole Holsti on the other hand lend support to the hypothesis that there is, indeed, a link between beliefs and actions. In developing his concept of what he calls "operational code" of Bolshevik leaders, Alexander George¹¹ comes to the conclusion that Bolshevik leaders are guided by this operational code. Basic element of this Bolshevik code is their intrinsic belief that the history of the world is one of struggle and conflict resulting in the eventual victory of communism. The inevitability of the final victory prevents Soviet leaders from engaging in adventurous enterprises with uncertain outcomes. Alexander George, thus, would interpret Khrushchev's retreat in the Cuban missile crisis as well as his actions in the second Berlin crisis as consistent with his operational belief system.

Glenn Stassen's findings about U.S. senatorial response to Secretaries of State Acheson and Dulles further supports this finding. Stassen¹² argues that his "cognitive

⁸ Choucri, 1969: 13.

⁹ Holsti et al., 1969: 683-684.

¹⁰ Campell, 1963: 94-172.

¹¹ George, 1969: 190-222.

¹² Stassen, 1972: 107.

processing model" was successful in explaining the senatorial support or opposition. While James Rosenau,¹³ in a earlier study, had focused exclusively on the independent variable party role in explaining the degree of senatorial support, Stassen found that this variable only accounted only for a small amount of variation in the senatorial behavior. He, therefore, included a second factor measuring cognitive processes like their images of isolationism, alliance support and perceptions on the Cold War. This "belief set" model was more highly correlated with senatorial support than the original role variable.

Robert Bernstein and William Anthony yielded similar results in their research.¹⁴ Bernstein/Anthony proposed three hypotheses to explain why a senator might adopt or change positions on such a controversial issue as ABM. The first hypothesis identified economic benefits (in terms of production or research jobs for the state a senator represents) as a reason why a senator would adopt a position favoring this issue; the second focused on the party role of a representative; and the third hypothesis stated that senators vote in accordance with an internalized set of political beliefs variously termed political doctrines, conscience or ideology. The authors finally concluded that ideology is a much more influential factor than either party commitment or economic incentives in determining a senator's stance in this issue.

Joanna Luomba hypothesized that "perceptions of India's international behavior and domestic conditions constitute an important influence upon America policy maker's intentions regarding assistance to that country."¹⁵ She found that different orientations toward foreign aid for India among members of the American foreign policy-making elite were most strongly associated with different evaluations of India's international behavior as well as well as with different evaluations of India's political, military, eco-

¹³ Rosenau, 1968: 17-50.

¹⁴ Bernstein/Anthony, 1974: 1198-1206.

¹⁵ Luomba, 1972: 352-369.

conomic and social transactions with the United States. Though three role variables: service on different Committees, region, and Senate or House membership, correlated with the granting of foreign aid, the above mentioned perceptions and beliefs proved to be much stronger in explaining the variance in senatorial behavior.

Other important studies conducted on the outbreak of World War I,¹⁶ the Korean War in 1951,¹⁷ and the Cuban Missile Crisis¹⁸ have further enhanced the knowledge concerning the linkage between belief systems and foreign policy behavior, though many of these suffer from another methodological shortcoming. In trying to establish a relationship between these two variables, many of the above mentioned studies rely heavily on Lampston's "image of the opponent" or Wright's "national interest" concepts, which are said to elicit a certain behavioral reaction on the part of political leaders. Since these two notions are rather broad and unrefined concepts, they are unfit for assessing which *particular* image/belief is linked to which *specific* foreign policy behavior.

2.2 *Societal Sources of Foreign Policy*

Ronald Reagan ... is applying in the White House the techniques he employed in getting there. Making more effective use of media research than any previous president, he has brought into the white house the most sophisticated team of pollsters, media masters and technicians ever to work there. They have helped him to transcend entrenched institutions like the congress and the Washington press corps to appeal directly to the people. This does not mean that the president goes by the polls rather than by his own conservative ideology. The polls don't change his beliefs or shape his policies, they tell him how to plan his strategies.

Sidney Blumenthal (1981: 43)

¹⁶ Zinnes, 1968: 117.

¹⁷ De Rivera, 1968; Lampston, 1973: 28-35.

¹⁸ Holsti et al., 1969: 683-684.

Nobody can know what it means for a President to be sitting in that White House working and to have hundreds of thousands of demonstrators charging through the streets. Not even earplugs could block the noise.

President Nixon (1977)

2.2.1 Public Opinion

The citations above illuminate the controversy concerning the evaluation of public opinion as a societal source of foreign policy; does American public opinion account for some variation in the foreign policy behavior of the United States or is its impact just a myth? Is there evidence to support the argument that foreign policy is a function of shifts in American public attitudes? Or is the relationship one of policy first and opinion second?

2.2.1.1 *The Classical Democratic Theory*

This theory is based on the premise that democracy is government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Whether we interpret this theory by viewing decision-makers as "instructed delegates" who execute the wishes of a majority of the electorate or as Burkean representatives who make decisions on behalf of the people they represent (justified by their superior knowledge), the "relationship between the domestic setting and the decision-making level is largely one-directional, from the public to the government."¹⁹

¹⁹ Hughes, 1978: 5.

2.2.1.2 The Pluralist Model

Another model which takes domestic setting elements into account is the pluralist model best presented by Robert Dahl.²⁰ He argues that the policy-making elite consists of various subsets of competing elites with differing and often antagonist interests. In pursuit of these interests the competing elites are searching for allies in their external environment such as parties, interest groups and the general public to strengthen their relative power vis-a-vis other power elites. Even in the foreign policy field, these competing elites are, to a certain degree, dependent on support by the groups listed above. The latter are only going to cooperate if they can be confident that the final policy outcome will at least partially reflect their positions.

2.2.1.3 The Bureaucratic Model

This model assigns at least some importance to the role of the general public and its subgroups in shaping foreign policy. It resembles the pluralist model in that it identifies various different bureaucratic units competing in the same decision-making arena in order to mobilize outside support for their opposing positions in policy questions. The relationship between decision-making units and outside forces (public, interest groups and Congress) differ however in these two models. Hughes²¹ analyses this subtle difference by pointing out:

Whereas in the bureaucratic model the officials reach out to find allies for their institutionally defined role, pluralists are more likely to perceive the officials as extensions or representatives of groups within the public. Thus the pluralists suggest the possibility of a two-way relationship in which officials do try to manipulate constituencies but in which the public also has some ability to place those it desires in the governmental fray.

²⁰ Dahl, 1956.

²¹ Hughes, 1978: 15.

All of these models are based on the presumption that foreign policy decisions are reflections of public preferences and beliefs. Many authors, however, argue that this picture is too simplistic for two reasons: First, the role of the American public requires as a precondition the existence of a well-informed and active citizenry. Numerous studies,²² however, have provided ample evidence to refute this assumption. These studies gave a poor account of American public's ability to play the role assigned to it within the framework of those theories. They concluded that the American public is rather ignorant about international affairs and not even interested in foreign affairs.²³ And second, these three theories are based on the assumption that decision-makers are willing to listen to the "public voice."

2.2.2 The President and the Polls

This "public voice" finds its expression in public opinion polls. According to Seymour Sudman,²⁴ every President since Franklin Roosevelt has used opinion polls as aid in election/reelection planning or as inputs to policy formulation. Many presidents, when encountering stiff public resistance, have often used political opinion polls as a political barometer directing them to address issues of public concern or to mobilize political support for policies. Presidents may even alter the positions when public opinion dictates. The second possibility, however, is rather the exception since most policy makers agree that

²² Weisberg, 1976: 33; Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin, 1980: 19; Bendt, 1980: 44.

²³ Rielly, 1979: 8.

²⁴ Sudman, 1982: 301-310.

nothing is more dangerous than to live in the temperamental atmosphere of a Gallup poll, always taking one's pulse and taking one's temperature... There is only one duty, only one safe course, and that is to try to be right and not to fear or say what you believe to be right.²⁵

2.2.3 The Electoral Cycle and the Conduct of Foreign Policy

Another form of public opinion, the right of the American people to elect their Chief Executive every four years, also seriously affects the conduct of American foreign policy. Thus, when the President extends or abuses his authority in foreign politics, he must not only be aware of facing charges of impeachment by the legislative branch, but also must be afraid of the electoral response on election day in the case of first-term presidents.

Presidential elections take place every four years and the maximum incumbency is limited to eight years.

In practice.... "these constitutional arrangements" often mean that presidents have little time during their incumbency when they have both the experience and the power needed for sensible and effective conduct of foreign policy. The price we pay is a foreign policy excessively geared to short-term calculations in which narrow domestic political considerations often outweigh sound strategic thinking and where turnover in high positions are so frequent that consistency and coherence are lost.²⁶

According to Quandt all presidencies are characterized by typical and consistent patterns. By analyzing American presidencies on a year by year basis he identifies the following problems, which have a negative impact on the foreign policy performance of the Reagan Administration. In the first year, presidents usually lack the experience and knowledge in foreign policy issues. This fact might be aggravated "if the President has been a Washington outsider and if there has been a change of party in control of the White House."²⁷ A newly elected president often comes to the White House with the

²⁵ Sudman, 1982: 303.

²⁶ Quandt, 1986: 825-837.

²⁷ Quandt, 1986: 830.

ambition to do everything better than his predecessor. Thus, decisions made in the first year are often characterized by a strong ideological element. In the course of the second year, presidents have learned from their mistakes and try to implement a more realistic foreign policy. The midterm elections in November necessitate a popular foreign policy to minimize losses for the incumbent's party. Sundquist²⁸ refers to this phenomenon as the one-year-in-four cycle. This is to say, that with perspective of the upcoming November election, Congress (particularly the House) abandons its cooperative stance. Congressmen now pay attention to the special interests of their constituents and neglect or even oppose new foreign policy initiatives which they can not sell to their electorate. The honeymoon period the President usually enjoys in his first year is over. As early as the middle of the third year electoral consideration on the part of the incumbent president come into play. And especially in the fourth year of a presidency new initiatives are rare and rhetoric prevails over actions.²⁹

2.2.4 The Mass Media as Societal Source of Foreign Policy

There is little doubt that the mass communication industry (television, radio and newspapers) has influence on foreign policies though there are greatly differing views about where this influence comes into play and, more generally, how much influence the mass media exert. It is hypothesized that the mass media are crucial in the policy formation process because on the one hand they affect opinions and actions of the general public and also have an impact on opinion/attitudes and actions of decision-makers.

²⁸ Sundquist, 1986: 110.

²⁹ For an opposing point of view see Robert J. Spitzer, 1983: 109. Spitzer maintains that an analysis of foreign policy activities reveals a peak during periods when the incumbent is a candidate for reelection, a view which contradicts Quandt's findings.

From either perspective the mass media seems to influence, to one degree or another, the foreign policy behavior of the United States.

There is an extensive body of research available with regard to the first hypothesis. Most researchers examine the "agenda-setting" capacity of the mass media.

Agenda setting refers to the ability of the mass media to influence the level of the public's awareness of issues as opposed to their specific knowledge about those issues - in Cohen's (1963) terms, what to think about as opposed to what to think.³⁰

And as Cook remarks:

The agenda-setting capacity of the mass media implies a causal connection between a temporal sequence of events: first, news media reporting occurs; second, these presentations influence perceptions of issue importance. The assumption is that these changed priorities will themselves influence policy choices.³¹

There is still no agreement among political scientists as to the strength of this causal relationship. Some would argue that there is a very strong relationship between the agenda-setting capacity of the media and the general public's perception of the relative importance of salient political questions (the most extreme position being that the mass media create public opinion),³² others would state a weaker version of this relation predicting, instead, an **overlap** between media and public policy agendas. Kegley states four rival hypotheses which according to his opinion question a direct causal link between the two variables:

1. "The mass media do not determine public attitudes because people are inattentive to foreign affairs."
2. "The influence of the mass media, by and large, are themselves relatively inattentive to foreign affairs."

³⁰ Roberts&Bachen, 1981: 307.

³¹ Cook et al., 1983: 17.

³² McComb, 1977.

3. "Public attitudes are relatively impervious to new information provided by news sources."
4. "The capacity of the mass foreign policy attitudes is undermined by the media's vulnerability to government manipulation."³³

Not until quite recently did another rival hypothesis find widespread support. As time-lagged correlation research designs³⁴ were executed, the direction of causality between mass media and public agenda setting became clearer. Many researchers tried to minimize the role of the media as an agenda-setting institution by arguing that the mass media, in order to find a market for its information, responded to the general public's agenda rather than vice versa.

With regard to the second hypothesis, which states that the policy agendas of decision makers are shaped by the agenda-setting impact of the mass media, the research is not as advanced and sophisticated. Lambeth³⁵, Blanchard,³⁶ and Cook,³⁷ are among the few to address this research question. The difficulties in evaluating this hypothesis stem from the fact that the media establishment and the government are highly intertwined. The media is, to a considerable degree, dependent on government sources to obtain information, while policy makers derive most of their information directly from the mass media. Kegley suggests that the media assumes the role of a transmitter between the governing elite and the American public.

³³ Kegley, 1982: 300-304.

³⁴ Tipton et al., 1975; McCombs, 1977; Sohn, 1978.

³⁵ Lambeth, 1978: 11-18, 62.

³⁶ Blanchard, 1974.

³⁷ Cook et al., 1983: 16-35.

However, there is still another approach to the role of the mass media. The media can definitely influence the decision-making process by creating foreign policy issues which necessitate action on the part of the decision makers. One of the most recent and prominent example is the role of the media in the "Irangate-Contra" affair. The Reagan Administration was forced to make major corrections with regard to its behavior; the media was certainly an important factor in bringing about this change.

2.2.5 The Influence of Interest/Ethnic Groups on American Foreign Policy

Traditionally, domestic policy is distinguished from foreign policy. While the former is characterized by the participation and competition of a multitude of different groups and other societal actors, the latter is portrayed as being dominated by a small elitist group which, in the absence of public interests and involvement, could carry through its own independent foreign policy. This absence, in theory, would lead to a more coherent national policy devoid of particularistic interests of groups and individuals.

Today, however, the above mentioned criteria for this distinction in character is no longer applicable. The line between these two spheres has become blurred; with the growth of international interdependence, foreign and domestic policies intersect more and more. Especially in the economic sphere, the linkage between domestic and foreign policy processes becomes apparent:

Slow domestic growth, intense foreign competition and other factors provide an incentive for American industry and unions to protect their jobs and earnings-that is to enter the field of foreign economic policy. Foreign policy considerations-from the most-favored-nation status to tariffs on specific goods to import-quota agreements [or economic sanctions]-and have profound effects both on the domestic economy and on foreign affairs, and domestic economic interest groups have an incentive to increase their activity in both these areas.³⁸

³⁸ Terchek, 1983: 58.

Thus, foreign policy in many areas like ecology, environment, economy, and communication has developed into a pluralist bargaining sector thereby depriving this area of its elitist character. However, though the number of interest groups in the foreign policy sector has increased dramatically, these groups have had little identifiable effect in the past. Part of the explanation lies in the professionalism and strong commitment of those career civil servants whose careers are devoted to foreign policy making and execution. They strongly resist the pleadings of particularistic interests and, instead, pursue what they consider to be in the national interests. While in the domestic sphere, interest groups often can rely on their superior sources of information to convince executive officials of the validity of their positions, in the foreign policy sphere executive departments and even congressional committees have more specialized information at hand.

2.2.5.1 The Influence of Ethnic Groups

Given the highly heterogeneous character of the American society, it is only logical to inquire about the relative impact of various ethnic groups on U.S. foreign policy. Traditionally, ethnic groups have been described as being partial in scope and ideologically biased in the pursuit of their goals. James Madison³⁹ judged (ethnic) separatism as being contrary to the national interest of the American melting pot, in which all ethnic groups would assimilate.

There is widespread disagreement concerning the degree to which interest groups influence the foreign policy decision making process. While authors like Daniel P. Moynihan and Nathan Glazer⁴⁰ identify the immigration process as single most impor-

³⁹ Madison, 1787: 10.

⁴⁰ Moynihan, Glazer, 1975: 22-23.

tant determinant of American foreign policy and maintain that it reacts "probably first of all to the primal facts of ethnicity," other authors are more cautious in their evaluation. The Moynihan-Glazer thesis is certainly supported by successes of the organized Jewish community, which in various instances proved to be a powerful factor in determining the outcome of U.S. foreign policy.⁴¹ Another famous example of successful lobbying of an ethnic group can be seen in the American response against Turkey for its invasion of Cyprus. While acknowledging these successes by ethnic groups, Stephen Garrett⁴² maintains, that by and large, [Eastern] ethnic groups have not been very successful in their efforts. Irving Louis Horowitz⁴³ lists eleven arguments why ethnic groups have had a rather weak influence on U.S. foreign policy. Without engaging too much in this discussion, it is worth mentioning that at least the national committees of both the Democratic and Republican party organizations have recognized ethnic groups as important political factors by establishing permanent sections appealing to Americans of diverse ethnic background. This observation leads me to the next question in this context, that is:

By which means do ethnic [interest] groups influence foreign policy?

1. The most important means of influence these groups have at their disposal is certainly the power of the ballot box. Given the high concentration of ethnic groups in individual states (like the Cubans in Florida or the Polish population in Illinois or

⁴¹ A famous example is the successful lobbying of Jewish groups when in 1972 President Nixon negotiated a trade agreement with the Soviet Union promising broad trade concessions to Moscow as part of his policy of detente. When this trade agreement was finally dealt with in Congress, the legislative branch under considerable Jewish pressure passed the so called *Jackson-Vanik amendment* which prohibited most-favored nation status for the Soviet Union unless a more liberal emigration policy for Russian Jews was guaranteed by Moscow.

⁴² Garrett, 1978: 301-323.

⁴³ Horowitz, 1977: 175-181.

Ohio) and major cities (like the high concentration of Jews in New York) it is hardly surprising that individual Congressmen and even Presidents are responsive to the demands of ethnic groups, being afraid of the electoral punishment by members of these groups.

2. Closely related to this first point is the argument that the success of these groups is related to the efficacy of ethnic appeals to the American public. It is argued⁴⁴ that if these ethnic groups can demonstrate that their appeals are basically an expression of American values rather than Polish or Hungarian values, they are likely to be more influential.

2.3 Governmental Sources of Foreign Policy

2.3.1 Congress, the President and Foreign Policy

Congress has inhibited the President's freedom of action and denied him the tools necessary for the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy.

Senator John Towers (1982)

Just as a child gets into trouble when family rules are not enforced, so the President -and the nation- get into trouble when Congress ignores the Constitution's dictates and does not exercise supervision over the activities of the Executive.

Congressman Don Edwards (1987)

⁴⁴ Garrett, 1978: 316.

Unique among world powers, the United States' participation in international relations is split between the executive and legislative branch of government. Thus Richard Neustadt's famous statement that "the Constitutional convention of 1787 is supposed to have created a government of 'separated powers'. It did nothing of that sort. Rather it created a government of separated institutions *sharing* powers,"⁴⁵ not only applies to domestic politics but also is relevant in the foreign policy area. The division of power between the two branches as specified in the American Constitution has become a permanent source of struggle between the two "antagonistic partners."

2.3.1.1 *The Constitutional Framework*

Article II of the American Constitution assigns the following powers to the President:

The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America... he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices. ... The President shall be the commander in chief of the army and navy. ... He shall have the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise herein provided for... He shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States.⁴⁶

This accumulation of powers was interpreted as an expression of the founding fathers' belief that in the area of foreign policy and in the area of war powers the Chief Executive would have to assume a leading role since "two houses of a rapidly expanding representative legislative could not speak for the nation to other countries on matters of national concern."⁴⁷ But Congress had a different stance in this matter and refused to yield.

⁴⁵ Neustadt, 1961: 33.

⁴⁶ Article II of the Constitution

⁴⁷ Goldsmith, 1986: 7.

Thomas Franck gives a short historic review of shifting authorities and predominance in the foreign policy arena. He explains the power shift between the two branches by looking at a third intervening variable, which is public mood.

When the public trusts its president, when the nation is on a successful roll of foreign initiatives, or when the threats from abroad are clear and unmistakable, the nation rallies around its President and Congress becomes either supportive or quiescent... When on the contrary, the President is distrusted or there are perceived to be few threats or opportunities abroad and when domestic priorities loom large, the system adjusts to a period of congressional supremacy...⁴⁸

Thus, during the two world wars, President Wilson and President Roosevelt had, by and large, a free hand to "make the world safe for democracy and peace" and to free the world from German and Japanese Fascism. Between the two world wars, however, the refusal of the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, growing isolationist tendencies in the American public, the modest tones of Coolidge, Harding and Hoover, and the Great Depression made the pendulum swing back as Congress reasserted itself. After 1945, necessities of international engagement (especially the world wide confrontation with Communism during the Cold War) contributed to an extension and eventual abuses of executive power on the expense of the legislative branch including abuses of presidential power under the vast emergency laws, the use of executive agreements instead of treaties to enter into secret negotiations with a foreign nation thereby bypassing Congress constitutional ratification rights, and the invocation of the executive privilege.⁴⁹ Through the use of these mechanisms the executive branch could withhold information from Congress in violation of the Constitution's clear intent that Congress share in the making of foreign policy.

But Congress fought back and eventually the American humiliation in Vietnam "became the catalyst for an extended self-examination of its own proper role in the

⁴⁸ Franck, 1984: 20.

⁴⁹ Schlesinger, 1973.

making of foreign policy and for the subsequent reaffirmation of long-neglected checks and balances.”⁵⁰

- In 1970, Congress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, thereby signaling President Johnson that it disapproved of his undeclared war in Southeast Asia.
- In 1972, Congress passed the *Case Act* which was designed to contain the use of executive agreements and reassert congressional participation in the foreign policy formulation.
- In 1973, Congress passed the *War Powers Resolution* which should ensure the right of the legislative branch to decide about war and peace.
- In 1974, the *Hughes-Ryan Amendment* was designed to guarantee improved congressional control over the C.I.A.. In the same year, Congress imposed an embargo against arms sales to Turkey in retaliation for its invasion of Cyprus against the expressed will of the Ford-Administration.
- In 1975, Congress terminated American participation in South Vietnam by preventing President Ford from giving emergency aid to the South Vietnamese government which was about to collapse under the impact of communist forces.

The list of examples could go on and on. The most recent example of a revitalized Congress looking for a coequal voice in foreign policy making can be seen in congressional efforts to change the Administration's Central American policy by terminating military aid for the Contras in Nicaragua.

⁵⁰ Senator Sparkman, 1977: 434.

2.3.2 The Rivalry within the Executive Branch

An additional factor to consider when analyzing the sources of foreign policy is the increasing involvement of a multitude of different government agencies with often conflicting goals. First and foremost, the Department of State is primarily responsible for the conduct of American foreign relations. Recently, other government agencies have appeared on the scene displaying, to a increasing degree, their intentions to secure their share of the foreign policy pie. This development is reinforced by structural weaknesses within the State Department which prevent it from assuming its leadership role in the foreign affairs government:

1. The foreign service within the State Department has developed a distinctive subculture that has jeopardized its role in the making and execution of foreign policy in so far as this subculture promotes traditionalism and conformism. There is an "institutionalized desire" to diffuse responsibility instead of exercising it oneself.
2. Another important source for the State Department's inability to emerge as a leader in the foreign affairs government is its "lack of political resources and bureaucratic muscle in Washington's politically intense bureaucratic environment."⁵¹

Filling in this gap is another department concerned with matters of foreign policy and national security. The Office of International Security Affairs (also referred to as "the little State Department") which forms a part of the Department of Defense, infringes more and more upon areas which formerly had been under the jurisdiction of the State Department. This office coordinates Defense Department policies related to inter-

⁵¹ Kegley, 1984: 360.

national "politico-military" and foreign economic affairs. Given the sheer size of the Defense Department, the traditionally strong military-industrial complex, and resurgent pro-defense attitudes of the Reagan administration, there is little doubt, that the Defense Department plays a prime role in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy.

The existence of multinational corporations and the highly interdependent state of the international monetary order and international trade necessitate an enhanced role for the Departments of Treasury and Commerce. Especially the latter becomes more and more involved as its primary responsibility lies with the expansion and protection of American commerce abroad. Other agencies like the Department of Agriculture bear responsibilities for the conduct of American foreign relations. All of these departments (including the Intelligence Community) want to participate in the making of foreign policy. This case study is an excellent illustration of the consequences of this dispersion of responsibilities and its ramifications for the foreign policy behavior of the United States.

2.4 The Impact of External Factors on U.S. Foreign Policy

2.4.1 The Changing International Environment and Its Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy

Since 1945, the international system has undergone a profound change. After World War II the United States, for a short period, emerged as the most potent and influential power. Based on its enormous economic potential (the United States in 1947 accounted for 50% of the World's Gross National Product) and its monopoly over nuclear weapons, the United States had the capability to dominate international politics. By 1949, the Soviet Union had also become a nuclear power and had tightened its control over Eastern and Central Europe. Thus, from 1949, the International System was characterized as bipolar. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the relative power and influence of the two superpowers vis-a-vis their respective allies declined steadily.

Henry Kissinger⁵² identified four events that brought about the end of American hegemony: European economic recovery, European integration, decolonization and the Cuban missile crisis and its aftermath. The revitalization of the Western European and the Japanese economies was accompanied by new political vigor and independence. France in the late 1950s developed its *force de frappe* and expelled Allied forces from its soil; Britain and France ignored Washington in their intervention in the Suez crisis and

⁵² Kissinger, 1965: 3-28.

Greece threatened to quit NATO as a response to the Turkish seizure of Cyprus, to give just a few examples.

The process of European integration has further advanced the self-confidence of its member-states and collective voices calling for a more independent policy on the part of the European Community are becoming louder and louder. The combined military and economic strengths of the European Community and Japan are unmatched in the world. Though they remain dependent upon the American nuclear umbrella, these economic and military capabilities have formidably increased their bargaining power vis-a-vis the United States. Second, the decolonization process freed European powers like Great Britain and France from their overseas commitments. Thus, as Kissinger pointed out: "No European government, with the possible exception of the United Kingdom, is likely to be convinced that its security is jeopardized by events in another part of the globe."⁵³

The behavior of Europe with regard to American initiatives to fight International terrorism, the use of trade as a political leverage and the fight for the free accessibility of natural resources underline the different viewpoints of America and its European allies. Finally, the Cuban missile crisis marked the end of the Cold War period. Both superpowers realized that in order to avoid the nuclear holocaust they had to cooperate in international affairs. Detente between the United States and the Soviet Union decreased the probability of armed conflict and removed the urgency of previous Allied cohesion. The European Allies started to develop their own foreign policy initiatives. The Federal Republic of Germany, under Chancellor Brandt, for example engaged in its own independent *Ostpolitik*, not to the pleasure of American administrations. The resistance of some members of NATO to participate in American sanctions against the

⁵³ Kissinger, 1965: 6.

Soviet Union for its invasion in Afghanistan is another illustration of the tensions and differing perceptions within the western alliance.

All of the above mentioned examples are an illumination of the fact that the international system changed from bipolarity to polycentrism. The major consequence for United States foreign policy is a reduced influence of the United States over its Allies. Polycentrism puts a premium on greater sophistication, subtlety and greater regard to European foreign policy initiatives. Thus, changes in the international system work as constraints on United States foreign policy in that "the erosion of American power in world affairs has placed limits on the countries options."⁵⁴

2.4.2 The Spread of Multinational Corporations and its Effects on U.S.

Foreign Policy

The size, dominance and strength of these multinational corporations has an effect on (American) foreign policy in that

for the first time, foreign policy has become global... Today, statesmen face the unprecedented problem of formulating policy for well over a hundred countries....what used to be considered domestic events can now have world-wide consequences.⁵⁵

The consequences for the foreign policy of the United States are far-reaching.

If the United States initiates, for instance, a trade embargo on a country, United States corporations usually are explicitly instructed not to trade with that country. However, another country where United States subsidiaries are located may not share the same policy and carry out trade with the embargoed country. That host country may then put pressure on the United States subsidiaries to export, while the United States government seeks to prevent it.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Kegley, 1982: 150.

⁵⁵ Kissinger, 1974: 53.

⁵⁶ Kjell/Ringbark, 1976: 97.

This proliferation of multinational corporations combined with a heightened state of economic interdependence indeed has a good deal of influence on United States foreign policy.

2.5 Developing a Comprehensive Theory of Foreign Policy

Having given an overview of the forces shaping U.S. foreign policy I would now like to present Rosenau's pretheoretical framework which integrates them into a coherent theory of foreign policy. This theory, though slightly modified as the diagram in chapter IV suggests, will serve as foundation and framework of my research design. At a later point, it will be helpful in deriving an explanation for U.S. foreign policy behavior with regard to the pipeline sanctions against the Soviet Union.

Currently, a large number of frameworks exist for the investigation and explanation of a nation's foreign policy. But, to one extent or another, most of these can be traced back to James Rosenau's *pretheoretical framework*.⁵⁷ While developed in 1966, it still provides one of the most useful and comprehensive framework for the analysis of foreign policy.

2.5.1 Rosenau's Pre-Theory of Foreign Policy

Rosenau discovered that while foreign policy had received extensive attention and ample treatment, there was an urgent need for theory in the field. He complained that

⁵⁷ Rosenau, 1966: 115-152.

while most scholars had identified the most important factors of foreign policy behavior, hardly anyone had traced their influence and evaluated their relative potencies. Many scholars were committed to single-country, historical approaches to foreign affairs, and by treating each country and each situation as unique and nonrecurring, forgot to put their interpretations and findings into a larger theoretical framework which would allow a more comparative analysis.

Rosenau identified two basic shortcomings, one philosophical and the other conceptual, which had held back the development of foreign policy theories.

2.5.1.1 Philosophical and Conceptual Shortcomings of Foreign Policy Theory

With regard to the philosophical shortcoming, Rosenau observed:

If theoretical development in a field is to flourish, empirical materials which have been similarly processed [rendered comparable] must be available... Unlike economics, sociology and other areas of political science, the field of foreign policy research has not subjected its materials to this preliminary process... The preliminary process to which foreign policy materials must be subjected is of a much more basic order. It involves the need to develop an explicit conception of where causation is located in international affairs. Should foreign policy researchers proceed on the assumption that identifiable human beings are the causative agents? Or should they treat political roles, governmental structures, societal processes, or international systems as source of external behavior? ⁵⁸

Rosenau attacked these questions by developing his famous pre-theory, which provides for comparison in the examination of the external behavior of various countries in various situation. He maintained that all pre-theories of foreign policy are *five-dimensional*. These five variables (or rather variable clusters) underlying the foreign policy behavior of a nation are labeled individual or idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal and systemic.⁵⁹ These variables are interrelated in that no single source category alone determines fully the foreign policy behavior of a nation.

⁵⁸ Rosenau, 1966: 126-127.

⁵⁹ In practice, most analysts using Rosenau's pre-theoretical framework have interpreted the systemic category in two ways. They distinguish between "systemic" and "external" sources of foreign policy. Kegley, 1982: p. 18, views the former as "aggregate or general attributes of the international environment (e.g. the

To fulfill a second requirement for a scientific theory of foreign policy one has to assess the relative potencies of these five sets of variables. Rosenau did this in terms of distinction between large and small, between developed and underdeveloped economies and between open and closed political systems. For the United States, a large country with a developed economy and an open political system, he came up with the following rank order: the role variable ranked first, societal second, governmental third, systemic fourth and individual fifth.

In executing my own research design examining the foreign policy behavior of the United States in the pipeline sanctions against the Soviet Union, I will develop my own pre-theory. By looking at each of the five sources of American policy separately, the causal impact each category exerts by itself on the foreign policy behavior of the United States will be examined. It will then be interesting to compare the rankings [relative potencies] of the five sets of variables with Rosenau's results, thereby gaining more insights as to which degree some variables might have become more important over the years. This also will enable me to investigate more clearly the dynamics of foreign policy continuity and change.

The purpose of this study, then, is to contribute to the development of a more general theory of foreign policy. But how will the application of a modified form of Rosenau's pre-theory allow the field to move beyond its present position? Rosenau gives the answer:

As previously implied the answer lies in the assumption that the widespread use of explicit pre-theories will result in the accumulation of materials that are sufficiently processed to provide a basis for comparing the external behavior of societies. If most researchers were to gather and present their data in the context of their views about the extent to which individuals, roles, governments, societies, and international systems serve as causal agents in foreign affairs, then even though these views might represent a variety of pre-theories, it should be possible to discern patterns and draw contrasts among diverse types of politics and situations. Theoretical development is not in any way dependent on the emergence of a consensus with respect to the most desirable pre-theory of foreign policy. Comparison and theorizing can ensue as long as each researcher makes clear what variables he considers central

amount of alliance of war) which are shared by all states-not just the United States. The latter are relationships between particular states (e.g. interactions between the United States and the Soviet Union).

to causation and the relative potencies he ascribes to them. For even if one analyst ascribes the greatest potency and still another regard them as impotent, they will have all provided data justifying their respective assumptions, and in so doing they will have given the theoretician the materials he needs to fashion if-then propositions and to move to ever higher levels of generalization.⁶⁰

Before reaching these higher levels of generalization, however, the researcher has to take care of another *conceptual* problem which has hampered the development of general theories of external behavior, namely "the tendency of researchers to maintain a rigid distinction between national and international systems."⁶¹ Rosenau develops the notion of a *penetrated system* to deal with this problem. The International System has become more and more complex and interwoven, so that in looking for an explanation of the foreign policy behavior of the United States, foreign elements have become central to certain aspects of the decision-making process in the United States. This conceptual clarification is of even greater importance in the 1980s than it was back in 1966 when Rosenau developed his pre-theory; this issue will receive ample attention in the framework of this thesis.

Before proceeding with the presentation and execution of my research design, I would like to mention that while Rosenau's explanatory model treated all five sources as independent variables accounting for the foreign policy behavior of the United States, I will use the role source as an intervening variable. The implication of this will become clearer in chapter V when I will justify my decision.

⁶⁰ Rosenau, 1966: 135-136.

⁶¹ Rosenau, 1966: 137.

3.0 Research Design

The first objective of this study is to explain U.S. foreign policy behavior vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the pipeline embargo. The sanctions were intended to be an American punishment for the role the Soviet Union played in the imposition of martial law in Poland and prevent a European-Soviet rapprochement. The *time frame* of this analysis is clearly defined: it covers a period of almost a year taking as the starting point December 29, 1981, when the Reagan Administration in retaliation for the imposition of martial law in Poland imposed a first round of sanctions against the Soviet Union. On June 22, 1982, Reagan declared new economic sanctions to protest the unchanged situation in Poland. A third point within this time frame is marked by Reagan's announcement on November 13 to lift these sanctions. These three points in time distinguished from one another by the degree of severity of sanctions constitute the dependent variable. In analyzing the first major foreign policy crisis of the Republican Administration, it is worth noting that within a period of less than a year, U.S. foreign policy experienced a radical change without a corresponding change in the original motives. Thus, if the "real world" situation had not altered (if at all, it deteriorated), then other factors must explain this policy change.

3.1 *Societal Sources of Foreign Policy*

In the first chapter of this paper I have identified five concepts representing this category. Now, I would like to present my first concept and develop my ideas of how to use it in this research design.

3.1.1 **Mass Media Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy**

It is hypothesized that the mass media play an important role in the policy formation process in that they affect opinions and actions of decision-makers as well as those of the general public. The first problem to be solved in this context involves a choice as to which type of media to include in the verification/falsification process of this hypothesis. Numerous studies have specified media and audience related factors conditioning the agenda-setting process. Most of these studies which compare the agenda setting function of television, radio and the press generally come to the conclusion that newspapers are most influential in setting agendas.¹ Even if we limit our universe to printed sources, the researcher still has to face the difficulty of arriving at a representative sample of newspapers. I selected *The New York Times* and the *Washington Post* for two reasons:

- First, these two newspapers are among the top eight newspapers in terms of their daily circulation.²

¹ Tipton et al., 1975: 15-22; Benton & Frazier, 1976: 261-274; McClure & Patterson, 1976: 23-28; McCombs, 1977: 89-105; Weaver, 1977: 107-119; William & Larsen, 1977: 744-749.

² According to the latest available weekday figures of the Audit Bureau of Circulation (September 30, 1983

- Secondly, both newspapers are well known for their extensive coverage of foreign policy issues. As a matter of fact, most government officials working in the State Department use one of the two newspapers as their primary source of information in so far as foreign political developments are concerned.³

Thus, the goal of this part of the analysis will be to see how these two newspapers' coverage of the events surrounding the Polish crisis and the Soviet pipeline embargo affect subsequent changes in the foreign policy behavior of the United States. In *operationalizing* my concept: Influence of the Mass Media, my variable will be the degree of positive evaluation of the Reagan administration's foreign policy actions directed to Poland and the Soviet Union as measured by the percentage of all editorials on the subject that were positive in these two newspapers.⁴ In plotting out the results on a monthly basis from December 30, the moment when the U.S. sanctions were imposed in retaliation for the imposition of martial law in Poland through November 13, the day when the Reagan Administration decided to lift these sanctions, I hope to come up with some insights as to how far the variations observed in the news coverage accounts for variation in the dependent variable.

FAS-FAX [ABC Research]), the *New York Times* is ranked sixth with 910.538 and the *Washington Post* eight with 718.842 copies.

³ The most apparent way in which the press enters the policy-maker's world is by means of the daily newspaper. And the single most important newspaper is, of course, the *New York Times*. It is read by virtually everyone in the government who has an interest or responsibility in foreign affairs... One frequently runs across the familiar story: "It is often said that Foreign Service officers get to their desks early in the morning to read the *New York Times*, so that they can brief their bosses on what is going on." This canard is easily buried: there "bosses" are there early, too, reading the *New York Times* for themselves... The *Times* is uniformly regarded as the authoritative paper in the foreign policy field. In the words of a State Department official in the public affairs field: "You can't work in the State Department without the *New York Times*. You can get along without the overnight telegram sooner." (Cohen, 1961: 220-21 cited in Kegley, 1982: 307).

⁴ This indicator, of course, measures only the *direction* of influence, but not the *actual* influence, since we do not know if the general public and policy makers read/are influenced by these editorials.

3.1.2 Public Opinion

Assuming that, in a democracy, decision-makers are sensitive to public evaluations, one would expect to find a correlation between the degree of public approval/disapproval and changes in foreign policy. Given the nature of the democratic system it is reasonable to assume that the more negatively foreign policy actions are perceived by the general public the more likely it is that decision-makers will feel the need to make corrective changes in their actions. In *measuring* public opinion I utilize two of the most prominent public opinion polls, the *Harris Poll* and the *Gallup Poll*. All survey items designed to elicit public evaluations of the Reagan Administration's performance of foreign policy in general and its performance with regard to the pipeline sanctions in particular will serve as instruments for obtaining a sound indicator. By plotting the public's approval/disapproval of the pipeline policy public consent on a monthly basis, I hypothesize that the resulting curve will find reflect changes in U.S. foreign policy.

3.1.3 Presidential Popularity

Closely related to this last category is the concept of presidential popularity. Every president since Roosevelt (modern public opinion research started in 1935 when both the Gallup Poll and the Fortune Poll came into existence) has been sensitive to his standing in public assessment. Given, that the President, as head of the Executive, can be expected to have a decisive influence on U.S. foreign policy, one might advance the following hypothesis:

"The lower presidential popularity, the more likely the President feels the need to engage in new policy initiatives to reverse the trend."

Another hypothesis distinguishes between two presidencies - one oriented to domestic and one to foreign policy.⁵ According to this perspective:

"The lower the rankings of presidential popularity with regard to his handling of domestic issues (economy, social welfare etc.) the more the President exercises initiatives in the foreign policy arena."

This is the case because the general public is less knowledgeable about foreign policy issues and therefore successes in the foreign policy arena can make up for failures and set backs at home. Thus, in this section I am trying to find out to what extent President Reagan's decision to lift the sanctions was correlated with domestic policy failures and his popularity rankings.

3.1.4 The Electoral Cycle

Another concept which I summarized under societal sources of foreign policy and which is hypothesized to have an impact on the decision of the Reagan Administration to lift the economic sanctions against the Soviet Union and Poland is the influence of the electoral cycle. In this part I am testing Quandt's findings that the electoral cycle has a negative impact on the foreign policy performance of all American administrations. Quandt maintains that especially the midterm elections in the second year of each presidency necessitate popular policies to minimize the losses for the incumbent's party. Thus, I hypothesize that Reagan's decision to abandon the foreign policy posture of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was caused

⁵ Wildavsky, 1966: 7-14; and Cronin, 1980.

- by intense congressional pressure on the part of his Republican party colleagues in Congress, and
- by his own insight that he had to reverse his stance in this matter to prevent an erosion of his congressional support basis for future initiatives.

3.1.5 Interest Group/Ethnic Influence

The last variable representing the societal source category is labeled degree of interest/ethnic influence. This influence is particularly difficult to evaluate since most activities of interest groups occur through informal channels. Again, it is difficult to measure empirically the relative influence of opposing interest groups on decision-makers. However, it is possible to present a listing of pro/con interest/ethnic groups and an evaluation of their relative capabilities in terms of

1. their access to decision makers,
2. their organizational structures and financial resources, and
3. their membership strength.

will enable me then to infer the balance of influences on policy makers from this assessment of the relative strength of potentially contending forces.

3.2 *Idiosyncratic Sources*

In the previous literature review I hypothesized that personal characteristics like personality traits and beliefs have a decisive impact on how an individual decision-maker reacts to an external situation. In other words, we have to find out in how far Reagan's perception of the Polish crisis is congruent with his subsequent decision to lift the sanctions against the Soviet Union. The analysis is particularly interesting due to two circumstances. First, Ronald Reagan, in the eyes of many political observers, is the most conservative and ideological president in recent history; thus, we would expect a very strong correlation between his beliefs and actions. Second, the Polish crisis constituted the first major policy challenge for the Reagan Administration and was one which pitted the U.S. against the Soviet Union. Therefore, it provided Reagan with an opportunity to act in accord with his belief system.

The objective of this analysis is to establish a link between Reagan's beliefs and the foreign policy behavior of the United States. However, there can be no question of establishing a direct one-to-one link between individual beliefs and actions. Present day research methods are just not sophisticated enough to do this. But at least I will determine the range of possible actions which might flow from Reagan's belief system. In the words of Alexander George:

Beliefs of this kind serve as a prism that influence the actor's perception and that provide norms and standards to guide and channel his choices of actions in specific situations. The function... then is to provide this actor with "diagnostic propensities" and "choice propensities". Neither his diagnosis of situations nor his choice of action for dealing with them is rigidly prescribed and determined by these beliefs.⁶

⁶ George, 1980: 45.

3.2.1 The Determination of Beliefs - Some Methodological Concerns

The only practical way to find out about a person's belief system is to analyze what this person says. *However*, every researcher doing content analysis has to face the dual problem of access and inference.

3.2.1.1 *The Problem of Access*

In selecting the data for the analysis, three major sources of information are at one's disposal:

- private statements and discussions,
- official public statements (speeches, press conferences etc.), and
- operational statements (White House transcripts, memoranda etc.)

Obviously, the first source is not accessible, since private conversations and discussion between Reagan and his foreign policy advisors are unable for public consumption at this time. Operational statements are also not accessible due to the fact that White House transcripts of the Reagan Administration have so far not been disclosed. This leaves official public statements as only available source of information.

3.2.1.2 *The Problem of Inference*

Content analysis always may run into the problem that statements often may be “political” or “ideological,” thus not reflecting original elements of the speaker’s belief system. Rosati recognized this problem:

There has been a continuous debate regarding whether most communications are “representative” of an actor’s beliefs or whether they are purely manufactured and “instrumental” for the purpose of a specific audience.⁷

In the framework of this research design I hope to deal with these problems by only including the most significant and broad-gauged speeches thereby excluding those “instrumental elements.” A universe of 10 speeches dealing with the Polish crisis and the Soviet pipeline embargo will be analyzed. The text of these speeches are included in the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*. This publication is a valid indicator of Reagan’s belief system because it contains speeches which fulfill the two criteria mentioned above. By looking at those speeches over this one-year period, we should be able to discern whether there is a discrepancy between Reagan’s stated beliefs and public actions or whether his actions were consistent with his stated beliefs.

3.3 *Governmental Sources of Foreign Policy*

3.3.1 **Evaluating Congressional Influence**

⁷ Rosati, 1984: 163.

Based on research by Theodore Lowi⁸ and Huntington,⁹ Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin¹⁰ distinguish between three categories of foreign and defense policy which correspond to different levels of congressional involvement in the foreign policy decision-making process.

The least degree of congressional involvement occurs in what Theodore Lowi¹¹ labeled *crisis policy*. During times of crises (crises being defined as situations which pose a potential threat to the national security interests of the U.S.) the decisional locus is exclusively rested in top executive circles without much congressional involvement or consultation prior to the foreign policy action. Congress is thus reduced to legitimizing or opposing presidential actions which have already taken place.

The highest degree of congressional involvement occurs in *structural policies*, which Ripley/Franklin define the following way: "Structural policies and programs aim primarily at procuring, deploying, and organizing military personnel and material, presumably within the confines and guidelines of previously determined strategic decisions."¹²

Structural policies are characterized by a low level of conflict as all parties involved - whether Pentagon officials, private defense contractors, or members of Congress whose constituents directly benefit from contracts- cooperate in the distribution of considerable sums to procure military hardware. However, the influence of Congress as a macro-level unit is reduced to perfunctory ratifications of decisions agreed upon on the subcommittee-executive bureau level. These decisions are then presented to the floor which ratifies them without many discussions and amendments.

⁸ Lowi, 1967.

⁹ Huntington, 1961.

¹⁰ Ripley and Franklin, 1987.

¹¹ Lowi, 1967: 324-325.

¹² Ripley and Franklin, 1987: 27.

Finally, the last category of foreign policy - strategic policies, are defined by Ripley and Franklin as "policies and programs designed to assert and implement the basic military and foreign policy stance of the United States toward other nations."¹³ This type of policy differs from structural policies in that the locus of decision shifts from the micro to the macro level. Though subcommittees still vote on bills and pass recommendations to the floor, these decisions have no finality. And while structural policies are characterized by a high degree of agreement between the executive and legislative branch, strategic decisions are often the outcome of deep controversies, especially if these strategic decisions are linked to the domestic domain. As the interests of large parts of the electorate become involved (especially in economic issues), Congress has the potential for developing positions significantly different from those of the administration.

This case study clearly belongs to the last category. The issues revolve around strategic considerations of East-West political and economic relations. Since East-West trade relations frequently also have repercussions on the domestic arena we would expect to find a high degree of congressional influence. Evaluating this influence on U.S. foreign policy in our specific case study is equivalent to analyzing the extent to which congressional pressures convinced the Reagan Administration of the necessity to review governmental policy with respect to Poland and the Soviet Union and declare an end of the Soviet pipeline sanctions. Methodologically, we run into the problem of measuring congressional influence due to the fact that influence and pressures on the Executive branch are often exerted through back door channels by means of informal meetings between the members of the two branches. The analysis can either focus on

1. the individual Congressman who intervenes on behalf of his constituents by addressing members of the Administration asking them to support their request [the

¹³ Ripley and Franklin, 1987: 27.

units of analysis here are personnel letters or memoranda] or by sponsoring a bill aiming at changing the status quo in their favor, or

2. on collective actions on the part of the legislative branch. Here, we are interested in the activities of subcommittees, committees and decisions on the floor. Again, due to the decentralized structure of Congress, it is extremely difficult to locate centers of influence. This situation has been aggravated by the congressional reforms in the 1970s which deprived former influential committee chairmen of their power and enhanced the influence of the House and Senate subcommittees. To find out about the intentions and actions of committee members, we have to concentrate on records of congressional hearings, investigations, oversight sessions, and discussions of bills. A most useful source in this regard is the *Congressional Record* which keeps track of all observable actions and opinions of Congressmen.

In order to find answers to the above stated question the following propositions are advanced:

- I hypothesize that Congress is especially influential in foreign politics if a foreign policy decision by the Administration has repercussions on the domestic arena since at that moment the parochial interests of those representatives being affected by this decision become more important than the national interest. Congressional opposition will become particularly strong if the foreign policy decision threatens the constituent bases of Congressmen who then fight with all means to save their political careers.

In testing this proposition, I will have to identify those congressmen whose constituencies were most seriously affected by the pipeline sanctions. Tracing their pub-

lic statements (e.g. letters and memoranda to the President and other important Administration officials) and activities (e.g. voting behavior in bills relevant to the subject matter) will enable me to test this hypothesis.

- No president can afford to alienate the House and Senate completely and certainly no president can afford to ignore his own party if the overwhelming majority of its members has a different evaluation of the situation than the Chief Executive. Therefore, Congress will be more influential [can exert more pressure] vis-a-vis the Executive if both parties can agree upon a bipartisan position in a foreign policy matter. It will be interesting to see how many republicans joined their democratic colleagues and how this affected the decision outcome.?

Utilizing the *Congressional Record* and performing a roll call analysis of relevant bills will help me to evaluate this degree of bipartisan support/opposition for the administration with regard to the pipeline sanctions against the Soviet Union.

Though, it is difficult to identify the power and influence structure in Congress, there are nevertheless certain congressmen who, by virtue of their personality and positions within Congress, have an important impact on the framing of decisions. In the foreign policy arena I maintain that the Chairmen of the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, ranking minority members of these committees, as well as the majority/minority leaders in both houses belong to this category. They are the people most likely to be contacted by any administration in pursuit of congressional support for their policies. By analyzing their statements and tracing their activities, we can evaluate the degree of congressional influence.

3.3.2 Evaluating the Impact of Bureaucratic Fragmentation

I hypothesize that the fragmentation of the executive branch into a multitude of different government agencies contributes to the type of inconsistent foreign policy displayed in the case study of the pipeline sanctions. The embargo provides a useful example of how various executive agencies, with often overlapping jurisdictions and conflicting foreign policy objectives, compete with each other to shape U.S. foreign policy according to their specific preferences.

When Reagan, under authorities granted by the Export Administration Act of 1979, announced the sanctions, several agencies claimed responsibility for administering the embargo. The Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury, and Defense cited respectively strategic considerations, trade interests, financial involvements, and national security interests as underlying rationales for becoming active under the EAA. The analysis focuses therefore on the results of inter-agency competition for American foreign policy performance. A most useful source of information in this respect is Alexander Haig's autobiography. It is understood that this book was published after Haig had resigned as Secretary of State in the wake of the economic summit in Versailles and the subsequent decision of President Reagan to enforce the extraterritorial application of the sanctions on the European allies. Nevertheless, his account provides valuable insights as to the interaction and competition between the different agencies and its impact on U.S. foreign policy behavior.

3.4 External Sources of Foreign Policy

It is widely accepted among scholars that characteristics of the external environment shape U.S. foreign policy. Therefore I hypothesize that President Reagan's decision on November 13, 1982, to lift the sanctions, was made under the significant impact of external pressures. This external pressure emanated especially from America's European partners, whose political, economic, and judicial interests were strongly affected by the administration's foreign policy initiative. Thus, the problem will be evaluating, to which degree public statements by European leaders and foreign policy actions directed against the United States on the part of West Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain represented pressures to which Reagan finally caved in. Given the changing external environment I would argue that the Reagan Administration, more than any American postwar administration, was forced to be sensitive to the contours of European opinions and demands, which eventually pushed Reagan to reconsider his decision.

4.0 Analysis

4.1 *Congress as Foreign Policy Maker*

On December 30, 1981, and June 22, 1982, under authorities granted by the Export Administration Act¹ of 1979, the President imposed export restrictions on oil and gas transmission, refining and related equipment and technology destined for the Soviet Union from U.S. firms, their foreign subsidiaries and their foreign licenses and suspended considerations of all license applications for exports to the Soviet Union in retaliation for its role in the Polish crisis.

These decisions encountered stiff resistance from Congress. Congressmen from heavily affected central Illinois became especially active in attempting to influence the President to reverse his position. In various letters to different members of the executive

¹ The origins of this Act go back to 1949 when Congress passed the so called *Export Control Act* of 1949 designed primarily to control the export of commodities with military significance to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. This Act vested the President with the power to restrict or prohibit exports if national security, foreign policy objectives or the preservation of materials in short supply were involved. On January 1, 1970, the 1949 act was replaced by the *Export Administration Act* which was subsequently amended in 1979 and 1981. Finally, on June 12, 1985, President Reagan signed the Export Administration Act Amendments of 1985.

branch, Congressman Paul Findley from the 20th district of Illinois tried to convince administration officials that the sanctions were counterproductive. In a letter to the President, dated December 29, 1981, the very same day President Reagan implemented his policy of sanctions, Congressman Findley warned Reagan about repercussions on the domestic economy, pointing out that unilateral sanctions [citing the failure of the grain embargo as an example] had always produced counterproductive effects.² In similar initiatives, Findley, along with the two senators of Illinois, Republican Charles H. Percy and Democrat Alan J. Dixon, expressed their concern to Secretary of State Alexander Haig. Representing the state of Illinois, where two companies, Fiat Allis North America Inc. (the largest private sector employer in Springfield with 6300 people employed) and Caterpillar, were especially hurt by the embargo, these Congressmen pressed the Secretary of State to discuss their matter with the President.³ On March 2, Congressman Findley addressed the Undersecretary of Security, Assistance, Science and Technology James Buckley.⁴ In pointing out the devastating impact of the sanctions for his district, he urged the Undersecretary (in anticipation of his trip to Europe in which he would discuss the sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union) to represent Illinois' interest which Findley believed to be identical with the interests of the Western Allies.

On March 17, 1982, virtually the entire Illinois delegation, in a letter to the President, asked him to review his stance in this matter and accused him of being responsible for the export "of several thousand badly needed jobs in Springfield and Peoria to

² Findley, Paul. 1981. Letter of Congressman Findley to the President on December 29, 1981, published in *Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 6838*, App. III, p. 174.

³ Percy, Charles, Alan Dixon and Paul Findley. 1982. Letter of these three Illinois Representatives to Secretary of State Alexander Haig on January 29, 1982, published in *Hearings and Markups before the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 6838*, App. III, p. 177-178.

⁴ Findley, Paul. 1982. Letter of Congressman Findley to Undersecretary of Security, Assistance, Science and Technology on March 2, 1982, published in *Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 6838*, App. III, p. 174.

Japan,"⁵ thereby exacerbating an already critical situation in Illinois industrial employment.

Besides these *individual-level* attempts to influence the Reagan Administration's foreign policy behavior, the legislative branch started to act in this matter. Congressmen Corcoran and Findley on July 22, four weeks after Reagan had announced the extraterritorial application of U.S. export controls, introduced H.R. 6073. This bill was designed to amend the Export Administration Act in a way to prevent the Administration from imposing an embargo unless the President had declared war or a national emergency and to lift the sanctions Reagan had issued to punish the Soviets for the ongoing repression in Poland. The implication of this became clearer in a session of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade. During the hearing, a member of the subcommittee, Congressman Dymally, asked his colleague from Illinois:

In that amendment referring to the national emergency, what are the possibilities of having Congress give approval for these sanctions before they are executed?

Congressman Findley responded:

Well, in effect, that is the purpose of H.R. 6073. It would require the Congress to pass judgement either through war declaration or the declaration of a national emergency before they could be effective.⁶

H.R. 6073 was aimed at curbing the President's rights granted to him under the "old" Export Administration Act to use economic sanctions as a tool to shape foreign policy and simultaneously enhancing Congress' role in formulating and carrying out foreign policy in this field. This point found further consideration when the bill was approved by the Subcommittee with a 5-2 vote and turned over to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on August 10, 1982.

⁵ Letter of the Illinois delegation in Congress to President Reagan on March 17, 1982, published in *Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 6838, App. III, p. 186-187.*

⁶ Cited in *Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 6838, p. 54.*

The Committee on Foreign Affairs "in an unusually bold demonstration of its willingness to challenge the president on foreign policy,"⁷ on August 10 ordered it reported favorably to the House by a vote of 22-12. The Committee, by examining the role of the President in invoking the EAA of 1979 judged that none of the criteria in the Act justified the actions taken by the Chief Executive. Section 2405(b) of the EAA provides that when imposing, expanding, or extending export controls under this section, the President shall consider

1. the probability that such controls will achieve the intended foreign policy purpose, in light of other factors, including the availability from other countries of the goods or technology proposed for such control;
2. the compatibility of the proposed controls with the foreign policy objectives of the United States, including the effort to counter international terrorism, and with overall United States policy toward the country which is the proposed target of the controls;
3. the reaction of other countries to the imposition or expansion of such controls by the United States;
4. the likely effects of the proposed controls on the export performance of the United States, on the competitive position of the United States in the international economy, on the international reputation of the United States as a supplier of goods and technology, and on individual United States companies and their employees and communities, including the effects of the controls on existing contracts;

⁷ Felton, 1982: 1961.

5. the ability of the United States to enforce the proposed controls effectively;
6. the foreign policy consequence of not imposing controls.⁸

Especially the "extraterritorial application" of these regulations to European firms was a very contentious aspect of the sanctions and most Committee members argued that these "extraterritorial controls" exceeded the authorities granted by the EAA to the President.

After having completed their critical oversight of the President's actions the Committee on Foreign Affairs passed the vote by a margin of 22-12 thereby underlining Congress' claim to reestablish legislative-executive relations in this issue with emphasis on enhanced congressional oversight needs. It is important, however, to realize that there were other members who had different views about Congress' role in Foreign Politics in general and in this matter in particular. In a separate statement issued along with the majority decision of the full committee, a minority group of 8 Congressmen declared:

It is the view of the Minority who oppose the legislation that it is a grave error to be legislating day-to-day foreign policy. It's bad policy and especially bad timing. The passage of the bill would not correct a policy some people disapprove of. It could only be viewed as an attempt to undermine the President's legitimate role in formulating and carrying out the foreign policy of this nation...The final result of House consideration of H.R. 6838 is that this is an embarrassing display of disunity in implementing U.S. foreign policy, a slap at the President and an exercise in futility."⁹

On September 29, 1982, finally this bill was sent to the floor. Interestingly enough, the leader of the Republican minority in the House of Representatives, Congressman Robert Michel from the 18th district of Illinois, called up H.R. 6838 to amend the EAA of 1979 to terminate the export controls imposed on December 30, 1981, and June 22,

⁸ 50 U.S.C. App. Section 2405(b) (Supp. V 1981).

⁹ House of Representative Report, No. 97-762, Second session, p. 1.

1982. After a very controversial debate on the floor Michel's bill was defeated by a vote of 206 to 203.¹⁰

4.1.1 Analysis of the Roll Call Vote

In order to evaluate congressional pressure on the President it is useful to concentrate on the voting behavior of those key Representatives who have most influence in the framing of foreign policy decisions. In the House of Representatives, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Democrat Clement J. Zablocki from Wisconsin as well as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Democrat Lee H. Hamilton from Indiana united with the Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Democrat Jonathan B. Bingham from New York, the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, Democrat Jamie Whitten from Mississippi and the Republican House Minority Leader from Illinois, Robert Michel, to favor this bill. Although the Senate did not vote on this issue, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Republican Charles H. Percy from Illinois as well as Republican Senator Dole, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee clearly opposed the sanctions imposed by the Reagan Administration.¹¹ Proceeding now to an aggregate-level analysis the following points stand out: 206 Representatives supported the Administration whereas 203 did not. Out of these 203 votes, 57 came from Republicans. More than one third (36%) of Reagan's party colleagues abandoned the President on this crucial foreign policy issue. As pointed out earlier, the overwhelming

¹⁰ These numbers can be found in the *Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 97th Congress*, Vol. 128, No. 132.

¹¹ Three days after Reagan finally had lifted the sanctions, Senator Dole on a U.S.-Soviet trade conference in Moscow said flatly that he opposed trade sanction for foreign policy purposes unless bilateral relations are curtailed across the board. This fact is stated in *Congressional Quarterly*, 1982, p. 2882.

majority of the Committee on Foreign Relations voted against Reagan. Another interesting statistic can be derived from the so called Farm Belt Vote. The following votes [Indiana 9:1, Illinois 16:7, Iowa 6:0, Nebraska 1:2, Kansas 4:1, Wisconsin 6:3, Minnesota 8:0] indicate why "the sanction issue was particularly difficult for House Republicans, many of whom had to choose between supporting their president and voting for a measure that seemed to promise the restoration of jobs for Americans."¹² Combining the above listed numbers to an aggregate figure, it turns out that 50 Representatives were against the sanctions, while only 14 Representatives endorsed them. The Representatives of the Farm Belt States were especially sensitive and sympathized with their colleagues from Illinois, since they had experienced the same problems in 1980, when President Carter in response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan imposed a total grain embargo thereby destroying the jobs of thousands of farmers in the Farm Belt. As these states are traditionally pro-Republican, their impact should not be underestimated.

4.1.2 Results

To what degree are the above listed facts relevant to my research question and, more specifically, to the two hypotheses which are designed to evaluate congressional influence on the foreign policy process?

My first hypothesis stated that Congress will be more influential if a foreign policy decision by the Administration has repercussions on the domestic arena since at this moment the parochial interests of Congressmen come into play. These parochial interests are naturally stronger in the House than in the Senate since the 2-year electoral cy-

¹² Felton, 1982: 2467.

cle make Representatives much more sensitive to the needs and wishes of their constituents. Especially for the Illinois delegation in Congress, the stakes were high in view of the upcoming congressional elections of November. The Republican House Minority leader, Robert Michel, in opening the one-hour debate on the floor told his colleagues:

I have to say, frankly, that it is a matter of parochial interest for me.¹³

Clement J. Zablocki, D-Wis., Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee expressed the same concern:

It is the height of hypocrisy for the president to extend the grain agreement at the same time he is toughening other economic sanctions. Where is the equity? Why should Caterpillar Tractor, which has a factory in my district, sacrifice and not the grain farmer?¹⁴

That Reagan responded to this congressional pressure can be derived from the fact that Reagan engaged extensively in the election campaigns of his threatened party colleagues.

The second hypothesis contained two components; the first maintained that Congress will have greater influence if it can agree upon a bipartisan position in a foreign policy matter; the second emphasized the importance of key Representatives who lead Congress in important foreign policy issues. Though the term bipartisan opposition in the Soviet Pipeline sanctions is certainly exaggerated, it is still remarkable that more than one third of Republican representatives joined a great majority of Democrats to challenge the Administration in this issue. Even if the bill was defeated the close outcome of the vote was a slap for Reagan. All the more as almost all key Representatives [at least those which had an important say in the framing of foreign policy decision] deserted the Chief Executive on this issue. No President, not even one so popular as the former Governor of California, can afford to alienate the congressional elite. That the congressional effort to bring about an end of the pipeline sanctions failed at all, must

¹³ Cited in the Congressional Record of the 95th Congress, second session, Vol. 128, No. 132, H 7915.

¹⁴ Cited in the *Congressional Quarterly*, Aug. 14, 1982, p. 1961.

be attributed to the unfortunate timing of its discussion on the floor. Secretary of State George Shultz was, at the very same time, at the United Nations discussing the sanctions, Poland, and other issues with NATO foreign ministers. The Democratic Speaker of the House, Tip O'Neill, contacted by Shultz, managed to convince his colleagues that the Administration was trying to resolve the problems connected with the embargo and that therefore the legislative branch should not stab the Administration in the back.¹⁵

4.1.3 Further steps by Congress

Though, the first attempt of Congress to curb the President's power under the EAA failed, it put him under considerable pressure to lift the sanctions; Reagan must have felt that this issue was of primary concern especially for the House since trade unions and business exerted considerable pressure on their Representatives in this matter. It is very interesting to follow up congressional action concerning the EAA which was triggered by Reagan's application of this act in the Poland crisis. Even after Reagan under strong internal pressure lifted the sanctions on November 13, congressional leaders were debating the wisdom of using trade as a foreign policy tool: Representative Don Bonker, D-Washington, influential expert in trade matters and member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, said that the Soviet sanctions experience "may prod Congress to pass legislation protecting businesses against the continuing threat of trade sanctions."¹⁶

It took Congress until June 12, 1985, to fulfill this prophecy due to deadlocks in the congressional decision making process. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs envisioned strong congressional control over the implementation of this Act by using their

¹⁵ "USA: Das Ende des Embargos" in *der Spiegel*, Nr.47/1987, p. 149-150.

¹⁶ Cited in the *Congressional Quarterly*, Nov. 20, 1982, p. 2882.

power of the purse and proposing authorization of funds on a yearly basis to give the legislative branch a chance to annually overview the Executive. Moreover it looked for stronger control by proposing that Congress should have the right to use the strongest congressional control device, the *legislative veto* to approve continuation of an embargo, sixty days after the President invoked it.¹⁷ The Senate (particularly Senator Jake Garn, R-Utah, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, who had long been a leading proponent of using trade policy to apply pressure on the Soviet Union) rather focused on the national security issue and the important function of trade sanctions in the pursuit of foreign policy goals. Finally on July 12, 1985 Congress passed the new Export Administration Act.¹⁸

In what way does the new act enhance congressional oversight over foreign policy? Dean L. Overman¹⁹ lists a number of substantial modifications to prior law concerning these export controls for foreign policy reasons.

1. Past administration have often imposed foreign policy controls with little or no consultation with Congress, U.S. industry or our COCOM allies. Section 108 of the new act attempts to curb the President's power to impose such controls on a unilateral basis.²⁰ In section 108(b) it is stated that the President may impose foreign policy controls only if he finds that the controls meet the criteria set forth in this section. Under prior law, the President was required only to consider such criteria, but could and often did ignore such criteria.

¹⁷ House Reports No.257, First 98th Congress, first session 1983.

¹⁸ The Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Public Law No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (1985) (sometimes cited as the Export Administration Act of Reauthorization) (to be codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. app)).

¹⁹ Overman, 1985: 325-390.

²⁰ See New Act, Section 108 (amending section 6(a) of the old EAA), to be codified at 50 U.S.C. App. Section 2405(a).

2. The new act prohibits the President from imposing, extending or expanding foreign policy export controls without prior consultation with Congress and requires that the President submits a report containing the purpose and statutory basis for the controls as well as prior or planned consultation with U.S. industry and foreign nations (Congress never had a formal role in imposing the pipeline sanctions and congressional unhappiness was further fueled by the Reagan administration's failure to submit a required report on the June 22 sanctions).
3. In so far as the issue of contract sanctity is concerned, it attempts to alleviate the past problems by limiting the president's power to nullify existing contracts.

These are the most important features of the new EAA. In evaluating Congress influence on Reagan's foreign policy decision to lift the economic sanctions imposed against the Soviet Union, all evidence suggests that Congress did indeed play an important role. It is certainly not too much to assume that Reagan faced with the option to lift the sanctions or not chose not to openly confront Congress and especially the Republican party leaders on whom he was dependent to pass other important legislation. Another point which must lead to the conclusion that Reagan must have noticed the opposing stance of Congress is his willingness to campaign for those Congressmen who were afraid of the impact of these sanctions on their reelection chances. Democrats on the other hand accused Reagan of lifting the sanctions because of partisan reasons. Charles T. Manatt, the chairman of the Democratic National Committee accused Reagan of making a major effort to end the pipeline sanctions shortly before the elections by saying that "the delicate matters affecting the employment of thousands of American citizens should not be used for partisan purposes."²¹

²¹ *New York Times*, October 30, 1982, 1: 6.

4.2 The Impact of Bureaucratic Fragmentation

In December 29, 1981, Reagan, under authorities granted by the Export Administration Act, imposed economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. Prior to this decision, intense struggles within the administration had taken place as several government agencies including the Departments of Commerce, Defense, State, and the Customs Service share responsibilities in administering export controls.

The Commerce Department plays the leading role within the administration, for a potential exporter must file an export license application with it. It then conducts an examination of the license application and sends it to the State Department if the application is subject to foreign policy controls. The Department of Defense being responsible for the review of critical military technology, bears primary responsibility for the export of dual items to the Eastern Bloc.

All of these departments are supposed to coordinate their actions to establish a coherent foreign export policy. However, with regard to the Soviet pipeline sanctions, all three of them had widely differing opinions. The strongest supporter for the embargo was certainly the Department of Defense under Caspar Weinberger who strongly favored unfettered presidential discretion to impose foreign policy controls. The Pentagon argued that the United States should maintain opposition to the pipeline on grounds that this would squeeze Moscow financially, deny the Soviet hard currency earnings from natural gas sales which would permit the Soviet Union to purchase Western high technology to support its industrial base and military machine. It disapproved of any sanctity of contract clause arguing that national security concern ranked higher than the fulfillment of contracts. The Defense Department believed that even at the risk of al-

ienating the allies, the United States should proceed to order the European subsidiaries of American companies to abide by the sanction policy.

The State Department, on the other hand, tended to concur that foreign policy controls had to be applied in some cases but not to foreign-origin goods exported by a foreign subsidiary or a foreign company. Although Secretary of State Alexander Haig shared Weinberger's concern about increased European dependence on the Soviet Union and potential financial gains which would increase their military capabilities, he was afraid that pressures on the Europeans to cancel the pipeline might fracture the NATO alliance. Haig realized that the West Europeans were determined to go ahead with the pipeline project and that it was too late to coerce them into halting the project. The State Department proposed that the administration should abstain from the extraterritorial application of the embargo and rather settle for a future agreement with the Europeans on stiffer export controls for high-technology goods and a more restraint credit policy vis-a-vis the Eastern bloc.

In the beginning, the Commerce Department under Malcolm Baldrige took a middle position. But in the course of 1982, it started to align itself with the State Department after having come under strong attack from its business clientele which felt that the Commerce Department neglected its traditional role of promoting American trade interests in the international environment.

Both decisions, the initial December 29 embargo as well as the June 18 extension of the sanctions, were the result of intense struggles within the National Security Council. Alexander Haig, in his autobiography *Caveat*, gives an account of the ongoing fights between the department involved:

At meetings in the White House, the hard-liners spoke of draconian measures... Bush and Weinberger and their supporters urged tough talk to the Russians in private and the world in public... Sanctions

against the Soviet Union and the Jaruzelski, even a complete embargo by the West, were discussed.²²

But the Secretary of the Treasury Regan objected that the reimposition of the American grain embargo would cost the treasury at least \$3 billion in payments to farmers in compensation for taking 30 million tons of wheat off the market. And Secretary of State Haig warned that "if Defense has its way, we'll have the United States in a war scare and the Europeans off the bridges by Christmas."²³

In the beginning, Reagan went along with Haig, Regan and Baldrige and imposed relatively mild sanctions. Even the pipeline embargo was, according to Haig, not meant to be retroactive in the first place, requiring manufacturers to renege on existing contracts.

However, when the decision was applied by the Department of Commerce, one of its officials going beyond the letter and intent of the President's policy, interpreted it as being retroactive. Inexplicably, the administration accepted this bureaucratic fiat. This meant that equipment already contracted for, even equipment manufactured or in the process of being manufactured would not be licensed for export to the U.S.S.R..²⁴

This, then, is an example how the dispersion of responsibilities among different departments led American policy in another direction than originally planned. At first, Haig along with Regan and Baldrige managed to convince the President to postpone the extraterritorial application of the sanctions. However, this changed when at the economic summit in Versailles June 4-6, a deal authored by Haig failed, which would have ended American retroactive sanctions in exchange for a cooperative policy on the part of the Europeans to limit future government-backed credits to the Soviet Union. At a meeting of the NSC [Haig did not participate] the hard-liners around Weinberger managed to convince the President to extend the sanctions. Soon afterwards, a disappointed Alexander Haig along with his Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business

²² Haig, 1984: 251.


²³ Haig, 1984: 251.

²⁴ Haig, 1984: 254.

Affairs, Robert Homats resigned and George Shultz took over. The new Secretary of State, though less abrasive in style, was no less skeptical of the utility of sanctions. While trying to avoid a foreign policy defeat, Shultz, supported by the Treasury and Commerce Departments, convinced Reagan that his policy had gone astray and had done harm to U.S. foreign policy. This insight finally resulted in the lifting of the sanctions.

Thus, this review of the administration is a perfect example how a lack of executive branch unity constitutes a domestic constraint for U.S. foreign policy. Too many departments interfered in the decision-making process which resulted in inconsistencies and misunderstandings.

4.3 The President and the Pipeline Sanctions



By MacNelly for the Chicago Tribune

There is little doubt that Ronald Reagan is one of the most conservative and anti-Communist presidents in recent American history. But how did Reagan come to acquire these characteristics? To answer this question, one has to analyze how past experiences and events have contributed to shape the mind and beliefs of Ronald Reagan. Reagan has long taken an active interest in politics. Inheriting from his father a New Deal orientation, he at first held liberal views and belonged to the Democratic party. In 1947, Reagan became president of the Screen Actors Guild, a union that represented film performers. As union leader, Reagan for the first time plunged into politics; America, then, experienced a period of strong anti-Communist feelings and Reagan worked to remove suspected Communists from the movie industry.

That Ronald Reagan evolved into a hard-hitting, effective anti-Communist was confirmed in 1951 in testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities when actor Sterling Hayden confessed his involvement in the Communist plot. Testifying on Communist maneuvers to capture Hollywood, Hayden was asked what stopped them. His answer: We "ran into the Board of Directors of the SAG and particularly into Ronald Reagan, who was a one-man battalion."¹

During his five full terms as president of this organization, Reagan altered his ideology perceptibly and developed strong conservative and anti-Communist beliefs, which he would maintain for the rest of his political career. In 1954, Reagan received an offer to act as the principle spokesman for the General Electric Corporation. In this capacity, Reagan started to write his own speeches (his two principle themes being the danger of big government and, of course, the threat of Communist plots against America) and gradually transformed his public appearances into something that resembled a political campaign. In a speech, delivered to the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce in March, 1961, he spoke against the continuing menace of Communist infiltration:

Most people agree that the ideological struggle with Russia is the number one problem in the world. Millions of words are used almost daily to record the fluctuating temperature of the Cold War. And yet, many men in high places in government and many who mold public opinion in the press and on the airwaves subscribe to a theory that we are at peace, and we must make no overt move which

¹ Edwards, 1980: 54.

might endanger that peace. "Men cry peace, but there is no peace." The inescapable truth is that we are at war, and we are losing that war simply because we don't, or won't realize that we are in.²

In 1962, Reagan quit his job with GEC and joined the Republican party, where soon he became one of the favorite speakers of the conservative circuit. In 1964, he became cochairman of California Citizens for Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater. On October 27, 1964, Reagan managed to stage his political breakthrough. In his famous television speech entitled: "A Time for Choosing" which he began by warning that America faced in Communism "the most dangerous enemy ever known to man" he posed the global contest with the Soviet Union in dramatic terms:

We are at war with the most dangerous enemy that has ever faced mankind in his long climb from the swamps to the stars, and it has been said if we lose that war, and in doing so we lose this way of freedom of ours, history will record with the greatest astonishment that those who had the most to lose did the least to prevent its happening.³

Reagan throughout his career would maintain this strong anti-Communist stance:

Reagan's mind set never had changed from the early 1960's: The Soviet Union was the enemy.⁴

Reagan also was firmly convinced that the United States could only deal with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. This contrasted with the conviction of American presidents dating back at least to Richard Nixon in 1969, that the Cold War approach was outdated and that detente could best guarantee peace and freedom. Reagan, citing the outbreak of WWII as historic example, believed that this conviction was born not out of reality but out of political pathology at home, characterized by defeatism, pessimism and appeasement.

World War II came without provocation. It came because nations were weak, not strong in the face of aggression. The same lessons apply today. Firmness based on a strong defense capability is not provocative. But weakness can be provocative simply because it is tempting to a nation whose imperialist ambitions are virtually unlimited. We find ourselves increasingly in a position of dangerous isolation. Our allies are losing confidence and our adversaries no longer respect us.⁵

² Ronald Reagan in a speech *Encroaching Control: The Peril of Ever Expanding Government* at the annual meeting of the Phoenix (Arizona) Chamber of Commerce, March 30, 1961.

³ Ronald Reagan in *A Time for Choosing*, a National Television Address on October 27, 1964.

⁴ Evans and Novak, 1981: 159.

⁵ Smith, Hedrick et al, 1980: 100.

Reagan, later, would strongly accuse his predecessors Nixon, Ford, and Carter for their assumption that the American people were unable to bear the burden of outright competition with Moscow.

Throughout his presidential campaign in 1980, Reagan aware of the wide popular disenchantment of the American electorate with post-Vietnam diplomacy promised his followers to reverse Carter's soft diplomacy and "to get tough" with the Soviet Union. During the campaign he strongly accused Carter of misperceiving the Soviet threat and uttered resentment that America had retreated in face of Soviet aggression. In his acceptance speech of the Republican presidential election, Reagan pointed out:

Adversaries large and small test our will and seek to confound our resolve, but we are given weakness when we need strength, vacillation when the times demand firmness... Who does not feel growing sense of unease as our allies, facing repeated instances of an amateurish and confused administration, reluctantly conclude that America is unwilling or unable to fulfill its obligations as leaders of the free world? Who does not feel rising alarm when the question in any discussion of foreign policy is no longer: "Should we do something?" - but: "Do we have the capacity to do anything?"⁶

When the California Governor in January 1981 became the 40th president of the United States, many political observers thought that a new Cold War period was about to begin as they discovered that the newly elected incumbent evaluated most foreign policy crises from an East-West perspective.

The New President approaches the world with a basic philosophical outlook which is a throwback to the 1950s when American power was paramount and which may founder on the more complex realities of the 1980s. His is the bipolar world of the early Cold War. For Ronald Reagan, much more than for other recent American Presidents, the global power rivalry with Moscow not only animates his thinking about foreign affairs but to a great degree it is the prism through which he views the entire world.⁷

Russell J. Leng argues along the same lines. According to his opinion Reagan's beliefs about the nature of Soviet foreign policy are congruent with what Yergin once called the "Riga axiom". Thus, Reagan tends to see the Soviets as a "world revolutionary state,

⁶ Ronald Reagan in Presidential Nomination Acceptance Address to the Republican National Convention in Michigan, July 17, 1980.

⁷ Smith, Hendrick et al, 1980: 99.

denying the possibility of coexistence, committed to unrelenting ideological warfare, powered by a messianic drive for world mastery.”⁸

This short review of important events and speeches sets the stage for the execution of the research design. It is designed to find out to which extent Reagan’s decision to lift the sanctions against the Soviet Union was motivated by idiosyncratic characteristics of the President. The question to be asked, then, is whether Reagan’s perception of the Polish crisis was congruent with the November 13 decision. By giving a brief overview over all the speeches in the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* which contain references to the Soviet pipeline embargo I hope to provide an answer.

4.3.1 Summary of the speeches

In his first public statement following his decision to impose sanctions, the President made it clear that they were directed against the Soviet Union to counteract Soviet involvement in the ongoing repression in Poland. In a *December 29 statement* he maintained:

The Soviet Union bears a heavy and direct responsibility for the repression in Poland. For many months the Soviets publicly and privately demanded such a crackdown. They brought major pressures to bear through now public letters to the Polish leadership, military maneuvers, and other forms of intimidation. They now openly endorse the suppression which has ensued. I informed him [President Brezhnev] that, if the repression continued, the United States would have no choice but to take further concrete political and economic measures affecting our relationship.⁹

⁸ Yergin, 1977: 11.

⁹ “Soviet Involvement in Poland: Statement on U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union” in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 17, p. 1429.

On a press conference on *January 19, 1982*, Reagan admitted that the situation in Poland was deteriorating despite the sanctions.¹⁰ On *June 18, 1982*, he decided to impose new sanctions against the Eastern superpower to protest the unchanged status quo in Poland:

I have reviewed the sanctions on the export of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union imposed on December 30, 1981, and have decided to extend these sanctions through adoption of new regulations to include equipment produced by subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad under licenses issued by U.S. companies. The objective of the United States in imposing the sanctions has been and continues to be to advance reconciliation in Poland. Since December 30, 1981, little has changed concerning the situation in Poland; there has been no movement that would enable us to undertake positive, reciprocal measures. The decision taken today will, we believe, advance our objective of reconciliation in Poland.¹¹

And on a press conference on *June 30*, Reagan confronted with the opposing views of the European Allies [the British government that same day had taken steps to enable British companies to get around the U.S. embargo] and the dissenting view of his own Secretary of State [Haig had resigned on June 25] argued:

This is simply a matter of principle. We proposed that embargo back at the time, when the trouble began in Poland, as we believe firmly that the Soviet Union is the supporter of the trouble in Poland and is the one to deal with on that. And we said that these sanctions were imposed until - and we specified some things that we felt should be done to relax the oppression ... Now, if that is done we'll lift those sanctions. But I don't see any way that, in principle, we could back away from that, simply because the Soviet Union has sat there and done nothing.¹²

On *July 19*, during the Captive Nations Week, Reagan again sharply attacked the Soviet Union for its role in the suppression of the Polish people.¹³ On *July 28*, a week after the congressional bill aiming at lifting the sanctions was introduced and facing the united front of the European Allies against him, Reagan is asked whether he had second thoughts about the pipeline sanctions. While affirming his uncompromising stance in this matter he also specified the conditions under which he would review the sanctions: replacement of the Polish military government, release of the detainees and the reopen-

¹⁰ See the President's News Conference of January 19, 1982 in the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 18, p. 40.

¹¹ "Export of Oil and Gas Equipment to the Soviet Union: Statement on Extension of U.S. Sanctions", in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 18, p. 820.

¹² Ronald Reagan Answering Questions on a Press Conference on June 30. Cited in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 18, p. 854 - 855.

¹³ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 18, p. 918.

ing of the dialogue with the Solidarity movement.¹⁴ Reagan remained stern. In a message to Congress on *August 24*, two weeks after the House Foreign Committee had expressed its strong dissent with the Administration's policy, Reagan argued:

The objective of the United States in imposing the sanctions has been and continues to be to advance reconciliation in Poland....The decision taken to extend the sanctions will, I believe, advance our objectives of reconciliation in Poland.¹⁵

When on *October 9*, the Polish Government declared Solidarity illegal, Reagan in a Radio Address to the Nation responded by saying:

The Polish military leaders and their Soviet backers have shown that they will continue to trample upon the hopes and aspirations of the majority of the Polish people. America can not stand idly by in the face of these latest threats of repressions and acts of repression by the Polish Government.¹⁶

The first indication that Reagan might cave in to European and domestic pressures came on *October 18*. For the first time, Reagan suggested the possibility of lifting the sanctions:

Now, let me just say one thing, also, about the sanctions. We did not set out to have that as our principle thing that we could do to the Soviet Union to show our anger about what they are promoting in Poland. We sent representatives to Europe to talk to our allies about some other things that we believe could be more punishing to the Soviet Union than these sanctions. And we could not get agreement on those. We are trying again. If we can get a better set of restrictions other than the sanctions, we will be willing to lift those sanctions.¹⁷

Finally, on *November 13*, Reagan announced the end of the sanctions:

The United States imposed sanctions against the Soviet Union in order to demonstrate that their policies of oppression would entail substantial cost. Well, now that we have achieved an agreement with our allies which provides for stronger and more effective measures, there is no further need for those sanctions and I am lifting them today.¹⁸

¹⁴ The President's News Conference of July 28, 1982, published *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 18, p. 964.

¹⁵ Message to the Congress transmitted on Aug. 24, 1982, and published in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 18, p. 1059.

¹⁶ Reagan in a Radio Address to the Nation on October 9, 1982, transcribed into the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 18, p. 1289.

¹⁷ Reagan in a Remark-and-Answer Session via Satellite to 19 Republican Campaign Events, published in the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 18, p. 1343.

¹⁸ Reagan in a Radio Address to the Nation on November 18, 1982, published in the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 18, p. 1476.

4.4 Conclusions

This summary of the most important passages of these presidential speeches constitutes our universe. Those ten units of analysis are our only available sources to derive the content of Reagan's belief system with respect to the Soviet role in Poland. It is worth mentioning that the number of public references with regard to the Soviet Union increases dramatically after June 18 (the second point in my time frame), while the time span between them decreases as the President has to deal with increased domestic and foreign pressures. Between December 29 and June 18, there are basically only two public statements by the President with regard to the Soviet pipeline sanctions. In the succeeding four months this number increased to eight public statements. In analyzing now the content of these speeches, three reasons make me conclude that there is, indeed, a discrepancy between Reagan's beliefs and actions.

1. First, one underlying theme in all ten speeches is that Reagan held the Soviets accountable for the situation in Poland. The President, on numerous occasions, repeated that the sanctions were imposed to punish the Soviets for their role in the Polish crisis. On June 30 and July 28, he made it absolutely clear that the sanctions are "a matter of principle" and that he would not reconsider his decision, unless martial law in Poland was lifted and the dialogue with Solidarity restored.¹⁹ Clearly, the lifting of the sanctions can not be attributed to improvement in the situation in Poland which on November 19 did not differ significantly from the December 1981

¹⁹ This also seems to be the impression which Reagan conveyed. In a *New York Times* editorial of July 21, Evans/Novak write: "Nothing can shake Reagan's determination to punish Moscow until martial law ends in Poland and Solidarity leaders are freed."

situation. On the contrary, as I mentioned above, Reagan, in retaliation of the Polish government decree banning Solidarity, suspended indefinitely the U.S. most favored nation status; a measure which clearly contradicts the decision to lift the sanctions.

2. Secondly, Reagan's argument that by reaching a trade agreement with the European Allies to strengthen existing controls on the transfer of strategic items to the Soviet Union he simply replaced the sanctions by more effective measures, raises doubts. The European reaction tells a different story. Although supporting Reagan's decision to lift the sanctions, allied leaders maintained they had consented to study further limits on trade with the Soviet Union and had not committed themselves in advance to specific actions. When one day after Reagan had made his announcement, the French foreign ministry issued a statement containing the following message:

Progress has been made in these talks [East-West trade] but no definite conclusion have been reached and we consider it useful to continue the discussions... President Reagan's announcement is judged premature by this ministry.²⁰

it became clear that Reagan had tried to save face. This impression was reinforced when later French President Francois Mitterrand publicly refused to acknowledge that France was part to the agreement.

3. To many of Reagan's strongest supporters, the lifting of the sanctions came as an unpleasant surprise. Especially the New Right felt that by the time President Reagan had passed the midterm elections of 1982, it had become clear that there were limits to the ability of a revived conservatism to provide the basis for a comprehensive American foreign policy. Formerly enthusiastic supporters publicly ex-

²⁰ *New York Times*, Monday November 15, 1982, A10.

pressed their anger. Norman Podhoretz, in an article originally written for the *New York Times* but widely circulated by the Committee for a Free World, stated that many of the people who had initially been hopeful of Reagan's ability to reassert American power had sunk into a state of near total despair. Among criticisms concerning many international issues, Podhoretz was especially critical of the administration's general failure to respond forcefully to events in Poland.²¹ Jake Garn, R-Utah, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee (which has jurisdiction over the EAA) said that he was "disappointed" by the lifting of the sanctions. Senator Garn, a staunch conservative and one of Reagan's most loyal followers, long had been a leading proponent of using trade sanctions to apply pressure on the Soviet Union. While reproaching the Europeans for being "misguided, shortsighted and predominantly one-sided in favor of the Soviet Union" in their support for the pipeline, he also accused the President of having failed to send "a clear message to our allies of our serious concerns."²² Also members of Reagan's own administration, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle opposed any dilution of the sanctions.

4. Reagan's November 13 decision did not affect a companion series of sanctions that he imposed on December 29, 1981, to protest Soviet pressure on Poland. In imposing the initial sanctions, Reagan also suspended service to the United States by Aeroflot, imposed a series of controls on access to U.S. ports by all Soviet ships, postponed negotiations for a new U.S.-Soviet maritime agreement, and closed a Soviet Purchasing Commission office in New York.

²¹ Podhoretz, 1982: 30.

²² Congressional Quarterly, Nov. 20, 1982, p. 2883-2884

Lifting the most severe sanction and leaving the accompanying measures in place seems to be incoherent foreign policy and leads me to the conclusion that Reagan, against his personal conviction and under severe domestic and foreign pressure, had to abandon the most unpopular and damaging one, the pipeline sanctions. Thus, evidence seems to indicate that domestic politics and international events had constrained the capacity of the United States president to pursue his own independent policy.

Since on the one hand Reagan's perceptions of the Soviet Union have not changed [on March 28, 1983, he labels the Soviet Union an "evil empire"] over this one year period and since on the other hand the situation in Poland, which had triggered the President to impose the pipeline sanctions in the first place, had remained stable, we fail to establish a direct link between Reagan's belief system and the foreign policy behavior of the United States.

4.5 The Allies as Factor in U.S. Foreign Policy


On June 18, 1982, Reagan announced the toughening of sanctions against the Soviet Union by extending the December 29 ban on the sale of U.S. oil and gas equipment of U.S. corporations' foreign subsidiaries and European companies manufacturing under U.S. licenses.¹ This decision soon developed into a major touchstone for the Western alliance. After five months of hard fighting and negotiations, President Reagan caved in and on November 13, lifted the sanctions. In the succeeding analysis, the focus will be on two questions:

¹ The six foreign companies involved included two in France (Creusot Loire and Dresser France), two in West Germany (AEG Telefunken and the Mannesman Steel Group), one in Great Britain (John Brown Engineering Company), and one in Italy (the state-owned Nuovo Pignone).

1. How did the perspectives of Western Europe/Japan and the United States differ concerning the pipeline sanctions?
2. How did these differences translate into Allied pressure and why is it justified to maintain that President Reagan's decision to lift the sanctions was made under the impact of Allied this pressure?

4.5.1 Differences in Western European and U.S. Perspectives

4.5.1.1 *The Economic Aspect*



From the perspective of Western European countries, the gas deal was of vital importance to their economies; as the graphic² above suggests, Britain, France, Italy and West-Germany had secured 3.5 billion dollars in orders and thousands of jobs were at

² In *U.S. News & World Report*, Sept. 13, 1982, p. 28.

stake. Faced with rising unemployment and stagflation, the Europeans were most unwilling to give up on the gas deal. Allied leaders charged Reagan for being inconsistent in demanding that their economies should renounce on billions of dollars of equipment orders, while the United States continued to earn billions of dollars from selling grain to the Soviet Union. In the words of British Trade Minister Peter Rees: "We just feel that the burden is not being equally shared."³ Also, the Europeans were loath to jeopardize their standing as reliable partners by applying economic sanctions retroactively, that is renouncing existing contracts which in the case of the British company John Brown, for example, dated as far back as September 1981, or even risk Soviet claims for penalty payments.

Secondly, there were vast differences of views as to the desirability of increased Soviet energy production and expanded East-West energy ties. Europe imports approximately two-thirds of its energy needs whereas America imports just one-fifth of its energy requirements.⁴ Buying gas from the Soviets from an European perspective was considered a pragmatic way to diversify important energy resources and limit their high dependency on oil from the Middle East and Northern Africa. Given the U.S.S.R.'s relative proximity to Europe, the Soviet Union was welcomed as an acceptable if not desirable supplier. All the more, as traditionally trade links from a Western European standpoint have always served to moderate Soviet international behavior:

To the extent that the pipeline promotes greater interdependence between East and West and relaxes tensions, the West as well as the East benefits: historically periods of detente have produced far more extensive Soviet concessions in every area...than have periods of acrimonious confrontation.⁵

This aspect was especially of concern to West Germany. They, more than their European neighbors, saw the pipeline deal as one ingredient in the continuing policy of

³ *U.S. News & World Report*, Sept. 13, 1982, p. 29.

⁴ Johnston, 1982: 63.

⁵ Maechling, 1982: 5.

detente, which had brought concrete results - an improvement in human contacts between the two Germanies, improved communications between West Berlin and West Germany and a emigration of ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. However,

by the same token, the USSR has more political levers over West Germany. It could conceivably threaten the FRG with a deterioration in intra-German relations or in the Berlin situation ... This is the primary concern for the U.S. focus on the danger of German dependence on Soviet gas.⁶

The Reagan Administration thus stressed rather the energy security impact of increased West European reliance on Soviet energy resources. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Hormats declared:

Our strong concern is that this project crosses the threshold of a prudent level of European dependence on Soviet gas.⁷

Washington was afraid that once the gas pipeline was in place, a sudden cut off of the flow of gas in conjunction with another Middle East oil embargo would enable the Soviets to enforce their will and demands on the Western European nations.

The Europeans, however, argued, that relying on the Soviets for approximately 25-30% of their natural gas supplies (4% of their total prime energy) could by no means constitute a Soviet leverage against Europe. Another concern of the Reagan Administration was that Soviet exports would give the Soviet several billions (the estimate ranges between \$8 and \$10 million dollars a year) in hard currency which would enable them to buy additional Western technology to boost their military and therefore tried to bring their European partners into line.

⁶ Stent, 1982: 82-83.

⁷ Testimony of Robert D. Hormats, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Governmental Processes of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, October 14, 1981, p. 2.

4.5.1.2 *The Political Aspect*

The pipeline sanction controversy is a powerful illumination of the fundamental change which has taken place in the political relationship between the United States and its allies. Today the European Community and Japan are economically as strong as the U.S. To many Europeans, this seems to legitimize Europe's claim for equal partnership with the United States in political issues. A new generation of politicians and diplomats, who are today in key governmental positions, no longer reflexively gauge comparative standings in the alliance in terms of America's rescue of Europe during and after World War II. These persons regularly question America's preeminent role in the formulation and execution of foreign policy initiatives and are no longer willing to always set their clocks by Washington time. Obviously, Reagan neglected to take these considerations into account. Though technically he is authorized under the EAA, on which he based his June 22 order, to act unilaterally, he also is required to secure the prior cooperation of the countries affected by his decision. Moreover, in practice, the act must be interpreted in the context of partner relationship and the COCOM agreement, by which 15 NATO members and Japan collaborate to regulate exports of armament, strategic materials and sensitive (military) technology. Thus, "for the United States to take unilateral action at a time of economic distress for European heavy industry without consulting its principal allies and trading partners is without precedent."⁸ Moreover, the extension of the sanctions came only two weeks after the Versailles economic summit where Reagan had not even raised this question and the European leaders had won the impression that Reagan had given in on the pipeline issue. Congress, too, criticized the lack of genuine

⁸ Maechling, 1982: 4.

consultation and sensitivity for European positions. Jonathan Bingham, D-NY, realized that

the allies have decided to fulfill their contracts with the Soviet Union and now we are telling them as if they were children that they were wrong and we are going to try to punish their companies that hold U.S. licenses.⁹

Perhaps the most important factor behind the allied revolt against Reagan is a fundamental difference in view over the nature of the Soviet threat and how to deal with it. Europeans, situated close to the Soviet Union geographically,¹⁰ see the Eastern superpower as a hostile neighbor they must live with more than an enemy that should be isolated. Saying this in a broader terms: the pipeline controversy was also a struggle between the European concept of detente and the American concept of Cold War.

4.5.1.3 The Jurisdictional Aspect

The Extraterritoriality Issue: As of June 22, Reagan's widened sanctions attempted to impose U.S. law on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies and on European/Japanese firms holding U.S. licenses to manufacture products invented in the United States. This extraterritorial jurisdiction issue has long been a point of conflict and irritations with European governments.

Prior efforts have mostly been in the areas of anti-trust enforcement and regulation at the maritime industry, but have also included attempts to enforce economic sanctions. Generally regarded as disguised attempts to impose American economic and political policy on foreign governments and consequently as an infringement of sovereignty, they have been uniformly unsuccessful, except when met by the voluntary compliance of the countries concerned.¹¹

⁹ *Congressional Quarterly*, October 2, 1982, p. 2468.

¹⁰ As a Belgian Defense Ministry official put it: "Soviet tanks are 250 miles from where I sit. That affects the way I think."

¹¹ Maechling, 1982: 2.

The Reagan administration, on its part, tried to enforce the extraterritorial application of export controls by imposing temporary denial orders against any company that did not comply with these controls.

This time, all members of the European Community sharply condemned Reagan's act as unacceptable interference with European affairs. On June 22, the European Community accused the United States government of violating International Law¹² by widening the restrictions and disregarding European sovereignty claims. European Commission Vice President, Etienne Davignon, said that the Community considered taking Washington to an International Court over the ban on the supply of technology for the gas pipeline.¹³ This step, even though it was merely a consideration and never followed through due to the fact that State communities cannot appear as prosecutors, shows how the balance in the Western alliance had shifted and how seriously the Europeans took Washington's attack on their sovereignty. After all, the European subsidiaries and licensors targeted by the embargo, regardless of ownership of dependence or American technology, were legally European and therefore exclusively subject to the respective European national laws. On August 12, the European Community delivered a note and a set of legal comments to the U.S. State and Commerce Department containing the following message:

The European Community wishes to draw attention to the importance that it attaches to the legal, political, and economic aspects of the United States measures, including their impact on the commercial policy of the Community. As to the legal aspects, the European Community considers the U.S. measures contrary to international law, and apparently at variance with rules and principles laid down in U.S. law ... The EEC therefore calls upon the U.S. authorities to withdraw these measures.¹⁴

¹² For a more comprehensive treatment of the jurisdictional aspects of the pipeline sanctions, see: James N. Bierman: "The 1983 Export Administration Act Legislation: The Extraterritoriality Issue" and Jerome J. Zaucha: "The Soviet Pipeline Sanctions: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Export Controls" in *Law and Policy in International Business*, Vol. 15, No. 3-4, 1983.

¹³ *The Washington Post*, Wednesday, June 23, 1982, A28.

¹⁴ "EC Files Legal Protest" in *Europe*, September-October 1982, p. 6.

The Contract Sanctity Clause: Should governments have the right to interrupt overseas sales for which contracts already have been signed and export licenses already approved? Should existing contracts be abrogated when the government promulgates new foreign policy controls? Most European leaders negated these question, thus opposing Reagan's views in this matter. Britain's Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, by many considered to be the United States' closest ally in Europe, emphasized this point: "I feel strongly that once you have made a deal, you have got to keep it, short of war of something like the Falklands."¹⁵

4.5.2 European Pressure

On November 13, 1982, Reagan finally rescinded the Soviet pipeline embargo and removed the temporary denial orders that were imposed to enforce the embargo and that had been in place for approximately five month. How did this change in mind come about? First of all, after the June 18 extraterritorial application of the pipeline sanctions, it soon became apparent that the Europeans this time would refuse to fall in line. Leaders of all European countries joined in their common critique of the sanctions and accused Reagan of misperceiving the impact these sanctions had on the more vulnerable European economies. Against Reagan's will they ordered their firms to defy the U.S. ban on equipment for the pipeline and to fulfill their existing contracts. It is very interesting to see how Reagan reacted to this challenge of his leadership capabilities. Whereas in the beginning, he barred *all* U.S. exports to violating companies - a move that would have potentially crippled at least some Europeans enterprises - he soon caved in to the European uproar and tried to ease tensions by two means:

¹⁵ *U.S. News & World Report*, Sept. 13, 1982, p. 28.

- First, he adopted the so-called laser-beam strategy crafted to punish foreign companies for defying the U.S. embargo while avoiding a direct confrontation with the allied governments.¹⁶
- Second, Reagan also softened the original penalties by giving up the total embargo and imposing only a partial embargo against defying companies, preventing them only from purchasing U.S. made gas-and-oil related items.

President Reagan must have realized that the U.S.-European dispute over the sanctions, after his June 18 decision, had entered a new and potentially perilous phase. Many analysts believed that the risk factor had shifted and not to the advantage of the United States.

Before, the danger was that we might escalate the pipeline feud. Reagan, pursuing his security policy of isolating and containing the Now, the danger is that the Europeans might escalate.¹⁷

Soon, the dispute began to spill over into other areas such as defense and U.S.-European trade. A major risk, which Reagan must have perceived, was that the pipeline sanctions affected the debate over the deployment of U.S. missiles in Western Europe. During the period when the pipeline controls were put into effect, the U.S. was actively seeking the support of its European allies in the nuclear arms reductions negotiations with the Soviet Union. European politicians, however, warned that the U.S. stand on the pipeline issue threatened to revive anti-American sentiments and further arouse popular dissatisfaction against deploying the cruise missiles pershings in their countries. As a European official put it:

¹⁶ For more information see "The Nasty Pipeline Mess: Any Way Out" in *U.S. News & World Report*, Sept. 13, 1982.

¹⁷ Gerald Seib and Art Pine: "Western Disarray" in *Washington Post*, September 17, 1982, A1.

It is not good to have that issue when you need deployment. It gives fuel to those who oppose missiles.¹⁸

The United States could simply not afford to leave the Europeans behind on this crucial issue. In so far as U.S.-European trade was concerned, the embargo could not have come at a worse time. The two sides were already embroiled in disputes over steel, agriculture, high U.S. interest rates and the strong dollar. Although both sides asserted after the June 22 extension of the pipeline sanctions that a trade war was not imminent there were clear signs of European retaliation that demanded emergency negotiations. As a French official argued:

We Europeans now have a long series of quarrels with Americans over the pipeline, over steel imports, over a whole list of questions. We aren't very open to discussions with a partner who acts as if he has the power to order us to do anything he wants.¹⁹

1. The Europeans, for example, challenged the probable imposition by the U.S. of stiff import duties on Common market steel shipments. In a formal protest to the 87-nation General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, they contended that the U.S. Commerce Department had greatly overstated the extent of subsidies to domestic steel industries.
2. The Europeans also revived a decade-old complaint in GATT against the Domestic International Sales Corporation program which provides tax subsidies for U.S. exporters.²⁰

¹⁸ *Washington Post*, September 17, 1982, A12.

¹⁹ *The Wall Street Journal*, Friday, September 17, 1982, p. 1.

²⁰ *Wall Street Journal*, Thursday, July 15, 1982, p.1.

3. The Common Market resumed considerations of a plan, previously shelved at Washington's urging to limit U.S. sales in Europe of corn gluten, which competes with European grain as an animal feed.²¹
4. West European leaders also served notice that as a result of the the extension of the sanctions, they are not likely to back important U.S. initiatives to extend current international trade rules to cover services, investments and high technology - a major U.S. goal at November's ministerial trade negotiations.
5. In a meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Toronto, West German Finance Minister Manfred Lahnstein spoke against the long-standing U.S. opposition to beginning "global negotiations" on aid to developing countries even though Bonn had quietly supported the U.S. stance before.²²

4.5.3 A Practical Example - Italy.

Italy is a good example of how one of the countries participating and supporting the pipeline project responded to the June 22 export control imposed by the Reagan administration. One Italian company, Nuovo Pignone, had a substantial contract to supply materials for the pipeline and was subsequently the subject of a U.S. "denial order" for continuing to perform the contract. During the period that U.S. pipeline controls were in effect, Italy's Prime Minister, Giovanni Spadolini, visited the United States, and while there, officially expressed opposition to the sanctions. The Prime Minister also an-

²¹ *ibid.*

²² *The Wall Street Journal*, September 17, 1982.

nounced that Italy's national airline, Alitalia, had agreed to buy thirty McDonnell Douglas Corp. DC-9 jets, but implied that the agreement could not be completed until the U.S. pipeline sanctions were ended. Finally, the Spadolini also discussed possible increased participation by Italy in the Middle East peace-keeping force -advocated by the United States- although he did not specifically link the prospects for such and increase with the pipeline sanctions.²³

4.5.4 Conclusions

When the President on June 18 declared the extension of the previously imposed sanctions, he was convinced that his action served an important purpose. In his view, Reagan was asserting America's leadership role in the Western Alliance on an issue that he deemed important: to meet the Soviet threat. Ironically, the pipeline sanctions, which were intended to be a Western demonstration of their determination to punish the Soviet Union for their aggressive foreign policy vis-a-vis Poland and Afghanistan, turned out to be a triumph for Moscow. What had been planned as a crusade against the Soviet Union pushed U.S.-European relations close to a dangerous point. In fact, as Charles Maechling perceives it: "No event since World War II has so damaged the trans-Atlantic partnership as the Reagan Administration's embargo of June 18."²⁴ Reagan had to realize that all the unilateral pipeline sanctions had accomplished, was to further alienate Europe from the United States, widen the fissures within the Western Alliance and make collective economic action in the next East-West crisis an even less credible

²³ For more information see Jerome J. Zaucha: "The Soviet Pipeline Sanctions: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Export Controls in Law & Policy in International Business" in *Law & Policy in International Business*, 1982, p. 1176.

²⁴ Maechling, 1982: 1.

weapon. The United States had paid heavily for this mistake. Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, had finally resigned because of it.²⁵ The United States was about to engage in a trade war with its most important economic partner. Reagan's vision of a strong unified Allied response (the so called NATO-Doppelbeschluss) to the Soviet military threat seemed to break up over the dispute.

Weighing the pros and cons, Reagan finally must have reached the conclusion that the political stakes were too high, that is, that the pipeline sanctions were too damaging to the foreign policy interests of the United States. That it took Reagan over five months to change his mind, shows how difficult it must have been for him to back away on this issue of principle. In his perspective, the United States would appear weak and indecisive if it gave up on the sanctions while at the same time the Russians showed no sign of moderation in their conduct in Poland. That he caved in on this vital foreign policy issue is evidence for the extraordinary strong impact of external factors on the decision-making process in the United States.

4.6 The Impact of Public Opinion on American Foreign Policy

I hypothesized that, given the nature of a democratic system, we would expect to find a correlation between the degree of public approval/disapproval (concerning Reagan's foreign policy in general, his pipeline sanctions in particular) with change/stability in foreign policy.

²⁵ Schnorr, 1982: 3-4.

The first reaction of the American public was captured by a January 18 Harris Survey.¹ Overall, President Reagan was given a relatively high rate of approval for the way he had handled the U.S. response to the imposition of martial law in Poland.

- By 69-24 percent, a majority of Americans agreed that "President Reagan did the right thing by making the Russians pay a price for ordering the military crackdown in Poland, but at the same time not completely cutting off the prospects for negotiating a nuclear arms agreement with the Russians." The public also backed President Reagan in his controversy with the European allies (especially the West Germans) concerning the right approach in this matter.
- By a 68-24 percent margin, a majority was convinced that "in not going along with the sanctions taken against Poland and Russia, many of our allies in Western Europe, especially the West Germans, are showing that they are more interested in the money they can make with Russia and Communist Eastern Europe than in helping the Polish people gain more freedom."

However, it also became clear that many Americans would have preferred Reagan to react faster and impose tougher sanctions. 42 percent of Americans agreed with the charge that "the Reagan administration was too slow to condemn the military takeover." And asked whether the Reagan administration was not forceful enough in publicly accusing the Russians of being behind what was done by the Polish government, half of the respondents agreed.

¹ Harris Surveys in general are conducted by telephone with a representative cross section of adults 18 and over at approximately 1250 different sampling points within the United States. Figures of age, sex and race were weighted when necessary to bring them into line with their actual proportions within the population. In a sample of this size, one can say with 95% certainty that the results are within plus or minus three percentage points of what they would be if the entire adult population had been polled.

The overall impression, one can gain from these figures, is that the American public was generally satisfied with the foreign policy behavior of the United States though a considerable number would have preferred more rapid and tougher action. Only three days later, on January 21, 1982, a second Harris Survey was published which again contained elements of American public opinion with regard to the Polish crisis and the Soviet pipeline sanctions; the American public clearly shared President Reagan's view that the Soviet Union had to take a major share of blame for what was going on in Poland and that they should be the target of U.S. sanctions rather than the Jaruzelski regime in Warsaw.

- While Americans supported Reagan's banning on Polish fishing vessels from all U.S. waters (which had been one of the sanctions imposed in the aftermath of the military crackdown in this country) only by a 47-46 percent plurality, a 64-36 percent majority voiced support for Reagan's decision to prevent Russians airliners to land in the United States and a 64-31 percent majority approved Reagan's sanctions not to allow Russian ships to dock in American ports. Even more important with regard to the American pipeline sanctions against the Soviet Union,
- a decisive 72-23 percent majority of Americans approved Reagan's move to cut off all U.S. shipments to Russia of oil and natural gas drilling equipment and pipelines.
- A 70-27 percent majority expressed support for the administration's decision to suspend all exports of electronic equipment, computers and other high technology to the Soviet Union.

The above stated results make it clear that the American public shared the President's views as to whom to blame for the conditions in Poland. The domestic approval

as evidenced by these two surveys clearly must have strengthened the President's position vis-a-vis the Allies (especially Chancellor Schmidt who had been more than reluctant to identify the Soviet Union as scapegoat). Until June 18, step II in my time frame, neither the Gallup Poll nor the Harris Survey tried to elicit further public opinion on this issue.

Since in my research design I had predicted a correlation between the degree of public approval/disapproval and change/stability in the administration's foreign policy, it is only reasonable to assume that Reagan toughened the sanctions conscious of the public support behind his December 29, 1981, sanctions. After June 18, 1982, however, the picture changed drastically. It is interesting to pursue how the American public's opinion changed as a result of Reagan's decision to extend and toughen the sanctions and the following European outburst of anger and revenge. In June, shortly after his trip to Europe and before the furious reaction of the Allies really unfolded, Reagan had received a 51-45 percent negative rating on his leadership in world affairs. Within a month, his approval rating dropped to 38 percent. In the same survey, a plurality of Americans opposed the President's decision to "not allow U.S. experts and technology to be used to help build the natural gas pipeline from Russia to Western Europe" (45-33 percent). Presumably the negative press and the fact that all major European allies sharply condemned Reagan's decision, contributed to this complete reversal of American public opinion.

In another Harris Survey, conducted between August 5th and 10th, President Reagan continued to receive poor ratings for his handling of foreign policy matters. The 38% approval rating represented the second-lowest rating in this dimension since he had taken office in 1981. Though this rapid drop in public opinion rating clearly cannot be attributed solely to his handling of the Soviet pipeline sanctions (a majority of Ameri-

cans were also highly critical about the way he dealt with the situation in El Salvador and the Lebanon crisis), the impact of this dispute should not be underestimated.

In yet another survey, conducted between August 26th and 31st the Harris Survey found out that by 68-26 percent a majority agreed with the European view that "as long as we don't sell military secrets, trade with Russia helps provide a real basis for their keeping the peace with us." This is particularly significant as it indicates that a sizeable majority of Americans had adopted the European standpoint that trade is a key component in relieving tension between the two superpowers (and Europe) and that trade interdependence is a good way to avoid military confrontation.

With regard to the pipeline sanctions, the negative trend seemed to be reversed as for the first time a 45-43 percent plurality favored President Reagan's decision to refuse to allow the use of American equipment and expertise to help build the natural gas pipeline from Russia to Western Europe. However, when asked: "Would you still favor or not the decision to refuse to allow the sale of U.S. equipment to help build that pipeline, if our allies in Western Europe, who strongly support the pipeline, responded by taking steps to restrict the sale of American goods, chemicals, and other products in Western Europe?", a solid 57 percent opposed Reagan's actions, while only 31 percent supported them.

4.6.1 Conclusions

Assuming that in a democracy foreign policy makers are sensitive to changes in public opinion, the following two observations with regard to the dependent variable can be made: Most indicators used in the execution of my research design reveal that until June 18, the American public had a rather positive picture of Reagan's foreign policy

approach and his handling of the Soviet pipeline affair. Therefore, I arrive at the conclusion that Reagan extended the sanctions assuming that he would have the backing of the majority of the American people.

After the June 18 decision, however, Reagan's public opinion ratings on all levels experienced a drastic decline. According to the Gallup poll, between June and July, he dropped 9 percentage points on the approval scale for his handling of foreign policy. His approval rate for dealing with the Soviet Union dropped from 49% to 44% and by July he was opposed by a significant 45-33 percent majority for his handling of the pipeline sanctions. This negative evaluation would persist until November 13, when Reagan decided, to lift the sanctions.

Taking all these figures into account, one could argue that Reagan's decision was made, in part, under the impact of the public's negative evaluation of his administration's performance in this issue. However, looking more closely, another picture emerges. The polls also found, that only half of those questioned had actually heard or read about the government's stand on the pipeline and only 33% of all respondents could accurately describe the American position. Thus, the alternative rival hypothesis which stated that the effect of public opinion is negligible due to the fact that most of the time there simply is no public opinion with regard to foreign policy, receives impressive backing. Though it is possible to establish a relationship between the two variables, its significance is seriously reduced by taking into account the fact that only one-third of the population proved to be knowledgeable about the topic. Given the public's disinterest in foreign policy in general and this topic in particular, the impact of public opinion on the administration seems to be only marginal.

4.7 The Impact of Popularity Rankings and Domestic Policy Failures

In the previous research design I had presented the following two hypotheses: (1) "The lower presidential popularity, the more likely the President feels the need to engage in new policy initiatives in order to reverse the trend;" (2) "The lower the rankings of presidential popularity with regard to his handling of domestic issues, the more the President exercises initiatives in the foreign policy arena." Looking at Reagan's popularity trend, apart from a short period of time, shortly after Reagan's inauguration as 40th president of the United States, the curve reveals a general downward trend in popular support. By June of 1982 (point II in my timeframe), Reagan's popularity had fallen from a 60% approval rate a year before to a disappointing 43%, only to drop even further in July and August of 1982. By mid-November (point III in my timeframe), nothing had changed. Earlier, it was argued that characteristics of American public opinion are relevant to the extent that they are perceived by American decision makers. Thus, the point can be made that Reagan, by June 18, after one year of continuous decline in his public opinion ratings (27 percent points over a one year period) felt that he had to do something to reverse this trend.

One reason for Reagan's election victory in the 1980 presidential elections had been his promise to make America strong again and its voice heard and respected in the world. Therefore, it would only be logical to assume that Reagan, in reacting to the general public's dissatisfaction with his administration's foreign policy performance, tried to boost his popularity and demonstrate his leadership qualities by toughening the sanctions against the Soviet Union. Obviously, this strategy did not work out as

Reagan's popularity continued to drop, until by November of 1982, it had declined to 41%. By this time, Reagan must have realized that something had to be done and in view of his own political career and the result of the devastating mid-term elections, he lifted the sanctions.

Turning now to the *second* hypothesis the following observations can be made: It is a widely accepted theory in International Relations that when decision makers face problems at home they try to engage in foreign policy initiatives to divert public attention in their countries from the domestic situation. The most important concerns in the public's mind have not changed very much over the past decades. When asked: "What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?", 61% named unemployment, 18% inflation, 11% the general state of the economy and only 2% Foreign Relations.² It is no secret that public opinion has undergone a considerable change from election day in November 1980 to the midterm elections of 1982, which brought heavy losses for the GOP. Whereas in the beginning the public had afforded Reagan a honeymoon which was even stretched by the assassination attempt on Reagan's life, public disillusion grew considerably during a period which lasted from the middle of June, 1981, until late in 1982.

During this time, many Americans felt that they were going downhill economically. The last Harris Survey before the June 18 decision of the Reagan Administration to extend the pipeline sanctions, revealed that most Americans viewed their country as going through the worst economic hardship since Reagan had taken office. When asked: "A year from now, as a result of President Reagan's economic program, do you feel that (1) unemployment will be reduced to below where it is now; (2) the rate of inflation will be below 10%; and (3) the economy will be expanding at a healthy rate, 50% disagreed with

² John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill: *Public Opinion during the Reagan Administration*, the Urban Institute Press, Washington, Table 4 on page 13.

the first point (45% agreed); 48% disagreed with the second point (43% agreed); and 55% disagreed with the third (38% agreed). These three indicators are sufficient for the point I would like to make: on all issues of vital public concern (as listed above) the Reagan administration had consistently received negative scores. Being under great pressure for the failure of his economic recovery program, Reagan was looking for a chance to turn attention away from criticism of his administration by scoring in the foreign policy arena. And what could have been more suitable of receiving widespread public support than taking on the communist foe. Taking the above stated arguments into account, it seems reasonable to argue that Reagan's new foreign policy initiative vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was a result of his perceived need to counteract domestic policy failures.

4.8 Impact of the Mass Media

The question asked at the outset was: "To what degree did the news coverage in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* account for the reversal of the administration's position in the pipeline embargo?" The mass media, and for this matter, particularly the prestige press can stimulate changes in the course of U.S. foreign policy as they are one of the most important prisms through which policy makers and policy influentials perceive the world. Unlike the general public, however, this elite derives most of the information directly from the press. Thus, by setting the agenda and creating foreign policy issues, newspapers affect decision maker's attitudes which eventually translate into subsequent new policy initiatives.

Applying these general observations now to the news coverage of the Soviet pipeline embargo - this topic did certainly receive ample attention in both the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*. They covered almost on a day-by-day basis the controversies surrounding the sanctions and recorded the sentiments in the countries affected by the embargo. Their editorial sections, especially after July 18, were dominated by this issue. I had chosen the percentage of positive editorials as my indicator to measure media influence; the results were plotted out on a monthly basis from December 1981 until November 1982. Figure 1 on page 95 displays the following facts:

As a combined measure, the topic of the pipeline sanctions was discussed 49 times during this period. Many former politicians like James Siena, Henry Kissinger and George Ball along with renowned journalists like William Safire, Nathaniel Samuel or *Le Monde* publisher Andre Lafontaine expressed their views in this matter. The overwhelming majority of these editorials sharply criticized the Reagan administration's stance in this matter. Titles like "Pipeline Machismo," "Mr. Reagan's Reckless Soviet pipeline decision" or "on cutting pipelines and our throats" dominated the headlines. Only 7 articles endorsed Reagan's policy while 42 condemned it. Another important fact is the distribution on a monthly basis. Before Reagan's July 18th decision to expand the sanctions and apply them extraterritorially, only ten editorials dealt with this topic; this number skyrocketed to 39 in the weeks following his controversial decision. By publishing constantly the international circumstances surrounding the crisis, the media drew attention to the precarious situation and forced the foreign decision makers involved to act. The almost unanimous rejection of American foreign policy in this matter must have created doubts in the minds of the policy elite which refused to contemplate a change to improve the situation and reinforced the convictions of Reagan's opponents in the State Department and elsewhere.




Figure 1. Washington Post and New York Time News Coverage of the Sanctions

Thus, I arrive at the conclusion that indeed the course of U.S. foreign policy was influenced by the media. This is not to say that there is a direct link between news coverage and change in policy. Rather, the news coverage played a crucial role in the transmission of opinions within the foreign policy establishment and created an atmosphere which finally necessitated action by key decision makers.

4.9 The Impact of Interest/Ethnic Groups on American Foreign Policy

The pro-sanction alliance: Some of the most active interest/ethnic groups supporting the Reagan administration in its efforts to sustain the sanctions against the Soviet Union and the Jaruzelski regime were, of course, the Polish associations in the United States and most prominently the Polish-American Congress (PAC), an umbrella foundation of local and national Polish foundations with over three million members. The PAC is the political arm of the Polish Americans and works with the U.S. State Department regarding Polish and Polish American matters.

During a telephone interview with the president of PAC, Mr. Elowsk Macuwski told me that on one occasion he personally had a chance to present his views to Secretary of State Schultz and President Reagan. However, this was a one time event and was not followed up by intense and recurring lobbying efforts. One reason for this might be that none of the Polish associations is located in Washington, D.C.. This organizational weakness impedes the lobbying effort as communication lines to key decision makers are more difficult to establish. Furthermore, as these sanctions were widely considered to

be a Polish matter, there was no coordinated action on the part of other East European ethnic groups.

The PAC, however, found an influential ally in the American Federation of Labor/Congress of International Organizations. With a membership of 13,200,000 (including spouses and children there are approximately 50 millions in the AFL/CIO) the AFL/CIO is the largest organized group in the United States and a powerful political entity. The AFL/CIO went even further than the Reagan administration asking for a complete embargo, including a termination of grain exports to the Soviet Union.

The anti-sanction coalition: in the opposing camp, Reagan was facing the united front of American business which unanimously rejected the sanctions. The largest and best known business group in America, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, traditionally reflects a strong belief in the character of American free enterprise and opposes excessive government regulations of business. In 1988, the Chamber's annual budget is about \$65 million and it employs 1400 professional staff workers. The Chamber has about thirty standing committees that initiate policy positions and present them to members of both the executive and legislative branch. In the case of the pipeline sanctions issued by President Reagan under the Export Administration Act, the Chamber and its president, Richard L. Leshner, took a strong stand against the embargo, arguing that such actions would merely result in the loss of sales to foreign trade competitors. In numerous letters to Congress and Members of the Executive (President Reagan, Haig, Baldrige, Meese and Clark) throughout 1982, the Chamber expressed its dissatisfaction with the foreign trade policy of the Reagan administration. Joining in this criticism was the powerful National Association of Manufacturers. This association has an annual budget of \$13,300,000 and 13,500 member companies. The organization's headquarters moved from New York to Washington in 1973 which gives its 200 staff members there (amongst them 13 full-time lobbyists) direct access to decision makers. The NAM's main objective

is to promote American commerce, especially international trade; thus, it is not surprising that the sanctions were of great concern to them. Other business groups like the National Foreign Trade Council and the Machinery Allied Products Institute sharply attacked the Reagan administration:

The foreign policy trade control process must be both rational and firm. A step to achieve that goal would be to review the process with the intent of increasing the participation of business, Congress and foreign trade policy officials in what is now mainly the province of a limited group of government officials.³

Another member of the anti-sanction coalition, the American Association of Bankers representing 95% of the commercial banks and trust companies, was considerably worried about the administration's plans to declare Poland in default and urged the President in view of their financial involvement to ease the tensions.⁴

Evaluating the relative capabilities of all the actors [interest/ethnic groups] involved in terms of access to decision makers, financial resources, organizational structures and membership strength, the following conclusions are reached: Although the AFL-CIO sided with the Polish ethnic associations, the motive behind their position was largely moral support for their Polish Union colleagues. The AFL-CIO is a powerful political entity if the economic well-being of its 13 million members is endangered. But in this case, the fate of the Polish workers did not seem to be an important enough issue to engage in serious lobbying efforts and maintain the sanctions. For the business community, however, the risks were considerably higher as fundamental international trade issues had to be discussed in connection with the embargo. Billions of dollars worth of contracts, the international reliability of U.S. business as well as U.S. competitiveness were at stake. The business community simply had more to lose in this controversy and

³ Letter dated June 23, 1982, to Hon. Jonathan Bingham from Richard W. Roberts, president, National Foreign Trade Council, Inc..

⁴ Van Meer: "Banks, Tanks, and Freedom." This article from *Commentary Magazine* was presented at a hearing before the Subcommittee on international Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy, Serial No. 98-17, p. 358.

was therefore more willing to make use of its resources to bring about a change in the administration's policy.

With regard to access to decision makers, again, business had an edge. All of the above mentioned groups maintain headquarters in Washington, D.C., which allows them to stay in close contact to key government officials. Supported by professional, full-time lobbyists, they were able to pressure the administration unlike the PAC or other Polish associations which had to organize their campaign from their headquarters in Illinois. A comparison of the relative financial potential of the two groups reveals that both sides had considerable resources at their disposal. In addition to their impressive budget, however, business groups had a decisive edge in communication capabilities. All of them reach a rather big segment of society by publishing numerous periodicals or even produce their own program for national television. Thus, I contend that in terms of their financial and organizational resources as well as in their determination to make this topic a priority on their agenda, the anti-sanction coalition of American business was more willing and capable of using their influence to reverse Reagan's policies.

5.0 Conclusion

The Soviet pipeline embargo is an excellent illustration of the changes which have taken place in American foreign policy in the post-war period. It is an example of how changes in the domestic and external environment have caused a more general transformation of U.S. foreign policy.

1. In so far as the *domestic* foundation of U.S. foreign policy after 1945 is concerned, the operative assumption among most political scientists and policy makers had been that the foreign policy of the United States was founded on a basic political consensus:

As far as economic interests were concerned, whether in the sense of borne collectively or of particularist interests that might be at stake, it was both a point of analysis and a normative judgment that they were not and should not be of first-order considerations. However much Americans might bicker and horse-trade over the who gets what, where, when, and how of domestic policy, when confronted by external threats such as Soviet communism, they wisely abided by the motto, *e pluribus unum*. Congressional partisanship did and should give way to bipartisanship, bureaucratic battles to executive-branch unity, interest-group pressure to the collective good, and public opinion to basic patriotism.¹

However, as the case study of the pipeline sanctions shows, the basic foundation of U.S. foreign policy has shifted from consensus toward conflict and had probably so

¹ Jentleson, 1984: 625.

since the end of the Vietnam war. None of the characteristics of this consensus - bipartisan support, executive branch unity, interest groups seeking collective goods rather than particularistic interests, and a public which lends unfaltering support - materialized in this foreign policy episode.

When President Reagan imposed the pipeline sanctions to punish the Soviets for the crushing of Solidarity and the imprisonment of Lech Walesa, he expected that the American people would respond to the ideological challenge. Although the public and Congress unanimously condemned the Soviet Union, they were not inclined to pay the economic and political costs of renewed superpower confrontation. Reagan's policy of using economic coercion as a means to punish the Soviets soon encountered stiff resistance. For American manufacturers and workers, the pipeline embargo meant the loss of billions of dollars in export contracts and thousands of jobs. General Electric, the President's old employer, lost \$170 million in contracts as a direct result of the sanctions; since 90 % of GE's energy equipment and technology business is international, the long-term impact of the embargo was even more significant. Other losses by companies like Fiat Allies (lost \$500 million in sales) or Caterpillar (which compiled a company record \$334 million loss in the first three quarters of 1983 and lost huge market shares to its most important international competitor, Komatsu of Japan) prompted the Illinois State Department of Commerce and Community Affairs (headed by a Republican) to declare the pipeline sanctions the state's number one economic problem.²

Soon, most major business groups such as the powerful U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the American Association of Bankers became active in pressing the administration to reverse its policy.

² Jentleson, 1984: 653.

Many of the affected business groups had powerful congressional connections. Caterpillar was most successful in expressing its opposition as with Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Charles Percy as its leader in the Senate and Republican House Minority Leader Robert Michel a House sponsor. In view of the upcoming November elections, Michel as well as other House Republicans abandoned party loyalty and associated themselves with the Democrats against Reagan's policy. This move came almost too late as Michel's poor performance in his constituency revealed where after twelve consecutive victories he barely escaped electoral defeat. In a further demonstration of bipartisan opposition to the administration's policy, the House Committee on Foreign Relations voted 22 to 12 (7 of 17 Republicans joined in the opposition) against the sanctions. This bill later was defeated on the floor by the narrowest of margins (206:203) but only after Secretary of State Shultz had assured the Speaker of the House, Tip O'Neill, that the administration was working on a solution of the problem.

In 1983, Congress rejected the administration's new version of the Export Administration Act, the statute under which the President had promulgated the sanctions. Both the Democratic-dominated House and the Republican-controlled Senate favored more extensive decontrol, opposing the administration on the extraterritoriality and contract sanctity issue. Clearly parochial interests of Congressmen dominated over bipartisan support for the administration [pluribus over unum]. The actions of Congress can also be understood in a constitutional context. According to the Constitution, Congress has full authorities to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Reagan's attempts to use trade sanctions as a political weapon without consulting Congress were clearly viewed as infringement upon basic legislative prerogatives. Thus, congressional opposition must be interpreted as a reassertion of congressional power vis-a-vis the Executive.

The American public, while originally supportive of the punitive measures, in the course of 1982, became less amenable to Reagan's efforts to reassemble a new Cold War consensus. As numerous public opinion polls revealed, the American public did not consider economic sanctions an appropriate way to punish the Soviets. Moreover, two decades of detente had changed the American public's image of the Soviets:

By "de-demonizing" the Soviet Union, detente also appears to have had a long-run effect of eroding the legitimacy of Cold War-infused policies. And while the threat was not to be ignored, it might also be something less than a functional and moral equivalent of war. To be sure, as Jimmy Carter belatedly discovered, the majority of Americans were still not prepared to find their fear of communism inordinate. But, as Ronald Reagan began to discover, neither were the public and Congress disposed to launch a full-scale anticommunist crusade.³

While still thinking of the Soviet Union as an antagonistic power,⁴ the American public was not willing to follow the President on a path which inevitably would lead to new confrontation between the two superpowers.

Even within the Administration the pipeline issue was a subject of heated debates. Secretary of State Weinberger and his Assistant Secretary Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Commerce Brady, National Security Advisor William Clark and White House political chiefs Edwin Meese and Michael Deaver were strongly in favor of the sanctions whereas the opposition formed by Secretary of State Alexander Haig, the Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige, and Special Trade Representative William Brock argued against them.

The pro-sanction coalition maintained that by agreeing to the pipeline deal, NATO had helped the Soviet Union escape economic disaster and exploit instead the industrial potential of Western Europe. Their governments had even facilitated

³ Jentleson, 1984: 660.

⁴ A public opinion poll conducted in 1986 by the *Chicago Council on Foreign Relations* revealed that the Soviet Union finished next to last in a preference rating of 24 countries.

this effort by granting the Soviet Union government-backed credits to unusually favorable conditions. Gordon Crovitz emphasizes this point:

The low-interest credits extended by Western Europe to the Soviet Union represent capital that could otherwise have been used for investment in the West European economy and its future. As a political matter, it is hard to find any wisdom in subsidizing the military enemy of the West. The Soviet prophecy is that capitalists would sell them the rope with which to be hanged; in the pipeline case, the rope is being sold on credit.⁵

The anti-sanction front led by Secretary of State Shultz, though acknowledging that the pipeline was not in NATO's best interest, argued that it was too late to stop the deal and pointed at the negative intra-alliance ramification of the U.S. position. The Department of Treasury was anxious not to undermine the international reputation of the United States as a reliable supporter which had already suffered from President Carter's grain embargo. Moreover, it contended that unilateral sanctions were ineffective and unnecessarily hurt American business interests.

2. In so far as the *external* foundation of U.S. foreign policy after World War II is concerned, until the late 1960s the United States was the undisputed leader of the Western world. However, the amazing economic recovery of Western Europe accompanied by increased military capabilities has increased its bargaining power within the Western Alliance, which often translated into disagreements over foreign policy objectives. One of the most persistent problems revolved around the question of how East-West trade can be used as an instrument of foreign policy and how NATO can influence trade to shape Soviet behavior. Europeans generally have claimed that an expanding trade is the best way to moderate Soviet international behavior and contribute to a relaxation of the international climate. Especially West Germany views the promotion of their trade ties with Eastern Europe as a barometer of what is possible in intra-German relations. Unlike the American adminis-

⁵ Crovitz, 1982: 413.

tration, Western Europe does not believe that manipulations of the trade flow will help the Alliance to impose their goals on Soviet leaders.

Thus, Europeans did not recognize the necessity of abandoning the pipeline project. The gas deal was seen as an opportunity to diversify their energy sources and limit their dependency on oil from the Middle East and Northern Africa. Faced with the worst post-war recession, they could not afford to give up on this multi-billion project. Washington, on the other hand,

was bothered by the symbolism involved in the conclusion of a significant agreement between the Soviet Union and Europe when in the space of four years the Soviets invaded one country and crushed a grass-roots mass political movement in another.⁶

On moral grounds the Administration was on weak footing as America continued to sell grain to Soviet Russia and even by applying sanctions, a tactic usually reserved for enemies, not allies, failed in their effort to stop the building of the pipeline.

5.1 Summary

In the post-Vietnam period, the domestic foundation of U.S. foreign policy - congressional bipartisanship, executive branch unity, interest group collaboration, and a supportive public - has been replaced by an assertive Congress, a fragmented executive branch, antagonist interest groups, and a divided public. These domestic changes were accompanied by external changes, especially the declining ability of the United States to control its international environment. Both these structural changes worked as constraints on President Reagan to implement the policy he considered best for the Ameri-

⁶ Hewett, 1982: 20.


can interest as he was forced to lift the sanctions against his deep rooted personal convictions. The external and internal constraints proved to be too powerful so that after eleven months of continuous controversy, Reagan felt that he had to leave behind idiosyncratic beliefs and reverse his stance in the embargo policy. This is the reason why I treated the role variable as intervening rather than as independent factor.

Figure 1 on page 95

concludes this section. In summarizing the arguments presented above, it gives a visual explanation why the foreign policy of the United States within a period of less than a year experienced a complete reversal in spite of the fact that the conditions which originally led to this policy [that is the internal situation in Poland and the behavior of the Soviet Union] had not changed. The figure is based on Rosenau's five-dimensional theoretical framework which outlines the impact of the five factors in this case study.

In the first part of the conclusions I had mentioned structural changes which resulted in the loss of the American foreign policy consensus and a turn towards a more conflicting and aggressive foreign policy decision-making process. As exemplified in this case study of the pipeline sanction, in the wake of the Vietnam war, high levels of external and domestic constraints impacted on foreign policy makers and limited the prospects for an effective and consistent foreign policy. I now would like to analyze these constraints more thoroughly to see what really has changed over the past two decades. A comparison between the relative rank order [measuring the degree of the variables' impact on the decision-making process] Rosenau formulated in 1966, with the one based on the results of this case study will facilitate this objective.

FOREIGN POLICY



- + Forces in favor of lifting sanctions
- Forces in favor of maintaining sanctions

Figure 2. The Foreign Policy Process in the Soviet Pipeline Embargo

*Rosenau**Wasser*

1) role

1) role

2) societal

2) governmental

3) governmental

3) external

4) external

4) societal

5) individual

5) individual

These two rank orders show important similarities as well as significant differences. Both rankings assign the least importance to the individual or idiosyncratic variable while at the same time identifying the role variable as the most salient factor underlying the foreign policy behavior of the United States. In other words, the presidency seems to work as a constraint on the individual who holds this office in that it prevents him from implementing his personal style and preferences. One can hardly imagine two presidents having more diverse personalities and ideologies than Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. On the one hand, the Southern Democrat from Georgia, pursuing his human rights crusade and policy of detente (focusing more on the North-South than on the East-West conflict), on the other hand the Republican hard-liner and Cold Warrior Reagan, who promised to reassert America's role in the world in "getting tough" with the Soviet Union. Yet, what stands out is the amazing continuity in American policy. Despite Ronald Reagan's harsh criticism of Carter's foreign policy and despite his strong verbal attacks against the Soviet Union culminating in expressions like the "Evil Empire", the foreign policy actions of the Reagan administration did not match his rhetorical outbursts. It was Reagan who soon after his inauguration as president of the United States lifted the grain embargo imposed by his predecessors to punish Moscow

for its invasion of Afghanistan. And it was again Reagan who remained passive when the Soviet Union shot down a civilian South Korean airliner with 360 people on board.

By the same token, many political observers were taken by surprise by the way the Reagan administration handled its first serious foreign policy controversy with the Soviet Union. The rather hesitant, delayed and modest reaction following the military crackdown in Poland startled particularly conservative hard-liners whose expectations had been nourished by the President's rhetoric. And when in November of 1982 Reagan was forced to abandon the pipeline sanctions, it became clear that in his *role* as president of the United States, he was unable to maintain the damaging embargo which potentially threatened to imperil foreign policy goals of his country. James Schlesinger wrote in 1985:

Like the Carter Administration, the Reagan Administration has been highly personalized-almost anti-constitutional. In its early years, much of its foreign policy was set by the President's instincts, rhetoric and ideological convictions.⁷

This statement is only partially true. Indeed, Reagan originated many new foreign policy initiatives and often did not hesitate to push his constitutional powers to the limits or beyond. But in most instances he had to accept the constitutional limits placed on him and settle for compromise or even a complete policy reversal as I have demonstrated in this case study. Proceeding now to the discrepancies between the two rank orders, several observations stand out.

5.1.1 The External Variable

This variable has certainly increased its relative potency over the past two decades. Whereas in 1966, when Rosenau first established his rank order, the United States was

⁷ Schlesinger, 1985: 957.

still the undisputed world leader in terms of political, economic, and military power, recent developments have changed the international environment. The bipolar world of the post war period has given way to a multipolar world in which the relative power and influence of both superpowers have declined. The policy implications of this increased diffusion of power are evident. The United States no longer can impose its will and policy on other nations without encountering serious opposition. In this case study, the conclusion was reached that pressure emanating from the European Community and Japan was among the factors which compelled the United States to abandon the embargo and change its foreign policy options. The emergence of a parity between these countries in the political and economic realm (though not in the military arena where Western Europe and Japan are still dependent on the nuclear shield provided by the United States) clearly has diminished America's predominant role as foreign policy proponent of the Western Alliance. The characteristics of U.S. foreign policy developments which I have described so far are likely to be reinforced.

5.1.1.1 America's Economic Decline

Arthur Schlesinger presents a rather disillusioning picture of America's capability to shape foreign policy in a transitional external environment:

The day of the messianic foreign policy, the United States as the redeemer nation commissioned by the Almighty to rescue fallen humanity, is coming to an end... Strength in the modern world has economic as well as military dimensions. The impending crisis for the United States is rather more likely to be in the banks than on the battlefield. We are instructed incessantly about the deadly threat of Marxist Nicaragua. But the damage Nicaragua can do to U.S. interests is nothing compared to the devastation that a large-scale repudiation of the Latin American debt - now approaching \$400 billion - can have on the already shaky U.S. banking system. Our great international vulnerability is economic rather than military... Recall America after the Second World War: a nation with a capital surplus, an export surplus, 40 percent of the gross world product, 22 percent of the world trade, and every indication of continuing technological and financial supremacy. 40 years later: the huge budget deficit, the huge trade deficit, public debt, private debt, external debt; the decline in America's ability to compete in world markets; the stagnation in America's productivity; the shrinkage of America's industrial base; the decay of America's infrastructure; the transformation of the United States into the largest debtor known to history. America is at the mercy of international economic forces as never

before. To avert disaster, America must work out modes of international collaboration as never before.⁸

America's continuing economic decline and the trend toward diffusion of economic capabilities and growing international trade interdependence has limited the range of feasible options available to foreign policy decision makers. A clear example of this proposition can again be derived from the example of the Soviet pipeline embargo. So far, this thesis has only presented what the Reagan administration actually chose to do; other measures which were in the discussion were finally dismissed as infeasible because of external constraints.

Through most of 1982, the administration thought about declaring the Polish debt in default to punish the Jaruzelski government and the Soviet Union. However, the fact that Reagan eventually did not opt to implement this measure, demonstrated less his concern for the well-being of the Polish and Soviet economies but rather his insights in the possible repercussions of this action not only on the Soviet Union and Poland, but also on the United States, Western Europe, and the Third World.

The impact of a U.S. decision to declare Poland unilaterally in default would have had devastating consequences on the West European Allies. Their governments and banks would have had to write off \$14 billion in Polish debt which in turn might have triggered a major financial crisis in these countries and deepened the fissures within the Alliance. Especially West German, British and French banks would have been in serious financial difficulties; even if their governments stepped in to help these commercial banks it would have been hard to prevent a large-scale banking crisis.⁹

⁸ Schlesinger, 1987: 281.

⁹ For further information see: John Van Meer: "Banks, Tanks, and Freedom". This article from *Commentary Magazine* was presented at a hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy, Serial No. 98-17, p. 358.

This is, then, an example how the growing international economic interdependence has prevented an American administration from taking steps in which the negative repercussions would have outweighed the political benefits. Thus, the Reagan administration, in addition to relatively mild sanctions, settled for an ad-hoc policy of convincing the allies to restrict credit to the Soviet bloc instead of forcing the issue of debt default. This is, what Schlesinger meant when he pointed out "that America must work out modes of international collaboration as never before." Foreign policy makers in Washington must, to an ever increasing degree, take into account the interests of international banks, multinational companies, and the global trade system. This point became clear in an *Washington Post* article: "Business Forces Make Their own Foreign Policy":

There are probably some people who think that foreign policy is made at the White House, the State Department or even the Defense Department. The controversy over President Reagan's sanctions against the Soviet natural gas pipeline to Western Europe is proving how narrow this view is... The rights and wrongs of this debate-there are plenty on both sides- are less important than the sort of world they reflect. The traditional ideological and strategic orientation of foreign policy has given way before economic interests. Even now, American farmers desperately want to trade with the Soviets. International banks, multinational companies and global traders now effectively create their own foreign policies.¹⁰

5.1.1.2 *America's Military Decline*

But not only in the economic sphere has America's power declined in the post-war period. In so far as the military capabilities of the Western superpowers are concerned, the changes are probably even more radical as they influence the capacity of the United States to implement their autonomous foreign policy. Whereas after World War II, the United States, for a brief period of time, enjoyed a nuclear monopoly, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the emergence of the Soviet Union to nuclear parity have

¹⁰ Robert J. Samuelson in the *Washington Post*, Jy 20, 1982, D7.

undermined the preeminent military role of the United States. Members of NATO, skeptical about the nuclear protection of the United States guaranteed in case of a Soviet attack, have developed their own nuclear forces, thereby enhancing their relative power within the Alliance. The relative military decline of the United States is aggravated by the fact that the global commitments have increased. And though Ronald Reagan sought to turn around the trend by financing a trillion dollar defense budget thereby enhancing America's military capabilities considerably, Reagan's successor as president will have no choice but to cut back on defense due to the tremendous budget deficit. This, in turn, will automatically translate into a reduction of America's overseas commitments [even a reduction of the American military presence in Europe has been discussed] and a corresponding decline in American influence.

5.1.1.3 The Changing Political Atmosphere

Another development which has to be discussed in this context is the changing political atmosphere which has taken place since Mr. Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Soviet Union. His overtures to the West - international glasnost- have considerably ameliorated the international atmosphere. This external change has profound repercussions on U.S. foreign policy. During periods of detente, European concerns about Soviet expansionism and aggression decline and so does their dependency on U.S. protection. Evaluating the East-West conflict from a different geostrategic angle, the Alliance structure becomes less binding and the room for independent foreign policy maneuvers on the part of the Europeans greater. During detente, Europeans become more confident and less amenable to American leadership. This confidence is only bolstered by the fact that the economic capabilities of Western Europe and Japan

[ironically fostered by the United States after 1945] have become greater than those of the U.S..

5.1.1.4 Summary

All of the above mentioned external factors, the emergence of a polycentric world and the systematic diffusion of economic and military capabilities, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the new era of detente under Gorbachev, the growing economic interdependence, and the rise of non-state actors like international banks and multinational corporations have created constraints for American foreign policy and limited the freedom of any president to implement an autonomous foreign policy.

5.1.2 The Governmental Source

At the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 the Founding Fathers divided the foreign policy powers between the President and Congress but not in a definite manner as Edward S. Corwin noted:

What the Constitution does, and all it does, is to confer to the President certain powers capable of affecting our foreign relations, and certain other powers of the same general kind on the Senate, and still other such powers on Congress; but which of these organs shall have the decisive and final voice in determining the course of the American nation is left for events to resolve.¹¹

In the course of the 20th century, the balance had tilted considerably in favor of the Executive. It was a commonly held perception that the Executive initiated foreign policy with the implication that this relegated the Legislative to an inconsequential role. It was this view of Congress on which Rosenau based his rank order.

¹¹ Corwin, 1957: 171.

Then came Vietnam and the Watergate scandal which brought to the forefront questions about the abuse of Executive power and served as a catalyst for a period of strong congressional reassertion.¹² Thus, Congress initiated foreign policy by means of legislative directives as in the case of the Turkish Arms Embargo (1975) or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (1978). It also became more active in placing legislative prohibitions and other limitations on the President's freedom of action in the conduct of foreign policy. In 1976, it restrained President Ford from supplying covert assistance to the Angolan resistance [the so called *Clark Amendment*] and it placed numerous restrictions and limitations on Reagan's Central America policy [*Boland Amendment*]. Other bills like the War Powers Resolution (1973), the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (1974) and the Intelligence Oversight Act (1980) indicated that Congress had become more aggressive about asserting its constitutional role in foreign policy. Using new appropriation procedures, intensified oversight, and legislative vetoes, Congress submitted the foreign policy of each president to close scrutiny, a development about which especially Presidents Ford and Carter complained.

President Reagan, however, had begun to reverse the flow of power in the foreign policy decision-making process. This effort was certainly facilitated by a decline in congressional alertness. When in 1987, the House and Senate Select Committees on the Iran-Contra Affair were inquiring about allegations surrounding the secret arms transfer to Iran and the siphoning off of the profits to aid the Nicaraguan Contras, perhaps the most important lesson was that Congress had shockingly neglected its oversight role of how the money appropriated was spent and whether the activities of the Executive branch had been conducted lawfully. Reagan, probably to a greater extent than most of his predecessors had taken advantage of this lack of congressional oversight in im-

¹² For an excellent description of the congressional revitalization, see Cronin, Thomas: "A Resurgent Congress and the Imperial Presidency" in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 95, pp. 209-238.

plementing the "Reagan doctrine". He and his associates made it clear that they would pursue their policies even without congressional involvement. One day, after the House of Representatives had voted against further military assistance to the Contras, Reagan, during a meeting in the White House, thought about alternative ways to provide funds to the Contras.

Until the Iran-Contra affair Reagan was fairly successful in reestablishing the executive dominance in the foreign policy process particularly with his successes in two foreign policy gambles in which he consulted Congress at the last minute: the 1983 invasion of Grenada and the bombing of Libya. Though Reagan informed members of Congress before these two operations, military operations were already under way. In the Achille Lauro incident and in the event of the shelling of Arab villages in Lebanon, Reagan failed to consult Congress at all. And since all of these actions enjoyed widespread public support, it was difficult for the legislative branch to accuse the President of violating regulations of the War Powers Act without being stigmatized and denounced. Whether we look at what is going on at the moment in the Persian Gulf or Casey's Lebanon adventures,¹³ Congress always seems to "close the barn after the horse is out."

However, I think that the Iran-Contra affair will have a decisive impact on future executive-legislative relations in that they will be characterized by renewed congressional mistrust and alertness which will result in closer scrutiny and oversight on the part of the legislative branch. The Iran arms scandal is significant in that power will again flow toward Congress and consequently will lead to diminished executive liberty in shaping foreign policy. Reagan already experiences an erosion of his authority by a muscular

¹³ Recent revelations by Washington Post staff writer Bob Woodward (*Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987*) made it clear to everyone that the *Hughes-Ryan Amendment* in fact is limited in its effectiveness since Congress as an institution is just not able to closely supervise the Central Intelligence Agency or the F.B.I.

Congress. Congressional efforts are under way which would give the legislative branch authority over sales of sophisticated weapons to *all* countries except U.S. allies.

Congress in the coming years will display foreign policy activism to a greater extent. Besides the above mentioned impact of the competition between the two branches, Congress has another incentive to increase its involvement in matters of foreign policy:

The way Congress is now structured makes it incumbent on members to take a greater interest in foreign policy issues. It's very, very hard to detach foreign policy from domestic issues.¹⁴

This fact has increased the interest in foreign affairs and made them more susceptible to congressional scrutiny, which in turn translates into further constraints on American presidents.

5.1.3 The Societal Source

The last factor underlying U.S. foreign policy, has maintained its explanatory power, though certain variables within the cluster are more important than others. Though in this particular case study, it might not be evident, the electoral cycle certainly has a profound impact on American foreign policy. In spite of the fact that Reagan lifted the embargo *after* the devastating November 10 midterm elections and though this foreign policy issue had less repercussions on the domestic sphere than, for example, Carter's sanctions against the Soviet Union after their invasion of Afghanistan, the impact of the electoral cycle should not be underestimated. This point finds further support if one traces Reagan's actions in the fourth year of his presidency shortly before the 1984 presidential elections. In view of the large Polish electorate [approximately 2.5 million U.S. citizens are of "Polish stock" by Nativity and Parentage]¹⁵ Reagan decided to lift

¹⁴ Madison, 1986: 3061.

¹⁵ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population.

most of the sanctions against the Jaruzelski government though the internal situation had not improved substantially.¹⁶

5.1.4 Change or Continuity in American Foreign Policy

I would like to conclude this work by evaluating to which extent the policy process as presented in the diagram favors or hinders the existence of an effective and consistent foreign policy. Do the five underlying factors promote stability and continuity or do they prohibit changes in a rapidly changing external environment?

The individual variable, representing the impact of the personality and ambitions of a newly elected president proved to be the weakest determinant in both Rosenau's and my rank order. Once assuming presidential powers, most presidents realized that in many circumstances they are shaped by the exigencies of the roles attached to the office and are not capable of exerting the influence to the degree they hope. Radical changes from past policies and traditional U.S. positions prove to be the exception. The dominance of the role over the individual category, which promotes continuity rather than innovative policies, is one of the most persistent features of the American political system and unlikely to change.

But even if the Chief Executive brings an extraordinarily strong personality to the office (as in Reagan's case) and a determination to push through his new policy program, other factors prevent a radical departure from the past. The President presides over a large and multifaceted bureaucracy which assists him in executing his policies. But as Kegley observes:

¹⁶ In the *Time*, August 13, 1984, p. 23.

Among the salient characteristics of behavior in the institutional setting are bureaucratic parochialism (bureaucratic agencies pursue their own narrowly defined purposes); bureaucratic competitiveness (they seek to advance their power and position within the government hierarchy); and attitudinal conformity (they discourage creativity, dissent, and critical thinking; reward conservatism, rigidity, and timidity). ... In such an environment, decisions are made not on the basis of the substance of the issue but rather on how the decisions will affect the interests of bureaucratic organizations.¹⁷

Reagan identified this problem as he made the fight against the growth of bureaucratic institutions detrimental to policy innovation and efficacy one of his top priorities. Another feature of the American constitutional setting, the sharing of foreign policy responsibilities by both the Executive and Legislative branches, places constraints on key decision makers in the implementation of new ideas. A president who wants to be successful with a new policy program has to be assured of the support on the part of congressional centers of influence and power. Identifying these support bases has become increasingly difficult in the wake of the congressional reforms of the early 1970s which evidenced a shift from the macro to the micro level. The dispersion of congressional power, combined with the growing connection of foreign policy decisions to the domestic arena and the growing awareness of the electoral connection between policy outcomes and constituency interests by members of Congress has it made more and more difficult for presidents to engage in new foreign policy initiatives without at least consulting with Congress.

The third factor underlying the foreign policy behavior of the United States is different in this respect. It is undisputed that the development from a bipolar to a multipolar international system, the growing political and economic interdependence, and the relative decline in America's political, economic and military power, has further constraint U.S. foreign policy makers by limiting the options available as a response to external stimuli. At the same time, the rapidly changing international environment is a challenge to the superpower's ability to adapt to these changes in order to increase the

¹⁷ Kegley, 1982: 532.

prospects for an effective policy and ultimately for a stable international order. Thus, the external source unlike the role and governmental categories fosters some degree of change and innovation.

The societal category provides both incentives and limitations on administrations engaging in new policies. In so far as public opinion is concerned it is commonly accepted that the overwhelming majority of the American public is highly inattentive and uninformed about what is going on outside the United States. This view was reinforced by findings yielded by this case study as only one third of the American population had heard about the pipeline situation and knew the administration's stance in this matter. But public opinion still places constraints on policy innovations in that certain images of what basic U.S. foreign policy positions ought to be limit the policy maker's flexibility (as Reagan experienced in his Central America Policy). By the same token, the influence of interest groups promotes continuity rather than change. Most of them are committed to preserving the status quo and those interest groups who want to change this status quo, soon encounter the massive resistance from other interest groups which counter their propositions and pressure. In summary, most of the factors depicted in the diagram work as constraints on the ability of an administration to pursue an autonomous and effective foreign policy and promote continuity rather than change.

5.1.5 Shortcomings of Rosenau's pretheory

Finally, I would like to address two important matters which question the applicability of Rosenau's framework and the validity of its results. To which extent are the results of this case study a representation of the U.S. foreign policy process? Rosenau's theoretical approach is useful in deriving a somewhat general theory about this process

but the rank order, he presents, shifts depending on two other intervening variables which render the results yielded incomparable. The first intervening factor which I already mentioned refers to the distinction between different typologies in foreign policy. Based on research by Lowi and Huntington, Ripley/Franklin had developed three distinctive patterns of foreign policies, namely strategic, structural and crisis policies. The case study of the pipeline embargo belongs to the first category. Accordingly, the rank order as depicted in my model represents the relative balance among the five factors with respect to strategic policy situations. This relative balance, however, might shift dramatically if one analyzes different typologies of foreign policy. In crisis policies, for example, the rank order is almost reversed. Threatened by external circumstances which pose as danger to the national security of the U.S., the usual centers of decision-making shift to a small group of executive government officials who take control of the situation. Consequently, the importance of the governmental factor declines as bureaucratic procedures usually involved in the foreign policy process will be sidestepped. Most likely, there will be no time or inclination on the part of this small executive decision-making unit to consult with Congress. In the military intervention in Grenada or the bombing of Libya, key congressional leaders were briefed on U.S. actions after the operation was underway. In crisis situations the impact of the societal source is almost negligible as the moment of surprise and the need for rapid action preclude the involvement of the public or interest groups. On the other hand the impact of the idiosyncratic variable increases dramatically in importance as it is the personalities of the people who compose the small decision-making unit which determine the kind of action taken in response to the external stimuli. In crisis situations, individuals can make a difference as numerous case studies (like the analysis of the Cuban crisis or the outbreak of World War I) have shown. The role variable still is salient as presidents and their advisors have to take the national interest (or in the worst case even national survival) in consideration when

rendering their decisions. In summary, the relative rank order in crisis situations like the Grenada incident would have the individual factor ranking first, the role second and the governmental and societal at the bottom.

Another intervening factor makes the assessment of the relative influence and salience of U.S. foreign policy sources more difficult. Many analysts ignore the importance of *issue areas* and presume that the U.S. foreign policy process unfolds similarly with respect to any issue. Rosenau acknowledged the importance of this intervening factor:

There is ample evidence for presuming that the functioning of a political system depends on the nature of the issues that it is processing at any moment in time.¹⁸

He contended that the foreign and domestic areas foster different degrees of political involvement and summarized his conclusions in terms of a single overall hypothesis:

The more an issue encompasses a society's resources the more it will be drawn into the society's domestic system and the less it will be processed through the society's foreign political system.¹⁹

This statement, however, needs refinement. The type of foreign policy issue at stake determines who will become involved in the foreign policy process and accordingly determines the relative importance of the underlying factors. In other words, different types of issues areas result in different rank orders. There is a difference in foreign policy issues which have strong ramification for the domestic U.S. sphere and those issues which lack this internal dimension. In the first case we would expect a strong impact of effected individuals, interest groups and congressional members defending the interests of their constituents. In the latter case, the societal factor would have a lower rank.

A final word with regard to the model depicted on page 108. It differs from Rosenau's pretheory in that the role source is treated as intervening rather than as independent variable. It is the president who renders decisions and is held accountable.

¹⁸ Rosenau, 1971: 404.

¹⁹ Rosenau, 1971: 435.

The decisions are a reflection of the fight between his personal preferences and expectations of his multiple roles as president of the United States, cabinet and party leader, and leader of an alliance. Whereas in crisis situation the idiosyncratic factor certainly plays a dominant role in the foreign policy process (role expectations can not materialize quickly enough), in strategic policy situations such as the Soviet pipeline episode, the pressures on the president become stronger and his flexibility to act in accordance with his personal beliefs smaller. Thus, Rosenau's model was adapted to this type of situation as the role factor works as a filter for the other four underlying factors which determine the policy outcome.

Rosenau's multicausal approach proved to be very useful for the analysis of this particular case study but his call for a more comparative level analysis must be followed while keeping in mind the above mentioned shortcomings. The rank order developed for this specific foreign policy episode can only be compared to foreign policy situations which display the above mentioned characteristics and not to crisis and structural policies. For these two policy typologies new pre-theories and rank orders have to be constructed.

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