

COMBAT MOTIVATION IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH ARMY

by

Mark H. Danley


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(ABSTRACT)

Battle has consistently been the most dangerous collective human activity. In battle, human beings risk serious wounding and even death. Consequently, the study of the motivation of soldiers in combat is important to military history. Combat motivation in the army of eighteenth-century Britain merits study, since the subject as it pertains to pre-industrial armies has at present received little attention.

The soldiers of Hanoverian Britain received motivation from several sources. Basic training in the eighteenth-century British army laid the foundations for certain relationships among military personnel which contributed to combat motivation. One such relationship was a network of primary ties among soldiers. The

relationship between soldiers and officers was also important. The relationship between individual soldiers and the military institution as a whole also contributed to combat motivation. These relationships created a set of standards to which the army expected soldiers to react. When they reacted correctly, they were motivated to face the dangers of combat.

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## CONTENTS

Introduction. . . . .	1
Indoctrination. . . . .	8
Primary Group Ties. . . . .	28
Leadership. . . . .	43
Institutional Esprit. . . . .	61
Conclusions. . . . .	72
Sources Consulted. . . . .	79
Vita. . . . .	83

CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION

A soldier's vocation involves death. Soldiers fight battles, the greatest and most confusing human endeavors at collective violence. <sup>1</sup> Few people in Western societies are naturally adept at professional killing. Consequently, armies, the social institutions responsible for waging battles, are and have always been faced with a problem of combat motivation. To function, an army must convince its members to endure the stress of combat. The question of combat motivation, that is, just how armies have convinced soldiers to fight, is a pertinent field of investigation in the study of military history.

Much scholarship on combat motivation adopts largely monocausal explanations. Most treatments of the motivation question emphasize the importance of primary group dynamics. The network of strong reciprocal personal loyalties among a small group of soldiers who live and fight together is often presented as the principal or sole source of motivation. <sup>2</sup> There has been some recognition of the importance of other factors, including garrison background, manpower allocation policies, and leadership. <sup>3</sup> Overall, however, studies of combat motivation have emphasized primary group

relations. Such emphasis is not wholly misplaced, but analysts should not stress it alone at the expense of other factors.

Just as most treatments of combat motivation emphasize a particular factor, so also do they concern themselves with only certain periods of history. Most studies of combat motivation are devoted to the subject as it pertains to twentieth-century warfare. Detailed studies of American soldiers of the Second World War consider the matter of combat motivation.<sup>4</sup> Some studies adopt a broader chronological frame of reference. They deal with twentieth-century warfare in general and give some attention to the nineteenth-century roots of modern warfare.<sup>5</sup> Other scholarship centers on twentieth-century armies but asserts the universal application of its conclusions to all periods of Western history.<sup>6</sup> In general there has been little attention devoted to combat motivation in pre-industrial armies. There is limited specialized study of combat motivation in the military institutions of particular nations.<sup>7</sup>

Upon first consideration, the study of combat motivation in the eighteenth-century British army, or any military institution of that period, might seem impertinent. Throughout the military history of the Western world, there have been periods during which bringing one's enemy to



battle was not the only way to decide a campaign. Fighting set-piece battles is only one of several ways to wage war. Such a "combat strategy" has dominated Western military practice in some periods, while raiding strategies have been important in others. <sup>8</sup> In certain eras wars were won by the art of maneuver, the end of which was not necessarily to bring the enemy to a decisive battle, but to cut supply lines or occupy valuable territory. In periods when such practices dominated, it is questionable whether or not combat was the essence of warfare. Consequently, the source of combat motivation may seem a factor unimportant to the study of such periods of military history.

The military world of eighteenth-century Europe might seem one such period. Generals did not always believe that defeating an enemy in pitched battle was the only way to win a campaign. <sup>9</sup> In the early part of the century warfare was largely an affair of skillful maneuver and siegecraft. Campaigns might begin and end without the opposing forces ever meeting in open battle. <sup>10</sup>

Even so, eighteenth-century Europe did see its share of set-piece battles. <sup>11</sup> Important engagements like Blenheim, Ramilles, Fontenoy, Rossbach, Monmouth and many others have long received the attention of military historians. The period from the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession until the French Revolution was sometimes known for

its campaigns of maneuver and raiding, but the armies of that period, including the British army, did fight battles. Thus the question of combat motivation is pertinent to the study of the British army of the eighteenth century.

Preliminary consideration of combat motivation in the army of eighteenth-century Britain may also give rise to another assumption. It might appear that most armies in the eighteenth century functioned chiefly on the basis of their harsh system of military justice. One feature of eighteenth-century armies very salient to the modern commentator is their severe system of discipline and punishment. The armies of Frederick the Great's Prussia, Hanoverian Britain, and other countries are well known for their use of corporal punishment, often considered brutal by modern standards. One might assume that brute force alone motivated the soldiers of eighteenth-century Europe. <sup>12</sup>

This assumption is oversimplified and misleading. An understanding of the combat motivation of the soldiers of eighteenth-century Britain must be reached from a more comprehensive examination of the army as a social institution. The army should be viewed as a unique group of people with a unique job - waging war and fighting battles. Study of combat motivation must examine how the army's personnel viewed themselves and how they viewed each other. It must also focus on their relationships with colleagues and supe-

riors. The relationship of the primary group was important, but so too were other relationships. The relationship between leaders and followers, and the relationship between the individual and the institution as a whole are worthy of study. The key to understanding combat motivation in the army of Hanoverian Britain lies in consideration of the meaning and significance of soldiers' complex perceptions and relationships. Permeating all these relationships were some common themes. The army was similar to an extended family. Within this context soldiers reacted to certain sensibilities arising from their relationships with each other, their officers, and the army as a whole. When they reacted correctly, they fought well.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

<sup>1</sup>Gwynne Dyer, War (New York: Crown, 1985), 132.

<sup>2</sup>Anthony Kellet, "Combat Motivation," in Contemporary Studies in Combat Psychiatry, ed. George Belenky (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 211.

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, Anthony Kellet, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1982).

<sup>4</sup>Kellet, "Combat Motivation," 211. Studies of American Forces in World War Two which deal with combat motivation include: S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (New York: William and Morrow, 1947) and Samuel Stouffer et al., Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier, 2 vols. (Princeton: University Press, 1949).

<sup>5</sup>Kellet, Motivation, has such a scope.

<sup>6</sup>The treatment of combat motivation in Dyer, War, 101-128 adopts such an approach.

<sup>7</sup>Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981) gives some attention to the question of combat motivation. However, the approach presented centers on regimental esprit, 112, 118, and gives little attention to small unit esprit and primary group ties. Furthermore, soldiers are presented as largely unconscious of their allegiances and the motivational effects thereof.

<sup>8</sup>Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 691-704.

<sup>9</sup>Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age

of Reason (New York: Atheneum, 1988), 189-90.

<sup>10</sup>F. J. Baumgartner, From Spear to Flintlock: A History of War in Europe and the Middle East before the French Revolution (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, forthcoming), 296-97. For example, in 1711, during the War of the Spanish Succession, the Duke of Marlborough pierced the French Non Plus Ultra defensive lines in a summer campaign consisting only of skillful maneuver and siegecraft. See H. C. B. Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century (New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1977), 125-28.

<sup>11</sup>Some analysts even distinguish the eighteenth century as a period especially known for decisive, set-piece battles. See, for example, Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), xi - xviii.

<sup>12</sup>For example, Richard Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York: Free Press, 1975), 2-3, makes this assumption in passing.

## CHAPTER TWO

### INDOCTRINATION

All of a soldier's various relationships within the army began when he enlisted. The foundations of military life in eighteenth-century Britain began in the indoctrination process. Unlike basic training in modern armies, the eighteenth-century British army did not seek to change massively or to manipulate rapidly new recruits. As now, recruits entering the army faced a new world with a particular set of values, but the army of eighteenth-century Britain did not induce a new soldier immediately to adopt these values. Instead, the army gradually eased a recruit into his new role as a soldier. In doing so, the army did less to create a set of relationships for the new soldier as it did to ensure that they evolved. Indoctrination was significant because it was the first step in such an evolutionary scheme.

One current explanation of combat motivation places almost total emphasis on the military indoctrination process. According to this approach, soldiers are motivated chiefly by primary group ties. Total identity to a primary group provides a system of emotional and psychological support. These ties of group loyalty are created in the

indoctrination process, or basic training. In basic training, armies use a carefully calculated intentional shock treatment. An army rapidly subjects a number of recruits to psychological stress in order to erode their individual identities. The military institution then instills in the recruits a group identity. These ties of group loyalty are the source of motivation in battle and the basis upon which a military unit functions in combat.<sup>1</sup> This approach to psychological motivation in battle applies well to the armies and soldiers of nation-states of the modern industrial West.<sup>2</sup> However, it does little to explain the motivation of the soldiers of eighteenth-century Britain.

The experience of initiation into eighteenth-century British military life was very different from the process which modern recruits undergo. These differences existed on both the conceptual and applied levels. First, the eighteenth-century process was centered on the individual. This contrasts sharply with the modern emphasis on group indoctrination. Second, while the modern process seeks to transform the civilian into a soldier quickly, armies of the eighteenth century gradually eased the young recruit into military life. Finally, the earlier process of indoctrination did not involve the precisely measured, intentional psychological stress of modern basic training. To

be sure, young men underwent psychological stress during their indoctrination into eighteenth-century military life, but the pressure was neither orchestrated nor intentional. It does not seem to have had the same overarching purpose of the mental stress of modern basic training. There were moments of trauma, but no crash courses on becoming a professional killer. Rather, eighteenth-century British basic training included a framework of conditions which indirectly contributed to motivation.

Eighteenth-century Britain created each soldier individually. Of course, the close order infantry tactics of the period did require an organized and disciplined unit.<sup>3</sup> Subordination to authority and ability to work in a group were necessarily a part of soldiering.<sup>4</sup> However, a man became a subordinate cog in the military machine after, not during, his transformation from recruit to soldier. Learning the basics of military life was a process centered mostly on the individual.

When a man made his mark or signed his name onto the rolls, his military career began. The military institution was isolated and almost autonomous from the greater society. As a result, members of the institution had a sense of isolation. A recruit was in effect entering a new world,<sup>5</sup> and he entered as an individual. Contemporary European military theory advocated placing the new recruit



under the personal supervision and mentorship of a veteran private, corporal or sergeant. <sup>6</sup>

British military practice incorporated this belief. The veteran served as a personal liaison between the recruit and his new environment. The experienced soldier was to introduce the recruit to the fundamentals of military life. Bennett Cuthbertson, an eighteenth-century British military theorist, proscribed that, "A Recruit should always have a good old soldier appointed for his comrade, who will have good nature enough to instruct him in what he is to do." <sup>7</sup> Such individual instruction might include assistance with practical skills necessary for everyday life in the army. J. G. Seume, a Hessian conscript recruit in the British service during the American Revolution, relied in his early days on the mentorship of a veteran enlisted man. Contrary to the prescribed ideal, Seume had been made a sergeant without experience. He found himself in a difficult position. As an NCO, he was expected to supervise activities about which he knew nothing. Seume sought out the advice and assistance of an old veteran of the Prussian service. The old soldier taught him how to set up a tent and coached him in the manual of arms. <sup>8</sup>

Matters of daily life were only one element of training taught to the recruit as an individual. Of course the soldier needed to know everyday skills to survive on garrison

or campaign, but eventually the army would fight a battle. A recruit's tactical combat training was fundamentally important. This too, at least in the early stages, centered on the individual. The close order linear tactics of the eighteenth century required disciplined units able to maneuver and deploy as a group. Training of units as units was important. Still, such training did not occur until instructors had taught each man the basics. Military manuals advocated training a number of recruits in a graduated fashion. First an instructor would teach the most fundamental elements of linear maneuvers to each individual recruit. The new soldier learned how to march, halt and face to directions. Then a small group of recruits learned slightly more complicated movements such as marching in a single rank. Instructors assembled individuals into small groups, and then assembled the small groups into progressively larger bodies, teaching correspondingly more complicated maneuvers. However, the first elementary tactical lessons were taught on an individual basis. <sup>9</sup>

In most elements of basic training, from domestic skills to combat training, each man received individual instruction. The military, as an isolated and close knit society, did stress identification to the group. Linear tactics made group cohesion a tactical necessity. Still, such emphasis on group loyalty was mostly for men who were

already indoctrinated into the army. The British military institution did not mass produce soldiers. The army could acquire experienced soldiers only with valuable time and effort. Considered as military raw material, one man was not just as good as another.<sup>10</sup> When the army began the process of creating new soldiers, it crafted each one individually.

Eighteenth-century basic combat training, with its gradual approach, mirrored the indoctrination process as a whole. Indoctrination in the eighteenth-century British army was unlike modern basic training. In the latter, the new soldier is suddenly immersed in the military environment. Entering an eighteenth-century army was an extended, rather than an abrupt, process.<sup>11</sup>

Eighteenth-century administrative and logistical practices contributed to the gradual nature of a recruit's entrance into the service. A new soldier was often shuffled from one temporary unit to another before he reached his destination. An example is found in veteran officer Richard Kane's administrative advice on reassigning personnel from the grenadier company to one of the line companies of a regiment.<sup>12</sup> If a man was transferred from the grenadiers to a line company already at full strength, that line company was "to part with the last Recruit."<sup>13</sup> Another example of administrative shuffling of new recruits

is found in the experience of Thomas Sullivan, who enlisted in the 49th Regiment of Foot in Dublin on February 5, 1775. The recruits of the regiment were temporarily assigned to different companies of the regiment for the duration of a march to Cork, which it reached two weeks later. A further two weeks passed before Sullivan and the other recruits received final company assignments in the regiment. <sup>14</sup>

A new soldier might not receive basic tactical training, such as learning the manual of arms and marching in formation, until he had been "in" the army for some time. Sullivan and his fellow recruits of the 49th Regiment first learned facings and marching in Cork, nearly a month after they enlisted. <sup>15</sup> Introduction to weaponry came later, and when it occurred, it happened little by little. Contemporary military theorists admonished junior officers and NCOs in charge of training recruits not to hurry new soldiers. NCOs were to teach the manual of arms slowly and patiently. Recruits should master each element of the drill thoroughly before the lesson proceeded. Richard Lambart, the Earl of Cavan, a contemporary military theorist, gave advice to an NCO training recruits. He should "be careful to teach them but one distinct motion at a time, and . . . he [should] never offer [instruction to the recruits] at running from one thing to another, before they are truly perfect in that which was first taught them." <sup>16</sup>

Contemporary military scholarship was clear about the justification for such a slow, gradual approach. It was more efficient. Hurrying the new recruits would not yield satisfactory results. Understrength units might fill up faster, but not with quality soldiers. It was better to take all the time necessary to do the job correctly. The idea was to acclimate the recruits to the mechanics of soldiering, however slowly, but steadily. In that way, the army would craft a high quality product. Cavan admonished an NCO in charge of drilling recruits, "That he do previously prepare their minds for whatever they are to do, and that he patiently explain the intent of things, in order that the business they are upon may be better comprehended, and that his instructions have the fuller effect."

<sup>17</sup> Military theorist Campbell Dalrymple echoed this testimony to the efficiency of the gradual approach. Junior officers should attend drill sessions, wrote Dalrymple,

to instruct and encourage the recruits and aukward [sic] men in learning the exercise, and to prevent drill serjeants [sic], and corporals from proceeding too hastily with them. By recommending temper to the one, and attention to the other, the end will be best obtained, and the recruits forwarded with expedition. <sup>18</sup>

In fact, it could conceivably take up to half a year to acclimate the new man to the basics of drill. Veteran officer Richard Kane advised that, "all the Recruits of the Year be formed into one Squadron in the Spring, to be perfected in their Exercise . . . . In the Course of the Year, the Recruits are to be forwarded in their Exercise, so as to be fit for Duty." <sup>19</sup>

The army ensured gradual indoctrination in other ways as well. Military service in eighteenth-century Europe often included a wide range of activities. A new man did not participate in all of them until he was fully indoctrinated. Soldiers did more than maintain garrisons in peace and fight battles in war. There were many ancillary aspects of military life. A soldier might serve as a personal manservant or "batman" of an officer in addition to his normal duties. Soldiers might be allowed to take on outside civilian jobs during their off-duty hours. However, contemporary military theorists discouraged the participation of new recruits in these advanced variations of military life. Bennett Cuthbertson advised against allowing recruits to work at outside jobs. He claimed that soldiers should engage in such activities only after they were "thoroughly acquainted" with the elementary basics of soldiering. <sup>20</sup> Similarly, Cuthbertson advised that officers must not employ a recruit as a personal servant. He

asserted: "It is highly improper to take a Recruit for a Servant or Bat-man, until he has been long enough in the Regiment . . . it should never be allowed until he is perfectly informed of every part of his duty as a Soldier." <sup>21</sup>

This limitation on advanced activities meant that the recruit was not simply thrown into all the complexities of the profession of soldiering. The military institution allowed him to experience the advanced aspects of soldiering only after he was fully indoctrinated into the fundamentals. While modern soldiers also may not experience all facets of military life immediately after enlisting, modern indoctrination emphasizes a quick transition from civilian to soldier. <sup>22</sup> In the eighteenth-century indoctrination process, a man moved gradually from civilian to soldier. When recruits like Thomas Sullivan spent nearly a month in the army before they were even introduced to weaponry, they were experiencing a gradual form of indoctrination.

Military indoctrination in eighteenth-century Britain was not deliberately stressful. It was unlike modern basic training. The latter process seeks deliberately and carefully to apply psychological stress to recruits in order to create among them bonds of group allegiance and camaraderie. This was not the case for the earlier process. Becoming a soldier in eighteenth-century Britain could be at times traumatic, but not for the same deliberate reasons

that modern indoctrination is psychologically stressful. Conscripts might initially be unhappy about their new status, or some NCOs training recruits might not completely heed the theorists' advice. Still, there was no concerted effort to cause recruits stress.

The initial stages of training a recruit involved gentle treatment and a relaxed psychological environment. This did not mean, however, that lax or undisciplined behavior was permissible. Quite the contrary, the first step in training a recruit was forcefully but calmly to instill in the new man a submission to authority. Joining the army meant entering a new world. It was a world of rigid hierarchy and unquestioned authority.<sup>23</sup> The military institution was careful to acclimate the new recruit to proper respect, deference, and submission to the will of superiors and the hierarchy.

Contemporary military theorists agreed on the importance of instilling subordination in the common soldier. It referred to such submission to authority as "discipline." Theorists saw this fundamental of hierarchy as the essence of military organization. It was the very basis upon which armies functioned. Samuel Bever, a contemporary military theorist, wrote: "we should instill into the Heart of a Soldier, that Obedience is the Foundation of Regularity and Order; that by this, Discipline is maintained; by



this great Designs are executed." <sup>24</sup> The Earl of Cavan wrote that a "due deference to our Superiors" was the first element of discipline. <sup>25</sup>

Consequently, perhaps the most vital part of the indoctrination process was the introduction of military discipline to the recruit. Personnel in charge of training recruits should were to instill actively and carefully in new soldiers submission to authority and the concept of subordination. All discipline originated in proper respect for superiors. Cavan advised: "The Corporal is first of all to proceed with the recruits under his care, by duly instructing them in an humble, decent, and proper mode of behaviour to their superiors." <sup>26</sup>

Learning proper respect for authority was a serious matter and worth a substantial investment of time and resources. Cavan advised that corporals practice with recruits proper behavior and etiquette. The NCO was to instruct recruits in proper behavior and then, "each morning make them practice his rules, and see that they do observe them." The lessons were specific including proper ways of standing, speaking and walking. Cavan advised corporals inculcating discipline in recruits to "take occasion to speak to them himself, and to ask them questions, in order to observe their behaviour, and to perfect them in it." <sup>27</sup>

Other elements of recruit training helped instill subordination. Basic tactical training intrinsically included elements of discipline and obedience to authority. Simply going through specific bodily motions at the direction of a superior subconsciously symbolized order and hierarchy. Thomas Simes, a military professional of the period who wrote extensively, praised the manual exercise. Not only did the manual exercise place a man "in the most beautiful attitudes," and "made his limbs active and agile," but more important psychologically, it "teaches him duty and obedience." 28

Modern commentators, coming from a society which praises individualism as the highest good, might react negatively to the eighteenth-century emphasis on subordination and hierarchy. In fact, one of the challenges of modern basic training is to create cohesive, disciplined units of soldiers from civilian members of a highly individualistic society. 29 Hanoverian British military convention considered the rigid hierarchy of the institution not only necessary, but positive and agreeable. Thomas Simes asserted: "It is a mistaken opinion that subordination and passive obedience to superiors, is any debasement of a soldier's courage; so far from it that those battalions which have been subject to the severest discipline, have always performed the greatest manoeuvres, marches and victories." 30

The indoctrination process of the eighteenth-century British army instilled in recruits the important recognition of authority, but the process was marked by a deliberate attempt, at least ideally, to avoid stress. Simes noted that while new recruits must learn subordination, instructors must teach it gently. He recognized that NCOs might experience frustration with the awkwardness of new men. Yet Simes concluded that "the only way to reconcile these difficulties with affection, is to be cool and patient; to instruct them in an obliging good-natured manner, at the same time they must encourage an opinion of respect and obedience." <sup>31</sup> Bennett Cuthbertson agreed and noted that "The Serjeants [sic] and Corporals, who are appointed to instruct Recruits, must not use too much severity with them, lest they should become disgusted with the Service: it requires a great share of temper and coolness to lead them on." Likewise, Cuthbertson, in reviewing the qualifications for a senior NCO, stated that "in his temper he must have a certain degree of coolness, to give instructions in the exercise, and to bear with patience the stupidity of Recruits." <sup>32</sup>

A relaxed and gentle approach was necessary because discipline and subordination, as a positive good, was more than just blind obedience. Of course, good soldiers should follow orders unquestioningly, but ideally their respect

for superiors was mixed with affinity. This army was in this sense like an extended family. Samuel Bever elucidated this point in the prescriptions for ideal NCO - enlisted relations. NCOs were to strive to achieve, "a Love mixed with Respect from his Equals and Inferiors." Similarly, in regards to relations between corporals and their charges, the former should, "endeavor to gain their Respect as well as Love." 33

For all this, the journey from civilian to soldier could still be traumatic. Entering a whole new world could result in stress and psychological pressures. For unwilling Hessian conscript J. G. Seume, the first few days of his military career, which began with his own virtual kidnapping, were stressful. Seume, a former student, was traveling through Hesse-Kassel on his way to Paris when a Hessian recruiting agent forcibly abducted him. Seume remembered: "I was taken under arrest to the fortress of Ziegenhain. Here I found companions in misery, who had been collected all over the country to be sent to America the next spring. I surrendered to my fate and tried to make the best of a bad situation." Later some fellow conscripts made escape plans, but the conspirators were discovered, and two were hanged. At first, the authorities suspected Seume, but then released him for lack of evidence. Eventually things did get better for Seume. He recalled: "During

my stay in Ziegenhain old General Gore used me as an office helper and treated me with a great deal of kindness." 34

New recruits might also experience stress if NCOs did not heed completely the advice of the professional theorists. Roger Lamb, who enlisted in the 9th Regiment of Foot in 1773, later recalled that the sergeant in charge of teaching him the manual of arms was "unnecessarily, if not wantonly severe." 35 However, even though he was at the bottom of the military hierarchy, Lamb knew that such experiences ran contrary to the theory of eighteenth-century indoctrination. Years later when he wrote his autobiography, Lamb happily reported that "some most salutary alterations in the conduct of these officers towards the young recruits have since been enforced." 36

The important element remains, however, that any stressful aspects of indoctrination were incidental, or decidedly contrary to the prescribed norm. Unwilling conscripts might be scared or unhappy initially, but they did have access to the more pleasant elements of indoctrination, such as the personal advice and assistance of veterans. In no case did the eighteenth-century British military institution apply intentional psychological pressure to create group identity and cohesion. The essence of modern basic training is to stress quickly a group of recruits so that they will yield their individuality in favor of total

personal allegiance to a group. By contrast, eighteenth-century basic training slowly and steadily created one soldier at a time, calmly, gradually and individually.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

<sup>1</sup>This approach to explaining combat motivation is found in Gwynne Dyer, War (New York: Crown, 1985), 101-28.

<sup>2</sup>Dyer used the late twentieth century United States Marine Corps as a case study in his analysis.

<sup>3</sup>Orthodox eighteenth-century military theorists recognized linear tactics as the only proper way to deploy infantry. According to linear tactics, infantrymen maneuvered and fought shoulder to shoulder in large line formations.

<sup>4</sup>Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 96.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 118, 132.

<sup>6</sup>Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (New York: Atheneum, 1988), 104.

<sup>7</sup>Bennett Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Economy of a Battalion of Infantry (Dublin: B. Grierson, 1768), 32.

<sup>8</sup>J. G. Seume, "Memoir's of a Hessian Conscript: J. G. Seumes Reluctant Voyage to America," trans. Margarete Woelfel William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 5 (October 1948): 568-69. The manual of arms or "manual exercise" was the basics of handling, loading and firing a musket, the standard infantry small arm of the period.

<sup>9</sup>Duffy, Military Experience, 104; David Dundas, Principles of Military Movements, Chiefly Applied to Infantry (London: T. Cadell, 1788), 37-38; Richard Lambert, Earl of Cavan, A New System of Military Discipline Founded

Upon Principle (Philadelphia: R. Aitken, 1776), 28;  
Cuthbertson, System, 163-64.

<sup>10</sup>John O'Rourke, A Treatise on the Art of War (London: T. Spilsbury, 1778), 2.

<sup>11</sup>Duffy, Military Experience, 104.

<sup>12</sup>In the eighteenth-century British army, the standard administrative unit of infantry was the regiment. A regiment consisted of eight infantry or "line" companies, one grenadier company, and one light infantry company. A company normally consisted of thirty-six men. Grenadiers were a form of elite infantry.

<sup>13</sup>Richard Kane, A System of Camp-Discipline, Military Honours, Garrison-Duty, and Other Regulations for the Land Forces (London: J. Millan, 1757), 80.

<sup>14</sup>Thomas Sullivan, "The Common British Soldier: From the Journal of Thomas Sullivan, 49th Regiment of Foot," ed. Sydney Bradford, Maryland Historical Magazine 62 (September 1967): 223.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, 224.

<sup>16</sup>Cavan, New System, 28.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>18</sup>Campbell Dalrymple, A Military Essay (London: D. Wilson, 1761), 64.

<sup>19</sup>Kane, Camp-Discipline, 81.

<sup>20</sup>Cuthbertson, System, 153.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 155.



<sup>22</sup>Dyer, War, 103.

<sup>23</sup>Frey, British Soldier, 94.

<sup>24</sup>Samuel Bever, The Cadet: A Military Treatise (London: W. Johnston, 1762), 101.

<sup>25</sup>Cavan, New System, 29.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 30.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Thomas Simes, A Military Course for the Government and Conduct of a Battalion of Infantry (London: By the author, 1777), 180-81.

<sup>29</sup>Dyer, War, 107-108.

<sup>30</sup>Simes, Military Course, 155.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 174-75.

<sup>32</sup>Cuthbertson, System, 163, 4.

<sup>33</sup>Bever, Cadet, 110, 103.

<sup>34</sup>Seume, "Memoirs," 555-57.

<sup>35</sup>R[oger] Lamb, Memoir of His Own Life, by R. Lamb (Dublin: J. Jones, 1811), 62.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE  
PRIMARY GROUP TIES

After each recruit became a soldier, he had to function in his new environment and relate to his superiors and to the institution as a whole. He also had to relate to his comrades. Soldiers related to each other chiefly in the form of primary group ties. Though the eighteenth-century British army did not rapidly create small-unit esprit during basic training, the intensity of such ties played an important role in combat motivation. The military institution was set up so that primary ties would evolve and function as a source of motivation. The institution and its personnel from time to time helped create and reinforce the motivational capability of primary group ties.

To function as source of combat motivation, a primary group must first be cohesive. Cohesion arises chiefly from clear-cut goals. For soldiers in combat, most goals fall into two essential categories - survival of both the individual and the group and the achievement of the tactical objective. Few soldiers alone have the ability or will to accomplish a goal, but with the intense ties of a primary group, there is a collective capacity to act. <sup>1</sup>

The soldiers of eighteenth-century Britain formed pri-

mary groups with these characteristics and functions. British military theorists realized that soldiers rarely had the capacity to act alone in combat situations. Soldiers had to act and be led in groups. No one could be expected to face combat alone. The Comte Turpin de Criss wrote generally of the frailty of individuals when commenting on the proper method for assaulting entrenchments. Infantry forming for an attack should deploy under cover, so they would not be destroyed before they got a chance to attack. Turpin asserted: "The bravest soldier will be often disheartened when he sees himself exposed to blows which he has not in his power to return." <sup>2</sup> Thomas Simes also recognized that the sum of many individual efforts was not enough in combat. He cited Frederick the Great's advice that immediately before combat it was necessary "to familiarize the soldiers with the fire and bind them with regard to the danger." <sup>3</sup> Units, not a mass of individuals, fought battles. Not only did a soldier's bravery require leadership, it had to be a corporate effort. The Earl of Cavan wrote, "There can be no true valour, where there is not public spirit." <sup>4</sup>

Acting as part of a group was necessary because of the inherent uncertainty of battle. Historically, armed combat has been the most unpredictable and volatile type of human social interaction. <sup>5</sup> This was true for the army and sol-

diers of eighteenth-century Britain. Combat had an inherent uncertainty about it, and the bravery of any individual soldier could neither change nor mitigate that fact. Thomas Anburey, a British officer in the American Revolution, remarked: "The confusion of a man's ideas during the time of action, brave as he may be, is undoubtedly great." <sup>6</sup>

Primary group relations, that is, a network of strong reciprocal personal expectations, were necessary. Cohesion among the small group of soldiers was the key. Cohesion arose from the existence of clear-cut objectives. <sup>7</sup> Since the characteristic of combat most obvious to participants is its inherent danger, survival was an important goal. Matthew Bishop, a soldier in Webb's Regiment during the War of the Spanish Succession, recounted how he helped comrades survive the danger of siege conditions during the siege of Aire in 1710. Bishop and some comrades were in a detachment detailed to dig fieldworks and were constantly exposed to enemy artillery fire. Some men did not know how to take proper cover from incoming shells, but the more experienced Bishop taught them how. Bishop recalled: "Sometimes as we were working there would a Shell fall amongst the Midst of us, and blow up in a Moment. But for my Part, I knew how to deal with those terrible Engines, and prevailed upon some to do as I did; that was to fall down like one dead." <sup>8</sup>

Sergeant Roger Lamb also commented on the importance of

group survival as a goal. Lamb recounted the perilously frightening situation of the British forces crossing the Catawba during the skirmish at McCowan's Ford in February 1781. While some artillery crew were bringing their guns across the river, one man lost his grip and was swept away by the current. On the opposite bank were American infantry about to open fire. When the artillery crewman was swept downriver, Lamb immediately risked his own life to save him. Lamb recounted:

I knew that if this artillery man was either killed or drowned, his loss would be great indeed, as we had no man at hand that could supply his place in working the gun; this consideration darted through my mind in an instant, and I was determined to save his life or perish in the attempt. <sup>9</sup>

Ideally, however, soldiers had more to accomplish than simple survival. Lamb risked his own life to save that of his comrade, but he did so with a precise tactical objective in mind. Thus, primary groups had another clear-cut goal - achieving the tactical objective. To be an effective fighter, a soldier had to know for certain that he was a member of a unit. Combat was an extremely volatile and uncertain situation, but soldiers needed to feel they were

part of a group with clear objectives. Turpin de Criss advised generals to deploy troops before battle so that men would see exactly what they were to do. The general plan should be clear even to individual soldiers in the line.<sup>10</sup> Other theorists did not place as much faith in the ability of soldiers to reason clearly before battle,<sup>11</sup> but many agreed that soldiers had to feel they were part of a group with clear objectives.

Membership in primary groups helped motivate the soldiers of Hanoverian Britain in two general ways. First, soldiers in battle offered strong positive emotional support to each other. Second, the primary group threatened to apply negative sanctions to members who might stray. This combination of positive support and negative sanctions created a network of reciprocal expectations and loyalties. Each member of a primary group knew that his comrades were counting on him. A soldier knew his comrades would expect him not to run away, but he also knew that they would encourage him. At the same time, each soldier held similar expectations of his comrades.

Positive support could manifest itself in several ways. First, soldiers might use simple verbal encouragement. Even in the heat and confusion of battle a few words of reassurance might motivate men to carry on. During the crossing of the Catawba, Lamb recalled that when the artil-

leryman lost his grip, "At that very instant, I was bringing up the division that covered this gun, and encouraging the men to hold fast to one another, and not to be dismayed at the enemy's fire." 12

Likewise, Matthew Bishop verbally encouraged his comrades during a perilously frightening situation in the Battle of Malplaquet in 1709. Bishop's unit, closely engaged with French infantry, had just fired. Bishop recalled:

Then they returned our Volley with great Success. I may say it, for my right and left hand Man were shot dead, and in falling had almost thrown me down, for I could scarce prevent my falling among the dead Men. Then I said to the second Rank, "come my Boys, make good the Front." With that they drew up. Then I said, "never fear, we shall have better Luck the next Throw." 13

Another French volley felled both the man behind Bishop and the man on his right. Another soldier in the rear was called to move up to the front rank beside Bishop, but the man hesitated. Again, Bishop verbally encouraged his comrades:

By strong Persuasion I prevailed upon him, so that he

was not in the least daunted, but stood it out as bold as a Lion. We received a great many Vollies after that, and one time I remember it wounded my Captain and took my left hand Man, and almost swept off those that were on my Right, so that it left the Man that was intimidated, and myself alone. Then I said, "come, Partner, there is nothing like having good Courage." So we filled up our Ranks in a regular Form, and when we had so done, we fired on them briskly and with great Success. 14

More emotive group activities were also important. For example, singing together was a common way for soldiers to reassure one another. Singing was sometimes a practical impossibility during actual moments of combat, but units might march into battle singing. When describing the action around Hibbertown in 1777 Sergeant Lamb found it "not unworthy to observe that the German troops prepared for the conflict as they approached the field of battle by singing Psalms." 15 Similarly, Thomas Anburey described an episode in the action around Ticonderoga in July 1777 in which a detachment of American troops sent to support the rearguard of a retreating force went into action "singing Psalms on their advance, and at the same time kept up an incessant firing." 16



Soldiers might maintain reciprocal ties of loyalty in another way - the potential application of negative sanctions to members of the group. Such negative sanctions did not involve material things. Soldiers supported each other in combat because they wanted to maintain their reputations. If a man faced the danger of battle, he knew not only that his comrades would support him but that he would avoid their reproaches. Maintaining the respect of one's fellows was so important that the threat of losing respect helped motivate a man. Sergeant Lamb wrote, "The private soldier's and non-commissioned officer's good name and moral character are most precious to him, they constitute his best property." <sup>17</sup> Lamb probably was concerned with having a "good name" not only among a primary group of close friends and comrades but among his profession as a whole. However, he also meant that soldiers cared very much about what their immediate peers thought of them.

Military theorists recognized the desire of soldiers to meet the expectations of comrades. Military theorist Thomas Simes knew group loyalties bound soldiers together, and that each man's wish to avoid the group's negative sanctions helped motivate him to fight. Simes remarked in general instructions on assaulting fortifications:

The most favourable time for the making of an attack,

is in the day: for as the actions of every man will appear in full view, the brave, through a laudable emulation, will endeavor, at the expence of their lives, to out do one another; and even the fearful will exert themselves, by performing their duty, rather than bear the infamous name of coward; the fear of shame being generally more powerful than the fear of death. <sup>18</sup>

Another theorist, Count O'Rourke, agreed. He wrote that "soldiers should not keep any society with a comrade who has given any instance of timidity." O'Rourke went on to note prescriptively: "The French troops show a very nice sense of honour on these occasions; particularly the grenadiers, who never suffer a comrade who is suspected of cowardice, to rank with them. The well-disciplined troops of all nations ought to keep up the same principles." <sup>19</sup>

Thus the network of reciprocal expectations and shared loyalties of primary groups was a factor in the combat motivation of eighteenth-century British soldiers. Unlike modern armies, <sup>20</sup> however, the British military institution made no concerted effort during basic training rapidly to create a group identity. Instead, the British military institution was set up so that primary group ties naturally evolved. The very fact that men who served together shared

each other's lives inevitably led to the gradual formation of primary group ties. Group consciousness, on both the level of small primary groups and the larger level of regimental and organizational esprit, was bound to evolve in a tight-knit and socially insulated organization like the Hanoverian British army. 21

Basic training in the eighteenth-century British army did not have the explicit, intentional and calculated purpose of rapidly forging primary group loyalties among a group of recruits. However, certain elements of eighteenth-century military indoctrination were conducive to the evolution, if not the creation, of a man's loyalty to a primary group. The indoctrination process transformed civilians into soldiers gradually, gently, and one at a time. It instilled in them values of subordination and discipline. In so doing, the army ensured that new soldiers were properly integrated into their new environment. Integration included induction into the network of group loyalties.

The degree to which soldiers are successfully integrated into a primary group affects the success that the group ties will have in combat motivation. 22 The eighteenth-century British army did have means to assure sufficient integration. The gradual nature of the indoctrination process was not the only factor conducive to success-

ful integration. Soldiers themselves sought to ensure that all members of their cohesive group were well integrated. The verbal encouragement soldiers gave to each other in combat included acclimating new and less experienced men. Roger Lamb wrote of the new and less experienced soldier that "some confusion and lack of presence of mind must attach to every young soldier, but habit and the usage of fighting will soon supply coolness and self-possession in action." <sup>23</sup> One's comrades could assist in one's acquiring "the habit and usage of fighting." Lamb remembered of his own first combat experience in a skirmish around Three-Rivers, Canada in June 1776:

In order to encourage the young soldiers amongst us, some of the veterans who had been well used to this kind of work, said, "there is no danger if you hear the sound of the bullet, which is fired against you, you are safe, and after the first charge all your fears will be done away." These remarks I found to be perfectly true many a time afterwards. <sup>24</sup>

Thus the institution as a whole, and individual soldiers themselves, sought to secure the cohesiveness of primary groups through ensuring that members were properly integrated. Primary groups, with their network of recipro-

cal obligations and expectations, contributed significantly to the combat motivation of eighteenth-century British soldiers. Like primary groups among soldiers of other nations and eras, they had clear-cut objectives - survival and the tactical mission. Primary group ties existed in part because soldiers could not and, according to the theorists, should not face the danger of combat as individuals. Soldiers faced death and dying as a unit. Each man knew he should encourage his comrades with emotional support, and he expected them to do the same. Conversely, a soldier knew that if he faltered, he was letting down his comrades and forsaking a valued reputation. Primary groups motivated men to fight with a combination of positive encouragement and negative sanctions.

The British army of the eighteenth century did not rapidly subject a group of recruits to stressful indoctrination in order to create primary group ties. Instead, the institution and its members ensured that they evolved. The army as a whole and soldiers as individuals made certain that everyone was well integrated into the group. Years of long service together were conducive to the evolution of a group identity among a small group of comrades. When soldiers faced the peril of combat, they knew they did it together.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

<sup>1</sup>Anthony Kellet, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), 320-21.

<sup>2</sup>Lancelot, Comte de Turpin de Criss, An Essay on the Art of War, trans. Joseph Otway (London: W. Johnston, 1761), 1:188.

<sup>3</sup>Thomas Simes, The Military Medley (London: n.p., 1768), 119.

<sup>4</sup>Richard Lambart, Earl of Cavan, A New System of Military Discipline Founded Upon Principle (Philadelphia: R. Aitken, 1776), 256.

<sup>5</sup>Gwynne Dyer, War (New York: Crown, 1985), 132-36; Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 18.

<sup>6</sup>Thomas Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America (London: William Lane; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1969), 1: 333-334.

<sup>7</sup>Kellet, Motivation, 320-21.

<sup>8</sup>Matthew Bishop, The Life and Adventures of Matthew Bishop of Deddington in Oxfordshire (London: J. Brindley, 1744), 228.

<sup>9</sup>Roger Lamb, An Original and Authenic Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War (Dublin: Wilkinson and Courtney, 1809; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1969), 344.

- 10Turpin de Criss, Essay, 1:265.
- 11Humphrey Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline (London: S. Buckley, 1740), 142.
- 12Lamb, American War, 343.
- 13Bishop, Adventures, 211.
- 14Ibid.
- 15R[oger] Lamb, Memoir of His Own Life, by R. Lamb (Dublin: J. Jones, 1811), 174.
- 16Anburey, Travels, 1:329.
- 17Lamb, Memoir, 104.
- 18Simes, Medley, 97-98.
- 19Count John O'Rourke, A Treatise on the Art of War (London: T. Spilsbury, 1778), 6.
- 20Dyer, War, 101-28, explains combat motivation for all periods of Western history solely in terms of primary group loyalties. According to this approach, armies form primary group ties among soldiers during basic training. By subjecting a group of recruits to psychological stress, the new soldiers yield their individuality in favor of group loyalties. See above, pp. 8-9.
- 21Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 137.
- 22Kellet, Motivation, 321.

<sup>23</sup>Lamb, Memoir, 175.

<sup>24</sup>Lamb, American War, 107.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### LEADERSHIP

Soldiers faced the peril of combat not only with their comrades, but also with their leaders. The relationship between soldiers and their leaders in eighteenth-century Britain was important to the combat motivation of the former. Contemporary British military theorists themselves considered leadership important to combat motivation. Fundamental to military activity was the assumption that no one could expect soldiers to perform well unless they were properly led. In all eras, the very nature of combat has meant that men attempt to function in an inherently dysfunctional environment. <sup>1</sup> No army could undertake such difficult action on the sole basis of each man's individual initiative. No unit could reasonably be expected to function properly without a sense of central direction. Furthermore, each individual member of the unit could not be expected to do his part without the direction of a central personality. Tactician David Dundas wrote in the 1780's that soldiers will never "act with spirit and animation, when they have no reliance on the capacity of those that do conduct them." <sup>2</sup>

Leadership contributed to combat motivation primarily

through the force of example. Central to this idea were eighteenth-century military theorists' attitudes about the relationship during combat between officers and men. Soldiers composed the unit which engaged in the violence of armed combat. They were men capable of executing the tactical and strategic plans of generals and kings. For them to realize this capability, another type of person, the officer, had to exhort them and direct their potential. Officers were the managers, controllers, and directors of the soldiers and the violence which soldiers created. To be such, officers in turn had to be the managers, controllers and manipulators of soldiers' minds.

The idea of officers as directors of their men's violence is exemplified in the eighteenth-century British military community's concept of "courage." Hanoverian military thinkers often did not have a single concept to denote the ability to confront danger successfully. Rather, they conceptualized human reactions to danger in two different but related ways. First, there was what Comte de Turpin de Criss called "bravery." By this he meant impulsive, instinctive, but decisive action. Turpin asserted that "bravery" derived from "instinct" and "mechanical impulse." It was innate to persons who possessed it. Contrasting to this was what Turpin called "courage." It existed on a higher plane of reason. It was more of a "noble and sub-

lime conception." <sup>3</sup> It was more conscious than bravery and was founded in cool, collected contemplation. Turpin de Criss contrasted these two elements. He noted that they might exist together, but were nonetheless distinctive. Bravery was in the blood, but courage rose from the soul. Most important, bravery depended on the "force of example" while courage was inspired by duty and a sense of responsibility. <sup>4</sup>

This conception corresponded closely to the ideas of Turpin de Criss and others about the relationship between officers and men in combat. "Bravery" was the ideal quality of the soldier, while "courage" was the ideal quality of the officer. <sup>5</sup> Just as the reason of "courage" moderated, guided, and managed the force of "bravery," so should the officer's reason and coolness guide, and utilize to the greatest tactical advantage, the military force of soldiers in combat.

Samuel Bever echoed Turpin's conception of a division of the qualities which compose human ability to face danger. Bever recognized three rather than two qualities, but the basis by which he segregated the qualities had a similar rationale. He wrote that "Bravery . . . depends upon the Mechanism of the Body." To Bever, "Valour" consisted of "Bravery," "that lively Ardour which fires us for combat," "Reason," which "points out to us the method for conducting

it with justice and prudence," and "Force," which was "necessary for the Execution." <sup>6</sup> Bever did not explicitly say that raw force was the province of the soldier and reason the duty of the officer, but his conception was nonetheless similar to that of Turpin de Criss.

Officers, with their qualities of reason and coolness, led by example, so as to bring out and manage effectively the force of soldiers. The "force of example" was the inspiration of Turpin's "bravery." "Bravery" was an involuntary reaction, and "depends not at all upon ourselves." <sup>7</sup> Military success clearly demanded that officers demonstrate resolution in the face of danger. By setting an example of coolness and calm, the officer could effectively manipulate military force.

The first element in leadership by example was consciousness of the follower's attitudes. Officers in combat had to be sensitive to what soldiers thought and felt. An officer should pay close attention to the most subtle indications of the men's state of mind as they went into action. Turpin de Criss recommended monitoring minute indicators such as facial expressions. <sup>8</sup> The officer had to monitor the soldiers' sensibilities so closely because he, as leader, was the lynch-pin of the unit's operations. Any tactical setback could degenerate into catastrophe if panic or distress spread. Soldiers seldom analyzed a tac-

tical situation objectively. Instead, they sometimes acted from subjective impressions or impulse. <sup>9</sup>

Humphrey Bland, a celebrated military thinker of Hanoverian Britain, explained the difficulty a general faced when his first line gave way. In the event of such a reverse, the correct course of action was to engage immediately with the reserve second line. But the contagion of panic among soldiers could make this difficult. Bland wrote:

The greatest Difficulty which we have to struggle with on these Occasions, does not proceed so much from a Real as an Imaginary Danger: For when the Men of the second Line perceive those of the First give way, they are apt to form to themselves vast Idea's [sic] of the Enemy, which, by working strongly on the imagination, become so terrible, that, by the Time they approach near, they frequently betake themselves to a shameful Flight, or make but a weak Resistance. <sup>10</sup>

Count O'Rourke also recognized the danger which panic posed. He wrote, "The loss of men is not the greatest evil in a defeat, but rather the panic which seizes troops in consequence of it." If an army did become dispirited, wrote O'Rourke, then "a long time is necessary to revive"

its courage. 11

Therefore, the officer had to be a bastion of calmness in a situation ripe for disaster. If the officer could exemplify fortitude, soldiers could probably function adequately in combat. Humphrey Bland explained: "Private Soldiers, when they are to go upon Action, form their Notions of the Dangers from the outward Appearance of their Officers; and according to their Looks apprehend the Undertaking to be more or less difficult." Good officers, according to Bland, were aware of this and consequently, to "fortify their Courage, the Officers should assume a serene and cheerful Air." 12

Officers could provide this sense of direction, stability, and coolness in the face of peril in a number of ways. They could generally maintain a certain type of close relationship with their men, while also undertaking specific actions. One overriding factor in the officer's stabilizing effect was the existence of patron-client relationships between the officers and men of a unit. The close ties among the personnel of a unit - officers, NCOs and men - were like familial ties. 13 In this sense the military institution tended to become somewhat unique in the social structure of eighteenth-century Britain. In traditional agrarian English society, patron-client relationships were at one time common in many aspects of daily life. For

example, domestic servants were part of their employer's establishment. However, as the eighteenth century progressed, that element of English society began to weaken. Englishmen of all classes, particularly the poor, could depend progressively less on the security of patron-client relationships.<sup>14</sup> In this scenario of growing uncertainty, the military institution provided a haven of familial security. In the army, soldiers could find a refuge from the increasingly impersonal and harsh civilian world. The family spirit of a military unit animated all aspects of military life. Most important, it contributed to the psychological sustenance of soldiers in combat.

One element of the patron-client relationship was the officer's responsibility for the welfare of his men. Bennett Cuthbertson, commenting on military life in general, asserted that officers are "a sort of Guardians to the men in their respective Companies."<sup>15</sup> In combat situations especially, the officer had a distinct responsibility not to place men in unnecessary peril. Being a manager of violence did not authorize the indiscriminate use of force. Turpin de Criss wrote "it is a great inhumanity in a general to expose troops which he can place in security."<sup>16</sup> Count O'Rourke agreed, claiming that "To spill a soldier's blood to no purpose, is a kind of barbarous slaughter."<sup>17</sup> Officers could lead men to perform by setting an appropri-

ate example, but they had a sort of paternal responsibility for their men's welfare. If they fell short of this responsibility, no one could reasonably expect soldiers to follow and do their duty. Leadership by example motivated men; indiscretion eroded their motivation. David Dundas summed up this belief when he asserted that:

what we have a right to expect from a soldier is undaunted bravery in the first attack; but obstacles unsurmountable are not to be thrown in his way. - After a repulse, perserverance depends on circumstances; where there is not a great probability of prevailing, the multitude will not greatly exert themselves . . . the many must have their prospect of success pretty apparent; every method must be taken to ensure it, by order, discipline and example. 18

Dundas' reference to "order, discipline and example" indicates another element of the paternal relationship of officers to men. Officers motivated men in combat with their potential to apply both positive and negative sanctions. Example was positive, but discipline, with the threat of punishment, could be negative. Count O'Rourke wrote, "soldiers in general never do their duty except when animated by the presence of their commanders, or influenced



by fear of punishment." 19 Turpin de Criss also favored using the potential application of both positive and negative sanctions. He asserted that a general must know both to "encourage the soldiers by hopes of rewards, and by motives which may spirit them up, and to threaten those who are so unmanly as to tremble at the sight of an enemy of rash enough to run forwards without an order." 20

Maintaining a paternal relationship with soldiers was the general means by which an officer provided the necessary stability and coolness in the danger of combat. Officers could also undertake specific actions which might reinforce their image as cool, collected leaders. For instance, leadership by example might require an officer to give a pep-talk to his unit before it went into battle. In fact such pre-combat orations by a commander were commonplace in eighteenth-century European military practice. It was usually physically and technologically impractical for a commander-in-chief to address an entire army, but he could at least ride up and down the line, perhaps waving to or hailing particular officers and men. 21 General Howe is said to have addressed the three thousand man British force at Breed's Hill in June 1775 immediately prior to the first assault. Howe said,

Gentlemen: I am very happy in having the honour of

commanding so fine a band of men. I do not in the least doubt but that you will behave like Englishmen, and as becometh good soldiers . . . I shall not desire one of you to go a step further than where I go myself at your head. <sup>22</sup>

On the regimental level and lower, extensive orations were possible, <sup>23</sup> but the speech did not have to be exceptionally lengthy or verbose. Thomas Anburey recollected that on one occasion in the Seven Years War, an officer made the following simple but effective speech: "There, my brave lads, there's the enemy, and, by God, if you do not kill them, they'll kill you." <sup>24</sup> Whatever the form and style, the intended effect was similar. By addressing troops personally the paternal figure of the officer could demonstrate his reassuring role as the calm, reasoning director of battle.

The ideal role of the officer in combat motivation was to be the rational manager of the soldiers' violence. By setting an example, and demonstrating confidence in the face of danger, he would help persuade soldiers to endure the danger of armed combat. To a considerable degree this ideal was realized. Roger Lamb, who served as a sergeant in the 23d Regiment of Foot, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, in the American Revolution, confirmed in his memoirs many of

the theorists' ideals. To some extent, Lamb recognized the distinction between plain physical force and a more subjective, guiding determination. Lamb wrote in verse:

Not noise, nor number nor the brawny limb,  
Nor high built size prevails: Tis courage fights,  
'Tis courage conquers. 25

The guiding force of this courage was the officer. With a paternal presence, he could lead soldiers on to military success. The ideal commander inspired soldiers to withstand the rigors of combat by his example of cool reason and resolution. In Lamb's opinion General John Burgoyne met this ideal in his conduct at the battle of Freeman's Farm in September 1777. Lamb asserted:

General Burgoyne during this conflict behaved with great personal bravery, he shunned no danger; his presence and conduct animated the troops, (for they greatly loved the general;) he delivered his orders with precision and coolness; and in the heat, fury and danger of the fight maintained those true characteristics of the soldier - serenity, fortitude and undaunted intrepidity. 26

Soldiers like Lamb thought so highly of Burgoyne because, with his "serenity, fortitude and undaunted intrepidity," he seemed to represent the theoretical ideal officer.

Lamb also remembered the inspiring leadership of Lieutenant Colonel James Webster of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers during a pause in the fierce action at Guilford Court House in March 1781. The regiment charged some American infantry behind a rail fence. When the British closed to within forty yards, they saw the whole of the American line poised to fire. Lamb recalled:

At his awful period a general pause took place; both parties surveyed each other for the moment with the most anxious suspense. Nothing speaks, the general more than seizing on decisive moments: colonel Webster rode forward in front of the 23rd regiment, and said, with more than his usual commanding voice (which was well known to his Brigade,) "Come on, my brave Fuzi-leers." This operated like an inspiring voice, they rushed forward amidst the enemy's fire; dreadful was the havoc on both sides. 27

By exhibiting resolution in the face of danger, Webster helped inspire Lamb and his comrades to carry on.

Private Thomas Sullivan of the 49th Regiment of Foot also testified to the importance of leadership as a motivating factor. For Sullivan, General William Howe's and General Sir Henry Clinton's conduct in the assault on Breed's Hill in June 1775 contributed to the eventual British success. Sullivan wrote, "The conduct of Major-General Howe was conspicuous in this occasion, and his example spirited the troops, in which Major-General Clinton assisted, who followed the reinforcement." 27

Corporal William Todd of the 12th Regiment of Foot remembered the effectiveness of leadership by example. Shortly before Todd's unit went into action in battle of Vellinghausen in Westphalia in July 1761, the commander, Lord Granby, inspired his soldiers by showing solidarity with them and projecting an image of calm, resolute courage. Todd remembered, "Lord Granby wrapt himself in his great coat and lay down upon the ground amongst us which greatly encouraged our men although we were in the greatest wants of alsorts [sic] of Necessaries at this time & expecting to engage every moment." 28

Johann Conrad Dhla, an Ansbach-Bayreuth soldier in the British service in the American Revolution testified to the reassuring conduct of Captain Ludwig Heinrich Vollrath von Erckert of the Ansbach Grenadier Company in the assault on Fort Montgomery, New York in October 1777. Dhla narrated:

Captain von Erckert, with his company and the Hessian Grenadier Battalion, pressed through with fixed bayonets, even though many people fell. When he was already at the third battery [of the fort], Captain von Erckert received a discharge of grape that shattered his right arm. This caused him to fall, but he raised himself, took his sword in his left hand, exhorting and calling his grenadiers with these words: "Be consoled and undisturbed my children. I still lead you bravely on and will not leave you. Only press forward! Keep your honor, keep your courage!" With these and other words he steadfastly urged his troops on. 29

British soldiers of the earlier years of the eighteenth century also testified to the effectiveness of leadership by example. Matthew Bishop remembered the dangerous conditions his unit endured in the trenches during the siege of Aire in 1710 during the War of the Spanish Succession. Bishop and his comrades suffered, but as he later recollected:

Neither did we want for Encouragement; for his Royal Highness the Prince of Hannau would walk backward and forward in the Trenches, and say, "Come, brave English-

men, I am determined not to have this Beard cut off, till such Time as the Town surrenders." Reader, I leave you to judge, whether it was not a fine black Beard of ten Weeks Growth. But by that Means he enlivened our Men, and it rendered them capable of doing their Duty to Admiration. 30

Leadership in both theory and practice could be an important factor in the combat motivation of eighteenth-century British soldiers. In the military institution, a soldier could find the security of family-like patron-client relationships, things already becoming less accessible in other elements of English society. In battle, the soldier's role was to exude "bravery" and be the embodiment of violent military force. It was the officer's duty to see that the soldier's abilities were fully realized and properly applied. No one expected a soldier to engage in combat on the sole basis of his individual initiative. To function in combat, soldiers needed the officer, the rational manager of military force, who could inspire and direct him through exemplification of martial virtue and confident resolution.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

<sup>1</sup>Gwynne Dyer, War (New York: Crown, 1985), 132-36.

<sup>2</sup>David Dundas, Principles of Military Movements, Chiefly Applied to Infantry (London: T. Cadell, 1788), 23-24.

<sup>3</sup>Lancelot, Comte de Turpin de Criss, An Essay on the Art of War, trans. Joseph Otway (London: W. Johnston, 1761), 1:iv.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Samuel Bever, The Cadet: A Military Treatise (London: W. Johnston, 1756), 184.

<sup>7</sup>Turpin de Criss, Essay, 1:v.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 1:268.

<sup>9</sup>Humphrey Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline (London: S. Buckley, 1740), 143.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 142.

<sup>11</sup>Count John O'Rourke, A Treatise on the Art of War (London: T. Spilsbury, 1778), 120.

<sup>12</sup>Bland, Treatise, 144.

<sup>13</sup>Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social



History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 109, 120.

<sup>14</sup>Derek Jarrett, England in the Age of Hogarth (New York: The Viking Press, 1974), 162-63.

<sup>15</sup>Bennett Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Economy of a Battalion of Infantry (Dublin: S. Grierson, 1768), 192-93.

<sup>16</sup>Turpin de Criss, Essay, 1;188.

<sup>17</sup>O'Rourke, Treatise, 107.

<sup>18</sup>Dundas, Principles, 24.

<sup>19</sup>O'Rourke, Treatise, 101.

<sup>20</sup>Turpin de Criss, Essay, 1:264.

<sup>21</sup>Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (New York: Atheneum), 194; Frey, British Soldier, 127.

<sup>22</sup>Charles Hibbert, Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution Through British Eyes (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), 51.

<sup>23</sup>Frey, British Soldier, 127.

<sup>24</sup>Thomas Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America (London: William Lane, 1784; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1969), 1:298.

<sup>25</sup>Roger Lamb, An Original and Authenic Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War (Dublin: Wilkinson and Courtney, 1809; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1968), 160.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 161.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 361.

<sup>27</sup>Thomas Sullivan, "The Common British Soldier: From the Journal of Thomas Sullivan, 49th Regiment of Foot," ed. Sydney Bradford, Maryland Historical Magazine 62 (September 1967): 234.

<sup>28</sup>William Todd, "The Journal of Corporal Todd, 12th Foot: Written-over and Finished by his Daughter, Peggie Todd, 29 April 1774," quoted in Sir Reginald Savory, His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany During the Seven Years War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 323.

<sup>29</sup>Johann Conrad Dhla, A Hessian Diary of the American Revolution, trans. Bruce E. Burgoyne (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 52.

<sup>30</sup>Matthew Bishop, The Life and Adventure of Matthew Bishop of Deddington in Oxfordshire (London: J. Brindley, 1744), 228.

CHAPTER FIVE  
INSTITUTIONAL ESPRIT

Although soldiers required the guidance of an officer and his resolute martial virtue, they still held their own notions of military honor. Eighteenth-century British soldiers had a sense of the uniqueness of their vocation and a belief in its importance. This conception resulted in an important relationship between an individual soldier and the military institution as a whole. This relationship affected combat motivation. The personnel of the British army of the eighteenth century, both officers and men, knew that they played a distinct role in their society. Soldiers have always been different from every other social group. In its essential elements, their vocation involves death and dying.<sup>1</sup> Esprit and group loyalty existed among members of primary groups, but also existed on higher levels. There was a sense of belonging on the regimental level, and on the level of the institution as a whole. Being a soldier meant being a member of a distinct, select group.

In the context of the whole of eighteenth-century British society, the army did not enjoy a particularly prestigious position. English political culture had within it

deeply rooted mistrust of, and antagonism towards, professional armies. Many in England looked upon the army as a barely necessary evil, something to be rarely praised and usually despised. <sup>2</sup> Any sentiments of martial glory were reserved for the institutionally distinct navy. <sup>3</sup> The result was such that the army was a socially isolated institution. It came to be a virtually self-contained society. <sup>4</sup>

Members of the military institution itself felt the army deserved considerable respect. The very isolation of the army fostered an almost elitist pride. The army made efforts to reaffirm its virtue to itself, and prove it the rest of British society. The most basic elements of military life involved the sense of uniqueness and pride which officers and soldiers felt. For example, the wearing of uniforms had as part of its purpose to demonstrate a sense of military pride, both to soldiers and civilians. The Earl of Cavan asserted that the purpose of military dress for a soldier was "to characterize him in his profession" and "to give reputation to the service in which he is engaged." <sup>5</sup> Theorist Bennett Cuthbertson also believed that soldiers should be proud of their station. The army should demonstrate and live up to the expectations of that pride in its dealings with the rest of society. Cuthbertson noted, for example, that "a recruiting party should, by

a remarkable neatness in their dress, and always appearing with the air of formed soldiers, draw on themselves the attention of the country people" so as to "merit their esteem." According to Cuthbertson, this was the best way for soldiers to "do honour to the Corps they serve in." <sup>6</sup> Likewise, Cuthbertson advised that officers forbid soldiers under their command to take on outside jobs of a menial or degrading nature. Such employment might "reflect dishonour on the Regiment, or lessen that character, which every soldier of spirit should endeavor, by his conduct, to establish in the opinion of the Publick."<sup>7</sup> Although "the Publick" may not have in actuality given the army much appreciation, the military institution felt it deserved Britain's esteem.

Not only did the army expect others to recognize its unique station in society, it expected its own members to recognize and live up to the theorist's ideals of martial virtue. The relationships between officers and men were like familial ties, and the relations among men in a primary group were similar. The social isolation of the army as a whole even conferred on soldiers and officers a family-like spirit which encompassed the entire institution. Officers and men might be separated, at least formally, by wide social distances. Likewise, there were differences in economic station or ethnic background. <sup>8</sup> Superceeding all

of these differences was something they all held in common, which they recognized as of overriding importance. Regardless of the differences, in the end they were all soldiers.

Such institutional esprit was a durable and strong force, even in stressful situations. For example, even during the criminal proceedings of a court martial, everyone remembered that they shared the fundamental identity of a soldier. Sergeant Roger Lamb remarked of military tribunals:

What must be the military judge's mind in trying a man, whom the habits of his honourable profession makes him look even at the bar of offended majesty and justice, as his brother in some degree, beholding before him one who accompanies him in the field of battle, where fortitude, that faithful partnership which puts by the distinction and punctilios of civil life, builds up a relationship disinterested and durable. <sup>9</sup>

Institutional esprit was so durable and pervasive it contributed to combat motivation. A man's pride in his identity as a soldier helped fortify him to endure the danger and stress of combat. Ideally, every member of the institution was to be imbued with such esprit. Roger Lamb pointed out that "honour" and "virtue" were not the exclu-

sive reserve of the gentleman officer, as Lamb suspected some might think. Rather, Lamb claimed:

It is very properly attempted to inspire the soldiery through all the gradations of the army with an ardent spirit of propriety and self-estimation. This consciousness of fidelity and manly dignity, awakens and cherishes ingenuous sentiments in the breasts of individuals, which neither danger nor difficulty can subdue. 10

Institutional esprit, Lamb's "ingenuous sentiment," helped inspire men to fight in several ways. First, it created and reinforced a sense of the soldier's unique place in society. The army was the only social institution in Britain whose official role included engaging in the ferocity of armed combat. 11 The uniqueness and singularity of their job made the soldiers of eighteenth-century Britain, like the soldiers of other times and places, different from everyone else. 12 Part of being a soldier meant enduring combat. Conversely, soldiers were the only type of people really capable of doing so. Roger Lamb noted the uniqueness of soldiery. Lamb believed that levies or irregular forces might sometimes enjoy success in battle, but continual success required the training of a

professional soldier able to endure the hardest tests of battle. Lamb claimed: "all new levies become unsteady, until the habit of fighting confers firmness of nerve and possession of mind, and above all things presence of mind must be possessed by soldiers." <sup>13</sup>

Consequently, part of the military institution's standard of conduct, both formal and informal, was enduring combat. Soldiers were conscious of this expectation. Stephen Popp, an Ansbach-Bayreuth soldier in the British service during the American Revolution, remarked approvingly of his American enemies in the battle at Elizabethtown, New Jersey in June 1780 that they "stood up manfully like good soldiers." <sup>14</sup> There was a sort of professional standard which soldiers met by facing the danger of battle.

Such a professional standard is related to another way in which institutional esprit contributed to combat motivation. Just as members of a primary group were concerned with what their comrades thought of them, so on a larger scale were soldiers concerned that they behaved as everyone in the military institution agreed that they should. Similar to the dynamics of primary group relations, the institution as a whole encouraged soldiers to behave properly with both positive encouragement and negative sanctions.

Just as the positive encouragement and negative sanctions of primary group relations were not of a material



nature, so neither were the rewards and penalties which the military institution as a whole offered. Soldiers were concerned with their reputations. The emphasis was less on what the soldier thought of himself than on what colleagues and superiors thought of him. Stephen Adye, a theorist on the military justice system, asserted generally of military life that "rewards are not considered according to the intrinsic value of what may be given as such. The bare thanks of a monarch or a general, are of greater value to a truly noble and patriotic soldier, than the greatest pecuniary rewards that can be heaped on him." <sup>15</sup>

Just as there were rewards, there could be penalties. If a soldier did not live up to the standards of his profession, he would be out of place in the whole military institution. Since one of the most important professional standards was to be able to face battle, a man's concern for his professional credibility contributed to his motivation in combat. Thomas Simes recognized the importance of institutional esprit, and the use of negative sanctions, as a means of maintaining it. Simes claimed that a soldier "must have an ambition; [he must] learn to despise danger, and prefer to fall like a brave man, rather than be branded with the name of a coward." <sup>16</sup> Soldiers had a sense of their professional identity and their desire to live up to its standards contributed to their motivation in combat.

Institutional esprit, besides providing soldiers with a sense of their profession's uniqueness and standards, contributed to combat motivation in a third way. The military institution of Hanoverian Britain, with a family-like spirit on several levels, provided a socially secure environment for its personnel in an era of growing social insecurity. It was thus imbued with a deep sense of tradition and conservative solidarity. Soldiers knew they were socially secure. This benefit was of such value that they were willing to accept the most dangerous aspect of their job - fighting battles. Men might develop over years of service a sense of tradition, perhaps even nostalgia, for military life. Such sensibilities helped make men willing to face the danger of combat. Thomas Simes recognized the strength of a man's attachment to the military institution when he commented on the re-enlistment of veterans. When long-service veterans' terms of service were expired, a cash bounty combined with "the common attachment to their corps, may impel them to engage again; and their respect for the banners under which they have been victorious, with the expectation of a pension, may incline them to voluntary service." <sup>17</sup> To become victorious under any banner, a man had at some point to face the danger of battle. A sense of attachment, enhanced by tradition, might inspire him to face such danger consistently.

The soldiers of eighteenth-century Britain were imbued with an institutional esprit. Men formed close bonds of loyalty among themselves on the primary group level, and with their officers. Yet the institution as a whole fostered among all its personnel a sense of belonging and common identity. Such institutional esprit contributed to combat motivation in several ways. First, it instilled in soldiers a sense of the uniqueness of their profession. Soldiers fought battles in part because they knew a battle could be fought only by soldiers. Second, when soldiers had sense of institutional esprit, they became aware of the standards of their profession and strove to live up to them. If they tried hard, their colleagues and superiors would encourage them. If they wavered, they forsook their reputations. Last, institutional esprit created in soldiers a sense of tradition and constancy. A man fought in a battle in part because he knew soldiers had done so before and would do so again. Being a soldier meant being different from everyone else. Soldiers fought battles. When man faced combat, he did so with a strong sense of professional identity and institutional allegiance.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

<sup>1</sup>Gwynne Dyer, War (New York: Crown, 1985), 132-33.

<sup>2</sup>Derek Jarrett, England in the Age of Hogarth (New York: Viking Press, 1974), 38-45, 49-53.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 45-46.

<sup>4</sup>Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 94, 133.

<sup>5</sup>Richard Lambart, Earl of Cavan, A New System of Military Discipline Founded Upon Principle (Philadelphia: R. Aitken, 1776), 9-10.

<sup>6</sup>Bennett Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Economy of a Battalion of Infantry (Dublin: B. Grierson, 1768), 76.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 185.

<sup>8</sup>British infantry regiments in the eighteenth century might be composed of a significant proportion of Scots and Irishmen. For example, of the over 1500 recruits entering into the 58th Foot between 1756 and 1800, almost 25 percent were Irish. Frey, British Soldier, 10.

<sup>9</sup>R[oger] Lamb, Memoir of His Own Life, by R. Lamb (Dublin: J. Jones, 1811), 106.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 105.

<sup>11</sup>For analytical purposes the navy may be excluded from this consideration. Naval combat has always been

structurally different from set-piece land battles. At sea, combatants are in a self-contained physical environment, and may engage each other at relatively long distances. Human factors, including combat motivation, may be less important than technical factors in determining the outcome of a naval engagement. Dyer, War, 137.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 136.

<sup>13</sup>Lamb, Memoir, 196.

<sup>14</sup>Stephen Popp, "Popp's Journal, 1777-1783," ed. Joseph G. Rosengarten, Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 26 (1902): 35.

<sup>15</sup>Stephen Adye, A Treatise on Courts Martial (New York: H. Gaine, 1769), 272-73.

<sup>16</sup>Thomas Simes, A Military Course for the Government and Conduct of a Battalion of Infantry (London: By the author, 1777), 213.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 161.

## CONCLUSIONS

A number of factors contributed to the motivation of eighteenth-century British soldiers in combat. The close ties of primary group relationships, leadership by example, institutional esprit and a sense of professional identity all helped motivate men to face the danger of armed combat. Transcending all these factors are some common themes. They reveal the nature of the army's social structure and the characteristics and role of soldiering as a vocation. First, the army of eighteenth-century Great Britain contained a network of relationships similar to that of an extended family. Second, within this context, the soldier of eighteenth-century Britain was a status-conscious professional, who was sensitive to what his colleagues and superiors did and what they thought of him. When soldiers acted upon their sensibilities, within the psychologically secure environment of familial ties, they received the inspiration and motivation to face the danger of battle.

When a man joined the army, he entered a completely new environment. <sup>1</sup> It was a world which offered a strong sense of social security. It offered relatively good physical security, but more importantly, it offered strong emotional support and psychological security. The army was socially

isolated. Despite the fact that the army itself felt it deserved better, the rest of English society held the military institution in low regard. A new recruit joined a new world, but its isolation gave it the atmosphere of a tight-knit family.

The first element of the familial spirit of the army was the way in which a man entered it. The military institution demonstrated a concern for the security of its newest members in the theoretical layout of its indoctrination process. The army made civilians into soldiers one at a time. Basic training emphasized gradual, gentle and individual indoctrination. In this way, the army ensured that its new members were successfully integrated. The army crafted each soldier individually, and it valued each one, as a family might value its progeny. Indoctrination could be gradual and individual and still include the inculcation of subordination. Like members of an extended family, soldiers had to remember their place and the nature of their relationship with their colleagues and superiors.

The relationship between soldiers and officers is a second important element of the army's familial spirit. The indoctrination process carefully created a soldier, integrated him into his new environment, and taught him "a due deference to [his] [s]uperiors." <sup>2</sup> Along with such deference came the more subtle guarantees of a special kind

of relationship with his superiors. Officers and soldiers related to each other in patron-client relationships. Like elders and progeny of an extended family, each had responsibilities to and expectations of the other. Officers expected soldiers to be the manifestation of armed force. Soldiers expected officers to lead by example and be the embodiment of cool, reasoned, martial virtue.

Soldiers had family-like ties with their colleagues as well as with their superiors. Just as members of an extended family develop primary ties as they live together, so did soldiers develop them. Unlike modern armies, the eighteenth-century British army did not intentionally create the psychological foundations of primary ties during basic training. Such ties developed almost by nature, as they would in a family-like institution. The primary group ties formed among eighteenth-century British soldiers were cohesive, and the institution and its personnel sought to assure the successful integration of members of the group. Primary group ties require time and prolonged contact between people to develop. For the same reasons primary ties develop in an extended family, they developed among the soldiers of eighteenth-century Britain. <sup>3</sup>

The largest level on which familial ties existed was among the members of the institution as a whole. Officers and soldiers had a sophisticated sense of their profes-



sional identity. Just as the solidarity of an extended family arises from its common kinship and ancestry, so did an institutional esprit permeate the ranks of the eighteenth-century British army. Soldiers knew they pursued a vocation very different from any other in their society. With this knowledge came a sense of exclusive pride, regardless of the actual sentiments of English society towards the army. In fact, the socially isolated military institution could not help but develop a sense of institutional esprit and recognition of the significance and standards of professional soldiery.

The eighteenth-century British army, as a social institution, contained a network of family-like relationships. Within this context, its enlisted personnel lived, fought, and sometimes died. Underlying all the complex relationships of the army's personnel were some fundamental characteristics of the soldier. Within the army's network of familial relationships and reciprocal expectations soldiers were conscious and reactive to the demands of their social environment. When the army created a soldier from a civilian and instilled discipline in him, it made an individual who would be responsive to the expectations of his new social environment.

Under the ideals of contemporary military theory, soldiers were the personification of military force. If com-

bat was the application of military violence to achieve a tactical end, the soldiers were the living applicators. However, they retained a sense of social consciousness. Soldiers reacted to officers. When a commander displayed the requisite ideal of calm, reasoned resolution in the face of danger, soldiers saw this and were spurred onward. Soldiers reacted to each other. In the tight-knit society of the army, primary groups formed, and with them came reciprocal expectations. Conscious of their responsibilities to each other, soldiers endeavored to live up to them in the danger of battle. Soldiers also recognized a broader, more widely held set of expectations. With a sense of their profession's uniqueness and standards, soldiers reacted to institutional expectations.

All such reaction took place within the psychologically secure social environment of the army. It was within the context of a close-knit, isolated institution, with the spirit of an extended family, that soldiers consciously reacted to all these influences. When they did so, they received the inspiration and drive to endure the rigors of armed combat. The brute force of physical coercion was certainly a part of army life in the eighteenth century. However, combat motivation arose not from the simple threat of physical violence, but from a more complex set of social relationships among the personnel of a unique institution.

When the soldiers of Hanoverian Britain faced the deadly peril of battle, they were reacting to a complex and interlocking network of personal and institutional expectations. Soldiers fought from the inspiration of their officers and for the respect of their colleagues and themselves.

## NOTES TO CONCLUSIONS

<sup>1</sup>Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 118, 132.

<sup>2</sup>Richard Lambart, Earl of Cavan, A New System of Military Discipline Founded Upon Principle (Philadelphia: R. Aitken, 1776), 29.

<sup>3</sup>Primary group ties develop in families because the latter provides an epitome of the environment which primary ties require to develop: relatively limited membership, continuous face-to-face contact, and informal relations not based on role or status. Jon M. Shepard, Sociology, 3d. ed. (New York: West Publishing Co., 1987), 145-47.

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mark H. Danley". The signature is written in a cursive style with a prominent loop at the end of the last name.